The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Russian army and the Japanese War,

Volume II, by Aleksei Nicolaevich Kuropatkin

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of
the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have
to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this
ebook.

Title: The Russian army and the Japanese War, Volume II

Being historical and critical comments on the military
policy and power of Russia and on the campaign in the Far
East

Author: Aleksei Nicolaevich Kuropatkin

Translator: Alexander Bertram Lindsay

Release Date: December 20, 2019 [EBook #60975]

Language: English

Character set encoding: UTF-8

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR
***

Produced by Brian Coe, David Tipple and the Online

Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive)

Transcriber’s Notes:

A small number of obvious typos have been corrected. Except for

these corrections, the spelling and punctuation of the book have
not been changed.

Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that
end this sentence _are in italics_.

There are 113 footnotes in the source book marked by characters

such as * and †. In this e-book each footnote has a unique marker
that consists of a number enclosed by square brackets. All the
footnotes have been moved to the end of the main text where each
footnote is headed by its marker.
 THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE
JAPANESE WAR

[Illustration: GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS.]

THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND

THE JAPANESE WAR,

BEING HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTS ON

THE MILITARY POLICY AND POWER OF RUSSIA
AND ON THE CAMPAIGN IN THE FAR EAST,

BY GENERAL KUROPATKIN.

TRANSLATED BY
CAPTAIN A. B. LINDSAY,
2ND KING EDWARD’S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
TRANSLATOR OF “THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA”;
“THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR,” ETC.

EDITED BY
MAJOR E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E.,
AUTHOR OF “THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER’S DRIFT”;
AND EDITOR OF “THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.”

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. II.

NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY
1909

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

CONTENTS TO VOL. II

CHAPTER IX

PAGES
Reasons for our reverses (_continued_): The insufficient
tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken
to improve it 1–25

CHAPTER X

Reasons for our reverses (_conclusion_): Particular

difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in
organization and _personnel_—Absence of a military
spirit in the army, and lack of determination in
carrying operations to a finish—Breakdown of our
organization under the strain of active service 26–97

CHAPTER XI

Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior

ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and
reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve
troops; for increasing the number of combatants
in infantry regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve
troops—Troops on the communications—Engineers
—Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization generally 98–176

CHAPTER XII

Summary of the war 177–204

CHAPTER XIII

Introduction and conclusion to Volume III. 205–305

APPENDIX I

The Royal Timber Company 306–313

APPENDIX II

Breakdown of the unit organization and distribution 314–335

INDEX 336–348

ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS _Frontispiece_

OPPOSITE PAGE
 GENERAL LINIEVITCH 18

GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI 40

GENERAL GRIPPENBERG 100

FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA 206

MAPS

SKETCH-MAP OF MANCHURIA, SHOWING MAIN PLACES

ALONG RAILWAY SOUTH OF HARBIN 27

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF

WAR RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN 34

SKETCH-MAP OF AREA CONTAINING THE BATTLE-FIELDS

OF LIAO-YANG, THE SHA HO, HEI-KOU-TAI, AND
MUKDEN, SHOWING SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT
PLACES MENTIONED _At the end_

MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH OF

MUKDEN _At the end_

THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR

CHAPTER IX

REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_continued_)

The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—Measures

taken to improve it.

I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was
shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous
was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually
did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and
dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms
towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main
attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively
great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn
to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to
place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which
had not formerly been necessary.

After the war of 1877–78 we set to work to study our weak points, in
order to eliminate our faults. Much must have been accomplished since
then, for the tactical training of the army at the beginning of the
recent war was undoubtedly of a higher standard than it was twenty-five
years ago. Still, in some matters we had not progressed, while in
others we had actually gone back. The duty of training the troops rests
with commanding officers of all ranks, and the responsibility for this
extends right up to those in command of military districts. Although
the same drill-books and manuals are used by the whole army, there
is considerable variety in the way that the tactical instruction is
imparted, owing to the diverse views held by the district commanders.
I have taken part in many manœuvres, and was in command of the army
at the grand manœuvres at Kursk in 1902, and I noted down what I
considered to be our principal failings in this respect. In October,
1903, I submitted a report on the subject to the Tsar, in which my
conclusions on certain points were as follows:

“1. _Staff Work with the Main Army and with Detached Columns at
the Grand Manœuvres._

“Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized

as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were
the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to
be chiefs of the different staffs, the poor organization of
the staffs themselves, due to a limited personnel and to an
insufficient supply of the means of communication [telegraph
and telephone equipment] for both the troops and staffs, and
the neglect to arrange proper intercommunication between units
by making use of mounted orderlies, automobiles, or cyclists.
Intelligence of the enemy as well as of the disposition
of other units was always received late by those whom it
concerned, because the cavalry was badly organized, and could
not carry out its orders properly.

“The amount of writing done by the various staff-officers was

colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their
effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in
all directions; but the orders were rarely received by the
troops in proper time. At the manœuvres of the Warsaw Military
District in 1899, cases came under my notice of general
officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in
the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to
start.

“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant

of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently
did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with
sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions
made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their
employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff
and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for
the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear,
a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and
information which was quite avoidable.

“2. _Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres._

“The increased importance now attached to the strategic or

independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted
detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The
spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly
grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of
both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore
neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the
information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and
left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual
combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or
defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing
to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the
information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might
be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed.
The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones.
Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with
the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses
required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was
grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were
futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which
were not always in accordance with the general idea of the
operations.

“The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with

that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers
in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is
auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in
command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and
accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry
should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action,
then to crush the enemy on the field of battle.

“3. _Attack and the Defence._

“Here again information was wanting. When commanders made up

their minds either to attack or to stand on the defensive, they
were never able to feel, from their information of the enemy
and the locality, that they thoroughly knew what they were
doing, or that it really was in accordance with the spirit of
the general idea. We were strong in the defence, but we rarely
delivered a soundly conceived or executed attack. In the attack
column commanders did not always take pains to obtain enough
accurate information as to the dispositions and strength of the
enemy, so as to be able to appreciate the situation properly
and draw up a reasoned plan of battle, to select the direction
of the main attack, to allot the troops for it, and take steps
to deceive the enemy as to its precise direction. When they had
massed sufficient first-line troops for the main attack, they
did not also move up the reserves of all arms.

“In particular, we did not know how to conduct the advance, and
then deliver the assault with proper preparation by artillery
and rifle fire. Many commanders seem, unfortunately, to be
wedded to the idea of carrying out a continuous advance without
making any use of the rifle. If we ever encounter an enemy,
such as the Germans, who systematically train their troops to
advance under cover of their own heavy rifle-fire, we shall be
worsted, for in peace we often advance almost without firing a
rifle to a range of 1,000 or even 800 paces of the position.
“The guns also frequently ceased fire at the same critical
period—_i.e._, when their attacking infantry are nearing the
enemy. My inquiries as to the reason for this were usually
met with the reply that their ammunition was expended. If
the absolute necessity for keeping in hand a considerable
number of rounds for the assistance of the decisive infantry
attack is not realized now that we have quick-firing guns, our
artillery will in war become useless at the very moment when
its co-operation is most vital.

“In defence we are better than in the attack, and we know how
to make the most of the fire effect of both guns and rifles.
The ranges in front of a position are usually measured and
clearly marked. But proper use is not made of reserves. We do
not, as we should, throw them into the firing-line, so as to
increase the volume of fire after the enemy’s main attack has
developed, nor do we launch them in a fierce counter-attack
after he has come within decisive range. The reserves are
often kept in mass, and thrown against the attack without any
supporting rifle-fire. Many regiments and brigades told off as
reserves to a defensive position go through the whole manœuvres
without firing a single round.

“4. _The Revival of the Column Formation in the Attack._

“Other European armies are now doing everything possible to

minimize the murderous effect of modern rifle and artillery
fire on themselves, and are, at the same time, endeavouring
to develop their own fire to the utmost, both in the attack
and defence; indeed, the Germans, in their efforts to this
end, have gone the extreme length of deploying all their
troops—sometimes even to the sacrifice of their reserves—in
long thin lines. We, on the other hand, judging by the last
manœuvres, are going to the other extreme, for our decisive
attack is delivered almost without any fire preparation, and
with men massed in quarter column!

“If a stop is not put to the increasing density of our attack

formations, we shall suffer for it heavily. It is all the more
dangerous for us, as we do not assist our assaulting infantry
properly with supporting gun and rifle fire.

“5. _The Work of the Artillery._

“Artillery positions were in most cases skilfully chosen, but

the fire discipline was often bad. As batteries can only carry
a limited number of rounds in the field, it is vital that the
gunners should be taught to economize every round; this is, of
course, particularly important with quick-firing guns. But we
often fired more rounds than were necessary: fire was opened
too hurriedly, at quite unimportant targets, with the result
that, at the critical moment of the attack, batteries had to
signal that they were in action, for all their ammunition had
been expended.[1]
 “6. _The Work of the Sappers._

“The bloody lessons of Plevna and Gora Dubniak put fresh life
into our military engineering, which lasted for a certain
time after the Turkish War. Our sappers became skilful at
constructing trenches and redoubts, and the other troops were
also trained in field-works, and began to like entrenching
themselves. But a reaction soon set in. This was largely due
to General Dragomiroff, who did much to bring about a return
to the old order of things, when it was held that everything
was decided by the bayonet. He was quite opposed to the use of
cover, and carried his orders on this subject to the height of
absurdity, even forbidding his men to lie down while advancing
to attack!

“To dig oneself into the ground means labour, and takes much
time. Moreover, instructions used to be issued that all
trenches dug had to be filled in again, and all redoubts
dismantled. This at once limited the scope of trench-work in
the army. The entrenching tool, which after the Turkish War had
been valued next to cartridges and biscuits, was relegated to
the mobilization store, and never brought out for use or even
for inspection. At many manœuvres the men were not practised at
all in the fortification of positions; at others the alignment
of trenches was traced only. While giving the sapper units full
credit for their excellent training, I cannot but express my
fear that they specialize far too much in a mass of detail, and
ignore the fact that their main duty in war is to co-operate in
every way with the infantry, both in strengthening defensive
positions and in the attack of them.

“7. _Criticism by Commanders._

“It is gradually becoming the custom to omit all criticisms[2]

at grand manœuvres. Mistakes, therefore, pass unnoticed, are
repeated, and tend to become chronic. I remember some very
instructive manœuvre criticisms made by General Gurko, and
I have listened with interest and advantage to others made
by General Roop. Discussions after the operations are always
held in the Kieff and St. Petersburg Military Districts,
but nowadays some officers in command of districts neither
make any remarks themselves when present at manœuvres, nor
expect them to be made by the officers commanding sides or
the other seniors. Orders issued after a long period—though
they may enumerate the various points noticed—and the reports
eventually printed of large concentrations and manœuvres, are
comparatively useless for instruction. To be of use, criticisms
must be made by the commanders, and made on the spot.

“It is, however, important to realize how rare the power of

good criticism is. The remarks usually made are either quite
colourless or too highly pitched. Some of our most capable
general officers also seem peculiarly ‘unlucky’ in the way
they manage unnecessarily to hurt the feelings of commanding
officers by their harsh way of putting things. They forget
that to lower the prestige of a senior in the presence of his
juniors always produces a bitter harvest, especially in war.
 They forget the infinite variety of the conditions of different
tactical situations, and that at peace manœuvres there is
no need for one side to win or lose. Again, independent
action, though certainly not wrong in itself, is often put
down as a mistake and adjudged to be wrong because the senior
commander has his own opinion in the matter. Such narrow-minded
criticism deprives officers in command of units of the
spirit of independence, of initiative, and of the desire for
responsibility. Instead, they try to discover the fads of the
officer in command, in order to ‘play up’ to them.

“8. _Conclusion as to the Tactical Instruction of our Troops._

“Although the opinion of the generals in command of military

districts in all matters pertaining to military training
should, and do, carry great weight, yet there must be some
limit to individual action. It is impossible, for instance, to
permit each of them to train the troops in his command entirely
in accordance with his own views as to what is most important
in war; for the instruction of attack and defence should not
be carried out on entirely different lines in the different
districts. Yet this is more or less what has been done. We at
headquarters are partly to blame, owing to the delay in the
publication of the field-service manuals and the instructions
for the combined training of all arms. As an example of what I
refer to: General Dragomiroff has trained the troops under him
in the Kieff Military District to attack according to a system
of his own, of which the soundness is open to doubt. If some of
his theories are carried out in war, they will result in heavy
loss, and therefore their inculcation in peace seems entirely
wrong. His order that the skirmishers escorting artillery
should be on a line with the guns themselves would only cause
the premature silencing of the latter; and another, that the
lines of skirmishers advancing to attack should not lie down
when halted, is simply impossible of execution. When bullets
are flying, a line lies down of its own accord as soon as it
halts, and quite rightly so, as men get cover more easily when
lying than standing. And now, following General Dragomiroff’s
example, in the Vilna Military District General Grippenberg has
begun to act according to his own theories, and depart from
the textbook. In his District Orders this year,[3] in which
were published his criticisms on the work done at manœuvres, he
recommends that infantry in close order should receive cavalry
with independent fire[4] instead of with volleys. He insists,
also, that when a line is advancing by short rushes, these
rushes should begin from the flanks.

“Unfortunately, much that I saw when inspecting the troops in

the different districts and on grand manœuvres led me to the
conclusion that the tactical training, especially in command,
of officers commanding units, from regiments upwards, is
neither sound nor uniform.”

My strictures on the peace tactical training of the army were,

unfortunately, only too well confirmed during the war.
The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of
climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the
“probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore,
quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese
were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the
information that we did possess about them tended to show our great
superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition
of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised
edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to
be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely
strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled
and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command
of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief
staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know
something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points,
and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to
death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the
Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by
European standards. I continued:

“It is most important that in the first engagements, in which

they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give
the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only
still further elevate their spirit.

“No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our

present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in
manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.”

I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented

in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops
moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the
enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry
was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877)
we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the
fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent,
and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not
sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry
and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on
September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly
distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of
our troops in the Turkish War as follows:

“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The
troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted
waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units
arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not
always find the officers who should have been waiting their
arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were
often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack
of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we
sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength
and dispositions, and even partially so of our own.

“As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be

quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case.
 Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for
five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches
could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on
the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a
body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured
strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great
bravery.

“In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us
remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.”

After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated

those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres.

As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known

as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December,
1904, to issue supplementary instructions.

Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had
been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions
and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was
exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried
out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything
of the enemy. My instructions ran:

_Instructions issued in August._

“In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly,

without strengthening positions already occupied, and without
full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at
a period when we still had large numbers both in the general
and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to
positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps
to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not
only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was
far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack.

“Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have

not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to
defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if
we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been
obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements
which their superior numbers have made possible.

“In attacking, especially among hills, the infantry must wait

so that the assault may be prepared by fire, in order to get
breath or to give time for the co-operation of a turning
movement. There is also another and involuntary reason for
halting—namely, the enemy’s fire. Owing to this, units halt,
or, what is worse, begin to retire without orders; what then
usually happens is this: A few men begin to trickle back from
some company that has come under a particularly hot fire; they
are followed by their own company, which is in turn followed
by the companies on either side, even though the latter may
perhaps be holding strong ground. Such a moment is, indeed,
critical, and unless some brilliant officer appears who
 possesses the secret of rallying retreating men and succeeds
in making the company hold its ground, the action is lost. But
besides setting a personal example to the men, a commanding
officer must at once push forward some of his reserves to
stop the rot among those retreating. The most important thing
at such a crisis is the example set by the officers or the
steadiest men, particularly by Cavaliers of the Order of St.
George.[5] A company commander’s example is everything to his
company. Therefore, however deserving he may be in peace, a
company commander who does not display personal gallantry in
action should be instantly removed from his command.

“The most effective method of guarding against a sudden

emergency either in attack or defence—and this is particularly
true in hilly country—is to have in hand a strong reserve,
and not to make use of it too lightly. This we have not done
in recent actions; we have told off weak reserves, and used
them up too quickly. Whole regiments have sometimes been sent
in support where two companies or a battalion would have been
ample.[6]

“In all kinds of operations officers in command must keep the

forces on either flank, as well as their seniors, informed of
everything that happens. We are, unfortunately, not accustomed
to do this. Before an action the smallest details are reported,
but as soon as an action begins we become so preoccupied with
the fight that the most obvious duties are forgotten. Chief
staff-officers of all grades will in future be held responsible
for the frequent transmission of reports during an action.”

The special attention of commanding officers was also called to the

necessity for providing their men with hot food during action, and to
the excessive expenditure of ammunition in our fights.

_Instructions issued during September._

The following were the main instructions given by me while preparing

for an advance after the fighting in August:

“It is a regrettable fact that so far, whenever we have taken

the offensive, we have met with reverse. Owing to our lack
of information, to which I have already drawn attention,
instead of delivering a confident attack according to a
clearly-thought-out plan, we have acted in a half-hearted
manner. We often deliver our main attack too soon, and
regardless of the enemy’s intentions. Instances have occurred
where we have detailed attacking columns as small as a
battalion; in others we have operated without any definite
plan of action. Finally, there have been cases where not
enough determination has been shown in pressing forward to the
objective.”

The importance of gaining even slight successes over the enemy’s

advanced troops at the beginning of a forward movement, the fact that
in the attack of positions turning movements should always be made
in combination with frontal attacks, and the advantage of pushing on
energetically when once an advance had commenced, were all points
specially noted. The necessity of holding on determinedly to every
yard of ground gained was accentuated, and leading units in a frontal
attack were warned not to deliver the assault until the synchronous
turning movement had been fully developed. Every use was to be made of
fire-effect of every sort. I wrote:

“A glaring case of that lack of co-operation from which we

suffer so much was the fight of September 2,[7] when the left
column began the action far too soon, and therefore finished by
retiring in disorder. This had the worst results on the success
of the whole operation.

“I must again remind all ranks of the great necessity for

economizing ammunition, especially gun ammunition. At Liao-yang
we used up in two days our special artillery reserve of more
than 100,000 rounds. The conveyance of gun ammunition to the
front is very difficult, and batteries which have expended
theirs become mere dead-weight to the army.”

[Illustration: GENERAL LINIEVITCH.]

The peculiarities attendant on operations in a country covered with

such crops as _kao-liang_ were also reviewed in detail:

“Any men leaving the ranks in action under pretext of

accompanying or carrying away wounded men will be severely
punished.

“Companies and squadrons must be as strong as possible for

an attack. To this end the most strict precautions must be
taken to limit the number of men employed on extraneous duties
and for transport work. The Cossacks are not to be employed
as orderlies and escorts by the officers under whom they may
be temporarily serving. Sound horses in possession of sick
Cossacks should be taken from them, and made over to those who
are horseless, but fit for duty.

“It is to be regretted—and I have more than once commented on

it—that commanding officers do not pay proper attention to the
order that the soldier’s emergency biscuit ration, carried on
the person, should remain untouched. This reserve ration is
constantly being eaten, and no steps are taken immediately to
replace it. Many commanding officers calmly allow the whole of
the men’s portable reserve to be consumed under the pleasing
conviction that it is the duty of someone else to bring up
fresh supplies to the regimental commissariat.

“The above instructions only touch on a few details of

field-work. The main guide for action is the ‘Field Service
Regulations,’ but these cannot, of course, meet every case
which may arise in the entirely new circumstances under which
we are now operating. I expect commanding officers of all
ranks, therefore, to show greater initiative in the performance
of their duties.”

My instructions issued in October included remarks on our offensive

operations during the end of September. Amongst other things, I said:

“I still notice faults in the method of conducting attacks.

Thick lines of skirmishers are too closely followed by the
supports and reserves. The formations have generally been
ill adapted to the ground, and have been such as to form an
excellent target. If this close-order formation had been
assumed in these cases just before a bayonet charge, then,
despite the heavy sacrifices entailed, there would have been
some point in it, because of the additional force and impetus
given to the assault; but it was adopted when the attack was
still at long range, and so caused useless and heavy loss.
We should in such cases imitate the Japanese, and do what we
used to in the Caucasus—make every use of cover. Every effort
must be made to reconnoitre well, in order that advantage may
be taken of every fold of the ground, and of every stick and
stone, and the attack may be enabled to advance as close as
possible to the enemy with the least possible loss. The way to
do this is for individual men, or groups of men, to advance
by short rushes till the attacking units are able to collect.
On open ground, if the attacking infantry has to wait for the
artillery preparation, it should entrench itself as rapidly as
possible.

“In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses

together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we
suffered. Again, to avoid unnecessary loss in retirement,
portions of a position have often been stubbornly held until a
withdrawal could be effected under cover of darkness. If the
portion of ground on either side happens to have been already
abandoned, and the Japanese are sufficiently mobile to make use
of it, such isolated defence of any one section of a position
might cost very dear. We must learn how to retire by day—by the
same methods as laid down above for the attack (by rushes), and
avoid close formations in doing it.

“I and other senior officers have noticed during an action

hundreds and thousands of unwounded men leaving the ranks,
carrying wounded to the rear. In the fights of October 12
to 15[8] I personally saw wounded men being carried to the
rear by as many as nine others. This abuse must be put down
with the utmost rigour, and until an action is over only the
stretcher-bearers should take wounded to the rear.

“The Japanese are fortifying the positions along our front,

converting villages, knolls, and hill-tops into strong,
defensible points, and strengthening their positions with
obstacles. These positions should be carefully studied, their
strong points noted, and in every section of our line a plan of
possible operations against the corresponding portions of the
enemy’s position should be made. The early organization of the
artillery preparation of any attack on these selected points is
important.

“Detachments of sappers and scouts should be sent ahead of the

assault to destroy the obstacles round fortified villages,
which should be well shelled. Till the assault is made the
 advance should be under cover, and if the leading troops find
they are not strong enough to capture the point on which they
have been directed, they must hold on to a point as near to
the enemy as possible, in order to press forward again when
reinforced.”

Finally, in my instructions issued in December, 1904, I recapitulated

the most important points brought out by our recent experiences, such
as—

“1. The necessity, in order to avoid loss, for our attack

formations to be better adapted to the ground.

“2. Economy in artillery ammunition.

“3. The more intelligent employment of rifle-fire, and the

necessity for volley-firing at night.

“4. The great value of night operations.

“5. Proper communication between all senior commanders.

“6. The necessity for the mutual co-operation of all arms, and
the maintenance of touch in battle.

“The surest road to success is the determination to continue

fighting, even when the last reserve has been exhausted, for
the enemy may be in the same, if not in worse plight, and what
is not possible in daylight may be accomplished at night.
Unfortunately, in recent fights, some commanders even of large
forces have confessed themselves unable to carry out the
operation entrusted to them, at a moment when they still had in
hand big reserves which had not fired a shot.”

Of course, as soon as our disasters began, the papers started to accuse

our troops of insufficient training, and they were not far wrong. In
the first place, most of the men were reservists who had forgotten
a great deal. In the second, this war was our first experience of
smokeless powder, of quick-firing artillery, of machine-guns, and of
all the recent developments in means of destruction, and much was
strange and unexpected. Our preconceived notions were upset, and we
were baffled by the deadly nature of indirect artillery-fire, by the
new attack formations—when advancing infantry is rarely visible, and
one man at a time crawls up almost unseen, taking advantage of every
inch of cover. Our troops had been instructed, but what they had
learned varied according to the personal idiosyncrasies of this or that
district commander. The stronger the officer commanding a district, the
less did he feel bound to abide by the authorized method of instruction
and training laid down in the existing drill-books. General Grippenberg
was no exception to this. In spite of the regulation as to the use of
volleys for repulsing night attacks; in spite of war experience which
in every way confirmed the necessity and value of volley-firing; in
spite of the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on this point, he made
up his mind some days before a battle to re-teach the force under his
command. He ordered the employment of independent fire at night. His
“Instructions for the Operations of Infantry in Battle” [signed by
him on January 4, 1905], printed and issued to the troops, aroused
consternation and amusement throughout the army. In this book it
was actually laid down that volleys were only to be resorted to if
the enemy suddenly appeared at close quarters, and that immediately
after a volley a bayonet attack should be made. While condemning the
method in which our troops operated at the Ya-lu, he, in the above
“Instructions,” gives a recipe for action whereby two of our battalions
might destroy a Japanese division. After a summary of the amount of
small-arm ammunition expended, he said:

“If our two battalions had been deployed and had opened rapid
independent fire, the Japanese division would have been
destroyed, and we should have won the day.”

Such a simple matter did General Grippenberg consider the annihilation

of a Japanese division! But a few days later, when he moved against
the Hei-kou-tai position with a strong force of 120 battalions, his
own prescription proved to be valueless. In the first few days, when
he was opposed by not more than two divisions, he was unable to take
San-de-pu, got his troops into confusion, gave the enemy time to bring
up strong reinforcements, and retired—to St. Petersburg.

As to the attack formation adopted by the troops arriving from Russia,

the 41st Division had in particular been taught to work in very close
formation, and not taught to make use of the ground. It came from
the Vilna district, which was commanded before the war by General
Grippenberg. Our gunners also arrived at the front with only one idea
of artillery tactics—to place their batteries in the open and make use
of direct fire. For this we paid dearly in our very first fight.

CHAPTER X

REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_conclusion_)

Particular difficulties of the strategic situation—Defects in

organization and _personnel_—Absence of a military spirit in
the army, and lack of determination in carrying operations to a
finish—Breakdown of our organization under the strain of active
service.

It is the duty of every Headquarter Staff to work out all

possibilities, and, regardless of existing international relations, to
provide for war in every probable quarter. Accordingly, our general
line of operation in case of war with Japan had been duly drawn up in
conjunction with the staffs of the Pri-Amur and Kuan-tung districts,
and had been approved. The following is an extract from the paper
dealing with the subject:

“Taking advantage of her military position—for she will be more

ready for war than we are, and will therefore possess in the
first period of the campaign a great numerical superiority both
by sea and land—Japan can afford to define her objectives only
generally. She may (1) confine her attention to the occupation
of Korea, and not take the offensive against us (which will most
 probably be the case); or (2) occupy Korea and also assume the
offensive—

(_a_) In Manchuria.
(_b_) Against Port Arthur.
(_c_) In the Southern Ussuri district (Vladivostok).

“Should Japan decide on the first alternative, then, taking

into consideration the number of reinforcements we shall need,
and the adverse conditions under which they will have to be
conveyed to the front, we shall be forced at first to allow her
to seize Korea—without retaliative action on our part, if only
she will confine herself to occupying that country, and not
develop plans against Manchuria and our territory. Should she
choose the second alternative, we should be obliged to fight,
and ought at once to make up our minds not to end the war until
we have utterly destroyed her army and fleet. In view, however,
of her numerical superiority and greater readiness during
the first period of the struggle, we shall have to assume a
generally defensive rôle. Any troops we may have within the
theatre of operations should as far as possible keep clear of
decisive actions, in order to avoid being defeated in detail
before we can concentrate in force.

“The numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet will probably

prevent our squadron from any major active operations, and it
will have to confine its action to the comparatively modest
task of delaying the enemy’s landing as much as possible. The
defence of our own possessions should be carried out by the
forces in the Southern Ussuri and the Kuan-tung districts,
which are formed for that particular object, and based on the
fortresses of Vladivostok and Port Arthur. All the remaining
troops, except those allotted to the line of communications and
to maintain order in Manchuria, should be concentrated in the
area Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen. As the Japanese advance, these
troops, while delaying them as much as possible, will gradually
be compelled to retire on Harbin. If it becomes evident in the
first period of the campaign that the whole Japanese effort is
being directed against us in Manchuria, then the force which
would be concentrated first of all in the Southern Ussuri
district (1st Siberian Corps) would be transferred there.”

[Illustration: Sketch Map of MANCHURIA showing main places

along railway south of Harbin]

The two years succeeding the date on which this paper was written saw
great alterations in the strength, dispositions, and readiness of our
military and naval forces in the Far East. There was also considerable
change in the political conditions in Manchuria and in Northern Korea
in consequence of the active policy which we had begun to assume. It
was therefore found necessary in 1903 to consider a revision of the
above scheme in accordance with these altered conditions. During those
two years our strength in the Far East had grown by the increase in our
land forces and fleet, and the improved efficiency of the railways.
We have already seen what was done to improve the latter. It will
suffice to say here that, instead of the twenty waggons available over
the whole Chinese line in 1901, the War Department in 1903 received
seventy-five in the twenty-four hours, and hoped, on the strength of
promises made, to have five through military trains by the beginning of
1904. The fleet, which in 1901 was considered inferior to the Japanese,
was, at the end of 1903, stated, on the authority of the Viceroy,
Admiral Alexeieff, to be so strong that any possibility of its defeat
by the Japanese was inadmissible. But in those same two years Japan
had not been idle, and had been unceasingly increasing her naval and
military forces. In consequence of this the relative local strengths
of the two nations were still much the same in 1903 as they had been
in 1901, and it was thought prudent to adhere to the same general plan
of operations as had been drawn up and approved two years previously.
To give an official opinion of that time, I quote an extract from a
memorandum I submitted to the Tsar on August 6, 1903:

“In the report which will be sent in from the Headquarter

Staff, the conclusion arrived at after a careful appreciation
of the resources of both nations is the same as that reached
two years ago—namely, that in the event of war with Japan,
we should act on the defensive; that the concentration
and general distribution of our troops should remain the
same; that although we may move troops on to the line
Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen, we cannot hold our ground in
Southern Manchuria in the first period of the war if that
region be invaded by the whole Japanese army. We should
therefore still count upon Port Arthur being cut off for a
considerable period, and in order to avoid defeat in detail,
should withdraw towards Harbin until reinforcements from
Russia enable us to assume the offensive. But I may add that,
while accepting the same plan of operations as we did two
years ago, we can now have far greater confidence in the
issue of a struggle. Our fleet is stronger than the Japanese,
and as reinforcements will arrive now more quickly than they
could have formerly, it will take less time for us to be in a
position to advance.”

In a memorandum by the Chief of the Headquarter Staff, submitted to me

on February 12, 1904—_i.e._, a few days after the enemy had attacked
our fleet at Port Arthur—General Sakharoff described the Japanese
intentions as follows:

“The Japanese plan appears to be—

“1. To inflict a crushing blow upon our fleet so as to paralyze

its activity once and for all, and thus guarantee freedom of
movement to their transports. To attain this end they have not
hesitated to attack us before the declaration of war (_vide_
the night operations of February 8 and 9). The transfer to
them by the British of Wei-hai-wei also has given them an
advantageous naval base right on the flank of any operations
undertaken by our squadron.

“2. To capture Port Arthur in order to attain the same

object—the destruction of our fleet.

