US v.

Figueras 4

People v. Hernandez 5

People v. Cabrera 6

League v. People 7

People v. Umali 8

US v. Lapus 9

US v. Apurado 10

People v. Perez 11

People v. Nabong 12

Espuelas v. People 13

US v. Barbas 14

People v. Reyes 15

People v. Tan Bomping 16

US v. Nieto 17

US v. Asensi 18

US v. Orera 19

People v. Domingo 20

Alonzo v. IAC 21

US v. Paraiso 22

US v. Infante 23

US v. Look Chaw 24

US v. Jose 25

US v. Ah Sing 26

US v. Chan Toco 27

US v. Concepcion 28

US v. Gan Lian Po 29

People v. De Jesus 30

People v. Punto 31
US v. Palma 32

US v. Filart 33

Evangelista v. Hon. Baes 34

Yaranon v. Judge Rubio 35

People v. Mina 36

US v. Mendoza 37

Vda. De Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla and Lombos 38

People v. Malabanan 39

People v. Sope 40

US v. Gimenea 41

US v. Richards 42

US v. Valdehueza 43

US v. Velasquez 44

US v. Togonon 45

US v. Sagun 46

US v. Lafuente 47

US v. Radaza 48

US v. Solis 49

US v. Webster 50

People v. Sendaydiego 51

People v. Villanueva 52

People v. Elviña 53
 US v. Figueras
G.R. No. 1282
Sept. 10, 1903
Facts: The judgment of the Court of First Instance from which the defendants appealed finds
them guilty of the crime of conspiracy under section 4 of Act No. 292, and imposes upon them
the penalty of two years' imprisonment and a fine of $2,000, and four years' imprisonment and a
fine of $5,000, respectively. Paulino Legaspi testifies that various persons, some forty more or
less in number, were conspiring to overthrow the constituted Government, and states that he
knows that the defendants were engaged in this conspiracy because he heard them say so in their
conversations. Called upon to repeat the words which he heard them say, he stated the following:
"What a life this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing. When will our wretchedness end?
When will the authorities remedy it? What shall we do?" He does not state that he heard anything
beyond this, and it appears that he relies solely upon these words, used by the defendants, as a
basis for his assertion that they were conspiring. This being so, his assertion appears clearly to be
the result of an arbitrary and gratuitous conclusion, because, although these words reveal
discontent on account of the evils, real or fictitious, to which they refer, they are not alone
sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy to rebel, much less with the aid of force, against
the constituted Government.

Issue: Whether or not the appellants be held guilty of conspiracy under Sec. 4 of Act No. 292.

Ruling: Proof that the defendants met together and made complaints showing a discontent with
the Government on account of real or fancied evils is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for the
crime of conspiracy to overthrow the Government. In view of the insufficiency of the evidence
for the prosecution it is unnecessary to consider the weight to be attributed to the testimony of
the witnesses for the defense, which, however, tends to demonstrate the innocence of the
defendants. Their guilt not having been established by the evidence, they are entitled to an
acquittal.
 People v. Hernandez
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26
May 30, 1964
Facts: On or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the
thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still
unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines
thru act heretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in
the Philippines. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above
indicated the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with
several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led
and/or maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the
Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and
affiliated or associated labor unions and other “mass organizations” in different places in the
Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the
herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its
activities with the activities of the “Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan” (H.M.B.) and other
organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to
thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned
armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crimes in relation to rebellion for being a
member or sympathizer of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Ruling: No. Under the allegations of the amended information, the murders, arsons and
robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by
Hernandez, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion and that the
crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime
of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Under Article 1346 and 1357, these five
(5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only
one penalty. One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article
135, is by “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious
violence” in the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply everything that war
connotes. Since Article 135 constitutes only 1 crime, Article 48 doesn’t apply since it requires
the commission of at least 2 crimes.

In view of all the above circumstances the court finds that there is no concrete evidence proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or
in any act of conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. The court absolves the
appellant from the crime charged. the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring
Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the
hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of
obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of
Communism.
 People v. Cabrera
G.R. No. L-17748
March 4, 1922
Facts: The arrest of a woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen in December 1920. The next day, a police officer was shot and
killed by a group of soldiers in Manila, Philippines. The encounter endangered a deep feeling of
resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment soon turned into a
desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila.

A rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks that policeman Mojica was allowed
to continue on duty on the streets of Intramuros. This rumor contributed in no small degree to
precipitating a movement for reprisal by the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen. A
corporal persuaded a private in charge of a quarter to be let out of the window. They sawed out
the window bars and brought rifles and ammunition. They divided themselves to attack the
police officers.

One night, a group of soldiers from the Constabulary attacked the city police force. Two men
were killed in the attack on the police officers quarters. A streetcar happened to stop at this time.
Victor de Torres was killed when a Constabulary squad opened fire on a streetcar and gravely
wounded three other civilian passengers. Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila,
proved himself a hero by persuading them to stop firing and administering spiritual aid. Minutes
later, Captain Wichman riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived at the corner
of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shots by Constabulary soldiers
resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of
patrolman Saplala. About the same time, a police patrol was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers
who had stationed themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in
the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison. On Calle General Luna, another platoon of soldiers
fired upon a police motorcycle on its way to Calle Real, wounding 1. They also fired
indiscriminately in one police station, where no one was harmed.

The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the
crimes of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before
different judges of first instance.

Issue: Whether or not the accused soldiers committed the crime of sedition.

Ruling: Yes. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in
the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition
who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any
one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal
Government. The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law,
had been committed, and we believe that such finding is correct.

Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act
No. 292 it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a
public functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivision 3 of section
5 of the Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
In one scene there were fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it
was an unequal fight brought on by the actions of the accused.
 League v. People
G.R. No. L-47367
Sept. 2, 1941
Facts: Jose League was the general treasurer of the so-called Sakdalista party whose objective
was to obtain absolute independence for the Philippines before the end of 1935; that the
Sakdalistas planned an armed uprising in several provinces, especially Laguna; that on the night
of May 2, 1935, the telegraph and telephone wires connecting the municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna, with the neighboring towns and with Manila were cut, the electric lights were turned off
and the houses were shut down; that armed people placed themselves in the streets of Santa
Rosa, Laguna, with the neighboring towns and with Manila; that on the night of May 2, 1935, the
electric lights were turned off and the houses were closed; that armed people were stationed on
the roads to stop the passage of vehicles, seizing the passengers and snatching from them the
weapons they were carrying; that several hundred of the sakdalistas, armed with bands, flags and
a variety of weapons, marched in groups to seize the municipal building of Santa Rosa and
remove said municipality from obedience to the duly constituted government; that there was a
bloody encounter between said sakdalistas and the constabularies who were sent to re-establish
order; that in said encounter there were dead and wounded; that among the vehicles that the
sakdalistas tried to stop on the night in question was the automobile of attorney Feliciano
Gomez, who was a passenger in it with several members of his family; that when said
automobile did not stop at the intimation of the sakdalistas, it was shot at by them; that Jose
League, the appellant here, was among those armed persons who tried to stop the automobile of
attorney Gomez; that he saw and knew the appellant, since he had been his childhood companion
and the driver Damian Hernandez also saw him on that occasion armed with a shotgun at a
distance of ten meters from the vehicle; that said accused fired two shots with his shotgun against
the Gomez's car and the projectiles hit the body of the car; That among the detained vehicles
there was a jitney owned by Ricardo Mendoza, who recognized the accused among the people
who attacked him because he was well illuminated by the light projected by the jitney's beacons.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of sedition.

Ruling: No. It is not the greater or lesser extent of the territory in which a public armed uprising
against the Government takes place and develops, which determines its nature of rebellion or
sedition, but the end pursued with said uprising. Rebellion has more transcendental ends, and its
effects are more serious and more pernicious to the Government, than those of sedition, because
with it a part or all of the Philippine territory or some body of its armed force, or to deprive the
Chief Executive, or the Legislature of some or all of its prerogatives or powers. This, or at least,
to achieve absolute independence by means of arms, before the end of the year 1935 which was
when the uprising occurred, to make this take place in several provinces, and to take the
municipality of Santa Rosa, occupying its municipal building, to remove it from obedience to the
constituted Government, is what the appellant and his henchmen or the Sakdalistas of which he
was treasurer proposed to do when they took up arms, as they did, going to the extreme of
attacking the Constables who had gone there to reestablish order, causing them some casualties.
Rebellion and not sedition is how the crime committed by the appellant should be properly
qualified, because rebellion is, according to article 134 of the Revised Penal Code:

“The public rising and taking up arms against the Government with the object of removing from
obedience to it, or to its laws, the Philippine territory or any part thereof, or any body of land or
sea troops or any other kind of armed force, or to deprive in whole or in part the Chief Executive
or the legislating bodies of their prerogatives or powers.”
 People v. Umali
G.R. No. L-5803
Nov. 29, 1954
Facts: The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been
committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the
evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place
resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan
including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the
house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano
and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that
during and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one
house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of the allegations of complicated crime
of rebellion including numerous murders, frustrated murder, arson, and robbery leveled against
them.

Ruling: Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder
and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of
prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum
of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the
buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window,
and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It
shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties
already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the
prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below
will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
 US v. Lapus
G.R. No. 1222
Jan. 21, 1905
Facts: In a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
among others, Mateo Lapus, Bonifacio Bautista, Rufino Ordoñez, Victorino Manalang, and
Pedro Bautista were charge with the crime of sedition. The complaint alleged that on the night of
June 3, 1902, a band composed of about four hundred men, among whom were the accused,
armed with guns, revolvers, talibones, bolos, and clubs, raided the town of Cabiao; that said band
went through the streets of the town firing shots, yelling, and frightening the inhabitants thereof;
that some of said band went to the house of the municipal president, while others raided several
houses, taking captive sixty or seventy of the inhabitants thereof, among whom were Roman Isip
Torres, Victorino Natividad, Braulio Rico, Gregorio de los Reyes, Eugenio Manalo, Antonio
Crespo, Antonia de los Reyes, Brigido Sigua, Eustaquio Tecson, and others whose names are not
known; that they roamed about the streets of the town threatening and intimidating the people;
that when the invaders left the town they took and carried their captives away with them; that
some of them were conducted to a place called Patatan, and others to that of Libutad on the
Chico River, where they were detained by their captors until about noon of the next day, when
they were released. “Santa Iglesia, the association in which the accused belonged, was organized
for the purpose of performing acts of hatred and vengeance against the authorities and the
wealthy people.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of sedition.

