HO CHI MINH: THE MISSING YEARS, 1919-1941

SOPHIE QUINN-JUDGE

ABBREVIATIONS
ACP: Annam Communist Party
AOM Archives d'Outre-Mer
BNTS: Ho Chi Minh: Bien Nien Tien Su (Ho Chi Minh: A Year-by-year
Biography)
CC: Central Committee
CCP: Chinese Communist Party
CYL: Communist Youth League
DDCSD: Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist Party)
ECCI: Executive Committee of the Communist International
FCP: French Communist Party
FEB: Far Eastern Bureau
GMD: Guomindang
ICP: Indochinese Communist Party
MAE: Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres
NCLS: Nghien Cuu Lich Su (Historical Research)
NXB: Nha Xuat Ban (publishing house)
OMS: Otdel Mezhdunarodnoi Sviazi (International Communications Section)
RC: Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern
History
SHAT SLOTFOM: Service de Liaisons avec les Originaires des Territoires de
la France d'Outre-Mer
SMP: Shanghai Municipal Police Files
SPCE: Service de Protection du Corps Expeditionnaire
VNQDD: Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam Nationalist Party or Vietnam
GMD)
 VNTNCMDCH: Vietnam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi (The
Comrades Association of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth, Thanh Nien)
***

PLACE-NAMES
I have retained the English forms of Canton for Guangzhou, Swatow for
Shantou and Whampoa for Huangpu because these terms are so strongly associated
with the events of the first united front in China, and/or occur frequently in the
documents from which I cite. Otherwise I have converted all Chinese place names to
the Pinyin form, unless the older form occurs in a direct quote. I refer
interchangeably to Tonkin or Bac-ky, Annam or Trung-ky, and Cochinchina or Nam-
ky throughout the text. The use of the administrative terms imposed by the French
does not imply a recognition of the French divisions of Vietnam, but simply reflects
the terminology which was current during the colonial period.

INTRODUCTION

The double myth

The shadowy Comintern agent Nguyen Ai Quoc, introduced to the world as
Ho Chi Minh (Ho the Most Enlightened) in 1945, became the symbol of Vietnamese
communism in the years after he took power as his country's first president. During
the American war with Vietnam he came to represent the treacherous 'double-face' of
Asian communism - for Lyndon Johnson he was a personal enemy. This persona was
in part the creation of Cold War propaganda, which portrayed Ho as a power-hungry
zealot who used and then betrayed non-communist nationalists. 1 Ho is still held
personally responsible by many Vietnamese for all the suffering which war and
communism brought to their country.
This anti-communist portrait of Ho Chi Minh is the mirror image of the myth
fostered by the Vietnamese communists: of Ho as the wise and prescient father of
independent Vietnam, a monk-like figure who devoted his life to his nation. After
1945 the Vietnamese communists began to use Ho Chi Minh as a device to create a
party history of unity and impeccable decision-making, and at the outset Ho himself
seems to have encouraged his portrayal as an austere nationalist patriot (accurate up
to a point). This use of Ho as a legitimizing and unifying figure became more marked
after 1947, when it became clear that the French were going to fight for their colony
and that the US government questioned the Viet Minh's nationalism. The preface to a
Ho Chi Minh biography which appeared in Paris in 1949 referred to him as a 'symbol
of popular hopes'; his heart was said to 'beat in the same rhythym as the hearts of the
people'. His teachings were full of'lofty and humanitarian concepts'; at the same time
they were 'extremely simple'.2 Yet a Nhan Dan article of 25 March 1951 made an
important distinction regarding Ho's role. It described President Ho as 'the soul of the
Vietnamese revolution and the Vietnamese resistance', while referring to Truong
Chinh, then leader of the communist party, as the revolution's 'builder and
commander'.3
By 1964, when the Vietnamese communists were being drawn deeper into
confrontation with the United States, Ho Chi Minh's role as a unifying figure in party
history became especially important. As we now know, 1963 was marked by
considerable tension within the party over the correct international line to pursue. So
the February 1964 article in Nghien Cuu Lich Su (Historical Research) which
emphasized Ho Chi Minh's role in 1930 as the unifier of the communist party carried
a strong message. The message was that compromise and unity are valued political
virtues, endorsed and personified by Ho Chi Minh.4 At the same time, the party was
presenting itself as inherently infallible, thanks to the wisdom of Ho Chi Minh.
Ironically, by 1964 Ho's personal political authority may well have been much
reduced.5 In 1973, when a fifth edition of Truong Chinh's biography of'Chairman Ho'
appeared, it included a long section on Ho Chi Minh's 'revolutionary policy' and
another on his 'virtue and conduct'.6 But it would not be until the collapse of the
Soviet bloc in 1989 that the Vietnamese would make an effort to systematize 'Ho Chi
Minh Thought' as part of their guiding ideology.
Both stereotypes of Ho Chi Minh - Machiavellian apparatchik or nationalist
saint - have in my view become deadweights impeding the search for the historical
figure. To begin with, they promote fruitless debates about whether Ho was some sort
of imposter or actor.7 (Clearly he could be a disarmingly frank interlocutor, but he
was also a long-time conspirator who rarely relaxed his guard.) The larger-than-life
image of Ho also leads many writers on Vietnamese communism to exaggerate his
early importance within the international communist brotherhood. Jean Lacouture,
whose 1967 biography has until recently been the standard work by a sympathetic
author, pictures Ho as an intimate of French leftist intellectuals such as Boris
Souvarine.8 Yet French and Russian documents tend to present Ho as a supplicant in
these relationships. Souvarine, moreover, may not have had much contact with Ho
until 1923, as he spent very little time in France after his imprisonment in 1920 and
1921, until his removal from the French party in 1924. 9 William Duiker describes Ho
as 'the recognized spokesman for the Eastern question and for increased attention to
the problems of the peasantry' by the close of the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924. 10
He was, however, a rather junior spokesman on colonial issues, who did not even
represent an Asian communist party. Charles McLane suggests that after his return to
Moscow from China in 1927, Ho may have reviewed his policy for Southeast Asia
with Comintern leaders, 'conceivably even with Stalin himself. 11 Yet there is no
evidence that Ho did more than deliver a report to the Krestintern and confer with his
superiors in the Executive Committee during his 1927 stay in Moscow. Charles Fenn
claims that Ho was one of two delegates to the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935
who supported the popular front strategy.12 In fact Ho did not have a vote at the
Congress, and the policy had been carefully prepared in advance by Georgy
Dimitrov, with Stalin's support. Ho's early effectiveness as a propagandist is also
sometimes exaggerated. An official biography, printed in the party paper Nhan Dan
on 17 May 1970, the year after his death, claimed that the anti-colonial newspaper Le
Paria which he edited in Paris had 'created a revolutionary gale which swept through
Indochina and many other countries'. This is in my view a vast overstatement of the
role which Paria played in the early 1920s.
Anti-communist writers tend to accept a variant of this view of Ho Chi Minh's
influence. Ton That Thien in his essay, 'Truths and Lies: Ho Chi Minh's Secret 1923
Voyage to Russia and his Disgrace in the Comintern', expresses no doubt about Ho's
importance within communist circles. He maintains that a speech by Ho at the
Second Congress of the French Communist Party (FCP) in 1922 so impressed the
Comintern agent Dmitry Manuilsky, that Ho was invited on the spot to prepare
himself to participate in the Fifth Comintern Congress in Moscow. 13 The reality, as
represented by documents in the French and Comintern archives, was a bit more
complicated. As is shown in Chapter 2, Ho had planned to spend only three months in
Moscow when he first arrived, and did not expect to attend the 1924 Fifth Congress.
According to Lacouture, Ho attended an important Anti-Imperialist Congress in
Brussels early in 1928, where he is said to have mingled with Nehru and other
nationalist leaders.14 However, that meeting was held in February 1927 when Ho was
still in Canton. On close inspection, it is interesting to see how many times Ho (and
later Ho Chi Minh) is credited with deeds which he was not in a position to have
accomplished, either because he was not present or was not sufficiently influential.
 One of the most curious of these cases is the attribution to him of an essay
titled 'The Party's Military Work among the Peasants' made in the 1970 re-edition of
the Comintern manual, Armed Insurrection. The original was published by the
Comintern in June 1929 under the pseudonym A. Neuberg, although an earlier work
with a similar title by Alfred Langer had been published in 1928 in Germany.
Scholars such as William Duiker and Huynh Kim Khanh have used this essay to
explain Ho's views on the peasantry and the Nghe Tinh uprising of 1930-31.15 In the
introduction to the 1970 reprint, Erich Wollenberg, who claims to be one of the
original authors, identifies Ho as the author of the final chapter, on peasant
insurrection.16 Wollenberg also claims that it was the Red Army Staff which sent Ho
to China in 1924. This identification of Ho as a specialist in military affairs occurs
from time to time in Western publications, but is not confirmed by any documentary
evidence that I have seen. Within the Comintern he worked as a translator,
propagandist and specialist in political mobilization. When he returned from China to
Moscow in June 1927 he reported on the peasant movement in Guangdong province,
but in a concrete, descriptive manner quite unlike the critical style of the later essay.
In Berlin in 1928 he also composed a popularized account of Peng Pai's peasant
movement. But he was not present in China during the Nanchang uprising, the Hai-
Lufeng Soviets or the Canton insurrection, all of which are analyzed in the 1929
essay. According to Comintern documents, the Military Commission of the
Comintern's Eastern Secretariat assigned the Lithuanian A. Gailis (known as Tom
when he worked in China) and another man, Y. Zhigur, who had worked in military
intelligence in southern China from 1926-7, to study the problem of tactics for an
armed insurrection. That decision was made at a meeting on 22 March 1928, when
Ho was in Berlin.17 Gailis's book on this topic was being printed as of 20 June 1929
in Moscow.18 Thus the 1970 claim that Ho authored the final essay would seem to
have been an attempt to increase his posthumous reputation as a communist
theoretician. (The essay in fact presents a standard Comintern view of 1928, and
while it is not unlikely that Ho shared many of its ideas, he would hardly have been
in a position to take such an authoritative tone on the failings of the Chinese party.)
Early Western biographies of Ho (e.g. Lacouture, Fenn) were necessarily
impressionistic, due to the lack of sources. Ho himself made a fetish of covering up
his past. The biographical information he supplied over the years amounts to a variety
of anecdotes and conflicting dates rather than a real record of his life. The biography
published in Paris in 1949, which first appeared in Chinese in 1948, was printed in
later Vietnamese editions under the title, Những mẩu chuyện về đời hoạt động của
Hồ chủ tịch (Glimpses of Chairman Ho's Life). Although the author's name is given
as Tran Dan Tien, it is believed, in fact, to be an autobiography 19 But the book is
constructed as a series of edifying vignettes recalled by his comrades, with a loose
approach to dates. While it is based on fact, its omissions, embellishments and
insistence on Ho Chi Minh's proletarian virtue make it an element in the construction
of his myth rather than a serious record. A Russian biography by Yevgeny Kobelev is
the work of a publicist rather than a scholar.20 It draws heavily on the writing of
Vietnamese biographer Hong Ha, who must also be classified as a publicist, given his
casual attitude towards sources.21
Biographical information on Ho's youth and his first years in Paris, uncovered
in the French archives by Nguyen The Anh, Thu Trang Gaspard, and Daniel Hemery
since the publication of Lacouture's work, has added to our appreciation of the origins
of Ho's nationalism.22 In particular, Hemery s 1992 article 'Jeunesse d'un colonise,
genese d'un exil, Ho Chi Minh jusqu'en 1911' shows the importance of his father's
career and disgrace as a mandarin in the young Ho's development. The recent
biography by William Duiker, however, fails to take into account Hemery's research.
Duiker follows the basic narrative of Ho's early career presented in Hanoi
publications. While he includes countervailing views from time to time and uses
some Comintern documents, he echoes Kobelev in over-stressing Ho's importance
within the Comintern.

In search of the historical Ho Chi Minh

With the opening of the archives of the Communist International (Comintern)
in 1992, it has become possible to sketch in more of the facts of the myth-shrouded
pre-1945 period in Ho's career. This study covers his years of political activism, from
1919 when he first emerged in Paris using his pseudonym Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen
the Patriot); to 1941 and the outbreak of the Second World War, when Vietnamese
contacts with the Comintern effectively ended. It is based on archival research in
what was formerly the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, now the Centre for
the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History23, as well as research in
the Centre d'Archives d'Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence. I have tried to stick as closely
as possible to the facts which we can discover in these documents, without trying to
create a seamless narrative. I augment these archival sources with Vietnamese
memoirs and, where possible, compare the official Vietnamese version of communist
party documents with those versions available in the Russian and French archives. It
should be noted that for the period up to 1941, with the exception of memoirs, almost
all the communist party documents in the Vietnamese archives and those reprinted in
Van Kien Dang (Documents of Party History) and Ho Chi Minh Toan Tap (Ho Chi
Minh's Collected Works) have been collected from the French and Russian archives
(see Bibliography for details).
The object of this study is not to destroy Ho Chi Minh's reputation, but to
define in as factual a way as possible what he actually did accomplish in his years
with the Comintern. These were years of underground disguise and secrecy, so it is
understandable that they should have given rise to legends of Ho as some sort of
Fantomas. In fact, although his life was often full of danger, much of his political
activity involved banging out multiple copies of reports on his typewriter, in the hope
of convincing the Russians to provide more funds for his work. Ho was not some sort
of a celibate monk; he had two documented relationships with women during the
period under examination here.24 He was a complex political animal and not a god.
The traditional Vietnamese focus on Ho's exemplary leadership has led to a tendency
to see him as the prime mover in any situation - he is pictured as the lead character in
a series of morality plays. I have tried to right the balance by depicting the broader
context in which he had to operate.
Ho Chi Minh's career is the connecting thread of Vietnam's relationship with
the Comintern. My study covers a full cycle in this relationship, from the period
when the Comintern first attempted to foster nationalist revolutions in the colonies,
through the era of internationalist class struggle from roughly 1928 to 1935, and back
to an emphasis on nationalist resistance at the start of the Second World War. Ho's
years of greatest influence were those when nationalist united fronts were the order of
the day. He spent much of the 1930s in the political wilderness, however, and for this
reason I will devote some space to those leaders who eclipsed his authority, including
Tran Phu, Ha Huy Tap, Tran Van Giau, Le Hong Phong, and Nguyen Van Cu. All
except Nguyen Van Cu studied in Moscow. This is inevitably a study of leadership
from the top down, an approach which is out-of-fashion in most history departments.
But unless we integrate new documentary evidence on the men and ideas that shaped
20th-century nationalism in Vietnam with our growing understanding of the
economic and anthropological roots of colonial rebellion, our historical framework
will remain extremely theoretical.
In order to understand the interplay between Moscow's policies and events in
Vietnam, we try to re-examine some of the key debates and documents which formed
Comintern policy for colonial countries. The most important of these was the
discussion of Lenin's Theses on National and Colonial Questions in 1920, the year
Ho Chi Minh joined the French Communist Party. Another key debate took place
from 1928 to 1929, one which the literature on Vietnamese communism generally
misinterprets. This concerned the change to more radical policies for the world
communist movement, which overrode the tactics for colonial countries which Lenin
had set out in 1920. In order to analyze the radicalization of Vietnamese communism
in the late twenties, it is necessary to establish the chronology of the Comintern's
switch to the 'class-against-class' polices of the so-called 'Third Period' of post-1918
capitalism. We also take a closer look, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, at the different ways in
which these more extreme ideas could have been transmitted to Vietnam. In
particular, the events in Vietnam are placed in a Southeast Asian context. Very little
attention has been paid in the past to the role of the Nanyang (Southseas) Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Vietnam during the late 1920s, yet this
research has shown that it did have a presence in Vietnam and may at times have
acted independently of the Comintern.
One would like to think that it is now possible to sweep away the politicized
history and propaganda associated with the name of Ho Chi Minh. But every
document presents its own new problems of interpretation. On the positive side, the
events mentioned by the Comintern documents are often confirmed or illuminated by
documents in the French archives. Yet the Comintern documents are not always easy
to identify in terms of author, point of origin or date. Party members writing from the
field back to Moscow, Ho Chi Minh in particular, tried whenever possible to avoid
using names in their reports. Sometimes it is possible to tell both when a document
was written and when it was received in Moscow, but this is by no means always the
case.
Then there is the issue, not unique to Russia, of which documents are being
made available to researchers. There is no way of knowing how much documentary
material remains in classified files which once belonged to the NKVD-controlled
departments within the Comintern. It would be over-confident to claim, based on files
currently available in Moscow, that 'we now know' the full truth of the Comintern's
relations with the Vietnamese communists. We have no documentary evidence, for
example, of a Comintern investigation into Ho Chi Minh's actions in China up to his
1931 arrest. Yet we know from collateral documents that he was excluded from the
1935 Seventh Comintern Congress and that he was 'politically inactive' during his
1934-38 stay in Moscow. Thus one can surmise that there was some sort of
investigation and that somewhere a classified record of the proceedings exists. In his
own statements to the Comintern Ho Chi Minh gave partial, sometimes contradictory,
information about his background. On enrolling in the International Lenin School in
1934, for example, he supplied the minimum of facts, listing his professional
speciality as 'none'. In 1938 he listed his birthdate as 1903 on a biographical
questionnaire, taking approximately ten years off his age.25
The use of French archival documents from the colonial period can also be
controversial. The reliability of the information and analyses of French intelligence
can by no means be guaranteed. Moreover, the collection of the Service de Protection
du Corps Expeditionnaire (SPCE) has been less used than some of the others in the
Archives d'Outre-Mer, in part because many of its files have only been declassified in
the 1990s. The SPCE kept files, mostly based on Sûreté documents, on individual
communists and nationalists.
This material includes several valuable 'declarations' or statements made to
the French police by imprisoned communists, as well as the reports of police
informers.
While both types of sources need to be treated with scepticism, I have opted
to make use of them. One can take advantage of the candour which disillusioned
communists sometimes demonstrated when captured by the French and often it is
possible to cross-check versions of events from two different confessions. This is
especially true in 1930 and 1931, when dissension over tactics in the communist
party seems to have reached an acute level. As for paid informers, they may well
exaggerate the importance of their contacts and inside knowledge to their employers.
But those who retained the trust of the Sûreté over a number of years must have been
judged to have supplied more accurate information than otherwise.
One of the most successful Sûreté informers, Nguyen Cong Vien aka Lam
Duc Thu, proved his worth by not only supplying monthly reports on Hos activities in
Canton from early 1925 onwards, but by also frequently passing on original
documents and letters. For example, he provided the French with an almost complete
collection of Ho Chi Minh's newspaper Thanh Nien (Youth), translations of which
can now be found in the archives. Much of the value of his reports for historians
derives from the fact that he was covering relationships among communists and non-
communists which, by the 1950s, had become politically dangerous to both sides, and
thus were rarely even hinted at by either left or right. He presents a picture which is
quite different from the Cold War-era view of rigid divisions between communists
and non-communist activists in southern China in the 1920s.
Although the period examined in this study falls outside the confines of the
Cold War, it has been largely interpreted from the perspective of those polarized
years. For this reason it seems useful to keep in mind some prescriptions for 'New
Cold War history' as we reconsider Ho's early career. Following John Lewis Gaddis,
three points should be emphasized. 26 First, one needs to take advantage of the
'detachment that comes from following, not reflecting, a historical epoch'. In that
spirit, the array of existing sources on Ho is used extremely carefully, with an eye on
the level of direct knowledge which the writer had of his subject. A second Gaddis
point is 'the need to take ideas seriously'. This requires that we try to enter the minds
of the men and women who struggled against French colonialism, and that we
recognize the power which Marxist-Leninist ideas exerted in the twenties and thirties
of the last century. In order to gain respect and maintain their power within the
communist movement, rival claimants to power would need to demonstrate a superior
grasp of this ideology and the Comintern line.
A third Gaddis prescription for the 'New Cold War History' is that it be multi-
archival, and we have attempted to fulfill this demand by using as much of the
documentary evidence on Ho's early political career as is currently available in the
Russian and French archives. There are without doubt still many discoveries to be
made about Ho's activities in this period from the Chinese and Vietnamese archives,
which may eventually become more accessible to researchers. Still-classified
documents in Russia and France, as well as in Britain and the United States, may also
add to our knowledge of Ho Chi Minh, in the days when he was Nguyen Ai Quoc.
But it is hoped that this study demonstrates the value of the Comintern sources, in
particular for the light they shed on the important influence which political changes in
Russia exerted on the different stages of his activity.

I. PARIS: THE EMERGENCE OF NGUYEN AI QUOC (1919-23)

1919: the path to the Paris Peace Conference

In the summer of 1919 the French security police started sending urgent
appeals for information to their colonial administration in Hanoi. 1 A mystery agitator
had appeared in Paris, just as France was catching its breath after four gruelling years
of war. He seemed to have a wide circle of acquaintances among the disparate
community of Vietnamese - intellectuals as well as workers and soldiers conscripted
from Indochina during the war. He was a complete enigma: no one had any idea who
he was or where he had sprung from. His name could not be found among the
immigration records for entering Indochinese. While the relentless security police,
the Sûreté Generale, were awaiting information from Indochina, the Ministry of
Colonies wasted no time in assigning its own agents to investigate the newcomer to
the Paris political scene.
He signed himself "Nguyen Ai Quoc", "Nguyen the Patriot", or literally,
'Nguyen who loves his country', usually with the designation, 'for the Group of
Vietnamese Patriots'. He behaved with considerable aplomb for a young man who
could not have been more than thirty - he called unannounced on deputies to the
French parliament, delegations to the Paris Peace Conference and newspaper editors.
In September 1919 no less a dignitary than the Governor General of Indochina,
Albert Sarraut, recently returned from the colony, gave him an audience.2
What was most shocking to the French authorities was his message. He was
sending out an official-sounding petition, 'The Demands of the Vietnamese People' to
participants in the Peace Conference, a political forum of twenty-seven delegations
which was to carve out a new world order. Although very few non-French
participants would have known precisely where Vietnam was, it seems that many
delegations at least took the time to acknowledge receipt of the petition. An aide to
Woodrow Wilson's representative, Colonel House, sent a polite note on 19 June to
that effect, as did a Nicara-guan diplomat.3 The Peace Conference had attracted a
fringe of political activists from around the world, from Ireland to Korea, all
promoting their own claim to nationhood. Although the French were surprised by the
Vietnamese initiative, it is not difficult to see why the Vietnamese nationalists
thought the time for change had come. The Russian and Hapsburg empires had
already crumbled; President Wilson was promising an end to the old world of secret
diplomacy, in which European royalty and heads of state could decide the fates of
distant peoples.
The Vietnamese Demands called on the victorious Great Powers to honour
their promise of a new era of 'law and justice' for subject peoples. They appeared in a
brief article on page 3 of the socialist newspaper L'Humanite on 18 June. From our
vantage point these demands appear far from extreme. They called for:
(1) general amnesty for all native political prisoners;
 (2) reform of Indochinese justice by granting the natives the same judicial
guarantees as were enjoyed by Europeans;
(3) freedom of press and opinion;
(4) freedom of association;
(5) freedom of emigration and foreign travel;
(6) freedom of instruction and the creation in all provinces of technical and
professional schools for indigenous people;
(7) replacement of rule by decree by rule of law;
(8) election of a permanent Vietnamese delegation to the French Parliament,
to keep it informed of the wishes of indigenous people.
They were signed 'For the Group of Vietnamese Patriots, Nguyen Ai Quoc'.
As it soon became clear, the French Republic and its colonial authorities had
no thought of renouncing their power over the lives of Algerians, Cambodians or
Vietnamese. After a war which had drained the treasury and laid waste much of
northern France, the resources of the colonies would play a larger role than ever in
French economic planning. The French were thus caught off balance by the audacity
of this native, one of their own subjects, who had appeared so unexpectedly in the
midst of their victory celebrations. It did not seem to occur to them to treat his appeal
for Vietnamese rights as anything other than subversion. They referred to it in their
bureaucratic communications as 'libel'.4 They were concerned enough to stake out his
residence and tail him throughout Paris for the rest of 1919 and off and on until 1923,
as their reports in the French Overseas Archives amply demonstrate. In reaction to
the beginning of the campaign for Vietnamese rights in June, the body overseeing
Vietnamese troops in France set up a Service de Ren-seignements politiques (SR),
under Pierre Arnoux.5 Their informers infiltrated Nguyen Ai Quoc's circle of
acquaintances and reported on his conversations.6 They confiscated letters and
articles which he tried to send to Vietnam. In doing so, they convinced the youthful
activist that the only way to deal with the colonial power was by subterfuge.
By the autumn of 1919 French intelligence-gathering was producing an initial
picture of the mysterious Vietnamese. A cable sent from Hanoi to regional centres on
8 September 1919 passed along the following, only partially accurate, information
from the Parisian police:
 Nguyen Ai Quoc claims to be from Nghe An's Nam Dan region, lives with
Phan Van Truong, seems to have completed studies in England, where he lived for
ten years, runs a group of Vietnamese patriots in existence for a long time but with no
legal basis, has replaced Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh in this function.
Please communicate information you may possess or gather on this native.7
Another Vietnamese informer in Paris code named 'Edouard' provided the
clue that Quoc's real name was Nguyen Van Thanh, which was close to the name he
had received from his father on reaching maturity: Nguyen Tat Thanh, 'Nguyen who
will succeed'. But the rest of what Edouard told the police turned out to be
disinformation, probably spread by Quoc himself (his claims that Quoc came from
Danang and lived on money provided by his wealthy family proved false). 8 By
December 1919 the French had mounted a daily watch on number 6 Villa des
Gobelins. This was an apartment on a quiet, residential cul-de-sac in southeastern
Paris, where the man calling himself Quoc had been living with the lawyer Phan Van
Truong and the exiled scholar Phan Chu Trinh.
In Vietnamese anti-colonial circles these two men were already respected
figures, even venerated in Trinh's case. Phan Van Truong had been imprisoned at the
outset of the war in 1914, on charges of coordinating support for anti-French
uprisings in Indochina. Phan Chu Trinh was also implicated in these plots and
contacts with the Germans, for which he was held in the Cherche-Midi Prison in
central Paris. The charges against the two men had to be dropped for lack of evidence
after a year, when the key Vietnamese witness suffered or staged a mental breakdown
and entirely ceased speaking.9 But at least one French official continued to believe in
their guilt.10 In Phan Van Truong's case, this belief may have stemmed from the
reputation which his family had as hard core rebels. Two of his brothers had been
sentenced to exile and hard labour for their involvement in the 1913 bombing plot
which killed two French army commanders in Tonkin (the plot was one of several
attributed to the anti-French exile Phan Boi Chau's partisans around this time).
Truong's trips to England in 1913, where he was believed to have been in contact
with a Joseph Thanh, an emissary of the royal pretender Cuong De, contributed to the
suspicion.11 The French also feared Truong's formidable intellect - trained as an
interpreter in Hanoi, he had mastered the art of blistering political argument during
his legal studies in Paris.
Phan Chu Trinh had come to Paris in 1911 after being amnestied for his
purported role in encouraging the 1908 tax revolts in Central Vietnam. He had spent
much of his first years in Paris working to release his comrades still in prison on
Poulo Condor. His Complete Account of the Peasants' Uprising in the Central
Region, an expose of the heavy-handed French reaction to the revolt, had been
translated into French by Commander Jules Roux. (Roux, an active socialist,
intervened on Trinh's behalf during his imprisonment.) 12 The French were wary of
Phan Chu Trinh's influence among the forty-odd Vietnamese students in pre-war
Paris, and had hoped to isolate him from the 'reformist' Asians who used to gather in
the Latin quarter.13 Their efforts failed, however. In 1912 Trinh and Phan Van Truong
started a Vietnamese club which met in cafes and Chinese restaurants in
Montparnasse. They may have indulged in little more than exile talk - Trinh always
maintained his innocence with regard to the anti-French conspiracies of Phan Boi
Chau and his confederate, Prince Cuong De. To prove his loyalty he had even handed
over to the Ministry of Colonies a letter he received from Cuong De in 1913. 14 The
testimony against him could have been fabricated by the military government then
administering Paris. But his own interpreter testified in 1915 that 'Phan Chu Trinh
received funding directly from Germany from the German government, which was
brought to him by two emissaries of Cuong De, Truong Duy Toan and Do Van Y.' 15
Had an uprising occurred in Vietnam, the Germans were expected to contribute more
funding via their consuls in China, the informer said. One suspects, though, that the
characterization of Trinh as a talker and writer rather than as an organizer of plots
was closer to the truth of the matter. The Administrative Director of the Indochinese
Instruction Group in Paris, of which Phan Chu Trinh was formally part, made the
following prophetic comment in a report to his superiors: 'One might ask what would
happen, if among the students or pupils in Paris there were a young Indochinese, a
man of action as Phan Chu Trinh is a man of the word, and if this young Indochinese
had relations with the Chinese or Japanese... or with some Indian reformer, a partisan
of extreme methods.'16
The true nature of Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh's involvement in
anti-French plots remains extremely ambiguous. The case against them ended in a
non-lieu when the informer fell mute. After his release from prison in July 1915,
Phan Chu Trinh's government stipend was cut off- - he was forced to start earning his
living as a retoucher of photographs. These experiences and continued harrassment
by the French police left him with a deep bitterness towards the ruling elite of the
mother country.17 Phan Van Truong was conscripted to work as an interpreter at the
Toulouse Arsenal, and after his demobilization in 1918 he started a legal practice.
Towards the end of the First World War the two men started a new Vietnamese
grouping, this time named the 'Vietnamese Patriots' Association'.
Nguyen Ai Quoc's relationship with these two older men was puzzling to
those outside their inner circle. The man using that name was young enough to be
Phan Chu Trinh's son and lacked his distinguished scholarly credentials. Compared to
Phan Van Truong he was an unpolished provincial. With hindsight, later observers
have drawn the conclusion that Quoc was the messenger and front-man for the two
better-known activists. The Trotskyist intellectual Ho Huu Tuong wrote in his
memoirs that Phan Chu Trinh was responsible for the ideas put forth by the Group of
Patriots, while Phan Van Truong and later others translated them into French.
Nguyen Ai Quoc, he said, then passed the articles on to the newspapers. Tuong
himself had not had any contact with the original group, however. 18 But one
Vietnamese informer had come to a similar conclusion in 1919. 'Agent Jean' told
Inspector Arnoux that Quoc was 'no more than an intelligent figurehead whom they
surround with mystery to make him appear more venerable. Because Phan Van
Truong and Phan Chu Trinh have already been pursued by the law, Quoc is now
given the leading role.'19
Yet most French police records depict the enigmatic Quoc behaving as a
social and intellectual companion of his two elders, certainly as more than an errand
boy. The Controller of Indochinese Troops in France, Pierre Guesde, remained
convinced of Quoc's importance as a political activist by the close of 1919. The
records compiled by Guesde and his informants show Quoc to have been a dedicated
campaigner for Vietnamese rights, whose sense of mission made up for what he
lacked in formal education. They reported that he had frequent contacts with Irish,
Chinese and Korean nationalists who had come to Paris to lobby the Peace
Conference. Notes on his conversations with fellow Vietnamese show that he was
well-informed about the issues facing his homeland, albeit strongly influenced by the
views of Phan Chu Trinh. In December, for example, Agent Edouard, apparently a
Vietnamese official of the Ministry of Colonies, turned in an eleven-page report on
an evening spent at 6 Villa des Gobelins. The first part documents a tete-a-tete with
Nguyen Ai Quoc. They discussed the newly-returned Governor General of Indochina,
Albert Sarraut, soon to become Minister for Colonies, and his plans for reform.
'Quoc by and large approves of M. Sarraut's policies in Indochina,' Edouard
wrote, 'especially the development of French language education and the extension of
the railway system, which will permit the forests of Annam and Laos to be exploited.'
He continued his paraphrase of Quoc's comments:
M. Albert Sarraut, Quoc says, has created a university and a lycee in Hanoi.
This is very well, but it is only the beginning of an immense task. For the 20 million
inhabitants of Indochina, we need not just one lycee, but 20 or 30 lycees, even more.
They need compulsory primary education, to allow the masses to become educated,
because it is the mass of the population which composes the people and not the
elite...People have always cited the lack of credits to explain the problem of
educational development in Indochina. They will use this reason again to prevent M.
Sarraut's successors from continuing the work he has begun.20
When Phan Chu Trinh turned up to join the conversation, he and 'Edouard'
continued to discuss the future of colonial policy in Indochina and what the natives
could 'demand' of the new Governor General, Maurice Long. Nguyen Ai Quoc
intervened to complain that the natives would never get anywhere by asking for
concessions: 'Why have our 20 million compatriots done nothing to force the
Government to give us our human rights? We are men and we should be treated that
way. All those who refuse to treat us as their equals are our enemies.' 21 Phan Chu
Trinh rebuked Quoc for being hot-headed: 'What do you want our unarmed
countrymen do to against the Europeans and their weapons?' he asked. 'Why should
people die uselessly without any result?'22 Trinh's point of view, inherently critical of
Phan Boi Chau's conspiracies, is one which Quoc eventually adopted as his own, like
his mentor's views on modern education and economic development. However,
Trinh's remedy, to demand their human rights, 'gently, but firmly and with the
greatest possible tenacity' was one which Quoc would soon leave behind.23
To come to a balanced picture of who the future Ho Chi Minh was when he
turned up in Paris, in my view one must start with this contemporary evidence which
the Sûreté provided. One can then work backward through the sparse information
which is available for the missing years in his early life, from his 1911 departure
from Vietnam until his emergence in 1919 as Nguyen Ai Quoc. After weighing this
evidence, I believe that there is a case to be made that Ho had already gained
considerable political experience by 1919, that he had been consciously preparing
himself during those years to play a role in liberating his nation from French rule.
While Phan Van Truong was clearly the author of the French text of the Demands
submitted to the Peace Conference, and probably did much of the writing of articles
submitted to the French press in 1919 in the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, Ho himself
may well have been one of the moving forces behind the campaign for Vietnamese
rights which was launched that June. This is, in fact, the explanation given in Ho Chi
Minh's purported autobiography: the idea of presenting the Demands was his, the
author says, but Phan Van Truong composed the French text, as Ho himself could not
yet write fluently in French.24 The young man calling himself Nguyen Ai Quoc seems
already to have been introducing techniques of political organizing to the Vietnamese
community which went beyond the writing of open letters and manifestos.
One of the best clues as to Ho's pre-1919 experience is his contacts with the
Korean delegation at the Peace Conference. Agent 'Jean' reported that Quoc had
taken many of his ideas from the Korean independence movement. 25 The Korean
National Association based in the United States had started its pro-independence
campaign as soon as Woodrow Wilson announced his Fourteen Points in January
1918. Their petition for liberation from Japan was submitted on 12 May 1919, a bit
less than a month before the Vietnamese appeal appeared in Paris. A Chinese
newspaper published in Tianjin, the Yishihao, printed on 18 and 20 September 1919
an interview with Nguyen Ai Quoc in Paris which explained that Quoc had
exchanged ideas with the Korean delegate during a trip he had made to America. 26
The article, which seems to have been written by a US-based Korean or Chinese,
identified Quoc as the Vietnamese delegate to the Peace Conference, who had come
from America. The introduction to the interview read:
The American correspondent relates that on the recommendation of Kin-
Tchong-Wen and Kim-Koei-Tcho, representatives of the provisional Korean
government, he was able to obtain an interview with Nguyen Ai Quoc. The latter is a
man of thirty, with a bold and youthful appearance; he knows English, French and
Chinese; knows characters well enough to be able to converse in writing. When he
was put in touch with the Korean delegate Kim during his time in America, he was
thus able to speak about the question of independence and to convince himself that,
as the situation is different in the two countries, they could not have identical action
programs.27
In this interview Ho Chi Minh makes clear that the publication of the
Vietnamese Demands was the beginning of a publicity campaign rather than a single
approach to the Peace Conference. The French summary of the interview says: 'His
demarches at the Conference having failed, he continued his efforts by approaching
various political figures, and managed to interest a number of deputies in his cause.' 28
And further, Nguyen Ai Quoc is quoted as saying: 'Besides the demarches I have
made to members of parliament, I have tried to gather support from all over. The
Socialist Party has shown itself to be unhappy with Government actions and has
willingly given us its support. This is our only hope in France. As far as our action in
other countries goes, it is in your country (America) that we have had the most
success...29
The French Service de Renseignements in Beijing had forwarded translations
of this interview to Paris, along with the following explanation:
In my note no. 9 of 5 June I brought to your attention the Chinese newspaper
Yi Che Pao [Yishibao], which in its multiple forms has for several years waged a
campaign damaging to French interests and to those of Indochina itself. Last April it
published some Vietnamese manifestos. Moreover, during the recent anti-Japanese
incidents in Beijing caused by the negotiations over Tsing-Tao, this paper published
several articles announcing that France was linked to Japan by secret agreements
concluded since the war...30
The extent of the Vietnamese connection to Yishibao can be judged by the
fact that Cuong De himself had published various articles there, which were similar
in tone to the Vietnamese Demands. Copies of these articles were found on the walls
of the Chinese workers' barracks in Marseille in June 1919.31 Ho told Agent 'Jean' that
he had an arrangement with the Korean delegation in Paris to send copies of his (or
Phan Van Truong's?) writings for publication in the Tianjin paper.32 There seems to
have been a degree of coordination between what was happening in Paris and the
Phan Boi Chau-Cuong De circle in China.
One of the difficulties with this view of Ho Chi Minh as an experienced
political activist in 1919 is that, according to most chronologies of his early years, he
had arrived in Paris from London in 1917 and lived there unremarked by the
authorities until the Peace Conference campaign. He was not known to have played
an early role in the Group of Vietnamese Patriots. Another probable reason why
doubt has been cast on his importance within the Group of Patriots is the fact that his
family history and links to Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Boi Chau were little known
until 1992. It seemed highly unlikely that the kitchen boy and manual labourer which
communist propaganda has created of the early Ho Chi Minh could metamorphose so
quickly into a spokesman for the patriotic cause. I will discuss these issues below.
As far as his date of arrival in Paris goes, there is no better or more
convincing record than that of the French police, who decided that he had arrived in
June 1919 from London.33 Their note says that Ho arrived in 1919 from London on 7
June; that he first lived at 10 rue de Stockholm, then at 56 rue M. le Prince, then at 6
Villa des Gobelins. One can assume that if the Korean press account of his meeting in
America is accurate, it was unlikely to have occurred during his one documented
stopover in New York when he was still working as a ship-board cook. That was in
December 1912, when he wrote to the Resident Superieur in Hue in an attempt to
send money to his father. Although the letter was postmarked New York, he gave his
address as the Poste Restante in Le Havre and described himself as a sailor. 34 At that
point Quoc had not yet had time to learn English and had only been out of Vietnam
for a year-and-a-half. In my opinion it is more likely that the encounter with the
Korean representative in America occurred in 1917 or 1918, when Korean nationalist
groups in America were becoming increasingly active. For while we have no concrete
proof that he was in France in those years, Quoc himself told the Comintern in 1938
that he had worked for a wealthy family in Brooklyn in 1917 and 1918. This
Comintern document gives his date of arrival in France as 1919. This information
might seem suspect, since other dates which he provides in this questionnaire are
clearly wrong - he gives his own birthdate, improbably, as 1903 and his mother's
death as 1910.35 Yet he may have been camouflaging an element of truth amidst a
collection of false statements. A remark made to the US peace activist David
Dellinger in 1969 reinforces the notion that his stay in America came after 1916. Ho
Chi Minh told Dellinger that when he was in America, he heard Marcus Garvey
speak in Harlem.36 Garvey, the leader of the 'return to Africa movement', did not
arrive in the United States from his native Jamaica until 1916. In 1917 and 1918 he
spoke frequently in Harlem on issues of racism, which had flared up in the US
following the 1915 reappearance of the Ku Klux Klan. Ho Chi Minh published an
article about the Ku Klux Klan in 1924 which described the practice of lynching in
the American South - his information could have been drawn from Garvey's speeches
or the US press of the time.37
If Ho had been seeking out Korean nationalists in 1917 or 1918, the question
arises: was he simply involved in the casual political tourism of a young man, in
search of new experiences as he made his way around the world? Or had he gone
abroad with a purpose? Was he, in 1911 or 1917, already part of an organized
movement to gain autonomy for Vietnam? For the French authorities, these questions
were partially answered when in the spring of 1920 they finally tracked down his
brother and sister. They began to sketch in the picture of someone whose past and
family connections made him highly suspect.
 His sister and brother had both, it transpired, been sentenced to hard labour
during the war for abetting Phan Boi Chau's partisans. His sister recalled learning in
1915 that Ho had gone to London.38 His brother mentioned that Ho had been enrolled
at the prestigious Quoc Hoc School in Hue in 1909, but that he had dropped out that
same year, after his father lost his post as a district chief. The young Ho had then
gone south to Phan Thiet, where he worked as a teacher (tro giao) at the private Duc
Thanh school, founded by a colleague of Phan Chu Trinh.39 Both brother and sister
remembered that their sibling had injured one ear in a childhood accident. (The
scarred upper portion of Ho's left ear would become the French key to his identity
over the years.)40
Having established the connection between their mystery agitator and the
family of Nguyen Sinh Huy, the French were able to dig out other, pre-1919 reports
which shed light on Ho Chi Minh's evolution. Both he and his brother had been
singled out for reprimands from the Director of the Quoc Hoc School, because of
their hostile attitude towards the French during the disturbances in Hue of 1908. 41
This fit with the intelligence supplied by Agent 'Edouard', who had told the Sûreté
that Nguyen Ai Quoc had been in Hue during 1908 and seemed unable to forgive the
French for their actions then. 'He claims that with his own eyes he saw the
Vietnamese coming empty-handed to the Residence Superieure to protest against the
heavy labour contribution... and that the crowd was fired on to disperse it.'42
These reports also establish the importance of his father's career in Nguyen
Tat Thanh's/Nguyen Ai Quoc's development. Although his father had achieved the
rank of Pho-bang, a second-rank laureate, in the national examinations of 1901 at the
same time as Phan Chu Trinh, he had had no overt involvement in the ferment which
led to the tax revolts in 1908. In 1909 he was appointed District Chief in an area
being opened for agricultural development in Binh Dinh province. 43 But within only a
few months he became involved in a scandal. He was accused of caning a man in his
jurisdiction who died some time later, ostensibly from injuries received during the
beating. In September 1910 Nguyen Sinh Huy was demoted four grades in rank by a
provincial commission, which left him without a source of income. Huy himself
claimed that the man's death was unconnected to the beating. 44 But the Sûreté in Hue
reported that Huy was guilty of brutality under the influence of alcohol. 45 By January
1911, when Huy requested permission to travel to Saigon-Gia Dinh to make his
living, the Sûreté refused, on the grounds that he was 'strongly suspected of
complicity with Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chau Trinh and others.' Their representative in
Hue noted: 'His son, who two years ago was living in a compartment in Dong-Ba [in
Hue], disappeared suddenly. He is believed to be in Cochinchina. Nguyen Sinh Huy
may be going to join him and to confer with Phan Chau Trinh.' 46 Rather than wait for
his request to be turned down, however, Ho's father went directly to the Vietnamese
mandarins in Hue for a laissez-passer and managed to sail from Danang on February
26. The Resident Superieur in Hue claimed to have information from the Court, 'that
his [Huy's] reasons for going to Cochinchina were not pure. He is believed to have
gone there as a messenger, carrying news from his daughter's friends. What gives his
voyage an even more serious nature is the fact that it follows immediately trips to
Hue and Quang Ngai made by this woman, known as Miss Bach Lien, who has lived
for years in a village in Nghe An.'47
Whether Nguyen Sinh Huy had sympathies with the reform movement of
Phan Chu Trinh, or the more violent resistance of Phan Boi Chau, before his disgrace
in 1909-10 is not known. We do know that he maintained a clean dossier with the
French until that time. Nor do we know how strongly his disgrace affected his
youngest son. As Daniel Hemery has pointed out, however, it narrowed the choices
open to Nguyen Tat Thanh, bringing his elite education in Hue to a halt. 48 The fact
that Tat Thanh went to teach at the Duc Thanh school, patterned on Phan Chu Trinh's
ideas of modern education in French and quoc ngu, would seem to show that he was
already involved with the reformist movement in 1909. The school's founder had
even established a fish sauce factory alongside the school, in line with Phan Chu
Trinh's prescription for indigenous commercial development. By going to Duc Thanh
to teach, the future Nguyen Ai Quoc was identifying himself with the philosophy of
Phan Chu Trinh, who had been deported as a criminal. His father, who had witnessed
the growing impotence of the Chinese-educated scholars under French rule, may well
have influenced his son's decision to follow this path.
By early 1911 Nguyen Tat Thanh had moved south to Saigon, where his
brother claimed he enrolled in a school for training mechanics. 49 If French suspicions
were correct, his father arrived in March and may have met Phan Chu Trinh before
the latter sailed for France at the end of the month. The amnestied scholar would have
brought welcome news of the scholars detained on Poulo Condore, a group of whom
came from Nghe An. Both Daniel Hemery and Thu Trang Gaspard suggest that
Nguyen Tat Thanh and his father may have discussed with Phan Chu Trinh a plan to
send the young man abroad to study. 50 Tat Thanh had to make his way to Europe as a
kitchen boy on the Latouche Treville, since his father was in disgrace and he had no
hope of getting government sponsorship for the trip, as Phan Chu Trinh had. But
there is no reason to believe that Quoc went abroad planning to spend the next years
as a sailor and manual labourer.
In September, after Nguyen Tat Thanh's July arrival in Marseille, he did
something which was entirely consistent with the behaviour of a follower of Phan
Chu Trinh. He sent a formal letter to the French President, requesting admission to
the 'Colonial School', an elite training institution in Paris which had been established
to turn out colonial administrators. 'I am completely without resources and eager to
learn. I would like to become useful to France in relation to my compatriots, and
would like at the same time to help them profit from the benefits of Instruction,' he
wrote, clearly with the aid of a Francophone. 51 One can read his 'desire to become
useful to France' as ambition to become a 'Confucian mandarin, expressly serving the
interests of the colonial power,' as does Nguyen The Anh.52 On the other hand, this
desire is redolent of Phan Chu Trinh's tactics of critical collaboration, which called on
Vietnamese to master the best of France's cultural and democratic traditions for their
own ends. At this stage the future Nguyen Ai Quoc seems to have hoped that he
could appeal to the noblest instincts of the French administration, and that he might
be judged on his own merits, rather than as the son of a disgraced mandarin. But the
request was referred back to the new Resident Superieur in Hue, who pointed out that
the would-be scholar had not exhausted the educational possibilities of the colony.53
This rejection did not end Ho's quest for an education, but changed the way in
which he would obtain it. We do not know for certain whether he was able to enrol
formally in some other institution, in England for example, or whether he picked up
his knowledge of English and colonial politics via informal contacts. The imperative
to earn a living seems to have left him with no recourse but to sail the seas for the
next few years. By October 1911 he was sending money to his father from Ceylon. 54
The letter cited above from New York was sent in December 1912. At that time he
wrote to the Resident in Hue, saying that he would like to send a monthly payment to
his father, but that he had no idea what his address was. 'I don't know what to do,
beyond turning to you, the obliging protector of our country,' he said. 55 The tone
taken towards the French administrator seems to have been dictated in part by the
Confucian self-abasement required in a petitioner, but also by prudence. In view of
the notes which he wrote not long afterwards to Phan Chu Trinh, one can assume that
his gratitude to France was feigned.
 In 1913 or early 1914 Ho Chi Minh appears to have given up seafaring and
settled in England. He reported in an undated postcard to Phan Chu Trinh in Paris,
that he 'had found a place to study their language and for a month-and-a-half had
been working only with Westerners, speaking their language all the time.' 'Living
here is not any different from France', he wrote, 'and I hope that in four or five
months when I meet Uncle I will speak and understand a lot of English.' 56 He gave his
London address as the Drayton Court Hotel, West Ealing, located at the junction
where the Great Western Railway left London. It is easy to suppose that he was able
to find work as a helper in the kitchen of a busy railway hotel (there is no
contemporary evidence that he worked as an assistant to Escoffier at the Carlton
Hotel, as is claimed in the Tran Dan Tien book). In another card, this time addressed
from 8 Stephen Street, Tottenham Court Road, London, he showed that he was
keeping up with current events in Asia. 'The five great powers are in a struggle. Nine
countries are making war. I am reminded suddenly of what I said to you a few
months ago, about the storm that was threatening. Destiny is saving more surprises
for us and it is impossible to say who will win this. The neutrals are still undecided
and the belligerents cannot guess their intentions. In these circumstances, if someone
sticks his nose into the business, he will be forced to choose sides.[...] We should stay
calm.'57 By this time, apparently around the time of Phan Chu Trinh's arrest in August
1914, Ho Chi Minh had learned enough English to feel that he could offer opinions
about world politics as seen from London.
A portion of another note was quoted during the interrogation of a
Vietnamese witness during Phan Chu Trinh's trial. The witness, Cao Dac Minh, said
that it was a letter written by Tat-Thanh in answer to a letter from Phan Chu Trinh.
The note seems to have been written after Trinh's arrest. As the witness explained:
'After deploring the evils suffered by his countrymen, Tat Thanh assures Phan Chu
Trinh that, 'after him, he will continue his work.'58
During the French investigation of wartime Vietnamese-German links, other
information came to light which showed that not only Tat-Thanh, but Vietnamese
known to be linked to Cuong-De, had been living and studying in London in 1914.
One known as Joseph Thanh, later identified as Lam Van Tu from Cochinchina,
sailed from Hongkong to Singapore in 1913 with Cuong De and two other southern
Vietnamese, who later turned up as the Prince's couriers in Europe. One of the
southerners, Truong Duy Toan, was the former editor of a mildly nationalist
publication, Luc Tinh Tan Van (News of the Six Provinces). He was said to have
stayed with Phan Chu Trinh during his trips to Paris. 59 The other courier, Do Van Y, a
school teacher from My Tho, settled in France and was in regular touch with Joseph
Thanh in 1914, when the latter was living in England. The French authorities
confiscated at least four undated letters from Joseph Thanh to Do Van Y written in
1914, two of them sent from Gower Street. 60 Other letters were addressed from
Constantine Road in Hampstead, London, and 3 Conquest Road, Bedford. They show
that Joseph Thanh was expecting to receive money from Cuong De. As we have seen,
Phan Van Truong was implicated in the activities of this circle at his trial.61
Spurred by the French to investigate Joseph Thanh and his contacts, the
British Home Office reported to Paris that Joseph Thanh and Tat-Thanh were
brothers aged eighteen and nineteen, and that Tat Thanh was living and studying in
Bedford. The two had been enrolled at the Regent Street Polytechnic, where they had
made the acquaintance of a student named Gourd, an Englishman whose parents lived
at 12 Constantine Road. The report noted that Tat Thanh 'is on friendly terms with a
daughter of the Gourd family' and that as a result Mrs Gourd helped him find an
apprenticeship at the Igranic Electric Company in Bedford. 'Nothing in their outward
habits would give rise to the suggestion that they are engaged in any conspiracy' the
document concludes.62 Later the Siirete decided that the 'two brothers' were surnamed
'Lam', and reported that Lam Van Tu or Joseph Thanh had returned to Cochinchina. 63
Without the network of Vietnamese informers which the French later developed, one
doubts whether the Home Office got very far in establishing the exact identity of
these men and what they were doing in England. There is no reason to suppose that
Joseph Thanh and Tat-Thanh were brothers, as 'Thanh' was part of Tat-Thanh's
personal name, not a family name. But it seems unlikely that there were two different
Tat-Thanhs in England. This convoluted web of interconnections leaves one with the
strong suspicion that Nguyen Tat-Thanh was part of an informal group which was the
western equivalent of the Eastern Studies movement. 64 In his supposed autobiography
one of the 'narrators' claims that Ho Chi Minh and he, as well as other Vietnamese in
England, were part of a secret organization (presumably Vietnamese) known as the
'Overseas Labour Association' (Hoi Lao-dong Hai-ngoai). 65 As long as he sailed the
seas, his brother and sister's links with the conspiracies of Phan Boi Chau would have
made him a natural candidate for liaison agent of Cuong De. Was Cuong De in 1914
using money raised from Vietnam (and perhaps the Germans) to support Vietnamese
students in the West? Was it pure coincidence that Nguyen Tat Thanh showed up in
London around the same time as Joseph Thanh and the Prince?
 Towards the end of 1916, Ho Chi Minh's 'autobiography' relates that he
returned to France to meet Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh. Another attempt at
rebellion had just failed - the flight of the young emperor Duy Tan had ended in his
exile to the island of Reunion. Ho asked his compatriots in the book's simplified
language: 'Now that King Duy Tan has risen up, as well as the people of Thai-
Nguyen and many other places, what should we do?' The writer continues: 'But after
that no one knows what Anh Ba (Ho) did next.' 66 The last years of the war would
have been a logical time for an English-speaking Asian nationalist to try to build
contacts in the United States, however. Both Chinese and Korean nationalists were
receiving support from influential people there. Still, in spite of the evidence from
Yishibao, Ho Chi Minh's passage to America in 1917-18 remains in the realm of
conjecture - the next confirmed sighting of Nguyen Ai Quoc/Nguyen Tat Thanh is in
Paris in 1919.
This excursion through the French archival records should offer some ideas of
how the person who emerged as Nguyen Ai Quoc at the Paris Peace Conference
arrived on the political scene. When he told Agent 'Jean' in January 1920 that he had
undertaken a study of colonial policies of the Americans, the English, the Spanish
and the Italians, his claim does not seem entirely far-fetched. 67 His ties with both
Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Van Truong probably dated back before the War; one can
guess that the three men's affinity was in part due to the fact that they all had friends
and relatives languishing forgotten by authors who see the two Phans as respectable,
middle class reformers, in contrast to the young firebrand Nguyen Ai Quoc.) While
Phan Chu Trinh and Ho Chi Minh would have political disagreements over the next
years, these never destroyed the bond of responsibility which the two showed towards
each other. And as for Phan Van Truong, his relationship with Ho seemed stronger
than ever by the time they separated in 1923.

The radical solution (1920-30)

The Paris Peace Conference closed in January 1920, with the inauguration of
the League of Nations. Ho Chi Minh and his compatriots were not among those who
had cause to celebrate: it was the end of their hopes that the Western democracies
would recognize their claim to independence. With the collapse of their campaign at
the Conference they seem to have lost some of their cohesion as a militant group. As
1920 wore on, money became scarce. For a time Ho was apparently supported by an
inhabitant of 6 Villa des Gobelins known as Khanh Ky, who had set up a small
business trading in photographic supplies in the occupied Rhineland. (The French
guessed that he may have been engaged in currency speculation.) Phan Van Truong
set up a legal practice in Mayence in the latter part of 1919, and defended both
Vietnamese and French soldiers who were being tried in military courts. His money
was reported to have come from his legal work in commercial disputes between
French and Germans.68 Phan Chu Trinh also contributed to the group's funds by
earning 30 francs a day as a retoucher of photographs.69 But an employee of the
Ministry of Colonies, a Mr Phu Bay who was probably Agent 'Edouard', reported at
the same time that these men were almost all suffering from bronchitis or
tuberculosis, as 'they lack the means to lead a healthy or comfortable life.' 70 He did
not view them as a serious threat to the peace of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh was
revealing frustration in his conversations with the informers who sought him out. In
early January 1920 he complained that Indochina was unknown in other nations.
When he spoke with international political figures, he said, he discovered that they
either had no knowledge of Indochina or supposed that it was a small frontier
province between India and China. 'We need to make a lot of noise in order to
become known,' he told Agent Jean; 'Korea is now well-known to all nations, because
the Koreans have raised their voices.' He added, though, that he would wait a while to
see what sort of policies the new Governor General Maurice Long would
implement.71 He tried to raise the cause of Vietnamese freedom at a meeting critical
of the peace settlement in the Orient, at which the socialist Deputy Marius Moutet
spoke, along with Professor Felicien Challaye and representatives of the Korean and
Chinese communities. Inspector Pierre Arnoux himself was in the audience of around
1,000, which included a large number of Chinese. He reported that Nguyen Ai Quoc
had distributed copies of the 'Vietnamese Demands' in the hall, but had failed to be
recognized by the chairman when he requested the right to speak. 'Nguyen Ai Quoc's
attitude,...his way of insisting on taking the floor, seem to have provoked a mixture of
good-will and mockery among the audience and the speakers,' Arnoux wrote
smugly.72 Soon after, Ho organized a meeting where he spoke in the name of the
'Group of Vietnamese Revolutionaries'. His talk, titled 'The Social Evolution of the
Far Eastern Peoples and the Demands of the Ancient Nation of Annam', attracted
around seventy people, who applauded enthusiastically at the end. 73 But the absence
of Vietnamese discouraged him from repeating his effort. When Jean suggested to
him that the mention of a group of Revolutionary Vietnamese had frightened his
compatriots away, he grew defensive. It appears that there was not an official group
with that name, but that Ho had hoped to gain publicity by using it. 'We need fights
and foolishness to get attention,' he told the ever-present Jean.74
 Ho was reported at this time to be spending long hours in the Bibliotheque St.
Genevieve next to the Pantheon. Part of his publicity campaign included the intention
to publish a book on the French record in Indochina, which he planned to call Les
Opprimes. In order to give the work more weight, he had decided to use long extracts
from French authors. The Sûreté compiled a list of thirteen books on Indochina which
they believed he had consulted, including Phan Chu Trinh's report on the events of
1908 as well as works on agriculture and the financial regime established by France. 75
He spoke of raising the money to print his book by finding a socialist to hire him as
domestic help, but as of September, he was still looking for funding and hoping that
Marcel Cachin at L'Humanite would take care of the printing. 76 His political activity
was interrupted by a hospital stay in August, when he received treatment for an
abcess on his right shoulder.77 Whether this was the first sign of a tubercular infection
is unclear. By the next year, however, he was being turned out of his job in a
photographic shop on the grounds that he had tuberculosis.78
As the French grew more certain that Nguyen Ai Quoc and Nguyen Tat
Thanh were one and the same, they began to strategize as to how best to control him.
In France they could minimize his contacts with other Vietnamese, and by the
autumn of 1920 they had determined to keep him there. The Director of the
Indochinese Sûreté in Hanoi, Rene Robin, requested that Nguyen Ai Quoc be denied
a passport. He suggested that the authorities overseeing the Indochinese in Paris
persuade Ho to admit his true name, by telling him that he could only obtain a ticket
for passage to Vietnam by producing authentic proof of his identity. But Ho would
not succumb to the Sûreté's pressures: he had already been summoned to the
Prefecture of Police on 20 September, where he had been photographed and
interrogated. After the questioning he went straight to the Human Rights League to
complain of police harrassment.79
The Hanoi authorities were convinced that Ho would not risk returning to
Indochina, where he would be subject to the the penalties of the Annamite code
against clandestine immigration. But they feared that he might try to go to another
country, where he 'would completely escape us and we would have to expect
surprises from such a determined individual...’ ‘A Nguyen Ai Quoc unmasked and
kept under surveillance by the Metropolitan police - we can not wish for better than
that,' wrote a M. Lacombe to Paris. 80 Pierre Guesde, who relished his role as 'General
Controller of Indochinese Troops in France', took a particularly hard line on Ho Chi
Minh and his immediate circle. By the end of 1920 he had opened 250 files on
suspect Vietnamese in France, but he considered the group from 6 Villa des Gobelins
to be the most dangerous.81
Why Guesde found Ho and his circle so threatening is at first difficult to
understand. The Sûreté had already frightened away the less determined adherents to
his cause; he was almost destitute and his health was beginning to trouble him. Yet
by November 1920 it was becoming clear that some of the Vietnamese were making
common cause with the more radical faction in the French socialist party. That month
Ho and a Tran Tien Nam attended a meeting organized by the Socialist Revolutionary
Party to celebrate the third anniversary of the Soviet Republic. On November 3, Phan
Chu Trinh, Ho and three others then living at Villa des Gobelins went to a meeting of
the 'Committee for the Third International' organized by the Socialists of the 13th
arrondissement. Then on the 19th of the month Ho received an invitation to a meeting
from the 'extremist fraction' of the 13th Section of the Socialist Revolutionary
Federation of the Seine. At this meeting a vote was taken on whether the Federation
should join the Third International based in Moscow.82 The Sûreté did not report the
result of that vote, but it seems fairly certain that Ho's mind had been made up on this
issue by the time he boarded a train on 24 December 1920 to journey to Tours for the
Congress of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He was representing the 13th Section,
his neighbourhood branch, as well as the 'Indochinese Socialist Group'. 83 It was at the
Tours Congress that a majority of the delegates formalized their decision to join the
Russian Bolsheviks in the Third or Communist International, to leave behind the
Second, Socialist International whose reputation had been tarnished in the eyes of
many radicals by its weak response to nationalist chauvinism during the First World
War. Ho's participation at this Congress made him one of the founding members of
the French Communist Party.
An article which Ho wrote for L'Humanite before the Congress gives some
idea of the strength of his views at the time. (This may, again, have been written with
Phan Van Truong's help. All the same, a friend in the 13th Section said his draft
required some stylistic improvements. Whether the ornate version in the French
archives is the edited version is unclear.) Ho called his article 'Colonial Policy'. It
reflects his exposure to Lenin's 'Theses on National and Colonial Questions', which
had been unveiled at the Second Comintern Congress in July 1920 and printed in
L'Humanite on 16 and 17 July. Lenin's analysis of imperialism, inherent in these
Theses, provided Ho with a theoretical framework for his visceral hatred of
colonialism.
 The hydra of western capitalism has for some time now been stretching its
horrible tentacles towards all corners of the globe, as it finds Europe too restricted a
field of action, and the blood of the European proletariat insufficient to satisfy its
insatiable appetite. English, German and French capitalists are all equal, as are their
crimes, but for the fact that the capitalists of other countries at least have the modesty
not to dress up their egoism with the pompous phrase of'Civilizing Mission'. But
behind the three colours of liberty, equality and fraternity, France introduces alcohol,
opium and prostitution to all of her colonies and sows misery, ruin and death along
with her ill-gotten riches.
In the face of these hateful practices, does the Socialist Party have a colonial
policy which is truly socialist? No, not yet has the party tried to aid any of the
colonies to free itself by revolutionary means. This inactivity would have carried on
if the rightist war had not laid bare the lies and hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy
and if the Russian Revolution had not violently stirred up the energies of the
Proletariat of the Universe.
Since the majority of the Party decided to join the Communist International
and Lenin presented his Colonial Theses to the Second Congress, our comrades have
begun to talk about the colonies...84
Ho's intervention at the Tours Congress was less heavy-handed, but raised the
same criticism of the Socialist Party. When Deputy Jean Longuet tried to protest that
he had spoken out on the colonial question, Ho asked him not to interrupt. Still, he
sounded a more diplomatic note than in his L'Humanite article. In closing his short
speech, he called on all members of the Socialist Party, right-wing as well as left-
wing, to come to the aid of Indochina. He got a warm response from the hall, where
cries of 'Down with the colonial sharks!' could be heard among the applause.85
Ho's speech is less well-known than the picture snapped of him by one of the
delegates. It shows a smooth-faced Vietnamese looking like a well-dressed schoolboy
in suit and tie, standing among the seated, bewhiskered French delegates. One right-
wing press account described him as a prize circus attraction presented by the P.T.
Barnum of the Tours Congress, Deputy Marcel Cachin. But Ho's contemporary Paul
Vaillant-Couturier gave him a glowing review, commenting: 'His intervention was
admirable in its concision, describing the agony of a nation of 20 million people.' 86 In
later years Ho would apparently make a point of keeping a low profile during
doctrinal debates in the Comintern. But it seems unlikely that, as he later claimed, he
came to the Tours Congress without a clear understanding of what the issues
separating the radical and moderate socialists were. After all, he had been attending
political meetings and reading the left-wing press in Paris for a year and a half by the
time he arrived in Tours.
At Tours Ho Chi Minh gave his allegiance to a force which would dominate
the rest of his life. The world communist movement would become both his family
and his chief employer. But in the winter of 1921 it did little to alleviate his personal
problems or raise the spirits of his Vietnamese collective. From 14 January till 5
March he was in the Cochin Hospital to have his shoulder abcess removed. When he
left hospital, he refused to pay for his treatment on the grounds that he had no
income.87 At 6 Villa des Gobelins he found Phan Chu Trinh in deep depression. His
only son, Dat, recently returned to Vietnam from France to cure his tuberculosis, had
died. Trinh's friends reported that he was not the same after this tragedy. 88 He himself
would not get permission to return to Vietnam until 1925. At the same time, some of
the habitues of Villa des Gobelins claimed to be unhappy with Nguyen Ai Quoc's
high-visibility radicalism. Khanh-Ky and Tran Tien Nam blamed the problems they
were having with the police on Quoc's behaviour, a Sûreté report said. Tran Tien
Nam was reported to have said that only Phan Van Truong, Phan Chu Trinh and a Vo
Van Toan shared Quoc's extremist opinions. He also claimed to be unable to
comprehend why these men would 'give their entire confidence to a compatriot of
whose true name and origins they were ignorant'. 89 Meanwhile Khanh-Ky, the group's
main breadwinner, complained that he could not pay off the rent which had been
allowed to accumulate during the last years of the war. 90 Both Phan Chu Trinh and
Ho Chi Minh started to look for new living quarters after this. As a result, Ho had no
alternative but to cut back his political activities and start earning his own living. In
July he moved across the Seine to northwestern Paris, in a hotel at 9 Impasse
Compoint. He found work as a photo retoucher next door to the hotel at 40 francs a
week, the wage paid to apprentices. With his frugal lifestyle, this was enough to
cover food and his 40 francs monthly rent. At the end of July the Sûreté reported that
he was leading a quiet life, going out only rarely to visit his friends at Villa des
Gobelins.91

Ho's journalistic efforts seem to have been receiving only lukewarm support
from his socialist friends. The draft pamphlet on French colonialism which he had
completed in 1920 was still without a publisher. Marcel Cachin gave evasive replies
about the possibility of having it published by L'Humanite - he explained that the
paper's circulation had dropped since the Socialist schism at the Tours Congress and
that he could not afford to pay an advance. 92 Still Ho did publish the odd article: one
in Charles Rappoport's monthly Revue Communiste of 14 April 1921, and another in
L'Action Coloniale of 10 June. The first of these, buried on page 133, was a variation
on what was to become his constant refrain - the failure of communist parties to act
on the colonial question. This inactivity was astonishing, he wrote, 'especially now
that there is no longer an internal debate in the purified party...' His article in Action
Coloniale made a comparison between the relatively liberal colonial policy of Japan
in Korea and French policies in Indochina. The Japanese had decreed in August 1919
that their colony would have autonomy and that her citizens would enjoy equal rights
with Japanese. 'The French government', Ho wrote, 'still has the naivete to believe
that in Indochina, to win the attachment of the natives, it is enough to dupe them
indefinitely with official speeches...'
In the summer of 1921, as the Group of Vietnamese Patriots seemed to be
drifting apart, M. Deveze's informers reported frequent, noisy discussions at 6 Villa
des Gobelins. In early July, the two Phans and Ho held a 'violent discussion' from 9 in
the evening until the early morning hours. 93 In September more of these exchanges
were recorded. In October Phan Chu Trinh moved out to rue Pernety. We have no
way of knowing what the group discussed or whether there were major political
disagreements among them. The break-up of their communal living arrangement and
their future political course must have provided plenty of meat for arguments,
however. But it was clearly not the case that Ho Chi Minh had a serious falling out
with his two colleagues, as has often been assumed in the past. 94 Although Phan Chu
Trinh's letters of 1922 and 1923 make clear that he disagreed with Ho's attachment to
Marxism, he maintained an open-minded interest in Ho's activities and often attended
political meetings with him. Phan Van Truong seems to have taken greater offence at
Trinh's behaviour, which

became somewhat erratic after his son's death.95 But Truong himself
remained, in the eyes of the Sûreté, a political extremist. As late as February 1922
they still suspected that Nguyen Ai Quoc may have been acting on his behalf, as his
'conscious or unconscious agent'.96
The topics of debate among the Vietnamese activists probably included the
invitation to join an Intercolonial Union, from a Malagasy lecturer at the School of
Oriental Languages, with the elegant name of Stephany Oju Oti.97 Stephany was
already involved with the journal Action Coloniale. The Union held its inaugural
meeting in October 1921, after several months of preparation. A number of the other
members were supporters of the Third International, and the Union was openly
affiliated with the French Communist Party. The new organization defined its
function as the study of colonial politics and economics, but it also came to play the
role of a mutual aid society. Ho attended the first meeting with Phan Van Truong and
a nephew who had moved into 6 Villa des Gobelins. He spoke with his usual
vehemence against French colonial policy and bureaucrats. (The Sûreté, also true to
form, had an anonymous informer there, most likely Nguyen Van Ai, known as
Agent de Villier.)98 Ho joined the executive committee, along with six others, lawyers
and small businessmen, from Reunion, Dahomey, Guadeloupe, the Antilles,
Martinique and Guyana. He was made one of the treasurers who collected the
members' dues every four months. The Union was soon dependent on him to man
their office in the heart of the Latin Quarter at rue du Marche des Patriarches. The
group also relied on him to get out their newspaper he Paria, which started to appear
in April 1922.99
The Intercolonial Union became Ho's new base, replacing the Group of
Vietnamese Patriots and the perhaps non-existent 'Revolutionary Group of
Vietnamese' (the Group of Vietnamese Patriots joined the Union en masse). Aside
from the communist party, he now had an officially recognized organization, one
with legal statutes and dues-paying members, to back his journalistic efforts and even
to provide an office. Le Paria began with a subscription list of 103 names, 100 and soon
reached a print run of 2,000 copies. (In April 1923 it had to be temporarily cut back
to 1,000 copies and a single sheet, as advertising revenues were nonexistent.) 101 By
June 1922 Ho claimed to have found 150 Indochinese subscribers - but three of these
belonged to the Service de Renseignements in Marseille.102 Some issues of the
simple, mimeographed paper did get back to Vietnam - two subscriptions came in
from Vietnamese interpreters at the Residence Superieur in Hanoi. Ho suspected,
however, that these too were from the intelligence services. 103 He was soon spending
less time on photo-retouching, and more on his journalism and political life. In 1922
he chose to ignore his current employer's threats and attended a May Day
demonstration, with the result that he lost his job. 104 After that he made some money
by painting decorations on fans and window blinds, but he may also have received a
subsidy for his work at he Paria. Journalism would become both his profession and
cover during his years as an underground communist agent.
 By 1922 Nguyen Ai Quoc had become a full-time communist publicist, with
colonial questions and Indochinese independence as his fields of interest. He attended
the French Communist Party's (FCP) First Congress in Marseille in December 1921,
as well as the second, held in Paris in October 1922. On the latter occasion he may
have been noticed by one of the guests from Moscow, Dmitry Manuilsky. 105 In April
1922 he attended a meeting of the newly-formed Committee for Colonial Studies
which the FCP had established at its First Congress.106 He may by this time have
developed friendships with Chinese student activists in Paris, where in 1921 Zhou
Enlai and Deng Xiaoping collaborated to publish a Chinese language paper known as
Youth from a flat near the Place d'ltalie, not far from Villa des Gobelins. Ho is said to
have introduced some of the better French speakers among the Chinese into the FCP,
including the two sons of CCP leader Chen Duxiu.107 We do not know if Ho belonged
to their Communist Youth League at this point. By 1921 the Chinese communists in
France had established their own links to Berlin and Moscow. As a large proportion
of the 2,000 Chinese students in France were involved in work-study schemes, many
lived in the provinces or in working-class suburbs of Paris such as Billancourt. 108 Ho,
on the other hand, was heavily involved with his fellow colonial subjects and FCP
activities.
How effective Ho was as a propagandist is difficult to judge. There is little
evidence regarding the circulation of he Paria within Vietnam, especially before
1925. Getting his message out to his countrymen was becoming increasingly
complicated. The number of Vietnamese troops and workers in France was dropping
off - by June 1920 there were 19,000 Indochinese left, down from 60,000 the
previous July. By 1926 there would be only 2,670 officially resident in France. 109 The
Ministry of Colonies and its Marseille watchdog, Léon Josselme, had become adept
at intercepting mail which went by sea (although they could be deceived by items
hidden inside other publications). Ho's audience was more and more one of left-wing
Europeans and colonial fellow-travellers. Thanks to Albert Sarraut's image as a
reforming Governor General, some Frenchmen who might otherwise have been
sympathetic to Ho's exposes felt that his criticisms of French policy were overstated.
In November 1921, a search of Ho's room by the Service de Renseignements
produced a revealing (but undated) letter from an official of the Human Rights
League, Gabriel Seailles. He was writing to acknowledge a copy of the 'Vietnamese
Demands' which had been sent to the League's Central Committee. Their response
was based on consultations with Sarraut's office. 'They say that you haven't taken into
account the reforms accomplished by M. Sarraut,' Seailles wrote. 'There must be a
misunderstanding here. Your proposals are formulated in too general a manner. It
would be in your interest to communicate your complaints with more precision.' In
any case, the writer believed, reform of the colonial justice system had already been
carried out; liberty of the press had been granted; liberty of education was something
which Sarraut was occupying himselfwith.110 In reality Sarraut's reforms were slow to
take shape, and the freedoms which Vietnamese enjoyed remained those of second-
class citizens. In March 1926 a list of demands presented at a public meeting in
Saigon by Nguyen An Ninh repeated several of the key points from the Group of
Patriots' 1919 petition.111
Phan Chu Trinh, himself frustrated at being unable to return to Vietnam, came
to the conclusion in early 1922 that it was time for Ho Chi Minh to return home.
Trinh had been given employment as a photographer at the Colonial Exhibition in
Marseille, thanks to his supporters in the Socialist Party. But the letter which Trinh
wrote to Ho in February 1922 reveals that he had no rosy illusions about French
intentions towards his country, or about his own potential to bring about change. Ho's
knowledge would be wasted, the old scholar believed, if he remained in France. The
time had come to take the lessons of Marxism-Leninism back to Vietnam to try them
out. He wrote in a spirit of reconciliation:
Because of our disagreements you have called me a 'conservative and
backwards scholar'...I'm not the least bit angry about this label, because I read French
poorly and I can't understand perfectly the works produced in this civilized land. I am
an exhausted horse who can no longer gallop; you are a fiery stallion...But I'm
sending this letter because I hope you will listen and prepare your grand design. From
East to West, from Antiquity to the present day, no one has acted as you have, in
staying abroad on the pretext that your country is full of traps...To awaken the people,
so that our compatriots will engage in combat against the occupiers, it is
indispensable to be there...Following your method you have sent articles to the press
here to incite our compatriots to mobilize their energy and spirit. But this is vain.
Because our compatriots can't read French or even quoc ngu; they are incapable of
understanding your articles!112
Whether the old-fashioned Phan Chu Trinh, who himself still wrote mainly in
Chinese, had any influence on Ho is hard to tell - but one senses that after his
criticism, Ho worked harder than ever to keep the colonial issue in the public eye.
Intelligence reports in 1922 describe him as 'indefatigable'. 'Nguyen Ai Quoc is
engaged in active communist propaganda in Vietnamese circles in Paris,' Pierre
Guesde wrote to Hanoi in July; 'and he is putting all his energy into attending
meetings in the capital and the suburbs.' 113 Guesde noted that Ho had been admitted
into the Freemasons. He listed the meetings which Ho had attended within the last
week:
- Two meetings of the Directing Committee of the Socialist Party-
Communist;
- A public meeting organized by the Communist Party in FJagnolet, to
support the Russian Revolution;
- Two meetings of the Club du Faubourg, Salle Printania, Ave. de Clichy;
- An evening at the Masonic Lodge at 94 Ave. de Suffren.
In addition, he made approaches to the editorial offices of various
newspapers, notably L'Humanite, Journal du Peuple and La Bataille Syndicaliste.
Not long afterwards the Vietnamese activists and Ho started to examine ways
of approaching the non-intellectual members of their community. Articles in Le Paria
and L'Humanite were a means to draw in educated Vietnamese, but Phan Chu Trinh
was right to point out that these would reach only a small proportion of their potential
supporters. The views of the Comintern and the FCP on mass organizing may also
have influenced their actions. In February and May 1923 the core group of
Vietnamese activists began to discuss new initiatives. They had been joined towards
the end of 1921 by a young northern intellectual named Nguyen The Truyen, who
quickly became one of Ho's closest collaborators. The son of a district official from
Nam Dinh, Truyen had received a French diploma in chemistry, but clearly had a
stronger interest in writing and journalism. In 1922 he had become the latest resident
of 6 Villa des Gobelins and at the end of the year began to work on Le Paria.114
In February 1923 Phan Van Truong, Ho and Tran Tien Nam discussed
recreating the old 'Fraternal Association' which Truong and Phan Chu Trinh had
started in 1912. The goal would be to unite the poorer Vietnamese manual workers in
France, who as Truong said, 'were badly paid, badly nourished, badly housed and
sometimes scorned by their employers...'115 Phan Van Truong was advised not to take
the presidency of the group, as his political notoriety might scare off potential
members who would be frightened of reprisals. At a recent gathering of the
Intercolonial Union, in fact, Truong had given a talk on Vietnam, in which he stated
that 'national liberty of self-determination could exist only when all peoples had
understood the necessity of communism, which would end the exploitation of man by
man and place all races on an equal footing.116 At an April meeting, Phan Chu Trinh
was proposed as president, but Phan Van Truong protested, saying that he
categorically refused to work with his former collaborator. 117 How this difficulty was
solved is not clear.
In May Ho himself sent out a subscription advertisement for a new quoc ngu
bi-monthly newspaper, to be called Viet Nam Hon (The Soul of Vietnam). His
announcement promised 'Asia, Europe, India and America all summarized in one
paper. Women and children will be able to understand.' It would be a paper 'in our
language, which my brothers will be able to read.' The first issue was to be of 100
copies. The subscription forms were to be returned to 3 rue du Marche des
Patriarches, the offices of Le Paria.118 This may be a sign that Ho had taken to heart
the reproaches of Phan Chu Trinh regarding his elite-oriented journalism. He seems
to have run out of time for this new project, however. On 13 June 1923 he would
suddenly disappear from his home in Paris, and would not be spotted again by the
French authorities until autumn, when his name would appear in the Moscow press.
Nguyen The Truyen would become the editor of Vietnam Hon.
How his voyage to Moscow was organized and who the instigator was not
known. The idea that he was spotted by a Comintern talent scout such as Manuilsky
at the French Party's 1922 Congress is plausible, but it does not appear, as the next
chapter will show, that he went to Moscow as someone who had already been picked
out for long-term Comintern service. It is equally plausible that he and the members
of the Intercolonial Union desired direct contact with the Comintern so that they
could provoke more action within the the FCP on colonial issues. Ho himself may
have initiated the trip in order to explore ways of getting back to Indochina with
Comintern support (the next chapter explores Ho's early contacts with the
Comintern). But it would appear that the Vietnamese patriots in France were
preparing some kind of concerted action. By June the Sûreté had heard that Phan Chu
Trinh was trying to return to Paris from Castres, where he had gone after his
unannounced departure from the Colonial Exhibition in Marseille. 119 Trinh wrote to
Ho to ask for a loan of 340 francs to pay for his travel and living expenses until he
could find work in Paris. But as Ho himself was short of money, and none of the
other Vietnamese were inclined to advance this sum, it may be that Ho Chi Minh and
Phan Chu Trmh missed this last chance to meet.120
Ho's departure from Paris was a carefully organized operation. In early June
he put out the word that he would be going on an eight-day holiday in the Savoie
region with the Club du Faubourg. He had confessed to the concierge at 6 Villa des
Gobelins that he would have liked to go to the Swiss Alps, but that he didn't want to
face the humiliation of being refused a passport. Then on 15 June Agent 'Desire'
reported that on the 13th Nguyen Ai Quoc had left his residence without any luggage.
His friends seemed to think that his holiday would be a brief one. The office hours at
the Union were covered by Monnerville from Martinique; at a meeting of the Paria
group at the end of June, none of the six people present, including Phan Van Truong
and Nguyen The Truyen, volunteered to get the paper ready for the printer. 'They
decided to wait for the return of Nguyen Ai Quoc for that,' reported Desire. 121 At the
end of the summer Phan Chu Trinh wrote to Nguyen Van Ai, a.k.a. Agent de Villier,
to accuse him of foul play in Quoc's disappearance. (Ai had become a vital member
of the Paria collective, but his role of informer had somehow become known to
Trinh.)
Even though Nguyen Ai Quoc is young and he doesn't act on mature
reflection, this is not important because he really has the heart of a patriot. He left his
family and travelled to Europe and America, working miserably to educate himself,
without any help from anyone... If he makes mistakes or not, that is not the question,
because all the Vietnamese repect his ardent heart... Let those who want to follow
him follow, and those who don't can leave him alone to get on with his work.
Why did you betray him, with your cowardly and underhand methods? He
trusted you like a brother... why did you try to make trouble for him? I ask you for the
truth, where did you incite him to go?122
It was Albert Sarraut himself who signed the secret telegram sent on 11
October 1923 to the Governor General in Hanoi, to inform him that Nguyen Ai
Quoc's tracks had been picked up in Moscow. Bloncourt, his colleague from
Dahomey, had paid his passage with funds from the Intercolonial Union, an informer
revealed.123 By November the rumour began to get around that Ho would soon be
returning to Paris.124 Phan Van Truong was booked to return to Vietnam in mid-
December, but he put off his departure once in the hope that Ho would return with
news from Moscow, the French believed. Finally on 23 December, apparently having
given up waiting, Truong sailed, carrying with him a number of issues of Le Paria. 125
Ho Chi Minh and the two Phans had seen the last of each other.
In Ho Chi Minh's new political life opening before him in Moscow, the basic
elements would remain those which had served him in his months of campaigning in
Paris. One of these was the Marxist-Leninist framework for his attack on colonialism.
This is discussed in detail in the next chapter. But one should remember that
alongside this radically modern outlook he retained the ethos of Confucian patriotism
and duty which had driven his father's contemporaries to oppose the French. Ho was
moving into the Comintern world of internationalism, yet he remained rooted in the
traditions of Vietnamese patriotism - the family and regional ties which linked him to
Phan Chu Trinh, to Cuong De and Phan Boi Chau in China and perhaps, still, to his
father, who had become an itinerant eccentric, wandering from pagoda to pagoda in
Cochinchina.126 When he left Paris his ties to the leftists Phan Van Truong and
Nguyen The Truyen were as strong as ever, and he would rely on such connections
when he became a Comintern agent based in Canton.
Was the Ho Chi Minh of 1923 someone with firmly fixed political ideas? I
would argue that in many ways his world view was already formed by his teenage
experience with the French, his failures at the Paris Peace Conference, and his early
exposure to Lenin's theories on imperialism. Yet he had also begun to demonstrate
the tactical flexibility of a pragmatic politician. Although he joined the Freemasons,
for example, in an effort to broaden his contacts in influential segments of French
society, he later accepted the Fourth Comintern Congress recommendation that party
members cut their links to the Masons and the French League of Human Rights. 127
This lack of ideological rigidity, which some would come to see as a Machiavellian
streak, was a trait which undoubtedly helped Nguyen Ai Quoc/Ho Chi Minh survive
his long years with the Comintern.

2. THE COMINTERN RECRUIT (1923-4)

First contacts in Moscow

Ho Chi Minh reached Petrograd (now once again St. Petersburg) by ship on
30 June 1923 from the North Sea port of Hamburg. In Berlin the Comintern network
had provided him with a Russian travel document in the name of Chen Vang. 1 He
was coming to Russia at a time when the first revolutionary illusions of the Bolshevik
leaders had passed. The command economy of war communism had led to
widespread peasant discontent in 1921; all attempts to ignite a revolution in more
developed European countries had failed. When a second effort at a German
revolution was made in October 1923, just months after Ho's arrival in Moscow, it
was met by indifference among the German working class. Trotsky's stirring promise
of 1919, that the 'hour of the proletarian dictatorship in Europe' would be the hour of
liberation for the 'colonial slaves of Africa and Asia', 2 may have sounded somewhat
hollow to impatient colonial activists by the end of 1923. Moreover, Lenin, the
undisputed leader and prophet of the October Revolution, had been incapacitated by a
stroke in December 1922. So it was that Ho arrived in the communist capital when
fundamental assumptions about the path to world communism were being questioned
and a leadership crisis was just beginning. This period from the end of the Civil War
in 1921 until Stalin's consolidation of power in 1929 became what Stephen Cohen
calls 'the great discussion period in party history'. 3
The official reason for Ho's invitation to Russia was the first International
Peasants' Conference, which opened in the Kremlin's Andreyev Hall on 10 October
1923. This conference marked the founding of the 'Peasant International' or
Krestintern, a body which was to bring together leaders of left-wing agrarian parties
and peasant associations from Europe, Asia and America. It was designed to function
as a legal organization including non-communists, but its Moscow connection was
never very well-disguised. Listed among the speakers bringing greetings of solidarity
on the second day of the meeting was a 'Miguel-al-Kvak' from Indochina 4 (the
Russian transcription of Vietnamese names does not always convey the Vietnamese
sounds closely, but this one is particularly fanciful). Ho did not waste his speech of
greeting on formalities: he launched directly into a quick exposition of the situation
of the peasants of the French colonies. 'You are peasants and farmers of Europe and
America. You are exploited as proletarians,' he told the delegates. 'But we others in
the French colonies are doubly exploited, as proletarians and as conquered races,' he
said. 'A white owner can come and make a request to the government, and whole
villages will be expropriated, villages which our fathers and ancestors inhabited and
which we still cultivate.'5 He made sure that the antiwar resolution passed by the
Congress raised the issue of colonial oppression, by writing an amendment which
demonstrated that, 'the peasants of the colonies constitute a very important factor in
questions of war and peace.'6 Ho was elected to the Krestintern Presidium of eleven
people at the opening session, along with one other Asian, the Japanese Ken
Hayasho.7
The Krestintern s founding reflected the turn towards compromise with the
Russian peasantry which was at the heart of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP).
Instituted in March 1921, the NEP replaced grain requisitioning with a tax in kind
and gradually came to encompass a return to market forces and capitalism in
agriculture, trade and small-scale manufacturing. By August 1923 the policy had
succeeded to the extent that the Russian capital managed to host a well-publicized
agricultural exhibition to demonstrate the country's return to economic normalcy.
Foreign left-wing leaders who attended the exhibition were invited to stay on for the
peasant conference.
The Krestintern's creation was also a direct result of the evolving united front
policy of the Communist International. The reaffirma-tion of the worker-peasant
alliance in Russia which the NEP signalled was accompanied by a gradual change in
the Bolsheviks' attitude towards allies abroad. The European working class having
proved to be a disappointment, the Russians were prodding the Comintern to look to
the 'world peasantry' as comrades in the march towards the socialist future. At the
Bolsheviks' Twelfth Party Conference in April 1923, Bukharin had advanced the idea
that the peasantry of colonial countries was a 'gigantic reservoir of revolutionary
infantry'.8 The Comintern had formed an Agrarian Commission in 1923, following its
IV Congress at the end of 1922. The Commission's task was to 'oversee and
concretize the slogan of the worker and peasant government within the various
parties'.9 This slogan signified the Bolsheviks' acceptance of reality: in a hostile world
socialist Russia needed more allies than just the proletariat of the capitalist West.
Although the workers were still seen in classic Marxist terms as the leading force of
revolution, it was now acceptable to revise Marx's injunction and to call on 'Peasants
and workers of the world' to unite.10 The Comintern's Agrarian Commission
organized the International Peasants' Conference in October which brought Ho Chi
Minh to Moscow.
Ho Chi Minh arrived in Russia expecting to remain for three months. 'For one
reason or another, my departure was put off from week to week, and then from month
to month,' he wrote in 1924 to an unnamed comrade.11 His immediate goal when he
arrived in Moscow seems to have been to draw attention to the failures of the French
Communist Party's Committee for Colonial Studies, which later became its Colonial
Commission. He in fact made a detailed report on these failings in July 1923 to the
Indonesian Commission of the Comintern's Eastern Section, which I will discuss
below.12 Composed of Grigory Voitinsky, Voja Vujovic and Boris Souvarine, the
Indonesian Commission seems to have been thought the most appropriate to consider
the affairs of a colony neighbouring Java.13 Voitinsky helped to found the Chinese
Communist Party in 192014 and would become the Comintern representative in
Shanghai in April 1924.15 Like Mikhail Borodin, he had lived for several years in
exile in the United States. Ho maintained a cordial relationship with Voitinsky until
at least 1927, when both had to leave China.
 From Ho's communications with the Comintern in Moscow it is clear that he
requested help in returning to Indochina via China as soon as he arrived in the
Russian capital. In a rather bad-tempered letter which he addressed to anonymous
'camarades' in March 1924 (the handwritten date is unclear, but his reference to a
nine-month stay would make the date roughly March), he wrote: 'It was decided
when I arrived in Moscow that after a stay of three months I would leave for China to
try to establish contacts with my country. But here it is the ninth month of my stay
and my sixth month of waiting, and a decision about my departure still has not been
made. I don't think it is necessary to speak here of revolutionary and nationalist
movements, old or recent; of the existence or non-existence of workers'
organizations, of the agitation of secret and other societies, because I have no
intention of submitting a thesis to you; I want only to make you feel the necessity of
studying EVERYTHING in a precise manner, and if NOTHING should exist, to
create SOMETHING [emphasis in original].' Among the four goals of his trip he
listed 'to establish relations between Indochina and the International', and 'to try to
organize a base for information-gathering and propaganda'. He requested a budget of
100 U.S. dollars per month to cover local travel, correspondence, subscriptions, food
and lodging; in addition he asked for the money for his voyage from Russia to
China.16 It would not be until after the Fifth Comintern Congress in June 1924 that a
concrete recommendation would be made to send Ho to Canton. 17 There are probably
several reasons why the Comintern and its Eastern Section were slow to assign Ho a
specific task. For a start, the form which Russian aid to Sun Yatsen would take was
only gradually worked out following Mikhail Borodin's arrival in Canton in the
autumn of 1923. The military officers who would become instructors to the
Guomindang army did not arrive in China until June, July and October 1924. 18
Moreover, as the buildup to the Fifth Congress began, Comintern decision-makers
were obviously preoccupied with the postmortem of the German uprising, and as was
often the case, had more pressing matters than Indochina to deal with. It is also likely
that the Comintern bureaucracy used Ho's extended stay in Moscow to size him up
and investigate his political links.

