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Russian Army in Japanese Wars Vol. 2
Russian Army in Japanese Wars Vol. 2
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Transcriber’s Notes:
Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that
end this sentence _are in italics_.
BY GENERAL KUROPATKIN.
TRANSLATED BY
CAPTAIN A. B. LINDSAY,
2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
TRANSLATOR OF “THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA”;
“THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR,” ETC.
EDITED BY
MAJOR E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E.,
AUTHOR OF “THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER’S DRIFT”;
AND EDITOR OF “THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.”
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY
1909
CONTENTS TO VOL. II
CHAPTER IX
PAGES
Reasons for our reverses (_continued_): The insufficient
tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken
to improve it 1–25
CHAPTER X
CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XII
CHAPTER XIII
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
INDEX 336–348
OPPOSITE PAGE
GENERAL LINIEVITCH 18
MAPS
CHAPTER IX
I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was
shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous
was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually
did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and
dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms
towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main
attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively
great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn
to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to
place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which
had not formerly been necessary.
After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in
order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since
then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the
recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five
years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in
others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests
with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this
extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although
the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there
is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is
imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders.
I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army
at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I
considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October,
1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my
conclusions on certain points were as follows:
“1. _Staff Work with the Main Army and with Detached Columns at
the Grand Manœuvres._
“In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and
then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery
and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be
wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without
making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy,
such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to
advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be
worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a
rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position.
“The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical
period—_i.e._, when their attacking infantry are nearing the
enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually
met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If
the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable
number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry
attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our
artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when
its co-operation is most vital.
“In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how
to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles.
The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and
clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do
not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to
increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has
developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack
after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are
often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any
supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as
reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres
without firing a single round.
“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life
into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain
time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at
constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were
also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching
themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due
to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return
to the old order of things, when it was held that everything
was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of
cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of
absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing
to attack!
“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much
time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all
trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts
dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in
the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had
been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to
the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even
for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at
all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment
of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full
credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my
fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and
ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in
every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive
positions and in the attack of them.
“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The
troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted
waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units
arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not
always find the officers who should have been waiting their
arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were
often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack
of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we
sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, and even partially so of our own.
“In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us
remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.”
Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had
been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions
and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was
exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried
out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything
of the enemy. My instructions ran:
“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and
the maintenance of touch in battle.
“If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid
independent fire, the Japanese division would have been
destroyed, and we should have won the day.”
CHAPTER X
(_a_) In Manchuria.
(_b_) Against Port Arthur.
(_c_) In the Southern Ussuri district (Vladivostok).
The two years succeeding the date on which this paper was written saw
great alterations in the strength, dispositions, and readiness of our
military and naval forces in the Far East. There was also considerable
change in the political conditions in Manchuria and in Northern Korea
in consequence of the active policy which we had begun to assume. It
was therefore found necessary in 1903 to consider a revision of the
above scheme in accordance with these altered conditions. During those
two years our strength in the Far East had grown by the increase in our
land forces and fleet, and the improved efficiency of the railways.
We have already seen what was done to improve the latter. It will
suffice to say here that, instead of the twenty waggons available over
the whole Chinese line in 1901, the War Department in 1903 received
seventy-five in the twenty-four hours, and hoped, on the strength of
promises made, to have five through military trains by the beginning of
1904. The fleet, which in 1901 was considered inferior to the Japanese,
was, at the end of 1903, stated, on the authority of the Viceroy,
Admiral Alexeieff, to be so strong that any possibility of its defeat
by the Japanese was inadmissible. But in those same two years Japan
had not been idle, and had been unceasingly increasing her naval and
military forces. In consequence of this the relative local strengths
of the two nations were still much the same in 1903 as they had been
in 1901, and it was thought prudent to adhere to the same general plan
of operations as had been drawn up and approved two years previously.
To give an official opinion of that time, I quote an extract from a
memorandum I submitted to the Tsar on August 6, 1903:
We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of
being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled
transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The
summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage
trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were
harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled.
But of all our difficulties, the complete command of the sea obtained
by the Japanese right at the beginning of the war caused the greatest.
With their three armies they cut off Port Arthur, and began an advance
from an enveloping base against our army, which was still tied to a
railway-line. Our southward advance for the relief of Port Arthur
was threatened by Kuroki’s army based on Korea. Any movement against
him was out of the question, especially for those corps which had
arrived from Russia, as they were quite unused to hilly country. Our
communications through Manchuria were only weakly defended, and might
be cut at any moment by the Chinese, while those further west were
liable to interruption (bridges destroyed, strikes, frost, etc.).
The feeding of the army depended on local resources, which a hostile
population could easily conceal, carry away, or even destroy; and as
the amount of supplies obtained from Russia was extremely small and
uncertain, the army might very easily have been starved. The chance
actions at the Ya-lu and Te-li-ssu, in which our most reliable troops
were worsted, still further improved the enemy’s _moral_, and lowered
ours.
With the absence of a proper military spirit among our troops, and
the evil influence of the many seditious manifestoes against the
war circulating amongst them; with the unsteadiness shown by many
units in the first fights, and with all the other defects above
mentioned, a great numerical superiority was necessary—I must speak
perfectly plainly—in order to defeat an enemy worked up to a pitch of
fanatical excitement. But we did not obtain this superiority until
it was too late—when we were waiting on the Hsi-ping-kai position,
and negotiations for peace were being carried on at Portsmouth. Up
to December we were fighting with what seemed a fairly large force,
according to a tally of battalions; but these were greatly under
strength, for in the most important early period of the war—from May
to October inclusive—we lost very many men, and received but few
drafts. In many cases the Japanese battalions were twice as strong as
ours. While all our actions were hampered by insufficient information
regarding the enemy, the intelligence we received as to what was
happening in our rear—in Mongolia and in the Manchurian provinces—was
so alarming as to compel us to detach a large force to protect our
communications. Again, when the enemy became complete masters of the
sea, we had to detail sufficient troops to guard against a landing in
the Vladivostok and the Ussuri districts. All these things combined
to complicate our position and give the enemy the initiative at the
start, and right manfully did their whole nation strive to seize
their advantage. Their land communications were safe; their sea
communication with their base was quick and sure. We, on the contrary,
could only put in the field a fraction of our land forces, and, till we
could concentrate sufficient men for an offensive, were tied down to a
definite course of action. We had—
DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZATION.
The war showed that our army organization gave us too small a
percentage of actual combatants as compared with the total numbers
whom we rationed. By this I mean that, in spite of the immense numbers
that we maintained in the face of great difficulties, we were unable
to put enough men into action to win. Our establishments of all arms,
of parks, hospitals, transport corps, field bakeries, staffs, and all
offices and institutions, include a large percentage of non-combatants,
which was swollen in the last war by the absence of any organized line
of communication troops, the necessity of carrying out a large amount
of railway construction, and of appointing officers and men to newly
formed supply and transport units. Even so the number of non-combatants
laid down in the establishments for each unit was not sufficient
to perform the duties that fell to them, and it became necessary,
for reasons which will be mentioned later, to detail combatants for
domestic duties. As but few non-combatants were wounded in action,
the proportion of them to the combatant element became still greater
after every big fight. It was usual, when a battle was imminent, to
order back to their units all men who were on extra-regimental duties,
but in spite of all the steps taken, the fighting number was never
more than 75 per cent. of the number of men on the strength. In the
beginning of April, 1905, when we were preparing the theatre of war up
to the River Sungari, the combatant element of the 1st Manchurian Army
actually fell to 58 per cent. of the strength. As in previous wars, the
infantry, of course, did most of the fighting, and also carried out by
far the greater number of fatigues and extra duties. As they also lost
more men in action, their fighting strength was proportionately more
reduced than that of the other arms.[17] In April, 1905, the percentage
of rifles in the 1st Manchurian Army to the total number of men that
had to be rationed was 51·9 per cent. When the convalescents returned
to the ranks, its strength amounted by the beginning of December to
192,000 men, of whom 105,879 carried rifles; but we could only put a
much smaller number in action owing to various duties, fatigues, etc.
In August, 1905, the number of rifles was 58·9 per cent. of the total
of men rationed.