Ruling: The facts as stated constitute the crime of sedition provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
section 5 and punished by section 6 of Act No. 292 of the Civil Commission. The appellants
were members of an illegal association and had publicly and tumultuously attacked the town of
Cabiao and roamed over its streets, firing shots, yelling, and threatening the residents with death,
and thereby frightening them. They performed acts of violence on the persons of the president
and other residents of the town, against the law and the supreme authority and with
political-social purposes. For these reasons the acts performed by the defendants constitute
sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections of Act No. 292. The crime of sedition was
consummated, even though the object of the defendants was not realized.

The liability of the defendants as principals in the aforesaid crime of sedition appears fully
proven by the testimony of several residents who witnessed the invasion of the town. The
witnesses identified the accused as members of the band which entered the town and committed
the acts complained of.
 US v. Apurado
G.R. No. 1210
Feb. 7, 1907
Facts: Some little time before the municipal council of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, entered
upon one of the municipality assembled near the municipal building, and upon the opening of the
session a large number of this assembled about the building crowded into the council chamber
and demanded the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and
the chief of police, and the substitution in their places of new officials whose names were
suggested by the spokesman of the party; that the council acceded to their wishes and drew up a
formal document setting out the reasons for its action, which was signed by the councilors
present and by several of the leaders of the crowd; that the persons who took part in the
movement were wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes; that the crowd was fairly
orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a
session of that body can be called disorder and misbehavior; and that the movement had its
origin in religious differences between the residents of the municipality, the petitioners desiring
the dismissal of the above-mentioned officials because they believed that they should not be
permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to one of the
factions into which the town was at that time divided.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of sedition.

Ruling: No. There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for
purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights
are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s rights. As early as the onset of this
country, the Court upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to
acknowledge. It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly
of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because eon such occasions
feelings is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders
over their irresponsible followers. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line between an essentially peaceably assembly and a tumultuous
uprising.
 People v. Perez
G.R. No. L-21049
Dec. 22, 1923
Facts: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen
of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of
Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General
Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he
has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other
persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the words uttered by Perez are protected by the freedom of speech and the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

Ruling: No. Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No.
1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This
section reads as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or
do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in
performing his duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety
or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the
constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United
States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an
act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has
made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has
made a statement and done an act which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities.
He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community
and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the
action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
 People v. Nabong
G.R. No. 36426
Nov. 3, 1932
Facts: The Court of Instance of Nueva Ecija convicted appellant Ignacio Nabong, a Cabanatuan
attorney, guilty of sedition. He was detained for delivering a seditious statement at a memorial
service for Antonio D. Ora, the Philippines' communist leader, held in Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
During this address, Nabong insulted the members of the Constabulary, saying things like these:
“They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad
because they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. In view of this, we ought to
be united to suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own
government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their
sides.” The defense testimony suggests that Nabong attended the meeting to avoid causing a
commotion. That the language he used was not meant to advocate for a violent overthrow of the
government.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of sedition.

Ruling: Yes. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the
Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it
was evidently intended to be understood. The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as
referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the whip, an
instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistent with the mild
interpretation which the appellant would have us impute to the language. It was the purpose of
the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by
unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist
and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and
meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies,
thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the order of the Government, in violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, as amended. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words
used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The law is
not aimed merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish utterances which may
endanger public order. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gitlow vs. New
York,"Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the
security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the
immediate danger is nonetheless real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance
cannot be accurately foreseen."
 Espuelas v. People
G.R. No. L-2990
Dec. 17, 1951
Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation
and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife
translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas,
pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to
write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of seditious libel.

Ruling: Yes. Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to
impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating
language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false
claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use of irritating language
centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationale of free speech
cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional
guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer at least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

As to the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up
people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek
to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up general
discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press
upon their minds.
 US v. Barbas
G.R. Nos. L-41265-66
July 27, 1934
Facts: That on or about the month of April 1932, in the Municipality of Sagay, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippine Islands, the accused being a special deputy of the provincial
treasurer of this Province for the sale of personal cedula and by reason of his office was
responsible for the public funds in his possession, received from Marciano Salazar the amount of
P2 as payment of the personal cedula of said Marciano Salazar for the year 1932 and the accused
with abuse of his office delivered to said Marciano Salazar the duplicate of Cedula F No.
1061367 forged before, in the singular form. That the original of said cedula was issued to
Patricio Fernandez and in said original as well as in the duplicate appeared the name of Patricio
Fernandez after the printed words. "This certifies that"; that the accused with the purpose of
receiving the amount of P2 from Marciano Salazar, with abuse of his office erased in the
duplicate of the cedula No. 1061367, the name of Patricio Fernandez and in its place wrote and
put the name of Marciano Salazar, and once he obtained from said Marciano Salazar the amount
of P2, he voluntarily and illegally appropriated for his use and benefit the said sum to the
detriment and prejudice of the Province of Negros Occidental and the Municipality of Sagay.
The trial judge found the defendant guilty of estafa through the falsification of public documents.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa through the falsification of public
documents.

Ruling: No. The defendant who misappropriated is guilty of malversation of public funds. The
evidence shows that the defendant altered the duplicates of the cedulas in question as alleged in
the information. These duplicates are public documents, and the alterations made by the
defendant constituted the falsification of public documents. The evidence shows that the
duplicates of the cedulas in question were falsified by the defendant in order that he might sell
them to Palmares and Salazar. The falsification was therefore the means which the defendant
availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation. As the acts of the defendant
constitute a complex crime, the penalty applicable thereto is that to the more serious offense, or
the falsification of a public document. The corresponding penalty therefore is the maximum
degree of prision mayor, or from ten years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor, and a
fine of not more than P5,000. The medium degree of prision mayor in its maximum period is
from ten years, eight months, and one day to eleven years and four months.
 People v. Reyes
G.R. Nos. L-34516
Nov. 19, 1931
Facts: That on or about the month of April 1932, in the Municipality of Sagay, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippine Islands, the accused being a special deputy of the provincial
treasurer of this Province for the sale of personal cedula and by reason of his office was
responsible for the public funds in his possession, received from Marciano Salazar the amount of
P2 as payment of the personal cedula of said Marciano Salazar for the year 1932 and the accused
with abuse of his office delivered to said Marciano Salazar the duplicate of Cedula F No.
1061367 forged before, in the singular form. That the original of said cedula was issued to
Patricio Fernandez and in said original as well as in the duplicate appeared the name of Patricio
Fernandez after the printed words. "This certifies that"; that the accused with the purpose of
receiving the amount of P2 from Marciano Salazar, with abuse of his office erased in the
duplicate of the cedula No. 1061367, the name of Patricio Fernandez and in its place wrote and
put the name of Marciano Salazar, and once he obtained from said Marciano Salazar the amount
of P2, he voluntarily and illegally appropriated for his use and benefit the said sum to the
detriment and prejudice of the Province of Negros Occidental and the Municipality of Sagay.
The trial judge found the defendant guilty of estafa through the falsification of public documents.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa through the falsification of public
documents.

Ruling: Yes. Where the defendant is accused of estafa with the falsification of a private
document, or falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third person, the weight of
authority as examined in the opinion of the court leans to the doctrine that there are not two
distinct crimes committed, estafa and falsification, and that article 89 of the Penal Code is not
applicable. This is the doctrine followed by the Supreme Court of Spain in construing article 318
of the old Spanish Penal Code.

Although articles 304 and 534, case 3, of our Penal Code, provide the same personal penalty, i.
e., presidio correccional in the minimum and medium degrees, the first of these articles further
provides a fine ranging from 625 to 6,250 pesetas; and that article 534 has been amended by Act
No. 3244, which adds case 4, providing the penalty of presidio correccional in the maximum
degree to presidio mayor in the minimum, if the fraud exceeds 50,000 pesetas.

The defendant's falsification of the "time book" with the intent to gain at the expense of the
injured party, constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third
person, defined and penalized in article 304 of the Penal Code, and the accused must suffer the
corresponding penalty.
 People v. Tan Bomping
G.R. No. L-24187
March 15, 1926
Facts: That on or about the 21st and 22d of November, 1923, in the municipality of Jimenez,
Province of Misamis, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the
above-named accused, confederating together and cooperating with one another, did willfully,
unlawfully and criminally prepare and cause to be prepared eight fictitious and simulated
documents acknowledged before a notary public wherein the accused Tan Bomping conveys to
his co-accused Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres Burias eight
parcels of land belonging to said accused Tan Bomping, making it to appear in said documents
that the same were executed on previous dates, about the years 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922 and
August of 1923, when as a matter of fact said documents were executed and signed by all the
five defendants on November 21, 1923, and acknowledged by them before a notary public on
November 22d of the same year.

Upon trial, the Court of First Instance found all of the defendants guilty of the falsification of
private documents and sentenced Tan Bomping to suffer one year, eight months and twenty-one
days of presidio correccional and to pay a fine of 625 pesetas. Each of the other defendants was
sentenced to six months of arresto mayor with the same fine as that imposed on Tan Bomping.
All of the defendants appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of falsification of private documents.

Ruling: No. The court a quo erred in holding that the crime committed was falsification of
private documents. Upon the facts stated, Tan Bomping is manifestly guilty of the falsification of
public documents and not merely of private ones as found by the trial court; he not only falsified
the documents, but was also directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents.
A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document, and in a criminal prosecution
for falsification of document the fact that the falsification was committed before the document
was presented to the notary does not alter the character of the crime as falsification of public
document, if the document was presented to the notary by the party who committed the
falsification, or at his instance. The case against his co defendants is not quite as clear and there
is room for a reasonable doubt as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions
described. The majority of the members of this court are therefore of the opinion that said co
defendants should be acquitted.The case against his co defendants is not quite as clear and there
is room for a reasonable doubt as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions
described. The majority of the members of this court are therefore of the opinion that said co
defendants should be acquitted.
 US v. Nieto
G.R. No. L-2607
Feb. 2, 1906
Facts: Fernando Nieto, the appellant in this case, was charged with the falsification of a public
document, with abuse of his office as municipal president.

It appears that the accused, who at that time was president of the municipality of Meycauayan,
bought a typewriter for the use of the said municipality for which he paid $90, gold, and at the
same time caused the vendors to sign a receipt and a reimbursement voucher setting out the facts
connected with the sale of the machine and the amount paid therefor. It appears further that the
accused changed the amount as set out in the receipt and voucher from $90, gold, to $95, gold,
and on the presentation of these falsified documents, recovered from the treasurer of the
municipality the sum of 190 pesos, Philippine currency, in reimbursement of his expenditure in
the purchase of the machine.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public documents.