The development of Comintern policy for colonial countries

By the time Ho Chi Minh arrived in Russia, the Comintern had grown from a
loose federation of communist and other left-wing party representatives into a
permanent bureaucracy selected in Moscow, one increasingly influenced by internal
Russian politics. Starting with the Fourth Congress (5 November to 5 December
1922) the Comintern Executive Committee was chosen by its own congresses instead
of by member parties. The aim was to turn the Comintern into a 'truly centralized,
united party'.19 At its founding in 1919, the Russian comrades had been less obviously
dominant in decision-making, even though of the fifty-two activists attending that
meeting, only seven were able to come from outside Russia. Three east Asian
socialists living in Russia attended the First Congress: Liu Shaozhou and Zhang
Yongkui of the Alliance of Chinese Workers, and a Korean known as Comrade Kain
representing the Korean Workers League. 20 There was also a group of central Asians
representing territories of the former czarist empire. Bukharin pointed out in a Pravda
article that support for the oppressed colonies in their liberation struggle was one of
the things which distinguished the new Communist or Third International from the
Second, socialist democratic one. 'It is no accident that at the first congress of our
Communist International for the first time we heard a speech in the Chinese
language,' he wrote.21 Yet the three east Asians, all resident in Russia, were only
allotted consultative votes, while the 'United Group of the Eastern Peoples of Russia'
collectively received just one full vote.22 The Asians' junior status at the 1919
congress reflected the belief that revolution in Europe was imminent and therefore
more important than the colonial liberation struggle. As Trotsky said in his
Comintern Manifesto, addressed to the 'proletariat of the entire world', 'The liberation
of the colonies is possible only together with the liberation of the working class in the
imperialist centers. The workers and peasants, not only of Annam, Algeria and
Bengal, but also of Persia and Armenia, will gain the possibility of an independent
existence only when the workers of Britain and France have toppled Lloyd George
and Clemenceau and taken state power into their own hands.'23
The first programme for what the Comintern called the 'colonial and semi-
colonial countries' was drawn up at its Second Congress in 1920. This programme,
drafted by Lenin, became the Theses on National and Colonial Questions (the early
draft was what Ho would have read in L'Humanite in July 1920). It was hotly debated
in the colonial commission at the Congress but eventually accepted, with extensive
revisions, as the official Comintern line. Since this programme embraces the key
political issues of Ho Chi Minh's communist career, it seems important to explore the
debate it provoked within the Comintern. This debate, in various forms, would recur
at intervals within Asian communist parties until at least the 1970s.
The Lenin who drafted these Theses had grown more cautious than the Lenin
of 1917. Although his programme was not a precise set of guidelines for action, it
was the source of the theory of the united front, which was successfully put into
practice by both Chinese and Vietnamese communists at the start of the Second
World War. It was after reading the Theses in the summer of 1920 in I'Humanite that
Ho Chi Minh claims to have become a convinced Leninist. 24 When they were
published in their amended form after debate in the Congress's Colonial Commission,
accompanied by a somewhat contradictory set written by the Indian communist
Mahendra Nath Roy, they left plenty of room for differing interpretations. Yet they
would remain an important element of Marxist-Leninist dogma over the years.
Although a new, more radical programme for colonial countries was put forward by
Otto Kuusinen at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, he still felt the need to claim
that his Theses were an outgrowth of Lenin's 1920 programme, which he said still
had full validity as 'the guiding line for further work of the communist parties'.25
Lenin's theses establish the importance of the colonial countries in the world
scheme of revolution. They are a logical development of his analysis of world
capitalism, On Imperialism, published in 1917. As the source of raw materials and
cheap labour for Western capitalism, Lenin theorized, the colonial countries were
crucial to its power. If the Western working class could ally with the oppressed
people of the colonies to help them achieve independence, he reasoned, they would
strike an important blow against the enemies of communism.
A second key aspect of the Theses was the idea that during a first, national
bourgeois stage of the colonial revolution, communists would have to work with and
even within the nationalist parties, as there was not a large enough colonial proletariat
to bring about revolution on its own. Only after the goals of the bourgeois revolution
had been attained - national independence and an end to feudalism in the countryside
- could the socialist revolution begin, led by the working class. Lenin allowed that if
the workers in the newly-liberated colony were aided by developed states where
communism had been established, they might be able to by-pass the capitalist stage
of development and move directly to socialism. This would seem to be an echo of the
'separate path' theory of the Russian Populists.
There were both Asians and Europeans at the Second Congress who were
uneasy with the idea that communists should work with bourgeois nationalists in their
countries' independence movements. The social democrats of the Second
International were looked on as unreliable reformists, too willing to compromise with
the capitalist ruling classes. Their support of their governments' war aims during the
First World War was seen by the more radical socialists who formed the Third
International as a betrayal of internationalist ideals. Eventually the delegates
persuaded Lenin to change the phrase, 'bourgeois nationalist movements' to 'national
revolutionary movements'.26 Other phrases were inserted into the final version of the
Theses to soften Lenin's united front tactics enough to make them palatable to the
delegates. For example, in article lla, which calls for communist parties 'to support
with deeds' the revolutionary liberation movement in 'the states and nations that have
a more backward, predominantly feudal, patriarchal, or patriarchal-peasant character',
the following condition was added: 'The form the support should take must be
discussed with the Communist Party of the country in question, if there is such a
party.'27 Yet there was no disguising the fact that Lenin had made it acceptable for
communists to dispense, albeit temporarily, with Marxist class warfare in these
'backward' nations. The Dutch communist 'Maring' (Henk Sneevliet) seems to have
been instrumental in swaying the delegates. His experience of organizing in Java
during the First World War, when radical socialists joined the nationalist Sarekat
Islam party to fight the Dutch, became a model for Comintern tactics in China. His
approach was purely pragmatic: bourgeois and communist forces had to work
together in colonial countries, because the communists would be insignificant on
their own.28
The Supplementary Theses on National and Colonial Questions written by
M.N. Roy were also accepted by the Second Congress's Colonial Commission in
amended form. The emphasis of Roy's Theses on differences between the colonial
bourgeoisie and working class is in open contradiction to Lenin's platform; Lenin
apparently preferred to leave a degree of latitude for differing interpretations, rather
than alienate a valuable ally from Britain's largest colony. Roy's distance from Lenin
is clear from his article 7: 'There are to be found in the dependent countries two
distinct movements that grow further apart from each other every day. One is the
bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement, with a program of political
independence under the bourgeois order, and the other is the mass action of the
ignorant and poor peasants and workers for their liberation from all sorts of
exploitation. The former endeavors to control the latter and often succeeds to a
certain extent. But the Communist International and its affiliated parties must
struggle against this and help to develop class consciousness in the working masses
of the colonies.' In some versions of this article the following sentence is included as
a compromise: 'For the overthrow of foreign capitalism, the first step toward
revolution in the colonies, the cooperation of the bourgeois-nationalist revolutionary
elements is useful.'29
 Maring, who chaired the Colonial Commission at the Congress, was able to
smooth over what might have been viewed as a glaring contradiction. He claimed that
Comrade Lenin's and Comrade Roy's Theses 'mean the same thing': 'The difficulty
lies only in finding the correct approach to the relationship between the
revolutionary-nationalist and socialist movements in the backward countries and
colonies. In practice this problem does not exist. It is essential there to work together
with the revolutionary-nationalist forces, and we are doing only half the job if we
deny this movement and pose as doctrinaire Marxists.' 30 The pragmatic Maring was,
however, ignoring the problems inherent in his solution. Allen Whiting points out
that this compromise only papered over the cracks which would later destroy the
united front in China: 'The complicated verbiage of the prolific resolutions served as
a convenient screen, covering the conflict between Lenin's tactics for revolution and
the Asian's hatred of those they considered their native exploiters. With this conflict
unresolved, the "united front" tactic in China faced not only suspicion from the Right
but confusion on the Left.'31 Inevitably united fronts based on Lenin's Theses would
be only temporary phenomena. They did not erase the philosophical differences
between those who saw the development of communism as an organic process which
would take time to complete and those who, like Lenin in 1917, wanted to force the
pace of change.

Ho Chi Minh and his place in the Comintern

In spite of the Comintern's increasing attention to the peasantry, when Ho Chi
Minh arrived in Moscow in July 1923, his report on anti-imperialist activities in
France was highly critical of the organization. While China's republicans were being
courted by Russian diplomats and special envoys, the more distant colonies of France
had clearly not attracted Russia's interest. In the end, Ho's Comintern-sponsored
return to Asia became possible as a result of and within the framework of the Russian
mission to Republican China. To all appearances, when he arrived in Moscow Ho
was still speaking as a representative of the Intercolonial Union in Paris, and may
have composed his report jointly with his colleagues there. He complained that the
Second Congress Theses on National and Colonial Questions had stirred up the
expectation in the colonies that the Third International would bring about their
emancipation. But so far these Theses were just 'decorations on paper', he wrote. On
the other hand, the Theses had caused the imperialists to redouble their efforts in
propaganda, obscurantism, and repression, he reported, without producing any action
on the part of the French or British parties.32 Opportunities to support colonial
movements such as a strike in Martinique and a revolt in Dahomey had passed
without any action, he said. 'It is not without irony and not without sadness that my
unfortunate Dahomian brothers, in the darkness of their civilizing prisons, read the
eighth of the 21 Conditions [for Comintern admission], which states that "Each party
undertakes to carry out systematic propaganda in its country's army against the
oppression of the colonial population; and that it must support the liberation
movement in the colonies with actions as well as words.'"
The death of Lenin in the bitterly cold January of 1924 opened the way to a
period of factional struggle in the Comintern. Joining the crowds who waited hours in
the cold to view the dead leader, Ho suffered from frostbitten fingers and nose. 33 This
show of devotion could not have harmed his political fortunes. In the next months
and years he managed to avoid being identified as an acolyte of Léon Trotsky, whose
influence in Kremlin politics had begun to wane as Lenin withdrew from active
political life. Many of Ho's colleagues and patrons in the French party, including
Boris Souvarine of the Comintern's Indonesian Commission and Jacques Doriot, who
later became Ho's patron when he ran the FCP's Colonial Commission, would not
fare so well. Ho should have learned a valuable lesson about political survival from
his first autumn in Moscow, when he would have witnessed Trotsky's last successful
political campaign. This was the campaign for Workers' Democracy.
Trotsky began to promote this course towards party democracy only after his
own power had passed its zenith. In a letter of 8 October 1923 to the Central
Committee he decried the practice of appointing party secretaries from above. His
initiative received the backing of forty-six well-known party members, who wrote a
letter supporting his proposal to the Central Committee. Faced with widespread
support for idea, the ruling triumverate of Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and Josef
Stalin consented to the formation of a committee on workers' democracy. Trotsky
was one of the authors of the final resolution which appeared in Pravda on 7
December 1923. The text called for an end to the 'bureaucratization' of the party, and
for free discussion and open election of governing officials.34
Within the Politburo, however, Trotsky was isolated. The 'Workers'
Democracy' campaign never went beyond resolutions (until it suited Stalin to revive
the idea of electing party secretaries); by the time the Fifth Comintern Congress was
held in June 1924, Trotsky was becoming an invisible man. Although he was once
again elected to the Presidium (but as a candidate member) and contributed an
eloquent manifesto on the 'Tenth Anniversary of the Outbreak of War', 35 this
founding member of the Comintern barely made an appearance during the course of
the Congress. Boris Souvarine, who had been instrumental in publishing Trotsky's
pamphlet on workers' democracy, The New Course, in French, would be voted out of
the French party at the close of the Congress. Perhaps it was at this stage that Ho
developed his reputation for abstaining from doctrinal debates, which the German
communist Ruth Fischer recalls in her memories of Comintern life. She told Jean
Lacouture that 'he was temperamentally far more inclined toward action than toward
doctrinal debates. He was always an empiricist within the movement.' 36 Fischer's
reminiscences, like those of other Comintern veterans who wrote about Ho after his
rise to power, should be viewed cautiously, however. In her book Von Lenin zu Mao,
she claims that Ho arrived in Moscow in 1922 to attend the Fourth Comintern
Congress. As there is no documentary or other evidence to support this, we can
assume that she has got her facts wrong.37 In any case, as early as 1924 Ho would
have learned that to be on the wrong side of an ideological wrangle could mean not
only the end of his career as a communist, but also of any hope of winning support
for Vietnam's independence. His already well-developed secrecy probably made it
easy for him to conceal his feelings about issues which didn't directly concern
Vietnam.
Ho's response to the political pitfalls of Comintern life was to put his head
down and charge towards his own carefully circumscribed objective. He concentrated
on his efforts to goad the Comintern into greater action on colonial issues. In
February and again in March 1924 he wrote to Zinoviev requesting an interview. In
1920 the latter had become the chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee's
'Small Bureau' (at this point Ho was not working in the Comintern offices, he wrote,
because of his frostbitten fingers and nose).38 Apparently Zinoviev passed on these
requests to the new head of the Eastern Section, Fyodor Petrov (F.F. Raskolnikov),
who had been named to replace Karl Radek on 8 March 1924.39 (Radek was made a
scapegoat for the failure in Germany, but became head of the Sun Yatsen Academy
until 1927). On 20 May 1924 Ho addressed a three-page typewritten proposal to
Petrov. His proposal outlined the rationale for a Federation of Asian Communists.
The weakness of the eastern peoples, he wrote, was caused by their isolation from
one another.
'How useful for the Annamites to learn how their brother Hindus are
organizing to struggle against English imperialism,' he enthused, 'or how the Japanese
workers unite to combat capitalism, or how the Egyptians are making sublime
sacrifices to demand their liberty. The eastern peoples are generally sentimental; and
one example is more valuable to them than one hundred propaganda lectures.' Ho
suggested that the University of the Toilers of the East, where Asians of sixty-two
different nationalities were studying, should become the base~for the creation of a
Federation. He was eager to organize a preparatory commission before the next
Comintern Congress, which was to open in June.40
His ideas do not seem to have been acted upon, at least until he himself went
to Canton and helped to organize the League of Oppressed Peoples in 1925. 41 The
Comintern must have viewed its own structures in Moscow as sufficient for bringing
Asians into contact with each other. Thus Vietnamese communists, without their own
communist party, remained in an ambiguous position, with several directions in
which they could look for guidance. Vietnamese resident in France could join the
French Communist Party; French communists seemed to assume that the Vietnamese
communists would look for direction to the French party's Colonial Commission, in
spite of the fact that it worked in a half-hearted way. Within the Comintern's
bureaucracy, however, from 1923 until 1926 Indochina was grouped in the
confusingly named 'Middle Eastern Section' of the Eastern Section, which also
included India and Indonesia. As the Vietnamese communist movement developed,
there would be continued confusion about who was responsible for guiding it. As it
turned out, the rapid growth of communism in China between 1923 and 1927 became
perhaps the major source of inspiration for Vietnam's embryonic communist
movement, as it did for communist movements in the rest of southeast Asia. A
number of Vietnamese exiled in China would become members of the CCP before
the Vietnamese party was founded.
One can surmise that informal contacts among Comintern workers and
students at the University of the Toilers of the East (also known as the Stalin School)
in Moscow became a forum for exchanging information and ideas. But with the
exception of Ho, the Vietnamese did not have this opportunity before 1925 or 1926,
when the first Indochinese students, sent from Paris, were formally enrolled. 42
Founded in 1921 to train communist cadres, the University by 1924 was educating
Asians from within the borders of the Soviet state and growing numbers of
foreigners. An enrolment list of east and southeast Asians for that year showed sixty-
seven Koreans, 109 Chinese, six Malays or Indonesians, and sixteen Mongolians. 43
There is no formal record of Ho Chi Minh having studied there before 1936, although
the Russian writer Yevgeny Kobelev cites a 15 March 1924 interview with Ho from
the Italian communist newspaper L'Unita, in which Ho describes his studies at the
University.44 M.N. Roy also claims that Ho studied at the school. 45 As Ho's first
formal attachment in Moscow was to the Krestintern, it is possible that he received
some sort of training in peasant organizing during his first stay there.
Ho Chi Minh received a pass as a 'non-staff worker' for the Comintern offices
in April 1924.46 One of his main occupations in Moscow was preparing reports on
Vietnam and writing short articles for the communist press. He may have revised the
manuscript which he had begun in France, which was at last published as Le Proces
de la Colonisation Francaise by the Librairie du Travail in Paris in 1925. The
typewritten French manuscript of what appears to be another brochure by Ho on
Indochina is in the Comintern archives, but there is no sign that it was published. It
included a brief section on Vietnam's history and geography, as well as chapters on
the confiscation of Vietnamese land by the unscrupulous French administration. 47
Another of Ho's journalistic efforts in Moscow was his 1924 article, 'Lenin and the
Peoples of the East'. He wrote one version, an eight-page article explaining Lenin's
views on imperialism and colonial liberation, which has far more substance than the
emotional paean which was printed under this title in Pravda on 27 January 1924
following Lenin's death. But the condensed version gives a faithful reflection of Ho's
obsessions at this stage of his life. 'Accustomed to being treated as backward and
inferior beings', he wrote, 'they [the Asian peoples] see in Lenin the personification of
universal brotherhood. [...] They feel veneration for him which is akin to filial piety' 48
Lenin's Theses and the Comintern's promises to colonial peoples were perhaps the
first sign which Ho had seen that anyone in the West would take his views of French
oppression seriously.

The Fifth Comintern Congress

When the Fifth Comintern Congress opened in Moscow in June 1924, Ho felt
obliged to maintain his pressure on the west European communists to pay more
serious attention to their colonies. All three of his recorded interventions at the
Congress are narrowly focused on the need for more action on colonial issues. Ho
apparently retained the passion and self-assurance of his early years in Paris. He was,
however, given only a consultative vote.49 Barely thirty years old, he was not shy
about lecturing the elite of world communism on their shortcomings - he intervened
at length during the extended debate on national and colonial questions. He was harsh
on the English and French parties: 'All that our parties have done in this domain is
equal to zero. In French West Africa military conscription is carried out via
completely unbelievable methods of compulsion, and our press says nothing about
this. In Indochina the colonial powers have become slave-traders and sell the natives
of Tonkin to planters in the Pacific Islands; they have raised the length of military
service for indigenous people from two years to four; they are handing over a large
portion of the colony to a consortium of sharks...and our press maintains a stubborn
silence.'50 He suggested several measures which, he said, could be immediately
implemented - a colonial forum in the newspaper L'Humanite, intensified propaganda
and recruitment among colonial peoples, sponsorship of colonial students at the
University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow, organization of the colonial workers
in France, and obliging party members to take an interest in the colonial question.51
Ho's final intervention, during a debate on the agrarian question, was
obviously carefully planned. He spoke as a specialist on the peasants of the French
colonies, not just on Indochina. His own research and articles by his Parisian
colleagues for Le Paria were probably the basis for his speech. He did not waste time
with the ideological niceties: such questions as percentages of poor, middle or rich
peasants and landlords. In his view, the 95 per cent of the French colonial populations
who were peasants were 'absolutely exploited'.52 Land confiscation by French
capitalists was at the root of their exploitation. In Vietnam, he said, 'When the French
conquered this colony, the war drove peasants out of their villages. As a result, when
they returned home, they found their land had been occupied by concessionaires,
following the victorious army. They handed out land which for centuries had been
populated and worked by the natives.'53 He painted a dark picture of abuse, worst of
all for the peasants of equatorial Africa, where 'the old folk, women and children are
imprisoned, mistreated, tortured, starved, martyred and sometimes murdered.' 54 Ho
equated liberation from the colonial yoke with the proletarian revolution: 'It is up to
the International to help these miserable peasants to organize. It is up to them to show
the path to proletarian revolution and emancipation.' 55 One wonders how much his
memories of central Vietnam in 1908 influenced his view of French oppression - the
injustice which he had witnessed as a teenager must still have motivated him, as it
had in Paris. In fact, when he reported to the Profintern in July 1924 about the
situation of the Vietnamese proletariat, he spoke of the 'brutal repression and bloody
cruelty' of the French in 1908.56 The timing of the bourgeois-democratic revolution or
relations between workers and peasants do not seem to have overly concerned him in
1924.
 The Fifth Congress, while it marked Ho's real debut on the Comintern stage,
was not itself a major forum for debate on colonial issues. The widening rift between
Trotsky and the ruling triumverate in Russia, along with the post-mortem of the
aborted 1923 revolt in Germany, overshadowed other issues. And as the dangers of
factionalism within the Comintern grew, increasing attention was paid to 'Bolshevik
discipline'. The slogan of'Bolshevisation' made its first appearance at this congress -
the Comintern's member parties were now required to becoine disciplined parties,
'permitting no fractions, tendencies or groups'.57 They were to be restructured on the
model of the Russian Bolshevik party. The central organs of the member parties of
the Comintern would be answerable to their own rank and file, but also to the ECCI.
The ECCI would be responsible for vetting their programmes and all programmatic
documents.58
Signs of the conflict within the Russian party surfaced in the Congress
discussion on the tactics of the united front, which Zinoviev called 'the most debated
question in our ranks'.59 Zinoviev himselt gave a bleak appraisal of the tactic and its
origins, yet he left no doubt that it was going to remain the Comintern line, as well as
that of the Russian party. 'The tactic of the United Front remains correct,' he said
flatly. But he added the proviso that 'the question should be put concretely, for every
country separately, in accordance with the prevailing conditions.' He made it clear
that he saw this tactic, which was returning Russia itself to relative economic
normalcy, as a retreat:
Looking back on the road that has been traversed, we can see that to the
Communist International as a whole in 1921-22, the tactics of the united front meant
the realisation that we have not yet won a majority of the working class; secondly,
that social democracy is still very strong; thirdly, that we are on the defensive and
that the enemy was attacking...fourthly, that the decisive fight is not yet on the order
of the day. Hence we advanced the slogan: 'To the masses!' and later to the tactics of
the united front...
For the European parties, the Fifth Congress constituted a move towards the
left. Karl Radek, who had been advising the German party, had to bear the blame for
the failure of the 1923 uprising there. Both he and, indirectly, Trotsky were castigated
for interpreting united front tactics as 'an organic coalition with social democracy'. 60
Yet it should be noted that, as Radek and the German party leader Brandler
maintained, this coalition had been approved by the Comintern in 1923. 61 The
insistence of the Comintern and Russian leadership on laying the blame for failure on
the local executors of policy foreshadowed what would happen after the breakup of
the united front in China. It should also be noted that Trotsky was by no means a
proponent of cooperation with social democrats. In his 'Manifesto of the Fifth
Comintern Congress on the Tenth Anniversary of the Outbreak of War', he criticized
the German social democrats for their role in the failed 1923 uprising: 'It is precisely
at such critical moments, moments of life and death for the bourgeoisie, when the
future of the workers is at stake, that the social-democrats maliciously destroy the
united front of the proletariat, bring irresolution into the workers' ranks, promote
discouragement, isolate the communist party, and become the pace-makers of
capitalist reaction.62 This point of view would in a few years become firmly set in
Comintern thinking and widely propagated by Stalin by 1928-29.
The French delegate Albert Treint's comments on the united front seem to
sum up the view which prevailed at the congress: 'The united front is a tactic for the
revolutionary mobilisation of the masses and not an organised alliance with the social
democratic leaders.[...] Labour governments and Left Blocs result in bourgeois
democracy finding an echo within our own parties...to fight against the bourgeoisie
means more than ever a fight against social democracy, exteriorly [sic], and a fight
against the right within the International.' In his closing remarks he stated: 'We are
also: Against the debolshevisation of the Russian party; For the Bolshe-visation of
the fraternal parties, For the realization of the world Bolshevik Party which the
Communist International, animated by the spirit of Lenin, must become.’63
Dmitry Manuilsky a French-speaking Comintern operative from the Ukraine
who would become identified as a spokesman for Stalin's viewpoint, did make a pitch
at the Congress for the united front tactic in the colonies. He raised the fact that the
CCP had criticized those of its members who had entered the Guonnndang for 'class
collaboration'. He admitted that communists had to steer a fine course between taking
advantage of the united front tactics which, he said, 'are revolutionizing the East,' and
losing their independent class identity. He wondered aloud whether Asian
communists should be willing 'not only to collaborate with petty-bourgeois parties
but to take the initiative in organizing them in backward countries.' 64 (To judge by a
letter which he wrote from Canton in 1925, Ho Chi Minh had no qualms about this
tactic of collaboration or infiltration. In a post-script to this letter, written to the
French delegation to the Comintern, he requested that they approach the Colonial
Study Commision of the French Party in Paris, to find out whether Nguyen The
Truyen had joined the communist party. If he had, Ho requested that he be given the
order 'to enter the newly organized Constitutionalist Group in Paris, in order to
infiltrate it [pour la noyauter]'.)65
On the whole, however, Manuilsky was careful not to go too far in endorsing
united front tactics. The bulk of his intervention concerned the problems of self-
determination for the Balkan nations and central Europe. His effectiveness must also
have been decreased by the sniping of M.N. Roy who. as in 1920. openly disagreed
with the Soviet evaluation of the nationalist movements in colonies. Roy felt the
Comintern should be paying more attention to the revolutionary workers and
especially peasants in colonial countries.66 As he became a full voting member of the
ECCI at this congress, his opinions must have carried some weight. Ho's intervention
in this debate, from which I have quoted above, came in the session following Roy's
and Katayama's, the 22nd. It was unambiguously in favour of Comintern action in the
colonies, but did not deal directly with the united front controversy. He shared with
Roy the conviction that the revolution in Europe depended on the development of
liberation movements in the colonies, and seemed to be willing to finesse a
discussion of how or to whom this support should be offered. His target was the
inaction of the French communists. He went so far as to warn that the colonial
population was 'turning towards democratic and liberal groups such as the League of
Human Rights..., which make an effort on their behalf, or at least give the appearance
of doing something.'67
Following the Fifth Comintern Congress, Ho Chi Minh also participated in
the Third Profintern Congress in July (the Profmtern, the Red International of Trade
Unions, was founded in 1921). Again, his overarching theme was the desperate plight
of his nation and the need for the French comrades to support their long-suffering
brothers in the colonies. In his five-page report to the Congress, he made the case that
there was a growing proletariat in Vietnam just waiting to be organized. 'There are
enterprises where respectable numbers of workers can be found,' he said: 3,000 at a
textile mill in Tonkin, 4,000 in the mines of Halong Bay; 8,000 railway workers and
30,000 employees of the Portland Cement Company. These workers toiled in
appalling conditions, according to Ho, for 12 to 14 hour days, with longer days on the
plantations. There was no question of pensions or compensation for accidents; the
workers had no right to strike.68 Worse still was the fact that there existed in Vietnam
three categories of forced labour which Ho described as 'three categories of slavery'. 69
First were the prisoners who were loaned to factories or plantations - they worked
handcuffed and yoked at the neck. Next were those eligible for the corvee or labour
contribution - all Vietnamese between the ages of eighteen and sixty. The number of
days of free labour to be furnished was fixed only in theory Ho said; 'In practice it is
indefinite. When there is a canal to be dug or a road to build or repair', he explained,
'there is a general mobilization which can last several months'. Third were the
labourers recruited to be sent to work in France's Pacific colonies, where Ho claimed
they were sold to planters and European factory owners.
The workers' situation was 'deplorable', but not hopeless, Ho told the
Congress: 'With the aid of revolutionary organizations and principally the Profintern,
we can work to wear down and then break the yoke of oppressive capitalism.' But the
French comrades had to make a 'real undertaking to give effective, practical
assistance, and not just with words alone'. Ho drew up a formal resolution, calling on
the French unions to support the indigenous peoples' right to unionize and to send at
least two permanent organizers to Indochina.70 The French delegate, Reynaud,
claimed to be well-disposed towards these proposals, but did not offer formal support
for Ho's resolution, as his union had no money to send organizers to Vietnam.71

The Comintern and the United Front in China

The Comintern pendulum was swinging away from what had become known
as 'united fronts from above', those organized by negotiation among party leaders, to
'united fronts from below', those created by attracting non-communist workers and
peasants to support communist actions and programmes. It is ironic that the Russian
party and state were at this very moment implementing Lenin's Theses on National
and Colonial Questions by helping to create a united front entirely from above
between the Chinese nationalists in the Guomindang and the CCP. This policy was
probably not submitted for debate to the Comintern; Charles McLane points out that
it was a 'multi-level policy' involving a number of Soviet party and government
branches.72 As Comintern debates were still printed more or less in full, it must have
been deemed politic not to stage an open discussion of China policy. The Russian
Foreign Ministry was not eager to publicize Borodin's advisory role to Sun Yatsen,
for fear that it would derail the normalization of relations with the Western
democracies. (Recently published Russian documents show that Borodin was
formally attached to the Russian Foreign Ministry's Beijing mission. Leo Karakhan
even considered withdrawing Borodin at the end of 1923, as he feared that Sun
Yatsen's indiscretions regarding Borodin's advisory role would embarrass the Foreign
Ministry.73)
 Comintern structures with responsibility for work in the East had undergone
constant organizational changes from 1919 onwards. To avoid confusion about where
and what the various Eastern and Far Eastern bureaux and secretariats were, I will
give a brief explanation of these changes up to 1924. An Eastern Section (otdel) of
the Comintern was established in December 1919 by a decision of the Executive
Committee (ECCI), but what it accomplished is not clear. 74 In July 1920 a section of
Eastern Peoples was created, attached to the Siberian Bureau of the Russian
Communist Party in Irkutsk, while an Eastern Bureau of the ECCI was also set up in
May 1920 in Vladivostok.75 Then in January 1921 a step was taken towards unifying
Russian party and Comintern structures responsible for the Far East. The Section of
Eastern Peoples in Irkutsk was converted into the 'Comintern representation in the
Far East in the form of a Secretariat'. By March 1921 sixty-eight people were
working there, including the future Mongolian leader Choibalsan. 76 By the end of
1921 this secretariat had four sections: a Mongolian-Tibetan, a Chinese, a Korean and
a Japanese.77
But at the Fourth Congress in December 1922, a report revealed that the
Eastern sector's work followed no plan and was 'completely unsystematic'. 78 Again a
reorganization was decreed. A single, all-embracing structure was created, again
called the Eastern Section (otdel) with Karl Radek named as its head in May 1923.
His deputy was Grigory Voitinsky. Three divisions were created within the Eastern
Section: the Near Eastern Section, composed of Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Palestine,
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Persia; the Middle Eastern Section, including British
India, Indochina and Indonesia; and the Far Eastern Section of Japan, Korea, China
and Mongolia.79 Indecision or perhaps competition for control seems to have caused
rapid changes in how Far Eastern activities were handled. Immediately after the
Fourth Congress, in December 1922, a new Vladivostok Bureau of the Comintern's
Eastern Section had been designated, composed of Voitinsky, Sen Katayama and
Maring. But in January the following year the ECCI's Organizational Bureau
proposed the creation of a Far Eastern Secretariat directly answerable to the
Executive Committee itself, not to the Eastern Section. The Far Eastern Secretariat
was given broader powers than the Vladivostok Bureau, which was officially wound
up in June 1923. The new secretariat took over the Bureau's personnel: Voitinsky,
Katayama and Maring. Although this secretariat was apparently based in Moscow,
Voitinsky and Maring spent considerable periods in China. 80 Conceivably the change
in the line of command was deemed necessary by the Russian Politbureau, which by
1923 had decided to take a close interest in Russian and Comintern aid to China. It
was, for example, the Politbureau and probably Stalin himself who in 1923 chose
Mikhail Borodin to lead the mission to Sun Yatsen.81 The ECCI was even in Lenin's
day becoming closely controlled by its members from the Russian party.82
The Comintern became involved in advising the Chinese communist
movement in the spring of 1920, when Voitinsky first travelled to Shanghai and
helped Chen Duxiu to produce the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) manifesto,
which appeared that November.83 Maring and another Comintern envoy, Nikolsky
were on hand at the Chinese party's First Congress in July 1921 - Maring's own report
shows that he raised the issue of a communist-Guomindang alliance during this visit,
but that it was rejected by the congress. 84 Thus the sections of Lenin's 1920 Theses
which advocated alliances with nationalist movements in pre-capitalist countries
remained a declaration without any tangible results. In August 1922, however,
Maring persuaded five of the CCP's top leaders to accept what became known as the
'Bloc Within' policy.85 This policy called on all CCP members to join the
Guomindang (GMD), while retaining their own party structures and goals.
In 1923 the young Soviet state began to develop a programme of support for
Sun Yatsen's republican government in the south of China. This policy grew out of
Russia's foreign policy objectives - the search for allies and safe borders - and was
perhaps pursued with more speed than the general membership of the Comintern
would have liked. As Charles McLane points out, the Comintern was not directly
involved in the diplomatic negotiations which produced the agreement between Adolf
Joffe and Sun Yatsen in January 1923. 86 The Joffe-Sun Agreement sealed Moscow's
offer of aid, and Sun's conditional acceptance. After that it was not just the Comintern
which provided advisers to China, but the Bolshevik party's Central Committee, the
Red Army Military Academy, the Profintern and the International of Communist
Youth as well. After Ho Chi Minh's arrival in Canton the Krestintern would also have
its representative there.
The Comintern appears to have functioned in China as one branch of the
Russian aid mission, with final decisions becoming the monopoly of Stalin and the
Russian party's Central Committee. Comintern directives to the Chinese party up to
mid-1923 show a measure of caution regarding Sun's intentions. For example, the
May 1923 instructions of the ECCI to the Third Congress of the CCP decree that the
communist party 'must attempt to establish a union of workers and peasants'; but
continue, 'it goes without saying that leadership must belong to the party of the
working class...To strengthen the CP, making it a mass party of the proletariat, to
assemble the forces of the working class in unions - this is the overriding obligation
of the communists...'87 But the reorganization of the Comintern's structures dealing
with the Far East in early 1923 could be viewed as evidence that Comintern advisers
would be working closely with the Russian Central Committee to implement the
united front between the Chinese communists and the Guomindang. As mentioned
above, it was in January 1923, the same month that theJoffe-Sun Agreement was
signed, that a new Far Eastern Secretariat directly answerable to the ECCI was set up.
When the CCP's Third Congress officially adopted the Bloc-within policy in June
1923, the stage was set for the beginning of Mikhail Borodin's mission to Canton.
Borodin (Mikhail Grusenberg), a seasoned Comintern operative who had spent
eleven years in America teaching English to immigrants and organizing Russian
socialists, left Beijing for Canton in September 1923.

Ho's assignment to Canton

After the Fifth Comintern Congress, Ho Chi Minh finally prodded the Eastern
Section into taking action on his planned voyage to China. His assignment appears to
have been so loosely defined, however, that it is difficult to believe that the
Comintern leaders who dealt with his request had paid it much attention. From his
own recapitulation ot events in his letter of 9 September 1924, it is clear that he was
leaving Moscow with very tenuous backing:
After the Fifth Congress, the Eastern Section informed me: 1) that it was
going to recommend me to the Guomindang, for which I 'would be obliged to work,
because except for the cost of the voyage, the section could not give me any financial
aid; 2) that I would be there as a private person and not as a Comintern agent; 3) that
I should have no relationship with our party [this seems to mean the French party, of
which Ho was still a member] while in China.
Even though all these conditions seem difficult, I accepted them in order to
leave. To make up for conditions two and three, I asked my party to give me a
mandate, and to send a letter to the Chinese party, asking them to help me in my
work. The problem has thus been resolved.88
Still, his departure from Moscow was delayed, this time by a flare up of the
civil war in China. 'The Guomindang hasn't answered the letter from the Eastern
Section. And my departure is once more adjourned to 'an indeterminate date,' he
wrote.89 None of these difficulties would exist, he continued, if it were not for the
financial problem. He suggested that the Comintern simply give him the money to
live in China which he was being given 'to wait in Moscow and do nothing'.
On 19 September Ho wrote to Albert Treint, a French Party member who had
moved into the top ranks of the Comintern at the Fifth Congress. He was a full
member of the ECCI as well as on the Secretariat. In this letter Ho made clear his
reservations about having to earn a living while in Canton. 'To work for a living is
not a problem, even in a country of which I know the written, but not the spoken
language,' he explained. 'But in my case there are several inconveniences,' he added.
Firstly, he complained, he would be living illegally in a city which was 'swarming
with French spies'. Secondly, he said, he 'ought to be entirely free to do what I want
to do, that is to study the situation, to see people and to organize something'. He made
a final plea that Treint should put his case to the ECCI. 90 Treint then approached the
Comintern Secretariat, which seems to have had the power to make quick decisions,
with a request that it advise the Eastern Section to reconsider Ho's request for
financial aid: 'This is not the time, when the French imperialists are starting to
intervene in China, when they are using Indochina as their base of action, for the
Eastern Section to skimp on the work in Indochina - not if it has the least bit of
political sense.'91
Apparently Treint s petition was successful, because Ho Chi Minh at last got
to Canton on approximately 11 November 1924. When he reported his arrival to a
friend in the Comintern, he mentioned that he was staying in Comrade Borodin's
home with two or three Chinese comrades. He gave his address as Lou, The ROSTA
Agency, Canton, China.92 It appears that between 22 September and his arrival in
Canton, someone had arranged for him to work as a translator for ROSTA, the
Russian Telegraphic Agency, a precursor of the Tass news service. As Borodin had
left for China in the autumn of 1923, the arrangement is unlikely to have been his
doing. Most likely it was thanks to Voitinsky's intervention that Ho found this niche
in Canton. Voitinsky was back in Moscow at this point, and would return to China in
November 1924.93 Correspondence in the Comintern archives shows that he had an
agent or informant in Beijing, known as Sam Slepak, who worked in the ROSTA
agency there in 1923. As Slepak had served as a Deputy Head of the Comintern's
Eastern Section in 1922, one can assume that he was a regular Comintern operative
and that ROSTA was already being used to provide cover for Comintern work. 94
Whether or not Ho was directly responsible to Voitinsky while he worked in China is
unclear, but Voitinsky seems to be the most likely recipient of the reports which Ho
would write in English from Canton (Voitinsky and Slepak were both, like Borodin,
fluent in English, which was a decided advantage for work in China). But while Ho's
work as a translator and correspondent must have provided enough money for his
daily needs, it does not seem to have provided him with official journalistic cover.
When he first wrote to the Krestintern after his arrival in Canton, he requested that
they continue to list his name in their Presidium or, if they decided to remove it, to
announce that he was ill - he did not want it widely known that he had gone to
Canton, since his status there was as an illegal.95
To summarize, one can say with some certainty that Ho Chi Minh was not
sent to Canton to be a direct assistant or secretary of Borodin as has been suggested
in the past.96 It is true, though, that his status and relationships within the Comintern
in 1923-24 remain something of a puzzle. There is little underpinning in the
Comintern archives for the idea that Ho was a respected equal of the upper strata of
leaders, such as Manuilsky, or the particular protégé of any one person. 97 M.N. Roy,
an imposing multilingual Brahmin Bengali who had burst on to the Comintern scene
in 1920, was the senior spokesman on colonial issues at the Fifth Congress. It is clear
that Ho was more in tune with the united front policy for the colonies than Roy, and
for that reason may have been encouraged to speak at the Congress by Manuilsky.
But unlike Roy and some of the other Asians involved in Comintern work in 1924,
Ho did not yet represent an Asian communist party. Both Semaun of Indonesia and
Sen Kata-yama of Japan were included in the ECCI in 1924, presumably because
they were thought to represent sizable communist movements.
Moreover, Ho's sympathy with Manuilsky's views does not seem to have
translated into privileged treatment. In a note to Petrov, head of the Eastern Section,
Ho complained about the rent he was being asked to pay for what he considered
inferior accomodation in the overcrowded Hotel Lux. 'During the months of
December, January and February," he wrote, 'I was in room 176, where there were
always four or five lodgers. In the daytime the noise was continual, which prevented
me from working. At night I was eaten by bedbugs, which prevented me from getting
any rest.' Since March, he had been housed in a small single room, he said.
'Comparing the restricted space and very basic furniture in my room with the other
larger rooms, more comfortable, with several lamps, telephone, bathroom, wardrobe,
sofa, etc, and with a reasonable rent, the price which they want me to pay is
scandalous.'98 The tone here is one of insult - did he feel that he was getting worse
treatment than the Europeans or someone of Roy's standing?
 The impression created by Ho Chi Minh's correspondence during his
fourteen-month stay in Russia is, in fact, one of frustration with the lack of action by
the Comintern. This could reflect the fact that the Comintern itself was without firm
direction or that the struggle between partisans of Trotsky and Zinoviev was
absorbing the full attention of the decision-makers. Ho's membership in the French
party may have complicated his position - Trotsky's influence among French
communists was considerable and as late as January 1923 he had been working as the
designated Comintern consultant on France, with Jacques Doriot as his deputy. 99 In
this political minefield, Ho Chi Minh seems to have learned to deal with whoever was
in authority and to pursue his own concerns. His personal style was the antithesis of
Roy's - Roy thrived on theoretical debate, and by 1929 he was removed from the
Comintern. Ho felt able to promote his agenda with Albert Treint, a leftist supporter
of Zinoviev, even though he may not have been in complete sympathy with all of
Treint's views. Once he got to Canton he wrote to a French colleague in Moscow that
Treint had 'fought hard' for his [Ho's] departure for China. 100 The first sign that Ho's
political position within the Comintern was not entirely secure would come only in
late 1927 and 1928, when he began to plan for his return to Asia from Europe. By the
end of 1927 Albert Treint would be expelled from the French CP and anyone with a
first-hand knowledge of the failures of Stalin's united front policy in China would
find himself under suspicion.

3. THE CANTON PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH (1924-8)

Although Ho Chi Minh could not yet speak Cantonese, his arrival in the
tropical port of Canton must have felt like a long-delayed homecoming. Canton (now
Guangzhou) had served as an outpost for Vietnamese freedom fighters since the
Manchu dynasty's collapse in 1911. But the early Vietnamese hopes that republican
China would back an anti-French revolt with money and weapons had quickly faded.
Intensified French repression within Vietnam during the First World War coupled
with the eclipse of Sun Yatsen's influence in China resulted in bitter disappointments
for the leader of the anti-French movement, Phan Boi Chau. Acts of sabotage
designed to attract support from Sun Yatsen's government, and then from the
Germans during the war, caused Phan's Quang Phuc Hoi (Restoration Association) to
loose many of its most faithful lieutenants. 1 Following the blowing up of two French
colonels in the Hotel Hanoi in April 1913, the plot for which Phan Van Truong's two
brothers were imprisoned, seven people were executed and fifty-seven imprisoned. 2
Phan Boi Chau himself spent the years 1914-17 in a Chinese prison, and then retired
to Hangzhou where he earned his living writing for such journals as Junxi (Military
Problems)3
Ho Chi Minh appeared on the scene in November 1924, just as the Russian
military mission in Canton was approaching its full strength of around fifty
instructors.4 The first shipment of arms from Vladivostok had arrived in Canton On 8
October.5 The united front between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Guomindang (GMD) had been formalized at the first GMD Congress in January
1924, when the establishment of a military training academy on Whampoa
(Huangpu) island in the Pearl River had been approved. At the same time three
communists had been elected to the GMD's Central Executive Committee, while six
others, including Mao Zedong, became candidate members.6 Ho's stay in China,
which would end in May 1927, coincided with a period of political success for the
government in Guangdong. He was able to take advantage of the most fruitful months
of the united front, a time when emigre Vietnamese in China could freely absorb the
training and new ideas being offered by the Russian advisers, both in military affairs
and political theory and organizing. The ferment in China would encourage a new
wave of political activism in Vietnam, which in turn would provide fresh recruits to
the population of would-be rebels in southern China. How Ho used these
circumstances to create the nucleus of Vietnam's communist party is the main theme
of this chapter.
However, it is too simplistic to look at Ho's Canton years as the time when he
arrived like a missionary from Moscow to make converts to communism. The united
front was also an important learning experience for him, as well as for the other
Vietnamese who lived through it. Ho found himself in the thick of a peasant upheaval
in Guangdong province, which he was expected to analyze and encourage on behalf
of the Krestintern. This was his first exposure to the Asian peasantry since his youth
in Central Vietnam, and must have marked a major advance in his progression from
propagandist to a real organizer of revolution. The CCP-Guomindang united front
was, moreover, a politically complex phenomenon which would be re-examined and
criticized for years to come. When it inevitably fell apart in 1927, the recriminations
became part of the intensifying battle for the soul of the world communist movement.
The breakdown of the united front would become a paradigm for communists of
various tendencies - both Stalinists and Trotskyists - who would use it as proof that
bourgeois allies should never be trusted. Ho Chi Minh and his compatriots who
experienced this chaotic time did not all draw the same lessons from it. In particular,
a number of Vietnamese students who were in China during the collapse and
aftermath of the united front became some of the most radical in the Vietnamese
political spectrum. The final part of this chapter looks at this aftermath and where the
Vietnamese communist movement stood at the beginning of 1928.
Three main documentary sources are available on this stage in Ho Chi Minh's
career, each of which portrays his activities from a different vantage point. There are
his reports and letters to various Comintern departments, which cover his efforts to
recruit Vietnamese for a proto-communist network. Then there are his letters to the
Krestintern, which give the impression that he was heavily involved with the
Guangdong peasant movement, especially in 1925. The third source is the French
archives, in particular the reports of the Sûreté agent known as Lam Duc Thu
(Nguyen Cong Vien, Nguyen Chi Vien or Hoang Chan Dong).
One of Phan Boi Chau's principal lieutenants, a graduate ot a Beijing military
academy, Lam Duc Thu (Agent Pinot) became an early recruit to Ho's secret group.
He is now known to have been the son of Nguyen Huu Dan, fellow-student of Ho Chi
Minh's father at the Quoc Tu Giam Academy in Hue. 7 His reports to the Sûreté
include occasional insights into how Ho operated, but he often appears to have been
retailing second-hand gossip, as several of the Sûreté informers seem to have done.
This can probably be explained by the fact that he was not accepted into the inner
circle of Ho's confidants - but there is also a possibility that he was not always
forthcoming to the Sûreté. Some of his collaborators, including two who became Ho's
closest allies, Le Hong Son and Ho Tung Mau, apparently believed that Lam Duc
Thu was passing useless information to the French in order to receive a subsidy for
the Vietnamese group.8
On balance, however, it seems clear that the Sûreté reaped the greater benefit
from Lam Duc Thu's services. He was, undeniably, an extremely useful agent until at
least 1929. He was so sure of his worth that he made frequent requests for more
money. In December 1926, for example, he complained that his salary was being paid
with a long delay 'and moreover', he wrote, 'I never receive all that is due to me and
the expense of my correspondence is ruining me.'9 Working as a photographer in
Canton, he took pictures of many early recruits to Ho Chi Minh's group. 10 These
would be used in 1930-31 by the French police to identify communist suspects. Yet
only at the end of 1929 did the communists in southern China become convinced that
Thu's allegiance belonged to the French.11 In early 1925 Thu was able to warn the
French that Ho Chi Minh was in China and using the pseudonym Ly Thuy. 12 Ho's
careful efforts to keep his presence a secret from the French were all to no avail.

The first organizational steps

Ho announced his arrival in Canton to his communist contacts in several
letters dated 12 November 1924. He claimed to have arrived the day before, 13 even
though he wrote as though he already had had considerable experience of events in
China. For example, one of these letters purports to be a first-hand description of how
Fanya Borodin, Mikhail's wife, was organizing Chinese women.14 He may have
journeyed as far as Shanghai with Voitinsky, who returned to China from Moscow in
November. In any case, he wasted little time in making contacts and setting up links
for his work with the ROSTA Agency, which was to provide his main source of
income during his years in Canton. The immediate preoccupation of the republican
capital that November was Sun Yatsen's planned trip to Beijing, where the
Guomindang president hoped to negotiate a political detente with the northern
warlords.15 Ho wrote in English in his usual laconic style to an unnamed friend at the
Comintern: 'I haven't seen anybody yet. Everyone here is busy about Dr. Sun going
North.'16 To Tomas Dombal, the Polish secretary-general of the Krestintern, he sent
his apologies for failing to inform the members of the council that he was leaving for
China. 'My departure from Moscow was decided somewhat brusquely and I had no
time to warn you,' he wrote in French. He went on to describe how the poor peasants
were organizing 'under the aegis of the Guomindang, but under the direction of the
communists. It is an excellent opportunity for our propaganda.'17
Ho wrote in the guise of a female member of the GMD named Loo Shing Yan
in his account of the women's movement. He sent it with a signed cover letter, also
dated 12 November, to a women's newsletter whose title he does not mention. 18
'When I was at the Comintern', he wrote, 'I had the pleasure of collaborating with
your paper. Now I want to continue that collaboration. But since I am working here
illegally I will send you articles in the form of "Letters from China", and sign them
with a woman's name. I think that will give originality and variety to the pieces, and
at the same time assure my anonymity.' As soon as Ho had assumed his duties as a
translator and propagandist for ROSTA he must have begun searching out the other
Vietnamese emigres scattered around southern China. In late 1924 these Vietnamese
do not seem to have formed a tightly knit group. They had been absorbed into a
variety of academies and local armies, in particular the army of the Yunnan general
Yang Ximin, who until mid-1925 shared power in Guangdong province. Some, such
as the Sino-Vietnamese rebel chieftain Tam Kam Say, lived as outlaws, consorting
with heroin traders and buffalo thieves in the border country. Even before Ho's
arrival, Phan Boi Chau's pre-eminence among the emigres had become less clear than
during the pre-war years. Sometime in 1923 several of them had begun to organize a
new grouping, the Tam Tam Xa (Heart-to-Heart Society or Society of Like Minds),
which they did not invite Phan Boi Chau to join. His reputation had been tarnished by
a treatise he had written on Franco-Vietnamese cooperation in 1918 at the behest of
emigre and suspected informer, Phan Ba Ngoc. The latter, son of the Nghe Tinh
nationalist leader Phan Dinh Phung, had been won over by the promised reforms of
Governor General Sarraut.19 Phan Ba Ngoc was assassinated as a traitor by Le Hong
Son in 1922 on Cuong De's orders.20
The Tam Tam Xa began by resuscitating some of Phan Boi Chau's
fundraising networks within Vietnam, and in June 1924 carried out a bombing aimed
at the visiting French Governor General Merlin, who was passing through Canton. 21
While neither Hanoi sources nor Phan Boi Chau's memoirs emphasize the point, Le
Hong Son later confessed to the Sûreté that a leading role in this attack was played by
Nguyen Hai Than, a northern nationalist who had first joined Phan Boi Chau in 1905
as a student in Japan. He was said to have approached an anarchist Chinese, a fellow
officer in the Yunnan army stationed in Canton, who helped the Vietnamese construct
two suitcase bombs. One of these was deposited at a reception in the French enclave
of Shameen by the recent emigre Pham Hong Thai, posing as a photographer. The
bomb killed three French guests, but missed Merlin.22 Pham Hong Thai drowned in
the Pearl River trying to escape and became a nationalist martyr. Ironically, this
moment of glory for the Vietnamese nationalists, seen by many as the opening salvo
in a new round of the battle against the French, may also have been the moment when
Lam Duc Thu won the confidence of the Stirete. He was believed by some of his
confederates to have warned the French of the coming attack, and also to have turned
over the second suitcase bomb for a reward.23
The attempt on Merlin's life seems to have re-energized Phan Boi Chau. He
arrived in Canton in the late summer, probably a few months before Ho's arrival, to
consult with the Vietnamese exiles and make contact with the Russian advisers newly
installed at Whampoa.24 At that point he may have helped some of his younger
followers gain admittance, via the good offices of the GMD leader Liao Zhongkai. 25
He also discussed with his fellow exiles the transformation of the Quang Phuc Hoi
into the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam Guomindang or National People's Party,
known by its initials as the VNQDD). They formed several committees,based on the
organization of the Chinese GMD, he wrote in his memoirs. 26 But by November 1924
Phan had returned to Hangzhou, where he would remain until the following June.
Among the Vietnamese cadets who enrolled at the Whampoa Academy in the
autumn of 1924 were Le Hong Son, Le Hong Phong and Le Quang Dat, all from
Nghe An province.27 But a number of the Vietnamese who would enroll in Whampoa
in mid-1925 were in 1924 still cadets in the Yunnan army, probably under the
command of Nguyen Hai Than. These included a Hoang Luong, Luu Bich, Ngo
Chinh Coc and Lieu Khac Thanh, according to Lam Duc Thu. 28 Along with Nguyen
Hai Than, the older emigres Dinh Te Dan and Dang Su Mac served as officers in the
Yunnan army. It is worth remembering that in the autumn of 1924, Whampoa had
been open for only a few months and was still in the early phases of organization. In
October 1924 the CCP's Central Committee made it clear that they were not
impressed with the way the school was being run. They reported to Borodin that
anarchists were in charge and that even a newly formed model regiment had 'fallen
into their hands'. 'They are spending your funds on the devil knows what,' their letter
said.29 So it is difficult to say what quality of military or political training any
Vietnamese who entered the first training courses would have received.
Ho Chi Minh arrived in Canton at a propitious moment, when the Vietnamese
were just becoming aware of the potential of the Russian aid mission, but had not yet
decided how to follow up the bombing attempt against Governor Merlin. Phan Boi
Chau in Hangzhou was too far away to play a role in day-to-day decision making
about new initiatives, even if the younger emigres had been willing to include him in
their deliberations. As a member of the Russian mission, one who at first lived in
Borodin's residence, Ho had the edge when it came to winning backing for the group
of nationalists which would adopt his Leninist methods of political organizing. But
gaining financial support from the Soviet mission was not as easy as one might
imagine. Moreover, the situation within the group of Vietnamese emigres was
probably more fluid than is often assumed. Between December and June 1925 Ho
was able to recruit a core group of young emigres for a protocommunist group, most
of whom would remain loyal followers until his disappearance from Canton in 1927.
But this process, alternately viewed as a victory for Marxist-Leninist theory and
organizational techniques, or attributed to Ho's manipulative skills and supposed
betrayal of Phan Boi Chau, was more open-ended than most accounts of Vietnamese
communist history have led us to believe.
 In the anti-communist version of Ho Chi Minh's assumption of leadership in
Canton, he was forced to inform against Phan Boi Chau in order to rid himself of his
only real competitor. This story has it that Ho informed the French police of his
rival's movements and then lured him to an address in Shanghai's international
settlement, where the venerated patriot was arrested. 30 Part of the rationale for Ho's
action, in addition to his desire to be rid of a rival, is said to have been his need for
the money the French had placed on Phan's head. Ho is also said to have calculated
that the protests which Phan's arrest would cause in Vietnam would stimulate
resistance against the French.31
From Lam Duc Thu's reports, however, it appears unlikely that Ho was
involved in turning over Phan to the Sûreté. These reports make it clear that Thu had
been informing the French of Phan's activities for some time, at least since 1924. 32 So
when the French decided the time had come to arrest Phan, they should not have had
any difficulty in discovering his movements. He was indeed picked up in July 1925
(probably not June, as is often assumed, based on Phan's own memoirs) and shipped
back to Hanoi. (Lam Duc Thu reported that Phan was planning to come to Canton at
the end of July 1925; he had not yet been arrested according to this report at the end
of june, 1925.33) In November 1925 he was sentenced to hard labour for life. The
campaign against his sentence became the start of a series of student strikes and
nationwide demonstrations, which in the end set many students on the road to
underground activism. In fact, Phan Boi Chau's trial provided open publicity for the
rebel movement in China, as one arrested activist testified in 1931.
Twenty-year-old Tran Van Thanh told his interrogators that, 'the trial of Phan
Boi Chau revealed the existence of Vietnamese revolutionaries in China, especially in
Canton. We students didn't talk about anything but the 5,000 soldiers in the
Whampoa army.'34 By December 1925 the new Governor General, Alexander
Varenne, would have to back down and convert Phan's sentence to life-long house
arrest. But it is difficult to believe that Ho Chi Minh could have foreseen the outcome
of Phan's arrest and manipulated events as cleverly as his critics claim.35
It is, moreover, difficult to see why Ho would have needed to get rid of Phan,
since in his own letters he claims to have made rapid progress in gaining the
adherence of'the best elements' of the Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang to his ideas. A
letter in the French archives which Phan Boi Chau sent to Ho in early 1925 also
shows that the older man did not feel that he and Ho were competitors, but rather that
Ho would insure the continuation of the anti-French struggle in the next generation.
'Aside from you, who else is there to entrust this responsibility of replacing me to?' he
asked. 'I left the country when I was almost forty,' Phan wrote, 'and I can't escape the
experience of my studies - thus my ideas now are the same as they were formerly.
You have studied widely and been to many more places than Uncle - ten times, a
hundred times more. Your ideas and your plan surpass mine - will you share one or
two tasks with me?' he asked, perhaps with a touch of irony. 36 Phan Boi Chau was
also a friend of Ho's father from the same district in Nghe An. Phan's son-in-law,
Vuong Thuc Oanh, who would become an early member of Ho's group, came from
the same village as Ho's father. Ho's older brother and sister had both been sentenced
to hard labour for the assistance they had given to Phan's fighters. So long as Phan
Boi Chau was not actively thwarting his plans, Ho Chi Minh would surely have had a
strong motivation to use him as a figurehead for his movement.
This is not to say that there were no rivalries among the Vietnamese in
southern China. Nguyen Hai Than (also known as Vu Hai Thu and Nguyen Cam
Giang), before long took a dislike to Ly Thuy, and in early 1927 would form a rival
anti-French group. He and Ho Chi Minh would remain competitors until 1946. But in
the first heady months of republican power in Canton, when the united front seemed
to answer the needs of both nationalists and communists, the differences in their
political inclinations had not yet become an obstacle to cooperation. Ho Chi Minh
knew how to wield political influence while allowing other emigres to take the more
important posts in the organizations he formed. The defeat of the Yunnanese army in
mid-1925 also worked to his advantage, as we shall see, by making Whampoa and its
army the main source of training and employment for the emigre Vietnamese.
Overall, the evidence provided by Lam Duc Thu and Ho's own reports to the
Comintern lead to the conclusion that the Vietnamese nationalists and proto-
communists had not yet formed well-delineated groups during Ho's first stay in
China. Some emigres such as Le Hong Son and Truong Van Lenh, two of Ho's most
trusted lieutenants, retained ties in both camps until at least 1928. It would seem a
mistake to assume that the Vietnamese emigres had sharply defined views about
communist aid to their independence movement in 1924 and 1925. So long as Ho had
something positive to offer, including new methods of organizing and potential
financial support, he had an automatic advantage over the older leaders, whose
Japanese backers had always let them down. But when the Comintern was slow in
responding to his requests for aid, Ho worried that he would lose influence among the
nationalists. I will discuss the evidence regarding these issues below.
 On 18 December 1924 Ho wrote to the presidium of the Comintern that he
had arrived in Canton in the middle of that month. (The discrepancy between this
arrival date and his earlier claim to have arrived on 11 November is unexplained.
Perhaps he was simply being consistent with his practice of doling out bits of the
truth to different interlocutors.) In a post-script to this letter he informed the
Comintern that he was posing as a Chinese named 'Ly Thuy'. Ho Chi Minh glossed
over the subtleties of his contacts with the Vietnameses emigres in this version of his
activities. 'I have met several nationalist-revolutionary Vietnamese', he wrote, 'among
whom there is one who left Vietnam thirty years ago and who during this time has
organized a number of anti-French revolts... The sole goal of this man is to avenge
his country and his family, who were massacred by the French. He doesn't know
anything of politics and even less of mass organizing. In our conversations, I have
demonstrated the necessity of having something organized and the uselessness of
agitation without any base. He is convinced.' 37 If one allows for a ten-year
exaggeration regarding his departure from Vietnam, this description might fit Phan
Boi Chau. But from Phan's letters of early 1925, it does not appear that the two met. 38
The other possibilities for the identity of this emigre are Nguyen Hai Than, or
possibly Ho Hoc Lam, like Phan Boi Chau a native of Nghe An province, whose
brother and father had both been killed by the French. But Lam, the uncle of Ho Tung
Mau, appears to have remained in Hangzhou during the united front period. A 1933
French political profile of Ho Chi Minh seems to show that Nguyen Hai Than is the
most likely candidate. This report mentions that when Ho arrived in Canton 'he
skillfully consulted Nguyen Cam Giang, who at the time exercised authority over his
compatriots.'39 The report says that with the aid of Nguyen Cam Giang, Ho created a
new group, but that later discord grew up between them and Giang started his own
association, with no more than thirty members. This falling-out coincides with the
description of Ho's relationship with Nguyen Hai Than given in Lam Duc Thu's
reports. Nguyen Hai Than, also known as Nguyen Cam Giang, appears to have been
the heir apparent to Phan Boi Chau until Ho Chi Minh appeared on the scene.40
In his letter of 18 December Ho lists the tasks which he and his fellow-emigre
had undertaken together. They had outlined an organizational plan; the emigre had
drawn up a list often Vietnamese who had worked with him in the past; and Ho had
chosen five, from five different provinces, to bring to Canton. He planned to give
them instruction and then send them back to Indochina after three months of study,
after which another group would arrive to take their place. This was the blue-print for
what would become the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, The
Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, usually called Thanh Nien (Youth)
for short. But Ho made no mention of this name yet, and in two letters in January and
February 1925 he referred to his group as the Vietnamese Guomindang (see below).
To bring the first bunch to Canton he would use the $150 [presumably US dollars]
left over from his travel money from Moscow. 'But after that?', he asked pointedly. 'I
work several hours per day for ROSTA, but my salary won't allow me to maintain my
"students", and when they are in Canton, it is possible that I will have to devote all or
most of my time to their education; my financial situation will be hopeless. This is
why I ask you to please give the order to your representatives in Canton to take care
of Indochina as well.'41
By 5 January 1925 Ho was able to report: 'The Komintang [sic] of Indochina
had been formed on the 3rd of this month, with three members to begin.' He wrote in
English, so was quite likely writing to the English-speaking Voitinsky. 'One member
will be sent to Annam and Laos. Another man (not yet member) will be sent to
Tonkin to bring five men to Canton to learn how to do organization work... In the
same time, I beg you to give order to our Russian camrades [sic\ here to take charge
also of the Indochinese affairs, because alone, I cannot do very much.'42 When he
wrote on 10 January to the Comintern Presidium, this time in French, he was able to
announce that the 'Kvak-zan-dang had just admitted its fourth member. But he
complained that he had had to get an advance from ROSTA to pay the travel costs of
his envoys.43
More progress had been made when Ho wrote again to the Comintern
Presidium on 19 February 1925. This time he reported that his group, a secret one,
had nine members, two of whom had been sent back to Vietnam; three were at the
front in the army of Sun Yatsen, he said, while one was on a 'military mission for the
Guomindang'. Of these nine members, five were candidate members of the
communist party (presumably Chinese) as well.44 Ho mentioned names as rarely as
possible in his correspondence, but we know from Vietnamese accounts that among
these five were Le Hong Phong, Ho Tung Mau, Le Hong Son and Lam Duc Thu; Le
Quang Dat, one of the early students at Whampoa, was probably the fifth. 45 All but
Lam Duc Thu, who came from Thai Binh, were natives of Nghe An. Nguyen Hai
Than appears to have remained outside the inner circle of Thanh Nien recruits,
perhaps because of his duties as an officer in the Yunnan army. By February Ho
seemed to have succeeded in co-opting the existing infrastructure of the Tam Tam xa,
which in turn had made use of Phan Boi Chau's old networks: he reported that his
group had a solid base-station in Siam for getting men in and out of the country.
'There are fifty farmers there who are closely united and who have rendered many
services in the past,' he wrote.
Now that Ho was gaining the confidence of his compatriots, his plans were
getting more ambitious. In this letter of 19 February he estimated that the tasks to be
accomplished in 1925 would cost $5,000. He needed the money to establish a base in
Canton, as well as communications bases in Guangxi; in the extreme south of
Guangdong; in Bangkok; at the end of the railway line from Bangkok to Tich-kho
(Udon Thani?), which he said was a twenty-day walk from Lacfach; and lastly at
Lacfach (Thakhek?), on the left bank of the Mekong River (in Laos), fifteen days on
foot from Annam. He also planned to send someone back to Vietnam to collect and
transmit news, as well as several people to work on the ships sailing between China
and Indochina. He included a neatly sketched map of Indochina at the end of the
letter, with the planned bases marked.
But in an undated memo titled, 'The Indochina Question', which seems to
have been written a few months later in 1925, he remained less than assured about the
future prospects of his group. Since it was written in English, it was probably again
addressed to Voitinsky. In point 4 of the memo, which is another plea for money, he
explains: 'Without the help and counsel of our Russian camrades [sic], it will be
difficult for me not to make mistakes. But I can get neither without order from you.
And they can do nothing for me empty handed.' 46 The crux of the request was that Ho
needed something to show his countrymen in the way of concrete Russian assistance,
so that he would retain his credibility. In point 1 he wrote: 'If you allow me to send
immediately one or two students, that will enable me to make good propaganda, to
tell what the Russian Revolution can do and will do for the colonial people. That will
enable me also - from now until August - to gain over the good elements of the Indo-
chinese Komintang [sic].
The Sûreté's reports fill in some of the missing detail about how Ly Thuy
approached his task in the early months of 1925. On 4 March Lam Duc Thu informed
his French contact: 'Ly Thuy and Nguyen Hai Than are working actively to organize
the association referred to in the annexe to note 121. They are working without the
knowledge of Phan Boi Chau.'47 The association's name is not given in this report or
in the French summary of the tract which Ly Thuy had prepared to recruit members
within Vietnam. It appears, though, that this was the first effort to develop the group
which became known as Thanh Nien. The March report on Ly Thuy's activities,
apparently based on Lam Duc Thu's information, was signed by Governor Merlin
himself. He noted that the recruiting tract took into account the Vietnamese
mentality, by requiring an oath of loyalty to the new 'party', but also departed from
the usual 'grandiloquent phraseology' of the Vietnamese revolutionaries. 'Nowhere is
there a mention of extreme methods,'Merlin wrote. 'One can see that for Ly-Thuy it is
of first importance to organize his partisans into disciplined groups, which will obey
blindly the instructions issued to them.' 48 Merlin was deeply impressed by the
influence of the 'Bolsheviks' and their methods. His analysis of the tract could have
been written by Ho himself - 'The nationalists have carried out a few attacks: they
have always lacked cohesion and have not been able to win over the Vietnamese
masses.' He saw that the new style of anti-French agitation could be harmful to
French influence, 'if it were permitted to develop freely'. But measures were being
taken to combat it, he assured his superior in Paris.
By early March Ly Thuy had convinced the emigres to contribute money each
month for a propaganda fund. Ly Thuy was giving $200 monthly, Nguyen Hai Than
$300, Dinh Te Dan $100, and Lam Duc Thu himself, $50 (Thu may well have under-
reported his own contribution). Ho was by Thu's account receiving from three to four
hundred dollars monthly salary for his translation work. 49 Thu reported in April that
Nguyen Hai Than and Ly Thuy had established a mutually agreeable working
relationship. He explained: 'Each one preserves his liberty of action. Nguyen Hai
Than continues to advocate terrorist methods and Ly Thuy is carrying out communist
propaganda. Since they both are pursuing the same goal, they help each other when
they have the opportunity.'50
However, recruitment within Vietnam seems to have been delayed, while the
Chinese republican government consolidated its power in the first half of 1925. The
only new Vietnamese recruits who arrived from in country before the summer appear
to be the five or six who attended the Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI)
courses, and perhaps Phan Boi Chau's son-in-law, Vuong Thuc Oanh. In order to
understand the development of the Vietnamese revolutionary groups, one needs to
keep in mind the key events in this consolidation process. The fortunes of the
Vietnamese emigres were dependent on both the local power structure in Canton and
the condition of the CCP-Guomindang alliance in general. As we have seen, many of
them served within Chinese military structures. Ho Chi Minh, like a number of the
other Vietnamese, could devote only a portion of his time to Vietnamese affairs. As
Lam Duc Thu reported at the end of 1925, Ho worked sixteen-hour days, translating
for ROSTA, reporting on the peasant movement for the Krestintern, and setting up
the structures which would become the nucleus of a Vietnamese communist party.51
From February until May 1925 the Whampoa cadets and Canton army waged
a campaign against the warlord Chen Jiongming in the East River Districts of
Guangdong. The local power broker in Guangdong, General Chen had been
threatening to return to Canton to take control, while Sun Yatsen stayed on in
Beijing, his health deteriorating. When Sun died in March, the struggle to succeed
him carried on. The Whampoa-trained troops routed the General with the support of
peasant militias, who provided sabotage as well as intelligence and propaganda
support.52 Three of the Vietnamese in Ho's secret nine-member group joined in the
fighting, as Ho had reported in his 19 February letter. Le Hong Son served under the
command of Zhou Enlai, political commissar of the First Army Corps. 53 Then in May
the Yunnan and Guangxi generals who had joined forces with the GMD, Yang Ximin
and Lau Tchauwan [Liu Chenhuan], rebelled against the republican leadership. The
newly-tested troops from Whampoa once again took the field, and defeated the rebel
forces. This cleared the way for the formation of an independent Guomindang
government in Canton at the end of June 1925, headed by Hu Hanmin. The CCP-
GMD united front was now approaching its zenith of political success. The shift in
local political power marked a new phase in Vietnamese organizing. For one thing,
the defeat of the Yunnan army left Nguyen Hai Than without a power base. Lam Duc
Thu reported on 15 June: 'Hai Than is defeated. He has not got a single man left. He
has come back to Canton, but he doesn't yet dare to show himself...he is at the end of
his resources and he seems very sad.' The cadets from his troops, he added, were due
to be 'incorporated into the Canton troops on Ly Thuy's recommendation.' 54 As
mentioned above, a number of them enrolled at Whampoa. Joining the new students
was a pair from Nghe An, former students from the officers school of the Guangxi
corps: Truong Van Lenh and Le Nhu Vong (Le Thiet Hung).55
With its power consolidated in Guangdong, the united front gave increased
attention to the peasant movement and labour organizing. The May 30 strike
movement in Shanghai was quickly followed by the Hong Kong strike and boycott of
British trade in Guangdong. The Hong Kong movement began on 21 June with a
mass strike against foreign companies - that same day Ho Chi Minh brought out the
first issue of the Vietnamese paper, Thanh Nien, a weekly which would continue to
appear until May 1930. (The first issue of sixty copies contained only two articles; by
October, eighty copies were being printed and distributed in Siam, Guangxi, Yunnan
and Hangzhou, as well as Guangdong.)56 On 30 June the League of Oppressed
Peoples (in Vietnamese, Bi Ap Buc Dan Toe Lien Hiep Hoi) was founded: it was a
grouping of Vietnamese, Korean and Indian anti-colonial activists, along with their
Chinese patrons. Liao Zhongkai, the new Canton governor and a leader of the GMD
left, presided over the League, with a Korean and Lam Duc Thu serving as vice-
presidents. Ly Thuy controlled the secretariat and the finances of the Vietnamese
section. The League was the first structure within which Ho Chi Minh would create
an open, revolutionary group of Vietnamese in Canton.
The League of Oppressed Peoples served a double function for him. Its
primary purpose was to demonstrate Asian support for the Chinese revolution,
initially for the boycott of British trade in Hong Kong. The leaflet which Ho wrote in
Chinese characters for the League's founding made this clear.57 But the League's
Vietnamese section also served as the basic organization for recruiting and educating
anti-French Vietnamese in 1925. Its members, including Nguyen Hai Than, were the
ones who put out the newspaper Thanh Nien. Although June 1925 is usually seen as
the founding date of the Thanh Nien association, this grouping did not come to exist
as a real political party until sometime in 1926, to judge by the available evidence. It
would not have a formal political programme and statutes until early 1927. Possibly
Thanh Nien existed first as the youth group within the League, which according to
Lam Duc Thu had responsibility for the League's propaganda.58 A recent Hanoi
history of Ho's years in Canton maintains that the formal name, the Association of
Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, came into being at the end of 1925. It quotes from
the memoirs of Vuong Thuc Oanh, who claims that a Thanh Nien Cong San Doan
(Communist Youth Group) had been created in Canton, but that the title 'Viet Nam
Thanh Nien Cach Mang Hoi' (Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth) was
dreamed up by himself and Le Duy Diem, when the latter returned from Canton
towards the end of 1925.59
A French summary of Lam Duc Thus reports dated 22 July 1925 makes clear
the new ascendancy of Ho Chi Minh in mid-1925: 'NAQ has decidedly taken charge
of the Vietnamese revolutionary group in Canton. While carrying out his functions as
a translator for the information service at the Soviet consulate, he works tirelessly to
prepare the revolution in Indochina. Treasurer of the Vietnamese revolutionary
group, founder, editor and printer of the paper Thanh Nien, organizer of a League of
Oppressed Peoples in Canton, affiliated to all the labour guilds and revolutionary
organizations in Canton, he attends most of the meetings held in the Public Gardens
and at Canton University; he visits the prestigious hosts at the Canton Cement Works,
Liao Zhongkai, Sie Yng Pak and Hu Hanmin. Nguyen Ai Quoc has found a milieu in
Canton which is entirely to his liking.'60
At the end of September Lam Duc Thu informed the Sûreté that Ho, Nguyen
Hai Than, Ho Tung Mau, Le Hong Son and himself had decided at one of the
Vietnamese section meetings to regroup the Vietnamese revolutionaries in Guangxi
and to resume contact with agitators from Tonkin. Ho Tung Mau would undertake
this mission in Guangxi, while Nguyen Hai Than would travel to Tonkin. Thu wrote:
'Nguyen Ai Quoc believes that we must reorganize the revolutionary groups in the
interior on the same basis as that of Canton... Questionable elements will be banished
without pity, as in Canton.'61
Sometime during the summer of 1925, Le Hong Son relates in his 1933
Sûreté confession, a group of fifteen Vietnamese were escorted from Dongxing to
Canton by Ho Tung Mau. Some of these may have been recruited by Nguyen Hai
Than or Lam Duc Thu. In the autumn, after Le Hong Son took leave from his duties
as an officer in the Canton army, he escorted seven of them back to the Vietnamese
border, via Nanning and Longzhou. At the border he handed his charges over to a
Chinese opium smuggler, who guided them back to Tonkin. Among the seven were
Xuan (Nguyen Cong Thu, brother of Lam Duc Thu, who would become a Thanh
Nien recruiter in Tonkin), Hoang Lun (Le Huu Lap) from Thanh Hoa, Le Duy Dung
from Nghe An, and Nhan (Nguyen Ngoc Ba) from Nghe An as well. 62 Vuong Thuc
Oanh, Phan Boi Chau's son-in-law, who had already established a network for
sending Vietnamese to China, had been initiated into the Thanh Nien core group
earlier in the year.63 These students would have formed part of the first official Thanh
Nien training course, which Ho would mention in a letter to the Comintern in June
1926 as being composed often people.64
But more political turmoil apparently disrupted the plans for another group of
trainees to come to Canton. The growing militancy of the GMD in Guangdong, along
with the boycott of British trade, encouraged the development of a new coalition of
interests in southern China between right-wing elements in the GMD and the
imperialist powers. One of the earliest signs of this break-down in nationalist unity
was the murder of Liao Zhongkai in August. The cadets at Whampoa braced
themselves for another outbreak of hostilities, as Le Hong Phong wrote from the
Academy to the Vietnamese in the city.65 However, a political compromise was
worked out, which forced Hu Hanmin, implicated in the murder plot, to go into exile
in Europe. The leftist Wangjingwei took over the leadership of the nationalist
government, while Chiang Kaishek became the Commander of the Guomindang First
Army as well as the Director of Whampoa Academy.66 Wangjingwei's position as
successor to Sun Yatsen was to all appearances consolidated at the GMD's Second
National Party Congress held in January 1926. The Congress confirmed the strength
of the united front and its alliance with Soviet Russia. 67 But the loss of Liao Zhongkai
undermined GMD support for the peasant movement in Guangdong and was
probably at least a temporary blow to Ho Chi Minh's projects as well. He had become
deeply involved in his work for the Krestintern in mid-1925, but by the following
spring the Comintern's attention would be re-focused in other directions. The second
Thanh Nien training course would finally open in the autumn of 1926, when the
united front had shifted its attention to the Northern Expedition. Before examining
the subsequent development of Thanh Nien, then, we need to look at the peasant
movement and the political forces which affected it.

The Guangdong peasant movement

Between February 1925 and March 1926 Ho was drawn into one of the more
tumultuous manifestations of the united front, the Guangdong peasant movement, via
his work for the Krestintern. Peasant organizing in Guangdong Province had begun
soon after the creation of the CCP, largely inspired by the son of a wealthy family
who had studied in Japan, Peng Pai. He made his first efforts to set up peasant
schools and organizations in 1922 and 1923, but had little success in protecting the
institutions he created from the wealthy gentry. 68 In the spring of 1925, however, the
power equation changed in the countryside east of Canton, when GMD troops, newly
trained and armed, defeated the forces of warlord Chen Jiongming. The peasant
associations founded by Peng Pai became government-recognized bodies with
guaranteed rights and a central place in the united front movement. They also gained
the right to organize their own militias to defend themselves against the landlord-
backed mintuan or 'popular militias' which in reality functioned as the armies of the
local elite.
The peasant militias in the Haifeng and Lufeng districts on the East River
were created from the training classes held in the Peasant Movement Training
Institute (PMTI) in Canton. Founded in August 1924, the PMTI was Peng Pai's
creation. For the first classes he did most of the lecturing and shaped a program
which included weekly practical work in the villages. Fernando Galbiati writes that in
the Second, Third and Fourth Classes trained at the Institute, the 'military element' of
the training steadily increased. The Third Class, which may have included some
Vietnamese, ran from 1 January to 3 April 1925. It was patterned on the organization
of an army company and received training in survey and propaganda work. 69 The
Fourth class started on 30 April, but was disrupted by the rebellion in Canton of the
Yunnan and Guangxi generals. According to Galbiati, the students dispersed to rural
areas until the Institute reopened in July. Five young Vietnamese who had been
studying in this course were reported to have moved to Canton University that
month.70 When only fifty students returned after this interruption, Galbiati believes
that the course was filled out with new trainees who may have been Vietnamese. 71
This group graduated in September 1925. The Institute's training may have been the
root of the armed propaganda brigades which the Vietminh would form in 1945. The
subjects covered were strictly practical - they included instruction in speech-making
and in setting up Peasant Associations, as well as ways to win peasant confidence
such as speaking the local language and living, eating and dressing as the peasants
did.72 The Fifth Course at the PMTI, for which Mao Zedong became an instructor,
would include forty-three students from Hunan Province.73 (Although Mao is
sometimes credited with founding the Institute, he did not become the principal until
the spring of 1926.) The importance of the Krestintern in guiding the peasant
movement is unclear. The Russian advisers who lectured at the PMTI on survey
techniques and who worked under Borodin as special advisers to the Peasant
Department of the Guomindang may not have been linked to the Krestintern. 74 One of
these, S.N. Belenky, who was known in the Comintern as 'Volin', was also a ROSTA
correspondent, perhaps the immediate day-to-day supervisor of Ho Chi Minh.75 In the
initial period of organizing, Borodin himself seems to have been closely involved in
giving advice on such issues as demands for reduction of land rents and land
redistribution.76 Yet Ho Chi Minh, apparently at this time the only Asian Krestintern
representative (and a translator of French and English language materials), was able
to follow the movement closely and participate in surveys of the Guangdong
peasantry. He sent the Krestintern a report in French on the major problems of the
Chinese peasantry, which they received on 2 March 1925. Along with high
population density, primitive tools and natural disasters, he listed the greed of the
landowners and the invasion of foreign capital as major difficulties. It is not clear
whether Ho was simply translating a report prepared by others, or whether he had had
a hand in compiling it. He mentioned only briefly at the end that the peasants were
forming associations with the encouragement of industrial workers and the southern
government. The following groups were to be excluded from the peasant
associations, he wrote: landowners with more than 100 mau 77 of land; anyone who
had committed acts of extortion against the peasants; ministers or leaders of religious
groups; anyone having relations with the imperialists; and gamblers and opium
smokers.78
In August 1925 the Krestintern sent Ho five-thousand rubles (worth around
$US 2,500 at the time) via Borodin's account in the Bank of the Far East. They
requested that he use the money to (1) produce revolutionary posters and brochures
on the peasant question; (2) send representatives to other provinces to start peasant
unions; (3) send a trusted Chinese comrade to Moscow to work in the Krestintern;
and (4) furnish regular information and documentation to Moscow on the Chinese
peasant movement. Their final demand was for bi-monthly reports. 79 Ho replied in
English on 17 October that he had received all the Krestintern's letters dating from
August and September (eleven in all, most of which are not in the Krestintern file
with Ho's correspondence) on the same day: 14 October 1925. He promised to
comply with most of their requests. But he declined to send a comrade to Moscow,
'because all our comrades are needed here now, and no-one [sic] of them understands
foreign language.' He also requested that they stop sending materials in German,
because there was no one available to translate it.80
On 5 November 1925 Ho sent the Krestintern the results of a survey of
peasant unions which had been completed for seven of the districts in Guangdong. 81
In a summary of the results, he wrote that the peasants, 'agree with the CP
programme when their fear of the "socialization of women" is vanished,' and that
'they are able to make great sacrifice [sic] to defend their class, or to support the
revolutionary government.'82 Presumably his Cantonese was not yet good enough for
him to have taken a direct part in the survey; he sent the reports to the Krestintern in
English. Another letter written 3 December seems to show that Ho was mainly
transmitting information from Chinese peasant organizers, rather than collecting it
himself. Ho explained that his Chinese comrades had advised against his developing
a formal relationship with the Guomindang Executive Committee in his capacity as
the Krestintern representative, something the Krestintern had earlier recommended.
He wrote: 'Our comrades said that it is not necessary, because I can get all
information concerning the peasant question though our C.P. comrades. (Although
the chairman of the Board of Peasant Affairs is a Kuomintang, all the work -
organization as well as propaganda - is done by our comrades).'83
 In the early hours of 20 March 1926 Chiang Kaishek moved against the
communist political commissars at Whampoa, arresting around fifty men.84 The
Soviet advisers in Canton were placed under house arrest. When faced with this coup
de force, Borodin aquiesced to the demands of the GMD Executive Committee,
which met in May and demanded a more restricted communist role within the
Guomindang. Communist members of GMD party committees were from then on
limited to one-third of the membership, while communists were banned from serving
as heads of government departments.85 Although the united front would continue with
Soviet backing until the summer of 1927, the March 20 incident marked the
beginning of the decline of the peasant movement in Guangdong, until the Hai
Lufeng Soviet of late 1927 was formed. As Ho Chi Minh explained in his report to
the Krestintern in June 1927, the GMD ceased helping the peasant associations as
soon as they had unified Guangdong province under their flag. 86 The peasant militias
were not strong enough to protect themselves against the militias of the gentry
without the support of GMD troops.87 Ho Chi Minh later claimed that the British and
French had been arming these militias.88 In the spring of 1926, when the planning for
the Northern Expedition got underway, Mao Zedong took over the PMTI and the
united front began to focus attention on the peasants of Hunan and Hubei.
In March 1926 the Krestintern seems to have rather abruptly lost interest in
Ho Chi Minh's work. He wrote them a brief note in French on 8 March 1926, to ask
why all of the letters which he had sent them had failed to elicit a reply, and why they
had failed to send any material for propaganda. 89 He had passed on all their
correspondence to Java, Manila, India and other places, he added. Part of the
explanation comes in their reply, an undated letter in which they revealed that they
had received his letters. But they had begun to correspond with a new member of
their Presidium, comrade Hu Hanmin, about the peasant situation in Shandong and
Yunnan provinces.90 It turned out that Hu Hanmin had gone to Moscow, after being
exiled from Canton, and had been elected to the governing body of the Krestintern.
At the Sixth Plenum of the ECCI in March 1926 he was received as an honoured
guest.91 The conviction held by the Stalin-Bukharin coalition in Moscow, that the
Guomindang was the prime revolutionary force in Asia, had led to this strange turn of
events.92 (Bukharin would replace the leftist Zinoviev as head of the Comintern in
October 1926). The man who had been held responsible for the death of Liao
Zhongkai, the protector of the Guangdong peasant movement, was suddenly the
Krestintern's primary contact in China. Ho Chi Minh was now presumably considered
either too closely allied with the communists or simply too insignificant to deal with.
After March 1926, there is no record of Ho's interaction with the Krestintern until his
return to Moscow in June 1927.

