ATP 1 (D) Vol-I

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATP 1(D)
VOLUME I
Allied Maritime Tactical

Instructions and
Procedures
The information contained in this document

shall not be released to a nation outside
NATO without prior approval of the NATO na-
tions as laid down in C-M(55)15(Final) or
MC-167 (latest edition) (as applicable).
JANUARY 2002
I (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
(This page is NATO-Unclassified)
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
January 2002
PUBLICATION NOTICE ROUTING
1. ATP 1(D), Volume I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, is avail-
able in the Navy Warfare Library. The effective date will be promulgated by the Com-
mander, Navy Warfare Development Command for U.S. Holders.
2. ATP 1(D), Volume I has an associated, UNCLASSIFIED Multinational Manual

(MM) publication MTP 1(D), Volume I composed directly from the unclassified
portions of ATP 1(D), Volume I. As the layout and numbering of the unclassified
material is virtually identical in ATP 1(D), Volume I and MTP 1(D), Volume I, U.S.
holders can use the unclassified procedures in ATP 1(D), Volume I directly with other
non-NATO nations using MTP 1(D), Volume I for exercises and operations. The publi-
cation is annotated clearly to indicate what information has not been included in
the MM.
3. Summary: ATP 1(D), Volume I, contains tactical principles, procedures, and

instructions evolved as a result of experience and exercises to implement operations
based on the philosophy supporting the various forms of maritime warfare.
Navy Warfare Library Custodian
Navy Warfare Library publications must be made readily

available to all users and other interested personnel within the
U.S. Navy. Classified Navy Warfare publications are to be
treated in the same manner as other classified information.
Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

This notice will assist you in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.
IIa (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol, I
III (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS
1 TU
2 NONE
3 NONE
4 NONE
5 NONE
6 NONE
7 NONE
8 NONE
9 NONE
10 NONE
11 TU
12 NONE
13 NONE
14 NONE
V ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
NATION SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS
TU a. The use of the term “Coastal Waters/Areas” is not acceptable to Tur-

key. Because it is not included in international law.
b. TURKEY understands that the commanders who will undertake the
OCA functions in both regional and full NCS will be designated by
NAC/MNC and approved by MC/DPC. (Chapter 1, Para 1270)
c. Since the command and control issues have not been solved yet, Tur-
key does not accept the criteria concerning boundaries all between NATO
Commands in establishing an amphibious area (AOA). (Chapter 11, Para
11015 and 11022.b)
VI ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO NATIONS
Each nation should substitute its own national letter of pro-

mulgation, if required.
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of Date Entered NATO Effective Date By Whom Entered

Change, (Signature; Rank,
Reg. No. (if any), Grade or Rate;
and Date Name of Command)
IX ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of Date Entered NATO Effective Date By Whom Entered

Change, (Signature; Rank,
Reg. No. (if any), and Grade or Rate;
Date Name of Command)
X ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and

Procedures
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
No.
PART I — GENERAL
CHAPTER 1 — ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND READINESS
SECTION I — ORGANIZATION
1100 TASK, TYPE, AND WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1101 Task Organization — Task Force Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1102 Task Organization — Task Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1103 Changes in Task Organization Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
SECTION II — COMMAND
1200 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
1201 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
1202 Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
1203 Delegation of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1204 Chain of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1205 Command System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1206 Exercising Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1210 STRUCTURE FOR THE COMMAND OF MARITIME FORCES . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
1211 Full Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
1212 Operational Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
1213 Operational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
1214 Change of Operational Control (CHOP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
1215 Tactical Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
1216 Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
1217 Tactical Control (TACON) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
1218 Command by Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1219 Command of Allied Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1220 COMMAND OF AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1230 COMMAND DURING REPLENISHMENT AT SEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1231 Method of Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1232 OPTASK RAS: The OTC Promulgating the Replenishment Program . . . . . . . . . 1-8
1233 OPSTAT UNIT: Supplying Ship Providing Details of Rigs to
Customer Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
1234 OPSTAT CARGO: Supplying Ship Reporting Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
1235 COMMAND IN MINE COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
XI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
1240 COMMAND IN OPERATION AWKWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

1245 COMMAND IN SEAWARD DEFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
1250 COMMAND IN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
1251 Authorities for Submarine Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
1260 COMMAND IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
1261 Parallel Chains of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
1262 Designation of Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
1263 Relationships During Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
1264 Command During Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
1265 Consultation Between Commanders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
1266 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
1267 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
1270 NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
1271 Convoy Commodore and His Deputies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
1272 Implementation of Naval Control of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
1280 COMMAND DURING SUPPORT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
1281 Support Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
1282 Support Operations, Situation A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
1283 Support Operations, Situation B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
1284 Support Operations, Situation C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
1290 OTHER SUPPORT OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
SECTION III — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

1300 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
1301 Command of Large Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
1302 Delegation of Command Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
1305 Command and Control Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
1306 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
1310 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
1311 Delegation Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
1312 Warfare Commander and Coordinator Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
1313 Promulgation of Duties and Delegation of Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
1320 TASKING METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
1321 Maritime Tactical Message System (MTMS) — Purpose and
Method of Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
1322 RAINFORMs — Purpose and Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-45
1323 Tactical Data Link Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-48
XII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
SECTION IV — READINESS
1400 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
1410 READINESS TO GET UNDERWAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
1411 Notice to Get Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
1412 Preparing for Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
1413 Getting Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
1420 READINESS FOR ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
1421 Operational Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
1422 Inoperable Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
1423 Command Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
1424 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
1425 Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
1430 GENERAL DEGREES OF READINESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
1440 PARTICULAR DEGREES OF READINESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
1441 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Damage Degrees
of Readiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
1442 Engineering Degrees of Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
1450 WEAPON ALERT STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
1460 AIRCRAFT ALERT STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
1470 THREAT WARNINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-54
SECTION V — RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES

1500 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55
1510 PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55
CHAPTER 2 — POSITION, MOVEMENT, AND MANEUVERING
SECTION I — POSITION AND MOVEMENT

2100 POSITION/REFERENCE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2101 World Geographic Reference System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
2102 Universal Transverse Mercator Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
2103 Cartesian Coordinate Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
2104 ASW Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
2105 Bearing and Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
2106 Quick Reference System (QRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
2107 Position/Bearing Accuracy Suffixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
2108 Altitude or Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
2109 Check Sum Digits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
XIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
2110 STANDARD POSITIONS/REFERENCE POINTS/

POSITION REPORTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
2111 Data Link Reference Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
2112 Helicopter Reference Point (HRP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
2113 Harbor Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
2114 Ship as Anchoring Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
2115 Routes and Reference Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
2116 Convoy Route Position Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
2117 Reporting and Exchanging Data on Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
2120 COURSE AND SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
2121 Course and Speed Made Good. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
2122 Position and Intended Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
2123 Endurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2130 ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2131 Reporting Time of Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2132 Entry Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2133 Anchoring in Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2134 Berth Numbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
SECTION II — RULES FOR MANEUVERING

2200 PRINCIPAL RULES FOR MANEUVERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
2201 Unit of Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
2202 Distance and Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
2203 Standard and Reduced Tactical Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
2204 Acceleration and Deceleration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
2205 Speeds While Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
2206 Speed Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
2210 STATIONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
2211 Joining and Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
2220 THE GUIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
2221 Automatic Changes of the Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
2240 SPECIAL MANEUVERING RULES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
2241 Individual Action to Avoid Danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
2242 Special Rules of the Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
2243 Sea Manners and Customs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
2244 Executing Maneuver at Prearranged Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
2245 Scouting Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
2246 Ships Towing Acoustic Arrays or Other Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
2250 MAN OVERBOARD — STANDARD PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
2251 Peacetime Recovery Maneuvers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
2252 Wartime Recovery Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
XIV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
2253 Rescue Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24

2254 Man Overboard Lights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
2260 BREAKDOWN AT SEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
2270 NIGHT AND FOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
2271 Navigation Lights on Darkened Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
2272 Whistle Signals While Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
2273 Standard Fog Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
2274 Entering Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
2280 WARTIME CRUISING PRECAUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
2281 Darkening Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
2282 General Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
SECTION III — EVASIVE STEERING

2300 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
2301 General Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
2310 ANTISUBMARINE EVASION AND TORPEDO
COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
2320 ANTI-FPB EVASION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-30
2321 Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-31
CHAPTER 3 — DISPOSITION OF FORCES
SECTION I — FORMATIONS
3100 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3105 BASIC SYSTEM OF FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3106 Forming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3107 Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
3110 GENERAL TYPES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
3115 CIRCULAR FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
3120 OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3121 Broad Operational Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3125 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3126 Destroyer Type Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3127 Transport/Logistic Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
3128 Replenishment Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8
3130 CONVOY FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16
3140 MISCELLANEOUS FORMATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16
XV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS
3200 GENERAL TYPES OF DISPOSITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3201 Forming a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3202 Maneuvering a Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3210 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DISPOSITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3211 Carrier Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3212 Special Disposition 2W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
3213 Replenishment Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
3214 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
3215 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
3216 Circular Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
3217 Cartwheel Disposition/Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
3218 4W Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33
3220 DISPOSITION PLANNING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36
SECTION III — SCREENS

3300 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
3310 TYPES OF SCREEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
3311 Screen Selection and Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
3312 Stationing Screen Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39
3320 DESCRIPTION OF SCREENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40
3321 Sector Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40
3322 Skeleton Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43
3323 Helicopter Windline Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
3324 Departure and Entry Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
3325 Screen for Damaged Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45
3330 MANEUVERING WITH A SECTOR SCREEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
3331 Maneuvering With Skeleton Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
3332 Instructions for Convoy Screens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
3333 Helicopters in the Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
3334 Control of Screen Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
3335 Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
3336 Towed Array Ships in the Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
3340 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
3341 Instructions for Individual Screen Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
3342 Screen Adjustment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
XVI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
CHAPTER 4 — COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION I — TACTICAL COMPLANS

4100 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4110 COMMUNICATION PLAN (COMPLAN) DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4120 COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
4121 Net Control Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
4122 Voice Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
4123 Call Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
4124 Use of RATT for Tactical Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4125 DATA LINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4126 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4127 Types of Data Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4128 Procedural Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4129 Emission Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4130 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4131 COMSEC Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4132 Authentication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
4133 Authentication Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
4140 ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW) COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
4141 AAW Reporting Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4142 AAW Coordination Net (Force/Sector). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4143 Local AAW Coordination Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4144 Inner Warfare Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4145 Outer Warfare Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4146 Combining AAW Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4147 Single Net Information and Plotting (SNIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4148 Joint AAW Shore Coordination (JAAWSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4149 AAW Data Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4150 AAW Call Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
4155 SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
4156 Surface Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
4157 SAG Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
4160 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
4161 Search and Attack Unit (SAU) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
4170 SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
4171 Basic Considerations and Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
4172 Submarine Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
4173 Tactical Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
4174 Submarine Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
XVII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
4175 CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

4180 AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
4181 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
4185 HELICOPTER COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
4186 Helicopter Control Nets — General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
4190 COMMUNICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZED COMMAND
AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18
SECTION II — TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM)

4200 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
4201 Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
4202 Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
4203 Electronic Warfare (EW) Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
CHAPTER 5 — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW)
SECTION I — OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

5100 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5101 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
5110 DIRECTION AND COORDINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
5111 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
5112 Functions Which May Be Delegated to EWC/ASWC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
5113 Individual Ship Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
5120 VOICE REPORTING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
5121 Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
5122 EW Reporting of Confidence Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
5123 EW Intercept Bearing Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
SECTION II — EMISSION POLICY (EP)

5200 CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
5201 Silent Emission Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
5202 Enemy Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
5210 BREAKING SILENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
5220 POST-ATTACK EMCON AND COMSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
SECTION III — EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

5300 EMCON CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8
5301 EMCON Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8
XVIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
5310 CONSTRUCTION OF EMCON PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

5320 EMISSION DIAGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW) TASKING

5400 TASKING OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
5401 Electronic Warfare Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
5410 ESM TASKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
5411 ECM Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
5420 ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
SECTION V — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC SUPPORT

MEASURES (ESM/AWSM)
5500 INTERCEPTION, DETECTION, AND DIRECTION FINDING
(DF) OF TRANSMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
5510 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) OF SEARCH
EQUIPMENT BY OWN TRANSMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
5511 Acoustic Interference of Search Equipment by Own Transmissions . . . . . . . . . 5-16
5520 RECORDING ENEMY EMISSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
5530 LOCALIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF ENEMY EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
5531 General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
5532 Recognition, Classification, and Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
5533 Disposition of Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
SECTION VI — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

COUNTERMEASURES (ECM/ACM)
5600 EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC
COUNTERMEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
5610 JAMMING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
5611 The Objective and Effects of Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
5612 Jamming Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
5613 Control of Electronic Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19
5620 COMMUNICATIONS JAMMING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19
5630 DECEPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
5631 Active Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
5632 Passive Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
5650 ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
XIX
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
SECTION VII — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC PROTECTIVE MEAS-

URES (EPM/APM)
5700 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
5710 EPM/APM CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
5720 REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECM/ACM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
5721 Reducing the Effectiveness of Jamming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
5722 Measures Against Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
5723 Reducing the Effectiveness of Electronic Neutralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
5724 Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion (MIJI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
SECTION VIII — AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION

5800 ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL (EWCC) . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
5801 EWCC Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
5802 Additional EWCC Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-25
CHAPTER 6 — GENERAL WARFARE INSTRUCTIONS
SECTION I — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

6100 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
6110 PLANNED RESPONSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
SECTION II — PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING

6200 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
6201 Picture Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
6210 THE PICTURE COMPILATION PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
6220 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
6221 Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
6222 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3
6223 Operational Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3
6230 ELEMENTS OF PICTURE COMPILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3
6240 THE PROCESS OF PICTURE COMPILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
6241 Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
6242 Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
6243 Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
6244 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
6245 Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
XX
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
6250 SCOUTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

6251 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
6252 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
6253 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
6254 Planning of Scouting Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
6255 Scouting Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
6256 Surveillance Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
6257 Patrol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
6258 Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
6260 TASKS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
6261 Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
6262 Information Exchange Between Shadowing and Relieving Units. . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
6263 Countershadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6264 Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6265 Countermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6266 Tattletale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6270 PICTURE COMPILATION AND WEAPON EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
6280 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
SECTION III — DATA COMPILATION

6300 DATA COMPILATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6301 Reference Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6302 OTC’s Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6303 Means of Data Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6304 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6310 SURVEILLANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6311 Surveillance Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
6312 Coordination of Data Compilation in the Surveillance Coord-
ination Surveillance Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
6313 Force Track Coordinator (Air) (FTC-A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
6314 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) (FTC-S) and Force Track
Coordinator (Subsurface) (FTC-SS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
6320 CONTACT REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
6321 General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
6322 Responsibility for Passing Information About Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
6323 Air Raid Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19
6324 Surface and Subsurface Raid Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
6325 Other Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
6326 Warfare Commander Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
6330 COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
6340 TACTICAL USE OF DATA LINKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
6341 Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
XXI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
6342 Integration With Standard Tactical Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

6343 Tactical Use of Link 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
6344 Tactical Use of Link 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
6345 Wide-Area Link Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
6346 Link 11 Waveform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
6350 LINK MANAGEMENT UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
6351 Data Net Control Station (DNCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
6352 Gateway Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
6353 Link Broadcast Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
6354 Grid Reference Unit (GRU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
6360 PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
6361 Grid Lock Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
6362 Link 14 Plotting Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
6363 Procedures for Reporting Own Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
6370 SECURITY AND EMCON CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
SECTION IV — AIR OPERATIONS

6400 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
6401 Maritime Tasking Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
6402 Air Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
6403 Informing the OTC of Operations in His Vicinity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
6405 TYPES OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
6406 Operations Integral to a Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
6407 Support Operations Tasked by Maritime Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
6410 PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT IN TRANSIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
6415 IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION OF SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
6416 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
6417 Identification/Recognition Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
6418 Responsibilities of the Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42
6419 Support Aircraft Joining a Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
6425 EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT WHILE ON DIRECT
SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
6426 ASW Mission Designators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
6427 Sonobuoy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
6428 Avoidance of Sonobuoy Mutual Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
6429 Identification and Recognition by Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
6440 MPA TO MPA TURNOVER PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
6441 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
6442 On-Task Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
6443 Procedures for Specific Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
XXII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
6444 Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49

6445 SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONTROLLED BY OTHER
AIR FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50
6450 AIR COORDINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50
6451 Responsibilities of Units Carrying Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
6452 Tactical Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
6453 Independent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
6454 Controlled Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
6455 Factors Determining Type of Operations and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
6456 Courses and True Bearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
6470 SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR MARITIME AIR
OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
6471 Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
6472 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
6473 Low-Altitude Rules (Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
6474 Lateral and Vertical Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
6475 Use of Lights by Ships and Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
6476 HAG Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
6477 Cooperation With Fixed-Wing Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
SECTION V — SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

6500 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
6501 Ship Movements During Flight Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
6502 Helicopter In-Flight Refueling (HIFR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
6505 CARRIER OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
6506 Duties in a Task Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
6508 Operating Carriers in Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
6509 Flying Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
6510 MANEUVERING FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
6511 Method A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
6512 Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
6513 Method C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
6514 Maneuvering for Emergency Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
6515 Antisubmarine Precautions During Delays While
Operating Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
6516 Maneuvering for Low Visibility Recovery Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
6517 Course and Relative Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
6518 Operations at Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
6519 Operations in Low Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
6520 AIR OPERATIONS IN A CONVOY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
6530 CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
6531 Offensive Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
XXIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
6532 Command of Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69

6533 Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
6540 REQUEST FOR CV AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
6550 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
6551 Ship Control Zones (SCZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
6552 Aircraft Launch/Departure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
6553 Procedure for Returning Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
6554 Marshal Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
6555 Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
6556 Carrier Approach Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
SECTION VI — AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

6600 AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
6601 General Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
6602 Communications During Aircraft Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
6603 Rescue Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
6604 Ditching, Bailout, and Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
6605 Diversion of Ship to Locate Survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-83
SECTION VII — SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO

AVOID MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
6700 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-85
6701 Implementation of Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-85
6702 Implementation of Water Space Management (WSM) Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 6-85
6711 Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6712 Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6713 Types of Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6714 Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6715 Identification/Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6716 Initiation of Self-Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
6720 ROUTES AND REFERENCE POINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-87
6730 RESTRICTED AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-87
6731 Controlled Airspace, Air Corridors, and Safety Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
6732 Shore Bombardment and Bomb Lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
6733 Blind Bombing Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
6734 Controlled Waterspace, Waterspace Management Areas,
and ASW Weapon Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
6735 Procedures for Request and Allocation of WSM Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-95
6736 Emergency Transit of Surface Forces Through SAAs or
JTAAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-96
6737 Procedures for Surface Ships Entering Restricted Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
XXIV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
6740 SAFETY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97

6745 SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
6746 Weapon Restrictions — General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
6747 Weapon Control Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
6748 Weapon Control Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
6750 SPECIAL SURFACE SHIP PRECAUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
6751 Surface Ship Notices and Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
6752 Radiation Hazards (RADHAZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
6760 SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100
6761 Compensatory Allowances for ASW Weapons Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100
6762 Submarine-Generated Search Area (SGSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100
6763 NOTACK Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105
6764 Safety Lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
6765 Command Relationships of Transiting Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
6766 Responsibility to Assist Disabled Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
6770 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
6771 Submarine Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
6772 Action on Suspected Mutual Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
6773 Operations Inherently Dangerous to Subsurface
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
6774 Action at Time of Increased Tension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
6780 PREVENTION OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
BETWEEN SUBMERGED SUBMARINES AND
SURFACE SHIPS WITH TOWED ACOUSTIC
DEVICES STREAMED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
PART II — WARFARE PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 7 — ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)
7000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

7001 Command and Control in Antiair Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
7002 Sector AAW Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
7003 Local AAW Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
7004 Force Track Coordinator — Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
7005 Individual Ship Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
7010 STATIONING ANTIAIR WARFARE UNITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
7011 Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
7012 Surface Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
7013 Aircraft Carriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
7014 Surface-to-Air Missile Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
7015 Units With Self-Defense Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
XXV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
7020 ANTIAIR WARFARE AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5

7021 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
7022 Combat Air Patrol Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6
7023 Electronic Warfare Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
7024 Aircraft Authentication on AAW Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
7030 ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
7040 ANTIAIR WARFARE COORDINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
7041 Methods of Antiair Warfare Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
7042 Missile Engagement Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
7043 Crossover Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
7044 Fighter Engagement Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
7045 Safety Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7046 Watch Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7047 Positive ECM Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7048 Missile Arc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7050 SPECIAL ANTIAIR WARFARE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7051 Types of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7052 Target Engagement Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7053 Missile State Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
7054 Ammunition State Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
7055 Aircraft Operating Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
7060 ANTISHIP MISSILE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
7061 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
7062 Disposition and Stationing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
7063 Employment of AAW Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
7064 Detecting and Determining Types of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
7065 Use of Sensors and EMCON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
7066 Selecting ASMD Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
7067 Coordinating ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
7068 Planning ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
7069 Promulgating ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22
7070 EXECUTING ASMD REACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22
7080 CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AIR DEFENSE TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
7081 Inner and Outer Defense Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
7082 Inner Defense Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
7083 Outer Defense Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
7084 Inner Defense Zone Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
7085 Outer Defense Zone Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-26
7086 CAP Stationing Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
7087 Return to Force Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
7088 VL Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-28
XXVI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
CHAPTER 8 — ANTISURFACE WARFARE
SECTION I — GENERAL
8100 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8101 Command in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8102 Force Track Coordinator (FTC) Surface and Subsurface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8103 Concept of Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8104 Surface Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
8105 Surface Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
8110 WEAPON STATE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8
SECTION II — ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS

8200 SURFACE ACTION CHECKOFF LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
8201 Surface Action Group (SAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
8202 Surface Action Group Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10
8203 Standard Surface Action Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
8204 Towed Array Ships in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
8205 Pickets in Antisurface Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
SECTION III — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION

8300 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
8301 Antisurface Operations Support by Fixed-Wing Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
8302 Antisurface Operations by Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
8303 Cooperation Between Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
8304 Employment of a Helicopter Action Group (HAG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
8305 Helicopter Identification/Recognition and Attack Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
8306 Operation Velocipede . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
8307 Attack Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18
SECTION IV — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH SUBSURFACE

COOPERATION
8400 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
8401 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
8402 ASSM Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
8403 Tactical Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
8404 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
SECTION V — THIRD PARTY TARGETING

8500 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
8501 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
8502 Over-the-Horizon Targeting Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
8503 Accuracy of Target Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
8504 Selection and Stationing of a Target Reporting Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
8505 Target Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23
XXVII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
SECTION VI — DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREAT

8600 DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
8601 Detection of Missile Carrier(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
8602 Actions Upon Interception of Target/Threat Radars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
8603 Anti-FPB Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
8604 Air Anti-FPB Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
8605 Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
CHAPTER 9 — ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
9000 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

9001 Command in Antisubmarine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9002 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) (FTC-S) and Force Track
Coordinator (Subsurface) (FTC-SS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9010 DEFINITIONS OF ASW OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9011 ASW Area Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9012 ASW Associated Support Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9013 ASW Direct Support Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
9014 Ranges of ASW Sensors and Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
9020 ASW WEAPON STATE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
SECTION I — EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS

9100 ASW SHIPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
9101 Surface Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
9105 SURFACE SHIP TOWED ARRAYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
9106 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
9107 Stationing of Towed Array Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
9108 Towed Array Screen Station Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
9109 Towed Array Zero-PIM Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
9110 ASW HELICOPTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
9112 ASW Helicopter Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
9120 ASW FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
9122 Conduct of Airplans for Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft and
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
9123 Aircraft in Support of Towed Array Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
9125 PASSIVE SONOBUOY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
9126 Sonobuoy Pattern (JEZPAT) Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
9127 Sonobuoy Interference Avoidance Plan (SIAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
XXVIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
9130 ASW SUBMARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11

9131 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
9132 Support Submarine Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
9133 Employment of Submarines in Area Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
9134 Employment of Submarines in Direct Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
9135 Command, Control and Communications in Direct Support
Submarine Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
9136 Stationing Considerations for Support Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
9138 Employment of Submarines in Associated Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
9139 STOVEPIPE Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
9141 Aided Intercept by Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
9142 Operation DISROBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17
SECTION II — CONTACT PROSECUTION

9201 Contact Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
9202 Contact Classification Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
9203 Contact Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
9210 ASW ATTACK POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
9211 General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
9212 Surface Ship ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
9213 Fixed-Wing Aircraft ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
9214 Helicopter ASW Attack Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
9215 Attack Restrictions When Operating with Support Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
9216 Assessing Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
9220 COORDINATED ASW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
9221 Datums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
9222 ASW Search Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
9223 Collision Hazard During ASW Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
9230 COORDINATED ASW ACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
9231 Action on Gaining Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
9232 Action by Units in the Vicinity of the Unit Gaining Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
9233 Sending Reinforcements to the Scene of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
9234 The SAU Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
9235 SAU Approach to a Contact or Datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
9236 SAU Commander/SAC Intended Employment of Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32
9237 Aircraft Reports to the SAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
9238 Changing Scene of Action Commander (SWAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
9240 ACTION FOLLOWING CONTACT WHEN DIRECT
SUPPORT FORCES ARE INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
9241 Support Submarine Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
9242 ASW Aircraft Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
9243 Passive Sonar Capable Surface Ship Gains Initial Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
9244 Coordinated Prosecution With Supporting Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
XXIX
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
9245 ASW Aircraft Response to a Submarine-Generated Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36

9246 Contact Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
9247 Submarine/Air Coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
9248 Submarine Associated and Direct Support Message
Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
9250 SHIP TOWED ARRAY CONTACT PROSECUTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
9251 Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
9252 TAS Ship/Aircraft Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
9253 Lost Contact Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
9260 COORDINATED ATTACK METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
9261 ASW Ship and Helicopter Attack and Support Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
9262 ASW Ship Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
9263 Vectored Attacks (VECTACs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
9264 MAD Verification (MADVEC) Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43
SECTION III — NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

9300 EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ASW WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
9301 Considerations in Employment of Nuclear ASW Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
9310 COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES AND
INTENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
9311 OTC’s Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
9312 OTC’s Intentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
9313 Responsibilities of Commanders Subordinate to the OTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
9320 CONTROL PROCEDURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48
9321 DUSTBIN Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48
9322 Release Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
9323 Control Procedures for Nuclear ASW Weapon Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
9330 NUCLEAR ASW WEAPON YIELDS AND
EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
9340 AIRCRAFT ARMING POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
9350 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
9351 Spread of Base Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
9352 Safe Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
9353 Ship’s Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-56
9354 Escape Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-56
9355 Re-Entry Into Contaminated Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-57
9356 Summary of Decisions and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-58
9360 BREVITY CODE WORDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-62
XXX
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
CHAPTER 10 — PROTECTION OF SHIPPING
SECTION I — GENERAL INFORMATION

10000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
10001 Naval Control of Shipping Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
10002 Activation of the Naval Control of Shipping Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
10003 Prerogatives of Commanding Officers of Allied Warships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
10004 Factors Affecting Merchant Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
10005 Regional Naval Control of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
10006 Full Naval Control of Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
SECTION II — REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

10010 REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
10011 Naval Control of Shipping Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
10012 Shipping Risk Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
10013 Command and Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
10014 Shipping Control Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
10015 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4
10016 OPTASK RNCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4
10017 Scope of Orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
10018 Escort Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
10019 Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
10020 Sailing Order Folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
10021 Allied Worldwide Navigation Information System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
10022 Protection of Shipping Against General Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
SECTION III — FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

10030 FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
10031 Convoy Commodore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
10032 Communication and Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
10033 Convoys Joining at Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
10034 Convoy Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
10035 Stationing Convoy Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
10036 Forming Up a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
10040 CONVOY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
10041 Shipping Requiring Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
10042 Routing a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
10043 Rerouting a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
10044 Regrouping a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
10045 Replenishment of Convoy Escorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
10046 Group Guides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
10050 MANEUVERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
10051 Bad Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
XXXI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
10052 Altering Course. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16

10053 Salvage and Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
10054 Instructions on Arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
10060 PROTECTION OF CONVOYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17
10061 Protection of Convoy Against Submarine Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17
10062 Protection of Convoy Against Air Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
10063 Protection of Convoy Against Surface Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
10064 Protection of Coastal Convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
10070 CONVOY FORMATION SELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
10071 Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
10072 Adjustable Columnar Unit Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
10073 Random Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
10074 Reverse Arrow Head Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-28
10075 Circular Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-28
10076 Group Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-32
10077 Advice on Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-32
CHAPTER 11 — AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
SECTION I — INTRODUCTION
11000 GENERAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
SECTION II — EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

11010 CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
11011 Types and Sequence of Amphibious Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
11012 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
11013 Fire Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
11014 Planning Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
11015 The Initiating Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
11016 Basic Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
11017 Detailed Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
11018 Joint Service Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
SECTION III — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

11020 DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
11021 Relationship During Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
11022 Command During Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
SECTION IV — COMMAND AND CONTROL

11030 CONSULTATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
11031 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
11032 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
11033 Airspace Control During Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
XXXII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
11034 Transfer of the Control of Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10

11035 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
SECTION V — LOGISTIC SUPPORT

11040 GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
11041 Logistic Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
11042 Logistic Planning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
CHAPTER 12 — NBC WARFARE
12000 HAZARDS FROM NUCLEAR BURSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1

12001 Types of Bursts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
12002 Flash and Initial Radiation Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
12003 Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
12004 Blast and Underwater Shock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
12005 Base Surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
12006 Residual Radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
12007 Range of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
12010 BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
12011 General Tactical Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
12012 Principles Affecting All Dispositions and
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5
12013 Principles Affecting Carrier Group Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-6
12014 Principles Affecting Convoy Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
12015 Action Prior to Nuclear Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
12016 Tactics Following a Nuclear Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
12020 SELECTION OF FORMATION RENDEZVOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
12021 Emergency Rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
12025 REPORT ON OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
12030 EMPLOYMENT OF OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
12040 BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
12041 Survival of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
12042 Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
12043 Detection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
12044 Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
12045 Hygiene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
12046 Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
12047 General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
12050 CHEMICAL WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
12051 Delivery of Chemical Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12
12052 Nature of Chemical Agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12
12053 Environmental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12
XXXIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
12054 Threat to Naval Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-12

12055 General Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
12056 OTC’s Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
12057 Chemical Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
12058 Aircraft Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
12059 Contamination of Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
12060 GRADUATED LEVELS OF NBC THREAT AND
MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
CHAPTER 13 — MINE WARFARE
13000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1

13001 Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
13002 Mineable Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
13003 Types of Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
13004 The Nature of a Minefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
13005 Types of Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
13006 Jettisoning Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
13007 Urgent Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
13010 MINELAYING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
13011 Information to Friendly Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
13012 Procedures for and Methods of Surface Mining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
13020 SUPPORT OF SURFACE MINELAYING OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
13030 MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
13031 Passive Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
13032 Self-Protective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-5
13033 Conduct of Surface Ships in Mined Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-6
13034 Active Mine Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12
13035 Command Responsibilities in MCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12
13040 MCM OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
13050 SUPPORT OF MCM OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
13060 TRANSIT OF SHIPS THROUGH MINED AREAS — LEAD
THROUGH OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
13061 Transit of Submarines Through Mined Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-18
13062 Evacuation of Anchorages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23
13063 Reporting Mine Explosions/Detections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23
XXXIV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
CHAPTER 14 — DEFENSE AGAINST UNDERWATER ATTACK IN HARBOR
14000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1

14010 DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK BY UNDERWATER SWIMMERS. . . . . . . . 14-1
14011 Countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
14012 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
14013 States of Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
14014 Action to be Taken by Individual Ships When Operation
AWKWARD is Ordered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
14020 ACTION AFTER ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5
ANNEX A — LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary-1
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index-1
XXXV
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
No.
Figure 1-1 Example of Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Figure 1-2 Levels of Command and Control Within the OTC’s Warfare
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
Figure 1-3 Example of Warfare Command and Coordination Incorporated
in a Task Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
Figure 1-4 Example of Assigned Command and Coordination Functions
in a Force Using a CWC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27
Figure 2-1 Sample Georef Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Figure 2-2 Sample CCG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Figure 2-3 Standard Distances and Maneuvering Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-15
Figure 2-4 Turning Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Figure 2-5 Acceleration-Deceleration Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Figure 2-6 Quick Reference System (QRS) Overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-33
Figure 3-1 Stationing Ships in Formation by Circular Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Figure 3-2 Rotating Formation Axis, Guide in Station Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6
Figure 3-3 Rotating Formation Axis, Guide Not in Station Zero. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7
Figure 3-4 Destroyer Type Ship Formation 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8
Figure 3-5 Destroyer Formations 21, 22, 23, and 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9
Figure 3-6 Transport/Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10
Figure 3-7 Replenishment/Logistic Circular Ready Formation 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11
Figure 3-8 Replenishment Formation — Circular Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13
Figure 3-9 Replenishment Ready Formation — Circular Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
Figure 3-10 Replenishment Formation With Skeleton Screen Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15
Figure 3-11 Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use (Lifeguard Next Alongside) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17
Figure 3-12 Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use (Lifeguard Next Alongside to Port) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18
Figure 3-13 Replenishment of Escorts — Two Delivering/Supplying
Ships Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-19
Figure 3-14 Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use ( Lifeguard Not Replenishing) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-20
Figure 3-15 Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying
Ship in Use (Lifeguard Not Replenishing) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-21
Figure 3-16 Departure and Entry Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
XXXVI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Figure 3-17 Special Disposition 2W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25

Figure 3-18 Replenishment Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
Figure 3-19 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened
Sector Protection) 2V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-28
Figure 3-20 Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V . . . . . . . . . . . 3-30
Figure 3-21 Disposition 4W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-35
Figure 3-22 Construction of a Sector (Example) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41
Figure 3-23 Sector Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-42
Figure 3-24 Skeleton Screen Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
Figure 3-25 Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-46
Figure 3-26 Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Figure 4-1 Example of EPM/Reduced Tactical COMPLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
Figure 5-1 Emission Diagram Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Figure 5-2 EW Tasking Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
Figure 6-1 Scouting Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

Figure 6-2 The Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment Process . . . . . . . . . . 6-15
Figure 6-3 Approach Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-40
Figure 6-4 Air Strike Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-70
Figure 6-5 Air Sweep Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-70
Figure 6-6 Multi-Picket Approach Corridor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74
Figure 6-7 Single Picket Approach Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74
Figure 6-8 Rescue Destroyer Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-80
Figure 6-9 Waterspace Management Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-90
Figure 6-10 ASW Compensatory Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-101
Figure 6-11 Submarine-Generated Search Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-102
Figure 6-12 Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-106
Figure 6-13 NOTACK Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-107
Figure 7-1 Example of Zone Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Figure 8-1 Ideal Disposition of CANDLE and ATTACKER Tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-15

Figure 8-2 Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-31
XXXVII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Figure 9-1 Example of SIAP Between Two Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12

Figure 9-2 Datum Approach Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Figure 9-3 DUSTBIN Area ORANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
Figure 9-4 Template for ASW Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-57
Figure 9-5 Airplan 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-63
Figure 9-6 Airplan 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-64
Figure 9-7 Airplan 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-65
Figure 9-8 Airplan 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-67
Figure 9-9 Airplan 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-69
Figure 9-10 Airplans 41, 42, 43. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-70
Figure 9-11 Airplan 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-72
Figure 9-12 Airplan 45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-74
Figure 9-13 Airplan 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-76
Figure 9-14 Airplan 47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-78
Figure 9-15 Airplan 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-80
Figure 9-16 Attack Method 1A (Lock On) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-81
Figure 9-17 Attack Method 2A (Deep Creek Attack) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-82
Figure 9-18 Attack Method 3A (Geographic Sector Attack) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-83
Figure 9-19 Attack Method 3A MOD (Modified Geographic Sector Attack) . . . . . . . . 9-84
Figure 9-20 Attack and Support Method 11AH Bear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-85
Figure 9-21 Attack, Support, and Lost Contact Method 14AH/14SH
Cordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-86
Figure 9-22 Search Plan 1S Oak Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-87
Figure 9-23 Search Plan 2S Acorn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-88
Figure 9-24 Search Plan 2SH Mod Acorn Modified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-91
Figure 10-1 Generic MERSHIP RCS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-8

Figure 10-2 Infrared Hotspots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-9
Figure 10-3 Convoy Formation Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Figure 10-4 Search Plan 52S BEETROOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20
Figure 10-5 Search Plan 53S CARROT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23
Figure 10-6 Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-24
Figure 10-7 Adjustable Columnar Unit Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-26
Figure 10-8 Random Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-27
Figure 10-9 Reverse Arrow Head Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-29
Figure 10-10 Circular Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-30
Figure 10-11 Group Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-31
CHAPTER 11 — AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
Figure 11-1 Planning Sequence for Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7
XXXVIII
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Figure 12-1 Above Water Burst Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4

Figure 12-2 Range of Effects of Base Surge (Underwater Burst) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5
Figure 12-3 Underwater Burst Effect Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-6
Figure 13-1 Normal Channel With Offset Buoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14

Figure 13-2 Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-15
Figure 13-3 Measuring the Distance of the Lead Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-22
XXXIX
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
LIST OF TABLES
Page
No.
Table 1-1 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28

Table 1-2 OTC’s Functions in AAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31
Table 1-3 OTC’s Functions in ASUW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-33
Table 1-4 OTC’s Functions in ASW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-35
Table 1-5 OTC’s Functions in Screening Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-37
Table 1-6 OTC’s Functions in Air Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-38
Table 1-7 OTC’s Functions in Air Resource Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-39
Table 1-8 OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40
Table 1-9 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Convoy
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-42
Table 1-10 OTC’s Functions in Departure and Entry Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-43
Table 1-11 OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Mine Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-44
Table 1-12 MTMS Messages — Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-46
Table 2-1 Maneuvering Formation When Using Evasive Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28
Table 3-1 Table of Formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Table 3-2 Table of Allocated Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Table 3-3 Table of Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24
Table 3-4 Disposition Planning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37
Table 3-5 Determining Sector Size for ASW Unit in a Sector
Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43
Table 4-1 Authentication Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Table 4-2 Typical Advance Notification Requirements
for Submarine Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
Table 5-1 Basic EMCON Plan Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Table 5-2 Radiation Status Indicators (RSIs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
Table 5-3 Standard Communication Antijam Measures/Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 5-23
XL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Table 6-1 List of Track Identification Methods and Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

Table 6-2 Link 11 Operational Employment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-24
Table 6-3 Table of Aircraft Mission Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
Table 6-4 Checklist of Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct
Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35
Table 6-5 ASW Mission Designator Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-38
Table 6-6 Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-51
Table 6-7 Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must Be
Used to Tactically Control Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54
Table 6-8 IMC Vertical Separation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-60
Table 6-9 Altitude Separation in HAG Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
Table 6-10 Night Lighting Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-67
Table 6-11 Signals From Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-78
Table 6-12 Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-78
Table 6-13 Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-79
Table 6-14 Rescue Destroyer Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-81
Table 6-15 Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-83
Table 7-1 SAM State Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15

Table 7-2 Criteria for Calling ZIPPOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-19
Table 7-3 ASMD Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21
Table 8-1 Surface Action Checkoff List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Table 8-2 Methods for Passing Target Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-25
Table 8-3 Anti-FPB Checkoff List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-28
Table 8-4 Criteria for Air Plan BLUEBELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-30
Table 9-1 ASW Air Plans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans . . . . . . . . 9-2
Table 9-2 Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
Table 9-3 Passive Acoustic Designation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Table 9-4 ASW Search Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Table 9-5 Selecting the Approach Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Table 9-6 Coordinated Employment of ASW Units at Scene of Action . . . . . . . . . . 9-33
Table 9-7 ASW Attack and Support Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
Table 9-8 SAC Courses of Action With Nuclear ASW Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-47
Table 9-9 Material Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Table 9-10 Time Late or Offset — Probability of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
XLI
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Table 9-11 Helicopter Stand-off Ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-54

Table 9-12 Surface Ship Stand-off Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-55
Table 9-13 Summary of Decisions and Actions for
Nuclear ASW Weapon Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-58
Table 9-14 Brevity Code Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-62
Table 10-1 Regional Naval Control of Shipping Transmission Guidance . . . . . . . . . 10-5

Table 10-2 ASW Surface Search Plans for Convoy Escorts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Table 12-1 Blast Damage Ranges in Yards From Ground Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3
Table 12-2 NBC Aide-Memoire (Nuclear) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-7
Table 12-3 Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure State, Dose Levels,
Probable Tactical Effects, and Risk of Exposure Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
Table 12-4 NBC Aide-Memoire (Chemical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-14
Table 12-5 Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Minimum Individual
Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-16
Table 13-1 Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-17
XLII
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
PREFACE
1. ATP 1, Volume I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, contains tactical principles,
procedures, and instructions evolved as a result of experience and exercises to implement operations based
on the philosophy supporting the various forms of maritime warfare.
(NR) (NMM) The background to subsurface warfare and surface warfare is contained in ATP 28 and ATP
31, respectively. Purely procedural information and brevity codes are in publications such as ATP 1, Vol-
ume II, Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book; APP 1, Allied Maritime Voice Reporting
Procedures; APP 4, Volume I, Allied Maritime Structured Messages; APP 4, Volume II, Allied Maritime
Formatted Messages; and APP 7, NATO Maritime Codeword Publication.
Definitions necessary to the understanding of this book will be found in the glossary.
(NR) (NMM) Procedures for tactical air support of maritime operations are contained in ATP 34. The fun-
damental aspects of joint operations doctrine are contained in AJP 1, Allied Joint Operations Doctrine. The
primary objective of AJP 1 is to provide a doctrine that outlines the principal factors affecting the planning,
execution, and support of Allied joint operations.
2. The procedures for each type of warfare are explained in separate comprehensive chapters. While the
construction of the book necessitates that subjects are dealt with separately, it is of the utmost importance
to understand that there is interaction between tactical procedures which are intended to counter different
types of threat.
3. It is unrealistic to assume that a situation will ever exist in which a force may safely prepare to face a sin-
gle threat in isolation. It is vital that tactical thought is shaped accordingly, that due account is taken of the
need for the coordination of all sensors and weapons to meet the most urgent situation within the shortest
possible reaction time, and thus to face any threat with the most effective counter.
PURPOSE
1. The purpose of ATP 1 is to provide doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures governing the com-
mand, control, and maneuvering of all maritime units. This publication serves as the cornerstone upon
which the Allied Maritime Tactical Library is built. As such, this publication has precedence over other
maritime tactical publications should ambiguity or conflict arise.
2. ATP 1 is divided into two volumes. The specific purpose of each volume is as follows:
a. Volume I — Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, provides doctrine, tactics, in-
structions, and procedures for the tactical command, control, and maneuvering of all maritime units.
This volume also provides instructions related to the employment of forces in selected aspects of spe-
cialized warfare, and, in particular, to the safe handling of units operating in close company.
b. Volume II — Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book, provides maneuvering, stan-
dard operational and administrative signals primarily for use between naval ships, and basic maneuver-
ing instructions.
SCOPE
1. The doctrine and tactics contained in ATP 1 cover all aspects of the command and control of maritime
forces in peace and war. The publication provides the instructions and procedures required by a com-
mander to issue orders to fulfill his specified responsibilities and to enable subordinates to understand and
comply with these orders. It also gives details of specific duties associated with the execution of tactical
tasks.
XLIII ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2. The scope of the individual volumes of ATP 1 is as follows:
a. Volume I — Contains the doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures related to the tactical em-
ployment of forces in specialized forms of warfare, and to the safe and effective maneuvering of mari-
time units at sea. Volume I is divided into two parts: Part I — General and Part II — Warfare
Procedures.
(1) Part I contains the principal organizational, planning, and procedural information required for
the effective conduct to maritime operations.
(2) Part II sets forth specific types of warfare necessary for mission accomplishment in a
multithreat environment.
b. Volume II — Contains signals covering all instructions and procedures provided in Volume I.
NOTE
Nonmetric values are accurate. Metric values are rounded off to the nearest meter.
It is therefore recommended that nations check converted figures for correctness
and report any errors to their appropriate national authority.
XLIV ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
PART I
Allgemein
Chapter 1 — Organization, Command, and

Readiness
Chapter 2 — Position, Movement, and

Maneuvering
Chapter 3 — Disposition of Forces
Chapter 4 — Communications
Chapter 5 — Electronic and Acoustic Warfare
Chapter 6 — General Warfare Instructions
XLV (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 1
Organization, Command, and Readiness
SECTION I — ORGANIZATION
1100 TASK, TYPE, AND WARFARE ORGANIZATIONS
There are three systems, all in force at the same time, for organizing the operational units allocated to
various commands.
a. Task Organization. The organization of forces for operational purpose is to provide the
necessary flexibility for meeting changing operational requirements while retaining a clear indication of
the chain of command. Whenever a task organization is created, the commander shall be named in the
order creating it.
b. Type Organization. The organization of units normally of the same type into
fleets/flotillas/groups/squadrons, divisions, and subdivisions together with assigned flagships, tenders,
and aircraft. Type organization is mainly for national administration and logistic purposes.
c. Warfare Organization. The functional organization of forces assigned to conduct tasks

within a specific area of Maritime Warfare: antiair warfare (AAW), antisurface warfare (ASUW),
antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The warfare organization should be implemented within either a task or
type organization.
1101 TASK ORGANIZATION — TASK FORCE NUMBERS
A fleet commander is allocated a block of whole numbers which he assigns as task force numbers in
accordance with his needs. Fleet organization into task forces is illustrated in Figure 1-1.
1102 TASK ORGANIZATION — TASK DESIGNATORS
A fleet commander allocates units to specific task forces, but leaves to the task force commander and
his subordinate commanders the subdivision of the task force into task groups, task units, and task elements
which comprise his task organization. The system of task designation employed is described below and is
illustrated in Figure 1-1.
a. Task Groups. A task force may be divided into as many as 99 task groups, designated by
adding .01 through .99 to the task number. Task Force 58 (the example in Figure 1-1) may comprise Task
Groups 58.01, 58.40, 58.64, and so on, up to and including 58.99. (For simplicity, Figure 1-1 shows only
three task groups.) In the series, 58 designates the task force and .01 through .99 designate the task groups.
b. Task Units. A task group may be divided into as many as 99 task units, designated by adding
.01 through .99 to the task group number. In the example in Figure 1-1, task units formed from Task Group
58.40 are 58.40.01, 58.40.02, etc.
c. Task Elements. Task elements subordinate to task units are only organized when the
complexity of the task assigned and the size of the force is such as to require an additional echelon of
command for the accomplishment of assigned tasks. Subdivision into task elements should be limited to
the minimum required for operations. There may be as many as 99 task elements, designated by adding .01
through .99 to the task unit number. In the example in Figure 1-1, task elements formed from Task Unit
58.40.34 are 58.40.34.01 and 58.40.34.99.
1-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
COMMON SUPERIOR
CTF 15 CTF 58 CTF 109
CTG 58.01 CTG 58.40 CTG 58.99
CTU 58.40.01 CTU 58.40.02 CTU 58.40.07 CTU 58.40.34 CTU 58.40.99
CTE 58.40.34.01 CTE 58.40.34.99
Figure 1-1. Example of Task Organization
d. Restriction on Subdivision. Subdivision should be limited to the minimum required. A task

organization commander may subdivide his units into lower ordered components only.
1103 CHANGES IN TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS
It may sometimes be necessary to assign part or all of one task organization to another temporarily or
permanently. Such a change is accomplished by change of operational control (CHOP) (see Article 1214)
when the OPCON authority changes. The communications aspect of a change of task designator should be
considered. An assignment to another task organization will be one of the following:
a. Short-Term Duration. In short-term duration, it will normally be desirable for the force being
transferred to retain its existing task organization designation.
b. Longer-Term Duration. Where the assignment is of a longer or of permanent duration, it is

preferable for the assigned force to adopt a designator derived from that component of the task
organization which it has joined.
1104 — 1199 SPARE
1-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — COMMAND
1200 SCOPE
This section includes definitions for command functions. It is written to specify responsibilities in
maritime warfare, to enable commanders to issue orders and instructions to fulfill their responsibilities,
and to enable subordinates to understand and comply with the orders and instructions they receive. The
duties to execute tactical tasks are not included in this chapter but are incorporated in the relevant chapters.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of his mission.
Note: Certain AAP-6 definitions that appear in this chapter are expanded to clarify their meaning
within the context of maritime command. However, AAP-6 definitions are unchanged and are shown in
italics. Other definitions and terms used may not presently be found in AAP-6.
1201 AUTHORITY
a. Person. An authority is a person vested with the power to make decisions and issue orders.
b. Individual Power. Authority is also the individual power to make decisions and issue related
orders imposing those decisions — such power may be limited in scope, time, and location.
c. Responsibility. Authority automatically confers the responsibility to carry out tasks and
report results to the assigning authority.
1202 COMMAND
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control
of military forces.
The aim of command is to achieve the maximum operational and/or administrative efficiency.
a. Direction. The process of planning decisionmaking, establishing priorities, formulation

policies, and imposing decision.
b. Coordination. The establishment in operations, according to a changing situation, of an

orderly correlation in time and place of planned actions in order to achieve the best overall result. In the
maritime environment, the term coordination may include certain specified control functions.
c. Control. That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the
responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or
delegated.
d. Exercising command presupposes the existence of a chain of command and a command and
control system. Some functions arising from direction, coordination, or control may be delegated to
subordinates. This is normally done in large or widely dispersed forces where decentralized
decisionmaking is required. However, a centralized command is the most direct way of allowing a
commander to make use of his experience and ability.
1-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1203 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
The action by which a commander assigns a part of his authority commensurate with the assigned
task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation of
authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority delegated
must be clearly stated.
Delegation to a subordinate commander creates a new responsibility for a specific task.

Subordinates should be kept aware of the policies and intentions of their superiors, so that they can act
accordingly when faced with unexpected circumstances. A subordinate should never await instructions
beyond the time for action.
1204 CHAIN OF COMMAND
The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is
exercised.
A chain of command establishes the interdependencies which exist at various levels between the
superior and his subordinates. Command functions may be exercised at any one of these levels. The
organization (task, type, or warfare) adopted for the forces employed automatically defines the chains of
command.
1205 COMMAND SYSTEM
A command system is formed by a chain of command and includes the means necessary to distribute
orders and collect, evaluate, and disseminate information.
1206 EXERCISING COMMAND
a. General. Successful accomplishment of any mission entails seven phases:
(1) Appreciation of the situation.
(2) Selection of the aim.
(3) Decision on course of action.
(4) Development of a plan.
(5) The operation order.
(6) Execution.
(7) Evaluation.
b. Appreciation of the Situation and Decision. A mission should have only one aim from
which the commander can derive his tasks and purpose. It is essential that all units participating in the
mission understand the aim, so that they may act in accordance with the commander’s intentions, even
when the tactical situation has changed and it is no longer possible to follow the original operation order.
c. Execution and Evaluation. Command and control of different operations vary widely and
depend on mission, composition, and disposition of the force. Documentation for the evaluation of these
operations may be drawn from many sources, most significant of which is probably the war diary. The
1-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
primary purpose of the war diary is to provide a cohesive picture of events which have occurred, so that
higher authorities may study the operation in all its aspects and evaluate the results achieved. Additional
documents to clarify or link events, such as copies of relevant messages, should be included as necessary.
1207 — 1209 SPARE
1210 STRUCTURE FOR THE COMMAND OF MARITIME FORCES
1211 FULL COMMAND
The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It
covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The
term “command,” when used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a
purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are
assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command
or operational control.
1212 OPERATIONAL COMMAND
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to

deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be
deemed necessary. It does not of itself include administrative command or logistical responsibility.
Operational command may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
Operational command of maritime forces also includes retention or assignment of tactical command.
NATO commanders receiving operational command or operational control of NATO forces will
specify the mission(s) and tasking for these forces and delegate command and control authority as required.
1213 OPERATIONAL CONTROL
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy
units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include the authority to
assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.
Operational control of maritime forces also includes retention or assignment of tactical command.
NOTE
Operational control is subordinate to operational command and has limited authority; its most
important limitation is its inability to allow reassignment of forces.
1214 CHANGE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL (CHOP)
The date and time (GMT) at which the responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes
from one operational control authority to another.
When it is intended that operational control of a force or unit pass from one operational control
authority to another, the operation order should state in explicit terms the manner of execution of CHOP.
This may be done in terms of time (GMT), position, or boundary crossing. Subject to the EMCON plan,
units executing CHOP should report to both operational control authorities and to the authority vested with
operational command over the force or unit. When a CHOP occurs, task organization commanders should
1-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
inform the operational control authority of changes in the composition of their forces and major deviations
from their normal capabilities.
1215 TACTICAL COMMAND
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
It involves, therefore, the responsibility for the conduct of the tasks pertaining to the mission; that is,
issuing detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also involves responsibility for the general
safety of assigned units, although ultimate responsibility remains with the commanding officers. Tactical
command of units temporarily attached does not include the authority to give them tasks inconsistent with
the mission previously allocated to them.
NOTE
Tactical command of forces also includes retention or assignment of tactical control.
1216 OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND (OTC)
The OTC is the senior officer present eligible to assume command or the officer to whom he has
delegated tactical command.
When a task organization is established, the commander (OTC) shall be named in the order creating
it. If the OTC is unable to exercise command, the next senior officer present in the task organization will
assume and retain command until or unless otherwise ordered. When a task organization has not been
established and the higher authority has not selected the OTC, the senior officer present eligible to
command will act as OTC.
The OTC will normally be under the operational control of a higher authority (i.e., fleet commander
or area commander). That authority will provide direction which specifies the mission, tasking, and forces
assigned to the OTC and will also delegate tactical command and control of those forces to the OTC. That
authority may designate himself, the task force/group commander, or another command as appropriate, to
be OTC of the constituted force(s) or group(s). The OTC must design his command and control
organization to accomplish the assigned mission and effectively defend the force. Article 1202 states that
exercising command presupposes the existence of a chain of command. Some functions arising from
direction, coordination, or control may be delegated to subordinates.
1217 TACTICAL CONTROL (TACON)
The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
This authority is granted by the authority exercising operational command, operational control, or
tactical command to a subordinate commander to assume some function concerning direction,
coordination, or control of movements, maneuvers, and actions relative to a specific task. The officer
exercising tactical control is also responsible for the safety of the units under his control. Tactical control is
usually assigned to a subordinate for a limited period of time to conduct a specific mission or task.
NOTE
Tactical control is subordinate to tactical command.
1-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1218 COMMAND BY VETO
In many aspects of maritime warfare, it is necessary to preplan the actions of a force to an assessed
threat and to delegate some command functions to a subordinate. Once such functions are delegated, the
subordinate is to take the required action without delay, always keeping the OTC informed of the situation.
The OTC retains the power to veto any particular action.
1219 COMMAND OF ALLIED FORCES
When Allied task forces of units of two or more nations are formed, the commander shall be named
in the order creating them. The commanders of national units joining an Allied task force at sea should not
displace the designated Allied commander by virtue of their national seniority or date of commission
unless specifically so directed by the senior in the chain of Allied command.
1220 COMMAND OF AIRCRAFT
The degree of authority exercised by the OTC over aircraft employed in maritime operations is
determined by the type of mission and whether the aircraft are shipborne or land based (see Chapter 6).
a. Aircraft Commander. The aircraft commander is responsible for the efficient execution of the
assigned mission and for the command and safety of the aircraft throughout its mission. He shall inform his
controlling authority if weather conditions or material failure significantly affect his ability to perform his
mission. An aircraft commander retains ultimate responsibility for the safety of his own aircraft.
b. Command of a Flight of Aircraft. The senior aircraft commander of a flight of aircraft or the
officer designated exercises tactical command of the flight and is responsible for the efficient execution of
the assigned mission.
1221 — 1229 SPARE
1230 COMMAND DURING REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
The senior commander of the two forces — the commander of the force to be replenished and the
RAS force commander — is the OTC. Although the OTC is responsible for the proper execution of the
entire replenishment operation, he should consider the recommendations of the other force commander. If
the RAS force commander is the OTC, he should generally respect the desires of the commander of the
force to be replenished as to position and time of rendezvous and the general direction of movement during
the replenishment. If the commander of the force to be replenished is the OTC, he should carefully consider
the RAS force commander’s recommendation as to replenishment course and speed.
The Maritime Tactical Message System (MTMS) provides an improved standard format for
ordering replenishment.
1231 METHOD OF EXECUTION
MTMS involves the use of five standard signals, as follows, all of which should be classified at least
Restricted.
a. OPSTAT RASREQ. For use by a combatant ship to signal its requirements, either direct to the
supplying ship or to the OTC. In either case, the requirements must be submitted in a timely fashion.
b. OPTASK RAS. For use by the OTC to promulgate the replenishment program.
1-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. OPSTAT RAS. For use by supplying ships to provide customer ships with details of rigs and
types of stores that can be delivered from respective transfer stations.
d. OPSTAT UNIT. For use by all ships to promulgate details of transfer stations.
e. OPSTAT CARGO. For use by supplying ships to report cargo remaining to the OTC after an
RAS operation and on changing operational control.
Details and examples of these RAS signals are provided in APP 4. It should be noted that the use of
MTMS RAS signals requires that transfer stations should be numbered.
1232 OPTASK RAS: THE OTC PROMULGATING THE REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM
a. Replenishment Program. When he has received the ships’ requirements, the OTC will arrange
and promulgate the replenishment sequence. This should arrive in the ships concerned as soon as possible
before the RAS operation to enable the supplying ships to prepare their stores and pre-dump as required.
RAS operations involving several replenishment units should be planned on RAS sheets (see APP 4).
The complete replenishment program will be passed by signal to all ships. A replenishment program
of a more complex kind can be signaled by Method A, and one which involves a small number of moves by
Method B.
(1) Method A. Paragraphs E1 and E2 of the OPTASK RAS are used for this method and list first
the supplying ships in sequence from the planning sheet, and then the customer ships and the coded de-
scription of their replenishment program taken from the RAS sheet.
(a) On receipt of the OPTASK RAS signal, individual ships should use a standard RAS
plotting sheet to ascertain their own ship’s replenishment program.
(2) Method B. Paragraphs F1 and F2 of the OPTASK RAS are used for this method and list the
sides of the supplying ships that will be used for replenishment, followed by the customer ships and the
transfer station numbers from the RAS sheet.
b. Preliminary Movements. When the OTC of the combatant force orders his ships to
“Replenish,” the ships shown in the signal as being first to replenish are to proceed to the supplying ship.
Remaining escorts are to join the screen and heavy units are to proceed to their allocated stations in the
formation. Unless otherwise ordered by the OTC, replenishments should then proceed as follows:
(1) Ships replenishing are to conform to the replenishment sequence laid down without further orders.
(2) Heavy units are to take up the waiting position automatically when the ship ahead reports that
she expects to disengage in 15 minutes, and are to replenish when it is clear to do so.
(3) Escorts are to proceed as described in paragraph 1232(1) above, if they have been ordered to re-
lieve at the replenishment unit. If they have been ordered to relieve on station, escorts are to proceed to
replenish as soon as they have been relieved in their station, without further signal.
1-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1233 OPSTAT UNIT: SUPPLYING SHIP PROVIDING DETAILS OF RIGS TO CUSTOMER

SHIPS
On receipt of the OPTASK RAS or when ordered by the OTC, supplying ships are to provide
customer ships concerned with the details of rigs and types of stores to be delivered at each transfer station.
This shall be done by using only paragraphs D1 and E3 of the OPSTAT UNIT.
1234 OPSTAT CARGO: SUPPLYING SHIP REPORTING CARGO
On completion of replenishment, each supplying ship is to report to the officer under whose
command the support ships have been placed (and to the replenishment force commander for information)
the quantities of cargo types remaining. If the OTC of an RAS operation is to be some other officer, the
supplying ship is also to report her cargo to the OTC 48 hours before the RAS operation.
1235 COMMAND IN MINE COUNTERMEASURES
Self-protection mine countermeasures are the responsibility of the OTC or commanding officer.
Active mine countermeasures are the responsibility of the local commander in own waters and of the
advance force commander in amphibious operations. For detailed responsibilities, see Chapter 13.
1236 — 1239 SPARE
1240 COMMAND IN OPERATION AWKWARD
For detailed responsibilities, see Chapter 14.
1241 — 1244 SPARE
1245 COMMAND IN SEAWARD DEFENSE
a. Seaward Defense Organization Available.
(1) The responsibilities for the operations for the defense of the area and of ships rests with the offi-
cer in charge of the Seaward Defense Organization. This, however, does not relieve a ship’s command-
ing officer (or the OTC, in the case of a group of ships) from taking such action as is considered
appropriate for the safety of his ship(s), keeping the shore authority informed.
(2) Coordination between the Seaward Defense Organization and ship(s) will be accomplished
through the Seaward Defense operations center and the operations room of a suitably equipped ship,
preferably that of the OTC. The ship designated will also be responsible for coordinating operations be-
tween other ships present.
b. Seaward Defense Organization Not Available. The OTC is responsible for the
coordination of operations for the defense of ships present, making use of the operations room of a suitably
equipped ship.
1246 — 1249 SPARE
1-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1250 COMMAND IN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
Traditionally, submarine operations have been conducted independent of aircraft and surface ships,
and have required a centralized command system. Improvements in submarine communication
capabilities along with refocusing of maritime objectives have brought about much closer cooperation and
interoperability of submarines and other maritime forces. Shifting of tactical control to an OTC for
coordinated operations between submarines and surface and/or air forces is highly desirable in many
scenarios. Procedures and requirements of the shifting of tactical control are contained in ATP 18. The
submarine operating authority (SUBOPAUTH) is the commander who has, as a minimum, operational
control of submarines, and has the authority to delegate tactical or control. The SUBOPAUTH is normally
the submarine force commander. When he is the area submarine commander, the SUBOPAUTH is
responsible to the area commander.
1251 AUTHORITIES FOR SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS
Authorities who have responsibilities with regard to submarine movements are the Submarine
Movement Advisory Authorities (SMAAs), Submarine Exercise Area Coordinators (SEACs), and
Submarine Operating Authorities (SUB-OPAUTHs). (See Article 6771.)
1252 — 1259 SPARE
1260 COMMAND IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), upon the commencement of operations,
assumes responsibility for the entire force and for the operation, and is vested with the commensurate
authority to ensure success of the operation. The specific means through which CATF exercises this
authority during an amphibious operation is set forth in ATP 8 and other relevant amphibious warfare
publications. For detailed responsibilities in amphibious warfare, which are complex and involve close
cooperation between many agencies, a summary has been included in Chapter 11.
1261 PARALLEL CHAINS OF COMMAND
The interrelation of naval and landing force tasks during the planning for an execution of
amphibious operations requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding
commanders at all levels of the amphibious task force organization. The following fundamental
considerations govern the application of such a system of parallel command:
a. Except during the planning phase, CATF, a naval officer, is responsible for the operation and
exercises that degree of authority over the entire force necessary to ensure success of the operation.
b. The amphibious task force and landing force commands are on corresponding level of command
with regard to their respective components.
c. Corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of both the amphibious
task force and landing force elements.
d. Matters of command which affect only the Navy forces are dealt with by CATF through the naval
chain of command.
e. Matters of command which affect only the landing forces are dealt with by the Commander
Landing Force (CLF) through the landing force chain of command.
f. Matters of command which affect both the naval force and the landing force are dealt with
through the corresponding naval and landing force chains of command. Commanders at all levels are
1-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
required to maintain a close and continuous relationship to ensure that, except in emergencies, no
commander makes decisions affecting corresponding commanders without consultation. In such cases,
the commander making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of his action at the
earliest practicable time.
1262 DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS
Regardless of the composition of the amphibious task force, CATF is a naval officer designated in
the Initiating Directive. The commander of all troop components within the amphibious task force is CLF
and is also designated in the Initiating Directive. Commanders of subordinate task groups within the
amphibious task force, if they have not been named in the Initiating Directive, are designated by CATF or
CLF as appropriate. Should air forces be assigned, their commander, an air force officer, will be designated
in the Initiating Directive.
1263 RELATIONSHIPS DURING PLANNING
a. As directed by higher authority, component commanders of the amphibious task force, at the
beginning of the planning phase, report for planning purposes to CATF, who is responsible for the
preparation of the overall plan for the amphibious operation. CATF serves as the coordinating authority for
the conduct of planning. Matters on which CATF and CLF and commanders of the other forces are unable
to agree are referred to their common superior for decision.
b. Since immediate responsibility for the conduct of landing force operations ashore is vested in
CLF, the planning and execution of the landing and assault are primarily his concern. Participation of other
components in the assault consists generally in providing support for the landing force. This involves the
analysis of landing force proposals to determine their feasibility from the standpoint of the remainder of the
amphibious task force. The capability of providing the necessary support is a primary factor in evaluating
and concurring to proposed landing force plans and concepts.
1264 COMMAND DURING OPERATIONS
a. CATF, upon the commencement of operations, assumes responsibility for the entire force and for
the operation, and is vested with the commensurate authority to ensure success of the operation.
b. The specific means through which CATF exercises this authority is treated in relation to those
aspects of the amphibious operations set forth in this and subsequent paragraphs.
c. CATF exercises his command authority through the commanders of his task organization. The
latter, in turn, exercise their authority through their own chains of command.
d. Within the amphibious objective area, CATF is given specific command authority as prescribed
by the commander having overall authority for the operation. He will exercise control, as prescribed in the
Initiating Directive, over forces not a part of the amphibious task force, when such forces are operating
within the amphibious objective area after the arrival of the advance force or the amphibious task force.
When such forces are merely passing through the amphibious objective area, control will be exercised only
to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference.
e. Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore, and for
the security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations ashore, is vested in CLF.
1265 CONSULTATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS
In the exercise of his command authority, CATF, to the greatest possible extent, obtains and
considers the opinion of appropriate commanders, particularly in cases involving a decision requiring the
1-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
exercise of professional judgment in their operational fields. However, this requirement in no way limits
the command authority of CATF.
1266 CONSULTATION BETWEEN CORRESPONDING COMMANDERS
No significant decision affecting the plans, disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander

is made without consultation with the commander concerned.
1267 NAVAL AUTHORITY OVER LANDING FORCE UNITS
No Navy commander, other than CATF, exercises authority over, or assumes responsibility for, the
operating of landing force units, except where a Navy commander below the amphibious task force level
has been designated as commander of a subordinate force composed of Navy and landing force units.
1268 — 1269 SPARE
(R) 1270 NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
The naval commander, responsible within a specified geographic area for the naval control of all
merchant shipping under Allied naval control, is the Operational Control Authority (OCA).
a. Regional Naval Control of Shipping (RNCS). When RNCS is implemented, the OCA is
the naval commander designated as NCS Region Commander (NCSRC). He will be responsible for the
control of all merchant shipping consigned to RNCS whilst they are in the NCS Region.
b. Full Naval Control of Shipping (FNCS). When mandatory NCS is introduced on a global
basis (FNCS), the OCA’s functions are undertaken by the naval commander responsible for each sea area.
1271 CONVOY COMMODORE AND HIS DEPUTIES
The Convoy Commodore, vice commodore, and rear commodore are naval officers or masters of
ships in the convoy. The Convoy Commodore is designated to command the convoy, subject to the orders
of the OTC, and the vice and rear commodores are designated to assist him. The vice commodore succeeds
to command of the convoy if the commodore or his flagship is incapacitated; the rear commodore succeeds
both. If a section of a convoy is detached and it does not include the vice or rear commodore, the convoy
commodore must designate a commodore for the detaching section. Further discussion of convoy
command relationships is found in Chapter 10.
1272 IMPLEMENTATION OF NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
In time of crisis, RNCS will be the responsibility of the authority nominated by the MNC as the
NCSRC. This can either be a shore-based commander or the Maritime Component Commander afloat. The
choice of which will be dictated by the location of the crisis area and the type of crisis. Given that the NCS
Region will not accord with any existing command area boundaries, it is important that appropriate liaison
with other commanders is maintained. In the event that FNCS is established, control will be compulsory
and exercised by OCAs. Full details of NCS procedures and organization may be found in ATP 2, Vol. I.
However, Chapter 10 of ATP 1, Vol. I, contains a comprehensive overview of NCS.
1273 — 1274 SPARE
1-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1280 COMMAND DURING SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1281 SUPPORT SITUATIONS
Occasions may arise when one force provides support to another force. Support is the action of a
force or portion thereof which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. The degree,
manner, and duration of support which forces provide each other will be specified by the commander
ordering the support. He will indicate which of the following relationships is to apply. Support force OTC
should be provided with the necessary information concerning the situation and the mission of the force in
need of support at the time when the support is needed.
a. Situation A. The support force is to join and integrate with the other force. The senior officer
present or the officer to whom he has delegated tactical command is to become the OTC of the combined
force.
b. Situation B. The support force does not integrate. Unless otherwise ordered, the senior OTC of
the two forces is to coordinate the tactical operations of the two forces.
c. Situation C. The support force commander has discretion how best to provide support. This
situation may be ordered when for example:
(1) There is requirement for a force to provide simultaneous support to more than one force or to
provide support to any number of forces entering a designated area, or
(2) When the supporting commander has under his operational control or tactical command the ma-
jority of ships or aircraft or has forces equipped with nuclear weapons.
1282 SUPPORT OPERATIONS, SITUATION A
The following considerations are applicable under Situation A:
a. Delegation of Tactical Command. The OTC of the overall force may delegate tactical
command or control of designated forces to subordinate commanders for the execution of assigned tasks.
b. Tasking of Forces. The overall force OTC will issue tasking directives (e.g., OPGENs),
specify reporting requirements, establish tactical communication circuits, order overall force dispositions,
and issue other direction as required by the situation.
1283 SUPPORT OPERATIONS, SITUATION B
Under the conditions of Situation B, the coordination between forces will depend upon the
following considerations:
a. Distance between forces.
b. Whether the support force is providing craft for overall force defense.
c. Whether only surface support is being afforded.
d. Communications requirements and capabilities.
e. Threat.
f. Weather.
1-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
g. Sensor capabilities and limitations.
h. Cover and deception plans.
1284 SUPPORT OPERATIONS, SITUATION C
The following considerations are applicable under Situation C:
a. General. Support Situation C differs from Situations A and B in that the missions of the
respective forces may be different. When the supporting force commander is ordered to support a
particular force under Situation C, the supporting force commander will decide what support can be
provided as dictated by the constraints of his assigned mission. Coordination between respective OTCs is
required to eliminate mutual interference and enhance conservation of resources.
b. Location of Operations. When the support force commander is ordered to support a particular
force under the conditions of Situation C, he should decide, in view of the discretion allowed him, whether:
(1) To operate in a central location and thus be better placed to meet any expected commitments, or
(2) To move close to the particular force. Taking into consideration the circumstances above, it may
be decided to adopt Situation A or Situation B.
c. Duration of Support. The duration of the support is to be decided by the supporting force
commander in the absence of orders to the contrary. If the OTC of the force being supported wishes to
retain the supporting force beyond this time, approval of appropriate authorities must be obtained.
d. Support in a Designated Area. The supporting force commander may be ordered to provide
support in a designated area through which a number of forces may be passing. If the forces to be supported
are not simultaneously in the same area, the procedures in subparagraph b. may be adopted by the
supporting force commander with regard to each force.
e. Exchange of Information. In addition to the items in Article 1283, flow of information

concerning the measures for the prevention of mutual interference can be ensured.
1285 — 1289 SPARE
1290 OTHER SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Individual units may be assigned to provide support to forces at sea. This support may be in one of
three forms:
a. Direct Support. The support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under command
of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or
formation.
A unit assigned in direct support will operate under the tactical control of the OTC who is being
supported. Operational control and tactical command remain with the assigning authority. The direct
support unit will report to the designated controlling authority for employment. Control procedures are
amplified in subsequent chapters.
1-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Associated Support. A unit assigned in associated support operates independently of the

supported force, but may be tasked to provide contact information to and receive intelligence from the
OTC who is being supported. The designated unit operates under the tactical control of the assigning
authority who coordinates the tasking and movement of the supporting unit in response to the supported
OTC’s requirements.
c. Area Operations. Area operations are normally conducted in a geographic area, not related to
the protection of a specific force. Areas may be related to the protection of maritime forces scheduled to
enter the area, or to provide defense in depth to distant forces. Tactical command of units conducting area
operations remains with the assigning authority.
1283 — 1299 SPARE
1-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA
1300 INTRODUCTION
a. General. The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission of the force. He
may delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all of the areas of maritime warfare
noted below to designated subordinate warfare commanders and/or coordinators. The three principal areas
of maritime warfare are antisurface warfare (ASUW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antiair warfare
(AAW). Requirements for air coordination, electronic warfare coordination, and surveillance
coordination concern more than one area of warfare and so assume particular importance in the devising of
a command structure.
b. Development of Command Structure. In the development of a command structure at sea,

the OTC must identify the activities that will be required by the assigned task and determine who will be
accountable to him for their execution. For the purposes of this book, the following conventions have been
adopted for describing the activities in the OTC’s chain of command.
(1) Responsibility. The obligation placed upon an individual for correct and timely execution of
a task assigned by a superior that cannot be delegated. Responsibility also entails accountability for the
exercise of the authority delegated when tasking was assigned. Responsibility cannot be delegated and
thus accountability cannot be shifted. When a duty is assigned, the fact that some tasking can be dele-
gated further down the chain will not lessen the obligation of the holder of the intermediate authority to
his superior. The term responsibility is also used to describe an activity that is specific to a duty and can-
not be delegated further.
(2) Duty. An identified block of related functions within a larger command structure that can be as-
signed to a single subordinate. Assignment automatically delegates the requisite authority for command
and control required to fulfill the tasking. With the delegation of authority comes the inherent responsi-
bility of the subordinate to the assigning superior for execution of the task in accordance with known or-
ders and procedures. The list of duties is contained in the Duty Table (ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D), for
signaling purposes.
(3) Function. A defined activity which may be delegated to subordinates through specific assign-
ment or as part of a duty within the force command structure. Functions are listed in Tables 1-1 through
1-11 and are grouped by warfare area. When any function is delegated, it is assumed that the necessary
authority for command, control, direction or coordination required for the execution of that function has
also been delegated.
1301 COMMAND OF LARGE FORCES
A fundamental component of command effectiveness is the ability of the commander and

commanded units to communicate. This is particularly so in the case of large or dispersed forces; if there
are inadequacies in the communications capabilities of individual units, these must be identified and
assessed before a disposition is ordered. There will thus be occasions when the communications capability
of a force will impact upon the OTC’s concept of operations.
1302 DELEGATION OF COMMAND FUNCTIONS
a. Considerations. A centralized command is the most direct way of allowing the OTC to make
use of his experience and ability. However, circumstances and command facilities can make delegation
necessary. Some factors are:
(1) Mission.
1-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) The threat.
(3) Need for quick action or reaction.
(4) Necessity to carry out many actions in different places at the same time.
(5) Practical inability of the OTC to exercise all functions because of excessive workload or the re-
quirements of some actions for specific knowledge of facilities.
(6) Lack of appropriate display and communications facilities.
(7) Force size and composition.
1303 — 1304 SPARE
1305 COMMAND AND CONTROL OPTIONS
The OTC is always responsible for formulating and promulgating policy. Other OTC functions,
including warfare functions, may, based on factors stated in Article 1302, be delegated to subordinates
within the constraints of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force and stated policy. For the three principal
warfare areas, the OTC has the following options:
a. The OTC retains command in the principal areas of warfare by retaining all the warfare
functions.
b. The OTC delegates to one subordinate commander one or more warfare functions.
c. The OTC delegates to more than one subordinate commander several warfare functions.
d. The OTC delegates to subordinates within geographic areas (or sectors) warfare functions
relevant to that area, but may retain any part of the overall function for himself. This form of delegation can
be used by a principal warfare commander as well, if so assigned.
e. A special form of delegation as described in item b. is that the OTC of a large force may allocate
all his warfare functions for the defense of a force to a Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) while
retaining overall responsibility for the mission. The CWC may, in turn, delegate some or all warfare
functions as described above.
NOTE
Item a. describes centralized command while options in items b. through e. all describe forms
of decentralized command.
1306 RESPONSIBILITIES
a. OTC’s Responsibilities. The OTC has overall responsibility for accomplishing the mission
of the force and for executing defense. The OTC’s policy and procedure for succession of command
authority as well as designation of the standby OTC should be specified in advance of the operation in the
OTC’s orders. The OTC shall specify the chain of command between himself and, when designated, the
CWC, principal warfare commanders, coordinators, supporting commanders, and the forces under their
tactical command and/or control. This may be done by task number designation or by stipulating which
task groups, units, or elements are designated for each commander. The detailed OTC’s responsibilities for
mission execution and defense of the force are listed in Table 1-1 and those for a convoy operation in Table
1-9 and mine warfare in Table 1-11. The OTC’s responsibilities cannot be delegated.
1-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Principal Warfare Area Responsibilities. In exercising his responsibilities, the OTC must
consider both the threat to the force and the units which he has available to counter the threat. However, no
single threat may be considered in isolation; consequently, no tactic to counter a specific threat may be
employed without considering its effect on the security of the force from other threats which may
subsequently materialize. The OTC’s detailed functions are found in Tables 1-1 through 1-11. There are
two categories reflected in the tables:
(1) Those functions of the OTC which may be delegated to a CWC.
(2) Those functions which may be delegated to warfare commanders, coordinators, or others to
control assets and take action necessary to execute the promulgated policy.
c. Coordination Responsibilities.
(1) Air Coordination. The OTC is responsible for coordinating all friendly air movement within
his area of interest. As he will not always know the position and intention of all friendly units, he must
exercise coordination partly by procedural means. The detailed functions of the OTC for air coordina-
tion are to be found in Table 1-6 and are explained in Chapter 6, Section IV. They may be delegated to an
Air Coordinator.
(2) Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (EAW) Coordination. The OTC is responsible for de-
termining and promulgating force EAW policies. Details of responsibilities and functions are to be
found in Tables 1-1 and 1-8 and are explained in Chapters 5 and 9. EW functions may be delegated to the
Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC). Guidance on the application of acoustic warfare is to be found
in ATP 28.
(3) Surveillance. The OTC is responsible for establishing the surveillance areas for each area of
maritime warfare within the overall guidelines of the general picture compilation plan. Details of re-
sponsibilities and functions are to be found in Tables 1-1 through 1-4 and are explained in Chapter 6.
Functions may be delegated to warfare commanders.
(4) Mine Warfare Coordination. The OTC is responsible for formulating and promulgating
mine warfare policy. Detailed responsibilities and functions are found in Table 1-11. Mine warfare
functions may be delegated to a designated Mine Warfare Coordinator (MWC), as indicated in the table.
d. The Convoy Responsibilities of the OTC. The OTC is responsible for the safe and timely
arrival of the convoy. Detailed responsibilities and functions are found in Table 1-9 and are explained in
Chapter 10.
(1) Mercantile Convoy. The OTC of the escorting ships is not altered when a more senior naval
officer is present in a naval ship designated as part of the convoy and not part of the escort.
(2) Military Convoy. The senior naval officer of the ships in convoy and escorting ships will des-
ignate the OTC of the combined force in accordance with Article 1216.
(3) When a Support Force is in Situation A. (See Article 1282.) When the OTC of the sup-
port force is senior to the OTC of a mercantile convoy, he should consider allowing the OTC of the con-
voy to remain in tactical command. This maintains continuity of command and the previous close
liaison between the OTC of the convoy and the convoy commodore.
(4) Unescorted Convoy. In the absence of a warship escort, the convoy commodore is to com-
mand the convoy.
1-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
e. OTC’s Functions for Departure and Entry Operations.
The functions of the OTC are found in Table 1-10 and are explained in Chapter 3.
1307 —1309 SPARE
1310 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
The OTC may retain tactical command and tactical control authority or he may delegate some of that
authority to subordinate commanders and coordinators. Such delegation does not mean that the OTC
relinquishes authority over subordinates. It does mean that the subordinate is given some or all of that same
authority over forces assigned to him by the OTC. If the OTC elects to designate a CWC and/or warfare
commander/coordinators, he may delegate tactical command authority required to carry out assigned tasks
to them by using the Duty Table (ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D) and Tables 1-1 through 1-11 of this chapter.
1311 DELEGATION CONSIDERATIONS
a. General. The following general considerations are provided for selection and location of
warfare commanders:
(1) Availability of interoperable data link and access to required displays.
(2) Sufficiency and interoperability of communications equipments.
(3) Availability of sufficient skilled personnel and state of training (staff augmentation if
necessary).
(4) Living/working space available in units.
(5) No undue limitations imposed by RADHAZ restrictions.
(6) Level of tension/state of hostilities.
(7) Threat assessment.
(8) Area of operations and disposition required.
(9) Emission policy including need for silence on unique emitters.
(10) Compatibility of unit force weapons and sensors employment with proposed warfare com-
mand functions.
(11) The desirability of delegating all functions in a single warfare area to a single subordinate.
b. Specific Antiair Warfare Commander (AAWC) Considerations.
(1) Easy access to EW information.
(2) Possibility of using AEW aircraft as sector or standby AAWC.
1-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Specific Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Considerations.
(1) Availability of communication systems and space required for coordination with support sub-
marines and the submarine operating authority (SUBOPAUTH). (Staff augmentation will normally be
required.)
(2) Availability of air ASW expertise.
(3) Requirement for specialized oceanographic expertise.
d. Specific Antisurface Warfare Commander (ASUWC) Considerations.
(1) Access to aircrew post mission debriefs.
(2) Access to AEW and strike warfare expertise.
(3) Access to adequate targeting data.
e. Authority and Responsibility. In deciding what degree of control is to be delegated, and

when, the OTC must observe one cardinal principle: To operate effectively, each unit and command must
know in detail its obligation to the OTC, warfare commanders and coordinators, and other units. To
achieve this, it is essential that the OTC clearly specifies the chain of command. Although control of
different force weapons systems in a single ship may be delegated to different warfare commanders, only
one commander may exercise control over the movements of an individual unit at any one time. Should it
be necessary to change tactical control to meet specific circumstances, the OTC must clearly specify under
what circumstances and when such change is to take place. Should another commander wish to move a unit
to better carry out duties in a warfare field, he must do so through the commander having tactical control of
that ship or unit, as specified in the task organization, with the OTC or CWC adjudicating any differences.
1312 WARFARE COMMANDER AND COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITIES
a. General.
(1) Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). That officer to whom the OTC has assigned all
his authority and delegated functions for the overall direction and control of the defense of his force.
(2) Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs). Subordinate to the OTC/CWC are three princi-
pal warfare commanders: Antiair Warfare Commander (AAWC), Antisurface Warfare Commander
(ASUWC), and Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC). The warfare commanders are responsi-
ble for collecting and disseminating information and in certain situations are delegated authority to re-
spond to threats with assigned assets.
(a) The warfare commanders, when so authorized, may autonomously initiate action.
Attention is drawn to Article 1218, “Command by VETO.” The CWC also has power of veto within
his area of responsibility.
(b) In addition, commanders may be assigned authority for the deployment of force
(long-range) weapons systems and sensors, in accordance with the warfare organization, by means
of duty/function tables, regardless of the commander exercising tactical control of the unit.
(3) Functional Groups. The OTC may form temporary or permanent functional groups within
the overall task organization. These groups would have specific stated functions, such as operational de-
ception, underway replenishment, screening duties, etc.
1-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) Functional Call Signs. Warfare commanders and coordinators may be allocated a two-letter
call sign related to their respective command or coordination functions. This convention allows a clear
picture of the command and control organization and provides a quick and easy reference to be used by
warfare commanders for intercommunications. See Article 4123, paragraph b.
b. Delegation to Principal Warfare Commanders. The AAWC, ASUWC, and ASWC will
be responsible for the collection of information in their particular areas and the dissemination to the OTC
and force of evaluated information in those areas. Warfare commanders will maintain continuous liaison
with each other to ensure timely flow of mutually supporting information and avoid mutual interference.
Subsequent sections and Tables 1-2 through 1-4 deal with specific functions of the warfare commanders
and specific amounts of authority delegated to them in particular environments. Some warships have
weapons systems which have effective ranges that extend beyond the local area in which the ship is
operating. Since warfare commanders are normally assigned authority to employ these weapons, this may
cause situations in which one commander has tactical control of a ship and another has control of that
ship’s force weapons systems. If firing the weapon does not interfere with the tasking of the ship, there is
generally no problem. However, if significant maneuvering is required, coordination between the
appropriate warfare commanders is vital in prosecuting the threat. A temporary shift of tactical control
might be required but command and control should remain clear. Disagreement between the warfare
commanders should be resolved by the OTC (or CWC if designated).
c. Delegation to the Screen Commander (SC). The SC is a functional commander who will
normally control movements for the ships in the inner screen in accordance with guidance received from
the warfare commanders. The functions of the SC are contained in Table 1-5.
d. Delegation to Coordinators. Coordinators are asset and resource managers. They carry out
the policies of the OTC and respond to the specific tasking of the warfare commanders. Coordinators may
also exercise control of specified assets.
(1) The Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC). The EWC is the principal advisor to the
OTC in all matters pertaining to the employment and exploitation of the electromagnetic and acoustic
spectrum. Accordingly, he has broad responsibilities, which impact upon task group planning as well as
the management and control of all active and passive weapons, sensors, and electronic communications
equipment which operate in or target the electromagnetic spectrum/environment to include: ESM,
ECM, EPM, EMCON, OPDEC, OPSEC, SIGINT (COMINT/ELINT), and SIGSEC
(COMSEC/ELSEC). The extent to which the EWC exercises actual control over assets is scenario de-
pendent and should be clearly stated by the OTC and understood by the principal warfare commanders.
The EWC’s planning and management responsibilities encompass several areas. The EWC’s functions
are found in Table 1-8. In addition:
(a) The EWC must ensure that force assets are employed to support the requirements of the
OTC and principal warfare commanders. Coordination between the EWC and the principal warfare
commanders is vital to ensure that all assets with ESM, ECM, and EPM capabilities are managed
effectively.
(b) The EWC is the principal manager of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. The
EWC will formulate, promulgate, control, and monitor the EMCON plan based upon the OTC’s
emission policy. The ASWC must operate force acoustic emitters within the effective EMCON
plan. The ASWC has the authority to break acoustic EMCON in defense of the force. He must,
however, notify the EWC of his actions.
(c) The EWC must ensure that the force deception plan and assets are employed in a manner
which facilitates the mission and policy of the OTC.
1-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(d) The EWC must ensure that cryptologic assets, both organic and nonorganic, are employed
in a manner which facilitates responsiveness to the AAW, ASW, ASUW, and EW information
needs of the OTC.
(2) The Air Coordinator. The Air Coordinator exercises coordination within the force air coor-
dination area. The duty for air coordination should be assigned to the unit which has the greatest number
of electronic aids to aircraft navigation and control, the largest number of experienced air control per-
sonnel, and the best air picture facilities. This duty may be collocated with the AAWC, AREC, HEC, or
ASWC.
(3) The Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC). The AREC is a resource manager. He
may, under certain circumstances, exercise tactical control for particular aircraft (i.e., for aircraft pro-
jecting power ashore), but his primary role remains that of asset allocation and of informing the warfare
commander of the status of these assets, the results achieved by them, and the information gained from
their sensors. Particular functions of the AREC are detailed in Table 1-7 and amplified in Chapter 6.
(4) The Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC). When two or more ships other than a CV
are helicopter equipped, a central scheduling authority for flight operations from these ships is useful. In
a multithreat environment, the assets controlled by this coordinator may be in demand by any of the
principal warfare commanders. The HEC’s functions, therefore, will in many ways parallel those of the
AREC, with whom he should coordinate, concerning helicopters. Additional functions found in Table
1-7 can be delegated to the HEC for non-CV-based helicopter operations. HEC functions will be dele-
gated by the OTC, generally to the senior commanding officer of helicopter-equipped ships. These co-
ordinating functions will normally not apply to amphibious force and logistic helicopters. Requests for
helicopters embarked in other than the CV and amphibious and logistic ships will be direct to the HEC.
The OTC must be made aware of helicopter scheduling, tasking, and flight operations in order to be able
to resolve potential requirement conflicts. The HEC should promulgate a daily flight schedule.
(5) The Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA).
(NC) (NMM) The SOCA functions as the primary point of contact in the task force/group with the
SUBOPAUTH and submarines assigned to him concerning coordinated operations matters. The
OTC/CWC may retain this function or delegate it to a subordinate commander (normally, but not neces-
sarily, the ASWC) depending on the role of the submarine (e.g., ASUW, special warfare, support of am-
phibious warfare, etc.).
(a) (NC) (NMM) Division of SOCA Functions. In large operations, the OTC/CWC may
retain selected submarine coordination functions (e.g., WSM coordination) and delegate all other
functions (e.g., TACON) to one or more subordinate commanders. In doing so, unambiguous lines of
coordination shall be retained between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH, and between individual
submarines and the commanders to whom they are assigned. Division of submarine coordination
functions can provide a task group greater flexibility in submarine employment, but it is not required if
a single commander can effectively accomplish SOCA functions for all submarines.
(b) (NC) (NMM) Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC)/Submarine Advisory

Team (SAT). The SEC is the principal advisor to the SOCA for submarine operations. Assignment of
a SEC to the SOCA staff should be considered anytime submarines operate in associated support and
is required in direct support (unless this requirement is waived by the SUBOPAUTH). While not
always necessary, a SAT — composed of additional watchstanders — may be required depending on
the scenario. SEC/SAT becomes an integral part of and is co-located with the SOCA staff.
(c) (NC) (NMM) SOCA and SEC/SAT functions and responsibilities are described in ATP 18.
1-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(6) Local Warfare Coordinator. When two or more units are in company, a local warfare coor-
dinator may be designated. Local warfare coordinators have the following functions:
(a) Direction Functions:
i. Delegating, as appropriate, specified functions to other units in his local group.
ii. Establishing watch zones for units in his group.
iii. Broadcasting the local picture to units of the group on the local coordination net.
(b) Coordination Functions. Correlating and evaluating reports from units in company
and, where appropriate, relaying this information to the OTC/CWC or warfare commander.
(c) Control Functions. The local warfare coordinator controls the local coordination net.
(7) The Mine Warfare Coordinator (MWC). The MWC is the principal advisor to the OTC on
matters pertaining to mine warfare. He is responsible for coordinating the laying of minefields in sup-
port of the OTC and the efforts of supporting mine countermeasures (MCM) forces, which are usually
not under the direct command or control of the OTC/CWC. Specific functions of the MWC include:
(a) Employment of tactical mining against targets of opportunity, using force assets.
(b) Coordination with appropriate commanders for the laying of tactical minefields and the
execution of mining plans.
(c) Tasking of MCM forces assigned to the tactical command of the OTC/CWC.
(d) Coordination with appropriate local commanders for response to enemy mining of choke
points, safe havens, or operating areas, and for the execution of MCM plans.
(e) Maintaining and disseminating a plot of relevant mine warfare information to the force.
e. Asset Control and Coordination.
(1) Picket Ships, Towed Array Ships, or Other Ships. Picket ships, towed array ships, or
other ships operating at a considerable distance from the main body will normally operate under the tac-
tical control of a warfare commander. As previously set forth, force AAW weapons systems may be
tasked by the AAWC and force ASUW weapons systems by the ASUWC, even though the ship is under
the tactical control of another commander. A ship’s stationing should be coordinated to consider the re-
quirements of all warfare commanders. Because tasking of a ship’s weapons by one warfare com-
mander may interfere with its primary tasking, such action must be preceded by prior concurrence of the
warfare commander having tactical control. If required, tactical control may be temporarily passed to
another commander (e.g., two Harpoon-equipped towed array ships could be directed to form a surface
action group (SAG) and temporarily operate under the tactical control of the SAG commander).
(2) Ships in the Inner Screen. Ships in the inner screen will normally operate under the tactical
control of the screen commander (SC), with that authority delegated to him by the OTC/CWC. The
ships’ inner screen positions will be assigned by the SC in accordance with the OTC’s or warfare com-
manders’ requirements. These ships, like those in paragraph (1), may possess ASUW capabilities and
the ASUWC may, if assigned authority to do so, direct the SC to detach units as a SAG, but not before
getting prior concurrence of the ASWC, AAWC, or CWC as appropriate. To simplify coordination, the
SC should also, whenever possible, be the ASWC. However, as noted previously, in large dispositions
there may be several SCs or none, depending upon force disposition.
1-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Rescue Destroyer. During flight operations, the unit designated as rescue destroyer should
be under the tactical control of the CV’s commanding officer and not be removed from the rescue station
without his consent. Rescue destroyers, like all other surface units, may be tasked by the AAWC for
emergency AAW support, and by the ASUWC and ASWC for “in-place” firings.
(4) Submarines. Submarines operating in support of a task group will conduct operations as di-
rected by the OTC/CWC (or designated subordinate commander acting as the SOCA) or, in the case of
associated and area operations, the SUBOPAUTH. When in support, the submarine is to communicate
directly with the SOCA regarding coordination of tactical operations and the exchange of intelligence
and targeting information.
f. Delegation to Commanders of Functional Groups.
(1) The OTC may designate commanders of functional groups, such as deception groups, under-
way replenishment groups, etc. This commander will be implicitly responsible for all local warfare
functions within his group. He may delegate these functions to units under his control; in this case, the
unit executing those functions may be designated a local warfare coordinator. The group commander re-
ports action taken, contact information, etc., to the OTC and/or warfare commander, as appropriate.
(2) The following is a list of the most commonly used titles (see the glossary for definitions and in-
dicated chapters for additional information):
(a) Screen Commander (SC), see Chapter 9.
(b) Search and attack unit (SAU) commander, see Chapter 9.
(c) Surface action group (SAG) commander, see Chapter 8.
(d) Helicopter action group (HAG) commander, see Chapter 8.
(e) Main body group (MBG) commander.
(f) Underway replenishment group (URG) commander.
(g) Deception group (DCG) commander (including missile traps and wolf traps).
g. Delegation to Control Units. To carry out control functions, it is necessary to perform

specialized duties which are generally delegated and distributed among the various units in the force. A
complete list of such duties is contained in the Duty Table (ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D).
1313 PROMULGATION OF DUTIES AND DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS
a. The term “duty” is used to define warfare commander/coordinator and other functional
assignments. ATP 1, Vol. II, Table D, lists all duties. Certain duty assignments may be promulgated by
appropriate commanders.
b. The term “functions” refers to the actions and tasking listed in Tables 1-1 through 1-11. These
functions will be delegated by the OTC, CWC, and other commanders as appropriate to the command
structure/force needs.
c. Figure 1-2 depicts levels of command and control within the OTC’s warfare organization.
Figures 1-3 and 1-4 provide examples of the command structure incorporating duty and warfare function
assignments.
1-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
COMMAND
(SEE ARTICLE 1202) OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND OTC
CWC
COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER (SEE PARA 1312a(1))
WARFARE PRINCIPLE WARFARE COMMANDERS

COMMAND
(SEE ARTICLE 1312) ANTISURFACE ANTIAIR ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE WARFARE WARFARE PWC
COMMANDER COMMANDER COMMANDER (SEE PARA 1312a(2))
ASUWC AAWC ASWC
FUNCTIONAL COMMANDERS
ASSIGNED UNDERWAY FUNCTIONAL
SCREEN MAIN
TACTICAL REPLENISHMENT DECEPTION COMMANDERS
COMMANDER BODY
CONTROL GROUP (URG) GROUP (SEE PARA 1312f)
(SC) GROUP
(SEE ARTICLE 1217)
ASSIGNED
COORDINATION COORDINATORS COORDINATORS
FUNCTION (SEE PARA 1312d)
EWC AIR AREC HEC SOCA MWC
(SEE PARA 1202b)
ASSIGNED
CONTROL CONTROLLERS
CONTROLLERS
FUNCTION (SEE ARTICLE 1312g)
(SEE ARTICLE 1202c)
(SEE TABLE D OF ATP 1, VOL II FOR COMPLETE LIST)
Figure 1-2. Levels of Command and Control Within the OTC’s Warfare Organization
1314 — 1319 SPARE
1320 TASKING METHODS
The OTC and other maritime commanders have at their disposal different means of tasking the
forces under their command. Suggested methods of tasking are as follows:
a. Maritime Tactical Message System (MTMS), see Article 1321.
b. RAINFORM System, see Article 1322.
c. Tactical signals (ATP 1, Vol. II, Article 3415 — Duty Table With Governing Group BV).
d. Appropriate tasking signals (e.g., OPTASK EW — Article 5401 and APP 4).
e. TASMO tasking messages (APP 4 and ATP 34).
1-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
TF 419
CTF 419 COMSTRIKFLTLANT (OTC)
(EMBARKED USS MT WHITNEY)
TG 419.01 TG 419.06 TG 419.08 (MAIN BODY GROUP)

CTG COMCARSTRIKGRU 4 (CWC/EWC) CTG COMASGRU 2 (ASWC) CTG USS MOUNT WHITNEY
HMCS PRESERVER
RFA FORT AUSTIN
USS SEATTLE
TU 419.01.01
CTU USS SARATOGA (AREC) TU 419.06.01 TU 419.06.02
CTU HMS ARK ROYAL CTU USS MCCLOY
HMS SIRIUS TU 419.08.01
USS TRUETT CTU HNLMS VAN GALEN (SC)
HMS AJAX
TE 419.01.01.01 USS JOHN ADAMS
CTE USS TICONDEROGA (AAWC) (SC) FGS MOLDERS
HNLMS TROMP TE 419.06.01.02
USS SPRUANCE CTE HMS YORK (SC)
USS STUMP
HMS ARROW (FROM 231200Z OCT)
TG 419.05
CTG COMCRUDESGRU 8 (ASUWC)
TU 419.05.06
CTU USS NEW JERSEY
TE 419.05.06.01
CTE FGS BREMEN
HMS ARROW (UNTIL 231200Z OCT)
Figure 1-3. Example of Warfare Command and Coordination Incorporated in a Task Organization
f. Air plans, see Chapter 9.
g. ASW tasking, see Chapter 9.
h. Maritime air tasking, see Chapter 6, Section IV.
i. Operation orders/plain text/voice transmissions.
j. Submarine tasking and coordination messages (see APP 4 and ATP 18).
1321 MARITIME TACTICAL MESSAGE SYSTEM (MTMS) — PURPOSE AND METHOD

OF USE
a. Purpose. The MTMS consists of standardized messages and may be used:
(1) To convey operational instructions or intentions.
(2) To pass operational information to tactical commanders at sea.
1-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
CTF
OTC
CWC
CTG CTG CTG PRINCIPAL

ASWC ASUWC AAWC WARFARE
COMMANDERS
SECTOR SECTOR
ASUWC AAWC
COORDINATORS
AC EWC AREC SOCA HEC MWC
MAIN
DECEPTION BODY FUNCTIONAL
1-27
URG SAG
SAU GROUP GROUP GROUPS
SC HAG
SC SC
LASWC LAAWC LOCAL

ASUW
SUB LEWC SEC AAW COORDINATORS
UNITS
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ASW AIRCRAFT UNITS AND UNITS

ASW UNITS
Notes
1. Diagram indicates certain command relationships and

is not a substitute for a task organization which will nor-
mally require to be promulgated.
2. The task organization should be prepared with the aim

of simplifying command and control relationships in sup-
port of the principal warfare requirements.
Figure 1-4. Example of Assigned Command and Coordinated Functions in a Force Using a CWC
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-1. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES
OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
(Which cannot be delegated)
101 Promulgate policies and plans to accomplish the mission set forth by higher authority, providing a
description of his intentions to his subordinate commanders
102 Direct and monitor operations
103 Establish command, control and communications policy, promulgate warfare command assign-
ments, and establish the force task organization if not already established by higher authority.
104 Establish the degree of authority delegated, specifying command functions assigned to each Princi-
ple Warfare Commander (PWC).
105 Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators) promul-
gate policies for force:
(a) Picture Compilation Plan.
(b) Electronic and acoustic emission, including Emission Control and Emission Security.
(c) Radar frequency plans.
(d) Electromagnetic compatibility.
106 Promulgate a force Communications Plan, including alternate plans, designating circuits and fre-
quencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.
107 During periods of tension, request the Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate to his mission from
higher authority.
108 (NC) (NMM) Formulate and promulgate plans for power projection and operations against land tar-
gets in conjunction with appropriate commanders.
109 Plan and coordinate logistics requirements.
110 Responsibilities specific to convoy operations as given in Table 1-9.
111 (NC) (NMM) Designate a Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA) to coordinate with
the Submarine Operations Authority (SUBOPAUTH) and assigned submarines.
112 (NC) (NMM) Provide for submarine tactical communication requirements in the overall communica-
tions plan (OPTASK COMMS). Ensure all aircraft and surface ship circuit operators are aware of
GUERRILLA procedures.
113 (NC) (NMM) When appropriate, ensure that a Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC) (or Submarine
Advisory Team (SAT) if additional personnel are required) is available to commanders serving as
SOCA.
114 (NC) (NMM) Specify procedures for consolidation of SOCA responsibilities when joining task groups
with each having submarines assigned.
115 to 119 SPARE
1-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-1. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
(Which may be delegated to a warfare commander/coordinator)
120 Promulgating the policy for Operational/Tactical Deception.
121 Formulating and promulgating the policy for planned responses.
122 (NC) (NMM) Promulgating the policy for, and when authorized, directing the employment of nuclear
weapons.
123 Formulating and promulgating general safety policy or assigned units including policy for air-
craft/units joining the force.
124 Providing air, surface, and subsurface units as available to appropriate PWCs, coordinating their re-
spective efforts and, when necessary, resolving conflicting requirements.
125 Requesting assignments of such external assets as may be required.
126 Designating position and intended movement (PIM), disposition and force surveillance areas, and
maneuvering the force.
127 With other appropriate commanders, arranging for coordination of air, surface, and subsurface sur-
veillance with other friendly forces operating within or adjacent to the force surveillance area.
128 Specifying desired search efforts outside the established force surveillance area, requesting addi-
tional assets as necessary.
129 Specifying reference systems for air/surface/submarine contact reporting.
130 From all information available obtained from external sources and/or PWCs, resolving any existing
conflict, and constructing, displaying, and passing to the force a composite picture of the tactical sit-
uation.
131 Evaluating information to establish probability areas/sectors for air, surface, and subsurface threats.
132 Ordering degrees of readiness.
133 Informing SUBOPAUTH of task force/group intentions and movements.
134 (NC) (NMM) Requesting support submarines as required. (Not applicable if submarines are perma-
nently assigned to the task group.)
135 (NC) (NMM) Coordinating submarine and task force/group Waterspace Management (WSM) re-
quirements with SUBOPAUTH.
136 (NC) (NMM) Providing SUBOPAUTH long-term submarine employment requirements and coordi-
nating information.
137 (NC) (NMM) Promulgating communications procedures and protocols required for submarine opera-
tions applicable to the specific scenario. (See ATP 18.)
138 (NC) (NMM) Promulgating or otherwise ensuring all elements of the force, including nonorganic
support units, have the effective SUBOPAUTH WSM Allocation and Status message for the area in
which they are operating.
1-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-1. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
139 (NC) (NMM) Providing assigned submarines with tailored intelligence support by Force Summary
message by tactical communications or via the SUBOPAUTH for relay on the submarine broadcast.
140 (NC) (NMM) As required, exchanging on-scene tactical coordination and intelligence information
with assigned submarines. Maintaining an updated Force Situation Report for immediate relay on
tactical circuits.
141 (NC) (NMM) Acting as or designating the SGSA Coordinating Authority.
142 (NC) (NMM) Overseeing on-scene operations to ensure submarine safety from attack by friendly
forces.
143 (NC) (NMM) When delegated by the SUBOPAUTH, assuming tactical control (TACON) of desig-
nated submarines.
144 to 199 SPARE
NOTE
Standby OTC will be prepared to assume the duties of the OTC.
1-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-2. OTC’s Functions in AAW

NO. FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.
220 Formulating and promulgating general AAW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance to the
force.
221 Promulgating EW policy as it affects AAW.
222 Formulating and promulgating policy on planned responses in AAW.
223 Ordering AAW degrees of readiness.
224 Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for AAW and forwarding related requests.
225 Designating the AAWC and standby AAWC.
226 Establishing and promulgating the air surveillance area.
227 Assigning air and surface AAW units to AAWC for detection/localization/identification/recognition
and reporting air contacts.
228 to 239 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the AAWC, but

may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
240 Developing and implementing the air surveillance and defense plan.
241 Dividing the AAW area into sectors, if required.
242 Designating sector AAWCs (SAAWCs) and/or local AAWCs (LAAWCs) as required, inner defense
zone coordinator (IDZC), and outer defense zone coordinator (ODZC).
243 Designating Force Track Coordinator Air (FTC-A).
244 Designating link management units.
245 Establishing the requirements for shipborne/organic AAW air support and forwarding requests to
AREC/HEC.
246 Assigning stations sectors and/or patrolling areas and designating control units (AEWCU or
CAPCU) for AAW aircraft, keeping Air Coordinator (AC) informed.
247 Establishing and promulgating the Identification Safety Range (ISR) and safety sectors for all
friendly aircraft and any special areas or zones established for aircraft safety and identification or to
prevent mutual interference, in coordination with AC.
248 Establishing joining control procedures for AAW aircraft, keeping the AC informed.
249 Promulgating identification criteria, required recognition levels, and required recognition confidence
levels.
250 Issuing criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if applicable).
251 (NC) (NMM) Establishing ZIPPO plan and defining ZIPPO area if other than a radius of 20 nm.
1-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-2. OTC’s Functions in AAW (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
252 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned surface AAW units in
accordance with the OTC’s policies and plans.
253 Coordinating and controlling air surveillance.
254 Coordinating and controlling use of all force sensors in AAW.
255 Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts and using all available infor-
mation to maintain a complete air plot of the surveillance area.
256 Coordinating movements of friendly aircraft with the air surveillance area, in cooperation with the
AC.
257 Issuing periodic AAW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other reports, including
SITSUMs and daily AAWC intentions message.
258 Controlling AAW nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in reporting
(COMSEC). The AAWC may in turn assign some of this responsibility to sector AAWCs and/or
FTC-A.
259 Coordinating with land-based air defense authorities.
260 Issuing threat warnings (AIR).
261 Issuing weapon restriction orders.
262 Coordinating and controlling employment of all force antiair weapons and resolving conflicts be-
tween tactical use of weapons and demands of aircraft safety.
263 Coordinating and ordering the launching and stationing of alert AAW aircraft.
264 Directing the employment of force CHAFF resources for AAW.
265 Exercising command by VETO over all AAW actions, initiated by other units of the force.
266 (NC) (NMM) Exercising control over ASMD by:
(a) Ordering any ZIPPO restrictions.
(b) Controlling ZIPPOs, force maneuver if required.
(c) Relaying relevant ZIPPOs to other commands’ groups.
267 Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in prosecution of the threat.
268 to 299 SPARE
1-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-3. OTC’s Functions in ASUW

NO. FUNCTIONS
320 Formulating and promulgating ASUW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance to the force.
321 Promulgating EW policy as it affects ASUW.
322 Formulating and promulgating policy for planned responses in ASUW.
323 Ordering ASUW degrees of readiness.
324 Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for ASUW, forwarding related requests.
325 Designating the ASUWC and standby ASUWC.
326 Establishing and promulgating the surface surveillance area.
327 Assigning units to ASUWC for detection/localization/identification/recognition and reporting surface

contacts.
328 to 339 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the ASUWC, but

340 Developing and implementing the surface surveillance plan.
341 Dividing the ASUW area into sectors, if required.
342 Designating sector ASUWCs (SASUWCs).
343 Designating a Force Track Coordinator Surface (FTC-S).
344 Establishing the requirement for organic ASUW air support and forwarding requests to AREC/HEC.
345 Assigning sectors and/or patrol areas and designating control units for ASUW aircraft, keeping Air
Coordinator (AC) informed.
346 In accordance with the AAWC’s directives (see function 247), establishing joining and control proce-
dures for ASUW aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.
levels.
349 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned surface ASUW units,
in accordance with the OTC’s policy and plans.
350 Coordinating and controlling surface surveillance.
351 Coordinating and controlling use of all force sensors in ASUW.
1-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-3. OTC’s Functions in ASUW (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
352 Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts using all available information
to maintain a complete surface plot of the surveillance area.
353 Issuing periodic ASUW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other reports, includ-
ing SITSUMs.
354 Controlling ASUW nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in reporting
(COMSEC). The ASUWC may in turn assign some of this responsibility to sector ASUWCs and/or
FTC-S.
355 Issuing threat warnings (SURFACE).
356 Coordinating and controlling employment of all force antisurface weapons.
357 Ordering aircraft launched and tasking aircraft attacks to counter hostile surface contacts (ASUWC
establishes aircraft alert requirements, OTC retains alert launch authorization until specifically dele-
gated).
358 Directing the employment of force CHAFF resources in ASUW.
359 Forming and detaching SAGs and HAGs, or in the event, directing screen commander in dispatch-
ing SAGs/HAGs, liaising with other Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs) as required.
361 to 399 SPARE
1-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-4. OTC’s Functions in ASW

NO. FUNCTIONS
420 Formulating and promulgating ASW plans and when necessary specific guidance to the force.
421 Formulating and promulgating EW policy as it affects ASW.
422 Formulating and promulgating acoustic emission policy.
423 Formulating and promulgating acoustic deception policy including the use of acoustic decoys.
424 Formulating and promulgating policy on planned responses in ASW.
425 Ordering ASW degrees of readiness.
426 Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for ASW and forwarding related requests.
427 Designating the ASWC and standby ASWC.
428 Establishing and promulgating the subsurface surveillance area.
429 Assigning air, surface, and subsurface ASW units to ASWC for detection/localization/identification/
recognition and reporting subsurface contacts.
430 (NC) (NMM) Designating the Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC) and standby SEC (subject to
concurrence of the Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH)).
431 to 439 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the ASWC, but

440 Developing and implementing the subsurface surveillance plan.
441 Dividing the ASW area into sectors, if required.
442 Designating sector ASWCs (SASWCs) and local ASWCs (LASWCs), as required.
443 Designating a Force Track Coordinator Subsurface (FTC-SS).
444 Implementing the acoustic part of the EMCON plan.
445 Establishing the requirements for organic ASW air support and forwarding requests to AREC/HEC.
446 Assigning sectors and/or patrol areas and designating control units for ASW aircraft, keeping the
AAWC and the Air Coordinator (AC) informed.
447 In accordance with AAWC direction (see Function 247), establishing joining and control procedures
for ASW aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.
levels.
1-35 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-4. OTC’s Functions in ASW (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
450 In accordance with OTC/CWC directives (see Function 423), ordering measures to evade subma-
rines, including tactical torpedo countermeasures (consequential maneuvering will normally be
ordered by the screen commander).
451 Issuing specific instructions to all friendly units to prevent mutual interference between submarines
in support, towed array surface ships, and all other friendly units.
452 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and maneuvering of assigned surface ASW units and
aircraft whose primary mission is ASW, and when direct support submarines are assigned, assum-
ing tactical control of the submarines.
453 Coordinating and controlling subsurface surveillance.
454 Coordinating and controlling employment of all force ASW weapons and sensors,
(NC) (NMM) taking into account the daily Waterspace Management (WSM) message of the
SUBOPAUTH.
455 Evaluating information and promulgating classification in the force when more than one ASW unit is
reporting and classifying a contact.
456 Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts and using all available infor-
mation to maintain a complete subsurface plot of the surveillance area.
457 (NC) (NMM) When submarines are assigned in support, maintaining a plot of the location and
movement of friendly submarine havens, WSM areas, transit lanes, and NOTACK areas which may
affect force operations in order to prevent mutual interference.
458 Issuing periodic ASW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other reports, including
SITSUMs.
459 Controlling ASW nets especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in reporting
(COMSEC). The ASWC may in turn assign some of these functions to sector ASWCs and/or
FTC-SS.
460 Issuing threat warnings (SUBSURFACE).
461 (NC) (NMM) Positively controlling ASW weapon release within the Joint Action Area (JTAA) in order
to prevent blue-on-blue engagements.
462 Ordering the launch and employment of alert aircraft to counter the submarine threat.
463 Coordinating contact prosecution, including coordination with the screen commander.
464 Forming and detaching SAUs, or, in the event, directing the screen commander to dispatch SAUs,
liaising with other PWCs, as required.
466 (NC) (NMM) Assigning AWSM duties and AWSM guards as appropriate.
467 Directing employment of force decoys according to the policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.
468 Promulgating plans to conduct acoustic deception in accordance with the policy formulated by the
OTC/CWC.
469 to 499 SPARE
1-36 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-5. OTC’s Functions in Screening Operations

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC or Functional Commander.
520 Designating the screen commander(s) (SC) (in a small force he may also be the ASWC) and the
standby screen commander.
521 Assigning to the screen commander(s) units to be employed in the inner screen(s).
522 Establishing the area in which the screen commander(s) accomplish(es) assigned duties.
523 to 539 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the Screen

Commander(s), but may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
540 In accordance with guidance provided by the OTC and/or Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs),
establishing the type of inner screen best suited to the existing environmental conditions, forces as-
signed, and other factors.
541 Arranging inner screen design with the PWCs if separate from SC, to ensure compatibility with the
overall employment.
542 Acting as local ASWC (LASWC) for inner screen.
543 Assigning necessary subsidiary duties to units assigned (plane guard, bathythermograph guard
ships).
544 Stationing and employing ASW aircraft within the area of responsibility and designating control
units, keeping the AAWC and the Air Coordinator (AC) informed.
545 Ordering torpedo countermeasures for use by units assigned in accordance with direction from
ASWC.
546 Promulgating actions to be taken when submarine/surface contact is gained by a screen unit within
the area of responsibility.
547 Promulgating the screen and screening stations to units assigned.
548 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and maneuvering, of units assigned within the area
of responsibility.
549 Coordinating contact prosecution in conjunction with the ASWC.
550 Dispatching SAUs when directed by OTC/ASWC and SAGs/HAGs when directed by OTC/ASUWC
and adjusting the screen accordingly.
551 to 599 SPARE
1-37 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-6. OTC’s Functions in Air Coordination

NO. FUNCTIONS
620 Promulgating air coordination policy.
621 Establishing (when this is not established by civil control authorities) and promulgating aircraft sepa-
ration and aircraft coordination procedures in the Force Air Coordination Area.
622 Designating the Air Coordinator (AC) and standby AC.
623 Establishing and promulgating within the force and to relevant outside authorities the dimensions
and location of force air coordination area.
624 to 639 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the Air Coordinator,

but may be retained by the OTC.
640 Designating air control units (ACES) for aircraft not assigned to warfare commanders/coordinators
in liaison with the Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC)/Helicopter Element Coordinator
(HEC).
641 Supporting the AAWC in establishing airspace coordination measures, such as special areas or
zones for aircraft safety, identification, or prevention of mutual interference.
642 Supporting Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs) in establishing joining and control procedures
for aircraft, if required.
643 Ensuring safe coordination of all aircraft when they are under TF/TG units’ tactical control.
644 Coordinating air traffic, controlling, and monitoring aircraft movements within the force air coordina-
tion area, ensuring altitude separation and traffic control, keeping AAWC and ACES involved
informed.
645 Coordinating and monitoring tactical employment of all force aircraft.
646 Ensuring that available weather information, including the altimeter pressure setting in millibars and
inches, is promulgated within the force air coordination area.
647 Support the AAWC in coordinating and reporting the movement of friendly aircraft.
648 Monitoring aircraft safety and coordination nets in conjunction with the ACU.
649 Maintaining up-to-date information on all national and international airspace information and reser-
vations that are likely to affect the force, ensuring adequate clearance and non-violation by the
force.
650 Promulgating restrictions on flying operations, due to meteorological conditions, keeping the
OTC/PWCs informed.
651 Supporting the AAWC in resolving conflicts between tactical use of weapons and demands of air-
craft safety.
652 to 699 SPARE
1-38 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-7. OTC’s Functions in Air Resource Coordination

NO. FUNCTIONS
720 Formulating and promulgating general employment policy for air resources.
721 Designating the Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC) and Helicopter Element Coordinator
(HEC).
722 to 739 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the AREC/HEC,

as appropriate, but may be retained by the OTC.
740 Supplying and apportioning air assets in response to warfare commander’s requirements, informing
them of assets assigned to their tasking.
741 Tasking organic aircraft assigned to warfare commanders/coordinators.
742 Designating air control units (ACUs) for aircraft not assigned to warfare commanders/coordinators in
liaison with the Air Coordinator (AC).
743 Passing orders and information to aircraft under his control to enable assigned tasks to be carried
out.
744 Informing warfare commanders/coordinators of results obtained by air assets assigned to their tasking.
745 Sending aircraft availability reports.
746 Promulgating and updating flight schedules and aircraft readiness.
747 Planning and executing war-at-sea air operations when so directed by the ASUWC or OTC and
power projection air operations.
748 Controlling aircraft operating against land targets (the controlling functions may be delegated to an
AACU or FAC).
749 to 799 SPARE
1-39 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-8. OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

NO. FUNCTIONS
820 Formulating and promulgating the force electronic and acoustic warfare (EAW) policy.
821 Formulating and promulgating the EW aspects of deception policy.
822 Formulating policy for decoy/jamming operations.
823 In peacetime or tension periods, formulating the EW aspects of anti-intruder policy.
824 Designating the Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC) and standby EWC.
825 Ordering EMCON plan in force and changes in response to the tactical situation.
826 Establishing COMSEC monitoring plan and designating on each net a Principal Warfare Com-
mander (PWC), coordinator, or unit COMSEC monitor (e.g., AAWC is COMSEC monitor on AAWC
net).
827 to 839 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the EWC,

but may be retained by the OTC or CWC.
840 Formulating and promulgating force electromagnetic compatibility plan/radar frequency (RADFREQ)
plan.
841 Assigning ESM duties and ESM guards as appropriate.
842 In accordance with the OTC’s direction, formulating and promulgating force EMCON plans.
843 Establishing tactical cryptologic information requirements and means of dissemination.
844 Allocating, disposing, and tasking ESM, ECM, and EPM resources to ensure that threat and target
emissions are covered.
845 Issuing the list of threat and target emitters and Electronic Order of Battle (EOB).
846 Tasking available units, including ESM and ECM capable aircraft, to detect and report emitter con-
tacts (EWC establishes alert requirements, OTC retains alert reaction authorization until specifically
delegated).
847 Coordinating with Air Coordinator (AC)/Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC)/Helicopter Ele-
ment Coordinator (HEC) for support aircraft.
848 Coordinating employment of ESM and cryptologic sensor equipment in support of the OTC’s and
warfare commanders’ tactical intelligence requirements.
849 Collecting, evaluating, and classifying ESM and reporting evaluated information gained to the OTC
and appropriate warfare commanders (to include bearings from jammed radars when appropriate).
850 Issuing EW SITREPs and SITSUMs as directed by the OTC in conjunction with the warfare com-
manders.
1-40 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-8. OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (Cont.)

NO. FUNCTIONS
851 Controlling and monitoring EW nets and force electromagnetic compatibility plan/RADFREQ plan
and ensuring compliance with the EMCON plan and ELSEC policy. (ASWC monitors acoustic por-
tions of EMCON plan).
852 Directing employment of force decoy and CHAFF resources in conjunction with the warfare com-
manders.
853 Exercising control of EW reactions to a threat, including planned responses.
854 Allocating force racket numbers.
855 Coordinating employment of active jamming and electronic neutralization devices according to the
policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.
856 Promulgating plans to conduct electronic deception according to the policy formulated by the
OTC/CWC.
857 to 899 SPARE
1-41 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-9. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Convoy Operations

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS
OTC’s RESPONSIBILITIES
901 Formulate and promulgate policy for the defense of the convoy against all threats.
902 Establish close liaison with the Convoy Commodore for safe navigation of the convoy and instruct
him to order emergency turns.
903 When required, designate appropriate warfare and functional commanders, including screen com-
mander(s).
904 Detail the emission policy for both escorts and convoy.
905 to 939 SPARE
FUNCTIONS
(Which may be delegated to appropriate commanders)
940 Advising the Naval Control of Shipping Officer (NCSO) of the optimum convoy disposition.
941 Stationing of escorts and establishing intership spacing within the convoy.
942 Establishing and controlling communications.
943 Ordering evasive alterations of course.
944 Keeping the Operational Control Authority (OCA) informed (emission policy permitting) of:
(a) Convoy’s position, course, and speed.

(b) Estimated time of arrival (ETA) at designated point.
(NC) (NMM) (normally point Xray.)
(c) Inability to adhere to route, comply with diversion, or reach a rendezvous within 1 hour of
the appointed time.
(d) Intended rendezvous and route when the convoy is scattered.
(e) Time of detaching sections from the convoy, and whether they are escorted.
(f) Names of escorts and merchant ships assigned to the convoy but not present on sailing.
(g) Failure of escorts to meet the convoy within 8 hours of the appointed time.
(h) Names of escorts detached if they are not expected to rendezvous within 24 hours.
(I) Enemy reports.
(j) Intercepts of D/F bearings of enemy emissions that provide the first indication of an
enemy’s presence.
(k) Requests for replenishment within a rendezvous.
(l) Ships sunk or damaged and aircraft lost.
(m) Operational defects suffered by ships when advance knowledge will materially assist shore
authorities.
(n) Weather conditions.
945 to 999 SPARE
1-42 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-10. OTC’s Functions in Departure and Entry Operations

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to the CWC

or a Warfare Commander)
1040 Promulgating departure or entry operation plan, ordering the time the plan is to be executed, and
specifying whether a departure or entry screen is to be formed.
1041 For operations:
(a) Ordering the time that the initial search is to commence.

(b) Promulgating zero hour to the force and local authorities.
(c) (NC) (NMM) Promulgating points Alfa and Xray, if not already done by local authority. For
departure operations, ordering the time the first ship of the main body is to pass through
point Xray.
(d) (NC) (NMM) Promulgating the position of point Oscar.
(e) (NC) (NMM) Ordering the time the first ship of the main body or the Guide is to pass
through point Oscar.
(f) (NC) (NMM) Promulgating the position of point Yankee, when applicable.
(g) (NC) (NMM) Ordering the time that a specific unit or formation will pass point Yankee.
1042 Informing the force of the support by shore-based forces.
1043 Allocating forces for the initial search on departure operations.
1044 Informing the screen commander of the cruising formation to be formed and the type of screen re-
quired on passing a designated point.
(NC) (NMM) (normally point Oscar.)
1045 Defining the area to be searched during the initial search and establishing, if required, the grid refer-
ence position.
1046 to 1099 SPARE
1-43 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-11. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Mine Warfare

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS
OTC’s RESPONSIBILITIES
1120 Formulate and promulgate the force mine warfare policy.
1121 Designate the force Mine Warfare Coordinator (MWC).
1122 to 1139 SPARE
FUNCTIONS
(Which may be delegated to appropriate commanders/coordinators)
MCM FUNCTIONS
1140 Acting as tasking authority in accordance with ATP 6 for MCM forces assigned to the OTC.
1141 Coordinating the efforts of supporting MCM forces.
1142 Coordinating with appropriate local commanders for response to enemy mining of choke points,
safe havens, or operating areas.
1143 Coordinating with appropriate local commanders for the execution of MCM plans.
1144 Requesting appropriate subarea commander to issue subarea navigation warnings resulting from
MCM operations by forces assigned to the OTC.
1145 to 1169 SPARE
MINING FUNCTIONS
1170 Coordinating the laying of minefields in support of the force.
1171 Planning and conducting tactical mining operations by assigned forces against targets of opportu-
nity.
1172 Coordinating with appropriate area commanders for the laying of tactical minefields.
1173 Coordinating with appropriate area commanders for the execution of mining plans.
1174 Requesting appropriate subarea commander to issue subarea navigation warnings for minefields
executed by assigned forces.
1175 to 1199 SPARE
1-44 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) To report operational information between commanders and from subordinate to higher
formations.
(4) To notify organizations of impending and actual operations of units engaged in maritime
warfare.
b. Method of Use. MTMS messages are to be used as shown in Table 1-12. Detailed instructions
and the message structures are found in APP 4.
c. Ships Should Receive All Relevant MTMS Messages Before Joining a Force.
Cooperating aircraft should receive the relevant MTMS messages at such a time that the information is
available at the preflight briefing. Sections that are not required or applicable should be omitted. Whenever
possible it is advisable to issue standing MTMS messages covering the total period of operation. Changes
are then only necessary for individual items which change.
1322 RAINFORMS — PURPOSE AND TYPES
a. Purpose. The RAINFORM System consists of standardized message forms and is used for the
following:
(1) To convey operational instructions or intentions from commanders to subordinates.
(2) To pass operational information to tactical commanders at sea.
(3) To report operational information and intelligence between commanders and from subordinates
to higher authorities.
(4) To notify air defense organizations of impending and actual movements of aircraft engaged in
maritime operations.
b. Types. The following types of RAINFORM are used in the reporting system:
FORM GREEN — Task assignments for aircraft operations; notification of planned aircraft move-
ments to appropriate air defense organizations and naval forces.
FORM BROWN — Movement report of own aircraft sorties; notification to air defense authorities.
FORM BROWN DEVIATION — Report of any deviation from FORM BROWN.
FORM RED (INTREP) — Relay of enemy contact reports issued by controlling authority of task
unit, group, or force commander at sea.
FORM GOLD — Reporting method used to input contacts and enemy contact reports into auto-
matic data processing systems that are not configured to handle FORM RED.
FORM PURPLE — Immediate report of aircraft sortie results (or other task operation results).
FORM BLACK — Periodic summary of enemy activity.
FORM WHITE — Report of own (friendly and neutral) forces.
FORM TAN — Aircraft availability and airfield state.
1-45 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-12. MTMS Messages – Use
TYPE OF
MESSAGE INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ORIGINATOR OCCASION
OPGEN General Policy and All TF/TG units, cooperat- OTC As Required
detailed instructions ing TF/TG commanders,
for retained responsi- appropriate shore authori-
bility ties
OPTASK AAW Detailed AAW in- All TF/TG units, appropri- OTC/AAWC/ As Required
structions ate shore-based SOC/CRC
authorities, cooperating
force commanders and
units, including adjacent
TF/TG commanders
OPTASK ASW Detailed ASW in- All units in force, cooper- OTC/ASWC As Required
structions ating force commanders
and units
OPTASK ASUW Detailed ASUW in- All units in force, cooper- OTC/ASUWC As Required
structions ating force commanders
and units
OPTASK AIR Detailed tasking and All units in force, cooper- OTC/HEC/ If required by
instructions for or- ating force commanders AREC/Air 2000Z daily
ganic aircraft and units, including shore Coordinator
authorities if required
OPTASK EW Detailed tasking and All units in force and par- OTC/EWC As Required
EW instructions ticipating shore-based
commands or units
OPTASK COMMS Promulgation of All units in force, cooper- OTC/delegated As Required

Comm Plan and re- ating force commanders commander
lated instructions and units
OPTASK LINK Detailed tasking and All units in force, cooper- OTC/delegated Presailing and
instructions for link ating force commanders authority or ap- As Required
operations and units propriate shore
command or
designated unit
OPTASK AMPHIB Promulgate essential Amphibious task force, CCATF/CATF As Required

instructions and infor- landing force, and support no later than
mation to conduct forces 72 hours pre-
amphibious opera- ceding
tions amphibious op-
erations
1-46 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 1-12. MTMS Messages – Use (Cont.)
TYPE OF
MESSAGE INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ORIGINATOR OCCASION
OPTASK MINE Detailed instructions OTC covering forces, OTC of MCM As Required
WARFARE for lead-through OTC naval forces, convoy or minelaying
minelaying and MCM commodore, units in force
operations TF/TG/convoy as appro-
priate
OPTASK RAS Promulgate replen- All units involved OTC/delegated As Required

ishment program authority
OPSTAT UNIT Promulgate opera- OTC/appropriate com- Unit Presailing, on

tional and manders joining, and as
administrative infor- changes occur
mation
OPSTAT RAS Signal RAS require- Supplying ships or OTC Units As Required
REQ ments
OPSTAT CARGO Signal remaining OTC/URG commander Supply Ships On completion

cargo of RAS
OPSTAT DAM- Signal information re- OTC/appropriate authori- Unit or appro- As Required
AGE garding damage ties priate
sustained commander
(NC) (NMM) Promulgate Area/subarea commanders SUBOPAUTH At least every

Waterspace Allo- waterspace allocation (surface/air), OTC, ASWC, 24 hours and
cation and Status and status informa- SOCA, convoy commo- as required.
tion required for dore, and maritime air units Serialized
coordination and as appropriate amendments
deconfliction of to this daily
friendly ASW and message can
submarine operations be issued;
however, each
amendment
must list all
previous
amendments.
A new “daily”
message
should be is-
sued any time
that potential
for confusion
exists.
(NC) (NMM) Sup- Tailored tactical and SUBOPAUTH, support OTC/SOCA Daily or as Re-
port Submarine coordinating informa- submarines, others (as required
Force Summary tion for SUBOPAUTH quired
and support
submarines
1-47 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Message Formats. RAINFORM message formats, with examples, are in APP 4.
1323 TACTICAL DATA LINK SYSTEMS
Tactical data links can be used by the OTC to make real-time amendments to tactical instructions,
command and control arrangements, and threat warning levels. These systems have an inherent capability
for exercising tactical coordination using contact reporting messages, weapons and platform status
messages, and command messages. Amplifying information can be found in ADatP 11 and ADatP 16.
1324 — 1329 SPARE
1-48 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION IV — READINESS
1400 SCOPE
This section establishes common procedures for organizing, ordering, and reporting the readiness of
a force.
1401 — 1409 SPARE
1410 READINESS TO GET UNDERWAY
1411 NOTICE TO GET UNDERWAY
The order for number of hours notice for readiness to get underway is issued by the senior officer
present. If, because of weather conditions or operational requirements, the senior officer present shortens
this notice, ships are to report via the chain of command as soon as possible at what time they expect to be at
the new notice. Commanding officers are authorized to shorten their notice for getting underway if they
consider it necessary.
1412 PREPARING FOR SEA
When ships are ordered to have power for a specified number of knots (operational speed) by a
certain time, they are to be ready for sea in all respects by that time.
1413 GETTING UNDERWAY
Because there are many different conditions that may be met in getting underway, no attempt is
made here to provide definite instructions that will be applicable in all circumstances. The following
paragraphs should, therefore, be considered of general application only.
a. Navigation and Pilotage. Each commanding officer is responsible for the navigation and
pilotage of his own ship, and should take action as necessary to avoid endangering his own or other ships.
b. Preserving True Bearing and Distance. When ships of a unit in separate berths have
weighed anchor together, or slipped from buoys together, they are, until further orders are received, to
preserve the same true bearing and distance from the senior officer of their unit as existed before getting
underway.
c. Casting Ship. When ships are leaving harbor in company, the senior officer may order them to
cast to port or starboard or to cast to a particular course. In each case, ships should do so without gathering
headway or sternway and should turn at the same rate as the senior officer of their respective units. In a
confined harbor, it may be unsuitable for all ships to cast in the same direction or to gather headway at the
same time. In such a case, the senior officer should then indicate the direction in which he intends to cast, at
the same time ordering remaining ships to cast as required.
d. Sequence in Leaving.
(1) An OTC will normally indicate in advance the sequence in which his ships are to leave harbor.
After consultation with the local authority, he will promulgate the departure sequence, taking into
consideration:
(a) Threat.
1-49 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Navigational situation and harbor facilities.
(c) Required time/distance intervals.
(d) Which berths his ships occupy.
(e) Number of ships.
(f) Ship types and their characteristics.
(g) Weather conditions.
(2) Should a unit be delayed, the unit commander is to inform the OTC, the unit commanders of suc-
ceeding units, and the local authority of the time at which his unit will be ready to proceed. In the ab-
sence of further orders from the OTC, the unit commanders are to adjust their times of proceeding
accordingly. At night or by day, when not in direct visual touch, each unit commander should when nec-
essary keep the unit commander of the succeeding unit informed of his progress.
1414 — 1419 SPARE
1420 READINESS FOR ACTION
1421 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
a. The operational capabilities of any combatant unit can generally be considered to consist of three
components: warning, evaluation, and action. Normally any engagement will develop in the following
sequence:
(1) Warning. The indication by any tactical information source of the presence of a threat.
(2) Evaluation. The appraisal of threat information to determine the type and degree of threat.
(3) Action. The employment of one or more weapon systems to counter the threat.
b. The rules governing degrees of readiness allow that, with a lowering of the warning, there
follows a more rapid lowering of the evaluation and a marked lowering of the action components. In
addition, the desired readiness for action is influenced by:
(1) Capabilities of tactical information sources, weapon systems, and communications.
(2) Effects of environmental factors (e.g., dawn or dusk, fog, sonar conditions, afternoon effects,
etc.).
(3) Training status of personnel.
(4) Command organization.
1422 INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT
When a unit is unable to assume or keep the ordered degree of readiness (or alert state), this inability
shall be reported to the OTC, including in the report the reason and the time at which the ordered degree of
readiness (alert state) will be assumed or resumed. Permission shall be obtained from the OTC before
1-50 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
equipment essential for warning, evaluation, or action is made inoperable for maintenance. Daily
performance checks are to be carried out on such equipment to ascertain its readiness for effective use.
1423 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Degree of Readiness. The OTC will order the degree of readiness to be assumed.
Commanding officers may order a higher degree of readiness for their own ship if they consider it
necessary.
b. Alert State. In a degree of readiness the OTC may order the alert state. Commanding officers may
order a higher state for their own systems. The OTC may assign this responsibility to one of the commanders.
c. Notice. The OTC will order the notice for the force.
d. Threat Warnings. The OTC will normally promulgate threat warnings. He may assign this
responsibility to commanders.
e. Emergency Signals. Emergency signals may be made by any commanding officer,

coordinator, commander, or the OTC, but their use requires caution because of the action/responses that
will be taken in the force.
f. Readiness in Harbor/Anchorage. The OTC or commanding officer will order the degree of
readiness in consultation with local authorities.
1424 ORGANIZATION
a. Ships. One general degree of readiness is normally ordered to meet all types of threat; however,
a particular degree of readiness may be ordered when the situation so justifies. Particular degrees may
concern antisurface warfare (ASUW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antiair warfare (AAW), mine
warfare (MW), NBCD, or engineering. A modification of the degrees of readiness may be assumed by
amphibious forces as necessary to provide for the embarkation or disembarkation of troops and equipment.
b. Guard Ships. The OTC may detail certain ships to assume a higher degree of readiness than
the remainder. Ships so detailed are known as guard ships.
c. Readiness in Harbor/Anchorage. Readiness in harbor will be organized in accordance

with local orders or on order of the OTC or commanding officer after consultation with local authorities.
For readiness of ships against underwater swimmer attack, see Chapter 14.
1425 JOINING
a. When a ship joins a force, the joining unit will provide the following information to the OTC:
(1) Messages OPSTAT UNIT and OPSTAT HELLO, stressing the restrictions to operational readiness.
(2) National restrictions to the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
(3) Messages and updated OPGEN, OPTASKs, and OPSTATs received to date.
1-51 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. The OTC will provide:
(1) Updated OPGEN, OPTASKs, and OPSTATs as necessary.
(2) Last status of EMCON, COMPLAN, and link net.
(3) A frequency and a geographic position to rendezvous if joining fails.
(4) A list of relevant signals in force.
1426 — 1429 SPARE
1430 GENERAL DEGREES OF READINESS
This article states the aim of the several general degrees of readiness. When only a general degree
of readiness is ordered, each department shall comply in accordance with the appropriate particular
degree of readiness.
a. First. The aim is to employ the full operational capability of the unit involved. All stations are
fully manned and can therefore be put into operation in the shortest time. Commanding officers may order
temporary relaxation from the first degree of readiness to permit designated personnel to draw and
distribute meals at their action stations.
b. Second. The aim is to employ the best operational capability that can be maintained for a
prolonged period (e.g., 2 to 3 weeks) with up to one-half of the personnel on duty. Emphasis is to be laid on
the warning component.
c. Third. The aim is to have weapons available to counter an unexpected threat and to retain
sufficient warning time to assume a higher degree of readiness, while relaxing equipment, with up to
one-third of the personnel on duty. This degree can be maintained for an indefinite period.
d. Fourth. The aim is to have all systems operational. Sufficient systems are to be manned to
achieve adequate warnings required.
e. Fifth. The aim is to allow for rest and relaxation within the limitations imposed by the notice
ordered. It is the lowest degree of readiness and is used only when in port or at anchor.
1431 — 1439 SPARE
1440 PARTICULAR DEGREES OF READINESS
When ordering a general degree of readiness, the OTC may order a higher degree of readiness for a
particular type of warfare, NBCD, or engineering, should the situation so demand.
1441 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND DAMAGE DEGREES OF READINESS
a. First. All NBC stations are manned; a maximum degree of watertight integrity is maintained; all
additional N, B, or C protective measures are imposed as the situation requires; the widest diversity of
sources of power is available; all NBCD equipment and systems are ready for immediate use.
b. Second. Up to one-half of the NBCD stations are manned; all additional N, B, or C protective
measures are as the situation requires; a maximum degree of watertight integrity is maintained within the
1-52 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ship, compatible with the health and comfort of the crew; all NBCD equipment and systems and a limited
number of sources of power are ready for immediate use.
c. Third. Up to one-third of the NBCD stations are manned; a maximum of watertight integrity is
maintained below the waterline; all NBCD integrity is maintained below the waterline; all NBCD
equipment and systems and a limited number of sources of power are ready for use.
d. Fourth. Sufficient NBCD warning systems are manned; the maximum degree of watertight
integrity is maintained below the waterline.
1442 ENGINEERING DEGREES OF READINESS
a. First. Propulsion machinery is fully manned and power is available for maximum speed.
b. Second. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
available at 2 hours’ notice.
c. Third. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
d. Fourth. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
1443 — 1449 SPARE
1450 WEAPON ALERT STATES
a. The readiness of force systems can be ordered by the OTC or his delegate or be reported by a unit
carrying force weapons.
b. When ordered, the weapon alert state expresses the time (in minutes) in which the weapon
system has to be ready. The alert state READY orders the immediate readiness of the indicated force
weapon system.
c. When reported, the weapon alert state expresses the time (in minutes) in which the weapon
system can be available. When the system is available it is reported READY.
1451 — 1459 SPARE
1460 AIRCRAFT ALERT STATES
a. The OTC orders an aircraft alert state to prescribe readiness requirements for aircraft within the
force. Alert states are:
(1) AIRBORNE ALERT — Combat equipped aircraft are airborne and ready for immediate action.
(2) DECK ALERT — The OTC specifies the number and type of aircraft and the time in minutes
that they are to be airborne after the order to launch is given.
b. A deck alert requires more warning than an airborne alert. The OTC should bear in mind that the
presence of aircraft on the flight deck may hamper freedom of maneuver and that deck alerts on board
small ships may restrict the use of other weapon systems. The OTC may use OPTASK AIR (see APP 4) to
order alert states for helicopters on all ships in the formation.
1-53 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
-EXAMPLES-
2 fighter aircraft Alert 5 . . . Two fighter aircraft ready to become airborne 5 minutes after the
order to launch has been given.
1 ASW helicopter Alert 20 . . . One ASW helicopter ready to become airborne 20 minutes after
the order to launch has been given.
1461 — 1469 SPARE
1470 THREAT WARNINGS
A threat warning is informative only. Force or individual unit actions are not therefore linked to it
automatically. An OTC may sometimes order measures of a temporary nature (including those for use with
ASMD) when a threat warning is promulgated (e.g., changing the EMCON plan). In many cases, however,
such actions are more appropriately linked to detections and enemy reports (emergency signals).
a. Color Code. The color code applied to a threat warning denotes the severity of the evaluated
threat:
Color Code Evaluation

WARNING WHITE ATTACK IS UNLIKELY WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING
WARNING YELLOW ATTACK IS PROBABLE
WARNING RED ATTACK IS IMMINENT, OR HAS ALREADY COMMENCED
b. Type of Threat. The following plain language words are to precede the color code to denote the
type of threat:
AIR
MINES
NBC
SURFACE
SUBMARINES
NOTE
For promulgation of mine threat, see also AHP 1.
1471 — 1479 SPARE
1-54 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION V — RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES
1500 GENERAL
It is recognized that in actual operations during wartime some tactics will prove more or less
effective than others and, in certain crucial cases, it is essential that a clearly defined method for rapidly
changing or perhaps canceling a current tactic or procedure should exist.
1510 PROCEDURE
a. Proposed Tactical (PROTAC) Amendment Message. Any operational unit observing

significant failure in the use of a NATO tactic is to report the fact to the OTC by message. The message
should take the form of a proposed tactical (PROTAC.) amendment message, in accordance with APP 4,
designed to:
(1) Improve the effectiveness of a currently unsatisfactory tactic, or
(2) Replace an unsatisfactory tactic with a more effective one, or
(3) Cancel an ineffective tactic.
b. OTCs Receiving a PROTAC Message Should:
(1) Where it improves the safety or operational efficiency of their force and is of immediate opera-
tional concern,
(a) Implement the PROTAC immediately for their own forces,
(b) Forward it by message to the Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) for action,
(c) Send information copies to appropriate authorities including, where applicable, the
commanders of adjacent areas/forces.
OR
(2) Where it is not of immediate operational concern, forward the PROTAC to the area MSC
by message.
OR
(3) Where the PROTAC is found to be invalid, cancel it by means of a message to the originating unit.
c. Corrected Tactical (CORTAC) Procedure Message. MSCs or delegated headquarters

receiving a PROTAC message are to act as coordinating agency for implementing the change to, or
cancellation of, a tactic throughout their area. As controlling agencies, MSCs or delegated headquarters
shall, if they approve the content of a PROTAC, promulgate a corrected tactical (CORTAC) procedure
message, in accordance with APP 4, to all appropriate forces in their area, with an action copy to their
Major NATO Commander (MNC).
1-55 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 2
Position, Movement, and Maneuvering
SECTION I — POSITION AND MOVEMENT
2100 POSITION/REFERENCE SYSTEMS
a. Position can be expressed by any of the following means:
(1) Latitude and longitude. Latitude is expressed before longitude; e.g., 14° N 47° W.
(2) World geographic reference system (Georef).
(3) Grids — Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), Cartesian Coordinate Grid (CCG), or other
grid promulgated by an appropriate commander.
(4) Bearing and distance in miles, or bearing and range in hundreds of yards.
(5) Station occupied (e.g., Station 3.)
(6) Quick Reference System (QRS).
b. The position may be further defined by an accuracy suffix and/or an altitude or depth indication.
2101 WORLD GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE SYSTEM
a. Georef is not a true grid; it is merely a convenient means of expressing latitude and longitude for
the purposes of rapid plotting and reporting. Georef may be used whenever a UTM or CCG grid is not
suitable; it shall not be used for naval gunfire support, close fire support, direct air support, or in any other
application where positional information must be reported with accuracy. The system is intended
primarily for inter-Allied use in air operations and in air aspects of antiair warfare operations.
b. Description. Georef is based on a division of the globe into 24 longitudinal zones of 15° each,
lettered from A through Z (omitting I and O) eastward from the 180th meridian; and 12 latitudinal zones of
15° each, lettered from A through M (omitting I) northward from the South Pole. See Figure 2-1.
(1) While relatively few charts have Georef overprints, the lettering system can easily be added on
existing charts by labeling the zones accordingly. Labeled in this manner, any basic 15° area can be lo-
cated by first reading right to the desired alphabetical column, and then up to the desired alphabetical
row. The reference symbol for any 15° area in the world consists of only two letters.
-EXAMPLE-
MK indicates a 15° rectangular area with its SW corner at latitude 45° N, longitude 15° W.
(2) Each 15° area is further divided by 15 lettered degree units eastward, and 15 lettered degree
units northward, using in each direction the letters from A through Q (omitting I and O). A 1° area can be
located by the right-up process, and the two-letter designator listed immediately after the two-letter des-
ignator for the 15° area. The reference symbol for any 1° area consists of only four letters.
2-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
{
90°
180° 165°150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°
75° 75°
60° 60°
K
MK
45° 45°
J
30° 30°
H
15° 15°
G
0° 0°
F
15° 15°
E
30° 30°
D
45° 45°
{
60° 60°
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
B
180° 165°150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°
{
75°
A
90°
Figure 2-1. Sample Georef Chart
-EXAMPLE-
GJPJ indicates a 1° area with its SW corner at latitude 38° N, longitude 77° W.
(3) Each 1° area is divided into sixty 1-minute units eastward and sixty 1-minute units northward.
These 1-minute units are designated by numbers, reading right-up from the SW corner of each 1° area. A
Georef report composed of four letters and four numerals is all that is required to locate any 1-minute
area in the world.
-EXAMPLE-
WGAN 5630 indicates a 1-minute area with its SW corner at latitude 12°30’ N, longitude
120°56’ E.
(4) Further accuracy, if desired, can be obtained by reporting each 1-minute unit in tenths (or hun-
dredths) of a minute eastward and northward. This requires a six (or eight) numeral reference. For exam-
ple, WGAN 56503060 indicates a point at latitude 12°30’36" N, longitude 120°56’30" E. (Note that
2-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
numerical position references will always have an even number of digits, in which the first half will indi-
cate the right direction and the second half will indicate the up direction.) The 15° designator may be
omitted from reports, but care must be taken to ensure that the omission will not cause ambiguity. For
example, NG 1720 identifies a location on the western side of Leipzig and NG 1720 (in UTM grid) iden-
tifies an aerodrome south of Skrydstrup in Denmark.
c. Size of Rectangle. To designate the size of any rectangular area, the standard Georef
coordinates used to indicate the SW corner of the area followed by the letter S (denoting length of sides)
and by digits giving the eastward and northward dimensions of the area in nautical miles. The digits are
separated by the letter X.
-EXAMPLE-
GJQJ 0207S6X6 indicates a rectangle with 6-mile sides and its SW corner at latitude 38°07’ N,
longitude 75°58’ W.
d. Size of Circle. To designate the size of a circular area, the standard Georef coordinates for the
center of the circle are followed by the letter R (denoting radius) and by digits giving the nautical mile
radius of the circle.
-EXAMPLE-
EDBL 2743R12 indicates a circle with a 12-mile radius with its center at latitude 34° 17’ S, lon-
gitude 118°33’ W.
e. Altitude. To designate altitude, the standard Georef coordinates for the geographic location of
the aircraft are followed by the letter H (denoting height) and by two digits giving altitude in units of
thousands of feet.
-EXAMPLE-
VFKC 1509H15 indicates aircraft at 15,000 feet at latitude 12°51’ S, longitude 114°15’ E.
2102 UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR GRID
The UTM grid (the Army square grid) is used for naval bombardment purposes and for other
purposes where applicable. When using this grid, the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) will be
used in communications between ground forces and other forces jointly engaged; specifically when air
forces including naval aviation are acting in close air support of ground forces, and when landing force
operations are supported by all supporting forces. In such operations, latitude and longitude will be used
when use of MGRS is impractical.
2103 CARTESIAN COORDINATE GRID
The Cartesian Coordinate Grid (CCG) is designed for limited security, rapid reporting of
geographic positions in a system compatible with tactical data systems. Grid positions are reported using X
and Y coordinates in relation to the grid origin (center). This grid origin is based on a geographic reference
point, and contact positions are measured in units east/west (X axis) followed by units north/south (Y axis).
The unit of distance is known as the data mile (2,000 yards). The four quadrants of the grid, reading
clockwise from the northwest, are each identified by a color — red, white, blue, and green (see Figure 2-2).
a. Establishing the Grid. The grid origin is established by the OTC. Selection of the grid origin
at a position containing whole or half degrees of latitude or longitude will result in a less secure grid and
should be avoided when possible.
2-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Example:
RED WHITE
200
100
0 X AXIS
300 200 100 100 200 300
100
GREEN 200 BLUE

Y AXIS
Goblin ALFA’s position : WHITE 242 TACK 083
Goblin DELTA’s position : GREEN 200 TACK 150
Figure 2-2. Sample CCG
b. Method of Reporting. In reporting a position, the quadrant is first identified by color.

