This specification defines how to secure credentials and presentations conforming to the Verifiable Credential data model [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE), Selective Disclosure for JWTs [[SD-JWT]], and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]]. This enables the Verifiable Credential data model [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] to be implemented with standards for signing and encryption that are widely adopted.

The Working Group is actively seeking implementation feedback for this specification. In order to exit the Candidate Recommendation phase, the Working Group has set the requirement of at least two independent implementations for each mandatory feature in the specification. For details on the conformance testing process, see the test suite listed in the implementation report.

Einführung

This specification defines how to secure media types expressing Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations as described in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] using approaches defined by the JOSE, OAuth, and COSE working groups at the IETF. This includes JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[RFC7515]], Selective Disclosure for JWTs [[SD-JWT]], and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]]. It uses content types [[RFC6838]] to distinguish between the data types of unsecured documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] and the data types of secured documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

JSON Web Signature (JWS) [[RFC7515]] defines a standard means of digitally signing documents, including JSON documents, using JSON-based data structures. It provides a means to ensure the integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation of the information contained in the document. Selective Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT) [[SD-JWT]] builds on JWS by also providing a mechanism enabling selective disclosure of document elements. These properties make JWS and SD-JWT especially well suited to securing documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [[RFC9052]] defines a standard means of representing digitally signed data structures using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [[RFC8949]]. Like JWS, COSE provides a standardized way to secure the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of information. It offers a flexible and extensible set of cryptographic options, allowing for a wide range of algorithms to be used for signing and encryption.

COSE supports two main operations: signing and encryption. For signing, COSE allows the creation of digital signatures over CBOR data using various algorithms such as RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA. These signatures provide assurance of data integrity and authenticity. COSE also supports encryption, enabling the confidentiality of CBOR data by encrypting it with symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms.

Terminology

Securing the VC Data Model

This section outlines how to secure documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] using JOSE, SD-JWT, and COSE.

Documents conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]], and their associated media types, rely on JSON-LD, which is an extensible format for describing linked data; see JSON-LD Relationship to RDF.

A benefit to this approach is that payloads can be made to conform directly to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] without any mappings or transformation, while at the same time supporting registered header parameters and claims that are understood in the context of JOSE, SD-JWT, and COSE.

It is RECOMMENDED that media types be used to distinguish verifiable credentials and verifiable presentations from other kinds of secured JSON or CBOR.

The most specific media type (or subtype) available SHOULD be used, instead of more generic media types (or supertypes). For example, rather than the general application/sd-jwt, application/vc-ld+sd-jwt SHOULD be used, unless there is a more specific media type that would even better identify the secured envelope format.

If implementations do not know which media type to use, media types defined in this specification MUST be used.

With JOSE

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Credentials with JOSE

This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable credentials conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming JWS issuer implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable credential is the unencoded JWS payload.

The typ header parameter SHOULD be vc-ld+jwt. When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vc. See Registered Header Parameter Names for additional details regarding usage of typ and cty.

A [=conforming JWS verifier implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable credential=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[RFC7516]] by nesting the secured [=verifiable credential=] as the plaintext payload of a JWE, per the description of Nested JWTs in [[RFC7519]].

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleAlumniCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSchema": {
    "id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:123",
    "degree": {
      "type": "BachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}
        

See for more details regarding this example.

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Presentations with JOSE

This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming JWS issuer implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded JWS payload.

The typ header parameter SHOULD be vp-ld+jwt. When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vp. See Registered Header Parameter Names for additional details regarding usage of typ and cty.

A [=conforming JWS verifier implementation=] MUST use [[RFC7515]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.

Verifiable Credentials secured in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Verifiable Presentations in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Presentation type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using JWS in this case.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable presentation=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[RFC7516]] by nesting the secured [=verifiable presentation=] as the plaintext payload of a JWE, per the description of Nested JWTs in [[RFC7519]].

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "VerifiablePresentation",
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"],
    "type": ["EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"],
    "id": "data:application/vc-ld+jwt,eyJraWQiOiJFeEhrQk1XOWZtYmt2VjI2Nm1ScHVQMnNVWV9OX0VXSU4xbGFwVXpPOHJvIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMzODQifQ.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.d2k4O3FytQJf83kLh-HsXuPvh6yeOlhJELVo5TF71gu7elslQyOf2ZItAXrtbXF4Kz9WivNdztOayz4VUQ0Mwa8yCDZkP9B2pH-9S_tcAFxeoeJ6Z4XnFuL_DOfkR1fP"
  }]
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation",  
  "id": "data:application/vp-ld+jwt,eyJraWQiOiJFeEhrQk1XOWZtYmt2VjI2Nm1ScHVQMnNVWV9OX0VXSU4xbGFwVXpPOHJvIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMzODQifQ.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.d2k4O3FytQJf83kLh-HsXuPvh6yeOlhJELVo5TF71gu7elslQyOf2ZItAXrtbXF4Kz9WivNdztOayz4VUQ0Mwa8yCDZkP9B2pH-9S_tcAFxeoeJ6Z4XnFuL_DOfkR1fP"
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

Implementations MUST support the JWS compact serialization. Use of the JWS JSON serialization is NOT RECOMMENDED.

