Chavez V Comelec Digest
Chavez V Comelec Digest
Issue:
Is the prohibition of billboards and other forms of private endorsements by candidates an invalid exercise of police power?
Held:
No. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to
level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand,
and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and
publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power as held in National
Press Club v. COMELEC,[2] wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,
which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time “for campaigning or other political purposes,” except to the
COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates
by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign “war chests.” This Court ruled therein that
this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income
distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population
falling below the poverty line.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, “election campaign” or “partisan political activity” is defined as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included under this definition are:
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual
and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to
use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the
campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or
not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period.
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal,
is indeed of vital interest to the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and
again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate
of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which
is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid because of overbreadth. A statute or
regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a person’s
propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period.
Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.
Notes:
There is no ex post facto law because the resolution punishes the non-removal and not merely the posting itself of posters, tarpaulins.