Position relative to grid origin is then reported by transmitting the number of miles along the X axis as a
three-figure group, followed by the number of miles along the Y axis as a three-figure group. The X and Y
coordinates are separated by the word “TACK.”
2104 ASW GRID
An ASW grid is designed to provide area commanders and ASW forces a common grid to facilitate
ASW operations. This grid incorporates areas sized and oriented to provide reasonable probability of
detection by sensors, to allow target pursuit and attack, and to accommodate topographical and
environmental conditions.
2105 BEARING AND DISTANCE
a. When Reporting Bearing and Distance in Miles, the order of reporting will be: bearing in
degrees from reference point — the reference point — distance in miles. The nautical mile (2,000 yards) is
the unit of distance. All bearings are reporting as true unless otherwise specified.
-EXAMPLES-
(1) From a point on the earth’s surface given in specific double letters or a code name:
125KK45
140 Point Holly 50
(2) From a point of land or a navigational mark:
112 Hatteras 12
237 Finisterre 21
(3) From a standard position in the force:
310ZZ7
(4) From a ship of own force, using the call sign of the ship:
273 HOT-SHOT 12
2-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. When Reporting Bearing and Range in Hundreds of Yards, the order of reporting is
the same as that for bearing and distance, except that the word “RANGE” must be spoken (reports in
RANGE should normally be limited to less than 10,000 yards).
-EXAMPLES-
(1) From a standard position, range 9,500 yards:
165 TT RANGE 95
(2) From a sonobuoy, range 1,700 yards:
230 KINGPIN RANGE 17
2106 QUICK REFERENCE SYSTEM
a. Purpose. The QRS is designed for rapid exchange of positions and tactical information
between units operating in coastal waters (e.g., a fjord environment). The QRS is suitable for exchange of
combat information, disposition of own forces, area allocation, TASMO control, enemy update, RECCE
operations, SITREPs, etc.
(1) The QRS sheet is a see-through plastic overlay in A-4 format (21.0 cm x 29.7 cm) with 176 num-
bered squares. An example of the overlay is provided in Figure 2-6 at the end of the chapter.
b. Establishing the QRS. Any chart may be chosen, but all participants must use the same scale.
Upper left and upper right corners are given by geographic positions. If the overlay is north-south oriented,
only the upper left corner position should be given. When more than one QRS is in use, each overlay is
identified as QRS ALFA, QRS BRAVO, etc.
c. Ordering the QRS. The geographic positions of the QRS overlays should be signaled by the
OTC well in advance by an OPGEN, OPTASK, etc. Information should contain:
(1) Chart number and scale.
(2) QRS identifier (when more than one overlay).
(3) Upper left corner position (and upper right corner position if not north-south oriented).
(4) Period.
-EXAMPLE-
X1/REPINST/QRS/NORWEGIAN CHART 322/1:200000//

QRS ALFA/7025.0N-1800.0E/23100-UFN//
QRS BRAVO/7025.0N-1906.2E/231600-232000//
QRS CHARLIE/7020.0N-2010.0E/7031.4N-2106.1E/232000-240200//
d. Procedures. Normal raid-reporting procedures are used, but position is reported as a

numbered square. The square number may be passed in NUCO. If it is necessary to specify position within
a square, add direction from square center (see example 2). When aircraft and helicopters are participating,
brevity words in APP 7/MPP 7 apply:
2-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
-EXAMPLES-
(1) Contact report:
SMUGGLER 2634 - SQUARE 27 BRAVO - TRACKING SOUTH - SPEED 20 - TIME

1645Z
(2) Movement report:
NA22 DESIG SQUARE 35 WEST - M CORPEN 045 - TACK 30
(3) Command message:
TA88 - 11 DESIG SQUARE 31 ALFA
2107 POSITION/BEARING ACCURACY SUFFIXES
To indicate the probable accuracy of a position or bearing, an accuracy suffix may be added. These
suffixes are particularly important when reporting an area of probability derived from two or more passive
bearings. The suffixes are:
a. Position:
Within a 2-mile radius — XRAY

Within a 10-mile radius — YANKEE
Outside a 10-mile radius — ZULU
From NAVSTAR GPS unit — GOLF PAPA
NOTE
There is no appreciable error unless otherwise stated.
b. ESM bearings:
Within 2° — ALFA
Within 5° — BRAVO
Within 10° — CHARLIE
Outside 10° — DELTA
NOTE
(1) Bearing accuracies are CHARLIE, unless otherwise stated.
(2) The word “CLASS” is inserted before A, B, C, and D.
2108 ALTITUDE OR DEPTH
When reporting positions, it may be appropriate to include an altitude or depth report.
a. Altitude. If an accurate altitude of any air track cannot be determined, estimated altitude is to be
reported using the appropriate APP 7/MPP 7 brevity code words (i.e., VERY LOW, LOW, MEDIUM,
HIGH, VERY HIGH).
2-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Friendly Air Tracks. The altitude of friendly aircraft can be reported using the words AN-
GELS (in thousands of feet; e.g., ANGELS 1 DECIMAL 5 is 1,500 feet) or HEIGHT (in feet, e.g.,
HEIGHT 400 is 400 feet) or using the International Civil Aeronautical Organization (ICAO) term
FLIGHT LEVEL (e.g., FLIGHT LEVEL 250 is 25,000 feet).
(2) Other Air Tracks. The altitude of other air tracks can be reported using the word ALTITUDE
(in hundreds of feet; e.g., ALTITUDE 151 is 15,100 feet) or using the ICAO term FLIGHT LEVEL.
NOTE
FLIGHT LEVEL is only to be used when altitude is reported by the aircraft (secondary surveil-
lance radar, IFF, or voice).
b. Depth. If an accurate depth of a submerged track cannot be determined, an estimated depth may
be reported using the appropriate APP 7/MPP 7 brevity code words (i.e., SHALLOW, DEEP), or if an
accurate depth can be determined, it may be reported as DEVILS (in tens of feet; e.g., DEVILS 30 is 300
feet).
NOTE
· NATO publications are in the process of being amended to the following standard units of
measurement:
(1) Range — yards.
(2) Distance — nautical miles.
(3) Altitude — feet.
(4) Depth of all objects in water, including bottom depth and thermal features, in meters with
feet or fathoms (as appropriate) in brackets using conversion of 1 meter = 3.28 feet and rounded
off to the nearest meter when exact figures are required. When using only approximate figures
the conversion may be rounded off accordingly (e.g.: 250 fm should be rounded off to 450 m
rather than 457 m).
(5) Thickness of ice — centimeters and/or meters.
(6) Temperatures — degrees Celsius.
· The standard units above are not to be confused with the code words RANGE and ALTI-
TUDE. For safety purposes during the transition period, the depth of all objects will be in
meters followed by feet or fathoms in brackets.
2109 CHECK-SUM DIGITS
a. To avoid confusion caused by errors in transmission, check-sum digits are to be used on all
positions, courses, speeds, and times when sent by RATT. Check-sum digits may also be used for ranges,
frequencies, etc.
b. To derive the check-sum digit, the numbers in the position, course, speed, or time are to be added
together and the total put after the appropriate element. Only the last figure of the summation is to be used;
that is, if the total comes to “19,” only the “9” is used.
2-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
-EXAMPLES-
(1) Position — 5004N9 15642W8. (The 9 and 8 are the check-sum digits.)
(2) Course — 225T9 degrees true or 225M9 degrees magnetic. (The 9 is the check-sum digit.)
(3) Speed — 15KT6. (The 6 is the check-sum digit.)
(4) Time — 281030Z4. (The 4 is the check-sum digit.)
2110 STANDARD POSITIONS/REFERENCE POINTS/POSITION REPORTING
The standard positions in the force are:
a. QQ — The center of the front of the main body or convoy when not in circular formation.
b. TT — Originator’s present position.
c. XX — The standard position established by the OTC on which a search, enemy reporting and so
forth is to be based.
d. YY — Addressee’s present position.
e. ZZ — The center of the force.
NOTE
Whenever possible, XX should be coincidental with the DLRP.
2111 DATA LINK REFERENCE POINT
a. The data link reference point (DLRP) is the common point from which all positional information
on data link is derived. The DLRP is established by the OTC, in a geographic position, before commencing
link operations, but may be changed for operational and/or security reasons. In principle, the DLRP should
be the same position as the CCG origin, thus ensuring that picture compilation is derived from using the
same origin by TDS and non-TDS units when cooperating.
b. The force track coordinator(s) is (are) responsible for an accurate tactical (data link) picture and
for raid reporting within the force or in a sector, using voice compilation nets. The grid reference unit
(GRU) is responsible to the OTC for maintaining the accurate position of the DLRP and the CCG origin.
The GRU holds by definition the correct position of the DLRP and/or grid origin.
c. Establishing the DLRP. Although more than one DLRP can be established for consecutive
periods and/or for geographic areas, only one DLRP per data link should be effective during a certain
period. The geographic positions of DLRPs and the times of change are to be established well in advance
by the OTC through means of OPORD, OPGEN, etc.
d. Initiating the DLRP. When commencing link operations, all PUs insert the DLRP in their
TDS. On completion, the GRU executes a grid lock.
e. Maintaining the DLRP. The accurate position of the DLRP is maintained by the GRU. When
necessary, the GRU executes a grid lock check to assist in updating PUs.
2-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. Changing the DLRP. Changing the DLRP causes disruption of the tactical picture for a short
period and should therefore only be executed when the tactical situation permits. On completion of
changing the DLRP and when all PUs have entered the DLRP in their TDS, the GRU executes a grid lock.
Non-TDS fitted ships are to shift the CCG accordingly.
2112 HELICOPTER REFERENCE POINT
In order to facilitate position reports from and to helicopters, an HRP may be established. Several
types of helicopters are equipped with tactical navigation systems optimized for passing positional
information as a bearing and range from a reference point. The HRP can also be used for updating the
helicopter’s navigation system. With the use of an HRP, position reports can be passed in the clear,
enabling ships and helicopters to process information quickly.
a. Establishing the HRP. The HRP is a geographically fixed position issued by either the Air
Coordinator (AC) in an OPTASK AIR or by the helicopter control unit (HCU) prior to a mission. Due to
navigation system design, the HRP should be as close to possible to the area in which the helicopter will
operate. Preferably targets or contacts to be reported should not be outside 50 nm of the HRP. When an
operation requires more than one HRP, subsequent points can be established and designated with a suffix
(e.g., HRP ALFA, HRP BRAVO) or a code word. For transits, more than one HRP can be established by
the AC or HCU for a limited period of time.
b. Position Reports To and From Helicopters. The HRP can be used to pass geographic
position information, such as an air plan search origin (“DATUM 315 HRP 5 DECIMAL 5”), or as the
common reference when using method B2 in accordance with Table 8-2. When the helicopter initiates a
“Request update,” navigation updates may be passed using the “Standby, mark” procedure.
2113 HARBOR REFERENCE POINTS
a. (NC) (NMM) In wartime, ships leave or enter harbor by a swept channel. The channel, which
varies in width, usually starts at the harbor entrance or boom gate and extends to seaward. Reference points
A, X, O, and Y (if required) are used to facilitate leaving and entering a harbor; reference times used are
estimated time of arrival (ETA) or departure (ETD) and zero time. Should multiple swept channels be
established, points A1, A2, X1, X2, etc., may be used. The Q-message system and area warnings will
provide the OTC with the necessary information on swept channels and mined areas.
b. (NC) (NMM) Harbor reference points are defined as follows:
(1) (NC) (NMM) Point A. In an open approach, point A may be right at the mouth of the harbor or
just to seaward of the gate; in a harbor with a long approach, it would be at the seaward end of the ap-
proach. Point A should be promulgated by the local authority and is to be signaled to forces at sea as soon
as possible. In the absence of a local authority, the OTC will establish point A.
(2) (NC) (NMM) Point X. Point X is the reference point at the seaward end of a swept channel. The
local authority will establish point X and promulgate the position to the forces at sea. In the absence of a
local authority, the OTC will establish point X.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Point O. On leaving, the various units of the formation that is to be formed
should be in or nearly in station when the Guide passes through point O. This maneuver should be ac-
complished so as to minimize the mining threat. The protective efforts of the screen should not be lost
and sufficient maneuvering room should be provided. On entry, the reverse of the foregoing process is
started at point O (i.e., the formation starts to break up in execution of the entrance plan, which normally
starts at this point). The OTC of the force entering or leaving harbor shall designate point O and inform
the local authority of the position of point O if EMCON permits.
2-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) (NC) (NMM) Point Y. Large dispositions should form at point Y when there is insufficient
area at point O. The component formations form at point O, and the disposition forms at point Y. On en-
try, the reverse of this process is started at Point Y. The position of point Y will be promulgated by the
OTC.
2114 SHIP AS ANCHORING REFERENCE
When a ship is ordered to anchor with reference to another ship, the reference ship is to identify
herself to the incoming ship.
a. Providing Identification.
(1) By day, her visual call sign is to be used.
(2) At night, she is to show a white light as high on the foremast as possible. This is in addition to
normal anchor lights.
(3) At darken ship, directional lights are to be used.
b. Providing Other Data.
(1) If at single anchor, she is to signal the bearing and distance of her anchor from her foremast.
(2) If moored with two anchors, she is to signal the direction of the ship’s head and the line of direc-
tion between her anchors.
2115 ROUTES AND REFERENCE POINTS
Routes and reference points are established for the purpose of facilitating control of surface, air, and
subsurface traffic so as to reduce interference between forces making passage in the same area. Routes and
reference points are established by commanders in chief and such other commanders as may be
specifically designated. Common routes and reference points should be promulgated when necessary in
order to ensure understanding between forces operating in adjacent areas. Information concerning
common routes and reference points should be disseminated to forces about to enter or leave an area as well
as to appropriate commands in adjacent areas. When no conflict with establish routes and reference points
would result, commanders subordinate to those mentioned above may promulgate additional routes and
reference points for the temporary use of their own forces.
2116 (NR) (NMM) CONVOY ROUTE POSITION DESIGNATORS
Convoys or independent Merchant Ships under Naval Control may be allocated routes using
two-letter designators for each prescribed position on those routes. These designators are chosen by the
Routing Authority, normally the OCA, at random for the first position on the route, and then sequentially
after that (avoiding I and O), and are changed for every sailing. Reference Diversion Points are similarly
ordered for each sailing to facilitate the ordering of subsequent diversions while retaining some simple
security between the Routing Authority and the merchant ships being diverted. For other methods of
prescribing Merchant Ships routed, see ATP 2, Vol. I.
2117 REPORTING AND EXCHANGING DATA ON POSITIONS
a. Navigational Danger. Ships sighting or detecting land are to report immediately if the
formation may be running into navigational danger or if the position thus obtained differs materially from
that based on the OTC’s reference position.
2-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Doubt of Position. Ships should exchange data on navigational positions if there is any doubt
of their positions, especially when approaching land or after a period in which a fix has not been obtained.
Large ships should also assist small ships and craft by passing their own positions to them.
c. Position Reports. All large ships and the screen commander(s) will make position reports to
the OTC at 1200 (or 15 minutes after noon position) or when called for. The method by which the position
was determined will be indicated. Position reported will be the formation center.
d. Movement Reporting System. When it is required on a need-to-know basis that

information be exchanged between commanders, individual ships (less submarines) or formations are to
report in peace, and may be directed in war, their positions, routing, changes thereto, and intended CHOP
by means of Movement Reports (MOVREPs). These MOVREPs may also include other intentions (see
ACP 176). Additional details are contained in APP 4.
2118 — 2119 SPARE
2120 COURSE AND SPEED
a. Ships are ordered to proceed by course and speed. In formations, the Guide is ordered to proceed
at the signaled speed on the signaled course. Signaled speed is attained by using the normal number of
revolutions for the ordered speed and adjusting as necessary for foul bottom and damage; signaled course
requires correction of the compass course for gyro error or variation and deviation. When evasive steering,
such as zigzagging, is ordered, a base course and a base speed are to be ordered. Subsequent course
alterations do not change the base course unless the change is specifically signaled.
b. Ships may also be ordered to proceed at a specific speed, such as maximum speed, operational
speed, stationing speed, normal speed, or steerageway. When no stationing speed has been ordered,
operational speed is to be substituted for stationing speed in the description of certain maneuvers. Normal
speed should be previously established if its use is expected to be required by the type or unit commander.
Speeds may also be ordered with reference to specific equipment performance requirements, such as
optimum or maximum sonar speed, or with reference to the requirements of specific operations, such as
replenishment speed.
2121 COURSE AND SPEED MADE GOOD
a. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between signaled (or base) course and signaled (or base)
speed and:
(1) Course and speed made good through the water (CSW).
(2) Course and speed made good over the ground (CSG).
b. CSW includes the effect of weather on course made good through the water (CTW) and speed
made good through the water (STW), but not the effect of current or tidal stream. CSG includes the effect of
current or tidal stream on course made good over the ground (COG) and speed made good over the ground
(SOG). It is CSG that is normally used when routing ships; in this case, the speed component is indicated as
speed of advance (SOA).
2122 POSITION AND INTENDED MOVEMENT
a. Purpose. The OTC establishes position and intended movement (PIM) to assist the return of
aircraft, to aid outlying surface units in maintaining station, to keep adjacent commands informed of his
2-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
intentions, and for rendezvous purposes. It is particularly important to keep all units in a dispersed
formation informed of PIM.
b. Signal. The OTC shall signal PIM as follows: position — time of position — course — speed
— period in hours (if required) for which course and speed are in force. If, during the period, several
changes of course and speed will be in effect, course, speed, and period in force should be repeated as
necessary for each change. The OTC shall signal PIM to detached units, or those about to be detached,
which are scheduled to rejoin later, in sufficient time to permit these units to take suitable action. PIM is
normally signaled one hour prior to flight operations. EMCON permitting, the OTC must advise his area
commander and maritime headquarters of the force’s PIM.
c. PIM of Independent Unit. Commanders of units acting independently may establish their
own PIMs.
d. When Position of Force Differs From PIM. After PIM has been issued, unforeseen
circumstances may cause the position of the force to differ from PIM. For example, a new operational
requirement or a shift in the wind may affect the course and/or speed made good by a carrier force. Under
such circumstances, the OTC will issue a new PIM.
e. Task Group PIM. Signaling the PIM assists aircraft and ships to return to the force after
operating beyond visibility distance. Ordinarily PIM is signaled by the OTC at least one hour before
aircraft are launched. As soon as it is known, PIM is to be promulgated for flight planning purposes; in any
case, it must be furnished to pilots before takeoff.
2123 ENDURANCE
Endurance is normally the hours fuel will last at indicated speed.
2124 — 2129 SPARE
2130 ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE
2131 REPORTING TIME OF ARRIVAL
The local authority is to be previously informed of the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of the unit
wishing to enter harbor. Ships should not enter harbor until permission is granted.
2132 ENTRY INTERVALS
The number and types of the ships entering harbor may be such that the situation is complex. In this
event, signals are provided to specify the sequence in which units are to enter and whether the units are to
be separated by time or distance intervals. To allow time for berthing, these intervals should normally be
greater than those for the same ships when leaving harbor.
2133 ANCHORING IN FORMATION
When ships are to anchor in formation they will be conducted to the anchorage by the formation
commander. Accurate station-keeping is particularly necessary.
2134 BERTH NUMBERS
Ships proceeding independently to assigned berths, or shifting berths in a harbor or anchorage

where berths have been established, are to hoist the numbers of the berths to which they are proceeding.
2-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
When proceeding to berths in formation, berth numbers are not to be hoisted unless ordered by the unit
commander.
2135 — 2139 SPARE
2-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — RULES FOR MANEUVERING
2200 PRINCIPAL RULES FOR MANEUVERING
A summary of principal rules for maneuvering is provided in ATP 1, Vol. II.
2201 UNIT OF DISTANCE
The nautical mile (approximately equal to the data mile, i.e., 2,000 yards) is the unit of distance. In
circular formations, 1,000 yards is the unit of distance for circle spacing, unless otherwise ordered.
2202 DISTANCE AND INTERVAL
a. Standard Distance. The distance between adjacent ships in a line is measured between
foremasts, or between navigation bridges of ships without foremasts. For the sake of uniformity, the
standard distance between two adjacent ships when formed in a line will be 1,000 yards between large
ships (ships over 450 feet in length) and 500 yards between small ships (ships 450 feet long or less) and
submarines, unless otherwise ordered. The distance between a large ship and a small ship or submarine will
be 1,000 yards or the distance ordered for the large ship. (See Figure 2-3.)
b. Maneuvering Interval. The interval between line guides will be the sum of the standard or
ordered distances of the longest line, plus the longest single distance in any one line. (See Figure 2-3.)
c. Extended Maneuvering Interval. Unless otherwise ordered, extended maneuvering

interval, which allows for station-keeping errors, will be maneuvering interval plus 500 yards.
2203 STANDARD AND REDUCED TACTICAL DIAMETER
a. Tactical Diameter. Figure 2-4 illustrates the turning distances for a ship on a turning circle
using a constant rudder angle. Tactical diameter is the transfer for a turn of 180°.
b. Size of Diameter. When ships of dissimilar type/size maneuver in the same formation, tactical
diameters will be as follows:
Tactical Diameter
Type/Size Standard Reduced
(yards) (yards)
Carrier present. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500 1,500
More than one cruiser or large ship present;
logistic or large amphibious ship present. . . . . . . . . . 1,200 1,000
Only one cruiser or large ship present . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000 800
Only small ships and submarines present . . . . . . . . . . 800 600
NOTE
Reduced tactical diameter will be used for turns of unspecified amount and emergency turns.
c. Changing Size of Diameter. A type or unit commander may, however, order a different
standard tactical diameter or a different reduced tactical diameter for his ships.
2-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
500 YDS 500 YDS 500 YDS 500 YDS 500 YDS 500 YDS
FOR SHIPS OF DIFFERENT SIZE

IN FORMATION TOGETHER
MANEUVERING INTERVAL
MANEUVERING INTERVAL EQUALS THE
SUM OF THE STANDARD OR ORDERED
DISTANCES OF THE LONGEST LINE, PLUS
4000 YDS
THE LONGEST SINGLE DISTANCE IN ANY ONE
LINE.
For the formation shown at the right:

Port column: Carrier, cruiser, 2 destroyers
Starboard column: 4 destroyers, 3 frigates
3000 YDS. + 1000 YDS..= 4000 YDS.
(Destroyers depicted are less than 450 feet in length)
1000 YDS 1000 YDS 500 YDS
FOR SHIPS OF THE SAME SIZE
M A N E U V E R I N G I N T E RVA L E Q U A L S T H E
MANEUVERING INTERVAL
2000 YDS
S U M O F T H E S TA N D A R D O R O R D E R E D
DISTANCES OF THE LONGEST LINE, PLUS
THE LONGEST SINGLE DISTANCE IN ANY ONE
LINE.
For destroyer formation shown at the left:

2000 YDS
1500 YDS. + 500 YDS. = 2000 YDS.
(Destroyers depicted are less then 450 feet in length)
500 YDS 500 YDS 500 YDS
Figure 2-3. Standard Distances and Maneuvering Intervals
2-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
TRANSFER FOR 180°

TRANSFER FOR 90°
TRANSFER
FOR 45°
ADVANCE FOR 90°
ER
ADVANCE FOR 45°
ET
AM
DI
AL
N
FI
TACTICAL DIAMETER
Figure 2-4. Turning Distances
d. Amount of Rudder Used. For precision in maneuvers, the amount of rudder used by
individual ships must be adjusted so that they turn as nearly as possible with the same turning circle as
their Guide.
e. Diverse Forces. When diverse ship types of different nationalities are present and confusion
could arise, the OTC is to order the size of standard and reduced tactical diameters to be used.
f. Aircraft Carriers. Turns by aircraft carriers may not conform to listed tactical diameter due to
flight deck heel constraints during periods of aircraft operations.
2204 ACCELERATION AND DECELERATION
a. Changing Speed. Ships operating together should normally employ uniform acceleration and
deceleration rates when changing speed. This is necessary for smoothness of maneuver and to facilitate
station-keeping.
b. Tables. The OTC or type commander may prescribe acceleration and deceleration tables as a
guide. Figure 2-5 is an example for use by a formation containing one or more aircraft carriers.
c. Emergency Acceleration. Emergency acceleration is to be at double the normal rate

prescribed by the OTC; that is, accomplished in one-half the time.
2205 SPEEDS WHILE MANEUVERING
a. Method of Ordering. Operational and stationing speed will be ordered by signal or issued in
orders to the formation. They will also be signaled to any unit joining.
b. Reserve Speed for Station-Keeping. When ships are maneuvering, the signaled speed
should be appreciably less than the operational speed, so as to leave a reserve of power for taking up and
keeping station. On other occasions one knot less than the operational speed leaves a sufficient margin for
station-keeping.
2-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
KNOTS MINUTES RATE
TIME
CHANGE OF REQUIRED TOTAL KNOTS
SPEED FOR ELAPSED PER
CHANGE TIME MINUTE
FROM TO
ZERO 15 3 3 5
15 19 2 5 2
19 24 5 10 1
FASTER
24 29 10 20 1/2
29 31 6 26 1/3
31 33 8 34 1/4
33 30 7 1/2 7 1/2 2/5

30 29 2 9 1/2 1/2
29 27 3 12 1/2 2/3
27 23 4 16 1/2 1
SLOWER
23 20 2 18 1/2 1 1/2
20 18 1 19 1/2 2
18 15 1 20 1/2 3
15 ZERO 3 23 1/2 5
Figure 2-5. Acceleration-Deceleration
c. Establishing Station Speed. The use of a speed slower than operational speed normally
enables changes of station to be completed within an acceptable time. This speed, known as stationing
speed, should be previously established, either by signal or in operation orders, particularly when
substantial economy of fuel will result. Ordering stationing speed does not restrict the OTC from signaling
any speed up to operational speed.
d. Speed When Taking or Changing Station. When a unit being maneuvered in formation
by its unit commander needs to increase speed to take or change station, the speed ordered for that unit is
normally to be one knot less than stationing speed. Ships needing to increase speed when taking or
changing station independently should normally proceed at stationing speed.
e. Change in Signaled Speed. When the speed of the Guide is changed by signal during a
maneuver involving units taking station on the Guide, ships in the unit being maneuvered are not to change
to the Guide’s new speed until so ordered by their unit commanders.
f. Rough Weather. In rough weather, commanding officers are to report to their unit commander
the inability to maintain the signaled speed without damage and are authorized to reduce speed as
necessary.
2206 SPEED FLAGS
In order to facilitate station-keeping, the speed at which a ship is proceeding may be indicated by
small-size numeral flags displayed from the navigation bridge or by regular-size numeral flags at the dip
2-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
from an outward signal halyard. Speed flags are normally used only when entering or leaving harbor in
formation, when minesweeping, or when ordered by the unit commander. They are not to be used for
ordering changes in speed, which are always to be signaled.
2207 — 2209 SPARE
2210 STATIONING
To station a unit is to order it to proceed to a position with reference to the Guide, a geographic
position, or an indicated unit. Station is expressed by one of the following methods.
a. A true bearing and distance; e.g., “Take station bearing 170° from the Guide, distance 5 miles.”
b. A relative bearing and distance; e.g., “Take station 30° on the starboard bow of (call sign),
distance 5 miles.”
c. A general relative area, such as the van or rear; an approximate distance may be included.
d. A numbered or lettered station on a diagram; e.g., “Take Station 14.”
e. The circular method (see Chapter 3).
f. The sector method (see Chapter 3).
g. The skeleton screen diagram (see Chapter 3).
2211 JOINING AND LEAVING
a. Units Closing or Rejoining.
(1) Meaning of Order to Close or Rejoin. An order to close or rejoin means that the unit ad-
dressed, except a screen unit (see Chapter 3), is to come closer to receive further orders. It does not in it-
self order the unit to take up any particular station. A unit ordered to close or rejoin is not to enter the
formation without further orders.
(2) Resuming Previous Station. Should the OTC desire a unit to resume its previous station, a
signal to this effect is available.
b. Units Temporarily Detached. A unit temporarily detached is not to act on or to answer

maneuvering signals made by the OTC unless its own call sign is specifically included in the address of the
maneuvering signal.
c. Units joining. The OTC will normally apprise the force of the expected time and general
direction of approach of approach of a unit joining. When within range, a unit joining is to establish
communications (EMCON permitting) and identify itself to the OTC, who will pass tactical information as
required. Information to be exchanged between warships joining a formation and the OTC is given in
Chapter 1. During radio silence, the first ship to sight a unit joining is to inform the OTC and pass any
required tactical information as directed by the OTC, using a system within the EMCON plan in force.
2212 — 2219 SPARE
2220 THE GUIDE
a. OTC’s Ship.
2-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) The ship in which the OTC is embarked is the Guide unless otherwise ordered or unless the
Guide changes automatically.
(2) The OTC’s ship may hoist the Guide flag temporarily for identification when the force is form-
ing up or when a unit joins.
b. Designated Ship. A ship (not the OTC’s) designated as the Guide is to hoist the Guide flag
and keep it flying until the Guide is changed. When a formation or disposition diagram indicates the station
designated as the Guide’s, the ship in that station automatically assumes duty as the Guide and, if she is not
the OTC’s ship, hoists the Guide flag.
c. Designation of New Guide. The designation of a new Guide does not in itself order a shift in
stations; ships must, therefore, maintain their present positions but keep station on the new Guide.
d. Further details are described in ATP 1, Vol. II.
2221 AUTOMATIC CHANGES OF THE GUIDE
The Guide does not automatically change when a new task or type organization is ordered or with a
change of tactical command. The Guide changes automatically only on the following occasions:
a. SHIP BEING FORMED ON becomes the Guide.
b. LINE GUIDE OF THE LINE BEING FORMED ON becomes the Guide.
c. SHIP BECOMING THE PIVOT SHIP for a maneuver becomes the Guide.
d. WHEN REVERSING THE ORDER OF SHIPS IN COLUMN FROM THE REAR, the rear ship
automatically becomes the Guide.
e. WHEN FORMING A LOOSE LINE OF COLUMN, COLUMN OPEN ORDER, OR

DIAMOND FORMATION, the leading ship becomes the Guide.
f. WHEN A WHEEL SIGNAL IS EXECUTED:
(1) WHEN IN SINGLE COLUMN, the leading ship will be the Guide.
(2) WHEN IN DIAMOND FORMATION, the leading ship will be the Guide.
(3) WHEN IN MULTIPLE COLUMNS, the leading ship of the pivot column will be the Guide.
g. WHEN WHEELING LINES SIMULTANEOUSLY, the leading or pivot ship of the Guide’s
line becomes the Guide and the leading or pivot ships of the other lines become line guides.
h. WHEN ALTERING COURSE BY SEARCH TURN, the wing ship on the side away from the
direction of the new course will turn to the course indicated and become the Guide.
i. WHEN THE GUIDE HAULS OUT, the new guide of that line is to become the Guide.
2222 — 2229 SPARE
2-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2240 SPECIAL MANEUVERING RULES
2241 INDIVIDUAL ACTION TO AVOID DANGER
Ships, whether acting independently or in formation, must take such individual action as may be
required to avoid danger. When necessary, ships may leave their stations to avoid risk of collision or to
avoid navigational hazards.
2242 SPECIAL RULES OF THE ROAD
The following rules are applicable to Allied naval ships and overrule the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea in the circumstances described.
a. Right of Way. Priority is in the following order.
(1) Helicopters when hovering with sonar in the water are to be considered as ships not under
command. A helicopter in the dip or hover is not to be approached by ships within 500 yards.
(2) Mine Countermeasures Units, which includes helicopters operating tethered MCM equip-
ment, have the right of way when showing the appropriate signal over ships engaged in replenishment or
ships engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft. MCM helicopters with gear streamed are not to be
approached by ships within 1,000 meters.
(3) Ships Engaged in Replenishment (other than VERTREP) have the right of way over car-
riers and other ships engaged in flight operations.
(4) Ships Engaged in Launching or Recovery of Landing Craft Utilities have the right of
way except over ships or formations showing the appropriate signals and are to be regarded as described
at the above stated priority configurations (1), (2) and/or (3).
(5) Ships Engaged in Launching or Recovery of Aircraft have the right of way except over
ships or formations showing the appropriate signals that are engaged in replenishment (other than VER-
TREP) or mine countermeasures operations; other ships are to keep clear (see Chapter 6).
(6) Ships Engaged in Launching or Recovery of Arrays have the right of way except over
ship or formations showing the appropriate signals and are to be regarded as described at the above
stated priority configurations (1), (2), (3), (4), and/or (5).
b. Screen Ships. When a formation consists of a main body and screen, ships of the screen are to
keep clear of those of the main body. When, from any cause, a ship of the main body finds herself so close
that collision cannot be avoided by action of the screen ship alone, she also shall take such action as will
best avoid collision. Rule 15 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea is not to
apply between screen ships and ships of the main body (but see Chapter 3 for instructions for individual
screening units).
2243 SEA MANNERS AND CUSTOMS
With the exceptions stated in Article 2242, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea are to be observed by ships in formation. However, in order to facilitate maneuvering, the
instructions in this article are to be observed, but in each case where one ship is directed not to hamper the
other, the ship required to keep clear of the other is so to conduct her movements throughout that her
heading and/or proximity to the other are not such as to introduce any doubts whatsoever as to her
intentions. She should also, if possible, indicate her intentions by signal. However, if doubt does arise, the
2-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (or, where applicable, any local port rule) are to
apply, except as in Article 2242.
a. General Conduct of Ships in the Presence of Formed Units. Ships joining, leaving,
approaching, or passing through a formation must not hamper ships already in formation.
b. Mine Countermeasures Units.
(1) Vessels or Formations engaged in mine clearance operations (as described in Rule 27f of
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (modified 1983)) are not to be ap-
proached nearer than 1,000 meters. Under no circumstances is a ship to pass through a mine clearance
formation.
(2) Helicopters engaged in mine countermeasures operations are to be considered as ships not
under command when operating tethered countermeasures equipment (see Article 2242a(2)).
c. Ships Not in Station. Ships that are not in station are not to hamper those in station. However,
ships in station should not stubbornly maintain their course and speed if danger of collision exists.
d. Passing Between Ships in a Line. No ship is to pass between ships in a line without (in the
case of a junior) asking permission, or (in the case of senior) indicating her intention to do so. It then
becomes the responsibility of the ship passing through the line to avoid hampering the other ships.
e. Passing Through a Formation. If ships are required to pass between ships in a formation or
between lines, it is the responsibility of the ships passing through the formation to avoid hampering the
movements of the other ships. No ship is to attempt to pass through a formation of minesweepers with
sweeps streamed.
f. Senior Officer’s Orders to Keep Clear. If a senior officer wishes a junior officer who has
the right of way to keep clear of him, the senior officer is to issue timely orders.
g. Restricted Waters. In restricted waters, a small ship must not hamper the movements of a
large ship.
2244 EXECUTING MANEUVER AT PREARRANGED TIME
a. Ordering the Maneuver. Maneuvers, such as altering course and speed or changing the
formation, can be ordered to be executed at a specific time or on arrival in a prescribed position; in these
cases no further signal to execute the maneuver will be made by the OTC, though unit commanders may
have to make signals to their units.
b. When Signaling Is Restricted. When it is desired to restrict signaling during a particular

period in the future, such as during darkness or when nearing the enemy’s coast, the OTC can use the
following signal: “The maneuver ordered to be carried out at ___ is to be executed at that time without
further signaling. Unit commanders are to issue necessary instructions in advance.”
2245 SCOUTING UNITS
Special maneuvering rules for scouting units will be found in Chapter 6.
2-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2246 SHIPS TOWING ACOUSTIC ARRAYS OR OTHER DEVICES
Ships towing acoustic arrays or other devices do not have complete freedom of maneuver. They will
not normally display lights or day shapes indicating conduct of special operations and are responsible for
informing any unit closing them of any special restrictions.
2247 — 2249 SPARE
2250 MAN OVERBOARD — STANDARD PROCEDURES
a. The ship from which a man falls overboard is to use the following procedure:
(1) Use the rudder and engines as appropriate to avoid the man.
(2) Drop a lifebuoy; in peacetime, also drop a day/night pyrotechnic marker.
(3) Mark the plot.
(4) In peacetime, the above information is to be passed regardless of the EMCON plan in force.
(5) Sound at least six short blasts on the whistle.
(6) Maneuver according to rules set forth in Articles 2251 or 2252, as appropriate.
(7) Secure active sonar if tactical situation permits.
(8) By day, hoist flag OSCAR where it can best be seen; by night in peacetime, display two pulsat-
ing red lights arranged vertically (see Article 2254) or fire one white rocket (or one white Very light).
(9) In peacetime, any ship may use searchlights as necessary.
b. Whenever a man has been reported missing overboard, the ship shall immediately inform the
OTC. The OTC shall determine the advisability of initiating a search. If a search is conducted, the OTC
shall designate the search plan and participating units. Ships towing acoustic arrays or other devices will
normally require the assistance of another unit to recover a man overboard. The commanding officer of a
ship steaming independently shall determine the search procedures for a crewmember who may have been
overboard for an undetermined period. In each case, the commander shall inform appropriate authorities
and recommend the duration of the resulting search.
2251 PEACETIME RECOVERY MANEUVERS
a. When in Column.
(1) The ship from which the man falls overboard shall stop engines temporarily and hold course,
unless it is the rear ship of the column, in which case, it shall maneuver as required to recover the man.
The rudder may be used to throw the stern away from the man slightly; the ship is then brought back to
the course.
(2) Ships ahead of the one losing the man, stand on at the prescribed speed and hold course.
(3) Ships astern of the one losing the man, stop engines and maneuver as necessary to keep clear by
hauling out of line: odd-numbered ships, counting from the leading ship of the column, turning to star-
board and even-numbered ships turning to port. All ships then resume the course and signaled speed.
2-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) The rear ship should always prepare to recover the man overboard; however, any ship in posi-
tion safely to recover the man should do so as soon as possible, informing other ships of her intentions.
b. When in Line Abreast or Line of Bearing.
(1) The ship from which the man falls overboard is to maneuver as required to recover the man,
avoiding a turn toward other ships unless they can safely be cleared.
(2) Other ships are to maintain the course and speed.
c. When in Any Other Formation.
(1) If a man falls overboard from a large ship, the nearest small ship, or the man-overboard recovery
ship when designated by the OTC, is to proceed to recover the man. If, however, it is clearly safe for the
ship losing the man to maneuver to recover him, it may do so. In either case, other ships are to maneuver
as necessary to stand clear of rescue operations and, if possible, maintain formation integrity.
(2) If a man falls overboard from a small ship, it is to maneuver as necessary to recover the man.
Other ships are to maneuver as necessary to stand clear of rescue operations and, if possible, maintain
formation integrity.
(3) In a close formation, a ship of the van should not maneuver to recover a man overboard if risk of
a collision exists. It should maintain course and speed unless otherwise directed by the OTC, who may
designate a man-overboard recovery ship to make the recovery.
d. When Engaged in Replenishment at Sea. During transfer at sea or replenishment

exercises, the following precautionary measures shall be taken for the purpose of rescuing anyone who
should fall overboard.
(1) If a rescue helicopter is available, it should be at a minimum deck alert during daylight hours.
However, if bad weather or special hazards demand, the helicopter should be airborne in a suitable
position.
(2) If a man-overboard recovery ship is designated, it should be stationed 500 to 1,000 yards astern
of the delivery ship.
(3) The customer ship is the designated man-overboard recovery ship when no other ship nor a suit-
ably equipped helicopter is available. In this case, both the supplying and customer ships shall ensure
that each is prepared to execute emergency breakaway quickly and safely throughout the replenishment.
(4) Should either the supplying or customer ship lose a man overboard, life preservers with markers
shall be dropped by both ships as close to the man as possible.
(5) The OTC shall be informed immediately.
2252 WARTIME RECOVERY MANEUVERS
a. If a man falls overboard from a large ship the nearest small ship, or the man overboard recovery
ship when designated by the OTC, is to proceed to recover the man if the tactical situation permits. Other
ships are to maintain the course and speed. If no small ship is present, the OTC will issue the necessary
orders but large ships should not stop in areas where enemy submarines may be encountered.
b. If a man falls overboard from a small ship, it is to maneuver clear of the formation and recover the
man if the tactical situation permits. Other ships are to maintain the course and speed but are to keep clear.
2-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2253 RESCUE HELICOPTER
If a man falls overboard and the tactical situation and flying conditions permit, a ship equipped with
a suitable rescue helicopter, as designated by the OTC, is to launch such a helicopter to assist in the rescue.
Surface ships are cautioned to keep clear when a helicopter is actually engaged in rescuing personnel.
2254 MAN OVERBOARD LIGHTS
a. If a man falls overboard during darkness, the emergency may be indicated by man overboard
lights. These are two red pulsating lights in vertical line, with the following characteristics:
(1) Visible two miles.
(2) Visible all around.
(3) Pulsating rate 50 to 60 pulses per minute.
b. During wartime, man overboard lights will be used only upon direction from the OTC.
2255 — 2259 SPARE
2260 BREAKDOWN AT SEA
a. Avoiding Danger to Other Ships. Should a breakdown occur, such as loss of steering
control or failure of main engines, the first requirement is to avoid endangering others in company. As a
means to this end, signals and information to other ships should be given as nearly concurrently with the
orders to the wheel and engines as is possible.
b. Signals From Disabled Ship. The following steps must be taken by a disabled ship:
(1) Sound at least six short blasts.
(2) By day, hoist flag 5; hoist two black balls. By night in peacetime, show two red lights in accor-
dance with Rule 27 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
(3) If a turn is being made, indicate the direction by sounding one short blast if the turn is to star-
board and two if to port.
(4) Inform the OTC of the nature of the breakdown, giving estimated time of its repair and of return
to station.
c. Maneuvering to Avoid Disabled Ship.
(1) When in Column: Ships ahead of the disabled vessel stand on. Ships astern of the disabled ves-
sel maneuver as necessary to keep clear and indicate their intentions by the appropriate sound signal.
When clear, all ships resume signaled course and speed.
(2) When in Any Other Formation: Ships maneuver to remain clear of the disabled vessel.
2-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2270 NIGHT AND FOG
2271 NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON DARKENED SHIPS
a. Any Ship Endangered by Others. When ships are darkened, and any ship considers herself
endangered by another, she is to switch on navigation lights using dimming feature if installed. Other
ships, in the immediate vicinity sighting such lights, using dimming feature, if installed.
b. When Maneuvering in Formation. When it is necessary to change the formation, formation

axis, or course of a screened unit, navigation lights may be switched on if it is not certain that ships will
clear each other.
2272 WHISTLE SIGNALS WHILE MANEUVERING
The following signals from the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea may be
used by ships in a formed state when maneuvering in fog or at night, even though the regulations require
that the ships be in sight of one another:
One short blast . . . . . I am altering my course to starboard
Two short blasts . . . . . I am altering my course to port
Three short blasts . . . . My engines are going astern
Five or more blasts . . . To be used in accordance with International Regulations
2273 STANDARD FOG SIGNALS
a. In Wartime. The standard fog signals, for example, one prolonged blast for a ship under way,
are not to be sounded in wartime unless otherwise ordered.
b. In Peacetime. Fog signals by ships in formation are to be sounded in the manner ordered by the
OTC, who will take into consideration the confusion that may be caused both to themselves and to other
shipping by too strict adherence to the International Regulations when large numbers of ships in company
are all sounding fog signals.
2274 ENTERING FOG
a. No Change Without Signal. No change in the formation, disposition, course, or speed of the
force is to be made without a signal from the OTC. However, when evasive steering is not being carried
out, unit commanders may change the arrangement of their units to a compact and more suitable formation.
If evasive steering is being carried out, it is to continue until stopped by a signal from the OTC.
b. Units Closing the Force. Units closing the force should maneuver so as to make their final
approach from well abaft of the beam of the rear ships of the force. If unable to operate radar, they are not to
attempt to join but are to assume the course and speed of the force until otherwise directed.
c. Use of Radar. If EMCON plan permits, ships are to man surface radar and the primary tactical
circuit.
d. Lookouts. Fog lookouts are to be stationed.
e. Lights. In peacetime, navigation lights are to be shown.
2-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. Fog Buoys. Ships in column, except the rear ship, should be prepared to stream a buoy at
four-fifths of standard distance and to direct a strong light on the ship astern.
2275 — 2279 SPARE
2280 WARTIME CRUISING PRECAUTIONS
2281 DARKENING SHIPS
a. Completely Darken Ship. Unless otherwise ordered, all ships are to be completely darkened
from sunset to sunrise, while at sea. A ship is to inform any ship whose lights are visible. Navigation lights
are not to be used when ships are darkened except in emergency to avoid collision. Article 2271 explains
this point more fully.
b. Modified Darken Ship. To improve habitability, the OTC may order modified darken ship.
Under this condition, doors, hatches, and ports may be opened but no direct white lights or red standing
light shall be permitted to show outside the ship.
c. Special Conditions. When authorized by the OTC, dimmed side lights and stern light may be
permitted during screen maneuvers, when ships join the formation, when individual ships maneuver
within the formation, or during coordinated operations. The OTC may authorize ships controlling aircraft
at night during darken ship conditions to identify their ship to the aircraft by use of Grimes light or
pulsating red truck lights. Ships involved in launching and recovering helicopters may show additional
lights at minimum brilliance consistent with safety.
2282 GENERAL PRECAUTIONS
Ships are to take precautions to avoid disclosure of own forces to the enemy. These should include
measures to avoid excessive external noises and smoke emission, including blowing of boiler tubes. Waste
is to be disposed of by sinking or retained on board. Use of electromagnetic, electro-optic, and acoustic
emitters is subject to the instructions in Chapter 5.
2283 — 2289 SPARE
2-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — EVASIVE STEERING
2300 SCOPE
This section describes antisubmarine evasion and torpedo countermeasures for main body, convoy,
and screen units as well as anti-FPB maneuvers against a missile- or torpedo-firing FPB.
(NR) (NMM) Specific plans and instructions for antisubmarine evasive steering are contained in
ATP 3.
2301 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
a. Main Body or Convoy. The main body or convoy will normally carry out evasive steering.
(NC) (NMM) If units of the main body are stationed by the sector method, only the Guide and the
slowest units will carry out evasive steering in accordance with ATP 3. Other main body units should
patrol their sectors at random and as vigorously as the speed of advance (SOA) allows.
The screen should be fully informed about the type and/or plan of evasive steering in order to be able
to adjust patrolling.
b. Screen Units. If screen units are stationed by the skeleton diagram and are ordered not to
patrol stations, evasive steering must be ordered separately.
(NR) (NMM) (per ATP-3).
2310 (NC) (NMM) ANTISUBMARINE EVASION AND TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURES
a. (NC) (NMM) Measures to evade submarines are designed to prevent a submarine from reaching
a firing position and normally will be ordered by the OTC.
b. (NC) (NMM) Torpedo Countermeasures for Formations and Single Units.
(1) Torpedo countermeasures (TCMs) fall into two broad categories, tactical and material, and are
designed to:
(a) Confuse the submarine’s fire control solution.
(b) Avoid a torpedo or torpedo salvo once fired.
(2) The OTC is to order countermeasures which are applicable to ships in formation. Countermea-
sures to be employed by ships engaged in ASW screening, or on search or patrol, are the responsibility
of the OTC or appropriate commander (if delegated). The policy for the use of towed decoys must be
promulgated by the OTC.
c. (NC) (NMM) Antisubmarine Evasion by Surface Units Transiting a Submarine

Threat Area.
(1) Main Body Units.
(a) All units use evasive steering as advised in ATP 28 and ATP 3 (a summary of maneuvering
during evasive steering is provided in Table 2-1), the highest speed is compatible with the aim, and
have degaussing on.
2-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 2-1. (NU) (NMM) Maneuvering Formation When Using Evasive Steering
ON EXECUTE WHEN ZIGZAGGING WHEN WEAVING

OF THE
SIGNAL
FOR
Cease Return Make Resume Applicable to Cease Resume Applicable to

Auto- to Base Maneuver on Auto- Without
matic- Course Relative Signal matic- Signal
è ally to ally
TURN Yes No Present Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant

TOGETHER Leg of Zig- Formation Formation
zag 2. All Screens 2. All Screens
Yes No To True Yes Mercantile

Course In- Convoys
dicated
WHEEL Yes Yes Base Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant

Course Formation Formation
2. All Screens 2. All Screens
No Yes To True Yes Mercantile

Course In- Convoys
dicated
CHANGE OF No No— 1. Combatant No— 1. Combatant

BASE Adjust Formation Adjust Formation
COURSE OF to New 2. Convoy to New 2. All Screens
10° OR LESS Base 3. All Screens Base 3. Independent
Course 4. Independent Course
CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant

AXIS See Leg of Formation Formation
Note Zigzag 2. All Screens 2. All Screens
CHANGE OF Yes No— Present Yes 1. Combatant Yes Yes 1. Combatant

FORMATION See Leg of Formation Formation
OR DISPOSI- Note Zigzag 2. All Screens 2. All Screens
TION
CHANGE IN No No 1. Combatant No 1. Combatant

TIME ZONE Formation Formation
2. Convoy 2. All Screens
3. All Screens 3. Independent
4. Independnt
SEARCH Yes Yes Base Yes Search Line No Yes Search Line
TURN Course
NOTE: If the signal “CEASE ZIGZAG, RESUME BASE COURSE” is ordered concurrently with either a change in formation or dispo-
sition, or a rotation of axis, ships may proceed to their own station and resume base course when in station if it is safe and quicker to
do so.
(NATO-CONFIDENTIAL) (NMM)
2-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Employ towed decoys in accordance with current employment doctrine for the decoy in
use.
(c) Spacing between units of a formed main body should be a minimum of 2,000 yards.
(2) Screen Units, in addition to the measures in subparagraph (1), should:
(a) Patrol their sector or station.
(b) Remain no longer than 3 minutes on a steady course.
(c) Proceed with sufficient speed advantage over the unit being screened to ensure a thorough
patrol of their sectors.
(d) The speed advantage of escorts should be between 3 and 6 knots. However, escorts should
not exceed maximum sonar speed and should ideally patrol at optimum sonar speed.
d. (NC) (NMM) Torpedo Countermeasures To Be Executed When a Submarine Is

Detected Within the Torpedo Danger Zone.
(1) Single Ship Main Body, at a range less than 10,000 yards, should follow the rules in subpara-
graph e; at a range over 10,000 yards, it should turn away and clear the torpedo danger area, increasing to
maximum speed.
(2) Multiship Main Body should report and wait for the OTC to maneuver the force clear; how-
ever, any ship of the main body which assesses a contact to be within 10,000 yards of herself should
carry out the maneuvers laid down in subparagraph e.
(3) Surface Escorts should take account of the requirements to maintain contact, attack the sub-
marine and defend the main body, then:
(a) Alter course between 60° and 90° if possible to place the contact on the opposite bow and, if
the tactical situation permits, displace ship 1,000 yards across the bearing of the submarine. Use
limited wheel as necessary to avoid loss of contact in the turn.
(b) If possible, units should simultaneously change speed with the alteration of course by an
increase or decrease of at least 3 knots.
(c) Units should not be steady with the contact within 15° of the bow if towed decoys are
streamed and activated.
(d) If towed decoys are not streamed, they should be streamed and employed in accordance
with current employment doctrine for the decoy in use.
e. (NC) (NMM) Torpedo Countermeasures To Be Executed When a Torpedo Is

Detected.
(1) Torpedo Detected By Own Units. On detecting a torpedo, units should increase to maxi-
mum speed, except that escorts should not exceed maximum sonar speed, and activate decoys.
2-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(a) If the Ship Is Not Turning, units should alter course as follows:
i. If a torpedo is detected within 30° of the bow, alter course to comb the track and when the
torpedo has passed, make a bold course alteration to clear a possible torpedo pattern.
ii. If a torpedo is detected between 30° and 70° on the bow, alter course toward and steady 30°
beyond the initial bearing.
iii. If a torpedo is detected on a bearing more than 70° but less than 150° on the bow, alter
course away and steady 30° short of the reciprocal of the initial bearing.
iv. If a torpedo is detected more than 150° on the bow, alter course away and steady 30° beyond
the reciprocal of the initial bearing.
(b) If the Ship is Turning, the turn should be continued or increased. Course should be steadied
30E beyond the initial bearing of the detection if turning toward, or 30° short of the reciprocal of the
initial bearing if turning away.
(c) In Both of the Above Cases, maintain new course until the ship is at least 1,000 yards clear
of its original track when torpedoes were first detected. This will take the ship clear of a possible
torpedo pattern.
(2) Torpedo Reported by Other Units.
(a) If the position of the firing submarine is not known, a single ship should normally turn stern
towards the reporting unit and increase to maximum speed to clear the torpedo danger area; escorts
should not exceed maximum sonar speed. If the position of the firing submarine is known and it is
not clear whether or not the reporting unit is the target, then a single ship should carry out torpedo
countermeasures in accordance with paragraph 2310d(1).
(b) The OTC of a multiship main body is to maneuver the force clear of the threat.
NOTE
· The torpedo countermeasures above are based on the assumption that the threat is a
straight-running torpedo with limited or no programmable logic.
· Increasing speed is not always the best way to avoid a torpedo. A silent speed can be defined
on modern ships, which can be combined successfully with an evasive course, especially if
the ship is fitted with a torpedo detection device. This tactic will be ineffective against
wire-guided torpedoes.
2320 (NC) (NMM) ANTI-FPB EVASION
Whenever possible, a force should keep well clear of areas in which FPBs are probable, such as
fishing fleets and groups of islands, and should maintain at least 40 nm of sea room, preferably more, in all
directions. When such areas cannot be avoided, they should if possible be transited in daylight. When a
threat is located, the force should turn away to increase the time available for countermeasures using high
speed and short-leg zigzag. In addition, a long-leg zigzag may be considered in order to mislead enemy
FPBs in calculating their interception.
2-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
2321 (NC) (NMM) MANEUVER
a. (NC) (NMM) Against Missile-Firing FPBs.
(1) Keep FPBs at as great a range as possible from the main body.
(2) Main body units should turn away from the threat.
(3) Escorts should carry out countermeasures between the main body and the threat.
(4) Once missiles are detected, ships should maneuver considering weapon arcs while providing
least radar target and optimizing chaff and decoy employment.
b. (NC) (NMM) Against Torpedo-Firing FPBs.
(1) Maneuver to keep FPBs on the quarter when a contact is evaluated as hostile or possibly hostile
to keep the weapon system arcs clear, reduce the closing range rate, and prevent FPBs from closing
within 4,000 to 5,000 yards forward of the beam.
(2) Maneuver by TURN or CORPEN to keep the line of ships close to the normal threat axis for as
long as possible; keep ships closed up for mutual support and ease of maneuver. When the threat could
be different from straight-running torpedoes, the torpedo countermeasures (maneuvers and decoy em-
ployment) will be based on threat assessment and carried out in accordance with respective national
doctrines.
(3) Maneuvering should be aimed at:
(a) Keeping FPBs within destructive range of aircraft.
(b) Evading until all ship’s weapons are ready.
(c) Upsetting the enemy’s fire control solution.
c. (NC) (NMM) Assigned Mission. Maneuvering is also subject to the assigned mission. A
surface unit should complete its assigned mission while simultaneously combating the FPB. A surface unit
screening large combatants should place itself between the main body and the threat. A surface unit
operating alone should maneuver to keep the FPB at maximum effective gun range and to minimize the
rate of closing.
d. (NC) (NMM) Other Factors. Whenever possible, a surface unit should attempt to get up-sea
of an FPB, as the latter cannot sustain at a high speed into the wind and sea. If FPBs attempt a pincer’s
movement, a surface unit may maneuver to engage both pincers, or only one pincer at a time, depending on
the tactical situation and firepower available. Use of a smoke screen should be considered. Use of
illuminants at night between a surface unit and the threat may reduce the enemy’s visual capability. See
also Chapter 8.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
2-33 (Reverse Blank)

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121
122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132
133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143
144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154
(This page is NATO-UNCLASSIFIED)
Figure 2-6. (NU) Quick Reference System (QRS) Overlay
155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165
NOTE: Reprint the overlay locally on transparent plastic at same size as template.
166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 3
Disposition of Forces
SECTION I — FORMATIONS
3100 SCOPE
This section describes types of formations for operational use. Basic rules for ordering are in ATP 1,
Vol. II. Where special rules and procedures are necessary (e.g., for replenishment), these are detailed in
following articles.
3105 BASIC SYSTEM OF FORMATIONS
In the interests of flexibility and simplicity, this section prescribes certain basic “ready” formations
and provides tables with each that list station assignments for varying numbers and types of ships.
a. Numbering. Operational purpose formations are allocated formation numbers from 20 to 99,
with formations designed for similar purposes allocated numbers from the same block.
(NC) (NMM) (see Table 3-1).
The purpose of a formation is indicated by appending the appropriate purpose and identification
letter(s) as required to the formation number.
(NC) (NMM) Numbers not allocated in this chapter may be used as desired by appropriate
authority.
b. Basic Types. Formations 50 and 51 are basic “ready” formations.

(NC) (NMM) They are designed so that antiair warfare (except for 50) and nuclear defense
formations can be assumed with minimum delay. The appropriate antiair warfare and nuclear defense
formations are indicated by the suffixes “V” and “Z” respectively. Other basic formations (circular
destroyer, replenishment, amphibious group sector, and departure and entry formations) are also included
in this chapter.
c. (NC) (NMM) Additional Types. Additional type formations may be specified by type
commanders for use by ship types not included in the main allocations above. These are indicated by
prefixing ship type indicator letters to the number of the formation (see Table 3-1). The number used in this
way is in no way related to the block numbers prescribed in subparagraph a. above.
d. Signaling. An operational purpose formation is signaled by using the FORM pennant.

(NC) (NMM) This is followed by the formation number and purpose letter(s). The use of the purpose
letter(s) simplifies the procedure when reforming because of the rule that when shifting from a basic
“ready” formation to an antiair warfare or nuclear defense formation there is usually no change in the
Guide, course, speed, or axis. A signal is also available to facilitate forming the type formations described
in subparagraph c. above.
3106 FORMING
The OTC specifies the appropriate formation for the existing tactical and operational situation, the
Guide, course, speed, axis, and ships’ station assignments. The OTC may direct subordinate commanders
to assign stations to their respective ships. Upon execution of the signal to form an operational formation,
ships shall move to their new stations independently, hoisting station numbers by day when ordered (see
3-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 3-1. (NU) (NMM) Table of Formations
Formation Numbers
20 to 29 Destroyer Formations
30 to 39 Large Combatant Formations
40 to 49 Spare
50 to 59 Transport/Logistic Formations
60 to 69 Replenishment Formations
70 to 79 Amphibious Formations
80 to 89 Surface Action Formations
90 to 99 Miscellaneous Formations (including Departure and Entry Formations)
Purpose Identification Letters
C Cruising Q Normal
D Departure R Ready
E (Sortie) Entry S Antisubmarine
F Fueling T Column
(Replenishment) U Screening
G Gunnery V Antiair Warfare
H Bombardment W Special
J Approach X Exercise
K Attack Y Assault (Amphibious)
L Low Visibility Z Nuclear Defense
M Minelaying or
Sweeping
Principal Ship Type Indicator Letters
A Auxiliary M Minesweeper
C Large Combatant N Minelayer
D Destroyer R Aircraft Carrier
L Amphibious S Submarine
(NATO-RESTRICTED) (NMM)
ATP 1, Vol. II). Units already formed will be maneuvered by order of their unit commanders when the
formation ordered is linear in nature and the new formation can be achieved by a unit maneuver.
3107 MANEUVERING
a. Course and Axis Changes. Formation axis changes are indicated and illustrated in Article
3115. Disposition course and axis changes should for simplicity ordinarily be given in multiples of 5°.
When the disposition axis is rotated, the OTC of each formation is to maneuver his formation to resume the
station relative to the old axis. Unless the rotation is a small one, the maneuver will take a long time to
complete.
b. Change in Organization or Composition of the Force. When any change in the listed
type or task organization is issued by the OTC or when units join or depart, the formation does not
automatically change. No ship is to move from its present station until a signal is made ordering a new
formation or, in the case of a single ship, a signal ordering the ship concerned to move to its new station.
Screen units may adjust station to cover gaps. When dissolving a formation, the OTC will ensure that the
formation is oriented to permit units to proceed on a safe course when detached. Normally, the OTC will
detach screen units first; when these units are clear, the main body will be dissolved in an orderly manner.
3108 — 3109 SPARE
3-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
3110 GENERAL TYPES
Formations are formed by linear or circular methods. Line formations consist of single and multiple
line formations and are described in ATP 1, Vol. II. Formations are listed in Table 3-2.
3115 CIRCULAR FORMATIONS
a. Formation Center and Axis. The direction of a formation axis is signaled as a true bearing;
however, if there is any doubt as to the position of formation center, the OTC is to indicate it by true bearing
and distance from the Guide or an indicated ship.
b. Circular Stationing. The circular method of stationing is shown in Figure 3-1. The station in
the center is called station zero and the circles are numbered consecutively outward from the center. Circle
spacing is 1,000 yards, unless otherwise ordered; thus the circle of radius 5,000 yards is known as Circle 5
and that of 7,300 yards as Circle 7.3. The location of a station is described by the number of the circle on
which it lies followed by its direction relative to the formation axis measured clockwise from 000° to 359°.
c. Taking Station. Upon execution of the signal to form a circular formation, ships move to their
new stations independently and, when ordered, are to hoist station numbers by day.
d. Stationing Units of More Than One Ship. A unit stationed in a circular formation is
normally a single ship, but exceptions will occur when it becomes necessary for a unit consisting of more
than one ship to occupy a station. Unit(s) so stationed shall not be of such size as to hamper adjacent
units(s) and shall take station according to tactical requirements (see ATP 1, Vol. II).
Table 3-2. Table of Allocated Formations
Type Number Purpose
Single Line 1, 2, 3, 4 Maneuvering in Close Company
Multiple Line 5, 6, 7, 8, Maneuvering in Close Company

9, 10, 11,
12
(NR) (NMM)
Destroyer 20,21, Circular (20) and
Type 22,23,24 Special Formations
Transport/ 50 Rectangular, Ready

Logistic 50V (NR) (NMM) Rectangular, Antiair Warfare
51 Circular, Ready
51V (NR) (NMM) Circular, Antiair Warfare
51Z (NR) (NMM) Circular, Nuclear Defense
(NR) (NMM)
Replenishment 60 Circular
61 Circular Ready
62 With Skeleton Screen
Departure and 90D Departure/Sortie

Entry 90E Entry
3-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
e. Rotating Formation Axis. The direction of a formation axis is rotated by signaling a new
direction; the axis then rotates by the shortest way to the new direction. A formation axis is not to be rotated
more than 60° in one step. Figure 3-2 illustrates rotation of the axis when the Guide is in station zero and
Figure 3-3 illustrates rotation when the Guide is not in station zero. (For ease of comparison, ships are in
the same initial stations and the formation axis is rotated 30° in both figures.)
3120 OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS
Formations more complex than linear and circular formations are used to fulfill operational
purposes, such as carrier or amphibious operations, surface action, and replenishment at sea, and must
provide for effective action in a multithreat environment. Because of the inherent element of surprise,
submarines, FPBs, guided missiles, and aircraft are predominant threats.
3121 BROAD OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES
a. Cruising (C) ASW Formations. These provide the best protection against the subsurface
threat by making the most effective use of ASW units.
b. Ready (R) Formations. These provide a compromise between optimum subsurface and
optimum air protection. They may be readily shifted to either a cruising or antiair warfare formation. They
retain acceptable protection against all threats while permitting maximum offensive operations.
c. (NC) (NMM) Antiair Warfare (V) Formations. These provide protection against medium-
speed, medium-altitude aircraft, when there is little likelihood that nuclear weapons will be employed;
defense against higher performance aircraft can best be achieved by employing AAW dispositions (such as
2V) which combine the advantages of dispersion (to reduce the effectiveness of nuclear attack) with
decentralization of control and defense in depth (to obtain warning and time in which to act with CAP and
missiles). These principles are covered in Chapter 7. Antiair warfare formations are assumed when an air
attack is probable, but plans for assuming them should be made in advance to ensure electromagnetic
compatibility of ships with missile systems.
d. (NC) (NMM) Nuclear Defense (Z) Formations. These are designed to minimize nuclear
blast damage by dispersion. The mutual support afforded by surface-to-air missiles replaces that formerly
afforded by antiaircraft guns in close formations; random steering and higher speeds compensate for the
reduction in effectiveness of close ASW measures. Nuclear defense formations are assumed when nuclear
attack is probable and are ordered as a passive measure or as one of the antiair warfare (V) dispositions
described in paragraph c.
e. (NC) (NMM) Formations Containing Surface-to-Surface Missile Capable Ships.

Formations containing surface-to-surface missile capable ships should optimize missile strike capability
while minimizing mutual interference between force AAW posture and antisurface ship missile
capabilities.
3122 — 3124 SPARE
3125 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS
3126 (NC) (NMM) DESTROYER TYPE FORMATIONS
a. The formations in this article are appropriate for use by destroyer type ships when operating in
separate formations.
3-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0
AXIS
COURSE
SHIP ON CIRCLE 5.5 —

5500 YARDS RADIUS
RELATIVE BEARING 025°
5.5025
3355
4300
CIRCLE 5 —
2000 GUIDE 5000 YARDS 13085
RADIUS
270° 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
STATION CIRCLE NUMBERS
ZERO CIRCLE SPACING
IS 1,000 YARDS
3210 10105
7.3125
7.3155 CIRCLE 7.3 —

7300 YARDS
RADIUS
180°
Figure 3-1. Stationing Ships in Formation by Circular Method
b. Formation 20 — Destroyer Type Circular Formation is designed for use when operating
in an area where air attack is probable (for example, on picket station). The course and formation axis
coincide upon forming, the axis passing from formation center through station one. Upon execution, the
ship which will occupy station one will become the Guide. While the formation is forming, the Guide
maintains course and speed, unless otherwise directed, and indicates course and speed by information
signal. Station assignments are normally the same as the ship’s allocated sequence number.
The commander ordering the formation should assign stations whenever there is any question.
Station coordinates are read from Figure 3-4 opposite the station number and under the number of ships in
the formation.
c. Formations 21 Through 24 Are Special Formations. They are illustrated in Figure 3-5.
3127 TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC FORMATIONS
a. Principles. The typical transport/logistic formations provided in this article are based on the
following principles:
3-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
330 9
0 21
15 0
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
OLD
7
FORMATION NEW
50
31
AXIS FORMATION
23
13
0
6 AXIS
0
60
30
24
0
12
0
4
290
70
250
110
30° 30°
280
80
260
100
30°
COURSE
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
STATION GUIDE
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ZERO
280
100
260
80
290
110
250
70
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
6
OLD
0
31
50
0
23
POSITION
13
7
0
40 NEW 0
32
22 POSITION 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Figure 3-2. Rotating Formation Axis, Guide in Station Zero
(1) Construction. Because transport/logistic ships have limited maneuverability characteristics,

a linear formation is suitable for simplicity of station-keeping. Formation 50, a multiple line, rectangu-
lar formation, is suitable in areas in which the subsurface threat is primary; when the air threat is pri-
mary, use Formation 51, a combination circular and columnar formation.
(2) Distances and Intervals of about 1,000 yards each for transport/logistic ships will provide
sufficient maneuvering space for conventional threats. Unless otherwise ordered, distances and inter-
vals in Formations 50 and 51 are 1,000 yards for transport/logistic ships. Support ships present take sta-
tions 1,500 yards outboard of transport/logistic ships on bearings relative to the axis. Distance and
intervals, for both support ships and transport/logistic ships, are increased to 3,500 yards for nuclear
defense.
(3) Formation Axis and Course normally coincide.
(4) Screen Units are stationed in accordance with Chapter 3.
3-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
150 0
0 40
32
8
NEW 22
0
14 FORMATION 0
7 AXIS
0
50
OLD
31
0
23
13
FORMATION
0
6
AXIS
0
60
30
24
0
12
0
4
290
70
250
110
3 30°
NEW
280
80
STATION ZERO
260
100
30°
OLD COURSE
270
270
90
STATION
2 ZERO
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GUIDE
280
100
260
80
290
110
250
70
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
0
NEW
31
50
0
23
13
POSITION
7
0
40 OLD 0
32
22 POSITION 0
0 8
14
30 30
3
Circle 21 0
0 20
9
340 15
Spacing is 200
160
10 350
1,000 yards 190
0
180 170
The Guide maintains course and When the rotation is

speed; all other units proceed completed, distance to
as in Figure 3-5, except that, the Guide is unchanged,
when adjusting stations, units while bearing of the
must also compensate for the Guide is changed the same
movement of formation amount and in the same
center (station zero) relative direction as the rotation
to the Guide. of the formation axis.
Figure 3-3. Rotating Formation Axis, Guide Not in Station Zero
3-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FORMATION DESTROYER TYPE SHIPS PRESENT

20 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 1000 1.1000 1.2000

STATION 2 0.5240 0.6270 0.7288 0.8300 1309 1.1315 1.2320
3 0.5120 0.6090 0.7072 0.8060 1051 1.1045 1.2040
4 ........... 0.6180 0.7216 0.8240 1257 1.1270 1.2280
5 ........... ........... 0.7144 0.8120 1103 1.1090 1.2080
6 0.8180 1206 1.1225 1.2240
7 STATION ........... 1154 1.1135 1.2120
8 COORDINATES ........... ........ 1.1180 1.2200
9 ........... ........ ........... 1.2160
Figure 3-4. (NU) (NMM) Destroyer Type Ship Formation 20
b. Formation 50 — Transport/Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation, suitable for day

or night cruising (Figure 3-6), provides excellent protection against submarines and yet permits a rapid
shift into an antiair warfare formation. The OTC may either specify station assignments prior to ordering
the formation or may direct transport/logistic and support ship type commanders to do so for their
respective ships. For best protection from submarines, two or three transport/logistic ships should be
formed in a line abreast; formations with larger numbers of transport/logistic ships should conform to the
station designator table (Table A) in Figure 3-6. Support ships present are stationed using Table B.
c. (NC) (NMM) Formation 50V — Transport/Logistic Rectangular Antiair Warfare

Formation uses the same large ship stations as Formation 50.
d. Formation 51 — Transport/Logistic Circular Ready Formation provides for excellent

tactical control (Figure 3-7), and offers the compactness that is essential to ASW and AAW gunnery
protection. It is flexible in that it permits a rapid shift into an antiair warfare formation or an orderly shift
into a nuclear defense formation when radial expansion from the Guide is required. The OTC may direct
transport/logistic and large support ship commanders to assign stations to their respective ships.
Transport/logistic ship stations are determined by referring to the station designator table (Table A) and
diagram in Figure 3-7; large support ship stations are given in Table B.
e. (NC) (NMM) Formation 51V — Transport/Logistic Circular Antiair Warfare

Formation uses the same large ship stations as Formation 51.
f. (NC) (NMM) Formation 51Z — Transport/Logistic Circular Nuclear Defense

Formation is formed by radially expanding Formation 51. Transport/logistic ships expand radially on the
same bearings as in Formation 51 until a distance of 3,500 yards is established between them — thus
stations on ring A will form on circle 3.5, those on ring B on circle 7, and those on ring C on circle 10.5;
support ships form on the same bearings as in Formation 51, but 3,500 yards outboard of the
transport/logistic ship formation. If the threat of nuclear attack is the primary threat and extends over long
periods, formations of more than 19 transport/logistic ships should be separated into two or more
formations (see Disposition 1AF in Figure 3-18).
3128 REPLENISHMENT FORMATIONS
a. Typical replenishment formations are based on the principles outlined below.

(NC) (NMM) (See figures 3-8, 3-9, and 3-10).
3-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
21 22
500 500
2000 2000
EVEN ODD ODD EVEN

NUMBERED NUMBERED NUMBERED NUMBERED
DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION
23 24
500 500
1000 1000
EVEN ODD ODD EVEN
NUMBERED NUMBERED NUMBERED NUMBERED
DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION DIVISION
SQUADRON COMMANDER NOTE: WHEN THE SQUADRON IS ORGANIZED WITH THE FLAGSHIP A COMPONENT OF A
DIVISION COMMANDER DIVISION, THEN THE SQUADRON COMMANDER’S POSITION SHOWN IS ELIMINATED
AND GUIDE IS SENIOR DIVISION COMMANDER. (DESTROYERS SHOWN ARE
SUBDIVISION COMMANDER ASSUMED TO BE LESS THAN 450 FEET IN LENGTH.)
Figure 3-5. (NU) (NMM) Destroyer Formations 21, 22, 23, and 24
(NC) (NMM) If the threat of nuclear attack is the primary threat and it extends over long periods,
protection through dispersion may be obtained by assuming Replenishment Disposition 1AF.
b. Principles. The following principles apply when establishing a replenishment formation.
(1) Supplying ships should be stationed in one or more lines, known as service lines, with ships in
line-abreast not less than 1,000 yards apart and with service lines 2,000 yards apart.
(2) The main body of the force should be stationed in waiting lines astern of the service lines, but, if
enemy air attack is possible, ships of the main body should be stationed to meet the requirements of AA
weapons defense.
(3) When practicable, areas should be made available in which carriers engaged in flight operations
can maneuver inside the screen.
(4) (NR) (NMM) Typical replenishment formations are shown in Figures 3-8 through 3-10.
(5) When conducting vertical replenishment and alongside replenishment simultaneously, the sup-
plying ship will be assigned a station in the service line.
(6) When a replenishment ship is conducting vertical replenishment only, it may be ordered to
move to a special VERTREP station in close proximity to the customer ship. Unless otherwise ordered,
this station will be 500 yards on the unengaged beam of the customer ship.
3-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FORMATION Transport/logistic ships are stationed in

columns (Table A) at distances and
50 intervals of 1,000 yards, unless otherwise
0 10 ordered; support ship stations are given
350
20 in Table B.
340
180 190
170
200
160 30
0
33 9
15
0 FORMATION AXIS AND 21
0
0 COURSE NORMALLY 40
32
8
0 COINCIDE. 22
14 0
7
0
50
31
TABLE A
0
23
13
0
6
TRANSPORT COLUMNS
0
60
LOGISTIC SHIPS IN THE
30
24
0
12
0
PRESENT FORMATION
4
4 to 9 3
290
70
250
10 to 12 4
110
SUPPORT
3 SHIPS
13 to 15 5
S2 S1 S3 16 to 18 6
280
80
260
100
19 to 28 7
TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC SHIP 29 to 32 8
338 to 36 9
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
S4 S5
11 21 31 41 51 61
12 22 32 2 42 52 62
280
100
260
80
23 33 43 53
3
S6 S7
290
110
250
70
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
GUIDE IS THE LEADING SHIP IN THE
0
CENTER COLUMN (ODD NUMBERS OF 6

COLUMNS) OR THE FIRST COLUMN TO
0
31
50
0
23
STARBOARD OF THE CENTER (EVEN

13
7
SUPPORT SHIPS PRESENT
0
NUMBERS OF COLUMNS), UNLESS

40
OTHERWISE INDICATED.
22
TABLE B 32
0
0 8
1 2 3 40
14 5 6 7 8 9 10
30 0
33
21
0 9 S1 4000 000150000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
20 3 0
S2 ..... 180 240 270 300 300 300 300 310 305
SUPPORT SHIP
200
160
10 350
0
Circle 190 170 S3 ..... ..... 120 090 060 060 060 060 050 055
STATIONS
180
Spacing is S4 ..... ..... ..... 180 216 240 257 270 280 288
1,000 yards S5 ..... ..... ..... ..... 144 120 103 090 080 072
S6 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 180 206 225 240 252
S7 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 154 135 120 108
S8 ..... ALL
..... STATION
..... .....1500..... ..... .....
YARDS 180 200 216
S9 ..... ..... OUTBOARD OF ..... .....
..... ..... ..... ..... 160 144
TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC SHIPS
S10 .....ON ..... ..... RELATIVE
BEARING ..... ..... TO .....AXIS
..... ..... ..... 180
Figure 3-6. Transport/Logistic Rectangular Ready Formation 50
3-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FORMATION 0 10
350 TABLE A
340 20
51 170
180 190
0 160
200
30 RING RING RING
33 FORMATION 9 AXIS AND
ALFA BRAVO CHARLIE
Circle Spacing 15
0 COURSE NORMALLY 21
0
is 1,00 Yards 0 COINCIDE. 8 40

32 0
A1
22
100 B1 2000 C1 3000
14 0
7
A2 1300 B2 1.8330 C2 2.7340
A3 1060 B3 1.8030 C3 2.7020
0
50
31
0
23
A4 1240 B4 2300 C4 2.7320
13
0
6
A5 1120 B5 2060 C5 2.7040

0
60
30
5
A6 1180 B6 1.8270 C6 3300
24
0
12
0
4
B7 1.8090 C7 3060
B8 2240 C8 2.7280
290
70
250
110
T SH
POR 3 IPS B9 2120 C9 2.7080
P
SU BR B10 1.8210 C10 2.7260
NG AV
280
RI
2
B11 1.8150 C11 2.7100
80
O
260
100
B12 2180 C12 3240

C13 3120
270
C14 2.7220
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
STATION STATIONS C15 2.7140

ZERO LISTED AS
RIN HA RANGE/ C16 2.7200
G ALP
280
100
260
C17 2.7160
80
2 BEARING
C18 3180
3
290
110
250
70
THE GUIDE IS IN STATION SUPPORT SHIP STATIONS
0
5
ZERO UNLESS OTHERWISE
30
60
0
24
ARE 1500 YDS OUTBOARD
12
INDICATED
0
OF NEAREST TRANSPORT
6
OR LOGISTIC SHIPS
0
31
50
0
23
7 13 STATION
0
40 0
22 32
0 DESIGNATION
0 8
14
SUPPORT
2
30
SHIPS PRESENT 33
0
RING
TABLE B 10 0 C1
20
9
340 15 CHARLIE
C2 RING
1 2 3 4 2050 6 10 7 8 0 9 10
350
160 C4
C3
C5 BRAVO
B1
190 170
S1 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 180000
000 000 C6 B2 B3 C7
S2 ..... 180 240 270 288 300 308 315 320 324 B4 A1 B5
SUPPORT SHIP
C8 A2 A3 C9
S3 ..... ..... 120 090 072 060 052 045 040 036
STATIONS
B6 B7
S4 ..... ..... ..... 180 216 240 257 270 280 288 C10 A4 STATION A5 C11
S5 ..... ..... ..... ..... 144 120 103 090 080 072 B8 ZERO B9
S6 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 180 206 225 240 252 C12
A6
C13
S7 ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 154 135 120 108 B10 B11
S8 ..... ALL
..... STATION
..... .....1500..... ..... .....
YARDS 180 200 216 B12
RING C14 C15
S9 ..... ..... OUTBOARD OF ..... .....
..... ..... ..... ..... 160 144 ALPHA C16 C17
TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC SHIPS C18
S10 .....ON ..... ..... RELATIVE
BEARING ..... ..... TO .....AXIS
..... ..... ..... 180
Figure 3-7. Transport Logistic Circular Ready Formation 51
3-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(7) Should carriers need increased maneuvering room when proceeding from the second to the first
service line, the OTC may change the distance between service lines as desired.
c. Guide.
(1) Unless otherwise ordered, the Guide is the center ship of the leading service line. If there is an
even number of stations in this line, the first ship to starboard of the center of the line on the replenish-
ment course is the Guide.
(2) When a carrier is present, it is normal for the OTC to designate the Guide of the supplying unit
alongside the carrier as the unit guide. When two or more carriers are replenishing simultaneously, the
OTC must designate the most appropriate ship as Guide.
d. Replenishment Course and Axis.
(1) Selecting the Course. Tactical requirements will normally dictate the replenishment course
but some operational factors that need to be considered when selecting the replenishment course are wa-
ter depth including potential shallow water effect along the course, carrier aircraft launch and recovery
operations, and weather.
(2) Conditions Under Normal Weather. For normal weather conditions, the optimum course
for replenishment is with the wind and sea within two points of dead ahead; if the wind and sea are from
different directions, it is preferable to head more nearly into the sea to reduce rolling.
(3) Conditions Under Rough Weather. Under some conditions of rough weather, consider-
ation may be given to replenishing on a downwind course, to reduce the amount of water coming aboard
ships with low freeboard. The controlling factor under these conditions is the ability of the ships to hold
the replenishment course without excessive yawing.
e. Replenishment Speed. Operational considerations influence the selection of the speed; for
instance, if the replenishment course is away from the area of subsequent operations, a low speed might be
desirable; this, however, conflicts with the need for a high speed as an ASW measure.
(1) Speed During Fueling Operations. The power required by the cargo fuel pumps limits the
speed of many oilers to about 13 knots during fueling operations. The alongside steering control of some
ships is unduly affected at speeds below 8 knots. When not limited by this condition, replenishment
speed should be 10 to 18 knots.
(2) Fueling Destroyers. With good sea conditions, destroyers may be fueled from heavy ships
or fast oilers at speeds up to 20 knots.
(3) Transferring Mail And Personnel. Under good sea conditions, light mail can be trans-
ferred between ships at speeds up to 25 knots and heavy materials and personnel at speeds up to 16 knots.
f. Ordering the Replenishment Formation.
(1) The OTC will inform the commander of the other force, in advance, of:
(a) The replenishment formation to be adopted, and the direction of the formation axis.
(b) The replenishment course and speed.
(2) Even though the force commander may be junior to the RAS force commander, the former’s de-
sires should determine the course and speed of the formation under normal circumstances.
3-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
0 160 30
33 9
21
0 0
15
0 40
32
8
WIND & SEA COURSE 22
0
14 10° 0
7
50
31
23
0
13
0
6
AXIS
0
60
30
5
0
24
12
0
4
290
70
250
110
2000 YD
3
A1 A3
FIRST SERVICE LINE
A2
280
80
260
100
2,000 YD
B3
MINIMUM DISTANCE 2000 YD B1 SECOND SERVICE LINE
B2
270
BETWEEN SHIPS IN A
270
90
90
4 3 2 2 3 5 6 7 8 9
LINE IS 1,000 YDS. B4 STATION C5
ZERO REPLENISHMENT FIRST
C3
CIRCLE 2 C1 CARRIER WAITING
C2
280
100
260
C4
80
2 LINE
REPLENISHMENT
SECOND
CARRIER 3
WAITING
290
LINE
110
70
250
1500 YD D1 D3
D4 D2
0
5
60
30
CIRCLE 3.5
0
24
12
0
1500 YD
6
0
50
31
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
Circle 30
33
0
Spacing is 21 0
0 20
9
340 15
1,000 yards 200 10
160
0 350
190 170 SHIP in station A1 will normally

180
be the Guide (but see Article
Service and waiting lines are at
3128b). All lines may be ex-
right angles to formation axis.
tended by one more station on
Service Lines Waiting Lines each side. Note that station A1
falls on the axis, station C1 on the
A Provisions, store and C Line tangential to reciprocal, and B1 and D1 to
ammunition ships on a circle 2. starboard of the axis, irrespec-
line tangential to tive of whether there is an odd or
circle 2. D Line tangential to even number of stations in a
circle 3.5. given line.
B Oilers on a line through
formation center.
Figure 3-8. (NU) (NMM) Replenishment Formation — Circular Type
3-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
FORMATION 350
340 170
180 190 20
61 160
200
30
330 WIND AND SEA
0 21
15 COURSE 0
10°
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
AXIS
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
0
60
30
24
0
12
0
290
4000
70
250
110
4.5320 1000 YDS 3 4.5040

FIRST SERVICE LINE
280
80
REPLENISHMENT REPLENISHMENT
260
100
CARRIER A4 A2 A1 A3 CARRIER
3.5285 STATION 2000 YDS 3.5075
ZERO
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B4 B2 B1 B3
4.5260 4.5100
280
100
260
80
SECOND SERVICE LINE

3.5235 2180 3.5125
3
290
110
250
70
5217 4180 5143
0
30
60
0
24
12
CAP CARRIER
0
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
First service line is tangential the center when there is an even

to Circle 2. Second service line number of columns (but see
passes through formation Center. Article 3128b).
Circle Guide is normally the leading ship Combatant ships take station
Spacing is of the center column or the leading on circles 3.5, 4, 4.5, and 5
1,000 yards ship of the column to starboard of
Figure 3-9. (NU) (NMM) Replenishment Ready Formation — Circular Ready
3-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
WIND AND SEA

COURSE
10°
FORMATION AXIS
62
SKELETON SCREEN
1500 YDS
PROVISION, STORE AND

FIRST SERVICE LINE AMMUNITION SHIPS
A-4 A-2 A-1 A-3 A-5
2000 YDS
SECOND SERVICE LINE
OILERS
B-4 B-2 B-1 B-3
2000 YDS
FIRST WAITING LINE SHIPS OF COMBATANT FORCE
C-4 C-2 C-1 C-3 C-5

2000 YDS
SECOND WAITING LINE SHIPS OF COMBATANT FORCE
D-4 D-2 D-1 D-3 D-5
Guide is normally the leading ship of the center column or the leading ship of column
to starboard of the center when there is an even number of columns (but see Article 3128b).
Figure 3-10. (NU) (NMM) Replenishment Formation — With Skeleton Screen
g. Underway Replenishment of Escorts. These procedures provide for the orderly

replenishment of ships, making optimum use of the delivering/supplying ship, and maintaining maximum
antisubmarine protection of the replenishment formation.
(1) Normal replenishment speeds are in the range of 12 to 15 knots. When a sufficient number of es-
corts are available, it is desirable to employ pickets to provide defense in depth. Usually, however, when
all round coverage is required, the scarcity of escorts permits only the establishment and maintenance of
a main screen.
(2) The first approach units and an initial lifeguard are to be designated.
(3) If one side of the delivering/supplying ship is in use (Figure 3-11), escorts from the wing station
on the engaged side of the service unit proceed to the lifeguard station, to the alongside station, then to
the wing station on the unengaged side of the delivering/supplying ship.
(4) If both sides of the delivering/supplying ship are in use (Figure 3-12), escorts from the port
(even) side of the screen rotate in succession from the port wing station, to the lifeguard station, to the
port alongside station, then to station number 2 in the screen. Escorts from the starboard (odd) side of the
screen rotate in succession from the starboard wing station, then to station number 1 in the screen.
3-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) Refer to Figure 3-13 for example of replenishment procedures when two delivering ships are
used.
(6) Screen units are to rig the appropriate side before commencing the approach. They must be alert
to the progress of the units engaged in replenishment. They should also be prepared in advance for rapid
rigging of the opposite side of the ship to preclude any delays due to rerigging should the receiving side
be changed immediately prior to going alongside.
(7) Ships alongside must be meticulous in the use of PREP. All signals will be repeated by flashing
light or voice transmission addressed to the next ship to follow alongside.
(8) Screen ships are to proceed when relieved at screen stations unless otherwise ordered.
(9) In some tactical situations, it may be advantageous to assign one ship as lifeguard for the replen-
ishment. If so, the procedures shown in Figure 3-14 will be used when only one side of the deliver-
ing/supplying ship is rigged. When both sides of the delivering/supplying ship are rigged, procedures
shown in Figure 3-15 are used.
3129 SPARE
3130 (NR) (NMM) CONVOY FORMATIONS
Details of convoy formations are contained in Chapter 10.
3140 MISCELLANEOUS FORMATIONS
Departure (Sortie) and Entry Formations 90D and 90E provide for the orderly and expeditious
movement of ships leaving or entering harbor while protected against enemy threats. They provide
maximum protection for vulnerable units against the threat of mines or submarine attack and as much
protection against air attack as is possible. The order of ship types and the intervals and distances between
ships are given in Figure 3-16. The OTC may specify the sequence of ships within types or delegate such
authority to the senior commander of each type in the formation
3-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
0
15 0
PK1 40
0
32
8
0 22
14 0
7
Pickets may be separately assigned by
0
50
31
the screen Commander

0
23
13
0
6
0
60
30
5
2
24
0
1
12
0
4
290
70
250
110
3
4 3
280
80
260
100
AO
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
280
100
260
80
2
6 5
3
290
110
250
70
4
Station No. 1 to
Station No. 3, to
Station No. 5, to
0
5
7
30
60
0
Station No. 7, to
24
12
Life Guard Sta., to
0
6 Station L1 Stbd., to
Station No. 6 to
0
31
50
0
Station No. 4, to
23
13
7
0
Station No. 2
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Circle Spacing
is 1,000 yards
Figure 3-11. Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivery/Supplying Ship in Use

(Lifeguard Next Alongside)
3-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
330 9
0 21
15 0
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
0 7
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
0
51
60
30
24
0
12
0
4
2
290
70
250
110
3
280
80
260
100
PO 2 PO 1
AO
270
45
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 4 3 2 2 3 4 55 6 7 8 9
280
100
260
LG
80
290
110
250
70
6 7
4
Port Stbd
Station No. 2, to Station No. 1 to
0
5
30
60
0
Station No. 4, to Station No. 3, to
24
12
0
Station No. 8, to 6 Station No. 7, to

Lifeguard Sta., to Station L1 Stbd., to
0
31
50
0
Station L1 Port, to Station No. 1
23
13
Pouncers7 will be rotated
0
Station No. 2
40
(if established) 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Circle Spacing
is 1,000 yards
Figure 3-12. Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use

(Lifeguard Next Alongside to Port)
3-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
0
15 0
0 40
32 0
Twelve ship 8concentric screen, 22
14 ten stations vacant, Stations 0
0 No. 10 and No.

7 11 filled
50
(shaded portion indicates
31
0
23
13
0
patrol area).6
0
60
30
24
0
12
0
1
4
290
70
2 3
250
110
4 5
280
80
LG 1 LG 2
PO 1
260
100
270
6 74
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 5 6 7 8 9
A1 A2
280
100
260
9
80
8 2
PO 1 PO 2
3
10 11
290
110
250
70
12
4
0
5
30
60
0
24
PK 1 PK 2
12
0
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 Replenishment course
8 180, speed 12 knots
14
30 30
3
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
ROTATION: 3. Upon completion of replenishment, last

1. When PREP at dip, pouncer station and ships alongside take picket
screen station, that side, take lifeguard station—ship alongside A 1 to PK 1,
and pouncer station respectively. ship alongside A2 to PK 2.
2 Ship alongside A1 to Station No. 11, to 4. LG 1 and LG 2 for last scheduled ships
PO 2, to LG 2, to alongside A2. Ship take Station No. 6 and Station No. 7
alongside A2 to Station No. 10, to PO 1, respectively.
to LG 1, to alongside A1.
Figure 3-13. Replenishment of Escorts — Two Delivering/Supplying Ships Used
3-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
15
0 PK 1 0
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 Pickets may be seperately 0
assigned by
7 the Screen Commander
0
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
0
60
30
24
0
2 1
12
0
4
290
70
250
110
4 3
280
80
260
100
AO
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
280
100
260
80
2LG 5
6
3
290
110
250
70
4
Port Stbd
0
5
7
30
60
0
24
12
0
Service Unit STBD., to 6 Station No. 7, to

Station No. 2 Service Unit STBD., to
0
31
50
0
Station No. 1
23
13
Replenishment escorts7 assume pouncer station
0
40 (if established) before returning to main 0

32
22 screen van position 0
0 8
14
30 30
3
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Figure 3-14. Replenishment of Escorts — One Side of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use

(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)
3-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
330 9
0 21
15 0
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
7
0
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
0
51
60
30
24
0
12
0
4
2
290
70
250
110
3
280
80
260
100
PO 2 PO 1
AO
270
45
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 4 3 2 2 3 4 55 6 7 8 9
280
100
260
2LG
80
290
110
250
70
6 7
4
Port Stbd
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
Station No. 8, to 6 Station No. 7, to

Service Unit, to Service Unit, to
0
31
50
0
Pouncer (if established), to Pouncer (if established), to
23
13
7
0
Station No. 2. Station No. 1.

40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 30
3
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Circle Spacing
is 1,000 yards
Figure 3-15. Replenishment of Escorts — Both Sides of Delivering/Supplying Ship in Use

(Lifeguard Not Replenishing)
3-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FORMATION (SORTIE) FORMATION ENTRY

90 D 90 E
1st—MINESWEEPERS 1st—MINESWEEPERS
AS NECESSARY AS NECESSARY
2nd—SCREEN UNITS 2nd—TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC
1500 YARDS
5000 YARDS 3rd—CARRIERS
1500 YARDS
3rd—LARGE SHIPS 4th—LARGE SHIPS
1500 YARDS
4th—CARRIERS 5000 YARDS
1500 YARDS
5th—TRANSPORT/LOGISTIC 5th—SCREEN UNITS
NOTE:
Distances Between Ships: Small ships, 500 yards
Large ships, 1000 yards
Screen unit, 1500 yards
(only for Formation 90D)
Figure 3-16. Departure and Entry Formations
3-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — DISPOSITIONS
3200 GENERAL TYPES OF DISPOSITION
A disposition is a combination of two or more formations, and may be formed by linear or circular
methods. Certain specific operational dispositions are prescribed in this section.
(NC) (NMM) Dispositions are ordered using FORM M (see ATP 1, Vol. II) and are assigned
number-letter designations based on the number of the disposition and a purpose-letter suffix(es). A type
indicator letter may be inserted between the number and purpose-letter if desired. (See Table 3-3.)
3201 FORMING A DISPOSITION
The disposition OTC specifies the disposition, guide group, course, speed, axis, and group intervals
and station assignments. In a disposition, a formation axis need not be oriented in the same direction as the
disposition axis. If the threat warrants stationing pickets, the disposition OTC specifies the picket
disposition, axis, stations to be filled, and interval from disposition center; he also designates which groups
provide pickets for each station. Unless otherwise directed, each group commander will station linkin units
to maintain voice radio or visual communications with the next inboard adjacent group whenever his
movements within the disposition make it necessary.
3202 MANEUVERING A DISPOSITION
Instructions for maneuvering dispositions are in relevant articles.
3203 — 3209 SPARE
3210 TYPICAL OPERATIONAL DISPOSITIONS
3211 CARRIER DISPOSITIONS
In a carrier disposition, carrier formations are normally spaced about 12 to 15 miles apart to permit
voice communication and mutual support for the disposition as a whole. The formations are generally
stationed on a line of bearing at right angles to the disposition axis, which is usually kept near to the wind
direction. The formations thus have freedom of movement upwind and downwind, without interfering
with one another.
3212 SPECIAL DISPOSITION 2W
a. Description. Special Disposition 2W is a multi-purpose disposition which may be used during

the run-in or strike phase of carrier task group operations. It is designed to satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) Dispersal of forces to protect against air attack.
(2) Disguise of the exact positions of valuable heavy units.
(3) Use of random courses or speeds by units of the disposition in order to confuse attack aircraft,
search and submarines.
(4) Mutual support.
b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is always 000°.
3-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 3-3. (NU) (NMM) Table of Dispositions
Type Number Purpose

Carrier 2W Run-in and Strike Phase of Carrier
Task Group Operations
Replenishment 1AE Nuclear Defense
Antiair Warfare 2V Threatened Sector Protection
3V Threatened Sector Protection

(Using Missile Ships)
c. Stations. Each station is a circular area of radius equal to disposition circle spacing unless
otherwise ordered. A change in the radius of a station does not affect the overall arrangement of stations.
Disposition center is at the center of station zero and should preferably be marked with a ship. The centers
of other stations lie on concentric hexagons separated by twice disposition circle spacing, and stations are
numbered to the right and left of the disposition axis (see Figure 3-17). Additional stations can be made
available as required by the use of additional concentric hexagons.
d. Disposition Movement. The disposition and speed of advance of the disposition is to be the
course and speed of the PIM unless otherwise ordered. Disposition center corresponds to the PIM unless
otherwise ordered.
e. Selection of Stations. Stationing of units depends on:
(1) Number of escorts available.
(2) Number of major ships to defend.
(3) Relative subsurface, air, and surface threats. (As a submarine threat normally exists, compro-
mise may result in escorts being stationed at ranges other than the optimum for antiair warfare.)
(4) Types of gun or missile systems fitted in the forces.
(5) Types of air attack expected.
(6) Degree of deception required.
(7) Electronic emission policy desired.
(8) For close-in stationing, consideration should be given to electromagnetic compatibility of the
missile ships.
(9) Predicted sensor performance under existing or expected environmental conditions.
f. (NC) (NMM) Stationing of Carriers, Command Ships, and Other Heavy Ships. These
ships are assigned to selected stations by the following criteria:
(1) Carriers occupy stations not on the boundaries of the disposition and should not normally be
placed on adjacent stations.
3-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DISPOSITION
2W
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
330 9
0 21
15 0
0 40
32
8
14
0 68 40 38 37 39 41 67 220
7
0
50
31
0
23
13
0
42 22 20 19 21 43
6
0
60
30
24
0
12
0
44 24 8 7
4 9 23 45
290
70
250
110
26 10 2 1 11 25
280
80
260
100
28 12 4 0 3 13 27
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
30 14 6 5 15 29
280
100
260
80
290
110
250
70
52 32 16 18
4
17 31 53
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
34 36 6 35 33 55
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
22
40
50 58 60 59 57 32
0
0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Figure 3-17. Special Disposition 2W
3-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) The AAWC’s ship occupies a station in the direction of the air threat.
(3) Maximum spacing between heavy ships is desired.
g. (NC) (NMM) Stationing of AAW Ships. These ships are best placed in the most likely
direction of attack at a distance that must be a compromise between the following:
(1) Giving the major unit unrestricted use of her short range guns and missiles.
(2) Giving a carrier sea room to operate aircraft.
(3) Giving a missile ship sea room to maneuver to enable missile firing arcs to be open.
(4) Keeping the missile ships clear of the position of maximum friendly air activity.
(5) Keeping the missile ships in good data transmission or voice communication with the major
units.
h. Stationing of Radar Pickets. These ships are to be stationed an appropriate distance from
disposition center at predetermined rather than randomly selected positions.
i. (NC) (NMM) Stationing of Other ASW Ships. These ships may be stationed as SAUs to
provide ASW support. These stations may be changed by the ASWC or screen commander as appropriate
and as necessary to combat the submarine threat, advising the OTC as practicable.
j. Disposition Orders. The following instructions are to be included when ordering Disposition
2W:
(1) Disposition circle spacing (in miles).
(2) Force PIM.
(3) Disposition center if other than force PIM.
(4) Station assignments.
(5) Radius of particular stations (if not equal to disposition circle spacing).
k. Maneuvering Instructions.
(1) Scheduled changes of course and speed (according to the PIM) are to be executed without fur-
ther signal by all units at the time indicated.
(2) The disposition may be maneuvered as a whole or individual units may maneuver as desired to
avoid known submarine positions.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Carriers, SAUs, and plane guards turn toward or away from each attack as appro-
priate at high speed to expedite change of station between SAU stations and plane guard station.
(4) Station-keeping is by own dead reckoning, satellite, or other navigational techniques. Accurate
navigation is essential, especially in dispersed formations.
3-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DISPOSITION
1AF
DISPOSITION
AXIS
12 - 15
MILES
UNIT 2 UNIT 1 UNIT 3
Figure 3-18. (NU) (NMM) Replenishment Disposition
3213 (NC) (NMM) REPLENISHMENT DISPOSITIONS
Replenishment Disposition 1AF is designed to give protection from the threat of nuclear attack by
dispersion of the forces (Figure 3-18). This disposition reduces over concentration of replenishment units
in any area. Disposition 1AF is composed of two or more replenishment units on a line of bearing at right
angles to the disposition axis; the axis is normally coincident with the replenishment course. The units may
be in Replenishment Formation 60, 61, or 62 while replenishing or in readiness for replenishment.
Formation 50 or 51 may also be used. The units will be from 12 to 15 miles apart, with the flagship of the
disposition in the center unit.
3214 (NC) (NMM) ANTIAIR WARFARE DISPOSITION (THREATENED SECTOR

PROTECTION) 2V
a. Description. Disposition 2V provides defense in depth, decentralized control, and dispersion

adequate for nuclear attack. It is appropriate for use when it is desired to concentrate the defense in the
general direction of the antiair warfare axis (see Figure 3-19). Designed principally for carrier task forces
in which no missile ships are present, it may nevertheless be successfully employed by any group or force
assigned pickets and CAP or missile ships. ASW protection is difficult to attain because of the separation
of units, and for this reason the disposition should not ordinarily be employed unless the air threat is greater
than the submarine threat.
b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is the antiair warfare axis.
c. Station Assignments.
(1) Sector AAW Coordinators (SAAWCs) are assigned by the OTC to provide for an appropri-
ate number of sectors. In the example shown, the SAAWC’s ships are on the 30-mile circle.
(2) Carriers are stationed to provide maximum protection from air attack commensurate with the
discharge of their assigned mission. Compromise in positioning may be necessary in order to afford
maximum coverage by accompanying forces, taking into consideration the necessity of providing ade-
quate maneuvering space for flight operations. Similarly, some asymmetric stationing is desirable in
3-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
DISPOSITION 340 170
180 190 20
2V 0 160
200
30
33 9
21
0 0
15
0 SECTOR XRAY 40
32
8
22
AAW AXIS
0
14 0
AEW 7 AEW
0
50
31
23
0
13
CIRC
0
6
ET LE 1
K 20
PIC
0
NS
60
30
TIO 5 MI
24
0
LE STA LE
12
SECTOR SECTOR
0
B S
WHISKEY SI YANKEE
POS CA
P 4
290
70
PIC
250
110
AEW 3 KE
T
ER
280
N 2
80
260
IN
100
S2 VITAL S3
270
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
AREA
280
100
260
80
S4
290
110
70
250
SECTOR ZULU
0
5
60
30
0
24
12
0
0
50
31
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 30
Scale 21
3
0
1 Circle = 0 20
9
340 15
20 miles 200
160
10
0 350
190 170
180
Two ASW units screen each AAW

ship at stations S1, S2, S3, and S4
One CAP station at force center

to back up any threatened
sector.
Figure 3-19. (NU) (NMM) Antiair Warfare Disposition (Threatened Sector Protection) 2V
3-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
order to exploit its deceptive potential. When necessitated by flight operations, carriers may maneuver
as required within a circle of 10 miles radius from their assigned stations.
(3) Surface Pickets are stationed in inner and outer picket rings. The following factors are con-
sidered in assigning stations:
(a) Number of picket ships available.
(b) Evaluation of enemy threat, size, type, and probable approach sectors.
(c) Picket ship radar, ESM, communication, and air control capability.
(d) Number, location, and type of antiair warfare ships.
(e) CAP on station capability.
(4) AEW Pickets are stationed to provide early warning against low fliers, usually working di-
rectly with a surface picket (see Chapter 7). Where aircraft range and equipment are suitable, some mod-
els of AEW aircraft can provide warning coverage at all altitudes and may be used as an advance picket
line ahead of the foremost surface pickets. Such aircraft may be capable of controlling CAP.
(5) ASW Units. Surface escorts and/or fixed and rotary-wing ASW aircraft are provided for carri-
ers and antiair warfare ships commensurate with the submarine threat and ASW force available. These
units conform to the movements of the ship being screened. Although Disposition 2V is based on the air
threat being greater, all ASW measures should be taken that do not conflict with antiair warfare needs.
3215 (NC) (NMM) ANTIAIR WARFARE DISPOSITION (INCLUDING MISSILE SHIPS) 3V
a. Description. Disposition 3V features defense in depth and decentralized control, similar to

Disposition 2V, but is designed for the use of missile ships as well a CAP (see Figure 3-20).
b. Disposition Axis. Disposition axis is the antiair warfare axis.
c. Station Assignments. One of the missile ships in each sector will be designated the
SAAWC’s ship. Possible arcs of missile fire are shown to illustrate the desirability of close-in stationing to
achieve mutual support. Stationing of the missile ships is based on consideration of the threat and types of
missile ships available. In the example shown, the missile ships are on the 20-mile circle. Surface pickets,
AEW pickets, and ASW units are stationed using the principles set forth and illustrated in Disposition 2V.
In the example shown, four medium range and four short range missile ships are used. In disposition 3V
(see Figure 3-20) station assignments are indicated in positions relative to the disposition axis (AAW axis).
However, AAW stations assignments will be promulgated using TRUE bearings in every case.
3216 CIRCULAR DISPOSITIONS
The method of stationing a circular disposition is similar to that described in Article 3115 and shown
in Figure 3-1 except that circle spacing is in miles, rather than in thousands of yards, as in circular
formations.
3217 CARTWHEEL DISPOSITION/FORMATION
a. Description. The CARTWHEEL disposition is designed to permit task groups to operate

loosely in mutual support. It may be ordered in Support Situation B or C, the latter being preferable where,
for example, one task group is providing ASW support to more than one other.
3-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DISPOSITION
3V
STATIONS
NOTE: Station assignments will be promulgated using
TRUE bearings (i.e., unit in station M1 will be assigned M1 M2 M3 M4
station 095ZZ020 for this example). MRMS 20045 20315 20135 20225
S1 S2 S3 S4
SRWS 20015 20345 20075 20285
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
30
AE
9
3
21
W
0
15 0
SE HIS
0 40
32
W
8
CT KE
0 22
14 0
O Y
R
7
0
50
POS
31
0
SIBL
23
IS
13
0
6
E
PI AX
FORW CK W
0
AA
60
ARD
30
5
ET
24
0
12
0
CA
4 P
CIR
290
70
ST
INN
250
SE ULU
110
ER A
CL
Z
AT
CT
EW
E
ON
O
R
120 MIL
280
80
260
100
2
AE
CICRL
CIRCLE
S2
S4
W
S1
ES
VI
AR
270
TA
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
EA 2 4 6 7 8 9
E
M
M
L
4
S3
AE
RE
W
AR
280
100
260
3
80
2
CA
P
290
ST
110
250
70
AT
SE RA
IO NA
4
X
C Y
RE
TO
A
0
R
30
60
0
24
12
0
6
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
SE AN
22 0
0 14
Y
8
CT KE
30 0 Maximum range arcs of fire are

O E
33
R
21 shown for 10 mile SRWS and

AE
0
0 20 340 15
W
Scale 200 10
0 350
160
20 mile MRMS. The MRMS
1 Circle =
190
180 170 may also be ASW ships.
20 miles
Long Range Missile System — over 50 miles
Medium Range Missile System — 10 to 50 miles
Short Range Weapons System — under 50 miles
Figure 3-20. (NU) (NMM) Antiair Warfare Disposition (Including Missile Ships) 3V
3-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) In this disposition, task groups are allocated to separate sectors, each sector being under the con-
trol of its own sector commander, who is normally also the CTG. In some instances the CTF may allo-
cate sectors to task units for a specific task, in which case the CTU becomes the sector commander.
(2) Sector commanders in a CARTWHEEL disposition may in turn station their units in a CART-
WHEEL formation. Care must be taken to ensure that the outer boundaries of that formation do not ex-
tend beyond the limits of the disposition sectors.
(3) The CARTWHEEL formation may also be used by OTCs of groups operating independently.
b. Purpose.
(1) To provide a disposition or formation that will allow an OTC or CTG to delegate the tactical
control and conduct of affairs to selected subordinate commanders or units while retaining the means to
rapidly resume control.
(2) To provide a defense that will allow for immediate and preplanned threat reactions.
(3) To provide deception and disguise in a formation that will conceal high value units (HVUs).
(4) To provide a disposition or formation that will allow attachments and detachments to take place
with minimal confusion and need for subsequent reorganization.
c. Execution.
(1) Disposition Sectors.
(a) Sectors will normally be allocated in accordance with the sector screen format.
Alternatively, the standard lettered sectors as specified for the CARTWHEEL formation in
subparagraph c(2)(a) below may be used, but the depth of radius of each sector must in this case be
signaled.
(b) Sectors will be based on the center of the task force (ZZ). If no ship is stationed in ZZ, the
geographic PIM or ZZ will be signaled.
(2) Formation Sectors.
(a) The CARTWHEEL formation will be divided into lettered sectors, which will be as
follows, unless otherwise ordered:
Sector ALFA 000 to 120 6 to 20 kyd
Sector BRAVO 120 to 240 6 to 20 kyd
Sector CHARLIE 240 to 359 6 to 20 kyd
Sector DELTA 000 to 359 0 to 6 kyd
(b) Any changes to the above bearings, radii, or depths of sectors will be promulgated when the
formation is ordered. Sectors will be based on station Zero, the center of the task group or task unit as
appropriate. If no ship is in station Zero, the geographic PIM of station Zero will be signaled.
3-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. Helicopter Sectors. Dipping helicopters may be assigned sectors for stationing by sector
commanders, or may be assigned sectors outside the CARTWHEEL, using the sector screen method of
ordering.
e. Method of Ordering. The CARTWHEEL disposition or formation will be signaled using the
format in ATP 1, Vol. II.
f. Mutual Interference. The OTC must allocate safety zones between groups, taking into
account:
(1) The risk of collision.
(2) The field of fire required by the ships of the HVU’s inner screen to engage incoming missiles
and aircraft.
g. Policies.
(1) Sector defense allows for immediate threat reaction by sector commanders, but the OTC retains
the power to override if necessary.
(2) The OTC will detail additional group or force assets to a sector if the situation dictates.
(3) Sector boundaries may be crossed to prosecute submarine or surface contacts.
(4) The OTC will pass joining information to units including sector allocations and sector com-
mander. Sector commanders are then to allocate stations within their sector or formation.
(5) Replenishment units will normally be moved between sectors for RAS(L)(A). Sequence will be
ordered by the OTC or CTG.
h. Communications. Generally all units should use the same tactical COMPLAN within a
CARTWHEEL formation, or within a sector of a CARTWHEEL disposition. Sector commanders are to
maneuver their forces on TF/TG Tactical UHF; otherwise, maximum use is to be made of visual signaling.
i. Sector Commanders.
(1) Will be units listed first in each sector allocation.
(2) Are responsible for maneuvering units in their own sectors, and selecting the formation for
those units.
(3) Should aim to remain within UHF radio range of the OTC when possible. (This will clearly not
be possible with the likely extended distances of a disposition).
(4) Are responsible for immediate actions to counter any threat in their sectors, calling for assis-
tance if required. They should also consider detaching HVUs to a disengaged sector. HVUs so detached
are to report to the sector commander of their new sector.
j. Position and Intended Movement (PIM). The OTC will signal the base course and speed,
and any zigzag for a unit at the formation center. Sector commanders are to maneuver the groups or units in
their sector as required by the policies in force and as required to respond to a threat. Zigzags may be
ordered for HVUs.
3-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
3218 4W DISPOSITION
a. Description. Disposition 4W provides a framework for operating forces in widely dispersed

groups. It can be used to assign Battle Group(s)/Task Group(s)/Task Unit(s)/Task Element(s)/individual
units to a specified dispersed operating area relative to a Force PIM. It can be used to define surveillance
areas, execute intercept of hostile units, prevent mutual interference and execute operational deception
(OPDEC).
b. Terminology.
(1) Disposition 4W. This refers to the entire Grid as illustrated in Figure 3-21.
(2) Segment. Any square within the Grid. The term segment is used to avoid confusion with
AAW Sectors or formation/screen stations. Large segments can be identified by specifying the borders
of the segment.
(3) Line. The boundaries dividing the segments in either direction (e.g., Line AB or Line 0405).
(4) Lane. The area between two specified lines (e.g., Lane C or Lane 04). A number of lanes can be
grouped together (e.g., Lane LN). Included lanes need not be designated.
(5) Point. Intersection of Grid lines. A point is described as the southwest corner of a single square
segment with the Grid oriented north, (e.g., Point C19 is at the intersection of Line BC and Line 18-19).
c. Grid Construction.
(1) The 4W Disposition Grid, as shown in Figure 3-21, is 240 nm X 240 nm and is divided into 10
nm X 10 nm square segments. If a larger or smaller disposition is required the OTC/CWC can use a por-
tion of Disposition 4W, change the size of the squares, or add new lanes in ascending alphanumeric
order.
(2) The 10 nm X 10 nm segments are described by the letter and number which include that segment
(e.g., H24). In labeling the lettered axis, the letters I and O are omitted. Lettering is A to Z (less I and O).
(3) Larger segments are described by combinations of the inclusive alphanumeric boxes which in-
clude that segment (e.g., segment PQ1516 defines a 20 nm X 20 nm segment containing subsegments
P15, P16, Q15, Q16).
(4) The disposition axis is oriented parallel to the lettered lanes. Normally, the disposition axis is
parallel to PIM track to allow efficient positioning of screen forces in the van of the disposition. How-
ever, if the PIM course changes frequently, or the nature of the threat does not require positioning of
screen forces in the van, or the type of friendly forces assigned (e.g., merchant convoy) precludes chang-
ing the axis with PIM course changes, then it may be simpler to orient the axis to an appropriate bearing
and keep it constant regardless of PIM.
(5) The geometric center of the grid is Point N13. Unless otherwise designated this will also be dis-
position center and PIM origin.
d. Execution. Disposition 4W will normally be ordered by instructions in the OPGEN/

OPTASKs or other appropriate messages. The OTC or designated warfare commander will specify
segment assignments for all groups/units. These assignments must be made in close coordination with
other warfare commanders/coordinators. Segment assignments may be executed by tactical voice signal
using the “STATION S” signal.
3-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
e. Group Formation. The commander of each group in the disposition is responsible for his
group’s formation/screen within his assigned segment whenever more than one ship is assigned. Unless
otherwise directed, a group may maneuver anywhere within its assigned segment.
f. Disposition Guide. Normally, there will not be a “Disposition Guide.” The disposition moves
with PIM. Therefore, all formations in Disposition 4W maneuver with PIM within their assigned segment.
The OTC/CWC will designate a disposition center (normally Point N13) and a disposition axis which
establishes the position and orientation of the Grid to PIM.
g. Communications. The OTC must be capable of communicating with each group at any time.
If EMCON precludes HF communications, the OTC must establish alternate communication links. The
following communications considerations pertain:
(1) Common HF/SATCOM circuits should be designated for intergroup communications. Each
group may be assigned separate UHF frequencies for intragroup communications.
(2) Warfare commanders should be able to communicate with all units (regardless of groups) hav-
ing primary capability in their warfare function.
h. Maneuvering Procedures.
(1) Segment Changes. Periodically, it will be necessary to change segment assignments. To

minimize mutual interference or possible hostile action against friendly forces, intra-grid maneuvers
should be ordered by tactical signal. This signal may be transmitted initially over a voice circuit, and
should be followed up by record traffic. It is essential that all commanders/warfare commanders and the
SOCA be made aware of the details of the change.
(2) Shadowing and Marking. Units will frequently be tasked to conduct surveillance or shad-
owing in a particular segment of the Grid. Units conducting such missions should avoid entering seg-
ments assigned to other groups or units. After arrival in a specified segment, the movement of a unit will
be largely determined by the target of interest it is following. Hence, these units should notify their war-
fare commander of their entry into unassigned segments as soon as it can be forecast.
(3) Planned Course Changes. The OTC’s OPGEN normally will specify task force PIM. The
disposition will move with PIM and the disposition axis will be PIM track unless otherwise specified.
(NC) (NMM) The OTC or SOCA is responsible for relaying appropriate information to support sub-
marines and the SUBOPAUTH. The following procedures apply to grid reorientation with planned PIM
changes.
(a) Large Axis Changes. A large axis change is any change in which rotation results in
different segment locations for a unit or group. In this event, the following procedures may be used:
i. Reassign Grid Squares. This is done by overlaying the new Grid orientation over
the old and determining what the new segment assignments should be. Such reassignments
should be included in the signal executing the axis change. This procedure eliminates any re-
quirements to maneuver. However, units may not be correctly aligned to threat axis.
ii. Retain Original Grid Segment Assignments. This procedure will require most
units to maneuver to new Grid locations. The time required to perform this maneuver will vary
and may be considerable.
3-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 20
ION 30
33
0 DISPOSIT
AXIS
0 40
32
24
ENT H
0
SEGM
50
31
C
LANE
LANE
20-22
0
60
30
24
23 ENT
SEGM
6
22 PQ 151
290
70
21
20
19
POINT
280
80
C 19 18
17
16
270
15
90
14
13
12
100
260
11
10
09 LANE
405 04
LINE 0 08
110
250
07
06
05
0
24
12
04 X Y
0
V W
03 S T U
Q R
N P
02 L M P 06
J K INUS N
0
23
H
13
01 E F
G
P 0406 M
0
C D EN T G
A B SEGM
22 B 0
0 LINE A
14
21 0
0 15
200
160
190 170
180
Figure 3-21. Disposition 4W
3-35 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Small Axis Changes. When the disposition axis is rotated, the commander of each
group is to maneuver his formation to remain in its assigned segment. If the before and after position
of the segments is such that all ships remain within their original segment, no additional procedures
are required. A larger course change can be accommodated using this method by dividing it into a
series of smaller course changes over a period of time.
(4) Immediate Course Changes.
(a) Normally such changes should be made with a TURN signal. The 4W Disposition axis is
not changed and all units and groups maintain the same true bearing and range from disposition
center as before. Disposition center moves off PIM in direction of the turn at ordered speed.
(b) If there is a common net that is being guarded by all TF units, then a TURN signal can be
executed by the IMMEDIATE EXECUTIVE method. At least one ship in each group and/or each
group commander should be required to acknowledge the signal.
(NC) (NMM) The OTC or SOCA is responsible for relaying appropriate information to support
submarines and the SUBOPAUTH.
If there is not a common circuit or if there is enough time, then the DELAYED EXECUTIVE
method can be used. This can be done on a tactical voice circuit, such as the TF/TG OTH Command
net, to all group commanders. After this is done, each group commander would put the signal over a
local group UHF circuit, such as the Tactical Maneuvering net. Another option would be to send a
HIGH PRECEDENCE tactical signal over the TF Broadcast with a specified execute time and direct
each group commander to acknowledge receipt.
3220 (NC) (NMM) DISPOSITION PLANNING FACTORS
Table 3-4 contains the main factors to be considered in the planning of force dispositions as set forth
in detail in this and other publications. It is not exhaustive, and is intended to be a guide only, and should be
reviewed as the tactical situation changes.
3-36 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 3-4. (NU) (NMM) Disposition Planning Factors
a. MISSION
b. THREAT ASSESSMENT
1. Enemy’s likely course of action

2. Enemy’s weapon systems capabilities
3. Enemy’s command, control and communications
capabilities
4. Enemy’s ECM, ESM, and acoustic capabilities
5. Enemy’s intelligence state
c. STATIONING
1. PIM
2. Defense in depth
3. Own capabilities — offensive and defensive
4. Use of chaff
5. Deception
6. Use of pickets
7. Advanced offensive positions
8. Reconnaissance
9. Own deficiencies
10. Replenishment
11. Mutual interference and support
12. Intercepts
d. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
1. Emission policy
2. Communications requirements
3. Data links
4. Navigation
e. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
f. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
1. Weather
2. Propagation; above water and below water
g. FLIGHT OPERATIONS
3-37 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — SCREENS
3300 PURPOSE
The purpose of a screen is to protect a main body or convoy. It may be designed to provide protection
against aircraft, missiles, submarines, or surface forces. In a multithreat environment, due consideration
must therefore be given to the assessment of threat priorities and the advanced warning which can be
obtained by the force. Since the threat can change during an operation, continuous reassessment of the
situation is necessary to maintain the efficiency of the screen. Since present weapons and sensors demand
defense in depth, screens should be adequately dispersed, thus increasing the enemy’s problem in
recognizing and attacking the main target.
3310 TYPES OF SCREEN
a. Sector Screen. Sectors are chosen to exploit the individual equipment capabilities of various
screen units and to provide flexibility and defense in depth. Sectors are defined by true bearings and
distances from screen center. Screen units patrol assigned sectors; the amount of patrolling and the size of
the sector depend on the speed advantage of the screen unit over the main body or convoy. Random
maneuvering in sectors has the advantage of disguising the disposition of the force and thus poses an
additional recognition problem to an enemy.
b. Skeleton Screen. Screen units are disposed relative to a rectangular main body or convoy and
patrol stations or ordered lines.
c. Helicopter Windline Screen. A helicopter screen is provided for a carrier temporarily

during flight operations, relative to the carrier’s track into the wind.
d. Departure Screen. When the main body is large, forming up may require considerable time, and it
may be desirable to wait for the moment when the main body is in formation to order screen units to their
appointed station in the cruising screen. In this case, a departure screen is to be ordered to protect the main body
while it is forming up. When the main body is small, it may not be necessary to form a departure screen.
e. Entry Screen. The purpose of the entry screen is the protection of the main body as it passes
through the area immediately to seaward of the swept channel, particularly during the period it is changing
formation prior to entering the swept channel. When the main body is large, an entry screen using the same
procedure as for a departure screen should be ordered by the OTC.
3311 SCREEN SELECTION AND DESIGN
Selection and design of the screen are based upon the OTC’s appreciation of the situation. The OTC
should consider the following:
(NR) (NMM) For details of various factors involved, see ATP 28 and ATP 31.
a. The Mission.
b. The Situation.
(1) The threat:
(a) Enemy forces (surface, subsurface, air, or combined).
(b) Enemy capabilities (sensors, weapons, standoff capability, nuclear warheads, jammers).
(c) Enemy’s possible courses of action.
3-38 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Characteristics of the area of operations:
(a) Distances (to own and enemy bases, to own and enemy supporting forces).
(b) Oceanographic factors (water depth, marine life, wrecks, sonar conditions, and currents).
(c) Meteorological factors (visibility, sea state, radar conditions, wind direction and speed).
(3) Own forces:
(a) Screen units (number and types, radar, EW, sonar, weapons, communications
replenishment requirements).
(b) Main body or convoy (composition, size and spacing, speed, maneuverability, defensive
capabilities).
(c) Support forces (pickets, aircraft, surface forces, submarines, auxiliaries).
c. Opposing Courses of Action.
(1) Enemy’s overall specific objectives.
(2) Own courses of action.
3312 (NC) (NMM) STATIONING SCREEN UNITS
a. Inner Screen. In addition to its ASW advantages, particularly against diesel submarine
torpedo attacks, an inner screen provides the best concentration of defensive fire and may be the only
possible formation with a small number of screen units. The risk of confusion is reduced over that which is
likely to be incurred when friendly forces are dispersed. Screen units stationed from 5 to 7 nm from the
main body are unlikely to detect FPBs on radar before they reach optimum firing range. The inherent
disadvantages of the inner screen may be alleviated when aircraft are used to provide radar early warning
and distant ASW forces are used to provide early warning of submarine contacts.
b. Outer Screen. An outer screen may provide a more effective defense against the anticipated
threat than an inner screen would. The long-range, passive detection capability of support submarines,
sonobuoy-equipped ASW aircraft, and towed array surface ships provides a reasonable ASW search
coverage of a large area and platform acoustic covertness inhibits the enemy’s ability to maneuver to avoid
detection. These units may be stationed in the order of 25 to 100 nm from the main body as an outer screen
to counter the threat of the medium-range, missile-equipped submarine and to provide an initial line for
defense in depth against submarine torpedo attacks. Note that submarines are assigned stationary areas and
are never used in moving screens. The search capability of these units is reduced when they are employed
in inner screens. Other factors to consider with an outer screen are:
(1) Coordination of the outer screen units may be complicated by a lack of communications
capability.
(2) Effective screen coordination is required between the various warfare commanders and the
screen commander.
(3) The requirement for early detection of threats and the selection of the appropriate response.
3-39 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) Outer screen surface units should not be stationed too near the limit of the main body’s radar
cover. When these units are lost on radar and reappear during a confused situation, they run the risk of
being engaged by friendly forces.
(5) The stern sector must not be forgotten.
3313 — 3319 SPARE
3320 DESCRIPTION OF SCREENS
3321 SECTOR SCREEN
a. Description. The center is ZZ or QQ, unless otherwise ordered. Sectors are allocated by
indicating sector boundaries and sector depth (separated by a tack) followed by the call sign of the unit
assigned to that sector (see Figure 3-23).
(1) Sector Boundaries are ordered by a group of four numerals. First two numerals indicate the
true bearing of the left boundary in tens of degrees; the second two numerals indicate the true bearing of
the right boundary in tens of degrees.
(2) Sector Depth is also ordered by a group of four numerals. First two numerals indicate the in-
ner limit and the second two the outer limit of the sector in thousands of yards from the screen center.
-EXAMPLE-
SCREEN K–ZZ–0307–0510 c/s DD 4
Meaning: DD 4 is allocated a sector 030° to 070° true, depth 5,000 to 10,000 yards from ZZ.
(3) Increments of 5° or 500 yards are ordered by using ANS.
-EXAMPLE-
SCREEN K–ZZ–20 ANS 33 ANS–02 ANS 07 c/s DD 6
Meaning: DD 6 is allocated a sector 205° to 335° true, depth 2,500 to 7,000 yards from ZZ.
b. Stationing a Main Body or Military Convoy. Ships of a main body or military convoy may
be stationed by the sector method, but the fact that they are a part of the main body or military convoy must
be made clear to the force. Ships stationed by this method carry out random movements within their
sectors.
c. (NC) (NMM) Sector Size for ASW Units in a Sector Screen. ATP 28 provides a general
method to be used when designating the screen to determine the approximate size of the area that a unit can
effectively sweep.
(1) To determine sector size for ASW units in a sector screen against a torpedo firing submarine, the
following simpler method can also be used. In this method, the size of the sector allocated to an ASW
unit is related to its tactical sonar range (TSR) and its station relative to the mean line of advance (MLA)
of the main body or convoy (ahead, bow, beam, quarter, and astern), as in Table 3-5 and Figure 3-22.
Speeds used are representative for main body or convoy speed, escort speed, and submarine approach
speed. True submarine approach speeds may exceed those used in Table 3-5.
3-40 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Note: 1. Frontal sector width is perpendicular to the mean line of advance (MLA) of the screened unit.
2. Sector patrol depth is parallel to the MLA

AHEAD
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
0
15 0
0 40
32
8
22
BOW 40
1 0
BOW
7
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
60
30
5
24
FRONTAL WIDTH
0
RIGHT ANGLE 4
2.1 X TSR
70
250
3
FRONTAL WIDTH
DEPTH
280
RIGHT ANGLE
80
260
100
4/3 TSR
TO MLA
2.5 X TSR
270
ABEAM ABEAM
90
90
7 6 5 4 3 2 4 5
2 3
DEPTH 8
4/3 TSR
280
100
260
80
290
110
250
SCALE 1 CIRCLE 2,000 YDS

70
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
EXAMPLE 22
40
32
0
0
0 8
14
30 0
Main body speed: 14 knots QUARTER 21
33
0
QUARTER
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
Escort speed: 18 knots 190
0
180 170
Escort TSR: 3,000 yards ASTERN
MLA: 000
Step 1. Decision to employ escort on a bearing 325 degrees relative to MLA (BOW) at a distance of 12,000
yards and another escort on bearing of 070 relative to the MLA (ABEAM) at a distance of 14,000
yards.
Step 2. Enter Table 3-5 main body speed 13 to 16 knots, escort speed 18 knots, column BOW; find factor
2.1; ABEAM find factor 2.5.
Step 3. Multiply factor 2.1 by TSR of 3,000 yards: result sector patrol line is 6,300 yards (BOW). Multiply
factor 2.5 by TSR of 3,000 yards: result, sector patrol line of 7,500 yards (ABEAM)
Step 4. Sector depth, 4/3 of TSR, is 4,000 yards.
Step 5. Construct sector graphically as shown.
SOLUTION: Sector limits 310 to 340 degrees and 10,000 to 14,000 yards (BOW). Sector limits 060 to 080
degrees and 10,000 to 18,000 yards (ABEAM).
Figure 3-22. (NU) (NMM) Construction of a Sector (Example)
3-41 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
160 30
0
33 9
21
0
15 0
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
7
0
50
31
0
23
12
13
0
6
11
0
10
60
30
24
0
12
0
48
7
290
70
250
110
36
5 DD4
4
280
80
260
100
3
2
1
DD6
270
ZZ
270
HS1
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
280
100
260
80
3 DD2
290
110
250
70
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
0
0
31
50
0
23
7 13
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200
160
10 350
0
190 170
180
Example:
SCREEN K — ZZ —
0307 — 0510 c/s DD4
0810 — 0811 DESIG H
11 ANS 15 ANS — 0510 c/s DD2
20 ANS 33 ANS — 02 ANS 07 c/s D
Figure 3-23. Sector Screen
3-42 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 3-5. (NU) (NMM) Determining Sector Size for ASW Unit in a Sector Screen
Speed (Knots) Factors for Escorts Stationed Relative to MLA Remarks
Main Escort AHEAD BOW ABEAM QUARTER ASTERN Factors are based
Body (335 to 025) (025 to 255) (065 to 115) (115 to 155) (155 to 205) on estimated sub-
or (295 to 335) (245 to 295) (205 to 245) marine approach
Convoy speeds (knots) of:
8 to 12 15 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 AHEAD 5

18 2.2 2.5 2.9 3 3 BOW 8
21 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.5 ABEAM 12
24 2.4 2.9 3.5 4 4 QUARTER 16
27 2.5 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.4 ASTERN 18
H/C 4 4.5 5 6 Up to 8
13 to 16 18 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.4 AHEAD 5

21 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.5 3.9 BOW 12
24 2.2 2.2 3.3 4.2 4.6 ABEAM 16
27 2.3 2.3 3.6 4.5 5 QUARTER 18
H/C 4 4 5 6 Up to 8 ASTERN 18
17 to 20 21 2.1 2.1 2.5 — — AHEAD 5

24 2.1 2.2 3 — — BOW 12
27 2.2 2.3 3.5 — — ABEAM 18
H/C 3.5 4 5 — —
INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Enter table with speeds used and bearing of intended sector to find factor.
2. To find sector frontal width, multiply escort’s TSR by the factor.
3. Sector depth — for ships, multiply TSR by 4/3 using at least 3,000 yards; for helicopters, use 4,000 yards.
4. Use sector frontal width and sector depth to construct a sector as shown in Figure 3-22.
(2) Instructions for the use of Table 3-5 are included in the table. Two parameters are obtained: sec-
tor frontal width and sector depth. The sector is then constructed as in the example provided in Figure
3-22. Sector parameters are independent of the distance of the sector from screen center.
(3) Sector for helicopters should be at least 6,000 yards clear of sectors for ships when they are sta-
tioned ahead of ships. Use of helicopters in the outer half of the missile detection zone should be consid-
ered when the threat is a submarine that fires both torpedoes and short range missiles. In this case,
maintaining UHF voice and link communications is an important factor.
3322 SKELETON SCREEN
a. Description. Stations assigned are relative to a corner or side of the main body or convoy.
b. Ordering a Skeleton Screen. Stations or patrol lines are ordered by using the skeleton
screen diagram (Figure 3-24).
(1) Station Allocation. A station is allocated by signaling one or two letters from the diagram,
followed by a number to indicate the nearest distance in thousands of yards, followed by the call sign of
the unit assigned to that station. The use of two letters to allocate a station indicates a middle line be-
tween two single letters from the diagram.
3-43 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a N AN M A B C CD b
O D
30° 15° 15° DE A
15°
P 30° E
15° Q F
30° 30°
Q F
1/3 WIDTH QQ 1/3 WIDTH
R G R G
1/2 WIDTH
T H
30° 30°
U 30° 30° I T H
30° 30°
S
V J
W X S L K
Note: All distances are to be given in thousands of yards
Figure 3-24. Skeleton Screen Diagram
-EXAMPLE-
SCREEN G–DE 5 c/s DD 6
Meaning: DD 6 is allocated the station 45° on starboard bow of the main body or convoy at
5,000 yards.
(2) Patrol Line Allocation. A patrol line is allocated by signaling two stations as in station
allocation.
-EXAMPLE-
SCREEN G–CD 5 E 5 c/s DD 6
Meaning: DD 6 is allocated the patrol line between 15° and 60° on starboard bow of the main
body or convoy at 5,000 yards.
c. Screening in Restricted Waters. Stations may be assigned by using the skeleton screen
diagram. A typical, narrow-front skeleton screen is shown in Figure 3-24.
3323 HELICOPTER WINDLINE SCREEN
Available helicopters are ordered to sectors, stations, or patrol lines ahead of a carrier launching or
recovering aircraft. The break-dip position is to be at least 5,000 yards from the carrier at all times. A
helicopter windline screen may be ordered by using either the sector method or by stationing the
helicopter(s) relative to the carrier.
3324 DEPARTURE AND ENTRY SCREENS
a. When the departure/entry screen is ordered, units proceed independently to the sectors or areas
assigned and then patrol at random within them. More than one unit may be allocated to a single sector or
area, in which case, the screen commander is to specify the unit that is to coordinate their patrol. Sufficient
3-44 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
time should be allowed so that screening ships do not proceed at a speed higher than optimum sonar speed
and are able to employ tactical countermeasures while taking up their cruising stations.
(NC) (NMM) In the case of departure operations, the screen commander should order the cruising
screen to be formed so that the screening units are in their cruising stations as the Guide passes point O.
(See Chapter 2.)
b. The two methods of ordering departure/entry screens are sector and grid. The choice between
them depends only on convenience of ordering in their particular geographic location.
c. Sector Departure/Entry Screens.
(1) Description. Units are allocated patrol sectors for which they are responsible, using the sector
method of ordering with the screen center given as a geographic position.
(NC) (NMM) Screen center is usually best placed on point X or along the line X-O.
(2) Method of Ordering.
(a) Form departure/entry screen sector.
(b) Screen center.
(c) Sector allocations.
(3) Example. An example is given in Figure 3-24.
d. Grid Departure/Entry Screens.
(1) Description. Ships are allocated patrol areas for which they are responsible, the boundaries of
these areas being specified by the use of CCG preferably locked to a prominent geographic feature.
(2) Method of Ordering.
(a) Form departure/entry screen.
(b) (NC) (NMM) Grid reference position (the grid position of point X must also be specified).
(c) Area allocations. Areas are designated by the grid reference indicating the southwest
corner of each patrol area. Patrol areas are to be 3 miles square unless otherwise ordered. If a larger
area is ordered, the grid reference is to be followed by a two-figure group, the first figure indicating
the East-West dimension and the second figure the North-South dimension in miles. Patrol areas
may be overlapped.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Example. An example is given in Figure 3-25.
3325 SCREEN FOR DAMAGED SHIPS
The sector method should be used for ordering screens for damaged ships. If the speed of a damaged
ship is low, screen units should be allocated large sectors in order to provide an all around protection and so
that they can use adequate tactical countermeasures for their own defense.
3326 — 3329 SPARE
3-45 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0 10
350
340 170
180 190 20
200
0 160 30
33 9
21
0 0
15
0 40
32
8
0 22
14 0
7
50
31
0
23
13
0
6
0
MINE
60
FIELD
30
5
24
0
HS1
12
0
4
DD5
290
70
250
110
POINT
280
2
A
80
260
POINT
100
DD4
POINT X
0
270
DD7
270
90
90
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 5 6 7 8 9
DD6
280
100
260
80
2
MINE
HS2 FIELD
3
290
DD3 HS3
110
250
70
DD1
0
5
30
60
0
24
12
DD2
0
0
31
50
0
23
13
7
0
40 0
32
22 0
0 8
14
30 0
33
21 0
0 20
9
340 15
200 10 350
0
160
190 170
180
NOTE: Circle spacing is 1,000 yards.
SIGNALS
SCREEN D1 — 260 DESIG X2
SCREEN 0 — 0004 — 0406 c/s HS1
— 0410 — 0104 c/s DD7
— 1410 — 0305 c/s HS2
— 1418 — 0406 c/s DD1
— 1836 — 0003 c/s DD6
— 1822 — 0507 c/s DD2
— 1924 — 0305 c/s HS3
— 2226 — 0608 c/s DD3
— 2631 — 0507 c/s DD4
— 3136 — 0305 c/s DD5
NOTE
For sector entry screen,
use signal SCREEN E1.
Figure 3-25. (NU) (NMM) Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen
3-46 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
02 04 06 08 10 12 14
200,200
LIGHT
HOUSE
MINE
98 FIELD
DD1
HS1
96
PTO HS2
PTX
94 MINE
FIELD
DD2
DD3
ISLAND
92
90
SIGNALS
SCREEN E2 DESIG LIGHTHOUSE WHITE 200 200 DESIG X 202 195
SCREEN O DESIG 0296 DESIG H (or c/s HS1)
DESIG 0696 53 c/s DD1
DESIG 0492 c/s DD2
DESIG 0891 34 c/s DD3
DESIG 0994 34-DESIG H (or c/s HS2)
NOTE: For grid departure screen, use signal SCREEN D2.
Figure 3-26. (NU) (NMM) Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen
3330 MANEUVERING WITH A SECTOR SCREEN
a. Conduct of Ship Screen Units. Units are to patrol widely throughout their sectors and when
a subsurface threat exists, to choose that speed which makes for the best use of sonar in the conditions
prevailing. Units should take account of the movement of adjacent screen units in order to avoid undue
gaps. For safety reasons a unit is not to close nearer than 500 yards to the boundary separating its sector
from one occupied by another unit.
b. Conduct of Helicopter Screen Units. Helicopters are to dip randomly throughout their
sectors. They may mark-dip in advance of their sectors but must break dip within it. Helicopters operating
under tactical direction should maneuver to cover adjacent helicopter sectors left temporarily vacant. For
safety reasons, a helicopter must break dip if it closes within 500 yards of a sector boundary common to an
adjacent occupied sector.
3-47 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Alteration of Course. If the base course of the main body or convoy is altered, screen units
continue to patrol their sectors.
d. Screening a Carrier During Flight Operations. The conduct of screen units depends on
the method used for carrier flight operations (see Chapter 6):
(1) If Method A is used, the rules in subparagraph c above apply.
(2) If Method B is used, screen units are to patrol their sectors in the upwind direction.
(3) If Method C is used, screen units should anticipate a turn into the wind by moving upwind in
their sectors.
e. Adjusting the Screen. To adjust the screen, units may be ordered to shift their sector
boundaries or to change the depth of their sector. If the tactical requirements are not met by adjusting, the
screen must be reordered.
(1) Shifting Sector Boundaries. Units are ordered to shift their sector clockwise or counter-
clockwise by a specified number of tens of degrees. Such shifts should be at least 10° and must not ex-
ceed 90°. Caution must be exercised to ensure that large shifts do not result in screen units hindering the
main body and a reduction in screen protection for an excessive period of time.
(2) Changing Depth of Sector. When the situation requires a rapid change of the screen, units
may be ordered to change the inner and outer limits of their sector in the direction of or away from the
screen center by a specified number of thousand of yards. Such changes should not be less than 1,000
yards.
(3) Main Body or Convoy. Ships of the main body or convoy that are stationed by the sector
method may be maneuvered by the OTC the same way as screen units.
3331 MANEUVERING WITH SKELETON SCREENS
a. Conduct of Screen Units. Units are to patrol their stations or patrol lines unless otherwise
ordered. The way of patrolling is at the commanding officer’s discretion, unless it is specified by the OTC.
The extent of patrolling depends, for example, on the distance between adjacent screen units and on the
speed advantage over the convoy or main body.
b. Turn-Together or Emergency Turn by Convoy or Main Body. Screen units maintain

true bearings and distances from the main body or convoy.
c. Wheeling by Main Body or Convoy. Screen units maneuver to maintain their relative
bearings and distances from the main body or convoy.
3332 INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONVOY SCREENS
General instructions for ordering and conduct of screens are contained in earlier articles in this
section. Specific responsibilities of convoy screen ships follow:
a. Maintaining Convoy Discipline. Screen ships are to assist the convoy commodore in
maintaining convoy discipline by reporting ships that make smoke, show lights, lose station, make
unauthorized use of radio, pump bilges, or dump refuse. They are to use initiative and warn merchant ships
directly when immediate action is necessary, informing the OTC and convoy commodore of the action
taken.
3-48 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Maintaining Convoy Formation. Screen ships are to make every effort to keep ships in their
proper stations. The OTC may order a screen ship to escort one or more scattered ships; he may also
remedy poor station keeping by ordering screen ships to lead the flank columns of the convoy until
individual merchant ships have regained station. OTCs must report merchant ship casualties by a
MERCASREP.
c. Action When Ship Is Damaged. A screen ship on observing that a ship has been damaged is
immediately to report the occurrence and the cause, if known, to the OTC, and at night, if possible, is to fire
two white rockets. It must not be assumed that the OTC is aware of a ship being damaged until the fact has
been reported to him.
d. Rescue of Survivors. Action to counter a threat and continued protection of the convoy are to
take precedence over the rescue of survivors. When survivors are sighted in the vicinity during a search for
a submarine, life rafts should be dropped. If required, the OTC is to designate screen ships, as soon as they
can be spared, to pick up survivors and to screen other ships engaged in rescue work.
3333 HELICOPTERS IN THE SCREEN
The rules for ordering helicopter screens or assigning helicopters a station or sector in a surface
screen are the same as those for ordering surface screens. However, stations or sectors assigned to
unspecified helicopters must be designated by addition of “DESIG H” after the station or sector assigned.
-EXAMPLE-
SCREEN G–N8C8 DESIG H
Meaning: In this skeleton screen, there is a helicopter patrol line 8,000 yards ahead of the main
body or convoy.
3334 CONTROL OF SCREEN HELICOPTERS
a. Helicopter Control Unit. The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) may assign the
control of helicopters to one or more helicopter control units (HCUs). The duties of the HCU are the same
as those of an ACU. In the case of a windline screen, the OTC should order the number of helicopters
required and designate the carrier as HCU. Helicopters may also be ordered to operate independently.
b. Procedure When Helicopters Are Employed on Screening Duties.
(1) The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) assigns helicopter screen stations.
(2) The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) normally allocates one or more helicopters to
each HCU.
(3) HCU passes to helicopters their sector boundaries and sector limits, or the bearings and dis-
tances of their stations from a suitable reference point (e.g., QQ or ZZ)
(4) HCU directs the movements of the helicopters under positive control to ensure safety.
c. Procedure When Carrying Out Evasive Steering. When evasive steering is being carried
out, HCUs must coordinate helicopter movements with ship movements so as to avoid unacceptable gaps
in the screen.
3-49 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Very-Long-Leg or Long-Leg Zigzag Plan. When one of these plans is in force, helicop-
ters in the screen need only be informed of this fact and of the alterations of course at least one dip cycle
before they take place.
(2) Short-Leg Zigzag Plan. When this plan is in effect, helicopters in the screen may be taken
under positive control. Helicopters should not be employed along the short legs except in the direction
of the force movement.
d. Information to Helicopters. Helicopters must be kept informed of the situation by their

HCUs to enable them to perform their functions properly. Information, such as course and speed
alternations, evasive steering in use, adjustment of the screen, and contacts obtained by other units, are all
required by helicopters in the screen.
3335 PICKETS
a. Ordering. Picket stations are ordered either by true bearing and distance from screen center or
by the sector method.
(NR) (NMM) When fixed-wing aircraft are employed as pickets, airplans from Chapter 8 may
be used.
b. Maneuvering. The true bearings and ranges of picket stations do not change with alterations of
course by the main body or convoy. If new picket stations are desired, the OTC (or screen commander, if
delegated) should order them well in advance of the alteration of course.
c. (NR) (NMM) AAW Pickets. For further details of tasking and maneuvering pickets in the
AAW role, see Chapter 7 and ATP 31.
3336 TOWED ARRAY SHIPS IN THE SCREEN
The procedures for stationing surface ships equipped with towed array systems are similar to those
for other surface ships.
(NC) (NMM) Additional considerations are:
a. (NC) (NMM) TAS Ship. The TAS ship may require at least 2 hours to localize and attack
passive contacts. The dimensions of the patrol station assigned should therefore include an allowance for at
least 2 hours of force movement along the PIM. In addition, a requirement to conduct Sprint and Search
Tactics may require elongation of a sector.
b. (NC) (NMM) TAS Ship Stations. TAS ship stations may be designated to include the ASW
function and for suitably equipped units those of EW, or ASUW, or AAW pickets.
(1) TAS equipped ships may also be employed in stationary patrol areas for operations such as en-
try/departure screens and defended lanes.
(2) More detailed explanations of TAS ship employment are found in Chapter 9 of ATP 28.
3337 — 3339 SPARE
3340 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
3341 INSTRUCTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL SCREEN UNITS
a. Report on Joining a Screen. On joining, the commanding officer is to report to the OTC and
screen commander any defect that affects his operational capability and his fuel state.
3-50 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Rejoining the Screen. Units rejoining a screen are to proceed to their previously assigned
station, unless otherwise ordered.
c. Replenishment of Screen Units. When screen units are to conduct replenishment, the
procedure will be as follows:
(1) Screen ships are to proceed when relieved at screen station unless otherwise ordered.
(2) Remaining screen units act in accordance with subparagraph f below.
(3) Screen units rejoining after replenishment act in accordance with subparagraph b above.
(4) Screen helicopters may be refueled by surface units.
d. Bad Weather Conditions. If, during bad weather, a screen unit is unable to maintain the
speed necessary to accomplish the task without damage or serious effects on its sensor performance, the
commanding officer is to report to the OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) the maximum speed he
can maintain.
e. Equipment Failure. Any sensor or weapon system failure in a screen unit is to be reported
immediately to the OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) and to adjacent units, including the estimated
time at which repairs will be completed. A gap caused by this failure is to be covered, as far as possible, by
adjacent units by adjusting their patrol without leaving their assigned sectors, stations, or patrol lines,
unless the screen commander decides to adjust or reorder the screen.
f. Filling a Gap. If a screen unit leaves the screen, units in sectors, stations, or patrol lines adjacent
to it are to maneuver in their sector, station, or patrol line so as to cover as much of the gap as possible. They
will leave their sector, station, or patrol line only if ordered to do so.
g. Right of Way. Ships of the main body or convoy have right of way over screen ships, unless the
latter are in contact with submarines. A helicopter in the dip or hover is not to be approached by ships
within 500 yards.
h. Navigational Hazards. Individual ships are responsible for avoiding navigational hazards.
i. Bulging the Screen. If, during maneuvering a carrier by Method B (see Chapter 6), the length
of flight operations necessitates the carrier to proceed outside the screen, the screen is to bulge. In this case,
the two screen units ahead of the carrier leave their sectors, stations, or patrol lines to screen the carrier.
j. Taking Up or Changing Sectors or Patrol Lines. Ships should proceed at maximum sonar
speed or operational speed as the tactical situation dictates.
k. Station Keeping by Helicopter. A helicopter should be in its allocated station or sector at the
moment of breaking dip for next jump.
3342 SCREEN ADJUSTMENT
The OTC, or the screen commander when delegated this responsibility, will adjust the screen
whenever there is a change in the tactical situation or in the number of screen units available.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 4
Communications
SECTION I — TACTICAL COMPLANS
4100 SCOPE
This chapter sets forth in broad terms the tactical aspects of communications, including data links,
and establishes measures necessary for their protection. Detailed communications doctrine,
communications plans (COMPLANs), and descriptions of specific circuits are contained in ACP 176 and
NATO Supplements. The use of certain nets, as they affect the principal areas of warfare, is described
below. See also Chapter 5, Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (EAW), and APP 1, Maritime Voice
Reporting Procedures.
4110 COMMUNICATION PLAN (COMPLAN) DESIGN
COMPLANs should be designed using the following guidelines:
a. Reduction to a minimum of the number of circuits to be guarded by ships. This is the principle of
the electronic protective measures/reduced tactical COMPLAN (EPM/RTC), an example of which is in
Figure 4-1. An RTC can be devised by combining circuits with similar procedures in order to reduce the
total number of nets in accordance with ACP 176. For small forces with limited communication
equipment, an RTC should be considered. The OTC must ensure that adequate instructions are issued
beforehand so that the COMPLAN is easy to interpret.
b. The use of MF/HF transmissions should be minimized to reduce the probability of fixing high
value units by the enemy. This involves the maximum use of satellite communications (SATCOM), using
AUTOCAT/MIDDLEMAN and ship-to-ship UHF relay.
c. Where the incorporation of MF/HF frequencies is unavoidable, use should be made of limited
range intercept (LRI) techniques.
d. Key circuits should be provided with frequency diversity, preferably in more than one band
(cross-band working). Since equipment and frequencies are bound to be in short supply, priority should be
given to those circuits most needed to coordinate force defense, particularly antiship missile defense
(ASMD).
e. Vital UHF circuits and alternates should have a frequency separation of at least 30 MHz
(preferably 40 MHz) to reduce effectiveness of disruptive jamming. To prevent mutual interference, a
frequency separation of 1 to 5 MHz is necessary. Minimum separation depends upon equipment fitted in
units.
f. Make maximum use of cryptographic protection on circuits to minimize the requirement for
low-grade codes and authentication.
g. Take account of special requirements for specific circuits as follows:
(1) Antijam Coordination Net — A line-of-sight net which ideally should be secure voice or out of
band (e.g., VHF (IMM) or VHF (Aeronautical)). It is used for passing vital information when under
ECM attack, alerting the force to imitative deception by a GINGERBREAD call, and the execution of
countermeasures.
4-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
LINE COLUMN IDENTIFIER

IDENTIFIER (NC) FROM_ TO _
FROM_ TO _ (NMM) PLAN SIX FOUR AND SO ON - -
LINE CIRCUIT EMISSION A B C D E
NO. TITLE
CHARLIE 205/206 TF/TG 4510 7344 2994 2678 19568
BROADCAST
WHISKEY 207/208 TF/TG 12132.5 2965 3767 2725 18325
CALLING
WORKING
AND SO ON 209/210 TF/TG 266.3 320.6 4213,5 5645.5
TACTICAL (4212) (5644)
212/213 TF/TG 308.6 371.1 2673.5
REPORTING (2672)
222 ACTION 288.7
NET
ALPHA
223 ACTION 293.0
NET
BRAVO
224 ACTION
NETCHARLIE
404/405 AAW
WEAPON
COORD
AND SO ON
Figure 4-1. Example of EPM/Reduced Tactical COMPLAN
(2) TF/TG/MF — A circuit for use by the OTC to pass vital instructions by CW when no other radio
circuits are available. Ships should always have this circuit on a loudspeaker and must be prepared to
guard it at short notice once threat warning RED has been promulgated.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Fighter Control Frequencies — These should be in the lower half of the UHF band
because of undesirable transmission characteristics which are more pronounced at the top of the band
than at the bottom.
h. To preserve security and to gain valuable time when changing frequencies in a jamming
environment, EPM COMPLANs should make allowance for the allocation of column and line identifiers.
Lines should be identified by random phonemicized letters of the alphabet, and columns by random
numerals. The OTC should make clear for what period the identifiers are in force.
i. To assist in equipment allocation within individual units, the OTC should indicate circuit priorities.
4120 COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
Detailed procedures for the conduct of communications vary for different types of nets and are
found in the appropriate ACPs and APs.
4-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
4121 NET CONTROL STATION (NCS)
Each net will have a net control station (NCS) assigned to control traffic and enforce discipline on
the net. The NCS function may be assigned as a specific duty or it may be incorporated in the functions of a
warfare commander, coordinator, or controller (i.e., EWC or FTC-A) as discussed in Chapter 6.
Link nets, such as Link 11, have slightly different requirements, and the control procedures for those
nets are described in Chapter 6.
4122 VOICE PROCEDURES
Maritime voice reporting procedures are contained in APP 1.
4123 CALL SIGNS
a. General. Daily changing call signs should be used on all military uncovered communication
circuits. Ship names or international call signs may be used:
(1) When communicating in the VHF (IMM) band in the vicinity of merchant vessels or stations.
(2) During search and rescue (SAR) operations.
(3) In circumstances where it is considered impractical or unsafe to use daily changing call
signs, for example on harbor movement nets. Such nets should not be used outside 15 miles of har-
bor limits.
NOTE
Instructions for the use of call signs are contained in APP 1.
b. Standard Call Sign Convention for Warfare Commanders and Coordinators.