JOSE Header Parameters and JWT Claims

When present in the JOSE Header or the JWT Claims Set, members registered in the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry or the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry are to be interpreted as defined by the specifications referenced in the registries.

The normative statements in Registered Header Parameter Names, JOSE Header, and Replicating Claims as Header Parameters apply to securing credentials and presentations.

The unencoded JOSE Header is JSON (`application/json`), not JSON-LD (`application/ld+json`).

It is RECOMMENDED to use the IANA JSON Web Token Claims registry and the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry to identify any claims and header parameters that might be confused with members defined by [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. These include but are not limited to: iss, kid, alg, iat, exp, and cnf.

When the iat (Issued At) and/or exp (Expiration Time) JWT claims are present, they represent the issuance and expiration time of the signature, respectively. Note that these are different from the validFrom and validUntil properties defined in Validity Period, which represent the validity of the data that is being secured. Use of the nbf (Not Before) claim is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it makes little sense to attempt to assign a future date to a signature.

The claims and security provided by this specification are independent of the data secured and semantics provided by the [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. This means that while the security features of this specification ensure data integrity and authenticity, they do not dictate the interpretation of claim data.

Implementers SHOULD avoid setting JWT claims to values that conflict with the values of verifiable credential properties when a claim and property pair refer to the same conceptual entity, especially with pairs such as `iss` and `issuer`, `jti` and `id`, and `sub` and `credentialSubject.id`. For example, JWK claim `iss` should not be set to a value which conflicts with the value of verifiable credential property `issuer`.

The JWT Claim Names vc and vp MUST NOT be present.

Additional members may be present as header parameters and claims. If they are not understood, they MUST be ignored.

With SD-JWT

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Credentials with SD-JWT

This section details how to use JOSE to secure verifiable credentials conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation=] MUST use [[[SD-JWT]]] [[SD-JWT]] to secure this media type. The unsecured [=verifiable credential=] is the input JSON claim set. The Issuer then converts the input JSON claim set (i.e., the unsecured [=verifiable credential=]) into an SD-JWT payload according to SD-JWT issuance instructions.

The typ header parameter SHOULD be vc-ld+sd-jwt. When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vc. See Registered Header Parameter Names for additional details regarding usage of typ and cty.

A [=conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.

When securing verifiable credentials with [[SD-JWT]] implementers MUST ensure that properties necessary for the validation and verification of a credential are NOT selectively disclosable (i.e., such properties MUST be disclosed). These properties include but are not limited to credentialStatus and credentialSchema.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable credential=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[RFC7516]] by nesting the secured [=verifiable credential=] as the plaintext payload of a JWE, per the instructions in Section 11.2 of [[SD-JWT]].

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleAlumniCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSchema": {
    "id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:123",
    "degree": {
      "type": "BachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}
        

See for more details regarding this example.

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Presentations with SD-JWT

This section details how to use SD-JWT to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded SD-JWT payload.

The typ header parameter SHOULD be vp-ld+sd-jwt. When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be vp. See Registered Header Parameter Names for additional details regarding usage of typ and cty.

A [=conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation=] MUST use [[SD-JWT]] to verify [=conforming JWS documents=] that use this media type.

Verifiable Credentials secured in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Verifiable Presentations in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Presentation type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using SD-JWT in this case.

When securing verifiable presentations with [[SD-JWT]] implementers MUST ensure that properties necessary for the validation and verification of a credential are NOT selectively disclosable (i.e., such properties MUST be disclosed). These properties include but are not limited to credentialStatus and credentialSchema.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable presentation=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [[RFC7516]] by nesting the secured [=verifiable presentation=] as the plaintext payload of a JWE, per the instructions in Section 11.2 of [[SD-JWT]].

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "VerifiablePresentation",
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential",
    "id": "data:application/vc-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
  }]
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation",
  "id": "data:application/vp-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

Implementations MUST support the compact serialization (application/sd-jwt) and MAY support the JSON serialization (application/sd-jwt+json). If the JSON serialization is used, it is RECOMMENDED that a profile be defined to ensure any additional JSON members are understood consistently.

With COSE

COSE [[RFC9052]] is a common approach to encoding and securing information using CBOR [[RFC8949]]. Verifiable credentials MAY be secured using COSE [[RFC9052]] and SHOULD be identified through use of content types as outlined in this section.

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Credentials with COSE

This section details how to use COSE to secure verifiable credentials conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming COSE issuer implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable credential is the unencoded COSE_Sign1 payload.

The typ header parameter, as described in COSE "typ" (type) Header Parameter, SHOULD be application/vc-ld+cose. When present, the content type (3) header parameter SHOULD be application/vc. See Common COSE Header Parameters for additional details.

