Understanding Algeria's 2019 Revolutionary Movement: Thomas Serres
Understanding Algeria's 2019 Revolutionary Movement: Thomas Serres
Professor of Politics
Shai Feldman
This Brief argues that the Hirak is a revolutionary movement that draws its
political strength from its ability to connect the current situation to the Algerian
war of liberation waged against the French (1954–62). The history of independent
Algeria is presented as a succession of usurpations and betrayals. The movement
deployed nationalist discourses inherited from the war of liberation, as well as
more recent strategies of non-violent resistance, and portrayed the regime as a
form of internal colonialism that had confiscated the country’s independence and
its public wealth—two inheritances from the earlier struggle.1 By reviving the
political sanctity that had been associated with the people during the anticolonial
struggle, the Hirak unified disparate groups and framed the struggle as one
between “the people” and “the System.” This revival of the populist legacy of the
first Algerian revolution helps explain the continuation of the protests despite
both the president’s resignation and attempts by the military to engineer a rapid
transition. But while this refusal to compromise in order to achieve genuine
independence has allowed the movement to last for more than five months, it may
also limit political possibilities in the future.
A Longstanding Crisis
Thomas Serres is a lecturer
As was the case with the Arab uprisings of 2010–11, Algeria’s current revolution is
in the Department of not the product of a sudden collapse of the country’s political equilibrium; rather,
Politics at the University it had been brewing for years and grew out of persistent socioeconomic grievances
of California, Santa Cruz and political discontent. After independence, two military coups, one in 1962 and
and associate researcher the other in 1965, allowed the bureaucratic-military apparatus that had emerged
during the war to appropriate power. The resulting authoritarian government
in the Development & implemented ambitious development policies under Houari Boumédiène (1965–
Societies Research Unit, 78) before facing major economic and political difficulties in the 1980s,2 as a result
Paris-Sorbonne. of which the feeling of an unfinished or, worse, confiscated revolution intensified
among an increasingly disenfranchised population. As the regime was sometimes
being portrayed as a “party of France” (Hizb Fransa), a popular uprising ensued
in October 1988. After the liberalization of political competition, the Islamic
Salvation Front won the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. In
response, the military canceled the electoral process and seized power, leading to
a long civil war (1992–99). The present revolutionary movement echoes this series
of “confiscations.”
2
Since Bouteflika’s first election in 1999, the regime has Bouteflika was reelected in 2014 with 81 percent of the
staged a process of democratization while in reality valid votes; the official participation rate was estimated
preserving the status quo. After 2011, proponents of to be just over 50 percent. Yet this electoral race also
this “reform” process emphasized the alleged successes saw multiple expressions of growing discontent. The
of “democratic consolidation” in Algeria, while the movement Barakat (Enough!) protested the prospect
presidency announced a series of reforms that did not of a fourth mandate for Bouteflika, and his campaign
challenge the prevailing political equilibrium. And despite team was repeatedly met by angry protesters and forced
the existence of numerous opposition movements from to cancel some rallies. Over the next five years, the
diverse ideological backgrounds, the ruling parties were illegitimacy of the political leadership along with the
able to win elections marked by significant declines in budget crisis resulted in persisting tensions. In 2017, the
turnout,6 reflecting a proliferation of irrelevant parties, government’s inability to propose a coherent economic
unclear or unrealistic political platforms, and corrupt strategy led to the sacking of two prime ministers in
figures. The electorate was increasingly being deprived three months, followed by the return of the widely-
of meaningful choices, and politicians from all sides hated Ahmed Ouyahia as chief of government. Ouyahia
were perceived by the public as both incompetent and reacted to continuing protests by portraying the
contemptible. protesters as anarchists or immature children. Deprived
of a credible figure to run the county, confronted with
Until 2013, the Algerian government was able, to the consequences of shortsighted economic policies, and
some extent, to address its people’s socioeconomic facing the pressure of a myriad of social movements, the
demands and contain domestic pressures by drawing ruling coalition responded with the redundant warning
on hydrocarbon rents. Yet its failure to plan for long- that chaos was at the door.
