International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

ISSN: 0885-0607 (Print) 1521-0561 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): An Oxymoron?

Bowman H. Miller

To cite this article: Bowman H. Miller (2018) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): An
Oxymoron?, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31:4, 702-719, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2018.1492826

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2018.1492826

Published online: 20 Dec 2018.

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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31: 702–719, 2018
Copyright # 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2018.1492826

BOWMAN H. MILLER

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT):

An Oxymoron?

Open-source was “frosting on the cake” of intelligence material

dominated by signals, imagery, and human-source collection. Today,
open source … comprises a large part of the cake itself.
—John C. Gannon, former Deputy Director of CIA for Analysis1

In today’s world information of all kinds is available to anyone who cares to

see it. If that’s the case, can such publicly accessible information be
considered intelligence? The answer is: “It depends.” A conundrum facing
U.S. intelligence is the enormous spectrum of information broadly known as
“open source.” As countless commentators repeat the shopworn claim that
the world is changing in ways and at a pace never before seen, have the role
and definition of intelligence remained what they were in the last millennium?
If not, what makes “OSINT,” its sources and its functions, different from
what intelligence was during wars from World War II to Korea and Vietnam,
in various crises from the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and more
recently in light of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks, Iraq, Afghanistan,
and the unseasonably short-lived “Arab spring”? While the world has
changed dramatically over the last quarter-century, has the explosion of open
source information changed the definition and expectations of intelligence?

Dr. Bowman H. Miller teaches at the National Intelligence University after

a career in the U.S. Air Force and in the U.S. Department of State, where
he served as Director of Analysis for Europe, 1987–2005. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or
the U.S. Government.

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 703

One element of the current information reservoir that is indeed vastly

larger and more prevalent is what has come to be called OSINT—“open
source intelligence.” Intelligence has seen its information challenge
transformed from coping with paucity to confronting saturation. While the
importance of openly accessible information in understanding the world and
its many elements cannot be denied, and has long been a staple of
information gathering and all-source analysis, can information that is freely
accessible or simple to buy automatically be characterized as “intelligence”?
Moreover, how does and should “OSINT” relate to and buttress the broader
intelligence collection and analysis enterprise?

DEFINING INTELLIGENCE
If today’s intelligence is comprised of upwards of eighty percent open source
information, can OSINT be disqualified as an intelligence discipline? If so,
how and why? What, after all, is intelligence? Former intelligence official
Mark M. Lowenthal begins his book Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy with
that question. His first answer is:

Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood

needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and
narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader
category of information. … All intelligence is information; not all
information is intelligence.2

This utilitarian definition, like many others, tends to focus on the

intelligence function over form, while making no reference to secrecy. That
definition’s last element, placing intelligence as a subset of information, is
central to the OSINT issue. Lowenthal later added: “By open-source
information, we mean any and all information that can be derived from overt
collection … .”3 [Emphasis in original.] In Reducing Uncertainty, Thomas
Fingar, a former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, asserted
that “[t]he purpose of intelligence since time immemorial has been to reduce
uncertainty about the aspirations, intentions, capabilities and actions of
adversaries, political rivals, and, sometimes, partners and allies.”4 The
coinage, attributed to former State Department intelligence official Jennifer
Sims,5 of seeking (by means of intelligence) to provide “decision advantage”
to the policy and decisionmaker also emphasizes use over origin. Elsewhere,
Sims defines intelligence as “information collected, organized, or analyzed on
behalf of actors or decision makers.”6 Again, her focus is on intelligence’s
aims, not its means of acquisition.
Is OSINT then just another example of the inescapable American
government and cultural obsession with acronyms? Or does it anticipate what
happens when open source information takes on an intelligence role—and

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gets classified in the process? Does it belong in the pantheon of existing

INT-disciplines, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and the others? If
OSINT is public or readily accessible information or data, what enables its
classification as “intelligence”? These functional perspectives on intelligence
provide part but not all of the answer. They are useful in looking at
intelligence in terms of the purposes for which it is sought, acquired,
processed, analyzed, and distributed. But this mission focus is not
what primarily characterizes the particular INT-disciplines that make up
the business of collecting intelligence: signals intelligence (SIGINT),
human-derived intelligence (HUMINT), geo-spatial/imagery intelligence
(GEOINT or IMINT), and measures and signatures (sensor-derived)
intelligence (MASINT).
Each of these collection disciplines is typified by the need to target certain
specific kinds of information to fill particular information (or warning) needs
by using special, concealed methods to collect that information. Those means
are applied against a range of targets and types, be they countries, leaders,
terrorist groups, drug cartels, human traffickers, weapons systems, decision
processes, or covert plans, to name some of the more prominent concerns.
But each such “INT” denotes a particular set of methods, sources, and, at
times, technologies employed to secretly acquire information that others seek
to conceal—and then to hide its secret possession from them and others
lacking the proverbial “need to know.” Those who know they have been
penetrated can change plans, alter codes, engage in deception, bury reactors,
or otherwise defeat sources and methods used against them. What is most
sensitive regarding the traditional collection “INTs” are the capabilities of
their varied methods and sources. Regardless of its origin and content,
intelligence loses some, if not most, of its value if and when it becomes
public. And publicizing intelligence always raises the risk that the utilized
sensitive sources and methods will become known and their effectiveness
compromised, the concern that lies at the heart of the dyspepsia over
intelligence leaks. That said, policy and national interests are occasionally
served by strategically divulging some aspects of otherwise secret intelligence,
for example, information regarding the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the
Chernobyl reactor meltdown, war crimes and mass graves, natural disasters,
and such.