A [=conforming COSE verifier implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to verify [=conforming COSE documents=] that use this media type.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable credential=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use COSE encryption, as defined in Section 5 of [[RFC9052]], by nesting the secured [=verifiable credential=] as the plaintext payload of an encrypted COSE object.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "http://university.example/credentials/1872",
  "type": [
    "VerifiableCredential",
    "ExampleAlumniCredential"
  ],
  "issuer": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
  "validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
  "credentialSchema": {
    "id": "https://example.org/examples/degree.json",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:123",
    "degree": {
      "type": "BachelorDegree",
      "name": "Bachelor of Science and Arts"
    }
  }
}
        

See for more details regarding this example.

Securing JSON-LD Verifiable Presentations with COSE

This section details how to use COSE to secure verifiable presentations conforming to [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

A [=conforming COSE issuer implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to secure this media type. The unsecured verifiable presentation is the unencoded COSE_Sign1 payload.

The typ header parameter SHOULD be application/vp-ld+cose. When present, the cty header parameter SHOULD be application/vp. See Common COSE Header Parameters for additional details.

A [=conforming COSE verifier implementation=] MUST use COSE_Sign1 as specified in [[RFC9052]] to verify [=conforming COSE documents=] that use this media type.

Verifiable Credentials secured in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Credential type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Verifiable Presentations in verifiable presentations MUST use the Enveloped Verifiable Presentation type defined by the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Credentials in verifiable presentations MUST be secured. These credentials are secured using COSE in this case.

To encrypt a secured [=verifiable presentation=] when transmitting over an insecure channel, implementers MAY use COSE encryption, as defined in Section 5 of [[RFC9052]], by nesting the secured [=verifiable presentation=] as the plaintext payload of an encrypted COSE object.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "VerifiablePresentation",
  "verifiableCredential": [{
    "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential",
    "id": "data:application/vc-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
  }]
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "EnvelopedVerifiablePresentation",
  "id": "data:application/vp-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlVRTV9fblE0UzZCTzhuUTRuT05YeHB4aHRob3lOeGI1M0xZZ1l6LTJBQnMiLCJ0eXAiOiJ2cCtsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZwK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.kYD63YtBNYnLUTw6Szf1vs_Ug3UBXhPwCyqpNmPnPDa3rXZQhQLdB1BgaoO8zgQ-c3B41fxaXMnLHYV9-B20uboSpJP0B-2Vre917eQt1cSDswDGA_Ytvn4BSqYVBB2J~WyJFMkFsRzhsY2p0QVFrcllIbjlIbnVRIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiVmVyaWZpYWJsZVByZXNlbnRhdGlvbiJd~WyI5NldYMDRneno4cVZzOVZLU2wwYTVnIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJaekU2VFVaamtHMW1DWXBKMEhnc0l3IiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyItQ3NsS25GZGFYb2JiQWsyU0JBVGR3IiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmViZmViMWY3MTJlYmM2ZjFjMjc2ZTEyZWMyMSJd~WyJuRm1OWl9IczB3WWNoOFdkeTdnQUNRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOmMyNzZlMTJlYzIxZWJmZWIxZjcxMmViYzZmMSJd"
}
      

See for more details regarding this example.

COSE Header Parameters and CWT Claims

When present in the COSE Header or as CWT Claims, members registered in the IANA CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims registry or the IANA COSE Header Parameters registry are to be interpreted as defined by the specifications referenced in those registries. CBOR Web Token (CWT) [[?RFC8392]] Claims MAY be included in a COSE header parameter, as specified in I-D.ietf-cose-cwt-claims-in-headers.

The normative statements in Header Parameters, Claims, and CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers apply to securing credentials and presentations.

It is RECOMMENDED to use the IANA CBOR Web Token Claims registry and the IANA COSE Header Parameters registry to identify any claims and header parameters that might be confused with members defined by [[[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]] [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]]. These include but are not limited to: iss, kid, alg, iat, exp, and cnf.

When the iat (Issued At) and/or exp (Expiration Time) CWT claims are present, they represent the issuance and expiration time of the signature, respectively. Note that these are different from the validFrom and validUntil properties defined in Validity Period, which represent the validity of the data that is being secured. Use of the nbf (Not Before) claim is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it makes little sense to attempt to assign a future date to a signature.

Additional members may be present as header parameters and claims. If they are not understood, they MUST be ignored.

Key Discovery

When iss is absent and the issuer is identified as a DID Subject, the kid MUST be an absolute DID URL.

{
  "issuer": "did:example:123"
  // ...
}
{
  "alg": "ES384",
  "kid": "did:example:123#key-456
}

When iss is absent, and the holder is identified as a DID Subject, the kid MUST be an absolute DID URL.

{
  "holder": "did:example:abc"
  // ...
}
{
  "alg": "ES384",
  "kid": "did:example:abc#key-456
}

When iss is absent, and the issuer is identified as a [[URL]], the kid MUST be an absolute [[URL]] to a verification method listed in a controller document.