term development and diversify its sources of income
contributed to a pervasive vulnerability. Following a This security-based discourse—warning of a civil war like
rapid drop in hydrocarbon prices in 2013, the ability the one that raged in the 1990s—ceased to be effective,
of the regime to mitigate the effects of socioeconomic however, for various reasons, including demographics:
inequalities decreased rapidly. With the first signs of The Algerian civil war ended almost twenty years ago,
budget scarcity and a government turn to austerity, the and approximately 54 percent of the population of Algeria
mismanagement of national wealth became impossible is under the age of 30.8 While the so-called “Dark Decade”
to ignore. The economic and political dimensions of of the earlier civil war has constantly limited the political
the crisis merged in public denunciations of a corrupt possibilities offered to generations of young Algerians,9
oligarchy that had plundered the country’s national this period of extreme violence is a distant experience for
wealth. many. Moreover, this past catastrophe has been replaced
by the current economic catastrophe resulting from years of
Algerians became deeply aware of the national emergency mismanagement. In early 2019, most economic indicators
resulting from a mix of mismanagement and political were negative: Unemployment (11.7%), inflation (4.2%),
irresponsibility. In the first decade of his presidency and the trade deficit ($1.14 billion) were all on the rise.
(1999-2009), Bouteflika was able to offer an alternative
narrative to that of a confiscated independence by More than the past exactions of Islamic guerrillas and
emphasizing the return of peace, unity, and steady military forces, Algerian youth suffer from concrete
growth. He even embodied an alternative to the structural problems: a crumbling education system, a housing
injustice that characterized “the System.” Nevertheless, crisis, and a lack of leisure activities. For this majority of
this changed progressively after the end of his second the population, the urgency is not to protect the country
term. In 2008, Bouteflika had constitutional limits to a from another civil war (although this threat has shaped
third term removed through a parliamentary vote. But the pacifist nature of the protests), but to put an end to
the beginning of that third term was tarnished by a series a system of government that they believe has endangered
of corruption scandals involving some of his close allies, the country.
notably Minister of Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil and
Minister of Transportation Amar Ghoul. The “East-West
freeway” scandal, uncovered in 2010, remains to this day Revolution Rebooted
a synonym for the moral failure and greed of Bouteflika’s
associates.7 Finally, after the president had been rumored The movement that started on February 22 was the
to be seriously ill for almost a decade, he suffered a stroke outcome of a longstanding crisis whose causes were in
in April 2013. The ruling coalition nonetheless moved many ways similar to those affecting developments in
forward to promote his reelection to a fourth term, other countries in 2010 and 2011. But one of the key
though he was by then unable to walk or speak.
3
differences for the Algerian Hirak resides in the centrality protesters have increasingly coupled their discourses on
of the past war of independence. As colonization and redistribution and public services with other political
decolonization are fundamental in the country’s political messages, such as the defense of human rights, the rule of
culture, they have largely shaped the current movement. law, and equality among citizens.11 Over time, they have
weaponized an egalitarian narrative inherited from the
Since the crisis of the late 1980s, the regime has come war of independence. Displaying their patriotism—by, for
to be perceived as an exogenous entity, a new form of example, chanting the national anthem or old nationalist
tyranny resembling colonialism—and Bouteflika and songs—the Algerian protesters have positioned
his associates failed to change this state of affairs. Over themselves as guardians of the nation in the face of a new
the past decade, key members of the government have form of internal colonialism allied with foreign interests
been associated with predatory endeavors that have (especially Western private companies).