Warfare commanders and coordinators may be allocated a two-letter call sign related to their respective
command or coordination function as shown below. This does not preclude the use of daily changing call
signs. A force may have more than one CWC (such as a carrier battle force consisting of multiple carrier
battle groups, each with its own CWC organization). The first letter of each call sign signifies which CWC
the commander or coordinator is subordinate to and is unique to that CWC organization. For example, the
first group would be allocated the letter A, the second group B. Therefore, call sign BW is the AAWC of the
second group.
4-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTE
The call sign AA is reserved for the Fleet Commander.
Primary Alternate
CWC “___”B “___”V
AAWC “___”W “___”C
ASWC “___”X “___”Y
ASUWC “___”S “___”T
SC “___”N “___”D
EWC “___”E “___”Z
AREC “___”R “___”U
HEC “___”L “___”H
MWC “___”G “___”F
SOCA “___”J “___”K
4124 USE OF RATT FOR TACTICAL MESSAGES
a. Where voice circuit encryption/decryption equipment is not available, secure RATT should be
used whenever possible to pass intra-force tactical signals.
b. All tactical signals passed via RATT circuits are to:
(1) Bear the precedence IMMEDIATE.
(2) Bear a sequential serial number and DTG.
(3) Be identified by TACSIG as the first word of the text.
(4) Be given RUSH DISTRIBUTION only and subsequently filed.
c. Tactical RATT cannot be used to transmit EXECUTIVE METHOD messages.
4125 DATA LINK
For details of communications and circuits associated with data compilation, see Chapter 4, Section I.
4126 GENERAL
Tactical data links are communication paths used to transfer information from tactical data system
(TDS) equipped units to both TDS- and non-TDS-equipped units. These links permit a rapid exchange of
information as they automatically exchange data between the units participating. The information
transferred may be used for picture compilation or to order specific action by units or weapon platforms.
4-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Voice communications must be used to pass all the appropriate information to non-link-fitted units and
may be required to assist in the management of links.
4127 TYPES OF DATA LINK
The following NATO data links are associated with maritime operations:
a. LINK 1 is the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) link between air defense sites
in Europe.
b. LINK 4 is used as a ground and ship-to-air link for the control of aircraft.
c. LINK 11 is an automatic medium-speed link used for the exchange of picture compilation and
command and control information between ships and between ships, aircraft, and shore stations.
d. LINK 14 is a semiautomatic data link transmitted by selected TDS units, a computer-generated

RATT transmission for the benefit of non-link-fitted ships. Termination in the receiving unit is be
teleprinter with manual or automatic plotting.
e. LINK 11B is an automatic medium-speed link used for the exchange of the tactical picture
between U.S. maritime units (forward) and U.S. military units ashore.
f. LINK 16 is a real-time, ECM resistant, secure, bit-oriented data link using time-division multiple
access technology for information exchange in contact reporting, aircraft control, weapons coordination,
and command and control.
4128 PROCEDURAL STANDARDS
These are detailed in relevant publications of the ADatP series.
4129 EMISSION POLICY
The Emission Policy (EP) is set forth in Chapter 5.
4130 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC)
4131 COMSEC PROCEDURES
a. COMSEC procedures are designed to protect communications transmissions from exploitation

by hostile forces. These include:
(1) Control of radiated power.
(2) Use of low-grade codes to protect voice transmissions.
(3) Use of covered (electronically encrypted) circuits.
(4) Use of authentication (see Articles 4132 and 4133).
(5) Minimal transmissions on communication circuits designated for use by the EP and strict circuit
discipline.
(6) Frequency selection to best exploit the medium in which the transmission is effected, including
the use of LRI techniques.
4-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(7) Attention to equipment maintenance to produce minimal internal noise and nullify the possibil-
ity of radiation of encrypted or unencrypted traffic from the superstructure of the transmitting unit or
other improper antenna.
b. COMSEC procedures form an integral part of electronic protective measures (EPM).
4132 AUTHENTICATION
a. Principles. Authentication is used as a measure of protection against imitative deception on

communication circuits. Current authentication procedures are based upon the following principles:
(1) Authentication should not be used unless warranted by the degree of risk that imitative decep-
tion may be attempted by the enemy.
(2) When used, the amount of circuit time devoted to the procedure should be the minimum consis-
tent with the achievement of an acceptable level of protection against the unit employing imitative
deception.
b. Risk of Imitative Deception. Risk exists on all types of uncovered circuits, and tactical voice
circuits are an obvious potential target. Morse circuits, which may replace certain RATT channels that
have been subjected to heavy ECM, may be vulnerable to imitative deception. The risk of imitative
deception will depend upon what the enemy has to gain from its employment in any tactical situation and
governs the establishment of the authentication policy (see Article 4133).
(NR) (NMM) (See APP 1 for GINGERBREAD procedures.)
c. Authentication Procedures. Present authentication rules call for the Challenge and Reply
mode whenever possible, because it is significantly more secure than the Transmission mode. It does not
follow that the lower level of security attainable through the latter is not an acceptable compromise
between security and circuit occupancy, when it is backed up by Challenge and Reply, if the credibility of a
given message is in doubt. This is amplified in Table 4-1, but it should be noted that it is relatively easy for
an experienced unit employing imitative deception to obtain an indate transmission authentication from
one circuit and to use it on another; and it is, therefore, a cardinal rule that a receiving station always
initiates a Challenge and Reply whenever the transmitting station has not been identified as friendly.
4133 AUTHENTICATION POLICIES
a. Definitions.
(1) Policy ALFA — Enemy forces are likely to use imitative deception; or the use of imitative de-
ception has been confirmed and a resulting change in policy ordered by the OTC.
(2) Policy BRAVO — Imitative deception is unlikely to be used by the enemy.
b. Use of Authentication Policies.
(1) If the tactical situation is in favor of the enemy trying to conduct imitative deception, the full de-
gree of authentication is to be implemented as in Policy ALFA (Occasions 1 to 14 in Table 4-1). This
also applies when imitative deception has already been confirmed. To guard against the situation in
which the marker attempts imitative deception simply to test the forces reaction (and the OTC does not
wish to reveal the practical effects of Policy ALFA), Policy BRAVO may be ordered by the OTC.
(2) In Policy BRAVO, authentication is used infrequently (Occasions 1 to 7 in Table 4-1). The ini-
tial stage of a marking situation is typical of one in which Policy BRAVO would be appropriate: the
marker is intent on monitoring rather than interfering with communications. The only benefit to the
4-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 4-1. Authentication Policies
Occasion for Use Type of Authentication

IMITATIVE DECEPTION
1. When challenged. (A station never responds to a challenge un- Respond to challenge in accor-
less it follows on immediately from a transmission they have dance with Challenge and Reply
made.) procedure.
2. a. When Spoofing is suspected. Challenge and Reply
b. To check identity of originator of an unexpected message. Challenge and Reply

3. On Receipt of a message:
a. Authenticated wrongly Challenge and Reply
b. On which authentication is more than 2 minutes time late. Challenge and Reply
c. Which was not authenticated when it should have been. Challenge and Reply
4. a. Joining a circuit. Challenge and Reply
b. Rejoining a circuit after a long absence (in excess of an hour). Challenge and Reply
5. a. Imposing radio silence. Transmission
b. Broadcasting to a unit under silence, or transmitting ‘blind’. Transmission
c. Requiring a unit to break silence. Transmission

6. Making enemy contact or amplifying reports. Transmission
7. Changing authentication policy in force. Transmission
8. Ordering to change watch, circuit, or frequency. Transmission
9. Initiating EPM procedures. Transmission
10. Detaching a unit; changing screening stations; or employment of Transmission
escorts and helicopters.
11. Altering course of speed of the main body. Transmission
12. Transmitting groups from Action Table. Transmission
13. Calling ZIPPO. Transmission
14. As directed by the command (i.e., when important tactical signals Transmission
are made).
marker in attempting imitative deception would be to assess the forces ability to recognize and respond
to his efforts. With this level of imitative deception threat and the possibility of it continuing for a period,
it will probably be the OTCs wish to relax from his full degree of authentication.
c. Ordering Authentication Policies. The authentication policy is ordered as a statement in a

signal or brief.
4134 — 4139 SPARE
4140 ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW) COMMUNICATIONS
AAW communications are used for picture compilation and weapon system coordination.
Well-coordinated AAW measures require a rapid and reliable flow of data between units of the force.
When coordinating AAW activities one or more of the following nets — AAW reporting net, AAW
4-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
coordination net (force/sector), or AAW coordination and reporting net may be used. The joint AAW
shore coordination net may be used when coordinating activities with shore air defense authorities.
If equipment limitations preclude manning of all assigned AAW nets by certain units, the affected
units will report this to the AAWC for resolution. If the AAWC is unable to resolve the problem without
affecting other warfare missions, the matter will be referred to the OTC for resolution.
4141 AAW REPORTING NET
The AAW reporting net, normally an HF (SSB) voice net controlled by the FTC-A, is used for
exchanging information about the positions, identities, and supplementary information of air contacts. The
duty of FTC-A is normally held by the AAWC, but may be delegated.
4142 AAW COORDINATION NET (FORCE/SECTOR)
This net is normally an HF (SSB) voice net controlled by the AAWC or SAAWC. Main types of
traffic are:
a. Threat warnings and ZIPPO calls.
b. Orders relative to CAP or AEW assignments, stationing, and relieving.
c. Weapon coordination (target assignment, weapon designation).
d. Weapon restriction orders relative to safety sectors.
e. Target engagement messages (TEMs).
f. Reports of AAW ammunition states.
g. Coordination of homing for lost aircraft.
h. Coordination and direction of the initial phase of SAR.
i . Shore coordination when appropriate.
4143 LOCAL AAW COORDINATION NET
This is a UHF voice net controlled by the LAAWC. The main uses of this net are to:
a. Provide a clear picture of the local air situation to enable point defense weapon controllers to
identify targets.
b. Promulgate threat warnings and ZIPPO calls.
c. Establish watch zones.
d. Issue weapon restriction orders.
4144 INNER WARFARE NET
This is the primary AAW voice coordinating, control, and reporting net for all AAW capable units
within the inner defense zone (IDZ). All aircraft transiting the IDZ will check in with the inner defense
4-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
zone coordinator (IDZC) upon launch from CV and when entering the IDZ at 100 nm from CV. Net control
is IDZC.
(NC) (NMM) The IDZ will normally be established at 100 nm from CV.
4145 OUTER WARFARE NET
This is the primary CAP/AEW UHF reporting net. Nonorganic aircraft entering the AAW
surveillance area will check in with the outer defense zone coordinator (ODZC) on this circuit to receive
clearance into the area. Net control is ODZC.
4146 COMBINING AAW NETS
In order to economize on the number of HF SSB sets in use, the AAW coordination and AAW
reporting nets may be combined into a single net, known as the AAW coordination and reporting (AAW
(C&R)) net. This is the primary voice coordinating, control, and reporting net for IDZC, ODZC, and
AAWC. This net is not to be confused with the SNIP net described in Article 4147. The success of the
combined net depends on good circuit discipline; the ability to pass information depends on the complexity
of the real-time situation. However, it is essential that the following information be included:
a. Initial detection and tracking reports of evaluated threats.
b. Engagement and results of engagement.
c. Tracking reports of friendlies that could be mistaken as hostile.
d. CAP and missile ship position reports when not on station.
e. CAP, AEW, and ASW aircraft launch and mission reports.
4147 SINGLE NET INFORMATION AND PLOTTING (SNIP)
This is the primary HF net used between SAAWCs to coordinate AAW measures. The SNIP net is
controlled by the AAWC. SAAWCs will use other nets to affect tracking and weapon control functions
within their respective sectors of responsibility.
4148 JOINT AAW SHORE COORDINATION (JAAWSC)
This net is used for selective reporting of the air picture between the air defense agency ashore and
the AAWC and AEW aircraft, when appropriate.
(NR) (NMM) It may also be used to pass some TASMO messages (see ATP 34) and intercontroller
and aircraft handover traffic.
4149 AAW DATA LINKS
a. Link 4A. Primary means of communication between E-2C/E-3/TDS (Link 4) ships and CAP,
whether it is one-way close control, two-way close control, or one-way broadcast control.
b. Link 11 (UHF/HF). Used to exchange track data and weapons control information between
AAW TDS equipped units and is the primary means by which IDZC and ODZC exchange information.
(1) This circuit is essential to AAW units within a time-critical IDZ.
(2) For purposes of the outer air battle (OAB), Link 11 net participants should be held to a minimum
with an AEW acting as NCS.
4-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Silent SAM units in the ODZ will receive tactical AAW picture via Link 11 (receive only). This
operation permits units detecting new contacts to get the information rapidly on the data link.
4150 (NC) (NMM) AAW CALL SIGNS
Encrypted or one- or two-letter call signs may be used on AAW circuits. The OTC will promulgate
which system will be used in his force. When lettered call signs are used, they will be assigned in the
OPTASK AAW message. Letter designators are assigned to AAW units as follows:
a. W — Collective call sign for all primary and secondary AAW units.
b. _W — Antiair warfare commander (AAWC) for a specific CWC organization. Remark: The first
letter of this call sign is significant and unique for the CWC organization to which the AAWC belongs. The
first battle group will be allocated the letter A, the second B, etc.
c. _C — Alternate AAWC for a specific CWC organization. For first letter see remark above.
d. D to P — Single letters for primary AAW units.
e. Q to R — Single letters for EW aircraft.
f. S — For all ASUW units.
g. T to Z (except W) — Single letters for AEW stations.
h. Dual letters for secondary reporting units. First letter of call sign is that of primary AAW unit
assigned as LAAWC. Second letter is A to Z (except I and O). Ensure call signs assigned to secondary
reporting units do not conflict with those previously assigned to warfare commanders and coordinators.
4151 — 4154 SPARE
4155 SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS
a. Surface Surveillance. Communication requirements for surface data compilation are

detailed below.
b. Surface Action Group (SAG). SAG communications are described in Article 4157.
c. Air Coordination. Requirements for air coordination communications are in Articles 4140
through 4150.
(NR) (NMM) TASMO communications for surface warfare are in ATP 34.
d. Over-the-Horizon Targeting (OTHT). Careful thought must be given for the

communication requirements for OTHT. Targeting units may well operate outside normal UHF range and
may require the use of HF (subject to emission policy). By virtue of their important function, OTHT
communications are also likely to be the object of ECM effort by an enemy, and antijam alternatives
should be allocated.
4156 SURFACE NETS
The circuits described below are primarily used for surface data compilation. Other activities may
require additional communications.
a. TF/TG Reporting UHF. This net is used for initial raid reports to alert units within a group.
4-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. TF/TG Reporting HF(V). This is the primary net for surface data compilation in a force and is
to be guarded by CTGs/CTUs, major units, and all detached units in the disposition. In addition, all surface
units should maintain receiver watch on the circuit. The net will be used as follows:
(1) By the OTC to pass tactical signals of an urgent nature to the disposition when passing a mes-
sage by other means would be detrimental to the operation.
(2) By the FTCs to:
(a) Pass all filtered raid and EW reports to the OTC.
(b) Pass all position reports of own ships and aircraft (or groups of ships for individual task
groups).
4157 SAG COMMUNICATIONS
a. Control Net. When the formation of a SAG is planned and adequate warning is given, there
will be no difficulty in activating a prepared communication plan.
(NC) (NMM) However, this may not be the case when a SAG is formed in an emergency to counter a
sudden threat. In this case, the SAG shall continue employing the present control net. The OTC/SC should
shift the remainder of the force to an alternate circuit.
b. Single-Letter Visual Signals. To counter an enemy capability to intercept or jam tactical

communications, ships detached to carry out SAG duties must be able to communicate without radio. This
may be achieved by use of the Single-Letter Maneuvering Signals and Single-Letter Action Signals in
ATP 1, Vol. II. Such signals may be used without further orders as soon as the SAG is formed. SAG control
and tactical nets are still to be manned, but should be used for vital information in emergency only.
4158 — 4159 SPARE
4160 ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) COMMUNICATIONS
ASW communications are used for picture compilation and weapon system coordination. The basic
communications organization for ASW is in ACP 176, and consideration must be given to the special
requirements in the tactical employment and coordination of support submarines and units with long-range
passive sensors described in ATP 28. These are further set forth below.
a. Support Submarines. The support submarine must operate in coordination with other units
in order that its potential may be fully exploited. This in turn requires communications to the submerged
submarine on an unscheduled basis; it also may require communications relay depending upon the
equipment fits of the submarine and the force ASW commanders ship.
(NR) (NMM) Support submarine communications are discussed in Articles 4170 through 4174 and
ATP 18.
b. Towed Array. The employment of towed array units requires provision of fast, secure,
communication channels. These include secure voice UHF for scene-of-action coordination and
UHF/SHF SATCOM to the OTC/ASWC; secure HF RATT may also be required. A dedicated intelligence
broadcast may also be required. Specific communication requirements are:
(1) A secure long-range circuit to pass contact information to the OTC/ASWC and for the
OTC/ASWC to control the towed array ship(s). A voice circuit is preferable; however, in its absence a
secure RATT circuit is acceptable.
4-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) A secure circuit is required for towed array ships to exchange contact data for crossfixing. A
voice circuit is again preferable. If SATCOM is not available and ships are beyond line-of-sight, it may
be necessary to employ a third party to relay this information.
(3) Each towed array ship should be capable of coordinating the localization process with assigned
aircraft using secure voice UHF communications.
(4) All towed array units must be capable of receiving the recognized surface and subsurface pic-
ture transmitted by the force track coordinator or other authority out to the limits of the ASW area of
interest.
(5) A single net may meet the requirements of items 1 and 2. In a small force, it may also include the
subsurface raid reporting function.
4161 SEARCH AND ATTACK UNIT (SAU) COMMUNICATIONS
On dispatch of a SAU, responsibility for its communication requirements is transferred from the
OTC to the SAU commander. In general, the existing ASW circuits will continue to be manned by the
SAU, with the remainder shifting to an alternative ASW control frequency (Procedure ALPHA, see ACP
176) or screen tactical frequency (Procedure BRAVO). Careful thought must be given to the emission
policy adopted by the SAU commander to avoid alerting hostile units to the existence, composition, or
position of the SAU, and to this end use should be made of standard tabulated messages, such as the ASW
Action Table in ATP 1, Vol. II. Single-Letter Maneuvering Signals may be used for SAU action.
4162 — 4169 SPARE
4170 SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS
Communications with submarines differ significantly from those with other force assets and present
the most significant challenge in effecting mission coordination and tasking. Keys to success are reliable
long-range communications between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH and dependable, redundant,
on-scene tactical circuits for the exchange of intelligence; command, control, and coordinating
information; and targeting data with assigned submarines. Planners and commanders must be familiar
with the submarine communication procedures and capabilities that are addressed in detail in ATP 18.
4171 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES
a. Tradeoffs between covertness and coordination will be necessary when conducting coordinated
operations. Planning should recognize that communication delays are often a necessary adjunct to
submarine operations. Additionally, an inverse relationship exists between the time a submarine spends in
a communications posture (depth and speed limited) and mission effectiveness, when the submarines
tasking requires it to operate at high speed or below communications depth for extended periods of time.
Historically, the submarine operational broadcast controlled by the SUBOPAUTH is the most reliable
means of providing coordination, tasking, and intelligence information to submarines. This method is
often slower than tactical communications, however, and provision must be made for the rapid, on-scene
exchange of intelligence and coordinating information as required by the tactical situation.
b. Brevity. As a rule, communications with submarines should be brief.

(NC) (NMM) Structured message formats in APP 4, Vol. I, Chapter 3, and ATP 18 are designed to
contain all information required by the SUBOPAUTH and individual submarines in a concise
summarization. The SUBOPAUTH may edit (or screen off the submarine broadcast altogether) lengthy
messages that are not specifically oriented to the submarines employment. The objective is to avoid
overloading the submarine communication system with message traffic not directly relevant to
submarine/task group operations. Extracts of operational messages with information may be consolidated
4-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
and included in Support Submarine Force Summary and Situation Report messages contained in APP 4.
OPTASK messages, because of their length, normally are not relayed via the submarine broadcast.
Nevertheless, they are important, and efforts should be made to provide them by a means other than the
submarine broadcast (e.g., mail, courier, shore/guard ship communications, etc.).
4172 SUBMARINE BROADCAST
a. Submarines receive message traffic on an accountable broadcast transmitted by the

SUBOPAUTH. How the broadcast is to be used for command and control of units operating with a task
group should be coordinated with the SUBOPAUTH prior to support operations. The information
transmitted on the broadcast must be prioritized and coordinated with the SUBOPAUTH and SOCA.
Generally, those messages containing operational level tasking (e.g., SUBNOTEs) will have first priority,
and those for tactical level tasking and coordination will have second priority. Messages generated by the
task group may be edited to fit on the broadcast. Use of communications ZPW (automatic cancellation)
procedures applicable to perishable information will allow early removal of these messages from the
broadcast and significantly reduce overall traffic loading.
(NR) (NMM) Further information on submarine broadcasts is contained in ATP 18.
b. Lead-Time Requirements. Depending on its role and communication schedule, lead time
required to ensure submarine receipt of tasking, coordinating instructions, intelligence, etc., can be
significant. Unless the submarine is maintaining a near continuous communications connectivity with the
SOCA, plans should be based on worst-case message delivery time and maximize use of scheduled
submarine broadcast cycles.
(NR) (NMM) Table 4-2 contains examples of lead-time requirements based on normal broadcast
cycles of 8 to 12 hours.
Table 4-2. (NU) (NMM) Typical Advance Noti-

fication Requirements for Submarine Operations
ADVANCE
EVENT NOTICE
(Hours)
Support Submarine Request 24 to 48
Mission Change 10 to 14
Waterspace Change Notification 12 to 30
Final Over-The-Horizon Targeting 2 to 3
c. Maritime Rear Link (MRL). Establishing a MRL between the OTC/SOCA and
SUBOPAUTH is essential for most operations and will greatly simplify coordination of submarine tasking
and waterspace management requirements.
d. (NC) (NMM) BARNSTORM Procedures. BARNSTORM is a single, serialized message

that may be used by the SUBOPAUTH to transmit submarine tasking, area assignment, waterspace
management application, intelligence, and other operational information on the submarine broadcast. The
objective is to ensure that submarines conducting communications intensive operations receive all
required information without placing excessive traffic load demands on the submarine broadcast.
4-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
4173 TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
a. Specific tactical circuits as well as special communication procedures for submarine

coordination should be identified in the OPTASK COMMS. This information should also be included in
the initial request for submarine support. The objective is to ensure tactical communication paths and
coordinating instructions are clear to all participants and that necessary and timely intelligence
information can be rapidly exchanged between the task group and submarine.
b. GUERRILLA Procedures. The code word, GUERRILLA, is used by a submarine to indicate

that it has HIGH PRECEDENCE traffic for the SOCA or a designated commander/unit in the task group.
This code word identifies the transmitting ship as a submarine and is intended to alert other circuit
operators to clear the net as soon as possible.
(NR) (NMM) Procedures are contained in ATP 18.
c. Tactical Circuits. Communications planning should provide for primary and secondary voice
and data circuits for use with the SOCA as well as alternate circuits for urgent communication with any
element of the task group. The intent is to provide the submarine a best bet circuit when time is of the
essence, while limiting the need for frequent changes in the submarines basic communications plan setup.
First priority should be satellite communications (if fitted), followed by line-of-sight UHF, and HF.
Changes that do occur should be reflected in periodic Force Summary message updates.
d. (NC) (NMM) Special Communication Windows. Depending on tasking, special communica-

tion windows outside the submarines normal broadcast cycle are generally disruptive to submarine operations
and, where possible, should be minimized. There are occasions, however, when use is appropriate; e.g., to
conduct initial rendezvous with coordinating air or surface forces, to provide updated over-the-horizon cruise
missile targeting information to the submarine, or to order/confirm implementation of a contingency plan.
Requests for special communication windows may be included in the Support Submarine Request and
subsequent Force Summary/SITREP messages or discussed directly with the submarine on tactical
coordination circuits.
e. (NC) (NMM) UPLINK/DOWNLINK Considerations. Frequently, tactical situations will

require immediate communications outside established communication windows. Procedures for
UPLINK and DOWNLINK should be clearly specified in the Support Submarine Request or appropriate
OPTASK (if held by the submarine) and changes identified in the Force Summary message.
(1) UPLINK.
(a) SATCOM Buoys. For submarines so equipped, SATCOM buoys can be used to send
messages via SSIXS to the SUBOPAUTH for relay to the SOCA. Contact reports sent via
SATCOM buoy are normally recorded in OTH GOLD format. This permits target data to be entered
directly into the supported forces intelligence data base.
(b) ECB/SLOT Buoys. Submarine-launched expendable communications buoys (ECB)

and one-way tactical (SLOT) buoys are a reliable communications option if the submarine must
remain at search depth. ECB/SLOT buoy use requires that an ASW aircraft be available for
monitoring. If continuous aircraft coverage cannot be maintained, specific monitoring periods that
will be available should be made known to the submarine. The useful range of ECB/SLOT buoy
radio transmissions is limited to line-of-sight range and may further be reduced by sea state and
low-power output.
4-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) DOWNLINK.
(a) Keyed Sonar. Depending on environmental conditions, keyed sonar provides a

reasonably reliable DOWN-LINK for Bellringer. Under good conditions, high-power,
low-frequency sonars can be effective if the transmitting surface ship is within 40 to 70 nm of the
submarine. PROBE ALERT, a modification to certain US sonars, provides a coded pulse capability.
Arranging specific signals to be used and keeping them simple and few in number, before the
operation, will facilitate communications on both the transmitting ship and receiving submarine.
Both collective and individual submarine callup codes should be considered if multiple submarines
are assigned to a task group. ATP 18 contains further details on keyed sonar employment.
(b) Sound Underwater Signal (SUS). Two general types of SUS are available. One
employs explosive charges to produce an omnidirectional, broadband signal. The other is
nonexplosive and uses a battery-powered device that alternately transmits discrete preset
frequencies. Pulse length and sequence may be varied on some systems. Keyed sonar (PROBE
ALERT) and SUS are overt acoustic communication methods that can reveal the presence of the
transmitting unit as well as the possible presence of a friendly submarine. Depending on the
scenario, geographic location, and EMCON plan in effect, deception tactics using routine, random
transmissions from unit(s) of the force should be considered whether a submarine is assigned or not.
ATP 18 contains further details on SUS codes and employment.
4174 SUBMARINE REPORTING
Specific submarine reporting requirements must be tailored to the scenario and clearly understood
by all parties prior to operations. Keeping the SOCA informed of contacts, search and engagement results,
intentions, and status is essential. Prompt contact, post-engagement, and periodic situation reports from
each submarine are key to the SOCA maintaining a master fused plot of operations, and the OTCs ability to
coordinate, allocate, or reassign assets as the operational situation evolves.
(NR) (NMM) Recommended communication traffic handling and event sequencing procedures are
addressed in ATP 18. Message formats for contact and periodic situation reports are contained in APP 4(B).
4175 CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS
Convoy communications will be conducted on International Maritime Mobile (IMM) single

frequency VHF channels. As a minimum, there is a need for:
a. A channel, with several alternatives, for communication between the Convoy Commodore and
the ships of the convoy.
b. A separate channel for communication between the OTC and the Convoy Commodore.
4176 — 4179 SPARE
4180 AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS
4181 MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (MPA) COMMUNICATIONS
a. Area Operations. MPA on area operations will establish two-way communications with their
shore-based controlling authority using the appropriate Maritime Air Communications Organization
(MATELO) frequencies. In addition, ground/air broadcasts are available. During area operations, the
MPAs first communications priority is to the MHQ. MPA operating on area operations will pass traffic to
the MHQ on the Air Reporting and Control net (ARCN), which operates in three modes RATT, voice, and
CW (RATT is designed to be the primary). Modes of operation and the primary and secondary frequencies
4-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
for the circuit are to be included in the Form Green/Brown/Brown Deviation to OTCs and submarine
operating authorities to allow the circuit to be monitored.
b. Aircraft on Direct Support Operations. These aircraft will maintain communications with
their shore-based controlling authority on MATELO until they join the force. Thereafter, they will
communicate with the specified agency within the force (e.g., force marshaller or ASW ACU), until they
depart the force. Normally, the OTC will exercise tactical control of aircraft through an aircraft control unit
(ACU), which will guard operational and safety frequencies. Whenever practicable, aircraft will monitor
MHQ ARCNs. Contact reports will not be sent to the MHQ unless ordered specifically by the OTC. During
direct support operations, the MPAs first communications priority is to the OTC. Subject to the Emission
Policy (EP), contact reports may be sent to the OTC on HF if contact is not possible on UHF. On departing
the force, aircraft will re-establish communications with their shore-based controlling authority on
MATELO. The following general communication procedures apply during direct support operations:
(1) RATT Procedures. MPA on direct support can use RATT:
(a) To pass joining messages.
(b) To overcome communication problems encountered when the identification safety range
(ISR) is greater than the UHF communication range.
(c) To allow exchange of tactical information between MPA and surface/subsurface units.
(d) (NC) (NMM) To allow submarines to operate Post Box and Blind Broadcast procedures.
(e) To provide the OTC secure communications with submarines operating in associated or
direct support.
(f) When necessary to clear urgent signal traffic from surface forces to shore authorities.
(2) UHF Procedures:
(a) Read-back procedures are not to be used.
(b) Secure RATT may be used on UHF circuits, if fitted, to achieve the communication
requirements listed in paragraph b(1).
(3) (NC) (NMM) SITREPs to OCA. If the EP permits, the aircraft is to transmit an encrypted en-
coded SITREP to the OCA on completion of an incident after informing the OTC of the shift of HF
channel. If this is not permissible while on task, the report is to be transmitted during the transit back to
base when the aircraft is at least 100 nm from the force. Detailed communication procedures that are to
be used on direct support operations are contained in ACP 176 and ATP 28.
c. Air/Submarine Operations.
(1) Communications between MPA and submarines will be primarily by UHF in the following pre-
ferred order:
(a) Secure voice.
(b) Secure UHF RATT.
(c) Uncovered UHF voice, using low-level code.
4-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) HF communications will normally be restricted to the interception of blind or indirect read-back
broadcasts by the submarine.
(NR) (NMM) Messages for relay via the MPA to other units or shore authorities are to be formatted
in accordance with ACP 127 procedures. (See ATP 28.)
d. Maritime Air Control Authorities (MACA) (may be a cell within the MHQ). All MACAs
will monitor circuits during MPA area and Direct Support operations. Messages received by a MACA
from MPA will be relayed on to the aircraft’s parent MACA.
e. MPA Control Nets General.
(1) A MACA, when required, will communicate with and control aircraft by the following types of
communication:
(a) Point-to-point communication.
(b) Air/ground/air communication.
(2) During area/surveillance operations, MPA will be under the control of the OCA/parent MACA;
however, other MACAs within the area should also be information addressees on message traffic. Dur-
ing Direct Support operations, MPA will be under the tactical control of the OTC.
4182 — 4184 SPARE
4185 HELICOPTER COMMUNICATIONS
Communications with helicopters place primary reliance upon radio, but visual signals may be used
for short-range communication (e.g., in launch and recovery operations) when a restrictive emission
policy is in force. The aircraft’s communication capability must be carefully considered when the emission
policy and communications plan are formulated.
(NC) (NMM) Helicopter communication fits are broadly detailed in ATP 29. When more specific
information is required, OPSTAT UNIT (see APP 4) may be used as a means of promulgation.
a. (NR) (NMM) Circuits. These will normally be specified in the OPTASK AIR (see APP 4) and
detailed in the COMPLAN. Circuits available for this function are described in ACP 176.
b. (NC) (NMM) Communications Relay. Some helicopters have a capability to monitor SLOT
buoys and may be used, subject to other screening commitments, to relay intercepted messages to the OTC
or SOCA (ASWC).
c. Tactical Data Links. Some helicopters have the capability to communicate with a parent ship
through a tactical data link.
4186 HELICOPTER CONTROL NETS GENERAL
a. Communication Circuits. Communication nets for helicopter control are detailed in ACP
176. Selection of a suitable circuit will necessarily be a function of the helicopter’s employment, but the
OTC must bear in mind the limited communication facilities available in most aircraft and control units.
Where interoperation with other types of aircraft is required (e.g., in ASW), it will normally be prudent to
use a common control circuit for both to aid information flow and to economize on communication
equipment and frequencies.
4-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Emission Security (EMSEC). Care must be taken that transmissions between ships and
aircraft are subject to the same EMSEC constraints as those between other force units. Details of EMSEC
procedures are in Chapter 5.
c. Voice Procedures. Voice procedures for helicopter control are in APP 1.
d. Brevity Code Words. Brevity code words used in helicopter control are in APP 7.
4187 — 4189 SPARE
4190 COMMUNICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL
a. General. When the OTC delegates tactical control of units in a force or group as described in
Chapter 1, there will be specific communication requirements between the OTC and appointed warfare
commanders and coordinators, and between warfare commanders and coordinators and their assigned
units. To meet these requirements, the OTC and warfare commanders and coordinators have certain
circuits, described in ACP 176, at their disposal.
b. Plans. When drafting a communications plan, the OTC and warfare commanders and
coordinators must consider the communications assets of units assigned. Smaller units can easily become
overburdened by too great a communication requirement. Requirements for manning the nets and the net
priorities should take into account each ships role as well as its abilities and limitations. To allow for
required maintenance and emergent casualties, communications plans should, as a goal, task no more than
90 percent of the communications equipment in any unit. To accomplish this, it may often be necessary to
combine some circuit requirements and/or assign guard ships for some nets. Communications plans should
include instructions for smooth transitions through various EMCON conditions. UHF airborne relay
planning must also be included to permit an uninterrupted flow of essential communications without
violating RADHAZ restrictions or EMCON plans.
c. Circuit Operation. Standard operating procedures apply to each circuit. The OTC and
coordinators will act as net control station (NCS) on their respective warfare nets. Warfare commanders or
their FTCs will be NCS for their respective coordination and reporting nets. NCS duties will be transferred
from a primary commander to an alternate commander when the warfare commander role is transferred. NCS
will be responsible for maintaining proper circuit discipline and ensuring that proper security procedures are
followed. Authentication and encryption will be used as required on all uncovered circuits in accordance with
the OTCs and/or EWCs instructions. Where possible, voice circuits should be operated in a secure mode.
d. Merger of Communications Circuits in Combined TG Operations. The merger of two

independent TGs into a combined TF will require one set of warfare nets to be secured while additional
units join the remaining nets. Having a number of units switching circuits can be complicated and, if not
handled correctly, cause a considerable amount of confusion. A suggested procedure for shifting warfare
coordination responsibilities upon joinup of two major TGs might involve the following:
(1) The OTC of the force/group being joined specify 24 hours in advance the EMCON plan in effect
and tactical communications circuits currently in use.
(2) Designated OTC issue a change to the OPGEN to reflect new warfare commander and coordi-
nator assignments (24 hours in advance).
(3) Designated OTC change delegated responsibilities to warfare commander and coordinator, if
required, by issuing change to the OPGEN (24 hours in advance).
(4) Post-joinup, warfare commanders and coordinators issue changes to warfare commander and
coordinator OPTASKs if required (12 hours in advance).
4-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM)
4200 INTRODUCTION
Satellites provide a method of line-of-sight communications over long distances. They have the
advantage of being little affected by ionospheric phenomena and thereby offer high availability and
reliability. SATCOM is limited in range only by the requirement for both shore and ship terminals to be
within the earth coverage of the satellite antenna, and communication links via satellite have therefore
assumed a most significant role in communication between the OTC afloat and commander ashore.
4201 SYSTEMS
Technical details and procedural instructions for use of SATCOM are given in national
publications, which may be released to other nations, as required. A number of commercial systems are
available for use by the merchant fleets of the world. These provide telephone and telex facilities and may
be used with appropriate off-line encryption to carry tactical traffic to suitably equipped auxiliaries.
4202 EMPLOYMENT
Military SATCOM systems generally provide secure transmissions and reception facilities for
telegraph, voice, and data traffic. They may be provided for strategic or tactical use.
a. Strategic Use. Because of their excellent long-distance performance, the majority of

SATCOM channels are used for strategic purposes between maritime forces and shore-based authorities.
Where traffic to and from a seaborne commander is heavy, satellite communications channels may be
configured as maritime rear link or full period terminations.
b. Tactical Use. Certain SATCOM systems are configured for tactical exchange of voice or data.
Where such a requirement is identified for strategic systems, this can be achieved, with the concurrence of
the operating authorities concerned, by transmission of traffic via shore for automatic retransmission over
satellite broadcast or rear link. This procedure may also be used for the radiation of a TF/TG broadcast
using shore-based transmitters, but the technique is expensive in satellite capacity and should be used
sparingly.
4203 ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) CONSIDERATIONS
a. Security. By virtue of the highly directional nature of satellite transmissions from the mobile
terminal, and the narrow beamwidth employed by them, SATCOM systems are less susceptible to D/F
than are HF transmissions. Nonetheless, they employ high power, generate significant sidelobes, and,
particularly at low angles of elevation, may be detected by enemy ESM at long ranges.
b. Effect on Friendly ESM. Because of the frequencies at which they operate, satellite
transmissions may affect the sensitivity of friendly ESM equipments. This factor, and the susceptibility of
SATCOM to intercept and D/F, must be considered when the emission policy is formulated.
c. ECM. Most SATCOM systems are vulnerable to ECM. Where SATCOM provides a primary
communications route, consideration should be given to the provision of alternative means of transmission
as a backup.
d. Limitations. When operating in high latitudes, continuous SATCOM is not possible because
of coverage limitations from geosynchronous orbits.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 5
Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (EAW)
SECTION I — OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION
5100 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This chapter covers the basic procedures and instructions for electronic and acoustic warfare
together with emission policy and control. The ability of a military force, as part of the overall C2W plan
(see AJP-1), to make effective use of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrum while, at the same time,
preventing or reducing the enemy use thereof, will play an important part in deciding the outcome of any
future conflict. A comprehensive and viable emission plan together with capable electronic and acoustic
warfare systems are as important as any other plan or weapon system in a commander’s arsenal, and must
be fully integrated into all military operations. For the purpose of this chapter, EAW means electronic
and/or acoustic warfare.
(NC) (NMM) Detailed electronic and acoustic warfare (EAW) information is contained in ATP 31
and ATP 28, respectively.
5101 DEFINITIONS
a. Electronic Warfare (EW). Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, which
encompasses the interception and identification of the electromagnetic emissions, the employment of the
electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of electromagnetic
spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
EW comprises three divisions:
(1) Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM). That division of EW involving action
taken to search for, intercept, and identify electromagnetic emissions and locate their sources for the
purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate de-
cisions involving ECM, EPM, and other tactical actions.
(2) Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). That division of EW involving actions taken to pre-
vent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, through the use of electromag-
netic energy. There are three subdivisions of ECM — electronic jamming, electronic deception, and
electronic neutralization.
(3) Electronic Protective Measures (EPM). That division of EW involving actions taken to
ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of the electro-
magnetic energy. There are two subdivisions of EPM — active EPM and passive EPM.
(a) Active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as necessary,
to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
(b) Passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical
features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.
b. Acoustic Warfare (AW). Military action to use the underwater acoustic spectrum to the
advantage of friendly forces by exploiting enemy emissions and controlling friendly emissions.
5-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
There are three divisions within AW:
(1) Acoustic Warfare Support Measures (AWSM). That division of AW involving actions
to search for, intercept, and identify radiated underwater acoustic energy for the purpose of exploiting
such radiation. The use of AWSM involves no intentional underwater acoustic emissions and is gener-
ally not detectable by the enemy.
(2) Acoustic Countermeasures (ACM). That division of AW involving actions taken to pre-
vent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. ACM involves intentional
underwater acoustic emissions for deception or jamming.
(3) Acoustic Protective Measures (APM). That division of AW involving actions taken to
ensure friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s use of acoustic
energy. APM involves anti-AWSM and anti-ACM, and may not involve underwater acoustic
emissions.
(4) The three divisions of electronic and acoustic warfare are parallel and complementary.
c. Frequency Management. Ensure frequency deconfliction and coordination, with particular

concern that safety frequencies are adequately assigned, throughout the force.
5110 DIRECTION AND COORDINATION
5111 GENERAL
The OTC/CWC is responsible for EAW; he may delegate functions in Table 1-8 to an Electronic
Warfare Coordinator (EWC) and Table 1-4/1-8 to an Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC). To
best exploit its potential, EAW policies and activities must be harmonized with other warfare policies and
activities. The OTC/CWC promulgates the Emission Policy (EP) for the force, which will be reflected in
the Emission Control Plan (EMCON Plan). To accomplish the mission, the electromagnetic and acoustic
environment in which the force will operate is a major factor of the situation assessment.
5112 FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY BE DELEGATED TO EWC/ASWC
a. Formulation of EMCON Plans. The EWC and the ASWC are the OTC’s/CWC’s principal
advisors on the formulation of his Emission Policy (EP). Once the OTC/CWC promulgates the EP, the
ASWC will develop the acoustic portions of the EMCON plans and the EWC will develop the electronic
portions. Both portions will then be incorporated into the force EMCON plans, which will be coherent in
intent and support the EP.
b. ESM/AWSM Activities. The EWC/ASWC assign the ESM/AWSM duties and guards as
appropriate. They perform the following functions, if delegated by the OTC/CWC:
(1) Issue the list of threat and target emitters (Electronic Order of Battle (EOB)).
(2) Assign the ESM/AWSM duties and ESM/AWSM guards as appropriate.
(3) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for submarine
support, and/or the OTC/CWC for surface support.
(4) Coordinate and control ESM/AWSM activities on the appropriate net.
(5) Collect, evaluate, recognize/classify intercepts, and disseminate data.
5-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(6) Correlate information obtained from own sensors with information available from other
sources.
(7) The EWC allocates racket numbers.
c. ECM/ACM Activities. The EWC/ASWC coordinate and control ECM/ACM activities

respectively within the force. Coordination with all warfare commanders is required. They perform the
following functions, if delegated by the OTC/CWC:
(1) Direct the employment of force decoys according to the policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.
(2) Coordinate the employment of active jamming and of electronic neutralization devices accord-
ing to the policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.
(3) Advise the OTC/CWC on planned responses.
(4) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for submarine
support, and/or the OTC/CWC for surface support.
(5) Advise the OTC/CWC, the SC, and warfare commanders on unit disposition to achieve the opti-
mum balance between ECM/ACM effectiveness and counter-surveillance posture.
(6) Promulgate plans to conduct electronic/acoustic deception according to the policy formulated
by the OTC/CWC.
(7) The EWC will provide tasking of ECM aircraft.
d. EPM/APM Activities. The EWC manages, monitors, coordinates, and may control EPM
within the force. In particular, he monitors compliance with the EMCON plan and assesses force
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and force electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The ASWC carries
out similar functions in APM. The EWC also manages the security aspect of force communications.
e. Anti-Intruder Activity. The EWC and warfare commanders may advise the OTC/CWC of
anti-intruder policy in peacetime or periods of tension.
f. Cryptological Activity. The EWC advises the OTC/CWC on the use of cryptological assets,
both organic and non-organic.
5113 INDIVIDUAL SHIP RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Each Commanding Officer is responsible for the defense of his ship. Therefore, under direct
attack, he may lift electronic and acoustic emission restrictions as necessary for self-defense.
b. Detached Unit. When detached, the commanding officer becomes responsible for
formulating the EP related to the ordered task, within the framework of the OTC/CWC’s overall EP.
5120 VOICE REPORTING
5121 PROCEDURES
(NR) (NMM) Procedures for EW voice reporting are in APP 1; those for AW are in APP 1 and APP 4.
5-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
5122 EW REPORTING OF CONFIDENCE LEVELS
a. Recognition of electronic emitters can be difficult, either because transmissions are short, or
because transmitted parameters are common to many emitters. False reports may not only lower the
confidence of the command in EW, but also may cause wrong decisions. Therefore, an operator is to
indicate his confidence in his assessment of an intercept.
b. Confidence levels as indicated are to be used in voice reporting:
(1) Confidence 1: Doubtful. The operator is unsure about the recognition of an intercept be-
cause it is based on estimated rather than measured information.
(2) Confidence 2: Possible. The operator has some reservations on the recognition of an inter-
cept because it is based on limited intercept information and/or falls within common parameters of other
emitters.
(3) Confidence 3: Probable. Recognition of an intercept based on measured parameters which,

although coinciding with those of the stated emitter, are common to some other enemy and/or friendly
emitters. The EWC may ask for the spot numbers of alternative emitters.
(4) Confidence 4: Certain. A recognition of an intercept based on measured parameters which

coincides accurately with those of the stated emitter.
5123 EW INTERCEPT BEARING ACCURACY
Bearing accuracy of an intercept must be reported as soon as it can be estimated to permit

triangulation of the source emitter. Bearing accuracy of any radar jamming experienced should be
reported. Accuracy should be reported by use of suffixes detailed at Article 2107.
5-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — (NC) (NMM) EMISSION POLICY (EP)
5200 (NC) (NMM) CONSIDERATIONS
a. The Emission Policy (EP) dictates the degree of freedom allowed in the use of electronic and
acoustic emitters in a force, the choice of which will be decided by the OTC’s/ CWC’s assessment and the
advantage which may be gained by the enemy from any interception of them. Silence on transmitters is the
normal condition and transmitting is the result of a deliberate decision to radiate. The resultant EP should:
(1) Reflect and support the OTC’s/CWC’s aim.
(2) Take account of the threat, capabilities, and tactics of the enemy.
(3) Cover all aspects of warfare and address all emissions including:
(a) Electro-optical, bridge dial illumination, cigarette glows, de-icing equipment, funnel exhaust,
and signal projectors.
(b) Radiated acoustic noise, including nonessential underwater transmissions, operation of

auxiliary machinery, cavitation, and nonessential crew activity.
(4) Provide sufficient warning by the use of pickets or specific units on which to base a change in the
policy.
(5) Allow for the reaction time of sensors and weapons that have been silent, and the time it takes to
build up a picture on which to fight effectively.
(6) Allow for the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force.
(7) Reflect the relative disposition of maritime units and areas of operation of supporting aircraft,
surface ships, and submarines.
(8) Allow for periodic systems checks and maintenance.
(9) Be sufficient for subordinate commanders to construct and recommend appropriate EMCON
plans. (See Article 5301.)
5201 (NR) (NMM) SILENT EMISSION POLICY
Transmissions should always be reduced to the absolute minimum required to achieve the aim of the
mission. The OTC/CWC must consider the advantages and disadvantages of a silent EP when formulating
the EP, and continuously review the need to transmit.
a. Some advantages of silent EP are:
(1) Deny passive information.
(2) Conceal identity of specific units.
(3) Assist own passive sensors.
(4) Achieve surprise.
5-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) Deny intelligence from communications.
(6) Deny fire control solutions to weapons fired on passive data.
(7) Support to antiradiation missile (ARM) measures.
(8) Provoke enemy emissions/radiations.
b. Some disadvantages of silent EP are:
(1) Reduction of warning time and range if enemy is silent.
(2) Reduction of tactical picture.
(3) Risk of surprise.
(4) Reduction of control and coordination.
5202 (NC) (NMM) ENEMY CONTACT
Once the enemy has been detected, it is important that the degree of relaxation correctly relates to the
degree of threat posed. Therefore, not all restrictions should necessarily be lifted at the first indication of
enemy presence.
5210 (NC) (NMM) BREAKING SILENCE
There are certain occasions when a commanding officer may break emission silence, although by
doing so he violates the plan in force. If he does, the OTC/CWC must be informed. The fact that silence has
been broken by a unit does not automatically change the policy in force. Any change must be reflected in
the EMCON plan and ordered by the OTC/CWC.
a. Standard occasions for breaking emission silence, which may be modified by the OTC/
CWC, are:
(1) To engage an enemy detected near or within weapon release range in self-defense or in close de-
fense of a HVU.
(2) To prevent imminent collision, grounding, or aircraft crash.
(3) When released by planned responses.
b. Standard occasions for breaking radio silence, which may be modified by the OTC/CWC or
aircraft controlling authority, are:
(1) To report contact with the enemy.
(2) To answer the authenticated call of a senior officer, including an instruction to acknowledge
immediately.
(3) To transmit a distress message.
(4) To prevent friendly units being fired upon by friendly forces. This includes reporting of ETA by
joining aircraft.
5-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) To report urgent defects which might prevent accomplishment of assigned mission.
(6) During exercises, to make communication and position checks as required by peacetime
regulations.
c. Examples of OTC’s/CWC’s modifications might include:
(1) Reporting unidentified radar, sonar, and ESM detections.
(2) Transmitting negative enemy contact reports.
5220 (NC) (NMM) POST-ATTACK EMCON AND COMSEC
On completion of any action that will have lifted restrictions on emissions and COMSEC, the
OTC/CWC/EWC/ASWC must ensure that a return to a firm control of EMCON is executed and that
COMSEC rules are re-imposed. This is in order to deny the enemy post-attack analysis from passive
sensors and will require him to conduct post-attack reconnaissance by other means.
5-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)
5300 EMCON CONSIDERATIONS
The overall EP is promulgated by operation order or signal and describes the policy in broad terms
with a brief explanation of rationale. It must be in sufficient detail for both subordinate commanders to
apply the EMCON plan and Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) to plan support operations accordingly.
The detailed control for each type of emission is achieved by an EMCON plan covering all
emissions. The OTC/CWC should promulgate, well in advance, a number of plans covering all options
related to the tactical situation and anticipated changes.
Table 5-1 contains the standard format of an EMCON plan. Methods of signaling EMCON are
explained below. Every effort should be made to ensure that air, surface, and subsurface units tasked in
support are aware of the force’s EMCON plan before arrival. In addition, the OTC/CWC should signal the
EMCON plan in force as part of the joining message.
5301 (NC) (NMM) EMCON OBJECTIVES
a. The EMCON Plan is derived from the Emission Policy and is used by the OTC/CWC to control
all emitters in order to:
(1) Gain maximum information.
(2) Deny information to the enemy.
b. The EMCON Plan must:
(1) Include all emitters.
(2) Be easy to interpret and understand.
(3) Be in effect at all times.
5310 CONSTRUCTION OF EMCON PLANS
a. In the EMCON Plan format (Table 5-1):
(1) Index Numbers are used to designate the columns assigned to each type of emitter. Spare
numbered columns should be used to designate specific emitters whenever it is necessary to issue sepa-
rate overriding instructions.
(2) Index Letters are used to designate the lines assigned to each type of unit. Spare lettered lines
may be used for particular units, or alternatively, a unit may be detailed to use a line other than that nor-
mally applicable by using the appropriate signal group from ATP 1, Vol. II.
b. The status of emissions required or allowed for each type of emitter by each type of unit should be
defined using a radiation status indicator (RSI) from Table 5-2. RSIs provide sufficient flexibility to meet
most situations. A blank space in any EMCON Plan is equivalent to the RSI “S” (silence). EMCON Plans
can be ordered and/or amended by Operation Order or MTMS directives, or by using signal groups from
ATP 1, Vol. II, and signaled to aircraft by using the appropriate brevity code word. Generally, original
EMCON plans are designated by letters; for example, EMCON Plan ALFA. Modified plans are designated
by the same letter as the original plan, followed by sequence number of the modification; for example,
5-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
SEARCH AI/FC/GMC
RADARS NAVAIDS ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES
HEIGHT FINDERS
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
38
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
INDEX NUMBERS 59
EQUIPMENT
TACTICAL UNITS
INDEX LETTERS
ALL JAMMERS
C/D BAND JAMMERS
E/F BAND JAMMERS
G/H BAND JAMMERS
I BAND JAMMERS
J BAND JAMMERS
K BAND JAMMERS
ALL BANDS
A/B BANDS
C/D BANDS
E/F BANDS
G/H BANDS
I BAND
J BAND
K BAND
CCA/ASI RADAR
ALL BANDS
E/F BANDS
G/H BANDS
I BAND
J BAND
K BAND
ALL NAVAIDS
UHF/VHF BEACON
LF/MF BEACON
RAD ALT DOPPLER
IFF 1/2/3 INTERROGATOR
IFF 1/2/3 TRANSPONDER
IFF MODE 4 INTERROGATOR 36
IFF MODE 4 TRANSPONDER 37
RADAR TRANSPONDER
TACAN
CHAFF CHARLIE
ALL DECM
ECHO ENHANCERS
RADAR DECOYS
COMM JAMMERS
A AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
B CRUISERS
C DESTROYERS/FRIGATES
D PATROL BOATS
E MINESWEEPER/HUNTER
F SUBMARINES
G LANDING SHIP/CRAFT
H
I
J MAIN BODY
K SCREEN UNITS
L PICKETS
5-9
M UNREP GROUP
N AMPHIBIOUS GROUP
O MERCHANTS/CONVOY
P
Q HELICOPTERS
R ASW AIRCRAFT
S ATTACK AIRCRAFT
T AEW AIRCRAFT
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
Table 5-1. Basic EMCON Plan Format
U MP AIRCRAFT
V RECON AIRCRAFT
W STRIKE AIRCRAFT
X TANKER AIRCRAFT
Y CAP AIRCRAFT
Z
AA
AB
AC
AD
AE
AF
AG
AH
NOTE
When index numbers are not sufficent, an OTC may allocate additional numbers within the equipment category by prefixing the numerical "1"
and repeating as much of the number series as is needed (for example, add 185, 186, and 187 under " radio communications" after 89)
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ORIGINAL 5-10
ALL EQUIPMENT 60
FATHOMETERS 61
UW TELEPHONE 62
TOWED DECOYS 63
SIMULATORS 64
IND ACTIVE DECOYS 65
SONAR BELOW 6 KHz 66
SONAR 6-15 KHz 67
SONAR ABOVE 15 KHz 68
EER/ACTIVE SONOBUOYS 69
SONAR JAMMERS 70
PROPELLER CAVITATION 71
ACOUSTIC
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
ALL UHF COMM 80
LINK UHF 81
UHF SHIP/SHIP 82
UHF SHIP/AIR 83
VHF 84
ALL HF/MF COMM 85
HF/MF SHIP/SHIP 86
HF/MF SHIP/SHORE 87
RADIO
HF/MF SHIP/AIR 88
LINK MF/HF 89
EHF SATCOM 180
COMMUNICATIONS
SHF SATCOM 181

UHF SATCOM 182
COMMERCIAL SATCOM 183
CELLULAR TELEPHONE 184
VISUAL COMM (DIR) 90
VISUAL COMM (OMNI) 91
STARSHELL/FLARES 92
PANEL/MARKER LGTS 93
IR DECOYS 94
ILLUMINATION IR 95
OPTICAL
IR COMM 96
LASERS 97
ELECTRO-OPTICAL
NAV/POSITION LGTS 98
99
PICKETS
CRUISERS
MAIN BODY
SUBMARINES
MP AIRCRAFT
HELICOPTERS
CAP AIRCRAFT
PATROL BOATS
UNREP GROUP
SCREEN UNITS
AEW AIRCRAFT
ASW AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT
STRIKE AIRCRAFT
RECON AIRCRAFT
ATTACK AIRCRAFT
TANKER AIRCRAFT
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
INDEX NUMBERS
LANDING SHIP/CRAFT
MERCHANTS/CONVOY
TACTICAL UNITS
MINESWEEPER/HUNTER
DESTROYERS/FRIGATES
I
J
Z
T
F
Y
X
V
S
P
K
E
B
A
U
R
N
H
D
C
Q
O
G
AF
AE
AB
AA
AH
AD
AC
AG
INDEX LETTERS
Table 5-1. Basic EMCON Plan Format (Cont.)
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 5-2. Radiation Status Indicators (RSIs)
The following RSIs indicate when equipment may be operated without seeking the OTC/CWC’s permission, or
operated outside the standard occasions for breaking silence:
A Aircraft May be operated if essential for safe operation of aircraft and helicopters.
B Night Between sunset and sunrise.
C Day Between sunset and sunrise.
D Distance When clear of nearest friendly unit or position designated. Distance to be

specified in miles (e.g., D30).
E Essential Transmission Essential transmissions maybe made without seeking the OTC/CWC’s per-
mission. (Note 1)
G Guard To be operated or guarded (COMMS) by unit designated on behalf of other

units. (Note 2)
S Silence No emissions permitted without the permission of the OTC/CWC or in accor-

dance with the standard occasions for breaking silence. Equipments that
“leaks” in dummy load or in standby should be switched off. (Note 3)
T Reduced Output Brilliance/output level reduced to the minimum level required for safety and/or
to obtain the required operational results.
U Transmitter Permitted Transmissions may be made. (Note 1)
X Specific Emissions The TCO/CWC must specify when the emitter may be used. (Note 4)
NOTES: 1. Units should transmit for as short a time as possible to achieve the aim, and should avoid emit-
ters that cause interference. Sonars may use random mode, scale, power, and frequency changes.
2. Details of guard ships and how they transmit information (e.g., data link) should be outlines in the
EP. The EMCON Plan must ensure that guard ships are provided with the means to transfer data to
the force. Guardship duties can be rotated at irregular intervals between appropriate units. RSI “G”
for communications should detail one unit for a named circuit (e.g., radar guard ship RSI “G” for HF
JAAWSC). This should not be confused with setting watch on circuits as detailed in the OPTASK
COMMS.
3. A blank space in any EMCON Plan is equivalent to the RSI “S” (silence).
4. XRAY is to be used to indicate unique occasions when an emitter may be used outside the stan-
dard occasions for breaking silence and the occasions governed by the other RSIs. These may be,
for example, the deployment of decoys against radar satellites, the use of FC radars for height find-
ing, or the use of IFF systems. The OTC/CWC is to specify these occasions for each column.
5-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
EMCON Plan ALFA ONE, ALFA TWO. Each modified plan should be considered to be a separate
EMCON plan. Units should keep a copy of each modified EMCON plan in order to be able to revert to an
earlier plan if required.
5320 (NC) (NMM) EMISSION DIAGRAMS
a. If the OTC/CWC needs emission diagrams, they should be promulgated within the Operation Order
or as part of the EMCON Plan. The following factors should be considered when preparing emission diagrams:
(1) Duration of each transmission period. Whenever possible, the duration of transmission should
be varied to reduce the probability of intercept.
(2) Random selection of emitters which operate at different frequencies. This reduces the probabil-
ity of intercept.
(3) Time required for the various emitters to go from a standby to radiate condition.
(4) Percentage of active acoustic and/or radar search required to meet mission objectives.
b. An example emission diagram is provided in Figure 5-1.
Emit (Radar device) in intervals:
Minutes Frequency Power

(percent)
00-10 D1 100
10-15 D3 50
15-18 D4 100
18-26 D2 100
26-38 D1 50
38-44 D3 100
44-55 D2 50
55-60 D4 100
Figure 5-1. (NU) (NMM) Emission Diagram Example
5-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW) TASKING
5400 (NC) (NMM) TASKING OBJECTIVES
a. The objective of EAW tasking is to ensure that:
(1) All emissions likely to be intercepted are covered by detection and analysis facilities.
(2) Active assets (e.g., ECM, active sonar, decoys, etc.) are deployed, briefed, and where appropri-
ate, pre-tuned to counter the threat.
b. Overall tasking policy is the responsibility of the OTC/CWC and should be adjusted to meet
changes in the tactical situation and equipment availability. The EWC, on behalf of the OTC/CWC, is
responsible for the promulgation of, and changes to, EW tasking signals. The ASWC is responsible for the
allocation, disposition, and tasking of acoustic resources.
5401 (NC) (NMM) ELECTRONIC WARFARE TASKING
a. Tasking Format. EW tasking is simplified by using a graphic format (such as the one shown in
Figure 5-2.)
b. Tasking Message. The EW tasking message is contained in APP 4.
5410 (NC) (NMM) ESM TASKING
a. Factors to be Considered. The EWC should take into account the following factors before
issuing his tasking instructions:
(1) Characteristics of enemy equipment, especially of threat emitters. Care should be taken to avoid
operator overload. In an expected dense signal environment, tasking of significant target radars should
be added to threat radars.
(2) Number, capabilities, and limitations of ESM equipment and associated platforms in the force.
(3) The disposition of units. There may be conflict between the requirements of different warfare
areas.
(4) The priority of communications intercepts versus radar intercepts.
(5) The number of communication circuits available.
(6) Duration of the operation, if known.
(7) Own emission policy.
b. Equipment Characteristics Affecting Tasking. Considerations affecting tasking of

individual items of ESM equipment are:
(1) High-probability, wideband, instantaneous frequency measurement (IFM) equipment should

normally be tasked to cover the whole of their bands and/or one of the sub-bands, if applicable.
(2) Low-probability narrowband equipment should be tasked to cover a portion of a frequency

band.
5-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
TARGET RADAR
THREAT RADAR
EW TASKING FORM
FREQUENCY (MHz)
2400 2600 2800 2900 3000 3900 4000

SPOT NO. NAME 2300 2500 2700 2850 2950 3300 3600 3950 4500
01134 (BN AS 15) X

T
01227 CROWN NEST X
H
03111 EGGHEAD X
R 03112 EYEGLASS X
E 03312 HEADBAND X
A 03525 STRONGHOLD X
03701 FINGERTIP X
T
UNIT EQUIPMENT TASKING FROM 050800Z TO 060800Z
E NORFOLK UAF
K. DOORMAN APECS II
S
0. FISHER DESMO
M
E3D LORAL
UNIT EQUIPMENT TASKING FROM 050800Z TO 060800Z
C EA6B ALQ-99
Notes: 1. The names and spot numbers are fictitious and only E/F band is shown.
2. Arrowheads indicate jammer tasking spot frequency.
3. ESM/ECM tasking is illustrative and does not reflect actual system capability.
Figure 5-2. (NU) (NMM) EW Tasking Format
(3) Units with automated recognition/classification equipment should be tasked to the frequency
range of threat emitters.
c. Threat and Target Emitters. A threat emitter is an emitter, normally associated with a
weapon system, the detection of which might indicate that an attack on the force is imminent or in progress.
A target emitter is an emitter, the detection of which would indicate the presence of enemy forces.
d. Threat and Target Emitter List (EOB). The OTC/CWC is to issue a list of threat and target
emitters in the tasking message. The list of threat emitters will vary according to the intelligence available
and the tactical situation. Attention must be paid to the fact that some surveillance emitters can be used for
targeting purposes and their data used to assist missile launch. Therefore, they are regarded as both target
and threat emitters, depending on the tactical situation.
5-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
5411 (NC) (NMM) ECM TASKING
a. Factors to be Considered when tasking ECM equipment:
(1) Characteristics of enemy equipment.
(2) Number and disposition of jamming, deception, and neutralization platforms.
(3) Characteristics of own equipment. Some jammers are ineffective against modern guidance and
homing systems, whilst others are for self-protection only.
(4) Jammers should be tasked as far as possible to the emitters against which the ship’s ESM equip-
ment is tasked.
(5) Emission Policy.
b. ECM Systems. These systems are divided into two main categories as follows:
(1) Area Defense Systems. These are the systems that are tasked at force level. Systems in-
clude force decoys and high-power noise and repeater jammers that may be capable of screening units
other than the jamming platform. The decoy deployment policy will be established by the OTC/CWC
and promulgated by operation order or signal.
(2) Self-Defense Systems. Self-defense systems include chaff launchers (for both deception
and seduction), IR and ARM decoys, and various types of jammers. As self-defense systems, employ-
ment of these assets resides with individual ships, unless otherwise ordered.
c. Planned Responses. The OTC/CWC may order planned responses to be used in reaction to
threats. When these are initiated, ships carry out the appropriate ECM responses. Careful consideration
should be given to planned responses when one or more area defense jammers are in force. Specific tasking
instructions should always be given in this instance.
5420 (NC) (NMM) ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING
The following factors should be considered in the allocation, disposition, and tasking of acoustic
warfare resources:
a. Anticipated threat, including emission characteristics of enemy forces.
b. Number and capabilities of own acoustic assets, including submarines and aircraft.
c. Predicted detection ranges for active and passive equipment, and predicted intercept ranges for
active sonars.
d. Radiated self-noise, including its effect upon own detection ranges, and assessed detection
ranges by enemy passive equipment.
e. Emission Policy.
5-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION V — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC SUPPORT

MEASURES (ESM/AWSM)
5500 INTERCEPTION, DETECTION, AND DIRECTION FINDING (DF) OF TRANSMISSIONS
a. The objective of ESM/AWSM search is to provide the tactical advantage of “first sighting” by
passive means. The first indication of an enemy’s presence may be provided by interception of his
emissions. In addition, early interception allows the timely preparation of countermeasures.
b. In order to conduct ESM/AWSM search for an enemy, complete and continuous coverage of the
frequency spectrum is required together with as wide a geographic dispersion of intercept equipment as
possible.
c. Intelligence sources may provide information on the frequencies emitted by the enemy and, in
certain cases, give actual frequencies used, or likely to be used. It is, therefore, possible for the OTC/CWC
to organize ESM/AWSM search to cover specific frequencies.
5510 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE (EMI) OF SEARCH EQUIPMENT BY OWN

TRANSMISSIONS
a. Interference caused by radiations from electronic transmitters of ships in company may reduce
the effectiveness of passive sensors. Radars, in particular, by reason of their short pulses at peak power,
produce powerful harmonics that can make reception in a sensitive search receiver difficult in adjacent
bands, and almost impossible in the same band. It is possible to reduce this interference by using a very
narrow bandwidth, a filter, or a suppression device in the receiver. This may result in a corresponding loss
of intercept probability.
b. Interference may also be caused by accidental radiations, such as sparking in motors or

generators, or by lack of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).
5511 ACOUSTIC INTERFERENCE OF SEARCH EQUIPMENT BY OWN TRANSMISSIONS
a. Interference caused either by own ship’s radiated noise or by active sonar transmissions can
reduce the effectiveness of sonar receivers both in own ship and other units in a force.
(1) Own ship’s radiated noise is sound that is inadvertently transmitted into the water, predomi-
nantly by machinery, cavitation from propellers, ship’s movement, and flow noise. These can be exacer-
bated by manmade noises caused by unsecured equipment and electrical/electronic circuits in the ship.
Radiated noise can be reduced but not eliminated by good husbandry of machinery, propellers, and gen-
eral securing of equipment throughout the ship.
(2) Sonar transmissions can cause mutual interference with other units operating in the same vicin-
ity, particularly when two frequencies are close. This can be received directly or through reverberations
that increase background noise. Interference can be reduced by placing units with similar sonar frequen-
cies on opposite sides of the screen.
b. Passive sonar can be confused by high acoustic levels; for example, units in a departure screen
streaming noisemakers/operating echo sounders/transmitting on UWT could mask the acoustic signature
of a heavy unit passing through the area from a listening submarine.
5-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
5520 (NC) (NMM) RECORDING ENEMY EMISSIONS
The recording of enemy emissions provides valuable information for intelligence data bases. Every
opportunity to record received emissions should be exploited. The data will be held in national and NATO
data bases like the NATO Emitter Data Base (NEDB). The NEDB is the primary source of data for
non-communication emitters.
5530 (NC) (NMM) LOCALIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF ENEMY EMISSIONS
5531 (NC) (NMM) GENERAL
Once an unknown emitter has been detected, immediate action is required to provide early warning
of possible enemy threats. The unknown emitter should be recognized/classified using all parameters
available. Its location should be determined by triangulation. Speed is of the essence and timely early
warning may not permit a detailed analysis.
5532 (NC) (NMM) RECOGNITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND IDENTIFICATION
a. Recognition or classification is aided by:
(1) Comparing parameters with current intelligence (or friendly equipment characteristics) by
manual or computer-assisted search of threat libraries.
(2) Correlating data with data derived from other sensors.
(3) Correlating data with intelligence information.
(4) Operators’ experience.
(5) Contact motion analysis (CMA).
b. Identification of an emitter may not be possible at this early stage without further analysis or
because of ambiguities. In such cases, the emitter must be treated as an unknown.
5533 (NC) (NMM) DISPOSITION OF UNITS
When stationing units, the following factors should be taken into account for localization:
a. To obtain satisfactory triangulation, a broad baseline is necessary. Useful bearing cuts are
between about 30° and 150°. The optimum length of the baseline will depend on the sensitivity and bearing
accuracy of the equipment. To conduct triangulation, ESM units need to communicate. This may be
restricted by the Emission Policy in force, unless a standard occasion for breaking radio silence can be
invoked.
b. To avoid mutual interference it may be necessary for units conducting passive search to be
separated from those using emitters in the same frequency band. Alternatively, emitters may be directed to
transmit away from passive search units.
c. The need to have adequate cover in the direction of a known threat.
d. The requirement to meet other needs, such as sonar and radar coverage, or communications and
weapon range.
5-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VI — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

COUNTERMEASURES (ECM/ACM)
5600 (NC) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC COUNTER-

MEASURES
a. General. ECM/ACM is action taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the
electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. There are three subdivisions of ECM/ACM: jamming, deception,
and neutralization.
b. Employment.
(1) ECM/ACM are weapon systems and must be coordinated with other weapons to counter air,
surface, and subsurface threats. They involve deliberate reflection, jamming, radiation, or re-radiation
of emissions and are detectable by the enemy. They are further divided into area and self-defense
countermeasures.
(2) ECM/ACM can be used against all enemy emissions, including communications, and can con-
tribute significantly to the defense of a force under attack. They provide the OTC with the ability to deny
or, at least, reduce the effectiveness of enemy coordination, control, communications, reconnaissance,
and weapons systems. When employed against missiles or homing torpedoes, ECM/ACM can be used
for confusion, distraction, and seduction.
5610 (NC) (NMM) JAMMING
The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of emissions with the object of impairing the use
of communications, sensors, and weapons being used by an enemy.
5611 (NC) (NMM) THE OBJECTIVE AND EFFECTS OF JAMMING
a. The objective of jamming is to reduce the fighting effectiveness of the enemy by degrading the
overall performance of his communications, sensors, and weapons systems.
b. The following effects may also take place:
(1) Create an additional load on the enemy’s other electronic and acoustic facilities.
(2) Cause confusion to the enemy’s operators.
c. Successful jamming is dependent upon knowledge of the enemy’s command, control and
communications and his weapon systems.
5612 (NC) (NMM) JAMMING CONSIDERATIONS
When jamming, the following should be considered:
a. Loss of Tactical Surprise. The start of jamming may give the first warning to the enemy of
own presence or of the imminence of operations.
b. Localization. The enemy can DF or localize the jamming transmitter. Since certain weapons
have a home-on-jam (HOJ) capability, the operation of jammers must be carefully considered.
c. Interference With Own Units and Equipment. Jammers may interfere with:
5-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Friendly equipment using similar frequencies in the vicinity of the jammer.
(2) Internal devices within the jamming unit.
(3) Decoy effectiveness.
5613 (NC) (NMM) CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC JAMMING
a. Subject to policies established by appropriate higher authority, the responsibility for the control
and organization of jamming rests with the OTC/CWC, although in some cases this function may be
delegated to the EWC.
b. The OTC/CWC should order:
(1) Transmissions that may be jammed without further orders.
(2) The range beyond which jammers should not be used for fear of premature disclosure.
(3) Frequency bands in which jammers should be prepared to jam.
c. The arrangements for jamming should be such that all important enemy targets are covered.
When sufficient units are available, jamming guards should be detailed in pairs.
d. The two methods of jammer control are:
(1) Positive — The OTC/CWC or delegated authority will control the use of all equipment in the
force.
(2) Veto — Units employ their own equipment, keeping the OTC/CWC or delegated authority in-
formed. The OTC/CWC or delegated authority may override the actions.
5620 (NC) (NMM) COMMUNICATIONS JAMMING
a. Jamming of communications, more than any other type of jamming, is subject to policies
established by higher authorities.
b. Although special equipment may be designed for jamming communications, it is possible to use
normal communication transmitters, provided the transmission is suitably modulated.
c. The omnidirectional nature of most communication antennas leaves them vulnerable to jamming
from any direction. The jamming antenna is also normally omnidirectional, so that multiple targets can be
jammed when desired.
d. The effectiveness of jamming will depend on:
(1) Relative positions of the jammer, transmitter, and receiving stations.
(2) Power of the jammer and communication transmitters.
(3) Type of communication signal that is being jammed.
5-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
5630 (NC) (NMM) DECEPTION
The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, or reflection of energy in a manner intended to

mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use of information received by his sensors. If deception is to be
effective, careful coordination is required to ensure that all sources of information to the enemy give the
same misleading picture.
5631 (NC) (NMM) ACTIVE DECEPTION
a. Deception repeaters are either on-board or off-board systems that return a false echo to the
receiver. They use echo enhancement, false target generation, and break-lock techniques. The echoes may
be altered to change range, bearing, and number or size of echoes. Deception can be:
(1) Manipulative — By changing the characteristics of single pulses.
(2) Imitative — By processing pulses without altering their characteristics or generating new pulses
with similar characteristics.
b. Noise jammers introduce energy into an enemy sensor to create a deceptive threat axis or mask
own intentions.
5632 (NC) (NMM) PASSIVE DECEPTION
The introduction of alternative echoes into an enemy’s sensor to mislead an operator or weapon
system. These echoes may be produced by decoys.
5650 (NC) (NMM) ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION
The deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or permanently damage

enemy devices that rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum. This implies the use of directed
energy systems.
5-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VII — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC PROTECTIVE

MEASURES (EPM/APM)
5700 GENERAL
a. The friendly use of the electronic and acoustic spectrums, with minimum risk of detection by the
enemy, is achieved as follows:
(1) The OTC/CWC issues his Emission Policy (EP).
(2) The EP is promulgated, taking into account current communication or emission security
(COMSEC/EMSEC) guidance.
(3) The EWC/spectrum manager produces EMCON/frequency management plans, based on the
EP, that friendly units should adhere to, unless released by standard occasions for breaking radio si-
lence, for instance.
b. Enemy ECM/ACM can be protected against by technical and tactical antijam measures.
5710 (NC) (NMM) EPM/APM CONSIDERATIONS
The following factors and measures to counter enemy ESM/AWSM should be considered:
a. Atmospheric and oceanographic conditions.
b. Directional transmissions.
c. Frequency management (e.g., frequency shifting, use of non-ionospheric propagation, and use of
low-probability of intercept (LPI) techniques.
d. The extent of which communications circuits may be used and the degree of security required.
e. Use of minimum power.
f. Reduction of transmissions, including intermittent policy and avoiding the use of unique emitters.
g. Technical alteration of emission parameters.
h. Use of War Reserve Modes (WARM).
5720 (NC) (NMM) REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECM/ACM
The enemy’s use of ECM/ACM can be protected against by using measures against jamming,
deception, and neutralization.
5721 (NC) (NMM) REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JAMMING
Measures to protect against jamming include:
a. Destruction of the jammer.
b. Dissemination of accurate information from unjammed units.
5-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Disposition of assets.
d. Technical EPM/APM measures in equipment.
e. Frequency shifting (see Table 5-3).
f. Communication antijam plans.
g. Sensor antijam plans.
h. Frequency diversity.
5722 (NC) (NMM) MEASURES AGAINST DECEPTION
Protective measures against deception include:
a. Frequency diversity.
b. Exchange and comparison of data within a force to eliminate false information.
c. Disposition of assets.
d. Use of technical EPM/APM measures.
e. Frequency shifting and authentication of communication circuits.
f. Discreet identification.
5723 REDUCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTRONIC NEUTRALIZATION
Measures to protect against electronic neutralization include:
a. Physical protection.
b. Technical EPM features.
5724 (NC) (NMM) MEACONING, INTERFERENCE, JAMMING, AND INTRUSION (MIJI)
a. Meaconing is the deception of a navigation aid, such as TACAN or DME, with the aim of
decoying an aircraft from its intended course or destination. The term “meaconing” can also be applied to
the seduction of mobile SATCOM aerials by an airborne platform. In both cases, meaconing is achieved by
transmitting an alternative signal. In intrusion, an enemy gains access to a communication system (voice or
data link) and manages to insert false data or instructions. Jamming and interference normally involve the
use of electromagnetic energy to degrade communication and radar/weapon systems to varying degrees.
b. Whenever a MIJI incident is experienced, the OTC/EWC should be informed immediately.

The EWC should attempt to identify the source of the MIJI, so that the necessary actions can be taken to
reduce the effects. The area EW coordination cell (EWCC), may be able to assist in the identification of
MIJI sources.
5-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 5-3. (NU) (NMM) Standard Communication Antijam Measures/Procedures
MEASURE DESIGNATOR
Frequency shift to column or frequency(ies) on circuit(s) nominated. ONE
Start parallel keying on additional column(s) or frequency(ies) ordered. TWO
Change from current column to nominated column in COMPLAN or- THREE

dered.
Change from day to night or night to day frequency as appropriate. FOUR
OTC/CWC will direct units to part of radio spectrum clear of jamming FIVE
after ESM search.
Activate TF/TG MF. SIX
Set watch on underwater telephone. SEVEN
Revert to morse on this circuit. EIGHT
NOTES: 1. Procedures for this use of antijam meansures are contained in APP 1.
2. Measure may be ordered on the affected circuit or any other usable circuit, on the
antijam coordination circuit, or by prearranged visual or acoustic signal.
3. Where possible, one station is to remain on the affected circuit(s) to occupy the
jammer.
5-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VIII — AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION
5800 (NC) (NMM) ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION CELL (EWCC)
a. EW impacts on all warfare activities. This impact has necessitated the creation of an at-sea EW
coordinator (EWC). The EWC, acting on behalf of the OTC/CWC, coordinates the activities of EW assets
within the force. It is essential that both at-sea and shore-based commanders at all levels have experienced
EW staffs to coordinate areawide EW assets and activities. To provide this intercommand coordination
function, an electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) should be established by a commander in his
area of responsibility (AOR) when a joint force or more than one force are employed, thereby maximizing
the impact of limited EW resources.
b. The EWCC is the commander’s mechanism for coordinating EW assets within his AOR. It will
be established as an integral part of the operations staff at the level(s) deemed appropriate to support the
operation, and will provide the means of coordinating all EW activities.
c. EW efforts of the force managed by the EWC will be coordinated by the EWCC with those of all
other forces in the commander’s AOR to achieve overall control of the electromagnetic spectrum. These
coordination actions executed by the EWCC will serve to support the commander’s overall operational plan.
5801 (NC) (NMM) EWCC RESPONSIBILITIES
Consistent with the resources available, EWCC responsibilities include, but are not necessarily
limited to:
a. Planning.
(1) Prepare EW aspects of operations plans, orders, and data bases, including recommendations on
Rules of Engagement (ROE) for EW and NATO Precautionary System (NPS) measures.
(2) Make recommendations to the commander on tasking component commanders to provide EW

support as required.
(3) Identify requirements for intelligence support to EW operations.
b. Coordination.
(1) Coordinate activities of joint and single Service EW components.
(2) Coordinate administrative, logistic, and communication support to EW resources.
(3) Recommend EW targets that support the commander’s C2W strategy and suppression of enemy
air defense (SEAD) campaign.
(4) Coordinate and prioritize requests for EW support.
(5) Request EW support.
(6) Coordinate EW mutual support.
(7) In coordination with other cells and agencies, develop, update, and maintain comprehensive
EW data bases.
5-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Monitoring.
(1) Ensure that all possible sources of EW information are exploited.
(2) Ensure timely dissemination of EW-derived data.
(3) Assist the commander in assessing the effects of hostile and friendly EW, and aid the CIS staff in
frequency deconfliction.
(4) Maintain a current assessment of the EW resources available to the commander.
(5) Disseminate tactical Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) updates obtained by nonorganic assets to
subordinate EW units.
d. Direction.
(1) Allocation of EW resources.
(2) Implementation of EW plans.
(3) Supervision of EW procedures.
(4) Supervision of force EPM, including revising the Emissions Policy.
5802 (NC) (NMM) ADDITIONAL EWCC CONSIDERATIONS
a. The EWCC will continually collect and process information relevant to the conduct of
operations. This will include maintenance of comprehensive data bases for:
(1) Electronic Order of Battle (EOB).
(2) Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).
(3) Areawide military, civil, and civilian frequency spectrum usage.
(4) Friendly and enemy EW equipment capabilities.
(5) Meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion (MIJI) incidents.
b. These data bases will be valuable tools for both afloat and ashore commanders, particularly in the
areas of frequency management and tasking of limited EW resources.
c. A fundamental responsibility of the EWCC is development of a JRFL to map use of the

electromagnetic spectrum within the area. It is composed of:
(1) Taboo frequencies — Friendly frequencies on which jamming or other intentional interference
is prohibited.
(2) Protected frequencies — Friendly frequencies on which interference is prohibited.
(3) Guarded frequencies — Enemy frequencies used as a source of information and on which jam-
ming is therefore controlled.
5-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. The JRFL is vital to prevention of unintentional interference and assists in optimizing the use of
limited resources. The list is continually updated by the EWCC staff, who have specific knowledge of
operational requirements.
e. The EWCC will maintain the JRFL for its AOR. It will need access to the radar frequency and
communications plans of any in-area maritime force(s) to resolve the inevitable conflicts. This two-way
flow of information is vital to the prevention of fratricide.
5-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 6
General Warfare Instructions
SECTION I — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
6100 INTRODUCTION
In the conduct of peacetime operations, maritime units normally base their conduct on International
Law, the International Rules of the Road, and the Geneva Convention. Those units under national
command are further guided by national instructions, while those units under the operational command of
the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) conform to NATO instructions. The national/NATO instructions
providing this supplementary guidance are designated as Rules of Engagement (ROE).
ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances
conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or action which might be construed as provocative, may, or
may not, be applied. ROE are not to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. With the exception of
self-defense, during peacetime and operations prior to a declaration of counter aggression, ROE provide
the sole authority to NATO forces to use force. Following a declaration of counter aggression, ROE
generally limit the otherwise lawful use of Force.
6110 PLANNED RESPONSES
a. Initial Responses. As very short advanced warning of an attack may occur, it is essential that
initial responses to specific detections be planned and promulgated by the OTC. To ensure quick reactions,
planned responses should be:
(1) Matched to the actual threats.
(2) Promulgated so as to permit rapid updating.
(3) As simple as possible.
b. Promulgation. Unless otherwise directed in planned responses, the implementation of such a

plan carries with it the automatic upgrading of the appropriate threat warning to RED.
6-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING
6200 INTRODUCTION
This section describes the process of picture compilation, which is fundamental to maritime
operations, and scouting, which is the observation of the surrounding environment.
(NR) (NMM) More details of the methods for gathering information and exploitation of the
recognized picture are contained in the relevant warfare publications: ATP 18, ATP 28, ATP 31, and ATP 34.
6201 PICTURE COMPILATION
In all maritime operations, ranging from peacetime through increasing tension to hostilities, it is
necessary to compile a plot of surface, air, and subsurface contacts.
The process of all actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot is called picture compilation.
In maritime operations, picture compilation will normally be executed to support decision making
in relation to the mission. The nature of the mission will dictate the importance of the plot and what
information is to be derived from it.
In support of the overall plan, the OTC and/or delegated authorities are to develop, formulate, and
implement the picture compilation plan.
6210 THE PICTURE COMPILATION PLAN
The picture compilation plan should take into account the following three items:
a. General considerations.
b. Elements of picture compilation.
c. The process of picture compilation.
6220 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
General considerations in developing the picture compilation plan are:
a. Environment.
b. Resources.
c. Operational situation.
6221 ENVIRONMENT
There are three basic elements of the environment which should be considered:
a. Geographic location of the area of operations (e.g., open ocean, inshore).
b. Environmental factors (e.g., oceanographic, meteorological, atmospheric, etc.).
c. Familiarity with the geographic location and environmental factors.
6-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6222 RESOURCES
The OTC or delegated authorities should assess all resources available to support the picture
compilation plan:
a. Intelligence information.
b. The capabilities and limitations of the available assets and their sensors and the probability of
gaining contact with them.
c. Dissemination capabilities (e.g., data link systems, voice communications, messages).
6223 OPERATIONAL SITUATION
In maritime operations, the operational situation will significantly affect the production and
implementation of the picture compilation plan. Important elements are:
a. Mission.
b. Threat.
c. Peacetime, time of tension, time of war.
d. Rules of Engagement (ROE).
e. Directives from superior authority.
6230 ELEMENTS OF PICTURE COMPILATION
In general terms, picture compilation should result in the determination of the following four
elements:
a. WHAT:
(1) Environmental descriptors (surface, subsurface, land, air and space).
(2) Identity (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral, assumed friend, friend).
b. WHERE:
(1) Position.
(2) Bearing.
(3) Area of probability.
(4) Height.
(5) Depth.
c. WHITHER:
(1) Course.
6-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Speed.
d. WHEN:
(1) Time of contact report of information in the report.
All elements should be amplified if possible or required (e.g., type, class, nationality, Doppler,
behaviour, time late, etc.).
6240 THE PROCESS OF PICTURE COMPILATION
Picture compilation can be subdivided into five processes:
a. Detection.
b. Localization.
c. Recognition.
d. Identification.
e. Dissemination.
6241 DETECTION
a. The detection process includes the employment of sensors in a certain area or volume, to
determine the presence or absence of contacts or contact-related data. The presence of contacts or
contact-related data should stimulate the other four processes.
b. The detection process can be aimed at the detection of specific contact(s) in a clear-cut area.
c. Probability of gaining contact depends on the following:
(1) Sensor probability of detection (sensor’s sweep width).
(2) Coverage factor.
(3) Frequency of cover.
(4) Duration of mission.
(5) Type and behaviour of target.
(6) Time late and last known position.
(7) Operator performance.
(8) Environmental and geographic factors.
d. These factors should be applied to the conduct of scouting missions against surface and
subsurface targets. As it is often impossible to assign values to these factors because of the problems in
predicting sensor performance and target behaviour, the probability of gaining contact is difficult to
determine. However, broad values for both coverage factor and frequency of cover may be required in
planning.
6-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
e. (NC) (NMM) In such cases, the following values of sweep width may be used:
(1) Sonar — Surface ships — twice tactical sonar range.
(2) Radar — 70 percent of twice maximum range of detection.
(3) Visual by aircraft in accordance with Table 6-1 of ATP 31.
(4) ESM — 70 percent of twice maximum range (provided target is making electromagnetic
emissions).
6242 LOCALIZATION
The localization process includes the employment of sensors to determine the positional
information and movements of a contact (WHERE/WHITHER). The positional information, which might
be an area of probability or a bearing, can be relative to a platform, absolute, or in a grid system.
6243 RECOGNITION
The recognition process includes the employment of sensors in order to determine characteristics of
a contact. The collected characteristics should be compared with reference data which can lead to
correlation, with a level of confidence. The degree to which recognition will have to be executed should be
ordered by the appropriate authority and can range from very rough (e.g., combatant/ merchant) to fine
(e.g., name of contact). In general, recognition is the interpretation of data collected by sensors. The
recognition confidence levels which can be used are:
a. Certain Target. Positively recognized by type, visually or electro-optically, and by a

competent person and continuously tracked after initial recognition.
b. Probable Target.
(1) A certain target that has been tracked intermittently and is confidently considered to be the same
target, or
(2) A contact viewed by imaging radar whose image quality provides strong cumulative evidence
with positive indicators that are consistent with a type of enemy unit, or
(3) Strong, cumulative information based on any two of the following:
(a) A contact with an electronic emission unique to a type of enemy unit.
(b) A contact with acoustic emissions unique to a type of enemy unit.
(c) In a position predicted by enemy or intelligence reports.
(d) Sighted visually or using electro-optics but not positively recognized.
(e) Radar target with tracking and/or formation consistent with that expected of the enemy.
(f) Active sonar contact with tracking and/or formation consistent with that expected of
the enemy.
(g) Missile release by target.
6-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(h) A contact viewed by imaging radar whose image quality provides indicators that are
consistent with a type of enemy unit.
c. Possible Target. A contact that has a lower degree of recognition than that required for
probable. The confidence of the recognition must be amplified as follows:
(1) High Confidence — A contact which satisfies only one of the criteria required for probable.
(2) Low Confidence — A contact which has indications that it may satisfy the criteria and further
investigation is required.
6244 IDENTIFICATION
The identification process includes the assignment of one of the six standard identities to a detected
contact (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral, assumed friend, friend). The assignment of a standard identity
will be executed by the appropriate or designated authority, based upon the available data (mostly
localization and/or recognition data) and a set of rules (identification criteria), laid down by the appropriate
authority. Table 6-1 provides examples of identification methods and criteria.
6245 DISSEMINATION
The dissemination process overlaps the previous four phases and includes the use of data links,
voice communications, and messages in order to transfer data of contacts between two or more units/
platforms.
6246 — 6249 SPARE
6250 SCOUTING
6251 INTRODUCTION
The considerations and processes described in the previous paragraphs are applicable to all areas of
warfare. However, each type of warfare has its own special features which will impact on the methods and
processes for compiling the plot. It is the responsibility of the OTC and/or delegated authorities to
promulgate specific instructions for different warfare areas in advance as stated in Chapter 1.
6252 AIM
The aim of scouting is the observation, either systematic or not, of the surrounding environment
executed by all available means in a particular area.
6253 SCOPE
a. In maritime warfare, the generic term “scouting” is used to describe all surveillance and
reconnaissance activities as indicated in Figure 6-1.
b. Only tactical scouting will be considered since strategic scouting is beyond the purpose of this
publication.
c. Scouting operations may be tasked against any vehicle or area. However, since deployed
maritime forces have a continuous need for information about the enemy or potential enemy, they are
constantly engaged in tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, and thus units may contribute to scouting
whether or not specifically tasked. Scouting operations are designed to investigate, detect, identify,
6-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-1. List of Track Identification Methods and Criteria
The following list, which is not exhaustive, is intended to give examples of identification methods and
criteria that can be used by the OTC or delegated authority.
VISUAL (including electro-optics)
- Contact positively identified

- Contact identified but not positively
- Opening of fire (guns, missiles ...)
- Wrong reply to a visual identification signal
- No reply to a visual identification signal
- Ship or aircraft showing no lights
ELECTRONIC
- Contact(s) less than 10 (or n) degrees from a communications intercept bearing (or at an intersec-
tion of two bearings)
- Contact(s) less than 10 (or n) degrees from a bearing (or at an intersection of two bearings) of a
radar or other electronic transmission
- Contact(s) less than 10 degrees from a jamming bearing
- Contacts not responding to an IFF/SIF interrogation
- Contacts giving wrong reply to an IFF/SIF interrogation
- Electronic emission identified as that of a missile guidance system
- Electronic emission corresponding to a fire control radar trained towards
- Electronic emission with changing characteristics (frequency, scan, PRF)
- Airborne radar transmissions associated with data link transmission
ACOUSTIC
- Contact with acoustic emissions

- Passive sonar intercept of a unit
- Passive buoy intercept of a unit
BEHAVIOR
- Contact in a position predicted by enemy or intelligence reports

- Contact closes within a specific range
- Contact closes from an expected direction
- Contact proceeds at excessive speed
- Contact operating airborne vehicles
- Contact correlates with known PIM, patrol area, or flight plan of own units
- Contact shows hostile intent
- Contact shows hostile act
- Change of speed greater than 5 knots
6-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FUNCTION SCOUTING
OPERATIONS
SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE
MISSION PATROL SEARCH
FIXED STATION RECTANGULAR

METHOD LINEAR SECTOR
CROSSOVER EXPANDING SQUARE
AREA INTERCEPTIVE
RANDOM
DETECTION
PHASES LOCALIZATION
IDENTIFICATION
RECOGNITION
PRE-HOSTILITIES
HOSTILITIES
TASKS
SHADOWING TATTLETALE MARKING SHADOWING ATTACK
HARASSMENT
Figure 6-1. Scouting Description
localize, report, and monitor if required. Occasionally, specific tasks may be ordered to accomplish more
limited needs, such as the hampering of the opposition’s movement.
d. The relationship between the various types of operations, missions, methods, and tasks are
illustrated in Figure 6-1.
6254 PLANNING OF SCOUTING OPERATIONS
a. Selection Criteria. The type of operation, mission, method, or task to be used will depend on
the situation and vehicles available and may also depend on the ROE in effect. Although Figure 6-1
illustrates a progression of all the above, the sequence may be initiated or terminated with any operation, as
appropriate.
b. Selecting Units and Sensors.
(1) Units. Surface units, submarines, and aircraft may be assigned to conduct a scouting operation.
Coordinated operations are encouraged, where possible, to maximize the advantages of each kind of
unit.
(2) Sensors. Sensor selection is partially limited by the type of unit tasked. The controlling au-
thority may specify the sensor(s) to be used by giving adequate emission policy. It is usually better to al-
low the unit a choice of sensor(s) as selection often depends on local operational and environmental
6-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
factors. Selection also depends on the ROE in force as they are a primary consideration in selecting co-
vert or overt action and are therefore a factor in selecting the type of sensors to be used.
c. Overt and Covert Tactics. Scouting can be carried out overtly or covertly and the tactical
implications must be considered before missions are ordered.
(1) Overt Tactics. In general, overt tactics are adopted when concealment of the unit’s task is un-
desirable, unnecessary, or impracticable, and/or the need for speed in gaining contact overrides the need
for concealment.
(2) Covert Tactics. The term, “covert,” applied to air operations, should be interpreted as “dis-
guised,” rather than as “passive,” because an aircraft may need to use radar occasionally to skirt uniden-
tified contacts at a safe stand-off distance based upon expected weapon envelopes of threat units. In
general, covert tactics are adopted to:
(a) Avoid detection of the unit or at least minimize the warning to enemy defenses.
(b) Deny the enemy continuous intelligence of the unit.
(c) Force the enemy to use active sensors.
(d) Deceive the enemy.
6255 SCOUTING METHODS
As indicated in Figure 6-1, scouting consists of surveillance and reconnaissance activities.
a. Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places,

persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; specifically, in maritime
surveillance, to detect and determine the number, identity, or movement of aircraft, missiles, surface, or
subsurface vehicles. Surveillance operations in peacetime are normally a national responsibility. NATO
Surveillance Coordination Centers (NSCC) coordinate maritime surveillance operations in order to
optimize the effort and the information obtained. Moreover, contingency plans are available to expand the
NATO surveillance effort when the situation so dictates. Since forces under different operational and
tactical control may participate in surveillance operations, the command and control relationships detailed
in Chapter 1 are not always applicable. However, when local coordination is required, the area
headquarters may designate an On-Scene Surveillance Coordinator (OSSC) as tactical coordinator. The
OSSC should:
(1) Establish communications with other forces involved in the same operation.
(2) Inform all units about his intentions.
(3) Dispose units in order to optimize efforts and resources.
(4) Send all the appropriate reports.
(5) Inform the concerned headquarters when assuming/passing his duty.
NOTE
(NR) (NMM) Air and surface surveillance are described in ATP 31; subsurface surveillance in
ATP 18.
6-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Reconnaissance. An operation undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection

methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
Reconnaissance operations are often classified according to the purpose for which they are undertaken
(e.g., intelligence, ice, or beach reconnaissance) or according to the means employed in obtaining the
information (e.g., radar or ESM reconnaissance). Reconnaissance missions may be conducted by satellite,
aircraft, submarines, or surface units. It is a more limited operation than surveillance.
6256 SURVEILLANCE METHODS
There are two methods to conduct a surveillance mission:
a. Patrol.
b. Search.
6257 PATROL
a. General. A patrol is a detachment of units sent out for the purpose of gathering information or
systematic and continuing investigation along a line to detect or hamper enemy movements.
b. Basic Types of Patrol. The four basic types of patrol are fixed station, linear, cross-over,
and area.
c. Ordering a Patrol. The OTC or controlling authority should promulgate some or all of the
following:
(1) Aim of the patrol.
(2) Type of patrol.
(3) Limits of the barrier line or location and dimensions of the patrol area.
(4) Sequence of ship and their initial position.
(5) Patrol guide.
(6) Start and duration of the patrol.
(7) Patrol speed.
(8) Assumed enemy course and speed.
(9) Sweep width.
(10) Direction and length of legs.
(11) EMCON plan.
(12) Tasking of passive sensors.
(13) Reporting procedures.
6-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(14) Action on gaining contact.
(15) Action on completing the patrol.
NOTE
(NR) (NMM) An aircraft patrol may be ordered using an appropriate airplan in Chapter 9.
6258 SEARCH
a. General. A search is a systematic investigation of a particular area to establish the presence or

the absence of (a) specific contact(s).
b. Basic Types of Search. The five basic types of search are rectangular, sector, expanding
square, intercepting, and random.
c. Ordering a Search. The OTC or controlling authority should promulgate some or all of the
following:
(1) Aim of the search.
(2) Type of search.
(3) Assumed position of enemy at a stated time, or the geographic area to be searched.
(4) Limiting enemy courses for intercepting search.
(5) Limiting enemy speeds for intercepting search.
(6) Direction of search line.
(7) Order of ships on search line if other than standard.
(8) Track spacing.
(9) Position of the Guide at time of starting search.
(10) Start and duration of search.
(11) Search course.
(12) Search speed.
(13) EMCON plan.
(14) Tasking of passive sensors.
(15) Reporting procedures.
(16) Action on gaining contact.
(17) Action on completion of search.
6259 SPARE
6-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6260 TASKS
Based on the recognized picture, tactical decisions can be made. This can lead to the assignment of
tasks to ships, aircraft, or submarines. The following tasks are described in the subsequent paragraphs:
a. Shadowing.
b. Countershadowing.
c. Marking.
d. Countermarking.
e. Tattletale.
f. Weapon employment.
6261 SHADOWING
a. Shadowing operations are normally a follow-up to surveillance and/or reconnaissance missions.

The effectiveness of shadowing is measured by the ability to obtain and report the required information.
Shadowing can be carried out using overt or covert tactics. In times of tension, the shadowing unit must be
well aware of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force. Shadowing may be conducted by aircraft,
submarines, or by ships, or combinations of them.
b. It is important that shadowing is not mistaken for marking, as this may cause an unwanted
escalator effect. To avoid any misunderstanding on own intentions, the following should apply:
(1) Select shadowing units with little offensive capability.
(2) Shadowing with relatively strong units should be done within own sensors but outside own
maximum effective weapon range.
(3) Shadow covertly.
6262 INFORMATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN SHADOWING AND RELIEVING UNITS
a. The exchange of information between the shadowing unit(s) and the relieving unit(s) must be as
complete as possible. Some major points to consider are:
(1) Additional information about the type of target.
(2) Position, course, and speed of the target.
(3) Observed emission policy and level of communications security of the target.
(4) Frequencies used by the target.
(5) Aircraft embarked.
(6) Behaviour of the target in general and against the shadowing unit(s).
b. During aircraft handover, the aircraft going off task is to ensure that the relief aircraft gets a
positive handover. In covert operations, the following should be considered:
6-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) The handover should take place below the target’s radar horizon.
(2) If possible, secure communications should be employed preferably at a range and altitude from
the target that will preclude intercept.
(3) Passive handover techniques such as the use of predesignated sonobuoy channels should be
considered.
6263 COUNTERSHADOWING
a. In both peacetime and in times of tension, commanders should be aware of the fact that they could
be shadowed even though there may be no indication of a shadower. The known presence of one shadower
does not exclude the presence of other, undetected, shadowing units. A shadower is not necessarily
dangerous in itself.
b. Its task may be to gather intelligence or to observe units and relay information on movements. On
the other hand, its task may be to provide target information for the opponent’s offensive forces, intended
to adopt counter-shadowing tactics to hamper the shadower’s task.
c. The purpose of countershadowing tactics is to confuse and deceive the shadowing opponent in
order to withhold information on own movements and intentions and, if possible, to shake it off. In general,
these tactics will be most effective when used at night, in reduced visibility, or by taking advantage of
(NC) (NMM) A full description of tactical deception is contained in ATP 55.
6264 MARKING
The aim of marking is to be able to deliver an immediate and effective attack on the enemy when
hostilities are ordered. However, units overtly engaged in marking operations will be particularly
vulnerable to surprise attack by the enemy; units marking covertly (e.g., SSNs) will be less vulnerable to
attack. In selecting the marking unit, it will be necessary to weigh the need to demonstrate a presence
against the vulnerability of the marker.
6265 COUNTERMARKING
The potential threat posed by a marking unit may be reduced by the employment of a countermarker.
Units engaged in countermarking will pose a direct threat to the marker and thus limit the options available
to him. If conducting continuous countermarking duties, they may be better able to accomplish the aim
than surface units as they are less vulnerable to pre-emptive action. Surface units conducting
countermarking may be at close quarters harassment stations; missile, gun, or radiation positions; or
defensive positions close to own threatened unit(s).
6266 TATTLETALE
A unit maintaining contact may be used to pass targeting information to other units. Such a unit
maintaining contact is designated a tattletale. A tattletale may or may not be capable of taking offensive
action. Tattletale operations may be preferable to direct marking as they permit the whereabouts of the
primary attacking unit to be concealed.
6267 — 6269 SPARE
6-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6270 PICTURE COMPILATION AND WEAPON EMPLOYMENT
a The required product of the picture compilation process is a recognized picture that forms the
basis for tactical decisionmaking, including weapon employment.
b. In general, weapon employment will only be considered on contacts which constitute a threat to
friendly forces and therefore should be identified as hostile.
(1) However, the identity hostile does not necessarily mean that the OTC has evaluated the contact
to form so great a threat that weapon employment is justified. On the other hand, in some situations
weapon employment may be authorized on contacts with a non-hostile identity.
(2) (NR) (NMM) The following factors are to be taken into account (see Figure 6-2) before weapon
employment on a hostile contact is allowed:
(a) More information might be required; e.g., specific characteristics with a certain level of
confidence.
(b) Political situation.
(c) ROE.
(d) Mission.
(e) Relative strengths.
(f) Target priorities.
(g) Weapon expenditure.
(h) Promulgated weapon restrictions (see Articles 6746 to 6748).
(i) Distance.
(j) Threat (see Figure 6-3).
(3) (NR) (NMM) Exception. The tactical situation can be (become) so unfavorable (e.g., num-
ber/type of threat, reaction time available) that the OTC/warfare commander considers weapon employ-
ment on contacts with an identity less positive than hostile justified. (This may also apply for individual
units in a self-defense situation.)
c. The OTC and warfare commanders are to specify all these requirements and considerations in the
respective general and warfare instructions in order to make sure to all subordinates what the weapon
employment policy is. Usually this will result in differences among warfare areas; (e.g., different
identification criteria, recognition (confidence levels), and weapon release criteria).
6280 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
a. Picture Compilation. All actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot.
b. Detection. The discovery of the presence of a contact or contact related data.
c. Localization. The determination of positional information and the movements of a contact.
6-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DETECTION
LOCALIZATION
IDENTIFICATION RECOGNIZED
ID CRITERIA PICTURE
WEAPON RELEASE
RECOGNITION CONSIDERATIONS
RECOGNITION LEVEL
(PLATFORM, TYPE, CLASS, NAME) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
RELEASE CRITERIA
RECOGNITION CONFIDENCE LEVEL TARGET PRIORITY
(CERT, PROB,...) DISTANCE
WEAPON EXPEDITURE
REC CONF LEVEL
WEAPON CONTROL STATUSES
PREPLAN
SALVO SIZE
WEAPON EMPLOYMENT
(NATO-RESTICTED) (NMM)
Figure 6-2. (NU) (NMM) The Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment Process
d. Recognition. The determination of certain characteristics of a contact.
e. Identification. The assignment of one of the six standard identities, based upon available data
and the determined identification criteria.
f. Recognized Picture. The result of the picture compilation process laid down in a common
plot, which is compiled using available information from all units/levels concerned, and which covers a
predetermined area in which all detected contacts have been evaluated and assigned an indisputed identity.
g. Identification Criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to determine
which standard identity can be assigned to a detected contact based on the available localization and
recognition data.
h. Release Criteria. Criteria laid down by OTC or delegated authority to be satisfied before
weapon employment is authorized.
i. Recognition Level. The level to which a contact must be recognized as to platform type, class,
or individuality.
j. Recognition Confidence Level. The degree of probability with which the recognition level
is established.
6-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — DATA COMPILATION
6300 DATA COMPILATION
6301 REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
a. Procedures and Instructions. Instructions concerning communication procedures are

contained in relevant Allied Communication Publications (ACPs).
(NR) (NMM) Voice procedures for raid reporting are contained in APP 1.
b. Brevity Code. Operational brevity code words are from APP 7/MPP 7. Personnel concerned
with raid reporting should familiarize themselves with code words in general use.
c. (NR) (NMM) Data Links. Guidance for the technical use of data links can be found in the
relevant ADatPs (10, 11, 14 and 16).
6302 OTC’S REQUIREMENTS
As described in Section II, the OTC/CWC and or delegated authorities will formulate and
implement the picture compilation plan. Parts of the plan are the required and available means of data
compilation.
6303 MEANS OF DATA COMPILATION
Various means are used to compile the recognized picture. Data links, voice nets, and RATT are
used to disseminate the information gathered through surveillance (which is done by air, surface, and
subsurface units). Data links, voice nets, and RATT are used to promulgate the information gathered
through surveillance (by these units). The function of the voice nets in data compilation is raid reporting.
On the same nets the management of data links will be coordinated.
6304 COORDINATION
As part of the picture compilation plan, surveillance is coordinated by the OTC or delegated warfare
commanders. Data compilation is coordinated by warfare commanders or by the force track coordinators
(air, surface, and subsurface) if the task is delegated by the OTC/warfare commanders.
6305 — 6309 SPARE
6310 SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance missions are normally designated by delineating the area and type of surveillance.
Surveillance may be of a tactical or strategic nature and may be followed by reconnaissance.
Considerations for the selection of vehicles for surveillance are similar to those applying reconnaissance.
6311 SURVEILLANCE AREA
a. The establishment of the size and shape of the surveillance area is fundamental to the success of
the surveillance concept. The size and shape of the surveillance area will be determined by comparing the
warning time required to deploy forces with the resources available to provide surveillance.
b. The surveillance area may move with the position and intended movement (PIM) or be fixed.
6-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6312 COORDINATION OF DATA COMPILATION IN THE SURVEILLANCE

COORDINATION SURVEILLANCE AREA
The aim of surveillance coordination is to optimize the use of resources and avoid duplication of
effort. Coordination of unit activities in surveillance is vested in the appropriate warfare commanders.
Coordination of data compilation may be delegated to the appropriate force track coordinator.
6313 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR (AIR) (FTC-A)
The AAWC is responsible for maintaining and disseminating the air picture as it is formed by the
total of sensor inputs. This duty may be delegated to the FTC-A, who is normally co-located with the
AAWC, if designated. The AAWC/FTC-A has the following responsibilities for picture compilation and
dissemination:
a. Control the AAW reporting net (see Article 4141).
b. Compile the air picture, including the correlation and evaluation of reports from other units of the
force (including data links).
c. Issue SITREPs.
d. Designate the link management units (DNCS, GRU, link broadcast units, and Gateway Unit).
e. Manage the link picture.
f. Promulgate the link management codes to be used in network management.
g. Control over link operational procedures.
h. Order general gridlocks to be done by the GRU.
i. Coordinate entries from non-link-fitted units into the link picture.
j. Order frequency shifts or other parameter shifts for link if necessary (initiated by the DNCS).
k. Crosstell of information with shore air defense authorities when appropriate.
l. Issue track release policy to be used.
6314 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR (SURFACE) (FTC-S) AND FORCE TRACK

COORDINATOR (SUBSURFACE) (FTC-SS)
The ASUWC and ASWC are charged with maintaining and disseminating the surface and
subsurface picture as it is formed by the total of sensor inputs. These duties may be delegated to the FTC-S
and FTC-SS, who are normally co-located with their respective warfare commands when designated.
Their duties can be combined in the FTC-S/SS. In TDS systems, the FTC-A has the primary responsibility,
while the FTC-S and FTC-SS are using that part of the system made available for their data compilation
efforts. The FTC-S and FTC-SS have the following responsibilities:
a. Control the appropriate reporting nets.
b. Compile the surface and subsurface picture, including the correlation and evaluation of reports
from other units of the force (including data links).
6-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Issue SITREPs.
d. Coordinate entries from non-link-fitted units into the link surface and subsurface picture.
6315 — 6319 SPARE
6320 CONTACT REPORTS
6321 GENERAL INFORMATION
a. Purpose. Contact reports are designed to pass the fullest information about contacts in the
shortest time and simplest manner. They serve to:
(1) Alert authorities and forces or units about contacts in the area.
(2) Develop comprehensive plots to assist in the rapid evaluation of the situation in the air, surface,
and subsurface environment. Contact reports can be made as raid reports and enemy contact reports.
b. Raid Reports. Raid reports are designed to alert the OTC/warfare commander and the units in
a formation or disposition to new contacts and, by means of a series of related reports, to develop an
accurate plot. They may concern hostile, friendly, neutral, or unidentified contacts. Rapid reporting may be
used with land-based stations when a continuous flow of information is required.
(NR) (NMM) Details are in APP 1.
c. Enemy Contact Reports (ECRs). Enemy contact reports are designed to alert appropriate
shore authorities, as well as other forces or units operating in the area, of the presence of hostile units or
unidentified contacts in the area. Enemy contact reports are made by:
(1) The OTC.
(2) Surface units operating independently.
(3) Land-based aircraft not on direct support.
(4) Submarines operating independently.
(5) Merchant ships.
NOTE
(NR) (NMM) RAINFORM reports are to be regarded as a form of ECR and are in APP 4.
6322 RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSING INFORMATION ABOUT CONTACTS
a. The OTC. The OTC is responsible for the dissemination of the recognized picture to all units under
his tactical command and to appropriate shore authorities or units in the area using enemy contact reporting.
b. Surface Units.
(1) Any unit operating under the tactical command or tactical control of an OTC is responsible for
passing early and accurate contact information to him, using raid reporting.
6-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Any unit in the vicinity of the force, but not under the tactical command or control of an OTC, is
responsible for passing early and accurate information to the force about contacts that may be a threat to
the force, using enemy contact reporting.
c. Aircraft.
(1) Aircraft on direct support are responsible for making raid reports to the OTC.
(2) Aircraft on area operations or in transit are responsible for making enemy contact and in-flight re-
ports to their shore controlling authority. When operating in the vicinity of friendly surface forces, aircraft
are also to pass the information to the OTC(s) concerned. Aircraft may be briefed to give precedence to re-
ports to the OTC(s) over reports to their shore controlling authority. If two-way communication with an
OTC cannot be established, or is not permitted by EMCON, an aircraft is to broadcast its reports and,
EMCON permitting, pass its reports ashore for retransmittal on the appropriate ship broadcast.
d. Submarines.
(1) Submarines operating independently that make contact with possible enemy units are to make
the appropriate enemy contacts reports as soon as practicable.
(NC) (NMM) The submarine may have to delay making its reports for the following considerations:
(a) The requirement to safeguard the reporting of own position.
(b) The requirement to maintain contact with the enemy, since coming to a suitable depth for
communication purposes may result in loss of contact with the enemy, particularly when it is
another submarine.
(2) (NC) (NMM) The OTC should advise support submarines if contact engagement or force
alertment is to take precedence. While destruction of the enemy is highly desirable, the ultimate objec-
tive of supporting units is to ensure the survival of protected units. This normally will require support
submarines to alert the supported force before all but urgent approaches and attacks.
(3) (NC) (NMM) On each occasion, the relative importance to shore authorities and other forces in
the area of the information to be reported has to be weighed against these considerations.
e. Merchant Ships. Enemy contact reports from merchant ships are designated ALARM reports.
Details of the form of these reports are contained in ACP 149.
6323 AIR RAID REPORTS
a. General. Long-range detection of air contacts is the first principle of anti-air warfare; however,
detection alone does not ensure success, because individual commands must first make a cursory
evaluation of all information prior to reporting an air contact. Position and accurate amplifying
information about all air contacts must be reported to the FTC-A. Air picture reporting will cover all
contacts in the anti-air warfare area, with emphasis on early detection and an information flow that is as
continuous as possible on friendlies. However, contacts already being reported by another unit desiring to
report is in a more advantageous position to track and wishes to assume reporting responsibility for that
contact. Ships are to track or watch all air contacts on their radar displays, with emphasis on promulgated
watch zones, and are to report in accordance with reporting rules promulgated by the OTC. In any case,
units are to report all air contacts not positively identified as friendly, provided they are considered an
immediate threat. All means of detecting air contacts, including lookout reports, are to be exploited to the
maximum extent.
6-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Visual sighting can be of special value in engaging both high and low contacts, and lookouts should
be indoctrinated as to the importance of reporting all sightings, smoke, and contrails.
b. Local Air Situation. In addition to reporting the general air station, there is an equal
requirement for all ships fitted with guns and self-defense missiles to have a clear picture of the local air
situation, including relevant information on missile zones, safety sectors, weapon restrictions, and
positions of friendly aircraft and helicopters. A knowledge of the positions of all friendly aircraft may be
the only clue to the identity of a contact that is in fact an enemy aircraft or missile. The AAWC will
normally be the LAAWC for his group and will promulgate the local air picture. Commanding officers are
responsible for the employment of their own weapons and the primary function of the local AAW
coordination net is to promulgate information to assist them in making their decisions.
c. Local Air Picture. The aim is to provide the group with a clear picture of the air situation
around the group. Contacts within 50 nm are given priority, with less frequent reports on those beyond.
Contacts are reported using the current agreed basic identities. Position is reported as range and bearing
from ZZ of the local force. Although reporting procedures are vital for good raid reporting, under certain
conditions a colloquial running commentary has been proven to be more successful than a rigid reporting
procedure. However, when a unit detects or sights a target that is a direct threat to the force and has not been
reported, it immediately broadcasts a flash report (see Chapter 4).
d. Amplifying Instructions. Friendly aircraft should be referred to by their task. Other aircraft
should ideally be referred to by their force track number. A unit reporting a contact must be careful to report
fades, including when it is ”too close,” so that another unit may continue reporting that contact.
(1) (NC) (NMM) Particular attention must be paid to HOSTILEs with fighters in pursuit. If the
fighter is hauled off, the direction of breaking must be reported (North/South, East/West), so that ships
may identify the enemy.
6324 SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE RAID REPORTS
Surface raid reports are normally made on TF/TG Reporting net. This net may be HF or UHF.
Details concerning the information to be exchanged are in Chapter 8. Subsurface reports are made either on
ASW Air Coordination net, on an action net, or on TF/TG Reporting net, depending on whether immediate
action is required. Searches should, where possible, be coordinated on a communication circuit common to
all operating units. Where MPA are operating in this role, ASW Air Coordination (UHF) net will normally
be used. Helicopters operating independently of fixed-wing aircraft should be TF/TG Reporting
(HF/UHF) net, unless the level of traffic is such as to overload the limited facilities of the helicopter.
Certain helicopters have the facility for transmission of the tactical picture by data link and, under these
circumstances, control of the aircraft may be conducted on a alternate circuit at the OTC’s discretion.
(NR) (NMM) Voice procedures are in APP 1.
6325 OTHER REPORTS
a. Air Combat Report. Air combat reports are reports made by aircraft and are primarily used to
warn other aircraft and the aircraft control unit(s) of the presence of enemy aircraft. The report consists of
code words from APP 7/MPP-7 and/or plain language.
b. Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations (TASMO) Reports. TASMO reports are
used in tactical air support of maritime operations.
(NR) (NMM) These are described in ATP 34 and APP 4.
c. Mine Detection Report. Every ship detonating a mine or detecting a moored mine or a
drifting mine case shall make a Mine Detection Report (MINEDETREP) to the OPCON authority with an
6-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
information copy to the OTC of the MCM force if in contact with such a force. (For further details see
Chapter 13).
d. Situation Reports (SITREPs).

(NR) (NMM) The use and components of SITREPs are detailed in APP 1.
e. RAINFORMs. See Chapter 1.

(NR) (NMM) See APP 4.
f. Engagement After-Action Reports. All units will submit hard copy after-action summary
reports to the OTC and warfare commander concerned informing other warfare commanders and others as
directed. Units will, in addition, make voice reports to the warfare commander concerned over the
appropriate tactical net. For detached units, the task element commander should submit consolidated
reports. The AREC will transmit Aircraft Mission Summaries (MISSUMs) or Rainform PURPLE
messages for CV-based aircraft. These reports will repromulgate mission results based upon mission
debriefing or post-flight analysis.
6326 WARFARE COMMANDER REPORTS
a. Warfare Commander SITREP. Warfare commanders will make voice SITREPs to the OTC
on the TF/TG Command net. Additionally, warfare commanders must keep units appraised of the tactical
situation over the respective coordination and reporting (C & R) nets. (The same SITREP may satisfy both
requirements, but if units are not guarding the TF/TG Command net, then the report should be made over
both nets). SITREPs will briefly describe the tactical situation and state the warfare commander’s
intentions. They will be transmitted whenever dictated by the tactical situation and will be particularly
critical during fast moving situations, in order to keep the OTC sufficiently informed.
b. Warfare Commander SITSUM. When directed, warfare commanders and coordinators will
submit message SITSUMs to the OTC. Reporting will be over the TF/TG Command (RATT) net in order
to keep the OTC, other warfare commanders, and the task force generally informed. SITSUMs will include
(as appropriate) warning and weapon status, equipment casualties, and other problems serious enough to
be brought to the attention of the OTC and other warfare commanders.
(1) The ASUWC will, in addition, report best current estimate of hostile ship positions and time of
last actual detection. Results of recent ASUW actions and surveillance flights, and status of on-going
actions and flights will also be reported. Friendly ship positions will be given on request.
(2) The ASWC will report best current locating information for hostile and friendly submarines
and towed array ships. Status of current prosecutions and ASW air picture and deck alert will also be
reported.
(3) The AAWC will summarize bogey and CAP status, including CAP station occupancy, air con-
trol units, and ready alert posture. Missile inventory and status and the results of recent engagements
will also be reported.
(4) The EWC will report force EMCON condition and intra-task force variations or violations
thereof, current RACKET status, and status of EW aircraft.
(5) The AREC will report aircraft readiness and availability, flight deck status, and launch sched-
ules. Real-time information will be most critical in AAW.
c. The OTC, along with the rest of the force, can best follow a rapidly developing situation by
monitoring the AAW(C) net. In order to avoid duplication in reporting and distraction of the AAWC from
his vital primary role, the OTC should cancel any requirement for AAW SITREPs/SITSUMs over the
6-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
TF/TG Command net during periods of intense AAW action and require instead an after-action report
from the AAWC summarizing the results of each series of engagements.
6327 — 6329 SPARE
6330 COMMUNICATION
For details of communications and circuits associated with data compilation, see Chapter 4,
Section I.
6331 — 6339 SPARE
6340 TACTICAL USE OF DATA LINKS
6341 PURPOSE
Data links facilitate the rapid and accurate exchange of picture compilation information and, in the
case of Link 11, weapon engagement status information and command messages. An important function is
demonstrated by the ability to pass a complete tactical picture to another unit joining a force or to one
whose transmissions are limited by emission policy.
6342 INTEGRATION WITH STANDARD TACTICAL DOCTRINE
Link information is compatible with the information passed over voice circuits between
non-link-fitted units and should reflect the same tactical picture. Positional information passed by data link
is based on the Data Link Reference Point (DLRP), which is established by the OTC and should be in the
same position as the origin for the Cartesian Coordinate Grid (CCG). This is considered further in Articles
2111 and 6371.
6343 TACTICAL USE OF LINK 4
a. Link 4 Operations. Link 4 may be employed in any of the three modes: one-way close control,
two-way close control, or one-way broadcast control.
(1) (NC) (NMM) One-Way Close Control. This Link 4 mode consists of a one-way data flow
from the controlling agency to the CAP. CAP receive target position, heading, speed, and altitude for up
to a maximum of eight targets or points.
(2) (NC) (NMM) Two-Way Close Control. This Link 4 mode of operation may be available to
CAP and permits these aircraft to transmit target data, jam strobes, pointers, fuel state, weapons state,
and other information back to the controlling platform.
(3) (NC) (NMM) One-Way Broadcast Control.
(a) To accomplish Link 4 broadcast control, AEW and CAP must select the same fighter link
reference point (FLRP). This FLRP may be VL or a tacan, which will be one-way information from
AEW to the CAP.
(b) Once the above has been accomplished, all data link information from the AEW will be
broadcast to all fighters. Each fighter must then determine target position in relation to his own
position. This procedure reduces voice communication and permits each fighter to maintain a
relative display of the air battle and other CAP.
6-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. (NC) (NMM) Link 4 Limitations. Link 4 has increased transmit power and is frequency shift
keyed (FSK). It is less susceptible to spot or barrage jamming than voice communications; however, it is
susceptible to deception (i.e., audio playbacks).
6344 TACTICAL USE OF LINK 11
a. Link 11 Operation. The OTCs tactical instructions for operating Link 11 are detailed in the
OPTASK LINK. The force picture depends largely on the interoperability and availability of Link 11
facilities within the force or cooperating units. For Link 11, as for other communications means, RSIs
apply respectively. The following considerations will influence the OTCs decision:
(1) Link equipment of participating units.
(2) Expected threat, preplanned reactions, and standard occasions for breaking radio silence.
(3) Mission.
(4) Planned tactical positioning of own units, keeping in mind the expected HF and UHF communi-
cation ranges.
(5) Rules of discretion (required (maximum) net cycle time, rate of sequential transmission, data
exchange periodicity).
b. Operating Modes. The operating (or transmission) modes of the link are:
(NR) (NMM) They are described in ADatP11.
(1) Roll Call.
(a) Full Roll Call.
(b) Partial Roll Call.
(c) Roll Call Broadcast.
(2) Broadcast.
(3) Silence.
c. Tactical Use of Silence Mode. The Silence Mode can be used in two ways:
(1) All units silent with single transmissions made only are standard occasions for breaking silence.
(2) All units silent with periodic, preplanned, single transmissions by designated units. This tactical
mode is referred to as Short Broadcast.
d. Operational Employment.
(NR) (NMM) See Table 6-2 for the description of operational employment options. The table gives
recommendations for tactical use of Link 11, depending on the RSIs resulting from the above mentioned
deliberations.
6-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
RSI Mode Advantage Disadvantage Mode Descriptor
U FULL ROLL 1. Optimum update rate 1. Net cycle time (NCT) may Permanent
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Complete exchange of be long
Transmission) data information between 2. Risk of participating units
PUs being intercepted and
detected
U PARTIAL ROLL 1. Call-up is directed 1. Repetitive call-up of partic- Full report by designated PU
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Exposed units may stay ipants prolongs NCT during PARTIAL ROLL CALL
Selective or silent or ROLL CALL BROADCAST
Sequential 3. Any PU has access to the — Sequential Transmission
Transmission) net
U ROLL CALL 1. Convert posture for PU 1. Repetitive call-up Silence (See Note)
(Unrestricted BROADCAST other than DNCS 2. Force picture depends on
Continuous (Extreme Version 2. Any PU has access to the DNCS
Transmission of PARTIAL net
of DNCS) ROLL CALL
U or E BROADCAST 1. Higher update rate from 1. No information from other Permanent
6-24
(Unrestricted assigned unit PU
Continuous 2. Force covert other than 2. Broadcast unit detectable
Transmission designated PU due to emissions
of Designated 3. No directive control
Unit — PU) possible
E SHORT 1. Force covert 1. Lowers update rate Preplanned action — OTC
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
(Essential BROADCAST 2. Vital information can be 2. Poor force picture option. The most covert
Transmission) broadcast immediately compilation mode. Transmission allowed
3. No directive control in accordance with OTC’s
possible schedule (See Note)
S SILENCE 1. No ESM decision possible 1. No information exchange Preplanned action (See

2. Immediate access to the 2. No force picture Note)
Table 6-2. (NU) NMM) Link 11 Operational Employment Options
net by SHORT BROADCAST
NOTE: Some units may choose the quantity of tracks or command and control orders selected for each transmission (selective SHORT
BROADCAST). If the OTC plans to use these capabilities, he should ensure that they are available and promulgate them in the
OPTASK LINK format (sets UNITFLTR, AREA or GENTEXT).
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6345 WIDE-AREA LINK OPERATIONS
When a Link 11 net is established on a wide area and involves several TF/TG operating
independently or in support situation Bravo or Charlie, a link point of contact, the FTC-A, will be
designated in each TF/TG. On behalf of the OTC, the FTC-A of each TF/TG will be authorized to provide
information and requirements about the link net management with the DNCS, using RATT messages or
the voice Link Coordination Circuit. Depending on the nature of the operation, the senior OTC will
promulgate information or requirements about the net management, updating the current OPTASK LINK
as necessary. During wide-area Link 11 operations, the DNCS should be the AEW aircraft (E-3 or E-2
type) when on station.
6346 (NR) (NMM) LINK 11 WAVEFORM
Either Kineplex or Single-tone Link 11 Waveform (SLEW) can be used for Link 11 operations on
the HF band, as ordered by the OTC in the OPTASK LINK. However, Kineplex must normally be the
standard emission unless OTCs/net controllers have confirmation that all units participating in the Link 11
are capable of HF SLEW operations or a suitably equipped ship is available to act as a gateway between
SLEW and Kineplex. Note that Kineplex terminals cannot use SLEW but SLEW terminals can use either
SLEW or Kineplex. SLEW is more reliable and uses a narrower bandwidth.
6347 — 6349 SPARE
6350 LINK MANAGEMENT UNITS
Apart from track management on voice nets and data links, the links themselves need to be
managed. Several duties describe the management task. These duties may be combined and are ideally
vested in the FTC-A.
6351 DATA NET CONTROL STATION (DNCS)
The DNCS is the participating unit in a link organization for air, surface, and subsurface data
compilation who performs the technical management of the net.
a. The responsibilities are:
(1) Advise the FTC-A on the use of frequencies and link parameters.
(2) Initiate and terminate the data net, under the overall directives of the OTC.
(3) Control the order in which units are called in Roll Call mode of operation (Link 11).
(4) Monitor and analyze the data nets from link establishment to link termination (technical
performance).
b. The DNCS is chosen on the basis of:
(1) Central location relative to other link-fitted units, which it must interrogate.
(2) Radiation hazard and EMCON considerations.
(3) State of equipment.
6-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6352 GATEWAY UNIT
In group working with more than one TDS system (i.e., Link 11) a gateway unit is assigned. A
gateway unit is a participating unit that is operating on both links and is responsible for transfer of selected
track data between the two link systems. The transfer can be manual or automatic.
6353 LINK BROADCAST UNIT
For Link 11 and Link 14, a broadcast unit may be assigned. This unit will transmit data from his TDS
system to other units, who will only receive this data but not answer or retransmit. The receiving units will
either plot this data manually or automatically.
6354 GRID REFERENCE UNIT (GRU)
The GRU is the unit designated by the OTC to maintain the OTC’s geographical reference point.
a. The GRU is responsible for:
(1) Carrying out general grid locks as ordered by the AAWC/FTC-A.
(2) Acting as reference for individual grid locks where possible.
(3) Monitoring the positional accuracy of transmitted data by link participating units.
(4) Ensuring his data systems’ navigational input is both up-to-date and accurate.
b. The GRU should be chosen by the OTC on the basis of:
(1) Position in the force, ensuring:
(a) Good link communications.
(b) Greatest track density coverage.
(2) Large and accurate track reporting capability.
(3) Accurate navigational facilities.
(4) Reliability of link participating unit.
6355 — 6359 SPARE
6360 PROCEDURES
6361 GRID LOCK PROCEDURE
a. Grid Locks. The GRU executes grid locks on completion of the insertion of the DLRP into the
various TDS, or after changing the DLRP. Grid locks are also executed periodically to reduce errors in grid
reporting.
(1) Individual Grid Lock (Codeword RONSON). Individual grid locks are undertaken:
(a) When a unit joins the force and enters the net.
6-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) On request of a misaligned unit.
(c) Whenever the GRU or FTCs detect misalignment of one unit only.
(2) General Grid Lock (Codeword GRID LOCK). General grid locks are undertaken:
(a) When misalignment occurs in several units.
(b) Upon activation of the net and after inserting the DLRP into the various TDSs.
(c) After changing the DLRP.
(d) When requested by FTC-A.
b. Execution of Grid Locks. The procedure of executing grid locks differs between TDS and
non-TDS units.
(1) TDS Units. This is the simple matching of the position of a single track reported over the data
link by the GRU or another unit with the same locally held radar contact in the unit(s) carrying out the
grid lock. Correction to align the link-reported track over the local contact will be in X and Y coordi-
nates and will be applied according to the individual system design, either by moving the DLRP in terms
of own-ship position or by applying the appropriate correction to transmitted and received tracks. Units
are to report whether or not satisfactory grid lock has been achieved.
(2) Non-TDS Units. The correct X and Y coordinates of a locally held track are reported by the
GRU or another grid locking unit, and units adjust their grid accordingly.
NOTE
The responsibility for keeping the picture aligned lies with the individual unit(s).
c. Locking Non-TDS Aircraft Into Grid. The appropriate aircraft control unit (ACU) can lock
aircraft into grid by four methods:
(1) Radar Grid Lock. On joining and after full identification procedures, the aircraft will be in-
structed to stand by for grid lock and X and Y coordinates are issued.
(2) Reverse Radar Grid Lock. If for some reason the ACU is unable to use radar, a reverse radar
grid lock is executed. This requires the aircraft to use its radar and take bearing and distance from QQ or
ZZ as applicable. It is essential that the aircraft knows the position of the reference within the force so
that the fix is correctly taken.
(3) On Top. If the aircraft has permission to enter the ISR and overfly the force and can identify the
ACU, the aircraft may obtain an ON TOP grid position of the ACU.
(4) Tacan Method. EMCON permitting and when a tacan-fitted ship is in the group, an aircraft
can obtain a tacan lock of this unit and then be passed its grid position.
(5) Alternative. Individual unit position reports can also be given using bearing and distance from
a geographically fixed reference position (e.g., helicopter reference position (HRP)). When this is done,
the code word(s) (REVERSE) UPDATE is (are) to be used. An UPDATE can be given by the GRU or
another grid locking unit as a bearing and distance from the reference position to the subject unit. If for
some reason the GRU or grid locking unit is unable to use radar, a REVERSE UPDATE can be
6-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
executed. The subject unit uses its radar to determine the position of the GRU or grid locking unit; the
GRU or grid locking unit passes its own position relative to the reference position. This bearing and dis-
tance is then used by the subject unit to align its grid.
d. Security of the Grid. Correlation between the DLRP and observed units enables the enemy to
break the grid and obtain a missile firing solution on any subsequent unit reporting its grid position. While
grid reports which have not been encoded are acceptable for detached units, bogeys, etc., the position of
major units must be encoded in a suitable numerical code.
6362 LINK 14 PLOTTING PROCEDURES
The quantity and speed at which tactical information is provided by Link 14 is too great to be
displayed manually in an accurate and timely manner. Therefore, there is requirement to limit the
information assimilated in the receiving ship. This is accomplished by:
a. Requesting that the Link 14 transmitting unit suppress specific “headers”, thus, limiting the
information transmitted on the link to all users (e.g., track release criteria).
b. Plotting only those contacts within a selected area determined by each ship from an assessment
of the threat and from the capability of the ship’s weapons systems and sensors.
6363 PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING OWN POSITION
Units not correctly reported on the net are to report their positions as follows:
a. All ships are to guard or copy the TF/TG reporting HF net.
b. PIMs are to be reported to the OTC when units join. The OTC will:
(1) Relay PIM information to the FTC-S.
(2) Inform transmitting units of the FTC-S frequency and call sign.
c. Periodic position reports are to be transmitted to the FTC on the TF/TG reporting net. Frequency
of reporting is as follows unless otherwise directed:
(a) Hourly, from CTGs, CTUs; major units; and all detached units.
(b) Every 2 hours, or when more than 5 miles from reported PIM, from transiting and
supporting units.
d. A composite position report is to be made for ships operating in company by the commander of
the group.
Units on the link will monitor Link 10/11/14 to check for own-ship position accuracy. Units
believing link position to be significantly in error will report correct position to FTC and Link 14 broadcast
ship. This procedure will be of particular importance for detached units (e.g., towed array ships) to ensure
that they are correctly included in the force surface picture.
6-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6364 — 6369 SPARE
6370 SECURITY AND EMCON CONSIDERATIONS
a. Speed of Transmission Versus Security. The conflict between the need to transmit an
enemy report quickly and the need for security has to be considered on each occasion of making an enemy
report. The solution will depend on the particular circumstances at the time, unless on-line encryption
facilities are available. If the enemy is aware that he has been detected, and especially if he is able to inflict
early damage, speed of transmission will be the more important factor. However, it must be realized that
enemy reports which are not encrypted may, if intercepted, be valuable to the enemy.
b. Effect of Over-Emphasizing Security. It is important that security classifications are not

imposed unnecessarily. Due consideration should be given to the availability of on-line encryption
facilities and to type of units concerned with the reports.
c. Reporting Procedures During Restricted EMCON. Modifications to reporting

procedures should be anticipated when the force is operating under restrictive EMCON conditions. In
particular, the OTC must specify which reports are to be made when the OTC and/or warfare commander’s
flagships are in EMCON and when the entire force is EMCON (e.g., when only the OTC’s flagship is in
EMCON for purposes of operational/communications deception); the OTC may require continued
reporting by warfare commanders and units, but will not acknowledge receipt or will acknowledge receipt
via another circuit. If required by EMCON, RAID reporting responsibility may be passed to the E2C,
AWACS, or MPA. Reports, other than initial raid reports, would normally be terminated in this situation.
d. Breaking Radio Silence. Enemy reporting is one of the occasions when radio silence may be
broken. This subject is described in more detail in Chapter 5.
6-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION IV — AIR OPERATIONS
6400 INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this section encompasses maritime operations outside of TASMO by aircraft:
1. Organic to a force.
2. Carrier- or land-based providing support to a force at sea.
3. Conducting air operations in the maritime environment.
6401 MARITIME TASKING AUTHORITIES
Maritime aircraft under the operational control of a maritime commander may be tasked by a shore
authority if land-based, or by the OTC if shipborne on a force at sea. When tasking maritime aircraft, the
tasking authority, MHQ, or OTC should:
1. Employ the appropriate aircraft in a safe manner to accomplish the assigned task.
2. Inform all units of all friendly aircraft operating in the vicinity.
3. Disseminate pertinent information to all units in the area in a timely manner.
4. Liaise with air defense authorities and civil air control authorities including NOTAM actions.
6402 AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Maritime aircraft may be assigned to provide support to forces at sea in one of three forms.
a. Direct Support. Aircraft assigned to direct support of a force at sea will operate under the
tactical control of the OTC who is being supported. Operational control will remain with the tasking
authority and tactical command may be delegated to the aircraft commander. Direct support operations are
normally carried out within the OTC’s surveillance area. The radius of direct support operations about the
force will be determined by the OTC and will vary according to:
1. The threat.
2. The number and type of aircraft available.
3. Area coverage desired.
4. EMCON plan in force.
The OTC is to inform the tasking authority of the dimensions of his surveillance area and of
subsequent changes, emission policy permitting.
b. Associated Support. In specific cases of communications or other control difficulties,

associated support may be provided. Aircraft tasked on associated support will operate independently of
other forces at sea; however, their tasking is in support of a specific force. They may be tasked to support
that force by providing contact information and to receive intelligence from the OTC who is being
supported. The aircraft may be tasked to establish communications with the supported force to prevent
mutual interference. The OTC of the supported force cannot take tactical control of the aircraft unless
6-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
authorized by the aircraft tasking authority. The aircraft commander should be briefed on the degree of
support it can give to the OTC.
c. Area Operations. Area operations are conducted in areas within which enemy forces are
known to be, through which enemy forces are likely to pass, or within which it is desirable to deny the
enemy freedom of action. In addition, operations may be related to the protection of maritime forces
scheduled to enter the area in the future or to provide defense in depth to distant forces. Land-based aircraft
on area operations are under the operational control of a shore-based authority. Tactical command and
control of the aircraft conducting the mission is normally delegated to the aircraft commander by the
tasking authority. Aircraft commanders should be briefed on the whereabouts of friendly naval forces and
as to whether or not they may react to a request from these forces to assist in the prosecution of contacts
within the aircraft’s operating area. Notwithstanding such authorization, the original tasking authority has
the right to resume control of the aircraft at his discretion.
6403 INFORMING THE OTC OF OPERATIONS IN HIS VICINITY
OTCs are to be informed by the appropriate coordinating authority of any aircraft employed on area
operations in the vicinity of their force.
If a force at sea is to be supported by land-based aircraft in associated or direct support, the OTC
will be informed by the appropriate coordinating authority of the type and nature of support being
provided in response to the support request, using standard RAINFORM formats. In the case of
shipborne aircraft support, the OTC of the force providing the support should keep the OTC of the
supported force, and, if possible, shore authorities, informed of the flying schedule and intentions using
the standard MTMS formats.
6404 SPARE
6405 TYPES OF OPERATIONS
6406 OPERATIONS INTEGRAL TO A FORCE
Helicopter and carrier borne aircraft which are an integral part of the force are under the tactical
command of an OTC. They are assigned tasks as directed by the OTC or warfare commander as required.
Although the employment of these aircraft is not a support operation, the procedures in this chapter
sometimes apply.
6407 SUPPORT OPERATIONS TASKED BY MARITIME AUTHORITIES
a. Air Operations Outside TASMO. Air operations in support of forces at sea outside TASMO,
which are controlled by maritime authorities, are normally tasked by standard MTMS or other messages
such as the ATO. The tasking authority should stipulate in the FORM GREEN both the form of support of
each mission and the specific mission type by promulgating mission designators from Table 6-3.
(1) Mission Designators. The Table 6-3 mission designators can only be changed by the air-
craft commander if delegated tactical command. Therefore, if an OTC wishes an aircraft to do more than
one mission type, it must be requested in the support request message, FORM GREEN REQUEST. The
ASW mission type is subdivided and once the tasking authority has authorized an ASW operation, the
supported OTC can modify the ASW tasking during a mission.
(NR) (NMM) Table 6-5 uses the ASW mission designators.
(2) Mission Type. Table 6-3 lists the mission types which maritime aircraft may be tasked. De-
tails on the various scouting missions are in Section II of this chapter.
6-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-3. Table of Aircraft Mission Designators
FORM OF AIR SUPPORT OPERATION (Notes 1 and 4) Designator

Area Operations AQ
Associated Support AS
Direct Support DS
MISSION TYPES (Notes 1, 3, and 4)

Air Surveillance SV
Antiair Warfare AD
Antisurface Operations SW
Area Search SA
ASW Operations (Note 2): Further amplified with more
mission designators in Table 6-4 KS
Attack (Surface Targets) AT
Barrier BR
Investigate IN
Mining Operations MI
Reconnaissance RE
Screen SC
Search and Rescue SR
Search and Shadow:
a. Overt search, Identification, and AR
b. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow CP
c. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow HR
d. Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow NV
e. Covert search, identification, and shadow SX
f . Covert search, identification, and high shadow WZ
Surveillance SU
Training TN
Notes:
1. Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the form of air
support operation and the mission types in all Forms GREEN.
2. To be used by tasking authority for all types of ASW operations (i.e., ASW
surveillance, air-sub operations, area, associated, or direct support operations).
3. Amplification of mission, such as reporting/tracking instructions or attack criteria

may be required, e.g., “BR + Report hourly.”
4. These designators may also be used in other message traffic to describe

aircraft employment.
6-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Antisurface Operations. The aim of antisurface operations by aircraft is to ensure the

detection, and early engagement of enemy surface forces in order to deny their effective employment.
Aircraft can effectively locate and shadow enemy naval surface forces. In war, aircraft should remain outside
the effective envelope of shipborne missile and gun defense systems whenever possible while searching for,
identifying, and shadowing and subsequently attacking hostile forces. At times, it may be necessary to
establish the identity of contacts detected at ranges in excess of the identification/recognition capability of the
aircraft sensors. Ideally, this identification/recognition should be done by a small, high speed, low level,
manoeuvrable aircraft equipped with radar, ESM, and ECM for self protection. In some situations, it may be
necessary for MPA/MRR aircraft or helicopters to identify the contact, but before ordering such a mission the
OTC/MHQ must consider all the factors including the possibility of losing the aircraft to enemy defenses.
c. ASW Operations. Air ASW support operations can be conducted by helicopters or by

fixed-wing aircraft. Shore-based aircraft are tasked by shore authorities to support forces at sea. Shipborne
aircraft can be tasked by their OTC to provide direct support to support other OTCs.
(NR) (NMM) In either case, standard aircraft tasking formats as detailed in APP-4 should be used.
The tactical procedures to be used on ASW missions are in this publication and appropriate tactical
instructions issued by the tasking authority.
(NR) (NMM) The ASW mission designators in Table 6-5 should be used by the OTC to task aircraft
on ASW missions and in GREEN REQUESTS. Tactical procedures are also in ATP-28.
There are many occasions when the long-range detection capability of the submarine can be
exploited or complemented by the use of cooperating aircraft. The combination of effective detection by
the submarine and subsequent rapid response by the aircraft provides a valuable system of defense and
surveillance against surface or subsurface enemy forces. In this context, cooperating units must be aware
of each other’s tactics and limitations. The types of AIR/SUB operations are:
(1) Aided Intercept. A submarine is provided with target location information by aircraft or other
other forces.
(2) AIR/SUB Support Operations. Cooperation between MPA and submarine when both are
on area operations. There are three levels of cooperation under these conditions:
(a) Mutual Cooperation. This is the highest level of cooperation. The air and submarine
patrol areas (APA and SPA) overlap.
(b) Indirect Cooperation. The APA and SPA are within communication distance. Units
operate independently unless one requests support from the other.
(c) Surveillance Cooperation. This is the lowest level of cooperation. Aircraft carry out
surveillance and make a blind broadcast to assist the submarine.
(3) ASW Operations Utilizing Submarines in Direct Support. Submarines may be called
on to protect surface forces by coordinating their operations with other ASW units. Aircraft may assist
the submarine in contact prosecution and may also assist OTC/submarine communications.
6408 — 6409 SPARE
6410 PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT IN TRANSIT
a. Enemy Contacts. Aircraft commanders are to be briefed before takeoff on action to be taken
on contacts gained while in transit. Briefing shall take the form of transit instructions as follows:
6-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Transit Instructions A (TRANSALFA). The aircraft is not to report or investigate enemy
contacts. Contacts gained are to be logged and reported after flight. The aircraft is to attempt to adhere to
scheduled task times.
(2) Transit Instructions B (TRANSBRAVO). The aircraft is to report enemy contacts to its
controlling authority and to the OTC of the supported force. It is not to investigate such contacts and is to
continue its briefed mission unless otherwise ordered.
(3) Transit Instructions C (TRANSCHARLIE). The aircraft is to attempt identification and re-
port all enemy contacts. Concurrently with the report, the aircraft shall take the following action:
(a) Submarine — Destroy it whenever possible, unless in a subsurface restricted area. In

prehostility phase, track it in accordance with Rules of Engagement. The time spent investigating an
enemy contact shall be in accordance with preflight briefing or further orders.
(b) Surface Ships — Endeavour to shadow until further orders are received.
(c) Aircraft — Endeavour to identify and ascertain course and speed.
b. Search for Friendly Force
(1) Not Found. If the force is not found within one hour of the expected time, an encrypted “Not
found” message is to be made to the authority ordering the mission. The aircraft may request the OTC to
use homing procedure; however, the OTC may not wish to break radio silence to answer the request or to
use homing procedure. The aircraft is to continue searching for the force.
(2) When Found. When the force is found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be made only if a
“Not found” report has been made previously or if the aircraft has been ordered to make this report. The
position of the force is only to be included in a “Found” report when the aircraft commander considers
that the estimated position is in error to such an extent that any delay in transmitting this information
would adversely affect subsequent operations. The “Found” report, if made, is to be transmitted at least
50 miles from the force. However, once the aircraft is under the tactical command of the OTC, it shall be
the OTC’s responsibility, considering his EMCON plan, to determine the range from the force at which
the “Found” report shall be sent.
6411 — 6414 SPARE
6415 IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION OF SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
It is important that all aircraft tasked to support a force at sea, be positively identified as friendly as
they close the force. When the aircraft departs from its base/force at sea, its identity is known and the
transfer of control and identification/recognition to the supported force can be done by radar handover or
nonradar handover procedures.
a. Radar Handover. This procedure is used when there is overlapping radar coverage at the
transit altitude between the departure air control area and the air control area around the supported force.
The controllers effect a positive transfer of control of the aircraft after mutual self identification.
b. Nonradar Handover. This procedure is used when there is a gap in radar coverage at the
transit altitude or when EMCON denies the use of radar and positive handover by controllers is not
possible. Aircraft who are tasked to support a force and are controlled by maritime authorities, are to use
appropriate self identification and joining procedures listed in Article 6417 and Table 6-4.
(NR) (NMM) Aircraft who are controlled by other air forces will use the procedures in ATP 34.
6-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-4. Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support
SERIAL
ACTION UNIT ACTION
NO.
1 OTC/ACU On receipt of FORM GREEN, transmit joining instructions

message in accordance with paragraph 6419b.
2 MHQ Relay the joining instructions message to the aircraft. If for any
reason the MHQ is unable to relay the message to the aircraft, it
is to inform the OTC/ACU.
3 Aircraft Complete aircraft joining message and transmit it to MHQ for dis-
patch to ACU. (See Note 5 or Serial 8.)
4 Aircraft Transit under tactical control of sector operations center (SOC) or

MHQ.
5 Aircraft Select assigned IFF/SIF codes as ordered in FORM GREEN.

