Moral: Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary Issues

MORAL REASONING, THEORY, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
001 NG
ETHICS
Moral Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary Issues

SIXTH EDITION
001 NG
ETHICS
Moral Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary Issues

SIXTH EDITION
Lewis Vaughn
~
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Title: DOing ethics: moral reasoning, theory, and contemporary issues / Lewis Vaughn.
Description: Sixth edition. I New York : W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., (2022] I Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021022106 I ISBN 9780393532517 (pbk) I ISBN 9780393885934 (epub)
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CONTENTS IN BRIEF
PREFACE xxiii
PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
CHAPTER 1 Ethics and the Examined life 3
CHAPTER 2 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism 20
PART 2: MORAL REASONING
CHAPTER 3 Evaluating Moral Arguments 45
CHAPTER 4 The Power of Moral Theories 71
PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY
CHAPTER 5 Consequentialist Theories: Maximize the Good 93
CHAPTER 6 Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your DUty 1 31
CHAPTER 7 Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 164
CHAPTER 8 Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 182
PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
CHAPTER 9 Abortion 221
CHAPTER 10 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 275
CHAPTER 11 Delivering Health Care 313
CHAPTER 12 The Ethical Treatment of Animals 338
CHAPTER 13 Environmental Ethics 382
v
vi 0 CONTENTS IN BRIEF
CHAPTER 14 Racism, Equality, and Discrimination 434
CHAPTER 15 Sexual Morality 488
CHAPTER 16 Tolerance, Civility, and Free Speech 535
CHAPTER 17 Drugs, Guns, and Personal Liberty 577
CHAPTER 18 Capital Punishment 624
CHAPTER 19 War, Terrorism, and Torture 657
CHAPTER 20 The Ethics of Immigration 739
CHAPTER 21 Global Economic Justice 783

CONTENTS
PREFACE xxiii
PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
CHAPTER 1 Ethics and the Examined Life 3
The Ethical Landscape 5

The Elements of Ethics 6
The Preenlinence of Reason 6
[21 QUICK REVIEW 7
The Universal Perspective 7
The Principle of lInpartiality 7
The DOIninance of Moral Nornls 8
Religion and Morality 8
Believers Need Moral Reasoning 9
When Conflicts Arise, Ethics Steps In 9
Moral Philosophy Enables Productive Discourse 9
[21 CRITICAL THOUGHT: ETHICS, RELIGION, AND TOUGH MORAL
ISSUES 10
SUMMARY 11
KEY TERMS 12
REVIEW QUESTIONS 1 2
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1 2
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 1 3
FURTHER READING 1 3
READINGS
What Is the Socratic Method? by Christopher Phillips 14
The Euthyphro by Plato 16
vii
viii 0 CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism 20
Subjective Relativism 21
o QUICK REVIEW 21
~ JUDGE NOT? 22
Cultural Relativism 23
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: "FEMALE CIRCUMCISION"
AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM 24
Emotivism 28
SUMMARY 30
KEY TERMS 31
REVIEW QUESTIONS 31
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 31
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 32
FURTHER READING 32
READINGS
Anthropology and the Abnormal by Ruth Benedict 33
Why Morality Is Not Relative by James Rachels 3 5
PART 2: MORAL REASONING
CHAPTER 3 Evaluating Moral Arguments 45

Claims and Arguments 45
Arguments Good and Bad 47
o CRITICAL THOUGHT: THE MORALITY OF CRITICAL THINKING 48
Implied Premises 5 1
o QUICK REVIEW 51
Deconstructing Arguments 52
Moral Statements and Arguments 55
Testing Moral Premises 58
Assessing Nonmoral Premises 59
o QUICK REVIEW 59
CONTENTS 0 ix
Avoiding Bad Arguments 60

Begging the Question 60
Equivocation 61
Appeal to Authority 61
~ ApPEAL TO EMOTION 61
Slippery Slope 62
Faulty Analogy 62
Appeal to Ignorance 62
Straw Man 63
Appeal to the Person 63
Hasty Generalization 63
~ QUICK REVIEW 64
Cognitive Biases 64
Confirmation Bias 64
Availability Error 65
Motivated Reasoning 65
The Dunning-Kruger Effect 65
~ QUICK REVIEW 66
Writing and Speaking about Moral Issues 66

SUMMARY 68
KEY TERMS 68
REVIEW QUESTIONS 69
ARGUMENT EXERCISES 69
FURTHER READING 70
CHAPTER 4 The Power of Moral Theories 71
Theories of Right and Wrong 71

~ MORAL THEORIES VERSUS MORAL CODES 72
Major Theories 73
~ QUICK REVIEW 73
Consequentialist Theories 7 3
Nonconsequentialist Theories 74
x 0 CONTENTS
Evaluating Theories 75
o QUICK REVIEW 76
Criterion 1: Consistency with Considered Moral/udgl11ents 77
Criterion 2: Consistency with Our Moral Experiences 77
o CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS 78

Criterion 3: Usefulness in Moral Problen1 Solving 78
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: A 100 PERCENT ALL-NATURAL THEORY 79
o QUICK REVIEW 80
Devising a Coherent Moral Theory 80

Moral Common Sense 80
Building a Moral Theol)' 81
Prima Facie Principles 81
Three Rules 8 3
[2j QUICK REVIEW 86
Self-Evidence 86
SUMMARY 87
KEY TERMS 87
REVIEW QUESTIONS 88
ETHICAL DILEMMAS 88
FURTHER READING 89
PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY
CHAPTER 5 Consequentialist Theories: Maximize the Good 93
Ethical Egoism 93
Applying the Theory 94
Evaluating the Theory 9 5
lZ! CAN ETHICAL EGOISM BE ADVOCATED? 97
~ QUICK REVIEW 99
Utilitarianism 99
[2j CRITICAL THOUGHT: HAPPINESS AND THE uEXPERIENCE
MACHINE" 102
~
.•
CONTENTS 0 xi
Applying the Theory 1 03

~ PETER SINGER, UTILITARIAN 104
Learning from Utilitarianism 1 08
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: CROSS-SPECIES TRANSPLANTS: WHAT WOULD A
UTILITARIAN Do? 109
Social Contract Theory 1 09

~ QUICK REVIEW 110
Hobbes's Theory 11 0
Evaluating the Theory 111
SUMMARY 113
KEY TERMS 1 1 3
REVIEW QUESTIONS 114

ETHICAL DILEMMAS 114
FURTHER READING 115
READINGS
Egoism and Altruism by Louis P. Pojman 116
Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill 120
Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes 1 24
CHAPTER 6 Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your Duty 1 31
Kant's Ethics 1 31
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: SIZING UP THE GOLDEN RULE 133
Applying the Theory 1 34

Evaluating the Theory 135
~ KANT, RESPECT, AND PERSONAL RIGHTS 136
Learning from Kant's Theory 137

Natural Law Theory 1 38
Applying the Theory 140
~ QUICK REVIEW 140
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: DOUBLE EFFECT AND THE "TROLLEY
PROBLEM" 141
xii 0 CONTENTS

Learning from Natural Law 142
SUMMARY 143
KEY TERMS 1 43
FURTHER READING 145
READINGS
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals by Immanuel Kant 145
A Simplified Account of Kant's Ethics by Onora O'Neill 1 54
What Makes Right Acts Right? by W. D. Ross 158
CHAPTER 7 Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 164
The Ethics of Virtue 1 64

~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: LEARNING VIRTUES IN THE CLASSROOM 165
Virtue in Action 1 66
Evaluating Virtue Ethics 1 66
~ QUICK REVIEW 167

o CRITICAL THOUGHT: WARRIOR VIRTUES AND MORAL
DISAGREEMENTS 1 68
Learning from Virtue Ethics 1 69
SUMMARY 169
KEY TERMS 1 70
FURTHER READING 1 71
READINGS
Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle 1 7 1
Virtue Ethics by Julia Driver 180
CONTENTS 0 xiii
CHAPTER 8 Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 182
Feminist Ethics 1 83
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: FEMINIST ETHICS IN HISTORY 183
The Ethics of Care 184

~ QUICK REVIEW 185
SUMMARY 185
KEY TERMS 1 85
FURTHER READING 1 86
READINGS
Feminist Ethics by Alison M. Jaggar 187
The Need for More Than Justice by Annette C. Baier 1 95
The Ethics of Care as Moral Theory by Virginia Held 203
What Is Feminist Ethics? by Hilde Lindemann 2 12
PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
CHAPTER 9 Abortion 221
Issue File: Background 221

~ ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: FACTS AND FIGURES 223
Moral Theories 224

~ MAJORITY OPINION IN ROE V. WADE 225
~ ABORTION AND THE SCRIPTURES 226
Moral Arguments 227

~ QUICK REVIEW 227
~ STATE ABORTION LAWS 229
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: FACT-CHECKING ABORTION CLAIMS 231
~ ABORTIONS LATER IN PREGNANCY 233
SUMMARY 234
xiv 0 CONTENTS
KEY TERMS 2 3 5
FURTHER READING 236
READINGS
A Defense of Abortion by Judith Jarvis Thomson 238
On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion by Mary Anne Warren 248
Why Abortion Is Immoral by Don Marquis 2 57
Virtue Theory and Abortion by Rosalind Hursthouse 269
CHAPTER 10 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 275

~ THE DEATH OF KAREN ANN QUINLAN 276
Issue File: Background 2 76

[& LANDMARK COURT RULINGS 278
~ QUICK REVIEW 279
Moral Theories 279

[& CRITICAL THOUGHT: DR. KEVORKIAN AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE 281
Moral Arguments 281

~ ACTIVE EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-AsSISTED SUICIDE
IN EUROPE 283
~ PUBLIC OPINION AND EUTHANASIA 284

SUMMARY 286
KEY TERMS 286
FURTHER READING 287
CONTENTS 0 xv
READINGS
Active and Passive Euthanasia by James Rachels 29 1
Voluntary Active Euthanasia by Dan W. Brock 29 5
Killing and Allowing to Die by Daniel Callahan 303
Euthanasia for Disabled People? by Liz Carr 305
Why Doctors Must Not Kill by Leon R. Kass 307
CHAPTER 11 Delivering Health Care 313
Issue File: Background 3 1 3

~ HEALTH CARE BY COUNTRY 31 5
~ QUICK REVIEW 31 6
Moral Theories 3 1 6
~ THE LORE OF HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS 317
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: COMPARING HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 318
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: ALLOCATING A COVID- I 9 VACCINE 319
Moral Arguments 321
SUMMARY 322
KEY TERMS 322

FURTHER READING 323
READINGS
Autonomy, Equality and a Just Health Care System by Kai Nielsen 325
Is There a Right to Health Care and, If So, What Does It Encompass? by Norman
Daniels 331
CHAPTER 12 The Ethical Treatment of Animals 338

[21 CRITICAL THOUGHT: WHAT'S WRONG WITH EATING MEAT? 341
o CRITICAL THOUGHT: USING ANIMALS TO TEST CONSUMER
PRODUCTS 342
xvi 0 CONTENTS
~ QUICK REVIEW 343
Moral Theories 343

~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: SHOULD WE EXPERIMENT ON ORPHANED
BABIES? 345
Moral Arguments 346

SUMMARY 347
KEY TERMS 348
FURTHER READING 348
READINGS
All Animals Are Equal by Peter Singer 3 52
The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan 3 62
Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position by Mary Anne Warren 3 69
The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research by Carl Cohen 3 7 5
CHAPTER 13 Environmental Ethics 382

~ CLIMATE CHANGE: How WE KNOW IT'S REAL 385
Moral Theories 3 87
hfJ ECOFEMINISM 388
h;§ QUICK REVIEW 389
Moral Arguments 389
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: SHOULD PANDAS PAY THE PRICE? 390
~ CARBON FOOTPRINTS 392
SUMMARY 393
KEY TERMS 393

CONTENTS 0 xvii
FURTHER READING 394

READINGS
People or Penguins by William F. Baxter 3 97
It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations by Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong 401
Are All Species Equal? by David Schmidtz 41 3
The Land Ethic by Aldo Leopold 420
A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change by Stephen
Gardiner 424
CHAPTER 14 Racism, Equality, and Discrimination 434

Race 435
~ SLAVERY AND RACISM IN U.S. HISTORY 437
Racism 439
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: SLAVERY AND RACE 439
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: WHITE PRIVILEGE 441
~ MICROAGGRESSIONS 443
Racist Acts and Motives 444
Justice and Respect 445
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: REPARATIONS 448
~ QUICK REVIEW 449
Moral Theories 450

~ COVID-I9 EXPOSES AND DEEPENS RACIAL INEQUALITIES 451
Moral Arguments 452

SUMMARY 454
KEY TERMS 455
FURTHER READING 456
xviii 0 CONTENTS
READINGS
Racisms by Kwame Anthony Appiah 459
Racism: What It Is and What It Isn't by Lawrence Blum 469
Dear White America by George Yancy 478
Uses and Abuses of the Discourse of White Privilege by Naomi Zack 481
How Not to Accuse Someone of Prejudice by Emrys Westacott 484
CHAPTER 1 5 Sexual Morality 488

Sexual Behavior 488
o VITAL STATS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 489
Campus Sexual Assault 490
o QUICK REVIEW 491
o CRITICAL THOUGHT: PROVING SEXUAL ASSAULT 492
Moral Theories 493

Moral Arguments 494
SUMMARY 496
KEY TERMS 497
FURTHER READING 498
READINGS
Plain Sex by Alan H. Goldman 500
"Why Shouldn't Tommy and Jim Have Sex?" by John Corvino 509
Seduction, Rape, and Coercion by Sarah Conly 5 1 7
Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification by Raja Halwani 527
CHAPTER 16 Tolerance, Civility, and Free Speech 535

Issue File: Background 5 3 6
[Zl THE INTOLERANCE OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES 539
CONTENTS 0 xix
Moral Theories 543

~ QUICK REVIEW 543
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Is HATE SPEECH VIOLENCE? 544
Moral Arguments 545
SUMMARY 545
KEY TERMS 546
FURTHER READING 547
READINGS
When Protest and Speech Collide by David Estlund 550
A Tolerant Society by Peter Balint 561
Putting Civility in Its Place by Sigal R. Ben-Porath 569
CHAPTER 17 Drugs, Guns, and Personal Liberty 577

Drugs: Social Harms versus Personal Freedom 577
[2J CRITICAL THOUGHT: DOES LEGALIZING MEDICAL MARIJUANA
ENCOURAGE USE AMONG TEENAGERS? 578
~ DIVERSE VIEWS ON LEGALIZING MARIJUANA 579
Gun Ownership: Security versus Individual Rights 580
~ QUICK REVIEW 580
~ VITAL STATS: GUNS IN THE UNITED STATES 581
~ SURVEY: VIEWS OF U.S. ADULTS ON GUN POLICY 582
Moral Theories 583

Moral Arguments 584
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: WHO Is TO BLAME FOR THE QPIOID CRISIS? 585
~ QUICK REVIEW 588
SUMMARY 588
KEY TERMS 589

xx 0 CONTENTS

FURTHER READING 590
READINGS
The Ethics of Addiction by Thomas Szasz 592
Against the Legalization of Drugs by James Q. Wilson 601
Gun Control by Hugh LaFollette 61 0
Political Philosophy and the Gun Control Debate: What Would Bentham, Mill,
and Nozick Have to Say? by Stacey Nguyen 62 1
CHAPTER 1 8 Capital Punishment 624

Moral Theories 626
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: THE MORALITY OF BOTCHED EXECUTIONS 628
[21 QUICK REVIEW 630
Moral Arguments 631

[2f CRITICAL THOUGHT: DIFFERENT CASES, SAME PUNISHMENT 632
SUMMARY 633
KEY TERMS 634

FURTHER READING 634
READINGS
The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense by Ernest van den Haag 63 7
Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag by Jeffrey H.
Reiman 641
The Case against the Death Penalty by Hugo Adam Bedau 648
CHAPTER 19 War, Terrorism, and Torture 657
;Ll CRITICAL THOUGHT: PREEMPTIVE WAR ON IRAQ 660

CONTENTS 0 xxi
Moral Theories 667

Moral Arguments 669
~ QUICK REVIEW 670
SUMMARY 673
KEY TERMS 674
FURTHER READING 675
READINGS
Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists by James P. Sterba 678
Drones, Ethics, and the Armchair Soldier by John Kaag 687
Can Terrorism Be Morally Justified? by Stephen Nathanson 689
The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist by Alan M. Dershowitz 697
My Tortured Decision by Ali Soufan 706
On Following Orders in an Unjust War by David Estlund 707
Proportionality in the Morality of War by Thomas Hurka 722
CHAPTER 20 The Ethics of Immigration 739

~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: DEPORTING CHILDREN 743
~ QUICK REVIEW 744
Moral Theories 744

Moral Arguments 744
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: ACCEPTING OR REJECTING REFUGEES 745
~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: CONDITIONS AT IMMIGRANT DETENTION
CENTERS 746
SUMMARY 747
KEY TERMS 747
FURTHER READING 748
xxii 0 CONTENTS
READINGS
The Morality of Migration by Seyla Benhabib 751
Selecting Immigrants by David Miller 7 5 3
Immigration and Freedom of Association by Christopher Heath Wellman 759
Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer by Sarah Fine 77 1
CHAPTER 21 Global Economic Justice 783

Moral Theories 78 5
~ ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 786
~ QUICK REVIEW 787
Moral Arguments 787

SUMMARY 788
KEY TERMS 789

FURTHER READING 789
READINGS
Famine, Affluence, and Morality by Peter Singer 792
World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The Case Against Singer by john Arthur 798
The Case for Aid by jeffrey Sachs 801
A Theory of Justice by john Rawls 804
The Entitlement Theory of Justice by Robert Nozick 811
GLOSSARY G-1
ANSWERS TO ARGUMENT EXERCISES A-1
NOTES N-1
INDEX 1-1
PREFACE
This sixth edition of Doing Ethics contains exten- NEW FEATURES

sive additions, updates, and improvements to the
previous version. The aims that have shaped this • A substantially revised chapter on systemic rac-
text from the beginning have not changed: to help ism, racial justice, slavery and race, the protests
students (1) see why ethics matters to society and for racial justice sparked by the death of George
to themselves; (2) understand core concepts (theo- Floyd, police violence, racist acts and motives,
ries, principles, values, virtues, and the like); (3) white privilege, microaggressions, reparations,
become familiar with the background (scientific, affirmative action, and the disproportionate
legal, and otherwise) of contemporary moral prob- impact of COVID-19 on people of color: Chap-
lems; and (4) know how to apply critical reasoning ter 14-Racism, Equality, and Discrimination.
to those problems-to assess moral judgments and • A new chapter on political and social tolerance,
principles, construct and evaluate moral arguments, tolerance and intolerance in political systems,
and apply and critique moral theories. This book, the paradox of tolerance, liberal and conser-
then, tries hard to provide the strongest possible vative intolerance, social civility and incivil-
support to teachers of applied ethics who want stu- ity, online incivility, intellectual civility, hate
dents, above all, to think for themselves and compe- speech, speech codes, and speech and violence:
tently do what is often required of morally mature Chapter 16-Tolerance, Technology, and Civil-
persons-that is, to do ethics. ity. It includes three readings by notable toler-
These goals are reflected in the book's extensive ance and civility theorists.
introdUctions to concepts, cases, and issues; its • Sixteen new readings to supplement the already
large collection of readings and exercises; and its extensive collection of essays.
chapter-by-chapter coverage of moral reasoning-
• A new section in Chapter 3-Evaluating Moral
perhaps the most thorough introduction to these
Arguments, on cognitive biases including moti-
skills available in an applied ethics text. This latter
vated reasoning, confirmation bias, availability
theme gets systematic treatment in five chapters,
error, and the Dunning-Kruger effect.
threads prominently throughout all the others,
and is reinforced everywhere by "Critical Thought" • Many new text boxes, including "Happiness and
text boxes prompting students to apply critical the 'Experience Machine,'" "Abortions Later in
thinking to real debates and cases. The point of all Pregnancy," "The Lore of Health Care Propos-
this is to help students not just study ethics but to als," "What's Wrong with Eating Meat?" "Eco-
become fully involved in the ethical enterprise and feminism," "Carbon Footprints," "Slavery and
the moral life. Race," "Reparations," "COVID-19 Exposes and
xxiii
xxiv 0 PREFACE
Deepens Racial Inequities," "Who Is to Blame and dealing with common argument fallacies and
for the Opioid Crisis?" "Allocating a COVID-19 cognitive biases.
Vaccine," "Deporting Children," "Accepting or Chapter 4 explains how moral theories work
Rejecting Refugees," "Conditions at Immigrant and how they relate to other important elements
Detention Centers," "Is Hate Speech Violence?" in moral experience: considered judgments, moral
and "Economic Inequality in the United States." arguments, moral principles and rules, and cases
• Updates on state abortion laws, active eutha- and issues. It reviews major theories and shows how
nasia and physician-assisted suicide in Europe, students can evaluate them using plaUSible criteria.
health coverage and the Affordable Care Act Part 3 (Theories of Morality, Chapters 5-8) cov-
(ACA), health care in wealthy countries, the ers key theories in depth-utilitarianism, ethical
treatment of animals in the meat industry, pub- egOism, social contract theory, Kant's theory, nat-
lic opinion on legalizing marijuana, gun own- ural law theory, virtue ethics, feminist ethiCS, and
ership and gun deaths in the United States, use the ethics of care. Students see how each theory is
of the death penalty, racial bias in capital pun- applied to moral issues and how the strengths and
ishment, and conditions at immigrant deten- weaknesses of theories are revealed by applying the
tion centers. criteria of evaluation.
In Part 4 (Ethical Issues), each of thirteen chap-
• New readings bringing the total number of
essays by women writers to seventeen. ters explores a timely moral issue through discus-
sion and relevant readings: abortion, euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide, health care, animal
ORGANIZATION welfare, environmental ethics, racism and equality,
sexual morality, free speech on campus, drug use,
Part 1 (Fundamentals) prepares students for the tasks gun ownership, capital punishment, tolerance,
~numerated above. Chapter 1 explains why ethics is incivility, war, terrorism, torture, immigration, and
~mportant and why thinking critically about ethical global economic justice. Every chapter supplies
ISsues is esse n t'Ia1 to the examIned
. life. It introduces legal, Scientific, and other background information
the .field of m ora1p h'Ilosophy, defines and illustrates
on the issue; discusses how rna j or theories have
baSIC termin 1 .
o ogy, clanfies the connection between been applied to the problem; examines arguments
religion
. and m l'
ora lty, and explains why moral rea- that have been used in the debate; and includes
sonIng is cru . I
CIa to moral maturity and personal additional cases for analysis with questions. The
freedom . Chapte r 2'InvestIgates
. a favorite doctnne.
readings are a mix of well-known essays and sur-
of undergraduates-ethical relativism-and exam- prising new voices, both classic and contemporary.
ines its distant cousin , emoteIVIsm..
Part 2 (Moral Reasoning) consists of Chapters
3 and 4. Chapter 3 starts by reassuring students PEDAGOGICAL
that moral reasoning is neither alien nor difficult
but. is simply ordinary critical reasoning applied to In addition to "Critical Thought" boxes and "Ethi-
ethICS. They've seen this kind of reasoning before cal Dilemmas," the end-of-chapter questions, and
and done it before. Thus the chapter focuses on the key terms, there are other pedagogical devices:
~dentifying, devising, dia~ramming, and evaluat- • "QUick Review" boxes that reiterate key points
Ing moral arguments and encourages practice and or terms mentioned in previous pages
competence in finding implied premises, testing • Text boxes that discuss additional topics or
moral premises, assessing nonmoral premises, issues related to main chapter material
PREFACE 0 xxv
• Chapter summaries (University of Alabama at Birmingham), Harry

• Suggestions for further reading for each issues Adams (Prairie View A&M University), Alex Aguado
chapter (University of North Alabama), Edwin Aiman
(University of Houston), Daniel Alvarez (Colorado
• Glossary
State University), Peter Amato (Drexel University),
Robert Bass (Coastal Carolina University), Ken
RESOURCES Beals (Mary Baldwin College), Helen Becker (Shep-
The sixth edition of DOing Ethics is accompanied herd University), Paul Bloomfield (University of
by InQuizitive, Norton's award-winning adaptive Connecticut), Robyn Bluhm (Old Dominion Uni-
online quizzing program. InQuizitive activities moti- versity), Kristin Borgwald (Miami Dade College),
vate students to learn the core concepts and theories Vanda Bozicevic (Bergen Community College),
of moral reasoning so that they're prepared to think Brent Braga (Northland Community and Technical
critically about ethical issues. There are thirteen new College), joy Branch (Southern Union State Com-
InQuizitive activities in the sixth edition , each cor- munity College), Barbara A. Brown (Community
responding to a chapter in Part 4 (Ethical Issues). College of Allegheny County), Mark Raymond
These new activities are designed to equip students Brown (University of Ottawa), David C. Burris (Ari-
with the theoretical and factual frameworks neces- zona Western College), Matthew Burstein (Wash-
sary to discuss and debate these issues. The text is ington and Lee University), Gabriel R. Camacho
also supported by a full test bank, lecture slides, and (El Paso Community College), jay Campbell (St.
a coursepack of discussion questions, flashcards, and Louis Community College at Meramec), Kenneth
other content that loads into most learning man- Carlson (Northwest Iowa Community College),
agement systems. Access these resources at digital. jeffrey Carr (Illinois State University), Alan Clark
wwnorton.com/ doingethics6. (Del Mar College), Andrew J. Cohen (Georgia State
University), Elliot D. Cohen (Indian River State
College), Robert Colter (Centre College), Timo-
EB001( thy Conn (Sierra College), Guy Crain (University
Norton Ebooks give students and instructors an of Oklahoma), Sharon Crasnow (Norco College),
enhanced reading experience at a fraction of the Kelso Cratsley (University of Massachusetts, Bos-
cost of a print textbook. Students are able to have ton), George Cronk (Bergen Community College),
an active reading experience and can take notes, Kevin DeCoux (Minnesota West Community and
bookmark, search, highlight, and even read offline. Technical College), Lara Denis (Agnes Scott Col-
As an instructor, you can even add your own notes lege), Steve Dickerson (South Puget Sound Com-
for students to see as they read the text. Norton munity College), Nicholas Diehl (Sacramento
Ebooks can be viewed on-and synced among-all City College), Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University),
computers and mobile devices. Access the ebook Peter Dlugos (Bergen Community College), Matt
for Doing Ethics at digital. wwnorton.com/ Drabek (UniverSity of Iowa), David Drebushenko
doingethics6. (University of Southern Indiana), Clint Dunagan
(Northwest Vista College), Paul Eckstein (Bergen
Community College), Andrew Fiala (California
AC1(NOWlEDGMENTS State University, Fresno), Stephen Finlay (Univer-
The silent partners in this venture are the many sity of Southern California), Matthew Fitzsimmons
reviewers who helped in countless ways to make (University of North Alabama), Tammie Foltz
the book better. They include Marshall Abrams (Des MOines Area Community College), Tim Fout
xxvi 0 PREFACE
(University of Louisville), Dimitria Gatzia (Uni- Luke Manning (Auburn University), Ron Martin
versity of Akron), Candace Gauthier (University (Lynchburg College), Michael McKeon (Barry Uni-
of North Carolina, Wilmington), Manuela Gomez versity), Katherine Mendis (Hunter College, CUNY),
(EI Paso Community College), Mark Greene (Uni- joshua Mills-Knutsen (Indiana University South-
versity of Delaware), Kevin Guilfoy (Carroll Uni- east), Michael Monge (Long Beach City College),
versity), Katherine Guin (The College at Brockport; Louisa Lee Moon (Mira Costa College), Eric Moore
SUNY), Meredith Gunning (University of Mas- (Longwood University), jon S. Moran (Southwest
sachusetts, Boston), Don Habibi (University of Missouri State University), Dale Murray (Virginia
North Carolina, Wilmington), Barbara M. Hands Commonwealth University), Elizabeth Murray
(University of North Carolina, Greensboro), Craig (Loyola Marymount University), Richard Mussel-
Hanks (Texas State University), Jane Haproff (Sierra white (North Carolina Central University), Thomas
College), Ed Harris (Texas A&M University), Justin Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College), jay Newhard
Harmon (Southern Oregon University), Carol Hay (East Carolina University), Marcella Norling
(University of Massachusetts Lowell), Blake Heffner (Orange Coast College), Charles L. North (Southern
(Raritan Valley Community College), Marko Hilg- New Hampshire University), Robert F. O'Connor
ersom (Lethbridge Community College), Andrew J. (Texas State University), Jeffrey P. Ogle (Metropoli-
Hill (St. Philip's College),John Holder III (Pensacola tan State University of Denver), Don Olive (Roane
Junior College), Mark Hollifield (Clayton College State Community College), Leonard Olson (Cali-
and State University), Margaret Houck (University fornia State University, Fresno), Matthew Pamental
of South Carolina), Michael Howard (University (University of Tennesse Knoxville), jessica Payson
of Maine, Orono), Frances Howard-Snyder (West- (Bryn Mawr College), Gregory E. Pence (University
ern Washington University), Kenneth Howarth of Alabama), Donald Petkus (Indiana University
(Mercer County Community College), Louis F. School of Public and Environmental Affairs), Tri-
Howe, Jr. (Naugatuck Valley Community College), sha Philips (Mississippi State University), Grant
Kyle Hubbard (Saint Anselm College), Robert Potts (Austin Community College), Thomas M.
Hull (Western Virginia Wesleyan College), Gary Powers (University of Delaware), Marjorie Price
Jason (California State University, Fullerton), Amy (University of Alabama), Netty Provost (Indiana
Jeffers (Owens Community College), Vicki jenkins University, Kokomo), Elisa Rapaport (Molloy Col-
(Ivy Tech Community College, Timothy jessen (Ivy lege), Michael Redmond (Bergen Community Col-
Tech Community College, Bloomington), john lege), Daniel Regan (Villanova University), joseph
johnston (College of the Redwoods), Marc jolley j. Rogers (University of Texas, San Antonio), john
(Mercer University), Frederik Kaufman (Ithaca Returra (Lackawanna College), Mary Ann Sellars
College), Thomas D. Kennedy (Berry College), (Ivy Tech Community College), Robert M. Seltzer
W. Glenn Kirkconnell (Santa Fe College), Don- (Western Illinois University), Eric Severson (Bos-
ald Knudsen (Montgomery County Community ton University and Seattle University), Edward
College), Gilbert Kohler (Shawnee Community Sherline (University of Wyoming), Aeon J. Skoble
College), Thomas Larson (Saint Anselm College), (Bridgewater Community College), Susan Smith
Matt Lawrence (Long Beach City College), Clayton (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) Eric Snider (Lan-
Littlejohn (Southern Methodist University), jessica sing Community College), Eric Sotnak (University
Logue (University of Portland), Ian D. MacKinnon of Akron), Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University),
(The University of Akron), Tim Madigan (St. john Piers H.G. Stephens (University of Georgia), Grant
Fisher College), Ernani Magalhaes (West Virginia Sterling (Eastern Illinois University), John Stilwell
University), Daniel Malotky (Greensboro College), (University of Texas at Dallas), Tyler Suggs (Virginia
PREFACE 0 xxvii
Tech), Michele Svatos (Eastfield College), David University), Matt Waldschlagel (University of
Svolba (Fitchburg State University), Allen Thomp- North Carolina, Wilmington), Steve Wall (Hillsbor-
son (Virginia Commonwealth University), Peter B. ough Community College), Bill Warnken (Granite
Trumbull (Madison College), Donald Turner (Nash- State College), jamie Carlin Watson (Young Har-
ville State Community College), julie C. Van Camp ris College), Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College),
(California State University, Long Beach), Nicholas Cheryl Wertheimer (Butler Community College),
VanHorn (The Community College of Baltimore Monique Whitaker (Hunter College, CUNY), Phil-
County) Michelle Rehwinkel Vasilinda (Tallahas- lip Wiebe (Trinity Western University), jonathan
see Community College), Kris Vigneron (Columbus Wight (University of Richmond), john Yanovitch
State Community College), Sarah Vincent (Florida (Molloy College), Steven Zusman (Waubonsee
State University), Christine Vitrano (Brooklyn Community College), and Matt Zwolinski (Univer-
College, CUNY), Mark Vopat (Youngstown State sity of San Diego). Thank you all.
DOl N G
ETHICS
Moral Reasoning, TheorYr and Contemporary Issues
SIXTH EDITION
PART
-----------~~.
~
1 ~~----------
~
~'n~
Fundamentals
CHAPTER 1
Ethics and the Examined Life
Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the philosophi- all ethical concepts are irrelevant or empty, you
cal study of morality. Morality refers to beliefs assume a particular view-a theory, in the broadest
concerning right and wrong, good and bad- sense-about morality and its place in your life. If
beliefs that can include judgments, values, rules, at some point you are intellectually brave enough
principles, and theories. These beliefs help guide to wonder whether your moral beliefs rest on some
our actions, define our values, and give us reasons coherent supporting considerations, you will see
for being the persons we are. (Ethical and moral, that you cannot even begin to sort out such con-
the adjective forms, are often used to mean siderations without-again-doing ethics. In any
simply "having to do with morality," and ethics case, in your life you must deal with the rest of the
and morality are sometimes used to refer to the world, which turns on moral conflict and resolu-
moral norms of a specific group or individual, as tion, moral decision and debate.
in "Greek ethics" or "Russell's morality.") Eth- What is at stake when we do ethics? In an
ics, then, addresses the powerful question that important sense, the answer is everything we hold
Socrates formulated twenty-four hundred years dear. Ethics is concerned with values-specifically,
ago: How ought we to live? 1noral values. Through the sifting and weighing of
The scope and continued relevance of this moral values we determine what the most impor-
query suggest something compelling about ethics: tant things are in our lives, what is worth living for,
you cannot escape it. You cannot run away from all and what is worth dying for. We decide what is the
the choices, feelings, and actions that accompany greatest good, what goals we should pursue in life,
ideas about right and wrong, good and bad-ideas what virtues we should cultivate, what duties we
that persist in your culture and in your mind. After should or should not fulfill, what value we should
all, for much of your life, you have been assimilat- put on human life, and what pain and perils we
ing, modifying, or rejecting the ethical norms you should be willing to endure for notions such as the
inherited from your family, community, and soci- common good, justice, and rights.
ety. Unless you are very unusual, from time to time Does it matter whether the state executes a
you deliberate about the rightness or wrongness of criminal who has the mental capacity of a ten-
actions, embrace or reject particular moral prin- year-old? Does it matter who actually writes the
ciples or codes, judge the goodness of your char- term paper you turn in and represent as your own?
acter or intentions (or someone else's), perhaps Does it matter whether we can easily save a drown-
even question (and agonize over) the soundness ing child but casually decide not to? Does it matter
of your own moral outlook when it conflicts with whether young girls in Africa undergo painful geni-
that of others. In other words, you are involved tal mutilation for reasons of custom or religion? Do
in ethics-you do ethics. Even if you try to remove these actions and a million others just as contro-
yourself from the ethical realm by insisting that versial matter at all? Most of us-regardless of our
3
4 0 PART 1: FUNDAMENTALS
opinion on these issues-would say that they mat- to him by his society, he nlay very well be a fine
ter a great deal. If they matter, then ethics matters, embodiment of the rules of his culture and accept
because these are ethical concerns requiring careful them with certainty. But he will lack the ability to
reflection using concepts and reasoning peculiar to defend his beliefs by rational argument against crit-
ethics. icism. What happens when he encounters others
But even though ethics is inescapable and who also have very strong beliefs that contradict
important, you are still free to take the easy way his? "He will feel lost and bewildered," Taylor says,
out, and many people do. You are free l10t to think and his confusion nlight leave him disillusioned
too deeply or too systematically about ethical con- about morality. "Unable to give an objective, rea-
cerns. You can simply embrace the moral beliefs soned justification for his own convictions, he may
and norms given to you by your family and your turn from dogmatic certainty to total skepticism.
SOCiety. You can accept them without question And from total skepticism it is but a short step to
or serious examination. In other words, you can an 'amoral' life .... Thus the person who begins by
try not to do ethics. This approach can be simple accepting moral beliefs blindly can end up denying
and painless-at least for a while-but it has some all morality." 1
drawbacks. There are other easy roads-roads that also
First, it undermines your personal freedom. If bypass critical and thoughtful scrutiny of morality.
you accept and never question the moral beliefs We can describe most of them as various forms of
handed to you by your culture, then those beliefs are subjectivism, a topic that we exanline closely in the
not really yours-and they, not you, control the path next chapter. You may decide, for example, that
you take in life. Only if you critically examine these you can establish all your moral beliefs by simply
beliefs yourself and decide for yourself whether they consulting your feelings. In situations calling for
have merit will they be truly yours. Only then will moral judgments, you let your emotions be your
you be in charge of your own choices and actions. guide. If it feels right, it is right. Alternatively, you
Second, the no-questions-asked approach inc- may come to believe that moral realities are relative
r~ases the chances that your responses to moral to each person, a view known as slIiJjective relativ-
dIlemmas or contradictions will be incomplete, iSlll (also covered in the next chapter). That is, you
confused, or mistaken. Sometimes in real life moral think that what a person believes or approves of
codes or rules do not fit the situations at hand, determines the rightness or wrongness of actions. If
or moral principles conflict with one another, or you believe that abortion is wrong, then it is wrong.
entirely new circumstances are not covered by any If you believe it is right, then it is right.
moral policy at all. Solving these problems requires But these facile roads through ethical terrain are
~omething that a hand-me-down morality does not no better than blindly accepting existing norms.
Include: the intellectual tools to critically evaluate Even if you want to take the subjectivist route,
(and reevaluate) existing moral beliefs. you still need to examine it critically to see if there
Third, if there is such a thing as intellectual are good reasons for choosing it-otherWise your
moral growth, you are unlikely to find it on the safe choice is arbitrary and therefore not really yours.
~oute. To not do ethics is to stay locked in a kind of And unless you thoughtfully consider the mer-
Intellectual limbo, where exploration in ethics and its of moral beliefs (including subjectivist beliefs),
personal moral progress are barely possible. your chances of being wrong about them are
The philosopher Paul Taylor suggests that there substantial.
is yet another risk in taking the easy road. If some- Ethics does not give us a royal road to moral
one blindly embraces the morality bequeathed truth. Instead, it shows us how to ask critical
CHAPTER 1: ETHICS AND THE EXAMINED LIFE 0 5
questions about morality and systematically seek to approach the subject. The first division is
answers supported by good reasons. This is a tall normative ethics-the study of the principles,
order because, as we have seen, many of the ques- rules, or theories that guide our actions and judg-
tions in ethics are among the toughest we can ever ments. (The word normative refers to norms, or
ask-and among the most important in life. standards" of judgment-in this case, norms for
judging rightness and goodness.) The ultimate pur-
pose of doing normative ethics is to try to establish
THE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE
the soundness of moral norms, especially the norms
The domain of ethics is large, divided into sev- embodied in a comprehensive moral system, or
eral areas of investigation and cordoned off from moral theory. We do normative ethics when "Ye use
related subjects. So let us map the territory care- critical reasoning to demonstrate that a moral prin-
fully. As the term moral philosophy suggests, ethics ciple is justified, or that a professional code of con-
is a branch of philosophy. A very rough character- duct is contradictory, or that one proposed moral
ization of philosophy is the systematic use of critical theory is better than another, or that a person's
reasoning to answer the most fundamental ques- motive is' good. Should the rightness of actions be
tions in life. Moral philosophy, obviously, tries to judged by their consequences? Is happiness the
answer the fundamental questions of morality. The greatest good in life? Is utilitarianism a good moral
other major branches of philosophy address other theory? S~ch questions are the preoccupation of
basic questions; these branches are logic (the study normative ethics.
of correct reasoning), metaphysics (the study of the Another major division of ethics is
fundamental nature of reality), and epistemology metaethics-the study of the meaning and logi-
(the study of knowledge). As a division of philoso- cal structure of moral beliefs. It asks not whether
phy, ethics does its work primarily through criti- an action' is right or whether a person's character is
cal reasoning: the careful, systematic evaluation of good. It takes a step back from these concerns and
statements, or claims. Critical reasoning is a process asks more fundamental questions about them: What
used in all fields of study, not just in ethics. The main does it mean for an action to be right? Is good the
components of this process are the evaluation of log- same thing as desirable? How can a moral principle
ical arguments and the careful analysis of concepts. be justified? Is there such a thing as moral truth? To
Science also studies morality, but not in the do normative ethics, we must assume certain things
way that moral philosophy does. Its approach is about the meaning of moral terms and the logical
known as descriptive ethics-the scientific study relationships among them. But the job of metaeth-
of moral beliefs and practices. Its aim is to describe ics is to question all these assumptions, to see if they
and explain how people actually behave and think really make sense.
when dealing with moral issues and concepts. This Finally, there is applied ethics-the applica-
kind of empirical research is usually conducted tion of moral norms to specific moral issues or cases,
by sociologists, anthropologists, and psycholo- particularly those in a profession such as medicine
gists. In contrast, the focus of moral philosophy is or law. Applied ethics in these fields goes under
not what people actually believe and do, but what names such as medical ethics, journalistic ethics,
they should believe and do. The point of moral phi- and business ethics. In applied ethics we study the
losophy is to determine what actions are right (or results derived from applying a moral principle or
wrong) and what things are good (or bad). theory to specific circumstances. The purpose of
Philosophers distinguish three major divisions the exercise is to learn something important about
in ethics, each one representing a different way either the moral characteristics of the situation or
the adequacy of the moral norms. Did the doctor Some things, however, are valuable for their own
do right in performing that abortion? Is it morally sakes. They are valuable simply because they are
permissible for scientists to perform experiments what they are, without being a means to something
on people without their consent? Was it right for else. Things that have been regarded as valuable in
the journalist to distort her reporting to aid a par- themselves include happiness, pleasure, virtue, and
ticular side in the war? Questions like these drive beauty. These things are said to be intrinsically
the search for answers in applied ethics. valuable-they are valuable in themselves.
In every division of ethics, we must be careful to
distinguish between values and obligations. Some- THE E1.EMENTS OF ETHICS
times we may be interested in concepts or judg-
ments of value-that is, about what is morally good, We all do ethics, and we all have a general sense of
bad, blameworthy, or praiseworthy. We properly what is involved. But we can still ask, What are the
use these kinds of terms to refer mostly to persons, elements of ethics that make it the peculiar enter-
character traits, motives, and intentions. We may prise that it is? We can include at least the follow-
say "She is a good person" or "He is to blame for ing factors:
that tragedy." At other times, we may be inter-
ested in concepts or judgments of obligation-that The Preeminence of Reason
is, about what is obligatory, or a duty, or what we Doing ethics typically involves grappling with our
should or ought to do. We use these terms to refer feelings, taking into account the facts of the situa-
to actions. We may say "She has a duty to tell the tion (including our own observations and relevant
truth" or "What he did was wrong." knowledge), and trying to understand the ideas
When we talk about value in the sense just that bear on the case. But above all, it involves, even
described, we mean moral value. If she is a good per- requires, critical reasoning-the consideration of
son , sh e IS
' good in the moral sense. But we can also reasons for whatever statements (moral or other-
talk about nonmoral value. We can say that things wise) are in question. Whatever our view on moral
such as tel eVISlons,
" rockets, experiences, and works issues and whatever moral outlook we subscribe to,
of art (things other than persons, intentions, and our commonsense moral experience suggests that
so forth) are good, but we mean "good" only in a if a moral judgment is to be worthy of acceptance, it
nonmoral way. It makes no sense to assert that tele- must be supported by good reasons, and our delib-
viSions or rock e t s In
' themselves are morally good erations on the issue must include a consideration
or bad. Perha ps a rocket could be used to perform of those reasons.
an ,action that IS. morally wrong. In that case, the The backbone of critical reasoning generally, and
actIon would be immoral, while the rocket itself moral reasoning in particular, is logical argument.
would still have only nonmoral value. This kind of argument-not the angry-exchange
Many things in life have value for us, but they type-consists of a statement to be supported (the
are not necessarily valuable in the same way. Some assertion to be proved, the conclusion) and the
things are valuable because they are a means to statements that do the supporting (the reasons
something else. We might say that gasoline is for believing the statement, the premises). With
g ood becau 't'
. se I IS a means to make a gas-powered such arguments, we try to show that a moral judg-
vehIcle work, or that a pen is good because it can ment is or is not justified, that a moral principle
he used to write a letter. Such things are said to be is or is not sound, that an action is or is not mor-
instranmentally, or extrinsically, valuable- ally permissible, or that a moral theory is or is not
they are valuable as a means to something else. plausible.
that applies in one situation must apply in all other