Ruling: No. The High Court held that the evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the
trial court, and agreed that the documents in question at the time when they were falsified were
private and not public documents, and that the offense was not committed with abuse of a public
office. In the purchase of the machine the accused was acting as a private person and not in his
official capacity as municipal president, and the receipt and voucher at the time when they were
altered were merely pieces of evidence of a private transaction between the accused and the
vendors of the machine. They did not emanate from any public office; they were not a part of any
public or official record, nor were they certified by any person authorized to certify public
documents. The mere fact that they were intended for use in support of a claim against the public
funds could not of itself raise them to the dignity of public documents before they had become a
part of some official record, and prior to their certification by some public official clothed with
authority for that purpose.
 US v. Asensi
G.R. No. L-11165
Aug. 15, 1916
Facts: Manuel B. Asensi, an employee of the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, asked
for the said corporation a check of P858.88 payable to the order of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, with which to pay the latter for the tax corresponding to the sales made during the first
quarter of 1914 that amounted exactly to P858.88 at the rate of 1/3 of 1% of the true amount of
the sales referred to. The next day, the accused went to the office of the CIR and presented
coupon No. 1 which is an integral part of the patent to which it was attached, No. 2751,
corresponding to the year 1914, issued by the CIR to the Compania General Tabacos de
Filipinas. Failing to declare the truth in the statement of the facts and declare and certify falsely,
with his signature, the amount of the sales made by the Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas during the first quarter of 1914 was P137,662.78. The Internal Revenue tax which the
corporation should pay on the said amount at the rate of 1/3 of 1%, was only P458.88. The
accused also induced and persuaded the CIR officers to believe the declarations, statement and
certification made by him in the said instrument and the officers accepted the P858.88 stated in
the check drawn to the order of the CIR by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas and
which the accused delivered to them only the sum of P458.88 as the tax due on the sales
declared, stated and certified to by the accused himself at the rate of 1/2 of 1%, over the said
amount of the sales returning in cash the difference between said amount and stated in the check
the sum of P400. Once he was in possession of P400, he appropriated the same for himself,
causing damages and injuries to the said corporation amounting to the said sum of P400
equivalent to 2,000 pesetas. The accused was charged with the crime of estafa, committed with
the falsification of a document. The appellant contends that the document falsified is not a public
document.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of public documents.

Ruling: Yes. The Penal Code contains no definition of what constitutes a public document. The
following, however, have been held to be public documents: (a) Any instrument authorized by a
notary public; (b) any instrument authorized by a competent public official with the solemnities
required by law; (c) forms prepared by the Auditor of the Philippine Islands in accordance with
Act No. 90. of the Philippine Commission; (d) receipts issued by the department of assessments
and collections of the city of Manila for taxes collected; (e) burial permits issued by the Board of
Public Health of the city of Manila; (/) receipts prescribed by the Government to be issued upon
the receipt of money for public purposes; (g) the official cash-book kept by the disbursing officer
of the coast guard and transportation department; (h) a cashbook of a public official, in which
entries are made of accounts of public moneys received; (i) an official receipt printed in
accordance with the standard forms required by the Government.

In the present case, the document in question was printed and furnished to merchants, in
accordance with the provisions of the law of 1904. This form was evidently prescribed by the
internal revenue department of the Government. When presented to the internal revenue
department of the Government, it became a part of the records of that office and in our judgment
is fully invested with the character of an official or public document, as those terms are used in
articles 300 and 301 of the Penal Code.

From all of the foregoing facts, the court held that the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause shows that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged in the complaint, and should be
sentenced in accordance with the provisions of article 301 of the Penal Code, in its relation with
article 89 of the same code.
 US v. Orera
G.R. No. L-3810
Oct. 18, 1907
Facts: Damian Orera, alias Kim Cuan, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, of the crime of having falsified to the damages of a Chinese theatrical company called
“Eng Ning”, a Chinese theater ticket which entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a
performance held in the theater of the above company at Manila, on the 7th of October, 1906, by
counterfeiting and simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the ticket the same figures,
letters, dragons, ornaments and signatures, as placed by Eng Ning and the above mentioned
Chinese theatrical company. The accused appealed that he could not be convicted of the
falsification of six tickets, as declared and held in the judgment appealed from, inasmuch as the
complaint was restricted to one ticket only, and that the ticket in question is a private document.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of private documents.

Ruling: Yes. The counterfeiting and simulation of the signature and rubric and the imitation of
the figures, letters, and other characters contained in a Chinese theater ticket to the damage of the
company issuing the same, constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document,
punishable under the provisions of article 304 of the Penal Code.

As to the first issue raised by the appellant where the complaint was restricted to one ticket only,
the accused can not be convicted of falsification of six tickets, and judgment must conform to the
charge.
 People v. Domingo
G.R. No. L-24086
March 25, 1926
Facts: A fishpond was registered in the name of two sisters who subsequently died. Under the
pretext of endeavoring to find a purchaser for the fishpond, the appellant obtained possession of
the certificate of title from the administrator of the estates of the sisters on the condition that she
return it in the afternoon of the following day. She failed to return the certificate, but shortly
afterwards a deed of sale of the fishpond was executed by two women, representing themselves
to be the two sisters in whose name the original certificate of title was issued. The forged deed
together with the certificate of title was presented to the register of deeds, who duly registered
the transfer evidenced by the deed, and cancelled the original certificate of title. When the
forgery was discovered the two women who executed the forged deed could not be found or
identified, and an information was presented against the appellant and alleged confederates for
falsification of a public document. Testifying at the trial of the case, the appellant denied that she
had received the original certificate of title from the administrator of the estate of the owners and
offered no further explanation.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed falsification of public documents.

Ruling: Yes. The evidence was conclusive that the appellant had obtained possession of the
certificate as alleged in the information. The crime could not have been committed if the
perpetrators had not been in possession of the certificate of title. That not having offered any
explanation as to what she did with. the certificate, the position of the appellant was analogous to
that of a person who immediately after a larceny has been committed is found in possession of
the stolen goods and offers no explanation, and that the possession of the certificate of title being
one of the necessary means of committing the crime in question, she was guilty as principal.
 Alonzo v. IAC
G.R. No. L-68624
June 30, 1987
Facts: That on or about October 30, 1974 in the City of Olongapo, the accused, being then the
personnel officer of the Fire Department of Olongapo City and entrusted with the preparation,
follow up and payments of payrolls, vouchers, and other papers and documents relative to the
salary of the personnel and members of the Olongapo City Fire Department prepared an official
voucher which is a public document pertaining to the salary of Wilfredo Cadua for the period
covering from October 1-31, 1974, for a total of P166.67 and falsified the signature and signed
for Wilfredo Cadua without the latter's knowledge and consent. The said voucher was presented
for payment and received the amount of P166.67. Once in possession of the said amount, the
accused misappropriated it to his own personal use. Despite repeated demands, the accused
refused and continued to refuse to remit the same, to the damage and prejudice of Wilfredo
Cadua. However, the accused subsequently remitted to Wilfredo Cadua the amount of P100.00.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty of estafa through falsification of public documents.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed falsification of public documents.

Ruling: No. From the above, it can be seen that the petitioners could not possibly be guilty of
preparing the complainant’s voucher, considering that it was his official duty to do so. He
prepared the voucher of Wilfredo Cadua in the amount of P166.67 for the month of October.
There was no alteration made in the amount stated in the voucher because the stated amount is
the correct salary of the complainant for that period. It was not the petitioner who presented the
voucher for payment but their office messenger, Pangilinan. The appellant did not misappropriate
the full amount of P166.67 nor did he refuse or continue to refuse to remit the amount. In fact, he
handed to Wilfredo Cadua the amount of P100.00 on that same day while, at the same time
informing Cadua that he was borrowing the amount of P66.67 for his x-ray expense. On
November 10, 1974, the appellant paid the complaining witness the amount of P66.67 upon the
advice of the chief of the Olongapo City Fire Department.

The fact that petitioner prepared the voucher is not a sufficient reason for the court to conclude
that the forgery was effected by the appellant; Rule that one found in possession of and who used
a forged document is a forger or the one who caused the forgery and is guilty of falsification, not
applicable in case at bar.—The fact that the petitioner prepared the voucher, considering it was
his official duty to prepare the payroll, vouchers, and other documents assigned to him is not a
sufficient reason for the respondent court to conclude that “there is no doubt that the forgery or
falsification was effected by the appellant.” Unfortunately, the respondent court mistakenly
applied the rule that: “one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger
or the one who caused the forgery and, therefore, is guilty of falsification.
 US v. Paraiso
G.R. No. 106
February 14, 1902
Facts: In the year 1900 the defendant was the agent in Vigan of the business house known as
"The Philippine Trading Company." In the month of March he signed a document with the name
of Luis Encarnacion in which it was made to appear that the latter had received from him as such
agent the sum of $150 on account of the purchase of 100 picos of maguey. In July he signed with
the same name a similar receipt for the sum of $970. During the trial the defendant confessed
that it was true that the receipts were false, that he had not bought maguey from Encarnacion,
and that he had not paid the latter any money. He signed the receipts in imitation of the writing
and rubric of Encarnacion.

The accused kept the said receipts in his house without having delivered or shown them to
anyone or made any use of them. Van Sternberghe, then the cashier of the accused, produced
them to the court. It does not appear how the latter obtained them, although the counsel for the
defendant stated at the trial in the court below that while the accused was absent in Manila Van
Sternberghe, who lived in his house, took the said receipts.

The defendant made false entries in the books of the company by which it appears there were
paid to Encarnacion on the dates of the receipts the sums which are stated therein. Nevertheless
he is not accused of any crime based upon the said entries. The complaint is limited to the
falsification of the receipts. It is probable that the entries were made first, the receipts having
been drawn up later in order that they might be availed of in corroboration of the entries. It is not
explained to us how the fact of the existence of these entries can have any relation to the facts of
the case. It is not proved that prejudice to the company might have arisen because of the entries
or the receipts.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed falsification of documents.

Ruling: No. The mere writing of false receipts found unused in the writer's house does not
constitute a violation of article 304 of the Penal Code. In the first place he must have
counterfeited the document, and secondly, he must have performed some other independent act
in order to make use of it — an act which, while it does not result in prejudice to a third party,
has been done nevertheless with the intention of causing such prejudice. The prejudice or
intention to cause the same to a third person must be evidenced by an act independent of the
writing of the false document.
 US v. Infante
G.R. No. No. L-11448
January 25, 1917
Facts: Appellants in this case were convicted in the former case of the crime of falsification of a
private document, in that they falsified a pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, to the
prejudice of the complaining witness. The evidence disclosed that the accused changed the
description of the pawned article as it appeared on the face of the pawn ticket and substituted
therefor another article of greatly superior value, and that thereafter the falsified ticket was itself
pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining witness for an amount largely in excess of the true
value of the article pawned in the Monte de Piedad, for which the original pawn ticket was
issued.

In the present case these appellants were convicted in the court below of the falsification of
another pawn ticket issued by the Monte de Piedad, and the evidence discloses that this pawn
ticket was falsified by these accused at or about the same time when they falsified the pawn
ticket for the falsification of which they were convicted at the former trial, that the falsification
was made in substantially similar manner to that in which the other ticket was falsified, and that
both the falsified tickets were pawned in the pawnshop of the complaining witness at the same
time and for the same purpose, that is to say, to procure a loan far in excess of the true value of
the articles originally pawned in the Monte de Piedad.

