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  • Edward B. Hager v. United States, 993 F.2d 4, 1st Cir. (1993)

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    The petitioner, Edward Hager, pleaded guilty to unlawfully importing wildlife from Mexico into the United States. Over two years later, he sought a writ of coram nobis to set aside his conviction, arguing that the district court failed to ensure his plea was voluntary as required by law. The district court denied the writ. The appeals court affirmed, finding that Hager did not explain why he did not appeal earlier, showed no ongoing consequences, and facts showed the plea was voluntary, including that the court knew of his medical issues and he said there was no reason not to accept the plea. The failure to ask more health questions did not constitute fundamental error warranting the extraordinary writ of coram nobis.

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    Filed: 1993-05-21 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 993 F.2d 4 Docket: 93-1017

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    The petitioner, Edward Hager, pleaded guilty to unlawfully importing wildlife from Mexico into the United States. Over two years later, he sought a writ of coram nobis to set aside his conviction, arguing that the district court failed to ensure his plea was voluntary as required by law. The district court denied the writ. The appeals court affirmed, finding that Hager did not explain why he did not appeal earlier, showed no ongoing consequences, and facts showed the plea was voluntary, including that the court knew of his medical issues and he said there was no reason not to accept the plea. The failure to ask more health questions did not constitute fundamental error warranting the extraordinary writ of coram nobis.

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    246 views3 pages

    Edward B. Hager v. United States, 993 F.2d 4, 1st Cir. (1993)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The petitioner, Edward Hager, pleaded guilty to unlawfully importing wildlife from Mexico into the United States. Over two years later, he sought a writ of coram nobis to set aside his conviction, arguing that the district court failed to ensure his plea was voluntary as required by law. The district court denied the writ. The appeals court affirmed, finding that Hager did not explain why he did not appeal earlier, showed no ongoing consequences, and facts showed the plea was voluntary, including that the court knew of his medical issues and he said there was no reason not to accept the plea. The failure to ask more health questions did not constitute fundamental error warranting the extraordinary writ of coram nobis.

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    of 3

    993 F.

    2d 4

    Edward B. HAGER, Petitioner,


    v.
    UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
    No. 93-1017.

    United States Court of Appeals,


    First Circuit.
    Heard April 5, 1993.
    Decided May 21, 1993.

    Robert E. McDaniel with whom Devine, Millimet & Branch, P.A.,


    Manchester, NH, was on brief, for petitioner.
    Peter E. Papps, U.S. Atty., Concord, NH, for respondent.
    Before BREYER, Chief Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
    BREYER, Chief Judge.

    In a hearing conducted on May 29, 1990, the appellant, Edward Hager, entered
    a plea of guilty to a charge of unlawfully importing four wild animal pelts from
    Mexico into the United States. 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting
    importation of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of foreign law), 3373(d)
    (1)(A) (setting criminal penalties for violation). Immediately after the hearing,
    the court sentenced Hager to serve one year of unsupervised probation and to
    pay a $75,000 fine. He did not appeal the court's judgment. On November 2,
    1992, he asked the district court to issue a writ of coram nobis, setting aside his
    conviction. See 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) ("All Writs Act"); United States v.
    Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512, 74 S.Ct. 247, 253, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). The
    district court denied the petition for the writ. And, Hager appeals the court's
    decision.

    Hager makes one argument on this appeal. He points out that the district court,
    before accepting a guilty plea, must make certain that the defendant's "plea is
    voluntary." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.

    25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (plea must be "voluntary and
    intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
    defendant"). Hager says that, in his case, the district court failed to make this
    determination. The court asked him
    3
    "Now,
    have there been any threats made by anyone against you, any member of your
    family, or anyone near and dear to you which compels you to offer a plea of guilty
    here this morning?"
    4

    The appellant replied,

    "Only the threat to my health, sir."

    How, asks the appellant, could the district court know enough about the matter
    after this brief exchange to satisfy itself that the "threat" to his "health" was not
    so grave as to make his plea essentially involuntary? Unless there is a
    satisfactory answer to this question, he adds, his "guilty plea" proceeding was
    so seriously flawed as to warrant issuance of the coram nobis writ.

    The legal answer to appellant's question is that the writ of coram nobis is an
    unusual legal animal that courts will use to set aside a criminal judgment of
    conviction only "under circumstances compelling such action to achieve
    justice." See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511, 74 S.Ct. at 252. Those circumstances
    include an explanation of why a coram nobis petitioner did not earlier seek
    relief from the judgment, see United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1061-62
    (3d Cir.1988), Kiger v. United States, 315 F.2d 778, 779 (7th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 375 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 270, 11 L.Ed.2d 166 (1963); a showing that the
    petitioner continues to suffer significant collateral consequences from the
    judgment, see Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-13, 74 S.Ct. at 253, Howard v. United
    States, 962 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir.1992); and a demonstration that an error of
    "the most fundamental character," relevant to the plea decision, occurred. See
    Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. at 253.

    The appellant has neither explained why he did not pursue a timely appeal nor
    shown significant, continuing collateral consequences flowing from his
    conviction. And, he has conceded the following facts: (1) at the time of the plea
    hearing, the district court was aware of his medical problems, both from the
    record of earlier proceedings in the case prior to its transfer to New Hampshire
    and from appellant's own description of these problems, later in the course of
    the hearing; (2) when asked whether there was any reason why the court should
    not accept appellant's plea, appellant replied that there was not, see Key v.

    United States, 806 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.1986) (defendant's representations at
    plea hearing strong obstacle to successful collateral attack on conviction); (3)
    appellant's counsel, in response to the court's inquiry, stated his opinion that the
    plea was in the best interests of his client, see United States v. Guichard, 779
    F.2d 1139, 1145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1127, 106 S.Ct. 1654, 90
    L.Ed.2d 197 (1986) (unless overt coercion alleged, counsel's opinion good
    evidence of voluntary and intelligent plea), citing United States v. Araiza, 693
    F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir.1982); and (4) the government demonstrated at the
    coram nobis proceeding before the district court that, two months after entering
    his plea, appellant was well enough to travel to Africa to hunt wild animals.
    These facts, together, convince us that appellant's plea was not "involuntary;"
    that the court's failure to ask more health-related questions was not erroneous;
    and, certainly, that no error of a "fundamental character" occurred. See Morgan,
    346 U.S. at 512, 74 S.Ct. at 253; Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) (no redress for Rule 11
    error which does not violate substantial rights); cf. United States v. Timmreck,
    441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979) (to justify
    habeas relief, violation of Rule 11 must be "complete miscarriage of justice" or
    "omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure," not
    just technical violation).
    9

    The judgment of the district court denying the petition for a writ of coram nobis
    is

    10

    Affirmed.

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