IF IT’S FREE, WHY STEAL IT?

Beginning in 1992, a new emphasis on exploiting open sources for potential
intelligence value developed, with congressional calls for such a focus, along
with a reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to accomplish it.
After all, acquiring openly available information entails less cost and less risk
but can provide the baseline of information on which to build by using other,

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sensitive collection methods. In 2005, after 13 years in gestation, the Director

of National Intelligence’s (DNI) Open Source Center (OSC), managed by
and housed in a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) facility, was finally
inaugurated. It was built on the structure of the former Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), a critical asset for analysts, academicians, and
others during the Cold War, when access to the Communist world and its
propaganda output—the real precursor of “fake news”—was much harder to
come by.
Today, the OSC employs “collectors” of a type radically different from the
case officers of the CIA’s clandestine service. They do not collect in the same
sense; rather, they identify, sift, and exploit information. But, unlike other
intelligence disciplines, open source acquisition must wait until someone else
has created the information. Much of what these “open source collectors”
do resembles the work of a research librarian, whose tasks also include
discovering new, viable, and informative sources and research products.
That involves both search and assessment, but it consists of
identification, not collection. On its Internet website the OSC outlines the
following basic responsibilities and functions of an “open source
collection officer”:

Open Source Collection Officers (OSCOs) are responsible for

systematically collecting publicly available information in a given
region or a subject area to meet customer needs. The information is
known as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and includes traditional
mass media, the internet, specialized journals, studies, conference
proceedings, geospatial information, and more. OSCOs develop
strategies and plans for the collection of OSINT, including the tools
and methodologies needed to accomplish the task:

Drive integrated information gathering on a strategic topic, regional,

or cross-regional need;
Research and acquire publically [sic] available information in response
to intelligence gaps;
Identify relevant sources for data collection.7

In short, open sources do not have to be discovered, recruited, intercepted,

or sensed technologically in the manner of clandestine modes of collection.
Rather, open source “collectors” must scan the horizon for valid sources,
then screen, sort, filter, and acknowledge them as both accurate and relevant,
or otherwise discredit them. Factual nuggets must be separated from the piles
of ore that make up most of the openly available information blanketing the
world every minute of the day. (Notably, in the published job description for
OSC collection officers, the IP address contains no reference to collection per

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706 BOWMAN H. MILLER

se but instead to an “analytical” role.)8 The OSINT collector-analyst

connection is much closer than those in the other INTs, with GEOINT
perhaps coming in second in this respect.
Given the current physical and organizational locus of the Open Source
Center, the ancillary concern arises that a bureaucratic culture that
emphasizes secrecy to the hilt (i.e., the CIA) will want to restrict with
classified markings even open source and openly-acquired information. This
tendency to privatize publicly available information is not only inappropriate
but also ineffectual. It is an “operation barn door,” with the open source
horse having already left the stable. Nonetheless, all too often those focused
on clandestine tradecraft want to do just that. Whether open source
management and exploitation deserves to be a separate, single IC agency is a
related topic for others to tackle.9 But its appropriateness and effectiveness,
not to mention the likelihood of even more bureaucratic overkill, can be
seriously questioned. George Orwell would not be surprised.
Open source information is only information, unless or until it is used to
fill an intelligence need or serve an intelligence purpose. Thus, OSINT varies
not only in its acquisition but in its transformation from information into a
role as intelligence. An official OSINT definition asserts:

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence produced from

publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and
disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the
purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement. OSINT
draws from a wide variety of information and sources, including: mass
media; public data; gray literature; and observation and reporting.10

Apparent from this definition, perhaps better called a description, is that

OSINT can and does cover a multitude of methods and venues. But a
peculiarity of OSINT is that the clandestine collection disciplines also tend to
have their open source counterparts. Thus, GEOINT has an increasing
number of commercial alternatives in DigitalGlobe, Google Earth, MapQuest,
and more. Whether those imagery producers should be better labeled as
providers of GEOINT or of OSINT is a matter of debate. Much of this geo-
referenced information is there for the asking, perhaps from a laptop computer
at the neighborhood Starbucks. Of course, doing this research also allows the
seeker’s location to be recorded and tracked. And this kind of information can
be purchased in the open market. Television and social media serve in many
ways as publicly-relayed avenues of SIGINT, and often as real time streaming
video. Malevolent forces use the Internet and social media to propagate
hatred, advertise recipes for fabricating explosives and various attack methods,
recruit partisans, and communicate directives. And those open uses call for
their identification and exploitation as intelligence.