impoverished the oil-rich nation. Former Minister of
Energy and Mines Chakib Khelil, a close associate of In denouncing the “gang” (‘isaba) that has seized the state,
Bouteflika’s, is the most infamous of the figures associated current protesters have radicalized a decade-long wave
with the plundering of the country’s resources. Yet, of protests. The Hirak makes the connection between the
despite his connection to a series of corruption scandals social and the political apparent in the name of freeing
involving the Algerian state-owned hydrocarbon the state that was inherited from decolonization. The
company Sonatrach, as well as its Italian and Canadian privatization of public wealth that has been characteristic
intermediaries, Khelil nevertheless traveled freely across of Bouteflika’s rule is portrayed as a breach in the
the country and even delivered lectures at public events. postcolonial social contract. Even the state became a
Other key figures in Bouteflika’s close-knit circle were site of contention: Public servants were instrumental in
mentioned in the Panama Papers,10 such as the head of the expression of dissent, notably those affiliated with
the business owners’ association, Ali Haddad, and former the independent trade union The National Autonomous
Minister of Industry Abdeslam Bouchouareb. In popular Union of Public Administration Workers (Syndicat
jokes, rap songs, and cartoons, the ruling coalition has National Autonome des Personnels de l’Administration Publique
been depicted as a clique of corrupt and incompetent —SNAPAP). Since February 22, workers in universities,
individuals responsible for the ongoing suffering of the hospitals, and local government have repeatedly gone on
country’s youth. In football stadiums, fans chanted, “You strike to demand the fall of “the System.”
ate the country, you thieves!” (“Klitou l-bled, ya seraqine”).
The president was nicknamed Boutesriqa, the “father-of- At the same time, socioeconomic claims are still relevant.
thieves.” On April 8, protesters stormed the steel complex of El
Hadjar, near Annaba, demanding jobs. Once a symbol
This contentious political discourse was the continuation of the state-centered program of industrialization, the
of a longstanding struggle for social justice. Since the giant complex has been plagued by mismanagement
Algerian state was born from a battle against colonial and partly privatized in favor of the multinational firm
exploitation, its historical duty has been understood to ArcelorMittal. These economic demands cannot be
include ensuring the redistribution of national wealth isolated from political demands: Reintroducing popular
and the development of the country for the common good. sovereignty would effectively “liberate” the state from
And some of the country’s signature policies in the decade those who are seen as having “confiscated” Algeria’s first
following independence included an agrarian revolution revolution. It would finally allow the Algerian state to
and the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources. In fulfill the promise of social justice that is at the heart of
Algeria, therefore, socioeconomic grievances are in the postcolonial social contract.
essence political.
Overall, the Hirak has appropriated a nationalist narrative
Over the past decade, those on the geographical, that revives the notion of political sanctity that has
social, and economic margins of Algerian society (e.g., been historically associated with the Algerian people,
unemployed youth, activists from the South, employees portrayed as a key revolutionary actor. The dominant
of the informal economy, autonomous trade unions) history has represented the war of independence as
have put sustained pressure on the regime. In order to an achievement of the people as a whole, even though
express their discontent in the public space, they have the insurrection was, in fact, initiated by a vanguard
developed a repertoire of contention, embracing riots, of revolutionaries in 1954. Similarly, social groups that
strikes, sit-ins, and occupations of public buildings. And have been at the forefront of the current mobilization
in reaction to the violence of the police state and the (e.g., football fans, human rights activists, students) have
contempt (hogra) it has exhibited toward them, these systematically spoken in the name of the entire people.
4
On social media, thousands of Algerians have echoed possibility of a fifth term as a fallacy of “the System” as
this discourse, thereby contributing to a collective mass a whole; they are demanding the end of this “System”
mobilization. while being fully aware of its cartelized and militarized
nature. For this reason, neither the ousting of unpopular
By successfully reviving the conception of the Algerian figures such as Ahmed Ouyahia nor the resignation of
people as imbued with political sanctity, the Hirak has Bouteflika himself has satisfied the protesters. As a young
brought about a powerful yet consensual impulse for man interviewed by Sky News Arabiya put it, “They
change. Organizations on the periphery of the regime must all be taken away!” (Yetnahou ga‘a). This expansive
have progressively supported popular demands, and understanding of the revolutionary movement explains
historical nationalist figures (such as Zohra Drif-Bitat, the continuation of the protests since Bouteflika’s
Djamila Bouhired, and Lakhdar Bouregaâ) have joined the resignation on April 2. “The System” has been weakened
movement. Even core actors in the regime have praised by the defection of peripheral organizations and
the population for its “maturity.” The revitalization of undermined by internal dissent. The presidency and its
this ideal of popular sanctity—inherited from the war close allies have been sacrificed, but other core elements
of independence—has been essential in the unification of the regime remain in control of state institutions.
