Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume XX

Southeast Asia, 1969–1972

United States Government Printing Office

Washington

U.S. Department of State

Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

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Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of State

June 2018

Contents

Preface

Sources

Abbreviations and Terms

Persons

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

Southeast Asia (Documents 115-185)

Thailand (Documents 1-114)

Philippines (Documents 186-265)

Indonesia (Documents 266-332)

Index

Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The sub-series presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This specific volume documents U.S. policy towards three important countries of Southeast Asia: Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, 1969–1972, a period when the future of Southeast Asia was a major concern of American foreign policy makers.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

This is the last print volume to document U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia, other than those print volumes that document the Vietnam War during the Nixon–Ford administrations. For the January 1973 to January 1977 period, U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia (nations other than Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) is covered in an electronic-only volume. The decision to cover Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia for 1969–1972 in detail in this print volume was based on the fact that each country was a key ally—either formally or de facto—of the United States during the Vietnam war, and each played a specific role during the conflict. Thailand sent troops to fight in Vietnam, provided bases for U.S. airpower in Southeast Asia, and secretly provided training, troops, and arms to support U.S.-backed guerrilla forces in Laos. The Philippines sent a 2,000-man civic action group to South Vietnam, and Filipinos made up many of the administrative contractors in South Vietnam. Indonesia provided key arms support to the Lon Nol government at a crucial time. In addition, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia were important countries in their own right, with key U.S. military and economic assistance programs, large embassies, and close relations with the United States. In each country, the United States had a considerable interest in their government's success.

The chapter on Thailand, the largest in the volume, has the most obvious and closest associations with the Vietnam war. A principal theme of this chapter is U.S. efforts to assure the Thais that unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and a projected settlement of the war did not mean a lesser U.S. commitment to Thailand. These efforts were difficult due to congressional investigations into the U.S. relationship with Thailand and charges that there were secret understandings and commitments. Another development that concerned the Thais was the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which led them to think that the United States was withdrawing from the area. A second key theme of the volume is the covert military role that Thailand's military forces played in supporting the anti-communist forces in Laos and the potential role they could play in supporting the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. The presence of the Thai Division fighting in Vietnam and whether it could be used elsewhere is yet another related theme. As U.S. troops withdrew from South Vietnam, Thailand, after some consideration, moved to draw down its own forces. Other themes covered in the chapter are less directly related to the conflict in Indochina: the fate of parliamentary government in Thailand, U.S. economic and military assistance, U.S. concern over the insurgency in northeast Thailand, rice sales, imports of Thai textiles to the United States, and efforts to prevent drug production and interdict drug trafficking in Thailand.

The second largest chapter in this volume documents U.S. policy towards the Philippines. The relationship between President Ferdinand Marcos and the Nixon administration is the dominant theme of this chapter. U.S. officials had to assure Marcos that they were neutral in the 1969 Philippines presidential elections and discourage his desire for a special channel to Washington. Corruption in the Marcos government, Marcos's desire to revise the constitution to his benefit, and his eventual declaration of martial law in September 1972 in the face of student riots caused U.S. officials in Manila and Washington to assess whether he was the best man to lead the Philippines from the U.S. point of view. It was in Washington's interest to have “more flags in South Vietnam,” so the fate of the Philippines Civic Action Group in South Vietnam was a key issue between Washington and Manila. The Group's fate was affected both by general U.S.-Philippines relations, the unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, and U.S. congressional hearings on U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia. Other themes that are documented in the chapter are ones that predate the Vietnam war, such as preference for Philippines exports to the United States, U.S. benefits for Filipino veterans who served in the Second World War, and U.S. bases in the Philippines. The seriousness and threat of insurgency in Central Luzon was an emerging concern. Finally, President Nixon's insistence that U.S. armed forces stationed in the Philippines be drastically cut caused considerable bureaucratic and political difficulties.

The final chapter in the volume deals with Indonesia, officially a non-aligned nation, but under strongman General Suharto, a de facto ally of the United States. The principal themes of this chapter are the question of Indonesia's international debt left over from the Sukarno years and U.S. support for multilateral Indonesian debt relief among international lending organizations. A related theme is the amount of U.S. bilateral aid provided to Indonesia. Because Indonesia's armed forces used Soviet equipment, the United States asked Indonesia to provide AK–47 rifles and ammunition to Cambodian armed forces, which were also armed with Soviet small arms, at a point when the Lon Nol government was fighting against North Vietnamese troops. In return, the Indonesians gained from Washington an expanded— although still small—U.S. military assistance program. Generally U.S.-Indonesia relations were good, and Indonesia enjoyed the kind of stability that the Nixon administration appreciated. There was, however, a dawning realization among the President and his key foreign policy advisers that they too often took Indonesia for granted. As a result, the Nixon administration made a special effort to consult periodically at a high level with Suharto and other key Indonesian government officials.

Like all recent Foreign Relations volumes, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation and on important issues, rather than the day-to-day implementation of policy. President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, still dominate the policy process, but the role of Secretary of State William Rogers and, in the case of Thailand, Vice President Spiro Agnew, are significant. In Southeast Asia, with the exception of issues relating to the Vietnam war, the Secretary—and Department of State—was granted a larger policy role by the President.

While the editors believe that this volume stands on its own through the use of annotation and especially editorial notes relating to other volumes, this volume is best read in conjunction with the four Nixon Vietnam volumes for January 1969–January 1973, volumes VI–IX.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. With the exception of Presidential recordings transcribed in the Office of the Historian for this volume, all ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2002 and was completed in 2004, resulted in the decision to withhold 19 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 7 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 48 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that notwithstanding the number of denied and excised documents, the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of U.S. foreign policy towards, and significant relations with, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Special thanks are due to Scott Koch, formerly of the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who was extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.

Daniel J. Lawler collected the documentation for this volume, made the selections, and annotated the documents under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, then Chief of the Asia and Americas Division. Susan C. Weetman coordinated the declassification review. Kristin L. Ahlberg prepared the list of names and abbreviations and terms. She and Vicki E. Futscher performed the copy and technical editing. Breffni Whelan prepared the index.

Marc J. Susser

The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

November 2006

Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through 1974 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. The papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of Foreign Relations.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The Nixon Presidential Materials staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XX

In preparing this volume the editors made extensive use of the Nixon Presidential Materials at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. The most valuable records within the Nixon Presidential Materials are in the National Security Council (NSC) Files, Country Files, Far East, specifically the country files for Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. These are the files maintained by the National Security Council Staff members responsible for the respective countries and they provide the day to day information on U.S. policy, as well as drafts and final versions of many of Henry Kissinger's memoranda to the President. This file provides the basic context for presidential decisions.

President Nixon and/or Vice President Spiro Agnew visited Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand during this period. Records in the Nixon Presidential Materials relating to these trips and related letters and other communications are in the NSC Files, Presidential Trip Files, the Presidential Correspondence Files, and the President/Kissinger Memoranda on Conversation File. Also of key importance in the NSC Files are the Backchannel Files. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger communicated on sensitive issues with ambassadors in Southeast Asia secretly through backchannel messages without the rest of the foreign affairs bureaucracy's knowledge. These files are of key value.

Also important in the NSC files of the Nixon Presidential Materials are the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) which are part of the NSC files, but not to be confused with the less complete NSC Institutional Matters Files. The former contains minutes of National Security Council Meetings, as well as minutes of such key NSC subgroups as the Review/Senior Review Group and the Washington Special Actions Group. For each set of meeting minutes there are corresponding meeting folders that contain the papers that Kissinger, who chaired all of these NSC groups, used in preparing for the meeting. Also in the H-Files are the complete set of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), and related studies and papers. The President used this NSSM/NSDM mechanism to generate policy options from the foreign affairs bureaucracy for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Of second importance in the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials are the Kissinger Office Files, the Lake Chronological Files, and the Haig Chronological and Special Files, all of which have occasional material of value. The President's Daily brief in the NSC Files provides sporadic information on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, sometimes with handwritten comments or orders by President Nixon. Finally, the Subject Files of the NSC Files including such sub files as HAK/Richardson Meetings, Presidential Determinations, and Symington Subcommittee often provide documents of value.

Besides the NSC Files, the Nixon Materials include the White House Special Files, including the President's Personal Files with its valuable Memoranda for the President, the President's Office Files, and Staff Members and Office Files. Material on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand is sprinkled through these files. Also of value are the Presidential tape recordings, Nixon's secret sound-activated taping system that began in 1971. The volume contains conversations transcribed specifically by the Office of the Historian, primarily relating to the visits of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines to Washington.

The Kissinger Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress often replicate documentation found in other collections, especially the NSC Files of the Nixon Presidential Materials, but have some documents unique to that collection. The most useful parts of the Kissinger Papers are the Chronological Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Memoranda for the President, and a collection of documents organized by countries under the Geopolitical Files heading. The transcripts of Kissinger's telephone conversations are in this collection and have a number of conversations about Indonesian aid to Cambodia, especially in May and June 1970. While the original transcripts are not open to the public, Dr. Kissinger has allowed the National Archives to make available copies at College Park, Maryland.

The volume also draws heavily on the records of the Department of State. Along with the President and Vice President, Secretary of State William Rogers had meetings with prime ministers, foreign ministers, and other high-level leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green had a keen interest in relations with Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Many records of high-level meetings and communications are in the Department of State Central Files located in Record Group (RG) 59 at the National Archives.

For high-level meetings the best collections in RG 59 are POL 7 POL 7 PHIL, and POL 7 THAI. POL 7 US/NIXON and POL 7 US/NIXON MOONGLOW contain records on President Nixon's trip of July 1969 to Southeast Asia. (MOONGLOW was the code name given for this trip.) POL 7 US/Connally covers former Treasury Secretary Connally's trip of June 1972 to Southeast Asia and other destinations. POL 7 US/AGNEW documents Vice President Agnew's January 1970 trip.POL 15–1 INDON, POL 15–1 PHIL, and POL 15–1 THAI contain important high level communications with and information about the respective heads of Government of these three countries.

For general political relations with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the best files are POL 1 INDON, POL 1 PHIL and POL 1 THAI and POL US–INDON, as well as POL US–PHIL, POL US–PHIL and POL US–THAI. In the Philippines a strong partisan political tradition existed and POL 12 PHIL,POL 13, and POL 14 PHIL provide documentation on the political system, as do POL 23–7 and POL 23–8, which are files that contain material on the opposition to the Marcos administration. For Thailand, the POL 23–7 and POL 23–8 THAI files relate mostly to the incipient insurgency in the northeast. Both Thailand and the Philippines contributed troops to the Vietnam war effort and were official members of the so-called Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). The file for this issue is POL 27 VIET S, the catchall file for military operations in South Vietnam.

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand were recipients of major U.S. aid programs, so the AID(US) INDON, AID(US) PHIL, and AID(US) THAI files and their related numerical sub files are important. Thailand and the Philippines had large U.S. military assistance programs, and Indonesia had an incipient one that was expanding, so DEF(US) INDON, DEF(US) PHIL, and DEF(US) THAI and their numerical sub-files are also of value. A specific file worthy of mention is DEF 1–1 INDON–US, a file for U.S.-Indonesia military contingency plans, that contains documents on the U.S.-initiated Indonesian effort to provide small arms and ammunition to the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Another file in which documentation on this issue can be found is POL 27 CAMB/KHMER. DEF 15–4 PHIL–US contains documents on U.S. bases and installations in the Philippines.

Indonesia suffered from large foreign debt left over from the Sukarno years and had limited ability to repay it. Records of consultation and cooperation among Indonesia's creditors are in the FN (financial) series of the Central Files, especially FN1–1 INDON. The question of foreign investment and land ownership in the Philippines was a difficult one, and FN 9 PHIL is the basic starting file. Trade with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are often files under INCO (short for international commodities) with the actual commodity:

Some Department of State “Lot” Files are worthy of mention. The basic conference files at the National Archives, entry 3051B, covering 1966–1972, and consolidating a number of Department of State conference files, contain records of the trips of Nixon, Agnew, Rogers, and others to the area. The files of U. Alexis Johnson, Lot 96 D 695, which include both personal and official records, are valuable, especially for Johnson's service as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1969–1973. This volume relied on Department of State Lot files relating to the NSC and the Under Secretaries Committee, S/S NSC Files: Lot 80 D 212 and S/S Under Secretaries Files: Lot 83 D 276. Additionally, the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) at the Nixon Presidential Materials have a more complete record of NSC related materials than these State lot files.

Intelligence related files of particular value are the Helms DCI Files at the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B0125A, the INR/IL Historical Files at the Department of State, and the Nixon Intelligence Files at the National Security Council in Washington. The latter will eventually be transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library.

The Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, known as the Symington Subcommittee, conducted a series of investigations and hearings on various countries of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines and Thailand. Senator Stuart Symington (D–MO) was especially critical of what he alleged to be the mercenary nature of the Philippines and Thai troop contribution to the war in Vietnam, corruption in the Philippines and Thailand, and unwarranted U.S. Government commitments to the Philippines and Thailand. The declassified version of the hearings was printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1970, after having been released by the Subcommittee on June 8. (United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Republic of Philippines, Kingdom of Laos, Kingdom of Thailand, hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, Parts 1–3, September-November 1969).

Department of Defense records of most value were the official records of Secretary of Defense Laird for 1969–1972, FRC 330 74 0142. In addition, worthy of mention are the Laird Papers at the Ford Library. These papers are copies of Laird's official records, chosen by his key aides at the end of his term that document some of the main themes of his tenure. Most of the documents of value for this volume are filed under Cambodia or Vietnam. Other Defense Department Records that are now available, but were not used when this volume was researched, deserve mention as potentially valuable resources. They are the Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, both RG 218, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files. For other lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

INR/IL Historical Files

Indonesia

Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971

Thailand Lotus File 1969–70

Thailand, 1972–1975

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

AID (US) INDON, general U.S. aid policy, Indonesia

AID (US) 8 INDON, U.S. grants and technical assistance to Indonesia

AID (US) 15–8 INDON, PL–480 Title I commodity sales, Indonesia

AID (US) PHIL, general U.S. aid policy, Philippines

AID (US) THAI, general U.S. aid policy, Thailand

AID (US) 10 THAI, strategic and political economic aid to Thailand

AID (US) 15 THAI,PL–480, Food for Peace program, Thailand

AID (US) 15–8 THAI, PL–480 Title I commodity sales, Thailand

DEF 9–5 CHINAT, training of Republic of China forces

DEF 6 PHIL, armed forces of the Philippines

DEF 15–4 PHIL–US, U.S.-Philippines base agreement

DEF THAI–US, defense affairs, Thailand-United States

DEF 1–1 THAI–US, contingency military planning, Thailand-United States

DEF 19 THAI–LAOS, Thai military assistance to Laos

FN 1–1 INDON, general Indonesian finance policy

FN 9 PHIL–US, foreign investment

INCO–COTTON 17 US–THAI, Thailand-United States cotton trade

INCO–RICE INDON, Indonesian rice industry and commodities

INCO–RICE 17 INDON–THAI, Indonesian-Thailand rice trade

ORG 7 EA, organization and administration, visits by officials of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

ORG 7 JCS, organization and administration, visits by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ORG 7 S, administration and organization, visits by Secretary of State

ORG 7 U, organization and administration, visits by the Under Secretary of State

POL CAMB–INDON, political affairs and relations, Cambodia-Indonesia

POL 27 CAMB, military operations in Cambodia

POL 27 CAMB/KHMER, military operations, Cambodia/Khmer Republic

POL CHICOM–US, political affairs and relations, People's Republic of China-United States

POL INDON–US, political affairs and relations, Indonesia-United States

POL 7 INDON, meetings with Indonesian leaders

POL 7 INDON, visits to Indonesia and meetings with Indonesians

POL 15–1 INDON, Indonesian head of state, executive branch

POL PHIL, political affairs and relations, Philippines

POL PHIL–US, political affairs and relations, Philippines-United States

POL 1 PHIL, general policy, Philippines

POL 1 PHIL–US, U.S.-Philippines relations, general

POL 7 PHIL, meetings and visits with Philippines officials

POL 7 PHIL, meetings with Filipino leaders

POL 12–6 PHIL, political parties and memberships, Philippines

POL 13–2 PHIL, students and youth groups, Philippines

POL 14 PHIL, Philippines elections

POL 15 PHIL, Government of the Philippines

POL 15–1 PHIL, Filipino head of state, executive branch

POL 15–4 PHIL, administration, Philippines

POL 15–5 PHIL, constitution, Philippines

POL 23 PHIL, internal security, Philippines

POL 23–7 PHIL, infiltration, subversion, and sabotage in the Philippines

POL 23–8 PHIL, demonstrations, riots, and protests in the Philippines

POL THAI–US, political affairs and relations, Thailand-United States

POL 1 THAI–US, U.S.-Thai relations, general

POL 7 THAI, meetings with Thai leaders

POL 15 THAI, Government of Thailand

POL 15–1 THAI, Thai head of state, executive branch

POL 17 THAI–US, diplomatic and consular representation, Thailand-United States

POL 23 THAI, internal security, Thailand

POL 23–7 THAI, infiltration, subversion, and sabotage in Thailand

POL 30 THAI, defectors and expellees, Thailand

POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D, condolences upon the death of former President Eisenhower

POL 7 US/AGNEW, visits and meetings, Vice President Agnew

POL 7 US/Connally, visits and meetings, John Connally

POL 7 US/GREEN, visits and meetings, Marshall Green

POL 7 US/KENNEDY, visits and meetings, David Kennedy

POL 7 US/NIXON, visits and meetings, President Nixon

POL 15 US, government, United States

POL 27 VIET S, military operations in South Vietnam

US–HK/BEAMS, DOVIE, protective services, welfare and whereabouts, Dovie Beams

SEATO 3, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization meetings

Lot Files

Conference Files, 1966–1972: Entry No. 3051 B

Files of the meetings and conferences of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of State, 1966–1972. Formerly S/S Lot Files: 67 D 586, 68 D 453, 69 D 182, 70 D 387, 71 D 227, and 73 D 323

EA/PAB Files: Lot 74 D 471

Letters and Memoranda file for 1972–1973 maintained by the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Green Files: Lot 74 D 471

Files of Marshall Green

Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695

Files of U. Alexis Johnson, 1958–1973, including both personal and official records

S/S National Security Council Files: Lot 80 D 212

NSSMs and Related Papers January 1965–May 1980

S/S NSC Under Secretaries Files: Lot 83 D 276

Records of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, Decision Memoranda, 1962–1977 Subject Files

Nixon Presidential Materials Project

National Security Council Files

Backchannel Files

Country Files, Far East: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand

Haig Chronological Files

Haig Special File

Kissinger Office Files

Lake Chronological Files

Nixon Intelligence Files

President's Daily Briefs

Subject Files: HAK/Richardson Meetings; National Security Study Memoranda;

Presidential Determinations; Symington Subcommittee

Trip Files

Vietnam Subject File

VIP Visits

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)

Review Group/Senior Review Group Minutes

Review Group/Senior Review Group Meetings

Vietnam Special Study Group Meetings

Washington Special Actions Group Meetings

Washington Special Actions Group Minutes

White House Special Files

Memoranda for the President

President's Office Files

Staff Member and Office Files

White House Central Files

Staff Member and Office Files, Daily Diary

White House Tapes

National Security Council

Nixon Intelligence Files

Subject Files: Minutes of 40 Committee; 303/40 Committee Records; Philippines; Thailand

Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Job 80–B01285A

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: Secretary Laird File: FRC 330 74 0142

Library of Congress

Manuscript Division

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger: Chronological File; Geopolitical File; Memoranda of Conversations; Memoranda to the President; Telephone Conversations

Published Sources

Documentary Collections

Congressional Quarterly, ed., Congress and the Nation, Volume III, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973)

U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969)

U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 1969–1972

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973)

Abbreviations and Terms

A–1 (Skyrider), single engine propeller-driven attack plane with one crew member

A/A, anti-aircraft

A/AID, Office of the Administrator, Agency for International Development

AA, Afro-Asian

AAA, anti-aircraft artillery

AAT, Additional Assistance to Thailand

ABF, attacks by fire

ABM, anti-ballistic missile

ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACM, Air Chief Marshal

ADB, Asian Development Bank

ADOA, Air Defense Operations Agreement

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AF, Air Force, also Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

AFB, air force base

AFP, Agence France Press

AG, Attorney General

AH or AMH, Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr.

AID, Agency for International Development

AID/ASIA/NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International Development

AID/NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development

AK–47, Soviet-designed Kalasknikov assault weapon

Amb, Ambassador

AMCITS, American citizens

APC, armored personnel carrier or Accelerated Pacification Campaign

ARA–LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (State), Bureau for Latin America (AID)

Arc Light, code name for U.S.B–52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia

ARD, Thai Accelerated Rural Development

ARDF, Aerial Radio Direction Finding

ARDL, Accelerated Rural Development Loan

ARDP, Accelerated Rural Development Program

ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam

ASA, Association of Southeast Asia

ASAP, as soon as possible

ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense

ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASPAC, Asian and Pacific Council

ASW, anti-submarine warfare

B–52, United States Air Force strategic bomber

Backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the

White House, for instance, used “backchannel” messages to bypass the Department of State

BNDD, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice

BOB, Bureau of the Budget

BPP, Border Patrol Police (Thailand) XXIII

C–47, propeller driven twin engine low wing aircraft used for transportation of troops and/or equipment

C–123, high wing 2 prop engine transport aircraft

C–130, United States Air Force transport plane

C–141, high wing 4 turbo prop engine aircraft used for rapid transportation of troops and/or equipment

C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State

CAP, Combined Action Platoon

CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper

CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation

CEA, Council of Economic Advisers

CEG, College Editor's Guild

CENTO, Central Treaty Organization

CF, contingency funds

CH–47, heavy transport helicopter (“Chinook”)

Chicom(s), Chinese Communist(s)

CHJUSMAG, Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group

CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group

CI, counterinsurgency

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CIA/ONE, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates

CIAP, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress

CIDG, Citizens' Irregular Defense Group

CIF, Chinese Irregular Forces

CINC, Commander in Chief

CINCMEAFSA, Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara

CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force

CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

CINCPACREPPHIL, Commander in Chief, Pacific's Representative in the Philippines

CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command

CINCUNK, Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea

CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific

CIP, commodities import program

CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CL, classified

CM, Chairman's (of JCS) memorandum

CMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps

CND, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs

CNO, Chief of Naval Operations

Codel, Congressional delegation

COMECON, Council on Mutual Economic Assistance

Comint, communications intelligence

Comite, committee

COMNAVBASE Subic, Commander, Naval Base, Subic Bay

COMUSMACTHAI, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand

COMUSMACV, Commander in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

ConCon, Philippine Constitutional Convention

CONGEN, Consulate General

CONUS, Continental United States

CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam

CPDC, Central Pacification and Development Council

CPP/ML, Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist-Leninist

CPT, Thai Communist Party

CSA, Chief of Staff of the Army

CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CSM, Philippine Christian Socialist Movement

CSOC, Thai Counter Insurgency Operations Command

CST, Central Standard Time

CT, Thai Communist Insurgents; also Country Team

CTZ, corps tactical zone

CY, calendar year

D, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

D/INR, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

DA, Department of the Army

DAO, Defense Attaché Office

DATT, Defense Attaché

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DDC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

DDI, Deputy Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

DDO/EA, Deputy Directorate of Operations, East Asia, Central Intelligence Agency

DefSec, Defense Secretary

del, delegate; delegation

Delto, delegation to (telegram series indicator from the Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam)

Depcirtel, circular telegram from the Department of State

DepFonMin, deputy foreign minister

Deptel, telegram from the Department of State

DEYMO, Philippine Democratic Youth Movement

DGNP, Director-General National Police

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DirGen or DG, Director General

Dissem, dissemination

DL, development loan

DMZ, demilitarized zone

DOD, Department of Defense

DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, International Security Affairs

DOS, Department of State

DPM, Deputy Prime Minister

DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee

DPRG, Defense Program Review Group

DRV or DRVN, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

DTG, date/time/group

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

E/ORF/ICD, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy,

Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/IND, Office of Indonesian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/PHIL, Office of Philippines Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EA/TB, Office of Thailand and Burma Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EAP, former designation for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EC–121, unarmed, four engine propeller driven reconnaissance aircraft

ECAFE, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council

ELR, Elliot L. Richardson

Emb, Embassy

Emboff, Embassy officer

Embtel, Embassy telegram

EOB, Executive Office Building

EST, Eastern Standard Time, also estimated

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, exclusive distribution

Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank of Washington

F–4 (Phantom), twin engine turbo jet, all weather, supersonic tactical fighter bomber with two crew members

F, fighter

FAC, Foreign Assets Control

FANK, Forces Armées Nationales Khmeres (Khmer National Armed Forces)

FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FAR or FARK, Forces Armées Royales Khmeres (Royal Khmer Armed Forces)

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FDF, Free Democratic Forces (of South Vietnam)

FEOP, Foreign Exchange Operations Fund

FFF, Philippine Federation of Free Farmers

Flash, indicates message of highest priority requiring the attention of the Secretary of State

FM, from; also Foreign Minister

FMS, Foreign Military Sales

FODAG, United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FonSec, Foreign Secretary

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FWF, Free World Forces

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

GA, United Nations General Assembly

GAO, General Accounting Office

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP, Gross Domestic Product

Gen, general

GMT, Greenwich Mean Time

GNP, Gross National Product

GOC, Government of Cambodia

GOI, Government of Indonesia

GOJ, Government of Japan

GOP, Government of the Philippines

GRC, Government of the Republic of China

GSA, General Services Administration

GUB, Government of Burma

GVN, Government of Vietnam

GVR, Government of the Republic of Vietnam

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger

H.E., His Excellency

HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee

HMG, Her Majesty's Government, United Kingdom

hq, headquarters

HR, House Resolution

HRH, His Royal Highness

Huks, Hukbong Magpapalaya Sa Banyan (paramilitary arm of Philippines Communist Party)

I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank

ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICC, International Control and Supervision Commission

ICJ, International Court of Justice

ICRC, International Committee, Red Cross

IFI, International Financial Institution

IG, Interdepartmental Group

IGGI, Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia

IMF, International Monetary Fund

INCB, International Narcotics Control Board

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/DCC, Office of the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INR/DDR/REA, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IR–8, rice strain developed at the International Rice Research Institute

IRBM, Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile

IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group

ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

ITAC, Interagency Textile Advisory Committee

J, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

J/PM, Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

JHH, John Herbert Holdridge

JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Group

JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office

K, Kissinger

kg, kilogram

KHR, Khmer Republic

KIP, Lao currency unit

KK, Khmer Krom

KL, Kuala Lumpur

KMT, Kuomintang

KW, kilowatt

L, Legal Adviser of the Department of State

LA, Latin America

LDC, less developed country

LDX, long distance xerography

Limdis, limited distribution

LOC, lines of communication

LP, Philippines Liberal Party

LPF, Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao)

LTA, Long-Term Agreement (textiles)

LTG, Lieutenant General

M–1, World War II-era U.S. military rifle

M–14, semi automatic U.S. military rifle

M–16, U.S. military field rifle

M–113, armored personnel carrier

M, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management

mm, millimeter

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC, Military Assistance Command

MACTHAI, Military Assistance Command, Thailand

MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MASF, Military Assistance Service Funded

MBA, Military Base Agreement

MemCon, memorandum of conversation

MENU, code name for U.S. bombings in Cambodia

Meo (Hmong), mountain tribes in Laos that fought on the U.S. side during the Vietnam War

MFN, Most Favored Nation

MIL, military

MILAD, military adviser

MinDef, Minister of Defense

Misoff, Mission Officer

ML, military list

MOD, Ministry of Defense

MP, Member of Parliament

MR, military region or memorandum for the record

MT, metric ton

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC, National Broadcasting Company

NCO, non-commissioned officer

NE, northeast

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEC, Thai National Executive Council

NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development

Niact, night action

NIC, National Intelligence Council

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

NLF, National Liberation Front

NLFSVN, National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

NOC, National Operations Council

Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)

Nodis/Khmer, special Department of State channel established to handle issues such as third country military assistance to Cambodia

Noforn, no foreign dissemination

Notal, not received by all addressees

NPA, New People's Army

NSA, National Security Agency

NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum

NSC, National Security Council

NSC IG/EA, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group on East Asia

NSDF, National Socialist Democratic Front

NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

NSF, National Salvation Front (of South Vietnam)

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

NUSP, National Union of Students of the Philippines

NVA (also NVNA), North Vietnamese Army

NVA/VC, North Vietnam/Viet Cong

NVN, North Vietnam

NZ, New Zealand

O & M, operations and maintenance

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OBE, overtaken by events

OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

ONE, Office of National Estimates (CIA)

OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, also President

PA, purchase authorization

PACAF, Pacific Air Force

PACFLT, Pacific Fleet

PACOM, Pacific Command

PanAm, Pan-American Airways

PAO, Public Affairs Officer

Para, paragraph; also Policy Analysis Resource Allocation

PARU, Police Aerial Resupply Unit (Thailand, paramilitary arm of BBP)

PAVN, People's Army of Vietnam

PBR, river boat patrol

PD, presidential determination

PDB, President's Daily Brief

PDJ, Plain of Jars (Plaine des Jarres)

PermRep, permanent representative

PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PHILCAG, Philippine Civil Action Group

PHILCAGV, Philippine Civil Action Group-Vietnam

PI, Philippine Islands

PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

PKP, Philippine Communist Party

PL, Public Law; also Pathet Lao

PL–480, Public Law 480 (Food for Peace)

PLA, People's Liberation Army

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; also prime minister

PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy and Planning, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PMG, Politico-Military Group

PNG, persona non grata

POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants

POLAD, Political Adviser

PolOff, Political Officer

POW, prisoner of war

PPP, Philippines Peoples' Progressive Party

PR, public relations

Prairie Fire (PF), code name for U.S.-led South Vietnamese reconnaissance teams sent into Laos to seek targets for U.S. bombing operations of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to assess bombing damage

PRC, People's Republic of China

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government

PriMin, Prime Minister

PSDF, People's Self Defense Force

PSYOP(s), psychological operation(s)

QTE, quote

R & D, research and development

RCD, Organization of Regional Cooperation for Development

RCT, Regimental Combat Team

RD, rural development

Recce, reconnaissance

reftel, reference telegram

rep, representative

res, resolution

RF/PF, Regional Forces/Popular Forces

RG, Record Group, also Review Group

RKG, Royal Khmer (Cambodian) Government

RLA, Royal Lao Army

RLAF, Royal Lao Air Force, also Royal Lao Armed Forces

RLG, Royal Lao Government

RLGAF, Royal Lao Government Armed Forces

RMN or RN, Richard Nixon

ROC, Republic of China

ROK, Republic of Korea

ROVN, Republic of Vietnam

RTA, Royal Thai Army

RTAF, Royal Thai Air Force

RTARF, Royal Thai Armed Forces

RTARFRV, Royal Thai Armed Forces Representation-Vietnam

RTG, Royal Thai Government

RTN, Royal Thai Navy

RVN, Republic of Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/AL, Ambassador at Large

S/NM, Office of the Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State

S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State

S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State

S/S–S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat of the Department of State

SA, supporting assistance

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM, surface-to-air missile

SAR, search and rescue missions

SARG, Syrian Arab Republic Government

SC, United Nations Security Council

SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State

SCI/EN, Office of Environmental Affairs, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State

SE, southeast

SEA, Southeast Asia

SEACOORD, Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee

SEAMEC, Southeast Asia Monetary Exchange Council

SEATO, South East Asian Treaty Organization

Secdef, Secretary of Defense

Secstate, Secretary of State

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington

septel, separate telegram

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SGU, Special Guerrilla Units

Sierra Romeo, code name for Thai artillery units in Laos

SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group

SIGINT, signals intelligence

SITREP, situation report

SLAT, Supply and Logistical Agreement

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNO, Special Narcotics Organization, Thailand

SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement

SOP, standard operating procedure

Sov, Soviet Union

SPT, Saha Pracha Thai (United Thai Peoples' Party)

SR, strategic reserve

SR–71, U.S. high altitude reconnaissance aircraft

SRG, Senior Review Group

STAFD, Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Defense

Steel Tiger, U.S. Air Force-Navy interdiction of North Vietnamese infiltration routes in southern Laos

Subj, subject

SVN, South Vietnam

SYG, United Nations Secretary-General

T–28, single engine propeller driven 1950s era trainer extensively modified as counterinsurgency aircraft

TA, technical assistance

TAC, tactical, also Tactical Air Command

TACAIR, tactical air

TACS, Tactical Air Control System

TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentsvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)

TC, technical cooperation

TCC, Troop Contributing (to Vietnam) Countries

TDY, temporary duty

TKV, Thai Khmer Volunteers

Toaid, series indicator for telegrams to the Agency for International Development

Todel, series indicator for telegrams to the delegation at the Paris Peace Talks

TOR, terms of reference

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while outside of Washington

Tosit, to the White House Situation Room

TPLAF, Thai Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces

TS, top secret

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State; also unclassified

U/SM, Under Secretaries' Memorandum

UAR, United Arab Republic

UH, utility helicopter (Huey)

UK, United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland

UN, United Nations

UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNSTO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

UPI, United Press International

US, United States

USA, United States of America

USAF, United States Air Force

USAID, United States Agency for International Development

U.S.C., United States Code

USDA, United States Department of Agriculture

USDAO, United States Defense Attaché Office

USG, United States Government

USIA, United States Information Agency

USINFO, United States Information Service

USIS, United States Information Service (overseas branches of USIA)

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USN, United States Navy

USOM, United States Operations Mission

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UST, United States Treaty

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VA, Veteran's Administration

VC, Vietcong

VC/NVA, Vietcong/North Vietnamese

VCI, Viet Cong Infrastructure

VN, Vietnam

VNAF, Vietnamese Air Force

VOLAGS, voluntary agencies

VP, Vice President

VSSG, Vietnam Special Studies Group

WESTPAC, Commander, Western Pacific

WH, White House

WHO, White House Office (series indicator for White House messages)

WHSR, White House Situation Room

WNRC, Washington National Records Center

WPR, William P. Rogers

WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

Abrams, General Creighton W., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Army Chief of Staff from July 1972

Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States

Aichi, Kiichi, Japanese Foreign Minister until July 1971

Alamsjah, H., Indonesian State Secretary

Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States from 1972

Anderson, Jack, syndicated newspaper columnist, “Washington Merry-Go-Round”

Aquino, Benigo S., Jr., Philippines Liberal Party Secretary-General

Arun Panupong, Thai Chargé d' Affaires, Thai Embassy

Asa Sarasin, Director of Southeast Asia Division, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, March 1970–April 1974

Barger, Herman H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1970–1973

Barnett, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until 1970

Behr, Colonel Robert M., USAF, senior staff member, National Security Council Operations Staff for Scientific Affairs, 1969–1971

Bekker, Konrad, Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, until 1971

BeLieu, Kenneth F., Under Secretary of the Army from September 1971

Bergesen, Alfred E., Acting Director for Thailand/Burma Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Bergsten, C. Fred, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, January 1969–June 1971

Black, Eugene R., Special Adviser to President Johnson on Southeast Asia

Blee, David, Chief, Near East and South Asia Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

Brandt, Willy, West German Foreign Minister until October 1969; thereafter, Chancellor

Bray, Charles W., III, Director, Office of Press Relations, Department of State from March 1971

Brewster, Robert C., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, July 1969–August 1971

Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brown, Winthrop G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972

Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until March 1969; head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1970–1971

Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 4, 1969

Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam

Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to the Philippines from August 29, 1969

Cargo, William I., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from August 4, 1969

Carver, George A., Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to the Director of Central Intelligence

Case, Clifford, Representative (R–New Jersey)

Cau Van Vien, General, Chairman, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

Chapin, Frank M., member, National Security Council staff and Staff Secretary to the 303/40 Committee

Charunphan, Isarangkun, Thai Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Chiang Ching-kuo, Son of Chiang Kai-shek; Minister of Defense, Republic of China, until 1969; Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan from 1969–1972; Premier from 1972; member, Kuomintang Standing Committee and the Republic of China National Security Council

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China

Chi P'eng-fei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, until April 1971; Acting Foreign Minister until February 1972; Foreign Minister from February 1972

Chou En-lai, Premier of the People's Republic of China

Church, Frank, Senator (D–Idaho)

Churchill, Malcom H., Country Officer, Office of Indonesian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 26, 1969

Connolly, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, February 1971–May 1972

Cooper, John Sherman, Senator (R–Kentucky)

Curran, Robert, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, August 1970–August 1972

Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, May 1969–December 1971; thereafter, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, from January 1, 1972

Dawee Chullasaspyra, Marshal, RTA; Deputy Minister of Defense, Thai Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of Thailand

Davies, Rodger P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, 1970–1971; Staff Secretary,NSC Staff Secretariat, after 1971

De Palma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 7, 1969

Dexter, John B., Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State from August 1969

Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Doolin, Dennis J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs responsible for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President, January–November 1969; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs after November 1969

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, 1953–1961

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 10, 1969

Esenbel, Melih, Turkish Ambassador to the United States

Finch, Robert, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Frelinghuysen, Peter H., Representative (R–New Jersey)

Froehlke, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, January 1969– June 1971; thereafter, Secretary of the Army

Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Galbraith, Francis J., Ambassador to Indonesia from May 1969

Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India

Getz, John I., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, January 1969–1971

Gleysteen, Dirk, Director, Secretariat Staff, Department of State, until 1971

Godley, George McMurtire, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969; Ambassador to Laos after July 24, 1969

Goldwater, Barry M., Senator (R–Arizona)

Grant, Lindsey, member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, February 1969–August 1970; member, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, June 1971–November 1972

Green, Marshall, Ambassador to Indonesia until January 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 1, 1969–May 10, 1973; also, Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia from May 1970

Greene, Joseph N., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, August 1969–March 1970

Gromyko, Andrei A., Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union

Gross, Nelson G., Ambassador and Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters from August 1971

Habib, Philip C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969; member of U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks until October 1971; thereafter, Ambassador to Korea

Haig, Brigadier General Alexander M., Jr., USA, Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, January 1969–June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970

Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff

Halperin, Morton, Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff until September 1969

Handley, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until May 1969; thereafter, Ambassador to Turkey

Hannah, John A., Administrator, Agency for International Development from April 1969

Hannah, Norman B., Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Bangkok until 1970

Hardin, Clifford M., Secretary of Agriculture, January 1969–December 1971

Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, January 1969–January 1970; thereafter, Counselor to the President

Hatfield, Mark O., Senator (R–Oregon)

Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State and Staff Director for the National Security Council Under Secretaries' Committee until August 1969; thereafter, Deputy Director for Coordination

Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969

Holdrige, John Herbert, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969; thereafter, member, National Security Council Operations Staff responsible for East Asia

Hongladarom, Sunthorn, Thai Ambassador to the United States until 1972

Hormats, Robert D., member, National Security Council Operations Staff/International Economic Affairs, 1970–1972

Houdek, Robert, member, National Security Council staff, January 1969–July 1971

Howe, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan, member, National Security Council Staff, 1970–1972

Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 1969

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., Ambassador to Burma until July 22, 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from February 1972

Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States until January 20, 1969; Senator (D–Minnesota) from January 1971

Ingersoll, John, Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice

Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D–Hawaii)

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State, September 1970–July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Secretary of State

Jenkins, Alfred le Sesne, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, from July 1971

Jira Vichitsonggram, General, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on Security, Thailand

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, November 1963–January 1969

Johnson, Vice Admiral Nels C., USN, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 19, 1970

Johnson, U. Alexis, Ambassador to Japan until January 1969; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1969

Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency

Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury, January 1969–January 1971; thereafter, Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development from February 11, 1971; U.S. Permanent Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from March 17, 1972

Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., USA, member, National Security Council Planning Group

Kishi, Nobusuke, former Japanese Prime Minister

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs after January 1969

Knowles, Richard T., member, National Security Council staff

Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Kotschnig, Walter M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until 1971

Kriangsak Chamanan, Lieutenant General, Thai Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command

Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union

Lagdameo, Ernesto V., Philippine Ambassador to the United States, 1969–1970

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense after January 1969

Lake, W. Anthony, member, National Security Council Planning Group until April 1970

Lodge, Henry Cabot, II, Head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, January 20–November 20, 1969

Lon Nol, General, FARK, First Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense of Cambodia; Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, June 1969; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970

Lon Non, head of the Phnom Penh police and younger brother of Lon Nol

Lord, Winston, member, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, until 1969; member, National Security Council Planning Group; staff member for United Nations Affairs, National Security Council Operations Staff, from 1971

Lowman, Shepard C., Country Officer, Office of Philippines Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff, 1969–1971

Macapagal, Dosado, former President of the Philippines

Macomber, William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until October 2, 1969; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (title changed to Management after July 12, 1971) from September 1969

Maestrone, Frank E., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Manila

Malik, Adam, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and President, United Nations General Assembly, 1971

Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D–Montana), Senate Majority Leader

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People's Republic of China

Marcos, Ferdinand E., President of the Philippines

Marcos, Imelda, First Lady of the Philippines

Martin, Graham M., former Ambassador to Thailand; Ambassador to Italy from October 30, 1969

Masters, Edward E., Country Director for Indonesian Affairs until September 1970; thereafter, Director for Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Mayo, Robert P., Director, Bureau of the Budget, January 1969–July 1970; thereafter, Counselor to the President, July 1970–1972

McAfee, William, Deputy Director, Directorate for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

McCain, Admiral John S., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific until September 1, 1972

McCarthy, Eugene, Senator (D–Minnesota)

McClintock, Robert, Ambassador to Venezuela, 1970; Chairman, Interdepartmental Coordinating Group (Symington Subcommittee), Department of State representative to White House Working Group

McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary from July 1969; also Ambassador at Large

McGovern, George S., Senator (D–South Dakota) and Democratic nominee for president in 1972

McNamara, Robert S., former Secretary of Defense; President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank

Meyer, Charles A., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, from April 1969

Moore, Jonathan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, September 1969–June 1970

Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; thereafter, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Moose, Richard M., member, National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970

Murphy, George, Senator (R–California)

Nelson, William E., Director, Office of Asian Affairs, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

Newman, George S., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, June 1970–November 1971

Nguyen Cao Ky, Vice President of the Republic of Vietnam

Nguyen Giap Vo, General, PAVN, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Nguyen Thi Binh, Head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government's Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam

Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Vietnam

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States

Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, March 4, 1969–January 30, 1972

Odeen, Philip, Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff, from November 1971

Okum, Herbert, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Packard, David M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 24, 1969–December 13, 1971

Palmby, Clarence D., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Passman, Otto, Representative (D–Louisiana)

Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor of the Department of State after January 24, 1969

Percy, Charles, Senator (R–Illinois)

Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy, 1971–1972, Secretary of Commerce from January 1972

Pickering, Laurence G., Officer in Charge of Thai Affairs, Department of State, until June 1970; thereafter, Counselor, U.S. Embassy Bangkok

Pierson, George K., Office Director for Southeast Asia, Bureau of East Asia, Agency for International Development

Pogorny, N.V., Chairman, Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet

Popple, Paul M., Office Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Department of State

Pote Sarasin, Thai Minister of National Development, Thai SEATO council member

Praphat Charusthein (Prapass Charusathiara), General, RTA, Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand

Prasit Kanjonawatana, Thai Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs

Pursley, Brigadier General Robert E., USAF, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until November 1972

Rafferty, James F., Special Assistant, U.S. Embassy Manila

Ratliff, Rob Roy, Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee

Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State, January 1969–June 1970

Robinson, Davis R., staff assistant, Office of the Secretary of State

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State, January 21, 1969–September 1973

Romualdez, Benjamin (Kokoi), Marcos' campaign minister and brother-in-law

Rush, Kenneth W., Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, July 8, 1969–February 20, 1972; Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 23, 1972–January 1973; Deputy Secretary of State, February 2, 1973–May 29, 1974

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State until January 20, 1969

Russell, Richard B., Senator (D–Georgia)

Sani, Ch. Anwar, Director General for Political Affairs, Indonesia

Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff, 1969–1971

Sawaeng Senanarong, General, Thai Government House Secretary-General

Selden, Armistead, I., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Shakespeare, Frank M., Director, United States Information Agency, after February 1969

Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor, January 20, 1969–June 10, 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, June 1970–May 1972; thereafter, Secretary of Treasury

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Cambodian Head of State until March 1970; thereafter, leader of Cambodian Government in exile in Peking

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; also Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia

Sison, Jose Maria, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines

Smith, K. Wayne, Director, National Security Council Policy Analysis Branch, 1971– 1972

Smyser, W. Richard, adviser to the delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia, 1970–1972

Sneider, Richard L., member, National Security Council Operations Staff/East Asia Division, May 1969–September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan, September 1969– July 1972; thereafter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1972

Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Prime Minister of Laos

Spear, Moncrieff J., Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until October 1970

Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, August– September 1969; thereafter, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Srey Saman, General, Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Army

Stans, Maurice, Secretary of Commerce, January 1969–January 1972

Starbird, Linwood, Country Director, Thailand/Burma, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Stennis, John D., Senator (D–Mississippi)

Sudjatmoko, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States

Sudomo, Vice Admiral, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy

Suharto, President of Indonesia

Sukarno, former President of Indonesia

Sullivan, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from April 1969; also Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam

Surakit Mayalap, Thai Army Chief of Staff

Suthi Nartworathat, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Thai Ministry of Economic Affairs

Swank, Emory C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, June 1969–September 1970; thereafter, Ambassador to Cambodia

Symington, W. Stuart, Senator (D–Missouri); Chairman, Subcommittee of U.S. Security Arrangements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Thajeb, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States

Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand until November 17, 1971

Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal, RTA; Prime Minister of Thailand, 1969–1971; Thai Foreign Minister from 1972

Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations until December 1971

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia

Tomseth, Victor L., Political Officer, U.S. Embassy Bangkok, from April 1970

Tran Thien Khiem, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam until late 1969

Tran Van Huong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam after late 1969

Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott, Prime Minister of Canada

Truehart, William C., Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until September 1969

Umar Wirahadikusumah, Lieutenant General, Indonesian Army Chief of Staff

Unger, Leonard, Ambassador to Thailand

Usher, Richard E., Country Director, Philippines, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969

Vaky, Viron P. (Pete), Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January–May 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/Latin America, May 1969–September 1972; thereafter, Ambassador to Costa Rica from September 11, 1972

Vang Pao, General, RLA, Commander of Military Region II and leader of the Meo (Hmong) forces

Vicharn Nivatvong, Director-General, Department of Foreign Trade, Thai Ministry of Economic Affairs

Walsh, John P., Acting Executive Secretary, Department of State, February–October 1969

Wanzeck, William T., Narcotics Attaché, U.S. Embassy Bangkok

Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Army Chief of Staff until June 1972

Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 2, 1970

Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, Indonesian National Planning Board

Williams, G. Mennen, Ambassador to the Philippines until April 1969

Wolff, Lester, Representative (D–New York)

Wright, W. Marshall, Country Director, Philippines, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State until May 1970; member, National Security Council Operations Staff/African and UN Affairs, June 1970–April 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, April–December 1972

Yost, Charles W., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, January 22, 1969–February 25, 1971

Ziegler, Ronald, L., Press Secretary to the President

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.[1]

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”[2]

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.[3] In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.[4] The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.[5]

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.[6] The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.[7]

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.[8]

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.[9]

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.[10]

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.[11]

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.[12]

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,[13] which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d' etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.[14]

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.[15]

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.[16]

[1]  NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257 .

[2]  NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed ibid., Document 292 .

[3] Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC– 10/2,” August 12, 1948, printed ibid., Document 298 .

[4]  NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, in Michael Warner, editor, The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 437–439.

[5] William M. Leary, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community.

[6] Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community.

[7] Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, p. 63.

[8] Ibid., p. 82.

[9] See Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278 .

[10] For text of NSAM No. 124, see ibid., vol. VIII, Document 68 . NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 56 .

[11] For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204 .

[12]  Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.

[13] For text of NSDM 40, see Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. II, Document 203.

[14]  Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

[15] Public Law 93–559.

[16] Executive Order 11905, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

Southeast Asia

115. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Bangkok, April 19, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Folder 943. Secret.

116. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 20, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

117. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 22, 1971.

118. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

London, April 28, 1971, 0545Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SEATO 3. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, Hong Kong, and USUN.

119. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and Burma (Dexter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Washington, May 12, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Green saw it. Copies were sent to Wilson, Masters, and Corcoran.

120. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Bangkok, May 28, 1971.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis; Special Handling.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in Hong Kong

Bangkok, May 28, 1971, 1131Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL

122. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 1630Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Withdrawn Box 14/15, Folder 943. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by James L. Carson (S/S), cleared by Nicholas A. Veliotes, and approved by Green. Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to Bangkok and Vientiane.

123. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 0730Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Confidential. Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to Bangkok.

124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon

Washington, June 9, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Folder 943. Secret.

125. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 9, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Top Secret. Sent for information.

126. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, July 5, 1971, 6:30 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. Davis sent an August 5 covering memorandum to Kissinger in which she noted that the “State Department has inquired in a low key as to whether and/or when they might receive copies of the memcons from your Far Eastern trip.” At the same time Kissinger approved the memcons (including Documents 127 and 128), he also initialed his approval that the copies be provided to the Department of State. Attached but not printed. The meeting was held at General Praphat's residence.

127. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 9 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.

128. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 10 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.

129. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Chargé d'Affaires in Thailand (Newman)

Washington, July 9, 1971.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis.

130. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

Washington, July 20, 1971, 10:03 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1971, Southeast Asia. Top Secret.

131. Memorandum for the Record

Bangkok, August 5, 1971.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret. [text not declassified] Forwarded to Under Secretary Johnson under an attached August 7 cover letter from Newman.

132. National Security Decision Memorandum 126

Washington, August 11, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret. The memorandum was signed by Kissinger. Copies were forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the CIA, and to the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, August 25, 1971, 0904Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15 THAI. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

134. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Washington, August 26, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “OK

135. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, September 15, 1971, 0745Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane.

136. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Washington, September 16, 1971.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand, 1970–71. Secret; Sensitive.

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, September 17, 1971, 0300Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand [text not declassified]

Bangkok, October 29, 1971.

Source: National Security Council, Country File, Thailand, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In an October 29 memorandum to Green, [text not declassified] stated that this message was [text not declassified] also being provided to “General Haig at the White House and Mr. Ingersoll in BNDD.”

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 3, 1971, 0324Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US Connally. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Received at 4:17 a.m. on November 4.

140. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 12, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Limited Official Use.

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 16, 1971, 1207Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Secret; Limdis.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 17, 1971, 0643Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

143. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, November 17, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for information. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

144. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, November 18, 1971, 9:30–11:05 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer Harlan Y.M. Lee and approved in J on December 21. The meeting was held at Government House.

145. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Washington, December 1, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Sent for action. Drafted and initialed by Hormats, with the concurrence of Colonel Richard Kennedy. A notation on the memorandum by Haig reads: “Great job by all around. AH” At the bottom of the page another notation in Kennedy's handwriting reads: “Al: The above added to encouraging news on the AAT suggests we may have pulled it off. Hopefully we'll have the AAT wrapped up very shortly—the Thai have agreed to everything—only a few minor technical problems remain and are being worked out now. Embassy has already drafted a proposed exchange of notes concluding the agreement. RTK”

146. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 14, 1971.

147. Editorial Note

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, December 24, 1971, 1050Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane and Saigon. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Haig and Sullivan, and approved by Johnson.

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, January 17, 1972, 0423Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 THAI. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC.

150. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 16, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Al—Let's get CIA assessment. HK” Another notation in Holdridge's handwriting reads: “done 2/20.” Haig wrote on the memorandum: “Tom Latimer see me.”

151. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 22, 1972, noon.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergesen on February 23, and approved by Brown and Lange Schermerhorn (S/S–S) on February 26. The meeting was held in Ambassador Brown's office.

152. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 29, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Bangkok, March 10, 1972, 0540Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 6:59 a.m. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane.

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Malaysia to the Department of State

Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 1972, 1425Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret;Nodis.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 0515Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok.

156. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 21, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum in Haig's handwriting reads: “HAK—this was a result of earlier HAK–Haig–Kennedy push. AH.”

157. Editorial Note

158. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

Washington, April 4, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Marshall Green Files: Lot 74 D 471, Box 13826, Department Correspondence, April 1972 Folder. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal. Drafted by Hummel.

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, April 6, 1972, 0003Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by Kissinger, Rush, and Robert M. Miller (S/S), and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Saigon.

160. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 6, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

161. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and Burma (Bergesen) to the Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Westmore)

Washington, April 10, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Exdis.

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, April 25, 1972, 0934Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 EA. Secret; Limdis.

163. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, May 12, 1972, 1201Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confidential; Immediate;Limdis.

164. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in Japan

Bangkok, May 13, 1972, 1005Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State.

165. Telegram From Vice President Agnew to the Department of State

Bangkok, May 18, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Visit of Agnew to Asia. Secret; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Printed from a copy with no transmittal time; a handwritten notation at the top of page 1 reads “CINCPAC # 1822212 May 72,” and later telegrams reference this number. However, no copy of CINCPAC 1822212 has been found.

166. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, May 24, 1972, 10:05–11:15 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, May 26, 1972, 1249Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Kennedy and Holdridge. The memorandum was attached to a June 8 covering memorandum from Kennedy and Holdridge to Kissinger. It was signed by Haig.

169. Telegram From the Consulate in Australia to the Department of State

Perth, June 30, 1972, 1322Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Trip to SEA. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Unger on June 29, cleared by Lissy (S), and Pedersen (C), and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Bangkok.

170. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush)

Washington, August 18, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, August 1972. Secret.

171. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, August 22, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Chronological File, 1/1/72–12/21/72. Secret.

172. Memorandum by the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)

Washington, August 23, 1972.

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, September 1, 1972, 1244Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 9–5 CHINAT. Secret; Nodis.

174. National Security Study Memorandum 159

Washington, September 9, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Top Secret.

175. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, September 16, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.

176. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, September 19, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

177. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 25, 1972, 3:45 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confidential. Drafted by Bergesen and approved by U. Alexis Johnson on September 28. The meeting was held in Johnson's office.

178. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 25, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Drafted by Kennedy. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

179. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, September 28, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.

180. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 2, 1972, 3 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Bergesen and approved in S on October 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II notes the request of the Thais not to be taken by surprise if a negotiated peace was in the offing, and Rogers's various reiterations that he had told them as much as he could and would let him know as soon as he could. The entire conversation is summarized in telegram 184763 to Bangkok, October 10. (Ibid.)

181. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 5, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

182. Memorandum for the President's File

Washington, October 6, 1972, 10:30 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 1, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge.

183. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Washington, November 29, 1972.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand 1972–1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Green saw it.

184. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 13, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

185. Letter From President Nixon to Thai National Executive Council Chairman Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn

Washington, December 16, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Nodis. It was delivered by General Haig on his late December–January trip to Southeast Asia.

Contents

Thailand (Documents 1-114)

Thailand

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, January 14, 1969, 1119Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Ambassador Johnson.

2. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, January 16, 1969.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand Lotus File 1968–69. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Unger. The meeting was held at Sarasin's residence. A notation on the upper right hand memorandum indicates Godley saw it.

3. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Washington, February 7, 1969.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Thailand. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the bottom left-hand corner of the first page reads, “303 Committee briefed on 11 February 1969.”

4. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, March 9, 1969, 10–11:15 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Thanom's residence. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. The memorandum of conversation was attached to a March 18 covering memorandum from Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to Kissinger.

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, March 11, 1969, 1154Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Confidential.

6. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, March 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Spear and cleared by Godley and William P. Bundy.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, March 26, 1969, 0152Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Confidential. Drafted by Spear on March 10; cleared by William Bundy, Secretary Rogers, and in the White House by Richard Moose; and revised in the White House on March 25.

8. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 1, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Spear and approved in J on April 9. The meeting was held in Johnson's office. The memorandum is part 6 of 6; parts 1 through 5 are ibid.

9. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Godley)

Bangkok, April 10, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the letter indicates Godley saw it. Copies were sent to Johnson, Ambassador Marshall Green, and Spear.

10. National Security Study Memorandum 51

Washington, April 26, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, May 23, 1969, 1217Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to New Delhi for the Secretary's party.

12. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to President Nixon

Bangkok, June 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret.

13. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 19, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by R. L. Sneider on June 19. The memorandum is unsigned but bears Kissinger's handwritten initials in the upper right-hand corner.

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, July 9, 1969, 2353Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Linwood Starbird (EA/TB); cleared by Cross and Brown (EA), Dennis Doolin (OASD/ISA), Robert McCloskey (P), and Davis R. Robinson (S); and approved by Green.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, July 10, 1969, 1049Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate.

16. Department of State Briefing Paper

Washington, July 10, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, President's Trip Files, President Nixon's Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thailand. Secret. Drafted by Starbird and Martin (EA/TB) and cleared by Spear, Sullivan, and Devine (OASD). Prepared for the President's July around-the-world trip to Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 17.

17. Department of State Briefing Paper

Washington, July 11, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, President's Trip Files, President Nixon's Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thailand. Secret. Drafted by Spear and Nelson (EA/TB) and approved by Green. Prepared for the President's July around-the-world trip to Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 16.

18. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, July 29, 1969, 10:10 a.m.–2:28 p.m.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105, Geopolitical File, Asian Trips, July–Aug. 1969. Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff Files, Tony Lake Chron File, [June 1969–May 1970], [4 of 6]. Secret; Sensitive. According to President Nixon's Daily Diary, the participants included Nixon, Thanom, Thanat, Kissinger, and Dawee. Presumably, Lake was also present. The meeting was held in the Conference Room of the Government House in Bangkok. The closing time of the meeting is also from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The President's ideas, only very briefly outlined here, became known as the Nixon or Guam doctrine.

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, August 12, 1969, 1123Z.

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 25, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn; Nodis. A note to Kissinger on the first page in Nixon's hand reads: “Urgent. K—Give me a brief statement as to [how to] handle this issue if Fulbright raises it Tuesday A.M.” According to an attached September 15 memorandum from Ken Cole to Kissinger, the President was referring to a September 16 meeting with Fulbright. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was of high priority.

21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 26, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on September 16.

22. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 28, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an unsigned copy.

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, September 9, 1969, 0955Z.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, 1969 September. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 1056Z. Repeated to SECDEF,JCS, and CINCPAC.

24. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 15, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret.

25. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, September 15, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret.

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, September 16, 1969, 0910Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate.

27. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 18, 1969, 4 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter (EA/TB) and approved by Kissinger on October 6. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. This conversation was also reported in telegram 160368 to Bangkok, September 19. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)

28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, September 24, 1969, 2030Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok.

29. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 20, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, WSAG Meeting 10/6/69 Laos. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Drafted by Holdridge. According to a handwritten and stamped notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 22.

30. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 30, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The memorandum is part 1 of 3; part 3 is ibid.; part 2 is Document 31.

31. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 30, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The memorandum is part 2 of 3; part 3 is ibid; part 1 is Document 30.

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, October 31, 1969, 0245Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1–1 THAI–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to SECDEF, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 1, 1969, 0402Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

34. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 5, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 11, 1969, 0623Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

36. Editorial Note

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 13, 1969, 1146Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, November 20, 1969, 1132Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis.

39. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew

Washington, December 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 450, President's Trip Files, V.P. Trip East Asia, January 1970. Secret.

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, December 23, 1969, 0936Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

41. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 24, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret; Umbra. Sent for information. Two notations in Kissinger's handwriting read: “Let me call Allen tomorrow” and “Please move on this. HK”

42. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 29, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. A notation in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Let's get this moved.”

43. Telegram From the Vice President's Party to the Department of State

Bali, January 11, 1970, 0813Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate. U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Francis Galbraith was traveling with the Vice President.

44. Telegram From the Vice President's Party to the Department of State

Bali, January 12, 1970, 0330Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate.

45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, January 22, 1970.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) THAI. Confidential. A covering January 13 memorandum from Hannah to Rogers, attached but not printed, indicates that both memoranda were drafted by George K. Pierson, Office Director for Southeast Asia, Bureau of East Asia, Agency for International Development, and were cleared by Green and Dexter, among others.

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Bangkok, January 28, 1970, 1515Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Confidential. Drafted by Joseph B. Kyle (E/ORF/ICD) and Walter West (EA/TB) on January 27; cleared by Dexter; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Barnett (EA).

47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 6, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.

48. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter; approved by Moore (EA) and Okun (S) on March 12. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; part 2 is Document 49; part 3, entitled “Thanat Views on Relations with China,” and part 4, entitled “SEATO Council Meeting,” are not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US) The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

49. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and approved by Moore and Okun on March 12. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 2 of 4; regarding parts 1, 3, and 4, see footnote 1, Document 48.

50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 25, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the first page reads: “Holdridge action.”

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, March 3, 1970, 1140Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 1 THAI–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

52. Editorial Note

53. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Washington, March 22, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret. In a March 22 memorandum Haig requested that the message be passed “on an urgent basis through established backchannel” to Thanat.

54. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Military Assistant (Haig)

Washington, March 22, 1970.

55. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Washington, March 23, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret. In a March 24 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kissinger noted that his message to Thanat had been drafted by the Department of State and had “been approved and slightly modified by the President. It was dispatched via the same channel that Foreign Minister Thanat's message was sent to me.” Attached but not printed.

56. Editorial Note

57. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, March 26, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.

58. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Washington, March 26, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a March 26 memorandum Haig requested that the message be transmitted “through our special channel” and “not be shared with any other individual.”

59. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, March 26, 1970, 2:34–3:06 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

60. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 8, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

61. Summary of Conclusions of WSAG Meeting

Washington, April 14, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–073, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia and Laos, 4/14/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to an April 15 memorandum from Jeanne Davis to U. Alexis Johnson, Nutter, Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson of the JCS, and Karamessines.

62. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Bangkok, May 11, 1970.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504, Box 1. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Rogers, CINCPAC, and Kissinger.

63. Editorial Note

64. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

Washington, May 20, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate. Repeated to Saigon for Bunker and Abrams and to CINCPAC for Admiral McCain.

65. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, May 21, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 11, May 1970. Top Secret. Drafted by Hicks (EA/TB) and Colonel Arthur Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation in Johnson's handwriting reads: “P.S. There is also an aspect on this I want to discuss directly with you. UAJ.”

66. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Bangkok, May 21, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074,WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70.

67. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

Washington, June 2, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Repeated to Saigon for Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams and to CINCPAC Honolulu for Admiral McCain.

68. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 5, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting (in addition to his initials) reads: “Take up in June 9 WSAG.” Another notation in Haig's handwriting reads: “John next WSAG.”

69. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 13, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive.

70. Editorial Note

71. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, June 20, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation on the memorandum reads: “P.S. You will recall Henry expressed interest in this. When we have our ducks in a row I suggest that we brief him. UAJ”

72. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 26, 1970, 11 a.m.

73. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 30, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive.

74. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Saigon, July 5, 1970, 0940Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–72: Entry 3051 B: Box 516. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger and approved in S by Peter Johnson and William Brandt. Repeated to Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Rogers had been in Manila for the SEATO meeting and in Saigon for the TCC meeting.

75. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, July 9, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for action.

76. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, July 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

77. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 16, 1970.

78. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 18, 1970.

79. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, July 23, 1970.

Source: Washington National Records Center, FRC 330 74 0142, Signers Copies Folder #24. Top Secret; Sensitive.

80. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, July 30, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret. A notation in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Al—I agree, I want the whole'71 package spelled out and communicated to DOD along the lines of VSSG decisions.”

81. Editorial Note

82. Summary Paper in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 51

Washington, August 5, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 2. Top Secret. According to a September 16 memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the response to NSSM 51 was not completed, but instead was incorporated into NSSM 99, Southeast Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, NSC Files: 80 D 212, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 1, NSC Admin. Matters, January 1970)

83. Editorial Note

84. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 14, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

85. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 14, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

86. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Apparently drafted by Holdridge and Kennedy, as evidenced by their attached August 26 memorandum to Kissinger. There is no indication that the President saw this memorandum, and a notation in the margin of the Holdridge/Kennedy memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads “Al—I think this is probably OBE. What do you think? At any rate please put in the files (as well as my personal files).” A notation next to it in Haig's handwriting reads: “Agree.”

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, September 5, 1970, 1824Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 449, President's Trip Files, Vice President's SEA Trip, Aug 1970. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Taipei, Rangoon, CINCPAC, and the White House.

88. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, September 10, 1970, 4:05–4:40 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

89. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, September 18, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “They have proven their contention ad nauseum.”

90. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Bangkok, September 18, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages—1970, Southeast Asia. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. An attached September 21 memorandum to Kissinger requested that this and other messages to Johnson and Green also be forwarded to Kissinger.

91. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1970, 2:15 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat, (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, October 9, this memorandum of conversation was drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

92. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1970, 3:15 p.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and approved in S on October 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

93. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, October 9, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter, cleared by Wilson and Corcoran (EA), and approved by Green.

94. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon

Washington, October 23, 1970.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Box 9 of 16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

95. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)

Washington, October 27, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Country Files, Box 563, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached October 22 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger reads: “Following the WSAG meeting on October 16 you asked that a letter be drafted from you to Ambassador Unger to make it clear to him what the situation is here with respect to the emergency employment of Thai air and ground forces in Cambodia. A draft letter for your signature is at Tab A.” The approval line of the memorandum is checked next to a recommendation that reads: “That you approve transmittal of this letter by back-channel message to Bangkok.” A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “urgent for dispatch.” A notation at the end of the memorandum reads: “Dispatched. Rec'd in Bangkok 10:15 on the 27th.”

96. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, November 19, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter and Brown and cleared by Wilson.

97. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Bangkok, November 20, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 THAI. Secret; Official-Informal.

98. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, November 20, 1970, 10:44–11:19 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

99. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Bangkok, November 27, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Official–Informal.

100. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 1, 1970.

101. Diplomatic Note From Secretary of State Rogers to the Ambassador of Thailand (Hongladarom)

Washington, December 10, 1970.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON. No classification marking. Drafted by West and cleared by Alexander Shakow (AID/EA/I), Malcolm H. Churchill (EA/IND), and Elizabeth M. Denham (S/S).

102. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 15, 1970, noon.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger on December 17 for approval under cover of an attached memorandum with the notation: “Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, no further distribution appears warranted.” The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in France

Bangkok, January 5, 1971, 1233Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 23 THAI. Secret; Priority;Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State and to CINCPAC.

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, January 11, 1971, 0909Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF THAI–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

105. Memorandum for the President's File

Washington, January 18, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive.

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, January 25, 1971, 1230Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority.

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, February 2, 1971, 1003Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta.

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Commanding General of the U.S. Air Force in Thailand (Evans)

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1121Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State, CINCPAC, and SAC.

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1205Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority.

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, March 11, 1971, 0957Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Singapore.

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, March 16, 1971, 1105Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Djakarta.

112. Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 10:26–11:55 a.m.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Files, Minutes, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the conference room of the Western White House. A notation on the minutes indicates Nelson, [name not declassified], and Blee of CIA were not present for the entire meeting.

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, April 4, 1971, 0549Z.

Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 15–1 THAI. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.

114. Memorandum of Conversation

Bangkok, April 8, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Confidential. Drafted by Tomseth with the concurrence of Bekker and Barger, and approved by Pickering. The meeting was held at the American Embassy.

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, January 14, 1969, 1119Z.

513. 1. This morning I called at my suggestion on the Prime Minister[2] and took advantage of my prospective visit with Ambassador Johnson in Saigon later this week to raise with him questions about important developments in Thailand. Present at our conversation were Foreign Minister Thanat and Government House Secretary-General, General Sawaeng.

2. I first said that Amb Johnson will undoubtedly have been informed in general terms about the insurgency situation and I would like to pass on the Prime Minister's assessment, particularly with regard to the recent intensified action in the three-province area of the North. The Prime Minister replied in rather general terms noting the importance to the counter-insurgency effort of the kind of matériel and equipment which the US is providing, both for security forces and for development activities. The Prime Minister specifically mentioned communications equipment for the police, the helicopter delivery schedule, modernization of weapons, and assistance to support programs to improve the livelihood of the hill tribes and we agreed that we would have our respective staffs see that everything necessary was being provided. This gave me an opportunity to emphasize the importance of the Thais making full utilization of equipment already on hand and being sure that they were ready to receive and use on arrival new equipment in the pipeline. I also warmly endorsed the Prime Minister's reference to helping the hill tribes and mentioned to him our impression from discussions in the North that Thai officials had not been given as concrete policy directive concerning their dealings with the hill tribes as would be useful. I emphasized the importance of Thai Government officials recognizing the hill tribe population as part of the Thai nation and dealing with them in such a way as to make friends and avoid building any additional hostility. The Prime Minister readily agreed with these observations. I also emphasized the importance of collecting more and better intelligence and we noted as a useful first step the setting up of a new JSC in Phitsanulok. In general we concluded that Mr. Tanham will keep in close touch with Generals Surakij and Saiyud and others as pertinent to follow up on these matters.

3. I then asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything on the coming elections and he said that there was “nothing worth saying” to Ambassador Johnson at this time, although he indicated his general satisfaction with the way matters were proceeding.

4. I then mentioned that the new administration will undoubtedly be occupied with the question of security and US military posture with regard to Southeast Asia in the period following a Vietnam settlement. I asked the Prime Minister whether there was any Thai Government thinking on this subject which he would like me to pass on to Ambassador Johnson. After some expressions of concern about the military situation in Laos the Prime Minister in effect passed the ball on this question to Foreign Minister Thanat. The latter first went through his familiar recitation about American journalists, senators, professors and others who obviously wanted no part of any American presence or activity in this part of the world. Contrary to earlier comments, he did not express confidence about the new administration in this regard. He concluded by saying, with the Prime Minister's agreement, that the Thai Government was not in a position to comment on these matters until the new US administration was able to provide some kind of a picture of what will be its security policy for Southeast Asia, and Thanat emphasized that given all the uncertainties of the past many months, the RTG hopes that clarification on this matter will be available soon. Before we left this subject the Prime Minister volunteered that, with regard to the current situation, Thailand does not need any more US forces; I accepted his point but noted that my question had related to a period following a Vietnam settlement when there would be a new situation.

5. At one point in our conversation the Prime Minister referred to the Anderson article in Parade and indicated his distress. He seemed to feel that my statement to the press had been helpful and was pleased that I had made my position clear to His Majesty when received in audience last Saturday morning.[3]

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo for Ambassador Johnson.

[2] Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand.

[3] January 11.

2. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, January 16, 1969.

SUBJECT

LOTUS

PARTICIPANTS

Minister Pote Sarasin

Ambassador Unger

After I asked Minister Pote for his assessment of how the election campaign was going and about the prospects for the government party and received some generally optimistic comments, I then proceeded to some specific points. In the first place I mentioned the party image and the fact that to many voters it might be important to know that the government party has a strong civilian component and was not just a party of military men. For this reason it seemed to me important that Pote and other civilians be brought to the voters' attention so that they are aware of these important civilian elements. Pote said, as he had before, that he was not very skillful at public rallies, but that he would, for example, be going with the Prime Minister for the opening of several roads in the Northeast which would get a good deal of publicity. He also mentioned a very large meeting he had had awhile back with taxi drivers who have been organized into a kind of mutual benefit cooperative, and he said that when he has some kind of entrée as in this case, he has made efforts to reach the public. I noted that this was a point that could also be covered in campaign literature with pictures and brief reference to his activities.

As to election prospects, Pote specifically expressed concern about the Northeast, where one-third of the country's population resides and where he feared that Thep and other small parties and independents might be able to pick up considerable support. He said the Northeasterners are congenitally opposed to the establishment and that Thep is also busy trying to win them over by promising to eliminate the rice premium, etc. Pote explained some of the more abstract economic arguments as to why Thep was wrong, but he acknowledged that these were unlikely to make much of an impact on voters. I said instead that the government party could make it clear what the premium is used for and how much benefit the farmer gets back from this tax. It was important that all the people being reached by Thep be reached by these counter arguments, whether in person or through graphic handbills or whatever.

I expressed concern about the discontented ex-SPT members who might be dividing the vote upcountry and thus preventing either the government candidate or themselves from getting into power and opening the way instead to an anti-government candidate. Pote acknowledged this problem and I asked whether some of those break-away candidates were now getting support from some of the people in the government party. Pote said that now that Chamnan is out of the political scene this was not the case. I asked what had happened to Chamnan's well organized political machine in the provinces and Pote said that he felt it had lost a good deal of its organization and effectiveness.

On party organization Pote averred that headquarters are now being set up in every one of the changwats and they would be appropriately identified and advertised. Pote also confirmed in reply to my question that funds had now been provided to all of the candidates and all of the provincial headquarters, along the line he had earlier sketched out to me (see my message of Dec 17 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]). I emphasized at this point and several other times the importance of candidates in the provinces being well supplied with points of argument and information that they could use effectively with the voters. For example, I said it was very important to the candidate to be able to say what the government had done and what it contemplates doing in that particular area, where projects would have special meaning for those voters.

I referred to government party policy and asked whether this would now be disseminated and whether this was related to the Pramane Grounds meeting scheduled for next week. Pote confirmed that this was the case, but he minimized the importance of a party policy statement saying that the voter was interested only in very concrete and specific matters and not in broad general principles.

I then told Pote I would like to “kibitz” a little bit about the election campaign and pass on to him some thoughts that I had developed on the basis of experience with our own elections in the US as well as other areas. I realized that some of these points would have limited or no pertinence to the Thai scene, but I nevertheless would pass them along for what help they might provide. I then reviewed the two memoranda, “Points To Be Made” and “How?”[2] Pote listened rather more carefully than I had anticipated to my review of these points and appeared to take a number of them in. When I had finished he asked to have the papers so that he could translate them into Thai and pass them to a few people who could make good use of them. I said I would give them to him if he liked, but obviously it was very important that a US role of this sort not be known. Pote said that if they were translated into Thai any appearance of a US origin would be removed and that he would bear in mind to restrict use.

In discussing the points contained in these two memoranda Pote made a few specific observations of interest. He was particularly receptive of the idea of making full propaganda use of the government's contribution in the economic and social fields and cited many additional specific examples, and agreed with the importance of these accomplishments of the government and future projected accomplishments being brought to public attention. He specifically mentioned a film which we had provided which he would be shortly showing to His Majesty on his return from Chiang Mai, which would then be shown on television all over the country just a week before the elections; this sets forth the Thai Government's accomplishments over recent years. With regard to the Prime Minister, Pote mentioned that although he is not very aggressive, he does make a very effective contact with the people and that his modest manner had very considerable appeal to the Thais. On some of the specific Saha Pracha Thai activities, Pote indicated that many of these had already been considered and adopted by the party but they were waiting to use some of these until the campaign was further along. He made the point that the party wished to wait long enough so that the other parties would not have an opportunity to answer whatever campaign lines were launched.

I mentioned to Pote my conversation several days earlier with General Sawaeng [3] and said that I had contemplated having Minister Hannah pass on some of these same thoughts to Gen. Sawaeng. Pote said he would be handing the translation of what I had given him to General Sawaeng and it was not necessary to pass it along separately, to which I agreed.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand Lotus File 1968–69. Secret; Special Handling. Drafted by Unger. The meeting was held at Sarasin's residence. A notation on the upper right hand memorandum indicates Godley saw it.

[2] Attached but not printed. The two memoranda outline points to stress for winning elections, including emphasizing economic achievement.

[3] After his meeting with Thanom, Thanat, and Sawaeng on January 14 (Document 1), Unger met alone with Sawaeng to discuss the upcoming Thai election. (Memorandum of conversation, January 14; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Thailand Lotus File, 1968–69)

3. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee[1]

Washington, February 7, 1969.

SUBJECT

Covert Support of the Thai Government Party in the Thai National Parliamentary Elections

1. Summary

On 11 November 1965, in response to a request from Ambassador Graham Martin and after 303 Committee approval, high authority authorized covert funding support [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to a political party to be formed by responsible Thai Government leaders.[2] Approval for this support was reaffirmed by higher authority on 15 September 1967 after favorable review by the 303 Committee. A final review was made on 16 August 1968. Funding which commenced on 31 August 1968 was completed on 4 February 1969. The Thai general elections will be held on 10 February 1969. A general accounting of the use of the funds by category has been obtained by Ambassador Leonard Unger. A recommendation is made that a report on the results of the election be made to the 303 Committee and, if possible, a relationship drawn between the results and the effectiveness of the financial support provided.

2. Background

In June 1965 a final draft constitution for Thailand had been completed providing for general elections which were assumed would be held in mid-or late 1966. With this in mind, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in June 1965 approached Ambassador Martin with a request for covert U.S. assistance to be used in conjunction with the upcoming general elections. Ambassador Martin subsequently proposed to Washington that CIA draw up a program of covert election support with the primary objective being to develop a viable political apparatus in Thailand under the present pro-U.S. leadership and to ensure the continuity of this leadership. A memorandum requesting 303 Committee authorization for such a program was presented to the 303 Committee on 7 October 1965. It estimated that initial funding requirements would be on the order of [dollar amount not declassified], stated that the number of witting Thai officials could probably be kept to six, [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. The 303 Committee approved the proposal for the expenditure of [dollar amount not declassified] subject to approval by higher authority which was given on 11 November 1965.

The draft constitution of June 1965 was delayed in debate, however, and the proposal remained in abeyance. Following the passing of the third and final reading of the constitution in February 1968, the subject of covert political support was reopened by the Thais. [1 line of source text not declassified], approached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Bangkok with a request for covert election support based on past commitments. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was advised that this question would have to be discussed with the Ambassador. [name not declassified] subsequently discussed the same matter with Ambassador Unger on 22 March 1968, noting that he was aware of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] level of support previously considered. [name not declassified]emphasized that only [1 line of source text not declassified], were aware of the previous U.S. commitment. After a series of informal talks, Ambassador Unger requested authority from Washington to proceed with this covert support. After 303 Committee consideration on 16 August 1968, a message was sent to Ambassador Unger from Assistant Secretary of State Mr. William Bundy authorizing the initiation of a covert funding program. This message was specifically cleared by both the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the President. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (30 lines of source text) and 1 heading not declassified]

4. Recommendations

A report on the outcome of the Thai elections scheduled to be held on 10 February 1969 will be made to the 303 Committee. If possible, an analysis of the relationship of this outcome to the effectiveness of the support provided should be made.

[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Thailand. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the bottom left-hand corner of the first page reads, “303 Committee briefed on 11 February 1969.”

[2] See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Documents 305 and 306 .

4. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, March 9, 1969, 10–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok on 9 March 1969

CM–4011–69

1. Prime Minister Thanom invited Secretary Laird to visit Thailand during his trip to Vietnam. Since Mr. Laird was unable to accept the Prime Minister's invitation due to time limitations, the Prime Minister suggested through Ambassador Unger that I come to Bangkok in his stead. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary Froehlke and I traveled to Bangkok on 9 March. We met with Prime Minister Thanom and Air Marshal Dawee, Deputy Minister of Defense, at the Prime Minister's residence, for about an hour and a quarter, beginning at 10 A.M. Present at the meeting were Prime Minister Thanom, Air Marshal Dawee, Ambassador Unger, Deputy Chief of Mission Hannah, Major General McCown, the Chief of our Military Assistance Group in Thailand, Assistant Secretary Froehlke and myself. Air Marshal Dawee acted as interpreter as necessary.

2. After the usual pleasantries, I briefed the Prime Minister on the military situation in South Vietnam, using a map, and pointing out that the situation was militarily favorable. I stated that the enemy had achieved no military successes and, contrary to the effects of the Tet offensive of 1968, little or no psychological success. Nevertheless, the enemy had not committed sizeable main force VC and regular NVA formations; therefore, the enemy continued to have the capability to mount substantial attacks, particularly in the I Corps Tactical Zone and the III Corps Tactical Zone. I observed that General Abrams and his subordinate commanders were confident that they could defeat any initiatives undertaken by VC/NVA forces.

3. As to the attitude of the South Vietnamese regarding rocket attacks on Saigon, I stated that I had been surprised at the calmness of President Thieu, Prime Minister Huong and General Vien and their feeling that these attacks did not as of the moment constitute a disturbing political factor for the Government of Vietnam. Of course, were these attacks to be continued over a long period of time or if they were increased in magnitude the situation could change radically and suddenly. The Prime Minister appeared to be completely satisfied with my presentation and showed great interest in the location of enemy main combat elements.

4. I then asked the Prime Minister if he would be good enough to discuss the insurgency problem in Thailand and to give me the benefit of his thinking as regards the magnitude of the dissidents and the counter action being undertaken by the Thai Government. He responded willingly. He stated that the dissident group in the North was comprised of hill tribesmen who were being subverted by agents from the outside. The group is not large nor does he consider the danger of expansion great so long as the Government moves promptly to suppress the insurgents' efforts. In this connection, he pointed out that the dissident elements were located in very remote and extremely difficult country which required that the insertion of Government forces and their resupply be done by helicopter. He expressed the view, backed up by Air Marshal Dawee, that the Thai forces need more helicopters in order to cope with the threat and to maintain an acceptable number of helicopters at all times ready for operational use. Turning to the dissident problem in southern Thailand he stated that the insurgent group there was also quite small; however their activities were tied in with those of similar Malaysian groups and this complicated the problem. Nevertheless the Thai High Command is now planning with Malaysian officials joint operations against the southern dissident elements.

5. The conversation then turned to the need of the Thai forces for more helicopters and for the provision of M–16 rifles. The justification for the latter one was the usual one: the enemy dissidents are better armed with communist-type weapons than are the Thai forces. I responded by citing the production limitations on M–16 rifles and the priority which, of necessity, had to be given the Free World forces in South Vietnam. I added that we were in the process of expanding M–16 production and that it was a matter which could be discussed in the usual channel; namely with Ambassador Unger and General McCown.

6. The meeting ended on the same friendly note that had been maintained throughout our interview. The Prime Minister thanked Assistant Secretary of Defense Froehlke and myself for coming to Bangkok and expressed the hope that Secretary Laird would be able to visit Thailand at some future time. He also asked me to convey his warm regards to President Nixon.

7. After we left the Prime Minister's residence, Ambassador Unger stated that he felt that our meeting had been a great success; the Thais are very sensitive as to their status as one of the troop-contributing nations and are desirous of being able to publicize the visits of ranking U.S. officials to consult with their leaders regarding the war. The Ambassador's observation was borne out by newspaper articles emanating over the next three days from Bangkok sources.

Earle G. Wheeler

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Thanom's residence. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it. The memorandum of conversation was attached to a March 18 covering memorandum from Colonel Robert E. Pursley, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to Kissinger.

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, March 11, 1969, 1154Z.

2928. Subject: Message to Prime Minister.

1. With Field Marshal Thanom already renamed PriMin by the King, expected to announce his new cabinet momentarily, and expected to present his new government's program to joint session of Parliament March 19 or 20, I believe it would be most appropriate for US to take formal note of Thailand's installation of a government constitutionally responsible to Parliament. I therefore strongly recommend the President send Thanom a message of congratulations on his new appointment. Most suitable delivery time would be just after Thanom presents government policy statement to Parliament.

2. We have been encouraged by Thai return to constitutional government. We have not, however, sent formal official congratulatory messages either at time of promulgation of constitution in June 1968 or following February 10 national elections,[2] largely because such messages could have been construed here as paternalistic and elsewhere if known as indicative of US influence behind Thai developments. Assumption of office by PriMin is, in contrast, an appropriate occasion to offer congratulations and to testify to our continuing cooperation without incurring disadvantages noted above.

3. Moreover, while RTG leaders have to date adjusted rather well to new political arena in which they are operating, taking opposition attacks during electoral campaign and failure to achieve absolute majority by balloting process more or less in stride, strains will continue and may well increase when opposition speaks out in elected House. Temptation to return to “good old days” and avoid all this parliamentary unpleasantness will still lurk in some leaders' minds. An expression of favorable US view toward Thai constitutional development, at time and in manner that avoid any aura of interference in Thai internal affairs, could help to encourage RTG leaders to accept inconvenient aspects of constitutional government.

4. I suggest text along following lines: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I wish to congratulate you on your appointment by His Majesty the King of Thailand to serve once again as Prime Minister. Your formation of a new government, following elections under the new constitution, marks an important milestone in Thai political history and is a tribute to your leadership. I look forward to a continuation of our close cooperation in pursuit of peace and freedom.”[3]

5. Although no congratulatory messages on election results have been publicized, we have had indications that Koreans and perhaps a few others have sent them in one form or another.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Confidential.

[2] The Thai national elections of February 10 resulted in a victory for the government parties, albeit a limited one. The Saha Pracha Thai (SPT) party of Thanom elected 75 deputies to the 219-member Lower House. Independent candidates, over half of whom were financially supported by Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, won 72 seats. The opposition Democrats won 57 seats, with the remaining 15 going to various minor groups. INR Intelligence Note No. 114, February 20, reported that the election “enhanced” Praphat's position and was likely to result in “a stronger behind-the-scenes role” for him. Forty-four Senators were appointed later in the month in order to bring the Senate up to its new constitutional size, and it remained securely under the control of the government party. Note No. 114 reported that Praphat was “unlikely to seriously threaten Thanom's position as Prime Minister” and was “probably aware that he would be an unacceptable Prime Minister to many Thais, from the King on down.” It added, however, that the composition of the post-election cabinet would probably reflect his wishes “that Thanom's leadership position will be more circumscribed,” and that the influence of civilian leaders, such as Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, could be decreased.” (Ibid., POL 14 THAI)

[3] See Document 7.

6. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon [1]

Washington, March 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Congratulatory Message to Thai Prime Minister

Recommendation

For reasons set forth below, I recommend that you approve the attached message of congratulation to Marshal Thanom on his reappointment as Prime Minister.[2] This message includes a general restatement of our security commitment to Thailand.

Discussion

On March 7 the King designated Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn as Prime Minister under the new Thai Constitution. A message from you congratulating him on his reappointment would be appropriate.

We believe it would be in our interest to use this message as an occasion for reaffirming the U.S. security commitment to Thailand.

We have reliable intelligence that the Thai leaders are currently in a mood of questioning and doubt with regard to the firmness of the U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia. This has been heightened by the Communist offensive in Viet-Nam (which the Thai view as a breach of the “understandings” which led to the total bombing halt) and the U.S. reaction to it. They are also apprehensive about the forthcoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee review of U.S. commitments. Many of these concerns have been reflected in recent public statements by the Thai Foreign Minister.

While initially reassured by your election, the Thai leaders are in some doubt about the policies of the new Administration. They have made it clear that they are hoping for a full discussion of where we expect to go in the war in Viet-Nam and the Paris peace talks during the SEATO and TCC meetings. But it will be risky to leave them in doubt regarding our basic intentions in the two and a half months until these meetings.

Early in the last two Administrations the President sent a message reaffirming in general terms the United States security commitment to Thailand, so there are precedents for such a message. Conversely, the absence of a message could be noted by Thai leaders and add to their concern in their present mood.

WPR

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Spear and cleared by Godley and William P. Bundy.

[2] Attached but not printed.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Washington, March 26, 1969, 0152Z.

46292. 1. Request Ambassador transmit following message to Prime Minister from President:

2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Congratulations and sincere good wishes on your designation by His Majesty as Prime Minister. Under your continued leadership, I am confident that Thailand will sustain the remarkable rate of development it has experienced in past years, and will remain firm in the defense of freedom.

I want to reaffirm to you, at the outset of this Administration, that the United States will continue to support Thailand and its resistance to Communist aggression and subversion. We fully intend to honor our SEATO obligation.

Secretary Rogers will report to me on his conversations with you and your colleagues when he returns from the May SEATO Council Meeting in Bangkok. This meeting will provide an excellent opportunity for you and the Secretary to review in depth the various issues of mutual concern. It will, as well, be a most welcome occasion for our two new governments to reaffirm the close ties between our countries that are so essential to the maintenance of freedom in East Asia.

Sincerely, Richard Nixon”

3. The White House does not plan to make this communication public.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 15–1 THAI. Confidential. Drafted by Spear on March 10; cleared by William Bundy, Secretary Rogers, and in the White House by Richard Moose; and revised in the White House on March 25.

8. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting With The President

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign

Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Thai Minister of Communications Arun Panupong, Thai Chargé d'Affaires

United States

U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Moncrieff J. Spear, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

Referring to his meeting with the President at the reception the previous evening,[2] Dawee said he had had a good talk. The President has asked his views on Viet-Nam. He had replied that every day that went by was a loss of time because American casualties continued to grow. He also relayed a message from the Prime Minister that following the bombing halt the situation in Southeast Asia had gotten worse. One way or another, we should find a way to resume bombing in North Viet-Nam. Dawee also felt that we should be prepared to use South Viet-Nam ground forces to cut the infiltration. They were both capable and had the will to do this job.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Spear and approved in J on April 9. The meeting was held in Johnson's office. The memorandum is part 6 of 6; parts 1 through 5 are ibid.

[2] A memorandum of this conversation, March 31, is ibid.

9. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Godley)[1]

Bangkok, April 10, 1969.

Dear Mac:

Thanks very much for your March 28 letter.[2] You have identified some of the really tough questions which are likely to face us in more or less direct fashion at the SEATO and TCC meetings in May, but whether or not there, then surely in increasingly active form later on. In this letter I'll try to give you some first answers and perhaps we can fit in an exchange or two more[3] before the meetings themselves.

Thanat Ploy

You are quite right to raise questions about Thanat's role and motivations in his rather excessive recourse recently to the press and public platforms. I have been troubled for some time by the apparent inconsistency between his deploring what he regards as serious waverings in American determination and resolve with regard to contributing to the defense of the Free World in Southeast Asia and his occasional insistence on a bilateral security treaty, no doubt motivated by these concerns; and on the other hand, his verbal approaches to Communist China and occasional expressions of reservations about a continued American military presence here. In a way I think we have to read this ambivalence as a product, at least in part, of our own current ambivalence in which we are on the one hand stoutly devoting great blood and treasure to the defense of Southeast Asia, which even Thanat cannot deny, but at the same time exhibiting to the world (no doubt in exaggerated form) a body politic, including much of the press, most of the youth, highly influential congressmen, and a preponderance of the articulate intellectual community, which condemns our involvement in Vietnam and which is obviously apprehensive even about our present degree of involvement in Thailand, which it tends to see as going the way of Vietnam. The Thai, to oversimplify somewhat, have increasingly based their national policy on collective security since 1954, and many of their own initiatives, and even more their agreement to actions of ours, including those on their territory, have been based on the continued availability of a protective cover from the US in case of trouble. Now Thanat and the Thai ask themselves to what extent that cover is still available and relate that question also to our readiness to see through the Vietnam process to the point where South Vietnam is going to be at least tolerably able to decide its own future without outside interference.

Most Thais don't take seriously the threat of massive Communist invasion as a likelihood in present circumstances, although they would undoubtedly argue that if there is an obvious American disengagement from Southeast Asia, the deterrent to such an invasion will have been largely removed and the possibility increased that the Chinese might return to something like Korean War methods. The President's recent message to the Prime Minister[4] and the assurances provided by Marshall Green, together with what I presume Secretary Rogers will be saying in May, will probably keep those apprehensions in the background for most of the Thai leadership even though Thanat will probably not desist from carping comments. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Thai don't want our direct military involvement in their insurgency, although they certainly are counting on our continued contribution through MAP and AID to the support of their own counter-insurgency. There is, unfortunately, an ambiguous middle area between an invasion and the insurgency and I think it is here that our most difficult policy problems lie. This brings us to the Laos problem above all, and I'll save further discussion of it for the next section.

Thanat has become increasingly over the past ten years, and particularly since Thanom has been Prime Minister, the architect of Thai foreign policy. In fields such as the promotion of regional activities, the position in the UN and dealing with the US on matters such as the Paris negotiations, he has, in my opinion, an almost completely free hand. He also has been one of the three or four most influential decision-makers on such matters as sending forces to South Vietnam and on relations with neighboring countries. However, I think it is questionable whether Thanat would have won out if, for example, he had opposed the sending of the Queen's Cobras and Black Panthers to Vietnam, or if he had insisted on strong initiatives to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cambodia; the fundamental military leadership still controls these matters in the last analysis. Thanat has been able to play the role that he has because he has been basically in agreement with the military leadership on these matters. Similarly, on the question of future US military presence here, including in the post-Vietnam period, Thanat's voice will probably not be decisive since prime matters of national security will be involved and the military leadership will make the final decisions.

In spite of this, however, Thanat is heavily depended upon by the military leadership and especially the Prime Minister, and his familiarity with the American scene makes him particularly important as an advisor about relations with us. Thus, Thanat could be very influential in convincing the leadership that a collective security policy based on US participation was no longer realistic for Thailand. If he should undertake this (and I do not believe he is presently doing so) and be successful, then the military leadership would have a much more negative attitude about Thai participation in Vietnam and the future US military presence in Thailand than they have today. At the present time I believe Thanat's role with the military leadership is to raise some warning signals about the future American role and to stimulate some thinking about contingent actions in case the US should in fact disengage from Southeast Asia. The military leadership consists largely of simplistic thinkers in the foreign policy and military strategy fields; the subtleties of regional security organizations and Paris negotiations do not interest or concern them very much.

There are others on the Thai scene who play some role in the foreign affairs field, notably Pote Sarasin who undoubtedly does advise the Prime Minister in a somewhat conservative and definitely pro-US vein. While Pote has on occasion made some dubious comment about some of Thanat's more unbridled statements, he has shown no disposition to challenge Thanat's leading role in the foreign affairs field. A possible future figure of importance is Bunchana Atthakorn and in this regard I call your attention to the enclosed press article on a recent speech of his. As time goes on, there possibly will also be new members of the military leadership who will have some more sophistication about foreign policy and military strategy, including emerging leaders like General Kriangsak. Today, however, the field is left very largely to the Prime Minister, Praphat, Dawee and Thanat for the basic decisions.

Another factor of increasing importance in Thanat's thinking, I believe, is his growing concern as a somewhat over-sensitive Thai nationalist about the impact of the presence here of 50,000 American military. Thanat, and most other Thais for that matter, are enough aware of what South Vietnam looks like today from the inside to know that they do not want American ground forces participating in fighting in Thailand. Thanat, and even more some members of the new Parliament and younger, semi-intellectual Thais, are increasingly disturbed about what happens to Thai communities under heavy GI influence and they are also vaguely uneasy about the effect on Thailand's freedom of decision in an increasingly tricky and uncertain period. Thanat is also over-sensitive at the twitting he no doubt gets occasionally from his colleagues in neighboring countries (although I would guess this is less true than in the past) and in international forums such as the UN about Thailand's having become so closely tied to the US. None of these things, in my opinion, will lead Thanat to begin to press for the pullout of American forces here, or even a substantial reduction, as long as the Vietnam war requires their presence. He does not like to have it assumed, however, that once that is past Thailand can be taken for granted as a home for indefinite US deployments in the future. You have noted, I am sure, however, that Thanat has carefully left a loophole in all of his statements about US withdrawal from Thailand which makes it clear that the Thais might find that there were compelling reasons why some US forces should remain here. I believe that in the absence of a virtually utopian settlement of Southeast Asia's security problems, Thanat will in fact, along with the military leadership, wish to have some continued US presence unless we seem to have gone the total disengagement route.

You are undoubtedly right in suspecting, too, that Thanat is in part addressing the American public. He bitterly resents the references which occasionally (and a good deal less frequently than he alleges) appear in the American press about Thailand's sending “mercenaries” to Vietnam and about Thailand's being a US puppet and one of “our boys”, ready slavishly to do the US bidding as long as we continue to throw a few bones its way. Thanat is also acutely conscious of the “Thailand: the next Vietnam” theme. For all of these reasons he is intent on conveying to the American public the sense of an independent RTG posture, even some reservations about or hostility to the US, and removing the black and white image of Thailand as a single-minded, anti-Communist US ally. In my mind this is surely one of his reasons for making such repeated loud noises about a willingness to talk with Communist China. Thanat, not unjustifiably in my opinion, has identified the peculiar American syndrome of denigrating and scorning its close and loyal allies and being attracted to those who kick us in the teeth from time to time; I think he is carrying out what is largely a one-man campaign to move Thailand toward the second category.

Finally, a last little intriguing twist. You will see from Bangkok's 4299[5] that Thanat probably is going to make a bid for the ICJ seat in 1970. Could it be that he has been working on his image and trying to be sure that he is regarded as an international statesman of broad views and not tied to the US kite, so that he does not lose the votes on which he must depend for election?

This first answer has gone on for so long that I will send it off by itself and proceed to the questions of post-Vietnam planning and Vietnam and Paris prospects as soon as I can turn to them.

Yours,

Len

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret; Eyes Only. A notation on the letter indicates Godley saw it. Copies were sent to Johnson, Ambassador Marshall Green, and Spear.

[2] Not found.

[3] Copies of this and follow-up letters from Unger to Godley, April 15 and 17, were forwarded by Unger to Kissinger along with a May 9 covering letter. Kissinger replied in a June 2 letter to Unger that: “Your discussion of issues in Thailand as well as your views on Laos and Vietnam are directly relevant to our NSSM 51 study of Thailand and provide valuable assistance to us.” (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I)

[4] See Document 7.

[5] Not found.

10. National Security Study Memorandum 51[1]

Washington, April 26, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget

Administrator of the Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

Program Analysis of Thailand

The President has directed that a program analysis of Thailand be undertaken in accordance with the procedures described in NSDM 4.[2]

If appropriate, two or three alternative outcomes to the Vietnam conflict should be assumed.

The study will:

1. Analyze U.S. interests and objectives in Thailand and their implications for future U.S.-Thai relations, giving due consideration to the historical background as it relates to Thai interests and U.S.-Thai relations.

2. In the light of alternative views of U.S. interests and objectives in Thailand, analyze those policy issues which will have a bearing on the size, mix and composition of U.S. programs to support these objectives over the next five years.

3. Analyze the program and budget implications of the key policy options.

4. Develop alternative statements of U.S. objectives, policy options and their program implications for consideration by the National Security Council.

The study should include an analysis of the following U.S. programs and possible trade offs among them:

1. Military assistance and its role in the development of Thai security forces.

2. The AID programs and their role in helping the Thai control the insurgent threat and in developing Thailand's economy.

3. U.S. forces and bases in Thailand in the light of possible post-Vietnam war contingencies in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.

4. CONUS-based and Theatre-based U.S. forces required as a reserve for Thai contingencies.

5. U.S. research activities and their contribution to U.S. and Thai program effectiveness.

6. The programs of the U.S. Information Agency, the Peace Corps, and the Central Intelligence Agency in Thailand.

Field research activities to obtain information needed for the analysis shall be undertaken as required.

The study will be performed by an Ad Hoc group chaired by the NSC Assistant for Programs; the Country Director for Thailand will be the Vice Chairman of the Ad Hoc group. The Chairman will consult periodically with the East Asia Interdepartmental Group. The Ad Hoc group will comprise members from the addressee agencies who shall be selected after consultation with the agencies and designated by the undersigned in a separate memorandum.

To assist the Ad Hoc group in its study, the Secretary of Defense should provide an analysis of possible Southeast Asia contingencies, including the defense of Thailand, and their implications for required U.S. forces and bases. This analysis will incorporate the results of analyses of the effectiveness of past operations conducted from Thailand and reflect agency views on the major outstanding issues. This study will be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by July 1, 1969.

The Department of Defense will provide administrative support for the Ad Hoc group. The study should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by October 1, 1969. Subsequently, the study will be referred to the NSC IG/EA for comment prior to consideration by the Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2]  NSDM 4, January 20, authorized program analysis studies for certain countries. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–208, NSDM Files, NSDMs 1–50)

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, May 23, 1969, 1217Z.

6750. Subject: Secretary Rogers, Prime Minister Thanom Bilateral. Following is an uncleared record of the Secretary's conversation with Prime Minister of Thailand Thanom Kittikachorn.

1. Following seven nation meeting Thursday, May 22, Secretary Rogers, accompanied by Amb Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan and DCM Hannah called on PriMin Thanom accompanied by Foreign Minister Thanat, Minister of Communications and Chief of Staff Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, Minister without Portfolio General Sawaeng Senanarong, and General Jira Vichitsonggram, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (on security).

2. After pleasantries, Secretary Rogers expressed our deep interest in Thailand and our intention to continue to cooperate and assist in any way we could. The Prime Minister said that the main thing Thailand needs today is military equipment to assist it in coping with the infiltrated Communist subversion. He mentioned specifically transport equipment, helicopters, signal equipment and hand-held radar. Secretary Rogers asked Ambassador Unger to comment on this point. The Ambassador explained that we are in regular touch with the Thai with respect to military equipment programs in various fields. With respect to transport, helicopters and signal equipment, we have fully coordinated continuing programs, primarily in MAP. Much equipment has been delivered and more is programmed. With respect to the hand radar, this is a subject on which we require further knowledge of Thai requirements.

3. Secretary Rogers asked if the most serious subversion is in the North. The Prime Minister replied that there are infiltration and subversion threats in both North and Northeast. Marshal Dawee interceded at this point to explain that there is serious infiltration in both areas and this is why the hand radar equipment is needed as well as helicopters with miniguns. He also mentioned reports of infiltration by enemy helicopter and pointed out that the Thai had disagreed with their American friends who had contended that enemy infiltration by helicopter was impossible and there were no authentic instances of craft having been seen. Marshal Dawee indicated that several confirmed sightings have in fact been made.

4. Ambassador Unger invited the Prime Minister to give the Secretary a fuller appraisal of the Communist terrorist campaign, particularly in the North where the counter-insurgency concept of the RTG may not yet be entirely clear. The Prime Minister said that internally there is no need for undue worry because subversion within Thailand can be controlled. But the Thai Government is very deeply worried about the external threat which comes from Laos. He said the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese are advancing in Laos. The Chinese Communists are building roads to points close to Thai borders. The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao are developing concentrations at points near the Thai border for purposes of infiltration. In this connection he mentioned particularly Campassak Province in Southwestern Laos which lies west of the Mekong, creating a special danger for Ubol Province. The Thai support the Lao Government and want it to keep up the fight in Laos outside of Thailand, but the Lao Government is very weak. Dawee interjected that recently General Quan visited Thailand saying “my pockets are empty.” Dawee said the Lao Govt is in very severe financial difficulties and is unable to pay or care for its soldiers. He feared this would create a dangerous sag in morale, desertions, etc.

5. Secretary Rogers inquired as to the quality of Lao soldiers. Ambassador Sullivan replied that it depends on how well led they are and where they are fighting. He said that shortly before leaving Laos he had recommended provision of M–16s to the Lao Army and also conversion of 2 AC–47s into gunships of the kind which have worked so well on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in recent months. With respect to the financial situation, he pointed out that the RLG has always paid its own forces but we, with help from some others, have put in considerable financial help to bolster the kip. He thought that Japan could very well make a significant contribution to this cause without infringing its “constitutional limitations”. He suggested that FonMin Thanat urge the Japanese to make such a contribution. Thanat said he has talked with the Japanese in the past about making a greater effort in this area and is not optimistic that they will do so.

6. Secretary Rogers expressed his satisfaction with the two meetings that have occurred this week, and paid tribute to Thanat for his role in them. After a courteous response, Thanat expressed the Thai Govt's appreciation for Secretary Rogers' reaffirmation of US commitments in his opening speech at SEATO,[2] indicating in particular the 1962 communiqué. Thanat thought the Secretary's speech had an excellent effect on the whole meeting. Secretary Rogers indicated that this was why he had reiterated our commitments in his opening speech at the beginning of the meeting. As for the 1962 communiqué, he said that he regards it merely as a valid statement, not an interpretation, of the commitments undertaken in the Manila Pact.

7. Before the meeting broke up, Secretary Rogers made a special point of expressing his deep appreciation to the Thai for the excellent treatment they have accorded US servicemen in Thailand.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to New Delhi for the Secretary's party.

[2]  Rogers, in his opening statement at the SEATO Council of Ministers meeting in Bangkok on May 20, said that SEATO had provided “a credible sense of security” in Asia and that “this is why we continue to adhere to the treaty and to regard the Rusk–Thanat communiqué as a valid restatement of the responsibility set forth in Article IV (Para 1) of the Treaty.” (Telegram 14754 from Bangkok, October 30; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I) Article IV (1) of the SEATO Treaty provided that “Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties or against any state or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” When the Treaty was executed the U.S. government clarified that its response was limited to Communist aggression.

12. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to President Nixon [1]

Bangkok, June 17, 1969.

Dear Mr. President,

May I draw your attention to a matter of prime concern with regard to Thailand and our relations with that country.

As you well know Thailand and the United States are intimately associated in many of the security arrangements related to the protection of Southeast Asia, and the fighting in Viet-Nam in particular. It is essential for this reason that mutual confidence be maintained between us particularly at a time like the present when critical decisions and actions are being taken with far-reaching consequence for Southeast Asia's future.

Now that the first step has been publicly taken with regard to the replacement of U.S. forces by South Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam and the initial need for absolute secrecy no longer applies so strongly, I deem it essential that we open a dialogue on this subject with the Royal Thai Government which has always held in strictest confidence the many highly sensitive matters we have discussed in the past. We have already reviewed with the Thai the considerations regarding withdrawal raised in your May 14 speech.[2] At an early date we would like to resume these discussions along the following lines:

1. As indicated by the Midway announcement it is the judgment of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments that the expansion and strengthening of the forces of South Viet-Nam have reached a stage which makes it possible to begin the withdrawal from Southeast Asia of some of the U.S. forces there. The U.S. Government would like to discuss this process with the Royal Thai Government in general, as it relates to our further actions on the ground and in negotiations toward a satisfactory solution of the Viet-Nam problem, and in particular as it relates to the U.S. air and army support forces presently stationed in Thailand.

2. We would also like to solicit the views of the Royal Thai government concerning the continuing role of the division of the Thai Army now fighting in Viet-Nam.

3. These matters also suggest the desirability of our looking ahead to the situation following a Viet-Nam settlement and beginning to consider, in that context, such matters as the future of the Royal Thai Air Force bases now very heavily utilized by the U.S. Air Force, of the air defense radar and communications system, and of the U.S. logistic system based on Sattahip and Korat.

I am persuaded, Mr. President, that unless we undertake to consult with the Thai Government on their forces presently deployed to Viet-Nam they may reach a decision unilaterally to begin the withdrawal of these forces. Since this would detract from the multinational force fighting there now and providing an important political symbol, I believe our consultations should begin promptly to avoid this.

A source of continuing preoccupation in Thai-American relations is our massive presence there today, made up primarily of U.S. air forces engaged in the defense of Viet-Nam and, to a lesser extent, Laos. For this reason and also for sound budgetary reasons, I am seeking by every means to reduce the number of official Americans in Thailand whenever this can be done without a loss in our effectiveness. In particular, I believe we should plan to begin a modest withdrawal of such of our Air Force units as may no longer be essential to the fighting in Viet-Nam and are not needed for air support in Laos. However, I would strongly recommend against any move of this sort or any indication of our intention to take such action until after we have carried out with the Royal Thai Government the kind of consultation outlined above which will give the Thai the full context of any actions we plan to undertake. Without such consultation the Thai may misread a withdrawal as premature and signalling a weakening in our resolve to see the struggle through in Viet-Nam to an acceptable resolution.

With this in mind, we will be formulating an authorization for Embassy Bangkok to undertake these consultations with the Royal Thai Government as a matter of urgency in accordance with instructions to be provided from Washington.

Leonard Unger [3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret.

[2] In his May 14 address to the nation, Nixon proposed the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, thus initiating the process of U.S. troop withdrawals from that country. The overall idea implied in this address, and in subsequent remarks from Midway Island, June 8–10, was that Asian nations should determine their own destinies. (Public Papers: Nixon , 1969, pp. 369–375)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

13. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, June 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

Appointment with U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Leonard Unger

Ambassador Unger will pay a brief courtesy call on you at 11:15 a.m., Friday, June 20.[2] He is currently on home leave from his post in Bangkok and will be returning there for a second tour.

Ambassador Unger has three major points to raise with you. They are:

1. Insurgency in north and northeast Thailand: While the Thais have been fairly effective in dealing with insurgency in the northeast, their effort in northern Thailand has been discouragingly poor. There has been some consideration to a greater U.S. involvement, but Ambassador Unger feels strongly that U.S. forces should not become involved in counterinsurgency operations. If the Thai cannot do the job, it will not be done, and excessive U.S. involvement tends to weaken the Thai sense of responsibility. Preferably, we should continue to advise and assist the Thais, but let them conduct counterinsurgency operations.

2. The U.S. presence in Thailand: Ambassador Unger is concerned over the need both to reduce the U.S. presence in Thailand and make it as little visible as possible. He would particularly like to see some military units, no longer essential to the Vietnam war effort, withdrawn at an early date. At your direction, we have asked the Under Secretaries Committee to study this question and come up with recommendations to you.

3. Fuller consultations with Thailand: Ambassador Unger suggests there is a need for fuller consultations with the inner circle of the Thai Government on both withdrawals from Vietnam and U.S. military deployments in Thailand after the Vietnam conflict. He believes this can be done with minimal risk of public leakage. He will be bringing a letter to you on this subject, a copy of which is attached at Tab A,[3] in view of the short time available for discussion with you.

Talking Points

I recommend that:

1. You encourage Ambassador Unger in both efforts to avoid direct U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency and to reduce the U.S. presence in Thailand.

2. Indicate your support in principle for fuller consultations with the Thais, if this can be done without breach of security and without becoming enmeshed in the process of clearing specific troop replacements with the Thais.

3. Ask him to convey to Prime Minister Thanom your appreciation of Thai determination to continue the close cooperation with us for common objectives in Southeast Asia. (We have recently received a copy of Thanom's letter to you expressing appreciation for your recent messages to him. This is attached at Tab B.)[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by R. L. Sneider on June 19. The memorandum is unsigned but bears Kissinger's handwritten initials in the upper right-hand corner.

[2] No other record of this meeting has been found.

[3] See Document 12.

[4]  Nixon had sent Thanom several courtesy messages in advance of his May 14 and Midway Island Vietnamization speeches; attached but not printed. Attached at Tab B but not printed is Thanom's undated letter thanking Nixon for his messages received on May 14 and 22. Telegram 115643 to Bangkok, July 12, asked the Embassy to thank Prime Minister Thanom for his letter of May 29 and for his assurances of continued cooperation between Thailand and the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 VIET)

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Washington, July 9, 1969, 2353Z.

113614. Ref: Bangkok's 9168.[2] Subj: Response to Fulbright Allegation of Secret Thai-U.S. Agreement.

Summary.

1. Sen. Fulbright has alleged both publicly and in top secret memorandum to the Secretary that U.S. has secret agreement with Thailand much broader than any publicly-known commitment. Department will continue inform you of significant press coverage and other public developments. Top secret reference is to Project Taksin military contingency planning. We plan both public and top secret response. End Summary.

Public Response

2. McCloskey held to same non-commital line July 9 as he used July 8 (State 112736).[3] However, rather than allow speculation to build up, we hope we can make clarification at regular Department press briefing July 10. Statement has not yet been fully cleared, but represents careful study and evaluation of pertinent documents and other material. Would appreciate your immediate comments on whether it would cause any significant problems with Thais.[4] Also request you talk with appropriate RTG leaders, explaining how matter has arisen, reassure that as our intended public statement makes clear our SEATO commitment remains unchanged and urge calm public posture in order to help put to rest in interest of all.

Suggested Statement

3. “Our commitments involving the defense of Thailand are defined by the SEATO Treaty of 1954. These were restated in the Rusk–Thanat Communiqué of 1962. There is no defense commitment to Thailand going beyond that Treaty. We believe Senator Fulbright refers to contingency military planning. For more than a decade we have participated in formulating contingency military plans involving the defense of Thailand. This planning involves no further commitment.”

Fulbright Letter to Secretary

4. Senator Fulbright has also sent Secretary a letter[5] and top secret memorandum on, inter alia, our commitments to Thailand. Memorandum: 1) expresses concern over growing influence of DOD in foreign policy; 2) notes statement in recent Department letter to effect that our contingency planning, both multilateral and bilateral, is simply normal activity undertaken pursuant to SEATO Treaty commitment and does not enlarge that commitment; 3) refers to existence of “COMUSTAF Plan 1–64[6] and subsequent plans” and provides summary; 4) claims that such plans lead the other party to believe that U.S. has firm commitment—already made in accordance with our constitutional processes—to specific action involving use of substantial military forces; and 5) argues plan already given partial effect by the stationing of 40,000 Americans in Thailand. Summary of “COMUSTAF Plan 1–64” included is full direct quotation of Top Secret June, 1965 “Hoopes Report” on military assistance reappraisal pages V–35 through V–37.[7]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Linwood Starbird (EA/TB); cleared by Cross and Brown (EA), Dennis Doolin (OASD/ISA), Robert McCloskey (P), and Davis R. Robinson (S); and approved by Green.

[2] Telegram 9168 from Bangkok, July 9, requested a full text of the Fulbright letter and an opportunity to comment on it. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 4 THAI–US)

[3] Dated July 8. (Ibid., PPB 9 US)

[4] See Document 15.

[5] Senator Fulbright sent Rogers a June 5 letter concerning U.S. commitments to Thailand. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, SEATO 3 THAI) Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber, Jr., responded to Fulbright on behalf of the Secretary in a June 27 letter, stating that U.S. obligations existed under Article IV (1) of the SEATO Treaty without any extension. (Ibid.)

[6] Senator Fulbright contended that the Thais might believe that the United States had committed itself to take specific action involving substantial use of American troops through the Taksin contingency plan, known also as Project 22 or by its DOD acronym, COMUSTAF 1/64. The Department of State had tried to assure the Senator that both it and the Thai Government agreed that military contingency plans did not affect commitments and were only operational details to be used if, as, and when agreed upon. Furthermore, Fulbright insisted upon seeing a copy of the plan, rather than having a briefing on it, as the Department of Defense proposed. On July 29, Fulbright renewed his request to the Department of State for text of COMUSTAF Plan 1/64. The text of Fulbright's July 29 letter to Acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson is in the Congressional Record, August 8, 1969, p. S9504. The Department of Defense continued its resistance to providing a copy of the plan as Richardson informed Fulbright several days later. The text of Richardson's letter, August 4, to Senator Fulbright is ibid. On August 8 Fulbright stated unequivocably on the Senate floor that the Department of Defense offer of a briefing in lieu of the text of the plan was not acceptable. (Ibid., pp. S9503–S9505) On August 19 Kissinger informed Laird that he had spoken with President Nixon about the contingency plans and that “they should be looked at only at the Pentagon.” Also the Senate Committee could only see the Thai plan “and no others are to be shown.” (Notes of a telephone conversation, August 19, 11:30 a.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[7] Printed from an unsigned copy.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, July 10, 1969, 1049Z.

9229. Ref: State 113614.[2]

1. Reftel arrived just as I was departing with Secretary to the Cabinet John Whitaker to call on Foreign Minister Thanat. During our review with Thanat of President's forthcoming visit to Thailand, I found an occasion to refer to Bangkok Post publicity regarding Fulbright charges. I reviewed the subject with Thanat on the basis of paras 1 and 2 reftel. Thanat seemed perplexed concerning the charge that there is a top secret agreement which commits the U.S. beyond the SEATO Treaty. When I mentioned Project Taksin, he seemed nonplused but his secretary, Birabhongse, confirmed to him that Taksin is a military contingency plan. Thanat expressed the opinion that all military contingency planning is within the SEATO context, but Birabhongse informed him that Taksin is purely bilateral. In any case, Thanat fully understands that military contingency plans do not affect commitments and are only operational details to be used if, as and when it is agreed to do so.

2. I read to Thanat the suggested statement in para 3 reftel and he commented “that seems very good.” As for himself, he said that if he is questioned publicly, he will simply say that he has no knowledge of any additional Thai-U.S. defense agreement beyond SEATO. Based on our own judgment, as well as this interview with Thanat, we concur with the suggested statement.

3. We will forward additional comments re reply to Senator Fulbright. We believe the question of historical context is very important particularly since we will be talking in those terms to Pincus and Paul who will undoubtedly report to the Senator. We reiterate our desire to see proposed reply before it goes forward.

4. On incidental interest, Thanat remarked that Fulbright's charges appear to be similar to some of the things written in The Washington Post and he speculated on the possibility of some kind of “cabal” between Fulbright and The Washington Post. This quite inevitably led him into a pithy review of his feelings about Stanley Karnow,[3] who he hopes will not seek to visit Thailand during the President's visit (being reported septel).

Hannah

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate.

[2]  Document 14.

[3]  Washington Post reporter Stanley Karnow.

16. Department of State Briefing Paper[1]

Washington, July 10, 1969.

NCV/T–5

THAILAND

Background—Thailand's Role in Viet-Nam

The Thai regard the Viet-Nam war as part of the defense of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Paris talks, the status of Laos in a Viet-Nam settlement, the stability of the GVN, improvement of the South Vietnamese fighting effectiveness, withdrawal of U.S. forces, the post-Viet-Nam U.S. force structure in Southeast Asia, all are matters in which the Thai are vitally interested and wish to feel involved in decisions on them. It is highly desirable that the U.S. initiate a dialogue with the RTG on these matters as soon as U.S. thinking reaches a point at which it can be shared.

A. The Paris Talks

The Thai are very interested and concerned about the Paris talks. They will be alert to any indication that they are not being kept as fully briefed as other TCC's, particularly since their record of maintaining security in sensitive matters is excellent. Thailand is less fully informed about the Paris talks than certain other TCC's (GVN, Australia,NZ) and less regularly briefed than Korea and the Philippines; only Foreign Minister Thanat is kept informed, and he has been only partially briefed by Ambassador Unger.

Their special interest vis-à-vis Paris will be the inclusion of Laos in any settlement. (See background paper on importance of Laos to Thai security.)[2] The Thai may also feel lingering anxiety about the possibility of unreciprocated U.S. withdrawal and its adverse effect on Asian security, and doubts about the viability of any government in South Viet-Nam that would include Communists. They understand that now is not the time to include TCC's in the talks but they (like the other four participants) expect that the time will come.

B. U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Viet-Nam

Although Thai leaders have commented favorably and helpfully in public on the results of the Midway meeting, they are watching very closely the developing pattern of U.S. actions for indications of U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia. In discussing the Midway meeting with RTG leaders, we have reviewed the progress in the expansion and modernization of the Vietnamese regular and territorial forces and the Midway agreements growing out of our collective assessment with the GVN of these situations. We have assured the RTG that our actions did not involve a diminution of Allied combat capability or a lessening in American determination for an equitable and honorable settlement, and have told them that there will be further review in August of troop replacement.

C. Thai Forces in South Viet-Nam

Thailand recognizes the intimate relationship of its security with that of Viet-Nam and Laos, and the dangers which would attend Communist successes among its Southeast Asian neighbors. Consequently, although indigenous Communist insurgency threatens many regions of the country, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has sent approximately 11,500 men to South Viet-Nam, including an army light division, small naval units, and an air force transport contingent.

When queried about the status of these Thai forces in Viet-Nam following the Midway Conference developments, Prime Minister Thanom stated on June 12 to the press that Thai forces would be neither increased nor withdrawn at this time, that the subject of their withdrawal was being studied, and that when SVN strength was sufficient, Thai forces would be gradually withdrawn.

We have not yet sounded out the RTG's views concerning the future of the Thai division in Viet-Nam. There are a number of factors which need to be considered: (a) the need for Thai forces in their own country to counter insurgency and provide a credible deterrent to Communist advances in Laos, (b) the capability of Vietnamese forces to replace the Thai, (c) the political importance of Thai forces participating in the defense of its Southeast Asian neighbor, and (d) the need to forestall a unilateral decision to withdraw on the RTG's part which might adversely affect the political significance of the multinational and Asian support for South Viet-Nam.

D. Future of U.S. Forces in Thailand

Good behavior by U.S. servicemen and energetic efforts by the Embassy and military commanders have kept the incident rate low, but sheer numbers, language, and cultural and income differences have led to inevitable incidents affecting the Thai community. And as the atmosphere in Bangkok has become increasingly political with the advent of elections and a national assembly, the RTG has become increasingly sensitive to these incidents.

The large U.S. military presence in Thailand—primarily U.S. air forces engaged in the defense of Viet-Nam and Laos—now totals about 48,000, including 35,000 USAF personnel; 11,000 Army personnel involved in support of air operations, in construction work, and in maintenance of prepositioned equipment; and 1,200 in JUSMAG involved in training Thai forces. We have built about $400 million worth of military facilities, including major expansion of five of the six Thai air bases we are using, the new port-airbase complex at Sattahip/U Tapao, and improvements in roads, communications networks, supply depots, etc.

In April 1968 Prime Minister Thanom asked that “American Air Force personnel now stationed at Thai bases remain in country, even though in reduced numbers, following U.S. withdrawal from Viet-Nam and thereafter be taken out only gradually.” During his visit to Washington in May 1968 we agreed to consult on this matter.

Foreign Minister Thanat has several times stated (e.g. interview with Terrence Smith of New York Times, February 14, 1969; Foreign Ministry statement of February 20, 1969) that U.S. forces are in Thailand in connection with the war in Viet-Nam and will leave afterwards unless there is some compelling reason for them to stay. In that event, a new agreement would have to be drawn up between the two governments. On February 21, 1969, the Department's spokesman affirmed that “the bulk of U.S. forces are in Thailand in connection with the war in Viet-Nam … that obviously large numbers of U.S. forces would not continue to be stationed in Thailand after a satisfactory settlement in Southeast Asia unless there were some compelling reason for them to stay. It is also quite clear that U.S. forces would remain only with the agreement of the two governments.”

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, President's Trip Files, President Nixon's Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thailand. Secret. Drafted by Starbird and Martin (EA/TB) and cleared by Spear, Sullivan, and Devine (OASD). Prepared for the President's July around-the-world trip to Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 17.

[2] Not printed. (Ibid.)

17. Department of State Briefing Paper[1]

Washington, July 11, 1969.

NCV/T–18

THAILAND

Scope and Objectives

A. Background

With a prospering economy and remarkable social and political stability—in spite of military coups which have been bloodless and largely of the “palace” variety—Thailand's problems are largely externally instigated, and as yet barely felt by the population as a whole. The insurgency is small, affecting the lives of relatively few and remote rural villagers. Thai leaders are concerned because they realize its Communist Chinese instigation and potential seriousness. Progress in government, by Western standards, is being demanded by Thailand's educated elite, while the mass of Thai people still complacently accept Thai government in traditional terms, demanding little from the government. The leading opposition party is royalist, conservative, and urban, while the pro-government party was strongest in rural areas.

Thailand is approaching a cross roads in basic policy directions as Thai leaders anticipate an end to the Viet-Nam war and try to plot their post-Viet-Nam course. Since World War II Thailand has been increasingly committed to a pro-U.S. policy in reaction to the Chinese Communist threat. During the last five years—with our heavy involvement in Viet-Nam—Thailand's commitment to this policy has been almost total. Foreign Minister Thanat has been one of the most outspoken of Asian champions of resistance to Communist aggression in South Viet-Nam. Now, with demands for peace and withdrawal being publicized in the United States, the Thai are beginning to wonder whether they have stuck their necks out too far by sending forces to South Viet-Nam and allowing our use of Thai air bases to bomb North Viet-Nam. Though still maintaining a pro-U.S. stance they are seeking to widen their policy options by strengthening regional ties and increasing contacts with other nations, such as the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

Thai leaders have been basically reassured by your letters to Prime Minister Thanom and by Secretary Rogers' statement at the SEATO Council meeting last May. However, contrary press reports and agitation in this country continue to disquiet them, making continuing reassurance necessary. Your visit, and re-affirmation of U.S. firmness in seeking a genuine peace in Viet-Nam without sacrificing the freedom of our allies, will help to maintain Thai confidence and stability.

The Thais have smarted under criticisms that their government is military and un-democratic. Their new Constitution, adopted June 20, 1968, and election of a House of Representatives on February 10, 1969, have reflected both a desire to improve Thailand's image before the Free World and genuine democratic aspirations on the part of Thailand's educated people generally. By low-key notice of this political liberalization your visit can encourage the Thais in these efforts.

We feel that by and large the Thai are meeting their present problems effectively. They are improving their counterinsurgency efforts— though encouragement to do still better in north Thailand is needed. They have responded helpfully to the peace talks in Paris and to our efforts to de-escalate the fighting. They have publicly maintained a posture of confidence in their pro-U.S. policy, in spite of underlying anxieties. They are supporting regional developments in the hope of someday building a foundation for a regional security system. They have taken modest but significant steps toward democratic rule. Your visit can dispel existing doubts on their part as to the constancy of U.S. friendship and the feasibility of their continued support to U.S. objectives as a means of ensuring their own security.

B. Outstanding Issues

—Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam and its effect on the Paris negotiations;

—The future of Thai forces in Viet-Nam;

—Redeployment of U.S. forces from Thailand and what forces, if any, should remain post-Viet-Nam;

—Thai concerns about Communist gains over the last year in Laos and the related Communist insurgency in north Thailand.

C. U.S. Objectives

Maintain Thai confidence in their policy of alignment with the United States.

By giving the Thai leaders assurance of our determination and continued support and an insight into our thinking on such subjects as Viet-Nam, the future of our forces in Thailand, and our shared concern about developments in Laos and the insurgency in north Thailand, you can help shape Thai policy in the direction of further support for U.S. objectives.

Help the Thai to improve their image as a Free World nation.

The Thai are proud of their long record of independence, and are very sensitive to insinuations that they are dominated by the United States. Communist propaganda harping on that theme accentuates their sensitivities. It is important therefore to emphasize the equal and independence status of Thailand in all possible ways.

It would also be helpful to use this visit to publicize Thai political liberalization as evidence of Thailand's dynamic, progressive development.

(Caution: It should be borne in mind that the powers of the new Parliament are quite circumscribed. References to progress toward democracy in Thailand should therefore be in low key.)

Encourage Thai efforts promoting regional organization in Southeast Asia.

Your visit provides an opportunity to encourage Thai leadership in Southeast Asian regional development. Congratulatory remarks would be appropriate concerning the skillful and constructive role the Thai have played in mediating differences and stimulating cooperation between nations of the region.

D. Thai Objectives

To “size up” your Administration. While Thai leaders know you as a person from several private visits, and while they got an initial “feel” for your Administration from Secretary Rogers at the SEATO Council meeting, they will want to use the visit to form their own assessment of the directions you will take as President.

To assure themselves of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The Thai will seek continued assurances of U.S. determination to “stay the course” in Southeast Asia; this inquiry may well focus on Laos. They will also be seeking our forward thinking on the war in Viet-Nam and the Paris peace talks.

E. The Message

We want to initiate a dialogue with the Thai regarding the future of U.S. forces in Thailand, so that they will not misinterpret withdrawals when they occur. (We want to avoid initiating any proposal that our forces remain in Thailand after the Viet-Nam fighting is over. This proposal should come from the Thai side.)

We want to convey:

—American respect for their status as an independent country, and our pleasure at their progress as reflected in their new Constitution and their recent Parliamentary elections.

—Confidence that Thailand can rely on U.S. firmness in supporting the freedom and independence of its allies in Southeast Asia while seeking an enduring peace in Viet-Nam.

—Recognition of the need for continued counterinsurgency efforts, particularly in northern Thailand.

—Our admiration and approval of their efforts to promote regional organization and cooperative development in Southeast Asia.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 454, President's Trip Files, President Nixon's Trip, July–Aug 1969, Country Briefing Book, Thailand. Secret. Drafted by Spear and Nelson (EA/TB) and approved by Green. Prepared for the President's July around-the-world trip to Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India, et al.; also see Document 16.

18. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, July 29, 1969, 10:10 a.m.–2:28 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

President Richard M. Nixon

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Thanom said that the communiqué of the 9th Party Congress shows that Peking has reaffirmed its intention to carry on war with its neighbors. Thailand will be under pressure. Many countries in Southeast Asia are not strong enough to resist.

Thailand does not want ground forces—but not having an industrial base, it does need assistance with matériel. It would need help with ground forces in a general war. As long as it is an unconventional revolutionary type war, however, the Thais want to depend on their own ground forces. The Thai government wants to pursue a vast program of civic action. The Thai government wants, (1) to work to create a viable grouping of non-Communist nations, (2) to receive matériel assistance, (3) to repel force with force—but with its own men, and (4) to continue to pursue economic reforms to supplement other means of defense.

So far the Communist intruders have chosen remote spots where economic development has not reached. They promise a paradise. The President said, “like China.” Thanat responded that in rural areas of Thailand, nothing is known of China. The President said he wanted the Prime Minister to know his own thinking. In case of overt aggression, we would expect to react. Where major powers act, they must expect reaction from other major powers. If the Communist Chinese were to try that, there will be a very strong reaction from the U.S. But this is not likely.

Thanom said he fully agreed about the unlikelihood of overt aggression. From the pattern we have been seeing, we can expect that Peking and Hanoi will continue to rely on war by proxy.

The President noted Thanom's statement that the Thai wish to rely on their own manpower. There is a difficult political problem in the U.S., he continued, but the U.S. public will endorse matériel support.[2]

Thanom said that in meeting subversion, the Thais will meet force with force, using a combination of military personnel, police and civic action. They are increasing security measures for all areas, with a three-pronged program. Attention will be given to getting produce to market.

The President noted that one can't deal with subversion by force alone—the causes must be removed. But he doesn't agree with soft-heads who think that you can solve every problem with another bowl of rice. Thus he was glad that Thanom referred to his determination to use force.

The President said he wanted to ask a critical question, and asked that Thanom not spare our feelings. He referred to our handling of Vietnam. How the war is ended will be critical for peace and freedom in the Pacific. Is there concern that the U.S. may move too fast in withdrawing its forces? Is there a feeling that regardless of what he says publicly, we will let the GVN go down the drain gracefully? He asked for an honest answer.

Thanom smiled and said that since the President asked him to be frank, he wanted to recall the views of leaders of previous Administrations. If a decisive step had been taken, the will of the enemy would now be broken. Because of the importance of public opinion, one must take measures to meet its demands. He hoped the other side would respond. If the other side does respond, the war can end. But so far the other side has not responded. What does the U.S. intend? If concessions are made by only one side, we have cause for concern. He hoped the U.S. wouldn't go too far.

The President responded that nothing substantial has happened on their side. If after a year the enemy refuses to talk, we can't continue to talk in Paris and fight in Vietnam with one hand tied behind our back. U.S. opinion won't tolerate this. What did the Prime Minister think of that?

Thanom said that other government leaders understand our motivation and our desire to meet public opinion. In certain quarters in this part of the world and in Vietnam, there is fear that the U.S. may appease the enemy too much.

The Thai government understands that the Vietnamese forces are to be trained. Thus it is not overly worried by U.S. withdrawal. If the enemy does not respond public opinion in the U.S. will recognize that the U.S. has no other choice but to end the war satisfactorily. Thus, if after the withdrawal of another 50,000 troops, there is no response, the U.S. will have no choice but to take these measures.

The President turned to the views on Peking and Moscow in Indonesia, noting that some people there think we have a condominium with the USSR. Others see too much significance in the easing of restrictions with China. With respect to Moscow, a condominium is out of the question. Moscow's objectives are the same as Peking's but their tactics differ. With respect to China, we took some tactical steps. But we play an even-handed game—depending on how each country conducts its policy. There is no sign of a Chinese change in this regard. Until this happens, no major alterations are possible.

Thanom thanked the President for this insight into U.S. policy. He expressed deep faith in the policy of the U.S., which has never known defeat in its history and, he was sure, had no intention to do so now. The Prime Minister hoped that some measure of assurance could be extended to other countries which have troops in Vietnam.

The President asked for Thanom's view on Laos. What should be done, other than our sending troops?

Thanom passed on information he said was provided by the Laotian government: The Lao capital is encircled by enemy forces. Enemy forces are coming closer to Vientiane. Laotians have asked for help from Thailand. The Prime Minister is reluctant to do so—although willing to help Laos with volunteers. They must get material assistance from outside. If the need is urgent, the Laos government should talk to the U.S. Thanom is willing to send volunteers provided he gets U.S. support.

The President returned to his previous point: the Thai contingent in Vietnam is extremely helpful with U.S. public opinion. Though our withdrawals will continue on a major basis as South Vietnamese troops are trained, the President hopes the Thai troops will stay.

Thanom replied that his government has faith in its ability to resist pressures from MP's who want to withdraw forces from Vietnam and reserve them for combatting subversion here in Thailand. From his standpoint the priority is clear: Thai forces should join in the struggle against Communist aggression in Vietnam. The presence of Thai forces there is justified. He will resist pressures to withdraw.

In response to the President's questions, Thanom said there are 45,000–50,000 Americans in Thailand. The majority conduct the air war in Vietnam and Laos. In addition, there are engineer troops.

The President asked if it would cause concern if we reduced some support forces related to bombing of North Vietnam, but not engineers working with Thai support forces.[3] Thanom said it was up to the President.

The President asked if the troops are behaving themselves. Thanom replied there are very few incidents. He would like to make a suggestion, he said, with respect to B–52's. Laotians have indicated eagerness for their use. The Prime Minister recalled having asked our headquarters for B–52 strikes: he welcomes B–52's here. As for frictions, he has talked to the military authorities regarding arrangements for a Status of Forces agreement similar to Korea and Taiwan.

The President asked what he believes the Chinese Communists will do after Vietnam.

Thanom replied that it depends on the Vietnam settlement. If the settlement is satisfactory for the Communists, China may have less opportunity for pressure. But whatever the outcome, the countries of Southeast Asia will be subject to pressure. There is roadbuilding toward Thailand from China and then from Burma to Thailand. China has not given up the possibility of interference. They are using proxies, influencing attitudes by means of these roads.

The President noted the Chinese Communists have their own problems. The Sino-Soviet disagreement may produce its own premises. Thanom replied that the Chinese are not losing their own men— they are losing others.

The President stated that we must bring the war to an end in a way that contains a message to China and USSR to discourage other aggression of this type. This should have been done three years ago.

Thanat asked if the Soviets have shown any indication of helping. The President replied that they have on procedural points— and in some oral comments. But he has been disappointed. There is a chance the Soviets might find a way. Until Vietnam is out of the way, we will not talk to them on other issues such as the Middle East, trade, etc.

Thanom noted that the USSR is not more liberal, as was shown in the case of Czechoslovakia. The President replied that we must avoid armed conflict. Self-survival requires that. On the other hand, Soviet policy is not soft. The Brezhnev doctrine completely discourages independence. We are therefore approaching them in a hardheaded way.

Thanom asked how about Romania. The President said he had visited Romania in 1967. He was invited by Ceausescu shortly after the inauguration. His visit is not an affront to Russia or a move toward China. What we are saying is that any country not threatening its neighbors can have good relations with us. It would be a mistake for the U.S. to recognize the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty. Some believe we should have an immediate conference with the Soviets and control of arms. We have not done so—not because the President doesn't want these things, but because U.S. power is essential to protect the free world. We will not tolerate Soviet superiority.

Thanom turned to the Middle East and asked about the balance of forces between Egypt and Israel. The President said that Israel is stronger than its neighbors not because of better equipment but because it is more capable, and will be for 3–5 years. The Soviets are continuing to send arms into Egypt and also for other Arab forces. In the long run, the balance may change because the Arabs have more people. Therefore we try to work for a peaceful solution and to prevent a change in the balance. Until there is a settlement, no change in the arms balance can be tolerated. Thanom drew a comparison between Israel and Thailand—a small country can resist outside pressure only with outside help. The President agreed this was a good analogy.

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105, Geopolitical File, Asian Trips, July–Aug. 1969. Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff Files, Tony Lake Chron File, [June 1969–May 1970], [4 of 6]. Secret; Sensitive. According to President Nixon's Daily Diary, the participants included Nixon, Thanom, Thanat, Kissinger, and Dawee. Presumably, Lake was also present. The meeting was held in the Conference Room of the Government House in Bangkok. The closing time of the meeting is also from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The President's ideas, only very briefly outlined here, became known as the Nixon or Guam doctrine.

[2] En route to the Far East on July 25, President Nixon held a press backgrounder on Guam. The President believed that, following the conclusion of the Vietnam war, there should be no U.S. withdrawal from Asia: “the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia,” he said, “is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.” But at the same time, he said, the United States should avoid policies that would make countries in Asia so dependent that it would be dragged into conflicts such as that in Vietnam. Later, the President added that the United States was determined to keep its treaty commitments, for example with Thailand under SEATO, but that it would encourage Asian countries to solve their own internal security problems. (Public Papers: Nixon , 1969, pp. 546, 549)

[3] Concerning the question of possible reductions in U.S. troop strength in Thailand, the President said in his July 25 background briefing that this would be discussed with the Thai in light of a general U.S. review of military and civilian personnel abroad. (Ibid., p. 552)

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State

Bangkok, August 12, 1969, 1123Z.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 THAI. Secret; Limdis. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]

20. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, August 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S.–Thai Relations

The following is a preliminary draft prepared by CIA analysts in response to a request for an objective unbiased view of current U.S./Thai relations. An updated and more in-depth analysis will be provided early next week.

The analysis makes the following points:

—Thai/U.S. relations have been severely strained in past weeks by the public dispute over the contingency plan.

—The Thais are looking for assurance that Secretary Laird's remarks[2] are not meant as U.S. reneging on a commitment made by the Johnson Administration.

—Bangkok will almost certainly conclude that:

(1) Domestic forces tending to undermine the U.S. commitment are becoming stronger.

(2) The U.S. government may be powerless to uphold its commitments even if it chooses to do so.

—The impact on U.S.-Thai interests will depend on assurances given the Thais and actions taken in Vietnam and Laos.

Intelligence Memorandum

U.S.-THAI RELATIONS

1. The events of the past several weeks have not only largely dissipated the good will and the sense of congruent interests that President Nixon engendered during his short visit in Bangkok, but they have also placed Thai-U.S. relations under the greatest strain since the Laotian crisis in 1961 and 1962. Much of the difficulty involves Thai sensitivity to being treated as something less than a full partner in the struggle for Southeast Asia, and displeasure that its contribution to the Vietnam effort has not been fully appreciated. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the current unpleasantness as nothing more than a display of the ephemeral of the Thai psychology. We are witnessing the surface manifestations of underlying problems that have plagued U.S.-Thai relations since the 1961 Laotian crisis, and which have grown worse as a consequence of the Vietnam war.

2.

The principle cause of the current difficulties has been the public dispute over Project 22, the so-called Taksin Military Contingency Plan for the defense of the Mekong Valley. The Thai have been upset over the way the U.S. has managed the controversy. Caught in a crossfire between the U.S. Senate and the ill-conceived remarks of Thai leaders regarding the juridical basis for the plan (Air Chief Marshal Dawee asserting at one point that the plan was a SEATO document and could not be shown to anybody without the consent of the SEATO partners), U.S. spokesmen have labored to set the record straight.[3] In so doing, they have bruised Thai sensitivities. In a recent talk with Ambassador Unger, Foreign Minister Thanat made a special point of protesting what the Thai regard as the unseemly alacrity with which State Department spokesmen have challenged Thai statements on Taksin. The Thai not only regard coordination on the Taksin affair as insufficient, but they are also opposed to showing the plan to Senator Fulbright (we would guess that this was the real message that Dawee was trying to get across), and his Senate Foreign Relations colleagues.

Opposition on this score not only reflects Thai misconceptions of how the U.S. constitutional system works, but much more important, reflects their belief that Senator Fulbright is nothing less than a sworn enemy of Thailand. (“Why is it”, Thanat has asked rhetorically, “that of all of the many military contingency plans, Fulbright has picked on this one.”) Turning the Taksin Plan over to the Senator then, is in Thai eyes, tantamount to giving the plan to the enemy. The fact that Senator Fulbright could pressure the Administration into showing him the document was a vivid—to the Thai at least—display of power on the part of those who are opposed to the U.S.-Thai alliance.

3. As upsetting as the Taksin imbroglio was up to this point, it still involved little more than strengthening the Thai belief that they had been once again misunderstood and pilloried for no other reason other than that they have been a strong supporter of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. In order to get this monkey off their back, Thanat suggested to Ambassador Unger that the two countries publicly announce that they would soon open talks on reducing the number of U.S. military personnel based in Thailand. Thanat asserted that only in this way could Bangkok demonstrate that U.S. forces were in Thailand for the sole purpose of supporting the war in South Vietnam and that the Thai had no need nor desire for direct U.S. support in fighting their insurgency. Thanat argued that this would undercut the position of those elements in the U.S. who were warning against additional commitments to Thailand. It also seems likely that Thanat had other purposes in getting troop withdrawal talks. What better way to demonstrate to the U.S., the contribution Thailand has made to the war effort, and at the same time, that such support could not necessarily be taken for granted.

4. From the Thai point of view, the Taksin affair took a much more ominous turn when Secretary of Defense Laird made reference to the lack of support in the plan on the part of himself and President Nixon. Prime Minister Thanat lost no time in making it clear to Ambassador Unger that they regard the Secretary of Defense's statement not only as a disavowal of a joint contingency plan, but a reneging on a commitment that has been made by the Johnson Administration. The Thai are clearly looking for some assurance that this is not what Secretary Laird or the government had in mind.

5. Even if such reassurances are forthcoming, the Taksin affair will probably leave a long-standing mark on U.S.-Thai relations.

6. How much Taksin effects U.S.-Thai interests will depend not only on what assurances we give the Thai, but also on what action we take with respect to Vietnam and, much more important, Laos. Vietnam is important to the Thai insofar as it is a bellwether of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Bangkok has been concerned over U.S. troop withdrawals, but once we made clear that the withdrawals would be something a good deal less than an indecent bug-out, Thai concern has centered on what they regard as their prerogatives as a troop contributor to the Vietnam war effort. They want the U.S. to truly consult with them before firm decisions are made on withdrawals. In the present atmosphere, such consultations are likely to loom even larger in Thai thinking than they have in the past.

7. The question of Laos is much more difficult. For the Thai, Laos cuts a good deal closer to the bone than Vietnam, and Bangkok will take a long hard look at how the U.S. meets the current threat on the other side of the Mekong. Whether this becomes a major testing ground in the coming weeks and months depends, in the final analysis, on what the Communists do. The Taksin affair and its aftermath, however, will serve to further exaggerate the importance the Thai attach to the Laotian problem and the willingness of the U.S. to stabilize the situation there.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn; Nodis. A note to Kissinger on the first page in Nixon's hand reads: “Urgent. K—Give me a brief statement as to [how to] handle this issue if Fulbright raises it Tuesday A.M.” According to an attached September 15 memorandum from Ken Cole to Kissinger, the President was referring to a September 16 meeting with Fulbright. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was of high priority.

[2] Secretary of Defense Laird had held a press conference on August 21 during which he elaborated on Rogers' theme that the present administration was neither involved in nor responsible for formulation of the contingency plan. Rogers had called it “an appendage that is a hangover from bygone days” in his August 20 news conference. (Department of State Bulletin, September 8, 1969, pp. 205–208) Speaking of the contingency plan, Laird said that it “does not have my approval and does not have the approval of the Administration.” Respecting Rogers' allusion to consultation with Congress on use of troops, Laird said, “I don't agree with the plan, I don't agree with using American troops without proper consultation and advice by the Congress of the United States, and I can assure you that this Administration would follow the procedures that were outlined by the Secretary of State yesterday.” A verbatim transcript of Laird's news conference is in Annex 11 of the Department of State Historical Office's study entitled “The Reexamination of the United States Commitment to Thailand, June 5–August 31, 1969,” Research Project No. 978, November 1969. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)

[3] See Documents 14 and 15.

21. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, August 26, 1969.

SUBJECT

US Commitments to Thailand

I attach a summary of US commitments to Thailand and statements regarding the defense of Thailand (Tab A).[2] You may find this of use, given the current furor in the Senate. I would call your attention particularly to the Air Defense Operations Agreement described below.

In brief, these are the key points concerning our formal and Presidential commitments:

—SEATO obligates “each party” to the Treaty to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” in the event of an armed attack. We are obligated only to consult in the case of subversion, or of armed attack by others than Communists.

—The Rusk/Thanat communiqué of 1962 affirmed that our SEATO obligation is “individual as well as collective.” Secretary Rogers in May reaffirmed this interpretation of the SEATO Treaty.

—SEATO contingency planning is under the SEATO Military Planning Office, and covers most contingencies, including Communist insurgency in Thailand or Communist aggression against it. This planning is intended to effectuate our SEATO commitment.

—The Johnson–Thanom joint communiqué of May 9, 1968, included Thanom's statement that “the Royal Thai Government regarded defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by its own forces.”

—You and your three predecessors have affirmed your intention to honor our SEATO (or “treaty”) obligations. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy spoke of “unswerving support in resisting Communist aggression and subversion.” You have spoken of US “support,” and have said that “the US will stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or from within.”

Project Taksin is a bilateral US/Thai military contingency plan to meet potential Communist moves in Laos. Its terms of reference provide specifically that it will be “implemented only upon mutual agreement and consent of both governments.”

We have specific bilateral arrangements with Thailand covering atomic detection systems, radio research activities, and the logistic support of Thai troops in South Vietnam. None of these involve US military commitments.

The USAF/RTAF Joint Use and Integrated Air Defense Operations Agreement. We have a technical agreement with Thailand governing detection of and protection against hostile aircraft. This involves elements of timing and decision-making which could, it might be argued, carry our commitment beyond the language of our SEATO commitment.

The Agreement states that the Thai Air Defense/Tactical Air Control System “has been integrated and incorporated into” the US Air Force's Pacific Air Defense Network. It provides for the assignment of USAF personnel to units of the Thai system.

It provides that: “Hostile aircraft, including unidentified aircraft, will be destroyed when determined by the RTAF Air Operations Center and/or the USAF Tactical Air Command Center to pose a threat to forces and installations in Thailand … USAF rules (of engagement) will apply for all USAF fighter and interceptor aircraft.” The language does not distinguish between Thai and US “forces and installations” which will be protected by this Agreement.

The Agreement states, somewhat ambiguously, that: “The air defense of Thailand is a sovereign responsibility of the Government of Thailand which has been vested in the RTAF. United States Forces deployed to, and at the request of, the Government of Thailand, will assist in the Thailand Air Defense/Tactical Air Control System”. It was perhaps this language which led Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee to state publicly, shortly before the Agreement was formally signed, that US aircraft in Thailand could be called into action by the Prime Minister to defend Thailand.

Ambassador Unger transmitted this Agreement to the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at the latter's request), with a Note stating that the “Agreement will improve coordination between our respective air forces, in furtherance of our common commitments to the defense of Thailand under the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty.” The reference to SEATO was thus explicit, though the phrase concerning “common commitments” was apparently new.

So far as I know, Senator Fulbright is not yet aware of this agreement. Senator Symington's investigating team (Messrs. Pincus and Paul) have listed this among the documents which they wish to receive. I have requested that State clear with the White House before replying to their request.

A copy of the Agreement with its covering Note is at Tab B.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on September 16.

[2] Attached at Tab A but not printed is a Background Paper that the Department's Executive Secretary Eliot forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an August 12 memorandum. It stated that while various bilateral agreements, including support of Thai troops fighting in South Vietnam and air defense agreements formalizing arrangements for defense against hostile aircraft, involved obligations on the part of the United States, “they do not extend our commitment to the defense of Thailand beyond that set forth in the SEATO treaty.”

[3] The Air Defense Operations Agreement is attached but not printed.

22. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 28, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Force Reductions in Thailand

I understand proposals to reduce U.S. strength in Thailand by 7,000 and 10,000 are under consideration.

It is also my understanding that CINCPAC proposes to accomplish the reduction with the following withdrawals.

7,000 man reduction

10,000 man reduction

2 A–1 squadrons

Same as for 7,000, plus:

1 A–26 squadron

3 F–105 squadrons and related support units

2 EB–66 squadrons plus related support units

These CINCPAC proposals raise important questions regarding the role of the remaining U.S. forces in Thailand. CINCPAC is proposing to take out virtually all of those forces best suited for missions over Laos (to assist the Laotian government and to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail), leaving in Thailand the forces best suited to bomb North Vietnam and clearly inferior for Laotian missions.

There are now 16 “fighter/attack” squadrons in Thailand. Twelve of these are high-performance jet squadrons (8 with F–4s; 4 with F–105s). Four are equipped with propeller-driven aircraft (3 with A–1s; one with A–26s).

Either CINCPAC proposal would remove all but one propeller squadron (which would remain primarily for search and rescue operations). According to available evidence on the comparative efficiency of these versus high performance jets, this would be a very poor allocation of our resources in Thailand.

Comparison of the effectiveness of jet aircraft and propeller-driven airplanes in attacking ground targets in Southeast Asia has shown that the prop planes are considerably more efficient than the jets. A recent study (August 1969) indicates that in Laos in 1968 propeller-driven aircraft were roughly twice as effective as jets in terms of targets destroyed per attack.

Comparison of Targets Destroyed or Damaged per 100 Attacks

Prop Planes

Jets

Target Type

A–1

A–26

F–4

F–105

Trucks

46.8

49.0

23.0

18.5

Truck Parks

3.4

5.2

2.5

1.9

Roads

53.6

55.0

25.9

23.3

Logistics Storage Areas

13.2

N/A

6.6

6.8

Air Defense Targets

12.6

12.9

8.3

12.7

Furthermore, the costs per year per squadron are substantially less for prop squadrons compared with jet squadrons.

Total Southeast Asia Operating Costs per Squadron per Year

Prop

Jet

A–1

A–26

F–4

F–105

$41 m

$30 m

$56 m

$61 m

The primary combat advantage of the prop aircraft is their ability to loiter, locate a target, and make multiple attacks on it. (Jets have a comparative advantage against sophisticated defenses, but these are not an important factor in Laos.) Prop aircraft also perform as well at night as during the day,[2] while jets are only half as efficient after dark. Most of the targets appear at night. One study has shown that the cost of destroying a target at night with a jet is 13 times greater than with a propeller aircraft. Finally, prop aircraft losses per target destroyed are about the same or lower than for jets.

Considering this evidence, it is hard to fathom CINCPAC's rationale for their proposed force cuts. An alternative proposal to take out three more jet squadrons instead of the A–1s and A–26s would provide more manpower reductions, considerably larger budgetary savings, and would have the least impact on the war effort. The disadvantage in doing so is that if bombing of North Vietnam were resumed jets would be preferable. Nevertheless, even an all jet redeployment would leave six squadrons of high-performance jets in Thailand, and if we decide to bomb North Vietnam again we can redeploy additional jet squadrons as necessary.

The proposal recommended by CINCPAC demonstrates again our inclination to attempt to suit the war to our equipment and technological preferences rather than the other way around. Our policies in this respect also serve to indicate to our allies that high-performance jets are better counter-insurgency aircraft than props, when in fact the reverse is true.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an unsigned copy.

[2] It has been suggested that the reason the effectiveness of prop aircraft does not decline at night is that the enemy cannot make visual sightings at night, there is more truck traffic at night, and the enemy's visually targeted anti-aircraft weapons are less effective at night. These factors permit the low flying, slower prop aircraft to operate more effectively whereas the high-speed jet cannot operate at low altitudes at night without greatly increased risks. [Footnote in the source text.]

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, September 9, 1969, 0955Z.

12246. Please pass White House. Subject: Thai-US Contingency Planning.

1. The following background information describes the role played by bilateral planning in Thai-US relations over recent years. We have gone into this at some length because a full understanding of this role is important in assessing the impact the controversy over Project Taksin has had on the Thai and on their views of basic trends in US-Thai relations. We also believe this background of US-Thai planning may be useful in preparing for further Congressional scrutiny.[2] We will address in immediately following telegram the effects of the recent contingency planning controversy on US-Thai relations.[3]

2. Project 22 now called Project Taksin sprang from US and Thai concerns over Communist failure to observe the 1962 Geneva Accords and what appeared to be a growing threat to Thailand developing through Laos. In July 1965 reacting to this Thai concern, the DCM called on Prime Minister Sarit under instructions to say “we intend to do whatever is necessary to meet the obligations of the US in Southeast Asia. The United States will not sit idly by and allow the Communists to become entrenched on the borders of Thailand. The United States considers the Communist advance in Laos as a threat to United States security as well as to that of Thailand. As we have publicly confirmed in the Rusk–Thanat communiqué, “the United States considers Thailand's integrity and independence as vital to its own.” (Bangkok 79, 7/15/63)[4] A generalized version of this appeared in the Bangkok newspapers.

3. Two months later Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson consulted in Bangkok with Prime Minister Sarit, Foreign Minister Thanat and others. When Secretary Johnson suggested it might be a good idea to return US combat troops to Thailand if the PL continued their advance, the Thai said that bringing troops to Thailand without intending to do more than in 1962 would not be good enough; if troops were to come the US should give a clear indication that they would move further if necessary.

4. On May 30, 1964, with continued deterioration in Laos, Secretary Rusk called on PM Thanom. When asked what the United States would do if the Communists continued their advances, the Secretary replied that a specific concrete answer would have to come from the President and that one would be forthcoming shortly. He added, however, that there was no limit to what the US would do if necessary to defend Thailand. The Prime Minister said the Thai were undertaking defense measures and might be compelled to cross the Mekong. He expected that if such steps were necessary the US and Thailand would act together. The Secretary said he was encouraged by this Thai planning and suggested the desirability of advance consultation. (Secto 27 5/30/64)[5]

5. At a June 1964 high-level US planning meeting in Honolulu attended by the Secretaries McNamara and Rusk it was decided that the US should request urgent consultations with the RTG regarding measures to be taken in the event of a PL drive towards the Mekong. On June 8, 1964, Ambassador Martin called on Thanom, reviewed the Honolulu discussions, and said he was convinced of the “complete firmness of the US decision to do whatever was necessary to prevent Communist domination in Southeast Asia.” The Ambassador then referred to Rusk's discussions in May and said that he had been instructed that the US desired to consult urgently about measures to be taken. He said that “our willingness to engage with the Thai in immediate planning was further evidence of the complete seriousness of our intentions.” He also pointed to the prepositioning of military equipment at Korat as further proof. (Bangkok 2106 6/8/64)[6]

6. On June 18, 1964, the first meeting took place with Dawee chairing the Thai side and with representatives from CINCPAC leading the US delegation. Dawee said he spoke for the Prime Minister. Thai policy was that they would hope to fight side-by-side with the United States, but would require substantial US logistical support should action be necessary against Communist advances in Laos. General Easterbrook, Chief, JUSMAG emphasized that this conference was a follow-on of the discussions held between Secretary Rusk and the Prime Minister. General Milton from CINCPAC said that he understood that Dawee was speaking for the Prime Minister but he was in a position only to transmit his views to CINCPAC and the JCS. Dawee said he understood how the United States Government works.

7. The US side pressed for Thai views on just what Communist acts would be required to trigger joint Thai-US actions. The Thai gave no definite answer but indicated that the situation would have to be judged against existing circumstances. Dawee also said that he assumed that this plan involving possible movement of forces to Laos would be implemented with the approval of the RLG but that we should be prepared to move without it.

8. In a letter to the Prime Minister from President Johnson transmitted on June 27, 1964,[7] the President said “We regard Communist advances in Laos as a threat to the security of the United States as well as to that of Thailand. In accordance with this concept, I have authorized Ambassador Martin to open consultations with you looking toward joint Thai-US military planning of measures to be taken in the event of a Communist drive towards the borders of Thailand. I understand joint planning meetings will begin in Bangkok this week. We must be prepared to act promptly and effectively to check such a drive as necessary.”

9. On August 11, 1964, State concurred in the terms of reference (TOR) in a letter from Bundy to Solbert[8] which said “We see the possibility of real political as well as military advantages arising from joint planning with the Thai and we hope that it can begin soon.”

10. The TOR called for planning to provide for the defense of Thailand to include military operations to hold the Mekong Valley, its principal cities, and its military facilities (in Laos as well as Thailand). The threat is defined as Communist operations in Laos as more than subversion but less than overt aggression. The defense of Thailand could require any of a combination of the following: definitive and punitive actions in the event of Communist border incursion into Thailand; counterinsurgency actions against Communist forces in Laos in the event of Communist border incursion into Thailand; counter-insurgency actions against Communist forces in Laos in the event of an insurgency in Thailand; and interdiction operations against North Viet-Nam. The TOR also stated that joint Thai-US consultations could be undertaken at any time to determine what portions of the plan should be implemented.

11. On October 26, 1964, the basic draft force level plan was submitted to the “national authorities” for approval. On August 23, 1965, the final force level plan was promulgated by Prime Minister Thanom at MOD. In November of 1965 a draft field force plan was submitted to the national authorities and on December 23, 1966 the final field force plan was promulgated by Thanom at MOD.

12. At the signing of the field force plan by Thanom and General Stilwell on December 23, 1966, Amb. Martin noted he was participating “on behalf of and as the personal representative of the President of the United States.” He traced the plan's beginning at the President's behest. He said the plan did not really deepen American determination to do whatever is necessary to carry out American commitments to insure the defense of Thailand and that “as the President pointed out in his recent visit to Thailand that commitment is full and complete and as the President reiterated then ‘America keeps its word.’” Ambassador Martin said, however, “that the act witnessed today does translate into effective operational terms the modalities of carrying out our joint commitments should events dictate that our respective governments would authorize the implementation of the plan. As such it is of tremendous political importance in this translation into effective operational planning for the use of our combined resources.” He then coupled the plan with the recent approval of SEATO Plan 8 and concluded by saying that he had been authorized by the President “to convey to your Excellency his personal gratification and congratulations on the completion of this exercise.” (A–498, 12/28/66)[9]

13. On January 5, 1966, Ambassador Martin sent a letter to PM Thanom. The PM was under criticism from Praphas and Thanat to the effect that recent American construction projects and deployments had no relevance to Thailand's security needs and that America was “occupying” Thailand. To help the PM fend this off the letter linked these construction projects to existing agreements and to both SEATO and Project 22 contingency planning.

14. In June 1967, the draft air, naval and unconventional warfare component plans of the project were approved in draft form and in October of the same year the draft ground component plan was approved by MACT.

15. In early 1968 a top secret working paper which gave a fairly clear picture of the plan disappeared from the trunk of a car belonging to a Thai member of the Project 22 working group. We do not know whether or not the plan fell into unfriendly hands. Following this the name of the exercise was changed from Project 22 to Project Taksin.

Unger

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, 1969 September. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 1056Z. Repeated to SECDEF,JCS, and CINCPAC.

[2]  Kissinger forwarded the telegram to the President under a September 26 covering memorandum in which he said that “Project Taksin itself originated as a Democratic effort to convince the Thai that we meant business when we said that we would do anything necessary to defend the Mekong, including the re-introduction of American troops.” Kissinger also summarized that the “history of negotiations shows clearly that the plans were developed at our initiative more than that of the Thai.” Attached but not printed.

[3] Dated September 9; not printed. (DEF 1 THAI–US)

[4] See Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XXIII, Document 479, footnote 1.

[5]  Secto 27 is printed ibid., 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Document 272 .

[6] Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 THAI–US)

[7] Dated June 18, 1964; the letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Document 277 .

[8] Not found.

[9] Not printed. (DEF 1 THAI–US)

24. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Your Use with Senator Fulbright at the Leadership Meeting, September 15[2]

At the Leadership Meeting on September 15 it is possible that Senator Fulbright will want to speak to you about the US role in Thailand. Although he has said that his differences with Secretary Laird over release of the Project Taksin plan (a contingency plan covering joint US-Thai operations to defend Thailand against aggression under the more general provisions of the SEATO Treaty) have now been eliminated, he may still wish to have a copy of this document turned over to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He may also reiterate the line which he has taken publicly to the effect that Project Taksin is in effect an automatic commitment by the US to use its forces to fight in Thailand.

Your Recommended Position

—The US commitment to Thailand exists wholly in the context of the SEATO Treaty, which in the event of aggression by an armed attack on any of its parties calls on them to act to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional procedures. In the case of subversion, all that the parties undertake to do is to consult. The Rusk–Thanat Declaration of 1962 adds that our obligations are individual as well as collective but we regard this as simply a valid restatement of the responsibilities set forth in the SEATO Treaty.

—Project Taksin represents nothing more than a contingency plan undertaken within the framework of the SEATO Treaty. This type of contingency planning is a normal military function. The plan cannot be put into effect without the specific approval of both the Thai and US Governments, and emphatically does not automatically commit US troops to fight in Thailand.

—The US SEATO commitment to Thailand is a firm one, however, and affects the entire political relationship between our two countries. You have said, and you wish to reiterate, that the US will live up to commitments of this nature.

—You have also stated that our commitment does not extend to using US forces to help fight internal subversion. Our role is limited to providing military equipment and economic assistance where needed. The Thai understand this, and have publicly said that they do not want US troops to assist them in dealing with their insurgency.

—Demonstrating the Thai attitude toward the presence of US troops in Thailand, the Thai Government has encouraged US to reduce the level of US forces in Thailand if not needed for Vietnam. It understands that these troops are present in connection with the Vietnam war, and can be withdrawn as their need diminishes.

—You consider that the Thai deserve a great deal of credit for their staunchness as a US ally. Despite their tradition of not becoming identified with any great power, they joined with US as long ago as 1950 to help resist aggression in Korea, they have cooperated with us fully in regional and world affairs, and they have sent troops to fight in Vietnam in recognition of the issues involved there. But they are a very sensitive Asian people, and feel that somehow their contributions are overlooked or misunderstood. You personally believe that it is important to reassure them on this score.

—(If asked) Concerning release of the Project Taksin plan, you understand that arrangements have been worked out whereby the document is available at the Department of Defense for scrutiny by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[3] You hope that this arrangement is satisfactory. To do more would of course raise a Constitutional question over executive privilege and separation of powers, and you believe that this issue deserves further study.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret.

[2] Holdridge indicated in a September 15 memorandum to Kissinger that he had drafted the talking points for the President “in the event that Senator Fulbright uses the Leadership Meeting” to bring up his “reservations about the US role in Thailand.”

[3] A notation next to this sentence in Nixon's handwriting reads: “H.K. Does this make sense? I question revealing any contingency plan. 9–15–69”

25. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 15, 1969.

SUBJECT

Reduction in Thailand

As you know, Ambassador Unger and Major General Seith in Bangkok have just completed a negotiation with the Royal Thai Government for a reduction of 6,000 military personnel in Thailand. All aspects of the reduction have been settled by normal State/Defense/JCS/NSC staff discussion with the exception of the precise timing of the withdrawals. Announcement of this reduction has been deferred temporarily, with the upcoming discussion between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Thanat on September 20 at the TCC meeting in New York[2] the most likely time for release. The purpose of this memorandum is to secure your decision on a date for the completion of the first 6,000 withdrawal. I recommend that December 31, 1969, be adopted as the deadline.

Advantages

—The budget effect will be greater during this fiscal year.

—It might be a useful item to include in your State of the Union Message and my posture statement next year.

Disadvantages

—It may leave us open to a charge of bad faith by the Royal Thai Government, inasmuch as Ambassador Unger provided the Thai with a tentative timetable indicating that this withdrawal will not be completed until about 1 September 1970.

Note: The schedule given to the Royal Thai Government was in terms of effective date of cessation of functions and packing up time was added. Assuming the maximum packing time given (60 days) in all cases, the Royal Thai Government would see the schedule about as follows:

Departure Date

Cumulative Total

December 1, 1969

950

March 1, 1970

1,800

June 1, 1970

3,900

September 1, 1970

6,000

—Phasing out the 18 A–1s, 16 A–26s and 12 U–10s included in the package in December 1969 rather than in June and September 1970 may degrade the air support to the Laotian Forces during much of the next Dry Season enemy offensive (November to May) by about 10%.

—The Thai and other Southeast Asia nations might assess this as a decision to “cut and run”.

Given all of the above, I believe on balance that the domestic advantages outweigh the Southeast Asia-related disadvantages. Thus, I recommend that December 31, 1969, be established as the completion date now so that the field may begin the necessary planning.

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret.

[2] See Document 28.

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, September 16, 1969, 0910Z.

12592. Ref: A. State 156149, B. State 156407, C. State 156733, D. Bangkok 11910, E. State 156752.[2]

1. This morning I secured appointment with Prime Minister before he opened cabinet meeting and carried out instructions contained ref A. The Prime Minister had with him General Sawaeng and Deputy Foreign Minister Chitti acting in place of Thanat.

2. I first conveyed to Prime Minister text of announcement[3] as contained ref A, as amended by ref B. Unfortunately, ref C arrived after I had departed from Embassy; to say nothing of ref E. I explained that short advance notice unavoidable because of inadvertent revelation from Saigon which Thais had all already read in morning newspapers here. I also related this announcement to our earlier discussions about troop replacement in Vietnam (latest of which reported ref D).

3. Prime Minister's first question was to ask for more information on reference to “offer of withdrawal of US and allied forces over 12 month period.” I pointed out that this and other points made in same context all refer to efforts already made which are here being reiterated and I recalled that some time ago we had specifically offered to make such a withdrawal if accompanied by responsive action by other side.

4. Prime Minister then pointed out that total projected US withdrawal by December 15 will amount to more than ten percent of US forces in Vietnam. In view of this he considered it may be necessary to reduce Thai contingent in Vietnam and said that he would be discussing this with President Thieu when latter makes anticipated visit to Thailand in latter part of October. Marshal Thanom added that people here will feel that if US can make such a reduction, Thailand should also be able to do so. I acknowledged this and fact that Prime Minister had discussed this with President Nixon during July visit, but I also received his confirmation that he was speaking only of a reduction and not a total withdrawal of Thai forces from South Vietnam. I emphasized the importance the USG attaches to the continued presence of other allied forces in South Vietnam.

5. Marshal Thanom then inquired whether we will in fact go through with the reduction of 40,500 additional men if there is no improvement in the military situation. I said I believed we would since the reduction was based, as far as I could tell, primarily on the enlarged capacity of the ARVN to carry the load, thus permitting South Vietnamese to replace American manpower. I added that our carrying through of the projected reduction might have to be reconsidered, on the other hand, if the military situation should seriously worsen.

6. The Prime Minister asked whether the projected reduction was based on any indication of a greater willingness on the part of Hanoi to negotiate. I replied that I was not aware of any improvement in that quarter and reiterated my interpretation of Washington's action as being based above all on the improved capacity of South Vietnam to carry additional military responsibility. I added, however, that it may also have been thought that the projected announcement could possibly provide a helpful influence on the course of policy discussions which may now be taking place in Hanoi following the death of Ho Chi Minh. Marshal Thanom asked for any information I could give him about who may be assuming leadership in Hanoi but I told him I had no useful information on this subject beyond identifying the four well-known figures generally assumed to be the leaders principally in charge there today.

7. The Prime Minister made no further inquiries about the announcement but did go on to make some observation which he said he had also discussed with President Nixon during the July visit. Thanom said that here in Thailand and around the world people have noticed a basic change in American actions. In World Wars I and II there was determination to fight for the achievement of military victory. This has now changed as illustrated by our actions in Korea and Vietnam where the US appears to have lost this determination and is prepared to settle for something less. I said that the important thing to keep in mind was the objective which, both in Korea and South Vietnam, has been to help a free nation to preserve its independence; this was achieved in Korea where there is now a thriving and prosperous Republic of Korea and, I was persuaded this would also be achieved in Vietnam. The Prime Minister did not dispute this except to say that in the Korean case we had expelled the Communists from South Korea by military action which has not been done in South Vietnam. I replied that while this was true today the situation at the present time was vastly improved over that of 1965 when the collapse of South Vietnam seemed a real danger and when American forces were introduced. Now the Communists know they cannot win a military victory. I said again I was persuaded that ultimately a settlement would be reached which would preserve for the people of South Vietnam their independence and right to decide their own fate. On Thanom's general point I added only that there was a new element on the international scene since the days of World Wars I and II, namely the reality of nuclear war and its dangers for all of humanity; the US must take this into full account in its actions.

8. Comment: I would naturally have much preferred to have given the Prime Minister more advance notice of the announcement. Thai negative feelings on this score were, of course, heightened by Ky's leak in Saigon. I also would have been in a better position to discuss the announcement and Washington's thinking and intentions intelligently if I had either been provided with some background at this time or been kept currently informed as the talks in Paris and the deliberations in Washington proceeded.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate.

[2] Telegrams 156149, 156407, and 156733 to Bangkok, all September 16. (Ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S) Telegram 11910 from Bangkok, September 2. (Ibid., POL 7 THAI) Telegram 156752 to Bangkok, September 16. (Ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S)

[3] The final text of the President's announcement on troop withdrawals from Vietnam was transmitted in telegram 156895 to Paris, September 16. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

27. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

New York, September 18, 1969, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Thai

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Ambassador-designate Sunthorn Hongladarom

United States

The President

Secretary Rogers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. John B. Dexter, Country Director

Highlights

—President deplored Senate and press statements regarding U.S. commitments to Thailand, contingency planning, etc.

—Assured Thanat U.S. will keep commitments under SEATO to help defend against external aggression and will continue help Thai strengthen capability to defeat internal insurgency.

—Advised that RTG should not be too disturbed about unfavorable Senatorial and press statements but should discuss problems with USG.

—Reassured Thanat that USG not disavowing controversial contingency plan, which is necessary and remains valid for implementation in the appropriate contingency if so decided by two governments.

—Re U.S. troops in Thailand, President and Secretary noted false impression created by critics to effect these troops there to protect Thailand.

—Secretary referred to Thanat's talks with Ambassador Unger re troop withdrawals and said he understood RTG wanted gradual withdrawal. President and Secretary both told Thanat we wished withdrawal schedule to follow Thai wishes.

—Thanat said RTG not misled by Senate and press criticism but saw it as dangerous to both U.S. and Thailand.

—Thanat said his request for U.S. troop withdrawal was tactic to reveal truth about purpose U.S. troops in Thailand and relieve U.S. domestic pressures. Intent was not to drive U.S. troops out.

—Responding President's question, Thanat said he foresaw no immediate change in North Vietnamese policy following Ho's death and believed current U.S. policy correct.

—Thanat concurred in troop withdrawals from Viet-Nam as politically necessary but noted importance of preparing ARVN to take over.

—Thanat said Prime Minister asked him reaffirm assurance that RTG would not call on U.S. to help fight insurgency, though it did want U.S. to maintain current level of aid to support Thai counterinsurgency. —In response President's request, Thanat indicated RTG concerned over Laos and would keep U.S. informed of its appraisal of situation.

Details

After introductory remarks, the President told Thanat he was glad to have this private talk because he had been disturbed over the effect on Thailand of recent Senatorial and press statements concerning our commitments to Thailand, contingency planning, etc. These statements, he said, might cause some Thai to think the United States was going to renege on its commitments and, worse still, seemed to reflect use of Thailand as a “whipping boy” in U.S. domestic politics. Also, he said, these were inconsistent with what he, the President, had told the Thai personally. He wanted Thanat to know that because the Thai had stood with us in the past, the United States would not let them down now. We will keep our treaty commitments. He commented that the fate of Thailand was to a large extent what the Vietnam war was all about.

The President explained that in the Senate and in other circles in the United States there were many who wanted the United States to pull out of all of its overseas commitments. For them, Thailand was merely a convenient target even though most of them did not understand anything about Thailand itself. The President then urged Thanat, whenever any public “flare-ups” of this sort should occur in the United States, to check with Ambassador Unger, with the Secretary or with the President to determine the facts. If any real differences should develop between us, he said, the RTG will not learn about them first from the press.

Referring to the controversy over the contingency plan, the President commented that such planning was obviously necessary and added that we would not disclose it to anyone who ought not to see it. The Secretary then called attention to the fact that, before joint planning with Thailand had come under Senatorial fire, there had been an earlier controversy regarding military planning with Spain. This showed that Thailand itself was not the objective of the critics. He added that there had been some misunderstanding about the United States position on the contingency plan and that, specifically, some remarks of Secretary Laird's taken out of context had been misinterpreted. When Secretary Laird characterized the plan as not having been approved, he meant simply that its implementation had not been approved; implementation would not, of course, be considered unless the appropriate contingency should arise.

The President then interjected to say that more important than any plan is the United States commitment. He said again, with emphasis, that the United States would help to resist external aggression against Thailand and would support Thai efforts to counter internal insurgency and subversion. He asked that this be conveyed to the RTG (the President then commented to Secretary Rogers that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had stood with the United States and were friends “whom we did not like to see kicked around”). The Secretary said there had been distorted statements in the press to the effect that United States troops were in Thailand to protect Thailand and this was false. He then referred to Thanat's talks with Ambassador Unger on troop withdrawal and said we wanted to follow Thai views on the timing which, he understood, the RTG wanted to be gradual. The President commented jokingly that, in light of Senatorial attacks on our troop presence in Thailand, those troops could stay as far as he was concerned “till hell freezes over.” He said the Thai should let us know what they wanted in this regard and we would do it.

Thanat said he was grateful for the President's assurances and would pass them to his Government. The RTG was not misled by the U.S. press but was concerned that the publicity campaign and political controversy were dangerous to both U.S. and Thai interests. He feared the U.S. public was being deceived about the role of U.S. troops in Thailand and the effect would be to drive a wedge between the United States and Thailand. He said he had discussed the subject before a correspondents' gathering in Thailand following conversations he had with Mr. Shakespeare, USIA Director, and Ambassador Unger. As he had told them, his purpose in calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops was not to drive them out but to bring the truth to the attention of the U.S. public and the world. He added that he thought that this tactic had succeeded. The President concurred. The President said we understood the RTG position regarding our troops and advised that the RTG could help in minimizing harm done by unwarranted public criticism by keeping U.S. press and Congressional comments in perspective. He assured him again that, if any real troubles or differences should develop between us, Ambassador Unger, the Secretary and the President would be certain to discuss them.

The President then asked Thanat's views on the new situation in North Viet-Nam following Ho Chi Minh's death. He wondered if Thanat anticipated that the new leaders would be more intransigent or less or about the same. Thanat said he expected that North Viet-Nam's policy would continue about the same for some time. He said the new leadership has not made up its mind yet and would require time to determine any new course of action. In the meanwhile, its eyes and ears would be directed at U.S. public opinion.

In response to the President's question as to what the United States should be doing on Viet-Nam, the Foreign Minister answered that currently the United States policy is in general accord with Thai views. He said they realize that the United States must withdraw troops to ease domestic pressures and he drew attention to the fact that the RTG had never objected to announced troop withdrawals. He cautioned, however, that we must make sure that the South Vietnamese are trained and equipped to take over the combat burden as U.S. troops leave.

Thanat then said the Prime Minister had asked him to reaffirm to the President that the RTG would not call upon the United States to help fight its insurgency. The RTG only hopes the United States would continue helping the RTG in its own efforts. He asked that there be no reduction in U.S. assistance.

The President inquired about Thai concern over Laos and whether the Thai were more or less optimistic now than they have been in the past. The Foreign Minister said recent developments have been favorable though the situation is of continuing concern. In response to a question from the President about the strength of the North Vietnamese forces in Laos, the Foreign Minister commented that they were not so powerful as they seemed but were reckless with human lives. The President concluded by urging Thanat to keep us closely informed of Thai views of Lao developments.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter (EA/TB) and approved by Kissinger on October 6. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. This conversation was also reported in telegram 160368 to Bangkok, September 19. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)

28. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 24, 1969, 2030Z.

Secto 44/3193. Subj: Secretary's Bilateral with Thai ForMin, Sept 23.

1. Following summary based on uncleared memcon, noforn and FYI only subject to revision upon review:

2. Secretary began substantive conversation by asking if ForMin Thanat would agree to a slight alteration in troop reduction scheduled. He said we would like to complete draw down by July 1 to meet our fiscal year.[2] ForMin agreed to July 1 date, saying RTG would leave scheduling to us. Secretary said he understood troop reduction announcement wording was agreed[3] and we would like simultaneous announcement in Washington and Bangkok, leaving handling Bangkok release to RTG. Thanat said his govt would follow US lead. Secretary responded that he would discuss exact timing with President and be in touch with ForMin.

3. Secretary asked Thai appraisal prospects success Thanat's ICJ candidacy and asked what we could do. After saying opposition spreading rumors US would prefer his withdrawal in order retain services as ForMin, Thanat said Colombian vote crucial. Amb Yost noted we had spoken to Colombians and received reply they committed to Indian candidate. Thanat raised possibility Colombia could vote for both Indian and himself. Amb Yost said we would check it out. It was agreed that work in SC was the most important, Amb Yost informed Thai that Finns presently studying issue. Secretary volunteered to discuss Thanat's candidacy with Colombian ForMin at LA dinner this evening and recommend vote for Thanat and Indian. Amb Anand said Thanat now had 7 votes for SC but 8 needed and 9 better.

