Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab
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For over two hundred and fifty years the Wahhabi religious movement has rested on the twin pillars of a clear, compelling credo and an indissoluble alliance with temporal power in Arabia. Absolutist, uncompromising theology and political and religious ambition combined to make it the dominant force there, turning its champions, the Al Sa‘ud clan, from petty rulers of a middle-sized settlement with a talent for balancing interests, into the guardians of Islam’s Holy Places, disposing of the earth’s greatest identified oil reserves. This thought-provoking and incisive biography, which charts the relationship between religious doctrine, political power and events on the ground, is ideal for readers interested in uncovering the life and convictions of the man who founded the Wahhabi movement and a dynastic alliance between his clerical descendants and Saudi princes that has lasted to the present day.
Michael Crawford
International deal maker and corporate executive Michael Crawford has helped some of the most powerful brands grow and operate globally. Crawford's leadership led to the development of major hotels, theme parks, entertainment destinations, retail outlets, and dining establishments around the world.Currently Chairman, President, and CEO of the Hall of Fame Resort & Entertainment Company, he served as General Manager and Senior Vice President of Shanghai Disney Resort and President of Walt Disney Holdings Company. He was also President of Asia Pacific and President of Global Portfolio Management with Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts. An Ohio native, he holds an MBA from the University of Notre Dame and a bachelor's degree from Bowling Green State University.
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Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab - Michael Crawford
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab
Michael Crawford
ONEworldLOGOnewBLACK%20%5bConverted%5d.tifIbn ‘Abd al-Wahhab
A Oneworld Book
First published in North America, Great Britain & Australia
by Oneworld Publications, 2014
This ebook edition first published by Oneworld Publications, 2014
Copyright © Michael Crawford 2014
All rights reserved
Copyright under Berne Convention
A CIP record for this title is available
from the British Library
ISBN 978–1–78074–589–3
eISBN 978–1–78074–590–9
Typeset by Jayvee, Trivandrum, India
Oneworld Publications
10 Bloomsbury Street
London WC1B 3SR
England
imprint-page-advert.tifCONTENTS
Einführung
1 THE WAHHABI PHENOMENON
Contested Origins
Divisive Sect or New Orthodoxy?
Backward-Looking or Ahead of Its Time?
Religious Universalism and Political Particularism
Sources of a Controversial History
2 AGITATOR FOR GOD
Scion of a Small Town Culture
Regional Travel and Early Influences
Response to an Ecumenical Challenge?
Narrow Window on the Wider Islamic World
Relaunching the Campaign for Godliness
The al-‘Uyayna Years
3 GUIDE OF THE COMMUNITY
Alliance with the Al Sa‘ud of al-Dir‘iyya
Overturning the Status Quo
The Battle for Najd
Later Career
Personality
4 CHAMPION OF TRUE BELIEF
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Writings
Assertion of Orthodoxy
Oneness of God
Tawhid in Action
Friends, Enemies, and the Fifth Column
A Community Apart
5 IDEOLOGUE OF STRUGGLE
Excommunication (Takfir)
Secondary Takfir and Emigration (Hijra)
Jihad
6 SCOURGE OF POLYTHEISTS
Sunni Clerical Opponents
The Bedouin
Customary Law
Takfir of the Bedouin
Tribalism and the Bedouin
Holy Men, Cults, and Sufis
The Shi‘a
7 THE REGIME OF GODLINESS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER
Explaining the Genesis of Wahhabism
Social and Economic Trends
State Formation and the Regime of Godliness
Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong
Government and the Political Order
Obedience to the Ruler
Princes and Clerics
Imamate
Administration of Justice
Social Justice
Fazit
8 WAHHABISM, SAUDI STATES, AND FOREIGN POWERS
Saudi Expansion and Conquest of the Holy Cities
Spreading the Word
Destruction of al-Dir‘iyya
Wahhabi View of the Ottomans
Saudis and Christian Powers
The Second Saudi State’s Uneven Career
Civil War and Collapse of the Second Saudi State
Restoration and Renewal
The Ikhwan and Internal Dissidence
Senior Clerics Become Officials
The Nasserist Challenge and the Saudi Bid for Islamic
Leadership
9 WAHHABISM AND RELIGIOUS RADICALISM IN SAUDI ARABIA
The Trauma of Juhayman
The Awakening
Jihadism
10 IBN ‘ABD AL-WAHHAB’S LEGACY
Bibliography
Further Reading
Index
Einführung
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab aroused great controversy in his lifetime. Two centuries and more after his death in 1792 he still provokes strong, often passionate, views. For some Muslims he is the model of a religious activist who fought against the odds to establish a regime of Islamic godliness. For others, especially Shi‘a or those associated with mystic orders, he is a hate figure. Some also see him as the ideological progenitor of Usama bin Ladin and the modern scourge of al-Qa‘ida. Few would deny he has shaped the Muslim world.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab created a remarkable phenomenon in the Wahhabi movement that is named after him. For over 250 years it has rested on the twin pillars of a clear credo and an unbroken alliance with temporal power. Absolutist theology and political and religious ambition made it the dominant force in Arabia. It transformed its champions, the Al Sa‘ud (House of Sa‘ud), from the petty rulers of a central Arabian settlement with a talent for balancing interests in the eighteenth century, into the guardians of Mecca and Medina (Islam’s two Holy Places) and beneficiaries of some of the earth’s greatest proven oil reserves in the twentieth.