of a deeply fragmented society. This has resulted in an
apparently dichotomous political configuration, whereby The current situation, which places Chief of Staff of
“the people” are opposed to “the System.” the Army Ahmed Gaïd Salah as the most powerful
man in the country, echoes another legacy of the war of
independence. This tension between civilian authorities
“The System” and the military elite has been a constant feature of
Algeria’s political history. It was a recurring source of
In 2018, a group of football fans, Ouled el-Bahdja, released anxiety under Bouteflika, and it has become a central
a song called “La Casa del Mouradia”12 that described issue in the current revolutionary movement. In the early
the routine of politics under Bouteflika: a succession of days of the Hirak, protesters were eager to request the
increasingly problematic mandates, the privatization of support of the army by evoking its mythical relationship
national wealth, and the despair of young people trapped with the people (“Jeysh, sha’ab, khawa, khawa”—“The army
in a life of scarcity and drug consumption. One year later, and the people are brothers”). This mythical union
“La Casa del Mouradia” has become an iconic song of the between the people and the armed forces is essential in
Hirak. The song explains that “during the fourth mandate, most nationalist discourses, as both are heroized in the
the doll died, and things continued as usual.” Indeed, the official history of the war of independence.
president has long been portrayed as a living-dead figure
used as a cover by a diverse ruling coalition. Yet this version of the nationalist struggle also competes
with a more critical understanding of the conflict.
When Algerians speak about the regime, they use A widespread counter-narrative sees the rise of the
unspecific terms such as “Nidham” (system) and “Pouvoir” bureaucratic-military apparatus during the war as having
(power). The presidency and the armed forces’ staff come at the expense of civilian leaders—the original
represent the main poles of power in this cartelized sin of the post-independence regime. The legitimacy
structure. Key elements in the regime include other of the army has also been undermined by the violence
influential state actors in the technocracy and security of the repression in 1988 and the bloody civil war of the
apparatuses, leaders of various parties (e.g., the National 1990s. Thus, the consensual discourse characteristic of
Liberation Front—FLN and the National Democratic the beginning of the Hirak, which presented the army as
Rally—RND) and trade unions historically linked to the an extension of the sanctified people, rapidly reached
state (e.g., General Union of Algerian Workers—UGTA), its limits after Bouteflika stepped down. As Gaïd Salah
along with, outside the state, major crony capitalists is now the obvious face of the regime, the rejection
linked to the main business association (Business Owners’ of military power became one of the main themes in
Forum—FCE). In addition, the periphery of the regime the slogans heard during protests (“Jamhouriya mashi
embraces semi-autonomous associations, parties, and cazerna”—“A republic is not a barrack”; “Dawla madaniya
Sufi brotherhoods (zawiya) that are major players in a mashi ‘askaria”—“A civil state, not a military one”).
nationwide system of patronage based on clientelist
networks.13 Historically the influence of the army has relied on the
complicity of technocrats and politicians. In addition
The current mobilization, therefore, has never been to Gaïd Salah, other figures who still hold key state
merely about Bouteflika’s fate. Algerians denounced the positions include the interim head of state, Abdelkader
Bensalah, and the head of the government, Noureddine
5
Bedoui. Tayeb Belaiz, the head of the Constitutional agenda aimed at the destruction of the Algerian state
Council, resigned on April 16. Bensalah, Bedoui, and and its key institutions (chiefly the armed forces). The
Belaiz have been repeatedly portrayed as the “three Bs” on General Directorate of National Security—the Algerian
signs and in the private press. This moniker stems from Police) released a surreal statement announcing the arrest
the war of independence, when the “three Bs” referred to of “foreigners” who, it said, were trying to radicalize
key figures of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the young people by distributing drugs during the protests.