4. Secretary turned to present attack on US administration in Washington on Laos. Thanat asked what we proposed to do. Secretary said we have time to prepare and he would have better fix following his return from Washington later this week. Thanat said in his view all part of same problem. It first focused on Thailand, now shifted to Laos, including charge US backing Lao units and 5,000 Thai troops in Laos, this last charge ridiculous. He regretted lack press coverage Lao reps GA address including fact 40,000 North Vietnamese troops now in Laos. Thanat said he was going to Washington Oct 3 to address Institute Foreign Affairs and, if Secretary agreeable, would hit North Vietnamese troop figures and fact no regular Thai army troops now in Laos. Secretary agreed that this approach would be helpful and expressed wish to see Thanat in Washington.

5. Thanat asked about results Gromyko dinner previous evening. In particular, anything new on Vietnam. Secretary replied he had not raised matter since we had previously made clear our willingness accept Russian initiatives to aid in settling Vietnam conflict. He said we do not want to appear overeager or panicky, which we are not. As result, neither Vietnam or China discussed. Secretary offered his opinion that Russians not settled on many aspects of foreign policy and these matters pretty much up in air. Only positive aspect was tone of meeting. Sov proposals on European security conference cloudy, only wished large conference to ease tension. ForMin and Secretary agreed that there was equally little substance in Asian security proposal. ForMin mentioned Sov overtures re Aeroflot service and Secretary observed that they appear willing only supply good will but no help.

6. ForMin said he supported US gestures to gain settlement but wished reaffirm need for US to maintain strong position. If such position held, he felt confident something would develop. Secretary reiterated that it was firm intention President maintain firm position on Southeast Asia.

7. ForMin asked if it would be possible for him to have more advanced consultation on US troop replacement. Secretary replied we will of course consult and asked if he were referring to B–52 36-hour pause or cessation B–52 action. He assured Thanat that we had no intention cease B–52 activities. Secretary then outlined our hope for evenly paced troop withdrawal, discussed problem of leaks which reduce President's flexibility, and undertook to give Thai more advanced notice. He said we expect to consider this problem again in mid-Nov.

8. Secretary asked if RTG considering troop reduction in Vietnam. ForMin replied not without full consultation with Vietnam allies and not unless reduction would not affect SVN war effort. In response to Secretary's suggestion that Thai need troops for internal use, Thanat replied that RTG might possibly require them in northeast.

9. ForMin then asked about effect of Cooper amendment. Secretary replied it intended prevent use of US ground forces in undeclared war and would not affect US commitments under SEATO. In response to ForMin's question re Chinese invasion, Secretary said that if Chinese attacked, SEATO obligation would become operative. Secretary went on to say concern was mainly over possible use US ground forces in Laos. He said this was a one-year amendment on an appropriation bill and he would get exact wording and discuss with Thanat in Washington. ForMin asked if it were not similar to Tonkin Gulf Resolution and Secretary replied negatively and repeated previous explanation. Secretary promised to get exact amendment wording and give a memo on subject to Thanat in Washington.

10. Tone of meeting very cordial and Thanat appeared pleased with answers to points raised.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok.

[2] In a September 19 memorandum to the President, Kissinger recommended approval of the withdrawal of the 6,000 troops by July 1, 1970, noting that, at his request, the Departments of State and Defense had compromised their divergent views. Laird had wanted the troops out by December 31, 1969, while State “as a result of a working level agreement with the Thais in Bangkok” had the withdrawal projected to September 1970. Kissinger noted that “State believes this revised schedule will be readily accepted by the Thais and Mel agrees providing you approve.” Nixon checked and initialed his approval on September 23. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, 1969–74, Feb. 1969–Feb. 1970. Another copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)

[3] The text of the agreed joint announcement is in telegram 164797 to Bangkok, September 27. (Ibid.)

29. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group's Recommendations for Providing Military Assistance to Laos

The Washington Special Action Group has developed a plan for providing military assistance to the Lao Government forces.[2] This plan lists actions which are already under way, and also contains agreed recommendations on further actions for your approval. The actions already taken include providing the regular and irregular Lao Government forces with M–16s and more artillery, giving the Air Force additional T–28s, improving and maintaining US aerial reconnaissance capability and tactical air operations, increasing Thai training and support of the Lao forces, and supporting political moves by Prince Souvanna Phouma to improve his posture as a genuine neutralist.

Actions for which your approval is requested are:[3]

1. Working out with our Embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok the introduction of a small Thai fire-control element into Laos to assist Meo gun crews, phasing the Thai out when Meo have been adequately trained to replace them. The assumption is that immediate reintroduction of the full Thai artillery battery which was withdrawn earlier (“Sierra Romeo VIII”) might reveal the Thai presence and leave Thailand vulnerable to charges of violating the 1962 Geneva Accords.

2. Continue studying with Embassies Vientiane and Bangkok the possible utilization of “Sierra Romeo VIII” elsewhere in Laos where it can be both effective and not readily visible or vulnerable. Defense believes that this battery is a useful asset; Ambassador Unger wants it to show the Thai that US interests continue in maintaining a military balance in Laos.

3. Consider via our Ambassadors in Bangkok and Vientiane giving specialized and intensive training to Thai forces for possible future operations against the North Vietnamese in Laos. Although the Thai forces would not necessarily be committed, their extra capabilities would be available in the event that their help becomes needed.

4. Once a North Vietnamese offensive begins and suitable targets are identified, implementing B–52 reconnaissance to develop strike information and possibly to give Hanoi a signal. This action would be withheld for the present, however, to give us an opportunity to study countermeasures for dealing with the risks involved and to provide for necessary advanced planning.

5. If an enemy offensive assumes a size indicating an intention of going beyond the previous pattern of attacks, giving commanders in the field authority to increase manned tactical reconnaissance activities over North Vietnam and the Lao border area below 19 degrees north and initiate tactical reconnaissance in the border area above 19 degrees north. Such activity would enhance intelligence collection capability, provide target data for possible future actions, serve as a signal to the DRV that we might bomb portions of North Vietnam, and possibly cause the DRV to disperse supplies and reconsider plans for an offensive.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, WSAG Meeting 10/6/69 Laos. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Drafted by Holdridge. According to a handwritten and stamped notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 22.

[2] The record of the October 6 WSAG meeting, and attached documents, are in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Document 131 . The minutes of this meeting also mention two other items related to Thailand: T–28 aircraft and 155 mm. howitzers. U. Alexis Johnson “brought up the matter of T–28 aircraft for the RLAF and the Thais, stating that the provision of additional aircraft is a high priority action. Kissinger was strong on the point that T–28s should not be taken from the Thais to be given to the RLAF. Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson agreed,” and reported that the JCS would probably recommend getting 22 aircraft from the VNAF and giving them to the RLAF. There followed a lengthy discussion of artillery support. It was reported that Thai Prime Minister Thanom had recommended introducing a Thai artillery unit equipped with 155s into Laos. It was noted that at “the present time Thai volunteers are training the Meo in the use of 155s. This gun is not particularly suited for operations in Laos. Moving them about from mountain to mountain by helicopter is an awkward task. Nevertheless, field recommendations favor introduction of Thai 155s with a combat defense force of about 300 troops. CINCPAC recommends a return of the Sierra Romeo 8 package to train the Meo, and then move it back out of country.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-071, WSAG Meeting 10/6/69 Laos.

[3] The President initialed his approval of all recommendations. In an October 23 memorandum, Kissinger directed the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to implement the five approved recommendations. Kissinger noted that he “would appreciate regular reports on the progress which is being made to implement the President's directive.” (Ibid.)

30. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Symington Subcommittee Hearings

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign:

Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the U.S.

United States:

U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

John B. Dexter, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

Under Secretary Johnson opened the conversation by referring to our current concern about the Symington Subcommittee hearings.[2] He informed the Ambassador confidentially that Ambassador Unger was returning to Washington shortly to testify before the Subcommittee on Thailand. He assured Sunthorn that we would do all we could to protect Thailand's interests in connection with public release of testimony but outlined the problems involved and warned that we could give no guarantee that the Subcommittee would not eventually publish information that we and the RTG would prefer to keep confidential. The Ambassador expressed appreciation and urged that every effort be made.

The Under Secretary noted that Senator Fulbright and the Symington Subcommittee were motivated largely by fear that in Laos and Thailand we might have undertaken commitments that could lead to direct involvement as in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador commented that Thailand was much better off than Viet-Nam in terms both of leadership and national will and thus the situation was not likely to become as serious as it had in Viet-Nam. The Under Secretary agreed and assured him that this point would be made in the hearings and put in the public record. He agreed with the Ambassador that it was in United States interest for us to help the Thai maintain their security but that there should be no need for United States troops. He told the Ambassador he believed the USG had nothing to apologize for in either Thailand or Laos, and that both we and the Thai should be proud of the story we had to tell about our relationship.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The memorandum is part 1 of 3; part 3 is ibid.; part 2 is Document 31.

[2] In an October 10 letter to Rogers, Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) announced that the third phase of hearings of the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations would take place the week of November 10 and would focus on Thailand. He requested that Unger, among others, be available for testimony in executive session. Symington noted that some of the subjects with respect to Thailand would include treaties, joint planning and exercises, U.S.-built military facilities and military forces in Thailand, military assistance, external and internal security threats to Thailand, U.S. electronic intelligence gathering in Thailand, the Thai roles in the Laotian and Vietnamese wars, and Thai companies controlled or run by Thai Government or military officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1–1 THAI–US) Subsequently, in a lengthy telephone conversation with Kissinger on November 17, Fulbright insisted that “Unger should testify by himself,” rather than with Helms, who “throws a cloak of secrecy” over the testimony. Kissinger demurred, stating that his instructions were that they testify together. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

31. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Thai Economic Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign:

Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the U.S.

United States:

U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

John B. Dexter, Country Director, Thailand/Burma

The Under Secretary asked the Ambassador what he saw as his most important problems as Ambassador in Washington. Sunthorn immediately responded that his most important concern was that the United States Government maintain economic assistance at past levels. Past assistance had been successful, he said, but Thailand's economic outlook was such that continuation of substantial assistance was desirable. He pointed out that the trade balance was adverse, primarily because of declining rice exports, and noted that the World Bank had reported that this year for the first time Thailand would suffer a balance of payments deficit. The decline in exports is a major factor and another is increasing domestic expenditures for development purposes, especially the accelerated rural development program (ARD) which has been sufficiently successful to justify increasing allocation of Thai resources.

The Under Secretary asked how U.S. economic assistance compared in magnitude with U.S. military expenditures in Thailand. The Ambassador could not give statistics but said military expenditures were considerably larger. He added that, while U.S. assistance has been substantial, U.S. exports to Thailand have also been increasing. In response to a question by the Under Secretary the Ambassador indicated there was also a growing trade deficit with Japan.

There followed a discussion of Thailand's efforts to diversify its agricultural production and exports through development of corn, millet, tapioca, cassava, etc. The Ambassador said there was little expansion of exports of manufactured goods, the development of manufacturing thus far serving primarily for import substitution (with the exception of cement).

Ambassador Sunthorn then reiterated that the main problem was rice and commented that our Department of Agriculture was familiar with RTG complaints about PL–480 sales in the area and exports of U.S. rice to Hong Kong, an important traditional Thai market. The Under Secretary said one of the problems affecting decisions on U.S. aid to Thailand was Thailand's high level of foreign exchange reserves. Some argue that this means Thailand does not need foreign assistance. On the other hand, one could question whether the Thai should be “penalized” for the good management which resulted in accumulation of reserves. In any case, the high reserve level was a problem when we tried to justify aid to Thailand on the Hill.

The Ambassador explained that the RTG had to maintain substantial reserves because it needs flexibility in the event of contingencies such as drought, floods, etc. which might suddenly reduce exports and require rapid drawdown of reserves. He added that Thai reserves will probably be down this year about $30 million and this trend is expected to continue for the next few years. This is one reason the RTG hopes U.S. economic assistance will remain at a high level. Under Secretary Johnson responded that it was nevertheless desirable to look toward a termination of all foreign assistance to Thailand as soon as possible, as had occurred with Taiwan. Thailand, he said, is a “success story” and it is healthy for both sides in the circumstances to anticipate an end to aid and to placing relations on an equal footing. The Ambassador agreed but argued that timing is important.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 THAI–US. Confidential. Drafted by Dexter, approved by Green, and approved in J on December 1. The memorandum is part 2 of 3; part 3 is ibid; part 1 is Document 30.

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, October 31, 1969, 0245Z.

14764. Subject: Symington Sub-committee Hearings (Thai Role in Viet-Nam). Ref: State 178591.[2]

1. This message contains all of the material we have been able to gather in response to the sub-committee's question.[3] We have found several gaps, particularly concerning the onset of negotiations with the Thai about the possibility of their sending ground troops to SVN. What follows should serve as a solid basis for a prepared statement:

2. The Thai arrived at their present force level in SVN in four stages. In 1964 they sent a small air force contingent, in 1966 a naval unit, in 1967 an infantry regiment and in 1968 they increased the regiment to a division. We began supporting their effort in 1966. This support evolved through several stages and for a time varied from unit to unit. There is consequently some overlap in the following account of the various Thai contributions.

[Omitted here are paragraphs 3–10 describing details of the Thai military involvement in Vietnam.]

11. Thailand can notify the GVN at any time that it wishes to withdraw some or all of its forces in SVN. While our records do not contain information specifically on the duration of the Thai commitment to SVN it is reasonable to assume that neither we nor the Thai are under an obligation to continue support of the Thai military contribution to VN indefinitely; therefore, the US could terminate its support of the Thai forces after, of course, notifying the RTG. Also we feel certain that we could persuade the RTG to withdraw its forces from SVN if it were prudent to do so. The Thai have indicated their desire to coordinate closely with the other allies in SVN. We have not suggested to the Thai that they reduce or withdraw their forces; however both we and they are aware of the insurgent threat in Thailand and the related threat of enemy advances in Laos. There has been some speculation among individual RTG authorities that it might be necessary to withdraw or reduce their forces if the threat to Thailand becomes worse. However, recently the RTG has publicly announced its intention to continue its military contribution to the GVN as long as each believes it is a necessary contribution.

Assistance to the Thai

12. USG direct assistance to the Thai to support their troop contribution is described above.[4] This aid is outside the regular Military Assistance Program. The MASF program was used to meet Thai requirements stemming from a deployment decision in 1967. Amb Unger's Nov 7, 1967[5] letter outlines this. The Thai had two major concerns when they decided to increase its infantry contribution to a division in late 1967.

A. They were concerned that sending their best troops out of country in substantial numbers would weaken their military posture in Thailand. They sought to meet this by accelerating their modernization efforts and sought our assistance. In response we agreed to increase the MASF level from $60 million to $75 million for FY 68 and to a $75 million planning figure for FY 69. We also agreed to consult with the Thai on the composition of the program.

B. With the decision to send a division, longstanding Thai anxieties about air attack surfaced once again. They asked for a Hawk battalion and after considerable discussion we settled on a Hawk battery to be deployed after the RTG had acquired the necessary land and completed the requisite construction. We also agreed to train the Thai to operate the battery and turn it over to them. The cost of the battery, not to be borne by the MAP Program, is about $7 million. The annual O&M cost to the MAP Program is estimated to be about $1.2 million. To date the site has not been prepared and the Hawks have not been deployed.

13. The dispatch of forces to Vietnam has had a nearly uniform positive political impact in Thailand. The Thai believe that their participation in the conflect reflects credit on the nation, particularly because it is a volunteer expeditionary force. The Thai believe that unit performance has been creditable and they take pride in the recognition given for specific actions by the allied command.

During the election campaign, nearly a year ago, a few voices were raised by left-wing fringe candidates advocating withdrawal of Thai forces from Vietnam (and US forces from Thailand), but as noted elsewhere these had no effects on the campaign or its outcome. More recently, in the wake of the beginning of the US troop reduction program, some similar comments have appeared. These have been divided among the handful who advocate withdrawal in principle, and who are still regarded as aberrant by most Thai, and a few who have argued that Thai forces should be drawn down along with other allied forces in the light of security requirements at home.

RTG and Viet-Nam Strategy

14. The Thai Government has participated as one of the troop contributing countries in periodic meetings and in the process of consultation on major political and military moves to which the US Government is pledged. The more formal acts of consultation have, of course, been accompanied by a continuing exchange of information, ideas and views. 15. By these means, key Thai leaders have been given a sense of participation commensurate with their contributions to the joint effort— contributions which in their minds include not only the dispatch of Thai forces to Vietnam, but the provision of bases and facilities for use by US forces in Thailand. They have neither had nor sought a direct role in development of strategic or tactical plans by COMUSMACV and the GVN. But they have felt free to express their judgments as to the general course of action best calculated to bring the war to a satisfactory ending. They have consistently advocated, and still prefer, that efforts at negotiation be accompanied by application of sufficient military pressure to make the negotiations meaningful and to protect the fundamental principles on which US and Republic of Vietnam participation in the Paris Talks has been premised.

RTG and Viet-Nam Settlement

16. The Thai Government expects to have a voice in the eventual Vietnam settlement and, indeed, desires to have a part in the post-hostilities efforts to maintain stability and promote regional reconstruction and development.

17. The Thai Government has accepted the propriety of the current phase of the negotiations being conducted by the US and the Republic of Vietnam, speaking for all the troop contributing countries. They expect to be kept informed of developments in and related to the talks. This has been done on a very selective basis, and there has been no indication that the Thai feel their legitimate interests are being disregarded. They have however emphasized their desire for more timely consultation in advance of actions. They have made no requests to participate in the Paris Talks themselves at this stage, but expect to participate in negotiations leading up to the eventual settlement.

18. The claim of the Thai and other troop contributing govts to participate in appropriate ways in the eventual settlement is recorded in the Manila Communiqué of 1966.[6] The Thai understandably and properly take this seriously. The US Government has given expression to the need for consultation as events unfold through meetings of the foreign ministers of the troop contributing countries, which have been held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the SEATO Council and, in Sept. 1969, at Secretary of State Rogers' initiative in New York.

In the absence of clearer indication of the time when negotiations will become meaningful, and in what kind of forum, the Thai Govt has not spelled out its ideas on the way in which it could appropriately participate. In the meantime, however, as noted above, they have wished to maintain a dialogue on the substance of the Vietnam problem. We believe that the Thai do this with the other allies as well as with the US and that the views of the Govt of Vietnam are given special weight in the development of Thai positions. Throughout the period of the Paris Talks, Thai leaders have spoken in opposition to the imposition of a coalition govt on South Vietnam, taking in this respect at least as hard a position as that of the GVN.

19. Foreign Minister Thanat has indicated in a general way the disposition of the Thai Govt to continue to play an active role in Southeast Asian affairs following achievement of a settlement. The Thai seem attracted to the idea of entrusting the task of supervising provisions of the settlement to a largely Asian group of nations, more broadly based than the International Control Commissions established in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements. If such a step were feasible now, it seems likely that the Thai Govt would itself be willing to contribute to such an effort.

20. The prospect of a coordinated attack on the problem of reconstruction and continuing development in the Southeast Asian region has held great appeal for the Thai ever since President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins in 1965. The Royal Thai Govt is already an active participant in virtually all regional organizations, either indigenous to Asia or involving participation of outsiders as well, and believes there is the prospect both for further strengthening of such institutions and for the Asian members to carry a progressively greater share in the effort. The Thai do not believe, however, that either such organizations or the region in general can achieve its potential without support from the US and other nations outside the region continuing for a further period.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1–1 THAI–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to SECDEF, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

[2] Telegram 178591 to Bangkok, October 21, transmitted the text of Senator Symington's October 20 letter to Rogers. (Ibid.)

[3] For a summary of the information Symington requested, see footnote 2, Document 30.

[4] Paragraphs 3–10 describe U.S. financial support of overseas allowances, meals, and accommodations for Thai forces in Vietnam, and death and disability gratuities. The United States also agreed to equip and pay for the training of the Thai ground forces going to Vietnam.

[5] Not printed.

[6] For text of the Manila communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, November 14, 1966, pp. 730–735. Paragraph No. 28 dealt with the participation of troop-contributing countries in the settlement. It stated that “they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.”

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 1, 1969, 0402Z.

14847. For Under Secretary Johnson & Asst. Secretary Green.

1. Before departing Bangkok to return to Washington I would like to give you a sketch of the way things look from here with regard to Thai-US relations. Some of the points mentioned are not at this time known to the Thai but if and when they are, I anticipate a cumulatively negative reaction which could well jeopardize close and effective relations which we have sought to maintain with the Thai over many years. My concern is further heightened because of the unfavorable publicity which I very much fear may result from the Symington hearings on Thailand.

2. The factors I have in mind are in a number of different fields but they all have in common what the Thais will take as an indication of acceleration disengagement on our part. These are the more pertinent factors:

(A) The decision which has apparently been taken to terminate the activities of USIS in Thailand which are “on behalf of the Thai Government” (see memo from Henry Kissinger to Frank Shakespeare October 9, copy to SecState).[2] We have been working steadily for some time now to get the Thai Government to assume more and more informational activities but I have been intent on continuing our support of necessary functions until the Thai were ready and able to take over. The order cited appears to foreclose any such orderly handover.

(B) Reduction of US military forces in Thailand: Although this action also has its constructive side if carefully executed, it nevertheless adds to the preoccupation of the Thais when combined with the other factors mentioned here. Furthermore, it would become a strongly negative factor if we should move too quickly to proceed beyond what is already programmed.

(C) The serious doubts raised about the continuing validity of the contingency planning with the Thai (Project Taksin) and therefore growing doubts about the credibility of our SEATO commitment.

(D) The downward trend in our economic aid as contrasted with high level assurances that we will continue to assist Thailand to handle its own problems through economic and military aid.

(E) The continuing Congressional and press criticism of Thailand (and our other allies in this region) which seems to concentrate on castigating just those who are most willing to help the US; the most recent unhappy case is Otto Passman in the Thai and other loans to the US to help out on the balance of payments.

(F) Our apparent reluctance to continue Sierra Romeo which has been a major element in our close cooperation with the Thais to employ all of the limited means available to us to try to stave off disaster in Laos.

3. I continue to assume that Thailand is of importance to us and that we wish to continue to enjoy the facilities and privileges we have here, such as those relating to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam and our actions in Laos, as well as certain highly classified vitally important activities. I also assume that Thailand, as the heart of Southeast Asia, is important to us as the key probably to assuring that that part of Southeast Asia which lies beyond continues in friendly hands.

4. Unless my assumptions are in error, the independence and friendly disposition of Thailand towards us must continue to be a priority objective in this part of the world. Heretofore our shared conviction with the Thais that we were working toward essentially the same goals and that we were both prepared to make contributions toward those goals assured a relationship of mutual confidence. We are now beginning to raise real doubts about our future intentions and beginning to undermine our close relations without which we could not expect to enjoy here the advantages we have had in the past. The reports about the RTG's reviewing its foreign relations (Bangkok 14722)[3] is one of a few significant straws in the wind of and “agonizing reappraisal” which the Thais may in due course reluctantly decide they must take.

5. These are fundamental points which have to be considered when we are weighing the nature and the level of our programs in Thailand in the coming period. Decisions on these matters which cumulatively signal growing US disinterest and disengagement will surely undermine and perhaps in due course destroy the effective and constructive relations we have had with the Thais for so long. I hope this is not where we mean to be heading.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL US. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

[2] Not found.

[3] Dated November 1. (Ibid.)

34. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 5, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Unger, November 6

You have a brief meeting scheduled with Ambassador Unger on Thursday.[2]

Unger remains a “big commitment” man to the last; his soul is rooted firmly in the days before the Guam doctrine. He is not happy with much that is going on now, and in recent weeks his mission has orchestrated a set of messages to support his line:

—It has cited declining Thai foreign exchange reserves and an alleged new Thai grasp of Thailand's problems to argue that “we should broaden our support to Thailand's efforts” (in counterinsurgency).

—It has reported in extenso (and I think over-interpreted) a Bangkok Post article to the effect that Thailand may have to make policy “readjustments” in view of US policy changes.

—It has dwelt upon evidence of the expansion of insurgency on the Malaysian border and of Communist re-grouping in the Northeast.

Unger's present preoccupations are stated in a recent Nodis cable (Tab A).[3] He cites recent US decisions (including the instruction on USIS operations in Thailand)[4] as evidence of an “accelerating disengagement” by the US. He warns that this disengagement will raise Thai doubts as to whether we share common objectives, and that these doubts may lead to an “agonizing reappraisal” by the Thai of their relations with us.

Unger is here to testify before the Symington Sub-Committee, and he is most concerned that the Hearings—and release of the testimony— will further damage Thai/US relations.

Suggest You Say:

—We are readjusting our policy, and it is natural and desirable that the Thai also engage in “readjustments.” (e.g. broadened international contacts; self-reliance in counter-insurgency; social and economic measures to avert disaffection; planning to live within their economic means)

—You wonder what the content really would be of a Thai “agonizing reappraisal.” Would the Thai leadership seriously think they could go over to the Communists? Or would they more likely seek means and redouble their efforts to maintain Thai independence and their own positions by making limited accommodations as necessary with Communist China but continuing to fight Communist subversion at home?

—On the USIS issue, you wish to make clear that you heard the Thai themselves express the feeling that popularization of the Thai King and Government should be done by the Thai. The President feels this very strongly, and has instructed that we look not only at Thailand but at our USIS operations elsewhere to see whether they are over-involved in the internal affairs of host countries.

—On the Symington hearings, you agree heartily with Unger's concerns. You hope that he will make his point forcefully in State. You are looking now at possible ways of controlling Senate release of confidential materials which damage our international relations.

—(Unger has not indicated whether he has asked the King about his views on the timing of a visit to the US.) Ask whether Unger has had a chance to raise the question of a visit to the US with the King.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

[2] No other record of the Kissinger–Unger meeting has been found.

[3]  Document 33.

[4] The USIA instruction was, according to Holdridge, very preemptory and allowed no time for winding down this operation. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]

[5] No record of a U.S. visit by the King or of the Nixon–Unger meeting has been found.

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 11, 1969, 0623Z.

15295. Subject: Symington Subcommittee Hearings. Ref: Bangkok 15212.[2]

1. Foreign Minister Thanat received me at his home Tuesday morning before going to Cabinet meeting. I conveyed the substance of State 189585.[3] Thanat listened attentively and expressed appreciation, but made clear his sense of deep concern, not only over the Symington subcommittee hearings but over the fact Plan Taksin had been shown to Senators.[4] He said that despite our assurance, he must assume that for all practical purposes “Plan Taksin is out in the open now.” I pointed out that we hoped to keep the content of the plan secret, but he shrugged his shoulders and remarked that the essence of the plan has already been revealed in the papers to the extent of revealing that it is a Thai-U.S. contingency plan for responding to a threat through Laos. He therefore feels that the other side knows more about our plans than we do about theirs.

2. I reminded him of the assurances contained in para 2 of State 160368[5] to the effect that we still support Plan Taksin. Thanat replied that he accepts implicitly the President's support of the plan but that he cannot overlook the fact that “a lot of water has flowed under the bridge in the past two or three months.” He said that it is no longer possible to have confidence that the Senate would permit the plan to be executed even were the appropriate contingency to arise.

3. He appreciated my offer to keep him informed regarding the progress of the hearings and concurred with my expression of hope that press leaks or critical public statements would not be allowed to pit US and the RTG against each other. Nevertheless, he argues that the problem is in the United States—not in Thailand, which he described as “a silent partner.”

4. On the whole I believe that my representation to him, and in particular the expression of desire to coordinate with the Thai to avoid misunderstandings, was useful. Although it is quite apparent that Thanat is deeply worried about the hearings and their impact and that he relates this to “the water which has flowed under the bridge,” which in his view undermines the solidity of our relationship. I believe the foregoing illustrates how important it is that we be provided with daily reports on the hearings in order that we may maintain regular liaison with the Foreign Minister.

5. Since drafting foregoing, I have just received State 190375[6] describing Assistant Secretary Green's briefing of Sunthorn. I will relay substance of this telegram to Thanat. When I told him earlier this morning that Sunthorn would be briefed, this reminded him that he had received a letter two or three days ago from Sunthorn in which the latter had said that he had called at the Department (possibly on Under Secretary Johnson)[7] and had been told that we would not reveal Plan Taksin to the Senate. I explained that the Department intended to call Sunthorn in again and bring him up to date.

Hannah

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 15212 from Bangkok, November 9, reported Deputy Chief of Mission Hannah's recent contacts with Thai officials concerning the upcoming Symington subcommittee hearings. Hannah included an account of Hollings' statement to Thanat on November 7, in which Hollings warned that the hearings would produce press accounts contrasting sharply with the expressions of friendship which both sides had made during the just-concluded Codel Sparkman and urged “very close coordination between the United States and Thailand governments during this difficult period immediately ahead.” Hannah also requested that the Department provide him with daily reports on the hearings, so that he could maintain close liaison with the Thai Government on this matter. (Ibid.)

[3] Telegram 189585 to Bangkok, November 6, requested that Hannah confer with the Thai Government about the fact that the Taksin contingency plan would soon be shown to select Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee, and to inform its officials about other aspects of the subcommittee hearing. (Ibid.)

[4] The Department of Defense finally let the Senate Foreign Relations Committee see a copy of the Taksin Plan on November 7. A Marine one-star general brought it to the Capitol, where it was perused by Senators Fulbright and Church; it was returned to the Pentagon later that same day. As reported by major newspapers the next day, including the Baltimore Sun and The New York Times, Fulbright said, “I really don't want a copy … This resolves it.”

[5] Not printed.

[6] Telegram 190375 to Bangkok, November 11, reported the highlights of Green's meeting with Ambassador Sunthorn on November 10, including Green's notice to the Ambassador that the Project Taksin Plan had been shown to certain selected Senators, but that the classified nature of the document would continue to be protected. Green said that it had been decided that it was “a tactical necessity” to let the committee see the document itself to forestall further criticism so that the committee “would recognize it for what it was, a contingency plan.” During the Symington subcommittee hearings, Green informed Sunthorn, “there were some topics on which there would be no testimony, others which we would explain but keep classified, and a third category which would eventually appear on public record.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II)

[7] See Documents 30 and 31.

36. Editorial Note

Hearings on Thailand before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, were held on November 10–14, and 17, 1969. The declassified version of the hearings was printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1970, after it was released by the subcommittee on June 8. (United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part 3, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969) The record pertaining to the subcommittee hearings is further amplified by Department of State telegrams to the Embassy in Thailand, as cited below.

The November 10 hearings were described as mostly harmonious, “although the Senators, especially Fulbright and Symington, were predictably antagonistic toward U.S. policies in Southeast Asia (not confining their questions and comments to Thailand) and especially to an alleged failure of the executive to keep Congress fully informed of what it was doing and the ‘commitments’ that it was alleged to be developing. They doggedly persisted in tendentious questioning about Project Taksin and the Rusk–Thanat communiqué, both viewed by them as unauthorized executive commitments going beyond SEATO.

“The most critical questions were on contingency planning (Taksin) and U.S. payments for Thai troops in Vietnam and Laos. Symington also fulminated against failure of the Thai and other SEATO allies to bear their proportionate share of the fighting burden in Vietnam.

“An impasse developed between Ambassador Unger and Ambassador McClintock, and Symington and Fulbright over (1) the Ambassador's position that he was not authorized to testify on the contents of the Taksin contingency plan, specifically the political implications of its provision for possible U.S./Thai intervention in Laos, and (2) on U.S. arrangements with the RTG concerning financial support of Thai military activities (especially the Artillery battery) in Laos.” (Telegram 190428 to Bangkok, November 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)

In addition, the hearings record provides a wealth of statistical and descriptive information about the nature of the U.S. commitment to Thailand, U.S. assistance to and forces in Thailand (as well as USAF reconnaissance and bombing in Laos from Thailand), and Thai efforts and contributions in Vietnam and Laos. Included in this information was testimony that revealed that under a secret accord entered into in 1967, the United States had been paying $50 million a year to Thailand for sending a combat division to South Vietnam. In addition, the United States agreed to increase its military assistance by $30 million for 2 years and to supply Thailand with a battery of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles in return for the 11,000-man Thai unit in Vietnam. It was also disclosed the United States had invested $702 million in construction of military bases in Thailand. (United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Thailand, Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part 3, passim.)

Telegram 190484 to Bangkok, November 12, summarized the first 2 days of the hearings. It reported that the subcommittee had asked probing questions about the meaning of the phrase “constitutional processes” in connection with implementing the Taksin contingency plan, and had asked about “what expectations Thai have as to how we will execute commitments.” It noted that some of the Senators had been strongly critical of U.S. payments to the RTAVF and of the alleged failure of Thailand to bear its “proper share of Vietnam war burden.” The telegram reported that when Fulbright and Symington expressed doubts that either North Vietnam or China were sufficiently serious threats to justify the costs of U.S. security programs in Thailand, Ambassador Unger and other witnesses tried to emphasize that the “bulk of U.S. presence and expenditures in Thailand have been in relation Vietnam war and not directly for Thailand's security, either external or internal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)

Telegram 191152 to Bangkok, November 13, reported that “today's questions were largely directed at possibility U.S. through military assistance and counterinsurgency programs was being drawn into implied commitments or creeping involvement in Thai internal security operations. We believe, however, that Ambassador Unger and other witnesses were able to establish clear record that subcommittee's apparent presumptions were unfounded and that mission and executive branch generally acting with great prudence to avoid the dangers mentioned.” (Ibid.)

Telegram 192811 to Bangkok, November 15, reported on Ambassador Martin's testimony before the subcommittee on November 14, based on his tenure as Ambassador in Bangkok preceding Unger. Asked whether joint U.S.-Thai activities had enlarged the basic U.S. SEATO commitment, “he expressed conviction that they had not in a legal sense, but everyone was free to make his own judgment whether the kind of loyalty and help extended by one partner created a ‘moral’ commitment. In his opinion, the Thai performance had been such as to fully merit our continued support.” Regarding the nature of the U.S. SEATO obligation to Thailand, Martin “maintained his view that it obligates the United States to help Thailand against overt communist aggression or massive external support to insurgency but does not specify precisely what we should do or obligate us to provide combat support against purely internal insurgency.” The telegram also reported that “up to now” the hearings had received “virtually no press treatment” and urged the Embassy to “make sure you have minimized possibility information leaking out that RTG has any knowledge subcommittee hearings.” (Ibid.)

Secretary Rogers called Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger at 5:50 p.m. on November 17 to inform him that Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms had called “and said he was very unhappy and that it wasn't going too well. Having Unger go up there with Helms and pretend it is intelligence.” Helms had stated that what Ambassador Unger was telling the committee about Thai troops “can't be presented as intelligence. K said he thought it considered military operations run by CIA. Rogers didn't think so. These are Thai troops that go into Laos. K asked what Rogers thought should be done.” Kissinger later asked, “what would happen in Thailand if we let it get into the record. Rogers thought there would be trouble. Rogers thought on these things we should go to the Committee and tell them frankly what the problem is and say this is going to be harmful to the national interest and have them keep that in mind. When Symington agreed with the President about intelligence, he didn't have this in mind. K agreed that it didn't mean we could shift non-intelligence issues into intelligence and keep it out of the record.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Thus, telegram 196666 to Bangkok, November 22, reported that “as a result extensive discussions with Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Symington subcommittee over questions concerning Thai involvement in Laos and U.S. support thereof, Ambassador Unger called back to testify again today on this subject. Testimony given before full committee in executive session with understanding that it involved matters of highest sensitivity and would not appear in public record.

“Ambassador Unger's testimony covered following questions: number of Thai troops in Laos; U.S. arrangements for financial support; U.S. pay for Thai pilots; funding procedures; Thai casualties in Laos; and various special payments such as death benefits. Ambassador answered factually and apparently to full satisfaction of committee.

“In view special consideration on which this hearing based, you should not inform RTG.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 13, 1969, 1146Z.

15438. Subject: Symington Subcommittee Hearings. Ref: A. Bangkok 15212;[2] B. State 190484;[3] C. Bangkok 15369.[4]

1. I spoke today to Marshal Dawee in great confidence and entirely alone, mentioning only very generally some of the points in ref B. I mentioned the agenda topics in para 2, ref B, explained the reasons for showing Plan Taksin to the Committee, and pointed out that Ambassador Unger had been at great pains to protect Plan Taksin in the hearings and to reassure the subcommittee that our commitments are limited to SEATO. Characteristically (and unlike Thanat), Dawee was inclined to be sympathetic and understanding of our problems and appreciative of our efforts to minimize the danger. He understands that there will inevitably be some unfortunate leaks or public statements, and while he will be angry when they occur, he is not inclined to punish us before they occur.

2. Without mentioning subcommittee criticisms of the Thai contribution in Vietnam or U.S. personnel, payments to the RTAVF, etc., I did tell Dawee that the committee is, of course, interested in obtaining a review of these aspects of Thai and U.S. cooperation in the Vietnam war. I emphasized that while we would have to explain to the committee our support to the RTAVF we would expect to keep this kind of thing confidential.

3. I believe this very once-over-lightly treatment with Dawee was useful and will be helpful at some future time. In view of Thanat's rather cool attitude two days ago and Birabhongse's critical attitude to our political counselor yesterday, I believe we will go slowly with the Foreign Minister. The Department should know that under my instructions to be cautious and because of Bira's absorption with the successive Johnson and Green interviews with Ambassador Sunthorn, political counselor did not mention a number of items in ref B, including contentious points paras 4, 6, and 7, which perhaps is just as well.

Hannah

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 35.

[3] See Document 36.

[4] Telegram 15369 from Bangkok, November 12, reported on the Embassy political counselor's talk with Foreign Minister Thanat's Secretary, Birabhongse. The latter revealed his and Thanat's pessimism about the subcommittee hearings, especially the revelation of the Taksin Plan to Fulbright and Symington, saying that “Thanat fears that, in wake of this first step contents of plan will ultimately be revealed, rendering it worthless.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 20, 1969, 1132Z.

15793. Subject: Symington Subcommittee. Ref: State 193723.[2]

1. I briefed Foreign Minister Thanat today on the basis of reftel, giving him the text of subparagraphs 3 a, b, and c. I did not take up the questions and answers in paragraph 4 since those deal solely with the Philippines and would probably have alarmed Thanat prematurely since he would regard them as a harbinger of future questioning regarding the Black Panthers.

2. Even so, the relatively bland contingency guidance of paragraph 3 stimulated his blood pressure. He resented the necessity to deny the characterization “mercenary” and remarked that “if the senators are opposed to the presence of Thai forces in South Vietnam, we could very easily withdraw them and on quite short notice as well.” I tried to explain to Thanat that the focus of the subcommittee's interest was quite different and that, if anything, some Senators had been critical of other east Asian countries for not having contributed to the Vietnam war, even though their security was at stake. However, this charge certainly could not be levied at Thailand, which had supported US in the war in countless ways, I had some difficulty making this explanation in the face of several interruptions from Thanat who was intent upon insisting that I report fully what he had said regarding the ability of the RTG to withdraw the Black Panthers, “if the Senate does not like them.”

3. I informed Thanat that the hearings were completed and that as far as I knew they had gone better in the latter part than during the first two days. Thanat quizzed me on the “sanitization process” which preceded publication of the report on the Filipino hearings. He is obviously fearful that the sanitization will not be very thorough and he clearly expects the worst when it comes to Thailand's turn.

Hannah

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 193723 to Bangkok, Manila, and Seoul, November 17, reported that, in response to public transcripts and press releases by the Symington subcommittee implicitly criticizing Asian allies in Vietnam for needing U.S. assistance, the Department of State had contingency guidance “which could be used along general following lines: a) the United States provides equipment and supplies, training, overseas allowances, and other kinds of support. b) The contribution by these nations to the Vietnam conflict and the support they receive from the U.S. cannot be characterized as ‘mercenary’ in nature since each of the countries concerned decided on its own to contribute to a cause it supports by reason of its own national interests and security. c) All three countries (Thailand, Philippines, and South Korea) had needed military and economic assistance for years and would be obviously unable to finance an overseas force without assistance while still facing considerable challenges at home.” (Ibid.)

39. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew [1]

Washington, December 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Your Visit to Bangkok

1.

The Current State of Relations: US-Thai relations are basically sound. However, we are presently undergoing a period of strain due in particular to Thai fears that the US troop withdrawals from Vietnam may represent a US pull-out from Southeast Asia, but also due to a number of lesser irritants including US PL 480 rice shipments to traditional Thai markets and to sensationalized press reporting of the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Thailand which alleged that the US paid a billion dollars for the Thai troop contribution in Vietnam.[2] The implication of the latter issue of course is that the US paid for Thai “mercenaries”, and the Thai resent this implication as well as what they regard as another instance of unfair criticism of them in the US press— in itself, a long-standing irritant in our relations.

Behind the immediate problems in our relations is a belief on the part of the Thai leaders that the US commitment in the area will indeed decrease over time, and they are seeking means to assure Thai independence in the changed context. They are worried over the prospect that the US withdrawal from Vietnam will proceed at a rate which would leave Thailand and other free nations exposed to a Chinese and North Vietnamese communist threat. The long-term threat from China is their greatest concern.

Most immediately, the Thai leaders are apprehensive that once the US withdraws from Vietnam, Laos may fall to the Communists who will then give direct large-scale aid across the Mekong River to the insurgency in the Northeast. Over the longer-term, they are worried about their ability to contain the Peking-backed insurgency in the North.

The constancy of US support, then, becomes a matter of great importance to the Thai. Any developments in the US which appear to question this constancy cause over-reaction in Thailand. Our Embassy is anxious to smooth things down and prevent the Thai tendency to over-react. At the same time, we feel that some officers in the Embassy may be over-solicitous on behalf of their Thai clients, who are perhaps more mature and capable than the Embassy gives them credit for, and who appreciate the realities of Southeast Asian developments despite a tendency to react emotionally to the issues of the moment. (For example, the Embassy is upset at our decision to cease the activities of USIS mobile information units which have been doing what the Thai themselves should be doing in calling for loyalty to the King and the Government. The Thai themselves expressed criticism of these units to me last summer.)

The President's visit to Thailand last July helped to reassure the Thai as to the continued US role in support of Thailand, as restated in the President's Guam doctrine, and your visit should have the same effect. They are on our side, and are proceeding in the directions which we favor such as supporting regionalism and self-help measures. We have no reason to believe they will want to withdraw their troops from Vietnam out of pique over their treatment in the US press.

2. What the Thai Will Want

a. The Thai will want to unburden themselves on what they consider unjustified US public and Congressional criticism of their role in Vietnam. They may do so in emotional terms. This may be more of a means of blowing off steam than an expression of a real crisis in our relations, and may, in fact, have a therapeutic effect.

b. The Thai will be worried about the present situation in Laos, and whether the US is doing enough to hold back the Communists there. They are also worried that an eventual Vietnam settlement will provide adequate protection to the integrity of Laos, or prevent Communist infiltration through Laos into Thailand. They will want your reassurances.

c. They may want to elicit your thoughts on the future of Southeast Asia and of US-Thai relations.

d. US “interference” with Thai rice sales.[3] The Thai have long resented US PL 480 rice sales. Right now, they are highly indignant because they think we “ordered” the GVN to back away from a purchase of 20,000 metric tons of rice from Thailand. (In fact, we have regularly supplied Vietnam's rice requirements through PL 480, to save foreign exchange. The possibility of a Thai sale arose from a momentary shortage in Saigon which we were able to meet through a diversion of a PL 480 shipment from a third country to Vietnam. We did not order the Vietnamese to do anything, but their requirements were met by this arrangement. While we do not regard South Vietnam as a normal marketing area for Thai rice, we are very sensitive to Thai feelings on the question of PL 480 rice sales, and will continue to consult and to endeavor to minimize frictions. You should use this line only if the Thai raise the issue.)

e. They are unlikely to raise specific bilateral issues directly, but may touch on some of the problems I have outlined above in passing.

3. What We Want:

a. To reassure the Thai of the constancy of US backing, under the principles outlined by the President in his Guam Doctrine. (The Thai appear to understand the revised US approach and even to be pleased at the confidence placed in them that they are capable of handling internal subversion.)

b. To downplay the effects of what may appear to the Thai as unjustified criticism. This of course represents only a small percentage of American opinion and certainly is not indicative of the attitude either of the Administration or the great majority of Americans.

c. To reassure the Thai of their own ability to handle the insurgency in Thailand.

d. To encourage the trend toward self-confidence, self-help and regionalism.

4. Points to Stress:

a. On Laos:

—The Administration is acutely aware of Thailand's particularly exposed position and the importance of Laos to Thai security. Recall that our side has insisted that a satisfactory settlement in Laos is an integral part of any solution in Vietnam.

—Refer to the steps we have undertaken in concert with the Thai to strengthen the ability of the Lao Government to cope with the threat posed by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces (see State Talking Points).[4]

b. On Vietnam:

—Stress the great appreciation which the President has expressed for the Thai troop contribution. The fact that these troops are volunteers demonstrates how clearly the people of Thailand see the issues in Vietnam.

—We are also grateful for the great assistance which Thailand has provided through the US-Thai airbases in Thailand in support of the Vietnam war. We recognize that countless American lives have been saved because of the existence of these bases.

—Ongoing US troop withdrawals will be carried out in keeping with the South Vietnamese ability to take over. We will consult with the Thai beforehand.

5.

Points to Avoid:

—The Thai Government has little love for Sihanouk, although it has expressed willingness to normalize relations if he takes the initiative. The Thai are probably unenthusiastic about our decision to resume diplomatic relations with Cambodia. If they raise the issue, you might turn it aside with the observation that Sihanouk has caused all of us problems, but that none of us want to see Cambodia pulled toward the Communists, and that we might both derive some advantage from a US presence in Phnom Penh.

6. Meeting with the King: Your discussions with the King will probably parallel those with Prime Minister Thanom and other Government leaders but be much briefer and more general. The same line of approach applies.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 450, President's Trip Files, V.P. Trip East Asia, January 1970. Secret.

[2] Telegram 16597 from Bangkok, December 9, contains a report of efforts by the President and Department of State Spokesman Charles Bray to expose the inaccuracy of this allegation and to give the public “a better appreciation of Thai contribution.” (Ibid., Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. II)

[3] Extensive information on Thai complaints of U.S. interference in Thai rice sales is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 THAI and, especially,

[4] Ibid.

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, December 23, 1969, 0936Z.

17214. Subject: Thai Volunteer Forces in Vietnam. Ref: Bangkok 17181.[2]

1. During conversation I had this morning with Thanat on another subject, he volunteered brief rundown his discussions in Kuala Lumpur with RVN FonMin Lam on subject of withdrawal of Thai forces in Vietnam. Thanat told me his purpose in discussing this was to establish the principle that Thai forces were not intended to remain in RVN indefinitely and that they could be withdrawn once circumstances permitted. In response to my question whether the RTG was currently making any such plans to withdraw, Thanat said this was not the case. He said underlying objective in making his statement to the press about the possibility of Thai withdrawal reftel was to convey to Hanoi another indication of the growing capability of the South Vietnamese to take care of their own problems and also to blunt thrust of Hanoi propaganda. He asked me to keep in strictest confidence his acknowledgment that no plans for withdrawal were actually underway as well as his motivation, with Hanoi as the target, of raising in public the possibility of Thai withdrawal.

2. I said that we are also convinced of the value of the Vietnamization policy as means, inter alia, undercutting the NVN propaganda effort. I added that at same time we saw continuing value in having some Thai forces in Vietnam. He said he knew this and we did not need to convince Thailand on this score. He added that some of the people in the government, including some military, did not understand the political and psychological reasons for his public statement re withdrawal Thai forces from Vietnam. He then left for the Tuesday cabinet meeting at which he said this issue would be discussed and, presumably, his initiative will be explained to those less sophisticated. 3. Department please transmit Embassies Saigon, Vientiane and Paris and CINCPAC for Adm. McCain and Polad.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 17181 from Bangkok, December 22, reported on Thanat's “obviously planned” statement to newsmen upon his return to Bangkok from an ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur that he had met with the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister during the conference and had discussed with him the subject of Thai troop withdrawals from Vietnam. (Ibid.)

41. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 24, 1969.

SUBJECT

Representations by Thai Chargé on U.S. Interference with Thai Rice Deal

The Thai Chargé called on you this afternoon to pursue the matter of US interference with the sale by the Thai of 20 million tons of rice to the GVN, which lost them $2.5 million. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

The points which the Chargé stressed in his presentation to me were: (a) this is viewed by Thailand as a very serious matter (the word “blatant” was used in describing the incident,) (b) the Thai government is nevertheless willing to work closely with us to find ways in which the US might make “amends” by purchase of other goods from Thailand to an equivalent amount for use in aid to Vietnam and Laos, and (c) it is urgent that such amends be made by January 3–4 when the Vice President arrives in Bangkok “so that the circumstances of the Vice President's visit will be the most favorable.” [2 lines of source text not declassified]

The amends business was suggested by Len Unger to Foreign Minister Thanat. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] Nevertheless, if anything can be done, I believe that appropriate steps should, in fact, be taken. The element of “face” is deeply bound into the situation, since the Thai Minister of Economic Affairs was actually in Saigon and the deal was all set to be concluded except for his signature when we intervened and killed it. I believe that they are smarting under what appears to them to be a low, and totally unexpected blow from a country which professes to be an ally. In addition, a great part of Thailand's foreign exchange earnings comes from rice sales, and we have hit them where it really hurts even though their economy is not likely to collapse through loss of this one deal.

In my conversation with the Chargé, I simply told him that I would report carefully to you what he had said, and also expressed sympathy with the Thai position. I assured him of the constancy of our relationship with Thailand, and that we regarded the Thai as true friends and good allies. This, I said, was exemplified by the President's remarks in Bangkok last July. I asked the Chargé if he had passed the word to the Department of State to which he informed me he had earlier today called on Under Secretary Johnson. The Under Secretary, it seemed, had taken the responsibility for having ordered the course of action which the U.S. had taken in this case.

As per your instructions, I have informed the Chargé that we will try to work something out by January 3rd.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Top Secret; Umbra. Sent for information. Two notations in Kissinger's handwriting read: “Let me call Allen tomorrow” and “Please move on this. HK”

42. Memorandum From Lindsey Grant of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 29, 1969.

SUBJECT

Amends to the Thai for the Rice Transaction

You asked for a recommendation as to what we can do to salve Thai feelings over the recent cancellation of the GVN rice contract.

I have told State that something needs to be done, that we leave it to them to propose specific measures, but that there must be something which the Vice President can offer when he arrives in Bangkok.

I am told by State that—accidentally, I hope—one of the two diverted ships containing PL 480 rice for Vietnam has sunk.

As a result, there are two immediate possibilities:

—we can encourage the Vietnamese to go to the Thai for 10,000 tons of rice, and the Vice President can let the Thai know that we are doing so.

—we can encourage the Vietnamese to buy some 30,000 tons of sugar from Thailand. Ambassador Unger has already been informally discussing this idea with the Thai Government.

I believe that with the application of continuing pressure from here, I can be confident that we will have a firm policy decision on one of these two possibilities for the Vice President to use in Bangkok.

Other possible ways of recompensing the Thai seem somewhat farther down the road and therefore less attractive.[2]

Recommendation

That you approve my continuing to press State and AID for a favorable decision on one of these gestures to the Thai.

Approve[3]

Disapprove

Other

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 560, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. A notation in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Let's get this moved.”

[2] We are asking Lindsey for a memo on what these are. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]

[3]  Kissinger initialed his approval on December 30.

43. Telegram From the Vice President's Party to the Department of State [1]

Bali, January 11, 1970, 0813Z.

Vipto 10/11. Dept pass Bangkok. Subj: VP's Meeting With P.M. Thanom.

1. Vice President Agnew met for nearly two hours on Jan 4th with Prime Minister Thanom and other Thai officials. Those attending the meeting on the Thai side included: Thanat, Pote, Dawee, Generals Sawang and Chira, Ambassador Sunthorn, and Dr. Sompong (Director General of Economic Affairs in the Foreign Office). Ambassador Unger and Messrs. Crane and Duemling attended with the Vice President.

2. Problems in US-Thai Relations. The Prime Minister stated that the Thai had been very pleased with President Nixon's visit last summer but several problems had cropped up since then. They were therefore delighted to have another chance to discuss matters of common interest with the Vice President. The Vice President responded that he was making his trip at President Nixon's request and noted that we too felt the need for a forthright dialogue. Although it would probably be difficult to get into detail, he felt that a discussion of intent would be useful at this time. Simply stated the intent of the US is to maintain the excellent relations which we have enjoyed with Thailand over the years.

3. US Intentions. The PM said he would appreciate clarification on “the so-called commitment of the United States to Thailand and Southeast Asia.” The Vice President stated that his response would reflect U.S. integrity and intent in the area and that was just the sort of thing he wanted to discuss. He stated that the United States stands by its commitment to Thailand and will discharge its responsibilities as a Pacific power. There might be changes in technology which would call for specific readjustments in our defense posture, but this would in no way affect our commitments to SEATO or any of the other less formal arrangements with Thailand.

4. The Vice President then took the initiative to provide brief assurances on several other questions affecting US/Thai relations:

A. The Vice President felt that we could have consulted more effectively with the Thai prior to making announcements of troop withdrawals in Vietnam. He felt we should and could do better in the future and planned to make a strong recommendation on this score to President Nixon.

B. The United States greatly regretted the inconvenience and embarrassment to Thai officials which occurred when their projected sale of 20,000 tons of rice to South Vietnam fell through. We hope to be able to find some new economic opportunities which would make up for the loss of the sale. In this regard, the Vice President was encouraged to note that the South Vietnamese may be needing another 10,000 tons of rice from Thailand since the United States is not in a position to provide this.

C. The United States will continue to assist Thailand in combatting insurgency. We intend to continue our economic and military aid programs. The US is looking favorably upon Thailand's requests for additional helicopters and M–16 rifles. Without going into detail, the Vice President stated that we hoped to deliver a substantial number of M–16s early this year.

D. The US clearly understands the importance of Laos to Thailand and we are concerned with the situation there. The Vice President assured the Thai that we felt any agreement reached at the Paris Peace Talks should recognize the integrity of Laos and call for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from that country back into North Vietnam.

5. Project Taksin. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the reassurances offered by the VP. He said that he had raised the issue of US commitments because the Thai were concerned over recent comments by high-ranking officials in the United States, not only Senators but Secretary Laird. The Thai could not understand our Defense Secretary's statement that Plan Taksin did not have either his or the President's approval.[2] Although Amb Unger had sought to clarify this statement, it was still most disturbing to the Thai. The Vice President replied that Secretary Laird's statement could be best understood in its local Washington context. The Secretary had merely been attempting to put out a political fire—a fire which the Vice President felt had begun with some rather irresponsible comments in the Senate. Mr. Laird had been attempting to dispel the false impression created by the media that the United States had secret contingency agreements which could be automatically activated without further review by the Secretary of Defense or the President. The Sec of Defense frankly had not had the occasion to review in detail and approve Project Taksin since this would likely take place only in an emergency situation when the USG would be considering how best to help the RTG.

6. Thai Support for SEATO. The Vice President expressed concern that troublemakers were attempting to drive a wedge between the US and its friends by implying that the US was planning to withdraw from this part of the world. We should not put much stock in such rumors and propaganda. As an example of how such rumors could upset people, the Vice President mentioned that we had heard that the Thai might be planning to drop out of SEATO. Although just a rumor, this concerned us greatly and we certainly hoped it was not true.

7. The Prime Minister responded that recent insulting comments by US Senators had been most upsetting to the Thai, Filipinos and others. These insults, plus revelations of what the Thai regarded as classified defense plans, adversely affected the normal SEATO relationships. However, the Thai have no desire to withdraw from SEATO or to see it broken up. As a matter of fact, the Thai have tolerated the lukewarm attitude and actions of certain European members of the Treaty Organization. The Prime Minister stated flatly that the Thai intend to keep working hard to preserve the regional defense arrangement.

8. The Vice President agreed that a few Senators have done serious disservice to the US in the way they have talked about our allies. Their statements were being played up by our enemies in an effort to try to destroy SEATO. On this score the Vice President had told President Marcos, and he wished now to repeat to the Prime Minister, that the US remained firm in its resolve to support SEATO. It was most important, in the Vice President's view, not to allow troublemakers to disturb the good relations which existed between the US and its allies. The Vice President noted that Senators have many prerogatives but he felt that recent actions by some Senators had been less than statesmanlike. Leaving the question of substance aside for the moment, he regretted that their manner had been so insulting. As an American the Vice President felt obliged to apologize, even though neither he nor the President had any control over members of the Legislative Branch.

9. Symington Hearings. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the Vice President's statement, however he still felt obliged to touch upon those very derogatory statements which alleged that Thai soldiers were being used as mercenaries in Vietnam. Feeling was running high in Thailand over these insults, and many people felt the US does not appreciate what the Thai are doing in Vietnam. The Prime Minister could not hide the fact that the Thai had been dismayed by such statements as “the Thai are the best allies money can buy.”

10. The Vice President again expressed his regret, and noted that such comments certainly do not reflect a majority of American views. He said that he himself had come in for a great deal of abuse, often from the same sources. The mercenary argument was so weak, in the Vice President's opinion, that he doubted any fair-minded American would subscribe to it. Mercenaries had historically fought far from home and had never felt any particular “involvement” in the conflicts they participated in. It is impossible to imagine that the Thai are not vitally concerned with what happens in Vietnam, so the mercenary argument really makes no sense. On the contrary, people in the US are most grateful for the efforts of Thai volunteers in Vietnam and realize that any support we can give the RTG is but a small token of our appreciation for its help. The Vice President was certain that such outrageous statements would never strike a responsive chord in the minds of the US public. He hoped that a more cool appraisal by the Cabinet would indicate that the offending Senators certainly did not speak for the United States.

11. The Prime Minister said he would like nothing better than to believe these assurances, but after all, in a democracy the repetition of falsehoods, even by a small minority, might snowball into a situation which could force a change in US policy. He pointed out that even in Thailand five Peace Corps volunteers had demonstrated against the Vice President's arrival. (Note: Investigation is still underway to ascertain the precise nature of this demonstration and its participants.) 12. The Vice President indicated he felt that the anti-war demonstrations had reached their highpoint with the Moratorium marches in November. Despite the media treatment of the demonstrations, it now seemed clear that they had so completely failed to attract public support that additional announced demonstrations had been cancelled. Rather than provoking changes in US policy, the demonstrations had in fact caused Americans to coalesce behind the administration's position. Public opinion polls and mail received since the President's November 3 television speech had clearly shown the public support for our policies in Vietnam.

13. Insurgency Problems. The Vice President asked the Prime Minister to give him a rundown of the current status of the insurgency in Thailand. The Prime Minister replied that the situation was generally under control, but that since the end of the rainy season, infiltration from Laos appeared to be increasing. In response to a question, he stated that increased infiltration in the north and in the northeast seemed to be under a centralized command. The Thai were working hard to interdict the infiltrators. The Prime Minister wished to reiterate that while Thailand intends to rely on its own forces to combat insurgency, the RTG will need to receive material support for its forces. The Prime Minister had spoken to President Nixon on this point and had felt that he was receptive. The Vice President confirmed that we wished to be receptive to Thai military aid requests. The Prime Minister stated that the RTG counter-insurgency policy was not simply one of meeting force with force, but also relied heavily on attempting to improve economic conditions. He claimed the Thai were committing “enormous resources to rural development.” In addition, they were working hard to improve the quality of local officials and to involve the local populace directly in government programs. The Vice President stated that President Nixon was most impressed with the way the Thai were approaching their insurgency problem, and added that we respect their right to chart their own course in this area.

14. PL–480. The Prime Minister touched briefly on the Thai concern over their loss of the rice sale to South Vietnam. Rice sales, after all, were not economically important to the United States, but were of vital importance to Thailand where they were taxed by the Govt. and were thus of importance as a source of revenue as well as foreign exchange. He felt that there had not been sufficient consultation between the United States and the RTG on this question. The Vice President said we were very aware of the problem which had developed and hoped that some sort of compensatory deal could be worked out between the RTG and GVN. In addition, the Vice President pledged that we would try harder to consult more closely on matters of economic importance to Thailand in the future.

15. In a related discussion on economic development, the VP underlined the importance of the role which can be played by private business and investment, and mentioned the residence problems of US businessmen in Thailand. The PM acknowledged this and said he had asked the Cabinet to find a solution.

16. Thai Troop Withdrawals. The Prime Minister moved to the question of future Thai troop withdrawals from Vietnam. He said that any withdrawals would be related to improvement in the Vietnam situation and to security requirements in Thailand, and would not be based on US or Australian withdrawal schedules. If problems develop in Thailand requiring more troops, the RTG will simply have to withdraw from Vietnam. However, the Thai will consult first with their allies, particularly the US. The Vice President agreed that adequate advance consultation is of major importance to prevent doubts from clouding our relations and to avoid providing our enemies with propaganda opportunities. We have been deficient in this regard ourselves, and will make every effort to consult more closely on our plans in the future.

17. US Relations With Communist Countries. The Vice President asked the Prime Minister for his views on the Sino-Soviet split. After brief comments the Prime Minister said that since the US had entered into discussions with both the Russians and the ChiComs, he hoped the Vice President might provide the Thai leaders with some new insights. The Vice President replied that President Nixon believes he has a responsibility to try to lessen world tensions. Accordingly, we have begun some very important discussions on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union. It is too early to tell how the talks will turn out, but we are sincere in our attempt to plumb Soviet intentions.

18. In addition, we have made some small moves toward Communist China which are designed to determine how intransigent their policies are. As the Thai know, we have received no encouragement from the ChiComs so far. The Prime Minister commented that these moves toward the ChiComs had raised some doubts in the minds of our Asian friends, especially in the Republic of China. The Vice President once again offered assurances that our intentions to reduce tensions should in no way be construed as a diminuation of our commitments to our allies.

19. In closing the Vice President expressed appreciation for the candor and understanding expressed by the Prime Minister. The discussions were valuable to the Vice President personally, and to the USG. The Vice President looked forward to a continued, mutually beneficial relationship with the RTG, and in response the Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the assurances which the Vice President had offered.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate. U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Francis Galbraith was traveling with the Vice President.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 20.

44. Telegram From the Vice President's Party to the Department of State [1]

Bali, January 12, 1970, 0330Z.

Vipto 12/19. Dept pass Bangkok. VP Channel. Subj: Vice President's Meeting With the King and Queen of Thailand January 4, 1970.

1. The meeting was held at the Royal Palace. In attendance were the King, Queen, Prime Minister, Ambassador Unger, Commander Cernan, as well as other aides.

2. The meeting began with an exchange of gifts between the principals and presentation to the King of the Thai flag and moon rocks by Commander Cernan.

3. Surprisingly, there was very little small talk between the King and me, and he moved quickly to the substantive matters. He expressed his concern over the Symington Subcommittee's testimony with particular regard to the characterization of the Thai soldiers as “mercenaries”. I assured him that this was not the prevalent American opinion and that President Nixon wished the Thai people to be aware of the continuing appreciation of the United States for their support in Vietnam and for their effective battle against insurgency in the north and northeast of their own country.

4. The King expressed grave concern over the situation in Laos, indicating that very serious mistakes were made at the time of the 1962 Geneva Accords—principally the failure to partition Laos in such a manner as to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. When I inquired about the activities of the Pathet Lao, he indicated that their effort would collapse without active North Vietnamese cadres prodding them and threatening them with execution should they not continue the fight against the Laotian Government.

5. The King indicated that the Thais were very concerned that a possible settlement in South Vietnam would not include a satisfactory requirement that the North Vietnamese withdraw entirely from Laos. I assured him that his position was understood and that we would consult in advance with the Thai Government to make certain that the Laotian situation was satisfactorily covered in any final agreement with the Communists.

6. I asked the King about Sihanouk and how he appraised the present Cambodian position. I expressed concern over the augmentation of shipments through Cambodia, particularly since the Vietnamization program was under its severest test in the Delta area. The King said that he felt Sihanouk was playing a dangerous game, but that he was virtually the captive of a nearly impossible situation. The moment that Sihanouk ceases to cooperate marginally with the Communists, the King said, he would be faced with wide-spread and effective insurgency which would probably result in his overthrow. Moreover, the King felt that so long as Sihanouk closed his eyes to the flow of Communist materials through his country he was in a better position to at least allow some American observation. He indicated that the Thailand-Cambodia ill feeling had receded to some extent and that he appreciated the difficulty of Sihanouk's position.

7. The King is very worried about increasing Communist capability in stimulating the insurgency in Thailand. The intention of the Communists is demonstrated by their focus of effort on the road construction program in Laos, and particularly the road that leads southwest toward Thailand. The King said that he did not think Souvanna Phouma wanted to encourage this venture, but that he did not know how to cut it off, having agreed to Communist road building assistance in other northern areas of Laos. The King's fear is that a good road will allow the rapid movement of troops and materials from North Vietnam to the Thai borders and that the supplying of the insurrection will become much easier.

8. My general impression of the King was very favorable. I assess him to be an extremely brilliant and intense young man who has a remarkable capability of concentration. Whatever he attempts he seems to throw himself completely into, and I would judge that he has a greater effect on the foreign policy of Thailand than the conventional monarch. He seems to have great social awareness and indicated that he was moving to provide increased social assistance to his people in the areas of education, health and land reform.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate.

45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon [1]

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance to Thailand—FY 1970

I. Recommendation:

That you approve the continuation in FY 1970 of the A.I.D. program in Thailand, consisting primarily of advisory and financial support of Thai police and developmental measures to prevent the growth of Communist insurgency in the North and Northeast, at a total obligational level of approximately $30 million of grant funds. No PL 480 assistance is proposed.[2]

II. Issue: Political Interpretation of Reduced FY 1970 Program Level

Discussion:

We are nearing the time in our discussion with the Royal Thai Government when we will be ready to make the major FY 1970 commitments in the A.I.D. program for Thailand. Prior to this agreement, we are submitting this Country Memorandum describing the program and the major policy issue for your consideration.

As shown in the table below, our obligations in the Thailand program rose to a peak of $53.3 million in FY 1967, fell slightly to $46.7 million in FY 1968, and last year were only $35.5 million.

FY 1964

FY 1965

FY 1966

FY 1967

FY 1968

FY 1969

Grant

12.7

19.0

43.3

49.8

46.7

35.5

Loan

___

___[3]

___

3.5[3]

___

___

Total

12.7

19.0

43.3

53.3

46.7

35.5

Our FY 1970 Congressional Request for the Thailand program was $45 million. Due to Congressional action on our request for funds, A.I.D. expects to reduce many of its country programs this year. Because Thailand competes with Vietnam for scarce supporting assistance funds, we will not be able to provide the full FY 1970 amount originally proposed. Taking into account funds still in the pipeline from prior year obligations, we believe our FY 1970 program requirements can be satisfied with up to $30.0 million: $22 million supporting assistance, and $8.0 million technical assistance, including family planning. Our assistance to Thailand plays a three-fold role by: (1) providing actual resources to help carry out Thailand's counterinsurgency effort; (2) promoting greater Thai attention and resource allocation to counterinsurgency measures and providing us an opportunity to influence the direction of this Thai effort—the primary aim of our program; (3) demonstrating continuing high-level interest in Thailand.

With respect to the above, we believe a program level of about $30.0 million essentially is adequate for the first two considerations. However, a $30.0 million program will not completely satisfy the third.

The Thais have become increasingly concerned that a Vietnam settlement will affect adversely their own security. At the same time, they have a growing doubt about the nature and extent of U.S. interest in Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular. A.I.D. obligations for the Thailand program are considered by the Thais as one indication of this interest. Thus, anything less than last year's obligation level of about $35.5 million will raise questions in their minds about our commitment. However, since a program of about $30.0 million is all our projects usefully can absorb, a consideration understood by the Thais, we believe adverse political reaction can be minimized and therefore are recommending this program level for Presidential approval.

III. U.S. A.I.D. Objectives and Strategy:

Thailand's importance to the U.S. lies in its key position in Southeast Asia, its key role in the economic and political development of the region, and its close cooperation with the U.S., particularly in support of our Vietnam effort. The basic U.S. assistance objective is to improve the Thai capacity for dealing with a Communist-supported insurgency threat.

The primary purpose of our program is to try to get the Thais to devote greater attention and allocate more resources to the security problem than they would in the absence of our program. Since the Thais contribute about $2 from their own budget for every U.S. dollar of support to our joint projects, we exert influence not only through our advisory assistance, but also directly upon their budget allocation itself.

Both U.S. and Thai governments recognize that the fundamental responsibility for countering this insurgency belongs to the Thais. We have concentrated our assistance in the North and Northeast of Thailand where incident rates have been highest and conditions conducive to insurgency are most acute. In combating the insurgency in other areas, the Royal Thai Government is using the strategy developed in our joint programs in the North and Northeast.

In dealing with the pressures of insurgency, Thailand has a number of strengths—its history of national independence, a widely-respected Royal Family, its well-established structure of government, and its strong economy. However, its highly-centralized government does not yet provide adequate channels for responding to local needs. Awareness and understanding on the part of Thai Government officials of the needs and aspirations of rural people and the increased commitment of resources are essential to the solution of Thailand's security problem. This weakness, even more than limitations of Thai manpower and fiscal resources, has been the greatest restraint on Thai Government efforts. It is this problem which is the principal focus of the A.I.D. program.

IV. Nature of Program:

Within the FY 1970 program, supporting assistance funds will be used primarily to facilitate Thai efforts to improve security in rural areas and to support Thai rural development programs. Technical assistance will be used to assist in more broadly developmental programs such as agriculture research and training, a river basin survey, private sector development, and improvements in Thai administration in civil service.

A. Rural Security

Against a $30.0 million program level, about $7.0 million of supporting assistance is proposed in FY 1970 for rural public safety programs. Our primary objective will be to help develop a rural security capacity of sufficient strength and efficiency to counter anticipated threats of communist terror and subversion to the rural populace. A.I.D. will continue to equip the new township police stations and vehicles and ammunition will be provided to the expanding police forces in the villages and to the mobile backup units now being manned.

B. Rural Development

The FY 1970 A.I.D. program includes about $9.0 million for a number of rural development projects aimed primarily at increasing the government's responsiveness to village needs. This is a major part of our counterinsurgency strategy and is accomplished by providing advisory services and construction equipment to provincial authorities for impact programs such as feeder roads and small ponds.

C. Education and Health

A.I.D. also will help the Thais expand and improve their education and health services in the North and Northeast as an important part of our security-related program, and we are planning to provide about $9.0 million for these purposes. We will continue to support mobile training units which provide vocational training to villagers as well as provide advisory services to a major Thai and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) financed vocational education project. Similarly, A.I.D. will provide commodities, advisory services, and participant training support to Thailand's rural health centers as well as its family planning program.

D. Government Administration

Consistent with our aim of narrowing the gap between the villager and government officials, A.I.D. support to in-service training will devote particular attention to provincial and local officials, as well as involve villagers in local self-government and project planning techniques. Our program includes about $1.0 million for this purpose.

E. Longer-Range Regional Development

To establish a more rational framework for allocating Thai and U.S. resources to the development of the security-sensitive Northeast, we are providing advisory assistance to the Thai Economic Planning Agency and operating ministries in developing a plan for that area, and among other activities also are helping finance a study of a river basin in Northeast Thailand. We are planning to obligate about $4.0 million for these activities, as well as for a few other projects such as private sector development.

V. Planning for the Future:

While our program rationale has been under continual review, this year the Agency will need to examine our program objectives and strategy for Thailand even more closely to determine if they will be valid in the near future. Our recent experience indicates the internal security problem in Thailand, while real, is a longer-range problem than was believed a few years ago. It does not pose an immediate threat to Thailand's political stability. This suggests that we should devote increased attention to identifying and bringing about fundamental changes in the political, social and economic conditions that foster insurgency, while stressing less short-run impact activities. Our strategy of concentrating our assistance in the North and Northeast of Thailand also must be reconsidered in this context.

Further, the situation in Thailand is being examined to determine the program implications of your statements at Guam and in the capitals of Southeast Asia, as well as the Administration's new Vietnam policy. We will need to consider the program consequences of a postwar Vietnam settlement, with emphasis on the proper balance between the Agency's bilateral and regional assistance programs.

The National Security Council study on Thailand, now in the final stage of preparation, will address the major options open to the U.S. in our relations to Thailand, as well as the program implications of these options. This study will prove particularly useful to A.I.D. in conducting our review of the Thailand program.

Our current year program will not be affected by these examinations. Some program adjustments will be possible in FY 1971 and the FY 1972 presentation will take into full account the results of the current examination.

WPR

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) THAI. Confidential. A covering January 13 memorandum from Hannah to Rogers, attached but not printed, indicates that both memoranda were drafted by George K. Pierson, Office Director for Southeast Asia, Bureau of East Asia, Agency for International Development, and were cleared by Green and Dexter, among others.

[2] The approve option was checked and a typewritten notation at the top of the first page reads: “The President approved (Jack Murphy to jmj, 3/10/70).”

[3] A $20.3 million loan was authorized in 1965 and then deobligated in 1967 and therefore is not shown in these figures. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] A $20.3 million loan was authorized in 1965 and then deobligated in 1967 and therefore is not shown in these figures. [Footnote in the source text.]

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Bangkok, January 28, 1970, 1515Z.

13154. Subject: Ambassador Sunthorn Meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary Barnett. Ref: Bangkok 508.[2]

1. On January 23, at Department's initiative, Sunthorn met with Barnett to discuss rice situation. Sunthorn presented aide-mémoire[3] which reviewed importance of rice to Thailand including importance of timing of export shipments and adverse effects of “cutting in effected by American shipments to South Viet-Nam and expected supplies to Indonesia.” Aide-mémoire concluded with statement “remedial measures of long-range effects are therefore essential.”

2. Sunthorn began by stating Thailand has between 1.3 and 1.4 million tons of rice to sell and suggested U.S. could find a way to dispose of surplus rice in a way that Thailand might participate in sales to above countries, especially brokens which India and Ceylon also use. Better grades of rice would be exported to traditional markets of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.

3. Barnett stated Thai should not imagine that we indifferent to or ignorant of problem, mentioning among other things Vice President's discussion of problem in Bangkok. Also referred to Thai good fortune in having second opportunity sell 20,000 tons to SVN, which would compensate original frustrated sale.

4. Barnett then reviewed history of rice shortage in Asia and U.S. rice acreage increase to avoid potential famine followed by acreage cuts to restore world supply demand equilibrium. Then explained differences of various types of markets including (1) usual Thai commercial markets (i.e. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore), (2) Indonesia, (3) Viet-Nam and Korea and reasons for rice requirements of each. Main distinction emphasized was difference between aid channels and normal commercial outlets. Mutual interests and benefits of greater stability in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, were stressed and rationale for assistance to Indonesia explained in detail.

5. Barnett mentioned long term problem of dependency on rice exports and expressed gratification of Thai progress in other areas such as corn. Viet-Nam and Indonesia were characterized as undependable and unpredicatable markets for Thai exports since, under normal circumstances, neither should be food importing countries. However, Barnett stressed that we not meeting all of Indonesia's requirements and it up to Thai to compete for commercial rice imports which amounted to about 400,000 tons during past year.

6. Sunthorn indicated appreciation of our position and agreed with desirability of long range diversification and industrial development but stated that flexibility limited in short run.

7. Memcon[4] and copy of aide-mémoire being pouched.

8. Re consultation procedures, we did not tell Sunthorn that present system would be changed to accommodate RTG. As Embassy aware, we do not initiate consultations until interagency approval of proposed program obtained. Consultation period of ten working days generally accepted by members FAO Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal and unilateral decision by U.S. to give additional time to any consultee would meet with opposition, including within U.S. Government. Regarding Embassy follow-up in Bangkok, including supplying material to local press, information on proposed agreements is not to be made public, although occasionally such information has been [is] leaked. Procedures have been set up for the simultaneous public release of information at the time of signing between the U.S. and the recipient government. On occasion, final agreements differ from the proposal communicated to the consultees. This is due not only because of consultation with third countries, but also subsequent negotiations with the recipient government. Thus, premature announcement proposal could prejudice U.S. position during negotiations as well as cause embarrassment to government with which we are negotiating.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Confidential. Drafted by Joseph B. Kyle (E/ORF/ICD) and Walter West (EA/TB) on January 27; cleared by Dexter; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Barnett (EA).

[2] Dated January 12. (Ibid.)

[3] Not found.

[4] Not found.

47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, February 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Thai Relations

Ambassador Unger recently reported his concern[2] that the Thais were seriously considering moving towards the Soviets in reaction to a perceived reorientation of U.S. policy away from strong support of Thailand.[3] You will recall that on Saturday last you would not clear State's proposed response which is attached at Tab A[4] and states, inter alia, that:

—Thailand faces an uncertain future security environment.

—U.S. posture in east Asia in the 1970's will be different and inevitably affect U.S.-Thai relations.

—The U.S. policy trend represented by the Guam Doctrine will continue in a direction emphasizing Asian self-reliance and more rigorous definition of U.S. security commitments.

—Reductions in U.S. general purpose forces indicate that the executive branch must be more conservative than before in considering contingencies in which it would risk armed conflict.

—U.S.-Thai relations are likely to be affected by “continuing, even increasing, stringency in economic and military assistance appropriations.”

—U.S. intentions will not require a relationship with Thailand as close and dependent [on Thailand's part][5] as in the past. Some loosening of our relationship would be healthy.

—In the process of moving to a more independent stance Thailand could become less closely aligned with the U.S. and more involved with the Soviets, which would not necessarily be an undesirable development. Thai initiatives to the Soviet Union are viewed without alarm.

—If the Thai relations became less one-sided the Soviets might be willing to contribute to multi-lateral institutions.

—The U.S. should no longer expect the degree of exclusiveness in U.S.-Thai relations that grew from the early cold war period and special conditions of the Vietnam War. More flexibility in Thai foreign policy is desirable.

Because you would not clear the message I have some indication that State is making its views known to Unger via back channel messages. Under the circumstances, there is every reason to expect Unger to become totally confused about your actual policies. Therefore, I would like to send a letter to Ambassador Unger [6] giving him a clear interpretation of what is meant by the Nixon Doctrine.[7]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.

[2] Telegram 1333 from Bangkok, January 30, reported Unger's conversation with Thanat on January 29, in which the latter spoke with deep pessimism about the future of the U.S.-Thai relationship and of SEATO. (Ibid.) Unger reiterated his concerns in a February 2 letter to Kissinger; attached but not printed.

[3] In the conversation reported in telegram 1333 from Bangkok, Thanat concluded that the Church amendment, a legislative ban on the introduction of U.S. combat troops into Laos and Thailand, originally proposed by Senator John S. Cooper (R–Kentucky), later modified by Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho), and passed by Congress on December 18, 1969 (H–PL 91–171), would force Thailand to rethink its positions and policies and perhaps base its security on a pre-World War II, “or perhaps even pre-World War I,” model. Unger told Thanat that it was his conviction that the United States Government “would respond to a situation such as that envisaged in SEATO article IV–1 and would have the support of the Congress. Circumstances at the time would dictate the nature of the response and whether or not it needed ground forces.” Thanat replied that he could not ask his country to base its policy on “what decision that body (Congress) would take when his country might be about to be engulfed.” (Ibid.)

[4] Attached but not printed.

[5] Brackets in the source text.

[6] An attached draft telegram to Unger bears the notation OBE.

[7]  Nixon initialed the approve option.

48. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Commitment and U.S. Congressional Attitudes

PARTICIPANTS

Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand

Ambassador Sunthorn, Thai Embassy, Washington

Ambassador Anand, Thai Permanent Representative to the United Nations

The Secretary

John B. Dexter, Country Director for Thailand and Burma

After a few opening remarks, the Secretary asked Thanat about conditions in Thailand, remarking that he gathered the Thai are “worried” about their security. Thanat confirmed this, indicating that they were worried mainly about U.S. congressional attitudes which, they fear, might limit the Administration's ability to fulfill U.S. commitments.

The Secretary assured him that congressional actions and attitudes would have no effect on U.S. treaty commitments. Even the Church Amendment was not a restriction, the Secretary explained, because the Executive would in any case seek congressional concurrence if it wanted to use combat troops abroad. Thanat asked why in that case the Church Amendment was necessary. The Secretary explained that it was inspired by concern on the Hill about the war in Vietnam and a feeling that President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had misled the Congress as we became involved in that conflict, specifically in their presentation of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Now he said they want to be sure that they are properly informed and consulted.

The Secretary then recalled that the SEATO Treaty contains a provision that in taking action the signatories will follow their “constitutional processes,” to which Thanat commented bitterly, “Yes, an escape clause.” The Secretary continued that the Church Amendment merely reiterates the Senate's expectation that constitutional processes will be followed.[2]

Thanat observed that the Church Amendment refers to introducing “ground combat troops” and noted that the U.S. already has “troops” in Thailand. He wondered if those troops had the right to defend themselves. The Secretary explained that from our viewpoint the Church Amendment had no effect on the activities of U.S. military personnel now in Thailand who will naturally be expected to defend themselves if attacked. He said the amendment deals with a possible land war in Asia and the possibility that we might become involved in such a war without congressional approval. However, he repeated we would seek congressional approval in any case, just as had been done in Korea and as President Johnson thought he had done in Vietnam through the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Thanat remarked that the Thai do not doubt the Administration's words in offering such reassurances but that the words of Congress raise doubts. He said he understands there is a struggle going on between Congress and the Executive for the control of foreign policy. He thought this was exemplified in congressional questioning about U.S. activities in Laos, adding that he thought attacks on U.S. policy in Laos were really intended indirectly for Thailand.

The Secretary responded that the real target is the Administration, that congressional attacks represent a feeling that Congress has not been adequately consulted and their determination that in the future they will be consulted. He repeated the point that the Executive would, under any circumstances, feel obliged to consult Congress on any measures that might involve armed combat.

Thanat asked about the “secret agreement” (Plan Taksin) and the Rusk–Thanat communiqué. What is the Administration's view on these? With regard to the latter, the Secretary recalled that when he was in Bangkok last year he reaffirmed the Rusk–Thanat communiqué and added that subsequent events had not in any way altered that position. As for the “secret agreement”, he repeated the by-now-standard explanation that we regard this as a contingency military plan which clearly provides that both governments must approve before it can be put into effect. He said Congress had been concerned because it thought it was a “secret treaty” but it is really no more than a plan. (Thanat then muttered, “Yes, like an executive agreement.”) The Secretary repeated that the plan required agreement between the two governments before it could be put into effect and that we thought of it as coming under the SEATO Treaty with its provision for constitutional processes.

Later in the conversation, after other subjects had been discussed, Thanat reverted to his concern about Congress, stating that his Prime Minister follows events on Capitol Hill closely and is worried. He mentioned that Ambassador Unger had given him (Thanat) shortly before he left Bangkok a useful memorandum on congressional developments but said the RTG is not happy. He said, “We want to establish squarely where responsibility lies.”

The Secretary explained that from our viewpoint there is no problem at this time. He said that when he was in Bangkok last year there had been a problem because of strong sentiment in the United States against our Vietnam war policy, but that the situation was now quite different. He cited a recent Gallup poll indicating that 64 percent of the people favored the President's policy in Vietnam as compared with only 24 percent opposed. Previously he said there had been a problem of congressional pressure on our Vietnam policy but this was no longer serious except to the extent that it caused the Thai to be disturbed and fearful that we might disengage from the region. He elaborated on the point by comparing U.S. sentiment which had compelled President Johnson to decide against seeking reelection with the relative lack of interest in Vietnam today.

The Secretary expressed confidence that there is general public acceptance today of the President's policy, of which key elements are that we will not disengage from our responsibilities in Asia but will phase down our presence at a rate geared to the ability of local governments to take over. He mentioned as an example that we now have many troops in Korea but that, in due course, we will probably want to reduce them gradually, though not to withdraw them entirely. In any case, he said, we will not disengage or renege on our treaty commitments.

Thanat commented that the Thai for their part would also keep their promise not to call on outside manpower to help them with their internal insurgency problem, though they will appreciate continuing U.S. assistance.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter; approved by Moore (EA) and Okun (S) on March 12. The memorandum is part 1 of 4; part 2 is Document 49; part 3, entitled “Thanat Views on Relations with China,” and part 4, entitled “SEATO Council Meeting,” are not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US) The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

[2] Telegram 19972 to Bangkok, February 10, complimented Unger on the “lucidity” of his response to Thanat's concerns as reported in telegram 1333 from Bangkok (see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 47). It noted that if “Thanat and others remain uneasy despite repeated assurances and explanations by the most authoritative U.S. Govt. spokesmen, then we have little hope that we could put their fears to rest by prefabricating new forensic ammunition. On the contrary we conclude that Thai concern is based largely upon their interpretation of the facts and we cannot deny that the facts of their situation do indeed give them reason for concern.” It continued that “we see no profit for either ourselves or Thai in trying to gloss over the problem by proffering unrealistic and inflated reassurrances. We cannot rid SEA of all conditions potentially threatening Thai security and we cannot expand our commitment to help them beyond what is stated in the SEATO treaty.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 THAI–US)

49. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 25, 1970, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

RTG Views on Laos

PARTICIPANTS

Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand

Ambassador Sunthorn, Thai Embassy, Washington

Ambassador Anand, Thai Permanent Representative to the United Nations

The Secretary

John B. Dexter, Country Director for Thailand and Burma

The Secretary asked how the Thai view things in Laos. Thanat responded that they were worried and that just before he left Bangkok there had been several Security Council meetings on the subject. He said they are not sure of Communist intentions. Possibly the Communists merely intend to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but there are other indications that they may also have designs on Thailand. He cited the Chinese road. (He noted as a “nuance” that in the construction, after a certain village had been reached—he could not recall the name—the Chinese no longer used Chinese personnel but only Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese.) He said the Thai fear that the road is being constructed to serve potentially as another “Ho Chi Minh Trail” if the Chinese choose to move against Thailand in the future.

The Secretary remarked that since his last conversation with Thanat the war in Vietnam had been going worse for the North Vietnamese and that both infiltration and the intensity of combat were considerably reduced. Thanat observed that this was offset by increased Communist efforts in Laos. He added that there was also increased guerilla infiltration into Thailand. He said his Prime Minister was much concerned and had asked him specifically to express his concern to the Secretary.

Thanat said the Thai would be willing to help the effort in Laos by operating helicopter gunships and added that the RLG would also like them to do this. He said the Thai had trained personnel to operate them but would need help. He indicated vaguely that they might require additional helicopters (though he may have been referring to equipment needed to convert existing helicopters to gunships).

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and approved by Moore and Okun on March 12. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part 2 of 4; regarding parts 1, 3, and 4, see footnote 1, Document 48.

50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, February 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance to Thailand for FY 1970

State (Tab A)[2] requests your approval of $30 million in grants for economic assistance to Thailand in FY 1970. Treasury and BOB (Tab B)[3] concur.

This is a reduction from our FY 1969 obligations of $35.5 million and FY 1968 obligations of $46.7 million. The reduction adds to Thai doubts about U.S. interest in them. State feels that the Thais understand that the reduction is due to Congressional cuts in AID appropriations and a shortage of projects, so the adverse political reactions can be minimized.

The program's primary objective is to help preserve the security of Thailand, partly by inducing the Thais to allocate more resources to their own security programs. Our program concentrates on providing advisory and financial support to the Thai police, and assisting in development programs, to try to prevent the growth of Communist insurgency in the North and Northeast.

Specifically, the program provides:

—$7 million for a public safety program, to help develop a security capacity sufficient to counter the growth of Communist insurgency in the rural areas.

—$9 million for the accelerated rural development program, which emphasizes road construction and other projects aimed at increasing the Government's responsiveness to village needs.

—$14 million to help increase support for the Thai Government in the North and Northeast, by helping their programs in health, education, agriculture and public administration.

In addition to the bilateral program proposed in State's memorandum,AID conducts a $14 million East Asia Regional Program, roughly half of which benefits Thailand. The regional program is growing in importance and could expand rapidly if its support for Mekong River Basin projects moves beyond the feasibility study phase.

The NSSM 51 study of Thailand, now in the final stages of preparation, will address the major options open to the U.S. in our overall relations with Thailand. Issues which will be considered in that study are, inter alia:

—Have we overemphasized quick-impact counter-insurgency programs at the expense of longer-term development programs?

—Have we pushed the Thais into programs which they feel are of low priority, and will be discontinued by the Thais after U.S. inputs are withdrawn?

—Can the Thais take full responsibility for their public safety program and their accelerated rural development program?

Your approval of the recommended program for FY 1970 will not prejudge these decisions for FY 1971, which can be made in the context of the NSSM 51 study.

Recommendations [4]

1. That you approve the $30 million economic assistance program for Thailand in FY 1970 proposed by State.

2. That you authorize me to instruct State/AID to develop economic assistance options for FY 1971, consistent with the broader options of NSSM 51.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the first page reads: “Holdridge action.”

[2] Attached at Tab A but not printed is a January 22 memorandum from Rogers to the President.

[3] Attached at Tab B but not printed is a February 11 memorandum from Mayo to the President.

[4]  Nixon initialed both approve options; a notation indicates S/S was notified on March 10.

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, March 3, 1970, 1140Z.

2550. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister. Ref: A. State 027316 (Joint State/Def); B. State 030190; C. Bangkok 2522; D. State 023802.[2]

1. During cordial meeting with PM at Government House March 2 to discuss deployment of Sierra Romeo IX[3] (reported ref c), I took the opportunity to inform him, in general terms (without divulging specific or sensitive information), of items I considered would be pertinent to his interests that were recently discussed at SEACOORD meeting. I covered the military situation in SVN, status of pacification, our views of Hanoi's post-hostilities planning and the Vietnamization program, including a word about its relation to third country forces.

2. The PM was very interested and brought up several points the most important of which concerned Vietnamization. He pointedly asked whether the U.S. was training and equipping the RVNAF to replace U.S. forces only or whether we also planned to replace Thai and other allied forces. I explained to him that for the purposes of the Vietnamization program we were now discussing the revitalized VN forces were intended to replace a substantial share of U.S. forces in SVN but that in the longer run I assumed their eventually replacing FWF was also contemplated. (I had already said that some U.S. troops which would be remaining in SVN through the Vietnamization process would continue to provide the Black Panthers with the various kinds of support from U.S. forces they are receiving today; my comment was based on my discussions last week in Saigon.) He responded that he had been under considerable pressure from Parliament to withdraw Thai forces from SVN in face of continued U.S. and allied reductions. In response to my direct question on whether it was his feeling that he would be obliged to carry our reductions, he did not say he intended to reduce the Thai troop contributions in SVN, but again stressed that he was under growing pressure from the representatives in Parliament and said that “when the people feel very strongly about a situation, the government must do something to ease that situation.”

3. I replied that I was aware of and sympathetic to his problem. The USG had warmly appreciated his statement that the RTG intended to maintain the Thai forces in SVN as long as the GVN needs them or until Thailand itself requires those forces. I added that my government hoped the RTG would retain all of the Thai forces in SVN, or at least a substantial part of them, at least during the Vietnamization process. I had already emphasized, however, that the Vietnamization program did not have a specific schedule for completion but its rate depended upon intensity of enemy activity on the battlefield, the capacity of the Vietnamese to take over the combat role and progress in Paris, if any. I then pointed out the psychological and political importance of having not only U.S. forces but Thai and other allied forces as well to support the GVN during the period of its takeover of the combat responsibility. I also pointed out the importance of the Thai forces in protecting the eastern and southeastern approaches to Saigon and thus freeing GVN forces, as Vietnamization proceeds to establish a stronger Vietnamese military presence in remote areas along the Cambodian border. I requested that, if at any time he felt he had to decide to withdraw some of the Thai forces, I be given the opportunity to discuss his plans with him before he takes any action. He said that he would discuss such plans with the cabinet, GVN, and indicated that I would also have an opportunity to talk with him.

4. In connection with Vietnamization I told the PM that the U.S. forces in Thailand might have some additional functions to perform here because some of the combat support activities now being con-ducted in SVN such as air defense, air interdiction and reconnaissance might, as Vietnamization proceeds, have to be continued from outside SVN, e.g., Thailand and elsewhere. I added that while there appeared to be a continuing need to have U.S. forces and personnel in Thailand to support the VN effort until Vietnamization is well down the road, I did not believe this ruled out a continuation of the gradual reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand which we and the RTG had jointly got underway last September. I speculated that we might have a follow-on reduction to the present one in the next fiscal year which would reduce our forces by about the same magnitude and that I would consult with the RTG as our plans developed. He acknowledged these points without comment.

5. Comment. The PM carefully avoided saying that he would at some point have to withdraw all or part of the Thai forces. However, it was clear that he wished to register the point of Parliamentary pres-sure and I did not press the matter beyond making clear our interest in maintaining Thai forces and in being consulted about any reduction plans. I believe that in sharing with the PM some of our thinking on questions I know weigh heavily on his mind we have restored some substance to our dialogue. I hope I will have made available to me timely information with which to continue such exchanges of information on matters of importance to the Thai, which also give us an opportunity to gain valuable insights into their thinking.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 1 THAI–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

[2] Reftels A–D are not printed.

[3]  Sierra Romeo was the codename for the Thai artillery unit which was periodically inserted into and withdrawn from Laos in response to Communist pressure against the Lao Government forces, mostly the Meo tribesmen on the mountain front; see Document 29.

52. Editorial Note

In February 1970, North Vietnam began an offensive in Laos which caused great concern to both the Thai and U.S. Governments. The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) began a series of meetings on the crisis in Laos in March 1970 that are covered in depth in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume VI, Documents 203, 204 , 207 , 209 , and 211 –213 .

One of the key issues discussed by the WSAG was the question of whether Thai troops should reinforce friendly troops in the Long Tieng and other areas of Laos. In the March 19 WSAG meeting, the CIA's briefing officer, [name not declassified], noted that “the recently deployed Sierra Romeo IX Thai artillery battalion” was among friendly forces at Long Tieng facing severe North Vietnamese pressure. Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger wondered about the consequences if any of the Thai were captured by the North Vietnamese. The CIA Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas H. Karamessines, said [text not declassified], “but that there certainly might be problems if some of them were captured.” In response to Kissinger's question about what further forces could be put into the defense of Long Tieng, U. Alexis Johnson mentioned a Thai regimental combat team (RCT) that had been advocated by the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley. However, Johnson noted that neither the Thai nor the Lao Governments had yet approached the United States about that step. Assistant Secretary Green pointed out that the RCT in question was the one designated in the Taksin Plan, “and its employment might raise the question of US action under the plan. He noted that Ambassador Unger thought that the RCT would not be suitable for anti-guerilla operations.” In response to Kissinger's asking whether anyone favored using Thai troops, Admiral Nels Johnson said that the JCS thought that the possibility should be explored. Green said that the North Vietnamese might retaliate against the Thais if the Thais became more involved in Laos. When Kissinger asked if the introduction of Thai troops at this time would restrain the North Vietnamese, Green replied that on the contrary, the North Vietnamese “would very much like to give the Thais a beating, and Karamessines agreed.” When Admiral Johnson circulated a draft JCS cable calling for the transfer of the 13th RCT and the Thai unit in South Vietnam to Laos, Green objected that the Thai unit in South Vietnam was made up of volunteers who were entitled to discharge if withdrawn from Vietnam. Green added that it was “highly important to maintain the multinational character provided by TCC units in South Vietnam.” Johnson raised the question of briefing Congress about the Sierra Romeo operation, but Kissinger said that this should not be done yet. Kissinger cautioned that the United States did not want a Thai debacle at Long Tieng. His final comment was that he would discuss the use of additional Thai forces with the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

53. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman [1]

Washington, March 22, 1970.

I am grateful for your personal message of March 22[2] and wish to reaffirm the assurances provided during my discussions with you as well as those given by President Nixon earlier.

We are watching the situation in Laos very closely and have instituted on an urgent basis additional measures to strengthen Lao defenses. You should be aware that we have just delivered three B–52 strikes in support of Lao forces in Plain des Jarres area. This information is provided for your exclusive knowledge and should not be divulged.

We are also urgently studying the proposal outlined in your message, as well as other possible emergency steps. I will be in touch with you on this matter in the immediate future.

Best wishes.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret. In a March 22 memorandum Haig requested that the message be passed “on an urgent basis through established backchannel” to Thanat.

[2]  Thanat had cabled Kissinger earlier that same day through the same backchannel to advise that “The Lao Government has appealed to the Thai Government for urgent help especially for despatch of combat units to stem the Communist advance” and that the Thai Government was ready to respond favorably to this request. Thanat noted that the Thai Government was prepared to send one battalion immediately, to be followed by two more, if needed, “provided necessary material and logistic support is received from the United States Government. Such support may be accorded [text not de-classified] through the [text not declassified] unit now operating in cooperation with Laotian forces.” Attached but not printed.

54. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Military Assistant (Haig)

Washington, March 22, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

55. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman [1]

Washington, March 23, 1970.

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

My colleagues and I have had an opportunity to study your letter of March 22.

You can rest assured that we are deeply concerned about recent developments in Laos and we appreciate the Thai wish to accede to the Royal Lao Government's appeal by dispatching an infantry battalion and possibly other units as well if future needs should dictate. We fully recognize the danger that Communist advances in Laos could ultimately pose to the security of Thailand which is, of course, a matter of highest importance to the United States. It is for this reason that we have recently taken the air actions of which I informed you yesterday as well as other steps designed to bring home to Hanoi the seriousness of our view of its actions.

Nevertheless, we are not convinced that the proposed deployment of Thai troops additional to those now serving in Laos with the Sierra Romeo artillery battery would be effective at this time. It is our current assessment that the fate of Long Tieng is not likely to be decided by introduction of such additional ground troops. Perhaps the best move that could be made at this time would be for you to assemble these battalions into an RCT at an advanced base (i.e., Udorn) and see that it is trained and readied against the contingency of further moves the North Vietnamese may make.

In expressing this judgment, I do not wish to imply in any way that, from a military viewpoint, Thai contributions to the Laos struggle have not been or will not continue to be extremely valuable. The Thai artillery battery now at Long Tieng has, according to our reports, been performing extremely well and may be given a large part of the credit for the fact that that outpost is still in Lao Government hands. We are also conscious that your Government's contributions, through your advisors in Laos, have been most important in improving the capability of the Lao Government forces. Our decision with respect to the proposed additional deployment of infantry is based upon our judgment that at this time, the risks and costs of this move would not be justified by the prospects of military success.

The President hopes that our two Governments will continue to maintain the closest contact with each other and with the Royal Lao Government on developments in Laos and on possible military and political means to stabilize the situation.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger [2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret. In a March 24 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kissinger noted that his message to Thanat had been drafted by the Department of State and had “been approved and slightly modified by the President. It was dispatched via the same channel that Foreign Minister Thanat's message was sent to me.” Attached but not printed.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

56. Editorial Note

According to the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting of March 25, 1970, which lasted from 6:30 to 7:30 p.m., Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger told the group that he had just been with President Nixon, “who wasn't inclined to let Laos go down the drain and let the record show he had disregarded the appeals of the King of Laos, Souvanna and Thanat.” Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson noted that the group had just been discussing alternatives and he outlined them for Kissinger. The first two alternatives, 1) acceding to the Thai and Lao request by introducing the Thai battalion as [text not declassified] and 2) agreeing to move the Thai battalion in and providing pay and allowances, but as openly declared Thai forces [text not declassified], were given the most attention.

When Kissinger asked what advantage there would be in declaring the Thai presence, Johnson replied that “there would be an advantage in the U.S. showing that we were not continuing to fight a secret war, but rather that the Thais felt strongly enough to take a clear stand.” Kissinger then asked if the Thais would be willing to declare their forces. Johnson responded that this remained to be seen, stating that with respect to Long Tieng, the Thais were reluctant, “but if the RCT crossed the border, he didn't see how they could be expected to act in any other way.” General Earle Wheeler of the JCS said that this issue raised the question of SEATO commitments. Kissinger added to this, wondering [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green noted, however, that the more covert the operation, “the more suspect it would be, and the more press criticism would arise.” Green thought that they might get away with a small operation, “but if it were larger it wouldn't jell.”

The WSAG went on to discuss the numbers, mechanics, and details of Thai troop assistance. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970) The full text of the minutes of this meeting are in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 211.

The WSAG met on March 26 from 8:53 a.m. to 9:22 a.m., again in the White House Situation Room, concerned about the seriousness of the Laos situation and the gravity of the decisions to be made. Kissinger asked if anyone had had any second thoughts during the night. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard replied “We would prefer not to put Thai troops into Laos now.” Kissinger asked if the United States was in a position to make a commitment to move Thai troops. General Cushman of the CIA replied that “the troops would be in place 36 hours after approval is received.”

Kissinger then advanced two options: option 1 was an airlift of a Thai battalion of 600 men to Long Tieng, and option 2 was a commitment to Souvanna and Thanat to prepare a full RCT of three battalions for introduction into Laos at a later date. Kissinger gave a detailed explanation of the pros and cons of each option.

Kissinger noted that “The President's preference [for putting Thai troops in Laos] has not abated.” Johnson warned against building up Long Tieng into “a turning point of the struggle in Laos” and against the “Dienbienphu factor.” Kissinger stated that the President wanted to know whether, “if we move in a Thai battalion, the enemy could then isolate it.” General Wheeler replied: “Sure they could but it would be a difficult operation. I don't think the Meo and Thai would sit in Long Tieng for a long siege. They would just fade into the bush.”

In weighing option 2, Kissinger noted that if Long Tieng fell the North Vietnamese would have moved closer to the Thai border, the effectiveness of the Lao forces would be less, “our commitment would be greater,” and that it “would be difficult to avoid linkage to SEATO and Plan Taksin.”

[text not declassified] He added that the “Thais want to involve us. They consider that U.S. involvement is tantamount to victory.”

Kissinger concluded the meeting by stating that the President wanted to make a decision by noon and that he was leaning toward option 1, moving the Thai battalion to Long Tieng as soon as possible. In response to Cushman's question as to whether the CIA could go ahead with the movement, Kissinger replied that “I will be in touch with you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970) The full text of the minutes of the meeting are in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 212.

57. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, March 26, 1970.

SUBJECT

Thai Forces for Laos

As I discussed with you, Souvanna and Thanat both have urged again that we agree to movement of a battalion-size unit to assist in the defense of Long Thien. Therefore we convened a meeting of WSAG at the Undersecretary's level[2] to consider available options. Two were developed:

Option 1: We could quickly flesh out the equipment needs of a Thai battalion (about 900 men) now located at Udorn Air Base and airlift it to Long Thien. This could be accomplished in about 72–96 hours.

Pro: If this unit is put into position before an all-out attack by North Vietnamese forces it would increase the probability of holding Long Thien against the forces now deployed against it. But it would not assure that the position could be held. It would delay the NVA forces, however, at least for the time they would need to move forward the division now held in reserve 40 miles away. It would boost the morale of Vang Pao and his Meo forces and toughen their resistance. It would stabilize Souvanna and Thanat for the time being and reduce the risk of the whole situation unraveling. The chances for an organized retreat should that become necessary, and thus the saving of those forces, would be increased. Moreover, this action would be a clear signal to North Vietnam that we would not let a major threat to Laotian sovereignty go unchallenged. This response also would strengthen Souvanna's hand against those rightist elements who seek his removal and whose succession could complicate our relations.

Con: On the other hand, Long Thien might fall despite the introduction of the Thai unit. We could face the same dilemmas compounded by an additional commitment especially if the retreat is not orderly. We would also face a strong domestic outcry which could result in increased inhibitions on our air operations in Laos. If the Thai battalion were lost in the action, it could be a serious blow to Thai morale.

Option 2: We could tell Souvanna and Thanat that the best way to use Thai forces would be to prepare a full regiment of three battalions for introduction at a later stage should North Vietnam take Long Thien and continue to move southward. We would commit ourselves to proceed on this course if the need were to arise. We would consult with them now on how to equip and train the unit readying it for use when the time came and decide on a place for putting it.

Pro: This course would avoid the danger of a disaster involving substantial Thai forces at Long Thien (although over 300 Thais are already there with an artillery unit). We would be giving a favorable response to the urgent plea of Souvanna and Thanat. The domestic political problem would be somewhat reduced—we could point to the fact that we had waited until North Vietnamese intentions to overrun Laos had become unambiguous and that we had shown great restraint in the face of earlier strong pleas for our help. Since it is not certain that North Vietnam intends to move much beyond Long Thien, we might not have to move the Thais at all.

Con: This response is less than Souvanna has asked—it might not prevent him from stampeding—and seeking a deal with North Vietnam in the belief that we are not prepared to support him. Moreover, by waiting we may be in a worse position when and if we have to move the Thai forces. The North Vietnamese would have moved closer to the Thai border, effectiveness of the Lao forces would be less and our commitment would be greater. Moreover, it would be harder in those circumstances to avoid the involvement of our SEATO commitments and our Taksin plan understanding with the Thais.[3]

Recommendation

Option 1

Option 2

Neither

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unsigned copy.

[2] See Document 56.

[3] There is no indication that the President approved these recommendations, but Document 59 suggests that the President verbally instructed Kissinger to implement option 1.

58. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman [1]

Washington, March 26, 1970.

As a one-time exception and because of the need to initiate coordination and local action promptly I have cleared a response to your message of March 22 through Ambassador Unger. He will therefore be informing your Government shortly of the President's favorable decision on your request to introduce one of your battalions into Laos.[2] In addition to the information which Ambassador Unger will be providing, you should also be aware that we have approved another two B–52 missions in support of the battle for Long Tieng. The latter is exclusively for your information.

Best regards.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a March 26 memorandum Haig requested that the message be transmitted “through our special channel” and “not be shared with any other individual.”

[2] On March 27 a message from Thanat for Kissinger was received over the same special channel, stating that the “Prime Minister has asked me to convey to the President and to you his deep appreciation for the very significant decision which the President has taken, which will go a long way to strengthen the defence of Laos as well as the security of the area, particularly that of Thailand.” (Ibid.)

59. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, March 26, 1970, 2:34–3:06 p.m.

SUBJECT

Laos

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

JCS

U. Alexis Johnson

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler

Marshall Green

NSC Staff

CIA

Gen. Haig

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

Col. Kennedy

Thomas H. Karamessines

Col. Behr

William Nelson

Mr. Holdridge

Defense

Mr. Guthrie

G. Warren Nutter

Lt. Col. Gerald H. Britten

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. The WSAG was informed of the President's decision to move a Thai battalion, on an unacknowledged basis, to Long Tieng as soon as possible in response to the requests received from Thanat and Souvanna.[2]

2. CIA will have responsibility for making arrangements to move the Thai Battalion to Long Tieng. In carrying out the operation, it should be understood clearly that an orderly retreat from Long Tieng, if necessary, is considered preferable to encirclement.

3. The State Department will prepare and submit to Dr. Kissinger draft messages to Thanat and Souvanna informing them of the President's decision.[3]

a. The message to Thanat will take the form of a letter from Mr. Kissinger and will be delivered to Thanat by Ambassador Unger. The letter should include a statement to the effect that we consider it would be a prudent measure that a regimental combat team be assembled. We will not make any U.S. commitment to provide support for this regimental combat team or for its employment.

b. The message to Souvanna will take the form of a letter from the President. It will note the need for Souvanna to make a formal request to the Thai Government for the battalion. However, preparations to move the battalion will not be delayed awaiting confirmation that a Lao request has been transmitted to the Thais.

4. Our public position, on an if-asked basis, will be the same as that already taken on Sierra Romeo, namely, that reports of movement of Thai troops to Laos are exaggerated and that the question is one for the Thai and Lao Governments, to whom inquiries should be directed. We will ask the Thai and Lao Governments to adopt a position of no comment in response to inquiries. We will urge the Thai and Lao Governments not to deny that additional Thai troops have been sent to Laos.

5. It was the consensus of the WSAG that the Administration should take the initiative in informing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the movement of the Thai Battalion to Laos. The WSAG recommended that the Committee be told that in response to requests from the Governments of Thailand and Laos, we are assisting with the movement of a few hundred more Thai troops to Laos. The new movement should be explained as an extension of the Sierra Romeo program about which the Committee has already been informed. Mr. Kissinger will seek the views of Bryce Harlow and will ask the President's approval of the WSAG proposal.

6. All operational communications involving the movement of the Thai battalion are to be handled through CIA channels. Other communications are to be transmitted through the most secure channels. Knowledge of the movement is to be restricted within each agency.

7. The letters which the President has already approved to signatories of the Geneva Convention other than Great Britain and the Soviet Union are to be dispatched.[4]

8. The WSAG and Laos Working Groups will revise their contingency plans to take into account the President's decision to move a Thai battalion to Laos.[5]

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] On March 28 800 Thai troops were airlifted from Udorn to Long Tieng and took up positions in the Long Tieng defensive perimeter. (Memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger, March 28; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 101, Vietnam Subject Files, SENSITIVE/Laos Souvanna Phouma/Long Tieng)

[3] See Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. VI, Document 214 and footnote 6 thereto.

[4] See ibid., footnote 5, Document 204 .

[5]  Kissinger talked on the telephone with Nixon who was in Key Biscayne, Florida, at 5:10 p.m. on March 26. The portion of the conversation dealing with Laos follows: “P: And the Thai battalion, are we going to get them in there? K: That's done also. P: And there's going to be no announcement. We are just going to do it. We don't have to explain it. The Thais are defending their own country. Hell, I would do that, wouldn't you Henry? K: I had a long talk with Alex Johnson and he feels the same way. P: He's a nice guy.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, March 26; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 1009, Alexander M. Haig Special Files, Haig's Vietnam File—Vol. 5 [2 of 2])

60. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 8, 1970.

SUBJECT

Potential Thai Assistance to Cambodia

You have asked for an analysis[2] of the potential Thai contributions to improving the situation in Cambodia.[3]

In the short term, the Thai can help the Lon Nol Government by:

—Issuing a statement recognizing the Cambodian border along the present frontiers. This is something which Sihanouk never got from the Thai, and issuance of such a statement now might help to give the Lon Nol Government extra credit in the eyes of the Cambodian people. The Cambodians have long wanted the Thai to accept the existing frontiers, since Thailand has maintained a traditional claim to large areas of Western Cambodia.

—Getting the word to the Lon Nol Government that Thailand has no intention of causing any military problems for Cambodia along the Thai-Cambodian frontiers. This would permit the Lon Nol Government to shift military forces from the Thai borders to more critical areas in Eastern and Northeastern Cambodia.

—Backing up Cambodian political and diplomatic initiatives, e.g. supporting UN consideration of the Cambodian situation if Cambodia wants this, and helping out where possible to bring about reactivation of the ICC in Cambodia. Thai help in this sphere would be most useful if other Asian nations without too close ties to the US (for example Indonesia and Singapore) were also in the act.

Over the longer term, Thailand might provide additional help by:

—Offering military aid to Cambodia. Cambodia still possesses sizeable stocks of US-supplied weapons, and the Thail might be able to provide (or act as a transit point for) ammunition, spare parts, and additional arms in the event that the Lon Nol Government finds it necessary to draw upon its US-supplied stocks to supplement the Communist arms with which the FARK is now mostly equipped. Conceivably, Thai LOCs to Cambodia could become very important in sustaining the Lon Nol Government.

—Once a sufficiently large number of other nations have recognized the Lon Nol Government, extending Thai diplomatic recognition. Lon Nol will probably need all the international backing he can get, but it would be unwise for Thailand to act too soon because of Thailand's close association with the US and the desirability of keeping Lon Nol's neutral credentials intact.

The Thai may already be thinking of taking some of the above steps, both short and longer-term, but could be stimulated into focussing more closely on possible actions through conversations with Ambassador Unger and others on his staff.

One step which I would not recommend would be introducing Thai troops into Cambodia. From our Laos exercise, we know that trained Thai troops are in any event hard to come by and might not be particularly helpful if the Lon Nol Government were attacked by NVA/VC forces. In addition, in view of Thailand's territorial claims, the presence of Thai troops on Cambodian soil would probably not be welcomed by the Cambodian people or could play into Sihanouk's hands. Finally, we would have the SEATO commitment to worry about if Thai troops were introduced into Cambodia.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

[2] An attached but not printed April 7 memorandum from Haig to Holdridge relayed Kissinger's request. A notation on that memorandum in Haig's handwriting reads: “HAK—This is a very sound analysis in my view. But who can muster the courage?” A notation beside it by Kissinger reads: “I want to discuss Thai contribution in Cambodia.”

[3] By “the situation in Cambodia,” it is assumed that Holdridge was referring to the recent replacement of Prince Sihanouk by General Lon Nol as head of the Government of Cambodia and to the North Vietnamese occupation of significant portions of eastern and northern Cambodia, in order to assist in their infiltration of South Vietnam.

61. Summary of Conclusions of WSAG Meeting[1]

Washington, April 14, 1970.

Laos

The WSAG discussed the pros and cons of responding to Souvanna's request for an additional Thai battalion. The principal arguments put forth in favor were that the battalion would strengthen the defensive situation and that it would deter the North Vietnamese from advancing further along Routes 7 and 13. The principal arguments cited against were that the presence of additional Thai troops might increase the incentive to the North Vietnamese to attack, that the Thai commitment to a conventional role in Laos would be increased at the expense of counterinsurgency activities within Thailand, that the Chinese might be led to step up their support for insurgency in northeast Thailand, and that the Thais might request additional military assistance from the US. The WSAG members noted the lack of Congressional and public reaction to the earlier introduction of a Thai battalion.

It was the consensus that the Thais would be willing to make another battalion available in return for the same sort of US support provided to the previous battalion. The WSAG members agreed that an immediate Presidential decision should be sought[2] regarding the second Thai battalion. Dr. Kissinger will prepare and clear with the State Department a memorandum to the President setting forth the advantages and disadvantages and requesting a decision.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–073, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia and Laos, 4/14/70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to an April 15 memorandum from Jeanne Davis to U. Alexis Johnson, Nutter, Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson of the JCS, and Karamessines.

[2] According to the April 16, 1970, WSAG meeting summary of conclusions, the WSAG was informed at that time of “the President's decision to go forward with moving a second Thai battalion to Laos.” The summary stated the movement would be “arranged on the same basis and according to the same procedures as were set forth at the WSAG meeting of March 26, 1970 to govern meeting of the first Thai battalion.” It also added that the press guidance for the movement and the need for a contingency plan for orderly withdrawal would remain the same. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–073, WSAG Meeting, Laos and Cambodia, 4/16/70.)

[3]  Document 231, Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. VI.

62. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to Secretary of Defense Laird [1]

Bangkok, May 11, 1970.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deeply appreciated your letter of March 27, with which you enclosed the text of your statement before the House Sub-Committee on Defense Appropriations. I have reviewed this very significant document and I noted particularly the emphasis which you placed upon the Nixon Doctrine. As you know, the Thai have fully endorsed the Guam Doctrine. They have repeatedly stressed the identity of their and our views that U.S. forces should not become involved in Thailand's internal security operations. They have also stressed the very point you made in your presentation, namely, the need to obtain critical resources and skills to do the job themselves. The Thai attitude can be illustrated by reference to three specific points which are currently active issues, i.e. military assistance, Laos and U.S. force reductions. These points and some others that are also relevant are discussed in greater detail in a memorandum attached to this letter.[2]

U.S. military assistance is regarded by the Thai as a key measure of the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. Unfortunately, military assistance is declining. Viewed in isolation the projected downward trend for Thailand would probably not be unmanageable, but the Thai will regard it as only one among several recent developments that have produced a sense of uncertainty about our future intentions. I was encouraged, however, by your remarks in the March 27 letter about the importance of improved training and sales programs. We are making certain recommendations regarding intensified training and the Thai are interested in increased military sales.

With respect to Laos, it is obvious from the map, why the Thai regard the situation there as being even more directly related to their own security than the situation in Viet-Nam. You are familiar with the rather considerable commitment Thailand has already made in cooperation with us to support the neutral Government of Laos. We are considering ways in which that support may be expanded. From the Thai point of view a Viet-Nam settlement which does not include a satisfactory stabilization in Laos would leave them under a very grave threat. In the light of recent developments in Cambodia,[3] the same would apply to that country. Accordingly, the Thai have been gratified and encouraged by the strong actions and position announced by the President in his statement of April 30.

The reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand is inseparable from the Laos question. It is for this reason that I take this opportunity to express to you personally my grave reservations regarding the impact of the 10,000-man force reduction which is now under consideration in Washington.[4] The removal of seven out of 15 USAF squadrons, three of A–1s and four of F–105s, would necessarily gravely weaken our capability in Laos and, accordingly, the capability of the Lao forces to resist. As seen in Thailand, it would comparably increase the threat to Thailand's security. The Thai expect us to propose a new force reduction and I believe that a reduction of approximately the size of the last one, 6,000 men, could be managed without either cutting too deeply into the Air Force muscle required for Laos, or arousing acute Thai concern over a too rapid withdrawal.

I understand that the projected Vietnamization program requires the continued availability of Thai bases and facilities as well as Thai forces in South Viet-Nam well into 1973, if not beyond. I don't think we will have any difficulty retaining the use of these facilities if we maintain Thai confidence in our intentions as manifested in military assistance under the Nixon Doctrine, our firmness in Laos, and the utilization of U.S. military facilities in Thailand. A further point which is most germane you yourself made very clearly on page 29 of your summary when you emphasized the need to maintain the confidence of our allies that we do not intend to renounce our long-standing obligations here. It is because of the close relationship between the success of the Vietnamization program and the availability of Thailand facilities over the next few years that I have taken this opportunity to emphasize the foregoing points. I appreciate the political and budgetary pressures at home and I assure you that we will do our utmost, given the situation in Thailand, to assist in the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

Leonard Unger [5]

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504, Box 1. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Rogers, CINCPAC, and Kissinger.

[2] A more detailed analysis of Laird's reduction recommendations, summarized in an April 29 memorandum from the Embassy's Political-Military Counselor, George F. Muller, to Unger, is attached but not printed.

[3] President Nixon announced in an address to the nation on April 30 that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had stepped up their infiltration and occupation of the part of Cambodia that bordered South Vietnam and, in response, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were moving into Cambodia to attack them. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410)

[4] The Thai reduction package recommended to the Secretary of Defense by the JCS was submitted as part of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Improvement and Modernization Program.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

63. Editorial Note

The Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Army (FANK), General Srey Saman, arrived in Bangkok on May 11, 1970, to discuss the Thai proposal to train ethnic Khmers in Thailand to fight for the Lon Nol government against the Communists in Cambodia. This followed South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and U.S. incursions into Cambodia to hit Communist supply centers and routes.

The Thai planned to form two regiments of 1,826 men each, according to an undated Central Intelligence Agency memorandum from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, U. Alexis Johnson, David Packard, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, Cambodia, 5/12/70)

Further details of the Thai-Cambodian meetings emerged a short time later. A memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Wheeler, dated May 13, noted that Cambodian General Srey, meeting with General Chairatana Intuputi, Commandant of the Thai Armed Forces Security Center, and with Prime Minister Thanom, General Praphet, and Air Marshal Dawee, gave full approval to the Thai proposal, but with a number of provisos, including that the “undertaking should be a joint Thai-Cambodian-U.S. operation with U.S. representatives to be invited to participate fully in formalizing the plans,” that the “operation is to be accomplished covertly,” and that the “Thai regiment would be paid in a similar manner to the Thai troops in Laos.” (Ibid.)

The Thai-Cambodian proposal was discussed in the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting on May 13, with Karamessines noting the above-mentioned aspects of the plan, as well as some additional aspects, such as the training of the two regiments in Thailand. He described the proposed pay arrangements last. Kissinger noted that the “difference is on the Thai regiment. They want us to pay in Cambodia.”U. Alexis Johnson responded that this was “out of the question,” and Kissinger agreed. Packard noted that the “training and equipment are service funded.” After a discussion of various pay scenarios, the following notation was made in the minutes: “[All agree that we will go back to the Thai and tell them to pay for their own regiments. We will pay for the training.]” (Ibid., Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

In backchannel message 405 to Bangkok, May 14, Johnson advised Unger that he could inform the Thai Government “that in principle we would be prepared to help with supplies and equipment requested of the Thais by the Cambodians either by directly turning over to the Thais U.S. stocks available in the area or elsewhere, or replacing material provided by the Thais from our own stocks.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)

64. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)[1]

Washington, May 20, 1970.

510. Ref Bangkok 645[2] (being repeated Saigon and Honolulu). For Ambassador Unger from Alexis Johnson.

1. This message responds, to extent we are now able, to questions you raised reftel and which were not answered in my message of May 14 (in this channel).[3] In all of this we should be careful not to get too far ahead of RTG and GOC.

2. In addition to our previous concurrence with general philosophy of para 3 reftel, subject to approval its application in specific cases, we agree our special forces should not become involved directly in training of two regiments. We envisage a supply program which would not contemplate MAP or USOM style follow up or supervision. [11/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. We note (re para 4) that you have already approached Dawee and PM (Bangkok 5941 and 6030, both notal)[4] on setting up Thai-Cambodian coordinating organization and Thai internal staff to centralize management and control of Thai assistance programs for Cambodia. We concur in your suggestion and emphasize the importance of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], MACTHAI, or Embassy officers not becoming part of this organization. They should assist and keep in touch with activities only through exercise of their advisory role with Thais. No special advisor should be assigned to the coordinating body.

4. We concur (para 5) in keeping communications on two regiments in this channel; other questions should be handled in Nodis/Khmer or other controlled distribution series following guidelines set up in Washington (State 061378 or 066129).[5]

5. On para 6, while provision by Thais of equipment and funds which are their property need not be protected, use of U.S.-supplied or funded equipment for the two regiments should be protected on a closely held basis. Provision by Thais of U.S. supplied equipment for any other projects must also be carefully protected.

6. In regard second para reftel numbered 6 (number duplicated), we would expect to furnish initial equipment for the two regiments from three to four 1000-man packs of arms, ammo and communications equipment which we have allotted for Cambodian assistance. Uniforms would be required. We would hope to provide uniforms from DoD stocks in RVN which would be moved [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]to training sites to avoid any major draw down of DoD stocks in Thailand. We do not believe this project could be kept covert if DoD stocks in Thailand are used. We expect [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covertly to fund for both regiments during period of training in Thailand, costs of food, housing and training, and following training to fund transportation to Cambodia. While in Thailand, Cambodian regiment will be paid covertly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], but we would expect Thais to assume responsibility for paying their regiment during training period. In Cambodia, ammunition and some replacement of original equipment will be required and we are planning to do this under same arrangement we have made for support of Khmer Krom troops now in Cambodia, i.e., from DoD stocks in RVN using South Vietnamese military transportation and delivered to FANK. After arrival in Cambodia, pay, food and housing for Cambodian regiment would become responsibility of FANK. Thai regiment presents special problem. We are proceeding on assumption that Thais will take direct responsibility for pay, food and housing for their regiment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is essential that (a) both regiments (officers and men) be composed entirely of or, in Thai regiment, almost entirely of ethnic Khmer troops and (b) follow same process as have Khmer Krom of being folded into FANK. Press and public seem to have accepted return of Khmer Krom to fight in Cambodia as natural and normal state of affairs. We realize Thais may have a different concept of operations for their regiment and need more information on Thai plans before we can make final commitment on this half of project.

7. On questions para 7, we are and will keep aware of what others may do to assist Cambodians. Question on supply while in Cambodia answered para 6 above.

8. Regarding para 9, question A, we have a Presidential determination establishing a small (7.9 million dollars) MAP program for Cambodia. This determination permits use of DoD stocks in RVN or those in possession of GVN or RTG which will then be replaced (unless equipment is excess of U.S., Thai or Vietnamese requirements) from Cambodian MAP funds of $7.9 million. We would hope to avoid any major use of RTG or DoD stocks in Thailand for reason stated para 6 above.

9. In response to para 9, question B, we wish to make it completely clear to Thais that the two regiments cannot become a U.S. responsibility in event they get into a situation in Cambodia like that faced by SR VIII last June in Laos. As is case for other FANK units, U.S. ground forces could not be committed to assist them; and it should not be assumed USAF air support would be available. You should make clear to RTG that our support for this project does not carry any implication of a decision on our part to commit U.S. forces to Cambodia or Thailand.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074, WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate. Repeated to Saigon for Bunker and Abrams and to CINCPAC for Admiral McCain.

[2] In backchannel message 645 from Bangkok, May 14, Unger urgently requested guidance on details of U.S. cooperation in the Thai-Cambodian plan to train and equip two regiments for Cambodia. In paragraph 3 Unger recommended that “our role should be to provide advice and counsel, technical knowledge, equipment and some financial support but not to become intimately involved in the conduct of the Thai-Cambodian programs.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)

[3] See Document 63.

[4] Both dated May 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)

[5] Neither printed.

65. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, May 21, 1970.

Dear Dave:

I understand[2] that in response to Secretary Laird's February 19 memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[3] a copy of which has been shown to me, the Joint Chiefs have provided the Department of Defense with their recommendations regarding the possible withdrawal from Thailand during fiscal year 1971 of some 10,000 U.S. military personnel, broken down into two packages of roughly 5,000 personnel each. As was noted in the SecDef memorandum, the problem is a complex one with important political implications that must be fully considered, particularly because of the likelihood of base closures and significant force readjustments.

Because U.S. troop withdrawals are of most serious concern to the Royal Thai Government, it is important that the foreign policy implications be fully taken into account. In addition, we must be mindful of the necessity in any planning we do, to provide adequate time for genuine consultations with the Royal Thai Government (anticipated to take about 60 days minimum) on any U.S. troop withdrawals we may desire to undertake. Some of the questions which will undoubtedly arise during discussions with the Thai are outlined in the attachment. With these in mind, I suggest we ask our staffs to review together the troop withdrawal proposals so that foreign policy problems can be resolved prior to consultations with the Royal Thai Government.[4]

Sincerely,

Alex

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 11, May 1970. Top Secret. Drafted by Hicks (EA/TB) and Colonel Arthur Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation in Johnson's handwriting reads: “P.S. There is also an aspect on this I want to discuss directly with you. UAJ.”

[2]  Green and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Ronald I. Spiers informed Johnson in a May 18 memorandum that they “had been made aware informally” that Laird had directed the JCS to begin planning a 10,000 man troop reduction in Thailand; attached but not printed.

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] Attached but not printed is a list of questions that were likely to arise during consultations with the Thai Government. Most of them dealt with rationalizing a 45 percent reduction in Thai-based air resources in the face of increased North Vietnamese activity in northern Laos and Cambodia, the projected reduction in the sortie rate in those areas, and compensating for that “loss of firepower which is required to deter, delay, or defeat in NVN/Pathet Lao advance into critical areas of Laos.”

66. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Bangkok, May 21, 1970.

Ref: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 510.[2]

Ref is very much appreciated by Ambassador [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We will have a number of questions to raise, but the most immediate problem is set forth in the following message from Ambassador Unger. For Under Secretary Alexis Johnson from Ambassador Unger

1. Dawee asked to see me on urgent basis this afternoon. As anticipated, he wanted above all to discuss support arrangements for Thai forces that might go to Cambodia. Present at our discussion also were General Kriangsak and General Prasert, Deputy Commander AFSC. Dawee said that after the Prime Minister had received another urgent letter for help from Lon Nol both the Cabinet and the Security Council had again discussed this issue. The Thai were prepared to send two regiments (3,600 men) of [1 line of source text not declassified], but could do so only on the basis of support arrangements similar to those made for the three battalions in Laos. He said, “If you cannot help Cambodia directly, help us to help them.” Dawee stressed the importance of holding Cambodia and that the situation there required immediate deployment of Thai forces; there was no time to await completion of a training program as previously discussed. Yem Sambour is still in town and he will meet again with Deputy PriMin Praphat tomorrow. Next week Praphat and a Thai delegation including Dawee and Chairatana will leave for Phnom Penh to conduct further discussions on Thai assistance.

2. Agreeing with him on the importance of assisting Cambodia, I went into the basic differences between the situation in Cambodia and that in Laos and Viet-Nam and explained Washington's thinking about support arrangements in terms of para 6, reftel. I stressed that we would help out with training and equipment while the forces were still in Thailand, but once they went into Cambodia we could no longer support their subsistence the way we do in Viet-Nam or Laos. We do not and will not have the means we have in both of those places to set up direct supply channels for Thai personnel. Dawee accepted this but retorted that if we don't find some means to help the Thai with the financial burden of supporting the forces, there would be no chance of sending any Thai forces to Cambodia; Thailand has the men, but needs matériel assistance. He confirmed that the RTG would pay basic pay, but would look to us for payment of subsistence and other allowances, various benefits, as well as for matériel and equipment. He said the reason they were thinking in terms of the same support arrangements as in Laos was that they would not send regular troops, but [2 lines of source text not declassified]. In this manner, the question of budgetary support would not come to public attention. He felt this was politically the most acceptable arrangement for us and would not stir up trouble in the U.S. such as charges about Thailand and/or Lon Nol trying to involve the U.S. a la Vietnam.

3. The forces provided by Thailand could be immediately used to stabilize the situation around Phnom Penh, and generally along the route from Thailand as, for example, around Kompong Thom; perhaps also on the west bank of the Mekong. He also said it was important to destroy enemy forces in the border triangle of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. After the forces drawn from the Khmer Serei and other Cambodian groups had had their training (in about 3–4 months) they could be rotated in to replace the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Thai forces. The latter can be phased in one battalion at a time, beginning practically immediately.

4. In a separate development, Pote Sarasin asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to call on him this morning in order to urge U.S. reconsideration of decision re non-support for Thai troops once deployed in Cambodia. Pote pointed out that the RTG intends to commit all the help to Cambodia that it can from its own resources and that the National Security Council had allocated 20 million baht to provide the kinds of finished goods which can be produced in Thailand such as shoes, uniforms, mosquito nets, and canteens. The RTG, however, needs U.S. assistance of the kind provided in Laos for Thai regiments in Cambodia and, in any case, could not fund such support from the Thai budget, even if it were able, without the knowledge of parliamentary reviewing committees and the consequent exposure of the covert nature of the effort. He pointed out that with U.S. assistance the Thais can maintain a credible cover story, if the presence of Thai troops in Cambodia subsequently comes to public attention, by claiming that these Thais are volunteers who are fighting with the Cambodian Army. Finally, Pote cited the contributions Thailand is now making to support free world efforts to resist aggression in Vietnam, Laos, and now Cambodia as evidence of RTG commitment to participate fully in this effort within the limits of its means.

5. To summarize, the Thais have undertaken to make two regiments of total of 3,600 men available as rapidly as possible in response to Lon Nol's urgent request. To the maximum extent possible, these troops will be familiar with the Cambodian language [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In the meantime, the Thais are proceeding to recruit former Khmer Serei and other Cambodian-speaking men on both sides of the Thai/Cambodian border. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has independent confirmation that this recruitment is proceeding. When these troops trained they can be rotated to replace the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Thai forces.

6. It seems to me that we should agree to pay such allowances as we are now paying the battalions in Laos in addition to the training expenses which you have authorized in reftel. These include subsistence, combat allowance, and death and disability payments. I have made it clear to Dawee that we cannot provide subsistence in kind as in Vietnam. It seems to me, therefore, that a monthly sum based on a daily baht rate should be negotiated as a reimbursement for the outlay the RTG will have to make. I think it is clear from the reasons which have been cited by Dawee and also by Pote that the Thais are unlikely to feel able to respond to Lon Nol's urgent request for these troops unless arrangements similar to those in Laos can be worked out. I am satisfied that Thais do intend and have already started providing significant assistance to the Cambodians from their own resources, namely finished goods which can be produced here. They are also ready to continue the basic pay for the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] troops just as in the case of all of the other troops now fighting outside of Thailand.

7. I urge therefore that you give this matter urgent and favorable consideration[3] since it is highly desirable for the Praphat delegation to be able to discuss further and complete the arrangements for Thai troops when it visits Phnom Penh, possibly as early as Monday, the 25th of May.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–074,WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70.

[2]  Document 64.

[3] This request for U.S. financial support for the two [text not declassified] regiments received extensive consideration at the WSAG and other high levels in Washington, but was never given an affirmative response. Instead, Washington's basic negative response was given in message 637, May 28, in which Johnson informed Unger of the “number of legal and operational questions” concerning the requested financial support. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 561, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. III)

67. Backchannel Message From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)[1]

Washington, June 2, 1970.

691. For Ambassador Unger from Alexis Johnson. Ref: Bangkok 680.[2]

1. You authorized to proceed as requested reftel in further exploration of scheme for expansion of Black Panthers and for their use in Cambodia along lines discussed para 3 of Bangkok 669.[3] In exploring this proposal with Thais, you should make clear to them that Black Panthers would have to be used in a fashion consistent with the theory of operations which we developed here and which was sent to you as para 3 of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 637.[4]

2. You should emphasize to Thais that particularly since this matter remains in exploratory stage, and no decision yet made, it is essential that Thais do not make any public comment concerning it.

3. During course of exploration you should also make clear to Thais that as in the case of two Thai Khmer regiments ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 510, para 9),[5] it should not be assumed by Thais that USAF air support would be available to Black Panthers.[6]

4. For our planning purposes here, it would be helpful if in the course of exploration you could also elicit from Thais their thinking with regard to the timing of this deployment.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Repeated to Saigon for Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams and to CINCPAC Honolulu for Admiral McCain.

[2]  Backchannel message 680, June 2, reported Unger's belief that he would be approached by the Thais the following day to resume the dialogue on the “short range proposal,” in the form of an expansion of the Thai Black Panthers division in Vietnam and for its partial use in Cambodia. (Ibid.)

[3]  Backchannel message 669, May 30, discussed various aspects of the “short range proposal,” the quick deployment to Cambodia of two regiments of Thai regular troops to meet the emergency need for forces. Paragraph three covered a number of points, including that the Black Panthers were not up to their allocated full strength, would probably deploy personnel “presently in South Vietnam” after being reinforced, would receive “all repeat all support arrangements” for the two additional regiments as for those already there, and would consult with the South Vietnamese Government concerning “some reduction in Black Panther area responsibility in Vietnam.” (Ibid., Vol. III)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 66.

[5] See Document 64.

[6]  Unger responded, in backchannel message 687, June 3, by stating that “it is hard to see the logic of air support changes” (considering U.S. air support for Thai forces in Laos and also its use of Thai air bases). Unger concluded by stating that “I would not be surprised, for example, if my telling the Thais that USAF air support could not be assumed to be available to Black Panthers operating in Cambodia would mean the end of any further consideration of that project by the RTG.” Attached but not printed.

68. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

Thai Actions on Cambodia

From Ambassador Unger [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]in Bangkok we have received a number of reports covering actions which the Thai are planning to take on Cambodia. These are:

—The Thai Cabinet has agreed to send two regiments to Vietnam for augmentation of the Black Panthers, and the commitment of Black Panther units inside Cambodia in the sanctuary area. These will go probably a battalion at a time.

—The decision has been made to proceed with the recruiting and training of two Thai ethnic Khmer regiments, with U.S. support. These will be trained in Thailand by battalions, and the process might take 8–16 weeks.

—The Thai will train 8 Cambodian pilots (but characteristically want us to pay).

—The Thai will also train regular Cambodian Army and Navy personnel.

—The question of giving Cambodian forces Thai Air Force support is being looked into. The Thai are also considering using the RTAF to support their forces in Cambodia.

—There is some possibility that the Thai will give a few (perhaps 5)T–28's to the Cambodians[2] while their T–28's are being prepared.

In addition to the foregoing, the Thai would like our help on the following:

—Furnishing trucks. They want us to provide 30–50 and are unwilling to take them from their own MAP.

—Provide 5–10 kilowatt transmitters for giving psychological warfare assistance to the Cambodians. It would be set up in Thailand near the Cambodian border.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting (in addition to his initials) reads: “Take up in June 9 WSAG.” Another notation in Haig's handwriting reads: “John next WSAG.”

[2] A notation in Kissinger's handwriting next to this sentence reads: “Let's push this.”

[3]  Kissinger wrote next to this paragraph: “Why not.”

69. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, June 13, 1970.

Dear Alex:

This responds to your letter of May 21[2] regarding troop withdrawals from Thailand.

As you probably know the FY 71 Department of Defense budget is facing serious pressure from both the Congress and inflation. We anticipate that these difficulties will increase sharply in FY 72. For this reason it is essential that we reevaluate the essentiality of each SEA program. As part of this review Secretary Laird asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess the relative priorities of all Department of Defense programs. In their response they found that, in the absence of supplemental FY 71 funding from Congress, reductions in SEA air operations must be made if we are to support other essential SEA and non-SEA Department of Defense programs. Since the mood of the Congress, in our judgment, prevents consideration of supplemental funding at this time, Secretary Laird has approved the proposed air reductions in Thailand.

The decisions on this matter, which have been provided to the President for review and final approval, are attached as in the schedule for force reductions in Thailand[3] as developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These decisions will result in only slight modifications of this very excellent plan which I believe goes as far as possible toward meeting legitimate political concerns within budget constraints.

At the juncture, it is essential that we initiate the discussions with the RTG as soon as possible. On June 5, Secretary Laird emphasized the urgency of this step. I believe that the appropriate next step is for our staffs to prepare negotiating instructions covering some of the questions in your letter and, consequently, I have not included detailed answers in this reply. However, I am satisfied that planned air resources will be adequate to continue Vietnamization progress and provide air support to the RLG forces.[4]

Sincerely,

Dave

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2]  Document 65.

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] Printed from a copy that indicates Packard signed the original.

70. Editorial Note

Because he “had the feeling” that the U.S. Government was “proceeding at too leisurely a pace,” President Nixon made his views about assistance to Cambodia directly known to his senior staff (including Kissinger, Helms, Packard, Moorer, Johnson, Green, Pickering, and Holdridge) at the Washington Special Actions Group meeting of June 15, 1970. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969– 1970) After initial discussion among these advisers, the President entered the room and, according to a June 17 memorandum from Kissinger to Helms, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, immediately reaffirmed that it “is our national policy to preserve the neutrality and integrity of Cambodia. It is important for such countries as Indonesia, Thailand and Laos to know that we are standing firm; we must keep the psychological factor in mind.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285 A, Executive Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Box 11 of 13)

According to the WSAG minutes, the President said that the “situation might appear dubious” in Cambodia but that he equated the current views “with the decisions which he had made on March 17 regarding the defense of Long Tieng in Laos. There we had decided to use our air power and commit the Thailand battalions. It had been a close decision, but this decision had eventually had some effect. We had perhaps saved the decision for another year.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970)

“Regarding the Thais, the President mentioned that he knew the legal arguments and problems, but even Frank Church and several other Senators who had objected to Americans in Cambodia understood the principle of Asians helping Asians. This might be a costly business, and Congress didn't like it, but the South Vietnamese, the Thai, the Indonesians, and others had an economic excuse for not assisting on their own. In addition, there would be a great psychological effect.” (Ibid.) The complete minutes of the June 15 WSAG meeting are in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, volume VI, Document 326.

71. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, June 20, 1970.

Dear Dave:

I refer to your letter of June 13[2] with regard to the force reductions in Thailand. I agree wholeheartedly that time is of essence, if we are to consult meaningfully with the Thais. We are proceeding as you suggest to prepare negotiating instructions for Ambassador Unger on an urgent basis. However, I believe we must adhere to the following ground rules if we are to keep from jeopardizing important programs in Southeast Asia.

a. As I pointed out to you in my letter of May 21, we must provide adequate time for genuine consultations with the Royal Thai Government. It is therefore urgently requested that any overt actions to withdraw our forces from Thailand, which have not already been agreed to by the Thais, be held in abeyance until our consultations can be satisfactorily completed. Furthermore, I think we must assure that any discussions of this matter with the Thais be coordinated by Ambassador Unger in Bangkok. In preparing these instructions we would want to address jointly with your staff those questions we can expect the Thais to raise, and assure that Ambassador Unger will be in the best possible position to answer them persuasively. In addition, it would appear that the evaluation directed by the President of our current air activities in Southeast Asia, as outlined in Mr. Kissinger's memorandum of June 15, could also affect the extent of our troop withdrawals for Thailand. I am well aware of the budgetary problems in DOD and I can assure you that we will proceed with these consultations with dispatch as soon as we have the necessary data to make a persuasive case to the Thais.

b. I have no doubt that US troop withdrawals from Thailand at this point will create political problems. Although we are working out plans with your staff based on the recommended DOD reduction package, it is necessary that the door be left open to reconsider the timing and extent of the program in light of the Thai reactions and reactions from other Asian allies as well as the Presidential directed evaluation mentioned previously. Changes would be recommended only if essential US programs and objectives in the area stand in jeopardy.

I note that the decisions made by Secretary Laird with respect to Thailand are but part of a broader package of decisions affecting our world-wide force posture for FY 1971. I think it would be useful, particularly in connection with the forthcoming DPRC budget review, if I could have a copy of the document approved by Secretary Laird; and if you could arrange in the future for similar documents reflecting major program decisions and which bear on our relations with our allies and other friendly states, to be made available to us. I will, of course, see to it that they will be used on a close-hold restricted basis.

Sincerely,

Alex

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hanket (PM/ISP). A notation on the memorandum reads: “P.S. You will recall Henry expressed interest in this. When we have our ducks in a row I suggest that we brief him. UAJ”

[2]  Document 69.

72. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 26, 1970, 11 a.m.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Meetings Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, WSAG Papers. Top Secret; Nodis; Khmer. 6 pages of source text not declassified.]

73. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, June 30, 1970.

Dear Alex:

After our discussion over the weekend, I reviewed our force planning for U.S. forces in Thailand. I have concluded our plans to withdraw 10,000 men during FY 71 are militarily sound and should be executed expeditiously. Let me briefly review our plans for the 10,000-man phasedown.

About 40% of the 10,000-man reduction relates to the phaseout of four F–105 squadrons and the closure of Takhli Air Base. The F–105s were very effective during the bombing of NVN, but they are not well suited for interdiction in Southern Laos, particularly strikes against moving vehicles. Also, they are not as effective against enemy troop targets as are other aircraft in our force which will remain in Thailand. The eight F–4 squadrons which will remain in Thailand, in conjunction with carrier and SVN-based tactical air forces, will provide adequate capability for requirements in Northern and Southern Laos.

The air base at Takhli is the most appropriate candidate for phasing out U.S. operations, being the farthest away from targets in Laos. By closing out all U.S. activity, we can maximize the manpower and budget savings with the least impact on military capability. After we phase out of the Takhli base, we will still be able to increase the number of aircraft deployed in Thailand quickly, should the need arise. Each of the remaining bases has some limited expansion capability and can handle additional aircraft on an emergency basis. In addition we believe the Takhli Air Base will be kept open by the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). A skeleton U.S. Air Force element will remain there for the rest of FY 71 to assist the Thai in learning to operate and maintain the base. Re-entry should be relatively easy since the base will be in full operation. In addition, we could move another Navy carrier into the South China Sea, or return forces to South Vietnam where ample air base facilities exist.

Another 15% of the planned 10,000-man phasedown concerns turnover of A–1 aircraft to the South Vietnamese in July 1971. These aircraft will be used in Laos until that time. Their turnover is part of our Vietnamization program and Vietnamese pilots are being trained to fly them. The loss of their truck-killing capability will be more than offset by the addition of new B–57G sensor-equipped aircraft and wider use of aircraft gunships. In this regard, I recently directed the Air Force to modify additional C–130 aircraft as gunships for use in the next dry season campaign. Planned reductions in reconnaissance forces constitute another 15% of the total Thailand force reduction. These are possible because of reduced overall sorties levels from Thailand.

We also plan to reduce Army engineers and transportation personnel (15% of the total phasedown) because they have largely completed their road-building efforts. A few parts of the projects may not be finished at their planned deployment date. If necessary, a small engineer force will be left to complete them, or local contractors will be used. The remainder of the 10,000-man phasedown consists of miscellaneous support, personnel, whose reduction will have little impact.

The 10,000-man phasedown reflects due consideration of the attendant military risks and I fully support it. Many of the redeployments were planned for the July–September period. We budgeted funds accordingly and any delays will force us to reprogram funds from other activities. You are well aware of our budget constraints and will appreciate our interest in getting these decisions carried out promptly.

For the above reasons I believe Ambassador Unger should proceed promptly with the necessary consultations with the Royal Thai Government. In his discussions he can assure the Thai that:

1. Reduction of F–105 and A–1 aircraft in Thailand will be compensated by additional AC–130 and B–57G aircraft which are considerably more effective for the type missions being flown in Laos.

2. The A–1 capability will remain in Southeast Asia, although the aircraft will move to South Vietnam to be flown by the VNAF.

3. The withdrawal of the Army engineers will not jeopardize the projects which we have promised the Royal Thai Government would be completed.

4. Remaining bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia have ample capability to support promptly an increase in our air assets, should the need arise. Also Takhli will be available for re-entry should it be needed.[2]

Sincerely,

Dave

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59,PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 1. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] A joint State–Defense message to Unger on July 3 instructed him to “immediately initiate consultations with RTG re next reduction of U.S. forces in Thailand.” (Telegram 105295 to Bangkok; ibid.) However, a July 2 note to Spiers attached to the telegram noted that “entire instruction was withdrawn Friday night at White House instruction” and “DOD is now instructed to defer any action.” (Ibid.) This action was precipitated by a July 2 telegram from Rogers to Kissinger, in which the Secretary stated that he “had not had chance to talk to Johnson before departure about my conversation with President about slowing down our steps because of need to maintain strong position in Thailand for future. Telegram does not seem to take that conversation into account. Could you look into this with a view to revised instructions. In the meantime I have asked Unger to delay action on what he has received until we hear from you.” (Telegram 765 to Manila; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV) In telegram 10662 from Saigon, July 5, Rogers added that “as a result of my talk with the President at San Clemente I am confident that he would not want any reductions made in Thailand that would reduce our air power there. Also the timing is particularly bad because our present efforts to encourage Thailand to do more in Cambodia.” (Ibid.) A July 2 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger indicates that Kissinger wanted “to hold up on the Thai force reductions until Larry Lynn's TACAIR studies are completed.” (Ibid.) An attached note and handwriting on the memorandum indicate that Packard was informed of the delay.

74. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

Saigon, July 5, 1970, 0940Z.

Secto 45/10660. Subject: Following uncleared memorandum of Secretary's Manila Bilateral with Thai FonMin Thanat (July 3).

(1) FonMin Thanat responded to the Secretary's mention of Cambodia and described the position of the RTG with regard to military assistance to that country. He explained that he had exerted some restraint on the Thai military leaders on the grounds that Thailand should not move too quickly until the military situation in Cambodia became clearer and also until the results of the Djakarta meeting follow-up were known. Furthermore, it was essential for the RTG to have an understanding of US Government intentions and to know what support would be available for whatever Thailand felt able to do. He emphasized that the Thais could not afford to become militarily deeply involved and find themselves left high and dry with the US having washed its hand of the Cambodian problem.

(2) The Secretary then reviewed for the FonMin the actions which we contemplate, including the provision of small arms and equipment and economic assistance as well as the provision of some continuing air support of specified types. He referred also to the help which US would provide Cambodia through a new MAP program for fiscal year 1971 (beyond the $8 million provided for fiscal year 1970), surplus weapons and equipment, the hand-over of captured items and perhaps some loans. The Secretary mentioned in addition the military help which we anticipate South Vietnam will provide to Cambodia and expressed the hope that others in the region will also help.

(3) The Secretary expressed specific hope that Thailand will do as much as it possibly can and he inquired how the US could help in this regard.FonMin first referred to the Black Panther unit now deployed to Vietnam and suggested that it might be wise in view of the new developments in Cambodia and the dangers closer to home for Thailand to use some of the Black Panthers to provide for Thailand's forward defense in Western and Northern Cambodia. In the discussion that followed the Secretary generally endorsed this idea after ascertaining that the FonMin was speaking of only a part, say about 4,000, of the Black Panthers and that he contemplated keeping some of the Panthers in Vietnam for some time yet. He also made clear that the US could not support the Panthers either in border areas of Thailand or in adjacent areas of Cambodia in the same way as they are now supported; specifically subsistence and various allowances could not be paid by the US under the circumstances although we could probably re-supply them with ammo, spare parts, etc. through the Cambodian MAP program. In answer to a direct question from the FonMin, the Secretary said it is US policy to encourage the Thais to provide direct military assistance to Cambodia as it may be necessary. He referred also to the President's view that we would understand that the Thais would put a priority on the use of their troops to defend their own home ground. In answer to the FonMin's question, the Secretary said that he did not believe that there would be any obstacles, generally speaking, put up by Congress which would stand in the way of US support of its allies who wish to help Cambodia, but there were certain specific kinds of assistance which were in question and would remain so until decisions were taken on some pending legislation.

(4) The discussion then turned to possible Thai assistance in training Cambodians and the help which the US might provide for this. Aside from the special arrangements which have been almost completed for US support for the training of Thai ethnic Khmer, we are not able at the moment to say precisely what help we can give although it almost surely would include some outfitting and equipping and possibly additional supply of consumables in Cambodia through Cambodian MAP. FonMin emphasized the teamwork he envisaged under the Nixon Doctrine in which Thailand and other countries in the area would provide manpower and the US would assist with weapons, equipment and financial and other support.

(5) The Secretary then turned to FonMin's obvious distress over statements made by US Senators and US press. He said that it was essential to recognize that these are personal and individual views and do not represent position of the Administration which deeply appreciates Thailand's position and the help it has rendered. He said it was essential to have a thick skin about critical comments and see them in perspective.

(6) Returning to Cambodia, the FonMin again expressed Thailand's very deep concern at this point about Cambodian situation and the threat posed to his country. The Secretary acknowedged this and said it was important for us to think about the measure it might be essential to take if a collapse of the government in Phnom Penh should threaten. He expressed the need to see that the supply route via Kompong Som (Sihanoukville) not be re-established by the Communists and he also mentioned the need to keep open access to Phnom Penh via the Mekong.

(7) The Secretary then referred to the FonMin's mention the previous year of his efforts to establish some contact with the government of Communist China. Thanat said that nothing had come of these. He said that he was sure that the Chinese would be glad to receive a secret mission from Thailand and then would undoubtedly seek to exploit it to Thailand's disadvantage. The Minister had no intention of playing this game, but was ready to talk openly; the Chinese were apparently not interested in pursuing this at this time.

(8) At the conclusion Ambassador Unger mentioned possible closer cooperation among the four nations of the region to make better provisions for their own security. Thanat generally endorsed this idea, noting the obvious common interests which Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam had in this regard. He also mentioned the reticence of the Lao to deal with the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese; the Lao preferred to work on security matters only with the Thais.

Department repeat as desired.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–72: Entry 3051 B: Box 516. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger and approved in S by Peter Johnson and William Brandt. Repeated to Bangkok and Phnom Penh. Rogers had been in Manila for the SEATO meeting and in Saigon for the TCC meeting.

75. Memorandum From Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

PL 480 Program for Thailand

Introduction

I understand:

—the WSAG is considering a proposal to provide a PL 480 loan of up to $20 million to the Thai,[2]

—that this loan is intended to indirectly compensate the Thai for costs associated with possible Thai and Thai Khmer force deployments to Cambodia.

Although I have not seen all the cable traffic on this proposal, I understand the Thai have not asked for the PL 480 program or even an explicit quid pro quo for their Cambodian contribution. Rather, Ambassador Unger has suggested that such a program could be used to help the Thai defray the expenses of their Cambodian effort. We would give the RTG $20 million in PL 480 commodities (e.g., wheat, tobacco, cotton). Thai importers would purchase these commodities from the RTG with local currency (Baht). According to the Unger proposal, sixty percent of the budget receipts, $12 million, would be used by the RTG in agricultural development while the remaining $8 million would be allocated to U.S. uses. The theory is that the Thai would divert currently budgeted agricultural development funds to their Cambodian effort.

Ambassador Unger proposed this PL 480 program on May 19, 1970. It was not clear why Thailand needed the program at that time (the economic circumstances of Thailand do not warrant such a pro-gram—see below) and his proposal was not favorably received at the working level in State,AID, or BOB.[3]

Raising this proposal again, as a possible quid pro quo for Thai assistance to Cambodia, may be justified by the desire to obtain Thai help in Cambodia. On the other hand, a PL 480 action in this context raises serious political and legal problems in addition to its questionable economic merits that should be addressed.

Incrementalism versus Fundamentalism

As a policy proposal the PL 480 program represents a clear case of “incrementalism.” It is an example of a policy proposal made in response to immediate circumstances, that has not been viewed in the larger context of U.S.-Thai relations, the total U.S. program effort in Thailand, the requirements of the Thai economy and U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia:

—In 1969, the Thai economy continued the high rate of economic growth it has achieved throughout the 1960's:

—GDP increased by 7.5%,

—budget revenues rose by 11.3%,

—foreign exchange reserves stood at a relatively high level of $875 million at the end of the year, having suffered a slight decline from the over $900 million level achieved in 1968 as a result of U.S. war-related expenditures in Thailand.

—Over the period 1971–1975 the Thai budget and balance of payments will come under serious pressure if the Thai expand their forces and if U.S. war-related military spending is reduced. This pressure could be alleviated by increases in U.S. military assistance and increases in the U.S. program assistance. Nevertheless, the NSSM 51 economic model indicates that in the near term the Thai economy clearly has the capacity to support increases in military and civilian expenditures.

—The Thai have been sensitive to U.S. press and Congressional criticism of our commitment to Thailand. They have repeatedly sought and obtained assurances of our commitment to defend Thailand. However, the NSSM 51 study concluded[4] that by responding to these requests piecemeal the U.S. has broadened its commitment beyond what it can defend against its critics and possibly beyond what U.S. interests could justify. The study concluded that a diplomatic strategy more closely gauged to the basis of our commitments—SEATO as interpreted by Rusk–Thanat—would be easier to defend, less likely to raise Thai expectations beyond what we can meet, and more consistent with stable U.S.-Thai relations instead of the hot-cold cycle we have experienced recently.

—The Thai view the level of U.S. program assistance to Thailand as one of the most important benefits of close cooperation with the U.S. and as a signal of U.S. intentions to back up its commitment. The NSSM 51 analysis concluded that our past program effort has been too diffuse and volatile to take full advantage of the Thai perception of it. The study concludes that we should focus our program effort in fewer areas, and set long-term program strategy and funding goals in consultation with the Thai. Such an approach would have the important ancillary benefit of improving Thai performance in key areas, e.g., ground force performance.

—The NSSM 51 study presents several U.S. assistance program packages. The package choices most consistent with the threats to Thailand, and therefore the most likely to be selected, will increase the level of U.S. assistance to Thailand. Assistance to the army and air force and possibly economic assistance can be expected to rise.

—You have asked for a study of U.S. strategy alternatives for Southeast Asia. A decision to embark on a new style of assistance to Thailand, which is what Ambassador Unger's proposal amounts to, should be made after a review of alternative burden sharing arrangements, the forms of assistance we are able to give, etc. While all decisions cannot await the formulation of a Southeast Asian strategy, this one probably can.

Conclusion

In sum:

—the PL 480 proposal:

—is not justified on economic grounds,

—will probably not have any lasting impact on U.S.-Thai relations,

—is unlikely to result in Thai performance improvements.

In addition, major Congressional opposition can be expected on political and on legal grounds as soon as the PL 480 agreement is signed.

—an alternative approach would entail:

—assuring the Thai that our overall assistance will be responsive to the threats to Thailand.

—informing them that we have just completed an analysis of our supports to Thailand which will be reviewed for decision in the near future. The resulting decision will determine how our economic and military assistance programs will be modified in response to recent developments in Southeast Asia. We expect to make a major assistance contribution to the overall Thai defense effort in the foreseeable future, and our contribution will be in proportion to the overall Thai defense burden which we recognize is increasing.

Recommendation

I recommend disapproval of the PL 480 proposal. If action is required to assure the Thai of our financial backing for additional defense costs they will bear as a result of the deteriorating security situation on their borders, I recommend the U.S. inform the Thai of the pending review of our assistance effort and assure them that the upcoming decision will be responsive to the requirement for an expanded Thai defense effort.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for action.

[2] See Document 76.

[3] In a July 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs Clarence D. Palmby noted that his Department also opposed this program “based on normal economic considerations and normal Title I program criteria.” He added, however, that “if you believe that such a program is in the national interest, we will cooperate with other agencies in its implementation.” Palmby's memorandum is also attached but not printed.

[4] See Document 82 for excerpts from the NSSM 51 Thailand Analysis Program Study.

76. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, July 10, 1970, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Support for Cambodia

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

CIA

State

Mr. Richard Helms

Ambassador Johnson

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. Moore

Mr. Nelson

Mr. Tom Pickering

JCS

NSC Staff

Admiral Thomas Moorer

Col. Richard Kennedy

General Vogt

Mr. John Holdridge

Defense

Mr. Nutter

Admiral Flanagan

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

[Omitted here is discussion on Cambodia.]

Turning to funding, Dr. Kissinger first brought up Thai activities with respect to Cambodia. It emerged that Senator Russell did not want CIA to finance Thai activities in Cambodia, and that Senator Stennis on the other hand believed that CIA rather than Defense should finance these activities. On the equipment costs for the Thai/Khmer regiment ($1.2 million) following a discussion of alternatives including Cambodian MAP, CIA funds, Thai MASF, or PL–480 trade-offs, the decision favored using prior-year Thai MASF, but with the possibility of using some Cambodian MAP. Action was assigned to Mr. Nutter .

In addressing the question of Thai operations in Western Cambodia, it was agreed that RTAF operations took precedence over providing the initial equipment for an RCT . The initial equipment costs for the RCT seemed highly loaded. The funding route of using prior-year Thai MASF, with replacement of run-downs via PL–480 funds used to make purchases from U.S. military sales was agreed upon. This would be used first to support a sortie rate by the RTAF of 900 per month. Ambassador Unger would be asked to discuss this with the Thai, and also to review with them the requirements for the RCT. This cable should reflect the urgency of the need for Thai air support. In the course of this discussion it was brought out that there was no economic justification of a PL–480 program for Thailand, but that there was no choice other than to go for a PL–480 program up to $20 million[2] as a source of funds for trade-offs.

The issue of Thai training for 15,000 Cambodian troops was raised, with several members questioning the effectiveness of such training. It was generally accepted that all training should be carried out in South Vietnam, where the job could be done more effectively, more quickly, and more cheaply. However, Admiral Moorer would be asked to look into a comparison of South Vietnam versus Thailand for training Cambodians, to include an estimate of the training times required.

The question of pay and allowances for the Khmer Krom and the Thai/Khmer units was addressed, with the alternatives being Defense funds, AID supporting assistance, the AID contingency funds, or CIA funds. The decision was made to rely on Defense funds for the 1st quarter of FY 71 and AID supporting assistance used later, subject to the views of the Secretary of Defense. (This was based on the assumption that an increase in the AID appropriation for general supporting assistance would not get through Congress at this time; Mr. Nutter, however, quoted Secretary Laird as believing that the issue should be carried to the Hill now.) A Defense switchback would be required to pay separation allowances of $1.7 million for the Thai/Khmer and Mr. Nutter agreed to talk to Mr. Packard on this. The size of the Cambodian MAP was considered. The consensus was to go for a Presidential Decision calling for a $40 million Cambodian program to be drawn from other programs, and to ask for a supplemental later when Congressional response might be better. The $40 million was estimated as being sufficient to carry through January or February 1971. Admiral Moorer felt that this sum was insufficient.

The meeting agreed to consider the retention of Thai forces in Laos at the next session. Agreement was noted on providing SAR operations in Cambodia for the RTAF, and on providing communications jeeps to Cambodia for use in air-to-ground control.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] Telegram 110878 to Bangkok, July 10, proposed a PL–480 program made up of tobacco, cotton, and wheat, as well as other aid programs. The telegram stated that “it may be desirable to provide some additional assistance to Thailand in recognition of Thai support of common effort to maintain Cambodian independence.” It added that it was “important, however, that no impression be given to RTG or others that the U.S. would be providing such additional assistance on any kind of matching basis with the Thai contributions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 10 THAI)

77. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 16, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject File, Country File, Thailand, 1969–1972. Secret; Eyes Only. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

78. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee

Washington, July 18, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject File, Country File, Thailand, 1969–1972. Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

79. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird [1]

Washington, July 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Redeployment of US Forces from Thailand (BANNER SUN)

I–35764/70

Your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 5 June 1970,[2] approved a plan to redeploy 7,300 USAF and 2,565 USA personnel from Thailand during FY 71. These redeployments were to begin 15 July 1970, except for the small F–102 detachment at Don Muang which redeployed 25 June 1970.

A State/Defense message was sent on 2 July[3] directing American Embassy Bangkok to initiate consultations with the RTG concerning these planned reductions of US forces in Thailand. At State's request the redeployments were rescheduled to begin 1 August, instead of 15 July, to provide Ambassador Unger additional time to facilitate negotiations with the RTG. Later, on the same day, State Department directed separately that action on redeployment of US forces in Thailand be suspended pending further instructions. This action was taken at the request of Secretary Rogers from Manila. Subsequent information indicated that the decision concerning this redeployment package would be withheld pending review of the FY 71 DoD budget and the VSSG study of air operations in Southeast Asia.

On the basis of the foregoing, JCS directed CINCPAC to take no further action to redeploy or prepare for redeployment of these forces. The FY 71 DoD budget is predicated, in part, on the planned reductions of forces in Thailand. A decision is required as soon as practical in order to begin negotiations with the RTG, preparatory to redeploying these forces.

Recommend you sign the attached memorandum to Dr. Kissinger [4] reemphasizing the necessity for expeditious resolution of the questions which are directly related to FY 71 force reductions in Thailand. (BANNER SUN). A talking paper on the subject for your use in California is also appended.[5]

RA Ware

[1] Source: Washington National Records Center, FRC 330 74 0142, Signers Copies Folder #24. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] Not found.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 73.

[4] Attached but not printed. The memorandum states that its purpose is “to reaffirm strongly” the Department of Defense position that negotiation with the RTG “should be started immediately so that we can retain our credibility with the Thai and minimize the adverse budgetary impact of the unplanned delay.” It also states the hope that “no additional delays in completing the VSSG study will be encountered.”

[5] Attached but not printed. The paper provides a chronology of the plan for military reductions in Thailand. It also asserts that the loss of the F–105 aircraft there would “be fully compensated for by the additional AC–130 and B–57s as in terms of interdiction in Laos” and that the Takhli base in Thailand “will no longer be needed” and that its closure “should have no impact on Thai decision-making regarding Cambodia.”

80. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 30, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Air Force Reduction in Thailand

In accordance with your request there is attached the memorandum which I received from our Thai people concerning the problem of United States reduction of Air Force units in Thailand. This memorandum addresses itself only to those reductions which our Embassy in Thailand knows are included in the Fiscal Year 1971 program. Our Embassy in Bangkok is not yet aware of the fact that one of the alternatives in the tactical air package for Southeast Asia might result in the elimination of additional squadrons and in the evacuation of the base at Korat.

Naturally, if there were any decision taken to accept the alternative which involves the Korat evacuation, our problem with the Thai would be even greater than is suggested in the attached memorandum. On the other hand, if we are going to make such a decision we should not break the news to the Thai piecemeal but should give them the bad news all at once.

Our very strong recommendation is that the decision on the tactical air package should leave the Korat installation intact. Therefore, if and when the decision is made to instruct Embassy Bangkok to implement the Fiscal Year 1971 package[2] we trust that will be a definitive decision concerning the total redeployments to be made from Thailand and that it will involve only the redeployment of the air squadrons and the evacuation of Takhli.

Attachment

Washington, undated.

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rogers [3]

SUBJECT

U.S. Air Force Reduction in Thailand

During your forthcoming visit to San Clemente, the Viet-Nam Special Study Group will take up with the White House the reduction of the USAF sortie rate from Thai bases. Whatever decision is taken with respect to the sortie rate will be the foundation for subsequent actions to reduce U.S. military forces in Thailand. As you know from your conversations with Ambassador Unger in Manila and Tokyo, he is greatly concerned not only over the size and pattern of the cuts themselves but also over the political importance that there be thorough, unhurried and genuine consultations and that in these consultations we genuinely take into account Thai problems. In this connection there are two important points:

A. That there be adequate lead time for consultation and planning process to take place. In practice this would mean that there should be at least 60 days following the initiation of consultations with the Thai and prior to the actual commencement of reductions. Thus if a decision were communicated to Bangkok to commence consultations on August 1, actual reductions in operations and/or redeployment actions should not commence until October 1. This is important not only for political reasons but to permit sound planning of what will prove to be a very complicated process for the Thai.

B. That the close out of Takhli Air Base be phased so as to gear into the Thai budgetary cycle, i.e. October 1, 1971, rather than on the proposed date of June 30, 1971. I understand our budgetary rationale behind the June 30 date, but there are substantial considerations arguing in favor of an October 1 close-out. Some 1900 locally hired workers will be thrown out of work in what is otherwise a tiny village community. There will be substantial local economic dislocation. In addition, if the Thai Air Force is to continue to keep Takhli open on a standby basis it will have to make budgetary arrangements to do so. All of these considerations will require budgetary and appropriation action by the RTG. To close out on June 30, 1971 will leave a three-month gap which will plague both the RTG and us in the future. If the consultation process is to be meaningful, we must be prepared to take account of this genuine problem. Even though the flying air squadrons may have already redeployed the USAF skeleton ground element should remain in Takhli until October 1.

I note from Under Secretary Packard's letter of June 30 to Under Secretary Johnson [4] that Defense expects the RTAF to keep Takhli open. Mr. Packard goes on to indicate that “reentry should be relatively easy since the base will be in full operation”. Since we are counting on the Thai to maintain the base in a operational status, it is in our own interest to facilitate Thai administrative and budgetary take over by phasing out our final withdrawal until October 1.

While the meeting in San Clemente is primarily concerned with the sortie rate and may not take specific questions of timing, yet the decisions to be made on the sortie rate will to a large extent determine our flexibility with respect to phasing and timing. I hope full consideration will be given to these points in considering the reduction of the sortie rate.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret. A notation in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Al—I agree, I want the whole'71 package spelled out and communicated to DOD along the lines of VSSG decisions.”

[2] The decision was made at the WSAG meeting of August 4, which was held in the White House Situation Room from 5:10 to 6:45 p.m. The WSAG agreed that DOD should pull its F–105s out of Takhli, but that the base should be kept open at least until October 1971. Excerpts relating to Thailand are in Document 81.

[3]  Green crossed out the Secretary as the addressee on this memorandum and wrote in Ambassador Sullivan's name with a note that reads: “Bill—I'm not sending this to the Secretary since he won't be at VSSG or even later at S. Clemente. However, you may find points here valid and relevant in your VSSG meeting. MG”

[4]  Document 73.

81. Editorial Note

During the Washington Special Actions Group meeting of August 4, 1970, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger announced first that the organization of several different groups of principals dealing with various aspects of the conflict in Southeast Asia would be simplified, and that “this group of principals will now be called the Senior Review Group on Southeast Asia.”

A summary reads as follows:

“Support for Thai Khmer Units. DOD is to pay initial family separation allowances for the first 2,000 troops, and to cover the first Quarter's pay and allowances after deployment in Cambodia. AID will offset this cost later by making available supporting assistance to cover a Vietnam cost which otherwise would be funded by DOD. The State Department is to make sure the Thais understand that these units must at least nominally be folded into FANK in order that initial equipment needs and operative support can be covered by Cambodian MAP.”

The WSAG also agreed “that projects for recruitment of two additional Lao SGU battalions and six Thai SGU battalions for paramilitary operations in South Laos should go forward.”

The last discussion of the meeting concerned the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand. Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson asked about the withdrawal of air support and stated that the “Black Panthers are leaving Vietnam, and some U.S. troops are leaving Thailand.” (Prime Minister Thanom announced on August 27 that his Government had informed the South Vietnamese Government that it planned to withdraw its troops from that country.) In response to Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard's question as to whether there was any reason to keep Takhli open, Kissinger made the following response:

“When you draw down your involvement in Thailand, it will be hard to get back in. Since one could conclude that Thailand will be our anchor in Southeast Asia, we might wish to pull troops now in South Vietnam into Thailand. If this should be the case, we would want to keep as much presence as possible in Thailand at this time. This is the argument that Sullivan has been giving me, and I understand that Secretary Rogers agrees.”

Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms added that “We shouldn't indicate that we are closing Takhli at this time.” Kissinger then stated, “I agree. Let's take out the F–105s, but keep open the base for now.” Kissinger concluded by stating that if “we tell the Thais that we are getting out, we will have to pay the political price. On the other hand, if we just take the F–105s out, but leave the base open, we can come back at any time that we choose.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

The discussions and agreement with the Thai Government concerning the redeployment of the additional 10,000 U.S. military personnel from Thailand during FY 1971 were publicly announced on September 8.

82. Summary Paper in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 51[1]

Washington, August 5, 1970.

A PROGRAM ANALYSIS STUDY OF U.S. POLICY AND PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR THAILAND 1971–1975

[Omitted here is Part I, Introduction.]

Part II

Analysis of Issues

(1) U.S. Interests in Thailand, the Threats to Thailand, and Alternative U.S. Commitments to Thailand.

U.S. Interests in Thailand. In his February 18, 1970 message to the Congress the President prescribed the following relationship between U.S. interests and U.S. commitments: “Our interests must shape our commitments rather than the other way around.”

U.S. strategic, foreign policy, military, political, and economic interests are involved in Thailand.

U.S. Strategic and Military Interests in Thailand—The U.S. has made extensive use of air bases and support facilities in Thailand for wartime bombing and intelligence operations in Vietnam. The bases, however, remain under nominal Thai control. Thailand is in an ideal position for staging operations in Laos and for support efforts to help Cambodia. Thailand has also made a contribution to the war effort in Vietnam as a Troop Contributing Country.

In the event of a Sino-U.S. war, the U.S. would mount attacks from its East Asian bases e.g. Japan, Philippines, Korea, etc., because they are close to China's industrial and population centers. Bases in Southeast Asia would be an asset but not of critical importance. Therefore, Thailand is not of great strategic value vis-à-vis China. However, Thailand is and will remain an important intelligence base for the monitoring of Chinese activities. Thai-based installations are useful for monitoring Chinese missile developments and potential military preparations, particularly for attacks on Southeast Asia. However, with satellite air and seaborne capability, the loss of Thailand as an intelligence base would deal a severe blow to U.S. interests only with regard to our ability to have the necessary warning to defend Thailand itself. Therefore, in the absence of other U.S. interests, the intelligence value of Thailand alone would not justify a U.S. commitment to defend Thailand.

As the major industrial power in Asia, Japan's security interests are important to the U.S. However, unlike its attitude toward Korea, Japan does not view its security to be closely linked to Thailand.

With regard to Southeast Asia, although the U.S. has stated that it does not seek permanent bases in Thailand after the Vietnam war, it is conceivable that U.S. interests in preserving the outcome in Laos or Vietnam may require U.S. access to bases in Thailand. A U.S. presence in Southeast Asia maintained by the U.S. SEATO commitment to Thailand, may also provide a security umbrella against an overt Chinese or other threats for nascent Southeast Asian regionalism or for individual nations (e.g. Cambodia) where the U.S. has interests but no commitments.

In relation to East Asia and the Pacific Area. To the South, Singapore possesses in the form of one of the largest and most modern non-American naval bases in the world—airfields, and ship and aircraft maintenance facilities—assets that could be used to support military forces in East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

A continued British and Australian presence in Singapore would probably preclude the hostile use of these naval facilities as well as provide a barrier to aggression across the Straits of Malacca. If Thailand were neutral or under Communist control, the U.S. would have the option of basing its own forces at Singapore in addition to the British and Australian presence.

About 800 Free World ships each month pass through the Straits of Malacca, but this route is of primary economic importance not to the U.S. but to Japan, which is the world's largest importer of oil (90% of which comes through the Straits). Even Japanese interests would not be seriously endangered if the Straits were closed as oil tankers could pass south of Indonesia.

Indonesia itself constitutes a major U.S. security interest in East Asia, although it is doubtful that a neutral or hostile Thailand would significantly alter Indonesia's[2] determination and capability to remain non-Communist.

In the Pacific area, as long as Indonesia remains independent, there is no direct link between the security of Thailand and the defense of Australia, New Zealand or other Pacific powers friendly to the U.S. Nor is there any direct link between Thailand's security and the security of the U.S.

Foreign Policy Interests: SEATO and the Problem of U.S. Commitments— To the extent that other powers gauge U.S. intentions on the basis of the U.S.'s performance vis-à-vis Thailand—for example, our willingness to honor our commitment to Thailand—our actions in Thailand will have wider repercussions in Asia, particularly for those Asian nations such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan that rely on the U.S. to balance the influence of China.

The same is true, although to a lesser extent, world-wide. While Thailand may not be considered an area of vital U.S. interest, and the Thai may be able to deal with their internal security problems on their own (or at least without U.S. combat troops), the U.S. has an interest in demonstrating fidelity to its international commitments. As the only mainland Asian subscriber to SEATO, Thailand ranks with South Korea and Taiwan as an area where the credibility of the U.S. commitment in Asia could be put to the test.

Thus, the U.S. commitment and involvement in Thailand are an element of the Asian balance of power. The size and nature of our role can vary significantly in relation to alternative estimates of the extent of U.S. involvement required to maintain regional stability in the face of the likely threats. While the present equilibrium in SEA may be acceptable to U.S. interests, other stable arrangements could also be compatible with U.S. goals. For example, in the post-Vietnam period a Thailand less dependent on the U.S. either as a result of increased Thai military capability, diminished threats, or diplomatic realignment or some combination of these three would not necessarily threaten the balance of power in Asia and thereby U.S. interests.

Political Interests—In addition to the SEATO relationship, informal or implied U.S. commitments to Thailand stem from communications and contingency plans relating to the formal commitment, implicit understandings regarding U.S. programs in Thailand, and from Thai cooperation in collective security actions in Asia, particularly in Vietnam.

The net effect of these informal obligations, over a period of twenty years, has been a considerable deepening of the intimacy of U.S.-Thai relations.

Therefore, while there are no historic U.S. ties of friendship with Thailand, there is a measure of intimacy that has resulted from a past close U.S.-Thai relationship, particularly through the Vietnam war.

Economic Interests—The U.S. does not have major economic interests in Thailand. U.S. investments amount to about $200 million. Thailand is not an important trading partner of the United States; total U.S.-Thai trade in 1968 was $267 million. Thailand is not an indispensable source of scarce resources for the U.S. It is not a major market for U.S. industry. However, U.S. access to Thai airspace and U.S. landing rights in Thailand are a decided convenience for the U.S.

Conclusion—Thailand is not of vital interest to the United States. Our greatest interest in Thailand derives from our foreign policy objective of bringing the Vietnam war to a successful conclusion.[3]

Beyond this, however, U.S. interests are not inconsistent with a new equilibrium in Southeast Asia resulting from either a change in the military balance or from diplomatic realignment. Whether U.S. interests would be served by such developments depends largely on how the new situation is arrived at. That is, if the U.S. acted precipitously in rejecting its alliance with Thailand, U.S. foreign policy interests in Asia and world wide could be seriously harmed.

On the other hand, if the threats to Thailand diminished as a result of action by China, the Soviet Union or North Vietnam, or if Thai actions increased Thailand's defense capabilities or improved its relations with Peking or Hanoi and thereby lessened Thailand's dependence on the U.S., such developments would not threaten U.S. interests.

The issue then is not whether U.S. interests can tolerate a Thailand less intimately linked to the U.S., but whether ways can be found to diminish Thailand's dependence and scale down the U.S. commitment to Thailand without: (a) jeopardizing our immediate goals in Southeast Asia, or (b) abandoning the Thai in a precipitous manner that would jeopardize U.S. foreign policy goals.