The contention of the appellants is that, since both these tickets were falsified at or about the
same time and for the same purpose, and since both were used at the same time to procure
unlawfully a certain sum of money from the pawn-broking establishment of the complaining
witness, there was but one crime committed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed two counts of falsification of private documents.

Ruling: Yes. The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no
relation to each other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the
falsification of one individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series.
The falsification of each of these documents constituted a single consummated offense wholly
separate and distinct from the other and wholly separate and distinct from the crime of
embezzlement which was committed when illegal and improper use was made of these falsified
pawn tickets as pledges; and that a plea of a former conviction of the falsification of one of these
pawn tickets is not a bar to the prosecution and maintenance of a criminal action wherein the
accused are charged with the falsification of the other.
 US v. Look Chaw
G.R. No. No. L-5887
December 16, 1910
Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on August 19, 1909, several persons, among them
Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue
agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo and
found first in a cabin near the saloon one sack (Opium A) and afterwards in the hold, another
sack (Opium B). The sack referred to as Sack A contained 49 cans of opium, and the other,
Opium B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which
the sack mentioned in Opium B was found was under the defendant's control who freely and of
his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Opium B and
found in the cabin belonged to him. The said defendant also stated that he had bought these sacks
of opium in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz,
and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other
Chinamen to keep the sack. Another lot of four cans of opium, Opium C, was the subject matter
of investigation at the trial and the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they
were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were
delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should
have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of
opium, always provided it should not be taken shore. And, finally, another can of opium, Opium
D, which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent and taken to the office of the
governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell, as stated by the witness.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction
to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal asked that
the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable
amount of opium seized.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the case at hand.
2. Whether or not the maximum penalty should be imposed against the accused.

Ruling:
1. Yes. Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general rule,
constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of
which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil; in such
a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed, with respect to which, as it
is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no
court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
2. No. Even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present
case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed
by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.
 US v. Jose
G.R. No. No. L-11737
August 25, 1916
Facts: Three secret service agents, Scott, Samson, and Balmes, went to Olongapo for the
purpose of seizing the drug as soon as it should be discharged and delivered to Marcelo Jose.
They observed a banca coming toward the shore from the steamship Abarenda with the evident
intention of landing near the lumber store referred to. They saw a sack containing a number of
cans of opium and thought more may be hidden on the premises. The agent who had been hiding
in the back part of the building called Balmes and they observed Tan Bo while he opened the
bundle. He followed him inside and there saw the accused, Tan Bo, in the act of opening the
bundle which had been delivered to him by the person who carried it from the banca. Samson
immediately arrested him and, searching him, found in his pockets and about his clothes ten cans
of opium. Marcelo Jose, the owner of the opium, took secret service man Samson apart and
offered him P800 if he would return the opium and say nothing about it. He accompanied this
request by delivering to Samson P400. Samson took the money and turned it over to his
companion Balmes for safekeeping and ordered him to call a policeman. Shortly afterwards Scott
arrived in company with a local policeman and Marcelo Jose was arrested along with two other
Chinamen and a woman who was found sleeping in the store. They also arrested Tan Bo; and, on
asking him who the owner's name was, he stated that it belonged to Marcelo Joseph Jose.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of importation as defined by the Opium
Law.

Ruling: In a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the
Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel from
which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug
on board.
The crime of illegal possession of opium is not necessarily included in the crime of illegal
importation of that drug, and, therefore, on failure to convict under the information in this case
charging illegal importation of opium and not illegal possession, no conviction can be had for
illegal possession of the same drug, although such possession is shown beyond a reasonable
doubt.
 US v. Ah Sing
G.R. No. No. L-13005
October 10, 1917
Facts: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang.
The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a
voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon,
brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip
from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the
authorities, on making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the
ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of
this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his
purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence, direct or indirect, to show that the intention
of the accused was to illegally import this opium into the Philippines was introduced.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of importation of opium.

Ruling: Yes. Under Section 4, Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands when the prohibited drug is found under
this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In this case, a person is guilty of illegal importation
of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the
facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and
forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of doing so. It would likewise be
impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use.
No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this
opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. The court accordingly found that there was
illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any
possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in
transit, a situation not present.
 US v. Chan Toco
G.R. No. L-3851
December 17, 1908
Facts: The accused in this case was charged with an infraction of section 4 of Act No. 1461 of
the Philippine Commission, in that on the 23rd day of October, 1906, he smoked opium in the
store of a Chinaman named Liangco, in the municipality of Santo Niño, in the province of
Samar, without being duly registered, and without having secured a certificate to that effect, as
provided in section 4 of the Act. The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial
court, and establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and we find no error in
the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the appellant. Counsel for the accused demurred to the
information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of opium had not been prescribed as
a medicine by a duly licensed and practicing physician; and in support of his contention that the
demurrer filed in the court was improperly overruled, counsel for the appellant insists that the
statutory offense defined in section 4 of Act No. 1461, of which the appellant was convicted, was
not sufficiently alleged in the information, and a formidable array of authorities have been cited
holding that, where the enacting clause in a statute describes an offense with certain exceptions,
the exceptions should be negative in the indictment, complaint or information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of use and possession of opium.

Ruling: Yes. It is not necessary, in an information charging a violation of section 4 of Act No.
1461, to negative the exception in favor of persons using opium under prescription of a duly
licensed and practicing physician, the matter contained in the exception being a matter of defense
which must be alleged and proven by the accused if he relies upon it.

Where a statute defining an offense contains an exception in the enacting clause of the statute
which is so incorporated with the language defining the offense that the ingredients of the
offense can not be accurately and clearly described if the exception is omitted, the rules of good
pleading require that an indictment founded upon the statute must allege enough to show that the
accused is not within the exception; but if the language of the section defining the offense is so
entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offense may be
accurately and .clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely
omit any such reference, as the matter contained in the exception is matter of defense and must
be shown by the accused. As a rule, an exception in a penal statute, by which certain particulars
are withdrawn from or excepted out of the enacting clause thereof, defining a crime concerning a
class or species, constitutes no part of the definition of such crime, whether placed close to or
remote from the enacting clause.
 US v. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-10396
July 29, 1915
Facts: On the night of the 2nd of December, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the
defendant, where she was living with her husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving there, they
obtained permission to enter and immediately proceeded to search the premises for opium. While
there is some dispute concerning the fact, we believe the proof shows that the defendant, during
the time the policemen were searching the house, went to a bed located in the house, after being
so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a pillow a small can of opium, said to contain
about 7½ grams of opium, and attempted to throw it away. At that moment the policemen took
possession of the can. There is some conflict in the proof as to just what took place at that
moment. That the policemen inquired to whom the opium belonged is not denied. The conflict
arises in the answer which was given to that question. The defendant in the present case,
according to some of the witnesses, declared that it belonged to her. Her husband, Felix
Ricablanca, according to some witnesses, declared that he was the owner of the house and was
responsible for everything that was found within it. The policemen, at that moment, evidently
believed that the opium belonged to the husband, Felix Ricablanca, for the reason that they
arrested him and took him to the pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a violation of
the Opium Law. He was later brought to trial and was acquitted but his wife was arrested and
found guilty of violation of the Opium Law.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of possession of opium.

Ruling: No. The fact that the defendant took the opium from under the pillow on the bed, at the
request of her husband, seems to us to be entirely supported by the proof. Her husband was a
confirmed user of opium. He admitted that he was in the habit of smoking opium. That the
defendant was temporarily in possession of the opium is not denied, even by her. That her
possession was such a possession as is prohibited by the law, she strongly denies. The mere fact
that she had in her possession the opium for but a moment and took possession of it under her
husband's order, is not, in our opinion, such a possession of opium as is intended to be
condemned by the law. She certainly did not intend, even remotely, to have in her possession
opium. She did exactly what any other faithful wife would have done under similar
circumstances. There is no proof that she was a user of opium in any form. There is no proof that
she knew that the can contained opium and consequently there is no proof of the animus
possidendi. In the absence of such proof there can be no conviction under the complaint for the
illegal possession of opium.
 US v. Gan Lian Po
G.R. No. L-11772
August 31, 1916
Facts: The appellant was the owner of a building located at No. 317 Ilang-Ilang Street in which
he conducted the business of manufacturing sacks. The superintendent and manager of that
business was the defendant, Ko Seng, whom we have referred to as having pleaded guilty. On the
29th of February, 1916, several police officers raided the premises and found a considerable
quantity of cocaine and morphine hidden away in a certain room among a mass of sacks. Arrests
were made and after preliminary investigation, the persons already mentioned, including the
appellant, were charged with the illegal possession of morphine and cocaine.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of possession of opium.

Ruling: No. While it is true that, as a matter of law, when opium is found in a house or other
building belonging to and occupied by a particular persons, the presumption arises that such
person is in possession of such prohibited drug in violation of law, and the fact of finding the
opium on his premises, together with the presumption referred to, is sufficient to convict, he may
escape a conviction by showing to the satisfaction of the trial court that the opium was placed on
his premises by some other person or persons without his knowledge or consent. The finding of
the drugs in the building owned by the appellant and hidden under sacks belonging alone, was
sufficient to convict. The appellant, however, accepted the opportunity offered by the law to
rebut the presumption of knowledge and sought to establish his innocence thereof. He testified,
as a witness on his own behalf, that, until the moment of the raid, he had no knowledge
whatsoever of the presence of the drugs on his premises. He declared also that the business was
under the control and superintendence of his foreman, Ko Seng, and that he placed the drugs in
the place where they were found, concealing from the appellant the fact that they were there.
They also showed that he had a considerable number of employees who occupied the building
and that the circumstances afforded every opportunity for the concealment of the opium in or
about his premises without the possibility of his knowing of its presence. He denied that he said
to Sergeant Sullivan that he knew the opium was there before the raid was made.
 People v. De Jesus
G.R. Nos. L-71942–43
November 13, 1986
Facts: Tipped of drug-trafficking at the Bisig Ng Nayon area, a haven for drug users/pushers, the
anti-narcotics group of the Caloocan City Police conducted a campaign thereat on January 17,
1984. Apprehended on that occasion-it was around one o'clock in the afternoon-was accused
Carlito de Jesus alias "Carling." Aside from selling five sticks of marijuana (worth P10.00) to
police officer Jesus Nadonga, who had posed as a drug-buyer, accused Carlito de Jesus alias
"Carling" was also found in possession of 32 sticks of marijuana-when frisked by the police.
Those sold by and confiscated from the accused were examined by the forensic-chemistry unit of
the National Bureau of Investigation-and were found "positively marijuana." Immediately after
his apprehension, the accused owned the crime charged-and even gave a statement which he
acknowledged before the inquest fiscal.