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Some aspects of MASINT also amount to open source data. Such can be
found in seismometers routinely measuring earthquakes and in sensors
measuring airborne radiation, indications of nuclear tests, or reactor
calamities. Much of this data is available from the National Weather Service
and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Indeed, in a sense every device able to communicate and to access the
Internet has become a sensor for the person using it. Democratization in
access to technology gives every user the power to create information, make
news, and shape opinions as never before. Most journalists carry out a form
of public HUMINT as they acquire and make use of sources, some of them
most useful when anonymous, while others are openly named.
Taken together with the broad range of other public sources of
information, the OSINT phenomenon shows itself to be a hyper-federated
reality,11 spanning untold sites and methods. Knowing few bounds, it also
reflects a speed that is often spell-binding: the rapidity of posting something
on the Internet coupled with the ability to remove it in an instant. But do this
ubiquity, rapidity, and variety provide the basis for characterizing open
source as a distinct INT?

UNEARTHING SECRETS VS. FILTERING INFORMATION

Practitioners of the craft of intelligence focus heavily on specialized, protected
sources and methods of intelligence acquisition, using primarily clandestine
means. The purists’ understanding of intelligence—widely held, especially
among collectors—consists of information held in secret by others that is
surreptitiously acquired using hidden methods, protected from disclosure,
and put to use secretly by recipient decisionmakers. Unlike OSINT, these
varieties of information are not “hidden in plain sight.” Moreover, OSINT’s
entirety is comprised of secondhand information—also true for much of
SIGINT—but in the latter case speakers/targets are not aware that they are
being monitored. Some other person or entity originated the OSINT
information. And, for it to be labelled OSINT in U.S. intelligence parlance, it
must have been legally acquired.12 And legally acquired also means that
copyright and patent protections must be observed. (Even in the realm of
acquiring foreign military materiel, the U.S. government simply buys what it
can before resorting to other, more nefarious methods of acquisition.) Not so
with clandestine collection. Thus, selected targeting and clandestine collection
contrast starkly with assembling the masses of publicly accessible or
purchasable information openly cascading daily around the globe on widely
accessible systems.
In both cases, those useful nuggets of information are sought in an effort
to answer questions, fill intelligence gaps, and reduce uncertainty for
decisionmakers. In using clandestine techniques, the issue is target

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708 BOWMAN H. MILLER

identification and target access. In OSINT, target identification is equally

relevant, but the issue of access is different. It has less to do with collection
and much more to do with the acquisition and sifting of masses of
information—justifying the cliche of trying to minimize “drinking from a
firehose.” Indeed, the looming danger today is that key kernels of secret
intelligence can drown in the flood of open source information. As the
historian of intelligence Ernest May has observed, “[T]he galloping
information revolution [has] strained the capacity of the intelligence
community to perform its traditional function of providing policymakers
with information not obtainable from open sources.”13 Obtainable from open
sources, if well selected and well used, is sense-making data. Those sources
can provide context, perspective, alternative interpretations, and world views,
what the Germans call Weltanschauung.
Identifying and accessing the target is the critical component of clandestine
collection methods. A time-worn cliche regarding intelligence collection holds
it to be an analysis-driven process, meaning that intelligence analysts point
collectors to what both they and their consumers need and are missing in
order to give warnings or make judgments. Among all-source analysts,
experience shows that such an “analysts-guiding-collectors” process is more
fiction than reality. Indeed, many clandestine HUMINT collectors, exploiting
either human or technical sources, see little, if any, value in analysis. They are
loathe to pay homage to the analyst as the reputed driving force behind the
collector’s work, and often pay little heed to what analysts claim to want or
need.14 Indeed, a more accurate portrayal of the relationship between
collectors and analysts, although somewhat exaggerated, has been that
“never the twain shall meet.”15 But in OSINT analysts, rather than
operators/collectors, tend to write the requirements.

OSINT: A COLLECTOR-FREE DISCIPLINE?

When clandestine case officers seek to enlist secret human sources, they
engage in complicated, risky, time-consuming tradecraft: spotting, assessing,
and vetting the person they target for potential recruitment to determine his/
her bona fides, access, susceptibility, and reliability. When the Intelligence
Community engages in technical collection, that too is carefully calibrated to
get the best, most critical, and most useful information to policymakers and
war fighters. How does that assessment and prioritization process work when
dealing with open source information? Do analysts tend to be overwhelmed
by the volume of open source and social media information and
communications? How adept is technology at sorting through trillions of
messages daily to find that “needle among a stack of needles” that affords
the intelligence consumers a “decision advantage” and reduces their
uncertainty?