The extent to which transport duties were responsible for weakening the
fighting strength of the army can be seen from the fact that, during
the fifteen months of war, 122 transport units were formed, and 8,656
carts, 51,000 horses, and 20,000 pack-animals purchased. For duty with
these, 328 officers, 22,000 men, 1,700 hired civilians (Russians), and
9,850 Chinamen were employed. These 122 units were improvised under
adverse conditions and from small cadres, and, as they had to be raised
in a hurry, there was nothing for it but to appoint to them men and
officers from the army.
I have pointed out (in Chapter VII.) that the army did not receive
its drafts in time, and that we had to fight below strength; this
shortage was still further increased for the following reasons: The war
establishment of a company was 220 rifles; but from this number had to
be deducted the shortage with which units arrived at the front,[18]
the sick, and those detailed for camp and other duties—a procedure
which, though unprovided for by Regulations, was permitted by officers
in command. Accordingly companies often went into the very first
fight at a strength of only 160 to 170 rifles. For a long time the
personal supervision exercised by commanding officers to insure that
units took the field as strong as possible was very slack. It seemed,
on the contrary, as if their efforts tended all the other way, for
they left men behind whenever they possibly could, particularly those
who were most necessary—_i.e._, those on whom depended the payment
and regular rationing of the men. Thus, with the exception of the
regimental adjutant, the staff of a regiment rarely went into action;
while of the men who are classed as combatants, the company clerks,
armourer-sergeant, cooks, officers’ servants, the butcher, the cattle
guards and the officers’ grooms, were always left behind. The formation
of a force of mounted scouts took away a certain number of men, and
stretcher-bearers and bandsmen of course did not fight. Finally, owing
to the peculiar nature of the country, donkeys for carrying water were
provided for each company, and these required men to look after them,
and one or two entire companies from each regiment had to be detached
as baggage guard owing to the insecurity of our communications.
Commanding officers thought it necessary to leave behind so many men
for the above purposes that the orders given for them to accompany the
firing-line were either quite neglected, or only half carried out. It
was soon found that eight bearers per company were far too few for
carrying wounded, and men from the ranks were allowed to help their
wounded comrades to the rear. From this cause companies often literally
melted away during a fight. There were many instances where unwounded
men went to the rear under pretext of carrying away the wounded, at the
rate of six, eight, or ten sound soldiers to one wounded! The return
of these willing helpers to the front was not so prompt as it might
have been, and was difficult to control. The result was that a company
hotly engaged usually only had 100 or less rifles after a few hours’
fighting, although its losses might have been inconsiderable.
The number for all the above duties taken together, with the wounded
and sick present with units, constituted on an average 400 to 500 men
per regiment. This, added to the 369 authorized “employed” men above
mentioned, brought the total up to 800. Obviously such a loss of
numbers must be taken into consideration in appreciating the fighting
work of the army.
Other things which contributed to the same result were the immense
development of the different staffs and administrations, the auxiliary
institutions, such as supply parks and hospitals, the congestion on
the roads caused by the masses of baggage which had collected, and
the fact that both our wheeled and pack transport carried less than
it was supposed to owing to the hilly country and the all-prevailing
mud. After heavy fighting our army corps, especially those consisting
of three-battalion regiments, amounted to less than 10,000 to 15,000
rifles, and yet the immense organization, military parks, baggage, and
transport, etc., for a full corps had still to be guarded. Even the
regimental standards, which should have been a source of strength and
encouragement in the fight, were in many cases prematurely taken to the
rear under a guard of a company or half a company, the troops at the
front being weakened by this number at the most important moment of an
action. I was obliged to make a ruling that in action the standards
should be kept with the regimental reserves, and that steps should be
taken that they should be a symbol of victory in the most critical
phases of a fight (as used to be the case in former wars), and a source
of strength instead of weakness to the units which possessed them.
DEFECTS IN _PERSONNEL_.
+-------+-------------------+-------------------+
| | Officers. | Rank and File. |
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
| | |Percentage| |Percentage|
| |Numbers.|to Average|Numbers.|to Average|
| | | Strength.| | Strength.|
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
|Killed | 167 | 4·1 | 4,779 | 2·5 |
|Wounded| 905 | 23·8 | 27,425 | 14·6 |
|Missing| 89 | 2·1 | 5,684 | 2·9 |
| +--------+----------+--------+----------+
| | 1,151 | 30 | 37,888 | 20 |
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
The losses in this army for the whole period of the war were somewhat
higher:
The fact that I only commanded for four and a half months out of
nineteen, and that this period was in the middle of operations, was not
taken into account by those who last year flooded Russia with pamphlets
and newspaper articles, apparently written with the sole object of
proving that I, both as Commander-in-Chief and as War Minister, was
the person mainly responsible for our misfortunes. In a letter to the
Tsar, dated February 21, 1906, from the village of Shuan-chen-pu, I
wrote on this point as follows:
The modern theorist in strategy, Blume, says: “Even the greatest genius
in a supreme commander cannot replace independent action by individual
leaders.”
Kirilloff and others have made a dead set against the behaviour of the
officers of our General Staff in the late war, but the majority worked
most unselfishly, and did good service commanding units or on the
staff. A large number distinguished themselves by their professional
zeal and gallantry, while some found a glorious death in action. At
their head may be mentioned General Kondratenko, the hero of Port
Arthur. Among the killed also were the gallant General Count Keller,
Staff-Officers Zapolski, Naumenko, Jdanoff, Pekuti, Vasilieff, Mojeiko;
and of those who died from wounds were Andreeiff and Yagodkin. Among
the wounded were four divisional commanders—Lieutenant-Generals
Rennenkampf and Kondratovitch, Major-Generals Laiming and Orloff; also
Staff-Officers Markoff, Klembovski, Gutor, Rossiski, Gurko, Inevski,
etc. Altogether, about twenty officers of the General Staff were
killed and forty wounded. The hostile attitude of the Press towards the
officers, the endeavour of divers persons to undermine their authority,
the indifference of the intelligent classes in Russia to what was
happening in Manchuria, and especially the anti-Government campaign,
which was conducted with the object of creating a mutiny among the
troops, was hardly calculated to raise the soldiers’ _moral_, or to
encourage them to perform acts of heroism. There was no military spirit
in the army.
The rank and file, like the officers, were of two classes: those
serving with the colours, and the reservists. The former were in every
respect good; they were steady in action, enduring and well trained;
but the reservists were on a much lower plane altogether. In the first
place, the older men were unable to stand the arduous conditions of
field service, coupled with the rigours of the Manchurian climate.
They suffered greatly from sunstroke and heart affections when
marching among the hills, and during the hot weather. At the battles
of Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and Liao-yang, these men fell out in
such numbers that their units became quite immobile, and absolutely
useless for any offensive operations. Moreover, the 2nd Category
reservists did not know the rifle, and had forgotten everything they
had once learnt when with the colours, and it required real hard work
to instruct and train them up to the level of the serving soldiers. I
have mentioned their unsteadiness. Units which were almost entirely
composed of these men—that is to say, those units which had been formed
by expanding the reserve regiments—were very unsatisfactory: it was
almost impossible to get them into action. The regiments of the 4th
Siberian Corps, which did so splendidly at Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng,
and Liao-yang, were an exception; they were composed entirely of
Siberian reservists, who, though surly fellows and poor marchers, were
men of character and very steady in action. The drafts composed of
young soldiers were magnificent. Most of them had only just done their
recruits’ course, were single men, and possessed both staying power and
activity, and, being regular soldiers, were accustomed to field-service
conditions. Unfortunately, it was only after the battle of Mukden that
these drafts began to arrive. But these young soldiers who did so well
in small actions would have done still better in a decisive engagement.