situations that are relevantly similar. If you say, for
QUICI< REVIEW
example, that lying is wrong in a particular situa-
ethics (or moral philosophy)-The philosophical tion, then you implicitly agree that lying is wrong
study of morality. for anyone in relevantly similar situations. If you
morality-Beliefs concerning right and wrong, say that killing in self-defense is morally permis-
good and bad; they can include judgments, sible, then you say in effect that killing in self-
values, rules, principles, and theories. defense is permissible for everyone in relevantly
similar situations. It cannot be the case that an
descriptive ethics-The scientific study of moral
action performed by A is wrong while the same
beliefs and practices.
action performed by B in relevantly similar cir-
normative ethics-The study of the principles, cumstances is right. It cannot be the case that the
rules, or theories that guide our actions and
moral judgments formed in these two situations
judgments.
must differ just because two different people are
metaethics-The study of the meaning and logi- involved.
cal structure of moral beliefs. This point about universalizability also applies
applied ethics-The application of moral norms to reasons used to support moral judgments. If rea-
to specific moral issues or cases, particularly sons apply in a specific case, then those reasons also
those in a profession such as medicine or law. apply in all relevantly similar cases. It cannot be
instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable- true that reasons that apply in a specific case do not
Valuable as a means to something else. apply to other cases that are similar in all relevant
intrinsically valuable-Valuable in itself, for its respects.
own sake.
The Principle of Impartiality
From the moral point of view, all persons are consid-
ered equal and should be treated accordingly. This
Our use of critical reasoning and argument helps sense of impartiality is implied in all moral state-
us keep our feelings about moral issues in perspective. ments. It means that the welfare and interests of
Feelings are an important part of our moral experience. each individual should be given the same weight as
They make empathy pOSSible, which gives us a deeper the welfare and interests of all others. Unless there
understanding of the human impact of moral norms. is a morally relevant difference between people, we
They can also serve as internal alarm bells, warning us should treat them the same: we must treat equals
of the possibility of injustice, suffering, and wrongdo- equally. We would think it outrageous for a moral
ing. But they are unreliable guides to moral truth. They rule to say something like "Everyone must refrain
may simply reflect our own emotional needs, preju- from stealing food in grocery stores-except for
dices, upbringing, culture, and self-interests. Careful Mr. X, who may steal all he wants." Imagine that
reasoning, however, can inform our feelings and help there is no morally relevant reason for making
us decide moral questions on their merits. this exception for stealing food; Mr. X is exempted
merely because, say, he is a celebrity known for
The Universal Perspective outrageous behavior. We not only would object to
Logic requires that moral norms and judgments fol- this rule but might even begin to wonder if it was
low the principle of llniversalizabilit)'-the idea that a genuine moral rule at all, because it lacks impar-
a moral statement (a principle, rule, or judgment) tiality. Similarly, we would reject a moral rule that
says something like "Everyone is entitled to basic that conflicted with a moral principle would be
human rights-except Native Americans." Such suspect, and the latter would have to prevail over
a rule would be a prime example of discrimina- the former. Ultimately the justification for civil dis-
tion based on race. We can see this blatant partial- obedience is that specific laws conflict with moral
ity best if we ask what morally relevant difference norms and are therefore invalid. If we judge a law to
there is between Native Americans and everyone be bad, we usually do so on moral grounds.
else. Differences in income, social status, skin color,
ancestry, and the like are not morally relevant.
RELIGION AND MORALITY
Apparently there are no morally relevant differ-
ences. Because there are none, we must conclude Many people believe that morality and religion are
that the rule sanctions unfair discrimination. inseparable-that religion is the source or baSis of
We must keep in mind, however, that some- morality and that moral precepts are simply what
times there are good reasons for treating someone God says should be done. This view is not at all sur-
differently. Imagine a hospital that generally gives prising, because all religions imply or assert a per-
equal care to patients, treating equals equally. But spective on morality. The three great religions in
suppose a patient comes to the hospital in an ambu- the Western tradition-Christianity, Judaism, and
lance because she has had a heart attack and will die Islam-provide their believers with commandments
without immediate care. The hospital staff responds or principles of conduct that are thought to constitute
quickly, giving her faster and more sophisticated the moral law, the essence of morality. For their mil-
care than other patients receive. The situation is lions of adherents, the moral law is the will of God ,
a matter of life and death-a good reason for not and the will of God is the moral law. In the West, at
treating everyone the same and for providing the least, the powerful imprint of religion is eVident in
heart attack patient with special consideration. This secular laws and in the private morality of believers
instance of discrimination is justified. and unbelievers alike. Secular systems of morality-
for example, those of the ancient Greek philosophers,
The Dominance of Mora , Norms Immanuel Kant, the utilitarians, and others-have
Not all norms are moral norms. There are legal of course left their mark on Western ethics. But they
norms (laws, statutes), aesthetic norms (for judging have not moved the millions who think that moral-
artistic creations), prudential norms (practical con- ity is a product exclusively of religion.
siderations of self-interest), and others. Moral norms So what is the relationship between religion and
seem to stand out from all these in an interesting morality? For our purposes, we should break this
way: they dominate. Whenever moral principles question into two parts: (1) What is the relation-
or values conflict in some way with nonmoral prin- ship between religion and ethics (the philosophical
ciples or values, the moral considerations usually study of morality)? and (2) What is the relationship
override the others. Moral considerations seem more between religion and 1narality (beliefs about right
important, more critical, or more weighty. A princi- and wrong)? The first question asks about how reli-
ple of prudence such as "Never help a stranger" may gion relates to the kind of investigation we conduct
be well justified, but it must yield to any moral prin- in this book-the use of experience and critical
ciple that contradicts it, such as "Help a stranger in reasoning to study morality. The key point about
an emergency if you can do so without endanger- the relationship is that whatever your views on
ing yourself." An aesthetic norm that somehow religion and morality, an open-minded expedition
involved violating a moral principle would have to into ethics is more useful and empowering than
take a backseat to the moral considerations. A law you may realize, especially now, at the beginning
of your journey into moral philosophy. You may Adherents of one religious tradition may disagree
believe, for example, that God determines what is with those from another tradition on whether an
right and wrong, so there is no need to apply critical act is right or wrong. Sincere devotees in a religious
reasoning to morality-you just need to know what tradition may wonder if its moral teachings make
God says. But this judgment-and similar dismiss- sense. In all such cases, intelligent resolution of the
als of ethics-would be premature, as we will see. conflict of moral claims can be achieved only by
applying a neutral standard that helps sort out the
Believers Need Moral Reasoning competing viewpoints. Moral philosophy supplies
It is difficult-perhaps impossible-for most people the neutral standard in the form of critical think-
to avoid using moral reasoning. Religious people ing, well-made arguments, and careful analysis. No
are no exception. One reason is that religious moral wonder then that many great religious minds-
codes (such as the Ten Commandments) and other Aquinas, Leibniz, Descartes, Kant, Maimonides,
major religiOUS rules of conduct are usually vague, Averroes, and others-have relied on reason to
laying out general principles that may be difficult examine the nature of morality. In fact, countless
to apply to specific cases. (Secular moral codes have theists have regarded reason as a gift from God that
the same disadvantage.) For example, we may be enables human beings to grasp the truths of sci-
commanded to love our neighbor, but what neigh- ence, life, and morality.
bors are included-people of a different religion?
People who denounce our religion? The gay or Moral Philosophy Enables Productive
lesbian couple? Those who steal from us? The con- Discourse
victed child molester next door? The drug dealers Any fruitful discussions about morality undertaken
on the corner? The woman who got an abortion? between people from different religious traditions
Also, what does loving our neighbor demand of or between believers and nonbelievers will require
us? How does love require us to behave toward the a common set of ethical concepts and a shared pro-
drug dealers, the gay couple, or the person who cedure for deciding issues and making judgments.
denounces our religion? If our terminally ill neigh- Ethics provides these tools. Without them, conver-
bor asks us in the name of love to help him kill sations will resolve nothing, and participants will
himself, what should we do? Does love require us learn little. Without them, people will talk past
to kill him-or to refrain from killing him? And, of each other, appealing only to their own religious
course, commandments can conflict-as when, for views. Furthermore, in a pluralistic SOCiety, most
example, the only way to avoid killing an innocent of the public discussions about important moral
person is to tell a lie, or the only way to save the life issues take place in a context of shared values such
of one person is to kill another. All these situations as justice, fairness, equality, and tolerance. Just as
force the believer to interpret religious directives, important, they also occur according to an unwrit-
to try to apply general rules to specific cases, to ten understanding that (1) moral positions should
draw out the implications of particular views-in be explained, (2) claims should be supported by
other words, to do ethics. reasons, and (3) reasoning should be judged by
common rational standards. These skills, of course,
When Conflicts Arise, Ethics Steps In are at the heart of ethics.
Very often moral contradictions or inconsistencies Now consider the second question introduced
confront the religious believer, and only moral rea- above: What is the relationship between religion
soning can help resolve them. Believers sometimes and morality? For many people, the most interest-
disagree with their religious leaders on moral issues. ing query about the relationship between religion
~
,,~, CRITICAL THOUGHT: Ethics, Religion, and Tough Moral Issues
How can we hope to grapple with complex moral match for a transplant-a historic combination. As
issues that have emerged only in recent decades? Lisa Nash said, "I was going to save Molly no matter
Can religion alone handle the job? Consider the what, and I wanted Molly to have siblings."*
following case: Is it right to produce a child to save the life or
According to a report by CNN, Jack and Lisa Nash health of someone else? More to the point, do
made history when they used genetic testing to the scriptures of the three major Western religions
save the life of their six-year-old daughter, Molly, provide any guidance on this question? Do any
by having another child. Molly had a rare genetic of these traditions offer useful methods for pro-
disorder known as Fanconi anemia, which prevents ductively discussing or debating such issues with
the generation of bone marrow and produces a people of different faiths? How might ethics help
fatal leukemia. Molly's best chance to live was to with these challenges? Is it possible to formulate a
get a transplant of stem cells from the umbilical reasonable opinion on this case without doing eth-
cord of a sibling, and Molly's parents were deter-
ics? Why or why not?
mined to give her that sibling, brother Adam.
Through genetic testing (and in vitro fertilization),
Jack and Lisa were able to select a child who would *"Genetic Selection Gives Girl a Brother and a Second
not only be born without a particular disease (Fan- Chance, CNN.com, October 3,2000, http://archives.cnn
II
coni anemia, in this case) but also would help a sib- .com/2000/H EALTH/1 0103/testu be .brother/i ndex. html
ling combat the disease by being the optimal tissue (December 8, 200S).
and morality is this: Is God the maker of morality? In The Brothers Karal1lazov (1879-80), the charac-
That is, is God the author of the moral law? Those ter Ivan Karamazov declares, "If God doesn't exist,
who answer yes are endorsing a theory of morality everything is permissible." This very sentiment
~nown as the divine cOinmand theory. It says that was espoused by, among others, the famous atheist
fight actions are those that are willed by God, that philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
?o~ literally defines right and wrong. Something Both religious and secular critics of the divine
IS nght or good only because God makes it so. In command theory believe that it poses a serious
th~ simplest version of the theory, God can deter- dilemma, one first articulated by Socrates two and
mIne right and wrong because he is omnipotent. a half millennia ago. In the dialogue Eutllypllro,
He is all-powerful-powerful enough even to create Socrates asks, Is an action morally right because God
moral norms. In this view, God is a divine lawgiver, wills it to be so, or does God will it to be so because
and his laws constitute morality. it is morally right? Critics say that if an action is
In general, believers are divided on whether the right only because God wills it (that is, if right and
divine command theory gives an accurate account wrong are dependent on God), then many heinous
of the source of morality. Notable among the the- crimes and evil actions would be right if God willed
ory's detractors are the great theistic philosophers them. If God willed murder, theft, or torture, these
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) and Thomas Aqui- deeds would be morally right. If God has unlimited
nas (]22S-1274). And conversely, as odd as it may power, he could easily will such actions. If the right-
sound, some nonbelievers have subscribed to it. ness of an action depended on (iod's will alone, he
could not have reasons for willing what he wills. No In any case, it seems that through critical rea-
reasons would be available or required. Therefore, soning we can indeed learn much about morality
if God commanded an action, the command would and the moral life. After all, there are complete
be without reason, completely arbitrary. Neither moral systems (some of which are examined in
the believer nor the nonbeliever would think this this book) that are not based on religion, that con-
state of affairs plausible. On the other hand, if God tain genUine moral norms indistinguishable from
wills an action because it is morally right (if moral those embraced by religion, and that are justified
norms are independent of God), then the divine not by reference to religious precepts but by care-
command theory must be false. God does not create ful thinking and moral arguments. As the philoso-
rightness; he simply knows what is right and wrong pher Jonathan Berg says, "Those who would refuse
and is subject to the moral law just as humans are. to recognize as adequately justified any moral
For some theists, this charge of arbitrariness is beliefs not derived from knowledge of or about
especially worrisome. Leibniz, for example, rejects God, would have to refute the whole vast range
the divine command theory, declaring that it of arguments put by Kant and all others who ever
implies that God is unworthy of worship: proposed a rational basis for ethics!,,4 Moreover, if
we can do ethics-if we can use critical reasoning
In saying, therefore, that things are not good accord-
ing to any standard of goodness, but simply by to discern moral norms certified by the best reasons
the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, and evidence-then critical reasoning is sufficient
without realizing it, all the love of God and all his to guide us to moral standards and values. We
glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if obviously can do ethics (as the following chapters
he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the con- demonstrate), so morality is both accessible and
trary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he meaningful to us whether we are religious or not.
has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will
takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord
with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in
that which is pleasing to the most powerful?2
Defenders of the divine command theory may CHAPTER REVIEW
reply to the arbitrariness argument by contend-
ing that God would never command us to commit
heinous acts, because God is all-good. Because of SUMMARY
his supreme goodness, he would will only what is
good. Some thinkers, however, believe that such Ethics is the philosophical study of morality, and
reasoning renders the very idea of God's goodness morality consists of beliefs concerning right and
meaningless. As one philosopher says, wrong, good and bad. These beliefs can include judg-
ments, principles, and theories. Participating in the
[O]n this View, the doctrine of the goodness of God is exploration of morality-that is, doing ethics-is ines-
reduced to nonsense. It is important to religious believ- capable. We all must make moral judgments, assess
ers that God is not only all-powerful and all-knowing,
moral norms, judge people's character, and question
but that he is also good; yet if we accept the idea that
good and bad are defined by reference to God's will, the soundness of our moral outlooks. A great deal is
this notion is deprived of any meaning. What could it at stake when we do ethics, including countless deci-
mean to say that God's commands are good? If "X is sions that determine the quality of our lives.
good" means "X is commanded by God," then "God's You can decide to forgo any ethical delibera-
commands are good" would mean only "God's com- tions and simply embrace the moral beliefs and
mands are commanded by God," an empty truism. 3 norms you inherited from your family and culture.
But this approach undermines your freedom, for if 5. What are S0l11e questions asked in normative
you accept without question whatever moral beliefs ethics? (p. 5)
come your way, they are not really yours. Only if 6. What is the difference between nonnative ethics
you critically examine them for yourself are they and metaethics? (p. 5)
truly yours. 7. What is the dilel11111a about God and morality
The three main divisions of ethics proper are nor- that Socrates posed in EIit/l)'Pllro? (pp. 10-11)
mative ethics (the study of the moral norms that guide 8. What kinds of moral contradictions or
our actions and judgments), metaethics (the study of inconsistencies confront religious believers?
the meaning and logical structure of moral beliefs), (pp.8-9)
and applied ethics (the application of moral norms to 9. What are the premises in the arbitrariness
specific moral issues or cases). argument against the divine cOlnmand theory?
Ethics involves a distinctive set of elements. These (p. 10)
include the preeminence of reason, the universal per- 10. Does the principle of impartiality ilnply that we
spective, the principle of impartiality, and the domi- 111USt always treat equals equally? Why or why
nance of moral norms. not? (pp. 7-8)
Some people claim that morality depends on God,
a view known as the divine command theory. Both
DisCIIssioIJ Qlle.stioIJs
theists and nontheists have raised doubts about this
doctrine. The larger point is that doing ethics-using 1. Do you think that morality ultimately depends
critical reasoning to examine the moral life-can be a on God (that God is the author of the moral
useful and productive enterprise for believer and non- law)? Why or why not?
believer alike. 2. Do you believe that you have absorbed or
adopted without question most of your moral
beliefs? Why or why not?
I(EY TERMS
3. Formulate an argul11ent against the divine
ethics or moral philosophy (p. 3) command theory, then formulate one for it.
morality (p. 3)
4. Give an exalnple of how you or S0l11eOne you
descriptive ethics (p. 5)
know has used reasons to support a 1110ral
normative ethics (p. 5)
judgment.
metaethics(p.5)
5. Identify at least two normative ethical
applied ethics (p. 5)
questions that you have wondered about in the
~nstrumentally or extrinsically valuable (p. 6) past year.
Intrinsically valuable (p. 6)
6. Name two things (such as persons, objects,
experiences) in your life that you consider
EXERCISES intrinsically valuable. Nalne three that are
instrunlentally valuahle.
Review Questions
7. How do your feelings affect the moral
1. When can it be said that your moral beliefs are judgments you make? Do they determil1e' your
not really yours? (p. 3) judgments? 00 they inform them? If so, how?
2. In what ways are we forced to do ethics? What 8. What is the logic Ix'hind the principle of
is at stake in these deliberations? (pp. 3-4) universalizability? Cite an exalnple of how
3. What is the unfortunate result of accepting moral the principle has entered into your moral
beliefs without questioning them? (pp. 4-5) deliberations.
4. Can our feelings be our sole guide to morality? 9. How does racial discrimination violate the
Why or why not? (pp. 4-5) principle of impartiality?
j
10. What is the "dominance of moral norms"? FURTHER READING

Does it strike you as reasonable? Or do you Anita L. Allen, New Ethics: A Guided Tour ofthe Twenty-First-
believe that sometimes nonmoral norms can Century Moral Landscape (New York: Miramax, 2004).
outweigh moral ones? If the latter, provide an Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, parts 1 and 4.
example. Simon Blackburn, Being Good: A Short Introduction to Ethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Donald M. Borchert and David Stewart, Exploring Ethics
ETHICAL DILEMMAS (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
1. You are the mayor of a major city, and you want Steven M. Cahn andJoram G. Haber, eds., Twentieth Century
Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995).
to keep the streets as clean as possible. You send
David Edmonds, Would You Kill the Fat Man? (Princeton,
the city's street sweepers to the more affluent
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
neighborhoods, but you ignore the poorer William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
neighborhoods because the poor residents pay NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
less in taxes than the rich people do. Is this Bernard Gert, Morality: Its Nature and Justification (New York:
practice a violation of the impartiality principle? Oxford University Press, 1998).
Why or why not? David Kelley and Debby Hutchins, The Art ofReasoning: An
2. You try to live strictly by the moral rules Introduction to Logic, 5th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton,
contained in your religion's moral code. The 2019).
two most important rules are "Be merciful" Brooke Noel Moore and Robert Michael Stewart, Moral
(don't give people what they deserve) and Philosophy: A Comprehensive Introduction (Belmont, CA:
Mayfield, 1994).
"Be just" (give people exactly what they
Pew Research Center Report (October 16,2017): 41A grow-
deserve). Now suppose a man is arrested
ing share of Americans say it's not necessary to believe
for stealing food from your house, and the in God to be moral." https://www.pewresearch.org/
police leave it up to you whether he should fact -tank/20 17 /l 0/ 16/a-growing-share-of-americans-
be prosecuted for his crime or set free. Should say-its-not-necessary-to-believe-in-god-to-be-moraIl
you be merciful and set him free, or be just and (Accessed 12/10/2020).
make sure he is appropriately punished? How Dave Robinson and Chris Garrett, Introducing Ethics, ed.
do you resolve this conflict of rules? Can your Richard Appignanesi (New York: Totem Books, 2005).
moral code resolve it? To what moral principles Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics, corr. ed. (Oxford:
or theories do you appeal? Blackwell, 1993).
3. Suppose you are an engineer building a road Paul Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction (Encino,
across a mountain. From a prudential point of CA: Dickenson, 1975).
Jacques P. Thiroux, Ethics: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed.
view, it would be easier and cheaper to build
(New York: Macmillan, 1986).
it through a family's farm. This option would
Lewis Vaughn, The Power of Critical Thinking, 6th ed.
reqUire compelling the family to move, which (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
would be an extreme hardship for them. From Thomas F. Wall, Thinking Critically about Moral Problems
a moral point of view, the family should be (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003).
allowed to stay on their farm. Which view G.J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen,
should take precedence? 1971).
READINGS
From What Is the Socratic Method?

CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS
The Socratic method is a way to seek truths by your humility, courage." Such qualities "protect against the
own lights. possibility" that Socratic dialogue, no matter how rig-
It is a system, a spirit, a method, a type of philosophi- orous, "would merely grind out ... wild conclusions
cal inquiry, an intellectual technique, all rolled into one. with irresponsible premises." I agree, though I would
Socrates himself never spelled out a "method." replace the quality of sincerity with honesty, since one
However, the Socratic method is named after him can hold a conviction sincerely without examining it,
because Socrates, more than any other before or since, while honesty would require that one subject one's
models for us philosophy practiced-philosophy as deed, convictions to frequent scrutiny.
as way of living, as something that any of us can do. It is A Socratic dialogue reveals how different our out-
an open system of philosophical inquiry that allows one looks can be on concepts we use every day. It reveals how
to interrogate from many vantage points. different our philosophies are, and often how tenable-
Gregory Vlastos, a Socrates scholar and profes- or untenable, as the case may be-a range of philosophies
sor of philosophy at Princeton, described Socrates' can be. Moreover, even the most universally recognized
method of inquiry as 44among the greatest achieve- and used concept, when subjected to Socratic scrutiny,
ments of humanity." Why? Because, he says, it makes might reveal not only that there is Ilot universal agree-
philosophical inquiry 44a common human enterprise, ment, after all, on the meaning of any given concept, but
open to every man." Instead of requiring allegiance that every single person has a somewhat different take
to a specific philosophical viewpoint or analytic tech- on each and every concept under the sun.
nique or specialized vocabulary, the Socratic method What's more, there seems to be no such thing as
ucall s for common sense and common speech." And a concept so abstract, or question so off base, that it
this, he says, "is as it should be, for how many should can't be fruitfully explored [using the Socratic method].
live is every man's business." In the course of Socratizing, it often turns out to be the
I think, however, that the Socratic method goes case that some of the most so-called abstract concepts
beyond Vlastos' description. It does not merely call are intimately related to the most profoundly relevant
for common sense but examines what common human experiences. In fact, it's been my experience
sense is. The Socratic method asks: Does the common that virtually any question can be plumbed Socrati-
sense of our day offer us the greatest potential for self- cally. Sometimes you don't know what question will
understanding and human excellence? Or is the pre- have the most lasting and significant impact until you
vailing common sense in fact a roadblock to realizing take a risk and delve into it for a while.
this potential? What distinguishes the Socratic method from mere
Vlastos goes on to say that Socratic inquiry is by nonsystematic inquiry is the sustained attempt to
no means Simple, and 44 ca ll s not only for the highest explore the ramifications of certain opinions and then
degree of mental alertness of which anyone is capable" offer compelling objections and alternatives. This scru-
hut also for "moral qualities of a high order: sincerity, pulous and exhaustive form of inquiry in many ways
(:hrhtopher Phillips, from Socrates Cafe!. Copyright ,(, 20rn hy Chris- "Socrati<: method" to think through difficult philosophical issues.
topht'r Phillip.,. lhed hy permission of W. W. Norton & Company, To see the Sonati<: method applied to ethic .. , rt.'ad the t'xcerpt from
JilL Although not "pecifically concerned with ethics, this short Plato's /·:utl1yp"ro that follow .. on p. 16.
piece h~· <hrhtopher Phillip .. makes a persuasive case for using the
singular philosophical perspective-can be upset- experiences of others-whether through direct dia-

ting. But that is all to the good. If it never touches logue, or through other means, like drama or books,
any nerves, if it doesn't upset, if it doesn't mentally or through a work of art or a dance. It compels us to
and spiritually challenge and perplex, in a won- explore alternative perspectives, asking what might
derful and exhilarating way, it is not Socratic dia- be said for or against each.
logue. This "forcing" opens us up to the varieties of * * *
From The Euthyphro