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While collection is the key in the traditional, concealed INT-disciplines, for

OSINT it is identification, validation, and exploitation. OSINT is more an
acquisition search than a collection targeting. But finding what is useful,
timely, and relevant in the vast reservoir of open source information is a task
for neither amateurs nor many analysts. In the arena of open source
information inquisitive analysts can call more of the shots, and perform a
role more closely related to that of collector. Many analysts remain wary of
those who intervene between them and original sources, even translators in
some cases. But the typical analyst is not well-versed on how and where to
seek in open sources what is needed and lacking. Moreover, much of what is
useful is often harder to find, is not in English, and is part of a seemingly
impenetrable mass of data and streaming information. More and more of it
no longer appears as text. This accounts for why the OSC uses individuals
who are better qualified to understand local languages, customs, perspectives,
narratives, and priorities.
Thus, even if some analysts can parse open source databases on their own,
doing so is both time-consuming and often imprecise. Open source searches
do not involve simply surfing the World Wide Web. Such inquiry demands
the skills, knowledge, and inquisitiveness of a research librarian. While they
may be able to circumvent the need for and functions of collectors, searching
for information is not the bread and butter of most all-source analysts. This
holds true even if all analysts were to also act as investigative researchers, and
they should not be confident that what they need will almost magically
appear on their computer screens. They, or those who support them in the
world of OSINT, need to know what avenues and reservoirs of information
and perspective can be of value for the areas that they cover, and where and
how to exploit them.

TAPPING FOREIGN SOURCES FOR “GLOBAL COVERAGE” CONTENT

AND FOR CUEING
Open source information simply exists, and in ever-growing masses. The task,
then, is not so much to acquire open source data and communications, but
more to winnow its bulk down to what holds promise for intelligence value
before acquiring or assessing it. The open source screener must sort and sift
for that minute fraction of the information universe that can serve an
intelligence purpose. And those purposes are essentially threefold: (1)
obtaining information with valuable, intelligence-relevant content per se; (2)
building and deepening analysts’ knowledge base; and (3) discovering
information that can be used indirectly to cue one of the clandestine
intelligence disciplines toward a target or a concern, or to unearth more
detail on a target of interest. Often, those clandestine means are necessary to
scrutinize and validate something reported publicly, whether in news

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coverage, via social media, or otherwise. That kind of open reporting, often
instantaneous, also comes without authentication. OSINT demands attention
to denial and deception measures every bit as much as do traditional
collection disciplines. Any astute Internet user is vigilant when it comes to
phishing, hacking, fake data, scams, and the like—an ever-present cyber
security concern in the OSINT arena.
The cueing function of open sources often proves of great value. Examples
include the global ubiquity of social media and peoples’ ability with their
cellphones to photograph in real time such events as a protest in progress, a
terrorist incident, or a natural disaster. That same information can be relayed
to geospatial collectors, whether governmental or commercial (e.g.,
DigitalGlobe), for them to examine and report on, using their unique, often
wider-ranging, and proven credible capabilities. This kind of information
gathering symbiosis holds in many other areas—tracking human and drug
trafficking routes, detecting hostile efforts at denial and deception, identifying
cyber intrusions and distortions, and more. Often the process of validating
the trustworthiness of an open source’s data requires scrutiny using classified,
sensitive collection and targeting methods. If the two conflict, analysts must
find ways to decide which to believe and use in making their judgments.
The reverse in the pointing context also occurs, when clandestinely
acquired information helps direct, target, locate, and/or sort open source
information or communication. Purposely concealed traffic on the Internet
that cannot be accessed without special or concealed techniques remains in
the domain of clandestine collection, e.g., in the “dark web,” but the public’s
open tweets, blog entries, published journals, and such qualify as accessible
open sources. The world of information, massive and molten as it now is,
requires advanced data analytics, adroit human screening, and schooled
analytic judgment in order to determine what is to be sought out, believed,
included in analysis, or discredited and discarded.

LEARNING FOREIGN REALITY FROM FOREIGNERS

One paradox of using open sources to better understand the larger world and
its many players and facets is the matter of gaining the most useful and
relevant information from abroad. The U.S. Intelligence Community takes,
as its charge, the need to monitor all corners of the globe all of the time. That
is a real “mission impossible.” The task would be even more unthinkable if
analysts were solely, or even primarily, dependent on clandestinely acquired
information with which to form judgments and deepen their knowledge. This
is where open sources become invaluable, be they news sources, blog writers,
academic contacts, informed observers, or others whose views and reportage
are both credible and useful.16 To know everything and to be constantly on
top of every account, country, or issue, is not incumbent upon all-source