“3. To advance on and capture Harbin, so as to isolate the

Pri-Amur district from the rest of Russia, and to destroy the
railway.”
Our hopes as to the promised improvement of the railway were
unfortunately not realized, while our fleet, damaged by the enemy’s
onslaught before the declaration of war, was not only weaker than the
enemy’s, but failed even to perform the modest task expected of it in
1901. Consequently the concentration of our troops was a far slower
business than we thought it would be, while the Japanese, having
gained command of the sea, threw the whole of their army on to the
continent. Thus, gaining the initiative on land as well as on the sea,
and fired as they were with immense patriotism, the enemy commenced
the war superior to us morally as well as materially. However, though
the task before us was one of extreme difficulty, our resources were
immensely superior to the enemy’s, and the moment when we should become
completely ready for the struggle was only postponed. Notwithstanding
the unfavourable conditions under which we started, after fifteen
months’ fighting we were holding the Hsi-ping-kai positions, and,
although we had not actually assumed the offensive, we had by no means
retired as far as Harbin, which had been accepted as a possibility
in the original scheme. If we had only possessed the determination
necessary to carry this scheme right through, we ought not to have
ended the war until we had utterly defeated the enemy. Therefore,
whatever we did accomplish can only be looked upon as preparatory to
the decisive struggle. One of the assumptions of our original scheme
of operations was that, if a strong Japanese force invaded Southern
Manchuria, we should not be able, in the first period of the war, to
hold it. In the event the whole Japanese army invaded that area, but
the opposition shown by our troops at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho, and
at Mukden, was so effectual that, though the enemy gained possession
of the greater portion of Southern Manchuria, they did not reassume
the offensive against us for six months. The difficulties which the
Japanese surmounted in advancing from Ta-shih-chiao to Tieh-ling
cannot be compared to those which would have faced them, in the three
defensive lines which we had constructed on the way to Harbin,[9] had
they attempted to drive us to that place. I reiterate what I have so
often said in the preceding chapters: though the war was brought to an
end, the army was not beaten. Of the great force which lay ready on the
Hsi-ping-kai position in August, 1905, one-half had never been under
fire. Further on I will explain how it was that we never acquired the
material and moral superiority necessary to defeat the enemy during the
fifteen months that the war did last.

In the diary I kept when in Japan[10] I drew a diagram, with

explanatory notes, to illustrate the Japanese question and show the
possibility of our being able to defend our interests in Manchuria and
Korea by force. I reproduce the diagram[11] and the notes _in extenso_:

“This diagram shows Japan’s comparatively favourable situation

with regard to the theatre of operations. Her base—indeed, her
whole country—is only about 600 miles by sea from our shores,
and 135 from Korea.

“Our territory in Asia is so vast and so thinly populated that

we shall be compelled to make European Russia, which is 3,400
to 6,000 miles distant, our base. For a protracted war with
Japan it is evident that the single-line Siberian Railway will
not suffice; we shall be obliged to lay a second track, and
to increase the number of trains in the twenty-four hours.
 Also, as it runs for a considerable distance along the Chinese
frontier and through Chinese territory, it cannot be relied on
in the event of war with both China and Japan together.”

We were glued to the railway, and could not move away without risk of
being left without supplies. Our field artillery and heavy four-wheeled
transport carts were unable to travel over most of the hill roads. The
summer rains made the movements of the army, with its heavy baggage
trains and parks, extremely difficult; teams of twenty horses were
harnessed to guns, and even empty carts had to be man-handled.

[Illustration: DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF WAR

RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN.]

But of all our difficulties, the complete command of the sea obtained
by the Japanese right at the beginning of the war caused the greatest.
With their three armies they cut off Port Arthur, and began an advance
from an enveloping base against our army, which was still tied to a
railway-line. Our southward advance for the relief of Port Arthur
was threatened by Kuroki’s army based on Korea. Any movement against
him was out of the question, especially for those corps which had
arrived from Russia, as they were quite unused to hilly country. Our
communications through Manchuria were only weakly defended, and might
be cut at any moment by the Chinese, while those further west were
liable to interruption (bridges destroyed, strikes, frost, etc.).
The feeding of the army depended on local resources, which a hostile
population could easily conceal, carry away, or even destroy; and as
the amount of supplies obtained from Russia was extremely small and
uncertain, the army might very easily have been starved. The chance
actions at the Ya-lu and Te-li-ssu, in which our most reliable troops
were worsted, still further improved the enemy’s _moral_, and lowered
ours.

With the absence of a proper military spirit among our troops, and
the evil influence of the many seditious manifestoes against the
war circulating amongst them; with the unsteadiness shown by many
units in the first fights, and with all the other defects above
mentioned, a great numerical superiority was necessary—I must speak
perfectly plainly—in order to defeat an enemy worked up to a pitch of
fanatical excitement. But we did not obtain this superiority until
it was too late—when we were waiting on the Hsi-ping-kai position,
and negotiations for peace were being carried on at Portsmouth. Up
to December we were fighting with what seemed a fairly large force,
according to a tally of battalions; but these were greatly under
strength, for in the most important early period of the war—from May
to October inclusive—we lost very many men, and received but few
drafts. In many cases the Japanese battalions were twice as strong as
ours. While all our actions were hampered by insufficient information
regarding the enemy, the intelligence we received as to what was
happening in our rear—in Mongolia and in the Manchurian provinces—was
so alarming as to compel us to detach a large force to protect our
communications. Again, when the enemy became complete masters of the
sea, we had to detail sufficient troops to guard against a landing in
the Vladivostok and the Ussuri districts. All these things combined
to complicate our position and give the enemy the initiative at the
start, and right manfully did their whole nation strive to seize
their advantage. Their land communications were safe; their sea
communication with their base was quick and sure. We, on the contrary,
could only put in the field a fraction of our land forces, and, till we
could concentrate sufficient men for an offensive, were tied down to a
definite course of action. We had—

1. To make certain of and protect the concentration of the

reinforcements which were arriving, so as not to allow them to be
destroyed as they came up.

2. To take steps to relieve Port Arthur.

3. To maintain order in our rear, and to guard the railway.

4. To feed the army—mainly on local supplies.

5. To guard the Ussuri district.

Had the Japanese got possession of our communications, a catastrophe

unprecedented in military history might have resulted. Without any
victory in the field, the mere destruction of the railway in our
rear, combined with the cutting off of local resources, would have
threatened us with starvation—and disaster. Such were the unfavourable
conditions under which we fought for fifteen months, and our army was
not only _not_ completely defeated, but grew in strength, while our
communication with Russia gradually became better secured and more
efficient. We had always recognized the possibility of being driven
back to Harbin and beyond; but this never happened, and we held on to
Hsi-ping-kai. The situation could only have been improved in one way—by
a rapid concentration of sufficient troops for, and an assumption of,
an offensive all along the line. While these troops were collecting,
each fight—quite independent of its actual result—would have really
helped us if it had at all weakened the enemy. But our departure from
our accepted plan of operations began at the commencement of the war,
when, instead of fighting a rearguard action, General Zasulitch got
seriously engaged against the whole of Kuroki’s army at the Ya-lu, and
was defeated.

In May, when the 3rd Siberian Division[12] had alone arrived at

Liao-yang (besides the troops of the Pri-Amur Military District), the
Viceroy, fearing for the fate of Port Arthur, instructed me to assume
the offensive towards the Ya-lu against Kuroki’s army, or southwards
for the relief of the fortress of Port Arthur. But the inadequate force
with which General Shtakelberg pushed forward, owing to ignorance
of the fact that the Japanese were in superior strength, got drawn
into a serious engagement at Te-li-ssu, and was defeated. With the
arrival of all the units of the 4th Siberian Corps and one division
of the 10th Army Corps, it seemed possible to contain Kuroki’s army,
to concentrate fifty to sixty battalions rapidly in the direction of
Ta-shih-chiao, and to attempt to hurl back Oku to the south. It seemed
as if our army had a splendid chance of operating on interior lines.
The enemy was strung along three lines of advance—Dalny, Kai-ping,
Ta-shih-chiao (Oku); Ta-ku-shan, Hsiu-yen, Ta-ling, Hai-cheng (Nodzu);
Ya-lu, Feng-huang-cheng, Fen-shui-ling, Liao-yang (Kuroki). We occupied
the central position—Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, Ta-shih-chiao—with advance
guards thrown forward on to the Fen-shui-ling heights. We might have
been able, by containing two armies and deceiving the enemy by a
demonstration, to strike the third army in force. A blow delivered at
Kuroki or Nodzu did not promise success, owing to our lack of training
in, and unpreparedness for, hill warfare [we had no mountain artillery,
our baggage was heavy, and we were uncertain of receiving supplies,
owing to the insufficiency of transport material]. The only other
course was to strike at Oku, who was based on the railway, but such an
operation was risky, because Kuroki and Nodzu might have driven back
our screens and fallen on our communications. On June 26 and 27, when
only one brigade of the 31st Division of the 10th Army Corps[13] had
arrived at Liao-yang, the Japanese on the eastern front (Kuroki and
Nodzu) themselves took the offensive and seized the passes (Fen-shui
Ling, Mo-du Ling, Da Ling) on the Fen-shui-ling heights. We opposed
them in insufficient strength, and did not even make them disclose
their numbers. The troops of the eastern force withdrew towards
Tkhavuop, and General Levestam’s force to Hsi-mu-cheng. Our screens
were thus situated as follows: on Kuroki’s line of advance, only two
marches from Hai-cheng; on Oku’s line of advance at Ta-shih-chiao, four
marches from Liao-yang.[14] Our position was critical, particularly
if the information we had received as to the Japanese collecting in
considerable force to operate against Hai-cheng was confirmed. Still,
if we were able to strike a rapid blow at Oku, we might rob the enemy
of the initiative, and after forcing back Oku’s army, have fallen on
Nodzu. After we had driven back these troops, Kuroki’s position would
have been so far forward and so far separated from the other groups
that the danger of his breaking through to Liao-yang would have been
minimized. But for such decisive operations the first requisite was the
concentration of sufficient troops for offensive operations against Oku.

[Illustration: GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI.]

At the end of June we had altogether available against the three

Japanese armies 120 battalions, and were inferior to the enemy both
in the number of battalions and the number of men. Our position was
made worse by an epidemic of dysentery which broke out amongst the
troops at Ta-shih-chiao, and swept off a considerable number of men.
The Krasnoyarsk Regiment[15] was the greatest sufferer, having as many
as 1,500 men down with the disease at the end of the month. But the
main thing which delayed any advance on our part was the rain, which
made all moves difficult, and some places absolutely impassable for
transport. It was even difficult to convey supplies to our various
stationary forces over distances of less than a march. In spite of the
lack of pack-saddles, wheeled transport had to be given up for pack
transport, and not even pack-animals could do more than seven to eleven
miles in the twenty-four hours. On the Liao-yang–Lang-tzu-shan road
things were still worse, for the bridges over the mountain streams had
been carried away, and communication between the eastern force (3rd
Siberian Corps, under Count Keller) and Liao-yang was interrupted for
some time. Far, therefore, from being ready to advance, the officers
commanding the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps found the greatest difficulty
in rationing their troops, and on June 29 asked that they might be
withdrawn towards the positions near the railway at Ta-shih-chiao, and
that the country east of the line might be left to the cavalry, with a
few infantry units in support.[16]

General Count Keller was persistent in his demands that communication

should be maintained between his force and Liao-yang, but we had
neither the material, the means, nor the time to comply with his
wishes, which would have meant the laying of a light railway and the
strengthening of the road bridges. As I feared that the Japanese might
make a fresh forward movement on Hai-cheng, I ordered thirty-nine
battalions to concentrate near Hsi-mu-cheng on June 29. The short march
from Hai-cheng was accomplished on the 28th with great difficulty
through a sea of mud, and on the 29th Hsi-mu-cheng was temporarily
cut off by the mountain streams in flood. The feeding of the troops
collected there was found to be so difficult that as soon as it was
known that the enemy, instead of advancing, had retired towards the
Fen-shui Ling (Pass), certain units were ordered to return to the
railway. Taking advantage, on July 18, of the screen formed by a
portion of the 17th Army Corps, we attempted to advance against part
of Kuroki’s army in the hope of forcing our way forward and gaining
a partial success. For this Count Keller had under his command
forty-three battalions, but the attempt failed. He stopped the action
before any large number of our troops had become engaged. On the 29th
Oku’s army took the offensive; we had to evacuate Ta-shih-chiao and
Newchuang after a feeble resistance, and allowed Oku and Nodzu to
join hands. When on July 23 I inspected the units of the 10th Army
Corps, who were holding the position near Hu-chia-tzu, I found out
how absolutely incapable of operating in hilly country the troops
newly arrived from Russia were. Before sending them forward, it was
necessary to train them in hill fighting, and to provide them with
pack transport. On July 31 all three Japanese armies advanced, and we
concentrated after a series of battles round Liao-yang. Here, in spite
of our resistance, the three armies were able to join hands. Their
attacks on the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho were repulsed, but owing
to the unfortunate nature of our operations on the right bank, the
conditions became so unfavourable to us that I was obliged to order a
retirement to Mukden. The withdrawal was conducted without the loss
of a single gun or transport cart, while the enemy lost in men more
heavily than we did. In the detailed accounts I have given in the first
three volumes of the operations at Liao-yang, on the Sha Ho and at
Mukden, our difficulties and the causes of our defeats are explained.
The course of events showed that our original scheme of operations was
quite a correct forecast, for in it the probable necessity of retiring
towards Harbin had been foreseen. Indeed, matters at Liao-yang, on the
Sha Ho, and especially at Mukden, might have been very much worse for
us than they were, and might have necessitated our retirement on Harbin
early in October, 1904, when, as a matter of fact, we remained in
Southern Manchuria.

Clausewitz has truly laid down that an army should be inseparably

connected with its base, but our base was Russia, more than 5,000 miles
away. The way that this one difficulty alone was overcome will perhaps
be eventually appreciated at its true worth. The very complicated
attendant circumstances demanded great and patient efforts on the
part of the whole nation in order to turn them to our advantage. Our
reverses were explicable, and even in our defeat we exhausted our
enemy, while ourselves increasing in strength. It was inevitable that a
different complexion would have been put on the face of things as soon
as circumstances became more favourable to us.

DIFFICULTIES IN ORGANIZATION.

The war showed that our army organization gave us too small a
percentage of actual combatants as compared with the total numbers
whom we rationed. By this I mean that, in spite of the immense numbers
that we maintained in the face of great difficulties, we were unable
to put enough men into action to win. Our establishments of all arms,
of parks, hospitals, transport corps, field bakeries, staffs, and all
offices and institutions, include a large percentage of non-combatants,
which was swollen in the last war by the absence of any organized line
of communication troops, the necessity of carrying out a large amount
of railway construction, and of appointing officers and men to newly
formed supply and transport units. Even so the number of non-combatants
laid down in the establishments for each unit was not sufficient
to perform the duties that fell to them, and it became necessary,
for reasons which will be mentioned later, to detail combatants for
domestic duties. As but few non-combatants were wounded in action,
the proportion of them to the combatant element became still greater
after every big fight. It was usual, when a battle was imminent, to
order back to their units all men who were on extra-regimental duties,
but in spite of all the steps taken, the fighting number was never
more than 75 per cent. of the number of men on the strength. In the
beginning of April, 1905, when we were preparing the theatre of war up
to the River Sungari, the combatant element of the 1st Manchurian Army
actually fell to 58 per cent. of the strength. As in previous wars, the
infantry, of course, did most of the fighting, and also carried out by
far the greater number of fatigues and extra duties. As they also lost
more men in action, their fighting strength was proportionately more
reduced than that of the other arms.[17] In April, 1905, the percentage
of rifles in the 1st Manchurian Army to the total number of men that
had to be rationed was 51·9 per cent. When the convalescents returned
to the ranks, its strength amounted by the beginning of December to
192,000 men, of whom 105,879 carried rifles; but we could only put a
much smaller number in action owing to various duties, fatigues, etc.
In August, 1905, the number of rifles was 58·9 per cent. of the total
of men rationed.

To obviate this state of affairs, and to insure that companies should

be as strong as possible in action, I gave orders on June 9, 1905
[when I was commanding the 1st Manchurian Army], that out of each of
the four battalion regiments, not more than 369 combatants should be
detailed for extra duties. This figure included 128 stretcher-bearers,
35 bandsmen, and 48 men for baggage guards. In addition to this, a
large number of men were required for road and bridge work on the
communications, for guards for the different stores, for working
parties to assist the supply and medical services, for policing
villages, for duty with the improvised transport units, etc. True, this
had its compensations, for we were able thus to get rid of the 2nd
Category reservists from the ranks; but we felt the loss in the number
of rifles we could place in the firing-line. Of course, there were, in
addition, the sick, the wounded, and the convalescents with units and
in hospital. In this way the total of all ranks classed as combatants
but absent from the firing-line, or not doing combatant work, amounted
on the average to 800 men out of every four-battalion regiment, or
about one-quarter of its strength. To carry on the campaign without
properly organized units on the communications, without sufficient camp
guards, without making roads and bridges, without allowing men for
transport and baggage duties, was impossible. Notwithstanding the good
payment we offered, the native population did not come forward to work
freely, especially when fighting was imminent. A certain number were
employed on transport, but they were very unreliable, and bolted at the
first alarm, often taking their horses and carts with them. During the
battle of Mukden, for instance, the whole of the hired transport of the
1st Army, consisting of 400 carts, entirely disappeared. Our attempts
to obtain Russian hired labour were a failure, though the rates of pay
offered were liberal enough.

The extent to which transport duties were responsible for weakening the
fighting strength of the army can be seen from the fact that, during
the fifteen months of war, 122 transport units were formed, and 8,656
carts, 51,000 horses, and 20,000 pack-animals purchased. For duty with
these, 328 officers, 22,000 men, 1,700 hired civilians (Russians), and
9,850 Chinamen were employed. These 122 units were improvised under
adverse conditions and from small cadres, and, as they had to be raised
in a hurry, there was nothing for it but to appoint to them men and
officers from the army.

The strength of units also decreased most marvellously in action.

This was partly due to losses, but often also due to the habit of
men leaving the firing-line to carry wounded to the rear. This was
sometimes done with permission, sometimes without. Very often the men
who retired did not have this excuse.

I have pointed out (in Chapter VII.) that the army did not receive
its drafts in time, and that we had to fight below strength; this
shortage was still further increased for the following reasons: The war
establishment of a company was 220 rifles; but from this number had to
be deducted the shortage with which units arrived at the front,[18]
the sick, and those detailed for camp and other duties—a procedure
which, though unprovided for by Regulations, was permitted by officers
in command. Accordingly companies often went into the very first
fight at a strength of only 160 to 170 rifles. For a long time the
personal supervision exercised by commanding officers to insure that
units took the field as strong as possible was very slack. It seemed,
on the contrary, as if their efforts tended all the other way, for
they left men behind whenever they possibly could, particularly those
who were most necessary—_i.e._, those on whom depended the payment
and regular rationing of the men. Thus, with the exception of the
regimental adjutant, the staff of a regiment rarely went into action;
while of the men who are classed as combatants, the company clerks,
armourer-sergeant, cooks, officers’ servants, the butcher, the cattle
guards and the officers’ grooms, were always left behind. The formation
of a force of mounted scouts took away a certain number of men, and
stretcher-bearers and bandsmen of course did not fight. Finally, owing
to the peculiar nature of the country, donkeys for carrying water were
provided for each company, and these required men to look after them,
and one or two entire companies from each regiment had to be detached
as baggage guard owing to the insecurity of our communications.
Commanding officers thought it necessary to leave behind so many men
for the above purposes that the orders given for them to accompany the
firing-line were either quite neglected, or only half carried out. It
was soon found that eight bearers per company were far too few for
carrying wounded, and men from the ranks were allowed to help their
wounded comrades to the rear. From this cause companies often literally
melted away during a fight. There were many instances where unwounded
men went to the rear under pretext of carrying away the wounded, at the
rate of six, eight, or ten sound soldiers to one wounded! The return
of these willing helpers to the front was not so prompt as it might
have been, and was difficult to control. The result was that a company
hotly engaged usually only had 100 or less rifles after a few hours’
fighting, although its losses might have been inconsiderable.

Meanwhile, as we only asked for drafts strong enough to bring companies

up to the established war strength, without taking into account the
above extraordinary leakage, the drafts we received did not bring
companies up to their proper strength in action.

The reason why the lines of communication in the field[19] took

so large a number away from our fighting-line was that we had no
proper communication units, and the large working parties necessary
for the light railway, road and bridge work had to be drawn from the
fighting troops. It was entirely owing to the care with which the
commanding officers on the line of communications—especially those
in the engineers—had been selected that we were able to fight, and
at the same time to make roads of some hundreds of miles’ length for
intercommunication between corps. For instance, at the end of 1904
and the beginning of 1905, when the 1st Army was south of the Hun Ho,
out of 180,000 men, 7,000 were on the line of communications. At the
beginning of July, 1905, when the strength of the 1st Army had gone up
to 250,000, and the communications stretched back a length of 150 miles
to the River Sungari, there were 10,000 men employed on them—_i.e._,
4 per cent. of the army’s strength. The length of the road made on the
Hsi-ping-kai positions by the 1st Army alone amounted to 1,000 miles,
with bridges of more than 20 feet breadth and 50 feet span, and nearly
40 miles of embankment. Though the greater part of this was done by
hired Chinese labour, even in this comparatively quiet period the
troops of the 1st Army were on “works” for a period of 30,000 working
“man days.”[20]

The supply service, also, as has been mentioned, absorbed a large

number of men. The field commissariat were unable, at the beginning of
the campaign, to work the bakeries owing to the lack of men. All the
bakeries, therefore, were taken over by the troops, who had to build
the ovens, buy flour, and bake the bread themselves. Thus the eight
field bakeries (of which four were in Liao-yang) which arrived in
Harbin and Liao-yang without transport or men had at first to be taken
over by the troops. But from May, 1904, onwards the Governor-General
insisted on most of the work being handed back to the Commissariat
Department. The energy of General Gubur, the Field Intendant of the
army, in obtaining supplies locally rescued it from the difficult
position in which it was beginning to find itself owing to the
constantly increasing number of mouths and to the inadequate number
of supply trains. Assisted by Generals Bachinski and Andro, General
Gubur took full advantage of all the resources of the country. For
this, again, officers and men were necessary to guard supply depôts and
collect and escort herds of cattle, and were taken from the combatant
troops. A large part of the forage and meat the troops obtained for
themselves, but this entailed the provision of strong foraging parties,
which went far afield and often remained away a considerable time, and
of permanent guards to tend the regimental cattle. When the troops of
the Pri-Amur district were concentrated in Manchuria, they left a
number of men behind as “base details” to look after their buildings
and property. Touch was maintained between these base details and the
units at the front during the whole war; from them the troops received
their warm clothing in winter, and to them it was sent back in the
summer of 1905. This all meant the employment of soldiers. Finally,
men had to be told off for topographical work, reconnaissance, and as
escorts for officers and other persons, etc.

The number for all the above duties taken together, with the wounded
and sick present with units, constituted on an average 400 to 500 men
per regiment. This, added to the 369 authorized “employed” men above
mentioned, brought the total up to 800. Obviously such a loss of
numbers must be taken into consideration in appreciating the fighting
work of the army.

Other things which contributed to the same result were the immense
development of the different staffs and administrations, the auxiliary
institutions, such as supply parks and hospitals, the congestion on
the roads caused by the masses of baggage which had collected, and
the fact that both our wheeled and pack transport carried less than
it was supposed to owing to the hilly country and the all-prevailing
mud. After heavy fighting our army corps, especially those consisting
of three-battalion regiments, amounted to less than 10,000 to 15,000
rifles, and yet the immense organization, military parks, baggage, and
transport, etc., for a full corps had still to be guarded. Even the
regimental standards, which should have been a source of strength and
encouragement in the fight, were in many cases prematurely taken to the
rear under a guard of a company or half a company, the troops at the
front being weakened by this number at the most important moment of an
action. I was obliged to make a ruling that in action the standards
should be kept with the regimental reserves, and that steps should be
taken that they should be a symbol of victory in the most critical
phases of a fight (as used to be the case in former wars), and a source
of strength instead of weakness to the units which possessed them.

In September and October, 1905, instead of one Manchurian army,

three were formed (the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd); they were all intended
for operations in the Mukden area, and were based on the one railway
which constituted their common line of communications. The powers
of the army commanders were as laid down by regulation. Officers in
command of armies were given (Field Service Regulations, 1890) almost
all the powers formerly vested in the Commander-in-Chief. As regards
fighting, it was laid down that “in conducting military operations the
officer commanding an army should be guided by the instructions of
the Commander-in-Chief, but should act independently.” This latitude
would be very convenient in operating in Europe, where each army
would have its own independent line of communications; but in the
conditions which existed at Mukden—one common position and one line of
communications for all—and with a difference of views existing between
the army commanders as regards the conduct of affairs, the arrangement
was, to say the least of it, extremely unsuitable. A difference of
opinion upon some vital matter might easily arise, when it might be
necessary either to order the army commander to carry out an operation
which he thought unnecessary, inopportune, or even dangerous, or
else to ask for him to be replaced. For instance, a fortnight before
we assumed the offensive on January 25, after everything had been
settled and all plans drawn up, General Grippenberg suddenly surprised
me by his opinion—that the campaign was lost; that we should retire
towards Harbin, hold that point and Vladivostok, and thence move with
two armies in other directions. In which directions, he was unable
to explain. The Commander-in-Chief’s instructions on many essential
points, such as the danger of holding non-continuous lines[21] and
the necessity for having strong army reserves, were not carried out
because the responsibility for holding the defensive positions occupied
by the armies rested on the army commanders. Thus my endeavours to
send at least twenty-four battalions—if not the whole of the 17th
Army Corps—from the 3rd Army into the reserve failed, as the officer
commanding that army thought that his position in the centre would not
be safe if the regiments of the 17th Corps, which was in advance, were
replaced by reserve regiments of the 6th Siberians. As mentioned in the
account of the operations of the 14th Infantry Division at Hei-kou-tai,
notwithstanding my instructions to conceal our intention of attacking
the enemy’s left flank as long as possible, General Grippenberg, for
no apparent reason, and without even asking permission, assumed the
offensive almost two weeks before the time that I had fixed by moving
the 14th Division towards Ssu-fang-tai (on the heights by San-de-pu)
on January 13, and by moving the 10th Army Corps into the advanced
lines between the right flank of the 3rd Army and the River Hun on the
16th. By this the enemy was informed of our intentions before we began
our forward movement, and the front of the 2nd Army was spread over
thirteen miles.

With the exception of General Linievitch, our army commanders were

unnecessarily sensitive to interference with their powers, and in
cases where orders would formerly have been issued to corps commanders
it now became necessary to reckon with the personal opinions of army
commanders, and to guard against offending their susceptibilities.
After the pomp and parade of General Grippenberg’s departure from
the army, the relationship between the army commanders and the
Commander-in-Chief became still more strained. How jealously they
looked after their rights, and how strangely they interpreted their
own powers, is illustrated by the following incident: On February 19
I sent for the three army commanders and their chief staff officers,
in order to ascertain their views as to the plan of operations which
should be undertaken under the unfavourable conditions brought about
by the fall of Port Arthur and General Grippenberg’s unsuccessful
operations at Hei-kou-tai. The following courses were open to Nogi’s
army, no longer required in the Kuan-tung Peninsula: it might join
the four armies already in the field against us; it might, together
with the divisions formed in Japan and the troops in Korea, form a
force of seventy to eighty strong battalions for operations against
Vladivostok, or, landing at Possiet Bay, it might march against Kirin
and Harbin, so as to outflank our position at Mukden. I had also been
continually receiving reports from General Chichagoff to the effect
that the enemy had invaded Mongolia, and, aided by numerous bands of
Hun-huses, had begun to attack the railway in our rear, which had forced
me to weaken the army by detailing an infantry brigade and four Cossack
regiments to reinforce the railway guard and safeguard our position. In
spite of these reports, Generals Linievitch and Kaulbars expressed the
opinion that we ought not to change our plans, and should carry out the
orders I had issued on January 25—namely, to fall on the enemy’s left
flank. But when my Chief of Staff asked the officer commanding the 2nd
Army—who was to commence the operation—how he proposed to employ his
cavalry, Kaulbars,[22] looking upon the question as an interference
with his authority, became annoyed, and said much that was unnecessary
and quite beside the point. As it turned out, the Chief of the Staff
had every reason to be anxious as to the employment of this Army, for
its work in the battle of Mukden was anything but satisfactory.
The very large powers vested in army commanders in the matter of
bestowing distinctions was both unnecessary and harmful. They were
authorized to award the fourth class Order of St. George on the
recommendations of committees convened by them; they could give the
Distinguished Service Cross to private soldiers, and award the Orders
of St. Anne, second, third, and fourth classes, and St. Stanislav,
second and third classes, with swords and ribbons. As the forces
were lying so close together, it was very soon noticed that the
distribution of decorations in the different armies varied very much,
being in accordance with the personal predispositions of the different
commanders. In one army they were so lavishly bestowed as to excite
general derision, and their value was much lowered in consequence. By
far the worst offender in this respect was one well-known general,
who for one and the same engagement [Hei-kou-tai] decorated divers
officers with two Orders apiece, while, contrary to regulations, he
bestowed the Distinguished Service Cross to fifteen and more men per
company and battery. I jotted down in my diary my impressions after
inspecting units of the 2nd Army. Amongst other things, I noted that he
had awarded thirty Distinguished Service Crosses to a battery, of which
only seventy men had been in action and even then scarcely under fire.
Indeed, to my astonishment, as they stood on parade almost the whole
of the front rank were wearing crosses. The officer in command told
me that he had been ashamed to announce these rewards to the men, and
to have to try and select certain specific acts for them. I told the
men I hoped that they would show themselves worthy of these marks of
distinction in the fights to come!

The large independent powers possessed by the army commanders in

matters of supply were also superfluous in a case where there was only
one railway and one tract of country in which to procure supplies. The
only result was that prices were raised all round by the fact that
the different armies were bidding against each other. In this respect
General Grippenberg’s behaviour was most incomprehensible. As meat was
very scarce in December, I advised him to cut down the meat ration from
1 pound to 1/2 pound. Instead of this, by an order issued on January 3,
he increased it to 1-1/2 pounds per man per day. With the conditions
that obtained generally on the Sha Ho, and if our army corps had been
organized on a broader basis, there would have been no necessity
whatever for three separate army commanders with their special powers;
but they were appointed. And yet, after the disaster of Mukden, it
was the Commander-in-Chief who was generally held responsible for
everything.

DEFECTS IN _PERSONNEL_.

As regards the _personnel_, I will give in full the impressions

recorded in my report on the 1st Manchurian Army at a time when the
experiences of the war were fresh in my mind; my opinion in the main
agrees with those of other senior commanders.