However, the defense adduced that the accused had a tooth-extraction on the date he was
arrested-and, therefore, he could not have perpetrated the crimes charged as he was then resting
when apprehended. The accused did not give any statement to the police-he was merely coerced
by the police into signing a prepared statement. Fistic blows were rained on him by the police
soon after his arrest-on the way to and at the police headquarters. Nonetheless, no step was taken
by him and his family relative to what happened to him (particularly the alleged injuries
inflicted).

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 as amended)

Ruling: Yes. Pat Jesus Nadonga who acted as poseur-buyer clearly and positively identified
appellant de Jesus as the seller of the marijuana. The appellant’s defense is that he was not there
at the scene of the crime. He was recuperating from a tooth extraction. The denial and
explanations cannot overcome the positive evidence. The court agreed with the lower court when
it cited the well-established rule that greater weight is given to the positive testimony of the
prosecution witness than to the accused’s denial.

The accused manifested before trial his willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
unlawful possession of marijuana but the prosecuting fiscal objected and insisted on the
prosecution of both offenses. All considered, the court held that the guilt of appellant de Jesus
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
 People v. Punto
G.R. No. 46170
Sept. 20, 1939
Facts: On or about October 12, 1937, in the barrio of Sto. Angel in the municipality of San
Pablo, Province of Laguna, the accused had in his possession and under his possession and
control effects related to the game of chance called jueteng, consisting of several jueteng slips, a
pencil and the sum of P0. 91 in cash, which effects were found by the agents of the authority in
possession of said accused who, on the referred date, had already been convicted and condemned
of the same infraction by the Justice of the Peace of said municipality of San Pablo, on August 3,
1932. The appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Commonwealth Act No. 235,
amendatory to article 195 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the penalty is cruel and
unusual.

Issue: Whether or not Act No. 235 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: No. The punishment provided, far from being cruel and unusual, is motivated by a
wholesome purpose, namely, to effectuate early repression of an evil that, in the opinion of the
Legislature, undermines the social, moral, and economic growth of the nation, and is best
calculated to answer the ends of precaution necessary to deter others from the commission of like
offenses.
 US v. Palma
G.R. No. 2188
May 5, 1905
Facts: The appellant and twenty-six others were arrested in the house of Santiago Palma by the
police and the evidence shows that they gathered around a table upon which was a bottle
(tambiolo) with the balls already in it, envelopes with papers in them about 7 pesos in money, a
box with papers in it, and a book. The appellants were convicted of playing the game of jueteng
in violation of article 343 of the Penal Code, Santiago Palma on the ground that he was the
owner of the gambling house and Francisco Palma on the ground that he was a player.

Issue: Whether or not Santiago and Francisco Palma violated Art. 343 of the Penal Code.

Ruling: No. There is no evidence in the case to show that the appellant Francisco Palma had
made any bet upon the game. There is no evidence that his name appeared upon the book or that
he was in possession of any ticket bearing any one of the thirty-seven numbers. The only proof
against him is that he was a bystander. We do not understand that article 343 makes it an offense
for one to be present in a gambling house. This appellant must accordingly be acquitted.

In order to convict the appellant Santiago Palma on the ground that he was the owner of a
gambling house, it must be proved that he was maintaining a place devoted to that purpose.
There is no evidence in the case to show that this game of jueteng or any other game had ever
been played in his house before. This defendant produced a witness who testified that he lived
very near the house of this appellant and that he had never seen people frequenting it for the
purpose of gaming.
 US v. Filart
G.R. No. L-10263
March 13, 1915
Facts: The appellants entered into an agreement whereby they would jointly sell to the public
450 tickets, successively numbered from one, up, each number representing a chance on an
automobile which was to be drawn by lot as a prize as soon as the tickets so numbered were sold;
and that the winner of the automobile was determined in the following manner: The numbers
composing the 450, each written on a separate piece of paper, were placed together in a box and
thoroughly mixed; a boy was selected by the appellants who placed his hand in the box and drew
out a number; this he delivered to a person placed there by the appellants for that purpose, who
unfolded the paper and read the number in a loud voice, while one of the appellants, with a list of
the 450 numbers referred to, struck therefrom the number corresponding to that drawn from the
box; this being repeated until all of the numbers were drawn from the box and stricken from the
list; that the last number drawn from the box was the winning number and that the owner of that
number won and received the automobile as a prize.

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated Act No. 1757, known as the Gambling Law.

Ruling: Yes. The court held that a lottery is said to be "a species of gaming, which may be
defined as a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or
agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance to obtain a prize." It is also defined as "a
scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance:" and "a scheme by which result is reached by
some action or means taken, and in which a result man's choice or will has no part, nor can
human reason, foresight, sagacity, or design enable him to know or determine such result until
the same has been accomplished." It has also been stated that "where a pecuniary consideration is
paid, and it is held determined by lot or chance, according to some scheme held out to the public,
what the party who pays the money is to have for it, it is a lottery." It has also been held that the
word lottery "embraces the elements of procuring through lot or chance, by the investment of a
sum of money or something of value, some greater amount of money or thing of greater value;"
and that "where small amounts are hazarded to gain large amounts, and the result of winning or
losing is determined by chance, in which neither choice nor skill can operate to influence the
result, there is gambling by lot, or a prohibited lottery;" and "any scheme whereby one, on
paying money or other valuable thing to another, becomes entitled to receive from him such a
return in value, nothing, as some formula of chance may determine" is a lottery. It was held in
the case of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, that three elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A
consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some advantage or inequality in amount or value which
is in the nature of the prize. The facts of record place this case within the definition generally
given of a lottery. Hence, the accused violated the Gambling Law.
 Evangelista v. Hon. Baes
A.C. No. 000 (Unnumbered CAR Case)
December 26, 1974
Facts: Ferardo Baeuan, one of the plaintiffs in CAR Case No. 1438, failed to appear at the
pre-trial, but Paciano Basuan, his co-plaintiff, appeared. For the failure of Ferardo to appear,
Judge Baes ordered the dismissal of the entire case, thus affecting also Paciano, which should not
have been the case. The order is indeed erroneous, but the motivation for its issuance excludes
malice or a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent to cause injustice. The transcript of
the stenographic notes taken at the pre-trial indicates that the hearing of the case had been
postponed several times at the behest of the plaintiffs; that they were previously warned that the
pre-trial would proceed whether they had a lawyer or not; that despite this warning, Paciano
appeared without counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: No. The High Court has had occasion to restate a fundamental rule of long standing,
which is, that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, and that he may be held liable
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment only if it is shown beyond cavil that the judgment is
unjust as being contrary to law or as not supported by the evidence, and the same was rendered
with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. There being good faith on the part of the
respondent judge in the issuance of the questioned order, the charge should be dismissed.
 Yaranon v. Judge Rubio
Adm. Matter No. 449-MJ
August 7, 1975
Facts: This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Antonio Rubio of the
Municipality of Inopacan Leyte for alleged (1) incompetence and/or ignorance of the law and (2)
delaying justice. Complainant, Atty. Yaranon filed a charge of estafa with respondent's court
against the spouses Puzon, his tenants or overseers who had earlier filed a case against him and
his wife for reinstatement, which the complainant eventually lost. Complainant accused said
tenants with having failed to account for agricultural items given to them in trust. After due trial
wherein the only witness of complainant was himself, respondent acquitted the accused.
Complainant charges that said decision of acquittal constitutes knowingly rendering an unjust
and/or unfair decision.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Rubio can be held liable for an error in judgment.

Ruling: No. The Court was satisfied that absent any evidence of ill-motive or improper
consideration, the same cannot by itself prove the charge laid against the respondent. The
decision discusses creditably the evidence of the parties and the Court see no indication therein
of any untoward factor that could have induced respondent to be unfair to complainant. The latter
may have a different view of his case, but mere error of judgment, assuming its existence, and
the Court hold that here there was none, cannot serve as basis for a charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, there being no proof or even allegation of bad faith.

With respect to the alleged delay in rendering his decision in question, The Court found
sufficiently justified the excuse given by respondent that the delay was due to “honest oversight”
as explained by respondent. The record of his performance when he was assigned to assist the
Municipal Judge of Baybay, Leyte is impressive.
 People v. Mina
G. R. No. L-45312
June 13, 1938
Facts: That on or about February 6, 1936, in the municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan, the
defendant, being the chief of police of said municipality, maliciously defaulted in the prosecution
and punishment of the violators prohibiting and penalizing Jueteng. The defendant failed to file
the corresponding criminal action against Juan Lazo who was caught possessing jueteng lists and
other objects relating to said game, and tolerated and permitted said Juan Lazo to continue acting
as jueteng collector.

On June 26, 1936 the case was called for the arraignment of the defendant but since he failed to
appear in spite of due notice to his bondsmen, the court confiscated his bond and ordered his
arrest. Several days thereafter, upon motion of the defendant who gave satisfactory explanations,
the confiscation of the bond and the arrest were set aside. On July 8th of the same year, the
defendant was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty”, and the trial was set for August 7, 1936. On
the third of the same month, the defendant asked for continuance and the trial was postponed
until the 25th, on which date the defendant appeared and asked for another continuance with a
view to preparing his defense. The court again acceded and accordingly postponed the trial until
August 27th of the same year. On the latter date, the defendant appeared and was permitted by
the court to withdraw his plea of “not guilty” and substitute one of “guilty”. The information was
again read and, after understanding the same, the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty.

Thereupon the court rendered judgment finding him guilty of the offense charged and sentencing
him to six months and one day of prision correccional and six months and one day of suspension
form the office of chief of police of the municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan. From this
judgment, the defendant appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the judge erred in his decision against the accused.

Ruling: No. Under Section 25 of General Orders, No. 58 has been construed liberally in the
sense that the allowance of substitution is within the discretion of the court even after judgment
of conviction. Before judgment, the substitution, although falling within the sound discretion of
the court, is generally allowed. In both cases judicial discretion is exercised having in view the
question whether the defendant clearly understood the allegations of the information and whether
the defense invoked, in case new trial is sought, is meritorious and will alter the outcome of the
case. The record shows that the defendant had sufficient time to prepare his defense and have his
witnesses subpoenaed from the moment he was first informed of the complaint on April 27, 1936
until he voluntarily pleaded guilty and judgment of conviction was rendered on August 27th of
the same year.