But persons who had nothing in common with the Social Revolutionary
party, and who sincerely loved their country, aided Russia’s enemies
by expressing the opinion, in the Press, that the war was irrational,
and by criticizing the mistakes of the Government that had failed
to prevent it. In a brochure entitled “Thoughts Suggested by Recent
Military Operations,” M. Gorbatoff referred to such persons as follows:
Generally speaking, the man who conquers in war is the man who is
least afraid of death. We were unprepared in previous wars, as well
as in this, and in previous wars we made mistakes; but when the
preponderance of moral strength was on our side, as in the wars with
the Swedes, the French, the Turks, the Caucasian mountaineers, and
the natives of Central Asia, we were victorious. In the late war, for
reasons that are extremely complicated, our moral strength was less
than that of the Japanese; and it was this inferiority, rather than
mistakes in generalship, that caused our defeats, and that forced us
to make tremendous efforts in order to succeed at all. Our lack of
moral strength, as compared with the Japanese, affected all ranks of
our army, from the highest to the lowest, and greatly reduced our
fighting power. In a war waged under different conditions—a war in
which the army had the confidence and encouragement of the country—the
same officers and the same troops would have accomplished far more
than they accomplished in Manchuria. The lack of martial spirit, of
moral exaltation, and of heroic impulse, affected particularly our
stubbornness in battle. In many cases we did not have sufficient
resolution to conquer such antagonists as the Japanese. Instead of
holding with unshakable tenacity the positions assigned them, our
troops often retreated, and in such cases our commanding officers of
all ranks, without exception, lacked the power or the means to set
things right. Instead of making renewed and extraordinary efforts to
wrest victory from the enemy, they either permitted the retreat of
the troops under their command, or themselves ordered such retreat.
The army, however, never lost its strong sense of duty; and it was
this that enabled many divisions, regiments, and battalions to
increase their power of resistance with every battle. This peculiarity
of the late war, together with our final acquisition of numerical
preponderance and a noticeable decline of Japanese ardour, gave us
reason to regard the future with confidence, and left no room for doubt
as to our ultimate victory.
My first three volumes supply the answer to the most serious of these
accusations: in them are described the tremendous efforts we had to
make to prevent our operations ending worse than they did. I have never
been one of those who believe that an order once given should not be
countermanded or modified. In war circumstances change so quickly, and
information received so frequently turns out to be false, that it would
be fundamentally unsound to insist, in spite of changed conditions, on
keeping exactly to an order once issued. An excellent example of this
is given by the operations at Hei-kou-tai. The order received by the
officer commanding the 1st Siberians to rest his troops on January 27,
and to occupy the line Hei-kou-tai–Su-ma-pu–Pei-tai-tzu, was founded
on the incorrect supposition of the commander of the 2nd Manchurian
Army that San-de-pu had been captured. The former was more than once
told not to attack. Yet, even though news was received that San-de-pu
had not been taken, he insisted in carrying out the orders given, in
which, by a mistake, a village held in force by the enemy was appointed
as our halting-place. The result is known: we fought all day, lost
7,000 men, and at daybreak on January 28 were compelled to retire.
With regard to the accusation that the late Commander-in-Chief[26]
constantly countermanded his own orders, it is interesting to note that
General Grippenberg, in his article, “The Truth about the Battle of
Hei-kou-tai,” points out that, although he did not agree with him as to
the necessity for retiring the right flank of the 2nd Army to take up
a more concentrated position, he did not express this opinion to the
Commander-in-Chief, because he and all his staff knew that Kuropatkin
would never countermand an order once given.
I might also have been blamed for not holding on longer to Tieh-ling
and fighting there, and for ordering the troops to retire on to the
Hsi-ping-kai position. My reply is given in detail in my third volume.
It is sufficient to say here that, when it was decided to retire from
Tieh-ling on March 12 and 13, according to the officers commanding
those units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies which suffered most in the battle
of Mukden, we only had an effective strength of 16,390 rifles in 114
battalions.[29] If I had accepted battle there under such conditions,
it would have been most dangerous, as we might have completely lost the
cadres of many units. How long it would have taken us to re-form for
a new battle can be judged from the fact that the officer commanding
the 3rd Army stated before a committee assembled as late as May 17
[two months after the retreat] that he thought the acceptance of a
general action even then on the Hsi-ping-kai position itself was
inadvisable.[30]
“In a few days the 1st Manchurian Army will be broken up, and I must
now bid farewell to the glorious troops which I have had the great
honour to command for two years. Upon you fell the arduous duty, in
the beginning of the war, of withstanding the attack of a numerically
superior enemy, so as to gain time for our reinforcements coming from
Russia to concentrate. You had the good fortune to be present at
the battles of the Ya-lu, Te-li-ssu, Ta-shih-chiao, Yang-tzu Ling,
Lang-tzu-shan, and also at the long-drawn struggles of Liao-yang, the
Sha Ho, and Mukden, and by your conduct during those fights you earned
the praise of the rest of the army.
“The firing-line of the 1st Army was in August last stronger than it
was at the beginning of the war, before the September battles on the
Sha Ho, and, thanks to the great exertions of those in command, and
the unselfish work of the medical services, the health of the army
remained excellent throughout. It was, indeed, fortunate, for if any
great sickness had broken out we should, owing to the few drafts
then arriving, only have had very weak cadres for the field. It was
absolutely essential, therefore, that no expense or efforts should be
spared in order to keep every man fit for the ranks, and I am happy
to say that our common efforts met with unusual success, for our
losses from sickness were less than in killed and wounded. In the 1st
Manchurian Army we had lost up to August 14, 1905, 2,218 officers and
66,785 other ranks killed and wounded in action, and 2,390 officers and
58,093 other ranks from sickness. I draw your attention to the fact
that while the percentage of losses from action should naturally be
higher among the officers than the men, they ought, on account of their
better living, to lose less from sickness. The converse was the case
with us, which shows that our officers were not sufficiently hardy,
and did not know how to preserve their health. To this we must pay
particular attention.
“In material matters the army was also excellently situated in August.
Clothing and equipment of all sorts were on the spot and plentiful,
while all technical supplies had accumulated. Never have we been such
a formidable force in every sense as we had become by the summer of
1905, when we were suddenly informed of the unhappy negotiations
at Portsmouth, and that peace had been concluded. Doubtless this
was necessitated by the state of the interior of Russia; but it was
heart-breaking for the army. I remember with what grief the news was
received by all ranks. Life seemed to die out of our bivouacs, and all
our minds were filled by one sad thought—that the war had ended before
the enemy had been beaten. Looking back on the trials we have recently
gone through, we can find consolation in the feeling that we have done
our duty to Tsar and country as far as has lain in our power; but for
many reasons the time given us has turned out to be insufficient. These
reasons we must fearlessly search out, and discover what—beyond mere
numerical inferiority—prevented our success before peace was concluded.
Before all others, I, your senior commander, am guilty because I did
not succeed in rectifying our many moral and material defects during
the war, and in making the most of the undoubted strong points of our
troops. The material defects are known to all of us—the small number
of rifles in the firing-line per company [partly owing to lack of care
to put as many men as possible into action], the insufficiency [at the
beginning] of mountain artillery, the lack of high explosive shells,
of machine-guns, and of technical stores of all sorts. By last August
the majority of these deficiencies had, through the great exertions
of the War Ministry, been made good. Our moral defects I attribute to
the different standards of training among the troops, their inferior
technical preparation, and the great numerical weakness of units in
action. We also suffered much from inadequate reconnaissance of the
enemy’s position before a battle, and the resulting vagueness as to
how to conduct the action [particularly in the attack]; and, most
important, from the lack of initiative and independent thought in
individual commanders, the absence of the military spirit in officers
and men, of dash, of mutual co-operation between units, and of a
general determination to carry out a task to a finish at any sacrifice.
The tendency to accept defeat too soon—after only the advanced troops
had suffered—and of retiring instead of repeating the attack and
setting an example, was highly detrimental. Such retirement, instead of
calling forth increased efforts from the neighbours, in most cases only
served as a signal for their own retreat.
“The relations between officers and men have always been of the
closest. Like fathers to the men, our officers have won their
affectionate respect. Remember that to our soldiers the word
‘father-commander’ is not merely an empty phrase; they believe in it.
Remember, also, that a commander only wins the heart of his soldiers
when he is their father-commander. It is quite possible to be strict
and at the same time look after the men’s welfare, for our soldiers are
not afraid of severity, but respect it; in the majority of cases a just
severity is a deterrent against crime. But the simple-minded soldier
is particularly sensitive to injustice, and soon sees through any
deceit practised on him. You who shared with the men all the hardships
and dangers of field service are very favourably situated. The men
having seen you in action—always in your place, giving an example of
unselfishness—will forgive much, and will follow you through fire and
water. These links which bind the ranks must be carefully maintained,
and officers who have been in the field with units must not be removed
from them unless absolutely necessary. Guard the military traditions
acquired by regiments, and do your best to preserve the memory of the
gallant deeds done by companies, squadrons, or batteries collectively,
or by individual members of them. Keep in close touch with the private
soldier; try to win his full confidence. You will gain it by your
constant care of and your affection for him; by your strict, and at the
same time fatherly, relations to him; by knowing your work; and by your
own example. Only by these will you be able to take advantage of all
his good points, to correct his defects, and guard him from the harmful
influences which will be more numerous in the future than ever. The
recent cases of military mutinies should be constantly in our memories.