FLN—Lakhdar Bentobal, Krim Belkacem, and Abdelhafid
Boussouf—who infamously ordered the assassination of A narrative of this sort, denouncing the malicious actions
political leader and revolutionary Abane Ramdane in 1957. of foreign elements charged with seeking to undermine
The figure of Ramdane is highly significant, as he was an the nation, is characteristic of a defensive nationalism
iconic nationalist leader who championed the supremacy inherited from colonization. In addition, the regime has
of civilian authority over military actors. His face and tried to exploit fears of the potential influence of radical
name have appeared on many signs since the beginning of Islamists, after former leaders of the Islamic Salvation
the movement in mid-February. Front expressed their support for the peaceful movement
and co-signed public statements demanding a democratic
Nevertheless, while the tension between military transition. Nevertheless, protesters have generally
and civilian authorities inherited from the war of avoided the divisive religious discourse that contributed
independence is central to the current conflict, it should to the civil war in the 1990s.
not be understood in Manichean or rigid terms. The
army still enjoys a historical legitimacy that is rooted in The radicalism of the Hirak instead has been expressed
the fight against the French as well as in its involvement in socioeconomic and moral terms. Widespread
in past development programs. Moreover, high-ranking corruption has been instrumental in maintaining both
officers are divided, and some retired senior officers, the cohesion of the regime and its mechanisms of
such as former head of the navy Rachid Benyelles, have internal regulation14—and this issue brings together the
supported the protesters against Gaïd Salah. confiscation of political power and the appropriation
of national resources in a way that evokes memories
of French colonization. A ubiquitous reality under
Attempts to Contain the Uprising Bouteflika, corruption also undergirds and reinforces
unequal access to opportunities and resources,
The unanimity engendered by independence-era discourse contributing to a sense of internal colonialism.
and the dichotomous understanding of the struggle as
between “the people” and “the System” are what give the The first signs of collapsing support for the presidency
present movement its revolutionary nature. In a society from within the regime came when key economic figures
that is deeply divided politically (54 parties competed in were forbidden to leave the country; this occurred a
the 2017 legislative elections), the Hirak has revived the few days before Bouteflika’s resignation. Since then,
radical legacy of the first Algerian revolution. iconic crony capitalists such as Mahieddine Tahkout,
Rhéda Kouninef, and Ali Haddad, the former head
Some regime figures and opposition politicians have of the FCE, have been arrested. Ministers and high-
promoted a reformist approach to the crisis. After level technocrats are being prosecuted for squandering
Bouteflika’s resignation, the interim president, Bensalah, public money. Moreover, Gaïd Salah has promised to
insisted on the need to follow a legalistic path that reopen investigations into some of the most infamous
respects the constitution and preserves the continuity of scandals of the last twenty years (e.g., Khalifa, Sonatrach,
the state. Chief of Staff Gaïd Salah has warned protesters Bouchi) in an attempt to appease the population.
against “unrealistic slogans” and emphasized the role of He has also appropriated the word ‘isaba (gang) to
state institutions in the “management of the transition denounce Bouteflika’s inner circle. As is often the case
period.” in authoritarian settings, anti-corruption prosecutions
are weaponized to settle internal conflicts and to control
To derail the radical demands of the movement, the institutional change.15 Such inquiries and declarations
regime has reverted back to its security-based discourse. serve to orient and limit the scope of transitional justice
Major figures such as Bouteflika’s brother, Saïd, and two and to neutralize the radical claims of the revolutionary
former heads of the intelligence services (Tewfik Mediene movement. Yet, in the meantime, core members of the
and Bachir Tartag) were arrested for “conspiracy against regime associated with corruption schemes and the
the authority of the state” and the army. Gaïd Salah also embezzlement of public money, in both the technocracy
warned that foreign NGOs were promoting a subversive and in the military, are still very much in place.