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intelligence analysts, but rather to know who is, where the trustworthy
sources are to be found, and how to make good use of them as the needs
arise. While most people have abandoned their paper Rolodexes crammed
with notes and business cards, the electronic equivalent is now the sine qua
non in both intelligence and business.
Instant analysis by television’s talking heads, the 24-hour news cycle, and
competing purveyors of ideologically grounded and selected news and
commentary now crowd the field and often seem to displace intelligence-
based analysis and reporting. Decisionmakers and their spokespersons play
catch-up with the news feeds, be they factual, biased, or simply bogus.
Speedy coverage, instant commentary, and live video have overtaken
seasoned expertise and thoughtful assessment. Nonetheless, these major
sources of information competition for the intelligence world are now well-
established and growing.
To establish the credibility of many open sources is extremely difficult.
Those tasked with trying to exploit foreign news coverage and reportage
must know where the sources of such reporting lie, the editorial and selection
biases of news managers, and the relationship between news organs and those
in power, both politically and economically. Published news is not
intelligence and is not the intent or yield of collection. “It is the particular
organization of the material for the decision maker that may turn publicly
available news into intelligence.”17 Knowing the difference in, say Germany,
between the tabloid Bild Zeitung’s orientation and that of the more
intellectual Die Zeit is critical. The challenge is to know which news sources
spout the government line and which routinely voice an opposition
perspective.
Even that is easier to do than to rate the accuracy and utility of self-
appointed news sources and commentators. “News” reporting is no longer
the sole or privileged purview of trained (and preferably objective)
journalists. But how and by whom are the credibility and utility of blogs
rated? Some are insightful; many are trashy or vitriolic. Blogs are not static,
and seldom do they have a reliability record that can be relied upon with
confidence. That said, regardless of the veracity or logic of content, the
size of a blog’s receptive audience can be every bit as important as its
messaging per se. That is why the users and follower numbers for Twitter
and the like are tracked. Impact is as important as content, and sometimes
more so. Journals, books, public speeches and interviews, policy
pronouncements, propaganda, blogs, and tweets are in the public domain.
Much in the news and the other sources can alert, inform, warn,
and contextualize, as well as trigger and point to requirements for
enhanced or new intelligence collection and coverage. And therein lies a true
treasure trove of analytically useful open source information—if it can

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be found within the masses of irrelevant, indeed often misleading,

information. All of this plays into the issue of galloping, and often
conflicting, OSINT.

… BUT BEWARE OF FOREIGNERS!

Although one of the best and most direct ways to acquire open source
information about the world is to talk with foreigners, that approach remains
largely a taboo in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Notwithstanding the
inability and futility in attempting to track developments in every country on
earth every day and hour—without open sources, a totally unimaginable
task—the Intelligence Community remains in thrall to an overweening focus
on secrecy and security. Too many of its personnel are caught in the risk
avoidance web that considers all foreigners, including any contact with them,
suspect. Because dealing with foreigners is deemed fraught with peril and
personal vulnerabilities, it is best either avoided completely or left to a few,
senior specialists. Anyone subject to a periodic polygraph examination in
order to retain clearances and employment runs the risk of having questions
about “foreign contacts” derail an otherwise routine exam.
Yet, analysts charged with monitoring and understanding foreign people
and events are unlikely to do so as effectively if they lack access to informed
or influential insights—social, cultural, economic, political, and otherwise—
regarding those foreign countries and their leaders, parties, armies,
perspectives, and narratives. How else, except through contact, can analysts
keep some level of continuing attention on all parts of the globe, from Kenya
to Korea to Kiribati? Open sources of information supply much of the raw
material with which to build up, expand, and refine the general knowledge
base. Occasionally, actual direct communication with foreigners, be they
scholars, journalists, think tank analysts, blog writers, or, in some cases,
government officials, makes a lot of sense, except perhaps to paranoid
counterintelligence types. The key is to train all analysts to be attentive,
discerning listeners when in the company of foreign “sources of information,”
volunteering little themselves, other than posing additional questions. With
an enlightened use of open sources, such “risky” direct contacts can minimize
security risks while enhancing analytic expertise.

OPEN SOURCE CHALLENGES

While many analysts lament the overwhelming amount of information they
confront, in still too many notable instances, even in the open domain,
insufficient information is available. That can be the result of a relative
“Internet darkness,” usually in those societies and states where the Internet’s
reach has not yet been fully felt or where governments have purposely moved

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to block Internet access. Since the Internet and the social media that ride on
it can be means to incite and coordinate protests, to convey opposition
complaints and accusations, and to generate calls to action, regimes that
abhor being challenged attempt to silence the net. Given the tendency of
authoritarian regimes to try isolate their publics from outside news and
connections, as did the Soviets during their years in power, can the
Intelligence Community contribute to efforts to counteract such
electronic blockades?
While the U.S. and its partners are ill-equipped to enforce Internet
openness, “freedom of information,” or “sunshine laws” in foreign states, one
aim of U.S. foreign policy, and of the Department of State, is to foster an
open Internet environment worldwide. Those efforts range from issues of
advocacy of Internet access (a passive action) to actually enabling Internet
rights (an active ability to facilitate usage of the Internet for communication
and information). In other instances, governments and their surrogates use
the Internet to distribute their own propaganda, as well as false and distorted
accounts of events, and manipulated and deceptive information, making
analysis perhaps more important but also more difficult. In the most extreme
cases, the issue is not distortion but actual denial of service. Estonia
experienced this from Russia in April 2007 after removing a Soviet-installed
monument from the center of Tallinn, the capital.18
Another flaw in the exploitation of open sources has to do with published
strategies, intentions, and visions. Too often published opinion is dangerously
ignored or overlooked. Many a leader has telegraphed his/her beliefs and
intentions. Had the world read and taken heed of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf
or made more of Osama bin Laden’s stated strategy of forcing the West to
spend itself into oblivion to pay for counter-terrorism and security
protection, some terrible historic events might have been either averted or
diminished.19 Those malevolent intentions had been both telegraphed and
openly accessible, even if largely discounted.