[Omitted here is Part III, Issues for Decision.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, PM/ISP Files: Lot 72 D 504, Subject Files, Box 2. Top Secret. According to a September 16 memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the response to NSSM 51 was not completed, but instead was incorporated into NSSM 99, Southeast Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, NSC Files: 80 D 212, General Files on NSC Matters, Box 1, NSC Admin. Matters, January 1970)

[2] A notation next to this underlined passage (from ‘doubtful’ through ‘Indonesia’s') reads “nuts! Heartland of SE Asia.”

[3] A notation next to this sentence reads: “more a non-commie SE Asia.”

83. Editorial Note

[text not declassified]

84. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy, Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Banner Sun Reductions in Thailand

The Banner Sun package represents total reductions of about 10,000 U.S. personnel. This includes about 4,000 personnel associated with the withdrawal of F–105s and 6,000 other personnel including engineer and transportation units, and other miscellaneous personnel.

The package was “approved” by Packard and Johnson and Ambassador Unger was advised to inform the Thai by a cable in early July[2] (on what basis is not clear to us), but a hold was placed on this at Secretary Rogers' direction[3] following his discussion with the President.

The Banner Sun package was discussed at the VSSG meeting in Los Angeles and subsequently in the WSAG meeting on August 4.[4] In both cases the discussion turned on whether Takhli should be kept open. In Los Angeles the discussion was in the context of sortie levels. At the WSAG meeting the discussion centered on whether we should inform the Thai of our intention ultimately to close Takhli or whether we should agree to keep it open and manned until October 1971, deferring until early spring informing the Thai of our decision. At the WSAG meeting it was agreed that we would keep Takhli open through October 1971, would withdraw the F–105 units, and would defer until spring 1971 decision as to whether to continue our operation of the base after October 1971 or to turn over responsibility to the Thai and to inform them of our intention to do so. NSDM 77 confirmed the decision on Takhli and set sortie levels.

The draft cable which Alex Johnson used as a springboard for the discussion at the WSAG meeting,[5] and which he left with you, authorized Ambassador Unger to inform the Thai of the full Banner Sun reduction package modified by the decision on Takhli, and to advise the Thai about September 1. (Our redraft taking into account your changes but still reflecting the Johnson/Packard “approval” of the entire Banner Sun package is at Tab A.)[6]

Both Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Packard are agreed that we should go forward on this basis, but we are unclear as to whether you agree or whether the reductions other than those associated with F–105s require further approval either by you or by the President.

We would appreciate your guidance.

Banner Sun approved in full with modification for Takhli[7] (approve cable at Tab A)

Air Force reductions modified by Takhli approved but do Memo for the President on other reductions

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 73.

[3] See Document 74.

[4] See Document 81.

[5] Attached but not printed.

[6] Attached but not printed.

[7] This option was checked.

85. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 14, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Request for Chronology of Thai Moves in Providing Regular RTA Forces for Service in Cambodia

At Tab A is the chronology of Thai moves in providing regular RTA forces for service in Cambodia[2] as we have pieced it together from regular and back-channel messages.

In brief, I believe that these messages bring out the following points:

—In May, soon after the U.S./GVN operations began in Cambodia, the Thai became concerned about the implications for them of the Communist aggression in Cambodia and began to consider the possibility of deploying regular RTA forces into Cambodia to help prevent a Communist takeover.

—An initial Thai concept was to deploy a regiment of the Black Panthers from Vietnam into Eastern Cambodia, replacing it with other regular forces from Thailand. The Black Panthers would thus have stayed on in Vietnam.

—After State determined that we could not legally support the Black Panthers in Cambodia unless operations were confined to the sanctuaries (“fighting the Vietnam war in Cambodia”) and we discovered also that the Thai intended to cover a broad area of Cambodia with these forces, an alternative was considered of supporting Thai forces (two regiments) from Thailand moving into Western Cambodia.

—We then (about the end of May) spoke of upgrading the two regular Thailand regiments but retaining them in Thailand as “fire brigades” pending deployment of the Thai/Khmer regiments.

—At this point we also began to engage in discussions with the Thai—from the Thai standpoint the word “haggle” might be a better term—on how U.S. support for these activities might be provided. We offered various combinations such as prior-year Thai MASF, trade-offs from economic assistance, and increased PL 480. It may have appeared to the Thai from this that we were fiddling while Rome was burning.

—As the June 30 date for the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia neared and no definitive arrangement for support of Thai forces in Cambodia was arrived at, the Thai began to consider the withdrawal of all Black Panther units from Vietnam to cope with dangers closer to Thailand, possibly by committing them to Cambodia.

—However, the Thai themselves began to have some second thoughts about too obvious a Thai military presence in Cambodia. Thai public opinion did not appear enthusiastic about involvement. Foreign Minister Thanat apparently exercised some influence on planning to assure that Thai contributions to Cambodia would be kept clandestine. In addition, a “high level political decision” was allegedly required before Thai troops would be committed. The Thai were also concerned that their moving into a military role in Cambodia would vitiate their influence as one of the three Djakarta Conference convener governments.

—Once again, misgivings about the level of U.S. support may have played a role in the Thai reservations. They have consistently found it very difficult to understand why the U.S. has not moved more vigorously to support them in coping with what they regard as clear and present threat to Thailand, and have apparently not comprehended the legal, financial, and Congressional complexities with which we must deal.

—The Thai concept which finally began to emerge from the withdrawal of the Black Panthers (which has still not been formally announced) was not to use them as a fire brigade but as the trained nucleus of expanded Thai forces—apparently not for immediate use in Cambodia.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Secret; Nodis; Khmer. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned.

[2] The 5-page chronology references the regular and backchannel messages that correspond to each Thai/U.S. move; attached but not printed.

86. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Chronology of Moves in Connection with Provision of Regular Thai Forces for Service in Cambodia

You are aware that there have been numerous problems in putting into effect your strategy for Cambodia of mobilizing maximum U.S. and third country efforts to prevent the collapse of the Cambodian Government. As an illustration of these problems, the chronology at Tab A[2] summarizes the sequence of events surrounding a plan for deploying two regular Thai regiments in Cambodia, which has now been dropped by the Thai.

When the Thai first proposed this on May 22 they emphasized the need for [1 line of source text not declassified], and (b) the need for U.S. support essentially as provided for their forces in Laos and South Vietnam. These two regiments were to be in addition to the Thai Khmer regiments which we were already committed to support. At that time the Thai had agreed to pay the salaries and expenses of the Thai Khmer regiments after they were deployed in Cambodia. Our initial reaction was to go slow on the regular Thai regiments, getting them ready (contributing equipment and training support) but keeping them in reserve.

When the Thai persisted, we discussed with them the possibility of overcoming the complex problems of support for these units in Cambodia by employing them as an augmentation of the Thai Black Panther unit in Vietnam. Some of the Black Panthers would then have moved into the sanctuary areas.

Meanwhile, plans for the Djakarta Conference were advancing and a great deal of emphasis was being placed on “neutrality” and “nonalignment” in the Asian capitals. Our Embassies with State's backing were taking every opportunity to remind governmental leaders of the need to protect their “neutral” credentials to (a) get the conference off the ground, and (b) assure a reasonable prospect for its success. This probably contributed to the Thai Cabinet's decision to defer sending the Thai “volunteers” to Cambodia—the Djakarta Conference called for removal of all foreign troops from Cambodia.

Thai desire for moving at least a regiment of the Black Panthers waxed again in mid-June, but despite our offers of indirect help to make this possible, they began to temporize. (The military situation in Cambodia, which had seemed critical in early and mid-June had improved somewhat which may have relieved some of the pressures on the Thai to move.) The way in which our offers were couched may have contributed at this point to a general uneasiness on the part of the Thai. State continued to paint a picture of the legal complexities which we had to overcome in giving any support. The effect probably was to suggest to the Thai that we really did not favor their movement. At the same time we were pursuing in all capitals the need for a vigorous follow-up to the Djakarta conference—the inferences were “remember your neutral status” and remember the Djakarta declaration that all foreign troops should withdraw.

The net effect of all this seems to have been that the Thai doubted either our willingness or at least our ability to come through with the kind of financial support they wanted. Behind their desire for financial support was also a clear hope for a U.S. commitment on behalf of their military actions in Cambodia. On this aspect, too, there must have been growing doubts. Despite occasional suggestions that they might be willing to go ahead without substantial help from us, the weight of the evidence is on the side that they wanted support of a kind they already were receiving for their forces in Northern Laos and in Vietnam. Our “explanations” of the difficulties of providing such support in Cambodia probably led them to conclude that we would only reluctantly acquiesce in such support and might not continue it for long. There would be no commitment.

Thus our position probably may have been interpreted as comparatively negative. This led the Thai in turn to reach a “political” decision not to go ahead. It also reinforced their concern as to our future intentions in the region—our Vietnam withdrawals, our ground force withdrawal from Cambodia and our planned reductions in Thailand all added up to produce a growing sense of uneasiness in Bangkok. When we discouraged (with General Abrams' concurrence) the use of the Panthers in Cambodia and didn't come forward with a positive and simple solution to the support problems for the Thai regiments in western Cambodia, the Thai probably concluded that the better part of valor was to tighten their belts and bring the Panthers home to protect Thailand itself before we withdrew the support we were then providing.

Ambassador Unger continued to suggest to Washington his enthusiasm for the project. State's instructions, however, tended to imply some reticence to move ahead and left Unger to carry the ball without positive evidence of full support from the Department for the project.

As evidenced at the WSAG meetings neither Ambassador Johnson nor Ambassador Green were enthusiastic at the prospect of regular Thai forces in Cambodia. This accounts for the fact that most cables originally were drafted in negative tone.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 562, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Apparently drafted by Holdridge and Kennedy, as evidenced by their attached August 26 memorandum to Kissinger. There is no indication that the President saw this memorandum, and a notation in the margin of the Holdridge/Kennedy memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads “Al—I think this is probably OBE. What do you think? At any rate please put in the files (as well as my personal files).” A notation next to it in Haig's handwriting reads: “Agree.”

[2] At Tab A, attached but not printed, is the same chronology as that mentioned in footnote 2, Document 85.

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Washington, September 5, 1970, 1824Z.

146291. CINCPAC For POLAD.

1. Following is approved memorandum of conversation between Vice President Agnew and Prime Minister Thanom in Bangkok from 10:00 a.m. to 12 noon on August 29, 1970.

2. Summary: Vice President had wide-ranging conversations with PM and other Thai leaders on situation in Thailand and neighboring areas and on political background of United States policies. Some specific problems related to US support of Thai efforts in Laos and Cambodia also discussed.

3. Meeting opened with briefing by Dawee on insurgency in Thailand and situation in Cambodia and Laos. PM raised Souvanna Phouma's request for three Thai battalions in Laos and need for US support of these. Vice President discussed this in relation to domestic US political situation and danger of exacerbating opposition's obstructive actions by attempting to provide direct support to this type of operation. He emphasized need to find indirect means of compensating Thai for cost of such operations. Vice President went on to discuss background of political situation in United States, political pressures of forthcoming election and Senate attitudes. He stressed need to keep Thai-US disagreements “in the family” to avoid giving advocates of isolationist policy ammunition for use against administration.

4. Vice President spoke briefly on visit to Viet-Nam and Cambodia, stressing impressive performance of Lon Nol.

5. Vice President informed Thais that FANK trained in Thailand could be equipped out of Cambodian MAP, assuming this met with GOC approval. When Thais urged that US make decision to divert funds for this purpose, VP cautioned against expecting United States to act without consulting Cambodians or to put pressure on Cambodians on this kind of issue.

6. Thais referred to US press attacks on them, citing recent Newsweek article by Maynard Parker. Vice President urged them not to be too sensitive and not to mistake this type of criticism for voice of the US people. Thais complained of being described as “bending with the wind” when in fact they had taken strong position against Communism.

7. Thais expressed appreciation for US aid, including PL–480 offer. Thais made strong appeal to Vice President not to reduce aid in face of increased threat. Vice President pledged to so recommend. Vice President expressed gratitude for Thai commitment and assistance in many parts [garble].

8. Meeting ended with brief discussion of situation in Burma. End summary.

9. Participants on Thai side were Prime Minister Thanom, Deputy Prime Ministers Praphat and Pote, Air Chief Marshal Dawee, General Sawaeng (chief of PriMin's office), Dr. Renoo (Secretary General NEDS) and Service Chiefs of Staff Bunchoo (Air), Charoon (Navy) and Surakit (Army). On American side were Vice President, Mr. Sohmer, Brig. Gen. Dunn, Mr. Duemling, Mr. Houdek, Ambassador Unger, DCM Newman, COMUSMACTHAI Major General Seith and Political Counselor Pickering.

10. PriMin Thanom led off, saying Thai had no formal agenda but would simply try to provide VP with picture of latest developments in Thailand as basis for his report to the President. He said Thais would appreciate getting from VP report of US policy, VP said this was completely agreeable, that he wanted briefing on the situation in Thailand and on this part of the world. For his part, he would try to help them understand certain aspects of the complex political situation in the United States which he knew were difficult to comprehend. He said he hoped they would not be inhibited by the well known and much appreciated Thai courtesy, but would go to the heart of all matters. He said we are engaged together in a difficult war with a determined enemy and must be completely frank with one another about problems.

11. Situation in Thailand and Neighboring Areas: Dawee presented this briefing. With respect to North Thailand, he said Communists had limited capability because they were mostly hill tribes and received no support from lowland Thai. Only danger was that of linkup with Pathet Lao in Sayabouri. Chinese Communist road leading to Sayabouri indicates ChiCom intention to support insurgency in Thailand. Northeast now “under control” thanks to combined civilian police and military effort. Situation a “little bad” in mid-South, but only real danger is possible linkup between CTS in mid-South and those on Malaysian border who are residuals from Malaysian emergency. Latter now recruiting and training Thai and some Malaysians.

12. In Laos, Dawee identified principal threat to Thailand as coming from Sayabouri and Champasak. Noted Thai assistance to RLG citing forces assisting Vang Pao and harrassment and interdiction teams. Said Thai wish to help further but require support from US.

13. On Cambodia, Dawee praised US operation in sanctuaries, but said Communists now establishing new sanctuaries in area in Northwest Cambodia. He estimated that no more than 20 percent of people (including those in Communist-occupied areas) support Sihanouk or Communists. Rest loyal to Lon Nol.

14. Additional Thai Forces for Laos: PriMin Souvanna Phouma had asked for three Thai battalions, one to serve in Sayabouri and two in Campassak and Sithadone. They were to relieve Lao forces to move into other, more critical areas. PM said he understood Washington approved establishing six Thai SGU battalions, but noted they had a four-month training cycle and could probably not be deployed before January 1, 1971. He said Souvanna Phouma wants help immediately and therefore the three battalions should move in in the meantime. He asked US support.

15. VP said this is difficult because of the political problems in the US. We are working on means to provide assistance, but it may not take the traditional form.

16. The Ambassador referred to discussions held with the PM and others the previous day concerning this problem. He said we can help with SGUs for use in trail interdiction, but he expressed doubt as to how much we can do in connection with a requirement for regular battalions in Sayabouri, Champassak, and Sithandone. However, we were seeking a complete answer on this from Washington.

16. The VP said the situation in Southeast Asia is so distorted in the press coverage that people do not get a clear picture of the nature of actions such as the assistance Souvanna is seeking. The Senate is focusing intensely on this type of action in a very hostile way. While we know it is needed and worthy of our support, that support cannot be provided in the usual way at this time. (At this point, FonMin Thanat (who has kept himself very closely informed on the various amendments which the Senate is considering) spoke to the PriMin in Thai for some time explaining some implications of the Cooper–Church, Fulbright, and other proposed amendments.)

17. The VP said that press is generally aware that there were some Thai forces in Laos, although we had not confirmed their presence. He said US support of additional Thai forces for Laos could cause a real explosion in US public opinion. Thus it was necessary to look for other kinds of assistance which would permit the Thais to transfer funds now allocated to other purposes to support such measures as Thai battalions for Laos.

18. Impact of Political Situation in the US on Southeast Asian Policy: Against this background the VP discussed further the pressures from the forthcoming elections and current attitudes in the Senate. He noted that Humphrey had recently come out in support of the McGovern–Hatfield Amendment. Many voices are now calling upon us to leave Asia now regardless of the consequences. The VP described the severe inflationary situation the President had inherited from the previous administration. Thus he had been forced to trim spending in an effort to reestablish a sane fiscal policy. Congress, however, had insisted on large education and housing appropriations, even overriding the President's veto, forcing the administration to trim the defense establishment by $10 billion. This meant applying the knife heavily all over the world, and facing considerable resultant unemployment in the US. He said the present was as tough a period of national adjustment as we had ever had to cope with.

19. The VP said President Nixon understands that we should fulfill our role as a Pacific power and was determined that we would keep our treaty obligations. He said the President would not have sent him back after only seven months if he didn't think this part of the world was important.

20. The VP expressed the belief that if the administration gets through the off-year election without erosion of its position on the Hill, the situation would right itself. He said that in many key races the issue was not partisan politics but was drawn between isolationism and continuation of the administration's foreign policy. He noted the domestic political importance of his ability to go back and report firsthand on the situation in Southeast Asia.

21. He said the mood of isolationism in certain parts of American society is directed strongly at Southeast Asia. He noted the contrast between Fulbright's position on the Middle East and that on Southeast Asia. It is politically tempting to appeal to people who are tired of the war, to students and to the media who want immediate withdrawal from Asia.

22. He appealed to the Thai leaders not to construe our actions as lessening support for them or weakening of our resolve. That would cause the administration further difficulty in the US.

23. He said if our allies seem to be complaining and criticizing all the time, people may get sick of it and go along with those who demand that we get out. This would make it impossible for the President, the real advocate of helping our friends. We must face the fact, he continued, that we cannot say things in the same way or operate in the same way as before. Even the limited statements he had made in relation to Cambodia, for example, had attracted criticism. He said the US faces an absolute crisis in government, and that the administration cannot operate without Congressional support. He concluded these remarks by noting that Ambassador Unger would help find less direct ways to meet the needs of the situation.

24. Impact on Vietnamization of Situation in Neighboring Countries: The PriMin said that he agrees with the program on Vietnamization and the need to strengthen the Vietnamese ability to stand on their own feet. However, he emphasized that if we do not assist victims of Communist aggression such as Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, and if they are weakened and lack support, it will be difficult for Vietnam itself to stand on its own feet.

25. The Vice President agreed, recalling his observations to newsmen concerning the effect on our withdrawals from Vietnam should Cambodia fall to the Communists. Administration policy is to do exactly what the PriMin suggests but unfortunately that is not the policy favored by some in the legislative branch who believe that countries of Southeast Asia can be allowed to go Communist without any serious repercussions.

26. The Vice President said he would like to see assistance accelerated, especially in light of the troop withdrawals we are making, but we must have appropriations to do this and these are under pressure in every respect. He noted that the DoD appropriation today is the lowest in terms of percentage of GNP since 1950. Even so, there are members of the House and Senate who would cut it further. They seem to want complete abandonment of our foreign obligations and total focus on our domestic problems. They apparently assume that Communists have suddenly become benign.

27. In sum, while the administration wants to assist countries of this area, it must play a cautious game so long as public opinion remains in its present state.

28. The PriMin commented that if dove views prevail there will be great danger in due course not only to this part of the world but to other parts as well. The Vice President agreed.

29. Thailand and the Future of the Nixon Doctrine: The PriMin said Thailand agrees with the Nixon Doctrine and is trying to implement it as it had been described to them by the President. They do not require manpower, but must have material assistance or the doctrine could not be implemented. He suggested that Congress may destroy or negate the Doctrine.

30. The Vice President said a fight is going on for the confidence of the American public. At stake is the course we will take in foreign policy. He said he thinks the administration will win this fight. He asked them not to attach too much importance to the gloomy picture he had painted because he regularly looks at the darker side so as to be prepared for the worst. He believes that when the full importance of our material and economic assistance is better understood, and as we reduce our armed forces in the area to acceptable levels, public opinion can be turned around. He believes people will ultimately understand that the cost of preventing the war from spreading is vastly less than that of fighting it after it expands.

31. The Vice President said he recognized the necessity of finding the means of turning the tide politically so that we can carry out our policy for this area directly and proudly as it should be carried out. He said many people had been sold a bill of goods to the effect that people of this area want communism.

32. He again appealed to the Thais to recognize the difficulties the President faced and not let disappointments go beyond the family to the point where they were exploitable by isolationist politicians and others who would say our allies want only our money and endlessly criticize us.

33. Press Attacks on Thailand: The FonMin said that Thailand was attacked less by the Communist side than by the “Eastern Seaboard Establishment” and “The Washington–New York Axis.” He then read from the recent Newsweek article on Thailand. He said millions of people would read this and be influenced by it.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 449, President's Trip Files, Vice President's SEA Trip, Aug 1970. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Taipei, Rangoon, CINCPAC, and the White House.

88. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, September 10, 1970, 4:05–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cambodia

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

JCS

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Mr. Marshall Green

Lt. Gen. John Vogt

Mr. Thomas Pickering

Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais

Mr. James Wilson

NSC Staff

Defense

Mr. John Holdridge

Mr. David Packard

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Dennis Doolin

Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

CIA

Mr. Richard Helms

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. William Wells

[Omitted here is the Summary of Conclusions.]

Thai-Khmer Units

Mr. Johnson: The Cambodians have now decided they don't want the Thai Khmer units, and the Thais are in the process of disbanding them.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they already disbanding them?

Mr. Johnson: They will start very shortly. There would be an advantage in converting the Thai Khmers into SGUs, which could be used in Laos, where they are needed. We prepared a draft message—which is now being circulated—suggesting to Ambassador Unger that he discuss this possibility with the Thai. In the meantime, Unger has come in with a similar proposal. I would like to move that we dispatch our cable.

Mr. Packard: What does the cable say?

Mr. Johnson: It tells Unger to talk to the Thais about turning the Thai-Khmer units into SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: If these troops are partially Khmer, will they be enthusiastic about fighting in Laos?

Mr. Johnson: We have raised this question in our draft cable. It can be pointed out to the Thai Khmers that they would be helping in the defense of Cambodia. The pay will also be an inducement. Of course, some of them may nevertheless drop out. We also ought to take into account that we already have the money available for the SGU program.

Mr. Packard: I think these operations in Southern Laos are useful.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be true; but before the year is out, we may be hard pressed in Cambodia and may be wishing we had two regiments to put in. I am reluctant to see our assets disappear. We should also keep in mind the President's view that he does not want Cambodia to go down the drain without some effort on our part.

Mr. Packard: In Southern Laos the units will be doing just as much good for Cambodia.

Mr. Johnson: Possibly they will be more helpful if used there.

Dr. Kissinger: If that is the case, why didn't we think of putting them there in the beginning?

Mr. Packard: Our concern then was about the immediate problem of bolstering the capabilities of the FANK. Since that time, they have given evidence of having some staying power.

Mr. Green: Also, the Cambodians won't integrate the Thai Khmer units into the FANK sufficiently to make it possible for us to employ Cambodian MAP funds in the program.

Mr. Johnson: The SGU operation is undoubtedly more pertinent to the present situation.

Mr. Green: If the Thai Khmer units are needed later in Cambodia, they can be relocated.

Lt. Gen. Vogt: The Thai Khmers can be used right now. They have equipment and ammunition. They will be a wasted asset unless we make some use of them now. Placed astride the enemy supply lines in southern Laos, they can make a real contribution to the defense of Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: We were going to establish the SGUs anyway. Using the Thai Khmers won't add anything to our total assets.

Mr. Johnson: It will mean that those assets will be more immediately available.

Mr. Karamessines: Actually, the Thai Khmers will add to the total of SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: Then the Thai Khmers would be in addition to the SGUs earlier planned for Southern Laos?

Mr. Karamessines: Yes. There would eventually be a total of eight Thai SGUs. In addition, we have been having difficulty finding personnel for the proposed Lao SGUs. Using the Thai Khmers will permit us to move ahead immediately.

Mr. Green: Then we will end up with eight Thai and four Cambodian SGUs.

Mr. Karamessines: That's right.

Mr. Wells: One of the Cambodian SGUs is at Pakse now. The second is in training, and the third and fourth will be coming in at the end of the month.

Adm. Moorer: (to Kissinger) I feel the same frustration you do with the Thais. On the other hand, Lon Nol has had more success than we anticipated.

Dr. Kissinger: And possibly more than he can sustain.

Mr. Karamessines: We will be significantly assisting Cambodia if we choke the enemy supply lines.

Dr. Kissinger: If Lon Nol knew that the present Cambodian MAP might be supplemented, do you suppose he would continue to refuse the Thai Khmers?

Mr. Helms: Basically, he doesn't like having Thai troops in his country.

Mr. Karamessines: The Cambodians have had a lot of trouble with the South Vietnamese troops. They would rather do without foreign troops now that their needs are less pressing.

Mr. Johnson: I think there is no doubt that using the Thai Khmers in southern Laos is the best way to help Lon Nol.

Lt. Gen. Vogt: CINCPAC thinks so too.

Mr. Helms: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: We will probably never see any Thai troops anyway.

Mr. Wells: We still have one problem. General Praphat is concerned about pay scales. This has been holding up the SGUs for four weeks. Praphat says that it isn't possible to have Thai units in Laos on two different pay scales.

Mr. Johnson: How much is the difference?

Mr. Wells: It is significant. The SGUs are much cheaper. An SGU costs us $1,250,000 a year. The three artillery batteries and three battalions in Long Tieng cost about $25 million.

Mr. Johnson: Couldn't we take the position in dealing with the Thais that we can't have SGUs being paid at varying rates?

Mr. Wells: We already have pay differentials among SGUs.

Mr. Green: It would be much better to allow a dual pay scale continue for a short period.

Mr. Karamessines: Praphat's proposal is eventually to have all Thai units in Laos be SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger: Did he think that up himself?

Mr. Karamessines: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Why did he suddenly come up with the idea? Everyone has told me that having units in Long Tieng has been financially very advantageous to the Thais. Why should they give this up?

Mr. Wells: General Praphat is looking forward to the return of the dry season. He doesn't want to have regular Thai units exposed to a major North Vietnamese offensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Has there been a rainy season offensive by our side?

Adm. Moorer: There has been some action in connection with Operation Leapfrog.

Mr. Holdridge: There is another explanation for Praphat's proposal. It would mean putting a substantial portion—thirty-eight battalions— of the Thai Armed Forces on the US payroll.

Dr. Kissinger: Is everyone satisfied with this state of affairs? Let me take a look tonight at Alex's proposed telegram.[2] Are you sure that we won't just be creating a complete vacuum everywhere by replacing the Thai units at Long Tieng?[3]

[Omitted here is discussion of Operation Prairie Fire and AK–47 ammunition for Cambodia.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] See Part I for the record of the WSAG discussion in the Middle East which immediately preceded the discussion of Cambodia. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3]  Kissinger was evidently not satisfied with the idea of shifting the Thai Khmer regiments to SGUs in southern Laos. In a draft memorandum to the President, attached to a September 14 covering memorandum, Kissinger identified the following “serious risks: The Cambodians probably will need all the help they can get two or three months from now.” He also noted that the SGU battalions “would not be readily available—they would be dispersed and hard to redeploy.” Finally, he claimed that “there is no assurance that the personnel of the regiment (who volunteered for Cambodia) would be willing to accept the SGU role in Laos. We run the risk therefore that in pursuing this course we may in fact be acquiescing in the disbanding of the unit.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)

89. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

George Tanham's Priorities for Thailand

You are probably aware that a strongly held view in the State Department is that the U.S. should not urge the Thai to deploy ground forces outside Thailand, e.g., in Laos and Cambodia, except perhaps on short-term cross-border operations.

Those who favor this “Fortress Thailand” view do so for a variety of reasons, including a fear that Thai ground operations outside Thailand will provoke a retaliatory response from Hanoi or Peking. One of their strongest arguments is that the limited Thai military capabilities that are available should be deployed against the insurgent threat within Thailand.

Marshall Green has called your attention[2] to the views of George Tanham, one of the proponents of the view just described, and suggested you might want to talk with him. (The Green and Tanham memoranda are at Tab A.)[3]

Tanham, who until recently served as Ambassador Unger's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, argues as follows:[4]

—The RTG does not take the insurgent threat seriously enough and is not devoting adequate attention or resources to its insurgency problems. For example, RTG units deployed against the insurgents are poorly trained and undermanned.

—Efforts by the U.S. to involve the Thai outside Thailand indirectly divert Thai attention from their internal problems. Moreover, in responding to U.S. requests to deploy “forward,” the Thai may believe that such deployments increase the U.S.'s obligation to help Thailand meet its insurgent threat.

Tanham's reasoning drastically simplifies an exceedingly complex problem. Thai decisions on out-of-country deployments turn more on their view of their security interests than anything else, although financial inducements play an important role. Furthermore, the NSSM 51 study has found no one-to-one trade-off between RTG capability to meet the external versus the internal threat. It is more likely that the Thai will:

—meet neither threat if they do not reform their forces or receive appropriate U.S. assistance, or

—meet both threats if they do take the necessary reform actions and U.S. assistance is provided intelligently. NSSM 51 lays out several options designed to promote Thai force effectiveness against the internal and external threats and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of external deployments as a separate political and strategic military issue.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “They have proven their contention ad nauseum.”

[2] In a July 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Green recommended Tanham as “one of the foremost authorities on insurgency problems, particularly in Thailand.”

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] Although Smith summarized Tanham's two main points, the latter made numerous other observations in his June 1970 memorandum. Some of his points are specific, e.g. “too many young officers in Bangkok,” while others are more general. For example, in his speculation concerning the reason for Bangkok's “probably complacent” attitude towards the insurgency, Tanham theorizes that “their successful experience in maintaining their independence,” their “leaders' belief in the basic loyalty of the Thai people,” and “an inadequate understanding of the real threat of communist revolutionary warfare” all played a part.

90. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Bangkok, September 18, 1970.

RE

Bangkok 149, 18 September 1970

1. We received a cable this morning from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Bangkok discussing preliminary negotiations with the Thais on the conversion of the Thai Khmer regiment and the formation of SGU's. Ambassador Unger asked that this information be passed to Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Green, and Ambassador Swank. Following is the text of the cable:

“2. At ceremony on morning of 18 September, Ambassador Unger raised general subject of what to do now in Laos with Surakij and Praphat in which climate established for working level exploration to see what might be done. Ambassador emphasized that Washington has not agreed any specific plan.

“3. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] followed up in working skull session with Surakij on afternoon 18 September. Following are results of this meeting, all of which subject to specific agreement between Ambassador Unger and General Praphat that these arrangements are desirable after some more working level negotiation.

“4. General Surakij agreed our understanding of the principle of ‘one pay scale’ for Laos and said it could be at the SGU rate. He accepted the desirability of an eventual 13 Thai SGU's to include Long Tieng replacements. He had some reservations that Thais might not be able to recruit and train 13 in end of year timeframe, but he did not raise this as an objection. Finally, he agreed in principle that the 13 could be used ‘anywhere’ in Laos after consultation; and he endorsed the current [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] pattern of operation, agreeing that the arrangements for command and control of the Thai regulars currently at Long Tieng are not really satisfactory.

“5. Surakij's problems grew out of the conversion of the TKV regiment to three SGU's. First, he had in mind that agreement with the Cambodians that these troops would be held in some sort of ready reserve in case the call came from Phnom Penh. Second, he saw problems with morale inherent in the conversion which he would prefer to avoid.

“6. Surakij expressed desire to have first Thai SGU deployment put in Champassak, Sithandone, and Sayaboury. He went on, however, that the units would not be irrevocably tied to these locations. First, these areas would be considered rotational; and second, if no NVA/Pathet Lao presence established, units would be moved to areas where needed.

“7. Wish reiterate that all of above is exploratory with both sides carefully repeating that no decisions have been made and in particular Washington has not given approval for any specifics.” (End of Message)

“8. This information was passed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] at Phnom Penh for delivery to Ambassador Swank in the field.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages—1970, Southeast Asia. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. An attached September 21 memorandum to Kissinger requested that this and other messages to Johnson and Green also be forwarded to Kissinger.

91. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 7, 1970, 2:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

Henry A. Kissinger

John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT

Thailand Foreign Minister's Comments on Southeast Asian Developments

After expressing pleasure at seeing Dr. Kissinger again, Foreign Minister Thanat asked about the President's European trip and whether it had been regarded as useful. Dr. Kissinger replied that the trip had been very good, considering what had been attempted. Its purpose had been to demonstrate U.S. power in the Mediterranean, and as an old friend of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Kissinger could tell him that we had achieved what we had wanted. Even in a Communist country such as Yugoslavia, President Tito had found it more important to remain and talk to the President than to go to Cairo for Nasser's funeral. Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that he had been glad to watch the effective way that the trip had been conducted.

Dr. Kissinger said that the President had specifically asked him to convey his, the President's, personal respects to Foreign Minister Thanat and to inform him of the high regard in which he was held by the President. The Foreign Minister then declared that the people and the government of Thailand consider the President their friend. This also applied to the people of Asia as well. Some unfortunate developments may have occurred in the U.S.-Thai relationship, but on fundamental things the relationship between the two countries remained firm.

Dr. Kissinger asked for Foreign Minister Thanat's frank opinion with respect to one question. Last April and May, there had been talk of putting two regiments of regular Thai troops or two regiments of Thai Khmer volunteers into Cambodia. Since then endless discussions had ensued. Was it because the Thai had become distrustful of our bureaucracy that their interest in sending their forces into Cambodia had cooled? The Foreign Minister said that he would give a frank and straightforward reply. There were a number of reasons as to why the Thai had not sent in their forces. First, long debates had been held in Bangkok in which some people, particularly the military, had wanted to send Thai soldiers to Cambodia; others, however, had felt that this would not have been desirable because if the Thai had sent in two battalions or two regiments, the Communists might have sent in the same number or more.

Continuing, Foreign Minister Thanat said that in the second place, the mood in the U.S., as far as could be judged from the press and from Congressional comment, was very hostile toward Thailand and not appreciative of its role. Therefore, he had thought that nothing should be done to aggravate the situation and increase the President's political burden. Dr. Kissinger remarked that the trouble was some liberals here disliked the U.S. so much they felt that any country which appreciated the U.S. had to be punished. They talked about what Bangkok should and should not do, and not about Hanoi. Foreign Minister Thanat observed that despite all, “you're with us and we're with you.”

Foreign Minister Thanat mentioned as a third consideration in the Thai judgment on sending troops into Cambodia the fact that they had worked out an arrangement with Prime Minister Lon Nol during his visits to Bangkok whereby the Cambodians could ask for Thai troops if they were in great need of them. In such a case, Thai forces stationed along the Cambodian border would join with the Cambodians in task forces to “beat up the Communist side.” This arrangement was one of the reasons which had prompted the Thai to bring back some of their troops from Vietnam. These troops would be moved to the Thai-Cambodian frontier.

Dr. Kissinger declared that if the Thai received any advice from our people to the effect that the Thai should not be there on the frontier but rather in the Northeast, this would be a violation of the intentions of the President and the Foreign Minister should get in touch with Dr. Kissinger about it. We wanted Thai forces to be stationed near the Cambodian frontier. The Foreign Minister remarked that he was not aware of anyone on the U.S. side who wanted Thai troops in the Northeast. Dr. Kissinger went on to say, however, that if any such advice was actually given to them they could tell the advisers what the President's intentions were. He could assure the Foreign Minister that he spoke for the President. The stationing of Thai troops on the Cambodian frontier was exactly what we were looking for. Commenting further on the plan to bring Thai troops back from Vietnam, Foreign Minister Thanat said that this move would cost less than raising new units. New units might cost millions of baht, require an increase in taxes, and create a political tempest. The Vietnam situation did not appear so urgent now as to require the whole Thai complement, and it was felt that “some” of the Thai troops could be brought back.

Dr. Kissinger said that we welcomed this Thai move. We thought that the situation in Cambodia could deteriorate, and it was comforting to know that there were forces available which might be able to do something. Foreign Minister Thanat confirmed that the Thai were prepared to act in Cambodia, but not on a permanent basis. Dr. Kissinger mentioned in passing that the Thai troops in Long Tieng had made a big difference. Referring again to the Thai rationale on troops in Cambodia, Foreign Minister Thanat recalled at the Djakarta Conference Thailand had pledged in the joint communiqué along with the other participants to support a call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Cambodia. Accordingly, if Thai troops had been sent in, the spirit of the joint communiqué would have been violated. Thailand felt that it had assumed a moral obligation under this communiqué. In the light of all these circumstances, the Thai believed that they would gain advantages on all sides by bringing some troops from Vietnam, and stationing them on the border in agreement with the Cambodians. Dr. Kissinger endorsed this as a good solution.

Foreign Minister Thanat then asked if the U.S. could support Thailand logistically if Thai troops went into Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger replied affirmatively. We had tremendous legal problems because of Congressional actions, but believed it would be possible for us to replace in Thailand those stocks of military equipment which the Thai used in Cambodia. The Thai could employ the stocks which they had on hand at present. In response to a question from Foreign Minister Thanat as to whether it would be possible for the U.S. military representatives in Thailand to tell the Thai this, Dr. Kissinger said that if the Thai talked to our Ambassador, he would give five million reasons as to why there was a problem. However, he could assure the Foreign Minister that if Thailand had to go in, we would find a way to give support. It was hard to say now just how this would be done. It would be best to use the stocks Thailand presently had on hand and we would replace them. We would need to figure out just how this would be done.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked in what way this matter could be undertaken—supposing that Thailand was seized with a request from Cambodia, could he get in touch with Dr. Kissinger personally? If and when the needs arose, could he let Dr. Kissinger know? Dr. Kissinger referred to the private channel which existed between the Foreign Minister and himself, and said that if it turns out we couldn't help he would tell the Foreign Minister. He reminded him, though, that we had kept our promises to the government in Bangkok, and had not given up any territory to the Communists. We did not want Cambodia to go under. The President was not like Senator McCarthy, who had wanted to abandon South Vietnam. We had a massive internal problem, but if we were lucky, we would have an easier time after the November elections.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked if the election prospects were good, to which Dr. Kissinger replied that he was not a domestic expert and couldn't say too much. While this was an off-year election in which everyone in the House had to run for reelection and in which the Administration party usually lost seats, there would be no problem here and we expected some losses. In the Senate, it was possible that the Administration might gain two or three seats. It might not seem like this would make much difference, but many votes had been running close to 50/50, and three seats more would make a significant difference. If the Administration gained seven seats, it could organize the Senate and get rid of Senator Fulbright. In this case it would be in great shape and could do a lot of things for Thailand which were not now possible. Arithmetically, the prospects were in our favor. Lots of Republicans had lost in 1964 because Goldwater had been running for President and had taken them down with him; hence there were more Democrats in the Senate now than would normally have been the case. Unfortunately, to speak frankly, in two big states we had poor candidates. In California, Senator Murphy had cancer but was resisting all efforts to induce him not to run, while in New York, Senator Goodell had decided to run to the left of Fulbright. We were not supporting him. Nevertheless, even though our gains were limited to only three seats, this would make a lot of difference. 51 to 49 votes against the Administration would be reversed.

Foreign Minister Thanat expressed the hope that Dr. Kissinger's prediction would come through. Dr. Kissinger said he felt that we had the Democrats on the defensive over a lot of issues. For example, in May they thought they could defeat the Administration on Southeast Asia, but today we had the public on our side. The Foreign Minister thought that the President had indeed handled the Vietnam question very well, and was interested in knowing anything Dr. Kissinger could tell him about what the President would say that evening. Dr. Kissinger was surprised that the Foreign Minister had not yet been informed as to what the President would say, and gave a quick run-down on the President's five points.[2]

In connection with U.S. troop withdrawals, Foreign Minister Thanat asked if we were going to set a withdrawal deadline. Dr. Kissinger's reply was “absolutely not.” In principle we were willing to withdraw completely and give a fixed deadline, but not before all other issues were settled. This would be conditional on everything else, including a North Vietnamese withdrawal. When questioned by the Foreign Minister about elections, Dr. Kissinger declared that we were willing to have the North Vietnamese participate in the electoral process and gain their support in elections to which they were entitled, but would not accept their demands for a coalition government.

Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that he had made a suggestion in his UN General Assembly speech that if the four great powers could join together for a Middle East settlement, they might also work with the Asian countries toward a settlement in Asia. Dr. Kissinger noted that the exception would be the French, who were not steady. The Foreign Minister said on this point that it would be necessary to work for their support, since they claimed to play a role. He had felt that the French were not entirely negative, and cited a speech by Schuman as containing some positive elements. In any event, the difference between the Middle East and Southeast Asia was that the four powers were working alone in the Middle East, while he did not want this to apply to Southeast Asia but preferred that they worked together with the local people. Dr. Kissinger declared that this was the reason why we wanted a larger conference on Indo-China. The U.S. had done well to get a cease-fire in the Middle East, and a similar situation might be attained in the Far East working in concert with the nations of the area. The Foreign Minister stressed that he wanted these nations to play a more effective role. He also was wondering about the possibility of reaching an agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—if the Soviets stopped supplying Hanoi with the sinews of war the fighting would end.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign Minister for his views on the situation in Vietnam. The Foreign Minister stated that he had last been in Vietnam for the July TCC meeting and had been impressed with the improvement in the situation and in the general appearance of the country which had occurred since his previous visit. It was his belief that the enormous amount of U.S. war matériel available should enable the South Vietnamese to take over a good part of the defense of the country once they were trained to handle this matériel. Dr. Kissinger observed that we thought the same thing. The Foreign Minister then cited his Prime Minister as believing that Vietnamization alone would not have a lasting effect if the Communists could use Laos and Cambodia— if these countries were available to them, they could launch new attacks on South Vietnam and offset the improvements which had taken place there. The present situation in Vietnam would be only temporary if the military balance in Laos and Cambodia could not be improved.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the Foreign Minister thought we were being as active as we could be in operating against the Ho Chi Minh trail. The Foreign Minister referred to the problem of supply, noting that the U.S. seemed to be finding it increasingly difficult to assist local forces in terms of economic and logistical support. He went on to refer to a lack of agreement on the use of local forces in Laos. The Thai would prefer to have forces of countries closest to the scene conduct the operations. Dr. Kissinger agreed with this, and pointed out that we had already undertaken to train 2,000 Cambodians for operations in Laos. Foreign Minister Thanat indicated that he knew of this, and noted also that at the time of his departure there had been discussions about sending Thai forces “far into Laos” to fill up the vacuum while the Cambodian troops were being trained. Dr. Kissinger expressed some surprise, and wondered when the Foreign Minister had left Bangkok. Foreign Minister Thanat said his departure had been three weeks earlier, at which time the U.S. had wanted to send Thai forces to the extreme southeast region of Laos beyond the Bolovens Plateau to a point close to the Cambodian frontier. The Thai had disagreed. They were in agreement on stationing Thai SGUs in Sithandone and Champassak, but the other area was too far east. Dr. Kissinger referred to the difficulties which the bureaucracy had created over the Thai troops, and said that this issue of the Thai SGUs would be put on the agenda for the next WSAG meeting. In the ensuing discussion, the Foreign Minister made it clear that he was not opposed to the recruiting of six Thai SGUs for use in operations against the North Vietnamese LOCs along the Se Kong River and in the Bolovens area of South Laos, but would object to any plans which would call for deployment further east. It was pointed out to him that we were in general agreement on this concept as well as with the Thai concept of stationing some of their SGUs in Sayaboury, Sithandone, and Champassak.

Dr. Kissinger inquired about the use of the Thai Khmer volunteers for service as SGUs in South Laos. Foreign Minister Thanat said that there would be no major difficulty regarding this concept.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked if Dr. Kissinger had any plans to come to the Foreign Minister's part of the world, or if the President had any further travel plans. Dr. Kissinger replied that he personally would be delighted to go back, but did not know when he could get away. The President would not be making any more trips until next year. The main thing he wanted the Foreign Minister to know was that everything the President had ever said concerning Thailand could be believed. The President had a great admiration for the Foreign Minister, and for selfish reasons was very glad that he had been elected to the Thai Parliament last year. Foreign Minister Thanat assured Dr. Kissinger that the Thai for their part hadn't changed. What he personally had said with respect to some critics of Thailand did not affect Thai-U.S. friendship.

He had felt it necessary to defend the honor of his country, and hoped that the President would understand. The Thai government had no problems with the President or with the Administration. With the U.S. press, though, there were indeed some problems.

Dr. Kissinger concluded by urging the Foreign Minister to keep in close contact with him through the special channel. If the Thai decided the time had come to move into Cambodia, he should get in touch and we would work out the modalities.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 102, Country Files—Far East, Thanat, (Foreign Minister), [2 of 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, October 9, this memorandum of conversation was drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

[2] For President Nixon's Southeast Asia peace proposals put forward in his television speech on the evening of October 7, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 825–828.

92. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 7, 1970, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Southeast Asia and Peace Prospects

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Thai Ambassador to U.S. Sunthorn

Thai Ambassador to U.N. Anand

Mr. Birabhongse, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister

William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

U. Alexis Johnson, J, Undersecretary of State

John B. Dexter, Country Director, EA/TB

The Secretary took advantage of a previously scheduled call by Foreign Minister Thanat to brief him on the Southeast Asia peace proposals that the President intended to put forward in a television speech that evening.[2] After he had heard the outline of the President's proposals, Thanat expressed the cautious judgment that it would be a useful initiative.

Thanat's first question concerned the concept of an enlarged conference that the Secretary had mentioned. He was relieved to know that we did not have a “Geneva-type” conference in mind. He then went on to comment that there were a number of Asian nations who would probably be willing to assist in cease-fire supervision measures. He mentioned Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Burma and Malaysia. He commented that the Japanese would want to participate only through civilians and that he supposed that, if the Pakistanis participated, the Indians would also wish to do so. Thanat then noted the importance of the Soviet role in any peace negotiations. He said that if the two super powers can agree, then peace can be obtained. He went on to say that in New York he had been talking with other Asian leaders such as Romulo and Malik about a plan to appeal to the big powers, especially the Soviets, to work for peace in Southeast Asia.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Thanat characterized relations with the GVN as quite good. He said in connection with the Thai forces in South Vietnam, the GVN wants the Thai to leave a token force there.

Further concerning Thai troops in Vietnam, he said the Thai want them back in Thailand as a back-up force along the Cambodia/Laos border. He said that they did not think it desirable now to send forces into Cambodia but that it was necessary to have troops ready nearby to take action in Cambodia if necessary. To send troops in now on a permanent basis would give rise to problems of financing,[3] friction with the Cambodians and charges that the Thai were “mercenaries”.

After a brief discussion of Thai domestic affairs (Thanat commented wryly on the Parliamentary Opposition's desire to “overthrow the Government”), Thanat inquired about conditions in the Middle East. The Secretary responded with comments indicating that he thought prospects for peace there were somewhat improved. Thanat observed that the most helpful sign was the apparent fact that the US and the Soviet Union were both willing to work for peace. This he saw as a lesson for Southeast Asia. He said that he was convinced that, if the Soviets would give the word, the North Vietnamese would accept peace.

Thanat then mentioned the Djakarta Conference and the follow-up actions of the Committee of Three. He said they had reached a dead-end and there was now need for a new initiative. He said, “We can't sit down and twiddle our thumbs.”

The Secretary suggested that the Djakarta Three could make use of the President's proposals and give their support to them. Thanat said that they would have to determine this after they had studied the speech. He said he would be seeing Malik and Romulo the next few days in New York and would discuss it with them. He added that he had asked Malik and some of the other Asian leaders to work on the Russians. Malik had agreed to talk with Gromyko during the UNGA session.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Dexter and approved in S on October 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 91.

[3] In a memorandum to Rogers, October 5, Green noted that the Fulbright amendments to the 1971 Military Procurement Appropriations Act excluded “the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Governments of Cambodia or Laos.” This amendment was approved by the Senate-House conference committee and was awaiting the President's signature to become law. Green added that although the legal advisers were “reviewing the language,” “it appears that it will preclude U.S. support from the DOD budget of Thai forces in Cambodia or Laos except for operations which persuasively could be said to be for the defense of Vietnam.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 THAI)

93. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, October 9, 1970.

SUBJECT

Proposed WSAG Consideration of Thai SGU in Laos

We have, as you know, authorized Ambassador Unger to commence discussions with the Thai on the proposals for supporting up to 13 Thai SGU's in Laos, of which eight would be for the South (two for Champassak/Sithadone) and four for North Laos to replace the present Thai RCT and SR–IX. A fifth is under consideration for North Laos for Sayaboury but this has not yet been agreed upon by all parties. We have wanted to consider this overall question as two separate projects, i.e. as a “Thai-in-South Laos proposal” and a “Thai-in-North Laos proposal”. Unger's discussions with the Thai on the Thai-in-North Laos proposal was conditioned only upon a budget review to assure that presently available funds would be adequate.

Messages were sent to Ambassador Unger on September 23 telling him we wanted to go ahead with these two proposals (see State 156373 and State 156387)[2] but subsequently the Fulbright Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act has given rise to a new problem with regard to the Thai-in-North Laos proposal. The Fulbright Amendment would in effect prohibit use of DOD funds for Thai troops in Laos except for those associated with interdiction of NVN infiltration to South Vietnam. Senator Stennis has advised Director Helms and Deputy Secretary Packard that this would permit DOD funding of Thai troops in South Laos but would not cover those in the North. CIA believes there is an outside chance that it would be acceptable legally for CIA funds to continue to be used for this purpose in North Laos and, if so, the two projects could both go forward. All that would be required is a shifting of funds to put the Thai SGU's in the South under DOD funding and those in the North under CIA, for which Bill Wells assures us their funds would be adequate. However, the legal authority for this is extremely shaky and I believe it would be hazardous to proceed without a green light from the Hill.

In the meanwhile, it does not seem advisable to commence talks with the Thai on the South Laos project independently. To do so would inevitably open the question as to our intentions with respect to North Laos, where we and the Thai will soon have to make important decisions about the future of RCT and SR–IX. As you recall, one reason for shifting to SGU's in North Laos was to put all Thai forces in that country on the same footing with regard to command and control and pay and allowances. While we would like to keep the two projects separate for planning purposes here, we agree with Ambassador Unger that it would be unwise to start talking with the Thai about the South before we are prepared to talk about the North as well.

I therefore recommend that this problem be brought up at the WSAG meeting scheduled for next Tuesday and that WSAG consider how to resolve the legal uncertainty regarding support for the Thai in North Laos.[3] This is an urgent matter because the proposed changeover in Thai units will have to take place in January and we will need all the time we can get in the meanwhile for recruiting and training of the new SGU's.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter, cleared by Wilson and Corcoran (EA), and approved by Green.

[2] Both dated September 23. (Ibid.)

[3] In a meeting on October 16, the WSAG reviewed [text not declassified] plans for the use of Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU) in northern and southern Laos. The consensus was that these activities should continue to be justified to Congress on the basis that they constituted a continuation of programs already under way and that they served to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam by attacking enemy supply lines and sanctuaries. The WSAG also agreed in principle to the proposal to replace Thai regular units in Long Tieng with SGUs. However, the Departments of State and Defense were tasked with studying whether this would degrade “friendly military capabilities in Northern Laos.” Finally, the WSAG was reminded by Kissinger “that in considering the question of Thai military involvement in Cambodia, the President's deep interest in insuring that all feasible measures must be taken into account.” The October 16 meeting summary of conclusions states: “In this connection, it is essential to obtain as soon as possible Thai agreement to contingency plans for employment of Thai ground and air forces in Cambodia as required.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

94. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon [1]

Washington, October 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Report on Southeast Asia Survey Trip: 7–22 October 1970

I. Purposes of the Trip.

1. This memorandum constitutes my report to you on my 7–22 October 1970 trip to Southeast Asia. On this trip, I had three major objectives.

a. To survey the situation in Indochina and Thailand at first hand and to form my own estimate of the probable course of events in that area through personal observation augmented by direct conversations with people themselves directly involved on the ground. This latter group, as outlined in the Annex,[2] included [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] State Department officials, senior U.S. military officers and local political and military leaders in the Indochina area.

b. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [13 lines of source text not declassified]

II. Conclusions and Findings.

A. The Situation in Southeast Asia: Dynamics and Prospects.

[Omitted here is discussion of Southeast Asia.]

25. Thailand. Though Thailand is not technically part of Indochina, the Thai are directly involved in the Indochina struggle and Thailand's leaders are deeply concerned about its outcome. Not surprisingly, this concern is viewed through the prism of what its leaders regard as Thailand's own vital interests, and these tend to focus on Laos. There the Thai are particularly concerned about the trans-Mekong border provinces of Sayaboury, Champassak and Sithadone. These provinces used to belong to Thailand, a fact that lends a strong emotional coloration to the views of the Thai leaders, who feel that Vietnamese Communist control over any Lao territory on the west bank of the Mekong would be tantamount to an invasion of Thailand. The King made this clear in our conversation when he pointed out that France had deliberately wrested these three provinces from Thai control in the 19th century in order to point “a dagger at our heart.” General Praphat and other senior Thai leaders expressed similar sentiments. This attitude about the border provinces obviously colors the whole Thai approach to the utilization and disposition of Thai regular and irregular forces in Laos, including the Thai-Khmer Volunteers and the Thai SGU's. The Thai want to make sure that Sayaboury, Champassak and Sithadone are adequately protected before they discuss use of Thai resources in other areas of Laos which they consider of less immediately urgent importance to Thailand itself.[3]

26. While the Thai welcome the Nixon doctrine, they are inclined to interpret it quite literally. Believing that they have already done much to aid us in providing bases in Thailand, sending troops openly to Vietnam, and deploying them [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Laos, the Thai feel that if they provide the human resources for additional activities against North Vietnam, the material and economic costs of raising and supporting these assets should be borne by the United States. Their bargaining position is framed accordingly. But the Thai do recognize that this is a common struggle and are far from indifferent to its outcome. They are convinced that a North Vietnamese victory in Indochina would leave them boxed on the north and east by borders under hostile Communist control, Chinese or Vietnamese. Under such circumstances, they feel that external support to the already troublesome but presently manageable insurgency threat within Thailand would rise sharply and the Thai government would find itself faced with serious internal problems. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Embassy officials with whom I talked believe that in such an eventuality, the whole political complexion of Thailand and her international posture would promptly change to a left-leaning neutralism.

27. Barring a North Vietnamese victory in the Indochina struggle, however, U.S. officials believe that Thai politics will probably continue on their current course without radical change. Thanom is planning to retire, but the path to a reasonably smooth succession by Praphat appears to be well paved. If Praphat should disappear from the scene, all bets are off.

28. [16 lines of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is discussion of the Indochina area.]

Dick

[1] Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086A, Executive Registry Files, DCI Eyes Only Files 1970, Box 9 of 16. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2]  Helms noted in the Annex that he “carefully reviewed the Thai situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] including programs involving Cambodia and Laos, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with Ambassador Unger and his senior associates.” He also stated that he had official meetings with Thanom, Praphat, Dawee, and the King, and that he had lunch with Thai National Police General Chamras. Helms added that he also attended “an instructive, informal dinner hosted by Thanom which included Praphat, Dawee, General Surakit (Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army), Generals Bunmag and Sawaeng (of the Prime Minister's staff) and General Dhep (who runs [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the organization that controls all Thai regular and irregular troops in Laos).” He also stated that he spent a day at Long Tieng “making a thorough survey on the ground of the situation there.” “I looked carefully into the role, performance and functions of the Thai troops and personally surveyed their emplacements and disposition.” Attached but not printed.

[3] In paragraph 35 of his memorandum to the President, Helms noted that his “personal inspection and conversations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]” had convinced him “that without the Thais, Long Tieng would have fallen last March. The Thai artillery whose emplacement I surveyed and the stiffening of Thai forces—regulars or SGUs—are both essential to MR II's defense and will have to be provided, if MR II is to be held.” Attached but not printed.

95. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)[1]

Washington, October 27, 1970.

Dear Len:

You will recall that when I was in Bangkok you suggested that it would be helpful for me to write you to give you the benefit of the President's thinking on issues of concern to you. In this light, I am passing on the President's interest in doing everything that we can to assure that third-country assistance to Cambodia is made available. He has issued specific directives concerning Thai air and ground actions in Cambodia if the need should arise.

First, the President wants everything possible to be done prior to the end of the rainy season to mobilize our own and third-country assistance to Cambodia to enable that country to survive an anticipated intensification in North Vietnamese attacks after the rains. He communicated this personally to senior officials of the Government in a meeting last June.

Second, the President has now directed that contingency plans be prepared for employment of Thai air and ground forces in the event of an NVA/VC offensive in Cambodia when the dry season begins. These might include: (a) the stationing of Thai forces along the Thai-Cambodia border in preparation for deployment in Cambodia, (b) use of Thai air support in Cambodia up to 900 sorties per month, to include areas beyond the present 30 kilometer zone agreed to by the Cambodians, (c) use of the Black Leopard units redeployed from South Vietnam as appropriate, and (d) provision of U.S. funding and matériel support for the Thai deployments including the use, as appropriate, of trade-off economic programs. These plans are to be completed and submitted to the Washington Special Actions Group for review no later than November 5.

Third, the President has further directed that the United States Ambassadors in Bangkok and Phnom Penh be instructed that the development of contingency plans to match our own by the Governments of Thailand and Cambodia be given their high priority attention.

I have the impression that we may have misled you in some of the cables which we sent to you by giving you a welter of technical details which obscured the imperative nature of the President's concerns. I want to assure you that he considers the situation in Cambodia to be extremely urgent, and wants all of us concerned to bend every effort to see that the assistance which Cambodia may need shortly on an emergency basis will be provided. This of course requires full understanding on the part of our Thai and Cambodian allies as to our thinking and as to the kinds of support which we are prepared to offer. There should be nothing left undone either by them or by us which actions on our part could have avoided.

Warm regards,

Henry

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Country Files, Box 563, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached October 22 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger reads: “Following the WSAG meeting on October 16 you asked that a letter be drafted from you to Ambassador Unger to make it clear to him what the situation is here with respect to the emergency employment of Thai air and ground forces in Cambodia. A draft letter for your signature is at Tab A.” The approval line of the memorandum is checked next to a recommendation that reads: “That you approve transmittal of this letter by back-channel message to Bangkok.” A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “urgent for dispatch.” A notation at the end of the memorandum reads: “Dispatched. Rec'd in Bangkok 10:15 on the 27th.”

96. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Washington, November 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Thai SGU's for Laos

Attached is a memorandum [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] [2] reporting the status of negotiations with the RTG concerning the SGU program. The main points to which we would call your attention are that the RTG is now committed to recruiting and assisting in the training of 14 Thai SGU's (13 infantry and one artillery), of which two are to be primarily composed of former TKV's. Of these 14, it is anticipated that two SGU's (the TKV's) will be ready for deployment to Laos in mid-December, six others will be ready in early March and the final five, including the artillery SGU, should be ready in April.

The availability timing is determined by factors of recruiting and training. A twelve week training program is planned for all except the two “TKV” SGU's who will require only a few weeks training in addition to what they have already received. Those TKV's, we understand, are now available in sufficient number for the two battalions. In addition to these, we understand that there are about 2200 volunteers already signed up who will man the next batch of six SGU's. So far as we know, the RTG does not yet have volunteer enlisted personnel for the last six.

Initially, there appears to have been a problem in recruitment. The RTG wisely sought to get volunteers with previous military experience and other high qualifications, but apparently were not very successful on the basis of the pay and allowance scale initially proposed. Recent negotiations in Bangkok [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]resulted in an agreement to raise subsistence and per diem allowances and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the recruiting problem has been solved.

Another problem has arisen with regard to training facilities. There are now three sites in Thailand being used for SGU's and these are adequate for the first eight battalions, but we understand could not accommodate any more. [1 line of source text not declassified] this problem can be resolved by establishing an additional training facility, and the matter is under negotiation through COMUSMACTHAI in Bangkok. A final decision on the matter is expected about the end of this month when General Surakij returns from his present visit to Australia.

The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] memorandum does not discuss the timing question in relation to the RTA, RCT's and Sierra Romeo now in Laos. We have been told, however, that in negotiations with the Thai it is being made clear that those forces will not be removed from Laos until the SGU's, fully trained and equipped, are ready to replace them.

In general, the SGU training program is not split in terms of future assignments to north or south Laos. However, it is understood that the first two battalions, the TKV, will go to Champassak/Sithadone and that the highest priority for the next batch will be Sayaboury. The reason for Sayaboury's priority is that the Thai cadre for Project Sayavong are being drawn down for the SGU program and the Thai feel that an SGU battalion should be sent in to fill the vacuum. Deployment of the rest of the SGU's will be determined by circumstances at the time their training is completed.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19 THAI–LAOS. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dexter and Brown and cleared by Wilson.

[2] The [text not declassified] November 18 memorandum [text not declassified] to Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, is attached but not printed. It noted that on November 16 “the Royal Thai Army Commander-in-Chief General Praphat confirmed to Ambassador Unger his concurrence with the final negotiated agreement (on the Thai SGU program) with only one exception—the composition and size of the Thai artillery SGU. Praphat indicated that he was prepared to implement the SGU program as soon as he had a formal request in writing from the Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.”

97. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Bangkok, November 20, 1970.

Dear Marshall:

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

I agree that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] role in Thai counterinsurgency operations should be limited to training and advice designed to improve Thai institutional capabilities to deal with this problem. This principle, I assure you, is reflected in the Mission CI Guidelines and governs our activities here. I am particularly alert to this principle because of my testimony before the Symington Committee when I assured the Committee that US personnel do not participate in counterinsurgency operations in Thailand.

The importance of adhering to this principle has been repeatedly reviewed with the senior personnel [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and I have stressed the need to err on the conservative side in such matters. On the other hand, I want to be very careful that in the interests of maintaining this principle we do not imbue [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] personnel with a frame of mind and attitude that becomes too restrictive and unintentionally limits their performance in their advisory role with the Thais [1 line of source text not declassified].

From time to time it will probably be necessary [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to undertake specific [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations within general program approvals that I have given them to satisfy requirements that have been levied by Washington. Such operations may become involved with some aspect of the counterinsurgency effort of the RTG. When this type of situation can be foreseen I have asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]to bring these specific operations to my attention so that I can determine whether we should go beyond the role we have set for ourselves in the counterinsurgency field.

Finally, I wish to assure you that I have and will continue to do my utmost to see that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agencies leave the initiative in the counterinsurgency field to the Thais and that our activities here are such that there is no question in anyone's mind about our non-involvement in Thai counterinsurgency operations.

Sincerely,

Leonard Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 THAI. Secret; Official-Informal.

98. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, November 20, 1970, 10:44–11:19 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cambodia and Laos

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

CIA

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Mr. Richard Helms

Mr. James Wilson

Mr. William Nelson

Defense

NSC Staff

Mr. David Packard

Mr. John H. Holdridge

Mr. Dennis Doolin

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

JCS

Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

Summary of Conclusions

1. Thai SGUs in North Laos. A decision on whether to replace Thai regular forces in North Laos with Thai SGUs will be deferred until the Thai SGUs complete their training in March, 1971.

2. Thai Khmers. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will provide data on the number of Thai Khmers who volunteer to join the Thai SGUs.[2]

3. Economic Trade-offs for Thailand. The WSAG agreed in principle that negotiations should proceed with a view to reaching agreement with Thailand on providing PL–480 assistance to offset increases in the Thai defense budget made necessary to prepare Thai forces for operations in Cambodia. The State Department will prepare a plan covering provision of PL–480 support in return for Thai agreement to bring up to strength regimental combat teams earmarked for operations in Cambodia. The Defense Department will investigate the feasibility of providing military equipment and supplies to Thai forces under the terms of the Supply and Logistical Agreement with Thailand of 1963.

4. Armored Vehicles. The WSAG noted that all agencies were agreed on going forward with supply of 25 M–113 armored personnel carriers to Cambodia.

The WSAG agreed that Australia should be encouraged to provide Ferret and Saladin vehicles to Cambodia. The Defense Department will continue discussions with the Australians on this subject; and if an Australian offer is forthcoming, the NSC staff will solicit agency views before a final understanding is reached with the Australians.

(Mr. Johnson and Mr. Wilson were not present at the opening of the meeting.)

[41/2 pages of source text not declassified.]

[Omitted here is discussion of APCs for Cambodia.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] In a November 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Johnson, Packard, and Moorer, [text not declassified] stated that Bangkok had advised “that 704 out of 1320 Thai Khmers from the Thai Khmer volunteer regiment had volunteered for the SGU program.” With reference to the replacement of the Thai regulars in north Laos, [text not declassified] noted that he had been advised that “the following statement was included in the final draft of the agreement given to the RTA: ‘The replacement of the 13th RCT and SR IX will be accomplished only after all parties have had an opportunity to assess the then existing military situation and the state of proficiency of the SGUs'. [text not declassified]reports that the RTA staff concurred with this statement but noted the possible problem of keeping the units beyond the agreed service of one year. [text not declassified], however, that General Surakij had previously agreed to extend SR IX beyond the one year if necessary and they believe he will also be willing to extend the RCT in circumstances where insertion of the SGUs would involve unacceptable risk.’ (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)

99. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Bangkok, November 27, 1970.

Dear Alex,

The recent bombing of North Vietnam targets by US aircraft is yet another in a series of cases that found me totally unprepared to tell the RTG anything about operations from Thai bases involving a significant departure from existing policies and practices as they know them. While fully appreciating the sensitivity of the subject, I strongly feel that my inability to communicate some of this information—at least at the top level—has prevented me from discharging commitments and responsibilities to the RTG that form an important part of the arrangements and understandings under which US forces were permitted to operate from Thai bases. Initially, you will recall, they asked for advance information on our operations. Our present arrangement of giving them post-strike summaries is predicated on the assumption that we will keep them informed of unusual operations, especially when the deviation from established practice has political dimensions of interest to the Thai.

I am enclosing a brief list of Thai-based operations[2] that took place this year without our knowing in advance or being able to inform the RTG except after the fact.

As far as last weekend's strikes against North Vietnam are concerned, despite my urgent inquiry to Washington,[3] I was again unable to offer the RTG any information about the involvement of Thai-based USAF resources beyond what had already appeared in the papers. The Prime Minister's first question when I introduced General Clay was about this operation. Had Thanat been present, he would surely have probed more deeply and perhaps gotten off one of his barbs about our failure to consult. To compound the problem, Secretary Laird's November 23 statement about the helicopter rescue operation (which I was instructed to convey urgently) was sent only Priority, did not arrive here until after lunch, and could not be conveyed before the RTG read it in the afternoon papers. In view of today's press stories that the helicopters used Thai bases, we may yet have some inquiries about this one.

I strongly feel that the requirement to keep the RTG fully informed on operations of Thai-based aircraft is fundamental to the smooth conduct of air operations from Thai bases. It has a direct bearing on the continuation of the operational freedom we have enjoyed here and which I presume it is desirable to maintain.

I know you will share my growing concern over these disturbing episodes and hope you will find opportunities to take them up at appropriate levels in DOD, perhaps by drawing Dave Packard's[4] and Tom Moorer's attention to them. With every understanding for the need for operational secrecy, I believe our policy of dealing out the RTG (whose record on security has been excellent) is short-sighted and someday may boomerang. Informing the RTG after the fact, and then only incompletely, simply will not do!

Looking forward to seeing you soon in Washington.

Sincerely,

Len

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Official–Informal.

[2] Attached but not printed.

[3] Telegram 14761 from Bangkok, November 22. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)

[4] In a December 4 letter to Packard, Johnson enclosed a copy of Unger's letter and commented: “I feel that his points are very well taken and, as we draw down in the area and the Thai look to what they feel are the policy implications for themselves, I feel that we should no longer necessarily expect the same degree of Thai complaisance in our use of bases in Thailand.” (Ibid.)

100. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 1, 1970.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 29, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Excerpt—1 page of source text not declassified. A notation in President Nixon's handwriting in the margin of this memorandum reads: “K—a disturbing report—Perhaps we need a stronger Ambassador.”]

101. Diplomatic Note From Secretary of State Rogers to the Ambassador of Thailand (Hongladarom)[1]

Washington, December 10, 1970.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Thailand and has the honor to inform him[2] as follows.

With regard to the proposed PL–480 sale of rice to Indonesia,[3] the American Embassy in Bangkok has relayed to the Department of State a request, received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[4] that the United States consider buying a portion of the rice from Thailand in a manner similar to Japan's purchase for Indonesia. Should this be impossible the message suggested that the proposed sale be delayed until the end of April.

At the December 1969 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) the United States pledged to contribute a fair share of the $140 million estimated food aid requirement for the 15-month period ending March 31, 1971. This assistance is still considered vital not only for its direct impact in conserving foreign exchange and stabilizing prices but also because of the local currency generated for support of the development program. Although Indonesia had anticipated that the United States would provide up to 450,000 tons of rice and had in fact requested a greater quantity, the total to be provided is not expected to exceed 400,000 tons. This would include 240,000 tons from the April agreement, the proposed sale of 110,000 and a possible additional 50,000 tons early next year. Any delay in arrival of PL–480 rice beyond March 1971 would fail to accord with understandings reached at the December 1969 IGGI meeting.

With regard to the suggestion that the United States buy Thai rice as has been done by Japan, it is regretted that this would not be feasible in view of availabilities of United States rice and the United States balance of payments considerations. It is understandable that Japan, which has a large surplus in its bilateral payments with Thailand, should wish to find measures to ease this imbalance. On the other hand, the United States is still a net contributor to Thailand's balance of payments.

Although the assistance provided by the various countries has helped to improve the situation following the serious financial strains which led to formation of the international assistance group in 1966, Indonesian recovery and development requires that foreign exchange resources allocated to food purchases be kept to a minimum. However, as a result of this assistance Indonesia has had the resources to purchase commercially on the average as much or more rice than was possible in 1965 when no rice imports were obtained under the United States PL–480 program. In supplementing Indonesia's resources and enabling them to continue to make commercial purchases of rice as well as other vital commodities this Government believes that the program, on the whole, has been helpful rather than harmful to Thailand.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON. No classification marking. Drafted by West and cleared by Alexander Shakow (AID/EA/I), Malcolm H. Churchill (EA/IND), and Elizabeth M. Denham (S/S).

[2] The note was delivered by Barger on December 10 during his meeting with Thai Ambassador Sunthorn. (Telegram 202614 to Bangkok, December 11; ibid.)

[3] The Department had advised Thailand of the planned sale in a diplomatic note of November 20. (Ibid.)

[4] Telegram 15262 from Bangkok, December 6, relayed the Thai request. (Ibid.)

102. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, December 15, 1970, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Leonard Unger

Henry A. Kissinger

John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Conversation With Ambassador Unger on US-Thai Relations

Dr. Kissinger expressed his pleasure in seeing Ambassador Unger. He went on to say that he had developed a number of obsessions about Thailand. One of these involved the use of Thai troops in Cambodia. After he had sent his letter to Ambassador Unger [2] he had come to believe that they both were on the same track;[3] on the other hand, for many months he had the strong impression that Unger's colleagues wanted the Thai troops to stay in Thailand, especially in the Northeast, and not get in trouble in Cambodia. Somehow, by hook or crook, Thai units intended for Cambodia would disappear. Because Ambassador Unger probably didn't know the origins of the interest here in having the Thai prepared to go into Cambodia, he, Dr. Kissinger, wanted to provide some of the background. He had to deal with the President, who would repeatedly telephone about this. One evening the President had called about the two regiments of Thai regulars which were supposed to be a strategic reserve, and said that he wanted them in Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger noted that he had then gone back to the WSAG to say that these regiments should be sent in.

He happened to be a member of the school of thought, Dr. Kissinger continued, which believed that a Presidential order should be carried out. He referred to the complicated sequence of events involving the two regiments of Thai regulars which were supposed to go into Cambodia, the forces which were to be sent from Thailand to Vietnam to free units of the Thai forces in Vietnam for service in Cambodia, and then the plan to train two regiments of Thai/Khmer volunteers. We had ended up with no Thai regulars in Cambodia, no units sent to Vietnam, and no Thai/Khmer regiments. Ultimately, the Thai decision was to pull out from Vietnam, leaving nothing in reserve. This had not looked like the most enthusiastic compliance with the President's orders.

Dr. Kissinger observed that Thai military planning now appeared to be coming along satisfactorily. However, if the occasion ever arose for the Thai to move, we should give the impression that we were really behind them rather than engaging in discussions over the details of our aid. This would give them the wrong impression. Ambassador Unger said that he felt our negotiations with the Thai on support were now proceeding satisfactorily, and that if we could carry these negotiations through we would have Thai units prepared and in place ready to move out for operations in Cambodia this dry season. Nevertheless, if the Thai went into Cambodia we would have a big financial problem in paying for the ordnance (bombs and ammunition), POL, and other supplies which the Thai would need. Ambassador Unger added that nobody had told him where these funds were to come from. He assumed that Dr. Kissinger probably remembered the last frank message from Bangkok in which he had pointed out these difficulties. Dr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Unger had suggested any solutions, and Ambassador Unger replied that he hadn't offered any because he had been knocked down on using Thai MASF, and had also been informed that Cambodian MAP was unavailable because it was overcommitted. Dr. Kissinger noted that the situation as to Cambodia MAP was now remedied by the supplemental appropriation.

Ambassador Unger stated that he wanted Dr. Kissinger to know his, Unger's, thinking. When the question of the Thai operating in Cambodia through South Vietnam had arisen, he had thought this was a great solution. However, it had been knocked down somewhere in Washington. The question was apparently how deeply into Cambodia the Thai should operate. The Thai had been ready to go, but somebody back here had killed the idea. He understood that it had been knocked out as a practicable possibility over the issue of how funds could be used, and also because of the possibility of Congressional flak. With respect to the Thai/Khmer idea the question was where the money would come from when the troops moved into Cambodia. Funds couldn't come from Thai MASF, or from Cambodia MAP either (although this might now be changed).

Ambassador Unger explained that the situation he had just described was why he had jumped on the SGU idea for using trained people—the two SGU battalions formed out of the Thai/Khmer volunteers—against the Ho Chi Minh trail. He understood that these units had just taken off from Korat for commitment to the Bolovens. Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Unger's opinion of the capability of these troops, to which Ambassador Unger replied that the units ought to be good because they had been well-trained. Because of this, the judgment had been made to put them into the Bolovens area, but we wouldn't know until later how well they would do. Thai troops were good on the defensive, although not so good on the offensive. Ambassador Unger cited Thai regulars in North Laos as an example of effective Thai performance on the defensive, noting that although they had recently been hit very hard and had suffered substantial casualties, they had held very well. He believed that the situation in the Bolovens was also one in which the Thai would do well. SGUs were a better kind of unit than the regulars, since they were more mobile. He hoped to see all the Thai troops in Laos eventually put into the SGU mode, with the RCT pulled back. It could also help defend Long Tieng and Sam Thong. Going back to the South Laos picture, if all went well and the situation didn't get out of hand, we would work out a smooth transition for putting in SGUs.

Dr. Kissinger declared that he was willing to go along with this since we had an assessment that the SGUs were as good as the RCT. The Joint Chiefs did not think so. Ambassador Unger remarked that the test would come soon in the South.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Ambassador Unger why the Department of State was so interested in SGUs instead of Thai regulars. Ambassador Unger replied that General Praphat had told him that the Thai could not have their soldiers fighting side by side at different rates of pay, and that types of units and pay scales should be standardized. In addition, the Thai were hesitant to put in RCTs except in places where they could be covered up. This was so as to avoid the appearance of violating the Geneva Accords. Ambassador Unger observed that his own conclusion was that the SGUs were preferable because they cost less and were more suitable for the type of fighting involved. Did Washington feel that the cost was an important factor?

Dr. Kissinger stated that what the President wanted was success— he wouldn't care about an additional $10 million if success was assured. There was a school here which interpreted the Nixon Doctrine as favoring a semi-neutralist Thailand. This was a brilliant theory, except for the fact that it didn't meet the President's ideas. The President did not want to encourage a semi-neutralist Thailand, or a defeat in Laos. When the chips were down, Thai regulars would be pulled in anyway. The President wanted reports on what Ambassador Unger believed, not reports on what Ambassador Unger believed conformed with the views of the White House. We then would proceed to give definite instructions. Dr. Kissinger suggested that every once in a while Ambassador Unger should sum up what he really thought for his, Dr. Kissinger's, use.

Ambassador Unger reiterated the belief that over the long run SGUs were the better deal. Dr. Kissinger said that he had no brief for the SGUs over the RCTs except that we knew that the RCT had worked in North Laos. What we would do was to put the SGUs in when they were trained, which would be at the beginning of the rainy season. Ambassador Unger told Dr. Kissinger that he would so inform Praphat, who wouldn't simply pull out the RCT but would keep it there in order to maintain his assets. Dr. Kissinger remarked that this was very important.

Ambassador Unger said that the Thai were not planning to put an RCT into South Laos, to which Dr. Kissinger commented that he did not see the need for an RCT where one was not already in place. In the Long Tieng situation we had waited a long time after being told the Thai regulars were needed before deciding to go ahead. The President had made the decision, which obviously had made all the difference. Ambassador Unger mentioned that he had no complaint over this decision, only over the fact that he had not been brought in on all of the preliminary communications. Dr. Kissinger explained that back channel messages had been used only because we had wanted to make sure before hand that the Thai were willing to go. There was no sense here that Ambassador Unger was doing anything but loyally carrying out his instructions. The difficulty was in making sure that the President's policy and wishes filtered through.

Ambassador Unger noted that there were misunderstandings among the Thai, too. He was now speaking to them on an entirely different basis from what he had been saying two years ago. Nevertheless, the Thai understood the Congressional problem, and knew that what Congress said was not necessarily the President's policy. Dr. Kissinger expressed understanding of the difficulties the Thai faced, recalling some of the problems which the President's advance men had caused prior to the President's trip last year.

Ambassador Unger declared that in our relations with the Thai we should not overlook small but important issues such as the Son Tay raid. The aircraft involved had all taken off from Thai bases, but he had been given absolutely nothing which he could pass along to the Thai about this. Dr. Kissinger stated that the problem here did not lie with Ambassador Unger or himself, but was due to the fact that when the decision had been made Secretary Rogers had not agreed to a suggestion from him that others in State such as Ambassador Johnson and Ambassador Green should be brought in. He personally had been prohibited from talking, and had called Ambassador Johnson over against orders to tell him about the raid while it was in progress. This was of course too late, and we should have had Ambassador Unger talking to the Thai about that same time. Ambassador Unger asserted that even an hour of advance notice would have been helpful. Only today, with the help of Secretary Rogers, he had gotten Secretary Laird to clear an anodyne message which could be given to the Thai.

In conclusion, Ambassador Unger mentioned that there were two issues which caused him considerable concern: first, the matter of close-in air support for the Thai if they went into Cambodia, and second the matter of our longer term commitment to Thailand under these circumstances and the relationship of the Thai actions to SEATO. Dr. Kissinger agreed that these were important issues, and instructed Mr. Holdridge to see that they would be put before the WSAG for consideration.

(Note: After the meeting Ambassador Unger elaborated on the close-in air support issue to Mr. Holdridge, saying that he believed the Thai air resources were inadequate to maintain the authorized sortie rate of 900 per month, and that in any event the Thai had no real experience in providing the kind of close-in support which might be necessary in Cambodia. There was also the related matter of how to provide logistical support.)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger on December 17 for approval under cover of an attached memorandum with the notation: “Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, no further distribution appears warranted.” The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

[2] See Document 95.

[3] In a December 14 memorandum to Kissinger, however, Holdridge stated that Unger had only partly “gotten” the President's desires with respect to the Thai helping out in Cambodia. Rather, he noted that Unger “has been inclined to push his own ideas first, notably in trying to focus upon the counterinsurgency requirements in Thailand as first priority. He probably shares the general State view that ‘Thai troops should serve in Thailand,’ as well as State's concerns over possible U.S. military involvement along with the Thai via our SEATO relationship. Thai in addition favors direct U.S. military assistance to Thailand in support of Thai activities in Cambodia, even though this is legally not possible—he wants the laws changed.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V)

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in France [1]

Bangkok, January 5, 1971, 1233Z.

130. Paris For SecDef. Subj: Thai Assistance to Cambodia. Ref: Bangkok 125.[2]

1. Thailand's long-standing security concerns have been compounded by Communist aggression in Cambodia. However, initial Thai receptivity to sweeping requests for assistance from Lon Nol was tempered not only by reserved response by U.S. concerning support, but also by serious assessment of their priorities and capabilities in light of existing troop commitments in Vietnam and Laos and requirements to meet mounting insurgency problems at home. Moreover, after it became evident that RTA ground combat presence would raise number of touchy issues (including command and control), Cambodians indicated to Thai that there was no immediate requirement for their troops and Cambodians also limited that airforce operations, thus reducing number of sorties RTAF could fly in support of Cambodia.

2. In response Washington directives to discuss with Thai measures to meet dry season emergency in Cambodia, we and Thai costed out their contingency plan for western Cambodia (Chakri Plan). We have recommended to Washington our moving ahead at this time only with package of readiness measures drawn from Chakri Plan for: RTAF operations of 900 sorties per month; preparing five regiments for combat; command and control; and activating reserve division. Total one-time costs of these packages would be about $36 million to achieve readiness; continuing O&M and personnel costs to maintain readiness would be $1.6 million per month. We would not intend to finance personnel costs of these packages and Thai have agreed in principle to assume them. One-time personnel costs are $2.66 million and continuing personnel costs are $1.8 million per month.

3. While consideration has been given to deploying Black Leopard units returning from RVN to Cambodia, if requested by Cambodia, this is not practicable since Black Leopards cease to exist as units shortly after returning to Thailand; about 40 percent of the personnel are volunteers for Vietnam and under the law must be released from active duty in accordance with their contracts; the other 60 percent (RTA regulars) normally return to their former units, and are badly needed there to bring forces up to acceptable strength levels.

4. Pending an answer from Washington on our recommendation (see para 2 above), we have not resumed dialogue on readiness measures with Thai. We expect Thai will take occasion of SecDef visit to inquire into status of project (which was undertaken at our initiative) and U.S. views on Thai assistance to Cambodia. Thai may also raise questions about U.S. support if in fact deployment to Cambodia should be required. This would include our help with logistics and air support as well as with greatly expanded costs for material in actual combat conditions.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 23 THAI. Secret; Priority;Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State and to CINCPAC.

[2] Dated January 5. (Ibid.)

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, January 11, 1971, 0909Z.

384. Subject: Secretary's Meeting with Thai Leaders.

1. Summary: In after-dinner meeting January 7 with Secretary Laird, Adm. Moorer, and their aides, and US mission reps, Thai leaders stressed following: their support for Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization, but concern that success of latter may be gravely impaired by continued enemy capability mount threat in Laos and Cambodia; recognition that SEA nations must make growing contribution to their own defense, especially in manpower; determination to assume full responsibility for their defense needs without US troops, but requirement for continuation of US military assistance; need for helicopters, ammo, T–28's and excess equipment that can be used to develop Thai forces; rice problem (reported Bangkok 276)[2] Secretary gave forceful presentation of Nixon Doctrine (including assurance of continued regular military assistance and fullest exploitation of excess program), stressed need for regional cooperation and will of regional countries to make effective use of their resources. In response to Thanat's expressed doubts whether the administration will be able to carry out the programs underpinning the Nixon Doctrine, Secretary explained importance of recent vote of defense appropriations and stated his conviction that President will get the support to carry through his program. Thai leaders did not seek additional meeting, evidently feeling that they got their main problems off their chests. End summary.

2. Following is uncleared account of Secretary's after-dinner discussion with RTG leaders. Present were: PriMin Thanom, DepPriMin Pote, FonMin Thanat, ACM Dawee, Gen. Jira (military advisor to PriMin), RTA C/S Gen. Surakij, Dep C/S Supreme Command (fwd) Gen. Kriangsak, and FonMin's Secretary Dirabongse. Secretary Laird was accompanied by Amb Unger, Adm. Moorer, Asst. Secretaries Nutter and Henkin, Dep Asst. Secretary Doolin, DCM, COMUSMACTHAI, and PolMil Counselor. Gen. Praphat had to be absent to manage budget debate; Gen. Sawaeno also originally on guest list was not present.

3. PM opened with brief review of instances of Thai cooperation with free world (Korea, Laos, SVN, basing of US forces in Thailand). He expressed full support for Nixon Doctrine and understanding for US troop reductions, but argued that these reductions be planned carefully, taking into account assessments of communist strength and action. Communist threat to SEA was still great as the small countries here were developing their own defenses while simultaneously trying to improve living standards. All sea nations should bear responsibility for their own defense, but continued substantial US assistance was required. Concept of Vietnamization should be broadened to “Southeast-Asianization.”

4. In commenting on implications of US troop withdrawals, Thai leaders several times stressed danger that as war in Vietnam winds down, threat to Laos and Cambodia (and thus to Thailand) could well increase. In their view, success of Vietnamization depended on how well the US could manage situation in Laos and Cambodia. Thanks to US and other SEA assistance, Cambodia had resisted much better than anticipated, but “some sort of US guard must be maintained; otherwise Vietnamization will fall flat” (Thanat). Saigon was still the enemy's principal target, but he is now attempting to get at it through Laos (where he is building up LOCs in the panhandle) and Cambodia.

5. Secretary several times stressed theme of regional cohesion, coordination and self-help. Enemy capabilities and intentions are not the only factors being considered in US troop reductions; willingness and capability of our friends to use their energies effectively and well were also very important. SVN forces were now much larger and more capable while enemy capabilities had declined since 1968. Secretary said in applying Nixon Doctrine we will give as much help as possible; while we are terminating our combat role, we will continue other important roles such as air, logistic and artillery support; we not fully withdrawing now, but only reducing and cutting back particularly in our direct involvement in combat.

6. Secretary made several inquiries about the insurgency, most of which brought little substantive response; Dawee stated however, government was successful in keeping insurgents from moving into villages, but Hanoi-trained Meo were operating in several provinces in the north; particularly disturbing aspect of the trouble in the mid-south was that the terrorists were ethnic Thai. Recent operations by 700 young Chinese refugees (Dawee rejected term kmt) in the process of resettlement in the north had resulted in discovery of larger ct forces stores and facilities than had been anticipated, including a 300–500 man reception center for trainees and infiltrators from NVN and Laos. Throughout the meeting, PM, Dawee, and also Thanat stressed that Thailand wants to take care of its own defenses; it will do its own fighting and wants no US forces (presumably US ground combat troops); but it needs US material support to subdue threat before it is too late. Secretary said he got the message on US forces which Thais appeared to mean to apply to Cambodia as well.

7. Thai made strong plea for excess equipment left behind by US forces. Secretary explained legal requirements for transfer of excess items; if RTG could meet necessary criteria it would have priority on excess items located in country. Secretary stated that increase in military assistance effort was important aspect of Nixon Doctrine and that excess program offered in some ways better vehicle than direct appropriation; Thai should identify their needs and explain how they proposed to use items so one could move ahead with excess program.

8. In response to Secretary's query re RTG's assessment of possibility arriving at some sort of arrangement with NVN as result recent Thai contacts with NVN Red Cross repatriation delegation, Thanat stated that talks had not yielded any results. (Note: In context Secretary's query he presumably referred to political results, not question whether some repatriation may in fact take place.) Thanat said only one member of NVN team was bona fide Red Cross; others were intelligence types. He interpreted NVN initiative largely as probing action. Even though several subjects, including POWs, had been touched upon, there had been no real communication or signal.

9. Thanat said in his personal opinion NVN were using Paris Talks as propaganda forum and no results should be expected there. To the NVN, the real meaning of Vietnamization is how long the US can stand behind SVN, since they are confident of their ability to dispose of GVN once US departs scene. Referring to situation in Laos and Cambodia, he expressed doubt whether successful implementation of Vietnamization in 1972 was possible unless situation those two counties could be contained; despite expressed intention of President Nixon and his administration, he was not certain whether in light of Congressional opposition these measures could be taken and whether American people were really behind Nixon Doctrine.

10. Secretary stressed legislative debate was often misunderstood, misinterpreted and misrepresented; he pointed out that though Vietnamization was first major thrust of Nixon Doctrine, it was only small part of it and should not be taken in isolation. He then explained importance of recent positive Senate vote on defense appropriations, stressing administration had done well on every test vote. Thanat conceded recent success but insisted there will continue to be opposition to President's program. Secretary said he thought President meant what he said.

11. Dawee briefly referred to Thai defense plan (Chakri), saying that costing exercise carried on with help of MacThai had demonstrated tremendous defense costs which Thailand unable to bear with its limited resources. Secretary said he aware of planning effort which now being considered in Washington in light of this back to RTG in next few weeks.

12. Dawee said RTG planning for a new division in 1973 which meant equipment requirements being developed now. Thai needed helicopters to replace combat attrition; they were running ammo war reserve down to dangerously low level due to high expenditure rates in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand; and speed-up of T–28 delivery would be most desirable. (Secretary held out no hope that this last was possible). Dawee stressed RTAF purchase of OV–10s as example of Thai modernization effort without US assistance.

13. Bangkok press Jan. 8–9 gave frontpage coverage to Secretary's visit. Stories highlighted his references to Nixon Doctrine; his “Promises of US military aid for next decade” (world) and “Aid Increases” (post); and his undertaking to convey to President Thai concerns about PL–480 rice shipments.[2] Thanat was reported as having stated that US had agreed in principle to “speed up” transfer of US arms and military equipment now being used by US forces in Thailand. Press also emphasized Secretary's remarks on regional cooperation and statement in his toast that differences between friends (US and Thailand) should make bonds of friendship stronger rather than weaker.

14. Dept may wish repeat CINCPAC for Secretary Laird and Embassies Phnom Penh, Vientiane.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF THAI–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

[2] Telegram 276 from Bangkok, January 8, noted that “Thai leaders (especially FonMin Thanat) made impassioned plea to SecDef for U.S. reconsideration of PL–480 rice shipments to Thailand's traditional markets.” It noted that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin told Laird that “U.S. deliveries were cutting into Thailand's most important source of income. This applied especially to Indonesia which normally buys Thai rice. If U.S. were to compete in open market and at a fair price, the Thai would not mind, but PL–480 sales not made under competitive conditions.” (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 INDON).

[2] Telegram 276 from Bangkok, January 8, noted that “Thai leaders (especially FonMin Thanat) made impassioned plea to SecDef for U.S. reconsideration of PL–480 rice shipments to Thailand's traditional markets.” It noted that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin told Laird that “U.S. deliveries were cutting into Thailand's most important source of income. This applied especially to Indonesia which normally buys Thai rice. If U.S. were to compete in open market and at a fair price, the Thai would not mind, but PL–480 sales not made under competitive conditions.” (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 INDON)

105. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, January 18, 1971.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between The President, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Admiral

Moorer, Director Helms and Dr. Kissinger (10:55 a.m.–12:00 noon and 12:42 p.m. to 1:36 p.m.)

The meeting was convened at 10:55 a.m. in the President's Oval Office so that the President and his principal advisors could hear a personal report from Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer on their trip to Thailand and South Vietnam with stop enroute in Paris.

After a brief discussion of the professional football championship game (Superbowl) which took place the preceding day, the President asked Secretary Laird to provide the group with a report on his trip to Southeast Asia and Paris.

[Here follows discussion of the Paris Peace Talks.]

Secretary Laird then stated that in Thailand his team had met with all of the principal Thai leaders and had participated in a dinner and an extensive after-dinner working session. The Thais made the following points to Secretary Laird:

—They complained bitterly about U.S. PL 480 rice sales to Indonesia and other Thai market areas. (Secretary Laird said that he avoided substantive comment.)

—Thai officials were not as concerned about the counterinsurgency problem in Northeast Thailand as Secretary Laird thought they should be. (The Secretary stated that two large insurgent base camps had been developed in Northeast Thailand, with the most serious problem being the camp located at the projected end of the Chinese road complex.)

—The Thais asked for assurances of continued U.S. military assistance, emphasizing they wished us to maintain our bases in Thailand but that they would have no need for U.S. ground power.

The President remarked to Secretary Laird that his past discussions with the Thais suggested that they were very much concerned about internal insurgency. Secretary Laird replied that the threat had actually increased over the past 12 months and that the Thais had few forces involved in this role.

The President stated that if the Thais fell we would be in deep difficulty because of our treaty arrangements and, therefore, we will have to push them on the insurgency issue. More importantly, we are going to have to assure that they get all the military assistance in terms of equipment and funds that they need. Dr. Kissinger stated that an additional problem was the fact that the Thais have forces in Laos and that while the insurgency in the Northeast may be a problem, the viability of Laos and Cambodia is the decisive factor in terms of Thailand's future. It is essential that they not pull their forces out of Laos.

The President then commented that he had been encouraged by the recent report on the performance of Thai forces in Laos.[2] Admiral Moorer stated that this was the first SGU battalion that had been formed by the Thais. He noted that the conduct of the battle was well executed by the Thais, who permitted the enemy to get inside their positions and then inflicted great damage on them.

The President then remarked that he had recently read an excellent press story on Cambodia and that these were the kinds of stories which would insure the proper attitude in the U.S. Mr. Helms stated that the Cambodians have certainly demonstrated an outstanding will but that now their requirement was to learn how to operate their forces.

Secretary Rogers reopened the question of insurgency in Thailand and asked Mr. Helms to comment on the seriousness. Mr. Helms replied that action programs are initiated each year with the anticipation that they will succeed but that at the end of the period it always appears that there has been further deterioration. Secretary Laird indicated that he had raised this issue on three separate occasions with the Thais but that they had appeared to want to avoid the issue. The President then reiterated that because of our treaty commitments, it was important not to permit the situation to deteriorate. He directed that necessary spending be undertaken now rather than to find ourselves involved in another massive insurgency in the future.

Secretary Laird stated that he sensed the need by the Thais for continual hand-holding with respect to our presence in Thailand and our assistance program. For this reason, the Secretary provided additional assurances to the Thai leadership. Secretary Laird added that we have already cut our forces by 16,000 in Thailand and that further reductions should be avoided. He expressed special concern about the retention of our naval base and the air base at Utopa.

The President confirmed that he wanted our bases retained in Thailand. The slight draw-downs accomplished thus far were acceptable but the bases must be retained. The President stated that the Thais have always needed constant reassurances and suggested that it might be of value to include a visit by the King on this year's state visit schedule. Secretary Rogers interjected that he agreed that this would be a good idea.

The President then stated that specific assurances should be given to the Thais after our next troop withdrawal announcement. He pointed out that the Symington Subcommittee hearings had done great damage to our overall relationships with the Thais and that this damage had to be rectified. Secretary Laird remarked that the Thai Foreign Minister was the principal problem in Thailand. The Secretary had emphasized to the Prime Minister that the supplemental vote in the U.S. Congress represented a major victory for those who supported strong U.S./Thai relations.

The President stated that he wanted it clearly understood that the U.S. was on a razor's edge with respect to the Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia. While we have made our policy clear, the press has consistently distorted it to our disadvantage. The President stressed that we must retain our presence in Thailand, and in all Southeast Asia, to include the Philippines, South Vietnam and Korea. The idea that the Nixon Doctrine constituted a formula for reducing our presence to zero was neither true nor in our interest. The President emphasized that it was important that we reassure our allies in this respect. Secretary Laird remarked that military assistance was the essential element since our Asian allies have the manpower resources.

In continuing his discourse on our relationships with our allies, the President stated that this same philosophy applied worldwide. That was why Senator Percy had been so much in error. We need a continued presence in Europe and in terms of our worldwide position, we cannot permit ourselves to slip into a weak conventional force posture. We need a strong conventional posture abroad. We should now be thinking about permanent U.S./Asian and European force deployments. Our Soviet and Chinese friends watch this issue intensely and they draw great comfort and attach great significance to reductions in our force levels abroad.

Secretary Laird remarked that we have to sell this issue to the American people. He commented that a 11/2 war strategy was not saleable but rather we should sell it on the grounds of a realistic deterrent consisting of adequate conventional, tactical nuclear and nuclear forces.

The President commented that Congressional proponents were the first to complain when we cut bases here in the U.S. if they involved their constituents. Mr. Helms stated it was obvious that the Thais must have continued reassurance from us and that they had already started to refurbish their lines with the Chinese Communists. The President restated that we should bring the Thai King on a visit to the U.S. The President instructed Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and Dr. Kissinger, as appropriate, to bring Senators in and to talk about the importance of Thailand and the need to avoid future hearings such as those conducted by Senator Symington.

Secretary Rogers commented that he was convinced the situation in the Foreign Relations Committee was now a great deal better. Secretary Laird added that the Committee was now obviously split and that the Son Tay operation had been largely responsible for this. Secretary Rogers stated that the Department of State was also breakfasting with members of the Committee and that this had improved communications immeasurably. Secretary Laird remarked that the Department of Defense was also working with the Committee on a regular basis.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [3]

Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Deputy Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] The President had recently sent Prime Minister Thanom a message, in telegram 6319 to Bangkok, January 14, stating that “I want you to know how impressed I have been with the performance of the Thai personnel who are assisting the Lao in the common defense interests of Laos and Thailand, first in successful actions at Long Tieng and Sam Thong, then at Ban Na and now at Ban Houay Sai. I wish in particular to commend the irregular forces at Ban Houay Sai who recently inflicted very heavy casualties on three regular North Vietnamese battalions with the loss of only one Thai.” (Ibid.,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL THAI–US)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, January 25, 1971, 1230Z.

1108. Subject: PL–480. Ref: A. State 012354;[2] B. State 012350.[3]

1. I made presentation to Prime Minister this afternoon following closely reftel A. PriMin was accompanied by FonMin Thanat and Minister in Prime Minister's office General Sawaeng. I was accompanied by political and economic counselors.

2. In my presentation, I laid particular stress on: a) joint interest of our two governments in Indonesia's economic and financial stability. This importantly furthered by IGGI efforts, in context of which U.S. PL–480 and other assistance provided. b) Opportunity for additional commercial sales which may be presented if GOI decides to forgo 50,000 tons of PL–480 rice in favor of other PL–480 commodities; and c) Evidence that our activity has not been disruptive of commercial opportunities provided by fact that 400,000 tons of rice commercially imported by Indonesia in their FY 1969–70 (almost double the 1965–66 total).

3. Thai side argued extensively with all three of these points, with Thanat carrying the attack.

4. PriMin did not argue against aid to Indonesia, but made one point in this respect which he held to politely but persistently—the U.S. should aid Indonesia, but with commodities other than rice or with cash. He said that the amount of money involved in 400,000 tons rice sale meant little to the U.S., but was fundamentally important to Thailand.

5. Thanat, nominally acting as interpreter but in fact presenting most of the argumentation himself, said “the IGGI has nothing to do with U.S. Simply because it is a member of IGGI, the United States cannot arrogate to itself the right to take actions seriously detrimental to this country.” He said Thailand is trying hard to stand on its own feet, as Marshall Green in a recent speech was quoted as saying they should do. Then he added their ability to do so is seriously affected when the United States unfairly disrupts its markets for its principal export, rice.

6.

I said that the U.S. had not disrupted Thailand's market, but that our actions had greatly helped Indonesia, a country badly in need.

Like Thailand, Indonesia was a very important country in Southeast Asia, its security, stability and financial health was very important to the area, including to Thailand, as well as to the U.S. Therefore we were working with others to try to restore Indonesia's economic health, at the same time minimizing the ill effects on the export markets of others. I said the fact that Indonesia's commercial imports were up showed both that the program was in fact contributing to the health of the Indonesian economy and that our program had not interfered with commercial markets. (Thanat picked this point up somewhat later.)

7. A second point stressed by PM was that if we had to use rice as a commodity in aid program for Indonesia, we should do as Japan did, i.e., buy some of the rice in Thailand to give to Indonesia. Thanat added that Japan had much larger rice stocks than the U.S., yet found it possible to take account of the interest of countries such as Thailand and to forestall the ill effects of its “politically motivated” sales.

8. I said I was happy that the Japanese had been able to take this action. I said that in making comparisons with this action and that of the U.S., however, we must remember that Thailand's heavy trade imbalance with Japan, which was not offset in any other way, contributed importantly to Thailand's balance of payments problems. By contrast, the total effect of U.S. activities and direct assistance made an important positive contribution to Thailand's overall balance of payments. Thus I could understand why the Japanese would be especially concerned to compensate at least in some small measure for the overall effect of their role.

9. Thanat then said that if we are going to compare Japan and the U.S., we must remember that Thailand is not extending the same cooperation to Japan and opening the same facilities to Japan that it is to the U.S. He said the Thai contribution to the security of this area and to U.S. interests in particular was persistently overlooked by some in Washington. I said I did not in the least minimize the Thai contribution, but that if we were going to look at the matter in the perspective he had suggested we should also round out the picture and recall the enormous expenditures which the U.S. had made and the enormous role it had played in other respects in Southeast Asia to contribute to the security of the countries of the area.

10. On the question of the commercial opportunity being open to Thailand, Thanat was thoroughly scornful of the 600,000 ton figure originally requested by the Indonesians (“Only a bargaining figure”; “They may just as well have asked for a million tons”). He was equally scornful of the possibility of a further 50,000 ton increase from the 400,000 ton planning figure. He said that 50,000 tons of rice was “an almost ridiculous amount,” and said that if we were to say we were cutting that 350,000 tons had already been shipped or was in the late stages of preparation for shipping and therefore the 50,000 tons were all that could be cut from the program. He said (referring to the Vietnamese case of last year) that “ships can be diverted”. He asked “What makes you think they will buy the 50,000 ton balance from us anyway?” I replied that they have been pressing us for more rice, and that we will be supplying other kinds of needs if they decide to forgo the rice which should free the necessary foreign exchange. Thus the possibility seemed good.

11. Picking up my point about the 400,000 tons of commercial sales in FY 69–70, he denied that Indonesia had purchased that much, saying he did not question that I had been told that, but that I had been “misled” by Washington. He said in any case it was “specious reasoning” to say that commercial imports of rice had gone up as the result of our PL–480 sales. I responded firmly that I had not argued that, but had said that the total effect of our activities, including the PL–480 sales, had obviously not been disruptive when commercial purchases by Indonesia were double the 1965–66 level. I said we thus saw no evidence that our activities had been disruptive. He said if we would stop our sales we would see immediately how disruptive they had been because Thai export sales would immediately rise. I responded by raising again the question of why Thailand had not obtained more of the rising commercial purchases Indonesia was making. Thanat then challenged me saying did I mean to say that PL–480 has not disrupted normal commercial sales: what about sales which Thailand in the past has been on the point of making which were cancelled at the last minute because of this program. I said I was addressing the present case of Indonesia.

12. Thanat again spoke of “intrusion into a perfectly normal market”. I asked why Germany and others couldn't just as well use such an argument to prove that we were “interfering” with their market in Thailand for equipment, weapons, etc. He simply said that was up to the Germans to raise with us. He said it was up to us to prove we were not causing disruption, not the other way around. He said everyone in Thailand, including the people on the streets, knew that disruption was being caused. I said these people were of course guided by what they were being told by the newspapers and others. I said I knew there was a problem, but the question was why. In the face of the large Indonesian commercial imports in the past year, I was still uncertain why Thailand did not get more of that market. Thanat again took the position that our figures were simply wrong.

13. I said our actions have shown that we do mean to work closely with the Thais to avoid damaging their interests. I said the USG has many commitments, including to Indonesia, but we attempted to discharge them without disrupting the markets of others. I recalled again the two reductions already made in the figure for PL–480 rice for Indonesia, and that we were now proposing another.

14. Thanat denied that we had taken their interests into account. He said we had not really consulted them, but simply presented them with faits accomplis. He said Ambassador Sunthorn has been treated with “arrogance” in his talks on this subject in Washington. I said I was very surprised to hear him say that, pointing out I had seen no reflection of it in my talks in Washington.

15. Thanat then said the U.S. does not raise rice for consumption but only to dump on the markets of the world, and asked why we don't do something about production. I pointed out that we had increased rice production to meet a grave world shortage starting in 1965, and that we had thereby saved many people from starvation. We recognized that the supply situation had changed and we had cut back acreage in the past two years, but such an adjustment takes time. He said I was “evading” the U.S. domestic political element. I said of course that element was there, but it was there largely because of the investments American farmers had made to gear up production where it was needed. He said the American economy could adjust more quickly than it was doing.

16. At the end I agreed to report the views I had heard to Washington and again urged them to be prepared to follow up on the commercial opportunity that might open. This earned a scornful “thanks” from Thanat.

17. Comment: While Thanat carried the ball and did most of the talking, Thanom obviously agreed with him on at least a couple of basic points, i.e., that Thailand is being hurt, and that they got previous little from us in response to his appeal through SecDef.

18. It is worth noting in particular that to reinforce one point about PL–480 rice sales Thanat cited (and obviously endorsed) a highly critical Malaysian comment about our rubber disposal program.

19. We are withholding any press release or comment until we see how RTG plays that aspect but are preparing for a substantial effort to get our side of story told if they go on the offensive again.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority.

[2] Dated January 23. (Ibid.)

[3] Dated January 23. (Ibid.)

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, February 2, 1971, 1003Z.

1492. Subject: PL–480 Rice.

1. In informal, wide ranging session with Deputy Prime Minister Praphat and two of his close aides and advisors (General Surakit Mayalarp and Dr. Malai Huvanandana), subject of PL–480 rice assistance to Indonesia came in for extended discussion. I ran through all of our principal arguments and found that he had been well briefed on them in advance by staff members to whom we had earlier provided background material.

2. All of our efforts, however, went for little because of the fact that he has also been informed that, when Thailand was negotiating for a commercial sale with Indonesia, the Indonesians, who at first showed considerable interest, later broke off the negotiations and told the Thais they had learned that the U.S. would be supplying Indonesia's rice needs through a PL–480 deal. In light of this, he said it was of no use to try to “prove” that our program did not interfere with Thai exports to Indonesia.

3. He went on to make it quite clear that he regards this issue as potentially damaging in the extreme to the long standing friendship between the Thai and American peoples—to him it is not just a government-to-government matter. He said that virtually every Thai person knows about this issue and believes that it strikes at the very heart of Thailand's economy, its rice production and trade. He said this was an issue which could easily put placard-bearing students on the march and which could get out of hand to the point where Americans could not appear on the streets of Bangkok “without getting their heads broken.” All this was said without any personal rancor on his part and in fact with explicit recognition of the political and economic problems we face at home and in full knowledge of the steps we have taken to try to ease the situation from Thailand's point of view.

4. I think we must take this as a very serious indication from our friends in the RTG, in this case a most important one, that while they are prepared to accept the fact that nothing can be done about our rice shipments to Indonesia during the present Indonesian FY, they do not feel it will be possible to face a similar outcome next year without it spilling over to the serious detriment of our general relations with Thailand. (I am not sure myself that we will not feel those consequences a good deal sooner.)

5. With this in mind, I would appreciate the earliest possible indication of our planning with respect to the IGGI food aid package for the coming Indonesian FY, as well as our other plans for PL–480 rice programs in the region.[2] With that information in hand I will come in with recommendations (a) as to how we should handle consultations with the RTG, and (b) for a broader economic strategy for Thailand in the context of which the PL–480 problem can hopefully be presented more successfully.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta.

[2] In telegram 23361 to Bangkok, February 10, the Department agreed “that Praphat's remarks are a significant indication of how seriously RTG leaders have taken PL 480 program” and shared “your concern about future relations.” It noted, however, that “we have little flexibility as to what we can do with respect to U.S. rice shipments. Although it may not be possible completely to avoid untimely PL 480 sales, we hope that future agreements which involve Thailand's traditional markets will not be signed during the November–April period when Thailand is searching for markets for its new crop and prices are particularly vulnerable.” (Ibid.)

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Commanding General of the U.S. Air Force in Thailand (Evans)[1]

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1121Z.

2566. Subject: ARC Light Capability. Ref: 7/13AF 230900Z Feb 71.[2]

1. PoMil counselor conveyed to Air Chief Marshal Dawee this morning on urgent basis our plan bring additional nine B–52's into U-Tapao to support maximum air effort in SEA. Dawee made note of fact that this would bring total number of B–52's to 51 and that five combat lightning K–135's would be removed. He asked how soon RTG approval was required. Counselor did not reveal fact that aircraft were at this point already airborne but said he hoped approval could be granted on the spot. Dawee did so, saying he would immediately inform PriMin.

2. While Dawee indicated full support for currently ongoing operations to cut enemy lines in Laos and expressed understanding for urgency of B–52 deployment, he clearly registered point that RTG approval was required for this deployment.

3. Ambassador subsequently touched base on B–52 deployment with Prime Minister who had already been informed by Dawee.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, ISP/P Files: Lot 72 D 504. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of State, CINCPAC, and SAC.

[2] Not found.

109. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, February 24, 1971, 1205Z.

2569. Subject: PL–480 Rice Sales. Ref: (A) Bangkok 2359;[2] (B) State 029914.[3]

Summary. In preliminary consultations concerning PL–480 aid to Indonesia during coming year, Thanat stressed gravity of Thailand's rice problem at present, above all depressed price, and concern that US and Japanese activity would leave little room for commercial sales to Indonesia. Our willingness to begin consultations this early and our commitments re timing of agreements are major new positive factors, and were acknowledged as such by Thanat. End summary.

1. I told Thanat at meeting on February 23 that Department had authorized me to open preliminary consultations with him concerning PL–480 portion of our aid to Indonesia for coming year. He was evidently appreciative of our willingness to begin process this early in the game. He said the rice problem, particularly severely depressed price, was a matter of deep concern to the RTG. This concern was shared by the King, he said, who was taking the closest interest in the problem. In all fairness, he said, they had to accept that there were a great many factors other than PL–480 which contributed to the problem. However, the latter did aggravate the problem at a time when it was already extremely serious. He said the RTG might well have to adopt a highly expensive price support program for rice this year to avoid widespread and serious hardship and dissatisfaction in rural areas. He said that the timing and magnitude of our PL–480 sales, while only one factor, could be an extremely important one.

2. I then spoke as outlined in ref A as authorized and modified by ref B. I stressed that what I had given him and the fact that I had been authorized to open these consultations at this time was in further response to the Prime Minister's request to the President made through Secretary Laird. Thanat took note of this and instructed his secretary (Birabhongse) to record the facts so that the substance of my presentation would be passed to the Prime Minister's office.

3. Commenting on the substance of our presentation, he noted that our planning figure of 350,000 was half of the minimum estimate of Indonesian requirements. Considering that the Japanese would be active in this market with non-commercial sales as well, he expressed concern that there would be precious little left for commercial sellers. He asked whether we knew what Japan was planning to do this year. I agreed to find out what if anything the USG held on that. (Thanat mentioned, incidentally, that RTG had also complained to GOJ concerning its rice program for Indonesia.)

4. In discussion of level of commercial sales in past years, Thanat acknowledged that there were other competing suppliers, including Italy and Egypt. However, he said Thailand was much less concerned about them, considering their competition as commercial in contrast to that of US and Japan.

5. Comment: It would be helpful to be able to go back to Thanat as promptly as possible with whatever information we can provide concerning Japanese intentions. This will of course have a bearing on the position RTG will take concerning the 350,000 ton figure. In any case, our commitment with respect to timing, which was obviously responsive to one of the primary concerns Thanat expressed prior to my presentation, will be of major help.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Secret; Priority.

[2] Dated February 20. (Ibid.)

[3] Dated February 23. (Ibid.)

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, March 11, 1971, 0957Z.

3380. Singapore For Amb. Kennedy. Ref: A. State 034153;[2] B. Bangkok 2928[3] and previous.

1. Late yesterday afternoon Amb. Kennedy was received in audience by Their Majesties the King and Queen; also present were Mrs. Kennedy, Mrs. Whittle, Mrs. Unger and myself. Amb. Kennedy at the outset explained President Nixon had asked him to convey his greetings to His Majesty, reaffirm his high regard for Thailand and close interest in developments here, his determination to continue working closely with countries in this region to assure their security, and to solicit any message which His Majesty would like to convey to the President through Amb. Kennedy.

2. The President's letter of invitation to Their Majesties was then presented.[4] His Majesty was obviously pleased but expressed his doubt about leaving his country this year in view of the many pressing problems and unsettled situation here. Amb. Kennedy made it clear that the President hoped that if this year were not possible, next year might be. (I arranged with His Majesty's aide to get the King's more considered reply for transmittal to the President as soon as it is ready.)

3. The remainder of the discussion between His Majesty and Amb. Kennedy was taken up in a lengthy and intense discussion by the King of several critical issues now facing Thailand. First on the list and obviously of profound concern to His Majesty was Thailand's severe internal and external economic problems deriving from the depressed price of rice and the important contribution to this problem made by U.S. PL–480 sales, above all to Indonesia. His Majesty's review of the problem was along familiar lines but I think we must not underestimate the strength of his feelings on this matter and his conviction that the rice problem will have not only mounting economic consequences but serious political repercussions as well, potentially very damaging to U.S.-Thai relations. Without going into detail His Majesty also alluded to the problem of disposal of rubber surpluses.

4. The other major topic was a review by His Majesty of the growing insurgency problem. Here his principal emphasis was laid in the first place on the need for equipment (above all helicopters) for the border patrol police who should receive support largely according to the same criteria as the military forces since their role is largely a military one. He also made clear his dissatisfaction with inept administration and even oppression by public officials as a contributory factor to the growth of the insurgency.

5. At the close of the audience His Majesty expressed appreciation for the President's having sent Amb. Kennedy and the opportunity it provided for him to convey his messages in return.

6. Amb. Kennedy has approved this message.

5. [sic] foregoing message classified Exdis because ref A. Unless Dept. sees objection suggest it be reduced to simple confidential.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Singapore.

[2] Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 7 THAI)

[3] Dated March 3. (Ibid.)

[4] The approved text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 38103 to Bangkok, March 5. (Ibid., POL 7 US/KENNEDY)

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, March 16, 1971, 1105Z.

3136. The following telegram sent action Singapore March 12, 1971 is h/w being repeated for Dept's action and Djakarta's info.

“Subject: Ambassador Kennedy's Call on PM Thanom.

1. Summary: Ambassador Kennedy's call on Prime Minister, who had with him four cabinet members and DG of National Economic Development Board, was used by Thai officials for emphatic presentation their views on PL–480 rice sales. They returned to this subject almost to exclusion all other topics raised by Ambassador Kennedy. In Thanat's absence atmosphere was more friendly than when same subject raised previously, but seriousness of Thai concern and unanimity of all top officials was presented even more effectively. Thai presentation focused on RTG's efforts to help itself, essential role of exports in Thailand's economic viability, central position of rice in this regard, and impossibility shift from rice to more diversified exports in short run, say next two years. New element was repeated request that United States lend Indonesia funds for rice purchases in Thailand. Request was presented in fashion reflecting, for first time, full recognition and appreciation of great value of IGGI program and US contribution not only to Indonesia, but to Southeast Asia as a whole and to Thailand in particular. Ambassador Kennedy expressed appreciation for informative presentation and assured Prime Minister of US intention give full consideration to Thai concerns. End summary.

2. Ambassador Unger yesterday took Ambassador Kennedy to call on Prime Minister Thanom who had with him Minister of National Development Pote, Minister of Finance Serm, Minister in Prime Minister's office Sawaeng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sanga (representing FonMin in Thanat's absence), and Secretary General of Nedb Renoo. Pote acted as Thanom's interpreter and principal spokesman.

3. Ambassador Kennedy opened discussion with brief explanation of his Presidential mandate. In his response Thanom immediately turned to Thailand's balance of payments problem. Thailand was still a low income country depending for economic viability heavily on a few export commodities. Rice was by far the most important export. Current trends toward self-sufficiency in neighboring countries, which constituted Thailand's markets, were seriously reducing export opportunities and depressing price. This problem was intensified by PL–480 sales. Besides rice, the important rubber market was weak, and the surplus disposal issue is a depressing effect. Tin, although of somewhat less importance to Thailand, was another export commodity whose price was declining. Ambassador Kennedy briefly commented on the importance of agricultural diversification in coping with excessive dependence on one or a few export commodities, but Thanom, speaking through Pote, returned to his theme. Diversification required both time and markets. For Thailand rice was now and would inevitably remain for some time the principal export commodity. For the US, rice was a marginal product. Thailand was able and prepared to compete even in the present depressed market on normal commercial terms, but was unable to compete against concessional terms offered to its traditional customers. Thailand's problem was intensified by the increasing financial burden of essential security measures and need to expand development activities just to keep even with population increase. Security was a precondition for economic development, and economic development without security would be meaningless.

4. Ambassador Kennedy said the United States was anxious to be helpful in assisting Thailand in working its way out of its present predicament. Among the major tasks with which we might be able to be helpful were the development of expertise and education, and particularly with diversification and market development. DepFonMin Sanga immediately returned to the theme of rice, saying that the biggest single problem in finding a market for the rice available for export was Indonesia.

5. Ambassador Kennedy expressed understanding of the importance of this problem, and asked whether tourism was expanding. Pote replied that the number of tourists was increasing, but money was getting scarce and the hotels were suffering. Returning to rice, he said that Thailand had considered subsidizing the Thai farmer, but there was really no way to do this which the country could afford. Sanga added that current prices were far below last year's. Ambassador Unger said that, recognizing Thailand's concern about this matter, we wanted to be extremely careful regarding next year's PL–480 program. We would consider what the ministers had told us, continue our consultations, which had already begun, both here and in Washington and avoid, in particular, timing of sales which would fall within Thailand's principal marketing period.

6. Pote, for the first time raising a subject other than rice, said tourism was very important to Thailand. Thailand was providing all possible incentives for its expansion. He was, therefore, concerned about reports that PanAm was taking its 747's to Singapore and hoped that they would not bypass Bangkok. He and Ambassador Kennedy then briefly discussed character of tourist industry here.

7. Returning to rice Pote said the RTG hoped that the United States might be able to lend money to Indonesia on favorable terms to buy rice from Thailand. Ambassador Unger explained that American rice to Indonesia was in effect not supplied on a loan basis but as outright aid. In a sense it did double duty: the rice itself met an urgent immediate requirement in foreign exchange field, and the rupiahs paid for it were channeled into development. Pote said he understood well that the American program was very helpful to Indonesia, and Thailand ‘could not make too much noise about it.’ Indonesia needed rice and had no foreign exchange to buy it. But even if the US lent money to Indonesia for only two years to purchase this rice from Thailand, this would help Thailand get over the worst of its readjustment to the new situation. The Minister of Finance commented that for the same reason Thailand warmly welcomed other US assistance to Indonesia, including American investment in Indonesia. The inflow of American resources in turn enabled Indonesia to purchase other requirements from Thailand. Ambassador Kennedy said part of the problem was that Indonesia's problems were long-term. It took the IBRD and other international lenders to work out an approach that seemed appropriate to the Indonesian situation, and this type of solution was not addressed to Thailand's short-term problem. He was most anxious to understand Thailand's problem and to have this opportunity to discuss it with Thai leaders.

8. Thanom, speaking through Pote, said Thailand was happy to know that the US helped Indonesia which has turned toward the free world. This assistance helped in strengthening the whole region. Thanom wanted this help to continue, and was only concerned that it should not create problems for Thailand's own endeavors to help itself.

9. Ambassador Kennedy said he was here to learn and appreciated the friendship extended to US over many years. It was the President's personal determination to build strength throughout the region and to work together with Thailand. It was his conviction that a good potential for a stronger economy existed throughout the whole area. He was also well aware of the fact that sometimes we ourselves were slowing down deliberately and tightening our budget in a manner that made itself felt in many contexts, in particular in our aid programs and in American tourism.

10. Thanom raised the question of special funds. The Asian Development Bank had substantial resources by now but its terms were such that Thailand did not appear able to receive much help from it. Ambassador Kennedy said that the administration had been unable to obtain Congressional approval for special funds for the ADB. It had been his own endeavor to have the United States make a contribution to ADB's special funds equal to that which the Japanese were making. This position which envisaged a US contribution of approximately $100 million had the firm support of the executive, and had been included in a bill providing for appropriations for other international lending institutions. Even though special funds for the ADB had been deleted by the Congress, the request will be resubmitted. The ADB, which had been slow in getting started, was nevertheless now in a better position to contribute to the development of the region.

11. Pote asked whether the US could help Indonesia with commodities other than rice. Was the US discouraging farmers from growing rice? Ambassador Kennedy said technological progress such as use of fertilizers sometimes permitted increases in yields even though acreage was restricted. Ambassador Unger referred to the recent discussion of our Indonesian aid program in Bangkok and Washington and pointed out that we had in fact offered to substitute other commodities this year for some rice scheduled for Indonesia. Indonesia needed a great deal of rice at certain times, and he repeated the hope that by beginning consultations on this complex problem early our efforts to reduce or eliminate an unfavorable impact on Thailand would be as effective as possible. Pote repeated that the Prime Minister wanted to stress the key importance of rice to Thailand. Indonesia constitutes a traditional market for about 300,000 tons of rice. With a disposable surplus of about 1 million tons, and with few other large markets (such as Hong Kong), sales to Indonesia were critical. He wished to repeat the suggestion that the US assist Indonesia by lending to it, perhaps through banking channels, an amount corresponding to the present level of American assistance. This would help solve Thailand's problem and satisfy everyone. Thailand itself would need PL–480 assistance and was looking forward to further talks about this matter.

12. Ambassador Kennedy expressed his deep appreciation for the opportunity to meet with his hosts and to explore these important problems with them.

13. Comment: In addition to underlining once more the central position of rice in this country's economy and therefore the sharply adverse impact of US PL–480 rice transactions on our relations, the discussion between Ambassador Kennedy and the Prime Minister and his group (heavily weighted on economic side) also strongly suggested that we will be adding another serious problem to US-Thai relations if surplus rubber disposal is not handled exceptionally carefully.

14. Ambassador Kennedy has approved.

Unger”

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 7 US/KENNEDY. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Djakarta.

112. Minutes of 40 Committee Meeting[1]

San Clemente, California, March 31, 1971, 10:26–11:55 a.m.

SUBJECT

Various—see summary of conclusions

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

Defense

Mr. David Packard

JCS

Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles

CIA

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. William Nelson

Mr. [name not declassified]

Mr. David Blee

NSC Staff

Mr. Frank M. Chapin

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed to:

1. Approve a proposal for employment of Thai SGUs in Sayaboury Province in Laos. (pages 2–3)

2. Use gunships stationed at Udorn, Thailand to provide cover for medical evacuation flights in North Laos. (pages 3–4)

[Omitted here are summaries unrelated to Southeast Asia.]

Dr. Kissinger: I take it you have been discussing Thai deployments to Sayaboury.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. We have just now received some new information which changes Dave Packard's and my views on this.

(Mr. Johnson showed the telegrams to Mr. Kissinger.)

Gen. Cushman: This group would be composed of regulars and would count against the total of regulars projected for SGUs. No extra money would be required for this program, since these troops would proceed into SGU programs. The regulars are part of the 1,174-man cadre already planned for the program. [6 paragraphs (61/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, why not go ahead and do it?

Mr. Johnson: There is a second item that was a late starter for this meeting. This is medevac for Ban Na. We were talking this over before the meeting and agreed that there would be great difficulty in stationing gunships in Laos. The Joint Staff is going to CINCPAC to see if it would not be possible to put the gunships in Udorn, realizing that they might have to refuel in Laos. There are two questions: whether we have the necessary assets and whether they should be stationed in Udorn.

Dr. Kissinger: Weren't Air America pilots to be used for this?

Mr. Packard: We were talking about gunships.

[1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified]

Gen. Knowles: We were talking about gunships other than Cobras. I will ring out CINCPAC to see what is available.

Gen. Cushman: Cobras are not available.

Gen. Knowles: We will check this out, but it is unlikely that we can get any Cobras.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me see if I understand what has been agreed. We are going to station gunships in Udorn.

Gen. Knowles: We are going out to CINCPAC to see, first, if we can station gunships (probably of the UHB type) at Udorn and, second, whether they can be provided with range-extension kits or whether we can put some bladders in Laos for refueling. The B-type gunships have greater utility, since they can also do some medevac.

Dr. Kissinger: We can find out if it is feasible. If it proves to be feasible why not go ahead and do it?

Mr. Packard: We decided that we should not base the gunships in Laos. We can approve a program that bases them in Thailand but provides for refueling in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't see what more we can learn once we determine whether this is technically feasible. Is everyone agreed that we should go ahead if this proposal is feasible?

All agreed. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: Now let's turn to the regular 40 Committee agenda.

[Omitted here is discussion of Laos and other countries.]

[1] Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Files, Minutes, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the conference room of the Western White House. A notation on the minutes indicates Nelson, [name not declassified], and Blee of CIA were not present for the entire meeting.

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, April 4, 1971, 0549Z.

4528. Saigon Pass General Abrams. Subj: General Praphat's Concern over Lam Son 719.

1. Summary. Deputy Prime Minister Praphat on April 1 expressed grave concern about outcome of Lam Son 719. He has heard from Vietnamese that poor US support made retreat inevitable. He is generally worried about what he sees as evidence of uncertainty in US about concrete support to strengthen Thailand and other sea countries. Discussion demonstrated need urgently a) to move ahead with effective STAFD [2] program and b) if possible, to offer DPM chance to discuss Lam Son 719 with top level military officer from Vietnam. End summary.

2. Evening Thursday, April 1 I had a long, highly informal session with Deputy Prime Minister Praphat over drinks. He had only RTA Chief of Staff Surakij and his civilian adviser Malai with him. I was accompanied by political counselor.

3. It soon became clear that the DPM was in generally gloomy mood about situation in this area. After brief and very general discussion of problems that had arisen during two decades of US military assistance to Thailand, and somewhat more specific reference to problems and ambiguities in US support for Thai operations and contingency plans in recent months, General Praphat said he was deeply worried about the uncertainties that had arisen concerning US support for the countries of Southeast Asia in the future. He said the US seemed to be wavering in its commitment to this area because of domestic politics—he referred to pledges to strengthen countries in the region but didn't see evidence of this in Thailand. He said he and the other RTG leaders were strongly committed to continue cooperation with the US, but that if the uncertainties about US intentions were allowed to deepen no one could tell when the Thai people, or Asian people generally, would feel obliged to change their attitude toward the US.

4. He then introduced the subject of Lam Son 719, and it was quickly apparent that this had contributed greatly to his disturbed frame of mind. Reiterating several times that he was giving us an “Asian view” as a close friend, he said he was extremely worried about what he characterized as the premature withdrawal from the route 9 area of Laos. He said he had heard from South Vietnamese sources that their retreat was made necessary by poor US support—the source claimed some units were not even kept supplied with basics such as ammunition. He expressed the view that if we were not prepared to stay in key parts of the trail area until the end of the dry season, it would have been much better not to go in at all. He compared the action to striking a bee hive with a stick, which makes the bees go out and sting everyone, but which does not prevent their return, leaving everything as before. In fact he said the enemy would be even better prepared next year to meet attempts to block their efforts, attempts which would have even less US support than the present ones had. He said it appeared that political considerations had prevailed over military in this operation. He expressed concern that the intent may have been merely to keep the situation in the South quiet so as to permit continued US withdrawals that would leave the countries of the area to cope with a worsened situation afterwards.

5. I said I was quite certain he was misinterpreting the purpose of the operation and not giving enough credit to its achievement. I noted that from the beginning it had been said publicly and privately that the intent was to destroy and to disrupt the flow of supplies and ammunition, not to hold territory. The strength of the enemy reaction seemed to have been a factor in determining the length of the operation, but indications were the ARVN generally fought well. As for our support, I said that weather was always a problem in connection with air operations, especially helicopter operations. I said the President had to be realistic about what he could do on a continuing basis since this could be done only with the support of the American people, and therefore could not put US ground forces in Laos in support of the Vietnamese troops. But I said our air and logistic support had been massive and unstinting. With respect to the effect of the operation, in addition to the casualties inflicted and the impact on supplies, it seemed almost certain now that the operation had given the Cambodians another year in which to train and equip their forces. By next dry season they should be a much more significant factor in the picture. Likewise other friendly countries in the area would be stronger by then so that the outlook was by no means bleak in spite of the fact that US troop withdrawals from Vietnam would be continuing.

6. While he took note of and understood my arguments, it was perfectly clear that he still believed the friendly forces should have gone in to stay until the end of the dry season, or not have gone in at all. With respect to strengthening the countries of the area, he did not question this with respect to South Vietnam and Cambodia, but he asked how much stronger will Thailand really be by the end of next year. He said old plans we had begun on had not been completed, and new plans have been discussed but implementation has not begun. He reminded me gently that he has been waiting for months to hear from me concerning plans and preparations which we asked them to begin making for Cambodian contingencies. Meanwhile he said he gets constant requests for his armed forces to loan equipment to others, and to provide training to others who “arrive naked” looking to Thailand to supply them from the ground up. While we have promised to replace what Thailand is giving he has seen little evidence so far that we will do so. Meanwhile Thailand is getting more pressure from the enemy, with new and heavier weapons being used against them, especially in northern Thailand.

7. Comment: The need to get on with discussion of the STAFD package is too evident to need further stress and I told the DPM that I expected to be able to begin useful discussions with him soon concerning plans to improve the capability of their forces in a truly meaningful way.

8. On Lam Son 719, in view of the weight Praphat's views carry in RTG councils I consider it important to expose him to a well-informed assessment of Lam Son by one of our top military people from Vietnam. I am currently trying to work something out with Saigon.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL 15–1 THAI. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.

[2]  STAFD was the acronym for the Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Defense program.

114. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, April 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

PL–480 Rice Sales

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Suthi Nartworathat, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Economic Affairs;

Mr. Vicharn Nivatvong, Director-General, Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs;

Mr. Herman H. Barger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State;

Mr. Laurence G. Pickering, Political Counselor, Embassy;

Mr. Konrad Bekker, Economic Counselor, Embassy;

Mr. Norman L. Smith, Economic Officer, Embassy;

Mr. Victor L. Tomseth, Political Officer, Embassy.

During the course of a wide-ranging luncheon conversation on Thailand's present rice marketing difficulties Mr. Barger reviewed actions the United States has taken or is prepared to take with respect to our PL–480 food assistance to Indonesia. He noted first that this past year the total amount of U.S. PL–480 rice provided to Indonesia totaled 350,000 tons as compared to their original request for 600,000 tons. He said that part of this reduction—50,000 tons—had been in direct response to an appeal made by the Prime Minister to President Nixon.

Moreover, we began early consultations with the Thai on next year's program. Such consultations have been virtually continuous on this subject between the State Department and the Thai Embassy in Washington and Thai and American officials in Bangkok since the problem was originally raised several months ago. Out of these consultations had come our decision to stay out of the Indonesian market during the peak period of Thai rice sales. This had come at the specific request of the Thai Government and we had duly informed the Foreign Ministry of our willingness to cooperate. Mr. Barger also said that the U.S. would try to avoid piecemeal sales and attempt to cover all PL–480 rice sales to Indonesia for the year under one agreement. Furthermore, the U.S. was willing to discuss at the IGGI a “Usual Marketing Requirements” provision in agreements with the Indonesians. This would guarantee that Indonesia would then procure a fixed proportion of her rice import needs on the commercial market.

At various points in the conversation Mr. Barger pointed out that the real problem facing Thailand stemmed from the “Green Revolution” and the desire of almost all countries to be self-sufficient in rice. The essential task is to come to grips with this phenomenon but the issue of U.S. PL–480 rice sales has tended to divert Thai attention from it.

Mr. Suthi said that the U.S. decision to stay out of the Indonesian market during the period immediately following the Thai harvest, which is the time when the bulk of Thailand's commercial sales abroad are made, was really meaningless since the Indonesians would attempt to avoid buying from Thailand during that period. First, he said, the Indonesian warehouses were full then, making it impossible to import more rice at that time. Moreover, they wanted to know the size of their own harvest before making any decisions on import requirements. They would then seek to cover as much of their deficit as possible through aid. Even if they were finally forced to make some commercial purchases the effect of their waiting would have been to force down the price of Thai rice. Mr. Barger said that the Thai Government's view as expressed to us through the Foreign Ministry was that it was important for us to stay out of the Indonesian market during Thailand's peak trading period.[2]

At another point Mr. Vicharn said the new principle of the World Food Organization was that food aid should not only benefit the recipient country but should also help the other developing countries that could supply that country's needs. He said that it was in accordance with this principle that the Japanese had agreed last year to purchase part of the rice it had undertaken to supply to Indonesia from Thailand. He said that Thailand would be very pleased if the U.S. could also adhere to this principle in supplying Indonesia with rice.

Mr. Barger pointed out that there was a significant difference between the U.S. and Japan in this instance. The U.S. is already supplying Thailand with considerable aid in other forms. Moreover, Thailand does not have a payments deficit with the U.S. Finally, since the U.S. has balance of payments problems of its own and a rice surplus the U.S. Congress is hardly likely to provide money for rice purchases in Thailand. Mr. Vicharn said that the amount would not have to be large whereupon Mr. Barger said that if Thailand was only interested in a cosmetic effect it could be done with a pencil; all that would be necessary would be to make a slight adjustment in the accounting procedures we are now using for the aid we are already providing to Thailand.

Comment. Suthi's comment should not be regarded as overly significant. In the first instance it probably reflects the usual lack of Thai interministerial coordination. Beyond that it is indicative of the Thai frustration over their lack of success in capturing a significant proportion of the Indonesian commercial market during the last few years. Suthi was right to the extent that U.S. activity in the Indonesian market whenever it may occur is not likely to affect Thailand's lack of competitiveness. Vicharn's proposal was certainly not new. He realizes, however, that political considerations effectively eliminate such action from the realm of possibility. His advancement of it was more in the way of a pro forma plea rather than as a serious proposal.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 INDON. Confidential. Drafted by Tomseth with the concurrence of Bekker and Barger, and approved by Pickering. The meeting was held at the American Embassy.

[2] Telegram 5615 from Djakarta, June 30, reported the sale of 100,000 tons of Thai rice to Indonesia and emphasized “how crucial our numerous representations with Indonesians (President Suharto, Fonmin Adam Malik, Widjono and others) were” to that success. It added that the “Indonesians were not disposed to buy rice from Thais against whom they harbor resentment for what they consider past price gouging. This resentment could be exacerbated if Thais again agitate about U.S. supply of PL 480 rice to Indonesia during critical period of Indonesia's development (apparently Thais have at Indonesian insistence agreed desist for one year.)” (Ibid., RICE 17 INDON–THAI)

115. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Bangkok, April 19, 1971.

Dear Marshall:

Our projection of future developments in Thailand involves us at the very outset in consideration of developments in United States policy. The major developments in Thai foreign and defense policy which are now taking place are a direct reaction to changes and anticipated changes in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. These changes have been most apparent in the context of the Indochina war, particularly in our reaction to events in Laos and Cambodia. In addition, over the past year the insurgency has grown in terms of the strength of the insurgents, the areas affected and in the impact on national life. Furthermore, the Thai have become alarmed over adverse trends in their economic situation. Their economic difficulties have given stimulus to a new nationalist and restrictionist outlook, and have placed additional strains on the fledgling parliamentary system. Thailand faces a difficult period of adjustment over the next few years, and Thai leaders face difficult decisions if they are to meet urgent defense requirements without sacrificing development needs. While we are not, on balance, pessimistic in our general projection, we recognize that our ability to influence Thai decisions on these important issues is declining with the shift in U.S.—and Thai— policy. In reading what follows it should be borne in mind that there are differing trends and currents in the Thai leadership's thinking and the issues identified are not necessarily seen in the same light by all.

Thai-U.S. Relations

Thailand is taking the first reluctant and tentative steps toward a partial disengagement from the close relationship with the U.S. which she has maintained over the past two decades. This process is painful to the Thai, but will doubtless continue—at a rate, I believe, closely related to the reduction of the American presence in Southeast Asia and of the credibility of the American commitment to Thailand.

Thai leaders have accepted the Nixon Doctrine as a reasonable and responsible statement of U.S. policy, but they are increasingly doubtful that the President will be able to carry out his policies in the face of political and especially Congressional resistance. As Deputy Prime Minister (and heir apparent) Praphat remarked when I presented him a copy of Secretary Rogers' Foreign Policy Report 1969–70, Thai leaders find no fault whatever with statements of U.S. Policy—it is the implementation which sometimes troubles them.

Changes in U.S. policy, as they affect Thailand, have been revealed to the Thai most clearly in the context of the Indochina war, particularly in Laos and Cambodia, where the Thai see the U.S. ability to prosecute the war increasingly hedged in by Congressional restrictions. These restrictions alter the security situation for Thailand in basic ways, and have led the Thai to question the validity of the American commitment to Thailand.

In forward defense of their homeland, the Thai have been willing to commit forces in Vietnam and, covertly, in Laos. However, their involvement was undertaken with full U.S. backing and assistance, and with the expectation of U.S. support in the event the conflict should spread to threaten Thailand directly. This concept—of American support to enable a Southeast Asian country to go to the defense of a neighbor—had to be discarded when, after the conflict spread to Cambodia, the USG was legally constrained from supporting Thai military operations in Cambodia. As a result, the Thai increasingly question the possibility of our past partnership's continuing. Although they still attach great value to the alliance, I think that in the future they will view with increasing care and skepticism any new American proposals for cooperative actions which would expose them to a potentially dangerous situation, unless they receive concrete evidence that adequate American support will be forthcoming.

On military matters, U.S.-Thai relations continue to reflect a high degree of cooperation, and I expect that this will generally continue to be the case with activities which the Thai consider to be directly related to their security. They recognize that U.S. military and economic assistance are needed to meet Thailand's development and security problems. They also recognize the importance to Thailand of U.S. efforts to bring the Indonesia war to an acceptable conclusion, and in this context the still considerable U.S. military presence continues to be only a relatively minor source of friction. It will in the future be increasingly difficult, however, to secure Thai cooperation in nonmilitary areas, and even in some U.S. military activities in which the Thai do not consider that there is a mutual benefit. We are already feeling the effects of an increased Thai nationalism in our dealings with civilian branches of the RTG, and we expect that these frictions will increase. This could lead to acute issues between us and the RTG over the status of U.S. military personnel still stationed here.

Another rapidly emerging problem is that of drugs. We can expect strains in our relations as accusations are levelled at Thailand from the U.S. because of frustrations there over this tragic U.S. domestic problem and as we work with the RTG to try to control the traffic in drugs.

New Foreign Policy Directions

Disillusionment with the 20-year old relationship with the United States has led the Thai to consider new foreign policy directions—they are moving cautiously toward expanded trade and other relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, they have made tentative overtures to initiate some kind of dialogue with Peking, and they have attempted exploratory talks seeking some way of reducing the hostility of North Vietnam. The Thai are, however, too realistic to abandon the protection which the remaining U.S. presence in Southeast Asia affords them, as the price of a risky accommodation with Peking.

We expect that the Thai will continue their role of active leadership in moves toward regionalism, especially in economic and social matters. I believe they will also emphasize the political aspects of regionalism, in an attempt to gain for Southeast Asia a measure of influence in international councils which can be attained only by joint action. On security issues, the essential and continuing Thai view is that, without the support of a major power, the military effectiveness of the nations of Southeast Asia would not be enhanced significantly through a regional alliance. They recognize that Japan is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to play a major security role, although they view the expanding Japanese influence and participation in Southeast Asian affairs as largely inevitable and, on balance, in Thai interests.

Economic Prospects

Increasing pressures on the Thai economy will also be a key factor influencing Thai foreign policy, U.S.-Thai relations, Thai internal politics, and Thailand's defense capabilities.

Thailand's very substantial rate of economic growth during the decade of the 1960's obscured from the Thai Government the pressing need to make changes in law and policy, and in its economic development strategy, if it were to sustain the rate of growth. Since 1965, however, earnings from some major commodity exports—principally rice, tin and rubber—have stagnated because of falling external demand and/or falling prices. By mid-1969 the softening markets for Thai exports, lower U.S. military expenditures, and reduced net inflows on capital account, together with a continuation of the heavy demand for imports which built up during the booming 60's, combined to produce a sizeable balance of payments deficit and a consequent drawdown in Thai foreign exchange reserves. We anticipate continuing depressed markets for traditional Thai exports, and continuing reductions in U.S. military expenditures; thus we foresee no relief from the balance of payments disequilibrium for some time.

The Thai economy continues to be basically sound, but there is a growing urgency for government action to maximize inflow of foreign investment capital needed to spur industrial development, to maximize foreign exchange earnings, and to spur and diversify agricultural production. The immediate challenge is to accomplish this sufficiently within the next one or two years to reverse the downward trend in foreign exchange reserves, or at least stabilize them at a level above a danger point. The longer range challenge, of course, is to sustain growth so that Thai economic capabilities can support Thai defense needs and the educational, social and other developmental programs required, given the very high rate of population growth.

While the need for corrective action by the Thai Government is becoming increasingly urgent, we find that our ability to influence their decision is declining. This results from a number of factors including Thai attitudes toward the United States discussed above, increasing nationalism, and a scaling down and refocusing of our aid programs and other U.S. inputs into the economy.

Rice, rubber and tin, major Thai exports which are now suffering from depressed international markets, are all commodities on which U.S. Government actions—PL–480 sales and stockpile disposals— threaten (at least in Thai minds) to reduce Thai export earnings. Needless to say, it is extremely important for us to bear in mind not only the real economic effects our actions may have on Thailand, but also the effects such actions may have on overall Thai cooperation with us.

Political Evolution

While the past two years have brought experience and increased self-confidence in their ability to work within a parliamentary government, the Thai have hardly begun to develop the political parties and other institutions needed to make a workable democratic political system. The parliamentary process frequently has been a source of irritation to the military men who still dominate the Council of Ministers, and few of them show a real understanding of its workings. However, the desire to be counted among the democratic countries of the world, shared by virtually all important groups and leaders in Thailand, continues to encourage leaders to work within the democratic process and to inhibit impulses toward drastic solutions.

Over the next two or three years, the economic difficulties Thailand is encountering will place increasing pressures on the parliamentary system. Members of Parliament are growing more vocal in their criticisms of government performance on economic problems, particularly the problems of the rice farmers who constitute over 80 percent of the Thai population. The issue will inevitably become more heated as the 1973 elections approach, and political considerations will weigh heavily in RTG decisions on economic problems. Thus political and economic pressures on the RTG will combine in a way likely to increase the irritation potential of the Thai parliamentary process, and this may inhibit rational economic decisions by the government.

The top leadership of the RTG will inevitably undergo some changes during the next few years. All of the key men are very near the same age and will soon reach sixty, the mandatory retirement age in both the military and civil service. It is virtually certain that Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn will not be Prime Minister after the elections in early 1973, and he may step down before that date. Deputy Prime Minister General Praphat Charusathien now seems to be the unchallenged heir apparent but he too is getting older. General Kris Sivara is waiting in the wings but age would make his tenure at most a brief one. Beyond that the picture is less clear. While any change of leadership is bound to involve a certain amount of maneuvering, the present leaders appear to have put trusted general and field grade officers into the key military positions, thus greatly reducing the uncertainties as to what group—if not which individual—is likely to succeed them.

Future difficulties, arising possibly from a depressed economic situation or an internal or external threat to Thai security, could at some point affect Thailand's internal political stability. However, I believe the likelihood is that the changing of the guard that must come before too many years will be relatively smooth.

The Insurgency

Communist insurgent capabilities and organization accelerated sharply over the past year. The most significant CPT gains have been the establishment in both the north and northeast of reasonably secure base areas for supply and training purposes, and the substantial upgrading of insurgent weaponry from external sources. These bases will facilitate more rapid insurgent expansion.

In the northeast, Communist cadre have undertaken a systematic expansion of party influence and control by organizing more formal village militia units, providing full-time presence in about 100 villages, and providing a recruiting and training ground for subsequent promotion upwards into local units and thence to hardcore regular “Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces” (TPLAF). Government efforts to counter the insurgency have been weakened by lack of vigorous national policy direction, diversion of the leadership's attention to threats to Thailand's security from Cambodia and Laos, frictions between the major responsible elements of the RTG, lack of integrated planning and resource allocation, and—in some instances—poor performance on the ground because of inadequate training and leadership. Government countermeasures will probably limit CT growth to some extent, but will not contain it unless radically new measures of government organization are undertaken, and more consistent top-level attention is given to the insurgency.

Sincerely,

Len

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Folder 943. Secret.

116. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Strengthening Thai Forces for Defense

At Tab A is a telegram from Ambassador Unger [2] reporting his April 15 conversation with Thai Prime Minister Thanom and his senior advisors. Unger was called in by the Prime Minister to clarify questions that had arisen during the Thai Government's consideration of our proposal.[3] The main points of Ambassador Unger's message follow:

—The Thai questioning centered on the relationship of the proposed PL–480 program to on-going military and economic assistance programs and revealed considerable Thai misgivings on the proposed program.

—The Thai challenged what they considered to be the requirement for “double consultation” (on both the economic and military sides) for the same fund contribution. Unger was subsequently told that Thanom has decided to set up separate civilian and military groups to plan implementation of the proposal with us. Discussions will start next week.

Comment: Ambassador Unger believes that the Thai understand the dimension of our proposal. Their attitude toward the size of the new resources available and toward the complications of the interlocking military and economic programs was reserved but Unger believes that Thai suspicions and concerns, at least in part, are due to the difficulty they are having in grasping the new concept of indirect assistance.

The Thai view that the new program constitutes a double intrusion into their budget process is also an obvious irritant. However, Unger believes that in practice the Thai will adapt to this system and he hopes that this new military assistance tool, Baht resources, will enable the U.S. to get the program under way.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

[2] Telegram 5202 from Bangkok, April 16, reported on the “RTG's consideration of STFD proposal.” Attached but not printed.

[3] The U.S. proposal consisted of allocating new increased PL–480 funds to Thailand for its social and economic programs, with Thailand thus able to divert funds from its budget to handle the increased military expenditures that the United States was encouraging. The proposal and the Thai reaction to it are described in telegram 5202.

117. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 22, 1971.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Secret; Sensitive. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

118. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

London, April 28, 1971, 0545Z.

Secto 29/3878. Subject: SecVisit SEATO: Secretary's Bilateral Conversation with Thanat.

1. In a private conversation between the Secretary and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, the latter said that he was satisfied with the outcome of our discussions thus far on the PL 480 rice question. Thanat indicated however that he felt it important that in the coming year we avoid handling the matter as we did over the past fall and winter.

2. In a much more extended discussion on the China question, the Secretary told Thanat that we still have under consideration the choice of continuing our present policy or adopting the principle of universality: no decision has been reached as yet. The Secretary did make clear that whichever way we move, we cannot accept the expulsion from the United Nations of the Republic of China, something which would generate a very strong dissent in the United States and could undermine our support of the United Nations.

3. After a discussion of the various options available, Thanat recommended against proceeding at all this coming fall with the “important question” approach. He is persuaded that this will surely be defeated and in the aftermath the Republic of China will be put out of the United Nations. Instead of that formula, he and the Secretary discussed one which would be more positively based on seeking approval for the admission in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China. Thanat felt such a tactic offered better possibilities of avoiding the expulsion of the GRC which Thailand also opposes. In the course of this discussion with Thanat the related question of representation in the Security Council was not raised.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SEATO 3. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, Hong Kong, and USUN.

119. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and Burma (Dexter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Washington, May 12, 1971.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on US-Thai Relations

As Vietnamization proceeds, and as the US military presence and capability in East Asia declines in the coming years, Thailand's role in regional affairs will become increasingly important as an issue in United States policy. The “Nixon Doctrine” enunciates some general principles that are relevant to Thailand but the Doctrine is compatible with a wide range of policy options and needs more precise definition.

We have in essence a choice between two general roles that we might want Thailand to play in Southeast Asia. In one, Thailand would serve as an agent of the United States, while also defending its own security interests, through a primarily military posture of defense and deterrence against further Communist expansion in the region. This role would envisage a line drawn somewhere in Indochina which would represent the perimeter of US balance of power interests and would correspond with our assessment of what we could expect to hold, relying in part on Thai manpower resources and probably also on our use of Thai bases for supportive US air operations. That line would also represent a Thai forward defense perimeter, though it would lie well beyond the vital zone that the Thai would be willing or capable of attempting to hold without US subsidy and support. The line would of course contain within it other political regimes (e.g. non-Communist regimes in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) which we felt it essential to back indirectly, without U.S. ground combat forces, and which the Thai could be persuaded to support directly, with our aid, in its own security interests. This role for Thailand would be consistent with those portions of the Nixon Doctrine which emphasize US fidelity to our security commitments, US willingness to support the defense capabilities of friends and allies, and US interest in promoting regional cooperation—in this case military cooperation involving Thai assistance to its neighbors.

A major argument in favor of US support for Thailand in the role sketched above is that, if Thai forces proved effective, it would help to keep the Communist threat away from Thai borders and therefore would reduce the risk of armed attack that could bring into play our SEATO commitment. While we are pledged to uphold that commitment, we obviously do not want to have it tested because we wish to avoid the choice between further US fighting in Southeast Asia and reneging on the commitment.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether this militant role for Thailand is feasible in the current political atmosphere in the United States and in light of the proclivities and capabilities of the Thai themselves. Successful implementation of this concept would be heavily dependent upon the willingness of Congress and the US public to back it, both in funding Thai military forces (and associated economic assistance requirements) and in the security reassurances that the Thai would seek if they were asked to continue exposing themselves in this fashion to Communist military power in areas forward of their own vital security zone. It would also be dependent on Thai confidence that US promises of support and US commitments would remain firm over a relatively long period of time. It could have serious consequences if the Thai should be ineffective in their military role or if the US, because of political and legislative developments at home, should have to have to cut off support for the Thai after starting them down this path.

As an alternative to this role for Thailand, we could see that country confining its security attention to Thailand itself, though with due concern for certain adjacent border areas of truly vital interest to Thailand, and seeking to settle its affairs with both North Vietnam and Peking by political rather than military means. In this role, the Thai might use the possibility of their intervention in support of neighboring non-Communist regimes (and the fact of their current presence in Laos) as a bargaining tool in attempting to reach an understanding with North Vietnam. The US security commitment and the actuality or possibility of Thai bases being used by the United States could also be helpful for this purpose and to strengthen Thai hands in working for accommodation with Peking. The US would confine its assistance to developing Thai strength economically and militarily for defense and internal security. We would terminate as soon as possible our subsidization of Thai mercenaries in Laos and desist from further planning on U.S. support of Thai forces in a regional role.

This alternative role for Thailand would, like the first, be compatible with the Nixon Doctrine, especially with the Doctrine's emphasis upon local initiative and a reduced American “profile” in Southeast Asia. It would, on the other hand, call for us to downplay the security commitment element of our relationship with Thailand and to reduce Thai dependence upon that commitment. It could lead to a “neutral” Thailand, with SEATO eventually reduced to a dead letter. This alternative would be consistent with present trends in US public opinion and legislation which do not favor subsidizing Asians to fight Asians in support of US interests—or in support of our SEA friends' interests as we see them. This alternative would also be compatible with traditional Thai methods of dealing with the outside world and with a strong current of opinion within RTG political circles which is pressing for moves to accommodate with Hanoi and Peking.

While it may be argued that the first alternative role for Thailand would have the advantage of insulating the US SEATO commitment, the same argument can be made for this second alternative. There is little evidence today that either North Vietnam or the PRC have any intention in the foreseeable future of attacking Thailand. There is little reason to suppose that they would expand their ambitions and develop such an intention if North Vietnamese forces should come nearer to Thai borders. On the other hand, should Thai military forces, at US behest and with heavy US subsidy, become a major obstacle to North Vietnamese objectives within Indochina, North Vietnam and the PRC could well be provoked into a more hostile attitude toward Thailand and even into military threats. Such threats would probably cause the Thai to turn to the United States for further reassurances, possibly including deterrent military actions to support our SEATO commitment. The second alternative would probably be preferable to the first in reducing the risk of having our SEATO commitment put to the test in this manner as a result of Thai provocation.

There are of course limits to the degree the United States can determine Thailand's role in the region and further limits to what the Executive Branch in the United States can do in the face of current American political trends. To the extent that we can rationally plan US policy and exert influence on Thailand however, our interests would be best served by a policy which pushed Thailand in the direction of the second alternative described above. The first alternative would lead, without real hope of success, toward continuation of the Cold War divisions in Asia of previous decades. The second alternative would contribute to a more flexible US diplomatic posture that will be appropriate to the multi-power system that we now see emerging in East Asia. Most important, this role for Thailand would be compatible with current US assessment of our real interests in Southeast Asia, with our national reluctance to become involved again in ground combat in that theatre and with our desire to expand and normalize relations with the Peoples Republic of China.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Green saw it. Copies were sent to Wilson, Masters, and Corcoran.

120. Letter From the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)[1]

Bangkok, May 28, 1971.

Dear Alex:

You may remember a rather special operation which was conducted here in 1968 and early 1969 on a very limited basis, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. Most correspondence with Washington was carried on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with a code word [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and I can give you in that connection a specific reference to my close-out message on the subject which was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of about February 10, 1969.[2]

The reason I am raising this matter is because [name not declassified] has again come to me with a request [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]that we engage in a similar operation, involving about the same magnitude of funds and serving the same general purposes. In this case, the purpose is not quite so immediately related to the elections which are not due to take place here until 1973, but rather to building up of the government political party, the Saha Pracha Thai (United Thai People's Party), having those elections, of course, ultimately in view.

[name not declassified] reviewed many of the same considerations he had put forward before, such as that [1 line of source text not declassified] do not want the government party to become beholden to wealthy businessmen for funds lest they run into the kinds of problems currently faced by, among others, the Philippines. Neither do they want to make improper use of RTG budgeted funds. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified] said he has and would continue to be putting some of his own money into this as would the others who were able to do so; however, the requirements were beyond their resources.

[name not declassified] emphasized how enormously useful our help had been previously. On the political side he said that [11/2 lines of source text not declassified], the government party can provide stability in Thailand for some time to come. He referred to many years of close cooperation with the U.S. and the assurance that this would continue and the strong implication that our interests would also be served by the continuing dominance of the local political scene by the government party.

Obviously [name not declassified] approach raises two questions: Do we have a means of providing help [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and do we consider it in the U.S. interest to do this? The first point can only be answered in Washington. As for the second, I have my doubts.

In the first place, this is a very delicate business to be engaged in and should it ever become public knowledge there would be acute embarrassment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is quite true that the last time the matter was handled successfully without any leaks whatsoever, but you can never be sure. In the second place, I strongly suspect that if money is really needed, some of the well-heeled government party supporters [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could find the money without getting it from us. Finally, I think it is probably inadvisable for us at this time to be making such an implied political commitment to the government party. To be sure, our close working relationship is of great importance to us, particularly as long as we have thousands of servicemen still in-country and the need to use Thai bases. I don't, however, see our cooperation as hanging on whether we do or don't provide this help, nor do I think this help is likely to be critical to the success or failure of the government party in the next election.

[name not declassified] asked me [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to support his request in Washington. I told him only that I would report it, mentioning that I would probably be in touch with you in the first instance. [21/2 lines of source text not declassified] I would appreciate at least your preliminary reaction at an early date. I am sending copies of this to Marshall Green [less than 1 line of source text not declassified];[3] you will know whether or not you wish to discuss it with the White House.

Yours,

Len

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis; Special Handling.

[2] See Documents 2 and 3 for discussion of [text not declassified] program.

[3]  Johnson forwarded copies of this letter to the 40 Committee principals under a June 10 covering memorandum.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Consulate in Hong Kong [1]

Bangkok, May 28, 1971, 1131Z.

7419. Deliver at the opening of business. Hong Kong for S/S only. Subject: Report of Under Secretary Irwin's Talk With Foreign Minister. Ref: Bangkok 7415.[2]

1. Immediately after call on PriMin May 27, Under Secretary Irwin met with Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman. Also present were Assistant Secretary Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan, Ambassador Unger, FSO Colebaugh, and Thanat's Secretary Birabhongse Kasemsri.

2. Thanat said the Thai look on US troop reductions in the region as implementation of the Nixon Doctrine. President Nixon said the prime American objective was to keep from using American manpower. The Thai agreed and are using their own men and resources, but they need outside help—economic, technical and logistical help. But now it appears that there will be no American manpower and no economic support either. The Under Secretary explained that the problem arises from anti-war elements who want to move in every way to stop the war immediately. However, the administration believes in building up our allies in Europe, Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

3. Thanat commented that the problem is deeper than just the anti-war groups, it is also a struggle between the Executive and Legislative branches of the US Government. Under Secretary Irwin agreed, but pointed out that the struggle arose over Vietnam and desire of Congress to curb the war powers of the President, and Ambassador Sullivan commented on the make-up and tactics of the anti-war movement.

4. Replying to a question on the NVN position during the recent talks on repatriation of Vietnamese refugees, Thanat said that NVN continued to accuse others of intervention while refusing to talk about their own. There is not much hope that they will argue reasonably. Assistant Secretary Green said there are two kinds of negotiations, the kind we are conducting in Paris, the kind the Thais are conducting here. In the second kind, one side takes tacit steps and then awaits response of the other side. Taking Cambodia for example, Green noted that Thailand uses minimal force in providing tactical air support to Cambodia, but holds its deterrent force on Thai territory. This appears to have kept the war from Thailand's borders. Thanat remarked that the Thai are looking for ways to open reasoned discussions to reduce hostilities. In this regard, Chinese appear more flexible than North Vietnamese.

5. The Under Secretary then explained the background behind recent moves in US–China relations. The US does not expect China to change her goals, but hopes that by coming out of isolation and resuming contact with rest of the world, China will begin to conduct herself according to internationally accepted modes of conduct. Thanat commented that President Nixon would have a better chance to improve relations with China if Congressmen and Senators were not hampering his efforts. Under Secretary Irwin pointed out that President Nixon's position on China has majority support.

6. The Foreign Minister asked if the US has taken a firm decision on China policy. The Under Secretary replied that no decision has been made, but one is expected soon. Assistant Secretary Green noted the belief encountered in Cambodia that ping-pong diplomacy might have some damaging effect in Southeast Asia, particularly on their own situation. Thanat said he and the Prime Minister understood what the United States purposes were even if some politicians were critical. Green said that there is not likely to be any change soon, that gradually over the long term contact with the outside should lessen China's sense of alienation from the world. He cited the recent prompt return of the hijacked Philippine aircraft and of a yacht which had strayed into Chinese waters, as examples of the new approach taken by China.

7. Thanat said the Thai will try to persuade the Chinese to stop providing arms to Communist insurgents in Thailand, and to stop infiltrating men. He noted that Communist propaganda has diminished, but has not ceased. If the Chinese really changed their policy, for example, by a change of position in the Paris negotiations, Thailand will get the message that Communist China plans to play its part in the area. Thailand hopes eventually to involve China in a Bandung-type conference, which Thanat thought would mean that Communist China had shifted back to a foreign policy similar to the pre-Bandung period.

8. Assistant Secretary Green raised the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations. Thanat remarked that this is a very difficult problem for Thailand, especially because the Republic of China is inflexible on the subject. In response to comments from the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary that the GRC is aware it must change tactics, Thanat remained firm in his view that the GRC is inflexible and thinks in very simplistic terms. Thanat noted that Thailand has not changed its policy on China—”not yet, anyway.” It was agreed that we will keep the RTG in touch with our thinking on the question through Ambassador Unger.[3]

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL

[2] Telegram 7415 from Bangkok, May 28, reported on Irwin's May 27 meeting with Prime Minister Thanom. Irwin, who visited Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand May 19–27, told Thanom that “he came with no specific purpose or message, but rather to become better informed.” The Prime Minister expressed concern about the situation in Laos and had General Surakij describe the North Vietnamese and Chinese threats there. Irwin described positive developments with the South Vietnamese but “then mentioned the lack of progress at the Paris peace talks.” (Ibid., ORG 7 U) Irwin's more closely held conversations with Thanom are in Documents 122–123.

[3] After meeting with Thanat, Irwin met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Development Pote Sarasin for 15 minutes. Irwin discussed the concern expressed at the U.S. East Asian chiefs of mission conference about the lack of Japanese aid in Southeast Asia. He stated that it was felt that what the Japanese called aid “appears to be largely commercial credits.” Pote observed that the Japanese should be able to do more and that the Thai looked on the Japanese as “ghosts.” (Telegram 7420 from Bangkok, May 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,POL Irwin's meetings, the Under Secretary “expressed U.S. concern that Japan live up to her commitment to contribute one percent of GNP to genuine aid and be prepared to take measures to reduce the great imbalance of trade between the Southeast Asian area and Japan.” “Pote generally adhered to line that Thailand's bargaining position with Japan is very weak due to lack of trade items.” (Ibid., ORG 7 U)

122. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State [1]

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 1630Z.

3515. Subject: Report of Under Secretary's Talk with Prime Minister: Thai SGU Units.

1. Following is cleared record of Under Secretary's conversation May 27 in Bangkok with Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn on Thai SGU units in Laos.

2. After general discussion of security situation in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, Under Secretary raised question of Congressional restrictions on use of funds. Because of these restrictions funds have been provided through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to support Thai SGU units in Laos. The Under Secretary asked for Thai views on the issue, noting that Senators Case and Fulbright have raised the SGU publicly, and that it may be necessary for Assistant Secretary Green to testify before Congress. In such event, and although in executive session, the Assistant Secretary would have to testify truthfully and candidly. Under Secretary Irwin expressed gratitude for what the Thai have done, and regret for the publicity.

3. Foreign Minister Thanat commented with irony that everything had come out already, and attributed this to fact that two former Foreign Service officers, Lowenstein and Moose, had unearthed the information for the Senate. (After the meeting, Assistant Secretary Green and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan pointed out to Thanat's private secretary, Birabhongse Kasemsri, our inability to control the actions or statements of Lowenstein and Moose in their present status.) The Under Secretary again stated the regret of President Nixon and Secretary Rogers for the publicity. Thanat again remarked that, as virtually all has been revealed already, Assistant Secretary Green's testimony shouldn't have a great deal more impact. Under Secretary Irwin explained that anti-war elements in the U.S. will try to prove that funds have been used illegally, and Assistant Secretary Green explained how his testimony may well have to go beyond what has already appeared in the press and cover in specific detail some of the arrangements which are not now public knowledge.

4. Ambassador Unger called attention to the manner in which the RTG has heretofore explained the presence of Thais in Laos, i.e., that there are individual Thai fighting in Laos as volunteers with the RLG forces but no regular Thai forces are there. He suggested that this provided a satisfactory general basis for our answers to queries. Thanat responded that he has used this formula, and that no regular Thai troops are in Laos. He emphasized that such RTA cadre as are with the SGU units have officially signed resignations from the Thai army, and that all persons now in Laos are “volunteers” [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. Assistant Secretary Green pointed out that there are two sides to the issue—a legal side and a political side. Leaving aside the legal aspect, it is important to argue the question on the basis of why the SGU units are used, in terms of the protection of US forces in Vietnam and the fact that the countries of the area are helping one another in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. Green said that this should also carry a signal to the other side, and asked the Foreign Minister if such a signal acted as a deterrent to NVN. Thanat did not reply directly, but remarked that both the Chinese and the North Vietnamese had accused the Thai of enlarging the war. These accusations have been made not only in propaganda attacks but from private sources speaking on behalf of the Chinese and North Vietnamese.

6. This meeting also provided an opportunity to call attention to General Sanga's remarks (Deptel 93462)[2] and counsel against any comments which might suggest that regular Thai military are in Laos.

Irwin

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Withdrawn Box 14/15, Folder 943. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by James L. Carson (S/S), cleared by Nicholas A. Veliotes, and approved by Green. Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to Bangkok and Vientiane.

[2] Not found.

123. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State [1]

Hong Kong, May 29, 1971, 0730Z.

3516. Subject: Report of Under Secretary's Talk With Prime Minister: Narcotics.

1. Following is cleared record of discussion of narcotics problem which took place during call by Under Secretary Irwin on Prime Minister Tham Kittikachorn May 27. Other topics covered in meeting are reported septels.

2. At close of call on Prime Minister, the Under Secretary expressed appreciation for Thai cooperation during the recent visit of BNDD director John Ingersoll, and noted U.S. concern over the increased availability of heroin to our troops in SVN. He noted that the major sources are in Burma, Laos, and Southern China, and that major traffic routes run through Laos and Thailand. Congress and those opposed to the Vietnam War will also use the drug question to arouse further opposition to the war. The Prime Minister responded that ever since the President and Vice President visited Thailand, the Thai have done what they could to help. He noted, however, that when even a big, powerful country like the U.S. has a problem controlling drugs, Thailand with its limited means finds it very difficult to control. Under Secretary Irwin expressed our understanding of the problem for the Thai. He also mentioned the joint U.S.-Thai committee on which DCM Newman will be the U.S. representative[2] and expressed the hope that it would be able to do effective work.

Irwin

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Confidential. Also sent to UNSTO and repeated to Bangkok.

[2] Telegram 7155 from Bangkok, May 25, reported on Ambassador Unger's meeting with Thanom that morning on “the alarming increase in drug traffic.” Unger mentioned “the repeated evidence of movement through Thailand and some processing in this country.” He also cited “the apparently reliable reports about ships, ostensibly engaged in fishing, that leave Thai ports daily and rendezvous with other traffickers offshore from Hong Kong.” Unger stated that Thanom “acknowledged what I had said and indicated his unqualified agreement on the need for effective action.” (Ibid.)

124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, June 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Visit to Southeast Asia, May 19 through May 27

My trip to Southeast Asia strengthened my belief in the value of the Nixon Doctrine, not only as the best means of pursuing U.S. policy objectives in Asia, but also as a formula for developing self-reliance and determination in the Southeast Asian nations.

Those themes emerged again and again in conversations with government leaders in Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. They all emphasize the continuing need for U.S. military and economic assistance, but most seem prepared and even anxious to do more for their own defense and development. They also seem somewhat more willing to face the internal and international implications of drugs and corruption, particularly as those issues bear on the willingness and the ability of our government to sustain its effort in their behalf.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and Laos.]

Thailand

Thailand has a special importance in the security of Southeast Asia, both for its own sake and for the assistance the Thai are providing and may be able to provide to the defense of Laos and Cambodia.

As you know, Thai regular army troops have all been replaced in northern Laos by Thai Special Guerrilla Units (SGU's). Vang Pao speaks of the effectiveness of these SGU's primarily in a defensive or consolidating role, thus freeing Meo and Lao SGU's for offensive operations. The Thai, along with U.S. air power, have been a key factor in resisting North Vietnamese attacks on Long Tieng. There are at present 10 Thai SGU battalions (approximately 3,500 men) in northern Laos with 4 more battalions now being trained.

Although the Lao need and want the help of the Thai, they show some concern about the long-term objectives of Thailand regarding those areas of Laos which once were Thai. We heard occasional comments to the effect that the Thai may be eventually almost as difficult to evacuate from the country as the North Vietnamese.

The Cambodians too view the prospect of Thai troops in their western provinces (which also once were under Thai rule) with some apprehension. At the same time, they have welcomed the limited air support provided by the Thai.

In both Laos and Cambodia, the Thai appear to be concerned about the risks of direct confrontation with Hanoi. While desiring to avoid direct confrontation, they are hoping that the use of their SGU's in northern Laos and their limited air sorties in Cambodia will signal to the North Vietnamese the seriousness with which Thailand views Hanoi's approach to Thai borders. During my meeting with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, General Surakit Mayalap, Chief of Staff of the Royal Thai Army, gave a briefing on the military situation in which he stressed the serious Thai concern over Hanoi's approach to Thai borders.

While the Thai need encouragement to continue their support to Laos and Cambodia, we should be alert to avoid the development of a situation vis-à-vis the North Vietnamese that might prompt the Thai to invoke our SEATO commitment at a time when public and Congressional attitudes inevitably raise a question as to our ability effectively to meet that commitment.

The Thai and North Vietnamese have been engaging in negotiations in Bangkok for some months, ostensibly with respect to the repatriation of Vietnamese who have settled in northeastern Thailand, but undoubtedly touching on wider issues. Foreign Minister Thanat told us frankly that the Thai have been trying to feel out both Hanoi and Peking, and acknowledged that Thai actions in Laos and Cambodia have been designed in part as a tacit negotiating process in which the Thai have been attempting to signal Hanoi. Although the repatriation talks have now been broken off and the North Vietnamese delegation has returned home, it would seem that the Thai, in traditional fashion, remain willing to cover their bets by talking with North Viet-Nam or China when an opportunity arises.

Heroin

In all conversations with government officials in Viet-Nam, Laos and Thailand, I stressed the deep concern of the U.S. Government over heroin and its impact on U.S. troops and the imperative need for action by the governments of the three countries. In Viet-Nam and Laos, the groups involved in the heroin trade seem to have high level protection and often to be more or less immune from local police enforcement. On the other hand, the leaders with whom we met gave the appearance of understanding the seriousness of the drug traffic and evidenced a desire to act to suppress it.

In Viet-Nam, President Thieu has taken initial steps toward better enforcement in response to representations made by Ambassador Bunker. In Laos, after Ambassador Godley and I spoke to Souvanna Phouma, he assured us that new legislation aimed at controlling the trade in opium and its derivatives would be passed by the National Assembly in the near future. In Thailand, at the instigation of our Embassy, a joint U.S.-Thai planning group is to be formed to develop plans to control the drug traffic in that country.

In spite of the attitude expressed by Thieu, Souvanna Phouma and Thanom, it seems unlikely, given the high level involvement in the drug traffic in both South Viet-Nam and Laos, that domestic forces alone will be sufficient. If some external police authority, perhaps under the cover of an international body such as the United Nations or Interpol were feasible, it might offer additional hope for positive action. The Department will explore this idea. In selected cases, the United States might also consider encouraging the use of guerrilla forces against identified processing facilities.

[Omitted here is discussion of China and Japan.]

John N. Irwin II

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Folder 943. Secret.

125. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

Thailand: The Latest Charade

The purpose of this memorandum is to:

—inform you of the latest charade in the bureaucracy's conspiracy to screw up our relations with Thailand;

—seek approval of a hold on and reconsideration of STFD (our currently proposed assistance package to Strengthen Thai Forces for Defense) with the idea that we should extract ourselves from this apparently doomed and ineffective proposal and face the issues of Thai force effectiveness head on;

—provide you with talking points for conversation with Under Secretary Irwin to set in motion a reconsideration of our assistance to Thai forces.

Background

DOD in response to the President's guideline to the agencies (NSDM 89 on Cambodia, October 26, 1971) that, in recognition of possible dry season threats, “contingency plans should be developed with Thailand for the possible deployment of Thai forces to aid in the defense of western Cambodia.”

Proposed to the Thai in April (five months after the NSDM and well into the dry season we were concerned about), the STFD package contains the following principal elements of program assistance:

—Foreign Military Sales Credit—We would provide up to $12 million in credit to finance Thai purchases of military goods from the United States. Most of these goods, consumables, would be in support of Thai air force operations in Cambodia.

—PL 480—We would provide $20 million of agricultural commodities over the next two years. This assistance would save Thai foreign exchange expenditures. The foreign exchange savings would offset the Thai purchase from the U.S. of ammunition and other consumables under the foreign military sales credit program. DOD and State layers contend that this complicated arrangement is necessary because military grant assistance could not legally be given to Thailand for use in Cambodia. The local currency receipts from the Thai sale of the commodities would support increases in the Thai defense budget to meet increased local costs (e.g., for airfield construction).

— MASF add on—Imports in the amount of $10–15 million in addition to those already provided or programmed for FY 71 and FY 72 MAP, i.e., $60 million annually, would be financed. Such imports would provide equipment and military consumables for the RTA and RTAF in Thailand, and as such could be covered by the regular MASF grant.

The proposal has not been accepted. The prospects for agreement as reported by the Mission (see cable at Tab B)[2] are “only fair.” The RTG is balking because it is:

—uncertain about the benefits of military deployments and preparedness which we have linked specifically to Cambodia when Thai concern is much more focused on the insurgency and on developments in Laos;

—confused about the complicated assistance trade-off and offset mechanism associated with the proposed assistance imposed by our legal restrictions.

The STFD proposal was poorly conceived from the beginning. We have received the very distinct impression that the motivation of some individuals involved in its design, who are against any external role for the Thai, was simply to provide a “sop to Henry,” perhaps knowing all along that the proposal would bring little or no results. It is, at best, one more illustration of the ad hoc piecemeal manner with which we provide assistance to Thailand. The White House guidance on the program was consistently of the “we don't care about the details—get on with it” variety.

The Real Issues

The STFD proposal does not deal with serious manpower shortages in the RTA/MC and the Thai budget constraint on more rapid additions of trained and skilled personnel to the force.

It does not provide the Thai with any indication of our long-run intentions with respect to Thai defense support. In effect nothing has been done to implement the Nixon Doctrine in Thailand.

The real issues are:

—(1) The Threat. The overriding consideration that bears on the content or timing of STFD or alternative proposals is that the RTG is capable of sustaining probably no more than the equivalent of ten battalions in combat—the approximate force currently operating against the insurgents. With this limited capability the RTG faces:

—Expansion and consolidation of insurgent forces. A fifty percent increase over the last six months in armed insurgent strength in the North (including for the first time recruitment of ethnic Thai in the North) and strengthening of organizational infrastructure in the Northeast signal mounting difficulties for the RTG in containing the insurgency. (Excerpts from mission reports on the insurgency are at Tab C.)[3]

—Encroachment by NVA/PL forces into areas of Thai security interest in Laos. Enemy pressure and advances in Laos, particularly in Sayaboury province in the North, raise the RTG's perception of threats to its national security.

—Allied requirements for greater participation in regional defense and military support for Vietnamization as the U.S. withdraws. Souvanna Phouma has asked for regular Thai battalions in the South to contest NVA/PL advances in the Bolovens plateau area (the RTG has decided not to meet this request) in addition to the irregular Thai forces already deployed in North Laos. The Thai could, with the South Vietnamese, deploy to interdict supply movements in the panhandle and divert NVA/PL forces from targets in Cambodia and South Vietnam as in Lam Son 719. But in my opinion a principal obstacle to Thai deployments is the paucity of Thai ground force capability.

—(2) Deployment Sustainability. Thai deployments out-of-country in Vietnam and in Laos have been sustained by U.S. personnel giving direct logistics support as well as financial assistance. By itself the RTG at present could probably sustain no more than 8–10 battalions in combat out-of-country and then only at the sacrifice of deployments against the insurgents in-country. Thus, while we may be able to buy additional Thai deployments, the price will be an expansion of the American logistics support presence in Thailand or a reduction in Thai deployments against the insurgents. If we or the RTG are unwilling to pay this price, then additional out-of-country deployments can only be obtained with improvements in the Thai's own deployment capability, e.g., extensive manpower recruitment, training and advancement, and logistics infrastructure improvement.

—(3) Local Currency Support for the Thai Military Budget. Shortages of personnel, particularly trained officers and NCOs appear to be a binding constraint on increases in the Thai defense capability. To overcome these shortages, large increases in local currency expenditures in the military budget will be necessary. Without a substantial U.S. contribution, it is unlikely that the Thai will undertake these expenditures because of the declining economic situation. Inasmuch as our programs in the past have been for military imports rather than local currency support, improvements in Thai defense capability will require a major program change for the U.S. and significant increases in U.S. costs, e.g., U.S. costs for Thai ground forces in FY 72 including financing for additional imports could reach $150–200 million compared to about $50 million in FY 71.

—(4) Alternatives to Irregular Deployments. In lieu of support for the current irregular Thai deployments, the U.S. could offer to support [21/2 lines of source text not declassified].

—The irregular deployments siphon off scarce trained personnel and financial resources from the RTA/MC and thus slow the development of a self-reliant Thai defense capability.

—Regular force deployments are difficult on political grounds both in Thailand and domestically.

Alternatives

Kennedy and Holdridge's request in support of Marshall Green and delayed again because of State pressure for STFD instead (after I reviewed it with you in San Clemente) the interagency analysis will finally be ready for review by the VSSG next week.

We are confronted with basically two alternatives:

—(1) Persist with STFD, continuing to offer some or all of the proposed assistance with the knowledge that we are buying little or nothing in the way of increased Thai defense capability or deployments.