6
According to a widespread representation of Algeria’s down and resulted in a multitude of conflicts after 1962.
modern history, the protesters aim to liberate the country It also served the interests of the bureaucratic-military
from the “gang” that took over “at gunpoint” after the apparatus, which was the only force able to impose a
war of independence.16 Their expansive understanding fragile myth of unanimity on a large and divided polity.
of the current revolutionary moment opposes the rapid
reordering favored by prominent state actors, and this Unsurprisingly, Ahmed Gaïd Salah has tried to exploit
tension is especially obvious with regard to the question the fear of division by reviving the conflict between a
of future elections. Much as in the periods after 1988 historical understanding of Algerian nationalism based
and 2011, the core of the ruling coalition seeks to limit on Arabic and Islam and a divergent idea of national
the extent of change by controlling the transition. After identity that integrates the Berber-speaking parts of
Bensalah’s official designation as interim head of state, the population. After warning against attempts to
several million people took to the streets to vendredire on undermine the country’s territorial integrity, he launched
April 12, rejecting any process controlled by elements a crackdown against activists bearing the Amazigh flag
from the Algerian military and technocracy. in the middle of June. This attempt to sow discord was
countered by the protesters, who reacted by massively
After Bouteflika’s resignation, Bensalah announced a exhibiting Amazigh colors in the streets of the country.
new presidential election scheduled for July 4, 2019. The While some activists were arrested, others chanted
disgraced ruling parties—FLN and RND—welcomed the “Kebayli, Arbi, khawa khawa. Makanch el-fitna ya khawana!”
announcement, and former prime minister Ouyahia did (“Kabyles18 and Arabs are brothers. There is no discord,
not rule out the possibility of running. Multiple voices you traitors!”). Nevertheless, one should not overlook
in the opposition, especially on the left, announced their the lasting conflicts that still divide the Algerian polity
rejection of this new presidential election and called first in 2019: debates over, for example, the place of religion,
for the election of a constituent assembly. The legalistic uneven economic development and the ideal economic
path has been depicted, in the critical private press and system, and the role of women. Even should the radical/
in demonstrations, as another attempt to confiscate populist approach to the revolution triumph, these
the revolution. Tellingly, some of the most significant conflicts will still have to be addressed.
resistance to the constitutional process promoted by Gaïd
Salah and Bensalah came from the state itself: Hundreds This grassroots Hirak movement also seems to be an
of judges and mayors announced their refusal to supervise agentless mobilization organized primarily through social
the planned presidential election. Eventually, the July 4 networks. The uprising of February 22 was largely the
presidential election was canceled by the constitutional consequence of the failure of the country’s political elites,
council. both those in the regime and those in the opposition; in
response, protesters have enacted a direct form of popular
The constitutional path, then, has been derailed. sovereignty that is free from the intermediaries that
The determination of the protesters to avoid another have usurped power since 1962. But the very character
“legal” confiscation of their revolution has proven to of the uprising poses a central question: If the Hirak is
be successful. Yet the revolution is far from being over. an anti-politician and anti-elite movement opposed to
Despite the end of the interim period on July 10, Bensalah the delegation of power, how can it offer a coherent
has, with the support of the armed forces, remained head alternative to the regime? This movement has no official
of state. leadership, and political actors have been cautious about
rallying around a central figure. As a result, opposition
figures and organizations remain unable to propose a
Questions about the Future of the Hirak common platform.
The radical approach inherited from the war of Former (liberal) prime minister Ali Benflis and leader of
independence may also suggest, however, a limitation for the (Islamo-conservative) Movement for the Society of
the future of the movement. Though the Hirak’s unifying Peace Abderazak Makri have published a road map, in
discourse allowed for the convergence of various social conjunction with other parties and unions, demanding a
groups, it hides a diversity of conflicting interests. collective direction of the transition. While accepting the
Such divides existed during the war of independence: central role of the military, during a national conference
for example, plebeian vs. bureaucratic elite, leftist vs. held on July 6 they demanded the resignation of Prime
reformist, religious vs. secular, Arab vs. Amazigh/Berber).17 Minister Bedoui. Meanwhile, leftist movements such
While a populist consensus was essential in waging an as the (Trotskyist) Socialist Workers’ Party and the
anti-colonial struggle against French colonialism, it broke (Berberist) Socialist Forces Front are demanding
7
the end of the military state and the election of a constituent assembly that would open the way to a second republic.