I turn to you officers in command of regiments in particular. You know
the great responsibility which falls upon you in action. How often has
the issue of the battle depended on the way a regiment has been led. It
has often been enough for an energetic, gallant, capable man to get the
command of a regiment to change its character utterly. The selection
of men for these appointments must, therefore, be carefully made, and
those chosen must work incessantly to educate all those under them.
“The greater part of the 1st Army is to remain in the Far East, and I
am convinced that the glorious Siberian regiments of the 1st Manchurian
Army, which have been such a tower of strength in action, will now,
under the new conditions of peace, still be Russia’s bulwark in that
quarter.
“In bidding you farewell, my dear comrades in the field, I sincerely
hope that the war experience you have gained will be of great advantage
to the army and the country. Devoted to Crown and country, always
ready to maintain law and order, and to uphold the authority of the
Government, holding yourselves aloof from the intrigues of political
parties, and knowing your own weak and strong points as shown up
by the struggle we have all been through, you will, I believe,
quickly heal your wounds, and lead the army in its struggle towards
perfection. Although in the future you may be denied the recollection
of victories won, you can remember—and this should be a consolation
and an encouragement—that you were ready, without fear of sacrifice,
to continue the struggle with the gallant enemy till you had beaten
him. You, officers, believed that you would win, and you succeeded in
instilling this belief into our grand soldiers.
“May God assist you in the duties that lie before you, which are as
important for our dear country as any we have already performed, even
though they be in peace. Farewell. Accept my sincere gratitude for
all your self-denying service in the field, and express to the men my
thanks for their services, and for the many proofs they have given of
devotion and loyalty to the Tsar and Fatherland.
“SHUAN-CHEN-PU,
“_February 18, 1906_.”
CHAPTER XI
As regards the first: Our three wars of the last fifty years have
disclosed many shortcomings in our officers. Most of these have
undoubtedly been due to the undeveloped state of the nation, and to
the general conditions of life and labour, which have affected the
army as an integral part of the whole population. Any serious attempt
to improve our officers as a body, therefore, is only likely to be
successful if and when a general improvement sets in in our social
conditions. It has pleased the Tsar to inaugurate many fundamental
reforms for the betterment of the civil status of all classes of our
population in every walk of life, and reforms in the officer class
should be instituted at the same time.
With the same object in view, we must continue to try and improve the
material position and prospects of the corps of officers. An important
matter, and one to which I have given much attention—so far without
entire success—is that service on the staff, in offices and in branches
of the War Department, should not pay better than service with the
troops. Many of the officers now so employed in semi-civil duties can
well be replaced by civilian officials. It is, moreover, essential that
service in the Frontier Guards, in the Customs, police, gendarmerie,
on the railway, and as tax-collectors, should cease to be financially
preferable to service in the army.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Army corps commanders are quite independent, but, like the divisional
commanders, are overburdened with routine correspondence, etc., and do
not get sufficient practice in commanding troops in the field. Some,
during a tour of duty of several years, have never commanded troops
on manœuvres; and it is impossible for all of them to have sufficient
acquaintance with cavalry, as some corps do not include this arm.
They and their staff, especially the General Staff officers, have no
practice at all, or else very little, in the use of technical equipment
and the modern aids to warfare (telegraphs, telephones, mines, motors,
balloons, etc.). The experience of the late war showed up the necessity
of increasing the establishment of the army corps, and the actions
of their commanders will have such an important, and in many cases
deciding, influence, that extremely careful selection is necessary for
these posts; the men appointed must be capable of teaching others as
well as of learning themselves. As with the divisional generals, so
should the powers of corps commanders be extended at the expense of
those now exercised by officers in command of military districts.
V.
The commanders of military districts are the senior officers actually
in charge of troops, and have at the same time important duties as
administrative heads of districts. Here again administrative work,
together with correspondence connected with the troops, occupies the
greater part of their time, and only in exceptionally favourable
circumstances (the large manœuvres with concentrations of troops from
different districts) can they get any practice in commanding in the
field. But as they also have to perform the duties of Governor-General,
they are not able to devote sufficient time to the troops, even in
inspecting them, or to improving themselves. I am absolutely convinced
that, however much such a combination of two appointments—each of which
requires a man of exceptional ability and character—may be desirable
from the political point of view, it has the gravest disadvantages for
the army. There is a limit to human power. As our governor-generals
devote the greater part of their time and energies to civil matters,
they entrust a large part of their military duties to the chief
staff-officers of the districts. It can easily be understood that such
an arrangement is not in the interests of the army. For instance, the
most important military district—that of Warsaw—was, as far as the army
was concerned, neglected in the time of several governor-generals.
Indeed, at one time, much to the subversion of the authority of
officers in command of districts and corps, the troops in this area
were controlled by the chief of the district staff! Therefore, if
we wish that the commanders of military districts—our most natural
selections for the command of armies in war—should have time to prepare
themselves for this important duty, _we should free them from civil
duties_; otherwise we shall get no improvement. They must also be
relieved of the numerous and responsible cares with respect to all
those questions which in war mainly fall to the officer in command of
the communications.
I have more than once pointed out how excellent the regulars were
as regards military qualifications, and how much more reliable in
the first fights than the reservists, especially the older ones. But
we must look to the nation itself for the cause of the shortcomings
of both. The lack of education in the peasant is reflected in the
private soldier, and the non-existence of a martial spirit amongst the
masses, coupled to the dislike for the war, resulted in the absence
of a military spirit in our troops in Manchuria. Their ignorance
made the conduct of modern war, which demands a much greater spirit
of combination and initiative from the individual than formerly,
very difficult for us. Consequently, while behaving with the utmost
gallantry when in close order—in mass—our men, when left to themselves
without officers, were more inclined to retire than to advance. In
the mass they were formidable; but very few of them were fit for
individual action, and this is a point in which the Japanese had a
great advantage. Their non-commissioned officers in particular were
better educated than ours, and on many prisoners—private soldiers
as well as non-commissioned officers—we found diaries written not
only grammatically, but with a general knowledge of what was going on
and of what the Japanese were trying to do. Many of them drew well.
One prisoner—a private—drew on the sand an excellent diagram of our
position and that of the enemy.
One of the most important requirements with our short term of service
is that our men should not be taken away from their work for police
duties. The part so frequently taken by the troops in putting down
civil disorders by force of arms is particularly harmful to discipline.
To turn to another point, owing to the inadequate funds allotted, our
soldiers have always been treated worse than those of other armies.
The Germans, for instance, spend twice as much per head upon the
maintenance of their army as we do. Some improvement in this direction
has already been made, especially in the feeding. With a serviceable
cadre of time-expired sergeant-majors and non-commissioned officers,
and with the living conditions of the men improved, we can face the
future calmly even with a three-year term of service. But we shall
only succeed if we relieve the troops of the large amount of extra
regimental work which falls to them (tailoring, shoemaking, and other
workshop work, care of reserve stores, etc.), and if we lighten their
guard duties. Our recruits are free from this work and from guards only
in the first year of service.
2. The infantry in the 1st Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions,
which were filled up to war strength with regulars at the beginning of
the war.
The only thing that will insure devotion to their country among
reservists proceeding to the front is the existence of a spirit of
patriotism in the nation. Discontent and feelings of oppression
among the people are naturally reflected in the minds of those of
them leaving for war. But, independent of such all-important general
considerations, there are certain definite things that can be taken to
improve the tone of the reservists. According to the present system,
when a man passes from the colours into the reserve his connection with
his own unit—in fact, with the Service generally—almost ceases. The
practice concentrations are not carried out on a large enough scale,
and though valuable, are often dispensed with altogether on account of
financial considerations. So it happens that a man passing into the
reserve takes his uniform with him, but, with rare exceptions, never
even wears his forage-cap; this he generally gives to some neighbour or
relation—hardly ever a soldier—to wear out. The reservist himself only
too gladly dons peasant’s clothes or other mufti; he is glad to feel
that he is a peasant again. He starts in business, takes up peaceful
occupations, and raises a family. When he reaches the age of forty,
he begins to put on flesh. And it is under these conditions that he
is suddenly torn from the bosom of his family, and sent to fight in a
strange, “hired”[35] land for a cause for which he feels no sympathy,
and which he does not understand. To this are added the general
discontent all around him, and a flood of revolutionary proclamations.