PLATO
* * * Euthyphro. True.
Euthyphro. Piety ... is that which is dear to the gods, Socrates. Or suppose that we differ about mag-
and impiety is that which is not dear to them. nitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by
Socrates. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given measuring?
me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what
Euthyphro. Very true.
you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make
no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words. Socrates. And we end a controversy about heavy and
light by resorting to a weighing machine?
Euthyphro. Of course.
Euthyphro. To be sure.
Socrates. Come, then, and let us examine what we
are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the Socrates. But what differences are there which can-
gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hate- not be thus decided, and which therefore make us
ful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare
opposites of one another. Was not that said? say the answer does not occur to you at the moment,
Euthyphro. It was. and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise
when the matters of difference are the just and unjust,
Socrates. And well said?
good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not
Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was cer- these the points about which men differ, and about
tainly said. which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our
Socrates. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we
admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences? do quarrel?
Euthyphro. Yes, that was also said. Euthyphro. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differ-
Socrates. And what sort of difference creates enmity ences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.
and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my Socrates. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthy-
good friend, differ about a number; do differences of phro, when they occur, are of a like nature?
this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with Euthyphro. Certainly they are.
one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetiC, and
put an end to them by a sum? Socrates. They have differences of opinion, as you
say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable
Plato, The Euthyphm, trans. Benjamin Jowett. and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels
among them, if there had been no such differences- Socrates. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro,
would there now? and yet say that they ought not to be punished?
Euthyphro. You are quite right. Euthyphro. No; they do not.
Socrates. Does not every man love that which he Socrates. Then there are some things which they do
deems noble and good, and hate the opposite of them? not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to
argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they
deny their guilt, do they not?
Socrates. But, as you say, people regard the same
Euthyphro. Yes.
things, some as just and others as unjust,-about
these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fight- Socrates. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer
ings among them. should not be punished, but they argue about the fact
of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. Then the same things are hated by the gods
Socrates. And the gods are in the same case, if as you
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear
assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some
to them?
of them say while others deny that injustice is done
Euthyphro. True. among them. For surely neither God nor man will
Socrates. And upon this view the same things, Euthy- ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to
phro, will be pious and also impious? be punished?
Euthyphro. So I should suppose. Euthyphro. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Socrates. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise Socrates. But they join issue about the particulars-
that you have not answered the question which I gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they
asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what dispute about some act which is called in question,
action is both pious and impious: but now it would and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to
seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by be unjust. Is not that true?
them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising Euthyphro. Quite true.
your father you may very likely be doing what is agree- Socrates. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do
able to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and tell me, for my better instruction and information,
what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods
Hera, and there may be other gods who have similar a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains
differences of opinion. by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is
Euthyphro. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods put in chains before he who bound him can learn from
would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with
murderer: there would be no difference of opinion him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one
about that. a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse
Socrates. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did him of murder. How would you show that all the gods
you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer or any absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me
sort of evil-doer ought to be let off? that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long
as I live.
Euthyphro. I should rather say that these are the
questions which they are always arguing, especially Euthyphro. It will be a difficult task; but I could
in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and make the matter very clear indeed to you.
there is nothing which they will not do or say in their Socrates. I understand; you mean to say that I am not
own defence. so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them
you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and Socrates. I will endeavour to explain: we speak of
hateful to the gods. carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and
Euthyphro. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all
listen to me. such cases there is a difference, and you know also in
what the difference lies?
Socrates. But they will be sure to listen if they find
that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that Euthyphro. I think that I understand.
came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to Socrates. And is not that which is beloved distinct
myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to from that which loves?
me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as Euthyphro. Certainly.
unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of
Socrates. Well; and now tell me, is that which is car-
piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be
ried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for
hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not ade-
some other reason?
quately defined by these distinctions, for that which is
hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing Euthyphro. No; that is the reason.
and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not Socrates. And the same is true of what is led and of
ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all what is seen?
the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But Euthyphro. True.
I will amend the definition so far as to say that what
Socrates. And a thing is not seen because it is viSible,
all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious
but conversely, visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led
or holy; and what some of them love and others hate
because it is in the state of being led, or carried because
is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety
and impiety? it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this.
And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be
Euthyphro. Why not, Socrates? intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state of action
Socrates. Why not! Certainly, as far as I am con- or passion implies previous action or passion. It does
cerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state
whether this admission will greatly assist you in the of becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer
task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of
you to consider. suffering because it suffers. Do you not agree?
Euthyphro. Yes, I should say that what all the gods Euthyphro. Yes.
love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all Socrates. Is not that which is loved in some state
hate, impious.
either of becoming or suffering?
Socrates. Ought we to enquire into the truth of thiS, Euthyphro. Yes.
Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on
our own authority and that of others? What do you say? Socrates. And the same holds as in the previous
instances; the state of being loved follows the act of
Euthyphro. We should enquire; and I believe that
being loved, and not the act the state.
the statement will stand the test of enquiry.
Euthyphro. Certainly.
Socrates. We shall know better, my good friend, in
a little while. The point which I should first wish to Socrates. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro;
understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all
the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved the gods?
of the gods. Euthyphro. Yes.
Euthyphro. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. Because it is piOUS or holy, or for some other
Socrates. reason?
Euthyphro. No, that is the reason. is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to
Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy God would have been loved as being dear to God; but
because it is loved? if that which dear to God is dear to him because loved
by him, then that which is holy would have been holy
Euthyphro. Yes.
because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse
Socrates. And that which is dear to the gods is loved is the case, and that they are quite different from one
by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because another. For one (BEOqJLA.ES) is of a kind to be loved
it is loved of them? because it is loved, and the other (0' (nov) is loved
Euthyphro. Certainly. because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to
Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthy- me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence
phro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the
God, as you affirm; but they are two different things. essence-the attribute of being loved by all the gods.
But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holi-
Euthyphro. How do you mean, Socrates?
ness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to
Socrates. I mean to say that the holy has been hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holi-
acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is ness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not
holy, not to be holy because it is loved. (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel)
Euthyphro. Yes. and what is impiety?
Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to Euthyphro. I really do not know, Socrates, how to
them because it is loved by them, not loved by them express what I mean. For somehow or other our argu-
because it is dear to them. ments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn
around and walk away from us.
Euthyphro. True.
Socrates. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is * * *
holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and
CHAPTER 2
Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism
Consider the following: Abdulla Yones killed his principles are rigid rules that have no exceptions
sixteen-year-old daughter Heshu in their apart- (a view known as abso/lItislI/) or that they must be
ment in west London. The murder was an example applied in exactly the saI11e way in every situation
of an "honor killing," an ancient tradition still and culture.
practiced in many parts of the world. Using a On the other hand, let us say that you assess the
kitchen knife, Yones stabbed Heshu eleven times case like this: "In societies that approve of honor
and slit her throat. He later declared that he had to killing, the practice is morally right; in those that
kill her to expunge a stain from his family, a stain do not approve, it is Illorally wrong. My society
that Heshu had caused by her outrageous behavior. approves of honor killing, so it is morally right." If
What was outrageous behavior to Yones, however, you believe what you say, then you are a cultural
would seem to many Westerners to be typical teen- relativist. Cultural relativism is the view that an
age antics, annoying but benign. Heshu's precise action is morally right if one's culture approves of
offense against her family's honor is unclear, but it. Moral rightness and wrongness are therefore rel-
the possibilities include wearing makeup, having ative to cultures. So in one culture, an action may
a boyfriend, and showing an independent streak be morally right; in another culture, it Illay be mor-
that would be thought perfectly normal through- ally wrong.
out the West. In some countries, honor killings are Perhaps you prefer an even narrower view of
sometimes endorsed by the local community or morality, and so you say, "Honor killing may be
even given the tacit blessing of the state. right for you, but it is most certainly not right for
What do you think of this time-honored way me." If you mean this literally, then you are com-
of dealing with family conflicts? Specifically, what mitted to another kind of relativism called sub-
is your opinion regarding the 1110raiity of honor jective relativism-the view that an action is
killing? Your response to this question is likely to morally right if one approves of it. Moral rightness
reveal not only your view of honor killing but your and wrongness are relative not to cultures but to
overall approach to morality as well. Suppose your individuals. An action, then, can be right for you
response is something like this: "Honor killing is but wrong for SOI11eone else. Your approving of an
morally wrong-wrong no matter where it's done action makes it right. There is therefore no objec-
or who does it." With this statement, you implic- tive morality, and cultural norms do not Illake right
itly embrace moral Objectivism-the theory that or wrong-individuals make right or wrong.
moral truths exist and that they do so indepen- Finally, imagine that you wish to take a differ-
dently of what individuals or societies think of ent tack regarding the subject of honor killing. You
them. In other words, there are moral facts, and say, "I abhor the practice of honor killing" -but
they are not human inventions, fictions, or prefer- you believe that ill uttering these words you are
ences. However, you need not hold that objective saying nothing that is true or faIse. You believe that
CHAPTER 2: SUBJECTIVISM, RELATIVISM, AND EMOTIVISM 0 21
despite what your statement seems to mean, you

are simply expressing your emotions. You there-
QUICI< REVIEW
fore hold to eDlotivisDl-the view that moral
utterances are neither true nor false but are instead objectivism-The theory that moral truths exist
expressions of emotions or attitudes. So in your and that they do so independently of what
sentence about honor killing, you are not stating a individuals or societies think of them.
fact-you are merely emoting and possibly trying cultural relativism-The view that an action is
to influence someone's behavior. Even when emo- morally right if one's culture approves of it.
tivists express a more specific preference regarding Implications: that cultures are morally infallible,
other people's behavior-by saying, for instance, that social reformers can never be morally right,
"No one should commit an honor killing" -they that moral disagreements between individuals
are still not making a factual claim. They are simply in the same culture amount to arguments over
expressing a preference, and perhaps hoping to per- whether someone disagrees with her culture,
suade other people to see things their way. that other cultures cannot be legitimately criti-
These four replies represent four distinct per- cized, and that moral progress is impossible.
spectives (though certainly not the only per- subjective relativism-The view that an action is
spectives) on the meaning and import of moral morally right if one approves of it. Implications:
judgments. Moreover, they are not purely theoreti- that individuals are morally infallible and that
cal, but real and relevant. People actually live their genuine moral disagreement between individ-
lives (or try to) as moral objectivists, or relativists, uals is nearly impossible.
or emotivists, or some strange and inconsistent emotivism-The view that moral utterances are
mixture of these. (There is an excellent chance, for neither true nor false but are expressions of
example, that you were raised as an objectivist but emotions or attitudes. Implications: that people
now accept some form of relativism-or even try to cannot disagree over the moral facts because
hold to objectivism in some instances and relativ- there are no moral facts, that presenting reasons
ism in others.) in support of a moral utterance is a matter of
In any case, the question that you should ask offering nonmoral facts that can influence some-
(and that ethics can help you answer) is not whether one's attitude, and that nothing is actually good
you in fact accept any of these views, but whether you or bad.
are justified in doing so. Let us see, then, where an
examination of reasons for and against them will
lead.
objectively right (or wrong). It is right (or wrong)
SUBJECTIVE RELATIVISM relative to individuals. In this way, moral rightness
becomes a matter of personal taste. If to Ann straw-
What view of morality could be more tempting (and berry ice cream tastes good, then it is good (for her).
convenient) than the notion that an action is right If to Greg strawberry ice cream tastes bad, then it
if someone approves of it? Subjective relativism is bad (for him). There is no such thing as straw-
says that action X is right for Ann if she approves berry ice cream tasting good objectively or gener-
of it yet wrong for Greg if he disapproves of it. Thus ally. Likewise, the morality of an action depends on
action X can be both right and wrong-right for Ann's an'd Greg's moral tastes.
Ann but wrong for Greg. A person's approval of an Many people claim they are subjective relativists-
action makes it right for that person. Action X is not until they realize the implications of the doctrine
;::-
",," Judge Not?
Jesus said" Judge not that ye be not judged." Some Midgley argues that Jesus was taking aim at
have taken this to mean that we should not make sweeping condemnations and vindictiveness:
moral judgments about others, and many who he was not trashing the "whole faculty of judg-
have never heard those words are convinced that ment." Indeed, Jesus is making the "subtle point
that while we cannot possibly avoid judging, we
to judge others is to be insensitive, intolerant, or
can see to it that we judge fairly, as we would
absolutist. Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain exam-
expect others to do to us." This is part and par-
ines this attitude and finds it both mistaken and
cel, then, of justice as fairness, as a discernment
harmful. about a particular case and person and deed. Sub-
I have also found helpful the discussion of the jectivism in such matters-of the "I'm okay, you're
lively British philosopher, Mary Midgley. In her okay," variety-is a cop-out, a way to stop form-
book Can't We Make Moral Judgments? Midgley ing and expressing moral judgments altogether.
notes our contemporary search for a nonjudgmen- This strange suspension of specific moments of
tal politics and quotes all those people who cry, in judgment goes hand-in-glove, of course, with an
effect, "But surely it's always wrong to make moral often violent rhetoric of condemnation of whole
judgments." We are not permitted to make anyone categories of persons, past and present-that all-
uncomfortable, to be "insensitive." Yet moral judg- purpose villain, the Dead White European Male,
ment of "some kind," says Midgley, "is a necessary comes to mind. *
element to our thinking." Judging involves our
whole nature-it isn't just icing on the cake of self- * Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Judge Not?" First Things,
identity. Judging makes it possible for us to "find no. 46, pp. 36-40, October 1994. Reprinted by permis-
our way through a whole forest of possibilities." sion of the publisher.
that are at odds with our commonsense moral expe- innocent people, including six million Jews. If so,
rience. First, subjective relativism implies that in by the lights of subjective relativism, his facilitat-
the rendering of any moral opinion, each person is ing those deaths was morally right. It seems that
incapable of being in error. Each of us is fnarally infal- the totalitarian leader Pol Pot approved of his
lible. If we approve of an action-and we are sincere murdering more than a million innocent people
in our approval-then that action is morally right. in Cambodia. If so, it was right for him to mur-
We literally cannot be mistaken about this, because der those people. But it seems obvious that what
our approval makes the action right. If we say that these men did was wrong and that their approv-
inflicting pain on an innocent child for no reason is ing of their actions did not make the actions right.
right (that is, we approve of such an action), then the Because subjective relativism suggests otherwise, it
action is right. Our moral judgment is correct, and it is a dubious doctrine.
cannot be otherwise. Yet if anything is obvious about Another obvious feature of our commonsense
our moral experience, it is that we are not infallible. moral experience is that from time to time we have
We sometimes are mistaken in our moral judgments. moral disagreements. Maria says that capital pun-
We are, after all, not gods. ishment is right, but Carlos says that it is wrong. This
By all accounts, Adolf Hitler approved of (and seems like a perfectly clear case of two people dis-
ordered) the extermination of vast numbers of agreeing about the morality of capital punishment.
Subjective relativism, however, implies that such treachery, surgically remove the clitorises of young
disagreements cannot happen. Subjective relativ- girls for no medical reason, kill one's elderly par-
ism says that when Maria states that capital punish- ents, have multiple husbands or wives, and make
ment is right, she is just saying that she approves of up for someone's death by murdering others.
it. And when Carlos states that capital punishment Among some people, it has been considered mor-
is wrong, he is just saying that he disapproves of it. ally acceptable to kill those of a different sexual
But they are not really disagreeing, because they orientation, lynch persons with a different skin
are merely describing their attitudes toward capital color, and allow children to die by refusing to give
punishment. In effect, Maria is saying "This is my them available medical treatment. (These latter acts
attitude on the subject," and Carlos is saying "Here have all been practiced in subcultures within the
is my attitude on the subject." But these two claims United States, so not all such cultural differences
are not opposed to each other. They are about dif- happen far from home.) It is only a small step from
ferent subjects, so both statements could be true. acknowledging this moral diversity among cultures
Maria and Carlos might as well be discussing how to the conclusion that cultures determine moral
strawberry ice cream tastes to each of them, for rightness and that objective morality is a myth.
nothing that Maria says could contradict what Car- The philosopher Walter T. Stace (1886-1967)
los says. Because genuine disagreement is a fact of illustrates how easily this conclusion has come to
our moral life, and subjective relativism is inconsis- many in Western societies:
tent with this fact, the doctrine is implausible. It was easy enough to believe in a single absolute
In practice, subjective relativism is a difficult morality in older times when there was no anthro-
view to hold consistently. At times, of course, you pology, when all humanity was divided clearly into
can insist that an action is right for you but wrong two groups, Christian peoples and the ((heathen."
for someone else. But you may also find yourself Christian peoples knew and possessed the one true
morality. The rest were savages whose moral ideas
saying something like "Pol Pot committed abso-
could be ignored. But all this changed. Greater
lutely heinous acts; he was evil," or "What Hitler knowledge has brought greater tolerance. We can
did was wrong" -and what you mean is that what no longer exalt our own moralities as alone true,
Pol Pot and Hitler did was objectively wrong, not while dismissing all other moralities as false or
just wrong relative to you. Such slides from sub- inferior. The investigations of anthropologists have
jective relativism to objectivism suggest a conflict shown that there exist side by side in the world a
between these two perspectives and the need to bewildering variety of moral codes. On this topic
resolve it through critical reasoning. endless volumes have been written, masses of evi-
dence piled up. Anthropologists have ransacked the
Melanesian Islands, the jungles of New Guinea, the
CULTURAL RELATIVISM steppes of Siberia, the deserts of Australia, the for-
ests of central Africa, and have brought back with
To many people, the idea that morality is relative them countless examples of weird, extravagant,
to culture is obvious. It seems obvious primarily and fantastic ((moral" customs with which to con-
because modern sociology has left no doubt that found us. We learn that all kinds of horrible prac-
people's moral judgments differ from culture to tices are, in this, that, or the other place, regarded
as essential to virtue. We find that there is nothing,
culture. The moral judgments of people in other
or next to nothing, which has always and every-
cultures are often shockingly different from our where been regarded as morally good by all men.
own. In some societies, it is morally permissible Where then is our universal morality? Can we, in
to kill infants at birth, burn widows alive with the face of all this evidence, deny that it is nothing but
bodies of their husbands, steal and commit acts of an empty dream?l
Here, Stace spells out in rough form the most A good argument gives us good reason to
common argument for cultural relativism, an infer- accept its conclusion, and an argument is good if
ence from differences in the moral beliefs of cul- its logic is solid (the conclusion follows logically
tures to the conclusion that cultures make morality. from the premises) and the premises are true. So
Before we conclude that objectivism is in fact an is the foregoing argument a good one? We can
empty dream, we should state the argument more see right away that the logic is in fact solid. That
precisely and examine it closely. We can layout the is, the argument is valid: the conclusion does
argument like this: indeed follow from the premises. The question
then becomes whether the premises are true. As
1. People's judgments about right and wrong
we have seen, Premise 1 is most certainly true.
differ from culture to culture.
People's judgments about right and wrong do
2. If people's judgments about right and wrong vary from culture to culture. But what of Prem-
differ from culture to culture, then right and ise 2? Does the diversity of views about right and
wrong are relative to culture, and there are no wrong among cultures show that right and wrong
objective moral principles. are determined by culture, that there are no uni-
3. Therefore, right and wrong are relative to culture, versal moral truths? There are good reasons to
and there are no objective moral principles. think this premise false.
CRITICAL THOUGHT: "Female Circumcision" and Cultural Relativism
In recent years many conflicts have flared between is defended by some who say that it prepares girls
those who espouse universal human rights and those for their role in society and marriage and discour-
who embrace cultural relativism. One issue that has ages illicit sex.
been a flash point in these contentious debates is a Public health officials regard FGC as a serious
practice called female genital cutting (FGC). Other health problem. It can cause reproductive tract
names include female circumcision and female infections, pain during intercourse, painful men-
genital mutilation. struation, complications during childbirth, greater
In FGC, a" or part of the female genitals are risk of HIV infection, bleeding, and even death.
removed. The procedure, used mostly in Africa International health agencies denounce FGC, but
and the Middle East, is usually performed on girls many say that no one outside a culture using FGC
between the ages of four and eight, but sometimes has a right to criticize the practice.
on young women. A report in the Yale Journal of Do you think that FGC is morally permissible? If
Public Health states that in Sudan, 89 percent of you judge the practice wrong, are you appealing to
girls receive FGC and that the cutting tools used some notion of objective morality? If you judge it
"include knives, scissors, razors, and broken glass. permissible, are you doing so because you are a cul-
The operation is typically performed by elderly tural relativist? In either case, explain your reasoning.
women or traditional birth attendants, though
increasing numbers of doctors are taking over *Sarah Cannon and Daniel Berman, "Cut Off: The
these roles."* The practice occurs for various rea- Female Genital-Cutting Controversy," Yale Journal of
sons, including religious and sociological ones, and Public Health 1, no. 2 (2004).
Premise 2 says that because there are disagree- that in the culture we are considering, those who
ments among cultures about right and wrong, belong to it believe (a) that at the moment of death
there must not be any universal standards of right one enters heaven; (b) one's physical and mental
condition in the afterlife is exactly what it is at the
and wrong. But even if the moral judgments of
moment of death; and (c) men are at the peak of
people in various cultures do differ, such differ- their physical and mental powers when they are
ences in themselves do not show that morality is sixty. Then what appeared at first to be peculiari-
relative to culture. Just because people in different ties in moral outlook on the part of the cultural
cultures have different views about morality, their group in question regarding the sanctity of life and
disagreement does not prove that no view can be respect for parents, turn out to be located rather in
objectively correct-no more than people's disagree- a nonmoral outlook of the group. A man in that
culture who kills his father is doing so out of con-
ments about the size of a house show that no one's
cern for the latter's well-being-to prevent him, for
opinion about it can be objectively true. Suppose example, from spending eternity blind or senile.
Culture 1 endorses infanticide, but Culture 2 does It is not at all clear that, if we shared the relevant
not. Such a disagreement does not demonstrate nonmoral beliefs of this other culture, we would
that both cultures are equally correct or that there is not believe with them that sons should kill their
no objectively correct answer. After all, it is possible fathers at the appropriate time. 2
that infanticide is objectively right (or wrong) and
that the relevant moral beliefs of either Culture 1 or To find similar examples, we need not search for
Culture 2 are false. the exotic. In Western cultures we have the famil-
Another reason to doubt the truth of Premise iar case of abortion, an issue hotly debated among
2 comes from questioning how deep the disagree- those who at first glance appear to be disagreeing
ments among cultures really are. Judgments about about moral principles. But in fact the disputants
the rightness of actions obviously do vary across agree about the moral principle involved: that mur-
cultures. But people can differ in their moral judg- der (unjustly killing a person) is morally wrong.
ments not just because they accept different moral What they do disagree about is a nonmoral factual
principles, but also because they have divergent matter-whether the fetus is an entity that can be
110011norai beliefs. They may actually embrace the murdered (that is, whether it is a person). Disagree-
same moral principles, but their moral judgments ment over the nonmoral facts masks substantial
conflict because their nonmoral beliefs lead them agreement on fundamental moral standards.
to apply those principles in very different ways. If The work of several anthropologists provides
so, the diversity of moral judgments across cultures some evidence for these kinds of disagreements
does not necessarily indicate deep disagreements as well as for the existence of cross-cultural moral
over fundamental moral principles or standards. agreement in general. The social psychologist Solo-
Here is a classic example: mon Asch, for instance, maintains that differ-
ing moral judgments among societies often arise
IT]he story is told of a culture in which a son is when the same moral principles are operating but
regarded as obligated to kill his father when the lat- the particulars of cultural situations vary. 3 Other
ter reaches age sixty. Given just this much informa- observers claim that across numerous diverse cul-
tion about the culture and the practice in question
tures we can find many common moral elements
it is tempting to conclude that the members of that
culture differ radically from members of our cul- such as prohibitions against murder, lying, incest,
ture in their moral beliefs and attitudes. We, after and adultery and obligations of fairness, reciproc-
all, believe it is immoral to take a human life, and ity, and consideration toward parents and chil-
regard patricide as especially wrong. But suppose dren. 4 Some philosophers argue that a core set of
moral values-including, for example, truth telling subjective relatiVism, it has several implications
and prohibitions against murder-111ust be univer- that render it highly implausible.
sal, otherwise cultures would not survive. First, like subjective relativism, cultural relativ-
These points demonstrate that Premise 2 of the ism implies moral infallibility-that a culture sim-
argument for cultural relativism is false. The argu- ply cannot be mistaken about a moral issue. If it
ment therefore gives us no good reasons to believe approves of an action, then that action is morally
that an action is right simply because ones culture right, and there is no possibility of error as long as
approves of it. the culture's approval is genuine. But, of course,
For many people, however, the failure of the cultural infallibility in moral matters is flagrantly
argument for cultural relativism may be beside the implausible, just as individual infallibility is. At one
pOint. They find the doctrine appealing mainly time or another, cultures have sanctioned witch
because it seems to promote the humane and burning, slavery, genocide, racism, rape, human
enlightened attitude of tolerance toward other cul- sacrifice, and religious persecution. Does it make
tures. Broad expanses of history are drenched with any sense to say that they could not have been
blood and marked by cruelty because of the evil of mistaken about the morality of these actions?
intolerance-religious, raCial, political, and social. Cultural relativism also has the peculiar con-
Tolerance therefore seems a supreme virtue, and sequence that social reformers of every sort would
cultural relativism appears to provide a justifica- a/ways be wrong. Their culture would be the ultimate
tion and vehicle for it. After all, if all cultures are authority on moral matters, so if they disagreed
morally equal, does not cultural relativism both with their culture, they could not pOSSibly be right.
entail and promote tolerance? If their culture approved of genOCide, genocide
We should hope that tolerance does reign in a would be right, and anti-genocide reformers would
pluralistic world, but there is no necessary connec- be wrong to oppose the practice. In this upside-
tion between tolerance and cultural relativism. For down world, the anti-genocide reformers would
one thing, cultural relativists cannot consistently be immoral, and the genocidal culture would be
advocate tolerance. To advocate tolerance is to the real paragon of righteousness. Reformers such
advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance as Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Mary
is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism Wollstonecraft (champion of women's rights), and
~ust be false, because it says that there are no objec- Frederick Douglass (American abolitionist) would
tIve moral values. So instead of justifying tolerance be great crusaders-for immorality. Our moral
to~ard all, cultural relativism actually undercuts experience, however, suggests that cultural relativ-
universal tolerance. Moreover, according to cul- ism has matters exactly backward. SOcial reform-
tural relatiVism, intolerance can be justified just ers have often been right when they claimed their
~s easily as tolerance can. If a culture approves of cultures were wrong, and this fact suggests that cul-
Intolerance, then intolerance is right for that cultural relativism is wrong about morality.
ture. If a culture approves of tolerance, then toler- Where cultural relativism holds, if you have a
ance is right for that culture. Cultural relativists are disagreement with your culture about the right-
thus committed to the view that intolerance can ness of an action, you automatically lose. You are
in fact be justified, and they cannot consistently in error by definition. But what about a disagree-
claim that tolerance is morally right everywhere. ment among members of the same SOCiety? What
At this point we are left with no good reasons does such a disagreement amount to? It amounts
to believe that cultural relativism is true. But the to something very strange, according to cultural
problems for the doctrine are deeper than that. Like relativism. When two people in the same culture
disagree on a moral issue, what they are really dis- carried out his orders). Then Hitler's final solution
agreeing about-the only thing they can rationally was morally right; engineering the Holocaust was
disagree about-is whether their society endorses a morally permissible. If you are a cultural relativist,
particular view. After all, society makes actions right you cannot legitimately condemn these monstrous
by approving or disapproving of them. According deeds. Because they were approved by their respec-
to cultural relativism, if Rene and Michel (both tive societies, they were morally justified. They
members of society X) are disagreeing about capital were just as morally justified as the socially sanc-
punishment, their disagreement must actually be tioned activities of Albert Schweitzer, Jonas Salk, or
about whether society X approves of capital pun- Florence Nightingale. But all this seems implausi-
ishment. Because right and wrong are determined ble. We do in fact sometimes criticize other cultures
by one's culture, Rene and Michel are disagreeing and believe that it is legitimate to do so.
about what society X says. But this view of moral Contrary to the popular view, rejecting cultural
disagreement is dubious, to say the least. When we relativism (embracing moral objectivism) does not
have a moral disagreement, we do not think that entail intolerance. In fact, it provides a plausible
the crux of it is whether our society approves of an starting point for tolerance. A moral objectivist
action. We do not think that deciding a moral issue realizes that she can legitimately criticize other
is simply a matter of polling the public to see which cultures-and that people of other cultures can
way opinion leans. We do not think that Rene and legitimately criticize her culture. A recognition of
Michel will ever find out whether capital punish- this fact together with an objectivist's sense of falli-
ment is morally permissible by consulting public bility can lead her to an openness to criticism of her
opinion. Determining whether an action is right is own culture and to acceptance of everyone's right
a very different thing from determining what most to disagree.
people think. This odd consequence of cultural We not only criticize other cultures but also
relativism suggests that the doctrine is flawed. compare the past with the present. We compare
One of the more disturbing implications of the actions of the past with those of the present
cultural relativism is that cultures cannot be legiti- and judge whether moral progress has been made.
mately criticized from the outside. If a culture We see that slavery has been abolished, that we no
approves of the actions that it performs, then those longer burn witches, that we recognize racism as
actions are morally right, regardless of what other evil-then we judge that these changes represent
cultures have to say about the matter. One society's moral progress. For moral relativists, however,
practices are as morally justified as any other's, as there is no objective standard by which to com-
long as the practices are socially sanctioned. This pare the ways of the past with the ways of the pres-
consequence of cultural relativism may not seem ent. Societies of the past approved or disapproved
too worrisome When the societies in question are of certain practices, and contemporary societies
long dead. But it takes on a different tone when approve or disapprove of them, and no transcul-
the societies are closer to us in time. Consider the tural moral assessments can be made. But if there
1994 genocide committed in Rwanda in which a is such a thing as moral progress, then there must
million people died. Suppose the killers' society be some cross-cultural moral yardstick by which we
(their tribe) approved of the murders. Then the can evaluate actions. There must be objective stan-
genocide was morally justified. And what of Hitler's dards by which we can judge that actions of the
"final solution" -the murder of millions of Jews in present are better than those of the past. If there are
World War II? Say that German society approved no objective moral standards, our judging that we
of Hitler's actions (and those of the men who are in fact making moral progress is hard to explain.
Finally, there is a fundamental difficulty con- noncognitivist view is emotivism, which says that
cerning the application of cultural relativism to moral judgments cannot be true or false because
moral questions: the doctrine is nearly impossi- they do not make any claims-they Inerely express
ble to use. The problem is that cultural relativism emotions or attitudes. For the emotivist, moral
applies to societies (or social groups), but we all utterances are something akin to exclamations that
belong to several societies, and there is no way to simply express approving or disapproving feel-
choose which one is the proper one. What soci- ings: "Violence against women-disgusting!" or
ety do you belong to if you are an Italian Ameri- "Shoplifting-love it!"
can Buddhist living in Atlanta, Georgia, who is a The English philosopher A.J. Ayer (1910-1989),
member of the National Organization for Women an early champion of emotivism, is clear and blunt
and a breast cancer support group? The hope of about what a moral utterance such as "Stealing
cultural relativists is that they can use the doc- money is wrong" signifies. This sentence, he says,
trine to make better, more enlightened moral
expresses no proposition which can lx' either true
decisions. But this society-identification problem
or false. It is as if I had written "Stealing money!!"-
seems to preclude any moral decisions, let alone where the shape and thickness of the exclamation
enlightened ones. marks show, by a suitable convention, that a spe-
What, then, can we conclude from our exami- cial sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which
nation of cultural relativism? We have found that is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing
the basic argument for the view fails; we therefore said here which can be true or false .... For in saying
have no good reasons to believe that the doctrine that a certain typl' of action is right or wrong, I am
not making any factual statement, not even a state-
is true. Beyond that, we have good grounds for
ment about my own state of mind:<\
thinking the doctrine false. Its surprising implica-
tions regarding moral infallibility, moral reformers, If moral judgments are about feelings and not
moral progress, the nature of moral disagreements the truth or falsity of moral assertions, then ethics
within SOCieties, and the possibility of cross-cultural is a very different sort of inquiry than most people
criticism show it to be highly implausible. The crux imagine. As Ayer says,
of the matter is that cultural relativism does a poor
IAls ethical judgements are mere expressions of
job of explaining some important features of our
feeling, there can be no way of determining the
moral experience. A far better explanation of these validity of any ethical system, and, indeed, no
features is that some form of moral objectivism is sense in asking whether any such system is true. All
true. that one may legitimately enquire in this connec-
tion is, What arc the moral habits of a given per-
son or group of people, and what causes them to
EMOT1V1SM
have precisely those habits and feelings? And this
enquiry falls wholly within the scope of the exist-
The commonsense view of moral judgments is
ing social sciences.1>
that they ascribe moral properties to such things
as actions and people and that they are therefore The emotivist points out that in addition to
statements that can be true or false. This view of expressing feelings and attitudes, moral utter-
moral judgments is known as cogllitivisill. The ances also function to influence people's attitudes
opposing view, called 11 ol1cogl1 iti vis In, denies that and behavior. So the sentence "Stealing money is
moral judgments are statements that can be true wrong" not only expresses feelings of disapproval
or false; it holds that they do not ascribe prop- but can also influence others to have similar feel-
erties to anything. Probably the most famous ings and act accordingly.
Emotivists also take an unusual position on different function. Here reasons are intended not
moral disagreements. They maintain that moral to support statements (because there are no moral
disagreements are not conflicts of beliefs, as is the statements) but to influence the emotions or atti-
case when one person asserts that something is tudes of others. Because moral utterances express
true and another person asserts that it is not true. emotions or attitudes, "presenting reasons" is a
Instead, moral disagreements are disagreements in matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influ-
attitude. Jane has positive feelings or a favorable ence those emotions and attitudes. Suppose A has
attitude toward abortion, but Ellen has negative a favorable attitude toward abortion, and B has an
feelings or an unfavorable attitude toward abor- unfavorable one (that is, A and B are having a dis-
tion. The disagreement is emotive, not cognitive. agreement in attitude). For A, to present reasons is
Jane may say "Abortion is right," and Ellen may to provide information that might cause B to have a
say "Abortion is wrong," but they are not really more favorable attitude toward abortion.
disagreeing over the facts. They are expressing This conception of the function of reasons,
conflicting attitudes and trying to influence each however, implies that good reasons encompass any
other's attitude and behavior. nonmoral facts that can alter so;meone's attitude.
Philosophers have criticized emotivism on On this view, the relevance of these facts to the
several grounds, and this emotivist analysis of dis- judgment at hand is beside the pOint. The essen-
agreement has been a prime target. As you might tial criterion is whether the adduced facts are suffi-
suspect, their concern is that this notion of disagree- ciently influential. They need not have any logical
ment is radically different from our ordinary view. or cognitive connection to the moral judgment
Like subjective relativism, emotivism implies that to be changed. They may, for example, appeal to
disagreements in the usual sense are impossible. someone's ignorance, arrogance, racism, or fear.
People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because But we ordinarily suppose that reasons should be
there are no moral facts. But we tend to think that relevant to the cognitive content of moral judg-
when we disagree with someone on a moral issue, ments. Moreover, we normally make a clear dis-
there really is a conflict of statements about what tinction between influencing someone's attitudes
is the case. Of course, when we are involved in a and showing (by providing reasons) that a claim is
conflict of beliefs, we may also experience conflict- true-a distinction that emotivism cannot make.
ing attitudes. But we do not think that we are only The final implication of emotivism is also prob-
experiencing a disagreement in attitudes. lematic: there is no such thing as goodness or bad-
Emotivism also provides a curious account of ness. We cannot legitimately claim that anything
how reasons function in moral discourse. Our com- is good or bad, because these properties do not
monsense view is that a moral judgment is the kind exist. To declare that something is good is simply
of thing that makes a claim about moral properties to express positive emotions or a favorable attitude
and that such a claim can be supported by reasons. toward it. We may say that pain is bad, but badness
If someone asserts "Euthanasia is wrong," we may (or goodness) is not a feature of pain. Our saying
sensibly ask her what reasons she has for believing that pain is bad is just an expression of our unfavor-
that claim. If she replies that there are no reasons able attitude toward pain.
to back up her claim or that moral utterances are Suppose a six-year-old girl is living in a small vil-
not the kinds of things that can be supported by lage in Syria during the civil war between President
reasons, we would probably think that she mis- Bashar al-Assad's Baathist government and rebel
understood the question or the nature of moral- forces. Assad's henchmen firebomb the village,
ity. For the emotivist, "moral" reasons have a very destroying it and incinerating everyone except the
girl, who is burned from head to toe and endures CHAPTER REVIEW
excruciating pain for three days before she dies.
Suppose that we are deeply moved by this tragedy
as we consider her unimaginable suffering and we SUMMARY
remark, "How horrible. The little girl's suffering
SlIbjectil'e relativism is the view that an action is mor-
was a very bad thing." 7 When we say somet h'lng
ally right if one approves of it. A person's approval
like this, we ordinarily mean that the girl's suffering
makes the action right. This doctrine (as well as cul-
had a certain moral property: that the suffering was
tural relativism) is in stark contrast to mortl/ objectiv-
bad. But according to emotivism, her suffering had
ism, the view that moral truths exist and that they
no moral properties at all. When we comment on
do so independently of what individuals or societ-
the girl's suffering, we are simply expressing our ies think of them. Subjective relativism, though, has
feelings; the suffering itself was neither good nor some troubling implications. It implies that each per-
bad. But this view of things seems implausible. Our son is morally infallible and that individuals can never
moral experience suggests that some things in fact have a genuine moral disagreement.
are bad and some are good. Cultural relativism is the view that an action is mor-
The philosopher Brand Blanshard (1892-1987) ally right if one's culture approves of it. The argument
makes the pOint in the following way: for this doctrine is based on the diversity of moral judg-
ments among cultures: because people's judgments
[T]he emotivist is cut off by his theory from admit-
ting that there has been anything good or evil in about right and wrong differ from culture to culture,
the past, either animal or human. There have been right and wrong must be relative to culture, and there
Black Deaths, to be sure, and wars and rumours are no objective moral principles. This argument is
of war; there have been the burning of countless defective, however, because the diversity of moral views
women as witches, and the massacre in the Katyn does not imply that morality is relative to cultures. In
forest, and Oswiecim, and Dachau, and an unbear- addition, the alleged diversity of basic moral standards
able procession of horrors; but one cannot mean- among cultures may be only apparent, not real. Societ-
ingfully say that anything evil has ever happened. ies whose moral judgments contlict may be differing
The people who suffered from these things did not over moral principles but over nonmoral facts.
indeed take up attitudes of revulsion toward them;
Some think that tolerance is entailed by cultural
we can now judge that they took them; but in such
relativism. But there is no necessary connection
judgments we are not saying that anything evil
OCcurred .... IEmotivismj, when first presented, has between tolerance and the doctrine. Indeed, the cul-
some plausibility. But when this is balanced against tural relativist cannot consistently advocate tolerance
the implied unplausibility of setting down as meanwhile maintaining his relativist standpOint. To advo-
ingless every suggestion that good or evil events cate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value.
have ever occurred, it is outweighed enormously.1i But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cul-
tural relativism must be false, because it says that there
Obviously, emotivism does not fare well when are no objective moral values.
examined in light of our commonsense moral Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism has
experience. We must keep in mind, though, that some disturbing consequences. It implies that cultures
common sense is fallible. On the other hand, we are morally infallible, that social reformers can never
should not jettison common sense in favor of be morally right, that moral disagreements between
another view unless we have good reasons to do so. individuals in the same culture amount to arguments
In the case of emotivism, we have no good reasons over whether they disagree with their culture, that
to prefer it over common sense-and we have good other cultures cannot be legitimately criticized, and
grounds for rejecting it. that moral progress is impossihle.
Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are 9. According to the text, how is it possible for
neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions people in different cultures to disagree about
or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can moral judgments and still embrace the same
disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People can- fundamental moral principles? (pp. 25-26)
not disagree over the moral facts, because there are no 10. Is there a necessary connection between cultural
moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting relativism and tolerance? Why or why not?
reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of (p.26)
offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone's 11. What does cultural relativism imply about the
attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as moral status of social reformers? (p. 26)
long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far- 12. What is the emotivist view of moral
reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is disagreements? (p. 29)
actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of 13. According to emotivism, how do reasons
goodness and badness. There is only the expression of function in moral discourse? (p. 29)
favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward
something.
DiscIIssion Qllestions
1. Are you a subjective relativist? If so, how did
I(EY TERMS you come to adopt this view? If not, what is
objectivism (p. 20) your explanation for not accepting it?
cultural relativism (p. 20) 2. Suppose a serial killer approves of his murderous
subjective relativism (p. 20) actions. According to subjective relativism, are
emotivism (p. 21) the killer's actions therefore justified? Do you
believe a serial killer's murders are justified? If not,
EXERCISES is your judgment based on a subjective relativist's
perspective or an objectivist perspective?
Review Qllestions 3. Are you a cultural relativist? Why or why not?
1. Does objectivism entail intolerance? Why or 4. Suppose a majority of the German people
why not? (p. 20) approved of Hitler's murdering six million Jews
2. Does objectivism require absolutism? Why or in World War II. Would this approval make
why not? (p. 20) Hitler's actions morally justified? If so, why? If
3. How does subjective relativism differ from not, why not-and what moral outlook are you
cultural relativism? (p. 20) using to make such a determination?
4. What is emotivism? How does emotivism differ 5. When cultural relativists say that every culture
from objectivislTI? (p. 21) should embrace a policy of tolerance, are they
5. How does subjective relativism imply moral contradicting themselves? If so, how? If cultural
infallibility? (p. 22) relativism were true, would this fact make wars
6. According to moral subjectivism, are moral between societies less or more likely? Explain
disagreements possible? Why or why not? your answer.
(pp.22-23) 6. If you traveled the world and saw that cultures
7. What is the argument for cultural relativism? differ dramatically in their moral judgments,
Is the argument sound? Why or why not? would you conclude from this evidence that
(pp.23-26) cultural relativism was true? Why or why not?
8. Does the diversity of moral outlooks in cultures 7. According to a cultural relativist, would the
show that right and wrong are determined by civil rights reforms that Martin Luther King Jr.
culture? Why or why not? (pp. 24-26) sought be morally right or wrong? Do ),Oll think
that his efforts at reform were morally wrong? FURTHER READING