Moreover, the court a quo did not misuse his discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration
and new trial, because the new evidence offered by the defendant, supposing it to be newly
discovered, did not tend either to alter the result of the case or to exonerate him. The alleged new
evidence consists of sworn statements of Luciano de Guzman and Canuto de Leon who declared
that they saw the arrest of Juan Lazo and heard the defendant say to him that he would be
released on condition that he would accompany the defendant to the place where jueteng was
being played and would help in the arrest of the bankers and collectors thereof. This evidence, if
admitted, far from justifying the conduct of the defendant, would have further demonstrated his
guilt, for the reason that there is no law empowering him to release a violator even if the latter
agrees to aid him in the capture of other culprits. Only the court, under the conditions prescribed
by section 34 of General Orders, No. 58, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2709, may exclude
a defendant from the charge and absolve him from all criminal responsibility.
 US v. Mendoza
G. R. No. 7540
September 23, 1912
Facts: About 8 o'clock in the evening of August 1, 1910, Bernabe Mangunay, mounted on a
carabao, approached the house of Mateo del Rosario, situated in the barrio of Apulid, of the
pueblo of Paniqui, Tarlac, to ask for something to eat. As he was then carrying a papaya
firebrand and got too close to the house, the eaves thereof caught fire and its nipa roof
immediately started to burn, a large part of it being consumed. Thereupon Silveria Marcoleta,
wife of the owner of the house, Rosario, who was not in at the time but a neighbor's, called out
for help and immediately left the house to escape from the fire, taking her two children and little
brother with her. Owing to the prompt arrival of the husband and several neighbors, the fire was
put out before it had burned the whole house.

On the following day the owner of the house, Mateo del Rosario, reported the occurrence to
Vicente Mendoza, the lieutenant of the aforesaid barrio, and accused Bernabe Mangunay of
starting the fire. Mendoza thereupon ordered the junior lieutenant, Candido Yabut, to summon
the accused. But when the latter appeared, said Mendoza took no action whatsoever, nor did he
even report the facts to the proper higher authority, but, on the contrary, permitted the incendiary
to return home.

The provincial fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac charging
Vicente Mendoza as accessory after the fact in the crime of arson. After trial, the defendant was
sentenced to the penalty of two years four months and one day of presidio correccional, to the
accessories, with allowance of one-half of the time of his detention, and to payment of the costs;
from which judgment he appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused barrio-lieutenant is guilty of the crime defined under Art. 355
of the Penal Code, not of Arson.

Ruling: Yes. A lieutenant of barrio who neglects his duty and fails to move the prosecution of,
and punishment for, a crime of arson, of the commission of which he is informed, would, in case
the alleged crime were afterwards duly proven, be guilty of "pre-varicación" under article 355 of
the Penal Code, but not of concealment of the crime of arson.

The responsibility of the accessory after the fact is subordinate to that of the principal, because
the accessory's participation is subsequent to the commission of the offense and his guilt is very
directly related to that of the principal. When a prosecution is instituted against a person charged
with crime, if the charge is not proven or the facts shown do not constitute a crime, there is no
ground for holding any person guilty either as principal or as accessory.
 Vda. De Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla and Lombos
G.R. No. L-12247
August 26, 1958
Facts: It appears that on June 29, 1954, the Bagatuas, together with their spouses and their
mother Beatriz Ramos, executed a public instrument which was duly registered, wherein they
sold and conveyed ownership unto Burgos Pangilinan of a part of the lot with an area of 3,358
square meters in consideration of the sum of P6,000. On June 21, 1956, however, Rodrigo
Bagatua, acting for himself and on behalf of his sisters, accused Burgos L. Pangilinan of estafa
before the City Attorney of Quezon City for having allegedly induced them to sign papers
supposedly necessary for the subdivision of their lot, but one of which turned out to be a deed of
sale. In virtue of which, they charged that they were prejudiced in the amount of P13,432.

Upon receipt of said complaint, the Assistant City Attorney of Quezon City conducted a
preliminary investigation which lasted for several days, during which occasions both parties
were duly represented by counsel. Testimonial as well as documentary evidence was presented
and after the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Assistant City Attorney
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Accordingly, the complaint was
dismissed. The complainants filed a petition for mandamus with the CFI of Quezon City against
the City Attorney and the Assistant City Attorney seeking to compel the aforesaid officials to file
the corresponding information against Burgos Pangilinan for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, contending that the respondents, in dismissing the complaint, committed a
grave abuse of discretion.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, on the theory that as
the duties of a fiscal are not ministerial but involve discretion, it cannot be controlled by
mandamus unless there had been a grave abuse thereof. It is averred that the respondent Assistant
City Attorney, in recommending the dismissal of the complaint and the City Attorney, in
dismissing the same did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

The CFI of Quezon City sustained the motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no clear
indication that in the performance of their duties, respondents abused their discretion. From this
order, petitioners appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the fiscal.

Ruling: No. The preliminary investigation elicited no improper motive on the part of said
complainants to accuse Pangilinan of the offense charged, and thus considered the dismissal of
the complaint as erroneous. The absence of motive alone is not sufficient to presume the
existence of a prima facie case. The circumstances and evidence on record must be taken
together before such a conclusion may be arrived at. The court have gone over the report or
memorandum of the Assistant City Attorney and from the facts established by the preliminary
investigation conducted by him as well as the reasons given for the dismissal of the complaint,
and held that nothing that would reveal or tend to reveal any semblance of abuse perpetrated by
respondents and appellees.

A fiscal's failure to give credence or weight to the testimony of witnesses or otherwise appreciate
the evidence presented in a preliminary investigation, unless patently capricious or arbitrary,
cannot be taken as an abuse of discretion, for he must have formed his impression after
observing and evaluating the demeanor and conduct of a witness testifying before him.
 People v. Malabanan
G.R. No. L-43430
January 7, 1936
Facts: In July, 1933, appellant was municipal president of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and
was engaged in raising funds for the construction of a ward in the provincial hospital for
tubercular patients. Notwithstanding all his efforts to secure contributions, he was unable to
approximate the quota which had been set for his town by the provincial authorities, and he
therefore on July 22, and July 29, organized and held cock-fights, neither day being authorized
by law for such purposes. Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas of a
violation of article 208 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is not clear whether the government is claiming the right to punish appellant because he did
not institute prosecution against himself for organizing a cock-fight on a day other than those
permitted by law or, under the last clause, that it was his duty to have prosecutions instituted
against all who attended the cock-fights and bet money thereon.

It is also contended in argument that the word "maliciously" in the Act means no more than mere
knowledge or voluntary violation of the law and that it only applies to the first clause and does
not qualify the toleration therein denounced. It is true that the word "maliciously" has been given
by the courts different meanings according to the context of the legislation in which the word is
used.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: No. The Court found appellant not guilty of a violation of article 208 but guilty of a
violation of article 199 of the Revised Penal Code. It is not clear whether the Government is
claiming the right to punish appellant because he did not institute prosecution against himself for
organizing a cock-fight on a day other than those permitted by law, or because it was his duty to
have prosecutions instituted against all who attended the cockfights and bet money thereon.

The definition of the Spanish word malicia, root of the word maliciosamente used in article 208,
found in 21 Enciclopedia, Jurídica Española, page 542, indicates what the ordinary use of the
word connotes, that the action complained of must be the result of a deliberate evil intent and
does not cover a mere voluntary act.

It is clear that giving article 208, Revised Penal Code, the most liberal interpretation possible
would result in impossible conditions in these Islands. If every public functionary who fails to
institute criminal proceedings for every misdemeanor which he has reason to believe has been
committed, is liable to be sent to jail for a year and a half as a felon, an intolerable situation
would occur. Every municipal president in the Islands would be subject to conviction by the
machinations of his political enemies, under a statute as rigorous as any devised by Draco.
 People v. Sope
G.R. No. L-16
January 31, 1946
Facts: When Juliana Chan was on her way home after selling a ring in a Bambang market, a
calesa suddenly stopped in front of her, from which the appellants Sope pointed his revolver to
her, while Cruz poked her back with a hard object. The other accused, Tomas Dimalanta,
remained in the calesa. Cruz ordered her to board the rig, which she did, followed by him. Sope
did not join them but stayed behind.

Cruz and Dimalanta pretended to be peace officers who had apprehended her because they had
found her violating the law, pointing to her a bag in the rig which they themselves had brought
along, by which they meant that she was unlawfully dealing in U.S. Army goods.

The calesa was ordered to stop at Herbosa Street in front of the Victory Cafe where the two
accused even asked the complainant to take coffee with them. But all the time they kept
intimidating and threatening her if she did not give them money. As a result of their concerted
action, she finally gave them P200.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of bribery.

Ruling: No. The accused, by pretending that they were officers of the law and by employing
threats and intimidation to obtain the amount of P200, are guilty of the crime of robbery. It is not
well founded to consider that the offense committed by the accused appears to be bribery. It
seems true that the offended witness was imputed to be carrying a bundle which might have
contained contraband, and for fear of discovery of that contraband the husband of the offended
party ran away from the scene and did not come back. There exists, however, no evidence
regarding said contraband other than the testimony of the accused themselves, which is not
positive and convincing. Moreover, it should not escape our attention that said testimony, coming
as it does from the accused who naturally want to exculpate themselves, cannot be regarded as
free from a bias and a desire to so intensify the details thereof as to suit their case. Regarding the
disappearance of the husband of the offended party, we believe that nothing unfavorable to the
case of the prosecution can be attributed thereby. For all we know, he might have gone to look
for a policeman or any other agent of the law to report or make a complaint of what had
happened; and, as if to lend support to this view, it has been established in this case that the
offended party reported the occurrence to the police and was subsequently investigated by the
prosecuting attorney's office which was the one that filed the robbery charges against the
accused. It was not the offended party who determined what charges to be filed; neither did she
have control of the case. What is clear and uncontradicted by the facts of this case is that it was
the prosecuting attorney's office that took charge of the investigation and filing of the charges for
robbery, and nothing like having so framed her accusation as to make the crime committed by
the accused appear to the robbery instead of bribery could be attributed to the offended party. It
is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended
party.
 US v. Gimenea
G.R. No. 8168
March 25, 1913
Facts: Escolastico Cabilao, a resident of the municipality of Cebu, was afflicted with leprosy and
was gathered in by the officials of the Insular Bureau of Health to be transported to Culion.
While awaiting transportation to the leper colony, he was confined in a hospital at Cebu with a
number of other leprous persons under a guard of Constabulary soldiers, among whom was the
appellant, whose duty it was to hold them in quarantine. On the night of May 17, Cabilao
attempted to escape but was caught in the act by the sentry and forced to go back upstairs where
he was quartered.

