Publish United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit: Filed
Publish United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit: Filed
SEP 20 2004
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
RANDY G. WORKMAN, Warden; and
DICK CONNER CORRECTIONAL
CENTER,
No. 02-6325
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 01-CV-1382-C)
Steven M. Presson (Robert W. Jackson with him on the brief) of Jackson &
Presson, P.C., Norman, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Nancy E. Connally, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney
General, with her on the brief), State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Respondent-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
I.
Prior to Mr. Youngs trial, the state objected to the introduction of several
Department of Human Services (DHS) reports and the testimony of certain
witnesses because defense counsel had failed to provide court ordered discovery
regarding the documents and the nature of the witnesses testimony. According to
defense counsel, he had planned to introduce testimony regarding inconsistencies
in the alleged victims version of events and documents indicating that the
childs care givers noticed nothing unusual about the childs demeanor or
behavior while she was at day care during the relevant period of time. Aplt. br.
at 11-12. After hearing argument from the parties about whether to admit the
evidence, the court noted it had previously ordered defense counsel to provide the
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state with any DHS records he would be relying on, along with more detailed
information regarding the testimony of the proposed witnesses. The court further
noted it had continued the trial so defense counsel could provide the discovery.
Despite the courts orders and continuance, defense counsel completely failed to
turn over the discovery information.
During the trial, the court made a further record regarding the discovery
issue, noting that its decision to sanction counsel by refusing to admit the DHS
reports and the testimony was based on counsels refusal to abide by its orders:
There has been no further discovery by you, [defense counsel], to the state.
So you did not comply with my order back in April of 1999. As you did not
comply with my order . . . and did not give the state the discovery that I
ordered you to give under 2002, [1] it allows the Court to order certain
Section 2002 of the Oklahoma Discovery Code provides, in relevant part:
B. Disclosure of Evidence by the Defendant.
1. Upon request of the state, the defense shall be required to
disclose the following:
a. the names and addresses of witnesses which the
defense intends to call at trial, together with their
relevant, written or recorded statement, if any, or if
none, significant summaries of any oral statement . . . .
....
sanctions, and the sanction that I imposed in this case was that those
witnesses would not be called as the state still had not did not have
sufficient information to adequately proceed to trial. I did not want to
continue the trial because it was time to take this case to trial. And thats a
remedy that I chose.
Tr., vol. IV, at 10304.
Mr. Young was convicted of three counts of forcible oral sodomy and
twelve counts of lewd or indecent acts with a child. He was sentenced to thirty
years incarceration per count, to run consecutively. On direct appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2254, Mr. Young then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court denied relief on all grounds. We granted a certificate of appealability on
only one issue: whether Mr. Youngs trial was rendered fundamentally unfair
when the trial court excluded evidence as a sanction for repeated discovery
violations.
(...continued)
....
1
E. Regulation of Discovery.
2. Failure to Comply with a Request. If at any time during the
course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
O KLA . S TAT . tit. 22, 2002 (emphases added).
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II.
Mr. Young filed his habeas corpus petition after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). His case is therefore governed by its provisions. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429 (2000). Under AEDPA, a federal court
may not grant habeas relief on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28
U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), (2). State court fact findings are presumed correct unless
the petitioner rebuts them by clear and convincing evidence. Hale v. Gibson, 227
F.3d 1298, 1309 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257,
1265 (10th Cir. 1999)).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under
section 2254(d)(1) if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides
a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A
state court decision is an unreasonable application of federal law under section
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2254(d)(2) if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
[the Supreme Courts] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the
facts of the prisoners case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The reasonableness of
the state courts application of federal law is to be evaluated by an objective
standard under which a state court decision may be held reasonable even if not all
reasonable jurists would agree with that conclusion. See id. at 409-10. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that an unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. Id. at 412
(emphasis in original).
On direct appeal to the OCCA, Mr. Young contended his Sixth Amendment
right to present a defense was violated by the sanctions imposed by the trial court.
The OCCA addressed this issue on its merits, holding that the district court did
not err in excluding Appellants witnesses based on the failure to comply with
discovery as there is no proof the witnesses were material or that appellant was
prejudiced by the sanction. Aplt. app. at 53-54.
Mr. Youngs Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and a fair
trial, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, include the right
to present witnesses in his own defense. Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 871
(10th Cir. 1997) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967)). As the
Supreme Court has stated,
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balancing.
Where a party has failed to comply with a discovery request, and the failure
is willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage at trial, then
exclusion of the evidence is entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 415. However, the
Court made it clear in Taylor that while willfulness and seeking of tactical
advantage justified exclusion, it was neither necessary nor appropriate . . . to
attempt to draft a comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of [a
courts] discretion [in ordering the exclusion of evidence] in every possible case.
Id. at 414. Mr. Youngs argument that the trial court did not make a specific
finding of willfulness in this case misses the point of the Courts case-by-case
approach: such a finding is not required for exclusion to be justified as a sanction
for discovery violations. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151-53 (holding exclusion of
testimony as sanction for violating discovery rule does not violate Compulsory
Process Clause as long as exclusion will prevent prejudice to the state and
preserve the integrity of the judicial process); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 241 (1975) (courts preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method of
assuring compliance with its order when counsel refused to comply with courts
order to submit copy of investigators report to prosecution).
Moreover, although a specific finding of willfulness is not required, the
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clear inference from the trial courts questioning of Mr. Youngs counsel is that
the court believed counsels behavior to be willful.
THE COURT: . . . if I ordered you to get something to me,
would you bring it to me or would you just tell me maybe I should
just come by your office in the event they might be there when I
happen to come by? This order to the state told the state that at some
point in time you might have these records. It is not incumbent upon
the state to call your office every day and say, Mr. James, do you
have those records yet, Id like to get them. You made absolutely no
effort to get those records to the state or at least even notify the state
Ive got the records, if you want to come and get them and copy
them, they are available. Isnt that correct?
MR. JAMES: In response to your question, yes, I would bring
them to the Court because of my respect to the Court.
THE COURT: And I understand. But isnt it correct that you
did not even notify Ms. High that you had finally gotten those
records and that you these were the records that you intended
using? Did you even do that?
MR. JAMES: No I did not notify her, no, Your honor.
Tr., vol. IV, at 105-06.
We do not require the trial court to use the word willful if the record
clearly reflects the courts belief that counsels violation of a discovery order was
indeed willful. To hold otherwise would create reliance on magic words, which
we decline to do. Cf., e.g., United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th
Cir. 2004) (unnecessary for district court to recite any magic words to show it
has fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of sentencing factors); Wells v. City
& County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1150 (10th Cir. 2001) (district court
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