DENIAL VS. DECEPTION: CREDIBILITY IN THE ERA OF “FAKE NEWS”

To be sure, some allegedly open source information conduits, like the dark
web, are not so easily penetrated, at least not overtly. But when assessing the
truthfulness and utility of open source information, denial is less the issue
than is deception. Any computer user or Internet visitor knows full well the
range of scams, phishing, ransomware, and other schemes intended to deceive
and defraud the public. The Intelligence Community must today determine
whether its increasing focus and reliance on (as well as concern over) open
source information still fulfills the necessary all-source intelligence function.
Source validation is every bit an OSINT requirement and priority. Gathering
and protecting the information that others consciously try to deny or conceal

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714 BOWMAN H. MILLER

is a huge challenge that must be met, especially if the intelligence collection

and analysis performed by government agencies is to be more precise,
relevant, and timely than that provided by commercial or journalistic entities.
In the area of OSINT, however, the general thrust is often the marketing of a
point of view, ideology, bias, belief, or product, regardless of its value
or truth.
The U.S. Intelligence Community must offer, now and in the future, a
quality of information that Stratfor, Oxford Analytica, Economist
Intelligence, CNN, Fox News, The New York Times, Wikipedia, Google, and
others cannot and do not provide, regardless of their quality and opinion
slant. This area needs and deserves a completely separate treatment. But the
solution lies, in part, in those specialized intelligence arenas exclusive of
“open source intelligence,” of which all of the IC’s clandestine INTs are a
part. In fact, those secretly acquired bits of information and perspectives can
and often do serve the purpose of either validating or discrediting public
information, initial reporting, and instant interpretations. Note how often
instant, published reactions to an event or a decision have been proved
wrong. This area remains under-developed in the fact-checking enterprise,
although some efforts have been made in assessing its accuracy.

OSINT: INFORMATION SERVING AN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSE

Open source information is not and does not become intelligence until or
unless it fills an intelligence gap or need. This caveat applies overall to
intelligence collection, mining public as well as very private realms, and to the
yield’s inclusion in or inspiration for all-source intelligence analysis.20
Non-OSINT intelligence achieves status at the point of collection, while
OSINT acquires it only if and when it is applied in an intelligence role. In
light of both globalization and brisk advances in technology and worldwide
telecommunications, the wealth of information afloat in today’s world is
astonishing when compared to earlier, not too distant, decades when access
to denied areas or information required clandestine means and tradecraft.
Hiding information, regarding both capabilities and intentions, was
traditionally a fundamental part of realist statecraft and, by the same token,
seeking to uncover it was the essential raison d’etre of intrusive, clandestine
intelligence operations.
Unchanged, however, is the kind of information that demands protection
once it has become intelligence or is drawn upon for intelligence analysis.
Interestingly, that aspect applies regardless of whether the information was
openly obtained or clandestinely collected. Thus, an intelligence analysis of,
say, the presumed motivations of a foreign leader—drawing on no
clandestinely-acquired information or secret insights—can be and still is
protected intelligence for the end-user. If it is to be and remain valuable, it

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requires non-disclosure except to those with an authorized need for it, lest it
become known to the subject of the assessment. What is said about or to
others in public is open and free; what analysts say about others to
decisionmakers is not. The confidential, intelligence-informed judgments that
analysts share with their consumers are no one else’s business.
Michael Warner has noted that any definition of intelligence must include
“a consideration of secrecy, … [the potential that it could] mean life or
death, … [and] both clandestine activity as well as information.”21 Indeed,
the word “intelligence” in modern usage has taken on a semantic meaning
connoting confidentiality, if not espionage, at least in the United States,
France, Russia, and Germany.22 That negative connotation of the word
“intelligence” has long prompted the United Nations (UN) to strenuously
avoid its use. Collecting furtively against fellow UN member states is deemed
a major taboo. Likewise, the Japanese have had an aversion to calling some
things intelligence. For years, Japanese officials have labeled their array of
intelligence satellites “information gatherers.”23 Yet, what, if anything, about
OSINT needs to be concealed? For foreign government analysts and
“collectors,” one caution is the fact that information intended for one
audience, their own, might be exploited by another, namely, the U.S.
Intelligence Community. For example, the study by outsiders of published
Chinese research endeavors that are posted in that country’s professional and
scholarly journals offers a case in point. Any apparent U.S. official interest in
a foreign information source, by agencies or individuals using government
computers for the on-line inquiry, can prove detrimental. Suddenly, what
once appeared in the public space goes dark.