Communications should be attempted with the force before the
aircraft reaches the gate.
6A Aircraft If radar handover expected, monitor handover on promulgated

handover circuit and establish communications with the force
marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC. (See Notes 1 and 2.)
6B Aircraft If nonradar handover expected, establish communications with

force marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC on RATT or voice
on ASW or marshalling circuits as promulgated. Pass: type of air-
craft, time at gate/ISR, direction of approach, and altitude. (See
Notes 1 and 2.)
7 Force Marshaller/ Respond to aircraft (see Note 1); challenge aircraft IFF or pass
Nominated identity procedure to be done (if required). Pass:
Controller/OTC
a. Call sign and position of ACU
b. Direction and distance to patrol area
c. Altimeter setting (QNH)
d. CSP aspects of EMCON plan
e. Inform aircraft if ACU has received FORM GREEN
f. Time check
g. Clearance to descend and proceed to patrol area, as re-

quired, and
h. If required, new control RATT or voice frequency, and control
of aircraft to ACU
i. Gridlock.
6-35 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-4. Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Cont.)
8 Aircraft Call ACU and ascertain if ACU has received aircraft joining
message. If not received, pass all items below; if received,
update appropriate items below:
a. Sortie number
b. Any restrictions to role (see Note 3)
c. Serial numbers of OPGEN and OPTASK received
d. ON/OFF task times
e. Serial number of the latest WSM message received
f. Aircraft data link coordination information.

Be prepared to pass following additional information if ACU
informs aircraft that no FORM GREEN was received:
g. Aircraft type
h. Weapon load
i. IFF mode setting.
9 ACU ACU pass following joining instructions message (See Note 4):
a. Identify maneuver if no previous voice communications
established. Pass ship’s position and clearance to close/
descend.
b. Threat assessment, mission designator and employment/
airplan, gridlock (if not already completed by force marshaller),
controller grade, control rules in force.
c. EMCON
d. EW task
e. PIM, if different.
f. Update important data from OPGEN and OPTASK if different.
g. Update important data from JTAA or SAA, if different; or pass

latest WSM serial number.
h. Update air safety information not previously transmitted, in-

cluding other aircraft activity.
6-36 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-4. Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Concl.)
9 ACU i. Lost communication procedures

(Cont.)
j. Weapons restrictions and rules of engagement
k. (NC) (NMM) DUSTBIN status and area (if appropriate)
m. SITREP, including in TA operations current contact acoustic

data (i.e., target sources, frequencies, source levels, aspect de-
pendencies and advice or sensor depth)
n. 1. Bathy and active acoustic information if different than
predicted range
2. In TAS operations: ambient noise
p. Weather, QNH, water depth, and tidal stream

q. Call sign and position of important and detached units
r. Times of ship/air RATT schedules (if applicable)
s. Data link coordination information.
NOTE:
Only information required need be sent.
10 Aircraft Report to ACU when in patrol area.
Notes:
1. Whenever joining an unsecure voice circuit, proper authentication must be used.
2. Helicopters are too close at altitudes that will allow early radar detection by the force being
joined and at speeds below 140 knots.
3. Restrictions should include any significant change in standard weapon load or any unservice-
abilities.
4. ACU should not duplicate any information already held by the aircraft.
5. Aircraft joining message is to be:

a. In accordance with MATELO Handbook
b. Of IMMEDIATE precedence
c. Addressed to the OTC/ACU
d. From the aircraft call sign.

6. The communications security protection (CSP) aspects of an EMCON plan are reflected by
RSIs A, D, and X.
6-37 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-5. (NU) (NMM) ASW Mission Designator Table
Mission Mission Threat (3) Sensor Remarks

Designator Aim (2)
(1) (4)
EM Deter All Radar — may Optimize radar operating mode for

be augmented deterrence
by sonobuoys
ZY Deter and All Radar — may 1. Optimize radar operating for

Detect be augmented deterrence
by passive 2. Patrol at best compromise
sonobuoys altitude for radar and sonobuoy
detection
NL Detect and All Radar — may 1. Optimize radar operating for

Deter (active be augmented detect
and passive) by passive 2. Patrol at best altitude for radar
sonobuoys detection
JK Detect (pas- Primary Passive sono- 1. Patrol at altitude for best

sive) nuclear buoys sonobuoy monitoring
2. May be used against noisy/
diesel-electric if known/assessed to
be snorting
FE Detect (pas- Nuclear Passive sono- Patrol at altitude for best sonobuoy
sive/active) (and/or buoys — may monitoring
diesel- be augmented
electric) by radar
SN Support sub- All As required 1. May be combined with another

marine ASW compatible secondary mission
operations 2. Patrol at altitude for best
sonobuoy/communications monitor-
ing
Notes
(1) Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the mission form and mission
type (Table 6-2). The OTC will order the specific ASW mission designator (Table 6-4).
(2) Specific requirements to “Report,” “Track,” and/or “Destroy” are to be ordered additionally by the
tasking authority, e.g., “ZY + Destroy,” “FE + Track + Report.”
(3) The tasking authority/OTC is to specify the type of threat, if known.
(4) If BLIND BROADCAST, POSTBOX, or AIRMAIL procedures are required, the FORM GREEN is
to be amplified accordingly.
6-38 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6416 DEFINITIONS
The terms used by maritime aircraft during support operations are listed below and are illustrated
in Figure 6-3.
a. Departure Location. The location from which the supporting aircraft departs, including an
airfield, a carrier, or another ship.
b. Force Air Coordination Area (FACA). The FACA is that area surrounding a force
within which air coordination measures are required to prevent mutual air interference between all
friendly surface and air units and their weapon systems. Normally, the FACA will coincide with the
AAW area or the area of ASW direct support, whichever is the greater. The size and shape of the area
will usually be prescribed by the OTC and will depend upon the limits to which tactical control of
aircraft must be exercised. If two or more FACAs overlap, the senior OTC is responsible for overall
coordination.
c. Handover Gate. The hand over gate is the point at which the control of the aircraft, if radar
handover is used, changes from one controller to another. The handover gate position is determined by
agreement between the shore ADC and the OTC.
d. Entry/Exit Gate. The entry/exit gate is the point to which an aircraft will proceed to commence
the transit inbound or outbound from an airfield or force at sea. It should be suitably located to make the
transit of the supporting aircraft as short as possible and clear of enemy units. Gates can be promulgated as
position geographic or relative to a force. In either case, the aircraft must be capable of locating the gate by
its own navigation system or radar. There may be a number of gates. When the entry/exit gates are
promulgated relative to a force at sea, the gates are normally at least 150 nm from the force/disposition
center. Since many aircraft radars cannot detect and identify a surface force at 150 nm, the gate should be
promulgated as a range and bearing from PIM and not from ZZ or QQ.
1. The entry/exit gate is 5 nm in radius (10 nm in diameter) from the surface to 25,000 feet MSL and
reserved as an MPA climb/descent zone to and from assigned altitudes.
2. The gate will be the only point of entry and departure for aircraft. Altitudes, as specified in
RAINFORM GREEN, should be at or near the upper limit of the gate in order to enable rapid and
positive identification by the force and ensure UHF communications.
e. Marshalling Gate. This is the point to which aircraft fly for air traffic control purposes
prior to commencing an outbound transit or after completing an inbound transit before landing.
Marshalling gates will always be within radar coverage of the designated controller (e.g., airfield/
CRP/CRC/SOC/carrier/force marshaller, etc.) and will be defined geographically or relative to the
force. The gate is a position clear of enemy units, and suitably located for transit from supporting air
departure positions.
f. Identification Safety Range (ISR). The ISR in maritime operations is the minimum range to
which an aircraft may close an assumed friendly force without having been positively identified to ensure
that the force does not mistake the aircraft for hostile. It should not be confused with the various self
defense safety ranges that aircraft are advised to use when approaching/investigating unknown contacts.
The ISR normally encompasses the force MEZ if zone AAW coordination is being used. In larger
dispositions this may not always be possible. In any case, the ISR must, as for entry/exit gates, be easily
located by aircraft supporting a force. As with entry/exit gates, ISR relative to ZZ or QQ will be difficult to
locate accurately when EMCON, large dispositions, and longer ranges are considered. Normally, ISRs
should be established relative to the promulgated PIM rather than the position of the force (ZZ or QQ)
whose disposition about the PIM is dynamic.
6-39 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
CRC RADAR
CRC COVERAGE
DEPARTURE LOCATION
(Airfield providing support)
FACA
MARSHALLING EXIT GATE

GATE
ENTRY RADAR
ENTRY COVERAGE
OVER LAPPING GATE
GATE
RADAR COVERAGE
(RADAR HANDOVER)
EXIT
GATE
ISP
HANDOVER ISR
GATE GAP IN RADAR
COVERAGE
(NON-RADAR
HANDOVER) MARSHALLING
ENTRY/EXIT ENTRY/EXIT GATE
6-40
GATE GATE
ISR ID OR
CORR
ISP APPROACH
CORRIDOR
ISP ROACH
APP
DEPARTURE LOCATION
(CARRIER PROVIDING SUPPORT)
Figure 6-3. Approach Corridors
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ST
FORCE ISR
BEING
SUPPORTED
TO PATROL
AREA RADAR
COVERAGE
(1) Marshalling Gates are normally used when the support consists of more than one aircraft.
(2) Once the force being supported has identified and has control of the aircraft, the OTC/ACU will normally direct the aircraft to his
patrol area.
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
g. Approach Corridor. The approach corridor is usually established on a line between the
entry/exit gate and the force/disposition center. If the force center cannot be determined by the aircraft’s
radar, the corridor will be on a line between the entry/exit gate and the PIM position. The inner boundary is
determined by the ISR. The approach corridor width is normally 5 nm either side of the line. Depending on
the mode of promulgation the corridor may be fixed geographically or move in the following manner (see
Figure 6-3):
1. If the entry/exit gate is fixed geographically and the ISR is relative to the force/disposition center,
the approach corridor will pivot about the entry/exit gate as its inner end moves with PIM and its
length will change.
There may be occasions when tactical considerations dictate deviation from the direct route from
entry/exit gate to the force/PIM position. In which case, the routing must be included in the OTC’s
OPGEN/OPTASK updates or agreed to between the shore ADC and the OTC. When establishing
approach corridors, the OTC must consider the communications that will be available for joining and
marshalling, the direction of the friendly bases from which aircraft might come, threat axis, areas in which
support aircraft will be employed once on patrol, location of TOMCAT and AEW pickets in a large
disposition, and AAW coordination such as MEZ and FEZ.
h. Identification Safety Point (ISP). When the gate is not within the radar cover of the ships or
when two-way communications are not established between the ACUs, the ISP is the point at which
aircraft on joining the force will attempt to establish two-way communications with the ships and
commence identification procedures. Unless otherwise promulgated the ISP will be a position at 150 nm
from ZZ on a direct line between the in-use gate and ZZ. There may be occasions when tactical
considerations dictate deviation from the direct route from gate to ZZ. In which case, an ISP may be
included in the OTCs AAW update or agreed between the shore ADC and the OTC, otherwise the ISP need
not be promulgated.
6417 IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION PROCEDURES
Tentative initial identification/recognition of friendly aircraft may be assumed when an aircraft,

showing the proper IFF/SIF code, enters and settles down on the heading of the designated approach
corridor or sector. Positive identification/recognition will be considered as established when an aircraft
has been visually sighted and recognized by CAP, other known friendly aircraft, or a surface ship. If not
sighted, positive identification/recognition may be assumed if at least one planned IFF/SIF change or
identity maneuver has been made. The following self identification procedures are established:
a. (NC) (NMM) IFF/SIF Identity. This may be ordered by the use of the term “Perform Identity
(designation).”
6-41 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Identity — Squawk IDENT

ALFA
(2) Identity — Switch to Standby for 1 minute.
BRAVO
(3) Identity — (Wartime Only) Shift for 2 min-
CHARLIE utes to the wartime mode/code
assignments designated for the
next half hour period, then return
to the current mode.
b. (NC) (NMM) Identity. If positive identification/rectification cannot be established through

IFF/SIF identity, one of the following shall be ordered by the controlling unit.
(1) Identity — Carry out one 360° orbit

DELTA
(2) Identity — Carry out a left or right 90°
turn
ECHO holding new heading for 1 min-
ute, returning to corridor at a 45°
angle.
(3) Identity — Carry out encoded vector.
FOXTROT
6418 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AIRCRAFT CONTROL UNIT (ACU)
Aircraft on direct support are under the tactical control of the OTC, who in turn normally delegates
that function to an Aircraft Control Unit (ACU). General responsibilities of an ACU are as follows:
a. Ordering the tactical employment of aircraft as required by the OTC/AAWC/ASWC/ASUWC

and specifying the type of control.
b. Keeping the OTC fully informed on aircraft status and of any other factors affecting air
operations.
c. Informing the OTC or air coordinator on movements of aircraft under control and in the
operations area.
d. Informing aircraft under his control on movements of other friendly and enemy aircraft; keeping
them informed on the tactical situation.
e. Assisting aircraft that are operating independently or are controlled by shore-based authorities.
6-42 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. Relaying tactical information to and from aircraft.
g. Safety of all aircraft under his control.
6419 SUPPORT AIRCRAFT JOINING A FORCE
a. Preparation. The OTC will promulgate handover gates, entry/exit gates, altitudes, ISP, ISR,
PIM, communication window times, etc., in appropriate MTMS messages. It is essential that the aircraft
receive all this information well before takeoff. The FORM GREEN will also provide further information.
b. Joining Instructions Message.
(1) The OTC/ACU should, whenever possible, send a joining instructions message to the tasking
authority and the airbase or parent ship to promulgate and update information regarding the mission.
The message should contain the information listed in Table 6-3, Serials 7 and 9. The message can be
transmitted by any means and should be received by the airbase at least 4 hours before aircraft takeoff.
(2) The signal should be of IMMEDIATE precedence to both action and information addressees.
The first words of the text should be “FOR...” (e.g., “FOR NWD GREEN 257 FROM (c/s ACU) TO
(c/s MPA)”).
c. Approaching the Force. The OTC should establish approach corridors for friendly aircraft
to use when joining a force. In extreme conditions of weather and EMCON, he may dictate a rigidly
designed flight profile for aircraft joining, operating on station, and departing a task force/task group. The
design of such a flight profile must take into account the force composition/disposition with respect to
ASW, AAW, ESM, ASMD, and airspace coordination in IMC. In a large disposition, the force AAW
posture may permit engagement of MPA or other friendly aircraft attempting to join long before
communications have been established or identification has been completed. This is especially true when
pickets or deception groups are used. Therefore, it is essential that aircraft remain in these corridors until
identified as friendly by the OTC.
(1) Aircraft at ISP. The aircraft should be at the ISP (entry/exit gate if no ISP) at the promulgated
ON TASK time and if early it is to hold there until ON TASK time. The aircraft then flies down the ap-
proach corridor, attempting to establish communications with the Force Marshaller/Nominated Con-
troller/OTC on the promulgated frequency when closing the force within the approach corridor. If the
aircraft reaches the ISR and has not established communications with the OTC and has not been identi-
fied as friendly, it is to hold at the ISR within the corridor and continue to attempt communications. If
after 15 minutes at the ISR, no communications have been established, the aircraft is to transit towards
the entry/exit gate inside the corridor until the aircraft commander considers it safe and:
(a) Unless otherwise directed, carry out an appropriate Airplan beyond the ISR and outside a
safe range from unidentified or hostile contacts.
(b) Make periodic attempts to establish communications on the promulgated joining circuit or
other force circuits.
(c) If the aircraft commander considers he cannot provide useful support or if his activities
may conflict with carrier-based operations, he is to clear the force to a suitable distance and inform
MHQ that he is unable to join and request instructions.
6-43 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Not Found/Found Procedure.
(a) Not found. If the force is not found within 1 hour of the expected time, an encrypted “Not
found” message is to be made to the authority ordering the mission.
(b) When found. When the force is found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be made only if a
“Not found” report has been made previously or if the aircraft has been ordered to make this report.
The position of the force is only to be included in a “Found” report when the aircraft commander
considers that the estimated position is in error to such an extent that any delay in transmitting this
information would adversely affect subsequent operations.
d. Use of Checklist.
(1) The checklist in Table 6-1 is designed to be for both RATT and voice joining. Whenever RATT is
available, it should be used in preference to voice as it is clearer, faster, and reduces traffic on busy voice
circuits. The OTC’s EMCON plan will indicate which information must be encoded when voice is used.
(2) Whenever voice joining procedures are used, the OTC should consider using the abbreviated
format (paragraph e), thereby reducing the time for establishing the aircraft on patrol.
e. Abbreviated Joining Procedure. It is sometimes necessary to expedite joining procedures;

for example, when an action is in progress during arrival of aircraft. Such a procedure should include only
the following items:
(1) From Aircraft:
(a) Authentication.
(b) Number and type of aircraft/helicopters, identity of senior aircraft/helicopter, persons on

board (POB).
(c) Joining from.
(d) Joining for/Request employment.
NOTE
The following additional information should be passed if different from the tasking signals:
Altitude
Weapon load
Off task time.
For helicopters, if applicable:
Observer control grade

Any restriction to aircraft capability.
(2) From Ship:
(a) Authentication.
(b) Identity and ship’s position.
6-44 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Employment/Airplan — including PIM, master/watcher, controller grade, control rules

in force.
(d) Clearance to close/descend.
(e) Weapon restrictions if appropriate.
(f) Gridlock.
(g) Data link information if appropriate.
Supplementary information can be passed later when the tactical situation permits.
f. Helicopters. When helicopters join from another task unit within the same task group, the
abbreviated joining procedure should normally be sufficient and should therefore generally be used. If the
helicopter requires further information, it should request it by reference to the appropriate section in the
joining checklist (for example, “HCU FROM HELICOPTER. REQUEST D, H, M, AND N”). (The
helicopter requires EW Task, Safety Info, SITREP, and Acoustic Info.)
g. (NC) (NMM) Covert Joining Procedures.
(1) The OTC may direct that covert joining procedure is to be used to avoid revealing the presence
of joining aircraft. This procedure restricts the aircraft commander from using UHF for voice transmis-
sion until he is involved in the active engagement of a contact. However, should the procedure become
too restrictive, it may be canceled by the OTC, ACU, or aircraft commander.
(2) When joining, the aircraft commander will carry out normal joining procedures, but he will not
transmit on UHF to establish communications, as outlined for the self-identification procedure. The air-
craft commander and ACU will carry out the following:
(a) The aircraft shows the appropriate IFF/SIF.
(b) When the ACU identifies the aircraft he passes patrol instructions using message
authentication.
(c) If the aircraft commander understands the instructions, he squawks IDENT (identity
ALFA) and proceeds on patrol.
(d) If the aircraft commander does not understand or hear all of the instructions, he switches his
IFF to standby for 1 minute (identity BRAVO).
(e) The ACU checks his message to ensure that his instructions are complete and then
retransmits. Should the aircraft commander again go to standby (identity BRAVO), it is probable
that he is having difficulty reading the ACU, and the ACU should instruct him to close.
(f) The procedure is repeated until the aircraft commander squawks IDENT (identify ALFA)
to signify that patrol instructions are understood. In no case should the aircraft overfly any ship
unless given permission to do so by the ACU.
6420 — 6424 SPARE
6-45 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6425 EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT WHILE ON DIRECT SUPPORT
Employment of aircraft on direct support is determined by the OTC or the ASWC/ASUWC as

appropriate. On joining the force, the aircraft will be tasked using an appropriate Airplan based on the
mission as promulgated in the tasking signal. The OTC cannot normally task a support aircraft on mission
types other than that authorized by the original tasking authority. The only exception to this is when “KS”
ASW operations is given, then the OTC can amplify aircraft using the mission designators in Table 6-4.
The OTC may change the employment of ASW aircraft by issuing a new Airplan and/or ASW mission
designator.
6426 (NC) (NMM) ASW MISSION DESIGNATORS
a. (NC) (NMM) Maximum Effect From ASW Air Effort. To derive the maximum effect from
ASW air effort, it is essential that the purpose and tasks of each sortie be clearly defined. Only by doing so
can it be assured that sorties are complementary and that the intentions of the tasking authority are
conveyed fully and without ambiguity to the aircraft commander.
b. (NC ) (NMM) Type of ASW Operation Ordered. Irrespective of the type of ASW operation
ordered, the ASW Mission Designator Table (6-4) specifies one or both of the following mission aims.
(1) Deter — To harass submarines to the extent that they fail to achieve their aims.
(2) Detect — To detect submarines.
c. (NC) (NMM) Tasking Authority Factors. Factors which must be taken into account by the
tasking authority when matching each sortie to the intention of the commander include the threat, other
friendly forces available, and the environment.
d. (NC) (NMM) Appropriate Designator Letters. Tasking authorities whether shore-based or

the OTC will order the missions in Table 6-5 by indicating the appropriate designator letters. Tasking
authorities will use “KS” in the mission line of FORM GREEN to order ASW direct support operations.
Selection and ordering of the specific ASW mission designator is the prerogative of the supported OTC.
e. (NC) (NMM) Deviation From Specified Sensor. Aircraft commanders may not deviate
from the specified sensor(s) without prior approval from the tasking authority/OTC since the use of other
sensors may negate the tasking authority’s/OTC’s intention.
6427 (NC) (NMM) SONOBUOY OPERATIONS
Aircraft tasked with conducting a passive sonobuoy search will normally determine their own sonobuoy
spacing and orientation in the light of briefed or measured acoustic information. If the unit is an ASW
helicopter, or if the OTC or designated warfare specialist wishes, detailed employment may be specified.
6428 (NR) (NMM) AVOIDANCE OF SONOBUOY MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
The procedure for the avoidance of mutual interference between sonobuoy equipped units operating
in adjacent areas is contained in the Sonobuoy Interference Avoidance Plan (SIAP) in Chapter 9.
6429 IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION BY AIRCRAFT
Visual identification/recognition is likely to be extremely hazardous to an aircraft. Covert tactics

should therefore be used to force the target to radiate and give the aircraft an opportunity for
identification/recognition. High-speed probe aircraft, when available, should be used if visual
identification/recognition is essential.
6-46 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a. Actions on Gaining Contact. On gaining contact, the aircraft should immediately turn away
from the target, attempt to fix its position, and recognize the target using ESM. The aircraft should remain
outside the potential MEZ and, if covert, operate at minimum operating level or below the ship’s
theoretical radar horizon.
b. Identification. If unable to recognize using ESM, a positive identification run may be

necessary. The aircraft will normally take the following precautions:
(1) Approach from a direction other than that on which the initial detection was made.
(2) Approach at minimum altitude and high speed.
(3) Monitor ESM for fire control radar lock-on and, if detected, alter course approximately 135°
and open the target at minimum altitude and high speed.
(4) If no fire control radar is detected, continue the approach until visual identification is obtained
or AA range is reached.
6430 — 6439 SPARE
6440 (NC) (NMM) MPA TO MPA TURNOVER PROCEDURES
MPA to MPA turnover procedures must ensure safety of flight, maintain the tactical problem, and
preserve the EMCON policy. MPA controllers shall ensure oncoming aircraft arrive in the assigned area at
an altitude above the on-task aircraft, and that the relieving aircraft not expend sonobuoys prior to the
on-task aircraft’s departure from the operating area. Fifteen minutes prior to the scheduled relief time, the
on-task aircraft is to deploy predesignated turnover sonobuoys (A, B, C) or briefed gapped turnover
channels, which describe the tactical situation, at the briefed off-task time, to the relieving aircraft. It is
imperative that the oncoming aircraft mark-on-top these buoys for flight safety, to ascertain the tactical
situation, and to plot-lock buoy patterns for subsequent analysis/reconstruct. The standard altimeter
setting during turnover procedures (defined as 30 minutes prior to briefed on-task/off-task time until
turnover is completed) is 1013.2/29.92.
6441 (NC) (NMM) TERMINOLOGY
The following terms are used to describe geographic positions that are pertinent to tactical situations.
a. Jig Point. The jig point is a fixed geographic position established by the MPA controlling
agency for each sortie at which a crew will be briefed to drop the first buoy (Kingpin buoy) of the briefed
cold pattern. Any change of Kingpin position when ordering new cold tactics in flight will be passed
relative to the jig point as a range and bearing or as a new latitude and longitude for Kingpin positions.
b. Kingpin. The Kingpin is the master buoy position of a cold tactic on which the barrier or field
pattern is oriented. The Kingpin will normally be an end or corner buoy of the barrier or field.
c. Pattern Time. Pattern time is the time by which a barrier, wedge, or field must be laid and
monitoring commenced. If a crew is unable to meet the criteria, the pattern is to be moved in accordance
with the briefed time-late instructions. Air messages revising Kingpin position are to include a time for the
completion of the new pattern.
d. Barrier. The term “barrier” is to be used to specify a straight line of buoys. Barrier orientation
will be ordered by one true bearing from the Kingpin buoy.
6-47 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
e. Wedge. The term “wedge” is to be used to specify a bent line barrier of buoys. Barrier
orientation will be ordered by two true bearings. The first bearing provides barrier orientation from the
Kingpin to the center of the wedge. The second bearing provides orientation from the center point to the
last buoy.
f. Field. The term “field” is to be used for all patterns that involve more than one row of buoys. The
pattern will be ordered by two true bearings. The first bearing will be row orientation from the Kingpin and
the second bearing will be the field direction (normally right angles to row orientation). For all fields, the
second and subsequent row are normally offset left or right (as specified) by one-half buoy spacing.
g. On-Task Point. The position of the reference buoy in the previous aircraft’s turnover pattern is
designated the on-task point for oncoming aircraft. An aircraft not relieving another is to use the master
buoy (kingpin) from his cold/cold tactic as the on-task point.
h. Reference Buoy. Turnover buoys deployed by the offgoing aircraft will be used as the
reference point for the turnover. Though more than one buoy may be used to indicate contact status, the
turnover point will be established by a single reference buoy as specified below:
Contact Deployed Reference

Status Buoy Buoy
HOT/HOT A, AB, ABC, A
AC
HOT/COLD B, BC B
COLD/COLD C C
i. Off-Task Point. A point 30 nm along a vector specified by the controlling authority from the
reference buoy dropped by the offgoing aircraft. The aircraft is cleared to commence a climb from FL 140
or below at the off-task point to the return transit level while maintaining the off-task vector. Where
possible the off-task vector should be along the target but optimized to give maximum lateral separation
from the track of the oncoming aircraft.
6442 (NC) (NMM) ON-TASK EXTENSIONS
Occasionally the on-task aircraft will be instructed to extend his off-task time. Unless in direct secure
communications with the offgoing aircraft, individual initiative on the part of the oncoming aircraft is not to
be used in determining early descents, buoy drops, or any other departure from established procedures.
Extensions to briefed on-task times may be only authorized by the aircraft’s OPCON authority.
6443 (NC) (NMM) PROCEDURES FOR SPECIFIC TURNOVER
To provide safe separation between the oncoming and offgoing aircraft during turnover, it is necessary
to establish a direction in which the aircraft must descend or climb when arriving and departing the operating
area. To establish this direction, the controlling authority will designate a departure vector for each turnover.
The designated vector will be used by the offgoing aircraft to determine the direction of his departure track
from the reference buoy and the reciprocal of the vector will be used by the oncoming aircraft to determine
the direction in which to descend to the desired on-task altitude. Turnover/takeover procedures are to be
flown at FL 140 and FL 150 respectively, unless specified differently in Forms GREEN and briefing signals.
Aircraft may not descend from transit to turnover altitude sooner than 30 minutes prior to briefed on-task
time, unless the previous aircraft has departed station. For safety of flight, it is essential that aircraft tasked for
operations in restricted EMCON adhere to the procedures outlined below.
6-48 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a. (NC) (NMM) Procedures for Aircraft at Off-Task Time.
(1) At off-task time minus 30 minutes, the aircraft is to remain at or below FL 140.
NOTE
The off-task time for the offgoing aircraft is the same as the on-task time for the oncoming air-
craft in a continuous prosecution scenario
(2) Not later than off-task time minus 15 minutes, deploy the appropriate turnover sonobuoys.
(3) Replace turnover buoys if required.
(4) Depart the reference buoy along the departure vector so as to arrive at the off-task point (30 nm
range along the departure vector from the reference buoy) not later than the scheduled off-task time.
(5) Under no circumstances are sonobuoys or stores to be released after the off-task time.
(6) When level at the assigned flight level, proceed to the designated inbound route.
b. (NC) (NMM) Non-Arrival of Relief. If the relief is late, the on-task aircraft is not to remain
beyond its briefed off-task time unless specifically ordered by its OPCON
If aircraft-to-aircraft communications have not been established, the departing aircraft should pass
appropriate information to the ASWACU for transmission to any subsequent relief.
c. (NC) (NMM) Procedures for Aircraft at On-Task Time.
(1) At the assigned transit flight level, proceed to the on-task point (reference buoy if deployed, or
Kingpin position if not relieving a previous event) via the assigned route.
(2) At the on-task point, descend if required, but do not fly lower than the authorized turnover alti-
tude (normally FL 150) until the on-task time.
(3) Monitor turnover buoys and establish the position of the reference buoy by mark-on-top.
(4) At the on-task time, descend to search altitude from the on-task point along the briefed
on-task vector.
(5) If the previous event was cold, proceed at the on-task time to the briefed position and commence
deployment of the briefed cold search pattern.
d. (NC) (NMM) Restrictions. If, for any reason, the position of the reference buoy cannot be
established, the aircraft is to remain overhead the on-task point at or above FL 150 until on-task time plus
15 minutes. After this time the aircraft is cleared to descend and proceed with the appropriate tactics.
6444 (NC) (NMM) SONOBUOY TURNOVER PROCEDURES
a. Non-gapped turnovers should use the sonobuoy turnover patterns specified in Table 6-6.
b. Planned gapped turnovers, when hot, should use the following turnover patterns:
(1) Alpha buoy on the best estimate of the target’s position at the off-task time.
6-49 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Bravo buoy on the best estimate of the target’s position at the on-task time of the
relieving aircraft.
(3) A five-buoy wedge centered on the Bravo buoy at 2 MDR spacing. The RF channels of the wing
buoys of the wedge, Delta-1 and Delta-2, will be designated by the controlling authority. The RF chan-
nels of the inner buoys will be at the discretion of the MPA captain.
NOTE
Sonobuoy life settings are to be the minimum that will guarantee RF life for the gapped period
and, if possible, the Bravo buoy should be a difar buoy. Crews are to be briefed for gapped turn-
overs for all events and are to employ gapped turnover procedures it advised that the oncoming
aircraft is delayed by more than one hour. A crew taking over a gapped turnover has one hour in
which to generate contact. If contact is not gained within one hour, cold/cold tactics are to be
employed. Table 6-6
6445 SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONTROLLED BY OTHER AIR FORCES
a. Maritime air operations involving other air forces usually occur as a result of an OTCs/MHQ’s
request for a specific mission or series of missions to support operations at sea. These maritime missions
are controlled by the appropriate air force authority and do not use standard maritime procedures. The
procedures to be used are encompassed in the Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (TASMO)
concept and embraces the organization, procedures, and communications to be used in NATO for land- or
carrier-based tactical air support for maritime operations. It does not include procedures for:
(1) Tactical air support for maritime units from their own shipborne air assets.
(2) Employment of any nuclear weapons in support of maritime operations.
(3) MPA operations.
(4) Air coordination and airspace control for amphibious warfare operations.
b. (NR) NMM) Details of TASMO procedures, tasking organizations, and communications are in
ATP 34. TASMO message formats, with examples, are in APP 4.
6450 AIR COORDINATION
Air coordination involves the safe employment of aircraft and the coordination of airspace with
other users.
a. The OTC has responsibility for:
(1) All aircraft embarked in the force at all times.
(2) All aircraft assigned to the force for tactical command or control from the time when two-way
communications are established with any ACU in the force.
b. Safety precautions and measures to prevent mutual interference are in Section VII of
this chapter.
6-50 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-6. (NU) (NMM) Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures
Turnover Pattern Meaning Position

in Water
Alpha (only) Hot localized DP contact at briefed On best estimate of target’s

off-station time. Target course and position at briefed off-station time.
speed uncertain. (See Notes 1 and 2.)
Bravo (only) Non-localized contact at briefed On top of buoy having strongest

off-station time. target contact. (See Note 1.)
Charlie (only) No significant contact held during On the end of the pattern closest to
the on-station period. Charlie buoy the destination air base (or as
deployed for search pattern briefed). (See Note 1.)
continuity.
Alpha and Bravo Hot CZ or BB contact at briefed off- Collocated on last buoy in contact.
Collocated station time. Note: If the air crew is (See Note 1.)
not certain of the type of contact
(CZ/BB or DP), assume non-
localized contact and drop Bravo
buoy as above.
Alpha and Bravo Hot localized DP contact at off- Alpha on best estimate of target’s
Not Collocated station time. Target course and position at briefed off-station time.
speed known. Bravo down target’s course at 1
nm for each knot of target’s speed.
(See Notes 1 and 2.)
Alpha and Charlie (Spare)

Collocated
Alpha and Charlie (1) Localized contact, off-going Alpha on best estimate of target’s
Not Collocated aircraft had to leave station prior or position at time the aircraft left
(2) Lost CTC prior to briefed off- station or lost contact. Charlie
target course and speed uncertain. separated from Alpha 2 nm per 15
minutes difference between the
time the aircraft left station or lost
contact time and briefed off-station
time. (See Notes 1, 2, and 3.)
Alpha, Bravo, and Same as above, except that target Same as above, Bravo down
Charlie Not Collocated course and speed are known. target’s course at 1 nm per knot of
target’s speed. (See Notes 1, 2,
and 3.)
Bravo and Charlie (Spare)

Collocated
6-51 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-6. (NU) (NMM) Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures (Cont’d)
Turnover Pattern Meaning Position

in Water
Bravo and Charlie Non-localized contact when leaving Bravo collocated on strongest buoy
Not Collocated (or station lost contact) prior to in contact at the time the aircraft
briefed off-station time. left station or lost contact. Charlie
displaced from Bravo 2 nm per 15
minutes difference from the time
the aircraft left station or lost con-
tact and the briefed off-station time.
(See Notes 1 and 3.)
Zulu Buoy placed 15 minutes of target Buoy positioned to maintain contact

SOA down track from Alpha buoy. on quiet targets.
Notes:
1. Crews are cleared to use any combination of buoy types for turnovers between similarly equipped
aircraft as briefed by the operational commander. When turnovers are between different aircraft
types, or if any doubt exists on types of buoys to use, lofar or difar will be used with preference
given to the use of difar for the Alpha and Bravo buoys.
2. For localized DP contact, the aircraft must have achieved Doppler shift or difar CPA and
employed fixing techniques to confirm contact position to within 5 nm.
3. If at all possible, the Charlie buoy should be positioned along the target track to provide an
additional opportunity for contact.
6451 RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITS CARRYING AIRCRAFT
Any units carrying aircraft are responsible for informing the air coordinator of any
unscheduled flights.
6452 TACTICAL PROCEDURES
Tactical procedures are required to prevent tactical deficiencies caused by mutual interference
between ships, aircraft, and their weapons systems, and, in particular, to:
(1) Ensure the timely engagement of enemy forces.
(2) Ensure that all weapons of the force can be employed effectively within force and local air coor-
dination areas.
(3) Prevent the force from being alerted and reacting unnecessarily to unidentified forces which are
in fact friendly.
(4) Safeguard friendly forces from being engaged by each other.
(5) Provide a safe margin of separation whenever necessary between individual friendly forces and
their weapons.
6-52 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6453 INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS
Independent operations may be planned and coordinated by the shore headquarters, OTC or air
coordinator. Independent operations will be necessary when aircraft are operating remote from a surface
force and under shore control, or are cooperating with ships and are beyond surveillance or
communications range. An aircraft selects its own speed, altitude, and heading; is responsible for its own
navigation and collision avoidance; and has tactical freedom to accomplish its task. To implement
independent operations, the code word SOLO may be used.
6454 CONTROLLED OPERATIONS
a. Terms and Definitions. The following terms and definitions are used to describe mission and
safety related control when ACUs are tactically controlling aircraft.
(1) Close Control. A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft is continuously con-
trolled, for altitude, speed, and heading, to a position from which the mission can be accomplished.
(2) Loose Control. A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft commander selects his
own speed, altitude, heading, and the appropriate tactics required to accomplish the assigned task. The
controlling unit will advise the aircraft of the current tactical picture and will provide further advice if
and when available.
(3) Broadcast Control. In the absence of full capability or if the tactical situation precludes close
or loose control, aircraft may be operated under broadcast control. Tactical or target information is
passed to enable the aircraft to accomplish its (their) task. The controlling unit, when possible, provides
adequate warnings of hazards, but the aircraft commander(s) is (are) responsible for aircraft navigation
and collision avoidance. Two-way communications are not a prerequisite for this type of control.
(4) Positive. The controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance, such as
ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.
(5) Advisory. The controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft
safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft’s navigation and collision avoidance.
b. Operational Use. These agreed terms and definitions and the operational use of the
combinations of the terms listed in Table 6-7 are based on:
(1) The two aspects of tactical control of aircraft, namely the aircraft’s mission and the air-
craft’s safety.
(2) The fact that, notwithstanding the safety aspects covered by the set of standard aircraft tactical
control terms, the aircraft commander is ultimately responsible for the aircraft’s safety. However, this
ultimate responsibility of the aircraft’s commander does not relieve the controlling unit from taking any
conceivable measure within the range of possibilities to ensure the aircraft’s safety.
(3) The fact that close and loose control will normally be associated with the terms positive and ad-
visory; however, in exceptional circumstances, the terms close, loose, positive, and advisory may be
used in isolation. In this situation only the definition associated with the single term in use describes the
control being offered by the controller.
(4) The premise that no further PROWORDs or codewords additional to the combinations listed in
Table 6-7 are required to tactically control aircraft.
6-53 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-7. Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must be Used

To Tactically Control Aircraft
SAFETY
MISSION POSITIVE ADVISORY
CLOSE A form of aircraft mission control in which A form of aircraft mission control in
the aircraft is continuously controlled, for which the aircraft is continuously
altitude, speed, and heading, to a position controlled, for altitude, speed, and
from which the mission can be accom- heading, to a position from which the
plished. mission can be accomplished.
The controlling unit is responsible for tak- The controlling unit will provide ade-
ing actions for collision avoidance, such quate warnings of hazards affecting
as ordering the necessary alterations to aircraft safety. The aircraft commander
heading, speed, and altitude, to maintain is responsible for the aircraft’s navi-
separation criteria. gation and collision avoidance.
LOOSE A form of aircraft mission control in which A form of aircraft mission control in
the aircraft commander selects his own which the aircraft commander selects
speed, altitude, heading, and the appro- his own speed, altitude, heading, and
priate tactics required to accomplish the the appropriate tactics required to ac-
assigned task. The controlling unit will ad- complish the assigned task. The
vise the aircraft of the current tactical controlling unit will advise the aircraft
picture and will provide further advice if of the current tactical picture and will
and when available. provide further advice if and when
The controlling unit is responsible for tak- available.
ing actions for collision avoidance, such The controlling unit will provide ade-
as ordering the necessary alterations to quate warnings of hazards affecting
heading, speed, and altitude, to maintain aircraft safety. The aircraft commander
separation criteria. is responsible for the aircraft’s navi-
gation and collision avoidance.
BROADCAST In the absence of full capability or if the tactical situation precludes close or loose
control, aircraft may be operated under broadcast control. Tactical or target informa-
tion is passed to enable the aircraft to accomplish its (their) assigned task. The
controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards, but the air-
craft commander(s) is (are) responsible for aircraft navigation and collision
avoidance. Two-way communications are not a prerequisite for this type of control.
NOTE: Following combinations of terms will normally be used; however, in exceptional circum-
stances, either column or line labels may be used in isolation:
1. Close — Positive Control
2. Close — Advisory Control
3. Loose — Positive Control

4. Loose — Advisory Control
5. Broadcast Control
6-54 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Inability to Exercise Control. If at any time the ACU cannot meet the requirement for
controlling its aircraft, it is to transfer its responsibility to another unit. If this is not possible, the ACU is to
decide whether to recall the aircraft or to order it to operate independently.
d. Change of Type of Control. Subject to control capabilities, all aircraft operating in the
same area should, if the danger of mutual interference exists, operate under the same type of control. A
change from one type of control to another may be ordered by the OTC, the ACU, or may be requested by
an aircraft.
6455 FACTORS DETERMINING TYPE OF OPERATIONS AND CONTROL
The factors that determine the type of operations and control that can be undertaken are:
(1) Operational considerations, such as mission, range, and emission policy.
(2) In-flight conditions.
(3) Tactical situation.
(4) Mutual interference.
(5) Capabilities of ACUs and controllers.
(6) Equipment status of aircraft involved.
6456 COURSES AND TRUE BEARINGS
Both true and magnetic courses and bearings may be used in aircraft operations. In communications
with aircraft, courses and bearings are to be suffixed TRUE or MAGNETIC.
6457 — 6459 SPARE
6470 SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS
6471 FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
Safety of aircraft operating in support of a naval force is achieved by planned air coordination
consisting of the organization, procedures, and measures required to prevent mutual interference between
surface and air units and their weapons systems. The following procedures are to be used by tasking
authorities and OTCs for maritime aircraft to ensure the safety of aircraft from takeoff to landing.
The ultimate responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests at all times with the aircraft
commander.
a. Transit Separation. Tasking authorities and air coordination authorities are to arrange
separation for aircraft joining and departing a patrol area or a force at sea. This may be done by ordering
routes, handover gates, entry/exit gates, ISP, transit and patrol altitude including upper and lower limits in
the appropriate messages. This must be coordinated with the appropriate air defense organizations.
b. Joining Procedures for Shore-Based Aircraft.
(1) Direct Support. Aircraft joining a force for direct support operations are to transit through the
entry/exit gate (ISP if promulgated), in the approach corridor to the ISR, at the allocated transit altitude
6-55 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
or flight level until identified as friendly and cleared to ascend/ descend to the patrol area by the Force
Marshaller/Nominated Controller/OTC. Aircraft must not leave the approach corridor while closing
unless identification has been confirmed by the force. If communication cannot be established with the
OTC, the aircraft will transit back towards the entry/exit gate within the corridor and continue opera-
tions as detailed in Article 6419.
(2) Associated Support and Area Operations. Aircraft proceeding to an operating area may
commence the descent before reaching the patrol area, providing they do not infringe on other aircraft
areas. When relieving other aircraft, they are to enter the area through the promulgated entry point at the
assigned altitude. The off-going aircraft is to depart through the promulgated departure point, at an as-
signed altitude normally lower than that of the relieving aircraft. After establishing two-way communi-
cation between the aircraft and arranging mutual separation, they may depart the assigned altitudes. If
communication has not been established between the aircraft, the relieving aircraft may leave its as-
signed altitude 15 minutes after the briefed ON TASK time.
(3) Adjacent Patrol Areas. Aircraft patrol areas may be ordered with common boundaries, but
to prevent mutual interference between adjacent aircraft, a safety zone must be established 15 nm either
side of the common boundary. Aircraft intending to prosecute a contact within this safety zone, and
prior to entering an area in which another aircraft is operating must, when the situation and EMCON
policy permit, broadcast on the briefed frequency their position, altitude, and intentions, including the
position of the contact under investigation, and maintain a continuous radar watch for other aircraft.
Subject to the EMCON plan in effect, ASW aircraft employed on operations in adjacent areas
should be allocated tacan channels for use in the air-to-air mode to assist in the safe separation of such
units. MHQs should allocate tacan channels to aircraft under their tactical control. Coordination between
MHQs and OTCs will normally be necessary to avoid conflict.
NOTE
To use the air-to-air tacan capability between suitably equipped aircraft, aircraft in adjacent ar-
eas should be allocated channels with a difference of 63 between channel numbers (e.g., 2 and
84, or 33 and 96).
(4) Aircraft Emergencies. The emergency communication procedures used by the MPA will be
in accordance with the procedures contained in ICAO documentation.
6472 HELICOPTERS
a. General. Helicopters may ditch without warning and should, whenever possible, be kept under
constant surveillance by a surface unit Helicopters in the dip are to be considered ships not under
command. When working at close quarters, it is the responsibility of ships to avoid helicopters. Ships
should not pass within 500 yards of hovering helicopters, and should pass preferably on the downwind
side. To assist in passing, use should be made of the order FREEZE or JUMP, both of which when given to
helicopters are mandatory. The order FREEZE should be followed by the order MELT as soon as the
situation allows. Fixed-wing aircraft are not to position themselves so that the slipstream strikes a
helicopter or causes a helicopter to maneuver to avoid the slipstream. If, for some reason, it becomes
imperative for the helicopter to leave the hover before recovering the sonar transducer, an emergency
breakdip may be executed by cutting the cable. The aircraft may also attempt a free-stream recovery by
leaving the hover with the transducer still streamed; attempting to recover the transducer in flight. In this
situation, the aircraft will transmit “Emergency streamer.” Fixed-wing aircraft within 2 nm are to vacate
the airspace below 1,000 feet.
6-56 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Joining Procedures for Helicopters.
(1) (NR) (NMM) Communication Procedures. Communication procedures for helicopters

joining or departing a maritime force are detailed in APP 1.
(2) Airmove Messages. Airmove messages may be used to determine and confirm which
agency has tactical control when aircraft are being transferred between ships and shore, and to enable
overdue action to be initiated at the earliest opportunity.
(3) Transit. In situations where radar coverage of the forces does not overlap, the transit is to be
conducted on the transit control frequency. Other aircraft on this frequency may be used to provide com-
munication relay facilities to simplify the transfer of control of the aircraft to the force marshaller. At-
tention is drawn to the significance of the establishment of two-way communication in the transfer of
operational control.
(4) Join/Rejoin. Due to the low altitude of the majority of helicopter operations and the small ra-
dar-echoing area of most helicopters, it is unlikely that positive identification/recognition as described
in Article 6417 will be achieved at ISRs in excess of 50 nm. However, the slow approach and distinctive
emissions associated with many helicopters should greatly assist in identification/recognition after the
helicopter has entered the ISR.
Helicopters joining or rejoining a force should obtain clearance from the AAWC or controlling unit
to close within ISR. The controlling unit should then order standard identification/recognition procedures
in accordance with Article 6417.
When a restrictive Emission Policy is in force or when two-way radio communication has not been
established, thus precluding a procedural clearance, the OTC/AAWC should consider the adoption of
some or all of the following procedures:
(a) Nominating “slot times” at the ISR for returning helicopters.
(b) Ordering specific approach altitudes and speeds for returning helicopters.
(c) Ordering briefed maneuvers and/or 1FF identifications to be performed every 10 minutes
while closing, until identified.
The procedures adopted should be stated in the AAW and tasking messages.
6473 LOW-ALTITUDE RULES (FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS)
a. Flying of Helicopters. Aircraft approaching a force are to assume that helicopters are flying
unless otherwise informed. The appropriate ACU is to inform aircraft on joining, of the state of helicopter
flying, and subsequently of any changes.
b. Standard Rules. Unless otherwise ordered, or overriding tactical considerations dictate, the
following rules apply when fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are operating in proximity (in the order of
10 miles):
(1) Maximum altitude for ASW helicopters — 400 feet.
(2) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing aircraft at night or when visibility is 3 nm or less — 700 feet
(except for aircraft in the carrier approach and landing patterns). When a fixed-wing aircraft is required
to operate below 700 feet, all helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the area are to be placed under
6-57 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
positive control whenever practical. However, in many situations, placing helicopters under positive
control and fixed-wing aircraft under advisory control will satisfy flight safety requirements without re-
stricting visibility.
(3) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing aircraft by day when flight visibility is greater than 3 nm —
l00 feet.
(4) Unless aircraft are cooperating and are on the same frequency, or can see each other, the follow-
ing minimum lateral or vertical separation is to be arranged:
(a) In the case of a fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter: 1,500 yards lateral or 300 feet vertical.
(b) In the case of two fixed-wing aircraft: 3 miles lateral or 500 feet vertical.
(c) In the case of two helicopters: 1,500 yards lateral or 300 feet vertical.
(5) Fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters conducting VECTAC or MADVEC procedures may overfly
a helicopter in the dip or hover position, but are to maintain a minimum vertical separation of 200 feet.
NOTES
1. When operating with an aircraft towing MAD, the above limitations shall be strictly
obeyed. The towed MAD sensor body and cable can trail as much as 120 feet below the aircraft.
2. When aircraft or helicopters are dropping sonobuoys, a lateral separation of 1,500 yards
must always be enforced to ensure the safety of aircraft operating at lower altitudes.
3. It is imperative that a force QNH be established by the Air Coordinator (AC) and updated
regularly to ensure aircraft separation within the force.
6474 LATERAL AND VERTICAL SEPARATION
a. General. Unless otherwise ordered, such as during tactical maneuvres, the following rules
apply when fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are operating within force-controlled airspace at levels
above 2,000 feet in IMC. Either lateral or vertical separation shall be provided. These restrictions do not
apply to tactical maneuvres, such as intercepts or rendezvous. Aircraft not in close formation should be
separated as follows:
(1) Lateral separation:
(a) At least 3 nm when aircraft are within 40 nm of the control radar.
(b) At least 5 nm when aircraft are beyond 40 nm of the control radar.
(2) Vertical separation:
(a) Helicopters shall be separated by 500 feet.
(b) Fixed-wing aircraft shall be separated by 1,000 feet.
(c) Helicopters shall be separated from fixed-wing aircraft by 1,000 feet.
6-58 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTE
Below 2,000 feet helicopters shall be separated from fixed-wing aircraft by 300 feet.
(d) When aircraft operate within assigned altitude bands, the above safety separation shall be
applied between the bands.
The vertical allocation of airspace should be promulgated by the Air Coordinator (AC) for all
aircraft operating within the Force Air Coordination Area (FACA). The transition altitude is 5,000 feet
unless otherwise ordered. (See ICAO procedures.) Airspace is primarily allocated by task (ASW/AEW/
ASUW/CAP, etc.) and type (fixed wing (FW) or rotary wing (RW)). Within the individual altitude/flight
level (FL) allocation, further separation may be required to deconflict aircraft of the same task/type. Units
operating within the same altitude/FL band must be on a common frequency to permit coordination of
standard vertical or lateral separation between units.
b. Infringements in War. On occasions in war, units may urgently require to operate in other
than their own allocated airspace, e.g., in order to prosecute a target. On such occasions it may be necessary
to infringe another unit’s airspace before separation can be arranged. The infringing unit should consider
broadcasting its intention on “Guard” and the tactical frequency in use for the area being infringed.
Additionally the unit should call when re-established at its originally allocated altitude/FL.
c. Overlapping FACAs. Where FACAs overlap, the senior OTC is responsible for the overall
coordination of the mix of aircraft and tasking within the combined area.
d. IMC Vertical Separation Plan. An example of a multiforce IMC vertical separation plan
based on semicircular IFR cruising levels is at Table 6-8.
6475 USE OF LIGHTS BY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
a. Ship Lights. During a night ASW action and/or when operating close to aircraft, the tactical
situation as well as safety-of-flight considerations may dictate the use of the 3600 red masthead light(s). If
this use is directed by the OTC, the following meanings apply:
(1) Steady red light(s) — Obstruction warning.
(2) Flashing red light(s) — Ship is in sonar contact and is attacking. (A light that shows a single
flash at regular intervals, the duration of light always being less than the duration of darkness, but
which shows more than 30 flashes per minute).
(3) Occulting red light(s) — Identification light when required for control of aircraft. (A light that is
totally eclipsed at regular intervals, the duration of light always being greater than the duration of
darkness and the minimum exposure at light being 3 seconds). A rotating green, amber, or blue bea-
con may sometimes be used for this purpose.
NOTE
It is often difficult for an aircraft to distinguish between occulting and flashing lights. The ap-
propriate safety warning must therefore always be given prior to carrying out an attack even
when the use of the flashing masthead light(s) is authorized.
b. Aircraft Lights. When numbers of aircraft are operating in proximity at night or in poor
visibility, the senior officer present may order aircraft to use navigation lights.
6-59 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-8. IMC Vertical Separation Plan
Altitude/Flight Level Aircraft
FL 290+ FW AEW
FL 270-290 FW ASUW
FL 250-260 AAR Tanker
FL 220-240 CAP
FL 200-210 FW AEW
FL 170-190 CAP
FL 140-160 VS/MPA (high)
FL 120-130 FW ASUW
FL 100-110 CAP (low)
FL 80-90 RW/AEW
FL 55-70 VS/MPA (Medium) (See Note 1)
5000 Transition Altitude
2000-4000 RW AEW/ASW (Passive)
700-1500 VS/MPA (Low)
400 RW ASW: Match Lamps
0-300 Dippers
NOTES: 1. Barometric pressures below 983 mb will reduce the separation between VS/MPA and
RW ASW (Passive).
2. ASW helicopters in the 0 to 400 feet allocation should be co-operating on the same
ASW frequency.
3. Administrative sorties will fly in an appropriate altitude/FL band monitoring the fre-
quency in use, but will use an alternate frequency for routine, non-operational messages.
4. If quadrantal FLs are required, the separation plan must be amended by commencing
the FL allotments at 500 feet below the semi-circular plan above, e.g., CAP (Low) be-
comes FL 95-FI 205.
5. Communications Relay — Provision has not been made in the plan for communica-
tions relay aircraft (FW or RW) employed on MIDDLEMAN/AUTOCAT/SATCATS tasks.
Often this tasking will be combined with other roles in which altitude allocation the aircraft
will operate. If dedicated sorties are required, the Air Coordinator may have to re-allocate
airspace accordingly.
6-60 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-9. Altitude Separation in HAG Operations
EXAMPLE HAG 1 HAG 2
Altitude (feet) Sector Altitude (feet) Sector
CONTROLLER 800 1,000
MISSILE CARRIER 400 045 to 085 600 000 to 040

HELICOPTER
ILLUMINATING HELICOPTER 1,500 2,000
6476 HAG OPERATIONS
a. Altitude Separation. See Table 6-9.
1. If more than one helicopter is operating in the same area, an altitude separation of 200 feet must
be observed between helicopters.
2. If more than one HAG is employed against the same target, each HAG should be assigned an at-
tack sector. As an additional safety measure, altitude bands should be allocated to the HAG.
3. Any departure from ordered altitude bands requires prior clearance by the ACU or HCU, which
then is responsible for horizontal separation.
b. Communications. Each HAG should, if possible, operate on a separate frequency. HAG

commanders will man an additional common frequency for coordination.
6477 COOPERATION WITH FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
If helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft cooperate in engaging a surface target, the following rules will
apply. As the supporting aircraft approaches the target area and communications are established, the
helicopter will provide all available target information to the supporting aircraft. The helicopter may be
requested to illuminate the target, if it is equipped to do so. Special precautions should be observed by
attack aircraft, particularly during periods of reduced visibility and at night, to ensure that the helicopter is
safely clear of dropped illumination devices, the attack flight path, and weapon effects.
6-61 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION V — SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
6500 SCOPE
This section covers aircraft operations from carriers and other ships with aircraft embarked. The
types and roles of aircraft are varied. Ordinarily the employment and responsibility for such aircraft
remains with the task group commander who must exercise care when positioning these ships in the task
group to facilitate coordinated flight operations.
6501 SHIP MOVEMENTS DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS
a. Right-of-Way. Ships engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft have the right-of-way
except over the ships and formations noted in Chapter 2. If a ship must pass a ship which is conducting
flight operations, she should pass to starboard when the ship is on the flight operations course or to leeward
when the ship is not on the flight operations course.
b. Adjustment of Movements. When carriers are operating aircraft, ships in the formation
other than rescue destroyers are to adjust their course and speed to maintain true bearing following minor
adjustments made by the carrier. Rescue destroyers shall maintain relative bearing and distance from the
carrier. Minor adjustments are defined as alterations of course of not more than ten degrees and alterations
of speed of not more than 2 knots from the promulgated flight operations course and speed. During periods
of darkness or low visibility, the carrier shall signal impending major course or speed changes to her
escorts and receive an acknowledgement before altering her course or speed, using the delayed executive
method when EMCON conditions permit, or by flashing light if radio silence is in force. Minor changes
should be promulgated as information signals as time permits.
c. Ships Operating Vertical (VTOL) and Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL)
Aircraft. Ships operating VTOL/VSTOL aircraft are not normally subject to the same constraints as those
imposed on a CV operating non-VSTOL aircraft, however, they have to turn towards the wind for takeoff
and landing but are unlikely to require high speed. Operating method B (Article 6510) is preferred because
of the flexibility of VSTOL.
d. Positioning of Ships Operating Helicopters. Large ships, such as LPH or LHA, will
often need considerable sea room and freedom to maneuvre when operating helicopters. They should be
positioned in sectors or areas of a suitable size and shape to allow them to remain protected while operating
helicopters. They can, if necessary, operate in the same way as a carrier. Commanding officers of such
ships should advise the OTC of the size of the sector or area required and the preferred operating method
whenever helicopter operations are likely to be prolonged. Escorts will also need sea room, but can
maneuvre, launch, and recover helicopters more quickly than larger ships. Their requirements for
helicopter operations are unlikely to be a major factor in the tactical positioning of the ships.
e. Landing Circuit. Ships should keep clear of the path normally followed by aircraft in the
landing circuit.
6502 HELICOPTER IN-FLIGHT REFUELING (HIFR)
HIFR employed by Task Force units extend helicopter flight endurance. HIFR ships shall be
prepared to conduct HIFR operations on 30 minutes notice.
6-62 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6505 CARRIER OPERATIONS
6506 DUTIES IN A TASK GROUP
a. Ready Deck System. The OTC may order one carrier to keep its landing area ready as a spare
landing field for immediate use by aircraft from other carriers.
b. Duty Carrier System. The OTC may divide the operating day among the carriers present with
each responsible for providing CAP, tanker, ASW, Middleman/AUTOCAT or surveillance services for
the entire force during the period assigned.
6507 SPARE
6508 OPERATING CARRIERS IN COMPANY DELETED BY CHANGE 8
6509 FLYING SECTORS
When two or more ships operating aircraft are in company, each ship is allotted a flying sector for
her aircraft. Flying sectors are calculated as follows:
a. Sector Median. The median of each sector will be on the extension of the line joining the
center of the formation to the ship concerned.
b. Arc of Each Sector. The arc of each of these sectors will be calculated by dividing the 360
degrees of arc by the number of ships involved. Thus, with two ships, each sector will cover an arc of 180
degrees: with three ships, 120 degrees; with four ships, 90 degrees.
c. Limits. Flying sectors extend upward and outward as far as necessary.
6510 MANEUVERING FOR FLIGHT OPERATIONS
A flight operations course and speed is used for maneuvering ships operating aircraft. Three
methods of maneuvering ships for flight operations are available. Unless otherwise ordered by the OTC,
Method A is to be used.
a. Method A — Maneuvering the Whole Formation Together. This method usually is

employed for all extensive flight operations at night or in low visibility because of the danger of operating
ships independently within a formation under such conditions.
b. Method B — The Independent Method. In this method, the ship preparing to operate
aircraft drops to leeward within the screen or to the leeward corner of its sector and then turns into the wind
and maneuvres independently. This method is particularly suitable when it is desired not to exceed
effective sonar speed but where it may be necessary to alter base course during flight operations to keep the
ship operating aircraft within her screen. Method B will normally be ordered when one ship only is
operating aircraft. It may be used at night at the OTC’s discretion. The sector method of ordering a screen is
recommended to be used with this method. The instructions in Article 6512 apply.
c. Method C — Methods A and B Combined. The ship preparing to operate aircraft proceeds
initially as in Method B. The OTC then maneuvres the whole formation, including the ship concerned. It is
used only by day when the OTC is not prepared to accept the risk that the ship operating aircraft may move
beyond the screen. This method is not used in low visibility. It normally will be ordered only when one ship
is operating aircraft. This method may be ordered if flight operations will be of such length that the use of
Method B will necessitate the ship operating aircraft to proceed outside the screen, and it is important to
spend as little time as possible off the base course. When executing this method with sector screening,
6-63 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
escorts should proceed to the upwind parts of their sector prior to the ship concerned increasing her speed
to operate aircraft.
6511 METHOD A
a. The Guide. The following considerations normally govern the selection of the Guide: (1) If
only one ship operating aircraft is present, she is to be designated the Guide. (2) When two or more ships
operating aircraft are present, the ship in station zero is made the Guide. (3) If there is no ship operating
aircraft in station zero or if a circular formation is not being used, a designated ship is to be made Guide.
b. Signals and Turns. The formation will be to and from the flight operations course by either:
(1) Signalling a turn-together to a definite course and speed at the beginning and at the completion
of flight operations, or
(2) Signalling an estimate of the flight operations course and speed beforehand; later turning and
adjusting speed by special signals. After turning away from the flight operations course, a new estimate
of the flight operations course must be signalled before each successive turn for flight operations.
NOTE
When either of the above is used, it is probable that adjustments of course and speed will be nec-
essary after the initial turn and before or during flight operations. All such adjustments are to be
taken as amending the signalled flight operations course.
c. Minor Adjustments. When they are on flight operations course, individual ships operating
aircraft have discretion to make minor adjustments of course and speed, but they must remain within 500
yards of correct station. See also Article 6501.
6512 METHOD B
a. Choice of Initial Position. The ship preparing to operate aircraft is to choose an initial
position best calculated to complete launching or recovering aircraft within the cover of the screen and
cause the minimum interference with other ships of the main body.
b. Bulging the Screen. See Chapter 3.
c. Resuming Station. The ship operating aircraft is to on the assumption that the course and
speed of the force will not be altered. On completion of flight operations, she is to resume station with as
little delay as possible.
d. Adjusting Course. Should it appear probable during flying operations that the ship operating
aircraft will get outside the screen, the OTC may adjust the mean line of advance (MLA) of the Guide by
signal. When a screened unit other than the ship operating aircraft is designated Guide, this alteration to the
MLA is to be ordered by a TURN and/or SPEED signal addressed to the main body.
The screen commander is not required to reform the screen unless ordered to do so by the OTC.
e. Screen Unit as Guide. When there is no other screened unit to become the Guide, the
following procedure is to be used:
(1) Forming or reforming the screen. The OTC is to order the formation of the screen in the normal,
way and include the sectors which the screen should cover.
6-64 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) The screen coordinator is to nominate an escort in advance, normally in a central on the screen,
to be Guide when position required by the OTC.
(3) When the ship operating aircraft must maneuver independently, the OTC is to make the appro-
priate escort the Guide. When using a sector type screen, the screen ship designated is to proceed to the
center of her sector and then remain within one mile of this position. The Guide is then to be regarded,
for station-keeping purposes, as being at the center of her sector at all times.
(4) The screen commander must be ready to nominate a new Guide should the existing one be di-
verted from her station.
(5) The OTC may order the ship operating aircraft to assume/resume Guide in certain circum-
stances (for example, to side-step a known submarine threat).
f. Resuming Course and Station. When flight operations have been completed. the OTC will
order the force to turn to the course required, adjusting speed as necessary. The ship completing aircraft
operations is then to regain her normal station.
6513 METHOD C
a. Choice of Initial Position. Refer to Article 6512.
b. Operating Within the Screen. A ship preparing to operate aircraft is to gain an initial
position well to leeward within the screen, changing speed as necessary. On moving to her initial position,
this ship is to make the signal Disregard my movements. The procedures laid down in Article 6501 arc to be
used in the normal I manner.
c. Maneuvering to Operate Aircraft. The OTC will turn the whole formation, including the
ship operating aircraft, as soon as this ship is ready. The ship is then to maneuver as necessary to operate
aircraft and the OTC will adjust the speed of the remainder of the force to keep the ship within the screen.
d. Resuming Course and Station. When flight operations have been completed, the OTC will
order the force, including the ship completing aircraft operations, to turn together to the course required,
adjusting speed as necessary. The ship is then to regain her normal station.
6514 MANEUVERING FOR EMERGENCY LANDINGS
Any ship which must maneuver to land aircraft in distress is to notify the OTC. The OTC may then
turn the formation to the flight operations course, or he may order the ship concerned to act independently.
In addition, the following special provisions apply:
a. When Formation Is on Flight Operations Course. The ship concerned may proceed to
recover the aircraft in distress, provided there is sufficient relative wind or when she can produce sufficient
relative wind without moving more than 500 yards out of her assigned station.
b. Independent Action in Peacetime. During daylight hours in peacetime, the commanding

officer of the ship concerned has discretion to act independently and at once, if this is necessary in the
interest of safety.
c. Rescue Operations. In the event of a forced landing in the vicinity, the destroyer or
helicopter (or both) assigned for the purpose should proceed to rescue the crew without further orders (see
Section VI).
6-65 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6515 (NC) (NMM) ANTISUBMARINE PRECAUTIONS DURING DELAYS WHILE

OPERATING AIRCRAFT
Prolonged periods on a steady flight operations course may be dangerous and unacceptable from the
ASW point of view; therefore, if there are delays in flight operations, it will be wise to order temporary
alterations from the flight operations course. The OTC is to be informed at once of the estimated duration
of any appreciable delays.
6516 MANEUVERING FOR LOW VISIBILITY RECOVERY OPERATIONS
If, while aircraft are airborne, it appears likely that the task force will encounter fog, snow, or other
conditions of low visibility, the OTC may order the task groups to separate and proceed independently in
the direction of the best predicted or known clear weather. Airborne aircraft are to be advised of this action,
and they are to advise the OTC of any clear areas known to them.
6517 COURSE AND RELATIVE WIND
Normally, the course for launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft will be such that the ship
concerned has the relative wind down the angled deck.
6518 OPERATIONS AT NIGHT
a. Lighting Measures. The OTC will order the degree of lighting to be used for night flying
operations. When lighting measures are ordered, ships shall automatically be darkened (except for the
lights prescribed by the lighting measure) without further signal unless otherwise ordered by the OTC.
Lighting measures are given in detail in Table 6-10. Lighting measure green is the minimum for all normal
night operations, even for specially trained pilots, and compelling reasons should exist for selecting a
lesser amount of lighting.
b. Flashing Light Communications. Except for signals concerning immediate flight

operations or emergency signals, unshielded or omnidirectional flashing light communications shall cease
15 minutes prior to scheduled night air operations and shall not be resumed until ships have signalled
completion of flight operations. Infrared light may be used for intership communications.
6519 OPERATIONS IN LOW VISIBILITY
The tactical situation may require shipborne aircraft to be launched and landed under low visibility
conditions. Governing considerations are the extent and severity of the weather conditions, the ability and
qualifications of the pilots, and the equipment to be used. Adequate preparations can be made when it has
been determined in advance that aircraft are to be launched and landed under known low visibility
conditions. It is also necessary that standard procedures be established for use when aircraft must operate
unexpectedly in unfavorable weather. When low visibility conditions are encountered or appear imminent,
an early decision must be reached as to how airborne aircraft are to be handled. One or more of the
following procedures may be used depending on existing conditions.
a. Aircraft orbit as directed until own ship has steamed into an area where visually controlled
landings can be made.
b. Aircraft land ashore in friendly territory if conditions permit.
c. Aircraft land on other appropriate ships which are operating in an area where visually controlled
landing can be made.
6-66 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-10. Night Lighting Measures
UNITS DESCRIPTION OF LIGHTING MEASURES NOTES

LIGHTS (1)
WHITE GREEN BLUE (2)
SHIPS Red Truck (Obstruction) ON ON ON A (1) Words in brack-

OPERATING ets are the
AIRCRAFT ON ON ON B nearest Royal
Special Operation Task
Lights Navy Equivalent
lights.
Deck Edge (Outline) ON ON ON C
(2) The OTC may or-
der lights added
Deck Surface (Outline) ON ON ON D to (or subtracted
from) any lighting
Stern/Ramp Designation ON ON ON E measure in force
(Round Down After End by signaling
of Flight Deck) PLUS (MINUS)
followed by
Signal Light Bars (Port ON ON (3) F letter designa-
and Starboard Group) tors.
Searchlight (Horizon ON (4) G Example:

and Sector) USE
MEASURE
Center Line Extension ON ON ON H BLUE MINUS
Drop Lights BRAVO MIKE
QUEBEC
DESTROYERS RENDEZ- Red Truck (Obstruction) ON ON I
VOUS (3) As required.
(4) ON as required
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON J
for homing lost
planes.
K
(5) Used as ordered
RESCUE Red Truck (Obstruction) ON ON L by OTC.
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON M
OTHER Red Truck (Obstruction) ON ON O

SHIPS
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON P
AIRCRAFT Recognition ON ON ON Q
Wing Lights ON ON ON R
Tail Lights ON ON ON S
Rescue Helicopter (5) (5) (5) U
6-67 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. Aircraft land on designated appropriate ships, using a ship-controlled type of low visibility
approach.
e. Aircraft land on designated appropriate ships using an aircraft-type low visibility approach.
f. Aircraft abandoned by ditching or bailing out in an area designated by the OTC.
6520 (NC) (NMM) AIR OPERATIONS IN A CONVOY
a. (NC) (NMM) Carrier in Situation A. The normal station for a carrier in Situation A (Chapter
1) is within the “box”. During flight operations, the carrier should operate in the area astern of the convoy,
remaining within the “box” whenever possible. Except during flight operations, the carrier, when in the
“box”, is to maneuver with the convoy. The carrier is not to pass between ships or between lines in a convoy
formation unless ships are spaced 2,000 yards or more apart.
b. (NC) (NMM) Duties of Carrier With a Convoy. The carrier will normally assume the
following duties:
(1) Aircraft Control Unit and in addition:
(a) Provide and control carrier aircraft within the requirement laid down by the OTC
(b) Coordinate the homing of land-based aircraft conducting joining procedures
(c) Control aircraft in search and rescue duties.
(2) AAW Commander. Except for those duties relating to the control of emissions, and the con-
trol of EW equipment, these particular duties remain the responsibility of the OTC unless specifically
delegated.
c. (NC) (NMM) Carrier in Situation B or C. The relationship between the responsibilities of

the OTC of a carrier group and the OTC of a convoy are described in Chapter 1.
d. (NC) (NMM) Procedures for Aircraft Operating With Convoy. Detailed procedures for
aircraft joining and departing convoys are given in Section IV of this chapter.
6521 — 6529 SPARE
6530 CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS
6531 OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS
a. Strike Formations. The purpose of strike formations is the destruction of enemy surface
targets. They are comprised of:
(1) Attack aircraft equipped with weapons which have a high capability of destruction.
(2) Escort aircraft, including fighter aircraft, which protect strike aircraft against enemy opposition.
b. Sweep Formations. The purpose of sweep formations is the destruction of enemy aircraft.
They are comprised of fighter aircraft and support aircraft (AEW and EW).
6-68 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6532 (NC) (NMM) COMMAND OF AIR FORCES
Figures 6-4 and 6-5 illustrate the command organization of aircraft for offensive, strike, and sweep
operations. See also Article 1220 for command of aircraft.
a. (NC) (NMM) Airborne Coordinator. When a succession of strikes is initiated, or when

several targets exist in one area, the task force commander is to designate an airborne coordinator and a
standby airborne coordinator. The duty of the airborne coordinator is to direct all aircraft formations in the
target area to the best advantage, thereby ensuring that no important target is missed and that no part of the
strike is wasted on targets already destroyed. He is to fly with an escort, in the most suitable position for
observing the strike, without seeking combat himself, and is to report all special circumstances in the target
area that may affect the arming, briefing, or conduct of future strikes. The task force commander may also
designate an airborne coordinator when a large-scale fighter sweep is contemplated. The airborne
coordinator’s aircraft may require additional communications equipment.
b. (NC) (NMM) Strike Commander. A strike commander for the aircraft from each task group
taking part in a particular strike is designated by each task group commander. The strike commander leads
the strike aircraft to and from the target and is responsible for the conduct of the strike, subject to the orders
of the airborne coordinator, if present. Each task group commander also designates a standby strike
commander. The strike commander or standby strike commander is normally either the attack leader or the
escort leader.
(1) Attack Leader. The attack leader is designated by the task group commander and is in com-
mand of all attack aircraft from the task group. He may also be the strike commander, if so designated by
the task group commander. Attack aircraft from each ship will be led by their leader to report to the at-
tack leader for the strike.
(2) Escort Leader. The escort leader is designated by the task group commander and is in com-
mand of all fighter aircraft assigned to escort the attack aircraft from the task group. The escort leader
may also be the strike commander if he is so designated by the task group commander. Fighter aircraft
from each ship assigned to the escort will be led by that ship’s fighter leader to report to the escort leader
for the strike.
c. (NC) (NMM) Sweep Commander. A sweep commander for the aircraft from each task group
taking part in a particular sweep is designated by each task group commander. The sweep commander is
responsible for the conduct of the sweep subject to the orders of the airborne coordinator, if present. Each
task group commander also designates a standby sweep commander.
6533 (NC) (NMM) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The organization for offensive carrier air operations depends on many factors: the nature of the
targets, whether surface or air, the time within which the required results will have to be achieved; the
constraints of the defensive organization of the force; and the availability of other aircraft. Offensive air
operations generally fall into two categories, strike or sweep.
a. (NC) (NMM) Strike Operations.
(1) Major Strike. An action in which there is a coordinated attack by a large number of aircraft,
often from multiple air wings. In addition to attack aircraft, other aircraft included are fighter escort,
target CAP (TARCAP), barrier CAP (BARCAP), and support aircraft, all deployed in a single forma-
tion or multiple formations. A major strike is normally recovered on a ready deck prior to launching of
the next formation.
6-69 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRBORNE
COORDINATOR
FOR TASK FORCE
STRIKE COMMANDER MAY BE ATTACK LEADER STRIKE COMMANDER

FOR TASK GROUP OR ESCORT LEADER FOR TASK GROUP
ATTACK LEADER ESCORT LEADER

FOR TASK GROUP FOR TASK GROUP
ATTACK ATTACK FIGHTER FIGHTER

LEADER LEADER LEADER LEADER
(1) STANDBY AIRBORNE COORDINATOR (2) EITHER THE ATTACK LEADER OR

AND STANDBY STRIKE COMMANDER ESCORT LEADER IS DESIGNATED THE
WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE AP- STRIKE COMMANDER BY THE TASK
PROPRIATE FORCE OR GROUP COM- GROUP COMMANDER.
MANDER.
Figure 6-4. (NU) (NMM) Air Strike Command
AIRBORNE
COORDINATOR
FOR TASK FORCE
SWEEP COMMANDER SWEEP COMMANDER

FOR TASK GROUP FOR TASK GROUP
FIGHTER FIGHTER
LEADER LEADER
STANDBY AIRBORNE COORDINATOR AND

STANDBY SWEEP COMMANDER WILL BE
DESIGNATED BY THE APPROPRIATE FORCE
OR GROUP COMMANDER.
Figure 6-5. (NU) (NMM) Air Sweep Command
6-70 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Limited Strike. An action which consists of a coordinated attack, similar to a major strike; but
with a smaller number of aircraft. This type of strike is preferred for sustained operations, or when the
requirement is to get a moderate number of aircraft to the objective in the shortest possible time (e.g., for
the neutralization of an enemy airfield over a sustained period). Aircraft engaged in a limited strike are
normally recovered after another formation is launched.
(3) Continuous Operations. An arrangement that permits offensive air operations to be con-
ducted over an extended period. This method is used when the destruction of the objective(s) can be
achieved by the concentrated firepower of major or limited strikes. Each recovery is preceded by the
launching of a similar number and type of aircraft.
b. (NC) (NMM) Sweep Operations. Sweep operations are designated to eliminate the enemy’s
air capability and are organized in a similar fashion to strikes. The principle difference is in the
composition of the formations that are launched. The deck load consists primarily of fighters and escort
aircraft selected for the specific mission. Escorts usually include AEW and EW aircraft.
6534 — 6539 SPARE
6540 (NC) (NMM) REQUEST FOR CV AIRCRAFT
a. (NC) NMM) Requests for CV Aircraft. Carrier-based air assets will be requisitioned
through the AREC. That coordinator will endeavor, insofar as possible, to meet the several warfare
command’s requests, and will issue and promulgate to the OTC and warfare commanders the daily
airplan. In order to aid the AREC in his planning and ensure that their own requirements are entered into
this planning, each warfare commander should provide the AREC a message request of projected
aircraft requirements for inclusion in the next day’s airplan. Requests should reach the AREC about
1800 local time. The OTC should receive an information copy. Needs will change, and these changes
should be communicated to the AREC.
b. (NC) (NMM) Requests for Tactical Aircraft. Requests for tactical aircraft embarked
aboard ships other than the CV (e.g., HARRIERs on board RN CVs) will be directed to the AREC. Marine
aircraft (fixed-wing and helicopters) remain under the command of the landing force commander.
Requests for marine aircraft by warfare commanders/coordinators should be coordinated by the AREC
and submitted to the Tactical Air Coordinator embarked with the landing force commander.
c. (NC) (NMM) Alert Requirements. Alert requirements should be included in the hard copy
message provided by the warfare commanders to the AREC for determining the next day’s airplan.
Changes in alert requirements will be of most immediacy, and must be rapidly communicated to the
AREC. The OTC will resolve any conflicts in alert requirements and will retain alert launch authorization
until specifically delegated to the particular warfare commanders (see Tables 1-2 to 1-5). Even when this
authorization is granted it must be used with caution. Warfare commanders should consider, and the
AREC should make them aware of, major disruptions to scheduled launches which may be caused by too
great a frequency of alert launches.
6541 — 6549 SPARE
6550 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
6551 (NC) (NMM) SHIP CONTROL ZONES (SCZ)
a. (NC) (NMM) General. SCZ is an area activated around a ship operating aircraft, which is not to
be entered by other aircraft without permission.
6-71 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. (NC) (NMM) Fixed-Wing Operations. For ships operating fixed-wing aircraft, a zone of 10
nm radius from sea level to 5,000 ft MSL is established. These are nominal values and may be changed as
the situation dictates. Outside the SCZ, there are special additional rules such as those for returning
friendly aircraft. These rules will apply out to a considerable distance, depending on weather conditions,
and will be promulgated separately. A SCZ may be permanently activated when continuous flying is
taking place or aircraft are at alert states.
c. (NC) (NMM) Helicopter Operations. For ships operating helicopters, a zone of 2 nm radius
from sea level to 500 feet AMSL will be activated.
6552 AIRCRAFT LAUNCH/DEPARTURE
a. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. When launched from CVs, all jet and turboprop aircraft normally
proceed directly to a point at least 7 miles ahead of the ship at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet, then jets fly a
10-mile arc, turboprops a 7-mile arc to intercept the departure radial. Propeller aircraft proceed to a point 5
miles ahead, fly a 5-mile arc to the departure radial, maintaining an altitude of 300 to 500 feet. High
performance VTOL/VSTOL aircraft operating from ships other than CVs shall comply with
launch/departure procedures delineated for CVs. Jet and turboprop aircraft rendezvous between 20 and 50
miles, and propeller aircraft rendezvous between 10 and 50 miles from the ship along the departure radial.
b. Helicopters. Helicopters may be operated either from the CV or other ships within the CV
control zone. ASW helicopters may also be operated tactically within the zone. Precise procedures to suit
every circumstance cannot be defined, but the following rules apply:
(1) All helicopters within the zone are to be under either positive or advisory control.
(2) Helicopters should normally be operated or transited through the control zone below 300 feet.
(3) Helicopters are not to approach within 5 nm of the CV unless cleared and/or operating under the
control of the CV.
c. Unscheduled Launch and Recovery Operations. Ships are to activate control zones by
INTENT message. Control zones around CV/LPH/LHA ships will be permanently in force unless
otherwise ordered.
(NR) (NMM) Detailed procedures for activation of control zones are provided in ATP 34.
6553 PROCEDURE FOR RETURNING AIRCRAFT
Aircraft returning from strikes and sweeps are to rendezvous on the way back from the target area
and return in formations appropriate for mutual defense, proper recognition, and fuel economy via the
Tomcat if one is stationed, and if they are so directed. To assist in the establishment of their friendly
character, aircraft make their final approach to each task group on a bearing and at an altitude previously
specified, and squawking IFF.
6554 MARSHAL PROCEDURES
a. Marshaling is the procedure whereby aircraft are controlled on a predetermined flightpath by an

ACU prior to commencing an outbound transit or after completing an inbound transit prior to recovery.
b. The location for this process is known as the marshaling gate and will be within the radar
coverage of the ACU.
6-72 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. On entering the ship’s control area, organic aircraft shall normally be turned over to marshal
control for further clearance to the marshal pattern. The marshaling gate may be overhead or on an
assigned radial at an appropriate distance/altitude to facilitate an orderly approach.
6555 APPROACH
Usually, under daylight/visual conditions, the aircraft approach the ship, enter a circling pattern, and
land in sequence. During night/instrument conditions, approaches will normally be under the guidance of
the approach control center on board the respective ship.
6556 (NC) (NMM) CARRIER APPROACH PROCEDURES
Aircraft approaching a carrier force, after completing a transfer joining procedure, may be ordered
to close by an approach corridor or an approach sector. These are specific safety sectors for carrier
approach. Land-based aircraft would normally be required to adopt these procedures.
a. (NC) (NMM) Approach Corridors. These corridors are assigned in conjunction with
specified check-in points based on Tomcats. The latter should be tacan-equipped pickets and ideally
should be SAM ships. (If non-tacan-equipped ships are used, procedures must be modified.) Figures 6-6
and 6-7 show multi-Tomcat and single Tomcat approach corridors, respectively.
Corridors 1 through 4 are established as radials of Tomcat tacan; corridors 5 and 6 are radials of the
tacan of the CV(s). Bearings of corridors 3 and 4, which may be rotated by up to 20° toward the axis to
provide the least deviation for returning friendlies. Additional corridors may be established, ir required, in
the rear hemisphere; such corridors are defined as tacan radials from the CV. All corridors are 10 nm in
width. Corridors from Tomcats to the 30-nm arc of the CV’s tacan may vary in direction, depending on the
CV’s movements. If the CV’s tacan is not in operation, pickets will steer returning aircraft to marshal.
Checkpoints may be established at 150, 100, and 50 nm from the Tomcat or CV tacan as appropriate.
These points are designated by corridor number followed by ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, respectively. At
each checkpoint self-identification procedures are carried out either by changing IFF/SIF settings or by
aircraft maneuver.
Tacan will normally be operated by Tomcats during periods when aircraft are returning from the
attack area. It will not be used by CVs when under air or submarine threat, except when the safety of aircraft
so dictates.
The OTC or AAWC may select any of the corridors for each day of a particular exercise or
operation. Corridors activated are normally promulgated indicating the corridor by number, the call sign of
the Tomcat, and its tacan channel.
b. (NC) (NMM) Approach Sectors. These sectors are more flexible than fixed-approach
corridors and may be assigned in conjunction with tacan approach control pickets for each sector. Initial
reporting distances form each approach control unit will be promulgated by the OTC. The essential
difference between this system and fixed-friendly approach corridors is that the aircraft may return from
any bearing within the specified sector, the position of each aircraft being reported on AAW nets.
(1) Identification/recognition and self-identification procedures are identical to those described in

Article 6417 and 6556a except that:
(a) Aircraft must report initially at a specified tacan distance from the sector tacan picket.
6-73 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(005ºR) (355ºR)
2A 1A
2B Anti- 1B
(300ºR) (060ºR)
COR-2 Air COR-1
CO - 3
4A R- Warfare R 3A
4B
4 2C Axis 1C CO 3B
4C I K 3C
TOMCATS
6A 6B 6C 5C 5B 5A
(270ºR) ZZ (090ºR)
COR-6 COR-5
30 MILE ARC
TO MARSHALL
0 50 100 150
scale
Figure 6-6. (NU) (NMM) Muti-Picket Approach

Corridor
(335ºR) (025ºR)
2A 1A
AXIS
CO
R-1
(300ºR) 2B 1B (060ºR)
R-2
CO
CO
4A R-4 -3 3A
OR
2C 1C C
4B 3B
4C 3C
TOMCAT
6A 6B 6C ZZ 5C 5B 5A
(270ºR) (090ºR)
COR-6 COR-5
30 MILE
ARC TO MARSHALL
0 50 100 150
scale
Figure 6-7. (NU) (NMM) Single Picket Approach

Corridors
6-74 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Friendly aircraft will be designated track numbers and shall be reported and plotted by
all units.
(2) The use of approach sectors is particularly applicable to formations where dispersion is mini-
mized and aircraft normally return directly to the force. Friendly aircraft may transit missile engage-
ment zones on direct return routes when directed by the AAWC or SAAWC.
6-75 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VI — AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE
6600 AIRCRAFT EMERGENCYAND RESCUE
The measures set forth in this section cover the more common problems encountered and the
procedures used in handling aircraft in distress.
6601 GENERAL PROVISIONS
a. Emergency Landing Ship. Whenever possible, the OTO should make specific provision for
emergency landings by designating another appropriate ship as the emergency landing ship. This
assignment should be on a rotation basis and integrated into the flight schedule (for helicopter operations,
use OPTASK AIR HELO, paragraph H1). This allows maximum aircraft usage from all ships in company
with minimum inconvenience to each.
b. Lost Aircraft Control. The OTC may detail one ship as lost aircraft control to coordinate the
homing of all lost aircraft. However, any ship which has lost an aircraft should begin to identify it and home
it, and the ship should immediately notify lost aircraft control of the steps that are being taken.
c. Continuous Watch on Airborne Aircraft. Ships are to maintain a current estimate of the
time of return of their aircraft and keep, insofar as possible, a continuous watch on their movements. They
are to be alert for emergency IFF or other indications of aircraft in distress and are to plot and report such
signals, taking further action as conditions indicate.
d. Escort Aircraft. Whenever possible, an escort aircraft will accompany the aircraft in distress
back to the force; assist in the emergency landing procedure as directed, or as conditions indicate; remain
with the distressed aircraft until it enters the landing circuit; and maintain watch until the emergency
landing is completed.
e. Aircraft Not Involved to Keep Clear. Whenever other aircraft become aware of an
emergency landing in progress, they must keep clear of the entire operating area concerned.
f. Rescue Destroyer and Helicopter. The duties of rescue destroyers and rescue helicopters
are described in Article 6603.
6602 COMMUNICATIONS DURING AIRCRAFT EMERGENCIES
The following provisions apply to aircraft in distress requiring an emergency landing and to the
ships involved:
a. Responsibility.
(1) Escort. The escort of an aircraft in distress assists by sending or relaying radio, radar, or visual
messages, using the same procedures as described for the aircraft in distress.
(2) Ship. Ships must be alert for radio, radar, or visual indications of aircraft in distress and assist
in relaying messages between the distressed aircraft, the OTC, and the parent ship as conditions
indicate.
b. Emergency IFF. An aircraft in distress is to turn on its EMERGENCY IFF and set in Code 77
on Mode 3. In daylight operations, if the aircraft is within visual range of the ship, the use of
EMERGENCY 1FF is optional.
6-76 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Pilot Voice Report. If possible, the pilot of an aircraft requiring an emergency landing is to
inform the ship with which he is in communication as to the nature of the trouble. He must state whether he
requires an IMMEDIATE or DEFERRED emergency landing and whether or not he can take a wave-off.
The pilot is then to furnish such amplifying information as conditions permit or require.
d. Minimum Voice Transmission During Aircraft Emergencies. Voice transmission

should be clear, concise, and kept to a minimum consistent with safety. Aircraft and ships not concerned in
the emergency must keep silent on the frequencies in use for the emergency.
e. Maximum Use of Visual Signals. During a landing with radio failure or lost
communications, the use of appropriate visual signals is mandatory. To expedite landings the visual
signals in Tables 6-11, 6-12, and 6-13 are to be used by NORDO aircraft and ships involved. The same
signals will be used by NORDO aircraft which are additionally in distress.
f. Establishing Visual Contact. The aircraft in distress and the ship should establish visual
contact with each other as far in advance of the emergency landing as is practicable. When initial visual
contact is to be made with the rendezvous destroyer or other ship, the aircraft in distress should start
signaling as soon as it approaches within reasonable visual range of the ship.
g. MAYDAY. The international distress call MAYDAY should only be used when an aircraft is
threatened by serious and imminent danger and is in need of immediate assistance.
6603 RESCUE OPERATIONS
A destroyer or helicopter (or both) should be assigned for rescue duties to a ship operating aircraft.
Any ship or aircraft is to report immediately if it sees an aircraft land in the sea. The parent ship is to inform
the rescuing ship or helicopter as to the number of men in the aircraft. Rescue operations are carried out as
described in the following paragraphs.
a. Rescue Destroyers.
(1) During daylight operations when rescue helicopters are not available or need to be augmented,
rescue destroyers may be assigned to ships operating aircraft. These rescue destroyers shall be stationed
at distances from the ship operating aircraft and on bearings relative to the flight operations course with
the exception of rescue destroyer stations 2SNX and 3SNX which are based on bearings relative to the
course of the ship operating aircraft. Rescue destroyer stations are as shown in Figure 6-8 and are also
listed in Table 6-14.
(2) Slide-back techniques in station 1SN may be used whenever speeds in excess of 22 knots are re-
quired. The use of the slide-back technique must be specifically authorized by the OTC.
(3) At night, rescue destroyers may be assigned the additional function of acting as reference ships
to indicate the horizon for takeoff and the landing pattern for recovery operations. Rescue destroyers
shall conform to the lighting measures in force at all time.
(4) If it is desired that the rescue destroyers have more boiler power than that required for screening
operations, the OTC shall so advise. Rescue destroyers are to have boats manned and ready for lowering
while flight operations are in progress.
(5) After flight operations, rescue destroyers are to remain with the designated ship until released
by her.
6-77 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-11. Signals from Aircraft in Distress
SIGNAL MEANING OR PURPOSE

1. Rocking wings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Initially, to attract attention and help establish vis-
ual contact. Subsequently, to acknowledge receipt
of signals. On crosswind leg of landing circuit, indi-
cates inability to take a wave-off.
2. Firing RED flare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Require emergency landing. Considered IMMEDI-
ATE unless other information is received.
3. Firing GREEN flare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An early landing is necessary in the interest of
safety, but can orbit for a short time.
4. Series of SHORT flashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Require IMMEDIATE emergency landing.
5. Series of LONG flashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Require emergency landing but can accept short
delay.
6. Fly up the port side of the ship, low and close . . . . . . . I desire IMMEDIATE landing.
aboard, rocking wings, in a landing configuration
with hook DOWN. Navigation lights BRIGHT and
STEADY with anticollision lights ON. If turning final
in the VFR pattern or approaching final on a CCA, mo-
mentarily turn on the taxi light, if available.
7. Fly up the port side of the ship with landing . . . . . . . . . I desire to land but can wait for the next recovery.
gear UP, hook DOWN, navigation lights BRIGHT
and STEADY, and anticollision light OFF while
abeam the ship.
8. Fly up the port side of the ship, rocking wings, . . . . . . I am proceeding to the BINGO field.
with landing gear and hook UP, navigation lights
BRIGHT and STEADY, and anticollision light ON.
If fuel state and the nature of the emergency permit,
continue making passes until joined by a wingman.
Upon reaching BINGO fuel state, proceed alone,
setting IFF/SIF to emergency when departing.
9. Flashing R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To acknowledge receipt of message.
10. (Helicopter) Fly close aboard starboard . . . . . . . . . . . . I require IMMEDIATE landing.
quarter, remaining clear of other traffic, with gear
DOWN and floodlights/landing light ON. With
complete electrical failure, fire a RED flare to
seaward.
11. (Helicopter) Fly by or hover on the starboard. . . . . . . . I desire to land but can wait for the next recovery.
side of the ship, low and close aboard, with navi-
gation lights BRIGHT and FLASHING and anti-
collision lights ON.
Table 6-12. Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships

Flashing WHITE R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Initially, to confirm visual contact. Subsequently, to
acknowledge receipt of signals from aircraft in dis-
tress.
Flashing RED G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The OTC has given permission for aircraft in dis-
tress to approach recovering ship.
6-78 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-13. Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress

OPTICAL LANDING SYSTEM **ALDIS LAMP BLINKER
1. Flashing cut and wave-off Flashing RED light M,M .......... *BINGO — Proceed to alternate landing field.
lights.
2. Flash, cut lights. N/A N/A .......... Add power — (jets and turbo props only).
3. N/A Steady GREEN light C .......... CHARLIE — Cleared to board.
-.-.
4. Flashing landing area Steady RED light D .......... DELTA — Delay in landing. Enter DELTA pattern
lights. -.. and maintain visual contact with the ship.
5. Landing area lights off. N/A N/A .......... Closed deck. Do not land.
(Night only)
6. N/A Z Z .......... Do not land. Ditch or bailout/eject in the vicinity of
--.. --.. the ship.
7. Steady (3 sec.) cut lights. N/A N/A .......... LSO has control of the aircraft on final approach at
approximately 1-1/2 miles.
8 N/A H H .......... Lower hook.
.... ....
9. N/A W W .......... Lower wheels.
.-- .--
10. N/A F F .......... Lower flaps.

..-. ..-.
11. N/A G G .......... Jettison disposable fuel tank.

--. --.
12. N/A Q Q .......... Jettison ordnance.
--.- --.-
OTHER MEANING OR PURPOSE

13. Series of GREEN flares (day only in wartime)..................... Ship ready to receive aircraft for IMMEDIATE emergency
landing.
14. Series of RED flares ............................................................. Do not land even if previous authorization has been given.
15. Flag: EMERG FOXTROT (aircraft) .................................... Have emergency landing in progress. (Aircraft not involved
EMERG HOTEL (helicopter) keep clear.)
*Signal is given only when ordered by the air officer.

**Aldis lamp may be located on the LSO platform, in the tower, or on the signal bridge.
(6) Sufficient stations are provided in Figure 6-8 and Table 6-14 to permit the OTC flexibility in as-
signing available rescue destroyers as appropriate.
(7) The ship operating aircraft shall indicate estimated course and speed to be used during impend-
ing flight operations in sufficient time to permit rescue destroyers to take and maintain proper station.
The ship shall also indicate readiness to operate aircraft at least 10 minutes prior to commencement of
flight operations.
(8) Rescue destroyers shall be in assigned stations at the time flight operations are scheduled to
commence. When assuming slide-back station 1SN, the destroyer takes a station that will result in a rel-
ative bearing 35° on the bow of the ship operating aircraft when the formation turns into the wind.
(9) A rescue destroyer, having taken station, is to maintain that station relative to the flight opera-
tions course and is to maneuver to maintain station without further orders on each occasion that the
flight operations course is altered by signal whether flying operations are actually in progress or not. The
6-79 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
0
15
0
32
0
14
000º
W IN
D
330º 3000 YD
325º
STATION 3
2500 YD
2000 YD STA 3A
STATION 1500 YD
1SN 1200 YD
(INITIAL
POSITION) 1000 YD
270º
STA. 2 STA. 2A 2 3 4
STATION 2SNX
1N
YD
(LIMITS)
1200 - 2000
NOTE: 2SNX and

3SNX are at all
3SNX times relative to the
200º course of the carrier
Figure 6-8. Rescue Destroyer Stations
exceptions to this rule are stations 2SNX and 3SNX in which the rescue destroyer maintains station rela-
tive to the course of the ship operating aircraft and is to maneuver to maintain station without further or-
ders by wheeling maneuvers. See Article 6501 regarding minor adjustments in course and speed.
(10) During night operations, the ship operating aircraft shall, except in emergencies, wait until res-
cue destroyers are on proper station before maneuvring to conduct flight operations.
(11) The commanding officer of a ship operating aircraft shall be responsible for keeping the rescue
destroyer(s) informed of his ship’s course and speed changes and for issuing timely orders to prevent the
development of a dangerous situation which might arise from misunderstanding his intentions.
(12) During night operations, rescue destroyers shall remain on station while aircraft are airborne
unless otherwise directed.
b. Helicopter Rescue Station. The rescue helicopter is under positive control of the ship
operating aircraft at all times. During launching and recovery operations, the helicopter is airborne on
rescue station. The rescue station is a circular flight pattern on the starboard beam of the ship, 1 mile in
diameter. This pattern will normally be flown in a clockwise direction at an altitude of 200 feet.
6-80 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-14. Rescue Destroyer Stations
Station Bearing Relative to Distance from Operating Aircraft (yards) Station Limits When
Number* Flight Operations (yards) Stationed
Course
NORMAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1 200° 1,000 to 1,500 Day/Night
2 270° 2,500 Night
2A 270° 1,500
3 330° 3,000 Night

3A 000° 2,000
SUPPLEMENTAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1N 200° Distance (yards) = (ship speed x 100) - 300. Not less than 1,200 Day/Night
nor more than
2,500**
1SN Initial station bears Initial distance is 1,500 yards; the rescue destroyer steams Not less than 1,200 Day
325°; rescue at a speed less than signaled speed and the ship operating nor more than
destroyer slides aircraft overtakes her. During the slide-back, the rescue 2,500**
back to station destroyer maneuvers to maintain the 1,500 yard distance.
bearing 200° Time required to complete slide-back may be controlled by
using a speed of relative motion commensurate with the
estimated time required to complete the launch or recovery.
When the slide-back is completed, distance is determined
using the distance formula for station 1N.
2SNX 190° (relative to 1,500 (normally) 1,200 to 2,500 Day/Night
course of carrier)
3SNX 190° (relative to 3,000 (normally) 1,200 to 2,000 Day/Night

course of carrier) (from station 2SNX)
4SNX The rescue destroyer operates on a station which has an inner limit of 2,000 yards and an outer limit of not more
than 6 minutes from the ship. The destroyer gains the outer limit of its station upwind and drops back at such a
relative speed that the outer downwind limit will not be exceeded, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards.
If the destroyer has not dropped back to the outer limit of station by the time the launch/recovery has been
completed, the destroyer turns ealier or faster to facilitate gaining the outer limit of station.
On downwind courses, the destroyer repeats the procedure in reverse (that is, sliding back from the outer limit
downwind of the ship to the outer limit upwind, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards).
When winds are light and variable and the ship turns toward the destroyer to hunt for the wind, the destroyer
maneuvers clear promptly.
When the ship’s sled is in use on courses out-of-the-wind, the destroyer maneuvers to clear the sled by at least
3,000 yards.
* Number and number-letter stations are not occupied simultaneously. ** OTC may specify maximum distance.
6-81 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations).
(1) Rescue ships normally are not required during daylight helicopter operations of helicopter ships.
(2) At night, it may be necessary in certain circumstances to detail a rescue ship. Rescue ships may
be assigned the additional functions of action as reference ships to indicate the landing pattern for recov-
ery operations. These ships shall be stationed at distances from the helicopter ship on a bearing relative
to the helicopter ship’s air operating course as shown in Table 6-15. The number of stations used de-
pends on different conditions of visibility, horizon, and the desires of helicopter squadron commanders.
d. Rescue in the Vicinity of Ships Operating Aircraft.
(1) If forced landing occurs in the vicinity of a ship operating aircraft, the rescue destroyer, of helicop-
ter (or both), proceed(s) to rescue the crew without further orders. First to arrive becomes on-scene com-
mander and directs all supporting forces. The commanding officer of the destroyer is to assume on-scene
command when ready to avoid any maneuver that might endanger the helicopter. The helicopter shall ap-
proach from downwind of the scene. The destroyer shall remain at least 500 yards upwind of the scene.
(2) The helicopter shall be the primary means of rescue during day or night operations except when
weather conditions preclude safe flight. During peacetime, the rotating anticollision lights will be
turned OFF indicating yielding of primary means of rescue to destroyer and/or motor whaleboat.
e. Rescue Outside Screen. In the event of a forced landing outside the screen, the nearest
screen ship is to proceed to rescue the crew without further orders. If more than one ship starts the rescue,
the senior of such ships will determine who is most suitably placed to continue the rescue, thus expediting
the recovery of personnel and at the same time ensuring that only one ship leaves the screen.
f. Ship Operating Aircraft to Make Signals. In the event of an aircraft landing in the sea from
the flight deck, the ship is to make the necessary signals to indicate the occurrence. In addition, the ship
should mark the location in the most appropriate manner, whenever circumstances permit.
g. Condition of Rescued Personnel. The parent ship is to be informed as soon as practicable

as to the number and condition of rescued personnel.
6604 DITCHING, BAILOUT, AND EJECTION
a. Ditching. The following procedures are designed to facilitate the safe landing and subsequent
rescue of the crew of an aircraft which must ditch at sea.
(1) Location. The pilot should attempt to ditch in a location most favourable for rescue operations.
(2) In a Rough Sea. If the sea is rough, a ship may be detailed to make a slick when time is avail-
able. The pilot of the ditching aircraft should time his approach to land in the slick when it is in optimum
condition for a water landing. A destroyer (or helicopter) is to be detailed to takeup a rescue station
about 1,500 yards downwind of the ship making the slick. When the landing is made, the destroyer or
helicopter should proceed to rescue the crew without further orders.
(3) In an Emergency. In an emergency or when the tactical situation does not permit the forego-
ing preparations to be made, aircraft forced to ditch near the fleet should try to land about 2,000 yards on
the lee bow of one of the leading destroyers of the screen.
(4) At Night. The pilot should first attempt to establish visual contact. He should turn on all avail-
able lights and try to land about 2,000 yards ahead of a destroyer in the rear semicircle. After landing, he
6-82 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 6-15. (NU) (NMM) Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations)
Bearing Relative to Flight Operations Course Distance From Helicopter Ship

Station (degrees) (yards)
Number
1H 180 1,000
2H 270 1,000
3H 000 1,500
4H 090 1,000
should signal his position in the water if it is at all possible to do so. The nearest destroyer in the screen is
to proceed to rescue the crew without further orders.
b. Bailing Out or Ejecting. The following procedures are designed to facilitate the rescue of
personnel who must abandon aircraft by bailing out or ejecting:
(1) Location. Pilots who must bail out or eject should try to do so in such a location that the aircraft
will crash well clear of any ship, and that they themselves will land in a location most favourable for res-
cue operations, preferably near one of the leading destroyers of the screen. Modern aircrew emergency
equipment contain an emergency transmitter beacon, sending a signal on 243.0 MHz. A DF position
should be established to help locate the aircrew.
(2) Escort Aircraft. One or more other aircraft or part of the CAP should standby the aircraft in
distress while the crew bails out or ejects and visually locate the parachute’s water entry.
(3) Establishing Watch Over Personnel in the Water. The escort aircraft should establish a
watch over survivors in the water; the watch should be relieved on station and a continuous watch
should be maintained, insofar as practicable, until the survivors are rescued.
(4) Marking Location of Survivors. Dye markers, smoke floats, and smoke lights should be
used to mark the position of survivors in the water, as conditions indicate.
6605 DIVERSION OF SHIP TO LOCATE SURVIVORS
a. When radio communications cannot be established with a surface ship which an aircraft wishes
to divert, the aircraft should first establish self-identification and then indicate the location of survivors by:
(1) Circling the ship at least once at low altitude.
(2) Flying across the bow of the ship at low altitude and, at the same time, rocking the aircraft.
(3) Sending a message by visual signalling or dropping a message if possible.
(4) Heading in the direction of the incident.
(5) Dropping smoke floats in the direction of the incident if possible.
6-83 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. This procedure should be repeated until the ship acknowledges by following the aircraft or by
hoisting the international flag NOVEMBER to indicate that it is unable to comply. In either case, the ship is
to report her actions to the OTC. Crossing the wake of the ship close astern at low altitudes, opening and
closing the throttles, or changing the propeller pitch and rocking the aircraft means that the assistance of
the surface ship is no longer required.
6-84 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VII — SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO AVOID

MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
6700 SCOPE
This section details responsibilities and procedures for the establishment and use of safety zones and
areas, and measures necessary to ensure safety of friendly air, surface, and subsurface forces from mutual
interference.
6701 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES
a. This section contains rules and procedures for both peace and wartime.
(NC) (NMM) Wartime procedures will be implemented at NATO Reinforced Alert or earlier, if
ordered, by a Major NATO Commander or his designated subordinate.
b. The transition from peace to wartime procedures will have an effect on:
(1) SUBNOTE procedures.
(2) Restricted areas.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Water space management (WSM) areas:
(a) Submarine action areas (SAAs).
(b) Joint action areas (JTAAs).
(c) ASW free areas (ASWFAs).
(4) Permanently and temporarily established exercise areas.
(5) VDS/DTAS NOTE, CATAS ADVISORY, and Surface Ship Notes.
(6) SMAA functions.
6702 IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER SPACE MANAGEMENT (WSM) PROCEDURES
Normally water space is managed by NOIs, VDS notes, SUBNOTEs, etc.

(NC) (NMM) In a period of increasing tension, WSM procedures may be implemented at any time
but should be in force shortly after Simple Alert is declared.
6703 — 6709 SPARE
The complexities of modern warfare necessitate promulgation of certain basic doctrines applicable
to all services and commands to prevent or minimize mutual interference during operations. Measures to
prevent or minimize mutual interference are those coordinated actions required of appropriate
commanders to ensure that the operations of forces under their direction are conducted in such a manner as
to prevent or minimize the adverse effects of actions of any one unit upon the operations of others.
6-85 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6711 AUTHORITY
Basic rules for measures to avoid mutual interference are prescribed on the basis of joint and
combined agreements. Detailed rules and procedures in consonance with the basic rules are promulgated
in appropriate service publications and by subordinate commanders as specified in Article 6712. During an
emergency, and when, in the judgement of the commander involved, time does not permit reference to
higher authority, the specified rules and procedures may be temporarily set aside. When such action is
taken, the commander involved must notify other appropriate commanders, setting forth the reasons for
the change.
6712 RESPONSIBILITY
Each commander shall ensure that such detailed rules, procedures, plans, and methods of operation,
as he considers necessary for dissemination at his level of command, are in consonance with those of
higher echelons and are coordinated with parallel echelons. Moreover, dissemination shall leave no doubt
as to the responsibilities which result. Commanders down to the lowest echelons of a force are responsible
for making certain that adequate measures are taken to prevent or minimize interference with the
operations of other friendly forces.
6713 TYPES OF MEASURE
Measures to prevent or minimize mutual interference include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Assignment of nonconflicting missions insofar as practicable.
(2) Designation of relative importance of missions where conflict of missions must occur.
(3) Scheduling of tactical tasks so as to limit conflict in space, time, or area.
(4) Provision of adequate recognition and identification procedures.
(5) Timely provision of essential operational data by controlling authorities and a similar exchange
between forces where interference may occur.
6714 COMPROMISE
In the event of compromise of any of the provisions or measures to prevent or minimize mutual
interference, commanders are responsible for seeing that immediate action is taken to notify the authority
establishing the particular measures and other commanders who may need to know.
6715 IDENTIFICATION/RECOGNITION
The proper use of the procedures prescribed for identification/recognition is an essential feature in
avoiding mutual interference. Friendly submarines are to steer the promulgated safety course while
identification/recognition procedures are being carried out.
(NR) (NMM) Procedures for identification/recognition are set forth in AMSI 10. Identification/
recognition procedures for friendly aircraft are in Article 6417.
6716 INITIATION OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION
The responsibility for initiation of identification procedures is assigned below and has universal
application:
6-86 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Aircraft identify themselves to friendly surface units.
(2) Aircraft determine identity of surface units and of other aircraft before attacking.
(3) Aircraft and ground forces are mutually responsible for establishing their own friendly identity.
(4) Ground forces and surface forces are mutually responsible for establishing their own friendly
identity, except where special instructions for harbor entrance control are effective, or when special or-
ders are issued for specific operations.
(5) Submarines identify themselves to friendly surface ships and aircraft, except in submarine
safety lanes and
(NR) (NMM) submarine action areas.
(6) When ships of different size encounter each other, it is normally the responsibility of the smaller
ship to establish its friendly identity to the larger ship.
(7) Within similar types, there is a mutual responsibility for establishing friendly identity; that is,
air-air, ship-ship, submarine-submarine, and ground-ground.
6720 ROUTES AND REFERENCE POINTS
Routes and reference points are established for the purpose of facilitating control of surface, air, and
subsurface traffic so as to reduce interference between forces making passage in the same area. Routes and
reference points are established by appropriate commanders. Common routes and reference points should
be promulgated when necessary to ensure understanding between forces operating in adjacent areas.
Information concerning common routes and reference points should be disseminated to forces about to
enter or leave an area, as well as to appropriate commands in adjacent areas. When no conflict with
established routes and reference points would result, appropriate commanders may promulgate additional
routes and reference points for the temporary use of their own forces.
(NR) (NMM) See also Chapter 2, Section I.
6730 RESTRICTED AREAS
a. Commanders establishing restricted areas shall:
(1) Advise other commanders sufficiently in advance to permit dissemination of restrictions to all
personnel concerned,
(2) Specify the geographic limits and, if appropriate, the altitude limits of the restricted areas, and
(3) Provide for the timely disestablishment of a restricted area as soon as conditions no longer re-
quire its existence.
b. Safety zones are normally used for non-combat operations.
c. Air and surface restricted areas include:
(1) Controlled airspace, air corridors, and safety sectors.
(2) Shore bombardment and bomb lines.
(3) Blind bombing zones.
6-87 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6731 CONTROLLED AIRSPACE, AIR ROUTES/AIR CORRIDORS, AND SAFETY SECTORS
Controlled airspace, air routes, air corridors, and safety sectors are used to provide the safe transit of
aircraft. Inputs for coordination and deconfliction of airspace requirements, of all services involved in an
operation, are required by the designated airspace control authority for the establishment and
dissemination of the airspace control plan. Further details are found in ATP 40.
a. Controlled Airspace. Prior coordination with the appropriate authority is required when a
controlled airspace is used by tactical or formation flights. Aircraft using a controlled airspace shall not be
subject to attack by friendly surface, submarine, or air forces unless positively identified as enemy or
unless they commit a hostile act. Controlled airspace will be in accordance with those published in
appropriate flight information or ICAO publications or as promulgated by appropriate commanders.
b. Air Routes and Air Corridors. Ships and ground batteries are forbidden to fire at any aircraft
in air corridors. The defense of air corridors against incursion by enemy aircraft is the responsibility of a
combat air patrol (CAP) established for that purpose. Ordinarily, air corridors are established only when a
major air operation is involved, and then only when it is essential that the participating aircraft pass near
own ground and sea forces. Included within the concept of air corridors is a low-level transit route (LLTR),
defined as follows: A temporary corridor of defined dimensions through the areas of organic low-level air
defenses of surface forces. For more details, see ATP 40.
c. Safety Sectors. Safety sectors are employed in AAW areas and are not the same as airways.
d. Identification Coordination. When maritime units are operating within, or in the vicinity of
airspace controlled by other agencies, it must be ensured that identification criteria are coordinated
between all agencies concerned, and known by all users of that particular airspace.
6732 SHORE BOMBARDMENT AND BOMB LINES
Shore bombardment and bomb lines are used in coordinated operations with ground forces. The
policy regarding establishing and using these lines shall be at the discretion of the appropriate
commanders. Tactical and forward (safe) bomb lines are normally prescribed by a troop commander
according to his assessment of the requirement for coordinating air strikes with his ground forces. (See
ATP 30).
6733 BLIND BOMBING ZONES
Blind bombing zones are used to permit aircraft to conduct operations unimpeded by the danger of
attack by friendly forces. Rules governing actions within blind bombing zones follow:
a. Aircraft may attack any target encountered in a blind bombing zone without inquiry as to its
identity, except for a submarine in a moving haven established by a SUBNOTE, or a surface ship in an area
of operations about which the aircraft have been notified.
(NR) (NMM) (See Article 6734.)
b. Surface Ships shall normally keep clear of blind bombing zones. When surface ships must
enter such a zone, the correct notice procedures must be followed. Surface ships may attack any submarine
encountered, except for a submarine in a moving haven established by a SUBNOTE.
c. Submarines shall normally keep clear of blind bombing zones; when submarines must enter
such a zone, they shall be protected by a SUBNOTE. During an emergency, a submarine entering a blind
6-88 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
bombing zone without prior timely notification (normally 24 hours is required) must accept the risk of
attack by friendly aircraft.
(NR) (NMM) Targets that a submarine may engage should be those permitted in Article 6734.
6734 CONTROLLED WATERSPACE, WATERSPACE MANAGEMENT AREAS, AND ASW

WEAPON RESTRICTIONS
a. Waterspace Management (WSM)/Prevention of Mutual Interference (PMI).

Effective WSM and PMI are essential to ensure safety of friendly submarine and surface forces. A clear
understanding of each function is required by all commands involved with submarine and/or ASW
operations. WSM and PMI are the responsibilities of the area SUBOPAUTH.
(1) (NC) (NMM) Waterspace Management. WSM is an essential element of the overall
battle-space control plan required for any maritime operation. Its principal purpose is to allocate
waterspace in terms of ASW attack restrictions to permit the rapid and effective engagement of enemy
submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarine and surface forces. Essentially,
WSM is a set of specifically defined submarine and ASW force operating areas and attack rules. WSM
procedures are implemented by the SUBOPAUTH on the behalf of the area commander. They should
be in place whenever use of ASW weapons by any type of platform becomes probable. WSM may be ap-
plied on any scale — local, regional, or theater-wide — depending on the crisis situation, the existing or
projected submarine threat, and requirements of the area commander. Areas are published by geo-
graphic reference or grid specified by the theater commander. Elements of WSM may be implemented
individually or in combinations to provide measures appropriate to operations ranging from peace sup-
port to hostilities. Figure 6-9 illustrates WSM areas and rules.
(2) (NC) (NMM) Prevention of Mutual Interference. For submarine operations, PMI proce-
dures are specifically intended to prevent submerged collisions between:
(a) Friendly submarines.
(b) Submarines and friendly surface ships’ towed bodies.
(c) Submarines and any other submarine hazards (e.g., detonations, submersibles, oil drilling
operations, etc.).
NOTE
PMI using STOVEPIPE procedures can be found in Article 9139.
b. (NC) (NMM) Definitions of Principal WSM Areas. ASW attack rules apply to attacks
against all contacts classified as submarine regardless of whether they are surfaced or submerged.
(1) ASW Free Area. An ASW free area (ASWFA) is one in which no friendly submarines are op-
erating. There are no restrictions on the use of ASW weapons, except when operating in the vicinity of a
boundary with a SAA, JTAA, SSL, or other activated submarine operating area when the necessary
ASW weapon compensatory allowances must be applied (see Article 6761).
(2) Submarine Action Area. A submarine action area (SAA) is an area that contains one or
more friendly submarines. Only submarine ASW weapons are authorized within an SAA.
(a) Submarines are allocated submarine patrol areas (SPAs) and moving havens (MHNs)
within an SAA to avoid mutual interference between submarines. While the locations of SAAs are
promulgated by the SUBOPAUTH to all friendly forces in the region, the specific locations of SPAs
6-89 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
SAA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attacks SSL: ASW Attacks Prohibited (1)
Prohibited
SUB: ASW Attacks Authorized
JTAA
ASWFA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attacks
SURF/AIR/SUB(2): ASW Attacks Requires Coordination with
Authorized Friendly SUB
SUB: ASW Attacks Authorized
NOTES: (1) SUBS may attack submarines positively identified as hostile inside SSLs.
(2) SUBs must remain inside assigned areas, but may shoot ASW weapons
into ASWFAs.
Figure 6-9. (NU) (NMM) Waterspace Management Areas
and MHNs within SAAs are normally only passed to the submarines concerned and appropriate
submarine movement authorities.
(b) Surface or air ASW attacks are prohibited in an SAA.
(c) Surface forces should not normally enter an SAA.
(3) Joint Action Area. A Joint Action Area (JTAA) is one in which a single friendly submarine is
operating in coordination with aircraft or in associated or direct support of surface forces. Air and sur-
face ASW attacks are prohibited throughout the JTAA unless a Submarine Generated Search Area
(SGSA) or NOTACK area has been established.
(a) A separate JTAA is to be established for each submarine with which coordinated
operations are planned or envisaged. Note that JTAAs may be used for submarines tasked in primary
roles other than ASW; e.g., ASUW, strike warfare, special operations, etc.
(b) Surface forces should normally not enter a JTAA unless the submarine operating in the
JTAA is on associated or direct support of this force and provision for implementation of SGSA
procedures has been made.
6-90 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) ASW Area of Responsibility. The ASW area of responsibility (ASW AOR) of a surface force
is a geographically fixed region or specified area around PIM in which the OTC, as opposed to an area com-
mander, exercises ASW responsibility. Size and configuration is determined by the OTC based upon the na-
ture of the threat and assets available to counter. Ideally, the ASW AOR should be an ASWFA that permits
unrestricted use of air and surface ASW weapons. If an SAA or JTAA waterspace is included in or overlaps
the ASW AOR, strict compliance with ASW weapons control procedures in this chapter is required.
(5) Submarine Safety Lanes. Submarine safety lanes (SSLs) are available as a set of lanes su-
perimposed on the grid, or geographically described, and may be activated completely or partly by mes-
sage. If activated, SSLs are special cases of SSAs.
c. Havens. Static havens and moving havens (MHNs), which may be stationary, are established
to provide a measure of security to submarines and surface ships in transit through areas in which existing
attack restrictions would be inadequate to prevent attack by friendly forces. Additionally, moving havens
in peacetime prevent or minimize mutual interference among friendly submarines or among friendly
submarines and ships operating VDS/DTAS systems. Submarines can be made available for exercises
with other forces during transit only when prior arrangements have been made. Ships operating towed
acoustic devices under circumstances where a VDS/DTAS NOTE is required should be routed in moving
havens. (See Article 6780.)
(NR) (NMM) See also paragraph (4) below.
(1) Static Havens (Used only during wartime or during periods of potential hostili-
ties). Static havens may be established by a SUBOPAUTH or task group commander. Offensive opera-
tions within a static haven are limited as follows:
(a) Under no circumstances shall ships or aircraft attack a submarine within a static haven. Nor shall
they attack a surface ship unless the target is positively identified as enemy. Additionally, surface ships
shall not enter a static haven without the permission of the commander who established the static haven.
(b) Submarines shall not attack other submarines or surface ships unless they are positively
identified as enemy.
NOTE
(NC) (NMM) Static havens are used to provide protection to friendly submarines during multi-na-
tional operations which include non-NATO partners. During this type of operation, standard WSM
areas (SAA, JTAA and ASWFA) will continue to be promulgated by the SUBOPAUTH or (when
TACOM has been delegated) the OTC or SOCA. Additionally, the commander promulgating
WSM status to NATO units will establish static havens which encompass submarine WSM areas
(SAAs and JTAAs) and disseminate the locations of these static havens to all units operating in the
area of concern. This commander shall also take positive steps to ensure that units which are not in-
formed of WSM status remain clear of static havens and do not conduct unauthorized attacks on
submarines and surface ships operating within these static havens.
(2) Submarine Moving Havens (MHNs) (Wartime or Peacetime Use). MHNs may be as-
signed by the SUBOPAUTH to submarines to prevent mutual interference or minimize the risk of attack
between friendly submarines.
(NC) (NMM) Submarine MHNs are established by BARNSTORM procedures in ATP 18 or by a
Submarine Notice (SUBNOTE) promulgated in accordance with the procedure in Article 6771. The
sides of the submarine MHN are always described in the following sequence — miles ahead, miles be-
hind, and miles on either side of the submarine’s ordered position.
6-91 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(a) Wartime. The dimensions of MHNs will be dictated by operational requirements. Unless
otherwise specified, the standard wartime submarine MHN has the following dimensions from the
submarine’s ordered position:
i. Outside the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas: 50 miles ahead, 100 miles behind, and 15
miles on each side.
ii. In the Mediterranean Sea east of longitude 05°55’W (except for the Aegean Sea) and in
the Baltic Sea entered in latitude 57°45’N: 20 miles ahead, 40 miles behind, and 15 miles on each
side.
iii. In the Aegean Sea: 5 miles ahead, 10 miles behind, and 3 miles on each side.
(b) Peacetime. In peacetime, SUBOPAUTHs are requested to restrict the size of the MHN
to the minimum to meet the submarine’s operational requirements — preferably an area 20 miles
ahead, 30 miles behind, and 5 miles on either side of the submarine’s ordered position. In peacetime,
the shape of the MHN may be varied to suit operational requirements, in which case the dimensions
are to be stated in the SUBNOTE.
(c) In Restricted Waters. MHNs should be reduced in size in restricted waters, in which
case the dimensions must be stated in the SUBNOTE. They shall be established for submarines in
transit even though they are under escort.
(d) Request for Change to SUBNOTE. A submarine is responsible for remaining within
the submarine MHN established by the SUBNOTE. When unable to do so, the submarine shall request
a change to the SUBNOTE from the SUBOPAUTH under whose operational control he is operating
and, in peacetime, with information to the SMAA. Such requests for changes to a SUBNOTE will
include the reason therefore, and will be assigned a precedence consistent with the urgency of the
situation, up to and including IMMEDIATE if necessary.
(3) (NC) (NMM) Operations Within a Submarine Moving Haven in Wartime. In wartime,
operations within a submarine MHN are limited as follows:
(a) Aircraft and Surface Ships. ASW attacks are prohibited.
NOTE
For procedures when surface forces require access to an SAA or JTAA, see paragraph e. below.
(b) Submarines. A submarine in a MHN shall not attack another submarine unless it is
positively identified as enemy.
(4) (NC) (NMM) Surface Ship Moving Havens. In wartime, surface ship moving havens are
established by surface ship notices, which will be promulgated in accordance with Article 6737. In
peacetime, they will be established by a VDS/DTAS NOTE in accordance with Article 6780. A surface
ship moving haven will normally be a circle centered on the ordered position of the ship (or Guide of a
group of ships). The OCA or ship originating a surface ship moving haven notice will determine the ra-
dius of a circular haven, taking into consideration such factors as the size of a group of ships and the
probable tactical maneuvers. The size of surface ship moving havens should be kept to the minimum
consistent with the foregoing requirements in order to minimize the area of prohibited attack. A surface
ship is responsible for remaining within its established haven. When unable to do so in wartime, the ship
shall inform the OCA concerned as soon as practicable and designate new planned positions. In peace-
time, Article 6780 is to be followed. Within surface ship moving havens, offensive operations are
6-92 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
limited so that surface ships will not be attacked unless positively identified as enemy or unless they
commit a hostile act. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be governed by the designation of the sur-
rounding zone or area. When the movements of cartel ships, enemy hospital ships, neutrals, etc. are
known, they can best be safeguarded by the dissemination of a notice of surface ship moving haven.
d. (NC) (NMM) Considerations in Area Allocations.
(1) Communication schedules and maximum speeds of advance will affect the planning and pro-
mulgation of changes in submarine area allocations.
(2) The inherent difficulties in providing adequate information exchange with a covert submarine de-
mand that communications be limited and strictly scheduled. Additionally, although a submarine may re-
ceive a message after a short while after release, it would not normally transmit an acknowledgement for
OPSEC reasons. These constraints dictate that a SUBOPAUTH cannot normally assume receipt of a mes-
sage, transmitted by broadcast to a submarine, for at least 12 hours after initial transmission.
(3) For both operational effectiveness and survivability, a submarine is restricted in speed. Limita-
tions may be imposed for sonar search purposes, to ensure continuous communications, to conserve bat-
tery capacity, or to minimize snorkel periods. A low speed of advance by submarines is a sensible
planning assumption.
(4) OTCs and MHQs should therefore give the SUBOPAUTH the earliest possible notification of
desired routes and water assignments. The SUBOPAUTH will acknowledge requests as soon as possi-
ble (normally within 4 hours of receipt). The acknowledgement will be either a WSM Allocation and
Status message or a denial.
(5) Own mining operations are to be conducted only after preliminary coordination with the appro-
priate SUBOPAUTH. This is also valid for the conduct of mine countermeasures to a limited extent as
discussed in Chapter 13.
e. (NC) (NMM) Procedures for WSM Allocation.
(1) Procedures for Use When Surface Forces Require Access to a Submarine Ac-
tion Area or Joint Action Area (other than one established for their use). The procedure to
be followed depends upon the notice that can be given, measured from the time of receipt and time of
new requirement.
(a) More Than 24 Hours From Receipt of Requirement. When more than 24 hours
notice can be given, the OTC must decide whether the aim of the mission is best served by seeking
separation or mutual support from submarines within SAAs. He must request an ASWFA or JTAA.
(b) Less Than 24 Hours But More Than 18 Hours From Receipt of Requirement.
It is emphasized that the following is an emergency procedure and might be impossible to
implement. In this case the OTC may request Operation GRASSHOPPER from the SUBOPAUTH.
This orders all affected submarines to move to a small preplanned part of their allocated area. The
duration of GRASSHOPPER and the area required must be defined. See Article 6736 for detailed
instructions for Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(c) Less Than 18 Hours Notice From Receipt of Requirement. An alteration of the
plans at this notice is not sufficient for any course of action other than for the force to prohibit ASW
attacks. It must be emphasized that the short notice might be insufficient even to warn friendly
submarines of the transit of friendly submarines of the transit of friendly surface forces. Ships must
be aware that they may be open to attack by a friendly submarine and therefore must make every
attempt to make their identity known.
6-93 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NOTE
DTAS/VDS-fitted ships that are passing through an SAA or JTAA must retrieve the
DTAS/VDS system unless GRASSHOPPER is in force. If a CATAS system is considered a
hazard to certain classes of submarine, the SUBOPAUTH will advise of any requirement to re-
trieve the CATAS. CATAS-fitted ships must recognize the possibility of damage or loss unless
the system is retrieved.
(2) Procedures Within a Joint Action Area. By definition, a JTAA will always contain a sin-
gle friendly submarine. Accordingly, air and surface ASW attacks are prohibited throughout a JTAA
until such time as an SGSA or NOTACK area is established by the submarine.
(3) Procedures Within an ASW Area of Interest.
(a) The SUBOPAUTH operating submarines within the ASW AOI may be requested by the
area or surface force commander to provide associated support to the force. If assigned, the
SUBOPAUTH must designate the submarine operating area as an SAA or JTAA.
(b) To provide maximum ASWFAs for forces in transit, JTAA sizes for submarines are to be
kept as small as feasible considering the requirements of submarine operations.
(c) If the transiting force stops to carry out local operations, JTAAs or SAAs in the vicinity
may be modified to provide support more appropriate to stationary PIM operations.
(4) Procedures for ASW Aircraft.
(a) In an ASWFA. No ASW restrictions apply for ASW aircraft in an ASWFA.
(b) Over an SAA. ASW aircraft should not normally be tasked over an SAA. If such occurs,
however, aircraft ASW attacks are prohibited.
(c) In a JTAA. Attacks by ASW aircraft are prohibited until such time as a NOTACK area is
established by the submarine. SUB/AIR cooperation procedures in accordance with ATP 18,
Chapter 12, apply when so ordered.
NOTE
A minimum of 12 hours notice must be given to a submarine ordered to execute SUB/AIR co-
operation procedures.
(5) Procedures for Submarines Within an SAA/JTAA. Submarines shall consider as en-
emy and may attack any target encountered, subject to specific orders to the contrary from higher au-
thority and the current interpretation of international law. Submarines shall not attack ships believed to
be neutral or ships encountered along a route or in an area of friendly ship operations about which they
have been notified. No ship encountered under the circumstances set forth in the preceding sentence
shall be attacked unless the ship has been identified as enemy beyond possibility of doubt.
f. (NC) (NMM) Coordination Responsibilities.
(1) The SUBOPAUTH will:
(a) Implement and promulgate SAAs, JTAAs, SSLs, and widely and on a regular basis ASWFAs
on behalf of the area commander.
6-94 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Order Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(c) Promulgate to appropriate authorities SPAs and MHNs within SAAs.
(d) Liaise with other authorities over cooperation within JTAAs.
(2) OTCs and MHQs can:
(a) Request ASWFAs or JTAAs.
(b) Request Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(c) Establish and promulgate ASW AOIs.
(d) Seek arbitration as appropriate.
g. (NC) (NMM) Operations After Loss of Submarine Command and Control. The
SUBOPAUTH will ensure ASWFAs are promulgated by regular message. In the event of loss of
submarine command and control, unrestricted ASW operations can continue in ASWFAs using
the information contained in the last promulgation message. These operations must remain
outside SSLs.
6735 (NC) (NMM) PROCEDURES FOR REQUEST AND ALLOCATION OF WSM AREAS
a. Procedures.
(1) Purpose. The purpose of this paragraph is to formalize the procedure to be followed when re-
questing or allocating ASWFAs, JTAAs, and SAAs.
(2) Aim. The aim is to provide a standard method to divide water effectively between the com-
mands involved.
b. Considerations.
(1) In order to reduce message traffic, WSM messages will initially not be addressed lower than
CTF/CTG level of any ASW capable force. CTGs and sub-area commanders are responsible for further
dissemination as required.
(2) To ensure uniformity of WSM plots, the SUBOPAUTH will issue a serialized WSM message
for his area of responsibility at an interval not exceeding 24 hours. If a new WSM message is not issued
within 24 hours, the last WSM message remains effective.
(3) If required the SUBOPAUTH will issue numbered amendments to serialized WSM messages
when time does not allow waiting for the next serialized WSM message.
(4) After a new serialized WSM message has become effective, the former serialized WSM mes-
sages and amendments are automatically cancelled.
(5) WSM requests received by the SUBOPAUTH will be acknowledged as soon as practicable
(normally within 4 hours of receipt) by IMMEDIATE message. The acknowledgement will be in the
form of:
(a) An amendment to a serialized WSM message, or
6-95 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) A denial of a request.
c. Format for WSM Messages. Formats for WSM messages are in accordance with APP 4.
6736 (NC) (NMM) EMERGENCY TRANSIT OF SURFACE FORCES THROUGH SAAs OR

JTAAs
a. Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(1) Purpose and Aim. To allow a transiting surface force, at short notice, the maximum freedom
for the use of ASW weapons by minimizing the size of SAAs or JTAAs in the quickest possible way.
(2) Considerations.
(a) This operation is to be regarded as an emergency procedure.
(b) If a STOVEPIPE Plan is in force, GRASSHOPPER may be requested, but cannot be

authorized unless the STOVEPIPE plan can be cancelled.
(c) The submarine’s ability to operate effectively will be significantly reduced during the
execution of these procedures.
b. Execution of Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(1) Description. When surface forces are required to enter an SAA or JTAA at short notice, the
SUBOPAUTH can order a submarine to withdraw into a preplanned part of its SPA, defined as a
MEADOW.
(2) Definition of a MEADOW. A MEADOW is a static submarine haven that is effective only
during the period and in the area in which Operation GRASSHOPPER is in effect. MEADOWs will be
defined by the Area Commander when he promulgates the ASW grid.
NOTE
If a submarine has been allocated only a part of a grid area (in which case the SAA or JTAA
boundary is cutting through the MEADOW), this MEADOW is cancelled.
(3) Submarines.
(a) Within the area in which GRASSHOPPER is effective, submarines withdraw into the
MEADOW or into any part of their SAA or JTAA which lies outside the GRASSHOPPER area and
remain there throughout the time specified in the execution message.
(b) When the effective GRASSHOPPER time expires, submarines again occupy their SAA or
JTAA as previously allocated.
(4) Surface/Air Assets.
(a) Within the time and area specified in the GRASSHOPPER execution message, attacks
with surface and air ASW weapons are prohibited within the MEADOW.
(b) Surface assets should normally remain clear of MEADOWs.
6-96 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) During the time GRASSHOPPER is effective, no restrictions are imposed in the
GRASSHOPPER area on VDS/DTAS, etc., outside the MEADOW.
(d) When the effective GRASSHOPPER time expires, the ASW weapon restrictions of
Article 6735 apply. (Surface/air ASW attacks are prohibited within the SAA. NOTACK or SGSA is
required for attacks within a JTAA).
c. Method of Requesting and Ordering Operation GRASSHOPPER.
(1) Request for GRASSHOPPER. The OTC or ASWC of a surface force that has to proceed
through an SAA or JTAA at a notice between 18 and 24 hours may request the SUBOPAUTH to execute
GRASSHOPPER using the message format in APP 4.
(2) Method of Ordering. The SUBOPAUTH orders GRASSHOPPER using the message format
in APP 4. When so ordering, the SUBOPAUTH must provide the coordinates of the center and the size
of each active MEADOW and the time they will be active.
6737 PROCEDURES FOR SURFACE SHIPS ENTERING RESTRICTED AREAS
a. Surface Ship Notices. When surface ships must enter a blind bombing zone, the commander
ordering the movement shall notify, as far in advance as possible, the theater, fleet, or equivalent
commander concerned and the commander controlling aircraft movements in the area. The commander
ordering the surface ship movement shall state either the route to be followed, given speed of advance
(SOA) and times of passing reference positions, or the area in which the surface ship operations are to be
conducted. During an emergency, surface ships entering a blind bombing zone without prior timely
notification (normally 24 hours is required) must accept the risk of attack by friendly aircraft.
6738 — 6739 SPARE
6740 SAFETY PROCEDURES
a. Safety procedures are established to:
(1) Safeguard friendly forces from attack by each other; prevent needless alarms; prevent expendi-
ture of unnecessary effort on the part of friendly forces by the approach of other forces not yet recog-
nized or identified as friendly.
(2) Provide confidence in identification, thereby ensuring the immediate effective engagement of
enemy forces.
(3) Ensure the safety of friendly forces in routing operations and exercises.
b. Safety procedures applicable to specific operations are established in appropriate publications.