The growth of Thanh Nien

Expectations of revolt. The progress of Ho Chi Minh's attempts to organize
links with Vietnam must have been slowed by the political tension within the Canton
government, as well as his own financial difficulties. By April 1926, although Lam
Duc Thu reported that thirty young Vietnamese were studying political and military
science at Canton University and the Whampoa Academy, there was still no sign of a
second intake of trainees for Thanh Nien.93 The Thanh Nien core group had dispersed
for the time being: Le Hong Son was reported to be serving as a political agent on the
staff of General Zhang Fakui on Hainan Island. In May Ho Tung Mau went with a
comrade identified as 'Mr Sau' (Luu Hong Khai or Vo Tung) to Siam, where they
hoped to organize a mutual aid society.94 Le Hong Phong, Han Rue and Dang Tu My
were soon to depart for Moscow for further military training. 95 At the same time, the
entente between Ho and Nguyen Hai Than was breaking down. In April 1926 Than
was accused by Lam Duc Thu of having misused money belonging to the Vietnamese
section of the League of Oppressed Peoples.96 That March the League had been
reorganized, perhaps in connection with Liao Zhongkai's death and Chiang Kaishek's
move to limit communist power. An article announcing the reorganization in the
Chinese press noted that the League had started a new drive to recruit members.97 The
Sûreté passed on the above information with an appended note to its Heads of Local
Administration, which opined that the exodus of Indochinese to Canton 'may not be
unrelated' to the reorganization of the League of Oppressed Peoples. These new
emigres may have been among the 30 Vietnamese then studying at Whampoa.
Lam Duc Thu told the Sûreté that Nguyen Hai Than was jealous of the
influence which Ho Chi Minh had over the group of revolutionary Vietnamese in
Canton. 'Nguyen Ai Quoc is preparing for revolution methodically. He will move at
the propitious moment. Nguyen Hai Than is a partisan of the violent method. He
wants to make use of it immediately,' the informer said. 98 In a follow-up to this
conversation, Lam Duc Thu expanded on his description of Ho Chi Minh: 'Nguyen
Ai Quoc is still attached to the Agency of the USSR. He doesn't say what he does
there...he is extremely suspicious and only tells his friends what is absolutely
necessary...in all of his actions, he conforms to his ideas. To those like Hong Son
who suggested that he buy some land on Hainan to start a school, he said that he
would never pay to acquire land and that since it belongs to everyone it should be put
at the community's disposal for free.'99
Among both the emigres in Canton and patriots within Vietnam there seems
to have been an expectation that 'Ly Thuy' would soon declare an armed revolt. By
the end of March 1926 political protest in Vietnam had reached a level not seen since
the tax revolts of 1908. The death on 23 March of the reformist leader Phan Chu
Trinh, once Ho Chi Minh's mentor, was the occasion for mass funeral observances all
over Vietnam. Student leaders who helped organize the funeral marches and
mourning ceremonies were expelled from schools in all three parts of the country -
for many this was the break with the French colonial establishment which eventually
pushed them into illegal organizing. The radical southern journalist and anti-French
personality Nguyen An Ninh was arrested on 24 March. Coming on the heels of the
mass protests against Phan Boi Chau's sentencing at the end of 1925, Phan Chu
Trinh's funeral and Nguyen An Ninh's arrest together created an explosive
atmosphere.
In Canton, meanwhile, the Russians and Chiang Kaishek had decided to bury
their differences by joining to organize a 'Northern Expedition' which would extend
the nationalist government's boundaries north to the Yangtze River. Certain
Vietnamese rebels clearly believed that this was the time for them to strike against
the Indo-Chinese border. The French began to get informers' reports about planned
military activities on the Sino-Vietnamese border by July 1926, just as Chiang
Kaishek's Northern Expedition got underway. On 13 July a French doctor serving as
French consul in Pakhoi transmitted to the Governor General in Hanoi the following:
A revolutionary Vietnamese named L. Soui - Lythuy alias Nguyen Ai Quoc,
now a military attache with the Canton government, who has graduated from a
military school in Moscow, is said to have received a secret promise from the Canton
government of 1,000 Russian rifles, in order to attempt a surprise attack on the
Tonkin border, in the region of Moncay. This Vietnamese is said to have also sent
emissaries into the Ten-thousand Mountains (the region of Na-Luong), where they
are to sign up any pirate with a gun.100
Tam Kam Say, who had led a military uprising in 1918, was reported by
another French informer, 'Konstantin', to be eager to attack the northern Vietnamese
town of Hongay. Konstantin at the same time passed on the information that Paul
Monin, a French lawyer active in anticolonial politics in Saigon, had come to Canton
to interest the Russians in supporting a revolt (other French sources place this visit
between the end of February and 30 May 1926101). The plan of attack was as follows:
three-thousand Chinese soldiers guided by 100 Annamites would sail from Pakhoi
and disembark at a Chinese port on the coast of Southern Annam. Konstantin, who
seems to have had no access to Ho's inner circle, thought that the attack had been
approved by Ho.102 But another note, apparently from Lam Duc Thu, reveals that Ho
had no faith in Monin's judgment and refused to support his scheme.103 The fact that
Monin worked with Ho's Paris colleague Phan Van Truong and was highly respected
in Saigon's nationalist opposition circles was not enough to sway Ho in his favour.
According to all the old rules of Vietnamese anticolonialism the time was ripe
for military action. These traditions of revolt seem to have encouraged the
development of a myth of Ly Thuy as a new generalissimo. But what Ho was actually
organizing seems to have been nothing more than the nucleus, still tiny, of Vietnam's
future communist party. The Sûreté came to believe that he had turned down a large
offer of aid from the Soviets in 1926, which would have been used to launch armed
attacks, because he judged that the Vietnamese rebels were not yet prepared.104 In
fact, his plan to create a communist-led independence movement was only just
getting off the ground.
The Cochinchina-Cambodia branch of the Nanyang Committee. It is possible
that some groups in Vietnam were planning violent actions against French power in
1926. (The belief that revolt was imminent also existed among leftist groups in
Indonesia in the summer of that year - but there the uprising did materialize in
November.)105 The organization beginning in 1926 of a branch of the Chinese CP
within Vietnam may be one cause of this confused picture. In February 1927 French
intelligence received a report from a source labelled 'digne defoi' which claimed that
a 'Cochinchine-Cambodge' branch of the Singapore-based Nanyang (South Seas)
Provisional Committee of the CCP was already active, and that it was beginning to
organize in Tonkin. The South Seas Branch Committee or Provisional Committee
had been formed by Chinese emigres in 1926 as part of the Chinese Communist
Party; it was believed to have members in the colonies of Great Britain, Holland and
France, as well as in Siam and Burma. 106 The French information was based on a
report supposedly presented to an Extended Plenum of the ECCI by 'Samoyan'
(probably Semaun), identified here as 'the agent for Indochina, Indonesia and the
Malay Archipelago.107 have not found corroboration of this intelligence in the files of
the Eastern Secretariat or the Seventh Extended ECCI Plenum held in November
1926, the most likely time for such a report to have been presented. (In 1930-1 there
are several references to the 'Cochinchine-Cambodge' group in the Comintern's
archives.) However, a Sûreté report summarizing Indochinese political developments
in 1926 and early 1927 shows that there were numerous ethnic Chinese workers'
unions active in southern Vietnam, with ties to Canton. 108 In the same period violent
secret societies were also being encouraged by the GMD in Saigon.109 As part of the
united front, these unions and societies probably contained a core of communists. By
mid-1927 ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam were helping to send new Vietnamese
recruits to Thanh Nien training courses in Canton, albeit under cover of the GMD.110
Semaun claimed that the Chinese party was active in the five districts of
Indochina under French control (presumably the five territories in the Indochinese
Union) and that the communist party of Cochinchina 'constitutes the most active
organization, leading an energetic effort among the indigenous masses'. A diagram
attached to this report showed sections within Cochinchina located in Saigon,
Cholon, Tra Vinh, Sa Dec, Ca Mau and Thu Dau Mot. In Cambodia sections are
listed in Kompong Cham, Kratie and Kampot, with a divisional committee of fifty
members in Phnom Penh. A conference of representatives from Haiphong, Hanoi and
Lao-kay was due to be held in February 1927 in Haiphong. These representatives
seem to be ethnic Chinese, for example a 'Mong Vinh Hoi', referred to as one of the
most active revolutionaries in the North [of Vietnam]. Semaun also mentioned an
indigenous revolutionary organization founded by natives of Vinh-na Tinh (sic) in
May 1926, but said that it had not yet taken a definitive form. This appears to be a
reference to the early recruiting efforts of Thanh Nien, or the Cach Mang Dang
(Revolutionary Party), discussed below. Conceivably those Vietnamese nationalists
in touch with the Cochinchina-Cambodia organization were the ones most actively
promoting armed revolt in 1926. Monin's plan may have been drawn up in
conjunction with elements of this group - Chinese in Tra Vinh were known to have
contributed generously to his journalistic efforts. 111 There was also a group in Bac
Ninh province, referred to by Tran Huy Lieu as the Vietnam Dan Quoc (Republican)
faction, which was planning an uprising in late 1926 (their plans were given away
when some of their homemade bombs exploded prematurely) 112. At the end of 1927
they would become one of the constituent groups of the Vietnamese Quoc Dan
Dang.113
The second and third Thanh Nien training courses. The extent, if any, to
which Ho Chi Minh and Thanh Nien were connected to Chinese GMD/CP activity
within Vietnam is impossible to determine. However, both Comintern records and
French sources give the impression that Ho was determined to avoid engaging in
premature military adventures. After a gap of almost a year in his reports to the
Eastern Secretariat, Ho wrote to the Comintern on 3 June 1926 that his work was
moving slowly because of his lack of funds.114 He was making do with his own
salary, that of one of his comrades and some grants from the Russians. Another
source of money for Thanh Nien may have been the funds which the Krestintern
advanced via Borodin for Ho's work in the peasant movement. This money may at
least have supported those trainees who attended the PMTI.115 By this point Ho may
have also been receiving contributions from wealthy patriots in southern Vietnam. A
Sûreté note of 12 August 1927 stated that Diep Van Ky, a Saigon publisher and
former pupil of Ho Chi Minh's father, frequently sent money to a Chinese
intermediary in Canton, whenever Ho Chi Minh sent him a request for funds. 116 As
early as 1925 Lam Duc Thu had reported that Ho was considering approaching his
old Paris companion Khanh Ky, now a photographer in Saigon, for money. Ho had
also mentioned Bui Quang Chieu, the wealthy leader of the Constitutionalist Party, as
a potential contributor.117 If a southern funding channel was already in operation in
1926, Ho clearly considered it unwise to reveal as much to the Russians.
Ho claimed in this June 1926 report that since his arrival in Canton he had
done the following for the Indochinese movement: (1) organized a secret group; (2)
organized a peasant union among Vietnamese residing in Siam; (3) selected a group
of seven 'pioneers' from among the children of peasants and workers (several of these
came from Siam), who were being educated in Canton; (4) organized a group of
revolutionary women with twelve members; and (5) organized a propaganda school,
for students brought clandestinely to Canton from Vietnam and Siam. At this point
the history of the Thanh Nien group which we have from various Vietnamese
memoirs intersects with what we learn from Ho's reports. 118 Ho sent this report as he
was preparing for the second group of students to arrive in Canton, for the training
course which eventually began in September 1926. The first course, Ho reported, had
involved ten students; he was expecting around thirty to arrive for the second. The
participants in this second Thanh Nien training course left their homes for Canton in
July and August of 1926. At least three of those recruited came from a political
society formed in Vinh by veterans of the 1907-1908 movement who had been
imprisoned on Poulo Condor. At its founding in 1925 the group took the name Phuc
Quoc, 'Restoration Society', in imitation of Phan Boi Chau's organization, the Quang
Phuc Hoi. Renamed the Vietnam Cach-Mang Dang (the Vietnam Revolutionary
Party) in 1926, it would become known as the Tan Viet (the New Vietnam Party) in
1928. This group, based in Ho's native region, formed mainly of Chinese-educated
literati and young school teachers, would provide some of the communist party's
most important leaders in its early years. The first official leader of the communist
party formed in 1930 would be Tran Phu, a schoolteacher who was among the Phuc
Quoc's earliest members. Another early recruit, Ha Huy Tap, a young teacher from
Ha Tinh, would be the de facto party leader between 1935 and March 1938. Why the
Phuc Quoc members were chosen for Thanh Nien's inner circle is an intriguing
question. A combination of their trusted family connections, mixed Chinese and
French education, and alienation from the colonial establishment made them the sort
of recruits whom Ho seems to have most valued. Tran Phu, for example, came from a
family which had suffered under French rule. He was the son of a mandarin who,
while serving in Quang Ngai province in 1908, had committed suicide rather than
force the local peasants to take part in a French military sweep against the tax
protests.119 The Phuc Quoc's younger members, disaffected youth from Vietnam's
poorest region, were clearly themselves receptive to the theories of revolution which
Ho was expounding. There is little doubt that the preponderance of early Thanh Nien
recruits from north-central Vietnam, including most of the Canton-based central
committee, must have made the group appear to be something of a regional club.
The band of recruits was led to Canton by Le Duy Diem, a former schoolmate
of Tran Phu who came from Ha Tinh. He had been selected in the second half of
1925 by the Phuc Quoc party to make contact with the Vietnamese in Canton and
discuss joint action. By the time he returned to Vinh he had been converted to the
Thanh Nien philosophy.120 The same thing would happen to most of the Phuc
Quoc/Revolutionary Party members who made the voyage to Canton: from the
second training course, Tran Phu and his pupil Nguyen Ngoc Ba would return to
Vietnam after three months as Thanh Nien members. (Le Hong Son places Nguyen
Ngoc Ba in the first course, as we have seen; he may have participated in both.) In an
account of the journey told by Phan Trong Quang, other men from central Vietnam
joined the convoy, including Nguyen Van Loi, Le Manh Trinh, Tran Van Dac,
Nguyen Van Khang, and himself. Two of the Phuc Quoc members, Ton Quang Phiet
and Hoang Van Tung, never made it to Canton, as they were arrested when they fell
behind the others at the northern border. It was not until September, after travelling
by train, on foot and by ship with weeks of waiting in between each leg of the
journey, that the group made it to the Thanh Nien headquarters in Canton. There they
found more students from Tonkin and a group from Siam. Around twenty trainees in
all were in Canton, including the future prime minister Pham Van Dong, who fell ill
and had to join the following course.121
The basic training lectures on topics ranging from human evolution, world
geography and Vietnamese history to Marxism-Leninism, Sun Yatsen's Three
Peoples' Principles and Gandhian non-violence were delivered by Ho Chi Minh.
Outside lecturers were invited to talk to the trainees from time to time, among whom
Phan Trong Quang remembers Zhou Enlai, Peng Pai and He Xiangning, widow of the
assassinated Liao Zhongkai. Borodin and a Russian woman also came to speak,
Quang claimed. Much of the time was spent in political discussion or practicing
public speaking. At the close of the second training course sometime in November,
Phan Trong Quang reports that five of the group were secretly chosen for
membership in the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cong San Doan, the Vietnamese
Communist Youth group. These five were Tran Phu, Nguyen Van Loi, Nguyen Ngoc
Ba, Phan Trong Binh and Phan Trong Quang himself, all of whom were from
Annam.
The third training course started in late 1926 and ended after the Chinese New
Year or Tet holiday in 1927. Hoang Van Hoan, another recruit from Nghe An who
would become prominent in the communist party, writes in his memoirs that there
were again around twenty students, some of whom had just taken part in a student
strike in Nam Dinh.122 Among the northern group were probably Do Ngoc Du, Duong
Hac Dinh, and Nguyen Huu Can, who would all become leaders of the Tonkin Thanh
Nien group.123 (Hoan does not mention the students from the Lycee du Protectorat in
Hanoi, what was known as the Buoi School, but Do Ngoc Du and a number of later
Thanh Nien trainees had been expelled from this school in 1926) 124. Among the
lecturers Hoan lists Peng Pai and Liu Shaoqi, who spoke on the workers movement.
Usually Ho Tung Mau, Le Hong Son or Lam Duc Thu interpreted for the Chinese
speakers, but Ho Chi Minh was able to fill in competently if the others were absent,
Hoan says.125 He also recalls role-playing in improvised dramas. Ho, known to the
trainees as 'Vuong', usually played a worker or peasant. 126 Hoan does not mention
how many of this group were inducted into the inner communist group, but if the
figure was as low as in the previous training course, the number of communists in the
Thanh Nien Association must still have been quite small. Huynh Kim Khanh gives a
figure of twenty-four members of the Communist Youth group in May 1929, but this
figure appears to refer to those members then living in China.127
 The total number of Vietnamese who would eventually pass through the
Thanh Nien school is difficult to assess. I have seen concrete references to only three
formal intakes of trainees; a fourth group of trainees was assembling in Canton in
March 1927, but their training was disrupted by the April coup. 128 Ho himself
reported to the Comintern on his return to Moscow in June 1927 that seventy-five
young Vietnamese had been trained at his 'propaganda school' in Canton. 129 A
Vietnamese memoir published in 1992, however, claims that there were ten classes
with 250-300 students altogether.130 A 1990 article by the same author, citing a
document from the Guangdong Institute of History, says that altogether more than
300 Vietnamese participated in various revolutionary activities in Guangdong from
1924 to 1927.131 This would include those who did not join the communist party. The
higher number may also include students from formal training classes in the second
part of 1927 and in 1928, after Ho's departure. Moreover, it may reflect the fact that
there were different levels and lengths of training provided. We do not know, for
example, whether there were separate sessions held for the women and 'pioneers'
whom Ho recruited, or for the less educated workers such as Nguyen Luong Bang.
Hanoi historians have, in fact, become more cautious recently about advancing final
numbers for Thanh Nien trainees. They cannot account for Ho Chi Minh's number of
seventy-five trainees by April 1927, even by including the names of recruits who are
known to have attended courses later in 1927.132
The largest group of expatriates was apparently that enrolled at Whampoa,
where by early 1927 there were fifty-three Vietnamese. 133 (It was at that point that a
Vietnamese-language section was started at the academy - before 1927 Vietnamese
seem to have enrolled as Chinese.134) But we do not know how many of these also
received the full Thanh Nien training course. As Lam Duc Thu had pointed out,
'Nguyen Ai Quoc only initiates recruits with extreme prudence and gives full
instruction only to those who are known to be devoted to the revolutionary cause.' 135
It appears that during Ho's time in Canton the northern Vietnamese who passed
through his training courses were less likely to become members of the communist
group than those from Annam, perhaps because the former had been recruited by
Nguyen Hai Than or Lam Duc Thu.
The Thanh Nien course material, some of which was printed in 1927 as
Duong Kach Menh, (The Path to Revolution), was most likely collected by Ho during
his stay in Russia, and may have been similar to the political lectures offered by the
communist political commissars at Whampoa Academy before their removal in
March 1926. This pamphlet became a Bible for the young communist recruits of
1926 and 1927, Ha Huy Tap would write in 1932. 'We learned it almost by heart,' he
said.136 It contained explanations of the different types of revolutions, the different
internationals, of unions, peasant unions and cooperatives. It was deeply imbued with
the concept of a two-stage revolution, as outlined by Lenin's Theses on National and
Colonial Questions. These two stages the pamphlet defined as the national revolution
and the world revolution. While the national revolution would make no distinction
between classes, the world revolution would be led by the peasants and workers and
bring to an end the world capitalist system. 137 By 1932, however, this concept of a
two-stage revolution had been disavowed by the Comintern and Ha Huy Tap would
write deprecatingly of the confusion and naivete of the Thanh Nien programme. In
particular he would criticize the theory that 'during the period of anti-imperialist
struggle, one must unite all the classes'. 'Such a theory signifies nothing more and
nothing less than class collaboration...' he would say.138
By February 1927 Ho Chi Minh's recruiting and training was at last gathering
momentum. His success in converting the members of the Tam Tam Xa was being
duplicated in his relations with the Phuc Quoc/Cach Mang Dang. The next step was
to put Thanh Nien on an official footing, that is to get recognition from the
Comintern, to draw up a programme and find reliable funding. The arrival of a
Comintern delegation in Canton in February 1927 gave Ho the opening he needed.
Jacques Doriot, a communist youth activist with whom Ho had attended the Fifth
Congress in Moscow, was in the delegation together with Tom Mann from Britain
and the American Earl Browder. Doriot had also become the president of the
Colonial Section of the French Communist Party, as well as a deputy in the National
Assembly. In his capacity as propagandist and translator, Ho was able to accompany
the group around Canton and gain Donot's support for his work in Vietnam. 139
Doriot's role was certainly connected to the Comintern's decision in March 1926 to
create a new secretariat for France, the French colonies, Belgium, Italy and
Switzerland. At that time the major responsibility for developing an Indochinese
communist movement was formally handed to the French CP.140 On 3 March 1927
Doriot, Ho (who signed himself Lee) and Volm representing the Russian advisory
group, drew up a memorandum agreeing that 'Lee' would prepare a budget request for
the Comintern, while Doriot would write a manifesto to the Vietnamese
Revolutionary Youth along with a resolution outlining their future tasks.141
 Doriot reported in an explanatory letter to the Eastern Secretariat that the
Thanh Nien organization had already established core groups all over Vietnam: one
in Cochinchina, two in Annam, six in Tonkin and four in Siam. 'Certainly, they still
have numerous weaknesses,' he wrote: 'first, the lack of a programme; second, a very
marked tendency to conspiracy and sectarianism. Their activity resembles that of a
secret society, rather than that of a mass revolutionary organization. For example, the
organization is constituted almost entirely of comrades who have been to Canton.
That is to say that their links with the masses are still weak. Nevertheless,' he
continued, 'some links have been established and attempts at organizing larger groups
have been made among students, merchants and peasants.' 142 Doriot explained that his
resolution on party work raised several points: (1) the need to transform the work of
sects into mass work; (2) to open the organization to a larger number of Vietnamese
who actually lived in Vietnam; (3) to become more involved in the political life of
Vietnam; and (4) to create workers' unions, peasant unions and student associations
and organizations for the other strata of the population.143
Doriot's manifesto - a letter addressed to the 'Indochinese Revolutionary
Youth' - makes clear that he viewed Thanh Nien as a nationalist organization, with
overt goals similar to those of the Chinese GMD: 'The Indochinese people - as your
organization has proclaimed - can only follow one path if they truly want to change
their situation: that of the struggle for independence.' 144 He emphasized that the
workers and peasants were the essential forces of the struggle. But he added a strong
endorsement for a united front: 'Do not forget that under imperialist domination, all
of the people (workers, peasants, merchants and intellectuals), with the exception of a
tiny minority of profiteers, have an interest in fighting imperialism. Don't neglect any
effort to attract them and organize them every day for the struggle. Do not refuse
their cooperation.'145 Nowhere in his tract did he mention communism, although he
did cite the example of the Russian revolution as a model of anti-imperialism, which
had liberated the oppressed peoples of the Tsarist empire. 146 The Comintern's desire
to mold Thanh Nien as a nationalist organization is underlined by a report from Lam
Duc Thu on 17 March 1927: 'Recently the Chinese and French revolutionaries have
begun encouraging "les amis" to create a party similar to the Chinese nationalist
party, with a programme, policy and worldwide propaganda service and information
agency. The statutes of this party will soon be completed.'147
Ho submitted a one-year budget to the Comintern which totalled $40,000
Chinese. Of this figure, half would go to cover the cost of travel to and training in
Canton for 100 future propagandists. In addition he requested $1,500 to support ten
full-time propagandists for one year. Publications, communications, setting up small
shops as fronts for liaison posts and other organizational tasks would absorb another
$8,500. The travel costs of another 100 men who would come to study at Whampoa
would amount to $5,000. As Ho explained in an attached note, Whampoa had
pledged to train these 100 Vietnamese if their travel costs were covered. 148 The final
$5,000 for 'unforeseen expenses' was to be set aside for illness or other emergencies.
By March 1927, with Doriot's support and two new groups of trainees
returning to Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh's organization appeared ready for sustained
growth. In central Vietnam negotiations were underway for a formal union with the
Phuc Quoc party, since mid-1926 renamed Cach Mang Dang. The two main sources
on the negotiations for unity disagree, however, on how eagerly this goal was
pursued. Ha Huy Tap, writing around 1932 in Moscow, claimed that Le Duy Diem
returned to Vietnam in March 1927 with a mandate from Canton to lay the
groundwork for unification. Diem attended local meetings of both parties in north and
central Vietnam, which were followed by a national unification conference in Hue
that July. For the first time, Tap writes, both parties received a written programme
and statutes, which included regulations for workers' and peasant unions, student
unions and other associations.149 This progression of events would have been a logical
consequence of Doriot's visit to Canton. But all did not go as smoothly as Ho might
have hoped. According to Ha Huy Tap, the two parties had decided to accept the
designation Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, The Comrades
Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, still known simply as Thanh Nien
or by its Vietnamese initials, VNTNCMDCH. The two organizations would carry out
a merger from top to bottom, combining all cells under a provisional central
committee. Provisional regional committees were formed in the north and centre, and
all that remained was to form a regional committee for Cochinchina. But the Thanh
Nien members from the south, who had been unable to attend the Hue conference,
balked at accepting the decisions of the July meeting.
By this stage, sometime after July 1927, Ha Huy Tap claims that the southern
Thanh Nien membership had become the largest in the country. This was a rapid
change from the situation in early 1927, when Doriot had reported only one Thanh
Nien group established in Cochinchina, and must have reflected an intense effort to
make the association into a mass party. Tap himself claims that he moved to Saigon
to engage in political work in March 1927, after being removed from his teaching
post in Vinh, where he had been organizing evening classes for workers.150 A group
often expatriates from Cochinchina or Annam, mainly workers, had arrived in Canton
in May or early June 1927, Lam Duc Thu claimed. 151 This group perhaps included
labour organizer Ton Duc Thang, the future President of North Vietnam, who
returned to Cochinchina from Canton in the second part of the year. 152 As we have
seen, a group of nine southern emigres sponsored by the GMD arrived in Canton in
July. Thanh Nien growth in the south may have been facilitated by the Cochinchina-
Cambodia organization attached to the CCP. Vietnamese sources claim that Ton Duc
Thang had been organizing Saigon workers since 1925, so it is quite possible that he
had been in contact with this urban-based Chinese committee.153
There is other evidence which points to the fact that Thanh Nien was making
an effort to develop roots in southern Vietnam in 1927. Ha Huy Giap, brother of Ha
Huy Tap, relates in his memoirs that he had moved to Saigon in 1926 to look for a
way to leave for France. But in early 1927 Nguyen Van Loi and Phan Trong Binh,
two of the Communist Youth Group members from the second training course,
arrived in Saigon and convinced him to stay on there, as a Thanh Nien activist. The
two Canton trainees remained in the south as teachers. 154 Giap also reveals what is a
potentially important link between the southern and central activists: he claims that
Nguyen An Ninh was imprisoned in Saigon in 1926 with Tu Kien, one of the Poulo
Condore prisoners who was part of the original conspiracy to form the Phuc Quoc
party in 1918. Both shared the ideas of Ho Chi Minh, Giap says. Nguyen An Ninh is
said by Giap to have passed on his 'undertakings' to Tu Kien, who was released from
prison first. Tu Kien then returned to Vinh, where he was formally initiated into the
Cach Mang Dang by Le Huan, his former prison mate from Poulo Condore. After
that he returned to the south, ostensibly to build up the membership of the
Revolutionary Party, but possibly also to work for Thanh Nien. 155 A Sûreté note of
May 1928 would refer to Tu Kien (Nguyen Dinh Kien) as the liaison between the
Vietnamese in Canton and Saigon.156 When he was again arrested in 1929, the French
found pictures of Marx and Lenin in his house.
Other party mergers may have been inititated since March, on Doriot's advice
to enlarge the Thanh Nien membership - it could be, for example, that some members
of the 'Youth Party' (also known as Jeune Annam) founded in Saigon in March 1926,
had become affiliated with Thanh Nien. (The closeness to the Thanh Nien name is
apparently coincidental.) In mid-1926 Ho Chi Minh had made a glowing report to the
Comintern on the Jeune Annam group, which was close to Phan Van Truong and
Nguyen An Ninh, both of whom had worked in Paris within the Intercolonial
Union.157 Their possible links to Thanh Nien, perhaps via the French CP, also need to
be investigated. On the whole, very little is known about the nature of the contacts
between Canton and the southern revolutionaries at this stage. But certainly by mid-
1927 activists from Central Vietnam had begun to build formal organizational ties to
augment whatever personal networks were already in existence.
The July 1927 attempt to merge with Thanh Nien left the Cach Mang Dang in
some confusion: until July 1928 it would retain the name Thanh Nien, Ha Huy Tap
claims, along with the association's statutes and methods of organization. 158 In his
view the two parties had no disagreements of principle, but suffered from personal
rivalries when it came to questions of organization.
A more complicated view of the relationship between the two parties is
presented in the memoir of the Revolutionary Party member Hoang Duc Thi,
published by the Sûreté in 1933. He admits that in 1927 his party adopted the
organization in cells which Thanh Nien had instituted, and that they pretended that
the two parties had united, under the leadership of Thanh Nien's central committee in
Canton.159 He explains this Byzantine behaviour as an attempt to win back the
allegiance of the students returning from China. But reading between the lines, one
senses that he is playing down a potentially dangerous episode in his political past.
By 1933 his old associate Tran Phu had died in police custody in Saigon, and Ha Huy
Tap himself, an important Revolutionary Party member in 1927, was on the point of
returning from Moscow to become a major force in the leadership of the Indochinese
Communist Party. While Hoang Duc Thi may never have fully approved the
closeness between the two parties, there is little doubt that it existed. Thi's version of
the breakdown of negotiations places the blame on the Thanh Nien members who
refused to merge their regional committees in the centre and north. 160 Both he and Ha
Huy Tap agree that Vuong Thuc Oanh played a negative role in these merger
attempts.
The situation was probably complicated by Ho Chi Minh's fondness for the
tactic of taking over movements from the inside. Ha Huy Tap describes what he calls
'some typical examples' of collaboration between the two parties: 'The comrade H. of
Thanh Nien was also the second secretary of the Revolutionary Party's central
committee; comrade Nguyen Si Sach, a liaison agent of the Revolutionary Party's
central committee, was a member of Thanh Nien's regional committee for Annam'. 161
Tap does not say whether he played a dual role, although he makes it clear that he
considered himself a communist (he also shared a house with 'certain members of the
Thanh Nien Regional Committee for Cochinchina'). Hoang Duc Thi's memoir
confirms that even Thanh Nien trainees who had no previous association with the
Revolutionary Party 'offered their services' to the Revolutionary Party on their return
from Canton.162 One can assume that they did so on the instruction of the Thanh Nien
leadership in China.

The collapse of the United Front

The organizational progress which the Doriot visit represented for Thanh
Nien had already been undermined by the time the merger negotiations with the
Revolutionary Party fell apart. Just as Ho Chi Minh's party-building and lobbying for
Comintern support began to pay off, the united front in Canton was brought to an
abrupt close. Chiang Kaishek's Shanghai coup on 12 April 1927 destroyed the left-
wing workers movement there and pushed the CCP underground. Similar moves in
other cities of republican China followed - mass arrests and executions of trade
unionists began in Canton around 14 April. By then Ho Chi Minh had either fled
north or taken refuge in the Russian consulate. He explained to the Comintern after
arriving in Moscow that the one Russian remaining in Canton, 'could not give us any
aid or advice, or even continue to pay me as a translator, as all work had become
impossible...I had no choice but to allow myself to be arrested or to continue my
work in Siam after returning to Moscow.' 163 Agent Konstantin reported that Ho and
other Vietnamese communists had been informed on by members of the rival
patriotic group in Canton, led by Tam Kam Xay (Dam Giam Tay). 164 This group, with
which Nguyen Hai Than was beginning to align himself, was positioning itself as the
purely nationalist revolutionary organization in Canton. Two of Ly Thuy's comrades
had been arrested, along with four or five Vietnamese who had just arrived from
Tonkin, Konstantin said. The intrepid Lam Duc Thu had had to allow himself to be
imprisoned along with Ho Tung Mau in order to preserve his cover. He wrote to his
Sûreté contact on 13 May 1927 that he had been in prison since 15 April. 'The
presence of Ho Tung Mau is a considerable obstacle to the writing and transmission
of my letters,' he explained. 'Do you realize, Sir, how I am feeling? If at this moment
I am still sparing no effort, it is because I have always had the most complete
confidence in you.' By mid-June they had been freed, however, and Lam Duc Thu
was once again engaged in reporting on the revolutionaries.165
Relations between Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Hai Than had been deteriorating
as tensions grew within the united front. Nguyen Hai Than was drawing closer to the
rival collection of Vietnamese rebels, who were more exclusively focused on military
activity than Ho. As Lam Duc Thu described them, Tam Kam Xay and Pham Nam
Son were 'professionals in circulating counterfeit money and in opium trafficking,
who have used Hai Than to create this party.' 166 Lam Duc Thu had reported at the end
of January that Nguyen Hai Than was discussing the organization of a new party with
Tam Kam Say and an assortment of others. 167 By March, Thu reported, Ly Thuy was
no longer consulting Hai Than.168 Lam Duc Thu also reported that Ly Thuy's highly
secretive handling of financial matters was a cause of the break-down in trust:
'Almost all the expenses of the group are paid by Ly Thuy in a very clever way: he
gives the money either to Hong Son or Tung Mau who deposit it in their names...In
this way it appears that the friends from Annam trust each other and lack confidence
in their compatriots from other parts of the Union, and it is this very distrust which
has pushed Hai Than and Pham Nam Son to create their own group.' (The money
came from the Canton government, Thu wrote, which paid it on the request of a
Russian councillor.)169
Yet the two groups continued to cooperate within the framework of Whampoa
Academy. In February 1927 Thu claimed that fifty-three Vietnamese had been
enrolled at Whampoa since the previous December. Graduates, including Le Hong
Son and Le Nhu Vong (Le Thiet Hung), had been selected to instruct the newly
enrolled Vietnamese, for whom a special Vietnamese language section was being
created.170 As it turned out, the Thanh Nien group would retain a foothold in Canton
after the April coup by maintaining their links with the non-communist national
liberation movement, including the left-wing of the Chinese GMD. In the case of
some members such as Truong Van Lenh, it was a question of out-and-out infiltration
of the rival group, as Lam Duc Thu informed the Sûreté on 8 April. 171 Truong Van
Lenh managed to stay on the payroll of the Canton government, first as police
corporal, then as a police company commander, until the end of October 1927. After
that he served in the army of GMD General Zhang Fakui. 172 As for Le Hong Son, his
political fortunes were also linked in part to Zhang Fakui - he had served on Zhang's
staff in 1926, when he was based on Hainan Island.
Ho Chi Minh's whereabouts were the source of frequent rumours until at least
December 1927. He may have primed Ho Tung Mau and Le Hong Son to pass on
false reports to the emigre circle. Konstantin, for example, reported on 1 June that Ly
Thuy had been imprisoned with the other Thanh Nien members. Later he was
reported by Lam Duc Thu to have fled to Hankou, 173 and still later in the year to have
joined the troops of Ye Ting in Swatow. 174 The young Cantonese woman whom Ho
'married' in October 1926, known as Tuyet Minh, was not informed of where he had
gone.175 From Ho's own account of his movements to the Comintern, however, we
learn that he must have gone more or less directly to Shanghai after leaving Canton.
Perhaps he went via Hankou, where a meeting of the Pan Pacific Trade Union was
held in late May or early June. But he makes no mention of this. He travelled by ship
from Shanghai to Vladivostok with Jacques Doriot and arrived in Moscow sometime
in June.176 In Vladivostok he ran into Voitinsky, who tried to persuade him to return
to Shanghai to work among the French and Vietnamese troops there. But Ho seems to
have already made up his mind to request funding to carry on his political training
work from Siam. In Moscow he had only brief contact with the Vietnamese at the
University of the Toilers of the East, who had formed a communist cell of five
members. They were 'Fon-shon' (Nguyen The Rue, a northerner from the clan of
Nguyen The Truyen); 'Le-man' (Ngo Duc Tri, son of the scholar and former political
prisoner Ngo Duc Ke from Ha-Tinh); "Jia-o" (Bui Cong Trung, the young journalist
and activist from central Vietnam who first became known in Saigon as a member of
Jeune Annam); 'Min-khan' (Bui Lam, a sailor and print-shop worker from Haiphong,
who came to Moscow via his French party contacts in Paris); and 'Lequy' (Tran Phu),
who had been elected secretary of the group.177 In a brief note Ho requested the
communist cell at the university to take charge of their political education. On 25
June he also made a report to the Krestintern in Moscow on the peasant movement in
Guangdong.178 After a time in hospital to treat his tuberculosis, he would be sent to
Paris in November with a new set of instructions from the Comintern.179
The remaining members of the Borodin mission left their last Chinese refuge
in July 1927, after an effort to patch together a new united front with the left-wing of
the Guomindang in Wuhan had failed. Once all illusions of compromise with its
leader Wang Jingwei had disappeared, the CCP was left to work out a new strategy,
in order to preserve something of the gains it had made during the united front years.
After three years of serving within the Guomindang-commanded army, the Chinese
communists would within a matter of months have to create their own fighting forces.
Stalin and the Comintern finally made an abrupt policy turn in July, after the first
escapees from the April coup had returned to Moscow to report (these included a
'Freyer', who made a lengthy report to the Krestintern on the Peasant Movement, as
well as Ho Chi Minh).180 In a 14 July resolution, the ECCI declared, 'The
revolutionary role of the Wuhan government is played out; it is becoming a
counterrevolutionary force. This is the new and peculiar feature which the leaders of
the Chinese Communist Party and all the Chinese comrades must clearly and fully
take into account.' Still the communists were advised to remain in the Guomindang,
but to apply a united front 'from below' strategy: to 'intensify the work among the
proletarian masses...build up labour organizations... strengthen the trade unions...
prepare the working masses for decisive action...develop the agrarian revolution...arm
the workers and peasants...organize a competent fighting illegal party apparatus.'181
After the anti-communist carnage unleashed by the GMD in April, the CCP
leadership at last hit back. Their first attempt to wrest power from the GMD
'reactionaries' came on 1 August, when the troops commanded by generals Ye Ting
and He Long staged a revolt in Nanchang, capital of Jiangxi Province. Zhou Enlai
was the political mastermind of the Nanchang uprising. This event marks the
foundation of the People's Revolutionary Army, according to CCP historians, as it
was the beginning of the communists' independent leadership of their troops. The
revolt was crushed within three days, when General Zhang Fakui, whom the
communists had assumed was their ally, attacked the rebels with his own forces. The
peasant masses did not come to the aid of the beseiged communists, who were forced
to retreat south to Swatow in the northeast of Guangdong Province, where their
attempts to establish a new capital were once again defeated in early October. In the
meantime, the CCP Central Committee met on 7 August in Hankou to condemn the
'right capitulationism' of the party leader Chen Duxiu, who had become the scapegoat
for the failures of the united front. They declared a new policy of agrarian revolution
and armed resistance to the GMD. The new provisional leadership 'decided to make
mobilization of the peasants to stage autumn harvest uprisings the major task of the
Party'.182 The new Comintern representative, Besso Lominadze, apparently took an
active part in shaping these decisions. It was not until 19 September, however, that
the Central Committee's Politbureau resolved that it would no longer carry on the
pretense of fighting under the banner of the Left Guomindang. From then on the CCP
was fighting for soviet power under its own red banner. 183 At a November 1927
meeting of the CCP Provisional Politbureau, the communists confirmed their leftward
course, again under the influence of Lominadze. Although their numbers had dropped
precipitously since April, they resolved that the 'revolutionary situation' was still at a
high point and that the tactics of armed insurrection should continue.184
The Vietnamese communists who had joined the GMD forces must have
found themselves in difficult circumstances - they may not have had time in 1927 to
make a conscious choice to fight under the communist's flag or under the command
of the unpredictable Zhang Fakui. We know from Lam Duc Thus reports,however,
that one of the heroes of the Vietnamese party, Le Hong Son, was still linked to
Zhang Fakui as late as November 1927, as were other members of Thanh Nien. Lam
Duc Thu told the Sûreté on 13 November that there were still 'a large number of
communists' in the army of'Truong Phat Khue', including Le Quang Dat and Truong
Van Lenh. They were earning salaries of 200 and 150 piastres per month
respectively.185 In Canton, the anti-communist purge had been carried out by General
Li Jishen, who, as Ho Chi Minh reported to the Krestintern, had shown particular
vehemence against the local peasant organizations. 186 So when Zhang Fakui's army
staged a coup against General Li on 17 November, there was apparently great relief
among the Thanh Nien leadership. '...The partisans of Tung Mau are jubilant, because
the return of their comrades will permit them to find work and support easily...,' Lam
Duc Thu wrote in anticipation of the coup.187
During these months of political transition, Vietnamese continued to come to
Canton for training. They included several from Tonkin who would become the
leaders of a radical break-away faction in the Thanh Nien group in 1929: Ngo Gia
Tu, Nguyen Duc Canh, Trinh Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Hoi. 188 It is extremely difficult
to do more than guess at what political influences they would have been subjected to
after April 1927, as the political situation both within Thanh Nien and Guangdong
Province was so complex. Different processes were underway which appear to have
been contradictory. Within Thanh Nien, there was an effort at reconciliation with
their nationalist rivals, while within the CCP, there was a lurch towards insurrection.
On the one hand, the remaining members of Thanh Nien in Canton began a concerted
effort in the autumn of 1927 to reunite the estranged Nguyen Hai Than with their
group. On both 18 and 24 October, Lam Duc Thu had reported meetings between the
two groups aimed at fusing their parties. 'Yesterday, Sunday,' he wrote, 'Ngo Thanh
and Dinh Te Dan met Tung Mau, Van Lenh and Quang Dat in the public gardens.
They discussed the need to bring an end to their quarrels.' Tung Mau believed that
they had resolved their disagreements.189 It was in September of 1927 that Nguyen
Duc Canh's biography says he went to Canton to meet the Central Committee of the
Thanh Nien association, in order to coordinate the work of his movement with theirs.
A native of Thai Binh Province born in 1908, Canh had been ejected from his school
in Nam Dinh in 1926 for organizing a student strike. He was a member of the Nam
Dong Publishing Society, which in December 1927 transformed itself into the
Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang or Nationalist Party. 190 Like other students before him,
he switched his allegiance to Thanh Nien after attending a training course based on
Ho Chi Minh's programme. Trinh Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Hoi were possibly in
Canton at the same time as Nguyen Duc Canh. Ngo Gia Tu's official biography
claims that he was in Canton in mid-1927. We do not know if he observed the April
coup d'etat.
The Vietnamese trainees would also have been aware of the events taking
place in the Haifeng and Lufeng districts to the east of Canton. Some of the troops
that had withdrawn from Nanchang to Swatow had since regrouped to these districts,
the scene of the first successes of the Guangdong peasant movement. These troops
began an attack on 25 October to create a soviet. After the violence perpetrated
against them by the troops of Li Jishen, both the peasantry and the province's
communist leadership seem to have been bent on revenge. Provisional revolutionary
governments were set up in Haifeng and Lufeng which were 'fully communist and
strongly military', writes Fernando Galbiati.191 He quotes a letter from the CCP's
Guangdong Committee which advised that 'the killing of landlords should continue
until not one is left. [...] Where this does not occur the taking of Hai-Lu-feng is as
unsound as a house built on sand.'192 As Galbiati points out, the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet as
a whole was firmly under control, stage-managed by 'a small central body, whose
orders were carried out by the members of the Peasant Association'. The CCP
organizers remained highly secretive and came to be referred to within the Soviet as
'the zuzhi or 'the organization'.193
The existence of the peasant soviet at Hai-Lu-feng was encouragement to the
CCP leadership to stage a revolt in Canton itself. The immediate trigger, however,
was the competition between Zhang Fakui and General Li Jishen, for on 26
November the Canton communists decided that the warlords' conflict created a good
opportunity to organize an insurrection. The date was set for 13 December. The
German communist, Heinz Neumann, the new conduit for Stalin's instructions in
Canton, is believed to have made the final decision to stage the insurrection, perhaps
under pressure from Stalin to deliver a success in China to coincide with the Fifteenth
Congress of the Soviet CP. The three-day insurrection, which was crushed by the
newly united GMD generals, again resulted in harsh reprisals against the workers and
communists who took part. It became an inspirational legend for the CCP, in spite of
its poor planning and the lack of support from the working class. But how did it affect
the Vietnamese communists who were based in Canton or studying at the Whampoa
Academy?
 One official history of the Vietnamese CP claims that the members of the
Thanh Nien association joined in the fighting and that twenty-four Vietnamese were
arrested.194 Those in the cadet corps at Whampoa are in fact the Vietnamese most
likely to have taken part, for this was the only military force available to defend the
communards. One Vietnamese, Phung Chi Kien, is said to have retreated to the Hai-
Lu-feng Soviet after the insurrection failed, where he served as a unit commander of
communist troops.195 But a confession by a southern communist who knew Phung
Chi Kien in China states that after participating in the Canton uprising, he returned to
Whampoa until he was imprisoned at the start of 1929. Only after his release in the
autumn of 1929 did Kien enter the Chinese CP and join the Red Army in eastern
Guangdong (Dong Kiang) as a company commander.196 Another Whampoa cadet
who may have been arrested following the uprising was Tran Van Cung (Quoc Hoa),
who in 1929 led the break-away faction of Thanh Nien. 197 A Hanoi source claims that
Truong Van Lenh was one of the leaders of the commune, but that he changed his
name and uniform afterwards to blend into the nationalist troops. 198 It is equally
possible that he was with Zhang Fakui's army outside of Canton. Unfortunately, Lam
Duc Thu's reports are silent on how this drama unfolded. But in May 1928 he
reported that twenty-four Vietnamese were still teaching or studying at Whampoa.
Among them were Le Duy Nghia (Le Duy Diem) and Manh van Lieu (one of Phung
Chi Kien's pseudonyms). Those Thanh Nien members who had been arrested during
the uprising were released on 13 May, most of them in bad health. 199 One history of
the commune claims that the Vietnamese cadet Do Huy Liem was killed in the
fighting;200 yet he remained at Whampoa until the end of 1928 and returned to work
for Thanh Nien and then the ICP in Tonkin until his arrest in 1930. 201 Still, for the
new recruits and trainees who were in Canton, the commune and the Hai-Lu-feng
Soviet may have been radicalizing experiences. At this point the CCP was on an
insurrectionary path: the formation of Soviets both in the towns and country was the
order of the day. But contrary to the standard Hanoi picture of 1928, Thanh Nien
would manage to continue some of its activities and military training in Canton until
the end of the year, when a second wave of anti-communist repression would begin.
Two currents of Vietnamese communism may have already been diverging by
the end of 1927 within the emigre group in China. One would follow the united front
strategy of the previous years, while the other would converge with the newly
militant strategy of the CCP. With no Comintern structure left in Canton at the end of
1927, there was no source of instruction or orthodoxy for the Vietnamese other than
the CCP. As Ho Chi Minh had left China, he was not forced at this point to identify
with either current. After his return to Moscow he would slip into the communist
underground and apparently remain aloof from the rivalries which would split the
Vietnamese communist movement in 1929. Although the French would continue to
receive intelligence reports of planned Vietnamese insurrections throughout 1927, it
does not seem likely that Ho had approved any such schemes. He remained the
gradualist and patient organizer, in spite of the violent end to the united front
experiment. When Grigory Voitinsky suggested to him in Vladivostok that he return
to Shanghai to work among the Vietnamese troops there, he rejected the idea. 'Should
we try to organize a few Vietnamese soldiers in Shanghai (who in any case are about
to return to their country, from what they told me), and let the work begun in
Indochina perish?' he asked in a report to Moscow. He proposed to move his work to
Siam: 'The work or rather the continuation of the work in Indochina - even though the
result may be more distant and less visible - is more important,' he wrote, 'because in
Shanghai other comrades can replace me, but not in Siam. And because the news of
the Chinese reaction, which has been spread widely by the French imperialists, is
sowing discouragement among the Vietnamese, and if we discontinue our work now,
all that we have done during the last three years will be lost, and it will be very
difficult to begin again, in view of the morale of the Vietnamese, who have already
been disappointed several times.202

4. FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW COURSE (1927-29)

Ho Chi Minh's travels

When Ho Chi Minh fled from Canton in April 1927, he travelled via
Shanghai and Vladivostok to Moscow. In Moscow, as we have seen, he sought
support for his plan to continue the work he had begun in Canton from a new base in
Siam. He spent part of that summer in a Crimean hospital being treated for
tuberculosis. That September (1927) the Comintern drew up directives for his future
work, and sent him off to Paris in November, to coordinate his plans with the
Colonial Commission of the French CP.1 Although the French party now had
responsibility for nurturing communism in Indochina, in practice FCP members
worked under strict supervision from Moscow.
In spite of the Comintern's disillusionment with the Guomindang, the
instructions which Ho Chi Minh took to Paris still reflected the tactic of the united
front with nationalist forces. The two-page directive (dated 12 September 1927)
noted that 'AK' (Ai Kvak, as the Russians spelled his name) should help to fuse 'the
national-revolutionaries among the Indochinese emigres (first in Paris and in France)
by creating a solid communist core among these elements. Then he was to establish
liaisons with Indochina in order to transfer revolutionary activity to the country itself.
In the meantime, in collaboration with the French CP, he was instructed to draw up
an action programme for the national revolutionary movement in Indochina. After
clearing this document with the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI), he was to
publicize it in Indochina and 'determine the possibility of developing intense
revolutionary work for Indochina in a neighbouring country, in Siam or another
country.'2 The Communist Party of Indochina which 'should begin to function in the
near future' would rely 'as far as possible on the national-revolutionary organisations,
as the left wing of these organisations, while retaining complete liberty of criticism.'
The basic political slogans of the revolutionary movement were defined as: '(1)
independence; (2) withdrawal of the forces of occupation; and (3) convocation of a
Constitutional Assembly and the creation of a democratic-revolutionary republic,
assuring the free distribution of all land to the peasants, broad-based legislation to
support workers' rights, and the energetic defense of the country's independence
against any attacks by the rapacious imperialists.' The final point of the 12 September
directive notes that the Comintern would pursue its efforts to establish links to
Indochina via China.3
For a variety of reasons Ho was unable to follow through on his Comintern
instructions in France, he later reported to Moscow. A French police crackdown on
communist activity in Paris coincided with a political crisis within the French CP,
probably connected to the purge of Trotskyists then underway in the Soviet Union in
anticipation of the December Fifteenth Party Congress. At the same time Jacques
Doriot, Ho's patron in the party's Colonial Commission, had been thrown in prison in
France. Ho wrote that the remaining members of the Commission avoided
substantive contacts with him. What he referred to in this report as a 'lack of
suppleness' in the Commission's work may actually have been political paralysis.
'During the month-and-a-half when I was in Paris,' he explained, 'as Comrade Doriot
was in prison, I could not find a single chance to have a serious conversation with the
other comrades. Several times I asked for serious addresses, so that I could
communicate with them when I am in the East, but the comrade in charge refused to
give them to me.'4
 Ho made no mention of his contacts with other Vietnamese in Paris, but one
wonders whether he found a way to meet Nguyen The Truyen again. Until at least
1926 Truyen was the key link between the Vietnamese leftists in Paris and the
Colonial Commission of the FCP. It was he who arranged for Vietnamese, including
several of his own relatives, to be sent to Moscow for study. 5 In early 1927, following
the collapse in 1926 of the Intercolonial Union, Truyen had started a new party in
Paris called the Annamite Independence Party (AIP).6 The formation of this
nationalist party in 1927 is normally seen as the beginning of a split between
nationalist and communist-oriented Vietnamese. But there is now some evidence that
Truyen was following a Comintern-approved policy for colonial countries, which
may actually have been strengthened during the time that Bukharin was in charge of
the ECCI. Jacques Doriot's prescription for Thanh Nien to become a mass nationalist
party is one example of this policy; Ho Chi Minh's September instructions are
another sign that colonial communist groups were expected to exist within national
revolutionary parties. Even as late as the winter of 1929, French members of the
FCP's Colonial Commission would continue to implement this policy in Algeria, by
working to form a nationalist Algerian party, L'Etoile Nord-africaine.7
The AIP was closely connected with the French branch of the Comintern-led
Anti-Imperialist League, which had held its first conference in February 1927. In a
report from the French CP's Colonial Commission to the Comintern in March 1927,
the author mentioned that the Independence Party was establishing groups in the
south of France and planning to hold congresses in the summer. 'We will take part in
the group's Paris meetings, to give them more practical support in their work,' the
report said.8 Truyen - along with two other activists from Vietnam, The Jeune Annam
journalist Trinh Hung Ngau and Duong Van Giao of the Constitutionalist Party -
undertook a French speaking tour in October, during which they subjected French
policy and institutions to vigourous criticism. The Siirete believed that these meetings
were organized with the complicity of the French CP.9 But like Ho, Truyen may have
found dealing with the FCP more difficult after Doriot's arrest. Truyen returned to
Vietnam in December. By the summer of 1928 Comintern prescriptions for action in
colonial countries would grow more confused, but it would not be until the middle of
1929 that the Comintern would explicitly revise its stand on cooperation with non-
communist nationalists in colonial countries.
From Paris Ho moved on to Brussels in December 1927 to attend a
conference, he claimed. But this was not, as is often written, the first Congress of the
Anti-Imperialist League, which had taken place the preceding February.10 Possibly he
took part in an interim meeting of the League's Executive Committee, which was held
9 December in Brussels.11From the middle of December until May 1928 he stayed in
Berlin, waiting for money and instructions from the Comintern for his return to Asia.
He received 18 marks a week from the Red Aid organization to cover his living
expenses, not enough to make ends meet, he said. 12 During his enforced wait he wrote
an account of the Canton peasant movement, which featured Peng Pai as the hero. It
was 120 pages, free from politics and statistics, concerning the peasants' way of life,
he explained. The Krestintern declined to undertake the editing necessary for
publication, but some of Ho's material may have found its way into other
publications.13 What sort of contacts he had with the Chinese community in Berlin is
unknown. But it would be surprising if he had not exchanged ideas with those
associated with the Anti-Imperialist League, which had its seat in Berlin. Sun
Yatsen's wife Song Qingling moved to Berlin in late 1927 and seems to have spent
most of 1928 there, working to establish a 'Third Party' for China. 14 In his 21 May
letter to Moscow, Ho informed his contacts that he would be communicating with
them via Comade Chutto, an Indian working in the Anti-Imperialist League. 15 So the
League would appear to have been an important contact point for him in Berlin.
The Comintern was preoccupied with far weightier questions than Ho Chi
Minh and his travel plans that winter. Léon Trotsky and 148 other members of his
Opposition were exiled from Moscow at the end of January, following the Fifteenth
Congress of the Soviet CP. For most of February the Comintern was busy with the
Ninth Plenum of its Executive Committee. Jacques Doriot, who after his release from
prison passed through Berlin on his way to the Comintern Plenum, had promised Ho
that he would take care of his 'problem'. But by mid-April Ho had still had no news
from Moscow or Doriot.16 The Krestintern had also been unhelpful. Ho had asked
them for US $500 and a 'practical organizing plan, so that I may work usefully.' 17
Dombal not only refused to provide any funds, but said that he knew too little about
the peasant situation in Indochina to provide a concrete plan of organization. He
advised that Ho use his experience of the peasant movement in China to begin the
fundamental task of forming peasant unions.18 On 12 April Ho wrote to Jules
Humbert-Droz, a Swiss communist working in the Comintern Secretariat which had
responsibility for the French colonies, saying, 'you can imagine what a moral and
material state I am in: knowing that there is a lot of work, but unable to do anything,
unoccupied, without money, living from day to day in forced inactivity, etc.' 19
Humbert-Droz was finally able to tell him (in a brief two-paragraph note dated 28
April) that the decision to provide funds for his voyage and first three months of work
had been taken: 'The amount we send in the future will depend on news from you. I
think that it would be more prudent for you to try to get along on your own, without
waiting for any sort of aid.'20
With this luke-warm send-off, Ho Chi Minh departed for Asia at the end of
May, travelling via Switzerland to Italy, and from there by ship to Bangkok. By then
he would have been aware of the crushing of the Trotskyist Opposition which Stalin
had engineered within the CPSU, as well as the varying strands of resistance to
Stalin's policy within the Comintern. One can assume that he would also have seen
the documents of the Ninth ECCI Plenum held in February 1928, which included a
set of resolutions on China. These made clear that the Russians felt it was time for the
Chinese comrades to show more caution, to take a step back after their reckless
attempts at insurrection at the close of 1927 (which of course had been undertaken
with the guidance of Comintern representatives Lominadze and Neumann.) The
present stage of the Chinese revolution was to be characterized as neither socialist,
nor 'permanent', as Lominadze had mistakenly claimed, but as still in the 'bourgeois-
democratic' phase. The CCP's basic tactical line was to 'prepare itself for a violent
surge forward of new revolutionary waves'. But the current task was still 'winning
over the worker and peasant millions, educating them politically, organizing them
around the party and its slogans.'Although an 'immediate tactical task' was defined as
'organizing and carrying through armed mass uprisings', the vanguard of the workers
and peasants should not break away from the masses and 'play with revolts'. 21 As
Vietnam's revolutionary movement was less developed than China's, Ho Chi Minh
may have interpreted these somewhat contradictory resolutions as an affirmation of
his own policy of careful political education and organizing.
It is important to keep in mind the fact that Ho may have still been
somewhere at sea when the Sixth Comintern Congress began in July 1928. He may
not have heard any detailed news of its results for many months. From all the
available evidence, it appears that he departed for Asia with nothing more recent than
his September 1927 instructions to guide his work.

The Sixth Comintern Congress

By the summer of 1928 the struggle against the Trotskyists had left both the
Comintern and the FCP in disarray. Yet another round of political bloodletting was
about to begin. In fact, by the Fifteenth Party Congress at the close of 1927, Stalin's
surrogates had already begun to criticize Bukharin for ignoring the 'right danger' in
the Comintern.22 But Stalin was not yet ready to dispense with his ally on the right. A
dual system of policy implementation was developing in Russia, with Stalin
increasingly working through his own appointees and organizations such as the
Komsomol to implement forced grain collections and similar measures. 23 The Sixth
Comintern Congress, a drawn-out affair which lasted from 17 July until 1 September,
reflected this duality. It was the beginning of a change of course for the Comintern, a
process which dragged on for an entire year, until the ECCI's Tenth Plenum in July
1929. It is usually assumed that the Programme and Theses of the Sixth Congress
marked a new era for the Vietnamese communist movement. Yet it is very difficult to
establish a direct chain of cause and effect between Moscow and events in Vietnam
until the autumn of 1929, or even precisely what the new polices for colonial
countries were.
During the summer of 1928 the leaders of the Chinese CP gathered in
Moscow, where their Sixth Party Congress was held from 18 June to 11 July, just
before the Comintern's Congress. This meeting was held under Bukharin's patronage
and approved the more moderate policies for China set out at the ECCI's Ninth
Plenum. But the dual nature of Comintern politics at this juncture was reflected in the
Congress resolutions, many of which were ambiguous or even contradictory.
Bukharin's advocacy of an anti-imperialist alliance with the petty bourgeoisie was
overlooked. The slogan 'preliminary victories in one or more provinces' became what
Zhang Guotao termed a 'panacea', a way of excusing the putchism of late 1927,
without having to claim that the Chinese revolution was experiencing a 'high tide'. 24
The Congress selected a new polit-bureau, led by the worker Xiang Zhongfa. The
other members were Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Li Lisan and
Xiang Ying. Three members of the new politburo returned to China before the
Comintern Congress. These were Xiang Zhongfa, Cai Hesen and Li Lisan, who
according to Zhang Guotao had been placed in charge of party organization. 25 The
personal influence of the CCP leaders who returned to Shanghai in July or August
1928, following their own party congress but before the Comintern gathering, may
initially have had more effect on the Vietnamese communists than the Sixth
Comintern Congress itself.
Although the Comintern's Sixth Congress is commonly seen as the decisive
event which instituted the 'new course' and 'proletarianization' as the watchwords of
world communism, it was in fact only the beginning of a techtonic shift. Bukharin,
still the General Secretary of the Comintern, dominated the proceedings and
produced the 'General Programme of the Third International'. But his position was
already being undermined by Stalin's manoeuvring within the CPSU - by December
1928 he would quit his post in the Comintern, even though he was not officially
removed until June 1929. Bukharin's position at the Congress meant, however, that
his 'rightist' allies in European parties such as Jules Humbert-Droz retained their
influence until the winter.26 In the summer of 1928 there was thus still a degree of
support within the Comintern for cooperation with the social democratic left and lack
of unanimity regarding the correct analysis of the current stage of world capitalism.
The Soviet delegation, made up mainly of Stalin's supporters, was dissatisfied with
Bukharin's 'Draft Theses', and 'amended them to emphasize the international
significance of the Soviet economic plan and the contradictions of capitalist
stabilization, and to sharpen the attack on the left social democrats.' 27 Nevertheless,
the apocalyptic tone of the description of the 'Third Period' in the development of
postwar capitalism was not as clear as it became at the ECCI's Tenth Plenum in 1929.
At the Sixth Congress, Bukharin characterized the Third Period as one of 'capitalist
stabilization', which would ultimately develop into another crisis of capitalism. 28 By
the summer of 1929, Otto Kuusinen would report to the Tenth ECCI Plenum that
'there is now full unanimity on the characterization of the Third Period as the period
of the break-up of capitalist stabilization and further - the period of the ripening of a
new revolutionary upsurge.'29 Kuusinen, a veteran Finnish communist, headed the
Colonial Commission at the Congress and was put in charge of the Eastern
Secretariat at the Congress's end. He was destined to become one of the Comintern's
new authorities on the East. But it was Bukharin's General Programme for the Third
International which provided the most concise statement of policy for colonial
countries. This programme listed eight main tasks:
(1) the overthrow of foreign imperialism, of feudalism, and of the landlord
bureaucracy;
(2) Establishment of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry on the basis of Soviets;
(3) Complete national independence and political unification;
(4) Cancellation of state debts;
(5) Nationalization of large undertakings (in industry, transport, banking, etc.)
belonging to the imperialists;
 (6) Expropriation of large landowners, of church and monastery estates,
nationalization of all land;
(7) Introduction of the eight-hour day; and
(8) Establishment of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' army.30
Within the Congress's Colonial Commission, Kuusinen's attempts to elaborate
a more detailed Comintern policy for the 'colonial and semi-colonial countries' faced
considerable opposition. Delegates were confused by his attempted division of
colonial countries into four categories and the lack of clarity regarding tactics for the
more backward countries.31 (These classifications were abandoned in the final text of
the theses.) In his concluding speech on 21 August, Kuusinen admitted that the
section of his Theses concerning 'non-capitalist development of the backward
colonial countries' lacked theoretical proof. (It had lacked proof in Lenin's 1920
Theses as well, he said.) He requested that this point, which refers to the 'separate
path' to communism, receive special attention from the drafting commission, which
had yet to begin work.32 In later remarks on the drafting commission's work, he
mentioned that the section of the Theses on tactical questions now applied only to
one group of colonial countries: China, India, Egypt and Indonesia - 'certainly the
most important colonial countries', as he put it.33
The Theses on the Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries had not been printed
in Inprecor by the end of 1928, in contrast to the other Congress resolutions and
theses; they were eventually printed as a 96-page booklet in Russian dated 1928, but
precisely when that appeared is unclear.34 In their final form the theses upheld the
analysis of capitalism as a spent force, with no future developmental role, even in
colonial countries. A brief dissenting view from the British delegation to the Colonial
Commission was printed on 27 December 1928. 35 The Italian Angelo Tasca (Serra)
who briefly headed the Romance (languages) Secretariat after the Sixth Congress,
was also unhappy. He wrote to Kuusinen in January 1929 to complain about the
Theses. 'They are neither purely political theses, nor a work programme, they are
insufficient in either case. I don't know to what extent the FCP took part in their
elaboration...'36 In July Tasca would be removed from the Comintern leadership.
Jacques Doriot, the promoter of the united front in Vietnam, would have to make a
full recantation of his views on cooperation with social democrats in order to retain
his positions in the French CP.37 This difficulty in achieving consensus on the correct
strategy for colonial countries was symptomatic of the general malaise in the
Comintern bureaucracy in the latter part of 1928. It was in November that Spanish
communist Andres Nin wrote a revealing note to Trotsky. 'Here in the Comintern
there is complete disarray. Nothing at all is done. Everybody is awaiting the outcome
of the fight between Stalin and the right. Demoralization is complete,' he
complained.38
The three-man Vietnamese delegation which attended the Sixth Congress was
selected by the FCP from among the activists in Paris. One of the three was Nguyen
The Vinh, from the family of Nguyen The Truyen. He had studied in Moscow from
September 1926 until November 1927, but left after a year due to ill health. 39 Another
was a Tonkinese sailor identified only as 'Ban' who left the party not long after the
Congress.40 The third was Nguyen Van Tao, a southern Vietnamese who had become
a member of the FCP and formed a Vietnamese communist group in Paris in April
1928.41 He delivered a speech to the Colonial Commission on 17 August using the
pseudonym 'An'.42 His analysis of French colonialism was close to Kuusinen's view
of colonial development in India: Vietnamese small-scale industry was being
destroyed by competition from companies in the hands of the national bourgeoisie
and imperialists; the artisans were joining the growing proletariat; agricultural
productivity was stagnant. His report made no mention of the training of Vietnamese
activists which had been taking place in Canton, nor of the beginnings of Thanh
Nien. For this reason it appears unlikely that Ho Chi Minh had prepared the speech
which Tao delivered, as the Sûreté later believed. 43 There was a group of relatively
experienced Vietnamese in Russia by mid-1928, including Tran Phu, Ngo Duc Tri
and Le Hong Phong, who seem to have attended the Congress as observers. Why they
were not made part of the official delegation is unclear. Two of the delegates from
Paris, however, seem to have ended up as personae non gratae. A subsequent letter
from a disgruntled, Paris-based Vietnamese activist, written in 1930 to the Eastern
Secretariat, mentions that after one of the Vietnamese Congress delegates had
criticized the work of the FCP's Colonial Commission, two of them (presumably
Nguyen The Vinh and Ban) were given their tickets back to France the following
day.44 In September 1928 a Comintern reorganization once again shifted
responsibility for Indochina back to the Middle-eastern Section, a division of the
Eastern Secretariat which also covered India and Indonesia. 45 Thus, although the FCP
and its Colonial Commission continued to be called on to support the Vietnamese
movement, in theory the primary source of ideological guidance was now the Eastern
Secretariat, which Kuusinen headed.
 At the Tenth ECCI Plenum Kuusinen was able to make a more categorical
statement on tactics in his comments on the opening day, 3 July 1929. Stalin, having
emerged supreme in the factional warfare in the CPSU, was using the Comintern to
demonstrate his new style of leadership. In this report, later printed as The
International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern, Kuusinen called on
communist parties to become, 'chemically pure', to prepare for 'the decisive battles
for power'.46 'Without cleansing themselves from opportunistic elements and
overcoming their conciliatory relationship to them, the communist parties cannot
successfully move forward to resolve their new problems, arising from the
sharpening of the class struggle in the new stage of the workers' movement,' he
declared.47 Members of any party who refused to submit to Comintern decisions
would be expelled.48 Now there was to be no more equivocating about united front
tactics - the Indian communist M.N. Roy, who had come to believe in the need for a
united front with Indian nationalists, was denounced. 49 In a stirring conclusion,
Kuusinen announced that, 'The current course of the Communist International is a
new course, but at the same time an old one. Three-quarters of a century ago Marx
had already stated our current slogan of "class against class" in his call to the
revolutionary class struggle. This is our new course.'50
At the Tenth Plenum far less attention was paid to the fine-tuning of
instructions to colonial countries in different stages of development. The world
revolution, a purely communist movement, was seen as one massive force fighting
for the world-wide proletariat. Kuusinen was inspired to new heights of eloquence:
'Looking back on the mass battles which have taken place in the short space of time
since the Sixth World Congress, we can say: the world army of active class warriors
is growing rapidly. The miners of the Ruhr and Scotland, the textile workers of
Poland and France, the fighters on the Berlin barricades, the Bombay strikers and
demonstrators, the plantation workers of Columbia, the black rebels in the Congo, the
striking agricultural workers of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Chinese
revolutionary workers and peasant partisans, the struggling Moroccans and hundreds
of thousands of others - this is a gigantic, active army.' 51 Kuusinen's discussion of
mass struggles foreshadowed what would happen in Vietnam within the next year. 'In
the current period the point of departure of the mass struggle is [the masses']
immediate, daily interests', he said. 'We must take this into account in our tactics. But
the struggle now is not limited by these immediate, partial demands - it has a clear,
strong tendency to go beyond these...'52
In Siam
Ho Chi Minh arrived in Siam just as the Comintern was initiating its shift to
more radical class-based policies in the summer of 1928. Since he wrote no known
reports to the Comintern during the approximately sixteen months he spent in Siam,
from July 1928 until November 1929, we rely for information on this period on the
memoirs of a few communist veterans and on the Tran Dan Tien book, Ho's supposed
autobiography. So the picture of the forgotten political exile derived from his own
letters becomes that of the ascetic underground sage, walking through the forests
from village to village. Although he was somewhere between thirty-four and thirty-
six years old, in the Tran Dan Tien book he is known as 'Old Man Chin', and is
always just a few jumps ahead of the police. At one point Tien writes that Ho had to
enter a Buddhist monastery in order to avoid the French detectives on his trail. 53 This
is perfectly plausible, but is not mentioned in any of the other Vietnamese memoirs of
Ho's time in Siam.
The lack of documentary information on this period is especially frustrating,
as one suspects that Ho Chi Minh was involved in more than encouraging mutual aid
societies, playing the village elder and helping to set up village schools. Echoes of the
changes in Comintern policy were beginning to be heard in China, Vietnam and the
rest of Southeast Asia by the autumn of 1928, yet we have very little sense from the
available memoirs that these had an impact in north-eastern Thailand. Only a few
Thanh Nien cadres whom he had trained in Canton would have known his real
identity, as well as one liaison agent, Cao Hoai Nghia, a former sailor who was
probably also a member of Ho's Canton circle.54 By 1929 the rumour had spread in
Europe that he had been arrested.55 The Canton-based Thanh Nien leadership
assumed that he was still in Moscow.56 Whether his well-developed clandestine habits
were simply coming into play, or whether he had a more precise reason to keep a low
profile is unclear. One can speculate that he was waiting for the storms of the anti-
Trotskyist purges to blow over. (Although he himself could hardly have been
considered a Trotskyist, within the French CP he had contacts such as Doriot who
were suspected Trotskyist sympathizers.) He may also have feared being informed on
by one of the non-communist Vietnamese with whom he had earlier associated in
southern China; or he may have begun to suspect that Lam Duc Thu was a French
spy.
Travelling on foot from the central town of Phichit, Ho arrived in Udon, one
of the centers of the overseas Vietnamese community, in August 1928, according to
the memoirs of Hoang Van Hoan.57 From what we can glean from Hoan's and other
Vietnamese memoirs of this period, Ho Chi Minh proceeded carefully, collecting
information about local conditions, helping to organize and build a school for the
training of Vietnamese youth in a village outside of Udon. 58 Hoan informs us that
after his stay in the neighborhood of Udon, Ho moved on to Sakhon, on the
eastbound route to Laos, and then to Nakhon Phanom on the Mekong.59 A Thanh
Men cadre from Nghe An, Vo Mai, in 1931 described to his French interrogators how
he brought a group of eight students from Vinh to Lakhon (an old term for the
Nakhon Phanom region) in October 1928. He remained with them for their three
months of study, then escorted them back to Vinh in December. Vo Mai's account
does not mention Ho Chi Minh's presence in Siam, but the timing suggests that the
trip may have been connected to his presence there. Vo Mai, a courier working
closely with the Thanh Nien Ky Bo (regional committee) in Central Vietnam, would
have brought vital information about the state of affairs m-country.60
Ho's approach to rural organizing recalls the methods developed by Peng Pai
in Guangdong during the united front with the GMD. By the time Ho turned up in
Siam, these methods were already being put into practice by Thanh Nien members
such as Hoang Van Hoan, who had arrived in northeastern Siam in June 1928. The
heart of the movement was to be found in the 'progressive' schools which the activists
established in rural areas. In these schools young people could be exposed to modern
political ideas and physical education, but also had to produce some of their own food
and a surplus to pay the teachers if possible. By the time Ho reported to the
Comintern on his activities in Siam, in February 1930, he claimed that Thanh Nien
had established three training schools and was working on a fourth. 61 In the same
report, he explained that as the Vietnamese resident in Siam were 'free peasants,
handicraftmen, small merchants, they can be organized only in "Brotherhood", with
patriotic and anti-imperialist ideology.'62 He suggested that the Vietnamese activists
change the name of their local newspaper from Dong Thanh (Unity) to Thanh Ai
(Fraternity or Affection), which implies a step back towards a looser, more inclusive
form of organization.63 There does not seem to have been a landless rural proletariat
to attract his attention among the Vietnamese in Siam. By the end of 1929 this
emphasis on 'patriotic ideology' would be seen as dangerously reformist. But Ho may
not have been informed of the changing climate within the world communist
movement until the summer of 1929, when two Vietnamese delegates from Siam
returned from the first Thanh Nien Congress in Hong Kong, held in May.
 The available memoirs are lacking in details regarding Ho Chi Minh's
activities from the end of 1928 until November 1929, when he left Siam for Hong
Kong. Vo Mai did not report any more trips across Laos to Siam after December
1928. Hoang Van Hoan informs us that Ho occupied himself with the translation of
works of communist theory from Chinese into simplified Vietnamese and that they
often worked together on these translations. But he places this activity in the latter
part of 1928. In Sakhon, Ho is said to have composed a verse epic on the life of Tran
Hung Dao, a patriotic hero of the 13th century whose cult was worshipped by the
local Vietnamese. The memoirs of Dang Van Cap report that Ho studied traditional
eastern medicine for a time, to help the local villagers improve their health. 64
(Perhaps he was looking for a cure for his tuberculosis, for he later informed a
Vietnamese colleague in Hong Kong that he had been ill for more than a year in
Thailand, and had been 'unable to undertake anything'.) 65 Ho travelled briefly in Laos
in order to meet Vietnamese residents, but abandoned two attempts to cross into
Vietnam, he later reported to the Comintern, because of the heavy police presence on
the border.66 According to Le Manh Trinh, around June 1929 he moved on to
Bangkok, from where he visited a number of'old revolutionaries'.67
Some Vietnamese historians believe that Ho established contact with his
father in 1928 and 1929 via the widow of the Luong Ngoc Can, whose house in
Phnom Penh served as a communications link for Vietnamese nationalists. 68 From the
spring of 1928 until his death in November 1929, Nguyen Sinh Huy (who had taken
the name Nguyen Sinh Sac) spent most of his time in the village of Hoa An near to
Cao Lanh, in Sa Dec province. Huy was believed by the French to use his travels as
an itinerant practitioner of eastern medicine to stay in touch with various centers of
nationalist activity in the South. There appears to be no documentary evidence of
direct contacts between father and son, however, even though Huy wrote frequently
to Can's widow in the spring of 1928, in the hope that she would have some special
news for him.69 While he was working in Siam, Ho was thought to have sent two
natives of Nam Dan district in Nghe An, then living in Siam, to work in Cambodia. 70
It is tempting to believe that Ho contacted not only his father via Phnom Penh, but
also the group of Thanh Nien activists who had established a progressive school in Sa
Dec town. These included Chau Van Liem, Ha Huy Giap, and Pham Van Dong,
according to Tran Van Diep, a Canton trainee and native of Can Tho who also taught
there.71 Most of this group would become members of the communist faction loyal to
the Canton leadership and Ho Chi Minh, the Annam Cong San Dang, in the autumn
of 1929.
The progress of Thanh Nien
While Ho Chi Minh worked quietly in Siam, while the Comintern readjusted
its course in Moscow, the revolutionary movements in southern China and Vietnam
developed their own momentum. During the latter part of 1928 a group of around 24
Vietnamese was teaching and studying at Whampoa - those activists arrested in
December 1927 had been freed.72 By mid-1928 Thanh Nien Regional Committees
(Ky-bo) had been formed in all three parts of Vietnam.73 The Canton-based Central
Committee (Tong-bo) in February designated the members of the Ky-bo for the
Center: Vuong Thuc Oanh, Nguyen Thieu and Nguyen Si Sach. In June the Canton
leadership named Le Van Phat to head the southern Ky-bo, which already included
Nguyen Kim Cuong, Chau Van Liem and probably Ngo Thiem. 74 Phat was a
traditional doctor from Ben Tre who had just returned from Canton, where he had
been imprisoned following the December uprising. The northern Ky-bo, started in
July 1928, composed of Duong Hac Dinh, Trinh Dinh Cuu and perhaps Nguyen Danh
Doi,75 came under the leadership of Tran Van Cung, when he returned from Canton at
the start of 1929. There is relatively little information available in the French archives
on the activities of Thanh Nien's Canton leadership during this period, so it is
impossible to say who played the key roles in assigning members to their posts within
Vietnam.
In June 1928 a final attempt to unify the Cach Mang Dang with Thanh Nien
had failed. After that the former party held a congress in Hue, where they took the
name Tan Viet (New Vietnam) party. Several of the leaders selected at this Congress,
including Phan Dang Luu, Hai Trieu (Nguyen Khoa Van), and Nguyen Chi Dieu,
would become the leaders of the communist party in Central Vietnam during the
Democratic Front in the late thirties.76 Vo Nguyen Giap, a student at the Quoc Hoc
school in Hue, may also have been active at this Congress. The Tan Viet party, like
Thanh Nien and the VNQDD, had begun organizing among women by this time. A
student from Vinh, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, was elected the leader of their women's
group. She later claimed that in 1928 her group had 50 members, including a cell of
twenty people at the match factory in Vinh, along with one of fifteen members at the
local sawmill.77 Labour organizing in Cochinchina was also showing marked growth
in 1928.78 Ha Huy Tap reported later that a successful strike was held at the Phu My
sugarcane plantation in Ba Ria, in June and July. He himself went to work at the
plantation in September 1928. He recounts an August strike of Bien Hoa railway
workers and a strike at the Nha Be refinery as well. All these actions he attributes to
unnamed communists.79
On 28 and 29 September 1928 Thanh Nien's Tonkin Ky-bo is said to have
met near Hanoi to discuss ways to 'proletarianize' their party. According to one
Vietnamese source, this meeting, sometimes described as a congress, was held in the
home of Ngo Gia Tu in the village of Lien-son, in Tu Son district of Bac Ninh
province.80 It became known as the 'Reorganization Conference', this source claims.
The group recognized that their membership was mainly composed of students and
teachers, and so resolved in the future to make workers the base of their movement.
They decided to increase propaganda among miners and factory workers; to send
cadres to work in the mines, factories and on plantations and to use 'every legal
means to organize the masses more widely'.81 Two Thanh Nien cadres, Ngo Gia Tu
and Nguyen Duc Canh, were designated to oversee propaganda among the workers.
They were also to oversee the attempted conversion of the petty bourgeois students
and sons of scholars, the great majority of Thanh Nien members, to the working
class. Those Thanh Nien activists who could not adjust to the new demands were to
be removed from the Association. This category included any bourgeois member who
was 'spoiled', who didn't follow revolutionary technique, who was afraid of hardship
or lacking in virtue. In March 1929 the Tonkin group would pursue their move to the
left by organizing what they would claim was the first communist cell in Vietnam.
Among those who attended this meeting at 5-D Ham Long St. in Hanoi were Ngo Gia
Tu and Nguyen Duc Canh, as well as Tran Van Cung (Quoc Anh) from Nghe An,
who, as we have seen, had come to Tonkin from Canton at the start of 1929 to take
over the Ky-bo.82 This was a group which had all been in Canton after the departure
of Ho Chi Minh, during the upheavals of 1927. Tran Van Cung is thought to have
taken part in the Canton Uprising.83 Their actions from September 1928 through to
the end of 1929 show that they had lost confidence in the Thanh Nien leadership in
Canton. The obvious question is whose ideological lead they were following in this
period. Although their September 1928 meeting might be seen as a reaction to the
Sixth Comintern Congress, it would seem to be too early for them to have a real
understanding of the Congress programme, especially as there was still no consensus
as to how this programme should be applied in colonial countries.
News of the 1928 events in Moscow - the Comintern's Ninth ECCI Plenum
and the Sixth Congresses of both the CCP and the Comintern in the summer - may
have been filtering back to Asia by the autumn. Informal reports from the Vietnamese
in Moscow and Nguyen Van Tao in Paris could have alerted the Thanh Nien
membership to the changes underway. But it is unlikely that any Comintern directives
aimed specifically at Indochina reached the Vietnamese before the spring, and more
likely the autumn, of 1929. By that time Kuusinen's Theses on the Colonial and
Semi-Colonial Countries must have been printed, at least in Russian, and Bukharin's
'General Programme' could have become known via Inprecor and other communist
publications. One must remember, though, that even the initial discussion of
Kuusinen's Theses was not printed in Inprecor until 4 October 1928; 'An's' speech on
Vietnam did not appear until 25 October. The French party did not begin to
implement the 'New Course' until its own Sixth Congress, held in April 1929. In a 21
April 1929 L'Humanite article, Maurice Thorez wrote that the party was entering 'a
decisive phase of correction' and a major struggle against 'opportunism'.

The evolution of the Chinese Left

From the Comintern's archives on China one can see that throughout 1928 the
Chinese Politburo tended to take a more militant line than the Comintern on the state
of the Chinese revolution. For example, a May 1928 statement of the Chinese
Politburo criticized the 9th ECCI Plenum of February that year. It insisted that the
'revolutionary upsurge' was continuing, and that the Comintern resolution said 'too
little about the lack of perspective for political and economic stabilization of the
ruling class' in China.84 The ECCI's Far Eastern Bureau (FEB), formed in Shanghai in
1926 to guide the east Asian communist parties, was reduced to a skeleton crew
during this period and did not resume its full guiding role until the spring of 1929. 85
The representative of the Comintern's International Communications Section (Otdel
Mezhdunarodnoi Svyazy or OMS), A.E. Albrecht (Abramovich), took on the double
function of distributor of funds and political representative during this interregnum.
At the beginning of June 1928, Albrecht wrote from Shanghai to Moscow, to
complain that the CCP's 'putchist mood' was continuing to manifest itself in the
countryside. In southern Hunan, Shanxi and northern Guangdong, he said, the army
was continuing to fight. But it had broken away from the masses and was behaving
like a 'group of bandits'. Albrecht blamed his fellow Comintern representative
Mitkevich (aka Olga) for planting the putchist tendency in the CCP. 86 But Mitkevich
himself criticized some of the excesses of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviets: for example, the
order to paint all the houses red, and the 'tendency to destroy district towns (as
centers where the power of the landlords and gentry was concentrated)'.87
 Although Albrecht reported that the May 1928 Japanese intervention in Jinan
had given a 'strong push to the urban mass movement', the CCP's center of gravity
was already shifting to the rural areas. Communist bands commanded by Zhu De and
Chen Yi linked up with Mao Zedong's forces on the Hunan-Jiangxi border in April
1928, to create a rural base area. After the fall of the Hai-Lu-feng Soviets in March,
some of their defenders retreated into the mountains of eastern Guangdong, while
some may have returned to Canton and melted back into the GMD army. Other
remnants joined the refugee flow which had swelled during 1927 to the Chinese
communities of the Nanyang, the Southern Seas. 88 This movement of working-class
Chinese to Southeast Asia apparently reinforced the development of the Nanyang
Provisional Committee, thus strengthening the latter's potential influence on the
Vietnamese communist movement. The French Foreign Ministry reported that by
1927 in Saigon, Cholon, and Phnom Penh, among the coolies and dock workers there
was a 'notable proportion of Chinese.' In Tonkin the Chinese were heavily
represented in 'certain mining centers'.89
The refugees, who included fleeing communist activists, were absorbed by a
well-organized diaspora where the GMD was already a strong force. The French
report on immigration stated that 'the Chinese in Indochina all claim to be affiliated to
the nationalist party or Guomindang...They are in effect recruited by force, as they do
not dare to rebel against the power of their "Congregations" or "Corporations", which
all belong to a General Union, itself controlled by the GMD.' 90 It is unclear to what
extent communist structures remained hidden within the GMD in 1928. In Canton, as
we have seen, some of the Vietnamese communists remained within GMD structures
until the end of that year in order to continue their clandestine training courses, but
probably also to earn a living. In the colonial countries of Southeast Asia they would
have done so simply in order to survive. In Singapore, for example, the communist-
influenced Left GMD (known as the Main School movement) controlled twenty-one
out of twenty-nine GMD sub-branches in August 1927. A purge of communists
within the Singapore GMD began in April 1928. 91 But the Nanyang Committee may
have formed new front structures during the year in order to maintain its
organization, as I will discuss below.
During 1928 and 1929 the left-wing intellectual climate in China was
influenced by an effort to revive the Left GMD, independent of the Comintern. In
May 1928 the Reorganization Comrades Association (RCA) was created. The term
'reorganization' was a reference to the spirit of the 1924 reorganization of the GMD,
carried out under Borodin's influence. The immediate stimulus for the formation of
this faction was the Japanese occupation of Jinan in Shandong province that same
month.92 But in the view of So Waichor, the GMD leftwing was also disturbed by
Chiang Kaishek's disregard for what they considered their basic principles: anti-
imperialism and agricultural reform.93 The ideology which the RCA represented
between 1928 and its collapse in 1931 'was intended to appeal to the "oppressed
classes" in China, which comprised a variety of social categories such as the middle
and small merchants, the peasantry - from small landlords to farm labourers, the
working class, the petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the youth.'94
The intellectual influence of the RCA leader, Chen Kungpo, appears to have
extended beyond the GMD. He was a US-educated intellectual and CCP drop-out
who had held several key posts during the united front. 95 The journal which he
published from early 1928 until it was suppressed by Chiang Kaishek in September,
Ko-ming P'ing-lun, (Revolutionary Critique), was Marxist-oriented. Its contributors
represented the extreme left of the GMD and included communist 'fellow-travellers'. 96
One of the ideas promoted by Chen Kungpo in this journal and other writings was
that 'the Chinese National Revolution was indissolubly linked with the world
revolution against imperialism'. He believed that the GMD should take on the
responsibility of leading the national revolution of the colonial peoples of the East,
thus promoting a world revolution.97 To this end he advocated the establishment of an
'International of the East' or an 'International of the Three People's Principles', which
would be a counterweight to both the League of Nations and the Third International
in Moscow. So Waichor maintains that Chen Kungpo's theory of anti-imperialism
'fashioned the minds of the Left on the issue'.98
The July or August 1928 founding of a new anti-imperialist league in
Shanghai, 'The League of the Oppressed Peoples of the East', may have been the
work of the RCA faction (also known as the 'Reorganizes') in the GMD. 99 This
League would play a leading role in left-wing activity in the Nanyang during 1929
and the first months of 1930. Its existence could have facilitated the RCA's efforts to
form overseas branches in Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore.100 However,
the League also seems to have been used as a legal front for communist activities.
This seeming anachronism - a continuation of the GMD-CCP united front - appears
to have been connected to Willy Munzenberg's direction of the Anti-imperialist
League in Berlin. At the Sixth Comintern Congress he had spoken up for the need to
maintain communist influence in a wide-range of non-communist organizations. 101 As
of April 1929 Mme Sun Yatsen, by then associated with the 'Third Party' movement,
was still listed as an Honorary President on the League's notepaper. 102 In a March
1930 letter, the FEB would refer approvingly to the CCP's 'mastery of the use of legal
and semi-legal possibilities', which, it noted, included the Anti-imperialist League
and the 'Freedom League'.103
A report by the Nanyang Provisional Committee (apparently to the CCP
Central Committee) written on 19 July 1928 reflects the importance of anti-
imperialist activity in this period. It also deals with the need for a 'merciless purge' of
the Committee's leading organizations.104 The report covers an extended plenum
which began on 2 July 1928. This meeting included representatives from Borneo, the
'Special Seamen's Cell', the cells of rubber workers, CYL and the Anti-imperialist
League.105 The Guangdong Committee did not send any representatives; nor is there
any mention of representatives from the Cochinchina-Cambodia branch. The plenum
decreed that the party organization in the Malay Archipelago (one of the ways in
which the Russians translated the term 'Nanyang') must be reorganized; all 'saboteurs,
regressive and hesitating elements' were to be purged. Only the 'bold, honest and self-
sacrificing comrades' were to be promoted; comrades from the workers and peasantry
were to be advanced to leading posts.106 The organization of events for 3 August,
designated a day of anti-imperialist demonstrations, was given special emphasis at
the plenum. Cadres were instructed to go 'to the peasants' and organize 'the broad
popular masses' to 'spontaneously rise up' to participate in the anti-Japanese
movement. But these actions would not be taken in the name of the Nanyang
Committee. The report stated that, 'at present we still do not have the possibility to
openly lead the mass movement in the name of the communist party'. Thus the
movement on 3 August would be secretly led, in the name of mass organizations such
as the Anti-Japanese Society, the Society of Chinese Residents for the Salvation of
the Motherland, the Society for the Boycott of Japanese Goods, and so on.107
The date of this plenum, at which the reorganization of the Nanyang
Committee was decreed, is intriguingly close to that of the 'Reorganization Meeting'
of the Tonkin Thanh Nien Committee in September. Did the Cochinchina-Cambodia
branch of the Nanyang Committee receive instructions on the need to 'reorganize'
after the July plenum? Was there any kind of link between the Chinese activists in
Saigon or Tonkin and their Vietnamese counterparts in Thanh Nien? Potentially any
of the communist organizations such as the Seaman's Union, the CYL, the Pan
Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, or communist elements in the Anti-imperialist
League, could have provided the framework for contacts and transmission of political
advice. At the very least, one can speculate that the impulsion to purge the Thanh
Nien organization and place more emphasis on proletarian organizing was
transmitted through the CCP, perhaps via the Nanyang Committee, not directly from
Moscow or from Ho Chi Minh in Siam. The Thanh Nien Central Committee in
Guangdong does not seem to have been involved - as the events of 1929 would show.
When Li Lisan returned from Moscow in the late summer or early autumn of
1928, he quickly moved to encourage the CCP's leftward tendencies, but in a manner
which temporarily brought the Chinese communists into a united front from below
with elements of the Left GMD. This is an aspect of Li Lisan s policies which is not
reflected in the official CCP record. But Comintern documents on the CCP provide
some evidence of this overlooked facet of Li Lisan's leadership, which in my view
may have influenced the path of Vietnamese events in 1929 and early 1930. When Li
returned to Shanghai he was only an alternate member of the Politburo and the
Standing Committee.108 But as head of the CCP's Organization Department, he soon
became a dominant leader in the urban areas. It seems likely that Li Lisan also made
his influence felt in the Nanyang Provisional Committee. As both a leader of the
General Labour Union in Shanghai during its zenith in 1925, and a member of the
Permanent Secretariat of the Pan Pacific Trade Union, he was probably a familiar
figure to the labour activists who had emigrated to the ports of Southeast Asia
between 1926 and 1928.109 He was associated with the leftist views of the Guangdong
Regional Executive Committee, of which he had been a member after his flight from
Shanghai in late 1925.110 Following the fall of the Canton Commune he was made
head of the Guangdong Province Committee; it is not clear how long he held that
post.111 The Singapore police would later note that there was a 'very great increase in
propaganda' sent from the CCP CC to Malaya in 1928 and 1929. They attributed the
growth of communism in Malaya to this propaganda. 112 The return of Li Lisan to
Shanghai in the second half of 1928 would appear to be one of the causes of this
propaganda offensive.
One of Li's first moves on returning to Shanghai was to expel Cai Hesen from
the leadership, an act which the Comintern regarded as a rejection of the results of the
Sixth CCP Congress. The Comintern had hoped to guarantee unity in the CCP's
leadership by bringing representatives of various factions into the Politburo, a
December 1928 letter from the Far Eastern section's Vladimir Kuchumov to Stalin,
Molotov, Bukharin, and Pyatnitsky explained. But Cai's removal was seen as a step
backwards towards the pre-Sixth Congress ultra-left line. Kuchumov's letter referred
to a CCP CC circular on organizational questions (no number is given) which
criticized the moderate leadership of the Shanghai Committee, by contrasting it to the
more radical Guangdong Committee. The Comintern letter, in turn, criticized Xiang
Zhongfa and Li Lisan for failing to organize the masses and for promoting the slogan,
'Union with the Petty Bourgeoisie'. The remedy to these political mistakes was to
send out a new team of ECCI representatives to work with the CCP CC. The final
point of Kuchumov's letter recommended the re-establishment of the Far Eastern
Bureau to lead the parties of China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Indochina.113
The new FEB was already working in Shanghai by the end of March 1929. 114
It included a Pole named Ignaty Lyubinetski-Rylski, a.k.a. 'Osten', as well as a
German who had been on both the left and right wings of the German CP in the
1920s. He was Gerhard Eisler, Ruth Fischer's brother, who was known as 'Roberts'.
Others who were based in Shanghai in 1929 were the Profmtem representative
George Hardy and a G.M. Bespalov, the representative of the Communist Youth
League (CYL), known as Willy or 'Young'. Jakov Rudnik, head of operations for the
OMS, would not appear in Shanghai for his second stint until the spring of 1930,
using the pseudonym Hilaire Noulens, among several others.115 Osten/Rylski and
Roberts/Eisler were the principal political reporters until Pavel Mif arrived in
September 1930, while the other FEB staff had narrower responsibilites, e.g. for
labour affairs, or in Rudnik's case, for handling the money and logistics of the
Bureau. The Chinese communists were aware, as Zhang Guotao tells it, that Rylski
and Eisler had 'rightist errors' in their pasts. (Zhang incorrectly identifies them as
Thalheimer and Brandler.) For this reason, he believes, they were not treated as
reliable authorities on the views of the Stalinized Comintern.116
The summer of 1929 brought new developments, which seemed to promise
that the elusive 'revolutionary high tide' which the Chinese had been waiting for was
about to roll in. As we have seen, the Comintern's Tenth Plenum in July made the
'New Course' and class warfare the official policies of the world communist
movement. (A Comintern letter to the CCP that summer informed the CCP that rich
farmers were no longer to be regarded as allies in the struggle against the
landlords.117) At the same time, armed resistance against the Guomindang in Nanjing
from a loose coalition of warlords and generals was on the rise. Kuusinen had
criticized the CCP in a February meeting of the ECCI Political Secretariat, saying
that 'Many Chinese comrades are focused on the short-term, as if they are sitting by
the window and waiting for a sudden revolutionary miracle to take place. How this
miracle should take place is not entirely clear They talk about the war of the
bourgeoisie and the Guangxi group and say that thanks to this an upsurge of the
revolutionary movement is approaching.'118 However, with the Comintern
increasingly emphasizing the need to guard against 'right opportunism' and
'conciliationism', the CCP seems to have decided that the rekindling of'militarist wars'
provided a good opening to promote their own armed uprisings. Stalin also was
heightening the tension within the Comintern by issuing increasingly urgent warnings
of a coming imperialist war against Soviet Russia, perhaps to stir up support for his
radical economic policies. He used the conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway,
which escalated in June 1929, to promote the idea that one of the obligations of the
world communist movement was to defend the Soviet Union.
When the Reorganizers became involved in coordinating armed resistance to
the Nanjing government in mid-1929, the CCP apparently gave them their support.
Among the militarists who backed the challenge to the GMD leadership were Zhang
Fakui in Hubei, and Li Zongren and Yu Zuobo, both in Guangxi. 119 Chen Kungpo
moved to Hong Kong in June 1929 to take charge of this military campaign, which
developed into the 'Party-defending and National Salvation Movement'.120 For a time
it appeared to have a good chance of bringing an end to Chiang's rule. Two
communist cadres, Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi (a native of Hainan), were sent
from Shanghai to Guangxi province to infiltrate the 'National Salvation Movement',
Deng in mid-1929 and Zhang perhaps as early as 1928. Deng would tell Edgar Snow
in 1936 that he went to Guangxi via Haiphong in Vietnam, as the route from Canton
was too risky. He claimed to have had contacts with the Vietnamese rebels who
started the 'worker-peasant rebellion in 1930'.121 It is improbable that, as Uli Franz
claims, Deng consulted with Ho Chi Minh in Shanghai on the best route to Guangxi.
Yet Deng does appear to have used Vietnamese contacts to help him travel from
Haiphong by train to the Guangxi border, from where he followed the Thanh Nien
emigration route to Longzhou and then to Nanning.122
Following the Tenth ECCI Plenum, the FEB in Shanghai - with former
'rightists' on its staff- - made a point of passing a resolution which would express
their loyal support of the 'New Course'. This document, dated October 1929, declared
that the FEB was ready to combat 'opportunistic dangers and deviations in the CCP'.
The resolution criticized the CCP for having only a 'thin layer of industrial workers
and contacts with various national-reformist groups'. The Guangxi Committee had
carried on negotiations with the General Yu Zubei (Yu Zuobo) on work within his
army, it said, and had sent telegrams to local organizations calling for a mass
campaign in support of a Zhang Fakui-Yu Zuobo bloc. Some comrades had also
refused to create red trade unions in enterprises where government or yellow unions
already existed.123
This FEB resolution would cause an angry reaction in the Chinese Politburo.
During a series of meetings with the FEB in December 1929, the Chinese,
represented by Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa, would refuse to
acknowledge the 'rightist errors' they were being accused of. At a 10 December
meeting, Rylski criticized the CCP for cooperating with the rich peasants and for
collaborating with the 'national reformists' in Guangxi.124 He admitted that when the
problem of the Eastern Railway developed, 'we discussed partisan wars with you and
made very concrete suggestions, which you accepted. We advised you to organize,
broaden and provoke partisan battles... '125 But in an effort to avoid responsibility for
CCP errors, he added that this advice had been accompanied by instructions to
educate the masses, which the CCP had failed to implement. 126 Li Lisan rebutted this
criticism in a second meeting (13 December), saying that the Chinese CC had been
struggling against the right danger consistently, that it had fought such right
tendencies as the move towards a legal movement, peaceful development and the
over-evaluation of the bourgeoisie. He also pointed out that the CC had criticized the
'Reorganizers' in Guangxi: 'Possibly there are comrades working in the military who
do not clearly understand the situation in Guangxi. But their mistakes cannot be
connected to the Central Committee and the [Guangxi] Special Committee.'127
Finally, after a long speech from Eisler on 17 December, the two sides agreed
to report their disagreement to Moscow, whose decision on policy would be final.
'Until the resolution of this question, we will carry on our daily work as before,'
concluded Xiang. 'Then, if the CCP commits errors, the FEB can correct them and in
the same way, if the FEB makes mistakes, we must struggle against them. In addition
to a telegram, we propose to send a Chinese comrade to Moscow.' 128 This outcome
left the FEB without any real authority in the eyes of the CCP until Moscow handed
down its decision. It appears that from the end of December 1929, Li Lisan and his
supporters showed increasing independence in interpreting Comintern policy. They
did not, however, want to lose the Comintern subsidy for their work, which in 1929
amounted to over US $200,000, as well as $16,408 for the Communist Youth. 129
Zhou Enlai left for Moscow for consultations in February 1930, where he arrived in
April after travelling to Berlin.130 Rylski would return to Moscow around the same
time.