—(2) Extract ourselves from STFD, minimizing the political costs as necessary. Inform the Thai that we are re-evaluating our assistance proposals in the context of recent developments in Cambodia and Laos, and in their insurgency. And tell them that we will be ready to discuss with them, in the near future, additional U.S. assistance in FY 72 and beyond to help build a more self reliant Thai defense capability.

Recommendation

I recommend that you opt for alternative 2, Extract ourselves from STFD. If you approve, I urge you to raise the appropriate issues at your upcoming luncheon with Under Secretary Irwin.[4] Talking points to accomplish this are at Tab A.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Top Secret. Sent for information.

[2] Attached at Tab B but not printed was telegram 7581 from Bangkok, June 2. Unger reported that it was suggested to Irwin and Green during their visit to Thailand that “substantial reduction in expenditures required (of the Thai for munitions for RTAF sorties in Cambodia) would be very helpful in gaining Thai acceptance of STFD.” Unger suggested that this reduction could be justified by reduced number of sorties forecast for RTAF in Cambodia (from 300 to 60 per month).

[3] Attached at Tab C but not printed was telegram 4862 from Bangkok, April 9, and Airgram A–175 from Bangkok, April 23, which reported increased numbers and aggressiveness of armed insurgents in northern Thailand.

[4] Not found.

[5] Attached but not printed.

126. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, July 5, 1971, 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Deputy Prime Minister Praphat of Thailand

General Sirikit

Dr. Malai Huvananda, Advisor to Minister of Interior

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. John Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Mr. Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand

Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Political Officer, American Embassy, Bangkok

SUBJECT

General Praphat's Comments on U.S.-Thai Relations

Dr. Kissinger began by commenting on the improvements in the security situation in South Vietnam. General Praphat said that he had received similar reports from the Thai soldiers in Vietnam. He noted that the first members of the Thai contingent which was returning from Vietnam had arrived that day and that the main body would be returning on July 22.

Dr. Kissinger asked General Praphat about the status of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand. General Praphat stated that things were going quite well, and that the Thai forces were now able to handle the insurgents. Ambassador Unger wondered if General Praphat's estimate included the Chieng Rai area. Had the situation there quieted down? General Praphat replied that things had been better during the past month.

Dr. Kissinger requested General Praphat's views on the situation in Vietnam. According to General Praphat, everything seemed to be quiet, but this made him suspicious. He anticipated that if the U.S. negotiations with the Communists were not successful, the Communists would undertake a new act of aggression. The North Vietnamese had the capacity for this.

Asked by Dr. Kissinger for his estimate of developments in Laos, General Praphat said that the situation there depended very much on the situation in Vietnam. If there was peace in Vietnam, then the same condition would apply to Laos. Dr. Kissinger said that he was not so sure—if things were quiet in Vietnam, the Communists would be able to shift forces to Laos. It was too early to tell about the negotiations. What the Communists had proposed was unacceptable. They were asking us to stop all aid to the Government in Saigon, which we could not do. We would not overthrow the government with which we had been working for so long. General Praphat asked if cessation of aid meant both military and economic assistance, and Dr. Kissinger replied that this was the implication of their demand. They were phrasing their proposals in a very complicated way, speaking like oracles to every Congressman who went to Paris; these then thought they had the road to peace. The North Vietnamese were speaking to them in ambiguities.

General Praphat said that he didn't know the detailed language of the Communist proposals, but from what he had heard and read in the newspapers he did not have the impression that the seven points would include a limitation on aid. Dr. Kissinger explained that they were putting their proposals in a complicated way. Their requirement that we cease all aid to the Thieu Government was interpreted by us as meaning that we had to stop all economic and military assistance. General Praphat remarked that after reading the newspaper articles about the seven points, he had thought the U.S. would accept them. He felt that we had an obligation to accept them quickly. Dr. Kissinger described the Vietnam situation as being extremely complicated, and foresaw the possibility of serious negotiations later on this year. He felt that General Praphat was correct, however, in sensing that the Communists were in a slightly better bargaining attitude now than in the past. General Praphat said that, speaking as a military man, long negotiations were undesirable because the enemy would gain more time to prepare for an attack against Thailand. Dr. Kissinger agreed, but noted that unfavorable negotiations would also be undesirable.

General Praphat wondered if the United States was considering reducing its military strength in the area. Dr. Kissinger noted that we had some difficult domestic problems. There was no question but that we had a number of Senators who were making a great deal of noise and were behaving in a way which made the conduct of foreign policy difficult. Nevertheless, the President was convinced that we had to maintain our military posture in Asia. In Dr. Kissinger's opinion the domestic situation had improved, and opposition to the Administration's policy had reached a high point. There was every possibility that we would not be in a better situation.

General Praphat said that negotiations were one thing, but after the rainy season the situation in Cambodia and Laos might be a good deal worse. Dr. Kissinger noted our judgment was that the South Vietnamese would be able to hold out in Cambodia against the North Vietnamese and would be stronger than the North Vietnamese. However, the situation in Laos was different. Whenever the North Vietnamese wanted to put more troops in they could advance. Therefore, in Laos we had to work with the Thai SGUs and with the Lao Government forces. We attached great value to what the Thai SGUs were doing and strongly supported this effort.[2]

General Praphat remarked that he had some doubt about the South Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, which were not too effective because of the way that they had been put in, pulled out and put in again. Dr. Kissinger declared that he didn't debate military strategy with a General, because the General might start debating academic points with Dr. Kissinger as an academician. We believed, though, that during the rainy season there was not much sense in leaving the South Vietnamese in Cambodia. They had established a line along Route 7, from which they would push north when the dry season arrived, although they would not go farther than the line of the Mekong. General Praphat observed that this strategy might be good for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, but still left the Cambodians with the requirement to fight west of the Mekong. Dr. Kissinger said that this was true, but the North Vietnamese had a supply problem in maintaining their forces west of the Mekong in heavy strength and at the same time fighting the South Vietnamese east of the Mekong. So far, they hadn't been able to do this and probably couldn't do it next year, either.

General Praphat said he assumed that the North Vietnamese would be able to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail to supply their troops in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger observed that they indeed could do so, and had expanded the Trail. General Praphat said that SGUs could not defend against this, neither the Thai SGUs nor the others (“neither ours nor yours”). Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that the SGUs could at least do something to harass the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

General Praphat stated that the Thai would be unable to sustain their SGUs without aid from the U.S. side, and for this needed “total support”. In response to comments from Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Unger that we felt on our side we were rendering such support, General Praphat commented that a great deal of time had been wasted in bargaining. Furthermore, there had been difficulties in receiving U.S. air support and medivac. With some bitterness, he said that Thai wounded had waited for five days for medivac, and none had arrived until he had made a special plea to Ambassador Unger. There was a problem also for the Thai to fight. Dr. Kissinger noted that we hadn't heard of these problems in Washington. We wanted the Thai to succeed and he, Dr. Kissinger, would look into the situation as soon as he returned.

General Praphat continued by outlining a few more difficulties in receiving air support. Requests had been put in on the ground which had gone to Ambassador Unger, who had in turn said the requests should have been presented to the U.S. military in Laos and to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] group. What had been sent was not enough. Ambassador Unger declared that no one had asked him to take care of the wounded, and if this issue had been raised he would have handled it. Dr. Kissinger assured General Praphat that this matter would be looked into, and that Ambassador Unger and Washington were in full agreement on the SGU program.

General Praphat remarked that he understood the political problems which the U.S. faced, but that the Thai had a political problem in their country, too. There was the question of economic support, and also that of the attitude of the Thai Parliament. Some politicians had wanted to pull all Thai out of Laos.

Returning to the subject of medivac for the Thai in Laos, Dr. Kissinger said that he thought this had been approved and that no problem existed. Ambassador Unger noted that all he had known of the medical problem was that there had been a large number of Thai wounded who had been taken care of at Udorn. There was a field hospital there which had been scheduled for closure; he had stopped the closing and had kept the facility open for a considerable time to take care of the wounded. He had not heard of the medivac difficulties. General Praphat said that this had been but one example of the difficulties the Thai had faced. He and General Sirikit jointly explained that another difficulty had been encountered over artillery support—they had needed and asked for 155s, but had received 105s; they had wanted six guns per battery and received four instead; they had requested an ammunition supply, but had been told to draw ammunition from Thai Army depots. There had been many complications. This is why they had spoken of needing full support for the SGU program. Dr. Kissinger once again said that he would look into the matter, and that he had not been aware of these details. He was under the impression the Thai had been getting everything they asked for. Who were they dealing with? Ambassador Unger said that questions such as these were normally handled [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] not through Thailand. He wanted to know whenever things were not going well, however, because he wanted to give his full support. Dr. Kissinger added that he would talk to responsible people and make sure that all the various complaints were looked into. General Sirikit remarked here that he hoped all this wouldn't appear in U.S. newspapers.

On the score of press and public opinion in the U.S., General Praphat questioned whether the U.S. people were actually supporting their country. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that the people were behind the Administration, it was just the intellectuals and a few Senators who were causing the trouble. He discounted an observation by General Praphat that the morale of the U.S. people was poor. The popular morale was good.

General Praphat made what he called “a final plea” with respect to U.S. aid to Thailand: that there be no reduction in this aid. Thailand remained a staunch friend of the U.S., and unlike the situation in other countries, the U.S. Embassy in Thailand had never been stoned. The Thai Government was working very hard to improve U.S.-Thai relations. Dr. Kissinger declared that he was very conscious of the pressures on Thailand. The President urgently wanted Thailand to be helped, and was committed to maintaining close ties. In this respect, he, Dr. Kissinger, was aware of the problems which had developed in our program for providing close assistance to the Thai in strengthening their defenses. (General Praphat agreed that such problems did, in fact, exist.) He would promise that when he went back to Washington in July, a package would be developed which would please the Thai. The President wanted this. We wanted to provide the maximum aid possible, but had to employ many different ways to provide our aid because of the legal restrictions imposed upon us. Nevertheless, a program different from what we and the Thai had been discussing would be developed.

General Praphat expressed his thanks for Dr. Kissinger's offer on providing maximum help. He again referred to Thai efforts to gain the support of public opinion in Thailand for working with the U.S. This was occasionally difficult, for when the U.S. made moves toward improving relations with Red China, the people became confused. The people were also upset about the rice situation—they worked very hard to produce rice, and then the U.S. came along and took their markets.

Dr. Kissinger concluded by saying that we definitely understood the Thai problems. He normally would check with the President on matters such as had been discussed this evening, but he was so close to the President's thinking on aid to Thailand he knew that we could move ahead.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. Davis sent an August 5 covering memorandum to Kissinger in which she noted that the “State Department has inquired in a low key as to whether and/or when they might receive copies of the memcons from your Far Eastern trip.” At the same time Kissinger approved the memcons (including Documents 127 and 128), he also initialed his approval that the copies be provided to the Department of State. Attached but not printed. The meeting was held at General Praphat's residence.

[2] According to a July 3 memorandum of conversation, U.S. Ambassador to Laos Godley told Kissinger that “the successful defense of Long Tieng” was due “to the performance of the Thai troops. The Thai were very good at digging in and fighting defensively. These forces were all SGU's, there were now no regular Thai officers and NCO's with the SGU's.” Godley praised the Thai battalion which had defended Ban Houei Sai (killing 138 enemy by body count while losing only one Thai soldier) and which was now dug in “and spoiling for a fight.” (Ibid., Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII)

127. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand

Foreign Minister Thanat

Air Marshal Dawee

Lt. General Sawaeng

Lt. General Sirikit

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Mr. Wayne Smith, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Mr. Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand

Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Chief of Political Section, American Embassy, Bangkok

SUBJECT

Prime Minister Thanom's Comments on U.S.-Thai Relations

Prime Minister Thanom opened by discussing the situation in Laos. Military conditions seemed to have improved with the arrival of the rainy season. Thailand would continue to send SGUs to help out in various places at the request of the RLG. Presently there were eight infantry battalions in MR II and one artillery battalion; one infantry battalion was in Sayaboury; and two infantry battalions were on the Bolovens. It therefore appeared appropriate to bring the number of SGUs up to the total number which had been requested. Dr. Kissinger verified that this meant 36 battalions. He agreed that the situation in Laos had improved, noting that Vang Pao's offensive in Northern Laos had captured a considerable amount of equipment. Possibly this was due in part to the arrival of the rainy season. In South Laos the situation was not as good. We of course strongly supported the Thai SGU effort. Was the process of recruiting and training proceeding at the fastest rate? Prime Minister Thanom and Air Marshal Dawee agreed that the process was being carried out at a rapid rate and that there was no problem in training or recruitment. Nevertheless, units could not be trained in a matter of weeks and advance preparations needed to be made to take care of filling out the full 36 battalions.

Dr. Kissinger noted that we had made a firm agreement to support 24 SGUs, and wondered when the decision would need to be made to proceed with the additional 12. Air Marshal Dawee said that the Thai would need to know before October when the last of the 24 would complete training. Dr. Kissinger stated that the decision would be made this summer and certainly before September. We were very sympathetic toward the Thai SGU program.

Dr. Kissinger wondered whether the Thai were planning to put some additional SGUs into South Laos. General Sirikit replied affirmatively. Units would be put into the Champassak and Sithandone areas. According to Air Marshal Dawee, this area appeared to be a new sanctuary for Communists infiltrating into Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. They had even developed hospitals there. Prime Minister Thanom described the Sayaboury area as being another dangerous spot where SGUs were needed. The program for raising 36 SGUs would provide units for these areas and also for North Laos. Ambassador Unger added that units would also be sent to the Bolovens. An operation was planned for July to retake Paksong and set up a strong protective shield east of the Mekong.

Dr. Kissinger wondered whether the Thai would have enough time to recruit and train if the decision on the 36 SGUs was made before September. Foreign Minister Thanat said that the time would be adequate provided there was no interference from Administration critics. On this, Dr. Kissinger commented that Foreign Minister Thanat and the Administration faced the same problems. Prime Minister Thanom referred to the very heavy burden which the Thai had to bear in the security field and hoped that the U.S. Government and people would show understanding and not be critical. According to Dr. Kissinger, Administration critics would be just as unhappy with 24 SGUs as with 36, and their attitude was related to the facts of the matter and not to the number. With respect to the defense of Thailand, the President has been personally interested in our working out a satisfactory arrangement. He, Dr. Kissinger, had had a long discussion the previous day with the Deputy Prime Minister on this matter. Mr. Smith of his staff would stay behind in Bangkok and work out a program with the Embassy which hopefully would be a satisfactory arrangement for the Thai. He wanted very much to show his appreciation for the Thai contributions in Laos.

Prime Minister Thanom expressed some apprehension that despite certain improvements in the military situation in Indo-China, the Communists might concentrate their efforts against the north and northeast of Thailand, and even further south. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that Hanoi had been severely weakened by the war, and would need several years after a settlement to recover. While there was no doubt that the Communists would like to intensify their activities, they wouldn't be making peace initiatives now if they were not under some pressure themselves. However, in the long term the Prime Minister was right in anticipating a step-up in Communist efforts against Thailand. Prime Minister Thanom explained that the reason the Thai felt this way was that while the Communist resources were depleted in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, this was not true in Thailand. Here, the other side could fight much better. Dr. Kissinger said in response that taking on Thailand directly would be a formidable undertaking for them, and they would probably try instead to encourage the insurgency in northern and northeast Thailand. Our experience was that the best time to fight an insurgency was in its early stages when the enemy hadn't consolidated his bases.

According to Prime Minister Thanom, the Communist side had increased its efforts and was waging a political and propaganda campaign against the loyalty of the people in the north. On the government side, it was necessary to show that the government would cater to the people's needs by offering direct benefits such as schools, roads, and economic aid. Thailand's resources were affected by the price of its export commodities. On the one hand, exports were decreasing, while on the other Thailand's needs were increasing; accordingly a better balance of resources on the economic side was required. If PL–480 assistance in the neighborhood of $30 million over a two-to-three-year period could be obtained, this could be of some help. General Sawaeng had already discussed a PL–480 agreement with Ambassador Unger. Dr. Kissinger said that he would review matters such as this on his return, and would report to the President not only on his general impressions but on specific issues. The President had a special interest in Thailand and the Thai could be assured that he was most sympathetic with respect to the Thai needs. He, Dr. Kissinger, knew that the Thai had a special situation, and he hoped that we could respond economically. The PL–480 matter would be looked at in particular.

Prime Minister Thanom wondered if Dr. Kissinger was aware that the Lao Government had more or less decided to negotiate with the Pathet Lao? Dr. Kissinger replied that he was aware something was going on, but was not aware of the Lao attitude—did they really want to settle, or were they doing this because it was expected of them? Prime Minister Thanom remarked that Prince Souvanna had previously insisted that all North Vietnamese troops had to be taken out but now had “relented.” Dr. Kissinger said his impression was that Souvanna didn't really expect any results. Prime Minister Thanom thought that the talks might lead to an agreement on a cease-fire. Dr. Kissinger asked if this meant just the Plaine des Jarres area, or all of Laos? What about the bombing of the Trail? Would they ask us to stop? Our Ambassador in Laos had said “no” to all these questions. Prime Minister Thanom agreed, saying that as long as the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces were attacking, he didn't think Souvanna would ask the U.S. to stop bombing.

Ambassador Unger explained Souvanna's position as being that he didn't have authority over south and southeast Laos and couldn't control what was happening there. He had not advocated ending the bombing. Dr. Kissinger agreed, adding that if Souvanna did accept a bombing halt, a very difficult situation would be created for the U.S. The war was divided into two parts, the North and the South. In the North, it was conceivable that the North Vietnamese would stop attacking and agree to a cease-fire. However, there was a different situation in the South. In response to a question from Prime Minister Thanom on whether or not a stand-still cease-fire was possible in Laos, Dr. Kissinger replied that it would be easier in the North, since the situation was subject to Souvanna's influence. There was a different problem in South Laos, though, since this area was related to the war in Vietnam.

Prime Minister Thanom asked whether during Dr. Kissinger's meeting with Vice President Ky, Ky had said anything about the North Vietnamese proposals being acceptable to him. Dr. Kissinger explained that Ky had not actually spoken in such terms. He had simply said he had gone through these proposals and that those dealing with the U.S. withdrawal were acceptable so long as U.S. military assistance could continue. His position was that U.S. forces were not needed except for air power. Ky's statement was somewhat ambiguous—he didn't say all seven points were acceptable, just the point on the withdrawal of the U.S. forces.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger said that what was important in these proposals was how we should interpret the demand that we cease support for the GVN. If the Communists meant we must stop all economic and military assistance, there would be a problem. Another problem concerned the cease-fire. If the cease-fire would apply only to the U.S., then the Communists could put in all their forces against the South Vietnamese. We couldn't accept this. It would be dishonorable for us if we withdrew in safety while the Communists attacked our friends. However, it would be acceptable if all forces were included in a cease-fire. We had proposed such a cease-fire on October 7. If the two issues of aid and the cease-fire could be settled, the element of a fixed deadline would still not be acceptable to us, however.

Prime Minister Thanom asked if the Communists had made any reference to the withdrawal of their own forces. Dr. Kissinger said that they had simply said that this would be settled “in a spirit of national concord.” The South Vietnamese believed they could handle the North Vietnamese forces as long as they could get continued U.S. military assistance. This was probably true. The Communists formerly had denied they had any forces in South Vietnam and were now implying they now did have forces there on the basis of settling military problems in all of Vietnam. But their forces in the South were not very strong any more, and they hadn't won a battle in the South for several years because South Vietnamese firepower was so superior.

Prime Minister Thanom asked what Dr. Kissinger felt about the prospects of the three presidential candidates. Dr. Kissinger discounted his ability to know the right answers about Vietnamese political affairs but observed that most people thought that in a two-man race between Thieu and Minh, Thieu would win; in a three-man race involving Ky as well, Ky would take votes from Thieu, but Thieu would still win. Minh had some popularity. He, Dr. Kissinger, had spoken to all three candidates to establish his impartiality.

Prime Minister Thanom expressed the view that if Thieu won, the situation would be satisfactory, but if one of the others won, stability would be affected. Dr. Kissinger said that he had met no one who thought Ky had a chance, and the general assumption was that Ky was preparing for the 1975 elections. If Minh won, he had already said he wanted to prosecute the war and had said yesterday that he was absolutely opposed to a coalition government and didn't want the Communists. There would be a change in the top administrator, though. The big question was whether Minh would be a competent administrator, not that there would be any change in policies. If Minh proved not to be a good administrator, there might be some military actions. The Thai had had Minh in Thailand for four years—what did they think? Foreign Minister Thanat simply observed that Minh had kept very quiet while in Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger said that Minh had told him he was against a coalition government and opposed to the PRG seven-point program, which he felt was a trick. Therefore, his views were not radically different from those of Thieu. However, he wanted a broader-based government which would, for example, bring the Buddhists in, and also wanted a program of “social justice”. Dr. Kissinger observed that opposition candidates were not usually distinguished by the precision of their formulations.

Dr. Kissinger requested Prime Minister Thanom's views on policy toward Communist China and on the U.S. position. Prime Minister Thanom said that if contacts between the U.S. and Chinese should result in a lessening of China's expansionist tendencies and support for wars of national liberation, the situation in Southeast Asia would be improved. Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that the Chinese had reaffirmed their support for national liberation movements a few months ago, and had also attacked the U.S. The GRC Ambassador had given him their statement to this effect. He, Thanat, had told the Prime Minister that there was not much difference between the Chinese and Soviet policies.

Dr. Kissinger said that U.S. policy toward China was first, that we had two common enemies, the USSR and Communist China, but didn't see why we needed to support the stronger against the weaker. We wanted contacts with both so we could moderate the policies of both, rather than to let Moscow act as a spokesman. Second, we also wanted to induce the Chinese to moderate their policy with respect to Southeast Asia, which we believed we could do if we could focus Chinese attention on the Soviet Union. We had no illusions about the Chinese and would expect them to affirm their support for national liberation movements. Third, we wanted to see if the Chinese might possibly want to withdraw their opposition to a settlement in South Vietnam. We were very unsentimental in our approach to China and looked at the problem from the standpoint of what we could do with respect to Chinese relations with the surrounding countries. We had no illusions that people who were revolutionaries all their lives would be charmed by little gestures such as trade, travel and ping pong teams.

Prime Minister Thanom said that he felt there was a greater relaxation and flexibility in Chinese policy, possibly including policy toward the UN. In addition, their increasing concern about the Soviet Union could create a better balance in Peking. So far as the U.S. establishment of contacts with the Chinese were concerned, the results were not yet in. There was a possibility that Chinese might use trade to further their objectives. Dr. Kissinger declared that there was no question but that the Chinese would look at everything from a political standpoint. They could create difficulties in Southeast Asian countries having large Chinese populations. From the U.S. point of view, we would do what we could to improve the situation. The Chinese could use trade as a weapon, for example, against Malaysia. But the Soviet forces along the border with China were twice the size of the Soviet forces in Europe, which was a somewhat unsettling factor for the Chinese. Therefore, there was some possibility that they would moderate their pressures against some countries such as Vietnam and Thailand. Over the long run, we had a special problem in that all of the Chinese leaders were 70 or above, and nobody could know what would happen when the present leadership disappeared.

Prime Minister Thanom asked if the Sino-Soviet border was very long, and Dr. Kissinger noted that the total distance was 7,000 kilometers even though the Chinese didn't recognize all of it. It was difficult to speculate about Chinese developments, and certainly we were going to proceed deliberately to see what the future would bring. We did not have much expectation about U.S. trade with China. Our lifting of trade restrictions had more of a symbolic purpose than anything else.

To a remark by Foreign Minister Thanat that the Soviets and the East Europeans appeared to have changed a bit, Dr. Kissinger wondered if the Thai thought they could increase their trade with East Europe. Thanat's reply was affirmative. The Soviets, the Hungarians, the East Germans, and the Rumanians were all interested in buying various Thai commodities.

Dr. Kissinger said he appreciated very much the opportunity to exchange ideas with the Thai, and wanted to assure Prime Minister Thanom again how firmly committed the President was to Thailand. The Thai should remember that those people who made all the noise did not formulate U.S. policy. We would get decisions on the SGUs and would see if we could adjust the framework of support for the Thai defenses. Our proposals would be reasonable. There was, in addition, one other problem which need not be discussed at this level—that of narcotics, which was causing the U.S. great concern. This had such emotional interest in the U.S., and was of such importance domestically, that any assistance from Thailand would be greatly welcomed.

On another point, over the long term he had heard interpretations of the Nixon Doctrine to the effect that we would withdraw from Asia. He had seen a great deal of the author of the Nixon Doctrine, who did not have any such impression.

Prime Minister Thanom expressed concern over the Supreme Court decision allowing the printing of secret papers. Dr. Kissinger commented jokingly that at a recent press reception in the State Department he had accused the Soviet Ambassador of being present to complain over having to pay for what the U.S. newspapers were getting free. The Supreme Court decision had not been that the act was legal, only that if documents were stolen the government recourse had to be through criminal prosecution and not through an injunction.

Therefore the U.S. would need to proceed against the criminal, and not against the newspapers. We would also adopt new procedures to restrict the circulation of documents to a much greater extent and not embarrass other governments. Prime Minister Thanom declared that making confidential decisions public would put the Executive in a difficult position because it set a precedent for the press in other countries. Dr. Kissinger remarked that there was no question but that this had been a very unfortunate incident. However, it was not likely to be repeated because it had taken place in a moment of hysteria.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.

128. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, July 6, 1971, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mr. Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand

Dr. K. Wayne Smith, Senior Staff Member NSC

Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

Mr. M. J. Wilkinson, Political Officer, American Embassy Bangkok

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Discussions with Foreign Minister Thanat on Vietnam and Chinese Representation

Dr. Kissinger referred to the just-completed discussions with Prime Minister Thanom and other senior Thai leaders, and noted that many important matters had been covered. We would want to continue to discuss the questions of US defense support for Thailand and support for the Thai SGU's.

Dr. Kissinger went on to say that with respect to US policy toward China and the Vietnam negotiations, we would try to keep the Thai fully informed so that they could have complete confidence in what direction we were going, and would not be confronted with any drastic surprises. We were not planning any such surprises. Foreign Minister Thanat wondered if speedy contacts with the Chinese might be included among the list of surprises, and Dr. Kissinger observed that he was talking more about developments connected with Vietnam. The Thai had no doubt been surprised on one or two occasions over our troop withdrawal decisions.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked Dr. Kissinger for his thoughts about the Paris talks. Dr. Kissinger replied that, speaking candidly, he did not expect much to happen over the next two months. We couldn't be sure about the purpose of the PRG proposal and would have to see how to interpret it. It could have been designed either to exploit US public opinion and increase pressure on us, or to mark the beginning of real negotiations. There was a chance that the North Vietnamese had decided to engage in serious negotiations because pressures on them-selves and developments vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Chinese made them believe that this was a good time to settle. On the other hand, they could be waiting for next year's US elections. We simply didn't know. Their proposal contained slightly more forthcoming language. It was consistent with what they had said before, but also consistent with what they might say if they were opening up. We would get word to the Foreign Minister about our reaction.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked, would the South Vietnamese make a counterproposal? Dr. Kissinger replied that we and the South Vietnamese had not decided how to handle the question of our response. This would depend to some extent on the President's judgment following his, Dr. Kissinger's, return. He was going to Paris to meet Ambassador Bruce—he would not see Mme. Binh, though—and would review the situation with Bruce, but not do any negotiating. Perhaps we would make a counterproposal, but within the framework of the President's October 7, 1970 position. We would not accept a cease-fire for us and none for our allies, and could not stop economic and military aid to these allies while the North Vietnamese received such assistance from the Chinese and the Soviets. On the question of our withdrawals and the timing, we were withdrawing anyway, but the December 31 date was unacceptable. We had not set a deadline because we wanted to relate this issue to the negotiations.

Foreign Minister Thanat called attention to the fact that all countries having troops in South Vietnam had said that they would withdraw, but the other side hadn't said anything about reducing its forces. This was a strong point for our side. Ambassador Unger agreed that the other side was setting a double standard which could be exploited. Dr. Kissinger stated that we would review the situation. We had a problem with public opinion in that many people didn't care what was fair—the radicals did not complain over the North's invasion of the South, but would put up great cries of indignation if the South threatened to invade the North. Foreign Minister Thanat surmised that this was because people didn't want the US to become involved.

Dr. Kissinger cautioned Foreign Minister Thanat not to expect anything much in Paris. We would move very slowly, and spend the next two weeks pointing out the negative aspects of the PRG proposal. At the time he had left Washington, we had no idea that this proposal was forthcoming.

Foreign Minister Thanat asked about the US decision on the Chinese representation issue in the UN, and Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that it would be made before the end of the month. Our problem was how to say something constructive which would not infuriate both Chinas. We had discussed with the Thai and others various formulae, such as a two-thirds vote for expulsion and a simple majority for admission. Foreign Minister Thanat's idea of voting on the expulsion issue first before that of admission was intriguing, and he, Dr. Kissinger, would explore this when he returned. There were of course a number of combinations, including sticking to our present policies.

Foreign Minister Thanat suggested that the two resolutions for requiring a two-thirds majority to expel Taiwan and admit the PRC by a simple majority might be put forward at the same time, or within a few hours of one another. These would be two separate resolutions, but expulsion would come first. He was not sure, though, what the rule was if somebody wanted to alter the order. Admittedly, it might be difficult to put one slightly ahead of the other. This matter could be left to the “arm twisters.”

Dr. Kissinger said that he was impressed by the Foreign Minister's concern. Would it be possible to vote by paragraph (on the Albanian Resolution) in such a way that the expulsion issue would never arise? Foreign Minister Thanat thought that this could be done very easily. Ambassador Unger thought that this procedure would need to be agreed upon by a substantial majority. Foreign Minister Thanat said that even if the (Albanian) expulsion resolution came first, we could ask for a two-thirds vote, which could be approved by a simple majority.

Dr. Kissinger reiterated that the President would make his decision before August 1, and it would probably be some variation of these ideas. We would inform the Thai, and Mr. Newman would take this up with the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Thanat declared that the Thai would go along with the President's decision.

Dr. Kissinger wondered what the Foreign Minister thought about sticking with the present formula? Foreign Minister Thanat said he did not believe this had any chance. Dr. Kissinger asked if it still might not be possible to get a majority for the Important Question? Foreign Minister Thanat said that he didn't know the answer to this. Dr. Kissinger suggested that if we could get a majority for that, we could postpone the matter for another year even if there was a bigger majority for the Albanian Resolution. Foreign Minister Thanat observed that this would happen only if the people who wanted the PRC in the UN relented. Ambassador Unger interjected to say that if the people who wanted the PRC in felt that it would be satisfactory to the PRC, then they might relent. Dr. Kissinger added that if these people thought that the PRC wouldn't come unless Taiwan were expelled, Taiwan would be expelled anyway and then we would have paid a price. This would be the worst possible case. Foreign Minister Thanat mentioned that the strength of those who were willing to have the PRC in the UN without pushing Taiwan out needed to be established.

Dr. Kissinger declared it was his instinct that the US would move to some position such as that which they had been discussing. There had been no final decision as yet as to making expulsion a two-thirds vote. When this decision was reached, we would make sure that the Thai were informed ahead of time. Foreign Minister Thanat remarked that those who wanted the PRC in were just about the same in number as those who wanted Taiwan in. Dr. Kissinger concluded by saying that was just about our own estimate.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge and approved by Kissinger on August 5. The meeting was held at Government House.

129. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Chargé d'Affaires in Thailand (Newman)[1]

Washington, July 9, 1971.

Dear George:

I am sure you are aware of Len Unger's letter to me of May 28[2] concerning Pote Sarasin's approach to him for a repeat performance of the 1968–69 “Project Lotus.” We will have a chance to talk to Len directly about this when he is in Washington for consultation next month, but I thought you should be acquainted with the Washington view at this stage.

The matter was discussed at a 40 Committee meeting recently and Len's position, as described in his letter, was unanimously supported. All of us share his distaste for this kind of an operation. However, a suggestion was made at the meeting that we have a look at the possibility of using this type of funding in some manner in connection with our efforts to generate more effective RTG actions in the narcotics field. We do not have any clear or specific ideas as to how this could be done. We would, of course, not contemplate using such funds in lieu of assistance that might more appropriately be provided for mutually agreed narcotics measures using overt funds such as AID. More important, we would want to avoid creating an impression on the Thai side that they could expect or demand a “payoff” for actions they ought to be taking anyway or for which we could influence them by more conventional and regular approaches. Finally, we must avoid setting a precedent for periodic under-the-table contributions to Thai political leaders for any purpose.

Notwithstanding these reservations and with full acceptance of Len's persuasive reasoning, we feel that the urgency and importance of the narcotics problem in Thailand makes it incumbent upon us to keep our minds open to any possible course of action, however un-orthodox, that might advance our objectives. Please give the matter some thought and let me know if you can see any possibilities.

Sincerely,

Alex [3]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret; Eyes Only; Nodis.

[2] See Document 120.

[3] Printed from a copy that indicates Johnson signed the original.

130. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)[1]

Washington, July 20, 1971, 10:03 p.m.

WH 10764. Subject: Thai Force Improvements: STFD Proposals.

To follow up my visit, I want to move as rapidly as possible to obtain an acceptable force improvement package for consideration by the President. I have found mission proposals transmitted to my staff in Saigon most valuable. I would like to have Mission comments by Monday[2] on the proposal spelled out below which represents our best synthesis of the variety of proposals available to us.

While the proposal outlined below continues to provide assistance for Thai efforts to increase RTARF readiness with respect to possible deployments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], its principal focus is on accelerating the improvement of general RTARF capabilities.

The concept is that this proposal should be viewed by the RTG as the first of two steps in gauging U.S. assistance to support RTG efforts to improve the capabilities of its military forces. The second step would reflect decisions in the context of NSSM 99 and the performance of the Thai in meeting the conditions of the agreement proposed for negotiation now.

The proposal includes an assistance package made up of two elements:

a) A two year $30 million PL 480 program, $15 million per annum.

b) A $15 FY 1972 MASF add on.

For this combined assistance package of $45 million the RTG will agree that

—the baht proceeds from the PL 480 sales will be allocated in consultation with the USOM to agricultural development activities.

a) No more than $10 million of PL 480 revenues will be used to undertake additional development activities.

b) The remaining baht proceeds from the PL 480 sales less the $10 million for agricultural development, approximately $17 million, will be used to offset additional expenditures for improvement of Thai forces. (An initial repayment of $3 million to the USG is assumed, thus accounting for the $30 million PL 480 total.)

—Expenditures for pol as agreed upon in earlier negotiations and for consumables directly related to RTAF sorties [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], 60 sorties/month, which cannot be legally covered under MASF will be financed by Thai foreign exchange.

—Up to 300 RTAF sorties/month [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]would be flown if required.

The principal activities which will be financed from the additional baht expenditures for RTARF are

—1) initiation of RTA manpower augmentations above those currently budgeted for maneuver and logistics units. (Augmentation should include filling to 90 per cent TO&E 3 RCTs and their associated logistics support units.)

—2) expansion of training programs.

—3) increases in the level of CI operations.

—4) upgrading of logistics facilities.

Our support for the expanded five division force should be made clear, the PL 480 and $15 million MASF is initial assistance to help the Thai move in that direction.

The principal activities for which equipment will be financed from the $15 million MASF add on are:

—1) upgrading of maneuver and logistics units.

—2) expansion of training operations.

—3) increases in the level of CI operations.

Mission comments and specific program details consistent with the above proposal should be sent via this channel so as to arrive opening of business Monday, 26 July. Keeping in mind that basic objective is to improve capability of Thai forces, Mission comments on significant differences between this proposal, and Mission and Renoo's alternatives passed to Sansom would be particularly useful.

Also await Mission views, pursuant to discussions in Saigon, on Thai para-military force development and on manpower tradeoff problems between Thai regular and SGU forces.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 410, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1971, Southeast Asia. Top Secret.

[2] In telegram 158, July 24, Unger “wholeheartedly” endorsed the Thai STFD force improvements proposed in WH 10764. He added that “the military activities and amount of assistance proposed will be a fair test of Thai willingness to upgrade their forces to meet security threats they now face.” (Ibid.)

[3] In telegram 208, August 2, Unger discussed the SGU program in detail, and reported Thai “concern over drain on RTA manpower (especially officers and NCOs).” He noted that if the SGUs were expanded to 36 battalions as planned then there would be a further drawdown of 126 officers and 417 NCOs from the regular Thai army, however, he concluded “it does not appear that the BC (SGU) program per se has or will seriously affect the RTA.” (Ibid.)

131. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Bangkok, August 5, 1971.

SUBJECT

KMT Irregulars and Their Involvement in the Opium Traffic

1. On 5 August Chargé Newman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]lunched with General Kriangsak to follow up the discussion which the Ambassador and the DCM held with Marshal Dawee as reported in Bangkok Embtel 9071 of 1 July.[2] Newman filled in Kriangsak on the consultations which have taken place between the Embassy and the Royal Thai Government on the subject of suppressing drugs and narcotics, the establishment of a joint USG/RTG committee to work on the problem headed by General Nitya and Chargé Newman, and emphasizing the mutual interests of both of our governments in addressing this problem aggressively and expeditiously.[3] Newman then recalled the conversation with Dawee and the latter's request that we follow up with Kriangsak to explore the possibilities for utilizing the KMT irregulars to help suppress the trafficking of opium from the Shan States in Thailand.

2. Kriangsak summarized the efforts in which he has been engaged for the past year to re-settle KMT irregulars in Thailand in areas where they could cultivate crops and raise livestock as an income substitute for trafficking in opium on condition that irregulars turn in their arms and submit fully to RTG authority. Part of the agreement of course involves first the clearance by the irregulars of areas controlled by the Communist insurgents, and after security is established they are supposed to turn in their arms to RTG controlled storehouses. The RTG is to provide tea tree seedlings and farm equipment as well as some livestock and advice and assistance in animal husbandry. KMT irregulars are also obliged to get out of the opium business. When this agreement was negotiated in the latter half of 1970, Generals Li and Tuan asked that the embargoes on KMT engagement in the opium business be deferred until after the 1971 crop had been disposed of. Li and Tuan pleaded that they would need this additional income during the period of re-establishment. Though Kriangsak never flatly so stated, it is clear that he felt obliged not to interfere with the KMT opium trafficking during the past few months when this year's harvest was being moved. Newman cited facts and figures, drawing on the attached brief,[4] indicating that Generals Li and Tuan control the movement of a significant amount of the opium crop in the Shan States to Thailand and also engage in refining it in Chiang Mai Province. Kriangsak made notes on the most recent shipments in June 1971 (see page 3 of attachment). Kriangsak was impressed with our information on the KMT opium smuggling activities and made no effort to dispute our information; in fact, he noted that it is difficult for him to obtain reliable information of this kind and solicited our assistance. I promised to give him a summary of our information on this subject, if possible by next week. I cautioned him, and he agreed, that in his use of this information there would be no reference to the fact that he obtained it from the Americans. Kriangsak seemed to be particularly interested in getting information on where the irregulars are operating their refineries.

3. Kriangsak was quite candid in his admission that he and the RTG cannot be certain that Generals Li and Tuan will honor fully and sincerely their commitments to the RTG. Kriangsak suggested that if they do not, the RTG will be forced to consider appropriate disciplinary action. He is trying very hard to provide enough assistance so that the irregulars can re-settle with their families, earn an adequate living, and exist as law-abiding Thai nationals.

4. Newman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] expressed admiration for his program and his efforts and asked whether he thought the next step could be taken, namely, the utilization of the better fighting elements of the irregulars to disrupt and hopefully prevent the movement of opium to refineries in Tatchileck, Laos and Thailand. We noted that it is not enough to get the KMT out of the opium business since there are plenty of others who will be happy to move in. A force will be needed to attack caravans under the protection of Shan insurgents and Burmese self-defense forces and hopefully destroy the opium before it reaches the refineries. In this connection we asked Kriangsak whether the KMT irregulars now in Burma would be moving to Thailand to re-settle with the others already here. Kriangsak said that they are free to do so until the end of this rainy season. If they reject the Thai offer, they will presumably join the other bands in Burma if they can. In thinking about the problem, Kriangsak also commented that if KMT irregulars were sent into Burma on opium-destroying missions it would be necessary to have a few Thais with them to make certain that we are not double-crossed. He concluded by agreeing to consider the matter further, after which he will be back in touch with us. Newman reiterated the urgency of developing plans in the near future in order that effective action can be taken against the next crop which will be planted this fall. Although no specifics were mentioned and none were requested, Newman advised Kriangsak that the American mission would attempt to support the RTG if a realistically feasible plan can be developed.

[name not declassified]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand, 1972–1975. Secret. [text not declassified] Forwarded to Under Secretary Johnson under an attached August 7 cover letter from Newman.

[2] Not found.

[3] In a July 27 letter to Under Secretary Johnson, Newman welcomed the news that the 40 Committee supported Unger's position on the political money (see Document 129) and informed Johnson, in response to the “other suggestion in your letter,” that he [text not declassified] had been “looking over the field for possibilities.” He recommended that intelligence be provided Police Major General Chompon Lohachala so that the latter could go after the drug traffickers. He stated that the Embassy planned to do this [text not declassified] “in the near future on a test basis.” In his August 7 cover letter to Johnson, (see footnote 1 above) Newman stated that he [text not declassified] planned to see General Chompon later that week “to make some information on drug traffickers in the North available to him and to encourage him to move against these individuals.” However, he noted, due to “jurisdictional concerns and departmental politics within the Thai National Police Department, we are moving cautiously on this front.”

[4] Not attached.

132. National Security Decision Memorandum 126[1]

Washington, August 11, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Agriculture

The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

Additional Assistance to Thailand

The President has directed that a $45 million special assistance package be negotiated with the Government of Thailand in order to strengthen the Thai economy and the defense capabilities of Thai forces. The purpose of this package is to accelerate the improvement of general Thai armed forces (RTARF) capabilities and to assure that they are capable of meeting likely contingencies.

The package will be composed of a $30 million PL 480 commodity loan to be made available over the two year period FY 1972 and FY 1973 and a $15 million addition to the FY 1972 Thai MASF program. This assistance will be provided to the Government of Thailand in accord with the following guidelines:

—The local currency proceeds from the PL 480 loan will be allocated to agriculture and education development.

—At least the equivalent of $20 million in Thai expenditures, additional to those currently budgeted, will be allocated to agreed military activities.

—The additional $20 million in Thai military budget expenditures and the $15 million MASF grant will finance the following principal activities:

a) RTA manpower augmentations above those currently budgeted for maneuver and logistics units.

b) expansion of RTA training programs.

c) increases in the level of counterinsurgency operations.

d) upgrading of logistics facilities.

e) improving Thai Air Force capabilities to conduct sustained operations under likely contingencies.

The U.S. Mission in Thailand should advise the Thai government that:

—This package is an immediate measure to assist Thai military force improvements. While the U.S. will support the formation of a fifth division, this support is not provided for in this package.

—The U.S. government requires assurances, including access to the Thai military budget, that actual incremental expenditures in the identified areas have taken place.

—As a follow-on to this decision, the U.S. will give consideration to other additional measures to assist Thai forces and the Thai economy. Implementation of such additional measures will be in part contingent on Thai performance and the establishment of adequate procedures for the implementation of this package, as well as on the availability of funds from the Congress.

In implementing the foregoing decisions, the Secretary of State in coordination with the Secretary of Defense should insure that:

—Negotiations with the Thai government begin immediately on the program as described herein.

—A report is provided, with a program budget by September 15, 1971,[2] to the President on the final package negotiated including the specific actions to which the Thai have agreed.

After review of the NSSM 99[3] options for further adjustments in Thai assistance, the Senior Review Group should provide alternatives to the President by October 1, 1971, on additional assistance to Thai-land. These alternatives should encompass both economic and military assistance.

This and the subsequent NSSM 99 decision on military and economic assistance to Thailand should be reflected in the proposed FY 1973 assistance program. This FY 1973 program will be submitted to the Senior Review Group and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget by November 1, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Top Secret. The memorandum was signed by Kissinger. Copies were forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the CIA, and to the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

[2]  Eliot reported in a memorandum to Kissinger, September 16, that “a number of problems on the Thai side” had “delayed conclusion of agreements on all details and have made it impossible to meet the September 15 deadline for reporting to the President.” Eliot stated that Embassy Bangkok had reported in telegram 12380, September 10 (a copy of which was attached to his memorandum), that “the major problems yet to be overcome relate to RTG budgeting for the required $20 million increase in the Thai defense budget and to certain important details in the proposed PL 480 program.” (Ibid.)

[3] For discussion of NSSM 99 on Southeast Asia, see Document 82, footnote 1.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, August 25, 1971, 0904Z.

11653. Subject: Additional Assistance to Thailand. Ref: Bangkok 11605.[2]

At departure ceremony today for Princess Ubol, Prime Minister asked me to express to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger his appreciation for the proposal I had outlined to him yesterday. He again pointed out that in many of the areas we wish to see increases in defense expenditures the Thai Government had already budgeted significant increases for 1972. I replied that we were aware of these increases but believed that the additional 20 million dollars in baht that we are proposing as their part of the package was fully justified in view of the threat. As he aware from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefing, the insurgency threat in the northeast was increasing and becoming more sophisticated and difficult to counter. We felt this was equally true in other regions. Consequently, we were suggesting that there should be significant increase in level of operations by the RTG against the insurgency. This could be accomplished by the additional 20 million dollars in defense expenditures and the 15 million dollar MASF add-on. The Prime Minister replied that he had asked Marshal Dawee to see what could be done practically and that Dawee would be in touch with our side on the details. He added that in many ways what was happening in northeast Thailand was reminiscent of South Viet-Nam 5–10 years ago and the Thai Government needs to move vigorously to prevent the insurgency from taking hold here as had been the case in Vietnam.

Newman

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15 THAI. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Dated August 25. (Ibid.)

134. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, August 26, 1971.

SUBJECT

Relief for Thai Textile Exports to the U.S.

State (Tab A)[2] has asked that HAK instruct the Interagency Textile Advisory Committee (ITAC) to permit the entry of 52,000 dozen cotton pajamas from Thailand into the United States and to permit Thailand to export an additional 17,000 dozen pajamas during the next nine months. State believes this would be consistent with the President's wish to improve U.S.-Thai relations.

Under the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA), textile exports to the U.S. are limited. Thailand, which has just begun to produce cotton pajamas, was told by us on April 30, 1971 to limit exports to the U.S. to 17,000 dozen pajamas over the succeeding twelve months and asked to consult with us. (This number was derived according to a formula contained in the LTA.) Subsequent to that time, however, the Thai speeded up production and exported 31,000 dozen pajamas in the month of May alone. Because of the apparent neglect by the Thai of our representations and the large number of pajamas exported, Commerce, Labor and other agencies (except State) argue that the Thai should not be permitted to import into the U.S. an amount in addition to the 17,000 dozen prescribed by the LTA, although these agencies would probably be willing to allow a one-time exception were the Thai to reach a voluntary restraint agreement for subsequent exports—which the Thai do not wish to do.

State's memorandum is, therefore, an attempt to bypass the ITAC. Doing so not only raises bureaucratic hackles but approval would mean our approving for Thailand imports of cotton textiles greater than the LTA prescribed level. Other exporters could be counted on to swiftly protest against this action on the grounds that it is discriminating against them and request increases in their own allotments. Also being a domestically sensitive product, cotton textile imports in excess of previously prescribed levels would incur serious domestic criticism. I have therefore asked that this matter be considered formally by the ITAC and that a memorandum containing the views of all concerned agencies be submitted.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VI. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “OK

[2] Attached but not printed.

135. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, September 15, 1971, 0745Z.

12551. Subject: High Level Discussion with Thais Regarding Volunteer Program. Ref: State 166094.[2]

1. In order to transmit to the RTG ref decision authorizing our support for 36 volunteer battalions[3] and to review the present status of the program, I met yesterday with Prime Minister Thanom, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, Marshal Dawee, and Generals Phaithun and Boonchai (standing in for Surakij who is out of country). With me were Minister Newman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I recalled the Prime Minister's discussion of a 36 volunteer battalion force level with Dr. Kissinger during the latter's visit to Bangkok in July[4] and noted our understanding that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had recently reiterated his request to the RTG that it undertake such an expansion of the program. I informed the Prime Minister that we are prepared to support 36 battalions subject only to the necessary legislative authorization of funds.

a. Having carefully reviewed since my return the slippage in the recruitment and training of the already authorized 24 battalion force and the severe losses by resignation, etc., among deployed battalions, I provided the Prime Minister with a rather detailed summary of the status of the program as we understand it. I explained to him that one of my purposes in doing so was to determine whether it is realistic and feasible at this time to engage in military and budgetary planning premised on the eventual availability of a 36 battalion force. My other purpose was to see that everything possible was being done to assure that we will be in a strong position to meet the anticipated heavy enemy pressures in Laos in the coming dry season.

3. I recalled that our mutually agreed schedule developed early in 1971 provided for 24 battalions to be deployed by the end of this calendar year. The last of these units were to go into training in October. There are now only 17 battalions in the field (actually the 17th will be deployed within the next several days); none are in training although we have been advised that two more battalions may start training later this month. If the original schedule is to be maintained, five more battalions must commence training before the end of October. This schedule, of course, was developed to assure the maximum possible force to repel the enemy's effort in the upcoming dry season campaign.

4. The situation with respect to the actual on-board strength of units currently deployed is even more disturbing. The average onboard strength of deployed battalions is only about 55 percent of the authorized strength; approximately 7 percent are on authorized leave and expected to return; an additional 6 percent have been lost to battle casualties. More than 30 percent of the volunteers have resigned from their units or have gone AWOL. In sum, the units deployed in Laos are short more than 4,500 men. To replace these losses and to commence the training of five battalions before the end of October will require a drastic effort to meet what now appears to be a shortfall numbering approximately 7,000 men.

5. In this connection I noted that at the beginning of the last dry season campaign, before any of the irregular battalions were deployed, Thai forces organized into three regular battalions plus the Thai artillery units numbered about 3,000 men. Today the 8 volunteer infantry and two artillery SGU battalions available to General Vang Pao have a total strength of only slightly more than 2,800 (today there are also other Thai forces in Laos, of course). Considering the attrition that Vang Pao's forces have suffered and the expected all-out effort on the part of the North Vietnamese during the coming dry season, there is deep concern that the forces available in MR2 will be woefully undermanned unless dramatic action is taken soon.

6. I suggested that it is not realistic for either of us to think in concrete terms of the formation and deployment of 36 battalions unless it is possible before the end of October to obtain enough volunteers to commence the training of the 24 battalions previously agreed to and in addition to providing replacements in the deployed battalions in sufficient quantities to bring these units up to at least 80 percent of their authorized strength level.

7. At this point I took note of the Prime Minister's interest in developing a bonus system for men who have completed their tour of duty in Laos as an inducement to help with the recruiting program and to reduce the number of losses through resignation and other absenteeism. Discussions between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Bangkok and Vientiane on the one hand and the RTA staff and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the other have resulted in the development of a scheme for a two part bonus system—one part to be paid to the volunteer for completing his duty and the other to be paid after reenlistment for a second tour. Though the funding of this proposal has not yet been completed, we are attempting to obtain expeditious action.

8. It has been our understanding that the tour of duty for each volunteer was 15 months after training. Recently we were advised that RTA headquarters has revised the tour length to be one year after training. The effect of this is to shorten the tour of duty by about 3 months. Since this might further exacerbate the recruitment problem and add an additional training burden, I inquired whether this decision to abbreviate the tour could be reconsidered.

9. Noting General Praphat's concern that an adequate medevac capability be assured to handle the casualty problem during the next dry season campaign, I advised the Prime Minister that action has been taken to assure the availability of six helicopter gunships to escort medevac lift operations. We are now awaiting the identification of Thai helicopter pilots so that we can plan and institute as quickly as possible a training program. The identification of these pilots must be accomplished if they are to be gunship qualified by the time they are needed.

10. Finally, I called attention to the decision taken some time ago to man the Korat Friendship Hospital with sufficient RTA personnel to handle the major portion of Thai volunteer casualties. According to our information, the staffing of this hospital is going rather slowly and I requested that the problem be examined on the Thai side to make certain that adequate preparation is being made to assure proper medical support for the Thai volunteers.

11. In his response, the Prime Minister admitted that they had had a number of problems with the Thai volunteer effort. Morale among the volunteers has not been very good and one of the reasons for this is that the the men in the program see no future for themselves. The pay has been low and the fighting has been tough. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the effort to get the bonus system approved. He feels this is essential to help keep the men in their units and to give a boost to the recruitment effort. For example, he noted that many of the volunteers from the Black Panthers returning from Vietnam are interested in the volunteer program but they are not attracted by the lower pay and loss of the other benefits which they had been receiving, including their mustering out payment at the end of their duty in Vietnam.

12. The Prime Minister praised the RTA for its efforts and said it is doing its best to recruit, but he expressed his regret that it has been unable to maintain the recruitment schedule and replace losses. He went on to say, with General Praphat nodding agreement, that the RTG would redouble its efforts and that it will have 24 battalions by the end of this calendar year. He needs help from us in obtaining prompt approval of the bonus system, but with that assistance, he feels certain that this target can be met. The Prime Minister, again with General Praphat in agreement, concluded this part of his comments by asking that we continue to plan and program for 12 additional battalions (36 battalion total) saying, “I guarantee we will do it.” I inquired whether a further boost to recruitment and retention of the program might be achieved by offering to those volunteers who perform successfully an opportunity for a career in the RTA. Dawee replied that they have been working on this and have already announced the performance, experience, and educational criteria for volunteers who wish to join the RTA. In order to open this opportunity to more men, the educational requirement has been reduced from Matayom Hok to Matayom See (equivalent respectively to 10th and 8th grades).

13. Dawee said that the Supreme Command is issuing an order to the various Thai services and will provide us very shortly with the identity of the pilots for gunship training.

14. The Thais strongly resisted our request to reconsider the decision already taken concerning the length of duty tours for volunteers. They noted that the men are kept on the line with little relief or leave. As Dawee said, “We can't expect to keep them in the foxholes longer than 12 months.” A move now to restore the 15 month tour of duty after training would aggravate rather than help solve the recruitment and training program. In view of their strong feelings, I did not press this further, but pointed out that it made it even more essential to pursue recruiting with real vigor.

15. Finally, concerning the medical treatment of casualties, Praphat assured us that orders have gone to the RTA Surgeon General who is responsible for developing surgical and medical teams which can move quickly to Korat or elsewhere as needed. The RTA suffers from severe shortages in this field and it cannot man the Korat Hospital beyond the level of current needs. However, steps are being taken to identify and prepare the medical teams to move rapidly when the situation requires.

16. Comment: The atmosphere throughout the session was constructive and forward looking. Though my brief was implicitly critical of the shortcomings of Thai performance, it was received without recrimination and the spirit of the meeting evidenced Thai determination to solve their problems and meet the 36 volunteer battalion goal. General Praphat did note in passing at one point that in the early stages of the program there had been some shortages in support on the American side but he had no complaints concerning the current level of support, and his comment was made in the context of the need for mutual understanding of the problems that exist on both sides in an effort to make this program succeed.

17. I do not think that we should expect any miraculous recovery of the slippages which have already occurred. Unquestionably, however, Thai leadership is impressed and grateful for our continued support of the volunteer program and for our decision to expand it to the 36 battalion level if funds become available. Their success in the course of the next six to eight weeks in identifying and placing into training the remainder of the previously authorized 24 battalions should provide a pretty good index of their ability to reach the 36 battalion level in 1972. In the meantime, it is quite essential that we authorize promptly the bonus system as developed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is my understanding that this can be accomplished within currently authorized program levels since it is quite clear that the average number of volunteers deployed is unlikely to exceed 80 percent of their authorized strength.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane.

[2] Attached but not printed was telegram 166094 to Bangkok, September 10, which requested Unger to inform the Thai Government that the U.S. Government would support 36 Thai SGU battalions for Laos and to urge them to accelerate recruitment of these forces so that they would “be of service during 1971–1972 dry season.” The telegram added that Unger should inform them “that implementation is contingent upon our continuing to have the necessary legislative authority,” noting that “restrictive amendments (concerning Thai volunteers in Laos) have been proposed in FY 72 defense procurement bill.”

[3] The decision to support 36 Thai SGU volunteer battalions for Laos was made at the August 10 WSAG meeting, when all agreed to Kissinger's suggestion to “go ahead with the 12 additional Thai SGUs in the last quarter of this year.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting Laos, 8/10/71)

[4] See Document 127.

136. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Washington, September 16, 1971.

SUBJECT

Conversation with General Kriangsak on Measures to Discontinue Chinese Irregular Forces Involvement in Opium Traffic

REFERENCE

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (TDCSDB–315/05276–71)

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a message from Bangkok, dated 14 September 1971, relating to a meeting held between Deputy Chief of Mission and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lt. General Kriangsak Chamanan, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. The report referred to in this message is TDCSDB–315/05276–71, a copy of which has been disseminated to you.

2. While the account of the meeting with General Kriangsak is very interesting, we are highly skeptical that the Chinese Irregular Forces, which have existed for many years primarily on the revenue obtained from opium traffic, will give up this lucrative trade. We note that under this plan, the 1971 opium crop would not be affected. This cycle could be repeated for the 1972 crop for one reason or another. There is also the good possibility, because of the current public concern over the drug problem, of the American interest or hand surfacing. While we have not yet examined what the repercussions of such event would have on Burmese/U.S. relations, we must assume they would be adversely affected. Additionally, such disclosure would only give credence to Burmese past and present claims and charges of U.S. support and involvement with the Chinese Irregulars.

For the Deputy Director for Plans: Thomas H. Karamessines [2]

Attachment

Message From Bangkok

REFERENCE

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (TDCSDB–315/05276–71)

1. The Deputy Chief of Mission [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] meeting with General Kriangsak to determine his progress in resettling the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) of Generals Li and Tuan and to press him to take appropriate action to discontinue CIF involvement in opium traffic. In early August, General Kriangsak reported that he had a commitment from both Generals Li and Tuan that their involvement in the opium traffic would cease after the 1971 crop had been disposed of. Last week he reported that he had reconfirmed this commitment with General Tuan which action is supported by the reference report. General Kriangsak stated that he was unable to see General Li during his August trip to the north but that he intends to follow up again with Li later in September.

2. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

3. In response to our query as to whether Kriangsak had any thoughts on how the refineries in Tachilek could be put out of business, Kriangsak suggested that he attempt to persuade Li and Tuan to undertake this task. He agreed to sound them out on this possibility at the time of his next trip. Kriangsak asked that we clear this informally with Dawee; this was accomplished on 9 September. He noted that there must be no leak to Li or Tuan concerning American interest or support and we assured him that we are as interested as he in maintaining strict security. Although we did not discuss the specifics of compensation to Li and Tuan for a successful operation, Kriangsak noted that he would wish to relate it to other assistance he is providing for the resettlement of the CIF. In addition, it will be necessary to promise death and disability benefits.

4. The foregoing may sound far fetched in view of the well earned reputation of the CIF for their heavy involvement in opium trafficking over the years. We are in no position at this point to provide a reliable assessment of Kriangsak's chances. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reporting over the past year has reflected Kriangsak's efforts to bring the CIF under control and to regularize their status in Thailand. Though Kriangsak himself remains skeptical about their long term intentions and motivation, he feels that he has made considerable progress in bringing these forces under greater RTG control and that in the process of doing so, his leverage has increased. Tuan and Li have been promised Thai citizenship and their forces will receive permanent resident permits. In return for this and other assistance, the CIF has performed a useful role against Communist insurgents. We believe that Kriangsak's interest in using CIF against the Tachilek refineries should be encouraged and, if appropriate, assisted if this can be accomplished without any disclosure of the hand of the United States Government. We recognize that if successful, the effort will probably be required on a continuing and not just a one-time basis. Kriangsak appreciates this, too, but rightly wants to approach this cautiously, avoiding long-term commitments pending step-by-step evaluation of the results.

5. Messrs. Gross and Minnick have been briefed on this possibility and feel we should pursue its feasibility. [1 line of source text not declassified]

6. Please bring the foregoing to the attention of U. Alexis Johnson and Marshall Green.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand, 1970–71. Secret; Sensitive.

[2]  Karamessines signed for Nelson above Nelson's typed signature.

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, September 17, 1971, 0300Z.

12650. Subject: Counterinsurgency: Communist Insurgent Threat in Thailand and the RTG Response.

1. At a meeting with Prime Minister Thanom, General Praphat, and Marshal Dawee on 14 September, I took the occasion to comment on the growing insurgent threat in selected areas of Thailand in order to press for a more vigorous Thai counterinsurgency response.

2. [4 lines of source text not declassified] This briefing was translated by them into Thai and, we have subsequently learned, read with care by the Prime Minister who instructed that it be given broader distribution to key officials of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The thrust of the briefing was to call RTG attention to the expanding covert village infra-structure which the CPT has built in the Phuphan Mountain area in the northeast, particularly in the Nakae District of Nakhon Phanom. Though our intelligence in the north is less detailed than in the northeast, attention was also given to the growing numbers of insurgents and more sophisticated weaponry in the north and the expanded activity on the part of the CPT cadre working out of the high-land into lowland Thai villages.

3. After noting that since my return I had reviewed developments in the insurgency situation during my absence, I commented on this rather discouraging picture—discouraging to the extent that the situation in these areas has continued to deteriorate during the past year. Recently, the CPT has been able to organize its covert village infra-structure in the northeast to foment at least 8 demonstrations against government officials—demonstrations clearly organized to press Communist interests and not the normal needs of the villagers. At least in this area, the Communists have the capability to manipulate public opinion and stir up the villagers against the government's counterinsurgency efforts. It is a dangerous new feature of the insurgency.

4. I observed that the progress which the CPT has made serves to highlight the need for a more intensive and aggressive RTG response. For one thing, greater cooperation on the part of civil, military, and police forces is urgently required. A number of instances were cited where differences among these various elements had prevented or weakened an effective RTG response. In other cases, there have been problems of inadequate support and attention from Bangkok resulting in district and province level positions being left unfilled, delays in making budgeted funds for counterinsurgency operations available, etc. a more concerted police effort is needed in some of the most critical areas. Many military patrol, reconnaissance and hunter-capture operations are effective while they last but are not run on a sustained basis. This gives the insurgents an opportunity to regroup and restore their access to the village population.

5. I emphasized that one of the reasons for the new AAT program is to provide additional assistance to the RTG to intensify their counterinsurgency operations. We realize the RTG is making every effort within its own budget to respond to this growing threat and we hope that additional assistance provided in the AAT proposal, by relieving budgetary pressure in other sectors, will enable it to do more than it would otherwise be able to do within present RTG budget limitations.

6. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the intelligence exchanged and for our interest, advice, and support in the entire range of counterinsurgency programs and operations. The RTG is trying, he said, to get the various elements of the government working together more closely, and he cited as an example the recent seminar of governors of the insurgency-infested provinces held in Bangkok under CSOC sponsorship with military, police, and dola participation. Every effort is being made to increase the budget for counterinsurgency operations. Dawee said that in 1970, 600 million baht was allocated for these operations; 650 million in 1971; and for 1972, despite the many cuts made elsewhere, over 800 million baht is budgeted for counterinsurgency. General Praphat said that the military intends to run more operations such as Operation Phalad in the north and that these will be prolonged, not so limited in time as was Phalad. Apparently, the RTA is now planning such an operation in Petchabun for which funds are being sought from lower priority requirements. Also, more intensive reconnaissance and hunter-capture operations are planned for Nakhon Phanom.

7. I expressed my satisfaction and interest in this evidence of increased activity and again asked that in their review of our AAT program, they look for other opportunities for striking hard against the Communists in ways that are not possible within their present budget. The Prime Minister closed with a strong statement of appreciation for the critically important assistance provided by the U.S. Government, noting that the Thais cannot now handle the problem without material aid from us. Praphat echoed this with a statement reflecting his recognition that a more powerful thrust is needed against the internal Communist threat.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand [text not declassified][1]

Bangkok, October 29, 1971.

24202. 1. At General Kriangsak's initiative, we met with him 27 October 1971 on further developments outlined ref. Kriangsak stated that he met earlier that day with CIF Generals Li and Tuan. Generals told Kriangsak that their present raw opium stocks total 14,000 choi. After Kriangsak determined size of stock, he informed Generals that RTG considering purchasing total stock on one-time basis for medicinal purposes. Price for stocks to be determined by current market price. Generals Li and Tuan said they would accept RTG offer, and Kriangsak then ordered them not to move any of these stocks without his personal approval. Kriangsak emphasized to Li and Tuan that RTG purchase, if approved, would be a one-time buy and no more. Further, Kriangsak added, he extracted commitment from Li and Tuan that they will not engage in opium traffic in future.

2. At current market of about 1,200 per choi, preemptive buying of total stock would be close to USD one million. Kriangsak asked that we consult with appropriate USG authorities seeking approval for this preemptive purchase. We reminded Kriangsak that per previous statements [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] this proposal had already been forwarded to Washington for consideration. We added that as of now, however, policy decision had not been communicated to mission in Bangkok.

3. Kriangsak commented that he starting to resettle CIF personnel and dependents in about December. In the meantime, he paying cost for feeding and housing CIF families which held in five or six locations in Fang district along Thai-Burma border. It appears clear that Kriangsak strapped for funds in his resettlement program and that preemptive buying of opium stocks will alleviate partially Li and Tuan's needs for funds.

4. Amb. Unger briefed on above 29 Oct. Amb. requests that substance of above be passed to Assistant Secretary Green together with statement that he endorses favorable action so that we can begin specific discussions with General Kriangsak in near future on conditions and means of carrying out this action.

[1] Source: National Security Council, Country File, Thailand, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In an October 29 memorandum to Green, [text not declassified] stated that this message was [text not declassified] also being provided to “General Haig at the White House and Mr. Ingersoll in BNDD.”

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 3, 1971, 0324Z.

Conto 24/14775. Subject: Connally Visit; East Asia—Secretary Connally's Calls on Minister of Finance Serm and Prime Minister Thanom.

Summary: Secretary Connally affirmed that the United States will honor its commitments to countries of SE Asia and that U.S. military presence as well as economic assistance will continue while a need exists. Secretary Connally also assured the Thai that the President's visit to the PRC would not jeopardize the interests of Thailand or other third countries. The major concern of Prime Minister Thanom was China and the threat posed to Thai security. He urged the U.S. to maintain a strong position in SE Asia while trying to improve relations with the PRC.

1. Secretary Connally called first on Minister of Finance Serm Vinicchayakul. After initial pleasantries, Connally asked for Serm's comments on the U.S. economic program. Serm said he understood the factors which prompted the U.S. to take this action. The fact that the dollar was not devalued, Serm felt, was important to countries such as Thailand with substantial dollar reserves. Secretary Connally assured Serm that the U.S. program took interests of developing nations into account. The administration believed that objectives of the program would be mutually beneficial to U.S. and developing countries. The U.S. looks to Southeast Asia as vital participants in world trade, suppliers of essential raw materials, and important trading partners. U.S. interest in this area will continue, Secretary Connally said.

2. At the conclusion of the meeting, Serm escorted Secretary Connally and the Ambassador to a meeting with Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn. Other persons present for the meeting were Deputy Prime Minister Pote Sarasin, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, Lt. General Sawaeng Senanarong, Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Minister Econ Affairs Prasit Kanjonawatana.

3. Secretary Connally opened with a forceful declaration of U.S. commitment to Thailand and other countries of SE Asia. President Nixon, he said, had asked him to affirm that the U.S. will maintain its military and economic presence in SE Asia as long as the need exists. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, Thailand can be assured of continued U.S. assistance to help meet its economic and military needs. Despite the recent defeat of the Foreign Assistance Bill by the U.S. Senate, the administration is vigorously seeking interim means of continuing assistance until the question can be favorably resolved.

4. In response, Thanom (speaking in Thai with Thanat interpreting his remarks) thanked the Secretary for the assurances which he brought from the President. Thanom said that U.S. military forces and assistance must play a vital role not only in Vietnamization but also “Southeast Asianization” to assure the future security of the region. He pointed out that Thailand had cooperated closely with the United States in realization of mutual objectives and that Thailand was fostering SE Asian unity by participating in regional programs.

5. Turning to the question of China, Thanom said that Thailand, like the US, believed that the time was ripe for the People's Republic of China to become a member of the United Nations, and had supported the U.S. position at the UN. Secretary Connally expressed his appreciation for Thai support. The U.S. realized that the question of admitting the PRC to the UN was of vital importance to countries “only a stone's throw from mainland China.”

6. Secretary Connally said that the purpose of President Nixon's visit to the PRC was to seek an improved relationship with the PRC. He emphasized that the U.S. had modest expectations for the results of the meeting. The President, he said, feels a responsibility to try to bring the PRC into the community of nations in a peaceful fashion. However, the U.S. would not cultivate new friends at the expense of old. The issues discussed at the meeting in China would be bilateral problems between the U.S. and the PRC; third countries need not fear that their interests would be jeopardized.

7. Thanom said that the China question was, of course, of great concern to Thailand. He urged the U.S. to maintain its “military/economic/political umbrella” over SE Asia at the same time that it tried to improve relations with the PRC. Diminished U.S. interest in SE Asia could result in a power vacuum which Peking might try to fill. He mentioned the Chinese road building program in Laos and Burma and ex-pressed apprehension about the ultimate purpose of these roads. Secretary Connally, in response, restated that the U.S. would continue to maintain its strong posture in SE Asia while the need existed.

8. Comment: The major concern of the Thai was the question of Communist China. Secretary Connally effectively outlined the objectives of the President's visit to the PRC, hopefully allaying Thai fears that the visit might be injurious to their interests. Secretary Connally also took the initiative in explaining that the administration is working hard to avoid any disruption in military and economic assistance which might occur as a result of the defeat of the Foreign Assistance Bill by the Senate. The Thai did not question his assessment of the problem or his assurance that it would be resolved.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US Connally. Secret; Priority;Exdis. Received at 4:17 a.m. on November 4.

140. Memorandum From Secretary of Commerce Stans to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 12, 1971.

SUJBECT

Thai Cotton Textiles

I have read carefully the State Department's memorandum of October 29[2] recommending that we release from embargo the Thai cotton apparel awaiting entry.[3] The grounds for this recommendation after acknowledgement by State that the Thai Government has handled the matter badly, are that “a political decision (is necessary) permitting the entry of the embargoed goods, not further consideration of the problem as a purely textile matter …”

This is probably the worst possible time for the Administration to make textile import decisions on policy grounds such as these. We have just concluded four understandings on wool and man-made fiber textiles with our principal Asian suppliers. These understandings need to be converted into agreements, notes exchanged, and the agreements implemented. The President has reaffirmed to the domestic textile industry that he intends to implement these agreements effectively to hold imports from these countries within the terms of the agreements. This means that we will need to implement these agreements in purely textile terms. If we allow policy considerations such as those suggested by State to intervene, the Administration will lose the confidence of the industry and call into question our intentions with regard to the implementation of the new Asian agreements.

The Thai Government has indeed handled the matter badly.

1. It neglected to advise its industry that the U.S. had invoked the provisions of the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (LTA).

2. It permitted shipments to continue without control during the 60-day period provided for consultations so that significantly more than the restraint level specified in our April 29 note to the Thai Government was shipped subsequent to the receipt of our note.

3. It did not avail itself of the opportunity to consult until the last day of the 60-day period specified for consultations in the LTA.

4. Its official representative assured us that further shipments would cease as of August 1, but our records show that shipments continued into September. (October data are not yet available.)

The State Department has not handled the matter well either.

1. In January 1971 Embassy Bangkok was requested in a State Department message cleared by the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee to alert the Thai Government about the possibility of action under the LTA on the items now in dispute. The Embassy chose not to do so.

2. In August 1971 when the Thais came to Washington to consult on this matter, Commerce proposed that we suggest to the Thais the negotiation of a bilateral agreement together with the outline of arrangement and the dates for such a negotiation. State did not concur.

3. In September 1971, Commerce proposed that one of its senior officials could undertake such a negotiation while he was in Hong Kong the last week of that month. State did not concur.

4. In October 1971, Commerce proposed that we ask the Thai Government to enter into a memorandum of understanding—just as was done with the four major Asian suppliers of wool and man-mades— that would contain the key points of a bilateral agreement. We offered to release the embargoed goods immediately thereafter when the Thai delegation came to Washington to negotiate an agreement and before an agreement was negotiated. State did not concur.

Despite my clear negative reactions to the State Department memorandum and the difficulty I have in seeing how the embargoed pajamas can be such ad adverse factor in our relations with the Thai Government, we have proposed another approach to resolve this problem which has been accepted by State, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, and STR. It involves releasing a portion of the embargoed goods if the Thai Government will agree to begin the negotiation of a bilateral agreement on a date certain in the near future and, if no agreement is reached, the quantity so released will be charged against the level for the second year the restraints are in effect. The amount of goods to be released is equal to the second year's restraint level. State is proceeding to communicate with the Thai Government along these lines.

Maurice H. Stans

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 563, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. V. Limited Official Use.

[2] The Department of State memorandum to Kissinger, October 29, stated that the embargo of the 50,000 dozen pair of cotton nightwear “is now damaging our overall relationship with Thailand.” It stated the Department's belief that “the political realities of the present situation require immediate release of the nightwear in exchange for a Thai promise to negotiate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO– COTTON 17 US–THAI)

[3] See Document 134.

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 16, 1971, 1207Z.

Johto 2/15421. From Ambassador. Subj: Under Secretary Johnson's Audience with His Majesty the King.

1. This morning Undersecretary Johnson, accompanied by myself and John Getz, was received in audience by His Majesty the King. The discussion ranged widely over various aspects of the current situation in Thailand, particularly in the field of economic development, noting forward progress particularly in the northeast since the period when the Under Secretary was Ambassador here.

2. Under Secretary Johnson then expressed concern about the worldwide narcotics problem and noted with satisfaction the progress that was being made toward the development of a Thai/U.S. program in this field. He referred specifically to my appointment with General Prasert earlier this morning. The Under Secretary then mentioned the problem of finding an economic alternative to opium production for the hill tribes in northern Thailand and said that he understood His Majesty was sponsoring some useful work in this field.

3. The King responded readily and talked at length about the experimentation going on with a number of crops (for example, peaches, soy beans, vegetables, and coffee). He explained the need for proceeding carefully, “unofficially,” and sometimes at greater cost to be sure that the hill tribesmen would be won over and would become willing participants. He discussed the importance of being sure there was a market (His Majesty advocated cooperatively organized rather than commercial canning industries) and the need for transport to market. Not unexpectedly, this led His Majesty to emphasize the heavy requirement for aircraft, particularly helicopters and stol planes.

4. Discussion was very friendly and constructive throughout, and His Majesty made none of the critical and pessimistic comments about the RTG or the situation in Thailand which had so strongly marked some earlier conversations with American visitors.[2]

5. Under Secretary has seen and approved this message.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 U. Secret; Limdis.

[2] One such conversation was Secretary Connally's with the King on November 3 at Chitralada Palace in Bangkok, as reported in telegram Conto 30/9579 from Djakarta, November 5, in which Unger reported that the King “found the government's efforts inadequate and its performance in some cases deficient.” (Ibid., Conference Files 1966–72: Lot 70 D 387, Box 526)

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, November 17, 1971, 0643Z.

15497. 1. Tonight at 2010 I met at his request with Prime Minister Thanom. With him were Deputy Prime Ministers Praphat and Pote and Marshal Dawee and General Kriangsak. Prime Minister informed me that since 1900 hours there had been effected a coup d'état carried out entirely under his control. Thanom said that this has been done for the sake of the security of Thailand “both externally and internally” as an alternative to letting things go to ruin in the country because of inaction. The decision had been taken to move rapidly and stop an unacceptable deterioration.

2. The Prime Minister, with contributions from others present, then described the deplorable situation that has grown up because of the actions of the members of Parliament since the inauguration of the Parliament in 1969. They cited difficulties with Parliaments in earlier Thai history but said the problems had never been so acute as in this case. In particular, the Parliament has interfered in a totally unacceptable way in the administration of the country and obstructed essential actions in many fields. Furthermore, collectively and individually Parliament and its members have attacked the government for its performance and also made many personal attacks and have spread among the people a growing lack of confidence in the government. There have been serious budgetary delays this year as in previous years so that money for the country's development is available only six months out of each year; members of Parliament are obstructing appropriation of funds for essential government purposes including national security and want money to be diverted instead to funds which would be spent in their districts for pork barrel purposes. The National Economic Development Board's five year plan is held up because of parliamentary inaction and there was specific reference made to World Bank President McNamara's statement that economic development in Thailand in the sixties was more rapid than it is today. The government is unable to take advantage of World Bank loans because the Parliament refuses to enact the necessary legislation.

3. The Prime Minister and General Praphat both referred to activities of members of Parliament with labor groups, students and others whom they were seeking to turn against the government. For their own purposes they were stirring up discontent and unrest and misunderstanding in complete disregard of the stability of the government and the country. According to Pote there was a concentrated move to stir up students to seek to take the universities away from the government and run them independently and to take advantage of student immaturity to turn them into instruments against the government.

4. Reference as then made to a certain number of members of Parliament who had Communist leanings, were very happy to have the PRC in the UN and were insisting that the RTG rush into establishing relations with the PRC immediately without giving any consideration to the dangers that could ensue. Praphat clearly attached special importance to this issue, commenting on the dangers of certain Chinese-born who were not Thai in spite of having been born here. The Communists were now trying to install in such people a feeling of the greatness of the new China. Pote also emphasized this point, saying that there is considerable recent evidence of Chinese in Thailand be-coming hostile to the Thai—although the PRC admission to the UN is certainly not the cause of the problem it has complicated it.

5. Marshal Thanom added the degenerating situation as far as public safety was concerned and the rapid increase in crime. Actions being taken now would make it possible to move much more effectively against criminals and make it possible to restore law and order. I said that I was aware of the conditions they were describing but was surprised that they found them so critical as to oblige them to take this action. After the several present again reviewed the budgetary and other problems they had mentioned before, Marshal Thanom concluded that discussion with his insistence that the action was taken out of no motivation except for the security and well-being of the country.

6. Thanom went on to say that the principal well-established Thai institutions and laws will continue to be observed and above all, the institution of the monarchy. When I asked if His Majesty had been informed of the action they said that Marshal Thanom had just sent him a letter explaining their actions. They did not feel it right to seek in any way to involve the King in their action and if they turned out to be wrong, it was on their head. Marshal Thanom went on to state that Thailand will uphold all its treaty obligations and that their action should have no effect on relations with friendly countries. They said that I was the only Ambassador they were calling in to inform personally and they hoped in particular that there would be no change in Thailand's relations with the US. (Reference was made to our recent active discussions, presumably on narcotics and AAT.) They insisted that their action was entirely an internal one and need have no effects or repercussions outside. (They also asked me not to mention my meeting with them since no other foreign representative was being called in.) General Praphat asked me whether I thought there should be some change in their foreign policy. I first told them that was for them to decide, not for me. I then said that we were generally happy with the foreign policy of the Thai Govt as it has been conducted over many years, particularly the close cooperative relations we have enjoyed. We also realized that in times of change like the present, it made good sense for the Thai Govt to be broadening its relations with other countries outside the circle of its close friends and particularly concentrating on strengthening its ties with its neighbors.

7. Since the group appeared to have completed their explanations for the actions taken, I then told them very frankly that I was sure their actions would be greeted around the world with considerable strong criticism. I said that also in the US they must anticipate expressions of disappointment at least, and in the press and probably in the Congress some sharply adverse comment about returning to dictatorship, etc. Marshal Thanom acknowledged this but said that their decision had been that regardless, for the good of Thailand they must proceed. Dawee expressed the fear that without strong direction there was danger that Thailand might go the way of Vietnam. Gen. Praphat said that while they respected the principles of democracy and had attempted to put them into action, it was clear that in Thailand today democracy doesn't work.

8. I acknowledged their comments but asked whether they did not feel that dissolving of the Parliament and their other actions might not in fact make more trouble for them internally with the Chinese groups, students and insurgents. They insisted that groups like the students, farmers and laborers would under normal circumstances be well behaved and support the government but they were now being instigated by those individuals, including members of Parliament, who were stirring up opposition to the government for their own benefit. Under the revolutionary group it was anticipated that the government could deal more effectively with agitation and subversive activities. They anticipated that there would be a rather prompt return to an orderly situation and one that would be generally acceptable to the people. I said I hoped that this would be the end result and that they did not find that they had created more trouble for themselves by their action.

9. I then asked what would be their next steps. The Prime Minister said that he could not say what would follow but it was explained that for the time being, with the Cabinet having been dissolved, there would be a caretaker arrangement, ministries would operate under their Under Secretaries and policy questions would be referred to the head of the revolutionary group, Marshal Thanom. Thanom himself said that he anticipated that in about two to three months a regular government with a cabinet would again be formed. In reply to my question they confirmed that various of the revolutionary party orders which were first put into effect in 1958 would again be enforced, including Article 17, having to do with security.

10. General Praphat returned to the public relations problem, recognizing that the revolutionary group's purposes and reasons for its action must be effectively explained abroad. We talked about the possibility, as a longer run matter, of the Thai securing professional advice in this field. Somewhat later I returned to this point with Marshal Dawee and emphasized the importance of the purposes and their reasons for taking this drastic action being fully and effectively explained. At this time I also mentioned that it would be important if they could make clear their intention of returning to constitutional government at some point.

11. This entire discussion was carried on in a friendly, almost relaxed atmosphere, the Thai present appearing calm and confident of the rightness of their action. I, of course, committed myself to reporting in full everything they told me so that my government would be aware of their reasons for action. While I made clear that I realized they were alone in a position to make decisions about Thailand's Government, it was my judgment that they must anticipate encountering considerable criticism abroad. As for the consequences at home in Thai-land, I expressed my personal doubts but acknowledged they were obviously the best judges.

12. I learned later that Marshal Thanom, Praphat, Pote, Dawee and General Prasert (Director General TNPD) went to explain in person to His Majesty the King the actions they had taken. According to Dawee the King listened sympathetically and wished them well.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

143. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, November 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Unger's Report on Coup in Thailand

Ambassador Unger has telephoned to State (Assistant Secretary Green)[2] a report of his meeting with the leaders of the coup in Thailand. This report provides significant details of the reasons for the coup and on the make-up of the new leadership structures, as follows:

—The leadership group consists of Field Marshal Thanom (now known as “Head of the Revolutionary Council” rather than Prime Minister), General Praphat, Pote Sarasin, and Air Marshal Dawee. These say that there are no differences among them. Thanom will be in charge of the Revolutionary Council for an undetermined period, and the country will be under martial law.

—The coup was undertaken in order to dismiss the Parliament and suspend the Constitution. This was done in response to what was described to Unger as a “deteriorating situation” in the country caused by the failure of the Parliament to measure up to legislative requirements such as the budget and other badly-needed pieces of legislation. Moreover, some members of the Parliament were undermining the Government by working with groups in the country seeking to broaden instability.

—One of the failures of the Parliament had been to impose restrictions on the terms offered for a World Bank loan, which made acceptance of this loan impossible.

—No foreign policy issues were involved in the coup, and there will be no change in Thai foreign policy.[3] The coup leaders are hopeful that cordial relations with the U.S. will continue. When Unger pointed out that a critical reaction in the U.S. and around the world might be expected over this lapse from democracy, the leaders said that they had anticipated a reaction of this kind, but felt their move was necessary on the grounds of internal security and in order to assure decisive action with respect to internal development. (Unger suggested that as a public line we should express disappointment that the Thai effort to reestablish representative government had run into difficulties, note however that these are difficult times, and then hope for an early restoration of constitutional government.)

—There is now no Cabinet. Thanat, in meeting with a foreign correspondents group, called himself “Mr. Thanat.” Unger thought that this might be temporary, and is reserving his judgment on Thanat's position.

—The King has been informed, but it is too early for his attitude to be made known. The Revolutionary group is taking full responsibility for the coup, making it plain that the King is not involved.

—It is also too early to know the reaction of the public and the press. Unger feels that there will be a mixed reaction, but that people will be cautious in commenting. There is no evidence of public unrest.

—Unger is the only foreign ambassador who has been called in to meet the new leadership and this fact has not been publicly made known.

Comment

As indicated by Ambassador Unger, there should be no change in Thai relations with the U.S. The leaders of the Revolutionary Council are in fact essentially the same ones with whom we have been dealing all along, and we can anticipate that our programs in Thailand will continue without interruption. One possible leadership casualty, how-ever, is Thanat, whose moves to make contacts with Peking have drawn some criticism from more conservative leaders such as Praphat. Praphat also had reservations about Thanat's proposal to favor an endorsement of neutrality for Southeast Asia at an ASEAN meeting scheduled for November 25 at Kuala Lumpur.

Praphat may in fact turn out to be the new strong-man, since the coup could not have been undertaken without the military forces which he commands. Thanom was planning to step down as Prime Minister in 1972 and Praphat was considered likely to replace him; the new situation may thus have simply moved up Praphat's succession to power even though Thanom may remain as titular head of the Revolutionary Council for some time.

I believe that we should be very cautious about commenting on the coup along the lines suggested by Ambassador Unger. There will be criticism enough on the Hill and in the media—with resulting pressure on legislation—without the Government adding to the uproar. Press guidance so far has been to say “no comment.”

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for information. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

[3] The President underlined this sentence and wrote: “K—This is what matters.”

144. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bangkok, November 18, 1971, 9:30–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

Under Secretary Johnson's Visit with NEC Leaders

PARTICIPANTS

Thai—Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn

General Praphat Charusathien

Pote Sarasin

ACM Dawee Chullasap

American—Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson

Ambassador Leonard Unger

John Getz, Special Asst. to Under Secretary Johnson

George F. Muller, Politico-Military Counselor

Laurence G. Pickering, Political Counselor

Harlan Y. M. Lee, Political Officer

The American contingent arrived at Government House at 9:30 a.m.

Pote Sarasin first came in alone to talk to the Under Secretary and Ambassador Unger. Pote said that there was no coup but simply a change. He said that doing business through the Parliament had become “in fact impossible,” and they felt there was no other way but to change the structure of the government.

He spoke of three things that he believed were most important in bringing about the decision to change the government. First was that the economic plan would be impossible to implement under the existing system. (Parliament obstructed international loan policy by refusing to make their funds available). Second, problems within the government party itself could not be resolved. Third, there was the problem of the Chinese in Thailand and the possibility of subversion of the Chinese community.

In response to Ambassador Johnson's question, Pote said there would be no problem of political prisoners as in the Sarit days, although he had earlier spoken of stern measures to be taken against any opposition. He said, “the people were dissatisfied and something had to be done.” He hopes that the new government will be decisive. His greatest fear is not that Thanom will be too harsh but that he will not be firm enough and then the change will be for naught.

The meeting then shifted to the main conference room where the Thai side comprised Field Marshal Thanom, General Praphat, Air Marshal Dawee and Pote.

Under Secretary Johnson opened the conversation by saying that he had been to Laos yesterday and had visited Long Tieng and the Plain of Jars and a battery of Thai volunteers. He said the Thai were doing a good job.

Pote asked about the Cambodian situation. Under Secretary Johnson said that on the whole he felt that Cambodia in the last 18 months had done very well. General Praphat expressed concern about the morale of FANK and commented that the Cambodians changed leaders or commanders too often. Under Secretary Johnson said that at the top there had been little change and that Lon Nol's health continued to improve; he was impressed by their strong sense of nationalism. Field Marshal Thanom said that last night he had invited the Ambassador and Under Secretary Johnson to meet with him. Regrettably the Under Secretary was not available but the Field Marshal assumed that the Ambassador had briefed Mr. Johnson. He said the Revolutionary Group had had a note sent to all Embassies explaining the reasons for the takeover. He said there was no change in Thai foreign policy.

Under Secretary Johnson said it was naturally up to the Thai Government to decide what must be done, but they should be aware that their action will have unfortunate effects abroad, especially in the United States. He expressed particular concern about its effect on the debate on economic and military assistance at this particularly critical time.

Field Marshal Thanom said that one of the reasons they under-took the change of government was that they felt they could then more effectively proceed with programs the U.S. has advocated, such as providing the counterpart funds necessary to AAT. The government had set aside this money, but the Assembly would not have agreed to its being spent for defense. He agreed that this should not be cited in public as a reason.

Under Secretary Johnson referred to the strong opposition in the U.S. Senate to the foreign aid bill and to assistance to Thailand in particular. This latest move will strengthen the hand of opponents of such assistance and the immediate question is what can be done to reduce the damage to the Thai program. He said that realistically the Thai must anticipate some reduction in U.S. aid in any case. He expressed the fear that riders will now be attached to the bill aimed specifically at the Thai program. He made clear that the Administration did not want this but it could well happen.

Reiterating that the Thai must make their own decisions, the Under Secretary ventured certain suggestions. First, he said that the phrase coup d'état creates an extremely bad impression and brings to mind soldiers shooting up the government and this obviously is not what had happened. But the phrase had been used and would be picked up by the New York Times, Washington Post, and Washington Star. He emphasized the press aspect in the U.S.

Field Marshal Thanom said that there were not only military but also civilian leaders in the new government and he hoped that the foreign press would pick up the local press coverage. Under Secretary Johnson noted that the local English-language Nation headlines had been “coup d'état” and that was what would be picked up in the foreign press.

The Under Secretary then said that a statement as soon as possible to the effect that the intention of the group is to return to a constitutional government would help. If it contained dates as to when this would be done, that would be even better. Field Marshal Thanom said they were considering what type of constitution would be suitable for a permanent constitution for Thailand. Pote said that they would make a public announcement regarding the constitution, but he did not know when this would be done.

Under Secretary Johnson said that the change will be made that a military dictatorship has taken over, with all the bad connotation that has in the United States, recalling events in Greece and Brazil.

General Praphat said that the people of the United States do not understand what “military dictatorship” means in Thailand, and that we think of it in terms of Latin American governments. He said the Americans in Thailand should help to make it clearer to Americans in the U.S. that what is called “military dictatorship” here is greatly different from the Latin American type. The Prime Minister said that the Thai preserve the institution of the Crown, for example, and do not attempt to set themselves up as Chiefs of State. He said the leadership after announcing their takeover met with the King, and the King gave his blessing to the change.

General Praphat said that perhaps the Thai should invite newspaper men and politicians to Thailand to see for themselves what the situation is like. Under Secretary Johnson said that would be helpful in the longer run but the immediate problem was what statements were to be made.

Air Marshal Dawee said that they had to terminate the power of the MP's, that MP's were promoting student riots and inciting labor and others, which led to the present situation. If nothing were done, the situation would become so bad that even if the U.S. gave a billion dollars in aid to Thailand there would be no country left to defend.

The Under Secretary said talking about executive-legislative relations would not help much in the U.S. Pote said that the press and Congress will always interpret things the way they want to and that Fulbright and Mansfield will never be won over. Most important to Thailand is what the leadership does in the months to come to bring about stability, security, and to assure the people's welfare. If the people are satisfied, this will vindicate the action. He said they know the problems caused by their action and know that they must live with these problems.

Under Secretary Johnson agreed that what the leaders did would be important but said again that his immediate worry is the short term. He himself must go before Congress soon to defend the aid program for Thailand. Pote asked the Under Secretary to help explain to Congress and the people in the U.S. that the situation in Thailand is different from that in the U.S.

Ambassador Unger said that the immediate problem to be addressed now is that certain things must be said regarding the change and that it is important that they be said in the right way. He suggested that it should be emphasized that this was not a bloody coup but a peaceful takeover by the same men who led the previous government, and that they are looking to the day when they can return to constitutional processes.

Air Marshal Dawee said the leaders will not keep power forever and that they also want to work toward democracy. He said that the Under Secretary could explain that he saw himself the takeover was quiet and there was no bloodshed.

Field Marshal Thanom said that he believed actions in the next few weeks and months were more important than statements that could be made now. Ambassador Unger said there was no reason why the leadership could not do both. Pote said they would do that. They would have to consider what could be said. They were not saying “no” to the suggestion.

Under Secretary Johnson returned to the comment concerning those such as Fulbright who would always be opposed to assistance to Thailand. He said he was really concerned about the middle group that would be prepared to shift depending on how this matter was handled in the next few days.

Thanom said that it was fortunate that Under Secretary Johnson was here at this time and could explain what had happened and say there was no bloodshed. Dawee observed that children went to school as usual, and there were the usual traffic jams and most everything was proceeding as if nothing happened. Pote also said that Under Secretary Johnson could help Thailand by stating that things were normal; he had confidence that Johnson's words had great weight. The Under Unger said all U.S. official statements will lack in persuasiveness.

Under Secretary Johnson said that when the coup of 1958 occurred, Thailand was not in the public focus, but because of what has happened in Southeast Asia in the intervening years Thailand was much more in the news and that people in the U.S. were more interested in Thai affairs.

The Under Secretary made the additional suggestion that it would be helpful if the Thai would emphasize the civilian and non-military aspects of the government. The press will seize on the fact that General Prasert is to be the administrator for the civilian side. People will not notice that Prasert is now Police Director General but only that he is a General. Field Marshal Thanom said that civilian Under Secretaries are not acting in place of ministers in all except the Ministry of Defense.

Under Secretary Johnson said that to an American having a Parliament is good and abolishing Parliament is bad, that nothing can really change this attitude. However, the way the press is handled can help, and the RTG cannot afford to ignore press relations, or expect the Americans to do the job for them. He suggested that the Thai, if they have not already done so, should consider hiring a full-time public relations man, a Thai, to handle press relations for them. Pote then said to the Under Secretary, “You find such a public relations man for us and we will hire him.” Ambassador Unger said that in the U.S. we usually use newsmen or those familiar with and acceptable to the working press to deal with this type of thing. Pote asked who there is in Thailand who can do this for the group. Ambassador Unger answered that the Americans can't name anyone but that he should look for someone, perhaps working in the English-language press, who has good foreign connections as well as being effective in Thailand. Under Secretary Johnson said that they should have a first-class press man in the Prime Minister's office and who would be responsible for all statements issued by the Revolutionary Group.

The Under Secretary asked whether the Thai leaders ever held press conferences. Pote said formerly the Prime Minister and he had weekly press conferences but the reporters “never printed what they said.” Under Secretary Johnson noted that Thanat's speech last night was helpful.

The conversation again turned to Cambodia, the Under Secretary's next destination. General Praphat said there were certainly more headaches there than in Thailand. Part of the problem in Cambodia was that a number of people were competing for the leadership. In Thailand, he said, there was no competition among the leaders of the Group,

Under Secretary Johnson asked the Thai if they had any advice they wanted to give us on Cambodia. General Praphat said the best thing the U.S. could do in Cambodia is to assist people who could bring stability to the country. Thanom and Praphat and the others agreed that the two who could do this were Lon Nol and Sirik Matak.

Under Secretary Johnson noted that at the time the Khmer Government had announced the dissolution of their Parliament, they had announced at the same time that they were establishing a Constituent Assembly. This had greatly dampened down reaction in the U.S. to the dissolution of the Parliament.

Field Marshal Thanom asked Under Secretary Johnson to convey to President Nixon his good wishes. He expressed the hope that the President will understand that the actions taken by the Revolutionary Group have been carefully considered and were taken to assure the security and well-being of the people. He stressed their attachment to the Constitutional Monarchy.

Under Secretary Johnson noted that there was in fact stability in Thailand, but it is up to the Thai Government to get this across to the public abroad. Pote asked again that Under Secretary Johnson help to get this point across to Congress.

The Prime Minister closed with the hope that the close relationships between our two countries would be maintained. The Under Secretary assured him that that was also his goal.

The meeting ended at 11:05 a.m.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 THAI. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Embassy Political Officer Harlan Y.M. Lee and approved in J on December 21. The meeting was held at Government House.

145. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)[1]

Washington, December 1, 1971.

SUJBECT

Progress on Thai Cotton Textiles

As you will recall, Dick Kennedy indicated several weeks ago that we had put the pressure on the bureaucracy to resolve the Thai textile issue without going to the President. Happily, the bureaucracy came up with a compromise solution which was acceptable to the Thai. Accordingly, we are releasing from embargo 18,000 dozen pairs of cotton pajamas, and the Thai are sending a representative to Washington to negotiate a bilateral textile agreement. Once that agreement is reached, we will release from embargo additional 50,000 dozen pairs of pajamas, which will be charged against Thailand's negotiated quota next year.

I shall continue to follow this.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VII. No classification marking. Sent for action. Drafted and initialed by Hormats, with the concurrence of Colonel Richard Kennedy. A notation on the memorandum by Haig reads: “Great job by all around. AH” At the bottom of the page another notation in Kennedy's handwriting reads: “Al: The above added to encouraging news on the AAT suggests we may have pulled it off. Hopefully we'll have the AAT wrapped up very shortly—the Thai have agreed to everything—only a few minor technical problems remain and are being worked out now. Embassy has already drafted a proposed exchange of notes concluding the agreement. RTK”

146. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 14, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council, Intelligence Subject Files, Country File, Thailand. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

147. Editorial Note

A meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) was held on December 23, 1971, in the White House Situation Room to address the emergency situation created by the North Vietnamese attacks in the Plain of Jars in Laos in the early morning of December 18. The North attacked much earlier in the season and took advantage of bad weather, which prevented U.S. tactical air forces from effectively supporting Meo and Thai forces. The North Vietnamese also used “highly accurate artillery fire” with the heaviest artillery pieces (Soviet-made 130 mm field guns) they had ever used on the Plain.

The main NVA thrust was made at Fire Support Bases Mustang and Lion, which were defended by Thai SGU battalions. William Nelson of the CIA described what happened. Nelson said that the Thais had about 2,700 men deployed on December 15 and that they had suffered an estimated 400 killed and 170 wounded. According to Nelson, “The Thai 609 battalion, at Fire Support Base Lion, was the worst hit. At one time 200–300 enemy bodies were laying in the perimeter defense wire, while Sting Ray Fire Support Base from Phou Seu provided covering 155 mm fire to within 50 meters of their outposts. During the night of the 19th, elements of the BG 609 requested permission to withdraw. Permission was denied, and they were told to hold their position and that reinforcements were en route. During the night of December 19–20, radio contact was lost with the BG 609, while hand-to-hand combat activity was underway.” Nelson said that they fought “very well,” and that the base had held until the “loss of the supporting Meo position allowed enemy forces to employ direct fire weapons on the base, destroying ammunition supplies, pinning gun crews and security troops down.”

Thai troops at Fire Support Bases King Kong and Panther (Thai SGU battalions 606–608) “fought a constant battle” through December 20 and into December 21. They were told to abandon King Kong on December 20. Nelson said that the “Thais put up a good fight. They withdrew in good order.” He then described how three Meo and three Thai battalions, about 4,780 troops, had arrived at the Ban Na/Pha Dong resistance line. He said that the CIA didn't know “where three other Thai battalions are,” that Ban Na/Pha Dong was “a very porous line,” and that all the friendly forces artillery had been lost on the Plain of Jars, although some of it was being replaced. He added that three Thai irregular battalions (SGUs 616, 617, and 618) of 1,403 men had been taken out of training and had been airlifted into Long Tieng on December 20 and 21.

When President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger asked whether regular Thai troops were available as reinforcements, Nelson supposed that they were, but said that “it's a question of paying for them.” Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson then explained that “we are not permitted to support them. Symington's ceiling, as you know, is $350 million. One thing we have to do today is decide how we are going to handle the ceiling.”

Nelson then described how enemy activity in South Laos had been light. The only critical area was around Paksong, where two Thai battalions had been hit very hard 10 days before and “rendered ineffective.” Still, he said, the “strength is with the Thais.” Kissinger said that the high option for the defense of Laos was “to continue to defend the Long Tieng area and to undertake the defense of the area at the junction of routes 7 and 13,” and asked whether “we have the forces for the high option.” The State Department's William Sullivan replied: “No, not unless we get Thai regulars. And unless the Thai Government pays for the regulars, we don't have a Chinaman's chance of getting them. (to Dr. Kissinger) Excuse me for mentioning your friends.”

To Kissinger's question as to whether the Thai military program (meaning the AAT) had been agreed to, Johnson replied that it was “close to agreement. The last meeting was yesterday, and there are no outstanding issues.” Nelson then added that “I understand that the Defense view is that there is no way to beat the ceiling and that we should be honest and forthright with the Congress. The feeling of the Secretary is that we should be honest and ask Congress for more money.”

Kissinger eventually decided to obtain President Nixon's guidance on what steps, if any, to take to overcome the problem caused by the Congressional ceiling of $350 million for expenditures in Laos in FY 1972. There was also considerable discussion of providing more U.S. air support for the Meo and Thai forces in Laos.

In the end, the Thai volunteer SGU battalions, combined with extensive U.S. air forces support (including B–52 bombers) permitted the U.S.-backed forces in Laos to survive this North Vietnamese assault and to hold key positions such as Long Tieng. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115,WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971)

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Washington, December 24, 1971, 1050Z.

230898. Ref: Bangkok 17212.[2]

1. Following is text of letter from the President to be delivered to Marshal Thanom soonest. Further instructions contained in immediately following septel.

2. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am pleased that you took the initiative to write me about the current situation in North Laos. You can be assured that I fully share the concern which you have expressed and agree that urgent action is needed to meet this increased threat. The reports which I have received make it clear that the Thai irregular units in the Plaine des Jarres were courageous and effective under intense attack and that they made the North Vietnamese pay dearly for their gains.

The three specific objectives for our air effort, which you have out-lined, accord completely with our own estimate of the most urgent requirements in that field. I have directed that all necessary steps be taken to meet these objectives. I hope that as the weather improves we will see positive results in the next few days.

In addition to the measures which can appropriately be taken from the air, there remain significant problems on the ground. The losses suffered in both manpower and equipment will require urgent corrective action. In this connection, I have directed the accelerated delivery of the equipment, especially artillery, which will be needed for effective ground defenses.

Meanwhile, the manpower and deployment needs generated by the current situation are matters to which you, together with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, will wish to give urgent attention.

I am asking Ambassador Unger to discuss these matters with you in greater detail and report promptly to me. Sincerely,”

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Vientiane and Saigon. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Haig and Sullivan, and approved by Johnson.

[2] Attached but not printed is telegram 17212 from Bangkok, December 20, which transmitted a letter to Nixon from Thanom, requesting urgent U.S. air support and additional U.S. arms aid for the battle in Laos.

149. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, January 17, 1972, 0423Z.

680. Subject: Insurgency in the North.

1. During my trip last week to the North, CG Third Army (LTG Samran Petyakul) emphasized to me the special advantages enjoyed by the insurgents in his region. Among them, he gave greatest weight to Communist control of contiguous areas in Laos, which affords secure hinterland for the “liberated areas” in Thailand. To my suggestion that friendly guerilla forces in Laos act as blocking forces for Third Army initiatives, he observed that the former are heavily engaged elsewhere.

2. I took the occasion to stress that dealing with the insurgency is above all a Thai responsibility and a vital Thai national interest. The US can help, but only as a supplement to what basically has to be a Thai effort. I emphasized the vital necessity for Thai commanders to use their resources effectively and energetically against the insurgents.

3. Samran accepted this, and replied by describing important operations—using both Third Army elements and forces from the Central Reserve—which are about to be undertaken in the current dry season, as well as paramilitary programs under development. Armed operations by the RTG have proven necessary in the North (as contrasted with the preferred “psychological operations” approach), because insurgent operational bases are strongly held and inhabited by non-Thais. Hill people share neither language, religion, nor loyalty to the King with the Thai, and RTG campaigns against opium growing are also exploited by the Communists: hill populations therefore are particularly vulnerable to Communist propaganda and recruitment efforts. Nevertheless, RTG suppression efforts are selective, and accompanied by efforts to win hill tribe loyalty. (The Thais have, in fact, developed good plans and organization to deal with the problem: implementation is now the issue.)

3. Although Samran emphasized the loyalty of the lowland Thai, I was struck by his comment that about five percent of the valley population (especially migrants from the Northeast) may be cooperating with the Communists. He also agreed with my point that effective loyalty is often a function of the government's ability to extend protection, which is frequently difficult to do under conditions prevalent in the north.

4. This visit strengthened my impression that the insurgency in the North is a serious and growing threat: I hope that I was able to strengthen Samran's resolution in dealing with it.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 THAI. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane and CINCPAC.

150. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 16, 1972.

SUJBECT

Communist Insurgency in Northern Thailand

The Chinese-supported Communist insurgency in Northern Thailand has been steadily gaining strength. The number of armed Thai Communist insurgents (CT), estimated in 1968 to be some 250, is (according to CIA) now over 3,100—2,300 full time and 800 village militia. Moreover, their weaponry has improved and now reportedly includes mortars, machine guns, flamethrowers, grenade launchers and anti-personnel mines as well as numerous AK–47s and SKS carbines. It is not known whether these weapons are coming direct from China or are from stockpiles in Laos and North Vietnam.

In addition, the CT have made major improvements in their politico-military organization and have formed some small battalions. While most of their indigenous support has come from the various hill tribes, the CT are beginning to make inroads among lowland Thai in the North.

The number of CT-initiated incidents in the North jumped from none in 1966 to 947 in 1969, dropped to 589 in 1970, and then rose to well over 1,000 in 1971. A January 2 NCNA report proclaimed that “the fighting efficiency of the Thai Peoples Armed Forces markedly increased in 1971.”

Ambassador Unger believes that the southward expansion of the Chinese road (and Chinese military presence) in Laos and Communist military advances in Laos are closing the gap between the external and internal threat to Thailand. He believes these developments suggest that China continues to apply indirect but growing pressure upon Thailand as a matter of policy, not merely “as casual encouragement of what has been erroneously characterized as a chronic, low-level dissidence.” Unger further believes that if these developments proceed on their current course, they could eventually diminish Thai ability to play a significant role in the stabilization of Laos, and undermine the internal development and stability of Thailand.

Peking's Role

The leading Chinese role in the Thai insurgency is ill-disguised. The insurgency radio, the “Voice of the People of Thailand,” broadcasts from China and has unabashedly extolled the virtues of “Mao Tse-tung thought.”CT cadre adhere strictly to Maoist ideology. The Thai Communist Party and its “NLF,” the Thai Patriotic Front, seem to be led by exiles now resident in China.

The Chinese road building operation in Laos—now involving over 30,000 construction and anti-aircraft troops—seems to have little purpose other than to provide direct access to Thailand from China and North Vietnam (See map at Tab A). Significantly, these roads point to the area where the CT are strongest (See map at Tab B). Since roads such as these are not needed to meet present CT resupply demands, it seems likely they are intended to support a considerably increased insurgency in Thailand.

Hanoi's Role

Hanoi is also involved in supporting the Thai insurgency; but its role is strictly secondary to that of Peking and is largely confined to North-eastern Thailand. The North Vietnamese (and perhaps the Pathet Lao) have trained Thai cadre and have helped supply the CT. Many of the 40–50,000 North Vietnamese living in Thailand are under Hanoi's influence and constitute a serious potential fifth column. Recently Hanoi-controlled media claimed that Thai insurgents are actively supporting their comrades in Indochina and cited as evidence the January sapper attack on our B–52 base at U Tapao. Hanoi has, of course, strongly attacked the presence of Thai troops in Laos as well as Thai-Cambodian cooperation.

Thai Countermeasures

The Thai Government has become increasingly concerned about the growing insurgency in the North and Northeast and plans a major counterinsurgency effort this year. In fact, a major military campaign has just recently been launched against CT strongpoints.[2]

In any case, insurgency in Thailand has reached the stage where it also deserves increased attention on our part.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “Al—Let's get CIA assessment. HK” Another notation in Holdridge's handwriting reads: “done 2/20.” Haig wrote on the memorandum: “Tom Latimer see me.”

[2] In telegram 2039 from Bangkok, February 12, Unger reported on his conversation with NEC Chairman Thanom, in which the former stressed the importance of “an effective RTG response to the evident insurgent decision to stand and fight regular Thai forces in operation Phu Kwang.” Unger told Thanom that the “new situation created by insurgent resistance and strength indicates requirement on RTG part to apply complete campaign plans with necessary support and continuity to get the job done.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7)

151. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 22, 1972, noon.

SUJBECT

Thai Request for Consultation on Future Vietnam Peace Proposals

PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Sunthorn Hongladarom, Thai Ambassador to the United States

Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director for Thailand/Burma Affairs, EA

Summary

Ambassador Sunthorn came in on instructions to deliver what he characterized as the most important message of his tour in Washington, the request of his government that it be consulted before any further modifications to the eight-point US peace proposal for Vietnam are made. End summary.

Ambassador Sunthorn came in on instructions with what he described as a very serious request.[2] He realized that high US officials were concerned with the security of Thailand as a whole and that they were interested in its problems. The President's eight-point peace proposal was acceptable in principle to the Thai Government as an attempt at a solution to the long term problem. However, whatever the outcome of the present difficulties in North and South Vietnam, Thailand's security would be affected. The Chairman of the National Executive Council (Thanom) felt that Thailand should have been consulted in connection with the eight-point program. The NEC now expected that there may be a new US proposal for Vietnam which would have the effect of involving or even endangering Thai security. As an ally and deeply involved, Thailand should be consulted.

Ambassador Brown asked whether this meant that the Thai wished to be consulted on any future proposal that we might make in Paris. Ambassador Sunthorn said yes. Ambassador Brown pointed out that we did not know what the outcome (of the eight-point proposal) will be nor whether there will be any new proposals. We would wish to think over what the Ambassador requested. There were many people involved. Would a similar approach be made to Ambassador Unger? Sunthorn said he thought so. His government felt the eight-point program had already made substantial concessions to North Vietnam. Any further concession would be detrimental to the interests of Thailand and the United States.

Ambassador Brown asked what worried the Thai especially. Sunthorn said his government had not specified, but they were particularly concerned about anything affecting the security of Laos and Cambodia, which would automatically affect Thailand's security. They wished to see nothing occur which would let North Vietnam control the whole of those two countries. Ambassador Brown said that we had no interest in seeing Thai security unfavorably affected or North Vietnam's taking over Laos and Cambodia. We appreciated very much what Thailand had already done. Ambassador Brown suggested that the problems of Laos and Cambodia would be dealt with after Vietnam was settled.

Sunthorn said yes, he thought it was a package deal. A stalemate, especially in South Vietnam, might lead to increased North Vietnamese action in Laos and Cambodia. Ambassador Brown said we would see what could be done to bring the Thai more into the picture. He would consult with Ambassador Sullivan and the Secretary on the latter's return.[3] Sunthorn said this was an important request which his government had asked him to make. They tried not to bother us—they recognize that we have many problems—but he regarded this as the most important message that he had had to deliver to this government.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergesen on February 23, and approved by Brown and Lange Schermerhorn (S/S–S) on February 26. The meeting was held in Ambassador Brown's office.

[2] According to telegram 2458 from Bangkok, February 22, Unger met on February 21 with Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Charunphan (who replaced Thanat as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under NEC Thanom after the November coup) and received the same basic message as that delivered by Sunthorn. (Ibid.)

[3] Telegram Tosec 76, February 23, reported the Brown–Sunthorn meeting to Green, who was travelling with the Presidential party on a state visit to China, along with Rogers, Kissinger, and others.

152. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, February 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Assistance to Thai Program for Resettling CIF Opium Traffickers

Summary

We have agreed to give the Royal Thai Government (RTG) $1 million to support Thai efforts to resettle the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) of Generals Li and Tuan against the latter's promise to cease trafficking in opium, and to turn over about 28 tons of opium, now under their control, to the RTG for destruction.[2]

Background

In 1949–50 KMT (Kuomingtang–Chinese Nationalist) troops under General Li Mi were driven out of Yunnan into Burma, where they settled despite the protests and military efforts of the Burmese to dislodge them. In 1953–54 and again in the early 1960's many of these KMT's were evacuated to Taiwan, and the Government of the Republic of China no longer has any control over those who stayed behind. The remaining forces, now mostly in Thailand, have gradually assumed a more local character through recruitment but have remained an effective military force, probably the best in the tri-border area. Now known as the “Chinese Irregular Forces” (CIF's), they are under the leadership of Generals Li Wen-Huan and Tuan Hsi-Wen.

Over the years the CIF's have acquired control over most of the illegal opium traffic from eastern Burma and northern Thailand to Bangkok. Operating in terrain they know better than the government forces, profiting heavily from “protection” and trade in opium, and fighting when they have to, the CIF's became a law unto themselves.

For the past year or two the Thai Government, faced with an increasing Communist insurgency in the north and recognizing the bad effects the opium trade was having on Thailand's reputation, has sought to settle the CIF's and make useful residents out of them. To this end the Thai promised that if the CIF's would turn their forces RTG's relations with the CIF have been carried out by General Kriangsak, Deputy Chief of Staff of Supreme Command, who has been well and favorably known to us for many years.

The Opium Trade

Recognizing the increasing problem of the illicit opium trade, the Thai Government sought to get the CIF's out of the business. Li and Tuan said they were willing to give it up, but they needed 20 million baht (equivalent to $1 million) to dispose of their obligations and opium procurement agreements and to settle their followers. While the RTG was able to put aside some funds for resettlement purposes, they could not allocate this additional amount, so General Kriangsak approached us for assistance. After careful consideration in Bangkok and Washington, agreement was reached on the form and amount of U.S. assistance. An essential consideration from the Thai point of view was that Li and Tuan were not to be aware that the USG was the eventual source of funds. U.S. funds are to be provided from AID Development Loan funds transferred to the BNDD.

The U.S./Thai Agreement

On February 1, General Kriangsak and the U.S. BNDD director in Bangkok signed a letter[3] which provided essentially as follows (full text attached):

In the interest of assisting RTG efforts to resettle the CIF's, the U.S. would contribute 20.8 million baht in two installments on a grant basis against the CIF surrender of 16,000 choi of opium (about 28 tons).

Disposition of the opium is to be by agreement between the RTG and the U.S. (the RTG insists on destruction of the opium).

The U.S. assistance is provided on a one-time basis.

In separate agreements between General Kriangsak and the two CIF leaders, the latter have agreed to turn over their stocks, to get out of the opium trade entirely, and to subject themselves and their forces to Thai law for any future offenses.

Conclusion

While we recognize that it is unlikely that our support of Thai efforts to resettle the CIF's will put a complete stop to opium trafficking in northern Thailand, the U.S./RTG agreement will enable us to hold Kriangsak and the RTG responsible for any violations by the CIF's. The removal of 28 tons of opium from illicit channels and its destruction will have a major impact on the quantity available for consumption outside the indigenous market. The resettlement scheme if successful may make productive citizens out of a group of several thousand freebooters. Finally, the possibility of further use of the CIF's as a force against the Communist insurgents in northern Thailand will be enhanced.

James Carson [4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.

[2] The suggested text of the agreement was transmitted to the Embassy in Bangkok in telegram 231185, December 27, 1971. (Ibid.)

[3] The February 1 letter to Lieutenant General Kriangsak Chomanan was signed by William T. Wanzeck, Narcotics Attaché of the Thai Embassy. In the letter Wanzeck repeats the language of telegram 231185 almost verbatim. He states that the U.S. Government is “particularly pleased with the provisions in this program that would remove these forces permanently from the illicit trade in opium which has international ramifications, and would turn them instead to agricultural pursuits or other legitimate means of earning a livelihood.” Attached but not printed.

[4] Carson signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Bangkok, March 10, 1972, 0540Z.

3318. Kuala Lumpur For Assistant Secretary Green. Subject: Assistant Secretary Green's Call on NEC Chairman Thanom.

Summary: In cordial but deeply serious meeting with NEC Chairman Thanom and other top Thai leaders, Assistant Secretary Green described background of President's Peking trip, assuring the Thais that there was no change in U.S. commitments to them and emphasizing the positive benefits that will accrue to them if our diplomacy succeds. Green stressed that continued U.S. strength and close bonds with allies such as Thailand are essential to success of our diplomacy.

He also emphasized that this diplomacy, which enjoys broad support at home, will give the President enhanced ability to carry out the Nixon Doctrine and thus put U.S. policy on a firm and steady course on which allies can rely. The Thais were deeply appreciative of this consultation and of the reassurances that Green was able to give. Thanom expressed deep concern about the growing level of insurgency in Thailand and Chinese support thereof, and asked if latter would continue. Green discussed possibilities but said we must await results to see if our diplomacy affected this. Thais obviously will be watching this one closely. Thanom also stressed heavily the need for continuing U.S. economic and military assistance in face of the massive aid the other side is receiving from its backers, and his concern about Congressional attitudes on this question. He also reiterated his earlier appeal for consultations prior to any U.S. decisions on matters affecting Thai security. End summary.

1. Assistant Secretary Green met with NEC Chairman Thanom to discuss President's Peking visit beginning at 2:00 p.m. March 8, Thanom was accompanied by Deputy Chairman Praphat, Assistant Chairman Pote Sarasin, Air Marshal Dawee, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Charunphan, and Director of Southeast Asia Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asa Sarasin (Pote's son). Green was accompanied by Ambassador Unger, Mr. Holdridge, DCM and POL counselor.

2. Field Marshal Thanom, with Pote interpreting, expressed great pleasure at opportunity to received President's special representative and his appreciation of opportunity to hear at first hand about the Peking talks and especially about the effects these talks would have on Thailand and Southeast Asia. Green responded by conveying to the Thai leadership from the President the latter's warmest wishes and highest regards and esteem, as well as those of Secretary Rogers. He then outlined briefly the role that he and Mr. Holdridge had played in the talks and the mandate the President had given him in connection with his present mission.

3. Green went on to describe briefly the steps taken by President Nixon leading to his Peking trip, beginning with the article in Foreign Affairs of October 1967. He stressed that the President had succeeded in removing barriers between the U.S. and the PRC so as to permit the establishment of a dialouge with Peking without sacrificing our relations with the ROC or anyone else. He recalled that all our defense commitments including that to the ROC, were specifically and publicly reiterated in Shanghai at the time the Communiqué was released.

4. Green emphasized the responsive chord which the President's diplomacy had struck among the American people, who strongly desired that some opening for peace be sought. Successful China diplomacy would greatly strengthen the President's hand in all respects and reinvigorate U.S. foreign policy across the board. Better relations between Washington and Peking could in turn open a real opportunity to move the world in a better direction. However, he said this could come about only if the U.S. remains strong and retains its close bonds with its allies to whom the U.S. must continue to provide adequate support. He said the PRC was interested in a better relationship with us because of our power and influence in the world.

5. He explored the reason why the Chinese wanted to hold these talks, which they strongly desired. He noted however that it was very important to avoid public speculation about these reasons, which could interfere with the achievement of the goals of our China diplomacy with no offsetting advantage. He cited a) Chinese fear of the USSR, reflected inter alia by widespread construction of air raid shelters; b) deep-running Chinese worry about the possibility of resurgent Japanese militarism; and c) great internal change and past turmoil in China, in the wake of which the general move had been away from extremism. Green produced a chart dramatizing this point which the Thais found most interesting.

6. The result, we believe, had led the PRC to realize, even though it would not say so, that it is not in its interest to have the U.S. withdraw rapidly from Asia. They do not want a vacuum created into which the USSR might move. They may be coming to realize that Japanese militarism (which we feel the Japanese will reject) is less likely to reemerge if a U.S.-Japanese relationship continues. Noting that their rhetoric may not always reflect this change of attitude, Green stressed the importance of encouraging them in positive acts without stopping to examine too closely their motives or being too concerned about their rhetoric.

7. Green described the process of drafting the communiqué. The Chinese ha d put up positions on certain controversial issues which we answered point by point. There was no attempt to paper over the differences, some of which were very fundamental. In addition to this, however, there were areas where agreement could be expressed, including the necessity to avoid the outbreak of war; opposition to hegemony or spheres of influence; and adherence to the “five principles” which go back to the Bandung period. He noted that when these latter were first enunciated, it was in an undesirable propaganda context which led Secretary Dulles to refuse acceptance of them. In fact, however, the points were in themselves unexceptionable. We now have a joint PRC–U.S. commitment to them on the record and intend in the future to hold this commitment before the PRC. He noted that we also expressed the hope for better conditions for the Chinese people which in our view will help further to move the PRC away from extremism.

8. Green stressed that no secret deals had been made, that there were no negotiations except on the communiqué and no attempt to deal with third country problems.

9. To sum up, he said the U.S. side has no illusions, but feels that some opening for peace has been made which can successfully be exploited in close concert and consultation with our friends. He emphasized again that we must speak from strength, extending a friendly hand but remaining on guard. He said he would upon his departure from Thailand make a stronger statement of reassurance than he had made or would make in any other country he was visiting.

10. Marshal Thanom expressed sincere thanks for this background. He noted that at a meeting with the Japanese Chief of Staff, who is currently visiting Thailand, he had expressed the view, completely in agreement with that of Assistant Secretary Green, that Chinese fear of Russia and Japan had motivated them to take part in these talks.

11. Thanom posed the question of whether the U.S. or the PRC initiated the talks. Green said the initiative had really come from both sides. As he had noted, the President's indications of desire for a dialogue went back to 1967, and the Chinese since then had increasingly found reasons which made it desirable from their point of view. In the end, after portraying Americans as devils for 20 years, the Chinese had come to the point where pictures of Chairman Mao smiling at President Nixon were carred on the front pages of all their newspapers.

12. Thanom noted that there was nothing in the communiqué on Thailand, and said he presumed therefore that there was no change in Thai-U.S. relations and that the SEATO commitment and the Rusk–Thanat communiqué remained in effect. Green confirmed this. He said none of our alliances or commitments were mentioned in the communiqué. He recalled that we took up in the communiqué only those controversial items the PRC mentioned. The PRC did not raise either the SEATO commitment or Thailand. However, Green said Marshal Thanom was entirely correct in assuming that all UMS commitments to Thailand remain in effect and unchanged.

13. Thanom asked specifically whether the Chinese had raised the question of U.S. use of Thai bases. Green replied that they had not.

14. Thanom recalled that in 1969, President Nixon during his visit to Thailand had described to him the Nixon Doctrine as it affected Thailand. He said he had found this extremely reassuring and assumed from what had been said that there was no change in this policy. Green confirmed that there was no change.

15. Thanon then asked whether Project Taksin also continued in effect. Ambassador Unger noted that while it is still in existence, Project Taksin is a military plan which takes a political decision to make it operative, not a commitment per se. Therefore it is in a different category from the other matters mentioned.

16. Green said he planned to stress in his departure statement that he recognize that our own interest required maintenace of our commitments to Thailand and our other allies and continuing contributions to the strength of our allies through economic and military assistance. He said he would also stress our readiness to consult closely with Thailand and our commitment not to negotiate behind its back.

17. Thanom noted that the PRC had reiterated its policy of supporting wars of liberation. To Thailand, he said, “liberation” means terrorism and disruption of public administration and public safety. He noted that the Communist terrorists in Thailand are using Chinese equipment including modern anti-tank weapons, rockets and small arms. He asked whether that could continue.

18. Green recalled that the President has said we can only judge by results. He noted again that the Chinese have now expressed themselves publicly along with us against interference in other sovereign countries. In the future, to involve themselves in such activities will expose them to charges of bad faith, and we must hold this commitment before them. He anticipated that the PRC will continue to use the jargon of wars of national liberation, but he believes their real concerns have turned in other direction. He foresaw no dramatic immediate change but if our general diplomacy succeeds their support of such activity may diminish. Even before the visit, we had concluded that their policy would move in the direction of greater caution, of attempting to “exploit external and internal contradictions” of other countries, i.e., a shift to “talk-talk” tactics. This trend is currently manifesting itself in the slogan “long live Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line.” He said the Chinese know that Thailand is a close friend of the United States. China wants a better relationship with us. This may give us some additional leverage on their actions vis-à-vis Thailand.

19. Thanom asked about the current relationship between the PRC and the DRV. Green said that two or three years ago, the PRC simply wanted us bogged down in Vietnam until, on a wave of disillusionment in the U.S., we would be swept out of Asia entirely. Now they are coming to see a continuation of the Vietnam War as redounding to the benefit of the Soviet Union, not to their own benefit. He said that as the war continues, the USSR as the supplier of the more advanced weaponry needed by Hanoi becomes more and more identified with Hanoi's goal of victory and will be the principal beneficiary if the goal is achieved. The Chinese seem more interested now in seeing the war end fairly soon.

20. Holdridge expressed agreement with this. He said the PRC had voiced support for attainment of Communist “goals” in Southeast Asia without defining the latter beyond expressing agreement with the PRC's 7-points and the two-point elaboration. They at no time became more specific than this and they lent no additional weight to Hanoi's positions. The impression left was that their assistance to Hanoi would continue in order to avoid leaving the field entirely to the Soviets but that they would not support any expansion of the conflict. Implicit in it all was that the U.S. role in Indochina would not stand in the way of a developing relationship with the PRC, and that the PRC was more interested in Northeast Asia, particularly the Soviet Union, Japan and Taiwan, than in Southeast Asia.

21. Thanom expressed the view that the North Vietnamese were afraid of being inundated by Chinese advisors, which was another reason which led them to turn to the Russians for more assistance. But he noted that while heavy equipment was coming from Russia, small arms, uniforms, etc. were coming from China.

22. Returning to the Thai insurgency problem, Thanom said Chinese equipment had showed up in every region of Thailand where insurgency existed. Since the talks in Peking were agreed to, the RTG has carried out extensive operations in the North and Northeast destroying Communist base camps. In connection with these they had intercepted communications from the enemy requesting more equipment, weapons, medicine and food from China by land and by heliocopter. He said the Chinese are deeply involved and so far have shown no signs of stopping or reducing their involvement. Green recognized this to date and repeated that we can only await results but our diplomacy may offer a road to an easing of the problem.

23. Green said that he wanted to make it explicit, as he had done yesterday in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, that we are not aligning with China against the USSR, or getting involved in the Sino-Soviet split. He recalled that the President would visit Moscow to seek a better dialogue with the Soviets. In this connection, he noted that before the President went to Peking, Gromyko was visiting Tokyo. At that point the Chinese eased their hostile anti-Japanese propaganda line. Adding that he did not believe the Japanese would move into the Soviet orbit, he said the net result might be an escalation toward peace. He said the U.S. goal was to further this kind of phenomenon, to establish a better relationship among the great powers from which all nations can benefit.

24. Thanom said it was at one time understandable that the Vietnamese should be “liberated” from the French, and the other former colonies from the metropolitan states, but the Thais are puzzled as to whom they are to be liberated from. Green said the Chinese leadership, after a life-time of struggle, take struggle as the normal condition of life. The rhetoric of “liberation” has become second nature to them. In a case such as Thailand, which has always been independent, the rhetoric and slogans may increasingly be exposed as empty and meaningless. Our aim must be to turn the Chinese leaders around in practice without worrying too much about their rhetoric.

25. Thanom reiterated that the terrorist movement in Thailand is an extremely serious danger to Thailand today. Thailand would help itself and would not need U.S. ground forces. But so long as the aggressors are being given outside support, Thailand would need support, including economic aid. Yet Congress now seemed inclined to cut aid to Thailand. This concerns them greatly. Green agreed to report this concern[2] and to support their request for continued assistance.

26. Thanom asked whether it was true that the North Vietnamese had sent people to Peking to meet with the Americans while the President was there. Green said this was a pure canard.

27. Green noted that Sihanouk had gone to Hanoi during the President's visit which further identified Sihanouk with the North Vietnamese and thus further hurt himself with his own people.

28. Green referred to the open letter which appeared in the Bangkok Nation on the day of his arrival (Bangkok U.S. info 071150Z Mar). This was quickly and emphatically disclaimed by the NEC. Green said that among the many errors in the letter was the assertion that the U.S. has accepted a “One China” policy. He said both Peking and Taipei claim that there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part and that we have simply noted and do not challenge these positions. The Chinese themselves must resolve this matter. We will not pressure Taipei one way or the other. He expressed the view that the PRC would show some patience and that it was now even more unlikely that it would resort to force in seeking to take over Taiwan.

29. Thanom noted that the commitment to ultimate withdrawal of forces from Taiwan was linked to a reduction of tension in the area; he found this very reassuring. Green noted also that with respect to the Indochina area the commitment to ultimate withdrawal was conditional, being tied in the case to self-determination for the countries of Indochina. With respect to the use of the term “region”, Green said that was intended to indicate that forces providing support to countries in Indochina from outside could also be reduced.

30. Thanom recalled the approach he had recently directed to be made concerning the RTG's desire to be consulted before decisions are made affecting its security (Bangkok 2458). He said this could be done through our Ambassador here with the Foreign Office or directly with him, or through the RTG Ambassador in Washington. The important thing was that true consultations be held in all cases where Thailand's security interests are involved. It was not enough to be informed of major U.S. moves an hour or so in advance. Green said he fully understood and would convey this point to Washington highest levels.

31. Marshal Dawee, recalling that Thailand has 3–4 million Chinese residents, asked about the future of the Republic of China. Green said that, while he of course could not predict the future, following his talks with the leaders in Taipei, particularly Chiang Ching-Kuo, they seemed to feel much more assured. He noted that their economy is doing well and that they have strong links of trade with many countries around the world which will continue. Noting again that our commitment to withdraw is highly conditional, he said we expect to draw down our forces in Taiwan from 8,500 to 2,000 in connection with Vietnamization, but he expected that the latter figure would be held to for the indefinite future pending resolution of the Taiwan issue.

32. Green recalled that, like the Thai leaders, the President has been effectively combating Communist aggression for many years and that he is very realistic. The President knows that strength and continued close ties with our allies are a prerequisite to our ability to deal successfully with Peking. But the President had also concluded that the time had come when traditional diplomacy had to give way to inspired action in order to make a breakthrough which would be in the interest of all. Green said that this thirty years of diplomatic service led him to the conviction that this was the kind of effort which would win worldwide support, convincing people that things can improve. He felt that this was particularly important with respect to our younger people.

33. Green said that the principal purpose of the Nixon Doctrine was to reverse a feeling widely shared by Americans that the U.S. is over-involved around the world, in order to avoid a reaction which would lead to under-involvment. In other words, the President sought to put U.S. foreign policy on a steady course which allies could bank on and on which they could base their own planning. In terms of reductions in U.S. forces, however, the President has concluded that the point had now been reached where there must be a pause (except for Vietnamization). He quoted from Secretary Rogers's recent report concerning this matter.

34. Following a brief exchange about press handling (see Bangkok 3298 for RTG announcement),[3] Marshal Thanom thanked Assistant Secretary Green warmly for the assurances he had brought from the President to the Government and people of Thailand. These assurances he said would make them more confident of their security and of their relationship with the United States.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received at 6:59 a.m. Repeated to Kuala Lumpur, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane.

[2]  Green met with President Nixon on March 23 to report on his meetings with Southeast Asian leaders about the President's trip to China. In regard to Thailand, Green said that Thanom, Dawee, Pote Sarasin, the King, and others had “all expressed their support, although they all were concerned about PRC support for the insurgency in Thailand. They felt they were under pressure. The King (see Document 155) had been particularly strong on the need for continued U.S. aid to cope with the insurgency.” (Ibid.)

[3] Not printed.

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Malaysia to the Department of State [1]

Kuala Lumpur, March 10, 1972, 1425Z.

836. Eyes Only For The Secretary and Dr. Kissinger From Asst. Secy Green.

1. Following NEC Chairman Thanom's dinner for our party March 8, I drew Chairman Thanom aside (with Pote Sarasin interpreting and Ambassador Unger also present) to mention a particularly sensitive point which I wished he would not share with anyone else in his government. I referred to his conversation of January 14 with Ambassador Unger [2] in which Thanom had asked that we take up in our Peking talks Thailand's concern over PRC support of insurgents and terrorists against lawful government and innocent people of Thailand, and to point out that RTG had stopped its anti-Peking broadcasts and wanted to have better relationships with PRC on basis of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

2.

I said Secretary Rogers specifically mentioned this point in one of his meetings with FonMin Chi Peng Fei. Chi's response had been along the lines that (a) China had historically maintained good relations with the Thai people but, after Chiang's troops had fled to Thailand the latter had made use of these troops, relations had deteriorated; (b) Thailand had opposed China and the Communists including interference in Indo-China and hence there were no diplomatic relations now; (c) new Thai Government pursues the same old policies but we (PRC) do not interfere in internal affairs of Thailand; (d) people of Thailand want revolution and PRC hopes that it will come to have normal state relations on basis of five principles. Chi had added: “We hope you will convey this to your good friends in Thailand.” Chi then said, I continued, that as for Thai charges about Peking supported guerrillas in Thailand, PRC admits some Thai guerrilla leaders are in Peking but how the guerrillas carry on in Thailand is their affair; we don't interfere.

Chi had ended by saying that U.S. and Thailand have their principles, and PRC has its own; nevertheless we can work for an improvement of state relations.

3. Thanom and Pote Sarasin expressed great appreciation for Secretary having taken this up and commented that Peking's response was pretty much as expected. Thanom felt that, to the extent the U.S.–PRC relationship improved and China moderated its course, this could prove in time to be of real benefit to Thailand. I agreed.

Lydman

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret;Nodis.

[2] A report of that conversation was transmitted in telegram 597 from Bangkok, January 14. (Ibid.)

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 0515Z.

2452. For The Secretary From Ambassador Unger. Subject: Marshall Green and John Holdridge Call on King of Thailand. Ref: Bangkok 3318.[2]

1. On March 9 Assistant Secretary Green was received by His Majesty the King. Also present were the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Charunpan, the King's Aide-de-Camp, Admiral Diskul, Mr. Holdridge and myself. Our conversation lasted about one hour and forty five minutes.

2. After conveying the appropriate expressions to His Majesty from President Nixon, Green proceeded to describe at length the President's visit to China and the discussions which took place there in terms very similar to those of the previous day before the NEC, which meeting is recorded in reftel. Emphasis was put on those points which I had identified to Green as being of particular interest and concern to the King.

3. His Majesty showed immediate understanding of the importance of the trip in the light of the situation in the U.S. and particularly the attitudes of young people there. He saw the value of the trip to the President in establishing better understanding with some alienated groups in the U.S. and therefore providing support for the President to enable him to carry out his larger programs. The King understood the value this also could have with regard to U.S. programs in Thailand.

4. Otherwise, however, the King tended to minimize the possibility of this reopening of contact between the U.S. and the PRC having any beneficial effect on the policy or actions of the latter. He discussed at length his view about Chinese intentions, particularly in Southeast Asia, where he feels that the Chinese are determined to establish their dominance. He cited maps which are a standard item in Chinese schools which show Thailand as an integral part of China and he is persuaded that the Chinese are not likely to be deterred from trying to make it so. Whatever might be our good intentions, he professed to be virtually persuaded that Thailand will be gobbled up. The King insisted that while the Chinese had very good understanding of Westerners, the reverse was not the case and he implied that our reestablished contact with the PRC may lead us to some false conclusions and unrealistic expectations.

4. In respectful terms but in firm tones Green challenged the implication that the U.S. would stand idly by and let her allies be taken over, pointing out that the U.S. has been second to none in the world in standing by its friends, he also insisted that we are in fact looking at the matter of reestablishing relations with the PRC entirely realistically and without false illusions. Moreover, we have a number of individuals who are exceptionally well informed about China and have worked almost all their lives on this one subject. He cited Mr. Holdridge as a case in point. Somewhat chastened, his Majesty made conciliatory comments to the effect that he recognized the desirability of the President's initiative on China in terms of the interests of America's friends as well as of the United States itself.

5. Most of the remaining discussion related to U.S. assistance to Thai armed forces and police in the field of helicopter and Stol aircraft, a subject which His Majesty has raised with me innumerable times in the past. After indicating his reluctant conclusion that the U.S. would not be providing further aircraft to the Thai National Police His Majesty then also commented on our apparent unwillingness or inability to provide a substantial additional number of UH–1H aircraft for the RTAF. He did not mention the large number of UH–1Hs which are in the program for the RTA, nor did he accept the explanation that the Thai Armed Forces themselves are not seeking additional helicopters for the RTAF RTG around 25 of the UH–1Hs now in surplus in Vietnam and awaiting shipment elsewhere. I said we would look into this immediately and also mentioned that we are seeking helicopters from that source ourselves to accelerate considerably the delivery already scheduled for the RTA, as well as a few additional helicopters for the RTAF.

6. In the course of this discussion the King commented that he could understand that the Ambassador might be afraid to press for some of these urgent needs of Thailand for fear of risking criticism in Washington. I replied that if I ever felt that I was unable or unwilling to report things from Thailand as I saw them, or make recommendations according to my best judgment, I would ask to be transferred the next day. His Majesty said perhaps he had gone too far but he was again critical of the bureaucratic complications and trials in meeting what he saw as urgent needs for his country in a deteriorating security situation. In the course of this discussion the King, on a number of occasions, was also sharply critical of the present Thai government, and armed services.

7. Comment: This was at times an uncomfortable audience, although I was not greatly surprised. I have had a number of lengthy discussions with His Majesty over recent months, particularly on the subject of U.S. aid programs and some of his favorite projects for which he expects prompt and full support. The King's frustration with his own government is understandable and may be aggravated by his dissatisfaction with his own status in the absence of a constitution. There are some delays and shortfalls on our part which also can be justifiably criticized. On the other hand, the strong and sometimes even intemperate nature of his comments probably arises in part from his lack of experience with criticism from his own people and limited opportunities for full and frank discussion with his subjects. I believe he appreciated the effort to convey to him our impressions and conclusions growing out of the President's visit to China and while he, and most other Thais, are very skeptical of seeing an end to Chinese interference in Thailand's internal affairs, he probably accepts the usefulness of the resumption of communication between the PRC and the U.S.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok.

[2]  Document 153.

156. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

Conclusion for Textile Negotiations for Thailand

After a history of frustrating negotiations and discussions marked by misunderstanding on the part of both sides, we have concluded a highly successful agreement with Thailand which will result in their voluntarily restraining the amount of cotton textiles they export to the U.S. The Thai are extremely satisfied with this agreement as is the U.S. domestic textile industry. This may be one of the few times in history that such an unlikely and mutually satisfactory outcome has been arrived at! For this reason alone, I believe it appropriate to send the letter at Tab A to Pete Peterson [2] complimenting his department and his negotiator Stanley Nehmer.

There is also another reason for doing so. Commerce will play a key role in enforcing the textile agreements worked out by David Kennedy with Japan, Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea. Our ability to delicately and discreetly importune them to be flexible in these negotiations could be extremely important in foreign policy terms. The letter, by complimenting Nehmer on his outstanding job in reconciling foreign policy and domestic interests will be helpful in any future efforts we may make in importuning him to apply a similar measure of flexibility in the future.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Peter Peterson at Tab A.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. No classification marking. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum in Haig's handwriting reads: “HAK—this was a result of earlier HAK–Haig–Kennedy push. AH.”

[2] A copy of the letter, signed by Kissinger and dated March 28, is attached but not printed. In it Kissinger compliments Nehmer and states: “I understand that the Thai are extremely pleased with the agreement, and that it was also completely acceptable to our domestic textile industry.”

157. Editorial Note

On March 23, 1972, Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green reported to President Nixon on his trip to East Asia, including his talks with Thai Prime Minister Thanom and other Thai leaders in Bangkok on March 8, 1972. (See Documents 153 and 154 for reports of Green's conversations with Thai leaders.) The meeting was held in the Oval Office from 4:08 p.m. to 5:02 p.m. The following is an excerpt from the tape recording of that meeting:

Nixon: “Tell me, now what, what about, did you—Thailand, you know, give a little deal on that. We have a [unclear].”

Green: “Thailand, the big problem there, of course, is all this insurgency going on—”

Nixon: “Right. And they blame the Chinese.”

Green: “And they know the Chinese are involved …”

Nixon: “Yeah.”

Green: “How active they are. They're unable to, perhaps, catalog it with—”

Nixon: “Were you able to have a private talk with Thanom or …”?

Green: “Thanom? No, because he was a monk and that was a holy day. I wanted to. I tried to, but I couldn't make contact with him.”

Nixon: “I understand, but on the other hand who'd you see”?

Green: “I know it's a big problem, though, because I talked with Thanom. Boy, this I talked with Praphat, and Dawee—”

Haig: [unclear]

Green: “You haven't had touch with [unclear]”?

Nixon: “Foreign Service [unclear]”

Green: “And then I [unclear exchange].”

Nixon: “I know some of them. I know those others, the old hands, like [unclear].”

Green: “Mr. President, when I left town they made a very favorable statement. The Government of Thailand made a very favorable statement. The reports we've had out of our Embassy have all been favorable as a follow up. Now they would say, ‘Well, the Chinese say they believe in these five principles but we know damn well they don’t.' And I said, ‘Well, we’re not saying that we think they've reformed but now we have at least mutually accepted standards to hold them by.'”

Nixon: “Well look, you could—I interrupt—I know, too, you probably assured them that you know Nixon and—”

Green: “Yeah.”

Nixon: “—he's not one that stands by.”

Green: “That's right, I know it's [unclear]”

Green: “Yeah, I told him what we're dealing with and [unclear] President Nixon. He's been around. There's no President that's come into office here who's had more background in foreign affairs. He's not being difficult. He's practical, and his approach to this problem is, as a matter of fact, to the extent that we can make progress [unclear].”

Nixon: “Sure. The world would be a hell of a lot safer out there for those people if we had some stroke with China rather than if we had to have our stroke against them. That's my opinion.”

Nixon: “Suppose that we just—suppose the Chinese thing made a run at Thailand. And suppose the Thais said, ‘Look, we have a treaty with you.’ Do you see an American President going down to the Congress and saying, ‘We’re going to declare war on China to keep our treaty commitments with Thailand?' Huh? We've got to let them think that. I mean we can't say that our treaty commitments are not going to be kept, and the Chinese better think they're gonna be kept. But the practical problem, that's what we've got to face, is that at the present time, except for Western Europe there are damn few places where you would get support. You wouldn't even get it now on Israel. Not today.”

Haig: “That's right.”

Nixon: “And then influence them, try to ameliorate their aggressiveness.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Green, Haig, and Holdridge, March 23, 1972, 4:08–5:02 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 692–3) The editor transcribed the portions of this conversation specifically for this volume.

158. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador to Thailand (Unger)[1]

Washington, April 4, 1972.

Dear Len:

This letter is in reply to your telegram 4552[2] on the subject of Thai interest in the US–PRC discussions.

I think that about all we can tell the Thai, even privately, is something along the following lines—which you can attribute to me if you wish: “We expect that the Ambassadorial talks in Paris will move rather slowly. They will be dealing with bilateral matters, centering on US–PRC trade and on travel between the two countries. If there is anything of interest to the Thai we will keep them informed.”

For your information only, we are working out with PRC Ambassador Huang the ground rules for the discussions, and we hope to get agreement or at least acquiescence that we will keep some friendly countries informed in general terms of the progress of the talks, on a confidential basis. Until the PRC has reacted to this suggestion, I am reluctant to go farther than the above in promising to inform the Thai or any other friends.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Marshall Green [3]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Marshall Green Files: Lot 74 D 471, Box 13826, Department Correspondence, April 1972 Folder. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal. Drafted by Hummel.

[2] Telegram 4552 from Bangkok, April 1, reported Asa Sarasin's request that the RTG “be kept informed of developments in continuing U.S.–PRC talks, such as those being conducted in Paris. Asa recalled that Chairman Thanom had mentioned to Marshall Green during his recent visit Thailand's concern about Chinese support for the insurgency in Thailand (see Document 153) implying that the Thai may at some point ask that that be raised in U.S.–PRC discussions.” (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand [1]

Washington, April 6, 1972, 0003Z.

58624. For Ambassador.

1. We believe it is important for you to give Thai leadership an authoritative impression of the President's view of the current situation in South Viet-Nam and the United States response to that situation. We wish you to seek appointment with Thanom, Praphat, and such others of Thai leadership whom you may consider appropriate to give them that impression as soon as possible.[2]

2. You may tell them that we regard this North Vietnamese attack as a clear-cut invasion across the DMZ, in which they have thrown away any pretense of “people's war” tactics. Because they have committed their forces so heavily, we assume this is an all-out effort to discredit Vietnamization, to demoralize both the Vietnamese and the U.S. public, and to create a favorable military position from which they will hope to dictate favorable peace terms. We take this threat seriously, but we regard it as vulnerable on both political and military grounds.

3. From our initial assessments, we believe the South Vietnamese forces are reacting with confidence and with an effective plan to contain this initial thrust, while positioning themselves for additional attacks which they expect elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. Their civilian services are coping with the refugee flow and the other disruptions resulting from this attack.

4. President Nixon is determined that the North Vietnamese plan shall not succeed. He has already ordered a significant reinforcement of U.S. air and naval forces in the area. He is reviewing the situation carefully to determine what other actions may be necessary.

5. You may inform the Thai leaders that we appreciate the steadfast attitude they have displayed in the face of this threat to our common interests. You should express particular appreciation for their rapid and favorable responses to our requests for deployment of additional U.S. forces in Thailand.[3]

6. FYI: The President has just approved a recommendation for the deployment of additional U.S. air units (fighter-bombers) from the continental United States to Thai bases. You should not mention this fact to the Thai leaders but should stay in close touch with U.S. military authorities in anticipation of such action. End FYI.

7. We would welcome any views Thai leaders wish to express and will hope to continue consultations with them as the military action develops.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sullivan, cleared by Kissinger, Rush, and Robert M. Miller (S/S), and approved by Johnson. Repeated to Saigon.

[2] Telegram 4792 from Bangkok, April 6, reported that Unger met with Thanom, Praphat, and Dawee that day to deliver the message from the President. (Ibid.)

[3] In the WSAG meeting of April 10, called in response to the North Vietnamese attack, Admiral Moorer stated that the United States had “all types of aircraft in Thailand—tankers, B–52s, F–104s and F–105s.” CIA Director Richard Helms then called Thailand“the seventh carrier.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972)

160. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Performance of Thai Irregulars

Previously the performance of the Thai irregulars in Laos has been spotty.[2] But recent reports from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Ambassador Godley [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Vientiane indicate marked improvement. A recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report recounts a series of incidents in the Sam Thong–Long Tieng area during 18–30 March in which the Thai fought with courage and determination, often in hand-to-hand combat with NVA infantry. They have withstood almost constant artillery and mortar bombardment and have destroyed four enemy tanks, one with grenades and small arms after it penetrated their perimeter.

The recent, excellent Thai performance probably results from their year of combat experience and a growing confidence that they can stand up to the best NVA units. If it continues, this improvement could prove most significant for events in both Laos and Thailand, for many of these men will return to the Royal Thai Army.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

[2] For a previous discussion of the performance of the Thai irregulars in Laos, see Document 147.

161. Memorandum From the Country Director for Thailand and Burma (Bergesen) to the Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Westmore)[1]

Washington, April 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Developments in U.S. Relationships with Thailand (and Burma)

Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT)

On March 13 and 14 our Mission in Bangkok completed an exchange of letters with the Thai on the military elements of the Additional Assistance to Thailand agreement. General Evans, (COMUS-MACTHAI), and Air Chief Marshal Dawee were the signatories. A PL 480 agreement was signed with the Thai on March 17 as part of the AAT package. It provides for $14 million in tobacco and wheat during CY 1972–73. Negotiations continue on a supplement to provide an additional $16 million in cotton. The Thai asked that the agreement be split in this fashion to give them additional time to bring their cotton producers and textile manufacturers into the picture.

Thai Textile Agreement Concluded

On March 16 we signed a five-year cotton textile bilateral agreement with Thailand permitting an aggregate annual level of exports to the U.S. of 15 million square yards. Shortly thereafter the embargoed Thai nightwear was released without being charged to the new Thai quota. All involved were pleased and relieved.

Residual Thai Forces

On February 4, the last major Thai combat forces were withdrawn from the RVN. By the end of April the Thai intend to pull out the remaining few men (some headquarters and LST personnel) of the RTAFV. A contingent of about 35 men will be sent as members of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Representation—Vietnam (RTAFRV). We are arranging to provide some minimal support for this Thai representational group for one year only (FY 73).

[Omitted here is discussion of Burma.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Exdis.

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, April 25, 1972, 0934Z.

5703. Subj: Deputy Assistant Secretary Hummel's Call on Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn

1. Deputy Asst Secy Arthur W. Hummel on April 24 paid approximately a one-hour call on Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn accompanied by Ambassador Unger and FSO Colebaugh. Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya, who interpreted for Thanom, and Under Secy of State for Foreign Affairs Charunphan Isarangkun were also present.

2. After initial formalities Deputy Asst Secy Hummel expressed the USG's great appreciation for cooperation of RTG in the deployment to Thailand of additional US forces to meet increased threat in Vietnam War. Amb Unger noted that there has been an increase to about 33,300 men or 1100 over the ceiling. He described the increase as temporary though of unknown duration.

3. In response to a question from Dep Asst Secy Hummel, Thanom stated that the insurgency in Thailand is “under control.” Thanom noted increased government activity against the CT's and said that the recent Phu Kwang operation was possible due to increased funds available to the RTG through expanded US assistance.[2] plans for increased coordination of civilians and police with military and unified command of operations, and mentioned more and better use of VDS–VSDU.

4. Thanom repeated a comment previously made to the press that NVN was extremely lucky to be supported by both the USSR and Red China who seemed to be competing with each other in their support of the North Vietnamese. He observed that without hesitation these two powers are “pouring” supplies into the north.

5. Dep Asst Secy Hummel raised the problem of narcotics trafficking and said the USG is interested in cooperating with the RTG in suppressing such trafficking. He particularly noted the recent well-publicized burning of 26 tons of opium and said this act has gone a long way in stilling criticisms of Thai efforts. Thanom said the RTG is sincerely trying to control drug trafficking and has been cooperating with the US and the UN. Dawee observed that harsher penalties for drug traffickers are in the works.

6. Thanom said he has received reports suggesting the Red Chinese are actively involved in drug trafficking. Dept Asst Secy Hummel expressed US interest in receiving any evidence of such involvement, but told Thanom that the US has never found hard evidence to support this.

7. The Amb also specifically raised with Thanom the drug problem at International School Bangkok, noting the considerable increase in the use of heroin among students at the school. He mentioned the great concern felt by everyone in the US community over this problem. Amb Unger said that he would act rapidly in all cases which came to his attention and that some people have already been returned to the US. Thanom said the drugs are being introduced not by young people but the older persons, also citing US and European “hippies” who travel here as tourists. He said he is considering banning such persons from entering Thailand. The Amb again noted that the USG appreciates the help that has been given so far, but said he would like to request special help from the police in cleaning up the sources of these drugs.

8. The Amb also told Thanom he has received a copy of an anonymous letter addressed to General Praphat Charusathien alleging involvement Thanom acknowledged receipt of the letter[3] and said he had already talked about it with police DG General Prasert.

9. Dep Asst Secy Hummel asked about plans to promulgate a constitution and form a cabinet. Thanom observed that the problems which had brought about the November 17 coup have not yet been solved. In this regard, he specifically noted the need for governmental reorganization and security. Thanom said the NEC is working to solve these problems before returning to constitutional rule “so we will not have to have a coup again.” Thanom said the governmental reorganization will be the subject of discussion at the NEC meeting scheduled for April 25. He noted that continuation of these problems does not mean that there will be a wait of “20 years” before returning to constitutional government, but he declined to predict exactly when the change may take place.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 EA. Secret; Limdis.

[2] See the March 24 memorandum of conversation for further detail concerning the Thai insurgency. Thanom noted that the Phu Kwang 10-day operation cost approximately 4 million baht and that a number of Communist insurgent camps had been captured in the North. Thanom mentioned that several CT camps had been captured in the South. He also claimed that public opinion had turned against the Communists there. Finally, “Thanom mentioned the problem of the North Vietnamese refugees in the Northeast. He said there are some 30,000 Vietnamese who could fight against Thailand and said an estimated 12,000 are ‘real Communist.’ When asked if there was evidence to support an active role by the North Vietnamese refugees in the insurgency, Thanom listed several examples of North Vietnamese fund-gathering efforts. Ambassador Unger observed that while there is ample evidence of their fund-gathering activities he was aware of little evidence the Vietnamese refugees are actively engaged in the insurgency against Thailand.” (Ibid., POL 23 THAI)

[3] [text not declassified] telegram 29786 from Bangkok, dated April 4, reported the Embassy's suspicions of drug corruption concerning Police Colonel Pramuan Wanikaphan and described its efforts to “neutralize” him through a fabricated accusatory letter to Praphat, Thanom, the American Embassy, and others, ostensibly written by an anonymous victim of Colonel Pramuan's extortion. This plan evidently was put into effect. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand 1972–1975)

163. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, May 12, 1972, 1201Z.

6616. Ref: State 082969[2] and 082970.[3]

1. I am profoundly concerned about Jack Anderson “revelations” reported in reftels. Earlier stories based on charges by Congressman Wolff and others have been unfortunate but we have at least been in a position to present our side of the story as I recently did in a public release with regard to narcotics (Bangkok 6400). While Thai Govt was and continues to be deeply disturbed about press and Congressional accusations and finds it hard to make distinctions between Congress and administration, nevertheless we have managed thus far to avoid serious damage to our working relations.

2. New “revelations”, however, appear to be unmistakably attributable to Executive Branch documents or conversations with Executive branch personnel privy to this and other missions' reporting on events and conversations in Thailand. I realize that this should come as no surprise to me since apparently Jack Anderson has access to whatever he wants in Washington today. I hope, however, Department appreciates what impact of coming stories likely to be on our relations here and on our capacity to influence RTG actions and programs and to secure RTG acquiescence or cooperation in programs essential to us.

3. I also question whether, given Anderson's motivations and mode of operation, we can afford to seem to be acknowledging “rumors implicating high Thai officials” and to be asking for substantiation. Actually, some months ago I asked all elements of this mission to give high priority to investigating rumors that top Thai leaders were involved in narcotics traffic. No evidence has come to light implicating any one at the NEC level. We are continuing to collect evidence on lower level[4] involvement but even here we lack much firm information.

4. I hope Whitten was given facts to put Anderson “information” on narcotics in perspective and also effort was made to persuade Whitten that “revelations”, particularly if they seem to be attributable to U.S. intelligence agencies and U.S. missions abroad, are virtually certain to jeopardize working relations laboriously developed with RTG and which are only means we have to bring about effective control of narcotics traffic.

5. “Revelations” about Phu Kwang, including judgments about Thai performance, snide comments about Praphat, reference to internal Mission discussions about B–52s and CS which have been contained for the most part in Secret or Top Secret, Nodis or Exdis messages will persuade Thais against any possible effort on our part to dissuade them that their conversations with us and the confidential information they provide us about their own situation and actions are available to the press. It will also convince them that this Mission holds views of such a critical and unfriendly nature that frank and friendly relations characteristic of our past association will be hard, if not impossible, to continue. Consequences of this when we are daily asking RTG for new favors and privileges should be clear to anyone.

6. Action requested:

A. Explain to Whitten, and if necessary to Jack Anderson, the situation regarding the narcotics traffic and that the Thai, in cooperation with us, are taking steps to restrict that traffic; that we have no information on the alleged atrocities in para 2 of State 082969; that the U.S. did not help plan Phu Kwang; that CS is a normal MAP item; and that this operation, despite its problems, has its positive side.

B. Keep out of the hands and away from the ears of the U.S. press sensitive communications from this Mission.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confidential; Immediate;Limdis.

[2] Telegram 82969 to Bangkok, May 11, reported Anderson staffer Whitten's report that he had documents that indicated Operation Phu Kwang was jointly planned by U.S. and Thai Governments, failed despite commitment of “crack” first division, and that General Evans had gone to Unger conveying Thai request for B–52 strikes to support RTA operations but that Ambassador had “wisely” declined. (Ibid.)

[3] Telegram 82970 to Bangkok, May 11, reported Anderson's allegations that some top Thai Government leaders were involved in drug trafficking and corruption. (Ibid.)

[4] See Document 162 and footnote 3 thereto.

164. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Embassy in Japan [1]

Bangkok, May 13, 1972, 1005Z.

6634. VP Only. For The Vice President From Unger. Subject: Thai-U.S. Relations and Your Visit to Bangkok. This message provides background on current Thai-U.S. relations and, where needed, talking points for use in your discussions with the Thai leadership.

1.

Vietnam

Background

A. Thai leaders fully support the measures taken by the President to meet the crisis created by the North Vietnamese invasion. They have shown this through public and private statements as well as their readiness to open their bases to our USAF buildup.

B. The Thai remain extremely concerned about the current military situation in South Vietnam. They see the future independence of Laos and Cambodia hanging in the balance along with that of South Vietnam. Thus they know their own security will be deeply affected by the outcome of the present campaign.

C. Thai leaders have readily accommodated our urgent needs for redeployment of U.S. forces to Thailand despite their full realization of the risks involved as public attention progressively shifts from RVN to Thailand as the major base for U.S. combat activities in Southeast Asia. They recognize the increased danger of retaliatory attack against Thai bases. The redeployment also has created an increased sense of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, including continued air support for the defending forces in Indochina. Further, it has heightened Thai expectations of military and economic assistance.

D. Thai realization of their increased exposure will also heighten the bitterness of their reaction if we make concessions at the negotiating table which they regard as inconsistent with their own basic security requirements. They have repeatedly asked to be consulted by us before fundamental changes are made on our negotiating position. These requests have been transmitted to the President. Since the President's speech of May 8, they have sought clarification particularly on our stance concerning a ceasefire, i.e. whether we are now prepared to accept continued North Vietnamese presence in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

E. Talking Point: It would be particularly useful if you could discuss with RTG our negotiating posture in light of the President's offer of May 8 especially clarification of the ceasefire offer. The Thai will also deeply appreciate whatever assessment you feel able to give them of the current military situation in SVN and of our program of severing NVN's supply line.

2.

U.S. Military Deployments to Thailand

Background

A. In 1970–71 we reduced U.S. military forces in Thailand from a peak of 48,000 to a U.S./RTG agreed level of 32,200. Eighty percent of these were USAF units engaged in the air war in Indochina. Major combat units operating from five Thai bases (Utapao, Korat, Udorn, Ubon and Nakhon Phanom) included one SAC wing (B–52's and tankers), eleven tactical fighter squadrons, mainly F–4s, and gunships, as well as support aircraft of many types.

B. Recent large USAF deployments associated with developments in Vietnam increased our in-country strength to approximately 40,000 and required the reopening of a sixth base (Takhli) which we previously turned back to the Thai Air Force. In the course of these deployments we added nine B–52's (making a total of 50) and nine F–4 squadrons as well as many tankers. Additional aircraft may be moved from Danang to Thailand. This would require a buildup at a new operating location and could add as many as 4,000 additional U.S. personnel to Thailand.

C. Talking Point: Express the administration's appreciation for all the Thai have done and are continuing to do in furthering our mutual interests in Indochina. Recognize the RTG's immediate approval of the large U.S. air buildup in Thailand required as a response to increased enemy initiatives throughout Southeast Asia.

3.

U.S. Politics and the U.S. Commitment

Talking Point: They will want your appraisal of the current political situation in the United States, both in terms of the Congress and the forthcoming election, and its implications for our continuing ability to carry out a foreign policy of collective security in Southeast Asia.

4.

U.S. Military Assistance to Thailand

Background

A. U.S. service-funded military assistance to Thailand, including special supplements, have averaged $72 million a year since FY–68. The FY–72 level (provisional) is $83.5 million. This includes a $15 million grant to enable the Thai to improve its counterinsurgency capability in the military services, and be prepared for contingencies. In FY–73 military assistance to Thailand will shift from MASF to MAP, funded by security assistance legislation, and thus particularly vulnerable to scrutiny in the Senate and by the SFRC.

B. U.S. military assistance was used in earlier years to equip a general purpose, conventional military force. Force modernization continues to be a program goal. More attention is now being given to developing forces adapted to the carrying out of counterinsurgency operations, including providing relevant equipment such as M–16 rifles and helicopters, and converter sets for gunships.

C. Thai leaders have fully endorsed the Nixon Doctrine and have accepted the principle that U.S. forces should not become involved in Thailand's security problem. They have been encouraged to expect that the U.S. will continue MAP at or near present levels. In January 1971, Secretary of Defense Laird stated in Bangkok that under the Nixon Doctrine the level of U.S. military assistance to Thailand would remain the same or even increase.

D. Talking Point: Thai leaders are likely to seek assurances of continued military assistance and may point especially to requirements for helicopters. In responding, you should assure Thais that we will be as responsive as possible to their requirements, but take care not to raise their expectations for specific dollar-levels of MAP. As to specific items, such as helicopters, we will consider these in context of Thai needs and capabilities to operate and support; we do in fact expect to deliver to the RTA this calendar year 32 Hueys (UH–IM) and two to the RTAF.

5.

Economic Assistance Program

Background

A. U.S. economic aid to Thailand declined steadily from a peak of $54 million in 1967 to $23 million in FY–1971. This fiscal year obligations will total approximately $17 million in aid funds plus $14 million from PL–480. Our program emphasizes support of RTG counterinsurgency activities, but includes assistance aimed at some of Thailand's longer term economic problems, particularly in the agricultural area. The $14 million of PL–480 assistance is the first part of a $30 million loan which is aimed at preventing the increased RTG security expenditurs from threatening development programs.

B. Talking Point: Thai leaders may ask for assurance on future aid levels. Suggest you respond that the President places great importance on continuing to provide needed assistance to countries which are endeavoring to meet their own development and security needs. We have requested from Congress, and expect to receive, funding that will permit programs in Thailand to continue at the present level.

6.

Insurgency

Background

A. Communist-directed insurgency in Thailand has continued growing in past year despite increased RTG efforts to deal with it. Number of main force insurgents rose about 20 percent last year to estimated 7,000. There has also been considerable improvement in quantity and quality of their weapons supplied primarily by Chinese through Laos. Most disturbing has been expansion of Communist political infrastructure in villages. Total number of incidents, including those initiated by RTG forces, increased to 3,500 in 1971, up about 50 percent from 1970. In 1971 1,481 Thai officials were killed or seriously wounded fighting the insurgency. This is double the figure for the previous year.

B. RTG has responded by putting more troops into counterinsurgency operations in field along with police and civilian paramilitary forces. It has also increased its defense budget this fiscal year and next by a total of about $20 million as part of a U.S.-Thai cooperative program to improve RTG capability to counter its insurgent threat. Main problem areas, which were highlighted in recent major CI operations, involve coordination among different organizations engaged in CI activity and effective implementation in field of well-conceived CI plans. Small unit training and leadership leave much to be desired. Our assistance to the police is a major element in our economic aid program.

C. Talking Points: Inquire about progress of the insurgency and RTG countermeasures. Encourage Thais to meet insurgency threat now before it becomes more difficult to handle. To any inquiry on assistance levels for Thai police, suggest you respond that you understand police presently have under consideration our proposal for a comprehensive program which reflects our best estimate of what is needed. This provides opportunity for RTG to register desire for helicopters if these are considered to be a priority need. Considering the dangers of a ground attack on U.S. Air Force elements stationed on Thai bases and engaged in the Vietnam War, you may wish to express appreciation for RTG cooperative efforts thus far, and suggest that even greater defensive patrolling and intelligence collection now by Thai civilian, police and military components would be helpful. (Thai forces are responsible for protection “outside the wire” of USAF assets.)

7. Narcotics

A. We have made a major effort to improve the suppression effort against the illicit narcotics traffic through Thailand over the past year. The Thai leadership has been forthcoming in statements and actions concerning the problem. We negotiated a memorandum of understanding on the subject in September 1971 and we have under way a number of programs aimed at increasing enforcement capability of the RTG. Our main problem in implementing the programs lies in the fact that the Thai view narcotics as essentially a U.S. problem and that top-level RTG undertakings have not always been translated info firm orders down the line.

B. Major results thus far include creating a special mobile task force in Northern Thailand, and RTG cooperation in breaking a number of major links in the narcotics traffic. The RTG also acquired (and destroyed) 26 tons of opium from Chinese Irregular Forces (former KMI) in return for offering land on which the Chinese can settle permanently. The RTG also extracted a promise by the Chinese Irregulars to end their involvement in illicit narcotics traffic, an agreement which the RTG will monitor. Although the fact is highly sensitive and not publicized the RTG arrangement with the CIF was partially financed from aid funds.

C. Criticism of the Thai narcotics suppression effort such as that voiced by Congressman Lester Wolff, and that presented in the NBC television special “The Thai Connection,” is widely publicized here and creates a good deal of resentment. We have explained publicly that we do not agree with those charges and appreciate RTG cooperation.

D. Talking Point: Express appreciation for Thai cooperation and for their increased efforts to suppress narcotics traffic. At the same time, you should stress to them that only improved performance will really answer the inevitable critics, just as in our handling of the problem in the U.S.

8.

Laos

Background

A. For years, Thai military units have played a key role in the defense of Laos, especially Gen. Vang Pao's stronghold at Long Tieng southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. A total of 22 Thai volunteer battalions (funded by the U.S.) are currently committed in Laos. Their support was crucial during the heavy dry season offensive launched by the Communists just before Christmas. Only the combination of Thai volunteer units and U.S. Air Force support (including the B–52's) permitted the friendly forces to survive and hold key positions such as Long Tieng under heavy enemy attacks earlier this year. The intensity of the DRV focus on the offensive in South Vietnam has eased the situation in Laos.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of State.

165. Telegram From Vice President Agnew to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, May 18, 1972.

Vipto 31. Subj: Memorandum of Conversation: Vice President's Meeting with Chairman Thanom and NEC Leaders, May 17, 1972.

Participants:

US—The Vice President, Ambassador Unger, Mr. Sohmer, General Dunn, Mr. Reynders, Mr. Masters, Maj. Gen. Evans, Mr. Pickering.

Thai—Chairman Thanom, Deputy Chairman Praphat, Assistant Chairman Pote, Supreme Command Chief of Staff Dawee, Supreme Command Deputy Chief of Staff Kriangsak, Army Chief of Staff Surakit, Under Secretary Charoonphand, MFA America Division Chief Thep Diskul, MFA Southeast Asia Division Chief Asa Sarasin.

Time: 3:00–4:30 p.m.

Place: National Security Council Headquarters.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, and Cambodia.]

16. Thanom referred to Moose–Lowenstein report and its references to Thai volunteers. He asked VP what effect this report would have on Thai/U.S. relations. VP said he was not too worried about this. Today's Senate vote will cool somewhat ardor of dovish elements in Congress. President is firmly committed to a course of action in SEA and will do whatever necessary to see it through. Thanom said he concerned because RTG has consistently maintained that, while it trains Lao forces in Thailand, only volunteers from Thailand serve in Lao forces.RTG concerned reports such as this will give impression that RTA forces are or will serve in Laos. VP said some elements of the press have behaved irresponsibly but public opinion surge he had described will discredit to some extent this kind of sniping. However, we must not expect a cessation of anti-war activism in U.S.

17. On VP's invitation to discuss priority matters to be conveyed to President Nixon, Thanom said insurgency situation in North, North-east, and South is worsening. RTG is taking measures to suppress insurgency and frustrate enemy's effort to win over the people, but continued U.S. assistance is needed. Dawee said priority needs are additional communications equipment, helicopters, and wheeled armored vehicles. Often Government forces know where enemy forces are but cannot get to them before they disappear. Government forces often encounter land-mines. More helicopters and armored vehicles would allow RTG forces to do better job and also boost their morale. VP said President Nixon pleased with recent RTG action to suppress insurgency. He would convey request for equipment.

18. On narcotics question, Thanom said Thai are deeply upset that Congressman Wolff is calling Thailand the center of opium trade and belittling its suppression effort. Recent NBC T.V. program used picture of Deputy Chairman Prapass to imply he involved in opium traffic. Thais very concerned about this. Drugs destroy lives of Thai youth too, and they wish to eradicate this menace. William A. Wanzeck and Jack Greene of BNDD being considered for Thai decorations for their role in suppression activities. Allegations that Thais not cooperating completely untrue as record of seizures and destruction of opium show. Thanom asked VP to make statement reassuring U.S. public on Thai effort. General Praphat made several interjections during presentation, obviously intent that VP understand seriousness with which Thais view subject. VP said President Nixon fully aware of Thai cooperation in this field, had asked VP to convey appreciation for efforts of Thai leaders. Some politicians use this kind of attack as personal launching pad, and media sometimes unfortunately support such efforts, as in case of misleading documentary on Thailand. VP assured Thais such criticism does not square with prevalent U.S. view of Thailand, personally regretted incident and expressed willingness to state support for Thais on this subject.

19. Thanom said Thailand is taking strong actions to eliminate opium traffic. Some of those caught have been executed. RTG has program to help hill tribes shift from opium to other crops. VP again gave recognition to Thai efforts, and said he knew Wolff had tried to show that his recent intervention had produced programs which in fact are result of long-standing cooperative effort.

20. Thanom asked VP to convey to President Nixon hope that President will continue vigorous and determined policies in SEA which are so important to morale of small countries making an effort to maintain their independence and freedom. Thailand will continue to defend its independence against communist attack, but needs military assistance in form of equipment from U.S. Enemy is equipped with foreign armaments, and as a developing country Thailand cannot afford equipment needed to match enemy. Thailand wants to avoid being caught short, as was GVN with NVN's 130 mm artillery.

21. VP promised to convey this message to President, added he will get information from Ambassador Unger to help refute false charges concerning narcotics. VP expressed thanks to Thais for speaking frankly on all issues as friends can and should do.

22. Thanom again thanked VP for visit, and President, VP and Secretary Rogers for their understanding of Thai problems. He hoped President will appreciate that Thailand asks for assistance only because it truly and urgently needed. VP agreed to convey this message, said U.S. has no more dependable friend in Asia than Thailand.

Agnew

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Visit of Agnew to Asia. Secret; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok and Saigon. Printed from a copy with no transmittal time; a handwritten notation at the top of page 1 reads “CINCPAC # 1822212 May 72,” and later telegrams reference this number. However, no copy of CINCPAC 1822212 has been found.

166. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting[1]

Washington, May 24, 1972, 10:05–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Vietnam

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Major Gen. Alexander M. Haig

State

U. Alexis Johnson

William Sullivan

DOD

Kenneth Rush

Armistead Selden

Major Gen. David Ott

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Capt. Kinnaird McKee

CIA

Richard Helms

George Carver [name not declassified] (only stayed for Mr. Helms' briefing)

NSC Staff

Richard T. Kennedy

John H. Holdridge

Mark Wandler

[Omitted here is the Summary of Conclusions and Discussion of Vietnam.]

Gen. Haig: Let's turn now to the problem of putting more B–52s into Thailand. We all realize this is a big problem.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, it is. I would like to have a good discussion of it here today. Tom [Moorer][2] and I spoke about it yesterday. (to Gen. Haig) Have you seen the cables from Unger?[3]

Gen. Haig: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: The first thing to consider is the physical problem— just getting space for the planes. Then we have the problem of the political approach to the Thai. We've been nibbling away at the Thai on a piecemeal basis. Unger feels, and rightly so, I think, that when he makes his next approach to them, they will ask us what our plans are. They will want to know how much more we plan to send to Thailand.

Also, Unger feels the Thai will want to have some sort of a discussion about our strategy and our thoughts for the future concerning Southeast Asia. As you know, we have not given anything along this line to Unger to pass on to the Thai.

On the physical side, we have had quite a few exchanges. Another cable came in from Len [Unger][4] this morning. The major question is how many more B–52s—if any—have to go to U Tapao? All other questions, it seems to me, flow from that.

Concerning personnel, we are fast approaching the point where we may have as many, if not more, people in Thailand than in Vietnam.

Adm. Moorer: And bear in mind, too, that we will have to start moving out of Danang if we want to withdraw the 196th Brigade— and meet the 49,000 ceiling.

Mr. Johnson: To the degree that it appears to the Thai that we are choking their facilities in order to maintain the Vietnam ceiling, they will not be receptive. This is a major problem which we have to face up to.

When we go back to Unger, I would like to have a full package for him, together with a rationale which he can present to the Thai. I've done the first draft of such a message, I think we should all take a look at it. If Unger can go to the Thai with this kind of a package and a rationale, he will be able to make an effective approach. If we keep going in piecemeal, though, the Thai will probably get their backs up.

Mr. Rush: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: The approach I outlined is what we have in mind.

Adm. Moorer: Unger says: “In my judgment, we are reaching the point where the tactical advantages of securing additional temporary aircraft accommodations in Thailand will be clearly outweighed by political liabilities of pushing the Thai too far. Accordingly, we must establish some clear limits beyond which we will not go in our deployment requests.”

When we move out of Danang, we will put even more aircraft into Thailand. We've already started preparing Nam Phong for the Marines.

Mr. Johnson: I was speaking to Bangkok on the telephone earlier today, and I was told that the Thai don't want any public statement about the opening of Nam Phong.

Adm. Moorer: That's all right. Incidentally, when the F–4s go there, we will need more tankers for them because they will have greater distances to fly. This is entirely separate from the B–52 problem, too.

While we're speaking about problems, I might mention the bomb problem. Quite naturally, our bomb expenditure has greatly increased as the B–52 force has been augmented. If we send more planes, the expenditure will obviously go up even more, too. In order to solve this problem, we must surge with bomb production. With 235 B–52s and all the Tac Air we have out there, we could very easily run out of bombs. We are dropping the bombs faster than we make them.

Mr. Rush: What about our worldwide inventory? Can we take some bombs from that?

Adm. Moorer: We are already drawing down the European inventory. However, if we step up production, we should be able to stop the drawdown and hold our own by January. The forthcoming rainy season in Vietnam will have some effect in cutting down the bomb expenditure because the planes won't be able to fly as many missions as they are flying now. Still, we have to take some drastic actions with regard to bomb production. The B–52s pour out the bombs by the hundreds of thousands of tons.

The first question that has to be decided is whether the President wants to add thirty-four more B–52s—to get the one hundred he recently ordered?[5] Or, will he be satisfied with the sixty-six additional B–52s?

Gen. Haig: I wouldn't worry about the President being wed to the figure of one hundred additional B–52s. He wanted a dramatic step-up in the number of B–52s, and we have done that.

Adm. Moorer: If he will be satisfied with the sixty-six B–52s, the only problem we will have is getting the additional tankers in Thailand.[6]

These tankers will be needed for the F–4s coming out of Danang, and I think we can arrange it with the Thai. They have already agreed to the transfer of the Marine F–4s from Danang.

Mr. Johnson: The Thai have also agreed to the reopening of Takhli, but they have not agreed about Korat.

Adm. Moorer: We plan to leave one alert squadron in Danang because we feel we can accept the hazard of keeping one squadron there after the 196th Brigade leaves. Abe, as you know, wants to pull the brigade out in order to get down to the 49,000 ceiling.

If the President wants the one hundred additional B–52s—that means thirty-four more than we are planning to send right now—we will have a big problem. We will have to force the Thai into agreeing that the tankers now at U Tapao should be moved to Don Muang.

Mr. Johnson: It will mean in effect that we have taken over Don Muang. We would have to close the second runway on the military side of the field and use it for parking space. And if we put forty-six KC–135 tankers into Don Muang, that will displace the Thai Air Force units there. As I said, we will have taken over Bangkok International Airport.

Adm. Moorer: We probably could lay a few more mats at Takhli and accommodate some more planes there. But that really isn't the solution. We've also looked at the possibility of stationing the tankers at Clark Field. Because of the greater distances involved, though, you have to put two and a half tankers into the Philippines for every tanker you take out of U Tapao.

Gen. Haig: It's clear that we should drop the option of putting more B–52s into Thailand unless we undertake crash construction projects on facilities we hold, rather than on facilities the Thai hold.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. Can we proceed on that assumption?

Gen. Haig: That's my feeling. But we have to give all the options to the President and await his guidance.

Adm. Moorer: We can start some construction work at U Tapao, but that will, of course, take some time.

Gen. Haig: Concerning the political problem of putting more B–52s in Thailand, the President isn't aware of the strain this move will have on the political fabric tieing us to the Thai. And only a handful of B–52s is involved.

Adm. Moorer: I don't think it's worthwhile to court political trouble by asking the Thai to accept more B–52s. These planes can only carry twenty-six bombs, anyway. We already have over 200 B–52s in the theater—more than we've ever had out there before. In my judgment, we have an adequate number of B–52s in action right now. But if the President wants to send more, we will do it.