According to the testimony of Escolastico Cabilao, an arrangement had been made between
Gimenea and the old man to allow him to escape from the hospital. One evening when Perez and
his brother-in-law arrived at the hospital with their father's supper, the old man told them that the
matter had been arranged and that they were to give Gimenea P10. Upon leaving the hospital,
Gimenea ordered a soldier named Aranas to follow them to get the money. The P10 was
delivered to Aranas at the house of the witnesses for the prosecution in the presence of Perez, his
wife, and his brothers-in-law. This was on the 17th of April. On the following evening when they
arrived with their father's supper, Gimenea told them to return at 10 o'clock and bring the money
with them to deliver to their father, as he would surely be able to escape early the following
morning. They were further instructed to inform the guard that they were bringing tobacco to
their father, as it was strictly against the rules to allow communication with the lepers at such a
late hour. They returned at 10 o'clock with P90, consisting of four P20 bills and one P10 bill. The
guard ordered them to half and asked them what brought them there, to which they replied that
they had some tobacco to deliver to their father. Gimenea was there and said to the sergeant who
was in charge of the guard at the time, "Let them talk two minutes." Perez, who gave the money
to his father-in-law, told him that when they turned him loose to give them the money. They then
left the hospital and went around to the rear of the building and waited there according to the
arrangement for their father, whom they were to take that same night to a farm belonging to him
located up in the mountains. They waited there until 2 o'clock in the morning, when, becoming
discouraged at the non-appearance of their father, they went home. In the meantime, the old man
had delivered the money to Gimenea and at about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning went downstairs
with Gimenea. The latter removed the grating of a window and just as the old man stepped out
he was stopped by a sentry, whereupon Gimenea told him to go back and they would try it again.
The next morning Perez informed the lieutenant of the Constabulary in charge of the whole
matter.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of bribery.

Ruling: Yes. A Constabulary soldier charged with the custody of a leper en route to the Culion
leper colony accepted money to assist in effecting the escape of the said leper. This was an
agreement to commit a crime, and, upon conviction on a charge of bribery, his punishment
should be fixed in accordance with article 381 of the Penal Code.

It is the duty of officers with police powers to assist the Director of Health, when called upon, in
the segregation and conveyance of lepers to places designated by that official. The connivance of
any such officer in the escape of a leper in his custody is a violation of such duty and a crime
penalized by section 6 of Act No. 1711.
 US v. Richards
G.R. No. L-2024
October 30, 1906
Facts: S. A. Reich and one Rosenburg, his partner, imported from China in the summer of 1903,
41 mules, which they accepted at the time they bought them to sell to the Insular Government of
the Philippines. When the mules arrived they were examined on board the vessel by the
defendant, who was paid by Reich the legal fees for such examination. After the mules were
landed 39 of them were bought and paid for the Insular Government. Prior to the payment of the
price they were examined by Dr. Best, the city veterinarian, and again examined by the defendant
at the request of the Insular Purchasing Agent, through whose office the purchase was made for
the use of the city of Manila. During these examinations four or five, probably five, of the
animals were rejected for various causes and other animals were supplied by Reich to take the
place of those rejected.

The sale was completed and the money paid by the Insular Purchasing Agent to Reich on the
27th day of July, 1903. On the 28th day of July he gave to the defendant a check for 50 pesos;
the latter received the check and drew the money thereon from the bank. On the 7th of August
Reich gave to Pete Wilson a check for 100 pesos which Wilson cashed. Wilson was foreman of
one of the city stables and had to do with the examination and purchase of these animals. On the
10th of August Reich gave a check of 100 pesos to Dr. Best, which the latter cashed. On the 29th
of July Reich drew two checks, one for 50 pesos and the other for 20 pesos, and on the 15th day
of August another check for 20 pesos, which were delivered by him to one Hullet. Hullet was an
employee of the Insular Purchasing Agent and had to do with the examination and purchase of
these animals. These checks were cashed, two of them apparently by one Smith and the third by
M. B. Davis. On the 3d day of August Reich drew a check for 500 pesos to the order of I. Beck
and delivered it to the latter. Beck notified Mehan, the superintendent of city transportation, that
he had this check for him, but Mehan refused to receive it. There was evidence to show that prior
to the arrival of the animals in Manila, Beck had a talk with Mehan in which he asked Mehan to
receive a thousand pesos and distribute it among the employees who would have to do with the
purchase of the animals. Mehan rejected this proposition and told Beck that he, Beck, had better
drop the matter.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of bribery.

Ruling: No. The money in this case was paid after the animals had been examined and the
transaction closed. In order to convict the defendant, therefore, under article 381 above quoted, it
is necessary to prove that there was some previous promise or agreement connected with some
act to be performed by Richards. The Court has called attention to all the evidence in the case
upon this subject and it is apparent that the only evidence to prove any previous agreement or
promise is the fact that after the transaction was closed Reich delivered and Richards received
the check above mentioned. This is entirely insufficient to show the existence of any promise or
offer made in connection with the animals described in the complaint. Whether the receipt of this
check by Richards would be evidence to prove an implied promise on his part to pass animals in
the future which Reich might sell to the city need not be discussed because the complaint does
not reach any such case.

The evidence in this case is sufficient to convict the defendant of a violation of article 386 of the
Penal Code. The defendant, Richards, testified at the trial that during the progress of these
examinations he gave Reich and Rosenburg some professional advice in regard to the habit of
cribbing in horses and told them how this disease could be detected in an animal, and he says the
50 pesos was the value of these services and that it was received by him in payment therefor. The
evidence in the case does not support this statement.
 US v. Valdehueza
G.R. No. 2118
April 26, 1905
Facts: The accused ordered the release of the prisoner Diego upon receiving from him the sum
of 20 pesos, instead of obeying the orders of the provincial governor requiring him to send this
prisoner to the capital. It is claimed by the defendant that it is not part of the official duty of the
president of a municipality to send prisoners in his charge to the capital of the province upon
receiving directions to that effect from the provincial governor.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of bribery.

Ruling: Yes. By the provisions of the Municipal Code the president of a municipality has the
control of the police officers and he has the power to give directions to them as to the custody of
prisoners in their charge. Having the prisoner under his charge, the Court has no doubt that it was
part of his official duty to obey the orders of the provincial governor in this respect. Hence, he
was guilty of bribery.
 US v. Velasquez
G.R. No. L-10935
November 4, 1915
Facts: From the testimony of the witnesses, on or about the 4th day of January, 1915, the
accused stole the money of the province by creating a difference between the amounts
represented in the receipts delivered to the persons from whom he collected fees and those
represented by the duplicate receipts which he retained in his hands from which the amount of
money for which he was responsible was determined. The evidence discloses that for some
considerable time he changed the duplicate receipts in such a manner as to make it appear that he
received less money than that actually received as shown by the receipts issued and delivered to
the persons who paid the fees. This system was followed until the difference between the
amounts shown in the original and the duplicate receipts was something like P597. This
difference the accused retained and converted to his own use.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of malversation of public funds.

Ruling: Yes. A clerk in the employ of a provincial government whose duty it is, among others,
to collect certain fees from persons registering land in that province and turn them over to the
provincial government is one of the persons described in section 1 of Act No. 1740, and may
properly be convicted under that statute if he is guilty of any of the acts therein prohibited and
punished.

A person accused under Act No. 1740 is a mere clerk and not a bonded officer of the provincial
government is of no legal consequence. The vital fact is that he is an employee of or in some way
connected with the government and that, in the course of his employment, he receives money or
property belonging to the government for which he is bound to account.

The name or relative importance of the office or employment held by the accused is not the
controlling factor; the nature of the duties which he performs—the fact that, as part of his duties,
he receives public money or property for which he is bound to account—is that which
determines whether or not, in case of failure to account, his case falls within Act No. 1740.
 US v. Togonon
G.R. No. L-4676
January 19, 1909
Facts: In the months of October, November, and December, 1907, being at that time municipal
president of the town of Corella, Province of Cebu, he received from W. Jayne Fosbury,
superintendent of schools, the sum of P60 as rent for a house owned during the quarter ending
December, 1907. It was the duty of the said Pedro Togonon to take charge of the amount
received by him as rental from municipal property and to deposit the same at the treasury of the
said municipality, but he refused and failed to account for it, and applied said amount to his own
use.

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated Act. No. 1740.

Ruling: Yes. The act of the municipal president falls under the provisions of section 1 of Act No.
1740, that ny bonded officer or employee of the Insular Government, or of any provincial or
municipal government, or of the city of Manila, and any other person who, having charge, by
reason of his office or employment, of Insular, provincial or municipal funds or property, or of
funds or property of city of Manila, or of trust or other funds by law required to be kept or
deposited by or with such officer, employee, or other person, or by or with any public office,
treasury, or other depositary, fails or refuses to account for the same, or makes personal use of
such funds or property, or of any part thereof, or is guilty of any malversation with reference to
such or property, or through his abandonment, fault, or negligence permits any other person to
abstract, misappropriate, or make personal use of the same, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than two months nor more than ten years and, in the discretion of
the court, by a fine of not more than the amount of such funds and the value of such property.

It is being charged in the complaint that the accused, by reason of his office as municipal
president, received money that belonged to and was owing the municipality, it is properly alleged
that he received and kept it in his possession by reason of his office. And if, as averred in the
complaint, he made personal use of such money without accounting for or delivering it as
provided by law, it follows that the unlawful personal use made of the money so received comes
within the meaning of, and the penalty imposed for, the crime of malversation defined in section
1 of Act No. 1740, the same as in articles 390, 391, and 392 of the Penal Code.
 US v. Sagun
G.R. No. L-5337
February 10, 1910
Facts: It appears that the accused, being justice of the peace of the municipality of Camiling,
Province of Tarlac, presented to the treasurer of said municipality, for the purposes of a
settlement, his accounts for fees, fines, and costs collected by him during the months of January,
February, and March of said year, a written statement of the various fines he had received during
said months. He said that the written statement was a correct statement of the moneys received
and the treasurer was very busy at the time of the presentation of said statement and the matter
was turned over to a clerk in his office, Cecilio Torres, for a settlement of the same. Torres, after
having examined the accounts, came to the conclusion that the accused was indebted to the
treasurer the sum of P57.50. The accused paid over the said sum and took a receipt therefor. A
few days later the clerk of the accused called his attention to the fact that an error had been made
by the treasurer in settling the accounts of the said accused. The accused immediately sent word
to the treasurer and asked that his accounts be again examined. The clerk of the treasurer stated
that he was very busy at that time but he would reexamine the accounts and inform the accused
later if he discovered any errors. A few days afterwards, and on or about the 20th of April, the
defendant was notified that according to the result of the reexamination of the accounts, the
accused still owed the treasurer the sum of P166. The accused immediately paid over that
amount to the treasurer.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of malversation of public funds.

Ruling: Yes. It is the duty of officials to act fairly in their dealings with the Government, and
that one who, having the custody of public funds, takes advantage of a mistake in the
examination of his accounts to retain in his possession funds which he should turn in to the
treasury, converts to his own use the money thus improperly retained and is guilty of the crime of
misappropriation.