What are your reasons for your decision? A. J. Ayer, Language, Tnlth and Logic (1936; reprint,
8. Do you believe that there has been moral New York: Dover, 1952).
progress in the past thousand years of human Robert Audi, Moral Value and Human Diversity (New York:
history? Why or why not? Oxford University Press, 2007).
9. Suppose a deer that had been shot by a hunter Brand Blanshard, UEmotivism," in Reason and Goodness
(1961; reprint, New York: G. Allen and Unwin, 1978).
writhed in agony for days before dying. You
Donald M. Borchert and David Stewart, UEthical Emotiv-
exclaim, "How she must have suffered! Her
ism," in Exploring Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
horrendous pain was a bad thing." In this Richard B. Brandt, chapter 11 in Ethical Theory: The Prob-
situation, does the word bad refer to any moral lems of Nonnative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs,
properties? Is there really something bad about NJ: Prentice Hall, 1959).
the deer's suffering-or is your use of the word Jean Bethke Elshtain, uJudge Not?" First Things, no. 46
just a way to express your horror without (October 1994): 36-40.
making any moral statement at all? Explain Fred Feldman, chapter 11 in Introductory Ethics (Engle-
your answers. wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978).
Gowans, Chris, "Moral Relativism," The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, Summer 2019 ed., ed. Edward N.
Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
entries/moral-relativism 0 anuary 1, 2021).
1. In Western societies, some cultural subgroups
Melville Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in
believe it is morally permissible to kill Cultural Pluralism, ed. Frances Herskovits (New York:
anyone who criticizes their religion. Do Random House, 1972).
you agree or disagree with this view? On J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmond-
what grounds? Is your position relativist or sworth: Penguin, 1977).
objectivist? Susan Moller Okin, uFeminism, Women's Human Rights,
2. Suppose you are a social reformer campaigning and Cultural Differences," Hypatia, 13: 32-52.
against your culture's practice of systematically James Rachels, USubjectivism," in A Companion to Ethics, ed.
discriminating against the poorest people Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),432-41.
Theodore Schick Jr. and Lewis Vaughn, chapter 5 in DOing
in your SOciety. Do you think your stance is
Philosophy: An Introduction through Thought Experiments,
morally right-or is your culture right while
2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003).
you are wrong? Why?
Walter T. Stace, UEthical Relativism," in The Concept of
3. Suppose you accept (approve of) premarital Morals (1937; reprint, New York: Macmillan, 1965).
sex. Is it possible for you to be mistaken Paul Taylor, chapter 2 in Principles of Ethics: An Introduc-
about this issue? Why or why not? Does tion (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975).
your answer suggest that you are a subjective David Wong, uRelativism," in A Companion to Ethics, ed.
relativist? Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),442-50.
READINGS
From Anthropology and the Abnormal

RUTH BENEDICT
Modern social anthropology has become more and the task of indicating the significance of the work that
more a study of the varieties and common elements of has been done and of the problems that have arisen.
cultural environment and the consequences of these One of these problems relates to the customary
in human behavior. For such a study of diverse social modern normal-abnormal categories and our conclu-
orders primitive peoples fortunately provide a labora- sions regarding them. In how far are such categories
tory not yet entirely vitiated by the spread of a standard- culturally determined, or in how far can we with assur-
ized worldwide civilization. Dyaks and Hopis, Fijians ance regard them as absolute? In how far can we regard
and Yakuts are significant for psychological and socio- inability to function socially as diagnostic of abnor-
logical study because only among these simpler peoples mality, or in how far is it necessary to regard this as a
has there been sufficient isolation to give opportunity function of the culture?
for the development of localized social forms. In the As a matter of fact, one of the most striking facts
higher cultures the standardization of custom and that emerge from a study of widely varying cultures is
belief over a couple of continents has given a false sense the ease with which our abnormals function in other
of the inevitability of the particular forms that have cultures. It does not matter what kind of "abnormal-
gained currency, and we need to turn to a wider sur- ity" we choose for illustration, those which indicate
vey in order to check the conclusions we hastily base extreme instability, or those which are more in the
upon this near-universality of familiar customs. Most nature of character traits like sadism or delusions of
of the simpler cultures did not gain the wide currency grandeur or of persecution, there are well-described
of the one which, out of our experience, we identify cultures in which these abnormals function at ease
with human nature, but this was for various historical and with honor, and apparently without danger or
reasons, and certainly not for any that gives us as its car- difficulty to the SOciety.
riers a monopoly of social good or of social sanity. Mod- The most notorious of these is trance and cata-
ern civilization, from this pOint of view, becomes not lepsy. Even a very mild mystic is aberrant in our cul-
a necessary pinnacle of human achievement but one ture. But most peoples have regarded even extreme
entry in a long series of possible adjustments. psychic manifestations not only as normal and desir-
These adjustments, whether they are in manner- able, but even as characteristic of highly valued and
isms like the ways of showing anger, or joy, or grief gifted individuals. This was true even in our own cul-
in any SOciety, or in major human drives like those of tural background in that period when Catholicism
sex, prove to be far more variable than experience in made the ecstatic experience the mark of sainthood.
anyone culture would suggest. In certain fields, such It is hard for us, born and brought up in a culture that
as that of religion or of formal marriage arrangements, makes no use of the experience, to realize how impor-
these wide limits of variability are well known and can tant a role it may play and how many individuals are
be fairly described. In others it is not yet possible to give capable of it, once it has been given an honorable
a generalized account, but that does not absolve us of place in any society.
* * *
Ruth Benedict, excerpts from "Anthropology and the Abnormal,"
Journal of General Psychology 10 (1934), pp. 59-82. ct'· 1934 Rout- Cataleptic and trance phenomena are, of course,
ledge. Reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis only one illustration of the fact that those whom we
Ltd., http://www.tandfonline.com). regard as abnormals may function adequately in other
cultures. Many of our culturally discarded traits are that speech communication may be possible at all, so
selected for elaboration in different societies. Homosex- the possibility of organized behavior of every sort, from
uality is an excellent example, for in this case our atten- the fashions of local dress and houses to the dicta of a
tion is not constantly diverted, as in the consideration people's ethics and religion, depends upon a similar
of trance, to the interruption of routine activity which selection among the possible behavior traits. In the field
it implies. Homosexuality poses the problem very sim- of recognized economic obligations or sex tabus this
ply. A tendency toward this trait in our culture exposes selection is as nonrational and subconscious a process as
an individual to all the conflicts to which all aberrants it is in the field of phonetics. It is a process which goes on
are always exposed, and we tend to identify the conse- in the group for long periods of time and is historically
quences of this conflict with homosexuality. But these conditioned by innumerable accidents of isolation or of
consequences are obviously local and cultural. Homo- contact of peoples. In any comprehensive study of psy-
sexuals in many societies are not incompetent, but they cholo!,l)', the selection that different cultures have made
may be such if the culture asks adjustments of them that in the course of history within the great circumference
would strain any man's vitality. Wherever homosexu- of potential behavior is of great significance.
ality has been given an honorable place in any society, Every society, beginning with some slight inclina-
those to whom it is congenial have filled adequately the tion in one direction or another, carries its preference
honorable roles SOciety assigns to them. Plato's Republic farther and farther, integrating itself more and more
is, of course, the most convincing statement of such a completely upon its chosen basis, and discarding
reading of homosexuality. It is presented as one of the those types of behavior that are uncongenial. Most
major means to the good life, and it was generally so of these organizations of personality that seem to us
regarded in Greece at that time. most incontrovertibly abnormal have been used by
The cultural attitude toward homosexuals has not different civilizations in the very foundations of their
always been on such a high ethical plane, but it has institutional life. Conversely the most valued traits of
been varied. Among many American Indian tribes our normal individuals have been looked on in dif-
there exists the institution of the berdache, as the ferently organized cultures as aberrant. Normality, in
French called them. These men-women were men who short, within a very wide range, is culturally defined. It
at puberty or thereafter took the dress and the occupa- is primarily a term for the socially elaborated segment
tions of women. Sometimes they married other men of human behavior in any culture; and abnormality,
and lived with them. Sometimes they were men with a term for the segment that that particular civiliza-
no inversion, persons of weak sexual endowment who tion does not use. The very eyes with which we see the
chose this role to avoid the jeers of the women. The problem are conditioned by the long traditional hab-
berdaches were never regarded as of first-rate super- its of our own SOciety.
natural power, as similar men-women were in Siberia, It is a pOint that has been made more often in
but rather as leaders in women's occupations, good relation to ethics than in relation to psychiatry. We
healers in certain diseases, or, among certain tribes, as do not any longer make the mistake of deriving the
the genial organizers of social affairs. In any case, they morality of our own locality and decade directly from
were SOCially placed. They were not left exposed to the the inevitable constitution of human nature. We do
conflicts that visit the deviant who is excluded from not elevate it to the dignity of a first principle. We
participation in the recognized patterns of his society. recognize that morality differs in every SOCiety, and is
a convenient term for socially approved habits. Man-
* * * kind has always preferred to say, "(t is a morally good,"
No one civilization can possibly utilize in its mores rather than "It is habitual," and the fact of this prefer-
the whole potential range of human behavior. Just as ence is matter enough for a critical science of ethics.
there are great numbers of possible phonetic articula- But historically the two phrases are synonymous.
tions, and the possibility of language depends on a The concept of the normal is properly a variant
c.;election and 'itandardization of a few of these in order of the concept of the good. It is that which society
such differences between cultures. One day, to teach woman who had borne twenty children but had killed
this lesson, he summoned some Greeks who hap- ten of them at birth. Female babies, he found, were
pened to be present at his court and asked them what especially liable to be destroyed, and this was permit-
they would take to eat the bodies of their dead fathers. ted simply at the parents' discretion, with no social
They were shocked, as Darius knew they would be, stigma attached to it. Old people also, when they
and replied that no amount of money could persuade became too feeble to contribute to the family, were left
them to do such a thing. Then Darius called in some out in the snow to die. So there seemed to be, in this
Callatians, and while the Greeks listened asked them society, remarkably little respect for life.
what they would take to burn their dead fathers' bod- To the general public, these were disturbing
ies. The Callatians were horrified and told Darius not revelations. Our own way of living seems so natural
even to mention such a dreadful thing. and right that for many of us it is hard to conceive of
This story, recounted by Herodotus in his History, others living so differently. And when we do hear of
illustrates a recurring theme in the literature of social such things, we tend immediately to categorize those
science: different cultures have different moral codes. other peoples as "backward" or "primitive." But to
What is thought right within one group may be anthropologists and sociologists, there was nothing
utterly abhorrent to the members of another group, particularly surprising about the Eskimos. Since the
and vice versa. Should we eat the bodies of the dead time of Herodotus, enlightened observers have been
or burn them? If you were a Greek, one answer would accustomed to the idea that conceptions of right and
seem obviously correct; but if you were a Callatian, the wrong differ from culture to culture. If we assume that
opposite would seem equally certain. our ideas of right and wrong will be shared by all peo-
It is easy to give additional examples of the same ples at all times, we are merely naive.
kind. Consider the Eskimos. They are a remote and
inaccessible people. Numbering only about 25,000, CULTURAL RELATIVISM
they live in small, isolated settlements scattered To many thinkers, this observation-"Different cul-
mostly along the northern fringes of North America tures have different moral codes"-has seemed to be
and Greenland. Until the beginning of this cen- the key to understanding morality. The idea of uni-
tury, the outside world knew little about them. Then versal truth in ethics, they say, is a myth. The customs
explorers began to bring back strange tales. of different societies are all that exist. These customs
Eskimo customs turned out to be very different cannot be said to be ((correct" or "incorrect," for
from Our Own. The men often had more than one wife, that implies we have an independent standard of
and they would share their wives with guests, lend- right and wrong by which they may be judged. But
ing them for the night as a sign of hospitality. More- there is no such independent standard; every stan-
over, Within a community, a dominant male might
dard is culture-bound. The great pioneering sociolo-
demand-and get-regular sexual access to other gist William Graham Sumner, writing in 1906, put
men's wives. The women, however, were free to break the point like this:
these arrangements simply by leaving their husbands
and taking up with new partners-free, that is, so long The ((right" way is the way which the ancestors used
as their former husbands chose not to make trouble. and which has been handed down. The tradition is
its own warrant. It is not held subject to verification
All in all, the Eskimo practice was a volatile scheme
by experience. The notion of right is in the folkways.
that bore little resemblance to what we call marriage.
It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and
But it was not only their marriage and sexual prac- brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is
tices that were different. The Eskimos also seemed right. This is because they are traditional, and therefore
to have less regard for human life. Infanticide, for contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral
example, was common. Knud Rasmussen, one of the ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the
most famous early explorers, reported that he met one end of our analysis.
CHAPTER 2: SUBJECTIVISM. RELATIVISM. AND EMOTIVISM 0 37
This line of thought has probably persuaded more by subjecting it to rational analysis; and when we
people to be skeptical about ethics than any other analyze Cultural Relativism we find that it is not so
single thing. Cultural Relativism, as it has been called, plausible as it first appears to be.
challenges our ordinary belief in the objectivity and The first thing we need to notice is that at the
universality of moral truth. It says, in effect, that there heart of Cultural Relativism there is a certain form
is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are of argument. The strategy used by cultural relativists
only the various cultural codes, and nothing more. is to argue from facts about the differences between
Moreover, our own code has no special status; it is cultural outlooks to a conclusion about the status of
merely one among many. morality. Thus we are invited to accept this reasoning:
As we shall see, this basic idea is really a compound
of several different thoughts. It is important to sepa- (1) The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead,
rate the various elements of the theory because, on whereas the Callatians believed it was right to eat
analYSiS, some parts of the theory turn out to be cor- the dead.
rect, whereas others seem to be mistaken. As a begin- (2) Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively
ning, we may distinguish the following claims, all of right nor objectively wrong. It is merely a matter
which have been made by cultural relativists: of opinion, which varies from culture to culture.
1. Different societies have different moral codes. Or, alternatively:

2. There is no objective standard that can be used to
judge one societal code better than another. (1) The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide,
3. The moral code of our own society has no special whereas Americans believe infanticide is immoral.
status; it is merely one among many. (2) Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right
4. There is no "universal truth" in ethics-that is, nor objectively wrong. It is merely a matter of
there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples opinion, which varies from culture to culture.
at all times. Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fun-
S. The moral code of a society determines what is damental idea. They are both special cases of a more
right within that society; that is, if the moral code general argument, which says:
of a SOCiety says that a certain action is right, then
that action is right, at least within that society. (1) Different cultures have different moral codes.
6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the (2) Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in moral-
conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an ity. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion,
attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other and opinions vary from culture to culture.
cultures.
We may call this the Cultural Differences Argument. To
Although it may seem that these six propositions go nat-
many people, it is very persuasive. But from a logical
urally together, they are independent of one another, in
point of view, is it a sound argument?
the sense that some of them might be true even if oth-
It is not sound. The trouble is that the conclu-
ers are false. In what follows, we will try to identify what
sion does not really follow from the premise-that is,
is correct in Cultural Relativism, but we will also be
even if the premise is true, the conclusion still might
concerned to expose what is mistaken about it.
be false. The premise concerns what people believe:
in some societies, people believe one thing; in other
THE CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ARGUMENT societies, people believe differently. The conclusion,
cultural Relativism is a theory about the nature however, concerns what really is the case. The trouble
of morality. At first blush it seems quite plaUSible. is that this sort of conclusion does not follow logically
However, like all such theories, it may be evaluated from this sort of premise.
Consider again the example of the Greeks and Cal- He says that there is no measure of right and wrong
latians. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the other than the standards of one's society: "The notion
dead; the Callatians believed it was right. Does it fol- of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of
low, from the mere fact that they disagreed, that there is independent origin, and brought to test them. In the
no objective truth in the matter? No, it does not fol- folkways, whatever is, is right."
low; for it could be that the practice was objectively Suppose we took this seriously. What would be
right (or wrong) and that one or the other of them was some of the consequences?
simply mistaken. 1. We could no Jonger sa)' that the customs of other
To make the point clearer, consider a very different societies are morally inferior to our own. This, of course,
matter. In some societies, people believe the earth is is one of the main points stressed by Cultural Relativ-
flat. In other societies, such as our own, people believe ism. We would have to stop condemning other societ-
the earth is (roughly) spherical. Does it follow, from the ies merely because they are "different." So long as we
mere fact that they disagree, that there is no "objective concentrate on certain examples, such as the funerary
truth" in geography? Of course not; we would never practices of the Greeks and Callatians, this may seem
draw such a conclusion because we realize that, in to be a sophisticated, enlightened attitude.
their beliefs about the world, the members of some However, we would also be stopped from criti-
SOcieties might simply be wrong. There is no reason to cizing other, less benign practices. Suppose a society
think that if the world is round everyone must know waged war on its neighbors for the purpose of taking
it. Similarly, there is no reason to think that if there is slaves. Or suppose a society was violently anti-Semitic
moral truth everyone must know it. The fundamental and its leaders set out to destroy the Jews. Cultural
mistake in the Cultural Differences Argument is that Relativism would preclude us from saying that either
it attempts to derive a substantive conclusion about a of these practices was wrong. We would not even
subject (morality) from the mere fact that people dis- be able to say that a society tolerant of Jews is better
agree about it. than the anti-Semitic society, for that would imply
It is important to understand the nature of the some sort of transcultural standard of comparison.
point that is being made here. We are not saying (not The failure to condemn tllese practices does not seem
yet, anyway) that the conclusion of the argument is "enlightened"; on the contrary, slavery and anti-
false. Insofar as anything being said here is concerned, Semitism seem wrong wherever they occur. Never-
it is still an open question whether the conclusion is theless, if we took Cultural Relativism seriously, we
true. We are making a purely logical point and saying would have to admit that these social practices also are
that the conclusion does not follow from the prem- immune from criticism.
ise. This is important, because in order to determine 2. We could decide w/lether actions are rigllt or wrong
whether the conclusion is true, we need arguments just by consulting the standards of our society. Cultural
in its support. Cultural Relativism proposes this argu- Relativism suggests a simple test for determining
ment, but unfortunately the argument turns out to be what is right and what is wrong: all one has to do is
fallacious. So it proves nothing. ask whether the action is in accordance with the code
of one's society. Suppose a resident of South Africa is
wondering whether his country's policy of apartheid-
THE CONSEQUENCES OF TAKING CULTURAL rigid racial segregation-is morally correct. All he has
RELATIVISM SERIOUSLY
to do is ask whether this policy conforms to his soci-
Even if the Cultural Differences Argument is invalid, ety's moral code. If it does, there is nothing to worry
Cultural Relativism might still be true. What would it about, at least from a moral paint of view.
be like if it were true? This implication of Cultural Relativism is disturb-
In the passage quoted above, William Graham ing because few of us think that our society's code is
Sumner summarizes the essence of Cultural Relativism. perfect-we can think of ways it might be improved.
Yet Cultural Relativism would not only forbid us from its face. It does make sense, they say, to condemn some
criticizing the codes of other societies; it would stop us practices, such as slavery and anti-Semitism, wherever
from critiCizing our OWIl. After all, if right and wrong they occur. It makes sense to think that our society has
are relative to culture, this must be true for our own made some moral progress, while admitting that it is
culture just as much as for others. still imperfect and in need of reform. Because Cultural
3. The idea of moral progress is called into doubt. Relativism says that these judgments make no sense,
Usually, we think that at least some changes in our the argument goes, it cannot be right.
society have been for the better. (Some, of course,
may have been changes for the worse.) Consider this
example: Throughout most of Western history the WHY THERE IS LESS DISAGREEMENT THAN
place of women in society was very narrowly circum- IT SEEMS
scribed. They could not own property; they could not The original impetus for Cultural Relativism comes
vote or hold political office; with a few exceptions, from the observation that cultures differ dramatically
they were not permitted to have paying jobs; and gen- in their views of right and wrong. But just how much
erally they were under the almost absolute control of do they differ? It is true that there are differences.
their husbands. Recently much of this has changed, However, it is easy to overestimate the extent of those
and most people think of it as progress. differences. Often, when we examine what seems to be
If Cultural Relativism is correct, can we legiti- a dramatic difference, we find that the cultures do not
mately think of this as progress? Progress means differ nearly as much as it appears.
replacing a way of doing things with a better way. But Consider a culture in which people believe it is
by what standard do we judge the new ways as better? wrong to eat cows. This may even be a poor culture,
If the old ways were in accordance with the social stan- in which there is not enough food; still, the cows are
dards of their time, then Cultural Relativism would say not to be touched. Such a society would appear to
it is a mistake to judge them by the standards of a dif- have values very different from our own. But does
ferent time. Eighteenth-century society was, in effect, it? We have not yet asked why these people will not
a different SOciety from the one we have now. To say eat cows. Suppose it is because they believe that after
that we have made progress implies a judgment that death the souls of humans inhabit the bodies of ani-
present-day SOciety is better, and that is just the sort mals, especially cows, so that a cow may be someone's
of transcultural judgment that, according to Cultural grandmother. Now do we want to say that their values
RelatiVism, is impermissible. are different from ours? No; the difference lies else-
Our idea of social reform will also have to be recon- where. The difference is in our belief systems, not in
sidered. A reformer such as Martin Luther King, Jr., our values. We agree that we shouldn't eat Grandma;
seeks to change his SOciety for the better. Within the we simply disagree about whether the cow is (or could
constraints imposed by Cultural Relativism, there is be) Grandma.
one way this might be done. If a society is not living The general point is this. Many factors work
up to its own ideals, the reformer may be regarded together to produce the customs of a SOciety. The soci-
as acting for the best: the ideals of the society are the ety's values are only one of them. Other matters, such
standard by which we judge his or her proposals as as the religious and factual beliefs held by its members
worthwhile. But the "reformer" may not challenge and the physical circumstances in which they must
the ideals themselves, for those ideals are by defini- live, are also important. We cannot conclude, then,
tion correct. According to Cultural Relativism, then, merely because customs differ, that there is a disagree-
the idea of social reform makes sense only in this very ment about values. The difference in customs may be
limited way. attributable to some other aspect of social life. Thus
These three consequences of Cultural Relativism there may be less disagreement about values than
have led many thinkers to reject it as implausible on there appears to be.
Consider the Eskimos again. They often kill per- Even then, however, killing the baby is not the first
fectly normal infants, especially girls. We do not option considered. Adoption is common; childless
approve of this at all; a parent who did this in our soci- couples are especially happy to take a more fertile
ety would be locked up. Thus there appears to be a great couple's "surplus." Killing is only the last resort. I
difference in the values of our two cultures. But suppose emphasize this in order to show that the raw data of
we ask why the Eskimos do this. The explanation is not the anthropologists can be misleading; it can make the
that they have less affection for their children or less differences in values between cultures appear greater
respect for human life. An Eskimo family will always than they are. The Eskimos' values are not all that dif-
protect its babies if conditions permit. But they live ferent from our values. It is only that life forces upon
in a harsh environment, where food is often in short them chOices that we do not have to make.
supply. A fundamental postulate of Eskimo thought is:
"Life is hard, and the margin of safety small." A family HOW ALL CULTURES HAVE SOME
may want to nourish its babies but be unable to do so. VALUES IN COMMON
As in many "primitive" societies, Eskimo mothers It should not be surprising that, despite appearances,
will nurse their infants over a much longer period of the Eskimos are protective of their children. How
time than mothers in our culture. The child will take could it be otherwise? How could a group survive that
nourishment from its mother's breast for four years, did not value its young? This suggests a certain argu-
perhaps even longer. So even in the best of times there ment, one which shows that all cultural groups must
are limits to the number of infants that one mother be protective of their infants:
can sustain. Moreover, the Eskimos are a nomadic
people-unable to farm, they must move about in (1) Human infants are helpless and cannot survive if
search of food. Infants must be carried, and a mother they are not given extensive care for a period of
can carry only one baby in her parka as she travels and years.
goes about her outdoor work. Other family members (2) Therefore, if a group did not care for its young, the
can help, but this is not always possible. young would not survive, and the older members
Infant girls are more readily disposed of because, of the group would not be replaced. After a while
first, in this society the males are the primary food the group would die out.
providers-they are the hunters, according to the
(3) Therefore, any cultural group that continues to
traditional division of labor-and it is obviously
exist must care for its young. Infants that are not
important to maintain a sufficient number of food
cared for must be the exception rather than the
gatherers. But there is an important second reason
rule.
as well. Because the hunters suffer a high casualty
rate, the adult men who die prematurely far out- Similar reasoning shows that other values must be
number the women who die early. Thus if male and more or less universal. Imagine what it would be like
female infants survived in equal numbers, the female for a society to place no value at all on truth telling.
adult population would greatly outnumber the male When one person spoke to another, there would be no
adult population. Examining the available statistics, presumption at all that he was telling the truth-for
one writer concluded that "were it not for female he could just as easily be speaking falsely. Within that
infanticide ... there would be approximately one-and- society, there would be no reason to pay attention to
a-half times as many females in the average Eskimo what anyone says. (I ask you what time it is, and you
local group as there are food-producing males." say "Four o'clock." But there is no presumption that
So among the Eskimos, infanticide does not signal you are speaking truly; you could just as easily have
a fundamentally different attitude toward children. said the first thing that came into your head. So I have
Instead, it is a recognition that drastic measures are no reason to pay attention to your answer-in fact,
sometimes needed to ensure the family's survival. there was no point in my asking you in the first place!)
Communication would then be extremely difficult, if mistakes: I have said that it rests on an invalid argu-
not impossible. And because complex societies cannot ment, that it has consequences that make it implau-
exist without regular communication among their sible on its face, and that the extent of cultural
members, society would become impossible. It follows disagreement is far less than it implies. This all adds
that in any complex society there must be a presump- up to a pretty thorough repudiation of the theory.
tion in favor of truthfulness. There may of course be Nevertheless, it is still a very appealing idea, and the
exceptions to this rule: there may be situations in reader may have the feeling that all this is a little
which it is thought to be permissible to lie. Neverthe- unfair. The theory must have something going for it,
less, these will be exceptions to a rule that is in force in or else why has it been so influential? In fact, I think
the society. there is something right about Cultural Relativism,
Let me give one further example of the same type. and now I want to say what that is. There are two
Could a society exist in which there was no prohibi- lessons we should learn from the theory, even if we
tion on murder? What would this be like? Suppose ultimately reject it.
people were free to kill other people at will, and no one t. Cultural Relativism warns us, quite rightly,
thought there was anything wrong with it. In such a about the danger of assuming that all our preferences
"society," no one could feel secure. Everyone would are based on some absolute rational standard. They
have to be constantly on guard. People who wanted are not. Many (but not all) of our practices are merely
to survive would have to avoid other people as much peculiar to our society, and it is easy to lose sight
as possible. This would inevitably result in individuals of that fact. [n reminding us of it, the theory does
trying to become as self-sufficient as possible-after all, a service.
associating with others would be dangerous. Society Funerary practices are one example. The Calla-
on any large scale would collapse. Of course, people tians, according to Herodotus, were "men who eat
might band together in smaller groups with others that their fathers" -a shocking idea, to us at least. But
they could trust not to harm them. But notice what this eating the flesh of the dead could be understood as a
means: they would be forming smaller societies that did sign of respect. It could be taken as a symbolic act that
acknowledge a rule against murder. The prohibition of says: We wish this person's spirit to dwell within us.
murder, then, is a necessary feature of all societies. Perhaps this was the understanding of the Callatians.
There is a general theoretical point here, namely, On such a way of thinking, burying the dead could
that there are some moral rules that all societies will have be seen as an act of rejection, and burning the corpse
in common, because those rules are necessary for society to as positively scornful. If this is hard to imagine, then
exist. The rules against lying and murder are two exam- we may need to have our imaginations stretched.
ples. And in fact, we do find these rules in force in all Of course we may feel a visceral repugnance at the
viable cultures. Cultures may differ in what they regard idea of eating human flesh in any Circumstances. But
as legitimate exceptions to the rules, but this disagree- what of it? This repugnance may be, as the relativists
ment exists against a background of agreement on the say, only a matter of what is customary in our par-
larger issues. Therefore, it is a mistake to overestimate ticular society.
the amount of difference between cultures. Not every There are many other matters that we tend to
moral rule can vary from society to society. think of in terms of objective right and wrong, but
that are really nothing more than social conven-
tions. Should women cover their breasts? A publicly
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM CULTURAL exposed breast is scandalous in our society, whereas
RELATIVISM in other cultures it is unremarkable. Objectively
At the outset, I said that we were going to identify speaking, it is neither right nor wrong-there is no
both what is right and what is wrong in Cultural objective reason why either custom is better. Cul-
Relativism. Thus far I have mentioned only its tural Relativism begins with the valuable insight
that many of our practices are like this-they are he tells the story of the Greeks and Callatians,
only cultural products. Then it goes wrong by con- Herodotus adds:
cluding that, because some practices are like this, all For if anyone, no matter who, were given the opportu-
must be. nity of choosing from amongst all the nations of the
2. The second lesson has to do with keeping an world the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would
open mind. In the course of growing up, each of us inevitably, after careful consideration of their relative
has acquired some strong feelings: we have learned merits, choose that of his own country. Everyone with-
to think of some types of conduct as acceptable, out exception believes his own native customs, and the
and others we have learned to regard as simply religion he was brought up in, to be the best.
unacceptable. Occasionally, we may find those feel- Realizing this can result in our having more open
ings challenged. We may encounter someone who minds. We can come to understand that our feelings
claims that our feelings are mistaken. For example, are not necessarily perceptions of the truth-they may
we may have been taught that homosexuality is be nothing more than the result of cultural condition-
immoral, and we may feel quite uncomfortable ing. Thus when we hear it suggested that some element
around gay people and see them as alien and "dif- of our social code is not really the best and we find our-
ferent." Now someone suggests that this may be a selves instinctively resisting the suggestion, we might
mere prejudice; that there is nothing evil about stop and remember this. Then we may be more open
homosexuality; that gay people are just people, like to discovering the truth, whatever that may be.
anyone else, who happen, through no choice of We can understand the appeal of Cultural Relativ-
their own, to be attracted to others of the same sex. ism, then, even though the theory has serious short-
But because we feel so strongly about the matter, we comings. It is an attractive theory because it is based
may find it hard to take this seriously. Even after we on a genuine insight-that many of the practices and
listen to the arguments, we may still have the attitudes we think so natural are really only cultural
unshakable feeling that homosexuals must, some- products. Moreover, keeping this insight firmly in
how, be an unsavory lot. view is important if we want to avoid arrogance and
Cultural Relativism, by stressing that our moral have open minds. These are important points, not to
views can reflect the prejudices of our society, probe taken lightly. But we can accept these points with-
vides an antidote for this kind of dogmatism. When out going on to accept the whole theory.
PART
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2 ~~----------
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Moral Reasoning
CHAPTER 3
Evaluating Moral Arguments
This much is clear: we cannot escape the ethical We therefore begin this Chapter with the basics
facts of life. We often must make moral judgments, of critical reasoning. The focus is on the skills that
assess moral principles or rules, contend with moral are at the heart of this kind of thinking-the formu-
theories, and argue the pros and cons of moral lation and evaluation of logical arguments. The rest
issues. Typically we do all of these things believing of the chapter is about applying critical reasoning
that in one way or another they really matter. to the claims and arguments of ethics.
Because we think that ethics (that is, moral
philosophy) matters, it follows that moral reasoning
CLAIMS AND ARGUMENTS
matters, for we could make little headway in these
difficult waters without the use of reasons and argu- When you use critical reasoning, your ultimate
ments. Along the way we may take into account aim is usually to figure out whether to accept, or
our feelings, desires, beliefs, and other factors, but believe, a statement-either someone else's state-
getting to our destination depends mostly on the ment or one of your own. A stateDlent, or claim,
quality of our moral reasoning. Through moral rea- is an assertion that something is or is not the case; it
soning we assess what is right and wrong, good and is either true or false. These are statements:
bad, virtuous and vicious. We make and dismantle
• The ship sailed on the wind-tossed sea.
arguments for this view and for that. In our fin-
est moments, we follow the lead of reason in the • I feel tired and listless.
search for answers, trying to rise above subjectiv-
ism, prejudice, and confusion. • Murder is wrong.
In this chapter you will discover (if you haven't • 5+5 = 10.
already) that you are no stranger to moral reason-
• A circle is not a square.
ing. Moral reasoning is ordinary critical reason-
ing applied to ethics. Critical reasoning (or critical These statements assert that something is or is
thinking) is the careful, systematic evaluation of not the case. Whether you accept them, reject them,
statements or claims. We use critical reasoning or neither, they are still statements because they are
every day to determine whether a statement is wor- assertions that can be either true or false.
thy of acceptance-that is, whether it is true. We The following, however, are not statements;
harness critical reasoning to assess the truth of all they do not assert that something is or is not the
sorts of claims in all kinds of contexts-personal, case:
professional, academic, philosophical, scientific,
• Why is Anna laughing?
political, and ethical. Moral reasoning, then, is not
a type of reasoning that you have never seen before. • Is abortion immoral?
45
46 0 PART 2: MORAL REASONING
• Hand me the screwdriver. Argumellt 3. Telling a white lie is morally permissible.