Mr. Johnson: Perhaps we can delay the redeployment of some units from Vietnam to Thailand, thus saving some space at Takli and Korat.

Mr. Rush: If we do that, it will certainly have an effect on the 49,000 ceiling.

Mr. Johnson: I know. Remember, though, that the President has always said he will make the necessary decisions based on the circumstances at the moment. If he has to maintain the ceiling, he will do it. Still, we can give him some options—such as deferring the redeployments and, thereby, saving space in Thailand.

Adm. Moorer: We have to get an answer to the basic question. Are sixty-six additional B–52s enough to meet the President's requirement? In three weeks, we will have sent sixty-six more B–52s to Guam. If this is enough to meet his requirement, then we can deal with the Thai on the basis of arranging only the redeployments from Danang. However, if it does not meet his requirement, and if he wants us to send another thirty-four B–52s, then we will have a great problem with the Thai.

Gen. Haig: As I said before, I don't think the President is wed to the figure of one hundred more B–52s. He wanted us to take drastic action, which we did.

[Omitted here is discussion of B–52 missions over North Vietnam.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] Telegram 7207 from Bangkok, May 23, and previous. (Ibid., Box H–088, WSAG Meeting, Vietnam, 7/24/72)

[4] Brackets in the source text.

[5] According to the minutes of the May 30 WSAG meeting, Haig stated that “we got an okay to hold to the sixty-six additional B–52s for Guam.” (Ibid., Box H–116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1/3/72–7/24/72)

[6] According to the minutes of the June 1 WSAG meeting, Moorer stated that everything was “ready to go” with the tankers in Thailand, including 46 for U Tapao, 20 for Takhli, and 13 for Don Muang, “most of which are already in place.” (Ibid.)

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, May 26, 1972, 1249Z.

7416. Joint Embassy/MACTHAI Message. Subject: Thai Military Equipment Request: Thanom's Comments to Vice President. Ref: A. CINCPAC 182221Z May 72 (Vipto);[2] B. Bangkok 7138.[3]

Summary: During recent visit of Vice President, FM Thanom asked Vice President for increased military assistance to Thailand, specifying helicopters, armored cars, and communications equipment. In response to call to DOD from Vice President's office, MACTHAI has been instructed through military channels to develop recommended package of defense equipment of approximately $15 million which might be given to Thais as special military assistance add-on. We feel this is opportunity to present constructive package which we have structure in four parts to be responsive to Marshal Thanom's specific requests as well as re-oriented high priority requirements and which we would relate to increased Thai performance in Thai security and counter insurgency programs. End summary.

1. In context of Field Marshal Thanom's request for more military equipment for Thailand to Vice President, during VP's recent visit to Thailand (see reftels), on May 24 MACTHAI received telephone request from OSD/ISA through CINCPAC to suggest items that might be provided to Thailand under military assistance if special add-on fund of $15 million were to become available. OSD/ISA stated request in response to inquiry from Vice President's office.

2.

In follow-up to Vice President's discussions with Thai leaders, including Ambassador's meeting with Marshal Dawee today, Mission has attempted obtain clearer idea what Thanom had in mind when he asked for additional helicopters, communication equipment, and wheeled armored vehicles (para 17, ref a). We conclude from three separate conversations with RTA Chief of Staff, General Surakij, during past week that Thanom wanted more helicopters (than Thais know are already in pipeline) delivered more quickly than projected delivery schedule. Thanom wants helicopters to fill out two existing RTA airmobile (helicopter) companies and to equip a planned third airmobile company. Although Surakij does not think Thanom sought helicopters for RTAF, need for more helicopters (including helicopters for RTAF and police) has been recurring theme in conversations with Thai leaders, from King on down.

While helicopter program recommended below should meet those needs if properly managed we will keep this question under study. We have invited Thai to explain needs as they see them but have also pointed to large MASF helicopter program over past few years and to management difficulties, including pilot shortage, which could arise by overloading. Regarding request for armored cars, Surakij felt a few such vehicles for RTA to evaluate new types would meet the requirements. He also addressed some RTA communication equipment needs, which are discussed further below.

3. In course of normal MASF/MAP dialogue before Vice President's visit, there have been several lower level RTG approaches regarding increased military assistance support to Thailand both for additional items of equipment and for increased level of support. Mission officers have responded to these requests by pointing out that military assistance funds are limited (and probably will continue to be), that US will do its best to assist Thais to meet their priority needs within these limits, and that mission will study each request very carefully.

4. Additional military assistance to Thailand would offer excellent opportunity to develop constructive supplemental program to meet real Thai needs. Add-on package could provide further incentive to move Thais to improve their own response to counterinsurgency. We feel assistance beyond basic program level should be negotiated with Thais in conjunction with actions which we feel Thais should take to increase effectiveness of their security and counterinsurgency programs (as in recent AAT/Ramasoon exercise, but less formally, considering short time available in FY 72). Although we believe that we should be responsive to each of Thanom's requests, pertinence to counterinsurgency including support for VDC and hill tribe volunteers should be a prime test of priority in expenditures for equipment in overall contemplated MASF add-on.

5. Mission has prepared a list of items which might be included in add-on, grouped by category without any priority having been assigned. We consider list, which follows as most desirable make-up of program for presentation to Vice President. This list of items recommended for possible add-on is necessarily tentative pending our submission of more final mission recommendations based upon further study and exploration of Thai desires.

[Omitted here is the list of items.]

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACTHAI.

[2] See Document 165 and footnote 1 thereto.

[3] Not found.

168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Thai Request for Additional Military Assistance

During Vice President Agnew's recent trip, the Thai asked him for additional helicopters, communications equipment, and armored vehicles.

At your direction Vice President Agnew asked Secretary Laird to prepare a forthcoming reply to the Thai request.

Secretary Laird proposes that we provide the Thai with four major items and spares[2] at a cost of $4.6 million (Tab B).

—12 rebuilt UH–1H helicopters ($4 million). This would affect helicopter delivery to U.S. Army reserve units, but not to the active Army.

—Fourteen M–113 armored personnel carriers ($.288 million to complete the Thai program of 221 APCs. These fourteen vehicles would have to be diverted from a shipment of 232 currently scheduled for delivery to Vietnam, but could be replaced in the Vietnam program during the first two weeks of September by briefly delaying delivery to FMS purchasers.

—Six armored cars ($.323 million) could be delivered within 18 months from new production. To provide them earlier, we would have to take them from U.S. base security units in SVN and Thailand, which Secretary Laird and I agree should not be done.

—Speed up delivery of half the 1,000 tactical radios now in the Thai program for arrival in March 1973. They could be delivered in August by a temporary diversion from SVN of 500 radios (from the planned SVN delivery of 2,000) for about two weeks and brief adjustments in delivery times of other programs.

Thailand will be transferred from Service funding to MAP on 1 July 1972, and MAP funds are severely limited. Therefore, if we are to provide a special package to the RTG, the decision should be made immediately so that Service funds may be obligated before 1 July. Proceeding now with Secretary Laird's package would serve two purposes:

—It would demonstrate our responsiveness to the Thai request and evidence a forthcoming attitude in view of all they have done for us during our force buildup.

—It will provide a hedge against possible MAP cuts next year.

I recommend that you approve Secretary Laird's proposal. If you agree I will convey your approval by the memorandum at Tab A.[3]

Recommendation

That you approve my forwarding the memorandum at Tab A to Secretary Laird approving his proposed additions to Thai military assistance.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 564, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. VIII. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Kennedy and Holdridge. The memorandum was attached to a June 8 covering memorandum from Kennedy and Holdridge to Kissinger. It was signed by Haig.

[2] In a June 2 memorandum for the President, Laird forwarded the proposal for the four programs but seemed to indicate skepticism about the Thai request, stating that there “is not a compelling requirement for military hardware additive to our regular program for Thailand, so the primary motive for providing additional assistance would be political.” Laird also noted that “everything that we can do for the Thai in the way of additional military assistance at this time has a direct and adverse impact on our current accelerated programs to satisfy combat requirements in Vietnam.” Attached but not printed.

[3] Attached at Tab A but not printed was the President's memorandum to Laird, signed by Kissinger and dated June 10. It noted that the President “has approved your recommendations,” directed the provision of 12 rebuilt UH–1H helicopters, 14 M–113 armored personnel carriers, 6 armored cars, and 500 tactical radios to the Thais, and requested that delivery “be accelerated to the maximum possible extent.”

[4]  Haig initialed the approve option for the President.

169. Telegram From the Consulate in Australia to the Department of State [1]

Perth, June 30, 1972, 1322Z.

Secto 93. 1. June 28 Secretary Rogers met with Thai SEATO Council Member Pote Sarasin to review several points in US-Thai relations as well as bearing on developments in Southeast Asia of summit talks and subsequent US contacts with USSR and PRC.

2. Secretary Rogers thanked the RTG for their prompt and generous assistance in accommodating US forces required for the increased air activities in North and South Vietnam. Pote said Thailand regarded this as fulfilling its obligations under SEATO. He noted that in so doing Thailand encouraged considerable criticism from neutral countries and made it more vulnerable to communist hostility, as was evident from increase in insurgency.

3. Because of this increase the RTG had asked Vice President Agnew for additional assistance, a reply to which Pote said had been received promptly and in the affirmative. With the growing threat, the Thais were concerned about their arms and equipment being inferior to the enemy and he asked about continuing US assistance; he expressed particular concern about the Wolff amendment on narcotics which would cut off all aid. Secretary said he could understand the Thai concern on these matters but explained that these were manifestations of US politics particularly in an election year and he said he expected that we would be able to help with what was essential.

4. Pote then referred to the summit meetings and subsequent contacts in Peking and Hanoi and said that Marshal Thanom, NEC Chairman, had instructed him to ask the Secretary on a very confidential basis what bearing those conversations had had on the situation in Southeast Asia including an end to the Vietnam war. Secretary Rogers explained to Pote that in spite of the lengthy conversations there was not very much of a specific nature that could be cited although we do believe as a result of the talks that both the Russians and Chinese doubt the wisdom of an extended continuation of the war in Vietnam. After some further discussion on this point the Secretary made clear that we have left neither Moscow nor Peking in any doubt about our taking very seriously our continuing commitment to our allies and SEATO, which of course means above all our commitment to Thailand. We have felt that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese challenge this.

5. Pote volunteered that the Thais have been urging their neighbors to accept the expanding role of the Japanese in Southeast Asia even while carefully looking out for their own interests; he felt this was important in order not to drive Japan back into a militaristic frame of mind. He also volunteered that the Thai leaders will be forming a new, constitutional government quite soon, attributing the delay to some lack of decision on the part of Chairman Thanom and their desire to have thoroughly worked out beforehand the framework for future administration. Secretary Rogers said we well understood the Thai situation. He also referred to narcotics control, thanking the RTG for its close cooperation and urging them to do anything more that they can. Finally, he acknowledged the crucial role of the Thai volunteers in the defense of Laos over the recent dry season.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Trip to SEA. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Unger on June 29, cleared by Lissy (S), and Pedersen (C), and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Bangkok.

170. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush)[1]

Washington, August 18, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Deputy Director for Plans, CIA

SUBJECT

General Praphat's Plans to Expand the Thai Volunteer Program and to Use Thai

Volunteers to Conduct Operations Throughout Laos

Mr. Karamessines' WSAG paper of 3 July[2] was most informative and reassuring about the Thai volunteer program and RTG intentions for the program. I agree that recruitment should be emphasized in order to bring deployed forces and replacement units up to full strength and keep them at that level. Additionally, the deployment plans voiced by General Praphat accord with our view, although the priorities among the areas mentioned by General Praphat are not clear. Of greatest interest as a potential problem area, however, were the comments on equipping the volunteers and sustaining them outside Laos temporarily should a ceasefire occur.

As you know, assistance to the Thai volunteers has been provided under the authority which permits military department appropriations to be utilized for military assistance to Vietnam and Laos. We have argued that the Thai volunteers are “local forces in Laos” as the words are used in the Defense Procurement Act. With assistance to Thailand now in the Military Assistance Program, the opportunity to mingle assistance to Laos and Thailand is further reduced. The points I wish to make are that:

—Equipment provided to the Thai volunteers is provided for the purpose of assisting Laos. This equipment may not be transferred by Laos to other governments or to persons not its officers or agents without US consent. This consent must be reported to Congress 15 days before given under Section 502, PL 91–441.

—Authority does not now exist to assist Thailand with military equipment other than by MAP. —Under circumstances of ceasefire, it is doubtful that maintenance of the volunteer force in Thailand could be justified as assistance to Laos. Further, unless the forces under redeployment to Thailand were either part of the RTA or under control of Thai MOD, they would not be eligible for support under Thai MAP.

These constraints should be considered in our dealings with the RTG concerning the volunteer program. In particular, a review of the above assistance problems—especially the effect on Laos-related projects of MAP funding for assistance to Thailand—should be dispatched to the Embassies in Bangkok and Vientiane to apprise them of the situation.

Finally, the comments by General Praphat about the build-up to 36 volunteer battalions, together with the recent surge in recruitment, indicate that the RTG is making a determined movement toward the 36 battalion objective. I wish in this connection to draw attention to the agreed criteria that battalions should be deployed at 100% of authorized strength and maintained at a minimum of 80% of authorized strength. These criteria have not been met. Before supporting added units beyond the existing 25 numbered battalions, we should assure that these manning criteria are met. In pursuit of this goal I am directing CINCPAC to provide support appropriate for additional battalions when new battalions are at 100% strength and all existing deployed units are at 80% strength. I hope you will agree that this action is appropriate to provide field activities with the leverage needed to assure that our manning goals are met.

Kenneth Rush

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, August 1972. Secret.

[2] Not found.

171. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers [1]

Washington, August 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

Determination and Authorization of the Grant to the Kingdom of Thailand of up

to $50 Million in Defense Articles and Services in FY 1973

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of July 12,[2] I hereby:

A. Determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2364), that the use of up to $50 million of funds available in FY 1973 for the grant of defense articles and services, including excess defense articles, to Thailand, without regard to the requirement of Section 514 of the Act, is important to the security of the United States; and

B. Authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, such use of up to $50 million of funds for the grant of defense articles and services, including excess defense articles, to Thailand, without regard to the requirements of Section 514 of the Act.

You are requested on my behalf to notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of my intention to take this action, in accordance with Section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and to specify an effective date for this determination.

This determination shall be classified SECRET and shall not be published in the Federal Register. Such publication would be harmful to the security of the United States because it could jeopardize continuing use by the United States of Royal Thai Air Force bases by raising the issue of the nature of our defense relationship with Thailand.

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Chronological File, 1/1/72–12/21/72. Secret.

[2] Not found.

172. Memorandum by the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)

Washington, August 23, 1972.

[Source: National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretary Johnson Chronology Files: Lot 96 D 695, Box 25, August 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State [1]

Bangkok, September 1, 1972, 1244Z.

12456. Subject: Status Report on Resettlement of CIF.[2] Ref: Bangkok 12010.

1. As of late August the RTG reports that 1153 CIF families have been permanently resettled, an increase of 343 since the May 31 report.[3] The average family is allocated 15 rai (2.53 rai equals 1 acre) for its personal use (although ownership is not formally turned over to them). A total of approximately 5,000 individuals are involved.

2. In many cases, the families have been living for some time as squatters in villages in the area in which they have now been given refugee status and allocations of land. In these cases, the allocated land has quickly been put to use for crops and livestock. Several new areas are also being opened up. For example, 200 families are scheduled to be resettled in new areas of Chiang Rai Province (areas previously dominated by Communist insurgents). A number of settlers at these two sites are at work building houses and clearing land. Schools to be staffed by Thai teachers are being erected.

3. In addition to land allocated to families, the Government also intends to set aside large tracts as common land to be used for the economic good of the community as a whole.

4. From the economic point of view, the project is viewed as falling into two parts, one aimed at producing the quickest cash return and the second aimed at putting the CIF on a permanently viable economic basis.

5. The RTG has asked for assistance from Taipei in high elevation horticulture to assist in the rapid development of cash crops. Experimentation and research areas are being set aside to help determine which crops are most suitable. The longer term economic base is to be founded on production of tea, cattle, mining, fruit, and vegetable seeds.

6. Some setbacks have been encountered in tea cultivation. Only 50 percent of the 450,000 plants already set out have survived. The Government has hired tea propagation experts from Taiwan to advise the settlers and has ordered new and better cuttings to replace the plants that died. It will be five years before the plants will have matured and start producing. The Government will provide a tea processing plant capable of producing 2,000 kilograms of tea per day, with this level of production to be achieved within ten years.

7. The CIF have approximately 600 head of brahman cattle from Burma, and they plan to double the size of their herds within one year by additional purchases. The Government is providing grass seed more suitable for cattle raising and will train additional CIF in the technique of artificial insemination. Eight are already qualified but more are needed. The CIF hope to be able to export cattle by the end of this year.

8. Antimony mining is scheduled to begin this year at Mae Salong in Chiang Rai. The Department of Mines is surveying the region to determine the best location for extracting the antimony. The Department of Mines must also give final approval before actual work can get underway.

9. General Kriangsak estimates that the CIF will be fully self-sufficient within two years.

10. The mobile development units in the area are training CIF personnel as mechanics to repair and maintain equipment which is being provided for use in agriculture in the common areas. Twelve mechanics from each group are to be trained initially. The mobile development units are also building roads in some of the newly opened areas.

11. At the present time, the CIF have been given refugee status under Thai law. If this program works out as planned, the Government plans to change their status progressively from refugees to temporary residents, to permanent residents, and finally to Thai nationals.

12. General Kriangsak told us this week that, with the insurgency problem somewhat quieter in Chiang Rai Province, the RTG expects to be able to devote more time and resources to the resettlement project. This will entail full time assignment of one or two RTG officers to each of the settlement areas (which are now visited periodically). This will not only speed successful resettlement, but will also enhance the RTG's capability to enforce the agreement to stay out of opium trafficking.

13. The RTG has expended a total of $733,000 in support of its program to resettle the CIF.

14. I believe the RTG's performance in resettling the CIF constitutes a satisfactory execution of their commitment to us. They have carried forward the types of programs upon which we and they have agreed, they have expended more than $700,000 of their own funds, and progress to date has been encouraging. I believe the RTG has also investigated seriously the allegations we have passed to them that Li and Tuan are not abiding by their commitment to get out of the opium trade. In a discussion with Brady and Boyer from the House Foreign Affairs Committee within the past few days, Kriangsak reaffirmed his government's determination to hold Li and Tuan to their promise. While a number of allegations against them have been made, none of these contains sufficient substance to warrant withholding our final payment. Basic situation remains as described reftel. I, therefore, plan to go ahead with final payment on September 6.

Unger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 9–5 CHINAT. Secret; Nodis.

[2] For a discussion of the resettlement of the CIF, see Document 152.

[3] Telegram 12010 from Bangkok, August 24, reported allegations of violations by CIF Generals Li and Tuan of their resettlement/narcotics agreement with the Thai Government, “sourced for the most part to persons of unknown reliability and undetermined access.” It concluded that “none of the reports contain sufficient substance to lead us seriously to consider holding up the final payment,” but promised to “continue to monitor situation most closely.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 9–5 CHINAT)

174. National Security Study Memorandum 159[1]

Washington, September 9, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of State

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Administrator, Agency for International Development

SUBJECT

U.S. Counterinsurgency Support for Thailand

The President has indicated his concern over the expanding insurgent threat to effective government control in a number of provinces in rural Thailand, particularly in the two areas bordering Laos in North and Northeast Thailand.

The President has requested a study addressing the following two issues:

— RTG actions to increase its counterinsurgency effectiveness. The repeated demonstrations of insurgent capability to thwart government efforts to counter the insurgent threat warrants an examination of alternative Thai programs and modes of operation which hold out the prospect of increased government effectiveness. The feasibility of such alternatives should be considered in the light of their impact on the balances within the Thai bureaucracy and their resource costs to the Thai government.

—The U.S. role in promoting a more effective Thai counterinsurgency effort. With limited security assistance resources and an uncertain ability to leverage even marginal changes in Thai direction, our assistance must be carefully organized and directed to ensure support for Thai actions which most effectively contribute to their counterinsurgency effort. Alternative adjustments in the U.S. counterinsurgency assistance program in terms of the allocation of our resources to various Thai programs and in our own management organization at all levels should be considered. The implications for RTG counterinsurgency efforts of either phasing out our counterinsurgency assistance or attempting to exert greater influence with increased levels of assistance should be assessed.

This study should draw on work already done in connection with the study directed by NSSM 51 but should focus on the specific issues for decision concerning the Thai counterinsurgency program. It should be prepared by an NSC interagency ad hoc group comprising appropriate senior representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State.

The study should be submitted not later than November 15, 1972,[2] for consideration by the Senior Review Group. It will be reviewed in conjunction with the study prepared in response to NSSM 51.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Top Secret.

[2] The Embassy in Thailand provided its assessments in a series of telegrams in late November and December 1972, including Bangkok 16953, November 30 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73. DEF 1–1 THAI–US); Bangkok 17264, December 7 (ibid.,POL 23 THAI); Bangkok 17269, December 7 (ibid.); Bangkok 17354, December 9 (ibid.); Bangkok 17357, December 9 (ibid.); and Bangkok 17368, December 9 (ibid.).

[3] See Documents 10 and 82 and footnotes thereto.

175. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

Thai Volunteers and FY 73 Legislative Ceiling

During FY 1972, a number of US-supported Thai volunteer units provided valuable assistance in resisting the North Vietnamese dry season offensive in Laos. By June, 22 such battalions had been deployed in Laos. However, these units were manned at only 59 percent of their authorized strength, in violation of the Thai agreement to maintain deployed units at a minimum strength of 80 percent.

During the past three months, exceptional recruiting efforts have taken place in Thailand. The Thai volunteer force has expanded from 9,000 to over 19,000 men during this time, and three additional battalions have been formed.

On 28 August 1972, Ambassadors Unger and Godley jointly requested that the number of Thai volunteer units be increased from 25 to 30 battalions. This would represent an increase in FY 1973 expenditures of at least $16 million. Interagency plans envisage a maximum force of 36 battalions at a cost of $134 million per year. The 30 battalions requested by the Ambassadors would cost $126 million.

You will recall that your 8 August 1972 letters to Chairmen Hebert and Stennis, as well as Department of Defense representations to the conferees, were all aimed at eliminating any ceiling on Laos expenditures. These efforts were successful only in raising the FY 1973 ceiling level from $350 million to $375 million. This ceiling is on total US assistance to Laos for FY 1973 and includes Defense, CIA and AID funding. We will incur at least a $55 million overrun if spending continues at the planned rate.

In view of this new ceiling, we have tried repeatedly to get interagency agreement to scale down the Laos program to get within the $375 million limitation. We have not been successful.

I view this new legislative ceiling as a serious matter and will assure that Defense operations are carried out at a level consistent with the $375 million limit. As a first step, unless you direct otherwise, I am issuing orders which will prevent expansion of the Thai volunteer force beyond the present 25 battalions—at least until fiscal pressures abate.

Melvin R. Laird

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.

176. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, September 19, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Breakfast Meeting with Secretary Laird, September 20[2]

Phil Odeen has already given you Talking Points. There is one additional subject which you might wish to raise—Thai volunteers and the Laos FY 1973 ceiling.

Secretary Laird in a memo to the President dated September 16 (Tab A)[3] expressed concern that we could not live with the $375 million ceiling for Laos unless programs were tightly controlled. To this end he intends to limit the Thai SGU program to 25 battalions unless the President directs otherwise.

—Mr. Laird will argue that we cannot live within the ceiling unless the Thai SGU program is held at 25 battalions; the Thai are not all that good or necessary; and the threat of NVA activity is less this year than last.

—The Thai have done a creditable job, particularly in North Laos. The NVA are west of the PDJ and on the Bolovens this year giving them a head start for their dry-season push. The Lao forces are weaker now and we will probably need all the Thai forces we can get to hold this year.

—Early estimates suggest that total expenditures with 30 Thai SGU battalions would be about $409 million—$34 million over the ceiling (less than 10%). The significant effects of weather alone on levels of combat and thus on consumption of weapons, ammunition, and air support can result in significant variation from early estimates as our experience of the past two years has shown. Thus it is simply too early to assume that we will be significantly over the ceiling.

The Thai have finally produced recruits for the training program enabling us to man the existing 22 battalions at 80% strength, deploy an additional 3 battalions at full strength, and still permit us to move toward forming an additional 5 battalions. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is geared up to get the training done and the battalions deployed. To cut back the program now could cause problems in our relations with the Thai, and deny us needed forces in the face of an uncertain NVA capability and intention for the coming dry season.

The Senate committee in reporting out the Defense Procurement Authorization Bill stated: “It is possible that adjustments will be required in the ceiling, depending on future events. Nevertheless, the committee believes a limitation should again be imposed to continue activities in Laos at approximately their present level.”

Thus we believe we should not foreclose, now, the possibility of going to the 30 battalion level. Meanwhile, we should caution Godley to keep a careful watch on expenditures as the situation develops over the next few months. We are continuing our efforts to refine our estimates, identify trade-offs and determine more precisely the effects of the ceiling on essential operations. If it appears by January that we have no alternative we should then be prepared to request an increase in the ceiling. Meanwhile, we should not impose artificial restrictions which may have the effect of giving the NVA the victory in Laos we have thus far denied them.

You might tell Mr. Laird:

—We need to continue our efforts to refine estimates and all agencies have been requested to do so.

—We should not foreclose now the possibility of moving to 30 Thai SGU battalions when the 25 existing units are filled out and replacements to keep them up to 80% strength are assured.

—We want to be sure that we make available whatever is needed to defend Laos; if that means a request for a ceiling increase later, we will have to consider it.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

[2] No record was found concerning the substance of the President's breakfast meeting with Laird.

[3] See Document 175.

177. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 25, 1972, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Thai Security: Call on Under Secretary Johnson by Boonchu Rojanasathien

PARTICIPANTS

Boonchu Rojanasathien, Executive Vice President, Bangkok Bank

Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson

Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director,EA/TB

After an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Boonchu asked Under Secretary Johnson about his reaction to Thailand's sending a ping pong team to China. Ambassador Johnson said that he agreed that communication should be established with Peking and he had no problem with that.

Boonchu evinced considerable interest in Ambassador Johnson's views on the security situation in Southeast Asia. He asked about the Viet-Nam negotiations and was told there has been no break-through. He inquired whether Thailand could survive if its neighbors were taken over. Ambassador Johnson said yes, if Thailand's resistance was not just military but also political and economic. He noted his concern that every year, since 1965, it was reported that the RTG was doing better in its counterinsurgency efforts, yet every year there were more insurgents. Boonchu said that the news in the papers wasn't necessarily the same as the facts. He did not think the insurgency had gained stronger support or that it was gaining recruits. To Ambassador Johnson's inquiry whether Boonchu was referring to the north or northeast, Boonchu said the problem in the north was military; it appeared that he meant the northeast as the area where there was not much new recruiting. Ambassador Johnson noted that Operation Phu Kwang (note—in the tri-province area, Jan–April 1972) wasn't very well done. Boonchu attributed this to lack of experience on the part of the forces involved.

The Thai visitor then made a pitch for continued US material assistance to Thailand. Ambassador Johnson replied “you have plenty of military supplies.” He emphasized the importance of police, that the only RTG official that the average up-country Thai sees is a policeman. If he has his hand out for bribes, it is easy to tell what the peasant's reaction to the RTG is likely to be.

Boonchu said military operations are expensive and the RTG is now increasing its military expenditures at the expense of development. Ambassador Johnson noted that it was not just a question of giving the Thai Government aircraft. At least as important was maintenance, up-keep and operations. It was not good for Thailand to depend too much on the US. However, Ambassador Johnson concluded, we have been helping Thailand and we will continue to do so.

Ambassador Johnson expressed his pleasure that Anand had become Thai Ambassador here. He described him as “first class”. In response to an inquiry, Boonchu noted, laughingly, that Thanat was now engaged primarily in playing golf.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 THAI. Confidential. Drafted by Bergesen and approved by U. Alexis Johnson on September 28. The meeting was held in Johnson's office.

178. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 25, 1972.

SUBJECT

Thai Volunteers and FY–73 Legislative Ceiling

Secretary Laird has written you (Tab B)[2] expressing views about his intention to live within the $375 million Lao ceiling and specifically about his concern that U.S. support of the Thai volunteer battalions, beyond the present 25, will put us over the $375 million limitation. He mentions that the Thai volunteers provided valuable assistance in resisting the North Vietnamese dry season offensive in Laos, even though they were under their authorized strength, and that the Thai Government is now bringing these 25 battalions up to strength. Secretary Laird states, nevertheless, that we will incur a substantive overrun if assistance to Laos for FY–1973 continues at the present rate, and as a first step, unless you direct otherwise, he proposes preventing the expansion of the Thai volunteer force beyond the present 25 battalions—at least until fiscal pressure abates.

Although I fully agree with Secretary Laird that we must do all possible to live within the Laos ceiling, I feel our first priority must be to make available whatever is needed to defend Laos.

The Thai have done a creditable job, particularly in North Laos. The NVA are west of the Plaine des Jarres and on the Bolovens Plateau this year giving them a head start for a dry-season push if they want to mount one. The Lao forces, particularly Vang Pao's irregulars, are weaker than in previous years. Thus we will probably need all the Thai forces we can get to hold this year.

Early estimates suggest that total expenditures with 30 Thai SGU battalions would be about $410 to 415 million—$35 to 40 million over the ceiling (about 10%). The effects of weather alone on levels of combat and thus on consumption of weapons, ammunition, and air support can result in significant variation from early estimates as our experience of the past two years has shown. Thus it is simply too early to assume that we will be significantly over the ceiling.

The Thai have finally produced recruits for the training program enabling us to man the existing 22 battalions already in the field at over 80% strength, fill three new full strength battalions, and still permit us to move toward forming an additional 5 battalions. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is geared up to get the training done and the battalions deployed. To cut back the program now could cause problems in our relations with the Thai, who have expected us to move gradually to support of up to 36 SGU battalions and deny us needed forces in the face of an uncertain NVA capabilities and intentions for the coming dry season.

The Senate committee in reporting out the Defense Procurement Authorization Bill stated “It is possible that adjustments will be required in the ceiling, depending on future events. Nevertheless, the committee believes a limitation should again be imposed to continue activities in Laos at approximately their present level.”

Thus we believe we should not foreclose, now, the possibility of going to the 30 battalion level. Meanwhile, we should caution Ambassador Godley to keep a careful watch on expenditures as the situation develops over the next few months. We are continuing our efforts to refine our estimates, identify trade-offs and determine more precisely the effects of the ceiling on essential operations. If it appears by January that we have no alternative we should then be prepared to request an increase in the ceiling. Meanwhile, we should not impose artificial restrictions which may have the effect of giving the NVA the victory in Laos we have thus far denied them.

The memo at Tab A[3] requests Secretary Laird not to foreclose now the possibility of moving to 30 Thai SGU battalions when the 25 existing units are filled out and replacements to keep them up to 80% strength are assured.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird at Tab A.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Drafted by Kennedy. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] See Document 175.

[3] See Document 179.

179. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Laird [1]

Washington, September 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Special Operations Report of Progress

I appreciate your efforts, as expressed in your memorandum of 16 September, to find ways to conduct our programs in Laos within the $375 million FY–1973 ceiling set by Congress. I certainly share your view that we must treat this ceiling as a serious matter.

However, I am convinced that we cannot forego undertaking any reasonable steps to make certain that Laos is well prepared and able to meet the possible enemy threat against Laos in the coming months. Therefore, I request that you do not foreclose now the possibility of moving to support 30 Thai SGU battalions once the existing units are filled out and replacements to keep them up to 80% strength are assured.

In the meantime, I am sure that you will do whatever you can to find ways to make economies that will not in any way diminish our ability to provide the assistance which the Government will need to successfully defend against enemy attack during the coming year.

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive.

180. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 2, 1972, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Thai Contact with the PRC

PARTICIPANTS

Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chairman, National Executive Council, Thailand

H.E. Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States

Mr. Wichian Watanakun, First Secretary, Thai Embassy

The Secretary of State

Alf E. Bergesen, Acting Director,EA/TB

The Secretary asked Pote about the Thai contact with the PRC. Pote said they had had to refuse the initial invitation to China which, in any case, was non-governmental, because Thailand was not a member (note: of the Asian Table Tennis Union). A few days later word came that Thailand had been made a member and so it was decided to send a team. Prasit Kanchanawat, whom Pote described as “my deputy”, was sent with the team. When Prasit arrived the Chinese took special care of him, e.g., separate accommodations. His midnight meeting with Chou En-Lai was without any forewarning as to the personage involved. It was a correct and formal meeting. Chou sent best regards to His Majesty the King and Field Marshal Thanom. Pote noted as interesting one item that Chou mentioned, that the Thai must be very careful about Russian interest in the Kra Canal. The Chinese, Pote said, evidently tried to be very nice to the Thai visitors.

Prasit told the Chinese that the Thai were worried about terrorists. The Thai people, he said, assumed that the Chinese were supporting the insurgents. Chou said “we” had nothing to do with this but would continue to support freedom fighters. After the tournament there was a tour of south China for the team and its advisors and Chou again appeared at the farewell party. Pote said that the Thai were not yet certain of Chinese motives. The Chinese understood that Thailand had good relations with the U.S.

In response to the Secretary's query about Chinese support of liberation movements, Pote noted that Bangladesh was a liberation movement, but the Chinese did not support it. The Secretary said that in his conversations in Peking the Chinese told him they favored “liberation and turmoil.” He wondered about Africa, which obviously needed peace and stability far more. Pote said that Prasit had noted that there was no case for liberation in Thailand and the subject was then dropped.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 THAI. Secret. Drafted by Bergesen and approved in S on October 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II notes the request of the Thais not to be taken by surprise if a negotiated peace was in the offing, and Rogers's various reiterations that he had told them as much as he could and would let him know as soon as he could. The entire conversation is summarized in telegram 184763 to Bangkok, October 10. (Ibid.)

181. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, October 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Mr. Pote Sarasin, Assistant Chairman of the Thai National Executive

Council (which since last November's coup has functioned as the Thai

Cabinet)

I. Purpose

To reassure the Thai as to the constancy of U.S. support for Thailand and for our determination to continue to play a useful balancing role in the Asian Pacific region.

II. Background, Participants, Press Plan

A.

Background. The Vice President, when he visited Bangkok in mid-May, emphasized the constancy of U.S. purposes in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the Thai leadership remains concerned over our long-term intentions in Asia, especially in view of our Vietnam withdrawal, our China initiative, and the growing internal insurgency in Thailand supported by Peking and Hanoi.

Partly in reaction to this, Bangkok in recent months began exploring in earnest the possibility of improving relations with the PRC. In August, talks in Peking between a senior Thai official who accompanied the Thai ping pong team and Chou En-lai indicated that the PRC is now sufficiently interested in getting relations with Bangkok onto a different track to allow Bangkok to set the pace in moving the relationship in that direction. With respect to our military presence in Thailand and Thailand's other support for the Indochina conflict, PRC officials mentioned this only indirectly. Thailand, however, intends to move slowly and prudently. The Government recently approved a small delegation to the Canton Trade Fair this fall.

Sarasin is third in the current Thai leadership lineup and is the ranking civilian. Although formally he is in charge of economic and financial affairs, he also functions as Foreign Minister.

To the best of our knowledge, you last saw Sarasin during your July 1969 visit to Bangkok, when he was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Development. He was Thai Ambassador to Washington between 1952 and 1957. A biographic sketch is at Tab B.[2]

B. Participants: Sarasin, myself, and Thai Amb Anand Panyarachun*[3]

C. Press Plan. The White House photographer will take photos at the beginning of the meeting. Mr. Ziegler will brief the press after the meeting.

III. Recommended Talking Points

Your talking points are at Tab A.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] Attached but not printed.

[3] The Thai Ambassador's name was handwritten at the end of this sentence with an asterisk. Next to another asterisk at the bottom of this page a handwritten notation reads, “He presented his credentials to you on Oct. 2.”

[4] Attached but not printed.

182. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, October 6, 1972, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Khun Pote Sarasin, Vice Chairman of the National Executive Council of Thailand

Anand Panyarachun, Thai Ambassador to the United States

John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT

The President's Remarks to Pote Sarasin on U.S.-Thai Relations and Related

Subjects

Khun Pote expressed thanks to the President for the latter's willingness to take the time from his busy schedule to see him. The President said that he always had time to talk to friends from Thailand, and went on to express the firm U.S. commitment to Thailand. Khun Pote expressed his appreciation for the President's remarks on behalf of the National Executive Council (NEC).

Khun Pote stated that he had been asked by Marshal Thanom, Chairman of the NEC, to raise with the President if an opportunity to meet him presented itself the question of the U.S. position with respect to the negotiations with Hanoi. Specifically, were we thinking only in terms of a ceasefire for Vietnam, or would we extend the cessation of hostilities to include Laos and Cambodia? This was important to the Thai because they had common borders with these countries. The President made it clear that our position had been from the outset that we wanted the ceasefire to include all of the countries of Indochina.

Khun Pote raised another question on behalf of Marshal Thanom: would it be possible for the U.S. to consult with Thailand on its position with respect to the North Vietnamese if a settlement seemed to be in the making? Thailand certainly did not wish to influence the U.S. position, but due to the role which they had assumed in the war— which they had taken willingly—the Thai hoped that they could be kept informed.

The President said that we had this very much in mind, and that we would certainly consult with the Thai[2] if a settlement appeared to be in the making. However, although the North Vietnamese had indicated in the Paris talks that they had an incentive to bring the war to an end (this was due to the effectiveness of our bombing and mining, and to the heavy North Vietnamese losses in the South) it did not now appear that a settlement could be reached prior to the U.S. elections. The President was confident, though, that a settlement would be reached in the not too distant future. He was optimistic about the military and political situation in South Vietnam.

Khun Pote mentioned that a group of Asian nations, including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia had been attempting to work out a formula for ending the war and would continue these efforts.

Khun Pote informed the President that he, Pote, had met PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in New York the preceding day. Ch'iao had not made an issue out of the U.S. use of air bases in Thailand in connection with the war in Indochina. Although he had referred to them, he had taken the line that the U.S. presence would inevitably be removed from Thailand following the completion of the war. According to Khun Pote, he had made it very plain to Ch'iao that this was a matter which would be worked out between the Thai and the Americans, and concerned them alone. The President said that this position was exactly right. It was up to the U.S. and Thailand to determine what kind of U.S. presence, if any, would remain there after the fighting ended. Thailand would make its decision on the basis of its own interests, as it had in the case of the air bases used by the U.S. The President referred in this connection to Senator McGovern's position on U.S. forces in Thailand, in which only U.S. interests were considered.

Khun Pote said that the Thai were interested in following up the current more friendly attitude of the PRC toward Thailand, and he had sent his own assistant along with the Thai ping pong team to China to talk to senior PRC officials. However, while the assistant had been well received, Thailand would be very cautious in its dealings with the PRC.

Khun Pote noted that the Chinese antipathy toward the Soviet Union had figured in his conversation with Ch'iao Kuan-hua to a considerable extent. The President described the tenor of his own talks with the Chinese on the subject of the Soviets, and attributed the Chinese willingness to deal with the U.S. in large part to fear of the USSR— it was a matter of survival. As a consequence, the Chinese had not made a great issue out of Taiwan in their conversations with us, nor of the U.S. presence in Thailand. The President then proceeded to describe the strategic factors which in his opinion influenced the Chinese in their attitudes toward the USSR, India, and the United States. The Chinese did not want us to pull out of Asia at his time, and we were not going to do so.

Khun Pote stated that he was very glad to hear the President say the U.S. was not going to pull out, because there were many people who felt that the U.S. was going to withdraw. The President then stressed that the Nixon Doctrine was not a means for getting us out of Asia but rather a means for enabling us to stay on. He was confident that with continued U.S. support, which we were going to provide (but which Senator McGovern wants us to remove) the free nations of Asia would be able to hold their own against Communism. The President declared he was optimistic that the free nations would do better than the Communist nations of Asia.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 1, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge.

[2] In an October 10 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted “the President's assurance to Pote that such consultations would be provided,” and stated that “I have requested the Thai Ambassador to treat this conversation as a very sensitive matter and to deal with the White House directly rather than going through State for any follow-up.” He also requested that Kissinger approve the memorandum of conversation for the President's file “with no further distribution,” which Kissinger did. (Ibid.)

183. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Washington, November 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

Executive Action by RTG Forces to Eliminate the Communist Terrorist Threat

1. Our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] briefed Ambassador Unger in Bangkok and the Consul in Songkhla on recurrent reports [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers in south Thailand have picked up concerning instances of executive action by Thai counterinsurgency forces to eliminate captured Communist terrorists. These reports have not been given any other dissemination.

2. Ambassador Unger approved the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]recommendation that the matter be brought up with the Thais by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Consul [1 line of source text not declassified] at the next appropriate occasion taking the line that although summary activity against captured personnel might appear to be temporarily effective in helping to eliminate the terrorist threat, it is illegal, morally indefensible and in the long run discourages terrorist defection. The Thais are to be advised that greater counterinsurgency impact could be achieved by proper and detailed interrogation and follow-up psychological warfare action. A final point to be made to the Thais is that if information on their action came to the attention of sensation-seeking journalists, the matter could be highly embarrassing to the Thai Government internally and internationally and could also embarrass the U.S. Government's advisory position in south Thailand.

3. We have advised [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we believe the recommended course of action is correct, adding that the approach to the Thais should be pursued vigorously rather than waiting for appropriate opportunities to bring it up.

4. Ambassador Unger has asked that the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 be brought to your attention.

For the Deputy Director for Plans: William E. Nelson [2]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Thailand 1972–1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Green saw it.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

184. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

Message to the President from Field Marshal Thanom

Field Marshal Thanom, Chairman of the Thai National Executive Council, has sent a message to the President dealing with the situation in Indochina and U.S.-Thai relations (Tab A).[2]

The letter congratulates the President on his re-election and for the leading role which he and his staff have played in bringing the Vietnam conflict to the brink of a settlement[3] in keeping with “peace with honor.” Thanom then goes on to point out, though, that the continued presence of large North Vietnamese combat forces in Laos and Cambodia does not augur well for the prospect of immediate peace in Southeast Asia, notes the damage which the externally-supported Thai insurgency has caused to his country's national development, and speaks of Thailand's consequent “continual need of effective weapons and budgetary resources.”

Thanom goes on to say that “with regard to the question of a general peaceful settlement of all conflicts in Southeast Asia, it is our opinion that if such a settlement were to be contingent upon the terms dictated by the aggressive forces then it is neither satisfactory nor in consonance with your noble goal of ‘peace with honour’.” He adds that a durable peace in Vietnam also requires that the questions of indirect aggression and externally supported insurgency in the immediate neighboring states must be properly dealt with and included in the terms of the eventual settlement.

Turning to the Thai role in support of U.S. actions in the Vietnam war, Thanom calls attention to Thai base facilities which have been made available “gratuitously” to the U.S. armed forces stationed on Thai soil— with consequent great savings to the United States—this despite grave risks and heavy criticism, including criticism from U.S. quarters.

In conclusion, Thanom expresses the belief that the U.S. continues to bear a great responsibility for the preservation of the power equilibrium in the Asian-Pacific region and for helping to bring prosperity to the nations of the region. Citing the “vital concern” to Thailand of the questions he has raised, Thanom declares that for some, preventive measures should be taken immediately; for others, exchanges of views are necessary. He therefore suggests that “confidential discussions at a high level between our two countries would be mutually beneficial,” and asks that this suggestion receive the President's urgent attention.

Comment

Clearly, the matters uppermost in Thanom's mind are:

—The nature of the settlement which will be worked out for the war in Indochina;

—Whether or not this settlement will safeguard Thai interests;

—The dimensions of the quid pro quo which the Thai should receive from the U.S. in return for the large contributions which they have made to the U.S. war effort.

These matters are indeed ones which we would expect the Thai to be concerned about, and to want to receive the President's urgent attention. Accordingly, Thanom will probably be considerably put out if the visit to Saigon by the Vice President and General Haig is not extended to include Bangkok. We believe that it in fact would be highly desirable for them to touch base with Thanom, even though additional consultations with Prime Minister Souvanna and President Lon Nol might then also be necessary.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 565, Country Files, Far East, Thailand, Vol. IX. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

[2] Attached at Tab A but not printed was telegram 17465 from Bangkok, December 12, which transmitted Thanom's December 12 letter.

[3] The United States and North Vietnam reached an agreement on a cease-fire in late October, but ratification was put on hold due to South Vietnamese objections to the North Vietnamese being allowed to remain in place within South Vietnam. The agreement was not ratified until January 1973.

185. Letter From President Nixon to Thai National Executive Council Chairman Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn [1]

Washington, December 16, 1972.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciated very much receiving your letter of December 12, 1972[2] in which you quite clearly laid out your views on the coming peace settlement in Vietnam. I have asked General Haig to deliver for me this reply to the questions you have raised and to outline for you the present status of negotiations.

May I first, however, thank you for your kind thoughts on my re-election and your hopes for my second term which were contained in your letter of December 12, as well as in your message of November 8. I was also moved by your generous compliments on our efforts to bring about a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. We all hope that this will be achieved soon on terms that will provide a stable base for peace in the region.

I appreciate your concern for the continued presence of substantial North Vietnamese forces in Laos and the Khmer Republic, as well as for the externally-inspired insurgency which you are confronting at home. I want to assure you that we too are concerned about these problems. I know that you are also greatly interested in the terms of a possible Vietnam peace settlement. It is in view of these wholly understandable concerns on your part that I have asked General Haig to discuss these matters with you at this important juncture.

As regards the question you raised concerning North Vietnamese forces in Laos and the Khmer Republic, I would note that the draft peace settlement contemplates the removal of these forces. May I also reiterate my gratitude for the vital assistance which the Thai irregular forces have given in coping with this problem in Laos.

As to the governing insurgency in Thailand, I am impressed by the increased attention which your Government is now giving to this substantial threat to your security and by the growing effectiveness with which you are meeting this challenge. You may be sure we will continue to do everything we can to provide the security and economic assistance necessary to assist you in coping with this insurgency.

I am keenly aware of the burdens which Thailand has willingly assumed to help defend the Republic of Vietnam against aggression from the north. Your earlier contribution of troops and your present provision of Thai bases have been invaluable in our combined effort to defeat this blatant attempt to take over South Vietnam by military force. I recognize the difficulties which your generous contributions have posed for Thailand, and want you to know that these are deeply appreciated. At the same time, I know that you recognize that the security of Thailand is a key to the stability of the region. Your efforts in Vietnam—and in Indochina as a whole—are a reflection on the importance of developments there to the security of Thailand. I want to assure you that the United States intends to stand solidly behind its longstanding security commitment to Thailand.

I hope you will share, in all candor, your concerns with General Haig. He will report these fully to me on his return, and I assure you that I will give them my closest attention.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL THAI–US. Secret; Nodis. It was delivered by General Haig on his late December–January trip to Southeast Asia.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 184.

Philippines

186. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 2, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PHIL–US. Secret; Exdis. Presumably drafted by Grant and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). The meeting was held at the Shoreham Hotel. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos was in Washington for the funeral of former President Eisenhower.

187. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 2, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rafferty on April 4.

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)

Washington, April 4, 1969.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971. Secret. Drafted by Trueheart. Hughes initialed the memorandum, as did two others, to indicate that he had seen it.

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, April 5, 1969, 1949Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wright, cleared by James M. Hawley (S/S) and Richard Sneider (NSC), and approved by Godley.

190. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, July 2, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 PHIL. Secret. Drafted by Wright, cleared by Green, and signed by Walsh.

191. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, July 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 461, President's Trip Files, Presidential Correspondence File, Part II. Secret. Sent for information.

192. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, August 4, 1969, 0848Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON/MOONGLOW. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Moonglow.

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 29, 1969, 1054Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral McCain, and to 13th Air Force exclusive for General Dempster.

194. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group (McClintock) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)

Washington, October 3, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Robert McClintock (PM), who was designated by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to represent the Department of State at meetings of a White House Working Group. President Nixon appointed this group to coordinate the testimony of all agencies of the Executive Branch before the Symington subcommittee. Copies were sent to Kissinger, BeLieu, French, U. Alexis Johnson, Torbert, Spiers, Green, Sullivan, and Moore.

195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)

Washington, October 20, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US. Secret.

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, October 30, 1969, 0920Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, November 11, 1969, 2326Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Usher and approved by Green and Curtis H. Taylor (S/S).

198. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 14, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the first page: “What finally happened?” with an arrow back to Holdridge's initials.

199. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, November 15, 1969, 0418Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVBASE Subic, and to the Commander of 13th Air Force.

200. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, November 16, 1969, 1231Z.

201. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, December 1, 1969, 0440Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.

202. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, December 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. The telegram shows no time of transmission.

203. Backchannel Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade)

Washington, December 31, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Usher on December 31 and cleared in draft by Moore. The telegram bears no time of transmission. According to a note Byroade wrote at the end of Document 204, “for accountability purposes only” this telegram was assigned the number 35889.

204. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, January 2, 1970, 0451Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; Exdis. A notation on the message indicates that Green saw it.

205. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, February 2, 1970, 1103Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret.

206. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 3, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 962, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File, Haig Chron—Feb. 1–7, 1970. Secret. Sent for information.

207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 7, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 17, President's Daily Briefs, February 2–10, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The memorandum is unsigned.

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, February 7, 1970, 0050Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 PHIL. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Usher on February 6; cleared by Moore, Green, and Eliot; and approved by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson.

209. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, February 11, 1970, 1027Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to CINCPAC and CINCPACREPPHIL.

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, February 17, 1970, 1052Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 PHIL. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC, CHJUSMAG, and CINCPACREPPHIL.

211. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 20, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970–March 1970. Secret. Sent for action. The President wrote on the first page: “I hereby order an immediate 1/3 cut in military personnel in Philippines (Clark Field).” A notation in Butterfield's handwriting reads: “Henry—the President approved this action recommendation on this condition:” with an arrow drawn to Nixon's aforementioned note.

212. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 4, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, March 6, 1970, 0521Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

214. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)

Washington, March 25, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

215. Report by the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee Review of U.S. Bases and Facilities in the Philippines

Washington, April 6, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. This 36-page study (plus four map drawings) was designated NSC–U/N 18, Annex C, and was forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under an April 6 cover letter, by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director of the Under Secretaries Committee.

216. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, April 7, 1970, 0651Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

217. Paper Prepared For the Under Secretaries Committee

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, NSC Under Secretaries Committee: Lot 83 D 276, Box 7813, NSC–U/SM 51B—4/7/70—US Philippine Bases Agreement Revisions. Secret. This study was prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group, which was charged with studying the Military Bases Agreement revisions. According to an April 7 memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other principals of the Under Secretaries Committee, this issue paper was prepared to “facilitate discussion on this topic” at the Committee's April 9 meeting. Circular Airgram 2879 to Manila and CINCPAC, May 23, reported that the Under Secretaries Committee endorsed the East Asia Interdepartmental Group's proposed revisions at the April 9 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US) No memorandum of conversation of the Under Secretaries Committee has been found.

218. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 12, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

219. Letter From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to President Nixon

Manila, May 13, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Top Secret.

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 15, 1970, 0301Z.

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 23, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

222. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 16, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information and action.

223. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 30, 1970.

224. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, July 2, 1970, 0928Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rogers was in Manila to attend the 15th Annual Council Meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

225. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, July 13, 1970.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 65, Memoranda to the President 1970, July, Part II. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for action. Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the original.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, July 22, 1970, 0945Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.

227. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 22, 1970.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mrs. Marcos' suite in the Hotel Madison. According to a September 23 attached covering memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, Helms met with Mrs. Marcos on the evening of September 22 at “the President's instruction.” According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met with Mrs. Marcos on September 22 from 12:42 p.m. to 1:14 p.m. No other record of the meeting has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

228. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 25, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a September 25 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, the memorandum was prepared at Kissinger's direction. A notation on an attached covering memorandum reads: “Sent to Pres. 10/2/70.” A notation on the covering memorandum indicates the President saw it.

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, October 3, 1970, 1044Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 PHIL. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

230. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 6, 1970.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Minutes, October 6, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

231. Paper Prepared in the Embassy in the Philippines

Manila, October 13, 1970.

Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The assessment was in response to an October 6 directive of the 40 Committee (Document 230).

232. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, October 20, 1970.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation indicates the President saw it.

233. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 15, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President Files, 1/10/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

234. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah)

Washington, January 27, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) PHIL. Secret. Drafted by Usher (EA/PHL) and Shepard C. Lowman, Country Officer (EA/PHL), and cleared by Wilson and Barger (EA). This memorandum responds to a January 21 memorandum from Green to Rogers. (Ibid.)

235. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, March 31, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation in Nixon's handwriting to Kissinger reads “K—Do letter as I wrote.” Regarding this letter, see footnote 5 below.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, July 8, 1971, 0851Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.

237. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, July 19, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Limited official use. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger.

238. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, August 20, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–6 PHIL. Confidential. Drafted by Forbes, cleared by Hulen (POL) and Kalaris (POL/R), and approved by Maestrone (POL). Repeated to Hong Kong.

239. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 3, 1971, 0937Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PHIL. Secret; Exdis.

240. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, September 13, 1971.

241. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, October 14, 1971, 2059Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. Secret. Received at 2210Z. Repeated to Manila and Saigon. Part II of III. Part I on the issue of Chinese representation in the United States and Part II on Nixon's proposed trips to Beijing and Moscow are ibid.

242. Editorial Note

243. Memorandum for the President's File

Washington, October 22, 1971, 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Secret. Drafted by Haig. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

244. Letter From President Nixon to Philippine President Marcos

Washington, November 18, 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. No classification marking. Drafted by Frank C. Bennett and Lowman on November 4 (ibid.); substantially revised in the White House. Transmitted in telegram 210645 to Manila, November 19, the original signed letter subsequently sent by pouch. (Ibid.)

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, January 4, 1972, 2337Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority, Exdis. Text received from the White House.

246. Talking Points Prepared by the Director of the Office of Philippine Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State (Usher)

Washington, undated.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/PAB 1972–73 Letters and Memos File: Lot 74 D 471. Secret. Drafted by Usher and attached to a February 8 covering memorandum to Green, in which Usher noted that the talking points “are related to the issues paper which S/PC has prepared in coordination with me,” and that both had been done in preparation for the East Asian Interdepartmental Group meeting on the Philippine Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) scheduled for February 23.

247. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, March 5, 1972, 0345Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon for Green.

248. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Washington, March 18, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL–US. Secret.

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, May 13, 1972, 0058Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Lowman, and approved by Green, Wilson, and Hummel.

250. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 19, 1972, 0955Z.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 25, 1972, 0803Z.

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, June 2, 1970, 0900Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC.

253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, June 7, 1972, 1616Z.

254. National Security Study Memorandum No. 155

Washington, June 28, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret.

255. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, July 6, 1972, 0425Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

256. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 15, 1972, 0942Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

257. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 21, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 PHIL. Confidential. Drafted by Political Counselor John D. Forbes on September 20, cleared by Political Officer George T. Kalaris, and approved by Maestrone. Also sent to Djakarta, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, CINCPAC for POLAD, and CINCPACREPPHIL.

258. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 21, 1972, 1011Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:14 a.m.

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 22, 1972, 0945Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

260. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, September 23, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig signed for Kissinger. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

261. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 26, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret. Drafted by Lowman and approved by Barger. The meeting was held in Deputy Assistant Secretary Barger's office.

262. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, September 27, 1972, 0420Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

263. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, October 2, 1972, 1042Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

264. Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note

Washington, November 1, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 PHIL. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Analyst Edwin L. Barber and Director Paul M. Popple of INR's Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific on October 27.

265. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff)

Washington, November 3, 1972.

186. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 2, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

President Marcos of the Philippines

Dr. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lindsey Grant, NSC Staff Member

U.S.-Philippine Relations

President Marcos introduced the question of U.S.-Philippine relations with the observation that the Philippines must be seen “not as a puppet, but as a friend.” He said that it had caused him troubles when President Johnson had referred to him as his “right arm in Asia.”

President Marcos said that, if the U.S. has problems in Asia, it should “tell its friends first” as to how it planned to meet them, rather than imposing solutions on Asia. Asked for an example, President Marcos cited the recent matter of Prince Sihanouk's overtures through the Philippine Ambassador for better relations with the U.S. Marcos had relayed the information through our Ambassador,[2] but had received no further response from the U.S. He had solicited U.S. views as to how to persuade Japan to take a more responsible military role in Asia, but had run into a blank wall.

Dr. Kissinger assured President Marcos of President Nixon's high regard, cited the need to be in continuing communication, and emphasized that if President Marcos ever has suggestions to pass to President Nixon, we shall look into them with care and answer them. He promised to look into the Sihanouk question and be back in touch.

Toward the close of the meeting, President Marcos reverted to the bilateral relation issue and reiterated that he wished to remain close to the U.S. but to “adopt a stance of independence.” He did not wish to be “in opposition, or disagreeable.” Dr. Kissinger agreed that we do not want satellites, and we want the Philippines to show themselves independent. We do, however, judge our friends in large degree by their actions. If the Philippines agrees with us on actions to be taken in the area, we do not much care about the superficial factors. President Marcos underlined that we agree on the need to oppose Communism, the common goal of security in the area, and the need to take effective measures to attain those ends. He said that the Philippines can help us with other Asians in pursuing those goals. He wanted U.S. military bases to remain in the Philippines both for their economic benefit and because there should be a U.S. presence in Asia.

In parting, President Marcos raised the Laurel–Langley agreement.[3] He warned that the Philippines may strike very tough bargaining positions in the negotiations over the follow-on to Laurel–Langley. He asked for understanding, and said that some Philippine industries, such as sugar, will collapse if the preferential arrangements are not extended. The effect on the Philippine economy would be catastrophic. Dr. Kissinger remarked that President Nixon had instructed him to look into the matter, and he would do so.

Vietnam

President Marcos suggested that the Philippines could be more effective if it withdrew PHILCAG, which was proving very expensive, and concentrated on helping the GVN to develop an effective constabulary force. He observed that the Philippines has much relevant experience. The training programs could perhaps be conducted in the Philippines.

Dr. Kissinger mentioned that President Nixon has been interested in an improved constabulary operation for weeks. It should probably not be either incorporated in the military or run by AID. He wished to look into President Marcos' suggestion.

President Marcos wondered whether General Valeriano, now resident in the States, might be a good person to take over the development of a constabulary.

Dr. Kissinger asked the President's thoughts on possibilities for a settlement. President Marcos supported the idea that the South Vietnamese should work out their internal arrangements, and that the U.S. might be able to work out a satisfactory military withdrawal as the first topic for the talks. He believed that Hanoi, which had thought that time was on its side, was beginning to have doubts. During the subsequent discussion, President Marcos asked whether the U.S. would be willing to withdraw, to which Dr. Kissinger said that we would not withdraw precipitately or unilaterally. The other side must also withdraw from Laos and Cambodia; then we will withdraw.

President Marcos remarked on a recent conversation with Vice President Ky; he said that Ky had shown himself “eager” to meet with the NLF leaders. Asked whether this reflects mistrust of us, President Marcos guessed that Ky may fear a U.S.–NLF deal without knowledge, but that this fear is probably transitory.

President Marcos asked pointblank whether there are any moves under way to promote conversations beyond the public ones in Paris. Who is doing it, and what are the prospects? Dr. Kissinger professed a lack of knowledge as to the initiatives of various parties, but said that the Communists are realists; if they believe it better to settle now rather than two years hence, they will settle now. Asked again whether there are private negotiations presently underway with North Vietnam, he said that there have been private meetings from time to time, but that there is not a continuing series going on now. President Marcos then suggested that there should be such talks, and that public talks in Paris would be useless without them.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether President Marcos felt that we were consulting sufficiently with him. The President said that consultation has been adequate so far, but that the time may be approaching for more consultations with Asian leaders. They must be private.

Japan

In answer to a question, President Marcos said that the Philippines would look favorably upon a Japanese role in regional military security, “provided the U.S. were there.” He had been interested in remarks which Kishi had made concerning the increase in the Japanese military budget and amendments to the Constitution. Marcos said that he was interested, and wondered whether there were a “new trend” in Japanese thinking. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he doubted that the Japanese were yet ready for a major expansion in their military expenditures.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PHIL–US. Secret; Exdis. Presumably drafted by Grant and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S). The meeting was held at the Shoreham Hotel. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos was in Washington for the funeral of former President Eisenhower.

[2] Telegram 644 from Manila, January 20, reported Marcos' conversation with U.S. Ambassador G. Mennen Williams, and noted that the “President stated that he had been invited to make a visit to Cambodia and that the Cambodians wanted him to help improve relations with U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PHIL)

[3] The Laurel–Langley agreement granted the Philippines preferential U.S. tariff treatment for sugar and other key exports. It was negotiated by Senator José Laurel as head of a Philippine economic mission sent to the United States in 1955 by President Magsaysay.

187. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 2, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Republic of the Philippines

James F. Rafferty, Special Assistant, AmEmbassy Manila

I had lunch with President and Mrs. Marcos on Wednesday, April 2. The President was in a jubilant mood. I hadn't seen him this elated in over six months. He felt his visit was a great success. Also he felt he had outmaneuvered his opponents (Magsaysay and Osmena).

Two important results of the trip according to Marcos were:

(1) He was convinced the U.S. and in particular the CIA was not consorting with his political enemies. I asked him point blank at lunch how his talks with the Director went.[2] He answered that he was convinced that there was no effort on CIA's part to undermine him. On the contrary he seemed to feel that he had the support of the Nixon administration. (Whether this present feeling that the U.S. is not working against him will continue when he returns to the political jungle of Manila remains to be seen.)

(2) He said he had an excellent talk with President Nixon.[3] He said he advised President Nixon to use him in Asia and if he (Nixon) ever wanted to have an “Asian opinion” President Nixon could quietly check with him. At this point he indicated his severe displeasure with President Johnson's statement about him (Marcos) “that he (Marcos) was his right arm in Asia.” Marcos said he was “still trying to live this statement down with his fellow Asians.”

Marcos said he discussed Laurel–Langley with President Nixon. Marcos asked the President to extend these economic privileges beyond the expiration of Laurel–Langley. If these privileges were not extended Marcos believed the Philippine economy would collapse. Marcos stated that President Nixon agreed in principle that these privileges would be extended and that “things could be worked out.”[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rafferty on April 4.

[2]  Helms met with President Marcos at the Philippine Embassy on April 1. According to an undated memorandum from the CIA to Richard K. Stuart (INR): “The meeting was arranged at Marcos' request with the knowledge and assistance of the Department of State.” Marcos had come to the United States to attend President Eisenhower's funeral. He told Helms “that he had wished to discuss rumors of CIA involvement in internal Philippine affairs. The Director took the occasion to assure Marcos that the CIA was supporting no candidate for President of the Philippines.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Philippines 1969, 1970, 1971)

[3] According to an April 7 memorandum from Walsh to Kissinger, to which this memorandum of conversation is attached, Marcos' meeting with President Nixon “was a private one and we have no U.S. version of the conversation.”

[4] According to a May 6 memorandum from Richard M. Moose of the National Security Council Staff to the State Secretariat, the “President has agreed that we should make sure that President Marcos understands that we have made no commitments to extend the economic preferences of the Laurel–Langley agreement after 1974.” Attached but not printed.

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)[1]

Washington, April 4, 1969.

SUBJECT

Philippines—Request by President Marcos for Direct Channel to CIA

At the regular EA/CIA meeting today (Brown, Godley, Wright, Duemling, and Trueheart present), Nelson reported on a meeting between Helms and Marcos which took place during the latter's presence in Washington for the Eisenhower funeral. At this meeting Helms, responding to concerns expressed by Marcos, gave categoric assurances that CIA is in no way involved in the Philippine elections and would not be. He distinguished the present situation sharply from the Magsaysay period when CIA had helped out in the anti-Huk campaign. Marcos appeared to be reassured.

Marcos then went on to express his concerns—as he has done before—over the alleged poor communications between his administration and the administration in Washington. To correct this deficiency, he proposed—and subsequently repeated the request three times—that Helms [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] establish direct contact with him. To establish the link he said [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should get in touch initially with the notorious Kokoi Romualdez, his brother-in-law and campaign manager. Marcos said that he might have need of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]advice of some unspecified sort in the coming months. Helms ultimately said that he would like to help if he could but Nelson was not sure whether he had made a firm undertaking to establish the requested contact. The only other thing that transpired at this meeting was that the Filipinos managed to get Helms and Marcos to pose for photographs together.

Marshall Wright, the Country Director, expressed the gravest concern over the proposed contact which was patently intended by Marcos to give him political advantage [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. The proposed relationship would also undermine the position of the new Ambassador and, if established before he arrived, would put him in a particularly disadvantageous position. I supported Wright in all of this and added that it would be much easier not to establish the relationship than to break it off later. Godley, while recognizing the problems, thought that it would be very difficult to refuse to permit the President [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. Brown was a good deal more negative and wanted to find out more precisely how much of a commitment Helms had already undertaken to Marcos. It was agreed that once we had clarification of this point the matter would be discussed with the seventh floor and the Secretary or Johnson might thereafter want to pursue the question further with Helms. Meanwhile, Helms was to be informed of the concerns expressed at our level.

Brown and Godley subsequently saw Johnson who took the position that no contact should be established at least until it can be discussed with the new Ambassador—whose identity and ETA are un-known to Godley and me, and perhaps everyone else. Helms is being informed of this, and unless he has objections, there the matter will presumably rest.

Comment: I am virtually certain that CIA does not want to establish this direct contact for any private reasons of its own.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971. Secret. Drafted by Trueheart. Hughes initialed the memorandum, as did two others, to indicate that he had seen it.

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, April 5, 1969, 1949Z.

52387. For AsSecDes Green.

1. This is round-up of Marcos visit Washington[2] based on uncleared memos or readouts of all the Marcos conversations except his private talk with President Nixon.[3]

2. From the Philippine point of view, we believe the visit was a smashing success. Marcos met with the President, Vice President, Secretaries Rogers, Laird, and Finch, a group of Senators,[4] Henry Kissinger [5] and Director Helms.[6] We understand Marcos left convinced that he stands well with the Nixon administration, that the U.S. Government is not and will not be involved in supporting his opponents in the upcoming election, and that we appreciate reasons and have sympathy for his recent statements about the need for a more self-reliant Philippines and a more independent Philippine foreign policy.

3. The visit thus served our purpose in removing or allaying the extreme suspicions and fears which have been so evident recently in Marcos' attitude toward us.

4. From a longer run point of view, however, the visit had about it an unreal air for all the discussions were focused on what the Philippines want from us. Meetings obviously arranged at last minute, U.S. participants hard pressed for time and there was little or no discussion of our specific current problems in the Philippines, such as Science tax, Customs negotiations, validity of 1965 amendment to bases agreement, PNG problem, territorial seas, etc.

5. On substantive points (as distinct from atmospherics) Marcos placed great stress on his balance of payments problem and the resulting GOP desire for: (a) ensured repatriation of dollars earned by overseas Filipino employees; (b) tight controls over dollars spent by the U.S. Government and U.S. personnel in Philippines so that dollars stay out of black market and end up in GOP reserves; (c) need for U.S. sympathy and cooperation in GOP limiting non-essential imports (automobiles, textiles, tobacco, etc.)

6. We indicated that we thought we could be helpful in several ways. We mentioned possibility of “lipsticking” U.S.G. social security and Veterans benefits checks as one example. In subsequent rather confused exchange with newsmen at press conference Marcos indicated he thought we might “lipstick” dollar payments to U.S. military personnel stationed at Philippine bases. He also seemed to think that U.S. was paying Philippino base employees in dollars. In short, Marcos was pleased with what we said, but seemed quite unclear about specifics. Should this come up, suggest you make point that “lipsticking” would apply only to U.S. benefit checks issued to Philippine residents. You might also make the point that it would be easier for us to be helpful on the whole problem of dollar control if Marcos could put an end to the GOP attempt to impose in violation of the military bases agreement the Science tax on privately owned vehicles of our military personnel in Philippines. That matter is arousing considerable adverse Congressional reaction, and creates climate in which dollar control measures are more difficult to establish and to enforce.

7. Marcos discussed Laurel–Langley extensively. He stressed that withdrawal of U.S. preferential treatment for Phil products in U.S. market would result in severe economic damage to Philippines. He said withdrawal of sugar quota would cause collapse of sugar industry. At Marcos' request, Secretary Rogers agreed that U.S. would do nothing to raise this issue this year or to publicize possible U.S.G. unwillingness extend tariff preferences beyond life of Laurel–Langley. This is based on our assumption (not made explicit by Marcos) that GOP will defer further consultations on Laurel–Langley until 1970.

8. Conversation with Helms reported extensively in another channel which you should see. In unlikely event question of direct contact comes up, urge that you avoid any statement. (Matter still under consideration here.)

9. Marcos raised with Kissinger the possibility of the withdrawal of PHILCAG, and suggested that the Philippines might concentrate instead on helping GVN develop an effective constabulary, possibly through training in the Philippines. Should this be raised, suggest you defer any comment beyond possibly mentioning importance of a united front in Vietnam at this stage and wondering rhetorically whether thought had been given to whether GOP would continue as a TCC under such a program.

10. Secretary Rogers and Marcos discussed possibility of visit by Secretary to Manila in June or July. Should this come up, suggest you reply that you aware of Secretary's desire visit Manila, but that when you left Washington his schedule was tight and plans not worked out.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wright, cleared by James M. Hawley (S/S) and Richard Sneider (NSC), and approved by Godley.

[2]  Marcos had numerous meetings with U.S. officials in Washington during the first 4 days of April despite the fact that the Embassy in Manila was advised that “it would be extremely difficult” to make arrangements for them because “U.S. officials will be very much occupied” with the funeral of President Eisenhower. Telegram 48924 to Manila, March 29, advised that Australian Prime Minister Gorton's March 31 official visit had been cancelled, and stated that although “we would not want to discourage Marcos from attending” the funeral, “it should be made clear to him that it would be most difficult if not impossible to combine ceremonial attendance at funeral with a working visit.” (Ibid., POL 6–2 US/EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 187.

[4] No other record of these conversations has been found.

[5] See Document 187.

[6] See Document 187 and footnote 2 thereto.

190. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 2, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between President Nixon and Philippine Presidential Candidate Osmena

During the President's Visit to Manila

You asked for recommendations as to whether President Nixon should meet with Senator Osmena, and if so, how such a meeting could be arranged.

Pros and Cons

There is no gainsaying the fact that President Nixon's visit will be—indeed is already being—interpreted by the Filipinos as an act having an important bearing on their Presidential election. If President Nixon does not see Osmena, this will be interpreted as an indication that we expect Marcos to win, want him to win, and are content to let Marcos harvest all the spin-off benefits of the visit.

Moreover, it is by no means certain that President Marcos will win the November election. Osmena may well be the Philippine chief executive during a period of critical transition in U.S.–Philippine relations. It is not prudent to ignore that possibility.

Finally, Senator Osmena is unquestionably disappointed that President Nixon has refused to see him during Osmena's current visit to the United States.[2] Osmena has declined a proferred appointment with Under Secretary Richardson, probably because he believes that a contact only at that level would be interpreted in the Philippines as a mark of American disfavor.

The only argument against seeing Osmena is the possibility of offending Marcos.[3] Marcos would doubtless prefer that we ignore Osmena. However, the Marcos reception in Washington in April was excellent and he was extremely pleased by it. The President's visit to Manila will be a political boon of the first water to Marcos, even if it includes a brief meeting with Osmena. Marcos is certainly conscious of all this and can, we believe, be persuaded to accept without too much ill grace a contact with Osmena.

The Modalities

1. We should inform President Marcos that Senator Osmena has requested a meeting with President Nixon. We should point out that it is very difficult to refuse such a request, particularly in view of the tradition that U.S. Presidents, in dealing with our democratic friends, customarily meet with leaders of the opposition as a normal aspect of political intercourse between open societies.

2. We should inform Marcos that to de-personalize the meeting somewhat we propose that President Nixon will have a brief meeting on the evening of his arrival with the leaders of the opposition, that is Party Chairman Roxas, Secretary General Aquino, Presidential candidate Osmena and Vice Presidential candidate Magsaysay.

Embassy Manila agrees that a meeting with Osmena is important, if not in Washington, then in Manila. We favor Manila for the meeting, for Osmena has already been turned down on his request for a meeting here with the President. Moreover, a meeting here is more subject to misinterpretation and distortion than one in Manila, and would not really substitute for a Manila meeting.

CIA concurs.

John P. Walsh

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 PHIL. Secret. Drafted by Wright, cleared by Green, and signed by Walsh.

[2]  Kissinger returned a call from Donald Kendall, CEO of Pepsico Inc., on July 1, to explain the decision not to see Osmena in Washington. Kendall said he was dining with Osmena that evening and was “prepared to give Osmena any message” Kissinger thought he should have. Kissinger said that “we have nothing against him and would not be heartbroken if he won election—odds favor the other guy. Kendall said one thing that bothers Osmena is that Marcos will use the President's trip” and Kissinger agreed. Kissinger said that “he gets nothing but good reports about Osmena which makes it tough but does not think Pres. should see him.” Kendall asked if there was any particular message which Kissinger wanted passed to Osmena. Kissinger “said only that we are interested in close relations with him and if he wins election he will find us cooperative and forthcoming—we have no favorites and are strictly neutral.” (Notes of Telephone Conversation, July 1, 1969, 9:50 a.m.; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

[3] Telegram 7261 from Manila, July 11, reported that Osmena's trip to the United States brought charges from Marcos that the Senator was an “American boy,” which led Osmena to declare an “independent policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PHIL)

191. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, July 17, 1969.

SUBJECT

Manila Visit: Your Meetings with President Marcos

1. Schedule: Your schedule is at Tab II.[2] It is intended to balance the close contact with President Marcos [3] with sufficient contact with opposition and other leaders to demonstrate that you are not taking sides in the current Philippine election campaign, and sufficient public exposure is programmed to establish a sense of contact with the Philippine people.

2.

Background: Note: Attached at Tab A[4] is a memorandum which covers general themes which are applicable to Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. This memorandum covers those themes which are peculiar to the Philippines. Your arrival comes at a time when the Philippines are facing many urgent problems. Domestically, corruption and inefficiency in government have reached proportions sufficient to menace economic stability. There are virtually no foreign exchange reserves, and there is an unhealthy reliance upon the income derived from US bases and military expenditures. Separatist sentiment among Muslim Filipinos in the Southern Philippines is increasing, due in large part to a feeling that the economic and political aspirations of the Muslims are being ignored.

On the foreign side, there has been widespread Filipino criticism of the Philippine contribution to Vietnam, the PHILCAG (Philippine Civil Assistance Group, an Army engineer contingent having its own security forces), for diverting funds away from national development. Filipino nationalism has been aroused over an old claim to Malyasian Sabah (North Borneo), and last year it became public knowledge that President Marcos was supporting a clandestine effort to infiltrate Philippine Muslim saboteurs into Sabah. This effort has been stopped, but Philippine-Malaysian relations remain strained. The development of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a regional grouping of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines) into a going concern has been compromised as a result.

The US-Philippine relationship, seen from Manila, is an ambivalent thing. There is much affection for America in the countryside, but strident anti-Americanism has become fashionable in Manila.[5] There, the Filipinos are very sensitive to the former colonial relationship—exemplified by the continued presence of US bases—and blame us for most of their problems. Fed by this sentiment and further stirred by hostile press articles, anti-US demonstrations have occurred—mostly among student groups—and may take place during your visit. Yet the Filipinos are economically and emotionally dependent on us, and not prepared to make the sacrifices which alternatives to the present relationship would entail. Your visit provides an opportunity to reach the Philippine people in general and convince them of continuing American friendship, while encouraging national self-reliance.

An election campaign is underway. President Marcos is trying to convince the Manila sophisticates that he is not your puppet, but that he can get more from the US than anybody else, while he tries to show the rural electorate that he is your friend and confidant. His principal opponent, Sergio Osmena, has also attempted to identify himself with the US.

3. What Marcos Will Want:

a. First and foremost, Marcos will be attempting to use your visit for his political purposes, and to prevent rival candidate Osmena from benefiting from your visit. Arrangements have been made for you to have some contact with Osmena and other opposition leaders to counterbalance Marcos' efforts.

b.

Second, Marcos will try to focus the discussions on economic matters in hopes of obtaining some economic concessions from you. He wants these both for political reasons—to show his ability to get things from the Americans—and to help alleviate very real and pressing economic problems. His proposed agenda for talks with you amounts in part to a “shopping list” which includes financial aid to support the currency; economic assistance (PL 480, AID development loan funds); trade concessions (early negotiations on the Laurel–Langley Agreement, which would extend until 1974 Philippine tariff preferences in the US market, with reciprocal advantages for US businessmen in the Philippines); and Philippine participation in post-war rehabilitation and construction in Vietnam (a new “Marshall Plan” for Asia).

—We have informed the Filipinos that you will not wish to discuss economic issues in detail, but we expect that Marcos will nevertheless give it a try.

c. Third, Marcos may want you to agree to a review of the status of the US bases in the Philippines. Although the three main US bases (Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and Sangley Point Naval Station) are recognized by the Filipinos as key contributions to Philippine defense, they also resent the bases as vestiges of colonialism and seek a greater degree of Philippine sovereignty and control. Particular Filipino objectives are obtaining more favorable terms on criminal jurisdiction, a return of some base lands, and a greater voice in the administration of the bases.

d. Fourth, Marcos hopes for increased US military assistance. There is substantial dissident movement in Central Luzon, against which Marcos wants greater material and logistical support (helicopters, M–16's and construction of military highways). In part, this may be a disguised way of gaining extra economic assistance. Marcos would also like a more automatic defense commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty. (In the Philippine dispute with Malaysia over Sabah, he resented the fact that we did not regard the Treaty as covering a Malaysian attack.)

e. Finally, Marcos will want to hear your views on Vietnam and the Paris negotiations, the US role in Asia after the Vietnam conflict, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet role in Asia. Paradoxically, these major issues weigh less in the minds of the Filipinos than do internal issues. Marcos has also sanctioned increasing contacts with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist China.

4.

What We Want: You will want your presence to be taken as evidence of your own and US's warm and sincere friendship for the Filipino people. You recognize that there have been strains and misunderstandings in our relationship, and that the US bears its share of the responsibility for the problems which have arisen. For your part you will do whatever you can to reduce sources of friction and to restore US-Philippine relations to the levels of mutual confidence and respect which formerly existed. You are emphatically not looking towards a “special relationship” which would downgrade Philippine sovereignty; you recognize that the Filipinos are searching for a new sense of national identify, and you support them in their search. To this end, you will wish to put our relations on a more equal basis, and to begin the process of eliminating some of the sources of Manila's present anti-Americanism, while maintaining our friendly relations, our base rights and other facilities in the Philippines.

You will also want to show that the US continues to support Philippine economic progress and security. You are willing to explore ways in which the US might make its aid more effective, and would encourage the Filipinos to participate in regional arrangements such as ASEAN as well.

Although Philippine concerns over the Vietnam war and post-Vietnam Asia are perhaps less than in other countries which you will visit, you will want Marcos to know your thoughts and, if possible, encourage him to play a more active and constructive role in regional affairs.

5. Points You Should Stress:

a. The US-Philippine economic relationship:

—Emphasize your interest in growing Philippine self-reliance, and endorse Philippine efforts to establish broader relations, particularly through regional organizations such as ASEAN.

—Point to the inherent dangers of extreme Philippine reliance upon a single market. (We presently take 44% of Philippine exports.)

—Remain noncommittal on the Laurel–Langley negotiations, but indicate willingness to see progress made. (Marcos has already raised this matter with you and me.) Make clear that the ultimate objective should be warm and friendly relations without special preferences.

—Refer specific economic problems to the advisers or to regular US-Philippine consultations, emphasizing the need for careful staff work.

—On a “Marshall Plan” for Asia, you will want to point to the problems both at home and in terms of the Paris negotiations of attempting to describe and launch a major new aid structure for Asia at this time. You may also wish to point out that the time is past for unilateral donor programs, and that we hope to cooperate with other rich nations in encouraging economic development in Southeast Asia.

b.

The Military Bases

—Suggest that you express willingness to work toward an amicable resolution of differences which would at the same time preserve the utility of the bases in defense of Philippine and US security. You are interested in cutting down the US presence in foreign countries. US forces overseas have already been reduced. US base issues should be susceptible of resolution through negotiations.

c. Military Assistance

—You would appreciate a review by Marcos of the nature of the dissident movement, and will refer any requests he may submit for stepped-up assistance to the proper officials of the US Government.

—Any review of the Mutual Defense Treaty would need to take place under circumstances in which all considerations can be carefully reviewed and both Philippine and US defense requirements (including regional needs) taken into account.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam and other issues.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 461, President's Trip Files, Presidential Correspondence File, Part II. Secret. Sent for information.

[2] Attached but not printed. Nixon began a global tour on July 25 by flying to Guam. He arrived in the Philippines July 26 and departed July 27. He subsequently visited Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and Romania, and returned to Washington on August 3.

[3] Presidents Nixon and Marcos held a private meeting from 3 to 5 p.m. on July 26. No memorandum of conversation of this private meeting has been found.

[4] Attached but not printed.

[5] Airgram A–182 from Manila, June 17, 1969, reported Political Counselor Francis T. Underhill's observations of anti-Americanism in Manila. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PHIL–US)

192. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, August 4, 1969, 0848Z.

8227. Subject: Meeting of Presidents with Advisers, Manila, July 26. Ref: Manila 8218.[2]

1. Following is telegraphic summary of memcon covering meeting of Presidents Nixon and Marcos with presidential advisers (reftel) in Manila July 26. Memcon itself approved by Green and pouched Dept from Sun Moon Lake.

2. President Nixon said he and President Marcos had again had a good talk, covering general exchange of views as well as certain bilateral problems. In latter category were military assistance and Philippine financial problems. He and President Marcos has agreed that such problems should be worked out by the people that handle them on a day-to-day basis. The President noted that the United States had a few financial problems itself, and he would refer specific questions to Secretaries of State and Treasury and New York bankers for further consideration.

3.

Of greater interest, the President continued, was their discussion of US future role in Asia. Manner in which war in Vietnam was settled would have considerable bearing on this question. He had described progress of Paris Talks, and said there were some “glimmers of change” leading to hope, but no real change. Lull in fighting, how-ever, deserved careful watching. For its part, US has been as forthcoming as it could be and President Thieu could not go further without being brought down.

The President said that US had withdrawn forces and would withdraw more. If Hanoi increased military activity in face of this, further appraisal would be necessary. At same time did not want to appear too pessimistic since there was some possibility we might be on verge of break over.

5. Way in which war concluded, the President added, must not prejudice future US role in Asia. American experience in Korea and Vietnam tended to disillusion average American. But US is Pacific power and must continue to play major role in area of vital future significance. Therefore satisfactory long-term solution to Vietnam problem must be found which will not damage American spirit. New approaches thus were needed. The US will continue to help, he said, but cannot continue as we have sometimes done in the past, to try to do it all ourselves.

6. President Marcos said he had been greatly heartened at what President Nixon had said to him. He had been deply concerned about the prospect of an American withdrawal. He now understood US dilemma and had received new perspective on US difficulties. Other Asian countries as well would be happy to know US had no intention of precipitate withdrawal.

7. Under these circumstances, President Marcos continued, he felt the Philippines could plan to face the dangers of internal subversion rather than external aggression. On former Philippines needed to develop capabilities farther. He noted that Red China is still trying to export subversive war, and that he needed US material help but not US forces. He and President Nixon had agreed, he said, that economic stability was an essential element in resisting internal subversion.

8. The meeting adjourned at 5:30 pm.

Wilson

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/NIXON/MOONGLOW. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Moonglow.

[2] Telegram 8218 from Manila, August 4, summarized the details of the Presidential Advisers meeting in Manila on July 26. The U.S. side included Kissinger, Rogers, and Green. The conversation centered on various aspects of U.S. financial assistance to and dealings with the Philippines. (Ibid., POL 7 US/NIXON)

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 29, 1969, 1054Z.

10217. Subject: Election Interference.

1. We have had in the last three days a most worrisome development in US-Philippine relations, but as of now I believe things are getting back on the track. It had to do with charges that illegal electioneering material and bogus money were entering the Philippines through the Mactan air base and that senior US officers, both civilian and military, were involved in this activity. These accusations were accompanied by an informal request that the accused officers be removed from the Philippines. This message reports an interview with acting Foreign Secretary Ingles on September 26 and President Marcos on September 28.

2. Acting Secretary Ingles asked me[2] to call at 5:30 on September 26. Executive Secretary Maceda was in his office when I arrived and was present during the meeting.

3. Ingles said he wanted to relay to me a message from President Marcos. It was a very serious charge that some of our people were interfering in Philippine internal affairs by taking sides in the election. He said that the President had intelligence reports which indicated that propaganda material and counterfeit money was coming in on our aircraft landing at Mactan and being turned over to the opposition. Ingles said that they wanted to inspect our incoming cargo to prevent this from happening in the future.

4. I told him that I did not know the terms of our base agreement affecting Mactan but would look into the matter urgently and be in touch with him as soon as possible.

5. Ingles then said that the evidence pointed to the involvement of two officers in the Mactan area and two senior officers in the Embassy, and that Marcos had asked that these officers be removed from the Philippines. Maceda at this point broke in to say that the President was so concerned that he had considered sending Kokoy Romualdez to Washington to convey the evidence.

6. I told Maceda that I was making a formal request through him to see President Marcos at the first opportunity. I said that I would like to see the evidence, that I would investigate the matter thoroughly, but that I was convinced that no senior officer of the Embassy could be engaged in any such action. Ingles, in a somewhat sheepish manner, said that it was of course not necessary to produce evidence. I agreed, but said that it would be most unusual in the relations between two friendly countries, particularly the Philippines and the US, to send home senior officers under such a cloud. This request, I continued, would come as a great shock to Washington and I felt that it would be best for our overall relations not to report the conversation until I had talked personally to the President. I said that if I did report it I would obviously get instructions to see the President anyway at the earliest opportunity. At this point Maceda said something which made it apparent that there was uncertainty about the identity of one of the officers. I said that this uncertainty made it all the more necessary for me to talk personally to the President and clear up the matter. Maceda said that he would radio to the President and arrange for an appointment.

7. I saw Marcos at 8:30 last night shortly after he had returned from a campaign trip. After delivering the Nixon family pictures (a good time for them to arrive!), I said that Maceda and Ingles had previously given me a most serious matter which I felt necessitated a request to see him even in the midst of his demanding schedule. Marcos said that he was truly concerned about some reports he had seen of activities at Mactan. He doubted that the traffic concerned was of real significance but hoped that it could be stopped before it became significant. He said he could hardly believe our officials at Mactan were involved, but the evidence he had was disturbing.

8. I told Marcos it was most important that he not misunderstand what I was about to say. I wanted him to know first of all that I recognized beyond any doubt that the final decision as to what foreigners remained in his country was up to him. I also wanted him to know that at this point I was in no position to deny anything that might have happened at Mactan because I was in no position to know. My chief request to him was to furnish us with such evidence as he could so that we could make a most thorough investigation. I told him that I would lead this investigation personally and would like to go to Mactan on Tuesday, probably accompanied by General Gideon's inspector general, if I could get the facts in time to make that schedule. I went on to tell him that my instructions from the Secretary of State and the President were explicit that no American should involve himself in any way in the election process in the Philippines. I had personally passed this out after my arrival, not only to my senior staff, but also at the various bases that I had been able to visit so far. I had followed this up with a written instruction to every American to not only remain out of the election process completely, but to avoid any act that could through misunderstanding cause the slightest suspicion of being involved. I said that in the face of all this I found it very difficult to believe that American personnel were involved, because their careers would be at stake, and we operated a very tight system where matters such as this were involved. I said this was one reason I had not so far reported the matter to Washington as I was afraid of severe reaction there, caused by an unwillingness to believe that our senior people could be involved, particularly so as we had been given no evidence.

9. Marcos interrupted to ask if I had not been given details of their charges, and seemed surprised when I replied in the negative. He said he would provide them to me and attempted unsuccessfully to get the papers from his staff as it was late Sunday evening. I told him I did not want to take his personal time on such a matter in any event and he agreed to supply the information to me through Rafferty today. He said that I would find that some of the information including items, tail numbers, etc. would be specific.

10. The President said he was most concerned about counterfeit money, campaign propaganda, and weapons coming in from outside the Philippines. He had specific information, that he felt had nothing to do with us, that the first shipment of 10 million pesos supplied by a Stephen Sy, a Chinese in Hong Kong, was to arrive in the Philippines between the 25th and 30th September, after a couple of trial runs of other less important amounts and items. In this connection it occurred to him that perhaps that past shipments in question into Mactan might have been these trial shipments.

11. I told him that by Tuesday night Mactan, at least from the American side, would be one tight airport. I said I would talk to General Gideon as soon as he returns, and to his deputy in his absence about tightening up at Clark in every conceivable way.

12. Marcos never mentioned the two senior officers here in Manila, nor did he say anything about desiring that I have any people removed. I believe, therefore, particularly with the steps that I told him I would take, that a PNG request is not in the works.

13. Marcos sounds as if he has hard evidence, but considering the heightening Malacanang tensions as election day approaches, we may find nothing but a sinister interpretation of an innocent incident. However, since the charge comes directly from the head of state, I feel we must make an honest effort to investigate.

14. An extreme position of subordinates followed by a calmer, moderate attitude of the boss is, I understand, Filipino tactic to test the water, and Marcos may have also been floating a “to-whom-it-may-concern” warning while soliciting a reassurance[3] that we are not against him.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral McCain, and to 13th Air Force exclusive for General Dempster.

[2] The new U.S. Ambassador, Henry A. Byroade, presented his credentials to the Philippine Government on August 29.

[3] Telegram 10314 from Manila, October 1, reported alleged Philippine sightings of several small “bundles” of papers being taken off USAF C–141s at Mactan and delivered to the USIS office in Cebu City. The Philippine Government reported its suspicion that these bundles were election materials supporting Osmena, Marcos' opponent in the upcoming presidential election, but provided no proof. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I) Telegram 10354 from Manila, October 3, reported that its investigation did not develop any information to confirm these suspicions. (Ibid.) Telegram 10484 from Manila, October 6, reported Byroade's letter to Marcos, detailing the results of the investigation. (Ibid.) The matter thereafter was dropped by both sides.

194. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group (McClintock) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, October 3, 1969.

SUBJECT

Principal Themes Developed by Symington Subcommittee

On the basis of the first week of the Symington hearings on the Philippines (which apparently will terminate today with the closed interrogation of the NSA witness), the main thrust of the Committee's inquiry[2] seems fairly evident.

A major theme will be to try to make a case that past Administrations, and by inference the present Administration, have undertaken commitments to foreign governments far in excess of the basic defense agreements which were ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. A case in point is the communiqué issued by the White House on October 6, 1964, following talks between President Johnson and the then Philippine President Macapagal, which stated:

“They reviewed, in this connection, the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in maintaining the security of both countries, and reaffirmed their commitment to meet any threat that might arise against their security. President Johnson made it clear that, in accordance with these existing alliances and the deployment and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against the United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled.”

A similar case occurred with Korea. In reply to a press conference question in Korea on February 23, 1966, Vice President Humphrey made the following statement:

“The United States Government and the people of the United States have a firm commitment to the defense of Korea. As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line, the whole and the entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defense of Korea.”

It seems to me that when eventually the Secretary or you are asked to testify before the Subcommittee on overall policy with regard to overseas commitments, the line to be taken is that we frankly recognize that the statements made by the last Administration were in fact in excess of our explicit treaty obligations. What the present Administration seeks to do is to go back to the letter of those agreements ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate. This has already been suggested by the Secretary's speech in Canberra on August 8, and by you in your speech in New York on September 5.

Senator Symington is obsessed with the fear of imminent bankruptcy of the US. He is convinced that a major measure for cutting down government spending lies in the broad field of our overseas commitments, which would include the MAP program and bases. At this point, Senator Symington removes his fiscal hat and puts on his General's cap. Another of his obsessions is the idea that overseas bases are no longer necessary because ICBM missiles and Polaris submarine rockets make the stationing of US conventional forces abroad no longer necessary. Senator Symington apparently has not thought through the implications of resorting to strategic nuclear war as the only alternative to the limited deployment of conventional forces in given circumstances. Without saying so, he comes close to the Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation.

All the Senators, but particularly Senator Fulbright, bore down heavily in the Philippine hearings on the theme: “Why do we pay so much and get so little?” They were indignant that the Philippine government refused to send even a civic action group to Viet Nam until the US had engaged itself to supply the equipment for three engineer battalions and to pay per diem for the officers and men who actually went to the Philippines. Senator Fulbright dealt at great length yesterday on what he regards as the exorbitant mercenary pay we agreed to give the Koreans for the two divisions now fighting Viet Nam. He referred a number of times to the “Brown letter,” which purportedly engages this government to pay for the Korean expeditionary force, and said its contents had been published in a Japanese newspaper.

The main theme of protest that our client states receive so much from the US and contribute practically nothing in return was made repeatedly in the case of the Philippines where “millions of dollars” had been poured into the country but even in a situation involving the SEATO Alliance, the government at Manila would not send even a token detachment unless backsheesh was paid in advance.

A kindred theme is corruption. To read the testimony of the Philippine hearings, one would think that a principal function of Clark Air Force Base is to subsidize illegally or otherwise the iniquitous City of Angeles, which is adjacent to the Base and whose inhabitants are anything but angels. Evidences of corruption of high officials going right up to the top of the Philippine government were freely disclosed by the Air Force OSI colonel who heads up a sort of export FBI operation at Clark Field. Senator Fulbright made the point that the presence of Clark Air Force Base was in fact an active incentive to theft and corruption. About the only amusing aspect of this part of the testimony was that DOD, which was late in getting in its written statement 24 hours in advance of the hearings, excused its tardiness on the plea that to provide the statement earlier might have endangered the Air Force colonel's life. Senator Symington, tongue in cheeck, said he would write the Secretary of Defense, praising the colonel's forthright testimony, but suggesting that in view of the danger to his life, he not return to the Philippines. We might keep this ploy in mind for certain other witnesses.…

I suggested to our military witnesses yesterday that, if they could find an opportunity, they should make a closely reasoned military rationale as to why certain of our bases in the Philippines are still to be regarded as assets and not as liabilities, as the testimony in the hearings might make them seem. However, neither General Gideon nor Admiral Kauffman had such an opportunity. I have, therefore, recommended to DOD that for future hearings in the prepared written testimony Defense include such rationale as to specific bases and military programs which may become subject to the Committee's scrutiny.

Senator Fulbright indicated a clear intention to build up a case against the Department by piece-meal interrogation of subordinate witnesses before he took on the Secretary of State. For example, he tried repeatedly yesterday to pin down Mr. Wilson, our witness on the Philippines, as to what reappraisals of East Asian policy the Department would undertake and what in fact our new policy toward communist China might be. I think we can expect in future hearings that Senator Fulbright will continue to press the same tactic. The answer by the witness in all cases should be that questions of broad policy must be deferred until the Subcommittee meets with the Secretary of State. This might, however, not be easy for Ambassador Sullivan in the hearings on Laos, as he is a Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Senator Symington's philosophy toward the Subcommittee's hearings was summed up succinctly in his own words yesterday afternoon—“You give the Committee all the facts; we'll draw the conclusions.”

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 398, Subject Files, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Robert McClintock (PM), who was designated by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to represent the Department of State at meetings of a White House Working Group. President Nixon appointed this group to coordinate the testimony of all agencies of the Executive Branch before the Symington subcommittee. Copies were sent to Kissinger, BeLieu, French, U. Alexis Johnson, Torbert, Spiers, Green, Sullivan, and Moore.

[2] On September 22 the White House Working Group set up an Interdepartmental Coordinating Group, chaired by McClintock, to supervise testimony before the Subcommittee. In a November memorandum to Secretary of State Rogers, John D. Erlichman stated that McClintock “was given clear instructions at this meeting, as to the categories of materials that should not be given to the Subcommittee.” Erlichman added that it was explained to McClintock that “the President had directed that guidelines for these hearings be set by the White House rather than by each department.” McClintock was also advised that no witness was to give any indication “that the White House was supervising or issuing instructions.” (Ibid.) In a September 24 memorandum to Kenneth BeLieu at the White House (who was also a member of the Working Group), McClintock delineated eight types of material or information “which under no circumstances should be divulged to the Subcommittee,” including information on nuclear storage, military contingency plans, and privileged communications between Chiefs of State or government. McClintock continued that the “Working Group defined materials or information which can be provided the Committee in sanitized version in the following four categories: 1) Corruption and crimes against US personnel and property in the Philippines; 2) Programs directed toward counter-insurgency matters; 3) Air defense arrangements between US and P.I.; 4) Negotiations for PHILCAGV.” Finally, McClintock noted that “a large amount of data” had already been provided to the Subcommittee, including international commitments, U.S. military facilities, forces, and missions in the Philippines, the Military Assistance Program and DOD and AID programs for counterinsurgency for the Philippines, joint military planning, and the Philippine contribution to the war effort in Vietnam, particularly PHILCAGV. (Ibid.)

195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson)[1]

Washington, October 20, 1969.

SUBJECT

Revisions in US Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines

The President has expressed the belief that the United States should be prepared to bring the terms of the US Military Bases Agreement in the Philippines into line with the terms under which we occupy bases in other countries,[2] in order to eliminate any aspects which may give the Philippines legitimate cause to feel that the US enjoys legal or other advantages which it does not possess elsewhere. It is the President's understanding that opinion in the Philippines, both official and non-official, is highly sensitive to what are considered to be in-equities, and that US-Philippine relations are rendered more difficult as a result.

The President accordingly has directed that the Under Secretaries' Committee undertake a review of our treaty and other relationships with the Philippines, and that a negotiating position be drawn up, setting forth the changes needed in our Military Bases Agreement to bring the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United States concerning base rights in the Philippines down to a level comparable with the rights which we possess in other independent countries where there are US bases. Particular attention should be paid to the questions of length of tenure of bases and procedures for establishing criminal jurisdiction. It is recognized that there are variations in our rights in various countries, but the objective should be to put the Philippines on a most-favored-nation basis.

The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries' Committee examine the total physical area included within the US bases, and the number of such bases, compared with the facilities available in other countries, note being taken of the different missions of the US bases in different countries. Consideration should be given to the release of land in the Philippines which may be surplus to military needs.

It is intended that when the foregoing studies have been completed, the Department of State will prepare to invite the Government of the Philippines to renegotiate the Military Bases Agreement so as to bring it into line with other US overseas base agreements. This approach to the Philippines should be made within a reasonable time after the forthcoming Philippine elections, but not before them. It is envisaged that the question of the release of land may be dealt with at a later stage of the negotiations in order to permit sufficient time for this particular study to be analyzed in detail. The target date for completion of the land study should be January 1, 1970.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US. Secret.

[2] According to an October 29 memorandum from Cargo to Green and Spiers, this memorandum superseded NSSM 73, Revision of US Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines, “which has been cancelled.” (Ibid.) A copy of NSSM 73 is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103.

196. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, October 30, 1969, 0920Z.

11375. For the President and the Secretary of State.

1. With the receipt of the second and third volumes of the Symington subcommittee hearings on the Philippines I now for the first time have had a chance to judge personally the full impact here of the pending publication of the present “sanitized” version of those hearings.[2] In my opinion the result of such publication, even two weeks from now after Philippine elections, will be an unmitigated disaster in terms of basic US interests in this country and the future of US/Philippine relations.

2. Beyond this I am deeply disturbed by the broader issue of principle involved in the implications of these proceedings as they seem to question, and publicly so, the control of the conduct of our foreign relations. Staff members of the committee prior to the hearings visited the Philippines and other countries of Southeast Asia and on the instructions of the Departments of State and Defense were provided with the most sensitive and highly classified information on virtually every aspect of our political-military relationships. Senior military and civilian officers summoned home from the field were the principal witnesses before the Subcommittee. These witnesses testified in good faith and spoke frankly in executive session on a series of highly delicate matters. They were continually pressed for personal opinions and judgments on policy decisions reached on the highest level of the United States Government and on conditions in the Republic of the Philippines and actions of its senior officials. They provided without reservation details of classified agreements with the Government of the Philippines.

3. The subcommittee is now apparently about to publish this testimony and, as I understand it, is setting itself as the final judge on what will be released. With an unfriendly committee controlling the proceedings it is inevitable that a distorted and unbalanced picture will emerge.

4. This applies not just to the Philippines but also to the other countries covered by the Committee's inquiries. It becomes particularly important at this time when you are engaged in the difficult task of shaping future US policy toward Southeast Asia.

5. I am also concerned about what this will be taken to imply with respect to the sanctity of confidential agreements between governments and our ability to enter into them in the future. Also, other Asian nations will be looking at this to see how we treat our former ward. They will reason that if we treat Filipinos this way they can expect worse when their turn comes.

6. There are other matters of considerable importance involved here. The most senior military and civilian staff members in several missions abroad are going to be faced with critical quotations attributable to them specifically by name in the press of their host countries. It is not at all inconceivable that public png cases may result. In other cases the effectiveness of these officers may be so impaired that termination of assignments would seem in order. To a lesser extent it is possible that the effectiveness of your Ambassadors in these various countries may be impaired in a guilt by association sort of way in that senior staffs would be expected to reflect the views of their bosses.

7. As you know, the Filipino is hyper-sensitive to foreign criticism, particularly when it comes from the former colonial power. This goes not just for the super nationalists but for our friends as well. We are already under heavy fire for the acquittal of a US sailor for shooting a Filipino at one of our bases. The violent reaction here to the relatively calm criticism of Eugene Black provides ample evidence of the explosion which will occur if the committee's hearings are published in their present form.

8. We are faced with a trying and difficult series of negotiations regarding our bases, our mutual defense arrangements, and our trade agreements, which we had hoped would normalize, and actually improve, our relationship for some time to come. Publication of the Symington hearings as they now stand will be taken as a clumsy attempt to signal future US policy and tactics in these discussions. It will play into the hands of those who are working against us and cost us most of our friends. It could eventually cost us the bases themselves.

9. At this critical stage in our economic relations there is also likely to be a destructive fallout in terms of our business interests. I am certain that the New York business community, with nearly a billion dollar of private investment here, would be extremely active in Washington just now if they realized what this may do to our coming efforts to negotiate away uncertainties here that are already plaguing them. Unfortunately they will not fully realize this until after publication when it is already too late.

10. Some of what is contained in these hearings needs to be said to the Philippine Government. But how we say it and when is the business of the Executive Branch. This is not the way to do it. It will make it that much harder, if not impossible, to say it properly later on.

11. I realize it may be most difficult to try to walk the cat back at this stage. At the same time I do not think the Committee's hired staff has played fair with the information thus far given it in confidence. Indeed I am informed that the local representative of the Reader's Digest claims to have already received a copy of the proceedings.

12. In short I am asking that this whole matter be reviewed once more[3] in view of its very serious implications. One would hope that the Senate leadership itself could be convinced to take action on their own to suppress publication completely if they could fully understand its almost certain damaging consequences of serious proportions. If this is impossible a lesser alternative, undoubtedly still damaging, but far less so, would be for the subcommittee to release its findings on the hearings in its own report and in its own words, with the volumes of actual testimony remaining classified and non-releaseable to the press.

13. I realize this is a difficult one for you to judge as neither of you can possibly read these voluminous reports and be able to weigh for yourselves the possible effects of publication of such sideswiping material. If nothing else can be done, please consider finding some manner of disassociating the Executive Branch, to the extent it can now be done, from the whole affair.[4]

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

[2] According to an undated memorandum from Erlichman to Rogers detailing White House complaints about McClintock's performance as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group and his ultimate removal on November 14, the White House did not learn the basis of the deal that had been struck between McClintock and Symington until October 23, after having been kept in the dark by the Ambassador for “a long period.” According to the memorandum, “In return for deleting certain non-policy passages of some witnesses, and for deferring publication of the transcript until after the Philippine elections, Ambassador McClintock had agreed to make no substantial cuts in the transcript, in clear violation of White House guidelines.” (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 398, Symington Subcommittee, Vol. I)

[3] Telegram 11375 elicited concern in Washington and Moore (EA) drafted a telegram stating that the Embassy had been kept advised of developments with the Symington subcommittee and that, with the exception of minor adjustments, it was too late to make substantial changes in the report. (Ibid.) Haig, in an October 31 memorandum to Erlichman, noted “that efforts to reverse agreed-upon policy with the Subcommittee would poison our whole relationship with the Subcommittee and would not preclude the testimony getting into public print in a distorted and possibly far more harmful manner.” Haig also asked for Erlichman's “written judgment as to the suitability of the course of action laid out in the proposed State reply.” (Ibid.)

[4] According to the agenda for the November 11 meeting of the White House Working Group, the transcripts were returned to the Subcommittee for publication, with the “more embarrassing sections dealing with corruption” deleted in return for Department of State agreement “to supply the exact figures for U.S. support for PHILCAG—in direct contravention of explicit White House instructions.” (Ibid.) A summary of Marcos' corruption [text not declassified] which states that “Marcos and his wife have gone to considerable lengths to enrich their personal base. [text not declassified] estimate that they have accumulated approximately $100 million during his term in the presidential palace.” (Ibid., Box 555, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. I.)

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, November 11, 1969, 2326Z.

190471. Subj: Release of Symington Subcommittee Testimony. Ref: State 189980.[2] For Ambassador from Asst Secy Green.

1. Long struggle over transcript of Symington Subcommittee hearings on Philippines—in which State and Defense representatives were in almost daily contact with Sub-committee staff—culminated last night (November 10) in hour and half meeting I had with Senator Symington. The Senator accepted the exclusion of considerable additional material from his proposed public edition of the transcript. At the conclusion of our meeting I told him that, with these further exclusions I could say that we had no further objection on national security grounds to the publication of this material. FYI —in making this latter statement we have not indicated that we welcome or approve publication of the remaining material, nor have we even indicated that we do not still regret its publication. If reaction to the publication should require it, we will be in a position to say in fact that we did not approve and that we regret. End FYI .

2. The additional material to be excluded from publication was: (a) All references to B–52 flights from Okinawa—of great importance to our relations with Japan. (b) The entire [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] testimony except for one paragraph in which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] explains that certain information he has provided consists largely of unsupported and unsubstantiated allegations and one paragraph in which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] gives his description of “an atmosphere of general lawlessness… throughout the area surrounding Clark Air Base.” A total of some 20 pages of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] material will be removed from the published transcript and replaced simply by the notation “20 pages (deleted).” (c) Virtually all of the passages in the testimony of the witnesses which could be embarrasing to them or imperil their effectiveness in performing their official functions in the Philippines. (d) Some remaining passages which were too prematurely revealing of our tentative internal planning for anticipated future developments or contingencies.

3. During my meeting with Senator Symington I also pointed out certain statements by the Sub-committee members which would have an adverse impact because they would be deeply resented by Filipinos. I asked that serious consideration be given to deleting these passages. I understand that some of these will be edited at least, but we don't know what the Sub-committee will finally do about the others.

4. Dick Usher will be communicating to you the revised portions and passages of the transcript which now will additionally be excluded. As we have already cabled you, the Senator will delay his release of the transcript for another week, and presumably also his press conference, since his concept of his press conference has been that he would hold it only after the press had had a few days to read the embargoed transcript.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Usher and approved by Green and Curtis H. Taylor (S/S).

[2] Dated November 11. (Ibid.)

198. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 14, 1969.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Byroade's Conversation with President Marcos on PHILCAG

Withdrawal

In the middle of the Sullivan meeting, November 14, Marshall Green asked me to leave the group in order to read a telegram which had just come in via back channels from Ambassador Byroade in Manila.[2] This telegram (Tab A) concerned Byroade's approach to Marcos to inform him of an impending move on State's part to preempt the Symington Subcommittee by announcing in advance of Symington that we had paid allowances to the PHILCAG during its stay in Vietnam. (Byroade's instructions had also been sent by back channel.)[3]

Byroade reported that Marcos was already planning to issue a statement on November 15 which would cover the points State wished to be made; namely, that these allowances had been paid by the US in order to prevent diversion of Philippine resources from badly needed internal development programs. However, it emerged from the conversation that Marcos had not felt under any obligation to use the funds we gave him for the PHILCAG directly, but had actually used it for purposes such as “security matters.” Marcos mentioned in this connection the expenses involved in Philippine peacemaking efforts, travels of emissaries (he mentioned Paris and Hanoi), and efforts in South Vietnam to make contact with the Viet Cong, etc. Marcos left Byroade with the impression that Marcos would try to portray himself as an Asian leader who, like President Nixon, had always been striving for peace in Vietnam and who also had engaged in activities such as those revealed by the President in his November 3 speech.[4]

Byroade was not sure just what of all this would emerge in the light of day in Marcos' November 15 statement. It seems highly possible, though, that some of Marcos' machinations may indeed be revealed. If so, this would be embarrassing to the President, since Marcos might try to make it appear that his efforts to contact the North Vietnamese were done with the President's consent, and also would be embarrassing to State if it appeared that the money which we gave to Marcos in support of the PHILCAG was used for other purposes. On this latter issue, Marshall Green called in Philippine Ambassador Lagdameo and in my presence explained the problems which use of our funds for purposes not connected with Philippine economic development or allied projects would cause for us with respect to the Symington Subcommittee. What nobody appeared to notice, or at least wanted to mention, was the possibility that Marcos used the funds given him for his own personal political activities. As you know, one reason he gave for recalling the PHILCAG was that the Philippine Congress did not vote any funds for its support. This could turn out to be a real mess for everybody.

Ambassador Lagdameo left the session with Marshall Green [5] assuring us that he would try to touch base with Marcos in advance of the release of the November 15 statement to make sure that everything was properly squared away. We now can only wait and hope.[6]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the first page: “What finally happened?” with an arrow back to Holdridge's initials.

[2]  Backchannel message 851 from Manila, November 14, attached but not printed.

[3] Not found.

[4] For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909.

[5] Details of the meeting between Green and Ambassador Lagdameo were transmitted in telegram 192677 to Manila, November 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 6 PHIL)

[6] Following up on Kissinger's question as noted in footnote 1 above, Holdridge informed Kissinger in a November 25 memorandum, that “Marcos has now denied that our funds had been granted as a quid pro quo for PHILCAG. He said that he had received some special funds from us, beginning in early 1965, which had been used for national security and intelligence operations too classified to discuss. He did not suggest that they were used to defray his expenses as a go-between.” Holdridge also reported that there had not been a lot of Philippine congressional and press interest in the story. A stamped notation on this memorandum reads “HAK has seen, Dec 20, 1969.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

199. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, November 15, 1969, 0418Z.

11818. 1. I had opportunity yesterday with Marcos alone to discuss in general terms our approaches to forthcoming negotiations. My remarks followed very closely the previous discussion with Romulo reported in detail Manila 11149[2] and in interest of brevity I will not repeat herein my opening remarks. They were perhaps more sharply focused this time on the dangers involved in negotiating through the press with large and high-ranking negotiating panels.

2. Marcos in general, like Romulo, said most of the things that I wanted him to say but seemed to have more apparent conviction than had Romulo. He said he had already taken some steps in this direction by telling the main members of the panel that he personally was going to make the decisions and that he did not want each of them playing the press in his own behalf. He went so far at one point as to speculate that perhaps we should not start out negotiations with publicly known meetings at all, but have the members of the technical panels meet quietly to see how far they could get before higher levels become involved.

3. I found general approach of Marcos quite encouraging. He said they were not really prepared as yet to handle matters of such importance and he wanted to put a damper on any idea of “immediate” talks. He said he felt that February was really too soon and at one time mentioned mid-summer. He also said that he thought we should allow time for passions to cool down and hoped for a better atmosphere under which to conduct the talks. He said he had told the policy council that he wanted no more statements about Americans being evicted either from the bases or from their economic interests in the Philippines. He also said he did not want to push us on matters on which we on our side might not be ready. He made reference in this regard to trade policy and evidenced some concern over President's recent speech re Latin America.

4. Marcos said he was making Defense Secretary Mata head of the technical panel on military matters, assisted by Alex Melchor. It was interesting that he remarked that if Mata did not remain in the cabinet he would be replaced on the panel by General Yan. I told him I thought this was very good, as, while we might not necessarily agree, it would be very easy for us to quickly understand each other with such personalities.

5. Marcos at one point mentioned Washington in connection with Laurel–Langley discussions. He also at one time referred to the desirability to wait a while before getting into such touchy subjects as “vested rights” on the part of American business here. His remarks on this subject could have implied that he preferred a negotiated settlement on this issue as he once referred to what proportion of present American holdings (presumably land) would be a fair and equitable settlement. I am not sure just what he meant on this and there was not time to explore further.

6. I mentioned the problem of negotiating on some of these matters with the prospects of constitutional changes hanging over our heads due to the coming convention in 1971. Marcos said this was indeed a matter that concerned him. He said he sometimes thought it might be better to delay completion of some of our negotiations until we could see what the composition of the convention delegates would be. He said that once he could look at the slate of delegates he felt he could almost know in advance what they would come up with. I jokingly remarked that he would have me at a disadvantage there as he could make such a judgment while I could not.

7. While all of Marcos' remarks indicated that he wanted delayed, quiet, and sober approaches to be made on all items of negotiation between us for the sake of eventually arriving at a sound and durable basis for our future relationships, I have a feeling that something unsaid was also on his mind. The Philippines are in a desperate financial situation and he, of course, is fully aware and conscious of their predicament. I think, repeat think, he will hope that we can go into a quiet period without new issues between us for a while in the hopes of our financial assistance. On my part I hope he may try to tamper down reaction here to the forthcoming release of the Symington testimony with this in mind.

8. It probably will appear that his super-active moves of this week (PHILCAG, today's coming statement on Symington, etc.) give a contrary impression to my above analysis. Please bear in mind, however, that Marcos' motives as of today is to do almost anything he can think of in order to dominate press coverage and get Osmena and LP charges and accusations re the elections off page one of the press. Please bear this in mind over the next few days as you judge his moves and statements.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVBASE Subic, and to the Commander of 13th Air Force.

[2] Dated October 24. (Ibid.)

200. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)

Manila, November 16, 1969, 1231Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Top Secret; Immediate; Literally Eyes Only. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

201. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, December 1, 1969, 0440Z.

12150. Subj: PHILCAG Overseas Allowances. Ref: State 198599[2] and 199807.[3]

1. Regret delay in replying to State 198599. It arrived during my absence at Baguio, and senior staff here so unanimous in feeling suggested second démarche to Marcos on subject would be so counterproductive that they decided to await my return. I share view and hope you can satisfy your requirements at home on this subject through Lagdameo and Melchor. If you feel strongly otherwise, I will of course see Marcos.

2. A peripheral reason for my reluctance is that almost without exception I have tried to handle some aspect of Symington Report in each visit I have had with him. It is by now a sore and dreary subject.

3. A far more important reason is that I think he would feel that I was returning to suggest a formula to him which I had previously given him. When I saw him on November 14 I suggested that he might want to handle the subject matter involved in a statement before actual release of the testimony based on the various reported leaks out of the Committee. I suggested that he might note that expenses of the operation were overburdening as far as the Philippine Government was concerned, and that he had felt it necessary to mitigate these extraordinary costs in same manner as some other troop contributing countries by accepting US offer to pick up expenses for equipment and supplies for PHILCAG in Vietnam and to offset costs of necessary special overseas allowances by other arrangements. I suggested that he could also say that he and we had felt it in our mutual interests to accelerate normal deliveries of US military assistance for badly needed domestic Philippine programs. I told him that the testimony would show that these latter were unconnected so far as he was concerned with PHILCAG itself but were needed on their own merits for mutually agreed objectives in promoting meritorious Philippine domestic programs. After suggesting the above, I left it in written form with him for his consideration. Your new formula is somewhat better now that the text is public but it does not seem sufficiently so to make any great difference.

4. I am equally concerned about dangers in the formula you suggest if we press it upon him too hard. I feel sure that Marcos at this point would not be willing to make such a statement and let it go at that because it will raise anew the unsettled question as to “where the money went.” I feel he would almost certainly add a long and detailed (and exaggerated) account of expenditures involved in heretofore secret attempts to serve as peace maker on Vietnam. This would be unfortunate in my opinion and would leave things no better off than they were.

5. We here find it difficult to understand why you place so much importance on this particular point. The public record is quite specific on the question of funds and the word of US Executive Branch officials will be generally accepted here, even though GAO has the problem now in Washington. To that extent it seems to us that Marcos has a problem far greater than we do. But Filipinos are not noted for and do not expect perfect consistency. Marcos plainly prefers to see things remain as fuzzy as they are at present and to ride it out. To that extent, if we are searching for precision, we are definitely at cross purposes.

6. Even if he made suggested statement, we feel it would do very little to help us here. The bitterness over PHILCAG is not the exact amount of money nor how it was used. It was rather the biting and sarcastic approach to the Philippines and PHILCAG itself by the two Senators involved and particularly Fulbright's implication that “the PHILCAG was nothing but hired mercenaries.” He might be reminded that his approach was a classic example indeed of “The Arrogance of Power.”[4]

7. We will be sending you in a few days our attempted assessment of the damage done here by this whole exercise. We may be somewhat over the hump on the first issue which was PHILCAG. It drew the first attacks because it was the first item reaching here through press reporting in the States. The fact that that reporting was distorted and superficial only served to make it worse. We are now starting up the second hump as the local press has finally had actual texts long enough to start dealing with the remainder of the report.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.

[2] In telegram 198599 to Manila, November 26, the Department expressed bewilderment at Philippine Presidential Press Secretary Tatad's November 20 press statement that “Philippines has received no ‘payments of any kind in support of the PHILCAG or its personnel.’” It advised Byroade to “let Marcos know that we foresee trouble with this” and that “it is most important that Marcos not reiterate these statements in face of contrary testimony from Hearings. If pressed, he must continue to support official testimony as it appears in the transcript.” The Department then proposed a scenario in which U.S. payments would be described as offset-type funds: “The funds which the United States did provide to cover the costs of overseas allowances for PHILCAG went directly to the Philippine Government. These offset funds made it possible for the Philippine Government to provide for this contingent without curbing important domestic programs.” (Ibid.)

[3] Telegram 199807 to Manila, November 29, reported Usher and Moore's November 26 conversation with Philippine official Alex Melchor about the PHILCAG overseas allowances payments, with the latter stating that he did not think that U.S. accounting of the amount of the funds provided was correct. (Ibid.)

[4] Reference is to J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Random House, 1967).

202. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Manila, December 17, 1969.

4161. For Assistant Secretary Green From Ambassador.

1. The DAO message[2] you refer to may be a little loosely drawn in terms of its comments. While there is considerable uneasiness in Manila as a result of election reverberations and the rise in prices, we foresee no immediate increase in the likelihood of revolution, an awfully strong word. Most of the talk about revolution and even assassination has been coming from the defeated opposition, of which Adevoso is a leading activist, and must be weighed in that light.

2. Where information coming to us on assassination plans has been relatively hard or well-sourced, we have made sure that it reached Marcos. We know that Marcos has been aware for some time of Adevoso's involvement in such plotting. The word has been passed to him [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. We also know from a sensitive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]source that Marcos sent an emissary to Adevoso whom seemingly extracted a promise that Adevoso would at least lay off Marcos personally [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], (TDCS–DB 31505154/69).[3]

3. I fully agree that we should protect the U.S. in all ways possible from accusations of collusion with any and all plotters, and I am sure, but will reiterate it to them, that all country team members and the military are aware of this danger. I will also see to it that Adevoso's normal American contacts are especially alert. At the same time, I feel it would be wrong to cut ourselves off completely from the waning opposition in this country, [garble] the initiative for contact comes from them. Sometimes, as I think I did with Osmena, we can even dampen their emotions a bit.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. The telegram shows no time of transmission.

[2] Telegram SNF–497 from the USDAO Manila to the DIA, December 15, reported the Defense Attaché's conversation with Liberal Party stalwart Eleuterio Adevoso. Adevoso stated that the Liberals had not expected Marcos to employ armed force in the election “so effectively or so broadly,” and that the Philippines “was ready for revolution.” Adevoso stated that he was going to the United States and “wanted to talk to the right people.” (Ibid.)

[3] Not found.

[4] In a December 16 backchannel message Green requested Byroade's comment on the DAO message, and advised that the Embassy must do everything it could “to avoid giving plotters any ‘evidence’ of American involvement in their activities.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

203. Backchannel Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade)[1]

Washington, December 31, 1969.

35889. For Ambassador from Green.

1. Department has recently received from the White House for appropriate action a hand-written notation by the President indicating his interest in cutting U.S. personnel on Clark AFB by 50% and overall in the Philippines by 25%. The notation was made on a copy of a study[2] which had been submitted to the President showing the distribution of contract employees of the U.S. military bases. It is likely the percentages refer to overall personnel; they might refer only to military personnel. In any event they suggest the order of magnitude of his present thinking.

2. This raises a point covered in your talk with the President in San Clemente. In reviewing your letter to me of August 21, 1969,[3] I note that the President spoke to you among other things of the necessity to cut down the American presence in the Philippines, and that he asked if you could give him a report by January containing your broad recommendations on policy and personnel. I have informed the White House that we would prefer to handle the matter within the overall context of the President's request to you, of course taking into consideration this indication his current views. It would be particularly useful if you could let us have in regular channels Nodis on a priority basis at least your preliminary views about the desirability of reducing our presence and how this might best be done.[4] Of course, you should take into account the feasibility of bringing about these reductions on a phased basis.

3. We have made some rough calculations here as to the numbers of people involved. Figures available here show a total U.S. American military presence in the Philippines of 50,863 made up of 27,423 military personnel, 1,443 civilians and 21,997 dependents. Of this Clark alone accounts for a total of 32,916 comprising 16,968 military personnel, 737 civilian employees, and 15,211 dependents. From these figures it emerges a 50% cut at Clark would in itself constitute a cut of more than 25% of the total American military presence in the Philippines. We do not have figures available which would show changes either up or down in American military presence since December 31, 1967 which was the eve of the BALPA in Embassy personnel. However, our figures on the Embassy and its component missions show a cut in American personnel from 700 as of December 31, 1967 to an authorized strength of 494 as of December 31, 1969 representing a 29.4% cut.

4. Your early response to this cable will be invaluable to us in the context of memoranda which we would be preparing here for the White House on this matter.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Usher on December 31 and cleared in draft by Moore. The telegram bears no time of transmission. According to a note Byroade wrote at the end of Document 204, “for accountability purposes only” this telegram was assigned the number 35889.

[2] Not found.

[3] Not found.

[4] See Document 204 for Byroade's response.

204. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Manila, January 2, 1970, 0451Z.

41. Eyes Only Asst Secretary Green, Dept of State. Ref: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 35889.[2]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

My primary point, even considering the level of the handwritten notation you refer to, is that I just do not think the problem should be approached in this manner by either me or the Department. If such drastic cuts are to be made out here, it seems to me that the message would have to go to the Pentagon, and they would have to decide how they would have to reorganize their forces in order to meet the requirement. The final decision would then have to be made taking into account the effects of this on our strategic posture, as well as the views of the Department on what the effect of cuts of this magnitude would have in the Philippines. The latter could properly include from us the effect of such cuts on our overall relations with the Phils, their economic impact, etc.

I see no way for me to even approach the initial problem of the proposed 50 percent cut at Clark. It is true that the base is on Philippine soil, but what we are really talking about is a drastic cut in the 13th Air Force with headquarters and support staff and many of its operating units at Clark but which, in actuality, extends from Taiwan to Thailand. One needs to get into what units, activities, and capabilities of the 13th Air Force would have to be reduced, or abandoned, and how this would fit into the picture with the present situation in Vietnam and our future national posture in the Far East. Exactly the same type of problem would be involved in a similar, even if reduced, reduction at Subic, substituting only the Seventh Fleet for the 13th Air Force and such matters as to where its future center of gravity and maintenance facilities should be. And we should not forget in the process that we are talking about very expensive facilities indeed, which if transferred elsewhere would be very costly. I realize that I am probably over-simplifying the matter because I do not know in just what context this all occurred, but it looks to be like initial action on this, at least, would have to be transferred to the Pentagon. State should of course have its voice, but I really think not an initial one as its role, or at least it seems to me, should be after the initial military appraisal.

We could, I suppose, volunteer through normal channels what the economic and political effect of cuts of this magnitude would mean in the Philippines, but I would feel much easier about it if we had a normal channel request to do so. The reason I feel this way is that I can not believe that cuts of this magnitude are consistent with our best interests, and I therefore have no reason to raise the prospects of such an eventuality.[3] I do not mean to say that a well thought out strategic plan of our posture in the Pacific of some years hence might not indicate reductions of this magnitude, and I would personally be glad if they could. But I really do think that it must be approached from that direction and not from the direction of cutting bases by name by specific percentages. The latter type of approach is merely the question of swinging the pendulum back, and when done for that reason alone, all past experience shows that it tends to swing too far and too fast, and that it has been costly to get it back to where it belongs.

I would as well in such a volunteered message have to say that I believed that both the political and economic effects in the Philippines would be adverse,[4] so I would in effect be giving the appearance of raising a straw man and then shooting him down. On the political level I think it would hurt our position here. The Nixon Doctrine is very sound policy but unfortunately its press treatment and, more importantly, actions in the Senate have local leaders concerned that in effect it is a policy of cutting and running beyond what the nations out here believe to be in their best interests. I would guess the Vice President will have a most important report on this aspect of the situation when he finishes his tour. And on the economic front only a brief but important point. I know we can't let this be a big factor in any decision to retain bases abroad. But it is a very important factor here at present. If the Phils should keep on the recent path of better policies, they would still need help. What better way to do it than by utilizing facilities of theirs which are useful to us.[5] At least this way we get something in return.

I have re-read my letter to you of last August regarding San Clemente.[6] I well see that as constructed that letter could have been misunderstood. As it actually happened, when the President asked if I could give him a good feel of the situation here by January, it was clear to me at the time that he had in mind a report on the general situation here containing broad policy recommendations. We were not at that moment focusing on the reduction-in-presence theme as the letter implies.

I have been wondering of late just how to best comply with my affirmative answer to this query of his, particularly as it is too early as yet to know in which direction Marcos will go in his new administration, or whether it will be more of the same. My doubts are affected somewhat by my indecision at the moment as to whether I shouldn't come home briefly on consultations some time in the next few weeks in order to be better equipped to handle the forthcoming talks with Marcos. I do not herein, however, raise this question for decision but may be in touch with you separately on this one.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; Exdis. A notation on the message indicates that Green saw it.

[2]  Document 203.

[3] After receiving such a “normal channel request,” telegram 3094 to Manila, January 12, Byroade emphasized in telegram 419 from Manila, January 15, that the projected plan would effect a “drastic cut in the 13th Air Force.” At the same time, Byroade stated that “my own view is that considerable reductions could be made in the number of personnel that the military says is necessary to perform the roles assigned to it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

[4] Telegram 420 from Manila, January 15, stated that the extent of the adverse impact “would depend primarily on timing, phasing, and the rationale offered to the GOP and to public opinion.” (Ibid.)

[5] A Department of State report, February 19, noted that U.S. spending in the Philippines “would drop from the current annual figure of about $140 million to a reduced level of about $83 million,” and concluded that the Philippine economy would be hurt by the loss of foreign exchange income, reduced economic activity, and a presumed reduction of Philippine employment at the bases. It added that the $57 million reduction “would theoretically cut back Philippine economic activity by $171 million,” using the standard multiplier of three effect, and that this “would be equivalent to about 2 per cent of the 1969 Philippine GNP of $8.5 billion.” (Ibid.)

[6] Not found.

205. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Manila, February 2, 1970, 1103Z.

132. We here are, as I am sure you can guess, in the midst of one of our occasionally delicate times. In the past few days I guess I have been spending more time trying to steer us through the present situation rather than reporting it.

When I saw Marcos the morning after the January 26 riots, he opened the conversation by saying how much he had looked forward that morning to seeing me. (We had arranged to meet on the 27th for a general talk when neither of us knew, of course, of the coming riots at Congress.) He said he had not slept much the night before, admitting that the demonstrations and riots had come as a jolt to him. He said he had been jolted further when some of his intelligence types late the night before had attempted to convince him that the U.S. had been implicated in the riots. He said he had seen pieces of paper which implicated Colonel Patterson, Dave Sternberg and Al Ravenholt.

He told me that we personally doubted these reports implicating Americans, but it was a factor nevertheless if people were talking about it around town. I told him that I had heard rumors about Patterson before and had thoroughly investigated his activities and had instructed him personally as to how to avoid future misunderstandings. I said I was thoroughly convinced that, if Patterson was guilty of anything, it was no more than having a sympathetic face.

I reminded Marcos that just after elections I had heard reports that Osmena was talking about rash things. I told him that I thought it best to go try and calm Osmena down and felt that I had at least accomplished something in my two hour talk with him. I told him at the time that I had asked that word reach him indirectly as to what I was trying to do. He said he remembered that and was grateful.

I told him that the policy of the U.S. was absolutely firm in the matter under discussion, and that was that the U.S. would in no way attempt any interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines, and that this was fully understood by my staff. We did, however, face a practical problem. It was an old game in the Philippines for politicians and others to claim American support and backing. I was sure he knew that people did occasionally approach us. It seemed also obvious that they were doing a lot of loose talking around town. Under these conditions if I released specific personnel without cause, nothing really would be accomplished because a new set of names would crop up in the future.

I told him I would do two things: 1) talk to sensible opposition leaders and let them know in passing, and of course with no mention of our talk, what the policy of the U.S. was, and 2) insure that no officer of mine let any such conversation end in the future without a clear statement that the U.S. policy was firmly against becoming involved in any way.

The conversation ended on good notes and I think Marcos was, temporarily at least, reasonably reassured.

In the wake of the serious demonstrations Saturday[2] night Kokoy Romualdez called Rafferty on Sunday asking if the Embassy had any thought about what had happened. Rafferty merely pointed out the obvious that the real damage had been caused by the infiltration of real pros into the study body. Rafferty suggested to Kokoy that it might be a good idea if he talked to me. Kokoy checked with Marcos and showed up at my house one hour later. We had a good talk and I think Kokoy's later report to Marcos was probably helpful. Kokoy was very frank and gave every evidence he felt himself in a friendly and helpful atmosphere. (As you know he is tense and somewhat tongue-tied when he feels himself in the opposite.) He said we had enemies surrounding Marcos who were deliberately feeding this stuff to the President.

Yesterday afternoon Osmena called me (on what are probably tapped wires) saying he had just returned from useful talks, particularly with Don Kendall in the U.S., and asked if he could come see me. I said of course he could (even though I did not particularly like the timing). Osmena stayed for 2½ rather uncomfortable hours. He was obviously happy to see the recent trouble and considered it a vindication of his protest positions over the elections. He furthermore said that this was just the beginning and that further trouble will follow. In the long conversation I let him know that some LP Party members would find us more cautious around them in the future as they were talking freely around town about contacts and conversations with Americans. I also let him know that the previous policy I had given him after elections about the U.S. position stood firm. I also said I could not see how it would benefit the Liberal Party in the future for them to even think of working side by side with leftist elements causing the trouble.

His proposition in general was that all he had tried to convince us of in the past was beginning to become true, and that the great danger was that things were being set up for a Communist takeover. My position was that he exaggerated that part of the problem.

I asked Osmena if he thought new worries of Marcos might make him a better President after the current troubles were over. In essence Osmena said no, because 1) in six months Marcos wouldn't be alive and 2) Marcos didn't have the courage to see it through, as he would not stand up under pressure from his political cronies.

Against all of the above I have a very sensitive report of a meeting which took place about 2 a.m. last night at the Palace. This would indicate that the President and Mrs. Marcos advised several close confidants that they believe the U.S. had in some way had a role in instigating demonstrations against Malacanang. President Marcos' reasoning was that the U.S. desires to keep him off balance in view of the forthcoming U.S./Phil negotiations on Laurel–Langley, bases, etc. President Marcos also discussed contingency plans in the event an insurrection in the Manila area was successful. The President apparently said his plans in this event were to move himself and some loyal followers to the Ilocos region where he can regroup his forces.

I believe we will be able to weave ourselves through this without something stupid happening, but wanted you to have the background of these three conversations just in case. The real danger, of course, is of Marcos becoming panicky in his surprise and concern. Hopeful developments as of today is that they have asked us for renewed riot training. We are equipped to do this locally and it is now underway. Also, very trusted security chief in Malacanang has just asked us for advice and possible assistance on getting the type of dye that Germans use effectively for identification purposes in connection with the fire hoses technique of riot control.

You must remember in judging all this that we here live in a situation where it is almost inconceivable to the average Filipino that anything ever happens in the Philippines without an American hand being involved somewhere.

I will provide you with this type background through this channel to supplement our regular reporting as long as this seems necessary.[3] Our principle problem at the moment seems to be one of helping Marcos to keep his cool. For this he needs reassurance from us among other things, and for this reason if for no other, I will try to see him soon and will continue to make plain that we are not and will not be involved in these internal matters.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret.

[2] January 31.

[3] In an attached note to Haig, February 2, Green passed on this message and stated that “I think Ambassador Byroade is proceeding just about right.” He noted that “I also sought to discourage him from using this ‘back channel’ too much, preferring regular channels with highest restricted indicators where necessary.”

206. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, February 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Riots in Manila

The Causes: The proximate cause of the student riots was a student demand that the political parties (i.e. specifically President Marcos) not influence the elections next November for a Constitutional Convention to frame a new Constitution. With Marcos' recent overwhelming victory, fears are growing among the students and others that he may perpetuate his power, and that a last chance may be lost to reform Philippine politics.[2]

The Liberals, disgruntled by their recent defeat, may have thought it useful to egg on the students to “get even” with Marcos. Some of his political competitors in his own party may be trying to generate pressures against a third term. Beyond this is a widespread sense of post-election letdown in the Philippines. The balance-of-payments crisis is tightening, and some people are being hurt by the Government's new austerity measures. In every previous Philippine election, frustrations could be blamed on the President who had just been defeated; Marcos' unprecedented re-election means that the natural scapegoat is still in office. Frustrations over the venality and lack of direction of Philippine political life have been growing, and some observers believe that church and parental authority was probably sympathetic to the strikers rather than being a restraining influence.

What Happened: The demonstration was originally organized by a moderate student grouping anxious to keep it peaceful. To avoid violence, they were in the process of dispersing, and their leaders were actually in the Malacanang talking with Marcos, when an extremist student group arrived with their supporters, looking for trouble.

During the period that followed, four or five students were killed, of some 15,000–40,000 involved. It was by all odds the largest and most violent demonstration in Philippine history.

The violence may have been fanned by professional Communist agitators, but this is still very moot.

The Reaction: The principal current reaction is shock and introspection. President Marcos has gone on the air and, in an effort to divert attention from the fact that he personally was the target of the students, has blamed the violence upon leaders “influenced by… the ideology of Mao Tse-tung,” and upon Communist and non-Communist conspiracies. He has further magnified the importance of the riot by closing schools for a week.

The Implications: Marcos has been put very much on the defensive in a remarkably short time following his election landslide. Popular discontent and political jealousies have focussed on him. It is much too early, however, to say whether he will be seriously weakened, or whether he will be deflected from an effort—which we surmise he has been making—to insure that the Constitutional Convention is malleable to his interests.

At its most serious (and fed by current economic troubles), an attack on Marcos could expand to an attack on the present political structure, but we have no evidence that the forces with the will and power to press for fundamental changes have coalesced.

We may hope that the riots will encourage Marcos to put a priority on social and economic reform, but this is by no means certain.

At the least, it is reasonably certain that Philippine politics will be inward-turned in coming months. Some journalists have, as usual, blamed the US, but the US will probably not become a major target, unless the power balance moves sharply to the left. Marcos has heretofore tended to monopolize the “nationalist” line, but his decision to blame Communists for his present troubles limits his flexibility to seek better relations with them. Because of the economic importance of good relations with us (and to avoid adding problems with the US to his other problems), Marcos will probably move very slowly on opening Military Base Agreement negotiations with us, and will probably seek to continue to defer negotiations on the Laurel–Langley renegotiation.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 962, Alexander M. Haig Chronological File, Haig Chron—Feb. 1–7, 1970. Secret. Sent for information.

[2] The President underlined the last two lines of the first paragraph and wrote: “(They need the reform!)”

[3] The President underlined the phrase “negotiations on the Laurel–Langley renegotiation” and wrote: “1) K—I want every possible step taken to reduce U.S. presence in Philippines—Let's not press for extended base operations. 2) Did we cut down on our military personnel in the base areas?”

207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, February 7, 1970.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]

—Ambassador Byroade's Conversation with Marcos : Ambassador Byroade reported a rambling conversation with a very distraught and unnerved President Marcos,[2] who made the following remarks:

—He wanted Byroade's “active help”; Marcos said he might have to impose martial law, and wanted to know if Byroade would “stand behind him.”

—He asked advice whether to postpone the Constitutional Convention scheduled for 1971, and about speeded-up deliveries of helicopters and ammunition under MAP.

—He complained about the hostility of the Manila press.

—He asked why we cannot be more forthcoming with help, and at one point mentioned the figure of $100 million. (We have already turned aside requests for $450 million in stabilization loans over three years, and have pushed the GOP to deal with the IMF. We are providing a small PL 480 program, and U.S. banks and oil interests are giving some balance of payments relief.)

Byroade reacted cautiously to keep us from being drawn into this situation. He tried discreetly to suggest the need for social programs and land reform, and to head off drastic actions such as martial law.[3]

Byroade comments that the Philippines are used to our moving in to bail them out, and that Marcos probably thinks our present restrained position is punitive. He observes that Marcos is really afraid of a revolution, and that he is further unnerved by Chinese soothsayers' predictions that he will die before June. Byroade himself thinks that the situation may get worse (the next student demonstration is scheduled for February 12, and there is a chance that labor may join it). Byroade thinks that Marcos' best course would be to make a sweep of the Cabinet and to embark upon such reforms as he can afford. He points out, however, that a Philippine President who moved too fast might well be murdered by his own establishment.

Separately, Byroade makes a plea for the return to the Philippines of an American soldier who was allowed to slip out of the Philippines while in U.S. custody awaiting a Philippine trial. He thinks this issue (coming on top of another similar incident) could become explosive to our relations if the GOP should endeavor to exploit it to divert attention from its own problem. At the least, he says, this incident could wipe out all hopes of negotiating a satisfactory criminal jurisdiction understanding with the GOP. (Tab A)[4]

[Omitted here is discussion of items on the Republic of China, Israel, and Honduras.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 17, President's Daily Briefs, February 2–10, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The memorandum is unsigned.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1071 from Manila, February 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PHIL)

[3] A marginal note in Nixon's handwriting next to this underlined section beginning with “social” reads: “K—I doubt this line's effectiveness.”

[4] The President highlighted this paragraph and wrote: “K—What are the facts?” Tab A was attached but not printed.

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, February 7, 1970, 0050Z.

19158. Subject: US Posture with Marcos Relative to Student Crisis. Ref: Manila 1071.[2]

1. We commend way you handled delicate conversation with Marcos, avoiding being drawn into position of giving him advice as to specific decisions he faces, while at same time being willing to discuss with him nature of problems with which he is now confronted. We agree that it is desirable for you to continue to maintain Marcos' confidence. Your conversations with him will provide an opportunity for you, without making any specific recommendations, to review events and show the pros and cons of various possible courses of action. Such talking out of the issues should also help Marcos maintain the necessary degree of composure and balance.

2. Believe you should continue to try to maintain this posture during this volatile period of uncertainty as to how the various forces at work are motivated and will operate in the immediate future. We believe we must try to keep the United States as much as possible from being drawn into involvement or appearance of involvement in this crisis. Thus, if you were to give Marcos specific advice, he might then let it be known that in his future actions he was acting on American advice, thereby involving us directly. On the other hand, by keeping in touch with him and helping him to analyze his situation as objectively as possible, you may be able at the same time to play a role in restraining him from ill-considered actions.

3. The situation requires, more than ever before, that we take every precaution to avoid incidents of any kind which might direct the focus of Philippine unrest and anger against the United States or any elements of its presence in the Philippines. No doubt you will be cautioning U.S. military and civilian components that they must exert extreme care and restraint to prevent incidents involving Americans.

4. We here will be doing everything we can to support you and your highly capable team in your best judgments as to how we should proceed.[3]

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–2 PHIL. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Usher on February 6; cleared by Moore, Green, and Eliot; and approved by Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson.

[2] Dated February 6. (Ibid., POL 15–1 PHIL)

[3] Telegram 21459 to Manila, February 11, informed Byroade that the Philippine Government and the IMF had reportedly reached agreement on a $27.5 million third credit tranche. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

209. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, February 11, 1970, 1027Z.

1213. Subj: Call on Romulo.

1. I called on Romulo at his request this afternoon. He held in his hand two notes to present to me. As I suspected they were on the subject of U.S. military leaving the Philippines to evade criminal jurisdiction by the Philippines.

2. I opened by saying that in view of our past conversations (nearly daily) I had hoped he would feel that he need not have to give me these notes today. He replied that he felt he had no alternative because he was “sick and tired” of evasion on these issues. He then went into a bit of speech-making which ended up with him asking me point blank what I was going to do about Moomey.[2] I told him that I was not ever going to even try to do anything about Moomey, inasmuch as I was sure he knew, there was nothing I could do about bringing him back. I also told him that I had every hope that Williams would be brought back. I did not see why, when he knew we were in the process of working very hard on this case, which had its complexities in American (as it would in the Philippine) system, that he would feel compelled to make a strong case publicly until the matter could be resolved.

3. I did not bother to read his notes, but proceeded to talk to Romulo in the strongest language I believe I have ever used with a foreign minister. I said I recognized the element of sovereignty in these cases which concerned him, but wanted him to know that as far as the real issues were concerned, which included matters of life and death, the exercise he was trying to put me through paled into semantics. I also told him that I could not believe he was fully aware of the things going on around town and feared that he was unwittingly joining into a pattern which seemed to me both serious and sinister.

4. I told him I thought there was an obvious effort going on in Manila to divert attention from the government onto the Americans, and this included efforts to divert the rioters and troublemakers as well. I suggested he think long and hard before he engaged in public polemics about us today in view of the anticipated troubles here in Manila tomorrow. There were rumors around town that there would be an indiscriminate attempt to kill some Americans in connection with the demonstrations scheduled for tomorrow. I felt these were serious enough that as a precaution I was making considerable effort to keep Americans in their homes tomorrow, even though I regretted taking this step as it might in a way contribute to the feeling of unease of everyone here. It was for this reason that I have made all my moves in this regard as low-keyed as possible.

5.

I also told him that the charges that he was leveling against us for infraction of rules around the bases paled even more into insignificance when one considered the security situation around these bases.

I told him I thought I would be ready soon to present him with facts that I was sure neither he nor the President knew about. In addition to the normal graft and corruption and straight malfeasance of justice situations which had long existed, things were now taking a more serious turn. It appeared to me that a pattern might be developing of periodic, indiscriminate killing of Americans. I said he could not accept forever that publicity would come only from him or his side, and that I might have to start speaking out publicly on these matters. I gave him four or five lurid cases which I must admit had even Romulo speechless.

6. I said he might likewise not know that he was planning this public attack on us at the very time that I was working closely with President Marcos in an effort to be helpful to him and the government in their current crisis.

7. Romulo interrupted and said that he wished he had talked to me earlier as he had already given the notes and comments to one afternoon newspaper. I said in that case I guess it was even too late to see the President, and my only recourse was to consider what I might myself do publicly.

8. Romulo jumped up and went into his adjoining office and came back with the material he had planned to use in the press conference after my departure. He threw it on his desk and said, “There it all is. I won't give out any more to the press and I will see what I can do to tone down what I have already done.”[3] He said that he had not known many of the things I had told him and wanted me to know personally that his intended action had been at his own initiative and he did not want me to think that he was joining others to turn Filipinos against us at this time.

9. Comment: I think that the latter is probably true and that Romulo, for purposes of his own shaky position and prestige, had decided that this was a good time for him to weigh in. There will be another staff cable enroute on these cases. I see now that his note complains about a case involving a Sgt. Moore back in August who apparently left on August 15 without a subpoena being issued to him which was received by base authorities on August 11. I also understand the Embassy was not informed of either this case or Williams for a long period of time. In any event, if I am going to get tough with the GOP on our side of the line, which I am in the mood to do,[4] I would certainly like no more dallying about getting Williams back here as the Filipinos have a fool-proof case on this one. An international agreement has clearly been violated and I must say I cannot understand the reluctance of Defense to make amends.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to CINCPAC and CINCPACREPPHIL.

[2] Moomey and Williams were U.S. servicemen stationed in the Philippines who were accused of serious crimes, and whom Philippine authorities wished to try in Philippine courts rather than the customary U.S. military courts.

[3] Telegram 1243 from Manila, February 12, reported that the “scathing tone reflected in February 11” newspapers was “nowhere to be found February 12,” and that the morning dailies had “temperate stories.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

[4] In a memorandum to Kissinger, February 17, Holdridge characterized this telegram as “some effective bare-knuckle diplomacy by Byroade.” Holdridge surmised that Romulo had intended to present the protest notes and then report the whole affair to the press, which would have stirred up anti-American sentiment and diverted attention from Marcos' problems with the students. He reported that “Byroade made a very strong presentation as to the danger of using us as a whipping boy in the situation.” Holdridge drafted a note from Kissinger congratulating Byroade, but the note apparently was not sent. (Ibid.)

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, February 17, 1970, 1052Z.

1393. Subj: Conversation with Marcos on Central Luzon.

1. I took departing AID Director Haraldson to say goodbye to Marcos yesterday and the latter asked me to remain afterwards for a private talk.

2. Marcos said he was going to clean up Central Luzon once and for all. He wanted to start the process within the next thirty days, but he wanted to know first whether he would have our support. I asked what he had in mind, and he quickly pointed out that all he had in mind was for us to supply military items. He said he was worried about the level of ammunition for his armed forces, the need for more M–16's and helicopters. I reminded him that we were momentarily in the process of bringing side arm ammunition up to date. He said he appreciated our quick action in this particular matter.

3. Marcos said that all eyes were focused on Manila whereas the real impetus for many of the troubles in Manila, and the real danger for the future, lies in Central Luzon. He said training camps were being set up in extremely inaccessible spots. He mentioned one that appeared being set up for about 100 men and another for 300 and that if he tried to drop 50 troopers in these areas using his present 5 helicopters they would be wiped out. He said any support that these camps were getting at this point from outside sources was negligible, but it looked like subversive forces were being formed which, when in being, might expect outside support.

4. He then dwelled at some length over the perennial disagreement here between his people and our JUSMAG over the level of supply of ammunition that should be in Philippine hands. (This has indeed been a problem over the years and it has often appeared to our people that it is more emotional than logical. We hope this problem will eventually be solved when their own ammunition factory comes into operation in late 1971. In the meantime, I think in judging them on this score we must be conscious of the psychological factors involved in having one's source of ammunition in foreign hands.)

5. What Marcos is asking for in effect is quick action on our part on some initial supply items so that he could plan his operations well prior to the beginning of the rains, and in addition to that some proof that we would continue to stand behind them for replenishment of used items. All this, of course, gives us quite a problem. In its broadest aspects I suppose he is trying to prove once again to himself that we will support him, but even more broader still may be putting us to the test on the Nixon Doctrine,[2] i.e., the Phils will do the job themselves but will need logistic support.

6. It is, of course, very much in our interests that Central Luzon be cleaned up and Communist oriented armed groupings there not be allowed to expand and organize under the umbrella of the current general situation here. We also have to think of the importance of operations at Clark Field and of our people in that area. To take the extreme, the terrain is such that a few hostile mortars in the hills could make for a very difficult situation at Clark.

7. One trouble in the past in this situation is that no President since Magsaysay has been willing to tackle the political aspects of changing the situation in Central Luzon. If Marcos really means it this time he is going to have to ride rough shod over local politicians of some stature. He is also going to have to move on civic action aspects of the problem and he has, of course, made one move by sending PHILCAG to that area, and another by starting air mobile operations in the area using available lift.

8. I would like to find some way to satisfy any legitimate concern Marcos may have as to our physical support for meaningful items and yet protect us from those that would not really be meaningful. We have already been able to move on some items and this has been very useful to us here. I do believe a few more helicopters makes sense and have recommended we try to find somewhere five more at an early date. I have just sent a message suggesting how we might be able to handle another roughly 1,200 M–16's.

9. This leaves the question of the level of supply of ammunition which we will support here. I would like to find some means of meeting this problem, which I would assess as being about half real and half psychological, and do it in a way that would not cost us much money (which we do not have in our program), and also in a way that would give us freedom of action to judge how the Phils perform in this task. It seems to me that there should be some middle course to satisfy these rather somewhat conflicting criteria.

10. I have not as yet had time to thoroughly explore this with JUSMAG, but am wondering whether we could not move into Subic for storage from depots in Japan or Okinawa an additional increment of supply above the 30 day base for their main line weapons. We would then be in a position to tell Marcos that the stuff was close by and could be drawn on as necessary to keep their levels at a satisfactory rate as ammunition was expended. It might be a bit hard to do this without giving the impression that we want to wait to see how he performs. Off hand I would think it could be presented to him primarily as a budgetary device because there was no immediate money in the program available and we would not need any as long as the ammunition was still in our hands/with him, however, knowing that it was close at hand. I am fully aware that any such apparently simple plan would be full of logistical and statistical nightmares but suppose it could be done nonetheless if our overall interests would so dictate.

11. We will be exploring these matters further and this message is to give a feeling of things here and to lay the setting for possible future message through both State and Defense channels.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–7 PHIL. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC, CHJUSMAG, and CINCPACREPPHIL.

[2] For further documentation concerning the Nixon Doctrine, see Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. I, Documents 5, 46 , and 52 . The Nixon Doctrine generally stated that, while the United States would honor its commitments and help its allies, Asian countries would bear the main burden of defending themselves.

211. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, February 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Williams Case

You will recall the Williams case in the Philippines, in which an Air Force sergeant at Clark Field was accused of complicity in an attempted rape case in the nearby town of Angeles, and was inadvertently allowed by his military supervisors to depart on reassignment while Philippine judicial procedures were pending against him.

The Williams case has now become a major issue in US-Philippine relations. As Ambassador Byroade had feared, hostile elements in the Philippines have picked it up as an affront to Philippine sovereignty and used it as a rallying point to inspire a mob assault against our Embassy in Manila—see the memorandum from State at Tab A, which reports a telephone conversation between Ambassador Byroade and DCM Wilson and the Philippine Country Director.[2] According to Ambassador Byroade, two-thirds of the anti-foreign speeches at a mass demonstration prior to the attack on the Embassy referred to the Williams case, and were used as one means of getting part of the crowd to move to the Embassy.

In the period since the confrontations developed between Marcos and discontented student groups, Byroade has been concerned over the possibility that the US might get caught in the middle and catch part of the blame for the situation. He feared, in fact, that the Philippine Government might deliberately attempt to draw in the US in order to deflect attention from the pressing economic and social issues behind the confrontation with the students. The Williams case impressed him as a perfect vehicle for this purpose, and indeed Foreign Secretary Romulo actually intended to use this ploy but was deterred by some extremely effective bare-knuckle diplomacy by Byroade. I attach (Tab B) a telegram reporting Byroade's conversation with Romulo to this effect.[3]

While Byroade was able to influence Romulo's behavior to some extent (though the absence of any police protection prior to the attack on the Embassy indicates a degree of Philippine Government duplicity), he was of course in no position to influence the leftists. There are many extremists who would like nothing better than to drag the US through the mud, and the Williams case has provided a perfect starting point. Filipinos of all descriptions are susceptible to propaganda charging the US handling of the Williams case as having violated Philippine sovereignty, especially since this is not the first case of this nature.

Meanwhile, the question of issuing orders to Williams to return, as urgently requested by Ambassador Byroade, has become stuck in Defense. State has asked the Air Force to issue the orders on foreign policy grounds, and the Air Force is willing to go along. However, higher authority in Defense is not, and is balking, due both to apprehensions over the prospect of adverse reaction on the Hill, and to the very good chance that Williams, if returned, would not receive a fair trial. Defense also believes that Williams might be able to resist return by seeking a legal writ. I understand that Justice is perfectly willing to take the case through the US courts if orders are issued to Williams and he employs legal procedures to resist; Justice also believes that it could win the case. It is not willing to take an official position on the matter at this time, though.

I believe that you will wish to consider the implications of the Williams case very carefully. Our position in the Philippines appears to be vulnerable, and if Williams is not returned, our whole relationship with the Philippines could be greatly complicated, including the tenure of our bases. According to our Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines, we have no grounds to keep Williams out of Philippine judicial process, even though some of these processes have typically been bent and stretched by the Filipinos in their handling of this and other cases. On the other hand, the possible US domestic repercussions, particularly those on the Hill, could be troublesome.

Even returning Williams at this time will not solve our problems, since we will appear to be operating under Philippine pressures rather than honoring our treaty relationship, but we can at least ease the criticisms on this score by claiming that the matter was under review by the appropriate authorities and action has been taken in accordance with standard procedures. Sending Williams back might also help to get us more into the background when Filipino tempers are running high. We could use any breathing-space gained to press the Filipinos for improvements in their judicial handling of criminal cases involving Americans, particularly at Clark Field.

Recommendations

That you inform Secretary Laird that orders should be issued to Williams sending him back to the Philippines.[4]

Alternatively, that you agree with Defense in not ordering Williams to return.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 338, HAK/Richardson Meetings, January 1970–March 1970. Secret. Sent for action. The President wrote on the first page: “I hereby order an immediate 1/3 cut in military personnel in Philippines (Clark Field).” A notation in Butterfield's handwriting reads: “Henry—the President approved this action recommendation on this condition:” with an arrow drawn to Nixon's aforementioned note.

[2] At Tab A was a February 18 covering memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger that transmitted a memorandum of a February 18 telephone call between Byroade and Wilson; attached but not printed. According to the memorandum of telephone conversation, a group of demonstrators broke away from a larger demonstration on the night of February 18 and marched to the U.S. Embassy, broke through the outer gates of the complex, and threw rocks and firebombs at the windows. Because there was no police protection at the Embassy, Ambassador Byroade telephoned President Marcos directly, emphasizing that “the Embassy had no protection. President Marcos said he would take care of it right away. Riot police arrived within half an hour and very quickly brought the situation under control.” Several situation reports describe the demonstration in greater detail. (Ibid., Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

[3]  Document 209.

[4]  Nixon initialed the approve option. However, in an attached February 21 note to Kissinger, Haig wrote: “I've done nothing on this. It will require direct discussions with Laird in my view.” Kissinger returned the note to Haig with the following handwritten notation: “Make sure I take up with President.”

212. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, March 4, 1970.

SUBJECT

Reduction of U.S. Presence in the Philippines

I must say this action borders on the ridiculous. This is an incredible reduction in U.S. presence in the Philippines no matter how unnecessary our presence may be. The degree to which our facilities in the Philippines are directly linked to operations in South Vietnam is substantial and no one with any knowledge of this fact has even been asked to comment.

If we were to send out a memorandum of this type[2] calling for a reduction of this magnitude over the time frame cited, I think we will ultimately provide either the biggest laugh in the bureaucracy or shake whatever confidence they may have in our ability to run foreign affairs on a sound and systematic basis. Our job is to prevent the President from making the kinds of mistakes which we know only too well he can make in times of emotional peak. This action fits into that category despite the fact that the President has reiterated his intention of reducing our presence in the Philippines on countless occasions.

The Philippine cut, the near 50% reduction in Korea, the precipitous draw down in South Vietnam and Thailand, the All-Volunteer Army ploy, the posturing for an assault on NATO next year, and the 10% across-the-board reduction of our overseas strength already accomplished this year cannot but convince the most amateur observer that despite all of our rhetoric we are adopting a fortress America concept which is not only inward looking but emotionally orchestrated. I think the Korean studies, even though triggered by a capricious directive, at least went through the motions of a clear and systematic interdepartmental review. In that instance the wisdom of reduction was confirmed by that review. We should certainly as a minimum follow a similar procedure on the Philippine issue.

I would suggest that you talk to the President about this before signing this memorandum and underline your concern that such a drastic reduction could not but be interpreted as a wholesale bug-out, which will have an incalculable impact on our efforts in Southeast Asia to say nothing of inflicting untold hardships on the economy and people of the Philippines. I also strongly recommend that we accomplish the Philippine reduction as a result of an objective NSDM which would initiate the kind of interdepartmental review of the type which we will all have confidence in with the kind of time we need to do it and with careful consideration given to the impact of this reduction on the Vietnam war, Pacific Fleet and air operations and the economic stability of an irritating but nevertheless long-time ally and ward.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis.

[2]  Haig evidently was referring to a draft memorandum outlining severe cuts in U.S. personnel in the Philippines, as insisted upon by Nixon; see Document 203. A March 11 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, attached but not printed, advised the President that Kissinger had informed Laird of the President's decision to cut personnel at Clark Air Base by one-third and that Laird had reported that he would have a “detailed” plan for the reductions completed by about April 20. In a March 10 memorandum Laird stated that the plan would call for the personnel reductions to be fully implemented by September 1. Kissinger asked if “this target date is acceptable to you,” and Nixon initialed his approval. (Both ibid.)

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, March 6, 1970, 0521Z.

1912. For Asst Secretary Green from Ambassador Byroade. Subject: U.S.–Phil Economic Bilaterals. Ref: State 25196.[2]

1. Your Feb 20 cable causes very grave concern on my part. It comes as quite a shock to learn six months after my arrival (and three months after we reaffirmed our willingness to renegotiate the Laurel–Langley Agreement first expressed in September 1966) that we are prepared to do nothing about our economic arrangements here except let nature take its course. It may be nice theory but it hardly fits the practical world of things, in which the Philippines is presently passing through several long-term crises at the same time (foreign policy, constitution, balance of payments, and economic relations with the U.S.). I also think it is a callous view as regards the degree of protection we should accord to U.S. business abroad, which I feel is a legitimate part of our national interest.

2. I don't think I can accept this without a considerable effort on my part to try to change our position. I realize, however, one doesn't win any cases with Washington when things still seem to be on a theoretical basis. Unfortunately, although it may not seem so on the surface, we are in a very real sense even now at the time of decision. The continued uncertainty is exacting an ever-rising toll in the economic realm. If we let things slide, this will mean that sooner or later we will confront the Phils across the table with the news that we really don't have anything to talk about. Their natural reaction will presumably be to take strong punitive measures against U.S.-owned businesses to force us off this position, where upon the latter will descend on the Washington scene in force. I know that there is a feeling in the Department that there is considerable difference in the thinking of local business leaders here and their home offices. Now that I am getting to know both, I think this has been greatly over-exaggerated. Not a week goes by here that I don't see several visiting bigwigs from home offices. I believe when the issues become defined that New York will at least try to push us to attempt to defend what seems to them to be fair and reasonable.

3. I predict that we would then develop a more flexible and imaginative position. The problem will then be, however, that, because of the nature of these issues, the need for legislation, etc., many months will thereafter be required for firm positions to be developed.

4. This would I believe be the wrong approach. It would of course exacerbate our military as well as our investment problems. I still hope we can to avoid adhering to such an approach which, I might add, appears to be widely at variance with the approach we are contemplating taking with the Latinos.

5. I wish to make clear that I do not recommend anything that might properly be termed a prolonged extension of “special relations.” I do believe however that there is need for general recognition throughout the U.S. Government of the importance and delicacy of the issues involved and of the essentiality of our managing this creeping crisis in the Philippines as painstakingly as we know how. Some flexibility on timing of the phase-out, and ad hoc problems, may be required. In any case, I am convinced that the approach in your message will only increase the perils already inherent in the situation.

6. If the position outlined in your message eventually remains firm in spite of these considerations, then I think the Department will have an obligation to inform U.S. industry. It would not be fair in my opinion to withhold this position from them and let many of them, who are still hopeful we will get a fair deal for them in negotiations, end up in a fire-sale atmosphere too late to make better arrangements.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 25196 to Manila, February 19, clarified Green's position to Byroade. Green stated that he was aware that any duty reductions granted to the Philippines “could be made available to other countries.” However, Green stated: “we do not believe this is a desirable course to pursue” for a number of reasons, the first of which was that the “Filipinos, in their own interest, must come to realize that the development of a sound economic base for their economy is essentially up to them.” (Ibid.)

214. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee (Richardson)[1]

Washington, March 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Personnel Reductions in the Philippines

The President has directed an immediate one-third reduction in the civilian and military personnel stationed at Clark Field in the Philippines. Secretary Laird has been informed of this directive and has agreed to submit a detailed plan for the reductions by April 20. They are to be completed by September 1, 1970. The Defense Department has been asked to coordinate with the State Department prior to submitting the plan.

In addition, the President has asked that other civilian and military personnel of all agencies in the Philippines be reduced 25 percent. These reductions should be completed as soon as possible and in no case later than June 30, 1971. The Under Secretaries Committee should consider how they are to be effected and report to the President on the schedule for carrying them out.[2] The report should consider their implications for U.S.-Philippine relations and for the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific. It should also reach the President by April 20.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

[2]  Richardson sent an April 10 memorandum to the members of the committee, requesting them to carry out the President's instructions and noting that an ad hoc group had already been established by his memorandum of March 31. Both memoranda are attached but not printed. The Embassy was advised of the President's decision in telegram 48653 to Manila, April 3. (Ibid.)

[3] A marginal notation in unidentified handwriting reads: “Now slipped a week.”

215. Report by the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee Review of U.S. Bases and Facilities in the Philippines[1]

Washington, April 6, 1970.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

SUMMARY

This study was undertaken as a result of the memorandum from Dr. Kissinger to the Under Secretary of State dated October 30 [20][2] , 1969, on the subject of “Revisions of the US Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines.” The memorandum indicated that the President had directed a review of our treaty and other relationships with the Philippines with the objective of:

—putting the Philippines on a most-favored-nation basis,

—examining the total physical area in the Philippines controlled by the US Forces and the number of bases for comparison with the US Forces holdings in other countries. Consideration should be given to the release of land in the Philippines which may be surplus to military needs.

The study sets forth objectives and outlines policy assumptions and guidance on which the effort is based. In addition, the Philippine pressures in the last five years, as related to the number and size of US bases, are discussed in detail. A section of the study is devoted to the size of the US bases in the Philippines and in several other countries. Country population, land areas and civilian population densities are compared to the same statistics of the US Forces in the various countries. Pertinent information of all the US bases and properties in the Philippines is provided and the need for the properties is discussed. The JOBAR study conclusions relating to the closure of Sangley Point, the JCS position concerning the study results and the present status of JOBAR recommendations are discussed briefly.

The Study conclusions are as follows:

a. Although the total land area of US bases in the Philippines is large in comparison to that in other foreign countries, a comparison of the various population densities does not indicate that the US controls a disproportionate share of land in the Philippines.

b. The two Navy VP squadrons, based on Sangley Point, are involved primarily in Vietnam-related missions. It is envisioned that this ASW force will be reduced to one squadron in the post-Vietnam era. As US combat forces are reduced in SEA, it may be desirable to relocate those naval aviation units and support activities now located at Sangley. The JOBAR Study addresses the issue of closure of Sangley in the present time frame. In late January 1970, however, DepSecDef elected against a unilateral decision to close Sangley Point now. This was due, in part, to the utility of the station as a bargaining point in our MBA negotiations.

c. From a review of Clark Air Base holdings, it is considered that the Air Force could relinquish a portion of Zone D acreage without adversely impacting on base expansion requirements, security, or integrity. However, it is believed that this acreage should be released only if the GOP presses for a reduction in the size of the Clark holdings.

d. Due to its topography, approximately one-half the land in the Subic Bay area is unimproved and is retained primarily for security reasons and to protect the watershed of the area. A portion of this land could be relinquished without adversely affecting the mission of the base provided there is an adequate land use survey.

e. John Hay Air Base serves as an important low-cost recreational area for all US armed forces personnel in the Philippines. The annual savings that would accrue from closing the base is small in comparison to its value in increased morale and productivity of the personnel. It should be retained unless GOP insists upon its return.

f. Land holdings in the minor US facilities are not considered in excess of requirements and are not identified for release.

g. The GOP has failed to live up to guarantees for watershed preservation in some cases involving release of US-controlled land in the past. Any actions involving future release of base lands should be completed only after adequate measures are taken by GOP to ensure protection of watershed areas essential to the bases.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Noforn. This 36-page study (plus four map drawings) was designated NSC–U/N 18, Annex C, and was forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under an April 6 cover letter, by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director of the Under Secretaries Committee.

[2]  Document 195.

216. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, April 7, 1970, 0651Z.

3028. For Under Secretary Richardson from Byroade. Subj: Reduction in US Personnel in the Philippines. Ref: Manila 2946.[2]

1. My guess is that we are just “whistling Dixie” if we think we will have any options left when the time comes to tell the GOP about our scheduled cuts in the Philippines. Yesterday I found that all of the bases here were informed through military channels of current plans for across the board cuts, with percentages provided. No rationale whatsoever was given.

2. Throughout all of this I have felt that when the chips were down and the effects, both here and in our support for the area as a whole, were coldly analyzed, that things would begin to fall into place in a more logical manner. I still think this will be the case, but now I wonder how much damage may be created before we reach that point.

3. At the very least I suggest you ask the military to follow up their JCS message to CINCPAC and its subsequent distribution here with the follow up order that they clam up on this particular subject pending further instructions. This would give your committees and planners time to weigh the consequences prior to any further word to the field.[3]

4. In a more philosophical vein I want to pass on along to you, and for the perusal of your sub-committees, a part of a draft policy report from here, not yet finished, that deals with “the American presence.” It is still in draft form, but because of the urgency of the situation, I will send it along as it now is.

5. Begin draft:

1. In considering the term “American presence” as it applies to the Philippines, it is useful first to review the current status of this presence:

(A) The number of American residents in the Philippines is declining and has been for some time, even though estimates of non USG connected persons claiming US citizenship still run as high at 24,000.

(B) The American business community is half the size it was a decade or two ago. With trained and competent Filipinos available it is unnecessary and expensive to maintain a large American staff.

(C) The American religious community increased sharply after World War II, but is now declining as Filipino priests and ministers are replacing Americans and other foreigners.

(D) Our civilian official strength has been cut back by almost thirty percent in the last eighteen months, and if the reduction in the number of Peace Corps volunteers is included, there has been a fifty percent reduction.

(E) Lower levels of military activity in Vietnam, and budgetary limitations have reduced our military strength. We have moved out of Mactan Air Base, and by June of this year military personnel reductions will be slightly over two-thousand.

2. The impact of this presence is difficult to measure. For the press critic and student radical in Manila, hostility to the United States is rooted in psychological and historical factors little affected by the number of Americans in the Philippines. In the countryside the respect and admiration for the United States is still so great that the American Ambassador runs the awkward risk of outdrawing the Philippine President. There are well publicized problems around the bases, but with one exception our military is concentrated in two relatively isolated areas in the Philippines, and the social and economic impact in even these areas is by no means all bad. There has certainly been no suggestion from the Philippine Government that there are too many Americans here. On the contrary, the Government is doing all it can to encourage the presence of many more American tourists.

3. It is important to recognize that seventy years of close association with the Philippines has bound us together, and that for good or ill, an American presence (in the broadest sense of this term) would remain even if every official American went home. We have established institutions here that took deep root and are now a part of Philippine society, representative government, private enterprise, and freedom of the press. Filipino newspapers would still continue to carry American columnists, American comic strips, and American ball scores. American books, movies, and products would still be favored. Over 4,500 Filipinos went to the United States for education and training last year. Over 16,000 went as visitors. Approximately 20,000 a year are now going as immigrants, and many later travel back to the Philippines for an extended stay. The cumulative impact of these tens of thousands of exposures to our country would have a continuing and pervasive influence on the course of internal Philippine affairs, and on our bilateral relations, even if there were no U.S. Government employees in the country.

4. Considered in this broader context, the number of official Americans in the Philippines is not in itself a critical factor in our relations. Our intentions and attitudes in all the complex issues in our contractual relationships, and our policy in the area as a whole, are still much more important.

End of Draft.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 2946 from Manila, April 4, reported Byroade's “shock” at the extent of the personnel cuts to be made in the Philippines and stated that “the implications” of this decision “could not be more profound.” In regard to the 25 percent across the board personnel reduction, Byroade stated that he felt “strongly that we have passed the point where this is possible. Whole operations and probably some agencies must be taken out to achieve reductions of this magnitude, not crippling cutbacks that will leave me with nothing operating properly.” (Ibid.)

[3] In telegram 52752 to Manila, April 10, Green informed Byroade that all agencies in the Philippines were required to submit lists of their positions “in ascending order of essentiality,” and that a “subcommittee established in State” would submit recommendations to the Under Secretaries Committee, which would “make final approval on programming of reductions and submit to President.” (Ibid.)

217. Paper Prepared For the Under Secretaries Committee[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Revisions in U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement and Other Relationships

I. Statement of Requirement

A. Revision of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement, As Amended, of 1947

The President by Mr. Kissinger's memorandum of October 20, 1969 directed the Under Secretaries Committee to make two studies:

(1) A comparison of the 1947 U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement with similar U.S. arrangements elsewhere, in which the objective would be to bring U.S. privileges and immunities in the Philippines down to a level comparable with rights we enjoy elsewhere. Particular attention was to be given to the questions of length of tenure and criminal jurisdiction procedures.

(2) A comparison of the extent of U.S. base holdings in the Philippines with those we hold elsewhere, with a view to the releasing of Philippine baselands surplus to our needs.

These studies were to be preliminary to an early invitation to the Philippines to renegotiate the Military Bases Agreement.

B. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1953

The Philippines has advised us that in any discussion of the 1947 MBA they will wish also to discuss certain aspects of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Therefore, in addition to answering the specific questions raised in Mr. Kissinger's memorandum, the IG has formulated recommendations on issues involved in these agreements.

II. Issues and Positions

There follows a statement of the steps which this study discloses are desirable, together with a statement of areas where views are divided. The USC is requested to approve recommendations that are unanimous and make decisions where differences exist.

The IG, concentrating on the areas of tenure, criminal jurisdiction and base operating rights, has concluded that with a few exceptions the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement is broadly comparable with our arrangements elsewhere.

A. Tenure

The Philippine bases agreement runs to 1991; most of our other agreements are on a one-year terminable basis, and run concurrently with mutual defense treaties.

Divided Position

State recommends that the MBA be put on a one-year terminable basis to bring it into conformity with those we have elsewhere.

DOD does not concur with the State recommendation because DOD does not believe such a change is necessary or desirable.

A decision is required.

B. Criminal Jurisdiction

In this area, the provisions of the Philippine agreement are about comparable with those we have elsewhere.

Unanimous Position

Both State and DOD agree that the principal features of the existing arrangement should be retained and that anticipated GOP demands for exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses either off-base or both off-base and on-base and pretrial custody should be opposed.

However, this conclusion may well be unacceptable to the Philippines unless changes in the manner the SOFA actually operates could make our position more palatable and the IG will be studying existing SOFA procedures to see if any modifications can be devised to make this decision more acceptable.

C. Base Rights and Operating Rights

Some of our agreements give slightly greater rights to host countries in such matters as the posting of host officials on the bases than the Philippine Agreement does.

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree that the U.S. should consider permitting the posting of appropriate Philippine officials on the bases to perform or oversee normal immigration, health, customs and other administrative functions.

Divided Position

State recommends that the U.S. also consider establishment of some form of nominal joint command of the bases. DOD does not concur.

A decision is required.

D. Selective Joint-Use of the Bases

Short of full joint-basing, there appear to be possibilities for offering the Philippine Government a broader role in utilization of the bases through selective joint-use in specific circumstances in which U.S. operational control of the bases would not be compromised.

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree on the utility of a study of joint-use proposals prior to the initiation of negotiations; and that the IG will forward any recommendations developed by such a study to the USC.

E. Baselands

The study shows that the extent of Air Force baselands in the Philippines far exceeds such holdings in any other country. The study indicates Navy baselands can also be reduced.

1. Clark

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree on relinquishment of a part of Zone D acreage (47,250 acres in all).

State and DOD also agree in principle that relinquishment be considered of portions of Zone A (28,350 acres) and Zone B (10,650 acres), following a land use survey to determine watershed requirements.

2. Sangley

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree on reversion of Sangley when the requirement for its Vietnam-related support efforts ceases.

3. Subic Bay

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree on reversion of a portion of the 36,124 acres at Subic following a watershed survey.

4. John Hay

Unanimous Position

State and DOD recommend retention of John Hay unless the GOP insists on its return.

F. The 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty

The Philippines may raise the issue of the 1952 mutual security treaty in the course of the base negotiations. Presumably the Filipinos will seek, as they have in the past, to obtain a more explicit commitment from the United States to come to their defense than that contained in the treaty.

Unanimous Position

State and DOD agree on the need to tell the Philippine Government when they raise this question that any effort to renegotiate the treaty would be completely counterproductive, especially, given the mood of the U.S. Senate.

G. 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement

The Philippines may raise the issue of MAP administration procedures and JUSMAG organization and privileges. These are nagging irritants which the Philippines have long wished to solve. In 1966 the Philippine Government drafted (and the U.S. rejected) a new draft Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in which a drastic reduction in JUSMAG prerogatives was proposed along with a countervailing increase in Philippine authority and independence of action, particularly with regard to freeing the Philippine Government from obtaining JUSMAG concurrence on each MAP procurement. The Philippine draft agreement also sought removal of the present injunction in paragraph 15 of the 1953 agreement that arms and other military supplies can only be obtained from third country sources with explicit U.S. approval.

These may be important considerations for the Filipinos. It is possible that U.S. concessions in this area may relieve Philippine pressures for concessions in other areas, particularly in criminal jurisdiction where there is little give in the U.S. position. Accordingly, the IG has assigned itself the task of determining specific revisions in the Military Assistance Agreement that might be responsive to Philippine needs.

Unanimous Position

State and DOD are agreed that specific ideas for revision of the Military Assistance Agreement should be forwarded to the Under Secretaries Committee.

H. Laurel–Langley

The Filipinos would like to have simultaneous negotiations on the MBA and the 1955 Laurel–Langley Trade and Investment Agreement, under which the U.S. and the Philippines enjoy mutual advantages. (The Laurel–Langley Agreement is due to expire in 1974.) The Philippines wishes to retain tariff preferences in the U.S. market and a sugar quota in a successor agreement to Laurel–Langley. They may seek to tie extension of U.S. base rights to obtaining equivalent Laurel– Langley concessions.

Unanimous Position

We would prefer not to have combined negotiations on the MBA and Laurel–Langley. However, if it should occur that we were otherwise making trade concessions in the Laurel–Langley context, we might try to use these to get concessions from the Filipinos on base matters, as well as in the context of favorable investment provisions for American capital.

I. Likely Impact on the Negotiations of Presidential Directives to Reduce U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel in the Philippines

By Mr. Kissinger's memorandum of March 25, 1970, the President has directed a one-third reduction of U.S. military and civilian personnel stationed at Clark Air Base. A one-quarter reduction of U.S. personnel of all U.S. military and civilian agencies elsewhere in the Philippines was also directed.

The likely impact on the military bases negotiations of personnel reductions of this magnitude will be to increase Philippine demands for more financial offset to counter the negative effects these cuts will have on their balance of payments. Since U.S. base spending totals about $150 million annually, it seems evident the reductions will entail a loss to the Philippines of the order of $50 million annually.

Unanimous Position

State and Defense are now analyzing the impact of the President's directive, particularly its effect on the Philippine balance of payments. We anticipate the reductions will have an adverse impact on the negotiating atmosphere for the talks on the MBA and related matters.

J. Timing

The Philippines is not presently ready to enter into MBA or, indeed, other negotiations. It would be advantageous, nevertheless, for the U.S. to take and keep the initiative with regard to demonstrating our readiness for negotiations.

