GRADY SLAY, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant

�0 In an appeal to the district court from the administrative revocation of a driver [997 P.2d 161] license, judgment went to Slay [driver or plaintiff]. The Department of Public Safety [defendant] appealed. On review the Court of Civil Appeals upheld the driver-license revocation. Upon certiorari earlier granted,

Earl L. Reeves, Jr., Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

Michael Gardner of the Law Offices of Joe Farnan, Purcell, Oklahoma, for the appellee.

LAVENDER, J.

�1 The Department of Public Safety [DPS or appellant] seeks review of a district court's judgment that reversed an earlier administrative revocation of Slay's [plaintiff or appellee] driver license.

�2 Slay was arrested on May 4, 1996 for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. When he was asked to submit to a chemical test to assess his sobriety, Slay refused. After a July 24, 1996 administrative hearing appellee's driver license was revoked under the terms of Oklahoma Implied Consent Law.

�3 During the May 28, 1998 review proceeding the arresting officer testified: (1) that he observed a motor vehicle being driven three feet left of the center line of public street for a distance of approximately 100 feet; (2) that after the vehicle [a truck] was stopped, the officer observed a mug containing a liquid next to the driver which Slay (upon being asked) identified as bourbon; (3) that he [the officer] observed Slay had [997 P.2d 162] slurred speech and when asked to step out of his truck, he had trouble maintaining his balance; and (4) that driver had a noticeable smell of alcohol on his breath. The officer also testified that after he had formed an opinion that Slay was intoxicated, he asked him to undergo a chemical test for alcohol consumption. Slay refused and acknowledged his refusal in writing by signing section 2 of the Affidavit. The officer also testified that he advised Slay his refusal to take the test would result in the revocation of his license. The arresting officer further testified that he signed the Affidavit in the presence of a notary public. Lastly, he testified that another officer administered a field sobriety test to assess Slay's degree of intoxication. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, DPS rested.

�4 Slay objected to admission of the officer's Affidavit, asserting that because the details which are normally embossed by the notary public's seal

�5 The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] reversed the district court's decision and ordered the cause remanded with instructions that an order be entered reinstating the revocation of Slay's driver license. Appellee then sought certiorari which was granted.

�6 Essential to Slay's quest for appellate relief is his assertion that DPS failed to meet its evidentiary burden in establishing his refusal to consent to the sobriety test requested of him. To prevail State must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence in a driver-license revocation case.

�8 Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence recognizes that an acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of a document's execution. There is imposed upon one who seeks to impeach a certificate of acknowledgment - which substantially complies with the law - the burden of producing evidence which is "clear, cogent, and convincing, and . . . produces a conviction amounting to a moral [997 P.2d 163] certainty that the certificate is false."

�9 First, the Affidavit does reflect that it was executed in the State of Oklahoma, County of McClain. The Affidavit is properly construed by examining what lies within the four corners of the document. It is a printed document which in its upper left- hand corner reflects the following:

Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (6

�10 Under the facts disclosed by the record there can be no question that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Slay. Certainly the driver's erratic operation of his motor vehicle

�11 The district court's decision that the administrative revocation of Slay's driver license was not sustainable is reversed. The arresting officer had probable cause to stop Slay. When - after making a proper stop - it became apparent to the officer that Slay was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, the officer was justified in requesting that Slay submit to a test for sobriety. Slay's non-consent to the requested test constitutes ground for revoking his driver license under Oklahoma's Implied Consent Law. The administrative documentation submitted to DPS adequately comports with the standards mandated by the governing statutes and, hence, provides an adequate legal basis for the earlier revocation.

�12 From the transcript of the appellate proceedings in the district court it appears that the court ruled at the conclusion of DPS's case, i.e., before Slay was able to put on his own defense. Each party in a case must be afforded an opportunity to present its case. This is an essential component of due process.

�13 Upon certiorari earlier granted,

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEAL'S OPINION IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART AND THE [997 P.2d 164] DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED.

�14 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, KAUGER, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.

�15 OPALA and WATT, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part.

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