We should judge the rightness of an act by its
• Don't speak to me. impact on human well-being. If an act increases
• Hello, Webster. human well-being, then it is right. Without ques-
tion, telling a white lie increases human well-
• For heaven's sake! being, because it spares people's feelings; that's
what white lies are for.
A fundamental principle of critical reasoning is
that we should not accept a statement as true with- These arguments are fairly simple. In Argu-
out good reasons. If a statement is supported by ment 1, a single premise ("because it helps to deter
good reasons, we are entitled to believe it. The bet- crime") supports a straightforward conclusion-
ter the reasons supporting a statement, the more "Capital punishment is morally permissible."
likely it is to be true. Our acceptance of a statement, Argument 2 has two premises: "If John killed Bill
then, can vary in strength. If a statement is sup- in self-defense, he did not commit murder" and
ported by strong reasons, we are entitled to believe "He did act in self-defense." And the conclusion is
it strongly. If it is supported by weaker reasons, our "Therefore, he did not commit murder." Argument
belief should likewise be weaker. If the reasons are 3 has three premises: "We should judge the rightness
equivocal-if they do not help us decide one way of an act by its impact on human well-being," "If an
or another-we should suspend judgment until the act increases human well-being, then it is right,"
evidence is more definitive.
and "Without question, telling a white lie increases
Reasons supporting a statement are themselves human well-being, because it spares people's feel-
statements. To lend credence to another claim, ings." Its conclusion is "Telling a white lie is morally
these supporting statements may assert something permissible."
about SCientific eVidence, expert opinion, relevant As you can see, these three arguments have
examples, or other conSiderations. In this way they different structures. Argument 1, for example, has
provide reasons for believing that a statement is true, just one premise, but Arguments 2 and 3 have two
that what is asserted is actual. When this state of and three premises. In Arguments 1 and 3, the con-
affairs existS-when at least one statement attempts
clusion is stated first; in Argument 2, last. Obviously,
to prOVide reasons for believing another statement- arguments can vary dramatically in their number of
we have an argument. An argument is a group of
premises, in the placement of premises and conclu-
statements, one of which is supposed to be supported
sion, and in the wording of each of these parts. But
by the rest. An argument in this sense, of course, has
all arguments share a common pattern: at least one
nothing to do with the common notion of argu-
premise is intended to support a conclusion. This
ments as shouting matches or vehement quarrels. pattern is what makes an argument an argument.
In an argument, the supporting statements Despite the simplicity of this premise-con-
are known as premises; the statement being sup- clusion arrangement, though, arguments are not
ported is known as a conclusion. Consider these always easy to identify. They can be embedded
arguments:
in long passages of nonargumentative prose, and
nonargumentative prose can often look like argu-
Argument 1. Capital punishment is morally permiS-
ments. Consider:
sible because it helps to deter crime.
Argument 2. If John killed Bill in self-defense, he did The number of abortions performed in this state is
not commit murder. He did act in self-defense. increasing. More and more women say that they
Therefore, he did not commit murder. favor greater access to abortion. This is an outrage.
CHAPTER 3: EVALUATING MORAL ARGUMENTS 0 47
Do you see an argument in this passage? You include consequently, hence, it follows that, thus, so,
shouldn't, because there is none. The first two sen- it must be that, and as a result. Besides because, some
tences are meant to be assertions of fact, and the common premise indicators are since, for, given that,
last one is an expression of indignation. There is no due to the fact that, for the reason that, the reason being,
premise providing reasons to accept a conclusion. assuming that, and as indicated by.
But what if we altered the passage to make it an Understand that indicator words are not fool-
argument? Look: proof evidence that a premise or conclusion is near.
Sometimes words that often function as indicators
The number of abortions performed in this state appear when no argument at all is present. Indica-
is increasing, and more and more women say that
tor words are simply hints that an argument may
they favor greater access to abortion. Therefore, in
this state the trend among women is toward greater be close by.
acceptance of abortion. Probably the most reliable way to identify
arguments is to look for the conclusion first. When
This is now an argument. There is a conclusion you know what claim is being supported, you can
("Therefore, in this state the trend among women more easily see what statements are doing the sup-
is toward greater acceptance of abortion") supporting. A true argument always has something
ported by two premises ("The number of abortions to prove. If there is no statement that the writer is
performed in this state is increasing, and more and trying to convince you to accept, no argument is
more women say that they favor greater access to present.
abortion"). We are given reasons for accepting a Finally, understand that argumentation (the pre-
claim. sentation of an argument) is not the same thing as
Notice how easy it would be to elaborate on the persuasion. To offer a good argument is to present
nonargumentative version, adding other unsup- reasons why a particular assertion is true. To per-
ported claims and more expressions of the writer's suade someone of something is to influence her
attitude toward the subject matter. We would end opinion by any number of means, including emo-
up with a much longer passage piled high with more tional appeals, linguistic or rhetorical tricks, decep-
assertions-but with no argument in Sight. Often tion, threats, propaganda, and more. Reasoned
those who write such passages believe that because argument does not necessarily play any part at all.
they have stated their opinion, they have presented You may be able to use some of these ploys to per-
an argument. But a bundle of unsupported claims- suade people to believe a claim. But if you do, you
however clearly stated-does not an argument make. will not have established that the claim is worth
Only when reasons are given for believing one of believing. On the other hand, if you articulate a
these claims is an argument made. good argument, then you prove something-and
Learning to distinguish arguments from non- others just might be persuaded by your reasoning.
argumentative material takes practice. The job gets
easier, however, if you pay attention to indicator ARGUMENTS GOOD AND BAD
words. Indicator words are terms that often appear
in arguments and signal that a premise or conclu- A good argument shows that its conclusion is wor-
sion may be nearby. Notice that in the argument thy of belief or acceptance; a bad argument fails to
about abortion, the word therefore indicates that the show this. A good argument gives you good reasons
conclusion follows, and in Argument 1 the word to accept a claim; a bad argument proves nothing.
because signals the beginning of a premise. In addi- So the crucial question is, How can you tell which is
tion to therefore, common conclusion indicators which? To start, you can learn more about different
~
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- CRITICAL THOUGHT: The Morality of Critical Thin1dng
You might be surprised to learn that some philoso- those questions which cannot easily be asked
phers consider reasoning itself a moral issue. That without disturbing it-the life of that man is one
is, they think that believing a claim without good long sin against mankind. *
reasons (an unsupported statement) is immoral. Do you agree with Clifford? Can you think of a
Probably the most famous exposition of this point counterexample to his argument-that is, instances
comes from the philosopher and mathematician in which believing without evidence would be mor-
W. K. Clifford (1845-1879). He has this to say on ally permissible? Suppose the power of reason is a
the subject: gift from God to be used to help you live a good
It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, life. If so, would believing without evidence (fail-
to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. ing to use critical thinking) be immoral?
If a man, holding a belief which he was taught
*W. K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in The Rational-
in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keeps
ity of Belief in God, ed. George J. Mavrodes (Engle-
down and pushes away any doubts which arise
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 159-60.
about it in his mind ... and regards as impious
kinds of arguments and what makes them good not offer conclusive support for the conclUSion, it
or bad. is said to be invalid. In an invalid argument, it is
There are two basic types of arguments: deduc- not the case that if the premises are true, the con-
tive and inductive. Deductive arguments are clusion must be true. Suppose the first premise of
supposed to give logically conclusive support to the Socrates argument was changed to "All ducks
their conclUSions. Inductive arguments, on the are mortal." Then the argument would be invalid
other hand, are supposed to offer only probable because even if the premises were true, the conclu-
Support for their conclusions. sion would not necessarily be true. The conclusion
Consider this classic deductive argument: would not follow inexorably from the premises.
Notice that the validity or invalidity of an argu-
All men are mortal. ment is a matter of its (onn, not its content. The
Socrates is a man. structure of a deductive argument renders it either
Therefore, Socrates is mortal. valid or invalid, and validity is a separate mat-
ter from the truth of the argument's statements.
It is deductive because the support offered for the Its statements (premises and conclusion) may be
conclusion is meant to be absolutely unshakable. either true or false, but that has nothing to do with
When a deductive argument actually achieves this validity. Saying that an argument is valid means
kind of conclusive support, it is said to be valid. that it has a particular form that ensures that if the
In a valid argument, if the premises are true, then premises are true, the conclusion can be nothing
the conclUSion absolutely has to be true. In the but true. There is no way that the premises can be
Socrates argument, if the premises are true, the true and the conclusion false.
conclusion must be true. The conclusion follows Recall that there are indicator words that point
inexorably from the premises. The argument is to the presence of premises and conclusions. There
therefore valid. When a deductive argument does are also indicator words that suggest (but do not
prove) that an argument is deductive. Some of the To evaluate an argument is to determine whether
more common are it necessarily follows that, it must it is good or not, and establishing that requires
be the case that, it logically follows that, conclusively, you to check the argument's form and the truth
and necessarily. of its premises. You can check the truth of prem-
Now let us turn to inductive arguments. ises in many different ways. Sometimes you can
Examine this one: see immediately that a premise is true (or false). At
other times you may need to examine a premise
Almost all the men at this college have high SAT
more closely or even do some research. Assessing
scores.
an argument's form is also usually a straightfor-
Therefore, Julio (a male student at the college)
ward process. With inductive arguments, common
probably has high SAT scores.
sense may be all that's required to see whether they
This argument is inductive because it is intended are strong or weak (whether the conclusions follow
to provide probable, not decisive, support to the from the premises). With deductive arguments, just
conclusion. That is, the argument is intended to thinking about how the premises are related to the
show only that, at best, the conclusion is probably conclusion is often sufficient. In all cases, the key to
true. With any inductive argument, it is possible for correctly and efficiently determining the validity or
the premises to be true and the conclusion false. An strength of arguments is practice.
inductive argument that manages to actually give Fortunately, there are some techniques that can
probable support to the conclusion is said to be improve your ability to check the validity of deduc-
strong. In a strong argument, if the premises are tive arguments. Some deductive forms are so com-
true, the conclusion is probably true (more likely to mon that just being familiar with them can give
be true than not). The SAT argument is strong. An you a big advantage. Let's look at some of them.
inductive argument that does not give probable sup- To begin, understand that you can easily indi-
port to the conclusion is said to be weak. In a weak cate an argument's form by using a kind of standard
argument, if the premises are true, the conclusion shorthand, with letters standing for statements.
is not probable (not more likely to be true than not Consider, for example, this argument:
true). If we change the first premise in the SAT argu-
If Maria walks to work, then she will be late.
ment to "Twenty percent of the men at this college
have high SAT scores," the argument would be weak. She is walking to work.
Like deductive arguments, inductive ones are Therefore, she will be late.
often accompanied by indicator words. These terms
Here's how we symbolize this argument's form:
include probably, likely, in all probability, it is reason-
able to suppose that, odds are, and chances are. If p, then q.
Good arguments provide you with good reasons p.
for believing their conclusions. You now know that Therefore, q.
good arguments must be valid or strong. But they
must also have true premises. Good arguments We represent each statement with a letter,
must both have the right form (be valid or strong) thereby laying bare the argument's skeletal form.
and have reliable content (have true premises). Any The first premise is a compound statement, con-
argument that fails in either of these respects is a sisting of two constituent statements, p and q. This
bad argument. A valid argument with true premises particular argument form is known as a conditional.
is said to be sound; a strong argument with true A conditional argument has at least one condi-
premises is said to be cogent. tional premise-a premise in an if-then pattern
(If p, then q). The two parts of a conditional premise If p, then q.

are known as the antecedent (which begins with if) q.
and the consequent (which follows then). Therefore, p.
This argument form happens to be very
common-so common that it has a name, modus Do you see the problem with these two? In
ponens, or affirming the antecedent. The first prem- the first one (denying the antecedent), even a
ise is conditional ("If Maria walks to work, then she false antecedent (if Maria will not walk to work)
will be late"), and the second premise affirms the doesn't mean that she will not be late. Maybe she
antecedent of that conditional ("She is walking to will sit at home and be late, or be late for some other
work"). This form is always valid: if the premises are reason. When the antecedent is denied, the prem-
true, the conclusion has to be true. Any argument ises can be true and the conclusion false-clearly
that has this form will be valid regardless of the an invalid argument. In the second argument
subject matter. (affirming the consequent), even a true conse-
Another frequently occurring form is known as quent (if Maria will be late) doesn't mean that
modus tollens, or denying the consequent: she will walk to work. Some other factor besides
her walking could cause Maria to be late. Again,
If Maria walks to work, then she will be late. the premises can be true while the conclusion is
She will not be late. false-definitely invalid.
Therefore, she will not walk to work. Consider one last form, the hypothetical syllo-
gism (hypothetical means conditional; a s)'I/OgiS111 is a
Symbolized, modus tollens looks like this: three-statement deductive argument):
If p, then q.
Notq.
If she is late, she will be fired.
Therefore, not p. Therefore, if Maria walks to work, she will be fired.
MOdus tollens is always valid, no matter what If p, then q.
statements you plug into the formula. If q, then r.
Here are two more common argument forms.
Therefore, if p, then r.
These, however, are always invalid.
Denying the antecedent: The hypothetical syllogism is a valid argument
form. If the premises are true, the conclusion must
be true.
She will not walk to work.
Obviously, if modus ponens, Inodus tol/ens, and
Therefore, she will not be late. the hypothetical syllogism are always valid, then
If p, then q. any arguments you encounter that have the same
Notp. form will also be valid. And if denying the ante-
cedent and affirming the consequent are always
Therefore, not q.
invalid, any arguments you come across that have
Affirming the consequent: the same form will also be invalid. The best way to
make use of these facts is to memorize each argu-
ment form so you can tell right away when an
She will be late. argument matches one of them-and thereby see
Therefore, she will walk to work. immediately that it is valid (or invalid).
But what if you bump into a deductive argu-

ment that does not match one of these common
QUICI< REVIEW
forms? You can try the counterexanlple method. This
approach is based on a fundamental fact that you statement-An assertion that something is or is
already know: it is impossible for a valid argument to not the case.
have true prenlises and a false conclusion. So to test argument-A group of statements, one of which
the validity of an argument, you first invent a twin is supposed to be supported by the rest.
argument that has exactly the same form as the
premise-A supporting statement in an argument.
argument you are examining-but you try to give
this new argument true premises and a false conclu- conclusion-The statement supported in an
argument.
sion. If you can construct such an argument, you
have proven that your original argument is invalid. indicator words-Terms that often appear in
Suppose you want to test this argument for arguments to signal the presence of a premise
validity: or conclusion, or to indicate that an argument
is deductive or inductive.
If capital punishment deters crime, then the num-
deductive argument-An argument that is sup-
ber of death row inmates will decrease over time.
posed to give logically conclusive support to its
But capital punishment does not deter crime. conclusion.
Therefore, the number of death row inmates will inductive argument-An argument that is sup-
not decrease over time. posed to offer probable support to its conclusion.
You can probably see right away that this argu- valid argument-A deductive argument that
ment is an example of denying the antecedent, an does in fact provide logically conclusive sup-
invalid form. But for the sake of example, let's use port for its conclusion.
the counterexample method in this case. Suppose invalid argument-A deductive argument that
we come up with this twin argument: does not offer logically conclusive support for
the conclusion.
If lizards are mammals, then they have legs.
strong argument-An inductive argument that
But they are not mammals. does in fact provide probable support for its
Therefore, they do not have legs. conclusion.
We have invented a twin argument that has weak argument-An inductive argument that does
true premises and a false conclusion, so we know not give probable support to the conclusion.
that the original argument is invalid. sound argument-A valid argument with true
premises.
cogent argument-A strong argument with true
IMPLIED PREMISES premises.
Most of the arguments that we encounter in every-
day life are embedded in larger tracts of nonargu-
mentative prose-in essays, reports, letters to the be implied instead of stated. Sometimes the prem-
editor, editorials, and the like. The challenge is to ises are implicit because they are too obvious to
pick out the premises and conclusions and evaluate mention; readers mentally fill in the blanks. But
the assembled arguments. In many cases, though, in most cases, implicit premises should not be left
there is an additional obstacle: some premises may unstated. It is often unclear what premises have
been assumed, and unless these are spelled out, When you evaluate an argument, you should
argument evaluation becomes difficult or impos- try to explicitly state any implied premise (or
sible. More to the pOint, unstated premises are premises) when (1) there seems to be a logical gap
often the most dubious parts of an argument. This between premises or between premises and the
problem is espedally common in moral arguments, conclusion and (2) the missing material is not a
in which the implidt premises are frequently the commonsense assumption. In general, the supplied
most controversial and the most in need of close premise should make the argument valid (when the
scrutiny. argument is supposed to be deductive) or strong
Here is a typical argument with an unstated (when the argument is supposed to be inductive). It
premise: should also be plausible (as close to the truth as pos-
sible) and fitting (coinciding with what you think
The use of condoms is completely unnatural. They
is the author'S intent). The point of these stipula-
have been manufactured for the explicit purpose
of interfering with the natural process of procre-
tions is that when you supply a missing premise,
ation. Therefore, the use of condoms should be you should be fair and honest, expressing it in
banned. such a way that the argument is as solid as possible
and in keeping with the author's purpose. Adding
In this argument, the first two sentences con- a premise that renders an argument ridiculous is
stitute a single premise, the gist of which is that easy, and so is distorting the author's intent-and
using condoms is unnatural. The conclusion is with neither tack are you likely to learn anything
that the use of condoms should be banned. This or uncover the truth.
conclusion, however, does not follow from the Be aware, though, that some arguments are
stated premise. There is a logical gap between irredeemably bad, and no supplied premise that
premise and conclusion. The argument will work is properly made can save them. They cannot be
only if the missing premise is supplied. Here's a turned into good arguments without altering them
good possibility: "Anything that interferes with a beyond recognition or original intent. You need
natural process should not be allowed." The argu- not take these arguments seriously, and the respon-
ment then becomes: sibility of recasting them lies with those who offer
The use of condoms is completely unnatural. They them.
~ave been manufactured for the explicit purpose of
mterfering with the natural process of procreation.
Anything that interferes with a natural process DECONSTRUCT1NG ARGUMENTS
should not be allowed. Therefore, the use of con- In the real world, arguments do not come neatly
doms should be banned.
labeled, their parts identified and their relation-
By adding the implidt premise, we have filled ships laid bare. So you have to do the labeling and
out the argument, making it valid and a little less connecting yourself, and that can be hard work.
mysterious. But now that the missing premise has Where are the premises and the conclusion?
been brought out into the open, we can see that it Are there implied premises? What statements
is dubious or, at least, controversial. Should every- are irrelevant to the argument, just background
thing that interferes with a natural process be or window dressing? How are all these pieces
banned? If so, we would have to ban antibiotics, related? Fortunately there is a tool that can help
anticancer drugs, deodorants, and automobiles. you penetrate all the verbiage to uncover the
(Later in this chapter, ways to judge the truth of essential argument (or arguments) within: argu-
moral premises are discussed.) ment diagramming.
So let's try to diagram the argument in this to go to war by saying that the action was neces-
passage: sary to preempt Iraq from launching a military strike
against the United States. (3) But the obvious question
In 2003 the United States attacked Iraq and thereby about the war has hardly been addressed and rarely
started a war. President Bush justified his decision answered: Was the United States morally justified in
to go to war by saying that the action was necessary going to war against Iraq? (4) I think just war theory
to preempt Iraq from launching a military strike gives us an answer. (5) The theory says a preemptive
against the United States. But the obvious question attack against a state is justified only if that state pres-
about the war has hardly been addressed and rarely ents a substantial danger that is uimmediate and immi-
answered: Was the United States morally justified nent." (6) That is, to meet this criterion, an attack by an
in going to war against Iraq? I think just war theory aggressor nation must be in the final planning stages-
gives us an answer. The theory says a preemptive an attack must not be merely feared, but about to hap-
attack against a state is justified only if that state pen. (7) If invading Iraq were justified. there would
presents a substantial danger that is uimmediate have been clear indications of Iraq's final preparations
and imminent." That is, to meet this criterion, an to attack the United States. (8) But there were no such
attack by an aggressor nation must be in the final indications. (9) There was only a fantasy about Iraq's
planning stages-an attack must not be merely having weapons of mass destruction, (10) and in the
feared, but about to happen. If invading Iraq were Bush administration, there was only the fear that the
justified, there would have been clear indications Iraqis were up to no good. (11) In addition. because
of Iraq's final preparations to attack the United there was no serious attempt by the United States to
States. But there were no such indications. There try to find a peaceful solution. the war was premature
was only a fantasy about Iraq's having weapons of and therefore unjust. (12) Most news accounts at the
mass destruction, and in the Bush administration, time reveal that steps by the United States to head off
there was only the fear that the Iraqis were up to war were halfhearted at best. (13) Finally. the war was
no good. In addition, because there was no serious unjustified because it violated the moral standard that
attempt by the United States to try to find a peace- must be met by any war: the cause of the war must be
ful solution, the war was premature and therefore just. (14).fonseguently we are fOIced to conclude that
unjust. Most news accounts at the time reveal that the war in Iraq was not morally justjfied
steps by the United States to head off war were half-
hearted at best. Finally, the war was unjustified A key reason for diagramming is to distinguish
because it violated the moral standard that must be the premises and conclusions from everything
met by any war: the cause of the war must be just. else: background information, redundancies, asides,
Consequently we are forced to conclude that the clarifications, illustrations, and any other material
war in Iraq was not morally justified. that is logically irrelevant to the argument (or argu-
ments). So the next step is to cross out these irrel-
The first step is to number all the statements
evancies, like this:
for identification and underline any premise or
conclusion indicator words. (Note: We count an if- (1) In 2003 t~tes-a-ttacked Iraq and
ther-eby-s-tart-ed-a-wa-r that contifttleS-to-tfti-s--t:l-ay.- (2)
then, or conditional, statement as one statement,
Pres-ident--B-ttsh-tu5tified-his-deffiiitm--t~t()-Wftf--by
and we count multiple statements in a compound sayifig--t-h-at--the--aetitm--wcessary to pr-eempH-r-aq
sentence separately.) Next we search for the con- f-rom-launching -a-m Hit-a-ry-st-rike-against-the-Bn-it-ed
clusion and draw a double Ijoe under it. Locating States-; (3) Bttt-the-obvious--questioft-abou-t----the-war
the conclUSion can then help us find the premises, lIas hardly been-acldressed anfr-rareI-y----a-mwered"!
which we tag by underlining them. The marked-up Warthe-Bnited--St-atey-mm-aHy-jttst-ified--ifl---going-t-o
passage should then look like this: wa-r---agairn-t~I-raq-? (4) l--thi-nk-jttst wa-r~t-het}r-y-gtves-tts
an--art5-WeI'-. (5) The-theory says-a--preempHve--at-t-aek
(1) In 2003 the United States attacked Iraq and thereby againsta-state--is-iust-ified--only-+f -that ~t-ate -pres~
started a war. (2) President Bush justified his decision en-ts---a- substantial -d-anger-th-at--is- -14-m-med+a-te---afltl
imminent." (6) That is, te meet this crirerien, an represent the premises and conclusion, we write
attack by an aggresser-natien must be in-the-&naI down the number for the conclusion and place the
planning stages an attack must net be merely numbers for the premises above it. Then, to show
feared, but abeut te happen. (7) If invading Iraq were how the premises support the conclUSion, we draw
justified. there would have been clear indications of
arrows from the premises to the conclusion. Each
Iraq's final preparations to attack the United States.
(8) But there were no such indications. (9) There-was
arrow indicates the logical connection between
enl) a fantasy abeut Iraq's having weapefts ef mass premise and conclusion, representing such expres-
destructieft, (10) aftd ift the Bush admiftistratieft, sions as "Premise 11 supports the Conclusion (14)"
there 'vas eftly the fear that the Iraqis were up to no or "the Conclusion (14) is supported by Premise 11."
geetk (11) In addition. because there was no serious Here's the completed diagram:
attempt by the United States to to' to find a peace-
ful solution. the war was premature and therefore
12 7+8 13
unjust. (12) Most news accounts at the time reveal
that steps by the United States to head off war were
halfhearted at best. (13) Finally. the war was unjusti-
fied because it violated the moral standard that must
be met by any war: the cause of the war must be just.
(14) Consequently we are forced to conclude that
the war jn Iraq was not moraJJy jllstjfied
\ 11
We now can see that most of this passage is logi-

cally extraneous material. Statements 1 through
6 are background information and introductory
remarks. Statement 3, for example, is an assertion of 14
the issue to be addressed in the passage. Statements
9 and 10 are embellishments of Statement 8. In the simplest relationship depicted here, Prem-
The premises and conclusion are asserted in ise 13 provides direct support to the conclusion (14).
Statements 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, and 14: Premise 11 also supplies direct support to the con-
(7) If invading Iraq were justified, there would have clusion, and this premise in turn is backed up by
been clear indications of Iraq's final preparations to Premise 12. (See how an arrow goes from 11 to 14,
attack the United States. and then from 12 to 11.) Premises 7 and 8 are linked
(8) But there were no such indications. to the conclusion in a different way, reflecting the
(11) In addition, because there was no serious attempt
fact that some premises are dependent and some are
by the United States to try to find a peaceful solution,
the war was premature and therefore unjust.
independent. An independent premise (such as Prem-
(12) Most news accounts at the time reveal that
ise 13) supports a conclusion without relying on any
steps by the United States to head off war were half- other premises; a dependent premise gives little or
hearted at best. no support on its own and requires the assistance
(13) Finally, the war was unjustified because it vio- of at least one other premise. Premises 7 and 8 are
lated the moral standard that must be met by any dependent premises and are joined by a plus sign
war: the cause of the war must be just. to represent this fact. Together, Premises 7 and 8
(14) Consequently we are forced to conclude that
provide support to the conclusion; they give a rea-
the war in Iraq was not morally justified.
son for accepting it. But if either premise is deleted,
But how are these statements related? To find the remaining premise can provide no substantial
out, we draw a diagram. Using the numbers to support.
As you work through the diagramming exercises state of affairs is actual (true or false) but do not
at the end of this chapter, you will come to under- assign a moral value to it. Most of the statements
stand why diagramming arguments can be so use- that we encounter every day are nonmoral. Of
ful. You will learn a great deal about the structure of course, nonmoral statements may assert nonmoral
arguments-which is a prerequisite for being able normative judgments, such as "This is a good
to devise, deconstruct, and evaluate them. library" or "Jack ought to invest in stocks," but
they are clearly not moral statements. They may
MORAL STATEMENTS also describe a state of affairs that touches on moral
AND ARGUMENTS concerns-without being moral statements. For
When we deliberate about the rightness of our example:
actions, make careful moral judgments about the • Many people think that capital punishment is
character or behavior of others, or strive to resolve wrong.
complex ethical issues, we are usually making or
critiquing moral arguments-or trying to. And • Jena did not lie.
rightly so. To a remarkable degree, moral argu- • You treated him as he treated you.
ments are the vehicles that move ethical thinking
• Tania tries to be a good person.
and discourse along. The rest of this chapter should
give you a demonstration of how far skill in devis- • Animals are treated cruelly.
ing and evaluating moral arguments can take you.
Now we can be more specific about the struc-
Arguments, as you will recall, are made up of
ture of moral arguments. A typical moral argu-
statements (premises and conclusions), and thus
ment consists of premises and a conclusion, just
moral arguments are too. What makes an argument
as any other kind of argument does, with the con-
a moral argument is that its conclusion is always a
clusion being a moral statement, or judgment.
moral statement. A moral statement is a state-
The premises, however, are a combination of the
ment affirming that an action is right or wrong or
moral and nonmoral. At least one premise must
that a person (or one's motive or character) is good
be a moral statement affirming a moral principle
or bad. These are moral statements:
or rule (a general moral standard), and at least
• Capital punishment is wrong. one premise must be a nonmoral statement about
• Jena should not have lied. a state of affairs, usually a specific type of action.
Beyond these simple reqUirements, the structure
• You ought to treat him as he treated you. of moral arguments can vary in standard ways:
• Tania is a good person. there may be many premises or few; premises may
be implicit or overt; and extraneous material may
• Cruelty to animals is immoral. be present or absent. Take a look at this moral
Notice the use of the terms wrong, should, ought, argument:
good, and immoral. Such words are the mainstays of
1. Committing a violent act to defend yourself
moral discourse, though some of them (for exam-
against physical attack is morally permissible.
ple, good and wrong) are also used in nonmoral
senses. 2. Assaulting someone who is attacking you is a
Nonmoral statements are very different. violent act of self-defense.
They do not affirm that an action is right or wrong 3. Therefore, assaulting someone who is attacking
or that a person is good or bad. They assert that a you is morally permissible.
Premise 1 is a moral statement asserting a As it stands, this argument is flawed. The con-
general moral principle about the rightness of a clusion (a moral statement) does not follow from
category of actions (violent acts in self-defense). the nonmoral premise. Even if we know that "not
Premise 2 is a nonmoral statement about the char- using every medical means" is equivalent to allow-
acteristics of a specific kind of action (violent acts ing a seriously ill newborn to die, we cannot then
against someone who is attacking you). It asserts conclude that the action is wrong. We need a prem-
that a specific kind of action falls under the general ise making that assertion:
moral principle expressed in Premise 1. Premise
2. Allowing seriously ill newborn infants to die is
3, the conclusion, is a moral judgment about the
wrong.
rightness of the specific kind of action in light of
the general moral principle. Here's the complete argument:
Why must we have at least one premise that is
a moral statement? Without a moral premise, the 1. Not using every medical means available to keep
argument would not get off the ground. We can- a seriously ill newborn infant alive is allowing
not infer a moral statement (conclusion) from a the infant to die.
nonmoral statement (premise). That is, we cannot 2. Allowing seriously ill newborn infants to die is
reason that a moral statement must be true because wrong.
a nonmoral state of affairs is actual. Or as philoso- 3. Therefore, not using every medical means avail-
phers say, we cannot establish what ought to be or able to keep a seriously ill newborn infant alive
should be solely on the basis of on what is. What is wrong.
if Our self-defense argument contained no moral
premise? Look: A nonmoral premise is also necessary in a moral
argument. Why exactly? Recall that the conclusion
2. Assaulting a person who is attacking you is a
of a typical moral argument is a moral judgment, or
violent act of self-defense.
claim, about a particular kind of action. The moral
3. Therefore, assaulting a person who is attacking premise is a general moral principle, or standard,
you is morally permissible. concerning a wider category of actions. But we can-
The conclusion no longer follows. It says not infer a statement (conclusion) about a particu-
something about the rightness of an action, but lar kind of action from a moral statement (premise)
~he premise asserts nothing about rightness-it about a broad category of actions-unless we have
Just characterizes the nonmoral aspects of an a nonmoral premise to link the two. We saw, for
action. Perhaps the action described is morally example, that we cannot infer from the general
permissible, or perhaps it is not-Premise 2 does principle that "committing a violent act to defend
not say. yourself ... is morally permissible" the conclusion
Another example: that "assaulting a person who is attacking you is
morally permissible" unless a nonmoral premise
1. Not using every medical means available to keep tells us that assaulting a person who is attacking
a seriously ill newborn infant alive is allowing you is an instance of self-defense. (The nonmoral
the infant to die. premise may seem obvious here, but not everyone
3. Therefore, not using every medical means avail- would agree that violence against a person who is
able to keep a seriously ill newborn infant alive attacking you is an example of self-defense. Some
is wrong. might claim that such violence is an unnecessary act
of retaliation or revenge.) The role of the nonmoral add that will be plausible and fitting and make the
premise, then, is to affirm that the general moral argument valid? This premise will do: "Admin-
principle does indeed apply to the particular case. istering a punishment to criminals that does
Unfortunately, both moral and nonmoral pre- not deter crime is immoral." The argument then
mises are often left unstated in moral arguments. As becomes:
we noted earlier, making implicit premises explicit
is always a good idea, but in moral arguments it is 1. Administering a punishment to criminals that
critical. The unseen premises (of which an argu- does not deter crime is immoral.
ment may have several) are the ones most likely to 2. The use of capital punishment does not deter
be dubious or unfounded, a problem that can arise crime.
whether an argument is yours or someone else's. 3. Therefore, the use of capital punishment is
Too many times, unstated premises are assump- immoral.
tions that you may be barely aware of; they might
be the true, unacknowledged source of disagree- Now the argument is valid, and trying to
ment between you and others. No premise should make it valid has helped us find at least one prem-
be left unexamined. (We'll learn more about assess- ise that might work. Moreover, if we know that
ing the truth of premises in the next section.) the argument is valid, we can focus our inquiry
The general guidelines for uncovering unst- on the truth of the premises. After all, if there is
ated premises discussed earlier apply to moral something wrong with a valid argument (that is,
arguments-but we need to add a proviso. Remem- if the argument is not sound), we know that the
ber, in a moral argument, as in any other kind of trouble is in the premises-specifically, that at
argument, you have good reason to look for implicit least one premise must be false. To put it another
premises if there is a logical gap between premises way, whether or not such an argument is a good
and the missing premise is not simply common argument depends entirely on the truth of the
sense. And any premise you supply should be both premises.
plausible and fitting. But note: The easiest way to As it turns out, our added premise is a general
identify implied premises in a moral argument is to moral principle. And like many implied premises,
treat it as deductive. Approaching moral arguments it is questionable. Deterrence is not necessarily the
this way helps you not only to find implied prem- only reason for administering punishment. Some
ises but also to assess the worth of all the premises. would say that justice is a better reason; others,
Consider this example: that rehabilitation is. (The second premise is also
dubious, but we won't worry about that now.)
1. The use of capital punishment does not deter In any case, if the supplied premise renders the
crime. argument valid, and the premise is plausible and
2. Therefore, the use of capital punishment is fitting, we can then conclude that we have filled
immoral. out the argument properly. We can then examine
the resulting argument and either accept or reject
This is an invalid argument. Even if the prem- it. And if we wish to explore the issue at greater
ise is true, the conclusion does not follow from depth, we can overhaul the argument altogether to
it. The argument needs a premise that can bridge see what we can learn. We can radically change or
the gap between the current premise and the con- add premises until we have a sound argument or at
clusion. So we should ask, What premise can we least a valid one with plausible premises.
TESTING MORAL PREMISES impervious to counterexamples. We can change

it like this:
But how can we evaluate moral premises? After all,
we cannot check them by consulting a scientific 1. Causing the death of a person who is incapac-
study or opinion poll as we might when examining itated is wrong.
nonmoral premises. Usually the best approach is to 2. Individuals in a deep, irreversible coma are
use counterexamples. incapacitated persons.
If we want to test a universal generalization 3. "Pulling the plug" on someone in a deep, irrevers-
such as "All dogs have tails," we can look for ible coma is causing an incapacitated person to die.
counterexamples-instances that prove the gen-
4. Therefore, "pulling the plug" on someone in a
eralization false. All we have to do to show that
deep, irreversible coma is wrong.
the statement "All dogs have tails" is false is to
find one tailless dog. And a thorough search for Premise 1 now seems a bit more reasonable. In
tailless dogs is a way to check the generalization. its current form, it rules out the counterexamples
Likewise, if we want to test a moral premise (a vari- involving self-defense and war. But it does not
ety of universal generalization), we can look for escape the killing-to-save-lives counterexample. In
counterexamples. some circumstances it may be morally permissible
Examine this valid moral argument: to kill someone to save many others, even if the
person is incapacitated. To get around this prob-
1. Causing a person's death is wrong. lem, we can amend Premise 1 so the counterexam-
2. Individuals in a deep, irreversible coma are ple is no longer a threat (and make a corresponding
incapacitated persons. change in the conclusion). For example:
3. "Pulling the plug" on someone in a deep, irre-
1. Causing the death of a person who is incapac-
versible coma is causing a person to die. itated is wrong, except to save lives.
4. Therefore, "pulling the plug" on someone in a 2. Individuals in a deep, irreversible coma are
deep, irreversible coma is wrong. incapacitated persons.
Premise 1 is the moral premise, a general moral 3. "Pulling the plug" on someone in a deep,
principle about killing. Premises 2 and 3 are non- irreversible coma is causing an incapacitated
moral premises. (Premise 2 is entailed by Premise person to die.
3, but we separate the two to emphasize the impor- 4. Therefore, "pulling the plug" on someone in a
tance to this argument of the concept of person- deep, irreversible coma is wrong, except to save
hood.) Statement 4, of course, is the conclusion, lives.
the verdict that causing someone in a deep coma to
die is immoral. Premise 1 now seems much closer to being cor-
Is Premise 1 true? It is at least dubiOUS, because rect than before. It may not be flawless, but it is
counterexamples abound in which the principle much improved. By considering counterexamples,
seems false. Is it wrong to kill one person to save a we have made the whole argument better.
hundred? Is it wrong to kill a person in self-defense? Checking a moral premise against possible
Is it wrong to kill a person in wartime? As it stands, counterexamples is a way to consult our consid-
Premise 1 seems implausible. ered moral judgments, a topic we broached in
To salvage the argument, we can revise Prem- Chapter 1 and take up again in Part 3 (Theories of
ise 1 (as well as Premise 3) to try to make it Morality). If our considered moral judgments are at
odds with a moral premise that is based on a cher-

ished moral principle or moral theory, we may have
QUICI< REVIEW
a prima facie ("at first sighf') reason to doubt not
only the premise but also the principle or theory • Look for an implicit premise when (1) there
from which it is derived. We may then need to seems to be a logical gap between premises
reexamine the claims involved and how they are or between premises and the conclusion and
related. If we do, we may find that our judgments (2) the missing material is not a commonsense
are on solid ground and the premise, principle, or assumption.
theory needs to be adjusted-or vice versa. If our
• Any supplied unstated premise should be valid
purpose is solely to evaluate a moral premise in or strong, plausible, and fitting.
an argument, we need not carry our investigation
• A typical moral argument has at least one moral
this far. But we should understand that widening
premise and at least one nonmoral premise.
our investigation may sometimes be appropriate
and that our moral beliefs are often more intercon- • The easiest way to identify implied premises in
nected than we might realize. Our ultimate goal a moral argument is to treat it as deductive.
should be to ensure that all our moral beliefs are as • Test moral premises with counterexamples.
logically consistent as we can make them. moral statement-A statement affirming that an
action is right or wrong or that a person (or
one's motive or character) is good or bad.
ASSESSING NONMORAL PREMISES
nonmoral statement-A statement that does not
Sometimes the sticking point in a moral argument affirm that an action is right or wrong or that
is not a moral premise but a nonmoral one-a claim a person (or one's motive or character) is good
about a nonmoral state of affairs. Often people on or bad.
both sides of a dispute may agree on a moral prin-
ciple but differ dramatically on the nonmoral facts.
Usually these facts concern the consequences of an
scientific research, the opInIons of trustworthy
action or the characteristics of the parties involved.
experts, pertinent examples and analogies, his-
Does pornography cause people to commit sex
torical records, or our own background knowledge
crimes? Does capital punishment deter crime? Is a
(claims that we have excellent reasons to believe).
depressed person competent to decide whether to
Ensuring that nonmoral premises are supported
commit suicide? When does a fetus become viable?
by good reasons is sometimes difficult but always
Are African Americans underrepresented among
worth the effort. The process begins by simply ask-
executives in corporate America? Does gay mar-
ing, "Is this statement truer' and "What reasons do
riage undermine the institution of heterosexual
I have for believing this?"
marriage? These and countless other questions
In your search for answers, keep the following
arise-and must be answered-as we try to develop
in mind:
and analyze moral arguments.
The most important principle to remember is 1. Use reliable sources. If you have reason to doubt
that nonmoral premises, like all premises, must be the accuracy of a source, do not use it. Doubt it if it
supported by good reasons. As we have already seen, produces statements you know to be false, ignores
simply believing or asserting a claim does not make reliable data (such as the latest scientific research),
it so. We should insist that our own nonmoral or has a track record of presenting inaccurate infor-
premises and those of others be backed by reliable mation or dubious arguments. Make sure that any
0"
I
experts you rely on are in fact experts in their cho- After all, the point of assessing a moral argument is
sen field. In general, true experts have the requisite to discover the truth. We must be brave enough to
education and training, the relevant experience in let the evidence point where it will.
making reliable judgments, and a good reputation
among peers. AVOIDING BAD ARGUMENTS
Probably every major moral issue discussed in
this book is associated with numerous advocacy Recall that a good argument has true premises plus
groups, each one devoted to promoting its par- a conclusion that follows from those premises.
ticular view of things. Too often the information A bad argument fails at least one of these condi-
coming from many of these groups is unreliable. tions-it has a false premise or a conclusion that
Do not automatically assume otherwise. Double- does not follow. This failure, however, can appear
check any information you get from them with in many different argument forms, some of which
sources you know are reliable and see if it is sup- are extremely common. These common bad argu-
ported by scientific studies, expert opinion, or ments are known as fallacies. They are so distinc-
other evidence. tive and are used so often that they have been
2. Beware when evidence conflicts. You have good given names and are usually covered in courses
reason to doubt a statement if it conflicts with other on critical reasoning. Though flawed, fallacies
statements you think are well supported. If your are often persuasive and are frequently employed
nonmoral premise is inconsistent with another to mislead the unwary-even in (or especially in)
claim you believe is true, you cannot simply choose moral reasoning. The best way to avoid using
the one you like best. To resolve the conflict, you fallacies-or being taken in by them-is to study
must evaluate them both by weighing the evidence them so you know how they work and can eas-
for each one. ily identify them. The following is a brief review
. 3. Let reason rule. Deliberating on moral issues of the fallacies that are most prevalent in moral
~s serious bUSiness, often involving the question- argumentation.
Ing .of cherished views and the stirring of strong
Begging the Question
fe~hngs. Many times the temptation to dispense
~Ith reason and blindly embrace a favorite outlook Begging the question is the fallacy of arguing in
IS enormous. This common-and very human- a circle-that is, trying to use a statement as both
Pred'Icament can lead us to veer far from the a premise in an argument and the conclusion of
relevant evidence and true nonmoral premises. that argument. Such an argument says, in effect, p
SpeCifically, we may reject or disregard evidence is true because p is true. That kind of reasoning, of
~at conflicts with what we most want to believe. course, proves nothing.
e may even try to pretend that the conflicting For example:
eVi~ence actually supports our preconceptions. Yet 1. Women in Muslim countries, regardless of their
reSIsting the relevant evidence is just one side of social status and economic limitations, are enti-
the coin. We may also look for and find only evi- tled to certain rights, including but not neces-
dence that supports what we want to believe, going sarily limited to suffrage.
around the world to confirm our prejudices.
2. Therefore, all women in Muslim countries have
Our best chance to avert these tendencies is
the right to vote in political elections.
to try hard to be both critical and fair-to make a
deliberate effort to examine all the relevant evi- This argument is equivalent to saying "Women
dence, both for and against our preferred beliefs. in Muslim countries have a right to vote because
women in Muslim countries have a right to vote." Appeal to Authority