Unanimous Position

State and DOD are agreed that the U.S. should take the initiative with the GOP by offering to negotiate an MBA that would be comparable to modern Asian SOFAs; however, it is agreed that in making such an offer no mention be made of our willingness to relinquish baselands.

[1] Source: Department of State, NSC Under Secretaries Committee: Lot 83 D 276, Box 7813, NSC–U/SM 51B—4/7/70—US Philippine Bases Agreement Revisions. Secret. This study was prepared by the East Asia Interdepartmental Group, which was charged with studying the Military Bases Agreement revisions. According to an April 7 memorandum from Hartman to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other principals of the Under Secretaries Committee, this issue paper was prepared to “facilitate discussion on this topic” at the Committee's April 9 meeting. Circular Airgram 2879 to Manila and CINCPAC, May 23, reported that the Under Secretaries Committee endorsed the East Asia Interdepartmental Group's proposed revisions at the April 9 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US) No memorandum of conversation of the Under Secretaries Committee has been found.

218. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Implications of the Proposed Reduction of U.S. Government Personnel in the Philippines

You asked whether Ambassador Byroade has some legitimate arguments against the proposed personnel reduction in the Philippines, or whether he is simply placating Marcos.[2]

These are Byroade's feelings, not Marcos'. So far as we are aware, Marcos does not know of the planned reductions, though rumors are already said to be floating around Clark.

Informal consultation with the State Department and the Embassy in Manila indicates that the following questions will arise in implementing your instructions:

—The impact upon our strategic position in the Pacific.

—When and how to tell the Philippine Government about the reductions.

—The effect that the reductions will have on the political position of President Marcos.

—The relationship between the reductions and upcoming negotiations on our base rights in the Philippines.

—The impact of cuts on the Philippine economy, particularly its foreign exchange position.

—The labor problems caused by laying off Philippine employees.

—The effect of the phasing of the reductions on all the above.

I have asked Elliot Richardson, as Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, to draw up a reduction plan for submission to you. He has been specifically authorized to include in his report an evaluation of the implications of the planned reductions for U.S./Philippine relations and for U.S. strategic capabilities in Asia. I have suggested that the plan envisage a completion date in 1971 for the planned reductions. Defense has asked for more time to make its submission for this report and a separate memorandum is coming to you on this subject.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

[2]  Byroade had requested in telegram 2946 from Manila (see footnote 2, Document 216) that his telegrams concerning the “profound implications” of the planned personnel reductions be shown to President Nixon, and Kissinger had reassured Green in an April 7 telephone conversation that this would be done. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 556, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. II)

219. Letter From the Ambassador to the Philippines (Byroade) to President Nixon [1]

Manila, May 13, 1970.

Dear Mr. President:

I feel that you will wish a more personal appraisal of some of the characteristics of President Marcos than it is wise for me to put into my general report to you, which of course will be read by several others. I wish I could do this part orally, but as this is impossible at present, I have asked Dr. Kissinger to prevent distribution and filing of this portion of my report.[2]

As I see it, Marcos is a product of the political system here, and not the cause of that system. His training in that system here has been in fact nearly all of his adult life—through the Congress, the Senate and now the Presidency. The whole atmosphere has been one of public expectancy that anyone able to move through these ranks would capitalize financially on their positions—and anyone who did not would be considered naive indeed—if not down-right incapable. This is one of the things that I predict will change—but we are only in the initial phases of this now.

Politics is still the single biggest industry in the Philippines. Candidates for public office spend huge amounts of their personal wealth in campaigns. If elected, they usually recoup these amounts while in office. Marcos is no exception to this. Marcos, like other Filipino politicians, has always been corrupt by American standards, but by Filipino standards he is no better or no worse than other Filipino politicians. Some several persons close to the President say that during his first term in office he amassed a multimillion dollar fortune, although there is no absolute proof of this. Yet when you compare his performance with that of past Filipino Presidents, such as Garcia and Magapagal, Marcos has done more for the Filipino people than many of the Presidents combined. He built more roads, pushed through miracle rice, built school houses, etc. While the opponents dismiss this with the phrase “the more projects, the more kickbacks,” nevertheless there is material evidence to show that Marcos did carry through with his infrastructure program better than anyone before him had done.

Not long after I got here a Chinese businessman of prominence said to me “You Americans are far too critical of Marcos because he is the best we ever had. Before Marcos, not even 20% of appropriated funds were put to good usage. Marcos has more than doubled that figure—and that's progress.” I guess it's all in the point of view!

Marcos is a typical Filipino. While money normally is power anywhere in the world, in the Philippines it would seem, many times, that money is the only thing that counts. Marcos believes that to keep the feudal-like political barons from his throat he must amass sufficient wealth to keep them in check. When you ask a Filipino who may have $20,000,000 why he continues to amass greater amounts of money, he will give you a simple but honest reply: “That's the way the game is played in the Philippines.” Marcos also believes that anything can be bought in the Philippines and he may be right, at least for the time being—but as I say in my main report I believe a beginning at least is being made in a change in the system.

I have no doubt that Marcos will endeavor to recoup the private monies that he spent in getting re-elected. Whether he will have the good sense to at least stop there, I just don't know. He is not engaged in petty or small things such as the corruption around our bases. He is a very sophisticated operator and anything he does will be well concealed through others in such things as private investment, stock market manipulations, etc.

Whatever his shortcomings, the Philippines, barring accident, has him for almost four more years, and so do we. Someday there will be a Jerry Roxas, but Jerry for all of his fine qualities, lacks one all-important one—the leadership capacity to get himself elected President of the Philippines. Marcos has been described as the greatest Filipino politician since Quezon. Politicians do not achieve greatness by insensitivity to changing demands, and I think it would be a mistake to underestimate Marcos' capacity to adjust to a new situation and work towards goals that are both in his own and his country's interests.

The personal relationship we have been able to develop with both the President and Mrs. Marcos are highly satisfactory—and have reached the point where I can say in all candor I do not want them to be any closer than they are now. He is easy and pleasant to work with, is extremely able and is quick in his actions and decisions. He is also, underneath, obviously quite pro-American.

I hope very much, Mr. President, that we can get at least a part of what you want here during your own tenure of office.

Respectfully yours,

Henry A. Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Top Secret.

[2]  Kissinger forwarded the letter to the President under a June 8 covering memorandum which summarized Byroade's “revealing and sensitive letter” “on President Marcos and his place in Philippine politics and history.” A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Attached but not printed.

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 15, 1970, 0301Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Top Secret; Nodis. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, May 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

Renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines

In response to your request of last autumn, the Under Secretaries Committee has come up with the outlines of a negotiating stance with regard to base rights in the Philippines, and has approved some preliminary conclusions concerning the base land issues.

In short, the Committee came to the following conclusions:

—Base Lands. USAF holdings in the Philippines alone exceed all other USAF holdings in foreign countries. It was agreed to relinquish 36% of the holdings at Clark and to consider further relinquishments there. The naval base at Sangley will be given up as soon as the need for its Vietnam support effort ceases. Part of the Navy's 36,000 acres at Subic Bay should be relinquished, following a watershed survey. Camp John Hay (Baguio) will be retained unless the GOP insists on its return. These relinquishments will be offered during the course of negotiations to gain Philippine acceptance of points vital to us on other issues, and thus will not be offered at the beginning of the negotiation.

—Tenure. The Bases Agreement runs until 1991. Such agreements with other countries usually have a one-year termination clause, comparable to the mutual defense treaties. The Committee agreed that the unstable political situation in the Philippines argues against offering such a one-year clause. However, if the Philippines press us on the Agreement, consideration will be given to reducing the length of its validity and/or agreeing to a termination clause.

—Criminal Jurisdiction. The Agreement itself is similar to other agreements, but the GOP seldom waives its jurisdiction, whereas other countries regularly do so. Problems concerning fair trial, the conditions of imprisonment, etc., generate unique problems in the Philippines. It was agreed to study ways to improve procedures and relations with the Philippines on this sensitive issue, but to place a high priority on retaining our present rights in this delicate area.

—“Filipinization” of the Bases. Detailed proposals will be developed to permit the Philippines a role in immigration, health and customs procedures on the bases, to provide for selective joint use and possibly to effect a symbolic joint command of the bases. In these respects, our present Agreement is less liberal than with most other countries.

It was agreed some of the most persistent Philippine complaints relate not to the Base Agreement itself, but to other aspects of our military relationship. On the 1953 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the Filipinos have a point. We have controls not duplicated elsewhere— for instance, the GOP can purchase military equipment from third countries only with our approval. A specific proposal for renegotiation of that agreement, to bring treatment in line with our other allies, will be developed and cleared by the Under Secretaries Committee. Negotiations on this agreement could be dovetailed into the Bases Agreement negotiation at a later stage.

The GOP periodically suggests that it wishes to renegotiate the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty to get a more explicit commitment from us. The Committee agreed that we would suggest to the GOP, if the issue arises, that renegotiation would be impractical and might be counterproductive.

The Philippines have hinted that they would like to renegotiate our economic agreements concurrently with the military ones. Their enthusiasm for this course of action may be diminishing, however, as they begin to realize that they cannot demand economic concessions for continued military agreements, as they have done in the past. The Committee agreed to keep these negotiations separate if possible.

The attached memorandum suggests that we will hold up negotiation of the Military Bases Agreement while we analyze the impact of proposed personnel reductions on our relationship.[2] This is inaccurate. There will of course be a connection, but no proposal to defer the Base negotiations was actually agreed among the Under Secretaries, and in fact State is proceeding to develop specific negotiating instructions and to authorize our Embassy in Manila to begin negotiations.

The GOP will probably wish to defer formal negotiation for Philippine domestic reasons. This is not a matter of great concern, since our willingness to negotiate will be documented by our offer, and this alone takes much of the sting out of the aspects of our military relationship which are unfavorable to the Philippines.

There is no need for any decisions on your part at this time. I will continue to keep you informed as the negotiating scenario develops.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

[2] See Document 218.

[3] Circular airgram CA–2879 to Manila and CINCPAC, May 23, informed the addressees that the U.S. Government would be “ready shortly” to inform the Philippine Government that it was prepared to begin negotiations and requested their comments and recommendations. More specifically it asked the Country Team to make detailed studies “of concessions we could offer the Philippines to Filipinize the bases,” of “joint-use proposals we offer the Philippines in the course of negotiations,” and of “nominal joint command proposals” that could be offered. Finally, the Country Team was requested to “make a detailed study of base and watershed requirements to determine what specific proposals for relinquishment of acreage” at Clark AFB and Subic Bay Naval Base “could be tabled in the course of negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15–4 PHIL–US)

222. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, June 16, 1970.

SUBJECT

Letter from Ambassador Byroade

Ambassador Byroade has sent you a personal assessment of the situation in the Philippines and of the proper role for U.S. policy (Tab B).[2] This was the assessment he promised when he saw you in San Clemente last August. (I recently sent you his separate, highly sensitive, letter assessing President Marcos in personal terms.)[3]

Byroade refers to the convulsion of anti-Marcos feeling which swept Manila in January and he observes that it is still impossible to say with confidence what caused that movement and what it may portend for the direction of Philippine development. He nevertheless ventures some estimates as to what happened then, what courses are open to Marcos now, and what the U.S. role should be now and in the future.

The riots against President Marcos. Byroade sees these as arising from the economic/financial crisis, from the psychological letdown following the election, from the revulsion against Marcos' manipulation of the elections, and from the long overdue outbreak of student political activism. At least as important, factions of the local Establishment turned against Marcos out of personal animosity and from fear of his growing power reflected in his election victory. Through their control of information media, these factions did an incredible hatchet job on Marcos' reputation within a matter of weeks.

(Byroade touches only lightly on another cause which was prominent in the Embassy's reporting at the time: in many normally conservative quarters including the Church, there has developed a deep and widespread frustration and disillusionment against the Philippine political system and its venality.)

The choices before Marcos. Marcos could embark on one of three broad courses:

—Assume leadership of the forces calling for fundamental but non-violent change, and challenge the Establishment.

—Continue the present lines of Philippine politics, playing off one group against the other, using the carrot and the stick, and avoiding any fundamental challenge to the system.

—Retreat to a defensive position relying upon the military and upon the more conservative elements in society.

Marcos does not seem to have decided which course he will take, and he may attempt to temporize throughout his second term. With the best will in the world, he might well find it impossible to pursue the first course above. The Establishment is very powerful, and resistances to change would be powerful. Marcos might be murdered if he attempted to challenge the system, and in any case he would not carry Congress.

The U.S. role. Byroade continues to think that we should take the course that you have sketched out: to modernize our relationship and put it on a “most favored nation” basis. He notes that we are moving ahead to begin negotiations on the major areas of our relationship.

He predicts, however, that we should not expect a dramatic improvement from our efforts, and he observes that our problems are most acute in renegotiating the Bases Agreement and Laurel–Langley Economic Agreements. He notes the following problems:

—Filipinos really do not realize that they are getting most–favored-nation or better treatment in many areas. As an example he points out that our military criminal jurisdiction agreement is in fact as favorable as our NATO or Japan formulas, but that most other countries almost invariably grant us waivers of jurisdiction in criminal cases, whereas the Philippines almost never do. Marcos himself was astonished when Byroade cited the comparative statistics on waiver requests to him.

—The Philippines will pose exaggerated demands which we will not be able to meet.

—Negotiations will proceed in a “Chautauqua” atmosphere which makes it doubly difficult to come to terms.

Byroade recommends nevertheless that we go ahead with due caution on the negotiations, and he recommends that we push ahead with economic negotiations without waiting for generalized preferences to LDCs under GATT. He believes that we should be prepared to give the Filipinos something in the way of continued preferences, while we protect the legitimate interests of American business in the Philippines. He suggests that we consider simultaneously negotiating a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty. (We have already urged State to develop a negotiating scenario for the economic negotiations.)

For the longer term, Byroade sees some hope. He says that all the Philippines needs is “good government and birth control.” He notes that there are powerful forces beginning to work toward an improvement in political morality, and that the Establishment is jittery and less inclined than heretofore to play “politics as usual.”

Ambassador Byroade urges that we provide quiet advice to move the Philippines towards correcting its own problems, but he also recommends more use of international advice through the IMF, the World Bank, etc. He urges also that we bring the Japanese into the exercise. He sees this as the way to move steadily away from our strictly bilateral “special relationships.”

I have sent an acknowledgement to Ambassador Byroade on his other letter on President Marcos. I have attached (Tab A) a note from you to Byroade, in case you wish to acknowledge this one.[4] Byroade has done an outstanding job in Manila. He has gotten across to the Philippine leadership that we are moving toward a new relationship, that we plan to treat the Philippines as an equal, but that we will no longer tolerate the Filipinos treating us as a whipping boy yet at the same time expect us to be particularly understanding and responsible toward them. (On at least two occasions, Byroade has stopped cold schemes by Romulo to blame us publicly in disputes over military base and consular matters, by making it clear that such behavior is simply not acceptable.) He has gotten the same message across to our military and civilian personnel in the Philippines, and has stopped certain high-handed practices which annoyed the Filipinos. At the same time, he has established close personal relations with Philippine leaders. (He was Marcos' personal guest on a recent Presidential boat tour of the outer islands.) I think that he would appreciate a message from you, and that he deserves one.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Ambassador Byroade at Tab A. The letter has been cleared with James Keogh.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information and action.

[2] Attached but not printed.

[3]  Document 219.

[4] Attached but not printed.

223. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, June 30, 1970.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971 File. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

224. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, July 2, 1970, 0928Z.

6187. Subj: Secretary's Talks with Marcos

1. In the brief interval after arrival of Secretary Rogers here and his call on Marcos, we had opportunity with Pedersen and Green present to run through the bilateral subjects that might come up, with particular attention to the subject of a possible state visit. The Secretary had had the opportunity of reading report of my last conversation with Marcos on this subject transmitted to Department as Manila 6085.[2]

2. The Secretary decided that he and I would go alone to Malacanang and I got this word to Marcos prior to our arrival. When we arrived only Romulo was with Marcos. After the photographers had left Marcos indicated that he would appreciate a short time with the Secretary alone and the two of them went into the inner library. They stayed alone for the full hour that Marcos allotted to us. (Other heads of delegations were scheduled every 15 minutes thereafter.) In the meantime, Romulo and I occupied ourselves with current business and enjoyed the company of Mrs. Marcos for a portion of that time.

3. What follows herein is my own summary of the debriefing the Secretary had the time to give me, and which he had indicated conveys the substance on the main substantive points. It lacks obviously finer points and nuances which it may be possible for me to obtain from the Secretary later on as his schedule permits.

4. The most important point to emerge was that the proposed state visit for Marcos in August is indefinitely postponed. Marcos took the initiative on this subject, raising some of his own doubts about the wisdom of his absence here in August, and wondering frankly what practical results could come out of the visit at this time, despite the fact that he would personally very much like another opportunity for discussions with our President. The Secretary indicated that, while he knew from President Nixon personally how much he would welcome such a visit, that the timing did indeed raise some problems on our side. The Secretary mentioned upcoming election period in the United States, the sensitivity of matters affecting the Far East now in our relations with the Hill, etc. This led Marcos to suggest that maybe it was not very good timing for either of us. In the discussion that followed as to exactly how to leave the matter, the Secretary suggested that really nothing need be done in any public sort of way, as it had never become public knowledge that such a trip had been tentatively planned. Marcos said this was quite agreeable with him.

5. They both agreed that it would be extremely important that there be no leaks that a visit had been planned but postponed. In the event of unfortunate leaks it could, of course, be quite truthfully said that it was certainly the desire of our President to see President Marcos on a state visit and the matter had been discussed from time to time with no decision as to possible timing (I would like to add my own recommendation that all concerned quietly cross off the possibility of a Marcos visit on August 19 and ensure that there be no leak or comment about it). It was the Secretary's own impression that Marcos was not personally disappointed at the thought of an indefinite postponement, and in fact may have been somewhat relieved.

6. There was general discussion on the reduction of forces in the Pacific area to somewhere near pre-Tonkin levels as the situation would permit. It appears to me that the Secretary did a very good job on this and that Marcos accepted the philosophy that this was really a part of a process that America should go through in order to be certain that the administration could keep the support of the Congress and the country for maintaining those forces abroad that would be actually necessary for vital security interests. The Secretary talked about reductions to be made elsewhere in the Pacific. I feel that this subject went well. He did not, of course, get into actual figures for the Philippines, which I will handle later on with Marcos as they become known.

7. The Secretary expressed our appreciation to Marcos for the many instances of late in which he personally had lent the support of his office to making conditions around our bases better for our own forces. The Secretary took note of the fact that, as I had told him earlier, we were nearing the point of being ready to undertake base negotiations at his convenience. Marcos made a rather interesting comment that he thought our troops would be happier in the Philippines if they used their leave opportunities to travel more in the Philippines away from the base areas, where conditions were bound to be some-what abnormal. He said the average Filipino liked Americans, and it was a pity that most of the troops never saw anything of the Philippines except the bar-infested areas outside the base gates. (The President may be thinking of the benefits of tourism, but there is no doubt in my mind that he made a very good point on this one.) Marcos gave the impression he was really in no hurry on base negotiations, and would just as soon see them postponed for a while.

8. There was some general discussion of Laurel–Langley problems with both sides apparently agreeing that there seemed no need to attempt any early negotiations on that matter as well. Marcos did mention his concern again over the sugar quota and the Secretary said that there would be every desire on the part of his department to be helpful to the Philippines as this problem came up, but that as Marcos knew other departments and the Congress itself were in the last analysis probably most important in the decision making process. Marcos said he appreciated the statement of support from the Secretary on the part of the Department.

9. Marcos indicated that he hoped the Philippines could get more military assistance from the United States in the future so that they could handle to the greatest possible extent their own security problems. He said he thought that the army could handle the limited type of internal security problems that now face the Philippines, but that their capability at present was really very little greater than that, and their navy and air force was practically non-existent. He said he fully shared, what he understood to be President Nixon's view, that nations should be more self-reliant on such matters, but that the Philippine financial situation would prevent them from moving forward much further without assistance. The Secretary said that, within the increasingly tight budgetary restrictions upon the administration, Philippine requirements would of course continue to receive sympathetic consideration.

10. There was no specific discussion on any future amount or type of possible U.S. assistance to the Philippines.

11. The Secretary tells me that the talks were extremely friendly and frank throughout and it appeared to me that the talks went well. Marcos certainly seemed to be in a good mood as they emerged and rejoined Mrs. Marcos, Romulo and me.

12. The Secretary has asked me to add to this message his personal desire that all elements of State involved in a possible Marcos visit ensure that the matter die as of now without leak or comment. He also asked that this particular matter be explained to the White House staff so that they will realize the desirability of no leak or no further mention of such a possible visit.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rogers was in Manila to attend the 15th Annual Council Meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

[2] Telegram 6085 from Manila, June 30, reported Rogers' discussion with Marcos, including the postponement of the latter's August visit to Washington and the reduction of U.S. forces in the Pacific. (Ibid.)

225. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, July 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Personnel Reductions in the Philippines

Description of Reduction Plan Recommended by Under Secretaries Committee.

U. Alexis Johnson has transmitted the Under Secretaries Committee plan for personnel reductions in the Philippines.[2] A summary of the plan, which appears fully responsive to your instructions, is contained in the table at Tab B.[3] In general its principal features are:

—a 33 percent reduction at Clark Field and a 25 percent reduction of other military personnel. This cuts back our military presence in the Philippines to pre-Vietnam war levels.

—a minimum of military redeployments to other locations in the Western Pacific. All but 400 of the military reductions involve the elimination of positions not now filled or the return of personnel to the U.S.

—a 32 percent reduction in the total official U.S. presence in the Philippines (including personnel of civilian agencies and dependents) to be fully accomplished by June, 1971.

Implications of the Plan for our Strategic Position in the Pacific and our Relations with the Philippines.

The recommended reductions will reduce our capacity and flexibility to deal with military contingencies in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific but should not prove unmanageable as long as they are tied to Vietnam withdrawals. They should not affect our continued tenure at bases in the Philippines which will become increasingly important in the years to come because of their unique geographical location, their capacity to handle “surge requirements” and the likelihood that it will be more difficult to maintain present base structures at a number of other pacific locations.

In the long-run, the impact of a substantial reduction in our involvement in the Philippines, which will contribute to greater Philippine self-reliance, should be favorable to U.S.–Philippines relations. In the short-run, however, there will be the following problems:

—As a result of the reductions, 3,000–5,000 directly hired Philippine employees of our bases will be laid off and up to 11,000 Philippine contract employees will be put out of work. This could result in strikes and protests organized by Philippine labor unions.

—The Philippines will loose $30–40 million a year in foreign exchange during a time of balance of payments crisis.

—The people of the Philippines, the majority of whom regard the retention of U.S. bases as beneficial, could interpret the reductions as a U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. This could intensify the climate of uncertainty which now characterizes the Philippine political situation.

—The reductions could also be interpreted as a sign of our disapproval of President Marcos and a lack of confidence in his leadership, making his political position more difficult.

We can, however, minimize these short-run problems by:

—making it clear that the reductions are related to Vietnam withdrawals and to world-wide budgetary and manpower constraints.

—emphasizing our continued commitment to Philippine security in the context of bi-lateral military agreements.

—undertaking new programs, where possible in the context of multilateral approaches, to mitigate the economic effects.

Issues for Decision and Recommendations

1. Cuts in the Diplomatic Mission

Ambassador Byroade recommends only a minimum of reductions (roughly 3%) in U.S. personnel under his direct control. Under his recommendation, one American position from the diplomatic mission would be eliminated; 5 would be converted to staffing by Philippine nationals and 17 involving regional activities would be relocated else–where in the Pacific area. The Under Secretaries Committee has also described two alternate plans for Embassy cuts, but has made no recommendation.

—The first involves a reduction of 50, which amounts to a 12 percent cut. Although a few programs would have to be curtailed, Washington agencies involved, including the Bureau of the Budget, feel that a reduction of this magnitude would be manageable.

—The second envisages a 25% reduction in Embassy personnel. In the opinion of the Under Secretaries Committee, it would require termination or severe curtailment of a number of programs considered essential to achieving our current national objectives in the Philippines.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve the first alternate plan proposed by the committee which calls for a 12 percent cut in the diplomatic mission. In my opinion, the 3 percent reduction recommended by Ambassador Byroade would not be consistent with the deep cuts proposed in other programs.[4]

2. The Timing of Reductions at Clark Field

The plan for reductions at Clark Field, which was drawn up by the Air Force, calls for 75% of the reductions to be implemented by September, 1970 (100 percent implementation by that time would involve an undesirable increase in the number of personnel who had to be redeployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific).

On the basis of your instructions, the Defense Department has already incorporated this immediate drawdown at Clark into its budget plan for FY 71 and is now reluctant to stretch out the reductions any further. Ambassador Byroade feels, however, that problems with the Philippine Government would be reduced if the immediate reductions at Clark were delayed a few months. The Department of State requests that you instruct the DOD that at least 50% of the scheduled reductions for Clark Air Base be completed by September 30, 1970 and that, to the extent possible, the balance of that reduction be spread out more evenly over the period ending June 30, 1971.

Recommendation

I believe that Ambassador Byroade is in the best position to judge the effects of the timing of the cuts. I recommend, therefore, that we leave some leeway for the Clark reductions to be slowed down. This could be done by directing that at least 50 percent of the Clark cuts be made by September 30 and that the level of any immediate reductions beyond that level be worked out between the State and Defense Departments and the Ambassador.[5]

A memorandum from me to the Under Secretaries Committee approving the plan recommended by the committee and incorporating the two recommendations above is attached at Tab A.[6]

[1] Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 65, Memoranda to the President 1970, July, Part II. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for action. Printed from a copy that indicates Kissinger signed the original.

[2] On June 20 in a memorandum to the President from the Under Secretaries Committee. (Department of State, NSC Under Secretaries Committee File: Lot 83 D 276, NSC–U/DM 42, 6/22/70)

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] The President checked the approve option.

[5] The President checked the approve option.

[6] The memorandum, July 17, advised the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee that the personnel reductions in the Philippines should incorporate “a 12 percent reduction in our diplomatic mission” (with JUSMAG and DAO to be excepted from the cuts) and ordered that 50 percent of the reductions at Clark Field be accomplished by September 30, with the remainder to be done by June 30, 1971. Attached but not printed.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, July 22, 1970, 0945Z.

6794. Deliver Upon Opening of Business. Subj: U.S. Personnel Reductions in the Philippines. Ref: State 115651; State 115652.[2]

1. I called on President Marcos this morning to discuss forthcoming U.S. personnel reductions in accordance with above messages. In our continuing conversations in the past several weeks I have attempted to gradually prepare him for this type of specific information so that it would not come as a surprise. The Secretary also did a good job for us with Marcos on this subject when he was here early this month. In spite of this I think he got a bit of a jolt over the magnitude of the cuts and the fact that they would start right away.

2. The first question from Marcos was whether these cuts affected in any way our Mutual Defense Treaty. I said that they did not, that our commitments still stood, and after some discussion on this point I believe he accepted the fact that the air and naval defense of the Philippines was not basically affected.

3. Marcos then quickly focused into the three points which caused him the most concern. The first was the effect of the loss of foreign exchange earnings from the bases on their precarious economic situation and their current economic plans. The second was the loss of jobs for Filipinos that would inevitably follow such a large cut of Americans. A third point of concern was how the matter could be handled publicly in a manner which does not cause considerable damage here. Our discussion focused particularly on this latter point and prompted my preliminary warning cable requesting that no public statement be made until we could think about this matter further and I could discuss it with the military commanders.

4. With regard to the first two points above, Marcos asked if I could give him statistics as to what we thought would actually be involved in the way of loss of foreign exchange and loss of jobs. I told him I was not in a position at the moment to do that but would give him as quickly as I could our best estimate on these matters. He understands that they will be very preliminary “estimates” but said they would be useful to him in planning within his own government with the thought he should initiate immediately.

5. Marcos asked what our plans were for handling the matter publicly. I showed him a possible opening statement being considered in Washington as contained in State 115652. When he read it his first comment was “but this will serve to undo everything you and I have been trying to do.” What he was referring to was handling doubts that are widespread here about future U.S. intentions. He said he is continually being asked if the U.S. intends to withdraw completely from the Philippines. This had reached the point where he recently had been asked if the U.S. and the UK had not reached some kind of a private understanding where the British would remain in the area, thus allowing U.S. withdrawal. I said this was of course utter nonsense and he agreed, but pointed out the fact that such questions do come from responsible people.

6. Marcos asked what I could tell him alone and privately about the future of U.S. intentions. Specifically, was this merely the first of several cuts, and how far down did we plan to go? I told him that I felt relatively sure that there was no planning within our Executive Branch at this time for further cuts in the Philippines. I told him I was sure that our President plans a continued military presence in the Pacific area for the foreseeable future. I said that I could not of course be categorical with him on actual figures for the future, but left him with no doubt that we were not considering anything like a withdrawal from the Philippines.

7. Marcos asked at one point if we need make any statement at all. He said he was afraid that the draft I had shown him would really raise fundamental questions that could not be answered. He then went into a rather lengthy thinking out loud process as to whether we should not try to answer some of these fundamental questions positively and publicly. Could we for instance say that this was the only reduction planned for the Philippines under the MDT; that there was no question of U.S. withdrawal from the bases, etc., etc. I told him I did not think it was in the cards that we could publicly commit ourselves to maintain the new reduced force levels for forever-and-a-day. I did undertake to think further as to whether we might in some manner handle publicly the question of whether our commitments under the MDT were effected and also how the matter of doubts about “withdrawals” might be handled.

8. I never felt more the real need of long ranged strategic planning for the Pacific Area which I plugged for so hard at the Tokyo Conference than I did during this conversation. I was somewhat taken aback to have him express thoughts which resembled very closely some of my own argumentations on this subject as contained in past cables.

9. I am convinced that we are dealing with a subject here on which we should attempt to find the best possible answer for our own interests, as well as those of Marcos, and in some instances at least I believe we have common cause for concern. It is definitely not in our own interest to have our image here as one of possible “withdrawal.” Our problem certainly is not with Marcos, whom I can talk to directly and who has the benefit of occasional talks such as the recent one with the Secretary. Our problem is one of public understanding, and this includes not only the masses but up through the Government and legislative branches as well.

10. By septel I am sending a revised press statement which I think goes as far as we can towards meeting Marcos' needs, as well as our own. I will be seeing him again on July 23 at 10:00 a.m., and same night at dinner, and if draft is acceptable, I could show it to him then.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.

[2] Telegrams 115651, 115652, and 115650, to Manila, all July 20, informed Byroade of the decisions made by the President on reductions of U.S. personnel in the Philippines (see Document 225), asked him to inform Marcos, and asked him to comment on a statement for the press describing the decisions. (All ibid.)

227. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

Conversation Between the Director of Central Intelligence and Madam Imelda

Marcos, Wife of the Philippines President

PARTICIPANTS

Madam Marcos, The Director of Central Intelligence, and a CIA Staff Officer

The Director met with Madam Marcos for thirty-five minutes in the evening on 22 September 1970 at her suite in the Hotel Madison. Mr. James Rafferty, Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador in the Philippines, The Honorable Henry A. Byroade, made the introductions and then withdrew.

Madam Marcos began her presentation by drawing attention to the forthcoming 10 November 1970 elections for delegates to a constitutional convention in the Philippines, planned for June–July 1971. She said socialist movements sponsored by certain lay and clerical elements in the Catholic Church, particularly the Jesuits, and some Communist fronts are planning to contest administration candidates in the election. She believes that the Marcos Administration could lose the election by default unless a crash program is organized to help it win. She noted that the Church has already picked candidates, either priests or lay persons, for each election district. Should these groups succeed in achieving their objectives, it would change the form of government in the Philippines to Socialism or Communism, with only a few people realizing what the real consequences would be. She underscored her view that Philippine democracy is viable but will not survive unless the United States helps the Marcos Administration through this difficult period.

She said the Philippines is a child of the U.S. and illustrated this point by describing Vietnam as a French baby, Malaysia as an English baby, and Thailand as everybody's baby. She observed that in Asia one's creditability is not measured by how one treats a friend, but how one treats his children. She is of the opinion that the United States needs a victory in Asia to maintain its stature there. A victory in Vietnam would be negative, she said, because a U.S. victory in Vietnam is expected, but a victory for those who have and continue to advocate democracy in the Philippines would be a positive one. She pointed out the richness of Philippines national resources, the high literacy rate (85%), and the cosmopolitan make-up of the population, reiterating that something must be done between now and November 1971 to help President Marcos.

She revealed that her husband is personally directing the current campaign against pro-Communist guerrilla bands in Central Luzon, commonly referred to as HUKS, and reminded her listeners of his recent successes. Madam Marcos also noted the President's efforts to meet his foreign financial obligation in order to maintain a creditable international image, but observed that when high interest and principal payments are made, little is left for internal improvement. She called attention to the political and financial pressures on President Marcos and described him as being squeezed and pushed into a corner by his detractors. She described candidates of the socialist fronts led by the Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) headed by ex-Senator Manglapus and the Communists as articulate and clever. She believes these anti-Marcos forces might succeed in their plan to control the constitutional convention. In this event, she said, the President would become a “strong man” because he has no intention of being pushed out by the CSM or the Communists. She has been told that the CSM is being supported by the Adenauer Foundation in West Germany and has sources of succor in England. She also directed attention to Father Ortega who recently resigned as head of Ateneo University in Manila to stand as a candidate for the constitutional convention under the CSM banner. Father Ortega is now in New York soliciting support for the CSM. She disclosed that her visit with Pope Paul VI, while en route to Washington, was not for the purpose of piety but to persuade him to make his visit to the Philippines in the third week of November, which would be after the election, to prevent the Catholic Church in the Philippines from using his visit to further its political ambitions. She said the Pope suggested prayer as a possible answer but he also agreed to delay his visit.

After listening to Madam Marcos suggest that the U.S. sometimes helps enemies but forgets friends, i.e., help Germany and Japan but forget the Philippines, Mr. Helms asked what was meant by a crash program. She replied:

a. A rural electrification program for the Philippines costing between 300 and 500 million dollars over a ten to twenty year period, announced by President Nixon as soon as possible in order to achieve high political impact. She said it would be understood that the full amount would be stretched out over a long period of time but she also emphasized that the announcement would have to include the full amount in order to assure maximum political gain.

b. A side sum of money for support of some of Marcos' candidates at the barrio level.

c. Support for a better exchange rate between the peso and the dollar.

d. Birth control and family planning programs.

Madam Marcos said Dr. Hannah of AID, who is now in the Philippines, promised 30 million dollars in aid, presumably for the rural electrification program. She thinks the Asian Development Bank might provide 30 to 50 million dollars and the World Bank another 50 million dollars; some of this latter money would be for birth control and family planning. In response to Mr. Helms' request for other possibilities, she suggested short-term bank loans and other short-term international credit be extended to long-term loans to ease the pressure of large interest payments. Presumably the money saved would be used for political purposes. She also suggested some consideration be given to manipulating the sugar industry, noting that the sugar barons are giving money to Communists to win their support. Mr. Helms said that he would see President Nixon in the morning on 23 September and would at that time discuss Madam Marcos' helpful and eloquent conversation.

Madam Marcos then said funding the election at the barrio level would mean 4,000 pesos for 35,000 barrios and also asked for more arms and helicopters to enable President Marcos to capture a fourth HUK leader, Commander Dante. She praised the Rockefeller and Ford foundations who, she said, maintained the U.S. image in the Philippines by developing the IR–8 miracle rice.

Mr. Helms again said he would discuss the matter with President Nixon.[2] Madam Marcos noted that she might leave Washington on Thursday but was prepared to stay for as long a time as it was necessary to acquire support for her husband. Mr. Helms suggested that it would be proper for the response to her request to come from the White House. Madam Marcos ended the conversation by yet another appeal to “back her and support President Marcos and democracy in the Philippines.”

In the morning of 23 September, Mr. Rafferty called the Agency and said that Madam Marcos talked with President Marcos after Mr. Helms departed. President Marcos reportedly said to her that what is needed is a 300 million dollar stabilizing fund for the peso.[3] President Marcos also said that the 300 million dollars need never leave the United States but would be used to backstop the peso free exchange rate, which, said Rafferty, is in a precarious position. Rafferty had no other commentary to offer as an explanation or clarification, but said that he was merely noting this conversation between Madam Marcos and her husband.

[1] Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Mrs. Marcos' suite in the Hotel Madison. According to a September 23 attached covering memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, Helms met with Mrs. Marcos on the evening of September 22 at “the President's instruction.” According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met with Mrs. Marcos on September 22 from 12:42 p.m. to 1:14 p.m. No other record of the meeting has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

[2] No record of this meeting was found.

[3] The Department of State position on the $300 million stabilization loan, as expressed in telegram 159948 and in a memorandum to Kissinger, September 25, was that such a loan would be contrary to U.S. policy of moving from the bilateral to the multilateral arena in assistance to the Philippines and that it “would torpedo the whole IMF–IBRD arrangement which has so successfully established financial discipline in the Philippines.” (Both in the National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines)

228. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Consideration of Philippine Constitutional Convention Issue

At the 40 Committee meeting on September 24[2] the issue was discussed of the Philippine Constitutional Convention and its possible implications for the U.S. national interest. It was decided that it would be undesirable to have radical or left-wing elements take over the Constitutional Convention and draft a constitution which, as Mrs. Marcos suggested to you, might turn the Philippines into a social democratic welfare state or a Marxist state.

It was also recognized, though, that we do not now possess enough information to make judgments on how to proceed in this matter, and that a number of questions would need to be answered on the basis of information furnished by informed sources in Washington and in Manila. These questions are:

—What do we want to achieve?

—What elements should we back? (In this respect, it was agreed that backing supporters of President Marcos in the November 10 elections for delegates to the Convention would be preferable to seeing a leftist victory. Alternatively, however, we might wish to back a moderate group if one is identifiable because of the public criticism directed at Marcos over his rigging of the election which gave him his second term.)

—How do we provide our assistance?

—What should be the magnitude of our assistance?

At your direction State was tasked with preparing a study of the implications of the Constitutional Convention and the elections of delegates.[3] These specific questions, however, were not addressed. The 40 Committee will meet again on October 6 to review the answers and to submit the findings to you for a decision.

On the subject of assistance to the Philippines in rural electrification, it was determined that some help might be provided prior to the November 10 elections. A statement on U.S. assistance might be made or financing of some type provided through the World Bank. Under Secretary Johnson will speak to Mr. McNamara on this last point. Follow-up steps will also be discussed at the October 6 40 Committee meeting.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a September 25 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, the memorandum was prepared at Kissinger's direction. A notation on an attached covering memorandum reads: “Sent to Pres. 10/2/70.” A notation on the covering memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] The minutes are in the National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Minutes of 40 Committee Files, September 24, 1970.

[3] The Department of State study, October 2, stated that “Mrs. Marcos is the only person who professes to believe that the Philippine Constitutional Convention will be controlled by leftist elements. In fact, there are few observers who believe it will not be controlled by President and Mrs. Marcos.” (Ibid.) The study was prepared in response to a September 22 memorandum from Davis to Eliot. This attached covering memorandum stated that “the President has asked that State prepare an analysis of the Philippine Constitutional Convention and its possible outcomes, particularly the possibility that it will be controlled by leftist elements. This analysis should include Ambassador Byroade's appreciation of the situation.” (Ibid.) Assistant Secretary Green also sent a letter to Kissinger, September 24, stating that he had heard that Mrs. Marcos had told the President that “we in Washington didn't seem to know about the Constitutional Convention” and “that I had not known anything about it when she talked to me last Sunday” and seeking to correct this matter “for the record.” (Ibid.) Kissinger replied to Green on October 13, stating in a postscript that he had mentioned Green's letter to the President who “has no illusions about the lady and a great deal of confidence in you.” (Ibid.)

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, October 3, 1970, 1044Z.

9074. 1. Mrs. Marcos called Rafferty at 6:30 a.m. this morning asking that an appointment be arranged with me sometime today. I saw her for about an hour and a half beginning at 2:00 p.m.

2. After small talk about her trip, I received, in general, the same presentation she had made so often in Washington as reported in State 159948,[2] and I will not therefore repeat it here. It was I think a somewhat altered presentation in that at times she was extremely frank about some of the aspects of the convention that worried her, particularly on personalities involved, including those in their own camp.

3. I attempted to use the occasion to accomplish three specific things. One was that I thought she had gone a little too far in exciting Washington that the Philippines was on the doorstep of becoming another Chile. She took this well, but in the discussion I began to realize that she was personally more convinced that the dangers were real than I had thought would be the case. She is obviously extremely tense, has lost considerable weight, and is in a generally emotional state. She carried on at great length about the weaknesses of the Nacionalista candidates in the upcoming election. At one time she referred to some of them as “unattractive tribal leaders” who would be incapable of matching the eloquence of the opposition in the convention itself, and that many of them that she would consider reliable would be very bad vote getters indeed, and put on quite sorry campaigns. I believe that this is a belated recognition that she and Marcos did not work hard enough to convince the right people to run, and on this point, at least, I think she was being quite open and honest.

4. Another thing I sought to do was to try to make her understand why huge amounts of cash from America at this time were not only impossible due to severe budgetary limitations, but out of step with policy in Washington as well. I told her that Washington was taking very seriously the Nixon Doctrine, and that “multilateralism” was a strongly held view in Washington from the President on down. As a practical matter, I said that even had we been able to pull the development funds out of the safe that she had asked for, most would feel that this would have been an unkind act for the Philippines itself. It would have dislodged and ruined the whole IMF exercise, the formation of the consultative group, and even upset their current workable relations with U.S. private banks. I told her of the very encouraging meeting in Paris (of which she was uninformed) and said that Washington was sure that this route was better, not only under our own conditions at home, but in the long-term interest of the Philippines itself. She was encouraged by the news from Paris but stressed over and over again that in the next few weeks, in particular, they needed signs of direct American support. I told her we would do what we could do (Can we for instance speed up action on PL–480 program?).

5. A third thing I had in mind was to try to prevent her from making any more statements to the press that would imply huge American assistance. She gave me a skillful reply on what was needed at the moment in the Philippines. She does understand her people very well, but unfortunately has a rather dismal ignorance on how things work for us at home. I told her I was already extremely worried about her exclusive interview of Sept 29 with UPI, in which she had come very close indeed to directly quoting our President, with approval and support, and had in the same interview ticked off a number of items which totalled approximately $900 million. She read the account and gave her explanation that it was somewhat distorted and she had not meant this to be the case. I cautioned her against further encounters with the press in which she could be represented as saying such commitments had been made. I said that it was not improbable that our President might be publicly asked by hostile members of our Congress if these commitments had in act been made. This could, of course, lead to a highly embarrassing situation. There is no doubt that she got the point and realizes that there is indeed a direct conflict between the postures she feels are important for her to assume here at the moment and our own method of doing business. I hope this will tone down her future statements.

6. When I returned to the office we had received the press release of the consultative group in Paris and its accompanying reftel. This has received no publicity in Manila, I suppose because of no Philippine news presence in Paris, and inadequate diplomatic reporting. I am taking this to the President within the hour in the hopes that he will see desirability of playing this in a constructive light here. More will follow.

Postscript: I have just returned from seeing Marcos. He was most appreciative of CG press release and was taking action as I left to give it full play in the Philippines. As time was running out on him, if it was to get heavy coverage in the influential Sunday press, I did not take up other items.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 PHIL. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 159948 to Manila, September 29, summarized Mrs. Marcos' meetings in Washington. (Ibid., POL 7 PHIL)

230. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, October 6, 1970.

SUBJECT

Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970

PRESENT

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles, and Mr. Helms

Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Mr. Viron P. Vaky, and Mr. William Broe were present for Item 1.

Mr. John Holdridge and Mr. William Nelson were present for Items 2 and 3.

Colonel Richard T. Kennedy and Mr. Thomas Karamessines were present for all items.

[Omitted here is discussion of Chile.]

2. Philippines

a. The Chairman reviewed the recent visit of First Lady of the Philippines Imelda Marcos and the web she tried to weave around Washington while here. She had expressed herself to higher authority[2] and Mr. Helms as well as others, throwing curve balls around a leftist threat to the Constitutional Convention, the need for a huge balance of payments loan, high impact projects, i.e. rural electrification and support for her husband's political campaign. As a result, four questions had been passed to Ambassador Byroade in Manila. He had replied with a 10-page cable on 30 September 1970.[3]

b. The Ambassador's assessment did not support the First Lady's scare talk. The Byroade analysis was that Marcos was in full control at this time.

c. It was also noted that Marcos was allegedly angered by his wife's freewheeling; none of this had come directly from him and she might be launching personal political ambitions.

d. Mr. Johnson, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Packard generally agreed with the Byroade assessment. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that higher authority was sensitive on matters like this and did not want to be told everything was all right only to awaken months later to find the bottom dropping out. Mr. Helms said the basic question was: Do we want at this time to earmark funds for covert support of Marcos candidates at a time when President Marcos—no neophyte at feeding at our trough—had not yet asked for a peso.

e. Mr. Nelson pointed out that there were 2400 candidates for about 130 seats and that current information was that the party in power had more than a 50% leverage, the opposition no more than 25%.

f. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Manila was directed to make an independent assessment (considering the worst that could occur) in as much detail as possible and have it ready for next week's meetings. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Philippines.]

Peter Jessup

[1] Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Minutes, October 6, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.

[2]  Imelda Marcos had met with President Nixon on September 22 from 12:42 p.m. to 1:14 p.m. No record of this meeting has been found.

[3]  Byroade's backchannel message to Green, September 30, was forwarded to the 40 Committee and the NSC under an October 1 covering memorandum [text not declassified]. (National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines)

231. Paper Prepared in the Embassy in the Philippines[1]

Manila, October 13, 1970.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]Manila Reply to Questions Concerning Philippine Constitutional Convention

1. It might be useful for a better understanding of the atmosphere in which the Constitutional Convention will take place to note current issues in Philippine political life which affect U.S. interests. These issues, which have been developing over a number of years, are:

a. A desire to eliminate special privileges currently allowed to U.S. investors and to regulate U.S. investments in the Philippines by new legislation based upon laws similar to those governing foreign investments in other Southeast Asian countries. In 1946 the Philippine Constitution was amended to give U.S. citizens equal rights with Filipinos in the development of natural resources and in the operation of public utilities. The Laurel–Langley Agreement also granted reciprocal national treatment to U.S. or Philippine citizens engaged in commercial activities within the other country. In addition, it provided for tariff preferences which favor the U.S. This agreement has been modified but its basic provisions remain intact.

b. A policy for U.S. military bases which would limit the free hand which we have thus far enjoyed in their operation and which would, at the same time, raise the price we must pay. The Philippine Constitution, for example, authorizes the U.S. to acquire bases in the Philippines for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the U.S., rent free.

c. A foreign policy which would establish diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations.

2.

What interest does the U.S. have in the Philippine Constitutional Convention?

In the long run we believe U.S. interests would be served adequately by a constitution which would encourage the viability of a self-sustaining, friendly Philippines, wherein our investments would not be discriminated against and whose soil we could use for military purposes under certain conditions. In the short term, 3–5 years, we would not want the use of the two military bases, Clark and Subic, significantly curtailed. In addition, we would not want to be confronted with constitutional provisions that would adversely affect U.S. investments in the Philippines without adequate provisions for retaining, or receiving compensation for, assets acquired under the current arrangement.

3.

Whom should we back, President Marcos, the moderates, or no one?

At this point in time there is no need to commit U.S. support to any particular group. Marcos-backed delegates probably will constitute the single largest voting bloc in the Convention. The other delegates will be made up of smaller groups representing business, religious, provincial and other special interests. These smaller groups will form alliances with one another and trade off support depending upon the particular interests they wish to advance at a given moment. Information available to us now on approximately 1,800 out of the more than 2,500 candidates leads to the conclusion that the majority are moderate in their outlook on issues which affect the U.S. Of the 1,800 candidates examined, there are less than 20 who can be classified as radical left or communist.

4.

If we are to become involved, how should we do it and what should be the size of our activity?

We should remain alert to the workings of the Convention. Should trends develop which would adversely affect our interests we should act [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to back the work of individual delegates or group leaders and deflate the more extreme proposals. We cannot control the majority of the Convention delegates. We can, however, directly or indirectly control small blocs of delegates which could, in turn, be joined to larger forces to protect our interests if the need arises. We believe the total number of delegates required to influence the Convention would not exceed twenty.

5.

“Worst Case” assessment[2]

There is a remote possibility that a solid minority of the delegates might acquire a supra-nationalist attitude or spirit and press for a constitutional revision which would jeopardize our interests. They might call for an immediate nationalization of foreign investments with only nominal compensation or they might seek to deny us the unrestricted use of our military bases. In such an event, we believe we could [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fragment the minority bloc, and encourage delegates to join the Marcos bloc. This would be costly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], and might promote charges of political interference, but probably could be effective. In the long run such American interference in Philippine elections, however, would be politically counterproductive.

6.

Possible outcome of the election

The intelligence available to us at this juncture indicates that Marcos, without making any further effort, can be expected to emerge from the elections with a minimum of 100 delegates[3] responsive to his dictates. This is so because of the procedures which govern the campaign. Marcos has the best political machine in the country and access to public funds which no other organization can match. There are several other factors which give Marcos an advantage. The Liberal Party has not recovered from its defeat in the 1969 Presidential elections and lacks adequate funds. The Catholic Church lacks the experience, the funds and the organization necessary to contest political elections successfully on a nationwide basis. With the possible exception of Manila, and Rizal Province, the field is open to the pressures and tactics that the Marcos machine has demonstrated it is capable of applying. If he does not have a clear majority of the delegates in hand after the election of delegates, he will, as a result of his machine's effort between now and the opening of the Convention, acquire what he needs for a majority when the Convention begins. He controls the Government machinery and will be the President for three more years. The problems that Marcos might have during the election and Convention will stem to a certain extent from his tendency to over-kill and the resentment that such an approach generates.

7.

Possible outcome of the Convention

The Convention most likely will produce a moderate document containing modest changes in the structure and functioning of the Government. The proposed Constitution probably will affect directly or indirectly foreign investments in the Philippines, although it is doubtful that these new provisions would be so extreme in nature as to exclude or seriously damage our business interests. This will probably also apply to the U.S. military bases.

8. The unknown factors which complicate our analysis are the precise objectives and plans of President Marcos. We know he wishes to prevent any significant reduction of the powers of the Philippine President. He also does not wish to decentralize a highly centralized government. Some say he would like to perpetuate himself in the Presidency. It is on these issues that delegates not in the Marcos camp might unite into an anti-Marcos bloc. Should Marcos seek to change the term of the President from two four-year terms to one six-year term and have this new provision apply to his administration, he probably will provoke the delegates to take extreme positions, although they would not be against a six-year term per se. If Marcos does decide that his tenure as President is to be his primary objective, he would be willing to make all compromises necessary to achieve this end. This could include a decision by him to adopt a supranationalist position, and, in the unlikely event Marcos finds himself unable to control the Convention, it is possible that he would move to dissolve it.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Country Files, Philippines, 1969, 1970, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The assessment was in response to an October 6 directive of the 40 Committee (Document 230).

[2] In an October 13 covering memorandum to Johnson, Green noted that should the “Worst Case” eventuate, i.e. “that a solid minority of the Convention might call for revisions which could jeopardize U.S. interests,” [text not declassified] “believes that this minority could be fragmented [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].” However, such an action would be costly [text not declassified]. Green said that “I agree in general with these assessments, and see no reason to initiate any [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] action directed supporting President Marcos in the Convention at this time.”

[3] There will be a total of 320 delegates to the Convention. [Footnote in the source text.]

232. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, October 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Philippine Constitutional Convention

At your direction the 40 Committee has three times[2] met to discuss Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos' urgent request to you for covert financial support to President Marcos in connection with the November 10, 1970, elections of delegates to the Philippine Constitutional Convention to be held in June–July 1971.

Independent assessments of the prospects of the Convention being dominated by communists and radical leftists, as feared by Mrs. Marcos, were requested and received from Ambassador Byroade [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Manila.[3] Neither believes that anything is likely to happen during the forthcoming elections which confirm Mrs. Marcos' foreboding. In addition, in a recent conversation with Ambassador Byroade, President Marcos himself stated that he does not share Mrs. Marcos' concerns.

The consensus is that President Marcos will want to and can quite adequately dominate the Convention through pro-Marcos delegates and is already moving to assure the election of delegates who will support him. He will probably be successful in this endeavor without any U.S. help. Marcos-backed delegates are likely to constitute the single largest voting bloc in the Convention.

As of now there are some 2600 candidates for 320 delegates positions to the Convention. Information presently available on approximately 1800 of these candidates leads to the conclusion that the majority are moderate in their outlook on issues which affect U.S. interests. Of the 1800 candidates studied, there are less than 20 who can be classified as radical left or communist. Intelligence available at this juncture indicates that Marcos, without any further effort, can be expected to emerge from the November elections with a minimum of 100 Convention delegates responsive to his dictates.

The principal knowledgeable concerns expressed over problems that Marcos might face during the election and ensuing Convention generally stem from his tendency to over-kill and the resentment that such an approach generates.

Based on the above, the 40 Committee concluded that involvement in the forthcoming elections of delegates to the Philippine Constitutional Convention is inadvisable. The Committee also agreed that following the election there should be a careful assessment of those through whom we might work effectively in furtherance of U.S. interests during the Convention should circumstances then so dictate.

I will follow up on this and see that appropriate proposals for any action at the Convention are submitted to the 40 Committee for consideration.

[1] Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject File, Philippines. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation indicates the President saw it.

[2] The 40 Committee meetings were held on September 24, October 6, and October 14. (Memoranda for the record; ibid., Minutes of 303 Committee, September 24, October 6, and October 14, 1970)

[3]  Document 231.

233. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 15, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Henry A. Byroade, American Ambassador to the Philippines

John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT

The President's Discussions with Ambassador Byroade on Developments in the Philippines

Ambassador Byroade began by explaining to the President[2] that there was very little he could tell the President which was good, in fact, he anticipated the President would be more concerned than ever before with what Ambassador Byroade had to tell him. (The President observed that the Philippines was indeed a “disaster area.”) However, just to show that things weren't entirely bad, he wanted to tell the President of progress which had taken place in three areas: foodstuffs, population control, and increased influence on the part of technically-trained personnel. On food products, the Philippines now produced all the rice needed to support the population and then some. As to population control, a very effective program had been implemented by President Marcos which enjoyed the support of large segments of society including the Catholic Church, which had resulted in the establishment of birth control clinics throughout the Philippines and a downward trend in population increase. It was estimated that by 1980 the rate of increase would drop from the present 3.3 percent per annum to 1.1 percent. Ambassador Byroade described this as a revolution which was even more important than the “green revolution,” and noted that the Philippines would probably lead the rest of Asia in the field of population control.

Turning to the influence of the “technocrats,” Ambassador Byroade said that as a result of prodding by the IMF Marcos had been induced to put fiscal controls into effect and to put trained personnel in charge of these reforms. In fact, about all the trained people the Philippines possessed were now in positions of responsibility, and these young men were becoming increasingly influential in determining Philippine policies. They were capable of understanding, for example, that discrimination against American business interests might cost the Philippines a disinvestment of close to $600 million, which would be a disaster for the Philippine economy. Thanks to the technocrats, Marcos was now considering measures to ease the pressures on American business interests. The President said that he was glad to have this information.

Turning to the political situation in the Philippines, Ambassador Byroade stated that he was obliged to report that nothing good would come out of the Philippines in the next six months. Just before leaving for Washington, he had had a long conversation with Marcos, in which Marcos had warned him of the possibility of serious disturbances in the next six-month period. Political forces hostile to Marcos were stirring up tensions and were actually preparing for an attempt to take over the key installations in the city of Manila in an effort to discredit Marcos and unseat him. Marcos had information to the effect that explosives and guns were being brought into the city, so that points such as the power station and the telephone exchange could be taken over or destroyed. Marcos had received one intelligence report that $8 million worth of guns had been purchased by opposition elements in Hong Kong—perhaps this was $8 million Hong Kong rather than $8 million U.S. since the figure seemed high.

Ambassador Byroade explained that the anti-Marcos forces were led by a man named Argenio Lopez, one of the richest men in the Philippines and the worst enemy of the United States there. The President interjected to wonder if Lopez was any relation to the Philippine Vice President, and was told by Ambassador Byroade that Lopez was the brother of the Philippine Vice President. Vice President Lopez was a fairly good man although rather stupid, but Argenio was a sour, vicious, and bitter person who wanted to drive the U.S. out of the Philippines completely. The danger was that if he succeeded in unseating Marcos, he would be able to control the Philippines via his brother. Ambassador Byroade remarked at this point that there was a 60 percent chance Marcos would not survive his last three years in office. He explained to the President that by this he meant Marcos might be assassinated.

Continuing, Ambassador Byroade said that the current crisis in the Philippines was undoubtedly of Lopez's making. The jeepney (taxi cab) drivers had gone on strike, and this strike had now gone on for nine days; unless somebody like Lopez had been supporting the drivers it would have collapsed within four days because the drivers couldn't normally stay out of work any longer. In addition, there was unprecedented campaign of vilification against Marcos also against the U.S., in the newspapers owned by the Lopez interests, which comprised the majority of the Philippine press. All of this added up to a very nasty situation.

Ambassador Byroade then declared that he had a very sensitive matter to lay before the President at Marcos' request. At the end of his predeparture conversation with Marcos, Marcos had warned him that he might find it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and establish martial law in the city of Manila—unprecedented steps which had not been taken by any Philippine President since the late 40's during the hukbalahap movement. What Marcos wanted to know was: in the event that he found it necessary to declare martial law in Manila, would the United States back him up, or would it work against him? Ambassador Byroade noted that he had promised Marcos he would bring back the President's personal reply.

The President declared that we would “absolutely” back Marcos up, and “to the hilt” so long as what he was doing was to preserve the system against those who would destroy it in the name of liberty. The President indicated that he had telephoned Trudeau of Canada to express this same position. We would not support anyone who was trying to set himself up as a military dictator, but we would do everything we could to back a man who was trying to make the system work and to preserve order. Of course, we understood that Marcos would not be entirely motivated by national interests, but this was something which we had come to expect from Asian leaders. The important thing was to keep the Philippines from going down the tube, since we had a major interest in the success or the failure of the Philippine system. Whatever happens, the Philippines was our baby. He, the President, was an activist and felt very strongly that it was far better to do something to try to save the situation than just to let it slip away from us. Ambassador Byroade said that he was very happy to hear the President say this. He acknowledged that if Marcos did act he would undoubtedly pick up some of his political enemies among those he arrested, but in general he would be attempting to do the right thing.

Ambassador Byroade went on to remark that in the event the worst happened, and Marcos was in some way displaced by the Lopez faction, the U.S. would need to face up to two options: whether to stay out of Philippine affairs entirely, or to intervene in some way. (The President again remarked that he believed in taking action rather than standing idly by.) If we did intervene, the question would be how? One situation which he foresaw was that in which Mrs. Marcos would come to us and ask us to back her up in calling for a special Philippine Presidential election in which she herself would run as a candidate. This would not be desirable. The President expressed surprise that Mrs. Marcos would have presidential aspirations of her own, and was interested in hearing that Mrs. Marcos very definitely had such aspirations. The other possibility which Ambassador Byroade envisaged would be for us to keep hands off until the situation got so bad that the Philippine military decided to take action and would request our support. Ambassador Byroade believed that in this event we should respond favorably. The Philippine military leaders were reliable—he pointed out they were all West Point and Annapolis graduates—and despite their tradition of not getting involved in politics could be relied upon to do their best for their country if compelled to act. The President asked if they actually had the political skill to run the country, and Ambassador Byroade replied that they didn't but that they would find someone to do the job for them. Ambassador Byroade observed that things now were nowhere near as bad as the circumstances which he had described, and that the crisis point, if it came, was still quite a bit of time away. We would need to keep watching the course of events, though. The President agreed.

The President wanted to know how Marcos was getting along with respect to the Dovey Beams case. Ambassador Byroade said that the case hadn't really caused Marcos all that much difficulty, since Philippine mores were quite different from our own. The only criticism of Marcos appeared to be over the fact that he got caught out. Whatever he did, he shouldn't have let Miss Beams make tapes of his liaison. According to Ambassador Byroade, Miss Beams was still trying to keep something of a hold over Marcos.[3]

Ambassador Byroade brought up as a final point the question of the President's reaction to possible Philippine moves to establish diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries. He had assured Marcos that he would ask the President for comments on this issue. Ambassador Byroade handed the President the text of a cable covering the position which he, Byroade, had outlined to Marcos,[4] and asked if the President agreed or disagreed. (The line taken by Byroade had been that the Filipinos had to decide the matter of recognition for themselves, but should weigh the benefits which they expected to receive against the security problems which would inevitably accompany the establishment of Eastern European or Soviet missions.) The President declared that he thought the line by Ambassador Byroade was the correct one. Of course, we would not be happy if the Philippines recognized the USSR, and this would also be harmful to the Philippines. However, Ambassador Byroade was correct in saying that the Filipinos had to decide things such as these themselves. He had long ago adopted the maxim of not trying to argue against something which somebody else had already decided to do. The only thing was, that if the Filipinos decided to go ahead they should give us some advance warning so we could use this matter in our relations with the USSR. We might want to go to the Soviets and tell them that the Filipinos had asked our advice on recognition and we had told them to go ahead. In this way, we might get some credit for the Philippine action.

Ambassador Byroade stated that he was not sure the Filipinos actually intended to go ahead. A while ago it had seemed almost certain that they would, but there had been some drawing back from establishing relations with the Communist world in recent weeks. Eight Philippine Senators were now against this policy, and if Marcos were to move today he would not be able to gain approval from the Philippine Senate.

During the conversation Ambassador Byroade expressed the opinion that we were taking the Philippines too much for granted. We had taken over eight months on PL–480 negotiations without reaching agreement, and the MAP for the Philippines had been cut from $20 million to $17 million and then to $13 million. Even though these cuts had been restored, the Filipinos weren't happy, and they would be less so when they found that the MAP for Indonesia was larger than theirs. They had no particular use for the Indonesians, and American interests in Indonesia were less than in the Philippines. Actions of ours of this nature were regarded as a “slap in the face from Father.”

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Memoranda for the President Files, 1/10/71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

[2] Ambassador Byroade was in Washington for consultations.

[3] Telegram 10183 from Manila, November 12, 1970, and subsequent telegrams from Manila and Hong Kong, transmitted reports on this affair. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 US–HK/BEAMS, DOVIE)

[4] Telegram 158 from Manila, January 6, reported this conversation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III)

234. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Hannah)[1]

Washington, January 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

Rural Electrification for the Philippines

Recent proposals from the GOP and USAID/Manila have outlined a rural electrification program for the Philippines to be funded in part by AID development loans. I understand that the initial reaction at working levels in the Department and in AID is basically favorable, while adding the ingredients of a greater emphasis on a multilateral forum, in conjunction with the IBRD and ADB, and greater emphasis on sector-wide planning. Assuming this to be the case, I should like to express to you certain political considerations which I believe support a decision to implement this program as soon as possible.

It has been characteristic of the Philippines that the pace of infrastructure development and modernization has been too slow to meet the expectations of a rapidly growing Philippine population.

In order to overcome a critical balance of payments crisis, Marcos has conscientiously enforced the fiscal and foreign exchange disciplines imposed a year ago by the IMF. This has led, however, to a slow-down in the rate of economic growth and a 22 percent rise in consumer prices in 1970. Discontent and an anti-administration mood prevails among the populace. Revolutionary extremists, operating provocatively through emergent student activists and with the unwitting cooperation of Marcos' conventional political opponents, are creating serious political instability and fanning the danger of explosive violence.

While this situation is partly of Marcos' own making—his overkill tactics in the last Presidential elections, the popular belief that he is amassing a large personal fortune from his Presidential office—the fact is that explosive popular discontent stems to an important extent from economic problems. For example, recent riots in which five were killed stemmed from a strike of jeepney drivers supported by activist students. Discontent could be reduced and popular confidence in the Philippines' democratic structure of government strengthened by indications that the country is moving forward with national economic development. It is in our interest, as well as in that of the Philippines, that this be achieved; and it is important that indications of forward progress come now, before the internal political situation of the Philippines further deteriorates.

Initiation of the long planned and impatiently awaited national electrification program at this critical juncture could have a significant favorable economic and political impact. Thus, I would urge that serious consideration be given to the allotment of sufficient development loan funds from FY 71 to initiate this program with the remainder to be programmed in FY 72.

William P. Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) PHIL. Secret. Drafted by Usher (EA/PHL) and Shepard C. Lowman, Country Officer (EA/PHL), and cleared by Wilson and Barger (EA). This memorandum responds to a January 21 memorandum from Green to Rogers. (Ibid.)

235. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, March 31, 1971.

SUBJECT

Some Positive Insights on Filipino Characteristics

Secretary Rogers has sent you a brief but remarkably perceptive report (Tab A)[2] on the political and social character of the Filipinos, prepared by the Political Counselor of our Embassy in Manila. It illuminates those positive and stabilizing aspects of Philippine society which we have been groping to understand, but which are so often lost from view amid the welter of daily events.

I agree with Secretary Rogers that this paper displays real insights. Its main points are as follows:

—There is no argument about the lack of visible progress in dealing with the Philippines' major problems; graft and corruption,[3] peace and order, the widening gap between rich and poor, government inefficiency, and the inadequacies of top leadership.

—If there is general agreement that Philippine society is seriously ill, there is also equally firm agreement that a revolutionary situation does not exist. The reasons for the “perverse stability of this noisy, poorly governed, disorderly, under-achieving society” are:

—There is a political system in the Philippines. The Constitution has been in effect for 35 years without suspension or having been rewritten by a “strong man.” Peaceful transfer of power repeatedly takes place. There is general agreement that the system needs revision, but there is equal agreement that the mechanism to bring about changes should be the Constitutional Convention.

—In other developing countries of Asia we are concerned because the provinces do not identify with the capital. This is definitely not the case in the Philippines. A good internal civil air network, a nationwide radio network, and an excellent newspaper distribution system provide good communication within this society.

—The Filipino is addicted to elections and if much energy is absorbed in the political game it fulfills the special purpose in the Philippines of serving to deal with the oriental problem of face. The Filipinos are unusual in Asia for knowing how to find a respected place for defeated ex-Presidents.[4]

—The Philippine press helps drain off revolutionary pressure. This is a compulsively open society, where the life span of a secret is measured in hours. Scandals are hyper-ventilated. After a while this produces not indignation but boredom. A comparable phenomenon is indifference to student martyrs. The normal level of casual violence is so high in the Philippines that there is no general sense of outrage when a few students are shot.

—The private sector of the economy works well. The road to wealth is open to the ordinary dishonest man. In most of developing Asia this road is controlled by the military.

—The Filipino is less interested in good government than in government that is good to him. Like a gambler in Las Vegas, the system may wipe him out, but he is no more interested than the gambler in changing it. Tomorrow he may strike it lucky.

—Sheltered in his extended family system, linked by dual tires of loyalty and obligation upward and downward in the social structure, the Filipino is almost never alone, either actually or figuratively. The individual loneliness and alienation that is deeply troubling the society of the West is almost unknown in the Philippines. This is perhaps the essential reason why the average Filipino is optimistic about the future. To the despair of the revolutionaries, he has not lost his sense of humor, he is not bitter.

—What are the limits? How much more can the long-suffering Filipino take before he accepts the arguments of those favoring violent change? Consensus for change develops slowly in a democracy, and if the needed change is basic as it is in the Philippines, it often takes a severe crisis to generate and sustain the consensus.

—The alternative to peaceful reform in the Philippines is probably not revolution but anarchy. Those who try to end the anarchy may come from either the Right or Left but they will have to accept the fact that the Filipino will not tolerate too much government. He will be intractable and rebellious if his individualistic way of life is denied him.

—The democratic values which the U.S. planted in the Philippines have now assumed their own indigenous forms. The roots are deep and if we have faith in the capacity of our own society to change and survive, we cannot give up hope for the Philippines.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation in Nixon's handwriting to Kissinger reads “K—Do letter as I wrote.” Regarding this letter, see footnote 5 below.

[2] Tab A, Political Counselor Underhill's report, sent as valedictory observations upon leaving the Philippines, was sent from Manila as airgram A–36, January 27. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Rogers forwarded it under cover of a memorandum to the President on February 25. Attached but not printed.

[3] For a different view of corruption and the abuse of power in the Philippines, see airgram A–4 from Cebu, February 8. (Ibid.,POL 15–4 PHIL)

[4]  Nixon underlined the last sentence (beginning with the word “how”) and wrote in the margin: “Like Mexico.”

[5] At the end of the memorandum Nixon wrote: “Dear Mr. Underhill: The Secretary of State has called to my attention your Airgram of __. This is one of the most perceptive, incisive and thoughtful analyses I have ever seen in reading hundreds of such reports over the past 20 years. The Nation is fortunate to have a man of your analytical ability in our foreign service. Cc to Rogers.” Attached but not printed is an undated letter to Underhill signed by President Nixon incorporating the notation almost verbatim.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, July 8, 1971, 0851Z.

6405. 1. I do not want to clutter up the wires with the obvious, but I do think I would be remiss if I did not report that the recent events started by the New York Times disclosures, the Supreme Court decision, et al, have had a great and injurious impact here. I have had long talks on these matters with both Marcos and Romulo, in each case at their initiative. Their immediate primary concern or course (in this continuing process, which for here, started with the Symington Committee disclosures long ago) is what may yet come out to cause further embarrassment to the GOP, and of course to Marcos personally.

2. As an example, Romulo told me yesterday he was appalled by the publication of the Lansdale Memo in 1961 indicating CIA support of, and implication with, three Philippine organizations, i.e., the Eastern Construction Company, Operation Brotherhood, and Security Training Center. I told him I had not seen that report and had only a hazy recollection as to what two of these outfits were like in 1961. I added, however, that there was certainly nothing sinister in our helping, if we did in fact help, in any of these efforts, as all three in fact were in a good cause. He said he agreed, but it was now being played in the light that it was sinister, and that, especially as two of these endeavors still existed, it could have serious and immediate local repercussions. (Unfortunately friendly and helpful Congressman San Juan is in charge of the Eastern Construction Company.) He said that it was so serious that he had asked for a full study and the Philippine Embassy to send in the complete text of the Lansdale Memo. Fortunately this particular disclosure has not as yet been played in the local press, but I assume that it will be and most probably in a sensational manner.

3. Marcos, in personal conversations, has never come directly to the point, but occasionally phrases he uses could hardly have any other meaning but to reflect concern on his part as to whether my own reporting might be distributed widely and be leaked in Washington. Romulo, more in sorrow than in anger, has gone much further and asked how any nation can have the confidence to converse freely with our ambassadors in the future. He hastened to add that this would be a tragedy, as he did not think American motives bad, but that there would naturally be great mistrust in doing sensitive things with us in the future. He thought Newsweek's graphic description of Lodge's last assurances to Diem in Vietnam in the face of what actually happened, would hamper us with every Asian leader for a long time to come.

4. For my part I go through the obvious: that these are only Pentagon Papers, which to the exclusion of all other relevant papers and records of discussions and decisions, leave a very distorted picture, that this has been further exaggerated by the manner of presentation, headline selection, etc. But, of course, there is really no effective answer, and it would be impractical to attempt to portray by cable all the local reactions, very many to me personally, on this subject.

5. But in summary I can say that we have suffered a very great loss indeed as a nation in these events. In my opinion it goes beyond a fear by local and high officials as to how it might affect them personally. The deeper loss of confidence reflects a worry about the U.S. itself, which is considered important by every segment of this country. I am not competent to know what steps we can take that would be effective, but additional search, on the one hand, for ways of assuring others that we have adequate laws to protect the security of our own confidences of state in the field of foreign affairs (and hence those of others), and on the other for ways of proving that we have the national will to tighten our own security, and prosecute under the laws if necessary, seems very definitely in order.

Even more difficult would be the search for forms of reassurance, in the case of Asian nations particularly, that we are on an honest and open course with them, in the interest of their own aspirations as well as our own.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Saigon, Bangkok, and CINCPAC.

237. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, July 19, 1971.

SUBJECT

Philippine Special Fund for Education: Proposed Project for Land Reform Education

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Secretary Rogers [2] recommending that we agree to the Land Reform Education project proposed by the Philippine Government to close out the funds remaining in the Special Fund for Education. (The Special Fund for Education, established by a 1963 amendment to the Philippine War Damage Legislation of 1962 and fully constituted at $28,133,000, is to be used as jointly determined by the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines.)

The Philippine Government has proposed that the remaining $1,281,935 in the Fund be used to establish a trust fund for land reform education. Earnings from the trust fund would support education for farm families, training of land reform personnel, research, and complementary programs in community development and cooperative farming. The trustee funding concept has proved successful in three previous projects carried out under the Special Fund for Education.

Recommendation

That you authorize the conclusion of an agreement with the Philippines for the expenditure of $1,281,935 from the Philippine Special Fund for Education (PL 88–94) to establish a Land Reform Education Fund.[3]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. III. Limited official use. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger.

[2]  Rogers' memorandum is dated July 2; attached but not printed.

[3]  Haig checked the approve option and wrote: “Haig for HAK for Pres.”

238. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, August 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Discussion with Filipino Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., LP Secretary General.

SUMMARY

Senator Aquino, the hyperactive Liberal Senator with a “maverick” reputation, reported that he will visit the People's Republic of China for ten days in September with a group of Filipino journalists. He was pessimistic about the prospects for the Liberal Party in the November senatorial, provincial and local elections and about the future of the Liberal Party and the two-party system in general in the Philippines. Aquino does not exclude the possibility of some sort of revolutionary upheaval in the Philippines during the next four years and sought to leave the impression that he might “go to the hills” as one of its leaders.

During a long merienda and introductory meeting at the Army-Navy Club on August 11 for Political Counselor Maestrone, Senator Aquino made a number of interesting comments that are worth recording.

Trip to Peking. Senator Aquino said that he would be leaving on September 2 for a ten-day trip to Peking, Canton, Shanghai and, possibly, other cities in Communist China. Accompanying him will be six Filipino journalists and two TV cameramen who will stay in China for a total of thirty-five days and will try to make a side trip to Pyongyang. The trip, which Aquino said is being sponsored by a Chinese journalistic association, is for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with current developments on the Mainland. (Although Aquino said that he had gone to Canton with the Philippine Chamber of Commerce group that traveled to China in May, we have no information that he actually went further than Hong Kong with the group or received a visa to enter the Mainland. If Aquino does, in fact, make the trip he says he will, he will be the most senior Philippine official to visit Peking.)

The 1971 Elections. Senator Aquino was pessimistic about the Liberal Party's prospects for this November's elections. Only two Liberal candidates (Salonga and either Magsaysay or Osmena) would be elected to the Senate, and the Liberals would fare badly in gubernatorial and mayoralty contests. President Marcos, Aquino complained, is buying off Liberal candidates with money or political appointments and has already persuaded eleven potential Liberal gubernatorial candidates not to run; four of these were confirmed on the day of our conversation as new Court of First Instance judges.

Senator Aquino showed us the results of a recent poll conducted nationwide by the Liberal Party. The poll, which had 2,800 respondents, confirmed his conclusions that the Liberals would not do well in the senatorial election. Of the issues that respondents were asked to identify as the most urgent problems presently facing the Philippines, high prices and the need for public works ran far ahead of graft and corruption and criticism of the Marcos Administration. The Nacionalistas, according to Aquino, had conducted a separate poll with similar results, with Senator Almendras emerging as the most popular candidate from either party. When we pointed out that high prices and the need for public works were issues that the Liberals could readily use in their campaign, Aquino replied that this was not the case; instead, what counted was how the voters, two-thirds of whom live in rural areas, would respond to these issues at the time of election. Their memory is short and their impressionability high, and between now and election day Marcos would dispense considerable amounts of “pork barrel” funds for local high-impact public works projects and would import enough rice to keep the price of this essential commodity down. Aquino appeared to place great stock in the value of his polls. He went over them column by column and figure by figure and gave no sign of questioning the validity of the statistics he quoted. As a practical politician, he said, he has his office conduct a nationwide poll of issues every 45 days, paying particular attention to identifying issues connected in the popular mind with certain Senators. Little nationwide impact resulted, according to his poll, from his Congressional budget and fund transfer campaign; Senator Magsaysay, however, drew high marks on land reform even though, according to Aquino, Magsaysay “never opens his mouth on this issue.”

The Liberal Party is in danger of extinction, Aquino continued. President Marcos has changed the traditional rules of the political game in the Philippines by spending unprecedented sums of money to ensure the election of himself and other Nacionalista candidates. The Liberals can no longer compete on this basis; they need 500,000 pesos per province per year (68 provinces) just to operate their party organization, let alone to pay for the costs of an election, and raising the necessary funds is becoming increasingly difficult. President Marcos will spend freely on the 1971 elections, Aquino claimed, and has already started doing so by passing out two thousand pesos to each of the twenty-seven thousand barrio captains in the country. In addition, Aquino states that Marcos now owns directly or controls through various means, 220 of the approximately 290 radio stations in the Philippines and has managed to prevent criticism in all of the major newspapers except the Chronicle and the Times-Mirror-Taliba group. Mandy Elizalde (described by Aquino as a political nobody whose inclusion on the Nacionalista slate was intended to prove that Marcos can get anyone elected) puts the Elizalde Tri-Media behind the Nacionalistas. (Aquino's claim of the extent of Marcos' control over radio broadcasting is open to doubt since the Lopez-owned ABS–CBN system owns a sizeable percentage of the broadcasting industry. As for newspapers, his remark is misleading since the circulation of the Times, Taliba and the Chronicle is considerably greater than that of all the other major papers combined.)

Revolutionary Change. Aquino's comments on the future of the Liberal Party led him into a discussion of his own future political role and revolutionary political change in general in the Philippines. Since Marcos had, by his overspending on elections, blocked the traditional avenues of access to political power for the Liberals, Aquino said he was left with three choices for his own future: 1) allow himself to be bought off by the Nacionalistas (Nacionalista Senator Jose Roy, Aquino related, had recently orally invited Aquino on Marcos' behalf to be the Senate's representative on the GOP delegation to the UN General Assembly and, upon his return, become the head of the Philippine National Bank. Aquino said he asked for the offer in writing from Marcos, thus effectively declining the probe); 2) “hang up my shingle” and retire from politics; or 3) “go to the hills” and join the revolution. Aquino implied that he was considering the third choice. Polls conducted by his office had shown that in response to the question “How would you react if a senator went to the hills?” 34% of the respondents said they would approve; two years ago the response was only 19%. A question on whether or not the respondent would approve of a revolutionary change of government in the Philippines produced a similar response. Aquino stated that his fellow Liberal Senator Jose Diokno has decided against the idea of “going to the hills” for the moment; Aquino, however, left the impression that this course was not excluded for himself. He thought a revolutionary leader of sufficient prominence would have little difficulty in gaining support from the peasants and that financial support would come from the urban middle class and some of the wealthy who were disenchanted with the Marcos Administration.

Aquino said that he believed that there could be a revolution in the Philippines sometime between now and 1974 or 1975. Underlying his comments on this subject was a fairly clear indication that Aquino is in active contact with KM leaders both in and outside Manila. For example, he reported that radical leaders had decided to change the tactics of their guerrilla activities. Starting in September they planned to place their emphasis on increased urban terrorism rather than on terroristic activities in the provinces which they felt were not having the desired impact. (This tends to support similar reports heard from other sources.) He noted that the number of students who have received two or three months of guerrilla training in the hills and who have returned to the cities is growing, and their tactics have become more sophisticated. In the future, Aquino thought that there will be fewer direct confrontations with the police and Philippine Constabulary and more use of sniping, arson, bombing and other forms of selective terrorism.

Aquino said that Marcos was becoming more and more of a dictator and was gaining control of the government and the country in line with his alleged intentions of continuing to stay in power beyond the end of his second term in 1973. Thus Marcos' present actions and future ambitions, Aquino argued, were creating a revolutionary situation for the Philippines. While Aquino said he could not predict with precision when a revolution would occur, he said that one of the key factors that any revolutionary must consider and which at present was unclear was the position the United States would take in a revolutionary situation in the Philippines.

Comment: Senator Aquino can be prone to exaggeration, and his remarks on the possibility of revolution and the role that he might play as one of its leaders seemed quite farfetched. Aquino, who is a longtime and prominent critic of Marcos, has no political ideology beyond his own personal ambitions. In this respect, his discussion of revolution can be interpreted as meaning that, if the Philippine political system has been changed to the extent that his political clique cannot alternate in power with the Marcoses by democratic means, then it will become necessary to resort to violent revolution as the means of gaining power. Although Aquino is believed to maintain regular contact with the Huks and the NPA, the jump from being a potential Liberal Party candidate for the 1973 Presidential election to leading a revolution in the hills may be a bit too much for the “boy wonder of Tarlac” to make.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–6 PHIL. Confidential. Drafted by Forbes, cleared by Hulen (POL) and Kalaris (POL/R), and approved by Maestrone (POL). Repeated to Hong Kong.

239. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 3, 1971, 0937Z.

8351. 1. I literally do not have time prior to my departure from here for detailed reporting on a long talk with Marcos alone today, and later on with Mrs. Marcos alone, and finally with the two of them together.

2. As it turned out it was a bad day indeed to see Marcos as there were two or three hundred people in Malacanang on a whole series of important meetings and he actually had about 100 waiting for him when I left. In the turmoil I ran into Mrs. Marcos by accident and walked over to say goodbye. She took me in the music room for about an hour's conversation. Her main concern seemed to be some doubt as to our support of the President in present circumstances, or as she put it, in his struggle to rid the country of Communist subversive operations. I told her she need have no worry on the latter, but went on to explain my concern that the President's actions to suspend the writ coming as it did in an election period, might well be misunderstood abroad. I tried to draw her out as to what had to happen, as she saw things, before he could raise the suspension, but did not get anything very specific. She went into long stories as to the nature of their evidence, as of now, implicating Aquino and possibly others.

3. I told her I would face many questions at home, and some in which I had no answers. I said the first question that everyone would ask me is “Who did it at Plaza Miranda?”[2] My answer would have to be the “I do not know.” The next question would be “Who do you think did it?” I told her my answer to that one would also have to be “I don't know.” I said this would put me somewhat on the defensive in Washington which was unfortunate as there were positive things that I wanted to work on there.

4. Later on as I was sitting down with the President, Imelda asked to see him before his talk with me. When I later joined the President in his private library, he said that I had left the First Lady quite agitated and worried, with her worry centering on my remarks in the quotes above. Marcos said I must know that he had not suspended the writ solely on the Plaza Miranda incident, as he had stated publicly, that this was only the last straw. He said he was determined, during the period of the suspension of the writ, to break the back of Communist-led insurgency in the Philippines, even though this might take some time. He assured me that he would not misuse the suspension for political purposes, or against personal enemies. Interestingly, he said that it would not be difficult to have the constitutional convention extend his tenure of office, but that he was not going to do that. He said he would retire in 1973 unless at the time the country seemed in such a condition that he could not conscientiously leave the office of the President.

5. I said that from all evidence we had it appeared that his people were operating under the suspension in quite a proper and legitimate manner. I said unfortunately, however, as long as the suspension was in effect he would be accused by his enemies of misusing it no matter what he did. He said he knew that was true, but there came a time in the life of many presidents where they had to become immune to criticism and he had personally passed that stage. He repeated that the affairs of the nation under the suspension would be handled properly, and said further that in the two years he had left he was going to institute significant reforms.

6. Our conversation then turned to the long list of specifics that I had prepared to take up with him prior to my departure. These need not be reported now except for matters connected with Clark Field. Marcos told me that he would sign the transfer orders of Judge Gaddi from the Angeles area today. He said it made him wince to have to “promote” Gaddi to get him out of our hair, but he would do it, and do it right away. He also phoned the Solicitor General in my presence and directed him to take any steps necessary to get Airman Whipkey out of jail in Angeles.

7. Imelda joined us and the three of us had a re-hash of her concern as to what I would say in Washington. It all ended amicably enough, but it is clear that she is somewhat worried. While this at times makes life a bit complicated for me here, I think I left her with just about the right amount of concern. I am not worried about the President as he is less emotionally inclined and I think respects and understands the position of the American Ambassador here far better than she. In any event, we will know in due course. I am leaving here by Pan American tomorrow. My itinerary will be sent separately.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PHIL. Secret; Exdis.

[2] The Plaza Miranda incident refers to an indiscriminate terrorist attack by unknown assailants who tossed two grenades there into a rally of the opposition Liberal Party on August 21. President Marcos responded by suspending the writ of habeas corpus for suspected subversives. Marcos also caused the detention of a number of persons without formal charges and immediately came under suspicion of exploiting the situation to stifle opposition elements, according to INR Intelligence Note REAN–47, September 1. (Ibid., POL 23–8 PHIL)

240. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, September 13, 1971.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Records, Philippines. Secret; Eyes Only; Outside the System. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

241. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

New York, October 14, 1971, 2059Z.

Secto 161/3504. Memorandum of Conversation: FM Romulo (Philippines) Part II of III: Military Situation in Philippines and Viet-Nam; October 13, 1971, 5:00 pm: 35 A Waldorf.

1. Participants: Philippines—FM Romulo, PermRep Reyes; US— The Secretary, Mr. Murphy (reporting officer).

2. Summary: Romulo said there were some subversive demonstrations in the Philippines and the Philippine Army needs US support on training and equipment. The Secretary said the military situation in Viet-Nam is good and even the other side must acknowledge it. End summary.

3. Asked about the situation in the Philippines, Romulo said there had been several subversive demonstrations including a recent bombing of an electric plant, and that those responsible are Maoists. Consequently, he said, it is against President Marcos' inner convictions to vote for the entry of PRC into the UN. The Secretary observed that US-Philippine relations were excellent, and Romulo said much credit should be given to Ambassador Byroade, who was the best US Ambassador the Philippines had had, and enjoys the respect and confidence of both the President and himself. The Secretary stated that things looked good in Viet-Nam at the moment and that although we were disappointed by the Presidential election, because Thieu could have won even with opposition, South Viet-Namese forces were fighting well and US casualties were very low. Romulo asked if South Viet-Nam could handle the military situation by itself if US forces withdrew, including US air forces. The Secretary said that the South Viet-Namese could make it without US ground forces, but the President had not yet decided how long US air power would be used. He said the other side also thinks the South Viet-Namese can do it on their own and that in recent conversations with the Russians they had acknowledged this. Romulo said his country would like to know what plans the US had to train the Philippine Army and what equipment they could get from the US. He remarked that the Philippines was not getting sufficient training or equipment at present. The Secretary asked how many insurgents were active in the Philippines, and Romulo said about 3,000, who were getting their equipment from Viet-Nam. He said President Marcos strongly desires to see his army properly trained and equipped. The Secretary inquired if the Philippine Government was in touch with the US military on this, and Romulo replied that they were, through the Mutual Defense Board. The Secretary promised to look into the matter and discuss it again with Romulo, and Romulo suggested that the Secretary could pass the message through Ambassador Byroade. He commented that the problem of the US surcharge on Philippine sugar seems to be solved now, and said much of the credit for that belongs to Ambassador Byroade.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. Secret. Received at 2210Z. Repeated to Manila and Saigon. Part II of III. Part I on the issue of Chinese representation in the United States and Part II on Nixon's proposed trips to Beijing and Moscow are ibid.

242. Editorial Note

First Lady Imelda Marcos made a trip to the United States in October 1971 and requested meetings with President Nixon and other high-level U.S. officials. The following excerpt is from the tape of a conversation between Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman and President Nixon concerning that request and other matters. The conversation took place on October 19, 1971, from 10:55 a.m. to 12:14 p.m. in the Oval Office.

Haldeman: “Marcos, do you have to see her when she comes?

Nixon: “Oh, hell, I don't know. I don't really think so.

Haldeman: “What they're [Department of State] suggesting is an option if you don't see her.

Nixon: “Yeah. She's here for what good?

Haldeman: “She's here to try to assess the extent of U.S. Government support for she and her husband's—her and her husband's fight against communism in the Philippines is—

Nixon: “Oh, is she?

Haldeman: —“the way she puts it.

Nixon: “Well—

Haldeman: “He intends to retain control until communism is defeated, either by extending his term of office or having her replace him as President—

Nixon: [unclear]

Haldeman: —“'til the end of his term.

Nixon: “I think I should stay out of it.

Haldeman: “He'll have to revise the Constitution to do that.

Nixon: “What do they [Department of State] suggest?

Haldeman: “They say we should treat her with reserve. At the same time, we don't want to give her cause to feel rebuffed. And I—

Nixon: “I think she's got to be seen some way but I don't—”

Nixon and Haldeman then agreed that the President would meet briefly with Mrs. Marcos. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation No. 596–4)

A record of President Nixon's subsequent meeting with Mrs. Marcos on the morning of October 22 is in Document 243.

Almost directly after his meeting with Mrs. Marcos, President Nixon met with Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr., from 12:16 p.m. to 12:45 p.m. in the Oval Office. The following excerpt is from that conversation:

Nixon: “Democracy isn't easy. I was just talking to Mrs. Marcos in the Philippines. You know what they're talking about now? Oh, they think that the Communist danger is so great that maybe, maybe—they may not—it may be in their interest to write their Constitution in a way that democracy could succeed itself without an election. And the Philippines, we [unclear] that's American style democracy trying to make it work in Asia—

Frelinghuysen: “As I understand it—

Nixon: “It's a hell of a problem, right?

Frelinghuysen: “It's not easy.

Nixon: “And our people who take this high and mighty attitude about democracy and all [unclear] our thing, particularly that is. The Latins aren't any good at it. In fact, the Anglos are the only people who are any good at democracy, the British and the Americans.” (Ibid., Conversation between Nixon and Frelinghuysen, Oval Office, Conversation No. 599–12) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversations printed here specifically for this volume.

243. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, October 22, 1971, 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President; Mrs. Imelda Marcos, Wife of the President of the Philippines; and Brig. Gen. A.M. Haig, Jr.—Friday, October 22, 1971 (11:45 a.m.– 12:15 p.m.)

The President welcomed Mrs. Marcos and asked for her appraisal of the Iranian 2500th Birthday Celebration. Mrs. Marcos said that it had been a remarkable assembly of world leaders. While she could not judge its economic costs, she did believe that the exposure of the leaders of so many different political ideologies could not but have had a constructive influence on world peace. She had again had an opportunity to talk with Vice President Agnew, she noted, and jokingly commented that many in the press had assumed that their identical conservative attitudes made them natural allies. Mrs. Marcos described the atmosphere in Tehran as almost fairy-tale-like in its simplicity, with world leaders of different viewpoints all seated at the same dinner table, indulging in frivolous games and a kind of light and good-humored banter which was almost childlike in nature. The days were extremely hot and the nights chilly, and the Iranians had gone all-out to provide adequate and colorful facilities for the celebration. Many tents had been erected to house the various activities and each was decorated in a unique color scheme of its own.

The President commented that the Shah of Iran was a strong and selfless leader who was a great favorite of his and who had generously and progressively exploited and distributed Iran's great oil revenues to the benefit of his people. He noted that while perhaps Iran's formal government did not meet the idealistic criteria of many critics, it was perhaps the best system for Iran at this point in history since it provided for strong leadership at the center.

President Nixon then asked Mrs. Marcos to comment on the internal situation in the Philippines, recalling his discussions with Mrs. Marcos in September 1970. Mrs. Marcos stated that all of the things that she had predicted with the President at their earlier meeting had come to pass. Internal disorders and efforts by extremists to discredit the Marcos Government had increased in intensity and culminated in the detonation of a grenade at a meeting of the liberal party leadership. She stated that this, of course, was contrived to make it appear as though President Marcos had been behind the incident. She stated that Communist activity was also increasing and that the Communist insurgents in the Philippines had achieved a degree of greater self-confidence as a result of recent events, to include perhaps even announcement of the President's visit to Peking. She noted, however, that President Marcos understood the purposes of the President's visit, even though many Asian leaders were concerned and worried by its implications.

President Nixon emphasized that his visit to Peking should not be misinterpreted. He was traveling there with his eyes open and would not under any circumstances sacrifice the interests of America's traditional friends. The 300 million people of Asia who formed an arc around the periphery of Communist China—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea—produced far more than all of Mainland China and constituted the bedrock base of freedom in the area. No American President could sacrifice the interests of any member of this essential arc in favor of progress in our relationships with Peking. On the other hand, the President pointed out, certainly the time had come to at least start talking to Peking's leadership in the interest of stability in the area and world peace in general. Mrs. Marcos assured the President that she understood this, as did her husband. Nevertheless, she said, a certain nervousness had resulted. President Nixon assured Mrs. Marcos that he would keep President Marcos fully apprised on a consultative basis with respect to both the meeting in Peking and his meeting in Moscow which was equally significant in terms of world peace.

The President then asked what the Philippines needed at present. Mrs. Marcos replied that her husband had been most grateful for the United States action on the Philippine sugar quota. The President commented that he had taken this action because of his special feeling for the Philippines and at some expense to our relationships with friends in Latin America.

Mrs. Marcos then stated that the Philippines need additional military assistance and felt that it would be most helpful if some of the equipment which the United States used in South Vietnam could be made available to her government as the U.S. presence was reduced. Her husband had asked her to mention this to the President and was particularly interested in helicopters, ammunition, and small arms, all of which could be used for internal security purposes. The President instructed General Haig to look into the Philippines' requirements and to view them with sympathy in light of our overall plans.

Mrs. Marcos then stated that there were many, some of whom were in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, who expected the Philippines to react as an American puppet. She stated that this could not be, for both substantive and political reasons, and many times she and her husband were forced to take positions which did not necessarily meet U.S. conceptions. On the other hand, this in no way should be interpreted by U.S. officials as a departure by the Philippine leadership from its longstanding and traditional pro-U.S. stance. Quite the contrary, President Marcos had recently taken a poll of Filipino attitudes with respect to the United States. The remarkable outcome of this poll indicated that in the rural areas in the Philippines a majority of the citizenry expressed a desire to become a state of the United States of America. She cautioned the President to keep this in mind when he received reports from the Embassy in Manila or when he was exposed to Manila press interpretations suggesting a growing anti-U.S. climate. The President expressed sympathy with President Marcos' problem. He stated that obviously no leader of the Philippines could assume a puppet stance and we would not want or expect this. He said even a traditional friend like Great Britain was forced to demonstrate its independence from the United States from time to time. Mrs. Marcos stated that she had spoken recently to Prime Minister Heath and that he had mentioned to her his desire to explain U.S. policies to the other powers in a constructive way, thus confirming his friendship for the United States.

As the meeting adjourned, Mrs. Marcos gave the President a letter from President Marcos (attached)[2] and commented that the internal situation in the Philippines continued to deteriorate as a result of some subversive activity by the Communists. For this reason, she said, it might be important to modify the Philippines Constitution to permit a strong and consistent leadership by President Marcos after the termination of his Presidential term in office. President Nixon did not comment on this remark.

The President then escorted Mrs. Marcos to Rose Mary Woods' office and from there to the White House Mess, where he introduced her to the Cost of Living Council. Mrs. Marcos made a brief speech to the group reiterating the warm friendship of the people of the Philippines for the people of the United States and informing them of the results of President Marcos' poll.

The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Secret. Drafted by Haig. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

[2] Attached but not printed. The text of Marcos' October 8 letter was forwarded to the Embassy in telegram 201847 to Manila, November 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL)

244. Letter From President Nixon to Philippine President Marcos [1]

Washington, November 18, 1971.

Dear Mr. President:

It was a great pleasure for me to see Mrs. Marcos once again during her recent visit to Washington and to receive from her your letter of October 8, 1971. Her account of the Persepolis celebrations was most interesting, and I also appreciated the chance to talk with her about the situation in the Philippines. I hope she enjoyed her short visit to the United States as much as we enjoyed having her here.

Your kind words of support for my coming trip to Peking are greatly appreciated. As you are aware, our efforts to establish a new relationship with the People's Republic of China are based on my conviction that all nations will benefit if relations between the United States and the People's Republic are improved. It is good to know that you feel tensions in Asia have already lessened as a result of our initiatives.

I was deeply gratified for your Government's decision to support our efforts to secure continued representation for the Republic of China in the United Nations—at the same time that we supported representation for the People's Republic of China in that body. I am sure that you share our disappointment that the General Assembly rejected the resolutions we both cosponsored. Throughout this difficult test I was heartened by the unstinting cooperation of the Philippines and others among our allies and friends. Please convey my compliments to Foreign Secretary Romulo, Ambassador Jimenez, Ambassador Yango, and other members of your Foreign Department for their excellent performance.

Now that the majority has spoken we will, of course, accept its decision. You can be sure that the United States will perservere in the effort to make the United Nations a more effective institution, and that we look forward to continuing our close cooperation with the Philippines in working toward that goal.

I was pleased that you were able to receive Secretary Connally during his recent visit[2] to your capital. I am looking forward to hearing his report concerning his discussions with you. Upon receiving his comments, I shall be writing you further to respond to the several questions you raised in your letter concerning our economic relations.

Again, Mrs. Nixon and I were very happy for the opportunity to receive Mrs. Marcos in Washington. To her and to you we extend our most sincere best wishes and warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PHIL. No classification marking. Drafted by Frank C. Bennett and Lowman on November 4 (ibid.); substantially revised in the White House. Transmitted in telegram 210645 to Manila, November 19, the original signed letter subsequently sent by pouch. (Ibid.)

[2] Connally's trip to the Philippines and meeting with Marcos is reported in telegram 10479 from Manila, November 12. (Ibid., POL 7 US/Connally)

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, January 4, 1972, 2337Z.

1189. For Ambassador.

1.

Please convey orally following message to President Marcos. Explain that the President has asked you personally to make this presentation.

Begin message: Before visiting Peking and Moscow the President is consulting with several heads of friendly and allied governments. He would have liked to have had an opportunity to get together with President Marcos in the course of these consultations. Unfortunately it is now clear that that will not be possible.

While the President very much regrets this, he is mindful that he and President Marcos have kept in close touch with one another's thinking on key issues. The President was pleased that Mrs. Marcos was able to visit the US in October and meet with him. He was grateful that President Marcos received Secretary Connally last month and engaged in a frank exchange of views with him. Finally, the exchange of letters between President Marcos and himself has, he feels, very usefully clarified our two countries' mutual understanding on important problems of common interest.

The President now wants to let President Marcos know what he is discussing during the Summit consultations.

Moscow Visit

The President during his current consultations is reviewing the general state of relations with the USSR, preparatory to his visit to Moscow in May 1972. He is making it clear that the US had no intention of “dealing over the heads” of its friends and allies in any matter where their security interests might be affected. For example, there have been no, and there will be no, bilateral US-Soviet negotiations on mutual withdrawal of forces from Europe.

The President is indicating during the consultations that some concrete progress might be made either before or during the Moscow visit in such bilateral areas as arms control and economic relations.

Peking Visit The principle purpose of the President's visit is that the PRC and ourselves achieve a better understanding of each others' positions, and that we establish a continuing means of remaining informed about these positions. In addition, he hopes that the two sides will be able to agree on at least the beginning of exchanges in nonpolitical fields so that our two peoples will begin to understand each other better.

The President is emphasizing that neither side is under any illusions as to the depth and complexity of the differences that separate us. Having been two decades in developing, these differences will not be easily resolved. Nevertheless, we hope to make a beginning toward clarifying our positions and toward working out the real differences that stand between us. To the extent we are successful, we believe we will have helped reduce tensions in Asia and the world, which should be of benefit to all nations.

The President is stressing that he has the interests of the Philippines and our other friends and allies very much in mind. He has no intention of concluding agreements at the expense of other countries; the talks will, in fact, focus on US–PRC bilateral issues. Given our differences, the question of formal diplomatic relations will not arise. Nor will US treaty commitments with other countries be affected.

Economic Issues

The President is extremely pleased that agreement has been reached on the realignment of exchange rates. This agreement—which is the basis for a restoration of international monetary and financial stability—is a manifestation of cooperation among the major trading nations to the mutual advantage of all. It is, further, evidence that economic differences which we may have with our trading partners can and will be solved amicably in a spirit of international cooperation. It would be incorrect for China, the Soviet Union, or any other nation to see such economic differences as representing an opportunity to divide free world nations. End message.

2. USG does not intend to make delivery of message public. Would appreciate host government also maintaining confidential nature of both fact and content of message. (FYI—similar messages are also being sent to selected other leaders. End FYI)

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority, Exdis. Text received from the White House.

246. Talking Points Prepared by the Director of the Office of Philippine Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State (Usher)[1]

Washington, undated.

PHILIPPINE PARA

EA/PHL TALKING POINTS

1.

Re. Assessment that U.S. interests in the Philippines are not seriously imperiled by anticipated political and economic evolution in the Philippines over the next five or six years.

a.) It should be heavily stressed that this assessment is based on an assumption that the U.S. will allocate resources required for the courses of action called for in Section II of this paper as needful to achieve objectives numbers 3, 4, and 5 under part D of Section I.

b.) It is also based on an assessment that needed social reform will proceed by evolutionary processes. If this process is frustrated by disruption of the Philippines open democratic institutions, then the country could be plunged into a deepening chaos in which all constructive interests would suffer. The danger of such a disruption is more likely to arise from right wing (oligarchs) attempts to arrest the evolutionary process or from a Philippine President's attempt to perpetuate himself in power by illegal means than from left wing attempts to accelerate or preempt the evolutionary process through violent revolution.

c.) A major problem for the U.S. will be to avoid being identified, because of our military and business interests in the Philippines, as the bulwark of the oligarchy.

There are two special factors which may help us to avoid such identification. These are the fact that the oligarchs are the chief advocates of anti-American nationalism—a pseudo nationalism which they use as a device to harass American business competition. Thus, the oligarchs themselves tend to have an image as tormentors of American interests rather than as the protected favorites of American power. The U.S. need not be regarded by the discontented masses of people as allied with their oppressors.

The second of the two factors is that there exists still among the people of the Philippines a great affection for the United States and an image of Americans as friends who would like to help them improve their prospects in life. In the Philippines there is no need for the United States to wind up on the wrong side of social evolution or even of revolution, should that, however defined, ultimately occur.

2.

Status of Base Talks

Except for some technical matters relating to exemption from the Philippine taxes and exit and entry procedures for American personnel on the bases, the principal issues remaining for negotiation are the tenure of the agreement and criminal jurisdiction arrangements (particularly the extent of Philippine participation in duty determination). Another possible issue is the relinquishment of additional areas of base land. However, Ambassador Byroade's instructions already authorize substantial land relinquishment, and we do not anticipate any significant difficulty with this issue.

3.

Military Assistance Program

Dangerously low politically, particularly now when we are trying to complete base negotiations. Ambassador Byroade has been warning us for a year that we would need “some blue chips” to wind up the MBA revision negotiations on the hard issues. Filipinos will think we are walking away from unspoken understanding that MAP is in return for bases. Marcos will think that we are walking away from what he, at least, had thought to be the Nixon Doctrine concept that we would provide increased MAP to help the Philippines prepare for increased self-reliance.

MAP is dangerously low too in terms of AFP need for improved capability to deal with internal security problems. As a practical matter, the cuts which we have already received in FY 1972 will eliminate all of the capital improvement element of MAP.

The problems inherent in this situation will be almost inconceivable compounded by the new requirement that the Philippines reimburse us in local currency for 10% of the MAP. We have no idea where the Philippine Government would get the money. Some 80% of the Philippine military already goes just for payment of salary and allowances. The prospect of Marcos asking the Philippine Congress for an appropriation to pay this 10% at a time when MAP has already declined to the lowest when he may also find himself faced with the necessity of seeking Philippine Senate approval of revisions in the base agreement is bewildering to say the least.

Such a combination of events coupled with the exemption in the U.S. legislation for countries whose MAP is explicit base rent, makes it almost inevitable that the Philippines will demand explicit rent for our bases there. Perhaps anticipating that the MBA revisions may be hard to sell in the Philippines in any event, Marcos has been publicly emphasizing the “continued need for an American military umbrella over the Philippines for some time to come.” But the unveiling of the 10% peso payment provision in our declining MAP will probably be more than Philippine public opinion can take.

In fact this 10% reimbursement requirement (which is contrary to the courses of action prescribed in Section II of PARA) could be of such serious dimensions as to undermine the first premise set out in the issues paper.

4.

Trade and Investment Relationship

The latest statement of our strategy is contained in the joint State/Commerce message of last January 1972.

5.

Are the Philippine Military Bases Essential?

Judging from NISM 69 and the circular telegram now in clearance process, one deduces that our bases in the Philippines are essential to the U.S. posture in the Western Pacific and that they will become more valuable to us in the future.

Not only is this eventuality being taken into consideration in our current MBA negotiations, it is the principal reason why the current negotiations are being undertaken. If we foresaw the diminishing need for the bases we could probably have lived with the existing MBA, enduring for a few years longer the increasing harassment and friction we had been experiencing before the MBA talks were undertaken.

The objective of the current talks is to put the MBA on an up-to–date basis which takes cognizance of new Philippine sensitivities about their sovereignty and which will make for improved U.S.-Philippine relations on base issues, thereby making it easier and pleasanter to operate our bases in the Philippines over the long pull.

The fact is that since we began the base talks last February, base relations have been much improved. The only and glowing exception is the trouble we are having with Judge Gaddi's challenge of the validity of the custody receipt. Gaddi has not been supported by the Philippine Government in this. In fact, the Philippine Executive Branch has supported us against Gaddi. The Philippine Government itself is being harassed by Gaddi's almost fanatical preoccupation with the august dignity of his court. He has harassed us by citing our base commanders and unit commanders for contempt and ordering their arrest whenever an American serviceman subpoenaed or charged in his court was late to or missed a scheduled court appearance. Early in February Gaddi cited the Philippine Secretary of Justice for contempt and ordered his arrest and imprisonment because no one from the Justice Department appeared in Gaddi's Angeles City court in response to a subpoena of the Justice Secretary.

However, if the MBA talks fail, we can expect a recrudescence of the kind of general harassment and press and public hypersensitivity on base incidents involving Filipinos which had plagued us in the past; and by a practical matter rendered our use of the bases increasingly difficult and our tenure increasingly insecure.

6.

Various Proposals for Consolidated Use of U.S. Inputs as Leverage to Obtain Protection of U.S. Interests

There are two basic dangers in this concept. The first of these is that each U.S. input already has a specific purpose which is being accomplished. If we try to make an existing input into a bargaining lever to achieve some secondary or tertiary objective unrelated to the basic purpose, we run the risk of undermining or sacrificing the basic purpose. Therefore, the concept would be valid only if the secondary or tertiary objective was so closely intertwined with the basic objective that all could be accomplished with the same leverage.

The second and perhaps far greater danger in the concept is that where the proposal is to combine all U.S. inputs into a single lever to compel the Philippine oligarchy to extend benefits of concessions to direct U.S. interests such as bases or business interests, we may:

a) Make our interests and inputs hostage to the Philippine oligarchy (if we can lever the oligarchy, they can by the same device put the squeeze on U.S. interests in order to get more U.S. input—and, as a matter of fact, the oligarchy has for a long time been smarter at this than we have);

b) Use up resources which we could otherwise use to improve the chances for a peaceful social evolution in the Philippines and diminish the danger of chaos and explosive revolution—objectives 3, 4 and 5;

c) Lock ourselves in with the oligarchy (which is protecting our interests in response to our leverage) as the enemies of the people.

One example of a type of leverage which we might use on the oligarchy would be a requirement for social and economic benefits to sugar estate workers as a condition for the Philippine sugar quota.

An example of a type of leverage we should not use would be economic aid as a lever to obtain protection of vested rights after the expiration of Laurel–Langley.

Note that the implication of such a leverage approach would be that if the vested rights were not protected the economic aid would be reduced or eliminated, thus reducing or eliminating many of our courses of action designed to achieve objectives 3, 4, and 5 in the PARA.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, EA/PAB 1972–73 Letters and Memos File: Lot 74 D 471. Secret. Drafted by Usher and attached to a February 8 covering memorandum to Green, in which Usher noted that the talking points “are related to the issues paper which S/PC has prepared in coordination with me,” and that both had been done in preparation for the East Asian Interdepartmental Group meeting on the Philippine Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) scheduled for February 23.

247. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, March 5, 1972, 0345Z.

1997. Subj Green–Holdridge Meeting with President Marcos.

Summary: Assistant Secretary Green's[2] meeting with top GOP leadership was well-nigh indispensable if we are to halt snowballing erosion of Philippine confidence in U.S. Asia policy and reliability U.S.–Philippine relationships. Exchange of views was brisk and penetrating, with questions to Green reflecting deep anxieties of Philippine officialdom and public. Visit greatly appreciated by Marcos and extremely helpful here whether or not it proves to have been an enduring corrective.

1. Green met with President Marcos for over two hours morning March 4, accompanied by John Holdridge, Consul General Osborn, and Ambassador. Marcos had present General Romulo, Finance Secretary Virata, Executive Secretary Melchor, and two DFA officials.

2. After brief exchange of warm and friendly greetings during photography, Marcos launched immediately (before Green was even able to convey President Nixon's and Secretary Rogers' greetings, which he did later) into series of pointed questions related to implications of President's Peking visit and the communiqué for future U.S. policy and behavior toward East Asia and most specifically Taiwan and the Philippines. It was more than an hour before any curiosity was expressed as to Chinese side of the coin or Chinese views on particular issues and problems. Main themes are summarized:

A. Marcos asked first about an apparent contradiction between U.S. acceptance that Taiwan is an internal Chinese problem and Dr. Kissinger's reaffirmation of U.S. defense commitment to GRC. In the ensuing discussion both Marcos and Romulo had considerable difficulty distinguishing between Marcos' formulation and the communiqué language of “acknowledging” and “not challenging” the view of Chinese on both sides of the Strait. Green carefully explained deliberate U.S. decision to leave undetermined position on “One China”, “Two Chinas”, “One China—One Taiwan”, etc. It became apparent Romulo had not really understood, through period of UNGA debate on admission of PRC, the deliberate care in wording of U.S. position on dual representation. This lack of understanding accounts for his recent feelings that he had been betrayed by what he saw as U.S. switch from “Two Chinas”—a position he had supported vigorously in UN—to what he has considered new “One China” stance.

B. Marcos then asked whether U.S. would challenge actions taken by PRC in accordance with its stated policy on Taiwan—”Tell us your intentions; Taiwan is only 92 miles north of Bosco” (northermost point in Philippines). Green reviewed President's interest and efforts since 1967 through series of careful steps to find a way to deal with the reality of China, to remove barriers to trade and travel, to avoid Cold War rhetoric, to remove tensions in area and show PRC we are not trying to threaten or isolate them. He said it has been made clear throughout that U.S. would stand by its commitments to GRC, and this had been stated again while on the Mainland. He noted his belief that Peking does not, in any event, want the U.S. withdrawal from Asia its propaganda has demanded while Peking's problems with USSR and Japan are viewed so seriously. Green stressed the importance of some means for dealing with day-to-day problems, which sterile Warsaw talks had failed to provide, and argued that communiqué reflects major gain of taking pressure off U.S. on recognition issue. Achievements of visit, he concluded, are what we need at this time and have been obtained without undercutting U.S. or free Asian interests in this area.

C. Pursuing his effort to pin down the U.S. intentions, Marcos asked what will happen to Taiwan in the long run. He asked Green to convey to USG his government's belief that Philippines must prepare for the worst, that within ten years Taiwan will be part of Communist China. He said this would threaten Philippine survival and conditions may deteriorate to the point GOP will have to adopt options it would not like. Green said he considered this line of reasoning unnecessary. The GRC is in a strong position, with outlook for trade and investment and economic progress good in comparison with PRC. Green referred to his talks in Taiwan, saying GRC leaders naturally not happy but that they understand our reasons and their situation and prospects are not bad. He made comparison with PRC which faces internal difficulties and severe external problems. Green sought to reassure Marcos with respect to continuity of U.S. concern for Philippines and other Asian friends, evoking special heritage U.S.-Philippine relations, quoting from President's foreign policy report on pillars of U.S. Asian policy and noting these have been reaffirmed since visit, and declaring U.S. prepared to stand on its record compared with all nations in history in living up to its undertakings. Marcos pursued his contention that communiqué says U.S. will let time solve the problem of Taiwan without interfering and referred to evidence he has that investors on Taiwan are offering to move holdings to Philippines, Singapore and elsewhere. Green referred to conversations in Japan and Korea, where similar concerns have been expressed, and said he felt, and our embassies have subsequently reported, that leaders there now understand and are satisfied with our policy. Green stated that our willingness to accept some future settlement between PRC and GRC did not mean that we are apathetic, noting military aid and diplomatic relations would continue. Ambassador noted tendency of public opinion to ignore military reality that GRC forces are large and strong and 7th fleet “remains out in front.”

D. Question from Romulo about communiqué statement on reduction of forces on Taiwan led Green to reaffirm the statement, noting it is consistent with Nixon Doctrine and that ultimate withdrawal is expressly contingent on peaceful resolution of problem. He referred to information previously conveyed by Ambassador on force deployments, assured Marcos this position still stands and said USG would try to repeat this kind of consultation from time to time. He said core elements will remain on Taiwan until settlement, which may well take many years. Green confirmed, in response to President's question, that U.S. PRC and GRC cannot settle differences peacefully, but expressed some confidence its contingency not real in light of Peking record since costly Korean conflict of avoiding adventuristic actions. He noted evidence including fact of President's visit that Peking wants some form of relations with U.S., making them less likely to prejudice own interests by resort to violence against Taiwan. Green expressed confidence we are on right track pursuing President's effort to escalate toward peace rather than war.

E. Regarding prospects for U.S.–PRC formal relations, Green suggested this not likely soon because Peking won't agree while U.S.–PRC relations are preserved. Green reiterated U.S. has obtained its short term objective, that visits by representatives may in actuality be better than a resident mission unable to operate in traditional fashion, in response to question whether he would not soon establish a Chargé in Peking and “commercial” representation in Taipei in British fashion.

F. When Green stated SEATO not affected by China developments, Romulo asked skeptically whether U.S. would still apply Article IV which is limited to “Communist aggression”, “now that you are friends.” Green said there has been no change and U.S. has record to prove we mean what we say. This exchange led on to discussion of the incorporation of the “five principles.” Green noted principles had always been unexceptionable, though propaganda environment at Bandung had precluded U.S. acceptance in 1950s, and suggested we gain in capacity to hold Peking to performance if we and Peking have stated our agreed support for five principles. This caused Romulo to refer to “U.S. interference” in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and Green to respond with specific reference to U.S. action in response to legitimate Cambodian call for help, including citation of even Sihanouk's October 1969 complaint of North Vietnamese aggression. When ousted, Sihanouk was in fact enroute to Moscow and Peking for very purpose of seeking their restraint on Hanoi's agression.

G. Discussion of U.S. bases in Philippines in this full meeting was brief, with Green stating in response to question there has been no short or long range change in our assessment of their importance. Marcos said he had asked Adm. McCain to obtain position on future of bases from Washington. Green affirmed that U.S.-Philippine relationship is unimpaired and he would so state to press on departure. Marcos expressed appreciation, noting irresponsible opposition effort in his Congress and consititutional convention on this issue.

H. To request for U.S. position of ASEAN neutralization proposal, Green said it is question for Southeast Asians to decide, U.S. considering it a worthy objective but noting many problems including establishment of adequate strength and stability to make it work.

I. Marcos expressed concern about Communist subversion.[3] Green acknowledged this is still a competitive world, said U.S. does not believe everything Peking says and will remain on its mettle and alert. Consul General Osborn noted that Peking frequently opts for diplomatic rather than military means of pressure when choice exists, and Green suggested they likely will increasingly conclude that sponsorship of national liberation movements is not useful. Marcos repeated his misgivings, looking ahead 10–20 years, and Green agreed it is important we all maintain adequate strength. He noted that overwhelming popular support in United States for President's China policy should strengthen his hand in Congress for totality of Pres. Nixon's policies and programs including adequate military aid.

3. Even after the foregoing and more, Marcos returned to theme that he had to find out exactly where we stand. Southeast Asian leaders expect him to be in the know about U.S. policy, “but I am not.” He said, “If your policy is to withdraw from Asia, just inform us.” Green responded that the President had personally charged him at end of China visit to convey to Asian friends and allies that U.S. is not going to leave western Pacific but rather find right way to remain. He said we should be and act confident, that Peking might be hypocritical but we stand to gain to extent Peking follows norms of international behavior. Urgent problems of environment, population, seabeds, and outer space cannot be dealt with on global basis without including China.

4. Romulo initiated discussion on related economic questions, asking whether U.S. will shoot for retention of GRC in World Bank; Green said U.S. will do what it can to support China in international financial institutions. Virata expressed concern about Phil problem in IMF should GRC be dropped and Green said he believed U.S. should give strong support. Virata requested U.S. decision as soon as possible. Similar concern expressed about ADB, particularly as it is located in Manila. Concerning trade, GOP leaders were informed PRC will henceforth be subject to same restrictions as USSR and that we judge trade will be limited and develop only slowly.

5. Toward end of discussion, Phils inquired about:

A. Peking view of Japan (we said Peking very worried about revival of militarism, though in fact internal restraints in Japan against militarism remain very strong);

B. Whether China still thinks in terms of encirclement (yes, but Soviets have replaced U.S. as number one threat and China may begin to perceive advantages in our overall posture of involvement);

C. PRC naval development (not yet a blue water navy). Phils asked about following subjects which were identified as not having been discussed during Peking visit: the ASEAN neutralization concept; Quemoy and Matsu; seabeds; and the ADB.

6. Marcos took Green away for half hour's private chat (septels). Interval provided opportunity for remaining group to elaborate a number of points previously raised (e.g., dual representation). Romulo came around to agree that U.S. and GOP position on Taiwan are the same, when it was stated we favor peaceful solution to be worked out by Chinese but will not yield to a forcible settlement.

7. As Marcos walked back with Green from private talk, he said the meeting had been useful, that it is obvious we are on same wave length, and that he was grateful to the President for sending Green to visit.

8. Comment: Embassy will forward fuller assessment after reactions to entire visit are registered. In brief, however, it is clear to us that the deep doubts and suspicions Marcos aired are real, shared within GOP as well as in increasingly noisy public discussion here. The reported misunderstandings and disbelief were undoubtedly somewhat exaggerated for test purposes and in an effort by Marcos to gather ammunition for use with critics and doubters. Secretary Green gave him plenty.

9. Dept repeat as appropriate.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/GREEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon for Green.

[2]  Green traveled to Southeast Asia in March 1972 to explain the Nixon administration's China policy in light of the President's trip to China and the joint U.S.-Chinese communiqué on Taiwan and East Asia.

[3] Telegram 1990 from Manila, March 4, reported Green's conversation with Marcos about Governor Romualdez's trip to China, in which the latter queried Chou En-lai about Chinese support of Maoist forces in the Philippines. (National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US)

248. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green)[1]

Washington, March 18, 1972.

SUBJECT

PARA Review—Philippines[2]

Pursuant to the review of February 10, 1972, following is a summary of our conclusions with respect to US policy toward the Philippines for the FY 72 review period.

I. Action Items

1. There was agreement that to require the Philippines to deposit 10 percent of the value of US military assistance could endanger the successful conclusion of our military base negotiations. The Department, therefore, will seek to exempt the Philippines from this requirement. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs will be the action bureau.

2. EA will amend the background statement on the situation in the Philippines (Annex I of country PARA document)[3] to highlight factors which work for and against peaceful evolutionary change and reform of Philippine society.

On the assumption that the next five years may be a transition period which will determine the future direction of change in the Philippines, this revised statement, updated annually as part of EA's PARA procedures, will be given further consideration in future PARA reviews.

II. Policy Program Guidance

A. Overall Policy Posture (Issue 1)

The challenge for the US over the next five years—and so long as the bases remain of fundamental importance to us—will be:

—to retain a satisfactory relationship with the Philippine Government that will ensure continued availability of the bases; but

—to avoid giving the appearance in the Philippines that we are wedded to a particular administration or are unsympathetic to the required basic reforms.

We have had some success in recent years in reducing Philippine dependence on the United States. These efforts should be continued.

Accordingly, we should:

—Seek to reduce and eliminate the remaining elements of the “special relationship” we have with the Philippines, emphasizing that excessive dependence on the United States is neither in the US nor Philippine interest and that a policy based on mutuality of interest will contribute to a healthier relationship.

—Continue to move as far as practicable from a bilateral to a multilateral framework in our dealings with the GOP.

—Keep our official presence to the minimum, consistent with our basing requirements, eliminating operations that are not essential or serve only marginal purposes.

B. Relations with Marcos (Issue 2)

Our relationship with Marcos should take into account his increasingly controversial role in Philippine politics.

While continuing to work closely with Marcos as the elected President, we will have to avoid identification as partisans of Marcos, particularly with respect to a possible move by Marcos to extend his incumbency beyond the present constitutional limit. (See III B below.)

C. Military Bases (Issue 3)

We should continue to avoid specific and public quid pro quo arrangements because these would be more costly and difficult than the present relatively modest military assistance program.

A tacit understanding has, in fact, long existed between the United States and the Philippines that US military assistance is a quid pro quo for otherwise rent free use of our bases. Neither country has wished, however, to formalize this relationship into a specific agreement that would formally tie MAP levels to US base rights.

To put the US-Philippine military relationship on a quid pro quo basis would undermine the concept of mutual US-Philippine defense interests in the area. Moreover, the Philippines would presumably seek a substantial increase in military aid if they were to regard the defense relationship in such stark terms, shorn of the long standing perception of the bases as serving mutual security interests.

D. Military Assistance (Issue 4)

The United States should continue to concentrate its security assistance on improving Philippine internal security capabilities.

The demands on the Philippine security forces are likely to increase over the next several years, reflecting mounting unrest both in the cities and countryside. There is no evidence at this time that we incur any serious political liabilities from our rule in support of this Philippine program.

This issue should be kept under review in the annual PARA cycle.

E. Development Assistance (Issue 5)

The US should continue to coordinate its development assistance through the IBRD-led Consultative Group and look to the IMF as Philippines' principal financial advisor.

Concentration of US aid efforts on rural development and population problems seems appropriate to our desired posture in the Philippines and to available resources. Short-term balance of payments support is also warranted.

F. Trade and Investment (Issue 6)

The review reaffirmed the position adopted in 1965 that we should not seek an extension of the Laurel–Langley Agreement.

Accordingly, beyond 1974, the US should neither extend special bilateral tariff preferences nor request parity (or equivalent) rights for US business. At the same time, the US should try to persuade the GOP that it is in the Philippines' own interest to maintain a favorable climate for foreign investment.

In this connection, the review noted that those American firms that will clearly be affected by the termination of the Laurel–Langley Agreement have by and large accepted this fact and have made or are making appropriate adjustments in the arrangements under which they operate. Most US firms will probably be affected to some degree by the termination, but the full impact on individual firms will not be known until the courts have ruled on a number of legal questions. Estimates of how much disinvestment may be required of US firms therefore vary. According to a 1970 Embassy assessment, disinvestment (outright sale, moving to minority equity position, sale of land in return for long-term leases, etc.) might be somewhere around $160 million (out of a total US direct investment of about $1 billion). Most American firms believe that they will be able to make sufficiently satisfactory adjustments and will probably continue to do business in the Philippines.

III. Policy Assumptions and Background (Issues 1 and 2)

A. The Policy Problem

Two assumptions set the framework for US policy in the Philippines:

—First, our military bases are of fundamental importance to the United States, at least for the foreseeable future. In fact, the bases are likely to become more valuable if US base rights are curtailed or restricted elsewhere in the Western Pacific.

—Second, if basic political, economic and social reforms are not soon forthcoming, internal unrest is likely to mount. While it is generally agreed that reasonable stability will probably be maintained over the next four or five years, there is considerable doubt whether the Marcos administration and its successor (most likely again controlled by the oligarchy) will institute the extensive reforms that are necessary to forestall rising internal unrest over the longer term.

At present the situation in the Philippines is mixed: forces of reform are gaining strength but are blocked by strong vested interests. On balance, there is probably little the US can do directly to induce the GOP to institute the required reforms.

B. The Problem of Marcos

Marcos is the first Philippine President ever elected to a second term. Although it is charged that the Marcos machine committed extensive fraud and applied considerable pressure tactics, particularly in the second term election, it is clear that in completely fraud-free elections Marcos would have been elected both times. Furthermore, Marcos' opponents are not entirely innocent of such practices.

Marcos has been one of the best Presidents the Philippines has had in terms of constructive accomplishments; and he has been friendly to the United States. Now, however, he has become a highly controversial figure, partly because of his presumed (but publicly denied) desire to continue as President despite the constitutional prohibition against a third term.

Appropriate portions of this memorandum are intended as policy guidance for the Bureau of EA.

Should the views of other agencies represented in the IG/EA result in conclusions by the Interdepartmental Group that depart substantially from this guidance, your Bureau is requested to bring these to the attention of S/PC for a possible review by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.[4]

John N. Irwin II

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL–US. Secret.

[2] The Policy Analysis Resource Allocation (PARA) study for the Philippines was prepared in the Office of Philippine Affairs of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in coordination with the American Embassy in Manila for consideration by and at the request of the East Asian Interdepartmental Group (NSC: IG–EA).

[3] See Document 246 and footnote 1 thereto.

[4] Annex A, Indicator Resource Guidance, is attached but not printed.

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines [1]

Washington, May 13, 1972, 0058Z.

84423. For Ambassador from Assistant Secretary Green. Ref: Manila 4379.[2]

1. While I can sympathize with your desire to challenge Aquino on these matters,[3] my own judgment would be strongly negative. His 44 points apparently lay out the foreign policy framework for his campaign for a presidential nomination. As such, they are so drafted as to seem more pro-Filipino than anti-American and leave plenty of room for maneuver. While you are the better judge, I would imagine the points would receive a good local press. Thus, I doubt we can gain much by attacking him on these points, and we would run serious risk of appearing to attempt to inject ourselves into domestic political conflicts.

2. His follow-up remarks on the relationship of the bases to the Vietnam conflict is, of course, a different matter and distinctly un-helpful. Nevertheless, I feel we must avoid public discussion of these matters as much as possible. We have sent you our standard press guidance in State 082955 and I believe we must adhere to that line, particularly at this time, and “no comment” any further detailed questions or speculation on the role of the bases other than to refer to the Bohlen–Serrano Agreement. We are sending a septel for your use with Romulo, though I fear it is not much more forthcoming.

3. Finally, I am concerned about the nature of the attack you would launch on Aquino. It seems to me he would almost have to categorically deny its truth. The consequences of such a public confrontation are hard to foresee but I cannot see how they would serve our interests. In this connection, we also have in mind the consequences that followed from Bill Blair's remarks directed towards Speaker Laurel.

4. All in all, I hope you will decide not to use the material.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Lowman, and approved by Green, Wilson, and Hummel.

[2] Telegram 4379 from Manila, May 12, reported Byroade's desire to reply to Philippine Senator Aquino's criticism of the U.S. military base in the Philippines. (Ibid.)

[3] Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Secretary-General of the opposition Liberal Party and a leading contender for the Presidency in 1973, strongly criticized Philippine national security dependence on the United States, the status of U.S. bases in the Philippines in general, and their use to support the war in Vietnam in particular. Airgram A–170 from Manila, May 30, among other messages, describes Aquino's policy initiative and criticism. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL)

250. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 19, 1972, 0955Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Immediate; Niact; Nodis. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, May 25, 1972, 0803Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. 8 pages of source text not declassified.]

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, June 2, 1970, 0900Z.

5107. Summary: Ambassador and EmbOff separately have had serious talk with Senator Aquino about his current anti-American stance and efforts to publicize and have investigated our usage of military bases in the Philippines. While our previous analysis that Aquino's actions are primarily for domestic political reasons still stand, it may be that some of his actions have been based, at least in part, upon a misunderstanding of facts or even miscalculation as to future U.S. policy and posture in the Pacific area.

1. Department should probably know that I recently used fairly strong words with Senator Aquino at a social affair. As I saw Aquino coming through the receiving line for Army Secretary Froehlke at Lagdameo's house, I began maneuvering to the opposite side of his group of 120 guests as I had no desire to talk to him. Aquino, however, came directly to me with a query as to whether I had seen his most recent article. (I still do not know what he was referring to.)

2. Making certain that we were not overheard, I told Aquino I had seen several of his other articles and letters which concerned me deeply. I said I could only conclude that he had made some basic miscalculations based upon mis-information. I said I thought I detected in some of his moves and words a feeling that we might lose in Vietnam. I told him most emphatically that that was not the case. He said “But what are you going to do?” I finally got his shifty eye and made it very plain that we would do anything we had to do not to lose. He began to appear a bit uneasy and said, “But it is proven that the South Vietnamese will not fight.” I told him there again he is quite wrong, saying that he must be relying too heavily on press reports of sometime ago which were in general quite distorted.

3. Being careful to remain courteous and polite, I told him that as a distinguished Filipino citizen he was, of course, fully entitled to his views, and of course to make them public. I said he must remember, however, that we of course are entitled to our own feelings, and that we could hardly help but be concerned that he would mount an apparent attack on the use of our military bases at the very height of the current intensified Vietnam conflict.

4. We then got more into details and at times it appeared that Aquino was honestly surprised by some of the things I told him. For instance, when he referred to GI's loading bombs underneath airplane wings at Clark I told him such reports were undoubtedly true. I said he must know that Clark is utilized for gunnery training by air force pilots both from the Philippines and other areas in the Pacific. The bombs closely resembled real ones but were most often filled with smoke marking material, concrete, etc. I said there had never been any secret about such things, reminding him that Marcos and I over a year ago had gone to Clark and handed the trophies to the Philippine air force, who in that gunnery competition had won over our own air force. I told him that he did not have to get conscientious objectors from Clark before a foreign senate body to find out such things. I asked why he did not ask Philippine pilots whose F–5–E's are standing right next to ours on the alert ramp at Clark. I had assumed he would know this, as Clark is in his area, but he seemed flabbergasted. The conversation was broken at this point as we were seated at different tables for dinner. PolOff Ron Palmer was at Aquino's table and he reported that Aquino told him that he was quite shaken up over his conversation with me, remarking that I had told him many things which he did not know and seemed contrary to what he had heard. The conversation was quite extensive, with Palmer answering his questions frankly and openly.

5. Aquino told Palmer that his experience at the Fuji Seminar on Japan's role in world affairs in the 1970's in late March had had quite an effect upon him. He said that Thanat Khoman and several other important people from the general area were there. He said it seemed to be the majority feeling of the delegates that the U.S. was in fact headed towards a “pull out” from the Asia area. He had thereupon begun to think what the Philippines should do to get prepared for this type of situation. Palmer reminded him that that conference was before President Nixon had shown the whole world, by a series of bold moves, that the U.S. was not going to lose in Vietnam. Aquino admitted that this was the case, but said that when he read the President's conditions for getting out of Vietnam (i.e., cease fire and return of prisoners only), he had taken it as a clear signal that we were going to bug out. Palmer replied that if he were more up-to-date on our massive actions re Vietnam, he probably would feel differently about it.

6. The evening ended with Aquino asking Palmer if he would be willing to meet and talk about things some more. Palmer replied at the time that he had enjoyed the conversation and would like to talk again. I told Palmer the next morning he was free to do so. Now I find that Aquino that same morning called long-time American resident, Dave Sternberg, saying (falsely) that apparently doors in the Embassy were closed to him and asking to see Sternberg.

7. There is no doubt in the minds of either Palmer or me that Aquino took our conversation seriously. While our assessment of Aquino's motives previously reported remains unchanged, I am inclined to think that maybe he has not been as well informed as we generally assumed. The pace of his daily activities is so great that he may not have spent the time on “facts” that we would have assumed.

8. In all of this, however, I find his remarks about the seminar in Japan most interesting. I have not been so concerned of late about the deleterious effect of the “American withdrawal” bugaboo that has concerned me so much in the past. In looking back I guess I had assumed that our present actions in Vietnam, beginning with the mine laying, had laid this one to rest for the time being. I do not, of course, assume for one minute that Aquino was necessarily telling the truth, while tacitly acknowledging his own ignorance, but on the other hand it would probably be unwise to be too sure that he was not. We will be watching for his next public utterances with interest.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC.

253. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, June 7, 1972, 1616Z.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

254. National Security Study Memorandum No. 155[1]

Washington, June 28, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines

The President has directed that a review of U.S. policies toward the Republic of the Philippines be made. The study should identify basic U.S. interests in the Philippines. It should examine the implications of the present situation in the Philippines for basic U.S. interests, and the consequent U.S. objectives in furthering those interests over the next five years. Lastly, it should delineate and examine the policy options open to the U.S. over this period.

The study should analyze factors and trends affecting U.S. interests and include consideration of:

—The political ambitions and intentions of President Marcos and opposition groups.

—The growth of Philippine nationalism, its manifestations in the Constitutional Convention, and its likely effects on U.S. military base agreements, investment and trade.

—The political role of the Philippine Armed Forces.

—Philippine perception of and reaction to the Nixon Doctrine and to U.S. policy toward the PRC, Japan and other nations of East and South East Asia.

—The economic situation in the Philippines.

The study should include consideration of the following policy issues and their interrelationship as they affect U.S. interests and objectives:

—Continued access to U.S. military bases in the Philippines. (In this connection, what should be the relationship to continued base access of (a) U.S. military assistance, and (b) the continuation of the preferential provisions of the Laurel–Langley Agreement?)

—Continued liberal access to the Philippine market for U.S. traders and investors, and reasonable protection for existing U.S. private investment in the Philippines.

—Particularly in relation to the foregoing two issues, (a) to what extent should we preserve our “special relationship” to the Philippines; and (b) should the U.S. take a position as regards the Constitutional Convention and the development of a new Constitution?

—U.S. role as regards:

—Philippine efforts to maintain internal stability and a satisfactory level of economic development. (As regards internal stability, what should be the U.S. role vis-à-vis Philippine internal security policy and operations? As regards economic development, what should be the U.S. role vis-à-vis external aid and economic development, what should be the scale and direction of our aid programs, and what should be the areas reserved for multilateral programs?)

—Philippine efforts to play a constructive regional role in Asia.

—As it relates in particular to the foregoing issues, how far should we go in limiting our identification with the present administration and its policies?

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia, and should be submitted not later than July 31, 1972 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.[2]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret.

[2] The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs completed its first draft of working papers in response to NSSM 155 on July 28, and the Embassy provided its input in telegram 7578 from Manila, August 15. (Ibid.,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PHIL–US) The Senior Review Group met on December 1 to discuss NSSM 155. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, Philippines, Dec. 1, 1972) NSSM 155 resulted in NSDM 209, “U.S. Policy Towards the Philippines,” March 27, 1973, and will be covered in Foreign Relations , 1969–1976, vol. E–12.

255. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, July 6, 1972, 0425Z.

6169. Subj Ambassador Has Frank Discussion with President Marcos on Recent Trends in US-Phil Relations. Ref Manila 5211.[2]

1. Summary: I saw Pres. Marcos July 5 to inquire about significance of GOP foreign policy developments of past month for future US-Phil relations. Marcos said no fundamental shifts have taken place, but acknowledged things have gotten out of hand and need cooling off. Marcos accordingly suggests putting off final stage of negotiations on US-Phil security and economic matters until early 1973.

2. I told Marcos during call July 5 that I was beginning to get questions from Washington regarding the foreign policy of the Philippines that I could not answer and hence felt it necessary to seek his own views. I told him that in the past three or four weeks it would be apparent to any observer that the Philippines is in the process of rather drastically changing their policies. Marcos said he would welcome my questions.

3. I said that in looking back to the period immediately following our meeting recorded on television (reftel) on the subject of our military bases, this subject had become highly publicized and somewhat emotional. Furthermore, the start of the campaign had seemed to be officially inspired. I reminded him that the very next day there were many items in the press quoting “official sources” or “sources close to Malacanang.” I reminded him also that the Daily Express (his own paper) had headlines the next morning “FM–U.S. Bases Must Go!” since that time there had been much pro and con debate about the Philippines leaving SEATO, etc. I paused for his reaction and he asked that I continue.

4. I said these things concerned us primarily because the things that seemed to be under debate were very fundamental indeed, as they all dealt in one way or the other with the military strength of the United States and its deployment overseas. I said that I thought when Romulo talked about the new “realities” in world affairs, that he left out many very important things. I said one reality, as an example, was that President Nixon in an election year was asking for a considerably expanded defense budget. I said that our administration was determined that U.S. strength would not fall below that of the Soviet Union, although we would, of course, do this in ways that would not violate our new SALT agreements, providing they were also lived up to by the Soviets. We hoped that further agreements could be reached with the Soviet Union, but this probably would be unattainable if we dealt from a position of weakness. It is in this context, I said, that we could hardly fail to be concerned at talk from one of our friends and allies of changes that might well significantly affect our force posture, which we consider not only important for ourselves, but for our friends and allies as well.

5. Marcos said he wanted me to know that there had been no such fundamental shift in his own thinking. He agreed, however, that things had gone a bit far and thought it was time that he moved to “take some steam” out of these issues. He said he was sure that I knew the Filipinos well enough to realize, however, that negotiations are usually approached with outlandish first positions. I said I realized this, and was sure that some of his advisers would urge such a stance to make the price go up. Marcos quickly interjected that he didn't subscribe to that tactic(!). I said the trouble with such an approach was that by the time a sensible compromise had been reached, it could produce a situation where the new agreement would be criticized as being no good because the Philippines did not gain their maximum position. He said he realized such dangers and would exert such control as he could.

6. I told him I had been wondering also about timing and tactics. I said I had been concerned of late that he might publicly nominate high-powered panels, including members of the Senate and the House, which I did not see how we could match in our current election process. He said he realized that. Suddenly he said, “I think this whole thing is getting out of hand. Why don't we just delay everything until early next year.” He said he had thought about trying to bring things to a head with a state visit before our elections, but he realized it was geting too late for that, and besides his government was not prepared on its part for such rapid action. I told him that there were some matters on our side that I doubted we could get in shape as well before November. There seemed to be agreement between us that a good time to bring things to a head would be somewhere around February or March. To delay much longer than that would be getting too close to elections here. He said maybe panels should be appointed in December. I told him that this seemed a good idea because there was a great deal of work involved and it might take two or four months to get everything in shape.

7. Marcos then asked about our “new” disclosure that we were just going to let Laurel–Langley die without being willing to talk about it. I told him that that revelation, sometimes labeled as a leak on our side, had appeared in so much of the press the same day that I can only conclude that it had been inspired by someone, as there had been no recent decisions or release of information on that subject from our side. It was apparent in his remarks that he would be considerably disturbed if the United States position were that we would refuse to talk about any follow-on to Laurel–Langley.

8. Marcos asked if he had dispelled some of my concerns. I replied that he had. He said, “Well, then let me go all the way.” He said to tell the truth he hadn't been thinking at all about such things as military bases, alliances, etc. He said that he was so deeply involved in so many internal matters that he had perhaps relied too much on others were distorting on the Philippine image (he explicitly named Romulo as being in favor of removal of our bases). He then went on to list at least 20 things he was working on and began to show some signs of frustration that he couldn't seem to get things done. (We have noticed ourselves a slackening in Malacanang efficiency and morale.) He listed the oil price problem here affecting our companies as one of the problems, and I took a fairly strong line as this problem is, in fact, becoming intolerable to our oil companies. He threw up his hands at one point saying that the Philippines had loans, but was largely without well worked out projects to take advantage of them. He began to show a somewhat agitated state of mind over the magnitude of the problems facing him personally. He did not mention, except once indirectly, domestic political problems.[3]

9. Our talk, which is much longer that can be put in a message, would seem to indicate that we are not about to be hit with some new demand that would surprise us. (There will be a follow-up message, however, recommending that with the short time we have to December or, even to March, we not relax with this new development, but keep our own preparations going.) While this is a welcome development, on the other hand, it is disconcerting to see Marcos personally so perplexed about his problems.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Dated June 2. (Ibid.)

[3] Telegram 5074 from Manila, June 2, reported Byroade's conversation the previous week with Marcos about domestic and political problems in the Philippines, in which the latter talked of the “great upsurge of communist insurgency threat in the country,” adding that “he might have to reinstate martial law. He asked again if we would support him or at least not oppose him.” To this, Byroade said that he “mumbled that our position on that had not changed, but added the hope that he would not find such a move necessary as I thought it would clearly at this time tear the nation apart into opposing factions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 PHIL)

256. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 15, 1972, 0942Z.

8734. Ref: Manila 8424.[2]

1. In order to deal with the obvious complexities of the developing situation in Philippines which we have been analyzing in our recent series of cables,[3] I should like to try to dissect the problem into more digestible proportions. We might first of all separate things into two categories: (1) The extension of Marcos in power by political means which are permissible under the Constitution, and (2) Extension in power by such means as martial law. There was no hint of the latter in his talk with Johnson, although he did list it as a possibility, in event the situation so warranted, with Senator Inouye.[4]

2. Barring unforeseen circumstances, I believe that Marcos can extend himself by constitutional means without our support, which, of course, he would not ask for unless he needed it. I believe he has the capability, for instance, of getting the Constitutional Convention to approve the concept of a transitional government with him as head for two years in preparation for a shift of parliamentary rule in 1975. He could do this by securing support from all those in the present Legislature who would be automatically extended, and bringing the Constitutional Convention (ConCon) body into the transition government to satisfy the appetities of its members there who are eager to run for public office. He could also bring drafting of the Constitution to an early enought conclusion, I think, so that (if approved by plebiscite) the parliamentary system would go into effect with national elections set for November 1973.

3. Having the ability to accomplish some combination of the above, I think Marcos will not ask for our help. He would only be interested in whether we would oppose him or try to thwart his plans. This may seem rather far fetched to non-students of the Philippines. But notwithstanding proponents of low profile, the position of the President of the United States and his representative here is still absolutely unique here as compared to other countries. A majority of Filipinos would even at this point in time list my position (not me) as the second most important position in the Philippines. A minority, although sizeable, would still list it as the most important. With these considerations in mind, and Marcos knows them well, our attitude on any given question is still a very important factor.

4. If Marcos wants to extend by constitutional means, and we intervene, (which I think we would not at this point, all things considered) we might be in a position to buy considerable benefit to ourselves by simply letting him know that we would not oppose in any way his continuation in power by constitutional means. These matters, we could say, are internal to the Philippines on which we would naturally take no position or action. However, we would want to make clear at the same time the importance we attach to the constitutional legality of these means. All of this, of course, would be quite private, and Marcos would want it that way.

5. At the same time we should have no hesitation at all to ask him to take specific steps in the interest of our mutual business relationships, which after all are basically good for the Philippines. Nor do I think it outside the realm of possibility that we might get a good share of them. Montelibano (principal spokesman for the sugar industry), for instance, and I think with the President's blessing or at least knowledge, is openly advocating an extension period of 10 to 15 years for the transition of American interests (Laurel is saying this very privately). I believe that this goes byeond his own interests in the sugar quota. I think Montelibano is convinced along with many others that any quick transition will end up in drastic deterioration of the Philippine economy.

6. I am in favor of the proposition of getting what we want now, while Marcos is legitimately in power, in the nature of constitutional provisions and laws which could be expected to extend beyond his tenure. In my first two years here Marcos played quite above board with me, but this situation had deteriorated somewhat due to his doubts that we can go along with his extension in power. My own attitude is that, if Marcos can keep his fingers crossed behind his back while making agreements with us, so can we—and we can also judge the future and our position completely in our own interests as time passes.

7. If we are going to go down this route with Marcos, we will want to broaden our support here as much as possible at the same time, and not narrow it down to him personally. There are many in and out of government who are vitally interested in the issues of trade preferences, sugar quotas, etc. I would say we should go ahead with the above, we should find some way of getting trade preferences for the Philippines, we should find some way of assuring them on sugar, and we should go ahead with the new approach I have recommended in the security field on military assistance. Incidentally, our recommendations in the latter field do not in any way greatly enhance a military capability that can be used against the Filipino people.

8. The second category mentioned above leads us into the question of extension of power by extra-constitutional means. It should be pointed out at the outset that a declaration of martial law, if carried out for the purposes specified in the Constitution, is not in itself, of course, an extra-constitutional step. It could become so if its purpose is extension in power, which obviously is outside the spirit of the Constitution.

9. I asked Marcos yesterday if he were about to surprise us with a declaration of martial law. He said no, not under present circumstances. He said he would not hesitate at all in doing so if the terrorists stepped up their activities further, and to a new stage. He said that if a part of Manila were burned, a top official of his Government, or foreign ambassador, assassinated or kidnapped, then he would act very promptly. He said that he questioned Communist capability to move things to such a stage just now and asked my views. I said I thought it a bit premature in their plans, but the present atmosphere undoubtedly increased their recruiting capability. He said 3,000 students were no longer in greater Manila universities (implying they have allied themselves with the dissidents—a figure we cannot sustain), and that if it were inevitable he would just as soon see them go for big things now in order to get this period of indecision over with!

10. Marcos could be encouraged in this course by a growing popular concern over the deteriorating law and order situation, particularly on the part of the influential Philippine business leaders, as well as government technocrats. The latter have felt for some months now that a firmer hand at the tiller is necessary to control this situation and the spreading corruption, as well as to remove political and legal obstacles to greater social reform. A rather surprising number of people seem to be in the mood of letting Marcos go ahead and take over with the hope he can straighten things out. This does not mean any great shift of popularity, although his position is somewhat better as reported elsewhere than say three months ago. Rather it is more a philosophical resignation to “who else is there?” There is without doubt a growing feeling that social reform under the present system just may not be possible. A legislature that represents the “status quo” will never agree to meaningful reforms. Also, nearly every action, even including clearance of obstacles from drainage canals which helped cause greater damage in the recent floods, can be stopped by hundreds of court injunctions. Among the articulate there is a growing feeling that revolution, “from the bottom” is inevitable unless “revolution from the top” is prompt and effective.

11. Romulo, in an amazing toast to the Korean Foreign Minister recently compared progress in Korea with that in the Philippines in a very unfavorable light for the latter. He concluded that under the present system of “complete democracy” the Philippines would never be able to keep pace with their Asian neighbors. On that same occasion he put his hand on my shoulder and said that “your brand of democracy clearly cannot get the Philippines out of its dilemmas and start her on the road to real progress.” He said that our system was for developed countries and developing countries could not afford this luxury. Later on I told him that in my opinion our brand of democracy really worked best while we were still in the process of development. He said that his people were different and the Filipino would never get out of their deterioration without a very strong hand to take them out.

12. Imposition of martial law, or an abandonment of the democratic constitution, would present us in America with a problem. Thailand, for instance, can change its governmental system with hardly a ripple felt in the United States. I do not believe this would be the case with regard to the Philippines, where we introduced our own brand of democracy.

13. This message brings you up to date both on reporting and analysis as we see things from here. We are working now trying to formulate as specifically as we can what seems to be reasonable positive action that might possibly be handled by the Supreme Court, the Legislature, and the ConCon. When we get this to you, you may have an easier task in providing Washington comments than has been the case with our reporting so far.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

[2] Dated September 7. (Ibid.)

[3] In addition to telegram 8424 from Manila, these included telegram 164964 to Manila, September 9; telegram 8619 from Manila, September 13 (both ibid.); and telegram 8652 from Manila, September 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US) The main issue of these telegrams was Marcos' maneuvering to continue in power and to gain the support of the United States for such a development. The telegrams also dealt with economic issues, especially the ownership of property in the Philippines by Americans, including America-owned oil industry property and rights. Marcos intimated that U.S. economic concerns would be best met by U.S. support of his political moves. U.S. concern over the property rights of Americans in the Philippines was occasioned by a court case called the Quasha decision which, according to telegram 164964, “would appear not only to deprive U.S. citizens of their right to continue after 1974 to own land which they have acquired in good faith under Philippine law, but would also appear to put into doubt the current validity of their titles to such land, including the ability to convey good title to a would-be purchaser.” During the first week in September, however, the Marcos-dominated Supreme Court overturned the Quasha decision, a move which Byroade theorized in telegram 8424 may have been one of Marcos' “first big moves to get our blessing, or at the minimum our acquiescence, to his extension in power.”

[4] According to telegram 8424, Senator Inouye gave Byroade an oral report of his “considerable time alone with Marcos.” Inouye said that Marcos had given him a long statement as to why it would be good for the Philippines if he remained in power. No other record of Inouye's meeting with Marcos was found.

257. Airgram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

Senator Aquino's Views on Martial Law and the Political Future of President Marcos

REF

Manila 8738[2]

A–244

Summary

In a private conversation on September 12 with the Political Counselor and another Embassy political officer Liberal Party (LP) Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. stated that he believed President Marcos would declare martial law in order to stay in power. Aquino said Marcos is faced with serious economic problems as a result of the floods and the Quasha decision, which Aquino thinks will have a severe dampening effect on foreign investment. With rapidly worsening law and order and Communist dissident problems added to these economic woes, Aquino believes that Marcos must take strong actions in the near future and that these will include martial law. If the President follows this course, Aquino said that, “for the good of the country,” he will support Marcos. However, Aquino pointed out, martial law could backfire on the President, and Aquino expressed doubts that the GOP has sufficient resources to carry out martial law successfully. As for his own political ambitions, Aquino believes that the possibilities of his becoming head of government by legitimate means are quickly diminishing, and he is accordingly keeping open an option to lead an anti-Marcos revolution in alliance with the Communists.[3]

During a protracted luncheon conversation with two Embassy officers on September 12, LP Secretary General Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., a leading presidential aspirant and principal critic of President Marcos, expounded on his views of Marcos' political future. (Aquino's comments on his connections with the Communists are reported in a separate airgram.)

Aquino stated that he has no doubt that President Marcos intends to remain in power. He was less certain of how the President would do this. Presidential elections in 1973 seemed to Aquino to be low on the scale of priority for Marcos; however, Imelda Marcos would almost certainly win if she ran since the President could fill the ballot boxes with fake votes and employ other illegitimate means of insuring her success. As Aquino believes that the Liberals would be powerless to prevent this from happening and could do little more than protest, Senator Aquino showed very little interest in his own ambitions for the Liberal Party nomination next year. A second Marcos alternative is to stay in office for two more years through the adoption of the synchronization of elections in 1975 proposal that pro-Marcos delegates are presently floating around Con-Con. But Aquino is unsure of Marcos' ability to completely control Con-Con. He said that Marcos had spent ten million pesos so far in his successful effort to control the Con-Con, but, nevertheless, must be very disappointed with the relatively narrow margin in his favor in the recent vote defeating a draft provision to ban him and his spouse from holding the positions of President or Prime Minister (see Manila 8452).

Aquino believes that martial law is the most likely means Marcos will use in order to stay in power. Aquino said that he would support Marcos if this is the course he adopts. Since the law and order and economic situation is deteriorating so rapidly, in Aquino's view, the good of the country requires strong measures on the part of the Central Government. The growing threat from the dissidents, the worsening law and order problem, the serious economic setback that has resulted from the floods in central Luzon and the probable ill effects of the Quasha decision of the Supreme Court on the country's foreign investment climate were cited by Aquino as reasons why stronger central government action is needed. Such action means martial law. Were he President, Aquino indicated that he would not hesitate to take such strong action and would, for example, execute several corrupt officials at the Luneta Park in Manila as a lesson to other officials that he meant business.

[Omitted here is discussion of Philippine politics.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 PHIL. Confidential. Drafted by Political Counselor John D. Forbes on September 20, cleared by Political Officer George T. Kalaris, and approved by Maestrone. Also sent to Djakarta, Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, CINCPAC for POLAD, and CINCPACREPPHIL.

[2] Dated September 16.

[3]  Aquino's revelations about his meeting with Jose Maria Sison, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines/Marxist–Leninist (CPP/ML), in which they discussed the possibility of forming a broad united front in opposition to the Marcos administration, are reported in airgram A–245, September 21. (Ibid.)

258. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 21, 1972, 1011Z.

8936. Ref A. Manila 8424,[2] B. Manila 8619,[3] C. Manila 8734,[4] D. State 171335.[5]

1. Yesterday local [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports began to be quite specific about the imminent imposition of martial law. On top of this Bob Wales of Mobile gave me in written form his memo of conversation with Marcos the day before which generally paralleled matters that Marcos had told Johnson of Caltex previously reported. We are classifying these two documents and will send them by pouch. For purposes of brevity, I will not herein summarize the memorandum of Wales, except to report its last sentence which is as follows: “Marcos ended up the discussion by saying that it would be a tragedy if he had to declare martial law if he was not supported by his ally, the United States”.

2. I decided I had no alternative but to undertake quickly the potentially dangerous task of a real heart to heart with Marcos on issues as delicate as his own plans and ambitions. Last night proved impossible but I had a very long session with him this morning.

3. I told Marcos that to save time he should assume that I knew in detail the important matters he had discussed with Johnson and Wales, except possibly for company matters which were not my concern. I said I did not believe he should place any blame on these two individuals, as they were conscientious Americans who realized that they were getting into matters of proper concern to me and to their government. He said he understood this very well (I think it obvious all along that he assumed they would talk to me).

4. I told Marcos that I was not seeing him for the purpose of preparing a report for Washington. I said I had a message asking me if I thought martial law was about to be declared, and whether we thought it necessary. I said I did not come even specifically to talk abut that, but on matters perhaps even more fundamental.

5. I said I was not under instructions and anything I might say would at this point be just personal from me. My motive was to try to achieve better understanding so that neither one of us might make a major miscalculation. I said that if I did so, nothing more would happen other than I would get fired and go look for a new job, and history would in no way be changed. On the other hand, if he, as head of state, were to make a miscalculation based upon some failure of mine to communicate, this could turn out to be of real importance.

6. He asked what I had in mind. I replied, a great many things, but I supposed we might just as well start with the question of martial law. He said he thought maybe we had better not discuss it directly, because he had to remain in a position where he could say that he had not accepted my advice. I told him that I was not in his presence to advise him on such a decision that only he can make, but I thought we did have to discuss the matter and quite frankly. I told him that he himself had told me that he might have to move if there were some new and significant event. This could mean at any given time that we might be only one day away. Also that one of his last remarks to Wales had brought up the question of our support. Moreover, the question had arisen as to whether New York could not urge more Washington support for him and his government.

7. I said I thought it was necessary to reflect a bit on the obvious. We did not have a dictatorship, but a big sprawling bureaucratic working democracy. I said that his brother-in-law's idea of trying to sneak into Washington under an assumed name and making a secret deal or understanding with somebody after midnight went out of vogue about the time of Teddy Roosevelt. I said that efforts on the part of New York, even with our President, could turn out utterly fruitless provided things happened where even our President could not get what he wanted in the way of legislative support, etc.

8. I reminded him again that it was terribly important that he understands that it was only I, a friend, talking to him personally and privately. In that context, I said I wanted to talk to him about the type of things that cause me to pace the floor. He said he understood completely and I should go ahead without hesitation. I then reminded him that we are in the wind-up phase of an extremely important election campaign in our own country. I said I thought McGovern would seize on anything like a military takeover in the Philippines in an effort to use it as the final proof of his charge that the foreign policies of Nixon, particularly in the Asian area, were a total failure. I said I thought he would scream that “even the Philippines” had been so badly messed up that the very form of government which we instituted here was now in the hands of military dictatorship, supplied by our equipment. He would probably try to make a major thing of it, proving that this was the beginning of another Vietnam “even in the Philippines.” I said I know Nixon pretty well, and I thought he would be greatly upset if the Philippines gave the appearance of blowing up in his face at a time like this. I returned to the idea that our hands could become so tied up that as a practical fact we couldn't do any of the things we really wanted to do for the Philippines.

9. Marcos said he had made no decision to move towards martial law, and he had never considered anything beyond that, such as military rule. He did admit, however, that planning for martial law was at an advanced state. He said that under any conditions he could foresee he would not consider any extra-constitutional moves in the Philippines. We then got into a discussion as to what type of events had to happen under the Philippine Constitution wherein it would be constitutional to declare martial law. He concluded that words might have a different meaning for us and the Philippine Constitution was perhaps broader in this respect than our own.

10. At one point I said maybe we needed his help and the help of his intelligence people, as it was obvious that he and they must know many things in this country that we could not know. I said it was difficult for us to start off with a band of armed men numbering somewhere around a thousand, mostly in the Hills and, with assumed figures as to the extent of their base and mass support, to conclude that the Philippine Government was in danger of being toppled. He said that, of course, was true, and he did not consider the government to be under that threat at the present time, but he said the very effectiveness of government was threatened and that was enough for him to move legally.

11. Marcos told me at one point that guns were not the answer. He said he did not mean that over the long haul that the Philippines did not need adequate military forces. He then went into quite a brilliant description of the state of things in the Philippines and the absolute necessity for social reform. He said after all of his years in government, including seven in the Presidency, that he did indeed question the ability of the Philippines to achieve adequate reforms in time under the present system. His descriptions of its evils, and graft and corruption, of the impossibility of getting adequate legislation, and adequate resources for desperately needed reforms could hardly have been equalled by any harsh critic of this country. It is hard to escape [garble] that he thinks that his place in history might be made if he had the power of drastic reform. He might even see at this point this is his only route to regain his popularity even to the point where he could win handily in a future election, although he made no reference to either of these thoughts.

12. We then went on in an unusually relaxed and friendly session, even for us, to discuss many other things which will be reported separately, and with different classification.

13. As I was about to leave he suddenly changed the subject and said “how long is it to your elections?” I said, “about six weeks.”

14. Whether or not I have succeeded in at least postponing new developments here until after our elections, I do not know. I ask White House tolerance in tossing around the name of our President so freely, but it was my judgment that I should pull out all stops on this one.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:14 a.m.

[2] Dated September 7. (Ibid.)

[3] Dated September 13. (Ibid.)

[4]  Document 256.

[5] Not found.

259. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 22, 1972, 0945Z.

8989. Ref: Manila 8875.[2] Subj: Talk with Marcos on Economic Issues.

1. Marcos told me Sept 20 that he wanted me to know that, in spite of all his other problems,[3] he was still devoting considerable time and study to our own problems. He then talked with great knowledge about the problems created by the recent Supreme Court decisions, etc. He made a number of very interesting statements.

2. He said he was not calling Congress back immediately for another much needed session, even though an extremely important bill had not been passed, as he did not want to risk any legislation just now on questions such as parity, or even efforts aimed toward getting legislation which would keep the waters muddy.

3.

He said he was slowly coming to the conclusion that the Supreme Court itself should correct some of its decisions, and that this might be the best route to try to proceed. He asked what I thought of SC action which would clear the titles of American-owned land as far as individuals are concerned, but not insofar as the state was concerned.

I said I didn't understand him. He replied that owners of property would be free to make any sale that they wanted to and the govt would then be free, through legislation, to spell out the ground rules for the future. He said this would get the matter back to being the subject of negotiations between two govts, where it belonged in the first place and not in the courts. We could then agree on such matters as a reasonable transition period, etc. I think he has in mind here something like a conveyance to the state or possibly escheat at the end of an agreed transition period, if private sales have not been made by that time. He may need something like this to get the Court or the Congress to go along with a stretched out transition. I said on first thought his suggestion seemed to hold promise. I felt, however, his choice of words wasn't very good as the average person would conclude from the manner in which he had used the word “state” that perhaps confiscation would be the end result. He said he had nothing like that in mind whatsoever. I said that I thought wording was important as under his proposal some time would elapse when people wouldn't know what was going to happen. He said this deserved thought.

4. I asked if he would consider separating out the Luzon Stevedoring case and consider quick legislation for its correction. He said this was a bad case, indeed, and had to be corrected without too much delay. He said he thought it best, however, that the SC itself correct it, as the court had made a great error in extending its decision way beyond what the case before it called for. He said he thought the SC should reverse itself and allow foreign participation in boards of directors. If that was not corrected the Philippines would never get any foreign investment. I agreed. I asked if he could broaden this to include executive management. After some discussion he said he didn't really know, but it was worth studying as he agreed that in some cases, such as advanced technological enterprises, it would be an asset to have foreign executive management.

5. Marcos said he thought some parts of the retail trade problem could be handled by legislation. His tentative thought was that the term “retail trade” should be redefined by Congress (perhaps by amending the Retail Trade Act which reserves retail trade to Filipinos but is vague about defining “retail”) and at least make exception for bulk transfers to commercial outlets, which would take care of our oil companies and a number of others who sell (wholesale in our practice) directly to retailers (rubbers, drugs, etc.).

6. I told him that we had some thoughts of what might seem reasonable and fair on all these matters and I wondered if he would mind receiving them from me. He said he would welcome that. I asked if there was anyone else in his government that it would be useful for us to have sessions with. He said he thought that he and I had better do it. He said the only two working with him on these matters were the Secretary of Justice and the Solicitor General (a good team). He said things were very delicate, and he even had to work indirectly through friends with the Court.

7. I told Marcos I remained extremely concerned about draft economic provisions in the steering committee at the ConCon. I said if these provisions were ever calendared we would all be in a real mess, as the parliamentary procedures in that body would mean that all these provisions would have to be changed line-by-line or even word-by–word through lengthy floor debates that would be emotional and could go on for a long time as well as come out in the wrong place.

8. Marcos then launched into quite an exposé on the ConCon. He said if they could move promptly, which he thought they couldn't, this could be a way they could handle some of the needed reforms in the country. He said it was such an unruly mess, however, that he had just about concluded that they would not finish their job in time for the '73 elections (quite a significant statement). When we finally got back to the provisions that I said worried me, he said he would do what he could to get the various provisions referred back to organic committees and out of the steering committee.

9. I said we were all in a box on these issues. On the one hand it was extremely important that our business interests see some sign of movement, and I dreaded the thought of a long period of no apparent motion. I said at least I could let the word get out that we were talking, but there wasn't much I could pass along of our private talks.

10. It is encouraging that Marcos was this forthcoming on our investment issues. He was obviously prepared, as he asked me September 19 on the phone if I wanted Abad-Santos or Mendoza at our meeting. I said “no” because I wanted to discuss quite delicate matters (reported separately).

11. I want to keep working with him on these matters in confidence, and things have now reached the point where, as suggested in Manila 8875, I need to get as many as possible of our needs in front of him. An early answer to this reftel would therefore be greatly appreciated.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram 8990 from Manila, September 22, Byroade reported that there were “several indications” that Marcos was “seriously considering martial law” as a possible option “because of increasing violence such as continuation of current rash of bombings, which would render effective operation of government either difficult or impossible.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV)

260. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, September 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

Philippine President Imposes Martial Law

President Marcos imposed martial law throughout the Philippines at midnight September 22. He proclaimed it officially at mid-day September 23, according to press reports, saying that it did not involve military rule and that civilian government would continue. We do not yet have the text of the proclamation, and thus do not at this point know its specifics, particularly as to whether Marcos suspended the Congress.

The situation at present is as follows:

—Numerous arrests of Marcos' critics have reportedly been made, according to Embassy Manila, including opposition Liberal Party Secretary General Aquino (whom Marcos recently accused of conspiring with the Communists), several other opposition politicians, and Manila Times editor Roces and several other journalists and commentators.

—All television stations and most radio stations have been closed, and no major newspapers appeared the morning of September 23. Radio stations are broadcasting no news.

—Domestic commercial flights have been cancelled, and Filipinos are allowed to board international flights only upon government permission.

—International cable and telephone traffic has been suspended.

—No U.S. citizens are known to be involved or endangered.

Background

Marcos' action followed an assassination attempt the evening of September 23 against his Defense Secretary in which no one was injured and the attackers were not apprehended. This attempt climaxed a two-week rash of urban bombings of government buildings, which have been somewhat unusual in that all occurred at night and very few have been injured. (Embassy Manila reports that public opinion remains about evenly divided as to whether these have been perpetrated by left extremists or staged by the government.)[2] These acts have occurred against a backdrop of a steady growth over the past three years of rural insurgency—and more recently urban terrorism. Our Embassy believes that this increasing violence could render continued effective government difficult or impossible, but could not threaten its existence.

President Marcos' ambition to hold onto the Presidency after his constitutional limit of two terms runs out at the end of next year is well known. In this context, and as his first-term lustre as a reform president has dulled, he has constantly underlined the deteriorating security situation as posing a need for a strong leader and improved discipline. He is assisted in this by a growing public concern, especially among influential Filipino businessmen and government technocrats, over the declining civil order. Particularly the latter believe that badly-needed reforms are now possible only under strengthened governmental controls.

Likely Filipino Reaction

Embassy Manila estimates that the country will react with resigned acceptance, after the initial shock and uproar.[3] Criticism of Marcos' action would diminish particularly if there is early evidence of movement toward meaningful reform. The Embassy believes that martial law could not be maintained over a long period without either a gradual return to normal constitutional rule or a drift toward more authoritarian forms. We believe that continued tight prohibition of dissent normally vented through the political opposition and media, important safety valves for the volatile Filipinos, would generate potentially dangerous political and social pressures.

Implications for U.S. Interests and Our Position

At least in the short term, martial law should pose no direct serious problems for U.S. security and economic relations with the Philippines. In fact, the climate for individual business operations might even be improved.

As to our position, I believe we should refrain from comment on Marcos' action, regarding it as a Philippine matter.[4] This stance may well be interpreted as tacit U.S. support for Marcos' move, and result in criticism of us, particularly if Marcos does not make good use of his increased authority and the situation deteriorates. On the other hand, Marcos probably will appreciate such a stance on our part, and this should result in his continued cooperation in our maintaining effective access to our bases in the Philippines and his assistance in resolving U.S. private investment problems resulting from last month's Quasha decision. As you will recall, we are reviewing our Philippine policy in NSSM 155,[5] and expect to forward policy options to you in the near future.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig signed for Kissinger. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] In telegram 9087 from Manila, September 25. (Ibid.)

[3] In telegram 9087 from Manila, September 25. (Ibid.)

[4] A notation in Nixon's handwriting next to this sentence reads: “K—Low key it.”

[5] The NSSM 155 study was completed in early 1973 and resulted in NSDM 209, “U.S. Policy Toward the Philippines,” March 27, 1973. See footnote 2, Document 254.

261. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

President Marcos and the Philippine Investment Climate

PARTICIPANTS

Tristan Beplat, Vice President Manufacturers Trust and President Philippine American Chamber, New York

Harold Smith, Hanover Manufacturers Trust

Max Ansbach, Colgate

Harding Williams, Del Monte

Herman Barger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Shepard C. Lowman, EA/PHL

At their request, a delegation from the Philippine American Chamber of Commerce in New York called on Mr. Barger to express their concern and views with reference to recent events in the Philippines. Mr. Beplat was the primary spokesman for the group.

Beplat first sketched briefly the recent events affecting the business climate in Manila. These included the Quasha case, the Lusteveco case, and the threat to declare the oil companies a public utility. He sees all of these actions as essentially political in nature, designed to bring pressure on the US to be responsive to President Marcos' requirements. Beplat does not, however, believe that the Philippines desires to drive away American business. To the contrary, he and others have been talking with senior Philippine officials recently, including Executive Secretary Melchor, Secretary of Finance Virata and Governor of the Central Bank Licaros, who are presently in the US. As a result of these conversations, he believes the GOP continues to desire American investment. Chamber members will be meeting with these technocrats in New York next week to discuss current problems. Governor Licaros specifically requested that Beplat invite representatives of 30 banks, with loans to the Philippines totalling $225 million, in order that he might have an opportunity to reassure them as to the future course of the Philippines.

Nevertheless, Beplat feels we have problems, arising from President Marcos' problems which include 1) how to continue in office after 1973, 2) growing levels of communist terrorist activities, and 3) a recalcitrant Congress which frustrates Marcos' efforts to obtain reform legislation.

Beplat believes that Marcos has now made the decision to carry out a program against communist subversion; that this decision will be a major fact of life in the Philippines, regardless of our assessment of the necessity for such a decision; that Marcos will be expecting and demanding various forms of US assistance in carrying out such a program to include additional military assistance, perhaps in the form of helicopters and other aircraft, as well as increased economic assistance to underpin the social reforms which Marcos plans to undertake as a part of his overall program to deal with the insurgency. Given the Philippine balance-of-payments problems, Beplat suggests that US aid might be necessary for the success of such reforms.

During this meeting, Beplat repeatedly reverted to the theme that Marcos expects to get additional assistance from the US because his need is great and because he believes that we are paying much larger sums for base rights to countries such as Spain, Portugal and Ethiopia. Regardless of whether the US feels it may be supplying adequate assistance to the Philippines at this time, the fact is that Marcos feels that the Philippines is being treated badly. It is given a separate aid category from base rights countries. It is shortchanged with respect to availabilities of excess defense articles and, generally, the Philippines insurgency is not taken seriously. Marcos had noted that when he sent his brother-in-law, Governor Ben “Kokoy” Romualdez, to the US to discuss such matters that Kokoy had returned with the report he had been given a run around; that nobody believes him.

Beplat said he presumed discussions were under way in Manila on these subjects. He alluded to the fact that Marcos had spoken very frankly and bluntly to some US business representatives in Manila. Marcos is deadly serious in his intent to stay and play his hand out in the Philippines and the economic aspects of US-Philippine relationship will not be settled unless the political aspects are. If Marcos goes down or things get rough in the Philippines, US business will suffer and other US interests will suffer as well. If we want to stay in the Philippines, we must pay the price and quickly. While Marcos understands politics and would not press for a final resolution of these questions before the US elections, we should be prepared to be forthcoming within a short time thereafter.

Beplat closed his presentation by stating that US business wishes to express its strong concern about the drift of events in the Philippines and to express its belief that the USG has to take action on these matters; something must be done and the USG would make a very serious error if it tried to handle these problems in a passive manner. If something is not done soon, the Chamber is going to form a delegation of their senior officials from senior companies and come back to Washington to see President Nixon.

Mr. Barger asked Mr. Beplat if what he was making was a specific policy recommendation to which Mr. Beplat replied in the negative. Mr. Barger pointed out that an expression of strong concern was one thing but a specific recommendation that we must accede to the demands of President Marcos would be something else again. In response to this, Mr. Beplat reiterated that he was not making such a policy recommendation; that it was up to the State Department how to best handle this matter, but that something must be done soon.

Mr. Barger pointed out that a major concern of ours was that the Philippines not reach a point of no return through acts which might cause US companies to bring pressure on the Congress to cut off aid or the Philippine sugar quota or through actions by the GOP which would trigger such automatic legal sanctions as those in the Hickenlooper and Gonzales amendments and sugar legislation with respect to expropriatory situations. He felt that this was a message which US business might usefully convey to the technocrats. Mr. Barger added that it seemed to him that we would not wish to get into a stance where the expectation in the Philippines is that the way to do business with the US is to squeeze the US investors in the country to obtain ever new US Government concessions. In the long run, such a situation would be in no one's best interest.

In closing, there was a brief discussion of why Marcos would jeopardize the major interests that the Philippines has in its close economic relationships with the US for the sake of gaining necessarily limited marginal increments to US assistance. In this connection it was pointed out that the United States already provides very substantial levels of aid, both for regular programs and in response to emergencies such as the flood.

In response to the query, Beplat seemed to be saying that Marcos understood the value of the economic relationship with the US, but that he would have to go all out on the difficult course on which he was embarked and that, if he failed, chaos would follow which would be bad for all.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US. Secret. Drafted by Lowman and approved by Barger. The meeting was held in Deputy Assistant Secretary Barger's office.

262. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, September 27, 1972, 0420Z.

9155. Ref: Manila 9147.[2]

1. This man Marcos is a chess player, par excellence. It is usually possible to predict that he will choose as his next move one of two or three options that seem open to him—yet we cannot be certain just which one of these the next sealed envelope will contain.

2. You should read above reftel which describes Marcos' interview with Durdin of New York Times that he has decided to settle our investment problems in the Philippines by Presidential decree. We have speculated here in my staff that Marcos might in fact make this move. It would tend to prove to the opposition party and all else concerned that he had our backing in his declaration of martial law. Any disclaimer by us, other than out-right public denunciation of him (absolutely out of the question at this time in our own best interests) would be entirely futile. We have almost come full-circle in the scenario discussed with my staff immediately following the Supreme Court decision re Quasha as reported in Manila 8424 of Sept 7.[3] There have been deviations along the way, including some alteration of time tables, but the basic theme therein remains.

3. While it would be a great relief to see our investment problems solved, or greatly eased, I cannot help but have mixed feelings over the fact that Marcos would proceed on these fundamental matters by Presidential decree. If he could have maneuvered the Supreme Court into handling at least two of these problems in our behalf, it would have been much better for us. Had he done so, of course, only a very few of my staff and the readers of these restricted series of messages would have known that he was our benefactor. For the viewpoint of Marcos, with his desire for our continued acquiescence to his recent moves, and with the hope that we could move quickly to full support, this probably was not good enough. He would conclude that he should move now, without any other quid pro quo, to obtain this type of support in New York and head off opposition from our Executive Branch and perhaps our Congress.

4. The decrees that he will make will predictably be sensible and good in themselves even for the Filipinos, as they will clear the air of very real recent obstacles to the future of foreign investment, not only our own, in the Philippines. But in doing it in this way, if Marcos fails in his efforts over, say, the next year, conditions might be such that any successor government might well reverse with vengeance every decree that he had made. Thus he has made one more very effective move in keeping our fortunes tied together.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

[2] Telegram 9147 from Manila, September 27, reported Marcos' decision to settle some of the economic issues with the United States by Presidential decree. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 9 PHIL–US)

[3] Not printed. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV)

263. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State [1]

Manila, October 2, 1972, 1042Z.

9362. 1. I am fully aware that this highly restricted channel should not be overdone, and hope things will develop so that perhaps this can be the last in this series for a while.

2. This message is to state that, both in my own opinion and that of my entire senior staff, we believe that we should now consider very seriously whether we have any sensible options left other than to accept and—in so doing—to assist as we can the effort by Marcos to build a “new society” in the Philippines. Our general reporting had indicated widespread local acceptance of his announced intentions and first firm steps in the direction of achieving reforms, registered in almost all levels of society here. What has been missing so far is any specific indication of the position we felt the USG should take in this matter. This is quite proper up to a point, but we are arriving at the stage where it will be desirable, we think, for private indicators to begin to be given. Also more and more—on a daily basis now—we are being faced with decisions that will in one way or another give some clue to our view, or, at least, be interpreted as such. As you will see later on in this message I do not visualize the need for, or recommend, any U.S. public statement of support.

3. The Liberal Party is in obvious disarray, with a sizeable grouping apparently ready to give public support to the measures Marcos is taking. But lest anyone think we should be too concerned over the plight of the opposition party, let me say the following: with the exception of a very few very solid people, patriots without doubt, the rank and file of the Liberal Party are nothing one could pin any great hopes on for the future of the Philippines. Were they in a position to come into power—the chances of which are now remote (but weren't good anyway)—this would not have represented a real hope of moving the Philippines toward meaningful reform. Dedicated as some very few of its leaders are, they do not seem to have the strength and guts to really control their followers. In general, a Liberal Party victory, which I think very unlikely in the near future anyway, would in time simply have renewed the old process of putting new hands in the till, with disappointment again for real change in the Philippines.

4. I conclude now that we should quietly continue business as usual with the GOP, including Marcos, watching all the while for any abuse of his new powers. For the short term, at least, I feel almost certain he will not do so. He knows now, in my opinion, that he is literally on a “life or death” course. He also knows that our support for meaningful social reform programs will be critical in the year ahead. There is real question in our minds as to whether the GOP can muster the minimum pesos for a sufficient effort without support from our own planned expanded programs. They can, I think, get off to a good start alone, but thereafter much will depend on us. At that time our ability to perform would depend on active program planning now on present programs and prompt consideration of such changes as we may want to recommend.

