Criminal Complaint Against JI CHAOQUN
Criminal Complaint Against JI CHAOQUN
Criminal Complaint Against JI CHAOQUN
I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge
and belief.
From on or about August 28,2013 to on or about September 21,2018, in the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, JI CHAOQUN, the defendant violated:
Code Section Offense Description
Title 18, United States Code, Section 951(a) did knowingly act in the United States as an
agent of a foreign government, specifically the
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City and state: Chicago. Illinois MICHAEL T. MASON. U.S. Maeistrate Judee
Printed nanle and Title
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Ar.FIDAVIT
United States Code, Section 794(a), and individuals who act as a foreign agent
without notice to the Attorney General, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 951(a).
that JI CHAOQUN violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 951. The
statements in this affidavit are based on my personal knowledge, and information I
have received from other law enforcement personnel and persons with knowledge of
relevant facts. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of
have not included each and every fact known to me concerning this investigation. I
have set forth only the facts that I believe are necessary to establish probable cause
to believe that the defendant committed the offense alleged in the complaint.
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Bachground
Governments), makes it a criminal offense for any person, other than a diplomatic or
For purposes of this law, the term "agent of a foreign government" includes an
individual who agrees to operate within the United States subject to the direction or
publicly available sources, the Ministry of State Security ("MSS") for the People's
consists of its primary central office, provincial departments, and a number of local
and municipal bureaus. For example, the Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security
("JSSD") is a provincial department of the MSS. These state and local bureaus report
to both their national ministries and state and local governments and party
committees. The MSS has maintained both a clandestine and overt human source
operating in and out of China. The MSS's purview and intelligence collection
capability has evolved over time, incorporating new missions as technolory allows.
2
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extensive overt, covert, and clandestine intelligence collection operations against U.S.
Southern District of Ohio. Emails obtained pursuant to the search warrant showed
the United States ("Individual A") to provide technical information from a U.S.-based
Company, the Company is among the world's top aircraft engine suppliers for both
research for U.S. military aircraft. The Company is a cleared defense contractor and
1Based upon my training and experience, and information obtained from publicly available
sources, I am also aware that Chinese intelligence services typically recruit and employ
agents to collect a wide range of information, including U.S. national security secrets.
Chinese intelligence typically focus their efforts on recruiting ethnic Chinese, primarily
because of cultural and language affinity.
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connection with the ongoing investigation in the Southern District of Ohio revealed
that the user of the Email Account established an iCloud account. In fact, the
Apple ID was the same as the individual's email address.
District of Ohio was executed on the Apple iCloud account related to the same
Apple ID. The contents of the iCloud account included a "Cadre Approval/Removal
residence of Individual A in the Southern District of Ohio. During that search, agents
Science and Technolog;r, located in China. The search warrant return for the iCloud
training and experience, as well as conversations with other law enforcement agents
familiar with the investigation in the Southern District of Ohio, I believe that
Intelligence Officer A uses aliases and false claims of emplo5rment when Intelligence
arrived in the U.S. from Beijing, China on or about August 28,20t3, on an F1 Visa,
for the purpose of studying in the U.S. He received his Master's Degree in Electrical
his FL Visa Application, JI listed his primary phone number as "152)OOOOQ(87" (the
"JI Phone").3
13. Certain text messages from the SMS database from the Apple iCloud
2Certain email and text message communications have been quoted or summarized in this
Affrdavit (the "communications"). The communications are based upon draft-not final-
English translations of Chinese communications completed by interpreters employed by the
FBI. The summaries do not include all statements or topics covered during the course of the
communications.
At various points in the Affidavit I have included my interpretation of words and phrases
used in the communications. My interpretations are based on the contents and context of the
communications, events occurring before and after the communications, my knowledge of the
investigation as a whole, my experience and training, and the experience and training of
other law enforcement agents in this investigation.
3 The complete phone number is redacted because this will be a public filing.
5
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Intelligence Officer A "Can Little JI use hisftrer real name to frll out forms?" On or
about December 18, 2013, Intelligence Officer B provided the following information
Officer A that JI would be on High Speed Rail G203 arriving at Nanjing South Station
at 22:37 .Intelligence Officer A replied to Intelligence Officer B, "Got it. Tell him that
between Intelligence Officer A and JI, from on or about December 19,2013 to July 9,
20L5.