The Thanh Nien rift

The early stage of Li Lisan's attempt to gain control of CCP structures
coincides with the growth of a rift within the Thanh Nien association. As mentioned
earlier, starting in September 1928, the northern branch of Thanh Nien had begun a
campaign to 'pro-letarianize' itself. In March 1929 they had formed a communist cell
in Hanoi. Just as the FEB was establishing itself in Shanghai, the Thanh Nien
leadership called a national congress in Hong Kong (they had had to leave Canton at
the start of 1929, when Ho Tung Mau and a group of Vietnamese cadets at Whampoa
were arrested). By the time the congress opened in May, the leftward turn in
Comintern policy had been clearly established. There was no apparent disagreement
among the delegates on the need to establish a communist party in the Bolshevik
mold, following what had become known as the spirit of the sixth Comintern
Congress. But in meetings preceding the official Thanh Nien congress, the northern
delegation provoked a split by insisting on the immediate formation of a communist
party. Three of the dissidents, Tran Van Cung, Nguyen Tuan and Ngo Gia Tu, left the
congress early, when the China-based leaders, Lam Duc Thu and Le Hong Son,
refused to change their opinion that Vietnam was not yet ready to move beyond the
preparatory phase of party formation.131 But according to a Sûreté source, Le Hong
Son had consulted the Chinese CP in Hong Kong on the new programme, and so had
some grounds to believe that he was following the right path.132 The delegates from
the central, southern and Siam sections of Thanh Nien remained in Hong Kong until
the end of May to draw up a voluminous 'minimum programme', complete with a
disciplinary code that listed five infractions meriting the death penalty. The
programme explicitly accepted the documents of the Comintern's sixth Congress and
announced the end of all relations with the Chinese GMD, which it called a party of
'notables, landowners and capitalists'.133 A Preparatory Commission was set up, to
begin the work of establishing a communist party. Ho Chi Minh was dropped from
the leadership, as he was too far away; according to Lam Duc Thu, there were now
rumours that he was seriously ill in Germany.134
The question of why the northern Thanh Nien leadership had become so
hostile to the China-based committee probably has no simple answer. Youthful
arrogance seems to have played a part, combined with a reasonable desire to bring the
communist leadership closer to its members inside the country. By the time of the
May Congress, the northern group may have had several concrete objections to the
Canton/Hong Kong leaders. The most obvious would have been the presence of Lam
Duc Thu, even in 1929 suspected by some of the revolutionaries, notably Nguyen Hai
Than, of being a French informer.135 Thu was also known for his decadent life-style
and himself reported to the Sûreté that he 'had been violently criticized by certain
comrades in the course of the year.' He had thus asked not to be given a leadership
position, and assured the Sûreté that this would, 'greatly facilitate my task.' 136 (His
task may have involved creating misunderstandings among the various revolutionary
groups). Another source of friction could well have been the dominance of men from
the central provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in the Hong Kong leadership. Related
to this regional tension may have been the different kinds of training and organizing
on which the two groups were concentrating. The China-based group was mainly
composed of men with military training, some of whom had been instructors at
Whampoa. These included Truong Van Lenh, Le Quang Dat, Le Duy Diem and Le
Hong Son. They had a rural orientation as well. Le Hong Son had served as a CYL
propagandist among the peasanty of Hainan Island; Ho Tung Mau had helped to
organize mutual aid societies in rural Siam. The Tonkin members of Thanh Nien, on
the other hand, were being drawn increasingly into organizing in urban areas. Their
work in the port of Haiphong and the mines of Cam Pha, Uong Bi and Mao Khe,
where there were high proportions of Chinese labourers, may have brought them into
contact with union organizers of the Nanyang Labour Federation or perhaps the
CCP's Guangdong Committee. These tensions may well have been present in Cochin-
china as well. The competition between Ton Duc Thang, a Saigon labour leader, and
Le Van Phat, which led to the latter's murder by Thanh Nien assassins in December
1928, may have grown out of this conflict between urban and rural orientation. One
can see that these sorts of differences would provide fertile ground for Sûreté
provocateurs to sow seeds of conflict.
The period from June 1929 until February 1930 was a critical one for the
Vietnamese communists. The break-away faction in Tonkin formed their own
communist party, the Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist Party or
ICP) in June, and quickly started sending emissaries to other parts of the country. As
they controlled the Thanh Nien committees in north Vietnam, the northern
membership appears to have joined the new party more or less automatically. They
made inroads in the centre and south as well. In both these regions the Thanh Nien
leadership was hit by a wave of arrests in the latter part of 1929. In July the entire
committee for central Vietnam was arrested, including Nguyen Si Sach, who had just
returned from the Thanh Nien congress, and Vuong Thuc Oanh. Tran Van Cung was
also arrested. Vo Mai fled to the uplands of Nghe Tinh. 137 (Ho Chi Minh and Tran
Phu were both sentenced to death in absentia by a tribunal in Vinh in October 1929.)
It was also in July that the French began to arrest activists whose names had come to
light during the investigation of Le Van Phat's murder, what came to be known as the
Rue Barbier affair. These included Pham Van Dong, Ton Duc Thang and Nguyen
Kim Cuong.138 Other organizers were forced to retreat to rural areas such as Dong
Thap.139 At the same time, the Tan Viet party (the former Cach Mang Dang) was
decapitated by the arrest of its leaders, both in the centre and in Saigon. Their shared
living arrangement with the Thanh Nien leaders had led to the discovery of party
documents written by Ha Huy Tap when the rue Barbier murder was discovered (Ha
Huy Tap and two other Tan Viet members, Tran Ngoc Danh and Tran Pham Ho, had
fled to Shanghai following the discovery of Tan Viet's headquarters in December
1928)140. In Vinh. Nguyen Thi Minh Khai would report, only the workers and
women's groups remained strong.141 These arrests must have worked to the advantage
of the ICP faction, as they became by default the most experienced group of leaders
in Vietnam. Not long after the ICP's formation, Ngo Gia Tu was sent to Saigon,
where he established a base among the coolies in Cholon and began to create a
General Trade Union. The Thanh Nien labour organizers who remained outside the
ICP would before long start to form their own General Labour Union.142
Under the threat of losing its entire membership, the Thanh Nien Central
Committee in Hong Kong was forced to give up its previous stand on the formation
of a communist party. By late August 1929, soon after Ho Tung Mau and around
twenty former Whampoa cadets had been released from prison, they decided to form
the Annam Cong San Dang (the Annam Communist Party or ACP). As they wrote in
a long, defensive missive (probably dated mid-October, given the reference to an ICP
letter of 4 October) to their membership: 'the Preparatory Commission was suited to
the earlier situation, but now this Commission no longer answers the needs of the
moment.'143 Part of the problem was that many members of this Commission had
been arrested upon their return to Vietnam following the May congress, the letter
explained. Thanh Nien had been dissolved and there were now only a few remaining
groups in Siam and Cochinchina. A cell of the ACP had been formed in Hong Kong,
whose task would be to work for the formation of a real party, 'as we have noted that
the ICP is not a real party', the letter said. The new party, led by Ho Tung Mau, Le
Hong Son, Le Quang Dat and Le Duy Diem, declared that it wanted to unite Thanh
Nien's communist elements within Indochina, but at the same time work towards a
fusion with the ICP.144 This desire for fusion did not mean, however, that the ACP
leaders fully accepted their rivals' programme. They complained that the ICP had
started organizing from the top down, before it had created cells in workplaces or
among the masses. Another criticism was that the ICP was creating groups of so-
called 'Reds' who were called on to work among the masses and to pay monthly
contributions to the Party, without actually becoming party members. Thus the 'Reds'
were forced to submit entirely to the orders and decisions of the party - this ran
counter to the principles of democratic centralism, the letter said. (The ACP leaders
based their knowledge of ICP methods on a letter of 4 October 1929 from the ICP to
the CCP, as well as on the 26 September issue of the ICP paper, Co Do [Red
Flag].)145 Yet another complaint was that, according to an anonymous ICP member,
the latter party had 'led the masses to destroy pagodas and temples'.146
Perhaps the most galling ICP fault was the fact that it had worked 'to overturn
Thanh Nien and the Tan Viet parties, while offering collaboration to the Nationalist
Party (Quoc Dan Dang) in order to contribute to its development'. The letter claimed,
in fact, that the ICP had aided the VNQDD by modifying its programme and by
introducing communists into the party.147 The introduction of communists into the
VNQDD is reminiscent of Ho Chi Minh's tactics in 1926-27 with regard to the Cach
Mang Dang/Tan Viet. It may have been an echo of the apparent alliance which
existed in 1928-9 between the CCP and the Left GMD The closeness between the
ICP and the VNQDD also appears to be a sign of regional rivalry between the north
and centre. While the Thanh Nien leadership had been keen to infiltrate and then fuse
with the Tan Viet Party, a group with roots in central Vietnam, the ICP preferred to
form a front with the non-communist party rooted in the north. As the ICP leaders
had written to the ACP on 4 October, their party believed 'that it could cooperate with
the VNQDD for the time being... But this cooperation would only take place if the
Nationalist Party did not oppose the propaganda and organizational work of the ICP
within their party (which means that the PCI will direct it secretly).' 148 Then in a letter
of 7 January 1930, from the ICP CC to Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon, the author noted that
vis-a-vis the VNQDD, the ICP would continue to look for ways to infiltrate it in
order to organize a soviet, then 'to incorporate our masses, in order to create real
Soviets.'149
Figures for the competing communist groups vary, but the ICP itself claimed
by 5 December 1929 to have recruited sixty members in Cochinchina, and either
forty or twenty in Annam (the reporter could not remember exactly). 150 Ha Huy Giap
claims in his memoirs that there were 800 Thanh Nien members in the south by the
autumn of 1929.151 Yet the ACP had only absorbed around fifty of these by mid-
autumn, according to one Sûreté informer, Duong Hac Dinh. He was an early Thanh
Nien trainee and until May 1929 a member of the Tonkin break-away faction. But he
had rallied to the China-based leadership after the congress, and was sent to Saigon in
September to organize a provisional committee for the ACP. (This was after the July
arrest of most of the members of the original preparatory committee.) Along with
Hoang Tuyen (Tran Van Minh), a former Whampoa cadet from Cochinchina, Nguyen
Ngoc Ba, Do Luong and Nguyen Van Ngoc, he drew up a list of Thanh Nien
members for the Saigon-Gia Dinh region, and another list for Mytho and Cantho, to
be inducted into the new party. The two lists amounted to around fifty names, Dinh
claimed.152
The first outside stimulus for the two communist factions to unite came from
a Chinese inspector of the FEB in Shanghai, who arrived in Hong Kong in November
on his way to Singapore. As Ho Tung Mau wrote to the ICP on 14 November, a
decision had been taken in Shanghai to form a secretariat of the Communist League
of the Oppressed Peoples of the East. The role of this league or federation would be
'to guide directly Malaya,Java, Burma, Siam and Annam, with a view to organizing
them as soon as possible into communist parties.' The opening meeting of this
association was to be held within two months, with delegates from different countries
attending. 'But it would be preferable for us to complete our unification before
sending delegates,' Ho Tung Mau wrote.153 The League's secretariat would be based
in Singapore and thus appears to have been a new manifestation of the Nanyang
Provisional Committee. A hint of the importance of the CCP role in Vietnamese
communism at the end of 1929 can be found in the Sûreté's comments on one of the
letters exchanged between the two factions in November. The Sûreté noted that the
ICP in Saigon was sending Chinese propaganda brochures to their comrades in
Tonkin, a sign that the South was still the center of Nanyang Committee activity in
Vietnam.154 The Vietnamese in Hong Kong questioned the idea of working under
Singapore's jurisdiction, according to Duong Hac Dinh's account. The Chinese
delegate advised them to inform the FEB of their feelings, but at the same time
encouraged them to send two delegates from each faction to Singapore at a later date.
Thus Le Quang Dat was sent off to Shanghai to talk with 'certain Chinese members
of the FEB'.155
 Significantly, at this stage the European members of the FEB seem to have
been promoting the role of Chinese communists in Southeast Asia. The role of the
Chinese inspector mentioned above may have grown out of the request from the Anti-
imperialist League in Berlin that the FEB organize a delegation to the Anti-
Imperialist Youth Conference which was due to be held in Frankfurt just before the
second World Congress of the Anti-imperialist League, scheduled for July 1929. The
FEB wrote to Berlin in May 1929 that they had no addresses for youth organizations
in Korea, Indonesia, Indochina or Malaya. 'The only possibility is to work through
the Chinese organisations there,' the letter said. They had decided that 'a comrade
must be sent to these places carrying instructions and suggestions for the building of
some anti-imperialist youth organisation to include both native and Chinese youth.'
The FEB's efforts were obviously too late to send any delegates to Berlin, but as they
explained, their envoy would give them 'the possibility to learn first-hand the
conditions in these places and to take steps for the formation of some national
organisation'.156
Rylski reported in January 1930 that the FEB was short of'comrades to do the
travelling' required within the region. The usefulness of the Chinese was limited by
the fact that they were frequently refused entry at Southeast Asian ports, or were
arrested on arrival.157 Yet there seemed to be no alternative but to rely on Chinese
comrades. In Moscow the Comintern was coming to the same conclusion. The
resurrected Mideastern Section, responsible for Burma, India, Indonesia and
Indochina, held a meeting on 12 November, at which rebuilding the Indonesian CP
was discussed. As the Indonesian cadres had been dispersed by the Dutch after the
1926 uprising, it was suggested that 'the Chinese communist organization which
exists in Singapore, the Malay States and Indonesia, which is linked to the CCP's
CC'be made use of. 'In spite of its numerical and ideological weakness', the protocol
reads, 'the organization has links among the local Chinese and the native workers and
leads a variety of trade unions, which are united in the Trade Union Council of the
Malay Archipelago...For the time being this organization can serve as the base for the
development of work in Indonesia.'158 The Comintern does not appear to have
understood the traditional Chinese concept of the 'Southern Seas' as a geographical
area in which Chinese influence would be predominant. The Europeans in the FEB
thought of Singapore as a central point for communicating with the area controlled by
the Comintern's Mideastern Section, from India to Indonesia, and when required,
Indochina. Kuusinen viewed India and Indonesia as the main targets of Comintern
work in this region, as we have seen; these two colonies would be the ultimate
destinations of the two French Comintern inspectors sent to Southeast Asia in 1930
and 1931.
The first of these to depart, an agent known as 'Thibault', was in Belgium in
August 1929 to obtain false papers. While he waited for news and money from
Moscow, he wrote that he was gathering documentation on Indochina, the Dutch
Indies and the Philippines. He asked that any recent decisions regarding his task,
including materials from the Anti-imperialist League, be sent to him rapidly. 159 By
piecing together several sources, one can guess that this was Jean Cremet, the French
communist who was long thought to have disappeared in China in early 1930 (In the
1960s he surfaced in Belgium).160 Joseph Ducroux, sent by the CYL to Asia in 1931,
mentions in his memoirs that the OMS had asked him to search for Cremet in
Shanghai and Hong Kong, as the Comintern had had no news of him for over one
year.161 Ducroux recalled that Cremet had travelled on a Belgian passport under a
Walloon name. Ducroux had worked in Moscow from 1928 to 1930 as a CYL expert
on India and was assigned in the winter of 1929-30 to take 'political, moral and
material aid' to the Indian CP. Neither of the Frenchmen would succeed in his
mission: Thibault would get no farther than Tonkin before vanishing in February
1930, and Ducroux, after travelling through Vietnam, would be arrested in Singapore
in 1931 before reaching India. Thibault/Cremet's disappearance seems to have created
some confusion in the lead-up to the unification of the Vietnamese communist
groups, as is discussed in the next chapter.

5. THE REVOLUTIONARY HIGH TIDE (1930-31)

The return of the Comintern trainees

At the end of 1929 the Vietnamese communist movement was composed of
two feuding parties competing for members. The ICP faction had gone so far as to
announce that even Ho Chi Minh would be treated as an ordinary party member if he
returned.1 The former Thanh Nien leaders in Hong Kong were fighting to unify the
communists on terms which would not mean total defeat for the Annam CP. They
were on the point of sending Le Duy Diem to Moscow to find Ho Chi Minh, when
the liaison agent Cao Hoai Nghia admitted that he had met Ho in Siam. He was only
persuaded to reveal Ho's hiding place when he realized how severe the split in the
ranks of the Thanh Nien group had become.2 It was Truong Van Lenh, one of the
remaining Thanh Nien stalwarts, who went to find Ho in October and persuaded him
to return to southern China.3
 In Moscow at the same time the Comintern was beginning to make long-
delayed decisions regarding the communist movements in India, Indonesia and
Indochina. Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri, having completed their studies at the Stalin
School, were preparing for their return to Vietnam via France. A brief set of
'Directives for Work in Indochina' was drawn up in Moscow on 27 October 1929, 4
when according to Ngo Duc Tri the Comintern passed a formal resolution on the
creation of an Indochinese Communist Party.5 The following day Tran Phu attended a
day-long discussion led by Kuusinen on the future programme for the Indian CP. 6
This must have been a way of preparing him for the thorny theoretical and practical
problems he would face in Vietnam. Caution was the dominant note in the directives
for Indochina. The 'general line' was to form communist groups and then to proceed
to their unification as a party. The two Vietnamese comrades leaving the Stalin
School were to gather information on the peasant movement and the strikes which
had been occurring in the last year; they were to develop links with the proletarian
and poor peasant elements among the nationalist groups and to 'provoke a
differentiation' in such organizations in order to attract the proletarian members to
join communist groups. The creation of labour unions, or where these had been
dissolved, mutual aid groups, was another task (they were encouraged to take
advantage of Chinese and Vietnamese traditions in developing these groups). Point
15 of the directives was a warning against any confusion, 'between our elements and
the Independence Party of the ex-communist Nguyen The Truyen'. On the other hand,
the two Moscow trainees were to enter into relations with the Chinese communist
groups which existed in Indochina and to make use of their experience. Point 17
called for the collection of political and economic data for the preparation of a set of
'Theses' on Indochina.
Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri were in theory returning to Vietnam as equals. An
addendum to their directives, on 'Technical Problems', stated that 'the two
Vietnamese comrades leaving the University must be considered as our leading
elements' for our work in Indochina.7 Yet Tran Phu, who had served as head of the
Vietnamese group at the Stalin school, was considered to be the first among equals,
perhaps because he was not tainted by any contacts with Nguyen The Truyen (as was
Ngo Duc Tri, from his stay in Paris). As the two were preparing for their journey they
were presented to the French communist with the pseudonym 'Thibault', who was
heading to Asia via Siberia as a delegate of the Comintern. Thibault/ Cremet made an
arrangement privately with Tran Phu to meet him in Hong Kong between 1 and 15
January 1930, or if that failed, in Haiphong in the first two weeks of February.8
 In addition to their resolution and the guidance which Thibault was due to
provide, the Comintern was to furnish the returning Vietnamese with a more detailed
set of instructions. These took the form of a 48-page pamphlet entitled On the
Immediate Tasks of the Indochinese Communists, drawn up in October and
November. It was in fact a critique of the resolutions of the Thanh Nien Congress in
May 1929. When Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri arrived in what was then Leningrad on
11 November 1929, they were informed that they would receive money in Berlin and
Paris; the resolution and the letter of instructions on forming a communist party
would also be sent to them in Europe. After sailing to Hamburg, they went by train to
Berlin, where they received a 'finely bound novel'. They were told not to take apart
the cover until they were in Saigon, where they could extract the papers hidden by the
Comintern.9
On the Immediate Tasks of the Indochinese Communists is a typical
Comintern document of the time, an attempt to combine elements of Lenin's Theses
on National and Colonial Questions with the more radical prescriptions of the Sixth
Congress and the Tenth ECCI Plenum.10 The Indochinese revolution was still 'a
struggle with the remnants of feudalism and a struggle against French imperialism for
national independence'.11 But now the party must be a 'product of class struggle', not
something created in political education groups.12 The Thanh Nien programme was
criticized for outlining a specific progression of revolutionary periods, leading
towards an armed struggle. The instructions stated that 'it is impossible to establish
the order or length of the phases of revolutionary development'. 'Concrete analysis of
the movement in any given period' must be the guide to action. Overestimation of the
situation could lead to 'adventurism and putchism', while underestimation would lead
to 'opportunism'.13 The blossoming of the Indochinese movement was occurring at a
time when an upsurge in the world revolutionary movement was beginning - this
demanded that the Indochinese communists orient themselves not just towards a
gradual growth of their movement, but 'towards the possibility and probability of
large-scale struggles and a quickening tempo of events'.14
'The main defect of the Thanh Nien resolutions', the Comintern said, was that
'they do not contain the necessary exactitude regarding the essence of classes and
their roles.'15 The petty bourgeoisie could no longer be counted among the 'moving
forces' of the revolution, as the Thanh Nien programme had stated. They could be
used in the anti-imperialist struggle and for the agrarian revolution, but only under
the leadership of the proletariat. The true moving forces of the revolution were the
working class and the peasantry; the most revolutionary elements of the peasantry
were the rural poor - landless peasants and small landholders.16 Relations with legal
groups and other parties were now defined in terms of pure exploitation. The party
should 'broaden, use and lead the anti-imperialist struggle of the urban petty
bourgeoisie, including students.17 The pamphlet also stated: 'The creation of strong
illegal communist groups, who have mastered a large variety of weapons to wield
legal and semi-legal influence - this must be the basis of party work in Indochina'a
current conditions.'18 Work in rural areas was not to be neglected. One of the most
important tasks of the party was to develop the peasant movement against the
landlords: 'The communists must ignite, prepare and lead the peasant struggle against
land rents, against the expropriation of land, taxes, share-cropping and so on. We
must aim for the extension of individual flare-ups to a broad peasant movement
against the landlords and imperialists.'19 But still, the 'center of gravity of party and
mass work must be in the factories, mines, railways, plantations, etc.' 20 These
instructions put heavy pressure on the Vietnamese to foment a violent struggle, yet
made clear that errors in the analysis of the local revolutionary situation would be
blamed on them.
Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri did not get to Saigon with their instructions until 8
February 1930. They were delayed in Paris by their difficulty in obtaining false travel
documents. Although it is generally believed that the Comintern had a workshop in
Berlin turning out counterfeit passports, this does not seem to have been in operation
in 1929 or 1930. For both the returning Vietnamese and the Frenchmen who went to
Southeast Asia for the Comintern in 1929-31, obtaining false identy papers posed
considerable problems. Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri took the advice of their former
Moscow classmate, Bui Lam, and travelled clandestinely. They paid 1,500 francs
each to be hidden by a Chinese sailor aboard SS Porthos for the voyage to Saigon.
Their late departure meant that Tran Phu would not arrive in Hong Kong until
roughly mid-February. He would thus miss both of his rendez-vous with Thibault, not
to mention the unification congress.21
The method and date of transmission of the Comintern's instructions to
Vietnam and Hong Kong are still sensitive details for Vietnamese communists, as
they bear on Ho Chi Minh's legitimacy as the party's unifier. The date on a Russian
copy of the 48-page pamphlet is 23 November 1929 (whether Tran Phu and Ngo Duc
Tri had received the instructions in their final form is unclear). This document, it
would seem, is what became known in the ICP as the 'December instructions' on
reunifying the party.22 Contemporary accounts refer to these instructions as the source
of Comintern authority on unification.23 But the Vietnamese text which since 1970
has been cited as the basis on which Ho unified the party is dated 27 October 1929.
(It has not been possible to find a version of this document in the Comintern
archives.) Titled ' Ve Van De Lap Dang Cong San Dong Duong (On Establishing an
Indochinese Communist Party), it emphasizes the role of'the Comintern
representative' in the creation of a communist party.24 However, on the basis of the
1930-31 criticisms of his role in the party's unification, as well as Ngo Duc Tri's
confession, it would appear that Ho had seen neither the 'December instructions' nor
the document printed in Van Kien Dang when he brought the communist groups
together in early 1930.

The unification process

Ho Chi Minh arrived in Hong Kong almost two months ahead of Tran Phu.25
Although he reported to the FEB that he had arrived in China on 23 December, 26 a
Sûreté informer claimed that 'Ly Thuy' had been sighted on the train in Kowloon
before 15 December.27 In Hong Kong Ho would find that the Vietnamese communist
movement had already been receiving instructions from a Chinese representative of
the FEB. Moreover, Thibault, assigned to guide the Vietnamese communists, appears
to have arrived in Hong Kong not long after Ho. He would seem to have been the
anonymous Comintern representative 'charged with the inspection of all communist
groups in the Far East', who was reported to have turned up in Hong Kong in late
December 1929. According to a Sûreté report, this inspector repeated the message of
his Chinese counterpart, that the direction of the affairs of the Vietnamese
communists would be in the hands of the Chinese CP for the time being. 28 The FEB
would report on 3 March 1930, that 'Jacques', 'the Frenchman', had headed to Hong
Kong at the end of December; after making contacts there and possibly undertaking
some travelling, he was due to return to Shanghai at the end of February. 'However,
since a message from Hong Kong received at the end of January, in which he wrote
that he was planning to travel to Indochina, we have had nothing more from him,'
they reported.29 In an earlier communication the FEB had referred to him as 'the
comrade for Indonesia'.30 Strangely, the French envoy does not seem to have met Ho
in Hong Kong.
In Hong Kong Ho moved quickly to end what he considered a 'puerile feud',
even though he had now become one voice of the Comintern among several who
could claim to have authority to direct the Vietnamese movement. Duong Hac Dinh's
1930 declaration to the Sûreté shows that Ho disapproved of the dissolution of Thanh
Nien.31 It should have been kept in existence after the creation of a communist party,
'at least at the beginning'. This disapproval underlines Ho's view of Thanh Nien as a
useful political front and may be why the Hong Kong party members continued to
publish their newspaper Thanh Nien until May 1930, 32 alongside the ACP paper Do
(Red), which had first appeared on 1 September 1929. 33 Dinh's report reinforces the
idea that Ho was out of touch with the rapid development of the political situation.
'We reported to Ho everything which had happened, both within the country and
outside', he explained. Two days after his arrival, Ho wrote to the leaders of the ICP
faction to explain his mission from the Comintern, to form a communist party for
Vietnam. By this account, Ho drew his authority from the instructions he had
received before his departure for Siam. He seems to have been convinced that he had
to act fast, without waiting for updated directives. He requested that the ICP faction
send two delegates to meet him in Hong Kong. (By the end of December two
delegates from the ACP were already in Hong Kong: Nguyen Thieu, alias Nghia, on
the run from the French police, and Chau Van Liem, who had been designated by the
Saigon party branch to attend the coming Singapore conference. 34) Ho also wrote to
the FEB to announce his presence in Hong Kong and submit his proposals to them.
According to Duong Hac Dinh, he asked for a monthly salary of 240-300 Chinese
dollars, to be paid via the Guangdong committee of the CCP. 35 The authority which
he displayed before his comrades may have involved a touch of bravado, however. In
late February 1930 he wrote to the French CP representatives in the Comintern to ask
for a clearer mandate: 'Now I don't know exactly what my position is... am I a
member of the PCF or of the PCV?' He also asked: 'Has the mandate which the
Comintern gave me been terminated? If not, am I a member of the FEB here?' He
requested a decision from the ECCI.36
Sometime between 6 January and 8 February 1930 the process known as the
'Unification Conference' took place. In his 18 February 1930 report (in English) to the
Comintern, Ho gives a typically laconic description of his actions: 'I called out
representatives of the two factions (Dongzuong (sic) [ICP] and Annam). We met on
January 6. As envoy of the Komintern with full power to decide all questions
regarding Revolutionary movement in Indochina, I told them where they were wrong,
and what they must do. They agreed then to unite into one party. Together we fixed
up programme and strategy, following the Komintern line.' 37 He noted that a
Provisional Central Committee of seven full members and seven candidate members
would be formed. The representatives returned to Vietnam on 8 February, he
claimed.38 Ho sent the FEB an English translation of his 'Appeal to workers, peasants,
soldiers, youth, students, oppressed brothers, sisters and Comrades', which
proclaimed the founding of the VCP. The appeal was due to be distributed around 20
March, by which time the Central Committee would be organized.39
On the issue of Vietnam's place in the communist hierarchy, Ho appears to
have made a diplomatic compromise. He explained: 'The Singapore section has
written to us that the Annam CP will be under the direction of Singapore. But
considering geographical situation (Russia - China - Annam) as well as political
situation (Party more strong, industries more developed in Tonkin than in
Cochinchina) - I propose that, the An. CP shall be directed from Shanghai via Hong
Kong. However, the An. CP must be in close touch with Singapore. For that reason, I
ask the Chinese CP a letter of introduction, so that we may send an Annamese
comrade to work with Singapore.'40 Ho was thus signalling that he was willing to
cooperate with the new federation being organized in Singapore, but that the
Vietnamese party would be directly linked to the Comintern via the FEB. His
preference for working through Shanghai should not be interpreted as a Chinese
orientation, but rather as a refusal to be subordinated to the CCP. The new party was
named the Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese CP), which Ho referred to in his
English text as the Annam CP.
Hanoi's official version of the conference is that recorded by Nguyen Thieu,
one of the ACP faction delegates.41 In his account the conference occurred between 3
and 7 February. The two delegates from the ICP faction were Nguyen Duc Canh and
Trinh Dinh Cuu,both members of the original ICP cell. A letter from the ICP faction
to its members in Saigon dated 7 January indicates that the two delegates summoned
by the International were due to depart for Hong Kong around the 17 or 18 of
January.42 Thus Ho Chi Minh may have been referring to the lunar calendar when he
wrote to the Comintern that the meeting began 6 January - that would have made it 4
February by the Western calendar.43 Another possibility is that the meeting occurred
in two or more stages, with a preliminary meeting held 6 January, followed by
consultations with the FEB and ICP members in Tonkin, and then a final meeting
between 3 and 7 February. To complicate this already confusing picture, a Chinese
account of the Unification Conference claims that Ho Chi Minh was not present at
the opening of the conference, as the meeting was too 'large' [apparently meaning too
public], but that it was held under Ho's 'direct leadership'. 44 It is difficult to say what
meeting this description would refer to, however, as all the other accounts of the
conference describe it as an intimate affair.
The exact date of the Unification Conference would be unimportant, were it
not for the hints of continued competition within the new party's leadership which
can be found in the French archives and even in Nguyen Thieu's second article on the
party's founding.45 As it is, the confusion over dates reinforces the impression that
there were still conflicting lines of command in the Vietnamese CP after 8 February
1930. The Conference in the end provided the framework for unification of the
feuding Vietnamese factions, but did not by any means complete the process. The
short programme which Ho Chi Minh put together for the new party is not very
different from the 8-point programme for the colonies which Bukharin produced for
the Sixth Comintern Congress. Ho clearly had not given up on the united front tactic,
for he did not condemn the bourgeoisie as a whole. His programme called for 'the
overthrow of French imperialism, feudalism and the counterrevolutionary
bourgeoisie'; the complete independence of Vietnam; a worker-peasant-soldier
government; the confiscation of banks and other means of production in the hands of
the imperialists; confiscation of all plantations and land holdings of the imperialists
and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, to divide them among the poor peasants;
an eight-hour work day; the abolition of national loans, personal taxes and tax
exemption for the poor; civil liberties; public education; and equality between men
and women.46 The policy on land confiscation appears identical to that established by
the Chinese GMD's Central Land Committee at meetings between 19 April and 6
May 1927.47 Thus the programme as a whole would not be acceptable to the post-
Tenth Plenum Comintern and bore little resemblance to the Moscow instructions
drawn up the previous autumn. It would be replaced by a new programme and a long
set of theses at the party's first plenum in October 1930. This would mark the real
beginning of the party's allegiance to the current Comintern line, as it had evolved
between the summer of 1928 and mid-1929.
In spite of Ho's apparent authority, the ICP faction appears to have played the
predominant role in the new Vietnamese party in the first months after the
unification.48 Until his arrest at the end of May 1930, Ngo Gia Tu would retain a
strong hold on the Saigon party structures, as head of a Provisional Executive
Committee (Ban Lam Thoi chap uy) for the south. The two ICP faction members at
the unification conference were given responsibility for work in North and Central
Vietnam.49 A marked federalism in the party's organization seems to have existed in
the first half of 1930: Nguyen Van Loi, who was elected to the southern Provisional
Executive Committee by the remains of the Tan Viet party, later told the Sûreté that
'standing central committees' (trung uong thuong vu), which met regularly in the
north and centre, were empowered to take decisions which had to be implemented in
Cochinchina.50 The Provisional Central Committee formed in early March contained
five ICP members, as opposed to one from the ACP and one from the old Tan Viet.
The original group of CC members was never able to meet, however. The members
of the Provisional Standing Committee based in the north were all ICP faction
members: Trinh Dinh Cuu, Nguyen Hoi and Tran Van Lan. 51 Some of the new party's
members may have harboured doubts about the need for unification. Nguyen Duc
Canh, for example, is said to have turned down a place in the Provisional Central
Committee, in favour of continuing his work in the Executive Committee of the Bac
Ky General Labour Union, a structure which may well have been affiliated with the
Nanyang Federation of Labour Unions.52 Overall, one receives the impression that the
different committee structures were being used in a competition for power.

The New Year's uprisings

The first stirrings of revolt in 1930 were already in their final planning stages
by the time the VCP was formed. The Comintern showed no sign of advance
knowledge of these events, but the CCP and the Vietnamese seem to have been
working in line with a common timetable. The strike at the Phu Rieng rubber
plantation in western Cochinchina, from 3 to 7 February, may in fact have been part
of a 1930 'Tet Offensive'. One of the organizers, ICP member Tran Tu Binh, relates
in his memoir The Red Earth that the strike actually began on 30 January, the first
day of the lunar New Year, when 5,000 workers gathered at the plantation manager's
compound to watch a dragon dance and present their demands for better working
conditions.53 The strike appears to have been entirely an ICP initiative, overseen by
Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon and activists from Tonkin, where the labour force had been
recruited.
On 2 February the Longzhou Soviet and the Chinese Eighth Red Army was
formed just north of the Vietnamese border in Guangxi province. According to
official CCP records, the Soviet covered eight districts around Pingxiang and
Longzhou and survived for about six months. It was reportedly sparked off by an
uprising of GMD troops in Nanning and followed Deng Xiaoping's establishment of a
revolutionary base in Bose (Pai-se) in December. The Longzhou uprising was led by
a communist, Yu Zuoyu, on the staff of warlord Li Mingrui's Nanning-based forces.54
 There is no direct evidence of a Vietnamese role in creating this soviet, but it
would be surprising if the Vietnamese communists settled in Guangxi had not been
involved. This was an area which the French considered to be in their zone of
influence, and in fact bombing by their warplanes helped to destroy the soviet before
long. A number of Vietnamese communists were living in Longzhou, including two
drivers on the staff of the provincial government, Le Quang Dat later told the
French.55 Le Hong Son was thought to enjoy the support of the governor, Yu Zuobo,
cousin of Yu Zuoyu and one of the warlords with whom the CCP was cooperating in
1929.56 Ho Chi Minh claimed in his 18 February 1930 report that five Vietnamese
'comrades' working in Guangxi had recently been arrested. 57 In the same report he
said that the 'anti-imperialist section' of the newly-formed party would have to 'do
their best to enlarge the Guangxi Soviet influence'. 58 In May the final issue of the
newspaper Thanh Nien commented that 'we must protest against the sending of
French imperialist troops to the Sino-Vietnamese border to destroy the Longzhou
Soviet government'.59 Irrespective of the political identity and numbers of Vietnamese
involved in the organization of the soviet, the VCP rallied behind it.
The abortive Yen Bay mutiny of 9-10 February, planned between September
1929 and January 1930, although organized by the VNQDD, may also have had some
connection to the other lunar New Year actions. Envisaged as a 'general uprising'
during which large towns and French military installations would be attacked, 60 the
uprising would have been a useful diversion of French troops from Longzhou. As we
have seen, the ICP faction had stated its intention of working through the VNQDD as
late as 7 January 1930. Ho Chi Minh also informed the FEB in his 18 February letter
that the 'left faction' of the VNQDD 'is in close relation with us;' at the same time he
noted that its right wing was inclined to putchism. 61 A key element of the mutiny,
which was not organized in time, was to have been an attack from Yunnan down the
Red River Valley. (Later in 1930 the French consul in Yunnan informed the British
that among the VNQDD members in the province were a 'considerable number of
communists, of whom many are now in the Chinese military academy'. 62) A group in
Macao called the 'Executive Council of the Association of Revolutionary Soldiers
and Sailors' was quick to produce a tract in support of the Yen Bay mutiny. In Hong
Kong the French confiscated copies of this leaflet (dated 17 February 1930)
addressed to the sailors of the battleship Waldeck Rousseau, urging them to support
'the revolutionary uprising of the Vietnamese'. The Vietnamese were 'rising up
heroically in Hanoi, Yen Bay and Hong Hoa [sic], etc., the insurrection of the
Vietnamese people should be supported and aided by the workers of France'. 63 The
French assumed that this tract was connected to the Thanh Nien organization, but it
may equally well have been produced by the ICP faction or the VNQDD. The Yen
Bay revolt was later criticized by the Vietnamese communists, but it was still viewed
as a heroic uprising which lit a revolutionary fuse in 1930. The French responded to
the VNQDD uprising with the destruction of whole villages which had shown
support for the rebels. This repression may have curtailed the development of
communist activities in the Tonkin countryside later in 1930.

New assignments
On 13 February Ho Chi Minh left Hong Kong for Shanghai, where he wrote
out by hand, in English, his account of his doings since his arrival in Siam in 1928.
The report reveals a preoccupation with relations with the CCP. He discusses not
only connections with the Singapore section, but also mentions that he has asked the
CCP for a letter with addresses of'some leading comrades (Chinese) in Siam, in order
that Annam comrades in that country can work with Ch. [sic] comrades.' He also says
that he has asked the CCP to 'send some leading comrades' to Saigon, where he notes
that there are around 200 Chinese comrades, but who are lacking an able leader. He
suggests that a bureau be created, with one or more representatives from each side, to
coordinate the work of the two parties when the interests of the Chinese and
Annamese masses are involved.64 At the time, he was planning to go on to
Vladivostok to meet his correspondent, who remains unidentified. His report (dated
18 February) shows that he had not yet met Tran Phu. He wrote that he had had no
news from the French and 'the two Annam comrades' at that point. I have found no
proof that he actually went on to Vladivostok after writing this report.
Vladivostok had become the site of a short-term training school established
for Chinese party members to update their communist knowledge and technique. The
CCP CC had suggested in May 1929 that such a training facility be set up, because
they could not spare the cadres or the workers whom the Comintern wanted to train in
Moscow. The Chinese saw it as a place to develop 'those elements from the
intelligentsia and peasantry, who had attained military experience in the red armed
forces and who had fled after the defeat at Hai-lu-feng.'65 Several Chinese-speaking
Vietnamese including Le Quang Dat, Ho Tung Mau and his wife Ly Phuong Thuan
are believed to have travelled there in 1930 to attend a three-month propaganda
course.66 By 1930 the Pan Pacific Trade Union also had a full-time secretariat there. 67
But Ho Chi Minh may have been exempted from this retraining and prevented
altogether from going to Vladivostok, as he was pulled into service by the FEB in
Shanghai. They reported on 3 March that Ho had appeared 'a few days ago'. They
explained: 'We are enclosing his letter, in which he relates everything which he has
reported to us orally. We have decided to use him for liaison work and have given
him several assignments regarding organization and the continuation of work in-
country.' The reason he was put to work in this ad-hoc way may be the fact that
Thibault had disappeared. Moreover, neither Rylski, who had already departed for
Moscow, nor Eisler spoke Chinese. So Ho could have served as a much-needed
linguistic go-between and perhaps as a source of information about Chinese politics.
The FEB did not mention in this letter that Ho was being made head of a Southern
Bureau (it is unclear whether he ever had such a precise title), or that he was being
sent to the Malayan party conference due to be held in Singapore in mid-April. They
noted that one Chinese comrade would attend this conference 'with instructions from
us'.68 It was only in May that they would reveal that they had sent Ho to Singapore to
the MCP conference.
Ho returned to Hong Kong by mid-March, where he finally made contact
with, first, Tran Phu and then, Ngo Duc Tri. After landing briefly in Saigon, Tran Phu
had gone ahead to Hong Kong so that he could meet Thibault. Tri waited in Saigon
three weeks without news, and then decided to sail to Hong Kong to find Tran Phu.
Before leaving, however, he met Bui Lam, a fellow Moscow trainee who had just
returned from Paris on 9 March. Bui Lam was carrying a set of instructions entitled
The Immediate Tasks of the Indochinese Communists, which had been translated into
French in Paris (Tri does not explain whether this was a version of the letter he had
brought from Berlin, or whether it was an additional or more complete set of
instructions). In early March Tri sailed to Hong Kong, where he eventually tracked
down Tran Phu at the YMCA. Tran Phu had missed his appointments with Thibault,
and had been unable to proceed to Haiphong because of the French crackdown
following the Yen Bay mutiny. He had not met Ho Chi Minh until the latter returned
from Shanghai in March. He told Tri about his meeting with Ho and news of the
communist party's unification in January. 'We had nothing more to do but return to
begin our work, given that Ho Chi Minh was in charge of relations with the
Comintern,' Tri told the French.69
Ho later met Ngo Duc Tri and explained: 'At the end of 1927 I received an
order from the Comintern to make propaganda for the formation of an Indochinese
communist party. I was ill in Siam for more than a year and was not able to undertake
anything.' Ho then described the unification and said the FEB had given its approval.
'After the fusion', he concluded, 'all the Chinese communists living in Indochina
would join the Indochinese communist party.'70 At this point, Ho had enough
authority to assign Ngo Duc Tri to return to Saigon, while Tran Phu was sent to work
in Hanoi. Tri's declaration reveals nothing more of Ho's instructions or his own plans.
Back in Saigon by early April 1930,71 Ngo Duc Tri was taken to meet Ngo
Gia Tu. Tu assigned him to work on propaganda, but failed to give him any concrete
tasks. He announced that, for the time being, 'we are still too occupied by a number
of things which have not been finished'. After that Tri was brought to Cholon to stay
in the house which served as the office of the communist cell of the Cholon power
station. He was not invited to join in the cell meetings, and no position was offered to
him other than as translator of the 'Resolution' he had brought from Berlin, as well as
of the letter carried by Bui Lam. Towards the end of April, Tri was told that he would
be producing propaganda for a strike in the towns and country. But only after the
May Day strike at the electrical plant and a move to a new lodging, was he put in
charge of the paper Red Flag. Only after Ngo Gia Tu's arrest at the end of May was
Ngo Duc Tri invited to join the southern Provisional Executive Committee, and then
the Central Committee itself.
The important role assigned to Ngo Gia Tu in this account is underscored by
the description given by Nguyen Nghia (Nguyen Thieu) in the second part of his
memoir on the unification process. Nghia's memoir explains that the two communist
groups in the south had selected two workers to serve on the Provisional Central
Committee: Sau (Hoang Quoc Viet) and Lo (Pham Huu Lau). 72 Yet he describes Ngo
Gia Tu, who was chosen head of the southern Provisional Executive Committee, as
the chief decision-maker. It was Ngo Gia Tu who assigned work in the provinces to
Nghia and Chau Van Liem, the two delegates from the Unification Conference sent
by Ho Chi Minh to oversee the party's creation in the south, in the name of the
Comintern.73 Thus, as in China, the Comintern's power appears to have been much
weaker on the ground than its staff in Moscow supposed.
Nguyen Nghia's article also raises the problem of assimilating Chinese party
members into the Vietnamese party. As Nghia points out, the Chinese group in
Cochinchina was larger than either of the Vietnamese communist factions there, with
many experienced activists who had fled Guangdong after the Canton Commune.
They were unenthusiastic about delegating members to join the new Vietnamese
party's Central Committee, for a variety of reasons: they claimed that the Chinese
lacked legal papers, were not familiar with the political situation, or did not speak the
language. They preferred to select someone to serve on the southern Provisional
Executive Committee.74 Eventually, another Hanoi source says, two Chinese
comrades were selected to the central body: Luu Lap Dao (A Lau) and A Duyen
(Duy).75
It is not surprising that the Chinese were slow to join the new party, given that
it was not to be a sub-branch of the CCP's Central Committee. As Ngo Duc Tri
reported to the French, the tension over the new party's alignment continued in the
spring. He learned from Ngo Gia Tu that a Chinese delegate from the FEB had
passed through Saigon on his way to Singapore from Shanghai. The delegate showed
his disapproval of the Vietnamese party's direct links to the FEB, and remarked that
the Indochinese communists should be answerable to the 'Secretariat of the
Federation of Communist Groups of Indonesia' (apparently meaning the Singapore-
based Federation or League). The Sûreté believed that in April a meeting was held in
Saigon with 'a Chinese inspector from the FEB' who was coming from Siam and who
had not learned of the 'independence given to the Vietnamese party by the FEB'. He
held a meeting to unite the Chinese and Vietnamese communists on 19 April.76 The
CCP thus does not appear to have been enthusiatic about the loss of authority over a
Southeast Asian party.

The revolutionary upsurge in China and the Nanyang

As the Vietnamese communists were organizing their new structures, Li Lisan
was pushing the CCP towards the crest of the new revolutionary wave. On 26
February 1930 he issued his Circular no. 70, which is considered 'the first clear and
unconcealed formulation of what was soon to be called the "Li Lisan Line'". 77 The
circular claimed that as the 'new revolutionary wave is developing forward' and that
as the 'warlord war' continued to expand, the objective basis was being created for the
development of a 'new revolutionary hightide'. Li maintained that 'nationwide mass
struggle' was developing evenly and that party organization in urban areas was
recovering from the setbacks of 1927. His strategy was one of 'concentration and
attack' to win an initial victory in one or more provinces. This would be achieved by
organizing 'an all industry general strike', supporting and penetrating the peasants'
struggle for land, and organizing troop rebellions among the warlord armies. Li
included a warning against 'rightists and liquidationists' who, he cautioned, would
criticize the 'party's political line as putschism'. 78 In early March the Guangdong
Province Committee of the CCP held a conference in Shanghai, to avoid the Nanking
[Nanjing] spies and 'Reorganizes' in Hong Kong.79 Around that time an 'action
committee' was established in Shanghai by Li Lisan s deputy Luo Mei (Li Weihan),
in an effort to neutralize the still-recalcitrant Jiangsu provincial organization. 80 On 15
March the Nanyang Provisional Committee also met, most likely in Shanghai, as a
meeting of the Federation of the Oppressed Peoples of the East occurred in Shanghai
around the same time, and many of the participants would have been at both
meetings. At this gathering a resolution in support of the ECCI's Tenth Plenum was
passed. This resolution, which emphasizes the CCP's adherence to the Comintern
line, was in part an answer to the FEB's October 1929 criticisms. It reads: 'The
Executive Committee recognized that the line and resolution of the Plenum [Tenth
ECCI] fully answer the demands of the leadership of the Revolution in China and in
Nanyang, and especially the state of the struggle with the right deviation, liquidators,
appeasers and opportunists...'81 The Nanyang Committee's resolution rejected the
criticism made by Chen Duxiu and others who 'consider that the present struggle of
the Chinese masses is the "opposite of a revolutionary upsurge'". 82 The document
states: 'The transition from a general workers' strike in Nanyang to a general political
strike is a pressing question for the workers' movement at the present time.' 83 This
meeting may have been an occasion for Li Lisan's supporters to propagate his newly-
articulated policy.
A Sûreté report shows that the day after this resolution was passed the
Communist Youth League (CYL) held a meeting in Shanghai. 84 This report
demonstrates the increasing involvement of the CCP in the affairs of other Asian
parties. At this gathering the Formosan Lee Nan Mow announced that, on instructions
from the CC of the CCP, the Youth League had been assigned to support 'by all
possible means' the revolutionary movement in the Indies, in Indochina and in Korea.
The Korean and Indian participants noted that although their movements had recently
made progress, it would nevertheless be difficult to continue the struggle without the
support of the 'great fraternal Chinese party'. The meeting agreed to request that the
Chinese CC send to the countries in question young Chinese propagandists and
revolutionary cadres, who would be provided with arms, money and propaganda. The
contact point for Indochina would be Canton. At the close of the meeting, the
chairman announced that 'the local office of the GMD had promised to support the
revolutionary movement in the Indies, Indonesia and Korea, independently of the
policy of the Central Government.' This seems to be a sign that the GMD left-wing
was still engaged in some level of cooperation with the CCP in the spring of 1930.
 Although the discussions recorded by the Sûreté source make no direct
reference to the Secretariat of the Communist Federation of the Oppressed Peoples of
the Far East, their report cited above notes that this meeting of the CYL confirmed
the existence of such a secretariat. This meeting may have been a gathering of the
CYL's Anti-imperialist League, which had been created as a front for their 'legal and
semi-legal' activities. The FEB noted in a May 1930 letter that at the start of 1930
there had been three different Anti-imperialist Leagues in China - 'the best and the
most popular' of these was that of the CYL, the letter observed. (One of the three, the
'Far Eastern' League - organized by the CCP, they said - had been wound up, since it
was nothing more than 'an apparat'.) The FEB apparently encouraged the CCP to
work with what they called the 'Chinese Anti-imperialist League' based in Tianjin. 85
Behind these mild observations there seems to lie a hidden drama, but it is only
through the French sources that we get some hint of what had occurred.
The final issue of Thanh Nien in May 1930 reported that a new Anti-
imperialist League of the East had been started 'to denounce the lies and tricks of the
nationalist Chinese party'. Its first meeting in April 1930 had been attended by
delegates from India, Korea, Java, Formosa, Indochina, China and other eastern
countries. This report refers to the 1928 creation of the League of the Oppressed
Peoples of the East as 'a subterfuge to separate Asian revolutionaries from the
Comintern'.86 Possibly Ho Chi Minh attended this April meeting. By this stage,
Russian scholars believe that the FEB was having difficulty in getting information
about what was happening within the CCP; at the same time, they say, the fear of
being accused of rightist errors was making the FEB staff 'extremely cautious' about
reporting on or criticizing what they regarded as leftist tendencies in CCP policies. 87
That may be why the FEB staff played down their effort to get the CCP to close down
or disassociate itself from one of the Anti-Imperialist Leagues, apparently the one
founded in July-August 1928. As we have seen, the origins of this organization seem
to lie in some sort of cooperation between the Left GMD/Third Party movement and
the CCP.
The Sûreté's reports from the spring of 1930 are confusing and at times
apparently contradictory. On the one hand, in March their detective in Hong Kong,
Neron, reported that Nguyen Ai Quoc had suffered a considerable loss of influence
with the Comintern after Stalin's consolidation of power. 88 However, by September
1930 the Sûreté had produced a new analysis. By then they had come to believe that
Ho/Quoc was the Comintern representative who had turned up in December 1929
with the power 'to inspect...the communist organizations in the Far East'. 89 This
changed view of Ho's role may reflect the FEB's decision in March or April 1930 to
take a more active role in combatting the influence of Li Lisan. In fact, it appears that
Ho Chi Minh took over some of the tasks which had been assigned to Thibault, the
Comintern inspector (who as noted above was referred to by the FEB as 'the comrade
for Indonesia'), when the latter failed to return to Shanghai from his trip to Indochina.
But Ho's authority, according to the Russian documents, seems to have been
delegated by the FEB in Shanghai between March and April 1930 and was probably
not as sweeping as that given to Thibault.
By April 1930 relations between the FEB and Li Lisan had come close to the
breaking point. On 17 April Li wrote to Zhou Enlai and Qu Quibai (then in Moscow)
to suggest that the Comintern reorganize the FEB. He believed that the FEB's
mistakes were of a 'dangerous, rightist character' and that they were 'politically in no
condition to lead'.90 Li apparently believed that he would receive Stalin's or Mif's
backing in this dispute. While Moscow delayed giving a clear sign of approval or
disapproval regarding the FEB, Li proceeded with plans for a general uprising. It was
in this context that the FEB decided to use Ho Chi Minh as an emissary to Siam and
Malaya, to help the local communists establish national parties. The haste to set up
these parties to replace the branches of the Nanyang Provisional Committee could in
part have arisen from the FEB's desire to limit Li Lisan's and the Chinese CC's
influence.91 It was only after the fact, in a letter of 18 May 1930, that Eisler and
Bespalov informed the Eastern Secretariat that they had sent Ho to Singapore to the
Malayan party conference, and also assigned him the task of selecting Malayan
delegates to the coming Fifth Profintern Congress in Moscow. They reported in the
same letter that the French comrade who had gone to Indochina had still not been
found, even though the Vietnamese communists were searching for his trace. 92 This
letter makes no mention of Ho's role in Siam.
The exact dates of Ho's travel are difficult to establish. Hoang Van Hoan, who
until now has been the main source on this episode in Ho's career, states that Ho
arrived in Bangkok around the end of March 1930. After holding discussions with the
Chinese comrades in Bangkok, he proceeded to Udon to explain the Comintern's
policy to the Vietnamese residents there, according to Hoan's account. With the
formation of a Siamese CP, the Vietnamese communists would be expected to
become members instead of joining the Vietnamese CP. The same principle would
apply to Chinese residents of Siam. Hoan says that after the Udon meeting Ho
returned to Bangkok to oversee the formation of the Siamese party on 20 April.93
A report sent to Moscow by the Siamese party in 1935, however, gives a
somewhat different chronology.94 This document says it was in June 1930 that the
Eastern Secretariat sent a delegate to Siam, who urged the Siam Committee
(composed exclusively of Chinese members) to join the Vietnamese in the northeast
of the country to form one party. The British found a passport bearing Ho's picture,
issued in the name of Sung Man Sho, when they arrested him in June 1931. It had
been granted for six months, on 28 April 1930, by the Consul General of the National
Government of China in the Straits Settlements. It stated that he was a citizen of the
Republic of China proceeding to Siam on business. 95 So it appears that at the end of
May Ho did travel to Bangkok, after attending the Third Delegate Conference of the
Malayan Provisional Committee in Singapore. But it was not until September 1930,
when Ho had returned to Hong Kong, that the unification of the Siam party was
completed, with two Vietnamese joining the Siam Central Committee. Thus Ho Chi
Minh may have visited Siam as early as April 1930, as Hoang Van Hoan claims, but
if he did so his visit did not coincide with the founding of a unified Siam CP.
The Third Delegate Conference of the Nanyang Provisional Committee was
apparently due to be held to coincide with the 1 May observances in Singapore.
However, as a letter addressed to the 'English Komparty' in London explains, at a 29
April meeting held to prepare for May Day, all eleven people in attendance were
arrested, including the secretary of the party, the Labour Union secretary and a
member of the Central Committee. This letter says that on 21 May the 'Conference
was called', and that the Malay Communist Party was organised on 24 May. 96 The
meeting was attended by eleven delegates, not including the CC members and the
representative of the FEB. The ten-page conference report which Ho Chi Minh seems
to have authored97 demonstrates that the FEB was now moving to curb the influence
of Li Lisan and the Chinese CC in the Nanyang. This report accuses the Nanyang
Committee of the error of putschism and an irresponsible attitude toward the staging
of insurrections.
After listing the 'Ten Big Demands of the Malay Revolution', the report
launched into a long list of 'Mistakes and Lessons from the Work done'. The first
mistake was 'to conduct the Chinese revolution in Malaya': 'The work', it said, 'was
conducted in accordance with the political line of the Chinese Party, apart from the
practical life of Malaya, and overlooked the fundamental tasks of Malay revolution.'
The party had neglected work among peasants and soldiers as well. It went on: 'The
development of organization was not only directed towards Chinese people but
towards one part of Chinese people (natives of Kwangchow, Kwangtung)...' Under
the heading 'Mistake of putschism', the report gave a list of errors. These included
'commandism and compulsion of strike'; 'disregard to insurrection and individual
terror (the Malay party in part compelled the striking workers to play the insurrection
as a joke - an unforgivable mistake)'; 'firing of factories and confiscation of property
of factory owners'; and 'bringing out the slogan "seizure of power and establishment
of soviet'". The author expanded on the final point thus: 'As the Malay P. was still in
beginning of organisation, lack of broad masses round the party, it is to neglect the
forces of enemies and overestimate our own forces and to abandon the general task of
the Party, that is, to win over the masses, to organise masses and finally to prepare the
armed insurrection, if we set up the slogan: seizure of power and establishment of
Soviet.'98 A final point described the 'connection between the Malay party and
brotherhood [NAQ's translation of "fraternal"] parties'. This drove home the fact that
the CCP did not have the exclusive right to direct the Malayan party: 'the Malay
parties (sic), besides under the direction of the Comintern, hope the P. of China, of G.
Britain, of Holland and of France give their experiences and instructions from time to
time.'99 The Police Journal for the Straits Settlements later reported that propaganda
and instructions from the 'Central' in Shanghai ceased in the middle of 1930,
following the third Delegate Conference.100

The revolutionary wave in Vietnam

The FEB reported on 25 June that they had just learned that Ho Chi Minh
would be arriving in Shanghai in the coming days (they were relieved that he had not
been caught in the Singapore arrests at the end of April, which they had learned of
from the Singapore press).101 He must have returned to Hong Kong by the middle of
June. He had thus missed the first wave of VCP militancy in 1930: a series of strikes
and demonstrations in all three parts of Vietnam which started in April and led to a
large number arrests in early May. As we have seen in Cochinchina, these actions, at
least in the urban areas, were organized largely by the ICP groups which had existed
before the Unification Congress. Both Ngo Gia Tu and Duong Hac Dinh were picked
up in Saigon at the end of May. Just before the May Day events Hoang Quoc Viet
was arrested in Haiphong, where he had gone to consult with Tran Phu. Many cadres
in the northern labour movement joined him in prison after May Day.102
 This blow to the urban movement refocused the Vietnamese communists'
attention on the rural areas. Ironically, just after Ho delivered his list of criticisms of
the Malayan party, a group referred to as the 'Provisional Central Executive
Committee' (Ban Chap Uy Lam Thoi Trung Uong) in Hanoi decided to work towards
an uprising in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, two provinces often referred to collectively as
'Nghe Tinh'. At a meeting in Hanoi (said by one author to have been held in June),
Tran Phu, Nguyen The Rue, Tran Van Lan, Trinh Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Phong Sac
(the latter three from the original ICP faction) arrived at this decision. 103 Nguyen
Phong Sac, a former teacher at the Thanh Long school in Hanoi, was the cadre who
had been assigned to lead the party in Central Vietnam. (His colleague from the old
Tan Viet party, Le Mao, remained in Nghe An during this meeting.) The participants
delegated Nguyen Duc Canh, formerly based in Haiphong, to work with Nguyen
Phong Sac in developing the Nghe Tinh movement. Thus the two major party figures
guiding the Nghe Tinh Soviets were comparatively well-educated northerners who
had been among the leaders of the ICP faction. In the 1950s and '60s the Vietnamese
would glorify the role of Le Viet Thuat, a Ben Thuy worker who became head of the
Regional Committee in Annam in April 1931. 104 However, in 1957 the Hanoi
historian Tran Huy Lieu would credit Nguyen Duc Canh with the direct leadership of
the Nghe Tinh Soviets.105 Tran Phu, imbued with the Comintern's radical view of the
'Third Period', may have been persuaded by his comrades with more recent
experience of political work in-country that the time was ripe for action. It must be
admitted, though, that we have very little knowledge of the extent of his power and
his exact position within the party at this juncture. The meeting issued an appeal to
the workers, peasants and soldiers of Nghe An to continue their resistance struggle
and prepare for the imperialist's repression - the least hesitation would be the
equivalent of helping the imperialists to destroy them, it said.106
Ho Chi Minh, who now appeared to have reached the peak of his authority in
the Comintern, seems to have returned to Hong Kong to deal with a situation beyond
his influence. Although Huynh Kim Khanh speculates that Ho may have played a
'considerable role in the conceptualization and direction of the soviet movement', his
basis for this view is the doubtful attribution to Ho of the article on peasant
insurrection discussed in the Introduction.107 Ho's letters and reports of 1930-1 do
include a prescription for work within the military. But the content and style of the
1928 article on military work among the peasants is very different from this 1930
document by Ho. The latter is a six-page handwritten essay which seems to post-date
Ho's June return to Hong Kong and Shanghai because it refers to a demonstration in
Cholon province which probably occurred in or after the spring of 1930. 108 Headed
simply 'Military', this document (an English copy) is an attempt to strike a balance
between the over-emphasis of military matters and the neglect of preparation for a
coming armed struggle.109 He states clearly: 'The military task of the party comprises:
military training of the party members; agit-prop among the army; organisation of
worker's and peasant's guards.' He devotes most of his attention to 'agit-prop in the
army'. The native soldiers are conscripted from the villages and should not be treated
as 'whole hunting dogs' of the imperialist, he says. At a demonstration in Cholon, he
points out, the peasants made the mistake of insulting the soldiers instead of'making
propaganda to them'. In agit-prop work, he says, 'the party must propagate the
programme "Bourgeois democratic revolution" among the soldiers, and utilize
national sentiment to make them agree with the revolutionary movement of the
workers and peasants and accept the leadership of the party.'
By June the beleaguered Eisler in Shanghai was failing in his attempts to
moderate Li Lisan's policies, in spite of the fact that the May Day demonstrations in
China had also resulted in large numbers of arrests.110 Ho Chi Minh may have found
himself in a similar position in relation to his own party, where he apparently did not
have a vote in the Provisional Central Committee. As a good Bolshevik, however, he
had to accept his party's decision to enlarge the Nghe An workers and peasants
movement. A 9 June letter to the Vietnamese fighting in the Chinese Red Army, to
ask that they return to the 'Annam front', may have been written by him. 'The work of
the Vietnamese revolution is now our work,' it says; 'work in China is not our task.' 111
However, at the same time Li Lisan was pressing the Comintern to send foreign
comrades from 'England, France, Japan, India, and Indochina' to carry out
propaganda work in China among the foreign sailors posted there. He insisted that
they work under the direction of the CCP.112 Thus by June several Vietnamese had
been seconded to work on military propaganda in Shanghai. The ICP organizer from
Tonkin, Do Ngoc Du alias Phiem Chu, says that Ho assigned him to go to Shanghai
in late March, after he had fled from Hanoi. He began editing articles aimed at the
French military after 14 June 1930, he later told the Sûreté. Another Vietnamese, Luu
Quoc Long, was responsible for the printing and distribution of tracts and articles.
The French language newspaper L'Armee began to appear twice monthly. 113 A
Vietnamese language paper, Giac Ngo (Awakening) was the responsibility of Le
Quang Dat (aka Hoang Cao), his wife Ly Phuong Duc, and Nguyen Luong Bang. Le
Quang Dat was in charge of liaison between the FEB and Hong Kong, as well as for
making travel arrangements for Vietnamese travelling to and from Moscow.114
 French reports describe the interval between 1 June and 30 August 1930 as a
period of peaceful demonstrations in Vietnam. 115 In fact two processes appear to have
been underway by June 1930: one was the formation of party structures which would
lead to the selection of delegates for the plenum due to be held in the autumn; the
other was, as noted above, the preparation for a second wave of direct action centered
in northern Annam. It is difficult to say how closely coordinated the two processes
actually were. Regarding party organization, Ngo Duc Tri's confession gives a picture
(lacking for the two other regions of Vietnam) of the restructuring which went on in
the south following Ngo Gia Tu's arrest. According to Tri's account, Ngo Gia Tu's
leadership had not been entirely popular with local party members. 'Since the creation
of the ICP and the Provisional Executive Committee all tasks had been decided by
the members of this committee, without consulting the members of the cell
committees,' he explained. He added: 'No reports of work carried out were made to
the cells, which caused some discontent.' Demonstrations in May and early June in Sa
Dec, Vinh Long, Cholon province and Duc Hoa in Gia Dinh had resulted in many
arrests and the death of Chau Van Liem - this may have also prompted the southern
party to reassess its tactics. 116 Around 18 June 1930 a meeting of the Nam ky
Provisional Executive Committee was held, which delegates from other localities
were invited to attend in order to present their opinions. Ngo Duc Tri had joined Ung
Van Khiem (Huan) and Nguyen Van Son (Dung) on the Committee just before the
meeting.117 Afterwards he also joined the Provisional Central Committee. Over the
summer, Tri says, 'some comrades wanted to start insurrections and commit acts of
terrorism.' The Provisional Executive Committee had to summon the members of the
provincial committees to explain to them that they had to abandon these plans. The
Committee instructed the members of the province committees to explain to the
masses that assassination is contrary to the fundamental principles of communism.' 118
Ngo Duc Tri may have been trying to absolve himself of responsibility for the
violence of 1930-31 in this confession, yet a 1931 report which he would send to
Moscow confirms that he held a low estimation of the results of the party's activism
(see note 149).
In North and Central Vietnam, the party seems to have taken a different
course. In principle Tran Phu gained more control over the party infrastructure when
he joined the Provisional Central Committee in the summer, after the arrest of
Nguyen Hoi. When Trinh Dinh Cuu dropped out of the Standing Committee to join
the Bac ky Regional Committee, his place also went to Tran Phu. 119 But in practice,
the northern party operated fairly independently, according to later Comintern
reports. For example, in an undated letter written after 4 April 1931, the FEB
instructed that 'the question of separatist tendencies in the North and Central
organizations must be cleared up.'120 (These tendencies seem to have surfaced the
previous autumn, as is discussed below.) After the transformation of the Nanyang
Provisional Committee into a group of national communist parties, the CCP CC
presumably no longer had a formal directing role in Southeast Asia. There is at
present no way of knowing whether or to what degree Li Lisan's timetable for China's
'revolutionary upsurge' influenced events in Vietnam. But there does appear to be a
rough correlation between the periods of planning and action in the two countries.
In China Li's planning for the armed uprisings of August and September 1930
took place at a series of meetings held between early June and 6 August. On 11 June
the CCP Politburo adopted a resolution which called on the Soviet Union and 'the
labouring masses of the world' to support the Chinese revolution. It made explicit the
idea that the Chinese revolution had become the focal point of the world revolution.121
The communists' Third Army staged a briefly successful attack on Changsha on 28
July. On 6 August Li Lisan's 'Central Action Committee' called for immediate
revolution and uprisings in Wuhan, Beijing, Tianjin, Harbin and other cities (in
response the FEB sent the ECCI a telegram dated 4-7 August which requested that Li
Lisan be 'immediately recalled' to Moscow). 122 A second attack on Changsha was
staged between 24 August and 12 September. During this period Moscow maintained
a noncommital attitude towards Li's endeavours, leaving the FEB to continue their
efforts to curb Li's adventurism. One of the new FEB representatives, the Profintern
representative S. Stolyar, known by the pseudonyms 'Jack' or 'Léon', wrote to the
Profintern chief Lozovsky on 5 August to support Eisler. He complained that Li
Lisan was mobilizing all responsible comrades against the Comintern. 123
Interestingly, the revolutionary high-tide which Li Lisan was proclaiming coincided
with a full-scale civil war within the Chinese GMD which lasted from 5 April until
early November.124 Chen Kungpo and the 'Reorganizes' played a key role in this
conflict from their new base in Beijing. It seems likely that Li Lisan was counting on
their eventual success.
In Vietnam, following the June meeting of the Provisional Central Executive
Committee in Hanoi, the provincial party committees for Nghe An and Ha Tinh were
reorganized in July. In Nghe An party organizations were created down to the village
(xa) level.125 The second wave of activism in Nghe Tinh, which led to the
disintegration of local administration and the establishment of Soviets, began on 29
August and reached its apogee on 11-12 September (on 12 September the peasants of
Gia Dinh, Cholon and Tan An provinces also demonstrated. 126) District offices were
burned down in a number of areas and local mandarins handed over their seals to the
village insurgents; village officials either joined the movement or were killed. 127
French bombing of demonstrators converging on Vinh on 12 September caused over
120 deaths. As Tran Huy Lieu explains, by that date local demonstrations were being
coordinated to involve several districts. These events are recounted chronologically in
the French reports, as well as by Tran Huy Lieu. 128 It seems significant that 12
September, later celebrated in Vietnam as the founding date of the Nghe Tinh
Soviets, was also observed by the CCP in the 1930s as the anniversary of the 1927
Autumn Harvest Uprising.129
There is little question that the local peasants, burdened with a variety of
taxes, were strongly motivated to demonstrate against the French and the local
mandarins. But the idea that their actions were spontaneous or inspired by a few local
hotheads is very hard to accept, in view of the planning carried out by the VCP, as
well as the incendiary instructions the communists had received from Moscow.James
Scott contends that 'while the party may have lent a certain coherence to the initial
protests, it hardly needed to instruct peasants about the objects of their anger.' 130 Yet
the very tactics which he refers to as arising from the 'concrete grievances of the rural
cultivators' - the demands for an end to taxes (or the delay of tax payments) and 'the
seizure of rice from the landlords' granaries' - were ones which had been taught to
peasant organizers since the early 1920s at Peng Pai's Peasant Institute. The
September actions in Nghe Tinh, which often involved the burning of district offices
and destruction of tax and land documents, employed methods which had been used
in Hai-Lu-feng during the soviet movement.131 One might conclude that, rather than
following the peasantry, the communists had developed organizing methods which
were well suited to the local conditions, at least in the short term. 132 One can also
conclude that Li Lisan's actions in China must have had some degree of influence on
the events in Nghe Tinh. The Nghe Tinh uprising might well have occurred in some
form without the Comintern's involvement, or without the CCP leadership's desire to
hasten the advent of the Chinese and world revolutions. However, it would not have
taken place in the form that it did had communist organizers not been in command. It
would probably not have occurred at the exact moment that it did, had they not set
some form of schedule for action.
The October Plenum and Tran Phu's consolidation of power
The newly-formed Vietnamese party was unable to unify its countrywide
leadership until the first Central Committee plenum was held in Hong Kong in
October 1930. In the interval between his June trip to Shanghai and the October
plenum, Ho Chi Minh seems to have settled into his work as a transmission post for
the Malay, Siamese and Vietnamese parties. Between 23 July and 2 September, he
claimed to have sent the FEB six letters. Of these, only the 2 September letter is in
the Comintern's archives. In this letter he explained that on 13 August he succumbed
to a TB attack, a condition which he described as 'lung suffering and blood spitting,
awfully weak and tired'.133 He also listed the agenda items which would be raised at
the coming CC meeting: '(a) autocritique of the past; (b) plan to keep the work going
until the congress; (c) plan for the congress; and (d) plan for the sending of students.'
He apparently did not foresee that the October plenum would involve a major
redirection of the party. In the same letter he mentioned that he had just completed
what he called 'a prop-vulgarisation work' entitled Notebook of a Shipwreck. It had
taken eight days to write and almost a month to print twenty copies, he said. 134 This is
a fable about three sailors, one French, one African and one Vietnamese, who are
ship-wrecked and rescued by a Soviet vessel. They are taken to Moscow and given
medical care, training in a communist institute, and shown respect which they had
been denied as French labourers. The Vietnamese sailor is struck by the 'unusually
powerful attraction' of Leninist theory on colonialism 'for people who have been
deprived of their motherland'.135 It was probably more than author's pride which led
Ho to spend a month preparing this pamphlet.
He may well have been demonstrating his loyalty to Moscow, at a time when
the CCP had adopted what the Russians considered an anti-Comintern line.
Ho still maintained what appear to have been good relations with the CCP,
however. He reported to the FEB on 22 September that he had requested advice from
the Chinese Southern Bureau on the tactics which the Vietnamese party should
employ to deal with the 'White terror', the repressive measures which the French were
using against the peasants in Nghe An. On 19 September three members of the VCP
CC had arrived in Hong Kong for the Central Committee plenum, he explained, and
had made a report on events in Vietnam. As it would have taken too long to consult
the FEB (a 'fast' letter between Shanghai and Hong Kong was taking fifteen days to
arrive at this point)136, the CC members and Ho held a discussion with the Chinese to
work out the VCP's next move. Ho's bland description of this discussion mentions
that the Chinese agreed with the VCP's decision to collect money for the victims and
hold a national protest movement. The group also decided to begin organizing a
'peasant guard', to reinforce party work among workers and propaganda among
soldiers.137
Ngo Duc Tri gives a more detailed account of this encounter with two
Chinese from the Southern Bureau, which he says included Ho, Ho Tung Mau,
Truong Van Lenh, his fellow CC member 'Sau' (Nguyen Trong Nha, also known as
Nguyen Trong Nhat, a former student from Ha Tinh) 138 and himself. (The other
members of the Vietnamese CC had not yet arrived for the plenum.) The Chinese felt
that the demonstrations which marked the beginning of the 'insurrectionary
movement' were a good thing. But Ho Tung Mau responded that insurrection was
bringing 'more defeats than victories', although there was no harm in continuing the
demonstrations. Ho believed that it would be impossible to stage a full insurrection,
but that in the villages the peasants could elect Soviets and carry out land
redistribution. Ngo Duc Tri claims to have taken the firmest stand against the trend
towards insurrection in Nghe Tinh. 'The revolutionary movement is just taking
shape...it is a mistake to advocate insurrection; it will have no value for the
revolutionary movement, just bombing and defeats. The Chinese party is calling for
insurrection, but... what is possible in China is not always possible in Indochina. The
creation of Soviets and the distribution of land without the support of an insurrection
is impossible to carry out,' Tri claims to have said. Of the Vietnamese, only 'Sau' was
in full agreement with the Chinese.139
The Chinese CC delegate from Saigon, A Lau, did not participate in this
discussion. But he may have contributed to the report on the Cochinchina-Cambodia
section of the party which Ho sent to the FEB on 22 September. By this stage, the
Chinese party in the south appears to have formally merged with the Vietnamese.
(However, in 1931 a report from Saigon would again refer to the Cochinchina-
Cambodia section as an entity separate from the ICP.) 140 In Cambodia, the party now
listed 120 Chinese and four Vietnamese members, with 300 Chinese in a labour
union. In Cochinchina the party had shown strong growth, with 70 Chinese members
and 400 Vietnamese, an increase of 350 Vietnamese since February 1930. There were
500 members of labour unions (not broken down by ethnicity) and 13,500 members
of peasant unions.141
Two of the remaining CC members, Tran Phu and Le Mao, reached Hong
Kong on 2 October, just as the southern members were about to give up waiting and
return home. (A third, the former ICP activist Tran Van Lan, missed the rendezvous
and spent most of October waiting in a hotel. One wonders if he had been given a
wrong address.) Nguyen Phong Sac, the other missing member, was too occupied
with the Nghe Tinh movement to attend. Ngo Duc Tri came down with appendicitis
immediately before the meeting, and thus spent the next two weeks in hospital.
Although at least one Vietnamese scholar has attempted to show that Ho Chi Minh
was also absent from the October plenum, the Comintern evidence shows that this
was not the case.142 On 28 October Ho wrote one of his least informative reports ever
on the proceedings. In addition to listing the numbers of party members in various
organizations (now, 1,740 members, of whom 190 were Chinese), he enumerated the
items and resolutions discussed, noting that these had not yet been translated. His
expense report showed that the total cost of travel, food and lodging during the
plenum amounted to 440 Hong Kong dollars. At the close he asked: 'Please, call for
us immediately, because we must return immediately after having seen you.' 143 This
would seem to show that he indeed accompanied Tran Phu to Shanghai, to report to
the FEB, following the plenum.
For anyone attempting to prove that Ho was the constant guiding light of the
Vietnamese party, his absence from Hong Kong would have been convenient at this
point. For it was at the October plenum that he lost his authority as the interpreter of
Comintern policy for Vietnam. His February 1930 programme for the VCP was
replaced with new Political Theses and resolutions in tune with the current Comintern
line. As we have seen, this required that the party develop as a class-based
organization. The party's twofold mission of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
revolution now concentrated on the emancipation of the working class, both urban
and rural. By 1931 this ideology would result in the purging of many middle-class
patriots from the party and their alienation from the revolutionary movement. At the
same time, the plenum appears to have criticized the September uprising in Nghe An.
A circular which is identified by Van Kien Dang as dating from October criticizes the
'Annam Committee'. It states: 'At the present moment, given the situation in the
country, the level of preparation of the proletariat and the exploited masses in the
towns and countryside, the level of party preparation and the strength of the enemy,
isolated uprisings in a few places are putchism and are incorrect.' 144 At the end of the
plenum, the participants decided to establish the Central Committee in Saigon. Tran
Phu was named secretary of the CC, with Ngo Duc Tri and Nguyen Trong Nha as the
other two members of the Standing Committee (Bureau Permanent). Nguyen Phong
Sac and Tran Van Lan retained their CC membership. The Chinese member, A Lau,
decided to remain in Hong Kong to work with the Chinese party, as he was a
Whampoa graduate.145
Following the plenum, according to Ngo Duc Tri, Ho and Tran Phu went to
Shanghai together to report to the FEB. When Tran Phu returned to Hong Kong
around 20 November, he brought a short letter from Ho, Ngo Duc Tri explained. The
letter admitted that the party's unification had been carried out hastily, and that there
had been many gaps in direction, due to the lack of information from inside the
country. Ho also gave his agreement to the party's change of name to Indochinese
Communist Party.146 A 9 December circular to party organizations made public Ho's
admission of his errors. It noted that none of the regions of Vietnam had implemented
the Comintern's instructions, which had been sent out to them in February and March
1930; in fact, these directives had been 'coldly received'. Party members had not
realized that the 'comrade who called the Unification Conference had been sent home
to work by the Comintern without any particular instructions... he acted on his own
initiative and made a series of mistakes... This comrade has already recognized his
mistakes and has agreed to correct them.'147 This circular also pointed out the need to
view all landlords 'as a class'. In opposition to the February programme of the
Unification Conference, the circular stated that all landlords were enemies of the
peasantry and that their interests were 'closely linked to the interests of
imperialism'.148
By late January 1931, although new waves of demonstrations were taking
place in Ha Tinh and Quang Ngai provinces, Ngo Duc Tri wrote to Moscow that 'the
bloody terror is affecting the spirit of the masses and making our work more
difficult'. Out of ninety party members in Haiphong as of October 1930, he noted,
seventeen had been arrested, ten had had to flee, and forty-five had left the party out
of fear of repression. As of December 1930 the number of members there had risen
slightly to ninety-three with the addition of new recruits, but the number of union
members had dropped from ninety-nine in October to sixty-seven in December. 149 In
the coal mining regions of Hon Gay. Cam Pha and Ha Tu, where there are thousands
of miners, he wrote: 'We have only twenty-nine comrades'. 150 The party had not been
able to penetrate the plantations since the Phu Rieng uprising, and in the countryside
where the repression was especially harsh, the peasant unions 'had been
annihilated'.151 As a post script he added that the CC had started to establish
communications with Shanghai, but that at the moment, the system was functioning
badly. (It is probable that the discovery of the Chinese CP's Southern Bureau by the
British police in Hong Kong in December 1930 disrupted communications, already
slow, between Hong Kong and Shanghai. As the British would report in 1932, the
bureau 'lived on in a moribund state, as a transmission and translation agency of the
FEB, in the person of Nguen [sic] Ai Quac, the Annamite Communist.'152)
This depressing situation seems to have affected the CC's relations with Ho.
On 12 February he forwarded a letter to the FEB from the Vietnamese CC (in his
own English translation), which began: 'What is the opinion of the CI concerning our
draft resolutions? Has it any letter for us? If not, then what is the use to have an office
at HK. At least the CI should have a letter for us. [...] If you cannot help us
connecting with the CI and the E. Section, then what is the use of you being there?' 153
The instructions and support which the renamed ICP desired always took a long time
to arrive in Vietnam. This was not necessarily Ho's fault, as the FEB was slow in
responding to their requests. In a February note to the FEB, Ho had emphasized the
delicate position in which the CC leadership found itself and the importance of
building up their authority. The reason the 'new directors of the Indochina firm' are so
anxious to receive your promised letters, he said, is that 'they are newly arrived in the
country and they do not yet have the necessary influence over their subordinates, who
have been in the firm longer.'154 But the FEB was far better at issuing general
instructions and criticizing the reports they received than solving concrete problems
(in the winter of 1931 they may also have been fully absorbed by the task of ridding
the CCP of Li Lisan's influence). They had written to Ho on 12 January to promise
that 'a more thorough and detailed document' with instructions would be ready
shortly, but this did not materialize until the end of March. 155 The FEB's 12 January
letter also criticized his reporting, ignoring the fact that he probably had had to
change his address and communications methods since the discovery of the CCP's
Southern Bureau. 'Your connections with the places seems to us still insufficient and
unsatisfactory.... Also the information about the White Terror is too "dry" (only that
so-and-so many are arrested); it is important to know on what work they were
arrested, why they were arrested, etc.'156 In the same letter, the FEB demanded more
demonstrations: 25 February was to be 'Unemployment Day', marked by 'the widest
possible mobilisation of the masses in the shops and factories'.
Ho seems to have told the FEB of his marriage plans sometime in the winter.
The FEB informed him in their letter of 12 January that he should let them know the
date of his marriage two months before it took place. As this letter uses none of the
code of a business firm, we can assume that they were literally referring to Ho's
taking a wife. In February he mentioned that his wife was busy with preparations for
the New Year and the planned reception of visitors from Saigon and Tonkin, so it
seems that he ignored the FEB's instructions or that they arrived too late. 157 From
other Comintern documents from 1934 and 1935, we learn that this wife was
apparently Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, the former Tan Viet activist from Vinh who was
assigned to work in Hong Kong after the party unification.158 She was later assigned
to liaison work with the Chinese party. Whether she and Ho remained man and wife
after their arrests in April and June 1931 is not known. (The French documentary
sources on Nguyen Thi Minh Khai would lead one to believe that she had a variety of
relationships with her male comrades between 1930 and 1940. In 1932, for example,
the Sûreté was convinced that she was the mistress of Tran Ngoc Danh, Tran Phu's
younger brother. They intercepted one letter in 1933 which she wrote in Hong Kong,
seemingly to reject a suitor, which declared 'I am no longer haunted by the idea of
marriage or motherhood...My only husband is the Communist Revolution.' 159 Yet by
late 1934, when she arrived in Moscow, she wrote that she was married to 'Lin', Ho's
pseudonym at the time.160 Her Vietnamese biographies state that she married Le Hong
Phong in Moscow in 1935, but there is no contemporary account of such a
marriage.161)