The separation of the reservist from all touch with the army once he
has left it does not tend to his rapid retransformation from “mujik”
into trained soldier. In the case of Manchuria he certainly became a
good man after some months in the school of war, but so long a period
of grace cannot be counted on in the future.
Coming here into the heart of the country as I did nine months ago, and
staying here continuously, I have been in a position to observe our
reservists returning from the war. When the return stream first began
in March, April, and May, there were large numbers. Sometimes when I
passed they would fall in—in line—and receive me after the military
fashion. They wore fur caps, very often military great-coats, and
looked, as they were, a fine body of young soldiers. Nine months of
hard work in the fields soon turned them again into peasants, and now,
when they come to me, on business or otherwise, instead of saluting,
they take off their caps and call me “Barin.”[36]
Only by the reformation of our schools, and the introduction into the
life of the lower classes of reforms, which, besides increasing their
comfort, will develop in them a love for, and pride in, their country,
and a deep sense of the necessity for some sacrifice for it, shall we
get in the reserve a thorough soldier of the right sort. The attainment
of such a result cannot depend entirely on any actions of the War
Department, which must, after all, be secondary; but the things that
can be effected by it are nevertheless important, and I will enumerate
those which seem to be the most pressing.
Under ordinary conditions our work should tend to make the man passed
into the reserve arrive in his native village or town well disciplined,
knowing his work, taking a pride in his old corps, and respecting
those under whom he has served. We must therefore endeavour to prevent
him from losing touch with the Service and quickly forgetting what he
has learned in it. In some armies to obviate this they have what is
called the territorial system, by which reservists maintain touch
to the end of their term with those units in which they have served.
This system is not possible for us in its entirety, but it might be
applied partially and adopted on a fairly large scale. One of its great
advantages would be that reservists would on mobilization at once
join the units in which they had previously served. They would not be
strangers, but would be known to the cadre of time-expired, but still
serving, non-commissioned officers and the officers, and would soon
settle down. Men of the same district would be more inclined to hold
together under fire, and every man would feel that if he behaved badly
his comrade would send news of it to his home. Units territorially
connected with the people would be more dashing than corps collected
from anywhere. There would, of course, be many difficulties, which
would have to be overcome before the system could be adopted. For
instance, men taken from a certain locality would, if employed to
suppress disorders in that place, be more likely to waver than men from
another unit and district. Cases have been known where non-commissioned
officers who had been strict with their men have requested, on being
passed into the reserve, not to be sent off in the same compartment
of a train with their late subordinates, who had threatened to “make
things even” so soon as they both passed into the reserve together.
With us such a settling up of old scores might easily be effected under
a territorial system, by which both officers and soldiers would, after
their service, come together in one district.
We have already seen (Chapter VI.) how, when the war began, we found
it necessary, in the absence of any assurance arranged by diplomacy
against other contingencies, to be ready for any military eventuality
on our Western frontier. Consequently, too great a number of reserve
units were included amongst the troops told off to take the field in
the Far East. Another reason for this was that we did not really know
the qualities of different sections of our army. Our crack troops,
taking both officers and men together, of three Guard and three
Grenadier divisions, six divisions in all, were left in European
Russia, while newly formed corps composed of reserve units were sent
into the field. I have already mentioned how my recommendation to
mobilize the reinforcements being sent to us immediately after Easter
was for various reasons rejected, how they were mobilized a month
later than they should have been, and arrived in Manchuria unsettled,
untrained, knowing scarcely anything of the new rifle, without having
fired a course of musketry, and not having done any combined tactical
operations with the other arms.
The troops of the 6th Siberians, which certainly had been in camp for
a short time before starting, had not been given a gun or a squadron
to enable them to practise combined operations. Of the 4th Siberian
Corps, which mobilized under most favourable conditions, only the
Omsk Regiment had been trained in artillery, and this was of an old
pattern; yet it had to go into action with quick-firing guns. Cavalry
were hardly seen. Indeed, if we consider the haphazard selection of
commanding officers, the lack of any community of thought amongst the
officers generally, the almost complete absence of proper tactical
training, the large number of 2nd Category reservists, general dislike
of the war, and, finally, the absence of military spirit, it will be
evident why some units of the reserve troops failed. In the first
battles the troops of the 4th Siberian Corps won a good reputation in
the army. The reasons for this were:
4. The long time they had, compared with other troops, to train and
acquire cohesion.
But, after the reserve troops which came out from European Russia had
received their baptism of fire, they also did well. It is sufficient
to call to mind the behaviour of the regiments of the 54th and 71st
Divisions at Mukden, as well as those of the 55th and 61st Divisions.
But this result was not reached till late, and cost many lives. In
a European conflict the fate of a campaign will be far more rapidly
decided than it was in Manchuria, for the first battles fought after
the declaration of hostilities will have a deciding influence. In the
recent war, owing to the slow concentration possible on a single-track
railway, the reserve troops might have been collected sooner and given
several months to settle down, and have thus arrived at the front more
ready for battle. In a European war they will have to be transported
into the theatre of operations in a very short time after mobilization.
We made a great mistake in forming the reserve troops into separate
army corps. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have
put them into existing corps—either as third divisions or separate
brigades. This would have improved our corps organization, which is too
unwieldy and too big for a strength of only twenty-four battalions.
With strong corps consisting of efficient self-contained brigades the
confusion of units in battle would be minimized.
Before the war no army corps organization had been worked out for
the reserve troops; everything had been arranged for a divisional
organization. In my opinion, neither corps nor divisions are
necessary. It would be more advantageous to form the reserve units
into independent brigades of eight battalions, and to use them as army
troops, or possibly as corps troops. The mobilization of the reserve
artillery, sapper, and cavalry, should take place together with that of
the infantry. Every reserve brigade of eight battalions (8,000 rifles)
should have, with two batteries of twelve guns, one company of sappers
and one reserve squadron of cavalry or a _sotnia_ of Cossacks. This
arrangement would permit of reserve troops being employed on secondary
objects without the organization of the army being broken up, and it
would no longer be necessary to find so many divisional and corps
commanders, with their numerous staffs.
Company clerks 16
Mess caterers 18
Officers’ mess cooks 4
Men’s cooks 18[40]
Butchers and cattle guard 12
Officers’ grooms 27
Transport drivers with scout sections 13
Instructors 4
Stretcher-bearers 128
Baggage guard 48[41]
With water donkeys 16
Officers’ orderlies 80
Sergeant-major of non-combatant company 1
Transport driver non-commissioned officers 5
Despatch riders 20
Bandsmen 35
Drummers 33
Reserve in case of sickness and wounded 13
―――
Total 491
Non-combatants 159
Bandsmen, drummers, buglers 69
Regimental quartermaster-sergeants 3
Sergeant-majors and baggage non-commissioned officers 6
For supply duties 240
―――
Total 477
MACHINE-GUNS.
At the beginning of the war the army had only a small number of
machine-guns. Recognizing the value of this weapon, the Japanese
quickly introduced it, and furnished their field troops with a large
number. We did the same, and several machine-gun companies and sections
arrived from Russia during the summer of 1905. But the type of weapon
did not satisfy tactical requirements—(1) as regards its weight; and,
(2) adaptability to the ground. A pattern must be invented that can be
carried even into the outpost line. Our high, unwieldy weapons, with
their shields, more resembled light field-guns; and their unsuitable
construction, combined with the difficulty of adapting them to the
ground, was responsible for the decision that these guns should be
organized into batteries, and be treated and used as artillery. Such an
opinion is absolutely wrong, for the great volume of fire which they
can deliver calls for their distribution at the most important points
along the firing-line, and, therefore, a capability of advancing with
assaulting columns. The organization of machine-gun companies did not
meet the above tactical requirements. Each battalion should have four
guns.
The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing
the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded
in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to
us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace
casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have
made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the
twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks
took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some
25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days
instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000
men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number
of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was
infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that
suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large,
and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result
that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to
the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else.
