People v. Lacson (Digest)

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, et al. v PANFILO M. LACSON G.R.
149453
Judicial Perspective on The Bill of Rights | April 1, 2003 | Callejo, Sr., J.
Nature of Case: Motion for reconsideration re: the Supreme Court decision on People vs. Lacson (May
28, 2002)
Digest maker: Isis Valencia
FACTS: The respondent is accused of multiple counts of murder, the victims being alleged members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Citing Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure, said
charges were dismissed provisionally by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999. This provisional dismissal
was contested in an earlier case (People vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002) with the SC ruling that 1) the
dismissal had express consent of the accused and 2) Section 8, Rule 117 could be given retroactive
effect however, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are
attendant. They then remanded the case to the RTC of Quezon City to ascertain if the other conditions
stipulated by Section 8, Rule 117 were met. The petitioners aim to question said ruling. Hence, the
present motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the requisite for applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 were met.
(2) Whether or not the time-bar rule in Section 8, Rule 117 should be applied retroactively.
RULING:
(1) No, the requisites were not met.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
More specifically, Lacson failed to prove that the requisites stated in the first paragraph were met at the
time that the provisional dismissal was granted. In fact, in the CA hearing on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file the
motion to dismiss the criminal cases against him nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal of same.
(2) No, Section 8, Rule 117 should not be given retroactive effect. The time-bar under the new rule does
not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation
of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed
but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a
crime is to be punished. However, a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would
work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
By the time that the Rule was promulgated, the State only had 1 year and 3 months to contest the
provisional dismissal, rather than the stipulated 2 years. As such, the Court ruled that the period of April 1,
1999 to November 20, 1999 should be excluded in the 2-year computation for case revival. T The two-
year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely
to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely
affect the administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule
is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect.
This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the
case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a
valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.
RELEVANT STATUTES:
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused an with notice to the offended party.
The Provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. WIth respect too offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.

People v. Lacson (Digest)

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PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, et al. v PANFILO M. LACSON G.R.

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