The March Plenum and the end of the 'high tide'

By 12 March 1931, when the Second plenum started in Saigon, the CC's
relations with Ho Chi Minh had deteriorated to the point that he would soon ask to be
relieved of his assignment in Hong Kong. One of the items on the March plenum's
agenda was the 'question of Ho Chi Minh'. According to Ngo Duc Tri, the leaders in
Annam and Tonkin complained that Ho frequently demanded reports from them for
the FEB in Shanghai, reports which were the responsibility of the CC's 'Standing
Committee' to prepare. The meeting decided to write to Ho to ask that he stop
requesting these reports; when necessary, the CC would send reports to the FEB via
Hong Kong, but Ho would simply be asked to pass them on. 162 Later in April, Tran
Phu would write to the FEB to announce that they should no longer use Ho as a go-
between, as 'he is too brief and sometimes he gives us his own opinions without
consulting you.'163
Ho responded to these criticisms in a letter of 23 April to the CC, saying that
he saw little point in simply serving as a post box. He explained: 'I know that
circumstances are difficult and the CC has a lot of work. But "one" needs to
understand our situation clearly, and that is why we have had to request reports form
the local committees.'164 At the end of March the FEB tried to persuade him to stay in
Hong Kong, on the grounds that it would be no easier for him to maintain
communications from Shanghai. They assured him that, 'You personally are
indispensable and above all for the need we spoke of last November. Here is how we
have defined your tasks: (1) to maintain the closest links possible with the party
organizations in your country; (2) to inform us of everything that is going on where
you are; (3) to prepare and educate the party for the future struggle.'165
The Comintern inspector Joseph Ducroux met Ho in March and April, on his
way into and out of Vietnam, where he held several meetings with Tran Phu and Ngo
Duc Tri. He revealed very little about the tension between Ho and the CC in a letter
written just after meeting Ho in April. But he remarked that Ho felt isolated and
suggested that the FEB reinforce its guidance and the 'concrete assistance' which it
gave to Ho and his 'friends in-country'.166 Ducroux also reported that the ICP's 'central
leadership has finally been recognized by everyone and has authority, in spite of
some minor federalist tendencies'. These tendencies, though, were so strong in the
north that the CC decided at their plenum to replace the northern leadership. Both
Ngo Duc Tri's confession and the Comintern correspondence from Ducroux and Tran
Phu relate that a member of the Northern Regional Committee, assigned to translate
the Comintern's letter 'Immediate Tasks of the Indo-chinese Communists', had
included a preface which stated that the Third International did not understand the
situation in Indochina. This dissident, identified as 'Ky', maintained his influence on
the northern leadership, even after being removed from his position, and had
attempted to form a rival fraction.167 A letter from the FEB written following the
March plenum reiterated that the ICP must fight against those 'elements in the north
provinces' which think that the Comintern does not understand the concrete situation
in Indochina. 'These arguments have been used in the past year by Li Lisan, who did
not carry out the directives of the CI, which resulted in very serious damage for the
company here.'168
Where Ho Chi Minh stood in relationship to this conflict over the Comintern
line is a complex question. We can assume from his good relations with the FEB, his
1930 report from Malaya, as well as from his April 1931 correspondence, that he had
no desire to become involved in disagreements with Moscow. But his position may
have been weakened by Mif's assertion of control over the FEB in the autumn of
1930. From Tran Phu's point of view, Ho's failure to impose a clear class line within
the party was one of the chief causes of its disunity. In his letter of 17 April 1931 he
held Ho largely responsible for the legacy of the 'old revolutionary organisations'
within the Vietnamese party. He claimed that 'the months which have passed have
shown that all the elements of the ideology of the old groups have coalesced into
resistance to the new line of practical and ideological unification of the party.' The
February 1930 unification conference had been imbued with the ideology of the old
revolutionary organisations, he said. This ideology included the acceptance of small
and medium landlords, as well as the nationalist bourgeoisie, as participants in the
revolution. He explained: 'The work of this "unification conference" carried the clear
imprint of the period of collaboration between the GMD and the CCP, in particular
the rightist policy of the CCP between 1925 and 1927.'169
Tran Phu's advocacy of the class policies associated with Stalin's ascendancy
may have had an unintended consequence. His efforts to impose a 'class line' at the
March 1931 Plenum may have led to a new phase of extremism in Central Vietnam in
the spring of 1931. The decisions taken by the two-week long March Plenum are
often characterized as strongly critical of'leftist tendencies' within the party in Central
Vietnam, for example by Ngo Vinh Long.170 It might be more accurate, however, to
describe them as the replacement of one set of extremist prescriptions by another.
While the plenum did condemn individual terror and the premature use of violence, it
called for a strengthening of the class character of the ICP. The resolutions read: 'One
of the greatest dangers is that party members still do not have a clear understanding
of the position of the proletariat in the revolution and the duties of the party.' 171 The
first organizational tasks which had to be undertaken were: the solution of the crisis
in party leadership in Bac Ky and the strengthening of the CC in the centre and south.
It was necessary to gradually replace the representatives of the intelligentsia and
conservative elements in the leading organs with workers or poor peasants.172 The
party was instructed to investigate the peasant unions and remove from them any
elements who were not connected to the peasantry; to bring into the administration
representatives of the poorest peasants and rural labourers. The class struggle in the
countryside was to be broadened and any nationalist influence was to be uprooted. 173
Women's organizing was no longer to be aimed at 'women in general', but was to be
carried out only among labouring women. The Women's Liberation Association was
to be immediately disbanded.174
One result of these class-based resolutions seems to have been a purge of the
Trung-ky party organization in April. Again, there is confusion about the nature of
this purge. Nguyen Duy Trinh portrays it as a removal of comrades 'who had
committed grave mistakes of leftist tendencies'. 175 Tran Huy Lieu, however, describes
a circular dated 29 April 1931 from the Trung-ky committee as calling for opposition
(bai xich) to the intellectuals, rich peasants, landlords and notables.176 This
terminology recalls the well-known slogan of the most radical period of the Nghe
Tinh movement: 'Tri, phu, dia, hao, dao tan goc, troc tan re (intellectuals, rich
peasants, landlords, notables - dig them up, pull them out by the very roots!). As Tran
Huy Lieu writes, this sort of divisive slogan enabled the French to win over a
significant portion of the population, at a time when the French repression was at its
height. When the 29 April Circular was issued, Le Viet Thuat had been entrusted
with the leadership of the Trung Ky Party, according to Nguyen Duy Trinh. Nguyen
Duc Canh and Le Mao had both been arrested on 9 April; Le Viet Thuat probably
suffered the same fate on 1 May, while Nguyen Phong Sac was captured by the
French on 3 May 1931.177
This move against the bourgeoisie may have been intended as a non-violent
purge. But it seems to have been transformed into a search for scapegoats, as the
French brought more troops into Vinh and famine spread. French court records show
that in Ha Tinh, beginning in November 1930 and throughout the first half of 1931,
suspected informers and villagers accused of holding back the soviet movement were
assassinated by a variety of means. 178 One party dissident was tied up and then
thrown alive into a river, along with his wife and child; a thief of rice and potatoes
was buried alive; a suspected informer was beaten to death. Whether these incidents
were part of the purge mentioned by Tran Huy Lieu is unclear. In a situation which
was daily growing more dangerous to party members, a 'class enemy' who had been
removed from a position of influence in the party would almost automatically have
been suspected of betrayal.
According to Van Kien Dang, a directive was issued on 20 May 1931 from
the CC to the Trung Ky regional committee, which called a halt to the purge. This
document claims that 'The Trung-Ky regional committee, in particular the Secretary,
issued a directive to purge the party of intellectuals, rich peasants, landlords and
notables; this directive has no foundation and is ill-defined, arbitrary and rash.' 179 The
Trung Ky committee was instructed in the strictest manner to examine and correct its
mistakes. Strangely, Tran Huy Lieu, writing in 1957, was not aware of this directive.
As we have seen, Nguyen Duy Trinh, who claims to have been a direct witness to
these events and to have attended the April Trung Ky committee meeting, places the
correction of leftist errors in April, when in fact a more violent phase of the soviet
movement may have begun. There appears to be a distinct possibility that what by
1935-36 came to be considered 'leftist errors' were not in fact corrected in 1931. The
extremist phase may simply have petered out as the party's structures disintegrated.
As we know from Tran Phu and Ho Chi Minh's last letters to the FEB (before
their arrests), in April 1931 and early May 1931 all ICP structures above the
provincial level were destroyed by French arrests. Ngo Duc Tri was arrested on 1
April, along with the entire Nam Ky Committee. On 15 April the Saigon CC
headquarters was discovered, which caused the loss of its correspondence and $1,500
recently brought by Ducroux to cover three months' expenses. Tran Phu escaped
because he had been in the outhouse at the time of the raid. 180 Ho wrote on 28 April:
'There are arrests every day' Thai Binh and Nam Dinh provinces were hard hit, as
their liaison agent had been arrested and made a confession. In Saigon the new CC
print shop was discovered and several more party members arrested. 181 Ho reported
Tran Phu's arrest on 19 or 20 April. After that Ho wrote, only one young worker was
left to the secretariat. In Hong Kong one of the 'comrades in charge of
communications', Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, was captured on 29 April.
Given these widespread arrests, the authorship of the supposed 20 May 1931
directive to the Trung Ky committee poses a problem. Was there at the time a CC
which could have issued such a document? Did Ho Chi Minh himself write it and
send it to central Vietnam in the name of the defunct CC? Would Ho Chi Minh have
been willing to take such an initiative, when the Comintern was to all appearances
fully behind the policies articulated by Tran Phu? Was it actually received and put
into effect in Trung ky? The only evidence from the French archives on this score is
the unfinished circular which the Hong Kong police found in Ho Chi Minh's
typewriter at the time of his arrest on 6 June. The topic was the correct way to fight
the French terror. The French described the letter as of'no interest', but believed that it
demonstrated Ho's authority over his party.182
From a letter in German which the FEB sent to Moscow on 10 June, it
appears that they had decided to issue an appeal 'to all members of the party' in the
name of the ICP CC. This appeal supposedly 'asserted that the party was restoring
order and getting down to work'.183 The writer, who may be Rylski, does not give any
more details regarding this document. However, in a 12 May letter apparently
addressed to Ho, in non-native English, the writer delegates the task of writing an
appeal to the party to him: 'We think it necessary that a letter be issued by you, an
open letter to all comrades. In the letter you shall speak about the tasks of the party in
the mass work, in organising the economic fights of the workers in the plantations,
factories, agricultural workers, of organising the trade unions, Anti-imperialist
League, Peasant's Committees, Soldiers' Committees etc. You shall speak about the
necessity to lead and organise the spontaneous actions of the Peasantry by our
comrades, etc. You shall warn the party before the danger of putchist tendencies and
first of all show the possibility for increase of the right danger as a reaction to the
white terror.'184 Given the date of these instructions, it is possible that Ho did issue a
letter in the name of the CC on 20 May. It is also conceivable that he realized that the
message the FEB asked him to convey was out of touch with reality. He may have
finally taken matters into his own hands and written the directive which appears in
Van Kien Dang.
We learn something of Ho's state of mind in April from his letters. On 28
April he complained to the FEB about the educational level of new party members.
Both the students being selected for training in Moscow and the worker and peasant
members are illiterate, he wrote. 'This means that in spite of their courage and
abnegation, they work badly, their ideological and political level being too low' He
added: 'The result of this complete lack of education is that in the daily work the
worker and peasant comrades depend entirely on the intellectuals.' At the same time
he noted that the majority of Vietnamese intellectuals sent to Moscow from France
are 'unusable'. They included spoiled children of the bourgeoisie, he complained. 185
He also worried about the tactics being employed to fight French repression. Between
12 and 20 April he noted that 185 peasants had been killed during demonstrations. The
imperialists had decided to stop the movement 'by massacre', he said. 'What concrete
plan of struggles shall we give our comrades? If we let them go on in that way there
will be great danger of putchisme [sic].' 186 Ironically, in the same letter, he mentioned
that Reuters had published the news on 25 April that the ICP had been admitted as an
'independent section' by the Comintern. If the news were true, he wrote, 'it would be a
great moral boost to the party and masses.'187
Ho's prestige within Vietnam may still have been great enough to influence
the ICP's course at this stage, had he not been arrested in early June. But Tran Huy
Lieu's 1960 description of the spring of 1931 does not leave one with the impression
that Ho was able to make a real impact on the course of events: 'The Soviet
movement in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, far from petering out, gained in intensity and
violence during its last months. Blood flowed more and more abundantly. In passing
from the stage of economic and political demands to the struggle against the white
terror, the demonstrations turned more and more frequently into armed
engagements.'188 One suspects that Lieu's judgment of these events many years later
would not have been possible in 1931. 'The programme of action of 1930 made the
error of calling for the overthrow of the national bourgeoisie along with the French
colonialists and the feudal classes...they should have been pulled into the ranks of the
democratic bourgeois revolution and not systematically kept apart,' he wrote. 'In the
countryside, the struggles undertaken against the rich peasants, the middle peasants
and the village elders and scholars were grave errors which discredited the whole
movement and gave an opening to enemy propaganda.'189
An anonymous rapporteur in Saigon, writing sometime in 1931 on the
situation in Indochina, gives no hint that the ICP was making a correction of course.
(The writer identifies himself as a member of a four-person cell in a store where there
are 200 workers. The report was stamped as received by the Comintern in June
1931.) At the time of writing there were 2,400 party members in the country, of
whom 600 were in Cochinchina (not including the 200 Chinese in the Cochinchina-
Cambodia group). Commenting on 'opportunist tendencies', he mentions that the
national revolutionary elements who joined the party after the unification conference,
and who had been excluded during the struggle, were 'attempting to form a
Cochinchina section of the Independence Party', (Nguyen The Truyen's party). There
was also a newly-formed anarchist group, as well as an active Trotskyist group
working among the intellectuals, and a new 'Communist League' formed by party
members who had been expelled. The ICP was working against all these tendencies,
except for the anarchists, who were inactive. The 30 remaining members of the
VNQDD in the south, he claims, were ready to join the ICP. But they had decided to
organize a 'great night' of actions which would shake the imperialists before joining
the party. The leaders were captured before any of these plans came about, he
added.190 As we can see from this report, fragmentation of the revolutionary
movement lay ahead. The return of Ho Chi Minh to a position of influence lay many
years in the future.

6. DEATH IN HONG KONG, BURIAL IN MOSCOW? (1931-38)

The prisoner
On 8 June 1931 the Governor General in Hanoi, Rene Robin, cabled the
Ministry of Colonies to announce the arrest of Ho Chi Minh two days earlier. 1 Ho had
been found thanks to the discovery of Joseph Ducroux's address-book in Singapore,
where the French agent had been caught exchanging documents with local
communists. Robin's cable announced that Ho's arrest was due to 'the liaison
established by the Sûreté Generale with the British police in Hong Kong and
Singapore, and the police of the French concession in Shanghai.' These links had
enabled the French to capture Ho Tung Mau, Nguyen Huy Bon, a Moscow returnee,
the worker Phan Duc who had attended the Fifth Profmtern Congress in Moscow, and
most of the Vietnamese communists working in Shanghai. (Nguyen Thi Minh Khai,
arrested 29 April in Hong Kong, had been deported to a Canton prison, on the
assumption that she was Chinese. There she joined Truong Van Lenh and three other
Vietnamese who had been arrested earlier in 1931.) Ho Tung Mau's wife Ly Ung
Thuan was arrested along with Ho. The greatest blow to the Comintern's operations
would come on 10 June, when their OMS agent Hilaire Noulens and his wife were
traced via a Shanghai post-box address found in Ducroux's notebook. Although for
many years they were thought to be the Swiss citizens Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, they
have now been identified as the Russian couple Jakov Rudnik and Tatiana
Moiseenko-Velikhaya.2
Robins dispatch was full of self-congratulation. The arrest of'all communist
leaders in Vietnam', including nine Moscow returnees and the majority of
Vietnamese activists in China, was 'the fruit of investigations skillfully carried out by
the competent services', he wrote; they 'give us absolute mastery of the political
situation.' However, he did not anticipate Ho Chi Minh's extradition to Indochina.
The French consul in Hong Kong had already warned him that the Vietnamese
arrested in Hong Kong might well be set free. Robin proposed that the best solution
might be to persuade the British to intern Ho in some 'distant possession', as a
reciprocal gesture for the detention of any Indian or Burmese communists who might
be captured on French territory.3 By late June the Sûreté detective Neron was
considering how to allocate the reward money for these arrests ($15,000 for Ho and
$10,000 each for Ho Tung Mau and the activists arrested in Shanghai) 4. But the
course of British justice would run counter to French designs.
Ho Chi Minh's fate hinged on the nature of the deportation order which would
be handed down in Hong Kong. Neron believed that the documents found at Ho's
address would serve as evidence to have him deported for communist propaganda,
with Shanghai as the probable destination. Not only had the British found an
unfinished circular in Ho's typewriter denouncing French imperialism, they had also
found letters demonstrating that he had played an active role in abetting the
communist movement in Malaya. Yet some of the British legal advisers who
commented on the case in the Colonial Office's dossier advocated a strict
interpretation of the detainee's civil rights. He had committed no offense against
Hong Kong law, and thus the only grounds for deporting him was the fact that he was
a communist. One Walter Ellis wrote, for example: 'We cannot, it seems to me, insist
on his going to Indochina any more than if we had occasion to deport an ex-official
of the Tsarist government [illegible] insist on his going to a Soviet republic' Ellis
explained that if the French had had evidence that Ho had committed 'any
extraditable crime', they would have made a formal appeal for extradition.5
Ho did not admit to any name other than Sung Man Cho, the name on the
Chinese passport he had received in Singapore. In contradiction to his claim to be
Chinese, though, he portrayed himself as a nationalist fighting for king and country,
with a death sentence hanging over his head in Vietnam.6 As Dennis Duncanson has
pointed out, this contradictory testimony may have been a defensive tactic advocated
by the Comintern.7 By July 1931 he was receiving what appears to have been highly-
skilled legal counsel, apparently arranged by the International Red Aid organization,
from a team of lawyers led by Frank Loseby. His lawyers argued that deportation to
Shanghai would be the equivalent of a disguised extradition to Indochina. 8 (Ho Tung
Mau and his companions were in fact deported to Shanghai at the end of June,
without a formal identification having been made. They were arrested in the French
concession and shipped back to Vietnam.9)
The defense strategy was to demand Ho's rights as a political detainee under
the Deportation Ordinance, which required that he be allowed to chose his destination
and depart in secret. If this right was not guaranteed, the defendant would 'attack the
proceedings in every possible manner and by every known step,' his lawyer Mr.
Jenkin told the court.10
Thanks to the application of this strategy Ho's case would drag on until
January 1933. The mobilization of world-wide left-wing support for the mysterious
Noulens probably gave Ho's plight more attention than it would have received had he
been arrested on his own. To judge by the press accounts, he also made a good
impression in court, speaking in English without a translator, projecting sincerity in
his declaration of his nationalist beliefs. The Colonial Office would clearly have liked
to have handed him over to the French; one official referred to him as being 'one of
the worst agitators who was put into the bag in the round up following the Lefranc
[Ducroux] seizure.'11 After the Hong Kong judiciary rejected a defense appeal for a
writ of Habeas Corpus, the French grew confident that they would finally get their
man. On 24 August 1931 the Sûreté in Hanoi had cabled Saigon to announce that Ho
Chi Minh would leave Hong Kong on 1 September on the General Metzinger bound
for Saigon. Two French policemen had been delegated to escort Ho back to
Vietnam.12 But with just days to go before the deportation, Ho's solicitors appealed to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. They claimed that the
deportation order was not valid under Hong Kong law. Thus on 23 October 1931 the
Secretary of State announced that there would be no deportation until the results of
the appeal to the Privy Council were known. 13 Given the length of time needed to
prepare the briefs, the appeal was not scheduled to be heard until November 1932.
In the meantime the Sûreté began to pressure Lam Duc Thu to gather
information on the Vietnamese who had been arrested in Canton, and perhaps to
make contact with Ho. After Ly Ung Thuan's release in late August 1931 on the
grounds that she was a Chinese national, she went to stay with Thu for a time. In
November 'Agent Pinot' claimed to have received a request from Ho, for aid in
getting the Vietnamese imprisoned in Canton released, as well as for help in carrying
on the party's work until the new activists due from Russia arrived. Ho was
particularly eager that Truong Van Lenh be released to take over the party's affairs in
China, according to Lam Duc Thu; Ho may also have been concerned about the
welfare of Minh Khai.14 It is indeed strange that he would have contacted a known
informer at this point - perhaps he believed that there was no more damage that Thu
could do, with the party's work so badly disrupted. These contacts may have resulted
in criticism of Ho's conduct after his release. They do not appear to have lasted very
long in any case. From a report which Lam Duc Thu sent on 16 May 1932 we
discover that Thu was getting information regarding Ho indirectly, from Loseby's
office.
Toward the end of 1931 Ho Chi Minh was transferred to hospital, where he
stayed under guard. In December Prince Cuong De sent him a letter, in response to
the news that he was gravely ill. The Prince sent 300 yen towards his medical
expenses, and advised him to take good care of himself, for 'the sake of the country'. 15
(At this stage the Vietnamese communists such as Le Hong Son maintained their
links to Cuong De, perhaps for purely pragmatic and financial reasons. 16) Dennis
Duncanson's assertion that Ho was not ill during his imprisonment thus appears to be
incorrect.17 As we have seen, Ho claimed to have suffered a severe TB attack in
September 1930; the French consul in Hong Kong, Soulange Teissier, in 1932
confirmed in a letter to his foreign minister that he was suffering from pulmonary
tuberculosis of a slow-developing, controllable form. In the summer of 1932 press
accounts of'the little Vietnamese, with his body debilitated by consumption and the
soul of a chief began to appear.18 Later the communist press would announce that Ho
had died of TB in August 1932.19 The French were never taken in by these reports,
however. Their Hong Kong consulate kept the authorities in Hanoi informed of each
stage in Ho's efforts to leave the British colony.20
His departure would finally take place in late January 1933, after one false
start. On 27 June 1932 the appeal to the Privy Council was withdrawn, when Ho's
lawyers agreed with the counsel for the Hong Kong government on new terms for his
deportation. Ho was eventually put on a ship to Singapore, where he arrived on 6
January 1933. The Straits Settlements authorities refused to allow him to remain,
however, so he was sent back to Hong Kong where he was re-arrested as he
disembarked on 19 January. The Hong Kong governor William Peel decided against
imposing the one-year prison term meted out to illegal immigrants; he also refused to
inform Teissier of the details of Ho's subsequent departure. 21 Loseby this time
convinced the authorities to play a more active role in implementing their
undertaking to help Ho depart for a destination of his choice. As Peel himself
explained in his dispatch, he arranged for Ho to be taken by a 'non-government
launch' to SS Anhui lying at a berth outside the Hong Kong harbour late on 22
January.22

In hiding/new political currents

Ho travelled disguised as a wealthy Chinese with Loseby's secretary, Mr
Lung, to Swatow (Shantou).23 At this point in 1933 the Vietnamese communists had
not yet re-established official contacts with the Chinese party and, according to the
rules of revolutionary discipline, a party member fresh out of prison was forbidden
from returning to any of the addresses he had frequented before his arrest. So perhaps
Ho did, as is usually assumed, maintain his disguise of the wealthy businessman for
the next months, as he lay low in Swatow. The Vietnamese who were still at large or
who, like Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, had been released from prison, spent the latter part
of 1932 and most of 1933 trying to restore their communications networks.
Ironically, trusted members of Ho's Hong Kong circle, Le Hong Son and Minh Khai,
as well as the returnee from Moscow, Tran Ngoc Danh, brother of Tran Phu, found
themselves under suspicion when they tried to contact the Chinese party in 1932.
 The one Vietnamese party member who remained in contact with the CCP in
Shanghai was Truong Phuoc Dat, a naval mechanic from Phan Rang who in 1929 had
been an early recruit to the ICP faction in Saigon. After escaping from prison in
Saigon and travelling to Hong Kong in 1931, he was chosen by the party to go to
Russia for study. He and his two travelling companions had been turned back at the
border in Manchuria, however, so Dat returned to Shanghai. Here the CCP's Jiangsu
province military committee assigned him to restore the links with the French and
Vietnamese military men which had been broken by the arrests of the Vietnamese
propagandists in the summer of 1931. Thus by mid-1932 Truong Phuoc Dat found
himself being asked to vouch for the Vietnamese who turned up in Shanghai looking
for help and money from the Chinese party. Tran Ngoc Danh requested funds to
support the union of Vietnamese domestics which he had reorganized from old Thanh
Nien elements in Hong Kong. He and Minh Khai were attempting to rebuild the ICP's
communications network there with the help of various sailors. Some French reports
refer to her at the time as his concubine. Le Hong Son was planning to return to Siam,
from where he hoped to reorganize the ICP Central Committee. The Vietnamese
gathered in Shanghai decided to send Dat to Siam to work, along with Le Hong Son.
As this decision displeased him, Truong Phuoc Dat sabotaged their projects by
accusing them of 'petit bourgeois' behaviour (e.g. staying in a modern hotel with
elevators) in his report to the Chinese CC. Moreover, he denied having known any of
them before their arrival in Shanghai. In the end the Vietnamese group, which now
numbered five, had to pawn some of their clothing in order to pay their hotel bills and
travel to Nanjing, where they could count on the hospitality of Ho Hoc Lam. 24
Whether this episode reflects continuing tension between the former ICP and ACP
factions of the Vietnamese party, or simply one case of double-dealing, we do not
know. Tran Ngoc Danh and Le Hong Son were eventually arrested in Shanghai on 25
September 1932. Truong Phuoc Dat himself was captured in April 1933. 25 By March
1933 Minh Khai had returned to Hong Kong, from where she corresponded with the
Vietnamese in Nanjing.26
A French informer in Thailand claimed that Ho Chi Minh was hiding in the
Nakhon Phanom region from early January 1933, but this was later classified as a
case of mistaken identity.27 In September 1933 a French informer claimed to have
sighted Ho living in Nanning with a small group of Vietnamese. Agent 'Maria' said
that among the four Vietnamese men living at 78 Cau Song Kai Street one matched
the photo of Ho Chi Minh. The informant also mentioned that three women, along
with three girls and a boy, were living in the same house. Ho was said to be using the
name Ly Sin Sang (Mr Ly).28
However, Le Hong Phong, who was living in Nanning and Longzhou during
much of 1933, made no mention of contacts with Ho when he reported to the
Comintern in January 1935. Phong had planned to go up-country to meet the Siam-
based Vietnamese when he arrived in Bangkok in February 1932, on his way home
from Moscow and Paris. But finding himself under close police surveillance, he gave
up this plan after ten days and by April had moved on to Canton and Nanning. Here
he began to reconstitute the communist group in the Vietnamese border province of
Cao Bang and also formed some new cells in Langson province. He propagandized
among the cadets at the Nanning military academy, which since 1925 had been a
source of communist recruits. In August 1933 he met his fellow returned students Ha
Huy Tap and Nguyen Van Dut in Canton, and by June 1934 they had constituted an
Overseas Bureau to manage the party's affairs until an in-country Central Committee
could be created.29
If Ho Chi Minh had taken refuge in Nanning, we can assume that he had
moved on by September. For it was at the end of September 1933 that his old
acquaintance from the French CP, Paul Vaillant-Couturier, showed up in Shanghai
for an Asian Congress Against War. Ho later claimed that it was Vaillant-Couturier
who helped him get back to Moscow by putting him in touch with Soviet
representatives in Shanghai.30 (The USSR had restored diplomatic relations with
China at the end of 1932; the new ambassador presented his credentials in Shanghai
on 2 May 1933.) The conference was held clandestinely in a private home on 30
September. The French reported that the participants included Lord Marley, Vaillant-
Couturier, a Dr Marteaux, the American journalist Harold Isaacs, a Soviet
representative, and fifty Chinese, including Mme Sun Yatsen. 31 Several of these
personalities were leading members of the Berlin-based Anti-Imperialist League. Ho
Chi Minh may have stayed away from the proceedings, but it seems to be from this
period that Harold Isaacs retained a memory of Ho as, 'my Shanghai friend of long
ago'.32 We can only speculate on how close Ho's ties to Song Jingling, Mme Sun,
were. But there is no reason to discount his story that he made contact with Vaillant-
Couturier by arriving at her house in his disguise as a wealthy Chinese, to leave a
letter for her.
By this point in 1933, as Ho Chi Minh began to plan for his return to
Moscow, the left wing of Vietnamese politics was once again making itself felt.
Radical students returned from France had demonstrated the continuing anti-
establishment sentiments of the Saigon populace by winning two places in municipal
council elections held in late April and early May. Although the election of Nguyen
Van Tao, an ICP member, and Tran Van Thach, a Trotskyist, was annulled in August,
their initial success pointed towards the future development (in mid-1934) of the La
Lutte front between the Trotskyist and ICP communists.33 The Stalin School student
Tran Van Giau had returned to South Vietnam in early 1933, where he was rebuilding
the ICP in line with the dictates of the radical 1932 Action Programme which he had
helped to draft in Moscow.34 ICP members in Siam, as well as Vietnamese who had
become members of the Siam CP, were also actively supporting the rebirth of the ICP
via a Committee to Aid Indochina.35 Anti-imperialism, in the interpretation of the
'Third Period' had become an expression of wo rid-wide proletarian solidarity, "while
nationalism was an out-moded concept. Daniel Hemery notes that in twenty-one
months of publication, up to June 1936, the newspaper La Lutte mentioned
Vietnamese national aspirations in only twenty articles, and then often in the context
of criticism of bourgeois patriotism.36 Yet a meeting 'Against Fascism and War' held
in Saigon's Khanh Hoi Theatre on 11 August 1933 was attended by over 600
participants, according to a French report, and attracted a cross-section of activists
ranging from Duong Van Giao and Trinh Hung Ngau, associated with the
Constitutionalists, to Nguyen Van Tao and Tran Van Thach. Vaillant-Couturier
attended this meeting before travelling on to Shanghai, and received warm applause
when he described actions in Paris in support of the Vietnamese political prisoners
under sentence of death.37 Ta Thu Thau, who had been an active member of the Anti-
imperialist League in Europe, may have been involved in organizing this meeting.
The French believed, however, that the legal political activities of Nguyen Van Tao
and Tran Van Thach were connected to Tran Van Giau's return to Vietnam.38
Although the full elaboration of the Comintern's revamped united front policy
would not come until its Seventh Congress in 1935, by 1933 one can already observe
a drawing-back from the class-against-class radicalism expounded in 1929. Nazi
power in Germany had become a serious factor to reckon with, while the designs of
the imperialist powers in Asia appeared as an ever-growing threat both to the Soviet
Union and the Chinese communists. Otto Braun claims that as early as January 1933
an ECCI directive recognized the need for a 'united struggle against Japan' with any
Chinese army or group which would end attacks against the Soviet regions. 39 A
Comintern pamphlet which appeared in July 1933 addressed to the Indian and
Indochinese communists reverted to the Leninist strategy of emphasizing the national
independence struggle over the goals of the socialist revolution. The pamphlet, first
published in English by the Pan Pacific Worker, was the record of a question and
answer session with 'Orgwald', who from Comintern documents can be identified as
the old Bolshevik Osip Piatnitsky, who headed the Comintern's all-important
Organization Department between the Fifth and Seventh Congresses (1924-35). It is
not surprising that by mid-1933 the rise of Hitler was causing some Bolsheviks to re-
examine their views on nationalism and united fronts. 'Orgwald' advised in his
pamphlet that it would be unwise at present to call for the overthrow of the
bourgeoisie, as that would alienate the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. A
united front with nationalist parties would be acceptable if it followed the principle of
'fight together, but march apart'.40 This material was not published in French until
1934 and we have no evidence that it was published in Vietnamese at all. It
contradicted the policy line brought back from Moscow by key ICP leaders such as
Tran Van Giau and Ha Huy Tap. This divergence between the class-against-class line
of the 'Third Period' and the new tactics which began to be discussed in 1933 would
become a serious stumbling block to ICP unity.
Evidence of this divergence can be seen in the long letter addressed to the
Indochinese communists from the CCP's Central Committee in August 1934. It was
given the Comintern's sanction as a political directive. (As late as March 1935, Vera
Vasilieva, who was running the Comintern's Indochina section, would refer to it in
correspondence to the ICP's Overseas Bureau as a document which laid out 'those
basic tasks on which you must concentrate all your attention at present'. 41) In all
likelihood this letter was prepared in Moscow with Comintern support by the Chinese
CC members there, led by Wang Ming. While it called for the creation of a legal
press and the exploitation of other legal organizing possibilities, it sent a strong
warning against cooperation with social democrats and the nationalist bourgeoisie. It
cited the failure of the Austrian uprising of 1934 as an example of the 'traitorous
influence' of social democracy. Although the letter acknowledged that many
members of the Indochinese bourgeoisie were eager to fight French imperialism, the
workers and peasants must never forget that the 'nationalist bourgeoisie, self-
interested and cowardly, betrayed the movement of 1930-31'. 'In the situation of
general discontent which is growing in the country, national-reformism will try more
than once to take over the leadership of the mass movement, in order to behead it,' the
letter read. 'This is precisely why we must constantly work to unmask all of the
national-reformist groups and parties, no matter what "leftist" slogans they hide
behind…'42
 This Chinese letter might be interpreted as an effort by some Comintern
leaders to combat the French party's decision to cooperate with the Socialist Party,
which had been made at an FCP CC meeting 14 and 15 March 1934. 43 Ho Chi Minh's
old contact Jacques Doriot was among the most out-spoken advocates of this
rapprochement with the French socialists. But in Saigon, where there was no socialist
party, the united front of the left remained a joint effort of the Moscow-oriented and
Trotskyist communists. The formal La Lutte front was launched at a September 1934
meeting led by Nguyen An Ninh. It was an alliance aimed against the colonial
government and the Constitutionalist Party, with a strongly proletarian orientation.44

Return to Moscow
Ho Chi Minh did not get back to Moscow, by his own account, until July
193445 There is no information about how he spent the autumn of 1933 and the first
months of 1934. He returned to a Moscow which must have been quite changed from
the place he had known in 1923-24 and again briefly in 1927. It was no longer the
free-wheeling city of the NEP which he had experienced on his first visit; nor was it
the politically charged communist capital where the final battles for control of the
Soviet party were about to be played out in 1927. Stalin's cult of personality and
control of all Soviet institutions was creating a deadened political climate dominated
by paranoia and a siege mentality towards the outside world.
By 1930 purges (chistki, literally 'cleansings') in Comintern institutions such
as the Sun Yatsen School, closed that year, and the International Lenin School had
become a feature of Comintern life. A purge of the French section of the Lenin
School, where Ho Chi Minh would enrol in October 1934, was held in October 1933,
presided over by Andre Marty of the Romance Secretariat. An essay by one of the
students with the pseudonym 'Bretane' gives some idea of what was required during
these 'cleansings'. Even among those who had not committed any political errors, or
were not threatened with expulsion from the party, a high degree of self-abasement
was required. In his essay titled, 'Purging as a Factor of Bolshevization' Bretane
writes: 'What is important is to lay bare the weaknesses which remain in order to
eliminate them. We have been able to see, via various biographies, that at the bottom
of these weaknesses lie social origin and the foreign influence which is imprinted on
the militant when he is working abroad.' 46 Yelena Bonner, whose stepfather Gevork
Alikhanov was a top official in the Comintern's Cadres Department, watched from
behind a curtain in her home at the Lux Hotel as he and others were investigated by a
troika in 1933. They were expected to bare their souls and reveal even their most
personal secrets, down to past romantic liaisons and any resulting children.47
When Ho Chi Minh turned up in the summer of 1934 there is reason to
believe that he expected to be the object of an investigation of some sort. Vera
Vasilieva's daughter, then a girl of ten, has a memory of him sleeping on the couch in
the wooden house where her family then lived in central Moscow, as though he were
trying to keep a low profile.48 Ho had, after all, been involved in a series of arrests
which had been a major blow for both the Far Eastern Bureau and the Chinese CP in
1931. Vasilieva, a naive and perhaps unimaginative Bolshevik, is known to have
defended friends accused of political misdeeds, as well as her own husband Mark
Zorky.49 But there is no record of any political difficulties for Ho in the Comintern
files, until the lead-up to the Seventh Congress the following year. He recounts in his
autobiographical questionnaire that he spent several months recuperating from his
illness in Crimea in 1934, then enrolled in the Lenin School in October. 50 At that time
he was the only Indochinese registered at the school, although the Comintern planned
to admit twelve Indochinese students for a short-term course for the 1935-6 term. 51 It
does not appear that these places were filled. The school was described at this time by
its director, Kirsanova, as 'the only forge of cadres for the Communist International' 52
and was viewed as a training institute for foreign communist leaders. Still, there was
an element of disgrace for such leaders as Li Lisan and Ho who were sent there. The
fact is that (in Li's case in particular) they had earlier served in the top ranks of their
parties and might have expected to be given work in the ECCI, had their status
remained intact.
On 1 December 1934, as preparations for the Seventh Congress were
underway, the Leningrad Party chief, Sergei Kirov, was shot by an intruder in his
headquarters at the Smolny Institute. This murder provided Stalin with a pretext to
begin a man-hunt for enemies of the state.53 As the era of the Popular Front was
dawning, then, a new round of suppression of Stalin's political enemies, real and
imagined, was about to begin. When on 8 December the three Congress delegates
sent by the ICP arrived in Moscow, a mini-crisis erupted at the Stalin School.
Because the OMS failed to meet them at the train station, the three had had to make
their own way to the hostel where the Vietnamese were housed - this was viewed as a
major lapse in conspiratorial technique. Three people filed reports on the incident:
Vera Vasilieva, Kotelnikov of the Eastern Secretariat, and 'Kan Sin' (Kang Sheng),
whose position is not given on his report.54
 The three Vietnamese delegates were Le Hong Phong, the senior member of
the Overseas Bureau; a member of the Tay minority who went by the name Cao-bang
or Van-Tan in Moscow, whose real name was Hoang Van Non; and Nguyen Thi
Minh Khai, referred to in a letter from Ha Huy Tap to the Comintern as 'Quoc's wife'.
Ho would also be designated as a Congress delegate by the ICP plenum held in
March 1935.55 On the autobiographical form which Minh Khai filled in after her
arrival, she wrote that she was married and gave her husband's name as 'Lin', Ho's
latest alias.56 This would seem to show that theirs was more than a fleeting liaison, in
spite of the French suspicion that she had been the mistress of Tran Ngoc Danh 57 (Ho
Chi Minh, however, never mentioned a wife on any of his official Comintern forms).
In Moscow she took the name 'Fan Lan'.
Between December 1934 and the end of March 1935 several reports on the
situation of the ICP arrived in Moscow from Vietnam. In addition Le Hong Phong
wrote a long account in Russian of his activities since his return to Southeast Asia in
February 1932.58 Ho wrote his own critique of the ICP's failings during the
'revolutionary upsurge' of 1930-1.59 (He undoubtedly wrote other accounts of his
activities in 1930-4, but these are not available in the archives.) With the Comintern's
policy now shifting back to where it had been in 1924-7, Ho apparently felt safe in
criticizing the ICP's generally low level of theoretical understanding, and in particular
the fact that 'the majority of comrades - even those in charge - do not understand the
meaning of "the bourgeois democratic revolution". [...] They repeat words without
understanding their meaning,' he wrote, 'and very often find themselves caught out in
their propaganda and agitation work.' He also criticized the mechanistic way in which
workers had been trained to organize a strike, without being encouraged to make
decisions based on their own judgment of the situation. Another danger which he
raised was that the workers who had been brought into the leading party organs,
'always allow themselves to be influenced by the intellectual elements, because they
have read everything in the theses or in books'. 'This is what had happened in 1930-
31,' he said, 'when our comrades were old and experienced militants. Now, all or
almost all of these comrades are in prison or have been killed. The comrades today
are younger and less experienced, and are as a result likely to make more serious
errors.'
The remedy which he proposed was the production of a series of short
brochures in simple language on themes starting with The Communist Manifesto and
Comintern history, moving to 'the national question' and 'the agrarian question', and
ending with 'how to form a united front' and 'the Comintern's theses and resolutions
on the colonial question'. He had learned to quote Stalin at the appropriate moment -
'Stalin is a thousand times right', Ho wrote, 'when he says "Theory gives the
comrades...the power of direction, clarity of perspective, faith in their work and
confidence in the victory of our cause.'" 60 One can assume that Ho realized that the
prevailing theory had changed since 1928-9, but was intelligent enough not to point
this out in writing. His attitude as a teacher and student at the Stalin School, as we
shall see, would seem to show that he did not take Moscow's approach to theoretical
training terribly seriously.
Le Hong Phong's report of his activities from the end of 1931 until his return
to Moscow at the end of 1934 is a factual, almost a-political account of his successes
and failures. The reports which Ha Huy Tap (Sinitchkin in Moscow) sent back to
Moscow between December 1934 and April 1935 have quite a different tone. 61 They
show that he began to take a more active, even dictatorial role in shaping the ICP
after Le Hong Phong's departure for Moscow. A slight man known by the nickname
'Sniffles' (Khit) in Saigon and as 'Mr Short' in China, Ha Huy Tap seems to have gone
back to Asia with the full trust of the Comintern in mid-1933. One Sûreté report
refers to him as a "renifleur", a "sniffer" or 'bloodhound', perhaps a play on his
nickname.62 He was for a time the only one in the Overseas Bureau whom the
Comintern trusted with the cipher code for the radio messages which it was beginning
to use for communications in 1934-35.63 The security obsession induced in the
Comintern by the Kirov murder would have made the Moscow apparat appreciative
of someone with Ha Huy Tap's penchant for detailed reporting. Moreover, for the
Eastern Secretariat security had become a major preoccupation after the destruction
of the CCP's Shanghai Bureau in December 1934. At that time the Comintern lost its
only radio link with the CCP, which was in the middle of its Long March. (After that
the ICP was instructed to cut off all contact with the CCP and the Soviet Consulate in
Shanghai.)64 In any case, Ha Huy Tap would eventually have the distinction of
denouncing Tran Van Giau, Ho Chi Minh, and a number of other ICP members,
including one of Ho's liaison agents, Nguyen Van Tram (Cao Van Binh). 65 During the
lead-up to the Seventh Congress (which originally had been scheduled for 1934, then
for March 1935 and finally opened in July) Ho Chi Minh was perhaps the one who
suffered the most dramatic loss of trust.
The ICP's 27-31 March 1935 Congress in Macao passed a 30-page political
resolution, selected a new Central Committee and permitted Ha Huy Tap to take
control of the ICP in Le Hong Phong's absence. What it did not do, however, was
reflect the currents of change in Moscow, which would only be articulated at the
Seventh Comintern Congress in the summer. At the end of 1934 Tap had reported
that the party had around 600 members, including those in Laos and Cambodia. 66
Thirteen had managed to attend the Congress, he claimed. It selected a Central
Committee headed by the absent Le Hong Phong, including eight workers, one poor
peasant from the Tay minority, three intellectuals and one member from Annam still
to be selected (profession unknown).67 Ho Chi Minh was listed number 13 as a
candidate member. The Moscow trainees in the CC included the worker 'Din-Tan'
(Tran Van Diem), head of the party committee in Tonkin; and 'Svan' (Nguyen Van
Dut), then head of the Inter-regional Committee in Cochinchina. Ha Huy Tap
reserved for himself a position in the Overseas Bureau, which at this point had the
power to give political guidance to the CC.68
At the end of his report on the Congress, Tap brought up the issue of Ho Chi
Minh. He said that the Congress had designated Comrade Line as the ICP's
representative to the Comintern. But at the same time he wrote:
In Siam and in Indochina the communist organizations are carrying out an
open struggle against the remnants of the national-revolutionary ideology, mixed
-with reformism and idealism, of the Thanh Nien association and of Comrade
Nguyen Ai Quoc. These remnants are very strong and constitute a very serious
obstacle to the development of communism. This pitiless struggle against the old
opportunist theories of Quoc and Thanh Nien is indispensable. The two party
committees in Siam and in Indochina will write a brochure against these tendencies.
We propose that Comrade Line himself write a brochure to criticize himself and his
past failings.69
By the end of April 1935 Ha Huy Tap felt obliged to make his criticisms
clearer. As the final point of a four-page letter hand-written in French, which dealt
with various cases of suspected treachery in the ICP, he informed the Eastern
Secretariat that several delegates to the Macao Congress had discussed Ho's
responsibility for the arrest of over 100 former Thanh Nien members trained in
Canton. Tap listed their reasons as follows:
(a) Quoc knew that Lam Duc Thu was a provocateur, yet continued to use
him; (b) Quoc was wrong to demand 2 photos of each student, his real name, address,
the names of parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents...; (c) in the country, in
Siam and in the prisons, they continue to talk about Quoc's responsibility,
responsibility which he could never deny; (d) the photos demanded by Quoc and Lam
are now in the hands of the police; (e) gradually as the party's line becomes clearer to
party members and to the masses, they are criticizing more severely the policy
followed by Com. Quoc. The general secretary of the Siam CP, formerly a convinced
follower of Quoc, is one of those who says that before 1930, Quoc was not a
communist!(70)
In response to the ICP proposal that Ho become their representative to the
Comintern, Vasilieva gave a definite 'no'. 'Quoc will have to study seriously for the
next two years and will not be able to undertake anything else,' she explained; 'after
his studies we have special plans to make use of him.' 71 We do not know whether she
had received the April denunciation when she wrote these remarks. The April letter
appears to have affected Ho's role at the Seventh Congress, however. On one list of
Congress delegates, giving the nature of their mandate, someone wrote, 'necessary to
refuse' next to Ho's name.72 Most lists of Congress delegates show three
representatives from Indochina, one of whom was a woman - all three of these were
listed as having full votes. The two Siamese delegates received consultative votes
(soveshchatelniie golosy), which in communist practice meant that their votes did not
count.73 But it seems that Ho did not even receive that. One can argue that he was
kept away from the public Congress proceedings to preserve secrecy, but then one
has to ask why any Vietnamese, all of whom were expected to return to active
political work in Indochina, should have been given public roles.
If a commission was organized to investigate the latest charges against Ho, it
is likely to have taken place just before the Seventh Congress. Given the concern with
security lapses in the wake of the Kirov murder, it would be strange if no action at all
had been taken. One account given many years later by a former staff member of the
Soviet Central Committee's International Department, Anatoly Voronin, has it that
Ho was investigated by a troika composed of Dmitry Manuilsky, Kang Sheng and
Vera Vasilieva. According to this version, Manuilsky was neutral, while Kang Sheng
called for Ho's execution. Vasilieva is said to have defended him, on the grounds that
his mistakes in security procedure were made out of inexperience. 74 In 1935 it would
have been more likely that Kang Sheng called for Ho's expulsion from the party than
for his execution, if he believed that Ho shared the guilt for the 1931 arrests. But
without some kind of documentary evidence, which may well be hidden in the
archives of the former KGB, we have no idea as to how seriously Ha Huy Tap's
accusations were taken. The Vietnamese communists themselves, though, were well
aware that their party had been penetrated by the Sûreté. At the end of 1934, Ha Huy
Tap had sent a list to Moscow which analyzed the record of the thirty-seven
Vietnamese students who had left Moscow for France or Asia. Of these twelve were
classified as having turned traitor or provocateur. Only ten were listed as
'professional revolutionaries'.75
Some light is shed on the Comintern's handling of cases such as Ho's by
Joseph Ducroux's report of his treatment in Moscow, when he returned in January
1934. Ducroux wrote in 1970 that the OMS chief Abramov had been keen to lay the
blame for his Singapore arrest on Ducroux's own technical errors. He was not treated
as a returned hero, and was only authorized to eat in the common dining hall at the
Lux Hotel, not with the political leaders. He was summoned to a meeting in the
ECCI, at which Manuilsky, Lozovsky, Piatnitsky and Bela Kun were present.
Manuilsky made a 'violent attack' against him, and called for his expulsion from the
party. Lozovsky showed more understanding of the difficult conditions he had
worked in. After two days he was informed that he could stay in Moscow to work as
a translator for the bulletin Communist International. Instead, Ducroux asked to be
sent back to France. Permission was granted, but he was forbidden to take on any
work connected with the FCP's Central Committee.76 Ho Chi Minh would in a similar
fashion be removed from work that involved political decision-making. Ho faced the
added complication of involvement in the affairs of the Chinese CP, in particular in
the difficult days of 1930. It is possible that Kang Sheng had a grudge against him, as
someone who knew what his role had been in the period of Li Lisan's ascendancy, or
as someone who may have known about the failures of his special security
organization in 1933. After the Kirov murder, Kang is said to have begun to agitate
for a new purge of the Chinese party in Moscow. 77 But again, without more
documentary evidence there is very little that one can say with certainty about the
relationship between Ho and Kang Sheng.

The Seventh Comintern Congress

The Seventh Comintern Congress at last opened on 25 July 1935. It achieved
a belated consensus in support of an alliance with the social democratic left in the
fight against fascism in Europe. This consensus had been painstakingly prepared
since the middle of 1934, when the French CP had agreed to carry out joint action'
against fascism with the French Socialist Party. There appears to have been little in
the way of spontaneous debate and all Congress resolutions were passed in
unanimity. The political passions of the Sixth Congress, where the nature of the
'Third Period' and the effects of colonialism had been thrashed out, were now
carefully channelled by the Comintern leadership. In a transformation apparently
conceived by Georgy Dimitrov in July 1934, the Comintern would grant greater
freedom of manoeuvre to individual communist parties, but would at the same time
renew its apparat and 'build a close link between the Comintern leadership and the
Politbureau of the Soviet party'.78 The Comintern was now leaving behind the
extremism of 1929 and the Tenth Plenum, when the radical tactics laid down in
Moscow were imposed without regard to local conditions on the worldwide
communist movement. Dimitrov emphasized the necessity of taking into account the
uniqueness of conditions in different parts of the world and the unequal development
within the communist movement; a standardized approach should not take the place
of concrete analysis in various countries.79 But at the same time the Comintern would
continue to aid its member parties in training 'truly Bolshevik leaders'. 80 Dimitrov
may have convinced Stalin to accept what was already happening in France and
China, where the parties were making decisions in response to their own political
situations, by agreeing to a tighter level of control by the Soviet leader at the top-
most level of the Comintern.
A small, cohesive Secretariat of the ECCI was chosen in August 1935, whose
members would each have their own secretariat, directing the affairs of a group of
communist parties. Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Comintern, took charge of the
Chinese party, while Wang Ming became responsible for the South American and
Caribbean parties. Responsibility for Indochina was in the hands of Manuilsky's
secretariat, which handled the countries of the former Romance Secretariat and their
colonies. Thus, throughout most of the Popular Front period, at least until the autumn
of 1937, the Vietnamese communists were in close contact with the French CP. Otto
Kuusinen, a specialist in Indian questions, took on the parties of Japan, Korea, India
and Siam. The Philippines fell under Andre Marty's secretariat, since he ran the
affairs of the Anglophone countries and some of their colonies; the Netherlands and
Indonesia became the province of Ercoli (Togliatti). 81 The interests of the Southeast
Asian parties were in this way subordinated to the needs of the parties in the
metropolitan countries.82
In 1935, as many writers have emphasized, the Comintern superimposed the
concept of a united front on the radical policies of 1928 and 1929. The stage of
renouncing socialist goals, even if temporarily, had not yet arrived. As McDermott
and Agnew write, 'The close identification of Stalin with the sectarian tactics and
theories of the Third Period precluded any far-reaching critical examination of the
experience of the previous six years. As such the Popular Front era was marked by an
unresolved tension between tradition and innovation, between inherited ideological
and organizational structures and the initiatives of communist parties to reengage
with democratic national political cultures.'83 Ho Chi Minh's desire expressed in
January 1935, to look at the failings of 1930-1 in terms of a misunderstanding of the
'bourgeois democratic revolution", may have been ahead of the times. Dimitrov
explicitly stated in his Congress report that the united front would not signal a move
back to the concept of the two-stage revolution. It would be a mistake, he said, to see
an anti-fascist coalition government as 'a special democratic intermediate stage lying
between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat'. 84
At this stage there was still scant information in Moscow about the progress of the
Long March. Wang Ming and the other Chinese leaders assumed that a new soviet
district was being established in Sichuan, around Chengdu. 85 Wilhelm Pieck could
thus still cite the creation of Soviets in China as the 'outstanding event' in the Asian
communist movement since the Sixth Comintern Congress.86 But in the absence of a
special commission on colonial and semi-colonial countries, the Seventh Congress
did not elaborate a clear message for the colonies of the Western nations.
Le Hong Phong was the only Southeast Asian to become a member of the
ECCI at the 1935 congress. This placed him in the elite company of the Chinese
leaders Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming (Kang Sheng and
Bo Gu were made candidate members).87 When he addressed the Congress on the
fourth day, under the pseudonym of Hai An, Phong emphasized the importance of the
Chinese experience for Vietnam. The October Revolution in Russia had played a
large role in the development of the revolution in Vietnam, he said. 'But it is the
victorious soviet movement in China which is playing the decisive role,' he claimed.
'During our party's entire history, the Chinese PC has given us aid and support and
shared its experience. [...] Close fraternal ties bind our two parties.' 88 The true
relevance of the Chinese Soviets for Indochina in this period is not clear from Hai
An's speech, however. After the period of the ICP's 'maximum development' in 1930-
1, he explained, there remained nothing more than isolated communist groups in
Vietnam; but at the present moment 'the movement is developing on a much broader
base than in the past. The most diverse strata of the population, the most backwards
elements of the working class, the national minorities (Moi, Tho, Laos etc.), the
broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals have all been pulled into the
struggle.'89 But he regretted the fact that his comrades had not yet considered the task
of creating a united front based on 'a broad anti-imperialist front'.90
Nguyen Thi Minh Khai's intervention at the Congress on 16 August also
demonstrates the intermediate state of progress towards the united anti-fascist front.
She spoke on the anti-war themes raised by Ercoli's report to the Congress. She
mentioned women's issues only briefly to lament the small number of women at the
Congress. Her main theme was the increasing danger of French militarism in the
Pacific and the transformation of Indochina into a French military base. The task of
the ICP was thus to 'mobilize all its forces to create a broad popular front to struggle
for peace'. Although the Soviet Union had agreed in June 1934 to a mutual assistance
treaty with France, the ICP vowed to 'unmask French imperialist policies, using the
concrete example of Indochina'.91 Only after the election of a Popular Front
government in France in the spring of 1936 would the ICP begin to modify its
opposition to French defence efforts.

The United Front in Indochina

In examining the results of the Seventh Comintern Congress, one is struck by
the fact that the change to a new united front policy did not immediately bring about
a reversal of fortune for Ho Chi Minh. We do not know what Vasilieva had had in
mind when she wrote of 'plans to use him after two years of study' - but we do know
that Ho remained in Moscow after the return to Asia of Le Hong Phong in 1936 and
then of Minh Khai and Hoang Van Non in 1937. A note from Vasilieva to 'Dmitry
Zaharovich' (Manuilsky), which must have been written in late 1935 or early 1936,
confirms that in Moscow Le Hong Phong was taking the lead in developing the line
of the ICP at this time. Vasilieva writes that, 'Hai An wants to hold a consultation on
Indochinese questions in the coming days, as he has to (1) write a letter to the
party...and (2) will probably have to spend several days in hospital.'92 Eight
Comintern staff members were invited to the consultation: Manuilsky, Kuusinen,
Kon-Sin (Kang-Sheng), Wang Ming, Stepanov, Gere, Mirov and Vasilieva. At the
bottom of this list Vasilieva has noted that the two Indochinese students from the
Stalin School and 'Comrade Lin (Ai-kvak)' from the Lenin School can also be called
on to attend.93
During 1936 the ICP produced several letters on the subject of a united front
in Indochina. The earliest of these may have been drafted in Moscow following the
consultation referred to above. A letter in French from the Indochinese Section of the
Anti-imperialist League to 'Parties and Revolutionary Elements at Home and
Abroad', dated 27 February 1936, can be found in the files of Manuilsky's secretariat.
The letter calls on all parties, all revolutionary elements at home and abroad, to join
the Indochina section of the Anti-imperialist League 'in order to unify the national
liberation movement in Indochina'.94 Another document titled 'Open Letter from the
Central Committee of the ICP' appeared in April - a copy received in Moscow was
translated into Russian on 6 June 1936. It was addressed to 'the Vietnamese Quoc
Dan Dang, and to all nationalist revolutionary groups and organizations, to anti-
imperialist groups, to reformist and opposition groups and to isolated revolutionary
elements in Indochina'.95 The letter proposed a flexible framework for a united front,
which would give lower level communist organizations the power to make decisions
regarding joint actions on the local level. It suggested that other parties either join the
Indochinese section of the Anti-imperialist League or that each group elect a number
of delegates to a coordinating committee. The Overseas Bureau of the ICP would be
responsible for holding talks with the overseas branches of other parties.96
It is not clear who the actual author of the above letter was. Its inclusion of
'reformist groups' in its appeal is, however, one of the first signs of a shift to a new
sort of united front strategy for the ICP. One can say with some certainty that the
letter was not a joint production of Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap. For when Ha
Huy Tap wrote a report to Moscow covering ICP business from May 1935 to June
1936, Le Hong Phong had still not made contact with the Overseas Bureau, then in
Macao.97 One can guess that the February and April letters advocating an anti-
imperialist front with other nationalist parties were connected to the original founding
of the Viet Minh Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Viet Minh Independence League) in
Nanjing. As reported by Hoang Van Hoan, this event took place with Ha Huy Tap's
approbation, sometime in early 1936.98 However, in his own report to the Comintern
of 1 July 1936, Tap writes that 'a so-called Revolutionary Vietnamese Independence
League had been founded in Nanking', and that a "fake congress was even held". "We
have excluded from the party all the communists who created this league with Min
[aka Phi Van, Nguyen Huu Cam]; it has already been dissolved, as we have
unmasked it,' he reported.99 (However, Hoang Van Hoan writes that the League
lapsed into inactivity due to the hostility of certain nationalist Vietnamese and the
difficulty of raising money.100) Conceivably Le Hong Phong went directly to Nanjing
from Moscow with his united front message: he had longstanding ties with Ho Hoc
Lam and Nguyen Hai Than, two of the members of the first Viet Minh group. As
subsequent events would show, even after Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap made
contact in 1936, Tap would continue to resist elements of the Comintern's post-
Seventh Congress strategy.
At a meeting held in late July in Shanghai, often referred to as a Central
Committee plenum, the two Vietnamese leaders finally made contact. It was at this
meeting that the outdated resolutions of the Macao Congress were suspended. The
plenum in reality may have been a gathering of the Overseas Bureau, which since
September 1935 had also been acting as the Central Committee; it may not have been
attended by any party members from in-country.101 It issued a new open letter on the
formation of a united front, now referred to as 'a United Anti-imperialist Popular
Front'.102 The gathering followed the June formation of a Popular Front government
in France, which opened the way for Ha Huy Tap to move to Saigon in August to
establish a new Central Committee.103 He in theory took with him the July 'Open
Letter' and a set of resolutions which reflected the ICP's acceptance of the Seventh
Congress line but, as it transpired, he would later be accused of refusing to implement
the Comintern's new policies and failing to publicize the decisions of the July
meeting in Shanghai. In a retrospective report which he apparently wrote in the late
summer of 1937, he mentioned that 'Litvinov (Le Hong Phong) is staying abroad as a
reserve agent; due to his absence he is not playing any role in the work of the CC.' 104
Someone in the Eastern Secretariat wrote a commentary on this report in January
1938, and noted: 'Litvinov (Hai-An) received the assignment when he left Moscow to
return to the country and organize the transfer of the CC of the ICP to the interior.
After the transfer organized by Ha Huy Tap took place, Hai-An was instructed by
Lozeray [a French communist visiting Asia with a parliamentary commission of
inquiry]...to try to regain the leadership of the party in-country. Evidently he did not
succeed.'105 Thus it may be that Ha Huy Tap was acting on his own initiative in 1936
when he moved back to Saigon. The further development of this disagreement is
discussed in the next chapter.
The effects of the Léon Blum government in Vietnam have been well
documented, particularly for Cochinchina, where La Lutte flourished as a joint
publication and political alliance of the ICP and local Trotskyists until the summer of
1937.106 The Indochina Congress movement, which began with a proposal by Nguyen
An Ninh printed in La Lutte on 29 July 1936, brought a new wave of political
activism across the political spectrum. Action committees were organized, first in
southern towns and villages, to collect the peoples' demands and prepare for the
holding of a Congress, conceived by the communists and Trotskyists as a body which
would have broad popular representation. An amnesty for political prisoners resulted
in the release from July 1936 to August 1937 of over 2,000 activists, 643 of them
from the prison island Poulo Condore. 107 The communist prisoners had made good
use of their time inside: they had improved their knowledge of communist theory and
sharpened their conspiratorial skills.108 Many of them, including an important group
of the ICP's leaders, were soon integrated into the movement to demand better
working conditions and democratic freedoms for the people of Indochina. But the
colonial administration's lack of enthusiam for the Popular Front meant that the first
wave of Vietnamese optimism regarding the new French government did not endure
for long. By September 1936 the socialist Minister of Colonies, Marius Moutet, had
informed Hanoi that the holding of a large-scale Congress in Saigon was out of the
question.109 Following the visit of Popular Front representative Justin Godart to
Saigon and Hanoi in early 1937 and the mass demonstrations to welcome him, the
colonial authorities began a new campaign of repression. A 1937 report from the
Overseas Bureau to Moscow, however, placed some of the blame for the Congress
movement's failure on the Trotskyists: this letter criticized La Lutte for driving the
'national bourgeoisie' away from the united front with excessive criticism. 110 The
'united front from below' between the ICP and the Trotskyists did not survive the
general disappointment with Blum's government. In May 1937 the ICP was pressured
to withdraw from the alliance by the French CP, which was now involved in Stalin's
all-out war against Trotskyism, but it was largely the Comintern's growing
commitment to anti-fascist alliances which brought about the dissolution of the La
Lutte front in June 1937. By August the ICP would begin a period of reorganization
which is discussed in the next chapter.
The activities of Le Hong Phong in China have been less well-documented
than the history of La Lutte in Saigon. However, Sûreté reports show that from the
autumn of 1936 to the first part of 1937 he was moving around southern China and
renewing contacts with, among others, Nguyen Hai Than, the nationalist leader who
had fallen out with the Thanh Nien group in 1927. According to Agent 'Konstantin'
Le Hong Phong visited Than around 23 September 1936. The two were said to be
planning to hold a large meeting in Shun-tac (Shunde). 111 Phong was sighted again by
Sûreté informers in March and April 1937 - he was said to be constantly on the move
between Shun Tac, Fat Shan and Canton.112 Le Hong Phong's activities may have
influenced the creation of a Popular Front among the Vietnamese emigres in Yunnan,
an event which was the subject of a French military intelligence report of March-
April 1937. This report noted that the three most important cells of the 'Nationalist
Party', those in Hekou, Amitcheou (Kaiyuan) and Kunming had joined this front,
which the report called a 'subsection of the Tonkin section of the Indochinese Popular
Front'.113
Here we have one of the early signs that the united front in Tonkin (as well as
central Vietnam) would take a different form from that in Saigon. Obviously there
was no escaping events in China for party activists in the north. But it was also true
that in Hanoi the Trotskyists did not possess a strong organization and do not appear
to have penetrated the workers movement. Moreover, there was no local equivalent
of the bourgeois Constitutionalist Party. Thus when the amnestied communist
prisoners began to show up in Tonkin at the end of 1936, the ICP had little
competition in organizing the labour movement. At the same time they had an open
field when it came to making political alliances with middle-class forces, and seem to
have actually played the key role in creating the Vietnamese branch of the Socialist
Party, the S.F.I.O., in the north. In March 1936 the bi-monthly socialist review
L'Avenir began to appear. Among its staff were Vo Nguyen Giap, Phan Anh, Dang
Thai Mai, Vu Dinh Huynh and Bui Ngoc Ai, most of whom would play important
roles in the Viet Minh.114 In November 1936 a mixed group of ICP communists and
Trotskyists established Le Travail, a paper which gave aid to released political
prisoners and organized the preparations for Justin Godart's visit. Among its leading
journalists was Dang Xuan Khu, the activist from Nam Dinh who had worked with
Nguyen Duc Canh in 1929, before being imprisoned in Tonkin in 1930. He would
become better known by the name which he took in 1945: Truong Chinh (Long
March). By January 1937 the Travail group was cooperating with the SFIO and the
Radical Party (both French organizations) on a plan to create a Tonkin section of the
SFIO.115 This group was joined in April 1937 by Pham Van Dong, who had been
living in Hue under restricted residence, as a recently released prisoner. A Sûreté
report noted that he had a reputation as an excellent journalist, and was being made a
permanent editor of Le Travail.116 However, the paper had to close down soon after
Dong's arrival, due to a series of fines and law suits against its publisher. By the
summer of 1937, disagreements between Trotskyists and ICP communists had broken
up the first attempt at a united front in Hanoi.117 But the ICP would continue to pursue
an alliance with nationalist intellectuals and other members of the bourgeoisie in
Tonkin.
Ho Chi Minh's last years in Moscow
After the Seventh Congress Ho Chi Minh stayed on at the Lenin School until
the end of 1935, but by 1936 he was working as an instructor within the Indochinese
section at the Stalin School, where the two remaining Vietnamese delegates to the
Seventh Congress were enrolled. A report of a meeting of teachers and students of
this section in April 1936 shows that 'Lin' and Vera Vasilieva were working together,
apparently to develop a course of study on Indochina. She served as the senior
lecturer in the Indochinese Section. 'Working with him is pleasant, as he is not a
novice in the study of his country' she commented; 'he knows the country but not
systematically' They were working on political problems such as the agrarian
question. 'He has a large amount of revolutionary experience, but because, like other
Indochinese comrades, he has made many errors, we are now paying a lot of attention
to these questions...he has made significant progress.' 118 Some Vietnamese sources
claim that Ho was planning to write a thesis on the agrarian question, but this author
has seen no references to this, beyond Vasilieva's report. One of Ho's students, 'Van-
Tan' (Hoang Van Non) complained that Comrade Lin was putting him through a
'Stakhanovite' course of study - in one month he had had to complete a course on the
history of the Soviet communist party, and as there was no literature available, he had
had to memorize everything. 'Comrade Lin speaks quickly, like a spinning wheel,' he
said; 'that is the reason for the state of my knowledge.' 119 (One can speculate that Ho
had no real interest in teaching the young Tay the Stalinized 1935 version of party
history. When Ho wanted to teach something, we know that he would go to great
lengths to make the subject matter clear and simple.)
At the close of 1936 Vasilieva drew up a training plan for Indochinese
students which provided for a new contingent often Vietnamese students to come to
Moscow. It also called for the creation of a new training school in China, to offer
two-month political courses to lower-level party activists from Vietnam. She
projected a budget of US $3,000 to train ten students for each two-month session.
Point nine of her proposal mentioned, 'we have to decide the question of sending
Comrade Lin, who has finished his studies in Moscow, to organize and run this
school.' However, at the end of her memo, someone had scribbled: 'All these
proposals have been cancelled, following the clarification of the problem.' 120 What the
'problem' was is not explained, but we know that Comrade Lin stayed on in Moscow
for further studies.
 In 1937 the Stalin School was reorganized, with the non-Soviet students being
placed in the 'Scientific Institute for the Study of National and Colonial Problems'.
The more neutral name did not mean that the school had changed its function,
however. In a letter to the 'Soviet Control Commission' in April 1938, a school
administrator explained that the Institute's function was to prepare cadres for foreign
parties - the name was a cover and did not reflect the true nature of the institute's
work, he wrote.121 Ho was still registered as both an instructor and as a graduate
student, now in the 'first course' of the Institute's History Department. He did not
show a great deal of enthusiasm for his studies: his marks for 'Dialectical
Materialism', 'Ancient History' and 'Middle History' were all just 'satisfactory'. Only
in 'Modern History' did he receive 'excellent'. His status as an instructor seems to
have been relatively low - he was teaching Indochinese Studies in the Vietnamese
language.
By contrast, "Minin", Nguyen Khanh Toan, who had studied at the
University, of Hanoi, was listed as "acting lecturer" in "Political Economy", 'General
History', and 'Country Studies'.122 (Nguyen Khanh Toan's extended residence in
Moscow has never been explained. He would return to China in 1939.)
By mid-1938, when Ho Chi Minh was preparing to leave Moscow, the
Institute was being closed down. Pavel Mif, the Institute's Director and since 1928
Stalin's hatchet man for Chinese affairs, was arrested as 'an enemy of the people'
sometime in 1937. He was executed in 1938. Throughout 1937 and 1938 many
Russian party leaders and Comintern activists were arrested and shot. The Comintern
operatives who had helped to implement the hard line of 1928-9 were particularly
hard hit. These included the Pole 'Rylski', 'Gailis' (the compiler of the book Armed
Insurrection), Volk, Vasiliev, Safarov and Piatnitsky (Orgwald) himself. The peasant
experts who had overseen Ho Chi Minh's work in the mid 1920s - Dombal and 'Volin'
- were also swallowed up by the purges. 123 At the same time, the three Russian
communists - Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin - who had led the Comintern up to
1929 had all been swept from the scene.
It is difficult to imagine how an old communist like Ho Chi Minh could have
kept functioning through this period of madness. But in January 1938 he was still
translating the rare letter that arrived in Moscow from Indochina. His survival
through the worst years of the purges is often taken as a sign that Ho was protected
by one of the higher ranking survivors, Manuilsky or that he was a dutiful Stalinist.
On the latter score, we know that Stalin had made so many changes of course that it
was almost impossible not to have been in conflict with one of his policies at some
stage. Ho, as he showed in 1924, was willing to cooperate with whichever group held
the current Comintern leadership in order to promote his goal of independence for
Vietnam. Yet even quiet compliance would probably not have been enough to save
him had he been a Pole, Balt, German or Turk. These latter parties received the full
force of Stalin's vengeful attentions in 1937-38. Comintern representatives from legal
parties, such as the French, British and American CPs, were largely spared in this
period.124 In Ho Chi Minh's case, the fact that he came from a distant country with a
low priority for Soviet foreign policy must have been at least part of the reason why
he was not arrested. At the same time, he had made it a long-term practice to keep a
low profile in Moscow and had never presented himself as a theoretician, as had
M.N. Roy. In a biographical questionnaire which he filled in when entering the Lenin
School in 1934, he was typically secretive. He wrote that he had no adult family
members, no wife, no profession or specialty, was not acquainted with any branch of
industry and did not know what kind of work he could do. At the end of his short
essay on his life, he wrote tersely: 'I think that is all about my biography for the time
being'.125
As far as his relationship with Dmitry Manuilsky is concerned, we learn from
a letter sent to Manuilsky's Secretariat on 6 June 1938 that the two had not met for
quite some time. Ho wrote: 'I would be very grateful, dear Comrade, if you would
grant me an interview. You have not seen me for a long time.' Ho pointed out that it
was the seventh anniversary of his arrest in Hong Kong as well as the beginning of
his eighth year of "inactivity": 'Send me somewhere. Or keep me here. Use me in
whatever way you judge useful. What I am requesting is that you not let me live too
long without activity, outside the party.'126 The records of the Institute for the Study
of National and Colonial Questions show that his wish was granted and that on 29
September 1938 he was officially discharged.127 Not long afterwards he seems to
have departed for China. Once again, we are in the dark as to what Ho's job
description was when he departed from Moscow for China. But we do know that he
went back as an official emissary of the Comintern to the ICP. Vasilieva intervened
with Dimitrov to have Ho granted an audience before his return. In a brief note she
explained: 'It is essential that someone from the leadership should speak with
Comrade Lin before his departure, about those questions which were the subject of
disagreements within the Party [Indochinese] leadership and which now still face the
party. Lin is a member of the Central Committee, enjoys great authority in the Party,
and as he is coming from here [Moscow], they will listen to what he says very
attentively. It is important that he speak correctly.' 128 (It would seem that at this stage
Ho was still considered at least a candidate member of the ICP CC.)
As it turned out, Vasilieva's confidence in Moscow's authority was somewhat
misplaced. In the following chapter I will review the disagreements within the ICP
leadership which divided the party from 1936 to 1940. It would not be until May
1941, after Ho had spent two-and-a-half years in China, that he would officially
deliver his message to the party's Central Committee.

7. THE RETURN OF HO CHI MINH AND THE PATH TO THE EIGHTH

PLENUM (1937-41)
By the time Ho Chi Minh had received the go-ahead to return to Asia in the
autumn of 1938, the Soviet Union and the nationalist Chinese government had re-
established an alliance. The drawn-out negotiations between the two sides in Moscow
and Nanjing led to the signing of a non-aggression pact in August 1937. As in the
early 1920s, this diplomatic achievement was not received with entirely good grace
by the Chinese communists. But it did result in a new in-flow of military aid to help
the GMD slow the Japanese advance from the coastal cities into central China.
Charles McLane estimates that between the end of 1937 and November 1940,
Russian aid to Chiang Kaishek reached a total between $300 and $450 million.1 The
Russian-GMD understanding led to the revival of the united front between the
nationalist and communist Chinese, as well. This meant a return to legality for the
CCP for a few years, and a chance to establish a presence in the GMD's strongholds,
first Nanjing and, briefly, Wuhan; then Chongqing. In September 1937 the Chinese
Red Army was reorganized under the command of the GMD's Military Affairs
Commission, with the Eighth Route Army formed to operate in the northwest and a
New Fourth Army created to fight south of the Yangtze. The CCP was authorized to
run two Guerilla Training Courses in southern China in cooperation with the GMD.
As early as June 1938, overseas Vietnamese communists were able to meet the CCP
general Ye Jianying, who was liaising between the Eighth Route Army and the
Military Affairs Commission, in Wuhan.2 Ho Chi Minh was thus returning to China
at an auspicious moment of Sino-Soviet cooperation. His assignment on returning to
Southeast Asia was to bring the ICP into a 'broad national democratic front', which
would include progressive French residents of Indochina and the nationalist
bourgeoisie as well.3 The Comintern's eight-point directive, which he had had to
commit to memory, called on the Vietnamese communists to place the aims of the
antifascist front before the aims of the proletarian revolution. This was the nature of
the fronts which had been established in France in 1936, and then in China in 1937.
The ICP was asked not to make demands which were too extreme, for full
independence, for example, or a parliament. 'This would be to fall into the trap of the
Japanese fascists,' the directives cautioned. The party should organize a front to press
its demands for freedom of speech, press and the right to assemble, as well as a full
amnesty for political prisoners. Regarding the national bourgeoisie, the party was
advised to act 'with suppleness'; to draw it into the front and push it to act, or if
necessary, to isolate it politically. The party should not claim the right to direct the
democratic front. It should earn that right by showing itself to be one of the 'most
active, sincere and devoted' parties. Towards the Trotskyists no concessions or
entente were permissible. They were to be politically exterminated.

The political prelude to Ho Chi Minh's return (1937-8)

By 1938 within Vietnam a complex configuration of political forces had
evolved, from Trotskyist to far right parties, a fact which made Ho's organizing task
even more difficult than it had been in 1924-37. The ICP had only re-established a
unifed leadership in 1935. Now the Vietnamese party was being asked to sign on to a
world-wide anti-fascist crusade which would require that it moderate its opposition to
the French colonialists. But without the unifying force of a Japanese invasion, the
Vietnamese communists found it very difficult to agree on the nature of the united
front which they should enter. The immediacy of the Japanese threat would be much
more strongly felt in Tonkin and Annam than in Cochinchina. Some Vietnamese
viewed the Japanese as potential liberators. As we have seen, when Le Hong Phong
returned from Moscow in 1936, his message regarding the united front met with
opposition from an unexpected quarter - from Ha Huy Tap. Tap had returned to Asia
when the proletkult was still a powerful force; he was apparently surprised by the
Comintern's about-face. However, the ICP's resistance to the Comintern's orders only
became known in Moscow in January 1938, when they received a report dated 10
September 1937 and signed 'F.L.' This report recaps some of the developments which
followed the Central Committee meeting held in July 1936 in Shanghai. Given the
author's description of her return journey to Asia via Paris, we can be fairly sure that
the writer was Nguyen Thi Minh Khai or 'Fan-Lan'. 4 The letter was written after the
ICP's Enlarged Party Conference and Second Plenum, held outside of Saigon from 25
August until 4 September 1937, when the Vietnamese CC fell in line with the
Comintern's policy.5
 Minh Khai and Hoang Van Non had travelled back to Hong Kong via France
and Italy in the late spring of 1937. They had memorized a nine-point list of policy
directives, which they were to transmit to the Overseas Bureau on arrival. I have not
found a copy of this list, but we can assume that it was close to the eight points which
Ho Chi Minh was called on to implement in 1938. The two travellers found Le Hong
Phong in July and passed on the Comintern's recommendations. As the letter from
'F.L.' relates, he explained to them that the Central Committee had been critical of the
Comintern's new emphasis on legal and semi-legal methods of organizing and viewed
it as, 'liquidationist, opportunist and rightist'. The Overseas Bureau had written a
brochure explaining the new policies, but this had been kept out of circulation by Ha
Huy Tap. According to Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap had written to tell him that 'the
comrades overseas were far from the practical reality of the country, and that the CC
must be responsible for the work in-country.'
Le Hong Phong sent Minh Khai to Saigon in August 1937 to deliver the
Comintern's latest directives in person. (Hoang Van Non was sent to Hanoi to do the
same.) In response to Minh Khai's message, Ha Huy Tap once again stated that the
tactics being promoted by Moscow and the Overseas Bureau were 'reactionary'. (As
'F.L.' explains, she discovered that the CC in Saigon had sent the party organizations
a letter on 26 March 1937, to annul the decisions of the 1936 Shanghai meeting. 6) 'I
wanted to write to explain all this to the comrades overseas,' she writes, 'but comrade
Sinitchkin told me that if I did, I would be expelled from the party.' At a conference
held before the CC plenum, however, the northern party members, Hoang Quoc Viet
and Nguyen Van Cu, supported the Comintern recommendations. They claimed that
they had not seen the 26 July 1936 letter on new methods of organizing, and that Ha
Huy Tap had given a false explanation of Comintern policy at the preceding CC
plenum in March 1937. Phung Chi Kien represented the Overseas Bureau at the
August plenum. The presence of the French communist Maurice Honel in Saigon at
this time seems to have been critical in overcoming Ha Huy Tap's resistance to the
new line. F.L.'s letter says that Honel criticized Tap's 'sectarianism', and that he
encouraged her to write to the Comintern to make clear what was happening within
the ICP.
The reason for the bitterness of this disagreement is hard to fathom from the
political jargon used by the Comintern trainees - on the surface it would seem to have
been fairly insignificant. Personal animosity may have accounted for some of the
tension (F.L's September 10 letter does not mention disagreements over policy
towards the Trotskyists). The Comintern and Overseas Bureau advocated placing
greater emphasis on legal organizing and joining a front with non-proletarian parties.
(They do not seem to have questioned the need for the party leaders to remain
underground.) One item of contention was the nature of youth organizing. Ha Huy
Tap wanted to transform the Communist Youth into an illegal Anti-imperialist Youth
League to develop cadres for youth work. Eight of the party members who attended
the Plenum supported this point of view, while the remaining five supported the
transformation of the Communist Youth group into a popular, legal organization. In
this latter scenario, the best of its members would be brought into the communist
party and, at the same time, would form the backbone of the legal youth
organizations. The whole debate on methods of organizing could reflect the
continued presence within the communist movement of the tensions which had
surfaced in 1928-9 when the cult of proletarianization began.
The final decision on youth organizing was left to the Comintern. Otherwise,
F.L. judged that the August-September plenum had been successful in unifying the
party and combatting 'sectarianism'. Ha Huy Tap reacted quickly to the Plenum
decisions, to judge by a letter which came to the Sûreté's notice. On 7 September
1937 Tap informed the writers of L'Avant- Garde newspaper that from now on all
brochures in French and quoc ngu would have to be submitted to party censors.
(L'Av'ant- Garde was the paper formed by the ICP after its separation from the La
Lutte group in May 1937. Around this time its name changed once again to the more
inclusive Le Peuple. By the following March the Stalin School trainee Tran van Kiet,
a.k.a. Remy, would return from France to take over Le Peuple and start its
Vietnamese-language version, Dan Chung.7) All newspaper articles for Le Peuple
would have to be written one or two days in advance. As Tap explained, L'Avant-
Garde had published several articles 'whose extreme left-wing tendency has served as
a pretext for repression'. He warned that the press in Tonkin was also distorting the
party's policy: 'All these actions will inhibit our legal action or turn against us those
groups with whom we could form alliances.'8
A French summary of the resolutions adopted by a Congress of the Southern
Regional Committee gives some more information regarding the policy changes
which were decided in September 1937. Held from 22 to 25 September 1937, this
congress declared that the party's propagandists had been talking over the heads of
the masses with their 'scholarly dissertations'. Their 'incendiary goals' had either
'intimidated the "unconscious masses" or created antipathy among the religious
elements, or wounded the amour-propre of the rich peasants'. The party line,
however, was to 'use all efforts to enroll these elements in popular organizations
(friendship circles, mutual aid associations, etc.).'9 Rich peasants were in future to be
won over or neutralized. 'But if there are those who, sacrificing their interests, ask to
join our organizations, we should open the doors wide to them so as not to upset them
and force them into the arms of the reformists, the reactionaries and the Trotskyists.'10
Soon after the CC plenum, Le Hong Phong moved to Saigon, in part to
establish contacts with the Central Committee of the Chinese Party, apparently via
their Saigon committee.11 At the end of March 1938, when the ICP held a Third
Plenum at Ba-Diem in Gia Dinh, with seven people attending, Ha Huy Tap was
removed from the post of General Secretary. (He would be arrested in May and
expelled to Ha Tinh under restricted residence.) Nguyen Van Cu, a young protégé of
Ngo Gia Tu from Bac Ninh province, an amnestied political prisoner who had served
time on Poulo Condore, became the new General Secretary. A new Secretariat of the
Standing Committee was established, including Ha Huy Tap, Nguyen Van Cu and, as
the Sûreté noted, 'a returnee from China'. This last member was most likely Le Hong
Phong, as Phung Chi Kien had returned to Hong Kong after the September 1937
plenum. The Standing Committee itself included five people: Ha Huy Tap, Nguyen
Van Cu, Gia or Anh Bay from the south (apparently Vo Van Tan), Nguyen Van
Trong or Nguyen Chi Dieu, a released prisoner who was rebuilding the Annam
regional committee, and again the 'Returnee from China'. At this time Nguyen Thi
Minh Khai was identified as a member of the Cochinchina Regional Committee, as
well as of the Saigon Committee. She was also put in charge of the education of party
members.12
We can assume, then, that by the time of this meeting the Comintern line and
its supporters were beginning to have a stronger influence within party structures in
Cochinchina. The CC report on the March Plenum mentions, in fact, that some party
members in the south had been excluded for 'lack of activity', while others had left of
their own accord. The total number of party members in Cochin-china had remained
steady at 655 since the Second Plenum.13 However, the selection of Nguyen Van Cu
as General Secretary shows that the Moscow-trained communists had to compromise
with the ICP structures already existing inside Vietnam, as Tran Phu and Ha Huy Tap
had done before. With the released political prisoners being brought back into the
party, former activists of the Tan Viet party appear, in particular, to have begun to
play a major role in the leadership. Preparations for a May Day meeting to be held in
Saigon also show that, although the ICP was now trying to become an acceptable
partner to bourgeois parties, they were still countenancing some cooperation with the
Trotskyists. The organizing committee for this meeting was composed of one
socialist (French), one Trotskyist, and two 'Stalinists'. But Ha Huy Tap insisted that
leaflets announcing the meeting list only 'workers' as the organizers. According to the
Sûreté, he was afraid that if the VNQDD saw that Trotskyists were involved, they
would break their links with the ICP.14
From the ICP reports written in late 1937 and early 1938, we can see that the
party's links with the Comintern and the French CP had weakened since the first days
of the Popular Front. Maurice Honel had returned to France in 1937, promising to
raise the profile of Indochina within the FCP. But nothing had been heard of him six
months after his return. As the CC report sent to Moscow in April 1938 makes clear,
lack of support from the PCF was eroding the ICP's influence in Cochinchina.
Following the June 1936 formation of the Léon Blum government, the report said, the
PCF had stopped paying attention to the problems of Indochina. On the other hand,
the Trotskyists in France attacked the colonial policies of the Popular Front, a fact
which helped the Saigon Trotskyists gain influence among the masses, especially
among intellectuals.15 The Trotskyists had also publicized the FCP role in the ending
of the La Lutte front in May-June 1937 and printed brochures on the show trials
taking place in Moscow.16 Still, the ICP CC remained committed to the concept of the
anti-fascist front and continued to try to establish regular contacts with the
Comintern. (It did not seem to have any idea of the havoc which the Moscow purges
were working within the Third International, and was possibly unaware that
Comintern leaders such as Piatnitsky and Mif had been arrested in 1937). In their
April 1938 report the ICP leaders requested that the Comintern send regular
directives on political and organizational questions, and that a 'leading comrade' be
sent every five or six months to bring these directives, along with financial aid. In
addition to an immediate advance of $5,000 to print books, they requested advisers
and funds to open a legal training center in China, along the lines of what had existed
in 1926-7.17 The dispatch of Ho Chi Minh to Asia in the autumn of 1938 may have
been a response to this request.
By this time communications with the Comintern via China had become
extremely difficult as a result of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The
Chinese ships on which the ICP had liaison agents were no longer able to sail to
Vietnam due to a Japanese blockade.18 When Phung Chi Kien wrote to the Comintern
in November 1937, he requested permission to open official contacts with the
Southern Bureau of the CCP, as the Chinese party had become, 'more or less legal'.
As he explained it, 'Even though for more than a year, we have had relations with the
Southern Bureau, this link, although close, remains irresponsible because it has not
received your approval.' He also asked to transfer his responsibility for
communication with the Siam CP to the Southern Bureau. 19 At the time of writing
this letter, Kien seems still to have been in Hong Kong. By June 1938 he was in
Wuhan to consult with the Chinese general Ye Jianying, according to Hoang Van
Hoan's memoirs. Kien was probably already acquainted with the general from his
days as a Whampoa cadet, when Ye Jianying commanded the Training Regiment.
After October 1938, as the Japanese were moving into Wuhan and after his Kowloon
residence had been raided by the police, Phung Chi Kien was said to have gone to
Shantou for guerilla training.20 For the Vietnamese communists in southern China at
this juncture, the role of the Comintern in their day-to-day decision making must
have been growing negligible. Yet, as noted above, the ICP in-country was eager to
re-establish regular links with Moscow, partly for financial reasons, and in March
1938 was trying to raise the money to send a party member abroad for consultations.
One Sûreté report claimed that Phung Chi Kien had volunteered to be the emissary,
but that the CC had decided to send a legal communist instead. 21 It does not appear
that anyone made the journey, either to France or Russia.