Men.
1. Half company infantry 120
2. Transport 320
3. Road troops 25
4. Postal telegraph working parties 5
―――
Total 470
ENGINEER TROOPS.
The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once
more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous
effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be
conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is
made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions
with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial
obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of
such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of
explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for
heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges.
An adequate number of sapper units with regiments will not only help us
in the capture of fortified positions strengthened by obstacles, but
will assist us rapidly to adapt them for defence when taken. The work
of the mining company in future wars will be great both in attack and
defence, especially in defence. It should have charge of all explosives
required for demolitions, including mines, pyroxyline bombs, and
hand-grenades. The great effect of the bombs thrown by revolutionaries
and anarchists points to their extensive use in war in the future. If
fanatics can be found who will rush to certain death in order to kill
peaceful citizens, it should certainly be possible to find devoted
soldiers who will advance ahead of the firing-line and throw bombs into
the enemy’s obstacles.
Besides supply of field railway material for the army, each corps
should have enough for thirty miles of line (steam or horse draught,
according to circumstances).
ARTILLERY.
Our gun proved an excellent weapon; but our shrapnel, which was very
effective against objects and troops in the open, was of no use against
invisible targets, earthworks, and mud walls. Our artillery fire
against villages held by the enemy, therefore, produced very little
result. I consider that a new pattern of shell should be introduced
with thicker walls and a heavier bursting charge; but even then the
effect of such light projectiles as our field-guns fire will not be
great against the earthworks which are nowadays so quickly thrown up on
positions. To prepare the way for the assault on such fortifications,
and to obtain any speedy result in attacking defended localities, we
must have field howitzers of a modern type. They should be organized
in regiments of two batteries (twenty-four howitzers), and attached to
a corps as corps artillery. Finally, it is essential that every army
should have a light siege-train to assist in the capture of strongly
defended posts and heavy works.
The organization of park units was well conceived, but the vehicles
were unsuited to the Manchurian roads. I am afraid to express an
opinion in favour of a further increase of mobile parks, because we
were so overburdened with baggage of different kinds. I think it is
preferable to improvise local parks at railway-stations and junctions,
as we did in Manchuria.
Small-arm ammunition rarely ran short, but there was often a great lack
of gun ammunition, and after the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho,
and Mukden, our reserves for filling up battery and park stocks were
exhausted. The average expenditure of rifle ammunition worked out as
follows: For a whole-day battle for one battalion, 21,000 rounds, with
a maximum of 400,000; an hour’s fighting for one battalion, 1,700,
with a maximum of 67,000. The total reserve taken with a four-battalion
infantry regiment was 800,000. The average expenditure per quick-firing
field-gun in a one-day battle worked out at 55 rounds, with a maximum
of 522; an hour’s fighting, 10 rounds, with a maximum of 210.
In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and
was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries
fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire.
Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European
theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill,
and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove
that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended
entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries
were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the
batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall
the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery
Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This
battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more
than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries,
and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders
were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry
of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which
were with it lost _only two men wounded and one missing in eleven
days’ fighting_. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted
regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be
one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry
division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three
regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one
regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps.
CAVALRY.
Though our cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our
expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough.
In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the cavalry is to
improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it should
fight as _obstinately as infantry_, the money expended on our mounted
Arm will be thrown away. If infantry can still continue fighting after
losing 50 per cent. of their strength, cavalry should be able to do
the same. In action we nursed the cavalry too much; out of action we
did not take sufficient care of it. Though they had not lost a man,
whole regiments were moved to the rear as soon as the first shrapnel
began bursting near them. The four regiments of cavalry—two dragoon
and two Cossack—on whom fell the most difficult but the most honourable
duty of obtaining information and opposing the leading units of Nogi’s
enveloping forces at the battle of Mukden, lost in killed and wounded:
Men.
February 25 2
March 2 1
March 4 1
March 5 7
March 6 2
March 7 6
March 8 1
March 9 1
March 10 1
――
Total 22
Which works out at less than one man per squadron and _sotnia_. The
casualties in almost every company of infantry were more than in these
twenty-four squadrons and _sotnias_. It is quite plain that these units
did not fight, but merely avoided the enemy; and it is equally plain
that, by avoiding battle, the cavalry neither checked the enemy’s
movement nor got any information about him. The material of which our
cavalry was composed was excellent, but everything depended on those in
command. In the battle of Te-li-ssu the infantry of the 1st Siberian
Corps lost 2,500 men; the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment, belonging to the
same corps, lost one!
But I repeat that where their leaders meant fighting the cavalry did
their duty and suffered heavily. Take, for example, the Trans-Baikal
Cossacks, which did so well under Mischenko, and the Caucasian Brigade.
The Siberian Cossacks, under Samsonoff, fought at Liao-yang and the
Yen-tai Mines with greater bravery than was displayed by some of
Orloff’s infantry, while the independent _sotnias_ of the Don and
Orenburg Voiskos, and the dragoons under Stakhovitch, were no whit
behind them. Indeed, the men of the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment were good
enough; it was the officers who failed in not getting the best out
of them. The independent units of all the Cossacks did well, but it
was out of the question to expect martial ardour or a keen desire to
perform feats of gallantry in old men such as formed the 3rd Category
Cossack regiments. But even these 3rd Category regiments could do good
work when skilfully handled. The Cossack horses generally, and the
Trans-Baikal horses in particular, were too small; while those of the
Don regiments were sturdy, but rather soft. The Trans-Baikal Cossacks
on their shaggy little ponies reminded one more of mounted infantry
than cavalry. On the whole, however, our cavalry worked far better
than in the Russo-Turkish War under Generals Kuiloff and Loshkareff at
Plevna. The great difficulty now is to find and train cavalry leaders;
in Manchuria, according to most accounts, the juniors were good, the
field officers moderate, and the general officers, with few exceptions,
bad.
INFANTRY.
As in former wars, so in Manchuria was the heat and burden of the day
borne by our infantry, and there is no doubt that, in the future,
infantry will retain its name as the principal Arm. The importance
of other Arms depends entirely on the extent to which they assist
infantry to defeat the enemy, for the latter is the final arbiter of
victory or defeat. But infantry cannot work alone, and nowadays, if
it is not assisted in action by artillery, cavalry, and sappers, if
every resource of modern science is not brought into play to lighten
its heavy task, it will either fail or will buy victory at too high a
price. It is to infantry, as the principal Arm, that we must pay our
chief attention. _And yet with us service in the Line is not considered
so honourable as service in the other branches!_ From the moment of
the selection of its recruits we do everything to weaken it. Even
the pattern of uniform worn by our Line infantryman is particularly
ugly. In his old-fashioned, badly fitting tunic, overburdened with
haversacks and equipment of all sorts, he is anything but a martial
sight. This is an aspect of the case which cannot be ignored, and it
is almost as important that a man’s uniform should be comfortable and
attractive as that it should meet all the purely military requirements.
All ranks should be enabled to admire their own dress and be proud of
it. Up to the present, the majority of Line officers have not been
given a good enough general or military education. Officers of all arms
should receive a general education not lower than the intermediate
standard of the national educational establishments, and a military
education not lower than that of the military schools. We should teach
the line officer to have a love and respect for the Arm in which he
serves, as well as a knowledge of its particular rôle in battle,
and must therefore raise his social position so that he may be a
welcome guest in any society. We must provide him with a comfortable,
inexpensive, and smart uniform. We must protect him from being abused
by his seniors in the presence of his juniors, and in every possible
manner encourage the development in him of an independent spirit.
Bravery alone is not sufficient nowadays to attain victory; knowledge,
initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility are also required.
Infantry have always had a hard part in action, and have always
suffered great loss, but the modern battle which lasts for days makes
greater demands upon their mental and physical endurance than ever
before. With a large proportion of reservists and short-service men,
we cannot rely on perfection in the soldier; it is therefore all the
more necessary that we should take steps to obtain it in our officers,
and for this purpose we are lucky in having excellent and responsive
material. Under all the arduous conditions under which the majority of
our regiments had to fight, the greatest trials fell to the infantry
officer, and right well he did his duty. It is quite enough to compare
the casualties amongst those officers with those of their brothers
in the cavalry, artillery, and sappers to see on whom fell the chief
hardships and dangers. In some regiments the whole set of officers was
changed several times. The following figures serve as an illustration
of how they suffered:
Killed and
Wounded.