Former leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (Kamel Guemazi, Mourad Dhina, Ali Djeddi) have also expressed their
support for a national unity government and called for civil disobedience. Other figures, such as human right activists
and lawyers Ali-Yahia Abdennour, Mustapha Bouchachi, and Zoubida Assoul, have emerged as powerful voices echoing
the uncompromising rejection of “the System” and its affiliates. But, in a fragmented environment, none of these people
can speak in the name of the movement or even have their voice heard in any lasting manner. This fuels the structural
uncertainty resulting from the political crisis.19
Unlike the war of independence, the Hirak does not draw on a vanguard of activists organized in a common, unified
structure. While its grassroots organization allows it to articulate a powerful discourse, which is at once consensual
and dichotomous, it also comes with obvious strategic limitations. The mistrust resulting from the narrative of the
confiscated revolution results in an absence of clear leadership, and this lack of leadership makes it almost impossible
to oppose the regime with a concrete and positive agenda. As such, the Hirak is still a largely antagonistic political force,
mostly defined by what it wants to destroy. Moreover, the conjunction of this antagonistic orientation and the lack of
leadership means that the protesters are less likely to compromise with the ruling elites. Though it is possible that this
might result in the complete success of the movement, it could also precipitate a lasting deadlock.
Concluding Remarks
The Algerian revolution that started on February 22 is still largely undetermined. Despite the cancellation of the new
presidential election originally scheduled for July 4, unresolved tensions remain. Nationalist war hero Lakhdar Bouregaâ
was arrested for “undermining the morale of the army” after criticizing Ahmed Gaïd Salah. Pro-regime media outlets
immediately spread rumors that Bouregaâ was not the commander of the Wilaya IV (a military regional subdivision)
during the war of independence, but rather stole his brother’s identity. In reaction, the portrait and name of the
celebrated moudjahid (veteran) were ubiquitous during the mass protests organized on July 5, on the anniversary of the
country’s independence.
Given the protesters’ determination to avoid another confiscation of their revolution, a settlement with regime elites
along the lines of the Tunisian example is unlikely. Based on the political influence of the army, one might fear an
outcome similar to that which transpired in Egypt. Yet the vast majority of the actors in Algeria, including the military,
seem committed to avoiding mass violence. Moreover, the political fragmentation of the country should prevent a
sequence of events similar to that which led to the rise and fall of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood between 2012 and
2013. In Algeria, the outcome will depend on the ability of local political elites to overcome their divisions, to regain the
trust of the population, and to offer a coherent vision of governance to replace the current institutional order.
One thing is certain: The longer the current phase of political uncertainty lasts, the more appealing calls for a return to
order will seem. Conversely, the ambitious task undertaken by Algerian protesters is colossal. A profound reconfiguration
of the state and the political arena will be necessary if this movement is to deliver on its promise of genuine popular
sovereignty. Should it succeed in leading to a second Republic, the Algerian Hirak will immediately face major trials: a
situation of economic emergency, along with structural injustice inherited from decades of predatory behaviors and
mismanagement. Thus, the government will face a budget crisis, even as popular pressure for social justice persists.
Refashioning the country will call for a new political economy and new procedures for the redistribution of wealth.
Vested interests will be threatened, and new reactionary coalitions will appear. A genuine revolution takes years to
unfold, and Algeria is merely in the middle of another year one.
8
Endnotes
1 The idea of a confiscated independence is widespread in Algeria. See Ferhat Abbas, L’indépendance confisquée [The Confiscated
Independence] (Paris: Flammarion, 1984).
2 Kay Adamson, Algeria: A Study in Competing Ideologies (London: Cassell, 1998).
3 Layla Baamara, “Mésaventures d’une coalition contestataire: Le cas de la Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et la
Démocratie (CNCD) en Algérie,” [Misadventures of an Opposition Coalition: The Case of the National Coordination for Change
and Democracy] Année du Maghreb 8 (2012), 161–79.