{
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049"
  }
  // ...
}
{
  "alg": "ES384",
  "kid": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123
}

When the holder is identified as a [[URL]], and iss is absent, the kid MUST be an absolute [[URL]] to a verification method listed in a controller document.

{
  "holder": {
    "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049"
  }
  // ...
}
{
  "alg": "ES384",
  "kid": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123
}

When iss is present and is a [[URL]], the kid MUST match a key discovered via a JWT Issuer Metadata Request, as described in [[SD-JWT-VC]].

This normative statement depends on the IETF OAuth working group draft [[SD-JWT-VC]]. This feature is at risk and will be removed from the specification if at least two independent, interoperable implementations are not demonstrated.

To complete the verification process, a verifier needs to obtain the cryptographic keys used to secure the credential.

There are several different ways to discover the verification keys of the issuers and holders.

Using Header Parameters and Claims for Key Discovery

These JOSE header parameters and JWT claims can be used by verifiers to discover verification keys.

kid

If kid is present in the JOSE Header or the COSE Header, a verifier can use this parameter as a hint indicating which key was used to secure the verifiable credential, when performing a verification process as defined in RFC7515.

kid MUST be present when the key of the issuer oder subject is expressed as a DID URL.

iss

If iss is present in the JOSE Header, the JWT Claims, or the COSE Header, a verifier can use this parameter to obtain a JSON Web Key to use in the verification process.

The value of the issuer property can be either a string or an object. When issuer value is a string, iss value, if present, MUST match issuer value. When issuer value is an object with an id value, iss value, if present, MUST match issuer.id value.

If kid is also present in the JOSE Header, it is used to distinguish the specific key used.

cnf

If cnf is present in the JOSE Header, the JWT Claims, or the COSE Header, a verifier MAY use this parameter to identify a proof-of-possession key in the manner described in [[RFC7800]] or [[RFC8747]] for use in the verification process.

Use of a proof-of-possession key provided by the Holder to the Issuer to establish a cryptographic binding to the Holder in the Verifiable Credential that is verifiable by the Verifier in the Verifiable Presentation is RECOMMENDED.

Well-Known URIs

JWT Issuer

When the issuer value is a URL using the HTTPS scheme, issuer metadata including the issuer's public keys can be retrieved using the mechanism defined in [[SD-JWT-VC]].

This normative statement depends on the IETF OAuth working group draft [[SD-JWT-VC]]. This feature is at risk and will be removed from the specification if at least two independent, interoperable implementations are not demonstrated.

Using Controller Documents

When using [=controller documents=] with this specification, the following requirements apply.

The value of the `type` property of the verification method MUST be JsonWebKey.

Verification material MUST be expressed in the publicKeyJwk property of a JsonWebKey. This key material is retrieved based on hints in the JOSE or COSE message envelopes, such as kid oder iss. At the time of writing, there is no standard way to retrieve a public key in JWK format from a DID URL or controller document.

Conformance Classes

A conforming JWS document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .

A conforming JWS issuer implementation produces [=conforming JWS documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .

A conforming JWS verifier implementation verifies [=conforming JWS documents=] as described in Section .

A conforming SD-JWT document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .

A conforming SD-JWT issuer implementation produces [=conforming SD-JWT documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .

A conforming SD-JWT verifier implementation verifies [=conforming SD-JWT documents=] as described in Section .

A conforming COSE document is one that conforms to all of the "MUST" statements in Section .

A conforming COSE issuer implementation produces [=conforming COSE documents=] and MUST secure them as described in Section .

A conforming COSE verifier implementation verifies [=conforming COSE documents=] as described in Section .

Securing Verifiable Credentials

The describes the approach taken by JSON Web Tokens to secure JWT Claims Sets as applying an external proof.

The normative statements in Securing Mechanisms apply to securing application/vc-ld+jwt and application/vp-ld+jwt, application/vc-ld+sd-jwt and application/vp-ld+sd-jwt, as well as application/vc-ld+cose and application/vp-ld+cose.

JSON Web Token implementers are advised to review Implementation Requirements.

Accordingly, Issuers, Holders, and Verifiers MUST understand the JSON Web Token header parameter "alg": "none" when securing [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] with JSON Web Tokens. When content types from [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]] are secured using JSON Web Tokens, the header parameter "alg": "none", MUST be used to communicate that a JWT Claims Set (a Verifiable Credential or a Verifiable Presentation) has no integrity protection. When a JWT Claims Set (a Verifiable Credential or a Verifiable Presentation) contains proof, and the JSON Web Token header contains "alg": "none", the JWT Claims Set MUST be considered to have no integrity protection.

Verifiable Credentials and Verifiable Presentations are not required to be secured or integrity protected or to contain a proof member.

Issuers, Holders, and Verifiers MUST ignore all JWT Claims Sets that have no integrity protection.

The JWT Claim Names vc and vp MUST NOT be present in any JWT Claims Set.

IANA Considerations

Media Types

application/vc-ld+jwt

This specification registers the application/vc-ld+jwt Media Type specifically for identifying a with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: `application`
Subtype name: `vc-ld+jwt`
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary; `application/jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.').
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in .