(_a_) _The Command._—No appreciation of the senior commanders—that is

to say, of the work done by individual corps, divisional, and brigade
commanders—can or, indeed, ought to be made at present. The personal
element is too prominent. We must wait till personal feelings have
died away, so as to be able to draw impartial conclusions based on
authenticated facts, and on facts alone, as to what happened and who
was to blame. All the same, it may be said that the most pronounced
weak points amongst our senior commanders, especially in the first
period of the campaign, were their lack of initiative, their ignorance
of the method in which an attack should be conducted, and their want
of determination. There was never any co-ordination in the operations
of large units, which were really quite remarkable for their absolute
disconnection. Indifference as to the position of neighbouring forces
was the rule, and a tendency to accept defeat before a fight was really
lost was painfully evident. Even our best commanders preferred their
neighbour to be told off for the attack, while they themselves remained
in support. If a column were retiring under difficulties, any other
forces close at hand would withdraw also, instead of coming to its
assistance; and there was practically no instance of a bold forward
movement. The work of the regimental commanders was certainly better
than that of those higher up, but it was impossible not to notice that
they did not possess the power of making the most of a situation and
finding their way about. A regimental commander detached on special
duty could rarely make his arrangements without the assistance of
an officer of the General Staff; he could not, as a rule, read a
map himself, much less teach those under him how to do so. This was
especially the case at the beginning of the war, and had considerable
influence on the conduct of operations, as regiments often either
arrived late at their rendezvous or went to points where they were
not wanted. The lack of eye for country is partly explained by the
fact that our officers were quite unused to hills. Though this defect
certainly became less marked as time went on, it was still perceptible
in the operations round Mukden, and even afterwards.

Though the officers lacked a proper military spirit, they were

generally good in other ways, particularly those of the regular army.
The best proof of their gallantry is furnished by the number of losses
sustained by the 1st Army from November, 1904, to September, 1905, from
which it will be seen that their proportion of killed and wounded was
considerably higher than that of the men.

+-------+-------------------+-------------------+
| | Officers. | Rank and File. |
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
| | |Percentage| |Percentage|
| |Numbers.|to Average|Numbers.|to Average|
| | | Strength.| | Strength.|
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+
|Killed | 167 | 4·1 | 4,779 | 2·5 |
|Wounded| 905 | 23·8 | 27,425 | 14·6 |
|Missing| 89 | 2·1 | 5,684 | 2·9 |
| +--------+----------+--------+----------+
| | 1,151 | 30 | 37,888 | 20 |
+-------+--------+----------+--------+----------+

The losses in this army for the whole period of the war were somewhat
higher:

Officers. Rank and

File.
Killed 396 10,435
Wounded 1,773 56,350
With the exception of those who had volunteered for the front, the
officers of the reserve were not nearly so well qualified as those of
the regulars; they were much behind them in tactical training, and did
not always perform their duties with the zeal which should be shown on
active service. Many ensigns of the reserve turned out unsatisfactory,
having accepted this rank purely to escape becoming private soldiers
upon mobilization; they had no sympathy with the military profession,
and hated soldiering. They were absolutely without training, and some
of them had no authority whatever over the men. The ensigns and
acting ensigns[23] promoted from the ranks for distinguished service
were excellent in every respect. Having been selected from the rank
and file, they usually appreciated their rank, and had considerable
authority amongst the men; they got on well with the officers, and
proved efficient and hard-working assistants to the company commanders.
The extent to which the acting ensigns sacrificed themselves to duty
is evinced by the fact that of 680 in the 1st Army in February, 192
were killed and wounded in the Mukden battle—_i.e._, more than 28 per
cent. The moral tone of the officers was quite satisfactory; during the
whole period of the war only nineteen were dismissed for unbecoming
conduct. In reporting on the work done by the officers of the General
Staff, the majority of the senior officers in command of troops
expressed the opinion that their theoretical training and intelligence
stood very high, and that their work was unselfish, but that they were
not sufficiently in touch with the troops, and lacked the personal,
practical knowledge required to enable them to judge properly how much
might be expected of men, and in what way an order would be carried
out—a knowledge which is necessary if small errors are to be avoided in
the transmission of orders, etc. They recommended that, to give these
staff-officers the necessary practical training, they should do most
of their service with troops of all three Arms, and only a part of
their service on the staff; while, to prevent them being looked upon
by the troops as mere clerks, they should be relieved of the mass of
clerical work that now falls to the General Staff. As in other bodies
of men, so amongst these officers are to be found some specially fitted
for field-work, and others, again, who prefer purely staff duties, and
in my opinion the two classes should be separated. Generally speaking,
the General Staff officers in the 1st Army did everything that was
required of them. From November, 1904, to September, 1905, their losses
in killed and wounded amounted to 12 per cent. of their strength; if
the casualties which occurred before the formation of the 1st Army are
taken into account, the percentage works out as much as 25·7. During
the whole of the above time only four were sent back to Russia on
account of sickness, while the majority of the wounded returned to the
front.

As regards the senior commanders, many general officers who had

commanded independent units with great success in peace-time were
quite unfitted to take command of large units under the stress of war.
Few had even had sufficient peace practice in the actual command of
divisions and corps, and many were not up-to-date in their knowledge of
modern war requirements. The general characteristic displayed by most
was their lack of the power of forming a decision and a disinclination
to accept responsibility. Some arrived at the front actually holding
important commands for which they were—either through ill-health or
for other reasons—quite unfitted. From three army corps, composed of
veteran regiments which had arrived earlier than others in the theatre
of war, there retired, or were sent back, after the first fights, one
corps, four divisional, and several brigade commanders. Amongst the
reasons which contributed to complicate the conduct of operations were
the frequent changes in the Commander-in-Chief, of whom there were
three in nineteen months. From the beginning of the war till the end
of October, 1904—for eight and a half months—Admiral Alexeieff was
in supreme command; from the end of October to the middle of March,
1905—four and a half months—I was in command; from the middle of March
till the end of the operations—six months—General Linievitch was in
command.

The fact that I only commanded for four and a half months out of
nineteen, and that this period was in the middle of operations, was not
taken into account by those who last year flooded Russia with pamphlets
and newspaper articles, apparently written with the sole object of
proving that I, both as Commander-in-Chief and as War Minister, was
the person mainly responsible for our misfortunes. In a letter to the
Tsar, dated February 21, 1906, from the village of Shuan-chen-pu, I
wrote on this point as follows:

“I am aware of the serious accusations levelled against me

in the Press. Though there are among them many to which I
would scorn to reply, I should be happy to accept entire
responsibility for the disasters which have overtaken us, but
that such a course would be historically incorrect. It would
also be a mistake, because it would lessen the general desire
of the whole army for a thorough investigation of all the
causes of our partial defeats, so that we may be able to avoid
them in the future.

“I venture to say ‘partial’ defeats, because there could be no

possible suggestion that our land forces in Manchuria suffered
defeat similar to that sustained by the fleet. When peace was
concluded we had an army of almost one million men, still
holding positions occupied by us after the Mukden battle,
and ready, not only for the defensive, but for a most active
advance.

“Information that reached us from Japan showed that the sources

from which she had been drawing the men for her armies were
drained dry, that her finances had been completely exhausted,
that discontent at the long-drawn-out war was already making
itself felt among her people, and that for these reasons her
army could not reckon on further success against our superior
numbers. Therefore, the most searching and exhaustive study of
all our weak points cannot shake the belief prevalent in the
army that our troops in Manchuria would have been victorious if
only the war had been continued.

“It will be for the future historian to decide whether the

troops we put into the field before March, 1905, would have
sufficed for victory.

“Nowadays, with the complicated machinery of modern armies, the

personality of the supreme commander is less important than it
was. Without trusty, able, and energetic subordinates, without
a spirit of initiative amongst all ranks, without a superiority
 in numbers, and, what is most important, without a military
spirit amongst the troops and patriotism in the whole nation,
the duty of a Commander-in-Chief is so difficult that it is
far too much for a merely talented leader. It may be said that
a military genius would have overcome the moral and physical
difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff,
a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a
Bilderling were unable to do so.

“I venture to remind Your Imperial Highness that, on receiving

the orders appointing me to be Commander-in-Chief, I did not
joyfully express my gratitude. I replied to the effect that
it was only a dearth of commanders which led Your Majesty to
select me. If I still firmly believed in victory after the
Mukden battle, I had, indeed, good grounds for so doing.”

The author of the cleverly written article entitled “All about

Commanders” writes as follows:

“The absence of initiative, the habit of always relying upon

superiors, and only acting when ordered to from above, are
characteristics of junior commanders which made the work of
those at the head of the army more difficult. The value of the
time element in war also was forgotten.”

The modern theorist in strategy, Blume, says: “Even the greatest genius
in a supreme commander cannot replace independent action by individual
leaders.”

Even during actual operations numerous newspaper articles appeared,

well calculated to discredit the officers. They were represented as
overbearing, rude, dishonourable drunkards. Indeed, one of the most
gifted of our writers—Menshikoff—went very far in this respect, for
he wrote of the “blunted sense of duty, intemperance, moral laxity,
and inveterate laziness” of a large body of men who never spared their
lives and performed their duty almost religiously. In a diatribe
against military life by M. Kuprin, called “The Duel,” private soldiers
were represented as being treated with the greatest cruelty, and it was
implied that it was the custom for our officers to slap and beat their
men on company parades. The writer concluded by saying that the time
would come when the officers would be caught and beaten in byways, when
women would deride them, and soldiers refuse to obey their orders. In
the great family of officers—as in other classes—there are, of course,
bad specimens, but no generalization can be made from this as to the
class as a whole. If some officers were seen drunk on the lines of
communications or at Harbin, it is not fair to jump to the conclusion
that all officers got drunk. They should be judged after they have been
seen in action, in the trenches, and on the line of march, not only, as
they often were, by what happened in the rear. But it is much easier
to sit in St. Petersburg or Harbin and hurl abuse than it is to watch
matters at the front. I have alluded to the large proportion of killed
and wounded amongst the officers, which shows that their gallantry has
not grown less than it used to be, and they certainly looked after the
welfare of the soldier in a way that was unprecedented. The men were
fed, clothed, cheered up, and kept in good fettle. The junior officers
were zealous, soon found their feet under new and strange conditions,
and as they grew accustomed to the local topography, became good
map-readers. The most severe critic must acknowledge that the standard
of our officers, both staff and regimental, has been much raised since
the Russo-Turkish War.

But, according to the opinion of these same observers, the private

soldier has, on the contrary, deteriorated during these twenty-seven
years, for, though a better man physically, he is morally a worse man
than he used to be. As I have remarked, the men with the colours were
quite reliable, but many of the reservists—especially the 2nd Category
men—required much supervision both in action and out of it, the most
difficult material to handle being that from the manufacturing centres
and large towns. Soldiers nowadays require more looking after than they
did formerly, when but few were literate. Up to the present, thank
God, our officers still have a good hold upon the men, based on mutual
respect; but great endeavours were made at the beginning of the war to
undermine this.

Kirilloff and others have made a dead set against the behaviour of the
officers of our General Staff in the late war, but the majority worked
most unselfishly, and did good service commanding units or on the
staff. A large number distinguished themselves by their professional
zeal and gallantry, while some found a glorious death in action. At
their head may be mentioned General Kondratenko, the hero of Port
Arthur. Among the killed also were the gallant General Count Keller,
Staff-Officers Zapolski, Naumenko, Jdanoff, Pekuti, Vasilieff, Mojeiko;
and of those who died from wounds were Andreeiff and Yagodkin. Among
the wounded were four divisional commanders—Lieutenant-Generals
Rennenkampf and Kondratovitch, Major-Generals Laiming and Orloff; also
Staff-Officers Markoff, Klembovski, Gutor, Rossiski, Gurko, Inevski,
etc. Altogether, about twenty officers of the General Staff were
killed and forty wounded. The hostile attitude of the Press towards the
officers, the endeavour of divers persons to undermine their authority,
the indifference of the intelligent classes in Russia to what was
happening in Manchuria, and especially the anti-Government campaign,
which was conducted with the object of creating a mutiny among the
troops, was hardly calculated to raise the soldiers’ _moral_, or to
encourage them to perform acts of heroism. There was no military spirit
in the army.

_The Rank and File._

The rank and file, like the officers, were of two classes: those
serving with the colours, and the reservists. The former were in every
respect good; they were steady in action, enduring and well trained;
but the reservists were on a much lower plane altogether. In the first
place, the older men were unable to stand the arduous conditions of
field service, coupled with the rigours of the Manchurian climate.
They suffered greatly from sunstroke and heart affections when
marching among the hills, and during the hot weather. At the battles
of Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and Liao-yang, these men fell out in
such numbers that their units became quite immobile, and absolutely
useless for any offensive operations. Moreover, the 2nd Category
reservists did not know the rifle, and had forgotten everything they
had once learnt when with the colours, and it required real hard work
to instruct and train them up to the level of the serving soldiers. I
have mentioned their unsteadiness. Units which were almost entirely
composed of these men—that is to say, those units which had been formed
by expanding the reserve regiments—were very unsatisfactory: it was
almost impossible to get them into action. The regiments of the 4th
Siberian Corps, which did so splendidly at Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng,
and Liao-yang, were an exception; they were composed entirely of
Siberian reservists, who, though surly fellows and poor marchers, were
men of character and very steady in action. The drafts composed of
young soldiers were magnificent. Most of them had only just done their
recruits’ course, were single men, and possessed both staying power and
activity, and, being regular soldiers, were accustomed to field-service
conditions. Unfortunately, it was only after the battle of Mukden that
these drafts began to arrive. But these young soldiers who did so well
in small actions would have done still better in a decisive engagement.

The general feeling of discontent which already prevailed in all

classes of our population made the war so hateful that it aroused
no patriotism whatever. Many good officers hastened to offer their
services—which was only natural—though all ranks of society remained
indifferent. A few hundreds of the common people volunteered,
but no eagerness to enter the army was shown by the sons of our
high dignitaries, of our merchants, or of our scientific men.
Out of the tens of thousands of students who were then living in
idleness,[24] many of them at the expense of the Empire, only a
handful volunteered,[25] while at that very time, in Japan, sons of
the most distinguished citizens—even boys fourteen and fifteen years
of age—were striving for places in the ranks. Japanese mothers, as I
have already said, killed themselves through shame when their sons were
found to be physically unfit for military service. The indifference
of Russia to the bloody struggle which her sons were carrying on—for
little-understood objects, and in a foreign land—could not fail to
discourage even the best soldiers. Men are not inspired to deeds of
heroism by such an attitude towards them on the part of their country.
But Russia was not merely indifferent. Leaders of the revolutionary
party strove, with extraordinary energy, to multiply our chances of
failure, hoping thus to facilitate the attainment of their own unworthy
ends. There appeared a whole literature of clandestine publications,
intended to lessen the confidence of officers in their superiors,
to shake the trust of soldiers in their officers, and to undermine
the faith of the whole army in the Government. In an “Address to the
Officers of the Russian Army,” published and widely circulated by the
Social Revolutionists, the main idea was expressed as follows:

“The worst and most dangerous enemy of the Russian people—in

fact, its only enemy—is the present Government. It is this
Government that is carrying on the war with Japan, and you are
fighting under its banners in an unjust cause. Every victory
that you win threatens Russia with the calamity involved in the
maintenance of what the Government calls ‘order,’ and every
defeat that you suffer brings nearer the hour of deliverance.
Is it surprising, therefore, that Russians rejoice when your
adversary is victorious?”

But persons who had nothing in common with the Social Revolutionary
party, and who sincerely loved their country, aided Russia’s enemies
by expressing the opinion, in the Press, that the war was irrational,
and by criticizing the mistakes of the Government that had failed
to prevent it. In a brochure entitled “Thoughts Suggested by Recent
Military Operations,” M. Gorbatoff referred to such persons as follows:

“But it is a still more grievous fact that while our heroic

soldiers are carrying on a life-and-death struggle, these
so-called friends of the people whisper to them: ‘Gentlemen,
you are heroes, but you are facing death without reason. You
will die to pay for Russia’s mistaken policy, and not to defend
Russia’s vital interests.’ What can be more terrible than the
part played by these so-called friends of the people when they
undermine in this way the intellectual faith of heroic men who
are going to their death? One can easily imagine the state
of mind of an officer or soldier who goes into battle after
reading, in newspapers or magazines, articles referring in this
way to the folly and uselessness of the war. It is from these
self-styled friends that the revolutionary party gets support
in its effort to break down the discipline of our troops.”

Reservists, when called out, were furnished by the anti-Government

party with proclamations intended to prejudice them against their
officers, and similar proclamations were sent to the army in Manchuria.
Troops in the field received letters apprising them of popular
disorders in Russia, and men sick in hospitals, as well as men on
duty in our advanced positions, read in the newspapers articles
that undermined their faith in their commanders and their leaders.
The work of breaking down the discipline of the army was carried
on energetically, and, of course, it was not altogether fruitless.
The ideal at which the leaders in the movement aimed was the state
of affairs brought about by the mutinous sailors on the battleship
_Potemkin_. These enemies of the army and the country were aided by
certain other persons who were simply foolish and unreasonable. One
can imagine the indignation that the M―s, the K―s, and the K―s would
feel if they were told that they played the same part in the army
that was played by the persons who incited the insubordination on the
_Potemkin_; yet such was the case. Firm in spirit though Russians might
be, the indifference of one class of the population, and the seditious
incitement of another, could hardly fail to have upon many of them an
influence that was not favourable to the successful prosecution of war.

Commanding officers in the Siberian military districts reported,

as early as February, that detachments of supernumerary troops and
reservists had plundered several railway-stations, and later on regular
troops, on their way to the front, were guilty of similar bad conduct.
The drifting to the rear of large numbers of soldiers—especially
the older reservists—while battles were in progress was due not so
much to cowardice as to the unsettling of the men’s minds, and to a
disinclination on their part to continue the war. I may add that the
opening of peace negotiations at Portsmouth, at a time when we were
preparing for decisive operations, unfavourably affected the _moral_ of
the best in the army.

M. E. Martinoff, in an article entitled “Spirit and Temper of the Two

Armies,” points out that

“... even in time of peace, the Japanese people were so

educated as to develop in them a patriotic and martial spirit.
The very idea of war with Russia was generally popular, and
throughout the contest the army was supported by the sympathy
 of the nation. In Russia, the reverse was true. Patriotism was
shaken by the dissemination of ideas of universal brotherhood
and disarmament, and in the midst of a difficult campaign
the attitude of the country toward the army was one of
indifference, if not of actual hostility.”

This judgment is accurate, and it is evident, of course, that with

such a relation between Russian society and the Manchurian army it
was impossible to expect from the latter any patriotic spirit, or
any readiness to sacrifice life for the sake of the Fatherland. In
an admirable article, entitled “The Feeling of Duty and the Love of
Country,” published in the _Russki Invalid_ in 1906, M. A. Bilderling
expressed certain profoundly true ideas as follows:

“Our lack of success may have been due, in part, to various

and complicated causes, to the misconduct of particular
persons, to bad generalship, to lack of preparation in the
army and the navy, to inadequacy of material resources, and to
misappropriations in the departments of equipment and supply;
but the principal reason for our defeat lies deeper, and is to
be found in lack of patriotism, and in the absence of a feeling
of duty toward and love for the Fatherland. In a conflict
between two peoples, the things of most importance are not
material resources, but moral strength, exaltation of spirit,
and patriotism. Victory is most likely to be achieved by the
nation in which these qualities are most highly developed.
Japan had long been preparing for war with us; all her people
desired it; and a feeling of lofty patriotism pervaded the
whole country. In her army and her fleet, therefore, every
man, from the Commander-in-Chief to the last soldier, not
only knew what he was fighting for, and what he might have
to die for, but understood clearly that upon success in the
struggle depended the fate of Japan, her political importance,
and her future in the history of the world. Every soldier
knew also that the whole nation stood behind him. Japanese
mothers and wives sent their sons and husbands to the war with
enthusiasm, and were proud when they died for their country.
With us, on the other hand, the war was unpopular from the
very beginning. We neither desired it nor anticipated it,
and consequently we were not prepared for it. Soldiers were
hastily put into railway-trains, and when, after a journey that
lasted a month, they alighted in Manchuria, they did not know
in what country they were, nor whom they were to fight, nor
what the war was about. Even our higher commanders went to the
front unwillingly, and from a mere sense of duty. The whole
army, moreover, felt that it was regarded by the country with
indifference; that its life was not shared by the people; and
that it was a mere fragment, cut off from the nation, thrown to
a distance of 6,000 miles, and there abandoned to the caprice
of Fate. Before decisive fighting began, therefore, one of
the contending armies advanced with the full expectation and
confident belief that it would be victorious, while the other
went forward with a demoralizing doubt of its own success.”

Generally speaking, the man who conquers in war is the man who is
least afraid of death. We were unprepared in previous wars, as well
as in this, and in previous wars we made mistakes; but when the
preponderance of moral strength was on our side, as in the wars with
the Swedes, the French, the Turks, the Caucasian mountaineers, and
the natives of Central Asia, we were victorious. In the late war, for
reasons that are extremely complicated, our moral strength was less
than that of the Japanese; and it was this inferiority, rather than
mistakes in generalship, that caused our defeats, and that forced us
to make tremendous efforts in order to succeed at all. Our lack of
moral strength, as compared with the Japanese, affected all ranks of
our army, from the highest to the lowest, and greatly reduced our
fighting power. In a war waged under different conditions—a war in
which the army had the confidence and encouragement of the country—the
same officers and the same troops would have accomplished far more
than they accomplished in Manchuria. The lack of martial spirit, of
moral exaltation, and of heroic impulse, affected particularly our
stubbornness in battle. In many cases we did not have sufficient
resolution to conquer such antagonists as the Japanese. Instead of
holding with unshakable tenacity the positions assigned them, our
troops often retreated, and in such cases our commanding officers of
all ranks, without exception, lacked the power or the means to set
things right. Instead of making renewed and extraordinary efforts to
wrest victory from the enemy, they either permitted the retreat of
the troops under their command, or themselves ordered such retreat.
The army, however, never lost its strong sense of duty; and it was
this that enabled many divisions, regiments, and battalions to
increase their power of resistance with every battle. This peculiarity
of the late war, together with our final acquisition of numerical
preponderance and a noticeable decline of Japanese ardour, gave us
reason to regard the future with confidence, and left no room for doubt
as to our ultimate victory.

In both Russian and foreign papers numerous articles have appeared

in which the Commander-in-Chief has been accused of a lack of
determination in the conduct of various battles. Without any real
basis for their statements, critics have represented that orders to
retire were for some unknown reason more than once given by him at a
moment when victory lay in our hands. Comments upon his indecision and
frequent change of orders were so common that the idea became universal
that it was Kuropatkin, and Kuropatkin alone, who prevented the army
and corps commanders from defeating the enemy.

My first three volumes supply the answer to the most serious of these
accusations: in them are described the tremendous efforts we had to
make to prevent our operations ending worse than they did. I have never
been one of those who believe that an order once given should not be
countermanded or modified. In war circumstances change so quickly, and
information received so frequently turns out to be false, that it would
be fundamentally unsound to insist, in spite of changed conditions, on
keeping exactly to an order once issued. An excellent example of this
is given by the operations at Hei-kou-tai. The order received by the
officer commanding the 1st Siberians to rest his troops on January 27,
and to occupy the line Hei-kou-tai–Su-ma-pu–Pei-tai-tzu, was founded
on the incorrect supposition of the commander of the 2nd Manchurian
Army that San-de-pu had been captured. The former was more than once
told not to attack. Yet, even though news was received that San-de-pu
had not been taken, he insisted in carrying out the orders given, in
which, by a mistake, a village held in force by the enemy was appointed
as our halting-place. The result is known: we fought all day, lost
7,000 men, and at daybreak on January 28 were compelled to retire.
With regard to the accusation that the late Commander-in-Chief[26]
constantly countermanded his own orders, it is interesting to note that
General Grippenberg, in his article, “The Truth about the Battle of
Hei-kou-tai,” points out that, although he did not agree with him as to
the necessity for retiring the right flank of the 2nd Army to take up
a more concentrated position, he did not express this opinion to the
Commander-in-Chief, because he and all his staff knew that Kuropatkin
would never countermand an order once given.

Upon the point as to whether we might have defeated the Japanese at

Liao-yang or Mukden we shall remain unenlightened, in spite of the
publication of my book, till we know in detail the actual movements of
the Japanese in these actions. As regards Liao-yang, I can only express
my personal opinion. An important decision, such as that leading to
an order for troops to retire, cannot be given upon the inspiration
of a moment. All the attendant circumstances have to be taken into
account—the results of the previous engagements; the physical and
mental condition of the troops; the strength and dispositions of the
enemy; the results which he may attain if the fight is continued; the
reports from the front, flanks, and rear; the extent to which the
reserves have been depleted, their readiness for action; the amount of
ammunition in hand, etc. At the battle of Liao-yang Kuroki’s army, in
addition to Nodzu’s, might easily have been pushed across to the right
bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, just as the Japanese boldly threw the greater
part of Oku’s army, in addition to Nogi’s, across on to the right bank
of the Hun Ho at Mukden. This was all the more possible because our
attempt to assume the offensive with the troops stationed on the left
bank on September 2 ended disastrously. If there is no hope of worsting
an enemy by an offensive counter-stroke, it is very important for a
defending force, circumstanced as we were,[27] to retire in good time,
and not to hold on until an orderly retirement becomes impossible to
carry out. We retired under very difficult conditions along roads deep
in mud, but not a single trophy was left behind, not a prisoner, not a
gun, not a transport cart.

If we had delayed a single day, our retirement might have resembled

that of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which were in so awkward a plight at
Mukden. For the reasons explained in my third volume, the 2nd Army was,
on March 7, almost surrounded on flanks and rear. Great efforts were
necessary in order that we might extricate ourselves from the position
in which we were placed without being utterly defeated. But these
efforts were not made, and the situation of our whole force on March 7,
8, and 9 became worse, and the danger of a considerable part of the 2nd
Army being surrounded by Nogi’s troops still more imminent. Comparing
the condition of our men with that of the Japanese on March 7 and 8, as
well as the positions occupied by the two forces on the 8th, and taking
into account the moral superiority of the Japanese, I should have given
up hope of a victorious issue from the battle on the 7th and 8th, and
have arranged for a retirement to Tieh-ling before the army became
disorganized. The future historian will probably accuse me of having
held on too long. I did not give the order to retire till March 10, and
according to events and the opinion of my staff, the order should have
been given a day earlier. If we had retired on the 9th, the army would
probably have fallen back in complete order without losing anything
(except wounded); indeed, we might have taken with us a fairly large
number of prisoners and captured guns and machine-guns. In my report
upon the battle of Mukden to His Majesty the Tsar, I acknowledged that
I was primarily responsible for our reverse, and admitted that I should
have more accurately gauged the difference between the men of the two
forces and the qualifications of the commanders, and that I should
have been more careful in making my decisions. Hoping against hope to
defeat the enemy, despite the disastrous operations of the 2nd Army,
between March 2 and 7, I gave the order to retreat too late. I should
have abandoned all hope of eventual victory at Mukden a day sooner than
I did, and our withdrawal would have been effected in good order. Thus,
the general conclusion regarding the battles of Liao-yang and Mukden
could, in my opinion, be expressed as follows: If we had retired from
Liao-yang a day later than we did, the result would have been much the
same as at Mukden; if we had retired from Mukden a day sooner, the
result would have been much the same as at Liao-yang.[28]

I might also have been blamed for not holding on longer to Tieh-ling
and fighting there, and for ordering the troops to retire on to the
Hsi-ping-kai position. My reply is given in detail in my third volume.
It is sufficient to say here that, when it was decided to retire from
Tieh-ling on March 12 and 13, according to the officers commanding
those units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies which suffered most in the battle
of Mukden, we only had an effective strength of 16,390 rifles in 114
battalions.[29] If I had accepted battle there under such conditions,
it would have been most dangerous, as we might have completely lost the
cadres of many units. How long it would have taken us to re-form for
a new battle can be judged from the fact that the officer commanding
the 3rd Army stated before a committee assembled as late as May 17
[two months after the retreat] that he thought the acceptance of a
general action even then on the Hsi-ping-kai position itself was
inadvisable.[30]

I will bring the present chapter to a close by quoting literally my

farewell address to the officers of the 1st Manchurian Army. In this
address, with fresh impressions of all that we had gone through and had
actually felt during the war, I outlined those of our defects which
prevented us defeating the enemy in the time at our disposal. But while
indicating our weaknesses, I also brought out the strong points of
the troops which I had commanded—points which gave every reason for a
belief that we should have won in the end.

“_To the Officers of the 1st Manchurian Army._

“In a few days the 1st Manchurian Army will be broken up, and I must
now bid farewell to the glorious troops which I have had the great
honour to command for two years. Upon you fell the arduous duty, in
the beginning of the war, of withstanding the attack of a numerically
superior enemy, so as to gain time for our reinforcements coming from
Russia to concentrate. You had the good fortune to be present at
the battles of the Ya-lu, Te-li-ssu, Ta-shih-chiao, Yang-tzu Ling,
Lang-tzu-shan, and also at the long-drawn struggles of Liao-yang, the
Sha Ho, and Mukden, and by your conduct during those fights you earned
the praise of the rest of the army.

“With a comparatively weak establishment of five and a half corps (160

battalions), or an average fighting strength of 100,000 rifles and
2,200 officers, the 1st Manchurian Army lost up to March 14, 1905:
 Officers. Rank and File.
Killed 395 10,435
Wounded 1,773 56,350

or a percentage of killed and wounded amongst the officers of 91, and

amongst the rank and file of 67, per cent. of the average war strength.
In the independent units the losses in killed and wounded were:

Officers. Rank and File.

34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 89 3,243
36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 73 2,531
3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment 102 2,244
4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment 61 2,170
23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment 50 2,290
1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment 71 1,920

“The particularly gallant conduct in action of the officers is apparent

from the fact that the percentage of killed and wounded is considerably
higher than that of the men, while many single units proved that it
is possible to continue fighting after a loss of two-thirds of the
fighting strength. And yet, despite these sacrifices, despite all our
efforts, we were unable to beat the enemy. Undoubtedly we had to fight
against a very brave, energetic, and most martial foe. So careless were
the Japanese of life that they piled the bodies of their comrades on
our obstacles, and endeavoured to reach our positions by climbing over
these masses of corpses. For a long time also they were able to bring
superior forces against us. But we became tempered by misfortune, and
gained wisdom by experience, and our numbers grew until we finally
became so strong in mind and spirit last summer that victory seemed
assured.

