Steinmetz v. Coyle & Caron, Inc., 1st Cir. (2017)
Steinmetz v. Coyle & Caron, Inc., 1st Cir. (2017)
No. 16-1996
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
Defendant, Appellee.
Before
its exercise of its right of petition. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231,
59H. Coyle & Caron also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Steinmetz v. Coyle & Caron, Inc., No.
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15-cv-13594-DJC, 2016 WL 4074135 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016).
*34, that the statute did not violate the Seventh Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, id. at *6, and that the statute applied to
of the statute, the district court next found that Coyle & Caron,
made its threshold showing that the Steinmetzes' claims were based
state law, that the burden shifted to the Steinmetzes to show that
factual support or any arguable basis in law and [that Coyle &
court held that the Steinmetzes had failed to meet this burden and
thus could not defeat Coyle & Caron's special motion to dismiss.
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support," as they were "the product of well-trained professionals
photos of James Island. Id. at *8. The mere fact that the
Id.
Id. at *9. The Memorandum did not refer to Coyle & Caron's
negligence and gross negligence claims because Coyle & Caron owed
Coyle & Caron's renderings constituted opinion and not fact, id.
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at *10, and the chapter 93A claim because the Steinmetzes lacked
*11.
to this case, and that the district court erred by granting Coyle
& Caron's special motion, even assuming the statute applies. The
Rule 12(b)(6).
N.E.3d 21 (Mass. 2017); 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. Jace Bos., LLC,
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We affirm today the district court's determinations that
the meaning of the statute if the statute applies to Coyle & Caron
and chapter 93A claims are not colorable under the augmented anti-
by that court.
I.
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application to the Cohasset Conservation Commission. The
opposed the construction out of fear that the scenic views from
view frame than where it will actually be." Third, they portrayed
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than it actually would be. Fourth, the renderings "represent[ed]
five defects, the Steinmetzes point out that their proposed home
many of which are taller than the proposed house and "will largely
looming over the tree line of the island" (quoting Amanda Thompson,
/20150912/news/150919497).
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her affidavit that the first draft of the renderings was not
she did not intend for the draft to be circulated more widely. As
based upon the unfounded and irrational fear they created, and
against Coyle & Caron in the U.S. District Court for the District
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II.
any case in which a party asserts that the [claims] against said
Laws ch. 231, 59H. It goes on to state that the special motion
shall be granted "unless the party against whom such special motion
is made shows that: (1) the moving party's exercise of its right
arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party's acts caused actual
"the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing
is based." Id.
makes its threshold showing that "the claims against [it] were
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support or any arguable basis in law for its petitioning activity,"
id. at 961. This was the framework under which the district court
4074135, at *68.
now survive the special motion not only by "demonstrating that the
(first quoting L.B. v. Chief Justice of Prob. & Family Court Dep't,
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As we understand Massachusetts law in the wake of
the answer to this question is no, then the special motion fails.
Laws ch. 231, 59H. If the nonmoving party is able to make both
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Fourth, and finally, we ask whether the nonmoving party
following: First, the Steinmetzes contend that Coyle & Caron fails
within the meaning of the statute. Second, they argue that step
they succeeded in showing that Coyle & Caron lacked any reasonable
that their claims against Coyle & Caron were each colorable claims
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framework, as they each present questions of law. See Godin v.
Cf. P.R. Tel. Co. v. T-Mobile P.R. LLC, 678 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir.
2012).
third-party contractors like Coyle & Caron, then Coyle & Caron has
met its burden of showing that the Steinmetzes' claims were based
like Coyle & Caron in the first place, we certify that question to
the SJC.
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A. Claims Based Solely on Legitimate Petitioning Activity
Coyle & Caron has made its threshold showing that the claims were
its scope to a party who asserts that it faces legal action based
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of the United States or of the commonwealth." Id. While the
see, e.g., Plante v. Wylie, 824 N.E.2d 461 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005),
the SJC has warned several times, albeit in dicta, that the statute
trust that had opposed the expansion. 824 N.E.2d at 46264. The
and the Appeals Court reversed the denial of the motion, holding
when the statements that form the basis of the [developers'] claims
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as statements made by them directly. . . .
[S]uits directed against the attorneys who
represent petitioning parties are just as
likely to exert a chilling effect on
petitioning activity as suits directed against
the parties themselves, and the costs to
attorneys and their clients if such suits
cannot promptly be dismissed are just as
likely to impede the clients' right to
petition . . . .
Id. at 466.
N.E.2d 888, 893 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that a security
repeated statements from the SJC that only those who petition the
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government in their status as citizens may avail themselves of the
id. (noting that the anti-SLAPP statute does not "apply to those
itself, see Keegan, 920 N.E.2d at 893, the SJC recently clarified
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the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 118990 (third
alteration in original).
Cardno, 68 N.E.3d at 118890, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 59H).
Although the SJC has not elaborated on this point, we cannot ignore
the frequency with which the SJC has commented on the requirement
Caron has met its burden of showing that the Steinmetzes' claims
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applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute to Coyle & Caron. As a
repeatedly states that the Coyle & Caron renderings are "highly
person could conclude" that there was factual support behind the
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respects, the renderings had "no basis in fact." The renderings,
an express caveat that they were not completely accurate and were
MacFarlane, who attested that Yuka Suganuma had told him, inter
alia, that the renderings that she had helped prepare for Coyle &
motion inquiry, that the district court did not comment on the
MacFarlane affidavit.
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renderings had no factual basis at all.3 Simply put, accurate or
do not reach the issue of whether Coyle & Caron's actions caused
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a "likelihood of success" as to be "frivolous." Levin, 388 N.E.2d
at 1209.
issue. Second, they argue that Coyle & Caron was negligent in
creation of the renderings fails for the reason that the district
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services." Meridian at Windchime, Inc. v. Earth Tech, Inc., 960
N.E.2d 344, 350 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (citing Craig v. Everett M.
foreseeable and reasonable for them to do so, or that Coyle & Caron
that the Steinmetzes' claim that Coyle & Caron acted negligently
law.
Coyle & Caron "had a duty to the Steinmetzes to not allow its
support their assertion that Coyle & Caron would owe such a duty.
this case, Coyle & Caron owed the Steinmetzes no duty to ensure
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that its draft rendering would not end up on Facebook. Any
chance of success.
2. Chapter 93A
dismissal of their chapter 93A claim on the ground that they failed
this reasoning was in error because they say they brought their
claims under section 9, not section 11, of chapter 93A, and there
suit.
F. Supp. 2d 51, 5657 (D. Mass. 2004) (rejecting suit brought under
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accident" at issue (citation omitted)). Absent any such
3. Defamation
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the scope of a defamation claim. While the issue is close, we
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the district court properly granted the special motion, we must
where the moving party is not the petitioner itself but a third-
activity.
like position to Coyle & Caron fall within the scope of the anti-
SLAPP statute, then Coyle & Caron's special motion must be granted
Gray LLP v. Jalbert (In re Engage, Inc.), 544 F.3d 50, 53 (1st
question of whether Coyle & Caron may invoke the protection of the
Showtime Entm't, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61, 82 (1st Cir.
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2014). Under these circumstances, we exercise our discretion to
Massachusetts SJC:
III.
& Caron, then the negligence, gross negligence, and chapter 93A
motion.6
SJC, under the official seal of this court, a copy of the certified
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the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The panel retains
So ordered.
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