The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 102
The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 89
The 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 73
The 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 71
The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 61
The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 50
It must always be borne in mind that the infantry of the Line is the
backbone of our Service in peace as well as in war. Consequently, we
should make much more of those who serve in it than we do, and give
them a better chance. At present the list of regimental commanding
officers includes far too many Guardsmen or officers of the General
Staff. I am convinced that if the importance of service in the Line is
to be maintained, we must put an end to the present unfair acceleration
of promotion amongst Guards and General Staff officers as compared with
that of their brothers. The latter produce a great many men capable
of being good regimental commanders; all that is wanted is to know
how to select them. Since the last Turkish War they have undoubtedly
made considerable progress, and it is for us to arrange that this
improvement is continued by fostering it in every way.
I repeat that the tasks which fall upon infantry in battle nowadays are
of such exceptional difficulty that the promotion of its officers for
distinguished field service should be made exceptionally rapid. I am
aware that even a good regimental commander may make a bad divisional
general; but I also maintain that a regimental commander who has
successfully commanded in several fights, has shown a knowledge of
his work, keenness, enterprise, and personal bravery, and has won the
confidence of his men, should be promoted as quickly as possible. He
may find it difficult at first to get his bearings under the new and
more complicated conditions of a high command, where he has to rely
upon maps and the reports of others instead of upon the direct evidence
of his own eyes and ears, but still he will grapple with the situation,
even of an army corps commander, far better than some general whose
experience has been confined to office-work and peace manœuvres.
ORGANIZATION.
This, I think, will give great independence to all units, and the
creation of independent reserve brigades, outside of the divisional
and corps organization, would often prevent the breaking up of this
organization when a battle was in progress. To organize reserve field
troops beforehand in field formations, such as divisions of three
brigades, or corps, is not a convenient or suitable arrangement, as
they will not be ready to take part in the fighting as soon as the
regulars.
* * * * * *
Amongst steps which will raise the status of regimental service, and
so attract the best men to it, I consider it necessary, in addition
to providing an attractive uniform, to establish ranks distinct from
those borne by officers on the staff, in administrative offices, and
in departments. According to the scale of our military hierarchy, the
various commands (exclusive of the Cossack troops) carry ranks as
follows:
All these ranks are also conferred on officers serving on the staff
and in departments. Thus, the rank of Colonel, which ought only to
be given to men in command of regiments, is also borne by those on
the administrative and police staffs, while generals of all grades,
who have never held command of troops or even of small units, fill
up our Generals list. At the time I framed the regulation to limit
the number of promotions to General’s rank of men not actually in the
army I was much bothered by numerous officers who feared that their
further promotion might be blocked. The present large number of ranks
amongst the officer class is not required. It is quite possible to
reduce them, and to give to these their old Russian names (to which
the Cossack[51] troops still adhere), for officers of all Arms doing
regimental service—namely, _Khorunji_, _Sotnik_, and _Esaoul_. The
rank of _Pod-esaoul_, which was adopted later, might be excluded.
_Esaouls_ would command companies, squadrons, _sotnias_, and companies
(of artillery); _Sotniks_ would command half-companies, half-squadrons;
and _Khorunjis_ would command sections. The normal establishment of a
company would be one _Esaoul_, two _Sotniks_, and four _Khorunjis_. The
same should be done in the cavalry. For those not serving regimentally
the ranks of Ensign, Lieutenant, and Captain might be maintained,
those of Sub-Lieutenant and Staff-Captain being abolished. The present
ranks of field-officers might be conferred on those officers not
doing regimental service, and the titles of _Voiskovoi Starshina_ and
Colonel on those with regiments. The first would command a battalion,
a division of cavalry or artillery; the second, regiments of all Arms.
The rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to be kept for staff and departmental
officers, and the rank of Major should be introduced instead of that
of Colonel. The names of the ranks of those serving with troops to
correspond generally to the nature of the appointment; thus, officers
commanding brigades should be called Brigadiers, those in charge of
divisions, Divisional Generals, of an army corps, Corps Generals. The
latter rank should also be given to commanders of military districts
and their assistants. The only officers not actually serving with
troops who should be allowed to have the title of Corps General
should be three: the War Minister and the chiefs of the General and
Headquarter Staffs. For service away from troops only two ranks of
General should be maintained—Major-General and Lieutenant-General. The
titles Generals of Infantry and Cavalry, etc., should be abolished. The
grading would then be as follows:
From the short sketch I have given of what was accomplished by the
Russian armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it
is seen that we took the offensive in the majority of the wars we
were engaged in. Without railways, but with a large peace standing
army (period of service twenty-five years with the colours), with
equality and often a superiority[52] in armament and training, Russia
was able to commence operations, and to force her will upon the
enemy—_i.e._, to assume the offensive. Nowadays we have been left
behind by our Western neighbours in readiness for hostilities, and
the recent war disclosed the fact that we had been outdistanced by
our Eastern neighbour also. Russia will, no doubt, in time find the
strength and means once more to take her former place amongst other
Powers as regards fighting efficiency; but it will take years of
unceasing effort, for rapid concentration and an offensive strategy are
impossible without great developments in our railway system. No one can
say whether we shall be allowed to wait for everything to be perfected,
or whether we shall again be drawn into war before we are ready. It is
therefore absolutely necessary to prepare without loss of time to make
war under conditions as unfavourable as those of the recent conflict.
CHAPTER XII
2. Those dependent on the War Ministry, for which officers in the field
had no responsibility.
(_b_) The subordinate part played by the fleet during the war.
(_a_) The delay in mobilizing the reinforcements for the Far East.
(_b_) The transfer into the reserve during the war of well-trained
soldiers—men who were still liable for colour service—from the military
districts in European Russia, while untrained elderly reservists were
being sent to the front.
(_c_) The belated despatch of drafts to the front. (The reason of this
was also the inefficiency of the railways.)
The weak points of our forces, which were so noticeable in the wars
waged in the second half of the last century, had not been entirely
eliminated during the fifty years which intervened since the Crimea,
and were again evident in the recent struggle—namely:
We did not have before us any clear idea of our object, and
consequently did not show sufficient determination in its prosecution.
So many different reasons have been advanced for our failure that the
question naturally arises as to what foundation there really is for my
opinion—shared by the greater part of the army in the field—that if we
had not concluded peace so hastily victory would have crowned our arms.
My belief that we could, and ought to, have issued victorious from the
struggle is based upon—
I.
We have already seen how fatal the inefficiency of our railways was for
us. Yet, though six months before the outbreak of war only two pairs
of short trains were available for military purposes, when peace was
concluded we had ten and even twelve pairs of full trains running in
the twenty-four hours. Thus, during hostilities the carrying capacity
of the railway grew sixfold, and was capable of still further increase.
Notwithstanding all our reverses, the army continued to grow in
numbers, and was 1,000,000 strong when peace was concluded, and more
than two-thirds of this number (including the newly arrived drafts,
the new corps, and the Pri-Amur troops) had not been under fire.
Moreover, owing to improved rail transport and the proper exploitation
of all local resources, the whole number was assured of everything
necessary, both for fighting and subsistence, to an extent that had
never previously been the case. We had received a proper proportion
of artillery of every nature, reserves of light railway material,
telegraph and wireless telegraph stores, and entrenching and technical
tools and equipment of all sorts. We had constructed three strong
lines of defence at Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kwang-cheng-tzu;
our communications in rear were safe; almost every army corps was in
possession of its own line of rails; and the Sungari and other rivers
were crossed by many bridges. The war strength of all units had been
considerably augmented. Russia’s resources for continuing the struggle
were greater than those of Japan, for not only had our Guards and
Grenadiers not been drawn upon, but the greater part of the army was
still at home.
II.
The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14,
1905, predicted this improvement in the _moral_ of the troops,
notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the
spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words:
“The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy;
roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses
were built.
“At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance;
the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for
horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in
any great strength.
“In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now
recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a
forward movement in complete confidence.”
The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff,
formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which
had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and
reliable body of men.