PRIVACY VS. SECRECY IN THE CONTEXT OF “OSINT”

The uninitiated have difficulty fathoming why an analysis based solely on
open source/public domain information can still end up being classified. But
analysts’ judgments, regardless of their motivating evidence, are no one’s
business outside the circle of approved access, until or unless a conscious
decision is taken to make them public. Pre-clearance procedures for
publishing and speaking publicly by intelligence personnel have their purpose
and import. What U.S. intelligence analysts are telling their colleagues or
government officials about a foreign country’s leader, intentions, or
perspectives is not for the subject of that assessment to know or learn. Herein
lies the essence of the problem of leaks. Leakers knowingly violate their
employment oaths24 and national security procedures, notwithstanding their
purported ethical aims or motivation. That is a primary reason why
intelligence as processed information is generally kept secret, just as most
private sector companies fervently protect their unique proprietary
information.

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716 BOWMAN H. MILLER

Among the most closely held secrets in the United States are not only the
launch code for nuclear missiles but also the formula for the syrup used in
making Coca Cola. That formula is stored in a Fort Knox–style vault at
corporate headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, to be accessed by only those few
with a validated “need to know.” To underscore the example, some years
back two Coke employees with such purported access offered to sell the syrup
formula to the competitor, Pepsi Cola, for millions of dollars. Pepsi reported
their treacherous offer to police, who then ran a sting operation. Subsequently
tried and convicted of a felony theft attempt,25 the pair were sentenced to five-
and eight-year federal prison terms.26 This was clearly a case of attempted
industrial espionage, reminiscent of convictions for national security violations
in espionage or leak cases. And Coke’s “secret formula” is still secret.
Since at least 2014, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has been
under intense scrutiny and pressure concerning its reported collection and
retention of e-mails and other correspondence generated by and for U.S.
persons. Much of that turmoil was the result of claims by whistleblower
Edward Snowden, a one-time NSA contractor. Rumors abounded that the
NSA was vacuuming up every e-mail sent and storing it for analysis and
retention, perhaps at its mammoth data center in Utah.27 While such extreme
government collection was routinely denied and never validated, it illustrated
another complicating, ethical aspect of dealing with open source information.
Acquiring gray literature, from newsletters to blogs to underground
publications, is one thing. Scooping up private correspondence and snooping
upon Americans is, of course, quite another matter, and U.S. and publics
elsewhere were upset by such allegations of NSA excess.
Two related issues involving open sources are their occasional nefarious
use and the justified concern over the erosion of privacy in this Internet age.
Groups of all kinds engage in unlawful, often violent activities; they also use
the Internet to recruit, train, motivate, communicate, and propagandize.
Those actions are of keen interest to the Intelligence Community in serving
national security, law enforcement, and public safety. Moreover, the Internet,
World Wide Web, and an ever-expanding array of social media, from
Facebook and Instagram to Linked.in and others, are channels of
information that afford little (and, in some cases, no) protection from peering
eyes, hackers, and malicious actors.
The public’s trust in privacy protection is now thin and rightly so. As
Amanda Hess noted in a New York Times Magazine article, “Our ‘privacy’
has become a key currency in online life—traded away in return for
convenient services and cheap thrills. … It is increasingly seen not as a right
but as a luxury good. … Data-mining companies know everything about us,
but we know very little about what they know.”28 “Friending” on Facebook
is a supposedly protected activity, if users set their privacy protections

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properly, but “tweeting” to the world, even if done by the President of the
United States, is not. Moreover, the prevalence of “fake news,” deceptive
schemes and scams, spam e-mails, spear-phishing efforts, “monetizing” users’
information and purchase trends, and other obscured and and/or malevolent
actions make the sorting of good data from the huge volume of useless
garbage found in open sources a demanding, if not often impossible, task.

SO, IS OSINT INTELLIGENCE?

Something calling itself OSINT has become an integral part of all-source
intelligence, both in its acquisition and usage. The IC would be increasingly
hamstrung, if not blind, without it. But the challenges in OSINT’s acquisition
and usage differ from those of the clandestine collection disciplines and their
major U.S. three-letter agency managers. They require the seekers to
determine which sources of information, most of which are out there in the
open and free for the taking, afford analysts what they need in order to make
sense of foreign decisions, perspectives, and likely developments for the
benefit of end-users.
The answer to the question as to whether open source information belongs
in the family of the clandestine collection approaches remains shaded toward
the negative. OSINT is not classified at the point of collection. It is simply
viewed or, if necessary, purchased. It need not be purloined, even if it is
shielded upon taking on an intelligence role. Indeed, open source information
found not useful can be simply discarded into a circular file, whereas
clandestine collection products still require disposal in a shredder or burn bag.
Coining a unique acronym, OSINF (for information vice intelligence),
while perhaps more accurate, remains an unmarketable and tardy
compromise. Suffice it to say that open source information’s potential for
intelligence use is undeniable, even if its definition as another, stand-alone
intelligence discipline—and one even perhaps deserving a separate agency—is
less than convincing.