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

application/vp-ld+jwt

This specification registers the application/vp-ld+jwt Media Type specifically for identifying a with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Presentations definition in the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: application
Subtype name: vp-ld+jwt
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary; `application/jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.').
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in .

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

application/vc-ld+sd-jwt

This specification registers the application/vc-ld+sd-jwt Media Type specifically for identifying a with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: `application`
Subtype name: `vc-ld+sd-jwt`
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary; `application/sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters.
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in .

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

application/vp-ld+sd-jwt

This specification registers the application/vp-ld+sd-jwt Media Type specifically for identifying a with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Presentations definition in the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: application
Subtype name: vp-ld+sd-jwt
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary; `application/sd-jwt` values are a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') or tilde ('~') characters.
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in .

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

application/vc-ld+cose

This specification registers the application/vc-ld+cose Media Type specifically for identifying a COSE object [[RFC9052]] with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: `application`
Subtype name: `vc-ld+cose`
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]].

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

application/vp-ld+cose

This specification registers the application/vp-ld+cose Media Type specifically for identifying a COSE object [[RFC9052]] with a payload conforming to the Verifiable Presentations definition in the Verifiable Credential Data Model.

Type name: `application`
Subtype name: `vp-ld+cose`
Required parameters: None
Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)
Security considerations:

As defined in this specification. See also the security considerations in [[RFC9052]].

Contact: W3C Verifiable Credentials Working Group [email protected]

Other Considerations

Privacy Considerations

Verifiable Credentials often contain sensitive information that needs to be protected to ensure the privacy and security of organizations and individuals. This section outlines some privacy considerations relevant to implementers and users.

Implementers are advised to note and abide by all privacy considerations called out in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Implementers are additionally advised to reference the Privacy Consideration section of the JWT specification and NIST Special Publication 800-122 [[SP-800-122] "Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)" for privacy guidance.

In addition to the privacy recommendations in the [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]], the following considerations are given:

These considerations are not exhaustive, and implementers and users are advised to consult additional privacy resources and best practices to ensure the privacy and security of Verifiable Credentials implemented using this specification.

Security Considerations

This section outlines security considerations for implementers and users of this specification. It is important to carefully consider these factors to ensure the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials when implemented using JOSE or COSE.

When implementing this specification, it is essential to address all security issues relevant to broad cryptographic applications. This especially includes protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric secret keys, as well as employing countermeasures against various attacks. Failure to adequately address these issues could compromise the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access, modification, or disclosure of sensitive information.

Implementers are advised to follow best practices and established cryptographic standards to ensure the secure handling of keys and other sensitive data. Additionally, conduct regular security assessments and audits to identify and address any vulnerabilities or threats.

Follow all security considerations outlined in [[RFC7515]] and [[RFC7519]].

When utilizing JSON-LD, take special care around remote retrieval of contexts and follow the additional security considerations noted in [[json-ld11]].

As noted in [[RFC7515]] when utilizing JSON [[RFC7159]], strict validation is a security requirement. If malformed JSON is received, it may be impossible to reliably interpret the producer's intent, potentially leading to ambiguous or exploitable situations. To prevent these risks, it is essential to use a JSON parser that strictly validates the syntax of all input data. It is essential that any JSON inputs that do not conform to the JSON-text syntax defined in [[RFC7159]] be rejected in their entirety by JSON parsers. Failure to reject invalid input could compromise the security and integrity of Verifiable Credentials.

Zugänglichkeit

When implementing this specification, it is crucial for technical implementers to consider various accessibility factors. Ignoring accessibility concerns renders the information unusable for a significant portion of the population. To ensure equal access for all individuals, regardless of their abilities, it is vital to adhere to accessibility guidelines and standards, such as the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.1) [[WCAG21]]. This becomes even more critical when establishing systems that involve cryptography, as they have historically posed challenges for assistive technologies.

Implementers are advised to note and abide by all accessibility considerations called out in [[VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0]].

Examples

Controllers

        {
          "id": "https://vendor.example",
        }
      
        {
          "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
          "verificationMethod": [{
            "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123",
            "type": "JsonWebKey",
            "controller": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
            "publicKeyJwk": {
              "kty": "EC",
              "crv": "P-384",
              "alg": "ES384",
              "x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
              "y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
            }
          }]
        }
      
        {
          "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
          "verificationMethod": [{
            "id": "https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123",
            "type": "JsonWebKey",
            "controller": "https://university.example/issuers/565049",
            "publicKeyJwk": {
              "kty": "EC",
              "crv": "P-384",
              "alg": "ES384",
              "x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
              "y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
            }
          }],
          "authentication": ["https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123"],
          "assertionMethod": ["https://university.example/issuers/565049#key-123"]
        }
      