5. For our part, I do not believe we should be impervious to the apparent fact that a majority in this society have spoken out more quickly than we anticipated along the lines of giving Marcos a chance for meaningful social reform. Certainly we would not want doubts and hesitations on our part to build up any belief that we do not want the same thing for the Philippines. If reform can happen at least to the degree that would preclude the label “failure” from resulting, it cannot help but be beneficial to our own interests and future relations. And, alternatively, if the current efforts of Marcos come to be labeled “failure” there would be the prospect of very serious troubles, indeed, in the Philippines which could affect not only our business interests, but also our security interests as well. It is worth noting in this connection, that at least so far there has been no hint, in the trends that government pronouncements are taking, to blame the past and present ills of the Philippines on the foreigner, which has so often been the case in underdeveloped countries around the world in efforts to move to reform their societies. Our own interest would seem to dictate that we try to keep it this way.

6. As I say, I don't see the desirability of the USG taking any public role in explicit support of Marcos, or even of publicly expressing mild hopes that much needed reforms can come to the Philippines. This could be useful to offset some quite unbalanced reporting by temporary press visitors (in contrast to that of the wire services which has been much better informed and balanced) but even so I don't see such a need to commit us. On the other hand, I think we are already in a period where nothing positive in our programs should be held up in a “wait and see” attitude. For instance, if it becomes possible to announce the grand aid reconstruction funds now being discussed with our Congress—then I think we should go right ahead without delay. This of course would be an indirect indicator, but even so it is for a good and popular cause, and there can be no conceivable gain from delay. Monies such as this are not actually spent in the very short term anyway, and we will have opportunities along the way to delay or withhold actual dispersement if things later on seem to be going sour.

7. I have had a fear that staff action in Washington on all matters re the Philippines may be suspended due to uncertainty following the declaration of martial law. I hope this is not the case, and at this point we would like the record to show that we want this Mission's recommendations over the last few months to stand, and we hope staff work can continue on them. I know some of these recommendations cause you difficulty, but I want to repeat that as of now they still remain the recommendations of this Mission concerning what we believe is best for US interests. (We have the tape of Marcos's talk with Till Durdin. He still is planning an across-the-board broad scale talk early next year with us on economic and security matters, as he told me some time ago.)

8. In making your assessment of this situation, I suggest you keep in mind that a long drawn out posture of “hesitation” on the part of the United States would indeed be, or at least should be, considered as an important and definite decision on our part. We may very well soon want to adopt the posture, here at least, of pursuing every reasonable avenue that may be available to us in trying to ensure that this situation comes out right.

Byroade

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 557, Country Files, Far East, Philippines, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.

264. Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note[1]

Washington, November 1, 1972.

The Philippines Tries One-Man Democracy

While there is nearly universal acclaim in the Philippines for the abatement of crime and violence during the first five weeks of martial law, Filipinos are waiting to see whether President Marcos really intends to eliminate Communist dissidence and to fundamentally reform Philippine life. Marcos' security measures so far appear aimed more at his own political opponents than at Communists, and his “reforms” have been little more than conventional bids for popular support which could have been initiated without martial law. The more radical part of Marcos' reform program has so far been largely hortatory, and nothing he has yet done directly threatens the entrenched economic interests of the country's oligarchy. What he clearly is doing is erecting a one-man constitutional regime which permits him to stay in office indefinitely, with almost unlimited powers, under a veneer of parliamentary democracy. Marcos wants to have a new constitution completed and approved by the country within about three months, which will enable him to control the government for several years without having to call elections if he finds it inexpedient to do so.

[Omitted here is discussion section of Marcos' one-man rule.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 PHIL. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Analyst Edwin L. Barber and Director Paul M. Popple of INR's Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific on October 27.

265. Memorandum From the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff)

Washington, November 3, 1972.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Files, Philippines. Secret; Sensitive. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

Indonesia

266. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, March 26, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.

267. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, April 1, 1969.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FN 1–1 INDON. Confidential. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Approved. Mr. Sneider to D Gleysteen 4/11/69.” A handwritten notation underneath the date reads: “Called AID (Menlinberg) 4/14. M. says he saw a 4/13 State cable notifying our delegation of Pres. decision.”

268. National Security Study Memorandum 61

Washington, June 23, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–154, NSSMs, NSSM 61. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

269. Editorial Note

270. Memorandum for the Record

Jakarta, July 27, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff Files, Lake Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Tony Lake. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

271. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Jakarta, July 29, 1969, 1045Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rogers visited a number of East Asian countries, including Indonesia and Japan, for conferrals following President Nixon's July 25th Guam statement; see Document 269.

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, July 29, 1969, 1110Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

273. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Bali, August 5, 1969, 1530Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret; Nodis.

274. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

New York, September 26, 1969, 2336Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta. Rogers was in New York to attend the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly.

275. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 30, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “John, See me HK.”

276. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 17, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a separate attached memorandum, November 25. Kissinger initialed his approval on the covering memorandum on November 28 and wrote: “Send to State. Incidentally this goes to S/S only as all other Presidential MemCon s. Don't let into the working level.” The meeting was held in the President's office. Another copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 INDON.

277. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–041, SRG Meeting, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 12/22/69. Secret. Attached to a December 16 memorandum from Holdridge and Lord to Kissinger that explained that the summary was prepared for the Senior Review Group. A copy of the 29-page response to NSSM–61 is also attached but not printed. Holdridge and Lord stated in their memorandum that, “the President need only address the issues of military assistance and the U.S. role in maintenance of a Singapore base.” They added, “We don't think that our policy towards these countries [the memorandum concerned Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Indonesia]requires an NSC meeting. However, a package should be forwarded to the President because of his personal interest in Indonesia.” The Department of State paper was included in that package.

278. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, December 22, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State

Canberra, January 14, 1970, 1610Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate.

280. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, January 21, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia. Vol. I. Secret.

281. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 22, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a January 22 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger that indicates Kissinger saw the memorandum.

282. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Washington, February 2, 1970.

283. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Laird

Washington, March 11, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Mayo.

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

Washington, March 31, 1970, 0155Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Nodis. Drafted by Green and Masters on March 30, cleared by Haig in the White House and Wingate Lloyd (S/S), and approved by Green.

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, April 2, 1970, 0930Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

Washington, April 15, 1970, 0023Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Green on April 14, and cleared by Under Secretary Johnson, Director Dirk Gleysteen (S/S-S), and Kissinger at the White House.

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, April 15, 1970, 1030Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

288. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 17, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559, Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On April 21 Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger who approved it on June 1, with the proviso “Just for our files and my personal ones.” (Attached memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, April 21; ibid.)

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, April 19, 1970, 1130Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:12 a.m.

290. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 21, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559, Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Confidential.

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, April 23, 1970, 0430Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

292. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 5, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge on May 5 and approved by Kissinger on May 7.

293. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 12, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 370, Subject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71–10. Secret. Sent for action.

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, May 21, 1970, 0430Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

295. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:33 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres./HAK MemCon s, President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger, May 26, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In telegram 87970 to Djakarta, June 6, the Department sent a summary of the President's two conversations with Suharto on May 26 and May 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER)

296. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Paul Gardner (EA/MS) and approved by John D. Stempel (D) Documents 297 and 298. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

297. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved in U by Stempel on June 11. The memorandum is part II of IV; part III is ibid., parts I and IV are Documents 296 and 298.

298. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Masters and approved by Stempel (U) on June 11. The memorandum is part IV of IV; part III, U.S. Troops in Cambodia is ibid.; parts I and II are Documents 296 and 297. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

299. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 27, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres/HAK MemCon s. Top Secret; Sensitive.

300. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, May 27, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret. An attached covering note from Colonel Kennedy to Kissinger, May 28, stated that Green's paper “seems to add nothing to our store of knowledge or action program.” Kennedy added that he would give a copy to Holdridge, who would do “a more complete brief.”

301. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10:08–11:03 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres/HAK MemCon s. Top Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The meeting was held at the White House.

302. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved by Stempel (U) on June 10. The memorandum is part I of III; part III is ibid., part II is Document 303. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

303. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Gardner, and approved in U on June 10. The memorandum is part II of III; part III is ibid., part I is Document 301. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

304. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 4, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Strictly Personal. In an attached covering memorandum sent to Kissinger for action on June 5, Haig summarized Green's letter and added: “Underlying all of this, of course, is Green's basic view that we should be very cautious about changing Indonesia's non-alignment image and about providing her with greatly increased military assistance.” Haig then asked for Kissinger's decision on the proposed message to Suharto. Kissinger initialed the approve option on June 8 and noted: “(already approved by telephone. Deal with Jonathan Moore in absence of Marshall Green.)”

305. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 18, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Khmer.

306. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 20, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger saw it.

307. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 25, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Nodis. Sent for action.

308. Memorandum of Conversation

Los Angeles, California, July 1, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger under a July 6 covering memorandum. The meeting was held at the Century Palace Hotel.

309. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, July 7, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

310. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 8, 1970, 5 p.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and sent to Kissinger for approval under a July 13 covering memorandum. Kissinger initialed the approve option and also approved sending an attached sanitized summary of the conversation to the Department of State, which had “been pressing for word of what was said.” Attached but not printed. The summary is also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

311. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, August 10, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret. In an August 11 routing slip, attached but not printed, Holdridge noted that “HAK has seen, no further action necessary. JHH 8/12.”

312. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, October 13, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

313. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)

Washington, November 2, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Green.

314. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 18, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger's handwriting in the upper right-hand margin of the first page reads: “Discuss soonest. Why not smallNSC working group on model of VSSG (Vietnam Special Study Group) task force.” A note attached to the first page reads: “Xeroxed comeback copy sent to Holdridge/Kennedy 11/27 for action.” In a memorandum to Kissinger, November 30, Holdridge stated that he, Kennedy, and Dr. Wayne Smith had agreed that the NSC should not become involved directly in the group sent to Indonesia, “but rather leave this to the bureaucrats to determine and staff through the NSC process.” (Ibid.) Kissinger initialed his approval of this idea on a November 10 memorandum from Herbert Levin. (Ibid.)

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, November 21, 1970, 0430Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, November 24, 1970, 1000Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral McCain. A notation on the first page in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “We can't rest till they [or they will] buy Soviet arms. HK” An arrow was drawn from this notation to Haig's name, which is followed by Haig's initials.

317. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. An attached December 15 memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council staff to Kissinger indicates that the memorandum was drafted by the former and sent to the latter on that date. An attached routing slip indicates it was approved by Kissinger on December 16.

318. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 23, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret.

319. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 24, 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret.

320. Memorandum for the President's File

Washington, July 27, 1971, 11 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

321. Memorandum for the President's File

Washington, September 14, 1971, 10:45–11:45 a.m.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 532, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted and initialed by Haig.

322. Editorial Note

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State

Tokyo, November 12, 1971, 0735Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally.

324. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro

Washington, December 11, 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

325. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, January 12, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 38, President's Daily Briefs, January 3–17, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

326. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro

Washington, January 15, 1972, 1731Z.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

Washington, January 25, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by Theodore J. Heavner (EA/IMS) and by Robert T. Curran (S/S), and approved by Charles S. Whitehouse (EA).

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)

Washington, February 1, 1972.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia File. Secret. Drafted by Richard K. Stuart (INR/DDC) and sent through INR Director Ray S. Cline.

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, February 4, 1972, 0650Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra.

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 1130Z.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

331. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Belgrade, July 7, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Trip to SEATO, June 24 to July 12, 1972. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Frederick W. Flott, Special Assistant at the Embassy in Indonesia on July 4; cleared by Eliot S/S); approved by David H. Lissy, Special Assistant to Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Djakarta, Saigon, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Moscow, Canberra, and Wellington. Rogers was in Belgrade July 7–9 for an official visit.

332. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 21, 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Entirely out of system. Sent for information.

266. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, March 26, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

—Tour d'Horizon with President Soeharto: During Ambassador Green's farewell call, President Soeharto made a number of remarks indicative of his present thinking:[2]

a. He thought that the USSR provided the principal pressure point on Hanoi for a settlement of the war, but Indonesia has no present leverage with the USSR.

b. A resumption of bombing of North Vietnam might increase Hanoi's interest in a negotiated settlement. (Ambassador Green commented that he has never heard him come out so openly for bombing.)[3]

c. He was very much aware of the relationship of Vietnam to Indonesia's own security.

d. He is concerned at a resurgence of Communist activity in Indonesia, and blames the Chinese Communists.

e. He underlined the importance of Indonesian cooperation with its neighbors and stated flatly that Indonesian forces would if necessary take a forward defense posture. If there were aggression against Malaysia, and Malaysia requested help, Indonesia would send forces. (Ambassador Green observes that Soeharto and the military take a more relaxed view as to the requirements of “non-alignment” than do Malik and the Foreign Office.)

f. President Soeharto reiterated his interest in visiting the US, and Ambassador Green said that he was confident that a visit would be welcome, and that the Indonesian Ambassador was in touch with our Government on the question.[4]

Despite the shibboleths of non-alignment, President Soeharto's views seem to be running very close to ours on most of the key questions of Southeast Asia security. (Tab B)[5]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.

[2]  Green's farewell call on President Suharto was reported in telegram 1724 from Djakarta, March 23. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US)

[3]  Nixon wrote the following comment next to this paragraph: “ K. Note! He may be right (on psychology).”

[4] A marginal note in Nixon's handwriting next to this sentence reads, “K as soon as possible. Summer or Fall.”

[5] Attached at Tab B but not printed is telegram 1724 from Djakarta, March 23.

267. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon [1]

Washington, April 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position at April 14 Inter-Governmental Group (IGGI) Meeting on Indonesia

Last year, the Government of Indonesia, with the support of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, requested $500 million of aid for calendar 1969. This request was addressed to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), composed of the Bank, the Fund, the United States, Japan, Netherlands, France, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

At the October 21, 1968 meeting of the IGGI, the United States pledged to meet one-third of the non-food aid portion ($365 million) of this request, plus an undefined “fair share” of the food aid needs then estimated at $135 million.

This memorandum requests your authority to reaffirm that pledge at the April 14 IGGI meeting and approval of the program to carry it out.

Progress of the Soeharto Government

President Soeharto gained effective control of the Government of Indonesia almost two years ago, following the bloody aftermath of the Communist coup attempt of October, 1965. His performance during this period has exceeded what most observers thought possible.

In the economic field, Soeharto and his American-trained advisers have, with the help of foreign aid and the advice of the Bank and Fund, sharply reduced the inflation rate from 635% in 1966 to about 26% for the twelve months ending March 1, 1969. Budgetary stringency and expanded tax collection have led to a balanced 1968 budget. Foreign private investment has been welcomed, although bureaucratic barriers continue to hinder the flow. Free market forces are now the prime determinants of import priorities; government corporations are no longer heavily subsidized; the private trade sector has been revitalized by ending a corrupt system of licenses and controls, and by enabling private enterprise to obtain needed spare parts, new equipment, and raw materials. Exports for 1968 reached the highest level for seven years; they were about 10% above 1967. But stabilization austerity has understandably restricted growth and Indonesia is only beginning the long climb back to pre-1941 levels of productivity.

In the political field, the Soeharto Government ended Sukarno's career and confrontation with Malaysia, re-instituted freedom of the press, brought the legislature into the political process for the first time in many years, and suppressed a communist attempt in mid-1968 to establish a guerrilla base in eastern Java. Very serious problems, going to the heart of Indonesia's future, remain: the vitality of political parties is limited and Soeharto has not yet attempted to mobilize effectively the goodwill toward him that exists throughout the country, thus leaving him excessively dependent on the armed forces for political support and administrative action; corruption and smuggling are still widespread and may become a serious political issue; and the nation's archaic administrative apparatus is burdened by an inflated civil service.

Despite these and other problems, Soeharto has succeeded in taking many of the politically tough decisions needed to stop economic decline and to move towards stability. The Government is now preparing to give highest priority to economic reconstruction and development. The aid extended by the IGGI has been critical to economic progress thus far, and Soeharto's ability to persist in sensible economic and political reforms depends heavily on continued international support.

The Multilateral Approach

In 1966 the United States decided that our interests called for a wholly new approach to our aid strategy in Indonesia which would maximize aid from other nations, deeply involve international agencies, and minimize direct U.S. Government involvement in Indonesian initiative and decision-making.

The United States took the lead in calling together in 1966 a group of Indonesia's western creditors (the communist states, though invited, refused to participate), to consider Indonesia's unmanageable debt problem, a $2.2 billion burden inherited from the Sukarno era. The main western creditors reached agreement in 1966, and again in 1967 and 1968, to reschedule current or overdue principal and interest payments on this debt. Communist countries have separately made comparable debt rescheduling arrangements with Indonesia. But, as Indonesia's servicing of “Sukarno” and new aid indebtedness for the next decade far exceeds its capacity to repay without great harm to its development, western creditors are now sponsoring a study to find a long-term solution to this problem.

The IGGI, formed subsequent to the first creditors' meeting, has met about every six months since early 1967 to consider Indonesia's economic performance and its need for foreign assistance.

The International Monetary Fund has taken the lead in advising the Indonesians on their stabilization program and in evaluating their economic performance for the benefit of aid donors. The Fund has taken the unusual step of establishing a resident mission in Djakarta, including a group providing much needed technical assistance in fiscal affairs. In addition, the Fund entered into a $51 million standby arrangement with Indonesia in 1968 and the Fund staff has just demonstrated further support for the Soeharto Government's economic program by recommending a $70 million standby for 1969.

The World Bank has also assumed a major and unprecedented role in Indonesia's development. In October, 1968 the Bank opened an office in Djakarta with a ten-man professional staff to assist Indonesia in planning development programs, preparing capital projects, and coordinating foreign assistance. Thus far, the International Development Association has authorized $7 million in credits to Indonesia, with $20–$40 million more expected in 1969.

The Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, Harvard Development Advisory Service, and other agencies are also providing skilled personnel and financial resources.

United States Aid

In 1967, the IGGI countries provided $210 million in general stabilization support to Indonesia. Of this, the United States provided about a third, or $65.2 million ($37.5 million in A.I.D. commodity loans and $27.7 million in P.L. 480 rice and cotton). Japan also contributed about a third, with other donors providing the remainder.

For 1968, the United States again provided about one-third ($110 million) of a $325 million Indonesian requirement ($25 million of this was an A.I.D. commodity loan and the remainder P.L. 480 rice and cotton). We responded to an unexpected emergency by offering an additional $50 million in P.L. 480 wheat products to help prevent a recurrence of the serious food shortages which had caused a quadrupling of the basic rice price at the end of 1967. About $30 million of this has been shipped. Japan agreed to commit $110 million, and about $85 million came from others.

In October, 1968, the Fund and Bank endorsed Indonesia's $500 million foreign aid request for calendar 1969 ($365 million for projects and basic imports, including cotton, and $135 million for food). The increase over 1968 is largely accounted for by including total costs of multi-year projects, instead of only actual disbursements as was done in 1968; 1969 disbursements are estimated to be only slightly higher than in 1968.

The U.S. had pledged to meet one third (about $123 million) of this non-food aid requirement plus a “fair share” of the food aid requirement. Separating food aid from non-food aid took account of the facts that food aid requirements are highly uncertain from year to year, and that the U.S. is in a special position to respond quickly and flexibly to such needs. While we do not want to define “fair share” precisely, in order to keep some pressure on Indonesia to obtain food from other donors, we must realistically expect to provide the great bulk of wheat and rice needed. This formula also left an amount for non-food aid that represented a practical target for burden sharing.

The U.S. pledge was subject to several conditions:

1. That other donors make commitments satisfactory both as to amounts and terms.

The budgetary cycle of most donor nations usually does not permit pledges to be made before the mid-April IGGI meeting and often not before mid-year. The Dutch and several small donors have made known their pledges but a decision from the Japanese is not expected for several months.

We propose to offer Indonesia about two-thirds ($81 million) of our non-food aid and $50 million of food aid prior to the April IGGI meeting, leaving a decision as to the balance for later in the year when we know other countries' plans.

2. Continued satisfactory reports from the Fund and Bank on Indonesian performance in its stabilization program and in using aid effectively.

Due to slack demand for more expensive American goods and high freight costs from the U.S., use of A.I.D. loans has been slow in the past. However, with Fund approval, the Indonesian Government recently made special arrangements for A.I.D. loans which have speeded use.

3. The availability of sufficient quantities of rice after the priority needs of Viet-Nam are considered.

This is no longer a problem; Viet-Nam's rice requirements are far lower than projected last October.

4. Availability of Congressional appropriations.

A.I.D. is giving Indonesia very high priority on limited funds, at the expense of development programs in other important countries of Asia and Africa.

We are presently planning to meet our calendar 1969 non-food aid pledge as follows:

($ million)

Total

Source of Financing

CY 1969

FY 1969

FY 1970

A.I.D. Development Loans

$70

$50

$20

P.L. 480

a) Cotton (raw and yarn)

50

30

20

b) Tobacco

3

1

2

$123

$81

$42

The $50 million for FY 1969 A.I.D. loans is already available from current appropriations, as is the P.L. 480. The A.I.D. loans would finance a Stabilization and Food Production Loan of $44 million and a $6 million expansion of Indonesia's major cement plant. The remaining $20 million of A.I.D. loans in this calendar year's pledge would come from FY '70 loan funds still to be appropriated. The funds provided will finance U.S. exports only and commodities will be selected to minimize impact on our balance of payments.

It is now uncertain whether Indonesia will require delivery during 1969 of the full $135 million in food aid (principally rice and wheat) requested in October 1968. Extraordinary rice harvests due to favorable weather, combined with our rice and wheat commitments (including 100,000 metric tons (MT) of rice already shipped and charged to our 1969 pledge) of last year, produced for the first time in memory a stable rice price during the normal December–March scarcity season. In addition, approximately $20 million of wheat is still available from our $50 million commitment of last year. However, in order to assure price stability during the 1969–1970 scarcity season, the Indonesians will have to line up sufficient rice and wheat imports within the next few months. With this in mind, they have recently requested under P.L. 480, for delivery by early 1970, 350,000 MT of rice (about $70 million), and 300,000 MT of wheat flour (about $30 million).

We would instead propose to offer now only 250,000 MT of rice ($50 million) in addition to the wheat still available under last year's commitment. The balance of the rice and wheat request could be provided in a subsequent PL 480 agreement later in the year when food needs are better known and the contributions of other countries announced. The rice agreement would be a convertible local currency credit; the wheat may be on the same terms, or be a grant under the Kennedy Round Food Aid Convention, depending on the outcome of negotiations with the Indonesian Government now underway.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to reaffirm our October 1968 pledge to Indonesia and approve the CY 1969 A.I.D./P.L. 480 program as set forth above.[2]

The Secretaries of Treasury and Agriculture concur.[3]

WPR

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FN 1–1 INDON. Confidential. A typed notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Approved. Mr. Sneider to D Gleysteen 4/11/69.” A handwritten notation underneath the date reads: “Called AID (Menlinberg) 4/14. M. says he saw a 4/13 State cable notifying our delegation of Pres. decision.”

[2] A copy of Rogers' memorandum was attached to an April 10 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon in which the President approved the Indonesian aid program. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I)

[3] Memoranda from the Secretaries of Agriculture and Treasury are also attached to the Kissinger memorandum of April 10 but not printed.

268. National Security Study Memorandum 61[1]

Washington, June 23, 1969.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia

The President has directed a review of our policy toward Indonesia.

This study should assess U.S. interests, objectives and policy alternatives, and should include a discussion of the following issues:

—our general political approach toward Indonesia and her unaligned status

—possible internal political conflicts or insurgencies

—our economic and military assistance programs

—economic problems, including foreign investment

—Indonesia's relations with Malaysia and Singapore and the interaction of our policies toward all three countries

—Indonesia's relations with major countries such as Japan, Australia, the USSR and China

—the West Irian situation

—Indonesia's role in Asian regional organizations.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia undertake this study. The Chairman of the group may invite other agency representatives to participate as appropriate. The study should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by September 12, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–154, NSSMs, NSSM 61. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

269. Editorial Note

In late July 1969 President Nixon made a globe-circling diplomatic trip visiting Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, South Asia, and Romania. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State Rogers, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, and a number of other foreign affairs specialists. Guam was the site of Nixon's press backgrounder on July 25 in which he stated that the United States would encourage Asian countries to solve their own internal problems, and at the same time the United States would keep its treaty commitments to them. This policy became known as the Nixon Doctrine. After meeting with President Marcos in the Philippines on July 26, Nixon had private talks with Indonesian President Suharto at Merdeka Palace on July 27 and 28. No record of these meetings has been found, but a few briefing documents hint at some of the points Nixon and Suharto discussed. For Suharto's account, see Document 273.

Talking points prepared for the meetings indicate the policy highlights that Nixon was to stress to Suharto. Nixon underlined what he felt were the key points in the talking points for July 27; the talking points for July 28 indicate the President saw them. On the former, Nixon underlined “regional cooperative” efforts as being important to political and economic stability in Southeast Asia. He also underscored the idea that, while the United States would provide its share, economic assistance to Indonesia was best “handled on a multi-lateral basis.” Nixon also underlined the fact that “Indonesia's special circumstance” deserved sympathetic consideration, but that military “requirements should be weighed carefully with economic ones.” (Both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 452, President's Trip Files, President's July 69 Trip to Far East)

270. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Jakarta, July 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Indonesian Generals

Mr. Kissinger met on July 27 with General Sumitro, the Defense Chief of Staff, General Tjakradipura, the Minister for Interior, and General Sutopo Juwono, the Army Staff Intelligence Chief. The generals had asked for the meeting at President Suharto's request. Mr. Kissinger was accompanied by Messrs. Holdridge and Lake of his staff.

The generals made the following points:

1. The U.S. should stay in Vietnam long enough to provide Indonesia—and other Southeast Asian nations—with time to strengthen themselves against Communism. The generals were concerned by press reports that the U.S. intends to withdraw by the end of 1970, and showed great relief when Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing without regard for the circumstances. The key is a reasonable, tolerable outcome.[2] The generals stated that the U.S. should concentrate on strengthening the GVN; in five years, but no less,[3] a South Vietnam capable of defending itself could emerge.

2. The Indonesian military are developing plans for one half a Corps of troops which could be contributed to an international peacekeeping force.

3. Although the primary Indonesian emphasis is on economic development, the Indonesian Armed Forces need assistance to build for the future.[4] The only specific request the generals mentioned was for more training. General Sumitro will give Mr. Kissinger this request in writing on July 28. Mr. Kissinger said that we would consider this request very sympathetically.[5]

4. The generals said that they had intelligence reports that Hanoi is interested in a temporary ceasefire to gain a breathing spell.[6] The North Vietnamese economy was devastated by U.S. bombing, and Hanoi's manpower pool is depleted. The VC are harder and more pro-Peking than Hanoi.

5. The generals clearly disagreed with Foreign Minister Malik's statement about the desirability of taking VC into the GVN. This, they said, was “political.”

6. The generals expressed concern that a secret Soviet deal existed.[7] Mr. Kissinger assured them that the U.S. has no secret agreements with Russia.

7. The generals suggested that Russian proposals for Asian Collective Security arrangements are designed to stimulate Chinese attacks on Southeast Asia before a pact could be arranged; these attacks would relieve pressures on Siberia and involve the Chinese in confrontation with the U.S.

—Mr. Kissinger noted our desire to work with the Indonesians on a basis of equality. We can work with all nations when our interests coincide. We do not seek client states; we prefer healthy independence.

—Mr. Kissinger also stressed the point that we do not intend to “withdraw from Asia” or fail to live up to our commitments. With regard to Indonesia, an attack on so important a nation would clearly threaten the peace of Asia, and we would take it very seriously.

The generals asked that the meeting be closely held to the White House, and specifically indicated a desire that the State Department not be informed. They said that if they had further information or views which they wished to convey to Mr. Kissinger, they would do so through a military attaché (an intelligence man) at the Embassy in Washington.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1048, Staff Files, Lake Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Tony Lake. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

[2] The President underlined this sentence.

[3] The President underlined the words “in five years, but no less.”

[4] The President underlined from the word “Indonesian” to the end of the sentence.

[5] In a backchannel message to Jakarta, August 11, Kissinger, who had accompanied Nixon on this Southeast Asia trip, informed General Sumitro that he had discussed their conversation with President Nixon and that the latter had “indicated that he would look with favor on your proposal for initiating expanding military training. Along these lines, would you please provide me through this channel with the specific proposals that you would like the U.S. Government to entertain. The President would be grateful for early advance notice on this project.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I)

[6] The President underlined the words “Hanoi is interested in a temporary”.

[7] The President underlined from the word “secret” to the end of the sentence.

271. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Jakarta, July 29, 1969, 1045Z.

5129. Dept Pass Action AmEmbassy Tokyo for Secretary's Party. SecState for S/S. Subj: Secretary's Meeting with Adam Malik and Counterparts July 27.

1. Present on Indonesian side in addition to Malik, Brig Gen Sudharmono (Secretary to Cabinet), Prof Widjojo (Chairman National Planning Bureau), MajGen Alamsjah (State Secretary), LtGen Sumitro (Chairman Ministry of Defense and Security), Anwar Sani (DirGen PolAff FonDept), Amb Sudjatmoko, Madame Artati Marzuki (SecGen FonDept), BriGen Her Tasning (FonDept), J. Ronodipuro (SecGen InfoDept), BriGen Supardjo (Head Asian Pacific Bureau FonDept), Ismael Thajeb (Dir EconAff FonDept).

2. In addition to Secretary on US side were Ambassador [sic, Counselor] Pedersen, AsstSec Green, Dr. Kissinger, DepAsstSec Barnett, Mr. Holdridge, and Mr. Lydman.

3. Following is uncleared running summary of meeting:

4. After usual amenities, Secretary noted he was pleased there were no bilateral problems between US and Indonesia. At present time, he said, there was a very favorable attitude towards Indonesia in the administration and in Congress and there was less opposition to extending aid to Indonesia than to some other countries. He was particularly grateful therefore for opportunity to learn more about Indonesia and its problems and, if possible, to be better able to understand Indonesia's needs.

5. Mr. Malik said it was indeed gratifying there were no problems between two countries; he hoped the US would, however, not be too surprised in years to come if there might have to be some increases in external aid to meet Indonesia's requirements; such aid, of course, would be in accordance with IGGI estimates of Indonesia's real needs.

6. Malik said he would like to address problems outside of bilateral area and among these were Vietnam; the general effects of British withdrawal east of Suez; China and the Soviet Union; and Japan.

7. Vietnam: If asked if GOI were happy with prospect of US with-drawal from Vietnam, Malik said this would be an extremely difficult question to answer. In principle Indonesia believes Vietnam problem ultimately must be settled by Vietnamese themselves and thus GOI would be pleased if US were to withdraw its presence. There are practical difficulties, however, with this course of action. If a US withdrawal were precipitate there would be great danger of an equally precipitate Communist takeover not only in Vietnam but also in neighboring countries and this would have a direct impact on Indonesia's security interests. Malik therefore hoped that US in considering staging of withdrawal of forces from Vietnam would bear in mind need to maintain general security of Southeast Asia and would see that Saigon Govt, in first instance, as well as other vulnerable govts on periphery of Vietnam, would be effectively strengthened in order to protect themselves from the expected Communist infiltration and subversion.

8. Malik said he would like to see a democratic govt established in South Vietnam. In view of realities of the situation, he assumed that such a GOG would have to include Viet Cong elements.

9. British withdrawal: Malik said that Indonesia has no objection to continuing presence of Australian and New Zealand forces in Malaysia and Singapore. This does not mean, however, that GOI would welcome any other foreign forces there to substitute for the British.

10. Communist China: Malik said Indonesia's view towards China is that despite the low state of relations between GOI and Peking (relations are suspended) Communist China as representing the Chinese people should be allowed to enter the community of nations. In this way, said Malik, one could at least hope that over time Communist China might become a responsible member of world community.

11. Soviet Union: Malik said it was obvious that the Soviet Union was increasing its interest in Southeast Asia. The GOI was intrigued by Brezhnev's statement about collective security in South and Southeast Asia but has been unable to gain any clarification of what Brezhnev has in mind. Mrs. Gandhi, who was a recent visitor in Djakarta, also has no idea what Brezhnev means.

12. Japan and regional cooperation: The GOI is a sincere supporter of regional cooperation, active in ADB, ECAFE,SEAMEC and ASEAN. The GOI is proud that it has been able to achieve some progress in this area. It is hoped that Japan will play a more prominent role in regional affairs as time goes on. Southeast Asian countries, however, fear Japanese economic strength and Indonesia particularly would like a clearer idea of Japan's motives in regional cooperation.

13. In addition to these main points Malik said that he would also want to comment on:

14. Middle East: The GOI believes that the UN resolutions on the Middle East problem are not effective and there appears to be a dangerous confrontation of military forces in that region. Malik expressed the hope that the big powers will be able to contain conflict in the Middle East.

15. Five-year Plan: Malik said that Indonesia's five-year plan is a modest one in the sense that it is based on a realistic appreciation of prospects for development in Indonesia. The country will require about $600 million a year in external aid for this program. The principal objective is to achieve agricultural development and thus lay a solid base for a second five-year plan in which hopefully Indonesia may approach a takeoff stage. In the three years of the new govt, the GOI has broken the hold of the PKI on the country and the five-year plan is successfully achieved, this will lessen substantially the capability of the PKI to return to power. The aim in this five year period is to demonstrate to the people that the govt is able to supply their basic needs of food, clothing and other essentials. In the second five-year plan the govt must demonstrate that there will be opportunity for gainful employment for all the people and also govt must launch industrial development. Major objective of second plan will be to develop national capacity to resist subversion and aggression.

16. Malik said he was happy that there was a sympathetic response to Indonesia's debt problem on part of Western creditors. He wondered what US thinks of Dr. Abs' recommendations. Malik said he recognized that Dr. Abs' recommendation for waiving interest payments would probably raise a problem for US Congress. He hoped that this procedural problem would be overcome, however, since a favorable US attitude toward this issue would certainly influence other countries in favor of Abs' recommendations.

17. To revert to economic plan, Malik said that Indonesia hopes for considerable help from private sector. Indonesia will need steel production, it will need to develop the Asahan power complex in Sumatra and additional cement and petrochemical facilities in Java. Roughly $200 million will be required for these projects and it is hoped that they can be financed by private investment.

18. Secretary Rogers responded as follows:

19. On debts, the Secretary said we are sympathetic to Indonesia's debt problem, and we have had discussions with Dr. Abs concerning his recommendations. There are two helpful factors in regard to this issue, (1) Indonesia is generally held in high regard for the caliber of its govt and its policies and (2) the important fact that Indonesia has checked a virtually runaway inflation.

20. On private investment the Secretary noted that we are doing all we can to encourage American investors and will continue in this direction.

21. On British withdrawal, the Secretary said the US has no intention of supplanting the UK although we would be concerned if any other super power has such an intention.

22. Commenting on the Brezhnev statement on collective security, the Secretary noted that we had been unable to clarify Brezhnev proposal. The Soviet Ambassador in Washington had been unable to enlighten US and the Indian Foreign Minister was similarly unclear as to Brezhnev's intention. It would be interesting, said the Secretary, if the Soviets were thinking of some kind of security arrangement of non-Communist countries which would be directed against Communist China. He thought this had a ring of unreality.

23. Reverting to British withdrawal, President Nixon, said the Secretary, thinks it important that we make clear that we are a Pacific power and we will continue to honor our treaty obligations and to do our part in helping in the economic, educational and cultural development of other countries. We have no intention of withdrawing from Asia. However, we will not get involved with our troops except in connection with treaty obligations. We regard insurgency as a problem for the Asian countries themselves. We will, however, be prepared to help in other ways to strengthen the capabilities of Asian countries to manage their own insurgency problems. Basic to our position is that we will not interfere in the sovereignty of other nations.

24. Our interest in regional cooperation derives from the conviction that if the Asian countries themselves fail to appreciate the importance and necessity for such cooperation, they will surely be taken over. We therefore intend to encourage regional cooperation to the best of our ability and we wish to congratulate Indonesia on its successful efforts thus far in strengthening regional arrangements.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.]

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rogers visited a number of East Asian countries, including Indonesia and Japan, for conferrals following President Nixon's July 25th Guam statement; see Document 269.

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, July 29, 1969, 1110Z.

5130. Department Pass Action Tokyo (priority). For Secretary's Party. SecState for S/S. Subj: Secretary's Meeting with Adam Malik and Counterparts July 28.

1. Present on Indonesian side: Malik, LtGen Sumitro, MajGen Alamsjah, Prof Widjojo, BrigGen Sudharmono, Mrs. Marzuki, Anwar Sani, Ismael Thajeb,Amb Sudjatmoko, BrigGen Her Tasning, BrigGen Supardjo, Suryo Di-Puro (Chief American Bureau FonDep).

2. Present on US side: Secretary, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Green, Amb Galbraith, Mr. Ron Ziegler, Mr. Barnett, Amb Pedersen, Mr. Holdridge, and Mr. Lydman.

3. Following is uncleared running summary of meeting:

4. Mr. Malik began the session by requesting clarification of US views on Dr. Abs' recommendations on the debt question.

5. Mr. Barnett noted that as an agent chosen by the creditors, Dr. Abs had been given a mandate to report his views but not to negotiate a debt rescheduling. Abs has advanced the view that while the GOI needs relief from its debt problem the purpose of his exercise is to establish a permanent credit position for the GOI. He is recommending that interest on all categories of debt be cancelled; this would lower the Sukarno debt from $2.2 billion to $1.7 billion. The principal would be amortized over 30 years with payments to begin immediately. Dr. Abs believes there must be one formula for debt rescheduling for all creditors, East Bloc as well as Western. His problem now is how to make his recommendations acceptable. In this regard it is hoped there will be agreement among major creditors such as the Japanese and US with regard to procedures for settling the new debt in order that the GOI can establish a strong position for negotiations with the USSR. Abs will be submitting his recommendations the first week in August to the French chairman of the creditors group. Abs will not become a broker in negotiating with the creditors unless he is requested to do so. The US has not influenced Dr. Abs in any way but is giving him a free hand to develop his creative thoughts. Our hope is he may become the negotiator with the creditors. It is not certain that he will be able to sell his formula of a settlement with zero percent interest and he may have to modify his proposals in this regard. The US intends to talk to the Japanese, however, about the post-Sukarno debts in order to give the GOI leverage to influence the attitude of the USSR. Mr. Barnett said that we see some problem ahead in that US aid may be used indirectly to service the Communist debts. In facing up to this problem we would attempt to establish the creation of Indonesian creditworthiness as the major point of the whole debt resettlement exercise, recognizing that a fair settlement of the debt problem is vital for the GOI.

6. Mr. Malik turned to West Irian and reviewed the GOI's implementation of the act of free choice. He said that the last stage of this procedure would be initiated on August 2. There is no doubt about the result; the West Irian people will of course register their desire to remain in Indonesia. Malik, however, asked that the US recognize that the people in West Irian feel somewhat of an historic relationship with the American people due to their experiences in World War II. After the act of free choice the GOI will be carrying a major responsibility in West Irian. Only a small part of external aid to Indonesia now goes to West Irian and Malik said the GOI wishes to establish a substantial development fund for West Irian after the act of choice is finished. The GOI has dismissed this matter with the Dutch who have been the principal contributors to the UN fund in West Irian and the Dutch have agreed that the GOI should seek additional funds from the ADB and also hopefully from the US. Malik said he would welcome special US assistance for West Irian.

7. Malik said that after the act some African countries will be heard from in the UN when the West Irian problem comes to their attention. He would appreciate US help in explaining the facts of the West Irian situation to these Africans, particularly to the Liberian lady[2] who is likely to be the next president of the GA.

8. Malik turned to the question of US–GOI military relationships, noting that General Sumitro and Dr. Kissinger had discussed this yesterday. The GOI does not need material assistance for its armed forces; most of all it requires understanding of the role the armed forces must play. In this connection Malik hoped that the US might lend assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in the training area, including training in the tactical use of modern weapons. So far as equipment was concerned, Malik said if any surpluses are available the GOI could certainly use them. He said he would not go into this matter in any greater detail.

9. Malik asked that the US seek to enlarge US quotas, or markets, for Indonesian primary products such as sugar, rubber, palm oil, etc.

10. The Secretary said he would give careful consideration to the matters raised by Mr. Malik.

11. Mr. Green, referring to the West Irian problem, inquired what actually is expected to happen after the act of choice takes place. Mr. Malik said that Ortiz Sanz and the GOI, separately, will report to the Secretary General. The Secreatary General will then report to the General Assembly. His report does not require a GA vote but comment and debate on the subject cannot be excluded. Mr. Malik said that the GOI wants the least possible debate on this issue because it could become a football for certain Communist countries, such as Albania, to castigate Indonesia; also the problem has racialist overtones in certain African countries, and the GOI fears that the methods used by the GOI in implementing the act of free choice might be exploited by colonialist powers.

12. Responding to the Secretary's question on Vietnam, Malik said that while Indonesia would welcome a US withdrawal from Vietnam, leaving the Vietnamese free to decide their own destiny, at the same time GOI realizes that the US has commitments in the ARDL and indeed does not wish the US to pull out quickly. Malik said he cannot make this latter position a matter of public record but it nevertheless represents the view of the govt. If the US withdraws rapidly, North Vietnam will certainly take over and neighboring countries will be wide open for Communist subversion. The GOI would hope for a fair solution from the Paris discussions but also wishes a strengthening of South Vietnam. Realizing that this is not easy in a war-time situation, the GOI hopes that the South Vietnamese people will come to accept the regime as their own. The social-political base of govt must be strengthened in South Vietnam and it is necessary that every hamlet have the will to resist. An important element in this resistance, said Malik, is to give the people a sense of proprietorship by making it possible for them to own the land. Both the Northern and Southern regimes in Vietnam have slogans that they are giving land to the farmers. This must be credibly implemented in the South.

13. Mr. Malik thought that there were other political forces in South Vietnam that should be included in govt in order to broaden popular support. If South Vietnam can broaden its political base it must then find an ideological base like Pantja Sila. If this can be done then US forces could perhaps safely withdraw. Finally, said Malik, there is also the possibility that the Paris Talks will fail, that North Vietnam is not sincere. If so, as he had already told Ambassador Green, the US must be prepared to exert greater pressure on North Vietnam. Again, said Malik, this position could not be made public but he wished the Secretary to know his feelings.

14. The Secretary commented that in effect Malik's views represent both the policy of the United States and that of the Government of South Vietnam. The Secretary said that through the process of local elections and other base-broadening activities, such as President Thieu's land reform program, which is now before the Assembly for final approval, and through a broadening of cabinet participation—all the major actions that Malik had underlined are being pursued. The ideological objective is more difficult, said the Secretary, because there has been no base developed for nationalist leadership. The only rallying point at present is anti-Communism. However, if the army and civil defense and civil service could be unified in common purpose in support of the govt this would represent a very substantial base of support for the govt's actions.

15. Mr. Malik continued on Vietnam, said that he thought it was important that the behavior of US troops and South Vietnamese troops be carefully considered in order that they might acquire the image of protectors of the people and comrades-in-arms of Vietnamese forces. He thought it vital for the future of South Vietnam that as US troops pull out, the process should be managed in such a way as to support the image of the South Vietnamese troops that are taking their place and who must remain.

16. The Secretary agreed that this was a highly desirable and important objective and noted that we had withdrawn one of our best divisions which had been replaced by one of South Vietnam's best divisions specifically for the purpose of improving the image of the South Vietnamese troops in the eyes of their own people.

17. In response to the Secretary's question on China, Malik said Indonesian-Chinese relations are frozen. He said that obviously China cannot be ignored or isolated indefinitely. He feels China must be brought into the community of nations and that we must face up to this problem in the UN. On the other hand, said Malik, the GOI cannot sponsor China in the UN in view of the present state of relations between the two countries. There is hope, however, for change in China where Communism has developed in stages. In the first stage, the iron hand was needed to secure sufficient food and clothing for the population. Now China is in the second stage, industrial development is underway and the govt can now force people to work because they have secured sufficient food and clothing for them. This is the meaning of the cultural revolution. At some future time, the Chinese will proceed to the third stage of their development when they will expose their industrial production to the outside world. At that time they will require better relations with outside countries. If China decides to join the UN it will be a reflection of its development into its third stage as a Communist country. We may have to wait a long time for this, said Malik.

18. Also in judging the Soviet-Chinese conflict, said Malik, we must recognize their different stages of development. In their first stage of development, the Soviets tried to include China as well as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and others in their internal development plan. This created serious difficulties for the Soviets when each of these countries developed to the point where they could no longer be so dependent on the USSR. If the Chinese should achieve more economic development, said Malik, we can expect their aggressiveness to lessen in the same way that the USSR became less aggressive as it advanced economically.

19. In response to the Secretary's question on Taiwan, Malik said that in a sense the GOI's attitude toward Taiwan is a procedural matter. If one asks who is the legimate head of the Chinese Govt, the answer must be Peking, but the existence of the Taiwan Govt cannot be ignored. One might hope that there would be such changes in the Mainland that it would be possible for Taiwan to return to its control. If this is not possible, Taiwan should be reconciled to a status as an island country, not one representing 800,000,000 Chinese. Taiwan, representing Taiwan only, should certainly be a member of the UN.

20. In responding to the Secretary's question about Cambodia, Malik said that Sihanouk faced an urgent struggle for survival under extremely difficult conditions. Sihanouk wants to be a saviour and this is only possible in the framework of his Socialist program; this he pursues also to draw support and sympathy from the USSR, China and North Vietnam. A question here is what these countries think of Cambodia. North Vietnam has an historic position of desiring all of the former French Indo-China to be under one system. The efforts of the US and Indonesia should be directed towards trying to keep Cambodia and Laos neutral. This may be decided by the outcome of the Paris negotiations.

21. Turning to the Secretary's question on Malaysia, Malik said he did not think we need worry too much about the situation in Malaysia. The clashes now underway cannot be avoided. The British wished to establish a multiracial society and believed this had been achieved in the 12 years of independence. But when independent Malaysia was created the British left the leadership in the hands of feudal Malays and rich Chinese. Difficulties should really have broken out much earlier and might have been more easily contained but now after one whole generation substantial numbers of Malays and Chinese have been isolated from their leadership—this has created not only a racial problem but a social problem. It is now necessary for the govt to adapt to the real situation. The govt must conciliate the dissident Chinese (in Penang and other areas), and the Malays must face up to the fact that their survival depends on multiracial cooperation. For the Malays it is too easy to see their country as a Malay country and some of them are looking to Indonesia to help them in this regard. Maybe they hope that Sumatra will help them in their struggle against the Chinese, but this is not possible!

22. Responding to Mr. Green's question what could be done now for example, by the National Operations Council (NOC), Malik said that he had told his friends in KL that the NOC will be a danger if it is protracted because it excludes Chinese and the longer it continues the more disaffected the Chinese will become. It is logical for the Malays to unite and to seek to strengthen themselves as a community but they must open the dialog with the Chinese and with the poor Malays to bring them into a sense of participation in their country. And they must deal with the Malay extremists, to convince them that their attitude is destructive to the whole Malay community. The govt in KL must seek rapidly to correct the past errors; there must be more and better jobs for the Malays, more and better schools for Malays, and the rural Malays must be given a sense of involvement in their government.

23. Malik said that the Tunku and Tun Razak are inhibited from dealing constructively with the Chinese because of the influence of extremists in the Malay community. But this is the problem they must solve and perhaps the national unity effort of Ghazali can serve some useful purpose in this regard.

24. In response to the Secretary's question on the PRG, Malik said the GOI had told the PRG representative the GOI was not in position to recognize them. A representative of the NLF is resident in Djakarta but has no diplomatic rank. Malik said there are indirect contacts with the South Vietnamese Govt.

25. Turning to the subject of ASPAC, the responding to Mr. Green's comment that the US is not pushing ASPAC as an organization that other countries should join, Malik said that the GOI considers ASPAC ECAFE, SEAMEC, ADB and ASEAN. Malik said the GOI is getting confused about organizations like ASPAC and others. He asked what organization the USG prefers as a channel for US assistance in SEA.

26. Mr. Barnett commented that the US regards the GOI as kind of a model of a developing country for the reason that its economic prospects, requirements and indeed the supervision, of its economic program have been carefully developed on a multilateral basis including excellent assistance from the IMF,IBRD and ADB. (Discussion was halted at this point.)

27. President Nixon and President Suharto joined the meeting at 11 am. President Nixon noted that the Presidents had had an excellent discussion. President Suharto had accepted his invitation to visit the United States at a time to be worked out by their respective ambassadors. President Nixon thought early January might be a convenient time and he hoped that President Suharto would be able to spend long enough in the United States to travel not only to Washington and New York but also to Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles and possibly Houston, to view the Space Center. President Nixon said he was keenly aware of the immense importance of private investment in Indonesia and he was encouraged by the interest that had been shown by American businessmen. In this regard he hoped President Suharto might be able to arrange a meeting with some of our top business executives in New York. President Nixon said he thought the five-year plan needed maximum support from private investors.

28. Viewing Asia as a whole, President Nixon said it was quite obvious that the key to at least South and Southeast Asia was Indonesia and certainly if there was a serious reversal in Indonesia it would seriously affect other countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. It is thus necessary that Indonesia remain strong and it is the goal of its policy to support this strength.

29. It is important, said President Nixon, that our relationship must not give any appearance of neo-colonialism or exploitation. [garble—We?] must “go together, not one behind the other” whether in the context of multilateral or bilateral relationships, the US respects Indonesian independence and wants to be a part of its era of progress.

30. President Suharto expressed his gratitude for the very good exchange of views that he had had with President Nixon which he believed had established a solid foundation for future US-Indonesian relations. He expressed thanks for President Nixon's invitation to visit the US which he would certainly do at a convenient time.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Reference is to Angie E. Brooks, President of the UN General Assembly during the 24th session in 1969.

273. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

Bali, August 5, 1969, 1530Z.

10. From Ambassador Galbraith. Dept pass Djakarta. Subject: Indonesian Reaction to Presidential Visit.

1. I saw Suharto prior to leaving for Bali yesterday. I told him it would be some time before the content of his talks with the President on the second occasion would become known to me.[2] I did not wish him to disclose to me anything I should not know, but it would be a help if he told me anything he thought I should know. He looked at me thoughtfully for a moment and then gave me the following, in summary:

2.

Viet-Nam. Suharto had said that while Indonesia favored a Viet-Nam free of foreign troops it fully realized that the United States should not pull its troops out of Viet-Nam precipitately; also that the United States could not do this in a month or even within a year but over a period of some time, depending on South Viet-Nam's SVN) ability to consolidate its strength. In Indonesia's view this meant finding and inculcating a common ideology and a broadened base for the government so as to increase and strengthen popular support and the national will and capability to resist.

Answering President Nixon's question about how Indonesia would be prepared to participate in a peacekeeping force in SVN, Suharto said that Indonesia was prepared to send its troops to SVN to monitor the implementation of a settlement on condition that (a) it would be part of a UN sponsored force, (b) its participation would receive the approval of both the U.S. and North Viet-Nam (NVN), and (c) Indonesia would not have to bear the cost. Although Indonesia would be present as a nonaligned power it would have an anti-Communist orientation and, on the basis of Indonesia's experience, would try to help SVN develop the ability to resist a Communist takeover.

3. Threat to Indonesia. The President asked Suharto what he saw as the greatest danger to Indonesia, whether it was Communist subversion in the area, a re-emergent Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Suharto said it was actually none of these things that he feared. The danger lay in possible failure of the five-year development plan. Such failure would provide fertile soil for the comeback of communism in Indonesia by weakening the national will and ability to resist.

4.

Assistance for Indonesian Development. The President asked Suharto whether Indonesia preferred its economic assistance from the U.S. to be on a bilateral or a multilateral basis. Suharto replied that it didn't matter to Indonesia. But where projects could provide long-term monuments to U.S.-Indonesian friendship and cooperation, Suharto would prefer to see them provided on a bilateral basis. Suharto stressed the importance of continued foreign assistance for the five-year development plan at a level of $600 million a year. Some relief for Indonesia's indebtedness was also required, possibly along the lines of the Abs Plan.

As a sound basis for the second five-year plan certain key projects should be accomplished as soon as possible. These included (a) the Asahan power complex, (b) the steel plant at Tjiligon, (c) the cement plant at Tjibinong, and (d) the fertilizer plant at Tjirebon. The cost of these projects would be only about $200 million. These are the kind of monumental projects that would enhance U.S.-Indonesian relations over the long haul. By implication, Suharto hopes the U.S. will find it possible to support these projects.

5.

Military Assistance. President Nixon asked Suharto whether he felt assured that he had the loyalty and support of the Indonesian armed forces. Suharto said certain elements earlier had succeeded in infiltrating into and subverting some units of the armed forces, turning them against Suharto. But cleansing operations had been carried out. Most importantly, Suharto, as Minister of Defense and Security and Commander in Chief, maintains control over the military, including the police. He plans to keep this control to help ensure against disruption whether from the left or the right.

Suharto said training in modern weaponry and tactics is also needed. Suharto repeated the desire to obtain conventional aircraft for close support roles (B–25s, B–26s, A–1s, etc.) and for transport aircraft (C–130s). He said these planes are obsolete in the U.S. but still in supply and very useful to Indonesia.

6. West Irian. Suharto told President Nixon that the act of choice would be completed between August 2–4. The follow-up would be all important. It will be a burden for Indonesia to bring the 700,000 West Irianese, the most primitive of the Indonesian people, to an acceptable level of development. In humanistic terms this effort deserved the support of all, particularly the developed countries. President Nixon said he had not studied the background of the West Irian problem. He would do so when he returned to Washington. Suharto said he hoped President Nixon would publicly note that the act of choice had resulted in a decision to stay with Indonesia and pledge U.S. support for the development of these stone age people who had served the U.S. indirectly during World War II. Such public notice by the President would interest other countries in the task of developing West Irian. Suharto hoped the President's announcement could come as close as possible after August 4 and before the General Assembly meets.

7. East-West Relations. Suharto felt it would be unwise for the U.S. to strengthen either Red China or the USSR in relation to the other. He thought Red China should be brought out of its isolation, if possible, and into the UN. He implied that the continuation of the Soviet-Communist Chinese conflict might weaken both and that this would not be unwelcome to him.

8. Other Subjects. Suharto indicated briefly that they had discussed Japan, and the importance of stable prices and markets for Indonesia's agricultural and mining products. Indonesia is making strenuous efforts to increase its oil production and continued access to U.S. markets for Indonesia oil is crucial, Suharto said.

9. Suharto said he would charge his Ambassador in Washington to get in touch with the Department of State upon his return and work for implementation of the Presidential talks. Suharto hoped I too would be of assistance and that the talks beginning in Bali on August 5 would also contribute to the implementation of the general principles he and also President Nixon had agreed upon.

10. At the conclusion of the review of his talks with the President, I asked Suharto to clarify for me how he saw Indonesia interacting in the future with its neighbors, not only in the economic and cultural fields but in the field of security. Suharto said internal subversion could only be met by the consolidation of the national will and ability to resist, based on the individual nation's own national ideology and economic strength. Indonesia could serve as a model and source of inspiration and provide advice on how it had accomplished this. Indonesia would consult its own interests in the event of any aggression anywhere in the area and he would expect every country to do the same. Any country under a threat which [garble] not feel it could itself meet could ask Indonesia for help and Indonesia would be prepared to respond. Indonesia had already provided military advisors and training assistance to the Government of Malaysia.

11. Comment: Suharto carefully asserts Indonesia's independent policies, foreign and domestic, as well as its primary responsibility for its own development, but he clearly looks to the U.S. as the primary source of foreign assistance. His reference to “monuments” in the form of U.S. financed projects suggests his desire to gradually induce among the Indonesian people recognition of this primary reliance on the U.S. Clearly Suharto would raise the ante on economic aid to include support for $100 million worth of what he regards as key projects, to be begun as soon as possible; also by unspecified amounts of MAP assistance in the form of line items for the military excess to U.S. requirements. This may run in the opposite direction from our own desire to avoid challenging public sensitivity here on any suggestion of a developing neo-colonial relationship and our attempts to continue a low posture.

12. Both Lydman and I have found Ambassador Sudjatmoko concerned about the inflation of Indonesian expectation, developed since President Nixon's departure, for additional U.S. Assistance.[3] We will need careful guidance on the President's intentions with respect to fulfilling these inflated expectations and we will need to deal with them urgently, if they require deflating, before they set in concrete.[4]

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret; Nodis.

[2] President Nixon had private talks with President Suharto from 4 to 5:55 p.m. on July 27 and from 9 to 11:25 a.m. on July 28 at Merdeka Palace in Jakarta. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

[3] In telegram 5596 from Djakarta, August 16, the Embassy cited “heightened expectations and insistent Indonesian requests for increased military assistance” as well as the “excellent rapport established with President Suharto” as some of the results of the “highly successful presidential visit.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 8

[4]  Rogers met with Foreign Minister Malik and other Indonesian officials in Bali August 5–7. Their discussions are reported in telegram 5427 from Jakarta, August 8. (Ibid., POL US)

274. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

New York, September 26, 1969, 2336Z.

Secto 62/3255. Subj: Secretary's Bilateral with Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, September 26.

1. Malik began conversation by discussing West Irian. In UN context he said he hoped to have matter handled as expeditiously as possible, but it now appeared it would not come up until end October or early November. He would have to make another trip to New York at that time. He saw no problems in getting report through UN.[2] Amb. Abdulgani said they were discussing with the Netherlands a joint resolution to take note of report.

2. Malik then gave a long report on Indonesia's debt problems. He said he met Abs before going to Africa and discussed his proposal. He understands there will be a meeting in Paris in Oct. He knew there were problems with the proposal on the American side and there are also problems for the Japanese. Aichi told him problems in three areas (a) the long repayment period, (b) interest, and (c) debts on which agreed term of repayment exists. Malik suggested to Aichi that perhaps they could arrange exchange of views at World Bank meeting.

3. Before leaving Djakarta he met USSR mission which had come at Indonesian invitation to discuss debts. Soviets wanted hold discussion on basis 1966 Protocol which called for $7–8 million short term payment 1967–68–69 and $22 million long term repayment beginning 1970. Under present circumstances Indonesia could not meet payments. Negotiations almost ended at this point. Malik suggested negotiation turn to discussion new Indonesian proposal. This was close to the Abs' terms except had asked Soviets for 35 years repayment and had avoided linking proposal to Abs plan. Soviets said workers country could not be philanthropic and reduce interest to zero. However, it might put off interest payments and accumulate same until Indonesia in position to pay. Malik felt door still open for future negotiations.

4. His impression was that there is change in Soviet tactics regarding Indonesia and, if debt problem worked out, Soviets will finish aid projects Indonesians wish completed. Soviets might even increase amounts available. The Soviet del also offered possibility assist Indonesian government projects with experts and material. On navy and air force spares, Soviet said they would supply on cash and carry basis.

5. Malik turned to special development fund for West Irian. Dutch and Australians have already agreed to supply some funds and he hoped US would come in. Amb. Sujatmoko said this already discussed with Green. He noted President Nixon's indication personal interest this matter and his request he be reminded. He said Dutch were pressing for establishment of fund for “internal political purposes.” Dutch have agreed to 5 million dollar contribution but Australia not yet committed on amount. Dutch hope for fund establishment in November, but need not have prior US agreement. Secretary suggested further talks with Green and pointed out time problems facing US in obtaining Congressional approval. Sujatmoko said he was in touch with Green and Barnett. Secretary recommended he also talk to Samuels.

6. Secretary raised possibility Malik undertake activities here stimulate private investment. Sujatmoko said 20 man group now in New York on this project. Perhaps October/November Malik trip might provide better time. Secretary suggested talks with James Lennon and Sujatmoko said they were in touch.

7. Secretary suggested Malik also undertake improve relations with key Congressional leaders. Malik agreed this useful and suggested October/November time frame. Secretary asked to be reminded and suggested either lunch at Dept or visit to Hill. Sujatmoko requested Mansfield be included in order refute concern expressed his report that US exceeding self-imposed 1/3 formula in Indonesia. Secretary emphasized benefits close personal contact 3 or 4 Congressional leaders citing South Korean success this field. He urged this be undertaken at present time when Indonesian image with US public very good. Sujatmoko said he would discuss this with Green.

8. Malik asked for Secretary's views on Vietnam and the Middle East. Secretary indicated no great change in situation since their last conversation. He said he saw no willingness yet on the part of the North Vietnamese to enter useful talks. However, he noted change in tactics, quoting President's press conference statement that infiltration rate down by 2/3 and also noting decrease enemy activity. He viewed this as good sign and said if other side wished reinstitute offensive operations it would require build up time. He also noted casualty ratio remains unfavorable North Vietnam. He expressed pleasure over smooth progress redeployment program. He hoped opposition would conclude negotiations would offer best result. He indicated US willingness discuss difficult problem setting up mutually agreeable system supervise free elections, regardless what required. Other side had not indicated willingness discuss. If they continue obdurate we will continue Vietnamization.

9. On ME Secretary said we have hopes of movement but have word problems. Malik asked if these on both sides. Secretary suggested possible success Rhodes Formula, but noted difficulties Riad experienced with press when he raised this. He noted Israeli difficulties due October election and said hoped resume four power talks about Oct 20. Malik asked if the USSR was willing and the Secretary said yes but they held different views. Malik said in his discussion Soviets, Malik USSR) had said four powers willing but contestants not agreeable. Secretary agreed contestants must be party to any solution. Malik said he would have opportunity further soundings at non-aligned meeting scheduled tomorrow in New York.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta. Rogers was in New York to attend the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly.

[2] On April 1, 1968, UN Secretary-General U Thant had appointed Fernando Ortiz Sanz as his Representative for the “act of free choice” under which the inhabitants of West Irian would decide whether they wished to remain with or sever their ties with Indonesia, under the terms of the agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands of August 15, 1962. The representative made a number of reports on the progress Indonesia had made on this issue. On November 6, 1969, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly concerning the act of self-determination. In his report the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly concerning the act of self-determination. In his report the Secretary-General annexed the final reports submitted to him by his Representative and by the Indonesian Government, which described in detail the arrangements, conduct, and results of the act of free choice. Malik is evidently referring to one of these reports. (United Nations Yearbook, 1969, pp. 175–177). The act of free choice, the Secretary-General said, had been held between July 14 and August 2, when the enlarged West Irian councils, which had included a total of 1,026 members, pronounced themselves, without dissent and on behalf of the people of West Irian, in favor of remaining with Indonesia.

275. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 30, 1969.

SUBJECT

Indonesian Request for Arms Aid

I attach (Tab A) Djakarta's 7460,[2] which describes an approach made by General Sumitro to the Ambassador's Special Assistant for arms aid. Sumitro said that President Suharto had authorized him to approach the Embassy, to explain the situation as they see it, and to request that we study the possibility of equipping the Indonesian armed forces over the next 5–7 years.

Sumitro said he recognized that Congressional approval of new major MAP programs is probably two or three years away. He hopes, however, that a program can be sketched out and that personnel can be trained to use the equipment which they might plan on receiving some years hence. Consequently, he hoped for “some modest increase” in professional training in the current MAP budget, plus transport aircraft and naval spares to meet specific requirements.

Sumitro said that the Indonesians have completed their list of requirements. The list does not constitute an immediate request, but they are looking for an indication that the US will in the future assist them in replacing Soviet equipment. Sumitro said that this will be a major topic when Suharto meets the President next spring.

Sumitro said that he planned to raise the same points with Admiral McCain during his forthcoming visit.

You will recall that General Sumitro some weeks ago passed you a similar request for arms aid through the Indonesian Military Attaché, General Suhud. It would appear that President Suharto has now decided that he had better begin to hit the US Government at different levels with his request.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “John, See me HK.”

[2] Dated October 28, attached but not printed.

276. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 17, 1969.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia

Ambassador Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko

Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green

John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

Following a very brief discussion of the purpose of Mr. Malik's visit to the UN in connection with the West Irian debate,[2] the President remarked that he had good memories of his visit to Djakarta last summer, and certainly hoped that our relations were going well. He jokingly said that he hoped, too, the Indonesians were receiving good cooperation from Ambassador Green. As he had said when in Indonesia, if one looks at this area of the world Indonesia's 120 million people and great geographic area give it a key relationship in the future of the region. Without Indonesia, there would be no real possibility for regional solutions. Knowing that the Indonesians wish to retain their independence, we in this Administration were looking forward to maintaining a close relationship with them. Mr. Malik stated that he indeed hoped that our relationships could be strengthened.

Changing the subject, Mr. Malik declared that the Indonesians had read the President's recent speech[3] with great interest and sympathy, and looked on it as a very objective statement of the US situation in Vietnam. Mr. Malik added that he thought the speech also indicated the time now was right for political movement in South Vietnam so that the thrust of US policy would not only be of a military character. As he looked at US domestic developments, he had the impression that many people thought the US was pressing solely for a military solution. Political development in South Vietnam might therefore deflect domestic opinion away from controversy in the US to events in Vietnam. Although the position of Thieu and Ky was not so good, their situation might be strengthened if they were to rely more on the leadership in the countryside. If the relationship between the national leaders and the natural leaders in the countryside could be developed, to the point where the latter were willing to participate in the physical development of the country, the influence of the Viet Cong would be neutralized.

The President declared that one of the most encouraging developments in his ten months in office was the strengthening of the Vietnamese territorial forces, as distinct from the regular armed forces. General Abrams had said that this was the most significant development which had occurred. The territorial forces had always existed, but before had not possessed much of a will to fight; now they were better equipped, increasingly active, and could provide security to outlying areas which the regular forces could not reach.

Referring to Mr. Malik's comments on political development in South Vietnam, the President said that this in fact was our objective, but that the process took time—years and even generations. What we were trying to do was to compress political evolution in the country into a time span of five minutes. Nevertheless, it was important to make the effort, for if there were no local elements assuming responsibility, once the regular military went away, the old problems would appear again. The President likened this type of war to playing a violin—there had to be at least four strings: economic, military, political and social progress.

Mr. Malik noted that one of the side effects of the President's speech could be found in his area, namely, the speech would definitely increase the desire of the nations of the area to increase their cooperation regionally. In this respect, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers were to meet in Kuala Lumpur in December. The President's speech had had a reassuring effect on the ASEAN countries and would encourage them to work out a greater degree of regional cooperation.

The President said that in this country we had to rule out the easy way of ending our involvement in Vietnam. We could of course get out easily, but this would in turn get us out of Southeast Asia, and therefore we had to find a way to bring the war to an end and yet achieve our limited objective of preventing a government from being imposed on the Vietnamese people from the outside. Noting that this objective had been accomplished in Indonesia, the President hoped that the same outcome would be reached in Vietnam. He thought that he could keep US opinion in support of this goal, and certainly would resist efforts to wash out the war as a bad deal, which would bring very bad consequences.

Mr. Malik indicated that, on the other hand, there was a danger that the ending of the US involvement in Vietnam would lead to isolationism. The President agreed, saying that Vietnam must not be interpreted domestically as a failure, especially after the loss of 40,000 lives. If we were to leave under humiliating circumstances or with the war a failure, the American people would say in the event that a threat were directed against Indonesia, Thailand or India, “Why do anything?”

Continuing, the President mentioned that one point had been very encouraging to him: Mr. Malik and his colleagues had been able to avoid a Communist takeover in Indonesia. They had displayed courage and leadership and by resisting had showed that the people and leaders of their country possessed the will to retain their independence. Indonesia was the brightest spot: having had the greatest problems, it had now turned completely around.

The President touched on the problems in other areas, referring to Thailand and Malaysia, and noting Malaysia's interracial conflict. He commended Singapore under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, observing that Lee understood the problems of Vietnam. The difficulties of all these countries, including Laos and Cambodia, were related and were but a part of the total picture.

In response to a statement by the President that Ambassador Green had been in Indonesia when the change had happened, Mr. Green recalled the President's visit to Indonesia as a private citizen, recalling that the President had been the best visitor the Embassy had ever known. Mr. Green then spoke of the long-standing friendship which Mr. Malik had displayed toward the US, which had existed even during the bad days under Sukarno.

The President remarked that Mr. Malik understood the real nature of the problems facing his country, and recognized that there were civilian as well as military components. Moreover, Mr. Malik had a view which was not limited to Indonesia, but saw things in terms of the whole area. Too many people, the President said, thought only of their own country. On his trip to Europe, European friends had said to get out of Vietnam in any way. Their reasoning was that because the US was in Vietnam it was not doing enough to support Europe. The same situation was true in the Middle East. The Israelis, for example, assumed that if we were not in Vietnam we would do more for Israel. He had told them that if Vietnam ended as a failure, “forget it”. Americans would simply withdraw from Vietnam, Asia and the Middle East and stay home. He stressed that we were not going to fail; however, we needed to appreciate the fact that there was a domino effect—indeed, just to talk in these terms was to touch on too small a part of the picture. In terms of the effect on the US and its world relations, if we were unable to succeed in supporting one small country for limited goals, great internal frustrations would result. The US had to play a world role, but a proper, not a dominating one. The key was to find a way to end the Vietnam war so that this world role could be played successfully. Most of our friends in Asia understood this. Our efforts were directed not so much at changing North Vietnam, but rather towards trying to find solutions which would enable South Vietnam to stand on its own feet.

Turning again to the subject of regional cooperation, the President stated that this was very important and he was encouraged to hear about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Regional cooperation was the responsibility of the countries concerned but was also very helpful to our policy here. Too many people here had never visited the region and did not know the great national pride and desire on the part of the peoples of the region to stand on their own feet. Assistance was not wanted if it meant control, and this was a very healthy attitude. However, the US could play a good partnership role.

Mr. Malik mentioned on the score of foreign assistance that early after the 1965 coup he had told Ambassador Green not to offer aid before Indonesia had settled its own house. Ambassador Green added he had been told by the Foreign Minister at that time that when the time had come for US aid he would let us know.

The President asked about Indonesia's present situation—were we doing about what we should be doing? Mr. Malik replied that he hoped the US would continue and possibly increase its present level of aid, which was crucial in maintaining Indonesia's stability and accomplishing its five-year plan. The President referred to the difficult situation in the US, with the Congress having cut the aid appropriation below what we had asked for. The Foreign Minister should understand that what we were doing now was not a reflection of what we would like to do. However, over a period of five years he anticipated that the situation would be different and Congress would provide more support.

Mr. Malik said that he was fully aware of these difficulties, but that the Indonesians were still not giving up hope. The President observed in response that we would do as well as we could.

Mr. Malik again brought up the possibility of new isolationism in the US, particularly among the youth. The President said in reply that the isolationists were not a majority. Some elements in the population said we should not do anything abroad, but most would support a responsible foreign policy. Over 300 members of the House and 59 Senators had joined in resolutions supporting his policy on Vietnam. This was the kind of support which counted. Policy was made in this way, not otherwise.

Mr. Malik referred to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund, and wondered about the US contribution. Ambassador Green noted we had pointed out that we could not yet go forward with our contributions since we had no special legislation. The President said that he had a long talk with World Bank President McNamara prior to the Sato visit and had talked in general on this subject. Mr. McNamara felt that we need to give more emphasis to the whole Asian problem. He himself could only say that as a result of his own personal intervention we would give this matter more attention. Frankly, we had a problem with Congress, but over a period of five years there would be a change.

Mr. Malik mentioned the question of the Indonesian oil quota in the US, to which the President remarked that he was very familiar with this whole issue, and knew that the Indonesian quota was quite modest. Mr. Malik expressed the hope that the Indonesian quota would be kept open and that Indonesia would have increasing access to the US market. The President assured him that Indonesia would have a percentage of any increase and would keep this in mind.

In conclusion, the President urged Ambassador Green to encourage members of the Cabinet and Congressional leaders to visit Indonesia in order to see the country and to get a feel for Indonesia's problems. He told the Foreign Minister that the Indonesians were fortunate to have as Assistant Secretary of State a man such as Ambassador Green who was so thoroughly familiar with Indonesia and its conditions. He asked Mr. Malik to transmit his best wishes to President Suharto.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Holdridge and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of a separate attached memorandum, November 25. Kissinger initialed his approval on the covering memorandum on November 28 and wrote: “Send to State. Incidentally this goes to S/S only as all other Presidential MemCon s. Don't let into the working level.” The meeting was held in the President's office. Another copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 INDON.

[2] Foreign Minister Malik visited Washington November 15–18 in between visits to the United Nations in New York. In addition to his meeting with the President, Malik also met with Rogers and key members of Congress. Details of these discussions are reported in telegram 195740 to Jakarta, November 21. (Ibid.)

[3] President Nixon, in his address to the nation on the war in Vietnam on November 3, made the point that the United States would not engage in “an immediate, precipitate withdrawal” from Vietnam, but would, instead, “persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible,” or would “withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909)

277. Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF NSSM–61 ON INDONESIA

I. Indonesia's Importance to the U.S.

The Indonesian leadership during the first half of this decade combined hyper-nationalism and Marxist-Leninist revolutionary doctrine in a formula for “nation-building” which in fact sought to destroy Western influence and deny the concept of peaceful change in Southeast Asia. In contrast, the current Indonesian government seeks to obtain economic and social development through the pursuit of pragmatic, non-doctrinaire policies in close cooperation with its neighbors and with multilateral assistance from international agencies and Free World governments.

Success for the new Indonesian approach would dramatically improve the economic and security environment in Southeast Asia, of which roughly half the population and area is Indonesian. It could also set a constructive example for other less developed nations. Conversely, an unhealthy Indonesia would pose serious problems for Asia and Australia and endanger U.S. policy objectives in the Pacific.

II. The Indonesian Setting for U.S. Policy

Indonesia has many of the key ingredients for successful development. Separation from mainland conflicts and an ability to handle all foreseeable internal threats permit concentration on economic stabilization and development. Only partially explored but apparently extensive mineral wealth promises future increase in income, and new rice technology may bring self-sufficiency in the nation's basic food crop. Moreover, the performance of the Indonesian government to date has earned the increasing support from international agencies and Free World governments which is essential for the success of that nation's development program.

Indonesia's weaknesses, however, match its assets. Two decades of neglect have left Indonesia's basic economic infrastructure in disrepair. Roads, railroads, ports, communications and power will require substantial investments to provide an adequate base for economic development.

Problems concerned with human resources loom even larger. A severe shortage of technical skills and managerial expertise limits absorption of economic assistance, and the educational system must be completely reoriented to meet this need. Even more basic impediments to progress are the traditional attitudes and values of Indonesian society, which can deflect foreign efforts to help. These include an emphasis on adaptation to rather than manipulation of the environment, a tendency to avoid rather than solve conflicts and problems, and a paternalistic social organization which places personal relationships above impersonal codes of conduct.

Indonesia aspires to a role in Southeast Asia commensurate with its size and population. With this goal in mind, it hopes to see a gradual lessening of the area's dependence on major powers. It has fostered good relations with its immediate neighbors and has attempted to build up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into the primary vehicle for subregional cooperation. It has scrupulously followed a policy of non-alignment on international issues while pursuing rigidly anti-communist policies at home.

III. Current U.S. Policy Objectives

The absence of immediate security threats or of pressing bilateral issues has permitted United States policy to focus on the long-range goal of assisting in Indonesia's modernization.

The United States has sought to strengthen Indonesia's commitment to a pragmatic approach to development. Economic progress attained by such policies will in turn help prevent successful challenges to the regime from internal forces hostile to U.S. interests, promote Indonesian cooperation with the U.S. and other Free World powers, and contribute to the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. U.S. policy objectives have respected Indonesia's desire to maintain a balance in bilateral relationships which will preserve its non-aligned status.

IV. Current U.S. Posture

Past experience cautions against certain dangers attending American participation in Indonesian development: (1) too prominent a role can stimulate a fear common to Indonesia's traditionalist masses that modernization is in fact “Americanization” which threatens Indonesia's cultural identity and political independence; (2) assistance in certain

To avert these dangers the United States has: (1) adopted a multilateral approach in which the IMF, the IBRD and the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia assist in determining and meeting Indonesian aid requirements; (2) emphasized economic assistance, limiting military aid to non-combat materials tied to the development program and avoiding direct efforts to promote social or political changes; (3) encouraged private foreign investment; (4) maintained a “low profile”, restricting the number of American personnel in Indonesia to a bare minimum; and (5) quietly encouraged a regional approach to development through ASEAN, ECAFE and similar organizations.

V. Alternatives in Overall U.S. Approach

The options open to the United States in defining its overall approach to Indonesia tend towards two poles:

1. Maintaining (or accentuating) the multilateral, “low profile” approach with the short-term goal of keeping Indonesia on a friendly but non-aligned course and with a possible long-term goal of promoting Indonesia as the nucleus for a healthy, independent Southeast Asia.

2. Leading Indonesia into a close bilateral relationship in which the United States would take a much more direct and immediate role in helping meet economic and social problems endangering present Indonesian stability and in helping prepare Indonesia for a greater security role in the region; this relationship would, of course, involve greater obligations on our part.

The United States approach can be established at many points between these two poles. Movement towards a close bilateral relationship, however, cannot be easily reversed and can build up a momentum of its own.

VI. Policy Alternatives

There is no single issue of such importance that it alone will set the tone for U.S.-Indonesian relations. The United States is instead faced with alternative approaches in several broad sectors which will in combination define our overall posture.

The multilateral, “low profile” approach, for example, would be reinforced by decisions to: (1) restrict our Military Assistance Program to civic action, related transportation needs and professional training; (2) adhere strictly to a multilateral formula in which the level of our economic assistance is not allowed to exceed roughly one-third of that contributed by other nations; and (3) restrict technical assistance to current low levels.

Some of the advantages accruing from such decisions are: (1) Indonesia would be encouraged to focus its efforts on economic development; (2) pressure would be kept on other foreign donors to contribute; and (3) the United States would not incur the many risks arising from a conspicuous role and a large American in-country presence.

Among the disadvantages of this approach are: (1) failure to meet certain military requests could harm our relations with the Armed Forces, which provide the leadership and the political base of the current regime; (2) the multilateral framework gives less leverage for exacting quid pro quos, including self-help measures, and creates delays and uncertainties in meeting Indonesian needs; and (3) a low ceiling on technical assistance would tend to limit efforts to improve Indonesia's absorptive capacity for foreign assistance.

At the other extreme, a close bilateral association would be promoted by decisions to: (1) assist in the modernization of Indonesia's Armed Forces; (2) disregard the multilateral approach and match available American resources to Indonesian needs; and (3) provide technical skills wherever needed.

Typical advantages deriving from these decisions are: (1) Indonesia might be willing to share the current defense burden on the Southeast Asian mainland; (2) a greater assurance that its foreign assistance needs would be met would strengthen Indonesian confidence in the economic course we advocate; and (3) Indonesia would be directed more towards American markets for eventual military and civil purchases.

Disadvantages associated with such decisions include: (1) a significant increase in U.S. expenditures; (2) apprehension on the part of Indonesia's neighbors over its increased military capabilities; (3) the danger that we might replace contributions from other countries or inhibit the growth of Indonesian initiative; and (4) a hostile reaction from Indonesia's powerful traditionalist forces who could accuse the regime of abandoning Indonesia's independent course in foreign affairs and permitting “Americanization” of the Indonesian society.

There are, of course, intermediary positions on most of these issues which would provide generally less negative and less positive results than the courses outlined above. Among these are: (1) increasing military assistance in non-combat equipment and training; (2) adjusting U.S. aid levels to meet the gap in Indonesian requirements while adhering to a multilateral framework; and (3) modestly increasing technical assistance.

(In the text of this study policy alternatives are discussed by individual problem areas, which have been grouped together in the discussion above for the purpose of brevity. There are other issues which cannot be grouped with those directly affecting our overall posture towards Indonesia but which will nevertheless require important policy decisions. Among these are: (1) whether to attempt directly to foster political and social progress or to avoid such sensitive and difficult activities; (2) the problem of finding a suitable mix between “program” aid and “project” aid; and (3) finding a means of settling the huge foreign debt inherited from the Sukarno regime which will ensure a continued flow of resources into Indonesian development and protect the interests of donor nations.)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–041, SRG Meeting, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 12/22/69. Secret. Attached to a December 16 memorandum from Holdridge and Lord to Kissinger that explained that the summary was prepared for the Senior Review Group. A copy of the 29-page response to NSSM–61 is also attached but not printed. Holdridge and Lord stated in their memorandum that, “the President need only address the issues of military assistance and the U.S. role in maintenance of a Singapore base.” They added, “We don't think that our policy towards these countries [the memorandum concerned Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Indonesia]requires an NSC meeting. However, a package should be forwarded to the President because of his personal interest in Indonesia.” The Department of State paper was included in that package.

278. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, December 22, 1969.

SUBJECT

U.S. Aid to Indonesia in 1970

The Inter-Governmental Group of donors to Indonesia (IGGI) last week accepted Indonesia's request for $600 million of aid in 1970. At Tab A are recommendations from Secretaries Richardson, Kennedy and Hardin, concurred in by Director Mayo (Tab B),[2] on the U.S. share in that total.

The Indonesian economy has achieved stabilization and must now move on to development. The Suharto Government has held inflation to 7 percent in 1969 compared with 85 percent in 1968 through a policy of strict budget balancing and liberal foreign assistance in financing food and commodity imports. Both foreign and domestic investment are increasing, with emphasis on the manufacturing sector. Free market forces have been given the major role in economic decisions.

Indonesia's greatest problems are its slowness in developing capital projects and in making credits available for needed local investment, inadequate price incentives for farmers to grow more rice, an inefficient administrative apparatus, and a shortage of private sector entrepreneurs and managers. U.S. assistance has focused on these points. The World Bank is expanding its advisory and project coordinating efforts to help as well.

Donors in the IGGI currently supply all of Indonesia's foreign assistance. Indonesia's present request of $600 million includes $140 million for food aid and $460 million for non-food aid. The request would actually cover a 15-month period from January 1970 to March 1971. AID, the IBRD, and the IMF agree that this is an appropriate aid level. In addition, Indonesia is benefiting from a major rescheduling of debts by most of the IGGI countries.

In the IGGI, the U.S. has adhered to a “one-third” formula. We have agreed to pledge one-third of total non-food aid with the hope of pressuring Japan to do the same and the other donors—the Europeans and Australians—to supply the remaining third.

This year, the agencies propose that the U.S. pledge one-third ($125 million) of bilateral non-food aid ($375 million) and a “fair share” (approximately $105 million) of non-[sic] food aid ($140 million). Including our share of the money which will be provided to Indonesia by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, this would be slightly more than we contributed last year.

We would pressure Japan to match our $125 million and the Europeans and Australians together to provide the same. This proposal ensures proper burden-sharing and represents a level which is consistent with our budgetary constraints. It risks a small shortfall in meeting Indonesia's request if Japan and other donors prove niggardly, although we could probably make it up late in the year if necessary.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize the U.S. to provide $105 million of Indonesia's food aid requirements which total $140 million.[3]

2. That you authorize the U.S. to provide one-third ($125 million) [4]

Additional Point

Program loans are extended to Indonesia to finance general commodity imports important to her development effort. The U.S. is not competitive in most of these, however. Indonesia therefore must subsidize imports from the U.S. to use our money. The loans thus cause an inefficient allocation of aid money and a waste of Indonesia's local currency. Budget recommends that we carefully study the possibility of liberalizing the procurement restrictions attached to our program loans to Indonesia.[5]

Recommendation

That you authorize me to direct AID to study methods of liberalizing the procurement restrictions attached to our program loans to Indonesia.[6]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

[2] Tab A, a December 5 memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, and Tab B, a December 6 memorandum from Budget Director Robert Mayo to Nixon, are attached but not printed.

[3]  Nixon initialed his approval.

[4]  Nixon initialed his approval.

[5] A memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and Treasury, and to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, January 16, is attached but not printed. Kissinger stated in the memorandum that the President had directed that they “undertake a study of the difficulties involved in the use of U.S. program loans to Indonesia, particularly as these difficulties relate to our present tying practices.” They were asked for recommendations “on any measures needed to deal with the problem, such as the possibility of partially untying such loans to permit Indonesian procurement from other less developed countries in the region.”

[6]  Nixon initialed his approval.

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State [1]

Canberra, January 14, 1970, 1610Z.

Vipto 020/285. Subj: Vice President's Meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik. Dept Pass AmEmbassy Djakarta.

1. The Vice President met with Foreign Minister Malik for one hour and twenty minutes on January 11 in Bali.[2] Malik was accompanied by Anwar Sani and Abu Bakar Lubis. Ambassador Galbraith, Mr. Crane and Mrs. Duemling were also present.

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, the Vice President expressed interest in Indonesia's economic development plans. He indicated awareness of Indonesia's great resources, its geographic expanse, and asked how long the Foreign Minister thought it would take to achieve their objectives.

3. Malik responded that at least five years would be required just to re-establish the economy which had been ravaged during the Sukarno years. In this time he hoped Indonesia could become self-sufficient in food production. The distribution infrastructure was key because some areas produce a surplus while others are in deficit. Indonesia's problem was to increase its productivity for current consumption at the same time it is investing in infrastructure. Foreign investment is most welcome but it takes time for results since at least two years are required for research and preparation. However, Malik hoped that Indonesia would reach the “take-off point” by the end of the first five-year plan.

4.

Demographic Problems

Java presents the greatest problem because of population density and high annual population increase. Malik reviewed Indonesia's experience with transmigration. During the colonial period, entire families with all their goods were evacuated, but this technique simply transplanted the same static condition to the new location.

5. During the occupation, the Japanese engaged in forced migration. Both techniques yielded poor results. After independence, several schemes were tried leading to general confusion. Attempts to clear virgin jungle suffered from inadequate preparation, with the result that the people's spirits were broken before they became established. Now the government is considering using the armed forces in jungle clearance as part of their civic action program.

6. Current thinking on transmigration includes provision of jobs and housing as well as a subsidy until migrants can earn their own livings, though this will be costly. Also, younger people will be encouraged to migrate (rather than entire families) since they are more energetic and carry a new spirit. In addition to jungle clearing, new industries will be created and new foreign enterprises encouraged. The government hopes for a chain reaction relationship between foreign investment and migration.

7. The Vice President complimented Malik on the sagacity of Indonesia's planning for migration and its intention to balance agriculture and industry. He hoped foreign investment would ameliorate the Indonesian plans. He thought another stimulating factor could be economic cooperation within the region. Population control remains a problem because most people are happiest in large groups. However, congested areas are time bombs whose potential for disruption and civil disorder offer an easy mark to extremists. Therefore, the problem is political as well as economic. The Vice President concluded by pressing his admiration for Indonesian realism on this matter and his hope that the IGGI nations could be helpful.

8.

Outcome of ASEAN Meeting

In response to a question from the Vice President about current regional cooperation on security matters, Malik reviewed in some detail the results of the ASEAN meeting held in Malaysia in December 1969. Malik suggested that progress so far had only resulted in agreement on the need for cooperation. Prior to the ASEAN meeting there had been some apprehension among the membership about one disruptive influence of the Sabah issue, but President Marcos had the courage to relax tensions by recognizing that a political approach as well as a juridicial one was possible. Therefore, the Philippines had been willing to put its claim aside for the time being without actually renouncing it. Marcos told Malik that he hopes to visit the Tunku in March or April 1970.

9. At the ASEAN meeting the five member nations recognized the limitations of their own funds and therefore agreed on a token $1 million contribution from each. Since they have also approved 98 projects, it is clear that the available funds are woefully inadequate. However, this symbolic beginning was a good one.

10. Malik expects short-term results in tourism and communications and perhaps long-term cooperation in such projects as steel production. On the latter point he said the participants hoped to agree on a site close to the source of raw materials.

11. Malik also mentioned several possibilities for bilateral operation (in addition to multi-lateral): between Indonesia and the Philippines on copra production, Indonesia and Malaysia on rubber and tin, etc.

12. Progress had also been made in reducing tensions. For example, Malaysia in recent years had been fearful that Indonesia might be dominated by communism, religious extremists or a military regime; Malik thought Indonesia had helped alleviate these fears by bringing Malaysian students over to study in the Indonesian Armed Services Staff College. In the same spirit, Indonesia has not objected to Australia becoming a substitute for the United Kingdom in Malaysian defense matters. Indonesia has also attempted to calm Singapore's apprehensions about the fate of Chinese in Indonesia by easing the citizenship requirements.

13. A common fear expressed at the ASEAN meeting, Malik said, related to the post-Vietnam period. Since the ASEAN charter has no military aspects, the question of defense was discussed informally, outside the regular meetings. In the case of major war or invasion, the countries are planning to send troops to one another; in this respect the others look primarily to Indonesia. This is compatible with Indonesia's forward defense doctrine which favors fighting outside Indonesian territory in the event of a clear threat. Malik said Indonesia is not planning on this at the present time but it wishes to consider the means of avoiding open attack. Malik said he had stressed the necessity of these nations demonstrating their unity and strength to help avoid attack. They had achieved understanding on the exchange of information among their top military intelligence officers, though this will take place outside the ASEAN framework.

14. In considering the post-Vietnam situation, the ministers had asked the Vietnamese and Lao observers at the meeting to explain the situation in their countries. The Ministers then held bi-lateral talks with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister since each country has slightly different relations with and policies toward Vietnam. Indonesia, for example, agreed with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister to exchange information on subversion. Vietnam wanted to insist on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia. But, Malik said, Indonesia is “in different position from Thailand and the Philippines.” So for the time being, this will not be possible. However, they have agreed to operate a chamber of commerce in each others' capitals. In response to questions from Ambassador Galbraith, Malik and Sani said that the chamber of commerce mechanism was chosen (rather than a trade office) Malik pointed out, however, that each government would be free to appoint anyone to this position and it could be an official, even a high-ranking diplomat.

15.

Additions to ASEAN

On the subject of other nations joining ASEAN, Malik provided the following summary. Thailand thought Burma would not join because of the possible reaction from Communist China. Similarly, Ceylon's trade with China is too important to jeopardize. Australia and New Zealand are already associated with two ASEAN countries through the Commonwealth. Malik mentioned that Australia had asked Indonesia for its thoughts about Australian relationship to ASEAN, as well as about the Indonesian role in in Southeast Asian security. Malik said that Indonesian cooperation with Australia and New Zealand is improving and expanding especially through the navy and air force. He said border problems between Australia and Indonesia in New Guinea (Irian) had all been settled.

16. The Vice President expressed complete agreement with the ASEAN emphasis on economic cooperation and the organizations' tentative interest in regional security. He suggested that the current danger is not so much all-out invasion as it is insurrection and infiltration. If people have confidence in their government they will willingly combat insurrection and countries which have a stake in foreign trade will be interested in assisting their neighbors.

17.

Communist China

The Vice President also mentioned steps which the US is taking to reduce tensions with Communist China. These are small steps and we do not plan to relax our vigilance, but Communist China already appears to have responded with a desire to resume the Warsaw talks.

18. The Vice President then commented about US policy in Vietnam which was in accordance with the feelings of the American people, though not necessarily with the views of the press. We hope to conclude the Vietnam War as quickly as possible. However, the war is not over and we will face a difficult problem with American public opinion unless the nations of Southeast Asia indicate their concern and support for our position. The Vice President pointed out that immediate disengagement, as some people urge, is not compatible with the security of Vietnam. The American public is somewhat bewildered because, although our government receives private assurances from Southeast Asian nations, some Asian leaders often leave the impression in public that the US is not welcome.

19. As for what might be done in these circumstances, the Vice President suggested that small nations could help if they would frankly tell us when we are doing something wrong or abrasive. Similarly, they should be equally frank with the Soviet Union. They could also shore up American public opinion and counter isolationist sentiment by being equally frank when they agree with US policy. These approaches might also help diminish tensions with the USSR and Communist China.

20. The Vice President said that the Thieu Government is enjoying continued success. Enemy activities have decreased but major attack is still possible, and its effect would not be military so much as psychological because it would once again arouse anti-war activities in the US. Whether or not our withdrawal is precipitate depends in part on whether Asian nations are able to impress their concern on American public opinion. The American people will believe one side or the other. At the moment, President Nixon's head-on approach has turned public opinion in his favor but this situation would be seriously impaired by a preemptive Communist attack. The Vice President expressed complete agreement with a toast made in Singapore by Prime Minister Lee in which he cited the folly of notifying the Communists about the time and level of our withdrawals. The Vice President understood the delicacy of Indonesia's domestic politics but he hoped Indonesia would find an opportunity to indicate that the Americans are wanted in Asia.

21. Foreign Minister Malik replied that the subject of the American presence now and in the future had often been discussed among the Southeast Asian nations. They do not favor a precipitate withdrawal because they are not yet prepared to assume the defense burden, although they cannot admit this publicly. (Malik said that even after the Vietnam War is over America should not become isolationist because its assistance will be needed. When he last saw President Nixon in Washington he had expressed this need and also mentioned the need to determine how Southeast Asian nations can help Vietnam.) The Vice President mentioned how impressed he had been while visiting Vietnam with the cooperation between US and Vietnamese troops. If the US adheres to reasonable levels of withdrawal, we can successfully transfer responsibility to the Vietnamese. He also drew an analogy with our experience in Korea where, today, very few US troops are involved. Korea is also an example of how a country's ability to defend itself depends on economic stability.

22.

Bilateral Relations

Malik said he would not wish to conclude the meeting without mentioning US-Indonesian relations, which he thought were going well. He particularly commended our understanding of Indonesia's needs, as demonstrated at the recent IGGI meeting, and hoped Indonesia would also have our support in convincing other nations that they should help. The Vice President said that our ability to respond depends on our own budgetary situation. We look upon assistance as an investment in world society. However, many Americans think our efforts are not appreciated. The Vice President recognized the problem of incurring reactions from Communist states, but he thought countries like Indonesia should take a calculated risk in this matter. The Vice President thought it was important for nations to make clear which economic system they favored and which promised them the greatest gains.

23. Malik said that the Indonesian people recognize what the US has done and this recognition will be made clearer in the future.

24. The Vice President asked Malik to convey his best wishes to President Suharto, expressed his regrets at not being able to visit Djakarta but stated that he looks forward to seeing President Suharto when he visits Washington. Malik indicated he would transmit this message.

Rice

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Immediate.

[2]  Kissinger prepared talking points for Agnew's meeting with Malik in a December 17 memorandum. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 82, V.P., Agnew Trip Dec. 1969–Jan. 1970)

280. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird [1]

Washington, January 21, 1970.

SUBJECT

MAP Alternatives for Indonesia

At the Review Group Meeting on December 22, 1969,[2] it was agreed that the Departments of State and Defense would prepare a memorandum for the President spelling out in broad terms the equipment which would be supplied under the military aid program for Indonesia, under Options 3 and 4 of Section VI B of NSSM 61.[3]

The consensus in the Review Group was that the program should be somewhat larger than at present and that there should be a judicious addition of combat equipment to the present program, which is limited to civil action equipment.

The President believes that his conversations with President Suharto oblige him to proceed with a combat/civil action mix, between Options 3 and 4. For planning purposes a program level of about $15 million should be assumed. (If supplies are available from surplus stocks, they could of course be utilized, reducing somewhat the need for additional MAP appropriations.)

The report to the President should be submitted by February 2.[4]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia. Vol. I. Secret.

[2] Minutes of the meeting were not found.

[3] See Document 277 and footnote 1 thereto.

[4] See Document 283 and footnote 2 thereto.

281. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, January 22, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Provision of 10 C–47 Aircraft to Indonesian Armed Forces

On January 21 I asked Brig. General Suhud, Indonesian Military Attaché, to stop by my office. Upon his arrival, I informed him that the U.S. had decided to provide the Indonesian Armed Forces with 10 C–47 aircraft, and that these aircraft would be arriving in Djakarta shortly. I stressed to him that these aircraft were being made available as a direct consequence of President Nixon's conversation with President Suharto in Djakarta last July, and that I would appreciate his passing this information to President Suharto and General Sumitro. I added that in the meantime appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government were giving further consideration to the question of providing military assistance to Indonesia, and that he should not necessarily take the 10 C–47s as the end of the story.

General Suhud, who had not heard of the provision of the C–47s, appeared very pleased. He asked if he might now discuss with Defense the arrangements which had been made for sending the aircraft to Indonesia. Since our Embassy in Djakarta had told the Indonesians there about this matter, I informed General Suhud that I could see no objection to his getting in touch with Defense, but that I would appreciate his not informing Defense that he had heard of the matter from me.

General Suhud informed me inter alia that he is returning to Djakarta early next month to assume a new post. He believes that this position will be Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Indonesian Army. His replacement will not be informed as to the contact which he, Suhud, had been maintaining with the White House, and hence any further communications would need to be via the special channel which had been set up last summer in Djakarta.

John H. Holdridge

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. I. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a January 22 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger that indicates Kissinger saw the memorandum.

282. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Washington, February 2, 1970.

[Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject File, 303/40 Committee Files, Indonesia. Secret; Sensitive. Extract—1 page of source text not declassified.]

283. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers Laird [1]

Washington, March 11, 1970.

SUBJECT

Additional MAP for Indonesia

The President has directed the following actions, in response to the memorandum of February 4 from the Secretary of State.[2]

1. An expanded MAP program for Indonesia is approved on an annual basis totaling approximately $15 million per year (including the imputed valuation of items supplied from excess stocks), with the five year projection strictly for planning purposes. No commitments for a five year program should be implied, nor should the program be designed so as to provide more gradual deliveries in the early years with a speed-up toward the close of the period.

2. Because of his conversations with President Suharto the President has directed that there should be more combat matériel than is envisaged in the illustrative program enclosed with the memorandum of February 4. There should be informal consultations with the Indonesian Armed Forces as to their combat equipment priorities, in order to determine what combat matériel should be considered for the program.

3. A supplemental MAP appropriation bill should not be required in order to finance the $10 million increase over the original budget for MAP for Indonesia in FY 1971. This increase should be met from deductions from other programs and insofar as possible from maximum use of excess stocks.

4. You are authorized to proceed immediately with discussions with the Indonesians.

5. The nature of the proposed program should be definitively spelled out prior to President Suharto's visit in late May.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Mayo.

[2] See Document 280; Rogers' February 4 memorandum has not been not found.

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia [1]

Washington, March 31, 1970, 0155Z.

046476. For Ambassador from Asst. Secretary Green.

1. Public statements by Adam Malik clearly show his awareness of importance of Cambodia to security Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. As reported by FBIS, Malik told press March 25 that “what is happening in Cambodia at present is a change of government and that Indonesia recognizes the government currently in power in that country.” Malik added that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Cambodia since their presence only “endangers situation in SEA.”

2. Request you see Malik at earliest convenient moment to discuss developments in Cambodia as they relate to security of Southeast Asia. After commending him for his above statement, you might point out to him that we too fully support the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. Communist allegations of US involvement in Cambodian affairs are absolutely without foundation. These charges are an obvious effort to divert attention from the undeniable fact that there are perhaps 40,000 North Vietnamese encamped on Cambodian soil plus some 5,000 Viet Cong. It was in order to gain international support, including that of Moscow and Peking, for the removal of these NV/VC forces that Sihanouk set out on his trip. Meanwhile, Lon Nol is continuing efforts to talk with Hanoi and PRG to get them to remove these forces and there are now unconfirmed reports and rumors that Communists may be seeking to attack and overthrow Government of Cambodia or to extend control over various parts of country.

[2]

3. Under these circumstances, would be most useful if Asian countries were to register their concern over developments in Cambodia and their support for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity, much the way Malik has already done (see para 1). If this could be done by ASEAN countries speaking with common voice, this would be particularly impressive, but if ASEAN as an organization shrinks from being involved in this kind of an issue, then it would be second best if ASEAN member countries could speak up on their own. In any event, it is better for Asians to take the lead than it is for US or European countries. Moreover, any indication that US was putting Asian countries up to making such statement would be unfortunate.

4. I leave it to your best judgment and finesse as to how to handle this issue with Malik in a way likely to result in ASEAN (or failing that, ASEAN member countries) making their position clear along above lines. It is not our intention to approach other ASEAN countries on this issue since this should be a purely Asian initiative. Indeed I would hope you could handle conversation in such a way that Malik would make suggestion himself about ASEAN or ASEAN member countries making statement and that he would follow through with them.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Nodis. Drafted by Green and Masters on March 30, cleared by Haig in the White House and Wingate Lloyd (S/S), and approved by Green.

[2] In telegram 46727 to Djakarta, March 31, Green advised Galbraith in part that if ASEAN countries were “to play [a] useful role with regard to Cambodia, it [is] important that they publicly announce their support for Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity at earliest possible moment. I therefore do not believe you should await Malik's return April 4 or 5 [from Bonn] but should try to see Suharto soonest and encourage Indonesian initiative through him.” (Ibid.)

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, April 2, 1970, 0930Z.

2311. For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador. Ref: State 46727.[2]

1. In meeting with Suharto evening April 1, I told him I had a matter of some urgency that I had wanted to discuss with FonMin Malik but he was abroad. It was matter which I thought had to be considered at top level.

2. I said situation in Cambodia and question of preserving Cambodia's neutrality were most worrisome. I said Malik's statement a few days earlier stressing the importance of Cambodia's neutrality had been helpful. I spoke of the importance of underlining and doing all possible to preserve Cambodian neutrality, and of the difficulty for U.S. to do much because we were already accused of having been somehow involved in change of governments in Phnom Penh. I emphasized, of course, this not true and Suharto appeared accept this. I asked whether Suharto had thoughts about what might be done, whether there had been any consultation with Indonesia's neighbors, whether he thought it might help if group of Asian nations such as ASEAN were to evidence interest and support for Cambodia's neutrality.

3. Suharto said current events in Cambodia were difficult to interpret, because of paucity of information and conflicting reports. It was necessary to study the Cambodian situation carefully in order determine whether support to Lon Nol was indeed the way to preserve Cambodian neutrality and the best chance for Cambodia's continued independence. He reflected considerable caution that Indonesia not be caught in support, verbally or otherwise, of an unsuccessful Cambodian regime, or in a posture which would both weaken Cambodia and be seen as collusion between GOI and USG.

4. Suharto thought best thing currently to be done was to try to strengthen support among Asian nations for UN consideration of threats to Cambodian neutrality and he implied that GOI was prepared to support such an effort.

5. Suharto said that if it developed that Lon Nol was able consolidate FARK and people behind him and he needed outside help, GOI would be prepared try to help him. But, Suharto said, Indonesia had no physical possibility of helping Cambodia.

6. Suharto added that it might be vital to U.S. position in SVN that Lon Nol receive help and perhaps GOI could serve as channel for U.S. assistance which would, if given directly, otherwise compromise Cambodian neutrality. I said it would be next to impossible in American system to channel our assistance in any way that would not become known and further complicate problem.

7. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified][3] reports GOI has sent message to Indon delegation UN to quietly but urgently push for some move by U Thant. GOI is thinking of UN peacekeeping force for Cambodia and, if requested by UN, GOI would be prepared to participate in such a force, along with such other truly non-aligned nations as Burma and Sweden. But only if UN requested GOI participation.GOI believes there need for prompt UN action and is worried that U Thant will drag feet and do nothing.GOI has not discussed this plan with RKG, nor has GOI offered any assistance to RKG.

8. Comment: As we have noted previously, Suharto, while appearing to realize importance of maintaining Indonesia's non-aligned position, does not appear always to realize nuances of protecting that position. Malik and FonDept generally take care of this aspect. Suharto appeared stimulated by our discussion of this problem but I have feeling he needs Malik's guidance. In any case, my discussions on Cambodian problem here last few days reveal that Indonesians are thinking mainly of UN not ASEAN as vehicle for group action and they obviously want to be part of larger and non-aligned supported effort.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 284.

[3] Not found.

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia [1]

Washington, April 15, 1970, 0023Z.

055342. For Ambassador Galbraith from Asst. Secretary Green.

1. You may have noted today's Phnom Penh broadcast declaring Cambodia's adherence to neutrality and spirit of Bandung, and informing international community of necessity “to accept all unconditional foreign aid from all sources for national safety.” In your estimation, would GOI be willing to assist Cambodia, even in small token way? What would be GOI's attitude towards US-financed Indonesian assistance to Cambodia on a covert basis? What are the chances of keeping such a transaction covert?

2. Since Cambodian Army (FARK) utilizes AK–47 rifles, we would be particularly interested in knowing whether Indonesians might have any AK–47's and ammunition which could be made available for Cambodia. (We understand Indonesia manufactures AK–47 ammunition.)[2] FARK?

3. Would appreciate your information and opinions on above queries soonest. Foregoing should not be discussed with GOI.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Green on April 14, and cleared by Under Secretary Johnson, Director Dirk Gleysteen (S/S-S), and Kissinger at the White House.

[2] The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) considered possible types and quantities of assistance to Cambodia in a meeting on April 14. According to the minutes of the meeting, Johnson raised the question of possible “Indonesian sources” for AK–47 rifles and ammunition. Green stated that the Indonesians had “a small factory in Bandung” that produced AK–47s and some ammunition, but he did not know “whether the production is in excess of their own needs.” William Nelson of the CIA added that Indonesia was “the only possible sizable source within reach of Cambodia” and that they had “about 15,000 AK–47s issued to their own troops.” Kissinger stated that if the Indonesians were to give AK–47s to Cambodia, “we would have to replace them with American rifles.” He then asked how long it would take “to get delivery from Indonesia” and how “the rifles would be routed to Cambodia.” Nelson replied, “If the shipment were to be completely covert, we could make arrangements with the Indonesians less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. They could arrange commercial air shipment to Cambodia.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970)

287. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, April 15, 1970, 1030Z.

2645. For Asst Secretary Green from Ambassador. Ref: A. State 55342;[2] B. Djakarta 2631.[3]

1. Within few hours after dispatch ref B, Sudjatmoko on instructions from Pres. Suharto reiterated to me Indonesia's willingness to assist Lon Nol Government with small arms if U.S. willing replenish and said Suharto awaiting US reaction. Sudjatmoko obviously not in complete agreement with his President's position but dutifully carried out instructions.

2. According to Sudjatmoko President told him this morning that Cambodia must be helped and that Indonesia should do its best to be of assistance since, because of historical background, Thailand would have difficulty and, to preserve Cambodia's neutrality, US should not become directly involved. Indonesia only logical country available and Suharto willing to provide training within Indonesia, and small arms. Lon Nol has asked GOI specifically for small arms for two to three divisions. Indonesia might be able to help with small arms for brigade but could not supply quantities required without replenishment by the United States. Arms for Cambodia would not be of US manufacture and Sudjatmoko said to Suharto that Indonesia could handle transport by air, ferry and sea. In response to my query Sudjatmoko said that, while President did not specifically say so, he had implied GOI supply of arms to Lon Nol government would be open although replenishment by US would be kept confidential.

3. Sudjatmoko raised with Suharto the implications for Indonesian non-alignment if such collusion between US and Indonesia became known. He also said he had explained to Suharto the cautious hedging of both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists in their support for Sihanouk and effect on entire Indo-China conflict if Indonesia were to become so openly involved. Suharto apparently undeterred by Sudjatmoko cautions but told Sudjatmoko that he had informed Lon Nol to go slowly in shift from monarchy to republic and that he had urged Lon Nol to try to use Sihanouk or Queen Mother to neutralize their supporters, somewhat in the fashion he had used Sukarno's supporters after 1965 coup.

4. Sudjatmoko intends to discuss this whole matter with Malik either in Djakarta or Bangkok Friday or Saturday. It's our impression that neither Malik nor others in FonDept had, before Suharto talked to Sudjatmoko, been cut in on Suharto's plans to assist RKG.

5. In light of what appears to be specific request from Lon Nol to Suharto and Suharto's willingness to be forthcoming, it appears GOI would be amenable to move ahead along lines ref A with some assurance US approved of such action and would be willing to provide replenishment for arms given to RKG. However, when Malik returns, he may try to slow down Suharto.

6. Sudjatmoko's task was to be sure I got message and reported it to you which I assured him was case.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

[2]  Document 286.

[3] Telegram 2631 from Djakarta, April 15, reported Suharto's indications of his willingness for Indonesia to support Cambodia. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II)

288. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 17, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Kissinger

John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

William R. Smyser, Staff Member

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

SUBJECT

Dr. Kissinger's Conversation with Ambassadors Green and Sullivan

Following are the highlights of Dr. Kissinger's luncheon conversation with Ambassadors Green and Sullivan in the White House situation room on April 17, 1970.

[Omitted here is discussion of Cambodia.]

Military Assistance to Indonesia

Mr. Green raised the subject of US military assistance to Indonesia. The Indonesians had asked us for 40 T–37 jet trainers, and he and Ambassador Galbraith both felt that this was not advisable. For one thing, the cost of the T–37s would virtually take up the whole aid program, and in addition he doubted that jets would be a good idea. The Australians, for example, were opposed to them. He proposed instead that our aid be confined to transport-type aircraft such as C–47s and C–130s which could be converted as gunships and thus might meet the Indonesians' desire for combat equipment. He appreciated the desire of the Indonesian Air Force to get jets and the morale factors involved, but thought that giving the T–37s was going too far.

Dr. Kissinger responded with the observation that the President would probably ask, if confronted with State's position, why it would not be possible to give the Indonesians at least some of what they wanted, say perhaps 5 or 10 T–37s. Mr. Green agreed that this could be done.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559, Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On April 21 Holdridge sent this memorandum to Kissinger who approved it on June 1, with the proviso “Just for our files and my personal ones.” (Attached memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, April 21; ibid.)

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, April 19, 1970, 1130Z.

2738. Subj: Indonesian Help to Cambodia. For Asst Sec Green from Ambassador.

1. At informal Sunday luncheon meeting at residence, General Alamsjah, who as you know is one of President Suharto's closest advisers, raised Cambodian issue with me. He indicated awareness of my talk with Suharto and of at least my first talk with Sumuatmoko and he asked whether I'd had any response from Washington on proposition that if Indonesia gave arms assistance U.S. would replenish. After my negative reply Alamsjah urged I try again.

2. Alamsjah said it was Indonesia's assessment that unless Lon Nol Government received arms and other help within next two weeks it might fail. Result of that would be increased Communist threat in Southeast Asia.

3. Alamsjah said Indonesia felt it urgent to get small arms for from five to ten battalions into Cambodia within next two weeks. He indicated Indonesia was prepared to do this (I asked him if Indonesia was thinking of supplying AK–47s and he indicated vaguely that this was possible) but that unless these arms were replenished Indonesia itself might be facing increased internal threat. Alamsjah said Indonesia was prepared to supply small arms, training assistance both within Cambodia and in Indonesia, and close air support. Latter would depend entirely, however, on willingness U.S. to supply T–37s and OV–10s.

4. I told Alamsjah that I thought it best that Indonesia work out with Cambodian Government whatever assistance it thought it should and could give without reference to any arrangement with U.S. I said I thought questions of U.S. supply of small arms and aircraft to Indonesia should be quite separate matter. I said otherwise some leak linking two was almost inevitable and would be devastating. Alamsjah indicated agreement in principle but said some reassurance from U.S. that replenishment would follow was essential.

5. Alamsjah said Suharto thinking in terms of flying small arms into Cambodia from and basing any air support for Cambodia on Natuna Island which about two hours flying time from Phnom Penh.

6. I asked Alamsjah whether Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who I knew had some ideas on trying to shore up Cambodian neutrality on diplomatic front, was aware and approved of Indonsia military assistance to Cambodia. Alamsjah answered affirmatively. He said he had discussed it with Malik before latter left for Manila a little over a week ago and Malik had commented that it was important that whatever was done be done expeditiously.

7. Alamsjah said Suharto regarded Indonesian efforts to help Cambodia to be implementation of the Nixon Doctrine.

8. Comment: You and I know that Alamsjah unlikely to be most coordinated chanel in Indonesian Government. But he is close to Suharto and I have hunch that he accurately reflects Suharto's thinking. He may not be au courant with Sutopo Juwono [1 line of source text not declassified][2] , indeed Sutopo may not yet have made pitch to Suharto. Sutopo in turn probable awaiting Malik's return and perhaps return Indonesian team from Cambodia.

9. Although there is serious doubt in my mind that Indonesians would be very effective in this, their first, exercise in providing military assistance to beleagured neighbors, I tend to think it would be salutary for them to get their feet a little wet in their attempt to give content to the Nixon Doctrine on Asians taking intitative. I suggest therefore that I be authorized to suggest to Suharto that they work out whatever they think they can and should do to block expansion of Communist threat in Cambodia and that they will find U.S. sympathetic to problems of replacement and replenishment which, however, must be handled quite separately and unrelated to what they do for Cambodia.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 7:12 a.m.

[2] Not found.

290. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, April 21, 1970.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Indonesia.]

On Indonesia, Suharto wants training rather than weapons as I understand it. This should be a very easy request to fill. In any event, I hereby direct that we go forward on the Indonesian military request in the event that Suharto wants it, particularly since it is minimal and completely consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. McCain tells me that Djakarta has ordered the Soviet technicians out. They have no spare parts for their Soviet equipment and, consequently, may have to come to us eventually for equipment.[2]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 559, Country Files, Far East, Southeast Asia, 1970, Vol. II. Confidential.

[2] According to an April 20 memorandum from the President's Military Aide General John Hughes to Kissinger, the President met with Admiral John S. McCain, CINCPAC, on April 19. Admiral McCain said that his recent visit to Indonesia was “the first CINCPAC visit there and he had received a good reception.” McCain said that “Suharto felt strongly that the Fort Leavenworth training for his Army officers helped greatly in defeating the communists.” McCain then told the President that the Indonesians were in the process of expelling Soviet technicians, and that the Soviets had not provided spare parts for the equipment that they had furnished. (Ibid.)

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, April 23, 1970, 0430Z.

2859. For Asst Sec Green from Ambassador. Subj: Indonesian Initiative on Cambodia. Ref: Djakarta 2763.[2]

1. Malik told me this morning (I met him with dawn patrol on golf course) that he is shooting for conference of 12 or 14 Asian nations at either Kuala Lumpur or Djakarta in early May.

2. I asked Malik whether he was trying to convene preparatory meeting before main conference in early May. He replied in negative. I asked him which countries would be sponsoring conference. He said Thailand, Japan, New Zealand, and Indonesia. I asked him whether Australia would also sponsor. He said there hadn't been time to get Australian Foreign Minister's approval when he talked to him but that Australian Foreign Minister had announced approval publicly in last day or two.

3. Malik said he had met with North Vietnamese Chargé yesterday and asked latter to convey to his Government Malik's ideas about conference and invitation to attend. Malik said Chargé's response reflected irritation. Chargé called Cambodian Government illegal, said coup had been arranged by American CIA and that American troops were in Cambodia. Malik responded that GOI information indicated Government of Cambodia legal with approval of legislature. Malik said perhaps North Vietnamese had information on CIA involvement which Indonesia did not have but Indonesia's information indicated there were no American troops in Cambodia.

4. Malik said with obvious relish that North Vietnamese are now on defensive and that “we had seized the initiative.”

5. I told Malik that we were most interested in his efforts and were rooting for him.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

[2] Telegram 2763 from Djakarta, April 20, reported Ambassador Galbraith's meeting on April 19 with Foreign Minister Malik. Malik had met shortly before that with Suharto to discuss Indonesian ideas on assisting Cambodia. Galbraith reported that “Malik suggested we continue to drag our feet on responding to Suharto on proposal that U.S. replenish Indonesian arms supply to Cambodia. I said I thought it was highly impractical to link U.S. military assistance to Indonesia to Indonesian assistance to Cambodia. Malik indicated agreement and said he had made this point to Suharto. I said I was somewhat concerned however that Suharto felt he should receive response from me to questions he had put to me. Malik said I didn't need to worry, he had told Suharto he would be talking to me on Cambodia.” Galbraith concluded “there is obvious lack of consensus among various advisers to Suharto on how to help Cambodia. I suggest we go along with Malik for a few days.” (Ibid.)

292. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 5, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko

Dr. Kissinger

John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT

Comments by Indonesian Ambassador on Cambodian Developments

Ambassador Soedjatmoko thanked Dr. Kissinger for receiving him in what must be a very busy period. However, he was very pressed by two problems: the conference Indonesia was planning to hold on Cambodia, and the Suharto visit here; and the connection between these developments and what was happening in Washington. He would appreciate clarification on the decisions taken to move into Cambodia, and on the resumption of the bombing. Dr. Kissinger interjected that we had not resumed the bombing and our activities over North Vietnam had been stopped after we had achieved what we wanted.

In reply to a question from the Ambassador on whether this was a one-shot affair, Dr. Kissinger said that it depended on the other side, but that our intention was not to go on day after day.

Returning to the subject of Cambodia, the Ambassador asked whether the conclusion could be drawn that the US had given up on establishing buffer states? Dr. Kissinger stated that it had not been the US which had moved into Cambodia, established bases, and expelled the Cambodian authorities. We were not going to occupy Cambodia, but would destroy supplies and then withdraw. We were not going to march on Phnom Penh, and would be delighted if all foreign forces could be withdrawn from Cambodia and Indo-China. Our purpose was to protect our own forces and to protect Cambodia.

As to buffer states, Dr. Kissinger noted that we had no interest in staying on in that region, and would expect, welcome, and support anything which other states encouraged. We had had nothing to do in instigating the Cambodian situation, and had accepted the situation under Sihanouk. The Communists had then moved out of their bases and had shown that they themselves did not accept a buffer state.

Continuing, Dr. Kissinger stressed to Ambassador Soedjatmoko that he could assure his President and the highest levels of authority in Indonesia that we wanted buffer states, and that if the Asian nations desire a security system we would be glad to withdraw. We believed that what we were doing was in the interest of the neutral nations in Asia.

The Ambassador declared that he was relieved to hear what Dr. Kissinger had said—he had been starting to be less sure on these points. Dr. Kissinger said that the situation reminded him of a joke, in which somebody was hitting a mule over the head with a sledge hammer, and when asked why, had said that he had to do something to get the mule's attention.

Ambassador Soedjatmoko recalled that in the President's April 30 speech,[2] there had been a heavy reference to the credibility of the US. Kissinger expressed the opinion that the issues were closely related, to which the Ambassador remarked that he would have expected a slightly lighter tone if we had been focusing only on Hanoi. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that it was hard to distinguish. This was the most dangerous situation in the world, and Hanoi knew both publicly and privately that if it moved on Phnom Penh we would do something. It knew, too, that if it stepped up US casualties, we would do something. The situation affected not only Hanoi but other countries. We were not looking for a confrontation, though.

Ambassador Soedjatmoko said that there was some pressure in Indonesia to call off the conference on Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger observed that this would be a mistake, to which the Ambassador responded with the reassurance that his Foreign Minister still believed the conference should be held. Dr. Kissinger agreed, but emphasized that it should be an Asian initiative and that we would make no public endorsement.[3]

Ambassador Soedjatmoko mentioned that when President Suharto arrives, it may be at a time when issues were heightened in the US. Suharto was scheduled to have a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Was there a danger that the visit might become politically utilized or embarrassing? Dr. Kissinger thought that the visit would not be embarrassing for the Administration, although almost certainly an effort would be made to embarrass Suharto and to show that Asians disapprove of our policy. Nevertheless, having seen President Suharto in action, Dr. Kissinger had great confidence in his ability to be enigmatic. Ambassador Soedjatmoko laughingly referred to inscrutable Asians, and Dr. Kissinger said that occidentals could be inscrutable too.

Dr. Kissinger expressed confidence that the Suharto visit could be handled tactfully. His estimate, based on what he knew, was that President Suharto was not excessively pained by our policy and if he expressed his views carefully would be understood and not embarrassed. We were looking forward to his visit, and would do everything we could for its success.

Ambassador Soedjatmoko raised a minor point: if the two Presidents met alone, he hoped it would be possible to have the Foreign Minister meet with Under Secretary Richardson and Dr. Kissinger at the same time. (Secretary Rogers would be in Rome.) Dr. Kissinger explained that a decision would be needed as to whether he would sit in with the President; if not, he would certainly sit in with the Foreign Minister.

Dr. Kissinger asked if there were any special wishes from President Suharto which the Ambassador wanted to convey. He wanted to reassure the Indonesians that we understood their position. We wanted a neutral Indonesia, and didn't expect a blanket endorsement of our policies. We thought that what we were doing in Cambodia was in their own interest, and undertake not to hurt their neutrality but to protect it. Our operations were limited, as would become apparent when they were completed. Our main purpose was to strike at enemy logistics.

In conclusion, Ambassador Soedjatmoko referred again to the point of a neutral buffer zone and said that Dr. Kissinger's remarks had clarified the US position in this respect.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Holdridge on May 5 and approved by Kissinger on May 7.

[2] In his address to the nation on the situation in Southeast Asia of April 30, President Nixon explained that U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would launch attacks “to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border,” where “North Vietnam in the last 2 weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 405–410)

[3] In a memorandum to Kissinger, May 4, Holdridge stressed some of these very points, noting that the United States Government would be “glad to see Indonesians and other Asians taking the lead in trying to do something for Cambodia,” and that a “public U.S. endorsement would harm rather than help the conference.” Holdridge noted also the U.S. hope “that any resolution on withdrawal of foreign forces does not seem to be pointed at us, whose presence is admitted and can be documented, rather than equally at the Vietnamese Communists, whose presence there long antedates ours, but who refuse to admit it.”

293. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, May 12, 1970.

SUBJECT

Determination to Permit Continuation of the Grant Military Assistance Program to Indonesia

Under Secretary Richardson (Tab B)[2] requests that you sign a determination authorizing the use of FY 1970 military assistance funds in excess of $3 million to provide defense articles to Indonesia. Similar determinations were made in 1968 and 1969.

Section 505(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act limits the provision of grant defense articles to any country to $3 million per fiscal year if the articles are not to be utilized for the maintenance of the defensive strength of the free world. Military assistance to Indonesia is not considered to do so.

However, Section 614(a) of the Act permits a waiver of Section 505(6)(2) when the President determines that such assistance is important to the security of the U.S. State feels that it is, and Budget concurs (Tab C).[3]

The proposed $5.8 million program for Indonesia for FY 1970 is a continuation of our prior civic action-type programs in substance, amount, and purpose. It helps the Indonesian military focus on constructive economic rehabilitation work, thereby bringing it closer to the people, and improves our working relationship with the Government.

Congress has been informed of the justifications for the proposed grant assistance.

Recommendation

That you sign the determination at Tab A.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 370, Subject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71–10. Secret. Sent for action.

[2] Attached at Tab B, but not printed, was Richardson's April 3 memorandum requesting $5.8 million in grant military assistance to Indonesia.

[3] Attached but not printed.

[4] Attached at Tab A, but not printed, was Presidential Determination No. 70–8, May 18, authorizing the grant assistance Richardson had requested.

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, May 21, 1970, 0430Z.

3709. For Asst Sec Green from Amb.

1. I had an hour's pre-departure discussion alone with President Suharto last night providing me with insight into what he will want to discuss with President Nixon.

2. I began conversation by congratulating Suharto on outcome of Asian conference and way it had been handled. He said he hoped that conference and follow-up, if successful, might serve as pattern which could be used further to deal with situations in Laos and South Vietnam. He indicated that achieving consensus between divergent views of South Koreans and South Vietnamese, who wanted to condemn Communists, and, for example, Singapore, which was anxious to avoid damaging its trading and financial interests with both USSR and Red China, was difficult.

3. This led Suharto into further derogatory comment on Singapore. He said that although leadership of Singapore was perhaps free of any dominating influence by Peking, there were many Chinese in Singapore who looked toward Communist China. For this reason he thought great care should be taken in providing Singapore with weapons which might be transferred to Communists. He made specific reference to M–16 factory, production of which might some day fall into hands of Communists. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] I explained to Suharto genesis of Singapore's acquisition of factory and limitations on and control of M–16 production.

4. Suharto discussed briefly talks he had had with both Cambodian and South Vietnamese Foreign Ministers about possible Indonesian material assistance to Cambodia. He indicated that arms and ammunition caches in Cambodian sanctuaries should provide source arms and ammunition which Indonesia was in no position, in any case, to supply. Cambodian army lacked training, however, in guerrilla warfare and there was inadequate understanding of how army and people in Cambodia should work together to defend Cambodia against NVN/VC. Suharto indicated that Indonesia was prepared to provide training in this general field.

5. I outlined to Suharto results of study in Washington of MAP program we had worked out with Hankam for FY 71. I mentioned possibilities of substituting T–28s for T–37s, situation with respect to C–47s, substitutions we were considering in naval patrol craft, possible availability of two lsts and possibility of requirement for communications system for Hankam. I said it had become clear in going over our recommendations that list we had submitted and substitutions which would probably be required would come to great deal more than $10 million addition to MAP. Some selectivity on basis of priorities would be required. I said we would welcome Suharto's views on priorities.

6. In commenting on foregoing, Suharto began by describing additional difficulties which Indonesia was undergoing in trying to get spare parts for Soviet equipment, implying that Soviet-Indonesian relations had further deteriorated. He said it had originally been planned to try to maintain this equipment and make it do through five-year plan but that this, in the face of difficulties, indeed impossibilities, of securing Soviet spare parts made this plan impractical. It would be necessary to scrap Soviet cruiser, “West Irian”, destroyers and some 16 other vessels which were completely useless. Likewise with antonovs, of which three had been flying, it would be impossible to keep these going beyond next overhaul requirements. Suharto said it was necessary, therefore, in terms of Indonesia's internal defense and minimum deterrent to outside aggression to find, by end of 1971, source of equipment for armed forces. Clearly he hopes this will be the U.S.

7. Suharto said he hopes to speak to President Nixon in terms of possible commitment for four years beginning FY 1972 which would permit some rational planning and relieve him from trying set priorities now. This would make it possible to plan equipment to be acquired for armed forces by end of four years and to adjust in the meantime to availabilities and financial and other problems on U.S. side.

8. Suharto said acquisition of military equipment Indonesia will need to insure its internal security, minimum of deterrent to outside agression and some potential for cooperating in strategic terms with U.S. in area could be provided on either grant or credit basis or both.

9. I told Suharto that I couldn't comment on possibilities beyond FY 71 commitment which President Nixon had already decided. I thought it would be difficult for President, in face of Congressional questioning of expanded military involvement in Southeast Asia, to make forward commitment of this kind and I knew he would not want to make commitment unless he was certain he could fulfill it. I assured Suharto President Nixon would listen sympathetically.

10. Replying to my question what other subjects he might want to discuss, Suharto mentioned need for capital investment needed to effect increased timber exports and income therefrom and to stimulate tourism and investment in facilities therefore. Suharto indicated desire to explore EX–IM Bank loans for purposes of expanding airports in Djakarta and Bali to accommodate jumbo jets, which he felt would in turn bring private investment in hotels and lead to quick increase in Indonesia's earnings from tourism. In the case of timber, he said Indonesia is presently exporting at the rate of about $10 million annually. This could easily be doubled and one-tenth or more of cost of exporting this timber could be saved with acquisition of Indonesian shipping (Indonesia now dependent on Japanese shipping for exporting its timber which costing it large amount foreign exchange, Suharto said). Implied Suharto wants to discuss Export-Import loan for acquiring ships for timber trade.

11. Suharto said he will want to express his appreciation to President for U.S. participation in and leadership of IGGI and donor effort. He said additional and accelerated momentum to development process could be achieved through increased attention to exploitation of timber and tourism in Indonesia. He would want to discuss importance of this with President; it was not unrelated to acquiring equipment needed for Indonesia's defense. I told Suharto it was hard for me to guess what magnitudes he might be talking about in terms of Export-Import loans but I sparked no response from him on this.

12. Comment: It appeared implicit in way Suharto related events in Cambodia and threat to South Vietnam and U.S. armed forces there, his suspicion of Chinese Communists and Soviet influence in Singapore, difficulties Soviets are giving Indonesia in supply of spare parts for Soviet military equipment and possibly accelerating threat of Communist aggression in neighboring countries, that Suharto will want to talk mainly about enlarged and accelerated flow of military equipment from U.S., beginning, as he put it, after elections in 1971.

Purnell

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

295. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:33 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

President Suharto of Indonesia

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

President Nixon expressed his pleasure at having the opportunity of meeting President Suharto and told President Suharto how much he had enjoyed his visit to Indonesia. President Nixon then inquired about the state of Indonesia's economy. President Suharto replied that his economy was progressing in accordance with his approved program. The five-year plan was working well and Indonesia is taking steps to abolish the dual exchange rate and is working to adjust the oil rate. However, progress in the economic field, while encouraging, is not enough for the population which wants a speedup. Indonesia also must speed it up to destroy the remnants of the Communist Party.

President Nixon asked what the strength of the Communist Party was and whether there is a real danger or is it under control. President Suharto replied that strategically the Communist Party had been nullified. Ten percent of the old body of the hard-core members still exist even though thousands are in jail. President Nixon then inquired about the Indonesian students' attitude on the Communists. President Suharto said that he thought the student movement was under control, pointing out that Indonesia is making students participate in development projects with good results. Students go into the villages to carry out government work and this way they do not have so much time to become ideological.

President Nixon then asked what President Suharto thought of United States problems in Indonesia. President Suharto replied that the progress in the Indonesian economy is, of course, in the first instance the result of Indonesian efforts, but foreign governments certainly have helped. Indonesia is aware that the United States has difficulties with Congress in getting appropriations and it appreciates that despite this the United States has increased its aid to Indonesia. In addition, foreign capital and the World Bank have been very helpful and Indonesia has appreciated U.S. assistance in rescheduling its debt.

President Nixon said we want to be of every assistance consistent with respect for Indonesia's non-aligned status. Indonesia will continue to have U.S. support. President Nixon added, “The principle I wish to emphasize is this: we do not want to interfere in Indonesian affairs, but we want Indonesia to be strong enough so that no one else can interfere.”

President Suharto thanked the President for his expression of respect for Indonesia's non-aligned status, which will be used to preserve peace in Asia and especially Southeast Asia. President Suharto said he was convinced that a sound economic situation produces a commitment to peace but improving economic conditions is, by itself, not enough. “Military strength is also essential. We cannot neglect military strength. In the first few years of office, I have put top priority on economic strength, but now Indonesia must give attention to military strength as well. Assistance is especially needed for the navy and air force. Given Communist strength we cannot neglect defense, especially air force and navy patrol craft.”

President Suharto stated further that the Chinese IRBM threat was now beginning to give the Chinese the capability of reaching countries even as remote as Indonesia. The military leaders in Indonesia recognize that Indonesia must move step by step and not get over-ambitious. However, Soviet infiltration in Asia and in the Indian Ocean makes it necessary to strengthen the ASW capability around Indonesia. President Nixon agreed that Indonesia's military strength was necessary for both external and internal reasons. He added that President Suharto was correct in putting first priority on economic matters, but neutrality is meaningless unless the neutral can defend its neutrality.

President Suharto said he had already talked to Ambassador Galbraith and that the Ambassador wanted to move step by step.

It was very important from now on to know what kind of assistance the U.S. can give Indonesia. President Nixon confirmed that the U.S. would give Indonesia's requests very sympathetic consideration, recognizing its desires are defensive. President Suharto replied it is an important part of Indonesia's responsibility to make sure other states in the area are convinced of the seriousness of the situation in Cambodia. Indonesia received a Cambodian request for help. The limitations in Indonesia's capabilities make it impossible to do much in the military field, but they are giving all political and moral support and attempting to line up others. Political activities have included the Djakarta Conference whose main aim is the territorial integrity of Cambodia, elimination of foreign troops, and reactivating of the Geneva 1954 Accords. A commission of three has been appointed to look into it, but there also exists a military difficulty. Lon Nol's Government has only 35,000 soldiers facing larger and more experienced forces. The involvement of the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces was essential strategically to give Cambodians a chance to help themselves.

The crucial role of sanctuary operations cannot be overemphasized, President Suharto added. They will help Vietnamization. President Suharto urged President Nixon to give the equipment captured in Cambodia to the Cambodian Government, stressing that the relations between the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese was not especially good. Also, the Lon Nol Government realizes the continuing need to deal with VC and the NVA on Cambodian territory after the United States withdrawal.

Summing up, President Suharto stated, “we hope that sanctuary operations will smash the military strength of the VC and the NVA. VC and NVA. At this time, the Indonesians can give only training support, especially in anti-guerrilla warfare. Indonesia is limited in its ability to give military support because of limited resources and because of economic priorities. However, they would certainly be prepared to do so if resources would be freed.” President Nixon asked whether President Suharto considered the survival of Cambodia important for Indonesia and other countries in the area. President Suharto replied affirmatively, stressing the need for the actual neutrality of Cambodia.

President Nixon suggested that some people say the U.S. should have let Cambodia go since it would have made no difference. President Suharto replied that this attitude is reflected only by those who do not live in the area, adding, “if Cambodia falls into Communist hands, it will be an expanded base for guerrilla and infiltration activities; Vietnamization could not succeed.” President Nixon stated that the U.S. has no designs on Cambodia and will leave as soon as the sanctuaries have been destroyed. The GVN will react, however, if NVA sanctuaries are restored. The war in Vietnam, President Nixon continued, has been a very difficult war for the United States. Many want us to pull out. We have not and will not do so, not because we have designs, but because to do so would demoralize all of Southeast Asia including the Indonesian people. Therefore, it is also important that the local people speak up. President Suharto said Indonesia had this idea from the beginning, but when Indonesia proposed to Ambassador Galbraith that it send equipment for the battalions of the Cambodian army, Ambassador Galbraith doubted that the U.S. could replace this equipment.[2] President Suharto had in mind that Indonesia's proposal could maintain the neutral position of Indonesia and yet help Cambodia.

President Nixon said that the U.S. wanted to provide whatever help it can that will not, in turn, hurt Indonesia. Indonesia is indispensable for the future of Southeast Asia.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres./HAK MemCon s, President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger, May 26, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) In telegram 87970 to Djakarta, June 6, the Department sent a summary of the President's two conversations with Suharto on May 26 and May 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER)

[2] In a telephone call to President Nixon later that same day, Kissinger said that “the Ambassador's attitude when we give military assistance was troubling.” The President responded: “They should provide assistance and we will replace it.” He added: “Let's get going on that subject. I assume they are following up on getting some captured equipment over here.” Kissinger answered: “That is being done.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

296. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Role in Southeast Asia

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign:

Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Soedjatmoko, Ambassador to the United States

H. Alamsjah, State Secretary

Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, National Planning Board

Vice Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy

Soedharmono, Secretary of the Cabinet

Dr. Ch. Anwar Sani, Director General for Political Affairs

Suryono Darusman, Chief of Protocol

United States:

Elliot L. Richardson, Acting Secretary of State

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Francis J. Galbraith, Ambassador to Indonesia

Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

John Holdridge, White House Staff

Edward E. Masters, Country Director for Indonesian Affairs

PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS

After welcoming Foreign Minister Malik and his colleagues to Washington and conveying Secretary Rogers' regret that a long standing commitment to attend a NATO conference had prevented his being present, Mr. Richardson asked Mr. Green to provide a brief survey of the situation in East Asia.

Mr. Green outlined the principles which underlie the Nixon Doctrine and noted that, while the Cambodian situation has injected a new element into Southeast Asia, our policy there is completely consistent with these principles. The President's action in sending troops into Cambodia, Mr. Green pointed out, is designed to protect and advance the policy of Vietnamization and increase prospects for Cambodia's stability and friendly cooperation with its neighbors. Referring to a Harris poll the previous day which showed that a majority of the American people support the President on this issue, Mr. Green stated that the success of our action in Cambodia would increase this popular support.

Mr. Richardson noted that the Nixon Doctrine does not mean that we are in the process of disengaging or running out on our commitments but represents an adjustment of U.S. policy to actual conditions. It reflects increased Asian capability for and interest in regional cooperation, the declining influence of ideology and the fact neither super power is in a position to push others around. For these and other reasons, Mr. Richardson explained, the President has decided that we should adjust, but not abandon, our role in Asia.

Mr. Richardson emphasized that the U.S. does not seek a military victory in Southeast Asia and noted that we have placed definite restraints on our actions regarding North Vietnam. The U.S. believes that it will have discharged its obligation to the people of South Vietnam if they are given freedom to choose their own course.

The United States recognizes the importance of Indonesia as a nonaligned country, Mr. Richardson said, and can envisage as a possible solution of the conflict a situation in which all of Indochina might be non-aligned, if this is what these nations want. The U.S. commitment to the people of South Vietnam is to help them attain a position in which they can reach their own solutions rather than be forced to accept those dictated by others.

Malik said he wished to make clear that Indonesia has no misapprehensions regarding the Nixon Doctrine but, in fact, believes that it is time for some rethinking along these lines by the U.S. Indonesia hopes, however, that under this new doctrine the U.S., as a super power, will not equate all problems of Southeast Asia. The Indonesian Government understands the domestic problems which the U.S. faces but nonetheless believes it important that the U.S. stress and even increase its commitments as far as certain problems are concerned.

Malik perceived two distinct facets of communists' strategic approach, the more moderate public line of the Soviet Union and the militant position of Communist China. This divergence in the communist camp has an impact on world opinion and on domestic opinion. Indonesia would like to expose the communists' views so that they are not able to play both sides of the street.

Until now, Malik continued, the impression has been created through communist propaganda that the communists are all right and the U.S. is all wrong. Demonstrators aiming at ending U.S. support for Vietnam's struggle forget that the communists have been attempting to subvert South Vietnam for a long time. The Djakarta Conference was designed, among other things, to open the eyes of the world to the true state of affairs, Malik explained.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Paul Gardner (EA/MS) and approved by John D. Stempel (D) Documents 297 and 298. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

297. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Diplomatic Initiatives on Cambodia

PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS

[Omitted here is the list of participants, which is identical to that in Document 296.]

Mr. Richardson explained that the U.S. crossed the Cambodian border to insure our ability to carry forward with Vietnamization and not to insure the survival of the Cambodian Government. This latter objective can best be served by the diplomatic initiatives. In this connection, the United States is interested in proposals for an international conference to discuss Cambodia and related matters, Mr. Richardson continued. French suggestions in this regard were promising. At one point Malik of the Soviet Union seemed to be saying much the same thing, but unfortunately nothing materialized from his remarks. The U.S. has also watched with quiet interest Indonesia's initiatives in calling the May 16–17 Foreign Ministers Conference in Cambodia.

Malik explained that, although Indonesia should logically concentrate first on economic development and its internal problems, it sees a connection between Cambodian events and Indonesia's own security. India opposed the idea of the Djakarta Conference, preferring to wait and discuss Indochina in the forum of the Non-aligned Conference. Indonesia did not accept this view, first because of the need to act quickly (the Non-aligned Conference will be held in September) and secondly because, if past performance is any indication, that Conference would give the communists an additional opportunity to spread their propaganda unless thorough preparations were made in advance.

Indonesia consequently decided to invite 21 nations to a meeting in Djakarta, Malik continued. Invitations were sent to Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia to see if these nations really wanted to solve the problem through negotiations. Indonesia concluded that it was better to continue with the Conference even though the communists refused to attend.

Noting the importance of Moscow's reaction to the Djakarta Conference, Malik said Indonesia advised the Soviet Union twice regarding the Conference. Although Pravda and Izvestia opposed the Conference, officially there has been no reaction from Moscow except a question as to why Peking was invited. Indonesia perceives some hesitation in the Soviet Union's policy towards Cambodia. The Soviets have not closed their Embassy in Phnom Penh and, just before he left Phnom Penh for the Djakarta Conference, Cambodian Foreign Minister Yem Sambaur received assurances from the Soviet Ambassador that the U.S.S.R. was not in a hurry to break off relations with Cambodia.

Malik noted that the Djakarta Conference had encountered difficulties because of the different approaches recommended by various participants. South Vietnam and Thailand wanted to condemn North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Cambodia, for its part, wished to use the Conference as a forum to mount a major push for military assistance. Indonesia managed to convince the Cambodians the day before the Conference opened that they should not do so or they would jeopardize Indonesian efforts. Mr. Malik said he had explained to Yem Sambaur that the aim of the Conference was not to assist Cambodia in waging war and that it would be disadvantageous to give the impression that the Conference was beating war drums for the Cambodians.

Malik noted that the participants did not wish the Djakarta Conference to be a one-shot affair. They consequently empowered Indonesia as Chairman to take all necessary steps to carry out the agreed decisions and appointed Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia as their representatives to carry their views to the Geneva Conference Co-Chairmen, the three members of the ICC and the UN. Those nations which declined to attend the Conference will also be informed of the results of the meeting, Malik noted.

Malik believed that the flexible decisions of the Djakarta Conference may reinforce U Thant's view that there should be an international conference on Indochina. The major key to such a Conference is Moscow, Malik said, adding that in his opinion the Russians have not yet made up their minds on this question. France, Germany and the United Kingdom seem agreeable to convening a Geneva-type conference, Malik added, but this cannot be hurried. Malik said that the U.S. could play an important role in bringing about such a conference, but this role cannot be too open. If the U.S. enters too directly into the picture, Malik said, there is danger that the other side will use this fact in its propaganda to defeat the possibility of a conference. Appropriate ways should be found to press the Soviet Union to agree to a Geneva-conference on Indochina, Malik added.

Referring to North Vietnamese claims that they are willing to fight for another 100 years, Malik said there are actually indications that North Vietnam is tired of the war. If the Soviet Union can be drawn into a conference, Malik continued, this could have a constructive influence on Hanoi. It is also necessary to exert pressure on North Vietnamese troops in Laos and in the Thai–Laotian–Cambodian border area similar to the pressure exerted in the fishhook area of Cambodia, Malik said, while acknowledging the possibility that this could cause North Vietnam in turn to step up its pressure on Cambodia. In addition to Indonesia's diplomatic efforts, Malik envisaged two means of aiding Cambodia:

Malik expressed doubt that Communist China will intervene in Indochina, suggesting that its strategy is rather to arouse opposition to U.S. policy and put the Soviet Union in an increasingly difficult spot. A Geneva-type conference would force Peking into the open and prevent it from continuing this strategy, Malik explained.

Mr. Richardson agreed that diplomatic initiatives clearly offer the best prospects for preserving Cambodia's neutrality and stabilizing the situation. In this and other respects the role of the Soviet Union is crucial. The extent to which it can influence or is influenced by Hanoi is an open question.

The United States fully supports the efforts of the Three Nation Committee appointed by the Djakarta Conference, Mr. Richardson continued, but will be careful to avoid giving them the “kiss of death.” The United States will keep in close touch with the Indonesians regarding means of helping without compromising the efforts of the Three Nation group, Mr. Richardson added.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved in U by Stempel on June 11. The memorandum is part II of IV; part III is ibid., parts I and IV are Documents 296 and 298.

298. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 26, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Cambodia

PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S WASHINGTON VISIT—CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS

[Omitted here is the list of participants, which is identical to that in Document 296.]

Mr. Malik noted that participants in the Djakarta Conference agreed that they should concentrate on finding a peaceful solution to the Cambodian problem, leaving the matter of military aid for bilateral negotiations. The Cambodians nonetheless informally asked all of the participants for weapons and even troops. The Indonesians understood that Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and some others have promised aid.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Yem Sambaur had high hopes of obtaining military aid from Indonesia, Malik continued, but the Indonesians explained that the maximum they could give was training assistance. Providing the Cambodians with an adequate supply of weapons would not seem too difficult, Malik said, if arms captured by South Vietnamese and U.S. troops could be given to Cambodia. Malik explained that, according to Indonesian information there was, however, another problem over and above the shortage of arms: the Cambodian Armed Forces are not yet able to handle any significant volume of arms. They need training first, Malik said, and Indonesia can perhaps help in this field.

Mr. Green remarked that Malik seemed to envisage two concurrent courses of action regarding Cambodia: diplomatic efforts, which depended in good part on the Soviet Union and the outcome of which is not yet clear, and action to keep the Cambodian Government afloat while these diplomatic efforts are proceeding. Mr. Green noted that the U.S. is giving limited support to Cambodia, primarily in the form of small arms. The U.S. hopes that others will provide support also, not only because it is needed militarily, but also because this support would provide a psychological boost to the Cambodian Government and signal to Moscow and others that the countries of the area are willing to work together to preserve peace.

In response to Mr. Green's question on how Indonesia would help Cambodia in the field of training, Malik explained that Indonesia had in mind bringing Cambodians quietly to Indonesia for training in guerrilla warfare. They could be blanketed with other nationalities training there, he added, without attracting undue attention. Indonesia is also considering sending Indonesian instructors to Cambodia, which Malik felt would reveal Indonesia's hand too openly. Another possibility, Malik said, is the attaching of some officers to the Indonesian Embassy in Phnom Penh to help advise the Cambodian Government on military matters in a liaison capacity. This matter is still under discussion by Indonesian defense officials, Malik said, and a decision has not yet been made.

Malik said Indonesia was caught between two difficult problems: Lon Nol Government fail on the other.

Malik said there was one related matter he wanted to mention. According to Indonesia's information, Cambodia does not have direct, open contacts with the U.S. on matters such as military aid; as a result, Cambodia is trying to channel its requests through third countries. Perhaps, Malik said, the U.S. could calm Cambodia by giving more direct proof of its support. The Cambodians, for example, have mentioned to the Indonesians the possibility of dealing with the U.S. on military matters through the former U.S. military attaché in Phnom Penh who is well known to the Cambodian military.

Mr. Richardson assured Malik that we are in direct touch with the Government of Cambodia through our Chargé in Phnom Penh on aid and all other matters and that additional channels are not needed.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Masters and approved by Stempel (U) on June 11. The memorandum is part IV of IV; part III, U.S. Troops in Cambodia is ibid.; parts I and II are Documents 296 and 297. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

299. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 27, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency H. Alamsjah, Indonesian State Secretary

Henry A. Kissinger

John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Mr. Alamsjah said that his President had ordered him to see Dr. Kissinger as a continuation of the previous day's discussion. President Suharto had felt that it would be better to give more explanation concerning Indonesia's request for military assistance. This position had also been explained to Admiral Moorer, who at that moment was still busy with Admiral Sudomo.

Since 1965, Indonesia has been concentrating on peaceful development of its economic and political stability. However, following the Cambodian affair, when things were moving very fast, President Suharto had decided—while still adhering to Indonesia's basic principles of non-alignment—that it must take a greater interest in Southeast Asia developments. The Djakarta conference was an outgrowth of this decision. (Mr. Alamsjah went on to describe the nature of the conference, and the agreements which have been reached for ongoing diplomatic initiatives to end the war in Indo-China.) At the conference, all of the countries except Singapore had been very worried at the situation in Cambodia and surrounding countries, and also about the spread of Communism. Their representatives had brought this out in conversations with Foreign Minister Malik. They had also expressed their full confidence in Indonesia. Hence Indonesia, which since 1965 had never stressed military affairs, now felt that it had a special role with respect not only to Cambodia but to the surrounding countries. Lon Nol had twice approached Indonesia on the possibility of obtaining Indonesian weapons. This request had been made known to the U.S. at President Suharto's suggestion through Ambassador Galbraith, but no reply had been received.

Dr. Kissinger wondered whether there might be a problem here in that the Indonesian Foreign Minister didn't want to give arms. Nevertheless, Suharto wanted to send arms, our President would be sympathetic.

Mr. Alamsjah expressed the opinion that his Foreign Minister would not say anything other than what his President suggested, since he knew he could be replaced if he acted otherwise. In any event, as President Suharto had suggested through Ambassador Galbraith, the Indonesians were prepared to send sufficient weapons to Cambodia to equip 10 battalions. Dr. Kissinger mentioned that we had never received a formal proposal to this effect, to which Mr. Alamsjah replied that it was correct to say that there had been no formal proposal, but that the proposition had been passed along and only three people had known about it in Indonesia: President Suharto, Alamsjah himself, and Galbraith.[2] Mr. Alamsjah noted that the Indonesia proposal had been made three weeks to a month ago, and involved sending small arms, including mortars, but no artillery. The Indonesians had also brought up a related problem—if they sent arms they would need replacement stocks, and would expect these from the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger asked if the quantity of replacement stocks had been made known to Admiral Moorer. Mr. Alamsjah explained that he had touched on this matter with Admiral Moorer the preceding evening, and that Suharto had afterwards decided that he, Alamsjah, had to see Dr. Kissinger.

Turning to Cambodia's military requirements, Mr. Alamsjah said that there were two urgent matters for Indonesia to consider. First, there was the matter of weapons, and there was also training. On training, if possible the Indonesians would like to send Cambodians to Indonesia for guerrilla training. Many foreign students had received such training, since Indonesia's experience in dealing with guerrilla warfare was the greatest among all Southeast Asia armed forces. In addition, if the Cambodian situation became urgent, Indonesia could send officers to Cambodia who would be carried as personnel of the Indonesian Embassy but who would train the Cambodian forces.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had been told the preceding evening that Foreign Minister Malik had been most unhappy about what our President had said to President Suharto. Mr. Alamsjah doubted that Mr. Malik had been unhappy, and referred again to the fact that the Foreign Minister was subject to the orders of the President.

To recapitulate the Indonesian proposal for aid to Cambodia, Dr. Kissinger asked if it was correct that they were willing to send military equipment to Cambodia immediately, that the amount would be sufficient for ten battalions, and that they would want us to replace these stocks. Mr. Alamsjah agreed. On replacement, Dr. Kissinger asked over what period? Mr. Alamsjah replied as soon as possible, since removing these arms from their supplies would leave an empty hole. Dr. Kissinger then asked how this should be handled as a practical matter. Mr. Alamsjah referred again to the military mission which his President wanted to send. In addition to the point of aid to Cambodia, however, there was a second point concerning the general state of the Indonesian armed forces. For ten years the Navy and Air Force equipment had all come from the USSR, and now spare parts were unavailable. As he had mentioned to Admiral Moorer, a Navy without gunboats was useless, and pilots without aircraft were useless. He indicated that he was thinking not only in terms of Indonesia, but in terms of the other countries of the region except Singapore. Indonesia was being counted on by these others, but they did not know the real power of the Indonesian military sector. The U.S. had a military advisory and assistance system, but Indonesia was not a member. Admiral Moorer had suggested to Admiral Sudomo that it would be impossible for the U.S. to re-equip the Indonesian Navy and Air Force, even though these forces possessed tactical skills.

Dr. Kissinger explained that our problem was with Congress. Nevertheless, we would like to help, and would do our best. The President was sympathetic. We had more than tripled our MAP for Indonesia, although we recognized that this was still not enough. We would like to look into the problem of surplus equipment from Vietnam at lower costs, but the problem of Congress remained. How could we get an idea of the Indonesian needs? Mr. Alamsjah again referred to their military mission.

Dr. Kissinger declared that the President had reiterated the same morning that he was anxious to cooperate fully with President Suharto on the matters which he had discussed with President Suharto the previous day on aid to Cambodia. He had found President Suharto's attitude very encouraging.

Dr. Kissinger noted briefly that the Indonesians also had a problem in connection with the Bandung munitions factory. We would take this matter up and let them know. The amount was not great, being only somewhat more than $3 million, and we would be sympathetic in reviewing the Indonesia aid request. Dr. Kissinger stated that their military mission should bring a complete proposal with it.

Turning to the equipment for the 10 battalions, Dr. Kissinger said that we would look at this matter with the intention of being helpful and knowing that this was in the spirit of what the President wanted.

Mr. Alamsjah asked about the possibility of taking care of some of the Indonesian needs prior to the elections, particularly those of the Air Force. In sending weapons to Cambodia they planned to use air transportation from Indonesian to Cambodian airports. Dr. Kissinger replied that we would do the best that we could, and asked how soon the military mission would come. Mr. Alamsjah said it would arrive not more than three weeks from now. Mr. Alamsjah observed that the mission would be led by the top Indonesian Army man, General Umar. Kissinger had met in Djakarta last year, was now concentrating on internal Indonesian affairs and General Umar was responsible for broader matters.

Mr. Alamsjah reverted to the question of Foreign Minister Malik's attitude on aid to Cambodia, and recalled at yesterday's advisers' meeting he had made a very strong pitch for military assistance. Dr. Kissinger mentioned, however, that he had expressed some doubts about this matter. Mr. Alamsjah thought that these doubts referred to sending arms only if there was no replacement.

The meeting closed with Mr. Alamsjah expressing confidence that the press problem could be handled, and with Dr. Kissinger emphasizing once more the President's pleasure over his conversation with President Suharto. The President understood President Suharto's view, and saw eye-to-eye with President Suharto on maintaining Indonesia's formal policy of non-alignment.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres/HAK MemCon s. Top Secret; Sensitive.

[2] This exchange between Alamsjah and Kissinger went a long way towards answering Nixon's question “What did you find out on this thing?” that he posed to Kissinger in their telephone conversation of May 26. Following the question, Nixon ordered that Kissinger “check this out with the Ambassador. We want the Indonesians' help. I want it done. That is a policy decision. It is vitally important to have other countries help them in some way. Now here is a country that is willing to help. We tried to get the Thais. But now this country wants to help. What in the hell happened here.” Kissinger responded: “It is part of the problem we talked about before. We have to make these departments more responsive.” Nixon continued, “If Indonesia wants to send this ammunition, they should do it. The Soviets of course are taking on Lon Nol. As long as he appears to be a puppet of the US it is one thing but when I ordered this three weeks ago that is the way it is to be. We have got to get the military to shape up and get it done. I want the Indonesians to send some stuff. We will replace their stuff. Of course we will get a military request from Indonesia anyway. So let's see what we can accomplish.” Kissinger then promised that “I will have it done by tomorrow evening.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

300. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, May 27, 1970.

Dear Henry:

In response to your suggestion this morning, I list below a phased program through which Indonesia might help Cambodia without unduly interfering with its diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Cambodia or seriously complicating its internal or external position. We cannot at this time fix a time phase for this program but would have to remain flexible, keying later steps to the progress of Indonesia's diplomatic efforts. As I see it, there are four major areas in which we might expect the Indonesians to be helpful:

1. First, as top priority, the Indonesians should be encouraged to continue their present diplomatic efforts. The Three Nation committee appointed during the recent Djakarta Conference will be contacting the Co-Chairmen and members of the ICC as well as key U.N. officials during the next few weeks to consider ways in which Cambodia's independence can be preserved. The Indonesians are realistic enough not to expect dramatic results. Concurrently, they will push Cambodia's case within the non-aligned forum. A preparatory meeting for the September Non-aligned Conference will be held in New Delhi on June 8. The Indonesians expect the Sihanouk government in exile to make a major bid to be seated during this meeting. Indonesia will support the Lon Nol government, and Adam Malik believes it important that Indonesia take no action before that time which might compromise its credentials with the Afro-Asian group.

2. Indonesia has apparently already decided to provide some military training to the Cambodian armed forces. While details have not yet been worked out, they are considering the possibility of bringing Cambodians to Indonesia for training in Indonesia's service schools, particularly those concerned with counter-guerrilla activities. This will not be publicized. They are reluctant thus far to send advisers to Cambodia since this would be even more difficult to conceal but have mentioned the possibility of assigning several military experts to their Embassy

3. We should now begin exploring quietly with the Indonesians the possibility of Indonesia converting its ammunition plant near Bandung to produce ammunition for the AK–47. We do not know how big a job this would be, but we believe it would be manageable and acceptable to Indonesia provided that, through some indirect offsetting arrangement, we helped them meet the costs involved. Indonesia has on-going need for some AK–47 ammunition and would be in a position to sell much of the plant's output to Cambodia, which has urgent requirements for such ammunition.

4. A final step, which I believe should be delayed until the above steps are further advanced, is the provision of military equipment by Indonesia to Cambodia. Indirect offsetting arrangements with the U.S. (within agreed limits) are necessarily involved.

Malik and others are concerned that providing weapons to Cambodia at this time would complicate Indonesia's current diplomatic efforts and also trigger opposition among domestic left wing as well as traditional groups which fear a basic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy of non-alignment.

As I mentioned this morning, the Indonesians seem to be placing top priority during this visit in getting a commitment from us to replace their Soviet military equipment. This equipment had an original price tag of nearly $1 billion. Some Indonesians hope, by giving arms to Cambodia, to put us in their debt and improve chances for such a commitment.

There is also the danger of exaggerated expectations on the part of the Indonesian military. I have been through this once. In 1966 some of the Indonesian Generals received the impression following a visit to Washington that we were going to give them arms to the tune of $500 million. This, of course, was impossible, but it took nearly a year to convince them of this fact. Meanwhile, our relations with the Indonesians were strained and I was cut off from effective contact with Suharto.

We should also bear in mind the fact that the Indonesians are already having difficulty absorbing what they are receiving. Skilled personnel are in short supply, and maintenance procedures are poor. At present, they could not effectively use more than they are getting through our expanded $15 million annual program.

The problem, as I see it, is essentially one of timing. I believe we can successfully avoid the problems of exaggerated expectations as well as internal or external damage to Indonesia's position if we follow the phased program outlined above and keep flexible. Steps one and two are already underway in any event and should prove helpful to Cambodia while we assess further steps.

Marshall

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret. An attached covering note from Colonel Kennedy to Kissinger, May 28, stated that Green's paper “seems to add nothing to our store of knowledge or action program.” Kennedy added that he would give a copy to Holdridge, who would do “a more complete brief.”

301. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10:08–11:03 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Suharto of Indonesia

The President

Dr. Kissinger

The President: I consider this an historical opportunity because we are the two largest democratic countries of the world, with the exception of India. You and Henry both know that I would like to travel to Indonesia again before the end of my present term. I always emphasize to my American colleagues the economic and strategic importance of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Most people know about Thailand, Cambodia or Vietnam but not many people know very much about Indonesia. This is because there are not many opportunities to travel there.

President Suharto: I am very happy with your evaluation concerning the important role of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The fact that you would like to return again is a sign of our close friendship. The Indonesian people will always welcome you with an open heart.

President Suharto: Concerning military matters, I have appointed Lt. Gen. Sumitro to take charge of these affairs and I have in mind to appoint a reserve officer also. In the future I will also appoint an additional limited number of officers to work in this field.

The President: What is the rank of your military attaché here in Washington?

President Suharto: There are three—Air Force, Army and Navy. The Air Force Attaché is a Colonel, the Navy Attaché is a Colonel and the Army Attaché is a Brigadier General. The Army Attaché was trained in Russia but he is also a member of the revolutionary generation of 1945.

The President: I would like to have one military attaché in Djakarta to have my complete confidence. The rank is not important but it shouldn't be out of line with the rank of the Indonesian attaché in Washington. To Kissinger—I wanted more than that. I would like to upgrade this position in Djakarta.

The President: Quite frankly we must recognize that there is resistance both in Indonesia and in the United States to a large military assistance program for Indonesia. We do not want to compromise your non-aligned position. There is also a fear in the United States that increased military assistance will be a financial burden. But you and I as politicians must recognize these political realities. We would like to work out an arrangement to fulfill the needs of Indonesia without any embarrassment to your political situation. These needs should be met so that Indonesia may play a larger role in Southeast Asia. For example, when the Cambodian problem began, they turned to Indonesia for assistance but your capabilities were limited. Your equipment was all old. We may be helpful there. Looking at the broader picture in Southeast Asia and Asia, the larger countries such as Japan and Indonesia should play an effective role. The role of Japan can only be in the economic field. In Southeast Asia itself, Indonesia is the largest country and can perhaps lead the way in collective security arrangements but always within the framework of the necessity to maintain your nonaligned position. Indonesia as a neutral country must be strong enough to defend itself against minor assaults. But it is not enough only to insure ones own neutrality. If a nation believes that its neutrality is only for its own self interest and has no role when a smaller nation goes down, that nation itself will become the next target.

President Suharto: Thank you very much. My view is not much different from yours. Indonesia must be strong economically, socially, and militarily in order to develop the will and capacity to resist ideological, political and military attacks. We will continue to carry out our active and independent foreign policy, but we place great importance on working together with the other Asian neighbors. I recognize also that there is fear within the area that Indonesia will become too strong. But this fear is completely unjustified. Our philosophy, Pantjasila, does not permit us to expand in relation to other countries and peoples or to attack other countries. This is absolutely contrary to Pantjasila. I have made it clear to you and to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that our first priority is economic development, but this also must be related to security measures. We must not neglect military development but this must not be so rapid that it hampers economic development. Concerning the possibility of a strategic capability for Indonesia in the long-range future, I feel that training can be carried out in the U.S. and this training can be put to use later if needed.

The President: I hope that we can work out the appropriate cooperation in an agreeable way. We welcome your military mission.

I would like to emphasize our appreciation for the initiative of Indonesia in sponsoring the recent conference concerning Cambodia. The initiative of Asian nations is very important. Who knows where the next problem will occur? It may be in Burma or it may be in Laos again. But when something happens it is heart-warming to see a country such as Indonesia speaking up and gathering together other Asian nations to discuss the problem. When a country is under attack it seems as if it always ends up with the question of what the U.S. is going to do. The U.S. becomes the issue but the issue should be the small country which is under attack. We do not intend to withdraw from Asia. Our intention is to help you to do what you decide is best. There is no American imperialism. We seek no colonies. We do not want any bases.

President Suharto: We understand completely the role of the United States and we are convinced that the United States is waging a just struggle for independence and freedom in Southeast Asia. Concerning our role in Southeast Asia, we must keep in mind our limited capabilities for activity outside of the borders of our own country. A larger role for Indonesia in Southeast Asia depends upon the rate of acceleration of our economic development program. If we were to undertake actions which were beyond our capabilities, this would certainly endanger our domestic situation. There are four conclusions which I would like to present to you. First, we are pleased that the United States understands our efforts in the field of economic development and we appreciate the aid of the United States in these efforts. Secondly, we appreciate the manner in which the United States respects our non-aligned position. Thirdly, we hope that the United States fully supports the recent 11-nation Asian conference on Cambodia which was held at Djakarta. Fourthly, we fully support the Nixon Doctrine or the Guam Doctrine and hope that it will continue to be carried out.

The President: Very good. Very good.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Pres/HAK MemCon s. Top Secret; Sensitive. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The meeting was held at the White House.

302. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S WASHINGTON VISIT—SECOND CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALK

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign:

Adam Malik, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Soedjatmoko, Ambassador to the United States

H. Alamsjah, State Secretary

Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman, National Planning Board

Vice Admiral Sudomo, Chief of Staff, Indonesian Navy

Soedharmono, Secretary of the Cabinet

Dr. Ch. Anwar Sani, Director General for Political Affairs

Suryono Darusman, Chief of Protocol

United States:

Elliot L. Richardson, Acting Secretary of State

Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Francis J. Galbraith, Ambassador to Indonesia

Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

John Holdridge, White House Staff

Edward E. Masters, Country Director for Indonesian Affairs

Mr. Richardson opened the discussion by returning to the topic of U.S. economic and military assistance to Indonesia, which was introduced by Foreign Minister Adam Malik just before the May 26 concurrent meeting was interrupted.

At the earlier meeting, Malik expressed deep appreciation for the U.S. role, and in particular that of Mr. Barnett, in assuring Indonesia sympathetic treatment at the April meetings of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) on economic aid and of the “Paris Club” on the Sukarno debt problem. Malik added, however, that Indonesia required additional help at this particular state of economic development. He noted that Indonesian efforts to procure aid from “socialist” countries have not been productive but will continue. In the meantime, he wondered if there were additional sources of U.S. assistance which might be tapped, mentioning in particular the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Barnett noted that the multilateral IGGI mechanism had enabled Indonesia to obtain greater aggregate assistance than if it had dealt bilaterally with individual donors. He added that, again, one of our reasons for supporting a Paris Group solution of the Sukarno debt was to provide Indonesia with essential multilateral leverage in dealing with Eastern European creditors. Mr. Barnett noted that we had not encouraged Indonesia to repudiate its debt to the Soviet Union in light of the latter's importance as a source of military spare parts, as a potential aid donor, and as an important future market for rubber and other natural resources. Repudiation of the Soviet debt might also damage Indonesia's credit worthiness, he added. Mr. Malik later expressed appreciation for the U.S. Aide Mémoire in which the U.S. accepted the debt settlement worked out at Paris in April, which he said would help Indonesia to move forward in negotiations with other countries.

Regarding additional sources of U.S. assistance, Mr. Barnett said that progress made in resolving the debt problem would permit the Export-Import Bank to talk with the Indonesians about a possible resumption of the Bank's financing activities in Indonesia. Mr. Barnett pointed out that the Bank is already offering insurance for suppliers' credits and is a participant in Freeport Sulphur's program. Mr. Barnett noted, however, that the Export-Import Bank is not a foreign aid agency and its function is to facilitate U.S. exports. He emphasized the need to consult fully with the Resident Mission of the IBRD in Djakarta on the priority of projects for which Ex–Im financing might be sought. Indonesia should be aware of the risk that aid donors might reduce their aid should Indonesia indicate through Ex–Im transactions that it was entering a phase where it could borrow on normal commercial terms.

Mr. Malik inquired whether the Export-Import Bank could lend to the Indonesian private sector in order to further contacts between private business in the two countries. Mr. Barnett expressed the opinion that the Bank would wish to know about particular projects being considered and the extent to which the Indonesian Government is involved, through guarantees, for example. When queried whether there is not a means to get around a requirement for government guarantees, Mr. Barnett suggested that representatives of the Indonesian Government discuss the matter with the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Malik referred also to the possibility of doing more in the field of scientific cooperation but did not specify what he had in mind.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Gardner and approved by Stempel (U) on June 10. The memorandum is part I of III; part III is ibid., part II is Document 303. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

303. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, May 28, 1970, 10 a.m.

PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S WASHINGTON VISIT—SECOND CONCURRENT WHITE HOUSE TALKS

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

[Omitted here is the list of participants which is identical to that in Document 302.]

The May 28 meeting returned to the subject of U.S. military assistance raised by Foreign Minister Adam Malik during the May 26 meeting but not discussed because of lack of time.

At the earlier meeting, Malik said that Indonesian hopes for a peaceful solution of Southeast Asian problems should not lead it to neglect its own internal defense. Economic development remains Indonesia's top priority, he added, but Indonesia must also prepare for the worst possible eventuality. Recent developments affecting Cambodia have created concern in neighboring countries and have given rise to the expectation in some quarters that Indonesia might help defend neighboring states if a more serious situation developed. At present, Indonesia could not do so, Malik said.

Referring to President Nixon's July 1969 conversation with President Suharto in Djakarta on military assistance, Malik said the Indonesian Navy and Air Force remain in a most difficult position. Most of their equipment originated in the Soviet Union which continues to take a hard-nosed attitude regarding spare parts. Malik said there was not time to go into details but the Indonesian Armed Forces could discuss the problem with their counterparts. In this respect, Malik mentioned the possibility of the United States sending a delegation to Indonesia to determine its needs. In conclusion, Malik pointed to the presence of Admiral Sudomo in President Suharto's official party as an indication of the importance Indonesia places on the defense aspect of national development.

At Malik's request, Mr. Masters summarized the current status of the Military Assistance Program for Indonesia. He noted that the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Defense Liaison Group in Djakarta seem to have reached a general understanding on the items to be included in the FY 1971 program, which is to be increased almost threefold over the current annual level. Mr. Masters mentioned in particular that the U.S. hopes to help within budgetary limitations to meet the Air Force's requirement for trainer and close support aircraft, the Navy's need for patrol craft, and all of the Services' needs for communication and electronic equipment. As for the latter requirement, Mr. Masters noted that a U.S. technical team has just completed an in-country survey and is now drawing up its recommendations.

Mr. Malik asked if support for the police is to be included in the expanded program. Mr. Masters said that the U.S. was tentatively thinking of allocating approximately $300,000 of the FY 1971 program to meet police requests for communications equipment, subject to the findings of the technical team which had also explored police needs in this field.

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Masters and Gardner, and approved in U on June 10. The memorandum is part II of III; part III is ibid., part I is Document 301. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

304. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 4, 1970.

Dear Henry:

I have long believed that it is important for us to do whatever we possibly could to encourage Asians to become more involved in their own affairs. I deeply share the President's views—and your views— on this vital issue. Our own problems will be much simpler when Asians speak with a common voice on maters of mutual concern, when their present rudimentary efforts toward regional cooperation and mutual security really take hold. In this connection, I believe also that it is important that Indonesia and the other nations of Southeast Asia assist Cambodia. Their own security is clearly at stake.

At the same time, there are dangers involved in forcing the hand of Indonesia and others too quickly. In the case of Indonesia, for example, too sudden or too deep an involvement in Cambodia could upset fragile internal balances. Nationalist political groups are already concerned that Indonesia is moving too close to the West. Cambodia, if not properly handled, could give them additional ammunition against the Suharto Government.

In addition, the handling of this problem could upset civil-military relationships. Suharto's instincts on this matter are sound, but this is not true of some of his close advisers. A number of these, including General Alamsjah, are out to get Malik. If we induce Indonesia to move in a way or in a time frame which discredits Malik we will not only be damaging the effectiveness of a man who has been of great assistance to us, but we may well be contributing to a disturbance of the present delicate balance between military and civil leaders in Indonesia.

We can already see in the case of Indonesia that some of the Generals are using the Cambodian issue as a lever to get from us a broad commitment to re-equip their armed forces. It would not only be politically undesirable for us to take on this role but it would also be far beyond our present capabilities. There is also the problem of Indonesia's limited absorptive capability which we have discussed before.

I am, of course, not averse to a bit of judicious pressure, but if the Nixon Doctrine is to be effective, these countries must themselves recognize the danger and be prepared to act on their own. If they do so largely at our behest, they will expect us to pay the bill.

Your conversation with General Alamsjah, unlike that between the President and Suharto, causes me concern. Given the curious workings of the Indonesian scene, the three references which you made to Malik's doubts about Indonesia providing military aid to Cambodia could jeopardize his position, although I know this was not your intent. I am concerned in particular by the fact that you signalled to Alamsjah that Malik had on May 26 expressed his misgivings directly to us.

As I mentioned earlier, Alamsjah is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a man who has been the target of intense criticism in Indonesia for years. We learned reliably [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] several years ago that he hoped to become Foreign Minister. For this and other reasons he is out to get Malik, and I feel he will use your remarks to further this objective. Frank Galbraith tells me that Malik was very subdued during the trip outside Washington. It may well be that Alamsjah has already scored some points with Suharto against Malik.

I am also aware that the military team which Suharto plans to send will expect more than we could and should give them. Your remarks that they should bring a “complete proposal with them” may well be taken by the Indonesians as an invitation for another unrealistic Indonesian shopping list. We have had a number of these over the years and have only recently succeeded in getting the Indonesians to sit down with our people and plan realistically regarding their military requirements. As I told you last Wednesday morning, I was in coventry for several months in 1967 (denied access to Suharto by Alamsjah and others) due to frustrations by the Indonesian military who for some reason had been led to expect during Pentagon visits that we would give far more civic action aid than we delivered.

One way out of this difficulty, particularly that affecting Malik's position, would be for the President to send a message to Suharto. This could be in response to the message of thanks we will likely receive from him or we could use the fact that June 8 is Suharto's birthday as the peg for a message. In this message, the President might express his appreciation for his useful talks with Suharto and confirm the fine impression which Suharto left here with the Congress, the press, and others. He could also extend warm regards from himself and Mrs. Nixon to Mrs. Suharto, who made so many friends in the U.S. He might then ask that his best regards be conveyed also to Foreign Minister Malik whose astute handling of Indonesian foreign policy has won admiration throughout the world, including the U.S., and who played a particularly helpful role as catalyst in bringing together the eleven nations which recently met in Djakarta to discuss Cambodia.

If this were done, I think Suharto would clearly get the signal that we support the diplomatic efforts initiated by the Djakarta Conference and also Malik's continued role as Foreign Minister. If you agree, I should be glad to try my hand at such a message.[2]

Sincerely yours,

Marshall

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Strictly Personal. In an attached covering memorandum sent to Kissinger for action on June 5, Haig summarized Green's letter and added: “Underlying all of this, of course, is Green's basic view that we should be very cautious about changing Indonesia's non-alignment image and about providing her with greatly increased military assistance.” Haig then asked for Kissinger's decision on the proposed message to Suharto. Kissinger initialed the approve option on June 8 and noted: “(already approved by telephone. Deal with Jonathan Moore in absence of Marshall Green.)”

[2]  Green's proposed message was drafted and approved by Masters and sent as telegram 88649 to Djakarta, June 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDON)

305. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 18, 1970.

Dear Henry:

As you know, a recent Djakarta message indicates that General Sumitro may arrive here as early as next Monday (June 22) to follow up on the discussions with President Suharto and General Alamsjah last month. We do not yet have detailed knowledge of just what the Indonesians have in mind, but it appears that Sumitro will carry with him two lists. One will include military items they would expect from us to replace any equipment they might give Cambodia, and the other would deal with Indonesia's own long range military requirements. Sumitro plans to see you first and follow your guidance on others he should talk with in Washington.

The Indonesians apparently then plan to send a second military mission in July to be led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Umar, and including logistical experts from all of the armed services. According to word from Djakarta, the Umar mission will seek a “fixed commitment” from us to re-equip Indonesia's Armed Forces over the next five to seven years.

President Suharto's visit here gave new impetus and direction to the Indonesians' as yet only partially formulated plans to assume a greater role in matters affecting Southeast Asian security. Sumitro's visit will give us another good opportunity to nudge the Indonesians in the right direction. The Sumitro group will also bring along a few bear traps, however, which we should keep well in view. Principally among these is the Indonesian tendency to read more into what we tell them than we actually intend—to translate our general comments into what they consider broad and binding commitments. For this reason I would like to suggest the following general precepts by which the visit might be handled:

1. Indonesia's diplomatic efforts are at a particularly sensitive stage with the Three Nation Committee now engaged in discussions with the Soviet Union. For this and other reasons it is important that the Sumitro visit be treated low key and that every effort be made to avoid publicity.[2]

2. Since Sumitro is coming here primarily to talk with you, I believe it important that he get from you a full and realistic assessment of what we can and cannot do to help Indonesia.[3] Otherwise, he will not take to heart comments about budgetary limitations and other problems which he may receive at DOD.

3. In addition to his talks with you, I would welcome an opportunity to talk with Sumitro and suggest we also arrange a courtesy call on General Westmoreland and a “working level” meeting with officers in DOD who have detailed knowledge of MAP matters and possible availability of excess equipment.[4]

4. I suggest we tell Sumitro that we welcome the opportunity to get his firsthand views and those of other key Indonesian officials, but we believe that both our interests would be best served by continuing to handle detailed planning in Djakarta.[5] For this reason, while we would be delighted to see General Umar, we would suggest that he not bring any large number of experts with him but that we continue to handle details of our MAP in Djakarta through the very effective coordination already developed between HANKAM and our Defense Liaison Group.

If you agree, a copy of this letter might be passed on to Dave Packard and Tom Moorer.[6]

Sincerely yours,

Marshall

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Khmer.

[2] A notation apparently in Holdridge's handwritting next to this sentence reads: “yes.”

[3] A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “guidelines of Pres.—encourage be helpful in Cambodia.”

[4] A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes.”

[5] A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes.”

[6] A notation in the same handwriting next to this sentence reads: “yes. They can send but we direct.”

306. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 20, 1970.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with General Sumitro

Indonesian General Sumitro, whom you met in Djakarta last year, is arriving in Washington June 22 for the expressed purpose of seeing you and following up on your conversation with General Alamsjah about U.S. arms aid to Indonesia and Indonesian military assistance to Cambodia. (We will not be able to set the specific time of your meeting until after he arrives.) Although State is very much aware of Sumitro's visit, the arrangements have been made through the special channel and not by State. Sumitro will, in fact, probably want to short-circuit State (although a protocol call on Ambassador Green is in order) on the grounds that he will expect to get more by dealing directly with you and Defense.

Sumitro's Anticipated Position

—He will hope to obtain a firm U.S. program for Indonesia which will re-equip a substantial part of the Indonesian armed forces with U.S. military hardware. (He will not wish to get into specifics, since a military mission under General Umar will be arriving soon to discuss details.)

—He may justify the need for a MAP program on the grounds that the Indo-China situation poses a grave threat to the entire Southeast Asian region, and that Indonesia has an important regional defense role. He will probably explain that Indonesia's previous Communist sources of arms are now excluded.

—He may also argue that Indonesia's needs for economic development preclude picking up this burden through Indonesian resources.

—He will probably raise the matter of Indonesia's plan to send 15,000 Communist-pattern weapons to Cambodia. He will want immediate U.S. replacement of these stocks, as a special program and not part of the regular MAP.

—He will solicit your help in getting favorable action out of Defense and State.