“The intervals of comparative peace between the great battles were

employed in strengthening the army, and many positions up to and
including Mukden were fortified with immense trouble. After that battle
the defence of the left flank of the whole force was entrusted to
you, and three very strong defensive lines were constructed by your
labours up to the River Sungari. These lines, particularly the first
and second, were, on account of their fortifications and the nature
of the ground, in every way suited either for a desperate defence or
for the attack. Although our army was not quite ready to assume the
offensive by last May, it would have welcomed orders to advance. The
enemy, shaken by their losses at Mukden, kept their positions for
six months, and waited for us to move forward. We inaugurated many
improvements based upon our previous experiences in the war, and the
tactical training of the troops made immense progress. We not only
filled up our weakened ranks by means of the drafts which reached us,
but expanded all the rifle regiments into four battalions. In the way
of reinforcements, the 1st Army received the 53rd Infantry Division,
the Cossack Infantry Brigade, and the Don Cossack Division.

“The firing-line of the 1st Army was in August last stronger than it
was at the beginning of the war, before the September battles on the
Sha Ho, and, thanks to the great exertions of those in command, and
the unselfish work of the medical services, the health of the army
remained excellent throughout. It was, indeed, fortunate, for if any
great sickness had broken out we should, owing to the few drafts
then arriving, only have had very weak cadres for the field. It was
absolutely essential, therefore, that no expense or efforts should be
spared in order to keep every man fit for the ranks, and I am happy
to say that our common efforts met with unusual success, for our
losses from sickness were less than in killed and wounded. In the 1st
Manchurian Army we had lost up to August 14, 1905, 2,218 officers and
66,785 other ranks killed and wounded in action, and 2,390 officers and
58,093 other ranks from sickness. I draw your attention to the fact
that while the percentage of losses from action should naturally be
higher among the officers than the men, they ought, on account of their
better living, to lose less from sickness. The converse was the case
with us, which shows that our officers were not sufficiently hardy,
and did not know how to preserve their health. To this we must pay
particular attention.

“In material matters the army was also excellently situated in August.
Clothing and equipment of all sorts were on the spot and plentiful,
while all technical supplies had accumulated. Never have we been such
a formidable force in every sense as we had become by the summer of
1905, when we were suddenly informed of the unhappy negotiations
at Portsmouth, and that peace had been concluded. Doubtless this
was necessitated by the state of the interior of Russia; but it was
heart-breaking for the army. I remember with what grief the news was
received by all ranks. Life seemed to die out of our bivouacs, and all
our minds were filled by one sad thought—that the war had ended before
the enemy had been beaten. Looking back on the trials we have recently
gone through, we can find consolation in the feeling that we have done
our duty to Tsar and country as far as has lain in our power; but for
many reasons the time given us has turned out to be insufficient. These
reasons we must fearlessly search out, and discover what—beyond mere
numerical inferiority—prevented our success before peace was concluded.
Before all others, I, your senior commander, am guilty because I did
not succeed in rectifying our many moral and material defects during
the war, and in making the most of the undoubted strong points of our
troops. The material defects are known to all of us—the small number
of rifles in the firing-line per company [partly owing to lack of care
to put as many men as possible into action], the insufficiency [at the
beginning] of mountain artillery, the lack of high explosive shells,
of machine-guns, and of technical stores of all sorts. By last August
the majority of these deficiencies had, through the great exertions
of the War Ministry, been made good. Our moral defects I attribute to
the different standards of training among the troops, their inferior
technical preparation, and the great numerical weakness of units in
action. We also suffered much from inadequate reconnaissance of the
enemy’s position before a battle, and the resulting vagueness as to
how to conduct the action [particularly in the attack]; and, most
important, from the lack of initiative and independent thought in
individual commanders, the absence of the military spirit in officers
and men, of dash, of mutual co-operation between units, and of a
general determination to carry out a task to a finish at any sacrifice.
The tendency to accept defeat too soon—after only the advanced troops
had suffered—and of retiring instead of repeating the attack and
setting an example, was highly detrimental. Such retirement, instead of
calling forth increased efforts from the neighbours, in most cases only
served as a signal for their own retreat.

“Generally speaking, there was in all ranks a great dearth of men

of strong military character, with nerves tough enough to enable
them to stand the strain of an almost continual battle lasting for
several days. It is evident that neither our educational system nor
our national life during the last forty to fifty years has been of
a nature to produce men of strong independent characters, or more
would have appeared in our army when wanted. Now the Tsar has given
us the blessing of freedom. The nation has been released from the
leading-strings of a bureaucracy, and can now develop freely, and
direct its energies to the good of the country. Let us hope that this
blessing of freedom, coupled to a well-thought-out system of education,
will raise the material and moral forces of the Russian nation,
and produce in every sphere of national activity stalwarts who are
enterprising, independent, possessed of initiative, and strong in body
and soul. By an infusion of such the army will be enriched. But it is
not possible for the army idly to await results which are the work of a
generation. Knowing now our strong and weak points, we can, and ought
to, start on self-improvement without delay. The war has brought out
many men [especially amongst all ranks of the 1st Army], from modest
company officers up to corps commanders, on whose energy, zeal, and
ability the Russian nation can rely; and I notice with pleasure that
not a few of those amongst the 1st Army have received good appointments
in the Far East and in Russia. This should serve as a fresh proof that
the Tsar is diligently watching our efforts, and is losing no time in
employing the most worthy of you to the advantage of the whole army.

“You have first-hand knowledge of the difficult conditions generally

under which war is now conducted, and of the moral and physical effort
that is required to carry on an almost continuous battle for several
days. You also know by experience the exact value in action of all
kinds of technical equipment. All this makes it necessary for you
to endeavour to perfect yourselves. With the exception of the cadet
corps, our schools take no pains about the physical development of
children; consequently, many of our officers, as was evident in the
war, are physically feeble. Pay attention to gymnastics, to fencing,
to singlesticks, and to musketry. An officer should not be a mere
spectator of the physical exercises of the men—a thing I have often
noticed—but should himself set the example to those under him.

“The relations between officers and men have always been of the
closest. Like fathers to the men, our officers have won their
affectionate respect. Remember that to our soldiers the word
‘father-commander’ is not merely an empty phrase; they believe in it.
Remember, also, that a commander only wins the heart of his soldiers
when he is their father-commander. It is quite possible to be strict
and at the same time look after the men’s welfare, for our soldiers are
not afraid of severity, but respect it; in the majority of cases a just
severity is a deterrent against crime. But the simple-minded soldier
is particularly sensitive to injustice, and soon sees through any
deceit practised on him. You who shared with the men all the hardships
and dangers of field service are very favourably situated. The men
having seen you in action—always in your place, giving an example of
unselfishness—will forgive much, and will follow you through fire and
water. These links which bind the ranks must be carefully maintained,
and officers who have been in the field with units must not be removed
from them unless absolutely necessary. Guard the military traditions
acquired by regiments, and do your best to preserve the memory of the
gallant deeds done by companies, squadrons, or batteries collectively,
or by individual members of them. Keep in close touch with the private
soldier; try to win his full confidence. You will gain it by your
constant care of and your affection for him; by your strict, and at the
same time fatherly, relations to him; by knowing your work; and by your
own example. Only by these will you be able to take advantage of all
his good points, to correct his defects, and guard him from the harmful
influences which will be more numerous in the future than ever. The
recent cases of military mutinies should be constantly in our memories.
I turn to you officers in command of regiments in particular. You know
the great responsibility which falls upon you in action. How often has
the issue of the battle depended on the way a regiment has been led. It
has often been enough for an energetic, gallant, capable man to get the
command of a regiment to change its character utterly. The selection
of men for these appointments must, therefore, be carefully made, and
those chosen must work incessantly to educate all those under them.

“Up to the present our regimental commanders have, unfortunately, been

too much taken up with routine and office work, and have been unable to
give sufficient time to the practical military side of their duties,
to that intercourse between officers and men which is so valuable.
Some seem to think that their chief duty is to look after such details
as the colour and the repainting of the transport carts, and not the
training of the men. The constant strain of how to make both ends meet
with the money granted, how to maintain the clothing and other funds,
has increased to such an extent, and worries some commanders so much,
that they scarcely get to know their own officers, and do positive
harm to their men by trying to increase funds at the expense of their
rations, and therefore of their health. In the late war the Supply
Department carried out their difficult duties so well that they have
proved that they deserve to be implicitly trusted in peace-time; we can
therefore give over to this department much of the work of supplying
the troops (clothing, equipment, transport, food). Then regimental and
company commanders will stand out as real flesh and blood commanders
in the true sense, and will cease to be “office” automatons and mere
inspectors of stores and depôts, and the work of training and education
will progress.

“I would invite the special attention of all commanding officers to the

necessity for thoroughly studying the characters of those under them.
With us, men of independent character and initiative are rare. Search
out such men, encourage them, promote them, and so encourage the growth
of the qualities which are essential for all soldiers. Men of strong
individuality are with us, unfortunately, often passed over, instead of
receiving accelerated promotion. Because they are a source of anxiety
to some officers in peace, they get repressed as being headstrong.
The result is that they leave the service, while others, who possess
neither force of character nor convictions, but who are subservient,
and always ready to agree with their superiors, are promoted. Remember
how much our inattention to the opinions and evidence of those under us
has cost us.

“The greater part of the 1st Army is to remain in the Far East, and I
am convinced that the glorious Siberian regiments of the 1st Manchurian
Army, which have been such a tower of strength in action, will now,
under the new conditions of peace, still be Russia’s bulwark in that
quarter.
“In bidding you farewell, my dear comrades in the field, I sincerely
hope that the war experience you have gained will be of great advantage
to the army and the country. Devoted to Crown and country, always
ready to maintain law and order, and to uphold the authority of the
Government, holding yourselves aloof from the intrigues of political
parties, and knowing your own weak and strong points as shown up
by the struggle we have all been through, you will, I believe,
quickly heal your wounds, and lead the army in its struggle towards
perfection. Although in the future you may be denied the recollection
of victories won, you can remember—and this should be a consolation
and an encouragement—that you were ready, without fear of sacrifice,
to continue the struggle with the gallant enemy till you had beaten
him. You, officers, believed that you would win, and you succeeded in
instilling this belief into our grand soldiers.

“May God assist you in the duties that lie before you, which are as
important for our dear country as any we have already performed, even
though they be in peace. Farewell. Accept my sincere gratitude for
all your self-denying service in the field, and express to the men my
thanks for their services, and for the many proofs they have given of
devotion and loyalty to the Tsar and Fatherland.

“SHUAN-CHEN-PU,
“_February 18, 1906_.”

CHAPTER XI

Suggested measures for the improvement of the senior

ranks; for the improvement of the regulars and
reservists; for the reorganization of the reserve troops;
for increasing the number of combatants in infantry
regiments—Machine-guns—Reserve troops—Troops on the
communications—Engineers—Artillery—Cavalry—Infantry—Organization
generally.

Our recent experiences have furnished ample material by which we may

be guided in our efforts to improve the war training and increase
the efficiency of our forces. The War Ministry, assisted by officers
who served in Manchuria, and by articles which have appeared in the
military Press, has already embarked upon numerous reforms. I shall
here merely express my own opinion upon the points I consider most
important, and which should be settled first of all. Amongst these are
measures for—

1. The improvement of the senior ranks.

2. The improvement of the regular soldiers and reservists.

3. Reforms in the organization of the reserve troops.

4. Increasing the number of actual combatants in our infantry regiments.

5. Enlarging the war establishment of regiments, brigades, divisions,

and corps, and, by means of decentralization, making them more
independent.

As regards the first: Our three wars of the last fifty years have
disclosed many shortcomings in our officers. Most of these have
undoubtedly been due to the undeveloped state of the nation, and to
the general conditions of life and labour, which have affected the
army as an integral part of the whole population. Any serious attempt
to improve our officers as a body, therefore, is only likely to be
successful if and when a general improvement sets in in our social
conditions. It has pleased the Tsar to inaugurate many fundamental
reforms for the betterment of the civil status of all classes of our
population in every walk of life, and reforms in the officer class
should be instituted at the same time.

Why is it that, with so many capable, keen, and intelligent men as

we possess among our junior officers and those in comparatively
subordinate positions, we have so few original-minded, keen, and
competent seniors? As I have said, the standard of all ranks of the
army entirely depends on that of the nation. With the growth of the
moral and mental faculties of the people at large there will be a
corresponding growth in that of the military class; but so long as
the nation suffers from a paucity of well-informed, independent, and
zealous men, the army cannot well be expected to be an exception. If
the uniform attracted the pick of the population, out of a nation of
many millions, however backward, there would be at least hundreds of
the very best men—in every sense—quite capable of commanding troops in
war. It would therefore seem necessary—

1. To adopt a military uniform such as will attract the flower of our

youth.

2. To insist that the best of those privileged to wear the uniform

should serve in the army, and there acquire the military knowledge and
strength of character necessary for war.

[Illustration: GENERAL GRIPPENBERG.]

In the first of these two particulars we have succeeded, for in

Russia the military uniform has been particularly honoured for years;
but we have by no means approached near the second desideratum. The
majority of the best men wearing military uniform have not only never
served in the army, but are absolutely unconnected with it. In the
eighteenth century a custom crept in of dressing the sons of grandees
in military clothes, and they could get promotion at an age when they
were riding toy horses round drawing-rooms. Then, little by little,
military uniform, military rank, even that of General, ceased to become
the absolute prerogative of the army, or, indeed, to denote any
connection with war. The members of the Church were the only people
not arrayed in it. Members of the Imperial Council, Ambassadors,
Senators, Ministers of the different departments and their assistants,
Governor-Generals, Governors, Mayors, Superintendents of Police,
officials in the various Government departments and in the military
institutions, all wore military uniform, and were graded in different
ranks. With few exceptions, all that they had to do with the army was
to be a source of weakness to it. Amongst the many names in the long
list of generals, only a few belong to officers on the active list,
and, what is worse, those who are serving in the army get superseded
in rank by, and receive less emoluments than, those who are not.
Consequently, the best elements in the service are naturally anxious
to leave. The posts of Minister of the Interior, of Finance, of Ways
and Communications, of Education, and of State Control, used to be held
by generals and admirals, as well as the appointments of Ambassador
at Constantinople, Paris, London, and Berlin. Service uniforms were
therefore conspicuous at all diplomatic and ministerial gatherings.
Military clothes also had a great attraction for other departments, and
several of them tried to assimilate their uniforms as much as possible
to those of army officers. The worst offender in this respect was the
Ministry of the Interior, which adopted a uniform for police-officers
and even for constables which could hardly be distinguished from that
worn by military officers. The private soldiers were naturally unable
to make anything of this multitude of uniforms, and never knew whom to
salute or obey; indeed, the police-officers’ great-coats and caps with
cockades were enough to puzzle the most discriminating. This all seems
incomprehensible; but the ambition to wear military uniform is easily
explained. It is largely due to the ignorance of the people. Not long
ago, anyone wearing even a hat with a cockade was taken in the country
for a person in authority; caps were doffed to him, and in winter
heavily laden sledges would be turned into snow-drifts to give him the
road, while his vulgar abuse would be patiently accepted.

Thirty years ago, when a young officer, I spent about a year on

service with the French in Algiers, and travelled a great deal. I was
astonished to find that it was found convenient, even under republican
rule, to keep to a system of semi-military government for the native
population—Arabs and Kabyles. It was, in this case, entrusted mainly to
army officers, and those civilians who were also appointed had to adopt
a uniform similar to that worn by the military. These officials told
me in all seriousness that their spurs and the gold braid round their
caps assisted them in their dealings with the Arabs, in collecting
taxes, settling land questions, and other matters. It was so in our
case. Undoubtedly the wearing of military clothes did facilitate the
difficult work which our police-officers have to do; but a great
change has recently come over the country, and a uniform alone is not
now enough to command obedience. It is sometimes a drawback, if not a
danger. It is, of course, to be hoped that such an unnatural state of
affairs will not last; but it is very desirable to take advantage of
the present indifference displayed by the civil population to uniform
to take it from all who are not actually serving in the army. The
time has come when the prestige appertaining to our uniform should be
restored, and the status of those serving in the army should be raised.

With the same object in view, we must continue to try and improve the
material position and prospects of the corps of officers. An important
matter, and one to which I have given much attention—so far without
entire success—is that service on the staff, in offices and in branches
of the War Department, should not pay better than service with the
troops. Many of the officers now so employed in semi-civil duties can
well be replaced by civilian officials. It is, moreover, essential that
service in the Frontier Guards, in the Customs, police, gendarmerie,
on the railway, and as tax-collectors, should cease to be financially
preferable to service in the army.

As senior officers get on in the service, they must not be allowed to

forget what they have previously learnt, a thing which is now only
too common. It is essential that they should be practised in peace
in commanding troops, and not be mere administrators, inspectors,
spectators, and umpires. They should therefore be in a position to
spend most of their time with troops in the field and in cantonments.
With our military system the command of troops is at present almost
entirely in the hands of the regimental, brigade, divisional, corps and
district commanders.[31] Thus our infantry and cavalry regiments used
to be under five masters. But, in the words of the proverb, too many
cooks spoil the broth, and in war all was not for the best in all our
regiments. Often while the ingredients and the fire left nothing to be
desired, the cooks did not know what to do. How can such a state of
things be explained? It will be said that the selection of commanders
was not always happy. That is true; but it must be remembered that
selections had to be made from those men who were qualified according
to the regulations and the reports drawn up by various commanding
officers. In some cases seniority was considered to be by itself
a qualification for promotion. Efforts of a sort were undoubtedly
made to get the best men we had, but they were insufficient. All
the commanders in the five degrees of our military hierarchy are so
occupied with their daily work of routine and correspondence, while
many are so overburdened with the administrative details of their
appointments, that they have little time to attend to the business of
actual war. Yet, as they get on in the service, more knowledge of war
is required of them. The short periods of concentration in summer,
with only a few days of instructional work on both sides, give little
practice in command, and at other times the number of responsible
duties connected with administration places that art on a far higher
plane than mere soldiering. And what is most important is that the
whole of our service—of our lives almost—is spent doing things which
do not go to form character. Of the five posts above mentioned, only
two—the divisional and corps commanders—are in any way independent,
and their occupants are immersed in office work. The relative amount
of time spent on the different sorts of duties tends to turn the
regimental commander into an administrator rather than a fighter,
while a brigade commander has absolutely no independence; in fact, his
absence or presence is scarcely noticed. Finally, the same tendency
to produce office men and bureaucrats is noticeable even in the work
of those on the highest rungs of the ladder—the general officers in
command of military districts. Instances might be multiplied of men
who, though long in charge of military districts, never once commanded
troops on manœuvres, and for several years never even got astride a
horse. How can this impossible state of affairs be remedied, and a body
of leaders, constantly practised in the execution of those duties in
command of troops that would be required of them in war, be formed?

I.

On active service the rôle of the regimental commander is both wide

and important. To issue successfully from the test of modern war, he
must have character, experience, and facility in manœuvring his unit
in the field, must know his men well, and therefore have found the
time both for intercourse with his officers and for perfecting himself
in his profession. In battle it is men he has to deal with, and not
files of papers and storehouses. But, situated as he is at present, he
is so overburdened with important administrative details that most of
his time is passed dealing with requisitions and inventories instead
of with flesh and blood. The penalties he incurs by neglect of his
administrative duties are far heavier and more tangible than those
incurred by neglecting the tactical training of his regiment. The
greater part of these duties—those such as are connected with clothing,
transport, and rationing—should be removed from his shoulders. He
should be made the controller of these sections of duty, and not the
person actually responsible. Nor is his position easy in respect
to the _personnel_. The great shortage of officers, especially in
those units quartered in inferior barracks, is the cause of many
difficulties. When mobilization is ordered, some of the already too
small number of officers are told off for the innumerable miscellaneous
duties and detachments; commanders of battalions and of companies are
interchanged; many of the men are transferred to other units, a mass
of reservists join, and, if there is not time for the new arrivals to
settle down with the few old hands, the commander has to lead into
action a regiment which he does not know, and which does not know
itself. Our mobilization schemes, therefore, require revision in this
respect, and every regiment should have in peace-time a permanent
establishment of officers and men who would accompany the regiment on
service. The company commanders in particular should not be removed
from their companies. But to make such an arrangement possible, it is
essential that one of the senior captains (who might be appointed to
the staff) should run the regimental school. It is also important to
keep the regimental commander as a man apart as far as possible; he
should be made to realize upon all occasions the peculiar importance of
the duties entrusted to him, and the respect due to himself personally
by reason of these duties.

II.

In Manchuria, just as in the wars of the second half of last century,

the great value of the infantry brigade as an independent fighting
unit came out strongly in all the large battles; as also did the great
influence of its commander on the result of the fight.

The advance and rear guards of army corps generally consisted of

brigades. A brigade commander usually began the attack; a brigade
commander usually finished it (by commanding the rearguard). And yet
the post of Brigadier is not considered one of importance; his powers
are insignificant, and his position does not allow him sufficient
independence to enable him to train either himself or his unit.
Divisional commanders and their chief staff-officers in peace-time
often ignore the brigadiers as if they were not wanted, and were fifth
wheels to the coach; and their absence for whole years, building
barracks and roads, etc., is not considered to have any adverse effect
on the successful training of the regiments under them. In such
circumstances even the zealous ones, and those anxious to do their
duty, become dulled, slack, and lose capacity for work. There can
be only one way out of this unnatural state of things, which, from
a military point of view, is most harmful: _brigade commanders must
in peace-time be given independent command of those units which they
will have to command independently in war_. This applies to cavalry as
well as to infantry. Every brigade should have a small staff such as
exists in independent brigades—namely, two adjutants, one an officer
of the General Staff for operations, and one for administration. Each
brigade commander should have powers in both these branches of their
duty equal to that now delegated to divisional commanders, while their
disciplinary powers should remain as at present.

III.

Our divisional commanders are independent and in direct touch with

troops; but they also are overburdened with routine correspondence,
and as they are frequently appointed to command the summer camps, it
happens that they are more often present at the exercises of the troops
as spectators than actually in command. In field operations where
there are two sides, the divisional general rarely finds it possible
to take command of one, partly owing to an exaggerated idea of his
own abilities, and partly to the scarcity of officers of sufficient
seniority to be umpires. Consequently, he only gets practice in
commanding troops in the field during concentrations of large bodies
of men. This is not enough. Commanders of infantry divisions, in
particular, do not know nearly enough about the other arms, owing to
the little practice they get in commanding mixed forces. So, while
giving greater powers to brigade commanders, it will be also advisable
to delegate to divisional generals the powers now exercised by corps
commanders (with the exception of disciplinary powers). Divisional
commanders should always remember that the 16,000 rifles which they
command are a number that can decide the fate of any action. With the
inclusion, in divisions, of artillery, sapper, and cavalry units,
exceedingly instructive exercises can be arranged within these units
both in summer and winter, and the troops and their commanders thereby
trained for war under modern war conditions. The four[32] officers of
the General Staff who would be with each division should be relieved of
all routine, except that relating to operations, and they should devote
the whole of their time and energies to preparing work for the brigade
and divisional commanders in the training of the troops for battle.

IV.

Army corps commanders are quite independent, but, like the divisional
commanders, are overburdened with routine correspondence, etc., and do
not get sufficient practice in commanding troops in the field. Some,
during a tour of duty of several years, have never commanded troops
on manœuvres; and it is impossible for all of them to have sufficient
acquaintance with cavalry, as some corps do not include this arm.
They and their staff, especially the General Staff officers, have no
practice at all, or else very little, in the use of technical equipment
and the modern aids to warfare (telegraphs, telephones, mines, motors,
balloons, etc.). The experience of the late war showed up the necessity
of increasing the establishment of the army corps, and the actions
of their commanders will have such an important, and in many cases
deciding, influence, that extremely careful selection is necessary for
these posts; the men appointed must be capable of teaching others as
well as of learning themselves. As with the divisional generals, so
should the powers of corps commanders be extended at the expense of
those now exercised by officers in command of military districts.

V.
The commanders of military districts are the senior officers actually
in charge of troops, and have at the same time important duties as
administrative heads of districts. Here again administrative work,
together with correspondence connected with the troops, occupies the
greater part of their time, and only in exceptionally favourable
circumstances (the large manœuvres with concentrations of troops from
different districts) can they get any practice in commanding in the
field. But as they also have to perform the duties of Governor-General,
they are not able to devote sufficient time to the troops, even in
inspecting them, or to improving themselves. I am absolutely convinced
that, however much such a combination of two appointments—each of which
requires a man of exceptional ability and character—may be desirable
from the political point of view, it has the gravest disadvantages for
the army. There is a limit to human power. As our governor-generals
devote the greater part of their time and energies to civil matters,
they entrust a large part of their military duties to the chief
staff-officers of the districts. It can easily be understood that such
an arrangement is not in the interests of the army. For instance, the
most important military district—that of Warsaw—was, as far as the army
was concerned, neglected in the time of several governor-generals.
Indeed, at one time, much to the subversion of the authority of
officers in command of districts and corps, the troops in this area
were controlled by the chief of the district staff! Therefore, if
we wish that the commanders of military districts—our most natural
selections for the command of armies in war—should have time to prepare
themselves for this important duty, _we should free them from civil
duties_; otherwise we shall get no improvement. They must also be
relieved of the numerous and responsible cares with respect to all
those questions which in war mainly fall to the officer in command of
the communications.

The inspection of hospitals, of supply depôts, engineer and artillery

units, of parks, of offices—everything that takes too much time
from the exercises for the actual training of the troops and of
themselves—should be eliminated from their duties. These have become
so heavy with the complications of modern war, and are fraught with
such importance to army and country, that the men who will have to
perform them must unceasingly prepare themselves in peace; but, for
the reasons I have already given, few officers have time to follow up
the developments in their profession. That is why in the recent war
we were left behind in knowledge of the employment of artillery, of
the utility of the various technical means of intercommunication, in
appreciating relative value of different attack formations, etc. _Our
senior officers must be given_ _sufficient leisure, while improving
the troops under them, at the same time to improve themselves._

IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGULARS.

I have more than once pointed out how excellent the regulars were
as regards military qualifications, and how much more reliable in
the first fights than the reservists, especially the older ones. But
we must look to the nation itself for the cause of the shortcomings
of both. The lack of education in the peasant is reflected in the
private soldier, and the non-existence of a martial spirit amongst the
masses, coupled to the dislike for the war, resulted in the absence
of a military spirit in our troops in Manchuria. Their ignorance
made the conduct of modern war, which demands a much greater spirit
of combination and initiative from the individual than formerly,
very difficult for us. Consequently, while behaving with the utmost
gallantry when in close order—in mass—our men, when left to themselves
without officers, were more inclined to retire than to advance. In
the mass they were formidable; but very few of them were fit for
individual action, and this is a point in which the Japanese had a
great advantage. Their non-commissioned officers in particular were
better educated than ours, and on many prisoners—private soldiers
as well as non-commissioned officers—we found diaries written not
only grammatically, but with a general knowledge of what was going on
and of what the Japanese were trying to do. Many of them drew well.
One prisoner—a private—drew on the sand an excellent diagram of our
position and that of the enemy.

It is never easy to turn in a short time an ignorant, illiterate

recruit into an intelligent and keen soldier, capable of individual
action; and the recent reduction[33] of the term of service has made
the task still harder. The greatest difficulty, however, is to get good
non-commissioned officers; even with the four to five year period with
the colours we were not able to do this satisfactorily. The mass of
our recruits are so illiterate, and so much book knowledge is required
in the schools from our non-commissioned officers, that there is a
natural tendency to pick the men for these posts on account of their
education and outward sharpness. This is a mistake, as these qualities
are often superficial. The simple recruits of the deepest and strongest
characters are usually slow and uncouth and do not shine externally;
consequently many of them never become selected for non-commissioned
rank, and finish their service as private soldiers. But a surly man
of some character often makes a better soldier than his smarter
comrade. With the reduced term of service we can do nothing without
a considerable number of time-expired men. The present conditions
under which these men are kept on in the ranks are sound enough, but
the men dislike doing time-expired, or what they characterize as
“mercenary,” service. We must get over this dislike, and therefore
as much as possible raise the position of sergeant-major and other
non-commissioned officers.

Another burning question, and one with which we shall be confronted

more and more in the future, is how to keep the destructive tenets of
the revolutionary parties out of our barracks. Drastic action will of
course be taken, but if we do not succeed in crushing these parties
among the people, we can hardly expect to be able to keep the army from
infection.

One of the most important requirements with our short term of service
is that our men should not be taken away from their work for police
duties. The part so frequently taken by the troops in putting down
civil disorders by force of arms is particularly harmful to discipline.
To turn to another point, owing to the inadequate funds allotted, our
soldiers have always been treated worse than those of other armies.
The Germans, for instance, spend twice as much per head upon the
maintenance of their army as we do. Some improvement in this direction
has already been made, especially in the feeding. With a serviceable
cadre of time-expired sergeant-majors and non-commissioned officers,
and with the living conditions of the men improved, we can face the
future calmly even with a three-year term of service. But we shall
only succeed if we relieve the troops of the large amount of extra
regimental work which falls to them (tailoring, shoemaking, and other
workshop work, care of reserve stores, etc.), and if we lighten their
guard duties. Our recruits are free from this work and from guards only
in the first year of service.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE RESERVISTS.

Our infantry in the recent war can be classified in four groups,

according to the relative number of old regular soldiers and reservists:

1. The East Siberian Rifle Regiments, which were maintained almost on a

war footing[34] in peace.

2. The infantry in the 1st Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions,
which were filled up to war strength with regulars at the beginning of
the war.

3. The infantry of the regular army corps brought up to war strength

with reservists.

4. The infantry units formed from reserve troops.

According to the opinion of competent officers who served in the war

(which I fully share), other conditions being equal, _the more regular
soldiers there were in a unit, the more it could be relied on in
battle_. The best troops we had were the East Siberian Rifle Regiments,
and after them the brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions. In the case
of the army corps, which proceeded to the front direct from Russia,
sufficient care was not taken to regulate the proportion of regulars
to reservists. Some units—the 10th Army Corps, for instance—arrived at
the front 20 per cent. below strength in men, and more in officers.
In the first fight in which it was engaged, several companies of this
corps had only sixty regular soldiers—thirty trained men and thirty
recruits—who had not _even passed their recruit’s musketry course_. All
the remainder were reservists, among whom were a large number of 2nd
Category men. These regular units consequently were, to all intents and
purposes, nothing but reserve units. Finally, our reserve units arrived
almost without any permanent peace cadres, so swallowed up were they in
the great mass of reservists. In the early fighting these reservists,
particularly those of the 2nd Category, were vastly inferior to the
regulars; many of them took advantage of every opportunity to leave
the ranks with or without permission. There is little doubt that if
the war had been a national one, and if the country had supported its
sons at the front instead of doing the opposite, these men would have
done better in the first fights; but it is also quite certain that,
other conditions being equal, the man with the colours must be better
than the other as a soldier. He is not torn from his family at a time
when he has begun to think that his military liability is over; he is
better trained, and possesses _esprit de corps_. Therefore, the best
way of improving our infantry is to maintain it with a stronger peace
establishment than at present.