{
  "@context": [
        "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
        "https://w3id.org/security/jwk/v1",
        {
            "@vocab": "https://vendor.example#"
        }
  ],
  "id": "did:web:vendor.example",
  "alsoKnownAs": ["https://vendor.example",
    "did:jwk:eyJraWQiOiJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6b2F1dGg6andrLXRodW1icHJpbnQ6c2hhLTI1NjpGZk1iek9qTW1RNGVmVDZrdndUSUpqZWxUcWpsMHhqRUlXUTJxb2JzUk1NIiwia3R5IjoiT0tQIiwiY3J2IjoiRWQyNTUxOSIsImFsZyI6IkVkRFNBIiwieCI6IkFOUmpIX3p4Y0tCeHNqUlBVdHpSYnA3RlNWTEtKWFE5QVBYOU1QMWo3azQifQ"
  ],
  "verificationMethod": [{
    "id": "#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs",
    "type": "JsonWebKey",
    "controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-521",
      "alg": "ES512",
      "x": "AFTyMw-fIYJNg6fBVJvOPOsLxmnNj8HgqMChyRL0swLaefVAc7wrWZ8okQJqMmvv03JRUp277meQZM3JcvXFkH1v",
      "y": "ALn96CrD88b4TClmkl1sk0xk2FgAIda97ZF8TUOjbeWSzbKnN2KB6pqlpbuJ2xIRXvsn5BWQVlAT2JGpGwDNMyV1"
    }
  }, {
    "id": "#z6MkhEdpG12jyQegrr62ACRmNY8gc531W2j9Xo39cHphuCEH",
    "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
    "controller": "https://vendor.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:FfMbzOjMmQ4efT6kvwTIJjelTqjl0xjEIWQ2qobsRMM",
      "kty": "OKP",
      "crv": "Ed25519",
      "alg": "EdDSA",
      "x": "ANRjH_zxcKBxsjRPUtzRbp7FSVLKJXQ9APX9MP1j7k4"
    }
  }, {
    "id": "#subject-authentication",
    "type": "JsonWebKey",
    "controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-384",
      "alg": "ES384",
      "x": "PxgAmVYOQvSNcMYL2tOzoLwSWn4Ta3tIMPEUKR8pxeb-gmR11-DyKHBoIiY-2LhM",
      "y": "BZEBTkImVdpwvxR9THIRw16eblnj5-tZa7m-ww5uVd4kyPJNRoWUn2aT9ZuarAe-"
    }
  }, {
    "id": "#credential-issuance",
    "type": "JsonWebKey",
    "controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kty": "EC",
      "crv": "P-256",
      "alg": "ES256",
      "x": "MYvnaI87pfrn3FpTqW-yNiFcF1K7fedJiqapm20_q7c",
      "y": "9YEbT6Tyuc7xp9yRvhOUVKK_NIHkn5HpK9ZMgvK5pVw"
    }
  }, {
    "id": "#key-agreement",
    "type": "JsonWebKey",
    "controller": "did:web:vendor.example",
    "publicKeyJwk": {
      "kty": "OKP",
      "crv": "X25519",
      "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
      "x": "qLZkSTbstvMWPTivmiQglEFWG2Ff7gNDVoVisdZTr1I"
    }
  }],
  "authentication": ["#subject-authentication"],
  "assertionMethod": ["#credential-issuance"]
}
      

Credentials

{
  "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/23894672394",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "K9UnitCredential"],
  "issuer": {
    "id": "https://contoso.example"
  },
  "validFrom": "2015-04-16T05:11:32.432Z",
  "credentialStatus": {
    "id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/status/4#273762",
    "type": "StatusList2021Entry",
    "statusPurpose": "revocation",
    "statusListIndex": "273762",
    "statusListCredential": "https://contoso.example/credentials/status/4"
  },
  "credentialSubject": [{
    "id": "did:example:1312387641",
    "type": "Person"
  }, {
    "id": "did:example:63888231",
    "type": "Dog"
  }]
}
      
{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "id": "https://contoso.example/credentials/35327255",
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "KYCExample"],
  "issuer": "did:web:contoso.example",
  "validFrom": "2019-05-25T03:10:16.992Z",
  "validUntil": "2027-05-25T03:10:16.992Z",
  "credentialSchema": {
    "id": "https://contoso.example/bafybeigdyr...lqabf3oclgtqy55fbzdi",
    "type": "JsonSchema"
  },
  "credentialSubject": {
    "id": "did:example:1231588",
    "type": "Person"
  }
}
      

Presentations

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
  ],
  "type": "VerifiablePresentation",
  "verifiableCredential": [
    {
      "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "id": "data:application/vc-ld+cose,QzVjV...RMjU",
      "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
    },
    {
      "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "id": "data:application/vc-ld+jwt,eyVjV...RMjU",
      "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
    },
    {
      "@context": "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
      "id": "data:application/vc-ld+sd-jwt,eyVjV...RMjU",
      "type": "EnvelopedVerifiableCredential"
    }
  ]
}
      