All public officials who have in their hands public money owe a duty to the Government,
namely, the duty to pay over, not a portion, but all of said money. They owe the further duty of
being fair to the Government, a duty which the accused failed to discharge in this case. He stood
by and saw the receiving official make a clerical mistake in calculating the amount due from him
to the Government, and took advantage of that mistake, knowing that it was a mistake and
realizing that to take advantage thereof was unfair and unjust. A different question would be
presented if the accounts were long and intricate. In that case an honest mistake might be made
by the accounting official. An honest mistake by an official when rendering his account and
paying over money is not criminal. Under the circumstances of this case, however, by reason of
the fewness of the items, the largeness of the sum in his hands, and the simplicity of the
accounts, it is impossible to believe otherwise than that the accused knew at the time he was not
paying to the Government all the money that was due it. Thus willfully failing to live up to his
known duty and obligation to the public he appropriated such money to his own use.
 US v. Lafuente
G.R. No. L-12888
February 16, 1918
Facts: The municipal Law (now secs. 2319, 2321, 2322, and 2323 of the Administrative Code of
1917) authorizes a municipal council to grant the exclusive privilege of fishery or right to
conduct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion of the municipality. The same is to be
let to the highest and best bidder. In conformity with this law, the municipal council of Loon,
Bohol, enacted an ordinance providing that fishing privileges should be sold at public auction.
Accordingly on April 26, 1916, a public auction for the sale of fishing privileges was conducted
by the municipal president of Loon, with the assistance of the municipal treasurer, the municipal
secretary, and a councilor. The municipal secretary, who is the accused herein, acted as secretary
of this committee. A list of the successful bidders was made. When the auction was concluded,
the municipal treasurer being busy, the bidders were told to deposit the amount of their
respective bids with the municipal secretary. Eighteen persons did so deposit various sums in
payment of fishery privilege licenses and one person turned in a small sum for his land tax. The
total was P53.22. The complainants did not receive the licenses for which the money was paid,
nor was their money returned to them, nor was it placed in the municipal treasurer.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of malversation of public funds.

Ruling: Yes. Where the accused is a public officer or employee, one test determining the nature
of the crime is whether the accused received the funds or property in an official or in a private
capacity. If the accused had charge of the funds or property embezzled by reason of his office or
employment or was accountable for the same—then conviction for misappropriation of public
funds —if not, then conviction for estafa. Hence, the accused is guilty of misappropriation of
public funds.
 US v. Radaza
G.R. No. L-6084
November 11, 1910
Facts: In the month of March, 1908, in the barrio of La Paz, municipality of Burawen, Province
of Leyte, Francisco Tirado paid to the appellant the sum of P5, being, as he thought, for the
privilege of slaughtering a carabao. The appellant presented himself as having authority and
being the person in charge of the collection of these fees. He promised to obtain a receipt for
Tirado for this amount. He not only failed to obtain the official receipt for this amount but
converted the same to his own use. The appellant at this time was one of the councilors of the
town of Burawen and in charge of the barrio of La Paz. The real crime committed by the
appellant is that of estafa and not malversation of public funds.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of estafa and not malversation of public funds.

Ruling: Yes. The appellant was not a bonded officer or employee at that time, nor did he take
charge of the P5 by reason of his office as councilor. The P5 was not deposited with him under
authority of law. It was not his duty, neither did he have authority to collect slaughterhouse fees.
He did not act as councilor in receiving the P5, but as a private individual. The appellant did not
receive the P5 in his official capacity. It was not his duty to collect these fees, and he had no
authority to do so, For these reasons he is not guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds,
but he is guilty of the crime of estafa, as defined and punished in paragraph 5 of article 535, in
relation with paragraph 1 of article 534 of the Penal Code.
 US v. Solis
G.R. No. L-2828
December 14, 1906
Facts: Juan Solis on various dates between the 20th of September, 1904, and the 25th of
February, 1905, in the municipality of Zamboanga, Moro Province, Philippine Islands, being a
public functionary employed in the office of the municipal treasurer of said municipality,
appropriated to his own use public funds which were under his charge, amounting to 1,075
pesetas.

Issue: Whether or not a person who is charged with the crime of malversation of public funds be
convicted of the crime of estafa upon the same complaint.

Ruling: Yes. A public official charged in a complaint with the crime of embezzlement may be
convicted of the crime of estafa under the same complaint if the evidence shows: First. That such
public official appropriated or misapplied money, goods, or any kind of personal property which
he has received as a deposit on commission for administration or in any other character
producing the obligation to deliver or return the same, or who shall deny having received it.
Second. If the evidence shows that by virtue of his public office he had no authority to receive
money, etc., which he misappropriated and refused to account for.
 US v. Webster
G.R. No. L-2732
August 23, 1906
Facts: The defendant was forage master, having charge of Government forage in the corral in
Manila and in the hay yard at Pandacan, subject to the orders of the quartermaster, who was
directly responsible to the United States Government and without whose order to forage could be
issued. Upon requisition forwarded by the division quartermaster he issued his orders to the
forage master and dray slip corresponding with it was delivered to the teamster to serve both as
his authority to pass the gate and, when signed, as a receipt by the person to whom the forage
was to be delivered. The forage master had no authority to receive money from the
quartermaster's office.

Without orders from the quartermaster's or other authority, and upon dray slips made out by
himself, the defendant sent out of the corral 186 bales of hay and 138 sacks of oats, of the value
of 2,015 pesos, to be delivered to livery stables and individuals, for which the Government
received no pay.

The qualified charge of the forage, subject to the orders of a superior, who alone was responsible
to the Government for it, without the right on the part of the accused to sell it or to part with the
physical custody of it unless on written orders, was not such a possession as to render the
abstraction of the property by him malversation instead of theft.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of theft and not malversation.

Ruling: Yes. An official having only a qualified charge of property without the right to part with
physical possession of it unless upon written orders from his immediate superior, the person
accountable for it to the Government, and improperly disposing of it without orders, is guilty of
theft.

A prior conviction for theft of a smaller quantity of like property does not constitute former
jeopardy where the accused fails to show either that the two quantities are at least in part
identical or that the two charges amount in substance to different specifications of the same
offense.
 People v. Sendaydiego
G.R. Nos. L-33252-54
January 20, 1978
Facts: Sendaydiego is a provincial treasurer. Through six falsified vouchers presented by samson
in his office, they managed to take 55k from the provincial budget. Samson is an employee at a
hardware store. Sendaydiego received the vouchers in his office when his secretary said that he
usually receives them outside. During the pendency of the case, sendaydiego died. It was ruled
that his estate will still be civilly liable. It was contested that Samson didn’t sign the vouchers but
subsequently proved that he did. His possession of such falsified documents gave rise to the
presumption that he also authored them; a presumption he failed to rebut. The lower court
convicted Samson of being a principal in a complex crime of malversation and falsification.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed a complex crime of malversation and falsification.

Ruling: No. The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of
falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a
single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a
means to commit malversation. In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the
malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses. x x x In the instant cases,
the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund,
could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifying any voucher. The falsification was
used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation. The falsification cannot be regarded as
constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse. Each falsification of a
voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or
distinct offenses. x x x And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher
constitutes a separate offense. The six misappropriations evidenced by the six vouchers
constitute six distinct offenses.

The overall result is that in these three cases six separate offenses of falsification and six separate
crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson (a private person) is a co-principal in
each of the said twelve offenses. x x x he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because
he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies
from the provincial treasurer. He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he
conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly
ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing
malversation is also guilty of malversation.

In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty. In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium period
since there are no modifying circumstances.
 People v. Villanueva
G.R. Nos. 39047-52
October 31, 1933
Facts: On December 7, 1931, there was sent from Honokaa, Hawaii, a postal money order for
the sum of P200 in favor of Irene Sanchez, resident of Santa Lucia, Ilocos Sur. On January 14,
1932, there were likewise sent from Watsonville, California, five postal money orders, four of
which were for the sum of P200 each and one for the sum of P100, in favor of Feliciano Isidro
residence of the same municipality of Santa Lucia, Ilocos Sur. The postal money order in favor
of Irene Sanchez was sent to her by her son Conde E. Aceta and the ones sent to Feliciano Isidro,
by his son Victor. In or about the month of March, 1932, Irene Sanchez and Feliciano Isidro, who
had been informed by letter that the money orders in question had been sent to them, went to the
post office of Santa Lucia to make inquiries regarding the matter. The defendant Virgilio
Villanueva informed them that the money orders had not yet been received, Irene Sanchez and
Feliciano Isidro returned to the same office twice to make the same inquiry but they were given
the same information that the money orders had not been received. In April of the same year,
when Feliciano Isidro went there again, the defendant informed him that he had already received
the money orders and that he had appropriated the amount thereof. Consequently, through the
intervention of Pedro Callejo, principal of the Santa Lucia Primary School, the defendant signed
two documents (Exhibit B and D) wherein he admitted having received the money orders, forged
the signatures of Irene Sanchez and Feliciano Isidro thereon, collected and appropriated the
respective amounts thereof. Furthermore, we find that this admission by the defendant was made
voluntarily.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed a crime of malversation of public funds and
falsification of public documents.

Ruling: Yes. Inasmuch as the amount of the postal money orders appropriated by the defendant
was in his custody as postmaster, it had the nature of public funds and the appropriation thereof
constitutes the crime of malversation. Even without imitating their signatures, the fact that the
defendant affixed the names of the payees to the postal money orders in question was sufficient
to qualify the crime of falsification of public documents. (U. S. vs. Cinco and Redoña, 42 Phil.,
839.) The defendant was found guilty of six offenses of malversation and six offenses of
falsification of public documents and was sentenced accordingly.
 People v. Elviña
G.R. No. L-7280
February 3, 1913
Facts: From the 1st of July, 1909, until the 31st day of January, 1910, the said accused, who was
municipal treasurer of San Juan de Guimba, Nueva Ecija, had in his possession various
properties and sums of money pertaining to his office, but during said time maliciously and
criminally disposed of said properties and money for the sum of P2,505.61 and refuse to render
an account of the same in spite of having been required by the District Auditor to do so.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of misappropriation of public funds.

Ruling: No. One who has actually paid out the public funds in good faith to persons who have
rendered services to the municipality of which he is treasurer, and under and in accordance with
resolutions of the municipal council authorizing him to make such payments, is not guilty of the
crime of misappropriation of public funds, although such payments may have been made in
violation of law.

Where the money alleged to have been misappropriated was paid out in the interest and for the
benefit of the municipality, in good faith and in the honest belief that it was his duty as municipal
treasurer to make such payment, such funds so paid out are not criminally misappropriated,
although they may have been paid out on insufficient vouchers or improper evidence.

Where a municipal treasurer makes an honest mistake as to the law or to the facts concerning his
duties relative to the expenditure of the public funds, and actually in good faith pays out such
funds under such mistake, he is not guilty of the crime of misappropriation of public funds,
although he may be civilly liable to reimburse the municipality.