Safety procedures for maritime air operations are detailed in Article 6470.
(NR) (NMM) Safety procedures for submarine operations in Article 6760.
6-97 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
6745 SAFETY OF AIRCRAFT
6746 WEAPON RESTRICTIONS — GENERAL
Weapon restrictions apply to aircraft, SAMs, and guns and may be ordered to allow the operation of
friendly aircraft, especially within MEZs. They are promulgated by AAWCs, each at his own level and in
his own area, as the occasion demands. They may be ordered in a general sense, or specifically for a given
area, or for a given type of weapon.
6747 WEAPON CONTROL STATUS
a. Weapon Control Status. The following weapon control status may be given, prefixed by
weapon code words:
(1) … FREE. Fire may be opened on any target(s) that has (have) not been identified as FRIEND.
(2) … TIGHT. Do not open fire unless target(s) has (have) been identified as HOSTILE.
(3) … SAFE. Do not open fire/cease firing. Fire may be opened only in self-defense or in response
to a formal order.
b. Qualifying Weapon Control Status. Weapon control status may be qualified by one or
more of the following:
(1) A sector.
(2) A safety sector.
(3) A period of time.
-Example-
“WEAPONS TIGHT 5 SECTOR 2.”
Meaning: Do not open fire in safety sector 2 for 5 minutes.
c. Changing Weapon Control Status. A weapon control status is changed by directing

another weapon control status.
6748 WEAPON CONTROL ORDERS
a. Weapon Control Orders. Independent of weapon control status, the following weapon
control orders may be directed by the AAW:
(1) HOLD FIRE. Do not open fire/cease firing (missiles in flight must be destroyed). The direction
to hold fire should be repeated at the end of a transmission.
(2) CEASE FIRE. Do not open/cease firing (missiles in flight continue to intercept).
b. Qualifying Weapon Control Orders. Weapon Control orders may be qualified by one or
both of the following:
(1) A particular unit.
6-98 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) A particular contact (track number or position).
-Example-
HOLD FIRE ON TRACK 1247, HOLD FIRE.”
Meaning: Do not open fire/cease firing on track 1247 (missiles in flight must be destroyed).
Note: If AAWC directs a weapon control order in general it accounts for all units and all contacts.
-Example-
“W this is AW, HOLD FIRE, I say again, HOLD FIRE.”
Meaning: All units hold fire on all contacts (missiles in flight must be destroyed).
c. Cancelling Weapon Control Orders. A weapon control order can only be cancelled by the
AAWC, using the prefix “NEGAT” to the weapon control order.
-Example-
“W this is AW, NEGAT HOLD FIRE, I say again, NEGAT HOLD FIRE.”
Note: A specific weapon control order can exist within a weapon control status.
-Example-
“WEAPONS FREE, HOLD FIRE ON TRACK 1644.”
6750 SPECIAL SURFACE SHIP PRECAUTIONS
6751 SURFACE SHIP NOTICES AND ADVISORIES
Surface ship notices or advisories will only be required for those specific instances in which surface
ships are towing acoustic devices in peacetime under the provisions of Article 6780 or are required to enter
blind bombing zones or submarine patrol areas in wartime.
6752 RADIATION HAZARDS (RADHAZ) TO PERSONNEL
a. Ships Fitted With High-Power Transmitting Equipment. Ships are fitted with a large
amount of high-power transmitting equipment — radio communications, radar, and sonar. High-power
transmissions are a hazard to human life because of the effects of radiation on the human body. They can
also ignite explosive devices and combustible material. There are also certain other hazards that originate
from the same source as the radiation hazard, such as the danger from rotating antennas and aural shock
from the use of sirens. The commanding officer of each unit is responsible for the safety of his own
personnel and stores from RADHAZ produced within his unit. Because of the variety of ships, aircraft, and
equipment in NATO forces, it is not always possible for the forces commander to provide detailed
regulations for the prevention of RADHAZ accidents between units. It is therefore also the responsibility
of individual commanding officers to warn other units when his unit is within such a range that
exceptionally powerful transmitters could be a hazard to personnel in the other units. If feasible, ships are
to include details in the RADARAT at SPECINFO paragraphs of OPSTAT UNIT messages. It is also the
responsibility of each commanding officer to warn other units of stores that are held in such a location that
they could be hazarded by transmissions from the other units.
6-99 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Instructions.
(1) A minimum distance apart of 100 yards is to be maintained between ships and between ships
and aircraft.
(2) Unit commanders are to ensure that transmitters with a power density of 100 watts per square
meter (100 W/m2) or greater at a distance of 100 yards do not irradiate ships or aircraft within the 100
W/m2 radius.
(3) Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs) are not to be exposed in a RADHAZ unsafe condition within
a distance of 1,000 yards from other units.
(4) In the event that units are required to breach either the 100-yard or 1,000-yard safe distance, ac-
tion is to be taken to ensure that risk transmitters are controlled to ensure safety (e.g., directed to a safe
bearing, reduced in power, or eventually switched off).
6760 (NC) (NMM) SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR SUBMARINES
Procedures for preventing engagement of friendly forces are of critical importance and must be
conscientiously followed, especially within JTAAs. Air and surface units shall not employ ASW
weapons inside a JTAA unless prior coordination has been conducted with the submarine per the
procedures of this chapter. Likewise, submarines shall employ ASW and ASUW weapons with due
regard for friendly surface units that may be operating within or in the vicinity of the JTAA. Within a
JTAA, two types of area — submarine-generated search area (SGSA) and NOTACK — are used to
prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines. SGSA procedures allow rapid engagement of
hostile submarines by other ASW platforms without having to BELLRING the friendly submarine,
while NOTACK procedures allow direct coordination between the friendly submarine and an attacking
ASW platform. The two procedures complement each other and maximize the operational flexibility of
both submarines and other ASW units.
6761 ASW COMPENSATORY ALLOWANCES
a. For any ASW engagement, air and surface units shall apply a compensatory allowance which
minimizes the risk of that weapon inadvertently entering an area containing a friendly submarine.
(NC) (NMM) Conceptually, a compensatory allowance is a weapons danger zone with a navigation
safety buffer which applies to SAA, JTAA, activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and SGSA boundaries.
b. The weapon danger zone is based on the type of weapon, method of employment, run
pattern, and estimated acquisition range. This danger zone is not intended to be the maximum
possible weapon run, but an area which will protect the submarine from a properly operating
weapon. Weapon danger parameters are derived from ASW weapon employment publications, and
may also be specified by the ASWC.
c. Submarines shall remain clear of their area boundaries by at least their assessed navigation error
and take appropriate precautions to prevent its own ASW weapons from endangering friendly submarines
and surface units.
d. Figure 6-10 illustrates compensatory allowances.
6762 (NC) (NMM) SUBMARINE-GENERATED SEARCH AREA (SGSA)
An SGSA (code name: BULLPEN) is a stationary, geographically defined area within a JTAA in
which the submarine will operate for a specified period of time. While the SGSA is in effect, an SGSA
6-100 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ASW weapons may be employed when the weapon

danger zone (B) lies completely outside the applicable
submarine area boundary and SURF/AIR self-assessed
navigation error (C)
Submarines operate
at a distance > their
self-assessed navigation
B
error (A) from the applicable A C
submarine area boundary.
A - SUB Self-Assessed Navigation Error

B - SURF/AIR Weapon Danger Zone
Applicable submarine area boundary C - SURF/AIR Self-Assessed Navigation Error
Figure 6-10. ASW Compensatory Allowances
Coordinating Authority/Unit controls employment of non-submarine ASW weapons within the JTAA.
The manner in which SGSA procedures are implemented depends on whether the submarine is operating
with a task group or independently in cooperation with MPA or other land-based tactical aircraft in area
operations. All message formats associated with SGSA establishment, cancellation, and attack
authorization are found in APP 4, Vol I, Chapter 3. Figure 6-11 illustrates SGSA attack rules.
a. Definitions.
(1) SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit is the designated command or platform that controls
employment of air and surface ASW weapons within a JTAA when SGSA procedures are in effect. It is
normally a command or platform with whom the submarine is conducting coordinated operations.
(a) Task Group Operations. When a submarine is operating with a task group, a specified
commander is to be designated as the SGSA Coordinating Authority. This authority coordinates
with the submarine regarding establishment of SGSAs and, when ASW weapon employment is
required by air/surface units, coordinates and authorizes ASW engagements in the portion of the
JTAA that lies outside the SGSA. SGSA Coordinating Authority responsibilities will normally be
assigned to the SOCA. When ASW weapons are to be employed and the submarine is inside the task
group’s ASWC AOR, this should be the task group’s ASWC. If delegated, these functions shall be
performed by a responsible command in the ASWC’s chain of command, normally no lower than a
sector ASWC.
(b) Area Operations. When a submarine not operating with a task group is conducting
coordinated operations with MPA or other land-based aircraft, a single on-station aircraft shall act as
the SGSA Coordinating Unit. Responsibilities are the same as for a task group SGSA Coordinating
Authority.
(2) FREEWHEEL. FREEWHEEL is the code word used by an SGSA Coordinating Author-
ity/Unit to confirm cancellation of an SGSA. It is sent to the submarine only after verification that no air
6-101 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
JTAA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attack Requires Authorization by
SGSA Coordinating Authority (designated by SOCA)
SGSA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attack
Requires Coordination of NOTACK
Area with Friendly SUB
SUB: ASW Attack Authorized
NOTE: (1) SUB must remain within SGSA, but may shoot ASW Weapons
into the remainder of the JTAA.
Figure 6-11. (NU) (NMM) Submarine-Generated Search Area
or surface ASW attacks or engagements are in progress or authorized in the JTAA and outside an SGSA.
Upon receipt, the submarine is free to maneuver throughout the JTAA.
NOTE
SUB must remain within SGSA, but may shoot ASW Weapons into the remainder of the
JTAA.
b. SGSA Utilization. Submarines are authorized to use SGSA procedures any time when
operating in a JTAA. The submarine commanding officer is the final authority in the establishment of an
SGSA. During task group operations, he will do so, in liaison with the SGSA Coordinating Authority, to
meet task group requirements consistent with submarine safety and his ability to complete assigned
tasking. In this regard, any request or directive to a submarine to establish an SGSA should provide
sufficient rationale such that the commanding officer understands its intentions and can assess and advise
the SOCA on issues that may affect submarine safety. The SGSA may also be used for an area
deconfliction purposes other than those strictly associated with ASW. Examples include:
(1) Establishing a specified segment of a JTAA required by a submarine for ASUW, strike warfare,
intelligence surveillance, special operations, etc.
(2) Clearing a portion of a JTAA for surface ship transit or emergent submerged interference advi-
sory event, aircraft emergency ordnance jettison, or live fire training exercises.
6-102 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. SGSA Configuration.
(1) SGSA Size and Location. The requirements of the task group and the submarine’s search
capability are the primary factors in determining SGSA size and location. Creating an SGSA that is
larger than the submarine can reasonably use for the performance of its mission during the given time
period may unnecessarily restrict employment of other assets. Conversely, an SGSA that is too small or
poorly situated may inhibit the ability of the submarine to carry out assigned tasks and defeat the pur-
pose of coordinated or cooperative operations altogether.
(2) SGSA Boundary Definition. The SGSA is always defined by specific geographic refer-
ence: latitude and longitude, grid, circle, or line. In addition to prescribing derivatives of the standard
methods, the OTC or SUBOPAUTH may establish other appropriate means of identifying a specific
SGSA; e.g., preplanned areas identified by number or code name. When used, preplanned areas should
overlap to allow creation of sequential SGSAs.
(3) SGSA Duration. The effective period for an SGSA is defined using specific Start and Stop
times. Duration should normally be equal to or less than the submarine broadcast cycle (usually 8 to 12
hours) but greater than 2 hours. If duration is longer than the communication interval, the submarine is
not required to communicate each cycle solely to confirm SGSA duration.
(a) When operating with a task group and two-way communication with the SGSA
Coordinating Authority has been established, the submarine should obtain concurrence to the SGSA
before leaving communication depth to ensure that parameters conform to the force’s operational
requirements.
(b) To facilitate SGSA continuity, the submarine may set more than one SGSA in a single
establishment message so long as only one SGSA is effective at a time. Similarly, as SGSA Stop
time may be set to overlap the next tactical communications window.
(c) Submarines shall specify a Stop time for SGSA duration. The term, “Until further notice,”
shall not be used in order to prevent confusion which could result if communications with the SGSA
Coordinating Authority are lost prior to JTAA expiration.
(d) In area operations, the SGSA expiration time should be no later than the MPA off-station
time (includes the period of continuous on-station relief aircraft). This is to preclude periods when
the JTAA outside the SGSA would not be covered by either submarine or MPA.
(e) An SGSA may be cancelled at any time by the submarine or the SGSA Coordinating
Authority. Once the SGSA expires or is cancelled, the entire original JTAA reverts to an area in
which release of air/surface launched ASW weapons is prohibited unless a NOTACK area is
established by the friendly submarine.
d. Coordinating Authority/Unit Requirements. A submarine shall coordinate with only one

on-scene task group SGSA Coordinating Authority or area operations SGSA Coordinating Unit at a time.
The SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit shall maintain a plot showing the location and Start and Stop
times of each SGSA and an engagement authorization log listing the attacking unit, location, and
expiration time for use in coordinating and responding to attack requests.
e. SGSA Establishment. SGSAs are to be established with the SGSA Coordinating

Authority/Unit using the message format in APP 4, Vol I. Messages are normally sent via designated
tactical circuits and may be included in routine submarine SITREPs. Use of SSIXS by submarines so
equipped is also allowable during task group operations. SUBOPAUTH should immediately relay such
messages sent via SSIXS to the SGSA Coordinating Authority by the fastest means possible. Once the
6-103 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
submarine transmits an SGSA establishment message, it shall not leave the SGSA until the area either
expires or is cancelled. This includes situations in which no acknowledgement of the SGSA establishment
message is received.
(1) Task Group Operations. A submarine operating with a task group shall establish the SGSA
with the SGSA Coordinating Authority, who may then authorize engagements outside the SGSA (in-
cluding attacks by MPA operating in support of the task group).
(2) Area Operations. AIR/SUB cooperation procedures per ATP 18, Chapter 12, are used in co-
ordinated area operations. An on-station aircraft in the JTAA acts as the SGSA Coordinating Unit. Note
that for area operations, SGSA procedures are executed by the submarine with a single on-station air-
craft, which is to coordinate and authorize all attacks outside the SGSA — its own as well as those of
other ASW aircraft. This duty may be turned over to a relieving aircraft.
f. SGSA Cancellation by the Submarine. To terminate a SGSA, the submarine must send a
cancellation message to the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit. The message should be sent via tactical
communications. Use of SSIXS is also allowable during task group operations. The SUBOPAUTH should
immediately relay such messages sent via SSIXS to the SGSA Coordinating Authority by the fastest
means possible. The submarine shall not leave its SGSA until receipt of cancellation concurrence (code
word FREEWHEEL) by the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit per message format in APP 4, Vol I, or, in
the absence of that concurrence, until the Stop time of the SGSA.
(1) Task Group Operations. When operating with a task group, the submarine shall cancel the
SGSA by contacting the SGSA Coordinating Authority. Upon receipt of a SGSA cancellation message,
the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall verify from the SGSA plot and attack authorized log that no at-
tacks have been authorized outside the SGSA and inside the submarine’s JTAA.
(a) If no attacks have been authorized, the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall concur with
SGSA cancellation. The submarine is free to operate anywhere in the JTAA.
(b) If attacks have been authorized, the SGSA Coordinating Authority shall acknowledge
receipt of the submarine’s message and advise that engagements are or may be in progress outside
the SGSA (specify location). When all attack authorizations have been cancelled, confirmation is to
be sent to the submarine.
(2) Area Operations. In area operations, the submarine shall cancel the SGSA by contacting the
on-station MPA acting as the SGSA Coordinating Unit. Upon receipt of the cancellation message, the
SGSA Coodinating Unit — after confirming that no ASW attacks are being conducted in any portion of
the JTAA outside the SGSA — shall concur with the SGSA cancellation. After the SGSA is cancelled,
the SGSA Coordinating Unit shall not release or authorize use of ASW weapons until:
(a) A new NOTACK area or SGSA has been established by the friendly submarine, or
(b) The contact enters an ASWFA.
g. Use of SLOT Buoys. At the submarine commanding officer’s discretion, an SGSA

implementation message may be sent by SLOT buoy provided communications have previously been
established with the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit. The message must include an encoded position
element that must be check decoded on the submarine before the buoy is released. SGSA messages passed
by SLOT buoy need not be acknowledged until the two-way communications opportunity if the SGSA is
still in force. SLOT buoys may not be used to modify or cancel an existing SGSA.
h. SGSA Modification. SGSAs shall not be modified. Changing an existing or pre-established

SGSA requires cancelling the existing or pre-established SGSA and establishing a new one.
6-104 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
i. SGSA Cancellation by the SGSA Coordinating Authority. When the SGSA

Coordinating Authority desires to cancel an SGSA, he must first ensure that no attacks have been
authorized outside the SGSA and inside the submarine’s JTAA. Once verified, the SGSA Coordinating
Authority shall inform the submarine of SGSA cancellation via local communications or advise the
SUBOPAUTH to relay the cancellation on the submarine broadcast.
j. SGSA Attack Rules. Attack rules associated with SGSA procedures apply only within JTAAs
and are not applicable to SAAs and ASWFAs. NOTACK area procedures always apply inside an SGSA
and throughout the JTAA whenever an SGSA has not been established by the submarine. Unless a
NOTACK area is in effect, the SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit alone must grant permission before any
air or surface ASW engagements are conducted within a JTAA. Units desiring to conduct an attack will
request attack authorization subject to the following:
(1) If an SGSA has not been established or the target is inside the SGSA, the SGSA Coordinating
Authority/Unit shall positively deny the request, provide the last known position and intentions of the
submarine, and direct that a NOTACK area be coordinated with the submarine prior to ASW weapon
release.
(2) If an SGSA has been established and the contact is within the JTAA but outside the SGSA, the
SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit shall transmit SGSA coordinates and Stop time to the requesting
unit and may authorize engagement. If the coordinates along with the serial number or code name of the
SGSA currently in effect have already been passed to the attacking platform, only the serial num-
ber/code name and Stop time need be transmitted. The attacking platform, in addition to the SGSA Co-
ordinating Authority, must verify that the target is in the portion of the JTAA that is outside the SGSA.
Compensatory allowances must be considered in determining whether an attack can safely be made if
the target is in the vicinity of the SGSA boundary.
(3) In that SGSA parameters are set or cancelled by the submarine with an SGSA Coordinating Au-
thority/Unit, the details of the SGSA geographic position may or may not be an aircrew pre-flight brief-
ing item. In any event, SGSA location and attack authorization must be obtained from the SGSA
Coordinating Authority/Unit before any air or surface ASW weapons are released inside a JTAA.
k. Aircraft-to-Aircraft SGSA Handover During Area Operations. Figure 6-12 defines the
rules for handing over SGSA from one SGSA Coordinating Unit to another during area operations. It
applies specifically to situations in which an on-station MPA is being relieved by another aircraft during
independent AIR/SUB cooperation. These rules do not apply during associated or direct support
submarine operations.
6763 (NC) (NMM) NOTACK AREA
a. NOTACK Area Specified. In certain circumstances, it is desirable to use other force assets to
prosecute contacts within the JTAA or SGSA. Protection of the friendly submarine is maintained by
establishing a smaller, stationary area within the JTAA or SGSA around the submarine known as the
NOTACK area. The protected submarine is the only unit authorized to release ASW weapons within this
area. Establishment of a NOTACK area requires a relative plot lock between the submarine and another
unit, so that navigation inaccuracies are reduced over a short period of time, and so that positive
identification of a submerged contact as a non-friendly submarine can be established. Unless otherwise
specified by the submarine, a NOTACK area has a 10-nm radius and exists for a period of 2 hours (unless
cancelled by the submarine). Attack rules for NOTACK areas within JTAAs and SGSAs are illustrated in
Figure 6-13.
6-105 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Valid SGSA YES

> 60 minutes
remaining?
NO
ACFT to
NO ACFT Comms YES
Established?
W/m2
100,000,000
Magnetic Field
10,000,000
SUB SGSA MSG
NO passed from YES
1,000,000 OFFSTA ACFT to
ONSTA ACFT?
100,000
10,000
Electric Field
1,000
NO SGSA
100 Readback
Correct?
10
1
0.001 0.1 10 1,000 100,000
YES
0.01 1 100 10,000 1,000,000
Frequency (MHz)
ASW WEAPONS PROHIBITED SGSA VALID
ASW aircraft await RDVU/ ASW aircraft may attack

Comms with SUB or execute outside SGSA (plus
NOTACK BELLRINGER procedures. Compensatory Allowance)
but inside the JTAA per
SGSA procedures.
Figure 6-12. (NU) (NMM) Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations
6-106 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
JTAA OR SGSA
SURF/AIR/SUB: All ASW Weapons Authorized Outside NOTACK Area.
Inside NOTACK Area, Only SUB ASW Weapons are Authorized.
NOTACK
NOTE: SUB must remain within NOTACK areas, but may shoot ASW
weapons into the remainder of the JTAA/SGSA.
Figure 6-13. (NU) (NMM) NOTACK Area
NOTE
Only the submarine may establish a NOTACK area in its JTAA or SGSA.
b. Requesting a NOTACK Area. A request to establish a NOTACK area will be signalled to the
submarine by any means available that has been authorized by the OTC. Careful consideration should be
given to the method used in order to maximize the ability of the submarine to remain as covert as possible.
In addition to two-way communications, other methods of transmitting the request are PROBE
ALERT/ATAC/long-range call up (LRCU), SUS/ESUS, and keyed sonar.
c. Submarine Responsibility in Establishing a NOTACK Area. The submarine will

acknowledge a NOTACK area request by either:
(1) Establishing a NOTACK area, or
(2) Informing the ASW unit of own intentions to prosecute the contact.
d. NOTACK Area Procedures.
(1) Establishing a NOTACK Area. The submarine may use two-way UHF voice or a SLOT
buoy to establish a NOTACK area. The former requires the submarine to come to communication
(periscope) depth and establish two-way communications with the requesting unit on assigned ASW
coordination frequencies. This may degrade the submarine’s ability to continue its search/prosecution
of a contact it may hold.
(2) Announcing. The submarine must announce the initiation time and its position using the
NOTACK message format in APP 4.
(3) Remaining in the Area. The submarine must remain within the NOTACK area.
6-107 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) Scene-of-Action Commander (SAC). The submarine will be the SAC for the water space
within the NOTACK area.
(5) Size of the NOTACK Area. Since NOTACK area rules preclude attacks within the
NOTACK area by other than the submarine, the submarine may elect to adjust the size of the area to
other than the standard 10-nm radius.
NOTE
A NOTACK area does not move. If the submarine must compensate for intended movement
during NOTACK area duration, a larger NOTACK area should be specified.
(6) Changing a NOTACK Area. The submarine may elect to change the time, location, or di-
mension of a NOTACK area. This is accomplished by cancelling the old NOTACK area and establish-
ing a new NOTACK area.
(7) Cancelling the NOTACK Area. The submarine may cancel a NOTACK area at any time.
Acknowledgement of the cancellation by the ASW unit is required before the submarine may depart the
NOTACK area.
e. Aircraft Responsibility in Establishing a NOTACK Area. ASW aircraft which request a

NOTACK area must:
(1) Mark-on-top the submarine or the SLOT buoy and establish a plot lock.
NOTE
Plot lock may be considered established if the aircraft’s position is positively confirmed to the
aircraft by the submarine, whether or not the aircraft is able to mark-on-top.
(2) Ensure that the time and position passed by the submarine equate to the check-sum digit pro-
vided for each.
NOTE
An incorrect check-sum invalidates the NOTACK message and a new request to establish a
NOTACK area must be initiated.
(3) Plot and maintain the NOTACK area for its specified duration.
(4) Add weapon stand-off distance to the radius of the NOTACK area.
(5) Add navigational drift error for the aircraft.
NOTE
Any element above that is missing or cannot be accomplished results in automatic cancellation
of the authorization to attack within the JTAA and a request for a new NOTACK area must be
initiated.
(6) Once these conditions are met, ASW attacks may be conducted against targets in the remainder
of the JTAA or SGSA outside the NOTACK area.
6-108 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. Coordinated Aircraft/Surface Unit Attacks. A situation may exist in which other ASW
units are in position to launch an attack against an enemy submarine within a submarine JTAA or SGSA.
Thus, the attacking platform may be other than the one marking-on-top the submarine. In this case, the
SAC is the unit conducting the plot lock with the submarine and the SAC must ensure that the requirements
above are met.
g. NOTACK Area Message. The specific message format is for voice, but the same procedure is
applicable for recorded communications with the appropriate modifications.
(1) If a NOTACK area message is received via two-way voice, the aircraft should read back for ver-
ification. If a SLOT buoy is used, the establishment message should be recorded twice using a 30-sec-
ond interval to enable the aircraft to copy without a delay. Additionally, the SLOT buoy message must
be independently copied by two separate crew members with an identical match of message content.
(2) NOTACK message format and procedures are given in APP 4.
h. Use of Satellite Positioning System. In lieu of establishing a relative plot lock, a

geographic plot lock (i.e., the passing of a submarine’s position to the cooperating unit) is permissible
provided both the aircraft and submarine are equipped with fully functional satellite positioning systems
(e.g., GPS). During NOTACK establishment, the submarine shall use the brevity word “GLOBAL” to
indicate that its position has been established with GPS.
6764 SAFETY LANES
Safety lanes are used to facilitate submarine and surface ship operations. Rules governing actions
within activated submarine and surface ship safety lanes follow:
a. Submarine Safety Lanes (SSLs). SSLs are available as a set of lanes superimposed on a
grid, or geographically described, and may be activated wholly or in part by message. SSLs may be used to
prevent or minimize mutual interference among friendly submarines, ships and aircraft. Offensive
operations within activated SSLs are limited as follows:
(1) Aircraft. ASW attacks are prohibited.
(2) Surface Ships. ASW attacks are prohibited.
(NC) (NMM) Procedures for use when surface forces require access to an SAA are described in
Article 6734. OPERATION GRASSHOPPER or designation as a JTAA are not applicable to SSLs.
(3) Submarines. A submarine in an SSL shall not attack another submarine unless it is positively
identified as enemy.
b. Surface Ship Safety Lanes. Offensive operations within a surface ship safety lane are
limited so that surface ships will not be attacked while in the lanes unless they are positively identified as
enemy or unless they commit a hostile act. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be governed by the
designation of the surrounding zone or area. Cartel ships, enemy hospital ships, and neutral shipping may
be routed along surface ship safety lanes.
(NC) (NMM) However, surface ship moving havens are more appropriate for the previously
mentioned vessels.
6-109 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
6765 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF TRANSITING SUBMARINES
The OTC of all escorted submarine moves is normally the escort commander. In the case of
unescorted moves or when the submarines part company with the escort for any reason, the senior
submarine commander present shall assume the duties of OTC. The commander of an area through which
submarines are transiting will provide routing instructions for the SUBOPAUTH.
6766 RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST DISABLED SUBMARINES
Any friendly ship or aircraft meeting a disabled friendly submarine is to make every effort, so far as
circumstances permit, to ensure the subsequent safe passage of the submarine.
6768 — 6769 SPARE
6770 SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS FOR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME
This section contains additional procedures for promulgating NATO submarine movement
information. It also provides a system that meets the requirements for an orderly transition from peace to
war. The primary reason for accurate and timely promulgation of submarine movement information is to
prevent submerged mutual interference. Secondary reasons are to provide information for intelligence
plots so that submarine contact reports may be properly evaluated and to establish a search area in case of
SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSINK based on the routing information given in the SUBNOTE.
6771 SUBMARINE MOVEMENTS
a. Authorities. Authorities who have responsibilities with regard to submarine movements are
the Submarine Operating Authorities (SUBOPAUTHs), Submarine Movement Advisory Authorities
(SMAAs), and Submarine Exercise Area Coordinators (SEACs).
Allied nations are responsible for informing relevant SMAAs about those national submarine
exercise areas which have been established permanently as agreed by the nations concerned and are under
the control of SEACs. SMAAs are responsible for monitoring submarine and VDS ship movements and
for informing SEACs, SUBOPAUTHs, and units concerned of possible mutual interference. NATO
SMAAs have no authority to control submarine movements. The procedures required below will neither
infringe on national prerogatives, infringe on the freedom of the sea, nor release submarine commanders
from their responsibilities regarding the International Law of the Seas. They do place a moral obligation on
all Allied SUBOPAUTHs to declare accurately their submarine operations and in sufficient time to permit
the widest promulgation to “need to know” addressees.
b. SUBNOTE Procedures. Submarines are routed in peace and in war by means of SUBNOTEs
that must clearly and accurately define the route to be followed.
(NR) (NMM) Details are in this section and APP 4.
c. Notice of Intention (NOI). When exercises are being planned it may be considered advisable
to establish a temporary submarine exercise area and/or to promulgate the intended track of the submarine
well in advance. This should be done by issuing an intention message to appropriate addressees in advance
of promulgating a SUBNOTE. This message should state the limits of the area and the duration of its use
and/or intended track.
d. Diving Restrictions. It is assumed that the submarine will proceed along its promulgated
track dived. Those portions of the route that must be transited surfaced are to be specified in the
6-110 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SUBNOTE. Should it be necessary to route the submarine dived through permanently established exercise
areas, the provisions of Article 6772 apply.
6772 ACTION ON SUSPECTED MUTUAL INTERFERENCE
a. Outside Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The SMAA will advise

SUBOPAUTHs as soon as interference is suspected. However, an interference situation may become
evident to SUBOPAUTHs concerned as soon as SUBNOTEs or changes thereto are promulgated, in
which case they should initiate action to eliminate the suspected interference situation without waiting for
a message from the SMAA. There are no set parameters for determining when an interference situation is
deemed to exist, and the good judgement of the authorities involved will determine the necessary action.
(NR) (NMM) As a minimum, however, interference should be considered to exist when the edge of
a moving haven, SPA, or temporary exercise area is within 10 miles of another moving haven, SPA, or
temporary exercise area.
b. Inside Permanently Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The SEAC will be best
informed concerning the movements of his own submarines within an established exercise area. On receipt
of information of a submarine transiting through the permanent exercise area, the SEAC is, if interference
is possible, to recommend avoiding action to the SUBOPAUTH involved, keeping the SMAA informed.
c. Inside Temporarily Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The commander

establishing a temporary submarine exercise area by a notice of intention (NOI) will be best informed
concerning the movements of exercise submarines within the area. On receipt of information of a
nonexercise submarine transiting through the temporary exercise area, the SMAA is responsible for
advising the commander who established the area and the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. The commander
who established the area is to decide if interference is likely and to recommend to the appropriate
SUBOPAUTH, keeping the SMAA informed, whether or not avoiding action is required.
6773 OPERATIONS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS TO SUBSURFACE OPERATIONS
a. Various peacetime operations scheduled by surface and air commanders are inherently
dangerous to submerged submarine passage when the whereabouts of the submarines are unknown to
these commanders. Such operations include:
(1) Streaming/deployment of VDS, minesweeping or minehunting gear, or other underwater

devices/bodies.
(2) Scheduling of live air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or antisubmarine weapon firings.
(3) Hydrographic survey explosive ranging.
b. Recipients of SUBNOTEs should further disseminate submarine movement information to

those authorities normally involved in scheduling these operations in order to avoid mutual interference.
c. It is incumbent on surface and air commanders to send a message to the appropriate authorities
informing them of their intent to schedule operations which may be inherently dangerous to submerged
operations. In the case of surface ships streaming VDS or other towed underwater devices/bodies, the
requirements of Article 6780 shall be followed. In the case of live weapon firings, the time and geographic
area involved should be signalled. Commands scheduling hydrographic survey explosive ranging
operations should include track information, speed of advance, times for explosive ranging, and size and
detonation depth of charges to be used.
6-111 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. Operations inherently dangerous to submerged submarines are frequently undertaken by civil

authorities. These operations require separate consideration by authorities with responsibility for
submarine safety.
e. Area commanders and national authorities should issue DANGER AREA NOTICES when they
intend to conduct operations hazardous to submarines.
(NR) (NMM) per APP-4
6774 (NC) (NMM) ACTION AT TIME OF INCREASED TENSION
a. Wartime procedures will be implemented when ordered by a Strategic Commander (SC) or his des-
ignated subordinate. They will also be implemented at NATO Reinforced Alert. Timely implementation of
Waterspace Management (WSM) procedures which should be in force shortly after NATO Simple Alert is
declared or earlier, will facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime procedures.
b. The order will be promulgated in time of tension when a greater than normal number of
submarines of NATO nations have begun deployment and when some of these submarines have been
transferred to NATO command and control. In a situation in which a submarine is operating in a
stationary MHN (i.e., at speed zero), or in a differently shaped MHN that is not moving, the MHN will be
confined to the specified area in which the submarine is operating at the time of execution of the order.
When the SUBNOTE in effect has the submarine scheduled to remain in a stationary MHN for an
extended period of time, it is incumbent upon the SUBOPAUTH to issue an amendment to the
SUBNOTE which changes the MHN to the standard wartime size and delineates clearly how it is to be
oriented. When the submarine is operating within a published local submarine exercise area at the time
the order is to be executed, the local exercise area in which the submarine is operating will become an
MHN until such time as the submarine departs the exercise area and a normal MHN is in effect. MHNs
are described in detail in Article 6765.
c. The order will contain a time of execution and will be promulgated well in advance so that
authorities and submarines can take appropriate action at the same time. Normally a new SUBNOTE
should be issued to reflect the change in area and to reflect the different addressees.
d. BARNSTORM procedures in ATP 18 are the preferred means of promulgating specific

submarine area assignments, once WSM procedures are in force.
6780 PREVENTION OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE BETWEEN SUBMERGED

SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS WITH TOWED ACOUSTIC DEVICES
STREAMED
a. Safety measures prescribed below shall be enforced to prevent mutual interference between
submerged submarines and surface ships with Variable Depth Sonar (VDS), Depressed Towed Array
System (DTAS), and Critical Angle Towed Array System (CATAS) devices streamed when operating in
nonexercise situations in peacetime. This coordination is required to enhance safety, surveillance
coverage, and avoid conflicts of interest, but is not intended to prejudice national prerogatives or inhibit
freedom of the seas.
NOTE
Towed torpedo decoys are excluded from these requirements
(1) Submarine commanding officers must assume that all ships which are operating sonar have
streamed a towed acoustic device unless positively known otherwise and that ships do not know the sub-
marine’s position. A submarine hearing sonar transmissions or other signals is to remain clear, keeping
6-112 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
in mind that the subject unit may be trailing an acoustic device up to 4,000 yards astern. A surface ship
with contact on a friendly submarine must keep his ship and towed array clear of the submarine.
(2) VDS may be employed in the active or passive mode. No active sonar transmissions or other sig-
nals are required, provided the response to the VDS/DTAS NOTE has been received from the SMAA.
(NC) (NMM) If the towing ship departs the MHN and the transducer cannot be recovered, the tow-
ing ship is to provide a warning signal on some other acoustic device, such as hull-mounted sonar or un-
derwater telephone.
(3) VDS/DTAS Safety Precautions
(a) The VDS/DTAS NOTE described below is required for safety whenever a VDS/DTAS
device is to be streamed to a depth greater than 30 meters (98 feet). A VDS/DTAS NOTE is also
required for operations at 30 meters (98 feet) or less when:
i. The water depth is less than 375 meters (1,200 feet).
ii. Operation within 40 nautical miles of the Norwegian Coast.
iii. Operation in the Aegean Sea north of Crete.
iv. Operation in the French national exercise areas.
(b) The required VDS/DTAS NOTE is to be sent to the appropriate SMAA at least 48 hours
before commencing the operation. Upon receipt of the VDS/DTAS NOTE, the SMAA is to send a
message to the originator of the VDS/DTAS NOTE confirming that there is no safety hazard. If a
risk of collision between the VDAS/DTAS and a submarine is apparent, the SMAA will advise
those concerned and request that appropriate action be taken to eliminate the hazard. VDS and
DTAS are not to be streamed until the ship is in receipt of the SMAA confirmation message, except
as noted in paragraph (5).
(NR) (NMM) VDS/DTAS NOTE is sent using the message format in APP 4.
(c) Once the confirmation message is received, the ship may employ VDS/ DTAS in the active
or passive mode and no active sonar transmission or other warning signals are required.
(NC) (NMM) If the towing ship departs MHN and the system cannot be recovered, the towing
ship is to provide a warning signal on sonar or underwater telephone, as described in AXP 1, unless
otherwise specified by the SMAA.
(4) (NC) (NMM) A ship planning to stream a CATAS at depths greater than 30 meters (98 feet) is to
send a CATAS ADVISORY, using the message format in APP 4, to the appropriate SMAA at least 48
hours before commencement of the operation. Upon the receipt of the CATAS ADVISORY, the SMAA
is to send a reply to the originator of the CATAS ADVISORY acknowledging receipt. In the acknowl-
edgement, the SMAA may include advice on other units conducting surveillance in the area or advice on
best placement of the sensor for minimizing mutual interference and avoiding duplication of effort.
Upon receipt of the acknowledgement, and after considering the SMAA’s advice, the ship may stream
its CATAS as stated in the CATAS ADVISORY. If the towing ship departs the CATAS ADVISORY
area and the system cannot be recovered, the towing ship is to provide warning on sonar or underwater
telephone, as described in the Sonar Signal Code Table of AXP 1, at least once every 5 minutes unless
otherwise specified by the SMAA.
(5) (NC) (NMM) Urgent Contact Investigation. When a ship is required to conduct an urgent
investigation and time does not permit completion of the procedures in paragraphs (3) and (4) above,
VDS/DTAS or CATAS may be used but a VDS/DTAS NOTE or CATAS ADVISORY should be dis-
patched by IMMEDIATE precedence message. The initial submarine contact report to national or
6-113 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO authorities must contain a statement that VDS/DTAS or CATAS is being employed. During in-
vestigation of unclassified contacts, ships streaming towed acoustic devices should not deliberately
close the contact within 4,000 yards. When a contact has been classified as ”not a NATO or known
friendly” submarine by the appropriate SUBOPAUTHs, investigation forces should employ all acous-
tic devices in a manner to exploit their maximum capability for contact investigation. When a contact
has been classified as ”a NATO or known friendly” submarine, unless otherwise instructed, the ship is
to break contact.
(6) (NC) (NMM) Wartime Procedures.
(a) VDS/DTAS NOTES and CATAS ADVISORIES are not required provided wartime
procedures have been implemented and Waterspace Management (WSM) procedures are in force.
(See Articles 6734 through 6736 and 6774).
(b) The use of VDS/DTAS or CATAS systems is unrestricted in ASWFAs.
(c) Surface ships passing through an SAA or JTAA (other than one established for their use)
must retrieve their VDS/DTAS systems unless GRASSHOPPER is in force. In a CATAS system
that is considered a hazard to certain classes of submarine, the SUBOPAUTH will advise of any
requirement to retrieve CATAS. CATAS-fitted ships must recognize the possibility of damage or
loss unless the system is retrieved.
(d) The restrictions in subparagraph (c) above also apply to surface ships in a JTAA
established for their use, unless clearance has been received from the SUBOPAUTH. The use of
VDS/DTAS or CATAS systems and any restrictions that may apply should be negotiated between
the surface force commander and the SUBOPAUTH when a JTAA is established.
6-114 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
PART II
Warfare Procedures
Chapter 7 — Antiair Warfare (AAW)
Chapter 8 — Antisurface Warfare
Chapter 9 — Antisubmarine Warfare
Chapter 10 — Defense of Shipping
Chapter 11 — Amphibious Warfare
Chapter 12 — NBC Warfare
Chapter 13 — Mine Warfare
Chapter 14 — Defense Against Underwater

Attack in Harbor
XLVII (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 7
Antiair Warfare (AAW)
7000 INTRODUCTION
Antiair warfare (AAW) consists of those measures taken to defend a maritime force against attack
by airborne weapons, launched from aircraft, ships, submarines, and land-based sites. AAW procedures
used by a naval force at sea when operating in isolation from shore air defense authorities are described in
this chapter. However, when ships are operating beneath or adjacent to an established Air Defense Region
(ADR), they are to coordinate their AAW operations with those of the appropriate Combined Air Opera-
tions Center (CAOC) or Sector Operations Center (SOC).
(NR) (NMM) Employment of the Coordinated Air/Sea Procedures for Air Defense (CASP) is de-
scribed in ATP 34. Principles of AAW operations are contained in ATP 31; see also ATP 34. Voice report-
ing procedures are set forth in APP 1.
NOTE
In some coastal areas low-level transit routes (LLTR) and transit corridors (TC) that serve for
coordinating air traffic and AD/AAW represent weapons-tight zones for surface units, when
activated. TC and LLTR are temporary air corridors of defined dimensions through the area of
organic, low-level air defenses of surface forces.
(NR) (NMM) Details are in ATP 40, ATP 31, and respective NATO commanders airspace con-
trol plans.
7001 COMMAND AND CONTROL IN ANTIAIR WARFARE
The OTC’s functions in antiair warfare, including those that may be delegated to the Antiair War-
fare Commander (AAWC), are summarized in Table 1-2. When operating with a small force, the OTC will
normally retain most of his command functions; when operating with a larger force, the OTC will normally
delegate most of his command functions to the AAWC. Irrespective of any specific AAW duties that may
have been assigned to him, the commanding officer of each ship is responsible for the defense of his ship.
The threat, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and TF/TG communications and control capabilities will
determine whether or not the OTC executes centralized control or decentralized control. In general, effec-
tive AAW is facilitated by decentralized control when faced with a modern threat equipped with both
high-speed ASSMs and an ECM capability. The high-speed air threat and severe electronic warfare envi-
ronment significantly compresses air defense reaction time. This, coupled with lack of assured communi-
cations, requires that AAW be executed in a decentralized manner once the battle is joined.
Prior to battle, preplanned responses are developed that must be consistent with any applicable
ROE. These preplanned responses are contained in the OPTASK AAW and form the basis of decentralized
execution.
7002 SECTOR AAW COORDINATOR
If the tactical situation dictates that the AAW area should be divided into sectors, a sector AAW co-
ordinator (SAAWC) may be designated. Within his sector, an SAAWC will be subject to the overriding
authority (VETO) of the AAWC, but is otherwise vested with most of the prerogatives and responsibili-
ties of the AAWC.
7-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a. Direction Functions.
(1) Designating local AAW coordinators (LAAWCs).
(2) Assigning AAW aircraft to appropriate units for control.
(3) Initiating action against an air threat, if no action has been initiated by other units in his sector.
(4) Exercising overriding authority (VETO) over all actions initiated by other units in his sector.
b. Coordination Functions.
(1) Resolving with other SAAWCs problems of coordination on or near the border lines between
sectors, to ensure the efficient change of reporting responsibility and to avoid mutual interference.
(2) Coordinating the effective employment of aircraft and missiles within his sector.
c. Control Function. Controlling the AAW communication nets within his sector.
d. Additional Duties.
(1) Requesting the launch of land-based alert aircraft if no carrier is allocated to his sector.
(2) Keeping the AAWC informed of evaluated threats, and of the location of friendlies that could be
mistaken as hostile.
(3) Issuing SITREPs for the benefit of the units in his sector.
7003 LOCAL AAW COORDINATOR
When two or more ships are in company and within UHF range, a local AAW coordinator
(LAAWC) will be designated. The AAWC of a force will normally act as the LAAWC for his own local
group. LAAWCs have the following functions:
(1) Delegating, as appropriate, specified functions to other ships in his local AAW group.
(2) Establishing watch zones for ships in his group.
(3) Broadcasting the local air picture to ships of the group on the local AAW coordination net.
(1) Correlating and evaluating reports from ships in company and, where appropriate, relaying this
information to the SAAWC or AAWC on the AAW coordination net.
(2) Issuing threat warnings: if the threat to the group warrants a higher warning than that in effect
for the force, the LAAWC is to keep the SAAWC or AAWC informed.
(3) Passing pertinent information to ships of the group regarding missile engagement zones, weap-
ons restriction orders, safety sectors, and targets that have been designated to force weapon systems.
c. Control Function. Controlling the local AAW coordination net.
7-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
7004 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR — AIR
The AAWC or SAAWC is normally responsible for air reporting and track coordination within the
force or sector respectively; he may assign this duty to another, more suitably equipped ship, if required, as
force track coordinator — air (FTC-A). Responsibilities are found in Article 6313.
7005 INDIVIDUAL SHIP RESPONSIBILITIES
The following individual responsibilities always apply.
a. Self-Defense. Each commanding officer is responsible for the defense of his ship. When his
ship is under direct attack, qualifying orders, directives, or plans from higher authority do not relieve him
of this basic responsibility.
b. Degree of Readiness. Each commanding officer is responsible for establishing an appropri-

ate degree of readiness within his ship. The degree of readiness he sets must not be lower, but may be
higher, than that ordered by the OTC. The ship’s organization must ensure the proper maintenance of the
ordered readiness for as long as it is in force.
c. Reporting. Subject to any restrictions imposed by the EMCON plan, each unit is responsible
for reporting promptly to the appropriate antiair warfare commander or coordinator all AAW information
that may be of local, sector, or force interest, including any deficiencies of equipment.
d. Initiation of AAW Measures. Each unit is responsible for initiating AAW measures without
delay, whenever available information indicates the necessity of such action.
7010 STATIONING ANTIAIR WARFARE UNITS
Although AAW requirements normally call for dispersion, other considerations, such as antisubma-
rine warfare, mutual support, and emission policy, are likely to indicate the need for using a closer forma-
tion, disposition, or screen. In any operations, the OTC will invariably have to reach an optimum
compromise between all requirements to meet the prevailing threats. AAW units are stationed on true bear-
ings irrespective of the direction of the AAW axis. AAW stations are promulgated by means of the
OPTASK AAW message. Further details on stationing are in Chapter 3.
7011 (NR) (NMM) DISPERSION
Dispersion has the following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages
(1) Provides defense in depth.
(2) Makes the enemy’s recognition task difficult.
(3) Increases the coverage of sensors.
(4) Reduces the number of ships liable to damage by a single nuclear explosion.
(5) Provides good base lines for triangulation.
(6) When disposed upthreat, AAW forces are in a position to engage enemy bombers prior to mis-
sile release.
7-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Disadvantages
(1) Requires the use of long-range communications, which are vulnerable to jamming, intrusion,
and interception.
(2) Provides less effective defense against surface and subsurface threats.
(3) Increases the difficulty of maintaining gridlock.
(4) Increases the difficulty of weapons coordination.
7012 SURFACE PICKETS
(a) Picket ships are stationed primarily to extend the range of AAW measures. Surface pickets
are normally stationed to extend as far as practicable the AAW surveillance area, recognition/identi-
fication, and control of aircraft.
(b) (NC) (NMM) An additional advantage is that the surface picket may be able to engage
enemy bombers prior to ASSM release.
(c) When the number of pickets is not sufficient for all round coverage, stations on or near an
arc across the threat axis may be used to give effective detection capability in the threatened sector.
When attacks from only one general direction are likely, a second picket line closer in may be used,
in lieu of greater all round protection.
(d) A picket whose main task is AAW is called a Watchdog. A picket that has been given the
primary duty concerning the identification of friendly aircraft is called a Tomcat.
7013 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Carrier formations and dispositions are described in Chapter 3. Carrier and carrier air operations are
detailed in Chapter 6.
7014 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SHIPS
a. General. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are divided into three categories according to range:
(1) Long-range — range over 50 nm.
(2) Medium-range — range of 10 to 50 nm.
(3) Short-range — range under 10 nm.
b. Stationing. Antiair Warfare Disposition 3V, which includes stations for missile ships, is de-
scribed in Chapter 3.
(NC) (NMM) Otherwise, the following guidelines apply:
(1) Long-range SAM ships are normally stationed as far upthreat as will permit early detection and
engagement of enemy bombers. Long-range SAM ships have better engagement envelopes and better
probabilities of kill against bombers than against ASSMs.
(a) When stationed upthreat, ships may be teamed to increase AAW effectiveness and
ASW/ASUW self-defense capabilities. Alternate stations near the center of the force, or even
downthreat, may allow SAM ships to provide defense against high-level, steep-diving targets.
7-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Medium- and short-range SAM ships are normally stationed to protect a high value unit (HVU),
such as a carrier or a logistics or amphibious ship. Distance from the supported unit may be up to 10 nm,
and is dependent on the capability of the SAM system. A SAM ship should be given freedom of move-
ment to protect the unit from the most immediate threat.
7015 UNITS WITH SELF-DEFENSE WEAPONS
Ships equipped with self-defense weapons only must be stationed close to each other to provide mu-
tual support. This may be the only means of defending a force that lacks both fighter and missile defenses.
Such formations should be limited to small groups when used in a nuclear environment or under conditions
in which dispersed or deceptive formations provide a better defense. These ships also have the ability to
contribute to the AAW defense of a force against certain missile flight profiles, if they are stationed as close
as possible to the unit(s) being protected. Antiair Disposition 2V (Chapter 3) may be appropriate in this
instance.
7020 ANTIAIR WARFARE AIRCRAFT
AAW aircraft may be either land based or carrier based and, depending on the tactical situation, may
be ordered to be at ground or deck alert or on combat air patrol (CAP). Land-based aircraft in particular will
often be supported by tanker aircraft for air-to-air refueling (AAR) and should be stationed on a towline
promulgated in the OPTASK AAW.
(NR) (NMM) Details of types of AAW aircraft and their capabilities are in ATP 29. More informa-
tion about them and their interrelated roles is in ATP 31. ATP 34 gives details concerning land-based
aircraft.
7021 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AIRCRAFT
a. Capabilities. AEW aircraft are well suited for long-range detection and tracking of both high-
and low-altitude aircraft, for CAP control, and for surface search. Suitably equipped aircraft can also relay
communications (AUTOCAT), transmit information by data link, and intercept electromagnetic
emissions.
b. Stationing.
(1) AEW aircraft are stationed as directed by the OTC or AAWC in a barrier patrol line.
(2) (NR) (NMM) Points to consider when stationing AEW aircraft are listed in ATP 31.
(3) (NC) (NMM) The AEW barrier for older AEW aircraft is about 50 nm from ZZ at an altitude
up to 5,000 feet, so that a 90° sector will be covered. For modern AEW aircraft, distance from the force
can be up to 200 nm and the aircraft can be operated at altitudes of 20,000 to 30,000 feet to provide opti-
mum search, track, and height-finding capability. Normally, AEW aircraft should be given freedom to
select altitude and track on the barrier to optimize sensor employment.
c. Procedures.
(1) Call signs for AEW aircraft consist of daily changing call signs or the code word, ANY FACE,
followed by the barrier designator. Barrier designators are TANGO, UNIFORM, VICTOR, XRAY,
YANKEE, and ZULU. When a relieving AEW aircraft is airborne before its predecessor has landed, the
call sign must include a numeral suffix (i.e., ANY FACE TANGO is relieved by ANY FACE TANGO
ONE, which in turn is relieved by ANY FACE TANGO).
(2) (NR) (NMM) AEW aircraft report contacts in accordance with ATP 34.
7-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. Capability of Other Aircraft.
(1) Modern CAP aircraft with extended radar ranges should be considered an AEW sensor, particu-
larly during periods when AEW aircraft are not airborne.
(2) However, intense and sophisticated enemy ECM may severely degrade/negate modern CAP
detection capabilities.
7022 COMBAT AIR PATROL MANAGEMENT
a. General. CAP aircraft can be either land based or carrier based. Instructions in this article on
the use of CAP aircraft are applicable generally, but details given in this article concern carrier-based CAP
aircraft only. CAP missions can be more precisely identified when one of the following modifiers is used
before the CAP: force CAP (FORCECAP), barrier CAP (BARCAP), target CAP (TARCAP), rescue CAP
(RESCAP), and surveillance CAP (SUCAP). CAP aircraft employed in the AAW role are normally re-
ferred to as force CAP (FORCECAP).
(NR) (NMM) For details concerning land-based CAP aircraft, see ATP 34.
b. Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC)/CAP Instructions. The following points

are to be considered with respect to CAP aircraft during AAW operations:
(1) The OTC or AAWC will direct the AREC to maintain an alert posture and fill assigned CAP sta-
tions. CAP aircraft will relieve on station or within a specified distance of station.
(2) The AREC must keep the OTC or AAWC informed of the ability to maintain alert posture.
Weather, maintenance, or deck respotting operations may degrade alert posture.
(3) Alert CAP aircraft will be launched on assigned control frequencies to expedite stationing
and/or intercept of assigned raids.
(4) CAP aircraft proceed to and return from assigned stations within safety sectors or on return to
force (RTF) or minimum risk route (MRR) profiles. Positive control must be maintained to avoid en-
gagements by friendly units, especially when the safety sector is near or traverses missile engagement
zones or missile arcs. Provision should be made for deviation to expedite stationing and facilitate
prompt intercept action.
(5) EMCON permitting, carriers will track CAP aircraft operating within their radar coverage but
controlled by other ships, so that they can take over control if necessary.
(6) Parent carriers of CAP aircraft controlled by other units are to ensure that the controlling unit
knows the time, location, and altitude at which the parent carrier wishes the aircraft to be returned to her
control for recovery.
(7) Units controlling another carrier’s aircraft are to pass aircraft status reports to the parent carrier
as soon as they are received from CAP aircraft. CAP aircraft must pass this information immediately on
gaining contact with the controlling unit.
c. CAP Aircraft Stations. CAP aircraft should be stationed to engage enemy bombers prior to
their anticipated weapons release point.
(NR) (NMM) CAP aircraft are listed in ATP 31.
(1) CAP aircraft may be stationed by the OTC or AAWC at the following altitude bands:
(a) High (HICAP) — above 25,000 feet.
7-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Medium (MEDIUMCAP) — between 5,000 and 25,000 feet.
(c) Low (LOWCAP) — between 500 and 5,000 feet.
(2) Distance of CAP stations from the main body may vary from overhead to 200 nm. Any combi-
nation of altitudes and distance is possible. However:
(a) The radial size of sector covered by a fighter decreases as its distance from the main body
increases.
(b) Stationing at long range reduces overall fighter availability due to loss of time in transit and
short time on station.
(c) When employing modern fighters that have a high rate of climb, low and close CAP sta-
tions should generally be preferred, especially when the direction of the threat cannot be
determined.
d. Procedures. The following procedures are used to control CAP aircraft:
(1) CAP voice call signs will be used as follows:
(a) On CAP control nets, use the squadron call plus a three-number suffix.
(b) On AAW nets, use the word STATION, followed by the station number.
(c) Airborne CAP aircraft steering, or whose relief has been launched, will be reported as
STEERED plus station number. The launched relief will assume the station call.
(d) CAP aircraft in alert will be given stations by the OTC or AAWC, whether or not there is
any immediate prospect of launching. Call signs are to be based on these stations using the proce-
dure in subparagraph (b).
(2) The OTC or AAWC may delegate control of CAP stations to an AAW air control unit
(AAWACU). This designation is passed on the AAW coordination net.
(3) CAP stations will be assigned using the following systems:
(a) ZZ Method.
i. Station number.
ii. Bearing of the station.
iii. Distance in nautical miles from ZZ.
iv. Minimum altitude in hundreds of feet (or using the words HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW).
v. Control channel numbers (primary/alternate).
For example, CAP station 2 is to be in a position that is 060 degrees true, 50 nautical miles dis-
tant from ZZ, and at an altitude of over 25,000 feet. The primary control frequency is channel 12 and
channel 8 is the alternate. This station would be passed as: STATION 2 — 060ZZ50 — 250 — 12/8.
7-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) VL Method. In order to simplify AAW reporting, a standard grid origin has been adopted.
The center point of the grid (VL) is a reference point specified by the CWC/AAWC. VL should al-
ways be defined as a geographic point (latitude and longitude). However, a surface tacan can also be
positioned at VL as a navigation aid for non-INS equipped aircraft. If VL is defined only by a tacan,
long-range CAP may have difficulties maintaining station due to intermittent tacan reception. The
grid is oriented to magnetic north with distance from VL made by letter notation. Fifty (50) nm
from VL is designated ALFA, 100 nm from VL is BRAVO, etc. The bearing is designated by a num-
ber from 01 through 36 representing a bearing in degrees magnetic. The bearing 010 is designated
01, 110 is 11, 260 is 26, etc. With this as a basis, any CAP station can be readily identified by a num-
ber and a letter. For example, CAP station 010 at 250 nm from VL is designated station “ONE
ECHO.” This grid reference system provides a simple means of position both for friendly aircraft
and enemy targets.
(4) Units controlling CAP aircraft are to report to the OTC or AAWC the following information on
intercepts:
(a) Immediately, when initiating an interception.
(b) Progress of interception.
(c) If, for some reason, it appears doubtful that the interception can be successfully completed
within the fighter engagement zone (FEZ).
(d) Immediately, if the interception fails.
7023 ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT
Electronic warfare aircraft can be either land based, carrier based, or ship based. The primary func-
tion of these aircraft is to provide electronic warfare support measures (ESM) and electronic countermea-
sures (ECM) support to the force, as defined in Article 5101. Coordination of the EW capabilities of these
aircraft is normally exercised by the OTC through the Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC).
7024 AIRCRAFT AUTHENTICATION ON AAW NETS
Excessive use of authentication with single-seat aircraft is to be avoided. Authentication is recommended

over challenge and reply methods as it can be accomplished easily and quickly. For further details, see Chapter 4.
7030 ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMUNICATIONS
Details are in Chapter 4.
7040 ANTIAIR WARFARE COORDINATION
The cardinal principles of AAW organization — to ensure the quickest possible response to any
threat — are:
(1) Decentralized control to the lowest possible level, and the use of preplanned reactions and re-
sponses contained in the OPTASK AAW.
(2) Control by VETO, exercised by a commander/coordinator, who may apply a veto to an action
initiated by a subordinate unit.
7-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) The integration of fighters, SAM ships, AEW and EW aircraft, and measures to counter enemy
targeting to provide defense in depth.
The degree of decentralized control depends on the situation. When operating in a confined area, in
an area of joint operations, or in an area where neutral units may be encountered, the AAWC may have to
retain centralized control.
Examples of how the AAWC may control the air battle are given below.
a. Control by VETO. An example of control by veto is:
“This is (call sign) TAKING HOSTILE 3456 with STATION 4.”
“This is (call sign of AAWC) NEGAT HOSTILE 3456.”
b. Engagement Order. If the AAWC wishes a unit to engage a particular target, he is to issue an
engagement order; if the weapon to be used is a fighter, he is to state his intention to IDENTIFY or to DE-
STROY the target. For example:
“(Call sign) this is (call sign of AAWC) TAKE HOSTILE 1007 with STATION 3 and
DESTROY.”
c. MORE HELP. If the unit detailed to engage a raid cannot identify the target on radar or needs
further information, the unit calls for MORE HELP.
“This is (call sign) MORE HELP HOSTILE 1007.”
d. NOCAN. Any unit that cannot carry out the order of the AAWC is to say so, stating the reason:
“This is (call sign) STATION 3 NOCAN — STATE LAMB ZERO — OUT.”
“This is (call sign) STATION 3 NOCAN — WEAPONS ZERO — OUT.”
(NR) (NMM) The organization for AAW coordination with land-based aircraft is in ATP 34.
e. COVER. If the AAWC wishes a long- or medium-range SAM-equipped ship to initiate an en-
gagement on a specified track up to the point of firing, he can order this by “COVER.” This procedure al-
lows a track to be designated to more than one firing unit without multiple engagement of the track. For
example:
“(Call sign(s)) this is (call sign AAWC) COVER HOSTILE/FAKER 1234.”
“(Call sign) this is (call sign AAWC) TAKE HOSTILE/FAKER 1234 WITH BIRDS. (Call
sign(s)) COVER.”
7041 METHODS OF ANTIAIR WARFARE COORDINATION
Rules for the integration of fighters and SAMs in antiair warfare must:
(1) Minimize mutual interference.
(2) Prevent engagement between friendly units.
(3) Maximize weapon effectiveness.
7-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a. Area Coordination. Fighters, SAMs, and ECM are employed in the same airspace. The
AAWC and SAAWC resolve any conflict by ordering one or the other to hold off — or he may order spe-
cific engagements. This method is recommended for use against an enemy with little or no ECM capabil-
ity, when it is likely that a clear and coherent air picture can be maintained, communications are good, and
AAW coordination is of a high standard.
b. Zone Coordination. Fighters and SAMs are employed in separated zones of airspace, delin-
eated by sector, altitude, and range from an origin as appropriate. Normally, safety sectors and three types
of zone — missile engagement zone (MEZ), crossover zone, and fighter engagement zone (FEZ) — are
established (see Figure 7-1). They are promulgated by the AAWC and may be altered as necessary. The po-
sitions and shapes of the zones will depend on weapon characteristics, availability of aircraft, expenditure
of missiles, and disposition of units. ECM may be employed in all zones.
c. Promulgation. The method of coordination is normally promulgated by the OPTASK AAW.

An operation order may, in addition, specify jammer frequency restrictions and the circumstances under
which the method of weapon coordination is automatically changed. It is the responsibility of the AAWC
to ensure that forces involved are aware of the method of coordination in use. Procedural messages enable
the AAWC to establish, change, or give warning of a change of method, as in the following examples:
(1) Establish — “(Method) coordination is in force.”
(2) Change — “Cancel (method) coordination — assume (method) coordination.”
(3) Warning — “At (time) — cancel (method) coordination — (method) coordination will be
assumed.”
d. Local Coordination. Local coordination only applies to the employment of self- defense
SAMs, ECM, and guns; it is not an alternative to area or zone coordination. The LAAWC will compile and
promulgate the local air picture to specifically enable ships to identify friendly aircraft and prevent their
engagements by friendly units. No further attempt to coordinate weapons employment is normally made,
and target engagement messages for self-defense weapons systems are not required.
7042 MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE (MEZ)
a. Standard SAM MEZ. A MEZ will be established around a SAM ship. Under weapon control
status WEAPONS FREE, the ship is automatically cleared to fire at any target penetrating the MEZ, unless
known to be friendly or unless otherwise directed by the AAWC. Special features are:
(1) Friendly aircraft must not penetrate the MEZ unless positive clearance has been obtained from
the AAWC or LAAWC.
(2) Any change in status of a MEZ is promulgated to aircraft and friendly units by the AAWC using
the appropriate code words from APP 7/MPP 7.
b. Silent SAM MEZ. When covert, long- or medium-range, SAM-equipped ships are stationed
upthreat, a Silent SAM MEZ may be established; this has significant differences from the MEZ described
above. The key factors for ships operating a Silent SAM MEZ are:
(1) Ships remain covert, receiving the air picture via data links.
(2) Ships’ weapon control status is automatically WEAPONS FREE.
(3) The OPTASK AAW will contain details of MEZ size, position, and timing.
7-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
FIGHTER
ENGAGEMENT MISSILE ARC
ZONE
CROSS OVER
ZONE
CROSS OVER
ZONE
MISSILE
ENGAGEMENT
MISSILE ZONE
ENGAGEMENT 15 NM
ZONE 30 NM
FIGHTER
60 NM ENGAGEMENT
MED RANGE ZONE
75 NM SAM SHIP
LONG RANGE
SAM SHIP
SAFETY
SECTOR
Figure 7-1. Example of Zone Coordination
(4) No safety sectors are established in a Silent SAM MEZ.
(5) No friendly aircraft are allowed in the Silent SAM MEZ, except for AEW, ASW, and ASUW
aircraft that are required to operate in the Silent SAM MEZ, providing the following criteria are met:
(a) SAM ships must be alerted to the mission, the aircraft must be continuously tracked, and
their position transmitted on data link.
(b) Gridlock between the data-link reporting unit and SAM ship is excellent.
7043 CROSSOVER ZONE
A crossover zone normally extends 15 nm beyond the MEZ, but the width may be varied by the
AAWC and is usually based on the speed of the assumed threat. When a controller anticipates that an in-
fringement of a crossover zone may occur, he is to request a countdown. The fighter is to give a commen-
tary on the interception, indicating when it expects to complete. The controller will instruct the fighter to
break off if necessary, so that the target can be engaged by another weapon.
7044 FIGHTER ENGAGEMENT ZONE
Fighters have freedom of action within a FEZ to identify and engage air targets in accordance with
ROEs in force. If the AAWC wishes to engage a particular target in the FEZ with a long-range SAM, he is
7-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
to issue an engagement order assigning the target to a SAM system, ensuring that the fighter controlling
agency is so advised. When this order has been issued, a missile arc is automatically established.
7045 SAFETY SECTOR
A safety sector is defined by the AAWC and, when required, coordinated with the responsible ACA,
in terms of origin, range, center bearing, width, height band, time, and controlling agency. If more than one
safety sector is established, they should be numbered and designated. Safety sectors are normally dormant
and are activated by the AAWC.
7046 WATCH ZONES
When required, watch zones will be assigned to ships by the AAWC. Assignment of a watch zone
does not imply that the unit should not engage a target outside the sector, but that priority must be given to
surveillance and engagement within it.
7047 POSITIVE ECM CONTROL
When the necessity for concealing the presence of the force to the enemy is overriding, the OTC will
order positive control over ECM. Ships will wait for a specific order from the OTC, AAWC, or SAAWC to
employ ECM. This method applies only to area defense ECM and not to self-defense. See also Chapter 5.
7048 MISSILE ARC
This is established automatically when an engagement order has been issued assigning a target in the
FEZ to a SAM system. Unless otherwise ordered by the AAWC, the missile arc is 10° wide, centered on the
bearing of the target, and extends to the maximum range of the SAM.
7050 SPECIAL ANTIAIR WARFARE REPORTS
7051 TYPES OF REPORT
There are four types of AAW reports:
(1) Air raid reports (see Article 6323).
(2) Target engagement messages (TEMs).
(3) Missile state reports.
(4) Ammunition state reports.
7052 TARGET ENGAGEMENT MESSAGES
TEMs are used between AAW units to report on the progress of the air battle, but are not required for
self-defense weapons.
(NR) (NMM) The various types of TEMs are given in APP 1.
a. Weapons Assignment Report. This report should be made to the AAWC as soon as possi-
ble after the target has been detected, preferably as part of the initial report. A change in assignment must
also be reported. The proword TAKING indicates that an assignment has been made. For example:
“This is (call sign) TAKING HOSTILE 1234 with STATION 2.”
7-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. HOSTILE (Track Number) BIRD TARGET. Used by the AAWC to designate a target to be
engaged by missiles.
c. HOSTILE (Track Number) CAP TARGET. Used by the AAWC to indicate that a target is a
primary target for CAP (CAP voice call may be specified).
d. BIRDS AFFIRM HOSTILE (Track Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that missile
radars are locked on to a particular target and that the target will pass within missile intercept range.
e. BIRDS AWAY HOSTILE (Track Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that missiles
have been fired.
f. BIRDS NEGAT HOSTILE (Track Number). Used by missile ships to indicate that it is not
possible to fire at a designated target (i.e., missile directors not locked on, or engaged on other targets, or
targets did not come within missile range).
g. ROMAN CANDLE (Coordinates). A warning transmitted over all voice reporting nets and
aircraft guard circuits that a nuclear missile is about to be exploded in the area indicated.
h. CANYON AFFIRM (Track Number). Used by a ship fitted with a jammer to indicate that
designated target is being jammed.
i. HOSTILE (Track Number) SPLASHED. Used to indicate that the raid designated is be-
lieved to be destroyed.
j. HEADS UP HOSTILE (Track Number). Used to indicate that action by reporting unit against
target in question has ceased for one of the following reasons:
(1) When a previously reported engagement has been broken off prematurely (e.g., after shifting to
a more threatening target).
(2) If the interception is found to be impossible.
(3) At the end of an inconclusive engagement.
(4) When a SPLASHED message is shown to be untrue.
k. SALVO HOSTILE (Track Number). Means “about to engage with Birds,” and is used by a
SAM ship when it is threatened by a target that is already being taken by a fighter and the ship intends to en-
gage the target with missiles. When this occurs, it is the responsibility of the ship about to open fire to warn
the unit controlling the fighter:
“This is (call sign) SALVO HOSTILE (TRACK NUMBER) COUNTDOWN SIXTY NOW (en-
gaging in 60 seconds).”
The fighter is to be hauled off in ample time to clear the missile shot and the controller is to pass the
fighter’s disengagement direction:
“This is (call sign) STATION 2 SCRAMMING NORTH.”
l. COVER. An order from the AAWC to a SAM-equipped ship to initiate an engagement on a spec-
ified track up to the point of firing. This procedure permits a track to be designated to more than one firing
unit without multiple engagement of the track.
7-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
7053 (NC) (NMM) MISSILE STATE REPORTS
To inform the OTC and AAWC of SAMs available, missile states are reported by means of SUGAR
reports, which are passed, without request, to the OTC and AAWC whenever the missile availability status
of any one type of missile is reduced by 25 percent of the total missiles carried. The OTC and AAWC may
also ask for current SUGAR states, by category or specific type, depending upon the requirement. The let-
ters provided in Table 7-1 are to be used.
7054 (NC) (NMM) AMMUNITION STATE REPORTS
Ammunition states are reported by means of CANDY reports, which are passed, without request, to
the OTC and AAWC whenever the ammunition or chaff is reduced by 50 percent of the total ammunition
carried. The OTC and AAWC may also ask for current CANDY states. The following letters are to be used:
A 15.2 cm
B 5 in/38
C 5 in/54
D 12 cm
E 4.5 in
F 100 mm
G 3 in/50
H 3 in/70
I 76 mm
J 57 mm
K 40 mm
L 30 mm
M 25 mm
N Chaff for confusion
P Chaff for distraction
Q Chaff for seduction
For example, a unit that has 48 percent of its 100 mm AA ammunition remaining would report:
“(OTC) this is (call sign) CANDY report — F48 over.”
For ASSM state reports, see Chapter 8.
7055 AIRCRAFT OPERATING REPORTS
The carrier or AAWACU is to make reports of the following to the OTC or AAWC on the appropri-
ate tactical net:
(1) Completion of the launch and call signs of the aircraft.
(2) Changes in alert states of CAP aircraft.
(3) When CAP aircraft are steered for recovery.
(4) When recovery is completed.
(5) When CAP aircraft are on station at altitude and under positive control.
(6) Progress of intercept.
7-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 7-1. (NU) (NMM) SAM State Reports
RANGE CATEGORY TYPE DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES

LETTER LETTER
LONG X A Standard - 2 - Extended Range 1. The OTC, requiring the
numbers of long- and
B medium-range missiles
left in the force, signals:
C
D (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
Sign) INTERROGATIVE
E SUGAR XRAY YANKEE
OVER.
A particular ship, with 16

MEDIUM Y F Terrier HTR Standard - 2 - Extended-
G Terrier BT Range and 20 Standard - 2
- Medium-Range missiles,
H Terrier BTN signals the OTC:
I Tartar (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call

Sign) SUGAR REPORT
J Standard - 2 - Medium Range ALFA ONE SIX TACK
JULIET TWO ZERO
K Standard - 1 - Extended Range OVER.
L Standard - 1 - Medium Range
2. The AAWC, requiring a
M Standard ARM particular ship to report
the number of Sea Dart
N Sea Dart missiles remaining,
signals:
O Masurca
P Sea Slug 2 (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
Sign) INTERROGATIVE
Q SUGAR NOVEMBER
OVER.
R
The ship, with 14 Sea Dart
missiles remaining, replies:
SHORT Z S Point Defense Missiles (Call Sign) THIS IS (Call
T Sign) SUGAR REPORT
NOVEMBER ONE FOUR
OVER.
NOTE: Blanks provided are for the OTC’s use for additional missiles if desired.
7060 ANTISHIP MISSILE DEFENSE
7061 INTRODUCTION
a. Defense Against Missile Attack. This is an integral part of maritime warfare. ASMD is
taken to cover preparation for tactics and actions required, once the threat of pending missile attack has
been evaluated. ASMD includes hard- and soft-kill measures that must not only be timely, coordinated,
and executed, but continuously evaluated in response to new technology and equipment. ASMD doctrine
is contained in ATP 31. Procedures for the promulgation, coordination, and execution of countermeasures
are set forth in Articles 7062 through 7070.
(NR) (NMM) Instructions and examples for voice procedures are given in APP 1.
7-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Coordinated Missile Attacks. These may be expected from various platforms, possibly dis-
persed in azimuth, the attack consisting of waves or salvos of either the same or different types of missile.
In addition, ECM from the launching platform or from other assisting forces is likely to be used against
own sensors and tactical communications.
c. Considerations for ASMD. The best defense against ASSMs is the neutralization of the
launch or targeting platform(s) before missile release. The following criteria must be considered in defense
against the missile threat.
(1) Disposition and stationing considerations.
(2) Employment of AAW assets.
(3) Detection and determining type of attack.
(4) Use of sensors and EMCON.
(5) Selection of ASMD countermeasures.
(6) Coordination of ASMD reactions.
(7) Planned ASMD reactions.
(8) Promulgation of ASMD reactions.
(9) Execution of ASMD reactions.
7062 DISPOSITION AND STATIONING CONSIDERATIONS
The force’s disposition needs to strike the right balance between hard- and soft-kill weapons in order
to achieve the optimum effectiveness between these systems. Care must be taken, when stationing ships, to
avoid or minimize mutual interference between jammers, chaff, and all other weapon systems.
7063 EMPLOYMENT OF AAW ASSETS
a. Surface Units. The guidance given in Article 7014 should be followed.
b. Aircraft. Airborne assets can be specifically employed as follows:
(1) AEW/CAP Aircraft. AEW and CAP aircraft are normally airborne while the force is in a
threat area. CAP and AEW aircraft should be stationed at the best altitude, as determined by mission as-
signment, sea state, weather, and aircraft type.
(2) Reconnaissance and Attack Aircraft. These aircraft should be deployed to detect and de-
stroy the targeting and launch platform(s).
(3) ESM Aircraft. Aircraft with ESM equipment should be tasked to provide additional early
warning and detection of launch platforms and missiles.
(4) (NC) (NMM) ECM Aircraft.
(a) If only one ECM aircraft is available, it should be stationed overhead. In this position the
force will receive minimum electronic interference and maximum jammer power will be available
to confuse and/or distract the ASSM.
7-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. If additional ECM aircraft are available, they should be stationed 45° off the threat axis, or
stationed overhead if the axis cannot be defined. The aircraft stationed 45° off the threat axis should
primarily be tasked to jam launch platform sensors and command links. The aircraft stationed over-
head should also jam missile homing radars.
(5) Helicopters. Helicopters can be employed for reconnaissance or, for those suitably equipped,
they can either destroy lightly defended launch platforms or jam their sensors or missile homing radars.
7064 DETECTING AND DETERMINING TYPES OF ATTACK
a. Early Warning of Missile-Launching Platforms. This is of vital importance to ensure the

timely initiation of suitable defense measures. In this context, electronic warfare must be considered
carefully.
b. Target/Threat Radars. The interception of electronic emissions will normally be the first in-
dication of the enemy. Those radar frequencies that are known to be surveillance or fire control radars of
missile carriers, thus presenting an immediate threat, should be watched continuously. Careful ESM task-
ing is required, including the determination of threat radars, and hence the types of missile to be expected
(see Chapter 5).
7065 USE OF SENSORS AND EMCON
The policy for using active sensors must be matched carefully with ESM tasking to provide maxi-
mum warning and minimum interference to ESM equipment. The antiradiation missile (ARM) threat
must also be considered. Careful EMCON will also deny the enemy target information.
7066 SELECTING ASMD COUNTERMEASURES
a. ASMD Countermeasures. These comprise formation and ship maneuvers, hard- and
soft-kill weapons, and changes in EMCON.
b. Soft-Kill Weapons. The following selection of soft-kill weapons contributes to ASMD.
(1) Jammers.
(a) Noise Jammers. Noise jammers are to be used against the most dangerous targets in the
order of missile head, target indication radar, and reconnaissance radar. The maximum number of
available jammers should always be used.
(b) Deception Jammers. “Blip enhancers” are tasked by the OTC and may be employed
against surveillance radars in conjunction with deceptive stationing or decoy groups. Other decep-
tion repeaters are used for self-defense at units’ own discretion, generally against missile homing
head and tracking radars. The OTC should station them so as to prevent deceived missiles from
homing on friendly units in their vicinity. Where possible, the transfer of a missile’s homing radar
lock should be made onto a false target.
(2) Chaff.
(a) Chaff for Confusion. CHAFF C is used to delay target selection by enemy search/ac-
quisition radars by confusing operators.
(b) Chaff for Distraction. CHAFF D is used to deceive initial lock-on by the missile
radar head.
7-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Chaff for Seduction. CHAFF S is used to transfer the missile homing head lock-on
from target ship to chaff.
(3) Decoys.
(a) Radar Decoys. Radar reflectors are used to confuse or distract enemy reconnaissance,
target indication, and missile homing radars. They can be employed in anchorage and laying-up po-
sitions by pre-positioning or deployment from ships.
(b) Infrared Decoys. IR decoys are used for distraction and/or seduction. IR devices are de-
graded by those atomospheric conditions that hinder visibility (i.e., fog, rain, smoke, etc.).
7067 COORDINATING ASMD REACTIONS
a. Introduction. To assist in the timely coordination and execution of ASMD, a system of

planned reactions is necessary to supplement AAW procedures. These are made automatically, collec-
tively, and/or individually by units and depend on rapidity and simplicity.
(1) Initiation. ASMD reactions are initiated by the code word ZIPPO, followed by a number or let-
ter to indicate the type of attack and the reaction required.
(NR) (NMM) The criteria for determining the type of attack on which ZIPPOs are called are de-
tailed in Table 7-2.
(2) ZIPPO Area. The area within which all units react to the same ZIPPO is called the ZIPPO area.
Unless otherwise ordered, it is a circle having a radius of 20 nm from ZZ, or from the center of a detached
force. However, under certain circumstances, it may be necessary to select a large area, which should be
promulgated in the OPTASK AAW.
b. Command and Control Responsibilities. The command and control organization required
to order and execute planned responses within the overall command structure is set forth in Chapter 1.
(1) Certain ASMD functions may be delegated to the AAWC as shown in Table 1-2.
(2) The OTC is to coordinate all ASMD reactions within his ZIPPO area. When one force ap-
proaches another, OTCs are to coordinate the ASMD reactions of their forces by dialogue under estab-
lished principles.
(3) A commander of detached units should be delegated ASMD responsibilities as far as his detach-
ment is concerned.
7068 (NC) (NMM) PLANNING ASMD REACTIONS
a. ASMD reactions must be considered well in advance of any operation in order that they can be
understood and practiced. The OTC or commanding officer must be fully aware of all of the hard- and
soft-kill capabilities in his group or ship and other factors that will enable him to produce an optimized
ASMD plan. Whilst by no means comprehensive, the list below is provided for guidance during ASMD
planning. Different circumstances and ship system fits will determine which factors are applicable, and
may generate additional considerations.
(1) Threat.
(a) Type(s) of missile threat.
(b) Threat axis/sector.
7-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 7-2. (NU) (NMM) Criteria for Calling ZIPPOs
ZIPPO MISSILE THREAT GROUP CRITERIA
C Counter-targeting against all threats (1) ESM detection of radar associated with an
enemy target reporting unit (TRU) or any ev-
idence of targeting (e.g., data links,
communications).
(2) ESM detection of any radar assessed as

providing target information (TI) to a mis-
sile-firing platform or coastal missile battery
when ships are within range.
(3) Detection of armed enemy missile-firing air-

craft.
(4) Detection of surface missile-firing platforms

inside or close to their maximum missile
launch range.
(5) Detection of enemy shore battery preparing

to fire when ships are within range.
(6) Observation of heavy ECM, particularly

when intelligence suggests association with
enemy air activity or the presence of a sur-
face/subsurface missile platform within
missile launch range.
(7) ESM detection of multiple airborne TI radars.
(8) An assessment by the OTC/AAWC that a

missile attack is likely.
1 Longer range air-launched active and antiradiation Any evidence of a Group 1 missile in flight.
missiles that lock-on before launch. (Group 1)
2 Longer range surface- and subsurface-launched Any evidence of a Group 2 missile in flight.
missiles that normally require third-party targeting.
(Group 2)
3 Missiles that lock-on after launch and employ ac- Any evidence of a Group 3 missile in flight or
tive seekers or infrared (IR) homing with range ESM detection of a TI radar associated with a
gates that are susceptible to range-gate capture Group 3 missile launch platform.
(RGC). (Group 3)
4 Missiles that lock-on after launch whose active Any evidence of a Group 4 missile in flight or an
seekers are less susceptible to RGC. (Group 4) ESM detection of a TI radar associated with a
Group 4 missile launch platform.
5 Shorter range (tactical) air-launched antiradiation Any evidence of a Group 5 missile in flight or an
or electro-optically guided missiles. (Group 5) ESM detection of a TI radar associated with a
Group 5 missile launch platform.
6 Missiles that use command line-of-sight (CLOS) Any evidence of a Group 6 missile in flight or an
guidance and/or IR terminal homing, including ESM detection of a TI radar associated with a
surface-to-surface (SASS) capability. (Group 6) Group 6 missile launch platform.
U Unidentified Immediate countermeasures for unidentified mis-

sile threats within 100 nm.
7-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Secondary threats (e.g., mines).
(2) Warning Time.
(a) Intelligence support.
(b) AEW aircraft availability and capability.
(c) ESM coverage (N.B. SATCOM policy).
(3) Environment.
(a) Physical environment (e.g., proximity to land, sea room).
(b) Meteorological conditions.
(c) Electronic environment.
(4) Hard-kill Capability.
(a) Air defense aircraft availability and capability.
(b) Ship(s) weapon and sensor arcs.
(c) Long- and medium-range SAM-equipped ship capabilities.
(5) Soft-kill Capability.
(a) Tactical deception capabilities (e.g., disposition, false targets, simulators).
(b) Ship signatures.
(c) Decoy fits.
(d) Jammer capabilities.
(6) Operational Considerations/Constraints.
(a) EMCON.
(b) Mission.
(c) Maneuverability of HVUs.
(d) ASW versus AAW screen disposition conflicts (e.g., balance of threat).
b. Table 7-3 sets out the established ZIPPO calls and allows space for listing appropriate reactions
associated with the criteria in Table 7-2. It is structures to allow any procedures to be ordered. ATP 55 also
contains Table 7-3, listing possible ASMD reactions. It can be used as a working table.
7-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 7-3. (NU) (NMM) ASMD Reactions
COL ASMD REACTIONS ZC Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 ZU

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
ZA
ZB
ZC
ZD
ZE
ZF
ZG
ZH
ZJ
ZK
ZL
ZM
ZN
7-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
7069 (NC) (NMM) PROMULGATING ASMD REACTIONS
a. ZIPPO Reaction Table.
(1) To promulgate the ZIPPO Reaction Table, the OTC may distribute a completed Table 7-3, sep-
arately or with an OPORD.
(2) (NR) (NMM) Also, the OTC may refer to the working table in ATP 55 and signal the desired
reactions as described in paragraph b below.
b. Signaling the Relevant Data. When signaling the relevant data for completing Table 7-3, or
for amendments, use the following format:
(1) ZIPPO reactions should be promulgated in this order:
(a) ZIPPO number or letter.
(b) Column letter(s) in alphabetical sequence.
(c) (NR) (NMM) Specific reaction (if different from the working table in ATP 55).
(2) Example: Z1—A—B—D—K—L.
c. Changes. The OTC may modify the ASMD Reaction Table using an authenticated voice trans-
mission. This should be acknowledged and followed by a confirming signal.
d. Amplification. The OTC should include any amplification to the force reactions in an Inten-
tions Signal or similar message.
7070 (NC) (NMM) EXECUTING ASMD REACTIONS
a. Initiation.
(1) ZIPPOs. ZIPPOs 1 to 6 and U may be initiated by any surface unit when the criteria from Table
7-2 are met. Only one authority may initiate ZIPPO C. This is normally the AAWC or the OTC if he has
retained AAW function number 266 from Table 1-2. A unit may recommend calling a ZIPPO C to the
OTC/AAWC if warranted.
(2) Aircraft and ZIPPOs. Aircraft are not normally authorized to initiate ZIPPOs. An aircraft de-
tecting an attack or threat shall make a contact report to its controlling unit, who will call a ZIPPO if re-
quired. The OTC may wish to delegate the authority to call ZIPPOs to those aircraft capable of
identifying threat emitters and detecting associated launch platforms and missiles.
(3) Code Word ZIPPO. Planned reactions are initiated using the code word, ZIPPO. The order is:
(a) ZIPPO and number or letter.
(b) Reason.
(c) Bearing (and range if applicable).
(d) Amplification (if required).
7-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) ZIPPO/Number or Letter. The code word, ZIPPO, alerts units to a missile attack that is im-
minent or in progress and is qualified by the appropriate number or letter based on fulfillment of the cri-
teria in Table 7-2. Together they represent the executive order to carry out the planned reactions as
detailed in the ordered ZIPPO Reaction Table.
(5) Reasons for Calling the ZIPPO. The reasons for calling the ZIPPO should include a short
description of the threat. This can include:
(a) Code word (and track number for):
i. Missile radar.
ii. Missile.
iii. Missile-carrying platform.
(b) NATO nickname or designator for:
i. Missile.
ii. Missile-associated threat radar.
(c) Environment/identity/track number.
(d) Plain language description of event.
(6) Bearing and Range. The origin of the range and bearing must be specified, if other than the
reporting unit.
(7) Amplifying Information for Calling ZIPPO. Amplifying information includes material re-
lated to the reason for calling ZIPPOs, such as the NATO nickname or an emitter, or a comment on as-
sessment of the situation.
b. Implementation.
(1) Receipt of ZIPPO Call. On receipt of a ZIPPO call, planned reactions are to be carried out
without further orders and in accordance with the ZIPPO reactions in force. In case of self-defense reac-
tions, individual units should elect the most appropriate moment to take action, depending on own sen-
sor and weapon fit. Guidance is given in ATP 31. Reactions should be continued throughout the period
the ZIPPO remains in force.
(2) Rapidity of Reactions. In view of the necessary rapidity of reactions, the calling of ZIPPOs
within each unit should be delegated as far down the chain of command as possible, commensurate with
the experience and position of the personnel in the unit organization. Delegation of authority to initiate
the individual reactions should also be considered carefully and the manning of the appropriate external
nets adjusted accordingly.
(3) When ZIPPO is Ordered. When a ZIPPO is ordered, the air threat warning is automatically
upgraded to RED. When the ZIPPO is canceled or negated, the previous air threat warning is automati-
cally assumed. However, these changes to air threat warnings must also be passed on Tactical UHF by
the OTC and AAWC if delegated, but need only be repeated on the AAW net if there is any doubt.
(4) ZIPPO Is a Reaction System. It is stressed that the ZIPPO system is a reaction system; it
does not replace the established warning procedures. The first report of a missile attack need not
7-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
necessarily be a ZIPPO call. The FLASH report, EMERGENCY signal, or VAMPIRE code word are
some of the established methods of issuing warnings. Accordingly, initial detections of a missile attack
must be reported immediately, and ZIPPO reactions then called.
(5) EMCON Reactions. EMCON reactions are in force only as long as the ZIPPO is in force.
When the ZIPPO is canceled or negated, the EMCON previously in effect is to be resumed, unless the
OTC directs otherwise.
(6) ZIPPO Called Within One Group. A ZIPPO called within one group of ships is to be re-
layed on the intergroup AAW net in use (e.g., TG/TF AAWC HF) if the threat could affect another
group. This decision will depend on the nature of the threat, force disposition, and force ZIPPO reac-
tions ordered.
c. Restrictions. The OTC must ensure that planned reactions adhere to the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) in force. Thus, during a period of tension, all reactions to threats may be inhibited by the order,
ZIPPO TIGHT, with authentication if passed by voice. Reporting of threats is to continue, but ZIPPO
should not be called. The order, ZIPPO TIGHT, is canceled by, ZIPPO LOOSE, duly authenticated. (The
expression, ZIPPO FREE, is not to be used, as this can be too easily confused with, ZIPPO THREE.)
d. Control.
(1) Control of ZIPPOs. ZIPPOs are controlled on the appropriate circuit by the OTC or delegated
authority. In particular, the OTC:
(a) May order or prohibit specific reactions at the instant an individual ZIPPO is called.
(b) May negate or issue corrected ZIPPOs, if the original is considered inappropriate or inac-
curate, with the reason for doing so.
(c) Should negate appropriate ZIPPOs and/or give a SITREP of outstanding ZIPPOs, after a
missile attack is over and/or reactions are no longer required.
(d) Should exercise vigorous control in multiple attacks, where individual ZIPPOs are to be or-
dered for each attack, ensuring that ZIPPOs in force reflect the desired reactions.
(2) ZIPPOs Called in Error. The originator may only negate his ZIPPO when it is called in error,
and this must be done as soon as it is recognized. The reason must also be stated.
e. Communications. ZIPPOs are normally called on any available tactical AAW net. Addi-
tional instructions are contained in APP 1.
7080 CARRIER BATTLE GROUP AIR DEFENSE TACTICS
The key elements of Carrier Battle Group air defense tactics are:
a. Destroy hostile missile platform prior to release of weapons.
b. Position forces in the outer defense zone (ODZ) based on indication and warning information
for engagement of hostile missile platforms.
c. Position forces in the inner defense zone (IDZ) for engagement of leakers and ASSM defense.
7-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
7081 INNER AND OUTER DEFENSE ZONES
CVBG AAWCs are controlling two separate but interrelated forces: those forces assigned to the
ODZ and those within the IDZ. The former are primarily fighters, AEW aircraft, and SAM ships with re-
sponsibilities for destroying missile platforms before missile launch; while the latter are surface units with
primary responsibilities for engagement of leakers and providing ASSM defense for mission-essential
forces. Due to the separation of forces by mission and distance, each defense zone is essentially controlled
as a separate entity. With the exception of “heads up” situations on enemy penetrations, coordination prob-
lems mainly involve:
a. Identification of friendly aircraft operating within the IDZ or transiting between IDZ and ODZ.
b. Non-organic aircraft entering the AAW surveillance area.
7082 INNER DEFENSE ZONE
A circle around each CV whose radius is normally 100 nm but may be adjusted by the CWC based
on expected air threats and geographic considerations.
The primary AAW responsibility of IDZ units is to provide ASMD to mission-essential forces. This
is done through the coordinated employment of both hard-kill and soft-kill systems.
The IDZ will be defended primarily by SAM ships. IDZ AAW defenses may be augmented by CAP
normally positioned overhead the CV under either IDZC or carrier control. Primary targets for SAM ships
will be ASMs and enemy aircraft that have penetrated ODZ defenses.
7083 OUTER DEFENSE ZONE
The ODZ is an area encompassing the AAW surveillance area outside the IDZ to a range equivalent
to the maximum sensor range of assets stationed outside the IDZ.
The objective of AAW of ODZ is the early detection, identification, and destruction of the platforms
before missile launch. To accomplish this objective, fighters, ships, and AEW aircraft must be stationed in
sufficient numbers up-threat and at a distance that will ensure adequate warning and destruction of enemy
platforms before missile launch. Surface ships with long-range SAMs (80 to 115 nm) will be stationed in
the ODZ as either traditional AAW pickets or in a Silent SAM role. Coordination between SAM ships and
airborne assets is vital to avoid blue-on-blue engagements. ODZ forces must be prepared to execute pre-
planned response to counter attacking forces in an active electronic environment.
7084 (NC) (NMM) INNER DEFENSE ZONE COORDINATOR
(1) Establish search zones and sectors.
(2) Provide vectors to IDZ threats for transiting CAP (en route to/from ODZ) if there is no other
weapon available.
NOTE
It is imperative the AAWC be notified in the event ODZ CAP are redirected by the IDZC. Redi-
rection of ODZ CAP is a last resort when all other options have been exhausted.
7-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Coordinate AAW functions in the IDZ.
(2) Correlate and evaluate reports from units in company and relay to AAWC.
(3) Monitor local ROE decisions, keeping the AAWC informed.
(4) Keep units informed of friendly aircraft movements to avoid blue-on-blue engagements.
c. Control Functions. Control inner warfare net.
7085 (NC) (NMM) OUTER DEFENSE ZONE COORDINATOR
(1) Detect and broadcast location of enemy aircraft to CAP on the warfare net and to the AAWC on
the C&R net.
(2) Provide Link 11 information to Silent SAM ship.
(3) CAP management:
(a) Reassign CAP stations based on fuel and weapons state.
(b) Assign CAP stations for deck-launched interceptors (DLI).
(c) Coordinate with CAP on return to force (RTF) procedures.
(4) Tanker control:
(a) Assign control of tanker assets.
(b) Take control of tankers only when another control asset is unavailable.
(5) Process and disseminate ESM information regarding threat sectors and threat composition.
(6) Clear non-organic aircraft into the AAW surveillance area.
(1) Relay initial raid count from chainsaw CAP to AAWC via any/all nets. This information is cru-
cial for the AAWC/CWC to launch appropriate number of DLI in response to enemy raid.
(2) Repeat all fighter warfare net calls.
(3) Supplement voice calls with Link 4 information to CAP and Link 11 information to the AAWC
and other units of the AAW network.
(4) Update location of Silent SAM units.
(5) Monitor and negate, if necessary, ROE decisions by subordinate units, and request ROE neces-
sary to conduct AAW in the ODZ.
7-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Control Functions.
(1) Control the outer warfare net and the Admin (secondary outer warfare) net.
(2) Order frequency shifts on UHF nets or Link 4 when enemy deception is suspected or if commu-
nication jamming is effective.
7086 (NC) (NMM) CAP STATIONING TACTICS
CAP stationing tactics employed include:
a. Chainsaw. Chainsaw is a long-range tactic designed to cover an anticipated threat sector at

ranges out to 500 nm from VL. This tactic is optimized to achieve early threat detection when airspace and
geographic constraints allow use of extended range tactics. This tactic provides long-range detection, raid
count, and initial engagement once the raid count has been successfully relayed back to the
ODZC/AAWC. It is imperative that the raid count be relayed back to the AAWC, who can then order the
launch of the appropriate number of DLI to successfully engage an inbound threat. Sufficient chains are es-
tablished, in accordance with carrier air wing tactical procedures, to provide surveillance coverage over
the entire threat sector. After reaching 500 nm from VL, chainsaw CAP should take station and continue
the search for threat aircraft. This orbit should be maintained as long as prudent, taking into account fuel
state and deck cycle constraints. Two tactics are available to support chainsaw:
(1) Equidistant. All CAP are launched simultaneously for each chainsaw radial with a relief CAP
for each radial launched approximately every 72 minutes.
(2) Stagger. Alternating chainsaw radials are launched with replacement CAP launched on alter-
nating radials approximately every 36 minutes.
b. STRIKECAP. STRIKECAP are fighters launched to achieve an early detection of enemy raids,
to confuse the enemy as to the actual location of the CVBG, and to disrupt enemy plans and tactics. The
STRIKECAP tactic requires good indications and warning and a well defined threat axis placing the en-
emy raid approximately 1,000 to 1,200 nm from the CVBG.
c. Deck-Launched Interceptors. DLI are alert fighters on the carrier armed and ready for
launch in response to a pending threat. The AAWC will maintain an alert fighter package necessary to en-
gage the anticipated threat. The AREC will ensure alert packages are set to meet the AAWC’s
requirements.
d. CAP Stations. When the threat sector is well defined and the chainsaw tactic is not required,
CAP stations are designated by the number-letter designation in relation to VL or overhead a designated
unit (i.e., carrier). These stations are normally filled by a section of CAP during the day and a single fighter
at night.
7087 (NC) (NMM) RETURN TO FORCE PROCEDURES
Effective and easy to follow RTF procedures are essential in order to protect all friendly air assets
defending or returning to the battle group. Identification (ID) procedures and ROE, together with RTF
procedures, must be carefully coordinated by the CWC/AAWC.
a. The protection of friendly air assets requires that:
(1) CAP and SAM ships must evaluate contacts.
(2) Aircraft squawk all modes of IFF.
7-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Friendly aircraft comply with ID, IFF, and departure/return requirements.
b. Alternative Procedure. RTF aircraft will utilize IFF and fly a designated RTF profile for
identification (altitude and airspeed) as promulgated in the OPTASK AAW. All returning aircraft will be
required to fly to one or two transit points before returning to the CV. These transit points will be located on
the 100-nm arc from VL and 15° outside the threat sector. Upon reaching a transit point, aircraft will pro-
ceed directly to their assigned marshal point for recovery. The advantages of this RTF procedure are that
aircraft are not transiting through the center of the threat sector on their return and the transit points are lo-
cated such that aircraft can return expeditiously.
7088 (NC) (NMM) VL METHOD
The center point of the grid (VL) should be near the CVBG center (or the point to be defended) and
is a reference point specified by the CWC/AAWC.
7-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 8
Antisurface Warfare
SECTION 1 — GENERAL
8100 GENERAL
a. This chapter contains tactical and procedural instructions for ships (including submarines) and
aircraft when operating against enemy surface forces. Its purpose is to:
(1) Specify tactics and procedures in antisurface operations.
(2) Enable commanders to issue orders and instructions to fulfill their responsibilities.
(3) Enable subordinates to understand and comply with orders and instructions received.
b. (NR) (NMM) Background information on antisurface warfare is contained in ATP 31.
8101 COMMAND IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE
The OTCs functions in surface warfare, including those that may be delegated to the antisurface
warfare commander (ASUWC), are summarized in Table 1-3.
8102 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR (FTC) SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE
The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface surveillance to one of the warfare commanders.
They in turn can assign a FTC. In principle the designated force track coordinator surface and subsurface
performs the tasks as described in Chapter 6, Article 6314.
8103 CONCEPT OF ANTISURFACE WARFARE
a. Antisurface warfare must make full use of the offensive potential of own surface, submarine, and
air forces in order to deny the enemy effective use of his surface forces.
b. Antisurface operations by surface ships and submarines include all actions to combat enemy sur-
face forces. In the case of an offensive antisurface action, a SAG will be formed. A SAG may be comprised
of surface ships and/or submarines. If the action is of a defensive nature, the OTC may either detach a SAG
to counter the surface threat, maintain the integrity of the force, or avoid any action by altering course with
the whole force, depending upon the significance of the surface threat as compared to the air and
subsurface threats.
c. Forces Employed. Antisurface operations may be carried out by:
(1) Ships.
(2) Fast patrol boats.
(3) Fixed-wing aircraft.
(4) Helicopters.
8-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) Submarines.
(6) Coastal batteries (tactics and procedures are a national responsibility).
(7) Mining (see ATP 6).
NOTE
Submarine operations are not dealt with in this chapter. Safety precautions to be observed when
cooperating with submarines are prescribed in Chapters 6 and 9.
(NR) (NMM) Details of submarine operations are set forth in ATP 18.
d. Coordinated Operations. Antisurface operations may be carried out by a combination of

any of the single types of forces listed in paragraph c, in order to exploit the different advantages of their
sensor, weapon, and command capabilities. The most important combinations in coordinated operations
are dealt with in this chapter. The cooperation of those combinations not described must be arranged for ad
hoc using the procedural principles of this chapter.
8104 SURFACE POLICY
a. Surface Threat. Whenever a surface threat is deemed to exist, the OTC should promulgate a
policy for surface action. An early and comprehensive statement of intentions in an Operation Order/
OPGEN/OPTASK will reduce the requirement for messages, unless the situation changes.
b. Surface Policy. The Surface Policy can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in detail as
required. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff list, based on the phases of surface action outlined in Article 8105.
They may be used to prepare orders and to update and execute them.
c. Success of Surface Action. The success of surface action depends on a thorough under-
standing of the Surface Policy, a good initial plan, and the initiative of commanding officers.
8105 SURFACE ACTION
a. Phases of Surface Action. Surface action can be broadly stated as taking place in the follow-
ing phases.
(1) Phase 1 — Preparation.
(a) Events leading to the detection, localization, identification, and recognition of the enemy.
(b) A review of the situation against the established policy, planning, and tasking.
(2) Phase 2 — Detection, Localization, Identification, Recognition, and Target

Assignment.
(a) Assuming the optimum force offensive and defensive posture.
(b) The decision to join the enemy in battle.
(c) Selection and localization of particular enemy units as prime targets.
(d) Decision to request area commanders assets or to use force assets.
8-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 8-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List
PHASE 1 — PREPARATIONS PHASE 2 — DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND

TARGET ASSIGNMENT
a. Evaluate updated threat intelligence, SSM ships a. Determine employment of available surveillance
will be primary threat; SAM ships must also be con- assets, including provision of extra helicopters and
sidered. Decide enemy’s most dangerous likely tasking of ESM equipment of all aircraft.
courses of action, having determined whether he has
already been targeted by other friendly forces. b. Determine employment of air, surface, and
subsurface units, and other support facilities to pro-
b. Consider surface surveillance priority in relation to vide timely, continued, and accurate target localiza-
ASW and AAW. tion, identification, and recognition data.
c. Consider stationing of pickets, bulging the screen, c. If appropriate, request support from area com-
and/or detaching SAGs or submarines. manders’ forces.
d. Consider use of deception and evasion. d. In light of available target localization, identifica-
tion, and recognition data, review force weapon re-
e. Consider best use of assets, links, and communi- lease criteria.
cations for targeting.
e. Consider employment of air, subsurface, and sur-
f. Ensure emission policy is appropriate to surface face units for attack.
threat priority.
f. Review previously ordered, or order appropriate
g. Consider retention or delegation of authority to ini- Surface Action Plans.
tiate and coordinate OTH attacks by LR ASSM.
g. Review Emission Policy.
h. Consider target identification criteria, required
recognition level, required recognition confidence h. Consider SSM Missile Seeker Free Zone (MSFZ)
level, and weapons expenditure. and Missile Seeker Tight Zone (MSTZ).
i. Consider target priorities and damage criteria. i. Determine SAG composition after considering dis-
position and capabilities.
j. Determine likely units to coordinate and conduct
OTH action, after considering disposition, capabili- j. Assign targets and promulgate clear directions to
ties, etc. participating units.
k. Consider methods of damage assessment.
l. Reevaluate jamming tasking.
m. Consider effects of weather, e.g., on ship’s ma-

neuverability and flying operations.
n. Determine the execution of gridlocks, ensuring a

matched picture with all participating units.
8-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 8-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Cont.)
PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.)
a. INITIATION. (a) SAG uses appropriate HF/UHF/Secure

Voice circuits or visual signals, for maneuver-
(1) Engage with air or, if appropriate, subsurface ing and picture compilation.
assets.
(b) Establish communications with cooperat-
(2) Unless tasks have already been assigned, the ing submarines, MPA, AEW, or helicopters on
OTC or ASUWC may: their previously assigned nets, ordering shift
to SAG net as necessary.
(a) Detach a SAG with LR SSM assets and
consider redisposition of remaining forces. (c) The Air Strike Control Net is used to pass
position and intentions to friendly attack air-
(b) Order LR SSM attacks without forming a craft deployed against assigned target.
SAG.
(d) Establish communications on the TF/TG
(c) Order OTH Standard Action Plan, and if OTH Command Net if necessary.
not already specified:
(3) SAGC may assume duties of LAAWC,
1. Target to be engaged. FTC-S, and ACU for the SAG.
(4) Reassess threat, open-fire range, expected

2. When LR SSM are to be fired, or time time of coming under fire, and missile advantages
on target (TOT) for missiles. and disadvantages.
3. Communications/links to be used. (5) Reassess current electronic warfare policy.
(d) Order any other, or combination of, (6) Employment of allocated air, surface and sub-
Standard Surface Action Plan(s). surface assets to optimize OTH attacks. Consid-
erations include:
(3) If detaching a SAG, consider shifting remain-
der of force to alternate SAG net. (a) Assessment of OTHT information.
b. SAG APPROACH. 1. Single passive bearing.
(1) SAG Commander (SAGC) orders formation, 2. Triangulation.

disposition, course, and speed in accordance with
Action Plan(s). If no Plan is detailed, considera- 3. Deploying a TRU.
tions are:
4. Other sources.
(a) Formation/disposition.
(b) Updating of plots, identification/recognition,
(b) Freedom to maneuver.
and target selection.
(c) Mutual support.
(c) Obtaining best possible picture of imme-
diate area around target for selection of opti-
(d) Separation to avoid single jammer beam
mum missile seeker settings (e.g., weather,
width.
clutter, and proximity of other units).
(e) Concealment of identities of
(d) Selection TRU for passing accurate data
missile-armed ships.
by link or voice.
(2) Communications (unless specified otherwise):
(e) Stationing and protection of TRU.
8-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT PHASE 3 — LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(CONT.) (CONT.)
(f) Selection of LR SSM firing units. (2) If cooperating with surface attack aircraft, es-
tablish “time windows” for arrival of SSM. TOT for
1. Available missiles and their seeker aircraft and missiles should not coincide; however,
characteristics. aircraft and missiles attacks should be coordi-
nated.
2. Accuracy of required target data.
(3) After damage assessment, reattack if results
do not meet OTC’s Damage Criteria.
3. Spacing of other enemy units in relation
to intended line of SSM fire.
d. POST-COMBAT.
4. Direction of attack.
OTC, ASUWC, or SAGC orders action to cease and
issues post-combat instructions (See Phase 4, para-
(g) Safety of friendly forces, including MSFZ graph d. below).
and MSTZ.
PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT

(7) Order coordination and employment of:
(a) LR/SSM, including weapon release crite- a. INITIATION. Unless tasks have already been as-
ria and fire distribution. signed, the OTC will:
(b) Jammers. (1) If appropriate, detach a SAG and consider re-

dispositions of remaining units.
(c) Chaff-firing sectors and patterns for con-
fustion and/or distraction. (2) Consider main body evasion.
(3) Order Standard Action Plans, and if not already

(8) Intentions, to include plans of approach and specified:
post-combat rendezvous, must be passed early
since at a later stage communications are likely to (a) Targets to be engaged.
be saturated and/or jammed.
(b) Communications/links to be used.
(9) Action in case of damage. (4) Verify position of own forces to avoid engage-
ment of friendly units.
(a) Nominate standby SAGC.
(5) Consider shifting remainder of force to alter-
(b) Action for own damaged ships. nate SAG net.
b. APPROACH.
(10) Enemy contact report — SITREP to OTC/
ASUWC. (1) Actions covering formation, disposition, com-
munications, assumption of duties, reassessment
c. COMBAT. of threat and enemy’s intentions, and EW policy as
in preceding Phase 3, paragraphs b.(1) to (5).
(1) OTH action is conducted according to the
Standard Plan ordered, or as specified otherwise. (2) Employment of allocated air submarine, and
surface assets.
8-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I

PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.)
(CONT.)
(4) Action in case of damage.

(a) Assessment of target information.
(a) Standby SAGC take command.
1. Single passive bearing.
(b) Action for own damaged ships.
2. Triangulation.
(5) Missile/gunnery advantage/disadvantage.
3. Deploying a TRU/forward observer. (a) Maintain missile/gunner advantage.
4. Other sources (e.g., radar). (b) Carry out action to assume advantage if
not presently held.
(b) Updating plots, identification/recogniton,
and selection of target. (NC) (NMM) If a gunnery disadvantage:
(c) Selection of TRU/forward observer. 1. Zigzag before reaching enemy.
(d) Selection of firing units to include avail- 2. Cross weapon gap to own MER as
able SR SSM/SASS. quickly as possible and maintain as fine
an inclination as practicable.
(3) Order employment of:
(a) SR SSM/SASS — including weapon re- (6) (NC) (NMM) Fire control radar, consider:
lease criteria and fire distribution.
(a) Switching on as late as practicable.
(b) Guns.
(b) Deception by using alternate radar.
1. Methods of verification and control of (7) Enemy contact report — SITREP to OTC.
fall of shot.
(8) Following the OTC’s policy, order type and
2. Control of opening of weapon area. number of SR SSM/SASS to be fired. A “cocktail
mix” will make the enemy’s ASMD difficult.
3. Control of opening fire.
(9) Consider use of surface- or
4. Pre-action calibration (PAC) — range submarine-launched torpedoes and long-range
from enemy to conduct — ESM aspects. ASW weapons.
5. Ammunition type. c. COMBAT.
6. Wind finding. (1) Open fire order — coordination of SR

SSM/SASS and guns.
SEE NOTE 1.
7. Illumination.
(2) SEE NOTE 2.
8. Fire distribution.
(3) Reassess gunnery advantage/disadvantage;
(c) Jammers. change tactics accordingly.
(d) Chaff-firing sectors and patterns for con-

fusion and/or distraction.
8-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I

PHASE 4 — SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.)
(CONT.)
d. POST-COMBAT.
(4) Weapon arcs — adjust SAG formation to
a course to maximize SAG weapon effective- (1) Individual ships report to SAGC.
ness.
(a) Damage and assistance required.
(5) Fire distribution — consider redistribution.
(b) Ammunition reports.
(6) Ammunition expenditure — use burst fire SEE NOTE 4.
initially; continue burst fire until good hitting rate
achieved, then use continuous fire. (c) Fuel.
SEE NOTE 5.
(7) Jamming/chaff employment — continue
unless interference is caused to own gun/mis- (2) SAGC — SITREP to OTC.
sile control radar.
(3) Update position of post-combat rendezvous
(8) SEE NOTE 3. (if required).
(9) Damage reports — only if fighting capability (4) Update OTC Rendezvous/PIM.
is reduced.
(5) Order formation, course, and speed. Con-
(10) Fall of shot reports — only if situation is sider maximum sonar speed if significant sub-
confused. surface threat exists.
(11) Reassess target priorities. (6) Survivors — use helicopter assistance.
(NC) (NMM) (7) Further action — re-engage, shadow, or

withdraw.
NOTE 1 — Normally at MER for guns, but may
be ordered otherwise. (NC) (NMM)
NOTE 4 — Only if below 50 percent.

NOTE 2 — Attempt to stay between enemy and
his objective. NOTE 5 — Only if below 50 percent.
NOTE 3 — Smoke screen — consider as defen-

sive or deceptive measure.
8-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(e) Decision on the use of submarines for detection, identification, and possible attack utiliz-
ing either torpedoes or ASSMs.
(f) Decision on the use of air attack units and/or employment of ASSMs to provide defense in
depth.
(g) Obtaining accurate target data for possible engagement.
(3) Phase 3 — Long Range Engagement.
(a) Consideration of detaching air assets or submarines for long-range attacks.
(b) Detachment as necessary of long-range ASSM units in SAGs with supporting submarines
as appropriate or single units for long-range engagements.
(c) Conducting long-range attacks.
(d) Post-combat.
(4) Phase 4 — Short-Range Engagement.
(a) Detachment of SAGs with short-range missiles, guns, and torpedoes.
(b) Conducting attacks.
(c) Post-combat.
8106 — 8109 SPARE
8110 (NC) (NMM) WEAPON STATE REPORTS
a. BITTER ASSM state report, to the OTC, ASUWC, or SAG commander whenever the SSM
availability status is reduced. The following letters are to be used
E EXOCET
H HARPOON
M TOMAHAWK
O OTOMAT
P PENGUIN
T TESEO
Example
A unit that has eight TESEO missiles remaining would report: (OTC) this is (call
sign) BITTER report T8 over.
b. States of other weapons are to be reported using CANDY and SUGAR reports as in Chapter 7
with the addition of the suffix S in CANDY reports to indicate surface ammunition.
8111 — 8119 SPARE
8-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS
8200 SURFACE ACTION CHECKOFF LIST
a. Checkoff List of Surface Action. Table 8-1 contains a checkoff list of points to be consid-
ered during the four phases of surface action. Not all of the points in the table will apply to every action, but
they should be considered and disregarded if not appropriate.
b. Enemy SSMs. Enemy SSMs may be fired from over the horizon: that is, beyond the launching
platform’s active sensor ranges and at shorter or horizon range. With the horizon range threat, appropriate
factors in Table 8-1 must be considered early and plans quickly promulgated. Indeed, under these circum-
stances, phases 2 and 4 may be compressed to run concurrently. Because of the high level of expected EW
activity, success at horizon range depends on careful planning, thorough briefing, and minimal reliance on
radio communications.
8201 SURFACE ACTION GROUP (SAG)
a. SAG Commander. On formation of a SAG, the SAG commander is responsible for:
(1) The organization of the SAG and its tactical employment.
(2) The tactical control of aircraft assigned.
(3) EW coordination.
(4) Local AAW coordination.
(5) Keeping the OTC informed of the progress of the action.
b. Composition. SAG units should be compatible in weapons, sensors, speeds, and maneuver-
ability; however, if a capability such as a complete EW suite is available only in an incompatible unit, that
unit may have to be in the SAG despite any other shortcomings.
(NR) (NMM) The composition of a SAG for a particular operation depends on the factors listed in
ATP 31.
c. Communications. When the formation of the SAG is preplanned and adequate warning is
given, there will be no difficulty in activating a prepared communication plan. However, this may not be
the case when a SAG is formed in an emergency to counter a sudden threat. In this case, the SAG may em-
ploy any already established control net as ordered by the OTC. Where appropriate, the remainder of the
force should switch to alternate circuits.
d. Electronic Warfare.
(1) On the formation of the SAG, control of EW in the SAG is automatically assumed by the SAG
commander. The SAG commander will reassign ESM tasking based on threat intelligence and retask
ECM assets in order to enhance warning and defense possibilities with minimum mutual interference.
(2) Retasking of the SAGs EW equipment to concentrate on the surface threat against which the
SAG has been detached requires the EWC to reconsider overall force EW tasking. Threats no longer
covered by SAG units may have to be reassigned to ensure complete threat coverage within the force.
e. Antiair Warfare. As soon as possible after the SAG separates from the main body, the SAG
commander should become his own local AAW coordinator, controlling his own friendly aircraft if they
8-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
are available. This will add to the effectiveness of his forces, better ensure own aircraft safety, and mini-
mize the confusion that would result in divided aircraft control.
f. Antisurface Ship Missiles (ASSMs).
(1) ASSM systems are divided into two categories — “to-the-horizon” range or short-range ASSM,
and “over-the-horizon” range or long-range ASSM. The dividing line is 20 miles. The OTC should, if he
has any choice, allocate units to the SAG with ASSM systems of sufficiently superior range and lethality
to ensure success without needlessly wasting his most powerful assets.
(2) The conflicting use of SAM systems for AAW on the one hand and for SAM in the surface-
to-surface (SASS) mode on the other must be carefully weighed by the OTC. Systems with more than
one tracker can maintain both, although with reduced capabilities. However, most medium- and
long-range SAM systems have sufficient surface-to-surface capability to favorably influence the out-
come of the surface action.
8202 SURFACE ACTION GROUP POLICY
In defense of the main body, the primary concern must be to remain between the enemy and the main
body. If the SAG has been detached to destroy, neutralize, or repel missile carrier(s), the SAG should do so
as far as possible from the main body or convoy. In formulating his policy, the SAG commander must con-
sider the following factors:
a. Relative capabilities of own and enemy forces.
b. Likely tactics of enemy forces.
c. The use of ECM. The SAG commander should make use of the ECM capability of ships of the
SAG to disrupt enemy fire control, surface warning sensors, missile systems, and communications.
d. The use of deception. When approaching the enemy, the SAG commander should consider the
use of physical and electronic measures designed to conceal the size and formation of the SAG. The elec-
tronic emission pattern of the SAG must conform with the deception plan in use.
e. The formation. It is important that deployment into the chosen surface-action formation should
have been completed before action commences. The surface-action formation must allow ships to engage
with all their weapons, and to take avoiding action without endangering adjacent ships. Unnecessarily
large intervals between ships give an enemy with superior speed the opportunity to concentrate on one part
of the group at a time.
f. Pre-action fire control settings. It is vital that these are obtained as early in the action as possible.
Thus, initial settings on fire control equipment must be accurate. However, fire control is vulnerable to
jamming and therefore calibration involving fire control radar transmissions may be inadvisable and
should only be carried out on instruction from the SAG commander.
g. Fire distribution.
(1) Normal fire distribution. Normal fire distribution entails the engagement of opposite numbers
of the enemy force and should as far as possible leave no enemy ship unengaged. If concentration of fire
is possible, major enemy ships should receive priority. Normal fire distribution is automatically in
force.
8-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Targets to individual units. The SAG commander may make a fire distribution signal allotting
targets to individual units at any time before or during an action. Special signal groups are available for
this purpose.
h. Number of missiles to be fired in ASSM salvos.
8203 STANDARD SURFACE ACTION PLANS
Three standard surface action plans exist.

(NR) (NMM) They are detailed in ATP 31, Chapter 8.
a. Plan GREYHOUND. Plan GREYHOUND is the plan for SSM attack by ships using a target
reporting unit (TRU) and is best suited for over-the-horizon (OTH) attacks.
b. Plan GROUSE. Plan GROUSE is the plan for SAGs, which may include helicopters, in a coor-
dinated attack against enemy surface units other than missile-armed fast patrol boats. This plan is best
suited for engagements within horizon range.
c. Plan SNIPE. Plan SNIPE is the plan for SAGs against missile-armed fast patrol boats.
8204 TOWED-ARRAY SHIPS IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE
Towed array sonar (TAS) is capable of passively detecting surface as well as subsurface contacts at
extended ranges. In an area of high surface threat, the OTC may consider assigning a TAS ship to the
ASUW role in addition to or in lieu of the ASW role. In either case, the resultant effect on the forces ASW
posture must be considered.
8205 PICKETS IN ANTISURFACE WARFARE
Pickets are stationed primarily to extend the surveillance area, and in littoral areas especially to
cover entrances and choke points. A picket-chain consisting of several units might be ordered to cover
large areas. The ASUW picket may be a surface unit, a submarine, or an aircraft.
(NR) (NMM) For further details on capabilities and tasking see ATP 31.
8206 — 8209 SPARE
8-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION
8300 GENERAL
Air assets in support of antisurface warfare operations may be used for the detection of the enemy,
for locating, identification/recognition, and reporting in order to contribute to the surface picture and for
target data reporting and transmission. Independent and coordinated attacks on the enemy’s surface units
may be included. The type of support to be provided by air assets depends on operational requirements and
on the capabilities of the air assets. Air assets may also be used to distract the enemy’s attention from own
forces, and to disrupt the enemy’s command and control.
8301 ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS SUPPORT BY FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
a. The aim of antisurface operations by fixed-wing aircraft is to ensure the detection and
engagement of enemy surface forces in order to deny their effective employment. Fixed-wing aircraft may
be employed in:
(1) Attacks on enemy surface forces.
(2) Scouting, using any sensor to acquire tactical information.
b. Armed reconnaissance, a combination of both types, is possible, depending on the tactical situa-
tion and available air assets.
(NR) (NMM) Detailed instructions are provided in ATP 31 and ATP 34.
8302 ANTISURFACE OPERATIONS BY HELICOPTERS
a. The aim of antisurface operations by helicopters is to:
(1) Assist forces in the detection, localization, identification, recognition, and targeting of hostile
surface forces.
(2) Attack lightly defended enemy forces, especially fast patrol boats equipped with SSMs.
b. Helicopters will normally be integrated with a surface force that may or may not have other air sup-
port. They may be land based or shipborne. When two or more helicopters cooperate against a particular surface
threat, they form a HAG. The best-fitted helicopter should become HAG commander (CONTROLLER).
c. Helicopters in antisurface operations may be employed in reconnaissance and attack and may
carry out controlled operations or act independently, as ordered by the OTC, or the unit that the OTC has
assigned duty as HCU.
(1) Controlled Operations. When the helicopter has two-way communications with and is
within the radar range of the control unit, the helicopter is to operate under positive or advisory control.
(2) Independent Operations. When the helicopter is beyond radar range and/or communica-
tion range of the HCU, the helicopter is fully responsible for safety, navigation, and the accomplishment
of its task.
8303 COOPERATION BETWEEN FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
If helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft cooperate in engaging a surface target, the following rules will
apply. As the supporting aircraft approaches the target area and communications are established, the
8-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
helicopter will provide all available target information to the supporting aircraft. If it is equipped to do so,
the helicopter may be requested to illuminate the target. Special precautions should be observed by attack
aircraft, particularly during periods of reduced visibility and at night, to ensure that the helicopter is safely
clear of dropped illumination devices, the attack flightpath, and weapon effects.
8304 EMPLOYMENT OF A HELICOPTER ACTION GROUP (HAG)
a. Alert State. The limited endurance of missile-armed helicopters prevents, in most cases, the
keeping of a HAG at airborne alert. Missile-armed helicopters should, therefore, normally be placed at the
highest possible alert state (see Chapter 1).
b. Selection of a HAG Rendezvous. The HAG rendezvous should normally be in the direction
of the threat, in order to make best use of the short on-task time of the helicopter.
c. Attack Procedure. The prime requirement for a successful missile attack is precise information
about the position, course, and speed of the target. The need for the missile-firing helicopter to be in visual
contact with and/or be pointed in the general direction of the target mainly depends on the capability of the
sensors available and the missile used. In case of a visual attack, a flare-dropping helicopter may be used.
d. Provision of Helicopter Operating Facilities. When a SAG is to cooperate with a HAG,

units with helicopter refueling facilities should be included in the SAG to increase the effective range and
endurance of the HAG.
8305 HELICOPTER IDENTIFICATION/ RECOGNITION AND ATTACK TACTICS
The aim of this procedure is to extend the range at which a surface force can identify/recognize and
attack lightly armed surface units such as fast patrol boats.
a. Employment. Helicopters can be employed to investigate contacts held by other units. By day,
helicopters should be able to make visual identification/recognition if weather conditions permit. How-
ever, at night, a method of illumination is normally required. Identification/recognition and attack proce-
dures are described in paragraph c.
b. Altitude Separation. If more than one missile-armed helicopter is launched, it may be neces-
sary to allocate different height bands for HAG separation. The following altitudes are recommended:
HAG 1 HAG 2
(Feet) (Feet)
Illuminator 1,500 2,000

(CANDLE)
HAG Commander 800 1,000

(CONTROLLER)
Attack Aircraft 400 600

(ATTACKER)
If each HAG is operating on a separate frequency, it will be necessary for HAG commanders to man
an additional common frequency for coordination. If cooperating with fixed-wing aircraft, altitude separa-
tion should be imposed and departures from these altitudes made only while under positive control.
c. Identification/Recognition and Attack Procedures. By day, two aircraft comprise the

HAG carrying out this procedure: the CONTROLLER (control aircraft) and the ATTACKER (probe or
8-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
attack aircraft). At night, an additional aircraft will be required for illumination (CANDLE). In some cir-
cumstances, an AEW aircraft or ship may replace the control aircraft.
d. Day Procedure. The primary requirements for a successful attack are for the ATTACKER to
see the target and to be informed when within the maximum range of the missile from the target.
(NC) (NMM) This is achieved using the following steps:
(1) ATTACKER is turned onto the attack heading at a range of about 7,000 yards from the target.
(2) ATTACKER reduces speed to a firing speed of 50 to 70 knots.
(3) CONTROLLER passes target information, such as true bearing and range from the AT-
TACKER, every 500 yards until ATTACKER sees the target and reports TALLY-HO.
(4) After TALLY-HO, CONTROLLER continues to pass range information until ATTACKER re-
ports BRUISER LOOSE.
(5) CONTROLLER immediately passes an accurate range to enable ATTACKER to work out the
required missile time of flight.
(6) For the remainder of the attack until missile impact, CONTROLLER continues to pass range in-
formation every 500 yards.
(7) ATTACKER reports BRUISER HIT, for a hit, followed when possible by a target damage as-
sessment, or NO JOY, for a miss.
e. (NC) (NMM) Night Procedure. By night, the movements of ATTACKER and CANDLE
must be coordinated. The tactic is illustrated in Figure 8-1.
(1) Setting Up by CONTROLLER. The CONTROLLER:
(a) Initially vectors CANDLE directly towards the target (and makes adjustments later).
(b) Vectors ATTACKER to a fixed station 9,000 yards astern of CANDLE.
(c) When at station orders GANG UP and then maneuvers both helicopters simultaneously,
preserving the line of bearing.
(d) Reports the attack heading, that is, the tandem bearing of CANDLE from ATTACKER.
(e) Adjusts the GANG-UP vector so that CANDLE passes 5,000 yards clear of the target.
(2) Flare Line. The CONTROLLER vectors CANDLE onto the flare line 3,000 yards from the
target, at right angles to the attack heading, and with the centerpoint of the flare line opposite the targets
position. No allowance is to be made for the targets course.
(a) CANDLEs speed is 100 knots and altitude 1,500 feet during flare drops.
(b) In wind speeds of 0 to 15 knots, CANDLE drops the first flare 1,000 yards (20 sec-
onds) before the centerpoint. Only for wind speeds over 15 knots and within 45 of CANDLEs track,
allow 500 yards (10 seconds) early or late as appropriate on the first flare release point. Winds out-
side of the envelope are to be disregarded.
8-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CENTERPOINT
F
CANDLE
5 secs 10 secs 10 secs 10 secs
250 500 500 500

YARDS
ATTACK
HEADING
CENTERPOINT
F YARDS
Altitude 1500 ft
3000
Speed 100 kts
2000
s
yd 1000
00
30
CANDLE
5000 yds 0
1000
2000
BREAK OFF 3000

HEADING
4000
GANG UP
9000 yds M
R 5000
6000
1000
yds 7000
8000
ATTACKER
F - 1st FLARE RELEASE POINT 9000
R - ROLL OUT POINT, REDUCE SPEED
M - MISSILE RELEASE POINT
Figure 8-1. (NU) (NMM) Ideal Disposition of CANDLE and ATTACKER Tactic
8-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Flare spacing is as follows: in flat calm conditions, eight flares at intervals of 250 yards (5
seconds); in all other conditions, four flares at intervals of 500 yards (10 seconds).
(3) Attack. The attack is achieved using the following steps:
(a) At first flare ignition, ATTACKER turns without further orders onto the attack heading and
adjusts speed to 50 to 70 knots on completion of the rollout.
(b) CONTROLLER passes target range from the ATTACKER every 500 yards.
(c) After the last flare drop, CANDLE turns away onto the attack heading without further
orders.
(d) ATTACKER fires when ready (ideally within 10 seconds of the fourth flare ignition) or
breaks off the attack if the missile is not released by a range of 4,000 yards.
(e) After missile impact, ATTACKER performs an immediate maximum performance turn to
port/starboard (more than 90°) and reports BREAKING LEFT/RIGHT and the new heading.
(f) CANDLE complies with the ATTACKER’s turn onto the new heading without further or-
ders, remaining more than 3,000 yards from the target.
NOTES
· If helicopter facilities permit, the duties of CONTROLLER can be combined with those of
either CANDLE or ATTACKER. The CONTROLLER will always assume the duties of the
HAG commander.
· Attacks are normally conducted with ATTACKER at 400 feet (minimum 250 feet), CAN-
DLE at 1,500 feet (minimum 1,000 feet), and CONTROLLER at 800 to 1,000 feet.
· Minimum practical cloud base for these tactics is considered to be 1,500 feet.
8306 (NC) (NMM) OPERATION VELOCIPEDE
In this procedure, patrolling aircraft (MPA or radar-fitted helicopters) can home the HAG or SAG
onto enemy fast patrol boats or suspicious radar contacts and illuminate them for identification/recogni-
tion, attack, or both.
a. Initiation. On receipt of the first locating report from patrolling aircraft, the OTC:
(1) Orders EXECUTIVE VELOCIPEDE.
(2) Informs the control aircraft of:
(a) The call sign of the senior officer of the HAG or SAG.
(b) The direction of approach of the HAG or SAG.
(c) The track designation of the enemy force to be intercepted.
(3) Designates whether ON TOP or OFFSET illumination is to be used.
8-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Homing Procedures. After receipt of the order to execute VELOCIPEDE, the patrolling air-
craft continues to shadow the target while the HAG or SAG commander establishes communications with
it. The HAG or SAG commander then carries out the following actions:
(1) Identifies and gridlocks the aircraft.
(2) Orders the aircraft to report:
(a) Enemy contacts by grid location or by bearing and distance from the patrolling aircraft of
the HAG/SAG.
(b) Target movement.
(3) Calculates a course to intercept the enemy.
(4) Receives updates of enemy position until the enemy is held on radar.
(5) Informs the aircraft of his intentions.
(6) Executes SWAP with the aircraft.
c. Illumination. Illumination can be achieved using the following procedure:
(1) Action by the Scene-of-Action Commander (SAC). The SAC is to:
(a) Call the illuminating aircraft, give expected direction of attack, and state time at which illu-
mination is required. At least 6 minutes notice should be given to allow the aircraft to take up posi-
tion for illumination.
(b) Position attacking forces and pass any changes in attack heading or illumination time to the
illuminating aircraft.
(c) Inform the illuminating aircraft of the altitude of attacking helicopters so that adequate alti-
tude separation can be maintained.
(d) Inform the illuminating aircraft if it is to cease illumination when the attack is completed or
if it is required to clear the area.
(2) Action by Illuminating Aircraft Using On-Top Procedure. The illuminating aircraft is to:
(a) Call the SAC at 1 minute to flare release time and give own altitude and the direction in
which flares will be laid.
(b) Inform the SAC when commencing the laying of flares.
(c) Continue laying flares, adjusting position when necessary for target movement, until in-
formed by the SAC that illumination is no longer required.
(3) Action by Illuminating Aircraft Using Offset Procedure. The illuminating aircraft is to
fly at a minimum range of 3,000 yards from the enemy, on a track at right angles to the direction of at-
tack, and drop an adequate number of flares to illuminate the target. The flare release altitude is between
1,500 to 5,000 feet. A minimum of four flares is recommended. The aircraft is to:
(a) Inform the SAC of the direction in which flares will be laid.
8-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Inform the SAC when commencing the laying of flares.
(c) Continue laying flares (unless ordered to clear the area on completion of the first illuminat-
ing run), adjusting position when necessary for target movement, until informed by the SAC that il-
lumination is no longer required.
8307 ATTACK SUPPORT
Attack support is the generic term for all forms of tactical assistance given by a shadower to enable
strike, attack, or reconnaissance aircraft to locate their targets.
a. Surface Picture (SURPIC). The SURPIC message format is used for contact reporting dur-
ing shadowing and attack support operations.
b. Vector-Assisted Attack (VASTAC). VASTAC procedures enable attack aircraft to be

vectored to the target by the target reporting unit (TRU). The TRU must be capable of holding both the at-
tack aircraft and the designated target on radar.
(NR) (NMM) Details are described in ATP 31.
8308 — 8309 SPARE
8-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION IV — (NC) (NMM) ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH

SUBSURFACE COOPERATION
8400 GENERAL
Often the submarine may be best placed to deal with a surface threat. By virtue of its covert nature,
the attack submarine and especially the SSN is capable of long-term shadowing and subsequently attack-
ing a surface contact. The submarine can also operate in waters where, perhaps due to an unfavorable air
situation, other units may not safely venture.
8401 WEAPONS
The submarine may use either torpedoes or ASSMs. Torpedo attacks usually mean that the subma-
rine has to close its target to within 10 nm or less and the fire control solution is obtained from its own sen-
sors(ESM), sonar, periscope, and/or even radar. ASSMs give the attack submarine the option of a longer
range attack, if targeting data can be obtained.
8402 ASSM TARGETING
a. Very rarely will it be possible for a submarine to exploit the full range of its ASSMs using its own
sensors. Often the passive nature of the sensors will require a cooperative target, and even then, without ex-
tensive target motion analysis, the submarine may lack accurate range information. Furthermore, it may be
impossible to select one particular target within a group of ships.
b. Link 11, if fitted, and national targeting systems do provide the submarine with a far greater capa-
bility to select targets, generate long-range firing solutions, and avoid striking background shipping. An-
other solution is to provide long-range targeting from a third party. Tradeoffs between submarine
covertness, possible counter-detection, and the data refinement necessary to generate a sufficiently accu-
rate firing solution must be considered.
8403 TACTICAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
a. Preplanned Responses.
Given the time delays sometimes inherent with submarine communications, well formulated pre-
planned responses are essential to ensure actions taken by submarines are in accord with task group objec-
tives. As applicable, this information should be included in OPTASK Supplements or Support Submarine
Request messages and updated by Support Submarine Force Summary messages as changes occur. Informa-
tion must be sufficiently detailed to ensure mission continuance should tactical communications with the
submarine be disrupted or when, for whatever reason, it is not feasible for the submarine to communicate.
(1) General Planning Considerations. Preplanned responses should reinforce the capability of
the submarine on its own accord to undertake offensive or defensive action in consonance with the mission
of the task group to which it is assigned. In essence, this means the submarine must always know whether it
is to 1) LOOK, TALK, TRACK; 2) LOOK, SHOOT, TALK; 3) LOOK, TALK, SHOOT; or any other
combination desired by the OTC. While requirements will vary with the scenario and threat, at a minimum
preplanned responses should address desired actions the submarine is to take if:
(a) Enemy surface or subsurface units are detected prior to commencement of hostilities. In-
clude specific Rules of Engagement (ROE), as applicable.
(b) A target transits beyond the submarines engagement envelope or out of its immediate
waterspace area both prior to and during hostilities, as applicable.
8-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Long-range cruise missile engagements are to be undertaken independently or only after
coordination with the SOCA.
(d) Over-the-horizon (OTH) track data is inadequate to permit cruise missile employment.
(e) Acoustic, electronic, or visual battle damage assessment (BDA) is desired and how the
submarine will be keyed to event timing and the location or direction of engagement.
(f) Contact reporting (i.e., task group alertment) or contact engagement is to take precedence;
and when, how, and to whom should the submarine report under either circumstance.
(2) Submarine Target Priority List (TPL). Providing the submarine with a TPL specified by
the OTC (as may be developed jointly by the ASWC/ASUWC) is an essential part of preparing for and
executing submarine/task group operations. Because of the submarine’s unique capabilities and/or the
area in which it is operating, the TPL for a submarine may be quite different from that of other elements
of the force.
(a) During the time the submarine is operating with a task group, the TPL supersedes any pre-
vious target priority list, including that of the SUBOPAUTH, and becomes especially important if
submarine/task group tactical communications are disrupted. When combined with available threat
intelligence, the TPL provides guidance to the submarine commanding officer upon which to base
his specific tactical surveillance, search, and attack plans. Additionally, it serves as a useful decision
aid should the submarine be confronted with multiple high-interest targets simultaneously.
(b) The TPL may be conveyed to the submarine by governing OPTASK listing of contacts of
interest (if the OPTASK or extracts there of are held by the submarine) and simply referenced in
subsequent messages, or be specifically addressed in the Support Submarine Request message. In
turn, it may be updated at any time during the course of operations in the Support Submarine Force
Summary, Support Submarine SITREP, or OPTASK Supplemental message.
b. Specific Target Planning and Engagement Execution. Refinement from a general

ASUW (or ASW) search role to engaging a specific target will necessarily depend upon the manner in
which the submarine is to undertake the engagement. If the intent is for it to position and attack independ-
ently using organic sensors, initial tasking along with target location cueing (see aided intercept in ATP
18) may be all that is necessary from the SOCA. On the other hand, submarine attacks coordinated with
other force assets normally will require detailed instructions, particularly if third-party OTH targeting as-
sistance or post-engagement BDA information is required.
c. Contact Turnover. During support submarine operations, shifting prosecution of a specific

target between other force assets and a submarine, or between submarines, may become necessary. This
will generally occur when the target moves into or out of the submarines area, and the area dimensions
and/or designation cannot be changed rapidly. If requested by the submarine(s) involved, the OTC should
provide for aircraft communications relay. ATP 18 and APP 4 contain, respectively, the procedures and the
structured message formats to be used for contact handover.
8404 COMMUNICATIONS
Communications with submarines differ significantly from those with other force assets and present
the most significant challenge in effecting submarine tasking and coordination. Especially in the coordina-
tion of antisurface operations during rising tensions, some compromises between covertness and coordina-
tion will be necessary to coordinate antisurface operations.
8405 — 8409 SPARE
8-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION V — THIRD-PARTY TARGETING
8500 GENERAL
Weapon range of ASSM exceeding the sensor range of the missile-firing unit requires the evaluation
and transmission of target data by a third party acting as an external sensor. When there is a requirement to
disguise the presence or identity of a missile-carrying unit from a target within the firing-units sensor hori-
zon, third-party targeting may be used. Surveillance, identification, classification, recognition, and report-
ing as a contribution for the surface picture compilation by this external sensor is a prerequisite for the
firing unit to decide target selection, weapon, and firing policy. Damage assessment after missile engage-
ment is another important function for an external sensor.
8501 DEFINITIONS
a. Third-Party Targeting (TPT). TPT is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data for
the surface picture compilation and/or missile engagement by a target reporting unit (TRU).
b. Over-the-Horizon Targeting (OTHT). OTHT is the location evaluation and reporting/trans-

mission of data for a target outside the active sensor horizon of a missile-firing unit by means of a TRU.
c. Disguised Targeting. This is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data for an enemy
within sensor range of a missile-firing unit aimed to disguise its presence.
d. Remote Targeting. This is the evaluation of target data for a missile engagement by means of
a system-integrated remote sensor platform capable of midcourse and terminal command override.
e. Target Reporting Unit (TRU). TRU is a sensor platform (manned or remotely piloted). This
unit is able to evaluate and report/transmit data for surface picture compilation and missile engagement to a
missile-firing unit.
f. Voice/RATT Reporting. This is the reporting of data for surface picture compilation and mis-
sile engagement for a TRU to a missile-firing unit by voice/RATT.
g. Link Reporting. This is the transmission of data surface picture compilation and missile en-
gagement from a TRU to a missile-firing unit by automatic data transmission in real time (Link).
8502 OVER-THE-HORIZON TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS
a. Appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW. The OTC normally promulgates his antisurface
warfare policy using the appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW.
b. Employment of OTHT Weapons. Normally OTHT-capable weapons are force weapons

and therefore are employed as directed by the OTC or delegated authority.
c. Policy Considerations. The following is a list of items to be considered for inclusion in the
policy:
(1) Retain or delegate authority to initiate OTHT and coordination.
(2) Target priorities and desired results.
(3) Firing units in order of preference.
8-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) TRUs in order of preference.
(5) Force defensive action.
(6) SAG employment.
(7) Geographical and environmental aspects.
(8) EMCON.
(9) Sensor employment (including parameters of target vehicle emitters).
(10) Weapon release criteria.
(11) Mutual interference.
(12) Weapon economy.
(13) Damage assessment.
8503 ACCURACY OF TARGET DATA
Because of the finite size of the search pattern of an ASSM, the greatest possible accuracy of target-
ing information is required to ensure a high probability of missile acquisition which depends upon:
a. The accuracy of the sensor(s) used.
b. The positional accuracy of, and time delay in, plotting and calculating target data (course, speed,
position, and forecast movement).
c. The ability of the missile and/or reporting unit to discriminate between targets in formation to en-
sure engagement of the optimum target.
d. The positional accuracy of the data link/voice reporting reference point.
e. The accuracy of transfer of target data to the ASSM system in the firing system.
f. The accuracy of ASSM navigation and/or guidance systems in the flight profiles.
g. The ability to update target data to the missile in flight.
h. The countermeasures employed by the target and EPM capabilities of ASSM and launch or re-
porting unit.
8504 SELECTION AND STATIONING OF A TARGET REPORTING UNIT
a. Providing Target Data. Where target data cannot be provided by the ASSM launch vehicles
own sensors, selection of the TRU is very important to ensure provision of the most accurate and
up-to-date information. Target reporting units may include:
(1) Radar and/or ESM-fitted helicopters.
(2) Shipborne ASW aircraft.
8-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).
(4) Land- or carrier-based fighter/attack/reconnaissance aircraft.
(5) EW/AEW aircraft.
(6) Land-based ESM and radar stations, including installations, such as oil and gas platforms.
(7) Surface units, preferably capable of data link transmissions to the firing unit.
(8) Submarines.
(9) Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).
b. Radar-Fitted Aircraft. These aircraft usually provide the most effective platforms by virtue
of their mobility, extended sensor horizon, and endurance. Reporting accuracy may be increased if the air-
craft is fitted with data link transmission facilities.
c. TRU Stationing. Stationing the TRU will depend upon:
(1) Type of vehicle used, including self-defense capability of the TRU.
(2) Sensor fit. Active sensors will provide a more accurate solution than that obtained by correlation
and triangulation of passive data. The employment of active sensors will depend upon the emission pol-
icy to which the TRU is subject. The range of the TRU from the target will be a function of the discrimi-
nation possible with active sensors and the degree of risk to the TRU acceptable to the OTC.
(3) Range of ASSM engagement.
(4) Communication range between the TRU and the ASSM platform.
(5) Sensors available in the firing unit.
(6) ASSM flight profile, missile-homing search capability, and missile facility to receive
midcourse guidance corrections.
(7) Geographic and environmental constraints.
(8) Geometric considerations, including the need for passive sensor baseline.
(9) Enemy’s defensive systems.
(10) Rules of Engagement (ROE).
(11) Required recognition level and required recognition confidence level.
8505 TARGET REPORTING
Target data from the TRU can be transferred to the firing unit by voice/RATT report or by data link.
a. Voice/RATT Reporting. This has the disadvantage of being slow in data rate, prone to inaccu-
racy, and unless encrypted, it is not secure. Where voice transmissions are unencrypted, the use of a
low-grade code is essential to avoid compromise of friendly positions. Voice/RATT reports need to be fre-
quent and, if reports are passed in grid, a gridlock is required at the earliest opportunity.
8-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Link Reporting. The data link can be directional to a dedicated ASSM platform, or
omnidirectional to permit a number of suitable units to achieve a firing solution. The link need not be dedi-
cated to TPT, because of the high capacity of modern data link systems, but may be usefully employed si-
multaneously in other fields of warfare to best exploit the capabilities of the TRU. Caution should be
exercised when using data link to ensure sufficient gridlock accuracy and track quality for discriminative
targeting of a multiship formation.
c. Methods Used for Passing Target Bearing and Range. Table 8-2 (NMM) shows the
methods that may be used for passing target bearing and, when available, range. The selection of the most
suitable method depends upon the tactical situation and the equipment of the participants. It must be estab-
lished by the firing unit. The TRU should inform the firing unit if it is unable to comply and propose an al-
ternative method.
(NR) (NMM) Details are in ATP 31.
8506 — 8509 SPARE
8-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 8-2. (NU) (NMM) Methods for Passing Target Position
Method Transmission Target Position Passed As Remarks

By
ALFA VOICE Bearing and range from TRU Firing unit maintains radar con-
tact with TRU
BRAVO ONE LINK
TWO VOICE 1. Bearing and range from refer- 1. Designated reference point is
ence position, designated as passed with method being
follows: used.
A. Indicated units 2. Reference position designated
B. Computer reference point at 1A is moving and could be
a firing unit.
C. Pre-ordered reference point
3. Computer reference point des-
D. Grid or geographic reference ignated at 1B is
point geographically fixed at an indi-
cated time and should be
E. Helicopter reference point updated every 15 minutes.
(HRP)
2. Grid or geographic coordinates.
CHARLIE VOICE Bearing and range from firing unit. 1. May be employed when firing
unit does not hold TRU on ra-
dar, e.g., when firing unit is
operating under silent
EMCON.
2. This method is not suitable for
multi-firing ship situations.
3. If the launching platform is fit-
ted with tacan, EMCON
permitting, the TRU may “Re-
quest tacan” to initiate
frequent target reports.
DELTA ONE LINK Bearing only from TRU. Employed when TRU holds tar-
get on passive sensors only.
TWO VOICE
NOTES:
1. If EMCON permits, Method ALFA is preferred for any number of firing units.
2. If Method ALFA cannot be used and there are only one or two firing units, Method CHARLIE is preferred
with TRU reporting data to each firing unit. If there are more than two firing units, Method BRAVO ONE/
TWO 1A or BRAVO ONE/TWO 1B, depending on EMCON in force, is preferred.
3. Whenever voice is employed, secure speech equipment should be used. If not fitted, low-grade codes are
acceptable, bearing in mind time delays are involved.
8-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION VI — DEFENSE AGAINST SURFACE THREAT
8600 DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILE-ARMED SHIPS
a. For a successful defense against missile-armed ships, the following criteria must be considered
in addition to other procedures for antisurface warfare:
(1) Detection of the missile carrier(s).
(2) Actions upon interception of threat radars.
(3) Destruction or neutralization of the missile carrier(s) before reaching its engagement range
against friendly forces.
(4) Detection of missile(s) in flight.
(5) Deception and jamming of missile before lock-on.
(6) Measures to break lock-on of missile.
(7) Destruction of missile.
b. Details of defense against missile attacks are set forth in Chapter 7.
8601 DETECTION OF MISSILE CARRIER(S)
Early warning of missile-launching surface craft is of vital importance for the defense of own forces
to ensure the timely initiation of suitable defense measures. Especially, in this context ESM and airborne
surface surveillance efforts must be carefully considered and coordinated.
a. Target/Threat Radars. The interception of electronic emissions will normally be the first in-
dication of the enemy. Therefore, those radar frequencies should be watched continuously that are known
to be surveillance or fire-control radars of missile carriers and would therefore pose an immediate threat
(e.g., SQUARE TIE). Careful ESM tasking is required, including the determination of threat radars.
b. Use of Active Sensors. The policy for using own airborne and surface platform radars must
be matched carefully with ESM tasking in order to provide maximum warning and minimum interference
to ESM equipment and minimum ESM data to a launching platform.
8602 ACTIONS UPON INTERCEPTION OF TARGET/THREAT RADARS
a. Target/Threat Radar Detection. Once a target/threat radar is detected, the OTC may decide
to attack the missile carrier or avoid action:
(1) If an attack is intended, maneuver at maximum speed to bring own weapons to bear and to mini-
mize enemy weapon effectiveness.
(2) If action is to be avoided, turn away from missile carrier at maximum speed, try to show the
smallest possible radar cross-section, and keep firing arcs open.
b. OTCs Considerations. In addition to the alteration of course, speed, and formation, and de-
pending on whether the decision is to attack or to avoid action, the OTC should consider the following
actions:
8-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Actions which cannot be detected by the enemy. Readiness to:
(a) Employ chaff confusion/distraction.
(b) Launch decoys.
(c) Use jammers.
(d) Employ fire-control radars and weapons immediately.
(2) Actions which are likely to be detected by the enemy. Employment of:
(a) Chaff confusion and jammers to cause confusion to the enemy’s picture of the situation.
(b) Own active sensors.
8603 ANTI-FPB OPERATIONS
Table 8-3 contains a checkoff list of points to be considered by the OTC during anti-FPB operations. Not
all of these points will apply to every situation. Additional points to be considered may be found in Table 8-1.
(NR) (NMM) Details on defensive operations against fast patrol boats (FPBs) are set forth in ATP 31.
8604 AIR ANTI-FPB OPERATIONS
The following paragraphs describe airplans that may be employed by MPA and helicopters during
anti-FPB operations.
8605 AIR PLAN BLUEBELL
a. Purpose and Use.
(1) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed for use by MPA employed on anti-FPB operations in support
of a surface force. The aircraft’s primary search sensor will be radar. The airplan is designed to provide
warning of approaching FPBs in the following situations:
(a) Across a given sector, when an assessment can be made of the FPBs’ probable direction of
approach.
(b) All round the surface force, when the FPBs’ direction of approach cannot be assessed.
(2) The OTC attempts to assess the direction from which the FPB threat can be expected and assigns
MPA to execute the appropriate form of the airplan. Aircraft should report all contacts to the OTC im-
mediately, but should not deviate from the patrol to investigate or classify contacts unless specifically
ordered to do so by the OTC.
(3) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed for use in open-ocean waters. When operating in confined wa-
ters or in areas of dense shipping, a geographic or relative airplan, such as Air Plan 5, may be considered
to be more appropriate.
b. Description.
(1) Air Plan BLUEBELL is designed to provide sufficient warning across a given sector for heli-
copters or probe aircraft to intercept, identify, and engage FPBs before they can reach missile-firing po-
sition. When aircraft are on all-round patrol, the warning is only sufficient for interception. In both
8-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 8-3. (NU) Anti-FPB Checkoff List
PRIOR TO ATTACK
1. Avoid FPB probability areas. Transit in daylight if possible.
2. Very bad weather conditions inhibit FPB operations. Sea states 5 or less may be advantageous to the FPB.
Take this into account when planning transits.
3. Prepare/review preplanned responses.
4. Mount maximum air surveillance/reconnaissance all around the force and/or in the threat direction.
5. If threat direction is known, use pickets, barriers, or SAGs (in advanced position).
6. Identify all contacts as early as possible. Use surface and air units.
7. Select an inner or outer screen, depending on circumstances.
8. Review EMCON plan and EW tasking.
9. Review COMPLAN to ensure that it supports anti-FPB operations.
10. Assume the appropriate degree of readiness. Keep air assets at a high degree of availability.
11. Keep a clear and up-to-date surface picture in which own helicopters, direct support aircraft, and chaff are
incorporated to prevent confusion and surprise.
(NC) (NMM)
12. Consider random or dispersed formation.
13. Carry out a very long-leg zigzag with best speed.
WHEN FPB ATTACK DEVELOPS
1. Promulgate the appropriate threat warning.
2. Assume a higher degree of ASUW/AAW readiness.
3. Take appropriate torpedo countermeasures.
4. Ship’s weapon systems are to be used in accordance with standard doctrine.
5. Firm weapon coordination is required.
6. Employ all other possible decoys.
7. Assume the highest aircraft alert state.
(NC) (NMM)
8. Request/order air attack by fixed wing aircraft or HAG.
9. Carry out a short-leg zigzag with high speed.
10. Detach the SAG. Station escorts between the threat and the main body.
11. Turn away the main body.
12. Jam appropriate radars and communications.
13. Fire chaff for confusion.
14. Fire chaff for distraction.
15. Use smoke screen, combined with evasion and chaff.
16. Use illuminants to provoke or prevent enemy maneuvers and possible to achieve blindness.
8-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
cases, an alteration of course by the force away from the FPBs will increase the time available to inter-
cept, identify, and engage.
(2) (NC) (NMM) Six different sectors are detailed in Air Plan BLUEBELL. They are the ahead,
astern, abeam (starboard and port), all-round, and specific sectors.
c. (NC) (NMM) Geometry. The geometry of Air Plan BLUEBELL is based on:
(1) A surface force speed-of-advance of 15 knots.
(2) A maximum sustained FPB speed of 35 knots, giving a closing speed of:
(a) 50 knots from ahead of the force.
(b) 30 knots from abeam.
(c) 20 knots from astern.
(3) A maximum missile firing range of 20 nm. Factors concerning probability of detection, aircraft
scouting speed, and detection ranges, upon which Air Plan BLUEBELL is based, are provided in Table
8-4.
d. (NC) (NMM) Coverage and Security of Search.
(1) Maximum coverage by an aircraft employed on sector patrol will vary with aircraft speed and
sector patrolled. Figure 8-2 gives maximum coverage in degrees for each sector patrolled and for three
ranges of aircraft speed. Coverage in the ahead, astern, and abeam sectors is equally distributed either
side of the centerline.
(2) Patrol in the all-round sector may be in a counterclockwise or clockwise direction. The direction
of patrol should be chosen by the aircraft based on:
(a) Wind direction.
(b) Radar sea returns.
(c) Proximity of land to the force.
(3) Security of search is 95 percent, based on the assumptions in paragraph c. and Table 8-4.
e. (NC) (NMM) Altitude. The optimum altitude to fly on the airplan is best determined by the air-
craft and will normally be optimum radar search altitude for prevailing conditions. Before commencing the
airplan in support of a surface force, the aircraft is to inform the OTC of the preferred search altitude and
the aircrafts true airspeed (TAS) at that altitude.
f. (NC) (NMM) Format of Tasking Message.
A. Air plan sector in NUCO. Sectors are designated as follows (see Figure 8-2):
SECTOR ONE Ahead sector
SECTOR TWO Astern sector
SECTOR THREE Starboard beam sector
8-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTOR FOUR Port beam sector
SECTOR FIVE All-round sector
SECTOR SIX Specific sector, such as 140 to 180 degrees true.
B. Length of time OTC wishes the aircraft to remain on the air plan.
C. PIM. Course in degrees and speed of advance in knots.
D. Start time of the air plan.
E. Additional instructions. The following should be covered:
1. Frequency with which reports are to be updated.
2. Information on cooperating units.
3. Whether the aircraft is to close contacts to identify them.
Table 8-4. (NU) (NMM) Criteria for Air Plan BLUEBELL
SECTOR PATROL ALL-ROUND PATROL
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION 95 percent assumed, by radar, for an 67 percent assumed, by radar, for an
FPB at 25 nm in sea states 0 to 4. FPB at 35 nm in sea states 0 to 4.
AIRCRAFT SCOUTING SPEED 90 percent of true airspeed (TAS) 200 knots minimum (see Note 2).
(see Note 1).
DETECTION RANGE FPBs should be detected before FPBs should be detected between
they reach a position: 30 to 40 nm from the force to allow
(a) 45 nm ahead of force, sufficient time for interception by
(b) 35 nm abeam, or helicopters or attack aircraft.
(c) 30 nm astern
To allow sufficient time for intercep-
tion, identification, and engagement
by helicopters or probe aircraft.
NOTES:
1. In Figure 8-2, three ranges of TAS are shown. The lowest speed in each range has been used.
2. An increase in TAS will increase the security of the search. However, it should be kept in mind that a speed
increase may adversely affect the aircraft’s time on task.
8-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTOR ONE—AHEAD SECTOR
TAS (knots) AT PATROL ALTITUDE

AHEAD
160-179 180-199 200-220
ORIGIN RELATIVE
TO QQ OR ZZ 326/48 322/51 320/52
LEG A-B 073/28 076/32 075/35

LEG B-C 107/28 104/32 105/35
LEG C-A 270/54 270/62 270/68
TOTAL COVERAGE* 100º 110º 120º
*Equally divided about the fore and aft line.
0 10 20
NM
EXAMPLE
EXECUTE AIRPLAN BLUEBELL
ALFA SECTOR NUCO ONE UNNUCO A
BRAVO UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS
CHARLIE NUCO 070T/15 UNNUCO
DELTA 1000Z
ECHO Report all contacts and update every 45 minutes.
No identification required. 030/52
MLA
60º
070/15
QQ 60º
1000Z
C
AIRCRAFT TAS — 210 KNOTS
— — — — — — SECTOR COVERED
Figure 8-2. (NU) (NMM) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL
8-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTOR TWO—ASTERN SECTOR

ASTERN
160-179 180-199 200-220
ORIGIN RELATIVE
TO ZZ OR QQ 099/69 095/77 087/78
LEG A-B 250/72 250/81 240/90

LEG B-C 290/72 290/81 300/90
*Equally divided about the fore and aft line.
AIRCRAFT TAS — 210 KNOTS
A
0 10 20
EXAMPLE
NM
ALFA SECTOR NUCO TWO UNNUCO
DELTA 1300Z 037/78
ECHO Report all contacts. Investigate all those within.
___nm of force.
MLA
310/15
ZZ
1300Z 200º
Figure 8-2. (NU) (NMM) Aircraft Flightpaths for Air Plan BLUEBELL (Cont.)
8-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTORS THREE AND FOUR—ABEAM SECTORS

STARBOARD TAS (knots) AT PATROL ALTITUDE
(THREE) 160-189 190-209 210-220
ORIGIN RELATIVE
TO ZZ OR QQ 043/49 037/55 035/59
LEG A-B 178/36 178/44 178/49
LEG B-C 190/18 190/22 190/25
*Equally divided fore and aft of the beam.

PORT
(FOUR) 160-189 190-209 210-220
ORIGIN RELATIVE
TO QQ OR ZZ 317/49 323/55 325/59
LEG A-B 182/36 182/44 182/49 AIRCRAFT TAS — 205 KNOTS
LEG B-C 170/18 170/22 170/25
*Equally divided fore and aft of the beam.
0 10 20
A NM
323/55
MLA
EXAMPLE (SECTOR FOUR)
360/15
ALFA SECTOR NUCO FOUR UNNUCO
BRAVO UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS B 130º ZZ
2100Z
DELTA 2100Z
ECHO Report all contacts. No identification required.