In Manchuria a peace establishment of 100 men per company became

so weak from the various causes incidental to active service that
companies went into action with one-third regulars to two-thirds
reservists. Nominally regular forces, they were in reality more like
reserve troops. Regulars should be in the majority in every company,
but the great difficulties and expense of maintaining troops on a
strong peace footing compel us to pay special attention to the question
of improving our reserve men. Modern war must be fought mainly with men
temporarily called up from amongst the people.

The only thing that will insure devotion to their country among
reservists proceeding to the front is the existence of a spirit of
patriotism in the nation. Discontent and feelings of oppression
among the people are naturally reflected in the minds of those of
them leaving for war. But, independent of such all-important general
considerations, there are certain definite things that can be taken to
improve the tone of the reservists. According to the present system,
when a man passes from the colours into the reserve his connection with
his own unit—in fact, with the Service generally—almost ceases. The
practice concentrations are not carried out on a large enough scale,
and though valuable, are often dispensed with altogether on account of
financial considerations. So it happens that a man passing into the
reserve takes his uniform with him, but, with rare exceptions, never
even wears his forage-cap; this he generally gives to some neighbour or
relation—hardly ever a soldier—to wear out. The reservist himself only
too gladly dons peasant’s clothes or other mufti; he is glad to feel
that he is a peasant again. He starts in business, takes up peaceful
occupations, and raises a family. When he reaches the age of forty,
he begins to put on flesh. And it is under these conditions that he
is suddenly torn from the bosom of his family, and sent to fight in a
strange, “hired”[35] land for a cause for which he feels no sympathy,
and which he does not understand. To this are added the general
discontent all around him, and a flood of revolutionary proclamations.
The separation of the reservist from all touch with the army once he
has left it does not tend to his rapid retransformation from “mujik”
into trained soldier. In the case of Manchuria he certainly became a
good man after some months in the school of war, but so long a period
of grace cannot be counted on in the future.

Coming here into the heart of the country as I did nine months ago, and
staying here continuously, I have been in a position to observe our
reservists returning from the war. When the return stream first began
in March, April, and May, there were large numbers. Sometimes when I
passed they would fall in—in line—and receive me after the military
fashion. They wore fur caps, very often military great-coats, and
looked, as they were, a fine body of young soldiers. Nine months of
hard work in the fields soon turned them again into peasants, and now,
when they come to me, on business or otherwise, instead of saluting,
they take off their caps and call me “Barin.”[36]

In Japan mothers counted it a dishonour if their sons were rejected as

medically unfit to go to the front. With us how different it was! Women
often came to thank me heartily for having “had pity” on their sons
and husbands, because these latter happened to have been told off for
duty with transport units or with hospitals, etc., instead of being
sent into action,[37] and they did the same when their men returned
safe and sound. In Japan, Germany, and other countries, some endeavour
is made in education to inculcate patriotism into the people. A love
of country and pride in the Fatherland is created in the children. As
has been said before, the schools in Japan do everything they can to
create and foster a martial spirit in the youth of the nation, and to
practise them in military matters. There and in other countries the
formation of various patriotic societies is approved, and all kinds of
physical sport are encouraged. The authorities are not afraid to issue
thousands of rifles to the people for rifle practice, etc. We do not do
this; we are afraid for political reasons. Little is done to inculcate
patriotism by education in our schools, and the great gulf between
Church, rural, and Government schools makes matters worse. Students in
the highest educational establishments have long ago abandoned study
for politics; it has for long been the fashion to abuse everything
Russian, and military service is thought to be dishonourable. Our
infantry soldier is undersized and overloaded; he is usually untidy,
often dirty, and wears an ugly and ill-fitting uniform. Is it a wonder
that, as he slouches along, he excites more pity than pride in the man
in the street? And yet it is on this undersized man that the integrity
of the Empire depends. Money is tight, as we all know, but still, we
do not keep the soldier clean and smart enough when he is serving, and
when we pass him into the reserve we give him a dress which he can
display with no pride to his neighbours or even his own family. Under
such conditions, how can we hope that he will then suddenly turn into a
martial warrior?

Only by the reformation of our schools, and the introduction into the
life of the lower classes of reforms, which, besides increasing their
comfort, will develop in them a love for, and pride in, their country,
and a deep sense of the necessity for some sacrifice for it, shall we
get in the reserve a thorough soldier of the right sort. The attainment
of such a result cannot depend entirely on any actions of the War
Department, which must, after all, be secondary; but the things that
can be effected by it are nevertheless important, and I will enumerate
those which seem to be the most pressing.

In an army discipline is the foundation of all efficiency; but to

maintain discipline in an army is impossible when the mass of the
nation have no respect for authority, and where the authorities
actually fear those under them. The term of service with the colours
is now so short that there is no time to overcome in the soldier
the disorderliness of the people from whom he comes, yet to effect
improvement in the reservist demands an iron military discipline. It
must not be allowed for a moment that a soldier need not be afraid of
his officer. The present greatest enemy to discipline is the employment
of soldiers in the political struggle now going on. On the one hand,
the force is corrupted by propaganda; on the other, men are taken
away from military duties and detailed for almost continual police
work, in putting down disorder not only of a military nature, such as
mutiny, where the situation can only be saved by the assistance of
reliable troops, but riots which should be dealt with by the police
and the gendarmes. Officers are taken away to sit on field courts,[38]
to judge, shoot, and hang political and other criminals. These duties
make the populace hate the troops, and among the soldiers who suffer
in killed and wounded it arouses a feeling of hatred not only for the
civilians who shoot at them, but against the officers who order them
to kill the civilians. The result is demoralizing to a degree. What
impression can the man passing into the reserve take home with him
if, during the two or three years of his colour service, he has been
“maintaining order” in various ways with the aid of his rifle? The
army can and must do all that is necessary to suppress mutinies, and
to break down all organized opposition, but it should then return at
once to its ordinary work. If this sort of duty becomes frequent, if
the soldier sees that the Government is powerless to restore order
even with the aid of troops, doubts will creep into his mind as to the
expediency of the Government’s policy and as to his own commanders.
According to what I hear, it seems that the heavy task which has
recently fallen to the lot of the army is now coming to an end, and
that order is beginning once more to be restored in our great country.
Please God may it soon be the case, as otherwise the force must
deteriorate instead of improving.

Under ordinary conditions our work should tend to make the man passed
into the reserve arrive in his native village or town well disciplined,
knowing his work, taking a pride in his old corps, and respecting
those under whom he has served. We must therefore endeavour to prevent
him from losing touch with the Service and quickly forgetting what he
has learned in it. In some armies to obviate this they have what is
called the territorial system, by which reservists maintain touch
to the end of their term with those units in which they have served.
This system is not possible for us in its entirety, but it might be
applied partially and adopted on a fairly large scale. One of its great
advantages would be that reservists would on mobilization at once
join the units in which they had previously served. They would not be
strangers, but would be known to the cadre of time-expired, but still
serving, non-commissioned officers and the officers, and would soon
settle down. Men of the same district would be more inclined to hold
together under fire, and every man would feel that if he behaved badly
his comrade would send news of it to his home. Units territorially
connected with the people would be more dashing than corps collected
from anywhere. There would, of course, be many difficulties, which
would have to be overcome before the system could be adopted. For
instance, men taken from a certain locality would, if employed to
suppress disorders in that place, be more likely to waver than men from
another unit and district. Cases have been known where non-commissioned
officers who had been strict with their men have requested, on being
passed into the reserve, not to be sent off in the same compartment
of a train with their late subordinates, who had threatened to “make
things even” so soon as they both passed into the reserve together.
With us such a settling up of old scores might easily be effected under
a territorial system, by which both officers and soldiers would, after
their service, come together in one district.

It must be more frequently impressed on the reservists that they still

are soldiers. Local concentrations should be organized for them so that
they may get some training, and these should be arranged at such a time
of the year as to interfere as little as possible with the crops. This
would vary, of course, according to locality. Our recruiting officers
are now mainly occupied, like everyone else, with office work; they
should be more in touch with the reservists, who should look to them
as their commanding officer, adviser, and protector. The relationship
now is too purely official. An important matter also is the division of
reservists in peace-time. In my opinion it is essential to have three
classes. For the first two years after the man leaves the colours he
should be considered on furlough; he should be made to wear uniform,
and always be ready to be recalled in case of partial or general
mobilization. The men of the last two classes should be on a different
footing, and should be used on mobilization to fill up services in
rear, hospitals, bakeries, parks, transport units, and to guard camps
on the communications, etc.

REFORMS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE TROOPS.

We have already seen (Chapter VI.) how, when the war began, we found
it necessary, in the absence of any assurance arranged by diplomacy
against other contingencies, to be ready for any military eventuality
on our Western frontier. Consequently, too great a number of reserve
units were included amongst the troops told off to take the field in
the Far East. Another reason for this was that we did not really know
the qualities of different sections of our army. Our crack troops,
taking both officers and men together, of three Guard and three
Grenadier divisions, six divisions in all, were left in European
Russia, while newly formed corps composed of reserve units were sent
into the field. I have already mentioned how my recommendation to
mobilize the reinforcements being sent to us immediately after Easter
was for various reasons rejected, how they were mobilized a month
later than they should have been, and arrived in Manchuria unsettled,
untrained, knowing scarcely anything of the new rifle, without having
fired a course of musketry, and not having done any combined tactical
operations with the other arms.

The troops of the 6th Siberians, which certainly had been in camp for
a short time before starting, had not been given a gun or a squadron
to enable them to practise combined operations. Of the 4th Siberian
Corps, which mobilized under most favourable conditions, only the
Omsk Regiment had been trained in artillery, and this was of an old
pattern; yet it had to go into action with quick-firing guns. Cavalry
were hardly seen. Indeed, if we consider the haphazard selection of
commanding officers, the lack of any community of thought amongst the
officers generally, the almost complete absence of proper tactical
training, the large number of 2nd Category reservists, general dislike
of the war, and, finally, the absence of military spirit, it will be
evident why some units of the reserve troops failed. In the first
battles the troops of the 4th Siberian Corps won a good reputation in
the army. The reasons for this were:

1. The splendid character of the men in them. Bluff, surly fellows of

Siberia, they were strong in body and stout of heart, and understood
better than others the reasons for which we were fighting in the Far
East.

2. The careful selection of those in command.

3. The bravery of the officers.

4. The long time they had, compared with other troops, to train and
acquire cohesion.

But, after the reserve troops which came out from European Russia had
received their baptism of fire, they also did well. It is sufficient
to call to mind the behaviour of the regiments of the 54th and 71st
Divisions at Mukden, as well as those of the 55th and 61st Divisions.
But this result was not reached till late, and cost many lives. In
a European conflict the fate of a campaign will be far more rapidly
decided than it was in Manchuria, for the first battles fought after
the declaration of hostilities will have a deciding influence. In the
recent war, owing to the slow concentration possible on a single-track
railway, the reserve troops might have been collected sooner and given
several months to settle down, and have thus arrived at the front more
ready for battle. In a European war they will have to be transported
into the theatre of operations in a very short time after mobilization.
We made a great mistake in forming the reserve troops into separate
army corps. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have
put them into existing corps—either as third divisions or separate
brigades. This would have improved our corps organization, which is too
unwieldy and too big for a strength of only twenty-four battalions.
With strong corps consisting of efficient self-contained brigades the
confusion of units in battle would be minimized.

Before the war no army corps organization had been worked out for
the reserve troops; everything had been arranged for a divisional
organization. In my opinion, neither corps nor divisions are
necessary. It would be more advantageous to form the reserve units
into independent brigades of eight battalions, and to use them as army
troops, or possibly as corps troops. The mobilization of the reserve
artillery, sapper, and cavalry, should take place together with that of
the infantry. Every reserve brigade of eight battalions (8,000 rifles)
should have, with two batteries of twelve guns, one company of sappers
and one reserve squadron of cavalry or a _sotnia_ of Cossacks. This
arrangement would permit of reserve troops being employed on secondary
objects without the organization of the army being broken up, and it
would no longer be necessary to find so many divisional and corps
commanders, with their numerous staffs.

STEPS TO AUGMENT THE COMBATANT ELEMENT IN OUR INFANTRY.

Amongst the causes of our disasters has been mentioned (Chapter

VI.) the small number of rifles per company we had in action as
compared with the Japanese. We often had more battalions than they,
but fewer men. The various reasons for this I have already enumerated.
To lessen the number of subsidiary duties which take men away from
the fighting-line of the regular army, we must create cadres for the
troops of the rear services; we must also arrange that the casualties
are quickly made good from the reserve troops, which should be kept
up permanently and closely connected with the regular troops. (Every
regular regiment should have one reserve or depôt battalion.) To
augment the numbers fighting compared with the numbers fed, and, in
particular, to increase the number of men in the firing-line, we must
bring up the combatant establishment of our companies from 220 to 250
rifles. With 220 rifles on the roll of a company, we were never able
to put even 200 in action; and in bringing the strength of these units
up to 250, we must take steps to see that they all really can take the
field. According to the “War Establishments,” a line infantry regiment
has an establishment of 3,838 combatants and 159[39] non-combatants
(total 3,997), which gives 235 rifles per company. But in this
number are included 35 bandsmen, 33 drummers, 1 bugler, 3 regimental
quartermaster-sergeants, 1 sergeant-major of the non-combatant company,
5 baggage non-commissioned officers, and, moreover, another 240 (15
per company) detailed for supply work, etc. Excluding these, 3,520
combatants are left, which gives 220 per company; but experience has
shown that there is much leakage from this number.

The peculiarities of Manchuria necessitated the employment of men on

duties that would have been quite unnecessary, or less necessary, in
a European war. Thus, in addition to the authorized transport, we had
pack transport, which swallowed up fifty men per regiment. The large
herds of cattle with regiments required twenty-four men to look after
and guard them. There were nine regimental butchers. Two or three
donkeys were told off to each company. (Indeed, they were of such
great use in taking water and ammunition up into the firing-line that
I consider they should be included in the establishments of troops
in European Russia.) In each company one man was told off to these
animals. The number of officers on the regimental rolls included those
who had been wounded and were away convalescent, and many of these took
their orderlies with them on leaving the front. The expenditure in
these orderlies alone amounted to more than 100 men. For the special
pack transport which was formed for the scout sections for carriage
of ammunition and supplies, thirteen men per regiment were required.
Judging by the experience of the war, I consider the following
duties ought to be allowed for in every regiment in addition to the
establishment of 159 non-combatants:

Company clerks 16
Mess caterers 18
Officers’ mess cooks 4
Men’s cooks 18[40]
Butchers and cattle guard 12
Officers’ grooms 27
Transport drivers with scout sections 13
Instructors 4
Stretcher-bearers 128
Baggage guard 48[41]
With water donkeys 16
Officers’ orderlies 80
Sergeant-major of non-combatant company 1
Transport driver non-commissioned officers 5
Despatch riders 20
Bandsmen 35
Drummers 33
Reserve in case of sickness and wounded 13
―――
Total 491

All these must be classed as non-combatants. Adding to these the

prescribed establishment of 159 non-combatants, we shall get a total of
650 with each regiment of four battalions. They should all be armed,
and be ready to fight either in the advanced lines or with the baggage.

The value of machine-guns is now so great that we cannot afford to be

without them. In my opinion, each company should have one gun, and six
men should be detailed to carry it and its ammunition. Thus, there
would be 100 men with the machine-guns in a regiment (including four
reserve men). The scout sections also did such useful service in the
recent war that we ought certainly to have dismounted and small mounted
scout sections in each regiment. This would take up 200 more men.
Finally, the strength of every company, exclusive of all these extras,
should be fixed at 250 rifles, which would make 4,000 in the regiment.
The strength of a regiment would, therefore, total as follows:

Combatants (in sixteen companies) 4,000

Scout sections 200
Machine-gun sections 150
Non-combatants 650
―――――
Total 5,000

The present establishment of a four-battalion regiment is 3,838

combatants and 159 non-combatants; total, 3,997. Therefore a total
increase of 1,003 per regiment is desirable. Including fifteen men in
every company for supply duties, the authorized non-combatant element
works out at:

Non-combatants 159
Bandsmen, drummers, buglers 69
Regimental quartermaster-sergeants 3
Sergeant-majors and baggage non-commissioned officers 6
For supply duties 240
―――
Total 477

Fixing the total number of non-combatants required at 650, I thus add

to the expenditure authorized by existing establishments 173. These,
including stretcher-bearers, would never go into action. Thus, the
addition necessary to bring the fighting element of a regiment up to
5,000 comes out as follows:

Increase of thirty rifles per company (so

as to have 250 instead of 220) 480
Scout sections 200
Machine-gun sections 150
―――
Total 830

This increase would greatly add to its present strength.

MACHINE-GUNS.

At the beginning of the war the army had only a small number of
machine-guns. Recognizing the value of this weapon, the Japanese
quickly introduced it, and furnished their field troops with a large
number. We did the same, and several machine-gun companies and sections
arrived from Russia during the summer of 1905. But the type of weapon
did not satisfy tactical requirements—(1) as regards its weight; and,
(2) adaptability to the ground. A pattern must be invented that can be
carried even into the outpost line. Our high, unwieldy weapons, with
their shields, more resembled light field-guns; and their unsuitable
construction, combined with the difficulty of adapting them to the
ground, was responsible for the decision that these guns should be
organized into batteries, and be treated and used as artillery. Such an
opinion is absolutely wrong, for the great volume of fire which they
can deliver calls for their distribution at the most important points
along the firing-line, and, therefore, a capability of advancing with
assaulting columns. The organization of machine-gun companies did not
meet the above tactical requirements. Each battalion should have four
guns.

RESERVE (OR DEPÔT) TROOPS.

The reserve or depôt troops should be developed and given an

organization which will permit of the wastage in units, both in
officers and men, being made good from them immediately after a battle
or during a long series of battles. Each infantry regiment should have
its reserve (depôt) battalion, which should be formed on mobilization
at a strength of 40 per cent. of the combatant establishment of a
regiment—_i.e._, at 1,600 men.[42] Of these, 400, or 10 per cent. of
the regiment’s strength, should be in the theatre of war. This number
should be formed into one company, and should constitute the reserve
depôt company of its particular regiment, and be continually feeding
it. With every division these companies should be organized together
into a reserve battalion of 1,600 men for the immediate replacement of
casualties in the regiments of the division. All wounded and sick who
are not sent to the base should be attached to this battalion till they
are passed as fit. After great battles this reserve would be depleted,
and would require filling up from the base depôt. The establishment of
the other arms should be kept up to strength by a parallel arrangement.
The casualties amongst non-combatants are less, but in their case a
reserve is necessary, distinct from the combatant reserve, to make good
their wastage. It should be mainly composed of 2nd Category reservists
and those of the convalescent combatants not considered fit enough for
the ranks.

The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing
the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded
in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to
us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace
casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have
made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the
twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks
took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some
25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days
instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000
men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number
of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was
infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that
suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large,
and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result
that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to
the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else.

TROOPS IN REAR—COMMUNICATION TROOPS.

By troops in rear I mean those at rest camps, railway troops, road

working parties, telegraph sections, motor troops, transport of various
kinds, all of which should be under the general officer commanding
communications. There is also a large number of men in the departments,
institutions, and depôts of all the field administrations, but as in
Manchuria these were mostly fixed by the authorized establishment,
I will not refer to them. The absence of any prepared organization
of troops for the line of communication, however, led to their being
formed at the expense of the fighting strength of the infantry. While
officers commanding regiments complained of the great wastage of their
men on duties in the rear, those in rear complained that the numbers
they had were insufficient. Troops for the duties in rear should of
course be formed on mobilization. In the part of my report upon the 1st
Army which deals with the organization of the communications there is
much valuable material which is based on war experience, and may be a
useful guide for the future. By the end of August, 1905, the strength
of the 1st Army alone was 300,000. Its own communications in rear
had a depth of 150 miles and a frontage of 330 miles, including the
detachments guarding the extreme left flank and the left flank corps
under General Rennenkampf, with which we permanently occupied a front
of about 70 miles. Under the general commanding the communications of
the 1st Army, which consisted of six army corps, were 650 officers
and officials, 12,000 men, and 25,000 horses, and this number was
considered inadequate. In my report, I gave as my estimate for the
numbers required for one army corps per day’s march in length of
communications—

Men.
1. Half company infantry 120
2. Transport 320
3. Road troops 25
4. Postal telegraph working parties 5
―――
Total 470

ENGINEER TROOPS.

The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the

late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will
be made in a struggle between two European Powers. In this respect
the Japanese were much better served than we were, but even they were
not technically equipped in the way that will soon be necessary. The
speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways
(especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads,
the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by
heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and
bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day,
while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wire, mines,
hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now
required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger
number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway
units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order
that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage.
Without touching here upon the railway troops necessary for the proper
service of the communications, the number of which must depend upon the
length of the existing lines, and of those proposed to be laid during
operations, let us consider the question of the number of sapper and
telegraph troops required for one army corps of three divisions.

The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once
more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous
effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be
conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is
made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions
with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial
obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of
such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of
explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for
heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges.

While every Japanese division of twelve infantry battalions had one

strong sapper battalion, we had on an average only one company of
sappers with each division. This proved to be too small a proportion.
Our sappers worked nobly in the construction of earthworks and roads,
but they did little in actual contact with the enemy, and, strange as
it may appear, were often forgotten when an action began, even when we
attacked the enemy’s strongly fortified positions. In the 2nd Army we
had several sapper battalions, and yet in the assault on San-de-pu[44]
not a single company was told off to accompany the storming columns.
As our sappers were so scarce, we took the greatest care of them, as
their small number of casualties as compared with those of the infantry
proves. To get the best results from this arm, it seems to me necessary
to associate them more with other troops, and therefore _to attach
them to divisions_, instead of including them in the corps troops. If
we succeed in getting strong regiments of 4,000 rifles, I consider
it essential that every regiment should have attached to it, for
offensive as well as defensive operations, one sapper company of 250
men, which would mean a four-company sapper battalion, 1,000 strong,
for every division. They should be trained to put up obstacles very
rapidly, and should possess the necessary tools and equipment for their
destruction. A large supply of wire is also very important; it may be
taken that every division should have a sufficient supply of wire for
two defensive points, say 1 ton for each.

Moreover, there should be attached to each division a field-telegraph

company of six sections, in order to organize rapid communication
between each party of troops thrown out in front and the divisional
staff. Each regiment should have with it a section which should be
equipped to establish communication by telephone,[45] flag, cycle
or motor. With every three-division army corps there should be a
sapper brigade of three battalions, a field-telegraph battalion of
five companies, a mining company, a balloon section, and a railway
battalion. Two of the telegraph companies should keep up communication
from the corps to army headquarters, to other corps, to its own
divisions, to the parks, the baggage, and reserves.

One of our principal failings, as I have repeatedly mentioned, was

lack of information. Owing to this, and the consequent loss of touch,
commanders could not conduct operations intelligently or keep corps
and army commanders and the Commander-in-Chief informed of what was
happening. Every Japanese regiment laid down telephones as it advanced;
we used to find their dead operators in our _trous de loup_, which
showed that they were right up with the firing-line. With us touch
was not infrequently lost even between whole corps and armies! The
necessity for remedying this grave defect is obvious, and we must
practise how to do this in peace. Not a regiment should be allowed to
advance at manœuvres without at once being connected up by telephone
with its brigade commander and the divisional staff, and it is
essential that, as the information comes in by telegraph and telephone,
the divisional corps and army staffs should at once fix on the maps
the positions of both forces. Formerly commanders could watch the
whole battlefield through a telescope from an eminence, could see their
own troops, and could trace the position of the hostile infantry and
artillery from the smoke. Now there is nothing to be seen. Often the
troops are out of sight, and all that meets the eye are the puffs of
smoke from the bursting shrapnel. Therefore orders and dispositions
have to be worked out on the map, and we must learn how to keep these
maps constantly up to time. In order that all intelligence may be at
once noted, a “service of communication,” by means of motors, cyclists,
and particularly of telegraph and telephone, might be organized, in
addition to the ordinary reports brought in by mounted men. To attain
these important results, considerable expense must be incurred in the
creation of this “service of communication” or “service of information”
of such a nature as to meet in every way the requirements of battle, of
movement, and of rest.

An adequate number of sapper units with regiments will not only help us
in the capture of fortified positions strengthened by obstacles, but
will assist us rapidly to adapt them for defence when taken. The work
of the mining company in future wars will be great both in attack and
defence, especially in defence. It should have charge of all explosives
required for demolitions, including mines, pyroxyline bombs, and
hand-grenades. The great effect of the bombs thrown by revolutionaries
and anarchists points to their extensive use in war in the future. If
fanatics can be found who will rush to certain death in order to kill
peaceful citizens, it should certainly be possible to find devoted
soldiers who will advance ahead of the firing-line and throw bombs into
the enemy’s obstacles.

Besides supply of field railway material for the army, each corps
should have enough for thirty miles of line (steam or horse draught,
according to circumstances).

ARTILLERY.

We have learnt by experience that skill in the employment of guns is

more important than their number. Under modern battle conditions, when
the position of a battery cannot be seen, a great deal of ammunition
is fired during the artillery duel without any result. Two to four
well-concealed guns cleverly moved from one position to another can
hold their own with a brigade of artillery, and, if they can only
range on the enemy’s guns first, rapid fire gives them the power of
inflicting heavy loss. Our keenest and most experienced gunners got
on to the enemy on many occasions with great effect, but as a rule
our artillery did little damage. One occasion when very ineffective
results were obtained by us was at Hei-kou-tai, where, in our
endeavour to get possession of San-de-pu, we fired 70,000 rounds into
every square,[46] except the one which actually contained the village.
Our immense expenditure of ammunition also emphasized how carefully
the question of the right proportion of guns in a force must be
considered. In this war, owing to the great delay in sending up drafts
to repair wastage, we were often actually handicapped by having too
many guns! We frequently had to fight with divisions containing only
some 6,000 to 8,000 men in the four regiments and the full forty-eight
guns—a proportion of six to eight guns per 1,000 rifles, which is far
too many. And our guns were literally an embarrassment, especially
when they had run out of ammunition. Even assuming that we shall be
able (as I have suggested) to place in the field regiments with a
strength of 4,000 rifles, I consider it will be quite sufficient if we
maintain the proportion of guns at forty-eight per division, or three
guns per 1,000 rifles. The fire from quick-firing guns is nowadays
quite powerful and effective enough for four guns to be considered a
tactically independent fighting unit; but the formation of batteries
of such a size is expensive, and requires too many men. It appears
to be preferable, therefore, to abandon the artillery divisional
organization, and return to the former twelve-gun battery, dividing
it into three companies, each of which would be in a tactical sense
independent. The 48 guns—_i.e._, four batteries—with an infantry
division, would then be organized into an artillery regiment under the
command of the divisional general. Each company would be commanded by a
captain, the battery by a lieutenant-colonel, the regiment by a colonel.

We found that for mutual and smooth co-operation in battle it is most

important that batteries should operate as far as possible with the
same regiments of infantry. Close touch is established, and each arm
unselfishly supports the other. I often heard the expression, “our
battery,” “our regiment,” and in these simple words a deep, underlying
sentiment was expressed. Each battery should be capable of acting
independently of the artillery regiment to which it belongs. For hill
warfare mountain artillery should be allotted to infantry in the same
proportion as I have suggested for field artillery.

Our gun proved an excellent weapon; but our shrapnel, which was very
effective against objects and troops in the open, was of no use against
invisible targets, earthworks, and mud walls. Our artillery fire
against villages held by the enemy, therefore, produced very little
result. I consider that a new pattern of shell should be introduced
with thicker walls and a heavier bursting charge; but even then the
effect of such light projectiles as our field-guns fire will not be
great against the earthworks which are nowadays so quickly thrown up on
positions. To prepare the way for the assault on such fortifications,
and to obtain any speedy result in attacking defended localities, we
must have field howitzers of a modern type. They should be organized
in regiments of two batteries (twenty-four howitzers), and attached to
a corps as corps artillery. Finally, it is essential that every army
should have a light siege-train to assist in the capture of strongly
defended posts and heavy works.

The organization of park units was well conceived, but the vehicles
were unsuited to the Manchurian roads. I am afraid to express an
opinion in favour of a further increase of mobile parks, because we
were so overburdened with baggage of different kinds. I think it is
preferable to improvise local parks at railway-stations and junctions,
as we did in Manchuria.

Small-arm ammunition rarely ran short, but there was often a great lack
of gun ammunition, and after the battles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho,
and Mukden, our reserves for filling up battery and park stocks were
exhausted. The average expenditure of rifle ammunition worked out as
follows: For a whole-day battle for one battalion, 21,000 rounds, with
a maximum of 400,000; an hour’s fighting for one battalion, 1,700,
with a maximum of 67,000. The total reserve taken with a four-battalion
infantry regiment was 800,000. The average expenditure per quick-firing
field-gun in a one-day battle worked out at 55 rounds, with a maximum
of 522; an hour’s fighting, 10 rounds, with a maximum of 210.

In the earlier fights the work of the artillery varied a good deal, and
was not very successful; but as they gained experience, many batteries
fought splendidly, not only against guns, but against rifle-fire.
Compared with the work of our artillery in 1877–78 (in the European
theatre of operations), we have made considerable progress in skill,
and the very heavy losses in killed and wounded in many batteries prove
that our gunners know how to die. The horse artillery work depended
entirely on the commanders of the cavalry units to which the batteries
were attached, and when these commanders really meant fighting the
batteries did good work. As a proof of this, it is enough to recall
the gallant conduct of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery
Battery attached to Mischenko’s Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade. This
battery and its young commander were known to the whole army; more
than once it successfully fought several of the enemy’s batteries,
and yet its losses were insignificant. Sometimes our cavalry leaders
were unnecessarily anxious to retire, as was the case in the cavalry
of the 2nd Army at the battle of Mukden, when the two batteries which
were with it lost _only two men wounded and one missing in eleven
days’ fighting_. One six-gun battery was sufficient for four mounted
regiments of such strength as we had. As said above, there should be
one artillery regiment of four batteries (48 guns) with each infantry
division, or a total of 144 guns for the three divisions. These three
regiments would be organized in a brigade. There should also be one
regiment of 24 howitzers with each corps.

CAVALRY.