From the moment I joined the army in Manchuria, I invariably told every
unit that I met or reviewed that the war could only end after we had
been victorious; that till then none of us would be allowed to return
home; and that victory was certain when sufficient reinforcements
reached us. And belief in these facts sank into the hearts of officers
and private soldiers. Both before and after Mukden, I more than once
heard the men themselves—particularly those in hospital—say that they
could not return home till the enemy had been defeated. “The women
will laugh at us,” were their words. Another important factor, and
one which the Russian especially values, is constant and affectionate
care for his bodily needs and his health. For anyone who has not been
on active service it is difficult to appreciate how troops who have
been disorganized and badly shaken by hard fighting can regain heart
if they suddenly find hot food ready for them. A night’s rest, a full
stomach, ammunition replenished, a quiet calling of the roll, and the
calm demeanour of their officers—all assisted to make our splendid
soldiers once more ready for the fray. As regards the army’s _moral_
generally, I should mention that the nearer our men were to the enemy,
the better were their spirits and the fewer the carping comments and
criticisms which always do so much harm; there was no time to read the
papers. When I visited the advanced units of the 1st Army (those of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberians, and of the 1st Army Corps commanded
by Colonels Prince Trubetski, Tikhomiroff, Redkin, and General
Kashtalinski), I found universal keenness to advance. The men were well
looked after, discipline was strict, and the attitude of both men and
officers was one of quiet and steady determination. But in proportion
as the distance from the advanced lines increased, and direct touch
with the enemy was lost, there was time for talk and gossip. It was on
the lines of communication (particularly at Harbin) that drunkenness
and gambling took place, besides other forms of dissipation that
disgraced the army. It was here that the white-livered brigade
collected, leaving the front under any excuse even when fighting was in
progress, and, indeed, what else could be expected of them? It is much
to be regretted that some of our pressmen judged the army by what they
saw at Harbin, and that we were judged by this standard even in Russia.
Many officers and others in authority who had failed to pass the
“ordeal by fire” lived on in Russia, and from them a correct opinion
as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to
continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for
us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two
general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other
had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men
as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to
insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle.
A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane
treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those
immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war
conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property
being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in
cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in
getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves
occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being
maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to
requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get
local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite
of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population
against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of
many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people
appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in
their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily
kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials,
attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads,
they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of
war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses.
Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the
possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal
means taken by me to secure victory were:
1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be
brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our
efforts not one of us would return home.
III.
The enemy’s army began to weaken in the moral as well as the material
sense.
But what must have been the most serious source of anxiety to Japan
was the indifference which Europe and America were beginning to show
to her successes. At first it had seemed profitable to Great Britain
and Germany that Russia and Japan should be drawn into war, for when
they were exhausted the hands of both would be tied—ours in Europe, and
Japan’s in Asia. Nevertheless, it was not to the interest of Europe
generally to allow the triumph of the Japanese in the battlefields of
Manchuria to become absolute. A victorious Japan might join with China,
and raise the standard of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The extinction
of all European and American enterprises in Asia would be the first
object of this new great Power, and the expulsion of Europeans from
Asia would be the end. There is already little enough room on the
Continent of Europe. Without the markets of the wide world she could
not exist, and the cries of “America for the Americans,” “Asia for the
Asiatics,” “Africa for the Africans,” are of serious import for her.
But the danger is approaching, and is so imminent that the Powers of
Europe will be forced to sink their differences and unite in order to
withstand the attempt of the young nations[58] to drive old Europe home
into the narrow shell which she has long since outgrown. We might have
taken advantage of this change in international feeling, and have tried
to close the money markets of the world to Japan. Only one decisive
victory on our part was wanted to bring about a very serious reaction
both in Japan and in the army in the field. If we had exhausted her
financial resources, and had continued the war, we might soon have
compelled her to seek an honourable peace, which would have been
advantageous to us.
Even the inhabitants of Moscow, where, in all the difficult times the
nation has passed through, a manly and determined voice has always
been raised in support of the honour and dignity of Russia, showed
that their spirits had on this occasion fallen. It was with amazement
and sorrow that we read of a certain action of the Moscow Town Council
on June 7, 1905. The news had immense effect on the army, and on
hearing of it I sent the following letter[59] to Prince Trubetski, the
President of the Moscow nobility:
Among the main reasons for our disasters must be mentioned the
indifferent, even hostile attitude of the people to the late war; but
the menace to our nation from the Far East is now so clear that all
grades of society ought to prepare—in case of a fresh attack on Russia
by Japan or China—to rise like one man to defend the integrity and the
greatness of our Fatherland.
4. To move the army’s base as far as possible from Russia into Siberia;
and, what is most important—
5. To make ready to carry on a new war not only with the army, but with
the whole of a patriotic nation.
“SHESHURINO,[62]
“_November 30, 1906_.”
CHAPTER XIII
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63]
When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical
distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities
was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff:
2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian
Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and
1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting
of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of
the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if
necessary.
This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur
and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions,
was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of
our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded
on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of
Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff:
However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch
of March 1:
“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should
be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The
apparent importance of any single locality or position
(fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error
of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about
the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually
growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we
should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when
supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance
lasting over a fairly long period.”
Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the
words “Quite so.”
The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East
Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in
the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.
In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle
Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2
battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve
battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks.
Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the
initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of
Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these
corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre
by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily
turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th
Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly,
but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development
of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given
general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early
on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng.
On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate
preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the
Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his
troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour
to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment
of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at
Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the
strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of
the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was
diminished by twenty miles.
On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our
southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against
Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially
against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted
efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success
on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main
body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng.
On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were
directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling
(Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of
this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders
by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which
protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s
successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force
to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by
surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu.
Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards
Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps
to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of
energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the
reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of
the fight.
2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger,
carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack
transport.
The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been
submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of
it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with
great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but
were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments
of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions
rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions
made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was
by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000
rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army
reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and
holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only
sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st
we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to
the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the
10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full
strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined
attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every
reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate
against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of
one of two alternatives: either—
As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu,
they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties,
and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which
might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten
us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to
move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have
contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the
river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division
(total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were
not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an
extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior
numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy
[this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations
led to the adoption of the second alternative.
Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south
of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for
the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed
in a perfect sea of _kao-liang_, and were fired on from front and
flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force
retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even
went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure
from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We
lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for
our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north,
had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his
Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai
mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was
endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy
losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the
offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day.
Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against
Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden
of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which
behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On
the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the
enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve,
and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a
message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden
line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass),
sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing
the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki
could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division,
and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards.
As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his
main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been
sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide
whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang
and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of
Mukden, which had been already fortified.
On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any
confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation
implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the
retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The
most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell
to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force
attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing
a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed.
1. The defence of the main position on the left bank of the Hun Ho was
entrusted to the 10th and 17th Corps under Bilderling, to whom was
subordinated Dembovski’s force of 10 battalions of the 5th Siberians,
which was guarding the near right flank of the main position.
Altogether, the troops under Bilderling’s command amounted to 75
battalions, 53 squadrons and _sotnias_, 190 guns, 24 mortars, and 3
sapper battalions.
2. The protection of the left flank from Fu-shun to the west was
entrusted to Ivanoff’s force, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of
the 4th and some units of the 5th Siberians (total, 62 battalions, 26
_sotnias_, 128 guns, and 2 sapper battalions).
3. To keep touch between these two main groups were the 1st Siberians
under Shtakelberg (total, 24 battalions, 10 squadrons and _sotnias_, 56
guns, and 1 sapper battalion). To his force was entrusted the defence
of the portion of the Hun Ho from Chiu-tien to Pu-ling.
7. The Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack Brigades which did not belong to
any corps were joined together under the command of Mischenko (21
_sotnias_ and 8 guns).
1. Its left flank (Fu-liang–Fu-shun) was, owing to the bend in the Hun
Ho to the north-east of Mukden, thrown much too far back. If the enemy
were successful on this flank, and came out on to our communications,
we should be compelled to abandon the main position prematurely.
2. Almost immediately in rear of the position was the River Hun, which
was at the time unfordable, and could only be crossed by bridges.
Behind the river was the town itself.
Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving
at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were
received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army
could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670.
Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under
my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the
army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on
October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some
ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over
to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an
advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack,
for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on
the Mukden positions.