Your Recommended Position

—You recall with pleasure your talk with Sumitro and his associates last summer in Djakarta. You are glad to welcome Sumitro to Washington.

—As the President told President Suharto, we want to be as helpful as possible in responding to Indonesia's arms needs. There are of course Congressional and budgetary constraints on what we can do, but within these parameters we will try to work out an appropriate program. (You might wish to mention that we have already more than trebled Indonesian MAP.)

—As discussed by the President and President Suharto, the matter of arms aid to Cambodia is urgent. You hope that Indonesia can move soon on this, not only to meet the military needs in Cambodia, but to give the Cambodian Government a needed psychological boost. You appreciate, though, the desirability of maintaining Indonesia's non-aligned image, especially while Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia are following up the Djakarta Conference.

—You might wish to ask Sumitro how these arms would be delivered, and whether he thinks secrecy could be maintained. (Possibly the U.S. could render some assistance in delivery, either directly or through third parties.)

—You hope that Sumitro will have useful discussions with people in the Pentagon. Your staff members have been in touch with responsible people there in setting up meetings. The question of our replacing stocks of Indonesian arms sent to Cambodia can be discussed in them.

—You believe it would be useful, too, for Sumitro to talk with Ambassador Green. All of us—those in the White House, Defense, and State—want to be helpful.

—You understand that General Umar will be coming soon with a mission to go into details of U.S. military aid. He and his group will be welcome. You anticipate that further details will be worked out afterwards at Djakarta between our respective military representatives.

—(If Sumitro raises. You are glad to hear that our technicians have arrived to inspect the Bandung ammunition plant, and hope that conversion to handle AK–47 ammunition can proceed rapidly.)

Points to Avoid

—Implying any substantive role for Alamsjah in our arrangements. Since he was here with Suharto we have learned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]that senior officers among the Indonesian military have become sensitive over the way that Alamsjah functioned within the Suharto party. (Alamsjah is only a Brigadier General.) This smacks of Indonesian palace politics, of which we want no part. If the matter arises, you might note that you dealt with Alamsjah merely as Suharto's emissary, and as a transmission-belt for carrying the President's views to Suharto.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger saw it.

307. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, June 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

Further Points for Your Meeting with General Sumitro

General Sumitro arrived in Washington late yesterday, and his aides, General Latief and Colonel Soekeng, got in touch with me today. General Sumitro hopes for an early meeting with you, and does not want to talk with anyone at State or Defense beforehand. I have not given any assurances of when the meeting will be arranged, but assume that you will want to talk to him as soon as it is convenient. I assume also that the party can be flown out and back by Jetstar.

Meanwhile, a number of additional points have developed in my conversations with State and Defense which you might wish to bear in mind in your discussions with Sumitro:

—Defense hopes that the Indonesian offer of rifles to Cambodia can be held to 15,000, at least for the time being. The rationale in part is that making up stocks will be difficult (M–16's would need to come from new production at $150 each; M–14's are in short supply as stocks are being used to re-equip the National Guard). In addition, if the Indonesians turn over all 33,000 AK–47's in their possession there will be no requirement in Indonesia for the AK–47 ammunition produced by the Bandung ammunition factory.

—A way can be found to replace quickly the rifles Indonesia sends to Cambodia, however. Defense is thinking in terms of a loan of 15,000 M–14's with a promise to replace them later with M–16's out of the Indonesian MAP.

—Military assistance funds are extremely tight due to the extra burden which Cambodia has imposed. Defense is already cutting into MAP for other countries to take care of Cambodia, and the need to pick up Indonesia imposes yet an additional burden. This is over and above the replacement of rifles, which is being treated as a separate item. Defense believes it can locate funds to maintain Indonesian MAP at a level of $15 million as already agreed, but will find it very difficult to add more. Defense hopes that you can firmly but gently get this point across to Sumitro. ($15 million should be enough, especially if Defense is not held to $70 million annually on what it can provide from U.S. excess.)

—For their part, the Indonesians probably have high hopes for much more than $15 million. Suharto wants to standardize the arms of the entire Indonesian Army—which means U.S. help, since he can't get anything from the Communists. There is talk in Indonesia of setting up an Armalite or M–16 plant. The other services will want their share, too. The Indonesians desire a firm U.S. commitment.

—There is no enthusiasm whatsoever in State and Defense for the Indonesian technical mission to be headed by General Umar. They feel that this mission will tend to reinforce Indonesian hopes, in that it might go home with inflated ideas of what we can do if technical talks actually take place. State tried to turn the mission into just a protocol visit limited to Umar, his wife, and two aides. I told them that this simply wouldn't wash—your talks with Alamsjah and the President's talks with Suharto endorsed the technical mission concept, and that it simply cannot be turned off. (You may be hearing more on this, though, from Marshall Green.)

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Nodis. Sent for action.

308. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Los Angeles, California, July 1, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS

General Sumitro, Indonesian Army

Brigadier General Latif, Indonesian Army

Colonel Soekeng, Indonesian Army

Dr. Kissinger

Mr. Holdridge

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Dr. Kissinger expressed his regrets in his delay in seeing General Sumitro; the problem was that he had to be with the President so as to help prepare the President for the meet-the-press session that evening. He was pleased to see General Sumitro whom he remembered from the Djakarta visit last year. He also recalled the conversation which he had had with General Sumitro. Had General Sumitro engaged in talks with anyone else in Washington? General Sumitro replied that he had wanted to see Dr. Kissinger first. He would, though, want to call on Admiral Moorer. He also wanted to convey President Suharto's greetings to the President.

Continuing, General Sumitro explained that President Suharto had called a meeting of senior Indonesian Armed Forces officers just after returning from the U.S., and had gone over his conversation with the President. He had then ordered General Sumitro to come to the U.S. to follow up his, Suharto's, talks with the President. General Sumitro added that this visit, which was something of a surprise to him, was made on the basis of his having become, in effect, Dr. Kissinger's counterpart in Indonesia. Dr. Kissinger asked if General Sumitro had any special representative in Washington, and upon hearing that none presently existed, ascertained that any communications by the President and Suharto would be through Sumitro in Djakarta. The special channel would be used.

General Sumitro then brought up Indonesia's strategic thinking, noting that before Suharto had left for the U.S. he had directed that an analysis be prepared of the current situation in Southeast Asia and the Indonesian role. (There had been some changes since Dr. Kissinger had been in Djakarta.) This study took into consideration the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Far East over a period of time, which the Indonesians hoped would not be earlier than 1973. They also hoped that this would be a scheduled process. Looking at the situation very realistically, they had come to the conclusion that there should be no vacuum. At the same time, Indonesia was not yet a real power, and not yet able to take over the responsibility for security in Southeast Asia.

They had then addressed the problem of the future role of Japan, on the assumption that there were no other major powers with which they could undertake cooperation. (They had noted that the U.S. was moving in this direction also.) India could not be relied upon, although its industry was growing, because of its internal political unstability. While Japan had its troubles, too, its people seemed to be generally of the same opinion, namely, that the major threat to Japan would come first from Red China and secondly from the USSR. In 1968, when there first had been regional discussions, the fact of Japanese development had been recognized but also the dangers which came from that direction. The Indonesians maintained the hope that the U.S. would play a role in making Japan strong, and causing it to be a power able to give a sense of security to Asia.

On Japan, the Indonesian position was that they did not object to seeing Japan come into the region, but still had some doubts about the part which Japan would play as a political and military power. Japan was unpredictable, and while it had industry, logistical support, and manpower, and could develop strong armed forces, there might be yet some tendencies in Japan to accommodate. Two years ago, Sumitro had been told by the South Koreans that the Japanese might reach an understanding with the Chinese to divide up the responsibilities in the Far East between the two of them, with the Chinese dominating the Asian mainland, and the offshore centers coming under Japanese control. General Sumitro felt that this might be true, and that there were forces in Japan which wanted to work with the Chinese.

General Sumitro said that the Indonesian Government, President Suharto, and the principal officers of the Armed Forces had originally not intended to build up the Armed Forces before 1973 because they had decided in 1965 that the first need was to upgrade the Indonesian standard of living, and thus had sacrificed security for the sake of the national reconstruction effort. However, this situation had changed. There was the fact of the U.S. withdrawal from the Far East, and the knowledge that Japan was still a questionable friend even though it might become a political and military power. The Indonesians were also afraid that Asian centers such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, because of the lack of military power in the region would be pressed by domestic forces to make policy shifts. In this connection, General Sumitro referred to the intensity of Soviet diplomacy, and expressed apprehension that the Asian governments he had mentioned might lean to the Soviet side. Although the Soviets were committed in the Middle East, they had influence in the region, and the Asian nations might turn to the USSR to counter the danger of Chinese infiltration. Speaking frankly, Indonesia had to consider then becoming active in this situation.

General Sumitro noted that between 1960 and 1965 Indonesia had possessed strong Armed Forces, although the policies of the old regime in this period had been bad. He added that Sukarno, who had just died, could now be forgiven, but his policies would not be followed. Indonesia again needed to develop strong armed forces. He and his colleagues were not worried about internal disturbances, since they had been able to roll up the strong Communist organization. The problem was external, and what Indonesia could do if asked by others for assistance. Indonesia could send its men, but the means available to them were so poor that they could not do too much. Indonesia's “strategic material” was originally from the Soviets, but would be all used up by 1971. What was on hand was in bad condition and could not be used in a war against the Communists. Indonesia was willing to dispose of these materials. Dr. Kissinger mentioned, and General Sumitro confirmed, that the Indonesians have problems with spare parts for their Communist matériel.

According to General Sumitro, the Indonesians were now hoping to obtain military supplies from Western Europe and from the U.S. in order to rebuild their Armed Forces. They had been encouraged by the talks between the President and President Suharto, but when Admiral Sudumo had talked with Admiral Moorer on the Indonesian proposals, Moorer had said that everything had depended on Dr. Kissinger's views. This was the reason why Suharto had asked him to give the background of the Indonesian thinking. In speeding up the rebuilding of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Indonesia needed time to develop since its training facilities were limited and its management very bad. There was an additional principle: military development should not interfere with the Indonesian five-year plan. Not one penny could be expected from this plan, or it would fail.

General Sumitro remarked that the Indonesians had been extremely pleased at the boldness of the President's decision on Cambodia, and over the fact that he had not allowed public opinion to deter him. On the basis of the President's appreciation of the facts and the support which he enjoys with the silent majority, President Suharto had wanted him, Sumitro, to present a full conception of the Indonesian military requirements. These he had with him, which would be gone into in detail later by General Umar and the special group which would accompany him. Another factor which the Indonesians had taken into consideration was the possibility that if the U.S. demobilized or reduced its military strength, there would be surplus material which could be used by the Indonesians. Indonesia wouldn't ask for what was still required, but only for what would no longer be needed after demobilization. He would make the list of Indonesian requirements available to Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger asked if General Sumitro had the list with him, and was told that such was the case.[2] Dr. Kissinger said that he had no idea as to how this matter could be implemented, but wanted to say a number of things. We had a tough legislative problem, and there were also some divisions in the Government on the issue of military aid to Indonesia along the same departmental lines as existed in Indonesia. We had learned of Indonesian divisions from various sources. All these things posed a difficult problem, although he felt that we both understood the problems which existed in our respective Capitals.

Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to make one point plain—the strategic picture which we had in mind was not of withdrawal, but of a reduction. The President agreed with the Indonesian position, and had expressed this to President Suharto, whose visit he had very much welcomed. Anything which required legislation or money needed to wait until after the November elections. If these went badly there might be difficulties. General Sumitro expressed the hope that the elections would go very well. He observed, too, that he had convinced the Indonesian Ambassador in Washington on the need for what Indonesia was doing.

Dr. Kissinger asked how long General Sumitro had been in Washington. He was worried about the time factor. If this was no problem, he would suggest that the best procedure would be for him to study the Indonesian paper, and for General Sumitro to see Admiral Moorer, in whom he had full confidence. He would speak to Admiral Moorer beforehand. Because the President was so preoccupied with Cambodia, not much could be done that day, but he would be back in Washington on Monday. He would study the plan, would talk about it with the President, and meet again with General Sumitro on Monday or Tuesday. No one but Admiral Moorer and Mr. Holdridge would know of this matter. Possibly something could be worked out in principle, and he was sympathetic to the idea of providing surplus matériel. There was a problem, though, that if our help became too obvious, then Congressional restrictions might be imposed. The Congress would zero in if the program were too obvious. As for the elections, we didn't need to defeat all the Senators, but if three or four were defeated the others would get the message. Meanwhile, we could use the time between now and the Fall to do what could be done in developing a program. The Indonesian theory was fully consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. We would need to study the paper and transfer it into specifics. He would want to talk with General Sumitro again, and with the President in some detail so that proper guidance could be provided. An immediate way to be helpful might be on the matter of the Indonesian offer to send rifles to Cambodia. If these were replaced with some U.S. rifles, the program of re-equipping the Indonesian Armed Forces would already be beginning.

On the matter of the rifles for Cambodia, General Sumitro felt that it would be better to wait for the visit of General Umar to work out the technical details. President Suharto had told him not to get into details. Dr. Kissinger assured him that we would think the whole thing over. He could only say that the President had been very pleased over his conversation with President Suharto, and believed he had reached an understanding with him. He wanted to do what he could to help Indonesia develop. The problem was one of finding measures to do so which would be within our political capability. As to the visit by General Umar, it might be a good idea to hold this matter in abeyance and to talk about it further next week. General Sumitro indicated that General Umar would not leave until after his own return to Djakarta, so that holding off for a while would be no problem.

General Sumitro asked if Dr. Kissinger had any questions concerning Indonesian strategic thinking. Dr. Kissinger wondered about the magnitude of the development program, the size of the Indonesian Armed Forces, and the scale of re-equipment. He would get a better feel of this from the paper. On the Indonesian strategic appreciation, he recapitulated this as: first, accepting the importance of having the Asian centers play a larger role if the U.S. presence was reduced (we didn't like to talk about “withdrawals”); second, having Japan play a larger role but with its forces coming in only if a threat developed and not before; third, regarding Indonesia as another component in the strategic situation in which Malaysia, the Philippines, etc., tended to look to the largest country for security; fourth, seeing India as not being in a position to fulfill this responsibility; and finally, reasoning that the Indonesian Armed Forces needed to be re-equipped to some extent to fit into our reduction, using equipment of common origin. This meant replacement of matériel from Western Europe and U.S. sources. The Indonesians also were aware of the U.S. legislative restrictions, and were thinking of surplus equipment after U.S. forces were drawn down.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he would ask Admiral Moorer to translate the Indonesian request into dollars, and would try to keep this matter as restricted as possible. We would need some idea as to what was really involved. At the same time, the President had the warmest attitude toward Indonesia, appreciated its constructive attitude, and regarded the Indonesians as friends. Could he assume that General Sumitro spoke for President Suharto? General Sumitro replied that his position had been mentioned during the meeting of the two Presidents and reiterated before the Indonesian military leaders. General Latif, who had been in both meetings, could verify this. Dr. Kissinger observed that we would communicate with General Sumitro via our man in Djakarta. If we received confusing reports, we would check with him, and it would be helpful to receive information as to what President Suharto thought. Similarly, if they received confusing reports from our Ambassador, they should check with us. He would provide exact information. Was there any other matter which General Sumitro wanted to discuss? He did not object to the Indonesian list, but did not want it to become an official proposal. It was agreed that one copy would be provided to the NSC staff and one to Admiral Moorer. The NSC copy would be examined by Dr. Lynn.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger under a July 6 covering memorandum. The meeting was held at the Century Palace Hotel.

[2] Not attached and not found.

309. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, July 7, 1970.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Sumitro

Attached is the MemCon of your meeting with Sumitro in Los Angeles on July 2.[2] Admiral Moorer was asked yesterday to meet again with Sumitro and did so at 5:00 p.m. last night. Sumitro was told by Holdridge to provide Admiral Moorer with a list of Indonesia's requirements; however, he refused to do so and when he was pressed by Admiral Moorer he stated that his instructions provided that he had to give the list to you alone. All of the instructions which you gave to David were carried out, and Holdridge spoke to Sumitro yesterday morning on the subject but apparently to no avail.

During the conversation with Admiral Moorer, Sumitro made the following points:

—Indonesia is prepared to furnish up to 25,000 AK–47's to Cambodia.

—Indonesia is also prepared to train Cambodian forces either in Indonesia or in Cambodia. Sumitro estimates it would take three months to develop an effective soldier and six months to train highly qualified troops.

—Sumitro is very anxious to actively participate in Cambodia's anti-Communist efforts. He suggested to Admiral Moorer that the U.S. should completely replace all Soviet equipment in Indonesia and should also provide the amphibious or airlift for at least a brigade of Indonesian troops so that their power could be projected into trouble-spots.

—Sumitro estimated that the major threat comes from Communist China which could move through Burma or Thailand.

Admiral Moorer got the impression that there would be no difficulty in getting the Indonesians to help provided their quid pro quo was met. The quid pro quo, in Admiral Moorer's estimation, undoubtedly will be extremely large, however.

John Holdridge is completing detailed talking points for your use at tomorrow night's meeting with Sumitro and will have them to you before the close of business today.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

[2]  Document 308. The meeting took place on July 1.

310. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 8, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

General Sumitro, Indonesian Army

Brigadier General Latif, Indonesian Army

Colonel Soegeng, Indonesian Army

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Dr. Laurence E. Lynn

Mr. John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia

Dr. Kissinger said that he had read the memos covering General Sumitro's conversations with Admiral Moorer,[2] and had studied the Indonesian proposal for U.S. military assistance. In addition, he had just had a long talk with the President about the situation.[3] He had given the President a full account of the discussions in Los Angeles, and had told the President about the Indonesian defense philosophy if U.S. forces were reduced, i.e. others would need to step in, and Indonesia as the largest country in Southeast Asia would want to play a bigger role as its forces were modernized. The President had agreed. The problem now was one of how to put the Indonesian philosophy into effect. The full Indonesian list was very substantial; for example, B–52s did not appear to be the most immediate necessity. General Sumitro remarked that as he had explained to Admiral Moorer, the plan for modernizing the Indonesian forces was divided into phases.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the problem with the total list was that it was so comprehensive we found it hard to make a reasonable proposition. We would like, first, to build upon the $15 million Indonesian MAP. Although there were some here who said that the emphasis in the MAP should be put on civil construction, we recognized that this did not serve the purpose of modernization, and so would undertake a review. Second, we would look over our surplus equipment in Asia to see how much we could give. Third, we had established good success in our Government in making studies of problems such as this in terms of program analysis of requirements, and with their approval would like to do this for them to see how we could develop a reasonable program within our capabilities. We couldn't reach agreement on the full list right away, and needed a program; we also wanted to look at what we could get from surpluses. Dr. Kissinger assumed that the Indonesians could get such civil assistance items as road building equipment elsewhere, and that there would be no objection to a reordering of the Indonesian MAP.

General Sumitro said that he had discussed this with President Suharto, who had indicated that if the U.S. was in basic agreement, the MAP program would be dropped and included in the new requirement list. They hoped that MAP could be transferred into their overall requirements. Dr. Kissinger expressed the view that MAP should be continued; in fact, he had asked Dr. Lynn to see what could be obtained from MAP alone if it were concentrated on weapons. There was no need to go into details now, but a good deal might be obtained. (He read from an illustrative list.) We wanted, too, to look at surpluses. He had talked with Secretary Laird on the possibility of increasing the Indonesian MAP, and would attempt to do so, but we needed to get some idea of their needs in terms of realistic possibilities. We would look at their plan through Dr. Lynn,[4] and we would look at surpluses.

Dr. Kissinger indicated that until all of these requirements had been completed, it might be better for General Umar not to come. We did not want this matter to become too bureaucratized. If it were kept low, the Indonesians could be sure of the President's personal attention. General Sumitro agreed, observing that it would be much better if General Umar could wait. In the meantime, a study could be made in Indonesia, which he felt might require about two months. Dr. Kissinger thought that the time required might not be more than two weeks, since Dr. Lynn had done superior work before in this sort of analysis and could organize a study team quickly. This would be a good survey, which would provide us with a basis for joint action.

General Sumitro noted in response to a question from Dr. Kissinger that he was planning on returning to Djakarta on July 9. Upon his return, consideration would be given to what the Indonesia Five-Year Military Plan should be. There was as yet no idea as to magnitudes. Dr. Kissinger suggested that Dr. Lynn might be able to help in this respect. General Sumitro speculated that it might be possible to talk in terms of percentages of their total requirements list, perhaps 10–15 percent for a start. The officer in charge of laying out these requirements was just finishing up a seminar in the U.S. and was on his way to Djakarta.

Dr. Kissinger asked how we might maintain communications, to which General Sumitro replied he favored using the same special channel which now existed. In a month or two, he would have a military man in Washington who could act as a contact. Dr. Kissinger also raised the problem of maintaining security on Dr. Lynn's presence in Indonesia. On this, General Sumitro proposed that the study be made in Bali, which could be reached by direct flight to Bangkok. Dr. Kissinger observed that he would give further thought to this question, and would be in touch. Would they mind if our Ambassador knew of the study? General Sumitro replied that President Suharto felt Ambassador Galbraith could be relied upon. He was, however, subordinate to the State Department. Dr. Kissinger assured General Sumitro that we would keep this whole thing under tight control, and would look into the bureaucratic aspects.

On the question of obtaining a visa for Dr. Lynn, General Sumitro felt that this was no problem. The Indonesian Military Attaché could set it up, or it could be obtained somewhere else such as the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok (their Ambassador there was a General) or in Tokyo. General Latif observed that in the President's conversation with President Suharto the President had given assurances that Ambassador Galbraith would be kept fully informed. Dr. Kissinger agreed, but pointed out that the communications channel posed a problem. It would be difficult if we had to go through the regular channel. However, what we told our Ambassador would be our worry. Did Ambassador Galbraith know that General Sumitro was here? General Sumitro noted in reply that Ambassador Galbraith had been kept informed of his, Sumitro's, visit by the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Dr. Kissinger declared that we would keep Ambassador Galbraith informed on essential matters.

Dr. Kissinger stated that we would start now to work out the composition of the study, and the communications channels. Our requirement would be to get some sense of the magnitude of the quantities, and to know what we could realistically do. He emphasized that the President was in favor of helping. What the Indonesians had presented was a maximum program, but we needed to be realistic. Had the Indonesian plan been given to Admiral Moorer? General Sumitro said that it had not yet been given to Admiral Moorer, since they didn't regard it as a formal document. However, they would be glad to pass the plan on to Admiral Moorer if Dr. Kissinger thought that this would be desirable. It was agreed that Colonel Soegeng would give it to Mr. Holdridge for transmittal to Admiral Moorer.

Dr. Kissinger raised the issue of the Indonesian offer to provide AK–47s to Cambodia. General Sumitro said that Indonesia had 25,000 on hand which they were willing to offer as soon as they heard from Phnom Penh and as soon as U.S. replacement rifles arrived in Djakarta. They understood that the total Cambodian requirements were for 30,000 small arms. Dr. Kissinger informed General Sumitro that we would be willing to send 15,000 M–14s immediately, on loan, and replace these with M–16s under the Indonesian MAP. General Sumitro remarked that of the types of weapons available—the M–14, the AR–15, and the modified M–16—the modified M–16 was much the best. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that our proposal was to give M–14s now and replace them with M–16s as production became available.

General Sumitro raised another question: the re-equipping of the Indonesian State Police, for which they had also forwarded requirements. He pointed out that the Police were a part of the Indonesian defense establishment. Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Lynn indicated that this question, too, would be considered in the study.

Dr. Kissinger then telephoned Admiral Moorer to ask about the time which would be required to provide M–16s under the Indonesian MAP. He quoted Admiral Moorer as saying that the M–16s would be provided within a year or even less, and that the M–14s would thus be on hand for a relatively short period. These M–14s would be in good condition, since they were being held in reserve for the U.S. forces.

General Sumitro referred to the fact that the Indonesians had an arms factory capable of producing a machine gun known as the BM–59. This was a stop-gap weapon, which did not compare with the M–16. Was it correct that the U.S. had given an arms factory to Singapore for manufacturing M–16s? Mr. Holdridge said that he thought this was still under discussion, and had not yet been decided. Dr. Lynn asked if their existing factory could be converted to manufacture modern weapons, to which General Sumitro expressed uncertainties as to the technical nature of the problem. Again, the M–16 was better than anything else. Dr. Kissinger explained that we were in principle prepared to provide M–16s and would do so as soon as production caught up. We were in fact cutting back on production for our forces.

Dr. Kissinger wondered how AK–47 deliveries to Cambodia could be worked out. General Sumitro responded by saying that President Suharto wanted the Cambodians to take over this responsibility and transfer the weapons to Phnom Penh themselves. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was satisfactory, and that the Indonesians should let us know when the transfer had been completed so we could provide replacement weapons. General Sumitro then said that the Indonesians wanted the U.S. rifles first, to which Dr. Kissinger observed that we should start doing this and would take it up in the next WSAG meeting.

Dr. Kissinger touched on the question of Bandung ammunition factory, asking about its status. General Sumitro noted that the money was available in Indonesia to start building a new plant for AK–47 ammunition, and that nine months would be required for the first production. They still had ammunition reserves, but had pulled it all back to Djakarta and had re-equipped their commando and parachute brigades.

General Sumitro again brought up the question of the National Police, explaining that the Police would need to take over internal security responsibilities from the other services so that these services could concentrate on the national defense effort. Dr. Kissinger thought that our program would take care of most essentials.

General Sumitro went over Indonesian strategic concepts in the same terms which he had outlined in Los Angeles. Once again he expressed reservations about the role of Japan in Southeast Asia, pointing out that the Japanese military leaders properly understood the threat Communist China posed for Japan but that the Japanese politicians in contrast wanted to avoid a conflict with China and might accommodate. In fact, Japan's approach to the other Asian countries might even constitute an economic and political threat if things were to go wrong. When Dr. Kissinger asked what could go wrong, General Sumitro pointed once more to the possibility of a Japanese accommodation with Communist China. He hoped that the U.S. would be successful in influencing the Japanese to follow the proper line, but he was not so sure about this— he had the impression that the Japanese politicians were stubborn. Dr. Kissinger recalled that when he had been in Indonesia last year he had encountered disquiet over the future role of Japan.

The conversation concluded with a reaffirmation from Dr. Kissinger that the President had wanted very positively to respond to the Indonesian proposals and had asked that his warmest feelings be conveyed to President Suharto. He considered his relationship with President Suharto as one of the warmest he possessed. We had certain restraints on what we can do, but within these limitations we would act. We recognized the Indonesian role, which was precisely what the Nixon Doctrine required. General Sumitro should feel free to write on any subject and to keep in close contact.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Holdridge and sent to Kissinger for approval under a July 13 covering memorandum. Kissinger initialed the approve option and also approved sending an attached sanitized summary of the conversation to the Department of State, which had “been pressing for word of what was said.” Attached but not printed. The summary is also ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CAMB/KHMER. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

[2] Summarized in Document 309.

[3] According to the President's Daily Diary for July 8, Kissinger met with President Nixon from 4:17 to 5:10 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files)

[4]  Lynn had already looked at the Indonesian plan that Sumitro had given Kissinger, and had reported his conclusions in a July 7 memorandum to Kissinger. Lynn reported that the Indonesian plan requested “a complete force modernization plan,” including such new big-ticket items as B–52s and IRBMs, and that it would cost “billions of dollars.” Lynn proposed instead “to give them assistance which contributes to the priority mission of maintaining internal security,” including 18 T–37 aircraft, 20 C–47 aircraft, 10 patrol craft, 12 light landing craft, and initial equipment for 9 infantry battalions, which he estimated would cost $75 million over 5 years. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II)

311. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, August 10, 1970.

Dear Henry:

I have received a personal letter from Frank Galbraith covering a range of sensitive subjects regarding our relations with Indonesia. I thought you would be particularly interested in the following excerpts on Indonesian MAP. Frank presented these points as the views of the small circle in the Embassy who work on highly sensitive political/DCM, Political Counselor, Defense Attaché less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).

“What we are most anxious to see amplified is the timetable which the President and Dr. Kissinger have in mind for the Indonesian program. We are all agreed, as I believe you are in Washington, that Indonesia's present capability for assuming a meaningful security role in Southeast Asia is virtually nonexistent. A great deal of basic spadework needs to be done, both in stabilizing and developing the country as well as preparing the military establishment for modernization. The review of emphasis in our MAP which Dr. Kissinger mentioned to Sumitro has to a large degree already taken place. Although civic action continues to play an important role in the program, the planning under the new $15 million ceiling places primary emphasis on improving the maintenance capability, logistics, and communications of the military, along with the introduction of some combat equipment. All of these elements are, of course, a necessary preamble to a modernization program.

“President Suharto's reaction, as reported by General Sumitro to George Benson (Djakarta 5655)[2] fortunately seems to recognize the need for a measured approach. He seems to be sufficiently concerned with the budget and Indonesia's economic development to want to postpone any further burgeoning MAP for this year at least.

“There are a number of pitfalls which both we and the Indonesians will have to avoid if we want a realistic chance for a stable Indonesia capable of playing the role we envisage for it in the area. Shifting too quickly into a full-fledged modernization program, either because of our interest in forcing the pace of Indonesia's military progress, or because of the inability of the Indonesians to resist the temptations, would present us with one of two choices. Either one of these, I believe, would be undesirable at this stage. The first would be to turn over a lot of modern equipment too soon and watch it become quickly unserviceable; the other would be to provide hundreds of American trainers and advisers so that we could insist and insure that they take care of the equipment. If we were to adopt the second choice I am afraid that we would be adding significantly to the domestic political problems which are likely to mount for the Suharto Government anyway. Many of those in the Indonesian Armed Forces are all too inclined to ignore the political repercussions of actions which they consider desirable from a purely military point of view. If we compound their lack of political sophistication by ourselves ignoring such probable political repercussions, we are likely to increase their political troubles and eventually weaken the Suharto Government.

“Another area where a premature military modernization effort would weaken hopes for a stable base from which Indonesia could mount its heightened SEA role is on the economic side. It would be a tragedy should the Indonesians divert too soon their scarce resources from development into the military sector, a diversion which would be required if they were to seek to absorb more MAP, given the huge rupiah outlay required to receive, use and maintain the equipment we might give them. Progress on the economic side has been promising, but the situation remains critical. Such a diversion at this stage of the first five-year program could seriously set back the good start that has been made in economic rehabilitation.”

My personal experiences in Indonesia would support Frank's assessment.

Sincerely yours,

Marshall

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret. In an August 11 routing slip, attached but not printed, Holdridge noted that “HAK has seen, no further action necessary. JHH 8/12.”

[2] Dated August 4. (Ibid.)

312. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, October 13, 1970.

SUBJECT

Indonesian Request for U.S. Assistance in Furthering Southeast Asian Regional Military Cooperation

At Tab B[2] is a message to you from General Sumitro requesting U.S. assistance to Indonesia in furthering Southeast Asian regional military cooperation. He proposes that Indonesia take the initiative in arranging for: (1) exchanges of personnel for training; (2) strategic intelligence operations; (3) holding seminars of senior commanders on defense, intelligence and territorial warfare operations; and (4) ultimately, participation in joint military operations in border areas.

General Sumitro's thesis is that the British “East of Suez” policy and the Nixon Doctrine create a military vacuum into which the Communists (particularly Communist China) will try to move via protracted wars of national liberation, and that the free nations of the region thus have enough in common to be able to coordinate on foreign policy and defense matters if someone shows the way. This could lead to a military “gentleman's agreement,” and not necessarily to a formal military pact.

The initial costs to the U.S., as laid out by General Sumitro, would amount to a rounded-off figure of $1 million spent between 1970 and 1972 on conducting an educational program in joint strategic intelligence, a senior seminar, an Indonesian advisory and military training program in Cambodia, and a language training program. To provide for transportation of the personnel involved, Indonesia would like the loan of six C–130s, or if this is not possible, the use of U.S. aircraft as needed on an “on-call” basis. Typically, General Sumitro insists that there be no impairment of Indonesia's five-year plan by diverting funds from it.

As a final pitch, General Sumitro strongly urges that the U.S. set up an M–16 factory in Indonesia to bring about the standardization of weapons among all the free Southeast Asian nations. He suggests that the ammunition which Indonesia has sent to Cambodia be applied as a partial payment for the M–16 plant.

Comment

General Sumitro's proposal contains some intriguing aspects. We are interested in the development of regional security undertakings, and the Indonesians might well be the best ones to take the lead in this. The rather modest nature of their initial program would probably assure a good response, since there would be no implications of a formal security organization. The proposal might also be a means for getting Indonesia to move toward a security role of its own in troubled areas of Southeast Asia. The costs involved are also relatively modest.

On the other hand, we should recognize that Indonesia is not acting out of sheer altruism. A bid for six C–130s has been made to us earlier in connection with the shipment of ammunition to Cambodia, which we deflected by using U.S. aircraft, while a request for an M–16 factory has been made on several occasions, most recently during General Sumitro's conversation with you in July. It has been reiterated through regular State channels, also as part of a deal on the ammunition which they sent to Cambodia, and will probably come up again when Suharto sees the President. It is clear that they want the airplanes and the plant very badly, and may have used their regional cooperation proposal in part as the means to this particular end (or ends). They are also working their aid to Cambodia into the regional security framework, of course at our expense.

Nevertheless, as Mao Tse-tung put it, a single spark can start a prairie fire. As of now there is no movement at all toward a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia, and the Indonesians might just be able to get things going. At Tab A is a draft reply from you to General Sumitro, which while not assuming any commitment expresses interest in his proposal and suggests that he should submit it through Ambassador Galbraith so as to assure that it will receive full staffing.[3] [4]

Recommendation

That you approve the message at Tab A to General Sumitro.[5]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

[2] The September 25 message is attached but not printed.

[3] The draft was attached but not printed.

[4] Tab C was not attached.

[5]  Kissinger initialed the approve option.

313. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard)[1]

Washington, November 2, 1970.

SUBJECT

Military or Related Assistance to Indonesia in Exchange for AK–47 Ammunition

Your memorandum to me of October 27, 1970 on the above subject[2] AK–47s and ammunition which they sent to Cambodia is acceptable, i.e. providing them with $262,000 in cash and with 2,640 M–16s, each with 1000 rounds of ammunition.

I would also appreciate, however, a somewhat fuller study by Defense and State on the pros and cons of the M–16 factory which the Indonesians have requested. In this respect, I believe that it would be useful to weigh into the balance any political factors which might affect our judgment one way or the other. I would in addition like more details on the aid which we might offer in connection with the Bandung ammunition factory or the Husien Air Base Depot, specifically whether our assistance would be of an order of magnitude which would make these projects acceptable alternatives to an M–16 factory.

Pending completion of this further study, I recommend that the draft State/Defense message to Djakarta which you attached to your memorandum to me be sent without the final paragraph.[3]

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Green.

[2] Attached but not printed.

[3] The attached draft was sent as telegram 180287 to Djakarta, November 2; attached but not printed.

314. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Survey Group on Military Assistance to Indonesia

You have approved a draft message to General Sumitro informing him you will send a survey group to Indonesia to go into the question of U.S. military assistance in relation to Indonesian needs as soon as General Sumitro informs us of a suitable date. As finally sent, this message contains a new sentence to the effect that we will inform General Sumitro of the composition of the group once a date is established;[2] Lynn to come (Tab A).[3] We will of course want to inform him at an appropriate time that Dr. Lynn is no longer with the NSC and that the composition of the group will therefore be different than originally anticipated. However, any group which goes to Indonesia will be regarded as doing so under your direction and hence will be acceptable to the Indonesians.

A problem which now must be addressed is getting a suitable group organized. We believe that it would be desirable to send a small party so as to keep the visibility down, and to include one representative each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, a logistics specialist and a representative of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State. A representative of CINCPAC also should join the team for its Indonesian visit (he would pave the way for problem solving both with PACOM and MACV). The team chief preferably should be designated by the Joint Staff or DOD/ISA.

There is also a problem on how to initiate this project. No one other than Admiral Moorer is aware of the five-year improvement plan given you by the Indonesians. We suggest a game-plan which would involve your engaging in discussions with Under Secretary Irwin, Mr. Packard, and Admiral Moorer. Your luncheon on November 20 with Under Secretary Irwin and Mr. Packard would provide the opportunity to raise this with both of them, leaving only Admiral Moorer to be brought in. You could point out that:

—The Indonesians have been pressing to send a high-level mission to Washington under General Umar, their Army Chief of Staff, to determine possible levels of U.S. military assistance.

—Indonesian expectations are very high, and we, Defense, and State (the East Asian Bureau) agree that it would be inadvisable for General Umar's mission to come until we have a better feel for what they really need and what we can do. Otherwise, the Indonesians either would see our willingness to receive them as a sign that they can expect a great deal from us, or we would be placed in the position of turning them down.

—We do not want to leave the impression with the Indonesian military that we will not be helpful. The President, in fact, wants us to do what we can within the limits of available resources and has authorized an increase in the Indonesian MAP from around $4.5 million to $18 million for FY 71 (including $3 million to reimburse the Indonesians for their aid to Cambodia). The intention is to use surplus stocks as much as possible. The Indonesian military are a very important factor in the country's stability, and President Suharto wants to be able to meet their desires for new equipment to the greatest extent possible. A negative attitude on our part could seriously impair what is now a cordial U.S.-Indonesia relationship.

—At the same time, we do not wish to lend any substance to the high Indonesian expectations. We want to keep the whole question of military assistance to Indonesia under control and not let the Indonesians set the pace.

—Accordingly, you suggest that a special survey group on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia be sent out to go into Indonesian requirements and to see what we might be able to provide, particularly from surplus stocks in Vietnam. This group would plan on spending several weeks in Indonesia, and would also go to Vietnam to inquire into the surplus situation there. In this way we could hold off General Umar's mission, and keep the initiative in our hands.

—You suggest that the survey group be composed of representatives of the three Armed Services, a logistician, a CINCPAC representative, and a representative of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State. It would be headed by a military officer to be designated by the Joint Staff, or by someone of appropriate rank from OASD/ISA.

—We would want to keep the existence of the survey group very closely held. Its members would be picked very carefully and briefed thoroughly on the political sensitivities involved and on the need to stay out of the public eye while in Indonesia.

Wayne Smith (John Court for) concurs.

Recommendations

1. That you discuss with Under Secretary Irwin [4] and Mr. Packard the question of sending a survey group to Indonesia along the lines outlined above.

2. That you ask Mr. Packard to bring up this matter with Admiral Moorer.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2]. Kissinger's handwriting in the upper right-hand margin of the first page reads: “Discuss soonest. Why not smallNSC working group on model of VSSG (Vietnam Special Study Group) task force.” A note attached to the first page reads: “Xeroxed comeback copy sent to Holdridge/Kennedy 11/27 for action.” In a memorandum to Kissinger, November 30, Holdridge stated that he, Kennedy, and Dr. Wayne Smith had agreed that the NSC should not become involved directly in the group sent to Indonesia, “but rather leave this to the bureaucrats to determine and staff through the NSC process.” (Ibid.) Kissinger initialed his approval of this idea on a November 10 memorandum from Herbert Levin. (Ibid.)

[2] The attached message, sent as backchannel message WHO 2234 to Djakarta, from Kissinger to Sumitro, December 24, advised that the group was in the process of being organized, would depart shortly after the start of the new year, and “I will be communicating with you further as details are worked out.”

[3] Quoted in a November 14 memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger, attached but not printed.

[4] According to an attached but not printed December 1 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, Kissinger met with Irwin on November 30 and obtained his agreement “on the desirability of sending a survey group to Indonesia to consider military assistance which might be provided by the U.S.” The memorandum also suggested that Kissinger meet with Packard “following the next SRG meeting.”

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, November 21, 1970, 0430Z.

8770. For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador.

1. We have had some pretty good indications last few days that contrary some previous reports debate is still going on within Indonesian Government over question of seeking Soviet assistance for rehabilitation of Soviet military equipment (or has been reopened as a result of a new and presumably more attractive Soviet offer). My hunch is that foreign office plus certain elements in military concerned both with Indonesian nonaligned image and with importance of Soviet equipment in air and navy (and this does not include apparently chiefs of staff of these two services) are pressing Suharto to seek Soviet assistance in military field. We have also received indication from member of staff of Chief of Air Force Suwoto that Soviet Ambassador has in last few days given President Suharto rosy picture of possible future Soviet military assistance. I have agreed to meet informally and privately with Chief of Staff of Air Suwoto this coming Monday evening at his request to discuss this matter, his purpose apparently being to seek my reaction and to enlist my efforts to emphasize to Suharto U.S. intentions in military assistance field in way which would counter Soviet approach.

2. I talked with new Director General for Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry, Djajadiningrat, yesterday I was asked whether I didn't agree that Indonesia should seek support from Soviets for rehabilitation Soviet military equipment. I said this was decision for GOI but that from my point of view if price was right and Indonesia could preserve its independence of action I saw no objection.

3. I would appreciate reassurance[2] that line I took with Djajadiningrat is correct one, particularly if, as we suspect, Soviets are raising the ante.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

[2]  Green reassured Galbraith in telegram 191309 to Djakarta, November 22. (Ibid.)

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, November 24, 1970, 1000Z.

8853. For Asst. Sec. Green from Ambassador. Ref: A. Djakarta 8770[2] [3]

1. Before meeting mentioned para 1 ref A took place last night we learned that Chief of Staff of Air Suwoto was having cold feet about discussing alleged Soviet offers of military assistance with me. Nevertheless Suwoto and his chief of operations (Air Vice Marshal Slamat, who had served as intermediary) showed up at house of one of DLG staff and after some awkwardness about opening up subject (I eventually took initiative) Suwoto talked briefly and in very general terms about “probability” that Soviets will make attractive offer of military assistance to Indonesia. Suwoto said it is apparent to him that Soviets want to establish themselves in Southeast Asia in order to out-flank Communist China and that strenuous efforts they are making in this regard elsewhere in area is indication they will make attractive offer of military assistance to Indonesia. Suwoto said he does not want his air force split into two sections, one supplied by Soviet and one by U.S. (implying he is not in favor of accepting Soviet assistance) but he also implied that unless U.S. moves faster with its assistance for close air and other support for Indonesian air force he may be forced to take Soviet assistance.

2. I questioned Suwoto as closely as I could on whether Soviets had already made an offer or indicated in any concrete way that they are prepared to discuss the matter further. He maintained that this was all still in the conditional and the realm of possibility.

3. Air Marshal Slamat had also indicated previously that Suwoto would press me on possible procurement of excess B–25 aircraft. Suwoto did not do so although he queried me in general terms about availability of excess material in Vietnam. He also questioned me in general terms about future of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia. I replied in equally general terms that it was possible that there would be some excess equipment in Vietnam available that would be useful to Indonesia although we had not thus far been able to locate much within context our MAP. With respect to future U.S. military assistance I only said that Congress was watching this very carefully but that I felt sure we would do our fair share to help countries which showed that they could help themselves.

4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]contact has repeatedly assured [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Indonesians would not accept offer on spare parts from Soviets for Soviet military equipment. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] contact told [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on November 23 that Soviet military attaché had recently approached Suwoto with offer of spare parts for Indonesian air force. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] less than 1 line of source text not declassified]contact said he would advise [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] results their investigation.

5. Comment: It is hard to sort truth from fiction among the spongy and sometimes contradictory discussions referred to above. Our best guess is that although GOI, particularly army, has decided against accepting Soviet assistance and number of Soviet personnel which go with it, there are those among the armed services and, of course, in foreign office who believe that offer of credit terms which Malik brought back from Moscow for purchase of spare parts for military equipment should be taken up. The Soviets may be seeking to reopen the debate within the military over accepting Soviet spare parts (and incidentally embarrass the U.S. since they undoubtedly aware of our tardiness in delivering promised air force items) by a specific and presumably more attractive offer. Whatever Suwoto's motives in approaching me, he obviously backed away at last moment possibly at insistence of Hankam.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret; Nodis. Repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral McCain. A notation on the first page in Kissinger's handwriting reads: “We can't rest till they [or they will] buy Soviet arms. HK” An arrow was drawn from this notation to Haig's name, which is followed by Haig's initials.

[2]  Document 315.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 315.

317. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Aid to Indonesia

State (Tab A)[2] requests your approval for a U.S. endorsement of (a) a World Bank recommendation that Indonesia receive $640 million in aid from all sources in 1971/72 and (b) a pledge of $215 million as the U.S. share of the total.

The proposed package would support your general aid strategy of shifting U.S. assistance increasingly into a multilateral framework, and the high priority you place on Indonesia. The FY 71 allocation necessary to support this U.S. pledge would be within expected appropriations and the approved budgetary outlay ceilings. Treasury, Agriculture, and OMB (Tab B) concur.[3]

The $640 million Indonesian aid requirement was calculated by the World Bank, which coordinates the major non-Communist aid donors through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI).

The U.S. pledge of $215 million will consist of $90 million in food aid and $125 million of non-food aid. Both pledges are consistent with the formula used last year, that the United States provide a “fair share” of food and one-third of bilateral non-food aid. It would, however, represent a slight decline from our $230 million contribution this year.

Foreign aid has played a key role in stabilizing the Indonesian economy following the disastrous policies of Sukarno. The rate of inflation in 1970 has been less than 7 percent, compared with 600 percent in 1966. An increase in food availability, particularly rice, is the key to the success of the stabilization program. A sound rice policy has been instituted under which domestic procurement of rice by the Government has more than doubled over last year, helping assure an incentive price for farmers while eliminating seasonal fluctuations in urban rice prices.

In April 1970, basic reforms were introduced to simplify the foreign exchange system; exports thereby increased in the first ten months of 1970 by about 15 percent, despite falling prices for rubber and tin. Imports are being focused on high priority sectors. Indonesia's net foreign exchange position has improved, and foreign investment continues to be attracted to priority sectors. An international formula for rescheduling Indonesian debt has been worked out, and we expect to sign a bilateral agreement which will allow Indonesia to reschedule its debts to the U.S.

The problems facing Indonesia are still severe: generating long-term economic growth is difficult in view of the weak economic base; corruption continues to be a major problem; and the country's lack of a strong administrative capacity impairs even the most carefully conceived development plans.

However, President Suharto, with the assistance of the World Bank and the U.S., is sincerely trying to correct these problems and is showing encouraging success.

Recommendation

That you approve State's recommendation that the U.S. endorse (a) the $640 million 1971/72 aid requirement for Indonesia from all sources and (b) pledge $215 million as the U.S. contribution to meeting that total.[4]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent for action. An attached December 15 memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the National Security Council staff to Kissinger indicates that the memorandum was drafted by the former and sent to the latter on that date. An attached routing slip indicates it was approved by Kissinger on December 16.

[2] A December 5 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to President Nixon is attached but not printed.

[3] A December 14 memorandum from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, George P. Shultz, to President Nixon is attached but not printed.

[4]  Kissinger initialed the approve option for the President on December 16.

318. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 23, 1970.

SUBJECT

U.S. Response to Indonesia's “Five Year Military Plan”

This memorandum follows up on a recent conversation on the above subject you had with Under Secretary Irwin and has his approval.[2]

Indonesian military leaders appear determined to draw from us within the very near future a reaction to their proposal to assume regional security responsibilities as well as a more precise indication of the military support we will be giving them over the next five years.

They have not provided us and perhaps have not yet formulated a clear picture of Indonesia's prospective security role in the region. They seem to envisage as a first step, however, an in-country training program for other Southeast Asian troops as well as the stationing of Indonesian advisors in Cambodia and perhaps other forward areas. By the end of the “Five Year Plan,” they might well hope to equip a modern, mobile strike force to stand by for possible deployment on the mainland.

We believe that we must at this point provide as unequivocal a response as possible to this Indonesian démarche if we are to place our future relations on a sound basis and avoid leading the Indonesians into potentially harmful miscalculations. In formulating our response, we should bear in mind that it is in the Indonesian nature to expect more than is usually possible and to request more than is really expected.

The enclosed paper discusses the current Indonesian probe and evaluates alternative U.S. responses. Following are our views on the approach we should take with the Indonesians:

We should discourage the Indonesians from thinking that we will underwrite a regional security role for them over the next five years:

—Even should funds for such a program be available, we cannot promote Indonesia into a role to which it must be elected by its neighbors. Indeed, efforts to do so would probably be counterproductive as other nations would resent Indonesia's serving as a middleman for U.S. military assistance.

—More compelling, some of Indonesia's neighbors might well view an Indonesian external defense capability as a threat rather than a contribution to their own security.

—Finally and most important, Indonesia's assumption of regional security responsibilities before it has developed necessary management, logistical and operational capabilities will only delay efforts to lay an indigenous base for a more effective defense establishment.

On the other hand, we should be as positive and forthcoming as possible in helping Indonesia over the next five years to build an indigenous logistical base which would permit it to play a role in the area commensurate with its size, population and economic potential. This approach is discussed under Section V B of the attached paper. It would involve supplying light combat items wanted and required by Indonesia for helping to meet its internal security needs as well as continued concentration on improving Indonesia's maintenance, transport and communications capabilities. In addition we might afford assistance in building up defense-related industries. If a suitable program can be worked out, we should consider increasing the currently planned FY 1972–76 annual MAP levels of $15 million ($13 million funded and $2 million excess) over the next few years to permit support for a defense-related industry (estimated at approximately $2 to $3 million per year).

We strongly recommend informing the Indonesians of the approximate levels of both funded and long supply/excess support they can expect to receive under MAP for the next year or two, subject to Congressional appropriations. Failure to do so could well lead to exaggerated expectations and thus future misunderstandings. In this respect we support Alternative D under Section VI of the attached paper.[3] Using the current $15 million planning figure, our Defense Liaison Group in Djakarta is now working up a general prospectus of the types and amounts of MAP-supplied equipment we believe Indonesia will require next year and beyond.

We share your view that it is preferable to send a group of qualified DOD and State Officials to Djakarta to discuss this matter there with the Indonesians before General Umar's proposed visit to the U.S. This group could also look quietly into the question of increasing LS/E for Indonesia and helping to set up a vehicle and equipment repair facility. We believe, however, that we should define our response to this Indonesian initiative before entering into these discussions in Djakarta, which might best be timed for late January or early February.

R.C. Brewster [4]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

U.S. RESPONSE TO INDONESIAN REQUEST FOR MAP SUPPORT OF A FIVE YEAR MILITARY PLAN

I. The Problem

The Indonesian military leaders have reportedly approved a “Five Year Military Plan” which projects a regional security role for the Indonesian Armed Forces. They have urgently pressed for high level, bilateral meetings to sound out U.S. reaction to this plan, which would apparently rely on MAP support.

We have as yet obtained only a very sketchy outline of the Indonesian plan and it is possible that the Indonesians wish to probe the degree of U.S. support for this general concept before developing further their ideas. As a first step, they apparently envisage a large in-country training program for Malaysian, Thai, Laotian, Cambodian and perhaps other Southeast Asian troops and the establishment of regular channels for the exchange of military intelligence. (This would in fact be expansion of arrangements Indonesia has already established on a bilateral basis with certain countries.) The Indonesians also have spoken of stationing Indonesian territorial warfare advisors in Cambodia and may envisage a regional advisory effort.

Towards the end of the Five Year Plan, the Indonesians probably wish to establish and equip a modern, mobile land force for possible deployment to the mainland, a navy strike force consisting of destroyers, submarines and attack transports and an enlarged Air Force transport arm. In addition, the Indonesians have clearly indicated their willingness to provide troops for a peacekeeping role in Viet-Nam under certain political conditions.

Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Umar Wirahadikusumah has been invited to visit the U.S. in late March and early April, 1971. The Indonesian military leadership has clearly indicated that his primary mission will be to obtain a high level reaction to the Indonesian Five Year Military Plan.

The U.S. will consequently be faced in the near future with the problem of (1) commenting on Indonesia's plan to assume a regional role and (2) responding in some manner to an Indonesian request for MAP support for this plan. This paper discusses first the principal factors influencing the Indonesians to make this request, secondly the assets and liabilities which Indonesia would bring to a regional security role, and finally possible U.S. responses to this Indonesian démarche.

[Omitted here is discussion of further factors underlying the Indonesian request and possible U.S. responses.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Top Secret.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 314.

[3] Alternative D of Section VI of the attached 10-page paper, “U.S. Response to Indonesian Request for MAP Support of a Five Year Military Plan,” specified that the U.S. Government “could inform the Indonesians of an approximate ceiling both on funded and long supply/excess equipment.”

[4] Deputy Executive Secretary Brewster signed above Eliot's typed signature.

319. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, December 24, 1970.

SUBJECT

Current Status of the Multilateral Development Effort for Indonesia

The December 15–16 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI) in Rotterdam illustrates how a multilateral assistance effort can in time assume an inner dynamism of its own. Because this aid consortium so clearly demonstrates the basic principles of the Nixon Doctrine, it is worth noting some of the IGGI's accomplishments beyond those mirrored in the encouraging statistics of Indonesia's performance and donor nations' response.

The IGGI has grown not only in terms of donors and donations but, perhaps more important, in its ability to promote healthy change in Indonesia's institutions. The unanimous approval given to Indonesia's $640 million foreign assistance projection for 1971, the decision of four countries to join the US in announcing their assistance in advance of the April pledging session, and Canada's entry into full IGGI membership may be attributed in part to Indonesia's sound economic performance over the past year. Also a major contributing factor, however, was the member nations' increased confidence in the IGGI as an effective vehicle for stimulating modernization in all sectors of Indonesian society.

After commending Indonesian performance in economic stabilization, the Rotterdam meeting discussed candidly the many institutional deficiencies which continue to hamper development efforts. Criticism on the part of donors, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, however, was most carefully phrased so that it might be used as a lever by Indonesia's problem solvers to lift burdens imposed on their economy by special interest groups.

Steps taken to ensure a more rational use of Indonesia's now substantial and rapidly expanding oil revenues is one example of how moves by the IGGI, the World Bank and the Indonesian Planning Bureau have been carefully and unobtrusively synchronized to help solve sensitive internal problems. Because the national oil company Pertamina has long served as a source of support for influential segments of Indonesian society, including the Armed Forces, it was politically impossible two years ago for Indonesia's economic planners to demand an accurate accounting of its receipts and expenditures. Brief mention of this problem by donors prior to and during last year's IGGI meeting, however, set in motion joint discussions between Indonesia's Planning Bureau and World Bank representatives which resulted in written recommendations to President Suharto. At the Rotterdam meeting this month the Indonesians were able to announce that legislation is now before Parliament which will place a significant portion of Indonesia's oil revenues into the national treasury for the benefit of the society as a whole. The IGGI's Dutch Chairman responded with a tactful request for further information on oil revenues during the next IGGI session, a peg which will undoubtedly be used in coming months to initiate further reforms.

In much the same manner, improvements are being initiated in the tax and tariff structure, investment policies, fertilizer distribution, floor prices for the rice farmer, and several other pressing areas. These are all politically volatile sectors in which the intervention of individual foreign governments would be neither welcome nor helpful. The IGGI framework, however, has permitted donor nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to give discreet, highly effective support to the efforts of President Suharto and his economic planners to modernize their society's institutions. Although these particular accomplishments of the IGGI must remain unheralded, they are as essential to Indonesia's growth as the transfer of resources and technical skills, which is the IGGI's stated goal.

RC Brewster

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 531, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. II. Secret.

320. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, July 27, 1971, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko

Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko saw the President on July 27 for the purpose of paying a farewell call. Dr. Kissinger sat in. The White House photographer took pictures at the beginning of the meeting.

The President and the Ambassador began by discussing the President's July 15 China announcement,[2] which the Ambassador said marks a change in world history. The President agreed that it represents a massive change in world history—a visit by the leader of the most powerful country in the world to the most populous country.

The President assured the Ambassador that our action relates solely to our relations with Mainland China, and is not in derogation of any of our friends. Indonesia, he continued, is a tremendous force in Asia and in the Pacific. We have told the Indonesians we will assist them in their military programs. Under no circumstances will this Government move in any way against the interests of Indonesia. Dr. Kissinger noted that we have ordered an increase in U.S. military assistance to Indonesia. The President added that we have internal problems to contend with here.

The Ambassador said that it is of principal importance to his country to know what kind of US presence there will be in Asia in the future, in terms of economic and military aid. The President replied that we will continue our economic aid and we will even keep our military presence. Indonesia need have no fear of a US withdrawal.

The Ambassador then commented that what is important is how to place our withdrawal from Vietnam into some future kind of system. It is not enough to give personal assurance—one must make specific proposals. The Ambassador wanted to relieve himself of some anxiety, particularly on Japan. Everything should be done to keep Japan from going nuclear. There must be a concert of world powers, of which one is not assured. But it must be done.

The President emphasized his agreement on the importance of maintaining our world presence. But some, like Fulbright and Mansfield, are a problem. Actually, Mansfield is a great fellow, the President added. But if we get out of Asia, Japan will go nuclear or make a deal with somebody.

The Ambassador emphasized that his country is not worried over the terms of a Vietnam settlement or about the American President. We are worried, he said, about the credibility of the American people's performance. The Ambassador also commented that Japan is basically a tribal society, with no world view.

The Ambassador then referred to the rubber issue, with which Indonesia was very concerned. [This involved the GSA's resumption of U.S. rubber stockpile sales, announced July 7.][3] Dr. Kissinger replied that we would look seriously at the counterproposals which had just been submitted by the rubber-producing countries.

The meeting then ended.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

[2] President Nixon announced to the nation on July 15 that he had accepted an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China and that Kissinger had already held talks in Peking with Premier Chou En-lai July 9–11. (Public Papers: Nixon , 1971, pp. 819–820)

[3] Brackets in the source text.

321. Memorandum for the President's File[1]

Washington, September 14, 1971, 10:45–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President, Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith and Brigadier General A. M. Haig, Jr., September 14, 1971 (10:45–11:45 a.m.)

The President opened the meeting by welcoming Ambassador Galbraith and expressing his personal appreciation for the Ambassador's effective efforts over the past two years. The President recalled his meeting with Ambassador Galbraith at the time of the President's Asian trip, just after the Ambassador's arrival in Djakarta.

The President then asked the Ambassador for his view on the effectiveness of President Suharto and the Ambassador's estimate of the influence that the military had on Suharto's government. Ambassador Galbraith replied that President Suharto's demeanor was one of great reserve. Although his accession to power was based on the actions of the professional military in Indonesia he had been careful to insure a proper balance of civilian and military influence. His recent appointments were primarily civilian.

The President inquired about how President Suharto was getting along with Foreign Minister Malik, noting that in the past there had been some friction between the two men. The Ambassador answered that their relationship appeared to have warmed in recent months, especially after Malik played an active role in support of the President in the recent elections.

Ambassador Galbraith stated that the situation in Indonesia was very promising at the present time. In response to a Presidential question on the progress made with respect to U.S. investment in the country, the Ambassador reported that this year foreign investments would amount to $1.1 billion U.S. dollars, of which one-third represented U.S. investment. He noted that Indonesian oil exploitation had increased substantially and that their hardwood production would amount this year to over $100 million, with the possibility of reaching $500 million in the future.

The President asked Ambassador Galbraith whether the atmosphere was favorable for U.S. investment in Indonesia. The Ambassador answered that considerable improvement had been made, although there were still many frustrations which a prospective investor had to overcome. He stated that it would take a considerable period of time to reach an optimum situation but that patience on the part of U.S. investors would generally meet with success.

The President next asked for the Ambassador's assessment of the Indonesians' attitude toward his China initiative. Ambassador Galbraith replied that without question the Indonesians were experiencing an underlying nervousness with respect to the U.S. initiative. The President stated that he wished the Ambassador to actively attempt to put U.S. logic in its proper perspective. He noted that many incorrectly had assumed that our initiative was based on a U.S. assessment that the Chinese had changed or, in fact, the Chinese Communists had never been a source of tension. This was patently incorrect. The U.S. had carefully assessed the need to review our posture with respect to China and had concluded that the dangers of the continued isolation of 800 million Chinese were no longer acceptable. We had concluded, therefore, that a very careful deliberate and pragmatic opening towards normalization represented in the long run a strengthening of the security of the countries in the area and reduced the risks that an atmosphere of isolation and confrontation would entail. He emphasized the importance of Ambassador Galbraith's making clear to the Indonesians that our approaches to the Chinese were deliberate and calculated. They were not based on the naive assumption that fundamental changes in Chinese performance could be expected.

The President then asked Ambassador Galbraith for his assessment of the Indonesian attitude toward the U.S. military presence in Asia. The Ambassador answered that the Indonesians were extremely nervous at the prospect of U.S. withdrawal. He noted that in fact General Habib, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff, was visiting Washington now with the view towards ascertaining long range U.S. plans with respect to a military presence in Asia. The President stated that the Indonesian view appeared consistent with the view of other Asians and that he had no intention of eliminating our military presence in Asia. At the same time it was obvious that the aftermath of the Vietnam conflict would require some reductions.

The President then asked the Ambassador how the Indonesians view U.S. Vietnam policies. The Ambassador replied that the main concern of the Indonesians was that we would withdraw too quickly from Vietnam. The Ambassador added that the present political turmoil in Saigon did not represent a problem to the Indonesians except to the degree that it might affect our withdrawal rates.

In concluding the meeting, the President noted that there were those high level policy makers in the U.S. Government who felt quite strongly that U.S. assistance to Indonesia and, in fact, other developing nations such as those in Latin America should be channeled primarily through economic assistance and that military assistance tended to retard progress. The President stated that he did not accept this view. He asserted that it was essential that all understand that a developing country such as Indonesia, with thousands of miles of coastline, a strong military influence and an essentially military leadership had to have a substantial military capability if political stability was to be assured.[2] He noted that this was true in many Latin American states as well. He cautioned the Ambassador to keep this reality in mind as U.S. assistance efforts are developed. The Ambassador responded that the $25 million military assistance package for Indonesia appeared to be a sound one which maintained the proper balance between military and economic aid.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 532, Country Files, Far East, Indonesia, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted and initialed by Haig.

[2]  Nixon signed Presidential Determination No. 72–3, September 7, to provide a program of $25 million in military assistance to Indonesia during FY 1972. An attached August 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon contains the former's recommendations of the program. (Ibid., Box 370, Subject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71–11– 72–09/71) Further recommendation of increased military assistance to Indonesia had been provided by Ambassador David Kennedy in his meeting with President Nixon on April 9. Kennedy noted, according to a memorandum of conversation of that date, that Assistant Secretary Green was against this military assistance, “dominated our policies in Indonesia from his Washington desk,” and had “hand-picked” the top officers at the Embassy in Jakarta. Kennedy added that “he had been very unimpressed with both their attitudes and their ability.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Boxes 83–87, Memoranda for the President)

322. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1971, President Nixon met with Secretary of Defense Laird and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to discuss foreign policy matters, including Indonesia. They met from 3:16 to 4:20 p.m. in the Executive Office Building. At the time, Secretary of the Treasury Connally was traveling to various East Asian countries; see Document 323 for a report of Connally's trip to Indonesia. The following is an excerpt of the conversation among Nixon, Laird, and Kissinger:

President: “Let's get a hardnosed judgment, and when Connally gets back I think it will be very useful for him to sit down and give us his feel of Suharto, of Indonesia, don't you agree?”

Laird: “Oh, yeah. Well, I'm all for the Indonesian thing. I—”

President: “Mel—Well, let me ask you—”

Laird: [unclear]

President: “Let me say, Mel, I want you within the administration to push quite hard on the Suharto thing.”

Laird: “I've been pushing hard.”

President: “You will. And in public meetings—I mean in our meetings with the NSC. Because this is one thing I, we, have a constant battle with Marshall Green. Marshall Green is wrong about this. You can't have a thousand miles of islands with no damn equipment to defend those damn islands.”

Laird: “No, I don't think we don't. We won't prod them” [unclear]

President: “With Suharto in power …”

Laird: [unclear]

President: “We have to keep Suharto in power, too. Let's face it. Otherwise, you get another goddamn Sukarno in there.”

Laird: “Well, I'm going to let Westy go in there. Now Westy [unclear]. Apparently he wants to travel around the” [unclear]—

President: “Let him take a look.”

Laird: “I think so—”

President: “Don't you think so, Henry?”

Kissinger: “Absolutely.”

President: “That's excellent. When's he going?”

Laird: “He's going in there the first week in January.”

President: “Well, have him drop over and have a talk with me. I mean I should give him a little blessing anyway. He'll appreciate it. Let's do that. Let's get—you bring him over with [unclear]. He's a fine man. He deserves a little—and tell him to give us a real report on that. Not a silly report. Indonesia is the big prize. It's a big prize. We don't think of it very often.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Laird, and Kissinger, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 299–19)

General William Westmoreland traveled to Southeast Asia in late January and early February 1972. He delivered a letter from Nixon to Suharto (Document 327) and met with Suharto on February 3 (Document 329).

On November 14, 1971, Nixon and Connally met in the Executive Office Building from 5:02 p.m. to 6:41 p.m. about the latter's trip to Southeast Asia. In this wide-ranging discussion, Connally included a report of a conversation with President and Imelda Marcos in Manila and a substantive conversation with the King of Thailand in Bangkok. The following is an excerpt of Connally's conversation with Nixon about his meetings with Suharto and some of the leading ministers in Indonesia:

Connally: “So I gave them—I said: ‘The President asked me to see you and [unclear] too great to withdraw. The Nixon Doctrine is designed to draw on these [unclear] and so forth.' And I talked about the foreign aid thing and I told him that I'd talk to him on the foreign aid picture and said that you had recognized that [unclear] of protectionism of the United States largely because of what had been happening to it, and that you took the steps on August 15th both to correct the imbalance in our trade situation, and secondly, Congress still wants protectionism before they became too vocal in the United States. As part of that, you felt just that you could cut foreign aid ten percent and you did that. Well, but the Congress said, because they were in control of an opposite Party, thought that they had to get in some of the political popularity of protectionism—ok, so—growing in this country, so they just cut it all out. Now I'm sure the President can get it restored, and I said, ‘I don’t know in exactly what forms or in what amount but the administration is going to do everything within our power—'”

President: “Um-hmm.”

Connally: “‘to restore foreign aid.’And I said, ‘We’re not going to leave Indonesia. We're going to stay in Southeast Asia militarily, financially, economically, [unclear], for as long as we can now see.' And— so this is quite reassuring to all of them. And I think it particularly was to Suharto. His wife entertained at a luncheon for us, took us all to her home. One night with about ten of his Cabinet, he had dinner for us and all of our group and we had—we had a real good meeting with them on three different occasions. We met with all of his top economic people. And I'm very impressed with them.”

President: “Are you? In Indonesia?”

Connally: “Yes, sir.”

President: “Good. Good.”

Connally: “Oh, they are over there.”

President: “That's an important country.”

Connally: “They're all articulate. They're all highly educated. They're all fluent in English. They're all graduates, most of them, from United States schools. The Finance Minister spent 4 years at Berkeley. One of them is a graduate of Pennsylvania. One of them is from Purdue. They're all, as I've said, they're all damn smart, all of importance—”

President: “Good.”

Connally: “—[and] very aggressive. I found all of them extremely honest, extremely busy people, and he's listening to them. Suharto listens to them. As I've said, he's got a couple of old military buddies, a couple generals that are still around, that at least our people don't like; they think they're bad men, real [unclear], but—”

President: “Suharto raised the military aid thing with the U.S.? Did you reassure him that we are [unclear]—”

Connally: “Yes. And primarily he's—”

President: “At least that's one place where there's no damn difference with the State Department there.”

Connally: “He very much wants military and other aid for the simple reason that he wants to help Cambodia, and he's willing to do it.”

President: “Um-hmm.”

Connally: “He's willing to do it himself.”

President: “Um-hmm.”

Connally: “Or he's willing to serve as a conduit, but he is extremely interested in the military agreement” [unclear]. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Connally, Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 296–16) The editor transcribed the portions of the conversations printed here specifically for this volume.

323. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State [1]

Tokyo, November 12, 1971, 0735Z.

Conto 48/11325. Pass Treasury. Subj: Connally Visit:[2] East Asia: Suharto.

1. Participants: H.E. General Suharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia; H.E. Ali Wardhana, Minister of Finance; Lt. General Alamsjah, State Secretary; General Sutikno, Presidential Secretary; General Sudarmono, Secretary to the Cabinet; Mr. Widodo, Interpreter; Secretary of the Treasury, John B. Connally; Ambassador Francis J. Galbraith, Nov 5, 1971, Istana Negara, Djakarta, Indonesia.

2. Following is the text of the memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Secretary Connally and President Suharto drafted by Ambassador Galbraith and approved by the Secretary's party.

3. The Secretary conveyed President Nixon's warm regards to Suharto and expressed his own pleasure at being able to visit Indonesia.

4. Suharto began by describing, in familiar terms, Indonesia's economic development plans. He said these were modest in the first five years, covering merely the provision of the basic necessities of food, clothing and housing (the latter in the form of materials only). In the second five year plan some processing of the raw materials which constitute Indonesia's main exports would hopefully begin, establishing an industrial capacity. In the third five year plan Indonesia would start to produce its basic industrial requirements. Suharto mentioned the development of oil, minerals and timber which would provide additional foreign exchange.

5. Suharto said that Indonesia manufactured about 80 percent of its requirements in textiles but produced very little of the raw materials required. Indonesia did not seem to be particularly favorable for cotton production and most of its cotton therefore, thus far, had to be supplied from abroad.

6. Suharto emphasized that Indonesia's economic development depended mainly on its own efforts but, particularly in the present transition period, it also depended importantly on foreign aid. And in the provision of foreign aid, the position of the U.S. was key to the provision of foreign aid by others. He expressed some concern about the recent Senate actions;[3] about the upcoming IGGI meeting where the U.S. pledge was of great importance;[4] about the announced 10 percent cut in foreign aid; about the replenishment of IDA funds; and about Cambodian aid. Suharto stressed the importance of aid to Cambodia, a country which was not only threatened by subversion along with its neighbors, but by the presence of foreign troops. The defense of Cambodia was of major importance to the defense of Cambodia's neighbors. Indonesia was weak and could do little to help Cambodia but it was trying to do what it could to increase Cambodia's sense and capacity for national resistance.

7. Suharto suggested that the Secretary might wish to comment on both the short and long term outlook for U.S. economic and military assistance in the region.

8. The Secretary began by describing the basic reasons for the recent Senate action on the aid bill. He said this was not a case of sudden pique because of the vote in the UN on Taiwan, although that may have been the immediate cause for the particular timing. The underlying cause was the mood of the country and the conviction of the American people that the U.S. had too long been bearing all the burdens of foreign assistance and common defense to the neglect of its own national interests, while other countries, able to help, were not doing so to the extent of their capacities and were, moreover, taking unfair advantage of the U.S. in trade.

9. The Secretary said that President Nixon's announcement of a 10 percent cut in foreign aid had been the most popular thing this administration had done. 83 percent of the people had expressed approval and only 6 percent had disapproved. The economic measures announced on August 15 had also met with strong public approval. This did not mean that the American people were returning to isolationism or would fail to share their wealth or to show compassion for the needs of others. But the administration had won public approval for its measures demonstrating that it was doing something about the U.S. balance of payments situation and about the lack of fairness which had grown into the currency and other financial and trade relationships between the U.S. and, especially, the industrialized countries. The Secretary said that in his view the Senate action was, as is often true, 60–75 days behind the mood of public opinion in the United States. That public opinion had already shifted, as a result of the administration's action, in favor of the continuation of foreign aid, in the Secretary's opinion. The Senate would be realizing this and acting accordingly.

10. The Secretary said he did not know what form the legislation would take but he was personally confident the Senate would act to continue aid—both military and economic. It was in the U.S. interest that it do so.

11. The Secretary stressed the common interests of Indonesia and the U.S. in Indonesia's development. Indonesia produced raw and semi-processed materials for which the U.S. had an insatiable appetite. On the other hand, Indonesia's population of 120 million provided a potential market of great interest to the U.S. We wanted a greater not a lesser relationship with Indonesia. It would make no sense for the U.S. to abandon Indonesia at this point; on the contrary it made good sense for the U.S. to expand Indonesia's economic development and help assure its stability.

12. The Secretary also stressed the intentions of the Nixon administration, and in his opinion of the U.S., to remain in Southeast Asia in a military, economic, financial and cultural sense. The U.S. was withdrawing its troops from Vietnam and it was the U.S. policy to avoid involvement in further military action in Southeast Asia. But the U.S. would continue to exert an influence and to do its part in further strengthening the ability of the countries in Southeast Asia to defend themselves and to maintain their independence and develop themselves economically. Indeed it was the success of the efforts thus far of the counties of Southeast Asia in strengthening their own capacities and the success of U.S. programs in helping them do this that had made it possible for President Nixon to go to Peking and Moscow with the objective of reducing world tensions and misunderstandings that might lead to confrontation. This was also in the common interest of the free world.

13. The Secretary affirmed his strong personal belief that the U.S. would continue to help Indonesia and that it would make the pledge, as it had in the past, in the meeting of the IGGI December next. The Secretary stressed that he could not, of course, guarantee this but he was personally confident that it would take place.

14. With regard to the ten percent cut, which as he had already mentioned had served to strengthen the hand of the administration in continuing foreign aid as a principal policy tool, the Secretary said there was no requirement that it be leveled across the board and no certainty that it would affect the Indonesian program at all. He expressed the opinion that whatever aid monies the U.S. had would go first to those that supported the U.S. In this connection, the Secretary called attention to the recent vote in the UN on Taiwan, noting that Indonesia had supported the U.S. The Secretary told Suharto that he wanted to convey the special thanks of President Nixon for the support Indonesia had given the U.S. on the Taiwan issue. The Secretary said, “We lost, but our position was right.”

15. The Secretary also noted the fact that the replenishment bill for IDA funds had passed in the Senate and was now under consideration in the House. He thought that the outlook for this legislation was good.

16. With regard to Cambodia, the Secretary said the administration had every intention of continuing its assistance to Cambodia.

17. Comment: There was visible evidence in the faces of President Suharto and of those who sat in the meeting with him (Minister of Finance Wardhana, General Alamsjah, General Sudarmono, General Sutikno and others of the President's staff) of their pleasure at the forthright way the Secretary had spoken on Indonesia's favorable position in the eyes of the U.S. (the Secretary said that Indonesia's accomplishments in stabilization and economic development had been little short of phenomenal.) Following the foregoing, President Suharto and Secretary Connally withdrew for a separate and private conversation of about twenty minutes duration.[5]

Connally

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally.

[2]  Connally traveled to East Asia in November on behalf of President Nixon.

[3] The Senate rejected the House-passed foreign aid bill (HR 9910) on October 29, thus failing to authorize appropriations for both military and economic aid in fiscal years 1972 and 1973. The defeat of the bill constituted the first outright rejection of foreign aid legislation in the 24-year history of the program. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 876–877) Telegram 202840 to Djakarta, November 5, reported Green's efforts to reassure Indonesian Ambassador Sjarif Thajeb that “there would be a continuing aid program though likely at somewhat reduced levels.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDON)

[4] In telegram 180503 to USUN, October 1, the Department reported Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik's concern, expressed to Rogers at the UN General Assembly, that the United States might not follow its “recent practice by leading off with its pledge at December IGGI meeting. This would have an inhibiting effect on other potential donors.” Rogers responded that “he could not comment on the matter now since those aspects of the economic policy were still under study.” (Ibid., POL 7 INDON)

[5] No record of this private meeting was found. Records of Connally's meetings with the Indonesian economic advisory team, telegram 11329 from Tokyo, November 12, and with Sir Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Indonesian Minister of State for Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs, telegram 11330 from Tokyo, November 12, as well as other reports concerning the Treasury Secretary's visit, are ibid., POL 7 US/Connally.

324. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro [1]

Washington, December 11, 1971.

Your messages of December 5[2] and December 9[3] on the question of the U. S. pledge to be made at the IGGI meeting December 13 were much appreciated. President Suharto's letter to President Nixon on this subject[4] has also been delivered by Ambassador Thajeb. I hope that President Suharto by now will have received President Nixon's reply[5] explaining his thinking on this matter, which is unquestionably of great importance to both of our countries.

As President Nixon stated in his reply, we fully share your concern that the momentum of Indonesia's economic development, achieved under President Suharto's leadership and with arduous effort, not be lost. For our part we are pledging, consistent with our formula last year, to meet one-third of your non-food aid requirements and a fair share of your food aid requirements, for a total pledge of approximately $203 million.

We are also aware that serious consideration is being given by other IGGI donors to increasing their pledges for the coming year. I am sure that with the same representations with the other members which you have made in the past, Indonesia will again be successful this year in inducing them to increase their contributions. You may count on the fullest cooperation from the U. S. representatives in this effort.

Let me reassure you concerning the great value we place on the cooperation your Government has shown toward ours, and once again affirm our admiration of and support for the inspired progress that your country has made under the leadership of President Suharto.

Warm regards

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

[2] Sumitro's December 5 message to Kissinger stated that Indonesia had learned from the Department of State that the U.S. Government “would pledge approximately $100 million in support of Indonesia's Development Program at the I.G.G.I. meeting beginning on 13 December. This amount is a decrease of previous years and will have an adverse effect on our economic development plan.” Suharto, should very much like to have President Nixon be made personally aware of our concern.” (Ibid.)

[3] Sumitro's message to Kissinger of December 9 reiterated the concerns of the December 5 message and added among other arguments that the Indonesian Government was convinced that any U.S. Government reduction in its pledge “will have an adverse and negative impact on other donor nations who will probably follow your lead and decrease their pledges as well.” (Ibid.)

[4] Not found.

[5] Not found.

325. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon [1]

Washington, January 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

Information Items

[Omitted here is discussion of Indochina.]

Indonesian President Suharto's Reaction to Your Assurances on Peking and Moscow Trips: The principal points of President Suharto's reaction to your assurances on your Peking and Moscow visits, delivered by Ambassador Galbraith January 10,[2] were:

—He deeply appreciated your message and understands your purpose.[3]

—Countries lying close to the PRC such as Laos, Cambodia, and possibly Thailand should be reassured and kept as fully informed as possible about your trip. (Similar verbal assurances have been conveyed by our ambassadors in these three countries.)

—Indonesia will do its best to help strengthen the will and capability of Southeast Asian nations to resist Communism, and toward this end hopes the U.S. will support his efforts to improve Indonesia's cooperation with Japan and Australia.

—Communism, whether from Peking or Moscow, remains a threat to Indonesia, and the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict has resulted in a further extension of both Peking and Moscow into South Asia.[4]

—This threat underscores the importance of Indonesian political and economic stability, and Suharto is deeply grateful for your support through economic assistance for his country's development.

[Omitted here is discussion of Turkey and the Middle East.]

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Box 38, President's Daily Briefs, January 3–17, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.

[2] Telegram 298 from Djarkarta, January 11, reported Galbraith's conversation with Suharto. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON)

[3]  Nixon wrote next to this sentence: “K Set up a procedure where I bring in their Ambassador for a special briefing (after the trip).”

[4]  Nixon wrote next to this sentence: “K—of top priority—Keep close to Indonesia.”

326. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Indonesian General Sumitro [1]

Washington, January 15, 1972, 1731Z.

WH 20098. Please Pass Following Message to General Sumitro From Henry A. Kissinger:

In reply to your message[2] concerning support for the proposals discussed with Generals Hasnan Habib and Sudardjo Niklani, please be assured that these proposals remain under active consideration on a close-hold basis in appropriate areas of the Department of Defense. In view of the uncertainties which have developed from Congressional handling of this year's military assistance appropriation, it has not been possible to establish a clear basis for funding levels or sources. However, I will see to it that this matter will continue to be addressed. The entire military assistance picture should become much clearer in early 1972, and your proposals will be given every consideration. I anticipate that any assistance we provide can be handled covertly, as you prefer.

In the meantime, I have asked the Department of Defense to consider means for assisting Indonesia in this matter via existing programs. 5 lines of source text not declassified] I will keep in touch with you as further information becomes available.[3]

Warm regards

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials,NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2].

[2] Not found.

[3] Sumitro replied in a message, January 22, that he understood from Kissinger's message that “the financial support we expected has been more or less agreed upon and will be implemented thru covert channels, when approved.” Sumitro stated that he and President Suharto appreciated Kissinger's “personal attention and efforts on our behalf” in “the favorable results” from “President Nixon's decision on the U.S. I.G.G.I. pledge for 1972.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2])

327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia [1]

Washington, January 25, 1972.

14367. Subj: Letter to Suharto from President Nixon.

General Westmoreland is carrying letter from President Nixon to President Suharto. Text follows.

“General Westmoreland's visit with you presents an excellent opportunity to set forth to you my views on the importance of your country's security and continuing economic development and my determination to maintain our support for your outstanding efforts in these vital areas.

In my letter to you of December 11,[2] I outlined the extent to which I share your concern for strengthening the foundations of Indonesia's security and economic well being. In this regard, I recognize the strains placed on Indonesia's resources by the problems of strengthening its security while also maintaining the momentum of economic development which your country has attained under your dedicated leadership. We in the United States want to do everything we can to assist you in meeting this formidable challenge.

I also understand the concern which you expressed to Ambassador Galbraith recently over the threat which Communist expansionism— whether originating in Moscow, Peking, or Hanoi—poses for Indonesia and Southeast Asia. I welcome your interest in helping to strengthen the other Southeast Asian nations so that they may cope with this threat, as well as your plans to improve Indonesia's cooperation through ASEAN and particularly with Japan and Australia.

In the light of these considerations, I want to tell you that, despite the severe limitation which our Congress has placed upon funds for military assistance, we will continue our military assistance for Indonesia this fiscal year at a level at least equal to that of last fiscal year. Further, I am asking the Congress for funds to increase our military assistance to you in Fiscal Year 1973. I believe this assistance on our part, together with our contributions through the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia, constitutes one of the most important means by which the United States can help to insure that the tremendous progress realized during the past six years under your leadership is not lost, but will indeed continue.

I also want to reassure you, as I have on earlier occasions, that the United States intends to remain in Asia to play a balancing role in the stability of the region, and that we will stand firmly behind all of our treaty commitments. Toward these ends, we will retain sufficient air, naval, and ground forces in Asia in order to accomplish these purposes.

Indonesia has a vital role to play in the future peace, prosperity, and stability of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole. As I recently conveyed to you through Ambassador Galbraith, I shall have your country's interests very much in mind as I go to Peking and then to Moscow in the coming months. Knowing your keen interest in my trips, I will plan to be in touch with you when I return as to their results, and I would appreciate your reaction to these missions. I will hope, too, that you will feel free to pass any thoughts on these and other matters to General Westmoreland which he may report to me upon his return.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

(signed) Richard Nixon.”

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by Theodore J. Heavner (EA/IMS) and by Robert T. Curran (S/S), and approved by Charles S. Whitehouse (EA).

[2] See Document 324 and the footnotes thereto.

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McAfee) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)[1]

Washington, February 1, 1972.

SUBJECT

Procurement of Soviet Matériel from Indonesia

Currently negotiations are going on (in a somewhat desultory fashion, as suits the Indonesians) for the clandestine procurement of a MIG–17, MIG–19, and MIG–21, all in operating condition from the Indonesian Air Force. The U.S. Air Force's offering price is $250,000, a small sum which reflects the fact that the USAF has had previous access to these machines in Korea, Cambodia, and Israel. Additional units are desired, however, for testing.

Indonesia, which obtained a large stock of Soviet armaments during the Sukarno era, has become a prime source of Soviet matériel. Soviet replacements are no longer available to, nor desired by, a pro-Western Indonesian Government. The risks involved in obtaining Soviet matériel covertly, while undeniably present, are minimized by sloppy Indonesian inventory control in the past and consequent Soviet inability to maintain effective surveillance of the matériel. The Soviets are further hampered by travel restrictions, much reduced staff, and a generally hostile attitude on the part of the Indonesian Government and armed forces.

During the past two years the U.S. services have spent some two million dollars for Soviet matériel in Indonesia. The Soviet P–15 surface-to-surface missile, various fire control systems, anti-submarine warfare gear, and the Fan Song radar used in the Soviet SAM system are the major items obtained. All of these items (some still in the original crates) were air-lifted out of Indonesia without incident. In the case of the Fan Song radar three large vans were involved. The Air Force proposed using the huge and conspicuous C–5A which INR refused to agree to. Eventually USAF planes delivering civic action type supplies to the Indonesian services brought back the Fan Song vans on return flights. In all cases extreme care has been taken to do loading in hangars wherever possible and at night by specially vetted Indonesian military teams.

An outgrowth of the procurement of the P–15 missile was the opportunity to monitor the firing of several P–15 missiles by the Indonesian Navy. When the Indonesians proposed test firings at a target island in the Java Sea, the Naval Attaché, knowing that the Indonesians were scrapping SKORY class destroyers, suggested that one be sold— covertly—to the U.S. Navy and that it be used as a target ship. The Indonesians agreed and with U.S. guidance welded impact gages to the hull and installed a transponder on the mast. They also agreed to film, in color, and “rooster-tail” of the missile when fired and turn the films over to the U.S. The telemetry of the firings (the ship was hit and sank)

INR's role in the procurement of Soviet matériel is to make certain that the operation has the approval of the Ambassador, the Defense Attaché, [2 lines of source text not declassified]; that the Indonesian Government and the head of the Indonesian service involved approve; and that coordination is complete at the Washington level among State, including the policy bureau, Defense, and CIA.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia File. Secret. Drafted by Richard K. Stuart (INR/DDC) and sent through INR Director Ray S. Cline.

329. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, February 4, 1972, 0650Z.

1163. Eyes Only For General Westmoreland From Ambassador Galbraith. Subject: Letter to Suharto From President Nixon. Ref: State 014367.[2]

1. I accompanied General Westmoreland in his call on President Suharto afternoon February 3. Chief of Staff Umar and President's interpreter, Widodo, also present. General Westmoreland told Suharto President Nixon had taken keen interest in General's visit to Indonesia at invitation General Umar and had called Westmoreland to White House few days before he left Washington and had asked Westmoreland to pass to Suharto President's personal esteem for accomplishments Suharto Government and President's continuing interest in Indonesia. Suharto thanked Westmoreland and spoke briefly of the value he placed on his relations with President and on assurances he has received from Nixon on continued support for economic and military programs.

2. Suharto spoke of the priority given economic development in the Indonesian budget and of the austerity imposed on the armed forces which receive only a small part of total budget resources, barely enough for upkeep. Suharto said it was hoped and expected that in another few years and with economic development promising to gain some momentum, additional budget resources could be made available for the development of the Indonesian armed forces. He said Indonesia's armed forces understood and agreed to this approach.

3. Westmoreland gave Suharto letter reftel which Suharto read. Westmoreland then explained that although President had asked Congress for appropriations which would have supported $25 million MAP for Indonesia, Congress had cut overall appropriations for military assistance by 40 percent, that President hoped to provide Indonesia with at least $18 million for MAP which, together with $2.3 million provided in excess supplies and other excess items which might be found useful to Indonesia, should raise total for MAP above $18 million for FY–72. Westmoreland also mentioned no-cost lease arrangement on ships for Indonesian navy. Westmoreland said utilization all these sources might produce figure approaching $25 million and President Nixon hoped to be able to do better for Indonesia in following fiscal year.

4. Suharto said he understood President's problems with Congress. He said $25 million MAP was itself less than Indonesia hoped for and felt it needed.

5. I told Suharto that I monitored our MAP program very closely and that with amount of money which we hoped to make available and with prospect of somewhat more in following year I thought we would be alright. Suharto said our ability to plan a program on a two-year basis at the $25 million level should be alright.

6. Westmoreland said he also brought assurances from President Nixon that in connection with his forthcoming trip to Peking there would be no changes in U.S. policy affecting Indonesia. The President would keep Suharto informed on results of his trip and on anything that transpired of interest to or affecting Indonesia. Suharto indicated his understanding of President Nixon's purposes and his appreciation that President Nixon was keeping him informed.

7. Suharto said he would be going to Australia and New Zealand in next few days on state visit. He hoped to explore with governments those two countries assessment of common threat of communism in area and desirability of closer understanding and cooperation among nations in area facing that threat. Suharto indicated he hoped to develop with Australia and New Zealand, and also with Japan, common view on how to face threats to peace and security in this area. Suharto mentioned the saber jet squadron which Australia will be providing Indonesia, indicating that these planes would be helpful in maintaining Indonesia's pilot proficiency. Westmoreland indicated that he too would be going to Australia and New Zealand, though slightly ahead of Suharto.

Comment: It was apparent that there had been some difficulty in arranging for Westmoreland's appointment with Suharto, presumably because the latter is preparing for his state visits mentioned above and because he was involved immediately after the meeting in ceremonies connected with recent weddings his daughter and son. This probably explains why Suharto did not encourage a broader discussion Southeast Asian problems. There was, however, some indication that Suharto was aware of extensive discussions Westmoreland had over two-day period with Army Chief of Staff Umar on other subjects such as Westmoreland's observations on situation in Indochina.

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 JCS. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra.

[2]  Document 327.

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State [1]

Djakarta, March 13, 1972, 1130Z.

2499. For The Secretary. Canberra For Assistant Secretary Green. Green's Call on President Suharto.

1. Evening March 11, Assistant Secretary Green, accompanied by John Holdridge and myself, gave President Suharto detailed description of talks, atmospherics and flavor President Nixon's Peking visit. Also present were Foreign Minister Malik, Chiefs Palace Secretariat General Sudharmono, Chief of Protocol Subagio and Presidential Interpreter Widodo. Suharto listened closely with evident intense interest. Green started by extending to President Suharto President Nixon's warmest regards and highest esteem. Green slanted his presentation toward Indonesian concerns, underlining fact President Nixon had made no deals concerning other countries, that U.S. planned keep its commitments and maintain its position in East Asia and that U.S. under no illusions in U.S. approach to China. Green told Suharto that he and I were authorized to inform him that U.S. would maintain its present force levels less those related to Vietnamization, in Western Pacific in FY 1973. Green offered to go into more detail on these force levels with Deputy Chief Commander of Armed Forces Panggabean whom we would be meeting later.

2. In outlining main points and impressions emerging from the talks, Green included the following:

A. Peking seeks to avoid involvement in war and seems genuinely to desire a better relationship with U.S. Peking supported North Korea's 8-point plans for unification, but also interested in avoiding war to achieve it. Peking supports 7-point PRG peace plan but seemed less disposed than previously to have that conflict continue indefinitely since in its eyes this might serve to strengthen Soviet position in Hanoi.

B. Both sides subscribed to the Bandung principles even though PRC does not in fact live up to them, but it can now be better called to account for them.

C. Peking Government say they are concerned about Japanese militarism, although U.S. does not believe this would be problem so long as U.S.–Japan security treaty exists. ChiComs can be extension, therefore, come to see that maintenance U.S. security treaty with Japan could serve PRC interests though it would never say so publicly.

D. Taiwan was a most difficult issue but we now have a situation where, despite continuing U.S. commitments and ties to the ROC, we have in prospect an expanding dialogue and contact with with the PRC.

E. U.S. now reaffirmed that it will keep its commitments and continue its assistance to its friends and allies.

F. U.S. will continue to be power in Western Pacific.

G. China's announced position is the removal of all U.S. forces from sea, but it evidently does not want this done in way that enhances Soviet influence in sea. (Green summed up true ChiCom attitude as perhaps being “Yankee go home, but gradually.”)

H. Overshadowing all this and emerging as basic reason for ChiCom interest in talks is their fundamental fear of Soviets and concern of Soviets extending influence in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. ChiComs also fearful of revived Japanese militarism (and an unexpressed fear of Japanese economic hegomony in EA). Peking seeking to split Tokyo and Washington especially on Taiwan issue so as to isolate GRC all the more and bring Taiwan under PRC control. There were of course other PRC motives as well, both internal and external.

3. Suharto expressed deep appreciation. He expressed his understanding and support for President Nixon's effort to reduce world tensions and strengthen peace. He thought it salutary that PRC had in communiqué reiterated its support for Bandung principles, including non-interference in internal affairs other countries, non-agression, coexistence and peaceful settlement of disputes. He noted that ChiComs took public stand they supported suppressed peoples. This meant they will not only support those who seek independence but those who sought as national liberation movements to become Communist nations. ChiCom would continue their support for Communist subversion, Suharto said.

4. Green said he agreed with this and that U.S. was not letting its guard down even while extending hand of conciliation. Green stressed importance of seizing opportunity of present situation to do what could be done to enhance peace.

5. Suharto continued by stressing importance of U.S. making clear it stands behind its friends, and allies. He said neighboring countries in Southeast Asia need moral support as well as other kinds of assistance. Suharto stressed importance of building national capacity for resistance in Indonesia and neighboring countries. This would be required to cope with what he was sure would be continued ChiCom support for supervision. Indonesia had had its bitter experience with Peking.

6. Suharto expressed his special appreciation for Green's stated intention to talk further with Foreign Minister Adam Malik [2] and, in case of U.S. planned force levels, in more detail with Suharto's top military staff.[3]

Galbraith

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

[2] Telegram 561 from Wellington, March 15, reported Green's conversation with Malik. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 554, Country Files, Far East, New Zealand, Vol. I)

[3] Telegram 2498 from Djakarta, March 13, reported Green's conversation with some of Suharto's top military staff. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON)

331. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State [1]

Belgrade, July 7, 1972.

Secto 200/3310. Subject: Secretary's Meeting with President Suharto, July 1. Following is approved memorandum of conversation:

1. Summary: Suharto appeared pleased and reassured by Secretary's presentation, in which Secretary made clear President Nixon had wanted him to brief Suharto on Peking and Moscow Summits, more recent Kissinger visit to Peking and implications results these meetings for East Asia and other areas and for world peace. End summary.

2. Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Chief of Presidential Secretariat General Sudharmono (who took notes) and Widodo, Suharto's regular interpreter, were present on Indonesian side, and Asst. Secretary Green and Ambassador Galbraith accompanied Secretary.

3. The Secretary said President Nixon had stressed importance of Secretary's visit to Indonesia, and his desire that Secretary brief Suharto fully on summits. Secretary gave Suharto letter from President.[2] Secretary said he would speak first generally and then invite Suharto's views. Secretary stressed there were no secret agreements with either Peking or Moscow. President Nixon had made clear to both that we were continuing unchanged our policies toward, and our relations with our friends and allies.

4. The Secretary said we believe that talks in Peking and Moscow had tended to reduce tensions and could lead to further negotiations and reduction of threats toward independence of countries like Indonesia. But we had no intention of letting down our guard. We would base nothing on trust and make no concessions, but we would be prepared to take any reciprocal action to further reduce tensions.

5. In case of China, because there had been no conversations for 22 years, great deal of initial conversation concerned getting to know each other. Chinese felt it necessary make full statement of their dogma for the record. Once that was out of the way, talks turned to bilateral matters and to relationships in Pacific. Two sides agreed to put Taiwan aside and let that issue take its course. U.S. made clear it would continue its treaty and diplomatic relationships with Taiwan but would conduct these in way not hostile to PRC. We agreed have contacts in Paris, UN, and through special emissaries to Peking. Increased trade and exchanges are in offing, but they likely to expand gradually. In this way general improvement relations could ensue without disturbing U.S. relations with Taiwan. Treaties and relationships in Pacific with Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and others would also not be disturbed.

6. Secretary said with respect to Vietnam, U.S. would withdraw its troops but in process make sure North Vietnam does not overrun South Vietnam. We believe PRC recognizes that U.S., having reduced troop strength Japan, Philippines, Vietnam, etc., has no territorial aspirations in East Asia. Also PRC recognizes U.S. presence has stabilizing influence; that if U.S. left vacuum would result and be filled by Soviet presence or revived Japanese militarism. President Nixon had emphasized that we would maintain our troops in Pacific and there would be no change in our relations with our allies.

7. Secretary said that Kissinger had recently followed up on bilateral exchanges, students, athletic teams, scientists, etc. He had discussed Vietnam with PRC. PRC evidently wants negotiated settlement. They don't want Soviet position strengthened in Vietnam. They have not permitted Soviets to use their ports which has helped make mining North Vietnam harbors so successful. We think Chinese prefer negotiated settlement Vietnam and will help, but we are not sure how much influence they can exert.

8. In order avoid PRC suspicions Kissinger reported to PRC on Moscow visit.

9. Secretary said it is difficult to judge Chinese intentions and it is possible they might be deceitful and take advantage. He said there is no one who understands this better than President Nixon who intends to be wary. The U.S. will make no concessions nor base anything on trust but will be prepared to take any reciprocal action to reduce tensions.

10. Suharto asked Secretary to advise further on possibilities for settling Vietnam problem. Secretary said he thought possibilities for negotiated settlement were good but question was when it might take place. There are different theories about whether it is more likely to occur before or after our elections.

11. Suharto noted that in US–PRC communiqué there was reference to Bandung principles and noninterference in internal affairs of others. He also noted contradiction between this and PRC's announced support for “oppressed peoples” and for “wars of national liberation”. will continue and for this reason we have to be sure that independent nations are strengthened not only militarily but economically. Secretary expressed pleasure at Indonesian economic progress and in support U.S. able to give this worthy Indonesian objective.

12. Suharto wondered whether there was possibility that Vietnam would emerge as communist country something like Yugoslavia. Secretary said he thought South Vietnam growing stronger and has good chance to survive as independent entity. They were fighting well on ground where there were no longer U.S. combat troops. All Vietnamese refugees go south not north, which gives some indication of where they feel most comfortable. North Vietnam had charged that Government South Vietnam were puppets. Once U.S. troops departed they couldn't make that argument. We think if there were ceasefire now South Vietnam would be able to stand and there would be a political contest over time to see who would prevail. Our judgment is that people of South Vietnam would not support communists, Secretary said.

13. Suharto said that within framework U.S. attempts to reduce tensions and reach settlement with communists, Indonesia sought to strengthen its resilience against subversion. His visits to Australia, New Zealand and Japan have been in that context. Secretary said we had been pleased with Indonesian initiatives and with success of Suharto's visits. In our talks with Australians and New Zealanders we had said we would cooperate in any way we could in support and in context Indonesian independence and nonalignment.[3]

14. Before turning to subject of Moscow Summit Secretary said we had been impressed with Chinese friendliness toward Americans and had impression that Chinese trust Americans more than they do Russians. Chinese know we will continue our alliances and support our friends but don't look upon U.S. as threat to them as much as they do Soviets.

15. Secretary said there were two reasons Soviets were anxious that President make trip to Moscow: (A) concern over improvement of our relations with PRC (although Soviets did not say so) and (B) economic matters. In this latter connection, major security problems on Chinese/Soviet border as well as on Soviet western frontier had caused big economic drain. Build up of nuclear power was very costly, and no matter how much money Soviets spend, they know U.S. would not let them get ahead. Output of U.S. economy twice that of Soviets, therefore Soviets had embarked on detente in Europe to reduce cost and tensions there and to enable them to focus on Chinese problem. That they were anxious to improve relations with U.S. was borne out by their going ahead with summit despite U.S. mining of Haiphong and bombing North Vietnam. Soviets also feel need for more consumer goods. They need better production facilities, technology and credit.

16. Secretary said Soviets turned out whole upper echelon of government for talks. As many as twelve members of Politburo were present at one time and this was unprecedented. There was elaborate entertainment. President Nixon addressed Russian people on TV before which his scheduled appearance was advertised and Soviet people were urged to listen.

17. Seven separate agreements were signed in Moscow. It was worked out so that Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin all signed some of them. These included agreements on health, environment, cooperation in space, prevention of incidents at sea (first agreement between two military establishments since World War II). Most important was the SALT agreement providing for freeze on offensive and defensive weapons. Each side is permitted two ABM sites to defend capitals and one ICBM site each. Without going into details Secretary said both U.S. and USSR know that neither side can strike other without being destroyed by other. If Soviets decide to strike first there is nothing they could do to prevent U.S. from destroying Soviet Union and same thing is true other way around. Thus, unless governments run by crazy people the threat of nuclear exchange is ruled out except by misunderstanding or accidental launch. Procedures have been worked out designed to avoid either of these eventualities. Secretary said we think result of visit will be better relations with USSR at least for a while. We expect that this will result in more exchanges of scientists and others and additional agreements. European Security Conference was discussed and if it can be well prepared it should help reduce tensions in Europe.

18. Secretary said he had talked about trade with Kosygin who did all the talking in the economic field. We expect over time to work out problems in the economic field. Complication, however, is that USSR has debt to U.S. and this makes it difficult to extend the credit USSR seeks for its trade with U.S.

19. Secretary said Soviets indicated willingness to help with negotiated settlement on Vietnam. Subsequently Podgorny has gone to Hanoi to present some of the things U.S. talked to Soviets about.

20. Secretary stressed again there were no secret agreements and nothing discussed with Soviets that would affect nations in this part of the world.

21. Secretary gave Suharto some atmospherics of Soviet leadership. Although Brezhnev clearly dominates others, one has impression Politburo works together. Brezhnev cultivated others in public. In meetings he did the talking. Kosygin was less active except on economic issues.

22. On Middle East problems there was not much discussed. Secretary had talked to Podgorny, Gromyko and Kuznetsov and was satisfied Soviets will not promote outbreak of hostilities and want cease-fire to continue.

23. Suharto expressed concern that because of U.S. and British withdrawals, vacuums would develop into which Soviets would move and that because of Soviet/PRC tensions subversion would increase. Secretary said we would be careful to withdraw in way that would not create vacuum. Secretary noted that in both communiqué in Peking and in statement of principles in Moscow, statement was included about noninterference in affairs other countries. If PRC and Soviets did this, U.S. could talk to them about violation of these principles. It is also possible that because of the conflicts between them they would be less occupied in subverting others. In any event, this was the time for others to strengthen themselves, as Indonesia was doing.

24. Suharto commented that Indonesian relations with PRC had not been normalized because PRC continued to interfere in Indonesian affairs with slander and support for Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Secretary asked whether their attacks on Indonesia had not been somewhat reduced lately. Suharto said they were relatively less but continued. Secretary commented that we, too, hope for continued improvement in our relations with PRC.

25. Noting that U.S. doing all it could to encourage American investors, Secretary inquired about Indonesia's attitude toward foreign investment. Suharto said there was no change. He went on to say that Indonesia had to protect and reserve for domestic capital those fields where Indonesians had capability. Secretary expressed understanding. He said it important that whatever done in this field it be successful. U.S. did not want to encourage any foreign investment that would become an irritant. It was important to work out rules before rather than after private foreign entrepreneur invested. Suharto said that basic principles, including foreign investment law, unchanged but that Indonesia would have to insure that investments were not detrimental to Indonesia and were really in Indonesia's interest.

26. Secretary mentioned MAP program and regretted that it had been reduced slightly in past year. He said we had asked for more this year and he was sure that President Nixon would work out some way, over long run, to do what we had said we would do and which we both agreed we should do.

27. Secretary was pressed by time to leave at this point. Suharto expressed his thanks and sent best regards to President Nixon.

Rogers

[1] Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1971–1972: Lot 73 D 323, Secretary's Trip to SEATO, June 24 to July 12, 1972. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Frederick W. Flott, Special Assistant at the Embassy in Indonesia on July 4; cleared by Eliot S/S); approved by David H. Lissy, Special Assistant to Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Djakarta, Saigon, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Moscow, Canberra, and Wellington. Rogers was in Belgrade July 7–9 for an official visit.

[2] The original letter was delivered by the Secretary to Suharto; telegram Tosec 89/

[3] In a separate meeting with Malik on June 30 Secretary Rogers discussed developments in and observations about Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. Their conversation was reported in telegram 3331 from Belgrade, July 8. (Ibid., Conference Files, 1966–72: Lot 70 D 387, Box 526)

332. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)[1]

Washington, November 21, 1972.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with President Suharto and Foreign Minister Malik

For your meeting with President Suharto and Foreign Minister Malik,[2] the following background information and suggested talking points may be useful:

U.S.-Indonesian Relations in General

These are very good. The Indonesians are grateful for the military and economic help which we have given them, and believe that we can be relied upon to continue this help. They would like increased military assistance, but have accepted the fact that Congressional cuts have imposed some restrictions. They welcome American investment in Indonesia. They do not wish to see a precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Asia. They are anxious to develop Asian regional military cooperation as the U.S. military role diminishes, and would like our help to this end. The President and President Suharto have established a warm personal bond between them.

—You may wish to express the President's highest personal regards to President Suharto. He has sent a message thanking President Suharto for the warm election congratulations the latter transmitted via the special channel.[3]

—The U.S. will continue to do what it can to assist Indonesia in its developmental programs and in its efforts to improve regional cooperation.

Rice to Indonesia

Suharto recently wrote the President asking for 150 thousand tons of PL 480 rice prior to March 1973 (when the Indonesian elections occur) [4] We did not have the rice, or so we thought then, and arranged to provide Indonesia with extra PL 480 cotton which could be sold and hence provide funds to purchase the rice commercially from countries such as Pakistan or Thailand. [5] The President responded to Suharto to this effect. When informed of this, Suharto still asked for some actual shipments of rice if possible. We have now turned up an additional 50 thousand tons of rice—which will be provided under AID development loans—of which Indonesia has already been informed.[6] We have, through these efforts, gone extremely far in meeting Suharto's needs.

—You may also want to sound out Suharto's reaction to the cotton-for-rice deal, and see if he is satisfied.

U.S. Contributions to the Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI)

In Suharto's letter to the President, he also asked for assurances that we would continue to provide one-third of the annual IGGI contributions to Indonesian economic development. The President's reply in effect agreed; he said that we would keep this very much in mind and would contribute at a rate no less than we had in preceding years. At OMB's request, this response was left somewhat fuzzy to hedge against a large increase over Indonesia's request for last year. The Indonesians have now asked for $750 million, only 3% over that of last year, and we anticipate no trouble in providing a one-third share.

—You may want to state that, based on the Indonesian request for $750 million, we foresee no problem in providing one-third of this sum.

—The President believes that Indonesia under Suharto's leadership is doing a remarkable job of carrying out economic development; our contribution is money well spent.

Indonesian MAP

We are now operating on a CRA of $588.8 million for MAP worldwide, down from our request of $819.7 million. All country programs have been cut, and Indonesia's now stands at $18 million (the same as for FY 72). However, we expect to be able to locate at least $5 million extra from “reimbursements/recoupments” and we hope it will be possible to move the Indonesian MAP back to around the $25 million level which the President has directed. If the ceasefire in SEA is effective, it may be possible to go higher, but we do not yet know by how much. Defense is considering a supplemental for Southeast Asia. (Note: Suharto may raise the question of U.S. help in financing the Indonesian ICCS contingent in Vietnam.)

—Congressional cuts on the worldwide MAP appropriation have been heavy, but we are doing everything we can to maintain the Indonesian MAP at least at the existing levels. If we can raise it somewhat, we will do so.

Indonesian Diplomatic Relations with the PRC

Foreign Minister Malik has said it is only a question of time before Indonesia reestablishes diplomatic relations with the PRC. However, the Indonesians do not want to move precipitately, and will hold off until after elections next March. They have apparently slowed down Malaysia's drive to establish relations with Peking in order to move in concert with Malaysia. The Generals remain leary of relations with the PRC, and will watch developments closely.

—(If Suharto asks.) The U.S. has no objections to Indonesia reestablishing diplomatic relations with Peking. We believe each country must make this decision on the basis of its own estimates of its national interest and its own political circumstances.

The Nixon Doctrine

The Indonesians still appear apprehensive that the U.S. will pull out of Asia entirely. This in part accounts for their interest in regional military and economic cooperation, as noted above.

—You may wish to stress the fact that the Nixon Doctrine is not a formula for an American withdrawal, but rather a means for assuring our continued presence, our capability to meet commitments, and our ability to play a useful balancing role.

—We welcome Indonesia's efforts to facilitate regional military and economic cooperation, and regard these efforts as contributory to our own efforts to preserve peace and stability. We will assist Indonesia's programs when we can, and when our help is useful.

[1] Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 101, Backchannel Messages 1970, Indonesia, HAK/Sumitro [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Entirely out of system. Sent for information.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found.

[3] Not found.

[4] Telegram 171337 to Jakarta, September 20, described the delivery, substance, and discussion of Suharto's letter to President Nixon. (National Archives,RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO Kissinger, Eliot advised that the Department recommend that “the Department of Agriculture take immediate action to begin shipments in October of the 100,000 tons of rice already promised Indonesia, in addition to other scheduled shipments.” (Ibid.)

[5] Telegram 17355 and 17436 from Bangkok, December 9 and 12, respectively, reported the Embassy's successful efforts to elicit the Thai Government's promise to ship 250,000 tons of rice to Indonesia over the following 4 months. (Ibid., INCO

[6] Telegram 211789 to Brussels, November 21, reported this development. (Ibid., POL 7 INDON)

Index

Note: All references are to document numbers

Abdulgani, 274

Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 272, 279

Abrams, Gen. Creighton, 4, 64, 67, 86, 113, 276

Abs, Dr., 271, 272, 274

Adenauer Foundation, 227

Adevoso, Eleuterio, 202

Africa, 180

Agency for International Development (AID):

East Asia Regional Program, 50

Indonesia, 267, 278

Philippines, 186, 234

Thailand, 45, 75, 76

Agnew, Spiro:

Malik, meeting with, 279

Peace Corps protests against, 43

Philippines, 189, 243

Southeast Asia visit, discussed, 184

Thailand visit, Jan., 1970, 39, 42, 43, 44

Thailand visit, Sept., 1970, 87

Thailand visit, May, 1972, 164, 165, 167, 168, 181

Agreements with the United States:

Additional Assistance to Thailand (AAT) agreement, 137, 144, 161, 167

Bohlen-Serrano Agreement, 249

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Philippines, 1953, 217, 221

Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, 1952, 191, 194, 217, 226

Philippines-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 207, 209, 211

SALT I, 255, 331

Thai-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 18

USAF/RTAFF Joint Use and Integrated Air Defense Operations Agreement, 21

U.S. Military Bases Agreement with Philippines, 191, 195, 199, 215, 217, 221

Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 75

Aichi, Kiichi, 274

Air Defense Network (U.S. Air Force), 21

Alamsjah, Maj. Gen., 271, 272, 289, 323

Visit to Washington, 1970, 296, 299, 302, 304, 305, 306, 307

Albania, 128, 272

Almendras, Sen., 238

Anand Panyarachun, 28, 48, 49, 92, 177, 180, 181

Anderson, Jack, 1, 163

Ansbach, Max, 261

Antimony, 173

Anti-war movement, 121

Aquino, Benigno S., Jr., 190, 238, 239, 249, 252, 257, 260

Arab-Israeli conflict, 18

Asa Sarasin, 153, 158, 165

Asian Development Bank (ADB), 111, 227, 234, 267, 272, 276, 278

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN):

Cambodia role for, 284, 285

Indonesian role in, 276, 277

Neutralization proposal for Southeast Asia, 143, 247

Philippines' claim to Sabah, effect on, 191, 279

Australia, 82, 98, 267, 271, 279, 298, 329

Bangkok Post, 15

Bangladesh, 180

Barber, Edwin L, 264

Barger, Herman H., 101, 114, 234, 261

Barnett, Robert W., 46, 271, 272, 274, 297, 302

Beams, Dovey, 233

Behr, Col. Robert M., 59

Bekker, Konrad, 114

Belgium, 267

BeLieu, Kenneth, 194

Bennett, Frank C., 244

Benson, George, 311

Beplat, Tristan, 261

Bergesen, Alf E., 151, 161, 177, 180

Bergsten, G. Fred, 317

Binh, Mme. (Nguyen Thi Binh), 128

Birabhongse Kasemsri, 15, 37, 92, 104, 109, 121, 122

Black, Eugene, 196

Black Leopards, 95, 103

Black Panthers, 67, 68, 74, 81, 85, 86, 135

Blair, Bill, 249

Blee, David, 112

Boonchai Bamrungphong, Gen., 135

Boonchu Rojanasathien, 177

Brandt, William, 74

Bray, Charles, 39

Brewster, R. C., 318, 319

Brezhnev, Leonid, 271, 331

Brezhnev Doctrine, 18

Britten, Lt. Col. Gerald H., 59

Broe, William, 230

Brooks, Angie E., 272

Brown, Winthrop G., 96, 151, 188

Bruce, David K. E., 128

Budget, U.S. Bureau of, 75

Bundy, William, 3, 6, 7, 23

Bunker, Ellsworth, 64, 67, 124

Bunmag, Gen., 94

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 264

Burma, 92, 123, 131, 136, 161, 279, 285

Butterfield, Alexander P., 211

Buwono, Sir Sultan Hamengku, IX, 323

Byroade, Henry A., 200

Aquino, talks with, 238

Assassination plots against Marcos, 202

Constitutional Convention in Philippines, 228, 229, 232

Foreign policy of Philippines, 255

Green visit, 247

IMF loans, 208

Investment climate in Philippines, 262

Laurel-Langley Agreement, 213, 224

Martial law, 258

Military bases agreement, 199, 246

NPA, 210

On Marcos, 219

Philippines' force withdrawal from Vietnam, 198

Philippine view of, 241

Press leaks, 236

Riots in Manila, 222

SOFA, 209, 211

Suspension of habeas corpus, 239

Symington subcommittee hearings, 196, 197

U.S. force reductions in Philippines, 203, 204, 216, 218, 226

U.S. interference in elections, charges of, 193, 205

U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 201

Cambodia:

ARVN operations in, 126

Australian military aid to, 98, 298

Covert operations in, 63, 286

DRV policy toward, 291

Indonesian advisors in, 317

Indonesian diplomatic aid to, 60

Indonesian military aid to, 286, 287, 289, 294, 298, 299, 300, 304, 306, 307, 310, 313

Indonesian policy toward, 272, 295, 309, 323

Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 284, 285

Laos, relations with, 74

New Zealand military aid to, 298

Occupation of Cambodian territory by NVA, 60, 62, 95

Philippines, relations with, 186

Thai diplomatic and military aid to, 60, 74, 298

Thai forces in:

Cambodian position, 63, 66, 103, 124

Thai position, 66, 68, 85, 86, 92, 103, 124

Thai-U.S. talks on, 74, 87, 91

U.S. position, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 76, 81, 86, 88, 95, 98, 102, 125

Thailand, relations with, 44, 60, 291

Thai security concerns over, 62, 87, 104, 144, 151

United States, relations with, 39

U.S. military intervention in, 292, 297

U.S. policy and objectives in, 119

Canada, 319

Cao Van Vien, Gen., 4

Cargo, William, 195

Carson, James L., 122, 152

Carver, George, 166

Case, Clifford, 122

Catholic Church, 227, 231

Ceausescu, Nicolai, 18

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):

Cambodia, 291

Covert aid for Thai elections, 3

Perspectives on Thailand, 94

Philippines, 187, 188, 236

Thai forces in Cambodia, 76

Thai forces in Laos, 93, 147

Cernan, Eugene, 44

Ceylon, 46, 279

Chairatana Intuputi, Gen., 63, 66

Chakri Plan, 103, 104

Chamras, Gen., 94

Chapin, Frank M., 112

Charoon, 87

Charunphan Isarangkun, 151, 153, 155, 162, 165

Chiang Ching-kuo, 153

Ch'iao Kuan-hua, 182

China, People's Republic of:

Aquino trip, 238

Djakarta Conference, 297

DRV, relations with, 153

Five principles, 153, 157

Indonesia, relations with, 331, 332

Indonesian policy toward, 271, 272, 309, 321

Japanese militarism, 153

Malaysia, relations with, 332

Narcotic drug trafficking, 123

Return of hijacked airplane to Philippines, 121

Road-building toward Thailand by, 11, 18, 44, 49, 139, 150

Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180, 191, 272, 273

Thailand, relations with, 9, 154, 177, 180, 181, 182

United States, relations with, 43, 121, 127, 169

Nixon's visit, 1972, 139, 151, 153, 154, 155, 243, 244, 245, 247, 320, 330

Philippine position, 247

U.S. position, 279

War, possible, 82

U.N. membership for, 118, 121, 128, 139, 241, 244

China, Republic of:

Aid for resettlement of KMT irregulars in Thailand, 173

Indonesian policy toward, 272

U.N. membership for, 118, 121, 128, 244, 323

U.S. force reduction in, 247, 330

U.S. policy toward, 153, 247

Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF):

See Kuomintang.

Chi Peng Fei, 154

Chira, Gen., 43

Chitti, 26

Chou En-lai, 180, 247

Church, Frank F., 35, 47, 60

Churchill, Malcolm H., 101

Clay, Gen. Lucius, 99

Cole, Ken, 20

Colebaugh, 121, 162

Colombia, 28

Committee of Three, 92

Congress, U.S. (see also House of Representatives, U.S.; Senate Foreign Relations Committee):

Supplemental funding for FY 1971, lack of, 69

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 299, 308

Congress, U.S., Acts of:

Church Amendment, 47, 48, 87

Cooper Amendment, 28, 87

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 171

Fulbright Amendment to Defense Procurement Act, 87, 92, 93

Gonzales Amendment, 261

Hickenlooper Amendment, 261

McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, 8

P.L. 480:

Philippine position, 191

Rice sales:

To Indonesia, 46, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332

Thai position, 87, 110, 111, 127

U.S. position, 114, 130, 132, 164, 207, 229, 233

U.S-Thai talks on, 46, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 118

To Vietnam Republic, 39

Thai troops in Cambodia funded by, 75, 76, 98, 125

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 28, 48

Wolff Amendment, 169

Connally, John B., 132, 244, 245, 322, 323

Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal (FAO), 46

Corcoran (EA), 93, 119

Corn, 46

Cotton, 332

Court, John, 314

Covert operations:

In Cambodia, 63, 286

In Laos, 56

In Philippines, 230, 231, 236

In Thailand, 3, 120, 129, 131

Curran, Robert T., 327

Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E., 56, 59, 112

Czechoslovakia, 18, 272

Dante, Cmdr., 227

Davis, Jeanne W., 61, 82, 126, 228

Dawee Chullasaspyra, Marshal, 18

Contingency plan dispute, 20

Counterinsurgency efforts, 11, 137

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144

Narcotic drug trafficking, 131, 136

Nixon's trip to China, 153

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Symington subcommittee hearings, 37

Thai forces in Laos, 135

Thai Khmer forces in Cambodia, 63, 66

U.S. military aid to Thailand, 4, 11, 161, 167

U.S.-Thai relations:

Agnew visits, 43, 87, 165

Green visit, 157

Helms visit, 94

Hummel visit, 162

Kissinger visit, 127

Laird visit, 104

Thai approval for basing of additional U.S. bombers, 108

U.S. defense commitments, 21

Visit to Washington, Apr., 1969, 8

Ddjajadiningrat, 315

Defense, U.S. Department of:

Philippines, 214, 217

Symington subcommittee hearings, 194

Thai forces in Cambodia, 64, 81

Thai forces in Laos, 93

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305, 307, 314

Dempster, Gen., 193

Denham, Elizabeth M., 101

Dexter, John B., 27, 31, 45, 46, 48, 49, 96

Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30

Thai-U.S. relations, 119

Dhep, Gen., 94

Diokno, Jose, 238

Di-Puro, Suryo, 272

Diskul, Adm. Thep, 155, 165

Djakarta Conference, 86, 91, 92, 295, 297, 299, 300, 306

Doolin, Dennis, 14, 88, 98, 104

Drugs:

KMT irregulars' involvement with, 131, 136, 138, 152, 164, 173

Media publicity over, 163, 164, 165

Thai position, 115, 138

Thai-U.S. talks on, 123, 124, 136, 141, 152, 162, 165

Trafficking by Thai officials, charges of, 162, 163

U.S. position, 124, 129, 164

Duemling, Mrs., 43, 87, 188, 279

Dulles, John Foster, 153, 194

Dunn, Brig. Gen., 87, 165

Duong Van Minh, Gen., 127

Durdin, Till, 262

East Asia Interdepartmental Group, 217

Easterbrook, Gen. Ernest F., 23

Eastern Construction Company, 236

Egypt, 18, 109

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 21, 186, 187, 188, 189

Elections:

Israel, 1969, 274

Philippines, 1969, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 202, 205

Philippines, 1970, 227, 238

Thailand, 1969, 1, 2, 3, 5

Thailand, 1973, 115

United States, 1970, 91, 224, 308

United States, 1972, 258

Vietnam, possible, 91

Vietnam Republic, 1971, 127

Eliot, Theodore L., 21, 132, 152, 208, 211, 228, 318, 331

Elizalde, Mandy, 238

Erlichman, John, 196

Evans, Gen., 161, 163, 165

Export-Import Bank, 294, 302

Finch, Robert H., 189

Finland, 28

Five principles, 153, 157

Flanagan, Adm., 76

Flott, Frederick W., 331

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 46

Forbes, John D., 238, 257

Ford Foundation, 227

Foreign Affairs, 153

40 Committee:

Philippines, 228, 230, 232

Thailand, 77, 78, 112, 120, 129, 131

France, 91, 267

Freeport Sulphur, 302

Freylinghuysen, Peter, Jr., 242

Froehlke, Robert F., 4, 252

Fuji Seminar, 252

Fulbright, J. William:

Election prospects for, 91

Executive-legislative relations, 144, 320

Philippines, 194, 201

Project Taksin, 14, 15, 20, 24, 35, 36, 37

Southeast Asia, 87

Thai forces in Laos, 122

Gaddi, Judge, 239, 246

Galbraith, Francis J.:

Agnew visit to Thailand, 43

Cambodia, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 291, 295, 299

Indonesian-U.S. relations, 272, 273, 279, 321, 323

PRC-U.S. relations, 330

Regional cooperation proposal, 312

Soviet military aid to Indonesia, 315, 316

Suharto visit to Washington, 294, 296, 302, 304

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 310

Gandhi, Indira, 271

Garcia, Carlos P., 219

Gardner, Paul, 296, 297, 302, 303

General Services Administration (GSA), 320

Geneva Accords 1954, 32

Geneva Accords 1962, 29, 32

Germany, Democratic Republic of, 127

Germany, Federal Republic of, 106, 267

Getz, John, 141, 144

Ghazali Shafie, 272

Gideon, Gen., 193, 194

Gleysteen, Dirk, 267, 286

Godley, G. McMurtrie, 2, 6, 9, 124, 188, 189

Thai forces in Laos, 126, 160, 175, 176, 178

Goldwater, Barry M., 91

Goodell, Charles, 91

Gorton, John, 189

Grant, Lindsey, 42, 186

Green, Marshall, 9, 14, 17, 31, 45, 190, 194, 195, 199, 208, 223, 230, 234, 246

Cambodia, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 291, 298, 299

Thai forces in, 70, 86, 88, 125

Indonesia:

Soviet military aid to, 315, 316

U.S. economic and military aid to, 288, 302, 304, 305, 306, 310, 311, 321

U.S. relations with, 266, 276, 294, 296, 330

West Irian, 274

Laos, 52, 56, 59, 88, 90, 93

Narcotic drug trafficking, 136, 138

Nixon's trip to China, 153, 155

Philippines:

Assassination plots against Marcos, 202

Constitutional Convention, 228

Marcos visit to Washington, 189

U.S. force reductions in, 203, 204, 216, 218

U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 198

U.S. policy toward, 248

U.S. relations with, 189, 192, 205, 213

Symington subcommittee hearings, 35, 37, 197

Thailand:

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 97, 183

Covert operations in, 120

Internal vs. external threats to, 89

U.S. relations with, 33, 65, 80, 119, 158

Visits:

Indonesia, July, 1969, 271, 272

Philippines, 1969, 192

Philippines, 1972, 247

Thailand, 1971, 121, 122, 125

Thailand, 1972, 153, 155, 157, 158

Greene, Jack, 165, 233

Green Revolution, 114, 233

Gromyko, Andrei A., 28, 92, 331

Gross, Nelson G., 136

Guam Doctrine, 18, 39, 45, 62, 269

Guthrie (JCS), 59

Guthrie, D. Keith, 88, 98, 112

Habib, Gen., 321

Haig, Brig. Gen. Alexander M., Jr., 53, 54, 60, 138, 143, 148, 150, 168, 237, 260, 284, 316, 321

Indonesia, 304, 309

Philippines, 211, 212, 243

Symington subcommittee hearings, 196

Thailand, 59, 73, 86, 105, 134, 145, 166

Consultation on Paris peace talks, 184, 185

Visit to Southeast Asia, 184

Haldeman, H.R., 242

Hankam, 316

Hanket, Col. Arthur P., 65, 71

Hannah, John A., 10, 45, 174, 227, 234

Hannah, Norman B., 2, 4, 11, 35

Hardin, Clifford M., 132, 277

Harlow, Bryce, 59

Hartman, Arthur A., 215, 216

Harvard Development Advisory Service, 267

Hasnan Habib, Gen., 326

Hawley, James M., 189

Heath, Edward, 243

Heavner, Theodore J., 327

Hebert, Edward, 175

Helms, Richard M.:

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Philippines, 187, 188, 189, 227, 254

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 70, 76, 81, 88, 98

Thai forces in Laos, 36, 88, 93, 98

Thailand, 10, 94, 105, 166, 174

U.S. military aid to Laos, 29

Henkin, Daniel Z., 104

Heroin, 123, 124, 162

Hippies, 162

Ho Chi Minh, 26, 27

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 11, 22, 44, 49, 91, 102, 126

Holdridge, John H., 24, 29, 86, 117, 146, 168, 228, 240, 277, 288, 300, 305, 311

Cambodia, 60, 70, 76, 85, 88, 91, 95, 98, 102, 125, 292

Indonesia:

Malik visit, 276

PRC-U.S. relations, 330

Regional cooperation proposal, 312

Suharto visit, 296, 302

U.S. military aid to, 275, 281, 299, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314

Visit, July, 1969, 270, 271, 272

Philippines, 247

Force withdrawal from Vietnam, 198

Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 230

SOFA, 209

Thailand:

Communist insurgency in North of, 150

Forces in Laos, 59, 88, 98, 160

U.S. forces in, 84, 166

U.S. military aid to, 68, 116

U.S. relations with, 41, 126, 127, 128, 155, 182

Hong Kong, 31, 46, 111, 123

Hormats, Robert, 134, 145, 156

Houdek, Robert, 87

House of Representatives, U.S.:

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 62

Foreign Affairs Committee, 173

Huang Hua, 158

Hughes, Gen. John, 290

Hughes, Thomas L., 188

Hukbalahap movement (Huks), 188, 227, 233

Hummel, Arthur W., 158, 162, 249

Humphrey, Hubert H., 87

Hungary, 127

Huong (Tran Van Huong), 4

India, 46, 92, 191, 308

Indigenous people, 1, 149

Indonesia (see also Indonesia and Indonesian subheadings under other subjects):

Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 331, 332

Demographics of, 279

Economic situation:

Debt rescheduling, 271, 272, 274, 302

Five-year plan, 271, 273, 279

Indonesian position, 323

U.S. views, 267, 317, 321

Five-year military plan, 317

Japanese economic aid to, 278, 301

Japanese sales of rice to, 109

Malaysia, relations with, 266, 268, 273

Non-alignment of, 266

Pantja Sila, 272, 301

P.L.–480 rice sales to, 46, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332

Regional cooperation proposal, 312

Singapore, relations with, 268, 279, 294

Soviet military aid to, 315, 316

Soviet Union, relations with, 266, 274, 294, 302

Transmigration, 279

United States, relations with, 332

Connally visit, 322, 323

PRC-U.S. relations, effect on, 325, 330, 331

Rogers visit, 271

Suharto visit, 266, 272, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 301, 302

U.S. economic aid to:

Indonesian position, 271, 273, 302

U.S. position, 267, 278, 302, 317

U.S. loan proposal for Thai rice sales to, 110, 111

U.S. military aid to:

Grant program, 293

Indonesian request for, 275

Letter from Nixon on, 324, 327

MAP alternatives for:

Indonesian position, 275, 306

Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 294, 299, 303, 310, 329, 331

Philippine position, 233

Umar visit for discussions on, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318

U.S. position, 280, 283, 306, 307, 311, 318, 332

U.S. survey group for, 310, 313, 314

Military training, 270, 272, 273, 290

M-16 rifles, 313

Sumitro talks in U.S. on, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310

Transport aircraft, 281, 288

U.S. position, 277, 288, 295, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 321

U.S. oil quota for, 276

U.S. policy toward, 268, 277

U.S. security interests in, 82

Vietnam Republic, relations with, 279

Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92

West Irian issue, 272, 273, 274

Ingersoll, John, 123, 138

Inouye, Daniel, 256

Interagency Textile Advisory Committee (ITAC), 134

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI):

Aid requests for 1969, 267

Aid requests for 1970, 277, 278

Aid requests for 1971/1972, 317, 319, 323, 326

Indonesian view of U.S. role in, 294, 302

Japan as member of, 267

Thai views of U.S. actions under, 101, 106, 107, 111, 114

U.S. contributions to, 101, 332

International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD):

China membership question, 247

Indonesian aid requests, 267, 272, 277, 278, 295, 317, 319

Indonesian economic problems, 111, 274, 302

Philippines, 222, 227, 234

Thailand, 45, 142

International Control Commission (ICC), 32, 60, 300

International Court of Justice, 28

International Development Agency (IDA), 323

International Monetary Fund (IMF):

Indonesia, 267, 272, 277, 278, 319

Philippines, 207, 208, 222, 229, 233, 234, 247

Interpol, 124

Iran, 243

Irwin, John N., II:

Indonesia, 314, 317, 328

Philippines, 248

Thai forces in Cambodia, 125

Visit to Thailand, 1971, 121, 122, 123, 124

Islamic separatism:

In Philippines, 191

In Thailand, 4, 34

Israel, 18, 157, 274, 276

Italy, 109, 267

Japan. (See also Japan and Japanese subheadings under other entries):

Cambodia role for, 291

Djakarta Conference, 297

Fuji Seminar, 252

IGGI member, 267

Indonesian debts to, 272

Indonesia purchases of rice from, 109

Military role in Asia, 186, 308, 310

Military threat from, 153, 320, 330, 331

Philippines, relations with, 222

PRC threat to, 310

Regional cooperation, 271

Rice purchases from Thailand, 101, 106, 114

Security interests in Asia, 82

Southeast Asian role of, 121, 169

Taiwan policy of the United States, 247

Thai view of, 121

United States, relations with, 197

Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92

Jira Vichitsonggram, Gen., 11, 104

JOBAR study, 215

Johnson, Lyndon B.:

Congressional mistrust of, 47

Philippines, 187, 194

Thailand, 23, 32

Johnson, Vice Adm. Nels C., 29, 52, 61

Johnson, Peter, 74

Johnson, U. Alexis, 9, 61, 148, 159, 223, 286

Cambodia, Thai forces in, 63, 64, 66, 70, 76, 86, 98

Laos:

Thai forces in, 52, 56, 59, 88, 170

Thai-Khmer units, 90, 93, 96, 98, 112

U.S. military aid to, 29

Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92

Philippines:

CIA contact with Marcos, 188

Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 230

U.S. bases agreement, 215

U.S. force reductions, 225

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 35, 37, 194

Thailand:

Coup, Nov., 1971, 144

Covert operations in, 120, 129

Economic situation in, 31

Narcotic drug trafficking, 136

U.S. forces in:

Increase of, 23, 165

Reduction of, 65, 69, 71, 73, 80, 84

USIS role terminated in, 33

U.S. military aid to, 177

U.S. relations with, 33, 99

Dawee meeting with Nixon, 8

King Rama IX visit, 141

Rice sales, 41

U.S. notification about operations from Thai soil, 102

Unger visit, 1

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS):

Laos, 52

Philippines, 215, 216

Thailand, 52, 62, 65, 69, 79

Juwono, Gen. Sutopo, 270, 289

Kalaris, George T., 238, 257

Karamessines, Thomas H., 52, 54, 172, 314

Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 230

Narcotic drug trafficking, 136

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 76, 88

Thai forces in Laos, 59, 88, 112, 170

Karnow, Stanley, 15

Kauffman, Adm., 194

Kendall, Donald, 190, 205

Kennedy, David M., 110, 111, 156, 277, 321

Kennedy, John F., 21

Kennedy, Col. Richard T., 86, 117, 168, 178, 228, 300

Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 230

Thai forces in Cambodia, 76, 88, 95, 98

Thai forces in Laos, 98, 160, 176

U.S. forces in Thailand, 84, 166

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 314

U.S. military aid to Thailand, 125

U.S. textile imports from Thailand, 145

Kennedy Round Food Aid Convention, 267

Keogh, James, 222

Khmer (people), 63, 64, 68

Khmer Republic. See Cambodia.

Kishi, Nobusuke, 186

Kissinger, Henry A., 4, 54, 62, 100, 117, 146, 240, 277, 286

Cambodia:

Indonesian military aid to, 300

Thai diplomatic and military aid to, 60

Thai forces in, 63, 70, 76, 81, 85, 86, 88, 91, 95, 98, 102

U.S. military intervention in, 292

Indonesia:

Five-year military plan, 318

Malik visit, 276

Meeting with generals in, 270

Regional cooperation proposal, 312

Soviet military aid to, 316

Suharto visit, 292, 295, 300

U.S. economic aid to, 267, 278, 317, 319, 324

U.S. military aid to:

Grant program, 293

MAP program, 275, 280, 283, 299, 311

Military training, 293

M-16 rifles, 313

Sumitro talks on, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 326

Survey group on, 314

Transport aircraft, 281, 288

U.S. position, 304

U.S. relations with, 322, 325

Laos:

Thai forces in:

Infantry battalions, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61

Performance of irregulars, 147, 160

SGUs, 135

Sierra Romeo artillery unit, 52, 55

Thai-Khmer units, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98, 102, 112

Volunteer program, 170, 178

U.S. bombing in, 53

U.S. military aid to, 29

Nixon's Asia visit, 1969, 18, 269

Paris peace talks, 182

Philippines:

Byroade's assessment of Marcos, 219

Constitutional Convention, 228, 230, 232

Force withdrawal from Vietnam, 198

Land Reform Education, 237

Martial law, 260

Riots in Manila, 206, 222

U.S. force reductions in, 212, 214, 218, 225

U.S. interference in elections, charges of, 193

U.S. policy toward, 254

U.S. relations with, 186

Ferdinand Marcos visit, 189

Imelda Marcos visit, 227, 230

Military bases agreement, 195, 215, 217, 221

Nixon visit, 1969, 192

SOFA, 209, 211

PRC-U.S. relations, 127, 231

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 34

Thailand:

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, 150

Coup, Nov., 1971, 143

Internal vs. external threats to, 89

PRC relations with, 154, 181

Project Taksin, 23

U.S. economic aid to, 50, 75, 125

U.S. force reductions in, 13, 22, 71, 73, 80, 84

USIS role terminated in, 33, 34, 39

U.S. military aid to, 68, 116, 130, 168

U.S. program analysis for, 10

U.S. relations with:

Agnew visit, 39

Laird visit, 105

Loosening of alliance, 47

Rice sales, 41, 42, 118

U.S. defense commitments, 21, 24, 27

U.S. textile imports from Thailand, 134, 140, 156

U.S. views of Thanat, 9

Visits:

China, Feb., 1972, 151

Indonesia, July, 1969, 270, 271, 272

Thailand, 126, 127, 128

Knowles, Lt. Gen. Richard T., 98, 112, 230

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 297, 330

Korea, Republic of:

Japanese security interests in, 82

Philippines, relations with, 256

Taiwan policy of the United States, 247

Thai rice sales to, 46

U.S. force reductions in, 48, 212, 279

U.S. payments for forces in Vietnam from, 38

U.S. policy toward, 105, 194

Korean War, 24, 26

Kosygin, Alexei N., 331

Kriangsak Chamanan, Lt. Gen.:

Agnew visit, 165

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142

Narcotic drug trafficking, 131, 136, 138, 152

Resettlement of Chinese irregulars, 173

Rogers visit, 104

Thai forces in Cambodia, 66

Kris Sivara, Gen., 115

Kuomintang (KMT) irregulars, 104, 131, 136, 138, 152, 164, 173

Kuznetsov, 331

Kyle, Joseph B., 46

Lagdameo, 198, 201

Laird, Melvin R.:

Cambodia, 76

Indonesia, 268, 280, 283, 310, 322

Laos, 175, 176, 178, 179

Philippines, 189, 211, 212, 254

Thailand:

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 174

U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 62, 69, 71, 79

U.S. military aid to, 132, 168

U.S. program analysis for, 10

U.S. relations with:

Rice sales, 109

U.S. defense commitments, 14, 20, 24, 27, 43

U.S. notification about operations from Thai soil, 99, 102

Visits to Thailand, 4, 104, 105

Lake, Anthony, 18, 270

Laos:

Cambodia, relations with, 74

Covert operations in, 56

Japanese economic aid to, 11

Lam Son 719 withdrawal, 113

Long Tieng defense efforts, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 70, 102, 126, 147, 164

Narcotic drug trafficking in, 123

NVA forces in:

Call for withdrawal of, 43

Offensive of Feb., 1970, 52

Plain of Jars attacks, 147, 148, 164

Strength of, 27, 28

U.S. desire to counter, 57

Paris peace talks role for, 16

Partition of, possible, 44

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30

Thai forces in:

Buildup of, 61

Helicopter gunships, 49

Infantry battalion, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 81, 87

Laotian request for, 18

Medevac problems, 126, 135

NVA battles with, 147, 148

Performance of irregulars, 147, 160

Project Taksin provisions for, 36, 52

Sierra Romeo unit, 29, 33, 51, 52, 55, 59, 64, 96

Special Guerrilla Units (SGUs), 122, 124, 126, 127, 130, 135, 178, 179

Thai Khmer units, 88, 90, 91, 93, 96, 102, 105, 112

U.S. air support for, 25

Volunteer program, 135, 170, 175, 176, 177, 179

Thailand, relations with, 74

Thai security concerns over, 1, 11, 20, 39, 49, 62, 104, 125, 151

U.S. bombing of, 22, 53, 58

U.S. military aid to, 29

U.S. policy and objectives in, 119

Vietnam Republic, relations with, 74

Laos Working Group, 59

Latif, Gen., 307, 308, 310

Latimer, Tom, 150

Laurel, José, 186, 249, 256

Lee, Harlan Y. M., 144

Lee Kwan Yew, 276, 279

Lennon, James, 274

Levin, Herbert, 314

Licaros, Gregorio S., 261

Li Mi, Gen., 152

Lissy, David H., 331

Li Wen-Huan, Gen., 131, 136, 138, 152, 173

Lloyd, Wingate, 284

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 236

Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles (LTA), 134, 140

Lon Nol:

Indonesian aid to Cambodia, 284, 285, 287, 289, 298, 299

Popular support for, 87

Thai-Cambodian relations, 60

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66, 88, 91, 103

U.S.-Cambodian relations, 184

Lopez, Argenio, 233

Lopez, Fernando, 233

Lord, Winston, 277

Lowenstein, 122, 165

Lowman, Shepard C., 234, 244, 249, 261

Lubis, Abu Bakar, 279

Lydman, 271, 272, 273

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr.:

Indonesia, 308, 310, 314

Thailand, 22, 73, 75, 84

Macapagal, Diosdado P., 194, 219

Maceda, 193

Macomber, William B., Jr., 14

Maestrone, Frank E., 238, 257

Magsaysay, Genaro, 187, 190, 238

Magsaysay, Ramon, 186, 188

Malai Huvanandana, 107, 113, 126

Malaysia:

Australian/New Zealand forces in, 271

Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 332

Dissidents in Thailand, 4

Djakarta Conference, 297

Indonesia, relations with, 266, 268, 273

Interracial conflict in, 272, 276

National Operations Council (NOC), 272

Philippine claim to Sabah, 191, 279

Thai rice sales to, 46

U.S. rubber disposal program, 106

Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92

Malik, Adam:

Cambodia, 284, 285, 287, 291, 297, 298, 299, 300

Non-alignment, 266

PRC-U.S. relations, 330

Southeast Asia peace prospects, 92

Soviet military aid to Indonesia, 316

Thai rice sales, 114

U.S. economic aid to Indonesia, 302, 323

U.S.-Indonesian relations, 271, 272, 274, 279, 332

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 303, 304

U.S. views of, 321

Visit to Washington, 1969, 276

West Irian issue, 272, 274

Malik, Yacov, 297

Manglapus, Raul S., 227

Manila Communiqué (1966), 32

Mansfield, Mike, 144, 320

Mao Tse-tung, 153, 206, 312

Marcos, Ferdinand:

Aquino's view of, 257

Assassination plots against, 202

Attacks on U.S. embassy, 211

Byroade's assessment of, 219

Communist subversion, 210, 261

Constitutional Convention, 231, 232

Corruption charges against, 196

Foreign policy of Philippines, 255

Malaysian-Philippines relations, 279

Martial law, 207, 233, 256, 257, 258, 260

Military bases agreement, 199

Nixon visit to China, 243, 244, 245

Philippines' force withdrawal from Vietnam, 198

Press leaks, 236

Riots in Manila, 205, 206, 208, 222

SEATO, 43

Suspension of habeas corpus, 239

U.S. economic aid to Philippines, 227

U.S. force reductions, 203, 218, 225, 226

U.S. military aid to Philippines, 241

U.S. payments to PHILCAG, 201

U.S.-Philippines relations, 186, 224, 247, 322

Nixon visit, 1969, 191, 192, 269

U.S. interference in elections, charges of, 193, 205

Visits to the United States, 186, 187, 188, 189, 224

U.S. views of, 248, 262, 263

Marcos, Imelda:

Possible presidential candidate, 233, 257

Riots in Manila, 205

Suspension of habeas corpus, 239

U.S.-Philippines relations, 187, 219, 322

Visit to Washington, 1970, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232

Visit to Washington, 1971, 242, 243, 244, 245

Martin, Graham, 3, 23, 36

Marzuki, Artati, 271, 272

Masters, Edward E., 119, 165, 284, 296, 297, 298, 302, 303, 304

Mata, 199

Mayo, Robert P., 10, 50, 277

McCain, Adm. John, 62, 64, 67, 316

Indonesia, 275, 290

Philippines, 193, 247

U.S. force reductions in Thailand, 79

McCarthy, Eugene, 91

McClintock, Robert, 36, 194, 196

McCloskey, Robert, 14

McCown, Maj. Gen. Hal D., 4

McGovern, George, 182, 258

McKee, Capt. Kinnaird, 166

McNamara, Robert, 23, 142, 228, 276

Media, 163, 164, 165, 236

Mekong Valley, 20, 50

Melchor, Alex, 199, 201, 247, 261

Meo (people), 29, 58, 104

Meyer, Charles A., 230

Middle East, 87, 92, 271, 274, 331

Military Assistance Command Thailand (MACT), 23

Military Assistance Program (MAP):

For Cambodia, 64, 74, 76, 87, 88, 102

Costs, 32

For Indonesia:

Indonesian position, 275, 306

Indonesian-U.S. talks on, 294, 299, 303, 310, 329, 331

Philippine position, 233

Umar visit for discussions on, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318

U.S. position, 280, 283, 306, 307, 311, 318, 332

U.S. survey group for, 310, 314

For Philippines, 207, 233, 246

For Thailand, 168, 170

Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF), 76, 85, 102, 125, 130, 132

Miller, Robert M., 159

Milton, Maj. Gen. Theodore R., 23

Minh, Gen. (Duong Van Minh), 127

Mongolia, 297

Montelibano, 256

Moore, Jonathan, 48, 49, 76, 194, 201, 203, 208, 304

Moore, Sgt., 209

Moorer, Adm. Thomas H.:

Indonesian military aid to Cambodia, 299

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Thai forces in Cambodia, 70, 76, 88

Thai forces in Laos, 88, 96, 98, 105, 170

U.S. forces in Thailand, 79, 166

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305, 308, 309, 310, 314

U.S. notification about operations from Thai soil, 99

U.S. policy toward Indonesia, 268

Visit to Thailand, 1971, 104, 105

Moose, Richard M., 7, 122, 165, 187

Mosbacher, Emil, 276

Muller, George F., 62, 144

Murphy, George, 91

Murphy, Jack, 45

Narcotics. See Drugs.

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 91

National Liberation Front (NLF) (Viet Cong), 4, 186

National Security Council (NSC):

National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM):

77, 84

89, 125

126, 132

National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM):

51, 10, 45, 50, 75, 82, 89, 174

61, 268, 277

99, 82, 130, 132

155, 254, 260

159, 174

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 314

Nehmer, Stanley, 156

Nelson, William E., 265

Cambodia, 76, 98, 286

Drug trafficking, 136

Laos, 59, 98, 112, 147

Philippines, 188, 230

Thailand, 17, 183

Netherlands, 267, 272, 274

Newman, George S., 128, 129, 133

New People's Army (NPA), 210, 238

New Society, 262

Newsweek, 87

New York Times, 144, 236

New Zealand, 82, 271, 279, 291, 298, 329

Ngo Dinh Diem, 236

Nguyen Cao Ky, 26, 127, 186

Nguyen Thi Binh, 128

Nguyen Thieu, 4, 26, 124, 127

Nitya Bhanumas, Gen., 131

Nixon, Richard M., 100

Cambodia, 70, 86, 91, 95, 102, 292

China policy, 121

Democracy, 242

Indonesia:

U.S. economic aid to, 267, 278, 317, 324, 326

U.S. military aid to, 280, 281, 283, 288, 290, 293, 306, 310

U.S. relations with, 276, 321, 322, 325, 331

Connally visit, 322, 323

Suharto visit, 1970, 266, 295, 300, 303

Messages:

To Suharto, 322, 327, 329

To/from Thanom, 13, 16

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Philippines:

Byroade's assessment of Marcos, 219

Constitutional Convention, 228, 232

Investment climate in, 261, 262

Land Reform Education, 237

Martial law, 233, 258, 260

Meetings with opposition leaders, 190, 191

Riots in Manila, 206, 222

SOFA, 211

U.S. force reductions in, 203, 212, 214, 218, 225, 226

U.S. interference in elections, charges of, 193

U.S. relations with, 186

Ferdinand Marcos visits, 189, 224

Imelda Marcos visits, 227, 242, 243

Military bases agreement, 195, 217, 221

U.S. views of society in, 235

Re-election of, 184, 185

Symington subcommittee hearings, 44, 194, 196

Thai forces in Laos, 52, 93, 148, 175

Infantry battalion, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61

SGUs, 122, 178, 179

Thailand:

Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 181

Consultations on Paris peace talks by, 164, 182, 185

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, 105, 165

Coup, Nov., 1971, 143, 144

Reappointment of Prime Minister, 6, 7

U.S. economic aid to, 50

U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 73, 84

U.S. military aid to, 43, 168

U.S. relations with:

Green visit, 157

Irwin visit, 124

King's visit, invitation for, 110

Loosening of alliance, 47

Project Taksin, 20, 23

Rice sales, 109, 114

U.S. defense commitments, 21, 24, 27, 87

U.S. textile imports, 140

U.S. role in Asia, 271

U.S. treaty commitments, 157

Visits:

China, 1972, 139, 151, 153, 154, 155, 320, 330

Philippines' concerns over, 243, 244, 245, 247

Indonesia, 1969, 191, 269, 272, 273

Philippines, 1969, 191, 192

Thailand, 1969, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 26, 43, 191

West Irian, 274

Withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam, 12, 18

Nixon Doctrine:

Announcement of, 18, 269

Force reduction in Taiwan, 247

Indonesian position, 289, 296, 301, 308, 312

Nixon trip to China and, 153

Philippine position, 203, 210, 254

Thai position, 62, 87, 94, 104, 115, 164

Thai role in, 119

U.S. position, 47, 102, 105, 125, 127, 139, 229, 304, 322, 332

Non-Aligned Conference, New Delhi, June, 1970, 300

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 212

North Borneo, 191

Nutter, G. Warren, 59, 61, 76, 104

Odeen, Phil, 176

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 332

Oil, 276

Okinawa, 197

Okun, Herbert S., 48, 49

Operation Brotherhood, 236

Operation Leapfrog, 88

Operation Phu Kwang, 162, 163

Operation Prairie Fire, 88

Opium, 131, 136, 138, 141, 152, 162, 164, 165

Ortega, Father, 227

Ortiz Sanz, Fernando, 272, 274

Osmena, Sergio, 187, 190, 199, 202, 205, 238

Ott, Maj. Gen. David, 166

Packard, David:

Imelda Marcos visit to Washington, 230

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 70, 98

Thai forces in Laos, 56, 93, 96, 98, 112

U.S. force reductions in Thailand, 65, 69, 71, 73, 80, 84

U.S. military aid to Indonesia, 305, 313, 314

U.S. notification about operations from Thai soil, 99

Pahlavi, Shah Reza, 243

Pakistan, 92, 191

Palmby, Clarence D., 75

Palmer, Ron, 252

Panggabean, 330

Pantja Sila, 272, 301

Parade, 1

Paris Club, 302

Paris peace talks:

Indonesian position, 272

Philippine position, 186, 191

PRC proposal, 128

Thai position, 6, 16, 32, 104, 151, 158, 164

U.S. position, 43, 121, 126, 182, 185, 192

Parker, Maynard, 87

Passman, Otto, 33

Pathet Lao, 11, 39, 44, 127

Patterson, Col., 205

Paul, Roland, 21

Paul VI, Pope, 227

Peace Corps, 43, 216

Pederson, 271, 272

Pentagon Papers (Ellsworth), 127, 236

Percy, Charles, 105

Peterson, Pete, 156

Phaithun, Gen., 135

Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG):

Central Luzon actions of, 210

Philippine position, 186, 189, 191

U.S. payments to, 198, 201

Philippines:

Cambodia, relations with, 186

CIA contact with Marcos, 188

CIA role in elections in, 187, 188

Constabulary development for RVN, 186, 189

Covert operations in, 230, 231, 236

Cuts in U.S. embassy personnel, 225

Eastern bloc, relations with, 233

Economic situation, 191, 203, 227, 245, 261, 262

Foreign policy of, 255

Huk rebellion, 188, 227, 233

Islamic separatism, 191

Japan, relations with, 222

Korean Republic, relations with, 256

Land Reform Education, 237

Laurel-Langley Agreement:

Expiration of, 246, 248, 255

Philippine position, 186, 187, 189, 199, 205

U.S.-Philippines discussion on, 224

U.S. position, 206, 213, 217, 231

Malaysia, relations with, 191

New People's Army (NPA), 210, 238

Oligarchy in, 246

Political situation, 219

Assassination plots, 202

Constitutional Conventions, 206, 207, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 243, 256, 257, 259

Martial law, 207, 256, 257, 258, 260

U.S. position, 233, 264

Plaza Miranda attack, 239

Riots in Manila, 205, 206, 208, 222

Return of hijacked airplane by China, 121

Symington subcommittee hearings, 194, 196, 197, 201

United States, relations with:

Aquino criticisms, 249, 252

Attacks on U.S. embassy, 211

Balance-of-payments, 189

Benefits checks, 189

Criminal jurisdiction, 221, 222

Economic agreements negotiations, 221, 222, 259

Filipinization at U.S. bases, 221

Lansdale memo, 236

Military base agreement, 191, 195, 199, 215, 217, 221, 246

Nixon meeting with opposition leaders, 190, 191

Philippine nationalism, 191, 246

Press leaks, 236

Rogers visit, 224

Science tax, 189

SOFA, 207, 209, 211

Sugar quota, 241, 243, 246, 261

U.S. economic aid to, 191, 248

Philippine position, 227

P.L. 480 program, 207, 229, 233

Rural electrification, 227, 228, 234

U.S. force reductions in, 203, 204, 212, 214, 215, 216, 218, 225, 226

U.S. military aid to:

Equipment and training, 210, 241, 243

MAP in exchange for bases, 246, 248

Payments to PHILCAG, 198, 201

Philippine position, 191, 207, 224

U.S. payments for forces in Vietnam from, 38, 43

U.S. policy toward, 105, 246, 248, 254

U.S. views of society in, 235, 246

Pickering, Laurence G., 70, 76, 87, 88, 114, 144, 165

Pierson, George K., 45

Pincus, Walter, 21

Podgorny, Nikolai V., 331

Poland, 272

Political parties:

Christian Socialist Movement (CSM) (Philippines), 227

Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), 137, 150

Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), 271, 273, 295, 331

Democrats (Thailand), 5

Liberal (Philippines), 202, 205, 206, 231, 238, 262

Nationalist (Philippines), 238

Saha Pracha Thai, 2, 5, 120

Thep (Thailand), 2

Popple, Paul M., 264

Pote Sarasin:

Agnew visits, 43, 87, 165

Cambodia, 65

Chinese People's Republic-Thai relations, 154, 180, 181, 182

Connally visit, 139

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144

Election, Thailand, 1969, 2, 5

Irwin visit, 121

Japanese role in Southeast Asia, 169

Laird visit, 104

Nixon's trip to China, 153

Rice sales, 104, 111

Thai consultation on Paris peace talks, 182

U.S. views of, 9

Praphas, 23

Praphat Charusathien, Gen.:

Agnew visits, 87, 165

ARVN withdrawal from Lam Son 719, 113

Counterinsurgency efforts, 137

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144

Green visit, 157

Helms visit, 94

On implementation of U.S. policy, 115

Kissinger visit, 126

Laird visit, 104

Narcotic drug trafficking, 162, 165

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Political role of, 5

Rice sales, 107

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66

Thai forces in Laos, 88, 90, 96, 102, 135, 170

Vietnam conflict, 126

Prasert, Gen., 66, 141, 144, 162

Prasit Kanjonawatana, 139, 180

Project Lotus, 3, 129

Project Sayavong, 96

Project Taksin (Project 22):

Avoidance of publicity around, 35, 52, 56, 57

Background on, 23

Senatorial request for content of, 14, 21, 24, 37

Thai-U.S. relations as affected by, 15, 20, 33, 43

U.S. position, 48

Pursley, Col. Robert E., 4

Quan, 11

Quezon, Manuel, 219

Rafferty, James F., 187, 193, 205, 227, 229

Rama IX, King of Thailand:

Agnew visit, 39, 44

Connally visit, 322

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143

Green visit, 155

Helms visit, 94

Johnson visit with, 141

Nixon's trip to China, 153

Reappointment of prime minister by, 5, 6, 7

Rice sales, 109, 110

U.S. visit proposals, 34, 105, 110

Ratliff, Rob Roy, 265

Ravenholt, Al, 205

Razak, Tun, 272

Refugees:

Chinese, 104

Vietnamese, 121, 162, 231

Renoo, Dr., 87, 111, 130

Reyes, Narciso G., 241

Reynders, Thomas, 165

Rhodes Formula, 274

Rice:

8 miracle rice, development of, 227

Japanese trading in, 101, 106, 109, 114

Low prices for, 115

Proposals for Thai sales to Indonesia of, 101, 110, 111

Sales to Indonesia of, 46, 101, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 267, 332

U.S. P.L. 480 rice sales:

Thai position, 87, 104, 105, 110, 111, 127

U.S. position, 39, 114, 130, 132, 164, 207, 229, 233

U.S. rice sales to Vietnam Republic, 39, 41, 43

U.S.-Thai talks on, 46, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 118

Richardson, Elliot, 208

Indonesia, 277, 293, 296, 302

Philippines, 190, 195, 214, 215, 218

Suharto visit, 292, 297

U.S. secret agreements, 14, 194

Robinson, Davis R., 14

Rockefeller Foundation, 227

Rogers, William P., 45, 62, 194

Indonesia:

Malik visit, 276

Suharto meeting in Belgrade, 331

U.S. economic and military aid to, 267, 280, 283, 323

U.S. policy toward, 268

Nixon's Asia visit, 1969, 269

Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92

Philippines:

CIA contact with Marcos, 188

Rural electrification aid, 234

U.S. policy toward, 254

U.S. relations with, 189, 192

U.S. views of society in, 235

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 196

Thai forces in Cambodia, 74

Thai forces in Laos, 36, 122

Thailand:

Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 154, 180

Counterinsurgency efforts, 11, 105, 174

Reappointment of Prime Minister, 6, 7

Secret U.S. agreement with, 14

Security concerns over Laos of, 49

Southeast Asia role of, 32

U.S. defense commitments to, 21, 27, 48, 169

U.S. economic and military aid to, 10, 50, 132

U.S. force reductions in, 25, 28, 73, 76, 79, 80, 84

U.S. relations with, 16, 20, 102

U.S. views of Thanat, 9

Vietnam military situation, 241

Visit to China, Feb., 1972, 151, 153

Visit to Indonesia, July, 1969, 271, 272, 274

Visit to Philippines, July, 1970, 224

Romania, 18, 127, 191, 269, 272

Romualdez, Benjamin “Kokoi,” 188, 193, 205, 247, 261

Romulo, Carlos, 244

Green visit, 247

Military bases agreement, 199, 222

Press leaks, 236

Rogers visit, 224

SOFA, 209, 211

Southeast Asia peace prospects, 92

Vietnam military situation, 241

Ronodipuro, J., 271

Roxas, Jerry, 190, 219

Roy, Jose, 238

Rubber, 106, 110, 115, 320

Rush, Kenneth, 159, 166, 170

Rusk, Dean, 21, 23, 24, 36, 48, 75

Russell, Richard, 76

Sabah, 191, 279

Saiyud Kerdphon, Gen., 1

Salonga, Jovito R., 238

Samran Petyakul, Lt. Gen., 149

Sanga, Gen., 111, 122

Sani, Anwar, 271, 272, 279, 296, 302

San Juan, Rep., 236

Sarit Dhanarajata, Marshal, 23, 144

Savang Vatthana, King of Laos, 56

Sawaeng Senanarong, Gen.:

Agnew visits, 43, 87

Connally visit, 139

Counterinsurgency efforts, 1, 11

Helms visit, 94

Kissinger visit, 127

Laird visit, 104

Rice sales, 106, 111

Thai elections, 2

Withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam, 26

Schermerhorn, Lange, 151

Schuman, Robert, 91

Security Training Center, 236

Seith, Maj. Gen. Louis T., 25, 87

Selden, Armistead, 166

Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

Indonesian economic and military development, 301

Nixon administration's views of, 105

Review of U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia by, 6

Symington subcommittee hearings:

Philippines, 194, 196, 197, 201

Thailand, 20, 24, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 97

Thai forces in Laos, 59, 176, 178

Senior Review Group on Southeast Asia, 81, 132, 174, 254

Serm Vinicchayakul, 111, 139

Shakespeare, Frank, 27, 33

Shakow, Alexander, 101

Shultz, George P., 132, 317

Sierra Romeo, 29, 33, 51, 52, 55, 59, 64, 96

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 39, 44, 60, 87, 153, 186, 247, 272, 284, 287

Singapore:

Australian/New Zealand forces in, 271

Diplomatic aid to Cambodia, 60

Indonesia, relations with, 268, 279, 294

Thai rice sales, 46

U.S. security interests in, 82

Vietnam conflict, 276

Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180, 191, 272, 273

Sirikit, Gen., 126, 127

Sison, Jose Maria, 257

Slamat, Air Vice Marshal, 316

Smith, Harold, 261

Smith, K. Wayne, 89, 125, 127, 128, 314

Smith, Norman L., 114

Smith, Terence, 16

Sneider, Richard L., 13, 189, 267

Soedjatmoko, 272, 274, 276, 287, 292, 296, 302, 320

Soekeng, Col., 307, 308, 310

Solbert, Peter, 23

Sompong, Dr., 43

Southeast Asia:

Indonesian security role in, 317

Japanese role in, 121, 169

Neutralization proposal, 143, 247

Peace prospects for, 92

PRC policy in, 153

Regional cooperation in, 312

Thai role in, 32

U.S. security policy in, 1

U.S. Senate review of commitments in, 6

U.S. withdrawal from, 87

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO):

Article IV, 247

Cambodian treaty commitments, 60

Council Meetings:

Bangkok, May, 1969, 7, 9, 11

Manila, July, 1970, 224

Joint defense commitments, 21, 24, 36

Laos treaty commitments, 56

Military contingency planning, 15

Thai support for, 43

Treaty provisions, 48

U.S. role in Asia, 82

Souvanna Phouma:

Agnew visit, 184

Communist road building, 44

Narcotic drug trafficking, 124

Negotiation with Pathet Lao, 127

Thai forces in Laos, 56, 57, 59, 61, 87, 96, 135, 148

Soviet Union:

Djakarta Conference, 297

Indonesia, relations with, 266, 271, 274, 294, 302

Indonesian views of, 18

Middle East, 274

Philippines, relations with, 233

Sino-Soviet conflict, 127, 153, 180, 191, 272, 273

Strategic arms limitations talks, 43

Thailand, relations with, 47

United States, relations with, 28, 91, 169, 245, 331

Vietnam War ceasefire role for, 92

Spain, 27

Spear, Moncrieff J., 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17

Spiers, Ronald I., 65, 73, 194, 195

Srey Saman, Gen., 63

Stans, Maurice H., 140

Starbird, Linwood, 14, 16

Stempel, John D., 296, 297, 298, 302

Stennis, John, 76, 93, 175

Sternberg, Dave, 205, 252

Stilwell, Brig. Gen. Richard, 23

Straits of Malacca, 82

Strengthening Thai Armed Forces for Defense (STAFD or STFD) program, 113, 125, 130

Stuart, Richard K., 187

Sudardjo Niklani, Gen., 326

Sudharmono, Maj. Gen., 271, 272, 296, 302, 323, 330, 331

Sudjatmoko, 271, 272, 273

Sudomo, Vice-Adm., 296, 302, 303

Sugar, 241, 243, 246, 261

Suharto:

Cambodia, 284, 285, 287, 294, 299, 323

On Communism, 266

Connally visit, 322, 323

IGGI efforts, 319, 323, 324, 326

Messages from Nixon, 322, 327

Nixon visit, 1969, 269, 272, 273

PRC-U.S. relations, 330

Rogers meeting in Belgrade, 331

Thai rice sales, 114

U.S.-Indonesian relations, 325, 332

U.S. military aid, 275, 280, 281, 290, 304, 305, 310, 314, 327

U.S. views of, 321, 322

Visits:

Australia and New Zealand, 1972, 329

United States, 1970, 266, 272, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 301, 302, 303

Westmoreland visit, 329

Suhud, Brig. Gen., 275, 281

Sujatmoko, 272, 274, 276, 287, 292, 296, 302, 320

Sukarno, 267, 272, 276

Sullivan, William H., 148, 194

Counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand, 11

Thai forces in Cambodia, 81

Thai forces in Laos, 147, 194

U.S. forces in Thailand, 80, 166

Visit to Thailand, May, 1971, 121, 122

Sumitro, Lt. Gen., 271, 272, 312

U.S. economic and military aid to Indonesia, 270, 281, 299, 301, 311, 314, 324, 326

Visit to the United States, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310

Sumuatmoko, 289

Sunthorn Hongladarom:

Peace prospects in Southeast Asia, 92

Security concerns over Laos, 49

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 35, 37

Thai consultation on Paris peace talks, 151

Thai economic situation, 31

U.S.-Thai relations, 27, 43, 46, 48, 101, 106

Supardjo, Brig. Gen., 271, 272

Surakij, Gen., 1, 90, 96, 104, 113, 167

Surakit Mayalarp, Gen., 87, 94, 107, 124, 165

Suryono Darusman, 296, 302

Suthi Nartworathat, 114

Sutikno, Gen., 323

Suwoto, 315, 316

Swank, Emory C., 90

Sweden, 285

Sy, Stephen, 193

Symington, Stuart, 21, 30, 32, 35, 36, 37, 105, 147, 194, 197

Symington subcommittee hearings:

Philippines, 194, 196, 197, 201

Thailand, 20, 24, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 97

Tanham, George, 1, 89

Tasning, Brig. Gen. Her, 271, 272

Tatad, Francisco, 201

Taylor, Curtis H., 197

Tea, 173

Terrorism, 153, 180, 238

Textiles, 134, 140, 145, 156, 161

Thailand. (see also Project Taksin; Thailand and Thai subheadings under other subjects):

Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program, 31

Cambodia, relations with, 44, 60, 291

Cambodian troop training in, 76

Chinese irregulars resettled in, 173

Chinese minority in, 142, 144

Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 9, 119, 154, 177, 180, 181, 182

CIA perspective on, 94

Communist threat to, 149, 150

Corruption in, 162

Counterinsurgency efforts:

Equipment and support programs needed for, 1, 11, 110

In the North, 149, 150

In the Northeast, 13, 105

Rural development's role in, 45

Summary executions of Communists, 183

Thai position, 43, 150

U.S. position, 115, 137, 164, 174

U.S. role in, 9, 97, 137

Covert operations in, 3, 120, 129, 131

DRV, relations with, 124

Economic situation, 31, 115

Education and health, 45

Foreign policy of, 115

Hill tribes, 1, 149

Hippies banned from, 162

Internal vs. external threats to, 89

Japanese rice purchases, 101, 106, 114

Laos, relations with, 74

Muslim insurgency, 4, 34

Narcotic drug trafficking:

KMT irregulars role in, 131, 136, 138, 152, 164, 173

Media publicity over, 163, 164, 165

Thai officials' role in, charges of, 162, 163

Thai position, 115, 138

Thai-U.S. talks on, 123, 124, 136, 141, 152, 162, 165

U.S. position, 124, 129, 164

Nixon visit (1969), 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 26, 43

Northeast region:

Communist activity in, 34, 39, 87, 115

Communist political efforts, 137

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13, 105

Election, 1969, 2

NVA training of Thai insurgents, 150

Thai view of conflict in, 126, 165

Northern region:

Chinese support for rebels in, 39, 87, 150

Communist insurgency in, 149, 150

Counterinsurgency efforts in, 13

Increase pressure by insurgents in, 113, 165

Political situation, 115

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142

Elections, 1, 2, 3, 5, 115

Reappointment of Prime Minister, 5, 6, 7

Rubber, 110, 111

Rural security and development, 45

Secret U.S. agreement with, charges of, 14

Southeast Asia role of, 32

Soviet Union, relations with, 47

STAFD program, 113, 125, 130

Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) request by, 18

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 97

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 64, 66, 68

Tourism in, 111

United States, relations with:

Agnew visit, 39, 42, 43

Connally visit, 139

Constitutional government reestablished, 5, 6

Contingency plan dispute, 14, 15, 20

Economic relations, importance of, 82

Green visit, 153, 155, 157, 158

Loosening of alliance, 115

Nixon's trip to China, 153

Thai consultation on Paris peace talks, 151, 158, 164, 182, 184, 185

U.S. defense commitments, 14, 21, 23, 24, 27, 36, 43, 87

Congressional attitudes' effect on, 47, 48, 165

USIS termination, 33, 34, 39

U.S. payments for Thai forces in Vietnam, 36, 38, 39

U.S. economic aid to:

FY 1970 program, 45, 50

P.L. 480 program for, 75, 76, 87, 98, 111, 116, 125, 127, 130, 132, 164

Thai-U.S. talks on, 31

U.S. forces in:

Increases in, 162, 164, 166

Nixon doctrine role for, 62

Reductions in:

Banner Sun, 79, 84

Planning for, 73

Scheduling of, 25, 79

Thai position, 20

U.S. concerns over, 22, 62, 65, 80

U.S.-Thai consultations over, 12, 13, 16, 27, 28, 69, 71

Thai approval for additional U.S. bombers, 108

U.S. military aid to:

Ceilings on, 175, 176, 178

Equipment and weapons, 43, 68, 164, 167, 171

MAP program, 168, 170

MASF program, 76, 85, 102, 125, 130, 132

Thai position, 1, 9, 43, 104, 116, 132, 155, 169, 177, 184

U.S. position, 32

U.S. policy and objectives in, 16, 17, 82, 119

U.S. program analysis for, 10

U.S. textile imports from, 134, 140, 145, 156, 161

Vietnam Democratic Republic, relations with, 119

Vietnam Republic, relations with, 92

Withdrawal of forces from Vietnam:

Thai position, 16, 18, 40, 43

U.S. position, 12, 16, 32

Thai Patriotic Front, 150

Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF), 115

Thajeb, Ismael, 271, 272

Thajeb, Sjarif, 323, 324

Thanat Khoman:

Counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand, 11, 137

ICJ judgeship candidacy, 28

Japan, 252

Political role of, 5

Replacement of, 151, 177

Southeast Asia, 1, 32, 92

Symington subcommittee hearings, 35, 37

Thai forces in Cambodia, 74, 91

Thai forces in Laos, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 91

U.S. bombing of Laos, 53

U.S. force reductions, 25, 28

U.S.-Thai relations:

Agnew visit, 43

Connally visit, 139

Contingency plan dispute, 15, 20

Irwin visit, 121, 122, 124

Kissinger visit, 127, 128

Laird visit, 104

Loosening of alliance, 47

Nixon visit to Bangkok, 18

Rice sales, 39, 41, 104, 106, 118

U.S. defense commitments, 23, 24, 27, 36, 48, 75

U.S. views of, 9

Withdrawal of Thai forces from Vietnam, 40

Thanom Kittikachorn:

Constitutional government, return to, 169

Counterinsurgency efforts, 1, 11, 137

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144

Election, Thailand, 1969, 2

Narcotic drug trafficking, 123, 124, 165

NVA attack on Vietnam Republic, 159

Pote's view of, 2

Reappointment as Prime Minister, 5, 6, 7

Retirement of, 115

Thai consultation on Paris peace talks, 182, 184, 185

Thai forces in Laos, 29, 105, 122, 127, 135, 148

Thai Khmer forces in Cambodia, 63

U.S. military aid to Thailand, 116, 165, 167

U.S.-Thai relations:

Agnew visits, 39, 43, 44, 87, 165

Connally visit, 139

Green visit, 153, 157, 158

Helms visit, 94

Hummel visit, 162

Irwin visit, 122, 123, 124

Kissinger visit, 127

Laird visit, 104

Nixon messages, 13

Nixon trip to China, 153

Nixon visit, 18

Rice sales, 106, 111

Thai approval for additional U.S. bombers, 108

U.S. defense commitments, 21, 23

Wheeler visit, 4

Withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, 16, 26

Thant, U, 274, 285, 297

Three Nation Committee, 297, 300, 305

303 Committee, 3, 282

Tin, 111, 115

Tito, Josip Broz, 91

Tjakradipura, Gen., 270

Tokyo Conference, 226

Tomseth, Victor L., 114

Tourism, 111, 224

Tran Van Huong, 4

Troops Contributing (to Vietnam) Countries (TCC), 15, 16, 91

Trudeau, Pierre-Elliot, 233

Trueheart, William, 188

Tuan Hsi-Wen, Gen., 131, 136, 138, 152, 173

Tunku Abdul Rahman, 272, 279

Ubol, Princess, 133

Umar Wirahadikusumah, Gen., 299, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 314, 318, 329

Underhill, Francis T., 191, 235

Unger, Leonard:

Cambodia, Thai forces in, 63, 64, 66, 67, 76, 95, 102, 103

Chinese road-building, 150

Counterinsurgency efforts in Thailand:

Equipment and support programs needed for, 1, 11, 110

Summary executions of Communists, 183

U.S. role in, 97, 137

Withdrawal of U.S. forces from, 13

Coup, Nov., 1971, 142, 143, 144

Covert operations, 120, 131

Election, Thailand, 1969, 2, 3

Laos:

Thai forces in, 36, 51, 58, 59

Thai Khmer regiments, 90, 93, 96

Volunteer program, 135, 175

Narcotic drug trafficking, 138, 164

Soviet-Thai relations, 47

Symington subcommittee hearings, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 97

Thai role in Southeast Asia, 32

Thai-U.S. relations:

Agnew visits, 43, 44, 165

Contingency plan dispute, 14, 20

Green visit, 155

Hummel visit, 162

Irwin visit, 121, 122

Johnson visit, 141

Kissinger visit, 126, 127, 128

Laird visit, 104

Loosening of alliance, 47, 115

Rice sales, 39, 41, 42, 107, 109, 110, 111

Thai consultation on Paris peace talks, 158, 164

U.S. defense commitments, 21, 48

U.S. notification about operations from Thai soil, 99

Wheeler visit, 4

U.S. economic aid to Thailand, 75

U.S. forces in Thailand, 25, 62, 71, 73, 79, 80, 84, 166

USIS role terminated in Thailand, 33

U.S. military aid to Thailand, 116, 130, 133, 167

U.S. role in, 13

U.S. views of Thanat, 9

Visit to the North, Jan., 1972, 149

Visit with Amb. Johnson, 1

Withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam, 12, 26, 40

United Kingdom, 226, 267, 312

United Nations (UN), 124

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 267

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 277

United States Information Service (USIS), 33, 34, 39

Usher, Richard, 197, 201, 203, 208, 234, 246

Vaky, Viron P., 230

Valeriano, Gen., 186

Vang Pao, 57, 124, 127, 135, 178

Veliotes, Nicholas A., 122

Vicharn Nivatvong, 114

Vien, Gen. Cao Van, 4

Viet Cong (NLF), 4, 186

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (see also DRV and NVA subheadings under other subjects):

Djakarta Conference, 297

Occupation of Cambodian territory by, 60

In post-Ho era, 26, 27

PRC, relations with, 153

Red Cross repatriation delegation, 104

Thailand, relations with, 124

U.S. bombing of, 22, 99, 270

Vietnam, Republic of (see also ARVN and Vietnam and Vietnam Republic subheadings under other subjects):

ARVN withdrawal from Lam Son 719, 113

Cambodian troop training in, 76

Communist offensives in, 6

Indonesia, relations with, 279

Laos, relations with, 74

Military situation, 4, 91, 241, 279

Narcotic drug trafficking, 124

NVA attack on, 159

Philippine forces in, 186, 189, 191, 198

Thai forces in:

Thai position, 32, 40, 43, 85, 91, 126

U.S. payments for, 36, 38, 39

U.S. position, 51, 102, 161

Thailand, relations with, 92

Thai rice sales to, 46

Thai security concerns over, 164

U.S. policy toward:

Continued U.S. military presence, 105

Need for anti-Communist government, 119

Public opinion on, 48

Revisions to, 45

U.S.-Philippines talks on, 192

U.S. rice sales to, 39, 41, 43

Viet Cong role in government, 270, 271

Withdrawal of foreign forces from:

Indonesian position, 271, 272, 273, 276, 320, 321

Thai position, 16, 18

U.S. position, 12, 16, 32, 91, 331

Vietnamization:

Aircraft provision and pilot training, 73

Funding shortfall for, 69

Indonesian position, 295

Thai bases, role in, 62

Thai position, 26, 87, 91, 104

U.S. position, 12, 13, 51

Vietnam Special Study Group, 80

Vietnam War protests in the United States, 43

Virata, 247, 261

Vogt, Lt. Gen. John, 76, 88

Voice of the People of Thailand, 150

Wales, Bob, 258

Walsh, John P., 187, 190

Wandler, Mark, 166

Wanzeck, William T., 152, 165

Wardhana, Ali, 323

Ware, R. A., 79

Washington Post, 15, 144

Washington Special Action Group:

Indonesian military aid to Cambodia, 286

NVA attacks in Laos, 147

Thai forces in Cambodia, 63, 66, 70, 76, 81, 98, 102

Thai forces in Laos, 29, 52, 56, 59, 61, 91, 93, 98, 135, 170

U.S. economic aid to Thailand, 75

U.S. forces in Thailand, 80, 84, 166

Washington Star, 144

Wells, William, 88, 93

West, Walter, 46, 101

West Irian, 272, 273, 274

Westmoreland, Gen. William, 322, 327, 329

Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 4, 10, 56, 59, 63

Whipkey, Airman, 239

Whitaker, John, 15

Whitehouse, Charles S., 327

Whitten, Leslie, 163

Wichian Watanakun, 180

Widjojo Nitisastro, Prof., 271, 272, 296, 302

Widodo, 323, 329, 330, 331

Wilkinson, M. J., 126, 127, 128

Williams, G. Mennen, 186

Williams, Harding, 261

Wilson, James, 88, 93, 98, 119, 194, 234, 249

Wolff, Lester, 163, 164, 165

Woods, Rose Mary, 243

World Food Organization, 114

Wright, Marshall, 188, 190

Yan, Gen., 199

Yango, Alejandro D., 244

Yem Sambaur, 297, 298

Yost, Charles W., 28

Yugoslavia, 91

Zais, Lt. Gen. Melvin, 88

Ziegler, Ron, 181, 272