REFERENCES
1
See John C. Gannon, “The Strategic Use of Open-Source Information,”
Studies in Intelligence, Vol 45, No. 3, 2001, p. 67.
2
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed.
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), p. 1. In this context, recall that in the
practices of the United Nations, there is a profound inclination to shun
“intelligence” by that name (implying the UN condoning spying among
member states) in favor of the more anodyne “information.”
3
Mark M. Lowenthal, “Open-Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Realities,”
in Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and

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718 BOWMAN H. MILLER

Challenges, Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, eds. (Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, 2004), pp. 273–278.
4
Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National
Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 6.
5
The reference to Sims as originator stems from a lecture given in March 2017
by Mark Lowenthal.
6
Jennifer Sims, “What is Intelligence? Information for Decision Makers,” in
U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agenda for Reform, Roy Godson, Ernest
R. May, and Gary Schmitt, eds. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), p. 4.
7
Open Source Collection Officer—Central Intelligence Agency, available at
https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/analytical/open-source-officer-foreign-
media-an, accessed 17 May 2017.
8
See https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/analytical/open-source-officer-for
eign-media-an, accessed 23 May 2017.
9
For one strong view on the need for a separate OSINT agency, see Mark
Lowenthal, “Open-Source Intelligence,” pp. 273–278.
10
U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview, Intelligence Community Information
Sharing Executive, 2013, p. 46.
11
This coinage comes from Lt. Colonel Jennifer Smith-Heys, a member of the
National Intelligence University graduate faculty.
12
Eliot A. Jardines, “Open Source Intelligence,” in The 5 Disciplines of
Intelligence Collection, Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark, eds.
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016), pp. 6–7. Jardines’s is among the most
comprehensive and historical treatments of open source information/
intelligence. For a recent exultation of the value of open sources, see James
M. Davitch, “Open Sources for the Information Age: Or How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Unclassified Data,” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 87, 1
October 2017.
13
Ernest R. May, “The Twenty-First Century Challenge for U.S. Intelligence,” in
Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds.
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p. 8.
14
Although perhaps apochryphal, former CIA Director Allen Dulles, foremost a
collector, reputedly defined an analyst as “a person who takes 49 documents
and creates a 50th.”
15
My observation is based on 50 years in the business of U.S. all-source
intelligence analysis at the national level in more than one agency.
16
See also Bowman H. Miller, “Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis:
Elevate Knowledge in the Equation,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 337–354.
17
Jennifer Sims, “What is Intelligence?,” p. 5.
18
“Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S.
National Security,” International Affairs Review, available at http://www.iar-
gwu.org/node/65, accessed 12 July 2017.
19
In this context, recall the fateful claim made by George C. Scott, playing the
motion picture role of General George Patton when he confronted the Desert

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE 719

Fox, German General Erwin Rommel, with the assertion: “I read your
damn book!”
20
It is useful to note that, unlike U.S. intelligence, British intelligence—
particularly foreign intelligence—remains resistant to incorporating much, if
any, open source information in its multi-agency assessments.
21
Michael Warner, Comments re “What is Intelligence Theory?” in Toward a
Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (Conference Proceedings), Gregory F.
Treverton et al., eds. (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2006),
pp. 2–3.
22
Ibid.
23
In January 2017 Japan launched the “twelfth member of the Information
Gathering Satellite (IGS) series of optical and radar observation platforms … ,”
“Japan pursues military satellite deployment,” available at http://www.
aircosmosinternational.com/japan-pursues-military-satellite-deployment-91901,
accessed 21 March 2017. Mainichi headlined: “Japan Successfully Launches
Intelligence-Gathering Satellite,” available at http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/
200170317/p2g/00m/0dm/069000c, accessed 17 March 2017.
24
For reasons quite unclear to me, Intelligence Community contract personnel
are not required to swear the oath to protect and defend the U.S. Constitution.
25
Author visit to Coca Cola Headquarters, Atlanta, March 1996.
26
“Two Ex-Coke Workers Sentenced in Pepsi Plot Deal,” CNN on-line, 23
May 2007.
27
“NSA Utah Data Center,” Facilities Magazine, 14 September 2011, available at
http://facilitiesmagazine.com/utah/buildings/nsa-utah-data-center, accessed 24
April 2013, and https://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/07/01/seven-stats-to-
know-about-nsas-utah-data-center-as-it-nears-completion, accessed 4
October 2017.
28
Amanda Hess, “Open Secrets,” The New York Times Magazine, 14 May 2017,
pp. 11, 13.

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