Though our cavalry was numerous, its work hardly came up to our
expectations, but where it was properly commanded it did well enough.
In my opinion, the main reform that is necessary in the cavalry is to
improve their training. Till it is educated to feel that it should
fight as _obstinately as infantry_, the money expended on our mounted
Arm will be thrown away. If infantry can still continue fighting after
losing 50 per cent. of their strength, cavalry should be able to do
the same. In action we nursed the cavalry too much; out of action we
did not take sufficient care of it. Though they had not lost a man,
whole regiments were moved to the rear as soon as the first shrapnel
began bursting near them. The four regiments of cavalry—two dragoon
and two Cossack—on whom fell the most difficult but the most honourable
duty of obtaining information and opposing the leading units of Nogi’s
enveloping forces at the battle of Mukden, lost in killed and wounded:

Men.
February 25 2
March 2 1
March 4 1
March 5 7
March 6 2
March 7 6
March 8 1
March 9 1
March 10 1
――
Total 22
Which works out at less than one man per squadron and _sotnia_. The
casualties in almost every company of infantry were more than in these
twenty-four squadrons and _sotnias_. It is quite plain that these units
did not fight, but merely avoided the enemy; and it is equally plain
that, by avoiding battle, the cavalry neither checked the enemy’s
movement nor got any information about him. The material of which our
cavalry was composed was excellent, but everything depended on those in
command. In the battle of Te-li-ssu the infantry of the 1st Siberian
Corps lost 2,500 men; the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment, belonging to the
same corps, lost one!

But I repeat that where their leaders meant fighting the cavalry did
their duty and suffered heavily. Take, for example, the Trans-Baikal
Cossacks, which did so well under Mischenko, and the Caucasian Brigade.
The Siberian Cossacks, under Samsonoff, fought at Liao-yang and the
Yen-tai Mines with greater bravery than was displayed by some of
Orloff’s infantry, while the independent _sotnias_ of the Don and
Orenburg Voiskos, and the dragoons under Stakhovitch, were no whit
behind them. Indeed, the men of the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment were good
enough; it was the officers who failed in not getting the best out
of them. The independent units of all the Cossacks did well, but it
was out of the question to expect martial ardour or a keen desire to
perform feats of gallantry in old men such as formed the 3rd Category
Cossack regiments. But even these 3rd Category regiments could do good
work when skilfully handled. The Cossack horses generally, and the
Trans-Baikal horses in particular, were too small; while those of the
Don regiments were sturdy, but rather soft. The Trans-Baikal Cossacks
on their shaggy little ponies reminded one more of mounted infantry
than cavalry. On the whole, however, our cavalry worked far better
than in the Russo-Turkish War under Generals Kuiloff and Loshkareff at
Plevna. The great difficulty now is to find and train cavalry leaders;
in Manchuria, according to most accounts, the juniors were good, the
field officers moderate, and the general officers, with few exceptions,
bad.

The personality of the officer in command of a regiment of cavalry is a

very important factor, as his merits and weak points are very quickly
known, and as soon as a man in such a post shows himself unsuitable he
should be removed. (This also applies to the general officers.) But I
rarely found a divisional or corps commander who would report on the
unsuitability of senior commanders under them; they even concealed
cases of cowardice. It was only at the conclusion of hostilities that
it transpired that several had not only shown a lack of keenness, but
even of personal courage. Some of the regimental commanders were very
old; at fifty-five a man is too old for the command of a regiment. As
in the infantry, the post of cavalry brigadier should be improved, and
made a more important appointment. To it should be given the executive
and administrative powers now wielded by divisional generals.

Three brigades should be formed into a division, the divisional

general being given the powers of an army corps commander. There is no
necessity for a higher organization. To the division of three brigades
should be allotted a twelve-gun battery of horse artillery (three
companies of four guns each). To every three-division army corps
should be added one cavalry or Cossack brigade. One of the regiments
of this brigade should act as divisional cavalry, two squadrons
or _sotnias_ with each division. If it is thought desirable that
commanders of infantry divisions become acquainted with cavalry in
peace-time, then two squadrons should be stationed in the area of the
divisions under them.

INFANTRY.

As in former wars, so in Manchuria was the heat and burden of the day
borne by our infantry, and there is no doubt that, in the future,
infantry will retain its name as the principal Arm. The importance
of other Arms depends entirely on the extent to which they assist
infantry to defeat the enemy, for the latter is the final arbiter of
victory or defeat. But infantry cannot work alone, and nowadays, if
it is not assisted in action by artillery, cavalry, and sappers, if
every resource of modern science is not brought into play to lighten
its heavy task, it will either fail or will buy victory at too high a
price. It is to infantry, as the principal Arm, that we must pay our
chief attention. _And yet with us service in the Line is not considered
so honourable as service in the other branches!_ From the moment of
the selection of its recruits we do everything to weaken it. Even
the pattern of uniform worn by our Line infantryman is particularly
ugly. In his old-fashioned, badly fitting tunic, overburdened with
haversacks and equipment of all sorts, he is anything but a martial
sight. This is an aspect of the case which cannot be ignored, and it
is almost as important that a man’s uniform should be comfortable and
attractive as that it should meet all the purely military requirements.
All ranks should be enabled to admire their own dress and be proud of
it. Up to the present, the majority of Line officers have not been
given a good enough general or military education. Officers of all arms
should receive a general education not lower than the intermediate
standard of the national educational establishments, and a military
education not lower than that of the military schools. We should teach
the line officer to have a love and respect for the Arm in which he
serves, as well as a knowledge of its particular rôle in battle,
and must therefore raise his social position so that he may be a
welcome guest in any society. We must provide him with a comfortable,
inexpensive, and smart uniform. We must protect him from being abused
by his seniors in the presence of his juniors, and in every possible
manner encourage the development in him of an independent spirit.
Bravery alone is not sufficient nowadays to attain victory; knowledge,
initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility are also required.
Infantry have always had a hard part in action, and have always
suffered great loss, but the modern battle which lasts for days makes
greater demands upon their mental and physical endurance than ever
before. With a large proportion of reservists and short-service men,
we cannot rely on perfection in the soldier; it is therefore all the
more necessary that we should take steps to obtain it in our officers,
and for this purpose we are lucky in having excellent and responsive
material. Under all the arduous conditions under which the majority of
our regiments had to fight, the greatest trials fell to the infantry
officer, and right well he did his duty. It is quite enough to compare
the casualties amongst those officers with those of their brothers
in the cavalry, artillery, and sappers to see on whom fell the chief
hardships and dangers. In some regiments the whole set of officers was
changed several times. The following figures serve as an illustration
of how they suffered:
 Killed and
Wounded.
The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 102
The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 89
The 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 73
The 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 71
The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 61
The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment lost 50

It is impossible to recall the gallant war services of these and of the

officers of many other regiments without profound respect and emotion.

It must always be borne in mind that the infantry of the Line is the
backbone of our Service in peace as well as in war. Consequently, we
should make much more of those who serve in it than we do, and give
them a better chance. At present the list of regimental commanding
officers includes far too many Guardsmen or officers of the General
Staff. I am convinced that if the importance of service in the Line is
to be maintained, we must put an end to the present unfair acceleration
of promotion amongst Guards and General Staff officers as compared with
that of their brothers. The latter produce a great many men capable
of being good regimental commanders; all that is wanted is to know
how to select them. Since the last Turkish War they have undoubtedly
made considerable progress, and it is for us to arrange that this
improvement is continued by fostering it in every way.

Owing to casualties, the company commanders were changed too often

for efficiency, but they generally performed good service, lack of
initiative being, as usual, their chief fault. It is most important
for the good of the Service that captains (of all arms) displaying
distinguished military qualifications should be quickly promoted to
field rank. Yet recommendations sent to St. Petersburg were not acted
on for a very long time, if ever. In such a matter some discretion
should be allowed the Commander-in-Chief, and he should be empowered
to promote junior officers to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel for
distinguished service in the field. Special men would thus arrive
at the command of independent units and regiments, posts where the
personality of the man in command is so important. It often happened
that a regiment which had done badly absolutely changed its character
with a change of commanding officers. Seniority should not be the
only guide for promotion, and the establishment of field-officers
in Manchuria constituted a quite adequate number from which good
regimental commanders could have been liberally selected. During the
period when we were occupying the Hsi-ping-kai positions, many of
the regimental commanders in all the armies were good men, and the
1st Army was particularly lucky in this respect. Though many of the
infantry brigadiers who came out to the war proved failures, amongst
the regimental commanders were many capable field-officers, whose
advancement to the rank of General gave us some first-class brigade
commanders. In the 1st Army alone were Major-Generals Lechitski,
Stelnitski, Dushkevitch, Lesha, Riedko, Dobotin, etc. Thus, even under
the unfavourable conditions under which they served, we found enough
good material amongst our infantry officers to give us some confidence
for the future. Had the war been continued, many of the colonels
promoted to generals for distinguished service would have commanded
divisions. This is as it should be, for it ought to be possible for a
regimental commander to rise within a year to the command even of an
army corps, if he be sufficiently brilliant.

I repeat that the tasks which fall upon infantry in battle nowadays are
of such exceptional difficulty that the promotion of its officers for
distinguished field service should be made exceptionally rapid. I am
aware that even a good regimental commander may make a bad divisional
general; but I also maintain that a regimental commander who has
successfully commanded in several fights, has shown a knowledge of
his work, keenness, enterprise, and personal bravery, and has won the
confidence of his men, should be promoted as quickly as possible. He
may find it difficult at first to get his bearings under the new and
more complicated conditions of a high command, where he has to rely
upon maps and the reports of others instead of upon the direct evidence
of his own eyes and ears, but still he will grapple with the situation,
even of an army corps commander, far better than some general whose
experience has been confined to office-work and peace manœuvres.

Finally, in order to give due importance to the principal Arm—infantry

(infantry of the Line in particular)—I consider the following measures
necessary:

1. To give a better education to the officers entering it.

2. To improve their material and social position.

3. To provide officers and men with a smarter uniform.

4. To accelerate their promotion and put an end to the system by which

Guardsmen and officers of the General Staff get more rapid advancement,
and so block the way of their unfortunate brothers to regimental and
divisional commands.

5. To facilitate as much as possible the special promotion in war of

distinguished company officers to field rank.

6. To award regimental commanders who display particular merit on

service rapid advancement to the rank of General, without regard to
their seniority or the speed of their promotion.

The two last of these recommendations also obviously apply to officers

of the other Arms.

ORGANIZATION.

In my opinion, our experiences in the recent war have shown the

necessity for such an organization in our army as I will now describe:

_Infantry Regiment_: To consist of 4 battalions, each of 4 companies.

Each company to have a strength of 250 combatants. In addition to the
16 combatant companies per regiment, there should be scout sections
(mounted and dismounted), and machine-gun sections with 16 portable
guns. Strength of regiment, 5,000 men.

_Cavalry and Cossack Regiments_: As at present.

_Infantry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 8 battalions.

_Cavalry Brigade_: 2 regiments, 12 squadrons or _sotnias_.

All brigades should be capable of acting independently.

_Infantry Division_: To consist of 2 infantry brigades, 1 regiment of

artillery,[47] 1 sapper battalion, 1 telegraph company, 2 squadrons or
_sotnias_ of cavalry, transport company, parks, bakeries, hospitals.
Total, 17 battalions, 48 guns, and 2 squadrons or _sotnias_.

_Cavalry Division_: To consist of 3 separate brigades, 1 horse

artillery battery. Total, 36 squadrons or _sotnias_, and 12 guns.

_Army Corps_: To consist of 3 infantry divisions, 1 artillery brigade,

including a regiment of howitzers, 1 cavalry brigade,[48] 1 sapper
brigade,[49] 1 transport battalion, 1 battalion for camps on the line
of communication. Total, 48 battalions, 169 guns, 12 squadrons or
_sotnias_, and 3 sapper battalions.

_Reserve Troops_: To be formed into independent brigades, to which

the reserve units of artillery, cavalry, and sappers should be
attached. Each brigade to consist of 8 battalions, 2 batteries (24
guns), 1 squadron or _sotnia_, 2 sapper companies, half a company of
telegraphists, transport, hospitals, and bakeries. These brigades,
being organized on an independent footing, would be attached to the
armies; they would be detailed either as part of the army reserve or
for independent work in guarding the flanks and rear, or be joined to
corps, according to circumstances.

This, I think, will give great independence to all units, and the
creation of independent reserve brigades, outside of the divisional
and corps organization, would often prevent the breaking up of this
organization when a battle was in progress. To organize reserve field
troops beforehand in field formations, such as divisions of three
brigades, or corps, is not a convenient or suitable arrangement, as
they will not be ready to take part in the fighting as soon as the
regulars.

* * * * * *

Amongst steps which will raise the status of regimental service, and
so attract the best men to it, I consider it necessary, in addition
to providing an attractive uniform, to establish ranks distinct from
those borne by officers on the staff, in administrative offices, and
in departments. According to the scale of our military hierarchy, the
various commands (exclusive of the Cossack troops) carry ranks as
follows:

Sub-Lieutenant, Cornet, Lieutenant, and Staff-Captain in the different

Arms are the ranks given to the junior officers in companies,
squadrons, and batteries.

A Captain commands a company or a squadron.

A Lieutenant-Colonel commands a battalion, a battery, and a cavalry

division.[50]
A Colonel commands a regiment and a division of artillery.

A Major-General commands a brigade.

A Lieutenant-General commands a division.

A Lieutenant-General or a full General commands an army corps or a

military district.

All these ranks are also conferred on officers serving on the staff
and in departments. Thus, the rank of Colonel, which ought only to
be given to men in command of regiments, is also borne by those on
the administrative and police staffs, while generals of all grades,
who have never held command of troops or even of small units, fill
up our Generals list. At the time I framed the regulation to limit
the number of promotions to General’s rank of men not actually in the
army I was much bothered by numerous officers who feared that their
further promotion might be blocked. The present large number of ranks
amongst the officer class is not required. It is quite possible to
reduce them, and to give to these their old Russian names (to which
the Cossack[51] troops still adhere), for officers of all Arms doing
regimental service—namely, _Khorunji_, _Sotnik_, and _Esaoul_. The
rank of _Pod-esaoul_, which was adopted later, might be excluded.
_Esaouls_ would command companies, squadrons, _sotnias_, and companies
(of artillery); _Sotniks_ would command half-companies, half-squadrons;
and _Khorunjis_ would command sections. The normal establishment of a
company would be one _Esaoul_, two _Sotniks_, and four _Khorunjis_. The
same should be done in the cavalry. For those not serving regimentally
the ranks of Ensign, Lieutenant, and Captain might be maintained,
those of Sub-Lieutenant and Staff-Captain being abolished. The present
ranks of field-officers might be conferred on those officers not
doing regimental service, and the titles of _Voiskovoi Starshina_ and
Colonel on those with regiments. The first would command a battalion,
a division of cavalry or artillery; the second, regiments of all Arms.
The rank of Lieutenant-Colonel to be kept for staff and departmental
officers, and the rank of Major should be introduced instead of that
of Colonel. The names of the ranks of those serving with troops to
correspond generally to the nature of the appointment; thus, officers
commanding brigades should be called Brigadiers, those in charge of
divisions, Divisional Generals, of an army corps, Corps Generals. The
latter rank should also be given to commanders of military districts
and their assistants. The only officers not actually serving with
troops who should be allowed to have the title of Corps General
should be three: the War Minister and the chiefs of the General and
Headquarter Staffs. For service away from troops only two ranks of
General should be maintained—Major-General and Lieutenant-General. The
titles Generals of Infantry and Cavalry, etc., should be abolished. The
grading would then be as follows:

A.—FOR REGIMENTAL SERVICE.

Commander of section Khorunji.

Commander of half-company, half-squadron,
half-_sotnia_ Sotnik.
Commander of company, squadron, _sotnia_,
artillery company Esaoul.
 Commanding battalion, battery,
division of cavalry Voiskovoi Starshina.
Commanding regiment Colonel.
Commander of brigade Brigadier.
Commander of division Divisional General.
Commander of corps Corps General.

B.—FOR EXTRA REGIMENTAL SERVICE.

Ensign, Lieutenant, Captain, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major,

Major-General, and Lieutenant-General.

Except in the case of the chief staff-officers of districts, the

transfer of general officers not with troops to service with troops
should be forbidden. The appointments of Corps Chief Staff-officers
and Quartermaster-Generals on the staffs of districts should carry
the rank of Major. Officers going into other departments should take
purely civil rank, and promotion on retirement should be abolished.
To accelerate the advancement of specially distinguished colonels,
it should be possible to appoint them to brigades with the rank of
Brigadier. There is at present great confusion in this matter of
accelerated promotion in deserving cases, for colonels can be given the
command of independent brigades, and yet not of non-independent ones.

As war is a greater strain on the officers than on the men, it is

important, when granting special privileges for regimental service to
the latter, that great care should be taken to insure their physical
fitness. A particularly bad form of unfitness is that caused by
corpulence, and, unfortunately, many even of our company officers
suffered from this in Manchuria. One of our regimental commanders was
so stout that he was practically helpless, and was taken prisoner at
Te-li-ssu, though unwounded! As to the rank and file, hill-climbing
with an 80-pound equipment makes campaigning very arduous for those
of forty years of age or over. Company and field officers can well
serve up to fifty, but commanding officers of cavalry should not be
over fifty, and of infantry regiments over fifty-five. The age-limit
for generals in command of brigades and divisions should be sixty,
and of corps sixty-three. The necessity for the age regulations we
now have became apparent during the war, for as a result of them our
field-officers were relatively young; but our experience proves that
the limit should be still further lowered in the direction I have
mentioned.

The proposals set forth above, which it is thought would tend to

increase our fighting efficiency, are, after all, only details of
organization and of preparation. The main factors contributing to
insure victory are the same as they always have been—a high _moral_
and the power of rapid concentration in superior strength. Diplomacy
must prepare for the struggle so as to enable all the armed forces of
the Empire to be put into the field if necessary, and we must have
numerous efficient railways to facilitate the rapid massing of superior
numbers. On these two most important factors will depend the plan
of campaign. The ability to assume the offensive bestows an immense
superiority, for it gives the initiative to the side which undertakes
it. The defender’s leading troops are compelled to fall back, his
less prepared troops are perhaps crushed, while his reinforcements
are destroyed piecemeal. The result is that the _moral_ of the
attacker increases, while that of the enemy inevitably diminishes. To
re-establish a balance under such conditions is not only a matter of
time, but is extremely difficult. With a defensive plan of operations,
unshakeable belief in eventual success and immense patience are
necessary in order to overcome all difficulties, and to defeat the foe
with a final assumption of the offensive.

From the short sketch I have given of what was accomplished by the
Russian armed forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it
is seen that we took the offensive in the majority of the wars we
were engaged in. Without railways, but with a large peace standing
army (period of service twenty-five years with the colours), with
equality and often a superiority[52] in armament and training, Russia
was able to commence operations, and to force her will upon the
enemy—_i.e._, to assume the offensive. Nowadays we have been left
behind by our Western neighbours in readiness for hostilities, and
the recent war disclosed the fact that we had been outdistanced by
our Eastern neighbour also. Russia will, no doubt, in time find the
strength and means once more to take her former place amongst other
Powers as regards fighting efficiency; but it will take years of
unceasing effort, for rapid concentration and an offensive strategy are
impossible without great developments in our railway system. No one can
say whether we shall be allowed to wait for everything to be perfected,
or whether we shall again be drawn into war before we are ready. It is
therefore absolutely necessary to prepare without loss of time to make
war under conditions as unfavourable as those of the recent conflict.

Without referring here to the necessity for diplomatic preparation for

hostilities, and the proper attitude of all grades of Russian society
during war, I will comment in the most general lines on those measures
which should, in my opinion, be taken for the more useful employment
of resources already at our disposal. The principle which is of such
importance in field operations, that troops once engaged will not be
relieved, must be finally accepted. Therefore, every unit going into
action should know that it will be supported, but not replaced. The
principle in its broadest sense applies without distinction to all
ranks who join the field army, and till victory has been attained not
a soul should be able to return home or receive another appointment
outside the theatre of operations. Those who prove themselves unfit
for their appointments at the actual front should be given other
employments for which their bodily and mental qualifications are
fitted. In such a serious business as war in defence of country no
personal ambition should or can have place, and the removal of a
person from the field army should be considered the greatest possible
disgrace—a stain which the service of a lifetime cannot efface.
Officers thus removed should be deprived of their military rank,
dismissed the Service, and should forfeit all rights and privileges
gained in the Service, and officers and men so removed should be
deprived of the right to hold any Government post whatever, whether
under the War Department or not.

The punishment for cowardice should be death.

I have touched upon the question of accelerated promotion for good

service in the field, and the converse applies. Senior commanders
who show themselves unfit for their appointments ought to be at once
removed from their commands and given posts corresponding to their
capabilities. Commanders of corps and divisions considered unfit
may, in order to guard their military honour, request to be allowed
to remain in the army in command of divisions or brigades. Only one
kind of seniority can be acknowledged in war—namely, the ability to
gain the victory. General officers incompetent for field service can
do very useful work on the lines of communications, in the direction
and training of the reserve troops, the management of hospitals, the
administration of the inhabitants of the country, etc. If we ever mean
to be capable of defeating a powerful enemy, we must not allow an army
corps commander who is struck off from the command of his corps, and
who does not even display personal courage, to become a member of the
Committee of Imperial Defence; nor must we allow junior commanders who
fail when tested by war to receive appointments in non-mobilized units,
nor permit hundreds of officers who leave the front on account of
ill-health, and under various pretexts, to remain away and not return.
I say nothing of the case where an army commander leaves his army
during active hostilities without even reporting his departure to the
Commander-in-Chief.

If courts of honour are found to be a necessity in peace-time, how

much more are they necessary in war? In addition to being formed in
regiments, they should be formed in corps and armies to adjudicate
upon the conduct in action of senior commanders up to the rank of
Divisional General. It is vital that the existing immunity of men who
show cowardice in action, or who are guilty of disgraceful conduct out
of action, should at once cease. For this purpose I consider we should
form soldiers’ courts of honour in every company and independent unit,
as a means for suppressing the worst elements found in the ranks. For,
with the lack of moral development of the modern man in the street,
it is absolutely necessary to have some such tribunals upon whose
verdict corporal punishment can be awarded to private soldiers. To
leave the field under the pretext of assisting or carrying away the
wounded—except for the men specially detailed for this duty—should be
punished with the utmost rigour. And to fight an action to a finish,
officers must not hesitate to sacrifice their last reserves, if
necessary, and also themselves. It is necessary to draw attention to
this, as instances occurred in the war where officers, having given
orders for a retirement, were themselves the first to go. Such an
example is always infectious, and leads to disorganization of units
and loss of confidence in the commander. Commanders of forces who do
not in battle support neighbouring units when able to do so should be
deprived of their appointments, tried, and, if necessary, punished by
death. Commanders of all ranks should be thoroughly alive to the value
of every man in the ranks. Therefore, every endeavour should be made to
keep units as strong as possible during an action.

Finally, I will touch briefly on several points. I will permit myself

to express the opinion that the existing regulations as to rewards
in war require revision and considerable alteration. At present far
too many honours are bestowed. Another point that demands attention
is that of malingering. As we have seen, sickness was more prevalent
amongst the officers, in spite of their better living, than among
the men. Unfortunately, also, the medical officers more than once
called my attention, when I was inspecting hospitals, to cases of
malingering amongst officers as well as men. The great majority of
patients, of course, were really ill, but much of the sickness was due
to the individual not taking proper care of himself. Officers must
realize that, however honourable a thing it is to be wounded, it is as
dishonourable to remain in hospital when their comrades are fighting.
It should be ruled for all ranks that in such cases the period of
sickness should not count as service, and that during it pay should
be forfeited. All officers and officials absenting themselves for
more than two months should be removed from their appointments, and
appointed to the reserve or depôt troops. Amongst the many regrettable
things to be noted in the late war was the disgraceful conditions
under which both men and officers were often taken prisoner. The
existing regulations, which lay down that all the circumstances of
a case of capture should be investigated, were not complied with.
Officers who returned straight to Russia from being prisoners in Japan
were appointed by the War Department even to the command of divisions.
There is only one thing which justifies capture—the fact of being
wounded. All those who surrender when they have not been wounded should
be tried by court-martial for not fighting to the last.

The regulations regarding fortresses should be revised, and the

occasions upon which a fortress is allowed to surrender should be
absolutely cut out, for fortresses may be taken, but should never,
under any circumstances, surrender. Commandants of fortresses who
surrender them, captains who surrender their ships, officers in command
of units that lay down their arms, should be considered as forfeiting
all rights, and should be condemned to be shot without trial, and all
those not in command who surrender unwounded should be deprived of
their military rank from the day of their surrender. During the war
the Press did much to undermine the authority of officers in command,
and to lower the _moral_ of the men, by indiscriminate revelations.
In the next war only such events should be allowed to appear in the
newspapers as may help to encourage the men. When active operations
are over, the circumstances are changed, and it is then essential for
the good of the Service to have a thorough investigation into all
shortcomings.

But it is not sufficient that all ranks of the army should be

imbued with the spirit of fighting on till victory is won; it is
necessary that the whole nation should have the same feeling, and
to the best of their ability assist towards a happy issue of the
struggle being carried on by the army. In our state of backwardness
(especially as regards railways) we are doomed in our next war to a
slow concentration, and therefore to a protracted campaign. Being
unable at once to put large forces into the field, and to seize the
initiative, we may again be compelled to bear the consequences of our
unreadiness—frequent reverses, and retirement; but we must, without
wavering, firmly believe in eventual success, however unfavourable the
conditions at the start. The moral and material resources of Russia are
immense, and the fixed determination on the part of the army and the
whole nation to win is our principal guarantee of victory.

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY OF THE WAR

I have already reviewed[53] (in Chapters VIII., IX., X., and XI.)
the causes of our failure. They can be summarized in three groups:

1. Those causes independent of the War Ministry.

2. Those dependent on the War Ministry, for which officers in the field
had no responsibility.

3. Those for which officers in the field were alone responsible.

The first group comprises—

(_a_) The absence of any diplomatic arrangement which would have

enabled us to despatch and distribute our whole army freely as
circumstances dictated (similar to that which in 1870–71 made it
possible for the Prussians to move the whole of their armed forces
against France).

(_b_) The subordinate part played by the fleet during the war.

(_c_) The inferiority of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese Railways.

(_d_) The internal disorders in Russia, which affected the spirit of

the army.

The second group comprises—

(_a_) The delay in mobilizing the reinforcements for the Far East.

(_b_) The transfer into the reserve during the war of well-trained
soldiers—men who were still liable for colour service—from the military
districts in European Russia, while untrained elderly reservists were
being sent to the front.

(_c_) The belated despatch of drafts to the front. (The reason of this
was also the inefficiency of the railways.)

(_d_) The delay in promoting those who particularly distinguished

themselves in the field. (Many recommendations were ignored.)

(_e_) The deficiencies in our technical equipment.

(_f_) The faults of organization (absence of troops for protecting

communications, dearth of transport, unwieldiness of the army and corps
organizations).

(_g_) Deficiencies in the _personnel_ both of officers and men.

The third group comprises—

(_a_) The absence of a true military feeling among the troops.

(_b_) The poor spirit in action shown by some of them.

(_c_) The lack of determination on the part of commanders of all

degrees to carry out the tasks entrusted to them.
(_d_) The breakdown of the organization under the stress of war.

The weak points of our forces, which were so noticeable in the wars
waged in the second half of the last century, had not been entirely
eliminated during the fifty years which intervened since the Crimea,
and were again evident in the recent struggle—namely:

1. We were inferior to our enemy in technical troops and equipment.

2. The “command” was unsatisfactory.

3. The army was insufficiently trained tactically.

4. We did not insure victory by having considerable superiority in

numbers.

We did not have before us any clear idea of our object, and
consequently did not show sufficient determination in its prosecution.

So many different reasons have been advanced for our failure that the
question naturally arises as to what foundation there really is for my
opinion—shared by the greater part of the army in the field—that if we
had not concluded peace so hastily victory would have crowned our arms.

My belief that we could, and ought to, have issued victorious from the
struggle is based upon—

I. The steady growth of our material forces.

II. The growth of our moral forces.

III. The gradual deterioration of the enemy

in both respects.

I.

We have already seen how fatal the inefficiency of our railways was for
us. Yet, though six months before the outbreak of war only two pairs
of short trains were available for military purposes, when peace was
concluded we had ten and even twelve pairs of full trains running in
the twenty-four hours. Thus, during hostilities the carrying capacity
of the railway grew sixfold, and was capable of still further increase.
Notwithstanding all our reverses, the army continued to grow in
numbers, and was 1,000,000 strong when peace was concluded, and more
than two-thirds of this number (including the newly arrived drafts,
the new corps, and the Pri-Amur troops) had not been under fire.
Moreover, owing to improved rail transport and the proper exploitation
of all local resources, the whole number was assured of everything
necessary, both for fighting and subsistence, to an extent that had
never previously been the case. We had received a proper proportion
of artillery of every nature, reserves of light railway material,
telegraph and wireless telegraph stores, and entrenching and technical
tools and equipment of all sorts. We had constructed three strong
lines of defence at Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kwang-cheng-tzu;
our communications in rear were safe; almost every army corps was in
possession of its own line of rails; and the Sungari and other rivers
were crossed by many bridges. The war strength of all units had been
considerably augmented. Russia’s resources for continuing the struggle
were greater than those of Japan, for not only had our Guards and
Grenadiers not been drawn upon, but the greater part of the army was
still at home.

II.

Though an improvement of _moral_ is by no means as easy to bring about

in an army as that of its material condition, the officers who were
most in touch with our men were convinced that it was done in our
case. It may possibly be a peculiarity of the Russian soldier that
he possesses latent moral strength of the kind which is developed
slowly, and not destroyed by any trials to which the individual is
subjected; but to those who made a study of the war it appeared
perfectly clear that our men showed an increasing spirit of stubborn
determination as the campaign progressed. In the early fights before
the battle of Liao-yang—at Te-li-ssu and Ta-shih-chiao—we withdrew
after comparatively small losses. At the latter fight two army corps,
and at Yang-tzu-ling one corps, retired, though they together did not
collectively lose as many men as the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment
alone lost in the battle of Mukden. At Liao-yang our men fought better
than in the previous fights; on the Sha Ho they showed a better spirit
than at Liao-yang; while at Mukden many units showed a still further
improvement. We were all convinced, therefore, that in a defence of,
or an offensive advance from, the Hsi-ping-kai position, the men would
fight even better than at Mukden, for the improvement in spirit shown
by our troops had been progressive and steady. They had learned much,
particularly during their long stay in direct touch with the enemy
on the Sha Ho. Even the reserve units, which failed in the early
fights, fought with great bravery and steadiness at Mukden. To prove
this, it is only necessary to recall the exploits of the 71st and
54th Divisions, the later arrived reserve units of the 55th and 61st
Divisions at Mukden, and of many regiments of the 10th, 17th, and 1st
Army Corps. The regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps and the East
Siberian Rifles, indeed, were an example throughout the war.