SEA KING c/s 44 carrying flares airborne. C
Frequency designator (ASW helicopter control
unit). IFF (modes and codes in NUCO).
8-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTOR FIVE—ALL-AROUND SECTOR

FLIGHT PATH DIRECTION COUNTER- CLOCKWISE
RELATIVE TO PIM* CLOCKWISE
ORIGIN RELATIVE
TO ZZ OR QQ 204/25 156/25
LEG DISTANCE RELATIVE TRACK

A-B 49 074 286
B-C 56 359 001
C-D 39 290 070
D-E 20 270 090
E-F 40 228 132
F-G 29 180 180
G-A 48 125 235

E D
* Before deciding flightpath direction, the aircraft captain
should consider, among other things, wind direction,
resulting sea returns on radar, and proximity of land to
the force.
C
360/15
G
1000Z
A
0 10 20
EXAMPLE (COUNTER CLOCKWISE)
NM
ALFA SECTOR NUCO FIVE UNNUCO
BRAVO UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS SCOUTING SPEED — 200 kts
DELTA 1000Z
ECHO Report all contacts.
NOTE: Although the aircraft's flightpath is not symmetrical around

the force, the airplan's design provides equal coverage whatever the
direction of approach of enemy FPBs. The asymmetry of the
pattern is caused by the relationship between aircraft flightpath
and velocities of the surface force and FPBs.
8-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTOR SIX—SPECIFIC SECTOR

DATUM POINTS RELATIVE TO QQ OR ZZ
A 360/55 C 090/45 E 270/45
B 040/53 D 180/30 F 320/53
TAS (kts) AT PATROL ALTITUDE
SPECIFIC 160-179 180-199 200-220

SECTOR BARRIER LENGTH (nm)
57 64 71
TOTAL COVERAGE WHEN USED*
AHEAD 80º 100º 120º
ON THE BOW 85º 105º 120º
ON THE BEAM 130º KEY
95º 115º
ON THE QUARTER 155º AIRCRAFT TAS — 198 KNOTS
130º 145º
ASTERN 160º DATUM POINTS
140º 150º
DATUM LINE
*Figures are approximate and depend on the exact location
of the barrier. Some interpolation may be necessary. It is SECTOR COVERED
suggested that the lowest figure be used to ensure security
of search. Aircraft flight path S to F to E to T and
reverse.
LEADING EDGE
OF SECTOR
345º
A
FLIGHTPATH
ORIGIN (WITHIN 5º S
TO 10º OF LEADING
EDGE OF SECTOR)
F
EXAMPLE (SECTOR 240 to 345 TRUE) MLA 360/15

ALFA NUCO 240T/345T UNNUCO
CHARLIE NUCO 360T/15 UNNUCO QQ
E
DELTA 0700Z T 0700Z
ECHO Report all contacts. Investigate all contacts within
___nm of the force.
240º
0 20
NM

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 9
Antisubmarine Warfare
9000 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This chapter lists the types of operation available to counter the submarine threat and details tactical
and procedural instructions for ships, submarines, and aircraft when operating individually or in coopera-
tion with other maritime forces. Table 9-1 lists the air plans, attack and support methods, and search plans
available for use by an ASW unit and in coordinated ASW action.
(NR) (NMM) Amplification of and background information on the subjects presented in this chap-
ter are found in ATP 28. Details on submarine operations are found in ATP 18.
9001 COMMAND IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
The OTC’s functions in antisubmarine warfare, including those that may be delegated to the ASWC,
are summarized in Table 1-4.
9002 FORCE TRACK COORDINATOR (SURFACE) (FTC-S) AND FORCE TRACK COOR-
DINATOR (SUBSURFACE) (FTC-SS)
The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface surveillance to one of the warfare commanders.
They in turn can assign an FTC. In principle the designated force track coordinator surface and subsurface
performs the tasks as described in Chapter 6, Article 6314.
9003 — 9009 SPARE
9010 DEFINITIONS OF ASW OPERATIONS
There are three types of ASW operation:
a. Area operations.
b. Associated Support operations.
c. Direct Support operations.
9011 ASW AREA OPERATIONS
ASW area operations are generally conducted by units operating independently. Such operations
are conducted in geographic areas through which enemy submarines are likely to pass or which are likely
to contain patrolling submarines. Areas may be related to the protection of maritime forces scheduled to
enter the area or to provide defense in depth to distant forces. Operational control of units conducting area
operations remains with the Area Commander. Tactical control of units conducting area operations is exer-
cised by commanders subordinate to the Area Commander.
9012 ASW ASSOCIATED SUPPORT OPERATIONS
In Associated Support operations, the designated ASW unit operates independently of a specified
task force/group, but may be tasked to provide contact information to, and receive intelligence from, an
OTC. The designated unit operates under the operational control of the Area Commander, who coordinates
9-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-1. ASW Air Plans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans
For plans RED and BLACK, see Table 9-5.

AIR PLANS Page Page
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTERS: SEARCH PLANS (Convoy Escort):
Airplans 1 to 5 (NMM) . . . . . . . 9-63 to 9-69 52S Beetroot (NMM) . . . . . . . . . . . 10-20
53S Carrot (NMM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-23
DIPPING HELICOPTERS:
Airplans 41 to 48 (NMM) . . . . . . 9-70 to 9-80 SEARCH PLANS (Surface):
1S Oaktree (Area, Intercept, Lost
ATTACK AND SUPPORT METHODS: Contact, Bottom) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-87
3A Geographic Sector (NMM) . . . . . . . 9-83 2S Acorn (Lost Contact) (NMM) . . 9-88 to 9-90
3A MOD Modified Geographic 2SH MOD Acorn Modified (Lost
Sector (NMM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-84 Contact) (NMM). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-91
11AH Bear (NMM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-85 14SH Cordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-86
14AH Cordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-86
NOTE
Extracts of plans may be made for aircraft assigned to duty requiring their use. These extracts are to be
properly safeguarded and are to be burned when no longer required.
tasking and movement in response to the OTC’s requirements. Such operations can be conducted by sur-
face ships with towed arrays, aircraft, and submarines.
(NR) (NMM) Details on submarine Associated Support operations are contained in ATP 18.
9013 ASW DIRECT SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Direct Support operations are those in which the designated unit provides ASW support to a speci-
fied task force/group. Tactical control of the direct support unit is by the OTC of the force being supported
or a designated subordinate.
(NR) (NMM) Submarine direct support procedures are described in ATP 18.
9014 RANGES OF ASW SENSORS AND WEAPONS
a. ASW Sensor and Weapon Equipment. These are classified by maximum range capability
as follows:
(1) Short range — under 5,000 yards.
(2) Medium range — 5,000 to 15,000 yards.
(3) Long range — over 15,000 yards.
b. Predicted Sonar Range (PSR). PSRs are determined by each unit for its sensors under the
existing environmental conditions. When mixed-layer and thermocline conditions exist, PSRs are calcu-
lated for various sensor and target depth combinations in-layer and below layer. PSRs can be determined
for active or passive sensors, and depend on the sensor’s characteristics, operator’s ability, environmental
conditions, target source levels for passive operations, and depth locations of sensor and target. PSRs
should normally be determined on a 50 percent probability of detection, if not otherwise stated. When con-
venient, units fitted with variable depth sonars may specify the minimum and maximum figures of PSR for
targets below layer depth and report the shallowest target depths at which these figures are predicted.
9-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
(NR) (NMM) The method of calculation is in accordance with national doctrine, but uses the general
principles laid down in ATP 28.
c. Tactical Sonar Range (TSR). The TSR for ships and helicopters is decided and promulgated
by the OTC or commander/coordinator to whom the duty is delegated. When sonars of significantly different
capabilities are present in the same force, the OTC may elect to promulgate more than one TSR. TSR enables
the ASW or screen commander to station units to optimize ASW defense. TSR is also used for calculating the
distance apart at which units are stationed during ASW action. TSR is based on reported PSRs and may make
allowance for probable submarine depth and other tactical consideration. For tactical convenience, TSRs are
expressed in multiples of 500 yards, and normally should not be greater than the appropriate PSR.
9015 — 9019 SPARE
9020 (NC) (NMM) ASW WEAPON STATE REPORTS
ASW weapon states are reported by means of CAKE reports that are passed, without request, to the
OTC, ASWC, or SAU commander whenever the availability status of ASW weapons is reduced by 50 per-
cent of the total of specific weapons carried. The OTC/ASWC/SAU commander may also ask for current
CAKE states.
The following letters are to be used:
SHIP-LAUNCHED SHORT RANGE:
A Ahead thrown (Hedgehog/rocket type)
B Ahead/all round thrown (mortar type)
C Depth charge (dropped)
D Depth charge (self-propelled)
SHIP-LAUNCHED TORPEDOES:
H Heavyweight
J Lightweight
SHIP-LAUNCHED MEDIUM RANGE:
M ASW missile
AIR-LAUNCHED:
R Lightweight torpedo
S Depth charge (free fall)
T Depthcharge (self-propelled)
-Example-
A unit which has 9 torpedoes Mk 46 Mod 5, 3 torpedoes Mk 37 (Mod 0), and 24 depth charges
remaining, would report: “(C/S OTC/SAUC) this is (C/S) — CAKE Charlie two four tack Ho-
tel three tack Juliett nine-over.”
9-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION I — EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS
9100 ASW SHIPS
9101 SURFACE SCREENS
The design and selection of ASW surface screens will depend on:
a. Number of screening units available and their individual and collective weapons and sensor fits.
b. Size and disposition of the force being Screened.
c. Availability of ASW aircraft.
d. Anticipated threat.
e. Environmental conditions.
f. Tactical sonar ranges.
g. PIM, including any navigational constraints.
h. Requirement for command, control, and communication, including Emission Policy.
i. Requirement for supporting operations; for example, replenishment.
j. Requirement for other forms of defense; for example, AAW.
k. Requirement for nuclear spacing.
l. Deception policy.
(NR) (NMM) These and other factors are considered in ATP 28 and in Chapters 3 and 12.
9102 — 9104 SPARE
9105 SURFACE SHIP TOWED ARRAYS

(NR) (NMM) (See also ATP 28)
a. Generally, the method of employing a towed array ship will depend on the type of array fitted.
Surveillance Towed Array Systems (SURTAS) tend to have an extremely long length and are optimized
for very slow towing speeds. For this reason, they are best suited to stationary operations which allow them
to patrol their stations at slow speed and to avoid frequent maneuvers which cause array destabilization and
degrade its performance. Tactical Towed Array Systems (TACTAS) are specifically designed for higher
speeds and are the best option for moving-PIM operations such as convoy escort. The actual performance
of an array depends as well on its design. Critical Angle Towed Array Systems (CATAS) tend to be less af-
fected by tow ship noise due to the greater length of tow cable than do arrays towed from a depressor
(DTAS). Hence a CATAS will tend to provide better all round ranges of initial detection and tracking than
can be expected of a DTAS.
b. To enhance effectiveness as an ASW sensor system, it is necessary for a towed array ship to re-
duce the range at which it may be counterdetected by the submarine. For this reason, the towed array ship
9-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
will tend to operate in as silent an Emission Policy as possible. It is therefore necessary for the OTC to pro-
vide as much guidance as possible to the ship prior to its taking up station to avoid unnecessary electromag-
netic (EM) emissions which may reveal its presence. The following areas should be addressed in
appropriate messages/orders.
(1) The policy on contact reporting frequency.
(2) The relative importance of stationkeeping versus contact holding.
(3) The degree of freedom allowed the towed array ship with respect to EMCON in order to prose-
cute his contacts.
(4) Additional assets available to help prosecute contacts and the means of obtaining them.
(5) The OTC’s assessment of the tactical situation, together with a summary of the positions of
friendly, neutral, and hostile shipping, should be transmitted to the TAS ship as frequently as possible.
(6) Anticipated changes to PIM and the time the TAS ship is to reposition with respect to it.
(7) (NC) (NMM) Acoustic intelligence. Area Commanders and the ASWC should promulgate
all current target acoustic intelligence in the form of a brief summary including the significant sources,
frequencies, source levels, modes of operation, and aspect dependencies of all targets of interest in their
subordinate’s area.
9107 STATIONING OF TOWED ARRAY UNITS
The selection of a station for a TAS ship is based on the following considerations:
a. Own Force Noise. The reduction of force noise levels reaching a towed array is an important
element in increasing its detection envelope. For this reason, all units operating near a towed array ship
should institute measures to reduce their radiated noise levels.
(NC) (NMM) For the same reason, the towed array ship’s station must be selected so as to be clear of
the force’s residual radiated noise. In particular, the direct path and convergence zone annulus must be
avoided. In this regard, degradation caused by tow ship noise and/or endfire gaps should also be
considered.
b. Reaction Time. Towed array ships may be stationed ahead, astern, or on the flanks of a force.
Regardless of the relative position chosen, such ships should be stationed sufficiently far from the force to
allow the OTC time to react to detections made by the TAS ships. The actual distance will depend on:
(1) Whether the expected threat is equipped with missiles, torpedoes, or a mixture of both.
(2) Whether the threat is from nuclear or diesel-electric submarines.
(3) The type of localization to be employed.
(4) The time to complete localization.
(NC) (NMM) This time will vary from several minutes when ships are stationed to allow cross-fix-
ing to several hours for single-ship TMA localization.
(5) Detection envelopes. These will vary for different types of TAS.
9-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(NC) (NMM) In addition, the detection range will vary depending on the direction from which a
submarine closes the force. For example, a ship stationed astern of the force can expect to encounter sub-
marines, moving, closing slowly relative to the force but at a higher and, thus, noisier true speed than a TAS
ship stationed ahead. Thus, the range of detection for a given system can be increased, thereby providing
more reaction time than by choice of station alone.
(6) Whether the OTC is primarily concerned with alertment to allow evasion or whether he intends
further prosecution.
(7) Other sensors and weapons such as ESM or Area Air Defense fitted in the towed array unit.
c. Communications. The communication fit of a towed array ship will affect the OTC’s stationing
decision as well. Ships should not be stationed at a distance from the OTC/ASWC such that they are not capa-
ble of passing, on a real-time basis, contact information and of receiving orders from the OTC/ASWC (see
Chapter 4). Long-range communications are required between towed array ships and the OTC/ASWC to:
(1) Station units.
(2) Report figure of merit (FOM) and contact data to the OTC/ASWC.
(3) Request and coordinate nonorganic air support (from ashore).
(4) Assign aircraft to a TAS contact prosecution.
(5) Coordinate the task force/task group response to an ASW contact.
(6) Join MPA coming on task. This may be delegated to the ASWACU (see Chapter 6 for MPA
joining procedures).
d. Mutual Support. Because of the distance at which TAS ships can operate from the force, mu-
tual support for TAS ships should be considered in the following areas:
(1) (NC) (NMM) Defense Against Air Attack. TAS ships tend to operate in the covert mode;
therefore, they may be vulnerable to air attack. If unable to defend itself, some provision should be made
to include the TAS station in the force’s AAW defended area.
(2) Independent Localization and Attack. The TAS ship may be provided with an independ-
ent localizing and attacking vehicle such as a helicopter or MPA. Surface ship ASW pouncers may pro-
vide another option.
(NC) (NMM) This may be necessary because TAS ships are capable of detecting contacts at dis-
tances far greater than the effective range of their weapon systems and are often unable to localize to at-
tack criteria.
(3) Communications and Stationing Considerations. Depending on the limiting lines of

approach (LLA) and the frontal coverage desired, it may be advantageous to station towed array ships
specifically to allow for cross-fixing. In this event, it will be necessary to provide reliable communica-
tions between the TAS ships. If equipment fitment or EMCON restrictions prevent such communica-
tions, an acoustically quiet surface ship or an aircraft may be stationed between the TAS ships to act as a
relay unit.
(NC) (NMM) If it is decided to position towed array ships to enable cross-fixing, the following
points are relevant:
(a) The LLA for the anticipated threat should be covered by the TAS ships.
9-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) The TAS ships should be stationed to provide a significant overlap in their passive coverage
to maximize the probability of concurrent contact. A separation between TAS ships equal to UHF
communication range optimizes both probability of simultaneous contact and UHF communications.
(c) The ships should be stationed at a distance along PIM from the main body sufficient to
maximize coverage within the LLA while minimizing interference caused by force-generated noise
and providing sufficient reaction time for the OTC.
(d) Depending on the TAS ship fitment, it may be necessary for the TAS escort to employ
sprint and search tactics to optimize detection opportunities in high speed of advance (SOA) situa-
tions. The OTC must be kept informed of the TAS escort’s requirement to conduct sprint and search
as the possible resultant degradation to screen integrity must be considered when formulating his
overall ASW plan. If sufficient TAS escorts are available, the OTC should consider coordinating
their sprint and search cycles so that as one searches the other sprints. In addition, it may be possible
to employ sprint and search tactics as a means of generating submarine movement. Generally, a
short sprint/search cycle is preferable to a cycle which employs a long period of sprint coupled with
long search times. SOA in excess of 12 knots may degrade towed array operations.
(e) Delivery boy replenishment is recommended for towed array ships in the outer screen. If,
however, the towed array ship departs station for replenishment, the OTC must determine the time
to return to station and the method of screening in the interim.
9108 (NC) (NMM) TOWED ARRAY SCREEN STATION OPTIONS
Towed array surface ships may be stationed ahead in the outer or inner screen within the LLA, or
astern of the escorted force. The advantages and disadvantages are:
a. Outer Screen.
(1) Advantages. A station in the outer screen will optimize the TAS detection envelope, the fron-
tal coverage, and reduce interference caused by force-radiated noise. In addition, it will provide the
OTC with the most reaction time.
(2) Disadvantages. In the distant outer screen, the problems associated with command, control,
and communication are made more difficult. It is more difficult to provide individual TAS ships with
mutual support. Localization and attack will probably require support from air assets and take a signifi-
cant amount of time to accomplish.
b. Inner Screen.
(1) Advantages. The OTC will have better control over the TAS ship due to improved communi-
cations. At the same time, mutual support is more easily provided.
(2) Disadvantages. The proximity of the TAS ship to the escorted force will considerably reduce the
reaction time available to the OTC as well as preclude totally effective use of the frontal coverage available.
In addition, the proximity of force-generated noise may reduce the size of the TAS detection envelope.
c. Astern.
(1) Advantages. The principle advantage of the astern station lies in covering the rear of the force
against the approach of the fast nuclear submarine. Escorts with a low passive FOM or badly degraded
forward endfire maybe best employed in this role particularly if fitted with a broadband intercept
capability.
9-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Disadvantages. The use of a TAS ship astern of the force may reduce the overall ASW cover-
age provided ahead within the LLA.
9109 TOWED ARRAY ZERO-PIM OPERATIONS
Towed array ships may also be employed in zero-PIM operations such as barrier patrols, defended
lanes, and area surveillance. The OTC should consider these factors:
a. Selection of Station Size. In direct support operations, the OTC will have to decide on the
size of the area to be allocated to a towed array ship. The size of the area allocated will depend on the ex-
pected initial PSR for the sensor involved against the anticipated threat. The actual size should be such that
the revisit time throughout the area should be small enough to ensure the target cannot complete a transit
through the area between TAS ship visits.
b. Selection of Search Type. When applied to towed array searchers, the sweep width should
be replaced by the expected PSR. The specific type of search will depend on the actual operation. For ex-
ample, to search an area of probability (AOP) or datum, the expanding square search may provide the best
results whereas for defended lane operations, a linear or crossover patrol may be appropriate.
(NR) (NMM) This is based on the criteria laid out in ATP 31, Chapter 6, and ATP 28, Chapter 4.
9110 ASW HELICOPTERS
Stationing of helicopter carrying escorts in the screen should be made, if possible, to provide opti-
mum relative wind to facilitate launch and recovery without having the escorts leave their assigned sectors.
ASW helicopters may be fitted with sonobuoys, processors, dipping active/passive sonar, airborne
radars, FLIR, MAD, ESM and/or ASW torpedoes and depth bombs. When tasked within a force, they may
be considered as force assets or as extensions to ship’s sensors and weapon systems. Helicopters fitted with
sonobuoys and processors may be tasked in the same way as direct support fixed-wing aircraft. Screening
stations for helicopters fitted with ASW sensors should be selected using similar considerations to those
for surface units (see Article 9101).
(NC) (NMM) However, the limited endurance and buoy capacity may make them more suited for
flank screening rather than the ahead sector.
9112 ASW HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT
ASW helicopters may be allocated for screening duties as indicated in Chapter 3 and may also be or-
dered to carry out other ASW tasks.
(NR) (NMM) These tasks may be ordered by means of the airplans summarized in Table 9-2. Full
details of airplans for dipping helicopters are in Figures 9-5 to 9-15.
9113 — 9119 SPARE
9-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-2. (NU) (NMM) Airplans
Task Fixed-Wing Dipping

Aircraft/ Helicopters
Helicopters
Bearing 1 41, 42, 43

Investigation
Datum or Contact 2 44, 47, 48

Investigation
Barrier 3 45
Screening 4, 5 41, 42, 43
Area Investigation 5 41, 42, 43, 46
9120 ASW FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
a. Air Operations Procedures. Air operations procedures described in Chapter 6, Section IV,
apply to the tasking of ASW aircraft. The OTC’s functions for both ASW and air coordination are summa-
rized in Tables 1-4 and 1-6.
b. Planning. The following factors should be considered in planning and controlling ASW air
operations:
(1) Overall tactical situation.
(2) Assumed or known capabilities and tactics of the enemy.
(3) Number, type, and capabilities of available aircraft, including sensors and weapons.
(4) Size and location of area of operations.
(5) Environmental conditions.
(6) Availability and characteristics of cooperating and/or supporting units, including ships, subma-
rines, and other aircraft.
(7) Frequency of coverage required (revisit time).
c. Tasking. Fixed-wing ASW aircraft may be ordered to carry out ASW tasks by means of dedi-
cated airplans.
(NR) (NMM) These are summarized in Table 9-2. Details of airplans are contained in Figures 9-5 to 9-9.
d. RAINFORMS. Since aircrews and air controllers must be thoroughly briefed, it is mandatory
that Form GREEN be sufficiently detailed. When land-based aircraft have been ordered to provide support
to a force at sea, the OTC of the force will be informed by means of a Form GREEN. When organic air sup-
port is provided, the flying schedule will be promulgated by appropriate message.
9-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9122 CONDUCT OF AIRPLANS FOR FIXED-WING ASW AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS
a. Aircraft Flightpath. The flightpath of an aircraft within an assigned area depends on the type
of aircraft; on the search, localization, and navigation equipment available; and on environmental condi-
tions. An ASW aircraft joining a force should be prepared to inform the OTC of the maximum size of the
area that it can search effectively under the prevailing conditions.
b. Contact Investigation. When an airplan is ordered which requires an aircraft to investigate a

contact or bearing, it is essential that sufficient details of the contact or bearing be passed to the aircraft to al-
low the aircraft commander to determine the most appropriate search and localization procedures to be used.
c. Variations to Airplans. When an airplan is ordered, the order may include variations to the
airplan and any amplifying instructions not included in the order table.
d. Relative Airplans. The term “relative” applied to an airplan implies that the area so ordered
shall assume the intended movement of the force. It does not affect the bearings associated with airplans.
These bearings are always given in degrees from true North.
e. Change of PIM in Relative Airplans. The direction in which ships are to proceed may be
changed in many ways which may or may not require a change of airplan. To avoid misunderstandings,
whenever it is necessary to alter the PIM on which a relative airplan is based, the airplan is to be reordered.
f. Accuracy of Airplan Origin, Datum, or Contact Position. When ordering an airplan, it may be
desirable to use radar to ensure that the origin of the airplan, datum, or contact position is accurately established.
(NR) (NMM) (See Table 9-2.) For specific details of these airplans, see Figures 9-5 to 9-15.
9123 AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORT OF TOWED ARRAY SHIPS
The aircraft assigned is required to:
a. Join the AAWC/ASWC/ASWACU in direct support. In associated support and area operations, the
aircraft will cooperate with the towed array ship, depending on the disposition of forces, to prosecute contacts.
b. Report contacts to the OTC/ASWC/ASWACU in direct support and to the area commander and
cooperating individual towed array ships in area operations. In associated support, report contacts to the
OTC/AWC/ASWACU and to the area commander.
c. Receive and acknowledge the SAC’s AOP, airplans, search plans, and attack plans when con-
tact is held.
d. Exchange precise target acoustic data (type of contact, frequencies, sources, Doppler, complete bear-
ing information, and target movement) with the SAC and other cooperating units when contact is gained.
(NR) (NMM) See APP 4 for passive contact handover procedures.
9124 SPARE
9125 PASSIVE SONOBUOY PROCEDURES
9126 SONOBUOY PATTERN (JEZPAT) PROCEDURE
JEZPAT procedures facilitate the ordering or reporting of a sonobuoy barrier or pattern. This pattern
can be of any size up to a maximum of 81 sonobuoys and can be of any shape depending on the posts speci-
fied. Post spacing is equal in all directions. Care must be taken when choosing the master post to ensure that
the field can be expanded later.
9-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(NR) (NMM) APP-4 contains JEZPAT format.
9127 SONOBUOY INTERFERENCE AVOIDANCE PLAN (SIAP)
When sonobuoy-equipped units are operating in adjacent areas and mutual interference is likely, the
controlling authority (the OTC/delegated commander during direct support operations and the shore head-
quarters during area operations) should formulate a SIAP.
(NC) (NMM) The SIAP is achieved by ordering that odd-numbered channels or even-numbered
channels, as appropriate, should not be used close to (normally within 40 nautical miles) the adjacent area.
The appropriate area boundary is specified geographically; for example, N, SE, or WNW. The RF capture
phenomenon should also be exploited to avoid mutual interference. SIAP is also achieved by assigning dif-
ferent channel bands to separate units operating in proximity (e.g., Helos 1-10, MPA 11-20, Ships 21-31).
a. Promulgation of SIAP. The SIAP should be promulgated in the tasking or joining instruc-
tions. An example is given in Figure 9-1.
b. Direct Support. Channels should be allocated to direct support units by the OTC/ delegated
commander such that even channels are dropped to port of MLA and odd channels to starboard of MLA.
Units on area operations adjacent to direct support areas are to observe the corollary of this rule; that is, an
aircraft on area operations adjacent to a direct support unit to port of MLA should use only odd-numbered
buoys within 40 nautical miles of the direct support area.
c. Associated Support/Area Operations. For fixed-wing aircraft assigned to either Associ-

ated Support or area ASW operations, the SIAP should be based upon the expected geographic separation
of sonobuoy search patterns. Arbitrary odd/even plans should be avoided unless multiple search assets are
assigned to the same geographic area.
d. Units Prosecuting a Submarine Contact. SIAP restrictions do not apply and these units
are permitted to use any sonobuoys, using the shortest practical life.
e. Specific Channels. Some channels may be reserved by the OTC/delegated commander for
communication with submarines in direct support.
9128 — 9129 SPARE
9130 ASW SUBMARINES
ASW submarines may be employed in the following roles:
a. Area operations.
b. Direct Support operations.
c. Associated Support operations.
9132 (NC) (NMM) SUPPORT SUBMARINE PROCEDURES
a. Requesting Support Submarines. The OTC or SOCA submits requests for supporting subma-
rines to the SUBOPAUTH per the format in APP 4, Vol. I. This request should include the following informa-
tion and be of sufficient detail for the SUBOPAUTH to make a decision regarding support unit assignment.
(1) OTC of supported force and commander designated to function as SOCA.
9-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
N Key:
The aircraft in Area 1 is not to drop
odd-numbered buoys within 40 nm
of its NE boundary unless tactically
essential. The order would be in-
40 nm AREA 2 cluded in the Remarks Section of
the Form GREEN.
no no -Example-
odds evens RMK/SIAP/NODS/40/NE//
The aircraft in Area 2 would have a

AREA 1 complementing restriction placed
on it.
-Example-
RMK/SIAP/NEVS/40/SW//
Figure 9-1. (NU) (NMM) Example of SIAP Between Two Aircraft
(2) Mission, intentions, and PIM of supported command.
(3) Number of support submarines requested and duration of support.
(4) Proposed employment of support submarines.
(5) Type of support requested: Associated or Direct.
(6) Desired area of operations (location, size, SAA or JTAA).
(7) Tactical coordination information.
(8) Threat intelligence/situation assessment.
(9) Other amplifying information.
(l0) Nomination or request for a Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC) and/or augmentation re-
quired for a Submarine Advisory Team (SAT).
b. Availability of Support Submarines. If SSNs (or diesel-electric submarines suitably fitted with
the necessary communication and sensor equipment) are available for support operations, the SUBOPAUTH
will assign appropriate units, provide SUBNOTE coverage and submarine operating areas (either SAA or
JTAA ), provide personnel augmentation as needed, and keep the OTC advised. The SUBOPAUTH will advise
the OTC of submarine assignments and their significant equipment configurations.
9-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9133 (NC) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINES IN AREA OPERATIONS
Submarines may be employed in area operations to conduct an individual area patrol. Such subma-
rines operate independently under the control of the SUBOPAUTH, who may assign them specific tasks
that are supportive of a surface force. These tasks are normally executed autonomously with no require-
ment for the submarine to communicate or cooperate with the supported force. The SUBOPAUTH retains
tactical control and informs the supported force commander concerning task status and completion.
9134 (NC) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINES IN DIRECT SUPPORT
Submarines in direct support operate under the tactical control of the OTC or designated subordinate
commander who controls the movement and tactical actions of assigned submarines within specific
waterspace areas designated by the SUBOPAUTH (see Chapter 6). A submarine conducting direct support
is designated SSC(DS), SSK(DS), or SSN(DS) as appropriate.
a. A direct support submarine will normally operate within a JTAA. The OTC may maneuver the
submarine freely within the JTAA (but will not direct the submarine to leave the JTAA) and is responsible
for submarine safety within the JTAA. The SUBOPAUTH is responsible for promulgating the subma-
rine’s waterspace management area and for preventing mutual interference between direct support subma-
rines and all other friendly units not under the OTC’s tactical command. ASW weapon restrictions that
protect friendly submarines from attack by friendly ASW forces are also described in Chapter 6.
b. Employment Options. Direct support submarines may be used in one or more of the follow-
ing options. These options are discussed in detail in Chapter 13 of ATP 18:
(1) Transit operations.
(2) Precursor operations.
(3) Barrier operations.
(4) Coordinated ASW operations.
(5) Surveillance/reconnaissance.
c. Speed of the Force. The speed of the force is a major determinant of how the submarine can
be employed and how effective it will be.
NOTE
Support submarines should not be required to advance through stepped operating areas at
SOAs greater than l0 knots for SSNs or 4 knots for diesel-electric submarines.
9135 (NC) (NMM) COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS IN DIRECT

SUPPORT SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
a. Shifting Tactical Control of Direct Support Submarines. Procedures and requirements

for shifting tactical control are contained in Annex B to Chapter 13 of ATP 18. Placing a submarine in di-
rect support, thereby shifting tactical control to the force commander (who may then delegate it to a subor-
dinate commander), is normally the best command and control option for coordinated submarine/task
group operations. If the assigned submarine’s primary warfare area tasking will be ASW, the ASWC
should be designated as the SOCA (see Chapter l).
9-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(l) The SUBOPAUTH will use the Support Submarine Initial Assignment and Tasking Message
per APP 4, Vol. I, to inform designated submarines of the shift in tactical control and relay initial tasking
and coordination information provided by the force commander.
(2) Before the SUBOPAUTH will assign submarines in direct support, a Submarine Element Coor-
dinator (SEC) must be designated and confirmed by name. Depending upon the number of submarines as-
signed, the anticipated duration of Direct Support operations, and available assets, additional Submarine
Advisory Team (SAT) personnel may be required as watchstanders and planners for the SEC. The
SUBOPAUTH may waive the requirement for an SEC.
b. Relinquishment of Tactical Control. Tactical control of submarines will be returned to the

SUBOPAUTH, as mutually agreed between the force commander and the SUBOPAUTH, either upon the
loss of all communications between the officer exercising tactical control and the submarine, or whenever or-
dered by the SUBOPAUTH. When, for whatever reason, tactical control is returned to the SUBOPAUTH,
the officer exercising tactical control (OTC or designated subordinate commander) is to send a Relinquish-
ment of Tactical Control message per Chapter 3 of APP 4, Vol. I. This message is intended to inform the
SUBOPAUTH of the submarine’s tactical situation when it has operated in direct support for an extended pe-
riod of time and the SUBOPAUTH has incomplete knowledge of submarine tasking.
c. Communications. Communications requirements for submarine direct support or integrated

operations are extensive. Details are found in ATP l8.
9136 (NC) (NMM) STATIONING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT SUBMARINES
a. Determining the Position(s). The SOCA, when proposing the position(s) of JTAAs and/or
SAAs of support submarines, should consider:
(1) Number of support submarines assigned and capabilities (particularly sonar equipment and weapons).
(2) Desired size of each support submarine’s JTAA and the separation between areas.
(3) Separation required between the support submarine and surface forces to avoid acoustic interference.
(4) Additional command, control and communication requirements.
b. Acoustic Interference From Own Force. The position of the support submarine relative to
own forces to minimize the effect of acoustic interference will depend on the sonar conditions and the char-
acteristics of own forces. As a rough guide, active sonar interferes with submarine passive sonars within l0
nm of a surface force when an active search is directed away from the submarine, and within 35 nm when
the search is directed toward the submarine. Furthermore, masking of enemy submarines by propulsion
noise may occur if friendly ships are stationed in the search area of the support submarine. Consideration
must also be given to interference via convergence zone propagation.
c. JTAA Size and Use of SGSA. A JTAA must be sufficiently large to allow the support sub-
marine the freedom of maneuver to carry out its patrol. SGSA procedures should be used extensively to al-
low surface/air units the possibility for use of ASW weapons so that enemy submarines are not given
immunity from attack.
9137 SPARE
9138 (NC) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF SUBMARINES IN ASSOCIATED SUPPORT
A submarine conducting Associated Support operations is designated SSC(AS), SSK(AS), or

SSN(AS) as appropriate. This mode of support submarine operations is employed when on-scene
9-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
coordination with (but not direct control of) support submarines is required, or when the criteria for Direct
Support operations cannot be met. Tactical control is retained by the SUBOPAUTH, who coordinates
tasking of the submarine with the OTC’s support requests. The SUBOPAUTH will assign and station the
submarine(s) using SUBNOTE and WSM message procedures in coordination with the OTC’s require-
ments. The OTC/SOCA will normally amplify submarine tasking using the Support Submarine Force
Summary message. Effective employment of associated support submarine(s) depends on the OTC/SOCA
informing the SUBOPAUTH of desires for submarine employment in a timely manner to allow adequate
time for repositioning. Dedicated communications are required. In Associated Support operations, the
submarine communicates directly with the OTC, but must receive operational tasking and weapons release
authority from the SUBOPAUTH.
a. Employment Options. Submarines in associated support may be employed by:
(l) Using procedures described for direct support submarines.
(2) Using tactics normally employed in area operations, but in coordination with the OTC/SOCA of
the supported force.
b. Reports From Submarines. Supporting submarines should use report formats contained in
APP 4 to pass tactical, operational, and status information to the OTC/SOCA and the SUBOPAUTH .
c. Communication Windows. Three types of communication window may be ordered when us-
ing relay aircraft. Details are set forth in Chapter l2 of ATP l8.
9139 (NC) (NMM) STOVEPIPE PROCEDURES
A STOVEPIPE is a static haven that has a radius of 5 nm from the surface to a specified depth, cen-
tered upon a specified geographic point. A set of STOVEPIPEs may be put into effect within a designated
area. All STOVEPIPEs are established by the SUBOPAUTH.
a. Whenever a single STOVEPIPE is established, it is promulgated as a geographic position, speci-

fied depth, unit assigned, and effective period.
-Example-
STOVEPIPE, 3700N/0 01600W/7, SURFACE TO 150M6, FOR BLUEFISH

131600Z1-141900Z5.
-Or-
When there is a requirement to express depth in feet, this would read: STOVEPIPE, 3700N/0
01600W/7, SURFACE TO 400FT4, FOR BLUEFISH 131600Z1-141900Z5.
b. Whenever a set of STOVEPIPEs is established, two STOVEPIPE plans are available.
(l) PLAN ALFA STOVEPIPEs are located at the intersection of each whole degree of latitude with
each whole degree of longitude and each half degree of latitude with each half degree of longitude
within the designated area.
(2) PLAN BRAVO STOVEPIPEs are located at the intersection of each half degree of longitude
with each whole degree of latitude and at each half degree of latitude with each whole degree of longi-
tude within the designated area.
9-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Whenever a STOVEPIPE lies on a boundary of the designated area, it shall extend beyond the
area to include the full 5-nm radius.
(4) The establishment of a set of STOVEPIPEs is indicated as a STOVEPIPE PLAN, a designated

area, specified depth, unit assigned, and effective period.
-Example-
STOVEPIPE PLAN BRAVO, 33N6 35N8 006E6 008E8, SURFACE TO 150M6, FOR
BLUEFISH 131600Z1 - 141900Z5.
-Or-
When there is a requirement to express depth in feet, this would read: STOVEPIPE PLAN
BRAVO, 33N6 35N8 006E6 008E8, SURFACE TO 400FT4, FOR BLUEFISH 131600Z1 -
141900Z5.
9140 SPARE
9141 (NC) (NMM) AIDED INTERCEPT BY SUBMARINES
Aided intercept is the process of providing information, directions, and advice to assist a submarine to
intercept any seaborne force. The degree of control depends on the circumstances of the operation, the pre-
dictability of an opposition force’s movement, etc., but should always allow freedom of maneuver to the
friendly submarine. Because of the unpredictability of the target’s movement, the submarine’s area may re-
quire frequent and timely modification. Coordination between the submarine, SOCA, and SUBOPAUTH is
essential. Details for conducting aided intercept are contained in Chapters 2, 3, and 13 of ATP l8.
a. Tactical Control. Controllers must ensure that aircraft and other units under their control are
fully aware of the existence and position of the SAA or JTAA in which the submarine(s) is (are) operating.
If the contact of interest leaves the submarine’s area, the SOCA must decide whether to cancel the intercept
tasking or to obtain a new waterspace area assignment from the SUBOPAUTH.
b. Targeting. Targeting for an aided intercept involves the use of information inputs from diverse
sensors and platforms. Collection and analysis of this information prior to its being passed on to the subma-
rine is highly desirable. The submarine may otherwise receive conflicting contact information without the
means to determine which information is valid. Further, valuable search time can be lost if raw information
is transmitted to the submarine. It is the SOCA’s responsibility to ensure that only necessary information is
provided. The submarine Broadcast Control Authority (BCA) and the OTC/SOCA have message screen-
ing responsibilities to ensure that only necessary traffic is passed to the submarine.
c. Coordination Required. The degree of coordination between the SOCA and the submarine
determines the success of aided intercept procedures. The SOCA must provide timely information about
the contact’s movements, while allowing for communication delays, so that the submarine can achieve an
intercept position well in advance of the contact of interest’s arrival at the projected intercept point. Infor-
mation provided to the submarine must indicate the quality and timeliness of the information. The SOCA
must be prepared to act with dispatch in response to revised estimates of target motion.
d. Tasking Message. The SOCA should issue a message initiating the aided intercept. The
SUBOPAUTH will promulgate this information to the submarine by use of BARNSTORM procedures
(see ATP l8). All ASW capable units need to be apprised of JTAAs or SAAs established in support of the
aided intercept operation. The mission tasking and Rules of Engagement (ROE) under which the aided in-
tercept is to be carried out are to be specified. The WHAT, WHERE, WHITHER, and WHEN components
9-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
in the message refer to the latest contact report on the target assigned by the Aided Intercept/BARN-
STORM message.
9142 (NC) (NMM) OPERATION DISROBE
a. Description. This procedure is designed to confuse and break the missile-firing solution of an
SSGN that may be trailing a high value unit (HVU), with or without the support of a marking unit. Sup-
porting (DISROBING) ASW forces set up local ASW surveillance areas through which the HVU (DIS-
ROBED) group steams. On passing through the ASW surveillance area, the DISROBING and
DISROBED forces employ vigorous deceptive maneuvers, combined with electronic and acoustic decep-
tion, to try to break the contact of the trailing SSGN and units marking the HVU. On completion of DIS-
ROBE in the ASW surveillance area, the HVU may then proceed to DISROBE with a second ASW group
in a different area.
b. Deception Tactics. DISROBE stands little chance of throwing off a trailing SSGN unless
comprehensive deception measures are carried out, including rigorous enforcement of EMCON policies.
Measures to be considered include ship maneuvering, acoustic deception, and electronic deception.
(1) Ship Maneuvering.
(a) Exchanging the HVU’s escort with DISROBING force unit.
(b) Splitting the HVU group into smaller groups on passing through the DISROBING force’s
formation.
(c) Use of high speed by certain units.
(d) Conducting DISROBE at night or in poor visibility.
(e) Harassing surface marking units by close countermarking to reduce their concentration on
recording DISROBE maneuvers.
(2) Acoustic Deception.
(a) Use of high-powered sonars as decoys.
(b) Use of noisemakers to increase underwater sounds.
(c) Reduction of the HVU from four propellers to two propellers combined with the use of any
other available ship with four propellers to simulate the HVU.
(d) Coordinating the sonar radiation policy between DISROBING and DISROBED forces in
conjunction with deceptive ship maneuvers.
(e) Jamming underwater communications.
(3) Electronic Deception.
(a) Suppression of high-powered and distinctive emissions, such as tacan and air warning radar.
(b) Intelligently conceived and rigidly enforced emission policies on all radars and communi-
cation circuits in both forces, allowing for ship safety at close quarters during high-speed maneuvers
by day and night.
9-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(c) Use of deceptive tactical messages.
(d) Jamming.
c. Action by DISROBED Group. The OTC of the HVU group is to inform the OTC of the DIS-
ROBING force of:
(1) Rendezvous.
(2) HVU screened and screening unit formation.
(3) HVU PIM.
(4) Safety course and minimum distance ships of the DISROBING force may pass HVU screened
and screening units.
(5) Intended air operations.
(6) Deception measures to commence on passing through rendezvous, to include:
(a) Intended alteration of course and speed by the HVU.
(b) Splitting of the HVU group into smaller groups, including their composition.
(c) Acoustic emission policy.
(d) EMCON plan.
(e) Number of propeller shafts to be used by heavy units.
(f) Measures to be used to confuse surface marking units.
(7) Communications.
(8) Data-link instructions.
d. Action by DISROBING Force. The disposition and tactics of the DISROBING force are at
the discretion of that force’s OTC, except that he must ensure that when the DISROBED group passes
through the rendezvous, none of the DISROBING units are to close within the ordered distance from the
HVU and its escorts.
e. Air Operations.
(1) The OTC of the HVU group is to coordinate air operations to prevent mutual interference be-
tween the groups.
(2) ASW operations will take precedence during DISROBE. A CV will normally suspend
fixed-wing aircraft launch and recovery operations while DISROBE is in progress.
9-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — CONTACT PROSECUTION
The reaction of units gaining contact on a hostile submarine will be influenced by:
a. The range at which contact was gained.
b. The capabilities and ranges of own ASW sensors and weapons.
c. The degree of threat to the force screened.
d. The classification of the target.
9201 CONTACT CLASSIFICATION
Classification is the method by which subordinate commanders inform their superiors and other units
of their opinions as to whether contacts which they have just detected or are investigating are of submarine or-
igin. Since classification is subject to the individual reactions of personnel who have varying degrees of expe-
rience, classification terms are inevitably subjective in character. The maximum possible degree of
standardization is essential if senior officers and accompanying forces are to react quickly and with confi-
dence to contact reports. Classification terms are therefore intended as a guide; reporting commanders may
use their own judgement in interpreting the terms, always bearing in mind the aim of such reports.
9202 CONTACT CLASSIFICATION TERMS
a. CERTSUB (Certain Submarine Contact). A contact that has been sighted and positively
identified as a submarine is classified CERTSUB. Parameters for this assessment are: a surfaced subma-
rine; a submerged submarine; submarine masts, antennae, periscope or snorkel; a missile emerging from
the sea-sighted and positively identified by competent personnel. If any doubt exists about the certainty of
the observation the contact should not be classified CERTSUB.
b. PROBSUB (Probable Submarine Contact). A contact that displays strong cumulative evi-
dence of being a submarine is classified PROBSUB. Evaluation of a contact obtained by one or more of the fol-
lowing sensors. Possible sensors include sonar, radar, electronic intercept, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD),
passive or active sonobuoys, towed arrays, optronics, and other devices may be followed by a PROBSUB clas-
sification. The possible means of sensor contact are numerous. The following guidelines illustrate the extent
and quality of the evidence that is required before a PROBSUB classification may be made.
(1) Contact by Active Sonar or Active Sonobuoy.
(a) Competent personnel report a firm sonar contact showing submarine characteristics.
(NC) (NMM) These include a plot of the submarine’s track consistently compatible with any
Doppler effect detected, and exhibiting at least one of the following effects:
i. Pronounced wake.
ii. Propeller or distinctive submarine noises.
iii. Characteristic silhouette from a bottomed-target sonar set or similar high-resolution

sonar sensor.
iv. Sonar signals, sonar jamming, obvious decoys, or torpedo noises.
9-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) When none of these effects appears, the contact must be confirmed by another type of sen-
sor. A contact held only by two different active sonars at the same time is insufficient criteria for
PROBSUB classification.
(2) Broadband Contact by Passive Sonar or Passive Sonobuoy. Consistent tracking of

a firm contact with courses, speeds, or other indications, which are compatible with submarine charac-
teristics, and are confirmed by at least one other type of sensor.
(3) Radar Contact. Confirmation of a radar contact by at least one of the following, obtained si-
multaneously or in close sequence:
(a) Search receiver contact on the same bearing and displaying characteristics of a distinctive
submarine radar.
(b) Active or passive sonobuoy or MAD tracking.
(c) Sonobuoy and MAD contact near datum.
(d) Sonar contact having submarine characteristics.
(e) Lofar contact evaluated as submarine.
(4) (NC) (NMM) ESM Contact. All of the following conditions must be met:
(a) The intercepted signal shows all of the characteristics of a distinctive known submarine ra-
dar, and either:
i. A fix is established by crossed ESM bearings, or
ii. An ESM bearing is confirmed by a radar contact obtained simultaneously or in close

sequence.
(b) There are no ASW units in the immediate area of the contact position, and the ESM and ra-
dar contact appear or disappear at the same time.
(5) MAD Contact. MAD is normally a confirmatory sensor used in conjunction with other sensors.
(NC) (NMM) In cases in which MAD is the initial detection or main classification sensor, there must be:
(a) Sufficient tracking information to give strong evidence of a submarine target, and
(b) Confirmation by at least one other type of sensor.
(6) Narrowband Passive Sonar Contact. A lofar signature is evaluated as a submarine; if

known, the type of submarine is to be included in the classification.
c. POSSUB (Possible Submarine Contact). A contact on which available information indi-

cates the likely presence of a submarine, but there is insufficient evidence to justify a higher classification.
A classification of POSSUB may be given under any one or more of the following conditions:
(1) An object thought to be a surfaced submarine, submerged submarine, submarine periscope, or

snorkel is sighted; but, because of poor visibility or the lack of competence of the observer to recognize
such objects, the criteria for CERTSUB cannot be supported.
9-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Active or passive sonar, MAD, radar, ESM, EER, active or passive sonobuoys, towed acoustic
arrays, and other devices; such contacts are investigated or tracked, without confirming all of the char-
acteristics listed for PROBSUB, but are suspected to be of submarine origin.
(3) Surface flares, blinker lights, tracer lights, and similar indications are thoroughly investigated,
do not lead to submarine sightings or sensor contact, but are suspected to be of submarine origin.
(4) Surface ship HF/DF contact on a signal classified as being of submarine origin.
d. Confidence Level. The classification POSSUB must always be amplified by adding an as-
sessment of the confidence level. Confidence levels are specified as follows:
(1) LOW CONFIDENCE — A contact that cannot be regarded as NONSUB and requires further in-
vestigation. This assessment may be further amplified by using grades 1 and 2, 1 being the lower grade.
(2) HIGH CONFIDENCE — A contact that from the evidence is firmly believed to be a submarine,
but it does not meet the criteria established for PROBSUB. This assessment may be further amplified by
using grades 3 and 4, 3 being the lower grade.
e. NONSUB (Nonsubmarine Contact). After investigation, a contact that is shown to have

characteristics that exclude the possibility that it is a submarine. NONSUB is a firm statement that the clas-
sifier is entirely satisfied his contact is not a submarine. When a contact is lost which was previously classi-
fied POSSUB or PROBSUB, it is dangerous and wrong to amend the classification to NONSUB without
the most thorough investigation.
9203 CONTACT REPORTING
a. General Considerations.
(1) Initial Contact Reporting and Classification. To initiate rapid response to counter what
may be an imminent enemy attack, the initial contact (whether classified or not) must be reported imme-
diately. When not included in the initial report, a classification must be made in the subsequent amplify-
ing report. Where possible, contacts should additionally be amplified by propulsion and class.
(NR) (NMM) Voice contact procedures are contained in APP 1. Enemy contact reports are con-
tained in APP 4.
(2) Subsequent Evaluation. Reclassification of a contact continues throughout the entire ASW
action, and subsequent reports by a unit may amend or amplify the classification. Prosecuting units must
continually review contact classification using other sensors as available.
(3) Command Responsibility. When more than one ASW unit is in contact, the SAC or OTC
(or ASWC if delegated) evaluates all information and classifications and reports the contact together
with his classification.
(4) (NR) (NMM) Conditions. Since environmental conditions must be considered in the classifi-
cation of contacts, ATP 28 should be consulted for the effects of environmental considerations on vari-
ous sensors.
(5) Contact Information. The method in which contact was obtained, maintained, or localized
may be of assistance in assessing a passive acoustic contact report.
(NC) (NMM) In order to readily describe the method, single-letter designators from Table 9-3 may
be included in the amplifying data block of a Raid Report or Enemy Contact Report, e.g., “POSSUB
2251RED l23 TACK 456 ZULU-FOXTROT l0 NM POSSUB 225l.
9-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-3. (NU) (NMM) Passive Acoustic Designation
Area of Probability F( ) Acoustic/Doppler/TMA derived area of

(AOP) probability (accuracy estimate in miles)
M( ) Closest point of approach (CPA)

(range in yards)
Line of Bearing P Bearing from single sensor
Omni- L( ) Convergence zone contact (first CZ

directional range in miles)
O Non-convergence zone contact
(NATO-UNCLASSIFIED) (NMM)
b. (NC) (NMM) Support Submarine Contact Reporting. The precedence of contact report-
ing (i.e., task force alertment) or contact engagement; when, how, and to whom should the submarine re-
port; and under which circumstances, is highly dependent upon the scenario and the distance of the support
submarine from the force. Requirements placed on the submarine should be clearly specified by the
OTC/SOCA as a preplanned response in both Associated and Direct Support operations.
c. Choice of Reporting Method. The following guidelines are available to the submarine:
(1) If the initial contact report is made using a SLOT buoy and the first amplifying report is made
within 30 minutes using a SLOT buoy, and a relay aircraft is on station, then either one or both of the re-
ports will be delivered to the ASWC in approximately 95 percent of the cases.
(2) Unless the contact was initially assessed as near, a loss of contact information for l0 minutes is
good cause to come to periscope depth and report by radio.
(3) When reporting by radio, it is appropriate to employ both UHF voice to an ASW aircraft and a
hard-copy message via satellite relay when such communication paths are available. The hard-copy
message provides accurate message delivery to the OTC/SOCA and the UHF voice report keeps the
on-scene ASW aircraft current as to contact information for coordinated contact prosecution.
(4) In the course of a contact prosecution, extended periods (greater than 20 minutes) at periscope
depth for the purpose of communications are to be avoided.
(5) For purposes of contact reporting, a contact that is regained after more than l hour of lost contact
should be treated as a new contact if a lost contact report had been sent prior to regaining contact.
d. ASW Aircraft Relaying Contact Reports. Initial contact reports and amplifying reports
will be relayed to the OTC/SOCA or other appropriate commander, exactly as received, without delay.
When SLOT buoys are used, the channel number, time of receipt and, when available, SLOT location data
will also be passed.
e. TAS Contact Reports. Towed array ships will report contacts using standard procedures (see
Article 6320 and APP 4). However, during TAS contact prosecution, long-range communications will be
required (see Article 4160(b)) to:
(1) Report contacts.
9-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Exchange contact data with other towed array ships.
(3) Report threat AOPs as a result of crossfixes or TMA.
9204 — 9209 SPARE
9210 ASW ATTACK POLICY
9211 GENERAL
a. Types of Attack. Attacks may be URGENT or DELIBERATE. The purpose of an URGENT

attack is to upset the submarines plan of action and gain the initiative in the engagement; speed of action is
essential and outweighs accuracy. The purpose of a DELIBERATE attack is destruction of the hostile sub-
marine using the most effective ASW weapon for the prevailing tactical situation. Accuracy is more vital
than speed.
b. (NC) (NMM) ASW Actions. These may be CLOSE (within 8,000 yards) or STANDOFF (out-
side 8,000 yards).
9212 (NC) (NMM) SURFACE SHIP ASW ATTACK POLICY
a. Sonar Contact:
(1) If the contact is an immediate threat, carry out an urgent attack.
(2) If the contact is not an immediate threat, take appropriate torpedo countermeasures and carry out a
deliberate attack employing medium- and long-range weapons or vectored attacks whenever possible.
b. Other Than Sonar Contact:
(1) If the contact is an immediate threat, consider conducting an attack on available information
while maneuvering to gain sonar contact and switching on other sensors ordered or permitted by the
EMCON plan.
(2) If the contact is not an immediate threat, the detecting ship takes appropriate countermeasures
and maneuvers to gain sonar contact but is not to leave her station or sector unless authorized; however,
other ships in sectors or patrolling stations should anticipate possible detachment by moving toward the
engaged side of their sector or patrol line.
9213 (NC) (NMM) FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT ASW ATTACK POLICY
a. Policy on Use of Weapons. Policy on the use of weapons must be specified at briefings or
during the joining procedure. In general, attack policy depends on the tactical situation and on the classifi-
cation of the contact. Fixed-wing aircraft should follow attack policy in force and, if required, show appro-
priate IFF.
b. Urgent Attacks. Regardless of the classification, urgent attacks are to be carried out on con-
tacts which pose an immediate threat. At the SACs discretion, aircraft may attack individually or in coordi-
nation with other aircraft in accordance with the following:
(1) CERTSUB or PROBSUB. Aircraft should carry out attacks as frequently as opportunity offers,
except in coordinated operations in which attacks are conducted in accordance with the attack policy in force.
9-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE HIGH. Contact may be attacked by the first available means un-
less otherwise directed.
(3) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE LOW. Contact will be attacked if it presents an immediate threat.
9214 (NC) (NMM) HELICOPTER ASW ATTACK POLICY
a. Advanced Screening or Searching. Attack in accordance with the attack policy in force.
Show the appropriate IFF, if required.
b. Screening (Deliberate Attack). Carry out a HOVERTAC in accordance with the attack pol-
icy in force, or maintain contact until assisting units arrive.
c. Screening (Urgent Attack). Carry out a HOVERTAC or SELFTAC if the contact is an im-
mediate threat and no other unit is in a better position.
9215 (NC) (NMM) ATTACK RESTRICTIONS WHEN OPERATING WITH SUPPORT

SUBMARINES
a. Requirements. ASW attack restrictions when operating with a support submarine are gov-
erned by the type of action area in which the submarine is operating. See Chapter 6.
(1) No air or surface ASW attacks are permitted inside a SAA.
(2) No aircraft (including helicopters) or surface units may attack a submarine contact inside a
JTAA unless a SGSA or NOTACK area has been established per the procedures of Chapter 6.
NOTE
No aircraft or surface unit may attack a submarine contact that is within a NOTACK area. At-
tacks may be conducted within a SGSA provided a NOTACK area has been established. At-
tacks within a JTAA but outside an established SGSA require authorization by the SGSA
Coordinating Authority/Unit.
(3) Use of air or surface ASW weapons is unrestricted in an ASWFA.
b. Compensatory Allowances.
(1) Air/Surface ASW Attacks. For any ASW engagement, air and surface units shall apply a
compensatory allowance that minimizes the risk of that weapon inadvertently entering an area contain-
ing a friendly submarine. Conceptually a compensatory allowance is a weapons danger zone with a nav-
igation safety buffer that applies to SAA, JTAA, and activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK and SGSA
boundaries.
(2) ASW Aircraft With Inoperable Navigation Systems. ASW aircraft which cannot make
an accurate assessment of navigation error because of inoperable navigation equipment may not attack a
submarine contact inside a JTAA or within 10 nm of a SAA or JTAA boundary without authority, and
then only while under the direction of another unit with an adequate navigation capability, such as an
ASW helicopter control ship.
9216 (NC) (NMM) ASSESSING DAMAGE
The standard method of damage assessment is set forth in ATP 28.
9-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9217 — 9219 SPARE
9220 COORDINATED ASW
9221 DATUMS
a. (NC) (NMM) Establishing a Datum. A datum may be established by the OTC, ASW com-
mander, screen commander, SAU commander, SAC, or the last unit losing contact. A unit or authority es-
tablishing a datum will report the following to the OTC and the appropriate commander in the sequence:
(1) Datum established.
(2) Datum position.
(3) Datum error.
(4) Last known course and speed of contact.
(5) Datum time.
(6) Source of information.
(7) Classification of contact on which datum was established.
b. Designating a Datum. The datum is given the track number of the submarine or sonar contact
upon which it has been established. Subsequently, new datums established on the same contact retain the
original track designator.
9222 ASW SEARCH PLANS
Table 9-4 summarizes the ASW search plans available for use by ships or by ships and helicopters.
When helicopters are used, the letter H must be added as a suffix to the plan number. Search plans are
shown in Figures 9-21, 9-22, 9-23, and 9-24.
(NR) (NMM) ASW surface searches are explained in ATP 28.
9223 COLLISION HAZARD DURING ASW OPERATIONS
a. Safety Maneuvers. ASW maneuvering plans for multiship ASW action are designed to re-
duce the collision hazard. However, International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea will take
precedence over the maneuvers established by the maneuvering plans in use. If the situation becomes con-
fused, or if there is a possibility of collision, the first ship recognizing such a danger is to order “Break off”.
At this order, the operation is discontinued, ships are to maneuver to avoid collision, and the action is re-
sumed as soon as practicable.
b. Use of Navigation Lights. The attacking, directing, and assisting ships are required to burn
sidelights when multiship attacks or close searches are being conducted during night operations, unless
they are ordered to do otherwise. Dimmed sidelights may be used, but ships must have the facilities to rap-
idly switch them to full brilliance in an emergency. Dimmed stern lights should also be shown, whether or
not they can be switched to full brilliance at short notice. This paragraph limits neither the authority of the
SAU commander to order navigation lights darkened at any time, nor that of any commanding officer to
turn them on at any time they are necessary.
9-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-4. ASW Search Plans
Plan Code Purpose
1S OAK TREE For area search, intercept search,

lost contact search, or bottom
search by two or more ships.
2S ACORN A lost contact search by two

(NMM) ships in close ASW action.
2SH ACORN A lost contact search by one ship

MOD MODIFIED and one helicopter in close ASW
(NMM) action.
14SH CORDON A sector search around a datum,

involving one or more ships
and/or helicopters.
Remark: (NMM) For ASW surface search plans for convoy escorts (BEET-
ROOT, CARROT), see Chapter 10.
NOTE
For lights to be shown by ships, helicopters, or other aircraft operating together at night or in
low visibility, see Chapter 6.
c. Special Lights. Ships equipped with special lights are not to use such lights until their charac-
teristics and meanings have been disseminated by the OTC to other units.
9224 — 9229 SPARE
9230 COORDINATED ASW ACTION
9231 ACTION ON GAINING CONTACT
A unit gaining contact is to report in accordance with Chapter 6 and assume the duties of SAC if not
part of a SAU.
9232 ACTION BY UNITS IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNIT GAINING CONTACT
Units in the vicinity of a unit reporting initial contact are to take immediate action to render assistance.
a. Surface Ship. The ship best placed to assist the detecting unit automatically acts as assisting
ship unless otherwise directed. It is to report that it is assuming the duties of the assisting ship. If the detect-
ing unit is an aircraft, the assisting ship may take control of the aircraft when in a position to control the ac-
tion. Adjacent ships fitted with long-range weapons or weapon-delivery helicopters are to be prepared to
provide immediate assistance.
b. Helicopter. Except when operating under close positive control, and when there is an immedi-
ate threat to a ship or the force, the helicopter nearest the detecting unit is to proceed to support the detect-
ing unit and inform the detecting unit, HCU, or other appropriate authority of its intentions. When
operating under close positive control, the helicopter is to await orders from the HCU before proceeding to
assist the detecting unit.
9-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. When a fixed-wing aircraft has received a request for assistance from
the detecting unit, and when the tactical situation permits, the aircraft is to close that unit and inform the
ASWACU of his intentions. The aircraft is to keep clear of weapon danger areas, using the limits provided
by the ASWACU.
d. ASW Aircraft Control Unit. The ASWACU is to inform aircraft of the contact and:
(1) When a fixed-wing aircraft is in the vicinity of a contact that is an immediate threat, direct the
aircraft to close the unit in contact and ensure that it keeps clear of weapon danger areas.
(2) If directed, transfer control of the aircraft to the unit in contact or to another unit in the vicinity of
the contact.
e. Helicopter Control Unit. The ACU performing the duties of an HCU is to:
(1) Reassign helicopter screen stations as ordered by the OTC or appropriate commander.
(2) Inform helicopters of any contact that is an immediate threat.
(3) Direct the helicopter nearest the contact to a position in support of the detecting unit and:
(a) Inform the detecting unit of the helicopter’s availability, weapon load, and control fre-
quency in use.
(b) Be prepared to transfer control of the helicopter to the detecting unit, or the unit in the vicin-
ity of the contact that is most capable of assuming HCU duties. Transfer of control may take place
without further orders.
NOTE
Guidance in items 2 and 3 above applies to an aircraft performing HCU functions.
9233 SENDING REINFORCEMENTS TO THE SCENE OF ACTION
a. Designation and Dispatch of a Search Attack Unit (SAU). The dispatch of a SAU is
based on considerations of threat, mission, conditions, assets available, possibilities of evasion, environ-
mental conditions, and so on. The assessment of the total threat will determine the type and number of units
dispatched. The SAU may consist of ships and/or aircraft. Helicopters can provide a rapid reactive capabil-
ity, provided the distance is such that the time on task will be worthwhile.
b. OTC/ASWC Functions.
(1) The OTC’s general functions in ASW are in Table 1-4.
(2) Information required by SAU and SAU commander:
(a) Composition of the SAU and identity of the SAU commander.
(b) Identity of the SAC.
(c) Latest position, time, source of information, classification, and confidence level of the contact.
(d) If applicable: Datum designation, datum position, datum error, last known course and
speed of contact, datum time, and SITREP.
9-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. SAU Communications. On dispatch of a SAU, responsibility for its communication require-

ments is transferred from the OTC to the SAU commander. Normally, the existing ASW circuits will con-
tinue to be manned by the SAU, with the remainder shifting to an alternative ASW control frequency
(Procedure Alfa, see ACP 176) or screen tactical frequency (Procedure Bravo). Use should be made of
standard tabulated messages, such as the ASW Action Table in ATP 1, Vol. II. The Single Letter Maneu-
vering Signals may be used for SAU action.
(NC) (NMM) Careful thought must be given to the Emission Policy adopted by the SAU com-
mander to avoid alerting hostile units to the existence, composition, or position of the SAU.
9234 THE SAU COMMANDER
a. The SAU Commanders Responsibilities.
(1) Forming the units assigned and ordering the method of approach.
(2) Establishing communications on assigned SAU frequencies with units of the SAU and with the
SAC.
(3) Designating the appropriate ACU; however, ACU duties are normally best carried out by the
SAU commander.
(4) Establishing datums, as necessary.
(5) Promulgating helicopter alert states, if applicable.
b. Information To Be Passed by SAU Commander to SAU.
(1) Latest position, time, source of information, classification, and confidence level of contact.
(2) Identity of the SAC.
(3) ETA at contact or datum and, if applicable, the torpedo danger area.
(4) If applicable:
(a) Datum time, datum position, datum designation, and datum error.
(b) SITREP.
(c) Torpedo countermeasures to be employed.
(5) Intentions, including Plans RED and BLACK.
c. (NC) (NMM) Information To Be Passed by SAU Commander to SAC.
(1) Composition of SAU and call sign of SAU commander.
(2) Direction of approach, ETA at contact or datum (with revisions as applicable).
(3) Weapons available.
(4) Significant sensors operating at reduced efficiency or out of commission.
9-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) If applicable:
(a) Altitude and off-task time.
(b) Intentions, if SWAP is contemplated, including time, and Plans RED and BLACK.
(c) Call signs of ACUs.
d. (NC) (NMM) Information To Be Passed by SAC to SAU Commander.
(1) Position, course and speed of contact, or datum position, time and error, source, and latest
classification.
(2) Information necessary to enable the SAU to close the contact or datum.
(3) Number and type of weapons remaining.
(4) Weapons in water and the run-time remaining.
(5) Tactics and sensors employed.
(6) If applicable:
(a) Time remaining on task.
(b) Number of attacks made, types of weapons used, and results.
(c) Environmental conditions.
(d) Actions or operations by the SAU that are likely to interfere with the operations in progress.
(e) Sonobuoys in use, description of pattern, RF channel numbers, type, time laid, and life settings.
(f) Plans RED and BLACK.
(g) Submarine evasion tactics detected or believed to be in use.
9235 SAU APPROACH TO A CONTACT OR DATUM
The method of approach and countermeasures to be applied depend on the tactical situation. The
SAU commander must balance the danger to the SAU against the subsurface threat to the main body, con-
voy, and to friendly land installations that may be targets for submarine-launched missiles and accept a cal-
culated risk where necessary. Availability of a medium- or long-range weapon delivery capability,
especially in good sonar conditions, may allow the SAU commander to use a more deliberate approach tac-
tic than is necessary when only short- or medium-range weapons are available.
a. (NC) (NMM) Methods of Approach. Conditions under which the following approaches may
be selected are summarized in Table 9-5.
(1) Direct. When a unit is in contact, the search line should take a course to the contact that allows
for the submarines movement. When no unit is in contact, but time late is short enough to permit a single
sweep to cover the furthest-on circle, the search line should proceed directly to the datum. Figure 9-2
may be used to verify whether the furthest-on circle can be covered with a single sweep. In any case, the
9-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-5. (NU) (NMM) Selecting the Approach Method
UNITS SITUATION CONDITION APPROACH

In contact DIRECT
None in contact URGENT Datum position is within 6 miles of the main DIRECT
(see Note 1) body or convoy TDZ.
Datum position is within 30° of the MLA of the OFFSET
main body or convoy and more than 6 nm
from the main body or convoy TDZ.
Datum position is more than 30° off the MLA INTERCEPT
of the main body or convoy and more than 6
nm from the main body or convoy TDZ.
Submarine movement can be predicted. INTERCEPT
DELIBERATE Datum position is close enough to the SAU DIRECT
(see Note 2) that the whole probability area can be covered
by the search line.
Probability area cannot be covered by the OFFSET or MIXED
search line and there is no evidence of a likely (see Note 3)
submarine.
NOTE
1. Urgent situation applies when time is not sufficient to construct a datum approach triangle.
2. Deliberate situation applies when time is sufficient to construct a datum approach triangle.
3. Mixed Approach: Certain ships make an offset approach while others make a silent direct approach.
search line should be formed at an appropriate search distance, based on sonar conditions and the size of
the area to be searched.
(2) Offset. When direct approach is not suitable (that is, spacing to cover the furthest-on circle
would be too large for an acceptable probability of detection) or the direction of the enemy cannot be
predicted, the search line shall proceed on a course that is offset 10º to 30º to one side of the direct course
to the datum. The offset should normally be directed toward the mean line of advance (MLA) of the
screened unit. This offset permits conduct of a logical search of the area and may deceive or persuade the
submarine into steering a course away from the offset.
(3) Intercept. This method is used when direct approach is not suitable and the direction of the en-
emy can be predicted or when it is desired to place the SAU between the submarine and his target.
b. (NC) (NMM) Approach Tactics.
(1) Initial Approach. This approach should normally be made at maximum available speed.
However, if the tactical situation dictates, maximum sonar speed and evasive steering may be used.
(2) Final Approach. This approach begins at the time that the SAU first reaches either the tor-
pedo danger area (TDA) or the tactical sonar range (TSR) as measured from the furthest-on circle. In
the absence of intelligence to the contrary, the TDA extends for 4 nm outward from the furthest-on cir-
cle. The SAU commander should order:
9-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DATUM B
DATUM A
SAU BASE COURSE

AND SPEED
ED
SPE
N E-
RI
BMA
SU
A B
SAU SWEEP WIDTH
1. Datum A is inside triangle ABC:

Direct approach is suitable.
2. Datum B is outside triangle ABC:

Direct approach is not suitable.
Figure 9-2. (NU) (NMM) Datum Approach Triangle
(a) Ships to proceed at optimum sonar speed or up to maximum sonar speed if circumstances
so dictate.
(b) Employment of tactical countermeasures for which he can afford the time. Zigzag plans
XRAY and YANKEE from ATP 3 are specifically designed for use within the TDA.
(c) Use of material torpedo countermeasures. The use of these devices may reduce sonar detection
range.
c. (NC) (NMM) Antisubmarine Evasion and Torpedo Countermeasures (TCMs) To

Be Executed by a SAU.
(1) Approach to Torpedo Danger Area (TDA). Units should use maximum speed and evasive
steering (narrow weave or zigzag), or maintain a steady course as time and threat permit, and leave
towed decoys activated, depending on the tactical situation.
(2) Before Entering Torpedo Danger Area. Units should carry out the following measures:
(a) Reduce to optimum sonar speed.
(b) Execute zigzag plan XRAY or YANKEE from ATP 3.
(c) Stream towed decoys (if not already done).
9-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(d) Activate/deactivate decoys depending on the tactical situation.
(e) Consider the use of speed below cavitation speed.
(3) Initial Action on Gaining Contact.
(a) Report the contact.
(b) Conduct urgent attack when the contact poses an immediate threat.
(c) Ensure decoys are activated.
(d) Carry out tactical countermeasures.
(e) Continue with urgent or deliberate attack.
(4) During Medium- or Long-Range Attacks. Within the limits of maintaining sonar contact,
units should:
(a) Use fine inclinations toward (15º to 30º) or away from (150° to 165°) the submarine.
(b) Use frequent alterations of course and/or speed. Although dependent on the range from the
submarine, alterations should be conducted at least every 3 minutes. Course alterations should be of
at least 30º and speed alterations of at least 3 knots.
(c) Continue to employ towed decoys in accordance with current employment doctrine for the
decoy in use.
(d) Use speeds less than cavitation speed if tactically acceptable.
(e) If an attack with nuclear warhead torpedoes is likely, consider the advantages of remaining
within 6,000 yards.
(5) Closing to Attack With Short-Range Weapons. Except when a silent approach is in-
tended, units should:
(a) Use maximum sonar speed.
(b) Continue to employ towed decoys in accordance with current employment doctrine for the
decoy in use.
(c) Use zigzag plan XRAY or YANKEE from ATP 3.
(d) Try to maintain an angular separation of 60º or more between ships, as measured from the
submarine, while also trying to keep equidistant from the submarine.
9236 SAU COMMANDER/SAC INTENDED EMPLOYMENT OF UNITS
The SAC or SAU commander should promulgate, within the OTC’s policies, the intended employ-
ment of units as soon as a contact is gained, under the heading Plan RED, and the intended employment of
units immediately after contact is lost, under the heading Plan BLACK. The purpose is to advise all units,
well in advance, of what is expected of them and to avoid confusion at the time that contact is lost. An order
to Execute Plan RED or Execute Plan BLACK is all that is required to initiate the action; all units are then
9-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-6. Coordinated Employment of ASW Units at Scene of Action

NOTE: SHADED TEXT IS NC NMM
SHIPS AND HELICOPTERS SHIPS AND FIXED-WING FIXED-WING

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT AND
HELICOPTERS
Contact Held a. VECTACs a. VECTACs a. VECTACs

b. MADVECs b. MADVECs
Method Method c. MAD Trapping/
No. No. Tracking
PLAN b. Ship Attack c. Ship Attack d. Individual
RED Attacks
GEOGRAPHIC GEOGRAPHIC
SECTOR. . . . . . . . . . 3A SECTOR . . . . . . . . 3A
MODIFIED MODIFIED
GEOGRAPHIC GEOGRAPHIC
SECTOR . . . . . . 3A MOD SECTOR . . . . . 3A MOD
Method Method
No. No.
c. Support d. Support
BEAR . . . . . . . . 11 A/AH BEAR . . . . . . . . . 11 A
CORDON. . . . . . . 14A/AH CORDON . . . . . . . 14A
Immediate a. Search Plan Plan No. a. Search Plan Plan No. a. Dipping Helicop-
Action on (1) OAK TREE . . . . . 1S ters — Airplans
Loss of OAK TREE . . . . . . . . 1SH 44, 47, or 48
ACORN . . . . . . . . . . 2S (2) ACORN . . . . . . . 2S
Contact (3) CORDON . . . . . 14S b. Fixed-Wing
MODIFIED
ACORN . . . . . . 2SH MOD b. Aircraft Aircraft
PLAN b. Support (1) MAD Search (1) MAD Search
BLACK BEAR . . . . . . . . . 11A/AH (2) Active or Passive (2) Active or Pas-
Sonobuoy sive Sonobuoy
Helicopters in
Support (3) EER (3) EER
CORDON . . . . . . . . 14SH
to proceed as previously directed. Table 9-6 will serve as a guide in selecting and ordering Plans RED and
BLACK for the employment of ASW units at the scene of action.
a. (NC) (NMM) The SAC is Responsible for:
(1) Promulgating Plan RED, including:
(a) Disposition of units.
(b) Types of attacks.
(c) Employment of weapons.
(2) Promulgating Plan BLACK.
(3) Designating the attacking unit (if required.)
9-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(4) Designating the appropriate ACU.
(5) Ordering countermeasures to be used.
(6) Directing the homing of air and surface reinforcements to the contact.
(7) Reviewing EMCON plan within the OTC’s Emission Policy.
(8) Specifying aircraft altitude separation.
(9) Establishing additional datums, as necessary.
(10) Informing the OTC of progress.
(11) Executing time checks with the SAU commander.
(12) Promulgating estimated submarine speed to be used in constructing furthest-on circles.
(13) Knowing the location of SAAs and JTAAs, and enforcing attack restrictions when in their
vicinity.
(14) Designating datums, if specifically delegated by the OTC.
(15) Conduct of nuclear ASW (see Article 9300).
b. SAU Commander Responsibilities. When contact is gained by a unit that is part of a SAU,
the SAU commander is responsible for:
(1) Disposition of the air and surface units of the SAU.
(2) Ordering torpedo countermeasures.
(3) Assuming the duties of SAC.
9237 AIRCRAFT REPORTS TO THE SAU
An aircraft at the scene of action shall transmit reports to the SAU to assist in closing the contact or
datum. However, attack procedures and maintaining contact take precedence over reporting. The aircraft
may indicate the position of the submarine contact or datum relative to the approaching unit or relative to
KINGPIN (an arbitrary reference position established by the aircraft). The procedures described below
may be used to indicate contact, datum, or KINGPIN.
a. Radar On Top. When an approaching unit holds the aircraft on radar, the commander of the ap-
proaching unit may send the message “Request radar on top.” On receiving this signal, the aircraft shall fly
over the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and report, “On top contact (datum or KINGPIN) now, now,
NOW,” and using IFF squawk identity. The third “now” will be the on-top position.
b. Reverse Radar On Top. When an approaching unit does not hold the aircraft on radar, the
aircraft should try to determine using its own radar the position of the unit relative to the contact, datum, or
KINGPIN. The aircraft shall fly over the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and report, “On top contact (datum
or KINGPIN) now, now, NOW,” and transmit to the approaching unit the bearing and distance from the
approaching unit to the datum, contact, or KINGPIN.
9-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
c. Visual On Top. When the aircraft is sighted, the commander of the approaching unit may send
the message, “Request visual on top.” On receiving this signal, the aircraft shall fly in a shallow dive over
the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and signal, “On top contact (datum or KINGPIN) now, now, NOW.” The
aircraft is pulled out of the dive and a yellow Very light may be fired on the transmission of the third “now.”
9238 (NC) (NMM) CHANGING SCENE OF ACTION COMMANDER (SWAP)
When approaching the scene of action, the SAU commander who intends to assume SAC duties
must decide when to execute SWAP and must inform the present SAC of his intention and of the estimated
time of SWAP. The SAC should advise the SAU commander to delay his approach if, in his opinion, the
SAU may interfere with operations in progress. Upon execution of SWAP, the SAU commander is to re-
port this fact to all units at the scene and to the OTC. The information flow contained in paragraph 9234d
should precede any SWAP. If the SAC is an airborne unit, the SAU commander in a surface ship should en-
deavor to SWAP as soon as a satisfactory picture of the action is held. SWAP is frequently appropriate im-
mediately after a DOG BOX has been established.
9239 SPARE
9240 (NC) (NMM) ACTION FOLLOWING CONTACT WHEN DIRECT SUPPORT FORCES
ARE INVOLVED
These contact prosecution procedures are designed for use in Direct Support operations. Whenever
submarines are in Associated Support, they should attempt to keep the OTC/ASWC of the supported
forces informed and should coordinate with the other ASW units of the supported force as specified in the
Submarine Force Summary message.
9241 (NC) (NMM) SUPPORT SUBMARINE GAINS INITIAL CONTACT
a. On initial contact, the associated or direct support submarine shall carry out a standard sequence.
(1) Unless previously directed otherwise by the supported force commander, make the initial contact re-
port. If the contact is very close at initial detection, the submarine may not have time to release a contact report
prior to delivering an attack (ROE permitting). A post-attack report via SLOT buoy or by established commu-
nications with the ASW aircraft or the ASWC/SOCA should be sent as soon as possible after the attack.
(2) Commence prosecution, proceeding as mission assignment and target motion dictate.
(3) Make amplifying report.
(4) Be alert for downlink communication attempts.
(5) Continue prosecution within the guidelines of the established ROE and/or SAA/JTAA bound-
ary limitations. Consider contact handover alternatives.
b. If attack is made, make post-attack report.
9242 (NC) (NMM) ASW AIRCRAFT GAINS INITIAL CONTACT
a. On initial contact, the ASW aircraft carries out procedures in Articles 9203 and 9213 and also the
following:
(1) Be prepared to use ATAC/SUS to initiate communications with the supporting submarine in or-
der to pass contact information when directed.
9-35 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) If localization appears probable, request that a NOTACK area be established, if required (see
Chapter 6).
(3) Ensure that attack authorization is received before descending below good communications
altitude.
(a) Attack rules of this section apply.
(b) Advise the ASWC of reduced SLOT buoy monitoring capability while at low altitude.
(4) If contact is established with supporting submarine, conduct a coordinated procedure.
9243 (NC) (NMM) PASSIVE SONAR CAPABLE SURFACE SHIP GAINS INITIAL
CONTACT
a. On initial contact, the surface ship shall carry out a standard sequence:
(1) Make contact report to ASWC, reporting both towed array true bearings if appropriate (refine
bearing when possible but do not delay initial report to resolve bearing ambiguity).
(2) Commence localization as SAC using ASW aircraft as feasible.
(3) Send amplifying reports at least every 30 minutes to the ASWC (if contact is lost or evaluated as
nonsubmarine, make an immediate report).
(4) Be prepared to initiate downlink communications to the supporting submarine, as required.
(5) Request NOTACK area be established, if required.
(6) Observe attack rules of this section.
9244 (NC) (NMM) COORDINATED PROSECUTION WITH SUPPORTING SUBMARINE
A coordinated prosecution occurs when two or more platforms are cooperating in the prosecution of
a contact, based on an information exchange between the platforms, or on direction provided by the
ASWC/SOCA. When a coordinated prosecution in a JTAA evolves to the attack phase, and the attack is to
be delivered by a unit other than the support submarine involved, either NOTACK or SGSA procedures
must be followed.
9245 (NC) (NMM) ASW AIRCRAFT RESPONSE TO A SUBMARINE-GENERATED CONTACT
a. Contact Report on Enemy Submarines. When the aircraft receives a contact report on an
enemy submarine from the supporting submarine, it will proceed as though assistance is required by the
supporting submarine unless:
(1) The report is a post-attack report,
(2) Directed otherwise by the ASWC, or
(3) The aircraft is prosecuting a contact, in which case it shall advise the ASWC of the tactical situa-
tion and proceed as directed.
b. Action When Assistance is Required. The aircraft will proceed to the contact position by
the Rendezvous Method or the Direct Method. The Rendezvous Method is preferred, since it initially locks
9-36 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
the navigation of the two units (plot lock) and should be used whenever possible. The advantage of the Di-
rect Method is that the aircraft may reduce its time late; however, accurate navigation is required. The Ren-
dezvous Method requires the aircraft to mark on top the submarine or SLOT buoy. A SLOT Buoy
Rendezvous Method is preferred by ASW aircraft since it permits the aircraft to remain at altitude and be
covert. A supporting submarine at periscope depth effecting a rendezvous normally will have its IFF tran-
sponder equipment turned on. However, if the aircraft intends only to use IFF to locate the submarine, the
aircraft should request rendezvous using the NETBALL Method. The aircraft may also home on the subma-
rines UHF transmission if the submarine is communicating. These methods are less satisfactory for ASW
aircraft/submarine cooperation than the SLOT Buoy Rendezvous Method, since they require one unit or the
other to radiate and/or depart from optimum search. The Direct Method requires the aircraft to plot lock us-
ing the submarines IFF, the announced geographic position, or the SLOT buoy position. It then computes
the datum relative to this position and navigates directly to the contact area.
9246 (NC) (NMM) CONTACT HANDOVER
a. General. The handover of an active contact from one platform to another normally shall be ac-
complished as an intercept by the relief platform under direction of the ASWC/SOCA. In the event that the
ASWC/SOCA is not able to provide direction, handover will be coordinated and conducted in real time,
using two-way radio communication circuits. The unit assuming responsibility for prosecution of the con-
tact shall make a positive statement to the unit relinquishing the contact that it has assumed the duties of
contact prosecution. This positive handover will be reported to the ASWC/SOCA.
b. Submarine to Aircraft. Handover from submarine to aircraft will be initiated by an exchange

of call signs followed by the words, Contact handover, (as in APP 4). The aircraft will answer by indicating
the latest amplifying report that it has copied or indicate at this time if unable to accept the Contact Hand-
over message. The submarine will then transmit the Contact Handover message, excluding that informa-
tion which the aircraft has already received via amplifying report information.
c. Aircraft to Submarine. Contact handover from an aircraft to a submarine or from/to any other
unit will be accomplished as above with the exception of the amplifying report information.
d. Message Ordering. The following elements are to be included in the Contact Handover
message:
(1) LOCATING (Number) SERIAL (Number).
(2) Classification (and Confidence Level if POSSUB).
(3) Type and operating mode.
(4) Contact or datum position.
(5) Course/speed in knots or contact movements in cardinal points of the compass.
(6) Additional contact information.
(7) Time of contact position (ZULU).
(8) Submarine current position.
9247 (NC) (NMM) SUBMARINE/AIR COORDINATION
Procedures for AIR/SUB support operations are fully detailed in Chapter 12 of ATP 18.
9-37 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9248 (NR) (NMM) SUBMARINE ASSOCIATED AND DIRECT SUPPORT MESSAGE

APPLICATIONS
Message applications for support submarine operations are listed in ATP 18 and APP 4.
9249 SPARE
9250 (NC) (NMM) SHIP-TOWED ARRAY CONTACT PROSECUTION (See also ATP 28,
Chapter 4)
9251 (NC) (NMM) LOCALIZATION
Localization of a ship’s towed array contact to attack criteria can be a lengthy process. The methods
available to conduct this localization are ship’s Target Motion Analysis (TMA), cross-fixing with another
ship using its towed array, or employing sensors from another unit.
a. Target Motion Analysis. TMA requires no external assets or communication circuits but it is
time consuming and can require maneuvering by the ship. The present methods of surface ship TMA do not
result in a position accurate enough for an attack without additional information from another sensor. TMA
normally can generate an AOP of sufficient accuracy to allow the OTC to either avoid the submarine through
maneuvering of his force or to dedicate other passive assets such as an MPA to further localize the contact.
b. Cross-Fixing. Cross-fixing provides a rapid method of contact localization although the resul-
tant AOP will not be sufficiently small to allow for an attack. The contacts AOP should, however, be suffi-
ciently refined to allow the OTC to avoid the contact by maneuvers or to task other active or passive assets
to continue the localization. The disadvantages of cross-fixing are that it requires ships to be stationed spe-
cifically for this purpose, that reliable communications between the TAS ships are necessary, and that the
probability of both TAS ships gaining contact cannot be guaranteed.
c. Other Units. Cross-fixing plus TMA alone will not produce attack criteria. Ships and aircraft
can be tasked to localize a TAS contact. Aircraft are ideally suited for this because of their range, speed,
sensor fit, and weapons-carrying ability. In their absence, acoustically quiet ships can be used in a SAU.
Certain TAS ships have organic helicopter assets which may be used to assist in localization.
9252 (NC) (NMM) TAS SHIP/AIRCRAFT COOPERATION
In general, an aircraft is the most effective unit to prosecute a TAS contact but only if clear, concise,
and specific tasking information is exchanged between the TAS ships and the aircraft. The following activ-
ities should occur to accomplish a successful prosecution.
a. OTC/Shore Authority. The OTC/ shore authority should consider establishing a procedure
whereby the TAS ship can obtain support from a fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter to assist in the localiza-
tion of a TAS contact without a formal request to the OTC/shore authority. The procedure is to be promul-
gated in the Form GREENs, OPGENs, or Joining Instructions. In any event, the TAS ship must be aware of
the means by which aircraft support is to be obtained.
b. Gaining Contact. Upon gaining contact, the TAS ship sends a contact report to the OTC/shore
authority (see Article 9203e).
c. Localization. If localization is desired, the OTC/shore authority tasks an aircraft to join the
TAS ship for contact prosecution. If previously authorized, the TAS ship directs the assigned aircraft to
join for contact prosecution.
9-38 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
d. Aircraft Communication. The aircraft establishes communications with the TAS unit, re-
ceives employment and contact information, and proceeds to investigate the bearing line or AOP. The TAS
ship is the SAC for the overall prosecution and is the ACU for the assigned aircraft.
e. TAS Ship. The TAS ship can task the aircraft using air plans. The bearing origin may not be
necessary to the TAS ship but could be indicated as a geographic or related position or by a sonobuoy. The
TAS ship may be required to radiate on radar, tacan, or IFF interrogator in order to establish the point of ori-
gin. Units must plot-lock. The following information should be included with the air plan:
(1) Target bearing, bearing accuracy, time of bearing.
(2) Acoustic signature information.
(3) Range estimate, and how obtained.
(4) Array depth.
(5) Localization sensors to be employed.
(6) Observed target behavior.
f. Investigation of the TAS Contact. During the aircraft’s investigation of the TAS contact,
the TAS ship is to pass to the aircraft updated contact information. The TAS ship either maintains contact
or resumes its patrol as previously directed by the OTC/shore authority. In the latter case, the aircraft will
assume the duties of the SAC once in contact.
g. Aircraft Gains Contact. When the aircraft gains contact, it will pass contact information to
the TAS ship in the form of a Raid Report, unless otherwise directed by the OTC/shore authority. Similar
procedures can be used with other units, such as surface ship pouncers.
9253 (NC) (NMM) LOST CONTACT PROCEDURES
There is a high probability that a submarine will be unaware of the fact that it has been detected by a
TAS. It will therefore tend to continue its patrol or intercept in the same manner it did prior to detection. For
this reason, TAS bearing and tracking information decays very slowly and is tactically exploitable, de-
pending on submarine speed, for an hour or more after losing contact.
9254 — 9259 SPARE
9260 COORDINATED ATTACK METHODS
a. For attacks in which more than one ASW unit are involved in close prosecution, the attacking
unit must upon attack announce an area from which assisting units should remain clear for their own safety.
For torpedoes, an area (DOGBOX) is established within which units interfere with or are endangered by
running torpedoes. DOGBOX is based upon type of torpedo, method of employment, and estimated acqui-
sition range. The DOGBOX is time limited to torpedo expiry.
(NR) (NMM) ASW torpedo parameters can be found in the ATP 29 Supplement.
b. The presence of surface ships or employment of other ASW weapons within a DOGBOX may
degrade the performance of the running torpedo. Therefore, the attacking unit must reconsider the attack
and cancel it if:
(1) There is a risk to a friendly unit, or
9-39 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) The anticipated effect of the weapon is unacceptably degraded due to friendly unit interference.
9261 ASW SHIP AND HELICOPTER ATTACK AND SUPPORT METHODS
Table 9-7 summarizes the ASW attack and support methods available for use by ships alone or by
ships and helicopters. When helicopters are used in these methods, the letter H must be added as a suffix to
the method number.
9262 ASW SHIP ACTIONS
a. Attacking Ship. The ship conducting an attack or using aircraft to conduct an attack is consid-
ered to be the attacking ship. The attacking ship’s duties include:
(1) Delivering a deliberate or urgent attack, as appropriate, to keep maximum pressure on the
submarine.
(2) Indicating that she is the attacking ship and the weapon she will use.
(NC) (NMM)…as directed by the SAC.
(3) Maneuvering in accordance with the rules for the attack method ordered. If deemed necessary to
keep a constant range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight maneuver to ensure the stern is never
pointed towards it. This will limit chances of the contact being lost in the stern arcs of the sonar.
(4) Exchanging information and passing movements and intentions of own ship and attacking air-
craft under control.
(5) Indicating by signal immediately when the contact is lost or the contact becomes doubtful.
(6) In a close ASW action, transferring the attacking ship responsibility to an assisting ship holding
contact as the situation dictates.
(7) Promulgating the torpedo interference/weapon danger (DOG BOX) where appropriate.
b. Assisting Ship. The assisting ship’s duties include:
(1) Maneuvering to keep clear of the attacking ship and to avoid obstructing the attack.
(2) Maneuvering in accordance with the rules for the attack method ordered to gain and maintain
sonar contact and remain clear of torpedo interference/weapon danger (DOG BOX) areas. If deemed
necessary to keep a constant range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight maneuver to ensure the
stern is never pointed towards it. This will limit chances of the contact being lost in the stern arcs of the
sonar.
(3) Exchanging information with the attacking ship.
(4) Reporting immediately when the contact is lost or becomes doubtful.
(5) Reporting when ready to assume the duties of attacking ship.
c. Supporting Ship. Ships not engaged in a close ASW action may be used in support.
(NC) (NMM) Medium-range, long-range, or variable depth sonars may best be employed in this
role. Support ships may then hold contact at long range. Vector ships or aircraft may hold contact when the
attacking and assisting ships lose contact. Ships are ordered to support a close action in accordance with the
rules for the support method employed.
9-40 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-7. ASW Attack and Support Methods

NOTE: SHADED TEXT IS NC NMM
Method Code Purpose Special
3A Geographic Coordinated 2-ship attack 1. Suitable for ships with a variety of
Sector weapon systems.
2. May be used against submarines
using high speed.
3A MOD Modified Coordinated 2-ship attack To be used when one ship is equipped with
Geographic short-range weapons and the combination
Sector of weapon systems does not allow Attack
Method 3A.
11AH Bear 1. Line of bearing support for a To cover a definite direction or a probable
close ASW action. course of action by the submarine.
2. Stand-off attack from a
definite direction.
14AH Cordon 1. Sector support for a close 1. When support or attack is desired from
ASW action. one or more specified sectors.
2. Stand-off attack in sectors. 2. 3,000-yard attack zone based on
3. Circular attack in zone. contact. This is a designated sector
4. Automatic search plan. zero. The radius may be amended by
the SAC, if required.
NOTE
These methods are initiated by the SAC. The radius for plan
Cordon may be amended by the SAC/SAU commander, if required
NOTE
Multiship participation in an ASW action may cause a considerable increase in voice commu-
nications. Assisting ship and supporting ship(s) should therefore restrict their information in
such a manner that the attacking ships data on weapon delivery and safety factors take priority
over other information.
9263 VECTORED ATTACKS (VECTACs)
a. Rules. The rules for the conduct of VECTACs follow:
(1) The type of weapon must be agreed upon and the aircraft’s delivery speed and altitude mutually
understood.
(2) The attacking aircraft should be prepared to inform the controlling unit of the forward throw of
the weapon to be used and the desired splash point relative to the submarine.
(3) All bearings and courses must be specified at the outset as either magnetic or true and ranges
shall be given in hundreds of yards.
(4) The attacking aircraft should inform the controller of all weapon drops and MAD marks.
9-41 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) When the unit in contact is a helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft overflying the helicopter must main-
tain vertical separation of at least 200 feet.
(6) When more than one unit is in contact with the same target, only one unit shall conduct
VECTACs on that target at any given time. In this case, the SAC shall designate the controlling unit. If
the controlling unit is a ship, then that ship must also be designated as the attacking ship in accordance
with Article 9262.
(7) The attacking aircraft shall be informed of all contact course and speed changes.
(8) The controlling unit may at any time after initiating a VECTAC order “Cancel VECTAC.” After
this order is given, a subsequent attack must start with the full VECTAC procedure.
b. Methods. The methods of ordering and executing VECTACs are described below.
(1) Radar VECTAC. The attacking aircraft is directed to the weapon release point by the control-
ling unit. The controlling unit initiates the attack by ordering “Execute radar VECTAC.” During the run
towards the target, the controlling unit passes correcting vectors as necessary and frequent range infor-
mation. The attack is ordered by “Stand by weapons,” followed by “Drop, now, now, NOW.”
(2) Reverse Radar VECTAC. The attacking aircraft uses its radar to determine the position of
the unit in contact and, from that unit, plots the range and bearing of the sonar contact. The unit in contact
orders, “Execute reverse radar VECTAC” and the attacking aircraft will determine the optimum splash
point depending on the contacts course and speed and the type of weapon. The attacking aircraft maneu-
vers, using its own navigation system, to the weapon release point for release of the weapon.
(3) Informative VECTAC. The unit in contact gives bearing, range, course, and speed of the con-
tact to the attacking aircraft to enable it to maneuver to the weapon release point. The controlling unit or-
ders, “Execute informative VECTAC,” and specifies whether the bearing origin will be the controlling
unit or a marker. The attacking aircraft plots the contact information, visually marks on top the units in
contact or marker to lock plots, and is responsible for its own navigation to the weapon release point and
for the release of the weapon at the proper time.
(4) Visual VECTAC. The unit in contact gives the attacking aircraft a course and time to fly, either
from the controlling unit or a nominated marker, to the weapon release point. The attack is ordered by,
“Execute visual VECTAC,” and the departure point and approximate attack heading are passed to the
aircraft. The attacking aircraft makes a warning call, “Stand by 1 minute,” when approximately 1 minute
away from the departure point. The controlling unit then computes the splash point for the expected attack
time and the attack heading and time to fly. When the attacking aircraft is on top of the departure point on
the attack heading, the attacking aircraft reports “On top, now, now NOW.” The controlling unit then
times the run and orders weapon release. A visual VECTAC may be employed when the controlling unit
cannot conduct a radar VECTAC and the attacking aircraft has no navigation system.
c. Types of Attack. VECTACs may be either urgent or deliberate. Since the VECTAC is consid-
ered to be primarily a form of deliberate attack, an urgent attack, if desired, must be specifically ordered.
d. (NC) (NMM) MAD During VECTACs. Should a MAD-equipped aircraft on an urgent

VECTAC gain MAD contact prior to reaching the weapon release point, a weapon will be launched imme-
diately. When MAD contact is gained on a deliberate VECTAC, prior to reaching the weapon release
point, the attack should be conducted according to standard MAD procedures, with the controlling unit
continuing to provide target course and speed information.
9-42 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9264 (NC) (NMM) MAD VERIFICATION (MADVEC) RUNS
An informative or radar method may be used that is ordered in a similar way to a VECTAC (for ex-
ample, “Execute radar VECTAC).” Procedures are virtually the same as for a VECTAC except that the air-
craft will fly at a minimum safe altitude and will be directed to the submarine’s position. The controlling
unit shall state whether an attack is to be conducted by the aircraft, or by the controlling unit, when MAD
contact is gained. If the controlling ship intends to conduct the attack following MAD verification, the air-
craft will be advised, “Stand clear on MAD.” The aircraft will leave the area after MAD detection and
await further instructions.
9-43 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (NMM)
9300 (NC) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ASW WEAPONS
a. Employment. Employment of nuclear ASW weapons is prohibited under any circumstances

until approval has been given by national authority of the nuclear power(s), without which the applicable
Major NATO Commander will not send a properly authenticated release message.
b. Procedures. Procedures for obtaining approval for the release of nuclear weapons are laid
down in the Major NATO Commander’s Nuclear Weapon Release Procedures (MNCs NWRP) and in spe-
cific national regulations.
c. Command and Control. Command and control considerations for the general and selective
release of nuclear ASW weapons will be subject to the criteria laid down in the appropriate operational
plans of the Major NATO Commanders.
d. Selective Release. Selective release of nuclear ASW weapons will be subject to such con-
straints and restrictions as are directed by higher authority. These limitations will be defined in the release
message, originated by the Major NATO Commander, authorizing the use of nuclear ASW weapons.
e. Clearance. Once clearance has been obtained, the local commander should, as a matter of op-
erational practice, resort to the use of nuclear ASW weapons only under those conditions in which he be-
lieves, with reasonable certainty, that the use of available conventional weapons will fail to deny the
submarine its objective.
9301 (NC) (NMM) CONSIDERATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ASW WEAPONS
a. Recognition. In recognition of the fact that the reliability of the data contained in this chapter
has not been thoroughly verified by testing, a degree of conservatism has been applied to the information
presented.
b. Carrying Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear ASW weapons may be carried by a number of mari-
time units earmarked for assignment to NATO commanders. Specific information on the capabilities of
these units is provided in ATP 29.
c. Comparison With Conventional Weapons. The great value of the nuclear ASW weapon
in comparison with its conventional counterpart is that the former may succeed in a submarine kill under
conditions of target speed, depth, and localization in which the latter may fail. However, there may be clear
disadvantages in the former’s use under many circumstances. For example:
(1) Use of a nuclear ASW weapon against a submarine whose position has not been properly local-
ized, with kill probability doubtful, will make re-establishing contact extremely difficult. Sonar sys-
tems, particularly passive systems, may be rendered virtually useless for varying periods.
Contamination of the area around surface zero (SZ) will add to the difficulty of re-establishing contact.
(2) Stand-off requirements for surface ships and aircraft (that is, clearing the area) may induce de-
lays in delivery of the nuclear ASW weapon that will increase the chances for the submarine to escape.
(3) ASW efforts at great distances from the operational scene may be hampered by the effects of re-
verberations of a nuclear detonation on acoustic equipment (BLUEOUT).
d. Effects of Underwater Burst. Of all of the effects of an underwater burst, the least predict-
able is the degree of radioactive contamination that may result from a very shallow burst. A blowout, which
9-44 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
takes the form of a column of water and a mushroom cloud, can be anticipated and will subject a wide area
to radioactive fallout. Because of lack of confidence in predictions on blowout effects, it is expedient to
avoid a blowout in nuclear antisubmarine warfare.
e. Use of Nuclear ASW Weapons. When considering the tactical use of nuclear ASW weap-
ons, four main questions must be answered:
(1) Is it the best weapon to use?
(2) Is one readily available?
(3) Can it be used without danger to own forces?
(4) How will the after-effects limit own forces future action?
9302 — 9209 SPARE
9310 (NC) (NMM) COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTENTIONS
9311 (NC) (NMM) OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Designating an OTC. An OTC may be designated as the Executing Commander by an MNC

providing he holds the required documents including the MNCs NWRP and authenticators. This gives the
OTC the authority and responsibility for directing the use of nuclear weapons in accordance with the in-
structions in the MNCs request and release messages. The OTC as Executing Commander directs the em-
ployment of nuclear weapons by means of an OPTASK NUC and in so doing may delegate another ASW
Commander or Scene of Action Commander to direct weapon employment on his behalf as the Delivery
Force/Unit Commander. However, when designating a subordinate commander to direct the employment
of nuclear weapons, the OTC requires the designated Delivery Force/Unit Commander to validate the re-
lease message. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the correct use of nuclear weapons as authorized by the
MNC always rests with the Executing Commander.
b. Informing OTCs. OTCs not in possession of the MNCs NWRP may make unformatted re-
quests for the release of nuclear weapons to the next higher military authority holding the relevant docu-
ments and authentication. When such requests have been forwarded and approval for release is received
via the MNC and national authority of the nuclear power(s), the designated Executing Commander will in-
form the OTC and the Delivery Unit Commander(s) supporting the request of such approval, criteria for
use and constraints. When the delivery unit is subordinate to the OTC, the Delivery Unit Commander will
validate the release message, inform the OTC of correct validation and use of nuclear weapons in accor-
dance with both the MNCs and OTCs guidance. The latter is promulgated in the OPTASK NUC.
9312 (NC) (NMM) OTC’S INTENTIONS
The promulgated policy in the OPTASK NUC is to include:
a. The OTC’s intentions for the use of nuclear weapons and the areas in which those intentions apply.
b. Availability and arming of aircraft and ships including parent units, duty cycles, and alert states.
c. Criteria for use.
d. Criteria for acceptable contamination by own forces and stand-off ranges in force.
e. Any delegation of authority to include release message validation if required.
9-45 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. The OTC’s intentions for the use of nuclear ASW weapons by units under his tactical command
by means of the following color code:
(1) DUSTBIN BLACK — No unit may release a nuclear ASW weapon.
(2) DUSTBIN ORANGE — Units may, WITH the OTC’s prior approval, release a nuclear ASW
weapon, provided that the appropriate release criteria are met.
(3) DUSTBIN GREEN — Units may, WITHOUT the OTC’s further approval, release a nuclear
ASW weapon, provided that the appropriate release criteria are met.
9313 (NC) (NMM) RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDERS SUBORDINATE TO THE OTC
a. ASW and Screen Commanders. In addition to possibly being designated Delivery

Force/Unit Commander with the subsequent responsibilities of validation and weapons employment, the
ASW or Screen Commander may be authorized by the OTC to decide on and promulgate specific items
from the OTC’s policy with regard to the use of nuclear ASW weapons. Such items might be the stationing,
duty cycles, and alert states of available nuclear capable forces. The authorized commander is responsible
for informing MPA, particularly those in direct support, of the OTC’s nuclear ASW weapon policy and the
limits of DUSTBIN areas. This may also apply to other forces in the vicinity that the authorized com-
mander can inform using the means of communication he is allowed to use. If DUSTBIN areas extend be-
yond the identification safety range of the force, this information must be signalled to maritime
headquarters for aircrew briefing prior to takeoff or, if to inform other forces, as soon as the communica-
tion policy permits.
b. Scene of Action Commander. The aim must be to achieve the highest probability of success
while ensuring the required degree of safety of own forces. This aim demands the use of a high-yield
weapon at optimum splash point. In the case of surface ship action, this is best achieved either by an
ASROC delivery based on a fire control solution or by a nuclear ASW weapon dropped by a helicopter or
MPA. Failing this, the SAC should consider the use of time late or offset, ESOR, or low yield. This may in-
volve asking the OTC for a change in the release criteria.
(1) In deciding which of the above options is appropriate, the SAC must consider:
(a) The degree of threat.
(b) Advantages to be gained by an immediate attack.
(c) Ability to maintain contact, particularly while approval for a change to the OTC’s release
criteria is being obtained.
(d) Water depth.
(e) Vicinity of own forces.
(2) Table 9-8 summarizes the courses of action open to the SAC. Furthermore, the SAC is responsible for:
(a) The final decision that a nuclear ASW weapon is to be used on a specified target at the scene of
action, taking into full account the required target classification outlined in the OTC’s release criteria.
(b) Ensuring that the OTC’s final approval has been obtained for release of a nuclear ASW
weapon in DUSTBIN area ORANGE.
(c) Designating the control and attack unit(s).
9-46 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-8. (NU) (NMM) SAC Courses of Action With Nuclear ASW Weapons
CONTROL UNIT BELOW LAYER TSR < OSOR BELOW LAYER TSR > OSOR
SHIPS OR HELICOPTERS 1. Use ESOR if allowed. Keep outside OSOR and attack
ONLY with high-yield weapon where
2. If required probability of success can possible.
be achieved, use one or more of the
following:
(a) Open to OSOR and use time late.
(b) Use offset.
(c) Use low-yield weapon.
BOTH SHIPS AND 1. Helicopter takes over control. First unit to make contact retains
HELICOPTERS AVAILBLE control.
2. Ships withdraw.
(d) Informing the control unit that other units within 4 miles of the intended SZ are clear or not clear.
c. Control Unit. Aircraft carrying nuclear ASW weapons may be controlled for a nuclear ASW
weapon drop by any NATO unit, provided the appropriate level of NATO controller is available. However,
single-crewed helicopters which require special procedures are only to be controlled nationally. The con-
trol unit is responsible for:
(1) Ensuring that the release criteria are met.
(2) The correct and safe conduct of the attack, including broadcasting the position of the intended
SZ and the yield to be used.
d. Units at the Scene of Action. (1)Units under the command of the SAC and any other units
within 4 miles of intended SZ are to report DUSTBIN (ECHO/OSCAR) CLEAR to the SAC if they are
outside the ordered stand-off range (ESOR/OSOR) at the time that the control unit broadcasts the intended
position of SZ.
(2) Units which will not be clear, except the control unit and weapon carrier, are to report DUST-
BIN (ECHO/OSCAR) FOUL to the SAC. Subsequently they are to report:
(a) Estimated time to go to DUSTBIN (ECHO/OSCAR) CLEAR.
(b) DUSTBIN (ECHO/OSCAR) CLEAR when clear of ESOR/OSOR.
(3) The SAC is to report DUSTBIN (ECHO/OSCAR) CLEAR and FOUL information to the
control unit.
(4) If the scene of action is in the vicinity of the main body, the OTC will report DUSTBIN
(ECHO/OSCAR) CLEAR/FOUL for formed units of the main body. If DUSTBIN FOUL, report time
in minutes to DUSTBIN CLEAR.
9314 — 9319 SPARE
9-47 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9320 (NC) (NMM) CONTROL PROCEDURES
9321 (NC) (NMM) DUSTBIN AREAS
a. General. It will be necessary, primarily for reasons of safety, to define the areas in which the
OTC’s degrees of control are to be applied. These areas are known as DUSTBIN areas BLACK,
ORANGE, and GREEN. The following factors should be considered when deciding on the size and shape
of DUSTBIN areas:
(1) Need for simplicity and ease of ordering.
(2) Size and disposition of force.
(3) Location of SAAs or JTAAs.
(4) Ability of the force and individual units to avoid the base surge.
(5) Ability of the force and individual units to transit the base surge safely, and their military effec-
tiveness while in transit.
(6) Weapon yield, optimum burst depth, and therefore, the size of the base surge.
(7) Wind velocity.
(8) Standardization with other areas and zones already established to meet other threats.
(9) Importance of maintaining the PIM of the force or the need to remain in a particular area.
(10) Flying and replenishment operations in a particular area.
(11) Proximity of land.
b. DUSTBIN Area BLACK. The OTC can use DUSTBIN area BLACK:
(1) To safeguard particular areas from contamination, such as amphibious landing and carrier oper-
ating areas.
(2) To prevent the use of nuclear ASW weapons:
(a) In areas no longer considered to be worthwhile.
(b) In confused tactical situations, until the situation has clarified.
c. DUSTBIN Area ORANGE. In general, DUSTBIN area ORANGE is an area within a circle
centered on the center of the force with an extended upwind sector (see Figure 9-3). Radius (A) of the circle
should depend on factors indicated in paragraphs a(2) through a(6). The extended portion normally has a
depth (B) equal to one-half of the wind speed, although a slow, unmaneuverable force may require the dis-
tance to be increased. It may also be necessary for the OTC to impose additional restricted areas for special
purposes, such as flying operations. The tendency to make DUSTBIN area ORANGE unnecessarily large
must be resisted, since this will impair flexibility and speed of reaction. This is particularly significant in
the case of an MPA, when, for example, a DUSTBIN area ORANGE whose radius is 10 miles and whose
upwind extension is 10 miles (for a 20-knot wind) covers up to one-fifth of the area of a close support
airplan of 2,400 square miles.
9-48 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
D
IN
W
Figure 9-3. (NU) (NMM) DUSTBIN Area

ORANGE
d. DUSTBIN Area GREEN. DUSTBIN area GREEN is any area in which nuclear ASW weapon re-
lease has not been authorized by the OCA and that is not already designated ORANGE or BLACK by an OTC.
9322 (NC) (NMM) RELEASE CRITERIA
The release criteria must include the information provided in the following paragraphs:
a. Water Depth. Nuclear ASW weapons are not to be dropped in water with a depth of less than
46 meters (150 feet).
b. Proximity of Land. Nuclear ASW weapons are not to be dropped within 5 nautical miles of a
friendly or neutral coastline (except as authorized by the MNC), nor should they be used in areas where re-
sidual contamination can endanger the shore. With an on-shore wind, weapon release must be beyond the
distance that the base surge will travel in 90 minutes.
c. Merchant Ships. Nuclear ASW weapons are not to be dropped within 5 nautical miles of
friendly or neutral merchant ships.
d. Warships and Aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft attacking on their own sensor information are
not to drop nuclear ASW weapons within 4 nautical miles of a friendly warship or helicopter or within 2
nautical miles of other friendly aircraft. Whenever nuclear ASW weapons are to be expended against con-
tacts held by warships or helicopters, including the use of fixed-wing aircraft as a weapon carrier, the OTC
is to establish the degree of risk which is acceptable to units of his force. The risks depend on weapon yield,
water depth, and wind velocity, and are expressed as two stand-off ranges: OSOR and ESOR.
e. Target Classification Required for Actual Attack. The expenditure of a nuclear ASW
weapon cannot be justified unless the responsible commander is certain in his own mind that the contact is
9-49 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
a submarine. A nuclear ASW weapon is normally not to be expended unless the contact is classified
PROBSUB or higher. UK(M) will permit their helicopter-carried HE 600-pound bomb to be dropped on a
contact with a classification of POSSUB confidence HIGH FOUR.
9323 (NC) (NMM) CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR NUCLEAR ASW WEAPON ATTACK
a. SAC. The final decision that a nuclear ASW weapon attack is to be conducted is the responsibil-
ity of the SAC. In cases in which other units are in the vicinity, the SAC is to warn all concerned that a nu-
clear ASW weapon attack is imminent by ordering, “Standby DUSTBIN,” followed by the designation of
the control and attack unit(s). For example:
b. Control Unit. Two minutes before the attack the control unit is to broadcast, Two minutes be-
fore DUSTBIN.
c. Helicopter SELFTAC. A helicopter carrying out a SELFTAC is required to:
(1) Report, “Beware, beware,” thirty (30) seconds before weapon release.
(2) Pass the position of SZ to all forces in the vicinity.
(3) Check that no surface unit is within the stand-off range authorized by the OTC.
(4) Check that all aircraft are headed radially away from SZ and should be outside the authorized
stand-off range at the time of burst.
(5) Report, “DUSTBIN, DUSTBIN,” on weapon release.
d. MPA/Helicopter VECTAC by a Sonar-Fitted Ship. A sonar-fitted unit controlling an

MPA or helicopter for a nuclear ASW weapon drop will take action as follows:
(2) If radar is operating, check that no surface unit is within the stand-off range authorized by the OTC.
(3) If radar is operating, check that all assisting aircraft are headed radially away from SZ and
should be outside the authorized stand-off range at the time of burst.
(4) The delivery aircraft is required to:
(a) Report, “Beware, beware,” when executing its final run for weapon release.
(b) Check the safety of forces in the vicinity, if radar is operating, as in (2) and (3) above, irre-
spective of the capabilities of the control unit.
(c) Report, “DUSTBIN, DUSTBIN,” on weapon release.
e. MPA Attacking on Own Sensor Information. If other forces are in the vicinity, the MPA is to:
(2) Follow the requirements of d(4) above.
9-50 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-9. (NU) (NMM) Material Limitations
WATER DEPTH
WEAPON Less than 46 46 to 107 meters More than 107
meters (150 feet) meters (350 feet)
600-pound NOT TO BE Only low yield can be Yield selected will

USED obtained be obtained
B57 WILL NOT

DETONATE
f. Units Action After Weapon Release. Individual units are to act in accordance with the
OTC’s instructions after release of a nuclear ASW weapon. In the absence of instructions, units are to pro-
ceed clear of the contaminated area.
9324 — 9329 SPARE
9330 (NC) (NMM) NUCLEAR ASW WEAPON YIELDS AND EFFECTIVENESS
a. HE 600-Pound Bomb. When employing the HE 600-pound bomb, the pilot may select high or
low yield as directed. B57 weapons carried by fixed-wing aircraft give only a relatively high yield. Choice
of yield, when available, must be made in light of tactical considerations, but there are some overriding ma-
terial limitations built into the weapons that can affect the outcome. (See Table 9-9.)
b. Specific Kill Characteristics. It is not necessary for units to know the specific kill character-
istics of different weapon yields to fulfill their missions. What is required is a knowledge of the probability
of success in causing either surfacing or moderate damage to a submarine under varying conditions of sub-
marine speed.
c. Highest Probability of Success. The highest probability of success will always be achieved
when the weapon is dropped while still in contact and at optimum splash point. However, if the target is
held inside the promulgated stand-off range for friendly units, an adequate probability of success may still
be achieved by off-setting SZ to a safe distance from them or by using a time late to allow friendly forces to
gain the safe distance. Offset distance and time late are tabulated against probability of success for varying
submarine speeds in Table 9-10.
9340 (NC) (NMM) AIRCRAFT ARMING POLICY
a. Aircraft Characteristics. Aircraft characteristics are provided in ATP 29. It is inevitable that
some detections will be made in positions such that a nuclear ASW weapon cannot be used for safety rea-
sons. Ideally, therefore, both torpedoes and nuclear ASW weapons should be releasable at short notice.
b. Arming of Screen Helicopters. It will normally be unprofitable to arm some types of heli-
copters used in the screen, due to their reduced endurance and overall availability. However, if in-flight re-
fuelling facilities are available from screen ships, arming may be worthwhile. The operational endurance
of helicopters is reduced when carrying both torpedoes and nuclear ASW weapons simultaneously. It may
be preferable to arm screening helicopters only with torpedoes and allocate nuclear ASW weapons to dedi-
cated weapon-carrying aircraft.
9-51 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-10. (NU) (NMM) Time Late or Offset — Probability of Success
Probability of Causing
Surfacing/Moderate
Damage (%) Offset (yards)
Time Late Range (yards) by which to achieve
Mins Secs Ship can open Submarine Speed (kts) Probability
from Surface Zero shown against
at 22 knots 10 20 30 20 knot Submarine
HIGH YIELD WEAPON

0 00 0 95/95 95/95 95/95 600
0 30 365 95/95 95/95 86/95 600
1 00 730 95/95 90/95 68/92 1000
1 30 1095 95/95 75/95 50/76 1200
2 00 1460 95/95 62/90 36/62 1400
3 00 2190 90/95 42/76 16/47 1600
LOW YIELD WEAPON
0 00 0 57/93 53/90 47/85 0

0 30 365 46/85 26/62 10/35 500
1 00 730 33/73 4/29 0/4 -
1 30 1095 20/58 0/12 0/0 -
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL (NMM)
c. Stationing of Ships Providing Weapon Carriers. Ships supplying helicopters armed

with nuclear ASW weapons should be stationed as close as possible to those areas in which nuclear ASW
weapons can be used safely.
d. Changes in Helicopter Arming. It may be necessary to change the helicopter arming policy
as the force moves into different threat or geographic areas. The time taken to change an aircraft’s role (ap-
proximately 4 hours) will temporarily reduce its availability. The implications of the change must be con-
sidered well in advance.
e. Availability of Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The proximity of fixed-wing aircraft equipped with

nuclear ASW weapons and torpedoes must be kept in mind when considering the arming policy. A
fixed-wing aircraft 15 miles from the force is equivalent to a helicopter at about Alert 4 (4 minutes notice).
However, restricting the radius of action of a fixed-wing aircraft detracts from its deep field effectiveness.
Even so, at a normal longer range, the availability of fixed-wing aircraft must not be overlooked. For
example, a high-speed modern aircraft at 90 miles from the force is equivalent to a helicopter at Alert
15 (15 minutes notice).
9350 (NC) (NMM) SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
a. There have been several underwater detonations of nuclear devices and weapons that have
served to provide phenomena from which source data on underwater burst could be derived.
b. Hazards from the explosion of a nuclear ASW weapon can be divided into shock and contamina-
tion. Shock effects vary with water depth, burst depth, and yield, and, for a submarine, with the submarines
depth and aspect. Contamination includes:
9-52 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) The base surge.
(2) The spread of contamination from the base surge downwind.
(3) Contamination of the water around the burst.
c. It is particularly important to realize that hazards for surface ships and aircraft vary with yield,
water depth, burst depth, and wind velocity, each of which must be assessed in order to set safety limits. In
some circumstances, shock may be the limiting factor; in others, contamination.
d. The OTC has to decide to what extent he will accept the risk of contamination of his own forces
when conducting an attack. Apart from the basic rules laid down in the release criteria for the use of nuclear
ASW weapons, the OTC may add other tactical information based on the NBCD capability of his force and
the information contained in this chapter and in ATP 45.
e. The use of nuclear ASW weapons places additional responsibilities on all concerned and may require
areas within the OTC’s control to be divided into those over which the OTC wishes to retain close control, and
those in which more freedom may be given. If the OTC is unable or does not wish to delegate authority to use
nuclear ASW weapons, rapid communications throughout the whole chain of command is vital.
9351 (NC) (NMM) SPREAD OF BASE SURGE
The base surge is visible initially as a cloud or fine mist of water which spreads out from SZ. There-
after, the base surge spreads outward, at first at the rate of 100 fps, but then slows down as it mixes with the
air. The base surge can be expected to reach a range of approximately 2,300 yards in 100 seconds. The fig-
ures given below for the maximum spread of the base surge allow a considerable margin of safety:
(1) In light and variable wind conditions in which surface wind direction is not known, the base
surge is assumed to spread to a maximum radius of 3,000 yards for a low-yield weapon and 6,000 yards
for a high-yield weapon.
(2) When surface wind direction is known, the base surge is assumed to spread downwind at wind
speed for a period of 1 to 1-1/2 hours, after which the danger can be ignored.
9352 (NC) (NMM) SAFE STAND-OFF RANGES
Safe stand-off ranges are classified as operational stand-off range (OSOR) and emergency stand-off
range (ESOR).
a. OSOR. The range from SZ at the time of burst at which:
(1) A ship will receive no damage that will prevent it from carrying out its tactical mission, includ-
ing follow-on attacks on a target submarine.
(2) A helicopter in the dip has 90 seconds from weapon release to raise the sonar transducer and
achieve a safe escape to beyond the furthest limit of base surge with an acceptable degree of
overpressure.
(3) No personnel will suffer from radiation if escape maneuvers are carried out properly.
b. ESOR. The distance from SZ at the time of burst at which:
(1) A ship may receive damage that will interfere with its tactical mission, including re-attack on
the target submarine.
9-53 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-11. (NU) (NMM) Helicopter Stand-off Ranges
OSOR (yards)
WEAPON WIND UPWIND DOWNWIND

SPEED
600 pound 1-15 3,000 5,000
(HIGH) 16-40 3,000 6,000
600 pound 1-15 2,000 3,500
(LOW) 16-40 2,000 4,500
B57 1-15 4,000 6,000
16-40 4,000 7,000
ESOR (yards)
WEAPON WIND UPWIND DOWNWIND

SPEED
600 pound All 900* 1,800*
B57 All 1,500* 3,000*
*Shock limitation
NOTES
NOTE 1. 195 and AOS fitted helicopters break dip at weapon
release and cut cable.
NOTE 2. Allowances have been made for aiming and delivery
errors.
(2) A helicopter dipping between ESOR and OSOR at time of release will have to cut the cable to
achieve a safe escape maneuver.
(3) No personnel will suffer from radiation if escape maneuvers are carried out properly.
c. Less Than ESOR. At ranges less than ESOR, units will suffer unacceptable damage.
d. Helicopters. Helicopter aircrews must be briefed on the current OSOR and ESOR for ships be-
fore take-off and be kept informed of significant changes by the helicopter control unit. Operational and
emergency stand-off ranges for helicopters are given in Table 9-11.
e. Surface Ships. Safe stand-off ranges for surface ships vary with yield, water depth, and wind
conditions. Surface ships may more conveniently use the upwind and downwind figures for OSOR and
ESOR, calculated for a 22-knot escape speed, that are provided in Table 9-12. Surface ships operating
pre-wetting and at shelter stations can operate safely in the base surge. They therefore use the upwind figures
for OSOR and ESOR from Table 9-12 in the downwind sector. However, attacks from upwind are preferred,
since there may be tactical considerations which make the use of pre-wetting and shelter stations undesirable.
f. Submarines. The safe stand-off ranges for a submarine are 5,000 yards when above a depth of
125 meters (400 feet) and 10,000 yards when below 125 meters (400 feet). The submarine should normally
be brought to a depth above 125 meters (400 feet) before weapon release if the target is within 10,000
9-54 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-12. (NU) (NMM) Surface Ship Stand-off Ranges
HIGH YIELD WEAPON
Depth OSOR (yards) ESOR (yards)

WIND
(feet) (meters) SPEED UPWIND DOWNWIND UPWIND DOWNWIND
150 46 1-5 4,500 4,500 1,600 1,800

to to 6-15 4,500 4,500 1,600 2,300
299 91 16-25 4,500 4,500 1,600 3,500
26-40 4,500 4,500 1,600 4,500
300 92 1-5 2,000 2,000 1,500 2,000

to to 6-15 2,000 2,600 1,500 2,600
497 151 16-25 2,000 4,100 1,500 4,100
26-40 2,000 7,000 1,500 7,000
498 152 1-5 2,500 2,500 1,600 2,000

to to 6-15 2,500 2,500 1,400 2,500
719 219 16-25 2,500 3,700 1,400 3,700
26-40 2,500 6,100 1,400 6,100
720 220 1-5 3,000 3,000 1,700 1,900

to to 6-15 3,000 3,000 1,700 2,400
1139 347 16-25 3,000 3,400 1,700 3,400
26-40 3,000 5,600 1,700 5,600
1140 348 1-5 4,500 4,500 1,700 1,900

to to 6-15 4,500 4,500 1,700 2,400
2459 749 16-25 4,500 4,500 1,700 3,400
26-40 4,500 5,600 1,700 5,600
2460 750 1-5 5,600 5,600 1,700 1,900

to to 6-15 5,600 5,600 1,700 2,400
5099 1544 16-25 5,600 5,600 1,700 3,400
26-40 5,600 5,600 1,700 5,600
5100 1555 1-5 4,500 4,500 1,700 1,900

to to 6-15 4,500 4,500 1,700 2,400
9900 3018 16-25 4,500 4,500 1,700 3,400
26-40 4,500 5,600 1,700 5,600
LOW YIELD WEAPON
Depth OSOR (yards) ESOR (yards)

WIND
(feet) (meters) SPEED UPWIND DOWNWIND UPWIND DOWNWIND
150 46 1-5 1,700 1,700 500 700

to to 6-15 1,700 1,700 500 900
959 292 16-25 1,700 1,700 500 1,200
26-40 1,700 1,900 500 1,900
960 293 1-5 2,200 2,200 500 700

to to 6-15 2,200 2,200 500 900
3059 932 16-25 2,200 2,200 500 1,200
26-40 2,200 2,200 500 1,900
3060 933 1-5 1,700 1,700 500 700

to to 6-15 1,700 1,700 500 900
3779 1151 16-25 1,700 1,700 500 1,200
26-40 1,700 1,900 500 1,900
3780 1152 1-5 900 900 500 700

or or 6-15 900 900 500 900
greater greater 16-25 900 1,200 500 1,200
26-40 900 1,900 500 1,900
9-55 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
yards, since it is quicker for the submarine to change depth than to increase range. In addition, a fine aspect
is desirable.
9353 (NC) (NMM) SHIP’S TEMPLATE
a. Production of Templates. Production of templates at a suitable scale for antisubmarine plots

is a national responsibility. An example of a suitable template is provided in Figure 9-4. The template
indicates:
(1) Limits of initial base surge by circles at 3,000 yards and 6,000 yards for low- and high-yield
weapons, respectively.
(2) Division of the area into upwind and downwind sectors by a line through SZ at right angles to
the wind direction.
(3) Spread of contamination downwind within lines tangential to the limits of initial base surge.
b. Template. The template is completed before an attack is carried out by drawing in the stand-off
ranges in the upwind and downwind sectors. The template is centered either on the submarine’s position or
on the expected position of SZ and aligned with surface wind direction. It is then possible to:
(1) Determine the degree of risk to own ship or other units.
(2) Decide what evasive course should be steered.
c. Realignment of Template After Weapon Release. The template is realigned after

weapon release to the actual position of SZ as soon as it is known. To allow for a margin of safety the fur-
thest-on position of the base surge downwind from the initial limit shown on the completed template
should be plotted within the tangent lines starting at weapon release.
d. Information the Template Provides. (See Figure 9-4.) When completed, the template
provides:
(1) Stand-off ranges.
(2) Limits of initial base surge.
(3) Spread of contamination downwind.
9354 (NC) (NMM) ESCAPE MANEUVERS
a. Surface Ships. Escape maneuvers for surface ships are determined from their positions rela-
tive to SZ and wind direction.
(1) Downwind Sector. Surface ships initially steer 45º off the downwind direction and adjust
course as necessary to clear the contaminated area. Choice of course depends on wind speed. The down-
wind sector extends downwind from SZ to a distance in miles equal to 1.5 times the wind speed in knots.
(2) Upwind Sector. Surface ships should steer directly away from SZ until clear of the area
shown by the edge of the template.
b. Helicopters. Dipping helicopters are to raise sonar transducers or cut the cables, as appropri-
ate, and turn while accelerating from the hover to escape radially away from SZ, if in the upwind sector, or
to escape crosswind, if in the downwind sector, to beyond the limit of the spread of the base surge.
9-56 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
5 4 2 1 sz 1 2 4 5
DOWNWIND
SCALE CONFIDENTIAL
1 INCH = 2 MILES TIME HI/LO DEPTH WIND
Figure 9-4. (NU) (NMM) Template for ASW Plans
c. Aircraft and Helicopters in Transit. Supporting fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters in tran-
sit are to be heading away from SZ at the time of weapon release and are to report clear when steady on the
escape heading.
9355 (NC) (NMM) RE-ENTRY INTO CONTAMINATED AREA
Tactical considerations, particularly obtaining proof of success, may cause own forces to re-enter
the contaminated area after a nuclear burst.
a. Surface Ships. Contamination of the water around the burst may extend to a range of 2,500
yards from SZ, 15 minutes after the burst. Contamination of the water will spread gradually and may ex-
tend up to 5,000 yards, 4 hours after the burst. The contaminated area around SZ should be avoided for at
least 30 minutes and for 90 minutes if possible.
b. Aircraft. The base surge is unlikely to exceed a maximum height of 2,000 feet. Aircraft may
therefore overfly the radioactive pool at altitudes in excess of 5,000 feet very shortly after the burst. Once
the base surge has dissipated or blown clear, an aircraft may make a single pass over the radioactive pool:
(1) At 1,000 feet, 5 minutes after the burst.
(2) At 100 feet, 10 minutes after the burst.
9-57 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Aircrews are to be aware of the acceptable total doses that they may receive while conducting pro-
longed operations over the radioactive pool. Aircrews are to check the actual doses received themselves.
9356 (NC) (NMM) SUMMARY OF DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
A summary of decisions and actions by all units, before, during, and after an attack with a nuclear
ASW weapon is provided in Table 9-13.
Table 9-13. (NU) (NMM) Summary of Decisions and Actions for Nuclear ASW Weapon Attack
OTC ASWC/SOCA/SC SAC Control Unit Attack Unit Other Forces

BEFORE ACTION
1 1A. Promulgates nu-
clear weapons
policy, using 1B. Any information
OPTASK NUC: from 1A not al-
ready ordered 1C. Informs
(1) Disposition by the OTC. OTC and/
of weapon or ASWC/ 1D. As 1C, if
carriers. SOCA/SC if applicable.
(2) Duty cycle. duty cycles
(3) Alert states. or alert
(4) DUSTBIN states can-
color areas. not be met.
(5) Release
criteria.
(6) Contamin-
ation cri-
teria.
(7) Delegation
of authority.
2 2A. Informs
applicable MPA
(on joining).
ON CONTACT
3 3. Decides if nu-
clear ASW
weapon is us-
able with:
(1) Ship/heli-
copter/MPA/
SSN.
(2) DUSTBIN/
GREEN/
ORANGE
areas.
(3) HIGH/LOW
yield.
(4) OSOR/
ESOR.
(5) Time late/
offset.
(6) Target iden-
tification.
4 4A. Requests:
4B. Responds to (1) Attack and/

4A(2). or control
4C. Dispatches at- unit(s).
tack and/or con- (2) OTC’s ap-
trol unit(s). proval if in 4D. Dispatches
ORANGE attack
area. unit, if nec-
essary.
9-58 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 9-13. (NU) (NMM) Summary of Decisions and Actions for Nuclear ASW Weapon Attack (Cont.)

5 5A. Moves to
position
from which 5B. Moves to
attack can position
5C. Informs support- be con- from which
ing submarines trolled; if attack can
and vectors to a applicable, be per-
safe haven, if gains formed; if
applicable. contact. applicable,
gains
control.
6 6A. Informs applica-

ble MPA.
7 7A. Requests addi-

tional (control)
7B. Dispatches ad- units.
ditional (control)
units.
8 8A. Is any change

of release crite-
8B. If applicable, ria required? If
makes change so, contacts the
of release crite- OTC.
ria.
9 9A. Makes final de-

cision to use
nuclear ASW 9B. Informs at-
weapon. tack unit of
Informs OTC decision to
and control use nuclear
and/or attack ASW
unit(s). weapon.
STANDBY
DUSTBIN
(confirms
designation of
control and
attack unit(s)).
10
ON ATTACK
11 11. Broadcasts
time and
position of
intended
SZ and
yield.
12 12A. Informs
applicable
MPA.
9-59 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I

13 13A. OTC informs
SAC that main
body is 13B. All other
DUSTBIN units in
CLEAR/FOUL. the
If FOUL, ORANGE
reports time in area
minutes to report to
CLEAR. SAC as in
13A.
14 14A. SOCA informs
SAC whether
all submarines 14B.
under his (1) Checks that
control are units within
clear or not as 4 nm of SZ
in 13A. are clear or
not and
advises
control unit.
(2) When all

units are
clear,
informs
control unit
and orders
attack to be
made.
15 15. Decides
post-attack de-
ployment of
units at scene
of action.
16 16A. Starts
count-
down. 16B Same as
Reports 2 16A, if
minutes applicable.
before
DUSTBIN
release.
17 17A. Selects
weapon,
if applic-
able.
18 18A. Broad-
casts
18B. Broad- BEWARE,
casts BEWARE.
BEWARE,
BEWARE.
19 19A. Controls
attack unit
to weapon 19B. Releases
release weapon.
point.
20
9-60 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I

After Attack
21 21A. Broad-
casts
21B. Broad- DUSTBIN,
casts DUSTBIN.
DUSTBIN
DUSTBIN.
22 22. Reports ac-
tual position
and time of
SZ.
23 23A. Inform applica-

ble MPA of
DUSTBIN
release.
24 24. All units plot

SZ and
contamina-
tion spread.
Avoid
over-con-
tamination
and rejoin.
25 25. Alters
post-attack de-
ployment of
units at scene
of action, if re-
quired.
26 26A. Decides how

to obtain proof
26B. Promulgates of success, if
NEWBURST required.
message.
9-61 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
9360 (NC) (NMM) BREVITY CODE WORDS
Brevity code words and their meaning are as shown in Table 9-14.
Table 9-14. (NU) (NMM) Brevity Code Words
DUSTBIN BLACK No unit may release a nuclear weapon.