The conclusion merely repeats the premise but in This fallacy consists of relying on the opInIon
different words. The best protection against circu- of someone thought to be an expert who is not.
lar reasoning is a close reading of the argument. An expert, of course, can be a source of reliable
Equivocation information-but only if he really is an authority in
the designated subject area. A true expert is some-
The fallacy of equivocation assigns two different
one who is both knowledgeable about the facts and
meanings to the same term in an argument. Here's
able to make reliable judgments about them. Ulti-
an example that, in one form or another, is com-
mately, experts are experts because they carefully
monplace in the abortion debate:
base their opinions on the available evidence.
1. A fetus is an individual that is indisputably We make a fallacious appeal to authority
human. when we (1) cite experts who are not experts in
2. A human is endowed with rights that cannot be the field under discussion (though they may be
invalidated, including a right to life. experts in some other field) or (2) cite nonexperts
as experts. Expertise in one field does not automati-
3. Therefore, a fetus has a right to life.
cally carry over to another, and even nonexperts
This argument equivocates on the word human. who are prestigious and famous are still nonex-
In Premise 1, the term means physiologically perts. In general, on subjects outside an expert's
human, as in having human DNA. This claim, of area of expertise, her opinions are no more reliable
course, is indeed indisputable. But in Premise 2, than those of non experts.
human is used in the sense of person-that is, an Two rules of thumb should guide your use of
individual having full moral rights. Since the prem- expert opinion. First, if a claim conflicts with the
ises refer to two different things, the conclusion consensus of opinion among experts, you have
does not follow. If you are not paying close atten- good reason to doubt the claim. Second, if experts
tion, though, you might not detect the equivoca- disagree about a claim, you again have good reason
tion and accept the argument as it is. to doubt it.
-
~
"~
Appeal to Emotion
Emotions have a role to play in the moral life. In terrifying and menacing. And no one can ignore
moral arguments, however, the use of emotions the way he stabbed that girl and mutilated her
alone as substitutes for premises is a fallacy. We body. And her poor parents ....
commit this fallacy when we try to convince some- The question here is whether the defendant com-
one to accept a conclusion not by providing them mitted the crime, and the feelings of fear and
with relevant reasons but by appealing only to pity that he evokes are not relevant to it. But if
fear, guilt, anger, hate, compassion, and the like. the question were about the anguish or torment
For example: inflicted on the victim or her parents, then our feel-
The defendant is obviously guilty of murder in ings of empathy would indeed be relevant-and so
this case. Look at him in the courtroom-he's would any pertinent moral principles or theories.
1-
Slippery Slope are relevantly similar in several ways, but the ques-
The slippery slope fallacy is the use of dubious tion is, Are they relevantly similar enough to ren-
premises to argue that doing a particular action will der the conclusion probable? In this case, though
inevitably lead to other actions that will result in humans and apes are similar in some ways, they
disaster, so that first action should not be done. This are not relevantly similar enough to adequately
way of arguing is perfectly legitimate if the premises support the conclusion. Humans and apes have
are solid-that is, if there are good reasons to believe many differences-the most relevant of which for
that the first step really will lead to ruin. Consider: this argument is probably in the physiology of their
brains and in their capacity for advanced learning.
1. Rampant proliferation of pornography on the Arguments by analogy are common in moral
internet leads to obsession with pornographic
reasoning. For example:
materials.
1. When a neighbor needs your help (as when he
2. Obsession with pornographic materials dis-
needs to borrow your garden hose to put out a
rupts relationships, and that disruption leads
fire in his house), it is morally permissible to
to divorce.
lend the neighbor what he needs.
3. Therefore, we should ban pornography on the
internet. 2. Britain is a neighbor of the United States, and
it is in dire need of help to win the war against
Perhaps the chain of events laid out here could Germany.
actually occur, but we have been given no reason 3. Therefore, it is morally permissible for the
to beli~ve that it would. (You can see that this argu- United States to lend Britain the material and
ment IS also missing a moral premise.) Scientific equipment it needs to defeat Germany.
eVidence showing that this sequence of cause and
This is roughly the moral argument that Presi-
effect does OCcur as described would constitute
good reason to accept Premises 1 and 2. dent Franklin Roosevelt made during World War II
to convince Americans to aid Britain in its strug-
Faulty Analogy gle. The strength of the argument depends on the
degree of similarity between the two situations
The use of an analogy to argue for a conclusion is
described. At the time, many Americans thought
~own, not surprisingly, as argument by analogy.
the argument strong.
It IS a ~e of inductive argument that says because
The fallacy of faulty analogy is argument
~o ~hlngs are alike in some ways, they must be
by an analogy that is weak. In strong arguments
alIke In some additional way. For example:
by analogy, not only must the degree of similarity
1. Hu~ans feel pain, care for their young, live in be great, but the similarities must also be relevant.
socIal groups, and understand nuclear physics. This means that the similarities must relate specifi-
2. ~pes also feel pain, care for their young, and live cally to the conclusion. Irrelevant similarities can-
In social groups. not strengthen an argument.
3. Therefore, apes can understand nuclear physics. Appeal to Ignorance
In argument by analogy, the probability that This fallacy consists of arguing that the absence
the conclusion is true depends on the relevant sim- of evidence entitles us to believe a claim. Consider
ilarities between the two things being compared. these two arguments:
:~e greater the relevant similarities, the more likely • No one has proven that the fetus is not a per-
It IS that the conclusion is true. Humans and apes son, so it is in fact a person.
• It is obviously false that a fetus is a person, through critical thinking and honest and fair explo-
because science has not proven that it is a ration of issues. If you agree with this approach,
person. then you should not use the straw man fallacy-
and you should beware of its use by others.
Both of these arguments are appeals to igno-
rance. The first one says that because a statement
Appeal to the Person
has not been proven false, it must be true. The sec-
ond one has things the other way around: because Appeal to the person (also known as ad homi-
a statement has not been proven true, it must be nem) is the fallacy of arguing that a claim should be
false. The problem in both of these cases is that a rejected solely because of the characteristics of the
lack of evidence cannot be evidence for anything. person who makes it. Look at these:
A dearth of evidence simply indicates that we are • We should reject Alice's assertion that cheat-
ignorant of the facts. If having no evidence could ing on your taxes is wrong. She's a political
prove something, we could prove all sorts of outra- libertarian.
geous claims. We could argue that because no one
has proven that there are no space aliens control- • Jerome argues that we should all give a portion
ling all our moral decisions, there are in fact space of our income to feed the hungry people of the
aliens controlling all our moral decisions. world. But that's just what you'd expect a rich
guy like him to say. Ignore him.
Straw Man • Maria says that animals have rights and that
Unfortunately, the straw man fallacy is rampant we shouldn't use animal products on moral
in debates about moral issues. It amounts to mis- grounds. Don't believe a word of it. She owns a
representing someone's claim or argument so it can fur coat-she's a big hypocrite.
be more easily refuted. For example, suppose you
In each of these arguments, a claim is rejected
are trying to argue that a code of ethics for your pro-
on the grounds that the person making it has a par-
fessional group should be secular so that it can be
ticular character, political affiliation, or motive.
appreciated and used by as many people as possi-
Such personal characteristics, however, are irrel-
ble, regardless of their religious views. Suppose fur-
evant to the truth of a claim. A claim must stand or
ther that your opponent argues against your claim
fall on its own merits. Whether a statement is true
in this fashion:
or false, it must be judged according to the quality
X obviously wants to strip religious faith away of the reasoning and evidence behind it. Bad peo-
from every member of our profession and to ban- ple can construct good arguments; good people can
ish religion from the realm of ethics. We should not construct bad arguments.
let this happen. We should not let X have his way.
Vote against the secular code of ethics.
Hasty Generalization
This argument misrepresents your view, distort-
Hasty generalization is a fallacy of inductive
ing it so that it seems outrageous and unacceptable.
reasoning. It is the mistake of drawing a conclusion
Your opponent argues against the distorted version
about an entire group of people or things based on
and then concludes that your (original) position
an undersized sample of the group.
should be rejected.
The straw man fallacy is not just a bad • In this town three pro-life demonstrators have
argument- it flies in the face of the spirit of moral been arrested for trespassing or assault. I'm
reasoning, which is about seeking understanding telling you, pro-lifers are lawbreakers.
executions in the state happen frequently. This

conclUSion, though, is not justified by the tiny
QUICK REVIEW
sample of cases.
begging the question-The fallacy of arguing in
a circle-that is, trying to use a statement as COGNITIVE BIASES
both a premise in an argument and the conclu-
sion of that argument. Such an argument says,
Human reasoning is often undone by common
in effect, p is true because p is true. human failings-specifically, cognitive biases that
lead us to bad decisions, unfounded conclusions,
equivocation-The fallacy of assigning two differ-
and regrettable errors. The problem is that we
ent meanings to the same term in an argument.
often fall prey to these biases without even know-
appeal to authority-The fallacy of relying on the ing it, believing that we are in possession of truth
opinion of someone thought to be an expert and wisdom when we are in fact dead wrong. They
who is not. all have to do with how we handle evidence per-
slippery slope-The fallacy of using dubious prem- taining to our beliefs. Evidence is something that
ises to argue that doing a particular action will makes a statement more likely to be true. Scientific
inevitably lead to other actions that will result in research showing that cigarettes cause cancer is
disaster, so that first action should not be done. evidence. Your unimpaired, clear perception that
faulty analogy-The use of a flawed analogy to it's raining is evidence. In contrast, strongly
argue for a conclusion. believing that climate change is a hoax, or hear-
appeal to ignorance-The fallacy of arguing that the ing a YouTube influencer agree with your belief, is
absence of evidence entitles us to believe a claim. not, by itself, evidence. Here are a few of the most
straw man-The fallaty of misrepresenting someone's
common-and beguiling-cognitive biases.
claim or argument so it can be more easily refuted.
appeal to the person-The fallacy (also known as Confirmation Bias
ad hominem) of arguing that a claim should be To pay attention only to evidence that confirms
rejected solely because of the characteristics of our beliefs while ignoring opposing evidence is to
the person who makes it. fall prey to the cognitive distortion known as con-
hasty generalization-The fallacy of drawing a confirmation bias. Scientific research shows that
clusion about an entire group of people or things when people are asked to assess the truth of a claim,
based on an undersized sample of the group. they often attend only to evidence that supports
their existing beliefs. They cherry-pick evidence to
corroborate what they already believe or want to
believe, and they don't bother to check for discon-
• In the past thirty years, at least two people on firming evidence-even when the disconfirming
death row in this state have been executed and evidence is just as, or more, revealing.
later found to be innocent by DNA evidence. Why Confirmation bias can make beliefs-even false,
is the state constantly executing innocent people? dubiOUS, or ridiculous beliefs-seem reasonable,
In the first argument, a conclusion is drawn commonsensical, or irrefutable. Confirmation bias
about all people with pro-life views from a sample leads the social media provocateur to be supremely
of just three people. When it is spelled out plainly, confident of assertions that are demonstrably false,
the leap in logic is clearly preposterous. Yet such to be cocksure of the truth of the implausible and
preposterous leaps are extremely common. In the the absurd. Confirmation bias leads to ideas and
second argument, the conclusion is that wrongful theories that are nonfalsifiable-for which no
contradictory evidence would be allowed to call a collect evidence that supports that conclusion and
cherished belief into question, for which all con- ignore, dismiss, and downplay any evidence that
trary evidence is deemed irrelevant, for which con- contradicts that view. Motivated reasoning tries
firming evidence is the only evidence that matters. to prove something, not determine if that proof is
How do we escape confirmation bias? We must any good. Truth is beside the point.
make a conscious effort to look for both disconfirm- Motivated reasoning is on display everywhere
ing evidence as well as confirming evidence. We online. Motivated reasoners spend hours trying to
are naturally drawn to websites, magazines, books, prove that UFOs are real, that climate change is a
newspapers, and blogs that support our views of the hoax, that a cabal of hated people are controlling
world. But if we want a broader, truer, and smarter the world's economy, that the 9/11 terrorist attacks
perspective, we must have the courage to examine were an inside job. With motivated reasoning (and
the whole picture. the vast resources of the internet), it's possible to
build a very impressive, almost-plausible case for a
Availability Error claim that is complete bunk.
Another prevalent cognitive bias is the avail- Motivated reasoners work hard to prove a the-
ability error, the tendency to rely on evidence ory without ever considering opposing views or
not because it's reliable but because it's vivid or examining evidence impartially. Their reaction
memorable-in other words, psychologically avail- to opposing evidence is knee-jerk rejection. This
able. We fall prey to this bias if we conclude that lopsided process is, of course, a recipe for error and
crime in our city is on the rise just because we saw ignorance.
a TV news report about a mugging on Main Street; You are not likely to win an argument with a
if we decide that city transit buses are dangerous motivated reasoner. But you can avoid falling into
because a bus we were riding in was involved in a that trap yourself by doing the following:
fender-bender; or if we believe a politician is untrust-
• Give opposing views a chance; do not dismiss
worthy because he looks nervous. The classic exam-
them out of hand. Examine them carefully
ple of the availability error is believing that air travel
before passing judgment.
is more dangerous than other modes of transporta-
tion because we saw a disturbing media report about • Be reasonably skeptical of all sources, but espe-
a deadly plane crash. But research reveals that per cially of those that support your beliefs.
mile traveled, flying is far, far safer than automobile
• Be extra careful in evaluating the credibility of
travel, and many things (like accidental poisonings
sources that contradict your beliefs.
and choking) that are not psychologically available
are much more dangerous than air travel. The Dunning-Kruger Effect
The corrective for the availability error is a
Read the description that follows, and ask your-
combination of reliable data and careful research,
self if you know people like this: they are the least
the point of which is to rule out extraneous vari-
informed about a topiC, but they confidently tell
ables (like psychological vividness).
others how wrong they (those others) are and
lecture everyone on the fine points; they never
Motivated Reasoning doubt their own superior understanding of the
Motivated reasoning is reasoning for the pur- subject while disgorging an enormous amount of
pose of supporting a predetermined conclusion, false information and bad arguments. This is the
not to uncover the truth. It's like confirmation bias Dunning-Kruger effect in action, the common
on steroids. People who use motivated reasoning human failing of being ignorant of how ignorant
begin with a preferred conclusion, then set out to we are. David Dunning, one of the researchers who
originally studied the phenomenon, says of the rel- defend it-we must recall that confidence is not the
evant research: same thing as knowledge. The Dunning-Kruger effect
explains much of the loud, proud folly you find on
This isn't just an armchair theory. A whole battery social media. 2
of studies conducted by myself and others have
confirmed that people who don't know much about
a given set of cognitive, technical, or social skills WRITING AND SPEAI(ING ABOUT
tend to grossly overestimate their prowess and per-
MORAL ISSUES
formance, whether it's grammar, emotional intel-
ligence, logical reasoning, firearm care and safety, A common view about ethics is that arguing about
debating, or financial knowledge. College students morality is unproductive, unenlightening, frustrat-
who hand in exams that will earn them Os and
ing, unsatisfying-and therefore pOintless. A typi-
Fs tend to think their efforts will be worthy of far
higher grades; low-performing chess players, bridge cal moral disagreement can go like this:
players, and medical students, and elderly people "The university should ban alcohol everywhere
applying for a renewed driver's license, Similarly
on campus," says X. "Drinking is immoral,
overestimate their competence by a long shot. 1
whether on campus or off."
So what can we do about the Dunning-Kruger "You sound like the administration hacks. They're
problem? Here's the advice of Guy P. Harrison, all idiots!" says Y.
author of Think before You Like:
X: "They're not all idiots. Some are nice."
Having the mere awareness and understanding that
Y: "Wrong. They're idiots, and they drink plenty
all people-yourself included-struggle to accurately
assess competency levels can inspire the crucial and of alcohol every day. Alcohol helps them forget
necessary pause, that moment of reflection before they're idiots."
speaking, writing, clicking, liking, or swiping. Prior X: "What about Professor Jones? She doesn't drink."
to declaring the "obvious answer" to gun violence,
Y: "Yeah, but she's boring. And for a college professor,
racism, sexism, or poverty-and then digging in to
being boring is the worst moral failing imaginable."
This exchange really is pointless; it's going
nowhere. It's the kind of conversation that gives
moral discourse a bad name. As we've seen, proper
QUICI< REVIEW
discussions about moral issues-whether in written
or oral form-are not at all pointless. They are often
confirmation bias-Paying attention only to evi-
productive, thought-provoking, even enlighten-
dence that confirms our beliefs while ignoring
opposing evidence.
ing. You may not always like where the conversa-
tion ends up (what conclusions are arrived at), but
availability error-The tendency to rely on evi-
you will probably think the trip is worthwhile.
dence not because it's reliable but because it's
Good moral essays or conversations have sev-
vivid or memorable.
eral essential elements, without which no progress
motivated reasoning-Reasoning for the purpose could be made in resolving the issue at hand.
of supporting a predetermined conclusion, not 1. A claim to be proved. Almost always, the point
to uncover the truth. of writing or speaking about a moral issue is to
Dunning-Kruger effect-The common human fail- resolve it-that is, to determine whether the central
ing of being ignorant of how ignorant we are. moral claim or statement (a judgment, principle, or
theory) is true. Is it the case that same-sex marriage
is wrong (or right)? Is it true that Maria's action is science prove that persons do not have free will?
morally permissible (or impermissible)? Should Some philosophers think so. But I, along with many
actions always be judged right or wrong according astute commentators, beg to differ."
to the consequences they produce? To answer such 2. An argument for or against the claim. By now,
questions is to resolve the issue at hand, and resolv- you know that the essence of moral reasoning, the
ing the issue at hand is the point of the written or means for resolving (or trying to resolve) a moral
spoken discourse. Without a clear idea of the claim issue, and the overall shape of an essay or conver-
in question, the essay or conversation will mean- sation about a moral claim is the moral argument.
der, as it does in the previous example. The common pattern in an essay is to follow the
In an essay, the claim should be spelled out (or introduction (where the moral claim is stated) with
sometimes implied) in the first one or two para- a moral argument. Likewise, in a truly rewarding
graphs. In a conversation, it is most often men- conversation on a moral issue, the main event is
tioned (or understood) at the beginning. In either the presentation of a moral argument and the ensu-
case, it is by grasping the claim that we come to ing discussion about the quality of that argument
understand the pOint of it all and to follow the (whether the premises are true and whether the
thread of the discussion. conclusion logically follows from them).
In the most productive moral essays or con- Setting forth the argument involves explain-
versations, something else is made apparent early ing and amplifying each premise and supporting it
on: the reason the claim is worth discussing in the with evidence (expert opinion, studies, statistics),
first place. This means making sure that the mean- examples, or analogies. The aim is to demonstrate
ing of the claim is clear and that its implications clearly and carefully that the conclusion follows
are apparent. Sometimes this step requires only from the premises and that the premises are true.
a sentence or two, but usually much more explain- In a worthwhile oral debate, the elements are
ing is necessary. Just as essential is ensuring that much the same. Enough time and attention must
readers or listeners understand why anyone would be allowed for giving and explaining an argument
want to address the issue-why the issue is deemed and for thoughtful responses to that argument.
important enough to warrant an essay or serious 3. Consideration of altenlative views. In any good
conversation. Often all that's required is a brief essay or conversation about moral issues, present-
explanation of how the issue directly affects peo- ing an argument is not enough. There must be space
ple's lives. How, for example, might attitudes and or time to consider alternative views on the subject.
lives change if everyone agreed that same-sex mar- Specifically, there should be an honest and thor-
riage was morally permissible? Or how differently ough assessment of objections to your argument
might we view the world if all moral judgments and its conclusion. Students are often reluctant to
were based on the consequences of actions? take this step because they think it will weaken their
Many times, the best reason for dealing with a case. But the opposite is true. When you carefully
particular moral issue is that others have addressed it consider contrary opinions, you gain credibility,
and we want to disagree or agree with their response. because you show that you are fair-minded and care-
So we might say, "Juan argues that using illicit drugs ful. You demonstrate to readers or listeners that you
is morally right, but I think he's wrong on several are aware of possible objections and that you have
counts." Or, "In the debates over abortion, many good replies to them. Would you trust the assertions
commentators have asserted that a human fetus is of someone who dogmatically pushes his own view
a person with moral standing. But there are at least and ignores or dismisses out of hand anyone who
three reasons for rejecting this view." Or, "Does disagrees? Remember that a logical argument is not
a quarrel or spat and that a truly productive debate support is said to be strong. If it also has true premises,
is not a competition or shouting match. In ethics, it is said to be cogent.
written and oral approaches to moral issues are hon- Deductive arguments come in different forms.
est searches for truth and sincere exchanges of ideas. Some of these forms are known to be valid; some,
In an essay, an assessment of objections can invalid. Knowing these patterns helps you determine
come early or late but usually appears after the pre- the validity of deductive arguments. Using the coun-
sentation of the argument. In conversation, objec- terexample method can also aid your analysis.
The typical moral argument consists of at least one
tions may be taken up throughout and be addressed
moral premise and at least one nonmoral premise. The
as interlocutors raise them. Mutual respect and fair-
best approach to evaluating moral arguments is to treat
ness is a necessity in oral debate. Speakers must be
them as deductive. This tack enables you to uncover
given a chance to have their say-to present argu-
implicit premises. Implicit premises are often moral
ments, raise objections, or respond to objections. premises, which may be controversial or dubious. They
Handling objections properly involves both can be tested through the use of counterexamples.
summarizing and examining them. We should In moral reasoning, you frequently encounter
always avoid the fallacies mentioned earlier, of fallaCies-forms of bad arguments that arise repeat-
course, but in considering alternative views, we edly. Some of those you are most likely to come across
need to be especially alert to the straw man. Because are begging the question, equivocation, appeal to
the essence of the straw man fallacy is the misrep- authority, slippery slope, faulty analogy, appeal to
resenting of someone's claim or argument so it can ignorance, straw man, appeal to the person, and hasty
be more easily refuted, inserting the fallacy into generalization.
discussions is both dishonest and counterproduc- To think clearly and reason effectively, you also
tive. And by using it, you miss an opportunity to need to be aware of common cognitive biases. These
spot weaknesses in your case, which means you include confirmation bias, the availability error, moti-
also miss a chance to strengthen it. vated reasoning, and the Dunning-Kruger effect.
l<EY TERMS
statement (p. 45)
CHAPTER REVIEW argument (p. 46)
premise (p. 46)
SUMMARY conclusion (p. 46)
indicator words (p. 47)
An argument is a group of statements, one of which is deductive argument (p. 48)
supposed to be supported by the rest. To be more pre- inductive argument (p. 48)
cise, an argument consists of one or more premises and valid argument (p. 48)
a conclusion. In a good argument, the conclusion must invalid argument (p. 48)
follow from the premises, and the premises must be true. strong argument (p. 49)
Arguments come in two baSic types: deductive weak argument (p. 49)
and inductive. Deductive arguments are meant to give sound argument (p. 49)
logically conclusive support for their conclusions. A cogent argument (p. 49)
deductive argument that actually provides this kind of moral statement (p. 55)
support is said to be valid. If it also has true premises, nonmoral statement (p. 55)
it is said to be sound. An inductive argument is meant begging the question (p. 60)
to provide probable support for its conclusion. An equivocation (p. 61)
inductive argument that actually provides this kind of appeal to authority (p. 61)
slippery slope (p. 62) 12. What is the availability error? What is the
faulty analogy (p. 62) corrective for it? (p. 65)
appeal to ignorance (p. 63) 13. What is motivated reasoning? What is the
straw man (p. 63) common reaction of motivated reasoners to
appeal to the person (p. 63) opposing evidence? (p. 65)
hasty generalization (p. 63) 14. What is the Dunning-Kruger effect? What is
confirmation bias (p. 64) the advice of Guy P. Harrison for avoiding this
availability error (p. 65) cognitive bias? (pp. 65-66)
motivated reasoning (p. 65)
Dunning-Kruger effect (p. 65) Discussion Questions
1. Is it immoral to believe a claim without
EXERCISES evidence? Why or why not?
Review Questions 2. If moral reasoning is largely about providing
good reasons for moral claims, where do feelings
1. Are all persuasive arguments valid? Recount
enter the picture? Is it possible to present a good
a situation in which you tried to persuade
argument that you feel strongly about? If so,
someone of a view by using an argument.
(p.48) provide an example of such an argument.
3. Which of the following passages are arguments
2. Can a valid deductive argument ever have false
(in the sense of displaying critical reasoning)?
premises? Why or why not? (p. 48)
Explain your answers.
3. Are the premises of a cogent argument always
true? Is the conclusion always true? Explain. • If you harm someone, they will harm you.
(p.49) • Racial profiling is wrong. It discriminates
4. What is the term designating a valid argument against racial groups, and discrimination is
with true premises? a strong argument with true wrong.
premises? (p. 49) • If you say something that offends me, I have
5. Is the following argument form valid or invalid? the right to prevent you from saying it again.
Why or why not? (p. 49) After all, words are weapons, and I have a right
If p, then q. to prevent the use of weapons against me.
p. 4. What is the difference between persuading
Therefore, q. someone to believe a claim and giving them
6. Is the follOwing argument form valid or invalid? reasons to accept it? Can a good argument be
Why or why not? (p. 50) persuasive? Why or why not?
If p, then q. 5. Why do you think people are tempted to use
If q, then r. the straw man fallacy in disagreements on
Therefore, if p, then r. moral issues? How do you feel when someone
7. What is the counterexample method? (p. 51) uses this fallacy against you?
8. What kinds of premises must a moral argument
have? (p. 55) Argument Exercises
9. What is the best method for evaluating moral
Diagram the following arguments. Exercises marked
premises? (pp. 58-59)
with an asterisk (*) have answers in Answers to
10. Explain the method for locating implied
Argument Exercises at the end of the text.
premises. (pp. 51-52)
11. What is confirmation bias? How can it make *1. If John works out at the gym daily, he will be
false or dubious beliefs seem reasonable? healthier. He is working out at the gym daily. So
(pp.64-65) he will be healthier.
2. If when you are in a coma you are no longer a example, the Buddhists of Asia and the
person, then giving you a drug to kill you would Confucianists of China. Consider also the
not be murder. In a coma, you are in fact not great secular philosophers, from the ancient
a person. Therefore, giving you the drug is Greeks to the likes of David Hume and
not murder. Bertrand Russell. So it's not true that those
*3. Ghosts do not exist. There is no reliable without strong religious beliefs cannot be
evidence showing that any disembodied persons moral.
exist anywhere. 10. Jan is a student at Harvard. No student at
4. If you smoke, your heart will be damaged. If Harvard has won a Pulitzer Prize. Therefore, Jan
your heart is damaged, your risk of dying due has not won a Pulitzer.
to heart problems will increase. Therefore, *11.We shouldn't pay the lawnmower guy so much
smoking can increase your risk of dying due to money because he never completes the work,
heart problems. and he will probably just gamble the money
*5. The mayor is soft on crime. He cut back on away because he has no self-control.
misdemeanor enforcement and told the police 12. Either Manny, Mo, or Jack crashed the car.
department to be more lenient with traffic Manny couldn't have done it, because he
violators. was sleeping in his room and was observed
6. Grow accustomed to the belief that death the whole time. Mo couldn't have done it,
is nothing to us, since every good and evil because he was out of town at the time and has
lie in sensation. However, death is the witnesses to prove it. So the guy who crashed
deprivation of sensation. Therefore, death the car had to be Jack.
is nothing to us.
*7. The president is either dishonest or
fURTHER READING
incompetent. He's not incompetent, though, Richard Feldman, Reason and Argument, 2nd ed. (Upper
because he's an expert at getting self-serving Saddle River, N): Prentice Hall, 1999).
legislation through Congress. I guess he's just Richard M. Fox and}oseph P. DeMarco, Moral Reasoning:
dishonest. A Philosophic Approach to Applied Ethics, 2nd ed. (Fort
8. Most RepUblicans are conservatives, and Kurt Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001).
is a Republican. Therefore, Kurt is probably David Kelley and Debby Hutchins, The Art ofReasoning: An
a conservative. Therefore Kurt is probably Introduction to Logic, 5th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton,
opposed to increases in welfare benefits, because 2019).
Brooke Noel Moore and Richard Parker, Critical Thinking,
most conservatives are opposed to increased
7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
welfare benefits.
Lewis Vaughn, Concise Guide to Critical Thinking, 2nd ed.
*9. Can people without strong religious beliefs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).
be moral? Countless people have been Lewis Vaughn, The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective
nonbelievers or nontheists and still behaved Reasoning about Ordinary and Extraordinary Claims, 5th ed.
according to lofty moral principles; for (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
CHAPTER 4
The Power of Moral Theories
Recall that Part 1 (Fundamentals) gave you a broad of principles can be resolved, or if a new principle
view of our subject, outlining the major concerns of can handle cases that we have never had to address
moral philosophy, the function of moral judgments before. When we puzzle over such things, we enter
and principles, the nature of moral problems, the the realm of moral theory. We theorize-trying to
elements of our common moral experience, and the use, make, or revise a moral theory or a piece of one.
challenges of moral relativism and emotivism. The A moral theory is an explanation of what
last chapter covered one important part of moral makes an action right or what makes a person or
reasoning (evaluating moral arguments). This chap- thing good. Its focus is not the rightness or good-
ter covers the other vital part: understanding and ness of specific actions or persons but the very
appreciating moral theories. nature of rightness or goodness itself. Moral theo-
ries concerned with the goodness of persons or
things are known as theories of value. Moral theo-
THEORIES OF RIGHT AND WRONG
ries concerned with the rightness or wrongness of
Whatever else the moral life entails, it surely has actions are called theories of obligation. In this text,
moral reasoning at its core. We act, we feel, we we focus mostly on theories of obligation and,
choose, and in our best moments, we are guided unless otherwise indicated, will use the more gen-
by the sifting of reasons and the weighing of argu- eral term moral theories to refer to them. A moral
ments. Much of the time, we expect-and want- theory in this sense, then, is an explanation of what
this process to yield plausible moral judgments. makes an action right or wrong. It says, in effect,
We confront the cases that unsettle us and hope to that a particular action is right (or wrong) because
respond to them with credible assessments of the it has this property or characteristic.
right and the good. In making these judgments, we Moral theories and theorizing are hard to
may appeal to moral standards-principles or rules avoid. To wonder what makes an action right is to
that help us sort out right and wrong, good and bad. theorize. To try not to think much about morality
Our deliberations may even work the other way but to rely on your default moral theory-the one
around: moral judgments may help us mold moral you inherited from your family or culture-is of
principles. If we think carefully about our own delib- course to live by the lights of a moral theory. To
erations, however, we will probably come to under- reject all moral theories, to deny the possibility
stand that this interplay between moral judgments of objective morality, or to embrace a subjectiv-
and principles cannot be the whole story of moral ist view of right and wrong is to have a particular
reasoning. From time to time we step back from overarching view of morality, a view that in the
such considerations and ask ourselves if a trusted broadest sense constitutes a moral theory or part
moral principle is truly sound, whether a conflict of one.
71
~
Moral theories and moral arguments often work
~ together. A statement expressing a moral theory
,,\Moral Theories versus Moral Codes
may itself act as the moral premise in an argument.
A moral theory explains what makes an action More often, an argument's moral premise is ulti-
right; a moral code is simply a set of rules. We mately backed by a moral theory from which the
value a moral theory because it identifies for us moral premise (principle or rule) is derived. Testing
the essence of rightness and thereby helps us the premise may require examining one or more
make moral judgments, derive moral principles, supporting principles or perhaps the most general
and resolve conflicts between moral statements. norm (the theory) itself.
A moral code is much less useful than a moral the- Classic utilitarianism (covered in the next chap-
ory. The rules in a moral code inevitably conflict ter) is an example of a simple moral theory, one
but provide no means for resolving their incon- based on a single, all-encompassing standard: right
sistencies. Rules saying "00 not kill" and "Protect actions are those that directly produce the greatest
human life," for example, will clash when the overall happiness, everyone considered. What mat-
only way to protect human life is to kill. Also, ters most are the consequences of actions. Thus, in
rules are always general-usually too general a particular situation, if there are only two possible
to cover many specific situations that call for a
actions, and action X produces, say, 100 units of
moral decision-yet not general enough (in the
overall happiness for everyone involved (early util-
way that theories are) to help us deal with such
itarians were the first to use this strange-sounding
an array of specifics. How does a rule insisting
notion of units of happiness), while action Y pro-
"Children must obey their parents" apply when
duces only 50 units, action X is the morally right
the parents are criminally insane or under the
action to perform. The theory therefore identifies
influence of drugs, or when there are no parents,
just legal guardians? To make the rule apply, we
what is thought to be the most important factor
would have to interpret it-and that gets us back
in the moral life (happiness) and provides a proce-
into the realm of moral theory. dure for making judgments about right and wrong
The point is that moral codes may have their actions.
place in the moral life, but they are no substitute Should we therefore conclude that a moral
for a plausible moral theory. Rules are rules, but theory is the final authority in moral reasoning?
a moral theory can help us see beyond the rules. Not at all. A moral theory is not like a mathemati-
cal axiom. From a moral theory we cannot derive in
strict logical fashion principles or judgments that
will solve all the problems of our real-world cases.
A moral theory provides us with very general Because moral theories are by definition general
norms, or standards, that can help us make sense of and theoretical, they cannot by themselves give
our moral experiences, judgments, and principles. us precisely tailored right answers. But neither can
(Some moral theories feature only one overarch- we dispense with moral theories and rely solely on
ing standard.) The standards are meant to be gen- judgments about particular cases and issues. In the
eral enough and substantial enough to inform our field of ethics, most philosophers agree that care-
moral reasoning-to help us assess the worth of less fully made moral judgments about cases and issues
general principles, to shed light on our moral judg- are generally reliable data that we should take very
ments, to corroborate or challenge aspects of our seriously. Such opinions are called considered
moral experience, and even to generate new lower- moral judgments, because they are formed after
level principles if need be. careful deliberation that is as free of bias as possible.
CHAPTER 4: THE POWER OF MORAL THEORIES 0 73
Our considered moral judgments (including the -