15. According to his travel records, JI traveled to and from China on three
occasions since his arrival in the U.S. JI traveled to Beijing on or about December 9,
JI's last trip to China was when he traveled to Beijing on or about December 22,20L4,
a The search warrant return for the iCloud account included an entry for Intelligence
Officer B in Intelligence Offrcer A's contact list. The iCloud account also included a database
of SMS text messages. Intelligence Offrcer A's messages with Intelligence Officer B, from the
SMS database for Intelligence Offrcer A s Apple iCloud Account, show that in or around
January through April 20L4, Intelligence Officer B referred to Intelligence Officer A as
"Section Chief' and that Intelligence Officer B provided passwords to Intelligence Officer A.
Intelligence Offrcer B is therefore believed to be a colleague of Intelligence Officer A's in the
JSSD.
6
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16. According to the Apple iCloud records, on or about December 18, 2013,
JI sent the following message to Intelligence Officer A, stating, "Hi Big Brother, I'm
JI Chaoqun. I'm taking the G203 [train] and will arrive at Nanjing South Station at
22:37." JI and Intelligence Officer A then exchanged several more messages in which
five hours after this conversation, Intelligence Officer A informed his wife via text
message that he had a suite in a hotel and asked her if she would like to stay. Based
and JI's second meeting likely occurred in a hotel room. Based upon my training and
tradecraft because meetings in hotel rooms provide a discreet, private place for the
18. According to text messages from the SMS Database, on or about January
11,20L4, JI asked Intelligence Officer A to order him a train ticket leaving Nanjing
traveling to Beijing for the following day. Intelligence Officer A instructed JI to send
the train ticket back to Intelligence Officer A when JI returned home. On or about
7
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19. Open source research on the Nanjing City address revealed multiple
images identifring the address as the location for the Jiangsu State Security
Department.
21. Based upon my training and experience, MSS officers often use aliases
Intelligence Officer A's affiliation with the JSSD because Intelligence Officer A told
agent that he believed Intelligence Officer A was part of a "confidential unit" with
Intelligence Oflicer B, and that Intelligence Officer B told him stories about
espionage.
8
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Account 1").5 According to the search warrant return, on or about August 30,20L5,
an email was sent from JI, using Subject Account 1, to an email address hosted by
"qq.com," stating, "eight sets of the midterm test questions for the last three years,"
which email was forwarded from Subject Account 1 to Intelligence Officer A.0 The
subject line for the email was "Midterm test questions." Eight separate pdf documents
were attached to the email. The eight separate pdf documents are background reports
23. According to JI's Discover credit card statements obtained via subpoena,
on or about August 30, 2015, JI's credit card authorized charges in the total amount
of $34.85 from Spokeo. On the same date, JI's credit card authorized charges totaling
$277.35 from Intelius, Inc. According to the JP Morgan Chase records for JI's debit
card obtained via subpoena, JI made multiple purchases totaling $S+.SZ on or about
August 30, 2015; and one purchase totaling $19.95 on or about September 18, 2015,
5 The complete email account is redacted because this will be a public frling.
6According to its website, QQ is an email and instant messaging service developed and
maintained by China-based company Tencent Holding, Ltd.
7 According to their websites, Intelius, Instant Checkmate, and Spokeo are each U.S.-based
companies that offer, among other services, online services for consumers to purchase
background reports about any individual. According to a representative from Intelius, and
its Terms and Conditions, Intelius's services are intended only for U.S.-based consumers, and
it utilizes a tool that restricts access to the Intelius website from China, among other locatiosn
outside the U.S. According to a representative from Instant Checkmate, and its Terms of Use,
purchases from outside the U.S. are strictly prohibited. According to a representative from
Spokeo, and its Terms and Conditions, Spokeo's services are intended only for U.S.-based
consumers, and Spokeo only accepts payment from U.S.-based credit cards with valid U.S.
billing zip codes.
9
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from Instant Checkmate. According to Spokeo records obtained via subpoena, Subject
Account l- was the email account associated with JI's Spokeo account.
with the background check companies obtained via subpoena, JI registered his
accounts at Spokeo, Instant Checkmate and Intelius on August 30, 2015, from
25. In addition, JI's financial and travel records also indicate JI was in the
United States in August and September z}ll,when he purchased and sent the above-
records, his accounts are maintained in the U.S. According to the JP Morgan Chase
records, JI made a debit card purchase at Chicago Ventra on or about August 25,
2015, five days prior to his August 30, 2015 purchases from Instant Checkmate. On
or about September 9,2015, JI made a debit card purchase at the Potsticker House
in Chicago, Illinois, nine days prior to his September 18, 201"5 purchase from Instant
(TECS) records, JI's last international travel was the trip from Chicago to Beijing
U.S. citizens born in Taiwan or China now living in the United States. All eight
individuals either currently worked in or were recently retired from a career in the
10
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2018, at least seven of the eight individuals worked for, or had recently retired from,
27. Based upon my training and experience, it appears that JI was tasked
by Intelligence Officer A to provide him with biographical information on eight
individuals for possible recruitment by the JSSD. JI attempted to cover up the work
the attachments calling them "Midterm Test Questions" rather than stating the true
and scientists, including for cleared U.S. defense contractors. In my training and
order to protect that information, the asset, and the intelligence officer.