The Tsar, in his Order to the army and fleet of January 14,
1905, predicted this improvement in the _moral_ of the troops,
notwithstanding their reverses, with great foresight. His belief in the
spirit of the army was expressed in the following memorable words:

“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and

losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By
them Russia’s strength is renewed, and her power increased.”

As operations continued we made corresponding progress in our tactics.

We learned how to attack and make use of the ground, and how to
employ artillery, and learned by heart the lesson of keeping strong
reserves in hand [at the Hsi-ping-kai position the reserve of the 1st
Manchurian Army alone consisted of eighty battalions]. We also learned
how to obtain intelligence of hostile forces. At the close of the war
our knowledge of the Japanese dispositions was more complete than
it had ever been; indeed, we had accurate information of the exact
whereabouts, not only of their main bodies, but also of many individual
units. (This was chiefly obtained from prisoners.)

We received as reinforcements 300,000 regular soldiers then with

the colours, most of whom had volunteered for the front, and the
1905 recruits. These young soldiers were ready to face any danger;
they arrived in the highest spirits, and their cheerfulness and
evident keenness to see some fighting did one’s heart good. The
older reservists were mostly employed on duties in the rear. As a
result, volunteers were always forthcoming for the numerous raids and
reconnaissances made by the 1st Manchurian Army from the Hsi-ping-kai
position, or for any other adventurous work. The mainspring of the
improvement in our spirit, however, was the more careful selection made
of the officers appointed to command units. Many of these now began to
display military qualifications of a high order. The fighting round
Mukden had produced generals of a calibre upon which we could have
fully relied in any subsequent battles. As regards the general question
of the readiness of the 1st Manchurian Army for renewed fighting after
the Mukden battle, I concluded my report on this force as follows:

“With the occupation of the Hsi-ping-kai position the army

found itself confronted with a great work.

“No map of the neighbouring country existed, and the little

information we had of the enemy was chiefly remarkable for
its absolute vagueness. There were no roads to the rear, no
local depôts for the supply of the army, and no fords over
the Sungari River, which was a standing menace, as the usual
Spring floods were still ahead of us.

“The co-ordinated and willing efforts of all ranks, however,

soon changed all this. The fortified line of works from
Hsi-ping-kai Station to the village of Kung-chu-ling became
practically invincible, and the order was given to use it as a
_place d’armes_ and accumulate strong reserves there. In May
there were eighty battalions in reserve behind the left flank;
practically one-half of the five army corps was located here.

“A two-verst[54] map was made, showing not only the country

in our rear, but the strip of ground right up to the enemy’s
positions.

“By means of reconnaissances and the employment of spies,

we gradually sifted our inaccurate intelligence till our
information was correct. We were able first to locate the
disposition of the enemy’s armies, then of his divisions, and,
finally, of small units.

“The services to the rear were carried out with similar energy;
roads were laid out, the Sungari was bridged, and storehouses
were built.

“At the beginning of July the army was almost ready to advance;
the only thing lacking was the equipment for light railways for
horse traction. Without this it was impossible to advance in
any great strength.

“During the last few months a horse railway was laid to

 Ya-mu-tzu, and the carriage of supplies for a forward movement
was thus assured.

“A connected series of reconnaissances were carried out in

order to gain knowledge of the ground in front.

“The army was brought almost up to full strength by the drafts

and new units which had joined.

“In August it was quite ready for battle, and its now
recuperated and reinforced veteran corps waited the order for a
forward movement in complete confidence.”

General Bilderling, who commanded the 2nd Manchurian Army (which

suffered the most heavily at Mukden), finishes his report on this army
as follows:

“The army occupied the Hsi-ping-kai position, shattered and

disorganized by the battle of Mukden; but it has recovered with
extraordinary rapidity. With the arrival of the young soldiers
and reservists, all the units have been brought up to full war
strength, and it is only in the officers that there is still
a great deficiency. The mounted units have been reinforced by
fresh squadrons and by horses from the artillery reserve; the
guns and waggons which were lost or had become unserviceable
have been replaced. Every division has been strengthened by
mounted and dismounted machine-gun sections, and howitzer
batteries have been formed; a light railway for horse-draught
has been laid along the whole length of the position and in
rear of it; and, profiting by recent experience, the troops are
now thoroughly proficient in all exercises and manœuvres. Thus
the army, by reason of its numbers, material composition, and
training, has become really better prepared for hostilities at
the close of the war than it was at the beginning, and again
constitutes a menace to the enemy.”

The 3rd Manchurian Army, which, under the command of General Batianoff,
formed a reserve for the 1st and 2nd Armies, and contained corps which
had arrived latest and had not been in action, was also a large and
reliable body of men.

Of course, there is a skeleton in every cupboard, and naturally in such

a large force as the three armies constituted there were weak spots.
Thus, there were to be found amongst the men, and even the officers,
a certain number of poor-spirited creatures who disbelieved in the
possibility of victory. But even such characters would have plucked up
their spirits and done good service at the first success.

From the moment I joined the army in Manchuria, I invariably told every
unit that I met or reviewed that the war could only end after we had
been victorious; that till then none of us would be allowed to return
home; and that victory was certain when sufficient reinforcements
reached us. And belief in these facts sank into the hearts of officers
and private soldiers. Both before and after Mukden, I more than once
heard the men themselves—particularly those in hospital—say that they
could not return home till the enemy had been defeated. “The women
will laugh at us,” were their words. Another important factor, and
one which the Russian especially values, is constant and affectionate
care for his bodily needs and his health. For anyone who has not been
on active service it is difficult to appreciate how troops who have
been disorganized and badly shaken by hard fighting can regain heart
if they suddenly find hot food ready for them. A night’s rest, a full
stomach, ammunition replenished, a quiet calling of the roll, and the
calm demeanour of their officers—all assisted to make our splendid
soldiers once more ready for the fray. As regards the army’s _moral_
generally, I should mention that the nearer our men were to the enemy,
the better were their spirits and the fewer the carping comments and
criticisms which always do so much harm; there was no time to read the
papers. When I visited the advanced units of the 1st Army (those of
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberians, and of the 1st Army Corps commanded
by Colonels Prince Trubetski, Tikhomiroff, Redkin, and General
Kashtalinski), I found universal keenness to advance. The men were well
looked after, discipline was strict, and the attitude of both men and
officers was one of quiet and steady determination. But in proportion
as the distance from the advanced lines increased, and direct touch
with the enemy was lost, there was time for talk and gossip. It was on
the lines of communication (particularly at Harbin) that drunkenness
and gambling took place, besides other forms of dissipation that
disgraced the army. It was here that the white-livered brigade
collected, leaving the front under any excuse even when fighting was in
progress, and, indeed, what else could be expected of them? It is much
to be regretted that some of our pressmen judged the army by what they
saw at Harbin, and that we were judged by this standard even in Russia.
Many officers and others in authority who had failed to pass the
“ordeal by fire” lived on in Russia, and from them a correct opinion
as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to
continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for
us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two
general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other
had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men
as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to
insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle.

A step taken by me to raise and to maintain the spirit of the army

was the rapid promotion of those officers who had most distinguished
themselves in the field. We obtained a number of our best senior
regimental officers by promoting captains, and, what is more important,
we appointed many distinguished officers to the command of regiments
without regard to their lack of seniority, or to the fact that some
of them were only lieutenant-colonels. In a very short time these
commanding officers improved their regiments almost beyond recognition,
and fully proved how important a careful selection is in war. By
promoting to Major-General those colonels who had most distinguished
themselves on service, we began to get at the head of brigades leaders
who were worthy of every confidence, and offered a splendid selection
from which to choose divisional and corps commanders.

A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane
treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those
immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war
conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property
being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in
cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in
getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves
occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being
maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to
requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get
local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite
of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population
against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of
many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people
appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in
their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily
kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials,
attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads,
they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of
war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses.

Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the
possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal
means taken by me to secure victory were:

1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be
brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our
efforts not one of us would return home.

2. To foster a constant fatherly endeavour on the part of all in

authority to attend, as far as the exigencies of the Service permitted,
to the comfort and preserve the health of the troops.

3. To assist in all ways the readiness and preparation of the troops,

particularly by accelerating, irrespective of mere seniority, the
promotion of the most distinguished of the officers.

4. To maintain a uniformly humane attitude towards the Chinese

population of Manchuria.

III.

The enemy’s army began to weaken in the moral as well as the material
sense.

To drive back our army northwards to Hsi-ping-kai called for immense

efforts and many sacrifices on the part of the Japanese. I have
stated (in Chapter VII.) that our Headquarter Staff estimated the
total peace establishment of their army at 110,000 men [of which
13,000 were always absent on furlough and leave], and the reserve and
territorial forces at only 315,000, so that the total number available
for service was, as we thought, not more than 425,000. But, according
to the figures of the Japanese army medical authorities, more than
1,000,000 men were called up to the colours, which must have demanded
a great effort on the part of the nation. It was found necessary also,
during the war, to alter the existing laws so as to catch those men
who had already completed their time in the reserve for a further
period of service in the regular army, and to draft into the ranks
in 1904 and 1905 the recruit contingent of 1906 as well as that of
1905. (Towards the end we began to find old men and boys amongst our
prisoners.) Their casualties were very high; in the Cemetery of Honour
in Tokio alone 60,600 men killed in battle were buried, and to these
must be added more than 50,000 who died of wounds. Thus it appears
from these two sources alone that they lost 110,000—a figure equal to
the whole peace establishment of the army. Taking into account our
standing peace army of 1,000,000 men, our losses were comparatively far
lighter than those of the Japanese. In all some 554,000 men passed
through their hospitals during the war, of whom 220,000[55] were wound
cases. Altogether they lost 135,000 men killed and died of wounds and
sickness. Their losses in officers were particularly heavy, and the
men fought with such stubborn bravery that whole regiments, and even
brigades, were on certain occasions almost wiped out of existence. This
happened, for instance, in the fight for Putiloff Hill,[56] on October
15; also during the February fighting for the position held by the 3rd
Siberians on the Kiao-tu Ling [Pass]; in the battle of March 7, at
Tu-hung-tun[57] and other points. At Liao-yang and Mukden the majority
of the enemy’s troops suffered very heavily in their frontal attack of
our positions, and failed to take them. The fate of these battles was
decided by turning movements. In the fighting on the Sha Ho they tried
hard to force us back towards Mukden, and many of their units were
again and again driven off our positions, and only occupied them after
we had abandoned them of our own accord. The spirit of these Japanese
troops who had thus seen no success attend their individual efforts
could not but be shaken. Again, the ever-increasing determination
displayed by our men must have affected their spirit. Their regulars
had been placed _hors de combat_ in considerable numbers, and however
quickly the recruits might be called up and trained, it was not to be
expected that they would be able to develop the same stubbornness in
defence, and the same dash in attack, that their comrades had possessed
in the first campaign. This was noticeable in the fighting in front of
Mukden, but especially near Hsi-ping-kai. While our scouting parties,
and the troops of the advanced posts, were pressing the enemy more and
more boldly, we began to notice a comparative lack of enterprise on
their part, coupled with a want of their former daring, and even their
watchfulness. Perhaps the strain of war was beginning to tell on the
Southern temperament. Indeed, for six whole months they gave us time
to strengthen ourselves and fortify, without once attempting to attack
and press us back on the Sungari, and so inflict a crushing defeat.
While we remained at Hsi-ping-kai the number of prisoners taken by us
began to increase, and they ceased to display the fanaticism shown by
those captured in 1904. Many openly acknowledged that they were weary
of the war, and from the nature of numerous letters from Japan found
on the killed and prisoners, it was evident that this weariness was
general. These letters also told of the heavy increase in taxation
during the war, of the increased cost of the necessities of life,
and of the dearth of employment. Once an entire company surrendered
in front of the positions held by the 1st Siberians, a thing that had
never happened before. Nor were the enemy well situated as regards
material. Money became more and more scarce, while the requirements of
the growing army increased. Particular difficulty was found in quickly
replenishing artillery ammunition. This was very noticeable on the Sha
Ho.

But what must have been the most serious source of anxiety to Japan
was the indifference which Europe and America were beginning to show
to her successes. At first it had seemed profitable to Great Britain
and Germany that Russia and Japan should be drawn into war, for when
they were exhausted the hands of both would be tied—ours in Europe, and
Japan’s in Asia. Nevertheless, it was not to the interest of Europe
generally to allow the triumph of the Japanese in the battlefields of
Manchuria to become absolute. A victorious Japan might join with China,
and raise the standard of “Asia for the Asiatics.” The extinction
of all European and American enterprises in Asia would be the first
object of this new great Power, and the expulsion of Europeans from
Asia would be the end. There is already little enough room on the
Continent of Europe. Without the markets of the wide world she could
not exist, and the cries of “America for the Americans,” “Asia for the
Asiatics,” “Africa for the Africans,” are of serious import for her.
But the danger is approaching, and is so imminent that the Powers of
Europe will be forced to sink their differences and unite in order to
withstand the attempt of the young nations[58] to drive old Europe home
into the narrow shell which she has long since outgrown. We might have
taken advantage of this change in international feeling, and have tried
to close the money markets of the world to Japan. Only one decisive
victory on our part was wanted to bring about a very serious reaction
both in Japan and in the army in the field. If we had exhausted her
financial resources, and had continued the war, we might soon have
compelled her to seek an honourable peace, which would have been
advantageous to us.

At Mukden we fought with a shortage in establishment of 300,000 men;

we began the war with inconsiderable forces; we conducted it under the
most unfavourable conditions, and without the support of the country;
we were, moreover, weakened by disturbances in the interior, and were
connected with Russia only by a single-track weak line. In these
impossible conditions we put 300,000 of the enemy _hors de combat_,
and had 600,000 rifles ready at Hsi-ping-kai at a time when they were
beginning to flag. If we attained such results, can it be said that
our army accomplished but little? Is it fair to continue applying
the epithet “Disgraceful” to the war? It cannot be denied that both
the troops and their leaders did less in the time at their disposal
than they might have done if properly supported by the country; but
by the summer of 1905 conditions had begun to change in our favour.
The conquered are always judged severely, and the leaders should
naturally be the first to bear the responsibility for disaster to the
troops under them. We can only be judged as acquitted because of our
readiness to continue the struggle—a readiness which was created, and
grew stronger in the army in spite of disaster. We believed in the
possibility and certainty of victory, and if it had not been for the
serious internal disturbances in Russia, we should have undoubtedly
been able to prove the truth of our belief in battle.

Even the inhabitants of Moscow, where, in all the difficult times the
nation has passed through, a manly and determined voice has always
been raised in support of the honour and dignity of Russia, showed
that their spirits had on this occasion fallen. It was with amazement
and sorrow that we read of a certain action of the Moscow Town Council
on June 7, 1905. The news had immense effect on the army, and on
hearing of it I sent the following letter[59] to Prince Trubetski, the
President of the Moscow nobility:

“An overwhelming impression has been produced throughout

the army by the news which has reached us from home that
many poor-spirited people are trying to bring about an early
peace. It is forgotten that a peace made before victory has
been won cannot be honourable, and will not therefore be
permanent. Never has our army been so strong and so ready for
 serious battle as now. Victory is nearer than seems likely
to those at a distance. The troops have great belief in the
new Commander-in-Chief;[60] they are assured of everything
necessary to their wants, and their health is excellent. We
would welcome news of the enemy’s advance, and are ready to
move against them, when ordered to, with full faith in our
strength. The troops have become war-seasoned. Even those units
which were for various reasons not as steady as they should
have been in the early fights are now thoroughly reliable.
Numbers of wounded officers and men are hastening to rejoin,
though not completely convalescent. Though we have lost the
fleet, the army remains to us, and, I repeat, it is more
powerful than it ever was before. Our position is altogether
stronger and, tactically, better placed than those we held at
Liao-yang or Mukden, for the Japanese do not envelop us in
the same way. Though their forces have also been growing in
numbers, there are many indications that their strength is on
the wane: their ranks are being filled with men who formerly
would not have been accepted, and the whole spirit of the army
has undergone a change. More men allow themselves to be taken
prisoners than before; their artillery and cavalry are weaker
than ours, and they are short of gun ammunition. Letters from
Japan, which we have found on the men, show that a general
feeling of dissatisfaction with the war is growing among the
people, for prices have gone up, and they are enduring great
privations. These are the conditions under which I to-day
read in letters from Moscow that on June 7 the Town Council
discussed the advisability of inviting the representatives of
the people to consider the question of putting an end to the
war. Last February, on my departure for the front, you, in the
name of all the representatives of Moscow, bade me farewell
with words full of courage and of faith in the might of Russia.
I therefore consider it my duty to send this letter to you.
If the Muscovites do not feel as able as before to send their
worthiest sons to us to help us overcome the foe, let them at
least not prevent us from doing our duty in Manchuria.

“Although there is nothing of a secret nature in this letter,

its publication in the Press over my signature is very
undesirable.”

In reply, Prince Trubetski wrote to me on June 14 as follows:

“I have handed over your telegram, which greatly touched me,

to the Mayor and Zemstvo; I will communicate its contents to
as many as I can, and I will do everything that is possible to
get action taken on it. If it may be considered necessary by
the Tsar to end the war, I do not think it should be discussed
beforehand in committees. May God help you! My whole heart is
with you.”

But the efforts of individuals were powerless to check the march

of events. The serious state of Russia’s internal affairs and the
hostile—to put the best construction on it—indifference of the people
resulted in peace being prematurely concluded. The consequences
of making such a peace, by which Japan was recognized as Russia’s
conqueror in Asia, will have serious results not only for us, but for
all the Powers who have possessions or interests on that continent.
The “Yellow peril,” the appearance of which has only recently been
foreseen, is now a reality. Notwithstanding her victorious issue from
the war, Japan is hurriedly increasing her forces, while China is
forming a large army under the guidance of Japanese officers and on the
Japanese model. In a very short space of time she and Japan will be
able to pour an army of more than 1,500,000 into Manchuria, which, if
directed against us, could proceed to take a great deal of Siberia from
Russia, and reduce her to a second-rate Power.

We have seen above how the absence of any previous diplomatic

arrangements forced us to keep the greater part of our armed forces
in European Russia during the war, which fact constituted one of the
reasons of our reverses (the Guards and Grenadiers Corps remained
in Russia, while the reserve troops fought in Manchuria). We have
one consolation in that we now know that our Western neighbours are
not pursuing any policy of aggression against us, for they had an
excellent opportunity in the years 1905 and 1906[61] to alter the
existing frontier had they wished to do so. We may hope, therefore,
to be able to come to some understanding with the Powers of Europe by
which, should we be again attacked in the Far East, we shall be able
to throw the whole of our armed forces into a struggle with either
Japan or Japan and China combined. Another reason for our failure is
the fact that we were unable rapidly to make full use of such forces
as were available, because of the weakness of railway communication
between Russia and Manchuria. It is clear that, as matters now stand in
the Far East, the laying of a second track over the Siberian line and
the construction of a railway along the bank of the Amur are so vital
for us that no time should be lost in doing these things. The mere
construction of a line along the Amur can help us but little, while
a double-track line, even with forty-eight trains in the twenty-four
hours, cannot, of course, satisfy all the requirements of the great
army we should have to put in the field in the event of a fresh war.
In future we shall only be able to rely to a small extent upon the
vast supplies of food in Manchuria, and shall be obliged to convey
the greater portion not only of our munitions of war, but of our
food-supplies, from European Russia and Siberia. It will therefore be
necessary to make use of our water communications, for the failure of
the attempt to transport supplies in 1905 by the Arctic Ocean and the
River Yenissei cannot be considered final. Particular assistance also
could be afforded to the army by increasing the population of Siberia,
and so at the same time augmenting the local resources necessary for an
army. The rich reserves of metals, coals, and timber in that part will
assist us in bringing nearer to the Far East not only our food-supply
base, but also our war base (for ordnance, ammunition, explosives,
etc.).

Among the main reasons for our disasters must be mentioned the
indifferent, even hostile attitude of the people to the late war; but
the menace to our nation from the Far East is now so clear that all
grades of society ought to prepare—in case of a fresh attack on Russia
by Japan or China—to rise like one man to defend the integrity and the
greatness of our Fatherland.

Thus, to attain success in any such future war, which is by no means an

improbable contingency, we should strive—
1. To be in a position to make use of all our troops;

2. To have thorough railway communication between the Pri-Amur and

Russia;

3. To prepare the waterways of Siberia for the carriage of heavy goods

in bulk from west to east;

4. To move the army’s base as far as possible from Russia into Siberia;
and, what is most important—

5. To make ready to carry on a new war not only with the army, but with
the whole of a patriotic nation.

History had apparently destined Russia to undergo a bitter trial from

1904 to 1906, both on the field of battle and at home. Our great nation
has issued renewed and strengthened from still heavier trials, and let
us not doubt now but that Russia, summoned by the Tsar to a new life,
will quickly recover from the temporary blows which she has sustained,
and will not fall from her high place among the other nations of the
world. As regards the army, its bitter experiences should not on this
occasion fail to bear fruit, and the most detailed, thorough, and
fearless study of all its defects can only bring about a renewal and
increase of strength. We must remember one point—and it is the main
point: our officers and many of the men conducted themselves most
unselfishly in most difficult circumstances. Given this, all our other
faults can be comparatively quickly mended; but before all else, we
must not be afraid of openly acknowledging them.

Strength lies—in the truth.

In this important work of rejuvenation which is now beginning in Russia

for the good of the people and the army, we must remember the great
words of the Tsar to the Army and Fleet almost two years ago:

“Russia is mighty. During the thousand years of her existence

there have been years of still greater suffering—years when
greater danger menaced. Yet she has every time issued from the
struggle with fresh glory, with added might.

“Though we may be sore at heart on account of the disasters and

losses that have befallen us, do not let us be discouraged. By
them Russia’s strength is renewed and her power increased.

“A. N. KUROPATKIN, GENERAL.

“SHESHURINO,[62]
“_November 30, 1906_.”

END OF VOLUME IV. OF THE ORIGINAL

CHAPTER XIII
 INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63]

When war seemed likely, the following scheme for the strategical
distribution of the troops in the Far East in the event of hostilities
was agreed to by the Viceroy, Alexeieff:

1. The major portion of the troops, consisting of 60 infantry

battalions, 65 squadrons, 2 sapper battalions, and 160 guns (total,
65,000 rifles and sabres), were to be sent into Southern Manchuria. The
main body was to be concentrated in the area Hai-cheng–Liao-yang, and
the advance guard[64] moved forward to the Ya-lu.

2. The garrison of Port Arthur was to consist of the 7th East Siberian
Rifle Division (12 battalions), 2 battalions of fortress artillery, and
1 company of sappers. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, consisting
of 4 battalions with 6 guns, was also detailed for the defence of
the Kuan-tung district, to augment the strength of the garrison if
necessary.

3. The garrison of Vladivostok was to consist of the 8th East Siberian

Rifle Division (8 battalions of infantry), with 2 battalions of
fortress artillery, 2 sapper companies, and 1 mining company.

4. That of Nikolaievsk was to be 1 fortress infantry battalion, 1

fortress artillery company, and 1 mining company.

This scheme, by which the force detailed for the defence of Port Arthur
and the whole Kuan-tung Peninsula was limited to sixteen battalions,
was due to our exaggerated idea of the strength and invincibility of
our Pacific Ocean Fleet. According to the Viceroy, it was founded
on the following opinion, expressed by Admiral Witgeft, Chief of
Alexeieff’s temporary naval staff:

“According to the present relative strengths of the two fleets,

the possibility of ours being defeated is a contingency that
need not be considered, and until it has been destroyed it is
inconceivable that the Japanese can land at Newchuang or any
other spot on the Gulf of Korea.”

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA.]

But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary

to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War
Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior
commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was
resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should
be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East
Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps
should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions,
each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have
thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions,
for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a
special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the
existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped
port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base
for operations against it.
Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was
inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff
that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle
Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd
East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not
concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments.

On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian

Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24)
I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it
being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts
should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:

“If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged,

I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before
there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is
for this reason that I have already advised the concentration
of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.”

However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch
of March 1:

“Separate operations against the fortress would only be really

worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it
by a _coup de main_, and the moment for this has passed. The
land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though
not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional
guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than
forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being
brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia,
and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays
nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been
mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the
Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.”

He had already reported to the Tsar that—

“Although separate operations against Port Arthur would

threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege
or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms
as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s
forces.”

As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be

followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to
the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:

“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should
be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The
apparent importance of any single locality or position
(fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error
of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about
the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually
growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we
should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when
supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance
 lasting over a fairly long period.”

Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the
words “Quite so.”

I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the

28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in
Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and _sotnias_, and
140 guns. The distribution was as follows:

The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East
Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in
the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.

The _Eastern (Advance) Force_ (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd

East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8
machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu.

The _Mounted Force_ (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6

guns was operating in Northern Korea.

The _Main Body_ was divided into two groups:

At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division

of 8 battalions and 24 guns.

At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry

Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21
battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns.

In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3

battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s
Headquarters.

In _Port Arthur_ were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12

battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3-1/2 battalions of fortress
artillery, and a sapper and mining company.

In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle
Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2
battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve
battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks.

On my arrival I approved the following scheme of engineering works:

The fortification of the positions on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and
at Liao-yang, Mukden, and Tieh-ling; the construction of roads across
the passes to the Ya-lu, and of three parallel roads from Kai-ping to
Mukden; the construction of crossings over the Liao River, and the
hutting of three army corps. I at once took steps also to strengthen
our advance guard on the Ya-lu, which was some 133 miles distant. Two
regiments of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division were sent there, in
addition to the third battalions for the regiments of the 3rd East
Siberian Rifle Division. By the time, therefore, that the enemy began
crossing the Ya-lu, the Eastern (Advance) Force had been increased
to eighteen battalions, besides which the 21st East Siberian Rifle
Regiment had been moved towards Ta-shih-chiao. The advance guard was
under General Zasulitch. Meanwhile the units of the 1st Siberian
Division were detained by Alexeieff in Harbin, so that, from the middle
of March to the middle of April, the Manchurian Army did not receive a
single battalion from the rear.

Notwithstanding the orders Zasulitch had received to avoid a decisive

engagement with the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, on
May 1 part of his force became hotly engaged in what developed into a
serious fight at the Ya-lu, and after a disastrous finish his eastern
force was withdrawn to the passes of the greater Fen-shui-ling range,
which they reached on May 7. In this action only nine of our eighteen
battalions took any active part, those of the 11th and 12th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments showing great gallantry and determination.
When asked why he had disobeyed the orders repeatedly given to him
not to become entangled in a serious engagement, but to fall back on
Feng-huang-cheng, Zasulitch gave as his reason that he had hoped to
defeat the enemy. On May 5 the Japanese began debarking at Pi-tzu-wo,
and a small force of all arms under General Zikoff was detached
from the southern force in order to reconnoitre and ascertain the
importance of this landing. The advance of this column incidentally
enabled us to repair temporarily the portion of the line which the
enemy had destroyed, and so to run a train-load of mélinite shells,
machine-guns, and ammunition through to Port Arthur. The Emperor was
fully alive to the danger of the situation caused by the dispersion
of the Manchurian Army, and on May 11 telegraphed his orders for an
immediate concentration. This was completed by the 14th, and the force
was grouped on two points—Hai-cheng and Liao-yang. The former group
consisted of twenty-seven battalions, twelve squadrons and _sotnias_,
and eighty guns; the latter of twenty-eight battalions, six _sotnias_,
and eighty-eight guns. The passes over the Fen-shui-ling range were
guarded by small columns of infantry with guns, and advance and flank
guards were thrown out. The independent cavalry, operating on our
flanks east of the passes, was divided in two bodies, under Mischenko
and Rennenkampf. West of Liao-yang was a small force under General
Kossagovski, while five and a half battalions of the 1st Siberian
Division lay at Mukden. At this time also, when the Viceroy returned to
Port Arthur (after Admiral Makharoff’s death of April 13), the weakness
of the place began to be shown up, and Alexeieff’s apprehensions as to
its safety became acute. In a despatch of May 16 he questioned whether
the place “would be able to hold out for more than two or three months,
in spite of all the steps taken to strengthen its defences.” On April
25 the Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff telegraphed to me that, owing to
the inadequacy of the garrison, Alexeieff considered it essential that
if the fortress were attacked, the field army should support it as
energetically and rapidly as possible. Alexeieff was not singular in
his pessimistic views, for Stössel also gave up hope of a successful
defence of Port Arthur directly after he had so unnecessarily
abandoned the Chin-chou position on May 27. On the 28th I received a
telegram from him urging me to support him speedily and in strength.
This opinion was again endorsed by Alexeieff, who telegraphed on June
5 that “Port Arthur cannot strictly be called a storm-proof fortress,
and it is a question whether it can even stand a siege of the length
indicated in my telegram of May 16.”

The result of this _volte-face_ on the part of Alexeieff as to the

powers of resistance of the place was that he pressed me to send part
of the army at once to assist it, though we were by no means ready for
such an enterprise. On May 21 he wrote that he considered the moment
in every way favourable for the army to assume the offensive in one of
two directions—either towards the Ya-lu, with the object of defeating
and throwing Kuroki back across the river, detaching a force to contain
him there, and then moving on to relieve Port Arthur, or else direct on
that place.

It should be borne in mind that these instructions were given at a time

when the position of only two of the hostile armies had been fixed. Of
these, one—of three divisions and three reserve brigades—had forced
the crossing of the Ya-lu, and the other—of three divisions—had landed
near Pi-tzu-wo. Moreover, a landing, of the extent of which we had no
information, was then being carried out at Ta-ku-shan. Consequently
we did not know the destination of one-half of the enemy’s army, and
were thus not in possession of two important pieces of knowledge which
were necessary before any operations of a decisive character could be
undertaken—namely, the position of the enemy’s main forces and their
probable plan of operations. It was incumbent on us, therefore, to
exercise great caution, and to keep our forces as far as possible
concentrated, so as to be ready to meet the attack of two or even three
armies. Concerning the two directions in which the Viceroy advocated
an advance, the following few points suggest themselves. For any
operations towards the Ya-lu—bearing in mind the necessity for guarding
our flank and rear against one hostile force landing at Pi-tzu-wo,
and possibly others landing near Kai-ping or Newchuang—not more than
sixty to seventy battalions were available of the ninety-four which
in the middle of May constituted the army; the whole of the food for
these troops had to be brought up by rail, owing to the exhaustion of
the local resources—never very plentiful—in the hilly country between
Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng: we had not got the transport to do
this, for our ten transport trains could only have carried a three or
four days’ supply for a force of this size; the usual May and June
rains would have made the movement of our guns and baggage at first
difficult, and then impossible, and we had at that time no mountain
artillery or pack transport; we were by no means well placed in the
matter of artillery parks: the horses for those of the 5th, 6th, and
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Divisions were still _en route_ to
Harbin, while the 1st and 2nd Siberian Divisions had arrived without
any. Finally, if Kuroki should fall back behind the Ya-lu without
accepting battle, we should have been obliged to retire and leave at
least an army corps to contain him. When the rainy season came on, this
corps itself would have been obliged to withdraw, as with interrupted
communications it would have been seriously threatened by Kuroki’s
far larger force, well provided with both mountain artillery and
pack transport. For these reasons an offensive towards the Ya-lu was
impracticable.