J::a..........
"~
principles or rules sanctioned by those judgments)
QUICI< REVIEW
by themselves, however, are sometimes of limited
use. They may conflict. They may lack sufficient moral theory-An explanation of what makes an
justification. A moral theory provides standards action right or what makes a person or thing
that can help overcome these limitations. good.
So where does theory fit in our moral delibera- considered moral judgment-A moral assessment
tions? Theory plays a role along with judgments that is as free from bias and distorting passions
and principles or rules. In trying to determine the as possible. We generally trust such a judgment
morally right thing to do in a specific case, we unless there is a reason to doubt it.
may find ourselves reflecting on just one of these
elements or on all of them at once. We may, for
example, begin by considering the insights embod-
ied in our moral theory, which give some justifica- (or deontological). In general, consequentialist
tion to several relevant principles. In light of these theories say that what makes an action right is its
principles, we may decide to perform a particular consequences. Specifically, the rightness of an action
action. But we may also discover that our consid- depends on the amount of good it produces. A con-
ered moral judgment in the case conflicts with the sequentialist theory may define the good in dif-
deliverances of the relevant principles or even with ferent ways-as, for example, pleasure, happiness,
the overarching theory. Depending on the weight well-being, flourishing, or knowledge. But however
we give to the particular judgment, we may decide good is defined, the morally right action is the one
to adjust the principles or the theory so that it is that results in the most favorable balance of good
compatible with the judgment. A moral theory over bad.
can crystallize important insights in morality and Nonconsequentialist theories say that the
thereby give us general guidance as we make judg- rightness of an action does not depend entirely on
ments about cases and issues. But the judgments- its consequences. It depends primarily, or com-
if they are indeed trustworthy-can compel us to pletely, on the nature of the action itself. To a non-
reconsider the theory. consequentialist, the balance of good over bad that
The ultimate goal in this give-and-take of the- results from an action may matter little or not at all.
ory and judgment (or principle) is a kind of close What is of primary concern is the kind of action in
coherence between the two-what has come to question. To a consequentialist, telling a lie may be
be known as reflective equilibrium. 1 They should considered wrong because it leads to more unhap-
fit together as closely as pOSSible, with maximum piness than other actions do. To a nonconsequen-
agreement between them. This process is similar tialist, telling a lie may be considered wrong simply
to the one used in science to reconcile theory and because it violates an exception less rule. Thus, by
experimental data, a topic we address in more nonconsequentialist lights, an action could be
detail later in this chapter. morally right even though it produces less good
than any alternative action.
MAJOR THEORIES Conseqllentialist Theories
Moral philosophers have traditionally grouped the- There are several consequentialist theories, each
ories of morality into two major categories: conse- differing from the others on who is to benefit from
quentialist (or teleological) and nonconsequentialist goods or what kinds of goods are to be pursued.
But two theories have received the most attention situation the right action is the one that advances
from moral philosophers: utilitarianism and ethi- one's own best interests. In each circumstance, the
cal egoism. ethical egoist must ask, "Which action, among all
Utilitarianism says that the morally right possible actions, will result in the most good for
action is the one that produces the most favorable me?" Ironically, it may be possible for an ethical
balance of good over evil, everyone considered. egoist to consistently practice this creed without
That is, the right action maximizes the good (how- appearing to be selfish or committing many self-
ever good is defined) better than any alternative ishly unkind acts. The egOist may think that C0111-
action, everyone considered. Utilitarianism insists pletely disregarding the welfare of others is not in
that everyone affected by an action must be included his or her best interests. After all, people tend to
in any proper calculation of overall consequences. resent such behavior and may respond accordingly.
The crudal factor is how much net good is produced Nevertheless, the bottom line in all moral delibera-
when everyone involved is counted. tions is whether an action maximizes the good for
Moral philosophers distinguish two major types the egoist. This approach to morality seems to radi-
of utilitarianism according to whether judgments cally conflict with commonsense moral experience
of rightness focus on individual acts (without ref- as well as with the basic principles of most other
erence to rules) or on rules that cover various cat- moral theories.
egories of acts. Act-utilitarianism says that right
actions are those that directly produce the greatest Nonconsequentialist Theories
overall good, everyone considered. The conse- Nonconsequentialist (deontological) theories also
quences that flow directly from a particular act are take various forms. They differ on, among other
all that matter; rules are irrelevant to this calcula- things, the number of foundational principles or
tion. In act-utilitarianism, each situation calling basic rules used and the ultimate basis of those
for a moral judgment is unique and demands a new principles.
calculation of the balance of good over evil. Thus, By far the most influential nonconsequentialist
breaking a promise may be right in one situation and theory is that of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant
wrong in another, depending on the consequences. wants to establish as the foundation of his theory a
Rule-utilitarianism, on the other hand, says single principle from which all additional maxims
that the morally right action is the one covered by can be derived, a principle he calls the categori-
a rule that if generally followed would produce the cal imperative. One way that he states his prin-
most favorable balance of good over evil, every- ciple is "Act only on that maxim through which
one conSidered. The consequences of generally you can at the same time will that it should become
following a rule are of supreme importance-not a universallaw.,,2 (Kant insists that he formulates
the direct consequences of performing a particular just one principle but expresses it in several differ-
action. Specific rules are justified because if people ent forms; the forms, however, seem to be separate
follow them all the time (or most of the time), the principles.) The categorical imperative, Kant says,
result will be a general maximization of good over is self-evident-and therefore founded on reason.
evil. We are to follow such rules consistently, even if The principle and the maxims derived from it are
doing so in a particular drcumstance results in bad also universal (applying to all persons) and absolut-
consequences. ist, meaning that they are moral laws that have no
Ethical egoism says that the morally right exceptions. Kant's theory, then, is the view that
action is the one that produces the most favorable the morally right action is the one done in accor-
balance of good over evil for oneself. That is, in every dance with the categorical imperative.
For Kant, every action implies a rule or maxim A natural law theorist might reason like this:
that says, in effect, always do this in these circum- Lying is immoral because it goes against human
stances. An action is right, he says, if and only if nature. Truth telling is natural for humans because
you could rationally will the rule to be universal- they are social creatures with an inborn tendency to
to have everyone in a similar situation always act care about the welfare of others. Truth telling helps
according to the same rule. Breaking promises is humans get along, maintain viable societies, and
wrong because if the implied rule (something like show respect for others. Lying is therefore unnatural
"Break promises whenever you want") were uni- and wrong. Another example: Some natural law theo-
versalized (if everyone followed the rule), then rists claim that "unnatural" sexual activity is immoral.
no promise anywhere could be trusted, and the They argue that because the natural purpose of sex is
whole convention of promise making would be procreation, and such practices as homosexual sex or
obliterated-and no one would be willing to live anal sex have nothing to do with procreation, these
in such a world. In other words, universalizing the practices are immoral.
breaking of promises would result in a logically Another critical aspect of the traditional theory
contradictory state of affairs, a situation that makes is that it insists that humans can discover what is
no moral sense. natural, and thus moral, through reason. God has
Notice again the stark contrast between utili- created a natural order and given humans the gift
tarianism and Kant's theory. For the former, the of rationality to correctly apprehend this order. This
rightness of an action depends solely on its conse- means that any rational person-whether religious
quences, on what results the action produces for or not-can discern the moral rules and live a moral
everyone involved. For the latter, the consequences life.
of actions for particular individuals never enter One of the simplest nonconsequentialist theo-
into the equation. An action is right if and only if ries is the divine command theory, a view dis-
it possesses a particular property-the property of cussed in Chapter 1. It says that the morally right
according with the categorical imperative, of not action is the one that God commands. An action is
involving a logical contradiction. right if and only if God says it is. The rightness of
Another notable nonconsequentialist view is an action does not depend in any way on its conse-
the theory of natural law. Natural law theory quences. According to the divine command theory,
says that the morally right action is the one that fol- an action may be deemed right even though it does
lows the dictates of nature. What does nature have not maximize the good, or deemed wrong even if it
to do with ethics? According to the most influential does maximize the good. It may incorporate one
form of this theory (traditional natural law theory), principle only (the core principle that God makes
the natural world, including humankind, exhibits rightness) or the core principle plus several subordi-
a rational order in which everything has its proper nate rules, as is the case with divine command views
place and purpose, with each thing given a spe- that designate the Ten Commandments as a God-
cific role to play by God. In this grand order, natu- made moral code.
ral laws reflect how the world is as well as how it
should be. People are supposed to live according to EVALUATING THEORIES
natural law-that is, they are to fulfill their rightful,
natural purpose. To act morally, they must act natu- We come now to the question that moral philoso-
rally; they must do what they were designed to do phers have been asking in one way or another for
by God. They must obey the absolutist moral rules centuries: Is this moral theory a good theory? That
that anyone can read in the natural order. is, is it true? Does it reliably explain what makes an
action right? As we have seen, not all moral theo-

ries are created equal. Some are better than oth-
QUICI< REVIEW
ers; some are seriously flawed; and some, though
imperfect, have taught the world important lessons consequentialist theory-A theory asserting
about the moral life. that what makes an action right is its
The next question, of course, is, How do we go consequences.
about answering the first question? At first glance, it nonconsequentialist theory-A theory assert-
seems that impartially judging the worth of a moral ing that the rightness of an action does not
theory is impossible, because we all look at the world depend on its consequences.
through our own tainted lens, our own moral theory or
utilitarianism-A theory asserting that the mor-
theory fragments. However, our review of subjectivism
ally right action is the one that produces the
and relativism (see Chapter 2) suggests that this worry most favorable balance of good over evil,
is overblown. More to the pOint, there are plausible cri- everyone considered.
teria that we can use to evaluate the adequacy of moral
act-utilitarianism-A utilitarian theory asserting
theories (our own and those of others), standards that
that the morally right action is the one that
moral philosophers and others have used to appraise
directly produces the most favorable balance
even the most complex theories of morality. These are
of good over evil, everyone considered.
what we may call the moral criteria ofadequacy.
The first step in assessing any theory (before rule-utilitarian ism-A utilitarian theory asserting
that the morally right action is the one covered
using these criteria) is to ensure that the theory
by a rule that, if generally followed, would pro-
meets the minimum requirement of coherence. A
duce the most favorable balance of good over
moral theory that is coherent is eligible to be evalu-
evil, everyone considered.
ated using the criteria of adequacy. A coherent
theory is internally consistent, which means that ethical egoism-A theory asserting that the mor-
ally right action is the one that produces the
its central claims are consistent with one another-
most favorable balance of good over evil for
they are not contradictory. An internally consistent
oneself.
theory would not assert, for example, both that (1)
actions are right if and only if they are natural and categorical imperative-An imperative that we
that (2) it is morally right to use unnatural means should follow regardless of our particular wants
to save a life. Contradictory claims assert both that and needs; also, the principle that defines Kant's
something is and is notthe case; one statement says theory.
X and another says not-X. When claims conflict in Kant's theory-A theory asserting that the mor-
this way, we know that at least one of them is false. ally right action is the one done in accordance
So if two substantial claims in a theory are contra- with the categorical imperative.
dictory, one of the claims must be false-and the natural law theory-A theory asserting that the
theory is refuted. This kind of inconsistency is such morally right action is the one that follows the
a serious shortcoming in a moral theory that fur- dictates of nature.
ther evaluation of it would be unnecessary. It is, in divine command theory-A theory asserting that
fact, not eligible for evaluation. Ineligible theories the morally right action is the one that God
would get low marks on each criterion of adequacy. commands.
Eligible moral theories are a different matter.
Unlike ineligible theories, they are not guaranteed
to fare poorly when evaluated, and testing their
mettle with the moral criteria of adequacy is almost supposed to explain what makes an action right,
always revealing. But how do we use these criteria? and the data relevant to that issue are our consid-
The answer is that we apply them in much the same ered moral judgments.
way and for a few of the same reasons that scientists Recall that considered moral judgments are
apply their criteria to scientific theories. views that we form after careful deliberation under
Scientific theories are introduced to explain conditions that minimize bias and error. They are
data concerning the causes of events-why some- therefore thought to have considerable weight as
thing happens as it does or why it is the way it is. reasons or evidence in moral matters, even though
Usually scientists devise several theories (explana- they can be mistaken and other considerations
tions) of a phenomenon, ensuring that each one is (such as an established moral principle or a well-
minimally adequate for evaluation. Then they try supported theory) can sometimes overrule them.
to determine which of these is best, which offers A moral theory that is inconsistent with trust-
the best explanation for the data in question, for worthy judgments is at least dubious and likely to
they know that the best theory is the one most be false and in need of drastic overhaul or rejection.
likely to be true. To discover which is the best, they There is something seriously wrong, for example,
must judge each theory according to some gener- with a theory that approves of the murder of inno-
ally accepted standards-the scientific criteria of cent people, the wanton torture of children, or the
adequacy. One criterion, for example, is conser- enslavement of millions of men and women. As we
vatism: how well a theory fits with what scientists will see in the next chapter, inconsistency with con-
already know. A scientific theory that conflicts sidered moral judgments can be the undoing of even
with existing knowledge (well-established facts, the most influential and attractive moral theories.
scientific laws, or extensively confirmed theories) Consider Theory 1. It says that right actions are
is not likely to be true. On the other hand, the more those that enhance the harmonious functioning of
conservative a theory is (that is, the less it conflicts a community. On the face of it, this theory appears
with existing knowledge), the more likely it is to be to be a wise policy. But it seems to imply that certain
true. All things being equal, a conservative theory heinous acts are right. It suggests, for example, that if
is better than one that is not conservative. Another killing an innocent person would enhance a commu-
criterion is fruitfulness: how many successful novel nity's harmonious functioning, killing that person
predictions the theory makes. The more such pre- would be right. This view conflicts dramatically with
dictions, the more plausible the theory is. our considered moral judgment that murdering an
Now consider the following criteria of adequacy innocent person just to make a community happy is
for moral theories: wrong. Theory 1 should be rejected.
Criterion 1: Consistency with Considered Criterion 2: Consistency with Our

Mora1ludgments Moral Experiences
To be worth evaluating, a plausible scientific As we saw earlier, a good scientific theory should be
theory must be consistent with the data it was conservative. It should, in other words, be consistent
introduced to explain. A theory meant to explain with scientific background knowledge-with the
an epidemic, for example, must account for the many beliefs that science has already firmly estab-
nature of the disease and the method of transmis- lished. Likewise, a plaUSible moral theory should
sion. Otherwise it is a very poor theory. A moral be consistent with moral background knowledge-
theory must also be consistent with the data it with what we take to be the fundamental facts of our
was introduced to explain. A moral theory is moral experience. Whatever our views on morality,
~
"~ Considered Moral Judgments
The philosopher John Rawls devised the notion of likely to be erroneous or to be influenced by an
reflective equilibrium and put heavy emphasis on excessive attention to our own interests. Consid-
the quality of moral judgments in his own moral ered judgments are simply those rendered under
theory. This is what he has to say about the nature conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense
of considered moral judgments: of justice, and therefore in circumstances where
the more common excuses and explanations for
Now, as already suggested, [considered judg- making a mistake do not obtain. The person mak-
ments] enter as those judgments in which our ing the judgment is presumed, then, to have the
moral capacities are most likely to be displayed ability, the opportunity, and the desire to reach a
without distortion. Thus in deciding which of our correct decision (or at least, not the desire not to).
judgments to take into account we may reason- Moreover, the criteria that identify these judg-
ably select some and exclude others. For exam- ments are not arbitrary. They are, in fact, similar
ple, we may discard those judgments made with to those that single out considered judgments of
hesitation, or in which we have little confidence. any kind.*
Similarly, those given when we are upset or fright-
ened, or when we stand to gain one way or the * John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge,
other can be left aside. All these judgments are MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1999), 42.
few of us would deny that we do in fact have these feelings determine what is right, we cannot be
experiences: wrong. Whatever we happen to feel tells us what
actions are right. Our moral experience, however,
• We sometimes make moral judgments.
is good evidence that we are not morally infallible.
• We often give reasons for particular moral Theory 2 therefore is problematiC, to say the least.
beliefs. Could we possibly be mistaken about our moral
experience? Yes. It is possible that our experience
• We are sometimes mistaken in our moral beliefs.
of the moral life is illusory. Perhaps we are mor-
• We occasionally have moral disagreements. ally infallible after all, or maybe we do not actually
• We occasionally commit wrongful acts. make moral judgments. But like our considered
moral judgments, our commonsense moral expe-
As is the case with theories that conflict with riences carry weight as evidence-good evidence
considered moral judgments, a theory in conflict that the moral life is, for the most part, as we think
with these experiences is at least dubious and prob- it is. We are therefore entitled to accept this evi-
ably false. A moral theory is inconsistent with the dence as trustworthy unless we have good reason
moral life if it implies that we do not have one or to think otherwise.
more of these basic moral experiences.
Suppose Theory 2 says that our feelings alone Criterion 3: Usefulness in
determine whether actions are right-that if our Moral Problem Solving
feelings lead us to believe that an action is right, Good scientific theories increase our understand-
then it is right. But this theory suggests that we ing of the world, and greater understanding leads to
are never mistaken in our moral beliefs, for if our greater usefulness-the capacity to solve problems
CRITICAL THOUGHT: A 100 Percent All-Natural Theory
Imagine that you come across a theory based on ment.lmpermissible actions might include building
this moral standard: Only actions that are "natural" spaceships, using birth control, using performance-
are morally right; "unnatural" actions are wrong. enhancing drugs, being a loner or a hermit, and
We can call it the all-natural theory. It defines nat- intervening in reproductive processes (as in clon-
ural actions as (1) those done in accordance with ing, abortion, fertility treatments, in vitro fertiliza-
the normal biological urges and needs of human tion, and stem cell research).
beings, (2) those that reflect typical human psy- Is this a good theory? Is it internally inconsis-
chological tendencies and patterns, and (3) those tent? (For example, do the three definitions of
that help ensure the survival of the human spe- natural actions conflict? Would applying Defini-
cies. (This approach should not be confused with tion 3 contradict the results of applying Definitions
the more sophisticated and historically important 1 and 2?) Is the all-natural theory consistent with
natural law theory.) An all-natural theorist might our considered moral judgments? (Hint: Would it
view these actions as morally permissible: walking, condone murder? Would it conflict with our usual
talking, eating, having sex, cooperating with oth- concepts of justice?) If it is not consistent, supply
ers, caring for loved ones, teaching children, creat- an example (a counterexample). Is the theory con-
ing art, growing food, building shelters, going to sistent with our moral experience? Give reasons for
war, solving problems, and protecting the environ- your answer. Is the theory useful? If not, why not?
and answer questions. The more useful a scientific the theory. But a plausible theory can give scien-
theory is, the more credibility it acquires. A good tists good reasons to accept or reject specific data
moral theory is also useful-it helps us solve moral or to reinterpret them. Both the theory and the
problems in real-life situations. It helps us make data contribute to the process of searching for the
reliable judgments about moral principles and truth. Scientists work to get the balance between
actions and resolve conflicts among conflicting these two just right. They try to ensure a very close
judgments and principles and within the theory fit between them-so close that there is no need for
itself. A major reason for devising a moral theory is major alterations in either the theory or the data.
to obtain this kind of practical gUidance. In ethics, the link between theory and data (consid-
Usefulness is a necessary, though not sufficient, ered moral judgments) is similar. Considered moral
characteristic of a good moral theory. This means judgments help shape theory (and its principles or
that all good theories are useful, but usefulness alone rules), and a good theory sheds light on judgments
does not make a moral theory good. It is possible for and helps adjudicate conflicts between judgments
a bad theory to be useful as well (to be useful but fail and other moral statements. As in science, we
some other criterion of adequacy). But any moral should strive for a strong logical harmony between
theory that lacks usefulness is a dubious theory. theory, data, and subordinate principles.
Now we can be more specific about the similari- Remember, though, that theory evaluation is
ties between science and ethics in handling theory not a mechanical process, and neither is the appli-
and data. In science, the interaction between a the- cation of theories to moral problems. There is no
ory and the relevant data is dynamic. The theory is formula or set of instructions for applying our three
designed to explain the data, so the data help shape criteria to a theory. Neither is there a calculating
,,
-~
~
. QUICK REVIEW
The Moral Criteria of Adequacy

about the rightness or wrongness of particular
actions or the moral worth of particular people or
motives, trying to align our lives with moral norms
that we think rest on a solid footing. But some-
times we must take a bird's-eye view of morality to
Criterion 1: Consistency with considered judgments. see how these particulars are related, whether they
Criterion 2: Consistency with our moral experiences. reveal a pattern that informs the moral life, and
whether the moral principles we embrace are really
Criterion 3: Usefulness in moral problem solving.
worth embracing. In other words, we theorize.
In the next few pages, I show you how I do some
of this big-picture theorizing. I try to work out a
machine for determining how much weight to give plausible moral theory of obligation-an explana-
each criterion in particular situations. We must tion of what makes an action right or wrong. I base
make an informed judgment about the importance this theory on what I consider the best aspects of
of particular criteria in each new instance. Never- the moral theories discussed earlier and on the ele-
theless, applying the criteria is not a subjective, ments of the moral life in which we have the great-
arbitrary affair. It is rational and objective-like, for est confidence.
example, the diagnosis of an illness, which is based
on the educated judgment of a physician using Moral Common Sense
appropriate guidelines. As we have seen, some of the more influential
Now suppose you apply the moral criteria of theories of the past-utilitarianism, Kant's theory,
adequacy and reach a verdict on the worth of a the- and natural law theory-offer invaluable moral
ory: you reject it. Should this verdict be the end of insights. But each one overlooks at least one feature
your inquiry? In general, no. There is often much that seems vital to morality and to any adequate
to be learned from even seriously defective theo- moral theory. Some leave out the consequences of
ries. Many philosophers who reject utilitarianism, actions, some the claims of autonomy and rights,
for example, also believe that it makes a valuable and some the demands of justice. I think the
point that any theory should take into account: absence of these elements constitutes a disabling
the c~nsequences of actions do matter. Judiciously flaw for these theories. But if this assessment is
applymg the criteria of adequacy to a theory can correct-if our best theories to date are not entirely
help us see a theory's strengths as well as its weak- adequate to the task of providing moral guidance
nesses . Such'lnslg. h ts can ' . us to improve any
InSpIre and ethical understanding-how can we expect to
moral theory-or perhaps create a new one. devise something better? What are our prospects
You will get a chance to see firsthand how for improving on what we have?
theory evaluation is done. In Chapters 5 and 6 we I think our prospects are good. Recall that we
Wil~ apply the moral criteria of adequacy to se:eral are all capable of forming considered moral judg-
major moral theOries. ments, the assessments we make about cases and
principles after careful reflection that is as clear
DEVISING A COHERENT MORAL THEORY and unbiased as possible. These judgments-what
some call our moral common sense-are fallible
By now you know that we are all chronic moral the- and revisable, but they can constitute credible
orizers. We can't help ourselves. We usually operate evidence in favor of particular judgments or prin-
on the ground level of ethics, making judgments Ciples. They are used regularly by philosophers not
only to formulate principles and theories but also cases: people have a right of self-determination.
to test them for soundness. When a judgment or But to avoid jumping to conclusions, we examine
principle or theory or value seems questionable, we many similar cases, and this forces us to modify
usually fall back on our most trusted data: our con- our principle, perhaps a little bit or perhaps a lot.
sidered moral judgments. And our modified principle sheds new light on our
Our considered moral judgments tell us that cases, perhaps revealing that some of them are not
wantonly killing people is wrong, that slavery is really instances of wrongdoing after all. We gather
a moral abomination, that equals must be treated more considered moral judgments, and we think
equally, that respecting the rights of innocent peo- they suggest other principles. Ultimately we may
ple is morally required, and that inflicting unde- conclude that all our principles can be summed up
served and unnecessary suffering on others is evil. in one dominant principle (as is the case with utili-
We are rightly suspicious of any theory that says tarianism). Or perhaps we are left with an appar-
otherwise. We should have more confidence in our ently irreducible set of principles that seem to cover
considered moral judgment that abusing babies all our moral duties (as in natural law theory). In
is wrong than in any theory that condones it. Of either situation, we continually test the principles
course, our moral common sense can be in error; to determine if they lead to reasonable judgments,
we can be wrong about what at first seems obvious, and we check the plausibility of the judgments by
and a good moral theory can show us that a con- comparing them with the principles. The idea is to
sidered moral judgment should be revised. But we eliminate conflicts between the two and to achieve
are entitled to trust the urgings of common sense the closest possible agreement between them.
unless we have good reasons to doubt them. Utili- Thus, common sense shapes theory, and theory
tarianism, Kant's theory, and natural law theory informs common sense.
have all been found wanting, in large part because So in developing a moral theory, we begin with
they conflict in some way with our considered what we know or think we know. And through much
moral judgments. Our moral common sense, then, critical reflection on our data and the generalizations
is the starting point of our theorizing as well as the arising from them, we can formulate a theory-a
corroboration of what we learn. work in progress-and a more or less useful guide to
the moral life.
Building a Moral Theory
Here is one way a moral theory is built: Suppose we Prima Fade Prindples
begin with our data-our considered moral judg- But what shape would an adequate moral theory
ments rendered about specific cases. We judge that take? The overall structure of a moral theory of
the actions in these cases are morally wrong, and obligation depends largely on the number of fun-
then we look for what these wrong actions have damental principles it has and whether those prin-
in common. Suppose we notice that all of them ciples are absolute-that is, whether they are rigid
share the property of being instances in which rules that allow no exceptions. Utilitarianism has
people are prevented from exercising their auton- a single ultimate rule (the principle of utility), and
omy (their capacity for self-governance). Perhaps a so does Kant's theory (the categorical imperative).
doctor operates on them without their consent, or For these theories, no principles are more basic.
they are denied their right to live and work where Each basic principle is also absolute; the rule must
they choose, or they are forced to practice a reli- always be followed in every circumstance. There is
gion they despise. After much reflection, we think no clause that says the rule must be strictly adhered
we see a moral principle threading through these to except in circumstance X or Y. Other theories,
however, feature not one but several fundamental irresolvable contradictions. Honoring one rule may
principles, which mayor may not be absolute. Nat- force the violation of another. Suppose an absolut-
ural law theory, for example, is based on a handful ist theory consists of just two rules: "Care for loved
of absolute rules. But some theories that also con- ones in dire need" and "Keep your promises."
tain more than one basic rule reject absolutism. Suppose you promise to take your mother to see
Of these possible theory configurations, I think a Broadway show, something she has looked for-
only the latter type is plausible. Deep down, we ward to for years, but on that same night your son
may all want moral principles to be reassuringly becomes seriously ill and will suffer horribly if you
sturdy and absolute, but I think this is a false hope. do not tend to him. If you keep your promise and
It seems that for any absolute moral principle, we take your mother to the show, your son will suf-
can always find counter-examples in which adher- fer; if you take care of your son, you will break your
ing strictly to the rule can lead to immoral actions promise to your mother. You cannot obey one rule
and unpalatable results. Kant offers the example without violating the other. In absolutist theories
of the poor unfortunate who runs from an insane conSisting of two or more basic rules, such contra-
murderer and hides in a friend's house. When the dictions are common, and they render the theories
friend is asked for the whereabouts of the mur- implausible. Various attempts have been made by
derer's prey, he has a choice: he can lie and save absolutists to answer this kind of criticism, but in
his friend's life, or he can tell the truth and doom my opinion none of these efforts has succeeded or
her. Kant thinks he must tell the truth, even if the ever will succeed.
result is a tragic loss of life. According to Kant, we I think nonabsolutist, multiple-rule theories
must do right though the heavens fall. His absolut- have a much better way of dealing with conflict-
ism compels him to obey the letter of the law. But ing rules. Their approach hinges on the concept of
our considered moral judgments seem to suggest prima facie principles-principles that apply
that in situations like this, saving a life is far more in a situation unless exceptions are justified. Excep-
important than telling the truth. If the stakes are tions are justified when two rules conflict (when
high enough-if obeying an absolute rule would both rules apply, but it is not possible to obey both)
cause, say, death and destruction-violating the and one is considered weightier than the other.
rule would appear to be the right thing to do. Viewing the duties in the mother-son case as prima
Our moral common sense also tells us, I think, facie would require us to decide which duty was
that there must be more than one basic moral rule more important and therefore which should be
that defines our duties. More than one primary performed. The two rules represent apparent duties,
rule must be necessary, because we obviously have but after weighting the duties appropriately, only
many basic duties, and we cannot derive them all one constitutes our actual duty. This approach to
from one another or from one overarching prin- conflicting rules aligns better with our moral com-
ciple. Our duty to benefit others is distinct from our mon sense: we know that our duties sometimes col-
duty to respect their rights; if anything, these are lide, that a duty can be overridden by a weightier
competing duties. Utilitarianism and Kant's theory, one, and that occasionally we must break the rules
which boast just one ultimate rule, have trouble in order to do the right thing. We also seem to have
accounting for these disparate obligations. a sense that prima facie duties remain fundamen-
Any theory that consists of two or more funda- tally important even when they are overridden.
mental rules must explain how those rules relate to So I think that an adequate moral theory, how-
one another. For the absolutist, multiple rules lead ever it is fleshed out, must be based on more than
to a serious problem: they will inevitably produce one principle, and the principles should be prima
facie (nonabsolute) and irreducible (they cannot be justice. For most theorists, these concerns define the
derived from one another). Such a model is known full spectrum of moral norms that inform the moral
as principlism, a moral theory consisting of mul- life. Although philosophers have parsed these general
tiple moral principles that must be weighed and norms in different ways, there is plenty of agreement
balanced against one another to determine right about what they are.
actions. If all of these assumptions are correct, then a sat-
isfactory moral theory that reflects the facts of the
Three Rules moral life should comprise a small number of prima
The next issue to consider is what these principles facie principles covering all the duties endorsed by
are and how they function in the theory. On this our considered moral judgments. Absolute rules
point, theories of prima facie principles can differ and a structure dominated by a single sovereign
substantially in both the content of the principles principle cannot be features of this theory.
and their number. W.D. Ross (1877-1967), the With these requirements in mind, I want to
first philosopher to devise a theory of prima facie argue for a theory that rests on three prima facie
duties, thought there were at least seven prima principles: respect, justice, and beneficence. These
facie duties: duties of fidelity (keeping promises, three, I think, can cover all our basic moral duties
telling the truth); reparation (making amends for while simplifying the process of identifying and
a wrongful act); gratitude (acknowledging services weighing obligations. For particular cases, we would
done for us by others); justice (distributing benefits have to specify how, and to what, the principles
and burdens fairly); beneficence (benefiting oth- should be applied, but this process is a necessity for
ers); self-improvement (enhancing our own virtue any theory of general norms. As is the case with all
or intelligence); and non-maleficence (not injur- theories consisting of more than one moral norm,
ing others). 3 More recently, philosophers have the principles will often conflict. As suggested ear-
tended to argue for a smaller set of prima facie lier, the tension is resolved by weighing and balanc-
principles-for example, four (autonomy, justice, ing the prima facie principles to ascertain actual
beneficence, and non-maleficence), or two (justice duties-our "all things considered" obligations.
and beneficence). Respect refers to respect for persons, the guiding
These variations may seem to make the task of value of Kant's theory and other nonconsequen-
developing an acceptable theory fairly complex, tialist theories. Respect is owed all persons equally,
but the job is actually simpler than it might ini- because they have intrinsic worth and dignity
tially appear. First, principles that may seem funda- due to their autonomy-that is, to their capacity
mental can often be subsumed under fewer, more for rational decisions, autonomous action, and
basic principles, with the highest-level principles moral choices. Kant made this pOint by insisting
supporting subordinate ones. Second, the flawed that we must always treat persons as ends in them-
theories of the past have helped us see that the selves, never merely as a means to an end (a tool
moral life is defined by a relatively small number to be used for someone else's purposes). Another
of general norms or core values. We have learned way to express this is to say that, as persons, we
from utilitarianism and other consequentialist theo- have rights-specifically, negative rights, which
ries that any plausible moral theory must take into obligate others not to interfere with our obtain-
account the effects of actions and the demands of ing something. (In my theoretical scheme, posi-
beneficence and non-maleficence, and we have seen tive rights-the rights that obligate others to
in Kant's theory and other nonconsequentialist views help us obtain something-fall under the prin-
the supreme importance of autonomy, rights, and ciple of beneficence.) Persons have the right not
to be treated in certain ways: not to be used or else in a relevantly similar situation. Justice, then,
regarded as if they were mere instruments, and not reflects a central fact about the moral life: morality
to have their autonomous actions and free choices reqUires impartiality. Racial discrimination is con-
thwarted or constrained. The principle of respect trary to justice because it treats one group differ-
therefore would prohibit, among other things, ently than it does another, even though no morally
lying to persons, cheating them, coercing them, relevant differences exist between them.
falsely imprisoning them, and manipulating them. Like the principle of respect, the justice prin-
This principle of respect can accommodate ciple generally overrides concerns about conse-
most of Ross's prima facie duties. It supports what quences. In fact, one of the strongest criticisms
he calls dUties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, and of utilitarianism is that its emphasis on maximiz-
self-improvement. We can view this latter duty as ing happiness or welfare is often at odds with our
an obligation to respect ourselves, to more fully considered moral judgments about justice. Justice
develop those capacities that make us persons. demands equal treatment of persons, but utilitari-
Duties of respect can override the moral weight anism seeks to produce the best balance of good
of an action's consequences. In general, we may not over evil, which mayor may not amount to the
violate the rights of persons, even if the violation equal treatment of equals.
would benefit them or others. We would probably I think the proper way to take consequences
condemn a policy that mandated discrimination into account is through the prima facie principle
against a minority just so the majority could be of beneficence. This prinCiple is about the good and
happy. We would not countenance medical experi- bad effects of actions, the nonmoral consequences
ments on people without their knowledge and of what we do or don't do. It says we have a quali-
consent-even if the experiments were needed to fied duty to benefit others and to avoid causing
search for a cancer cure. them harm. This obligation has three different
. Respect, however, does not always trump util- dimensions: (1) we should not deliberately harm
Ity. It is, after all, a prima facie duty. In some cases others (should not kill, hurt, disable, rob, or terror-
We might be justified in flouting the principle of ize them, for example); (2) we should act to benefit
respect, but we would need very strong reasons to others (to prevent harm or evil, remove harm or
do so. For example, ifby jailing an innocent person evil, and promote good); and (3) we should strive
we could thwart a terrorist attack that would kill a to produce the most favorable balance of good over
~housand people, we would most likely favor jail- evil effects, everyone considered (the utilitarian
Ing the person. From a moral standpoint, the loss standard). It is possible to view these three options
~f.so ~any lives seems far more important than the as separate principles in their own right, but I think
InjUStIce of false imprisonment. that approach would muddle the essential differ-
The prinCiple of justice requires that persons be ence between our first two principles (respect and
treated fairly and that they get what is due them. justice) and beneficence, because the former are
Retributive justice concerns the fair use of pun- not primarily concerned with the consequences of
ishment for wrongdoing. Distributive justice actions, but the latter is.
(what I will focus on here) is about the fair distribu- In some cases we may see that only one ele-
tion of society's benefits and costs (such as income, ment of beneficence is relevant-either Option 1
privileges, taxes, health care, jobs, and public ser- or Option 2. But often both of these options apply,
vice). The essence of this principle is that equals and when considering whether to benefit or not
must be treated equally. A rule that applies to some- to harm persons, we must decide which duty is
one in a particular situation must apply to anyone weightier. Either consideration may override any
obligation to maximize utility. Suppose a physician our health to aid a stranger. Nevertheless I think
wants to try an experimental treatment that might we may have at least a limited obligation to help
cure a patient's disease but will also cause perma- those with whom we have no connection. We
nent damage to her lungs. The overriding principle surely must sometimes have a "duty of rescue"-
would be not to cause such harm, even if the ben- an obligation to try to save a stranger in serious
efit to be gained is substantial. A third possibility peril when we have the wherewithal to do so with-
is that both principles apply and that each duty out extreme risk or cost to ourselves. If we can eas-
comes with costs and benefits. We then must make ily save a drowning man without too much risk or
a utilitarian calculation (Option 3) to determine trouble to ourselves, we may be obligated to do so.
the best solution. And if we have such a duty of rescue, we may have
The prohibition against deliberately harming other duties of beneficence in morally equivalent
others is a common feature in moral theories: inten- circumstances.
tionally harming people is always deemed prima Because my proposed theory consists of princi-
facie wrong. Our duty calls not for some action but ples that are prima facie, conflicts between them are
for not performing an action. In most interactions less of a problem than they are in absolutist views.
with others, we have an implicit duty not to harm Much of the time, weighing and balancing prin-
them, but not necessarily a duty to benefit them or ciples to determine our actual duties is straightfor-
to maximize their welfare. If we are driving a heavy ward, though sometimes difficult. In each situation
truck on a busy highway, for example, our strongest that calls for a moral judgment, the basic pattern of
duty is likely to be to refrain from intentionally or our deliberations is something like this: (1) we dis-
carelessly harming other drivers and pedestrians, cern which principles (respect, justice, and benefi-
but we may not have an obligation to benefit them cence) apply; (2) we weigh them according to their
(by, say, continually yielding the right of way to importance in the case; (3) we determine which
them). And we would not ordinarily have a duty to principle dominates; and (4) we decide what action
maximize their good. best fits with this analysis.
It seems that our duty to benefit others (pre- The most challenging part of this process is
vent harm, remove harm, and promote good) determining the weight of the basic principles.
does not demand that we help all persons. Our Even if we know what those principles are, we
considered moral judgments tell us that we may still have to figure out their relative importance
have an obligation to promote the welfare of our in context. But there is no formula or algorithm
family, friends, and others we are close to, but we to help us with this. Even a rough but firm rank-
do not have an equally strong duty to help the ing of principles-in which, say, respect would
rest of the world. Treating everyone with such always outweigh justice, and justice would
beneficence would not be the fulfillment of a always outweigh beneficence-would be a tre-
duty but the performance of a supererogatory act mendous help. But there is no such formula or
(above the call of duty). We might have a duty to ranking, and there cannot be one, because the
help those in the rest of the world, but that duty relative importance of the principles fluctuates
cannot be as weighty as the one we have to our depending on the details of the case. Sometimes
loved ones. justice may carry the most moral weight, some-
We are also not obliged to make extreme sac- times respect or beneficence.
rifices to help those with whom we have no Our only option is to rely on our reason and
relationship. The principle of beneficence, for experience-that is, our considered moral judg-
example, does not insist that we risk our lives and ments and the theory that provides the perspective
,,\"--~ '
QUICK REVIEW
Self-Evidence
As you can see, my proposed theory appeals at
every turn to our moral common sense. But some
prima facie principle-A principle that applies in people might ask, "Who says our considered judg-
a situation unless exceptions are justified. ments are reliable guides to moral truth? Why
principlism-A moral theory consisting of multi- should we trust common sense to identify the true
ple moral principles that must be weighed and moral principles, especially given that we know
balanced against one another to determine it to be fallible and sometimes unreliable?" For
right actions. example, in response to the claim that utilitarian-
ism conflicts with our moral common sense, some
negative right-A person's right that obligates oth-
ers not to interfere with that person's obtaining
utilitarians have said, in effect, "That's too bad for
something.
common sense."
One facile response to this disparagement of
positive right-A person's right that obligates
common sense is to ask, "Doesn't every theory
others to help that person obtain something.
ultimately rely on common sense? Isn't the utilitar-
retributive justice-The fair use of punishment ian's principle of utility itself founded on common
for wrongdoing. sense, because the principle is not supported by a
distributive justice-The fair distribution of soci- more basic principle?"
ety's benefits and costs (such as income, taxes, But I think a more serious defense of moral com-
jobs, and public service). mon sense and our fundamental moral principles is
self-evident statement-An assertion that a per- possible. I want to argue, as several contemporary
son is justified in believing merely by under- moral theorists do, that many of our basic moral
standing it, such as "No bachelors are married." principles are self-evident. 4 I don't have the space
here to fully defend this claim, but I can point out a
few considerations that support it.
A self-evident statement is one that you
are justified in believing merely by understanding
and insight to these judgments. We must work it. Here are some self-evident assertions: "What-
without a net while trying to grasp at answers, ever has a shape has a size"; "No bachelors are
and we will occasionally fail. But this difficulty of married"; and "If A is larger than B, and B is larger
assigning weight to principles without detailed than C, then A is larger than C." If you under-
instructions is also a feature of other moral theo- stand what these statements mean, then you are
ries. And as discussed earlier, in their search for the justified in believing them, and you need no spe-
best theory to explain a set of data, scientists must cial faculty to discern their truth. You don't need
also decide the importance of divergent criteria- to gather evidence or conduct experiments to
and do it without a precise decision-making for- know them; you know them as soon as you grasp
mula. These judgments are like the ones that a their meaning, whether you understand them
physician makes when diagnosing a disease in a immediately or after long reflection. If some-
particular patient. There are usually rules of thumb one insists that the statement "No bachelors are
to follow, but in the end, the physician must use married" is not true, it is up to him to provide a
her best judgment to arrive at an answer. Such counterexample-to cite a circumstance in which
judgments are not formulaic, but they are rational the statement would not be true. If he cannot,
and far from arbitrary. then he has no reasons supporting his assertion
that the statement is false; his assertion is ground-