Ho Chi Minh's travels/the political landscape in 1939

Ho Chi Minh embarked for China in the autumn of 1938 and must have
arrived in Xi'an by November or December. He travelled via Urumchi and Lanzhou
and would have been part of a larger movement of advisers and material which was
being transported to China to support the war effort. It seems probable that he made
most of the journey by train and plane, as he managed to spend a month in Yan'an,
and still arrive in Guilin by February 1939. He later wrote that, with the outbreak of
war in China, he had 'fallen into a vast maelstrom which is changing the fates of
hundreds of millions of men.'22 In the same letter he reported that he had lost his
luggage in Yan'an, including the notes he had made on his Comintern instructions.
Chinese sources say that Ho Chi Minh, now known as Ho Quang, stayed in the CCP's
guesthouse for foreigners in the Date Orchard region, in the northwest of Yan'an,
where Kang Sheng was his host.23 Ho would have arrived soon after the CCP's Sixth
Plenum in October, which is believed to have ended with a rough balance in the
leadership between Mao and leaders such as Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai, who were
more enthusiastic supporters of the united front. 24 The battle for Wuhan had finally
ended with a Nationalist retreat at the end of October, a fact which seems to have
increased Mao's influence. We can assume from a long report and request for aid
which Ho would address to the Chinese party in mid-1940 that he maintained his
low-profile behaviour in Mao's base - in that report he would not demonstrate any
intimacy with the Chinese leadership, or assume that they knew the history of his role
in the ICP.25
Throughout China armies and refugees were on the move. The GMD army
was retreating south and west at the end of 1938. Hoang van Hoan's memoirs
describe his travels with the GMD bureaucracy beginning with the 1937 evacuation
from Nanjing to Wuhan; then in late 1938 to Changsha and Guiyang, where the
north-south highway to Xi'an intersects the east-west route; and finally west to
Kunming in early 1939. At roughly the same time, Ho Chi Minh moved south-east
across China, from Yan'an to Guilin in Guangxi province, which was now a front-line
city, regularly bombed by the Japanese. Ho had been made a major in the Eighth
Route army, which seems to have facilitated his travel through the chaos. After his
stay in Yan'an he made his way south to Chongqing, where he was sighted in Zhou
Enlai's company in early 1939.26 King Chen recounts that he moved in the entourage
of General Ye Jianying, who after the retreat from Wuhan had been appointed to run
the Southwest Guerilla Training Class in Hengyang, in Hunan province. 27 A Chinese
account of Ho's activities in the Eighth Route Army emphasizes that he was moving
under CCP patronage and protection, yet depicts him as fulfilling routine tasks in
what is sometimes referred to as a club or a liaison office, both in Guilin and in
Henyang, 350 miles to the north. The Guilin liaison office may have served in part as
an intelligence gathering point for the CCP, as it was outside the area of operations of
the Eighth Route Army. Ho was said to have been in charge of "sanitation", perhaps
meaning that he was a public health officer; he ran a club museum; he produced a
small newspaper for the unit; he listened to foreign language radio broadcasts, all the
time remaining in the disguise of a Chinese officer with a Cantonese accent. This
account says that Ho moved to Henyang from 20 June until 20 September 1939 as an
instructor for the second training session at the Guerilla Center.28
This depiction of Ho's activities in China does not accord with the picture of
an acclaimed communist leader returning home to take up the reins of power within
his party. The confusion created by war in China had certainly complicated his task.
But the rivalries and conflicting political views within his own party may also have
contributed to the difficulty he had in establishing contact with the ICP. By his own
account, Ho arrived in Guilin around February 1939. He was clearly discouraged
when he wrote a long report to Moscow in July that year. Seven months since his
arrival in China, he wrote, he still had not managed to accomplish his mission (this
letter does not mention his assignment in Henyang).
'What have I done in these seven months?' he wrote. 'With the help of friends
I have begun my search, which has not produced any results. Then I tried to build
some links; that has had certain results... While waiting and so as not to waste time, I
am working in the Eighth Army as a translator (listening to radio broadcasts), as
secretary of the cell, as president of the club, and now as a member of the club
committee. At the same time...I have written a brochure on the Special Region and
articles on political and military events, on Japanese atrocities, on the heroism of the
Chinese combatants, on the anti-Trotskyist struggle, etc...' He explained that since 12
February several of his articles had been published in the Hanoi weekly of the 'legal
Indochinese P.C.', Notre Voix. 'These articles are date-lined "Kweilin" with the
signature "Line", in the hope that the responsible comrades might guess who the
author is and where he is. But this hope has not yet been realized,' he wrote. He had
established good links with the paper's editor, who assumed that he was a Chinese
journalist. It was only at the end ofjuly he said, that he had been able to send on his
address and the Comintern's directives to the CC via a friend and the editor of Notre
Voix.29 The report to Moscow which follows this explanation, on the political
situation in Vietnam since 1936, is an eight-page, typed document full of information
on the press, elections, strikes and other political movements. He claims he has
gleaned these facts and figures from his reading of Notre Voix and Doi Nay (These
Times), another legal party paper from Hanoi which was edited by Tran Huy Lieu.
But one wonders if he had a more direct source of information.
Ho's explanation of his contacts with Vietnam leaves a few questions
hanging. Was it really possible that between February and July the 'responsible
comrades' in the ICP had not figured out who 'P.C. Line' was? As it happened, a
leading journalist at Notre Voix was Vo Nguyen Giap, who in 1939 married the
younger sister of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai. 30 In 1937 Sûreté reports show that he had
taken a forceful stand on the need to form a united democratic front and at one point
had even advocated forming a mixed section of the French CP in Vietnam to engage
in legal organizing activity.31 There is in my opinion some reason to suppose that Ho
was in independent contact with Minh Khai, or some of the legal activists who shared
her point of view, throughout 1939. As we shall see, by late 1939 she appears to have
made a trip to China to contact him. Another possible source of information for Ho at
this time would be links via the CCP to Le Hong Phong in Saigon. The latter,
however, was arrested on 22 June 1939 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment,
followed by three years of restricted residence, for using a false identity card. 32
Hoang Tranh's book on Ho's time in China, cited above, claims that he was in contact
with a Chinese liaison agent who travelled between Guilin, Haiphong and Hong
Kong. This agent, Ly Boi Quan, is supposed to have procured a Baby Hermes
typewriter with a French keyboard for Ho on one of his trips to Haiphong. But he
does not claim to have contacted the ICP on Ho's behalf until the autumn of 1939.33
The ICP's internal conflict over tactics flared up again in the summer of 1939.
After the United Democratic Front candidates Nguyen An Ninh, Nguyen Van Tao
and Vu Cong Ton were defeated by the Trotskyists in the elections to the Saigon
Colonial Council in April 1939, a polemic began in the communist press. The debate
pitted three of the so-called Stalinist communists, Nguyen Van Tao, Le Hong Phong
and Nguyen Van Cu, against each other. Once again the main issue was how the ICP
should relate to the bourgeois reformist parties. Nguyen Van Tao, the legal
communist who had represented the Vietnamese at the Sixth Comintern Congress in
1928, wrote in Dong Phuong tap chi (Far East Review) that the communists should
take a harder line against the Constitutionalist party, which had won three seats in the
assembly. A writer now identified as Le Hong Phong, using the pseudonym 'T.B.' or
'Tri Binh' wrote in several issues of Dan Chung to defend the ICP policy. 34 This
author took the line that there was no need to attack any indigenous party or class, so
long as it was not reactionary. He placed most of the blame for the ICP's electoral
failure on the harrassment of the colonial government (in fact Dan Chung's main
personnel had been arrested during the campaign).35
However, the ICP General Secretary, Nguyen Van Cu, wrote a pamphlet titled
Tu Chi Trich (Self-Criticism), in which he took to task both these viewpoints. In an
introduction to his pamphlet, he mentions that he had originally sent it as an article
for publication to Dan Chung in Saigon, but for one reason or another the article did
not get printed. He then had it published in pamphlet form by the Dan Chung
publishing house in Hanoi, which was more amenable. 36 He criticizes Anh T.B. for
expressing an 'individual opinion', not 'the united opinion of the whole Party'. 37 Part
of the blame for the failure in the elections, he says, lies in the fact that the ICP
placed too much emphasis on the peril of Japanese fascism and did not speak enough
about the oppression of the masses by 'the reactionary colonial forces'. 38 The mistake
made by T.B., he writes, is that he does not distinguish between a reformist party and
a reactionary one39 (the author does not mention that in Hanoi's April municipal
elections a single list of candidates was presented by the left under the SFIO
umbrella, and ran unopposed). Around this time, June 1939, the Sûreté got wind of a
ten-chapter Draft for Discussion which was being circulated by the Regional
Committee for Annam to its provincial committees. According to this document, the
party's policy was to support the formation of a democratic front - but this front
would have to be formed within 'powerful mass struggle movements'. The
Democratic Front would be a form of class struggle as well as anti-imperialist
resistance.40 This conception would seem to be the one held by Nguyen Van Cu.
When one reads the articles which Ho Chi Minh was sending to Notre Voix,
one can see that his situation in the middle of the Sino-Japanese war was a world
apart from that of Saigon and its elections. He was engaged in producing war-time
propaganda to build support for China and faith in its ability to resist the Japanese. At
the end of February he wrote about the third session of the Chinese National Political
Council. This was the first session after the defection of its ex-president, Wang
Jingwei, former leader of the Left GMD. Ho cited statements by Mao and Chiang
Kaishek to show that there was close collaboration between the major parties in the
anti-Japanese national front. He explained that the council had met 'at the moment
when the defeatist tendencies personified by Wang Jingwei - which had raised their
heads after the loss of Canton and Hankou - had been definitively crushed by the
unity and determination of our people'.41 At this point many communists believed that
the GMD's will to resist Japan was hanging in the balance. Those ICP members who
identified most closely with the Chinese struggle (Le Hong Phong, originally a CCP
member, would have been one of them) would have been less inclined than in the
pre-war period to worry about the exact political complexion of the Vietnamese
parties which were willing to join them in an antifascist front. But within Vietnam,
especially in the south, other issues such as the increasing recruitment of Vietnamese
for military duty in Europe and the tax levies of the colonial regime had more
immediacy than Japanese aggression in China.
Ho was apparently keen to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin and distance
himself from the left-wing GMD leaders who had fled to Hanoi at the end of 1938.
His letters to Notre Voix include some fairly crude anti-Trotskyist propaganda
quoting from the Moscow show trials. He mentioned trials of accused Trotskyists in
the Yan'an Special Region in 1937 as well. What he actually thought about these
trials remains a mystery. But he made the point that in 1937 the Chinese Trotskyists
had condemned the communist call for a united front with the Guomindang as
treachery.42 Altogether he wrote four anti-Trotskyist articles from Guilin. In his 1939
pamphlet Nguyen Van Cu also emphasizes the Trotskyist danger, as something which
should be viewed very seriously. In Vietnam, we should remember, the anti-
Trotskyist struggle was still a political contest for influence in which both sides had
roughly equal weaponry - the spoken and written word.

The changing international situation

In August and September 1939 international politics would intrude more
forcefully than ever into the internal debates of the ICP. On 23 August the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact was signed, which overnight brought the Moscow-aligned
communists into alliance with Nazi Germany. War broke out in Europe when the
Germans attacked Poland on 1 September. On 28 September the French Governor-
General of Indochina outlawed the ICP and all their publications. In the next weeks
the French began a round-up of communists, both Trotskyists and Stalinists, which
continued throughout the autumn and into 1940. But while the rapprochement
between the Soviet Union and Germany is usually viewed as a near disaster for the
ICP,43 there is evidence that many ICP cadres had gone into hiding by the end of
September and found ways to take advantage of the new political situation. The fact
is that the Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed the communists to once again take an
uncompromising stand against French imperialism. During the Democratic Front
period, they had been forced to support France's national defense programme and
recruiting efforts in Indochina. Now they could once again work to stir anti-military
sentiments within the Vietnamese troops in the French army, at a time when
recruitment was becoming increasingly unpopular.44
The issue of party leadership becomes increasingly complicated in this period,
as leaders inside Vietnam were arrested one after another and communications
between north and south became more difficult. In China, the Japanese advanced
west from Canton in November to Nanning and Longzhou, virtually to the
Vietnamese border. The communist Chinese sources relate that Ho Chi Minh
attempted to make contact with an ICP envoy in Longzhou at some point in the
autumn of 1939, but that the emissary had to return to Vietnam prematurely when he
was robbed and ran out of money.45 After a wait of three days, Ho is said to have
returned to Guilin. This story may well be true, but it probably does not give us a full
picture of Ho's efforts to contact the ICP CC. In April 1940 the Sûreté would find a
curious letter which they believed to be in Nguyen Thi Minh Khai's handwriting,
when they searched a party member's house in Gia Dinh. Its peremptory tone and
criticism of the CC are quite surprising. It is written to participants in a meeting
which she had the right to attend, but where she would not have had the right to vote.
She mentions that she has been working for the past two years with the 'directing
organs', so one can guess that the letter was written around the time of the ICP's Sixth
Plenum, held in Hoc Mon in November 1939. It reads:
Comrades!
We need to appoint someone urgently to bring back L! Why all this disorder?
You haven't decided on the rendezvous. Which means that L. has waited a long time,
without anyone going to get him. I was counting on bringing him back, but I didn't
know the meeting place, and anyway, I hadn't received any instructions about this.
[...]
In China events of exceptional seriousness are now taking place, which could
have repercussions for our Central Committee. We have to resolve this question, as
well as the financial question, which is very important. We have several hundred
piasters at our disposal and are awaiting the decision of the CC or the Regional
Committee. You must send a trustworthy comrade to come and get the money. The
CC will be asked to assign tasks more clearly. As it is, sometimes we make a lot of
effort without obtaining any results, because of the bad division of labour.
I know that the idea of a woman, even if she is just or has a good political
character, does not inspire great confidence. However, I feel that since I have begun
working with the comrades here, I have not made any suggestions or begun any
activities which are against the principles or the policy of the Party.46
This letter's tone of authority leads one to suppose that Minh Khai saw herself
as a representative of the Comintern or the Overseas Bureau of the ICP. With Le
Hong Phong under arrest this responsibility could logically have fallen on her
shoulders. But as her letter makes clear, her fellow party members did not like to be
given orders by a woman; they may have viewed her as insubordinate for making
unauthorized contacts with 'L' or with her allies in Tonkin, such as her brother-in-law
Giap. By the time this letter was written, the Sûreté was referring to her as 'the
concubine of Le Hong Phong'. The two had been sharing a house in Cholon and may
at least have been posing as husband and wife. In 1937, however, the French had
described her as already married, but separated from her husband.47 From what we
know of Ho Chi Minh's difficulty in making contact with the CC, it seems highly
possible that the 'L.' referred to in her letter is indeed 'Lin'. The letter could have been
written around the time of the failed attempt to make contact in Longzhou, which
must have occurred before the Japanese occupied the town in late November 1939.

The Sixth Plenum and the 1940 uprisings

Nguyen Van Cu came to Saigon from Hanoi in the autumn of 1939 for the
Sixth Plenum of the ICP (he had been expelled to Tonkin in the summer of 1938, not
long after he took over his post 48). This would be the final CC meeting before the
uprisings of 1940, which were to create an upheaval in the party's leadership
structures. Nguyen Van Cu himself would be arrested in January 1940, along with Le
Duan, another ex-prisoner from Poulo Condore who had moved to Saigon to work in
1939.49 Phan Dang Luu, Le Duan, and Vo Van Tan are the three other cadres usually
mentioned as having taken part in this meeting held from the 6-8 November in Hoc
Mon. Hoang Quoc Viet does not seem to have taken part, as he had gone into hiding
north of Hanoi; the Annam CC representative Nguyen Chi Dieu may have already
succumbed to tuberculosis by this time. Ta Uyen, a northerner from Ninh Binh, who
had been working in the South since his escape from Poulo Condore in 1935, is
another cadre likely to have participated. A member of the original ICP faction from
1929, his biography identifies him as secretary of the Southern Regional Committee
at the time of his arrest in October 1940. 50 Minh Khai does not seem to have been a
CC member at this stage, although by 1940 the French identified her as a CC
secretary.
The Sixth Plenum reacted to the changed international circumstances of late
1939 by calling for the creation of an Anti-imperialist United Front. National
liberation now became the major goal of the ICP. In a circular published in
December, the communists called on the 'struggling forces of the proletariat, of the
labouring peoples, of the small and weak nations' to unite with the Soviet Union.
They would have to rise up and struggle, 'to stamp out the flame of war by
eliminating its root: the capitalist, imperialist system'. 51 This manifesto called for a
halt to the sending of Vietnamese soldiers to France or other foreign countries; it also
called on communists to support the Soviet Union, as well as the revolutions in
France, China and the world.52 According to a version of the Sixth Plenum Resolution
published in 1983, the meeting revived Ho Chi Minh's moderate policy of 1930 with
regard to land confiscation.53 But in contrast to the statements of the Eighth Plenum
in 1941, the documents of 1939 are still aimed primarily at workers, peasants and dan
chung, 'the masses'. The ICP was, on the one hand, returning to familiar terrain for
those activists such as Ho Chi Minh who could recall the anti-war movement of the
First World War. At that time left-wing socialists and Bolsheviks had refused to
adopt the war aims of their respective ruling classes. On the other hand, the party was
now taking a stance which would bring it closer to its own left wing, as it prepared
the ground to return to a violent struggle to overthrow French power.
After the January 1940 arrest of Nguyen Van Cu it is unclear how the void in
the leadership was filled. Cu's removal from the scene seems to have created a
succession crisis in the ICP which was not fully resolved until the Eighth Plenum in
1941. It may be that in 1940 two wings or tendencies within the party once again
developed, in a way that echoed the split in the Thanh Nien association in 1928-9. In
March or April Vo Van Tan was arrested, which eliminated another key leader. 54 In
1940 two legal activists from Tonkin, Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong, began
to play a new role as a link between the CC and the communists in southern China.
Meanwhile, in Cochinchina a reinvigorated anti-French movement sprang up, which
made recruitment inside the army a major part of its mission. How closely what was
happening in Yunnan and Guangxi was coordinated with activities in Cochinchina
and other parts of Vietnam is impossible to say. The communists who made the effort
to travel to Kunming to meet Ho Chi Minh and the Overseas Bureau in 1940 were
some of those who had been most closely associated with the policies of the United
Democratic Front. They would include, in addition to Giap and Dong, the former Tan
Viet activist Phan Dang Luu. A woman known as Ly Thi Lan in Yunnan was also
sighted with Ho Chi Minh in May and June 1940. It is noteworthy that a French
report written that June mentions that the ICP has 'the intention to make more use of
its female elements for propaganda and liaison work'.55
In June 1940 the in-country and overseas sections of the ICP finally began to
come together. Ho Chi Minh had arrived in the Yunnan capital of Kunming early in
the year. After his failed attempt to rendezvous with the ICP in the autumn of 1939,
he is believed to have returned to Guilin, then made his way to Guiyang and
Chongqing. There he once again met Zhou Enlai, according to the Chinese account. 56
With the sudden change of policy in Moscow in August 1939, the Vietnamese would
have been eager to consult on how to adapt their own tactics. (Presumably Ho met
Zhou before the latter's visit to Moscow in early 1940. 57) The Vietnamese say that in
Chongqing Ho also met Ho Hoc Lam, his fellow native of Nghe An, who was still
attached to the GMD General Staff.58
The Vietnamese communists now making Kunming their center of operations
were a combination of old Thanh Nien trainees from Canton and former members of
the VNQDD who had taken refuge in Yunnan in 1930. Among the Thanh Nien group
Hoang Van Hoan and Phung Chi Kien were the most prominent. Kien, like Ho Chi
Minh, had still been considered a member of the ICP CC as of 1938. 59 He had
become the head of the party's reconstituted Overseas Bureau. The antecedents of
two other members of this group, Vu Anh (Trinh Dinh Hai) and Cao Hong Linh or
Lanh are less clear. Both were apparently communists in good standing and fluent in
Chinese, who may have earlier been part of the Nanjing circle around Ho Hoc Lam.
In 1935 Vu Anh and a former VNQDD cadre, Tran Ho Kinh, had been sent by the
ICP to build a communist group in Yunnan. They recruited two students at the
Kunming officers training school, Bui Duc Minh and Le Tung Son, who had grown
disenchanted with the VNQDD leadership.60 These two became stalwarts of the
overseas communist group, Bui Duc Minh serving as the guide for Giap and Dong
when they made their trip to Kunming in May 1940. There may still have been a
considerable number of VNQDD-affiliated workers in Yunnan in 1940, along the
railway line between Hanoi and Kunming. In spite of the united front in China, the
communists generally used some sort of front organization to protect themselves
from persecution by the local GMD. Several Vietnamese sources recount an
inspection tour along the Yunnan railway which Ho Chi Minh undertook with Phung
Chi Kien in April 1940. Ho encouraged the Vietnamese communists to increase their
propaganda along the line, to call on the Vietnamese to 'fight the French and to
support China's resistance to Japan', using the cover of the 'Association of
Vietnamese in Support of China's Resistance' for their activities.61
Vo Nguyen Giap relates that he and Pham Van Dong departed from Hanoi by
train in the beginning of May 1940. In Yen Bay they met Bui Duc Minh, who took
them by river boat on the next stage of the journey. After crossing the river into
China at Lao Cai, they changed into Chinese clothes to continue their trip to
Kunming.62 Strangely, on 13 May the Sûreté received a report that 'an emigre recently
arrived from Sian [Xi'an], Tran Ba Quoc', and Ly Thi Lan had left Yunnanfou by
train on 12 May. They were planning to travel to the Vietnamese border and cross on
foot, this report said. The man was dressed as a scholar and the woman as a Hakka
Chinese.63 The French identified the man as Ho Chi Minh. It seems possible that Ho
was hoping to meet the two envoys from Hanoi at the border. According to Giap's
account, however, he and Dong waited in Kunming until early June before Ho, whom
the Vietnamese referred to by his old Hong Kong alias of Vuong, turned up. At this
point the Vietnamese accounts are uninformative about the discussions which ensued.
However, a long report and request for aid which Ho prepared for the CCP in July
1940 may well have been the product of a joint decision made that month. The Sûreté
reported in December 1940 that Phan Dang Luu had admitted after his arrest that he,
too, had been in Yunnan in June.64 Another Sûreté report of 9 June 1940 referred to
'Indo-chinese communists in China returning to Indochina'. It mentioned four people
as travelling together: Tran Ba Quoc, Ly Thi Lan (whom it said was not Nguyen Thi
Khai, known as Co Duy, Ly Minh Xuan or Tran Thi Lan), Duong Ba Linh, and
Nguyen Cong Nam.65 Giap's alias in China is usually given as Duong Hoai Nam and
Dong's as Lam Ba Kiet. So we cannot say with any certainty who these four were.
The identity of the woman remains a mystery, but the French may have been too
quick to assume that it was not Minh Khai. They did not have any confirmed
sightings of her between the autumn 1937 plenum and her arrest in Cholon at the end
of July 1940, although they believed she gave birth to a daughter in Saigon in early
1939. By May 1940 she was being identified as a CC secretary by informers of the
Sûreté, so it would have been quite logical for her to join the group which travelled to
Yunnan.66
Ho's report on Indochina and request for aid, dated 12 July 1940, is presented
in the exhaustive style favoured by the Comintern. It includes an analysis of the
strategic situation in Indochina and international attitudes regarding its future. As it is
written in the first-person by someone who mentions that at the end of 1929 he
returned to Hong Kong to call a meeting of communist factions, we can assume that
the author is Ho Chi Minh. He refers to the French capitulation to Germany on 16
June 1940 as a moment when all Vietnamese rejoiced, believing that the propitious
moment for the overthrow of French rule had come. 'For this we are only lacking
organizers and leaders. And why doesn't the CP take up this organization and its
leadership? Because 80-90% of the old cadres have been arrested, and the new cadres
do not have enough experience or strength. The problem is that in order to arouse the
people to rise up we need an influential man, who will boldly and decisively go on
the attack.'67 Ho's analysis of Japan's intentions shows that he could not foresee the
Japanese-Vichy French partnership for the rule of Indochina which was to be
cemented in September 1940. 'At present', he wrote, 'Japan is making efforts to grab
this country' [Indochina]. The Japanese were already within three hours of Hanoi,
while their special forces were ready at any time to land in Haiphong, he said.
Although the government in Indochina had declared its support for the London
Committee of the Free French, he noted that they were in reality making concession
after concession to the Japanese.68 Yet he concluded that, although Japan was strong,
she could not use her full force to pacify Indochina, as her enormous military might
was tied down by the war in China. The French troops in Indochina, on the whole,
were made up of indigenous soldiers, he pointed out, and 'if we can appeal to them,
they - or at least some of them - will fight the French (or even the Japanese).' He also
noted that the anti-French forces had strong allies: in addition to the USSR, these
included China and India. A situation had been created when it would be enough 'for
one person to cry out loudly, for all the rest to rise up'. 'In a word', he wrote,
'objective conditions favour our success, but our subjective force - our party - is very
weak...at present our old, experienced cadres are groaning in prison. Thus the masses
are leaderless and cannot make use of this 'once-in-a-thousand years propitious
situation'.69 In order to change the situation, in order to help the party fulfill its
historic mission, he explained that they would need to attack from the outside. For
this they required: (1) freedom to cross their border; (2) some weapons; (3) some
financial aid; and (4) a few advisers. When we have these things, 'we can definitely
create an antifascist, anti-Japanese base,' he claimed. 'Further,' he concluded, 'if we
can use the contradictions among the imperialists and create and broaden a united
front of oppressed peoples, then the bright future will not be far off.' 70 This request
would appear to be the first formulation of plans for the armed Viet Minh. It may also
be the first sign that the man who was still known as 'Nguyen Ai Quoc' was preparing
to transform himself into the nationalist patriarch Ho Chi Minh, 'the influential man
who would boldly go on the attack'. The weakness of the ICP would seem to have
dictated a time-frame of at least six-months to a year for the planned uprising to reach
its take-off point.
The GMD Sixth Section (for information) picked up news of a Vietnamese
communist approach to the CCP in the summer of 1940. They reported that a
communist from the south, Tran Van Hinh, had arrived in Yan'an and that in August
the Chinese and Vietnamese concluded an aid agreement. (It is not clear whether he
was delivering Ho Chi Minh's request, or whether this was a separate approach to the
CCP.) King Chen lists the following items as part of this agreement: (1) to establish a
United Front of the Sino-Vietnamese people against Japan; (2) to enlarge the
communist's armed organization and begin guerilla activities; (3) to unite the ICP
with all political parties in an effort to set up a 'United Front for National
Independence', (4) to make the goal of the ICP struggle 'Anti-French Imperialism and
Anti-Feudalism'; (5) to send ICP cadres to Yan'an for training at the Resistance-Japan
University; and (6) for the CCP to serve as representative of the Comintern's Asian
Information Bureau to guide the ICP, and to offer $50,000 Chinese per month to the
ICP.71 This agreement would have reflected the inability of the French CP to continue
advising the Vietnamese, and the beginning of an arrangement of ICP subordination
to the Chinese party. Such an arrangement may have been inevitable at this point in
the ICP's development, as direct communications with the Comintern seem to have
ceased. (Ho's aid request to the CCP was not translated into Russian until 1942; how
it eventually arrived in the Comintern's files is not clear.) Giap's memoirs mention
that in Tonkin the party had been discussing the need to revive an Asian League of
Oppressed Peoples72, an idea which Ho also raised in the conclusion to his aid
request. It appears that the front organization which had been used to unite the Asian
communists in 1925-26 and 1928-30 was being considered as the vehicle for a
Chinese-led anti-Japanese front.
In July 1940 the French had begun to collect evidence in Cochin-china that
some sort of uprising was in the offing. They believed that at the end of June 1940,
the ICP CC had passed an order instructing party members to prepare for an armed
insurrection.73 This report could refer to the meeting which was held in Kunming in
June 1940, as there may actually have been more CC members there than remained at
large in Cochinchina. These would have included Phung Chi Kien, Ho Chi Minh,
Phan Dang Luu, and perhaps Nguyen Thi Minh Khai. The Sûreté also reported that
the Vietnamese party had sent a Chinese member of the ICP to China, to request CCP
support for an insurrection.74 We do not know whether this refers to Phan Dang Luu's
trip to Yunnan, the travels of the 'Tran Van Hinh' noted by the GMD, or whether
there was another link to the CCP from Cochinchina, for example via the CCP
organization in Saigon. The French gained their first hard evidence of the planning
for an armed movement when they arrested Nguyen Thi Minh Khai at the CC
headquarters in Cholon on 30 July 1940, along with the escaped political prisoner
Nguyen Huu Tien. They seized documents which they described as, 'concerning the
insurrection which the ICP plans to start when the "favourable moment" comes'. Most
of these documents had not yet been mimeographed and distributed among party
members. Some passages in the confiscated materials were aimed against the French
military, so the newly arrested prisoners were handed over to the military courts. 75
Sud Chonchirdsen describes the seized documents as covering the 'forming of an
insurrection organization, sabotage plans and guerrilla tactics'. 76 The party member
arrested along with Minh Khai, Nguyen Huu Tien (Giao Hoai), was like Ta Uyen a
former member of the original ICP from Ha Nam province. The two had escaped
together from Poulo Condore in the spring of 1935.
There would seem to be a connection between the gathering in Kunming in
June 1940, not recognized in party history as an official ICP meeting, and the
beginning of an insurrectionary movement within Vietnam. Yet from subsequent
developments in Cochin-china, one has room to question whether the plans which Ho
Chi Minh discussed with his colleagues, and the aid request he sent to the CCP, really
provided the masterplan of the Nam Ky Insurrection, which would begin on 23
November. Ho Chi Minh, as the cautious planner, most likely did not endorse the
rapid timetable for the insurrection which took shape in Cochinchina between
September and November 1940. As in 1930, it would appear that the voluntarist wing
of the party, which retained its predilection for symbolic violence and revolt within
the military, set the pace of the events which occurred in the autumn months. A
Vietnamese source claims that at a meeting of the Cochinchina Regional Committee
held in Mytho in July 1940, one group of delegates favoured delaying the
insurrection due to the weakness of the party's forces. This group included delegates
from Saigon-Cholon, the eastern provinces and Phan Dang Luu, now described as
representative of the CC for Cochinchina. The majority, however, voted to go ahead
with the insurrection. It was at this point that Phan Dang Luu suggested consulting
with the rest of the Central Committee. 77 After Phan Dang Luu had been arrested in
November, he would confess that the insurrection had been led by the extreme left in
the party, 'who were ignorant of the advice given by the Standing Committee of the
Cochinchina Committee concerning the preparedness of the party.'78 Some
Vietnamese sources, Tran Huy Lieu in particular, claim that the Anti-imperialist
Front in the South was extremely successful in attracting indigenous soldiers. In his
article on the Southern Insurrection he says that groups of soldiers in Gia Dinh and
Cholon, up to 300 at one time, fled into the jungle with their weapons in order to
prepare resistance to the French. In November 1940, as the French were preparing to
send troops to the Thai-Cambodian border to defend against Thai incursions, Lieu
claims that up to 15,000 (sic) Vietnamese soldiers in Saigon, including two artillery
units, were prepared to protest against their involvement in the conflict. As many as
two-thirds of the Vietnamese soldiers were ready to 'follow the revolution' at that
point, Lieu writes, as well as 15,000 ordinary southerners. 79 Other sources claim rapid
rates of growth for the southern party in this period after the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact.80 Yet it appears that the French were able to wind up the movement fairly easily
when it broke out in November.
The Japanese and French came to an agreement on military cooperation on 22
September 1940, which permitted the Japanese to station 6,000 troops in Tonkin, to
use four Tonkin airfields and to move their troops through Tonkin to Yunnan. 81 But
the night the agreement was signed, an unexplained Japanese attack on the French
border post at Dong Dang led to three days of fighting between French and Japanese
troops. Vietnamese in the Japanese-backed Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi
(Vietnam National Restoration League) took part in fighting at Lang Son, while in
the district of Bac Son an ICP-led insurrection broke out on 23 September. Resistance
in the area of Vu Lang carried on sporadically until 28 October, when the French
returned to disperse the revolutionary fighters. 82 Once it had become clear to the
communists that the Japanese were not going to dislodge the French in support of
Vietnamese nationalist forces, the short-term aims of the Anti-imperialist United
Front would have to be re-evaluated.
When Phan Dang Luu went north to Tonkin for consultations in October
1940, it is not at all clear what sort of meeting he would have been attending, or
whether its authority would be recognized by the party in the south. William Duiker
writes, based on interviews in Hanoi, that Luu met with the members of the Tonkin
Regional Committee, who at their meeting in early November 1940 reconstituted the
Central Committee, making Dang Xuan Khu, the future Truong Chinh, the acting
General Secretary.83 The other members included Hoang Quoc Viet (who in 1937 at
least had served on the CC), Hoang Van Thu, and Tran Dang Ninh, who had taken
charge of the Bac Son insurrectionary movement. This seems the most plausible
explanation of how the ICP succession crisis was resolved, although it is not clear
when the November meeting became identified as the Seventh Plenum, or whether
the CC members in Kunming had any input in its decisions. Curiously, in the
Museum of the Revolution in Ho Chi Minh City, there is an 'urgent communique' in
pamphlet form sent from the Standing Committee of the ICP CC asking for support
from the Central-Northern Party Committee (Dang bo Trung-Bac ky) for the
Southern Insurrection. The uprising had begun on 23 November, the pamphlet says; it
was the duty of the Central-Northern Committee 'to bring more renown to the
soldiers of the uprising by diverting the imperialist forces'. 84 If this document is
authentic, it shows that at least some of the southerners still considered the Standing
Committee to be in Cochinchina. However, the Sûreté reported in December 1940
that Phan Dang Luu had admitted that he had gone to Tonkin in October 1940,
'doubtless in order to attend the ICP CC meeting which is believed to have been held
on the 5,6 and 7 November.'85
In any case, the meeting which Phan Dang Luu attended voted to delay the
insurrection in the south, but to develop the armed forces in Bac Son. 86 Either the CC
advice failed to reach the southern party in time, or as some sources have it, the plans
were too far advanced to abort. Phan Dang Luu was arrested on arrival in Saigon,
shortly before the capture of Ta Uyen. The French had managed to keep abreast of
the insurrection plans, thanks to arrests of key participants. Thus most elements of the
uprising, such as the raid on the Central Prison in Saigon, were prevented. The mass
uprising of indigenous troops was nipped in the bud when they were locked into their
encampments. One suspects that the French were simply waiting for the organizers to
show their hand, before moving in to arrest them. A 1941 telegram to the Vichy
colonial authorities listed the damage from the insurrection as follows: thirty deaths,
including three Frenchmen, as well as thirty wounded, with again three Frenchmen
among them. Some of the victims had been savagely attacked. Of the 130 rifles and
revolvers stolen, forty had still not been recovered. Numerous buildings had been
burned down, bridges and telegraph and telephone lines had been sabotaged. Admiral
Decoux considered the violence to be so abhorrent that none of the accused ICP
leaders was to be shown clemency.87
The arrests and executions which followed this still-born uprising destroyed
the ICP infrastructure in the south. As many as 100 leaders were sentenced to death,
according to Tran Huy Lieu.88 Ha Huy Tap, Nguyen Van Cu, Phan Dang Luu, Vo
Van Tan, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai and Nguyen Huu Tien were all executed by firing
squad in August 1941. Le Hong Phong, Le Duan and many of the legal communists
such as Duong Bach Mai and Nguyen Van Tao would remain in prison until the
Japanese surrender in 1945 (Le Hong Phong would die on Poulo Condore in 1942).
This left the newly-constituted CC in Tonkin to reorganize the communist
infrastructure, which in theory should have been preparing for a long-term
independence struggle. The party's center of gravity would now shift over the border
to China, where Ho Chi Minh and the overseas party members were beginning to
make the links which would enable them to take part in the GMD-sponsored
Vietnamese liberation movement. The legitimacy of the new party leadership now
derived from Ho Chi Minh and his comrades from the days of the Canton training
courses. Even Truong Chinh would seem to have required Ho Chi Minh's blessing in
1941 to be confirmed in his post as party leader. To party members of the 1928-35
generation, this group would have perhaps had weak credentials: they had been
involved in united fronts with the bourgeois Guo-mindang on two occasions and few
of them had been 'proletarian-ized'. Vo Nguyen Giap, who would become one of Ho's
right-hand men, had only become an official party member in 1937. 89 His background
as a Tan Viet student activist in 1928-30 and a united front journalist in Hanoi were
suspect in the eyes of some ICP members. Only Phung Chi Kien had really seen
action with the Red Army in China. But these were the men who played the key roles
in 1941, when the Viet Minh began to take shape.

The move to the border and the Eighth Plenum

In October 1940 Ho Chi Minh and his entourage moved to Guilin from
Kunming. It "was at this point that the communists abroad decided to use the mantle
of the Viet Nam Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi), Viet
Minh for short, for their nationalist front. This was the same organization which had
been founded in Nanjing by Ho Hoc Lam, Hoang Van Hoan, Le Thiet Hung, Phi
Van, Nguyen Hai Than and others in 1936. As it was still an officially registered
organization in China, it was a structure ideally suited to Ho's purposes. Ho Hoc
Lam, though now ill in hospital in Guilin, remained a respected figurehead, with
good contacts in the GMD General Staff. Via Ho Hoc Lam the Vietnamese
communists were able to make contact with General Li Jishen, head of the GMD
Southwest Field Headquarters in Guilin.90 Ironically, Li Jishen was the general whom
Ho had accused of being behind the destruction of the Guangdong peasant movement
in 1926-7; he had also crushed the Canton Commune in December 1927. However,
he had over the years been an opponent of Chiang Kaishek and may now have found
that cooperation with the Viet Minh nationalists was essential to the extension of anti-
Japanese activities. Ho helped to enhance the Viet Minh's legitimacy by promoting
the formation of an 'Association of Sino-Vietnamese Cultural Comrades', composed
of what were then known as 'progressive writers'. Ho Hoc Lam and Pham Van Dong
became members of its board of directors.91 Ho's experiences within the earlier united
front in Canton, when he formed the first League of Oppressed Peoples, were now
being brought into play.
In late 1940 as a flow of refugees from the unsuccessful northern uprisings
arrived in China, the Vietnamese nationalists moved south to Jingxi, a town just 65
miles from the Vietnamese border. Zhang Fakui, now commander-in-chief of the
Fourth War Area, sent the VNQDD member Truong Boi Cong to Jingxi to enlist the
refugees in a 'border work team'.92 There were already a few communists such as Le
Quang Ba and Hoang Sam in this refugee group and Ho Chi Minh quickly sent three
of his best cadres south to join them. These were Vo Nguyen Giap, Vu Anh and Cao
Hong Lanh. They advised Ho that he should proceed to Jingxi to join them. When Ho
travelled south, accompanied by Pham Van Dong, Phung Chi Kien and Hoang Van
Hoan, he carried three pieces of identification, all dated 1940. According to Zhang
Fakui's account, these identified him as (1) a member of the Young Chinese
Newsmen's Association; and (2) Special Correspondent of the International News
Service; the third I.D. was a Staff Travel Permit of the Headquarters of the Fourth
War Area. All of these documents were issued under the name of 'Ho Chi Minh'. 93
The name, which means 'Ho the Most Enlightened', marked the creation of a new-
persona, that of the wise patriarch and monk-like disciple of the nationalist cause.
After Ho arrived in Jingxi in December 1940, he sent Vu Anh to the border of
Cao Bang province to choose a secure area to serve as a revolutionary base,
according to Vu Anh's own memoir.94 It was at this time that Ho opened a training
class in two border villages, for around forty of the Vietnamese refugees who had
been selected from Truong Boi Cong's 'Border Work Team' by Giap and his
comrades. Vu Anh claims to have selected the cave at Pac Bo as a secure hide-out
across the border for the communist nationalists. In view of French reports from
1941, however, it seems likely that the cave was mainly used as a hide-out for
guerillas moving back and forth between Vietnam and China.95 Ho Chi Minh is said
to have returned to Vietnam in February 1941, but he may actually have spent most
of his time in the villages on the Chinese side of the border.
Ho Chi Minh and his communist core group continued to function
successfully within a united front structure in 1941, while at the same time rebuilding
links to the ICP in Tonkin and Annam. In early 1941 Bui Duc Minh and Hoang Van
Thu came across the border to discuss plans for an Eighth Plenum of the ICP Central
Committee.96 This plenum would be one of two important meetings held in the spring
of 1941 in the Jingxi area, meetings which would strengthen the cross-border
communists' ties on both levels. In April a meeting of the Vietnamese National
Liberation League (Viet nam Dan Toc Giai Phong Dong Chi Hoi), yet another united
front group, organized by Truong Boi Cong and Ho Hoc Lam, took place. According
to King Chen, the nucleus of this grouping was the Viet Minh.97 Chen says that Dong,
Giap and Hoang Van Hoan were the key organizers of the Liberation League, as they
had first broached the idea with Li Jishen in late 1940, and had set up a preparatory
office in Jingxi.98 The League was clearly identified with the GMD united front and
took Sun Yatsen's 'Three Peoples' Principles' as its basic philosophy. It would
continue to be a useful vehicle for the Viet Minh communists until the end of 1941,
when strains in the united front between the CCP and GMD had nearly reached the
breaking point.
The organization of the ICP Eighth Plenum may also have required delicate
diplomatic work on the part of the Viet Minh collective. This would be remembered
as the first official meeting of Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee since Ho's
arrival in southern China. By the spring of 1941, with the party in all three parts of
Vietnam under strong pressure from the French, it appears that the Tonkin ICP
leaders were in no position to refuse the leadership of the overseas communists. The
fragility of the links among communists who remained at liberty in Vietnam is
demonstrated by the way that participants in the Eighth Plenum were recruited in
Annam. One of them, Bui San, later arrested by the French, told the Sûreté that he
had met Phan Dang Luu in Vinh towards the end of 1940. Luu sent him to Hanoi to
restore contact between Annam and the Tonkin party structure. At the end of
December 1940, Bui San received a letter telling him to send two delegates to attend
a congress. He made the trip to Cao Bang at the end of January 1941 with Ho Xuan
Luu.99 According to the police declarations of the two Annamese communists, the
meeting which they attended was held near Longzhou; this could have been a way of
putting the Sûreté off the track, but according to other statements which the Sûreté
received, the plenum was definitely held outside of Vietnam. An informer code-
named 'Ursule' reported to the Tonkin police that the meeting was held in a two-story
hut, built on a mountainside 4-5 km. from Trinh Tay (Jingxi) in Guangxi. The CC
met on the first floor, while the Tonkin Regional Committee met on the ground-floor
level. The two meetings were held simultaneously, with Ho Chi Minh attending the
CC meeting in the morning and the Regional meeting in the afternoon.100
The content of the discussions at the Eighth Plenum have been recorded by
the Vietnamese party to demonstrate Ho Chi Minh's foresight. 101 Whether or not he
actually predicted the German invasion of Russia, which would come on 22 June, is
unknown. What he did accomplish, however, is the integration of the ICP into the
united front with the GMD and the nationalist Vietnamese parties represented on the
Chinese border. Bui San told the French that a Phong (identified as Ho) presided over
the CC meeting, while 'Manh' (identified as Hoang Quoc Viet) served as secretary.
'Xuyen' or Dang Xuan Khu, later to become Truong Chinh, reported on affairs in
Thai Binh and Ha Dong provinces. Dang Xuan Khu would be confirmed as General
Secretary of the ICP at this meeting. When 'Phong' spoke on behalf of the Overseas
Party, he criticized the work in the interior of Vietnam. 'He said that at the present
moment, it was necessary to appeal to the entire population without making any class
distinctions'. He recommended that the party appeal to the nationalist sentiments of
the Vietnamese. They must encourage patriotic feelings and encourage people to read
about the history of Vietnam. For organizational purposes the meeting decided to
establish a 'Vietnam Salvation Association'. When questioned about the strength of
the world communist movement, 'Phong' told the delegates that 'the Party did not
plan to take power in any country immediately, but to inspire a world-wide
revolutionary movement.' 'For this purpose', he said, 'we must wait for the end of the
European war and the weakening of the imperialist countries, because while the
warring sides are killing each other, in Russia there would be security to prepare the
worldwide revolutionary movement.'102 This explanation, if accurate, would
demonstrate that Ho was still having to explain Comintern policy in terms of the
detente with Germany established in 1939. It does not suggest that he anticipated the
German attack on the Soviet Union.
At the Eighth Plenum the primacy of national liberation as opposed to class
struggle was stated without ambiguities. If the Vietnamese people did not force out
the French and Japanese, the resolution said, they would never in 10,000 years be
able to demand their class rights or resolve the agrarian question. 103 The appeal to the
Vietnamese people which Ho Chi Minh would date 6 June 1941 and sign as 'Nguyen
Ai Quoc' was the first example of the new face of the ICP. It called explicitly on
Vietnamese patriotism, exhorting the people to follow the examples of their anti-
French heroes: Phan Dinh Phung, Hoang Hoa Tham and Luong Ngoc Quyen. The
'great work' of regaining independence had not yet been achieved, the letter said,
because the propitious moment had not yet arrived, but also because the people had
not yet joined forces'. He called on the people to follow 'the great example of the
Chinese people' and organize anti-French and anti-Japanese national salvation
associations. After this, there would be only one more document signed by Nguyen
Ai Quoc, another appeal to the Vietnamese people in August 1945. But by then the
name by which his Comintern associates had known him would have been set aside.
By that time Ho needed to jettison his previous identity and its links to the
Comintern. He would be presented to the world as Ho Chi Minh, the President of the
newly independent Vietnamese state, on 2 September 1945.
 As Ho Chi Minh constructed the Viet Minh coalition in Guangxi, the
Comintern receded from the field of vision of the Vietnamese communists. Although
the Soviets resumed their place in the world-wide anti-fascist coalition in June 1941,
they were now involved in a life-and-death struggle with the invading Germans
which shifted their attention away from Asia. On 16 October 1941 the Comintern
staff began to evacuate eastward to Ufa and Kuibyshev, as the Nazis continued their
advance on Moscow. At the end of that month Dimitrov wrote to Stalin to suggest
that the Comintern start to operate under cover, using the 'Institute for the Study of
International Problems' as its public name.104 But it was not until May 1943, after
Dimitrov had returned to Moscow, that the discussion of dissolving the Comintern
began in earnest. At a meeting held by Dimitrov, Molotov and Manuilsky, it was
agreed that the Comintern had outlived its usefulness and had become 'an obstacle to
the independent development of the communist parties'.105 The official announcement
of dissolution appeared in Pravda on 22 May. Although many of the Comintern's
functions continued to be carried out by two 'scientific research institutes', at this time
we have no evidence that the Vietnamese communists received any guidance or
funding from Moscow between 1941 and 1947.106
The policies set at the Eighth Plenum became the framework for the war-time
activities of the Viet Minh. But as studies of the Viet Minh seizure of power in
August 1945 have shown, these policies were not evenly propagated within Vietnam;
nor were they universally accepted by ICP members.107 In the years to come the
pragmatic Ho Chi Minh, who valued unity above political purity, would continue to
face opposition within his own party to his efforts to build a nationalist coalition.

8. SUMMING-UP
The Introduction alluded to the way in which Cold War attitudes have
influenced our understanding of Ho Chi Minh and his efforts to develop a communist
party in Vietnam. The use of sources slanted towards propaganda has led many
authors to see Ho Chi Minh as either an all-important national saint or as an evil
genius. Not only was he the paramount leader of North Vietnam - he was seen as an
influential communist from the moment he joined the FCP. Yet Ho's stature within
the Comintern and Asian communism before 1945 was, as this study has tried to
show, less marked than was later supposed. He did not emerge as an influential
communist on the world stage in 1920 or 1930, and he had a good deal of difficulty
in getting the ICP's attention in 1939-40. His ascendancy in 1945 as the symbol of the
Vietnamese independence movement was by no means an inevitable development.
Robert Turner was right in maintaining that Ho Chi Minh should share much of the
credit for bringing Marxism-Leninism to Vietnam.1 But we should remember that his
approaches to the Russians were not immediately successful. Moreover, there were
other sources of leftist and Marxist influence in Vietnam by the 1920s - it seems safe
to say that a Chinese Communist Party branch was in existence in southern Vietnam
by 1927-28. This organization's role in the development of Vietnamese communism
has yet to be explored, but in view of its name - the Cochinchina-Cambodia
Committee - we can guess that it played an early role in promoting the idea of a
unified Indochinese communist movement, as opposed to a purely Vietnamese party.
Ho's efforts to create a Vietnamese communist party with Comintern support
must be understood within the context of French repression and the long Vietnamese
search for aid from abroad. The failure of the Vietnamese campaign at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919 turned the nationalists' attention towards Russia. It was
Lenin's views on the obligation of the Western proletariat to support nationalist
revolutions within colonial countries which persuaded Ho to join the Third
International. He had no romantic attachment to violent revolution or personal
heroism - in fact he demonstrated a strong attachment to self-preservation throughout
his political career. He was not a henchman of Stalin and may never have had a
personal audience with him until 1950. His attitude towards the use of violence and
class warfare was seemingly too cautious to please some of his younger fellow
communists.
There is no denying the fact that the early Comintern theory on national and
colonial questions was an important intellectual tool for Ho Chi Minh. It gave him a
strong framework within which to combine his anti-colonialism and his desire for
social justice. However, Leninist ideas on imperialism and colonial questions were
not just an analytic tool - his discovery and transmission of these ideas was an
important source of his legitimacy within the Vietnamese communist movement.
When these ideas were supplanted by the new analytical framework of 1928-29, Ho's
leadership was called into question. As mentioned in the Introduction, rival claimants
to power regularly tried to show that they possessed a superior grasp of ideology and
the Comintern line. This line may at times have been a barely comprehensible
pastiche of ideas taken from Marx, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other pre-
communist thinkers, but that did not lessen its importance as a means to gaining
legitimacy. As Arno Mayer says, 'Ideology is the lifeblood of revolution.' 'It is tied to
the need of a [new] social group to project an image of itself.' 2 The importance of
theoretical expertise in establishing oneself as a leader may also have been connected
to the Confucian tradition, which valued the ability to compose a classically orthodox
text above any practical skills.
These early conflicts over ideology within Vietnamese communism would
continue throughout Ho's political career. While in the West Ho's post-Second World
War efforts to project himself as a nationalist were met with scepticism, within the
ICP his lack of commitment to 'proletarian communism' continued to be viewed as a
shortcoming. As in the period from 1931 to 1935, when first Tran Phu and then Ha
Huy Tap called into question Ho's ideological credentials, there was renewed
criticism of Ho's nationalist outlook from other party members beginning in 1948-49,
if not earlier. By this time the Comintern's successor, the Cominform, had taken
shape and the world was dividing into two blocs. The hope for US support of Ho Chi
Minh's new government was all but dead.
For the left-wing ICP view of Ho's nationalist policies during the Second
World War and his dissolution of the communist party in November 1945, we can
turn to Tran Ngoc Danh, the DRV representative in France from 1945 to 1948 (as
well as a Moscow trainee and the younger brother of Tran Phu). He abruptly closed
the Paris representative office in late 1948 and fled to Prague. 3 From there he sent at
least two letters to Moscow. In one of these he writes the following:
After the Cominform's criticism, I am at present in total disagreement with the
opportunist and nationalist line followed by my party since its official dissolution.
This dissolution, which goes against the will expressed several times by our
comrades, could not have been carried out without the energetic intervention of
comrade Ho Chi Minh, at present President of the DKV. The authority of comrade
Ho with the Vietnamese people is without question very great; they consider him as
the symbol of the anti-imperialist struggle and the main promoter of our democratic
attainments. This confidence is reinforced by the fact that the Vietnamese
communists still see him as the former delegate of the ECCI; or to use a Vietnamese
expression, 'He is the International's man'. And the current degenerate policy was
inspired by his doctrine, which dates from the time of the Tours Congress in 1921.4
In another letter of 10 January 1950 addressed to 'Comrade Iudin' (who after
Zhdanov's death had become the chief ideologist in Stalin's retinue) Danh wrote that
the ICP was dominated by its 'nationalist, petty-bourgeois element', which 'lacked
faith in the revolutionary force of the proletariat. The decisive, divisive element is the
personality of Ho Chi Minh. To have an idea, it is enough to refer to the ICP's policy
of 1941, that is to say at the moment when he entered the Indochinese political arena
directly.'5
Ho Chi Minh's rivals - from the original ICP faction of 1929 to Tran Ngoc
Danh - all tried to show his inadequacy for leadership by pointing out his theoretical
'mistakes'. According to Tran Ngoc Danh's chronology, these mistakes began with
Ho's adherence to the Theses on National and Colonial Questions, which Danh dates
to 1921 but which seems to have become a. fait accompli by late 1920, even before
the Tours Conference in December 1920. Quoc himself remained more in tune with,
if not committed to, the line of 1920-27 and enjoyed another period of being
'ideologically correct' from 1938-47, when the Soviet-led communist movement
opted for nationalist communism and a degree of self-determination for individual
parties. By 1949-50, however, Stalin had re-imposed his ideological control over
most of the world communist movement and advised the Vietnamese communists to
turn to the victorious CCP for guidance. When Ho visited Moscow in 1950 as part of
Mao Zedong's entourage, Stalin gave him very half-hearted support.6
When his biography first appeared in 1948 (in a handwritten Chinese
manuscript) Ho may well have been attempting to shore up his political position. This
little book would accentuate both his proletarian virtue - his life as a sailor and
labourer - and his exploits as a nationalist leader. Thus it seems to have been intended
to serve a dual function: to win over nationalist sentiment throughout Vietnam, but at
the same time to convince sceptical communists such as Tran Ngoc Danh that Ho
was a true proletarian.
While attempting to delineate the factions which made up the ICP in 1941 or
1948 is risky, one can see the sources of opposition to Ho's leadership developing in
the early proletarianization movement, which originated in Tonkin in 1928. Of the
leaders of this group who went to Canton for training in the 1920s, almost all were
there after Ho's departure for Moscow. Thus they had no personal ties to Ho, either
by geographical region or as his students. One of the unresolved problems which
arises from this study is how to pinpoint the influences which shaped this Tonkin
group between 1927 and 1929. But the circumstantial evidence points strongly
towards some sort of connection between the Tonkin ICP faction and the Nanyang
Committee of the CCP from 1928 to 1930.
However, as we have seen, a number of the Vietnamese trained in Moscow
also rejected Ho's policies. After the Comintern's Seventh Congress in 1935, young
ideologues such as Ha Huy Tap found it difficult to reconcile themselves to the
nationalist coalition which first Le Hong Phong and later Ho advocated. A key
dividing line between Ho and his rivals, as this study has repeatedly pointed out, was
their attitude towards class conflict. When Ho started his political career in Europe,
Vietnam was just in the initial phases of industrial development; it was only
beginning to develop a proletariat. Yet Ho classified the vast majority of Vietnamese
- peasants and poor intellecutals as well as urban labourers - as workers exploited by
imperialism. Perhaps because Ho knew Vietnam as a relatively homogenous society,
he had no qualms about class collaboration to defeat the French. By 1929-31, of
course, his lack of emphasis on the issue of class struggle would make him, in the
eyes of the younger Moscow trainees, an outdated remnant of the united front in
China.
We are still a long way from being able to make a final judgment about Ho's
years in power. There is simply too little hard evidence about decision-making
processes in Hanoi. But during the years under examination here, there can be little
doubt that he was a dedicated and skilled campaigner for independence who did
much to put the issue of decolonization on the French political agenda. From the
Paris Peace Conference until his 1945 declaration of independence, he was motivated
by sincere patriotism and a deep resentment of French imperialism. Yet he was not
some sort of communist holy man. He lived with women at various times, made
compromises and infiltrated other nationalist parties. He was not always
straightforward - in many situations he would have regarded it as foolhardy to be
honest about his political beliefs. The depth of his attachment to communism is
difficult to gauge - the one thing one can say is that he had little interest in dogma.
The path he followed was often chosen from a range of options narrowed by events
outside his control.
Ironically, in the 1990s the Vietnamese party maintained its claim to
legitimacy after the East European communist parties had been thrust from power, by
claiming to represent 'Ho Chi Minh Thought'. A 1995 publication on Ho's Thought
from the Ho Chi Minh Institute of Politics (Hoc Vien Chính trị quốc gia Ho Chi
Minh) defines it as a new development of Marxist-Leninist theory. 7 This claim has
been met with a certain amount of cynicism, however, as many Vietnamese are aware
that Ho Chi Minh left behind no body of theoretical writing. He can with more justice
be seen as a consummate politician and diplomat, who bequeathed to his country a
model of coalition building and compromise which any modern nation state would
value.
 Documentary evidence in both Moscow and France shows that the Comintern
was far from being the efficient tool for spreading communist power which Cold War
political science and history would have had us believe. It was also inconsistent in its
support for anticolonial movements. But the connection which Ho established with
the Comintern played a major role in developing communism, as well as the national
independence revolution, in Vietnam. The Comintern provided Ho and his comrades
with a methodology and financial support for the training of propagandists and
organizers; it gave them an analysis to make sense of their predicament at the hands
of the French. Even though its advice and intervention were not always accepted,
during its existence it remained the ultimate arbiter of internal political quarrels,
which helped the communist party to remain more-or-less unified. It also provided
sanctuary in Moscow for communist trainees, who were able to rebuild the ICP on
their return to Vietnam in the early 1930s. Even Ho's unwelcome sojourn in Moscow
from 1934 to 1938 kept him alive to fight another day. But to view Ho Chi Minh and
the ICP as purely the creations of the Comintern would be a great distortion. They
existed simultaneously within many spheres - traditional Vietnamese society, the
French empire, the Nanyang and a world community which in the 1920s and 1930s
was already being shrunk by modern communications, travel and economic
interdependence. It was Ho Chi Minh's ability to move between these different
realms which finally secured his place as the most successful leader of the
independence struggle.

NOTES

Introduction
1. This characterization is in part drawn from the story of Ho Chi Minh's
supposed betrayal of nationalist leader Phan Boi Chau in 1925. This episode is
discussed in Chapter 3.
2. Tran Ngoc Danh, Tieu-su Hồ chủ tịch (The Biography of Chairman Ho),
Paris: Chi Hoi Lien-Viet tại Pháp, 1949, p. 6.
3. Cited in Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1985, p. 20.
4. Nguyen Nghia, 'Cong cuoc hop nhat cac to chuc cong san dau tien o Viet-
Nam va vai tro của dong chi Nguyen Ai Quoc' (The Unification of the First
Communist Organizations in Vietnam and the role of Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc),
NCLS, no. 59, February 1964.
5. Judith Stowe, 'Revisionism in Vietnam', paper for AAS conference,
Washington, DC, March 1998; authors conversation with Hoang Minh Chinh, Feb.
1995: Chinh claims that by 1963 Ho Chi Minh had been made politically
ineffective (bi vo hieu hoa).
6. Truong Chinh, Hồ chủ tịch, Lanh Tu Kinh Yeu Cua Giai Cap Cong Nhan
va Nhan Dan Viet-Nam (Chairman Ho: Beloved Leader of the Workers and People of
Viet Nam), Hanoi: N.X.B. Su that, 1973, p. 66.
7. See, e.g. Pierre Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po,
2000, pp. 55-71.
8. Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 33.
9. Branko Lazitch, A Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern, Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1973, p. 378.
10. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, Hyperion: New York, 2000, p. 102.
11. Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration
of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 137.
12. Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973, p.
59.
13. Ton That Thien, 'Verites et mensonges: le voyage clandestin de Ho Chi
Minh en Russie en 1923 et sa disgrace Au Komintern en 1933-1939' in Ho Chi Minh.
L'homme et son heritage, Paris: La Voie Nouvelle, 1990, pp. 51-2.
14. Lacouture, op. cit., p. 48.
15. William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 21-3; Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism:
1925-1945, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 168-70.
16. A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection, London: NLB, 1970, trans, by Quentin
Hoare from the German edition of 1928 and French edition of 1931.
17. Titarenko, Leutner et ah, VKP, Komintern I Kitai (dokumenti), (The
Soviet Communist Party, the Comintern and China, Documents) vol. III: 1927- 1931,
part 1), Moscow: Russian Center, 1999, p. 355, Protocol of a Meeting of the Eastern
Secretariat's Military Commission.
 18. Titarenko et al., op. cit, p. 572-4, Letter from Berzin and Sudakov to
Shifres.
19. Tran Dan Tien, Nhung man chuyen ve doi hoat dong của Hồ chủ tịch,
Hanoi: NXB Chính trị quốc gia, 1994. The attribution of the 1949 Paris edition to
Tran Ngoc Danh, a Moscow-trained militant, is curious. As Danh was
expelled from the ICP in 1949, the attribution may have been a way of quelling
rumours of dissent within the party.
20. Yevgeny Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, Moscow: Progress, 1989, trans, from
1983 Russian edition.
21. Hong Ha, Ho Chi Minh v Strane Sovetov (Ho Chi Minh in the Land of
Soviets),
Moscow: Polit. Literatury, 1986; trans, from Vietnamese edition titled, Ho
Chi Minh tren dat nuoc Lenin (HCM in the Land of Lenin), Hanoi: NXB Thanh Nien,
1980.
22. See Nguyen The Anh, 'How Did Ho Chi Minh Become a Proletarian?
Reality and Legend', Asian Affairs, vol. 16, part II; Thu Trang Gaspard, Ho Chi Minh
a Paris (1917-1923), Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992; and Daniel Hemery, 'Jeunesse d'un
colonise, genese d'un exil, etc.', Approches Asie, no. 11,1992.
23. In 2001 this archive was renamed 'The Russian State Archive for Social-
Political History'.
24. The first of these women, known as 'Tuyet Minh', was a Cantonese
student of midwifery who started living with Ho as his wife in October 1926. She is
not mentioned in Chapter 3 on Canton, since the relationship ended when Ho fled
from China in the spring of 1927. (See AOM, SPCE 367, Renseignements fournis par
Lesquendieu au sujet de Tuyet Minh, femme chinoise, maitresse de Nguyen Ai Quoc,
Hanoi, 28 Oct. 1931.) The second relationship, with Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, was
politically more significant (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).
25. His personnel forms are in RC, 495 201/1. The most likely date for his
birth is 1892 or 1893, supplied by his sister when she was questioned by the French
in 1920 (SPCE 364, Note conf. 711, Hue, 7 May 1920). Ho's official Hanoi birthdate
is 1890.
26. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, esp. final chapter, 'The New Cold War History'.
Chapter 1 The Emergence of Nguyen Ai Quoc (1919-23)
1. AOM, SPCE 364, e.g. tel. officiel, Saigon, le 22 juillet 1919/Chef Sûreté a
Directeur S.G., Hanoi.
2. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 25 S.R., 19 Jan. 1920, NAQ letter of 7 Sept. 1919
to Sarraut.
3. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 270 S.R. Paris du 29 novembre 1921 (cumulative
report).
4. AOM, SPCE 364, Pierre Guesde, note pour M. le Ministre, piece annexe
no. 2, Paris, 12 Oct. 1920.
5. See Historique de AOM, SLOTFOM in C.A.O.M.
6. These reports form the bulk of AOM, SPCE files 364 and 365.
7. AOM, SPCE 364, tel. officiel Hanoi 8 Sept. 1919, no. 869 S.G.
8. AOM, SPCE 364, S.R. Dec. 1919, Paris.
9. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, 'Les Dossiers rapportant a la question
Allemagne'.
10. AOM, SPCE 364,28 Dec. 1920: Pierre Guesde felt it was 'regrettable' that
the case ended in a non-lieu.
11. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Gouvernement Militaire de Paris, Proces
Verbal d'Interrogatoire, piece 56, p. 4.
12. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, letter of Ct. Roux, 20 Feb. 1915.
13. AOM, SPCE 372,1911-2, see letter ofj. Foures.
14. AOM,SLOTFOMIII,29,DeclarationdeCaoDacMinh,22mail915, p. 5.
15. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29 Proces-verbal d'Interrogatoire de Nguyen Nhu
Chuyen, p. 3.
16. AOM, SPCE 372, folder 1911-12, letter ofj. Foures 5 Aug. 1911.
17. See AOM, SPCE 371, note de 1'Agent Desire, 21 Feb. 1924.
18. Quoted from Ho Huu Tuong, Bon muoi mot nam lam bao (Forty-one
Years in Journalism), by Dang Huu Thu in Than The va su nghiep nha cach mang
Nguyen The Truyen, Melun, France: 5 Boulevard des Carmes, Melun, 1993, p. 29.
19. AOM, SPCE 364, Declaration de Jean, 3 Nov. 1919
 20. AOM, SPCE 364, Paris, 20 Dec. 1919, pp. 1-2.
21. AOM, SPCE 364, loc. cit., p. 6.
22. AOM, SPCE 364, Paris, 20 Dec. 1919, p. 6.
23. Ibid.
24. Tran Dan Tien, op. cit., p. 32.
25. AOM, SPCE 364, note de Jean, 1 Jan. 1920.
26. Thu Trang Gaspard quotes extensively from this interview in Ho Chi
Minh a Paris, 1917-1923, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992.
27. AOM, SPCE 372, note no. 12 du S.R. de Pekin.
28. Ibid., p. 3.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
30. Ibid. This French note mentions that the Beijing edition of Yishibao was
'under the direction of American missionaries' until it was closed down.
31. AOM, SPCE 364, Note pour M. le Ministre, piece annexe no. 2, Paris 12
octobre 1920, signe: Guesde.
32. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 49/SR, 12 March 1920.
33. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi de SR 19, Jan. 1920. Thu Trang and most other
Vietnamese authors accept that Quoc settled in Paris in 1917. The evidence from
Michel Zecchini which she cites seems to be transposed from 1921, as Zecchini talks
about helping Quoc move to Impasse Compoint, which happened in 1921. (Gaspard,
op. cit., pp. 71-5).
34. AOM, SPCE 15, 1-2; printed as Document No. 9 in appendix to Daniel
Hemery, 'Jeunesse d'un colonise, genese d'un exil. Ho Chi Minh jusqu'en 1911',
Approches Asie, no. 11,1992.
35. 495,201,1, p. 132. His mother died in 1901.
36. David Dellinger, 'Conversations with Ho', Liberation, Oct. 1969, pp. 3-4.
37. Inprecor, no. 74, 1924, pp. 827-8.
38. AOM, SPCE 364, note conf. 711,7 May 1920.
39. AOM, SPCE 364, declaration de Nguyen Tat Dat a la Sûreté de Hue,
March 1920.
 40. AOM, SPCE 364, e.g. Extrait d'un cablegramme, 5 Dec. 1919.
41. AOM, SPCE 364, note conf. 291, Hue 13 Feb. 1920.
42. AOM, SPCE 364, note conf.-Edouard, 17 Nov. 1919, p. 3.
43. Daniel Hemery, op. cit., p. 116.
44. AOM, SPCE 364, lettre de Nguyen Sinh Huy au Resident Superieur de
l'Annam.Jan. 1911.
45. AOM, SPCE 364, note de Delegue a l'lnterieur de la Susse.
46. AOM, SPCE 364, note de la Sûreté de l'Annam, 8 March 1911.
47. AOM, SPCE 364, note 571 S, Hue, 5 May 1911, signed H. Sestier; there
was a small group of activists in Quang Ngai which maintained contact with Phan
Boi Chau's partisans via Siam, see David Marr, Vietnamese Anticohnialism, p. 232.
40. Hemery, op. cit., p. 118.
49. AOM, SPCE 364, Declarations de Nguyen Tat Dat, March 1920.
50. Hemery, op. cit., pp. 118-19; Thu Trang Gaspard, Những hoạt động
củaPhan Chu Trinh tại Pháp 1911-1925, Paris: Sudestasie, 1983, p. 91.
51. Hemery, op. cit.,printed as Document no. 6, from Fonds de I'Ecole
Coloniale, carton 27, dossier 11, letter of 15 Sept. 1911.
52. Nguyen The Anh, 'How Did Ho Chi Minh Become a Proletarian? Reality
and Legend', Asian Affairs, vol. 16, part II, p. 165.
53. Hemery, op. cit., Document no. 8, Fonds de la Resident Sup. de l'Annam,
r. 28, 6971, 25 May 1912.
54. AOM, SPCE 364, Lettre de Nguyen Tat Thanh au Resident Sup. de
l'Annam, 31 Oct. 1911.
55. See note no. 34.
56. Copy of postcard on display at Ho Chi Minh Museum, Saigon; Thu Trang
Gaspard cites this card in Ho Chi Minh a Paris, pp. 57-8, giving Hong Ha (Thời
Thanh Nien của Bac Ho) as her source; she translates the word Tay (literally
'Westerner') to mean Frenchmen, whereas in the context I assume it refers to
Englishmen.
57. Thu Trang Gaspard, Ho Chi Minh a Paris, p. 60. This letter apparently
comes from the French archives, but as Thu Trang did her research before the
colonial archives had been organized in their present system, she does not always
give coherent references. She mentions in her earlier work, Những hoạt động của
Phan Chau Trinh tại Phap, Paris: Sudestasie, 1983, p. 100 that she 'presented' this
letter to Hong Ha. Alain Ruscio in Ho Chi Minh. Textes gives source as AOM,
SLOTFOM III, 29, p. 21.
58. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Proces-verbal d'information (interrogation de
Cao Dac Minh), 22 May 1915.
59. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Proces-verbal d'interrogation, 8 April 1915,
Interrogation of Nguyen Nhu Chuyen, p. 3.
50. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Gouvernement Militaire de Paris, Traductions
d'Extraits de lettres et de carte-lettres.
61. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Interrogation of Nguyen Nhu Chuyen, p. 4.
62. PRO: FO 372/668F; this document is cited by Nguyen The Anh, op. cit.
63. AOM, SPCE 364, Paris 19 Nov. 1919, Note 2157: Note fournie par M.
Petette de la S.G.
64. The Dong du movement (literally the Eastern Travel movement, but often
referred to as the Eastern Studies movement) started by Phan Boi Chau in 1905,
encouraged Vietnamese students to travel to Japan for their education.
65. Tran Ngoc Danh, Tiểu sử Hồ chủ tịch, Paris: Chi Hoi Lien Viet tại Pháp,
1949, p. 24
66. Both the 1949 and subsequent versions of this book include this reference.
See Tran Dan Tien, op. cit., 1994 ed., p. 29. As the Thai Nguyen rebellion did not
begin until August 1917, the author seems to be telescoping events for dramatic
effect.
67. AOM, SPCE 364, notes de Jean, 4 May 1920.
68. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi du 12 mars 1920, signed Jean.
69. AOM, SPCE 364, rapport de Jean, 8 Jan. 1920.
70. AOM, SPCE 364, rapport de Jean, 8 Jan. 1920.
71. AOM, SPCE 364, notes de Jean, 4 Jan. 1920.
72. AOM, SPCE 364,9 Jan. 1920, signed P. Arnoux.
73. AOM, SPCE 364, notes de Jean, 16 Jan. 1920.
 74. AOM, SPCE 364, notes de Jean, 21 Jan. 1920.
75. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 34/S.R., 13 Feb. 1920.
76. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 113 S.R., signed Deveze, 17 Sept. 1920.
77. AOM, SPCE 364,10 August 1920.
78. AOM, SPCE 364, signed Deveze, 14 Nov. 1921.
79. AOM, SPCE 364, Guesde note pour M. le Ministre, 12 Oct 1920.
80. AOM, SPCE 364, note au sujet du tel. no. 1466 du Controleur General des
Troupes Indochinoises au sujet de NAQ.
81. AOM, SPCE 364, 28 Dec 1920.
82. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi no. 160 S.R. Paris, 15 Jan. 1921.
83. Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch say in their Biographical
Dictionary of the Comintern, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1973, p. 150,
that Ho became a militant in the 18th Section of Socialist Youth in Paris, and then
joined the Ninth Section of the SFIO, whose members were newspapermen. After his
move to Impasse Compoint in July 1921, he seems to have joined the 18th Section,
but I have seen no archival evidence for the other affiliation.
84. AOM, SPCE 364,13 Dec. 1920.
85. AOM, SPCE 364,signe: Deveze, 12 Jan. 1921.
86. AOM, SPCE 364,Josselme report of press coverage of Tours Conf, 12
fev. 1921.
87. AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 28 March 1921.
88. AOM, SPCE 364, Pierre Guesde to Gov. Gen. in Hanoi, Feb. 1921.
89. AOM, SPCE 364, signed Deveze, 27 Dec. 1920.
90. AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 29 April 1921.
91. AOM, SPCE 364, note of 29 July 1921.
92. AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 12 Jan. 1921.
93. AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 13 July 1921.
94. See, e.g., Kobelev, p. 39; Fenn, op. cit., p. 25.
95. AOM, SPCE 365, note de l'agent Desire, 25 Sept. 1922, on Truong's letter
to Ng. The Truyen.
 96. AOM, SPCE 365, rapport etabli par la Dir. de la Sûreté Generale, Paris,
21 Feb. 1922.
97. AOM, SPCE 364; invitation was received 7 March 1921.
98. AOM, SPCE 364, Guesde, 9 Nov. 1921.
99. AOM, SPCE 365, note conf. no. 315 S.R., 23 Jan. 1923; this note
explained that Paria was formed as a cooperative society, as the propaganda organ of
the Intercolonial Union.
100. Gaspard, Nguyen Ai Quoc a Paris, p. 204.
101. AOM, SPCE 365, note de l'Agent de Villier, 27 March 1923.
102. AOM, SPCE 365, lettre 217 de l'Agent John, Marseille, 6 June 1922.
103. AOM, SPCE 365, Agent de Villier, 25 Dec. 1922.
104. AOM, SPCE 365, Controle general des Indochinois en France, note
conf. no. 389 S.R., 16 May 1922.
105. see Ton That Thien, 'Verites et mensonges', pp. 51-2; or Kobelev, op.
cit., p. 57.
106. AOM, SPCE 365, note conf. no. 389, S.R., Paris 16 May 1922, Guesde.
107. Hoang Tranh, Ho Chi Minh vox Trung Quoc, (Ho Chi Minh and China),
Vietnamese trans, of Chinese work, Beijing: New Star, 1990, p. 23.
108. MAE, Asie: Chine 492, Agitation Revolutionnaire Chinoise en France a
Paris, 1922-9, lists eight suspected communists in France; Han Suyin, Eldest Son,
1994, mentions Zhou and Deng's activities, p. 55.
109. From the Introduction to AOM, SLOTFOM Inventaire, CAOM.
110. AOM, SPCE 364, envoi no. 270 S.R., Paris, piece no. 57, 29 Nov. 1921.
111. AOM, SPCE 371, note de Sur. Gen. on meeting held 21 March 1926.
112. Marseille, letter of 18 Feb. 1922.1 have a Vietnamese translation of this
letter, originally in Chinese, from the Ho Chi Minh Museum, Ho Chi Minh City; it is
printed in French in Gaspard, Ho Chi Minh a Paris, pp. 181-7. Thu Trang discovered
it in the archives of the Ministry of Colonies before these were transferred to Aix-en-
Provence and gives no precise reference.
113. AOM, SPCE 365, note conf. no. 409 S.R., Paris, signe Pierre Guesde, 7
July 1922.
 114. Dang Huu Thu, Tlian The va Su Nghiep Nha Cach Manh Nguyen The
Truyen (The Life and Times of the Revolutionary Nguyen The Truyen),Melun,
France: 5 Blvd. des Cannes, 1993, p. 42.
115. AOM, SPCE 365, note de l'Agent de Villier, 27 Feb. 1923.
116. AOM, SPCE 365, note de la Prefecture de Police, 18 Feb. 1923.
117. AOM, SPCE 365, note de l'Agent de Villier, 4 April 1923.
118. AOM, SPCE 365, envoi S.R. Paris no. 695,30 May 1923.
119. AOM, SPCE 372, telegramme n. 244, De Guesde, 20 March 1923.
120. AOM, SPCE 365, envoi S.R. Paris 728,14 June 1923.
121. AOM, SPCE 365, notes de Desire, 15 June and 6 July 1923.
122. AOM, SPCE 372, signe Trinh, envoi du S.R. Paris, 5 Sept. 1923.
123. AOM, SPCE 365, Paris, Colonies a Gouverneur General a Hanoi, signe
Sarraut, 11 Oct. 1923.
124. AOM, SPCE 365, note de l'agent Desire, Nov. 1923.
125. AOM, SPCE 365, folder 1923, no. 992/S.R., Paris, 26 Dec. 1923.
126. AOM, SPCE 365, Saigon 13 Nov. 1923.
127. AOM, SPCE 365, note conf. no. 479 S.R., folder 1922.

Chapter 2 The Comintern Recruit (1923-4)

1. Photostat copy in R.C., 495,201,1, Ho Chi Minh's personal file.
2. Leon Trotsky, Manifesto of the Communist International, in John Riddell,
ed., Founding the Communist International, Proceedings and Documents of the First
Congress, New York: Pathfinder Book, the Anchor Foundation, 1987, pp. 227-8.
3. Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, New York:
Vintage, 1975, p. 124.
4. Kooperativnoe Delo (Cooperative News), Moscow newspaper, 14 Oct.
1923.
5. RC, 535,1,2, p. 18.
6. Ibid., pp. 68-9.
7. RC, 535,1,1, p. 45.
 8. Stephen Cohen, op. cit., p. 149.
9. G.M. Adibekov, E.N. Shakhnazarova, K.K. Shirinya, Organizatsionnaia
Struktura Komintema (The Organizational Structure of the Komintern), Moscow:
Rosspen, 1997, p. 79.
10. This slogan was printed on the Krestintern's stationery.
11. RC, 495,154,594, p. 4; letter of 11 Sept. 1924.
12. The written version of this report is in RC, 495, 154, 594.
13. Adibekov et ai, op. cit., p. 73.
14. Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991, p. 61.
15. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Revolution:
Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920-1927, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989, p. 6.
16. RC, 495,154,594, letter numbered 26, 353e, date illegible.
17. See letter of 11 Sept. 1924 in 495,154, 594, discussed below.
18. Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 7.
19. Adibekov et al, op. cit., pp. 63-4.
20. Riddell, op. cit., pp. 204-6 and 221-2.
21. Pravda, 6 March 1919, cited in Riddell, op. cit., pp. 307-8.
22. Riddell, op. cit., pp. 180-1.
23. Ibid., p. 227.
24. See 'Comment j'ai choisi le Leninisme' in Ho Chi Minh: Action et
Revolution, ed. Colette Capitan-Peter, Paris: Union Generale d'Editions, 1968 -
article written in April 1960 for the Soviet journal, Problems of Asia.
25. Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, vol.
II, London: Frank Cass, 1971, p. 530.
26. See Riddell version of the Theses, article 6, in Workers of the World and
Oppressed Peoples, Unite!, Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress,
1920, vol. 1, New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991, p. 285.
27. Ibid., pp. 287-8.
 28. Allen S; Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, Stanford
University Press, 1953, p. 53.
29. Riddell, Workers of the World., vol. 1, pp. 220-1; see his note 6 on
various renditions of this article.
30. Ibid., vol. l, p. 258.
31. Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., p. 54.
32. RC, 495,154,594, handwritten report of July 1923.
33. RC, 495,18,282, p. 5a, letter of 5 Feb., 1924.
34. Max Eastman, Since Lenin Died, London: Labour Publishing Company,
1925, pp. 37-8.
35. Jane Degras, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 107-13.
36. Jean Lacouture, op. cit., p. 44.
37. Lacouture, op. cit., pp. 42-3, citing Ruth Fischer, Von Lenin zu Mao,
Diisseldorf: Diedrichs, 1956.
38. RC, 495,18,282, pp. 5a, 5b and 21b, letters of 5 Feb. 1924 and 15 March
1924.
39. Adibekov et al., The Organizational Structure of the Comintern, p. 74.
40. RC, 495, 18, 282.
41. The Comintern did hold a Conference of the Toilers of the Far East from
21 Jan.-2 Feb. 1922, with participants from forty nationalities, but no obvious follow-
up. See Riddell, Workers of the World, vol. 1, p. 494, n. 20.
42. Anatoly Sokolov, 'Podgotovka Vietnamskikh Revolyutsionerov v
Kommunisticheskhikh Vuzakh Sovietskoi Rossii v 20-30 godakh', (Training of
Vietnamese Revolutionaries in the Communist Institutes of Soviet Russia in the
Twenties and Thirties) in Traditsionnyi Vietnam (Traditional Vietnam), Moscow:
Vietnamskikh Tsentr, M.S.U., 1996, p. 145.
43. RC, 532, 1, 12
44. Yevgeny Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989, p.
69.
45. M.N. Roy, The Men I Knew, Bombay: Lalvani, 1968, p. 138.
46. RC, 495, 201, 1
 47. RC, 495, 154, 595, draft brochure is only document in file.
48. RC, 495, 154, 596, the longer version is pp. 14a-22; the condensed is pp.
23-5.
49. RC, 495,154,577, p. 36. Undated report on ICP apparently prepared by
Vera Vasilieva before the VIIth Comintern Congress.
50. Pyatyi vsemirnyi kongress III Kommunisticheskovo internatsionala (Fifth
World Congress of the III Communist International), vol. 1, Leningrad:
Stenograficheskii Otchet, 1925, p. 655: 22nd Session, 1 July 1924.
51. Ibid., p. 657
52. Ibid., 25 Session: 3 July 1924, p. 759.
53. Ibid., p. 759.
54. Ibid., p. 761.
55. Ibid., p. 762.
56. See discussion below of report to the Third Profintern Congress, RC, 534,
1,40.
57. Jane Degras, op. cit., p. 154.
58. Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 94.
59. Inprecor (English version), no. 41,16 July 1924, p. 405: speech of 20
June, Third Session.
60. Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern, New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1997, p. 47.
61. Jane Degras, The Communist International, vol. II, p. 96.
62. Ibid., p. 108.
63. Inprecor, vol. 4, no. 42,17 July 1924, session of 20 June, p. 416.
64. Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress, 20th Session, 30 June 1924, p. 593.
65. RC, 495,154,594, p. 28.
66. Charles McLane, op. cit., pp. 38-9.
67. Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress, 22nd Session, p. 655.
68. RC, 534,1,40, p. 34, report delivered at 15th session of Congress, 21 July
1924.
 69. RC, 534,1,40, pp. 35-6.
70. RC, 534,1,40, p. 38.
71. Ibid., p. 66.
72. Charles McLane, op. cit., pp. 44-5.
73. Go Henyu,M.L. Titarenko et al, VKP(B), Komintern IKitai, Dokumenty,
(The Soviet Communist Party, the Comintern and China, Documents), vol. I,
Moscow: RTsKhlDNI, 1994, pp. 349-51. Hereafter references to all volumes of this
collection will use the shortened title Comintern and China.
74. Adibekov et al, The Organizational Structure of the Comintern, p. 10.
75. Ibid., p. 26.
76. Ibid., pp. 27-8.
77. Ibid., p. 48.
78. Ibid., p. 72.
79. Ibid., pp. 72-3.
80. Ibid., p. 73.
81. Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 7
82. See, e.g., McDermott and Agnew, op. cit., p. 44.
83. Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p. 61.
84. Ibid., p. 88
85. Ibid., pp. 105-7.
86. Charles McLane, op. cit., p. 35.
87. Jane Degras, The Communist International, vol. II, pp. 25-6; directives
cited by McLane, pp. 37-8.
88. RC, 495,154,594, letter to an un-named 'Comrade'. At top someone has
written in pencil 'to Voitinsky'. Hong Ha's contention, repeated by Kobelev. that Ho
went to China as a 'plenipotentiary of the Far Eastern Secretariat' seems to be
mistaken, or at least an overstatement (Hong Ha, op. cit., p. 82).
89. Ibid.
90. RC, 495,18,282, p. 81.
 91. Ibid., p. 80, letter dated 22 Sept. 1924.
92. RC, 495/154/594, p. 16, letter of 12 Nov. 1924.
93. Comintern and China, vol. l, p. 328.
94. Ibid., pp. 283-95.
95. RC, 535/1/42, letter to Dombal of 12 Nov. 1924.
96. Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, p. 46.
97. See the argument of Ton That Thien, op. cit., pp. 52-4.
98. RC, 495,154,594, undated note, written after March 1924.
99. Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 83.
100. RC, 495,154,594, p. 28.