Data URIs

data:application/vc-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlNJM1JITm91aDhvODFOT09OUFFVQUw3RWdaLWtJNl94ajlvUkV2WDF4T3ciLCJ0eXAiOiJ2YytsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZjK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.eyJAY29udGV4dCI6WyJodHRwczovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvdjIiLCJodHRwczovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvbnMvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvZXhhbXBsZXMvdjIiXSwiaXNzdWVyIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvaXNzdWVycy81NjUwNDkiLCJ2YWxpZEZyb20iOiIyMDEwLTAxLTAxVDE5OjIzOjI0WiIsImNyZWRlbnRpYWxTY2hlbWEiOnsiX3NkIjpbIkU3dU1sSWFyS29iYXJTdEZGRjctZm5qaV9sQVdnM3BGMkV5dVc4dWFYakUiLCJYelRaSVgyNGdDSWxSQVFHclFoNU5FRm1XWkQtZ3Z3dkIybzB5Y0FwNFZzIl19LCJjcmVkZW50aWFsU3ViamVjdCI6eyJkZWdyZWUiOnsibmFtZSI6IkJhY2hlbG9yIG9mIFNjaWVuY2UgYW5kIEFydHMiLCJfc2QiOlsiT3oxUEZIMG0tWk9TdEhwUVZyeGlmVlpKRzhvNmlQQmNnLVZ2SXQwd2plcyJdfSwiX3NkIjpbIkVZQ1daMTZZMHB5X1VNNzRHU3NVYU9zT19mdDExTlVSaFFUTS1TT1lFTVEiXX0sIl9zZCI6WyJqT055NnZUbGNvVlAzM25oSTdERGN3ekVka3d2R3VVRXlLUjdrWEVLd3VVIiwid21BdHpwc0dRbDJveS1PY2JrSEVZcE8xb3BoX3VYcWVWVTRKekF0aFFibyJdLCJfc2RfYWxnIjoic2hhLTI1NiIsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vdW5pdmVyc2l0eS5leGFtcGxlL2lzc3VlcnMvNTY1MDQ5IiwiaWF0IjoxNjk3Mjg5OTk2LCJleHAiOjE3Mjg5MTIzOTYsImNuZiI6eyJqd2siOnsia3R5IjoiRUMiLCJjcnYiOiJQLTM4NCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMzg0IiwieCI6InZFdV84WGxZT0ZFU2hTcVRpZ2JSYWduZ0ZGM1p5U0xrclNHekh3azFBT1loanhlazVhV21HY2UwZU05S0pWOEIiLCJ5IjoiRUpNY2czWXBzUTB3M2RLNHlVa25QczE1Z0lsY2Yyay03dzFKLTNlYlBiOERENmQtUkhBeGUwMDkzSWpfdTRCOSJ9fX0.rYzbxb6j1dwop8_s491iArVVJNm6A6C3b742gOm_qYO3zdkyQU4_VxxOSJ8ECcmWj2r5KyiCNC1ojfO4Yms-zBsjt7PoMYpYWBplsqXpiIvnehmM7D0eOLi40uHXki0X~WyJSWTg1YTZNMmEwX3VDWlFTVGZmTFdRIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~WyJMeG5GYTBXVm8wRUluVy1QdS1fd1dRIiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyJUQVdrakpCaVpxdC1rVU54X1EweUJBIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5vcmcvZXhhbXBsZXMvZGVncmVlLmpzb24iXQ~WyJTd2xuZFpPZzZEZ1ZERFp5X0RvYVFBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiSnNvblNjaGVtYSJd~WyJuSnJlU3E1Nzg3RGZMSDJCbU03cXFRIiwgImlkIiwgImRpZDpleGFtcGxlOjEyMyJd~WyIxMjNNd3hNcHRiek02YUk2aW03ME1RIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiQmFjaGVsb3JEZWdyZWUiXQ
      
data:application/vp-ld+sd-jwt,eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsImtpZCI6IlNJM1JITm91aDhvODFOT09OUFFVQUw3RWdaLWtJNl94ajlvUkV2WDF4T3ciLCJ0eXAiOiJ2YytsZCtqc29uK3NkLWp3dCIsImN0eSI6InZjK2xkK2pzb24ifQ.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.rYzbxb6j1dwop8_s491iArVVJNm6A6C3b742gOm_qYO3zdkyQU4_VxxOSJ8ECcmWj2r5KyiCNC1ojfO4Yms-zBsjt7PoMYpYWBplsqXpiIvnehmM7D0eOLi40uHXki0X~WyJTd2xuZFpPZzZEZ1ZERFp5X0RvYVFBIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiSnNvblNjaGVtYSJd~WyIxMjNNd3hNcHRiek02YUk2aW03ME1RIiwgInR5cGUiLCAiQmFjaGVsb3JEZWdyZWUiXQ~WyJMeG5GYTBXVm8wRUluVy1QdS1fd1dRIiwgInR5cGUiLCBbIlZlcmlmaWFibGVDcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIkV4YW1wbGVBbHVtbmlDcmVkZW50aWFsIl1d~WyJSWTg1YTZNMmEwX3VDWlFTVGZmTFdRIiwgImlkIiwgImh0dHA6Ly91bml2ZXJzaXR5LmV4YW1wbGUvY3JlZGVudGlhbHMvMTg3MiJd~eyJhbGciOiJFUzM4NCIsInR5cCI6ImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6IkVmeTROTFJPX3ZvSkszdDIzcUNfQlEiLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3ZlcmlmaWVyLmV4YW1wbGUiLCJpYXQiOjE2OTcyODk5OTZ9.6G-1nVcrDKFzR6BdbcFHcbtassEb8NZ7ZavTYz3SJ-e4pXleXs0tNcCkUCwMI70gsuOY0AXzeDPbHjp5GKyLDVuNWgWCt3Wo2VSaCwUkyfLyvhkCsmkF9kvFhMIOhp1i
      