Under the conditions laid down by the Viceroy as to keeping screens on

the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), and leaving a reserve at Hai-cheng[66]
until such time as fresh reinforcements had been received, a direct
advance on Port Arthur could only be made with one corps of twenty-four
battalions. In view of the possibility of Kuroki taking the offensive
in superior force (after reinforcement by the troops already beginning
to land at Ta-ku-shan) against our cordon, which extended along the
Fen-shui-ling range for more than sixty-six miles, and in view of the
possibility of the Japanese cutting off any detachment moving on Port
Arthur by landing somewhere in its rear, the despatch of this corps
130 miles to the south could not but be considered a most risky and
difficult operation.

As our numerical weakness absolutely precluded a general assumption

of the offensive on our part, I pointed out that by such a movement
for the relief of Port Arthur we risked disorganizing the whole army.
I also drew attention to the fact that, according to the report of
Captain Gurko, who had just arrived from the fortress, its combatant
strength amounted to at least 45,000 men (including sailors), and that
the enemy could not therefore have any very overwhelming superiority.
My views upon the inexpediency of any movement towards Port Arthur were
communicated to the War Minister in my telegrams (Nos. 692 and 701)
of May 28 and 30. But in a telegram of the 31st the Viceroy urgently
requested me to advance to the relief of the fortress, and expressed
the wish that four divisions should be detailed for the operation;
while on June 6 he quoted to me a message from St. Petersburg in which
it was stated that the time was “ripe for the Manchurian Army to assume
the offensive.”

At the end of May the first reinforcements—the 3rd Siberian

Division—began to arrive in the concentration area. This enabled me to
increase the force detailed for the advance into Kuan-tung up to 32
battalions,[67] 22 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 100 guns. As a reserve
to this force, the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division was placed in the
area Kai-ping—Hsiung-yao-cheng, and to a brigade of the 3rd Siberians
was allotted the duty of watching the coast from Newchuang to the
latter place. To hold Kuroki and the troops under Nodzu that had landed
at Ta-ku-shan in check, 40 battalions, 52 _sotnias_, and 94 guns were
left on the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), distributed over a length of more
than sixty-six miles. The general reserve consisted of the 5th East
Siberian Rifle Division at Liao-yang, and a brigade of the 3rd Siberian
Division at Hai-cheng. Early in June the force detailed under General
Shtakelberg for the operations towards Port Arthur began to concentrate
at Te-li-ssu, with its advance guard at Wa-fang-tien. On the 13th the
Japanese themselves began to advance from Pu-lan-tien, and by the
evening of that day we had been able to rail two regiments of the 9th
East Siberian Rifle Division into Te-li-ssu. On the 14th the enemy’s
attack of our position there was repulsed, and on the following day
Shtakelberg proposed to make a counter attack, having been reinforced
at noon by the Tobolsk Regiment. However, the battle ended in our
defeat, and we were forced to fall back. General Gerngross, who was
in command of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, was wounded, but
remained in action. Shtakelberg’s orders gave him freedom of action,
but he was instructed not to accept decisive battle if the enemy were
in superior numbers. Simultaneously with the enemy’s advance from the
south, Kuroki moved forward on the 14th to the Ta Ling[68] (Pass)
from Hsiu-yen, where three (according to some reports four) Japanese
divisions were concentrated. Their 12th Division and three reserve
brigades were left to watch our eastern force, and a further movement
on Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, or Hai-cheng was quite likely.

In order to be in a position to check the combined advance of the

two Japanese groups, I thought it advisable to strengthen our
southern force, and therefore so rearranged our dispositions that
87 out of 110 battalions were massed on the southern front, in the
area Kai-ping—Hai-cheng, against Oku and Nogi. Fortunately for us,
the critical position of our eastern front during the operations at
Te-li-ssu was not appreciated by Kuroki, which fact favoured Count
Keller’s demonstration towards Feng-huang-cheng in the middle of June.
Otherwise Kuroki might have seized Liao-yang. On the 25th the enemy’s
advance against our eastern force was commenced. On the 27th Keller
withdrew some of his troops from the Fen-shui Ling (Passes) without
opposition, and by July 1 the main body was concentrated seven miles
east of Lang-tzu-shan and twenty-seven from Liao-yang. On June 27,
without any serious engagement, but under pressure from the enemy, we
abandoned the Fen-shui Ling (Passes), which they at once occupied.
A few days previously—on June 23—about a division of the enemy had
been located by Rennenkampf to the east of Sai-ma-chi. Believing that
Hai-cheng constituted our greatest danger, as the enemy might, if they
gained a success there, cut off Shtakelberg’s force close by, on the
29th I concentrated forty-one battalions and eighteen _sotnias_ under
Zasulitch at Hsi-mu-cheng, intending with them to hurl back the enemy
on to their Hai-cheng line of advance. However, on the same day we
discovered that those of the enemy who had moved at first from the Ta
Ling (Pass) along the Hsi-mu-cheng road had again retired to it.

This danger being temporarily averted, I ordered the 31st Infantry

Division back to Hai-cheng. As the defence of Liao-yang from the east
was the next most urgent matter, a brigade of the 9th Division, which
had just arrived from Russia, was moved to Lang-tzu-shan to act as
a reserve to the eastern force, which had been previously augmented
by the return to it of two regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle
Division. The other brigade was sent, under General Hershelman, who
commanded the division, to Hsi-kei-an village [at the junction of the
Liao-yang and Mukden roads], so as to cover the left flank of the
eastern force and guard the road to Mukden. Taking into consideration
the considerable increase of the eastern force, I ordered Count Keller
to take the offensive, so as again to get possession of the passes.
He did so, but although he had forty battalions under his command,
he advanced with only twenty-four. Though our troops were successful
in the early hours of July 17, thanks to the gallant conduct of the
24th East Siberian Rifles under Colonel Lechitski, the result of the
day’s action was not favourable. Keller stopped the advance before
even bringing into action his strong reserves, with the result that at
nightfall the eastern force was once more on its former positions on
the Yang-tzu Ling (Pass). On the 19th the brigade of the 9th Division
was driven from its position at Chiao-tou, and fell back towards
Hu-chia-tzu.[69]

By the middle of July the disposition of the enemy’s forces was

approximately as follows: Kuroki, with three field divisions and
reserves, had captured the three Fen-shui Ling and Mo-Tien Ling
(Passes), and, with his outposts thrown out on the roads to Liao-yang,
had reached the valley of the Tang Ho, a tributary of the Tai-tzu Ho.
Nodzu, with an army of approximately the same strength, had captured
the passes on the Kai-ping, Ta-shih-chiao, and Hai-cheng roads, and
had two divisions and a brigade in reserve on the Hai-cheng line of
advance and one on the Ta-shih-chiao line. Oku, having moved up from
Kuan-tung with his army of some four divisions, had driven back our
outposts and occupied Kai-ping. Two brigades were left in reserve on
the line Feng-huang-cheng—Kuan-tien-chang. Thus, according to our
information, two armies of about 90 to 100 battalions had advanced
against us from the east, and one of about 50 to 60 battalions from
the south, whilst Nogi’s army of 3 divisions and 2 reserve brigades
had been left to operate against Port Arthur. Our dispositions were
briefly: 44 battalions against Kuroki’s army; 28 battalions on the
line Fen-shui-ling—Hai-cheng against 2 divisions and 1 reserve brigade
of Nodzu’s army; 48 battalions against Oku’s army, and 1 division of
Nodzu’s; 16 battalions were in the general reserve at Hai-cheng, and
four in garrison at Liao-yang. It must, however, be borne in mind that
the effective strength of our battalions was very far short of the
prescribed establishment.[70] From the beginning of the war up to July
only 3,600 men were received in the way of drafts.

With the above dispositions of the opposing forces, we should,

according to the theory of the art of war, have been able to operate
on “interior lines.” But for us this was extremely difficult, as,
in the first place, we had not enough men to attain the necessary
superiority over any one of the hostile groups without laying ourselves
open to defeat by the other two; and, in the second, the rains had so
seriously damaged the roads as to prevent the rapid movement (as we
had heavy guns and baggage) necessary for successful action even on
interior lines. Finally, as their bases (Korea, Ta-ku-shan, Pi-tzu-wo)
were enveloping it was possible for each of their groups to refuse an
unequal battle, and fall back without exposing its communications.
Still, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, it was proposed
to attack Kuroki, who menaced our communications most, at the earliest
favourable moment. The troops which could be employed to strike him
were distributed in two directions: twenty-four battalions of the
eastern force on the main road from Liao-yang to Lang-tzu-shan, with
its outposts on the Yang-tzu-ling heights; and twenty-four battalions
of the 10th Army Corps on the line Liao-yang—Sai-ma-chi, with its
outposts five miles short of Chiao-tou. Twenty-four battalions of the
17th Corps were told off to remain as a reserve to these two groups at
Liao-yang, while to prevent our left flank being turned, and to cover
the Mukden road, the 11th Pskoff and 2nd Dagestan Regiments, which
had just arrived from Russia, were ordered to Pen-hsi-hu. But on July
23, when I inspected the 10th Corps, I found that it was absolutely
incapable of operating in the hills, as it had no pack-animals. In
fact, those companies on outpost duty on steep or high ground had
actually to remain all day without food or water. As the units of the
17th Corps were in a similar condition, it was impossible even to think
of at once assuming the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the 23rd and 24th, the enemy themselves took the
initiative by attacking the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps south of
Ta-shih-chiao. In spite of the fact that the position held by these
corps was very extended (eleven miles), and was divided in the centre
by a rocky ridge, and that its left flank could have been easily
turned, all the enemy’s efforts were repulsed. The regiments of the 4th
Siberians, who bore the heat and burden of the day, behaved splendidly,
but “in view of the great superiority of the enemy and the development
of an attack from the direction of Ta-ling,” Zarubaeff, who was given
general instructions but allowed freedom of action, decided early
on the morning of the 25th to withdraw his force towards Hai-cheng.
On learning of this, I ordered General Sluchevski to make immediate
preparations for offensive operations, and, if Kuroki should cross the
Tai-tzu Ho and move towards Mukden, at once to advance, whether his
troops were prepared for operating in the hills or not, and endeavour
to strike Kuroki’s communications. However painful the abandonment
of the port of Newchuang was for us after our tactical success at
Ta-shih-chiao—for the enemy could now make use of it as a new base—the
strategical position of our army was improved. With the departure of
the southern force towards Hai-cheng, our greatly extended front was
diminished by twenty miles.

On July 31 the enemy advanced all along the line. As far as our
southern group was concerned, their blow was directed against
Zasulitch, who was holding a position west of Hsi-mu-cheng, especially
against his right flank, which was driven back in spite of the devoted
efforts of the Voronej and Kozloff Regiments. As any further success
on their part threatened to cut off the 2nd Siberians from the main
body of the southern group, I withdrew Zasulitch’s force to Hai-cheng.
On the same day, the enemy’s operations on the eastern front were
directed against both our groups. In the action on the Yang-tzu Ling
(Pass) General Count Keller was killed, and the unexpected death of
this gallant commander, together with the abandonment without orders
by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment[71] of the position which
protected his left flank, greatly influenced Kashtalinski (Keller’s
successor) in coming to his too hasty decision to withdraw the force
to Lang-tzu-shan. At the same time the 10th Corps was taken partly by
surprise,[72] and driven from its advanced posts towards Hu-chia-tzu.
Sluchevski, learning of the retirement of the eastern force towards
Lang-tzu-shan, and fearing for his right flank, then withdrew his corps
to An-ping. In these operations the corps commander displayed a lack of
energy, and several regiments showed great unsteadiness, especially the
reservists, many of whom actually left the ranks during the progress of
the fight.

The complicated nature of the situation now necessitated extreme

caution on our part, lest anything should prevent our concentration in
strength at Liao-yang, and there fighting a decisive battle against all
three Japanese armies with some hope of success. From Liao-yang to our
position on the eastern front, An-ping–Lang-tzu-shan, was twenty miles,
and to Hai-cheng forty miles. In order to insure the movement of the
troops on the southern front to their positions at Liao-yang in good
time, it was necessary to move them from Hai-cheng to the position at
An-shan-chan—fifteen miles from Liao-yang—which was fortified at the
beginning of the war. The retirement began early on August 2, and on
the following day the troops were concentrated on the position. In my
report to the Tsar of August 4, I gave the following general reasons
for withdrawing to the line An-shan-chan–Lang-tzu-shan–An-ping after
the July fighting:

1. The Japanese superiority in numbers.

2. They were accustomed to hills and hot weather; they were younger,
carried lighter loads, and had numerous mountain artillery and pack
transport.

3. Their energetic and intelligent leadership.

4. The extraordinary patriotism and military spirit of their troops; and

5. The lack of such a spirit on our side (caused by general ignorance

of what we were fighting for).

Every moment gained at the beginning of August was of great importance

to us, as the units of the 5th Siberians, which the Viceroy agreed
to send to the front—instead of into the Pri-Amur district, as was
proposed earlier—should have been beginning to arrive in Liao-yang.
Orders were therefore issued to fortify an advanced position half a
march from Liao-yang in addition to the main position at that place,
and for this time was required. Still, in spite of the obvious and
immense importance of every day we gained by delaying the enemy’s
advance, General Bilderling, who had taken over the command of our
eastern front from July 31, wrote that it was necessary to withdraw
his troops immediately without fighting to Liao-yang itself, while
Sluchevski urged that the army should be concentrated still further
north—in the area Liao-yang–Mukden. These officers reiterated the same
opinions still more forcibly early in August, when the difficulty of
moving their troops towards Liao-yang became greatly increased by the
heavy rains. The Viceroy, who was much perturbed about the fate of Port
Arthur by the news of the unfortunate result of the naval operations
on August 10, and whose fears were increased by Stössel’s highly
alarmist reports, was at the same time urging me (August 15) to assist
the fortress and make an advance of some sort—though it were only a
demonstration—towards Hai-cheng.

On August 25 the enemy again advanced, and on the 26th attacked us

on the eastern front, but their onslaught on the 3rd Siberians at
Lang-tzu-shan and the attempt made to turn our right flank failed.
Ivanoff (who was in command of the corps) handled his artillery most
skilfully, and all units of this corps behaved well. The reserves
sent up by Bilderling arrived in good time, but the enemy obtained a
position on the left of the 10th Corps which enabled them to menace the
retirement of this corps along the Tang Ho. In the hot fight on the
26th again several units of the 10th Corps did splendidly. At this time
a strong turning movement was discovered being developed against the
left flank of our An-shan-chan position; but by delaying and inflicting
heavy loss on the enemy on the Lang-tzu-shan and An-ping positions,
all the corps were able to fall back on the advanced positions at
Liao-yang, where the army was concentrated on August 29. At the
beginning of the action there the army was short of its prescribed
strength by 350 officers and 14,800 men. Excluding the men detailed for
extra duty (on the communications, etc.), the average strength of our
companies was only 140 to 150 rifles, and those companies that lost
most heavily in the previous fights could muster less than 100.

The detailed account of the battle of Liao-yang has long ago been
submitted to Headquarters. The following is a general description of
it: On August 30 and 31 the enemy attacked our advanced positions with
great determination, especially that of the 1st and 3rd Siberians, but
were repulsed everywhere with heavy loss. In this fight the regiments
of the 1st, 9th, 3rd, 6th, and 5th East Siberian Rifle Divisions
rivalled each other in steadiness and gallantry, while the dispositions
made by Shtakelberg and Ivanoff were good. Our success, however, was
by no means lightly gained. Our artillery expended as much as 100,000
rounds of ammunition, leaving us with only 10,000 rounds in the army
reserve. Moreover, excluding eight battalions furnishing guards and
holding the works of the main Liao-yang position, on September 1 only
sixteen battalions were left in the general reserve. During the 31st
we observed that large bodies of Kuroki’s army were crossing on to
the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. And, as the position held by the
10th Corps (against which Kuroki should have been operating in full
strength) had not for two days been subjected to any such determined
attacks as that held by the 1st and 3rd Siberians, there was every
reason to suppose that Kuroki’s main body was moving round to operate
against our communications. Accordingly a decision had to be made of
one of two alternatives: either—

1. To contain Kuroki with a small force and advance to the south

against Oku and Nodzu; or—

2. To fall back on the main Liao-yang position, leave as few troops

as possible to defend it, and then attack in force that portion of
Kuroki’s army which was moving round our left, and endeavour to crush
it by driving it back on the Tai-tzu Ho, which at that time of the year
was unfordable except at a few points.

As regards the first, even if we were successful against Oku and Nodzu,
they could always fall back on their communications if in difficulties,
and so draw us away from Liao-yang, while any success by Kuroki which
might lead to an attack by him on our communications would threaten
us with catastrophe.[73] In order to collect sufficient force to
move against the two armies, it would have been necessary to have
contained Kuroki with only such troops as were on the right bank of the
river—namely, the 17th Corps and two regiments of the 54th Division
(total, forty battalions) under Bilderling. But as these troops were
not yet seasoned, it was impossible to rely on their performing such an
extremely difficult task as that of holding in check Kuroki’s superior
numbers on the necessarily extended position they would have to occupy
[this fear was justified by subsequent events]. These considerations
led to the adoption of the second alternative.

On the 31st, under cover of darkness and without being pressed, we

began the evacuation of the advanced positions, which had already been
of value to us, inasmuch as the enemy had been weakened by the losses
incurred in attacking them. By the following morning as many as 100
battalions, with artillery and cavalry, had crossed on to the right
bank of the river. The Japanese did not occupy our abandoned positions
till the evening of that date, when they began to shell Liao-yang.
The general disposition of the army was as follows: 56 battalions, 10
_sotnias_, and 144 guns (under Zarubaeff) were still on the left bank;
30 battalions, 5 _sotnias_, and 84 guns were on the right for the
defence of Liao-yang itself. In addition to the small columns detailed
to guard our flanks and rear, the remainder of the army, totalling
93 battalions, 73 squadrons and _sotnias_, and 352 guns, were told
off to attack Kuroki. But in making this calculation as to the number
of battalions available, it is essential to explain a very important
factor. During the whole period of the war from its commencement
till August only 6,000 men had been received at the front as drafts
to repair wastage, and, as I have said, we began the fighting round
Liao-yang with a shortage of 15,000 men. The result of this, taken
in connection with the great number of men that had to be detached
for various non-combatant duties, and also our losses in the fighting
that had already taken place in the neighbourhood, was that the actual
strength of the ninety-three battalions was, on September 1, only from
50,000 to 55,000 rifles. For instance, the twenty-one battalions
comprising the 10th Corps (which took part in the affair of September
2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four
battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army,
on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000
to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the
right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position
held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights
near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force
of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot,
the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in
flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by
Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence
beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and
sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was
done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been
cleared in the _kao-liang_ crops. The consequence was that, in the
early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk
Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the
left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became
the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four
battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians
and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right.
Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was
expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to
their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s
command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was
recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during
the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the
Erh-ta-ho heights.

Orloff, on the other hand, moved from his position on the heights south
of the Yen-tai mines before he ought to have done, without waiting for
the arrival of the 1st Siberians. His troops became at once immersed
in a perfect sea of _kao-liang_, and were fired on from front and
flank; parts of the column were seized with panic, and the whole force
retreated in disorder towards Yen-tai station. A large portion even
went as far as the station itself. This sudden and unexpected departure
from the field of 12,000 men had a disastrous result on this flank. We
lost an excellent position, which should have served as the support for
our advance from the left, and the enemy, spreading away to the north,
had by 5 p.m., in spite of the gallant efforts of Samsonoff and his
Siberian Cossacks, occupied the whole range of heights and the Yen-tai
mines. With the occupation of these heights the whole of our left was
endangered. At midnight Shtakelberg reported that, owing to his heavy
losses in the preceding battles, he would not be able to take the
offensive, or even to accept battle on the following day.

Meanwhile the armies of Oku and Nodzu had advanced in force against
Liao-yang, but had been driven back by Zarubaeff. Here the main burden
of the fighting fell on the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, which
behaved extremely well, as did the regiments of the 4th Siberians. On
the night of the 3rd, however, Zarubaeff reported that, though the
enemy had been repulsed, he had only three battalions left in reserve,
and needed reinforcements and gun ammunition. At the same time a
message came in from Lubavin, who was covering the Pen-hsi-hu–Mukden
line, informing me of his retirement to the Tung-chia-fen Ling (Pass),
sixteen miles from Mukden. From this it is evident that if, choosing
the first alternative, we had marched against Oku and Nodzu, Kuroki
could most certainly have driven back the 17th Corps and 54th Division,
and have seized the railway in rear of our troops moving southwards.
As we knew, however, that Kuroki was not operating against us with his
main body during the battle of the 2nd, we realized it might have been
sent to turn our left. Such being the situation, we had to decide
whether to maintain our hold on the river, or to abandon Liao-yang
and retire to the position on the left bank of the Hun Ho in front of
Mukden, which had been already fortified.

As regards the first alternative, it seemed possible that we might,

by an immense effort and skilful manœuvring, be able to hold on to
Liao-yang and throw Kuroki behind the Tai-tzu Ho. But for this it was
essential to draw in the force that had crossed to the right bank, and
to deploy it on a fresh line farther to the north, so that we might be
able to attack the enemy’s position on the heights near the Yen-tai
mines from the north as well as from the west. Such a movement would
have exposed our right, and would have isolated the position still
held by the 17th Corps on the right bank of the river. The Japanese
might drive it in and issue in rear of the troops at Liao-yang, for
that place was only eleven miles distant from the position to which
the 17th Corps would have had to retire if it were driven back. The
defenders of Liao-yang, being then attacked by Oku and Nodzu combined,
would be in a critical situation. As regards the second alternative,
a retirement on Mukden presented great disadvantages and dangers. It
increased the distance to Port Arthur; it would have to be carried out
under pressure from the enemy in front and on the left, and the roads
had been so much damaged by rain that it was doubtful whether we
should succeed in getting our transport or even artillery to Mukden.
The abandonment of Liao-yang could not fail both to depress the troops
who had so gallantly defended it and encourage the enemy. But, on
the other hand, we should be extricated by such a retirement from a
situation in which we were threatened in front and flank. A successful
withdrawal would also give time for the 1st Army Corps to come up, and,
what was not less important, for us to replenish artillery ammunition,
of which we were very short. Besides this, the banks of the Tai-tzu Ho
were specially unsuited for our troops, as they were almost entirely
covered with _kao-liang_. Our men were unused to this, lost their heads
whenever they got into it, and were very liable to panic.

On the whole, our past experiences of the offensive did not inspire any
confidence that we should be able to cope with the difficult situation
implied by a retention of Liao-yang. I decided, therefore, on the
retirement towards Mukden, which was carried out by September 7. The
most difficult work, especially on the early morning of the 5th, fell
to the lot of the 1st Siberians, who had to beat off Kuroki’s force
attacking from the east; this they did with success, and without losing
a single trophy, in spite of the difficulties in which we were placed.

A general account of the operations round Liao-yang, and a statement

of all the considerations which led to our retirement, were telegraphed
to the Emperor on September 11. On the 14th the army was made happy by
the following gracious message, which I received from His Majesty:

“From your reports of the fighting at Liao-yang, I appreciate

that it was impossible for you to have held that position
longer without risk of being completely cut off from your
communications. Under such conditions, and in face of the
existing difficulties, the retirement of the whole force across
country without the loss of guns or baggage was a brilliant
feat of arms. I thank you and the gallant troops under your
 command for their heroic conduct and enduring self-sacrifice.
May God help you all!”

Upon retirement, our troops were grouped in two principal bodies—

1. The defence of the main position on the left bank of the Hun Ho was
entrusted to the 10th and 17th Corps under Bilderling, to whom was
subordinated Dembovski’s force of 10 battalions of the 5th Siberians,
which was guarding the near right flank of the main position.
Altogether, the troops under Bilderling’s command amounted to 75
battalions, 53 squadrons and _sotnias_, 190 guns, 24 mortars, and 3
sapper battalions.

2. The protection of the left flank from Fu-shun to the west was
entrusted to Ivanoff’s force, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of
the 4th and some units of the 5th Siberians (total, 62 battalions, 26
_sotnias_, 128 guns, and 2 sapper battalions).

3. To keep touch between these two main groups were the 1st Siberians
under Shtakelberg (total, 24 battalions, 10 squadrons and _sotnias_, 56
guns, and 1 sapper battalion). To his force was entrusted the defence
of the portion of the Hun Ho from Chiu-tien to Pu-ling.

4. The general reserve was disposed in two groups—

(_a_) 4th Siberians (24 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 12 mortars,

and 1 sapper battalion) on the line Erh-tai-tzu–Khou-kha.[74]

(_b_) 1st Army Corps, which concentrated in Mukden early in

September[75] (32 battalions, 6 squadrons, 96 guns, 1 sapper
battalion), along the Mandarin road on the line Pu-ho–Ta-wa.

5. The protection of the extreme right was entrusted to Kossagovski

(6-1/2 battalions, 9 squadrons, 14 guns), the main body of which was at
Kao-li-tun on the Liao.

6. A brigade of the 6th Siberians (8 battalions and 1-1/2 _sotnias_)

was concentrated at Tieh-ling to protect our communications.

7. The Trans-Baikal and Ural Cossack Brigades which did not belong to
any corps were joined together under the command of Mischenko (21
_sotnias_ and 8 guns).

Besides putting the finishing touches to the main position at Mukden,

which had already been fortified, the defensive work consisted of
strengthening the Fu-liang and Fu-shun positions, and throwing up some
works on the right bank of the Hun Ho between Mukden and Fu-liang. The
object of these was to check the enemy crossing until our reserves
could come up. In addition to this, much was done to improve the
communications towards Tieh-ling. On September 20 I learned by telegram
from the Viceroy of the formation of the 2nd Manchurian Army. This was
to comprise the 6th Siberians and 8th Army Corps, five Rifle brigades
from Russia, a Cossack infantry brigade, the 4th Don and 2nd Caucasian
Cossack Divisions, and three dragoon regiments of the 10th Cavalry
Division. General Grippenberg was appointed to the command of this
force on September 24.
Our position at Mukden had some very grave defects.

1. Its left flank (Fu-liang–Fu-shun) was, owing to the bend in the Hun
Ho to the north-east of Mukden, thrown much too far back. If the enemy
were successful on this flank, and came out on to our communications,
we should be compelled to abandon the main position prematurely.

2. Almost immediately in rear of the position was the River Hun, which
was at the time unfordable, and could only be crossed by bridges.
Behind the river was the town itself.

3. The Fu-shun coal-mines, which were most necessary to us (for railway

fuel), were right in front of the position.

These drawbacks, as well as our great desire to prevent any of the

enemy’s forces being detached for the reinforcement of Nogi’s besieging
army, drove us to try and take the offensive as soon as possible.

Meanwhile the drafts whereby to replace our losses were still arriving
at the front very slowly; during July and August only 4,200 men were
received. On September 29 the eight corps composing the Manchurian Army
could only muster 151,000 rifles, the deficit in officers being 670.
Besides these corps, the Viceroy put the 6th Siberian Corps[76] under
my command, with the proviso that it should not be included in the
army, and should not be split up.[77] It was concentrated at Mukden on
October 8. My requests that the units of the 1st Siberian Division—some
ten battalions—which were not included in the army, might be made over
to me were not acceded to. But although we were really too weak, an
advance seemed more advantageous than waiting for the enemy to attack,
for there seemed little chance of our being able to hold our ground on
the Mukden positions.

According to our information, the Japanese main forces had crossed

on to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, between Liao-yang and
Pen-hsi-hu, and were disposed approximately as follows: In the
centre, behind the line Yen-tai station–Yen-tai mines, six divisions
with brigades in reserve; on the right, écheloned along the line
Pan-chia-pu-tzu–Pen-hsi-hu, two divisions with brigades in reserve;
on the left, more or less along the line San-de-pu–Sha-tai-tzu, two
divisions with their reserves. The enemy had fortified their positions
on the Yen-tai heights and at Pan-chia-pu-tzu. It was decided,
therefore, that the first object of our advance was to hurl the
Japanese back on to the left bank of the Tai-tzu Ho. To do this we
were to deliver a frontal attack, and at the same time endeavour to
turn their right, so that, if successful, we should dislodge them from
the hills. Orders were issued for the forward movement to commence on
October 5. The following was the plan of advance decided upon by me:

1. _Western Force._—This force, under Bilderling, consisting of the

10th and 17th Corps (total, 64 battalions, 40 squadrons and _sotnias_,
196 guns, and 2 sapper battalions), was to make a demonstration in
front against the enemy’s main force.

2. _Eastern Force._—This force, under Shtakelberg, consisting of

the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberians (total, 73 battalions, 29 squadrons
and _sotnias_, 142 guns, 6 mortars, 32 machine-guns, and 3 sapper
battalions), was to attack the right flank of the enemy, moving round
it from the east. The first objective of this force was the enemy’s
positions at Pan-chia-pu-tzu.[78]

3. _The General Reserve._—This, consisting of the 1st Army Corps and

4th Siberians, with Mischenko’s brigade (total, 56 battalions, 20
_sotnias_, 208 guns, 30 mortars, and 2 sapper battalions), was to move
up in rear of the interval between the western and eastern forces.

4. _The 6th Siberians_ (32 battalions, 6 _sotnias_, 96 guns, and 1

sapper battalion) was to remain temporarily in Mukden (with a brigade
at Tieh-ling), so that it might either be moved to a flank or added to
the reserve, according as the operations developed.

5. _Flank Guards._—A force of 30-1/2 battalions, 39 _sotnias_, 82 guns,

and 1 sapper battalion was told off to protect the flanks. Of this,
19-1/2 battalions, 25 _sotnias_, 64 guns, and the sapper battalion were
to take part in the attack of the enemy’s position while keeping touch
with Dembovski’s and Rennenkampf’s columns of the eastern and western
forces respectively.

6. Should the enemy concentrate towards their right, an endeavour

was to be made to break through their centre in the direction of the
Yen-tai mines by the 6th Sibe