Chapter 3 The Canton Period and its Aftermath (November 1924-8)

1. David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1971, pp. 220, 229.
2. Ibid., p. 220.
3. Phan Boi Chau, Memories de Phan Boi Chau, trans. Georges Boudarel,
Paris: France-Asie, 1969, p. 183.
4. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, p. 7.
5. Comintern and China,Vol. l, p. 317.
6. O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964, p. 123.
7. Song Thanh et al., Hồ Chí Minh ở Quảng Châu (Ho Chi Minh in Quang
Chau), Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản chính trị quốc gia, 1998, p. 52.
8. AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe a l'envoi no. 208, 15 July 1925.
9. AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 356, 5 Dec. 1926.
10. Ibid., envoi no. 534, 29 Oct, 1929
11. AOM, SPCE 383, Mission Noel, envoi no. 537, letter of 8 Nov. 1929.
12. AOM, SPCE 365, note Noel no. 155, 24 May 1925.
13. RC, 495,154,594, p. 16.
14. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
 15. Clubb, op. cit., p. 128
16. RC, 495,154,594, p. 16.
17. RC, 535,1,42-file containing N.A.Q.'s correspondence with the
Krestintern.
18. RC, 495,154,594, p. 16.; BNTS p. 238 says that the letter was sent to the
newspaper Rabotnitsa (Working Woman).
19. Phan Boi Chau, op. cit, pp. 178-9.
20. AOM, SPCE 367, Interrogation de Le Van Phan (Le Hong Son), 24 Oct.
1932 and following days, pp. 5-6.
21. See Trung Chinh, 'Tam Tam Xa la gi?' (What Was the Tam Tam Xa?),
NCLS, no. 134, 1970, p. 8; although this article claims that Le Hong Son's fund-
raising trip to Vietnam in 1923 was carried out on behalf of Tam Tam Xa, in his
confession to the French in 1932, he claims to have been carrying out a mission for
Cuong De., AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, p. 9.
22. AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, pp. 10-11; Memoires de Phan
Boi Chau, pp. 189-90.
23. Ibid., Declaration de Le Quang Dat, 'Au Sujet de Lam Duc Thu'.
24. Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, p. 194.
25. AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, p. 12; Hong Son claims that
Liao Zhongkai helped him enter Whampoa.
26. Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, p. 194.
27. AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, p. 12.
28. AOM, SPCE 365, loocit.
29. The Comintern and China, vol. I, p. 485, refers to Comintern doc.
514/1/82, pp. 19-21, letter from CCP CC to Borodin, 'not later than 10 Oct. 1924'.
30. Hoang van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of
North Vietnam, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 18.
31. Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development,
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, pp. 8-9.
 32. AOM, SPCE 354, file 'Lettre des Russes', annexe a la note no. 197, 5 Jan.
1925; the envelope from this letter addressed to Phan Boi Chau and Lam Duc Thu
from the two Russian advisers was passed to the Sûreté by their agent Pinot.
33. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a l'envoi 208,15 juillet 1925. Hue Tam Ho Tai,
e.g., gives the date of PBC s arrest as 18 June 1925 in Radicalism and the Origins of
the Vietnamese Revolution, p. 140. The French Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete
sur les Evenements du Nord-Annam, p. 9, gives the arrest date as July 1925.
34. AOM,, SPCE, box 371 (on Phan Chu Trinh), Interrogation of Tran Van
Thanh, 31 July 1931.
35. See Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism, pp. 8-9; and Chinh Dao, Ho
Chi Minh, Con người và huyền thoại Hồ Chí Minh (Ho Chi Minh, The Man and the
Myth), vol. 2: 1925-45, USA: Văn Hoá, 1993, pp. 33-5.
36. AOM, SPCE, 371, copy translated by Lam Duc Thu to quoc ngu from
Chinese, Annexe no. 6 a Note Noel no. 144, translation of a letter from PBC to Ly
Thuy; retranslated to quoc ngu by Vinh Sinh for his article, 'Về mối liên hệ giữa Phan
Bội Châu va Hồ Chí Minh ở Trung Quốc (1924-1925)', (On Phan Boi Chau's
Relations with Ho Chi Minh in China, 1924-5), NCLS No. 3, 1997.
37. RC, 495, 154, 594, p. 17, letter 'Au Presidium du Kormintern, 18 Dec.
1924 signed Nguyen Ai Quac; note that the Hanoi rendering of this document drops
the reference to a specific emigre, and apparently changes 'he' to 'they' in the sentence
about ignorance of politics and mass organizing. See reference to the Hanoi version
in Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, p. 66, from Ban Nghien Cuu Lich
Su Dang, Commission to Study Party History, Chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh (Chairman Ho
Chi Minh), Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật, 1970, p. 32.
38. See Vinh Sinh, op. cit., p. 46.
39. AOM, SPCE, box 364, Feuillets et Notices, (a summary of NAQ's career
up to his 1931 arrest).
40. See Dao Trinh Nhat, Luong Ngoc Quyen, Saigon: NXB Tan Viet, 1957,
p. 25, for Nguyen Cam Giang's identification as Nguyen Hai Than.
41. RC, 495,154,594, pp. 17-18, letter 'Au Presidium du Komintern', op. cit.
42. RC, 495,154,594, p. 26. Here Ho is possibly referring to a reorganization
of Phan Boi Chau's group, or may be using QDD as a generic name for a
revolutionary group which he thinks the Russians will understand.
 43. Ibid., p. 17.
44. All references in this paragraph are to RC, 495,154,594, pp. 29-31.
45. See Quang Hung and Quoc Anh, 'Le Hong Son', p. 16, for a partial list of
the key members.
46. RC, 495/154/594, p. 49.
47. AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, envoi 4 mars 1925, note no. 127.
48. Ibid., Hanoi le 15 mars 1925, le Gouv. Gen. de l'lndo. AM. le Min. des
Colonies, no. 489.
49. Ibid., no. 127, 4 Mar. 1925.
50. Ibid., annexe no. 1 a note Noel no. 146, extrait D, compte rendu de
l'entretien Pinot-Noel du 6 avril 1925.
51. Ibid., Mission Noel, annexe a l'envoi no. 226: entrevues Pinot-Noel, 29,
30, 31 Oct. and Nov. 1925.
52. Fernando Galbiati, P'eng P'ai and the Hai-lu-feng Soviet, Stanford
University Press, 1985, p. 192; Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese
Revolution, Stanford University Press, 1951, pp. 68-9.
53. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a note Noel no. 213,1 Oct. 1925.
54. AOM, SPCE 365,M.N., annexe a note Noel no. 201,29 July 1925, rapport
de Pinot, 15 June 1925.
55. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a l'envoi 208, 15 July 1925.
56. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a note Noel no. 213,1 Oct. 1925. See Hue-Tam
Ho Tai, Radicalism, pp. 177-8, for a discussion of Thanh Nien's political orientation.
57. Ibid., Mission Noel, envoi 189,18 July 1925.
58. Ibid., Mission Noel, annexe a l'envoi 208, 15 July 1925.
59. Song Thanh et al., Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chau (1924-1927) (Ho Chi
Minh in Quang Chau), Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Chính trị quốc gia, 1998, p. 77.
60. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe no. 2 a note Noel no. 195, 22 July 1925.
61. Ibid., annexe a note Noel no. 213,1 Oct; 26 and 27 Sept. 1925.
62. AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le van Phan dit Hong Son, p. 13.
 63. Quang Hung, Quoc Anh, 'Le Hong Son, nguoi chien si xuat sac thuoc the
he nhung nguoi cong san dau tien o Viet-nam,' (Le Hong Son, An Exceptional
Fighter of the First Generation of Vietnamese Communists), NCLS 1-2, 1979, p. 15.
64. RC, 495,154,594, pp. 43-4, letter of 3 June 1926, to 'Cher Camarade',
signed 'Nguyen Ai Quac'.
65. AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, note 205, annexe no. 6, 20 Aug. 1925.
66. Isaacs, op cit., p. 84.
67. So Waichor, The Quomindang Left in the National Revolution, 1924-
19'31, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 18-19.
68. Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, pp. 120-2.
69. Fernando Galbiati, P'eng P'ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet, Stanford
University Press, 1985, pp. 240-3.
70. AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe a l'envoi no. 208, 15 July 1925.
71. Galbiati, op. cit., p. 243.
72. Ibid., pp. 241-2.
73. Ibid., p. 243.
74. Ibid., p. 251.
75. Comintern and China, vol. II: 1926-7, p. 953, identifies Volin only as a
Tass correspondent, while V.V. Vishnyakova-Akimova identifies him as an adviser
to the peasant movement. See Dva Goda v Bosstavshem Kitae, 1925-1927 (Two
Years in Revolutionary China), Moscow: Nauka, 1965, p. 249.
76. Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p. 163.
77. A mau or mu in Chinese is 3,600 sq.metres.
78. RC, 535,1,42, pp. 17-19.
79. RC, 535,1,42, p. 6, letter of 19 August 1925.
80. Ibid., p. 30.
81. Ibid., pp. 47-63.
82. Ibid., p. 32.
83.. Ibid., p. 64.
84. Ibid., p. 93.
 85. Ibid., p. 95.
86. RC, 535,1,127, p. 35, 'Kratkoe Informatsionnoe Sobshcheniie o
Krestianskom dvizhenii provintsii Guandun' (Brief Report on the Peasant Movement
in Guandun).
87. Hans Van de Ven, op. cit., p. 175.
88. RC, 535,1,127, p. 35,'Brief Report on the Peasant Movement in Guandun'.
89. RC, 535,1,42, p. 69.
90. Ibid., p. 9-10.
91. Harold Isaacs, op. cit., p. 86.
92. Ibid., p. 85.
93. AOM, SPCE, 368, Pinot report of April 1926.
94. Ibid., Mission Noel, note of 11 May 1926.
95. In an autobiography which Le Hong Phong wrote for the Comintern, he
said that he had arrived in Moscow in October 1926. RC, 495/201/46.
There is no record of what became of the other two Vietnamese in Moscow.
96. AOM, SPCE, 368, Mission Noel, envoi 290, 7 May 1926.
97. Ibid., letter from Hanoi, 22 Mar. 1926, 499 S.G.
98. AOM, SPCE, 368, extrait d'un compte-rendu de la conversation Pinot-
Noel, 6 April 1926.
99. Ibid.,Mission Noel, envoi 290, annexe: conversation Pinot-Noel, 7 April
1926.
100. AOM, SPCE, 368, Consulat de France, Pakhoi et Tongking, le Docteur
P. Gouillon, 13 July 1926.
101. Philippe Peycam, 'Intellectuals and Political Commitment in Vietnam:
The Emergence of a Public Sphere in Colonial Saigon (1916-1928)', unpubl. Ph.D.
thesis, University of London (SOAS), 1999, pp. 101,107.
102. AOM, SPCE 368, Agent Konstantm, 19 May 1926.
103. AOM, SPCE, 368, Mission Noel, note of 9 May 1926.
 104. AOM, SPCE, 364, Feuillets et notices, career of Ho Chi Minh up to
1933.
105. Ruth McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1965, pp. 325-8.
106. Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background, London: Dorothy Crisp,
1945, p. 112.
107. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 116, from le Conseiller d'Etat, Directeur des
Affaires Politiques, Paris, Feb. 1927.
108. Christophe Giebel, 'Ton Duc Thang and the Imagined Ancestries of
Vietnamese Communism', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1996, p. 158,
109. no. 20, quoting AOM, GG, 7F, c. 22 Sûreté Cochinchine, Rapport annuel
1926/27 (1 July 1927), vol. 1.
109. Peycam, op. cit., p. 115, mentions an am sack dang (assassination party),
citing a Sûreté annual report 1926-7, Goucoch, II/A. 45/204 (1), NA 2.
110. MAE, Asie, Affaires Communes, 36, p. 201: 'traduction d'une lettre en
caracteres chinois', gives their names. AOM, SPCE 371, the confession of Tran Van
Diep, describes their admission to the Thanh Nien training course.
111. Ho Hue Tam Tai, op. cit., p. 288.
112. Tran Huy Lieu, Cach Mang Can Dai Viet Nam, vol. 5, Hanoi: NXB Ban
Nghiên cứu Văn Sử Địa, 1956, p. 22-3.
113. Hoang Van Dao, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (The Vietnamese GMD),
Saigon: Nhà xuất bản Giang Dong, 1965, p. 30.
114. RC, 495,154,594, pp. 43-4.
115. RC, 535,1,42, p. 6, letter of 19 August 1925.
116. AOM, SPCE 368, Saigon le 12 aout 1927 a M. le Gouverneur de la
Cochin-chine, le Directeur de la Police et de la Sûreté Generale, Hanoi: signed
'Striedter'.
117. AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel annexe no. 1 a l'envoi 227, 27 Nov.
1925.
118. See Nguyen Luong Bang, 'Mes Rencontres avec l'oncle Ho' in Recits de
la resistance vietnamienne (1925-1945), Paris: Francois Maspero, 1966, pp. 11-13;
Phan Trong Quang's memoirs in NCLS, cited below; Hoang van Hoan, also cited
below.
119. Le Quoc Su and Pham Duc Duong, Ke Chuyen Tran Phu (The Story of
Tran Phu), Hanoi: Nhà xuất bản Kim Dong, 1969, pp. 7-9.
120. Gouvernement generale de l'lndochine, Direction des affaires politiques
et de Sûreté francaise, Contribution a I'histoire des mouvements politiques de
l'lndochine francaise, vol. 1, Hanoi: IDEO, 1930-5, pp. 15-16; Ha Huy Tap in RC,
495, 201, 45-Renseignements supplementaires, p. 6, says that Le Duy Diem became a
member of Thanh Nien's Central Committee.
121. Memoir based on Phan Trong Quang, recorded by Thanh Dam, 'Lop
Huan Luyen Chinh Tri Thu Hai o Quang Chau' ('The Second Political Training
Course in Canton'), NCLS no. 265,11-12,1992.
122. Ibid. p. 24.
123. AOM, SPCE 367, 'Declaration de Le Quang Dat'.
124. Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 168.
125. Ibid. p. 25.
126. Hoang van Hoan, A Drop In the Ocean, Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 1988, p. 26.
127. Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p. 78.
128. RC, 495/154/600, p. 1, unsigned letter in Vietnamese to Le Hong Phong,
point 4.
129. RC, 495/154/598, p. 2.
130. Thanh Dam, op. cit., p. 72.
131. Thanh Dam, 'Cac Nha Cach Mang Viet Nam Tham Gia Khoi Nghia
Quang Chau' (The Vietnamese Revolutionaries Who Took Part in the Canton
Uprising), NCLS, no. 6 (253), 1990, p. 72.
132. Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chau, p. 57; pp. 201-5.
133. AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, Canton, 16 Feb. 1927.
134. Thanh Dam, 'Cac Nha Cach Mang', p. 72.
135. AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a l'envoi 226, entrevues des 29,30 et 31 oct. et
du ler nov. 1925.
 136. Ha Huy Tap in RC, 495,201,45, p. 3 of manuscript titled
'Renseignements supplementaires sur l'origine des organisations communiste en
Indochine'.
137. Cac To Chuc Tien Than Cua Dang (The Precursors of the Party), pp. 23-
4.
138. RC, 495,201,45, pp. 3-4, of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
139. AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, letter of 23 Feb. 1927.
140. Adibekov et al., op. cit., pp. 105-6. The regional secretariats formed in
March 1926 were often referred to as lendersecretariats (landersekretariats).
141. RC, 495,154,555, p. 5.
142. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
143. Ibid., p. 3.
144. Ibid., p. 10.
145. Ibid., p. 14.
146. Ibid., p. 12.
147. AOM, SPCE, 368, letter from Canton, 17 March 1927.
148. RC, 495,154,555, p. 17, 'Note Explicative du Budget'.
149. RC, 495,201,45, p. 7 of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
150. RC, 495/201/45, 'Avtobiografia Sinichkina' (Sinichkin's [Ha Huy Tap's]
Autobiography).
151. AOM, SPCE, box 368,Mission Noel, annexe I, lettre de Pinot, 3 June
1927.
152. Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., p. 215.
153. Ban Lien Lac Tu Chinh Tri, Con Dao Ky Su va Tu Lieu (Con Son Island
Memoirs and Documents), Ho Chi Minh: Tre, 1996, p. 163.
154. Ha Huy Giap, Doi Toi, T.P. Ho Chi Minh: Nhà xuất bản, 1994, p. 47.
155. Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p. 46, and Contribution, vol. 1, p. 21. The term of
address 'Tu' was used for someone who had passed the tu tai examinations, roughly
equivalent to the baccalaureat.
 156. Fonds Goucoch (NA2, HCM), Note Mensuelle de la Sûreté, May 1928.
(My thanks to Philippe Peycam for providing this document.) L'Humanite, 13 Oct.
1929, refers to Kien's 18 years' deportation on Poulo Condore and his 1929 arrest in
an article on repression in Indochina.
157. RC, 495,154,596, p. 10, from an article written for Imprecor, 9 July
1926.
158. Ha Huy Tap, RC, 495, 201,45, p. 7.
159. Contribution, vol. l, p. 20.
160. Ibid., p. 24.
161. RC, 495/201/45, p. 6, of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
162. Contribution,vol. l, p. 19.
163. RC, 495,154,598, p. 2, undated report signed by NAQ.
164. AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, annexe I a l'envoi no. 374 du 21 avril
1927, Rapport de Konstantin.
165. Ibid., Mission Noel, annexe a l'envoi no. 384 du 27 juin 1927, Rapport
de Pinot, 21 June 1927.
166. Ibid., Mission Noel, 8 April 1927.
167. Ibid., Mission Noel, annexe a note du 10 fevrier 1927,letter of29Jan.
1927.
168. Ibid., Mission Noel, 7 March 1927.
169. Ibid., Mission Noel, letter of 17 March 1927.
170. AOM, SPCE, 368,16 Feb. 1927.
171. Ibid., 8 April 1927.
172. SMP, National Archives, Washington DC, Box 23, file 3055. (I suspect
that Lam Duc Thu was the original source of this information.)
173. AOM, SPCE, Box 368, 10 June 1927.
174. Ibid., annexe a 1'envoi N. 401 du 5 oct. 1927, letter of 29 Sept. 1927.
175. AOM, SPCE 368, report of Agent Pinot, 18 Oct. 1926 claims that HCM
married, so that he could improve his Cantonese and to have someone to look after
him. AOM, SPCE 367, 28 Oct. 1931, 'Renseignements fournis par Lesquendieu au
sujet de Tuyet Minh, femme chinoise, maitresse de Nguyen Ai Quoc', claims that Ho
did not see her again after his departure from Canton in 1927.
176. RC, 495,154,598, p. 2, from a three-page, unsigned report datelined
Moscow, June 1927.
177. Ibid., p. 1, letter of 25 June 1927, signed by Humbert-Droz and NAQ,
'the Vietnamese delegate'. Biographical information on the students can be found in
Anatoly Sokolov, Komintern i Vietnam, Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia, 1998.
178. RC, 535,1,127, 'Kratkoie Informatsionnoie Sobshcheniie o
Krestyanskom dvizhenii provintsii Guandun' (Brief Report on the Peasant Movement
in Guangdong).
179. RC, 495,154,598, p. 5, letter of 4 April 1928 from Berlin, signed in
Russian 'Nguyen Ai Kvak'.
180. RC, 535,1,127.
181. Cited by Harold Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 266-1.
182. Party History Research Centre of the CC of the CC9,A History of the
Chinese Communist Party: A Chronology of Events (1919-19'90), Beijing: Foreign
Language Press, 1991, p. 53.
183. Ibid., p. 55.
184. Ibid., pp. 56-7.
185. AOM, SPCE 368,13 Nov. 1927.
186. RC, 535,1,127, p. 36.
187. AOM, SPCE 368, Annexe a 1'envoi N. 401 du 5 oct. 1927.
188. Biographical information on Ngo Gia Tu, Nguyen Duc Canh and
Nguyen Hoi comes from, Nhung Nguoi Cong San. [The Communists (no author)],
T.P. Ho Chi Minh: NXB Thanh-Nien, 1976. Trinh Dinh Cuu's presence in Canton is
revealed in Quang Hung and Quoc Anh, 'Le Hong Son', NCLS, n. 184, 1979, p. 17.
189. AOM, SPCE 368,24 Oct. 1927:
190. Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 93.
191. Fernando Galbiati, op. cit., p. 275.
192. Ibid., p. 275.
193. Ibid., p. 295.
 194. Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chau, p. 194.
195. Georges Boudarel, Giap, Paris: Editions Atlas, 1977, pp. 172-4.
196. AOM, SPCE, 367, declarations faites par Truong Phuoc Dat le 22 mai
1933 et jours suivants, p. 41.
197. Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chau, p. 194.
198. Quang Hung and Quoc Anh, 'Le Hong Son', NCLS, no. 184 1979, p. 17.
This is plausible, as Zhu De himself is said to have returned to the GMD 16th Army
after the loss of Swatow with the help of another officer. See Pierre Broue, Histoire
de VInternationale Communiste, Paris: Fayard, 1997, p. 476.
199. AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 441 du 25 mai 1928
200. Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chau, p. 205.
201. AOM, SPCE 368, annexe a envoi no. 3222/S du 25 juin 1930.
202. RC, 495,154,598, p. 3 of June 1927 report.

Chapter 4 From the Old to the New Course (1927-9)

1. NAQ gives a resume of his movements from his departure from Canton to
his 1928 stay in Berlin in RC, 495, 154, 598, p. 5, letter dated 12 April 1928.
2. RC, 495, 154, 556, p. 16, untitled French document dated 12 Sept. 1927.
3. Ibid., p. 17.
4. RC, 495,154, 598, p. 8, letter of 21 May 1928.
5. See e.g. SPCE 367, declaration de Ngo Duc Tn, April-June 1931.
6. Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., pp. 233-5, gives the summer of 1927 as the AIP's
founding date, but this appears to be too late.
7. RC, 495,16,10, p. 11; Tasca letter to Kuusinen, 7 Jan. 1929.
8. RC, 495,154, 296, p. 176.
9. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, note from Ministry of Interior to Minister of
Colonies, no. 7667,27 Oct. 1927.
10. RC, 495,154, 598, p. 5 letter of 12 April 1928.
11. Thierry Levasseur, 'La Ligue Francaise contre l'lmperialisme et le
mouvement anticolonialiste vietnamien', Cahiers de VAsie du Sud-est, no. 26,1989,
p. 60.
 12. RQ495,154, 598, p. 5.
13. RC, 535,1, 42, letters of 3 Feb. 1928 and 21 Feb. 1928.
14. Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 783. Song Qingling lived from 1927 to June
1929 in Europe, most of the time in Moscow and Berlin.
15. RC,495,154, 598.
16. Ibid., p. 5.
17. RC, 535,1, 42, p. 68, letter from Berlin, 16 Dec. 1927.
18. Ibid., p. 11, letter of 5 Jan. 1928.
19. RQ495,154, 598, p. 6.
20. Ibid., p. 7.
21. Degras, The Communist International: Documents, vol. II, pp. 437-9.
22. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 267.
23. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
24. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928-1938,
pp. 78-81.
25. Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., p. 82.
26. See Richard Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists
(Seattle: Universities of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 28-9, for a discussion of
Stalin's compromise with Bukharin.
27. Degras, op. cit., vol. II, p. 455.
28. Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 41, 30 July 1929, p. 726.
29. Otto Kuusinen, Mezhdunarodnoie Polozheniie I Zadachy Kominterna
(The International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern), Moscow-Leningrad:
Government Press, 1929, p. 112.
30. Degras, vol. II, p. 507.
31. See remarks of Sultan-Zade, Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 74, 25 Oct. 1928, p.
1359.
32. Inprecor,vol 8, no. 81,21 Nov. 1928, p. 1,519.
33. Ibid., p. 1542.
 34. Tezisy I Resolyutsii VI Kongressa Kominterna, Vypusk Vtoroi (Theses
and Resolutions of the Sixth Comintern Congress, part II: Theses on the
Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries), Moscow-
Leningrad: Government Press, 1928.
35. Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 91, p. 1743.
36. RC, 495,16,10, p. 3, Tasca letter of 7 Jan. 1929.
37. L'Humanite, 4 April 1929, p. 1.
38. From letter in the Trotsky Archives, Harvard University Library, cited by
Degras, op. cit., vol. II, p. 566.
39. Dang Huu Thu, Than The va Su Nghiep Nha Cach Manh Nguyen The
Truyen (The Life and Times of the Revolutionary Nguyen The Truyen), Melun,
France: 5 Blvd. des Carmes, 1993, p. 160.
40. SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Duc Tri.
41. Thierry Levasseur, 'La Ligue Francaise contre l'lmperialisme et le
mouvement anticolonialiste vietnamien', Cahiers de I'Asie du Sud-est, no. 26,1989.
42. Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 74, 25 Oct. 1928.
43. See SPCE 367, Historique du PCA, p. 2.
44. RC, 495,154, 606, p. 8, unsigned letter.
45. Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 155.
46. Kuusinen, The International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern, p.
124.
47. Ibid., p. 139.
48. Ibid., p. 142.
49. Ibid., p. 61.
50. Ibid., p. 159.
51. Ibid., p. 94.
52. Ibid, p. 87.
53. Tran Dan Tien, op. cit. (1976), p. 71.
54. SPCE 367, Historique du PCA, p. 5.
 55. See RC, 495, 154, 558, p. lb, letter of 28 August 1929 from 'Thibault',
sent from Belgium to Moscow.
56. SPCE 367, Historique du PCA.
57. Hoang van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, Beijing: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1988, p. 47.
58. See Christopher Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of
the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885-1954, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000,
chapter 2, for a list of Vietnamese sources.
59. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 50-1.
60. SPCE 368, Interrogatoire de Vo Mai, alias Quoc Hoa, 10 Nov. 1930. Vo
Mai was believed by the Sûreté to be Dang Thai Mai, who later became Vo Nguyen
Giap's father-in-law and a leading cultural figure in North Vietnam. See SPCE 367,
Declarations de Ngo Duc Tri, index of names.
61. RC, 495,154, 615, p. 5, letter of 18 Feb. 1930.
62. Ibid, (original in English).
63. Hoan, op. cit., p. 48.
64. BNTS, vol. I, p. 311, refers to Memoirs of Dang van Cap in the Hanoi
Historical Institute.
65. SPCE 367, declaration de Ngo Duc Tri, 4 August, 1931.
66. RC, 495,154,615, p. 4b; also Nguyen Tai, 'Nho lai ngay dua Bac Ho tu
Thai Lan sang gay dung co so cach mang o Lao' (Remembering the Time I took
Uncle Ho from Thailand to Laos to Build a Revolutionary Base), Tap Chi Cong San,
no. 2, Dec. 1986.
67. Bac Ho: Hoi Ky (Memoirs of Uncle Ho), Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1960, p. 108.
68. This theory is put forward in a book about Ho's father: Nguyen Dac Hien,
ed., Nguyen Sinh Sac, Dong Thap: Khu Di Tich Nguyen Sinh Sac, 1994, p. 146.
69. Ibid., see letters on pp. 153-60. The author says that the Sûreté intercepted
all of them.
70. Ibid., p. 146.
71. AOM, SPCE 371, declaration of Tran Van Diep, 23 Sept. 1931; see also
Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., pp. 52-5.
 72. SPCE 368, Mission Noel, report of Agent Pinot, envoi no. 441 du 25 mai
1928.
73. AOM: SPCE 368, Vo Mai declaration, p. 2, and SPCE 367, Do Ngoc Du
declaration, p. 3, for Feb. and July 1928 establishment of regional committees in the
Centre and in Tonkin.
74. See bio of Nguyen Kim Cuong in Nguyen Chon Trung et al., Con Dao ky
su va tu lieu, p. 166; Chau Van Liem in Van Kien Dang, 1998, vol. 1. On Le Van
Phat see Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., pp. 215-17.
75. See Nguyen Chon Trung et al., op. cit., on Nguyen Danh Doi, grandson of
a patriotic resistance leader, and school mate of Nguyen Duc Canh and Dang Xuan
Khu (Truong Chinh) in Nam Dinh.
76. Ngo Nhat Son,Dong Chi PhanDangLuu,NXB Nghe Tmh, 1987, pp. 13-
14.
77. RC, 495, 201,35, Autobiography of Fan-Lan, dated 16 Dec. 1934.
78. On 1928 strikes in Cochinchina, see Ralph Smith, 'The Foundation of the
Indochinese Communist Party', Modem Asian Studies 32,4 (1998), pp. 781-2.
79. RC, 495, 201, 45, Ha Huy Tap, op. cit., pp. 13-14. A Saigon worker at the
Fifth Profintern Congress in 1930 claimed that the strikes before 1930 were often
spontaneous. See RC, 534,1, 144, speech by 'Cong', pp. 130-6.
80. This district outside of Hanoi was the centre of ICP underground activity
in 1945, during the preparations for the August Revolution.
81. Nguyen Van Hoan, 'Phong Trao Vo San Hoa Nam 1930' (The
Proletarianization Movement in 1930), NCLS, no. 134, Sept.-Oct. 1970, p. 11.
Another source on this meeting is Nhung Su Kien Lich Su Dang Bo Hanoi (Events in
the History of the Hanoi Party Committee), Hanoi: Hanoi Press, 1982.
82. Nhung Nguoi cong san, (The Communists), Ho Chi Minh City: Thanh
Nien Press, 1976, p. 29. Information on Tran van Cung's return comes from SPCE
367, Declaration de Do Ngoc Du.
83. Ho Chi Minh o Quang Chan, p. 189.
84. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1, pp. 380-1, 'Statement of the CCP
CC Politburo on the ninth ECCI Plenum Resolution on the Chinese Question',
Shanghai, April-May, 1928.
 85. Joseph Ducroux revealed in an unpublished memoir (pp. 13-14) that he
remained in Shanghai until the spring of 1928, working as a CYL organizer among
the French troops; memoir dated 6 Sept. 1970, in author's possession.
86. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1, p. 423-5, early June letter from A.E.
Albrecht to Piatnitsky. Mitkevich was a Profintern representative in China in 1927
and 1928.
87. Ibid., vol. III, part 1, p. 448-51, note by O.A. Mitkevich on 'The Soviet
Experience in China', Moscow, 10 July 1928.
88. For example, see bio. of Pen Hatan, CPM student leader in Malacca and
Singapore in RC, 495, 62, 30, p. 4.
89. MAE, Asie 1918-1929/Affaires Communes 50, Emigration Asiatique,
enquete
del'annee 1921, pp. 303-15.
90. MAE,loc. cit., p. 310.
91. C.F. Yong and R.B. McKenna, The Guomindang Movement in British
Malaya, 1912-1914, Singapore University Press, 1990, p. 89.
92. So Waichor, The Guomindang Left in the National Revolution, 1924-
1931, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 156.
93. Ibid., pp. 91-5.
94. Ibid., p. 173.
95. Howard Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, vol.
1, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
96. So Waichor, op. cit., p. 66.
97. Ibid., p. 84.
98. Ibid., p. 85.
99. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 888, n. 14, says the League was
directed by the CCP. However, the final issue of Thanh Nien (no. 208) of May 1930
says that the League was the creation of the Chinese nationalists, who founded it to
separate Asian revolutionaries from the Third International. (AOM, SLOTFOM V,
16.)
 100. So Waichor, op. cit., p. 165; also Yong and McKenna, p. 243, note that
Liao Zhonggkai's widow was in Singapore in 1930 to persuade GMD branches to
change their allegiance to the RCA.
101. Degras, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 465.
102. RQ542,1,30, p. 36a.
103. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 826, letter to the Eastern
Secretariat datelined Moscow, 20 March, 1930.
104. RC, 495, 62,1, pp. 1-10, in Russian translation.
105. Working from a Russian translation, I cannot say for sure what the exact
title of this Anti-Imperialist League would be in Chinese. The Russians, however,
seem to have used the term 'anti-Imperialist for the League of the Oppressed Peoples
of the East, as in Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, pp. 885, 888.
106. RC,495,62, l, p. 2.
107. Ibid., p. 6.
108. History of the CCP, p. 60.
109. Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 514.
110. Van de Ven, op. cit., p. 220.
111. Klein and Clark, p. 514.
112. CAOM, GGI 65560, Police Journal, Straits Settlements, no. 5, 15 May
1931; my thanks to Christopher Goscha for sharing this document.
113. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1,1927-31, pp. 510-12.
114. See letter from Gerhard Eisler to ECCI, 31 March 1929, Comintern and
China, vol. III, part I, pp. 543-6.
115. For details of Rudnik's movements see Frederick Litten, 'The Noulens
Affairs', China Quarterly, no. 138, June 1994, p. 502. Comintern and China, vol. III,
part 2, also has biographical details of Comintern and FEB representatives in its
'Index of Names'.
116. Chang Kuo-t'ao, vol. II, pp. 126-7.
117. Thornton, op. cit., p. 87.
118. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 523.
 119. Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese
Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1974, chapters 6 and 7, illuminates one side of
this conflict, pitting the 'Guangxi Clique', which in 1928 and the first half of 1929 had
a strong influence in Nanjing, against Chiang Kaishek. Her description of GMD
politics in 1927, as a period which 'almost defies untangling' (p. 87), seems to apply
equally well to 1928-9. It was, however, a temporary alliance with Chiang Kaishek
against the Guangxi Clique, which brought the Left GMD into a position of influence
in Guangxi in the second half of 1929 (pp. 140-7).
120. So Waichor, op. cit., p. 131.
121. Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 821.
122. Uli Franz, Deng Xiaoping,Boston: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988, pp.
78-9.
123. RC, 495, 154, 380, pp. 19-20; also printed in Comintern and China, vol.
III, part l, pp 619-22.
124. RC,495,154,380, p. 24;in Comintern and China,vol. HI,part l, pp. 664-
70.
125. Ibid., p. 28.
126. Ibid., p. 28.
127. Ibid., pp. 34-5.
128. Ibid., p. 50, in Comintern in China, vol. III, part 1, pp. 697-705.
129. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1, p. 513, letter from Pyatnitsky to
Albrecht, 14 Dec. 1928.
130. Comintern and China,vol. III,part 2, p. 791, letter from FEB to Eastern
Secretariat, 30 Jan. 1930.
131. Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., pp. 117-8, citing Contribution, vol. 4, supp.
2, p. 59.
132. SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 507 du 11 juin 1929, Rapport
del'Agent Pinot.
133. RC, 495,154, 604, pp. 22; 67; Programme Minimum du VNKMTN.
134. SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 507 du 11 juin 1929.
 135. SPCE 367, declaration de Le Quang Dat, July 1931, 'Au sujet de Lam
Duc Thu', pp. 4-5.
136. SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 507,11 June 1929.
137. SPCE 368, Interrogatoire de Vo Mai, p. 7.
138. Ralph Smith, op. cit., p. 784; also see La Tribune Indochinoise, 18 July
1930, 'La Crime de la rue Barbier et les societes secretes devant la Cour Criminelle'.
139. Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p. 60.
140. Contribution, vol. I, part 2, pp. 48-9.
141. RC, 495, 201, 35, 'Fan-Lan's' Autobiography, 16 Dec. 1934.
142. See SPCE 367, declarations de Truong Phuoc Dat, 22 May and
following days, on the formation of the ICP's General Trade Union, and the
competition from the ACP.
143. RC, 495, 154, 616, p. 62; 'Letter to the Interior from the ACP'; the
French copy in the Comintern archives is stamped 29 March 1930 and is 25
handwritten pages. This letter is one which was not captured by the French, and thus
does not appear in their collection of documents in SLOTFOM III,
129. These were intercepted by the French in Jan. 1930, and comprise letters
exchanged by the ICP leadership in Haiphong and the ACP leaders in Hong Kong, as
well as letters and instructions from the ICP in Haiphong to their representative Ngo
Gia Tu in Saigon. Ralph Smith, op. cit., pp. 789-98, gives a thorough description of
this correspondence, which is extremely acrimonious on the ICP end.
144. RC, 495, 616 pp. 61b-62.
145. Ibid., pp. 64-64b.
146. Ibid., p. 67.
147. RC, 495,154,616, pp. 65-7. The VNQDD did re-write its statutes in
1929, with advice from Hoang Van Tung, a member of the Cach Mang Dang/Tan
Viet. Thus Thanh Nien, the CMD and the VNQDD had very similar structures (Hue-
Tam Ho Tai, op. cit. p. 185).
148. SLOTFOM III, 129, documents captured by French, letter 13, p. 5.
149. Ibid., letter of 7 Jan. 1930.
150. Ibid., letter 14.
 151. Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p. 58.
152. SPCE 367, Declaration de Duong Hac Dinh, p. 30.
153. SLOTFOM III, 129, documents captured by French, letter of 14 Nov.
1929, signed 'Luong', who is identified in French notes as Ho Tung Mau.
154. Ibid., French comments on 'Luong'letter of 14 Nov. 1929.
155. SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 34-5.
156. RC, 542 (Anti-Imperialist League), 1, 96, p. 2, letter signed 'M'.
157. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 803: FEB letter to Eastern
Secretariat, 30 Jan. 1930.
158. RC, 495, 154, 378, p. 9, protocol no. 12,12 Nov. 1929.
159. RC, 495, 154, 558, pp. l-2b; letter of 28 August 1929, from 'Thibault' to
Vasiliev.
160. Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, in As-tu vu Cremet?, Paris: Fayard,
1991, p. 302, say that Cremet obtained a passport in the name of 'Thibault' while he
was in Shanghai. This book depicts a working relationship in China between Ho Chi
Minh and Cremet which is not supported by any of the documentation which I have
seen in the French or Russian archives. Faligot and Kauffer do not make clear what
their sources are or provide footnotes.
161. Joseph Ducroux, memoir dated 16 Sept. 1970.

Chapter 5 The Revolutionary High Tide (1930-1)

1. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129, Societes Secretes, letter 13, p. 5.
2. AOM, SPCE 367, Historique du P.C.A.
3. AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations de Duong Hac Dinh, p. 35.
4. RC, 495,154,556, pp 10-11; the Russian version is dated 27/V/1929, but
given the strong evidence that these directives were drawn up in October, on the eve
of Tran Phu and Ngo Duc Tri's departure for Paris, as well as the usual Hanoi date for
these instructions, one can assume that the typist made a mistake in writing V in
place of X.
5. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Duc Tri. In Vietnam, Ngo Duc Tri's
role in 1930-1 has been reduced to that of a turncoat, as he is said to have given away
many party members after his arrest in 1931. How much blame he deserves for
individual arrests is debatable, but he was badly disillusioned by April 1931, and
eventually made a long confession to the Sûreté.
6. RC, 495,154,384, Consultation on the Indian Question, 28 Oct. 1929.
7. RC, 495,154,556, p. 31, 'Tekhnicheskiie Voprosy' undated.
8. AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations de Ngo Duc Tri, April, May and June 1931.
9. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri.
10. RC, 495,154,560, pp. 20-68, On the Immediate Tasks of the Indochinese
Communists (pamphlet), 23 Nov. 1929.
11. Ibid., p. 20.
12. Ibid., p. 22.
13. Ibid., p. 24.
14. Ibid., p. 26.
15. Ibid., p. 42.
16. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
17. Ibid., p. 33.
18. Ibid., p. 37.
19. Ibid., p. 36.
20. Ibid., p. 38.
21. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri.
22. A synopsis made by Le Hong Phong was sent to Hong Kong, but
intercepted by Lam Duc Thu and passed to the Sûreté. They in turn sent a copy to
Paris on 14 Dec. 1929 (AOM,SPCE 383, Mission Noel, envoi no. 542,14 Dec. 1929).
23. See RC, 495,32,95: Lettre du C.C. d'Indochine (Tran Phu) to FEB of 17
April, 1931, p. 7 of file.
24. Van Kien Dang, vol. I, pp. 9-17; published in Nhan Dan, 6 Jan. 1970. See
excerpts in Robert Turner, op. cit., p. 16.
25. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration of Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 38-9.
26. RC, 495,154,615, p. 5, letter of 18 Feb. 1930.
 27. AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 554,3 Jan. 1930, which refers
to a report by Agent 'K' from 18 Nov. to 15 Dec. 1929.
28. Ralph Smith, op. cit., p. 795, citing AOM, SLOTFOM III, 48, no. 4, pp.
5-6.
29. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, unsigned letter from FEB to the
ECCI, 3 March 1930, pp. 821-3.
30. Ibid., Rylski letter of 30 Jan. 1930, p. 803.
31. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration by Duong Hac Dinh, arrested June 1930, p.
38. Whether Dinh was a French informer before his arrest in early June 1930, as
claimed by Huynh Kim Khanh (Vietnamese Communism, p. 117, n. 49) is unproven
by the documents to which I have had access; it is equally possible that he was an
ICP faction spy within the China-based group. But it is certain that the Sûreté in large
part based their analysis of events within the ACP leadership on his subsequent
declaration. The report labelled Fusion des associations antifrangaises en Indochine et
Vaction determinate de Ho Chi Minh in SPCE 367 is a case in point.
32. AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16; the final numbers 207 and 208 appeared in May
1930.
33. See copy in RC, 495,154, 610a.
34. AOM, SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 33, 37. This contradicts the
version of events in Nguyen Nghia's first article on the unification, in NCLS 59,1964,
mentioned below.
35. AOM, SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 40-2.
36. RC, 495,154,615, p. 34b, letter in French seems to be dated 27 Feb. 1930,
but the day is unclear.
37. Ibid., p. 5.
38. Ibid., p. 5-b.
39. Ibid., pp. 10-12b; p. 5b.
40. Ibid., p. 8
41. Nguyen Nghia, 'Cong cuoc hop nhat cac to chuc cong san dau tien o Viet
Nam va vai tro của dong chi Ho Chi Minh' (The Unification of the First Vietnamese
Communist Groups and the Role of Ho Chi Minh), NCLS, 59, 1964.
 42. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129, Associations Secretes, notes from Annexe N.I
a la lettre N. 895/SG, 12 Feb. 1930.
43. See Ralph Smith, op. cit., p. 769.
44. Hoang Tranh, op. cit., p. 80.
45. Nguyen Nghia, in NCLS, 62,1964, cited below.
46. RC, 495,154,615, p. 35b; Letter to Bureau Francais a 1'I.C, signed 'pour la
Comintern et le PCV, Ho Chi Minh. The list of 'mots d'ordre is cited on the final
page.
47. Galbiati, op. cit., p. 256.
48. See Ralph Smith, op. cit., pp. 799 and 803.
49. Nguyen Nghia, 'Cong cuoc hop nhat cac to chuc cong san o trong nuoc'
(The Unification of Communist Organizations within the Country), NCLS, 62, 5-
1964, p. 54.
50. AOM, SPCE 371, Declaration of Nguyen Van Loi, 18 Jan. 1932. Loi, one
of the first Thanh Nien trainees to work in the south, did not declare that he had been
to Canton for training, and may have left out other important details about the party.
51. Nguyen Ba Linh, 'Tim Hieu them ve Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Dang Thang
10 1930' (A Further Look at the Central Committee Plenum of October 1930), NCLS,
4, 1992, p. 1.
52. Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 97.
53. Tran Tu Binh, The Red Earth, trans. John Spragens, Athens, OH:
University of Ohio Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1985, p. 67.
54. Klein and Clark, vol. I, p. 74.
55. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Dat.
56. Contribution, vol. IV, p. 19.
57. RC, 495, 154, 615, pp. 9-9b.
58. RQ495, 154, 615, p. 5b.
59. AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16; translated French extracts from no. 208 are not
dated, but issue 207 is dated 5 May 1930.
60. Hoang van Dao, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, Saigon: Giang Dong, 1965,
pp. 78-80.
 61. RC,495,154, 615, p. 7.
62. PRO, FO 371,14743, p. 404: letter from British Consulate Gen.,
Yunnanfou, 19 May 1930 to FO.
63. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 117, annexe 3 a la transmission no. 1965, 27
March 1930.
64. RC, 495,154, 615, pp. 8-8b.
65. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1, p. 555, letter from CCP CC to
Eastern Secretariat, 6 May 1929.
66. AOM, SPCE 384, Pinot interview with the 'Director', 22-23 Feb. 1930.
67. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 127, folder on Bureau d'Extreme Orient et Syndicat
Pan-pacifique, 1929-33.
68. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, pp. 822-3, unsigned letter of 3
March 1930 to ECCI. The Chinese comrade is identified in a contemporary footnote
as Fu Da-tsin, Fu Ta Ching.
69. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri; note that here the party unification is
again dated in January.
70. Ibid.
71. Tri says he left Hong Kong in June 1930, but this appears impossible, as
he worked for a time with Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon, who was arrested at the end of
May; in fact just a few lines later Tri gives the date as the beginning of April.
72. Pham Huu Lau was from a peasant family in Hoa An village, Cao Lanh,
where Ho Chi Minh s father had been living at the time of his death. See Nguyen
Sinh Huy, p. 160,168.
73. Nguyen Nghia, NCLS, 62., p. 58.
74. Ibid., p. 57.
75. Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 1.
76. AOM, SPCE 367, Historique du PCA, p. 11.
77. Richard Thornton, op.cit., p. 111.
78. I am relying on Richard Thornton for this summary of Central Circular
no. 70, 'Chungyang tungkao ti ch'i shih hao',Thornton,op.cit., pp. 111-14.
79. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 821, letter of 3 March 1930.
 80. Thornton, op. cit., pp. 117-18.
81. RC, 495, 62, 1, p. 28., Resolution on the X Plenum of ECCI, 'Passed by
Nanyang Provisional Committee', 15 March 1930.
82. Ibid., p. 32.
83. Ibid., p. 33.
84. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129,letter of 13 April 1930 from Gov. Gen. to
Minister of Colonies.
85. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, letter to Eastern Secretariat from
FEB, 18 May 1930, p. 885.
86. AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16, Thanh Men, no. 208.
87. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 1, p. 488, introduction to Section 2.
88. AOM, SPCE 368, correspondance 1930, Note conf. no. 1725, S.G.,
Hanoi, 17 March 1930.
89. Ibid., 5220 S.G., 18 Sept. 1930, report on Ho Chi Minh signed Neron.
90. Comintern and China,vo\. HI,part 2,Li Lisan letter of 17 April 1930, p.
866.
91. Charles McLane suggests this idea in Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia,
p. 133.
92. Comintern and China, vol III, part 2, letter of 18 May 1930, pp. 884-5.
93. Hoang van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 52-5.
94. RC, 495, 16, 51, report on General Situation in Siam, pp. 66-8, original in
Chinese.
95. AOM, SPCE 365, folder 'Arrestation de Ho Chi Minh'.
96. RC, 495,62,6, p. 1, report of 1 June 1930 to the 'English Komparty,
London'.
97. RC, 495, 62, 3, pp. 1-10. Ho did not sign the reports which he sent to the
FEB on the Malayan CP, but in one of them he inserts a 'note from V (Victor), which
was how he signed his Hong Kong letters to the FEB. The typing and English of the
letters on Malaya get a bit erratic when he is in a rush, creating the impression of
rapid, almost slapdash, execution which is often present in his letters on Vietnam,
especially in the spring of 1931.
 98. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
99. Ibid., p. 10.
100. CAOM, GGI, 65560, Police Journal, Straits Settlements, 15 May 1931.
101. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, Eisler letter to ECCI, 23-5 June
1930, p. 916.
102. Hoang Quoc Viet, A Heroic People, Hanoi: FLPH, 1965, pp. 158-9,
cited by R. Smith, op.cit., p. 805.
103. Song Tung, Tran Phu, Hanoi: NXB Thanh Nien, 1980, p. 142. It is not
clear from this source whether this was a Bac ky or a national committee; the author
says that Tran Phu had been co-opted as a member.
104. Guong Chien Dau của Nhung Nguoi Cong San (Exemplary Communist
Fighters), Hanoi: NXB Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật, 1959; and Nguyen Duy Trinh, 'A
Highlight of the Movement' in In the Enemy's Net, Hanoi: FLPH, 1962, p. 25.
105. Tran Huy Lieu, Cach Mang Can Dai Viet Nam, tap VI, Hanoi: Ban
Nghien Cuu Van Su Dia, 1957, pp. 87-8.
106. Van Kien Dang, 1930-1945, vol. I, pp. 50-2, Appeal dated June 1930.
107. Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., pp. 168-9.
108. See Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 61 on spring demonstrations in the South;
also La Tribune Indochinoise, 30 May, 4 and 6 June 1930.
109. RC, 495, 154, 462, pp. 485-7b; undated, unsigned document,
accompanied in the Comintern file by a note which reads, 'documents written by
NAQ... Now our party has replaced them with others.'
110. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2: on May arrests-letter of 18 May
1930, p. 881; on Li Lisan s independent actions-letter of 20 June 1930, p. 903.
111. RC, 495, 154, 623, p. 5, letter in Vietnamese, signed 'q'.
112. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, letter to Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubao
from Li Lisan, 17 April 1930.
113. AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations de Do Ngoc Du, 8 October 1931 and
following days.
114. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Datjuly 1930.
 115. Commission Morche, Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les
Evenements du Nord-Annam, part II, p. 6; consulted in SOAS library in a version
which provides no publishing data.
116. La Tribune Indochinoise, 30 May, 4 and 6 June 1930.
117. In his Sûreté declaration (SPCE 371, 18 June 1932) Nguyen Van Loi
claims that he was a member of this committee for a time. It is not clear whether he
was, in fact, Nguyen Van Son.
118. AOM, SPCE, Declarations de Ngo Duc Tri.
119. Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 2. Linh says that Tran Phu joined the CC in
August.
120. RC,495, 154, 569, p. 52.
121. Benjamin Yang, 'Complexity and Reasonability: Reassessment of the Li
Lisan Adventure', Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 21, Jan. 1989, pp. 121-2.
122. Comintern and China, vol. III, part 2, p. 962; telegram from FEB to
ECCI, Shanghai 4-7 Aug 1930.
123. Ibid., Stolyar letter to Lozovsky, 5 August 1930, p. 963.
124. On the summer military events, see Benjamin Yang, op. cit., pp. 120-6.
125. S.A. Mkhitaryan, Podyem Revoliutsionnovo Dvizheniia v Indokitae
(The Revolutionary Upsurge in Indochina), Moscow: Nauka, 1975, pp. 63-4.
126. RQ495,154, 615, p. 115, NAQ letter of 29 Sept. 1930 to FEB.
127. Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 69.
128. Rapport de la Commission d'Enquete sur les Evenements du Nord-
Annam, part II, pp. 1-12; Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., pp. 62-72.
129. Nym Wales, Inside Red China, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co.,
1939, p. 345.
130. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and
Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 126.
131. Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., pp. 63-7, enumerates the September events.
132. The best analysis which I have encountered of the comparative
importance of historical, political and economic factors during the Nghe-Tinh
movement is by Martin Bernal: 'The Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement, 1930-1931', Past
and Present, no. 92, August 1981; see in particular p. 156, n. 16 and pp. 157-8. The
elements of the picture which he misses are the lack of unity within the communist
party and international communist movement.
133. RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 101, letter of 2 Sept. 1930, unsigned. At this stage
one begins to wonder to what extent Ho's illnesses were linked to political events.
134. Ibid., p. 101.
135. Excerpts from A.A. Sokolov, Comintern and Vietnam,^. 176-8.
136. RC, 495,154, 615, p. 105, letter of 12 Sept. 1930.
137. Ibid., p. 110, letter of 22 Sept. 1930.
138. See AOM, SPCE 371, Declaration de Nguyen van Lot, Jan. 1932, p. 4 on
Nguyen Trong Nha. Confusingly, Hoang Quoc Viet was also known as 'Sau'.
139. AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Duc Tri.
140. See unsigned report from Saigon in RC, 495,154, 462b/part 3, p. 236.
141. RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 110.
142. Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 3. Linh cites a letter of 25 Feb. 1931 from
the Sûreté archives, which he says is Ho's criticism of the October plenum. However,
this letter is not included in Ho's Collected Works or in any other collection of party
documents I have seen.
143. RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 109, 28 Oct. 1930, 'Report'.
144. RC,495,154,616, p. 102, Russian version undated, received 23 March
1931 in Moscow.
145. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri.
146. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri.
147. RC, 495,154,616, p. 123. Letter of the ICP CC to the Party
Organizations, 9 Dec. 1930. The most recent edition of Van Kien Dang (1998, vol. II)
includes this paragraph, which was omitted in the 1977 version.
149. Ibid., pp. 120-1.
149. RC, 495,32,95, p. 2,'Aux camarades du Secretariat d'Orient de 1'I.C,
signed 'Pierre [Leman]', undated.
151. Ibid, p. 1.
 152. Ibid, pp. 1 and 3.
153. National Archives, Washington, DC, SMP Files, D2527/45-Noulens
Case Analysis, pp. 34-5.
154. RC, 495, 32, 95, letter no. 13 (no p. number).
155. AOM, SPCE 367, letter from Victor, 16 Feb. 1931; for correspondence
which was less than secure the Comintern often used the cover of business-style
terminology.
155. RC, 495, 32, 95, pp. 24-26, 'Brief von FEB an IPC in French, 29 March
1931. This letter is intended as a political document for a coming Congress, which
-was never held.
156. RC, 495,154, 569 (no p. no.), to 'Dear Friend', 12 Jan. 1931.
157. AOM, SPCE 367, letter from Victor, 12 Feb. 1931.
158. See Chapter VI, notes 55 and 56.
159. AOM, SPCE 385, envoi n. 92, 21 April 1933; translation of three letters
in quoc ngu sent from Hong Kong on 31 March, 1933 by Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.
160. RC, 495, 201, 35, 'Ankieta' dated 14 Dec. 1934.
161. Nguyet Tu, Chi Minh Khai, Hanoi: NXB Phu Nu, 1976, pp. 60.
162. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri.
163. RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 10., 'Lettre du CC. d'Indochine', unsigned, 17 April
1931; as this was written when Tran Phu was the only CC secretary still at large, I
assume it was written by him.
164. AOM, SPCE 365, 23 April 1931 letter to the CC.
165. RC, 495,32,95, p. 24, letter of 29 March 1931, addressed to 'Cher
Camarade, signed 'Vos amis'.
166. RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 22, unsigned letter, 15 April 1931.
167. AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Duc Tri; RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 23, Ducroux letter of
15 April 1931; RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 9, Tran Phu letter of 17 April 1931.
168. RC, 495, 154, 569, p. 52, undated, unsigned letter identified as written
after 4 April, in non-native English, so probably by Rylski/Osten, who returned to
Shanghai around October 1930, perhaps at the same time as Pavel Mif's arrival.
169. RC, 495, 32,95, pp. 7-9.
 170. Ngo Vinh Long, 'The Indochinese Communist Party and Peasant
Rebellion in Central Vietnam, 1930-1931', Journal of the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars, December 1978, p. 28.
171. Van Kien Dang, pp. 234-5, 'An Nghi Quyet của Trung Uong Toan The
Hoi Nghi Lan Thu Hai, 3-1931' (Resolutions of the Second CC Plenum, 3-1931').
172. Ibid., pp. 242-3.
173. Ibid., p. 246.
174. Ibid., p. 247.
175. Nguyen Duy Trinh, op. cit., p. 25.
176. Tran Huy Lieu, op cit, p. 87.
177. Ibid., pp. 87-8.
178. Contribution, 'Documents', vol. V: 'La Terreur Rouge en Annam (1930-
1931)'.
179. Van Kien Dang, vol. 1, pp. 285-8, 'Chi thi của Trung Uong gui Xu Uy
Trung-ky ve van-de Thanh Dang Trung-ky', 20 May 1931' (CC Directive to Trung-ky
Committee on the Purge of the Party in Trung-ky); Mkhitaryan, op. cit., pp. 303-5.
180. RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 10, Tran Phu letter, 17 April 1931.
181. RC, 495,154, 462, no page nos; letter of 28 April 1931, signed 'Victor'.
182. AOM,SPCE 365,folder 'Arrestation de Ho Chi Minh'.sene F,document
18.
183. RC, 495, 154, 462a, p. 205;letter to Eastern Sec, 10 June 1931,unsigned.
184. RC, 495, 154, 569, p. 50; letter addressed to 'Dear Friend', unsigned.
185. RC, 495, 154, 462, no page nos, letter in French, signed 'Victor', 28 April
1931.
186. Ibid., English letter written after 25 April 1931, signed 'Victor'.
187. RC, 495, 154,577, p. 36. From notes on the ICP's history in this file, we
learn that the ECCI passed a resolution on 5 April 1931 to accept the ICP as an
independent party at its Eleventh Plenum. From 6 Jan. 1930 until April 1931, the ICP
had been a section of the FCP. (p. 35).
188. Tran Huy Lieu, Les Soviets du Nghe Tinh, Hanoi: Editions en Langues
Etrangeres, 1960, p. 44.
 189. Ibid., pp. 51-2.
190. RC, 495, 154, 462b, part 3, pp. 13 and 16.

Chapter 6 Death in Hong Kong, Burial in Moscow? (1931-8)

1. AOM,SPCE 368, telegramme ofHciel, Gougal a colonies, Hanoi, 8 June
1931.
2. Frederick S. Litten, 'The Noulens Affair', China Quarterly, no. 138,June
1994.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. AOM, SPCE 368, telegram from Neron to 'Gougal', Hanoi, Hong Kong, 25
June 1931.
5. PRO, CO 129, 533/3, 27 July 1931, pp. 3-4, and 4 Aug. 1931, p. 8.
6. MAE 91, Affaires Communes, Annexe no. 4 a la Depeche no. 52 a la
Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, 12 Sept. 1931.
7. Dennis Duncanson, 'Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32', China
Quarterly, Jan-March 1974, p. 91.
8. AOM, SPCE 368, Tel. from GOUGAL to Colonies, Paris, 28 juillet 1931,
signed Pasquier.
9. AOM, SPCE 368, Hong Kong 23 June 1931, Francsulat a Gougal, Hanoi.
Ho Tung Mau would remain on Con Son island until 1945. This would seem to
indicate that he was accused of a serious criminal offense such as an assassination.
Ton Duc Thang, accused of being a ring-leader in the rue Barbier affair, and Le Van
Luong, arrested in 1930 after a demonstration in Saigon at which a soldier was killed,
would both also fail to benefit from the amnesties for political prisoners in 1936-7.
10. South China Morning Post, 1 August 1931.
11. PRO, CO 129/535/3 (1931-2), p. 7, note by G.L.M. Ransom, 4 Aug. 1931.
12. AOM, SPCE 368, Dirsurge a Dirsurge, Saigon, sent from Hanoi 24 Aug.
1931.
13. PRO, CO 129/535/3, p. 27, letter from Howell (?) of 31 Dec. 1931.
14. AOM, SPCE 368, 'pour M. le Directeur de la Sûreté Gen.', Saigon, 19
Nov. 1931.
 15. MAE, Asie, Affaires Communes 91, p. 170, from Mission Noel, Envoi n.
645, 11 Jan. 1932.
16. AOM, SPCE 368, Note Conf. n. 3435/S.G. from Hanoi, 2 Oct. 1931
describes Le Hong Son's attempt to get funds from Cuong De in the summer of 1930.
17. Dennis J. Duncanson, 'Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32', China
Quarterly, Jan.-March 1974, p. 96.
18. AOM, SPCE 368, press clipping from L'Opinion, 20 April 1932, story by
Jean Dorsenne, 'Nguyen Ai Quoc: l'lllumine'.
19. An announcement of NAQ's death appeared in the Daily Worker
(London) on 11 Aug. 1932.
20. AOM, SPCE 369, see cable of 20 Jan. 1933 from Gougal, Hanoi to
Saigon; and 22 Jan. 1933 from the Hong Kong consulate to Gougal.
21. AOM, SPCE 369, Francsulat a Gougal, Hanoi, 22 Jan. 1933.
22. PRO, CO 129/539/2, pp. 3-4, letter of 31 January, 1933 from Governor
Peel to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
23. Duncanson learned these details from Loseby's assistant, Lung Ting-
chang, Duncanson, op. cit., p. 100, note 81.
24. AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations faites par Truong Phuoc Dat a la Sûreté
Gen., 22 May 1933 and following days; pp. 43-53.
25. Truong Phuoc Dat may be the Sino-Vietnamese who was planted in
Singapore as a British agent in 1934, and who rose in the MCP to become the
Secretary General known as Lai Teck. See Yoki Akashi, 'Lai Teck, Secretary General
of the Malayan CP', Journal of the South Seas Society, vol. 49,1994. One of the
aliases of Lai Teck given in this article corresponds to one listed in the Sûreté
statement of Truong Phuoc Dat, as do many other elements of his biography.
26. AOM, SPCE 385, envoi no. 92 du S.R. Changhai, translation of three
letters sent 31 March 1933 by Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.
27. AOM, SPCE 369, folder on Ho Chi Minh in Laos.
28. AOM, SPCE 383, note conf. no. 394/s, from Cao Bang, 5 Sept. 1933,
signed Barthouet.
29. RC, 495, 154, 686, pp. 1-12, 'On the work of the last three years and the
internal situation of the ICP', dated 15 Jan. 1935, written in Russian, signed 'Hai An'.
 30. Days With Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1965, p. 81.
31. SLOTFOM III, 127, folder 'Congres Asiatique contre la guerre'.
32. Harold Isaacs, No Peace For Asia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1947,
1967, p. 163.
33. Daniel Hemery, Revolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial en
indochine, Paris: Maspero, 1975, pp. 58-9.
34. See R.C. 495, 154, 676, p. 34; letter to Cam. Vasilieva of 20 Dec. 1934
from 'Honam'. In this letter Giau defends himself against allegations that he was
misinterpreting the 'Action Programme', which he says that he 'helped to edit'.
35. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Note periodique de la Direction de la Sur.
Gen., first trimester 1935, chap. 1. p. 1.
36. Hemery, op. cit., pp. 105-107.
37. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 127, from folder Congres Asiatique contre la
Guerre.
38. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Note Periodique no. 34 de la Direction de la
Sur. Gen., first trimester 1935, chap. I, p. 23.
39. Otto Braun, Kitaiskiie Zapiski (Notes on China), Moscow: Iz.
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974, pp. 35-6.
40. References from McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, pp. 161-2.
41. RC, 495, 154, 585, p. 5, Letter to Indochinese Comrades, signed
'Vasilieva', 17 March 1935.
42. Inprecor,nos 73-4,11 August 1934, pp. 1189-92 (French edition); second
part of letter printed in nos 75-6.
43. Cahiers du Bolshevisme, n. 7,1 April 1934.
44. Hemery, op. cit., p. 63.
45. RC, 495, 201, l, p. 132, 'Autobiography' dated 17 April 1938, signed 'Lin'.
46. RC, 531,1,260, Bulletin de l'Epuration, p. 13.
47. Yelena Bonner, Mothers and Daughters, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1992, pp. 147-50.
48. Author's interview with Neiia Zorkaia, Moscow 1992.
 59. According to Vasilieva's Comintern biography, she defended her husband
against accusations that he had been close to the disgraced Comintern operative
Madyiar (RC, 495, 65a, 956).
50. RC, 495, 201, 1, p. 132, 'Autobiography', dated 17 April 1938, signed
'Lin'.
51. RC, 531, 1, 50, Decree of ECCI Political Commission on the selection of
students for the 1935-36 academic year, issued 15 Oct. 1934.
52. RC, 531, 1, 51, p. 36, letter from Kirsanova to Kaganovich, Secretariat of
Soviet Party CC, 22 Aug. 1934.
53. See Robert Conquest, Stalin and the Kirov Murder, London: Hutchinson,
1989.
54. RC, 495,154, 543, 'Declarations made 15 and 17 Dec. 1934 to the Rector
of KUTV, Eastern Secretariat, and the Political Commission of the ECCI' (in
Russian).
55. RC, 495, 154, 688, p. 14, letter from Overseas Bureau to Moscow, 31
March 1935.
56. RC, 495,201,35, 'Ankieta' dated 14 Dec. 1934.
57. A Vietnamese biography of Minh Khai published in 1976 describes a
shipboard romance with Le Hong Phong as the two sailed to Vladivostok. This
source claims that they were married in Moscow. There is, however, no
contemporary reference to such a marriage which I have found; this account betrays
its unreliability by stating that Ha Huy Tap (still in China) was present at the
ceremony. It also refers to Le Hong Phong as 'Vuong', which was actually one of
Ho's pseudonyms in China. See Nguyet Tu, Chi Minh Khai (Sister Minh Khai),
Hanoi: NXB Phu Nu, 1976, p. 60.
58. RC, 495,154, 686, pp. 1-12, see ref. on p. 196.
59. Ibid., p. 13, Lin's letter of 16 January 1935 to Eastern Secretariat.
60. Loc. cit., p. 14.
61. E.g. R.C. 495, 154, 586, letter of 20 April 1935, to Bureau d'Orient,
signed 'Cm'.
62. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, note periodique no. 34 de la Direction Sur.
Gen., first trimester 1935, Chap. 1, p. 62.
 63. RC, 495, 154, 585, undated letter signed 'Vasilieva', written before receipt
of March plenum materials.
64. Ibid.
65. AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, note periodique de la S.G., 2e trimestre, 1935,
pp. 64-6, on Nguyen Van Tram. On Tran Van Giau see RC, 495, 154, 676, letter of
28 Dec. 1934 to Bureau d'Orient from 'Jos'.
66. RC, 495,154, 676, p. 15, letter of 20 Dec. 1934.
67. RC, 495, 154, 688, p. 19, letter of 31 March 1935 from Overseas Bureau
to Comintern.
68. See RC, 495, 154, 675, p. 32, Resolutions of Overseas Bureau Conference
(Russian version), 15-20 July 1934, on the role of the Overseas Bureau.
69. RC, 495, 154, 688, letter in French from Overseas Bureau, 31 March,
1935. The final remark on Lin does not appear in the Russian translation.
70. Ibid., p. 4 of letter, 20 April 1935, signed, 'Cin'.
71. RC, 495,154, 585, undated letter signed 'Vasilieva'.
72. RC, 494, 1, 454, p. 264; From Seventh Congress file containing
correspondence of the Commission on Mandates and lists of Congress delegates.
73. Ibid., p. 205, list of country reps, dated 26 July 1935.
74. Conversation with Anatoly Voronin, spring 1992.
75. RC, 495,154, 676, p. 37, letter of 28 Dec. 1934, signed 'Jos'.
76. Joseph Ducroux, unpublished memoir dated 16 Sept., 1970, copy in
author's possession.
77. See Victor Usov, 'Kang Sheng-Chinese Beria', Far Eastern Affairs, no.
4,1991, pp. 146-7.
78. Adibekov et al., Organizational Structures of the Comintern, p. 179.
79. Ibid., p. 180.
80. Ibid., p. 181.
81. Ibid., p. 188-9.
 82. See Charles McClane, op. cit., pp. 212-13, for a discussion of the Seventh
Congress and subordination of the interests of the Southeast Asian parties to those of
the metropolitan parties.
83. McDermott and Agnew, op. cit., p. 131.
84. Ibid., p. 132, reference taken from G. Dimitrov, The Working Class
Against Fascism, London, 1935.
85. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 56.
86. Cited in McLane, Soviet Policies in Southeast Asia., p. 211.
87. Adibekov et al, op. cit, p. 182-3; list of ECCI members footnoted to
494/1/399,
'The Report of the Commission on Mandates and the election of the ECCI',
pp. 54-5.
88. RC.494,1,177, pp. 39-40.
89. Ibid., p. 44.
90. Ibid., p. 48.
91. RC, 494,1,379, p. 47.
92. RC, 495,10a, 138, p. 1, undated note.
93. RC,495,10a, 138, p. 3.
94. Ibid., 139, no page numbers, 27 Feb. 1936.
95. Ibid., 139, pp. 1-6.
96. Ibid., 139, pp. 3-4.
97. Ibid., 139, pp. 86-91, report written 1 July 1936, signed Overseas Bureau,
acting CC.
98. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 84; p. 86.
99. RC, 495,10a, 138, p. 6 of report of 1 July 1936.
100. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 91.
101. RQ495, 10a, 138, pp. 23,letter to Vasilieva of 10 Sept. 1937, Vietnamese
text signed 'F.L'; refers to the meeting as an 'overseas conference'.
 102. Van Kien Dang, 'Tho Cong Khai của Trung Uong Dang Cong San Dong
Duong gui cho cac Dong Chi Toan Dang' (Open letter From the ICP CC to Comrades
in all Parties), pp. 56-69; dated June 1936 here; the letter cited in note 101 refers to it
as the 'letter of 26 July 1936'.
103. RC,495,10a, 140, p. 33,from 'Sinitchkin' letter written approx.Sept.
1937.
104. RC,495,10a, 140, p. 33.
105. Ibid., p. 30, 'Explanation of the document received from Indochina',
dated 17 Jan. 1938.
106. Daniel Hemery's Revolutionnaires vietnamiens provides in-depth
coverage of the Lutte front.
107. Sud Chonchirdsen, 'The Indochinese Communist Party in French Cochin
China (1936-1940)', Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London, 1995, p. 56; on figures for Poulo
Condore, Hemery, op. cit., p. 310.
108. For a discussion of the communist experience in prison see Peter
Zinoman, The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, i 962-1940,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001, pp. 200-39.
109. Hemery, op. cit., p. 323.
110. RC, 495, 10a, 138, p. 3, 'Summary of a report on the Situation of the
ICP, October 1937.
111. AOM, SPCE 383, envoi no. 195 of 7 Oct. 1936.
112. Ibid., envoi no. 74,22 April 1937.
113. SHAT, 15H Troupes de l'lndochine, Bulletin Mensuel de
Renseignements no. 32., 28 May 1937, p. 2. My thanks to Chris Goscha for making
this document available.
114. AOM, SPCE 377, note conf. no. 2470/S, Hanoi 7 March 1936. Bui Ngoc
Ai, who joined the Trotskyists, was the exception.
115. Ibid., note conf.no. 90/S, 5 Jan. 1937.
116. Ibid., 10 April 1937, note signed 'Arnoux'.
117. Ibid., report of 25 Sept. shows that the Trotskyists in Hanoi accused the
ICP communists of'capitulation to the capitalists' and 'falling into the swamps of
reformism' (note conf. no. 12666-S, a MM. le Resident Sup. au Tonkin, Hanoi, le Dir.
des Affaires politiques et de la Sur. Gen., signed 'Arnoux').
118. RC, 532, 1, 386, Record of meeting of teachers and students of Section
7, 1 April 1936.
119. Ibid.
120. RC, 495, 30,1175, typed document dated 8 Dec. 1936.
121. RC, 532,1,265, p. 24.
122. RC, 532,1,246, p. 49.
123. Adibekov et al, op. cit., p. 193.
124. Milorad Drachkovitch, The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Essays and
Recollections, Standford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1966, p. 141.
125. RC, 495, 201,1, p. 163.
126. RC.495,10a, 140,92.
127. RC, 532, 3, p. 5.
128. RC, 495,74, 261.

Chapter 7 The Return of Ho Chi Minh and the Path to the Eighth Plenum
(1937-41)
1. Charles McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists 1931-1946,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 129.
2. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 98-9.
3. RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 106 (HCM's own rendering of his directives as he
remembered them in July 1939).
4. R.C., 495,201,35, Ankieta (Questionnaire) for Fan-Lan, 14 Dec. 1934-
written across the top are the words, 'Left for her country 2 Feb. 1937'.
5. RC, 495,10a, 140, pp. 23-7, French translation of letter of 10 Sept. 1937.
6. What appear to be extracts from this letter can be found in the French
military archives in Vincennes, SHAT, microfilm 15H, 'Annexe II au Bulletin de
Renseignements no. 33, 31 July 1937, Troupes de l'lndochine, Service des
Renseignements Central. My thanks to Chris Goscha for providing a copy of this
document.
 7. AOM, SPCE 384, note no. 2057-S, Cochinchine, Iere Section; ultra-secret,
14 April 1938.
8. AOM, SPCE 384, Police de Cochinchine, premiere section, note of 20
Sept. 1937.
9. Vincennes, SHAT 15H, Troupes de l'lndochine, Annexe I au Bulletin de
Renseignements no. 36, p. 1.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. AOM, SPCE, 383, Note Confidentiel, no. 5701, S.G., Hanoi, 26 Nov.
1938; from document found in a police raid on Phung Chi Kien's Kowloon residence
on 25 Oct. 1938.
12. AOM, SPCE 384, note conf. no. 144-ss; Hue, 14 April 1938.
13. R.C., 495,10a, 140, p. 68, report dated Saigon, 6 April 1938.
14. AOM, SPCE 384, note. no. 2246-S, Iere Section, Information provenant
de la police de Saigon, 23 April 1938.
15. R.C., 495,10a, 140, p. 72, report dated Saigon, 6 April 1938.
16. Daniel Hemery, op. cit., p. 415; Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p. 227.
17. R.C., 495,10a, 140, pp. 70-70b, 'Proposals and requests'.
18. Ibid., p. 33, undated report signed 'Sinitchkin'.
19. Ibid., 'Letter from Kan', 13 November 1937.
20. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 108.
21. AOM, SPCE 384, Police de l'Indochine/Annam, Service de la Sûreté, note
conf. n, 144-ss, 14 April 1938.
22. R.C., 495,10a, 140, p. 102, Lin report in French sent July 1939 from
Guilin.
23. Hoang Tranh, op. cit, p. 94.
24. Thomas Kampen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the
Chinese Communist Leadership, Copenhagen: NIAS, 2000, pp. 93-8.
25. R.C., 495,10a, 140, pp. 123-39, report written in Chinese dated 12 July
1940, translated into Russian on 27 Feb. 1942.
 26. King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, Princeton University
Press, 1969, p. 34.
27. Ibid., pp. 34-5.
28. Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 95-9.
29. RC, 495,10a, 140, p. 102.
30. Tran Huy Lieu, Hoi Ky (Memoirs), Hanoi: NXB Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1991,
p. 216. The other leading writer (cay but chinh) was Phan Boi, also known as Hoang
Huu Nam, a former prisoner from Quang Nam.
31. AOM, SPCE 377, Note conf. no. 7964-S, signed P. Arnoux, Hanoi, 22
June 1937.
32. AOM, SPCE 383, PROCGAL Saigon a DIRJUST Hanoi, telegramme off.
N. 335-Pg, 30June 1939.
33. Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 97-8. The purchase of this typewriter is one of
those events which has taken on symbolic importance in accounts of this period. Vu
Anh, in his memoir Tu Con-Minh ve Pac Bo, in Bac Ho-Hoi Ky, p. 148, says that the
typewriter was purchased by Phan Boi, the journalist on Notre Voix mentioned in
note 30.
34. Marr, Tradition on Trial, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981,
p. 394, identifies Tri Binh as Le Hong Phong.
35. Notre Voix, 9 April 1939.
36. The details of these publications appear in the introduction to Tu Chi
Trich, republished in Hanoi in 1983 by the Nhà xuất bản Sự Thật Publishing House.
The latter pamphlet is the only one which I have had access to. Tran Huy Lieu
explains that after the closure of Tin Tuc in late 1938, two members of the Tin Tuc
group opened a bookshop which published books and pamphlets with the Dan Chung
imprint (Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 215).
37. Tu Chi Trich, p. 18.
38. Ibid., p. 24.
39. Ibid., p. 28.
40. AOM, GGI 65459, activites politiques en Annamjune 1939.
41. Notre Voix, 'Lettre de Chine', 9 April 1939.
 42. Notre Voix, 'L'activite des Trotskystes en Chine', 11 August 1939.
43. See Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit, p. 250. Khanh cites arrest figures from
Tran van Giau, Giai Cap Cong Nhan, 3.
44. See Sud Chonchirdsen, 'The Indochinese Communist Party in French
Cochin China (1936-1940)', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1995,pp.
261-5.
45. Hoang Tranh, op. cit., p. 102.
46. AOM, SPCE 385, translation of a letter seized during a search made on 21
April 1940 in the home of Nguyen Van Cho, Hoc Mon, Gia Dinh. A photostat of the
Vietnamese original is in this file, along with the French translation.
47. AOM, SPCE 385, note no. 5819-S, Activite communiste Rev. en Cochin-
chine, Saigon, 6 Sept. 1937, signed 'Campana'.
48. Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 63. Tran Huy Lieu says that Nguyen Van Cu
was a member of the Tin Tuc group in Hanoi. Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 201.
49. Ngo Nhat Son, Dong Chi Phan Dang Luu (Comrade Phan Dang Luu),
Nghe Tinh: NXB Nghe Tinh, 1987, p. 46. Le Duan (Le Van Nhuan), First Secretary
of the Vietnam Workers Party, then the Vietnamese Communist Party from 1960
until his death in 1986, was a native of Quang Tri. Arrested in 1931, he was released
from Con Son prison in 1936. He may have been a candidate from Quang Tri to the
Chamber of Peoples' Deputies in the spring of 1937. He moved to Saigon in 1939,
where he joined the Central Committee.
50. Nguyen Chon Trung et al., Con Dao ky su va tu lieu, p. 164.
51. 'Chu truong của nguoi cong san doi voi viec bat linh' (The Communist
Position on Forced Recruitment), 30 Dec. 1939, Van Kien Dang, II: 1930-1945, p.
389.
52. Ibid., pp. 394-5.
53. Nhung nghi quyet co ban dan den thang loi cach mang thang tarn (Basic
Resolutions Leading to the Victory of the August Revolution), Hanoi: NXB Nhà xuất
bản Sự Thật, 1983, p. 8.
54. Ngo Nhat Son, op. cit., p. 46. Other sources, such as Nhung Nguoi Cong
San, place his arrest in 'mid-year'.
55. AOM, GGI 65461, Annamjune 1940.
 56. Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 105-6.
57. McClane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, p. 144.
58. BNTS, p. 88.
59. RC, 495,10a, 140, p. 68b; report of 6 April 1938.
60. Le Tung Son, Nhat Ky Mot Chang Duong (A Stage in the Journey),
Hanoi: NXB Van Hoc, 1978, pp. 42-3.
61. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 108.
62. Vo Nguyen Giap, Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su (Historic Journies),
Hanoi: NXB Chính trị quốc gia, 1994, pp. 14-8.
63. AOM, SPCE 369, Yunnan fou 13 May 1940, Dirsurge Hanoi, n. 104.
64. AOM, SPCE 385, Fiche de Reference, Sûreté Cochinchine, no. 7624-S, 5
December 1940.
65. Ibid.,pour M. le Commissaire de Police Speciale, Langson, en
communication a Mess. Le Chef des Services de Police de Tonkin, Hanoi, les
Commissaires de Police speciale Laokay, Caobang, Moncay, Hanoi, 9 June 1940.
66. Ibid., Activites communistes/arrestations d'agitateurs, signe Castrueil,
chef local des services de Polices; in May 1940 the French arrested a Nguyen Duc
Hung, who confessed that he worked as a liaison agent between several organizations
in Cholon and Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, 'member of the CC of the ICP and head of the
Saigon-Cholon Committee.'
67. RC, 495,10a, 140, p. 134: quoted from a Feb. 1942 Russian translation of
the 1940 Chinese-language document.
68. Ibid., pp. 135-6.
69. Ibid, pp. 137-8.
70. Ibid, p. 138.
71. King C. Chen, op. cit., p. 41; whether there really were plans to form an
'Asian Information Bureau' at this date is uncertain.
72. Vo Nguyen Giap, op. cit., p. 24.
73. Sud Chonchirdsen, op. cit., p. 282, citing AOM, Direction des Affaires
Politiques, rapports sur les mouvements subversifs de Cochinchine et d'Annam, Nov.
1940-May 1941.
 74. Chonchirdsen, op. cit., p. 283, citing AOM, note sur l'activite des intrigues
politiques pendant le mois de juillet 1940, Sûreté 7F 27.
75. SPCE 385, note postale, conf., Gouverneur Cochinchine a Gouverneur
General de l'lndochine (Direction des Affaires Pol), Hanoi, 21 August 1940.
76. Chonchirdsen, op. cit., p. 284, citing CAOM, Sûreté 7F 27, July 1940.
77. Ngo Nhat Son, op. cit., pp. 52-3. Cited by Chonchirdsen, op. cit., p. 284-5.
78. Chonchirdsen, op. cit., pp. 300-1, citing AOM, Sûreté 7F 27, Nov and
Dec. 1940.
79. Tran Huy Lieu, Cac Cuoc Khoi Nghia Bac Son, Nam Ky, Do Luong (The
Uprisings in Bac Son, Nam Ky and Do Luong), Hanoi: NXB Van Su Dia, 1957,pp.
19-20.
80. Ngo Nhat Son, op. cit., p. 47, says the ICP grew by 66 per cent in the
period leading up to the insurrection.
81. David G. Marr, Vietnam in 1945: The Quest for Power, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995, p. 19.
82. Tran Huy Lieu, Cac Cuoc Khoi Nghia, pp. 12-5.
83. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, p. 66. For more
discussion of this issue see Stein Tonnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945,
Oslo: PRIO, 1991, pp. 115-16.
84. The author saw a copy of this pamphlet on a visit to Ho Chi Minh City in
February 1995.
85. AOM, SPCE 385, fiche de ref., Sûreté Cochinchine, no. 7624-S, 5 and 12
December 1940.
86. Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 135.
87. AOM, SPCE 385, Projet Telegramme d'Etat a Colonies Vichy, signed
'Decoux', 17 May 1941.
88. Tran Huy Lieu, Cac Cuoc Khoi Nghia, p. 124.
89. Cecil B. Currey, Victory at any Cost, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1997, p.
37, quoting two Western sources; this date appears probable, as a Sûreté document of
Jan. 1938 lists Giap as a member of a peasant organizing committee of the Tonkin
ICP Executive Committee. (SPCE 377, Note conf. 1533-S, 28 Jan.1938.) Vu Thu
Hien in Dem Giua Ban Ngay (Darkness at Noon), Germany:Thien Chi XB, 1997, p.
120, presents the view that Pham Van Dong was notconsidered a party member until
1940, when he underwent a training courseon the Chinese border led by NAQ (I am
grateful to Judy Stowe for bringingthis to my attention). However, he may well have
become an ICP memberduring his time on Con Son, when he served as one of the
prisoners' officialspokesmen.
90. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 112-13.
91. Ibid., p. 114.
92. King Chen, op. cit., p. 46, from information based on an interview with
Zhang Fakui.
93. King Chen, op. cit., p. 147; from Report of Zhang Fakui dated 23 Jan.
1944.
94. Vu Anh, 'Tu Con-Minh ve Pac-Bo' (From Kunming to Pac Bo) in Bac Ho-
Hoi Ky (Memories of Uncle Ho), Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1960, p. 152.
95. AOM, SPCE 369, report of informer 'Ursule', 10 June 1941.
96. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 119.
97. King Chen, op. cit., p. 49.
98. Ibid., p. 49.
99. AOM, SPCE 369, note conf., no. 3392-C, Sûreté Annam, 5 June 1941.
100. AOM, SPCE 369,Gougal a Colonies, Vichy, no. 4061 a 4067, Hanoi 28
July, 1941. report of informer 'Ursule'.
101. E.g. Marr, Vietnam, 1945, p. 168.
102. AOM, SPCE 369, note conf., n. 3392-C, Sûreté Annam, Hue, 5 June
1941.
103. Lich Su Dang Cong San Viet Nam (History of the Vietnamese
Communist Party), vol. 1: Truong Dang Cao Cap Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi: NXB Sach
Giao Khoa Mac-Le-nin, 1983.
104. V.V. Marina, 'Dnevnik G. Dimitrova' (Dimitrov's Diary), Voprosy Istorii
(Problems of History), 7/2000, p. 44.
105. Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 228.
106. Ibid., p. 232.
 107. See David Marr, op. cit.; Pierre Brocheux, 'Les senders de la revolution'
in Saigon 1925-1945, Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992; Stein Tonnesson, op. cit.

8. Summing-up
1. Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development,
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, p. 1.
2. Arno Mayer, The Furies, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 35; he quotes
Paul Ricoeur, Du Texte a Vaction. Essais d'hermeneutique, vol. 2, Paris: Seuil, 1986,
p. 306.
3. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 252-3.
4. Christopher Goscha, 'Le Contexte asiatique de la Guerre franco-
vietnamienne. Reseaux, relations, et economic d'aout 1945 a mai 1954', these de
doctorat, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (IV section), Paris, 2000, pp. 678-9, citing
Archives of Czech CP CC, collection 100/3, vol. 207.
5. Goscha, op. cit., p. 680, citing doc. 89357/425, letter received 14 April
1950 in Moscow, Archives of the CP USSR.
6. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans,
by Jerrold Schechter, Boston: Little, Brown, 1990, p. 155.
7. Hoc Vien Chính trị quốc gia Ho Chi Minh, Tu Tuong Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi:
NXB Chính trị quốc gia, 1995, p. 8.

BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
Bui Cong Trung (Giao, Jia-o), 1905-77. Native of Thua Thien province,
began his revolutionary activity in 1924, participated in student demonstrations in
1926; in Saigon became a member of the Jeune Annam group; went to Paris in late
1926, from where he was sent as a youth delegate to the Congress of the Anti-
Imperialist League in Brussels. Went to Moscow in May 1927 to attend University of
the Toilers of the East (Stalin School), where he completed a three-year course. At
the end of 1929 returned to Asia and sent to work in Saigon until his arrest in April
1931. Imprisoned on Con Son Island until 1938, when he returned to Saigon and
became active as a journalist and literary critic, often writing on nationalist themes.
During the anti-French resistance served as Minister of the Economy; after 1954
Deputy Chairman of the National Planning Committee; elected to Central Committee
at Third Party Congress in 1960. Lost influence after the 'Anti-party Affair' in 1968;
regarded as a 'revisionist', he was eventually stripped of his Party positions and held
under house arrest in Hanoi until his death in 1977.
Bui Duc Minh. One-time VNQDD member from Tonkin, former student at
Buoi School; recruited to join the ICP in 1935, when he was in an officer training
school in Kunming. In 1940 served as ICP liaison between Yunnan and Hanoi.
Bui Lam (Min-khan, Nguyen Van Gi, Nguyen Van Xich), 1896-?. From
My Loc district in Nam Dinh; went to Paris where he helped Ho Chi Minh print Le
Paria. Later became print-shop worker and sailor based in Haiphong, returned to
France, where he worked as typesetter at L'Humanite and in 1925 became candidate
member of FCP. Entered Stalin School in 1926, returned to Paris in 1928. In early
1930 returned to Vietnam, where he became involved in trade union organizing in
Saigon. Arrested in 1930, sent to Con Son; released in 1936. Played an active role in
workers' movement until re-arrest in 1939. Imprisoned in Son La until 1945. During
Resistance War became judge of military tribunal in Region III; after 1954 became
Special Ambassador to Germany.
Bui Quang Chieu, 1873-1945. From Mo Cay District, BenTre, received
degree in agriculture in France; after return to Vietnam established the
Constitutionalist Party of Indochina, published La Tribune Indochinoise. Served as an
Indochinese representative to the 'Conseil Superieur des Colonies' in France. On 29
September 1945 was sentenced to death by a 'People's Court' in Cho Dem, Saigon.
Cao Hoai Nghia. Ho Chi Minh's liaison agent between Siam and Hong Kong
in 1929; one of the few Vietnamese who knew where Ho was living in late 1928 and
1929. Seems to have undertaken a fact-finding trip for Ho or the Thanh Nien
leadership within Vietnam in late 1929.
Cao Hong Lanh, Linh. From Hoi An in Quang Nam, probably of Sino-
Vietnamese origin. Early revolutionary career unknown, perhaps received military
training at Whampoa or some other Chinese military academy. Played an important
role in the formation of the Viet Minh in 1940-1; one of liaison agents to Yan'an.
Travelled south with Hoang Quoc Viet in 1945 after the August revolution.
Organized logistics between Vietnam and Thailand in 1945-6. Went to Bangkok in
1948 to establish links with the CCP, then started an Overseas Bureau for the Party in
Hong Kong in 1949. Became head of the DRV consulate in Canton from 1950 on.
 Chau Van Liem (Viet), 1902-30. From O Mon in Can Tho; from a poor
family, received scholarship to Teachers' Training College in Saigon, went to teach in
Long Xuyen. In 1926 helped students organize mourning for Phan Chu Trinh. Joined
Thanh Nien, elected to Southern Regional Committee in 1928. Was one of the
Southern representatives at Thanh Nien Congress in May 1929 in Hong Kong;
returned to Saigon to start work of building the Annam Cong San Dang. Went back
to Hong Kong in December 1929 to participate in the unification of the communist
groups in February 1930. Killed on 4 May 1930 by the French, as he was leading a
peasant demonstration in Duc Hoa.
Cuong De, 1892-1951. Royal claimant to the Vietnamese throne, a direct
descendant of Gia Long (founder of the Nguyen dynasty), chosen by Phan Boi Chau
in 1903 as the figurehead for his anti-French Duy Tan Hoi. Lived in Japan with Phan
Boi Chau, travelled in Europe in 1913 to seek German support for Vietnamese
independence. Living in Japan in the early 1920s, he sometimes supplied refuge and
funds to Ho Chi Minh's partisans, in particular Le Hong Son. During the Second
World War headed the pro-Japanese Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam National
Restoration League). Was groomed by the Japanese to take the Vietnamese throne,
but in the end they decided not to use him.
Dang Thai Mai (Vo Mai?, pen-name Thanh Tuyen), 1902-84. From Thanh
Chuong district in Nghe An, his father, Dang Nguyen Can, was among the scholars
exiled to Con Son in 1908. His uncle was Dang Thuc Hua, a leader of the Vietnamese
community in Siam. Graduated in 1924 from higher school in Vinh, went to Hanoi to
study at School of Pedagogy. Graduated in 1928 and sent to teach at Quoc Hoc
School in Hue. Joined the Tan Viet party, arrested with suspended sentence; arrested
again in 1930. After his release, moved to Hanoi; in 1936 became member of the
Society to Propagate Quoc ngu. Replaced Phan Thanh when the latter died in 1938 as
a deputy from Quang Nam. Worked as a legal activist and journalist. One of the first
Vietnamese to write about theory of culture from a Marxist point of view. Minister of
Education in Viet Minh government from 1945-6. Father-in-law of Vo Nguyen Giap.
Dang Xuan Khu, see Truong Chinh
Diep Van Ky, 1895-1945. Born in Hue; through his mother was cousin to the
Emperor Thanh-Thai. His father was professor of French to Emperor Dong Khanh.
Studied Chinese with Ho Chi Minh s father in Saigon, later went to France to study
law. On his return lived in Sa Dec province in the town of Cao Lanh, where Ho's
father settled in 1926. Founded and edited the nationalist paper Dong Phap Thoi Bao
and later the paper Than Chung. May have been a financial contributor to Ho Chi
Minh's projects in Canton.
Do Huy Liem (Phuong Si Hung, Dong Son), 1907-?. From Nam Sach
district in Hai Huong. Studied Chinese characters with his father. In 1921 sent to
private school in Hanoi, then in 1923 entered the Buoi School (Lycee du Protectorat).
In 1926 he and classmates held a strike, when the school director refused to let them
wear mourning for Phan Trinh. Many of them were expelled afterwards. In October
1926 a recruiter persuaded him to travel to Canton for further studies. In January
1927 entered Whampoa Academy, where at the time there were two Vietnamese
instructors, Dinh The Dan and Ngo Thanh. During this period he never saw Ho Chi
Minh. A member of Thanh Nien, 'Luong' (Ho Tung Mau) instructed him to return to
Vietnam in Dec. 1928, to carry out propaganda work. From January 1929 headed the
financial section of Haiphong committee, later sent to Uong Bi mine to work.
Arrested in mid-1930.
Do Ngoc Du (Phiem Chu), 1907-38. Born in Hai Duong, in the province
centre, son of a minor civil servant. In 1922 finished his primary studies and entered
the Buoi School, the 'Lycee du Protectorat' in Hanoi. Like several of his
contemporaries, was expelled from the school, following the boycott of classes
organized at the time of Phan Chu Trinh s death. In the autumn of 1926 went to
Canton to take part in the second or third Thanh Nien training course led by Ho Chi
Minh. At the end was initiated into the select 'Cong San Doan', the inner communist
core of Thanh Nien members. Returned to work in the port of Haiphong in early
1927. Posed as a well-off building contractor, while he recruited workers for Thanh
Nien. In 1928 elected to Northern Ky Bo (regional committee) of Thanh Nien, while
serving as secretary of the Haiphong province comm. To avoid detection he was
moved to Hanoi at the end of 1928, where he took charge of finances and
communications.
In March 1929, along with Ngo Gia Tu, Nguyen Duc Canh and others, met in
Hanoi to establish the first communist cell in the country, to prepare for the founding
of a communist party. In June this group established the Dong Duong Cong San Dang
(ICP). Do Ngoc Du became secretary of the Northern party committee, as well as of
the Hanoi committee; fled Vietnam in the spring, and assigned by Ho to carry out
propaganda aimed at French and Vietnamese military men stationed in Shanghai.
Arrested in June 1931 and expelled to Vietnam. Sent to Con Son in 1933, released in
1936. Died of tuberculosis.
 Duong Bach Mai (Bourov), 1905-64. From Ba Ria, studied in Saigon, then
went to Paris, joined Nguyen The Truyen's Annam Independence Party. Later joined
the FCP along with Nguyen Van Tao and in 1929 went to Moscow to study at the
Stalin School. Returned to Saigon in 1932. One of the 'Stalinists' in the La Lutte front
in 1936-7 and was elected to the Saigon Municipal Council on their slate. For a time
was expelled to Cantho. In prison in Saigon at the time of the Nam ky Uprising;
afterwards sent to Con Son until 1943. Lived under house arrest in Bien Hoa until
1945. After August Revolution was for a time in charge of security for the
Provisional Committee in the South. Made a mark as an outspoken delegate to the
Dalat Conference in 1946, then member of delegation to Fontainebleau Conference
the same year. Afterwards worked in the Central Committee. From 1954 was Deputy
Chairman of the DRV National Assembly until 1964, when he became ill and died
just before he was due to deliver a speech.
Duong Hac Dinh (Nguyen Van Truc, Hac), 1906-?. Thanh Nien Canton
trainee from Bac Ninh province; one of the members of the breakaway group which
advocated transforming Thanh Nien into a communist party in May 1929. Switched
allegiance to the Thanh Nien leadership at the May congress, and stayed in Hong
Kong to work with Central Committee. At end September 1929 was sent to Saigon to
organize a branch of the Annam CR Returned to Hongkong in November, then
returned to Saigon as delegates were gathering for the Unification Conference.
Arrested in Saigon at end of May 1930, along with Ngo Gia Tu. Made a long
statement to the French; identified in some sources as a long-time Sûreté informer.
Duong Van Giao, 1894-1945. Southern Vietnamese, relative of Bui Quang
Chieu; studied law in France in the 1920s. Associated with Constitutionalist Party,
went on anti-colonial speaking tour in southern France in 1927 with Nguyen The
Truyen and Trinh Hung Ngau. In 1940 became the head of a Japanese-supported
independence movement. Assassinated in Saigon after the August Revolution.
Ha Huy Giap, 1906-95. From Huong Son district in Ha Tinh, from a scholar's
family, younger brother of Ha Huy Tap. Received a scholarship to the Buoi School in
Hanoi. In 1926 joined the mourning for Phan Chu Trinh. Went to Saigon in 1927,
where he was recruited into Thanh Nien by two graduates of Ho Chi Minh's Canton
training course. In 1928 he went to Sadec to teach in the progressive private school
where Chau Van Liem and Pham Van Dong were employed. In 1929 joined the
Annam Cong San Dang. In 1930 became secretary of the Special Committee for Hau
Giang, as well as serving on the Southern Regional Committee. Arrested in 1931,
sent to Con Son in 1933. Released in 1936, but sent to Ta Ke prison camp. At Second
Party Congress in 1951, elected to CC. From 1960 to 1976 secretary of the Party
group within the Ministry of Culture; in 1960s also served as Minister of Education.
From 1970 he was responsible for the construction of the Ho Chi Minh museum, and
headed the museum until his retirement in 1987.
Ha Huy Tap (Sinitchkin, Joseph, Khit, Marat, Hong The Cong, Hong
Qui Vit, Mr Short), 1902-41. From Huong Son district in Ha Tinh, studied at Quoc
Hoc school in Hue at same time as Tran Phu, joined Tan Viet party and became a
schoolteacher in Vinh. Organized evening courses for workers. Removed from his
teaching post in 1927, went to Saigon. Worked for a time at sugar plantation in Ba
Ria, where he organized workers. Living in same house as members of Thanh Nien
Regional Committee at time of rue Barbier murder, so had to flee to southern China
with Tran Ngoc Ranh, Tran Phu's younger brother. Unable to find Ho Chi Minh,
went to Shanghai and enrolled in university there for a time. Received permission
from Soviet consul in Dairen to travel to Moscow. Studied at Stalin School from
1929 to 1932; went to Paris with Tran Van Giau, but arrested and deported. Returned
to Moscow until April 1933. With Le Hong Phong established an Overseas Bureau
for the ICP in Hong Kong in the summer of 1934. While Le Hong Phong attended the
7th Comintern Congress, Tap held a First ICP Congress in Macao in March 1935,
which in theory established an in-country Central Committee. However, as most
members were arrested in mid-1935, there was no in-country CC until Ha Huy Tap
returned to Saigon in August 1936, following election of Popular Front in France.
Tap headed CC, in spite of Comintern wish that Le Hong Phong would take that
position. Stalled on implementing a united front in Vietnam until the late summer of
1937, when an extended party conference was held in Hoc Mon. Removed as General
Secretary in March 1938 on grounds of sectarianism; arrested in Saigon shortly
thereafter. After the Southern Uprising in 1940, executed with other party leaders in
August 1941.
Hai Trieu, see Nguyen Khoa Van
Ho Hoc Lam (Hoang Van Loi), P-1942. Uncle of Ho Tung Mau, from
Quynh Luu district in Nghe An. In 1906 joined the Duy Tan movement, went to
Japan to study; after the Vietnamese were expelled from Japan went to live in China.
Studied at military academy in Beijing; after graduation served in Chinese armed
forces. Joined Phan Boi Chau in Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi. Lived in Nanjing for
many years, where he provided lodging for Vietnamese emigres. Served as colonel in
Chiang Kaishek's general staff, but may have been providing information to the
ICP/CCP at the same time. In 1936 was among those who formed the first Viet Minh
association in Nanjing. Helped Ho Chi Minh in forming ties with GMD in 1941. Died
in Guilin.
Ho Tung Mau (Luong), 1896-1951. Born in Quynh Luu district of Nghe
Anh to a family with an impressive anti-French pedigree. His grandfather Ho Ba On
died resisting the French in 1883; his father Ho Ba Kien was killed after breaking out
of Lao Bao prison in 1915. His uncle was Ho Hoc Lam (q.v.). In 1920 Ho Tung Mau
went with a small group of friends, including Le Hong Son, to Siam. Lived in Ban
Dong village near Pichit until the money was raised to send the young men on to
Guangzhou. Lived with Ho Hoc Lam in Hangzhou while he studied Chinese. In 1923
formed the anti-French society Tan Tam Xa with a small group of exiles in Canton
who were influenced by the anarchist Chinese revolutionaries. After Ho Chi Minh
arrived in Canton from Moscow in November 1924, Mau became one of his closest
collaborators. In June 1925 they formed the League of Oppressed Peoples and began
to publish the newspaper Thanh Nien. Travelled to Siam that year to organize the
Vietnamese exiles there and create branches of what by the end of the year had
become known as the Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, or Thanh
Nien. Does not seem to have received military training, but worked with Ho in
Canton during the Thanh Nien training courses of 1926. In March 1926 joined the
CCP. Imprisoned for a few months in 1927 at the time of Chiang Kaishek's anti-
communist putsch, but after release continued to oversee Thanh Nien in Ho's
absence. Arrested at the end of 1928 and held until September 1929, when he once
again took charge of Thanh Nien and founded the Annam Cong San Dang in Hong
Kong. Towards the end of 1929 journeyed to Vladivostok for a short-term political
training course, then returned to work with the new VCP, then ICP, until his arrest in
June 1931 in Hong Kong. Deported to Vietnam and held in a series of prisons (not
Con Son) until March 1945. From 1946 chairman of the IV Interzone Resistance
Committee; in 1949 designated government Inspector General. Elected at 1951
Second Party Congress to the CC; also became head of the Vietnamese-Chinese
Friendship Association. Died in July 1951 as result of a bombing attack.
Hoang Quoc Viet (real name Ha Ba Cang, Sau) 1905-?. From Vo Giang
district in Bac Ninh (Ha Bac), from an artisan's family. Studied at a technical school
in Haiphong from 1922-5, but was expelled following the demonstrations and strikes
connected to protests over Phan Boi Chau's sentencing. Then worked in various coal
mines until he took a job at Caron machinery works in Haiphong. Joined Thanh Nien
in 1928, and as a result was removed from his job. Went to Saigon to organize
workers for DDCSD in mid-1929. Was arrested in Haiphong in May 1930 on his way
to a CC meeting. Sent to Con Son until late 1936, after which he joined the legal
movement in Hanoi. Attended Extended Party Conference outside Saigon in August
1937, when he joined CC. Left Hanoi to avoid arrest in late 1939, so was able to
attend the seventh and eighth Party Plenums in 1940 and 1941. Remained in Party
underground during Second World War. Travelled to Saigon after August Revolution
in 1945 to oversee creation of Viet Minh organs. In 1950 became president of
General Confederation of Labour; also served as president of Fatherland Front after
reunification.
Hoang Tuyen (Nao). A southerner who studied at Whampoa Academy; was
sent with Duong Hac Dinh to Saigon to form branch of Annam CP in September
1929.
Hoang Van Hoan, 1905-91. Born in Quynh Luu district, Nghe An province.
Attended third Thanh Nien training course in Canton in late 1926, then sent to Siam
in 1928 to develop Thanh Nien infrastructure and training. Learned Thai in addition
to Chinese, was active in formation of first Siam Communist Party in 1930. In 1935
returned to southern China, lived with Ho Hoc Lam in Nanjing and became active in
united front in China in 1936, when first Viet Minh organization was formed.
Working in Overseas Bureau with Phung Chi Kien in 1939 in Kunming, when Ho
Chi Minh returned. Active in Viet Minh in China until 1945. After August
Revolution named Dept. Secretary for National Defense. In 1948 joined ICP CC and
was sent to Thailand to direct party relations with all of Asia. From 1950 to 1957 was
DRV ambassador to China. In Politbureau until Fourth Party Congress in 1976;
defected to China in 1979.
Hoang Van Non (Van Tan, Cao Bang, Tu Huu), 1904-?. An ethnic Tay
born in Cao Bang province. Studied Vietnamese and Chinese and for one year in a
Franco-Vietnamese school. First revolutionary contacts in 1924-5, travelled to China
in 1928. Led a peasant demonstration against military recruitment. In 1930 organized
a communist cell, then in 1932 became chairman of Cao Bang party committee.
Arrested and held for five months that year. In 1934 selected to join Vietnamese
delegation to Seventh Comintern Congress. Studied at the Stalin School from 1935 to
early 1937, when he returned to Vietnam with Nguyen Thi Minh Khai. Worked in
northern party organization. After 1945 became a writer and historian.
 Hoang Van Thu, 1906-44. Brother of Hoang Van Non from Cao Bang,
studied at primary school in Lang Son. In 1927 went to China. Worked in Nam Hung
mechanical repair shop run by group of revolutionary Vietnamese in Guangxi
province. A communist cell organized in this workshop became the Interprovince
Committee for Cao Bang-Lang Son, with Hoang Dinh Giong at its head. Thu went to
Longzhou to start another cell near the border in Lung Nghiu village, which served as
a cross-border liaison point. Worked with Le Hong Phong when he came to Guangxi
in 1932. For a time worked in weapons factory in Longzhou, where Le Hong Phong
also held a job. In 1937 returned to Cao Bang to lead the movement there; at end of
year went to Hong Kong to receive latest instructions from Phung Chi Kien and Le
Hong Phong. Elected secretary of Bac ky Regional committee in autumn of 1939. At
Seventh Plenum in November 1940, elected to CC Standing Committee, placed in
charge of the armed uprising in Bac Son-Vu Nhai. His position in CC was confirmed
at Eighth Plenum. Arrested in August 1943 on way to a meeting in Hanoi, executed
in 1944.
Khanh Ky (Nguyen Van Xuan?). Member of the Vietnamese Patriots
Association in Paris at end of the First World War, ran a photographic supply
business in occupied Germany in 1919-20 which provided funding for the group
living at Phan Van Truong's house, Villa des Gobelins. Returned to Vietnam, helped
Phan Chu Trinh on his return. Ho Chi Minh mentioned him as a potential funder of
his work in Canton in 1925. Associated with Constitutionalists in mid 1930s. In late
1930s ran a photographic business in Hanoi; worked with Anti-Illiteracy League in
1938.
Lam Duc Thu (real name apparently Nguyen Cong Vien, also known as
Nguyen Chanh Dong). Son of Nguyen Huu Dan, who studied with Ho Chi Minh's
father in Hue. A lieutenant of Phan Boi Chau in China, studied at military academy in
Beijing and became an instructor in the Canton army. His role as key informer to the
Sûreté on the Vietnamese revolutionaries in Canton is now evident from the files of
the SPCE, in which he is often referred to as 'Agent Pinot'. He was an early member
of Ho Chi Minh's Canton group which developed into Thanh Nien; was removed
from his responsibilities at Congress held in his home in May 1929. After that he was
no longer allowed into the group's inner councils, but Thanh Nien members
continued contacts with him until 1932. In 1931 pictures which he had taken of
Thanh Nien recruits were said to have been used to arrest many ICP members.
 Lam Van Tu (Joseph Thanh). A southern supporter of Prince Cuong De,
student in England during the First World War who may have had contacts with Ho
Chi Minh there. Returned to South Vietnam, where he was involved in nationalist
journalism, worked with Nguyen An Ninh's Hope of Youth movement in 1928.
Le Duan (Le Van Nhuan), 1907-86. From Hau Kien village, Trieu Phong
district, Quang Tri. Joined Thanh Nien in 1926 and the newly-formed communist
party in 1930. Held jobs in railway company. Arrested in Haiphong in 1931, sent to
Con Son. Released in 1937, became a member of the Trung ky regional committee;
brought into the CC in 1939 when he went to work in Saigon. Took part in Sixth
Plenum, which adopted the policy of anti-imperialist front. Re-arrested in early 1940
and sent back to Con Son until September 1945. Became secretary of the Southern
Regional Committee. At the 1951 Second Party Congress elected to CC, became
secretary of the Central Office for South Vietnam. Remained in the South after the
Geneva agreement, went north in 1957 and joined the CC secretariat. Elected First
Secretary of the Party in 1960. His title became General Secretary in 1976. Remained
in this post until his death in 1986, before the Sixth Party Congress. In the 1970s
became closely identified with pro-Soviet policies, although in 1963 at time of the
Ninth Plenum he had been considered a supporter of the Chinese line.
Le Duc Tho (real name Phan Dinh Khai), 1911-90. Born in Dich Le
village, Nam Tru district near Nam Dinh, son of a mandarin family. Expelled from
school in Hanoi in 1926 for protesting Phan Boi Chau's arrest. In 1929 joined Thanh
Nien, then the DDCSD in 1930. Arrested in 1930, sent to Con Son in 1931. Served as
a medical orderly there, so was able to carry messages from the Party leadership on
the island to the different camps. Released in 1936, became a legal activist and
journalist in Nam Dinh, joined the Nam Dinh province committee. Re-arrested in
1939, sent to Son La and Hoa Binh prisons, released in 1943. In 1945 attended the
Tan Trao meeting in Thai Nguyen in August; then became a member of the ICP
Standing Committee. In 1948 was sent South to oversee the Party there. In 1951
ordered to set up a separate party in Cambodia. In 1954 regrouped to the North and
became Secretary for Party Organization after 1956; position confirmed at Third
Party Congress in 1960. Served in Politbureau until Sixth Party Congress in 1986,
when he became a special adviser to the CC. After negotiating the Paris Peace
Agreement with Henry Kissinger in 1973, he was offered the Nobel Peace Prize, but
declined the award.
 Le Duy Diem (Le Loi). From Nghe An, recruited by Tran Phu to make
contact with Thanh Nien in Canton in 1925, returned at the end of the year as a
Thanh Nien member and recruiter. Organized second group of Thanh Nien trainees
which went to Canton from Nghe Tinh/Thanh Hoa. Student at Whampoa. Returned to
Vietnam in 1927 with authority to arrange a merger with the Revolutionary Party
(Tan Viet). As he prepared to go in search of Ho Chi Minh in autumn of 1929, was
sent to Siam in disgrace for alleged affair with Le Hong Son's wife. Said to have been
murdered there by the Vietnamese for his mistreatment of the local women.
Le Duy Dung. Whampoa cadet, may have been brother of Le Duy Diem.
Le Hong Phong (Le Huy Doan, Litvinov, Hai An), 1902-42. From Hung
Nguyen district in Nghe An, son of a failed scholar and farmer. " Finished primary
education, then became a mechanic in Vinh. Travelled to Siam in 1924 with Pham
Hong Thai; from there the Vietnamese community sent them on to Canton. They
joined Tam Tam Xa and soon after their arrival Pham Hong Thai was killed, after
attempting to assassinate Gov. Merlin. Le Hong Phong studied at Whampoa
Academy, took part in East River campaign. For first nine months of 1926 studied at
aviation school in Canton, where he joined CCP. Sent to Leningrad to study first at
Military School (October 1926-December 1927), then at Borisoglebsk Aviation
Academy. Enrolled at Stalin School in December 1928, in 1929 joined the Soviet CP.
In 1932 returned to southern China, from where he worked to rebuild northern party
structures and make contacts with exiles in Siam. In summer of 1934 established an
Overseas Bureau, with Ha Huy Tap and Nguyen Van Dut. Returned to Moscow in
late 1934 to attend Seventh Comintern Congress, where elected to Comintern
Executive Committee. At First Congress of ICP in 1935 designated as First Secretary,
but Ha Huy Tap took charge of party in his absence. In the spring of 1936 returned to
China, where he began to construct a united front with other Vietnamese emigres.
Held a meeting with Ha Huy Tap in Shanghai in mid-1936 to establish united front as
official ICP policy; Tap then went to Saigon, where he formed a new CC and took
position of First Secretary. Phong moved to Saigon from Hong Kong at end of 1937
to serve as representative of the Comintern. Was arrested in Saigon in mid-1938, held
for ten months, then sent to Nghe Tinh under restricted residence. Re-arrested in
September 1939, held in Saigon, then sent to Con Son, where he died in 1942. Hanoi
biographers say he was married to Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.
Le Hong Son (real name Le Van Phan, a.k.a. Tan Anh, Le Thieu To, Vu
Hong Anh, Vu Nguyen Trinh, Do etc.), 1899-1932. Born in Nam Dan district of
Nghe An, in 1920 went with Ho Tung Mau and Dang Xuan Thanh to Siam and from
there to China. From Canton went to Hangzhou to meet Phan Boi Chau and Ho Hoc
Lam. In 1921 went to Japan and met Prince Cuong De. The Prince gave him the
assignment to assassinate Phan Ba Ngoc, a son of the deceased nationalist leader
Phan Dinh Phung, who was then living in Hangzhou and who, the emigres believed,
had gone over to the French. Entered Whampoa academy in 1924 along with Le
Hong Phong, Quyet Uyen and Le Quang Dat. In early 1925 joined campaign in East
River area against Chen Jiongming, then returned to Whampoa until the late summer
of 1925. Met Nguyen Ai Quoc on his return from the East River and joined The
League of Oppressed Peoples. Also joined the CCP in the summer. Became an
instructor at Whampoa and in 1926 helped to escort a group of trainees from the
Vietnamese border to Canton. Imprisoned in April 1927 until end of 1928. On his
release took charge of Thanh Nien, which moved to Kowloon; led the May 1929
Thanh Nien Congress, where Tonkin group left early to form a communist party.
After unification of communist groups in early 1930, went to Japan to raise money
from Cuong De; then to Yunnan to propagandize among Vietnamese there. Arrested
in late 1932 with Tran Ngoc Danh in Shanghai. Executed in 1933.
Le Huu Lap (Hoang Lun). Thanh Nien member from Thanh Hoa, in first
training course, 1925; sent to Siam in disgrace (for unknown transgression) in 1928.
Le Manh Trinh, 1896-1983. Born in Nghe An, trained in Canton. Worked
for Thanh Nien in Siam from 1928. Became one of most important Vietnamese
cadres in Thailand before and after the Second World War.
Le Quang Dat (Le Van Chinh, Hoang Cao). Born in Nam Dan district of
Nghe An, emigrated to Siam and then in 1924 to Canton, with aid of Vietnamese
community near Pichit. Studied Chinese, then took the entry exam for Whampoa in
1925. Met Ho Chi Minh and joined Thanh Nien group, also the CCP at the end of
1925. Accompanied Thanh Nien trainees from border to Canton; in 1927 helped train
two groups of students from Cochinchina. In prison from January to August 1929;
delegated by Thanh Nien leaders to consult Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai on
formation of CP. Became liaison between Shanghai and Hong Kong, worked on
Vietnamese paper aimed at military personnel stationed in Shanghai. Arrested 5 June
1931 in Shanghai, repatriated to Saigon, where he seems to have surrendered to the
French along with his wife, Ly Phuong Duc.
Le Thiet Hung (Luu Quoc Long, Le Nhu Vong). One of the Canton
emigres who moved from the Yunnan army to train at Whampoa Academy in 1925.
Worked in GMD army, married daughter of Ho Hoc Lam. In 1930-1 joined the
propaganda group targeting French and Vietnamese military personnel stationed in
Shanghai. In later 1930s continued to work within the GMD in logistics, although he
had joined the CCP. Became a Viet Minh organizer and later rose to the rank of
general in the VPA.
Le Tung Son. A trainee from the Kunming officer's training school who was
recruited for the ICP in 1935 by Vu Anh. Became an important Viet Minh cadre in
China. Published memoirs in 1978, Nhat ky mot chang duong (A Stage in the
Journey).
Le Van Luong (real name Nguyen Cong Mieu), 1911-95. From Van Lam
district in Hai Hung, completed his baccalaureate at the Buoi. School in Hanoi. Along
with schoolmates Ngo Gia Tu and Nguyen Van Cu participated in mourning for Phan
Chu Trinh. Joined Thanh Nien, then the ICP in 1929, when he was sent to Saigon.
There organized a cell at Nha Be refinery. In 1930 arrested at May Day
demonstration during which a soldier was killed; sentenced to death along with seven
others, but sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Sent to Con Son in May
1933, where he remained until 1945. Worked in Interior Ministry; became Party's
specialist on rectification from 1952 to 1956 as chairman of Party's Central
Organization Committee. Dismissed from Politbureau in 1956 for leftist errors, but
remained in Central Committee. In 1976 rejoined Politbureau and at the Fifth Party
Congress became Party Secretary for Hanoi.
Le Van Phat (Lang, Dau, My). A practitioner of traditional medicine from
Ben Tre, sent to Canton for Thanh Nien training course in 1927, after Ho Chi Minh's
departure. Assigned to head Southern Regional Committee in mid-1928, became a
rival of southern labour leader and fellow Canton trainee, Ton Duc Thang. Executed
on Thanh Nien orders in December 1928, on grounds that he had forced a young
female recruit to become his mistress.
Le Viet Thuat. From a village outside the city of Vinh in Nghe An province,
believed to have come from a poor peasant family and become a labourer in Vinh.
One of the leaders of Nghe Tinh Soviet Movement in 1930-1, became secretary of
Nghe Tinh committee in April 1931. Arrested in May 1931 and executed by the
French.
Luong Ngoc Can (Luong Van Can), 1854-1927. Native of Thuong Tin
district in Ha Dong, now Hanoi. In 1874 passed the cu nhan exam. In 1908 was one
of the founders of the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc school, the Dong Kinh Free School.
After the 1914 bomb incident at the Hotel Hanoi, he was exiled to Phnom Penh. He
was permitted to return to Hanoi in November 1921, but his wife maintained a home
in Phnom Penh. His daughter-in-law, the widow of Luong Ngoc Quyen (see below),
was a businesswoman in Phnom Penh who gave financial support to the anti-French
movement. Ho Chi Minh's father visited Can in Phnom Penh.
Luong Ngoc Quyen (Luong Lap Nham), 1890-1917. Son of Luong Ngoc
Can, in 1905 joined the Dong Du movement to Japan, then moved to China. In late
1915 arrested by the British, who handed him over to the French. Imprisoned in Thai
Nguyen, where he was able to proselytize among Vietnamese soldiers in French
troops. Freed during the uprising of August 1917, but committed suicide when it was
put down.
Luu Hong Khai (Mr Sau, Vo Tung). Born in Quang Ngai province, worked
with Phan Boi Chau in China and became an officer in the GMD army, then joined
Ho Chi Minh and Thanh Nien, which sent him to Siam to develop Thanh Nien
infrastructure. By 1929 was head of the Thanh Nien committee in Siam. Arrested in
1930.
Luu Quoc Long, see Le Thiet Hung
Ly Phuong Duc (Nguyen Tri Duc). Daughter of Vietnamese emigres in
Siam; her father Nguyen Tri Minh (Cuu Tuan) worked as a village official. Educated
first in Thai, then in Chinese and English in Chieng Mai. Sent with her brothers, Ngo
Chinh Quoc and Ly Tri Thong, to Canton in 1925 for schooling, aged around 14.
Attended Trung Son School, joined League of Oppressed Peoples, later helped to edit
Thanh Nien. Married Le Hong Son in August 1927, against her wishes. Divorced him
in 1929 to marry Le Quang Dat, another Nghe An revolutionary and Whampoa
graduate. Worked in Shanghai in 1930-1 with Vietnamese group proselytizing among
French and Vietnamese sailors and soldiers stationed there. Arrested in May 1931,
deported to Saigon, where she seems to have rallied to the French.
Ly Tri Thong. Brother of Ly Phuong Duc and Ngo Chinh Quoc, Whampoa
cadet, spent time in Japan with Prince Cuong De.
Ly Tu Trong (Nguyen Hui), 1915?-31. Son of Cuu Tuan, a Vietnamese
emigre living in Sakhon Nakhon. Sent to Canton for schooling at age often, with his
sister Ly Phuong Duc. Studied at the Trung-son School, became proficient in Chinese
and English. In autumn of 1929 was sent to Saigon to help create a communist youth
movement. He also carried out liaison work with 'other parties', probably the CCP in
the main, as he knew both Cantonese and Mandarin. At a demonstration in February
1931, to commemorate the Yen Bay uprising, he shot the French police detective
Legrand, who was attempting to arrest one of the speakers. Was captured almost
immediately and sentenced to death.
Ly Ung Thuan. One of the young Vietnamese sent from Siam to study in
revolutionary Canton. Sometimes referred to as the wife of Ho Tung Mau, she
became a member of CCP. She was living in Ho Chi Minh's house at the time of his
arrest in June 1931, posing as his niece. She remained a communist activist in China.
Manh Van Lieu, see Phung Chi Kien
Ngo Chinh Hoc (Tang). From an emigre family in Siam, went to China for
studies in early 1920s, attended a special English language school in Hangzhou and
became proficient in English and Chinese. His sister Ngo Khon Duy married Ho Hoc
Lam. Along with Ngo Chinh Quoc became one of leaders of the first Siamese CP, or
according to other sources, of the Vietnamese section of the Siam branch of the
Malayan CP. Unclear what his relations with the CCP were.
Ngo Chinh Quoc. Born in region of Nakhon Phanom in Siam to Vietnamese
village official, brother of Ly Phuong Duc, went to China for training around 1925.
First fought with Yunnan troops under Nguyen Hai Than; after their defeat
transferred to Whampoa Academy. Became one of leaders of Siam CP/Vietnamese
section of Siam CP.
Ngo Duc Ke (Tap Xuyen), 1878-1929. Born in Can Loc district, Ha Tinh,
son of a court mandarin. Passed his metropolitan exams in 1901, the same year as
Phan Chu Trinh and Nguyen Sinh Huy, Ho Chi Minh's father. Along with Phan Chu
Trinh, became an advocate of reform in education, and for the development of
indigenous Vietnamese enterprises. Sent to Con Son after the disturbances of 1908
for thirteen years. Father of Ngo Duc Tri.
Ngo Duc Tri (Le Man, Van), 1902/40s. Son of the well-known scholar and
Con Son prisoner, Ngo Duc Ke, from Can Loc district in Ha Tinh. After studying
Chinese, attended the 'College de Vinh' from 1920 to 1925. Among his friends there
were Ton Quang Phiet and Dang Thai Mai. In October 1925, enrolled in the Hanoi
Higher School of Commerce, but left in February 1926 due to lack of funds. In March
1926 took a job with the Yunnan railway, but fired after the mourning for Phan Chu
Trinh, which his father helped to organize. In April 1926
 Vuong Thuc Oanh, who had been in France, suggested he go to France to
work with Nguyen The Truyen. In August 1926 in Paris, Nguyen The Truyen
introduced him to a French member of the FCP's Colonial Commission, who agreed
to send him to Moscow for studies. Thus he joined a French language course at the
Stalin School in December 1926, which included Chinese and Greek students. The
third year course, which he and Tran Phu followed, was in Russian. Returned to
Vietnam via France and Hong Kong between November 1929 and February 1930.
Missed the Unification Conference in early February. Arrived in Saigon in April
1930; in June joined the Central Committee. Went to Hong Kong in October 1930 for
first party plenum, but spent the two weeks in hospital with appendicitis. Claims to
have opposed the uprisings of 1930, on the grounds that they were premature, as the
party was just being constructed. Arrested in Saigon at end March 1931, after the
close of the second plenum. After a few weeks in prison, made a long confession to
the French.
Ngo Gia Tu (Quyet, Bach), 1908-35. From Tam Son village, Tu Son district
in Bac Ninh Province. Studied at Buoi School, but expelled after taking part in
funeral demonstrations for Phan Chu Trinh. Returned to his village where he became
a teacher; also became involved in secret political activities. Attended a Thanh Nien
training course in Canton in mid-1927; on return joined Thanh Nien committee for
Bac Ninh, formed a Thanh Nien cell at the army base in province. In early 1928
joined Tonkin committee of Thanh Nien and that September organized a meeting
which called on party members to 'proletarianize' themselves. Established a
communist cell in Hanoi in March 1929. That May was one of the three delegates to
the Thanh Nien Congress in Hong Kong who left the Congress early, to mark their
disapproval of the leadership's refusal to move immediately to form a communist
party. With his fellow Thanh Nien leaders in Tonkin formed the DDCSD
(Indochinese Communist Party) in June. He went to Saigon to oversee party
formation in the South, where he worked as a coolie. The ICP developed cells on the
Phu Rieng rubber plantation, in the Cholon electric plant, Ba Son shipyard, and in
Vinh Kim village in My Tho. Became head of the Provisional Executive Committee
of the ICP in South, a position which he continued to hold after the Party's unification
with other communist groups in February 1930. Arrested in early June 1930 after
series of demonstrations in May. Sent to Con Son Island; died at sea during an escape
attempt in 1935.
 Ngo Khon Duy. Wife of Ho Hoc Lam, sister of Ngo Chinh Hoc, mother-in-
law of Le Thiet Hung (Luu Quoc Long).
Nguyen An Ninh (Nguyen Tinh), 1900-43. From Hoc Mon district, Gia
Dinh (now Ho Chi Minh city), son of a landowner. Went to France to study law,
received degree in 1920. Worked with the Vietnamese Patriots. In 1922 returned to
Saigon, where a speech he delivered titled 'The Hopes of Youth' became a call to
action for the intelligentsia. Started La Cloche Felee in December 1923. In March
1926 arrested and held for ten months before being amnestied. After another spell in
France, returned in 1928 to Saigon and organized the Nguyen An Ninh Secret
Society. At end of 1928 sentenced to three years in prison; released in 1930. Worked
with La Lutte, became a Popular Front activist in 1936, when he wrote the proposal
to start the Indochina Congress Movement which appeared in La Lutte. Arrested
again in July 1937, held until January 1939; then re-arrested in October 1939. Sent to
Con Son, died August 1943.
Nguyen Chi Dieu (Trong), 1911-39. Completed four years of primary
schooling in Hue, Expelled from school for participating in funeral observances for
Phan Chu Trinh in 1926. Joined Thanh Nien, worked as teacher and journalist. In
autumn of 1929 joined the Annam CP, sent to Saigon, where he was placed in charge
of the provinces of Gia Dinh and Cholon. Arrested in 1930; in 1933 sent to Con Son
Island. Released in 1936, joined ICP CC and became the Party secretary for the
Central Region. Died 1939 of tuberculosis.
Nguyen Cong Mieu, see Le Van Luong.
Nguyen Cong Thu (Xuan). Brother of Lam Duc Thu, Thanh Nien recruiter
for Tonkin.
Nguyen Cong Vien, see Lam Duc Thu.
Nguyen Danh Doi (Dien Hai), 1905-43. From Kien Xuong District in Thai
Binh. His grandfather had led anti-French troops in Nam Dinh in 1883. His father
was a member of Phan Boi Chau's Quang Phuc Hoi, who died for the cause in 1913.
While a student at the Thanh Chung School in Nam Dinh, became friendly with
Nguyen Duc Canh, Truong Chinh, and Nguyen Van Nang. After joining in mourning
for Phan Chu Trinh, went to Thanh Nien training course in Canton. On return to
Vietnam became secretary of Thanh Nien's Bac Ky regional committee and the party
secretary in Hanoi. Worked to convince the Northern Publishing Society to join
Thanh Nien. Arrested in February 1929, sent to Con Son for five years. Convinced
some VNQDD prisoners to join the communists. When sentence up in 1934 returned
to Thai Binh. From 1936 worked on Le Travail, participated in legal struggle
movement. In June 1940 was re-arrested, imprisoned in Bac Me prison camp, where
he died August 1943.
Nguyen Dinh Kien (Tu Kien). One of the Nghe An scholars arrested
following the 1908 disturbances and deported to Con Son. Escaped in 1918, made his
way to Hanoi, but was rearrested and imprisoned in Saigon. On release in 1926,
returned to Nghe An where he joined the Revolutionary Party, later called Tan Viet.
Set up a shop in Saigon as a front; according to the French, served as a one of key
contacts between Thanh Nien in Canton and southern revolutionaries. Arrested again
after the Rue Barbier affair in mid-1929, released with Nguyen Duy Trinh in 1930,
but died shortly thereafter. One of the links between the First World War era
nationalists and the communist movement.
Nguyen Duc Canh (Trong), 1908-32. Born in Thuy Anh district in Thai
Binh, father a scholar who refused to serve the French. Studied at upper school in
Nam Dinh, together with Truong Chinh. Following the movement to demand Phan
Boi Chau's release and to mourn Phan Chu Trinh, he was expelled in 1926. Went to
Hanoi and became a typesetter. Joined the Southern Publishing Society, which sent
him to Canton in September 1927 to hold discussions with Thanh Nien. After a
Thanh Nien training course, joined their group. On return to Vietnam went to
Haiphong to work with the Thanh Nien branch there. In 1928 became a member of
the Bac Ky Thanh Nien committee. Working in Haiphong he oversaw the recruitment
of miners and other labourers. In September 1928 joined Ngo Gia Tu in a campaign
to 'proletarianize' Thanh Nien. Then in March 1929 they organized a communist cell
in Hanoi. On 17 June 1929 with the other Tonkin leaders of Thanh Nien formed a
communist party, the DDCSD or first ICP. Late in July Canh formed the Bac Ky
General Labour Union; attended the unification conference in Hong Kong in
February 1930. After the arrests following the April-May strikes in the North, in the
summer of 1930 the party Executive Committee sent him to Nghe Tinh to strengthen
the leadership of the Soviet movement. Joined the Standing Committee for Trung Ky,
and wrote a manual on armed resistance in 1931 before his arrest. Arrested at end of
April 1931, executed in July 1932.
Nguyen Duy Trinh, 1912-?. Born in Dien Chau (or Nghi Loc?) district in
Nghe An, joined Tan Viet; arrested in Saigon party headquarters at end 1928, but
released in July 1930 when he returned to Nghe Tinh to join party leadership in Nghi
Loc, then the seat of the ICP regional committee. Arrested again in spring of 1931,
sent to Banmethuot prison, and then to Con Son in 1933. Released in 1936. After
1945 became secretary of the Zone V party committee during first Indochina War.
CC member from the 1951 Second Party Congress; head of DRV State Planning
Commission until 1965. Foreign Minister and Polit-bureau member from 1965 to
1979. Signed the Paris Peace Agreement for DRV.
Nguyen Hai Than (Nguyen Cam Giang, Vu Hai Thu), 1879-1955. Son of a
mandarin, from Ha Dong, near Hanoi. Joined Phan Boi Chau in Japan in 1905, after
passing the tu tai (baccalaureate degree). Lived in China from 1909 to 1945. Joined
Quang Phuc Hoi, trained in one of Chinese military academies; an officer in Yunnan
army in 1925 until its defeat by Whampoa troops. Then worked with Ho Chi Minh in
League of Oppressed Peoples, but moved away from Thanh Nien group in early
1927. Served in GMD army, worked with nationalist exiles in Guangdong. Probably
cooperated with Le Hong Phong in 1936 to form a Vietnamese united front among
emigres in China. Elected to council of the Dong Minh Hoi in 1942; after Dong Minh
Hoi's collapse, joined again when it was reorganized in 1944. In September 1945
entered Vietnam with Hsiao Wen's troops, negotiated with Ho and was appointed
Vice President of the Provisional Coalition Government in January 1946; later in year
resigned and went to Canton. In March 1947 tried to form a new anti-Viet Minh
united front in Hong Kong. Returned to Canton in autumn of 1947 and retired from
active politics.
Nguyen Hoi, 1909-33. Born in Haiphong, introduced to revolutionary
literature in 1927 by Do Ngoc Du. At the end of 1921 went to Canton for political
training by Thanh Nien. Returned to Haiphong, where his assignment was to make
propaganda and to print revolutionary materials for his province committee. In 1928
moved to Hanoi, and in March 1929 was assigned to work as secretary of the Nam
Dinh committee. After the first ICP was formed in June 1929, became the province
secretary for Nam Dinh, as well as a member of the Bac ky Regional Committee.
Remained province secretary after unification of the Communist groups in February
1930. A major strike broke out at the Nam Dinh textile mill in March-many of the
workers' demands were met, but the owners rounded up the communist activists and
destroyed most of their cells within a short time. Nguyen Hoi was arrested on 6 May
1930. From Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi he was sent to Con Son. At end of 1932 a party
cell was created on Con Son, and Nguyen Hoi was one of the leaders. Drowned in an
escape attempt at end of 1933.
 Nguyen Huu Can (Nguyen Vinh Xuyen, Phi Van, Min, Philippe). From
Bac Ninh province, went to Canton for training in late 1926. Joined DDCSD, then
ICP. Went to Moscow in 1930 and studied at Stalin School until end 1933, at same
time as Tran Van Giau. Studied radio technology-when he returned to southern China
in 1934 was assigned to handle the radio communications of the Overseas Bureau.
Before the First Party Congress in 1935 fell out with Ha Huy Tap and may have
given information to the French. In 1938 in Nanjing was among the founders of the
first Viet Minh association. Imprisoned in Son La during the Second World War.
Nguyen Huu Tien (Giao Hoai, Que Lam), 1901-41. From Duy Tien district
in Ha Nam (now Nam Ha), family of poor scholar; became a teacher in his home
district, encouraged students to join movement to free Phan Boi Chau. Joined Thanh
Nien in 1927, DDCSD in 1929. Arrested in May 1931; sent to Con Son in February
1933. Escaped from prison in April 1935 with Ta Uyen and Tong Van Tran.
Remained in south to organize the inter-province committee for western Nam Bo in
Chau Doc, Long Xuyen, Ha Tien and Rach Gia. Arrested in Saigon with Nguyen Thi
Minh Khai in July 1940. In March 1941 sentenced to death for alleged role in
organizing Nam Ky Uprising. Executed along with a group of party leaders on 28
August 1941.
Nguyen Huy Bon (Bui Van Minh, Bui Van Bon, Barsky). Born in 1901 in
Tonkin, from peasant family. Became a ship-board cook, based in Le Havre. Then
went to Paris to make laquerware. Became FCP member in 1924, studied in Moscow
in 1928 on a three-month course. May have returned to Vietnam for a time, but in
1934 was back in Moscow, where suspected of being a provocateur. Sent to work at a
factory in Samara; unknown when able to return to Moscow or Vietnam.
Nguyen Khanh Toan (Minin, Robert, Hong Linh), 1905-93. Born in Vinh,
Nghe An, in the family of a civil servant. Graduated from University or Pedagogical
Institute in Hanoi in 1926, then moved to Saigon where he participated in Jeune
Annam movement with Tran Huy Lieu, Bui Cong Trung and others. Went to Paris
and from there to Moscow, where he studied at the Stalin School from 1928 to 1931,
and then as a graduate student in the same school. In 1931 he may have come under
suspicion as an associate of Nguyen The Truyen. In 1933 became a teacher in the
Indochinese section, which later was part of the Institute of National and Colonial
Questions. While in Moscow wrote a number of studies of politics and history in
Vietnam, including, Groups and Parties in Indochina which could be drawn into a
United National Movement (1936). Also authored the first Vietnamese language
textbook in Russia in 1933. In 1939 travailed to China and spent Second World War
in Yan'an. Served as chairman of the DRV's Committee of the Social Sciences for
many years.
Nguyen Khoa Van (Hai Trieu), 1908-54. From An Cuu, outside of Hue; in
1927 joined Tan Viet; in June 1930 joined the VCP in Thua Thien province, then
went to Saigon and became a member of the Saigon city committee in August 1930.
Arrested in 1931, taken back to Hue, released in mid-1932. After release worked as a
legal activist, journalist and writer on culture. Arrested in August 1940, held until
March 1945. Took part in August Revolution in Hue, afterwards worked as head of
propaganda in Central Vietnam. Died in 1954 after prolonged illness.
Nguyen Kim Cuong, 1904-94. Born in Dien Chau district, Nghe An
province, joined Thanh Nien in 1926; travelled to Guangzhou to attend a training
course, but was arrested at the border and given a one-year suspended sentence. In
February 1927 went to Saigon, where he ■worked with Pham Van Dong for a time,
then at the end of the year went to Sadec, teaching at a private progressive school,
along with Chau Van Liem, Ha Huy Giap, and Dong. In 1928 selected to join the
Thanh Nien committee for the South, along with Le Van Phat and Nguyen Thieu. In
July 1929 arrested in connection with the Rue Barbier affair and sent to Con Son
island until 1936. After release went to work as a journalist and legal activist in
Hanoi-said to have worked with Vo Nguyen Giap on Notre Voix. After the August
1945 revolution became deputy chairman of committee for training and propaganda
in Nam Bo. In 1954 became deputy to Pham Hung on the Joint Military Commission
for the South in Saigon. In 1960 undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office. Fluent
in French and English.
Nguyen Luong Bang (Ba, Nhan, Pham Dinh Tiep, Sao Do), 1904-79. From
Thanh Mien district in Hai Duong; worked in Canton as a servant where he was
recruited by Ho Chi Minh to form a union of domestic workers and join the Thanh
Nien association. In 1930-1 worked with Vietnamese group proselytizing among
soldiers and sailors in Shanghai. After August 1945 served as head of the CC's
Inspection Committee, General Director of the Bank of Vietnam, a special
ambassador to the USSR, General Government Inspector and, after reunification,
Deputy Chairman of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Nguyen Ngoc Ba (Nhan). A student of Tran Phu who accompanied him to
Canton for Thanh Nien training in 1926 and became a member of the secret
communist youth group within the association. Moved to the South in 1927 to recruit
for Thanh Nien and was a member of the Cochinchina committee of Thanh Nien in
1929, according to Le Hong Son.
Nguyen Phong Sac (Thanh, Thinh, real name Nguyen Van Sac), 1902-31.
Born in what was Bach Mai village, now a street in Hanoi, son of an artisan. Entered
Buoi School on scholarship, after graduating worked in the finance office of the
colonial civil service. Became a teacher at the private Thang Long school. Joined the
Hanoi branch of Thanh Nien. After the decision to 'proletarianize' the party in late
1928, became secretary of the Hanoi Committee. After June 1929 founding of
DDCSD sent to Trung ky to recruit members from the existing Thanh Nien
organization. Took responsibility for the Vinh-Ben Thuy industrial area. Worked as a
truck-taxi driver which allowed him to travel freely around Nghe Tinh. Credited with
the direction of the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement by many sources, became secretary
of the Trung ky committee either in the summer of 1930 or at the October first
plenum in Hong Kong (which he did not attend). Arrested on 3 May 1931 in Hanoi;
unknown when or where executed by French.
Nguyen Si Sach (Phong). Teacher from provincial elementary school in Ha
Tinh who became early Thanh Nien and Tan Viet member; propagandized among his
students such as Nguyen Van Loi; may have studied at Whampoa. Returned from
China to Nghe Tinh in February 1928 with a party programme and instructions to
form a regional committee for Thanh Nien. In June 1928 designated one of three
leaders of the Trung ky Executive Committee. One of three Thanh Nien
representatives of Central Vietnam at the Thanh Nien Congress in Hong Kong in
May 1929. (Not clear if he can be identified with Nguyen Dinh Tu, who was listed by
the Sûreté as one of the three delegates from Trung Ky, along with Vo Mai and
Nguyen Thieu.) Arrested after return to Nghe Tinh from Congress, held in Lao Bao
prison, shot dead during a prison protest in December 1929.
Nguyen Sinh Huy (Nguyen Sinh Sac), 1862-1929. Father of Ho Chi Minh,
from Kim Lien village in Nam Dan district of Nghe An. Married Hoang Thi Loan,
the daughter of his teacher and adopted father. In 1894 passed the cu nhan
examination, then in 1901 gained a second-rank (pho bang) diploma at the national
level, along with Phan Chu Trinh. In 1902 took up the post of Hanh Tau (a low-
ranking official) in the Ministry of Rites in Hue, and was probably assigned to teach
at the Quoc Tu Giam academy there. Served as an examiner for regional
examinations. In 1909 assigned the post of district mandarin in Binh Khe district of
Binh Dinh, removed on grounds that by caning a petty criminal he had caused his
eventual death. Most Vietnamese sources claim he was removed for opposition to
French administration in Binh Dinh. Protested his demotion, but lost means of
livelihood and had to move to the South to make his living. Worked as tutor of
Chinese, overseer of a French rubber plantation, and itinerant traditional doctor.
French believed his travels to different pagodas and visits to exiled nationalists
connected to anti-French conspiracies. In 1927-8 settled in Cao Lanh in Sadec
province, an early centre of communist organizing in the South. Died in November
1929.
Nguyen The Ruc (Fanshon, Fonshon, Nguyen Duong Ruc), 1902(5)-37.
From clan of Nguyen The Truyen, born in Hanh-Thien village in Nam Dinh, also the
birthplace of Truong Chinh. Went to France in 1923 and studied in Montpellier at a
commercial college. Nguyen The Truyen enabled him to go to Moscow in 1925,
where he studied at the Stalin School until the end of 1929. Returned to Vietnam via
France in early 1930, worked in Hanoi with the Bac ky party committee. Arrested in
1931, released in 1936. Worked as a legal activist in the Le Travail group, died of
tuberculosis in 1938.
Nguyen The Truyen, 1896 (or 1898)-1969. From a well-off family in Hanh-
Tien Village, Nam Dinh, son of a district mandarin, outstanding scholar. From 1916
to 1920 studied science in Toulouse and received his Bachelors degree. Received a
scholarship to study at the Sorbonne where he completed a License in Philosophy in
1922. In 1922 went to live in Phan Van Truong's house at Ave. des Gobelins and by
end of year was working on Le Paria. Became editor of Paria after Nguyen Ai Quoc's
departure for Moscow, and started publication of Viet Nam Hon. Became the FCP's
link for Vietnamese who wanted to study in Moscow in 1926, but not clear whether
he joined the party. In 1927 founded the Annamese Independence Party in Paris,
became linked with the Anti-imperialist League. At end of 1927 returned to Vietnam,
where he travelled up the coast making contacts with revolutionaries, including Phan
Boi Chau and Ho Chi Minh's sister in Hue. By 1928 seems to have fallen out with the
communists. Had developed close contacts with Chinese GMD in Paris, and travelled
to China in 1928. Not known if he was involved in the VNQDD uprising in 1930-at
the time he was living with his family in Hanh Tien. Returned to France from 1934 to
1938, where he became involved with Popular Front anti-colonial activities in 1936-
7. Returned to Vietnam in 1938, arrested by French in May 1941. Deported to
Madagascar until 1946. Moved to South in 1954, stood unsuccessfully as presidential
candidate in 1967. Died shortly after Ho Chi Minh in 1969.
 Nguyen The Vinh (Thang or Tap Hy Hien), 1904-45. One of more
controversial of Nguyen The Truyen's relatives, also from Hanh Thien (Nam Dinh).
Studied at Hanoi Lycee (later Lycee Albert Sarraut), then went to France and studied
at the Commercial College in Montpellier from 1922-24. Worked on Le Paria and
Viet Nam Hon; went to Moscow in late 1925 or 1926. Studied at Stalin School for
almost two years, but was hospitalized with tuberculosis for thirteen months during
that period. Was given permission to return to France in the autumn of 1927, around
the same time that Ho Chi Minh returned to Paris. In mid-1928 he escorted two
Vietnamese delegates from the FCP to the Sixth Comintern Congress in Moscow, but
he and one of the delegates, Bui Thien Ban, were asked to leave before the Congress
closed when they criticized the Colonial Commission of the FCP. Vinh returned to
Vietnam with Nguyen The Ruc at the end of 1929. Attempted to set up businesses in
Saigon, but when these failed he returned to Hanh Thien. In July 1930 he renounced
his political involvements and surrendered to the French authorities, who gave him
work as chief clerk of the Resident Superieur. Returned to revolutionary activities
during the Popular Front, but remained suspect within the party. Executed by Viet
Minh in late 1945.
Nguyen Thi Minh Khai (Duy, Fan Lan, Tran Thai Lan, Ba Vai), 1910-41.
Born in Vinh to mother from Nghe Tinh scholars family, father from Tonkin who
worked as station master in Vinh. Studied for French primary certificate from age ten
to fifteen; while at school recruited into a patriotic student group. In 1927 became a
Tan Viet activist and by 1928 was in the Central Committee. Organized women
labourers in Vinh and Ben Thuy. In 1929 left home to avoid arrest, became Tan Viet
liaison agent. Sent to Hong Kong to work in VCP headquarters after Party
unification. Living in Ho Chi Minh's house during first plenum in October 1930,
moved out to carry on liaison work with the CCP. May have 'married' or started a
relationship with Ho at this time. Arrested May 1931 in Hong Kong, deported to
Canton. Released 1932 and returned to Hong Kong to rebuild party communications.
In 1934, after she contacted the Overseas Bureau, assigned to go to Moscow for the
Seventh Comintern Congress. Studied at Stalin School until February 1937. Returned
to Hong Kong with instructions on construction of united front. Le Hong Phong,
whose efforts to construct a united front in Vietnam had thus far failed, then sent her
to Saigon to deliver these instructions to Party plenum. She remained in Saigon to
play role as an illegal activist. Became secretary of Saigon Party committee, and by
1940 she may have joined the CC. Seeitis to have played a role in bringing Ho into
contact with the CC in 1940, although this has not been officially recognized.
Arrested in Saigon in July 1940, executed in August 1941. Her younger sister was the
first wife of Vo Nguyen Giap.
Nguyen Thieu (Nguyen Nghia). Thanh Nien recruit from Cochin-china,
attended the May 1929 Thanh Nien Congress in Hong Kong as one of Central
Vietnamese delegates. Avoided arrest after his return to Vietnam, but had to flee to
Hong Kong in autumn of 1929. There he took part in the Unification Congress in
February 1930. His memoirs published in Nghien Cuu Lich Su in 1964 form the
major official source on this process.
Nguyen Tuan (Kim Ton). A Canton-trained member of Thanh Nien from
Tonkin, was a member of its Tonkin committee in 1929. Joined what has become
known as 'the first communist cell' in Vietnam in early 1929 in Hanoi and walked out
of the May Thanh Nien Congress with those who wanted to form a communist party
on the spot. A founding member of the DDCSD, arrested by French when acting as a
liaison agent between Canton, Hanoi and Saigon in late 1929. Provided the Sûreté
with letters which the feuding communist groups were exchanging.
Nguyen Van Cu (Tri Cuong), 1912-41. Born in Tu Son (now Tien Son)
district of Bac Ninh province, in family of a poor scholar. Studied Chinese at home,
then went to district school to learn Quoc ngu; at sixteen entered the Buoi School
outside of Hanoi. Forced to leave due to his political activities, returned to his district
and opened a school. Came into contact with Ngo Gia Tu, another former Buoi
School student, and Thanh Nien. At beginning of proletarianization movement, went
to work in the mining area north of Haiphong. In June 1929 joined new DDCSD, and
took on more responsibilities for organizing miners. After party unification in 1930
became secretary of Hon Gai-Uong Bi Special committee. Arrested in spring of 1930,
sent to Con Son in 1932. Increased his knowledge of communist theory in prison.
After 1936 release, returned to Hanoi; in 1937 elected to the CC and its Standing
Committee. Replaced Ha Huy Tap as First Secretary in March 1938, but soon
expelled to Tonkin. In summer of 1939 published his pamphlet Self-criticism to
analyze the ICP's loss in Saigon municipal elections. Returned to Saigon in
November 1939 for Sixth Plenum, at which the Anti-imperialist United Front was
formed. Arrested in Saigon in January 1940. Executed August 1941.
Nguyen Van Dut (Svans, Svan), 1909. Born in well-off family from Long
An province, Cochinchina. Studied in Saigon at Lycee Chasseloup-Laubat. Went to
France for studies, where he joined the FCP in 1928. Secretary of Vietnamese student
group in Toulouse. After May 1930 demonstration in Paris to protest sentencing of
Yen Bay prisoners, expelled to Vietnam. Sent to Moscow to Stalin School by FCP in
August 1931. Remained until April 1933. Present at First ICP Congress in Macao in
early 1935, elected to CC and to head Southern Regional Committee. Arrested in
June 1935. After release returned to Cantho, worked as teacher. Became secretary of
his provincial branch of Lien-Viet Front during anti-French war.
Nguyen Van Linh (real name Nguyen Van Cuc, aka Muoi Cuc), 1914-98.
From My Van district in Hung Yen, now Hai Hung province. Studied in Haiphong,
joined a student political group early on. Arrested at age sixteen in 1930, sent to Con
Son in 1931. Pursued his political studies while in prison. After release in 1936
worked with Luong Khanh Thien in Hanoi to organize secret workers' groups within
legal movement. In 1937 was sent to Saigon to help organize a provisional city
committee. Nguyen Thi Minh Khai became secretary of this committee in 1938.
After Sixth Plenum in 1939 he carried the resolutions to the Center and North.
Arrested in Vinh at the start of 1941. Sent to Con Son until September 1945. Worked
in western Nam Bo, then joined Saigon city committee as secretary. After Geneva
Agreement he remained in the South. At the Third Party Congress in 1960 he joined
the CC. Became Deputy Secretary of the Central Office for the South. In 1975 joined
Politbureau and became Saigon City Committee Sec; in 1986 elected General
Secretary, until the following congress.
Nguyen Van Loi (Loc, Map Den, Dung), 1907-?. Born in Thach Ha district
in Ha Tinh. In 1924 entered the elementary course in the provincial school; failed
exam for primary school certificate; influenced by one of his teachers, Nguyen Si
Sach, member of the Thanh Nien committee for Trung ky. Probably attended second
or third Thanh Nien training course in Canton. Became a Tan Viet cadre and went to
Saigon in 1928. There became a recruiter, apparently for both Tan Viet and Thanh
Nien. Lived with Tran Ngoc Danh, Tran Phu's brother, in Saigon. Worked as
apprentice at an aircraft repair facility in Bien Hoa, then for telegraph agency in Phu
Tho. Joined the reunified party in Saigon in February 1930. Elected to the new party's
Provisional Executive Committee (Lam thoi chap uy) for Cochinchina. Also made a
member of the Saigon City Committee, led by Ngo Gia Tu. In his police confession,
stated that he resigned from this committee after two months and was demoted in his
responsibilities, after he made known his opposition to the demonstrations being
organized in the South. Arrested in early 1931.
Nguyen Van Tao, 1905-70. From Phuoc Loi in the former Cholon province.
Organized a student strike at his school in Saigon in 1926; travelled to France for
studies. Joined FCP in 1928, attended Sixth Comintern Congress in Moscow with
French delegation, after which he joined the French CC. Edited Vietnamese papers
Lao Dong and Vo San in Paris. Expelled from France in 1930, returned to Saigon
where he organized workers. In 1933 elected to Saigon Municipal Council. Worked
with La Lutte front, organized Indochinese Congress movement in 1936. Elected
again to Municipal Council with La Lutte slate in 1937. Arrested, then released
during 1937, then arrested again in 1939. Sent to Con Son until 1945. Worked with
Tran Van Giau in Provisional Executive Committee for the South. In 1946 became
Minister of Labour, a post he held until 1968.
Nguyen Van Tram (Trong, Cao Van Binh). A northerner working as a key
liaison agent for ICP between Siam and southern China in 1933. At end of 1934,
when working in the ICP Overseas Bureau in Hong Kong, accused by Ha Huy Tap of
raping a woman working in the Bureau. Fled with $1,500 to Hong Kong, Ha Huy Tap
claimed; fate unknown.
Nguyen Van Tran (Prigorny), 1914-98. Born in Cho Dem, Long Xuyen
province, son of a wealthy rice merchant. Educated at Petrus Ky Lycee in Saigon.
Studied at Stalin School in Moscow from November 1927 until 1929. After a brief
arrest in Saigon, from mid 1930s worked as a legal activist and journalist on La Lutte
and Dan Chung. After Nam Ky Uprising in 1940 fled to the Central Highlands. In
1945 returned to Saigon and worked with Tran Van Giau to organize the Viet Minh
takeover there. Elected member of National Assembly for Saigon in 1946; then sent
to be Party secretary in Khu 9. Late in 1949 travelled north with Ung Van Khiem;
attended 1951 Second Party Congress in Hanoi and afterwards was sent to China for
ideological training. Elected full member of CC in 1960. On return to Hanoi held
various teaching posts. Retired to Ho Chi Minh City in 1976.
Pham Huu Lau (Lo), 1905-59. Born in Hoa An village, Cao Lanh district in
Dong Thap Province, where Ho Chi Minh's father lived at the time of his death in
1929; from a poor family, gave up studies early to work as lacquer craftsman.Joined
Thanh Nien in 1928, then the Annam CP in late 1929. Around that time went to work
in railway repair yard at Di An. Became member of the Southern Region Committee
after the February 1930 unification of communist groups; also made a member of the
Provisional CC that spring. One of leaders of the Cao Lanh peasants' 1 May
demonstration to demand tax reductions. Arrested in Haiphong in July 1930 on his
way to a CC meeting; sent to Con Son that year. Released in 1936, went to Saigon
where in 1937 became an active member of the Dan Chung newspaper collective
until he was expelled to Cao Lanh. In 1939 returned to underground work in Rach
Gia; in 1940 re-arrested and sent back to Con Son. Released in 1945. In 1954 became
member of the Standing Committee for the South, remained working clandestinely
until death in 1959.
Pham Van Dong (Nam, Lam Ba Kiet, Lin Pai-chieh), 1906-2000. From
Mo Duc village, Duc Pho district, Quang Ngai province, son of a high-ranking
mandarin at the Hue court. Educated in Hanoi at the Higher Commercial College.
Attended Ho Chi Minh's third Thanh Nien training course in Canton in late 1926.
Moved to the South in 1927, worked for a time as a teacher at a progressive school in
Sadec. Following the Rue Barbier murder of Le Van Phat he was assigned to
investigate on behalf of the Thanh Nien CC. After attending a Thanh Nien Congress
in Hong Kong in May 1929, returned to Saigon as member of preparatory committee
to form a communist party, but was arrested almost immediately in the sweep of
activists caught up in the rue Barbier affair. Sent to Con Son in June 1930. Became
one the prisoners' representatives to prison authorities. Not known whether officially
made an ICP member while in prison. Released in 1936, returned to Quang Ngai,
then Hanoi where he joined the Le Travail newspaper collective until expelled to
Quang Ngai. In May 1940 went with Vo Nguyen Giap to Kunming to meet Ho Chi
Minh. Worked to construct a United Front with the help of the Guomindang; became
one of key members of the Viet Minh. Present at Tan Trao conference in August
1945; became Minister of Finance in the new government after the August
Revolution. Led the Vietnamese delegation at the Fontainebleau Conference in 1946.
With return to war at the end of 1946, became the government's representative in
Lien Khu V until 1948, then Deputy Prime Minister. At the Second Party Congress in
1951, elected to Polit-bureau. In 1954 led the Vietnamese delegation at the Geneva
Conference. From signing of peace agreement with France, became Prime Minister, a
post he retained until the Sixth Party Congress in 1986.
Phan Boi (Hoang Huu Nam), 1911-47. From Dien Ban district in Quang
Nam; known as revolutionary intellectual, took part in 1925-6 movement to demand
release of Phan Boi Chau and to mourn Phan Chu Trinh. In 1928 joined Thanh Nien,
then in 1929 the Annam CP; sent to Saigon where he joined the DDCSD in 1930.
During a February 1931 demonstration in Saigon to commemorate the Yen Bay
uprising, he was captured by French police as he was giving a speech. In 1933 sent to
Con Son; released in 1936, when he went to Hanoi to work as a journalist. Worked
with Vo Nguyen Giap on newspaper of the United Democratic Front, Notre Voix. In
1939 re-arrested, sent to Bac Me prison camp, then to Madagascar. In 1943 the Allies
sent him to India for training. In 1944 believed to have parachuted into the Viet Bac
to make contact with the ICP. After August revolution worked as head of President's
office. After evacuation of Hanoi at end 1946, became Minister of the Interior. Died
in a flash flood in Tuyen Quang province in April 1947.
Phan Boi Chau, 1867-1940. The best-known of the pre=communist
Vietnamese anti-colonial leaders. From Nam Dan district in Nghe An province, the
same district as Ho Chi Minh's family. Son of scholar and teacher, passed his regional
exams in Nghe An with highest honours in 1900; in 1904 formed the Duy Tan
(Modernization) Association. Selected Prince Cuong De as the royal figure-head of
his resistance movement. Travelled to Japan in 1905 in search for support and ideas
from abroad; encouraged Vietnamese students to join him in Japan for studies and
military training, what became known as the Dong Du or Eastern Travel movement.
In 1907 forced to leave Japan; lived for a time in Siam, then returned to southern
China in 1911, after the first Chinese revolution. His attempts to foment uprisings
during the First World War were costly failures and after three years in prison (1914-
17) retired to Hangzhou to make his living as a writer. Made contacts with envoys of
Soviet Russia in 1920; in 1924 formed the skeleton of the Vietnamese Quoc Dan
Dang (Peoples' Party), patterned on the Chinese GMD but did not have time to
develop this organization. In July 1925 arrested by the French on way from Shanghai
to Canton; deported to Vietnam; life sentence converted to house arrest in Hue after
mass protests. Lived in Hue for rest of life. His patriotic writings, such as Viet Nam
Vong Quoc Su (History of the Loss of Vietnam) strongly influenced other
Vietnamese anti-colonialists in both form and content.
Phan Chu Trinh (Hi Ma), 1872-1926. Born in Tay-Loc Village, Tien-Phuoc
district of Quang Nam, to wealthy scholar-gentry family, father a military official
who joined Can Vuong anti-French movement, killed 1885. Began training in
Chinese classics in 1887, passed the regional exam in 1900 and in 1901 received the
second-rank (pho bang) diploma in the metropolitan exams in Hue, along with Ho
Chi Minh's father. Worked at Ministry of Rites in 1903, then in 1904 broke with
mandarin system. Began to promote Western ideal of democracy, the ending of the
Chinese exam system, construction of modern schools and commercial development.
Helped to found the Duc Thanh school of modern learning, along with a nuoc mam
factory, in Phan Thiet, where Ho Chi Minh became a teaching assistant in 1909.
Became a popular lecturer at the Dong Kinh Free School in 1907. But after 1908 anti-
tax protests in Hue and Quang Nam, he was arrested as one of the spiritual fathers of
the revolt and sent to Con Son. Amnestied in 1911 and allowed to travel to France,
officially as part of government-sponsored Indochina students' group. Wrote an
account of anti-tax protests and heavy-handed French reactionjoined Phan Van
Truong to form a Vietnamese association which met in cafes for discussions.
Imprisoned with Phan Van Truong after outbreak of First World War, on charge that
he had been seeking German support for Vietnamese independence. Released a year
later, but lost French government stipend. Began photography and photo retouching
to make a living. At end of war he and Truong began the Vietnamese
Patriots'Association, which Ho Chi Minh joined when he returned to France in 1919.
According to Sûreté reports became despondent and erratic following death of only
son from tuberculosis in 1920. Argued with younger members of Vietnamese group,
but remained in touch with Ho Chi Minh. Remained at least overtly a supporter of
non-violent reform and the French socialist party. Finally permitted to return to
Vietnam in 1925 when socialists came to power. Died in March 1926, when the
funeral commemorations organized by Vietnamese activists resulted in many young
people being expelled from school and starting them on path of underground
activism.
Phan Dang Luu, 1902-41. Born in Yen Thanh district in Nghe An (now in
Ha Tinh) in a scholars family. Finished elementary education in Vinh, transferred
from secondary school in Hue to an agricultural college. Sent to work at a sericulture
station in Vinh Phu, then in 1925 returned to work in Vinh. There met Tran Phu and
was recruited into the Phuc Viet party, later known as Tan Viet. With other activists
started evening classes for workers. Lost government job due to his activities. Sent to
Hue to produce literature for party. In July 1928 chosen by the Tan Viet Congress to
join their central committee. At end of year the party sent him to Canton to discuss
uniting with Thanh Nien, but the Thanh Nien headquarters had moved from Canton.
Tried to return to Guangzhou in September 1929, arrested in Haiphong. In 1930 sent
to Banmethuot prison. After release in 1936, joined the Central Regional Committee
and worked as a legal activist in Hue. Then joined the CC; present at the Sixth
Plenum in Saigon, when United Anti-imperialist Front established. Probably went to
Kunming in May-June 1940 to meet Ho Chi Minh at same time as Vo Nguyen Giap
and Pham Van Dong, after which returned to Saigon, where plans for an uprising
discussed in July. Went to Tonkin in early November to consult on plans for uprising
in South. The newly-formed CC advised against uprising, but Phan Dang Luu was
arrested in Saigon before the plans could be halted. Executed by a firing squad on 28
August 1941.
Phan Trong Binh. One of trainees from Central Vietnam (Ha Tinh) in 1926
second Thanh Nien training class. From the clan of patriotic leader Phan Dinh Phung.
At end of course inducted into the Vietnam Communist Youth Group. After training
went to Cochinchina to recruit new members for Thanh Nien.
Phan Trong Quang. One of the 1926 Thanh Nien trainees from Central
Vietnam, inducted into the communist youth group at the end of the training course.
His memoir of this training course is one of the main sources on the early
organization of Thanh Nien.
Phan Van Truong, 1875-1933. From Tu Liem district,Ha Dong (now
Hanoi), he trained as an interpreter in Hanoi. Received law degree in Paris. With
Phan Chu Trinh he founded the Association of Vietnamese Patriots in France;
arrested on outbreak of the First World War, on suspicion of plotting against French
with Germans. After release drafted to serve as interpreter for French in Toulouse
arsenal; after war worked in occupied Germany mainly as a defense lawyer. In 1919
helped Ho Chi Minh draft the Vietnamese Demands to the Paris Peace Conference.
Joined Intercolonial Union in 1921, became member of the FCP. Returned to Saigon
at end 1923, became editor of L'Annam, in which he printed the Communist
Manifesto, also worked with Nguyen An Ninh on La Cloche Felee. Arrested by the
French in 1928, died in Saigon 1933.
Phung Chi Kien (Nguyen Vi, Manh Van Lieu, Kan or Can), 1901-41.
From Dien Chau district in Nghe An, poor peasant family. In 1926 attended a Thanh
Nien training course, then enrolled in Whampoa Academy under name of Manh Van
Lieu. Took part in Canton Commune; arrested in Canton in 1929 and after release
went to join guerillas in East River area of Guangzhou. Joined CCP in December
1929 and became a company commander. In 1931 sent to Moscow for studies- but a
few months' imprisonment on the Manchurian border delayed arrival until 1932. In
1934 returned to Hong Kong/Macao to work with Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap in
Overseas Bureau. Elected to CC at 1935 Party Congress. Travelled to Saigon for
1937 party conference and plenum, after which returned to Hong Kong to direct the
Overseas Bureau. Expelled from Hong Kong at end of 1938, then went to join
guerilla training course in China. At end of 1939 re-established Overseas Bureau in
Kunming, where Ho Chi Minh met him in 1940. In 1941, following the 8th Plenum,
accompanied Truong Chinh to Cao Bang to take military control of Bac Son base
area. Caught by the French in early August and executed on 21 August 1941.
Ta Thu Thau, 1906-45. Born in Tan Binh, Long Xuyen province. His father
was a scholar of Chinese as well as a carpenter. Attended College Chasseloup-
Laubat, received baccalaureate in 1925. Went to France in late 1927 where he
enrolled to study for a degree in mathematics; did not complete studies. Became
active in Vietnam Independence Party and the Anti-Imperialist League. Expelled
from France in May 1930. Became a teacher in Saigon and one of pillars of La Lutte.
Elected several times to Saigon Municipal Council. Became involved with pro-
Japanese independence movement at end of Second World War; executed by Viet
Minh in Quang Ngai province in August 1945.
Ta Uyen (Chau Xuong, Thanh, Dong). Born in Ninh Binh district, Ninh
Binh. Joined Thanh Nien in 1927, DDCSD in June 1929. Arrested in November
1929, sent to Con Son in April 1930. Escaped from prison in May 1935, to Soc
Trang; assigned by ICP to work in Tra Vinh. From 1936 to 1939 successively a
provincial committee member in Can Tho, inter-province committee member for Can
Tho-Vinh Long, secretary of Hau Giang Inter-province comm., member of the Nam
Ky Standing Committee, then secretary of the Nam Ky committee as well as
secretary of the Saigon city committee. Arrested in October or November 1940 was
just before the Nam Ky uprising. Died in police custody on 10 December 1940 in
Saigon.
Ton Duc Thang, 1888-1980. From a peasant family in My Hoa Hung village,
Binh Thanh District, Long Xuyen province, now An Giang. In 1906 went to Saigon
to study to become an electrician, completed course in 1910. Worked at Ba Son naval
shipyard, then sent to France where he worked as a repairman at the Toulon naval
yard. Probably not stationed with the French Black Sea fleet during 1919 mutiny, as
rumoured, but may well have participated in labour movement which surged in
France after war. Returned to Saigon in 1920, barred from working at Ba Son yard,
took job as car mechanic at a garage in Phu Nhuan. Began organizing workers at Ba
Son, where a strike in 1925 may have been organized in support of strike movement
in Hong Kong and Canton. Joined Thanh Nien in 1926, went to Canton for training in
1927, returned to Saigon to become member of the Saigon municipal committee and
a representative of Thanh Nien leadership in the South. In 1929 arrested in
connection with the rue Barbier murder of a rival Thanh Nien leader, sent to Con Son
in June 1930, where remained until September 1945. After release first worked in
party's Southern Committee and Southern administrative committee. In 1946 went
North to join National Assembly Standing Committee. From 1951 became a member
of Party Central Committee, which he remained until his death. After Ho's death in
1969, Thang replaced him as Chairman of the government.
Ton Quang Phiet. An early member of the Revolutionary Party (later Tan
Viet), who represented the party in Hanoi. Arrested at the Chinese border on his way
to the Thanh Nien training course in 1926. In 1928 may have influenced the VNQDD
to re-write their statutes, which made the latter very similar in organization to Tan
Viet and Thanh Nien. At time of August Revolution was principal of a private school
in Hue and an underground ICP member. Became chairman of Thua Thien province
people's committee at that time.
Tran Huy Lieu, 1901-69. Born in Vu Ban district in Nam Dinh, now Nam
Ha province. Moved to Saigon after his secondary schooling to become a journalist,
from 1925 to 1927 was the leading writer on Dong Phap Thai Bao. Wrote on
Buddhism, nationalism; one of founders of the Jeune Annam party in 1926. In 1929
joined VNQDD cell in Saigon; arrested that year and sent to Con Son prison until
1935; in prison became sympathetic to ICP. Became legal party activist and journalist
in Hanoi, said to have officially joined the ICP in 1936. Re-arrested in 1939, sent to
Son La, then to Nghia Lo prison camp, from which he escaped in March 1945. Joined
ICP leaders outside of Hanoi, became a journalist on Cuu Quoc. Attended Tan Trao
conference in August and elected deputy chairman of the united front committee
which was to lead the national uprising. Became Minister of Information in
provisional government; received Bao Dai resignation in Hue. In 1946 became a
secretary of the Viet Minh Central Committee, chairman of the Cultural Association
for National Salvation, member of Standing Committee of National Assembly. From
1948-50 was member of Executive Committee of the Vietnamese Association for
Study of Literature. In 1954 returned to Hanoi, served as head of the Institute of
History, edited The Journal of Historical Research. Oversaw compilation of the major
Vietnamese historical study of the pre-power communist party. Remained member of
Standing Committee of National Assembly.
Tran Ngoc Danh, Ranh (Blokov, Maurice, Thach), 1908P-5?. Probably
born in Quang Ngai province, like older brother Tran Phu; family originally from Ha
Tinh. Completed secondary studies in Hanoi. Joined Thanh Nien in 1927, lived in
Saigon with Ha Huy Tap in 1928 and had to flee to China in 1929 after the rue
Barbier murder was discovered. Arrived in Moscow in mid-1929, enrolled in Stalin
School but in 1930 may have transferred to the Lenin School. Joined Komsomol in
Moscow. Returned to China in 1932, where linked up with Nguyen Thi Minh Khai to
rebuild Vietnamese party structures in Hong Kong. Arrested in Shanghai in late 1932,
then transferred to Saigon and Con Son until 1936. Probably re-arrested in 1939 and
held until 1945. Became a candidate CC member in 1945 and the DRV representative
in Paris from 1946 to 1949. Fled from Paris to Prague in late 1949 or early 1950;
from there sent at least two letters to the Soviet CP criticizing Ho Chi Minh's
leadership. Removed from Party in 1950; died early 1950s.
Tran Phu (Ly Quy, Likvei, Ly Viet Hoa, Nam), 1904-31. Born in Duc Pho
district of Quang Ngai province, where his father was assigned as district mandarin.
(Family came from Ha Tinh province.) In 1908 his father committed suicide rather
than cooperate with the French to repress anti-tax demonstrations. Studied at Quoc
Hoc in Hue for four years, graduated in 1922; assigned to teach at Cao Xuan Duc
primary school in Vinh. In 1925 was one of founders of the Phuc Viet (Restoration
League), which later became the Revolutionary Party and in 1928, Tan Viet. Went to
Canton to meet Thanh Nien leaders in 1926, along with a group from Central
Vietnam. After training course led by Ho Chi Minh, Tran Phu joined Thanh Nien and
the communist group within it. Returned to Vinh briefly, but was sent back to Canton
to avoid arrest. Ho Chi Minh sent him to Moscow to study at the Stalin School.
Enrolled at school from February 1927 until his departure via France in November
1929. At that time, he was given assignment with Ngo Duc Tri to return to Vietnam
and form communist party from existing revolutionary groups. Met Ho Chi Minh in
Hong Kong in March 1930, following reunification of communist groups, and went
to Tonkin to oversee movement. Collected data for his Political Theses which were
presented at the first plenum, in Hong Kong in October 1930. At that time he and
Ngo Duc Tri were made CC secretaries and Ho Chi Minh's provisional party
programme was dropped. Went to Saigon at end of 1930 to take charge of ICP, held
second plenum in March. Arrested in late April and died in Saigon Central Prison of
tuberculosis in the autumn.
Tran Tu Binh. From Ha Nam, attended Catholic seminary, then was
recruited by Thanh Nien. Signed up to work on Phu Rieng rubber plantation in
Cochinchina, where he became one of the founders of a DDCSD cell and leader of
the strike there in February 1930. After fleeing the plantation he was arrested in 1931
and sent to Con Son. Released in 1936 and became secretary of the Ha Nam party
committee, and a member of the northern regional committee. After 1945 he joined
the military and became one of the first Vietnamese brigadier generals. Served as
Inspector General in the military. At Third Party Congress in 1960 he entered the CC,
and served as ambassador to China. Died in Hanoi.
Tran Van Cung (Quoc Anh, Thai Van Anh), 1906-77. born in Nghe An, an
early Thanh Nien member, in Canton at time of Canton Commune after which he was
imprisoned briefly. Returned to Tonkin in 1929 to become head of Tonkin Regional
Committee and one ofmembers of secret communist cell which promoted idea of
immediateformation of a CP at Thanh Nien Congress in May 1929. Imprisonedin Lao
Bao prison after arrest in mid-1929. After August Revolutionbecame secretary of the
Nghe An - Ha Tinh joint province committeeand then a member of the National
Assembly's Standing Committee. Died in Hanoi.
Tran Van Diem (Din-Tan). A southern communist who took refuge in China
in early 1930s and then accompanied Phung Chi Kien to Moscow in 1932 for studies
at Stalin School. Returned to China in 1934 or 5 and attended Macao Party Congress,
where made a member of the CC.
Tran Van Diep (Tran Ngoc Diep, Ho, Lieu, Hoa), 1908-?. From Cantho,
studied at the College de Cantho, expelled in 1926 after boycotting classes at time of
Phan Chu Trinh's funeral. Went to Canton for Thanh Nien training in July 1927 with
eight others; returned to Saigon in late November 1927. In 1928 found work teaching
in Sadec Hoc-Duong, a school run by Chau Van Liem, where Ha Huy Giap and Pham
Van Dong were also teaching. Recruited to join new VCP in February 1930 by a
fellow Canton trainee, Nguyen Van Tay (Nguyen Thanh Son). Arrested in 1931.
Tran Van Giau (Ho Nam, Jean le Rouge), 1911-. Born in Tam Vu district
in Tan An province, now Long An, in a peasant family. Studied at College
Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon from 1925 until 1928, when he departed for France.
Became student activist in Toulouse, participated in demonstration to protest
repression of Yen Bay uprising in 1930 and expelled from France. Managed to return
from Saigon to France, and from there to travel to Moscow, enrolled in Stalin School
1930. Comintern sources show he was author of treatise 'Organizational Principles of
Bolshevism', based on Piatnitsky's lectures; also helped to edit the 1932 ICP Political
Programme which was written in Moscow. In autumn of 1932 travelled to Paris with
Ha Huy Tap, where Tap was arrested and eventually returned to Moscow. On return
to Saigon in early 1933, began the work of rebuilding the ICP in the South. He was
arrested in 1934 for around four months; in late 1934 travelled to Macao to meet Ha
Huy Tap, where criticized for ultra-leftism and straying from the ICP Programme.
Returned to the south without attending the Macao Party Congress to continue party-
building, but after his arrest in mid-1935, almost all the committees he had
established were wound up. Sent to Con Son in 1935, released in 1936 but re-
imprisoned in the Ta Lai prison camp until 1941, when he and a group of other
prisoners managed to escape. In the summer of 1945 worked with Pham Ngoc
Thach's youth movement and created a mainly urban movement called Thanh Nien
Tien Phong (Avant-garde Youth). In August-September 1945 organized a Southern
Resistance Committee including a variety of religious and nationalist groups, which
was belatedly integrated into the Viet Minh and took power in Saigon briefly. Sent to
Thailand later in 1945 to organize logistics and relations with Thais, Laos and
Cambodians. Recalled to northern Vietnam in 1948. Thereafter worked as a journalist
and historian. His history of the southern working class has been a standard source
for many years.
Tran Van Kiet (Remy, Le Min), 1912-?. Born in Vinh Long in peasant
family. Finished middle-level education in Vietnam, then by 1930 was living and
working in France, first in Toulouse, then in Marseille in an oil refinery. Joined the
FCP in 1931, was secretary of Vietnamese party group in Marseille. Arrived in
Moscow in 1931 and entered Stalin School. Trained as printer and was expected to
bring printing equipment to Saigon for the ICP, which never arrived. In 1937 again
living in France with a French wife when FCP sent him to Saigon to help run the
newspaper Dan Chung after the ICP's 1937 re-alignment.
Tran Van Lan. A northern activist and worker who was a member of the
Provisional Central Executive Committee in 1930-1, based in Hanoi.
Tran Van Minh (Nam), 1909-?. Born in well-off peasant family in Tra Vinh,
studied at local school, then at lycee in Mytho. Expelled for participating in mourning
for Phan Chu Trinh and protests for Nguyen An Ninh's release, but allowed to return
to his studies in 1927. In 1929 his family paid for him to go to France to continue his
studies. When money ran out in 1929 found work in Toulouse, where met
Vietnamese communists and joined the Komsomol. Arrested in December 1931 and
held for six months; after release joined FCP in Marseille. In 1932 the FCP Colonial
Commission sent him to Moscow. Returned to Vietnam in 1934 or 35.
Tran Van Thach, 1903-?. From a well-off Cholon family, father was a
Customs official. Studied at College Chasseloup-Laubat, then received his License in
Philosophy in Toulouse. Became politically active while studying in France. Between
1927 and 1929 published Le Journal des etudiants annamites. In 1930 repatriated to
Saigon with Nguyen Van Tao as a result of his political activities, where he became a
leading Marxist activist. First elected to the Colonial Council in 1933, although that
result was annulled; elected Saigon Municipal councillor in 1935. One of founders of
La Lutte, became a Trotskyist in 1936.
Trinh Dinh Cuu (Chi). An original member of DDCSD (first ICP) who
attended the Lycee du Protectorat (Buoi School) before joining Thanh Nien. Joined
the first communist cell in early 1929 and in February 1930 represented the ICP
group at the unification congress in Hong Kong. Member of the Provisional Central
Committee, but left position in summer of 1930. One of the few communists who
appears to have avoided arrest in 1931 by escaping to China.
Trinh Hung Ngau. Southern activist and journalist associated with the Jeune
Annam group and Nguyen An Ninh; writer for La Lutte.
Truong Boi Cong. A long-time emigre in Canton and graduate of Beijing
military academy, served in GMD army at Nanjing. In Nanning in Guangxi was a
senior staff officer of military academy. In 1941 put in charge of training Vietnamese
exiles by Zhang Fakui. Giap and Dong worked with him to organize a united front,
but he always opposed Viet Minh leadership.
Truong Chinh (real name Dang Xuan Khu, Xuyen, Nhan, Song Hong),
1907-88. Born in Hanh Thien village, Nam Dinh, also home of Nguyen The Truyen s
clan. Was schoolmate of Nguyen Duc Canh in Nam Dinh, later studied at Higher
Commercial School in Hanoi. Probably joined Thanh Nien in 1927 or 1928, then first
ICP in summer of 1929. Worked on Lao Dong, newspaper of the Bac ky General
Labour Union founded by Nguyen Duc Canh in mid-1929. After VCP founding in
February 1930, worked with Northern Committee. Arrested in late 1930, released in
1936, went to Hanoi to work as journalist, legal activist. One of leaders of Le Travail
collective; in- 1938 edited Tin Tuc until its closing. Member of Northern Regional
Committee; voted ICP First Secretary at seventh plenum in November 1940; this
position was confirmed by the eighth ICP Plenum in May 1941. Remained First
Secretary until 1956, when the excesses of the Land Reform resulted in his demotion
to simple Politbureau member. Remained politically influential as member of Party
Secretariat, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and head
of the Nguyen Ai Quoc Party School. Regained the position of General Secretary
after Le Duan's death in 1986 until Nguyen Van Linh's election; gave formal
approval to the set of reforms known as 'Doi Moi'.
 Truong Phuoc Dat (Kha, Ly Minh Son, possibly also the Malayan
communist leader Lai Teck). Son of a customs official from Phan Rang, trained as
naval mechanic in Saigon, where he came in contact with Thanh Nien and DDCSD
organizers. Recruited by DDCSD to form a trade union in Saigon in late 1929.
Imprisoned in 1930 but escaped with connivance of his military guard and was
smuggled out to Hong Kong. There he met Ho Chi Minh who sent him to work in
Shanghai with the Vietnamese group working to recruit converts and sympathizers in
the military. Departed for Moscow with Phung Chi Kien, but they were arrested on
the Manchurian border and held for three months, after which they returned to
Shanghai. Dat did not make another attempt to go to Russia, but stayed on in
Shanghai working on propaganda in the military. Established good relations with the
CCP and avoided arrest in 1931. When a group of ICP members tried to reestablish
links with the CCP CC in 1932-3, he refused to vouch for them, he told the Silrete in
his confession. Arrested in late 1933 and did not re-appear in Vietnam, but his early
biography is very similar to that of the British agent who became head of the
Malayan CP, Lai Teck, as published by Yoki Akashi, based in part on British
sources.
Truong Van Lenh (Linh, Thanh), 1902-45. From Nghi Loc district in Nghe
An, from a Catholic family. Studied at seminary in Vinh, went to Siam in 1923, then
to China. Studied at Whampoa academy, joined Thanh Nien and CCP. Became a
company commander in GMD army, then a police sergeant in Canton, thus helped to
protect Thanh Nien after anti-communist coup in April 1927. Brought Ho Chi Minh
back to Hong Kong in 1929 to reunify party, served as liaison agent in 1930. In
December 1930 expelled from Hong Kong and imprisoned for a time in Canton.
Arrested in Shanghai in 1932, imprisoned in Lao Bao and Banmethuot. In 1942
escaped to Thanh Hoa and went to Thai Nguyen, where he helped train military
cadres for Viet Minh. In 1945 given responsibility for a military training school in
Hanoi, but died in November that year.
Ung Van Khiem (Uan, Huan), 1910-91. From Cho Moi, An Giang province.
Peasant family; father joined anti-French resistance of Truong Dinh. Studied at
Cantho lycee, expelled due to conflict with head. Recruited for Thanh Nien by Chau
Van Liem. Went to Canton for training in 1928; on return became secretary of special
committee for Hau Giang. Joined Nam ky regional committee when unified party
formed in 1930. Replaced Ngo Gia Tu as committee head after his arrest at end of
May 1930. In 1931 arrested and sent to Con Son. Released in 1935, returned to Cho
Moi, became involved in Indochina Congress Movement. In 1945 member of Nam
Bo committee; 1946 elected to National Assembly from Long Xuyen. During anti-
French resistance worked in Khu 9 (western Nam Bo). Joined CC in 1951. In 1954
regrouped to North; in early 1960s worked briefly as Minister of Interior, and then
Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1965. Expelled from Party after Hoang Minh Chinh
affair (1967?).
Vo Nguyen Giap (Van, Duong Hoai Nam, Yang Huai-nan), 1910-. At the
time of writing, one of the last surviving intimates of Ho Chi Minh; born in An Xa
village, Quang Binh province in central Vietnam. Studied at Quoc Hoc school in
Hue, influenced by his schoolmaster Dang Thai Maijoined the Tan Viet party before
being arrested in 1930. Released 1932, returned to Hue and then moved to Hanoi,
where he studied at the Lycee Albert Sarraut and passed baccalaureate. After that he
studied law. Became a history teacher at the private Thang Long School, and a
leading legal activist and journalist in popular front politics. Married the younger
sister of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, Ho Chi Minn's one-time companion. Worked with
Le Travail collective, then was a leading writer for the United Democratic Front
organ, Notre Voix, in which Ho's letters from China were published. Travelled to
Kunming with Pham Van Dong in spring 1940 to meet Ho and the Overseas Bureau
of the ICP. Became one of the main war-time organizers of the Viet Minh and in
1944 organized the Armed Propaganda Brigade for National Liberation, one of the
forerunners of the Vietnam People's Army. After the August Revolution was Minister
of the Interior; in 1946 became head of the DRV's Military Committee. During the
anti-French resistance he was Minister of Defense and commander-in-chief of the
VPA; credited as one of main organizers of the victory at Dien Bien Phu. Joined the
Politbureau in 1951 at Second Party Congress and was a vice-premier from 1955 to
1976. Increased his already great popularity when he made a speech in 1956
apologizing for the excesses of land reform and began the process of correction of
errors. Dropped from the Politbureau at Fifth Party Congress in 1982, he became a
sponsor of Vietnamese science and technology. Still living in Hanoi. Second wife the
daughter of Dang Thai Mai.
Vo Van Tan (Gia, Bay), 1894-1941. From Duc Hoa district in what used to
be Cholon province, now in HCM City. Joined Nguyen An Ninh secret society, then
Thanh Nien. Created a Thanh Nien cell in Duc Hoa; in late 1929 joined the Annam
CP. Organized anti-tax demonstration in Tan Phu Thuong Village in Duc Hoa on 4
June 1930; as two officials were 'punished' by demonstrators, French repression was
severe. Avoided arrest and became party secretary for Cholon, then in 1932 of Gia
Dinh province. Established ICP party headquarters in Hoc Mon-Ba Diem. Joined the
Nam ky Regional Committee and in 1937 became the secretary. Also joined the ICP
CC. Present at the Sixth Plenum in Hoc Mon when the Anti-imperialist United Front
was established. Arrested in spring 1940 and executed along with other southern
leaders in August 1941.
Vu Anh (real name Trinh Dinh Hai). Appears in the late 1930s as an
important overseas communist and seems to have been one of the recruits who came
from the VNQDD in Guangxi. In memoirs describes himself as a worker (is
sometimes confused with Le Hong Son, who used the pseudonym Vu Anh and Vu
Hong Anh when he studied and taught at Whampoa). In memoirs takes credit for
finding the cave at Pac Bo which the Viet Minh used as one of their hide-outs.
Vuong Thuc Oanh (Chat or Chac Tong). Son-in-law of Phan Boi Chau, in
1925 became a Thanh Nien member and recruiter in Central Vietnam. Went to
France in 1926 or 27 to work with Nguyen the Truyen. After return to Vietnam in
1928 believed to have resisted merger of Thanh Nien with the Tan Viet party.

END
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