DUSTBIN GREEN Unit may, without the OTC’s further approval, release a nuclear
ASW weapon, provided that the appropriate release criteria are
met.
DUSTBIN ORANGE Unit may, with the OTC’s prior approval, release a nuclear
ASW weapon, provided that the appropriate release criteria are
met (see Article 9313).
DUSTBIN LIMA Low-yield nuclear ASW weapon.
DUSTBIN HOTEL High-yield nuclear ASW weapon.
CARTWHEEL OSCAR OSOR extends ____ yards upwind, ____ yards downwind from
SZ. (Wind direction from ____ .)
CARTWHEEL ECHO Same as for CARTWHEEL OSCAR, but for ESOR.
RHINO An aircraft with a nuclear ASW weapon on board. (RHINO may
be used as a suffix to an aircraft’s call sign to indicate which
aircraft has a nuclear ASW weapon on board.)
DUSTBIN OSCAR I (or unit indicated) am/am not clear of OSOR.
CLEAR/FOUL
DUSTBIN ECHO I (or unit indicated) am/am not clear of ESOR.
CLEAR/FOUL
STANDBY DUSTBIN Nuclear ASW weapon attack approved.
NEGATIVE DUSTBIN Nuclear ASW weapon attack not approved.
BEWARE, BEWARE The cautionary report made by an ASROC-fitted ship or a nu-
clear ASW weapon delivery aircraft about 30 seconds prior to
weapon firing/release.
DUSTBIN, DUSTBIN The report made by an ASROC-fitted ship on firing an RTDC
(rocket-thrown nuclear depth charge) or an aircraft on releasing
a nuclear ASW weapon.
ABORT DUSTBIN I cannot attack with a nuclear ASW weapon but will attack with
conventional weapons if possible.
9-62 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 1
a. DESCRIPTION. A close search designed for use by one aircraft to investigate a bearing.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft flightpath depends on the search method employed. When an air-
craft is required to start the search from the origin of the bearing it is to be so ordered.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders to the aircraft:
Airplan Designation
A Bearing and type of bearing
B Time bearing obtained
C Origin of the bearing
D Distance in miles along bearing to be searched
E Starting position (optional).
NM
15
EXAMPLE BEARING
ORIGIN
EXECUTE AIRPLAN ONE
ALFA—060 CLASS CHARLIE RACKET I-BAND
BRAVO—1900Z
CHARLIE—UNIT CALLSIGN
DELTA—15
ECHO—(Aircraft Commander’s discretion)
Figure 9-5. (NU) (NMM) Airplan 1
9-63 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 2
a. DESCRIPTION. A close search designed for use by one aircraft to investigate a datum or
contact.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft proceeds to the required position to localize and classify the con-
tact. The aircraft commander reports results to the OTC who will determine the duration of the search.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders of the aircraft:
Airplan Designation
A Datum and datum error or contact position
B How datum or contact position was established
C Datum time or time contact obtained
D Contact classification.
EXAMPLE
5 NM
EXECUTIVE AIRPLAN TWO XX 15 NM
ALFA—DATUM 3123—090XXX15 DATUM
ERROR 5 MILES
BRAVO—CRISS-CROSS INDIA BAND
CHARLIE—1426Z
DELTA—POSSUB HIGH 3
9-64 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 3
a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan designed for use by one aircraft to provide a barrier along a given
line either fixed geographically or relative to a force. Unless otherwise ordered, the aircraft commander
will choose the sensor(s) to be employed. If the sensor to be employed is specified by the ordering au-
thority, the following should be considered.
(1) JULIE/ACTIVE SONOBUOY. A barrier of short duration and relatively short length (12
miles approximately). This barrier is fixed, and cannot be relative to a moving force; it can, however, be
extended to cover a moving force for a short time.
(2) MAD. A medium duration barrier which must be short in total length to be effective (5 miles
approximately).
(3) JEZEBEL. A passive barrier which may be maintained by either lofar or codar. It should be
located beyond the interference range of ships.
(4) OTHER SENSORS may be used, depending on aircraft equipment and the tactical
situation.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft flight path depends on the search method employed.
Airplan Designation
A Relative or geographic
B Origin (true bearing and distance in miles from a reference point) and time (when origin
is ordered with reference to a moving position)
C Bearing and distance of each leg
D Duration
E Sensor to be employed (normally aircraft commander’s discretion)
F Encoded course and speed elements of PIM (for relative airplans only).
9-65 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 3 (Cont.)
EXAMPLE CHARLIE—000-15 THEN 045-15
EXECUTE AIRPLAN THREE DELTA—UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS
ALFA—RELATIVE ECHO—VISUAL
BRAVO—285 QQ 18 AT 1015Z FOXTROT—025-12 (encoded)
NM
) 15
(T
45
(T) T OF
0
12
025 MEN
E
BO OV
IN D M
DY
000 (T) 15 NM
MA NDE
PROJECTED POSITION OF
E
ORIGIN SECOND LEG

INT
285 (
T) Q
Q1 8
PROJECTED POSITION OF
ORIGIN MAIN BODY SECOND LEG
285 (
T) Q
Q 18
MAIN BODY ON LEG OF

ZIGZAG PLAN
Figure 9-7. (NU) (NMM) Airplan 3 (Cont.)
9-66 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 4
a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan used to search rela-

SECTOR SYSTEM
tive to a force. The area around the force is divided into
quarters designated Sector One through Sector Four. Ad- SECTOR INTENDED
ditionally, for all round search the four quarters are com- TWO MOVEMENT
bined in Sector Five. Other divisions may also be ordered
by the methods shown in the diagram. All such sectors and
divisions are based on the DR position of ZZ or QQ (origin) SECTOR SECTOR
as it advances along the PIM. FOUR ONE
b. EXECUTION. When more than one aircraft is as-

signed, each aircraft task is to be ordered individually and a FORCE
distinct area assigned to each aircraft. SECTOR
THREE
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be in-
cluded in the orders to the aircraft:
SECTOR INTENDED
Airplan Designation TWO MOVEMENT
A Sector number(s), and either depth of search
in miles (Sectors 1-4) or in miles ahead, abeam and
SECTOR SECTOR
astern (Sector 5). ONE
FOUR
B Origin, time and encode position, course and
speed elements of PIM. CONVOY
SECTOR
THREE
EXAMPLE
EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR
ALFA—SECTOR 1 SQUARE 30
BRAVO-ZZ-0800Z-encoded 180 XX 40-090-10
9-67 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
EXAMPLE 5:
AIRPLAN 4 (Cont.) SECTOR 090-140 CIRCULAR 40
ORIGIN 40
090º(T)
EXAMPLE 1:
SECTOR 1 CIRCULAR 20 INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT
140º(T)
20
ORIGIN EXAMPLE 6:
SECTOR 090-14 CIRCULAR 30 to 50 MILES
50
ORIGIN 090º(T)
EXAMPLE 2: 30
SECTORS 1 and 2 CIRCULAR 20 INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT 140º(T)
EXAMPLE 7:
ORIGIN 20
SECTOR 5 35 AHEAD 25 ABEAM 12 ASTERN
INTENDED
25 MOVEMENT
EXAMPLE 3:
SECTOR 1 SQUARE 20 25
INTENDED
MOVEMENT
20
ORIGIN 35
20
ORIGIN
12
EXAMPLE 8:
SECTORS 1 and 2 SQUARE 35
EXAMPLE 4: SECTORS 3 and 4 SQUARE 20
SECTORS 1 and 2 SQUARE 10 to 30
INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT 35 MOVEMENT
35
35
ORIGIN
10
ORIGIN
20
30 20
20
9-68 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 5
a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan for use by one aircraft to search an area of any size or shape. The
area may be either geographic or relative to a force.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft commander will normally determine the aircraft flightpath
independently.
Airplan Designation
A Relative or geographic
B Corners (for areas with straight sides)
C Center (for circular area) and radius in miles
D Encoded course and speed elements of PIM (for relative areas only)
EXAMPLE 1 EXAMPLE 2
EXECUTE AIRPLAN FIVE EXECUTE AIRPLAN FIVE
ALFA — GEOGRAPHIC ALFA — RELATIVE
CHARLIE — 240 WW 120 RADIUS 35 BRAVO — 090 QQ 10—
240 QQ 40—
300 QQ 40
DELTA — 270 — 15 (encoded)
300-40
WW
NM
120
PIM QQ
35 NM 270-15 090-10
240-40
9-69 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLANS 41, 42, AND 43
a. PURPOSE. These airplans are designed to investigate a bearing or a small area with two or
more helicopters.
b. DESCRIPTION.
(1) AIRPLANS 41, 42, and 43 are all line abreast searches. In Airplan 41, the helicopters dip
along the direction of advance. In Airplans 42 and 43, the dips are offset so that each jump is at 45°
(Airplan 42) or 60° (Airplan 43) to the direction of advance. Thus, Airplan 41 provides the fastest speed
of advance of the three plans, but the narrowest search front. Airplan 43 provides a wide search front
but requires a slower speed of advance, and Airplan 42 provides a compromise between the two.
(2) OPTIMUM STATIONING between any two short-range sonar helicopters, and the jump
distance required, for various speeds of advance of the sonar front, depend on TSR. TSR is normally
expressed in multiples of 500 yards. The formula used is 1.6 x TSR.
(3) INITIAL DIP LINE is normal to the direction of advance.
c. ORDERING.
Airplan Designation
A Center of the initial dip line from reference point or unit

B Direction of advance
C Duration of search or distance to be covered
D Initial dip stations relative to center of initial dip line
E Optimum stationing distance in hundreds of yards (1.6 x TSR)
F Jump distance in hundreds of yards (1.6 x TSR)
EXAMPLE (see figure)

EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR ONE
ALFA — 090 ZZ 10
BRAVO — 000
CHARLIE — 20 MINUTES
DELTA — HELO 15 LEFT
HELO 16 RIGHT
ECHO — 32
FOXTROT — 32
Figure 9-10. (NU) (NMM) Airplans 41, 42, 43
9-70 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 41
D d TSR
C c
STATIONING
DISTANCE
B b
CENTER INTIAL a
A DIP LINE
HELO 15 HELO 16
FRONT
AIRPLAN 42
AIRPLAN 43
g
G TSR TSR
G g
F f
F f
E e E e
d D d
D
STANDING C c
C DISTANCE c
STANDING
30º B DISTANCE b
90º B
b
TURNS
150º
A a
CENTER INTIAL
CENTER INTIAL
a DIP LINE
A DIP LINE
FRONT
FRONT
NOT TO SCALE
NOT TO SCALE
Figure 9-10. (NU) (NMM) Airplans 41, 42, and 43 (Cont.)
9-71 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 44 d. ORDERING.
Airplan Designation
a. PURPOSE. A lost contact or datum A Position of search center or

search for use by two, three, or four helicopters. It datum
is suitable when time late is less than 20 minutes
B TSR
and when there is no estimate of the submarine’s
most likely course. This plan provides high density C Initial dip bearings
coverage near datum, and dip positions do not
vary with estimated submarine speed.
EXAMPLE (see figure)
b. AXIS. The search axis is always north.
c. EXECUTION. Before reaching datum, the EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR FOUR
unit ordering the search is to assign one helicopter
to make its initial dip to the north of the datum (on ALFA — 220 ZZ 41
the axis) and assign remaining helicopters to initial
dip positions such that the angular spacing be- BRAVO — 6000
tween helicopters is equal (i.e., two helicopters
start at 000° and 180° from datum, three helicop-
CHARLIE — HELO 15 000
ters start at 000°, 120°, and 240° from datum). Ini-
tial dip positions are at TSR from datum.
HELO 22 180
Subsequent dips are positioned to form an
expanding clockwise spiral search. The table
shows each dip position as a range and bearing
from datum.
Should the helicopters arrive late at datum, 3
the unit ordering the search can order helicopters
to start their search at the 2nd or 3rd dip. HELO
No coordination between helicopters is
15
needed once datum has been established.
2 2
HELO
22
1
9-72 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 44 (Cont.) TABLE FOR AIRPLAN 44
Distance from Datumn

(X TSR)
Dip
Number 2 Helos 3 or 4 Helos
1 1 1
2 1 1/2 2
3 2 3
4 2 1/2 4
5 3 5
6 3 1/2 6
7 4 7
8 4 1/2 8
Dip Position Bearing True or Magnetic as Ordered from

Datum for First Helicopter When Number of Helicopters
Used Is:
2 3 4
000 000 000
090 060 045
162 109 090
216 143 124
259 169 150
295 190 171
326 208 189
353 223 204
2nd helo add 180 2nd helo add 120 2nd helo add 90
degrees to all figures degrees, 3rd helo degrees, 3rd helo
above add 240 degrees to add 180 degrees,
all figures above 4th helo add 270
degrees to all fig-
ures above
9-73 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 45
a. PURPOSE. An airplan intended for use c. SELECTION OF JUMP DISTANCE.

when one or more helicopters are available to es- Jump distance is selected by the officer order-
tablish a barrier. ing the search. Theoretical complete cover-
age of the barrier can be achieved, using the
b. DESCRIPTION
graph, as follows:
(1) BARRIER ORIGIN. Selected by the
1. Decide maximum expected subma-
officer ordering the barrier. It is the initial dip posi-
rine speed (V knots).
tion of a helicopter which is to be stationed at one
end of the barrier. 2. Assess dip cycle time (T minutes) as
dip time (time in dip) plus jump time.
(2) BARRIER AXIS. Selected by the offi-
cer ordering the barrier. It is the bearing from the 3. Establish submarine travel per dip
origin along which the barrier is established. (And cycle (D kiloyards) from formula:
will therefore usually be at right angles to the ex- VT
D=
pected submarine course.) 30
(3) INITIAL DIP POSITIONS. One heli-
4. From D and TSR extract from the
copter is ordered to dip at barrier origin and the re-
graph the recommended jump
mainder dip at twice jump distance apart along the
distance.
axis. Dip stations are numbered consecutively
along the axis (see figure and example on next 5. Action when TSR is low: Theoretical
page) and are assigned by the senior helicopter coverage may be best achieved by
commander, taking into account the relative posi- ordering Helo Station distance at 1.6
tion of the helicopters in relation to the datum. times TSR apart and Helos remain in
the dip (see Example 2).
(4) SECOND DIP POSITIONS. After
completing initial dips, helicopters jump one dis- d. ORDERING
tance up the axis to start their second dip position.
Airplan Designation
(5) SUBSEQUENT DIP POSITIONS. On
completion of the second dip, helicopters return to A Position of origin
their initial dip positions. They then continue dip-
ping alternatively in their two dip positions. B Axis
C Helicopter station numbers
D Distance apart between station
numbers
9-74 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 45 (Cont.)
Helo 24 Helo 25 Helo 27

DIP 1 DIP 1 DIP 1
1 2 3
Helo 24 Helo 25 Helo 27
DIP 2 DIP 2 DIP 2
ORIGIN
090º
9,000
AXIS
18,000
24
12
22 KY
DS
EXAMPLE 1 TS
R
EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR FIVE 20
10
KY
ALFA—070 XX 25 DS
TS
18 R
BRAVO—090
CHARLIE—HELO 24 STATION ONE— 16 8K
HELO 25 STATION TWO— YD
Jump Distance (Kiloyards)
ST
HELO 27 STATION THREE SR
DELTA—EIGHTEEN THOUSAND YARDS. 14
12 6K
YD
ST
EXAMPLE 2 (When TSR is low) SR
10
EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR FIVE
ALFA — 070 XX 25 4
8 KY
DS
BRAVO — 090 TS
R
CHARLIE — HELO 24 STATION ONE— 6
HELO 25 STATION TWO—
HELO 27 STATION THREE 2
KY
DELTA — THIRTY TWO HUNDRED YARDS, NO JUMPS 4 DS
TS
R
0
2 4 6 8 10 12
Distance Submarine Travels per Dip Cycle(Kiloyards)
Determination of Jump Distance
9-75 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 46
a. PURPOSE. A helicopter search plan for c. EXECUTION. Each helicopter is or-

use when one or more helicopters are to be used dered to search one or more lettered squares.
on random search of a geographical area. The helicopters then dip at the center of each
of the numbered squares within the allocated
b. DESCRIPTION OF SEARCH AREA.
area. The order of dips may be at the pilot’s
Airplan 46 can be used to allocate each helicopter
discretion, or may be ordered from the ran-
to one or more quarters of an overall square area.
dom table below:
The overall area is divided into four lettered
squares, which are themselves subdivided each Column 1 2 3
into nine smaller squares, as illustrated below:
Dip Section 4 6 2
Sequence 9 2 4
AXIS 2 3 6
6 8 8
1 2 3 3 1 3
A 4 5 6 B 7 4 9
8 5 5
7 8 9
5 7 1
1 9 7
SEARCH D When using this table, the column may be en-
CENTER C
tered at any point and then followed sequen-
tially to the bottom, returning to the top and
down to the starting point and so on.
(1) AXIS. The axis (originating at search d. ORDERING

center and dividing squares A and B) is always Airplan designation
north.
A Search center (center of total
(2) SIZE OF AREAS. At discretion of offi- square area)
cer ordering search. It is recommended that the
numbered squares should normally have sides of B Helicopter assignments
about twice TSR. NOTE: It is not always neces- C Length of side of each lettered
sary to allocate all four squares. A square, rectan- square
gle or L-shaped search can be ordered (see
example below). D Dip sequence column allocation
(optional)
9-76 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 46 (Cont.)
EXAMPLE CHARLIE—18,000 YARDS
EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR SIX DELTA—HELO 14 COLUMN 1—
ALFA—220 POINT XRAY 85 HELO 15 COLUMN 2—
BRAVO—HELO 14 SQUARE A— HELO 16 COLUMN 3—
HELO 15 SQUARE B—
is
HELO 16 SQUARE C— ax
x
00
60 x
0
3 6 00
A B
14
LO LO
HE HE 15
C
16
O
HEL
SEARCH
CENTER
9-77 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 47
a. PURPOSE. A lost contact search for two C Helo assignment

helicopters. It is suitable for use against medium
D Datum time
speed submarines. When the plan is started on an
accurate datum within 5 minutes of lost contact
and TSR is at least 2,000 yards, Airplan 47 should EXAMPLE
give a good relocation chance against submarines
doing up to 15 knots. STANDBY AIRPLAN FOUR SEVEN
b. INITIATION. The senior helicopter will LEFT
select Airplan 47 as his intended action on lost
contact. The plan is then initiated by either heli- ALFA—050 TRUE
copter as soon as it loses contact, and when no
other unit has contact. This helicopter becomes BRAVO—2300
the directing helicopter of the search and estab-
lishes datum at a range and bearing from its pres-
ent position. This bearing is then used as the CHARLIE—HELO 22 ALFA—
search axis. HELO 24 BRAVO
c. SELECTION OF “LEFT” OR “RIGHT” DELTA—1513Z
PLAN. The directing helicopter selects the “Left”
or “Right” plan depending on the last known bear-
ing movement of the submarines (e.g., if bearing
movement was to the left, the left plan should be Once contact is lost, the helicopter orders,
chosen). EXECUTE AIRPLAN 47 and marks his present
position with smoke and/or a sonobuoy.
d. ORDERS BY DIRECTING HELICOPTER.
As soon as a helicopter has reason to doubt its con- e. EXECUTION OF SEARCH. The exe-
tact holding and no other unit is in contact, it should cution of the search is conducted as outlined
prepare for Airplan 47 by passing the following in the template.
message: f. ACTION ON REGAINING CON-
STANDBY AIRPLAN FOUR SEVEN LEFT/ TACT. When contact is regained by one heli-
RIGHT copter, the other is directed to a suitable
position for tracking to be continued. If how-
A Axis ever, contact is lost before this action can be
B Datum range effected, a fresh Airplan 47 is to be ordered.
9-78 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 47 (Cont.)
ROTATE TO
SWITCH AXIS
B1
TEMPLATE FOR AIRPLAN 47 LEFT RANGE & BEARINGS
1000 YD
270º 2000 YD 135º 3500 YD

A1 DATUM
180º B2
3500 YD
A3
HELO
055º LOSING CONTACT
2000 YD
180º
A2 3500 YD
0 1000 2000
B3
SCALE
NOTE: REVERSE THIS TEMPLATE FOR RIGHT PLAN
9-79 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AIRPLAN 48
a. PURPOSE. A datum sector search de- EXAMPLE

signed for two helicopters against submarine
speeds up to 20 knots and time late up to 15
minutes. EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR EIGHT
b. DESCRIPTION ALFA—180 ZZ 30 1515Z

(1) SEARCH ORIGIN. Selected by the
officer ordering the airplan. It is the datum position. BRAVO—060 TRUE
(2) SEARCH AXIS. Selected by the offi-
cer ordering the airplan. It is the submarine’s most CHARLIE—HELO 10 ALFA
probable course from the search origin. HELO 14 BRAVO
(3) DIP STATIONS. These are fixed sta-
DELTA—6000
tions as detailed below and are assigned by the
senior helicopter commander, taking into account
the relative positions of the helicopters in relation ECHO—LOOSE ADVISORY
to the datum.
ROTATE TO
Dip SEARCH AXIS
Number Helicopter A Helicopter B
HELO B
1 310° DATUM 050° DATUM DIP 3
X .8TSR X .8TSR
HELO A
2 315° DATUM 045° DATUM DIP 3
X 2.8TSR X 2.8TSR HELO A HELO B
DIP 2 DIP 2
3 000° DATUM 000° DATUM
X 2.3TSR X 3.7TSR
c. ORDERING
HELO A HELO B
Airplan Designation DIP 1 DIP 1
SEARCH ORIGIN
A Search origin and time
B Search axis HELICOPTER DATUM
SECTOR SEARCH PLAN
C Designate Helos
D Tactical sonar range (TSR)
E Control method (optional)
9-80 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK METHOD 1A
LOCK ON ATTACK
This method is a coordinated attack for use in duties of attacking ship to another ship as
a multiship ASW action. It is particularly useful circumstances require.
when difficulty is experienced in holding contact on
(3) ACTION BY ASSISTING SHIPS.
a high-speed submarine by the sector method. It
When the SAC orders the attack, assisting
also provides a good safety factor for ships maneu-
ships maneuver to stations at the range or-
vering at high speeds. Other ships present may be
dered by the SAC to contain the contact within
ordered to carry out support plans Bear (11A). The
a good holding formation. For two ships, sta-
aim is to contain the submarine between the ships
tions should be in the quarter opposite the at-
of the SAU, maintain contact, and attack.
tacking ship. For three ships, stations should
a. GENERAL be apexes of an equilateral triangle oriented to
best suit the position of all ships at the time of
(1) DISTANCE APART OF SHIPS. Opti-
ordering and centered on the contact. For the
mum distance between ships is between 2,000
few times when ambiguity could arise, the
and 3,000 yards. This may, however, be amended
SAC can clarify by ordering “(CALL SIGN)
as dictated by sonar conditions, characteristics of
EAST, (CALL SIGN) WEST” or a similar delin-
weapons fitted, and compatibility of sonars.
eation. When ships are in station, they are to
(2) TACTICAL DIAMETER. With ships of report “LOCKED ON.” In Method A, assisting
similar characteristics, the attacking ship should ships comply with all maneuvering orders im-
pass the rudder, speed, and engine orders. With mediately. In Method B, assisting ships com-
ships of dissimilar characteristics, it is necessary for ply with the direction of turn and come to the
the SAC to signal the tactical diameter to be used. required course and speed. They are to be
prepared to assume duties of attacking ship at
(3) LOCK ON RANGE. The lock on
any time and should report if they find them-
range is the range from each unit of the SAU to the
selves in a good attack position. Ships are to
attacking ship.
acknowledge all maneuvering information
b. PROCEDURES with the single word “(Ship’s call sign)” in al-
phabetical sequence.
(1) ORDERING THE ATTACK. The SAC
orders “EXECUTE LOCK ON RANGE . . . (in hun- (4) REVERTING TO GEOGRAPH-
dreds of yards),” designates the attacking ship and, ICAL SECTOR ATTACK METHOD. The SAC
where applicable, the tactical diameter to be used. may revert to the Geographical Attack Method
Thereafter, the SAC executes tactical command at any time by ordering “Unlock” and then or-
and the attacking ship executes tactical control of dering the Geographic Sector Attack Method.
ships ordered to “LOCK ON” and directs the action. If more than one assisting ship is present, the
SAC must redesignate the assisting ship and
(2) ACTION BY ATTACKING SHIP. The
assign others to support stations.
attacking ship immediately informs the assisting
ship(s) of her present course and speed. If in a po- c. ACTION WHEN CONTACT IS LOST.
sition to attack, she does so. She then endeavors These attack procedures are repeated as ap-
to keep the submarine inside the attack formation, propriate until the submarine is destroyed or all
maneuvering the SAU by either of two methods. In ships have lost contact. When all ships have
Method A, the lock on control ship passes rudder, lost contact, the lost contact search plan speci-
speed, and engine orders over the tactical net. In fied by the SAC is to be carried out.
Method B, the lock on control ship passes direc-
tion of turn and the desired course and speed over
the tactical net. The attacking ship passes the
Figure 9-16. (NU) (NMM) Attack Method 1A (Lock On)
9-81 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK METHOD 2A
DEEP CREEP ATTACK
This method is designed for a two-ship depth possible, forward of the submarine
charge or short-range homing torpedo attack on a beam. If this is not possible, bring the
submarine which is using deep submergence and attacking ship up from astern of the
slow speeds for evasion. It is effective only when submarine.
surprise can be achieved.
3. Vectors the attacking ship to the at-
a. OCCASIONS FOR USE. This method tack position by ordering courses
may be used when ships have no effective depth and speeds at frequent intervals.
determining sonar and under any one, or any com- Low speed should be ordered when-
bination of, the following conditions. ever possible.
1. When intelligence indicates that the sub- 4. Advises the attacking ship “Fifty
marine is damaged and has gone deep. yards to go” to the attack position.
2. When one of the ships involved has the 5. Orders the attacking ship to “Fire” at
only weapons available, but its sonar is attack position.
inoperative.
6. Vectors attacking ship to a new ap-
3. When sonar conditions prevent attack by proach position for the next attack
other procedures. when she has reported “Weapon
fired.”
CAUTION (2) ATTACKING SHIP
1. Takes position as directed by the as-
Deep Creep Attack procedures may sisting ship.
place both ships in danger if the subma- 2. Listens with sonar, but does not
rine decides to take offensive action. transmit.
b. PROCEDURES 3. Steers courses, and regulates speed
as ordered by the assisting ship.
(1) ASSISTING SHIP
4. Lays a depth charge pattern, or fires
1. Maneuvers to maintain a position in so- torpedo, as directed by the assisting
nar contact 1,000 to 2,000 yards from, ship.
and on the quarter of, the submarine.
5. On completion of attack reports
2. Vectors the attacking ship to start the run “Weapon fired.”
from a point about 800 yards at right an-
gles to the line of bearing between the as-
sisting ship and the submarine and, if
Figure 9-17. (NU) (NMM) Attack Method 2A (Deep Creep Attack)
9-82 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK METHOD 3A
GEOGRAPHIC SECTOR ATTACK
A two-ship close ASW action system designed to attacking ship should avoid entering a new sector
allow attacks by two ships while containing the subma- until the assisting ship has acknowledged the
rine between them. change in sectors.
a. GENERAL (5) The attacking ship should not hesitate
to pass control to the assisting ship should the latter
(1) Sectors are described by cardinal and
be in a more favorable position from which to con-
half-cardinal points of the compass as follows:
duct the attack.
N/S W/E NW/SE SW/NE
NOTE
(2) One ship acts as attacking ship and an-
other as assisting ship. Remaining ships are ordered by The attacking ship should not leave its
the SAC to carry out a support ship operation. sector before reassignment of sectors
has been ordered.
(3) The attacking ship is to signal immediately
the sector in which it will maneuver. This automatically c. ASSISTING SHIP
allocates the opposite sector to the assisting ship. Des-
ignation of sector should be made so that maneuvering (1) Maneuvers to gain or maintain con-
both ships to maintain assigned sectors is minimized; tact from within its assigned sector.
furthermore, maneuvering by both ships is normally (2) Maneuvers to keep clear of the tor-
eased if the sector boundaries roughly coincide with the pedo interference (DOG BOX) or weapon danger
submarine’s overall course. areas of the attacking ship’s weapons. If the assist-
(4) Ships proceed to their assigned sectors ing ship is tactically obliged to enter this area, it is to
and are then free to maneuver within them. warn the attacking ship of its intention to do so.
(5) If neither ship is able to attack, both maneu- (3) If the attacking ship allocates itself a
ver within their sectors to maintain contact and to be in a new sector, the assisting ship is to maneuver to
favorable position to resume attack when ready. The ship take the opposite sector.
that is in the best position for maintaining contact should
be designated as attacking ship even if she is not able to (4) The assisting ship must be ready to
attack because of the high submarine speed. assume the duties of attacking ship if so ordered by
the attacking ship.
b. ATTACKING SHIP
(1) At the start of action, the attacking ship is EXAMPLE
the first ship gaining sonar contact or the ship so desig-
nated by the SAC. The attacking ship may subsequently C2D THIS IS A1B
order the exchange of duties between the two ships as EXECUTE PLAN RED 3A
the tactical situation requires. A1B BROTHER SECTOR NORTH
(2) The attacking ship signals sectors as
specified in item 3 of the general procedures. A1B THIS IS C2D
(3) The attacking ship maneuvers within her ROGER C2D SISTER SECTOR SOUTH
sector as necessary to conduct her attacks. Before at-
tacking, the type of weapons to be fired and the firing
side are signaled. This side should be selected so that N
A1B
the submarine is placed between the two ships when
the attack is completed. sub
(4) The attacking ship should not hesitate to C2D
reassign sectors in order to improve own ship’s and the S
assisting ship’s positions relative to the submarine.
Continual changing of sectors may be necessary. The
Figure 9-18. (NU) (NMM) Attack Method 3A (Geographic Sector Attack)
9-83 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK METHOD 3A MOD

MODIFIED GEOGRAPHIC SECTOR ATTACK
A two-ship close ASW action system to be (4) As in Attack Method 3A.

used when at least one of the two ships is
(5) As in Attack Method 3A.
equipped with short-range weapons and when the
combination of weapon systems does not allow (6) On completion of her attack, the
Attack Method 3A. attacking ship reassigns sectors according to
item 3 and refires into the new sector. If the at-
a. GENERAL
tacking ship assigns the duty of attacking ship
(1) Sectors are as described in Attack to the assisting ship, the attacking ship moves
Method 3A, but the attacking ship may maneuver in order to withdraw as soon as possible from
within a circle radius of 3,000 yards centered on the sector of the new attacking ship.
the contact, unless otherwise ordered by the SAC,
c. ASSISTING SHIP. Maneuvers as in
as well as within her assigned sector. The assist-
Attack Method 3A. However, under no circum-
ing ship maneuvers within her assigned sector but
stances must ship approach the contact to a
is to keep outside 3,000 yards from the contact.
distance of less than 3,000 yards, unless oth-
The circular zone radius of 3,000 yards is desig-
erwise directed by the attacking ship.
nated Sector Zero. Exchange of information on
actual and intended movements of attacking and
assisting ships is paramount due to the close na-
ture of the ASW action.
(2) Sectors are prescribed by the attack- EXAMPLES
ing ship and ships proceed as in Attack Method 3A.
b. ATTACKING SHIP
(1) As in Attack Method 3A. SECTOR ATTACKING
(2) As in Attack Method 3A. N/S 3,000 yd

(3) The attacking ship maneuvers within N
her sector as necessary to conduct her attacks.
Before attacking, the type of weapon to be fired
and the withdrawal sector of the attacking ship af-
ter the attack is to be signaled to the assisting ship.
The withdrawal sector is established by estimating SECTOR 3,000 yd
the relative position of attacking and assisting
ships by the time of weapon delivery.
NW/SE
SE ATTACKING
Figure 9-19. (NU) (NMM) Attack Method 3A MOD (Modified Geographic Sector Attack)
9-84 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK AND SUPPORT METHOD 11AH BEAR
a. When ASW action is being conducted, EXAMPLE

this method may be used to provide support from a
specific direction, to order the direction from which C2D THIS IS A1B
ships are to conduct stand-off attacks, or to order a
barrier across the assumed course of a submarine. EXECUTE PLAN RED BEAR
b. Plan BEAR may be based on a subma-
rine, datum, or unit. Selection of the origin for the BEARING 180 RANGE 80
plan will depend on the mission and also the cir-
cumstances of the action. Plan BEAR can be used SIGNALS EXECUTE TO FOLLOW
as a support plan to a Plan RED and/or Plan
BLACK.
FORMATION OSCAR 270 TACK 50
c. Use of Plan BEAR to form a barrier is a
quick alternative for changing the orientation of SPEED 18
the screen or creating defense in depth.
d. Use of a submarine or datum position is
more appropriate when they are within or close to SUB
the TDZ: BEARING 180°
8,000 YD
(1) ACTION BY SAC. The SAC must
specify the origin of the plan, the bearing, and the
distance at which ships and helicopters will estab- C2D 5,000 YD A1B
lish their patrol. The bearing will generally be the
submarine’s most dangerous course, its probable
escape course, or up sea. The range will be de-
pendent on the tactical situation.
(2) ACTION BY SHIPS. Maneuver on a
patrol line at right angles to the bearing ordered.
Movements should be coordinated by the SAC or
senior officer.
(3) ACTION BY HELICOPTERS. Heli-
copters are to dip on a line at right angles to the
bearing ordered and at the range ordered or exe-
cute Air Plan 45 as directed by the SAC or HCU.
Figure 9-20. (NU) (NMM) Attack and Support Method 11AH Bear
9-85 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ATTACK, SUPPORT, AND LOST CONTACT METHOD

14AH/14SH CORDON
a. WHEN EMPLOYED AS A SUPPORT d. METHOD OF EXECUTION

METHOD — to provide support in one or more
(1) ACTION BY SAC. The SAC is to
specified sectors, to units engaged in a close ASW
order:
action.
(a) Sector assignments. Sectors
b. WHEN EMPLOYED AS AN ATTACK
to be designated by a single numeral.
METHOD — to provide:
(b) Radius of attack zone/Sector
(1) Sectors in which ships/helicopters
Zero if other than 3,000 yards.
are free to maneuver while conducting stand-off
attacks or carrying out assisting unit duties. (c) Exchange of duties between
units as the tactical situation requires.
(2) A circular attack zone with a 3,000-
yard radius centered on the contact, unless other- (2) ACTION BY SHIPS OR HELI-
wise ordered by the SAC, within which only the at- COPTERS. Units have freedom of movement
tacking unit and/or aircraft under its control have within assigned sectors, but they must not ap-
freedom to operate entering or leaving, as re- proach within 500 yards of adjacent occupied
quired, to maintain contact and employ weapons. sectors. The inner limit of sectors is the
The attack zone is designated Sector Zero. boundary of the attack sector/Sector Zero with
no outer limit.
c. WHEN EMPLOYED AS A SEARCH
PLAN — to provide an automatic search plan
when contact is lost. NOTE
(1) When contact is lost, the origin of the 1. When being used as a lost con-
search is based on the DATUM. tact search, care must be taken to
(2) The establishment of the DATUM is ensure that ships mutually support
the authority that initiates the search plan, units re- each other.
maining in their existing sectors, unless otherwise
ordered by the SAC. 2. SACs may order a range or dis-
tance with sector assignments. If
SECTOR ASSIGNMENT this is done, units are to remain
within 1 mile of that range/dis-
tance from the center of Plan
000 CORDON.
315 045
3. (NC) (NMM) Against modern
8 1 submarines, this method will gen-
erally only be valid for a limited pe-
ATTACK ZONE
7 2
SECTOR ZERO riod before another search plan will
be required.
270 090
6 3
CONTACT OR DATUM
5 4
225 135
180
Figure 9-21. Attack, Support, and Lost Contact Method 14AH/14SH Cordon
9-86 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 1S
OAK TREE
Oak Tree is a search by ships in a loose formation (3) LOST CONTACT SEARCH. This
into which helicopters may be integrated. It may be used method is used in the following cases:
as an area, intercept, lost contact or bottom search.
(a) When the submarine would be
a. DIRECTING SHIP. The SAU commander or outside the area covered by a close lost contact
SAC is the directing ship. search by the time it can be effectively started.
b. FORMATION. Units should be formed on a (b) When the execution of a close
loose line abreast. Distances between units and speed lost contact search would involve excessive ma-
are to be ordered by the SAU commander. Accurate neuvering of the ships as a result of their positions
station keeping in this search is not necessary. The with reference to the datum.
SAU commander is to order and coordinate the decep-
(c) When the submarine’s most dan-
tive or evasive steering of the formation and/or individ-
gerous course can be predicted, or when it is es-
ual ships.
sential that the units should remain between the
c. METHODS submarine and his target.
(1) AREA SEARCH. An area can be (4) BOTTOM SEARCH. When searching
searched by: for bottom contacts, an area search should be con-
ducted with the direction of the search at right an-
(a) A SINGLE SWEEP through the area,
gles to the current.
using a broad zigzag if necessary to widen the front.
This method could be used if the area is small, or if it is d. SEARCH TURN. If a zigzag is in use
desired to carry out a rapid but comparatively low proba- when a search turn is executed, the zigzag is to
bility search. cease automatically and units are to return to base
course. The zigzag is only to be resumed on signal.
(b) A SERIES OF SWEEPS in the form of
While the formation is completing the maneuver,
an expanding square search based on a datum or
ships are particularly vulnerable. Individual ships
search center. In this case units are required to be in a
are therefore to carry out their own torpedo coun-
loose line abreast. This provides a slow sweep rate.
termeasures during this time.
(c) A SERIES OF PARALLEL SWEEPS
e. HELICOPTER MANEUVER DURING
through successive portions of the area. This provides
SEARCH TURN. When a ship alters course using a
thorough geographic coverage but a slow sweep rate.
search turn, helicopters stationed on it are to be re-
(d) A SERIES OF RANDOM SWEEPS positioned on the other side of that ship on the new
within the area. This provides maximum deception course.
when it is believed that the submarine will remain within
the area. EXAMPLE
C2D THIS IS A1B
(2) INTERCEPT SEARCH. Units search a EXECUTE PLAN BLACK OAKTREE
moving area. The position and size of the area at any SIGNALS EXECUTE TO FOLLOW
moment depend upon the estimate of the submarine’s
FORMATION YANKEE 090 TACK 40
probable courses of action. This moving area can be
searched by a series of sweeps if the area is large and if SPEED 16
time permits. When intercepting a submarine assumed A1B
to be closing a convoy or force, time is normally limited.
The requirement to keep the units between the subma- 4,000 YD DATUM
rine and the force will in most cases permit only a single
sweep of the area.
C2D
Figure 9-22. Search Plan 1S Oak Tree
9-87 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 2S
ACORN
a. DIRECTING SHIP. The directing ship is d. EXECUTION.

the attacking ship of the ASW attack method in
(1) DIRECTING SHIP. The directing
use at the time of lost contact, unless the SAC or-
ship executes a slow turn as necessary to
ders otherwise.
pass through point D, then continues to follow
b. ORDERING. The directing ship is to the general search pattern, using random
signal: evasive steering. She should inform her con-
sort when passing through point D and should
(1) “Execute ACORN left” or “Execute
also pass bearings and distances of the da-
ACORN right.”
tum during these initial maneuvers.
(2) Position of datum and datum time.
(2) ASSISTING SHIP. The assisting
(3) Direction of the axis. ship maneuvers to pass through point A, re-
porting when she does so, then continues to
(4) Speed.
follow the general search pattern, using ran-
(5) Initial dip position(s) for helicopter(s). dom evasive steering.
c. DESCRIPTION.
NOTE
(1) AXIS. The axis is a line passing
through the datum and defining two sectors of To avoid violent maneuvering,
180° each in which the two ships maneuver during ships are not obliged to pass di-
the search. The tracks to be followed by the ships rectly through points A and D, but
are related to this axis according to the search should join the first leg as close as
plan illustration. This plan may be laid out on plots possible.
with a template if desired but, after initial maneu-
vers have been carried out, exact adherence to (3) ACU. The ACU at the time of the
the planned track is not necessary. lost contact retains control and orders helicop-
(2) CHOICE OF AXIS. The axis is cho- ter(s) as follows:
sen so that the two ships are within the two sectors (a) “Execute ACORN.”
determined by the axis and the initial maneuver of
the directing ship is made easier. The selection of (b) (H/S c/s) vector to initial
the axis does not depend on any estimate of the dip/late dip.
present or predicted submarine movement. (c) (H/S c/s) vector to initial
(3) DIRECTION OF SEARCH. The dip/late dip.
ACORN search consists of a left plan or a right
plan. In the right plan the directing ship maneuvers
on the right of the axis.
Figure 9-23. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 2S Acorn
9-88 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 2S (Cont.)

ACORN
H/S
LATE DIP
5,000 YDS
3,000
2,000
H/S
DIP 1 1,000
3,500 YDS
D A
ACORN RIGHT
D
IR
1,500 (One Helo)

EC
TI
N
G
SH
IP
SH
IP
G
IN
ST
SI
AS
H/S "A"
H/S LATE DIP
DIP 2 5,000 YDS
7,000 YDS
H/S "A"
3,000 DIP 2
RIGHT 7,000 YDS
2,000
H/S "A"
DIP 1 1,000
3,500 YDS
D A
D
IR
1,500
EC
ACORN RIGHT
TI
N
(Two Helos)
G
SH
P
I
SH
IP
NG
TI
IS
S
H/S "B"
AS
DIP 1
H/S "B" 3,500 YDS
DIP 2
7,000 YDS
H/S "B"
LATE DIP
RIGHT 5,000 YDS
Figure 9-23. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 2S Acorn (Cont.)
9-89 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I

ACORN
(4) HELICOPTERS: The ACU shall sta- (6) TERMINATION OF SEARCH.

tion helicopters as indicated in the following table The SAC should terminate the search as soon
in accordance with the time in which they can be in as tactical considerations indicate that an
dip position. area search would be more profitable.
(5) SUPPORT SHIPS. On initiation of
Acorn, the SAC is to specify his intentions should
the Acorn plan fail to regain contact. This will en-
able support ships to assume appropriate
positions.
BEARING1 AND RANGE
CASE POSITION TIME ONE H/S TWO H/S
H/S A H/S A H/S B
CASE A2 INITIAL DIP UP TO END OF MIN. 8 130 - 3,500 130 - 3,500 310 - 3,500
H/S IN DIP SECOND DIP FROM MIN. 13 ON 010 - 7,000 200 - 7,000 010 - 7,000
POSITION
BEFORE
END OF
MIN. 6
CASE B3 LATE DIP FROM TIME IN DIP ON 130 - 5,000 130 - 5,000 340 - 5,000
H/S IN DIP
POSITION
AFTER END
OF MIN. 6
NOTES: 1. Bearings of dip positions are measured clockwise from the axis in ACORN RIGHT and counter
clockwise in ACORN LEFT. Ranges are in yards from datum.
2. If case A applies, and contact has not been made, helicopter(s) will not remain in initial dip posi-
tion past the end of minute eight before proceeding to second dip position.
3. If case B applies, helicopters will remain in the late dip position.
Figure 9-23. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 2S Acorn (Cont.)
9-90 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 2SH MOD

ACORN MODIFIED
a. DIRECTING SHIP. The directing ship is Bearing of dip positions are measured
the ship taking part in the search. clockwise from axis in Acorn right and coun-
ter-clockwise in Acorn left. If convenient, the
b. ORDERING. The directing ship is to take
helicopter may be taken under loose advisory
the helicopter under close positive control and is to
control at the end of first dip; in this case, the
order it to:
directing unit is to order:
(1) “Execute ACORN Modified”
Execute ACORN Modified
(2) “Vector to initial dip position” Direction of search (RIGHT or LEFT)
Axis
c. DESCRIPTION
Datum (from YY)
(1) CHOICE OF AXIS. The axis is cho- Advisory Control
sen so that the initial maneuvers of the directing (3) SUPPORT SHIP. As in Acorn
ship are made easier. plan.
(2) DIRECTION OF SEARCH. The (4) TERMINATION OF SEARCH. As
ACORN Modified search consists of a left or a soon as the SAC determines that an area
right plan. In the left plan the directing ship maneu- search would be more profitable.
vers on the left side of the axis; in the right plan,
she maneuvers on the right side.
d. EXECUTION.
ACORN MOD
(1) DIRECTING SHIP. The ship which (Right)
takes part in the search selects the axis and ma-
neuvers in the same manner as the directing ship H/S "B"
DIP 1
in the Acorn plan. 3,500 YDS
(2) HELICOPTER. The helicopter which H/S "A"
operates as an assisting unit is to be positioned as DIP 2
3,000 3,000 YDS
follows:
2,000
H/S A H/S "A"
DIP 1
1,000
Dip 1: 270° DATUM 1,250 yards 1,250 YDS
Dip 2: 225° DATUM 3,000 yards D

Dip 3: 315° DATUM 3,500 yards H/S "B"
D
DIP 2
IR
EC
4,000 YDS
TI
H/S B
N
G
SH
IP
Dip 1: 130° DATUM 3,500 yards

Dip 2: 270° DATUM 4,000 yards H/S "A"
DIP 3
3,500 YDS
Figure 9-24. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 2SH Mod (Acorn Modified)

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 10
Protection of Shipping
SECTION I — GENERAL INFORMATION
10000 INTRODUCTION
a. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are of fundamental strategic interest to NATO be-
cause ships carry the overwhelming majority of its economic and military cargoes. Allied nations are eco-
nomically dependent on the seas and, in particular, they are reliant on distant countries for supply and
trade. There is also a key requirement for seaborne reinforcement and resupply in times of crisis and war.
This shipping will need protection.
b. Potential adversaries could interrupt shipping using one or a combination of surface action
groups, air attack, sabotage, mine warfare, and submarines. Of these offensive capabilities, the submarine
is the most difficult to counter. Protection of shipping measures are described in this chapter.
c. (NR) (NMM) The main factors influencing whether a ship is convoyed or sailed independently
are given at paragraph 10060b(1).
10001 NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING ORGANIZATION
The control and coordination of merchant shipping is vested in the Naval Control of Shipping Orga-
nization (NCSORG). This important aspect of protection of shipping is described in ATP 2, Vols. I and II.
10002 ACTIVATION OF THE NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING ORGANIZATION
Early decisions on activation are necessary as each element of the NCSORG will take some time to
become effective.
10003 PREROGATIVES OF COMMANDING OFFICERS OF ALLIED WARSHIPS
Commanding officers of Allied warships may give orders to merchant ships under naval control
covering the following subjects:
(1) Route to be followed.
(2) Speed.
(3) Regulations on dimming or extinguishing lights.
(4) Visual and radio communication at sea (radio watches and regulations regarding radio and
radar silence).
(5) Manning and operation of armament.
(6) Evasion.
10-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
10004 FACTORS AFFECTING MERCHANT SHIPS
The paucity of assets will preclude the continual or consistent close escort of all convoys. Many will
have to rely on such protective measures as:
(1) Tactical and environmental routing.
(2) Diversion.
(3) Zigzag.
(4) Restrictive emission control (EMCON).
(5) Reactive assistance.
(6) Speed.
10005 REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
In a crisis, varying degrees of control over the movement of merchant shipping will be necessary.
Crisis Response Shipping will require protection and escorting, while normal commercial shipping may
require a variety of considerations, depending on destination or route. With the receding threat of a global
war, plans for NCS now center upon RNCS. RNCS procedures lend themselves to almost any scenario
short of major conflict, including Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), peacekeeping, or humanitarian
operations.
10006 FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
FNCS still exists; should wide-scale conflict ever arise, or when the threat to, and losses of, mer-
chant ships reach an unacceptable level, the remaining option is to institute convoys. Although convoying
will create disruption in the normal shipping flow and should be used as a last resort, it must be
implemented.
10007 — 10009 SPARE
10-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
10010 REGIONAL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING PROCEDURES
a. RNCS procedures offer a menu of options ranging from simple advice at the lower end of the
spectrum, up to convoys if required. It must always be remembered that RNCS is not mandatory unless:
(1) An Allied nation consigns its ships to RNCS,
(2) Ships Taken Up from Trade (STUFT) are operated as military, or quasi-military vessels, or
(3) Ships are under charter to military authorities, and the charter specifies the requirement for such
control.
b. Only those elements of the NCSORG and Civil Direction of Shipping (CDS) organizations con-
sidered necessary to meet the threat will be activated. National Shipping Authorities (NSAs) will inform
their national ship owners and operators of the range of protective options on offer, and encourage their
ships operating in or near the region to conform to RNCS requirements.
10011 NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING REGION
Declaration of an NCS Region is a political and military reaction to counter risk to merchant ship-
ping. Its establishment in no way usurps national rights within territorial waters or freedom of passage on
the high seas. Appropriate liaison with the national authorities of littoral states may be required. Approval
of an NCS Region within the NATO area, having first been requested by a maritime commander, is given
by the Military Committee or Defense Planning Committee.
10012 SHIPPING RISK AREAS
Where an NCS Region is large and the degree of danger within varies, consideration should be given
to the establishment of a Shipping Risk Area (SRA) within the region to identify those areas of higher risk.
This will allow the concentration of protective measures to best effect. The SRA will be promulgated by
the NCS Region Commander (NCSRC).
10013 COMMAND AND CONTROL
In RNCS, control will be exercised by the NCSRC. He will either be located ashore, as part of the
area commander’s staff, or afloat, as part of the maritime component commander’s staff, although space at
sea will limit staff numbers. There is no hard and fast rule for this, and the choice will be dictated by the ac-
tual situation. If afloat, then the shore HQ will provide a “rear link” function and pass information to the
NCSRC at sea. In this case the NCSRC will specify which tasks the support HQ shall perform, including
reporting procedures.
10014 SHIPPING CONTROL POINTS
The purpose of a Shipping Control Point (SCP) is to provide a means whereby ships can be briefed
on risk and route and organized for protection, before proceeding into a region or SRA. Several SCPs may
be located either in convenient locations ashore, or afloat in a suitable naval vessel, naval auxiliary, or
chartered vessel. Availability of adequate communications will dictate the actual choice.
(1) Location and Manning. The location of the SCP will depend on the SRA disposition within
the NCS Region, the local geography, and the pattern of shipping flows. It is likely to be located at the
perimeter of the NCS Region. It may be manned by a multi-national team, whose expertise will depend
10-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
on the crisis situation, traffic density,and likely requirements. For example, in a low-risk situation man-
ning might be limited to enough people for picture compilation and verbal briefings. At the other end of
the scale, the SCP might also have numerous Naval Liaison Officers (NLOs) and a Convoy Commodore
and staff available.
(2) Function. The function of an SCP is to:
(a) Board merchant ships to brief them on current risk, pass them detailed routing instructions,
and check equipment and publications.
(b) Embark NLO in merchant ships if required, together with the necessary communications
equipment and classified/cryptographic material.
(c) Monitor merchant shipping in and out of the NCS Region.
(d) Debrief Masters on completion of an SRA transit and if necessary, collect any classified
documents and/or PACE.
10015 COMMUNICATIONS
a. Communication with merchant ships is a relatively straightforward matter. Most ships rely en-
tirely on INMARSAT for long-range communications and VHF IMM for short-range communications.
Ships under RNCS will be required to report the communications watch they will be keeping whilst on pas-
sage. They might be advised to listen to Coast Earth Stations (CES) and Coast Radio Stations (CRS) in or-
der to receive traffic of an immediate or general nature, when transiting in or near the region. Any form of
secure communications will only be possible if the Master holds a suitable security clearance or an NLO is
embarked. Secure communications will be achieved by the use of the MERCS Crypto System, which con-
sists of PACE/KL43 and the necessary keymat. All SCPs will hold sets of PACE for this purpose, and ships
allocated for escort duties will also need this equipment, which will be provided from Nations or NATO
sources. PACE is a small, hand-held, low-data-rate, crypto device capable of being used over any voice cir-
cuit, HF radio, and SATCOM. It is not practical for the transmission of long or involved messages such as
the OPTASK RNCS. It does however provide a limited covered capability up to NATO-Secret, depending
upon the keymat loaded.
b. In addition to the requirements detailed above, vessels transiting or proceeding to/from ports
within a region may be required to report when they have reached certain points during their voyage, called
Communication Reporting Gates (CRG), in order to receive updated risk information and instructions
concerning their transit.
c. Unless an ADP system using direct data transfer is in use, the MERCO message system is to be
used for reporting the movement of merchant ships to military and CDS authorities (see SUPP 1 to ATP 2,
Vol. 1). Plain-language formats from ATP 2, Vol. II, and its COMM Supplement are to be used in all com-
munications with merchant vessels. A transmission guidance table may be found in Table 10-1 that sum-
marizes “Who sends what.”
10016 OPTASK RNCS
The purpose of the OPTASK RNCS is to enable the NCSRC to promulgate detailed tasking and in-
structions for all aspects of RNCS. The message is to be promulgated by the NCSRC and sent to all units
and commands that will be involved in or affected by RNCS in the region. It is classified
NATO-Restricted, unless the content or situation demands a higher classification. The OPTASK RNCS is
still under development and will be found in APP 4 in due course.
10-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 10-1. Regional Naval Control of Shipping Transmission Guidance
NOTES: C D D M M N N N P R R S S S
1. May be originated by an NCS O E I E O E O O O E O A A A
authority at a port or SCP if the ves- R S V R V W N N R A U I I I
sel is damaged whilst in harbor. R C E C O P A S T D T L L L
2. Only if passage takes ship into E H R A R O R A S Y E O O O
that region. C A T S D S R 9 T R O R R R
T O R I I L A E R D D D
3. NCSRC may delegate authority
to sail vessels to an NCS authority I R E T V E T P D C I A
at the port or SCP O D P R E D E V N C
N E D R Y D C
4. Addees as in original message. P R E
Key: A = Action addee E P
X = Info addee P
O = Originator
4 = See Note 4 above
Area Commander 4 X X X 4 X X X X
1 3
NCS Region Commander 4 A O O A A A 4 A O O O O A
NCS Authority at Port or SCP of
Departure 4 4 O A A A A O
NCS Authority at Port or SCP of
Arrival 4 A X O A2 O 4 A A A
NSA of Ship’s Flag 4 O A A O X X 4 X X X X
NSA of Chartering Nation 4 O A A X X 4 X X X X
Adjacent Maritime Commanders 4 X X X 4 X X X
10017 SCOPE OF ORDERS
a. When a vessel is consigned to RNCS, routing advice will either be in the form of Guidance or Di-
rection. The following is a list of orders that may be given by NCS authorities to any vessel consigned to
NCS, while in, or bound for, an SRA:
(1) Route to be followed.
(2) Speed (see paragraph b).
(3) Visual and radio communications at sea.
(4) Convoy conduct.
(5) Rescue operations.
(6) Evasion.
(7) Diversion.
(8) Tactical maneuvering.
10-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Merchant vessels use several different terms to describe speed: Declared, scheduled, service, and
critical speed. These are defined in ATP 2, Vol. I.
10018 ESCORT COMMANDER
The escort commander, when tasked by the Maritime Force Commander as OTC of a group of mer-
chant ships requiring accompaniment, will decide how best to meet the prevailing threat (see also Article
10019). It is realistic to expect only one escort for a group of merchant ships, and the best policy will be to
try and skirt a danger. It may be that not all merchant ships will have an NLO on board. In this case signal-
ing between the escort and escorted ships is to be kept to a very simple level. Normal warfare precautions
will pertain to the protection of shipping, and will include:
(1) Threat.
(2) Speed of advance and time available.
(3) Weather.
(4) Availability of air cover.
(5) Own-ship defensive capability.
(6) Route.
(7) Nature of cargo (IVCs in particular).
(8) Formation and spacing.
(9) EMCON policy.
(10) Evasion policy.
(11) Emergency reaction to threats.
(12) Handling of casualties/stragglers.
10019 PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Areas where the threat to shipping is well defined or expected are called SRAs. Normally accompa-
niment will be confined to the transit of all, or part, of an SRA. Protective measures may consist of the
following:
(1) Protective Routing. Direction or advice may be provided regarding the route that will pro-
vide the safest passage, taking into consideration the threat, geography, weather, and oceanographic
considerations. Such advice may also include communications requirements and contingency actions.
(2) Accompaniment. Accompaniment is the most likely form of protection to be afforded to

merchant ships within the NCS Region. It allows for a ship or a group of ships to be gathered together for
the transit. No formal formation is necessary. Unless otherwise directed, ships form a loose column at a
safe distance from each other and cover the same ground as the one ahead. They must be carefully
briefed on the threat reactions required. Communications should be kept simple — usually VHF —
(crypto may be issued, which may require the embarkation of an NLO) and EMCON may be imposed.
An NLO may be embarked if the threat indicates that defensive maneuvering may be required.
10-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Convoy. The order to convoy will be made by the NCSRC. It is the most restrictive of the
available options, but does allow economy and concentration of available forces.
10020 SAILING ORDER FOLDER (SOF)
A Sailing Order Folder may be issued to any vessel consigned to RNCS and must be issued to any
ship proceeding in convoy. When issued, the Sailing Order Folder will consist of only those parts appropri-
ate to the voyage. Further details may be found in ATP 2, Vol. I.
10021 ALLIED WORLDWIDE NAVIGATION INFORMATION SYSTEM
The need for the NCS and AWNIS organizations to liaise closely will be of paramount importance
to the success of any protection effort in a risk area. The NCSRC will promulgate any navigational warn-
ings within the NCS Region through the AWNIS cell. The decision to activate AWNIS will be dependent
upon the threat to shipping from hostile action, particularly mining. As a rule, AWNIS will normally be ac-
tivated with RNCS.
10022 PROTECTION OF SHIPPING AGAINST GENERAL THREATS
The threat of attacks against merchant shipping falls into three broad categories: a long- distance and
intense attack, medium- to short-range attacks delivered by the increasing range of western-style weap-
onry, and terrorist/piracy-style attacks from organized gangs and opportunists. The latter threat is probably
the most difficult to counter, although a number of measures can serve to reduce the threat.
(1) Protection Against Air Attack. Air threats can be further subdivided into a range of attack
methods, from long-range high-diving weapons, to sea-skimming missiles such as Exocet. From the
merchant ship perspective, the results tend to be rather similar, and therefore the main aim must be to
avoid the enemy weapon-firing platform and the missile seeker head from seeing the target. Most mod-
ern weapon systems rely on energy traveling from the target back to the weapon sensors, whether this be
reflected radar energy, infrared energy from a hot engine exhaust, or emissions from the target’s own
sensors. Some aspects of the hull offer highly reflective surfaces to radar energy. The term used to de-
scribe this reflective energy is Radar Cross Section (RCS). In Figure 10-1, the aircraft/missile in posi-
tion A has to approach closer to the target in order to achieve a firing solution than the weapon system in
position B. The merchant ship must aim to move the reported target bearing off the RCS peaks. Thus,
Masters should attempt to avoid presenting bow, stern, or beam aspects to the attacking weapon system.
Other measures that must be considered in order to reduce RCS are:
(a) Close all upper deck doors and hatch covers.
(b) Remove, ditch, or stow all loose items on the upper deck (e.g., paint tins, stores, containers, etc.).
(c) Lower cranes and other working devices as low as possible.
The infrared spectrum can also offer a source of targeting for a weapon system. Little can realisti-
cally be done about the exhaust plume or wake, as the need for speed is likely to be paramount. However,
transit through low cloud, fog, or rain will help. If feasible, fire hoses can be played onto the ship’s struc-
ture in order to reduce localized heat sources. Finally, the weapon system that is searching for the merchant
radar (i.e., ARMs) can only be realistically defeated by switching off these emitters. In these highly auto-
mated days, crews may need to investigate emergency methods of ceasing radar transmissions (e.g., fuses,
breakers, etc.).
10-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Figure 10-1. (NU) (NMM) Generic MERSHIP RCS
(2) Protection Against Surface Attack. It should be recognized that an attack from a surface
ship that fires a missile constitutes an air, and NOT a surface, threat. Surface attacks tend to fall into two
main categories: surface gunnery from medium- and close-range weapon systems, and piracy-style at-
tacks from lightly armed small boats. Speed and increased maneuvering will afford the best evasion tac-
tics in these circumstances. A target holding a steady course and speed offers the easiest target for
gunnery fire control solutions. The wash created by a turning merchant will significantly reduce the
ability for a small boat to make a safe approach to the ship’s side. Care should be taken to ensure that all
methods of embarkation to the ship are removed. This includes ropes hanging over the side and anchors
that are not fully secured.
(3) Protection Against Submarine Attack. A number of tactics are available to the OTC to
reduce the threat of submarine attack on a merchant. These include:
(a) Diversion.
(b) Zigzag plan.
(c) Reduced noise state.
(d) Increased speed (incompatible with reduced noise state).
(e) Avoidance of choke points.
10-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
HOT EXHAUST PLUME HOT FUNNEL
WAKE
HOT HULL NEAR ENGINE ROOM
Figure 10-2. (NU) (NMM) Infrared Hotspots

Once a submarine has achieved a firing solution, there is little that can reasonably be done to avoid
attack, thus prevention should be the aim. For a threat from a conventional submarine (SSK), it is impera-
tive that the ship avoid putting the submarine in the track of the ship for any length of time. A robust zigzag
regime will help to ensure that the attacking submarine is generally placed outside a firing position, by con-
stantly changing the merchant aspect relative to the submarine. The only real solution against the nu-
clear-powered submarine (SSN) is a diversion, thereby denying the submarine with an attack opportunity
at all. Finally, as with all types of attack, make best use of the prevailing weather to mask the merchant
ship(s) presence, and thereby make an attack more difficult.
10023 — 10029 SPARE
10-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING
10030 (NC) (NMM) FULL NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING PROCEDURES
a. The convoy system is covered in detail in the remainder of the chapter because:
(1) When the threat to merchant shipping is such that direct protection is necessary, it can be ob-
tained best by the institution of the convoy system.
(2) The advantages of the convoy system have been reaffirmed throughout history.
b. Maritime forces allocated to the protection of shipping task will be employed by the Operational
Control Authorities (OCAs) to close escort the maximum number of convoys through their high-threat ar-
eas. Convoy prioritization will be undertaken by the Maritime Commander in consultation with the Land
Commander. The Maritime Commander will also control and coordinate the overall protection effort.
10031 (NU) (NMM) CONVOY COMMODORE
The relationship between the OTC and the Convoy Commodore must be understood. The Convoy
Commodore and his vice and rear commodores are naval officers or Masters of ships in the convoy. The
Convoy Commodore is designated by a naval authority to command the convoy, subject to the orders of the
OTC. In the absence of an escort he takes full command. His responsibilities include:
(1) Internal arrangements of the convoy.
(2) Tactical control of the convoy (subject to the orders of the OTC).
(3) Assignment of ships to convoy stations.
(4) Instructions to the convoy for its safe navigation, in consultation with the OTC.
(5) Readiness for action and conduct in action of the convoy.
(6) Internal communications of the convoy within the ordered EMCON plan.
10032 (NU) (NMM) COMMUNICATION AND LIAISON
Ships in a convoy will hold ATP 2, Vol. II, and should be maneuvered in accordance with this docu-
ment. There are two types of convoys: ocean convoys and coastal convoys. Details of their organization
and administration are found in ATP 2, Vols. I and II.
The OTC must be familiar with the communications plans and instructions laid down in the COMM
Supplement to ATP 2, Vol. II. The OTC and his staff should attend the convoy conference or be suitably
represented. This will usually be held ashore, and will be arranged by the Naval Control of Shipping Offi-
cer (NCSO) and his staff officers at the departure port or shipping control point.
10033 (NC) (NMM) CONVOYS JOINING AT SEA
a. Arrival at Rendezvous. The rendezvous of convoys joining one another should normally be
planned for daylight. Under normal circumstances, the officer who will be the OTC when rendezvous is ef-
fected is to assume the functions of OTC as soon as communications are established and then order the
courses and speeds of the two portions as desired. He is to inform all escorts and both Convoy Commo-
dores when he assumes overall responsibility and is to specify the communication plan in force.
10-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Failure to Rendezvous. When a joiner (independent or convoy) fails to rendezvous, the OTC
of the main convoy is immediately to inform the OCA, making the OTC of the joiner convoy an informa-
tion addressee. When the joiner is unescorted, the Convoy Commodore (or master of an independent) is to
be made an information addressee. On receipt of the “Not found” message, and if not already done, the
OTC of the joiner is to report his position, course, and speed to the OCA and to the OTC of the force to be
joined. Subsequent action thereafter is the responsibility of the OCA. The importance of effecting rendez-
vous will normally justify breaking radio silence.
10034 (NC) (NMM) CONVOY FORMATIONS
a. Convoy Formation. The arrangement of ships in a convoy is termed the “Convoy Forma-
tion.” While the convoy has traditionally been formed in columns on a broad front, the advent of higher
speeds and different types of merchant ship, and the modern vehicles, weapons and sensors in opposing
forces, may require convoys to be of any shape or size in order to get the best support from their protecting
forces.
b. Formation Grid. A convoy formation grid is at Figure 10-3, which allows total variation of
ship stations within a formation and also allows for the situation where it is considered that small but inter-
related convoys are required. When the convoy is formed on a broad front, with ships in column position,
QQ will remain as stated in Article 2110 in the center of the front. The formation of a military convoy is the
prerogative of the OTC.
10035 (NC) (NMM) STATIONING CONVOY SHIPS
a. The convoy formation will be formulated by the OCA, OTC, Commodore, and Naval Control of
Shipping Officer (NCSO). Shown as positions on the grid diagram, it will be included in the Sailing Order
Folder issued to each ship before sailing. If a change of formation is to take place at sea, the new positions
should be drawn up on a further grid diagram, also to be issued before sailing. Although it is technically
possible to signal a completely new formation by the grid system, it should be avoided because merchant
ships are neither trained nor practiced in complicated signaled maneuvers. However, the movement of in-
dividual ships within the formation, by signal, is perfectly feasible.
(1) Warships. When a warship occupies a station in a convoy formation, the station to be occu-
pied will be detailed by OTC, who may consult the Commodore.
(2) Aircraft Carrier. An aircraft carrier operating in a convoy may occupy a “box” formed by
omitting ships from stations in the rear and center of the convoy. The size of the box will be governed by
the requirements of the carrier for operating aircraft and the spacing of the ships in the convoy.
b. Convoy station designators will be used as call signs on convoy tactical nets.
10036 (NC) (NMM) FORMING UP A CONVOY
a. Departure Operations. The OTC, after consulting the local naval authority, is to issue the
necessary orders to escorts regarding departure operations (see Chapter 3). He is also to detail screening
ships to round up and direct individual merchant ships to their proper stations.
b. Intership Spacing. The ordering of intership spacing is the responsibility of the OTC. In open
water, the minimum distance between ships in column and the interval between columns is 1,000 yards of
clear water. In restricted waters, the minimum distance between ships in column may be reduced to 600
yards of clear water. When the primary threat is from pattern-running torpedoes, some increase in mini-
mum convoy spacing may be justified. When the primary threat is from kiloton nuclear weapons, the spac-
ing of columns and ships in column should be at least 2,000 yards. When the primary threat is from
megaton nuclear weapons, spacing should be at least 10,000 yards.
10-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CONVOY FRONT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Figure 10-3. (NU) (NMM) Convoy Formation Grid
c. Convoy Formation Grid Instructions.
(1) Forming Up. The grid is oriented relative to the convoy’s base course on forming up.
(2) Grid Square Size. Grid square size is to be 1,000 yards unless otherwise ordered. The size of
the grid squares may be changed to meet the requirements of the situation.
(a) Each vertical line of the grid is allocated to a single letter in alphabetical sequence (less I
and O) starting at the left of the grid.
(b) Each row is allocated a number of sequence starting with row 1 at the top.
(3) Individual Ship. Individual ship stations are indicated as shown in the following examples.
(a) Station J5 = the intersection of line J with row 5.
(b) Station FG3 = the point midway between lines F and G in row 3.
(c) Station K6L7 = the point midway between the intersections of line K, row 6, and line L,
row 7.
(d) Station PP67 = the point midway between row 6 and 7 in line P.
10-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTE
In example d, it is necessary to repeat the line indicator to prevent confusion. For example:
PP12 = the point midway between rows 1 and 2 in line P, while P12 = the intersection of line P
with row 12.
(4) Columns. Columns, if appropriate, are numbered from left to right, with every number pre-
fixed with a zero, beginning with 01 for the left-hand column. Lanes (the spaces between columns, and
to the left of the left-hand column and the right of the right-hand column) take their numbers from the ad-
jacent columns (12, 23, etc.), with the left-hand lane being numbered 01 and the right-hand lane taking
the number of the right-hand column less the prefix 0, but with suffix 0 (e.g., 90).
(5) Guide. The Convoy Commodore is normally the Guide and his station in the convoy is speci-
fied in the convoy formation. In a rectangular formation, his station is normally the leading ship of the
center column or the leading ship of the column to starboard of the center when there is an even number
of columns.
(6) Checking the Ships of the Convoy. After the convoy has formed up, the OTC is to com-
pare the stations of the ships present against a diagram of the intended formation. The OTC compares
the result with the NCSO’s report of ships that have failed to sail and is then to report names of ships not
present. A similar check is to be made periodically throughout the voyage.
(7) Course and Speed. The Convoy Commodore is to inform the OTC of the required course
and speed of the convoy while forming up. When the Convoy Commodore reports that the convoy is
ready to proceed, the OTC is to order the initial cruising course and speed.
10040 (NR) (NMM) CONVOY PROCEDURES
10041 (NR) (NMM) SHIPPING REQUIRING PROTECTION
a. Types of Shipping. The following types of shipping may be sailed and require protection:
(1) Military Convoy. A convoy consisting of merchant ships and/or auxiliaries that is controlled
and reported as a military unit.
(2) Military Independent. A merchant ship or auxiliary that is controlled and reported as a mili-
tary unit.
(3) Mercantile Convoy. A convoy consisting of merchant ships that is controlled by the NCS
organization.
(4) Independent. A single merchant ship that is controlled by the NCS organization.
b. Types of Convoy. When a convoy includes both naval and merchant ships, the OCA will des-
ignate whether it is a mercantile or a military convoy. The OCA is the naval commander responsible within
a specified geographic area for the operational control of all maritime forces assigned to him and for the
control of movement and protection of all Allied merchant shipping under Allied naval control. For details
of convoy organization, routing, and reporting and for the duties of various officers, both naval and civil-
ian, refer to ATP 2.
c. Command of a Convoy. The OTC is in overall command of a convoy and its escort. In the ab-
sence of an escort, the Convoy Commodore is in command of the convoy.
10-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
10042 (NR) (NMM) ROUTING A CONVOY
a. Selection. The selection of each convoy route rests with the routing authority. The factors to be
considered when selecting a route include:
(1) Threat assessment.
(2) Time constraints.
(3) Defense capability.
(4) Environment.
NOTE
Items 1 to 3 above vary according to the current operational situation.
b. Meteorological Factors. Optimum track ship routing (OTSR) in wartime can be used to ex-
ploit weather conditions that favor the convoy’s protection.
c. Oceanographic Factors. Acoustic routing can also be used to exploit the oceanographic
conditions; i.e., independents are routed through poor acoustic conditions to minimize detection by sub-
marines; convoys with active sonar escorts are routed through areas with good active sonar conditions.
d. Fleet Weather Centers and Oceanographic Information Centers. Centers supporting

NATO should provide the routing authority with environmental information for route selection.
10043 (NR) (NMM) REROUTING A CONVOY
Before the arrival of the convoy at its destination, important junction point, or coastal area, any
change in routing instructions and destination of ships will be signaled by the OCA to the OTC and Convoy
Commodore. The Convoy Commodore is to pass this information to ships concerned and adjust stations as
necessary.
10044 (NR) (NMM) REGROUPING A CONVOY
a. If the convoy is scattered for reasons of bad weather or enemy action (with or without signal), the
OTC and/or the commodore may decide that it should be reformed at a given time and position. To achieve
this, the OTC (Commodore if unescorted) will initiate a rendezvous message to the OCA of the area. The
message will contain:
(1) The rendezvous position.
(2) Time of rendezvous.
(3) Convoy course and speed after rendezvous.
(4) Instructions for those ships that cannot make the rendezvous, to proceed direct to the stragglers’
route and not to attempt to rejoin.
b. The OCA will cause the message to be broadcast to the merchant ships of the convoy and the es-
cort. If the OCA considers it to be necessary, he will add a new stragglers’ route.
10-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
10045 (NR) (NMM) REPLENISHMENT OF CONVOY ESCORTS
The OTC is to inform the Convoy Commodore of the desired stations of replenishment ships and of
the time by which these ships are to be in their replenishment stations. These stations may be in convoy for-
mation or clear of the convoy but within the screen. The OTC may order the Convoy Commodore to alter
the course of the convoy to the replenishment course if necessary.
10046 (NR) (NMM) GROUP GUIDES
When a convoy is in extended spacing it may be desirable to designate certain ships as group guides;
this is a responsibility of the Convoy Commodore. Such ships are to take charge of their groups in case of
emergency or doubt and, if necessary, act on their own initiative.
10047 — 10049 SPARE
10050 (NR) (NMM) MANEUVERING
a. Merchant ships in convoy do not use or hold ATP 1. They are maneuvered in accordance with:
(1) ATP 2, Vol. II, Allied Naval Control of Shipping Manual, Guide to Masters.
(2) ACP 149, Radio Communications Instructions for Merchant Ships Under Naval Control.
(3) ATP 3, Antisubmarine Evasive Steering (merchant ships hold the merchant ship supple-
ment only).
b. This is of special significance for the following:
(1) Evasive Steering. The OTC, after consulting the Convoy Commodore, will decide whether
or not the convoy is to zigzag and the plan to be used. Special zigzags for ships in convoy are contained
in the merchant ship supplement to ATP 3 (merchant ships do not carry the standard zigzag plans in
ATP 3).
(2) Changing Convoy Formation. The OTC is responsible for ordering the Convoy Commo-
dore to change the convoy formation or spacing as necessary to meet changing threats or because of geo-
graphic restrictions.
(3) Avoiding Collision. Escorts maneuvering in or around the convoy will be responsible for
keeping out of the way of the ships in convoy. However, by day, a merchant ship is expected to try and
keep clear when an escort is in contact with a submarine; at night, escorts maneuvering in or near a con-
voy are to burn side lights.
10051 (NR) (NMM) BAD WEATHER
a. Heaving To. To avoid weather damage to merchant ships and escorts, it may be necessary for a
convoy to heave to. The OTC and Convoy Commodore should consult on this matter, and the OTC should
issue the appropriate order before it becomes necessary for individual masters and commanding officers to
take independent action. The OTC should remain in the vicinity of the Convoy Commodore. One escort
should be ordered to lead each of the flank columns, and at least one screening ship should be stationed
astern of the convoy. These measures are intended to prevent the convoy from spreading and to facilitate
reforming when the weather moderates.
10-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Fast Convoys. In bad weather, escorts of fast convoys may be unable to maintain convoy
speed without risking serious damage. The decision for the convoy to proceed unescorted is the responsi-
bility of the OTC, who should take into account the opinion of the Convoy Commodore.
10052 (NR) (NMM) ALTERING COURSE
a. Wheeling, Turning Simultaneously, Turning Column Leaders Simultaneously —

Remainder Following in Succession. Alterations of the convoy course will normally be made by the
OTC through the Convoy Commodore.
(1) Wheeling. Wheeling is the normal method of altering the course of the convoy when
in columns.
(2) Turning Simultaneously. This method of altering the course is used to transfer a convoy
rapidly to port or starboard in order to avoid danger.
(3) Turning Column Leaders Simultaneously — Remainder Following in Succes-

sion. This method of altering course is suitable when the convoy is several columns and is used instead
of a turn when a required temporary alteration of course can be foreseen. This method will not be used in
conjunction with a skeleton screen (see Chapter 3).
(4) Alterations of Course. The facility exists in the signal vocabulary of ATP 2, Vol. II, to en-
able prior warning to be given of an alteration of course at a given time.
b. Emergency Turns. An emergency turn by a convoy is ordered in accordance with ATP 2,

Vol. II. It consists of a turn-together of 45° to port or starboard. Since merchant ships have difficulty in
keeping station in a line of bearing, it may be advisable to execute a second turn as soon as possible when
they are at minimum spacing. Emergency turns by the convoy are normally ordered by the Convoy Com-
modore on the instruction of the OTC. In exceptional circumstances, the Convoy Commodore may order
an emergency turn on his own initiative, informing the OTC.
c. Informing Direct Support Aircraft. Whenever the course and speed of a convoy are altered,
the OTC is to inform direct support aircraft of the new convoy course and speed and whether or not the al-
teration affects the present true or relative bearings of their search plans (see Chapter 9).
d. Maneuvering of Screen Units. The rules for the maneuvering of screen units when the con-
voy or main body alters course are contained in Chapter 3.
10053 (NR) (NMM) SALVAGE AND BREAKDOWN
The decision to attempt salvage, sink a damaged ship, or leave it derelict rests with the OTC. A dis-
abled escort is never to be left derelict but is either to be sunk or salvaged.
10054 (NR) (NMM) INSTRUCTIONS ON ARRIVAL
a. Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). After the convoy has chopped to the OCA of its destina-
tion, the OTC will inform the OCA of the destination at least 24 hours in advance of his estimated time of
arrival at Point X. A response will be sent indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence with ETA. If no re-
sponse is received prior to arrival, retransmit request/confirm agreement via the most expeditious means
commensurate with the EMCON plan in effect.
b. Entering Harbor. On arrival off Point O, the OTC is to redispose screening ships to form an
entry screen. The officer in command of the entry screen is to inform the Convoy Commodore when the
last ship of the convoy has passed Point X.
10-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
10060 (NC) (NMM) PROTECTION OF CONVOYS
a. Convoy Size and Disposition. The size (up to 60 maximum) and disposition of convoys
will be at the OCA’s discretion.
b. Convoy Speed.
(1) The scheduled speed of ocean convoys is normally 12 to 18 knots inclusive. Therefore, mer-
chant ships with a declared speed of more than 20 knots or less than 14 knots may be sailed independ-
ently, although exceptions may be made for ships carrying critically important cargoes. For coastal
convoys the scheduled speed may be as low as 8 knots.
(2) If it is decided to escort convoys at speeds in excess of 18 knots, the following effects should be
considered:
(a) Capability to detect a submarine will be reduced, either because the escort is patrolling at or
above maximum effective sonar speed, or because it is proceeding at maximum effective sonar
speed and not patrolling its station.
(b) Increase in the time required to regain station, if it is necessary to reduce speed for contact
investigation.
(c) Escorts will require more frequent replenishment.
(d) The beacon and deterrent effect of the active sonar and the reaction capability will be,
broadly speaking, unchanged.
(3) For convoy speeds in excess of 18 knots or in rough weather when the maximum effective sonar
speed of escorts with hull-mounted sonars will be considerably less than 22 knots, the OTC should:
(a) Consider reducing the width of the station given to each escort.
(b) Advise escorts on the speed at which they should patrol their station, and whether they
should adopt a sprint-and-drift policy.
c. Escort Size. Whenever possible, convoys should be provided with a close escort of four to
eight DD/FF and at least one maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) on station, particularly in high-threat areas,
such as convoy assembly and traffic focal points. In addition, a convoy rescue ship should be assigned (see
ATP 2) and consideration should be given to the need for allocation of a convoy escort oiler (CEO) (see
ATP 2).
d. Escort Stationing. Escorts should normally be stationed around the convoy by the skeleton
screen method (see Chapter 3). Instructions for convoy screens are also contained in Chapter 3.
e. Routing. Convoys should be routed to increase the transit distance for enemy interdiction as
well as to take advantage of the environment.
f. Anti-Ocean Surveillance Measures. Consideration should be given to using the ul-

tra-long-leg zigzag (ULLZZ).
10061 (NC) (NMM) PROTECTION OF CONVOY AGAINST SUBMARINE ATTACK
a. Whenever possible, ocean convoys should conduct a very-long-leg zigzag (VLLZZ).
10-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. To avoid a submarine threat, the OCA may order a diversion or the OTC an evasion. ASW sur-
face search plans described in Chapter 9 are available for convoy defense, as are Search Plans 52S and 53S
(see Table 10-2 and Figures 10-4 and 10-5). When helicopters are used, the letter H is to be added as a suf-
fix to the plan number ordered.
10062 (NC) (NMM) PROTECTION OF CONVOY AGAINST AIR ATTACK
The procedures in Chapter 7 are to be used for the defense of a convoy against air attack. To disperse
a convoy temporarily in an extreme emergency caused by heavy air attack by conventional or nuclear
weapons, the OTC may order the Commodore to “Star” the convoy. Instructions for this maneuver are con-
tained in ATP 2, Vol. II. When there is danger of nuclear attack, the appropriate intership spacing may be
adopted. Instructions for an emergency convoy maneuver to increase intership spacing when an attack by
nuclear weapons is probable are contained in ATP 2, Vol. II.
10063 (NC) (NMM) PROTECTION OF CONVOY AGAINST SURFACE ATTACK
When a convoy is attacked by a surface force, the escort is to be maneuvered in accordance with
Chapter 8. Should the OTC consider it possible that all escorts may lose contact with the Convoy Commo-
dore, he is to turn over tactical command of the convoy to the Convoy Commodore. As a last resort, the
OTC (or the Convoy Commodore when out of contact with the OTC) may order the convoy to scatter. This
maneuver is to be carried out in accordance with ATP 2, Vol. II.
10064 (NC) (NMM) PROTECTION OF COASTAL CONVOYS
a. General. Protection and guidance of coastal convoys will vary with the threat and depend on
navigational hazards, especially for passages through mine danger areas. In submarine danger areas, only
fast merchant ships and small coasters should be allowed to sail independently. Because of the complexity
of operations in coastal waters, at least one administrative escort should be allocated to each coastal con-
voy. The administrative escort will have embarked the Coastal Convoy Commander and his staff.
b. Area Protection of Coastal Shipping.
(1) Area Protection Operations. Area protection operations are directed by the area/local
commander who assumes responsibility for the protection of shipping in his area without assigning
units for close support.
(2) Planning and Execution of Area Protection. The planning and execution of area protec-
tion operations should make optimum use of all environmental factors. In certain coastal areas, these
factors may deny the enemy the use of his submarines.
(3) Consideration of Types of Units Available. Careful consideration will need to be given
to the numbers and types of units available for area protection. In all cases, surveillance (preferably by
aircraft) will be essential. If air defense aircraft are available, their tasking should be initiated by the
maritime headquarters (MHQ) concerned.
(4) Barriers. Barriers by own surface and subsurface units, and in some cases aircraft, can be es-
pecially valuable when a defended area has only a limited number of well-defined and narrow routes. In
times of tension, careful surveillance of access routes will enable a commander to know the strength of a
potential enemy in the area. However, full effectiveness will only be achieved after the outbreak of hos-
tilities when enemy forces in the area have been neutralized and further units are denied access by the
barrier. Mines may also be laid as mine barriers to deny the enemy the use of access routes and to protect
the flanks of coastal shipping. The tactical value of mine barriers will be enhanced by the use of own
submarines in adjacent patrol areas to engage enemy surface units, and submarines whose freedom of
10-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 10-2. (NU) (NMM) ASW Surface Search Plans for Convoy Escorts
PLAN CODE WHEN USED REMARKS
52S BEETROOT By day or night – To locate a sub- Ships and helicopters pass through
marine believed to be beneath the the convoy; in poor visibility or mini-
convoy. mum spacing, radar silence must be
relaxed.
53S CARROT By day or night – When the convoy is Ships increase speed and fan out-
attacked by a submarine that is sus- ward from the convoy for 8 minutes
pected of having fired from outside while carrying out the broad weave.
the screen.
maneuver is constrained by the barriers, and to defend the barriers against enemy mine
countermeasures.
(5) Protected Anchorages. When coastal shipping is required to anchor, it should be routed to a
protected anchorage. OCAs should establish and promulgate details of protected anchorages. Protec-
tion of these areas presents special difficulties because of the large number of stationary ships concen-
trated in confined waters for long periods.
(6) Point Defense. Point defense in coastal operations is normally established for the protection
of the anchorages/harbors and important offshore installations. The proximity of land-based weapon
systems and the availability of air support will hamper enemy movements in coastal areas and this con-
fers a measure of area defense. Route selection for coastal shipping should make full use of this
advantage.
c. Individual Protection of Coastal Shipping. The protection of individual convoys or ships

is achieved by surface escorts screening, the allocation of dedicated air effort, and implementation of
lead-through MCM procedures (see Chapter 13). It generally requires more assets than area protection, but
gives greater protection to the unit(s) defended.
d. Choice of Protection. Choice of the type of protection will depend on the volume of coastal
shipping, the relative importance of the units to be protected, the availability and capability of assets, and
intelligence and environmental factors. If possible, area and individual protection should be given to
high-value units.
10070 (NU) (NMM) CONVOY FORMATION SELECTION
This section describes various convoy formations and gives guidance on their employment.
10071 (NU) (NMM) BROAD FRONT RECTANGULAR (GRID) FORMATION
a. See Figure 10-6.
b. The broad front rectangular formation was designed primarily to counter the diesel submarine.
The effectiveness of this formation was clearly demonstrated in World War II.
10-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 52S

BEETROOT
An ASW close search plan for use when a subma- LANE 34 CALL SIGN FX
rine is believed to be beneath the convoy and intending
(2) EXECUTE REVERSE BEETROOT
to remain there. In poor visibility and with ships at mini-
mum spacing, this search requires radar silence to be LANE 12 CALL SIGN CE
relaxed. Screen ships, helicopters, and aircraft may be
LANE 23 DIPPER 15 (OR CALL SIGN
used. There are two types of search:
AB)
a. BEETROOT (LEFT OR RIGHT). Designated
LANE 34 CALL SIGN FX
ships and helicopters carry out a sonar search while
proceeding from the van to the rear (down the convoy). d. EXECUTION. Units are employed as
Once 1,000 yards clear of the convoy, they turn 180° to follows:
port (BEETROOT Left) or starboard (BEETROOT
(1) SHIPS.
Right) and proceed up the same lanes from the rear to
the van (negative sidestep). However, should SIDESTEP (a) BEETROOT (LEFT OR RIGHT).
be ordered, units proceed up the adjacent lane to the Designated ships proceed to the van of their as-
one previously by them (e.g., a ship ordered to sweep signed lanes at optimum sonar speed and sweep
lane 34 in BEETROOT Right Sidestep proceeds down down. They should not delay in order to form up
lane 34 and then up lane 23.) When the convoy is at ex- with other units in the search.
tended spacing, more than one unit may be allocated to
(b) REVERSE BEETROOT. Ships
each lane. BEETROOT is completed after two sweeps
proceed initially to the rear of their assigned lanes.
through the convoy.
(c) LIGHTS. At night, ships are to
b. REVERSE BEETROOT. All designated units
burn side lights.
are to start the search from the rear of the convoy. In this
case, BEETROOT is completed after the one sweep (2) HELICOPTERS. Helicopters
from the rear to the van through the convoy. proceed to their assigned lanes and dip along the
lanes. Alternatively, helicopters may be instructed
c. METHOD OF ORDERING. The OTC is to
to continue dipping in one position when the con-
order:
voy streams through. This method will be ordered
(1) Execute BEETROOT Left or in the form, “Lane 34 Mark Dip,” and is recom-
mended when the convoy is at minimum
BEETROOT Right or
spacing.
Reverse BEETROOT.
(3) FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT. The
(2) Sidestep or negative sidestep (not re- OTC may instruct the ASW aircraft control unit
quired for Reverse BEETROOT). to order MAD-fitted aircraft to sweep down the
convoy lanes.
(3) Convoy lanes allocated to each searching
unit. e. ACTION ON COMPLETION. Unless oth-
erwise ordered, ships and aircraft return to their as-
signed stations.
Examples (on following pages):
(1) EXECUTE BEETROOT LEFT

SIDESTEP
LANE 12 CALL SIGN CE
LANE 23 MARK DIP DIPPER 15 (OR CALL
SIGN AB)
Figure 10-4. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 52S BEETROOT (Sheet 1 of 3)
10-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
BEETROOT
Example of REVERSE BEETROOT
EXECUTE REVERSE BEETROOT

LANE 23 DIPPER 15 (OR CALL SIGN AB)
15
01 02 03 04 05
12 23 34 45
CE
FX
10-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 52S (Concl.)
BEETROOT
BEETROOT LEFT SIDESTEP
This example would be ordered by:
EXECUTE BEETROOT LEFT SIDESTEP

LANE 23 MARK DIP DIPPER 15 (OR CALL SIGN AB)
or by using appropriate signal groups from ATP 1, Vol. II.
15
CE FX
12 34
23
1,000
10-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SEARCH PLAN 53S
CARROT
An ASW search plan for use when es- b. Screen units detailed are to proceed
corts are stationed by the skeleton screen dia- at optimum sonar speed, weave, and fan out-
gram (see chapter 3). It may be used by day or ward from the convoy for 8 minutes unless oth-
night when the convoy is attacked by a subma- erwise ordered. They are then to resume their
rine that is suspected of having fired from out- stations.
side the screen. Units execute this search plan c. Helicopters should continue as previ-
as follows: ously employed, unless otherwise ordered.
a. Screen units in stations A and S are to
patrol their stations as shown in the diagram.
N C
CONVOY
T
H
Figure 10-5. (NU) (NMM) Search Plan 53S CARROT
10-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
BROAD FRONT RECTANGULAR (GRID) FORMATION
MLA
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P
This example also demonstrates the allocation of escort

stations within the convoy and varying the ship spacing to
allow for the maneuvering characteristics of very large
ships.
Figure 10-6. (NU) (NMM) Broad Front Rectangular (Grid) Formation
c. Advantages:
(1) It is easy to order.
(2) Merchant ships’ station keeping is simplified.
(3) It provides a limited number of target opportunities to an opposing submarine in a given period
of time.
(4) Communications are simplified, using relay if necessary.
(5) Joiner and leaver sections can be easily accommodated.
(6) When ordering the formation, the distance between the columns and the distance apart of ships
in columns can be selected to suit the types of ship in the convoy and the anticipated situation.
d. Disadvantages:
(1) It provides a submarine convoy “haven” — a large area of disturbed water under the convoy in
which a nuclear submarine could reload his torpedo tubes.
(2) The mean line of advance (MLA) can be readily identified by air and satellite surveillance.
10-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Maneuvering is restricted, and changing the distance between columns and ships after the con-
voy has formed is complicated and lengthy.
(4) Unless very large spacing is selected:
(a) Many ships would be damaged in the event of a nuclear attack; many more are likely to be
contaminated.
(b) Enemy torpedoes aimed at one ship could cause damage to ships in adjacent columns.
10072 (NU) (NMM) ADJUSTABLE COLUMNAR UNIT FORMATION
a. See Figure 10-7.
b. Advantages:
(1) Allows escorts/helicopters freedom of action within convoy.
(2) Provides some degree of antinuclear spacing.
(3) Joiner and leaver sections can be easily accommodated.
c. Disadvantages:
(1) Overall size of convoy is increased so that either:
(a) The front is significantly wider, thus reducing effectiveness of escorts; or
(b) Columns are extended and may provide attacking submarine with more than one target in a
given period of time.
(2) Communications difficulties are increased.
(3) SSN could use increased lane width for greater mobility in obtaining fire control solution.
10073 (NU) (NMM) RANDOM FORMATION
a. The random formation should be designed on a convoy formation grid (see Figure 10-1 and
Figure 10-8):
(1) Formation axis is always true north.
(2) The guide is normally at, or near, the center of the formation.
(3) Only TURN signals are relevant for course alteration.
(4) Ships are stationed at random at the intersection of a column and a row.
b. Advantages:
(1) Flexible.
(2) Easy to order.
10-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ADJUSTABLE COLUMNAR UNIT FORMATION
MLA
A B C D E F G H J
2 DDG
HELO VLCC
4 STATION
Figure 10-7. (NU) (NMM) Adjustable Columnar Unit Formation
10-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RANDOM FORMATION
CONVOY
GRID SIZE yds.

NORTH
COLUMNS
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R S T U V W
1
2
3
4
MLA
5
6
7
8
9
10
ROWS
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
NOTES:
1. Grid square size is to be 1,000 yards unless
otherwise ordered.
2. Example: Ship indicated is in station D5
(the intersection of Column D and Row 5)
Figure 10-8. (NU) (NMM) Random Formation
10-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Easily understood by merchant ships.
(4) Easy to disguise makeup of convoy.
(5) Easy to alter course of convoy.
(6) Convoy can be any shape.
c. Disadvantages:
(1) May be difficult to identify the Guide on joining the convoy.
(2) Station keeping is difficult in restrictive EMCON.
(3) For any given number of ships, the area covered by the convoy may be larger than for other
formations.
10074 (NU) (NMM) REVERSE ARROW HEAD FORMATION
a. See Figure 10-9.
b. Advantage.
(1) Reduces attack opportunities for submarine penetrating from ahead.
c. Disadvantages:
(1) Provides a submarine convoy “haven.”
(2) Joiner and leaver sections are difficult to accommodate.
(3) Submarine that penetrates from ahead is offered several attack opportunities.
10075 (NU) (NMM) CIRCULAR FORMATION
a. See Figure 10-10.
b. Advantages:
(1) A compact formation with relatively the smallest perimeter.
(2) Increased spacing between ships is simple to order.
(3) Enemy surveillance would find assessment of the MLA very difficult.
c. Disadvantages:
(1) Station keeping more difficult.
(2) Provides a submarine convoy “haven.”
(3) Joiner and leaver sections are difficult to accommodate.
10-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
REVERSE ARROW HEAD FORMATION
MLA
A B C D E F G H J
Figure 10-9. (NU) (NMM) Reverse Arrow Head Formation
10-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CIRCULAR FORMATION
FORMATION AXIS
000
330 030
MLA
300 060
270 090
240 120
210 150
180
NOTES:
1. A station is given as a bearing and range, in increments
of 1,000 yards, from the guide in station 0. For example,
“Take station 070-06” means: Take station on a bearing
070º at 6,000 yards from the Guide.
2. If the convoy consists of less than 37 ships, Formation 51
(described in ATP 1, Chapter 3) may be used.
Figure 10-10. (NU) (NMM) Circular Formation
10-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
GROUP FORMATION
MLA
R
Q
P
M N
L 1
K 2
J
3
1
2
H
G
F
E
1
D 2
C 3
B
A
1
2
3
The groups may be disposed by the sector method, as

shown, or as a range and bearing of the Group Commodore
from the Convoy Commodore.
Figure 10-11. (NU) (NMM) Group Formation
10-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
10076 (NU) (NMM) GROUP FORMATION
a. See Figure 10-11.
b. Advantages:
(1) Provides antinuclear spacing between groups.
(2) Joiner and leaver sections are very easily accommodated.
(3) Small, manageable groups of ships that can be made up of those with similar maneuvering
characteristics.
(4) Communications are simplified since messages are relayed through escorts.
(5) No submarine convoy “haven.”
c. Disadvantages:
(1) HF communications may be required.
(2) Lesser value merchant ships do not provide physical protection to those with highest value
cargoes.
(3) Disperses protective assets over wide area.
(4) Replenishment-at-sea coordination becomes more difficult.
10077 (NU) (NMM) ADVICE ON SELECTION
a. Against a predominantly conventional submarine threat, all formations are valid, although the
broad front rectangular convoy is recommended.
b. Against a predominantly nuclear submarine threat, sufficient space should be allocated for es-
corts and helicopters to operate within the convoy. However, the space should not be sufficient to allow a
nuclear submarine freedom to obtain a fire control solution.
c. Against a predominantly air or surface threat, the shorter perimeter of the circular formation will
allow better protection by the escorts.
d. If a nuclear threat exists, the group formation should be adopted to minimize the damage and
contamination from a single burst. The groups should consist of not more than 10 ships, and the groups
should be stationed at least 10 miles apart.
e. The circular formation is not suitable for mercantile convoys. The random formation should nor-
mally be chosen.
10-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 11
Amphibious Operations
SECTION I — INTRODUCTION
11000 GENERAL
a. This chapter contains a summary of NATO doctrine for amphibious operations and their associ-
ated command and control procedures. More detailed information on this subject can be found in ATP 8,
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.
b. Amphibious operations offer great strategic mobility together with both political and military
flexibility. Because they do not require specific points of entry, such as ports or airfields, they pose signifi-
cant operational problems for an enemy. However, they are complicated and require detailed specialist
knowledge, planning, and training.
c. Amphibious forces constitute a major force multiplier as the enemy must commit a significantly
greater number of forces to secure coastlines and all other possible points of entry. Once committed, how-
ever, this capability is much reduced until the force has re-embarked, on completion of an amphibious
operation.
d. An amphibious operation is defined as “An operation launched from the sea by naval and landing
forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore” (AAP 6).
e. An amphibious operation is always tactical in nature, and should not be confused with an admin-
istrative maritime reinforcement operation, for which the information in this chapter is not necessarily ap-
plicable. Neither should amphibious operations be confused with riverine operations, a river crossing, or
logistics-over-the-shore operations.
11-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION II — EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
11010 CONCEPT
a. Amphibious warfare incorporates virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, and landing
forces in a concerted military effort against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The inherent naval charac-
ter of the amphibious operation is reflected in the principles which govern the organization of the forces in-
volved and the conduct of the operation.
b. Mobility, flexibility, and sound up-to-date intelligence are fundamental requirements of am-
phibious operations. These operations exploit the element of surprise and capitalize upon enemy weak-
nesses. This is achieved through application of the required type and degree of force at the most
advantageous locations at the most opportune times. The mere threat imposed by the existence of powerful
amphibious forces may induce the enemy to disperse his forces; this in turn may cause him to make expen-
sive and wasteful efforts to defend the coastline.
11011 TYPES AND SEQUENCE OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
a. Types.
(1) Amphibious Assault. This is the principal type of amphibious operation and involves estab-
lishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. The requirement to be able to create a rapid
build-up of combat power ashore accounts for the organizational and technical differences between am-
phibious and land warfare.
(2) Amphibious Withdrawal. This is the withdrawal of forces by sea in naval ships or craft from
a hostile or potentially hostile shore.
(3) Amphibious Demonstration. This is an operation conducted to deceive the enemy in order
to make him take up positions which are unfavorable to him.
(4) Amphibious Raid. This is a landing from the sea onto a hostile shore, involving swift incur-
sion into, or temporary occupation of, an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. Raids might be
conducted to:
(a) Inflict loss or damage.
(b) Obtain information.
(c) Create a diversion.
(d) Capture or evacuate individuals or equipment.
NOTE
The last three types of amphibious operation do not involve establishing a landing force ashore.
b. Sequence. An amphibious operation is complete within itself and consists of a sequence of

five phases, some of which may be concurrent.
(1) Planning. The planning phase starts on an order (called the Initiating Directive — see Article
11015) that directs the operation to take place and ends with the embarkation of forces. Planning must be
11-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
conducted in some detail before any of the other phases can start. Although the phase formally ends at
embarkation, planning continues for the remainder of the operation.
(2) Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their equip-
ment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping.
(3) Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is re-
hearsed for the purpose of:
(a) Testing the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat readiness
of participating forces.
(b) Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans.
(c) Testing communications.
(4) Movement to Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) (see paragraph 11022.b). The move-
ment phase is the period during which the components of an amphibious task force move from the points
of embarkation or from a forward deployed position to the AOA. This move may be via rehearsal, stag-
ing, and/or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the components of the amphibi-
ous task force arrive in their assigned positions in the AOA.
(5) Assault. The assault phase is the period between the arrival of the major assault forces of the
amphibious task force in the AOA and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. De-
velopment of the area for its ultimate use may be initiated during this period.
c. Termination.
(1) The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mis-
sion of an amphibious task force in accordance with the specific conditions contained in the Initiating
Directive. The firm establishment of the landing force ashore is usually specified as one of these
conditions.
(2) The landing force is regarded as firmly established ashore when, in the opinion of the Com-
mander Landing Force (CLF) (see Article 11020):
(a) The force beachhead has been secured.
(b) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the contin-
uous landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.
(c) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been estab-
lished ashore.
(d) The CLF has stated that he is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.
(3) When the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) (see Article 11020) and the CLF are
satisfied that the conditions of paragraphs c.(1) and c.(2) have been met, the CATF will report these facts
to the higher authority designated in the Initiating Directive. This authority will then terminate the am-
phibious operation, dissolve the amphibious objective area and the amphibious task force, and provide
additional instructions as required, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces. How-
ever, the naval forces and navy support elements of the amphibious task force may remain intact.
11-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
11012 ORGANIZATION
a. The Amphibious Task Force. The task organization formed for the purpose of conducting
an amphibious operation is the amphibious task force. The amphibious task force always includes naval
forces and a landing force, with their organic aviation. Other air forces may be included as required.
b. Naval Forces. The naval element of an amphibious task force may include any of the follow-
ing groups. Two or more of the groups may be joined together for more effective control and their names
altered accordingly, at CATF’s discretion.
(1) Transport Groups. Groups which provide for the embarkation, movement to the objective,
landing, and logistic support of the landing force. They comprise all shipping in which the landing
force is embarked, including shipping which transports the helicopters and helicopterborne troops.
Navy landing craft to be employed in the ship-to-shore movement are organic to or attached to the
transport groups.
(2) Control Group. Personnel, ships, and craft designated to control the waterborne
ship-to-shore movement.
(3) Tactical Air Control Groups. Shipborne organizations necessary to operate a tactical air con-
trol center (TACC) and a tactical air direction center (TADC) (afloat) for the control of air operations.
(4) Fire Support Groups. Groupings of naval combatants charged with supporting landing
force operations ashore by naval gunfire and guided missile support.
(5) Shore-Based Navy Tactical Air Groups. Task organizations of tactical air units assigned
to the amphibious task force which are to be land based within, or sufficiently close to, the objective area
to provide tactical air support to the amphibious task force.
(6) Support Carrier Force. A task organization of aircraft carriers with embarked aircraft and
supporting ships which provides naval air support to the amphibious task force.
(7) Screening Group. A task organization to furnish protection to the amphibious task force en
route to the objective area and during operations in the objective area.
(8) Mine Warfare (MW) Group. A task organization of mine warfare units for the conduct of
surface minelaying and/or mine countermeasures (MCM) in maritime operations. In amphibious opera-
tions, the CATF, the advance force commander, or the respective local area commander is responsible
for the overall direction of mining/MCM forces and will normally issue the MCM OPDIR. The surface
mining and MCM commanders, who may be combined in one person, are responsible for the detailed
tasking of their units. The establishment of such groups, if required to accomplish the mission, will be
detailed in the Initiating Directive. Command and control arrangements for MW operations in amphibi-
ous warfare will be in accordance with ATP 6 and ATP 24.
(9) Reconnaissance and Underwater Demolition Group. A task organization including

ships, embarked reconnaissance troops, and underwater demolition personnel which conducts recon-
naissance, hydrographic surveys, and demolition of natural or man-made obstacles.
(10) Tactical Deception Group. A task organization which conducts deception operations
against the enemy, including electronic, communication, visual, and other methods designed to misin-
form and confuse the enemy.
11-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(11) Inshore Undersea Warfare Group. A task organization that provides surface and
subsurface detection of enemy targets in the seaward approach to the AOA. It is normally composed of
one or more inshore undersea warfare surveillance units.
(12) Close Covering Group. Naval combatants assigned to CATF to provide protection against
air, surface, and subsurface threats.
(13) Patrol Plane Group. A task organization of patrol aircraft units which conduct such mis-
sions as scouting, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine operations while the amphibious task force is en
route to and in the objective area.
(14) Air Transport Group. A task organization of transport aircraft units which provides air
transport for landing force components or provides logistic support.
(15) Administrative Group. The agency which is responsible for administrative and special de-
tails in the objective area: repair and salvage; hydrographic surveys; laying of nets, buoys, and beacons;
initial harbor development and control; port control functions; boat pools; mail; and other tasks as as-
signed. During the initial stages of the assault, virtually all administrative functions are performed by
CATF or his subordinate participating in the assault. Administrative duties are passed to the commander
of the administrative group as the progress of the assault permits.
(16) Naval Beach Group. A task organization which may consist of traffic control, communica-
tions, beach surf salvage, pontoon and fuel elements of the beach party, assault craft (not organic to as-
sault shipping), and combat stevedore elements.
c. Landing Force. The landing force consists of ground, aviation, and combat support units to-
gether with their logistic support units. They are organized to conduct the amphibious operation and may
be functionally organized for specific tasks at various times; e.g., for:
(1) Embarkation.
(2) The landing.
(3) Further combat ashore.
d. Air Force. Air support can be provided by both naval and land-based air elements depending
upon the location. When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided by the air force for an amphibi-
ous operation, an air force officer will be designated by the air force commander of the participating air
forces to direct the total air effort in the AOA. He will exercise such direction under the CATF or, when
control of air operations is passed ashore, under the CLF or an appropriate commander ashore who has the
capability to control such operations. The joint or combined use of air assets must be carefully coordinated
to ensure that maximum use is made of the firepower available.
e. Advance Force. An advance force is a temporary organization within an amphibious task

force which precedes the main body to the objective area. Its function is to participate in preparing the ob-
jective for assault by conducting such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, mine
countermeasures, preliminary bombardment, underwater demolition, and air support.
11013 FIRE SUPPORT
The success or failure of an amphibious operation will depend on the effective integration of air, na-
val gunfire, and artillery support. Until the assault phase, the protection of the force is very much a naval
matter but, once the landing has begun, control of these assets has to be transferred ashore. The provision of
11-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
continuous fire support during a landing and subsequent operations ashore is complicated and requires
planning and execution by specially trained personnel.
11014 PLANNING STAGES
Planning for an amphibious operation is a continuous process from receipt of the Initiating Directive
by CATF to termination of the operations. Amphibious planning procedures are distinguished by the ne-
cessity for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning by all participating forces. There are three distinct
planning stages:
a. The Initiating Directive.
b. Basic decisions.
c. Detailed planning.
(R) 11015 THE INITIATING DIRECTIVE
The Initiating Directive is issued at high level (Major NATO or Major Subordinate Commander)
and must contain, at least, the following information:
a. Mission.
b. Forces.
c. Commanders.
d. Command relationships.
e. Amphibious objective area (AOA).
f. Target date(s).
g. Related supporting operations.
h. Termination details.
i. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
j . Code names.
k. Operational and signal security.
11016 BASIC DECISIONS
In this stage the various options open to the amphibious task force are considered and an outline plan
decided upon. The various factors to be considered either jointly or by single Service headquarters are
listed diagrammatically in Figure 11-1.
11-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING
NAVY LANDING FORCE AIR
AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE MISSION
GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION
LANDING FORCE
MISSION
THREAT CONCEPT OF THREAT

ANTISUBMARINE OPERATONS ASHORE RECCE
ANTISHIP AIR DEFENSE
ENEMY
AIR DEFENSE OFFENSIVE AIR
GROUND
SEA LIFT
FORCES AVAILABLE
MCM/MINING
LOGISTICS TIMINGS
ADVANCE FORCE BEACHES TRANSPORT
SEA AREAS LANDING ZONES LRMP
WEATHER MINING
OBJECTIVES
LANDING
SITES BEACH-HEADS
LANDING AREAS
(LANDING ZONES
AND BEACHES)
TIMINGS
OUTLINE PLAN
DETAILED PLANNING
NAVAL PLAN LANDING FORCE PLAN AIR PLAN
INTELLIGENCE. ADVANCE FORCE OPERATONS. EMBARKATION.

TRANSIT. REHEARSAL. SHIP TO SHORE. ASSAULT. TERMINATION.
SUPPORTING ARMS. COMMUNICATIONS. ELECTRONIC WARFARE.
LOGISTICS. SUBSIDIARY LANDINGS. NUCLEAR. CHEMICAL.
OPERATION ORDER
Figure 11-1. Planning Sequence for Amphibious Operations
11-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTES
· When decision boxes fall into two or more Service columns, then that decision must be made
jointly.
· The concept of operations ashore is central to the planning process but must include allow-
ances for naval and air factors.
11017 DETAILED PLANNING
At this stage the outline plan is taken and each aspect is then planned in great detail. This results in
the amphibious operations order, promulgated by CATF, which must contain annexes on, at least, the sub-
jects listed below:
a. Intelligence.
b. Pre-D-day operations.
c. Embarkation.
d. Transit.
e. Rehearsals.
f. Ship-to-Shore movement.
g. Termination.
h. Supporting arms.
i. Communications.
j. Air defense and airspace control.
k. Electronic warfare.
l . Logistics.
11018 JOINT SERVICE COOPERATION
Not only must amphibious operations be planned in great detail but, equally important, they must be
planned by joint Service teams at all levels.
11-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION III — COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
11020 DESIGNATION OF COMMANDERS
Regardless of the composition of the amphibious task force, CATF will be a naval officer as desig-
nated in the Initiating Directive. The commander of all troop components within the amphibious task force
is CLF and is so designated in the Initiating Directive. Commanders of subordinate task groups within the
amphibious task force, if they have not been named in the Initiating Directive, are designated by CATF or
CLF as appropriate. Should air forces be assigned, their commander, an air force officer, will be designated
in the Initiating Directive.
11021 RELATIONSHIP DURING PLANNING
a. Direction by Higher Authority. As directed by higher authority, component commanders of

the amphibious task force, at the beginning of the planning phase, report for planning purposes to CATF,
who is responsible for the preparation of the overall plan for the amphibious operation. CATF serves as the
coordinating authority for the conduct of planning.
b. Responsibility for Conduct of Landing Ashore. Since immediate responsibility for the
conduct of the landing force operating ashore is vested in CLF, the planning and execution of the landing
and assault are primarily his concern. Participation of other components in the assault consists generally of
providing support for the landing force. This involves the analysis of landing force proposals to determine
their feasibility from the standpoint of the remainder of the amphibious task force. The capability of pro-
viding the necessary support is a primary factor in evaluating and agreeing proposed landing force plans
and concepts.
11022 COMMAND DURING OPERATIONS
a. Commencement of the Operation. Upon the commencement of the operation, CATF as-
sumes responsibility for the entire force and for the operation, and is vested with the commensurate author-
ity to ensure success of the operation.
(R) b. AOA. The AOA is the command and control area necessary to achieve the amphibious task
force mission and to conduct the defense of the task force. It is delineated in the initiating directive in terms
of sea, land, and airspace, and must be of sufficient size to contain the necessary sea, land, and air opera-
tions. CATF is responsible for the coordination of all activity within the AOA, including that of friendly
forces not part of the amphibious task force. Where such forces are merely transiting the area, CATF will
exercise control of them only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference.
c. Operations Ashore. Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for the conduct
of operations ashore, and for the security of all personnel and installations located in the area of operations
ashore, is vested in CLF.
11-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION IV — COMMAND AND CONTROL
11030 CONSULTATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS
In the exercise of his command authority, CATF, to the greatest possible extent, obtains and consid-
ers the opinion of appropriate commanders, particularly in cases involving decisions requiring the exercise
of their professional judgment in their operational fields. However, this requirement in no way limits the
command authority of CATF.
11031 CONSULTATION BETWEEN CORRESPONDING COMMANDERS
No significant decision affecting the plans, disposition, or intentions of corresponding commanders

should be made without consultation with the commanders concerned.
11032 NAVAL AUTHORITY OVER LANDING FORCE UNITS
No naval commander, other than CATF, exercises authority over, or assumes responsibility for,
the operation of landing force units, except where a naval commander below the amphibious task force
level has been designated as commander of a subordinate force composed of naval and landing force
units.
11033 AIRSPACE CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS
a. For an amphibious operation, the authority who orders the operation will assign to CATF for air-
space control an airspace of defined proportions which will include the AOA.
b. All air operations in the AOA will be under the control of CATF until the amphibious operation is
terminated.
c. To ensure unity of effort in overall air operations, CATF will coordinate air operations within the
defined airspace as necessary with the commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding area.
At the termination of the amphibious operation, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned
airspace will be disestablished, and the airspace control will normally be exercised in accordance with doc-
trine for control of airspace (see ATP 40) by the designated airspace control authority.
11034 TRANSFER OF THE CONTROL OF FUNCTIONS
As conditions warrant, and as coordination agencies are established ashore, CATF passes con-
trol of gunfire and missile support to CLF. At the discretion of CATF, control of air operations in the
AOA is passed to CLF, or to an appropriate commander ashore who has the capability to control such
operations.
11035 COMMUNICATIONS
a. An amphibious operation requires a reliable, secure, rapid, and flexible system of communica-
tions. Superimposed on the normal communication system of all forces are the additional requirements for
the command of the amphibious task force as a whole, for the several special forms of control which must
be exercised, and for lateral communications between all elements of the force in the execution of common
or coordinated functions.
b. Changes in command relationships, task organization, and disposition of forces require maxi-
mum flexibility in communication plans. These plans must not create a requirement for a large number of
11-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
non-essential nets. Multiple purpose nets must be utilized, where applicable, in order to assist in the reduc-
tion of mutual interference by decreasing frequency requirements.
c. Use of alternative means of communication, other than electrical, such as visual, helicopter, or
surface messenger, must be exploited to ensure the most rapid and secure delivery of information between
widely dispersed forces within the amphibious task force.
11-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECTION V — LOGISTIC SUPPORT

NOTE
For the purpose of this section, the term logistic(s) includes combat service support.
11040 GENERAL
The logistic plan must provide continuing and coordinated logistic and administrative support to the
landing force during a period in which its logistic system is primarily ship based.
11041 LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS
Logistic planning for an amphibious operation must provide for the following:
a. The orderly assembly and embarkation of personnel and material in a sequence designed to meet
the requirements of the landing plan and subsequent shore operations.
b. The establishment and maintenance of a logistic support system in the AOA, which will ensure
adequate logistic and administrative support to all elements of the amphibious task force.
c. The initiation of a logistic system for later support of base development and garrison forces.
11042 LOGISTIC PLANNING FACTORS
Consideration must be given to the following factors, all of which exert a marked influence on logis-
tic planning for an amphibious operation:
a. The character, size, and expected duration of the contemplated operation.

b. The target date.
c. The characteristics of the AOA.
d. The enemy capabilities.
e. The strength and composition of the landing force.
f. The capabilities of the landing force to perform combat service support functions.
g. The progressive increase in the level and form of logistic support required by the build-up of
forces in the AOA.
h. Support required to provide for prisoners of war.
i . The availability of logistic means.
j . The compatibility, capability, and requirements of logistic support systems.
k. The availability of communications means.
l . Elements of the base defense and garrison plans requiring consideration.
m. Requirements for rehabilitation or construction of aviation installations within, or in supporting
distance of, the AOA.
11-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 12
NBC Warfare
12000 HAZARDS FROM NUCLEAR BURSTS
At the outset of warfare, it will be necessary to assume that any attack on a large or important forma-
tion may be nuclear, and the possibility of a surprise attack by a nuclear-capable enemy cannot be dis-
counted. The effects of a nuclear burst will vary widely with the type of burst, yield, depth of water, and
meteorological situation. Specific geographical information pertaining to the characteristics, effects, plot-
ting, and forecasting of nuclear bursts can be found in ATP 45. The most significant hazards are:
a. Light flash, thermal radiation, and initial nuclear radiation effects, including transient radiation
effects on electronics (TREE).
b. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
c. Blast and underwater shock.
d. Residual radiation.
12001 TYPES OF BURST
a. Exoatmospheric or High Altitude Bursts. These occur at or above 30 km altitude. They

will produce EMP over large areas of the earth’s surface and may damage electronic equipment. Magneto-
hydrodynamic disturbances in the ionosphere may affect long-range communication (HF). Disruption
may last up to several hours, pending yield and height of burst.
b. Air burst. This occurs within the atmosphere where the fireball does not touch the surface. Signif-
icant fallout will not occur, but blast and thermal effects will be maximized in the area of weapon effects.
c. Surface Burst. This occurs within the atmosphere where the fireball touches the surface, pro-
ducing a significant amount of fallout.
d. Underwater Burst. This will produce predominantly shock and base surge. The effects will
be modified by depth of burst, sea bed reflection, and surface refraction.
12002 FLASH AND INITIAL RADIATION EFFECTS
Light flash, thermal radiation, and initial gamma radiation are of relatively short duration. Gamma
radiation damages all living organisms and some material, but material damage by some other weapon ef-
fect such as blast is nearly always more significant. Ships must rely on their own protective measures to
shield against effects of light flash and thermal radiation and to reduce the effects of gamma radiation. The
effects of initial radiation on electronics (i.e., TREE), may be very great, especially on digital systems.
Electronics start to be affected at 105 Centigreys/sec and this may well be the only effect that a small nu-
clear weapon would have on a ship. User checks are the only way of ascertaining whether or not electronic
equipment has been affected.
12-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
12003 ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)
The EMP produced by high/low air bursts has strong magnetic and electronic fields that exist for
only a fraction of a second. These fields can induce large, transient currents that may burn out electronic
equipment or produce transient signal overloads and spurious signals on communication nets and com-
puter-driven systems. The EMP hazards depend on burst altitude and yield. For low-altitude bursts, dam-
age from other weapon effects will predominate. For high-altitude bursts, computer and communication
system upsets, caused by large transient signals injected into antennas and equipment cables, may occur at
ranges where no damage is produced by other nuclear effects. Communication disruption as a result of in-
terference with the ionosphere may last several hours.
12004 BLAST AND UNDERWATER SHOCK
These hazards will have velocities in excess of the velocities of sound in air and water, allowing little
time, if any, for maneuvering. They are the most damaging to ships and parked aircraft and so determine
the action to be taken prior to and immediately after burst. High-velocity surface winds and high-water
waves may be encountered beyond the radius of heavy to moderate blast damage, traveling at velocities
well below the speed of sound. Since the severity of these hazards decreases rapidly with distance from
ground zero and time after detonation, maneuvers to increase the range from surface zero will greatly re-
duce damage.
(NR) (NMM) (See Table 12-1.)
12005 BASE SURGE
Surface or subsurface bursts will produce a dense radioactive cloud or mist in the vicinity of ground
zero and a pool of highly contaminated water at the ground. This radioactive cloud or mist is called base
surge. The area of the base surge expansion must be avoided for at least 30 minutes and, if conditions merit,
for 90 minutes, even though it will tend to become invisible after about 4 minutes. The size of the base
surge will be governed by many factors, such as the depth of burst and weapon yield. The contaminated
pool of water at ground zero will be smaller than the area of the base surge but will present a hazard that can
last longer. It may preclude re-entering the ground zero area for as long as 3 hours.
12006 RESIDUAL RADIATION
In surface and some underwater bursts, radioactive material is sucked up into the mushroom cloud;
some of this will return to the surface later as local fallout in the sector that is down the effective downwind
(EDW) from ground zero. This will cover varying distances up to several hundred miles, depending on
wind conditions at various levels, and will broaden as it moves. Maneuvers to avoid this fallout must there-
fore be based on the EDW. Should it be necessary to pass through fallout, washdown or prewetting sys-
tems, if available, should be activated and passage delayed as long as possible. The longer passage is
delayed, the less hazardous fallout will be, because of the relatively short half-life of most fission products.
There is little danger in steaming through water where fallout has ceased.
12007 (NR) (NMM) RANGE OF EFFECTS
Figure 12-1 shows the range of effects for airburst weapons. This figure is a composite picture dis-
playing the “worst case” situation. Figure 12-2 indicates range of base surge and is also a composite graph
displaying the “worst case” situation. Figure 12-3 shows underwater shock ranges from a typical nuclear
warhead displayed against water depth.
12008 — 12009 SPARE
12-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
Type SEAWORTHINESS MOBILITY WEAPON DELIVER SERVICEABILITY
of
Burst Carriers Destroyers Carriers Destroyers All Ships Aircraft
90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10%
LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS
Overpressure 40 25 12 15 8 12 8 8 3.5 1 2 1.5 1
(psi)
Air Burst*
10 KT 405 560 975 860 1,220 975 1,220 1,220 2,150 5,000 3,000 3,700 5,000
100 KT 900 1,200 2,100 1,860 2,630 2,100 2,630 2,630 4,650 11,000 6,500 8,000 11,000
5 MT 3,200 4,450 7,725 6,840 9,700 7,725 9,700 9,700 17,100 40,000 24,000 30,000 40,000
Surface Burst
10 KT 375 465 680 590 790 680 790 790 1,300 2,650 1,850 2,200 2,650
100 KT 810 1,000 1,470 1,270 1,700 1,470 1,700 1,700 2,800 5,700 4,000 4,800 5,700
5 MT
12-3
2,970 3,700 5,385 4,680 6,270 5,385 6,270 6,270 10,400 21,000 15,000 17,700 21,000
Subsurface
Burst**
From Ground Zero
10 KT/70M 450 450 610 610 675

10 KT/130M 675 675 935 935 1,040
10 KT/300M
750 750 1,275 1,275 1,430
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
* Air burst at optimum height of burst. ** Damage ranges based on the following damage criteria:
90% LOSS 90% LOSS 90% LOSS
Seaworthiness Mobility Weapon Delivery
150 ft. lb/in2 5 ft/sec 4 ft./sec
Table 12-1. (NU) (NMM) Blast Damage Ranges in Yards
Shock Wave Peak Peak

Energy Translational Translational
Velocity Velocity
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SHIP SEVERELY
1 DAMAGED
OR SINKS
10 5
2 CE
RANGE - THOUSANDS OF YARDS
NT
IGR
EY
PE
3 RS
EX MAY
EC NEGL
ON
PO S
UNHARDEND D IGIBL
ER
SE UFF
4 ELECTRONICS TO M ADIATION
D ER
MAY SUFFER AN
HE D
DAMAGE
LI AM
CO A
5
SHIP AND
PT G E
WEAPON
ER
SHIPS, MEN, AND
6 SYSTEMS
S
WEAPONS
UP
DAMAGED
10
UNAFFECTED
PE
BU DEC
PS
7
R
RN K
I
3.5
1.5
S A FIR
PS
P
ND ES
8
SI
I
9
0.1 KT 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 5 MT 10 MT
Note: 1 RAD = 1 Centigrey (cGy)
Figure 12-1. (NU) (NMM) Above Water Burst Effects
12010 BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFENSE
Evasive maneuvering is an essential element of nuclear warfare defense. Ships, whether acting in-
dependently or in formation, must take such individual and collective action as may be required to avoid, to
the maximum practicable degree, the immediate and residual hazards resulting from a nuclear detonation.
Basic predictions for defense against fallout are contained in ATP 45. Table 12-2 provides an aide-memoir
to the command of a ship for the correct reaction to a nuclear attack. The warning time for such an attack,
especially from a submarine, may be under 2 minutes. This would give time to cancel relaxation to the
gastight and watertight conditions of the ship, but may not allow a change in the manning or material state
to be made. Due consideration must be given to this before ordering a higher degree of readiness.
12011 GENERAL TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In a nuclear war, the most suitable nuclear defense disposition would be one where not more than
one ship would suffer sinking or severe damage from a single burst. Maintaining such a disposition may
not be tactically feasible considering the many factors involved, such as primary mission, geographic area,
weather, forces assigned, and relative importance of other potential threats. The OTC should select a force
disposition that effects the best compromise of all factors involved in a particular situation. When the prob-
ability of nuclear attack exists there are a number of principles that should be considered.
(NR) (NMM) Figures 12-1, 12-2, and 12-3 will give the OTC a broad indication of the penalties that
may have to be incurred with any particular selected nuclear spacing.
12-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
1 30 S
ECO
NDS
2 1M
RANGE - THOUSANDS OF YARDS
INU
TE
3 2M
IN
1. THESE CURVES DISPLAY THE UT
4 ES
WORST CASE FOR A COMBINA- M
4 TION OF YIELD AND DEPTH OF IN
UT
BURST. ES
2. ANY ESTIMATES OF BASE SURGE
5 POSITION AFTER TWO MINUTES
MUST MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR
SURFACE WIND.
6 3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 4 MINS
BASE SURGE WILL TEND TO BE-
COME INVISIBLE AND ITS DURA-
7 TION WILL LARGELY DEPEND
UPON METEOROLOGICAL CON-
DITIONS.
8 4. A POOL OF RADIOACTIVE WATER
WILL BE LEFT BEHIND IN AREAS
TRAVERSED BY BASE SURGE.
9
0.1 KT 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 5 MT 10 MT
Figure 12-2. (NU) (NMM) Range of Effects of Base Surge (Underwater Burst)
12012 (NR) (NMM) PRINCIPLES AFFECTING ALL DISPOSITIONS AND FORMATIONS
a. Spacing between ships should be such that not more than one heavy ship would be sunk or severely
damaged by a single nuclear burst. (In the absence of intelligence, a 1 MT threat should be assumed.)
b. Maximum ASW protection should be afforded major units as practicable.
c. The speed of major units and their screen, if provided, should normally be as high as possible.
Speed in excess of optimum sonar speed is an OTC’s decision.
d. Units should be stationed within the disposition or formation to provide the maximum attainable
degree of all-round air, surface, and subsurface surveillance.
e. Should the spacing selected for major units be greater than effective UHF/VHF range, it will be
necessary either to accept the limited capability of UHF/VHF links or to break HF silence.
f. Special considerations will apply in the case of operations involving underway replenishment,
minesweeping, amphibious warfare groups, and in all operations in restricted waters. The general consid-
erations above should be followed as far as practicable.
12-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
WEAPON: 5-KT TORPEDO

DEPTH OF
BURST: 110 METERS
SOURCE: DNA EM-1(N) PART II
3
NO SIGNIFICANT
EFFECTS WEAPONS SYSTEM
SUFFER DAMAGE
MOBILITY IMPAIRED
RANGE YARDS x 1000
1
SEAWORTHINESS IMPAIRED
SHIP SEVERELY DAMAGED

OR SINKS
DEPTH 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
METERS
Figure 12-3. (NU) (NMM) Underwater Burst Effect Graph
12013 (NR) (NMM) PRINCIPLES AFFECTING CARRIER GROUP FORMATIONS
a. Random stationing of units within the disposition and random courses and/or speeds should be
used to confuse search and attack aircraft and submarines and make more difficult the pinpointing of high
value units.
b. Units should be disposed in the direction of the expected air threat so as best to provide defense in depth.
c. AAW coordinators should occupy stations in the direction of the air threat.
d. Carriers should not occupy stations on the boundaries of the disposition.
e. When carriers are operated singly and when it is not possible to provide an ASW screen, at least one
SAM unit should be assigned a station adjacent to each carrier with secondary duties as plane guard, as required.
f. Radar pickets should be stationed at appropriate distances from disposition center, compatible
with radar and communication capabilities, rather than in randomly selected positions.
g. Maximum spacing between major units is desirable.
12-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
PREPARATION DETECTION OF AT BURST OR POST-BURST SUBSEQUENT ACTION
ATTACKING DETECTION OF
VEHICLE FALLOUT
1. Check total doses
AIR BURST
2. Report fitness to OTC
1. Cancel relaxations to 1. Search for damage
NEAR IAW Article 12025
1. Use anti-nuclear NBCD conditions
spacing in formation or 1. Take cover 2. Report IAW ATP 45
disposition (See Figures 2. If time permits,
12-1, 12-2, and 12-3 consider ordering a 2. Turn to present end-on
higher NBCD state or aspect
2. Promulgate EDW and condition SURFACE/ 1. Report IAW ATP 45
threat yield assessment SUBSURFACE
BURST 2. Escorts find major
3. Promulgate Point units to protect
Romeo 1. Alter course to avoid
base surge at best speed 3. Report fitness to OTC
4. If using group IAW Article 12025
dispersion, check for 2. Shelter/deep shelter
interference with group prewet/washdown 4. Make for Point Romeo
12-7
R/Vs DISTANT
WARNING OF 3. Search for damage 5. Monitor and carry out
5. Order fallout transit DISTANCE 1. Prewet/shelter on detailed decontamination
policy ATTACK detection of fallout 4. When clear of fallout, as convenient
exposed personnel carry
2. Send fallout detection out operational
signal IAW ATP 45 decontamination
1. Alter course to
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
avoid/lessen exposure to 11.Report IAW ATP 45

3. Operate machinery for 5. Operate machinery for
fallout
steady steaming steady steaming if
Table 12-2. NBC Aide-Memoire (Nuclear)
necessary 2. Report fitness to OTC

2. Adjust speed to allow IAW Article 12025
steady steaming 4. Rotate watches as
necessary 6. Report IAW ATP 45
3. Monitor and carry out
5. Maneuver to avoid detailed decontamination
fallout if possible as convienient
DISTANT
1. Exposed personnel
carry out operational
decontamination
2. Report IAW ATP 45
ORIGINAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
h. Use of single ship or multiple ship stations will depend on the forces available and the detection
and deception equipment available.
i. In situations in which the air threat is relatively small compared to that of the subsurface threat
and the use of nuclear warheads is expected, it may be desirable to use a screen within which multiple car-
rier operations could be conducted at high speeds while screen destroyers patrol at speeds both economical
and favorable to sonar detection.
12014 PRINCIPLES AFFECTING CONVOY FORMATIONS
Ships in convoy should have simple and concise instructions concerning action to be taken in the
event of a nuclear attack. It is important that orders and instructions to ships in convoy should be issued and
understood before the convoy forms up. This is best done at the convoy conference. The size of the convoy
and other factors permitting, wide spacing of columns and ships in column is recommended. If possible,
the spacing of ships in columns and between columns should not be reduced below 1 mile. Random forma-
tions should be considered in order to prevent easy recognition by the enemy.
(NR) (NMM) Merchant ship captains should be familiar with the merchant ship supplement to ATP 3.
12015 ACTION PRIOR TO NUCLEAR ATTACK
a. Establishment of Formation Rendezvous (Point Romeo). OTCs of formations are to

promulgate a formation rendezvous at which ships can re-form following dispersal. OTCs of dispositions
are to be kept informed of the position of the formation rendezvous. If no Naval Effective Downwind Mes-
sage (NAVEDM) is issued, a signal from ATP 1, Vol. II, may be used.
b. Promulgation of Fallout Information. In the absence of reports from shore authorities, the
OTC will promulgate information to the formation in the form of a NAVEDM, expanded to include infor-
mation on Point Romeo. Details are in ATP 45.
c. Operational Readiness for Fallout Transit. The OTC should state well in advance the re-
quired operational readiness for his units should a fallout transit become inevitable. The OTC should spec-
ify AAW, ASW, and ASUW degrees of readiness and the degree of readiness for engineering, stating the
maximum speed required for fallout transit. The OTC should also nominate guard ships (e.g., radar, sonar,
and EW guards), as many ships will be limited in operational performance during the transit. In general, the
OTC should re-examine the principles of readiness in Chapter 1 to match the problem associated with fall-
out transit.
12016 TACTICS FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR ATTACK
Tactics to be employed and considerations are in Table 12-2.
12017 — 12019 SPARE
12020 SELECTION OF FORMATION RENDEZVOUS
Point Romeo should be established relative to the formation center, and the course and speed of the
rendezvous must be indicated. When a disposition incorporates more than one formation, each formation
should promulgate its own Point Romeo. Whenever possible, Point Romeo should be up the effective
downwind (EDW) from the formation center and at a distance equal to the area of immediate contamina-
tion plus the diameter of the formation. In determining the position of Point Romeo, the OTC must con-
sider the following factors:
a. Direction and strength of EDW.
12-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
b. Expected yield of the weapon.
c. Threat.
d. Expected time for the force to re-form.
e. Direction in which the force is required to steam.
f. Dose rate and total doses that are acceptable.
g. Navigational restrictions.
h. Positions of other formations.
12021 (NC) (NMM) EMERGENCY RENDEZVOUS
When no Point Romeo has been promulgated, the standard emergency rendezvous will be 10 miles
up the EDW from the formation perimeter.
12022 — 12024 SPARE
12025 REPORT ON OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
After an attack all ships are to report their operational efficiency to the OTC. All ships must report
their capacity to:
a. Complete immediate operations.
b. Undertake a subsequent operation without delay (i.e., without rest, hospitalization, or decontam-
ination). (Table 12-3 may prove useful.)
12026 — 12029 SPARE
12030 (NR) (NMM) EMPLOYMENT OF OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The OTC should promulgate necessary information to all units likely to be involved when own
nuclear weapons are to be employed.
12040 BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
By their very nature, biological agents lend themselves to covert delivery methods. Lack of any de-
tection/warning equipment makes identification of the type and source of attack impossible and its occur-
rence will probably pass unnoticed. Agents can be delivered by emission from aircraft, ships, submarines,
missiles, or land-based sources. Under favorable meteorological conditions, a robust agent can remain ef-
fective after traveling hundreds of miles downwind and covering very large areas. Because of this large
area coverage capability, biological operations could, for example, be effective against reinforcement
shipping. The use of biological agents in the sabotage role also presents a hazard to ships in harbor or an-
chorage. The aim of biological operations is to produce disease or sickness (not necessarily lethal) by the
inhalation or ingestion of agents.
12041 SURVIVAL OF AGENTS
Factors which affect the ability of micro-organisms to exist are:
12-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 12-3. Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure State, Dose Levels, Probable
Tactical Effects, and Risk of Exposure Criteria
Total Cumulative Dose RES Probable Initial Tactical Single Exposure Criteria
(Centigrey) Category Effects After Exposure
No Exposure — 0 R0 None Negligible Risk — 50 Centigreys

Moderate Risk — 70 Centigreys
Emergency Risk — 150 Centigreys
Greater Than 0 But Not R1 None to slight decrease in combat The dose that, when added to the
Greater Than 70 effectiveness in up to 5 percent of group dose, will not exceed the
group. appropriate R 0 risk criteria.
Greater Than 70 But R2 Decrease in combat effectiveness Any further exposure is considered
Not Greater Than 150 in up to 25 percent of group. Up to to exceed a negligible or moderate
5 percent of group expected to risk.
become combat ineffective. (See Emergency Risk — The dose that,
Note 1.) when added to the group dose, will
not exceed the R 0 Emergency
Risk criteria.
Greater Than 150 R3 Group probably not able to per- All further exposure will exceed the
form complex tasks; sustained Emergency Risk.
effort hampered; more than 5 per-
cent of group expected to become
combat ineffective, increasing with
increased dose. (See Note 1.)
NOTES:
1. Combat ineffectiveness is taken to be the onset of severe radiation sickness.
2. Radiation exposure state (RES) categories may be useful in making the report required by Article 12025.
a. Light. All light, especially sunlight, giving ultraviolet rays, shortens the life of most organisms.
b. Humidity. Organisms vary in their response to humidity.
c. Temperature. Low temperature generally enhances the survival of micro-organisms; the

effective life of some micro-organisms diminishes with rising temperature. Temperature gradients
will also contribute to how quickly clouds of agents disperse.
12042 WIND
The speed and direction of the wind in relation to the target will be used to determine the release
point for an attack. Adverse wind conditions may cause postponement of an attack beyond acceptable
tactical limits.
12043 DETECTION METHODS
There is, at present, no means of detecting a biological attack. It is most important that medical per-
sonnel are made aware of the threat so that they may adopt a suspicious outlook toward any signs that an at-
tack might have been made (e.g., a sudden widespread onset of an epidemic, rather than a slow build-up).
12-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
12044 PROTECTION
In the absence of any means of detection, protective measures must be based on meeting any possi-
ble attack fully prepared. When intelligence indicates the existence of a biological warfare threat, respira-
tory protection should be adopted by collective or individual means. It is recommended that all ships
should close down to the maximum extent, in the same way as for a chemical or nuclear threat, and that res-
pirators should be worn continuously by all exposed personnel.
12045 HYGIENE
While the primary aim of biological attack is to infect target personnel individually, infections
caused by some biological warfare agents can be transmitted from person to person. Therefore, the mainte-
nance of high standards of personal and communal hygiene is important. When it is suspected that an at-
tack has occurred, strict personal hygiene should be observed, only well-cooked or canned food should be
eaten, and only properly packaged medical supplies used. (See AMedP 6 and STANAG 2500.)
12046 DECONTAMINATION
Overall decontamination will not be required after an actual or suggested attack although the use of
intermittent prewetting washdown is recommended. Contaminated clothing and spaces should be dealt
with in accordance with national instructions. If decontamination has to be undertaken on spaces such as
the sick bay, cleansing station, and galley, formalin and hypochlorite are effective wide-spectrum germi-
cides. Personnel cleansing is similar to that used for any other kind of contamination.
In planning biological warfare defense measures, the following should be taken into account:
a. The reduction in effectiveness of biological warfare agents caused by heat and light means that
the most likely time of attack will be during night hours when wind conditions are favorable. When it is ad-
dressed that there is a threat of biological warfare attack, OTCs should endeavor to ensure that personnel
are protected particularly during the hours of darkness.
b. There is no developed biological warfare defense doctrine, therefore procedures for defense
against chemical warfare agents should be utilized.
12050 CHEMICAL WARFARE
a. From the outset of conventional warfare, it must be assumed that chemical weapons could be
used against NATO naval forces. They could be used simultaneously with conventional weapons. The
possibility of covert chemical attack prior to commencement of general hostilities cannot be discounted.
The effects of chemical attack will vary widely depending on the agent used, its method of delivery, and
meteorological conditions.
b. Chemical weapons are most effective against unprotected personnel.
c. One of the advantages of chemical weapons is that they cause the defender to wear protective
clothing, thereby increasing his stress factor and reducing his efficiency. These effects can also be caused
by the mere threat of attack unless the defender has adequate and reliable protective devices. Therefore, it
is imperative that collective protection be used to full effect to allow maximum possible relaxation of NBC
personnel under threat conditions and after an attack.
12-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
12051 DELIVERY OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
Chemical attack against ships may be delivered as:
a. The warhead of a weapon aimed to hit the target and breach the citadel.
b. A vapor cloud released upwind of the target or through which ships may have to transit.
c. A spray released above the target by aircraft, bombs, shells, or missiles.
12052 NATURE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
The group of nerve agents is odorless, colorless, tasteless, and, for all practical purposes, invisible.
Blister agents, blood agents, and choking agents may also be invisible, but each has a characteristic odor.
Even with chemical detectors, the first indication of attack may be the onset of symptoms in personnel.
With washdown systems operating, some chemical agents may still be absorbed into paintwork, and the
subsequent vapor hazard could last for several days.
12053 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
a. The travel of toxic clouds and the persistence of chemical agents are influenced by meteorologi-
cal conditions as follows:
(1) Wind. Air stability, wind speed, and turbulence are the major factors governing agent concen-
tration, while wind direction determines the downwind hazard. Optimum wind speed for toxic clouds is
between 5 and 8 knots. Vapor concentration and persistency of liquid agents decrease as wind speed
increases.
(2) Temperature. At high air temperatures, liquid agents evaporate faster, and the dosage re-
ceived could be larger and more quickly absorbed.
b. Some types of chemical agent are fully effective under arctic conditions.
c. Agents delivered in the warhead of a weapon aimed to hit the target are relatively unaffected by
meteorological conditions.
12054 THREAT TO NAVAL FORCES
a. General Single Spray Attacks. These attacks against one or more fully protected naval
ships on open sea are not likely; chemical clouds (aerosols) in maritime areas, however, are apt to drift
around for hours at levels where they pose no danger to ships but where they are a serious and unexpected
threat to unprotected naval aircrews during low-level operations. In general, chemical attacks against ship-
ping will be executed supplementary to conventional weapons attacks.
b. Coastal Operations. Concentrating ships in harbor and inshore waters where their maneu-
verability is restricted increases their susceptibility to chemical attack and the likelihood of enemy success.
The embarkation and disembarkation phases of amphibious operations are particularly susceptible to
chemical attack, since the ships will be at least in a relaxed state of close-down condition.
c. Open-Ocean Operations. A well-protected and well-trained naval force should be capable

of prolonged operations in a toxic environment. The threat of, or an attack by, chemical agents could re-
duce the effectiveness of such a force. The success of a chemical attack, which will be most likely from
weapons aimed to breach the citadel, will depend on the preparedness of individual units, protection de-
vices, and the formation chosen.
12-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
In spite of threatened or actual chemical attack, the force must continue its mission with its disposi-
tion being dictated by the most serious threat present in a multithreat situation.
12056 OTC’S CONSIDERATIONS
When a chemical threat exists, the OTC should:
a. Order an appropriate degree of readiness and establish a washdown policy.
b. Consider possible changes to the disposition in view of prevailing and forecast wind direction
and speed.
c. Consider the desirability of stationing a ship or ships with automatic detection equipment upwind
of the force.
d. Station ships to avoid multiship contamination.
e. Establish a helicopter haven and fixed-wing aircraft diversion airfields.
f. Consider the desirability of continuing aircraft and flight deck operations.
g. Determine the necessity for scheduling underway replenishment operations in view of the need
to protect personnel and the risk of contamination if upper deck loads must be struck below.
12057 CHEMICAL ATTACK
a. If a chemical threat is deemed to exist, a chemical attack must be assumed when:
(1) A ship comes under fire.
(2) Hostile or unidentified low-flying aircraft are sighted.
(3) Suspicious mist, smoke, droplets, splashes, or odors are noticed.
(4) Personnel suffer any of the symptoms of chemical agent poisoning.
(5) Any chemical detection system or device indicates the occurrences of chemical attack.
b. A unit observing any of the above is to broadcast the alarm to the force. The OTC shall maneuver
the force or order ships to maneuver independently to avoid further contamination, depending on searoom
and the tactical situation. Guidance to individual ships is given in Table 12-4. Reports are to be made in ac-
cordance with ATP 45.
12058 AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
The operation of aircraft under a chemical threat warrants careful consideration. The employment
policy is the OTC’s decision and will depend on the threat situation. Reaction and turn-around times are
likely to be increased by the need for aircrews and flight deck personnel to wear protective clothing and re-
quirements for washdown.
12-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 12-4. NBC-Aide-Memoire (Chemical)
Preparation Detection of Detection of Post-attack Subsequent

Attacking Vehicle Chemical Attack Action
1. Consider effect of 1. Cancel VAPOR OR LIQUID 1. Report fitness to 1. Complete

wind speed and direc- relaxations. OTC. operational
tion on disposition and, Assume first decontamina-
if possible, avoid multi- degrees of NBCD 1. Get clear at best tion
ple ship contamination. readiness. speed if searoom 2. Monitor citadel
permits. boundaries
internally. 2. Order re-
2. Decide pre-wet 2. Respirators laxations,
policy and crash and gloves to be 2. All pre-wetting
shutting down of within reach inside ON if CIWS not 3. Washdown for 20
ventilation. citadel and worn required. Maneuver minutes. 3. Report to
outside. to make pre-wetting OTC.
effective.
3. OTC establish 4. Maneuver/ forced
helicopter haven 3. Launch or roll to ensure
and/or fixed-wing strike down 3. All personnel put efficient coverage,
aircraft diversion aircraft on deck. on respirators. then change detector
airfield and realistic papers and
alert states, turn decontaminate; reset
around, and re-arm 4. All pre-wetting 4. Make attack chemical alarm and
times in light of threat. ON until Threat report in detector units.
Warning RED, accordance with
then OFF during ATP 45.
4. Personnel outside attack to allow use NOTE: The removal
the citadel wear full of CIWS. CITADEL BREACH of respirators is a
protective clothing, command decision.
keeping respirator and
gloves within reach, 5. Reduce ship’s 1. All personnel put
and carry personal ventilation to on respirators and
issue of drug therapy. minimum required gloves.
to reduce chance
of possible spread
NOTE: To conserve of contamination. 2. Control damage.
stocks, protective suits
should not be worn
unless a strong 3. Restrict
probability of liquid movement of men
chemical attack exists. and spread of
contamination.
5. Order taking
of nerve agent 4. Make attack
pretreatment labels. report in
accordance with
ATP 45.
6. Order material
measures.
7. Minimize aircraft
and stores on deck.
Cover where possible
with a chemical agent
resistant material.
12-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
12059 CONTAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT
a. Aircraft should only be on deck when necessary for operational reasons. Although external con-
tamination of aircraft is unlikely to affect their ability to fly, it will result in many contamination control
problems that will reduce the speed and efficiency of their operations. If the operational situation permits,
steps to avoid contamination should be taken. When chemical attack is imminent or has taken place, the
following actions should be taken as appropriate:
(1) Stow aircraft in hangars with doors shut and lift raised.
(2) Cover all openings and intakes on aircraft, paying particular attention to the internal atmosphere
of the aircraft.
(3) Launch aircraft to a helicopter haven or fixed-wing aircraft diversion airfield outside the likely
area of contamination (e.g., take aircraft under cover).
b. Commanding officers must thoroughly weigh recommended precautions and protective mea-
sures under chemical threat against the required operational availability of own ship’s aircraft.
12060 GRADUATED LEVELS OF NBC THREAT AND MINIMUM INDIVIDUAL

PROTECTION
Table 12-5 gives commanders a method of promulgating the NBC threat level and gives guidance to
ships on the minimum protective measures. These minimum measures may be exceeded as required by an
individual command.
12-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 12-5. Graduated Levels of NBC Threat and Minimum Individual Protection
Serial NBC NBC Normal Protection Required

Threat Threat
Level (1) CHEM/BIO NUCLEAR NBC
(Individual) (Individual) (Collective)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 The enemy has an offensive LOW All personnel carry their Make regular
NBC capability but there is personal equipment or checks that all col-
no indication of its use in the have it readily available. lective protection
immediate future. components are
complete and
serviceable.
2 Nuclear weapons or chemi- MEDIUM Body protec- Low level Test static collec-
cal/biological weapons have tion, worn, applies. tive protection
been used in another area of less systems. Mobile
operations and/or there are overboots units earmark loca-
strong indications that the and gloves; tions for the
enemy will use these weap- respirators installation of col-
ons in the immediate future. carried (2a lective protection
and b). shelters and erect
them if the tactical
situation permits.
Personnel and
equipment to be
kept under cover as
much as possible to
protect them from
liquid contamination
radioactive fallout.
3 Nuclear attack or chemi- HIGH Increase Low level Put collective sys-
cal/biological attack is protection applies. tems into state of
imminent. level as nec- Eye protec- readiness, including
essary to tion as those of combat ve-
achieve full required hicles, and
body protec- and appro- wherever possible,
tion (2a). priate. collective protection
shelters belonging
to mobile units.
NOTES:
1. The threat level to a particular area will be decided by the appropriate commander in accordance with NATO
or national instructions.
2. These normal levels of individual protection may be:
a. Reduced if warranted by special conditions (i.e., personnel inside collective protection and/or com-
manders assess the risk of chemical or biological casualties is outweighed by benefits of reduced
individual protective equipment).
b. Increased if local conditions demand a higher degree of protection.
12-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 13
Mine Warfare
13000 INTRODUCTION
a. Mine warfare includes the whole field of designing, producing, and laying mines and the parallel
effort of designing, producing, and operating all forms of mine countermeasures to combat the enemy’s
mining campaign. This chapter provides background knowledge and instructions to commands and
personnel not normally involved in Mine warfare.
b. (NR) (NMM) For more detailed information, refer to ATP 2, ATP 6, ATP 24, and AHP.
13001 MINING
The aim of minelaying operations is to assist in the dislocation of the enemy war effort to the
maximum possible extent and to contribute to the security of our sea communications by the destruction or
threat of destruction of the enemy’s merchant and naval units.
13002 MINEABLE WATERS
a. Mineable waters are waters in which mines may be effectively used against submarines or
surface ships. The depth of the water may dictate the use of either moored or ground mines. Drifting mines
can be encountered in any depth of water.
(1) (NC) (NMM) Moored mines can normally be encountered in waters with depths up to 1,000 me-
ters, although this is not necessarily the technical depth limitation. Mines used in antisubmarine mine-
fields may be laid in depths down to the case-crushing depth.
(2) (NC) (NMM) Ground mines can normally be encountered in waters with depths up to 90 meters.
Ground mines used in antishipping minefields are unlikely to be laid in depths of more than 55 meters,
except where these mines are laid against surface targets whose draft exceeds 9 meters.
b. During the initial stages of a mining campaign, offensive operations are likely to be confined to
ports, harbours, and focal points where traffic concentrations can be foreseen.
(NC) (NMM) Only waters of 10 nm or less in width that cannot be readily avoided by traffic should
be considered during the initial stages.
13003 TYPES OF MINES
a. Mines are explosive devices laid in the water by aircraft, submarines, or surface ships. They can
be divided into two main categories:
(1) Controlled mines are controlled by the user and enable him to deny the use of certain areas to the
enemy while retaining freedom of movement for his own forces.
(2) Independent mines are not controlled by the user after laying and create the same danger to own
and enemy shipping. Types of settings used with these mines include:
(a) Ship counts, which allow a certain number of ships to pass the mine before it detonates.
13-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) Arming or rising delays, which prevent the mine from becoming active before a
preset time.
(c) Sterilizing time, which renders the mine inoperative after a preset time.
b. The mines described above may be either mines that are fired by remote control, contact mines,
or influence mines. Contact mines will normally be moored mines, although drifting mines can be used in
this context. Influence mines can be either moored or bottom mines.
13004 THE NATURE OF A MINEFIELD
As all minelaying operations will have a lasting effect on enemy as well as own operations, all
sources of intelligence should be used by officers concerned with the planning of such an operation. Where
independent mines have been laid, the minefield presents the same danger to own forces as to enemy
forces. Operational advantages can be achieved by the use of arming or rising delays and sterilizers that
will activate and deactivate the minefield at preset times. If sterilizers are not used, the minefield must be
expected to create a danger for years.
13005 TYPES OF MINING
a. Mines. Mines can be used strategically or tactically.
(1) Strategic Mining would be conducted with the broad long-term aim of denying the enemy
free access to or use of sea areas and sea lines of communications considered vital to the defense of
NATO territories and to the support of the war effort of the Alliance.
(2) Tactical Mining may be conducted in support of a limited military objective, generally in a
specified area of immediate tactical interest.
b. Minefields. Mines can be used to lay defensive protective fields or offensive fields.
(1) Defensive and Protective Mining is normally conducted in coastal or territorial waters or
in international waters and straits that normally are under the control of a NATO nation or the Alliance.
(2) Offensive Mining may be conducted in harbours or approaches thereto, straits, and territorial
waters that normally are under the control of the enemy, although under certain circumstances, it may be
conducted in neutral or international waters.
13006 JETTISONING MINES
The safety of the minelayer sometimes requires that the mines aboard be jettisoned. It is emphasized
that jettisoned mines may become a serious hazard to friendly ships unless suitable precautions are taken.
The optimum, but often unavailable, places for jettisoning mines in armed condition are enemy shipping
routes and other areas regularly used by enemy ships that will not be needed by friendly ships before the
mines are sterilized. If the mines cannot be laid against enemy ships, they usually should be either dropped
in water so deep that the mines will be crushed and destroyed by the pressure or dropped in safe condition.
13007 URGENT MINING
Urgent mining is the laying of active mines with correct spacing but not in the ordered or planned
positions. The mines may be laid inside or outside the planned area in such positions that they will hamper
the movements of the enemy more than those of own forces.
13-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
13008 — 13009 SPARE
13010 MINELAYING OPERATIONS
a. Normally the subarea commander issues orders for the operation. These consist of directives,
preparatory orders, and final operation orders. Minelaying intentions and plans must be coordinated with
subordinate commanders to ensure that mining operations will not conflict with submarine and surface
force operations. Details of ordering minelaying operations are given in ATP 24.
13011 INFORMATION TO FRIENDLY FORCES
a. Although the distribution of orders should be confined to units that are concerned directly, the
position, nature, and extent of a new minefield, or an addition to an existing minefield, must be
communicated to all other units that may transit the area. For this purpose AWNIS (Allied Warning
Navigation Information System) has been introduced.
b. (NR) (NMM) For details, see AHP 1.
13012 (NR) (NMM) PROCEDURES FOR AND METHODS OF SURFACE MINING
The procedure of mining is the principle according to which mines are spread throughout the area to
be mined. The procedure to be used is determined by the minelaying order. There are two mining
procedures: pattern mining and random mining. The minelaying method is the system according to which
the procedure of mining is implemented. The method to be used is to be determined by the OTC of the
minelaying force.
a. Pattern Mining. This mining procedure involves laying a minefield in the form of
geographically predetermined mine lines.
b. Random Mining. This mining procedure involves laying a minefield of practically uniform
density but with no recognizable pattern of mine distribution in a geographically predetermined area.
Random laying of mines hinders mine hunting and clearance.
13013 — 13019 SPARE
13020 (NC) (NMM) SUPPORT OF SURFACE MINELAYING OPERATIONS
a. Approach Phase. The OTC of the covering force will normally act in command relationship
situation C. The OTC of the minelaying force must ensure that there is a clear understanding between the
different forces involved as to their relative movements, communications, tactical limitations, etc. During
the transit to the minelaying area, the OTC of the minelaying force will try to avoid contact with the enemy.
The OTC of the covering force will operate in the direction of the threat. The primary aim of the covering
force is to prevent the enemy from detecting and attacking the minelaying force. This may be achieved best
by diverting the enemy away from the area to be mined.
b. Minelaying Phase. Direct communication between the OTCs is of paramount importance

during the execution of a minelaying operation. To facilitate communication, code words for the operation
should be provided to the OTC of the covering force prior to the start of the operation. All communications
directly concerned with minelaying (e.g., enemy contact reports, ship-air) should be handled by the
covering force. The OTC of the minelaying force will usually indicate, 15 minutes before the event, his
intention to start or complete minelaying. He must also keep the OTC of the covering force informed on the
progress of the lay, including:
(1) Start of minelaying.
13-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(2) Any interruptions or breakdown.
(3) Completion.
(4) Jettisoning of mines or urgent mining.
13030 MINE COUNTERMEASURES (MCM)
The aim of mine countermeasures is to permit Allied warships and merchant vessels to use the seas
and enter and leave ports, as necessary, to further the war effort and support the population, without
sustaining unacceptable damage or losses from enemy mines. This aim can be achieved by offensive and
defensive MCM.
a. Offensive MCM is intended to prevent the enemy from successfully laying mines. Included
under this heading are:
(1) Strategic bomb/missile attacks.
(2) Attacks on enemy minelayers.
(3) Laying own offensive/defensive minefields.
b. Defensive MCM is designed to reduce the threat from mines after they have been laid. They include:
(1) Passive countermeasures.
(2) Active countermeasures.
c. (NC) (NMM) Given the political will, the prevention of mining is always the preferable option;
this means utilization of offensive MCM techniques to prevent mining. In the absence of this, the most
productive surveillance assets available should be brought to bear on the enemy, followed by
minewatching, in order that the success of defensive MCM techniques might be more readily achieved
once commenced.
13031 PASSIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES
a. Localizing the Threat. The threat can be localized, mine clearing forces concentrated, and
shipping more effectively controlled by the establishment of a system of routing ships when passing
through mineable waters. Movement of shipping by convoy and an adequate navigational warning system
are also desirable.
b. Locating the Minefield. The laying of a minefield may be reported by mine watchers or other
intelligence sources. Knowledge pertaining to a minefield is of maximum importance to maritime
authorities. Units gaining intelligence of minelaying operations are to report it to the appropriate
commanders.
c. Reducing the Risk. Risk may be reduced by:
(1) Altering Navigation Aids. Lighthouses may be extinguished or have their lights dimmed; buoys
may be reduced to the minimum required for safe navigation of Allied shipping. Radio-locating systems
should be operated with caution as it is possible for an enemy minelayer to use them for fixing position.
(2) Self-Protective Measures. See Article 13032.
13-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) Seabed Surveys. These surveys are conducted in time of peace or war to determine environ-
mental suitability to various alternative mine countermeasures.
13032 SELF-PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Self-protective measures are part of defensive MCM; they are those passive measures taken by any
vehicle to reduce the risk to the vehicle from mines. Self-protective measures are achieved by tactical
measures or material means.
a. (NR) (NMM) Tactical Measures. By routing ships in deep water and at a slow speed, the
chances of detonating a mine can be lessened. It can be taken that for surface vessels, the deeper the water
under the keel, the safer the vessel is likely to be.
(1) (NR) (NMM) Tide. Sailing at high water increases the distance between hull and mine. This
way enables a ship to sail over a buoyant moored contact mine or reduce the influence detected by an in-
fluence mine.
(2) (NR) (NMM) Current. Stream will cause a moored mine to dip and will have the same effect as
tide. In good conditions, speed made good over the ground may be increased without change of the
speed through the water, and so, risk from acoustic or pressure mines may be reduced.
(3) (NR) (NMM) Safe Depth. As a result of the attenuation of the magnetic field of a ship with in-
creasing depth, the probability of actuating a given magnetic ground mine decreases as the water deep-
ens, until a safe depth is reached. At this depth, the field of the ship becomes insufficient to actuate the
mine-firing mechanism. The safe depth will vary with the characteristics of the mine, the speed of the
ship, and the magnetic signature of the ship. In the absence of more specific information, for degaussed
ships, the following figures for magnetic safe depth against ground mines may be used.
Magnetic Safe
TYPE Depth
(100 nT mine)
Aircraft Carrier 90 m
Cruiser 55 m
Destroyer or large (surfaced) submarine 42 m
2,000-ton cargo vessel 46 m
(4) (NR) (NMM) Safe Speed. Reducing speed reduces the pressure signature of a ship and generally
her acoustic signature also, and so will decrease the probability of actuating mines using these influences.
b. (NR) (NMM) Material Means include the use of various equipment which conduct to decrease
or alter the influence signatures of a ship, which may give a capability of detection of certain mines (sonar), or
which also conduct to the actuation of a mine outside the limit of the dangerous area of the ship. They are:
(1) (NR) (NMM) Degaussing equipment or other means, such as flashing, wiping, or deperming,
used for reducing or changing the magnetic signature.
(2) (NR) (NMM) Acoustic Measures. Reduce speed or practice of safe depth (indicated by
sound range report). Use of noisemakers or acoustic decoys that are capable of producing a rapid
13-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
increase in sound level; the use of this equipment must be approved by the OTC of the MCM forces
working in the vicinity.
(3) (NR) (NMM) Sonar. Ships fitted with a suitable sonar can use it to detect moored mines in suffi-
cient time to avoid passing through a moored minefield or possibly to dodge individual mines. To avoid in-
terference, the use of sonar must be approved by the OTC of the MCM forces working in the vicinity .
(4) (NR) (NMM) Shock Hardening.
(5) (NR) (NMM) Damage Control and Protection.
13033 (NC) (NMM) CONDUCT OF SURFACE SHIPS IN MINED AREAS.
a. Ship at Sea. Turn off cathodic protection 24 hours prior to entering the suspected mined area or
as soon as possible.
FIRSTLY: Measures to be taken by naval surface ships where moored contact mines are present.
They can be divided into general precautions, equipment and personnel protective measures, and
tactical measures.
(1) General Precautions.
(a) In areas where the presence of mines is suspected, do not proceed outside routes and
channels controlled by own mine warfare forces. Follow any instructions on navigation in
controlled channels issued by the Area Commander or the mine warfare tasking authority.
(b) If there are no guidelines or controlled channels, avoid areas with high traffic density,
narrow passages, and choke points near isolated navigational marks (e.g., buoys, beacons,
lighthouses, light ships, etc.) that enable the minelayer to fix his minelay accurately. Mine lines
across the general traffic should be expected. However, the ready availability of satellite navigation
systems (e.g., NAVSTAR or GPS) mean that it is possible to lay mines accurately even in areas
where no navigational marks are available.
(c) Use the deepest water available, preferably over 200 meters.
(d) Do not throw anything overboard. Many objects that float may be mistaken by lookouts for
floating mines. Cans and drums of any sort clutter the bottom and slow down the MCM effort. Even
garbage put over the side in perforated garbage bags may contain metallic cans or other debris that
can generate minelike echoes on a minehunters sonar.
(e) Be alert and observe the behaviour of other ships and aircraft in the vicinity. Any type of
ship, however small, may be used to lay mines (e.g., fishing vessels, yachts, dhows, hovercraft,
cargo ships, supply ships, etc.), as can helicopters and some aircraft. Watch should be kept for any
unusual or suspicious activity, such as the releasing of objects into the sea that might indicate mining
activity. Aircraft may release mines with or without parachutes.
(2) Equipment Protective Measures.
(a) Ensure that the maximum degree of watertight integrity is maintained below the main deck.
(b) Ensure that all equipment and stores are correctly stowed and secured.
(c) Maintain a high degree of NBCD readiness, with particular emphasis on damage control
equipment required to control leaks.
13-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(d) When the degree of risk is high, secure all equipment in galleys and serve only cold meals.
(3) Personnel Protective Measures.
(a) All personnel are to wear coverall suits or action dress.
(b) Arrange accommodations to avoid having all men of the same specialty in the same mess
space. Consider evacuating the forward mess spaces (most probable zone of impact with a surface or
submerged mine).
(c) Reduce the number of personnel remaining below the main deck or in compartments below
the waterline to the absolute minimum.
(d) If a mine is sighted nearby:
i. Evacuate all personnel from compartments below the main deck and from below
the waterline.
ii. Order all personnel to put on safety helmets (hard hats) and life jackets.
iii. Order all personnel who can do so to lie down on their bunks.
iv. Order all personnel evacuated under i above to lie down if possible.
v. Order personnel on watch and personnel not lying down to take up the safety posture.
This position is standing with knees bent, heels off the deck, facing athwartships and taking a
firm grip, with arms bent, on a solidly mounted fixture. The head, neck, and back should be kept
in a vertical straight line to absorb the effects of shock from the deck. This position can only be
held for a limited time and should only be ordered when danger is imminent.
(e) Personnel on the upper deck should stand clear of stays, antennas, and overhanging parts of
the superstructure.
(4) Tactical Measures.
(a) When in an area where moored mines are known to be present, ships should be stopped or at
anchor during the hours of darkness. A helicopter should be kept at readiness for reconnaissance duties.
i. If there are many drifting mines, ships should remain stopped.
ii. If the minefield density is high but there are no drifting mines, or if it is considered that
they present a lesser danger, then ships should anchor.
iii. Whenever possible, a helicopter reconnaissance should be carried out up-wind and
up-current of the anchorage.
iv. While at anchor, ships should have a boat available to divert drifting mines. (Use of a
diver to secure a rope to the lower part of a mine is recommended, as this method allows a mine
to be towed safely clear of the ship).
(b) If moving during the hours of darkness. If ships have to move in mined waters during the
hours of darkness, they should take the following precautions:
13-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
i. Set up the navigation radar to short range and maintain a surface search. Floating
mines can be detected in sea state 1 or less (Beaufort Scale).
ii. Carry out a helicopter reconnaissance ahead of the ship just before sunset and at dawn.
If the helicopter has a night capability, operate it in the role of forward lookout (see paragraph
(4)(f) below).
iii. If operational circumstances allow, follow in the wake of a large merchant ship. If in
company with other warships, follow directly over the same ground as the ship ahead at a dis-
tance of about 500 meters. (This precaution is also valid during the day).
iv. If no other means is available, use a searchlight close to the stem to provide lighting
ahead of the ship. This can be worthwhile when proceeding slowly in a smooth sea.
(c) Proceed at slow speed, so that if mines are detected the way may be checked to avoid
entering the minefield.
(d) Maintain an effective visual watch. Floating mines, however, only show about 30
centimeters of their shape above water and are difficult to see. Indeed, their color may have been
chosen for camouflage. It is recommended, therefore, that ships:
i. Reinforce the visual watch organization and place it under the direct control of an offi-
cer. All lookouts should have direct communication with the controlling officer.
ii. Post a lookout equipped with binoculars as high in the ship as possible.
iii. Equip all lookouts with polarized sunglasses.
iv. Use stabilized binoculars if available. Search distance should be chosen according to
visibility and sea state (from tens to hundreds of meters).
v. Relieve lookouts at frequent intervals to prevent eyestrain and maintain alertness.
vi. From dusk to dawn, use any available night vision equipment.
— Light amplification binoculars can achieve good results on a clear night (with
sufficient moonlight) in sea state 2 or less. In such conditions, it is possible to see a drifting
mine at a range between 300 to 600 meters. However, in worse conditions, detection
ranges decrease rapidly.
— The performance of infrared cameras is very dependent on sea state, relative

humidity, the type of camera, and the speed of the ship (because of the effects of vibration
on camera mountings). In good conditions (sea state 2, relative humidity of 60 to 70
percent, visibility of 5 nm, and using a good quality camera), a drifting mine can be
detected at a range between 300 and 600 meters. Beyond sea state 3, sighting probability
decreases rapidly.
(e) Utilization of sonar.
i. Ships fitted with a mine avoidance sonar should operate it.
ii. Ships fitted with a low-frequency ASW sonar will gain no benefit from its use, as trials
have shown that, even with alerted operators and a known mine position, these sets are unable to
detect a moored mine in the water volume. The same holds true for most ASW helicopter sonars.
13-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
iii. Ships still fitted with a high-frequency ASW attack sonar (above 20 kHz) should oper-
ate it in the ahead sector with a low depression angle. Echoes will be detected allowing avoid-
ance maneuvers to be taken. However, no further information on the nature of the detected
object (mine or not) will be obtained after completion of the avoidance maneuver.
(f) Utilization of helicopters.
i. The helicopter is able to sight mines on or near the surface and is, therefore, the primary
means of mine surveillance.
ii. In any minefield there is likely to be a percentage of moored mines that fail to take up
their correct depth and that float on the surface or watch at low tide. Also, even correctly laid
mines may be sighted at low water. Mines that have been laid for a long time may be visible be-
cause of their rusty colour or the build up of marine growth. In favourable conditions of weather
and sea, submerged moored mines may be seen (down to 10 meters or more). However, the use
of camouflage paint (e.g., grey, grey-green, or a mix of different colours) could greatly reduce
the change of detection.
iii. Conditions for visual mine-hunting from a helicopter that favor detection are:
- Clear water, in which the mine will contrast well with the background water volume.
- Clear sky.
- Calm sea (sea state 1 or less).
- Altitude of helicopter between 150 and 180 meters (360 meters in case of minefield
delimitation).
- Scan angle, from the vertical to 40 from the vertical in all directions.
- The sun behind the observer and 40 to 70 above the horizon.
- Speed adjusted in accordance with the prevailing environmental conditions.
iv. The efficiency of visual mine-hunting can be summarized as follows:
- The swept path is narrow, being limited to a few tens of meters either side of the
helicopter track.
- Unless all the conditions in iii above are met, the search is likely to be inefficient.
- The level of confidence that no mines are present after a helicopter search without a
sighting is poor.
(g) Ships should arrange to arrive at the entrance to ports or approach routes at high tide.
(h) Helicopter airborne radars can detect floating mines in sea state 0 if the mines are not
covered with marine growth. Effective use of light amplification binoculars or infrared cameras in
helicopters is, as for surface ships (see paragraph (4)(f)), very dependent on sea state and
13-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
SECONDLY: Measures to be taken if one or more mines are sighted on the surface. When a mine is
sighted visually, it may be either a drifting mine or part of a mine line (i.e., a minefield). To decide
which is the case, the following indications can be taken into account.
(1) If several mines are sighted, this indicates the presence of a minefield that has partly taken up the
wrong depth.
(2) If there is only one mine on the surface it should not be approached, as it may have been laid shal-
low intentionally to attract ships into the center of a pattern of properly laid mines. Way should be taken off
the ship, which should then withdraw, if possible, by retracing the path through the same water.
(3) Order the personnel protective measures given in paragraphs (3)(d) and (3)(e).
(4) Launch the helicopter as soon as possible to obtain an assessment of the situation.
(5) Withdraw, using helicopter surveillance to establish a safe route.
(6) Dispatch a team of clearance divers if one is embarked, when the ship is clear of the mine(s) (at
least 1,000 meters away). Dispatch them in a suitable boat to note the external features of the mine(s)
and make an identification if possible.
(7) Report the presence of the mine(s) to higher authority and to other ships in the vicinity. The main
information to be reported is as follows:
(a) Whether the mine is drifting or is still attached to its sinker; and whether fully floating, just
watching, or still submerged; and if the latter, the approximate depth.
NOTE
If the mine is still attached to its sinker, this indicates that a minefield has been laid in the area.
This is also the case if one or more mines are sighted in the water volume.
(b) The estimated diameter of the mine case and the proportion that is visible above the water.
(c) Any identifying features, such as the presence or absence of horns and their number, the
presence of snaglines, and any identifying marks on the case. The state of the case should also be
reported (e.g., very rusty, heavy marine fouling).
(d) The position of the mine, together with the accuracy of this position and the datum of the
chart concerned (e.g., WGS 84, EUROP 50, WGS 72).
(e) If possible, take detailed photographs of the mine(s) to accompany the follow-up report.
(8) Disposal of the mine(s). The following options are available:
(9) If MCMVs are present in the vicinity, request that they join, mark the mine(s), then hand over
and leave the area.
(b) If a clearance diving team is embarked, task them to carry out a mine destruction operation.
(c) As a last resort, destroy the mine(s) by machinegun (preferably 12.7 mm) or small arms
during daylight when sea state permits. The recommended firing distance is 200 to 300 meters; this
may be reduced to 150 meters if the ship has the mine line in the bow.
13-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTE
If the mine leaves the surface and is no longer visible, this does not mean that it has reached the
seabed. It may be partially buoyant and adrift just below the surface. In this condition, it is more
dangerous to surface ships than when it was floating on the surface.
THIRDLY: Measures to be taken where influence ground mines are present.
(1) In areas where the presence of mines is suspected, do not proceed outside the routes and chan-
nels controlled by own mine warfare forces. Follow any instructions on navigation in the controlled
channels issued by the Area Commander or the mine warfare tasking authority.
(2) If possible, remain in waters where the depth exceeds 80 meters.
(3) Reduce speed in order to limit:
(a) Acoustic signature, in the frequency range of 0 to 2000 Hz, and in the 20 to 30 kHz band
(which is required for some firing systems).
(b) Pressure signature, particularly in shallow water.
(4) Avoid violent maneuvers that generate noise.
(5) Switch on degaussing equipment and keep it on.
(6) Switch off cathodic protection.
(7) Take equipment and personnel protective measures as for the presence of moored contact mines
(see paragraphs (1)(b) and (1)(c)). With ground mines, however, the affects of an explosion are more in-
tense, as compared to an impact with the explosive charge. A close underwater explosion propagates an
intense shock wave in a broad spectrum and with very high acceleration over a very short period
(>1000g for a few microseconds). This causes severe whipping of the hull, which is the major cause of
damage. Whipping is most violent at the bow and stern; accordingly personnel should be kept clear of
the ships extremities.
FOURTHLY: Measures to be taken in the presence of mobile mines.
Although the threat to surface ships from this modern type of mine is not widespread, it should not
be discounted. One possible countermeasure is to select the route to pass over areas where the bottom
gradients are steep (e.g., margin of the continental shelf).
b. Ship at Anchor or Alongside.
(1) Reduce movement and noise (e.g., use only essential auxiliaries, avoid working anchor, prevent
sloshing/beating of fuel and potable water tanks, etc.).
(2) Sharp lookout for aircraft or surface vessels laying mines.
(3) Degaussing is operated as follows:
(a) Normally energized.
(b) If mines, bombs, or any other unidentified objects are dropped close to the ship:
13-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
i. The degaussing must remain unchanged, either ON or OFF, or energized step by step if
the ship is ordered to move.
ii. The ship must not be moved until competent authority has given permission.
(4) Use of weapons may increase the danger of actuating acoustic mines.
(5) In case of mining of a safe anchorage, the local commander/OTC should issue orders
concerning evacuation of the mined areas.
13034 ACTIVE MINE COUNTERMEASURES
a. Active mine countermeasures are any measures taken to attack a mine in its environment after it
has been laid. They are accomplished by laying out a pattern of tracks and towing or carrying equipment
designed to:
(1) Cut the wire of a moored mine by mechanical sweeping, special devices used by mine hunters,
ordnance used by clearance divers.
(2) Detonate mines by influence sweeping (acoustic, magnetic and/or pressure).
(3) Detect mines by minehunting with sonar, magnetic, optical means, or clearance diving.
b. These countermeasures aim at the destruction, neutralization, removing, or recovering of the mines.
c. (NC) (NMM) The efficiency of active mine countermeasures depends on numerous factors
described in ATP 6 and ATP 24; it is increased by use of a very accurate location system, good
environmental conditions, high effectiveness of the equipment, and knowledge about the mines.
d. (NC) (NMM) Statistical methods are used for evaluation and planning of operations, but
employment of active mine countermeasures is generally long and time-consuming for reaching an
acceptable low level of risk.
13035 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES IN MINE COUNTERMEASURES
a. Self-protective mine countermeasures are the responsibility of the OTC and commanding officer.
b. Active mine countermeasures in amphibious operations usually are the responsibility of the
advance force commander.
c. Operational command of active mine countermeasures in ocean areas usually is exercised by