to JI, was an FBI Special Agent working undercover (the "UC"). During the audio and
video recorded first meeting between JI and the UC, the UC introduced himself to JI
8 Based upon the review of the SMS database text messages, agents believe that
Intelligence Officer C is the direct supervisor of Intelligence Officer A at the JSSD. More
specifrcally, in the majority of messages in which Intelligence Officer A either communicates
directly with or references Intelligence Officer C, he uses Intelligence Officer C's formal title.
1"1
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29. On or about J0.[ay 17,20L8, JI met with the UC a second time. During
the audio and video recorded meeting, JI made multiple statements that corroborated
the information revealed during the course of the investigation and detailed above.
Officers A and B via Intelligence Officer C, who he met during a recruitment fair
while in school in China. He stated he believed Intelligence Officers A, B, and C were
Based on my training and experience, using the formal title is a sign of respect and indicates
that Intelligence Officer C holds a higher rank than Intelligence Officer A.
e Based on my training and experience, and information obtained from publicly available
sources, "Long Tan San Jie" verbatim translates to "three heroes of the dragon's lair," but is
colloquially a reference to a Chinese intelligence operation conducted in the late 1920s.
Considered one of the earliest modern examples of a Chinese "seeding operation," the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) directed three spies to infrltrate the CCP's main rival political party,
the Kuomintang (KMT). The three spies successfully gained employment with and access to
sensitive KMT information and provided crucial warning to the CCP during the peak of the
KMT's violent suppression of the CCP in 1931.
L2
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background checks on a few people from the internet. He explained that "they just
wanted me to purchase some documents on their behalf. Their reason was just
because it was inconvenient for them to make payments from China." Based on my
trail in China with the U.S.-based background check companies; and (b) was testing
JI's skills as a potential asset by tasking him to purchase these background check
reports.
33. JI further explained that the "people search website would tell you the
price of a report per person," which appeared to be a reference to the background
check reports JI purchased from Intelius, Instant Checkmate, and Spokeo. JI stated
that he "purchased the documents after [he] came to the U.S," and that he paid
approximately $ZOO for the reports. He further stated that Intelligence Officer A
asked how he could send the money to JI after JI purchased the background check
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34. JI further stated that he labeled the file containing the reports "Mid
Term Quiz Questions," and. sent the reports to both Intelligence Officers A and B via
Foreign Agents Registration Unit, as of June L4,2018, JI did not provide notice to
the Attorney General of the United States of his actions or intentions to act as an
36. Based on the foregoing, I believe that JI acted as an agent of the Chinese
individuals working for cleared U.S. defense contractors in the United States at the
of the Chinese government while in the United States, JI knowingly and unlawfully
under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program ("MAVNI")
program.lo
10The MA\N program authorizes the U.S. Armed Forces to recruit certain legal aliens
whose skills are considered to be vital to the national interest. Individuals such as physicians,
l4
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38. On or about June 6,20L6, as part of the process for his application to
39. In Section 20B of the SF-86, JI answered "No" to the following question:
Have you or any member of your immediate family in the past seven
years had any contact with a foreign government, its establishment
(such as embassy, consulate agency, military service or security service,
etc.) or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S.? (Answer
'No' if the contact was routine visa applications and border crossings
related to either official U.S. Government travel or foreign travel on a
U.S. passport.)
40. On or about December 6,20L7, also as part of the process for his MA'\rNI
interview with a U.S. Army officer. As part of the interview, the officer reviewed JI's
responses in the SF-86 with JI. During the interview, JI again failed to disclose his
interview.
nurses, and experts in certain languages with associated cultural background become eligible
if they meet the following requirements: candidates must be in the country legally, must have
been in valid status for at least two years immediately prior to the enlistment date, and
applicants who may be eligible on the basis of a nonimmigrant status category must not have
any single absence from the United States of more than 90 days during the two-year period
immediately preceding the date of enlistment. Once the immigrant enlistees complete the 10-
week Basic Combat Training, their citizenship application will be expedited without frrst
obtaining lawful permanent residence.
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Fazit
42. Based on the foregoing, I believe there exists probable cause to believe
the Attorney General, as required by law, in violation of fitle 18, United States Code,
Section 951(a).
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