4 Crude and gas account for 60 percent of the government’s budget and 94 percent of the country’s total exports.
5 Salim Chena, “L’Algérie dans le ‘Printemps arabe’ entre espoirs, initiatives et blocages,” [Algeria in the ‘Arab Spring’: Between
Hope, Initiatives, and Obstacles] Confluences Méditerranée 77 (2) (2011), 105–18; Louisa Dris-Ait Hamadouche, “L’Algérie face
au ‘printemps arabe’: L’équilibre par la neutralisation des contestations,” [Algeria and the ‘Arab Spring’: Equilibrium by the
Neutralization of Protests] Confluences Méditerranée 81 (2012), 55–67.
6 Adlène Meddi, “Legislative Elections in Algeria: The Turnout Obsession,” Middle East Eye, May 2, 2017.
7 MME & Agencies, “14 Jailed and Foreign Firms Fined $390mn in Algeria’s Scandal of the Century,” Middle East Eye, May 8, 2015.
8 According to “La population Algérienne à 42,2 millions d`habitants au 1er Janvier 2018,” [The Algerian Population Reached 42.2
Million Inhabitants on January 1, 2018] a study released by the National Office of Statistics in June 2018 (http://www.aps.dz/
algerie/75645-la-population-algerienne-a-42-2-millions-d-habitants-au-1er-janvier-2018).
9 Thomas Serres, L’Algérie face à la catastrophe suspendue: Gérer la crise, blâmer le peuple sous Bouteflika (1999–2014) [The Suspended
Catastrophe in Algeria: Managing Crisis, Blaming the People under Bouteflika] (Paris: Karthala-IRMC, 2019).
10 Moncef Wafi, “Paradis fiscal au Panama: 22 Algériens cités dans le scandale des «Panama papers» ” [Fiscal Paradise in Panama: 22
Algerians Named in the Panama Papers Scandal] Le Quotidien d’Oran, May 11, 2016.
11 Naoual Belakhdar, “L’éveil du Sud ou quand la contestation vient de la marge: Une analyse du mouvement des chômeurs
algériens,” [The Awakening of the South or When Dissent Comes from the Margins: An Analysis of the Algerian Movement of
the Unemployed] Politique africaine 137 (1) (2015), 27–48.
12 The title refers to the Spanish TV show La Casa de Papel. El Mouradia is the name of the presidential palace.
13 Mohammed Hachemaoui, Clientélisme et patronnage dans l’Algérie contemporaine [Clientelism and Patronage in Contemporary Algeria]
(Paris: Karthala-Iremam, 2013).
14 William C. Byrd, “Contre-performances économiques et fragilité institutionnelle,” [Economic Underperformance and
Institutional Fragility] Confluences Méditerranée 45 (2003), 59–79.
15 Béatric Hibou and Mohamed Tozy, “La lutte contre la corruption au Maroc: Vers une pluralisation des modes de gouvernement?”
[The Struggle Against Corruption in Morocco: Toward a Diversification of Models of Government] Droit et société 72(2)
(2009), 339–57; Jiangnan Zhu and Dong Zhang, “Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized
Anticorruption in China,” Comparative Political Studies 50(9) (2017), 1186–1220.
16 As stated, for example, in the revolutionary song “Win Rana Rayhin” (“Where Are we Going”), released in March 2019.
17 See Omar Carlier, Entre Nation et Jihad: Histoire sociale des radicalismes algériens [Between Nation and Jihad: A Social History of
Algerian Radicalisms] (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1995), and James McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
18 Most Berbers in Algeria are from the montainous region of Kabylia, situated to the east of Algiers, which is also a stronghold of
opposition political activism.
19 Michel Dobry, Sociologie des cries politiques [Sociology of Political Crises] (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences
politiques, 1986).
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Understanding Algeria’s 2019 Revolutionary
Movement
Thomas Serres
Daniel Neep, “Why Hasn’t the Asad Regime Collapsed? Lessons Learned from
Syria’s History of Tyranny,” No. 128
Shai Feldman and Khalil Shikaki, “Trump’s Peace Plan: Engagement or Swift
Rejection?” No. 126
Pascal Menoret, “How Saudi Suburbs Shaped Islamic Activism,” No. 125
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