COSE Examples

These examples rely on CBOR Diagnostic Notation. Remember that all actual interchange always happens in the binary format.

{                                   / Protected                     /
  1: -35,                           / Algorithm                     /
  3: application/vc,                / Content type                  /
  4: h'177f12cb...1933d554',        / Key identifier                /
  15: {                             / CWT Claims                    /
    1: urn:example:123,             / Issuer                        /
    2: urn:example:456,             / Subject                       /
  },
}
        
{                                   / Protected                     /
  1: -35,                           / Algorithm                     /
  3: application/vp,                / Content type                  /
  4: h'177f12cb...1933d554',        / Key identifier                /
  15: {                             / CWT Claims                    /
    1: urn:example:123,             / Issuer                        /
    2: urn:example:456,             / Subject                       /
  },
}
          
18(                                 / COSE Sign 1                   /
    [
      h'a4013822...3a343536',       / Protected Header              /
      {}                            / Unprotected Header            /
      h'0fbe22a0...3a009118',       / Attached payload              /
      h'09772c7f...5c4e736f'        / Signature                     /
    ]
)
      

The payload can be either a credential or presentation as described in Securing Mechanisms.

Verification Algorithms

This specification might be used with many different key discovery protocols. Therefore, discovery of verification keys is described in , and is assumed to have succeeded prior to beginning the verification process.

As a general rule, verifiers SHOULD strive to minimize the processing of untrusted data. This includes minimizing any processing of the protected header, unprotected header, or payload as part of the key discovery procedures.

After verification has succeeded, additional validation checks SHOULD be performed as described in Section

The outputs for the following algorithms are:

Algorithm for Verifying a Credential or Presentation Secured with JOSE

The inputs for this algorithm are:

Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured as a JWT [[RFC7519]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:

  1. Follow the algorithm defined in Validating a JWT [[RFC7519]].
  2. If processing completes successfully:
    1. Set status to true
    2. Set mediaType to vc oder vp
    3. Set document to the decoded JWS payload.
    4. Return
  3. If processing aborts for any reason or the JWT is rejected:
    1. Set status to false
    2. Set document to null
    3. Set mediaType to null
    4. Return

Algorithm for Verifying a Credential or Presentation Secured with SD-JWT

The inputs for this algorithm are:

Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured with [[SD-JWT]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:

  1. Follow the algorithms defined in SD-JWT for verification of the SD-JWT.
  2. If processing completes successfully:
    1. Set status to true
    2. Set mediaType to vc
    3. Convert the SD-JWT payload back into the JSON claim set by reversing the process in [[[SD-JWT]]] [[SD-JWT]]. Set document to the JSON claim set. (For examples of the transition from JSON claim set to SD-JWT payload, please see SD-JWT examples).
    4. Return
  3. If processing aborts for any reason or the SD-JWT is rejected:
    1. Set status to false
    2. Set document to null
    3. Set mediaType to null
    4. Return

Algorithm for Verifying a Credential or Presentation Secured with COSE

The inputs for this algorithm are:

Upon receipt of the verifiable credential or presentation secured with [[RFC9052]], the holder or verifier follows this algorithm:

  1. Follow the algorithm defined in [[[RFC9052]]] [[RFC9052]] under the Signing and Verification Process for COSE_Sign1.
  2. If processing completes successfully:
    1. Set status to true
    2. Set mediaType to vc oder vp
    3. Set document to the decoded COSE_Sign1 payload.
    4. Return
  3. If processing aborts for any reason:
    1. Set status to false
    2. Set document to null
    3. Set mediaType to null
    4. Return

Validation Algorithm

All claims expected for the typ MUST be present. All claims that are understood MUST be evaluated according the verifier's validation policies. All claims that are not understood MUST be ignored.

The verified document returned from verification MUST be a well-formed compact JSON-LD document, as described in Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0.

Schema extension mechanisms such as credentialSchema SHOULD be checked. If the extension mechanism type is not understood, this property MUST be ignored.

Status extension mechanisms such as credentialStatus SHOULD be checked. If the extension mechanism type is not understood, this property MUST be ignored.

Based on the validation policy of the verifier, the type of credentials, and the type of securing mechanism, additional validation checks MAY be applied. For example, dependencies between multiple credentials, ordering or timing information associated with multiple credentials, and/or multiple presentations could cause an otherwise valid credential or presentation to be considered invalid.