NATO commands.
d. Operational command of active mine countermeasures in coastal areas is exercised by

national authorities.
e. Because of the special limitations imposed on MCM units by their small size, support of MCM
operations must always be considered along with command and control.
f. The requirement for coordinating and reporting MCM operations will vary from place to place
according to the local situation. In all circumstances, all commands concerned must be kept informed of
the status of the mine danger and/or any employment of MCM gear/equipment.
(NC) (NMM) Especially at a depth greater than 30 meters (98 feet). This is particularly valid for the
appropriate SUBOPAUTH.
13-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
13036 — 13039 SPARE
13040 MCM OPERATIONS
a. When enemy mining has been located, MCM forces will carry out operations to open channels
through mined waters if diversions cannot be established. Sometimes adverse weather, poor
environmental conditions, and the use of MCM-defeating devices, affect the clearing of a channel and
make it a time-consuming task.
(1) (NR) (NMM) Examples of MCM defeating devices are:
(a) arming delays;
(b) ship counters;
(c) mixing of mine types
b. Channels are normally established to coincide with routes, the centerline of the channel being
identical to the line connecting the route positions. Channels will usually be marked by offset buoys, as
shown in Figure 13-1.
c. (NR) (NMM) The details of ordering and executing MCM operations are given in ATP 24, for Q
routes see AHP 7).
13050 SUPPORT OF MCM OPERATIONS
An MCM force will often need protection from a covering force. When operating in mined water,
MCM forces are limited in their ability to maneuver in channels and avoiding action cannot be taken before
the gear has been recovered. This makes the MCM force vulnerable to enemy attack. The covering force
should be able to provide close antiair warfare protection for the MCM force and at the same time deny the
approach of enemy surface forces. Warning should be issued in due time in order to enable the MCM force to
take avoiding action. The OTC of the covering force will normally act in command relationship situation C.
The OTCs must ensure that there is a clear understanding between the two forces as to their relative
movements, communications, tactical limitations, etc.
13060 TRANSIT OF SHIPS THROUGH MINED AREA
a. General Considerations. This article provides convoy commodores, OTCs, and individual
units with instructions for maneuvering through mined waters.
(1) The responsibility for the safety of merchant shipping rests with the appropriate Operational
Controlling Authority (OCA). The OCA of transiting units must decide whether merchant shipping
will, or will not, transit mined areas. The decision to pass naval units through mined waters rests with
their OTC. Convoy-commodores and OTCs of naval units must ensure that their masters/captains are
informed about lead through procedures. The senior OTC of the naval forces afloat assigns tactical con-
trol to MCM forces in order to conduct the lead through phase. In the case of convoy independents, tacti-
cal control of the lead through operation is to be assigned to MCM- forces by the OCA. MCM
authorities provide information related to the transit.
(2) It is important that the MCM tasking authority and the OCA of transiting units establish clear,
reliable communications between themselves and their subordinate units at sea. Figure 13-2 shows the
sources and responsibilities for the flow of information in situations that may arise when units transit
mined areas.
13-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
E
LIN
E
LIN
OY
BU
ER
NT
CE
Figure 13-1. Normal Channel With Offset Buoys
(3) Units transiting a swept/hunted channel should keep station by true bearing from the lead unit,
or navigate by radio direction finding (if available) or radar (if permitted by EMCON policy), in order to
proceed on the centerline or on another track as ordered. Depending on sea state, visibility, method of
navigation, maneuverability, and other characteristics of transiting units, one MCMV can lead up to
four units.
(4) Orders are given by MCMVs, preferable by use of flaghoist or signal lamp; ships that follow ac-
knowledge by the same means. Electronic emissions should be reduced to the absolute minimum as re-
quired by the tactical situation.
(5) MCMVs may be used to lead, but this should not preclude the use of other units that have suit-
ably qualified personnel, such as pilots, or special radio direction finding equipment.
(6) It should be kept in mind that the shorter the distance between the ships in column, the less the
danger from influence mines with regard to the mines intercount dormant period.
(7) In some MCM operations, units may have to transit the channel at specified intervals. In this
case they will be warned in advance by the OTC of the MCM force.
b. Safety Measures and Preparations.
(NR) (NMM) Take action in accordance with paragraph 13033a.
(1) When a convoy is approaching:
(a) The Convoy Commodore must form his convoy into a single column formation. Intership
spacing should be in accordance with paragraph 13060a(4), depending on sizes of the ships and the
navigational facilities. As a general rule, intership spacing should not exceed 1,000 yards,
depending on the sizes of the ships and the navigational facilities.
13-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTES:
1. MCM data will include:
(a) Channel position relative to Q route
(b) Channel width
(c) MCM tactical frequencies
(d) MCM units on task
(e) Amplifying information
2. TRANSITING UNITS’ data must include:
(a) Number of units
(b) Names of units
(c) Approximate size
(d) Any maneuvering limitations
(e) Maximum draft
(f) ETA
3. ETA CHANGES will be required if transiting
units are off their sailing schedule.
4. MCM tasking authority and OTC MCM may be united.
E
N G
H A ING A ET
C SIT AT A
A N D ) C
ET RA TS’ e 2 TA OCA (
M o HA
N
T NI ot A ) TRANSITING CM te N
U (N M D 1 UNITS
G
DA 3) E
C te
M (No TA
MCM OTC
TASKING TRANSITING
AUTHORITY UNITS
TR MC L
U A M
ET NI NS DA I CA
A TS IT TA OTC CT TS
(N CH ’ DA ING MCM TA NE
ot AN T
e A
4) GE
Figure 13-2. Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters
13-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(b) A naval force should pass in a single column formation at standard distance or less if possible.
NOTE
Other distances may be indicated by the OTC of the MCM force.
(2) If an entry/departure screen has to be established by escort forces, patrol sectors must be at least
500 yards off the mine danger area.
(3) If rendezvous with an LTV/MCM force is expected during darkness, the first unit to be led of the
column is to show three white lights displaced vertically at her bow for identification purposes. The
LTV will point the rendezvous position, showing a white light over red. If more than one LTV is em-
ployed, only the first LTV will show the lights mentioned. Other LTVs are to proceed to their assigned
stations and to show those lights after arrival.
(a) (NR) (NMM) The first unit in the column shows three white lights.
(b) (NR) (NMM) The lead unit will show a white light over a red light.
(4) Proceed along the centerline (Figure 13-1) or along another indicated track, each unit navigating
independently.
(5) The LTV only is to adjust speed to maintain the signaled distance (see paragraph 13060a(4)).
(6) The speed ordered should not be exceeded.
c. Situations. Table 13-1 provides a list of actions for transiting units that applies to
situations involving:
(1) Mine danger area known/not known.
(2) Channels established/not established.
(3) MCM forces available/not available.
d. Responsibilities.
(1) Arrival Time. From 36 to 48 hours in advance of arrival, the OCA of the transiting unit shall:
(a) Inform the respective MCM tasking authority about the ETA and composition of a
convoy/naval force that has to transit a certain channel.
(b) Inform the OTC of transiting units/Convoy Commodore about MCM data.
(c) (NR) (NMM) Using the Lead Through Information format of APP 4, this information
should include valid Q-messages and NAVWARNs.
(2) MCM Tasking Authority. The MCM tasking authority shall:
(a) In accordance with the Lead Through Order, give the appropriate order to the OTC of the
MCM force to execute the lead through operation.
(b) Provide information as shown by Figure 13-2.
13-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Table 13-1. Actions for Transiting Units in Mine Danger Areas
Situation LTV/MCM Forces Transiting Units

ONE May or may not be UNITS NEED NOT BE LED
available.
Mine danger area known 1. Conform with instructions in the latest appropriate:
and channel established,
promulgated, and marked. (a) Q message
(b) Routing/transit instructions
(c) Channel information.
(d) (NR) (NMM) SUBAREA WARN
(e) (NR) (NMM) MERSHIP WARN
2. Comply with appropriate safety measures.
TWO Available UNITS MUST BE LED

Mine danger area being 1. BEFORE ARRIVAL at danger area or channel entrance:
established, channel being
established, and channel (a) OTC or Convoy Commodore set watch on MCM
may be marked.
tactical frequency (HF/UHF), establish communi-
cations 4 to 2 hours before ETA, and pass relevant
MCM operations information to units in company.
(b) Keep OTC of MCM force informed of first unit’s ETA.
(c) Prepare to comply with appropriate safety measures.
2. AFTER ARRIVAL at channel entrance:
(a) Comply with instructions from OTC of MCM force

and LTV.
(b) Maintain signaled distance on channel centerline
or ordered track.
(c) Comply with appropriate safety measures.
THREE Available SAME AS FOR SITUATION TWO

Mine danger area not es- Not available TRANSITING UNITS NOT YET IN A MINED AREA
tablished and channel not
established. 1. Consider diversion if permissible.
3. Inform the OCA.
TRANSITING UNITS IN A MINE DANGER AREA
1. Continue transit.
3. Inform the OCA, if appropriate.
FOUR (NC) (NMM) Available SUBMARINE MUST BE LED
Navigational assistance for Comply with paragraph 13061.

submarines.
13-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(3) OTC of MCM Forces. The OTC of MCM forces shall provide information in accordance with
paragraph 13060.f, 4 hours (2 hours for coastal convoys) in advance. He may delegate this task to the
LTV or MCMV that has been ordered to execute the leadthrough.
(4) The Lead Through Vessel (LTV). The lead LTV shall:
(a) Conduct the leadthrough operation.
(b) Ensure that ordered distances are maintained.
(c) Ensure that Vessels Transiting the Minefield (VTMs) maintain the ordered track or centerline.
e. Units Damaged by Mines. Units damaged by mine detonation and unable to proceed at the
ordered speed should attempt to maneuver clear of the channel’s centerline. In narrow and shallow
channels, such as harbor entrances, heavily damaged or sinking units should be grounded outside the
main channel.
f. Transit Instructions. A naval force, convoy, or independent unit about to be led through, or
transiting a channel without a LTV, will be passed relevant instructions using the Leadthrough Transit
Instructions format of APP 4; merchant vessels will use ATP 2, Vol. II.
13061 (NC) (NMM) TRANSIT OF SUBMARINES THROUGH MINED AREAS
a. General Remarks.
(1) Purpose. The purpose of this article is to provide the commanding officer of a submarine with
instructions for maneuvering in mine danger areas. The prescribed procedure can also be applied for a
submarine passage between minefields, through an established channel in an enemy minefield or a gap
in a friendly minefield, or in waters difficult to navigate.
(2) If a Leadthrough Operation is Ordered. The OTC of the MCM force is required in accor-
dance with paragraph 13060 to send the Transit Instructions message to the SUBOPAUTH, who in due
time will promulgate the message. The format must be amplified by the SUBOPAUTH/OTC of the
MCM force by a new paragraph, as follows:
F. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMARINES
1. Rendezvous area
2. Rendezvous period/alternate rendezvous period
3. Danrunner will be unit indicated
4. Distance between danrunner and LTV, in yards
5. Communication instructions (frequencies; UWT available/not available).
(3) The Principle for a Leadthrough Operation. This should be to conceal the initial rendez-
vous between submarine and LTV from the enemy. All measures that would disclose the operation must
be avoided. Only units equipped with underwater telephone (UWT) are suitable as LTVs/danrunners
for submerged submarines.
(4) Channel. The channel has to be established in accordance with the appropriate mine warfare
publications. All positions in the channel at which a change of course is required must be marked by
either a navigational buoy or a danbuoy.
13-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
NOTE
A typical MCM channel is shown in Figure 13-1.
(5) Responsibility for Submarine Safety. This rests with the commanding officer of the sub-
marine. The decisions whether to pass or not/whether to pass surfaced or submerged is also up to the
commanding officer of the submarine. It is of paramount importance that submarine and LTV act in
agreement and that mutual information does not create any doubts about the actions to be taken. Tactical
control, from the rendezvous until the end of the passage, is assigned to the OTC of the MCM
forces/commanding officer of the LTV.
(6) Identification of Lead Through Vessels (LTVs). As long as the approaching submarine
has not positively identified its LTV, it remains absolutely covert. After identification, the submarine
has to establish communications with the LTV by appropriate means, taking into account the secrecy of
the leadthrough. The LTV has to act in accordance with paragraph b.(2)(a) below, up to the moment
when the submarine starts to communicate. The danrunner should mark the channel entrance in a posi-
tion very close to the first datum/danbuoy, and subsequently proceed on the datum line, taking up posi-
tion abeam of the LTV.
b. The Lead Through.
(1) Initial Rendezvous/Rendezvous Area. A geographical rendezvous area (ideally circular

with a radius of 2 nm) should be established well offset from the channel/gap entrance. The actual loca-
tion and shape of the rendezvous area depend on various factors, such as time available, tactical situa-
tions, topography, and environmental conditions. Any information in addition to that exchanged prior to
the leadthrough. listed in the Transit Instructions message should be
(2) Establishing Rendezvous.
(a) Action to be taken by LTV.
i. Be in rendezvous area during rendezvous period/alternate rendezvous period.
ii. Keep watch on UWT, UHF, and VHF every 15 minutes.
iii. Cavitate for 3 to 5 minutes in rendezvous period.
iv. If necessary, after communications are established, pass to the submarine additional
information/orders, and any alterations to the original plan, with reference to the Transit Instruc-
tions message.
v. When the submarine reports In station, proceed at speed previously ordered.
NOTE
The LTV should endeavor by all suitable means to assist the submarine during the difficult
identification phase.
(b) Action to be taken by the submarine.
i. Approach rendezvous area.
ii. Identify LTV by appropriate means.
13-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
iii. Establish communication with the LTV on UWT/UHF using authentication.
iv. Take station astern of the LTV.
v. Inform the LTV whether it will transit submerged, at periscope depth, or surfaced.
vi. Comply with transit instructions received.
vii. Report when In station.
viii. Action to be taken on failure to rendezvous. OTC of MCM forces to report to

OPCON/ SUBOPAUTH.
(3) Responsibilities During Transit.
(a) Responsibilities of LTV.
i. Provide the submarine with up-to-date information:
- When it enters/leaves the swept
- On altering course and/or speed.
- If there is any change to previous instructions.
- Action to be taken in the event of attack.
ii. Provide the submarine with an up-to-date position:
- When it leaves the channel/gap/safety lane.
- When it is released.
iii. Assist the submarine in maintaining station, using all suitable means, such as:
- Showing a dimmed stern light and top light at night.
- Using a danrunner (Situation ONE/TWO) as UWT relay station in order to assist the
submarine in measuring the distance to the LTV, if the latter is unable to keep distance.
iv. Report accomplishment of mission to SUBOPAUTH by OPCON.
(b) Responsibilities of the Submarine.
i. Maintain station ordered.
ii. Inform the LTV whether its intention is to transit surfaced, at periscope depth, or sub-
merged during the passage, if different from previous intentions.
c. Independent Transit. The tactical situation or the non-availability of LTVs may force a
submarine to transit a well-marked channel or a mine free gap (Situation ONE) without a LTV. The
SUBOPAUTH will order such independent transits of a submarine.
13-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(1) Responsibilities of the SUBOPAUTH.
(a) Transmit Transit Instructions message to submarine in due time.
(b) Ensure own forces are informed about submarine movement.
(2) Responsibilities of Submarine.
(a) Act in accordance with safety measures and procedures prescribed in this chapter.
(b) Request activation of navigational lights in accordance with AHP 3, if feasible.
(c) Report ETA channel/gap entrance if possible.
d. Submarine Capabilities in Lead Through Operations.
(1) Submerged State.
(a) The submarine is capable of:
i. Taking a bearing on the LTV:
- By hydrophone array.
- By mine detection sonar.
ii. Measuring the distance of the LTV:
- By angle measuring using hydrophone array. The distance between the submarine
and the LTV is calculated by measuring the angle between danrunner and LTV; e.g., if the
distance ordered is 300 yards, this angle is to be 70 at a distance of 900 yards between
danrunner and LTV. (See Figure 13-3.)
- By mine detection sonar.
(2) Periscope Depth. The submarine can:
(a) Take a bearing on the LTV by:
i. Hydrophone array.
ii. Mine detection sonar.
iii. Radar.
iv. Periscope.
(b) Measure the distance of the LTV by:
i. Angle measuring by hydrophone array as shown above.
ii. Mine detection sonar.
13-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
DANRUNNER LEAD VESSEL
DATUM BUOY
OR SUBMARINE
DAN BUOY
DATUM LINE CENTER LINE
Figure 13-3. (NU) (NMM) Measuring the Distance of the Lead Vessel
iii. Radar.
iv. Periscope.
(3) Surfaced State. The submarine can:
(a) Take a bearing on the LTV by:
i. Hydrophone array.
ii. Radar.
iii. Visual means.
(b) Measure the distance of the LTV by:
i. Angle measuring by hydrophone array as shown above.
ii. Radar.
iii. Visual means.
(4) Communications.
(a) The submarine will use:
i. UWT as the primary communication system.
ii. UHF as ordered.
(b) In case of interference with UWT traffic by the wake of the LTV, the danrunner has to be
used as relay station. If this is not possible, switch to UHF frequency.
13-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
13062 EVACUATION OF ANCHORAGES
a. Passive and Active Mine Countermeasures. The passive and active mine
countermeasures to protect merchant and naval ships from the danger of mines in anchorages, and
measures to move those units to safe waters, are covered by the term, evacuation.
b. Passive Mine Countermeasures. Ships caught in an anchorage by an enemy surprise

mining campaign should remain there until further orders, initiating passive mine countermeasures
immediately.
c. Anchorage Standing Orders. All units will receive Anchorage Standing Orders (in
accordance with Chapter 4 of ATP 6, Vol. I), for information about procedures in a mined area.
d. OPCON Authority. The OPCON authority will detach MCMVs, if available, to conduct
active mine countermeasures, preferably:
(1) Clearance diving in the vicinity of ships at anchor.
(2) Minehunting in link routes, exit channels, and close to ships at anchor.
(3) Minesweeping in channels where they are not endangering units at anchor.
e. No MCM Vessels Available. If no MCMVs are available, the OPCON authority will signal
further intentions.
13063 REPORTING MINE EXPLOSIONS/DETECTIONS
Every ship detonating a mine or detecting a moored mine or a drifting mine case, whether damaged
or not, shall make a mine detection report (MW signal, (see ATP 1 vol II) to the OPCON authority
informing the OTC of the MCM force if in contact with that force. If doubt exists as to which unit activated
a particular mine, the nearest ship is to report. The report does not substitute for any other report requested.
(NR) (NMM) A structured mine detection report (MINEDETREP message format) can be found in
APP 4.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CHAPTER 14
Defense Against Underwater

Attack in Harbor
14000 INTRODUCTION
In times of tension, as well as in war, ships at anchor or at berths are liable to clandestine attack. Such
attack may take various forms (e.g., underwater swimmers or floating mines). It is important that provision
be made within a force, as well as in individual ships, for an organization to coordinate defense and
establish degrees of readiness against this threat. Command responsibilities are in Chapter 1. All
operations involving divers, including bottom search operations, must be conducted in accordance with
ADivP-1, Allied Guide to Diving Operations.
14010 DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK BY UNDERWATER SWIMMERS
14011 (NR) (NMM) COUNTERMEASURES
The following countermeasures should be taken whenever a threat of attack by underwater

swimmers is deemed to exist:
a. Sentries. Armed sentries (equipped with directional lanterns at night) should be at the bow,
amidships, and at the stern of each ship. They should be briefed to keep a good lookout near the ship’s side,
particularly in the vulnerable area around the propellers and rudders, for swimmers or any suspicious or
unusual activity (e.g., bubbles, flotsam, or local boats passing close).
b. Illumination. Illumination policy should be:
(1) Ships darkened.
(2) Ships anchored clear of shore lights to avoid silhouetting.
(3) Directional lanterns only to be used to investigate suspicious activity.
(4) Underwater illumination only to be used in vulnerable area during a defensive search or when it
is known that an attack is in progress.
(5) Diver-borne lights to be used without restriction during underwater searches.
c. Radar. Radars should be employed and the sea area around the ship should be kept clear of
floating material to minimize false alerts. Tracks should be maintained of all contacts, including friendly
boats patroling the area.
d. Sonar. High-power active sonars should be employed to deter swimmers from closing the ship.
Passive sonars and underwater telephone (UWT) may give warning of approaching swimmers and small craft.
e. Boat Patrols. Boats equipped with portable radio sets and carrying a supply of explosive scare
charges should be used to patrol the area around the ships. Boats should also be fitted with towed
obstructors (e.g., barbed wire, grapnels) to increase the danger to swimmers.
14-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
f. Scare Charges. Charges of approximately 1-pound weight should be dropped from boats and
thrown well clear of the side of ship(s) at irregular intervals. The rate of exploding charges will vary,
depending on degree of threat and size of ship (e.g., destroyer at AWKWARD State 1 approximately 30
charges per hour).
g. Ship’s Propellers. Propellers should be turned ahead or astern at random intervals to hamper
the operations of enemy swimmers.
h. Helicopters. Helicopters are a most effective unit for use in AWKWARD. The OTC should
provide a flight program to cover the three AWKWARD states.
14012 ORGANIZATION
a. Seaward Defense Organization Available. Upon arrival of one or more ships, action to be
taken shall be as follows:
(1) Officer in Charge of the Seaward Defense Organization. He shall provide the arriving
ship(s) with the following material and information if it is not already held by them:
(a) Chart showing fixed targets and facilities in the base (nets and booms, dry docks, and so
forth) and their identification symbols.
(b) Chart showing the defense arrangements and the location of seaward defense weapons and
facilities.
(c) Chart showing berths and anchor berths assigned to each ship.
(d) Charts showing suitable positions for beaching ships.
(e) Chart showing the track of permanent or occasional patrols by Seaward Defense
Organization boats.
(f) Chart showing the location and sectors assigned to the Seaward Defense Organization
lookout stations.
(g) (NC) (NMM) Rules governing the use of anti-swimmer charges.
(h) (NC) (NMM) Communication plan for the Seaward Defense Organization.
(i) (NC) (NMM) Organize a flight program for available helicopters.
(2) Commanding Officer. The commanding officer (the OTC in the case of a group of ships)
shall contact the officer in charge of the Seaward Defense Organization with regard to countermeasures
to be adopted.
(NC) (NMM) In particular:
(a) The use of radar, sonar, and hydrophone by ships.
(b) The times at which scare charges are to be dropped and the number of charges.
(c) The intentions for silent routine.
14-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(d) Search of ship’s bottom and adjacent sea bed by shipborne divers, times of search, and
number of divers employed by each ship. Searches should be conducted at random intervals.
(e) The numbers of boats to be provided by ships for the surveillance of the waters
surrounding them.
(f) The location of ships’s lookout stations and assigned sectors to integrate with the sectors
covered by the stations to the Seaward Defense Organization.
(g) The channels available for quick communications with the Seaward Defense
Organization.
(h) Area lighting conditions and recommendations.
b. Seaward Defense Organization Not Available. The commanding officer of a ship (the
OTC in the case of a group of ships) is responsible for making all necessary arrangements on the same lines
as in paragraph a. to ensure the safety of the ship(s).
14013 (NC) (NMM) STATES OF READINESS
States of readiness which may be ordered either by the OTC of an anchorage or by the operational
commander ashore are shown below:
(These states are used by Operation AWKWARD)
State When Ordered
1 1. Actual evidence of an attack has been obtained (e.g., sight-

ing of swimmers or their bubble tracks).
2. Intelligence reports attack imminent.
2 1. In ports known to contain hostile elements.

2. Intelligence reports attack probable at some unspecified
time
(e.g., not imminent).
3 On all occasions when ships may be subjected to clandestine
attack but which are not covered by States 1 or 2.
14014 (NC) (NMM) ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL SHIPS WHEN OPERATION

AWKWARD IS ORDERED
a. State 3.
(1) Have scare charges readily available.
(2) Assume appropriate degree of damage control readiness.
(3) Retain on board one watch of divers sufficient to carry out a ship’s bottom search.
(4) Rig bottom lines.
14-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) Post sentries as required.
(6) Maintain normal harbor communications.
(7) Darken ship.
(8) Prepare diving safety boat if available.
b. State 2.
(1) Each ship drop scare charges at irregular intervals. (Not more than 10 charges should be
dropped each hour.)
(2) Assume second or third degree of damage control readiness as appropriate.
(3) Retain on board sufficient divers to carry out a ship’s bottom search.
(4) Come to 1 hour’s notice.
(5) Post further sentries.
(6) Rig bottom lines if not already rigged. (Bottom lines are lines passing from one side of the ship
to the other, beneath the hull, for the assistance of divers.)
(7) Send away one boat to carry out irregular patrols in the vicinity of the ship.
(8) Set watch on the main harbor intercommunications net and/or appropriate local communica-
tions net as laid down in local orders. Set visual signaling (V/S) watch.
(9) Darken ship.
(10) Helicopter, if available, airborne to carry out:
(a) Visual search of coastline and breakwaters.
(b) Visual search for swimmers.
(c) Identification of boats.
NOTE
Where underwater illuminations are required by local orders and are known to be effective,
they should be rigged at this stage.
c. State 1.
(1) Commence dropping scare charges, irregularly spaced and at random intervals.
(2) Darken ship.
(3) Assume first degree of damage control readiness.
(4) Send boats on irregular patrols in vicinity of the ship.
14-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
(5) Come to immediate notice.
(6) Ships move propellers slow astern (or ahead if mooring prevents moving astern).
(7) In ships equipped with high-powered sonar, all-around transmissions should be carried out and,
in sets so fitted, range scale and/or pulse length should be changed at random as frequently as possible.
(8) Be ready to commence search of ship’s hull within 5 minutes.
(9) Set watch on main harbor intercommunications net and/or appropriate local communications
net as laid down in local orders. Set visual signaling (V/S) watch.
(10) If there are definite indications of attack on own ship:
(a) Inform all ships.
(b) Stop firing scare charges and cease sonar emissions from own ship prior to divers entering
the water.
(c) Warn all ships to stop firing scare charges within 200 yards of ship being searched and to
stop sonar emissions which may prove dangerous to own divers.
(d) Divers commence bottom search schemes as appropriate.
(e) Request assistance of explosive ordnance disposal team (EODT) or underwater demolition
team (UDT).
NOTE
Charges of explosive weight greater than 1 pound should not be fired within 400 yards of ships
operating divers.
(11) Helicopter, if available, airborne to carry out:
(a) Visual search of coastline and breakwaters.
(b) Visual search for swimmers.
(c) Identification of boats.
14015 — 14019 SPARE
14020 ACTION AFTER ATTACK
In warships, the search for limpet mines is the responsibility of the ships’ own divers. Any limpets
found are to be dealt with by an officer qualified in rendering mines safe if such an officer is available. If no
such officer is available, one of the ship’s officers must undertake this task in accordance with instructions
based on available knowledge of enemy limpet mines. Clearing limpets from the hulls of merchant ships is
the responsibility of EODTs. In either case, speed is essential; every effort is to be made to find and remove
or render safe a limpet mine after it is discovered on any part of the ship as soon as possible. Ships are to
take all appropriate measures to minimize the effect of an explosion should such occur before a limpet can
be removed or rendered safe.

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ANNEX A
List of Acronyms
AAR. Air-to-air refueling
AAW (C&R). Combined AAW coordination and reporting voice circuit
AC. Air coordinator
ACM. Acoustic countermeasures
ACU. Air control unit
AEW. Airborne early warning
APM. Acoustic protective measures
ARCN. Air reporting and control net
AREC. Air resource element coordinator
ARM. Antiradiation missile
AS. Associated support
ASAG. Air surface action group
ASMD. Antiship missile defense
ASSM. Antisurface ship missile
ASW. Antisubmarine warfare
ASWC. Antisubmarine warfare commander
ASWFA. ASW free area
AW. Acoustic warfare
AWNIS. Allied Worldwide Navigation Information System
AWSM. Acoustic warfare support measures
CAP. Combat air patrol
CATAS. Critical angle towed array system
A-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
CEO. Convoy escort oiler
CHOP. Change of operational control
CMA. Contact motion analysis
COMINT. Communications intelligence
COMPLAN. Communication plan
COMSEC. Communications security
CPA. Closest point of approach.
CWC. Composite warfare commander
DF. Direction finding
DLA. Data link address.
DLI. Deck-launched interceptor.
DLRP. Data link reference point
DME. Distance measuring equipment
DS. Direct support
DTAS. Depressed towed array system
EAW. Electronic and acoustic warfare
ECM. Electronic countermeasures
ELINT. Electronic intelligence
EMC. Electromagnetic compatibility
EMCON. Emission control
EMI. Electromagnetic interference
EMSEC. Emission security
EOB. Electronic order of battle
EP. Emission policy
EPM. Electronic protective measures
A-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
ER. Extended range
ESM. Electronic warfare support measures
ESOR. Emergency standoff range
ETA. Estimated time of arrival
ETD. Estimated time of departure
EW. Electronic warfare
EWC. Electronic warfare coordinator
EWCC. Electronic warfare coordination cell
FEZ. Fighter engagement zone
FL. Flight level
FLRP. Fighter link reference point
FNCS. Full naval control of shipping
FTC - A. Force track coordinator (air)
FTC - S. Force track coordinator (surface)
FTC - SS. Force track coordinator (subsurface)
FW. Fixed wing
HAG. Helicopter action group
HEC. Helicopter element coordinator
HOJ. Home-on jam
HRP. Helicopter reference point
HVU. High value unit
ICAO. International Civil Aeronautical Organization
IFM. Instantaneous frequency measurements
IFR. Instrument flight rules
A-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
IMC. Instrument meteorological conditions
INS. Inertial navigation system
IR. Infrared
ISR. Identification safety range
JAAWSC. Joint AAW support and coordination
JTAA. Joint action area
LFAS. Low frequency active sonar
LPI. Low probability of intercept
LRI. Limited range intercept
LTO. Leadthrough operation
LTV. Leadthrough vessel
MACA. Maritime air control authority
MAD. Magnetic anomaly detector
MADVEC. MAD verification run
MATELO. Maritime Air Communications Organization
MCM. Mine countermeasures
MEZ. Missile engagement zone
MHN. Moving haven
MHQ. Maritime headquarters
MIJI. Meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference
MLA. Mean line of advance
MNC. Major NATO commander
MPA. Maritime patrol aircraft
MRR. Minimum risk route
A-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
MTMS. Maritime Tactical Message System
MWC. Mine warfare coordinator
NCS. Naval control of shipping; net control station
NCSO. Naval control of shipping officer
NCSORG. Naval control of shipping organization
NCSRC. Naval control of shipping region commander
NEDB. NATO Emitter Data Base
NLO. Naval liaison officer
NSA. National shipping authority
NSCC. NATO Surveillance Coordination Center
OCA. Operational control authority
OPCON. Operational control
OSOR. Operational standoff range
OSSC. On-scene surveillance coordinator
OTHT. Over-the-horizon targeting
OTSR. Optimum track ship routing
PIM. Position and intended movement
POB. Persons on board
PRF. Pulse repetition frequency
PRI. Prevention of interference
RAS. Replenishment at sea
RNCS. Regional naval control of shipping
ROE. Rules of Engagement
A-5 CHANGE 1
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
RSI. Radiation status indicator
RTC. Reduced tactical COMPLAN
RTF. Return to force
RW. Rotary wing
SAA. Submarine action area
SAAWC. Sector antiair warfare commander
SAC. Scene-of-action commander
SAG. Surface action group
SAM. Surface-to-air missile
SAR. Search and rescue
SAT. Submarine advisory team
SATCOM. Satellite communication
SAU. Search and attack unit
SC. Screen commander
SCP. Shipping control point
SEC. Submarine element coordinator
SGSA. Submarine-generated search area
SIGINT. Signals intelligence
SLOC. Sea line of communication
SLOT. Submarine launched one-way tactical (buoy)
SOA. Speed of advance
SOCA. Submarine operations coordinating authority
SOG. Speed made good over ground
SPA. Submarine patrol area
SRA. Shipping risk area
SSL. Submarine safety lane
A-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
STW. Speed made good over water
SUBOPAUTH. Submarine operating authority
SURTAS. Surveillance towed array system
TACON. Tactical control
TACTAS. Tactical towed array system
TDA. Torpedo danger area
TDS. Tactical display system
TDZ. Torpedo danger zone
TEM. Target engagement message
TF. Task force
TG. Task group
ULLZZ. Ultra-long-leg zigzag
VDS. Variable depth sonar
VECTAC. Vectored attack
VERTREP. Vertical replenishment
VFR. Visual flight rules
VLLZZ. Very-long-leg zigzag
VMC. Visual meteorological conditions
V/S. Visual signaling
VTM. Vessel transiting the minefield
WSM. Water space management
A-7 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
GLOSSARY
Definitions or portions thereof that appear in AAP 6 are indicated by italics.
abeam replenishment. The transfer at sea of personnel and/or supplies by rigs between two or more
ships proceeding side by side.
acknowledgment. A message from the addressee informing the originator that his communication
has been received and understood.
acoustic countermeasures (ACM). That division of AW involving actions taken to prevent or re-
duce an enemy’s effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. ACM involve intentional
underwater acoustic emissions for deception or jamming.
acoustic protective measures (APM). That division of AW involving actions taken to ensure
friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s use of
acoustic energy. APM involve anti-AWSM and anti-ACM, and may not involve underwa-
ter acoustic emissions.
acoustic warfare (AW). Military action to use the underwater acoustic spectrum to the advantage
of friendly forces by exploiting enemy emissions and controlling friendly emissions.
acoustic warfare support measures (AWSM). That division of AW involving actions to search
for, intercept, and identify radiated underwater acoustic energy for the purpose of exploiting
such radiations. The use of AWSM involves no intentional underwater acoustic emissions and is
generally not detectable by the enemy.
action. The employment of one or more weapon systems to counter a threat.
active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as necessary, to ensure
effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
active mine countermeasures. Countermeasures directed toward the destruction of mines after
they have been laid — including minesweeping, mine hunting, and explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) operations.
advance. The distance gained by a ship in the direction of the original course while turning.
airborne alert. A state of aircraft readiness wherein combat-equipped aircraft are airborne and
ready for immediate reaction.
airborne early warning (AEW). Air surveillance provided by AEW aircraft equipped with search
and height-finding radar and communications equipment.
air controller. An individual especially trained for and assigned the duty of the control (by use of radio,
radar, and other means) of such aircraft as may be allotted to him for operation within his area.
air corridors. Restricted air routes of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for
the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces.
Glossary-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
aircraft control unit. A unit with facilities and personnel, including controllers, for conducting air-
craft control and which exercises tactical control of aircraft or a unit(s).
aircraft section. The basic air tactical unit consisting of two aircraft of the same type.
aircraft squadron. An administrative or tactical organization normally but not necessarily com-
posed of aircraft of the same type.
air pickets. AEW aircraft positioned primarily to detect, report, and track approaching enemy air-
craft or missiles and to control intercepts.
air resource element coordinator (AREC). The officer who is assigned responsibility for co-
ordinating the employment of organic air assets other than those assigned to the helicopter
element coordinator.
air surface action group (ASAG). A unit comprised of two or more aircraft of the same type
assigned to counter a particular surface threat (when only helicopters are used, it is known
as a HAG).
air surface zones. Restricted areas established for the purpose of preventing friendly surface ships
and aircraft from being fired upon by friendly forces and for permitting antisubmarine opera-
tions, unrestricted by the operation of friendly submarines.
air-to-air refueling (AAR) towline. The line along which a tanker aircraft will be stationed for the
purpose of refueling combat aircraft.
airway. A control area or portion thereof established in the form of a corridor marked with radio
navigational aids.
alert state. The maximum time in minutes required to bring an aircraft or weapons system (or part of
it) to immediate availability.
alongside replenishment. (See abeam replenishment.)
altitude. The vertical distance of a level, a point, or an object considered as a point, measured from
mean sea level.
antiair warfare area. An area prescribed by the OTC which is kept under constant surveillance and
within which any air threat is opposed.
antiair warfare axis. A reference line extending from force center (ZZ) in the direction of a proba-
ble air threat (or North, when the direction of the threat is indeterminate).
antisubmarine action. An operation by one or more ASW units against a particular enemy submarine.
antisubmarine patrol. The systematic and continuing investigation of an area or along a line to de-
tect or hamper submarines, used when the direction of submarine movement can be established.
antisubmarine search. The systematic investigation of a particular area for the purpose of locat-
ing a submarine known or suspected to be somewhere in the area.
Glossary-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC). The officer delegated some or all of the OTC’s
detailed responsibilities for antisubmarine warfare, and granted the tactical control authority to
accomplish the associated missions and tasked to carry out those responsibilities. In ASW opera-
tions with SSN(DS) in the direct support role, the ASWC is that officer who has tactical control
of the ASW assets, including the SSN(DS).
antisurface ship missile (ASSM). Any missile (ASM, SASS, SSM, USM) used in the role of
attacking surface units.
approach corridor. A safety corridor established for direct return of friendly aircraft through the
vital area, including missile engagement zones if necessary.
approach sector. A safety sector more flexible than an approach corridor established for direct re-
turn of friendly aircraft through the vital area, including missile engagement zones if necessary,
and normally designated in conjunction with the stationing in the sector of a tacan-equipped
approach control picket.
area operations. In maritime usage, operations conducted in a geographical area, not related to
the protection of a specific force.
armed mine. A mine ready to receive a target signal, influence or contact.
associated support. Operations in which a designated unit operates independently of a specified

task force/group, but is tasked to provide contact information to, receive intelligence from, and
— if authorized — to cooperate and coordinate with the supported force. Tactical control
(TACON) of the unit remains with the assigning authority who coordinates tasking and move-
ment of the unit in response to the requirements of the supported force commander.
ASW free area (ASWFA) (NC) (NMM). An area in which no friendly submarines are operating
and in which there are no restrictions on the use of ASW weapons.
attack carrier air wing. Two or more aircraft squadrons formed under one command for adminis-
tration and tactical control of operations from a carrier.
authentication. A security measure designed to protect a communication system against fraudulent

transmissions.
authority. The person vested with the power to make decisions and issue orders; also, the individual
power to make decisions and issue relative orders imposing those decisions — such power may
be limited in scope, time, and location. Authority automatically confers the responsibility to
carry out assigned tasks and report results to the assigning authority.
axis. A reference line originating at formation or disposition center used for stationing units or for-
mations respectively.
azimuth angle. An angle measured clockwise in the horizontal plane between a reference direction
and any other line.
barrier combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter aircraft employed between a force and an objective
area as a barrier across the probable direction of enemy attack. Used as far from the force as con-
trol conditions permit, to give added protection against raids along the most direct approach routes.
Glossary-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
barrier line. The line formed by a series of static devices or mobile units arranged for the purpose of
detecting, denying passage to, or destroying enemy submarines.
base course. A reference course or direction desired to be made good when evasive steering is be-
ing carried out.
base speed. The speed resulting along the base course when evasive steering is being carried out.
bearing. The horizontal angle at a given point measured clockwise from a specific reference datum
to a specified direction.
blind bombing zone. A restricted area (air, land, or sea) established for the purpose of permitting
air operations unrestricted by the operations or possible attack of friendly forces.
bomb lines. Lines designated over land areas by ground forces which can be identified easily by ter-
rain features in order to delimit attacks by friendly aircraft.
brevity code. A code which provides no security but which has as its sole purpose the shortening of
messages rather than the concealment of content.
BULLPEN (NC) (NMM). Code word for a submarine-generated search area (SGSA). See definition
for SGSA.
cardinal points. The directions North, South, East, and West.
carrier air group. Two or more aircraft squadrons formed under one command for administrative
and tactical control of operations from a carrier.
cavitation speed. The speed for an individual ship at which propeller blade cavitation is the pre-
dominant factor in the ship’s acoustic signature.
CCG. The grid (Cartesian coordinate) used for rapid reporting of position in a form compatible with
ADP systems (see Chapter 2 for detailed description).
chaff. Chaff is a general term denoting the employment of light, ribbon-like pieces of radar reflective
material designed to be laid by aircraft or fired from shells or rockets.
chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate

through which command is exercised. The chain of command establishes the interdependencies
which exist at various levels between the superior and his subordinates. Command functions
may be exercised at any one of these levels. The organization (task or type) adopted for the
forces employed automatically defines the chain of command.
chainsaw. A two-phase AAW tactic designed to provide threat detection and engagement at ex-
tended ranges from the Battle Group.
change of operational control (CHOP). The date and time (Greenwich Mean Time/Greenwich
Civil Time) at which the responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one
operational control authority to another.
Glossary-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
check point (aircraft). A geographical location on land or water above which the position of an
aircraft in flight may be determined by observation or by electronic means.
check-sum digits. The summation of the numbers in positions, courses, speeds, and times to avoid
confusion caused by errors in transmission of RATT signals.
circular disposition. A tactical arrangement of two or more formations stationed on concentric cir-
cles and oriented clockwise from a disposition axis.
circular formation. A tactical arrangement of units stationed on concentric circles and oriented
clockwise from a formation axis to provide flexibility of maneuver while at the same time retain-
ing protection from air and subsurface threats.
close ASW action (NC) (NMM). An action in which one or more ASW units attempt to engage an
enemy submarine within 8,000 yards.
code word. A word which has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard
intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation.
column. A line in which ships form directly ahead or astern of the line guide.
combat air patrol (CAP). An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, over the force pro-
tected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense area for the purpose of in-
tercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target.
command. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination,
and control of military forces.
command system. The command system is formed by the chain of command and includes the
means necessary to distribute orders and collect, evaluate, and disseminate information.
communications intelligence (COMINT). Technical material and intelligence information de-

rived from electgromagnetic communications and communications systems (e.g., Morse, voice,
teleprinter, facsimile) by other than intended recipients.
composite warfare commander (CWC). That officer to whom the officer in tactical command
has assigned some or all of his authority and responsibilities for the overall direction and control
of the defense of his force.
confusion. Measures taken to make an enemy’s target identification and selection more difficult.
consolidation. The transfer of all types of cargo between replenishment ships to enable some of
them to be emptied so that they can return to base or reload.
contact lost. A target-tracking term used to signify that a target believed to be still within the area
of visual, sonar, or radar coverage is temporarily lost but the termination of track plotting is not
warranted.
contact mine. A mine detonated by physical contact.
contact report. A report of visual, acoustic, electronic, or electro-optical contact with the enemy.
Control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the
activities of subordinate or other organizations.
Glossary-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
control point (aircraft). A position usually marked by an identifiable object which is given a name
or number and used as an aid to navigation or control of aircraft.
control ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that controls the operation.
convergence zone. The annular zone, which occurs in the deep ocean, where spread sound rays re-
fracted from the depths arrive concentrated near the surface. The repeated occurrence of these
zones as concentric annuli to several hundred miles from the sound source depends on the re-
fraction of sound rays at depth and the reflection of these rays at the surface.
convoy. A number of merchant ships or naval auxiliaries, or both, usually escorted by warships
and/or aircraft, or a single merchant ship or naval auxiliary under surface escort, assembled
and organized for the purpose of passage together.
convoy escort. Naval vessel as or aircraft in company with a convoy and responsible for its protection.
convoy route. The specific route assigned to a convoy by the appropriate routing authority.
coordination. The establishment in operations, according to a changing situation, of an orderly cor-

relation in time and place of planned actions in order to achieve the best overall result. In the
maritime environment, the term coordination may include certain specified control functions.
course made good over the ground (COG). The direction in which a ship has proceeded, mea-
sured between two geographic positions.
course made good through the water (CTW). The direction in which the ship is proceeding, re-
sulting from the effect of weather but not the effect of current or tidal stream on the signaled or
base course.
critical angle towed-array system (CATAS). A towed-array system whose depth is dependent
upon towing ship speed and the length and weight of the towing cable only.
cross-over zone. The airspace between a MEZ and a FEZ to separate the two for AAW and air co-
ordination purposes.
customer ship. A ship in a replenishment unit that receives the transferred personnel and/or materiel.
damage control. In naval usage, measures necessary aboard ship to preserve and reestablish wa-
tertight integrity, stability, maneuverability, and offensive power; to control list and trim; to ef-
fect rapid repairs of materiel; to limit the spread of, and provide adequate protection from, fire;
to limit the spread of, remove the contamination by, and provide adequate protection from, toxic
agents; and to provide for care of wounded personnel.
data link. A communication link suitable for transmission of data.
data link reference point (DLRP). A geographic reference position representing the origin of a
Cartesian coordinate system in which track positions are reported within a force.
datum. The last known position of a submarine or suspected submarine after contact has been lost.
datum designator. The alphanumeric or four-figure octal group assigned to a datum for identifica-
tion purposes.
Glossary-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
datum error. An estimate of the degree of accuracy in the reported position of datum.
datum time. The time when contact with a submarine or suspected submarine was lost.
deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsifica-
tion of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
deck alert. An aircraft alert state expressing the time in minutes required for a specified number and
type of aircraft to become airborne after the order to launch has been given.
defense in depth. The stationing of mutually supporting units or formations designed to absorb and
progressively weaken an attack, prevent initial observations of the whole formation or disposi-
tion by the enemy, and allow the OTC to maneuver to oppose the threat.
degree of readiness. The amount of operational capability of a unit which is currently available.
delegation of authority. The action by which a commander assigns part of his authority commen-
surate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. While ultimately responsibility cannot
be relinquished, delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsi-
bility. The extent of authority delegated must be clearly stated.
deliberate attack. In ASW, an attack delivered with maximum accuracy against an enemy subma-
rine when the tactical situation allows time to obtain accurate attack data.
delivering ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that delivers the rig(s).
departure point (aircraft). A navigational check point used by aircraft as a marker for setting course.
depressed towed array system (DTAS). A towed-array system which is taken to desired depth
by a towed body or depressor.
detaching. The forming temporarily of a unit from the units of a force for a specific purpose, or the
separation of a unit from the main body for duty elsewhere.
detection. The discovery of the presence of a contact or contact-related data.
direction. The process of planning, decision making, establishing priorities, formulating policies, and
imposing decisions.
direct support. The support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under the tactical com-
mand of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support operations
required by that unit or formation. A direct support unit operates under the tactical control
(TACON) of a supported force commander. Operational control and tactical command remain
with the assigning authority.
disarmed mine. A mine which has been rendered inoperative by breaking a link in the firing sequence.
dispersion. The spreading of units of a force to reduce vulnerability to enemy action.
disposition. An ordered arrangement of the stations of two or more formations proceeding together
for any purpose, such as cruising, antiair warfare, or replenishment.
disposition axis. A reference line for stationing two or more formations in relation to each other.
Glossary-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
dissemination. The timely distribution of information and/or intelligence in the most suitable form
to those who need it.
distance. The space in yards between ships in a line.
distraction. Measures taken to offer alternative targets to a weapons control or missile homing sys-
tem so that a false target is selected.
diversion. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons. Except in the
case of aircraft, a diversion order will not constitute a change of destination.
division. An administrative or tactical organization of two or more ships, which for tactical purposes,
may be further divided into subdivisions.
drifting mine. A buoyant or neutrally buoyant mine free to move under the influence of waves, wind,
current, or tide.
easting. Eastward (that is left to right) reading of grid values.
echo sweep. An active mode sonar search.
electromagnetic spectrum. The entire and orderly distribution of electromagnetic waves accord-
ing to their frequency or wave length. The electromagnetic spectrum includes radio waves, mi-
crowaves, heat radiation, visible light, ultra-violet radiation, x-rays, electromagnetic cosmic rays
and gamma rays.
electronic countermeasures (ECM). That division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or

reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, through the use of electromag-
netic energy. There are three subdivisions of ECM — electronic jamming, electronic deception,
and electronic neutralization.
electronic deception. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of

electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse, distract, or seduce an enemy or his
electronic systems.
electronic intelligence (ELINT). Technical material and intelligence information derived from
electromagnetic noncommunications transmission (e.g., radar, navigation aids, jamming trans-
missions) by other than intended recipients.
electronic jamming. The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy,

with the object of impairing the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment, or systems being
used by an enemy.
electronic neutralization. The deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or

permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum.
electronic order of battle (EOB). The EOB is a list of emitters relative to a force or scenario with
specific information on electromagnetic characteristics, parameters, and platforms.
electronic protective measures (EPM). That division of EW involving actions taken to ensure
friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of electromag-
netic energy. There are two subdivisions of EPM — active EPM and passive EPM.
Glossary-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
electronic warfare (EW). Electronic warfare (EW) is military action to exploit the electromagnetic
spectrum which encompasses the interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions,
the employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromag-
netic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
electronic warfare support measures (ESM). That division of EW involving action taken to
search for, intercept, and identify electromagnetic emissions and locate their sources for the pur-
pose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate
decisions involving ECM, EPM, and other tactical actions.
EMCON plan. The plan ordered by an OTC to effect his emission policy and implement emission control.
emergency signals. A means of promulgating a threat requiring an expeditious or immediate ac-

tion as a result of either a subjective tactical decision or an automatic response, thereby sacrific-
ing some measure of evaluation.
emission control (EMCON). Selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy. The
aim can be two-fold: (a) To minimize the enemy’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the
information so gained; or (b) To reduce electromagnetic interference, thereby improving sensor
performance.
emission policy (EP). The policy which states what electromagnetic and acoustic emissions may
be allowed.
endurance. The time an aircraft can continue flying or a ship can continue operating under speci-
fied conditions; e.g., without refueling.
endurance distance. Total distance that a ship can be self-propelled at any specified
endurance speed.
endurance speed. The nautical miles per hour a ship will travel through the water under average
conditions of hull, sea in temperate weather, and wartime readiness. Endurance speeds in each
case will correspond with specific engine speeds.
escape course. Ships steer 90° away from fallout axis at maximum speed in order to leave the fall-
out hazard area before fallout arrival.
escort. A combatant unit or units assigned to accompany and protect another force; aircraft as-
signed to protect another aircraft during a mission.
estimated time of arrival (ETA). The time of arrival at the entrance to the harbor (passing break-
waters), or, when point X is established, the time of arrival at point X. For aircraft, it is the time
of arrival from an airfield, target, CAP station, and so forth.
estimated time of departure (ETD). The time of passing the entrance to the harbor (passing
breakwaters), or, when point A is established, the time of passing point A. For aircraft, it is the
time of departure from an airfield, target, CPA station, and so forth.
evaluation. The appraisal of threat information to determine the type and degree of threat.
evasion. A change in the planned route or speed (but not the destination) of a force, convoy, or inde-
pendent, usually ordered by the OTC for tactical reasons.
Glossary-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
evasion course. When a ship is too close to the actual area of deposition and escape course is not
always the safest solution.
1. Ship’s speed is greater than effective downwind speed, ship steers away from fallout axis,
and maintains actual distance to area of fallout deposition; therefore, the relative course of the
ship should be 90º away from fallout axis.
2. Ship’s speed is less than effective downwind speed, ship steers to be as far away as possible
from fallout axis, whenever the outer (forward) limit of fallout deposition arrives at the ship’s
position.
extended maneuvering interval. The standard maneuvering interval, plus 500 yards, unless oth-
erwise ordered, to allow for station-keeping errors.
fighter engagement zone (FEZ). The airspace beyond the cross-over zone out to limits as defined
by the OTC, taking into account the fighter’s combat radius and effective weapon range.
final diameter. The diameter of the circle that would ultimately be described by a ship turning
through 360º with a constant rudder angle.
fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based activities all under the com-
mand of a commander or a commander-in-chief who may exercise operational as well as admin-
istrative control.
fleet air wing. An administrative or tactical organization consisting of two or more squadrons of aircraft.
flex deck. CV operation where unscheduled, continuous launch and recovery of aircraft is made possible.
flight. Any number of aircraft, regardless of type (fixed-wing or helicopter), proceeding in company
on a common mission or to the same destination.
flight levels. Surfaces of constant atmospheric pressure which are related to a specific pressure da-
tum, 1013.2 mb (29.92 in), and are separated by specific pressure intervals. (Flight levels are ex-
pressed in three digits that represent hundreds of feet; e.g., flight level 250 represents a
barometric altimeter indication of 25,000 feet and flight level 255 is an indication of 25,500 feet.)
flight operations course and speed. The course and speed used by a ship when launching or re-
covering aircraft.
flotilla. An administrative or tactical organization consisting of two or more squadrons together with
such additional ships as may be assigned as flagships or tenders.
force. A general term for the ships and aircraft under the orders of an OTC, including friendly direct
support submarines.
force combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter aircraft maintained over the task force to destroy hos-
tile aircraft or missiles which threaten the force.
formation. An ordered arrangement of two or more ships, units, or aircraft proceeding together.
formation axis. A reference line for stationing ships of a formation, or the axis of the main body or
convoy, in a formation consisting of a main body or convoy and escorts.
Glossary-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
formation center. A position designated by the OTC as the center of a formation, normally the geo-
metric center; station zero in a circular formation; also, the point of origin of a formation axis.
formation guide. A ship in a formation on which the units in the formation take and keep station.
forward bomb (safe) lines. Bomb lines prescribed by a troop commander beyond which he con-
siders that bombing need not be coordinated with his own forces.
full command. The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to sub-
ordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within
national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of author-
ity than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full
command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to
NATO, assign only operational command or operational control.
Full Naval Control of Shipping (FNCS). Mandatory control of shipping on a world-wide basis
for all, or specific categories of, Allied merchant shipping.
furthest-on-circle. An expanding circle centered on a datum or search center of which the radius at
any one time is a command estimate of maximum submarine travel from datum plus datum error.
GRASSHOPPER. A procedure to allow a transiting surface force, at short notice, the maximum
freedom for the use of ASW weapons.
grid. Two sets of parallel lines intersecting at right angles and forming squares which are applied to
maps or charts to permit identification of surface locations with respect to other locations and com-
putation of direction and distance between points.
grid lock. The procedure in the CCG system that is employed to reduce errors in reporting caused by
errors in the estimated position of the reporting unit.
grid origin. The center of the grid in the CCG system from which X and Y coordinates originate; it
is based on a geographic reference position.
grid shift. The procedure in the CCG system that is employed to relocate the grid origin to another
geographic reference position.
guardship. A ship detailed for a specific duty for the purpose of enabling other ships in company to
assume a lower degree of readiness.
Guide. A ship on which other ships take station when forming up or keep station when formed; usu-
ally, the ship on which all units of a formation (or all formation guides of a disposition) take and
keep station. Also see ATP 1, Vol. II, for further details.
handover (aircraft). The process of transferring control of aircraft from one controlling authority to
another.
hard kill. In ASMD hard-kill measures are those which directly damage a missile by impact.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
height. The vertical distance of a level, a point, or an object considered as a point, measured from a
specific datum.
helicopter action group (HAG). A unit comprised of two or more helicopters which are assigned
to counter a particular surface threat.
helicopter element coordinator (HEC). The officer who is assigned responsibility for the coordi-
nation of employment of organic helicopters other than those retained by the AREC.
helicopter windline screen. A helicopter screen provided for a carrier temporarily during flight
operations, relative to the carrier’s track into the wind.
high probability intercept equipment. An intercept receiver which will detect any transmission
which illuminates its antenna, within the wide frequency band it is designed to cover, as soon as
that transmission is made within a certain limiting range.
HOVERTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping helicopter on its own target while maintaining
sonar contact.
identification. The assignment of one of the six standard identities, based upon available data and
the determined identification criteria.
identification criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to determine which
standard identity can be assigned to a detected contact based on the available localization and
recognition data.
identification/recognition. The determination by any means of the friendly or enemy character or

of the individuality of another, or of objects such as aircraft and ships, or of phenomena such as
communications-electronics patterns.
identification safety range (ISR). The minimum range to which an aircraft may close an assumed
friendly force without having been positively identified to ensure that the force does not mistake
the aircraft for enemy.
identify. The process of determining identity by either recognition or identification/recognition.
identity. The friendly or hostile character or individuality of a contact.
independent. A merchant ship under naval control sailed singly and unescorted by a warship.
influence mine. A mine actuated by the effect of a target or some physical condition in the vicinity
of the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine.
initial point. A well-defined point, easily distinguishable visually and/or electronically, used as a
starting point for the run to the target; a pre-selected point on the surface of the earth which is
used as a reference.
inner defense zone (IDZ). A circle around each CV used to coordinate fighter and missile
engagements.
inner defense zone coordinator (IDZC). The TDS tasked to coordinate fighter and missile
engagements within the IDZ.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
intercepting search. A type of search designed to intercept an enemy whose previous position is
known and the limits of whose subsequent course and speed can be assumed.
joining (aircraft). The procedure whereby an aircraft commander transfers tactical control of his air-
craft to the OTC.
joining (ships). A ship or group of ships which have sailed independently and subsequently rendez-
vous with a main body or convoy.
joint action area (JTAA) (NC) (NMM). An area in which a single friendly submarine is operating
in coordination with air and/or surface forces. Air and surface ASW weapon employment is pro-
hibited throughout the JTAA unless a NOTACK area or a submarine-generated search area
(SGSA) has been established.
Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). A listing of frequencies which map the use of the EM
spectrum within the area of responsibility. The JRL is composed of Taboo, Protected, and
Guarded Frequencies.
joint zone. An air and sea area in which friendly air, surface, and subsurface forces operate
simultaneously.
lame duck. An aircraft in a minor state of emergency resulting from ordnance or radio failure, oxy-
gen leak, or other cause.
large ship. A ship over 450 feet (or 137 meters) in length.
leaver. A section of the main convoy or an independent ship which breaks off to proceed separately
to its own prearranged terminal port.
line. A formation in which ships are formed along a straight line extending in any direction from the
line guide but not directly ahead or astern.
line abreast. A line in which ships form directly abeam of the line guide.
line guide. When ships are formed in a multiple line formation, the line guide is the ship occupying
the station in her own line that corresponds to that of the Guide in the Guide’s line, or, within
any line in which no ship occupies the corresponding station, the ship designated by the OTC.
line of bearing. A line in which ships form in a straight line on a line guide in any direction except
ahead, astern, or abeam.
link (communications). A general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities
between two points.
localization. The determination of positional information and the movements of a contact.
loose line abreast. A formation in which ships stay within 15º of the Guide or ship indicated rela-
tive to the base course.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
loose line of bearing. A line of bearing assumed on the basis of either a true or relative line of
bearing in which ships stay within 15º of the bearing or its reciprocal.
loose line of column. An approximate line of bearing within 15º of column in which distance may
be increased to reduce yawing.
low-probability intercept equipment. An intercept receiver which employs directional antennas

and/or variable frequency and which will not detect a transmission unless frequency, direction,
and polarization are in correct coincidence with the victim at the instant of transmission.
magnetic anomaly detector (MAD). A device which detects the presence of magnetic materials
by recording the distortions they produce in the normal magnetic field of the earth.
MAD verification run (MADVEC) (NC) (NMM). A procedure in which aircraft are vectored by in-
formation on radar methods to carry out MAD verification of a contact to assist in classification.
main body. Any group of warships and naval auxiliaries, or a single ship escorted by warships
and/or aircraft, and not designated a convoy.
maneuvering interval. When similar ships are formed in a multiple line formation, maneuvering
interval is the sum of the standard distances in the longest line, plus one standard distance; with
dissimilar ships, it is the sum of the standard distances in the longest line, plus the longest stan-
dard distance in any line, including the only ship in a line if the standard distance for that ship is
larger than that of any other ship present.
material torpedo countermeasures. Noise reduction methods, decoys, noisemakers, jammers,

degaussing equipment, and so forth, designed to reduce the effectiveness of torpedoes once they
have been fired.
maximum effective range. The maximum distance at which a weapon may be expected to fire ac-
curately to achieve the desired result.
maximum sonar speed. The maximum speed at which an individual ship can proceed without un-
acceptably degrading its sonar performance.
maximum speed. The highest speed at which a ship is capable of proceeding when using full power.
MEADOW. A static submarine haven effective only during the period, and in the area, that Operation
GRASSHOPPER is in effect.
mercantile convoy. A convoy consisting of merchant ships controlled by the Naval Control of
Shipping Organization (NCSO).
military convoy. A convoy consisting of merchant ships and/or auxiliaries/other military units. It is
constituted for special purposes. It is controlled and reported as a military unit.
mine hunting. Techniques for countering mines by mine hunters, based on determining the positions
of individual mines and concentrating countermeasures on those positions (includes mine loca-
tion and disposal).
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
minesweeping. Techniques for countering mines by minesweepers using mechanical or explosive

gear which physically removes or destroys the mine, or by producing in the area the influence
field that is necessary to activate it.
missile danger zone. The area which the submarine must enter in order to be within maximum ef-
fective firing range of its missiles.
missile engagement zone (MEZ). The airspace around a SAM ship in which missiles may be
given freedom of operation.
moving haven (MHN). A moving area of specified dimensions established about a submarine or
surface ship, extending about the ordered position along the track, and which is designated for
use in transit by the unit to prevent attack by friendly forces in wartime and to prevent or mini-
mize submerged interference among friendly forces in peacetime.
net (communications). An organization of stations capable of direct communication on a common

channel or frequency.
normal speed. The speed at which ships are to proceed if a signaled speed has not been ordered.
Northing. Northward, that is, from bottom to top, reading of grid values on a map.
NOTACK area (NC) (NMM). A small area established by the submarine within the JTAA to allow
friendly forces to prosecute a submarine contact within the remainder of the JTAA while contin-
uing to provide protection to the submarine.
notice. The alert state in hours for a ship’s propulsion system.
officer in tactical command (OTC). The senior officer present eligible to assume command or the
officer to whom he has delegated tactical command. When a task organization is established, the
senior commander present of that organization becomes OTC unless otherwise ordered. When a
task organization has not been established and the higher authority has not selected the OTC, the
senior officer present eligible to command will act as OTC.
oiler. A naval or merchant tanker specially equipped and rigged for replenishing other ships at sea.
operational command. The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to sub-
ordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational
and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not, of itself, include responsibility
for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
operational control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned
so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by
function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of
those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the
units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
operational control authority (naval) (OCA). The naval commander responsible within a speci-
fied geographical area for the naval control of all merchant shipping under Allied naval control.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
operational speed. The highest speed at which ships will be required to proceed during a particular
operation or during a stated period.
operation order. A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders

for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
optimum sonar speed. The speed for an individual surface ship at which, over a period, it can
achieve a maximum swept area with its sonar in the prevailing environmental conditions.
order. A communication, written, or oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to
a subordinate.
outer defense zone (ODZ). An area encompassing the AAW surveillance area outside the IDZ to a
range equivalent to the maximum sensor range of assets stationed outside the IDZ.
outer defense zone coordinator (ODZC). Unit tasked to coordinate the outer air battle and all
CAP entering the ODZ. The ODZC is normally an AEW aircraft.
overlay. A printing or drawing on a transparent or semi-transparent medium at the same scale as a

map or chart, etc., to show details not appearing or requiring special emphasis on the original.
passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical features of equip-
ment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
passive mine countermeasures. Measures intended to localize the threat, locate the minefield,
and reduce the risk to shipping. These measures are not concerned with the physical destruction
of mines.
patrol. A detachment of units sent out for the purpose of gathering information or the systematic and
continuing investigation along a line to detect or hamper enemy movements.
picket. A unit operating outside the outer limits of screen sectors and under the tactical control of the
OTC (or screen coordinator if delegated); it is stationed in a designated position with reference
to the appropriate axis, or in a geographic position for a specific purpose, such as air warning.
picture compilation. All actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot.
pivot column. The wing column toward which the wheel is being made.
pivot ship. The wing ship in the line on the side toward which a wheel is being made.
point A (NC) (NMM). A reference point near the harbor mouth at the inshore end of a swept channel.
point O (NC) (NMM). A reference point to seaward of point X at which the cruising formation forms
or breaks up.
point X (NC) (NMM). A reference point at the seaward end of a swept channel, or when there is no
swept channel, at a point selected by the local authority.
point Y (NC) (NMM). A location to seaward of point O (seaward of a swept channel), along the voy-
age course, at which large dispositions can form or break up when there is insufficient area at
point O.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
position and intended movement (PIM). A reference position established by the OTC at a given
time and a forecast of the course(s) and speed(s) expected to be made good over the ground.
precedence. A designation assigned a message by the originator to indicate to communication per-

sonnel the relative order of handling and to the addressee the order in which the message is to
be noted.
prevention of mutual interference.

1. Procedures to prevent interference between active or between active and passive electromag-
netic or acoustic sensors of friendly forces.
2. In submarine operations, a system of procedures to prevent, on the one hand, submerged col-
lisions between friendly submarines, between submerged submarines and friendly ship towed
bodies, or between submerged submarines and any other underwater object, and, on the other
hand, interference with any underwater event.
probe. Any aircraft which carries out the visual identification of a specific target which has previ-
ously been located by another means.
prudent limit of endurance. The time during which an aircraft can remain airborne and still
retain a given safety margin of fuel.
QQ. The standard position in the force for the center of the front of the main body or convoy when
not in circular formation.
radar. Radio detection and ranging equipment that determines the distance and usually the direction
of objects by transmission and return of electromagnetic energy.
radar coverage. The limits within which objects can be detected by one or more radar stations.
radar picket. Any ship or aircraft stationed at a distance from the force protected, for the purpose of
increasing the radar detection range.
radar silence. An imposed discipline prohibiting the transmission by radar of electromagnetic sig-
nals on some or all frequencies.
radio silence. A period during which all or certain radio equipment capable of radiation is kept
inoperative.
range. The distance between any given point and an object or target.
receiving ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that receives the rig(s).
recognition. The determination of certain characteristics of a contact. (See also identification/

recognition.)
recognition confidence level. The degree of probability with which the recognition level is
established.
recognition level. The level to which a contact must be recognized as to platform type, class, or
individuality.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
recognized picture. A compiled plot which satisfies the established criteria: the result of the picture
compilation process.
reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or by other detection meth-

ods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
reference position. The OTC’s promulgated estimate of his navigational position at a given time.
Regional Naval Control of Shipping (RNCS). Naval Control of Shipping measures introduced
within a limited area. RNCS is voluntary unless compulsion is imposed by national authorities or
written into a charter party.
release criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to be satisfied before weapon
employment is authorized.
rendezvous. A pre-arranged meeting at a given time and location from which to begin an action or
phase of an operation, or to which to return after an operation.
replenishment at sea (RAS). Those operations required to make a transfer at sea of personnel
and/or materiel.
replenishment course and speed. The course and speed ordered by the OTC for the replenish-
ment unit’s guide.
replenishment ships. Ships loaded with or supplying certain supplies and services to warships at sea.
replenishment unit. A group of ships consisting of one or more delivering ships with one or more
receiving ships replenishing and ships in waiting and/or lifeguard stations.
rescue combat air patrol. Combat air patrol which provides cover for a search and rescue
operation.
restricted area. An area or airspace of defined dimensions in which there are special restrictive
measures to prevent or minimize interference between friendly forces.
rhumb line. A line on the surface of the earth transecting all meridians at the same angle.
route. The prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination.
safety lanes. Specified sea lanes designated for use in transit by submarines and surface ships in
order to prevent attack by friendly forces.
safety sector. An airspace in the AAW area in which aircraft are safe from attack by friendly fight-
ers, missiles, or self-defense weapons.
safety zone. An area (land, sea, or air) reserved for noncombat operations of friendly aircraft, sur-
face ships, submarines, or ground forces.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
scene of action commander (SAC). The officer who assumes tactical control of assigned units in
a limited area, operating against a specific contact or datum. (Until such time as a SAU is for-
mally detached, the first unit reporting contact by any means (sonar, radar, visual, or ESM) shall
be deemed to be the scene of action commander.)
screen. An arrangement of ships, aircraft, and/or submarines to protect a main body or convoy.
screen center. The point on which screen units are stationed, normally QQ or ZZ.
screen unit. A surface ship, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, or submarine employed in a screen.
search. A systematic investigation of a particular area to establish the presence or the absence of (a)
specific contact(s).
search attack unit (SAU). The designation given to a unit separately organized or dispatched from
a formation to search for and attack submarines.
search axis. The reference bearing on which an ASW search is oriented.
search center. The origin or reference point of an ASW search when established at a point other
than datum.
sector. A defense area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is
responsible.
sector method. The method of stationing units by designating sectors defined by boundaries and
depth limits from screen center.
sector screen. A screen in which individual units are assigned particular sectors of responsibility
according to their sensors and capabilities.
seduction. Measures taken to break or move an enemy weapon control or missile homing system
away from its selected target.
self-identification. The indication by any act or means of your own friendly character or individuality.
self-protection mine countermeasures. All countermeasures, active or passive, taken by ships

underway for their self-protection.
SELFTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping helicopter on its own target after the helicopter has
broken dip.
sensor. An equipment which detects, and may indicate, and/or record objects and activities by means
of energy or particles emitted, reflected, or modified by objects.
separation zone. An area between two adjacent areas into which units are not to proceed unless
certain safety measures can be fulfilled.
sequence number. The number allocated to a ship by a unit commander to indicate its position in
the line.
shadowing. The observation of an enemy unit or force, usually as a sequel to surveillance or recon-
naissance, for the purpose of reporting its composition, location, movement, and any other rele-
vant information.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
shore bombardment lines. Ground lines established to delimit bombardment by friendly

surface ships.
signaled course. The true course which is being or which is to be steered.
signaled speed. The speed in knots at which the Guide has been ordered to proceed.
signals intelligence (SIGINT). The generic term used to describe COMINT and ELINT when
there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent
fusion of the two.
signature. The characteristic pattern of the target displayed by detection and identification equipment.
significant tracks. Tracks of aircraft or missiles which behave in an unusual manner and which
warrant attention since they could pose a threat to the force.
Silent SAM. An AAW tactic that places a long-range SAM ship in a silent posture. The tactical pic-
ture is provided by an AEW aircraft via Link. When directed or when preplanned responses dic-
tate, the Silent SAM ship engages the raid under attack based on Link data.
situation report. A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation.
skeleton screen. A screen in which individual units are assigned stations or patrol lines relative to
the corners or sides of a rectangular main body or convoy.
small ship. A ship of 450 feet (or 137 meters) or less in length.
soft kill. In ASMD soft-kill measures use devices such as ECM, chaff, or decoys to neutralize
the missile.
sonar. An acoustic device used primarily for the detection and location of underwater objects.
sonobuoy. A sonar device used to detect submerged submarines which, when activated, relays infor-
mation by radio. It may by active directional or non-directional, or it may be passive directional
or non-directional.
speed made good over the ground (SOG). The average speed at which a ship has covered the
distance between two geographic positions.
speed made good over the water (STW). The result of the effect of weather but not the effect of
current or tidal stream on the signaled or base speed.
speed of advance (SOA). The speed expected to be made good over the ground along the route.
splash point. The point where a single weapon or the first weapon fired of a pattern should enter the
water to have the highest probability of destroying the target; its location depends on target
course, speed, and depth, and the characteristics of the weapon after it has entered the water.
spreading. The maneuver of moving ships from a compact formation to stations on a search or
patrol line.
squadron. An administrative or tactical organization consisting of two or more divisions of ships,

plus such additional ships as may be assigned as flagships or tenders.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
standard distance. Unless otherwise ordered, 500 yards between small ships in a line and 1,000
yards between a large ship and any other ship, large or small, in a line.
standoff ASW action (NC) (NMM). An action in which one or more ASW units attempt to engage
a submarine outside 8,000 yards.
static havens. Specified sea areas for noncombat operations, including ship and submarine sanctu-
aries announced by theater, fleet, or equivalent commanders and exercise areas reserved for sub-
marine operations and training in noncombat zones.
station. The position ordered by the OTC for a unit of a force when in formation or for a formation
that is part of a disposition.
stationing speed. A speed slower than operational speed, specified for reasons of fuel economy.
steerageway. The slowest speed at which a ship can steer.
straggler. A ship that has separated from its convoy and is either 5 miles from its convoy and unable
to regain before dark, or 10 miles from its convoy whether or not it is able to regain before dark.
STRIKECAP. CAP launched to conduct an attack against an enemy at extended ranges to confuse the
enemy and/or change his attack plans.
subdivision. A tactical organization of ships within a division.
submarine action area (SAA) (NC) (NMM). An area that contains one or more friendly subma-
rines which are the only units that may use ASW weapons within that area.
submarine exercise area coordinator. An authority who publishes permanently established

national submarine exercise areas and lanes which have been agreed by the nations concerned.
submarine-generated search area (NC) (NMM). A stationary, geographically defined area

within a JTAA in which a submarine will operate for a specified period of time. It is established
by the submarine commanding officer based upon the mission requirements of both the subma-
rine and the units with which it is operating. Once established, a commander or unit designated
as the SGSA coordinating authority may authorize attacks in the portions of the JTAA that lie
outside the SGSA. Within the SGSA, NOTACK rules apply.
submarine movement advisory authority. The authority who monitors movements of subma-
rines and ships operating variable depth sonar or towed arrays within his area of responsibil-
ity and advises submarine operating authorities and, if necessary, units concerned, of
possible mutual interference.
submarine notice. A message report originated by a submarine operating authority providing oper-
ational and movement instructions for submarines in peace and war, including transit and patrol
area information.
submarine operating authority. The naval commander exercising operational control of submarines.
submarine operations coordinating authority (SOCA) (NC) (NMM). The warfare com-
mander who is assigned responsibility for the coordination and employment of
support submarines.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
submarine patrol area (SPA). A SPA is used to permit submarines to conduct operations or exer-
cises to prevent or minimize mutual interference. Such an area may be established by latitude
and longitude or by using an operational grid. This term is used only by the SUBOPAUTH for
stationing submarines and is not to be promulgated to air/surface forces.
submarine safety lanes. Specified sea lanes used exclusively for submarines in transit to and from
assigned patrol zones.
supplying ship. A ship in a replenishment unit that supplies personnel and/or materiel to be transferred.
support. The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any
other force.
support force. A force tasked by a higher authority to aid, protect, complement, or sustain
another force.
surface action group (SAG). A unit comprised of surface ships, which may be supported by
fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, formed to counter a surface threat. Unless the OTC has desig-
nated a SAG commander, the senior of the commanding officers is the SAG commander.
surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons,
or things, by visual, aural electronic, photographic, or other means; specifically, in maritime
surveillance, to detect and determine the number, identity or movement of aircraft, missiles, sur-
face or subsurface vehicles.
surveillance combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter or attack aircraft employed over a hostile sur-
face force for the purpose of countering the SSM threat.
surveillance towed array system (SURTAS). A towed-array system primarily designed for use
in area ASW operations. It is normally a very long array designed to operate at low speed for
low-frequency detection of a submarine’s radiated noise.
sweep (aircraft). An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft and
other targets of opportunity in an allocated area of operations.
tactical air support for maritime operations (TASMO). Organization, operational procedures,
and communications used in NATO for land- or carrier-based tactical air support of maritime of-
fensive, reconnaissance, and air defense operations. See also ATP 34 for additional guidance.
tactical bomb lines. Bomb lines prescribed by a troop commander beyond which he considers that
properly coordinated bombing would not endanger his forces.
tactical command. The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his
command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
tactical control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or
maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or task assigned.
tactical diameter. The distance along the perpendicular between the path of a ship on the original
course and the path of the same ship when steadied on an opposite course after turning through
180º with a constant rudder angle.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
tactical doctrine. The fundamental principles guiding the application of tactics.
tactical instructions. Directions and orders available for the execution of tactics.
tactical procedures. Prescribed modes (and methods) of implementing tactical instructions.
tactical torpedo countermeasures (NC) (NMM). Maneuvers, such as alterations of course or

speed and noise reduction and noise deception methods, designed to degrade a submarine’s fire
control solution or to avoid torpedoes that have been detected or are assumed to have been fired.
tactical towed array system (TACTAS). A towed-array system primarily designed for use in
ASW support operations. Its passive acoustic performance is optimized for submarine detection
at higher tow speeds.
target acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to per-
mit the effective employment of weapons.
target combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter aircraft maintained over an enemy target area to de-
stroy hostile aircraft and to cover friendly shipping in the vicinity of the objective area in am-
phibious operations.
target radar. A radar, the detection of which would indicate the presence of enemy forces or that an
attack is probable.
task designator. The number assigned to a task force, task group, or task element.
task element. A component of a task unit organized by the commander of the task unit or higher au-
thority for accomplishing a specific task.
task fleet. A mobile command of ships and aircraft necessary for accomplishing specific major tasks
which may be of a continuing nature.
task force. A component of a task fleet organized by the commander of the task fleet or higher
authority for accomplishing specific tasks.
task group. A component of a task force organized by the commander of the task force or higher
task organization. The organization of forces for operational purposes to provide the necessary
flexibility for meeting changing operational requirements while retaining a clear indication of
the chain of command.
task unit. A component of a task group organized by the commander of a task group or higher
threat and target emitters. A threat emitter is an emitter, normally associated with a weapon sys-
tem, the detection of which might indicate that an attack on the force is imminent or in progress. A
target emitter is an emitter, the detection of which would indicate the presence of enemy forces.
threat radar. A radar, the detection of which would indicate that an attack on the force is imminent
or in progress.
threat warning. A means by which a commander can rapidly promulgate the evaluated type and de-
gree of threat and specify the likelihood of attack.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
time late of datum. The elapsed time between datum time and the arrival of a unit at datum.
time of attack. Time of arrival of the first weapon in the target area.
TOMCAT. A surface picket or picket group which is responsible for early identification of friendly
aircraft returning, and for acting as a reference point for such aircraft when they proceed through
the AAW area.
torpedo danger area (TDA) (NC) (NMM). The area extending beyond the furthest-on circle for an
arbitrarily assessed distance of 8,000 yards.
torpedo danger zone (TDZ) (NC) (NMM). An area which the submarine must enter in order to be
within maximum effective torpedo firing range.
torpedo interference area (DOG BOX). An area within which units may interfere with or be en-
dangered by ASW homing torpedoes.
track. To display or record the successive positions of a moving object; also to lock on to a point of
radiation and obtain guidance therefrom; to keep a gun properly aimed, or to point continuously
a target-locating instrument at a moving target; or, the projection on the surface of the earth of
the path of an aircraft or ship, the direction of which path at any point is usually expressed in
degrees from North (true, magnetic, or grid).
transfer. The distance gained by a ship at right angles to the original course while turning.
transfer station. A ship’s designated area equipped for replenishment at sea.
TT. The standard position in the force for the present position of the originator of the message.
turning circle. The path of a ship with a constant rudder angle.
turn-together. A maneuver in which all ships turn simultaneously, maintaining their true bearings
and distances from the Guide.
type organization. The organization of units normally of the same type into flotillas/groups, squad-
rons, divisions, and subdivisions mainly for administrative and logistic purposes.
underway replenishment force. Replenishment ships, together with their escort, which provide
replenishment services to a force at sea.
unit. A ship, aircraft, or submarine; or a small group of ships and/or aircraft acting as an entity.
unit guide. The ship in a unit that is the guide; the guide in a replenishment unit.
urgent attack. An attack delivered with maximum rapidity against an enemy submarine located in a
position such that it is considered an immediate threat.
UTM. The grid used for naval bombardment and similar purposes, especially when ground forces and
other forces are jointly engaged.
Glossary-24
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
variable depth sonar (VDS). The term is normally used to describe a sonar whose transducer is
towed beneath the parent ship with the object of improving sonar detection ranges. Helicopter
and submarine sonars, although variable in depth, are not usually included.
vectored attack (VECTAC). An attack in which a weapon-carrying unit (air, surface, or

subsurface) not holding contact on the target is vectored to the weapon delivery point by a unit
which holds contact on the target.
vectoring (aircraft). The directional control of an inflight aircraft through transmissions of

azimuth headings.
vertical replenishment (VERTREP). The use of helicopters for the transfer of stores and/or ammu-
nition from ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore.
VICTOR LIMA (VL). A reference point used as an AAW grid origin.
visual call sign. A call sign provided primarily for visual signaling.
voice call sign. A call sign provided primarily for voice communications.
WARM. War Reserve Modes. Characteristics or operating procedures of equipment or systems which
are held in reserve for war or crisis.
warning. The indication by any tactical information source of the presence of a threat.
WATCHDOG. A surface picket whose main tasks is AAW.
watch zone. A sector in which the assigned ship is responsible, subject to no overriding weapon co-
ordination instructions from the AAWC, to ensure that air attacks on the unit or force do not take
place unopposed.
waterspace management. In naval warfare, a system of procedures for the control of antisubma-
rine weapons to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines.
weapon danger area. An area measured in degrees either side of the weapon firing bearing and ex-
tending to the maximum safe range and maximum safe trajectory height of the weapon in use.
For torpedoes, a specific area based upon weapon entry point.
weapon danger zone. In ASW operations, an area in which friendly units may be endangered by a
friendly ASW weapon. The area comprising the weapon danger zone is based upon the type of
weapon, method of employment, run pattern of a properly operating weapon, and estimated ac-
quisition range. Upon launch of an ASW torpedo, this area may be designated a DOGBOX.
weapon release point. The point where a single weapon or the first weapon fired on a pattern is re-
leased so that it enters the water at the splash point. For aircraft attacks, it allows for the air-
craft’s direction, speed, and altitude of approach, and the characteristics of the weapon.
weapon(s) system. A weapon and those components required for its operation.
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
wheel. A maneuver to alter course in such a manner that all ships will be in their former relative posi-
tions on completion of the maneuver.
XX. The standard position in the force established by the OTC on which a search, enemy reporting,
and so forth, is to be based.
YY. The standard position in the force for the present position of the addressee of a message.
zero time. The exact hour immediately preceding the time of execution of a tactical action or maneu-
ver from which time measurement is recorded and reported in minutes. (If the time of execution
is exactly an hour, that time will be zero time.)
ZIPPO plan. A plan which provides for preplanned reactions to various maritime warfare threats.
ZZ. The standard position in the force for the center of the force (not to be used in a convoy).
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
INDEX
Page
No.
Acceleration and deceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

Accompaniment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Accuracy of target data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
Acoustic:
Arrays, ships towing acoustic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Countermeasures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Devices streamed, prevention of mutual interference between submerged submarines
and surface ships with towed acoustic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Interference:
From own force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Own transmissions on search equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Protective measures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Delegation of functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Support measures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Acronyms, list of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Antisubmarine warfare actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Ship actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Assistance is required, action when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Attack in harbor, action after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5
Contact when direct support forces are involved, action following . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Danger, individual action to avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Gaining contact, action on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Increased tension, action at time of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Individual ship action when Operation AWKWARD is ordered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
Intercept of target or threat radar, action upon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Nuclear attack, action prior to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Readiness for action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Suspected mutual interference, action on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Units in vicinity of unit gaining contact, action by. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Activation of naval control of shipping organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Active:
Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
Electronic protective measures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-12
Sensors, use of active . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Sonar or sonobuoy contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Adjustable columnar unit formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
Advance force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Index-1 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Advisories, surface ship notices and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99

Advisory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
After-action reports, engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Aided intercept by submarine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Air:
Anti-fast patrol boat operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
Attacks:
Convoy protection against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
Protection of shipping against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Towed array ship defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Combat report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Control:
Combat air patrol aircraft procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Cooperation in antisurface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Force air coordination area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Coordinator:
Air resource element coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22
Force track coordinator — air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Corridors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Defense tactics, carrier battle group air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Forces:
Command of air forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Other air forces, support operations controlled by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30, 6-31, 6-55, 6-68
Outside tactical air support of maritime operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Picture, local situation and air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Raid reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19
Safety procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Tracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
Traffic control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Transport group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Airborne coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Aircraft:
Airplans, antisubmarine warfare aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Alert states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
Antiship missile defense, aircraft
employment in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Area operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15, 6-31
Arming policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Assists detecting unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Associated support by maritime aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Attack policy, antisubmarine warfare aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Index-2 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Attacks, coordinated aircraft and surface unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109

Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
Authentication on antiair warfare nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Blind bombing zone, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Carrier (See Carrier)
Chemical attack, aircraft operations in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
Combat air patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6
Air control procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Antiship missile defense employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
Stationing tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Command of aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Communications:
During aircraft emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
In towed array ship cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Contact handover with submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Contaminated area, aircraft re-entry into . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Contamination of aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
Continuous watch on airborne aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42
Antisubmarine warfare air control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Cooperation:
Between aircraft and helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
With fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
Delays while operating aircraft, antisubmarine warfare operations during . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Direct support (See Direct support)
Distress, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Escort of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Early warning aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
Employment in antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Emergency and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-56
Flight of aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Flightpath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Friendly aircraft approaching force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Gains contact in cooperation with towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Identification and recognition:
By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Of support aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Investigating contact in cooperation with towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Shore-based aircraft joining procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Support aircraft joining a force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Lane, aircraft in submarine safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91
Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Launch and departure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Launching or recovering aircraft, ships engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Lights by ships and aircraft, use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Locking non-tactical data system aircraft into grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
Lost aircraft control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Index-3 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Low-altitude rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57

Mission designators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Not involved to keep clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
NOTACK area, aircraft responsibility in establishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-108
Off-task/on-task time, aircraft procedures at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
Operating reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Passing information about contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Radar-fitted aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23
Reports to search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Requests for carrier aircraft and shipborne tactical aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Rescue in vicinity of ships operating aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Returning aircraft, procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55, 6-98
Ship control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Shipborne aircraft operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Signals, ships operating aircraft to make . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Support:
Antisubmarine warfare support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Antisurface warfare operations support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Towed-array ship support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Transit, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33, 9-57
Turnover procedures, maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Units carrying aircraft, responsibilities of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, ships operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Airmove messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Airplans:
Accuracy of airplan origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Anti-fast patrol boat operations, airplans for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
Airspace:
Control during amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
Controlled airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Air/submarine communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Alert:
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
State for aircraft and weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
Allocation of waterspace management areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3, 2-6
Separation in helicopter action group operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61, 8-13
Ammunition state reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Amphibious:
Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
Objective area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3, 11-6
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
Analysis of enemy emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
Command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Anchorage:
Evacuation of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23
Protected anchorage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Index-4 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Readiness in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Anchoring:
In formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Ship as anchoring reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
Assets, employment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Command and control in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Specific delegation considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Data links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Measures, initiation of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Nets:
Authentication on nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Combining nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Reporting and coordination nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Reports, special . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Stationing units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Anti-fast patrol boat:
Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-30
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
Anti-intruder activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15 to 7-18
Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Air effort, maximum effect from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Aircraft:
Control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-94
Relaying contact reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Response to submarine contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Urgent attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
With inoperable navigation systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Area operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Attack:
Air/surface attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Methods, ship and helicopter attack and support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Policy for units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Classification of contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Collision hazard during operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Compensatory allowances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100
Index-5 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Coordinated operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 to 9-26

Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Search attack unit responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
Direct support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Free area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Interest, procedures within area of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-94
Mission designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31, 6-46
Nuclear attack; action prior to, and tactics following . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Nuclear weapon:
Control procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Yields and effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Operation ordered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Ranges, sensor and weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Responsibility, area of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91
Screen commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Search plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Support operations by aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Weapon:
Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
State reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
Antisurface ship missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-10
Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Antisurface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Operations by:
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Pickets in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Towed array ships in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
With subsurface cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
Carrier approach procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
Contact or datum, search attack unit approach to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Corridor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41, 6-73
Methods; direct, offset, and intercept approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29, 9-30
Minelaying operation, approach phase of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
Tactics to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Approaching force, friendly aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Area:
Antisubmarine warfare:
Area of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-94
Index-6 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Area of responsibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91

Free area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Defense electronic countermeasures systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Force air coordination area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Overlapping areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-90
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105 to 6-107
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15, 9-1
By maritime aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Employment of submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Patrol areas, adjacent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Protection of coastal shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
Restricted areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-87
Shipping risk area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan, area operations and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Submarine action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Submarine-generated search area:
Configuration and duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-103
Handover in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105
Surveillance area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Waterspace management area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Allocations, considerations in area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-93
Areawide electronic warfare coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
Arming:
Aircraft arming policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Changes in helicopter arming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
Screen helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Arrival:
And departure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Estimated time of arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Instructions on arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Rendezvous, arrival at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Reporting time of arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Assault, amphibious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
Assistance is required, action when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Assisting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15
Maritime aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan, associated support and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Submarine:
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Message applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Attack:
Antisubmarine warfare attack (See Antisubmarine warfare)
Coordinated attack:
Aircraft/surface unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Missile attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Index-7 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Detecting and determining types of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17

Harbor, attack in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
After attack in harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-5
Helicopter identification/recognition and attack tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
Independent localization and attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Leader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Missile attack, defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
Nuclear attack (See Nuclear)
Restrictions when operating with support submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Rules, submarine-generated search area attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105
Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18
Towed array ship against air attack, defense of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
Underwater swimmers, defense against attack by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Urgent attacks by fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Attacking ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
Aircraft authentication on antiair warfare nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Authorities:
Maritime authorities:
Air control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Submarine movement, authorities for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10, 6-110
Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 6-86
Delegation of authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4, 1-19
Responsibility, authority and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Avoiding:
Collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Danger to other ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
AWKWARD, Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2 to 14-3
Axis:
Course and axis:
Changes in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
In replenishment formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8
Formation axis:
Formation center and axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Rotating formation axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Bad weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Effect on screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Bailout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
BARNSTORM procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
Base surge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Spread of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Bearing:
Accuracy suffixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Electronic warfare intercept bearing accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
Index-8 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Distance, bearing and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Passing target bearing and range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-24
Preserving true bearing and distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
True bearings, courses and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Berth numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Biological hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
BLACK, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48
Blast and underwater shock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Blind bombing zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
BLUEBELL, Airplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-27
Boat patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Bomb:
High-explosive 600-pound bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Lines, shore bombardment and bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Breakdown:
At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Salvage and breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Breaking:
Radio silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Silence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
Brevity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Code words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-62
Broadband contact by passive sonar or sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Broadcast control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Bulging the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Buoys, submarine communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Bursts, nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Airborne early warning aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
Antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Functional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Canceling:
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-108
Submarine-generated search area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-104 to 6-105
Weapon control orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Carrier:
Adjustment of movements by ships relative to carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Air defense tactics, carrier battle group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Air operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
Approach procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-73
Convoy, carrier operating aircraft in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Duties of carriers in a task group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Principles affecting carrier group formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5
Requests for carrier aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Screening carriers during flight operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Stationing carrier in convoy formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Index-9 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Cartesian coordinate grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

CARTWHEEL disposition/formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
Casting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
CERTSUB classification (definition). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Chaff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Chain of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Chainsaw tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Change in:
Composition of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Course and axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Organization of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Signaled speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Task organization assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Change of:
Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Position and intended movement in relative airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Type of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Changing:
Scene of action commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Sectors or patrol lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Size of tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
When changing station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Checklist for aircraft joining a force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-35
Checkoff list, surface action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3
Check-sum digits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
Chemical warfare threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Circle, size of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Circular:
Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Classification:
Initial reporting and classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Recognition, classification, and identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
Clearance to employ nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Close:
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Covering group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Close, meaning of order to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Closing or rejoining, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Coastal convoy (See Convoy)
Collision:
Avoiding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Hazard during antisubmarine warfare operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Combat air patrol aircraft (See Aircraft)
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Air forces, command of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Aircraft, command of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Index-10 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Allied forces, command of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Amphibious:
Operations, command during. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
Warfare, command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Antiair warfare, command and control in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Antiship missile defense, command and control responsibilities for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
Antisubmarine warfare, command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Antisurface warfare, command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
Chain of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Convoy, command of a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Delegation of command functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Development of command structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Direct support submarine operations; command, control and communications in. . . . . . . . . 9-13
Exercising command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Full command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Large forces, command of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Maritime forces, structure for command of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Mine countermeasures, command responsibility in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
(See Officer in tactical command)
Operational command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Operations, command during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
Options, command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
Parallel chains of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Readiness, command responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Replenishment at sea, command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Seaward defense, command in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
Submarine operations, command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Support operations, command during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Transiting submarines, command relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Veto, command by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Commander:
Aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Composite warfare commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Consultation between commanders and corresponding commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
In amphibious warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
Delegation to:
Functional group commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Principal warfare commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Screen commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Designation of commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
For amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-7
Escort commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Flight of aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Nuclear antisubmarine warfare operations, commander’s responsibilities and intentions in. . . . . 9-45
Principal warfare commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Regional naval control of shipping commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Index-11 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.

Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Search attack unit commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
Strike commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Surface action group commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Sweep commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Commanding officers of Allied warships, prerogatives of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Commodore, convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 10-10
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Aircraft communications:
Direct support operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16
Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Towed array ship cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Amphibious operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
Antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Decentralized command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18
Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
Design of communication plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Electronic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Flashing light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Helicopter communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
In helicopter action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Liaison, communication and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Over-the-horizon targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2
Regional naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Search attack unit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12, 9-27
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
Post-attack emission control and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
Submarine communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Direct support operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Support submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10, 8-9
Surface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Tactical communications plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1, 4-14
Task group operations, merger of circuits in combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11, 9-5
Windows:
For submarine in associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Special communication windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
ZIPPO communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Composite warfare commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Composition of surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
Index-12 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Confidence levels:
Electronic warfare reporting of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
For POSSUB classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Contact:
Accuracy of airplan contact position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Antisubmarine warfare contact:
Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Command responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Initial report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
By support submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Subsequent evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Support submarine gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Approach tactics to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Direct support forces are involved, action following contact when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Enemy contact:
By aircraft in transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Gaining contact, action on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
On search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
In cooperation with towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
By towed array ship in cooperation with aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
In submarine-generated search area during area operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105
Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
In towed array ship and aircraft cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Lost contact procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Passing information about contacts, responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Passive sonar capable surface ship gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
By towed-array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
On enemy submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Search attack unit’s approach to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Support submarine contact reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Turnover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
Unit gaining contact, action by units in vicinity of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Contaminated area, re-entry into . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-57
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Air control:
Combat air patrol aircraft procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Air traffic control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Aircraft control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Assets, control and coordination of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Change of:
Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Type of control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Command and control (See Command)
Index-13 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Delegation to control units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24

Electronic jamming, control of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Helicopter control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47, 9-27
Inability to exercise control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Lost aircraft control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Naval control of shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Net for:
Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
Maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapon, control procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Qualifying weapon control status and orders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Screen helicopters, control of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Shipping control points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Tactical control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Type of operations and control, factors determining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Veto, control by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Weapon control status and orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Controlled:
Airspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Waterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Convoy:
Advice on convoy formation selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Air operations in a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
Altering convoy course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Command of a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Commodore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 10-10
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Discipline, maintaining convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Emergency turn by convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Formation grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Formations:
Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Maintaining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Principles affecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Forming up convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Joining at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Mercantile, military, and unescorted convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Protection of convoy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17 to 10-18
Coastal convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-18
Regrouping a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Replenishment of convoy escorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Index-14 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Rerouting a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14

Route position designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Routing a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Screens, instructions for convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Stationing convoy ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Support force in situation A, convoy and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Cooperation:
Antisurface warfare with subsurface cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Between aircraft and helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
With fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61
Coordinated:
Aircraft/surface unit attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
Antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25 to 9-26
Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Attack methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Missile attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Prosecution of antisubmarine warfare contact with support submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Coordinating:
Antiship missile defense reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
Authority/unit, submarine-generated search area coordinating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-101, 6-103
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Aided intercept by submarine, coordination required for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18, 6-50
Antiair warfare coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Antiship missile defense reaction coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
Area coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Assets, control and coordination of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Electronic and acoustic warfare coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18, 5-2
Force air coordination area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Local coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Mine warfare coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18, 6-94
Submarine/air coordination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Surveillance coordination and data compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Zone coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Coordinator:
Air resource element coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6
Airborne coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Delegation to coordinators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Electronic warfare coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
functions delegated to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Force track coordinator:
Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Subsurface and surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1, 9-1
Inner defense zone coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
Local antiair warfare coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
Outer defense zone coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-26
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Index-15 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Sector antiair warfare coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Standard call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Corridor, approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Corridors, air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
CORTAC procedure message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55
Countermarking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Countermeasures:
Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Electronic and acoustic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Torpedo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
By search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
Underwater swimmers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Countershadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Course:
Adjusting course in maneuvering Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Alteration of course. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Axis, course and:
Changes in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
In replenishment formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Relative wind, course and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Resuming course and station in maneuvering Methods B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64, 6-65
Speed, course and/course and speed made good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
True bearings, course and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Cover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9, 7-13
Covert:
Joining procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Cross-fixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Crossover zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Cruising:
Antisubmarine warfare formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Wartime cruising precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
Cryptological activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Daily changing call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Damage, assessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Damaged ship:
Action when ship is damaged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Screen for damaged ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45
Danger:
Individual action to avoid danger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Navigational danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Dangerous to subsurface operations, operations inherently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Darkened ships, navigation lights on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Darkening ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
Data:
Antiair warfare data links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Index-16 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Compilation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 6-16
Reference point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Net control station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Datum:
Accuracy of airplan datum position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Approach tactics to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Establishing and designating datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Search attack unit’s approach to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Deceleration, acceleration and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Decentralized command and control, communications for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-18
Deception
Measures against deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
Risk of imitative deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
In amphibious operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
Deck-launched interceptors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Decoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
Defense:
Carrier battle group air defense tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Missile-armed ships, defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Missile attack, defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
Nuclear warfare defense concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
Towed array ship against air attack, defense of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Underwater swimmers, defense against attack by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Defensive:
Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Definitions, terms and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52 to 1-53
Delegation of:
Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4, 1-19
Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Delegation to commanders, coordinators, and control units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21 to 1-24
Deliberate attack by screen helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Demonstration, amphibious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
Departure:
Arrival and departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Launch and departure:
Fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-37, 3-42
Depth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
Designating datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Index-17 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Designation of:
Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11
For amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
Guide, new . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
Officer in tactical command for nuclear antisubmarine warfare operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
Search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Designator:
Aircraft mission designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32
Antisubmarine warfare mission designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Letters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Task designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Destroyer:
Rescue destroyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24, 6-76, 6-77
Type formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Detached, units temporarily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Detecting and determining types of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Detection:
Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
Missile carriers, detection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Picture compilation, detection in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
Radar, detection of target/threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Transmissions, detection of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Deviation from specified sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Diagrams, emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Diameter, tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Direct approach method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Direct support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Action following contact when direct support forces are involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Antisubmarine warfare direct support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Communications with aircraft on direct support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16
Employment of:
Aircraft on direct support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Submarines in direct support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Maritime aircraft, direct support by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan, direct support and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Submarine message applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
By higher authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
Electronic warfare, direction and coordination of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Finding of transmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Directive, initiating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
Disabled:
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Submarine, assisting disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Disguised targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Dispatch of search attack unit, designation and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Disposition:
2V, antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
2W, special . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Index-18 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
3V, antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29

4W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-33
Circular . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29
General types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Planning factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-36
Principles affecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5
Replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
Stationing considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Typical operational dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Units, disposition of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
DISROBE, Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-17
Dissemination (picture compilation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
Distance:
Bearing and distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Interval, distance and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Standard distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Unit of distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Distress, aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Escort of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Ditching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Diverse forces and tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-83
Diving restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
DOWNLINK considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
DUSTBIN areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48
Duties:
Of carriers in a task group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Promulgation of duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Carrier system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Electromagnetic:
Interference of search equipment on own transmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Pulse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Electronic:
Acoustic warfare, electronic and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Countermeasures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Aircraft employment in antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Positive control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Neutralization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
Index-19 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.

Order of battle (emitter list) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
Policy and detached units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Protective measures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
Reporting of confidence levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
Warfare (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Areawide coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Coordination cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Intercept bearing accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
Satellite communications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Warfare support measures (definition). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Aircraft employment in antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Elements:
Picture compilation elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3
Task elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
Emergencies, aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Communications during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Emergency:
Acceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Aircraft emergency and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Identification friend or foe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Landing:
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Visual signals for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Stand-off range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Turn by convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Emission:
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8
Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2, 5-8
Post-attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
Security and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Sensors and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 5-5
Silent emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
Index-20 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Emitter list (electronic order of battle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Emitters, threat and target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14
Endurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Enemy:
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
By aircraft in transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Report on enemy submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
Surface-to-surface missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Engagement:
After-action reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Order of engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Rules of engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Engineering degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
Entering:
Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Entry:
Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Operations, officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38, 3-44
Environmental conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Escape maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-56
Escort:
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Distress, escort of aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Leader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Replenishment of escorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15, 10-15
Establishing:
Datum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-74
Stationing speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Submarine-generated search area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-70
Estimated time of arrival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Evacuation of anchorages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-21
Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4, 1-50
Evasion:
Anti-fast patrol boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-30
Antisubmarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Evasive steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27, 10-15
Exchanging data on positions, reporting and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Execution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Specific target planning and engagement execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Exercising command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Exit gate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Exoatmospheric burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Extended maneuvering interval. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Index-21 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Failure to rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11

Fallout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Fast convoys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Fighter engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Filling a gap in the screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Final approach tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Fire support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Fixed-wing aircraft (See Aircraft)
Flags, speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Flash and initial radiation effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Flashing light communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Flight of aircraft, commander of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Flight operations:
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Screening aircraft carrier during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Ship movements during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Flightpath, aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Flying sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Fog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Force:
Air coordination area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Antiair warfare nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Change in composition of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Operations integral to a force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Support aircraft joining a force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Track coordinator — air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Air picture compilation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Track coordinator — surface/subsurface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17, 8-1, 9-1
Formation:
Adjustable column unit formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
Anchoring in formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Basic system of formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Broad front rectangular formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-19
Center and axis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Circular formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3, 10-28
Convoy formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11, 10-12, 10-15, 10-19
General types of formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Group formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-32
Maneuvering whole formation together (Method A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63, 6-64
Miscellaneous formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16
Operational formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Passing through a formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Principles affecting formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-5
Random formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
Recovery of aircraft when in formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Index-22 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Reverse arrow head formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-28
Torpedo countermeasures formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Transport/logistic formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
Typical operational formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Forming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Convoy, forming up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Found report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34, 6-44
Free area, antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
FREEWHEEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-101
Frequency management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Friendly:
Air tracks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7
Aircraft approaching the force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Minefield information to friendly forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Search for friendly force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Full:
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2, 10-10
Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Delegation of functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2
Functional:
Call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Delegation to commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Gates; handover, entry/exit, and marshaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39

Gateway unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
General degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
Geographic reference system, world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
Getting underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
GRASSHOPPER, Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-96
GREEN, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
GREYHOUND, Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Grid:
Departure/entry screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
Formation grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Lock procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
Reference unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
Group:
Administrative group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Fire support groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-32
Functional group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Delegation to commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Index-23 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Guides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Helicopter action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61, 8-13
Inshore undersea warfare group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Naval beach group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Task group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
GROUSE, Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Guard ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
GUERRILLA procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Automatic changes of Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
In replenishment formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Screen unit as Guide in Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
When maneuvering by Method A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
Handover:
Contact handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Radar and nonradar handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Submarine-generated search area handover during area operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105
Harbor:
Attack in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Entering harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Readiness in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
States of readiness in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
Havens, submarine and surface ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91 to 6-92
Hazard:
Antisubmarine warfare operations, hazard of collision during. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Nuclear bursts, hazards from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Radiation hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Heaving to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
Helicopter:
Action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-61, 8-13
Advanced screening or searching helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Antisubmarine warfare helicopter:
Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9 to 9-10
Attack policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Methods, attack and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Antisurface operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Arming of screen helicopters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51 to 9-52
Assists detecting unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Communications and control nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
Control of screen helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49, 9-27
Cooperation between aircraft and helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-12
Dip or hover, helicopter in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Index-24 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Element coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22

Flying of helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Harbor, use of helicopters in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
Identification/recognition and attack tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
In-flight refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Joining/rejoining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Launch and departure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Position of ship operating helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Reference point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
Rescue helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24, 6-76
Rescue station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-80
Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Screen, helicopter in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Sector screen, conduct of helicopters in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Self-attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Ship control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Stand-off ranges, operational and emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-54
Station for helicopter ship operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Station keeping in screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Support of detecting unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57, 9-57
Vectored attack by sonar-fitted ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Windline screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38, 3-44
High-altitude:
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
High-explosive 600-pound bomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
High-power transmitting equipment, ships fitted with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Hygiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Identification:
And recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46, 6-86
By aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Of support aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Emergency identification friend or foe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Helicopters, identification/recognition and attack tactics for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
Picture compilation, identification in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6
Recognition, and classification; identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Safety point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Safety range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Identity maneuver and identification friend or foe/selective identification feature identity . . . . . 6-41
Illumination policy for ships in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Imitative deception, risk of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
Index-25 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Implementation of naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12

Independent:
Localization and attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Method of maneuvering (Method B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Position and intended movement of independent unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Individual:
Action to avoid danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Information:
Exchange between shadowing and relieving units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Fallout information, promulgating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Friendly forces, information about minefields to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Passing information about contacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
In search attack unit
operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28, 9-29
Required by officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Informative vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42
Informing officer in tactical command:
About nuclear antisubmarine warfare operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
Of operations in his vicinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Infringements in war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Initial:
Antisubmarine warfare contact reporting and classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Approach tactic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Contact, unit gains initial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35 to 9-36
Position in maneuvering MethodsB and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Radiation effects, flash and initial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Responses to detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Support submarine, initial antisubmarine warfare contact report from . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Initiating directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
Inner:
Defense zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Ships in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Warfare net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Inoperable:
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Navigation systems (aircraft) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Inshore undersea warfare group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Intentions, notice of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Intercept:
Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Approach method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30
Bearing accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4
Target or threat radars, actions on intercept of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Interception of transmissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16
Interest, procedures within area of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-94
Interference (See Acoustic interference and Mutual interference)
Intership spacing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Index-26 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Intervals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12 to 2-15
Jammers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21
Jettisoning mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Jezpat pattern sonobuoy procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Convoys joining at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Instructions message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Procedures:
Abbreviated joining procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-44
Covert joining procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-45, 6-57
Shore-based aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Report on joining a screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
Support aircraft joining a force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
Units joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Joint:
Action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-90, 6-93
For support submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13 to 9-14
Antiair warfare shore coordination net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Service cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-8
Keep clear:
Aircraft not involved to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Senior officer’s orders to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Kill characteristics, specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Landing:
Ashore, responsibility for conduct of landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
Circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Emergency landing:
Maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Force:
In amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Naval authority over units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 11-10
Lanes, submarine safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91, 6-109
Large forces, command of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Lateral and vertical separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Launch and:
Departure:
Fixed-wing aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Index-27 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Recovery of aircraft:
Ships engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Unscheduled operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Leadthrough operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-18
Lead-time requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
Leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Sequence in leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Liaison, communication and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Lighting measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Lights:
Man overboard lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Navigation lights, use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
On darkened ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Ships and aircraft, use of lights by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Special lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Limited strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Link:
Antiair warfare data links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Broadcast unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-26
Integration with standard tactical doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Link 4, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Link 11, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
Waveform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Link 14 plotting procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Management units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21, 8-24
Types of data link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
Wide-area link operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Local:
Antiair warfare:
Coordination net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Situation and air picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Warfare coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Localization:
Enemy emissions, localization of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
Independent localization and attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Jamming transmitter, localization of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18
Picture compilation, localization in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
Logistic functions and planning factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
Loose control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-53
Loss of submarine command and control, operations after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-95
Lost:
Aircraft control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Contact procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Low-altitude rules for aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Low-visibility recovery operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Index-28 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Magnetic anomaly detection:

Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
During vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42
Verification runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-43
Main body:
Evasive steering by main body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Stationing by sector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Man overboard:
Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Standard procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Maneuver:
Executing maneuver at prearranged time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Identity maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Safety maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Disabled ship, maneuvering to avoid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Emergency landings, maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Fast patrol boats, maneuvering against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-31
Flight operations, maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Independent method of maneuvering (Method B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Intervals and extended maneuvering intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Low-visibility recovery operations, maneuvering for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Merchant ships in convoy, maneuvering of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Method C, maneuvering to operate aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Methods A, B, and C for maneuvering with carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63 to 6-65
Principal rules for maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Sector screen, maneuvering with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Skeleton screen, maneuvering with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Special maneuvering rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Speeds while maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Whistle signals while maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Whole formation together (Method A), maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Maritime:
Air control authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-17
Direct support by maritime aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Patrol aircraft:
Attacking on own sensor information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Turnover procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Vectored attack by sonar-fitted ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Rear link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
Safety procedures for maritime air operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Support operations tasked by maritime authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Structure for command of maritime forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Tactical Message System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-26
Tasking authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Index-29 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Marshal procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Marshaling gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
MAYDAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
MEADOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-96
Mercantile convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Merchant ships, factors affecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Message:
Airmove messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Found and Not Found messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Joining instructions message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43
NOTACK area message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
Ordering contact handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Tactical messages, use of radio-teletype for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
Target engagement messages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Tasking message for intercept by submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Miles, reporting bearing and distance in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
Military convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Stationing by sector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40
Mine:
Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Command in operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9, 13-13
Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Detection report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Reporting mine explosions and detections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23
Self-protective measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Threat, localizing the mine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Types of mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Mineable waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
Mined area, transit through:
Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-18
Minefield:
Locating the minefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Nature of minefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Minelaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1, 13-3
Miscellaneous formations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-22
Missile:
Arc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Detection of missile carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
State reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Missile-armed ships, defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Index-30 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Missile-launching platforms, early warning of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17

Mission designators, aircraft and antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-32, 6-46
Modification of submarine-generated search area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-104
MORE HELP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Movement:
Amphibious objective area, movement to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
Position and intended movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Preliminary movements for replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8
Reporting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Submarine movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Moving haven:
Submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91
Surface ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-92
Mutual interference:
Action on suspected mutual interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Avoidance of sonobuoy mutual interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Measures to avoid mutual interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-85
Prevention of mutual interference between submerged submarines and surface ships with
towed acoustic devices streamed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Mutual support for towed-array ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
Narrowband passive sonar contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20

Naval:
Authority over landing force units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 11-10
Beach group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Full . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12, 10-2, 10-10
Regional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Forces in amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Navigation:
Allied Worldwide Navigation Information System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Antisubmarine warfare aircraft with inoperable navigation systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Lights on darkened ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Pilotage, navigation and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Use of navigation lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Navigational:
Danger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Net control station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Nets, communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 to 4-11
Neutralization, electronic:
Reducing effectiveness of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-22
Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
NOCAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Noise, own-force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Nonarrival of relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
Index-31 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Nonradar handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34

Nonsonar contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
NONSUB classification (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Non-tactical data system units, execution of grid locks by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
Not Found message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-105 to 6-109
Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Of intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
To get underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Notices, surface ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
And advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Nuclear:
Action prior to nuclear attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Attack with nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44 to 9-51
Bursts, types of nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Defense formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Tactics following nuclear attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Warfare defense concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
Weapons, employing own nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Nuclear, biological, and chemical:
Degrees of defense readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
Graduated levels of threat and minimum individual protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-15
Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Numbering formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Numbers:
Berth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Task force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Offensive:
Air operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69
Offensive mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Chemical warfare, officer in tactical command’s considerations in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-13
Commanders subordinate to officer in tactical command, responsibilities of . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Convoy, responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Departure and entry operations, responsibility for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
Information required by officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Informing the officer in tactical command of operations in his vicinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Nuclear antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Passing information about contacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Radar is detected, officer in tactical command’s considerations when target or threat . . . . . . 8-26
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
Search attack unit, responsibilities for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
Ship of officer in tactical command as Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation, officer in tactical command’s role in . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Index-32 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Offset approach method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-30

Off-task/on-task time, aircraft procedures at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
On top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
Radar and reverse radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Visual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Operational:
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Change of operational control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23
Efficiency, report on operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Stand-off range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Operations, factors determining type of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
OPSTATs CARGO and UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8
OPTASK:
NUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
RAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
RNCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4
Options, command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
ORANGE, DUSTBIN area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-48
Ordering:
Authentication policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Patrol or search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10, 6-11
Replenishment formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Orders, scope of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-5
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Activation of naval control of shipping organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Amphibious operation, organization for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Change in organization of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Task, type, and warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Origin, accuracy of airplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Outer:
Defense zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-20
Screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39
Towed array ship stations in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
Warfare net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Over-the-horizon targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Overt tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Own-force:
Employment of nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Parallel chains of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10

Particular degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
Index-33 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Passing:
Between ships in a line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Target bearing and range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-24
Through a formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Passive:
Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20
Electronic protection measures (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Initial contact, passive sonar capable surface ship gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Mine countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Sonar contact, narrowband passive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Sonar or sonobuoy, broadband contact by passive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Sonobuoy procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
Adjacent patrol areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Plane group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-5
Pattern mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Peacetime:
Precautions for submarine operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Recovery maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Picket ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
In antisurface warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Picture compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 to 6-4
And weapon employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Pilot voice report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
Pilotage, navigation and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Plan:
Antisubmarine warfare search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Emission control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8
Picture compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2
Sonobuoy interference avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Standard surface action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Tactical communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Planned:
Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Electronic countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Planning:
Amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-6
Antisubmarine warfare air operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
Relationships during planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11, 11-9
Scouting operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
Point:
A, X, O, and Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 to 2-10
Identification safety point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8, 6-87
Romeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Index-34 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Shipping control point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Policy:
Aircraft arming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Antisubmarine warfare attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Emission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5, 5-5
Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
Accuracy suffixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Airplans, change of position and intended movement in relative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Designators, convoy route position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Doubt of position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Exchanging data on positions, reporting and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Movement, position and intended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Own position, reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Reporting position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
altitude or depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Ship operating helicopters, position of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Standard positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Towed array ship zero position and intended movement operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Positive control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-54
Electronic countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
POSSUB classification (definition). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Post-attack emission control and communications security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
Precautions:
Delays while operating aircraft, antisubmarine warfare precautions during . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Submarine operations, precautions for peacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Surface ship precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Predicted sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Preparing for sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Preplanned responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Prerogatives of commanding officers of Allied warships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Prevention of mutual interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Between submerged submarines and surface ships with towed acoustic devices streamed . . . 6-112
Principal warfare:
Area responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Probability of success, highest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
PROBSUB classification (definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Program, replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8
Promulgation of:
Antiair warfare coordination method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Fallout information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Planned responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Sonobuoy interference avoidance plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Propellers in harbor, use of ship’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
Index-35 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
PROTAC amendment message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55

Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Convoy, protection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17 to 10-18
Individual protection; levels of nuclear, biological, chemical threat and . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-16
Shipping against threat of attack, protection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Shipping requiring protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Protective:
Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Publications, reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Qualifying weapon control status and orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98

Quick reference system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
Radar:
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
On top. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Use in harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Vectored attack method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-42
Radar-fitted aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23
Radiation:
Flash and initial radiation effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Residual radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Status indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
Radio silence, breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Radioteletype:
Direct support aircraft procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-16
Tactical messages, use for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
Voice/radioteletype reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21, 8-23
Raid:
Amphibious raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18 to 6-20
RAINFORM messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-48
Random:
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-25
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Range:
Antisubmarine warfare sensors and weapons, range of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Identification safety range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Nuclear blast effects, range of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Passing target bearing and range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-24
Predicted sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Index-36 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Tactical sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3

Rapid amendment of tactics and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55
Reaction time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Reactions; planning, promulgating, and executing antiship missile defense. . . . . . . . . 7-18 to 7-22
Readiness:
Action, readiness for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Degrees of readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-52
In antiair warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Fallout transit, operational readiness for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Harbor or anchorage, readiness in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51, 14-3
Self-protective measures in mine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Underway, readiness to get . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Ready:
Deck system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Recognition:
Aircraft, recognition by. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Classification, and identification; recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Identification/recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
Picture compilation, recognition in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41
Support aircraft, recognition of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
Aircraft employment in antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
And underwater demolition group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Recording enemy emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Recovery:
Aircraft, ships engaged in launch or recovery of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Maneuvers:
Peacetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Wartime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
Operations, maneuvering for low-visibility recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Replenishment, recovery when engaged in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
Unscheduled launch and recovery operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Rectangle, size of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Reducing risk from mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Re-entry into contaminated area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-57
Reference:
Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8, 6-87
Data link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
Regional naval control of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Regrouping a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Rehearsal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
Reinforcements to scene of action, sending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Rejoin, meaning of order to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Rejoining:
Helicopters, rejoining of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Index-37 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Screen, rejoining the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51

Units closing or rejoining. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Relative:
Airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Course and relative wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
Relaying of contact reports by antisubmarine warfare aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Release of nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapon:
Action by units after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Criteria for use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-45
Relief, nonarrival of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
Relieving units, information exchange between shadowing and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Remote targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Rendezvous:
Arrival at rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-10
Emergency rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Failure to rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Formation rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Replenishment:
Command during replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Dispositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-27
Escorts, replenishment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-16, 10-12
Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Method of execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Recovery when engaged in replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
Screen units, replenishment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Ships engaged in replenishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Report:
Air combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Air raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19
Aircraft operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Ammunition state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Antisubmarine warfare:
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21 to 9-22
Weapon state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Enemy contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Engagement after-action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Mine detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Missile state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-14
Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Operational efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Position. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Screen, report on joining a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
Search attack unit, aircraft reports to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Special antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Submarines, reports from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Index-38 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Surface and subsurface raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20

Tactical air support of maritime operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Towed array ship contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Warfare commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Weapon state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8
Reporting:
Antiair warfare, reporting in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Choice of reporting method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Contact reporting, initial antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Data on position, reporting and exchanging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Emission control, reporting during restricted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Link reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Mine explosions and detections, reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-23
Own position, reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Position, reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Submarine reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Support submarine, contact reporting by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Target reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Time of arrival, reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Voice reporting procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Request for:
Carrier and shipborne aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-107
Support submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Waterspace management area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Rerouting a convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
Rescue:
Aircraft emergency and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Distress, rescue of aircraft in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50 to 6-52
Survivors, rescue of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Reserve speed for station-keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Residual radiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Responses, planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
Aircraft control unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-42
Antiship missile defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
Commanders subordinate to officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Departure and entry operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-19
Electronic warfare coordination cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24
NOTACK area, establishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-107
Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Search attack unit commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28 to 9-29
Units carrying aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Warfare commander and coordinator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3, 1-16, 6-86
Antisubmarine warfare area of responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91
Index-39 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Authority and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20

Command responsibility for antisubmarine warfare contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-21
Contacts, responsibility for passing information about . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-18
Disabled submarine, responsibility to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Landing ashore, responsibility for conduct of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-9
Restricted:
Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-87
Procedures for surface ships entering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
Emission control, reporting during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Screening in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-44
Restrictions:
Antiship missile defense reactions, restrictions on planned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Attack restrictions when operating with support submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Diving restrictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Subdivision, restriction on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Weapon restrictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Resuming:
Course and station in maneuvering Methods B and C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Previous station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Return to force procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Returning aircraft, procedure for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
Reverse arrow head formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-28
Reverse radar:
Grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27
On top. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Right of way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Ships launching/recovering aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Ships over screen units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Romeo, point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Rotating formation axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Rough weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Routes and reference points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10, 6-87
Routing, protective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Rudder used, amount of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Rules:
Antisubmarine warfare attack rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Engagement, rules of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Maneuvering, rules for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Road, special rules of the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Vectored attack, rules for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53

Safety:
Aircraft, safety of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Helicopters, safety of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Index-40 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Identification safety point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-41

Identification safety range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
Lanes, submarine safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91, 6-109
Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Maritime air operations, safety procedures for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Measures and preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14
Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Submarine safety procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100
Sailing order folder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Salvage and breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Satellite communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Scare charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
Scene of action:
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Changing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
In nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapon attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Sending reinforcements to scene of action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Units at scene of action of nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapon drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Scouting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2 to 6-9
Screen:
Adjusting the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Bulging the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-46
Delegation to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21
Convoy screens, instructions for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Damaged ships, screen for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45
Descriptions of screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40
Equipment failure, effect on screen of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Evasive steering by screen units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Filling a gap in the screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Arming screen helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Control of helicopter in sector screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Inner and outer screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39
Instructions for individual screen units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
Operating within the screen in maneuvering Method C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
Rescue outside screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Sector screen, sector size for units in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-40
Selection and design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Stationing screen units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39
Surface screens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Towed array ship:
In screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
Screen station options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
Types of screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Unit as Guide in maneuvering Method B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
Index-41 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Screening:
Aircraft carrier during flight operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Helicopter:
Advanced screening helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Deliberate or urgent attack by screening helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Sea manners and customs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
Attack unit:
Aircraft reports to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-34
Approach to contact or datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-29
Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28, 9-32
Change of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Intended employment of units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12, 9-28
Designation and dispatch of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
Equipment on own transmissions,interference of search. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12
Friendly force, search for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-34
Plans, antisubmarine warfare search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-25
Selection of search type for towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Submarine-generated search area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100 to 6-107
Searching helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Seaward defense:
Command in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-2
Sector(s):
Coordinator, sector antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
Flying sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Nets, sector antiair warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
Safety sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38, 3-40, 3-47
Taking up or changing sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Security:
Communications security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
Emission control, security and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Grid, security of the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-28
Selection criteria for scouting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
Selection of:
Antiship missile defense countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Convoy formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11, 10-19
Formation rendezvous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Station size and search type for towed array ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
Target reporting unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Selective release of nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Self-attack, helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Self-defense:
Electronic countermeasures systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15
Units with self-defense weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
Self-identification, initiation of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-86
Self-protective measures against mine threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-4
Index-42 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Senior officer’s orders to keep clear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

Sensor:
Active sensors, use of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Deviation from specified sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Ranges of antisubmarine warfare sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Selecting sensors for scouting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
Use of sensors and emission control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Sentries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Separation:
Transit separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Vertical separation in instrument meteorological conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Sequence:
In leaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Of amphibious operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Information exchange between shadowing and relieving units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Ship:
Acoustic arrays or other devices, ships towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22
Action by individual ship when Operation AWKWARD is ordered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3
Adjustment of movements by ships relative to carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Aircraft in distress, ship responsibility for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Aircraft, responsibilities of ships carrying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Aircraft, ships operating:
Minor adjustments by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
Rescue in vicinity of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-65
To make signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Anchoring reference, ship as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10
Antiair warfare responsibilities of individual ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Antisubmarine warfare ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Assisting and attacking ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40 to 9-41
Control zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-71
Damaged ships, screen for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45
Darkened ships, navigation lights on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Darkening ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
Disabled ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-83
Electronic and acoustic warfare, responsibilities of ships for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Emergency landing ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-76
Flight operations, ship movements during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Formed units, general conduct of ships in presence of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Guide, designated ship as/ship which is to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19
Helicopters, positioning of ships operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Inner screen, ships in the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Launching or recovering aircraft, ships engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Lights by ships and aircraft, use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-59
Merchant ships, factors affecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2
Methods, ship and helicopter attack and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Index-43 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Mined area:
Conduct of surface ships in:
Ship at anchor or alongside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-11
Ship at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-6
Transit of ships through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
Not in station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Passing between ships in a line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Readiness of ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Replenishment, ships engaged in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Rescue destroyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24, 6-76
Right of way of ships launching or recovering aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Screen ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-20
Sector screen, conduct of ships in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-47
Supporting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Surface ship (See Surface ship)
Surface-to-air missile ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Surface-to-surface missile ships, formations with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-56
Torpedo countermeasures for single ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Towed array ship (See Towed array ship)
Transmitting equipment, ship fitted with high-powered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Transport/logistic ships, intervals for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6
Shipborne aircraft operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Shipping:
Control point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Naval control of shipping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-12
Protection of shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Requiring protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-13
Risk areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Shore:
Authority role in towed array ship/aircraft cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Bombardment and bomb lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Signal:
Disabled ship, signals from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24
Emergency signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51
Fog signals, standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Maneuvering Method A, signals used in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
Position and intended movementsignal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Ship operating aircraft to make signals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-82
Signaled speed, change in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Signaling:
Data for antiship missile defense reaction table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-22
Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Silence, breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
Silent:
Emission policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
Surface-to-air missile engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Single:
Letter visual signals for surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Net information and plotting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
Index-44 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Situation:
Appreciation of situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
Report to operational control authority by maritime patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Reports and summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Size of:
NOTACK area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-108
Tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Skeleton screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-38
Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43
Maneuvering with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-48
SNIPE, Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Soft-kill weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
Sonar:
Active sonar contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Harbor, use of sonar in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Keyed sonar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Passive sonar contact:
Broadband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Narrowband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Ranges, predicted and tactical sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Sonar-fitted ship, aircraft/helicopter vectored attack by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-50
Sonobuoy:
Active sonobuoy contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-19
Interference avoidance plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Mutual interference, avoidance of sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46
Passive sonobuoy:
Broadband contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-20
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Pattern (JEZPAT pattern) procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Turnover procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
Sound underwater signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Specific turnover procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
Speed:
Changing speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Course and speed/course and speed made good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Force in joint action area, speed of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Ordering speed, method of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Replenishment speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-12
Reserve speed for station keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Signaled speed, change in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
When taking or changing station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
While maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Spread of base surge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Standard:
Call signs for warfare commanders and coordinators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Distance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Index-45 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
Surface action plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Tactical diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Stand-off ranges, safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Station:
Circular formation, taking station in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Combat air patrol stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Helicopter rescue station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-80
Resuming:
Previous station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Station in maneuvering Methods B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Ships not in station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Speed when taking or changing station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Towed array ship stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 to 9-8
Station keeping:
By helicopter in screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Reserve speed for station keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16
Stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Airborne early warning aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
Antiair warfare units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Circular stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Combat air patrol aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6, 7-27
Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-16
Convoy ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Screen units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39
Ships providing weapon carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-52
Speed, establishing stationing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Support submarines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Surface-to-air missile ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Target reporting unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Towed array ship options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
Towed array units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Units of more than one ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
STOVEPIPE procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Strategic:
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Use of satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Strike commander, formations, and operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68 to 6-69
STRIKECAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-27
Structure for command of maritime forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5
Subdivision, restriction on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Submarine/air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Submarine-generated search area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-100 to 6-102
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-24
Action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89, 6-93
Aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Aircraft response to submarine contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Antisubmarine warfare submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Area operations, submarine in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Associated support, submarine in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Index-46 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Blind bombing zone, submarine in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88

Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13
Command in submarine operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Contact handover with aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-37
Coordinator, submarine element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-22
Direct support, submarine in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33, 9-13
Disabled submarine, responsibility to assist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Enemy submarine, contact report on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Exercise areas, mutual interference in submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-92
Mined area, submarine transit of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-18
Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Authorities for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
Moving haven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-92
NOTACK area, submarine
responsibility in establishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-107
Operations after loss of submarine command and control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-95
Peacetime submarine operations, special precautions for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Prevention of mutual interference
between submerged submarines and surface ships with towed acoustic
devices streamed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Procedures within submarine action area or joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-94
Protection against submarine attack:
Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17
Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15
Reports from submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Safe stand-off ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Safety:
Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91, 6-109
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Support submarine:
Attack restrictions when operating with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Communications with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Contact reporting by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Coordinated contact prosecution with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Gains initial contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11 to 9-15
Requesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Shifting tactical control of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Tactical communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Threat area, antisubmarine evasion in submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
Transiting submarines, command relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Units prosecuting submarine contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11
Windows:
Index-47 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
For submarine in associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15

Special communication windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
SUBNOTE procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Subsurface:
Antisurface warfare with subsurface cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Force track coordinator — subsurface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17, 8-1, 9-1
Operations inherently dangerous to subsurface operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-111
Raid reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Suffixes, position/bearing accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
Summary of decisions and actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-58
Support:
Air forces, support operations controlled by other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-50
Air support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-30
Aircraft (See Aircraft)
Associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15
Attack support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18
Carrier force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Command during support operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
Direct support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
Force and convoy in situation A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Maritime authorities, support operations tasked by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Methods, antisubmarine warfare ship and helicopter attack and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Mine countermeasures operations, support of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
Situations A, B, and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13, 1-14
Submarine (See Submarines)
Surface minelaying operations, support of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Supporting ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-40
Surface:
Access of surface force to submarine action area or joint action area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-93
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Air coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
Commander, surface action group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Communications:
Surface warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Coordinated aircraft/surface unit attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
Emergency transit of surface force through submarine action area or joint action area . . . . . . 6-96
Force track coordinator — surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17, 8-1, 9-1
Group, surface action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9
Minelaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-3
Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
Pickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18
Plans, standard surface action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Protection against submarine attack:
Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-17
Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Index-48 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Raid reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19

Screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Ship (See Surface ship)
Success of surface action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Surveillance by aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Surface ship:
Attack policy, surface ship antisubmarine warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Blind bombing zone, surface ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-88
Contaminated area, surface ship re-entry into . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-57
Detecting unit, surface ship assists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-26
Gains initial contact, passive sonar capable surface ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-32
Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-92
Notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
Precautions, special surface ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Prevention of mutual interference between submerged submarines and surface ships
with towed acoustic devices streamed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Procedures for entering restricted areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
Safety lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-109
Shadowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
Stand-off ranges, emergency and operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-53
Submarine safety lane, surface ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-91
Towed arrays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Surface-to-air missile:
Missile engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16
Coordination and data compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
Survival of agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-9
Survivors:
Diversion of ship to locate survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-83
Rescue of survivors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-49
Sweep commander, formations, and operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-68, 6-69, 6-71
Swimmers, defense against underwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Tacan method of grid lock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27

Tactical:
Aided intercept by submarine, tactical control of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Air control groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Air support of maritime operations:
Operations outside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-31
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
At sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
Index-49 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Officer in tactical command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Communications plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Considerations in:
Chemical warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11
Nuclear warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
Data links, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
Deception group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Diameter, standard tactical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Link 4 and 11, tactical use of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22 to 6-23
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-52
Relinquishment of tactical control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-14
Satellites, tactical use of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-19
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-13
Sonar range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
Tactics:
Carrier battle group air defense tactics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Following nuclear attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Overt and covert tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9
Rapid amendment of tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-55
Taking:
Sectors or patrol lines, taking up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-51
Station in circular formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Station, speed when taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17
Target:
Classification required for attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-49
Data, accuracy of target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-22
Engagement messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Motion analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12, 7-17, 8-26
Action upon interception of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-23
Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21, 8-22
Submarine target priority list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-20
Targeting:
Aided intercept by submarine, targeting for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Third-party targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Task:
Designators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Force numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Group:
Duties of carriers in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-63
Position and intended movement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
Groups, units, and elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Nets, task force/group reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Changes in assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
Tasking:
Aircraft for antisubmarine warfare operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-9
Index-50 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Electronic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Message for aided intercept by submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-16
Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-25
Objectives for electronic and acoustic warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
Tattletale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Tension, action at time of increased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Termination of amphibious operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
Terms and definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Third-party targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21
Threat:
Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12, 7-17, 8-26
Action upon interception of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-26
Surface threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2
Warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51, 1-54
Time:
Prearranged time, executing maneuver at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21
Reaction time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
Torpedo countermeasures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27
By search attack unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-31
In torpedo danger zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-29
When torpedo is detected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-29
Towed acoustic devices streamed,prevention of mutual interference between
submerged submarines and surface ships with. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-112
Towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-23
Aircraft support of towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10
Antisurface warfare, towed array ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-11
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11, 9-6
Contact prosecution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-38
Contact reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-22
Investigation of contact in towed array ship/aircraft cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-39
Screen, towed array ship in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-50
Stationing of towed array ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5 to 9-8
Towed arrays, surface ship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4
Transfer of control of functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-10
Transit:
Emergency transit of surface forces through submarine action area or joint action area . . . . . 6-96
Fallout transit, operational readiness for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-8
Helicopters, transit of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-57
Instruction for aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-33
Mined area, transit through:
Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-13
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-18
Separation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55
Transiting submarines, command relationships of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-110
Transmission speed versus security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Transmissions; interference of, and interception, detection, and direction-finding of . . . . . . . . 5-16
Transmitting equipment, ships fitted with high-power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-99
Transport groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Transport/logistic formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
True:
Index-51 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Courses and true bearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-55

Turn by convoy, emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-16
Turnover procedures:
Maritime patrol aircraft to maritime patrol aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Sonobuoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49
Turns used in maneuvering Method A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-64
Type organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Underwater:
Blast and underwater shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2
Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44, 12-1
Demolition group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-4
Swimmers, defense against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
Underway, readiness to get underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-49
Unescorted convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
Unit of distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
Units:
Closing or rejoining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Disposition of units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17
Joining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Selecting units for scouting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8
Stationing units of more than one ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
Task units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Temporarily detached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18
Universal transverse mercator grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Unscheduled launch and recovery operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-72
UPLINK considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Urgent:
Attack by fixed-wing aircraft and screening helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-2
Variations to airplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10

Vector-assisted attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-18
Vectored attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-41
VELOCIPEDE, Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
Verification runs, magnetic anomaly detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-44
Vertical:
Separation, lateral and vertical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-58
Takeoff and landing aircraft, ships operating vertical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-62
Veto:
Command by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
Control by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Visual:
Contact between ship and aircraft in distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-77
On top. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-35
Index-52 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Signals for:
Emergency landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48
VL method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-28
Voice:
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Reporting procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3
Voice/radioteletype reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-21, 8-23
Warfare:
Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-20
Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
Standard call signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3
Nets, inner and outer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8, 4-9
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-50
Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-51, 1-54
Warship:
Prerogatives of commanding officers of Allied warships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
Stationing warship in convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-11
Wartime:
Cruising precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26
Recovery maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
Watch zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Waterspace management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-89
Allocation procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-93
Waveform, Link 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Weapon:
Alert states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-53
Assignment report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Control status and orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Nuclear weapons (See Nuclear)
Picture compilation and weapon employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
Policy on use of weapons by aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-23
Ranges of antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-98
Self-defense weapons, units with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5
State reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-8
For antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
Use of weapons by submarine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Whistle signals while maneuvering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25
Wide-area link operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-25
Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-10
Windows:
For submarine in associated support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-15
Special communication windows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Index-53 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
Page
No.
Withdrawal, amphibious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2

World geographic reference system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
Worldwide Navigation Information System, Allied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-7
Yards, reporting bearing and distance in hundreds of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Yields and effectiveness of nuclear antisubmarine warfare weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-51
Zero position and intended movement operation, towed array ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
ZIPPO procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18 to 7-24
Zone(s):
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-10
Crossover and engagement zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Fighter engagement zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11
Inner and outer defense zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-25
Watch zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
Index-54 ORIGINAL
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
ATP 1(D), Vol. I
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Effective Pages Page Numbers

Original I (Reverse Blank)
Original III (Reverse Blank)
Original V thru VII (Reverse Blank)
Original IX thru XLV (Reverse Blank)
Original 1-1 thru 1-55 (Reverse Blank)
Original 2-33 (Reverse Blank)
Original 5-1 thru 5-26
Original XLVII (Reverse Blank)
Original A-1 thru A-7 (Reverse Blank)
Original Glossary-1 thru Glossary-26
Original Index-1 thru Index-54
Original LEP-1 (Reverse Blank)
LEP-1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL
ATP 1(D)
VOLUME I
NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

ATP 1 (D) Vol-I

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ATP 1 (D) Vol-I

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

NATO-CONFIDENTIAL

ATP 1(D), Vol. I

Allied Maritime Tactical

The information contained in this document

I (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

PUBLICATION NOTICE ROUTING

2. ATP 1(D), Volume I has an associated, UNCLASSIFIED Multinational Manual

3. Summary: ATP 1(D), Volume I, contains tactical principles, procedures, and

Navy Warfare Library Custodian

Navy Warfare Library publications must be made readily

Note to Navy Warfare Library Custodian

IIa (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

III (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

NATION SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

TU a. The use of the term “Coastal Waters/Areas” is not acceptable to Tur-

Each nation should substitute its own national letter of pro-

Identification of Date Entered NATO Effective Date By Whom Entered

Identification of Date Entered NATO Effective Date By Whom Entered

Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and

CHAPTER 1 — ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND READINESS

1240 COMMAND IN OPERATION AWKWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

SECTION III — TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

SECTION V — RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 2 — POSITION, MOVEMENT, AND MANEUVERING

SECTION I — POSITION AND MOVEMENT

2110 STANDARD POSITIONS/REFERENCE POINTS/

SECTION II — RULES FOR MANEUVERING

2253 Rescue Helicopter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24

SECTION III — EVASIVE STEERING

CHAPTER 3 — DISPOSITION OF FORCES

SECTION III — SCREENS

SECTION I — TACTICAL COMPLANS

4175 CONVOY COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15

SECTION II — TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (SATCOM)

CHAPTER 5 — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW)

SECTION I — OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

SECTION II — EMISSION POLICY (EP)

SECTION III — EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

5310 CONSTRUCTION OF EMCON PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE (EAW) TASKING

SECTION V — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC SUPPORT

SECTION VI — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

SECTION VII — EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC PROTECTIVE MEAS-

SECTION VIII — AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION

CHAPTER 6 — GENERAL WARFARE INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION I — RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

SECTION II — PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING

6250 SCOUTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

SECTION III — DATA COMPILATION

6342 Integration With Standard Tactical Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22

SECTION IV — AIR OPERATIONS

6444 Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-49

SECTION V — SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

6532 Command of Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-69

SECTION VI — AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

SECTION VII — SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO

6740 SAFETY PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-97

PART II — WARFARE PROCEDURES

CHAPTER 7 — ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)

7000 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

7020 ANTIAIR WARFARE AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5