MFR Nara - t2 - CIA - CIA Employee 13-5-30!03!00536

MORl DocID: 145409l
EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs
G . tc UNCLASSIFIED
•
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
TO: Team 2 Files
CC: Kevin Scheid and Bruce Berkowitz
FROM: Gordon Lederman
DATE: June 2, 2003
RE: Interview wit~L -----I
This memorandum summarizes Bruce's and my discussion with I l.n

May 30, 2003 in his home. The interview was not recorded. Our objectIve was to ave
Describe his efforts to mcdernize .how CIA performs analysis - particularlyc=J
proposal for the use of virtual teams and information technology.
I. Proposals to Reform the Ie's Analytical Process.
r--lvorked for 'the CIA from 1977 to 1998. In 1994, he was among a number cl
indiviau~ho saw that the Iehad not changed to COITlpensatefor the end of the Cold
War. He said that the Ie's budget in 1994L-L . ----'
In 1986, he wrote a paper or monograph about the use of multiple scenario

analysis, but the CIA did not adopt his methodology. After the end of the Cold War, he
and others formed an informal group called the Global Visions Group (funded by CIA) to
study the forces shaping global society and potential resulting threats to the U.S. In 1996,
the group identified seven potential threats - including terrorism - to the U.S. even
though the U.S. would be the hegemonic power.
r--hoted that, in order to figure out what intelligence we need, we must

unders~ow the world has changed, what new threats result, and thus what the IC
must be able to do.
He said that, in general, analysts should engage policymakers in thoughtful

discussions and highlight uncertainty. In 1995, he proposed that the DI use information
technology to develop ad hoc working groups (including policymakers, who he said may
have information that analysts lack) using an online SECRET system. (This was a lower-
classification network, for information sharing and teaming, separate from the CIA's
TS/SCI system.) The initial proposal called for develo in a virtual structure to link
intelligence officers and olic makers is proposal was thus
sometimes called .s proposal were; (1) it
provided an inter rve orma so a analysts could help policymakers figure out what
they really wanted to know and what questions they should ask, and (2) it allowed for
consideration of uncertainty and multiple outcomes. After three years (1996-1998), he
abandoned the effort and subsequently retired from CIA. He attributed his project's
failure to the DO security office's resistance, as the DO sf:U;j office was reluctant to
permit non-DO individuals to have access to DO reports. lso may have said that
DO security was reluctant to have its people on the networ or security reasons. In his
•
words, "The DO never said "no' but never said 'yes. '" Certain elements of the State
Dept. also resisted. I Fupported his proposal. Does not
UNCLASSIFIED
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..--"
UNCLASSIFIED
seem to have appealed to higher-level CIA authorities regarding the DO security office's
stance.
II. IC Management.
He criticized the NIE process as too adversarial. He also criticized PDD-35 and
said it should never have beenissued. He said that everyone in the IC wanted to work on
the top issues listed in PDD-35 (which included terrorism along with over ten other
issues) but that the nature of the world is such that a tier 4 issue could quickly rocket to
tier 1; presumably, he meant that that ICmust maintain an analytical capability in a host
of areas that are not currently tier 1 but that one day might become tier 1, yet analysts are
naturally adverse to working on non-tier 1 issues. He criticized PDD-35 as keeping..
people and resources focused on old issues rather than new issues.
He criticized the IC as "not being able to say no to any policymaker." He said

that he assumed that the IC's budget had been cut .; and he said that a lot of support .
. personnel disappeared. More generally, he criticized analysis as being too focused on
short-term production. '
Bruce asked whether a senior analyst could go directly to a policymaker and offer
assistance and suggested that perhaps analysts needed to show initiative. Dgreed that
•
that is one reason. '
r---1aid that 'he thought that the DCI was very weak, even regarding the CIA and
particu~e DO. He said that the DO is very good at convincing the DCI what to do,
and that in any event the rapid turnover of DC Is means that DCIs have shorter time to
affect the Ie. '
Ibited two primary missions of the Ie: (l}to support policymakers in making
the bes'r-aea{ions possible to protect the national interest, and (2) wamingof threats.
Ibommented that he thought of intelligence differently than others (presumably, other
~sts) in that he thought that intelligence should be policy-relevant. He noted that
CIA's location in Langley gives it some distance from policymakers.
He said that, after the Indian nuclear test, the eIA (possibly the IG; perhaps the
Jeremiah report?) said that the CIA needed to alternative analytical methodologies.
However, he noted that the IC has a lot of cultural inertia and that the status quo has a lot
of support.
In general, he offered the following metrics for judging the efficacy of analysis:
(1) Is analysis helping policymakers ask the right questions?
(2) Is analysis predicting trends or issues in the future?
(3) Is analysis providing information that is useful to policymakers?
UNCLASSIFIED CIA 0132

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III. Counterterrorism.
With respect to the USG's failure on counterterrorism, he blamed interagency

rivalry. He said that agencies declined to share information with each other because each
agency wants to maintain a monopoly over information and to avoid another agency
getting credit (he cited FBI unwillingness to have the CIA get credit for information
acquired by the FBI). Decommended that analysts on terrorism meet every three
months to share ideas. ;.
He also noted that, while terrorism received a high level of attention, factors
driving terrorism did not. He also noted thai Afghanistan had not received much focus
prior to September 11th., '-
IV. Documents to Obtain, and Individuals to Interview.

'.,
ecommended that we talk to the followin individuals:
• ecommended that we obtain the followin documents:
v. Comments.
He mentioned the journal Competitive Intelligence Journal, which we should try

to obtain. He also gave us a number of articles and documents.
Query whether, if CIA had adopted his proposal for a virtual team, the IC would
have been able to detect the September 11th attacks. How can information technology be
used to improve analysis related to counterterrorism?
I ~ECRET-Ievel network would have been similar to

SIPME I In the number of people who could have used it; CIA is just beginning to get
SIPRNET .
• UNCLASSIFIED
CIA 0133

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MORl DocID: 145409l

This memorandum summarizes Bruce's and my discussion with I l.n

I. Proposals to Reform the Ie's Analytical Process.

In 1986, he wrote a paper or monograph about the use of multiple scenario

r--hoted that, in order to figure out what intelligence we need, we must

He said that, in general, analysts should engage policymakers in thoughtful

He criticized the IC as "not being able to say no to any policymaker." He said

UNCLASSIFIED CIA 0132

With respect to the USG's failure on counterterrorism, he blamed interagency

IV. Documents to Obtain, and Individuals to Interview.

ecommended that we talk to the followin individuals:

• ecommended that we obtain the followin documents:

He mentioned the journal Competitive Intelligence Journal, which we should try

I ~ECRET-Ievel network would have been similar to

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