Both movement and dynasty have endured many vicissitudes since the 1740s. For all the accusations against them of doctrinal and institutional rigidity, they have demonstrated both resilience and adaptability. Long experience of triumphs and bitter defeats has made the Al Sa‘ud cautious in wielding the enormous religious, political, and economic power they possess today. Older Saudi princes have a strong sense of history. Others may have forgotten distant events in the Arabian Peninsula; they have not.
I became interested in early Wahhabism in the late 1970s when Gulf studies were in their infancy and the Iranian revolution
consumed much academic attention. Saudi history was barely charted territory. My concern then, as now, was with the relationships between religious doctrine, political power, and events on the ground. Although this book focuses on the career, teachings, and impact of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, in these pages he shares the limelight with the movement forever associated with his name, and with the Al Sa‘ud who became arbiters of its fate.
Since this book is as much about early Wahhabism as about Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, I devote chapter 1 to a brief overview of the Wahhabi phenomenon. The next two chapters outline Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s background, career, and personality. The following three review his core doctrine of the Oneness of God (explained in chapter 2 and then in greater detail in chapter 4), its supporting concepts, and the main targets in society of his criticism.
Chapter 7 considers Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s stance on the regulation of society and government, and reflects on unresolved questions about the origins of Wahhabism: why then? why there? and why in that form? Chapter 8 offers an outline of the history of the three Saudi states, the first spanning the period 1744–1818, the second lasting from the 1820s until the 1880s, and the third in existence since 1902. Chapter 9 reviews briefly the ideological development of modern Wahhabism in Arabia, and its relationship with Salafism and jihadi extremism.
Concluding remarks on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s achievement in chapter 10 are succeeded in the appendix by a short bibliography and suggested further reading on him, Wahhabism, and Saudi history. I have concentrated throughout on Wahhabism in Arabia and have not tried to cover the much wider subject of its manifestations elsewhere in the world.
I refer throughout to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. This is how he referred to himself in correspondence (e.g. Ibn Ghannam, 1949, 1:151). I also use the terms Wahhabi
and Wahhabism.
Although at times Wahhabis have called themselves just that, today they treat the name as derogatory and reject it. They prefer muwahhidun (practitioners of tawhid or Oneness of God) or Salafis, a label that encompasses a broader spread of belief. Since Wahhabi
and Wahhabism
have become otherwise universally accepted labels, I shall use them – with neutral intent.
I have employed Common Era (c.e.) dates. Where the original sources supply a specific date in the Islamic calendar for an event, I have converted it to its c.e. equivalent, using www.islamicfinder.org/dateConversion.php. Where they offer just a year, I have given the two c.e. years with which it overlaps (in the form, e.g., 1729/30), unless the context makes it obvious in which c.e. year the event fell.
It is impossible to be entirely consistent in the transliteration of Arabic names and words. Where place names now have a widely accepted spelling in English, I have adopted that in the text (e.g. Mecca or Riyadh). Otherwise I have adopted current academic practice (but omitted diacritics).
For ease of reading, I have restricted the number of proper names in the text to those that are essential. I have placed full footnotes online at: www.oneworld-publications.com/books/michael-
crawford/ibn-abd-al-wahhab
I thank Professor Patricia Crone of Princeton (the general editor) for her initial help with this book, Professor Bernard Haykel, also of Princeton, and Charles Richards of London for their detailed comments. I am alone responsible for remaining errors. I owe a broader debt to Professors Haykel and Michael Cook of Princeton, and to Dr. Saud al-Sarhan of Riyadh for deepening my understanding of Wahhabism. For the record, I have not been beholden in preparing or writing this book to any institution, body, or individual for funding.
1.jpgTHE WAHHABI PHENOMENON
In mid-1798 Napoleon invaded and occupied Egypt, a self-ruling province of the Ottoman empire which then exercised suzerainty over much of the Middle East. Although some Ottomans had worried about growing Western advantage since the failed siege of Vienna in 1683, most Muslim observers were traumatized. A contemporary Yemeni religious reformer described this first Western occupation of Arab lands for centuries as making the eyes of Islam and of Muslims weep
(al-Shawkani, 1929/30, 2:8). The imagery was conventional but the shock genuine and deeply felt around the region. The Ottoman sultan warned of a French descent on the Holy Cities, which he did not rule directly (ibid., 2:9–15).
The defeat by Napoleon of forces fielded by Egypt’s mamluk rulers and then Nelson’s audacious destruction of Napoleon’s fleet at the Battle of the Nile were brutal demonstrations of the military and technological gap that had opened between the Christian powers and Islam’s premier empire. Recognition by both rulers and subjects of the backwardness of their societies and inferiority – all the more painful because it conflicted with Muslims’ conviction of God’s favor and of their own superiority over Christians – triggered a long Ottoman reform process that lasted until the empire collapsed at the end of the First World War.
The political, military, and cultural impact of the French occupation of Egypt on contemporary governments and societies in the region has made it a favored starting point for Western histories of the modern Middle East. The ensuing narrative relates how Ottoman efforts to recover ground, lost both physically and metaphorically to Western powers and Russia, concentrated first on revitalization of the military. As the nineteenth century progressed and the Ottomans saw that Western advantage stemmed from more than military technology and prowess, they extended the reform process under the broad heading of the Tanzimat to the political, economic, and social fields.
Subsequent modernization across the region, based on European models, was seen by its inhabitants as a reaction to Western pressures, and to be measured against Western benchmarks. Prominent Arab thinkers sought to adapt and liberalize Islam to assist the development process. Those engaged in politics after the First World War, operating in newly created nation states carved out of the old Ottoman empire, seized on European doctrines of secular nationalism to mobilize and justify popular hostility to colonial occupation and influence. Even major Islamist strands, such as the Muslim Brotherhood which first emerged in Egypt in the 1920s in parallel and competition with nationalism, reflected heavy Western influence as well as the effects of early globalization.
This standard account of regional history rightly presents Westernization as the key component and instrument of modernization across the Middle East. Yet modernizing reform in the region was not jump-started by the French conquest of Egypt. Contrary to the impression of eighteenth-century stagnation often conveyed by historians, the Arab and Persian worlds demonstrated a degree of political, military, and intellectual vibrancy even before rivalry between France under Napoleon and England detonated in a transcontinental war. Modernization began before Westernization and amounted to more than that.
By the eighteenth century dissatisfaction with existing approaches to government, religion, and military organization had already stimulated reformist impulses in Middle Eastern ruling circles. It had a similar effect among Muslim clerics (‘ulama), who operated without any formal hierarchy of authority and were among the leading public intellectuals of their time. Some initiatives dissipated without effect. Others took hold and became fully fledged, sometimes radical, campaigns to transform the status quo. Historians have tended to see Wahhabism as typifying such movements. But its religious dogma was not representative of wider intellectual trends and its political and social activism expressed itself in an unusually aggressive form (Dallal, 2011, 108–11).
Wahhabism as an indigenous religious reform movement was born in inland Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century. It arose in the central Arabian hinterland of Najd, a region long disdained by Arab metropolitan elites as a religious and cultural backwater. It lay beyond the Ottoman orbit and remote from the hybrid port culture of the Arabian Gulf with its close links to India and East Africa. It belonged neither to the story of Westernization in the Middle East nor geographically to the worlds of the Mediterranean or the Red Sea and western Indian Ocean, where Muslim rulers first felt the modern political and commercial influence of European powers.
When from 1790 Wahhabism exploded out of Arabia to assume a disruptive role on the Ottoman stage, regional elites saw it as an inexplicable, almost anarchic intrusion from a deprived periphery. Some Western historians adopted this perspective, depicting it as a solitary protest in a corrupt world
that exhibited features peculiar to the Arabian Peninsula (Gibb, 1947, 35). Many sweeping regional histories grant Wahhabism mere footnote status as an anomaly outside the main strands of narrative or analysis.
The early Wahhabi challenge to the political and religious assumptions underlying the Ottoman world can indeed seem curiously detached in origin from the rest of the Islamic world of its time. For all its religious inspiration and modern reputation as an ideology of resistance, it offered no transferable political model for Muslims facing political and commercial pressures from European powers.
The first Wahhabis of the 1740s appear to have been unaware of the speed and depth of contemporary English and French intrusion into far-off Muslim territories. Their better-informed successors remained undeterred by Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, or further English inroads into Islamic lands in India, from setting out to confound the Ottoman sultan, who had only recently reasserted his claim to be the caliph or leader of Muslims. It was not the French who launched themselves by sea at the Holy Cities of Islam but the Wahhabis. They encroached by land and captured them in 1803–6. As the sultan was officially guardian of the Holy Places, this loss, and the subsequent Saudi ban on the pilgrimage caravans he sponsored, dented his religious credentials and regional prestige.
This came at a bad time for the Ottoman empire. Its nerve center at the Sublime Porte in Istanbul was working to navigate the stormy waters of the Napoleonic War without losing more territory. The Wahhabis by contrast were committed to addressing the degraded condition of the Islamic world. Their targets