less. This is the only kind of response we can make CHAPTER REVIEW
to those who reject beliefs that we consider to be
self-evidently true.
I take it that the following are self-evident SUMMARY
moral beliefs (which are also prima facie moral
A moral theory is an explanation of what makes an
principles):
action right or what makes a person or thing good.
• Equals should be treated equally. Theories concerned with the rightness or wrongness
of actions are known as theories of obligation (or, in this
• It is wrong to punish the innocent. text, simply moral theories). A moral theory is intercon-
nected with considered moral judgments and prindples.
• It is wrong to inflict unnecessary and unde-
Considered moral judgments can shape a theory, and a
served suffering.
theory can shed light on judgments and prindples.
• It is wrong to torture people for fun. The two major types of moral theories are conse-
quentialist and nonconsequentialist. Consequential-
I have come to know these statements in the ist theories say that what makes an action right is its
same way that I come to know nonmoral truths- consequences. Nonconsequentialist theories say that
through reason and reflection, not by any extraordi- the rightness of an action does not depend entirely on its
nary faculties or irrational process. consequences. Consequentialist theories include utili-
As in the case of nonmoral statements, if some- tarianism (both act- and rule-utilitarianism) and ethical
one thinks that "It is wrong to inflict unnecessary egoism; nonconsequentialist theories include Kant's
and undeserved suffering" is not true, it is up to theory, natural law theory, and divine command theory.
her to cite circumstances in which the statement Because not all theories are of equal worth, we
would be false. If she cannot, then her rejection of must try to discover which one is best-a task that we
the principle is unwarranted. can perform by applying the moral criteria of adequacy
If there are self-evident moral truths, it is rea- to theories. The three criteria are (1) consistency with
sonable to expect that some of our prima facie considered moral judgments, (2) consistency with our
principles arising from our considered moral judg- moral experiences, and (3) usefulness in moral prob-
lem solving.
ments are in fact self-evident. Their self-evidence
would explain why we have such confidence in
some moral principles-so much confidence that
I(EY TERMS
moral theory (p. 71)
we would sooner give up a theory that denied
considered moral judgment (p. 72)
those principles than the principles themselves. If
consequentialist theory (p. 73)
at least some of my proposed theory's prima facie
non con sequentia list theory (p. 73)
principles are self-evident, then the theory (and
utilitarianism (p. 74)
theories like it) is on firmer ground than some act-utilitarianism (p. 74)
might think. rule-utilitarianism (p. 74)
The hard truth about moral theorizing is that it ethical egoism (p. 74)
never seems to result in a widely accepted, complete, categorical imperative (p. 74)
or unblemished theory. My proposal is no exception Kant's theory (p. 74)
to the rule. But it does have the advantage of incor- natural law theory (p. 75)
porating what I regard as the most manifest and least divine command theory (p. 75)
questionable elements of the moral life. prima facie principle (p. 82)
principlism (p. 83) some combination of both? What reasons do

negative right (p. 83) you have for adopting this particular approach?
positive right (p. 83) 5. Give an example of a possible conflict between
retributive justice (p. 84) a consequentialist theory and a considered
distributive justice (p. 84) moral judgment. (Show how these two may be
self-evident statement (p. 86) inconsistent.)
6. Provide an example of a conflict between a
nonconsequentialist theory and a moral judgment
EXERCISES based on the consequences of an action.
7. Using the moral criteria of adequacy, evaluate
Review Questions
act-utilitarianism.
1. Is a moral theory the final authority in moral 8. Using the moral criteria of adequacy, evaluate
reasoning? Why or why not? (p. 72) natural law theory.
2. What is the difference between a moral theory
and a moral code? (p. 72)
3. How can a moral theory be used in a moral ETHICAL DILEMMAS
argument? (p. 72) 1. Suppose your friend puts forth several
4. What is a considered moral judgment? (p. 72) arguments in an effort to convince you
5. What are the two main categories of moral that all abortions are morally wrong. You
theories? (p. 73) already have strong views to the contrary,
6. What is utilitarianism? ethical egoism? and you know she is a member of an anti-
(p.74) abortion group that advocates violence.
7. According to Kant's moral theory, what makes In light of these facts, should you dismiss her
an action right? (pp. 74-75) arguments out of hand? Why or why not?
8. What are the three moral criteria of adequacy? What would constitute a good reason for
(pp.77-80) rejecting her arguments?
2. You believe that all illegal immigrants
should be deported. You have no reasons
Discussion Questions for believing this; you were simply taught
1. Do you try to guide your moral choices with to believe it by your parents. Is it morally
a moral code or a moral theory, or both? If right for you to adhere to such a view without
so, how? good reasons? Do you have a moral duty to
2. Suppose you try to use the Ten Commandments apply critical reasoning to your belief? Why
as a moral code to help you make moral decisions. or why not?
How would you resolve conflicts between 3. Your grandmother is near death in the hospital,
commandments? Does your approach to resolving barely conscious but in great pain. She has
the conflicts imply a moral theory? If so, can you terminal cancer, and her medical team assures
explain the main idea behind the theory? you that she may linger in this state for a week
3. What considered moral judgments have you at most but will never recover. A year ago she
made or appealed to in the past month? Do made you promise that no matter how much
you think that these judgments reflect a moral she suffers, you are not to allow anyone to
principle or moral theory you implicitly appeal shorten her life by removing her ventilator or
to? If so, what is it? by letting her doctors administer "terminal
4. Would you describe your approach to morality sedation"-medication that relieves pain while
as consequentialist, nonconsequentialist, or slowly ending life (a legal form of euthanasia).
You can hardly bear to see her in such agony. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930; reprint,
Should you keep your promise to her and ensure London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956).
that she lingers in horrible suffering, or should Peter Catapano and Simon Critchley, eds., Modem Ethics
you break your promise and request terminal in 77 Arguments (New York: W.W. Norton, 2017).
sedation or removal of all life support? John Hospers, Human Conduct: Problems of Ethics,
shorter ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1972).
FURTHER READING James Rachels, ed., Ethical Theory 1: The Question of
John D. Arras and Nancy K. Rhoden, "The Need for Ethi- Objectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
cal Theory," in Ethical Issues in Modem Medicine, 3rd ed. John Rawls, "Some Remarks about Moral Theory," in
(Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1989). A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problems of NomlCl- University Press, Belknap Press, 1999).
tive and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Russ Shafer-Landau, Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?
Hall, 1959). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
PART
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3 ~~----------
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Theories of Morality
i
L
CHAPTER 5
Consequentialist Theories: Maximize the Good
There is something in consequentialist moral theo- advance one's own interests regardless of how oth-
ries that we find appealing, something simple and ers are affected. Self-interested acts promote one's
commonsensical that jibes with everyday moral own interests but not necessarily to the detriment
experience. This attractive core is the notion that of others. To further your own interests you may
right actions must produce the best balance of good actually find yourself helping others. To gain some
over evil. Never mind (for now) how good and evil advantage, you may perform actions that are decid-
are defined. The essential concern is how much edly unselfish.
good can result from actions performed. In this Just as we cannot equate ethical egoism with
chapter, we examine the plausibility of this conse- selfishness, neither can we assume it is synony-
quentialist maxim and explore how it is worked out mous with self-indulgence or recklessness. An ethi-
in its two most influential theories: ethical egoism cal egoist does not necessarily do whatever she
and utilitarianism. desires to do or whatever gives her the most imme-
diate pleasure. She does what is in her best interests,
ETHICAL EGOISM and instant gratification may not be in her best
interests. She may want to spend all her money at
Ethical egoism is the theory that the right action is the casino or work eighteen hours a day, but over
the one that advances one's own best interests. It the long haul doing so may be disastrous for her.
is a provocative doctrine, in part because it forces Even ethical egoists have to consider the long-term
us to consider two opposing attitudes in ourselves. effects of their actions. They also have to take in to
On the one hand, we tend to view selfish or fla- account their interactions with others. At least
grantly self-interested behavior as wicked, or at most of the time, egoists are probably better off
least troubling. Self-love is bad love. We frown on if they cooperate with others, develop reciprocal
people who trample others in life to get to the head relationships, and avoid actions that antagonize
of the line. On the other hand, sometimes we want people in their community or society.
to look out for number one, to give priority to our Ethical egoism comes in two forms-one apply-
own needs and desires. We think, If we do not help ing the doctrine to individual acts and one to rele-
ourselves, who will? Self-love is good love. vant rules. Act-egoism says that to determine right
Ethical egoism says that one's only moral duty action, you must apply the egoistic principle to
is to promote the most favorable balance of good individual acts. Act A is preferable to act B because
over evil for oneself. Each person must put his or it promotes your self-interest better. Rule-egoism
her own welfare first. Advancing the interests of says that to determine right action, you must see
others is part of this moral equation only if it helps if an act falls under a rule that if consistently fol-
promote one's own good. Yet this extreme self- lowed would maximize your self-interest. Act A is
interest is not necessarily selfishness. Selfish acts preferable to act B because it falls under a rule that
93
94 0 PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY
maximizes your self-interest better than any other them is an old memo from the president of a com-
relevant rule applying to act B. An ethical egoist can pany where Vincent used to work. In it, the presi-
define self-interest in various ways. The Greek phi- dent lambastes Vincent for botching an important
losopher Epicurus (341-270 B.C.E.), a famous ethi- company project. Rosa knows that despite what she
cal egoist from whose name we derive the words reads in the memo, Vincent has had an exemplary
epicure and epicurean, gave a hedonist answer: The professional career in which he has managed most
greatest good is pleasure, and the greatest evil, of his projects extremely well. In fact, she believes
pain. The duty of a good ethical egoist is to maxi- that the two of them are about equal in professional
mize pleasure for oneself. (Contrary to legend, Epi- skills and accomplishments. She also knows that
curus thought that wanton overindulgence in the if management sees the memo, they will almost
delights of the senses was not in one's best inter- certainly choose her over Vincent for the VP posi-
ests. He insisted that the best pleasures were those tion. She figures that Vincent has probably left the
of the contemplative life and that extravagant plea- documents there by mistake and will soon return to
sures such as drunkenness and gluttony eventually retrieve them. Impulsively, she makes a copy of the
lead to misery.) Other egoistic notions of the great- memo for herself.
est good include self-actualization (fulfilling one's Now she is confronted with a moral choice. Let
potential), security and material success, satisfac- us suppose that she has only three options. First, she
tion of desires, acquisition of power, and the expe- can destroy her copy of the memo and forget about
rience of happiness. the whole incident. Second, she can discredit Vin-
To many people, ethical egoism may sound cent by showing it to management, thereby secur-
alien, especially if they have heard all their lives ing the VP slot for herself. Third, she can achieve
about the noble virtue of altruism and the evils of the same result by discrediting Vincent surrepti-
self-centeredness. But consider that self-interest is tiously: she can simply leave a copy where manage-
a pillar on which the economic system of capital- ment is sure to discover it. Let us also assume that
ism is built. In a capitalist system, self-interest is she is an act-egoist who defines her self-interest as
supposed to drive people to seek advantages for self-actualization. Self-actualization for her means
themselves in the marketplace, compelling them developing into the most powerful, most highly
to compete against one another to build a better respected executive in her profession while maxi-
mousetrap at a lower price. Economists argue that mizing the virtues of loyalty and honesty.
the result of this clash of self-interests is a better, So, by the lights of her act-egOism, what should
more prosperous society. Rosa do? Which choice is in her best interests?
Option 1 is neutral regarding her self-interest. If
Applying the Theory she destroys her copy of the memo, she will neither
Suppose Rosa is a successful executive at a large gain nor lose an advantage for herself. Option 2
media corporation, and she has her eye on a vice is more complicated. If she overtly discredits Vin-
president's pOSition, which has just become vacant. cent, she will probably land the VP spot-a feat
Vincent, another successful executive in the com- that fits nicely with her desire to become a powerful
pany, also wants the VP job. Management wants executive. But such a barefaced sabotaging of some-
to fill the vacancy as soon as pOSSible, and they are one else's career will probably trouble manage-
trying to decide between the two most qualified ment, and their loss of some respect for Rosa will
candidates-Rosa and Vincent. One day Rosa dis- impede future advancement in her career. They
covers some documents left near a photocopier and may also come to distrust her. Rosa's backstabbing
quickly realizes that they belong to Vincent. One of will also probably erode the trust and respect of her
CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES: MAXIMIZE THE GOOD 0 95
subordinates (those who report to her). If so, their like it): People should be honest in their dealings
performance may suffer, and any deficiencies in with others-that is, except in insignificant matters
Rosa's subordinates will reflect on her leadership (white lies), they should not lie to others or mislead
skills. Over time, she may be able to regain the them. She believes that adhering to this prohibi-
respect of management through dazzling successes tion against dishonesty is in her best interests. The
in her field, but the respect and trust of others may rule, however, disallows Options 2 and 3, for they
be much harder to regain. Option 2 involves the involve significant deception. Only Option 1 is left.
unauthorized, deceitful use of personal informa- But if obeying the rule will lead to a major setback
tion against another person-not an action that for her interests, Rosa may decide to ignore it in this
encourages the virtue of honesty in Rosa. In fact, case (or reject it altogether as contrary to the spirit
her dishonesty may weaken her moral resolve of ethical egoism). If so, she may have to fall back to
and make similar acts of deceit more probable. act-egoism and decide in favor of Option 3.
Like Option 2, Option 3 will probably secure the
VP job for Rosa. But because the deed is surrepti- Evaluating the Theory
tious, it will probably not diminish the respect and Is ethical egoism a plausible moral theory? Let us
trust of others. There is a low probability, however, find out by examining arguments in its favor and
that Rosa's secret will eventually be uncovered- applying the moral criteria of adequacy.
especially if Vincent suspects Rosa, which is likely. The primary argument for ethical egoism
If she is found out, the damage done to her reputa- depends heavily on a scientific theory known as
tion (and possibly her career) may be greater than psychological egoism, the view that the motive
that caused by the more up-front tactic of Option 2. for all our actions is self-interest. Whatever we do,
Also like Option 2, Option 3 may weaken the virtue we do because we want to promote our own wel-
of honesty in Rosa's character. fare. Psychological egoism, we are told, is simply a
Given this situation and Rosa's brand of act- description of the true nature of our motivations.
egoism, she should probably go with Option 3- We are, in short, born to look out for number one.
but only if the risk of being found out is extremely Putting psychological egoism to good use, the
low. Option 3 promotes her self-interest dramati- ethical egoist reasons as follows: We can never be
cally by securing the coveted job at a relatively low morally obligated to perform an action that we can-
cost (a possible erosion of virtue). Option 2 also not possibly do. This is just an obvious fact about
lands the job but at a very high cost-a loss of other morality. Because we are not able to prevent a hur-
people's trust and respect, a possible decrease in ricane from blasting across a coastal city, we are not
her chances for career advancement, damage to her morally obligated to prevent it. Likewise, because we
professional reputation, and a likely lessening of a are not able to perform an action except out of self-
virtue critical to Rosa's self-actualization (honesty). interest (the claim of psychological egoism), we are
If Rosa believes that the risks to her career and not morally obligated to perform an action unless
character involved in Options 2 and 3 are too high, motivated by self-interest. That is, we are morally
she should probably choose Option 1. This choice obligated to do only what our self-interest motivates
will not promote her best interests, but it will not us to do. Here is the argument stated more formally:
diminish them either.
Would Rosa's action be any different if judged 1. We are not able to perform an action except out
from the perspective of rule-egoism? Suppose Rosa, of self-interest (psychological egoism).
like many other ethical egoists, thinks that her 2. We are not morally obligated to perform an
actions should be guided by this rule (or something action unless motivated by self-interest.
3. Therefore, we are morally obligated to do only a life. Our actions, no matter how we characterize
what our self-interest motivates us to do. them, are all about self-interest.
This argument is based on a conceptual confu-
Notice that even if psychological egoism is true, sion. It says that we perform selfless acts to achieve
this argument does not establish that an action is satisfaction. Satisfaction is the object of the whole
right if and only if it promotes one's self-interest exercise. But if we experience satisfaction in per-
(the claim of ethical egoism). But it does demon- forming an action, that does not show that our
strate that an action cannot be right unless it at goal in performing the action is satisfaction. A
least promotes one's self-interest. To put it another much more plausible account is that we desire
way, an action that does not advance one's own something other than satisfaction and then expe-
welfare cannot be right. rience satisfaction as a result of getting what we
Is psychological egoism true? Many people desired. Consider, for example, our man who saves
think it is, and they offer several arguments in its the child from a fire. He rescues the child and feels
favor. One line of reasoning is that psychological satisfaction-but he could not have experienced
egoism is true because experience shows that all that satisfaction unless he already had a desire to
our actions are in fact motivated by self-interest. In save the child or cared what happened to her. If he
other words, all our actions-including seemingly did not have such a desire or care about her, how
altruistic ones-are performed to gain some benefit could he have derived any satisfaction from his
for ourselves. This argument, however, is far from actions? To experience satisfaction he had to have
conclusive. Sometimes people do perform altruistic a desire for something other than his own satisfac-
acts because doing so is in their best interests. Smith tion. The moral of the story is that satisfaction is
may contribute to charity because such generos- the result of getting what we want-not the object
ity furthers his political ambitions. jones may do of our desires.
volunteer work for the Red Cross because it looks This view fits well with our own experience.
good on her resume. But people also seem to do Most often when we act according to some pur-
things that are not motivated by self-interest. They pose, we are not focused on, or aware of, our sat-
sometimes risk their lives by rushing into a burning isfaction. We concentrate on obtaining the real
building to rescue a complete stranger. They may object of our efforts, and when we succeed, we then
impair their health by donating a kidney to prevent feel satisfaction.
one of their children from dying. Explanations that The philosopher Joel Feinberg makes a similar
appeal to self-interest in such cases seem implau- point about the pursuit of happiness. He asks us
sible. Moreover, people often have self-destructive to imagine a person, jones, who has no desire for
habits (for example, drinking excessively and driv- much of anything-except happiness. Jones has no
ing recklessly)-habits that are unlikely to be in interest in knowledge for its own sake, the beauty of
anyone's best interests. nature, art and literature, sports, crafts, or business.
Some ethical egoists may argue in a slightly dif- But Jones does have "an overwhelming passion for,
ferent vein: People get satisfaction (or happiness a complete preoccupation with, his own happiness.
or pleasure) from what they do, including their The one desire of his life is to be happy."l The irony
so-called unselfish or altruistic acts. Therefore, is that using this approach, jones will not find hap-
they perform unselfish or altruistic actions because piness. He cannot pursue happiness directly and
doing so gives them satisfaction. A man saves a expect to find it. To achieve happiness, he must
child from a burning building because he wants pursue other aims whose pursuit yields happiness
the emotional satisfaction that comes from saving as a by-product. We must conclude that it is not the
CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENTIAlIST THEORIES: MAXIMIZE THE GOOD 0 97
,,\"-
~
Can Ethical Egoism Be Advocated?
Some critics of ethical egoism say that it is a very Such advice has been satirized on national TV. AI
strange theory because its adherents cannot urge Franken, a former writer for Saturday Night Live
others to become ethical egoists! The philosopher and author of Rush Limbaugh Is a Big Fat Idiot
Theodore Schick Jr. makes the point: and Other Observations, proclaimed on a number
of Saturday Night Live shows in the early 1980s
Even if ethical egoism did provide necessary and that whereas the 1970s were known as the "me"
sufficient conditions for an action's being right, it decade, the 1980s were going to be known as the
would be a peculiar sort of ethical theory, for its "AI Franken" decade. So whenever anyone was
adherents couldn't consistently advocate it. Sup- faced with a difficult decision, the individual should
pose that someone came to an ethical egoist for ask herself, "How can I most benefit AI Franken?"*
moral advice. If the ethical egoist wanted to do
what is in his best interest, he would not tell his *Theodore Schick Jr., in Doing Philosophy: An
client to do what is in her best interest because Introduction through Thought Experiments, by The-
her interests might conflict with his. Rather, he odore Schick Jr. and Lewis Vaughn, 2nd ed. (Boston:
would tell her to do what is in his best interest. McGraw-Hili, 2003), 327.
case that our only motivation for our actions is the against it, and therefore it does not tell us anything
desire for happiness (or satisfaction or pleasure). about self-interested actions. Anything we say
These reflections show that psychological ego- about such actions would be consistent with the
ism is a dubious theory, and if we construe self- theory. Any theory that is so uninformative could
interest as satisfaction, pleasure, or happiness, the not be used to support another theory-including
theory seems false. Still, some may not give up the ethical egoism.
argument from experience (mentioned earlier), So far we have found the arguments for ethi-
insisting that when properly interpreted, all our cal egOism ineffective. Now we can ask another
actions (including those that seem purely altruis- question: Are there any good arguments against
tic or unselfish) can be shown to be motivated by ethical egoism? This is where the moral criteria of
self-interest. All the counterexamples that seem to adequacy come in.
suggest that psychological egoism is false actually Recall that an important first step in evaluating a
are evidence that it is true. Smith's contributing to moral theory (or any other kind of theory) is to deter-
charity may look altruistic, but he is really trying to mine if it meets the minimum requirement of coher-
impress a woman he would like to date. Jones's vol- ence, or internal consistency. As it turns out, some
unteer work at the Red Cross may seem unselfish, critics of ethical egoism have brought the charge of
but she is just trying to cultivate some bUSiness con- logical or practical inconsistency against the theory.
tacts. Every counterexample can be reinterpreted to But in general these criticisms seem to fall short of a
support the theory. knockout blow to ethical egoism. Devising counter-
Critics have been quick to charge that this arguments that can undercut the criticisms seems to
way of defending psychological egoism is a misbe a straightforward business. Let us assume, then,
take. It renders the theory untestable and useless. that ethical egoism is in fact eligible for evaluation
It ensures that no evidence could pOssibly count using the moral criteria of adequacy.
We begin with Criterion 1, consistency with But it has been accused of another defect as well:
considered moral judgments. A major criticism of it fails Criterion 2, consistency with our moral
ethical egoism is that it is not consistent with many experiences.
of our considered moral judgments-judgments One aspect of morality is so fundamental that
that seem highly plausible and commonsensi- we may plaUSibly view it as a basic fact of the moral
cal. Specifically, ethical egOism seems to sanction life: moral impartiality, or treating equals equally.
actions that we would surely regard as abominable. We know that in our dealings with the world, we
Suppose a young man visits his elderly, bedridden are supposed to take into account the treatment of
father. When he sees that no one else is around, he others as well as that of ourselves. The moral life is
uses a pillow to smother the old man in order to lived with the wider world in mind. We must give
collect on his life insurance. Suppose, too, that the all persons their due and treat all equals equally,
action is in the son's best interests; it will not cause for in the moral sense we are all equals. Each per-
the least bit of unpleasant feeling in him, and the son is presumed to have the same rights as-and
crime will remain his own terrible secret. According to have interests that are just as important as those
to ethical egoism, this heinous act is morally right. of-everyone else, unless we have good reason for
The son has done his duty. thinking otherwise. If one person is qualified for
An ethical egoist might object to this line by a job, and another person is equally qualified, we
saying that refraining from committing evil acts is would be guilty of discrimination if we hired one
actually endorsed by ethical egoism-one's best and not the other based solely on race, sex, skin
interests are served by refraining. You should not color, or ancestry. These factors are not morally
murder or steal, for example, because it might relevant. People who do treat equals unequally in
encourage others to do the same to you, or it might such ways are known as racists, seXists, bigots, and
undermine trust, security, or cooperation in society, the like. Probably the most serious charge against
which would not be in your best interests. For these ethical egoism is that it discriminates against people
reasons, you should obey the law or the rules of con- in the same fashion. It arbitrarily treats the interests
ventional morality (as the rule-egOist might do). of some people (oneself) as more important than
But following the rules is clearly not always the interests of all others (the rest of the world)-
in one's best interests. Sometimes committing a even though there is no morally relevant difference
wicked act really does promote one's own welfare. between the two.
In the case of the murdering son, no one will seek The failure of ethical egoism to treat equals
revenge for the secret murder, cooperation and equally seems a serious defect in the theory. It con-
trust in SOCiety will not be affected, and the mur- flicts with a major component of our moral exis-
derer will suffer no psychological torments. There tence. For many critics, this single defect is enough
seems to be no downside here-but the son's reason to reject the theory.
rewards for committing the deed will be great. Con- Recall that Criterion 3 is usefulness in moral
sistently looking out for one's own welfare some- problem solving. Some philosophers argue that
times requires rule violations and exceptions. In ethical egoism fails this standard because the the-
fact, some argue that the interests of ethical egOists ory seems to lead to contradictory advice or con-
may be best served when they urge everyone else to flicting actions. If real, this problem constitutes a
obey the rules while they themselves secretly break significant failing of the theory. But this criticism
them. depends on controversial assumptions about ethi-
If ethical egoism does conflict with our consid- cal egoism or morality in general, so we will not
ered moral judgments, it is questionable at best. dwell on it here. Our analysiS of ethical egoism's
man with no living relatives and no friends-

someone who would not be missed. Through some
QUICI< REVIEW
elaborate subterfuge she manages to secretly do
act-egoism-The theory that to determine right what needs to be done, killing the man and suc-
action, you must apply the egoistic principle to cessfully performing the operation. She formulates
individual acts. the cure and saves countless lives. No one ever dis-
covers how she obtained the last bit of information
rule-egoism-The theory that to determine right
action, you must see if an act falls under a rule she needed to devise the cure, and she feels not the
that, if consistently followed, would maximize slightest guilt for her actions.
your self-interest. Did Dr. X do right? If you think so, then you
may be a utilitarian. A utilitarian is more likely
psychological egoism-The view that the motive
to believe that Dr. X's action was right because of
for all our actions is self-interest.
its consequences: it brought about consequences
that were more good than bad. One man died,
but countless others were saved. If you think that
Dr. X did wrong, you may be a nonconsequentialist.
problems using the first two criteria should be suf- A nonconsequentialist is likely to believe that Dr. X
ficient to raise serious doubts about the theory. did wrong because of the nature of her action: it was
murder. The consequences are beside the pOint.
In this example, we get a hint of some of the
UTILITARIANISM
elements that have made utilitarianism so attrac-
Are you a utilitarian? To find out, consider the fol- tive (and often controversial) to so many. First,
lowing scenario: After years of research, a medical whether or not we agree with the utilitarian view
scientist-Dr. X-realizes that she is just one step in this case, we can see that it has some plausibil-
away from developing a cure for all known forms of ity. We tend to think it entirely natural to judge
heart disease. Such a breakthrough would save hun- the morality of an action by the effects that it has
dreds of thousands of lives-perhaps millions. The on the people involved. To decide if we do right or
world could finally be rid of heart attacks, strokes, wrong, we want to know whether the consequences
heart failure, and the like, a feat as monumental as of our actions are good or bad, whether they bring
the eradication of deadly smallpox. That one last pleasure or pain, whether they enhance or dimin-
step in her research, however, is technologically ish the welfare of ourselves and others. Second,
feasible but morally problematic. It involves the the utilitarian formula for distinguishing right and
killing of a single healthy human being to examine wrong actions seems exceptionally straightforward.
the person's heart tissue under a microscope just We simply calculate which action among several
seconds after the heart stops beating. The crucial possible actions has the best balance of good over
piece of information needed to perfect the cure evil, everyone considered-and act accordingly.
can be acquired only as just described; it cannot be Moral choice is apparently reduced to a single
extracted from the heart of a cadaver, an accident moral principle and simple math. Third, at least
victim, someone suffering from a disease, or a per- sometimes, we all seem to be utilitarians. We may
son who has been dead for more than sixty seconds. tell a white lie because the truth would hurt some-
Dr. X decides that the benefits to humanity from one's feelings. We may break a promise because
the cure are just too great to ignore. She locates a keeping it causes more harm than good. We may
suitable candidate for the operation: a homeless want a criminal punished not because he broke
the law but because the punishment may deter happiness of the party whose interest is in ques-
him from future crimes. We justify such departures tion: or, what is the same thing in other words, to
from conventional morality on the grounds that promote or to oppose that happiness ....
they produce better consequences. By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
Utilitarianism is one of the most influential
pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the pres-
moral theories in history. The English philosopher ent case comes to the same thing) or (what comes
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was the first to fill again to the same thing) to prevent the happening
out the theory in detail, and the English philoso- of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party
pher and economist John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) whose interest is considered[.J 2
developed it further. In their hands utilitarianism
The principle of utility, of course, makes the
became a powerful instrument of social reform. It
provided a rationale for promoting women's rights, theory consequentialist. The emphasis on happi-
improving the treatment of prisoners, advocating ness or pleasure makes it hedonistic, for happiness
animal rights, and aiding the poor-all radical ideas is the only intrinsic good.
As you can see, there is a world of difference
in Bentham's and Mill's day. In the twenty-first
between the moral focus of utilitarianism (in all
century, the theory still has a strong effect on moral
its forms) and that of ethical egoism. The point
~nd policy deCision making in many areas, includ-
of ethical egoism is to promote one's own good.
Ing health care, criminal justice, and government.
An underlying tenet of utilitarianism is that you
Classic utilitarianism-the kind of act-utili-
tarianism formulated by Bentham-is the simplest should promote the good of everyone cOllcerned
and that everyone counts equally. When deliberat-
f?rm of the theory. It affirms the principle that the
nght action is the one that directly produces the ing about which action to perform, you must take
best balance of happiness over unhappiness for all into account the happiness of everyone who will be
affected by your decision as well as your own-and
concerned. Happiness is an intrinsic good-the only
no one is to be given privileged status. Such even-
intrinsic good. What matters most is how much
handedness requires a large measure of impartial-
net. happiness comes directly from performing an
ity, a quality that plays a role in every plausible
actIon (as opposed to following a rule that applies
moral theory. Mill says it best:
to such actions). To determine the right action, we
need only compute the amount of happiness that [T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian stan-
each possible action generates and choose the one dard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's
that generates the most. There are no rules to take own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between
in~o ~ccount-just the single, simple utilitarian his own happiness and that of others, utilitarian-
ism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
pnnCIple. Each set of circumstances calling for a
disinterested and benevolent spectator.]
moral chOice is unique, requiring a new calculation
of the varying consequences of possible actions. In classic act-utilitarianism, knowing how to
• Be~tham called the utilitarian principle the total the amount of utility, or happiness, gener-
principle of utility and asserted that all our ated by various actions is essential. Bentham's
actions can be judged by it. (Mill called it the great- answer to this requirement is the hedonic calcU-
est happiness prinCiple.) As Bentham says, lus, which quantifies happiness and handles the
By the principle of utility is meant that principle necessary calculations. His approach is straight-
which approves or disapproves of every action forward in conception but complicated in the
~hatsoever, according to the tendency which details: For each possible action in a particular sit-
It appears to have to augment or diminish the uation, determine the total amount of happiness
CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENTIAlIST THEORIES: MAXIMIZE THE GOOD 0 101
or unhappiness produced by it for one individual that happiness can vary in quantity and quality.
(that is, the net happiness-happiness minus There are lower pleasures, such as eating, drink-
unhappiness). Gauge the level of happiness with ing, and having sex, and there are higher pleasures,
seven basic characteristics such as intensity, dura- such as pursuing knowledge, appreciating beauty,
tion, and fecundity (how likely the pleasure or and creating art. The higher pleasures are superior
pain is to be followed by more pleasure or pain). to the lower ones. The lower ones can be intense
Repeat this process for all individuals involved and enjoyable, but the higher ones are qualitatively
and sum their happiness or unhappiness to arrive better and more fulfilling. In this scheme, a person
at an overall net happiness for that particular enjoying a mere taste of a higher pleasure may be
action. Repeat for each possible action. The action closer to the moral ideal than a hedonistic glutton
with the best score (the most happiness or least who gorges on lower pleasures. Thus Mill declared,
unhappiness) is the morally right one. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a
Notice that in this arrangement, only the total pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than
amount of net happiness for each action matters. a fool satisfied."s In Bentham's view, the glutton-
How the happiness is distributed among the per- who acquires a larger quantity of pleasure-would
sons involved does not figure into the calculations. be closer to the ideal.
This means that an action that affects ten people The problem for Mill is to justify his hierarchi-
and produces 100 units of happiness is to be pre- cal ranking of the various pleasures. He tries to do
ferred over an action that affects those same ten so by appealing to what the majority prefers-that
people but generates only SO units of happiness- is, the majority of people who have experienced
even if most of the 100 units go to just one individ- both the lower and higher pleasures. But this
ual, and the SO units divide equally among the ten. approach probably will not help, because people
The aggregate of happiness is decisive; its distri- can differ drastically in how they rank pleasures. It
bution is not. Classic utilitarianism, though, does is pOSSible, for example, that a majority of people
ask that any given amount of happiness be spread who have experienced a range of pleasures would
among as many people as possible-thus the utili- actually disagree with Mill's rankings. In fact, any
tarian slogan "The greatest happiness for the great- effort to devise such rankings using the principle of
est number." utility seems unlikely to succeed.
Both Bentham and Mill define happiness as Many critics have argued that the idea of
pleasure. In Mill's words, defining right action in terms of some intrinsic
The creed which accepts as the foundation of mor-
nonmoral good (whether pleasure, happiness, or
als utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that anything else) is seriously problematic. Attempts
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote to devise such a definition have been fraught with
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse complications-a major one being that people
of happiness. By "happiness" is intended pleasure, and have different ideas about what things are intrin-
the absence of pain; by 14 unhappiness," pain, and the sically valuable. Some utilitarians have tried to
privation of pleasure." sidestep these difficulties by insisting that maxi-
They differ, though, on the nature of happiness mizing utility means maximizing people's prefer-
and on how it should be measured. Bentham thinks ences, whatever they are. This formulation seems
that happiness varies only in quantity-different to avoid some of the difficulties just mentioned
actions produce different amounts of happiness. but falls prey to another: some people's prefer-
To judge the intensity, duration, or fecundity of ences may be clearly objectionable when judged by
happiness is to calculate its quantity. Mill contends almost any moral standard, whether utilitarian or
=--
~
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Happiness and the "Experience Machine"
According to utilitarianism, happiness is the only know that you're there; you'll think it's all actually
intrinsic good, the only quality that ultimately mat- happening. *
ters in our lives. If we ask people what makes life While hooked up to such a machine, you could
meaningful, they are likely to answer "happiness." live a life of supreme happiness, and if you do,
But many philosophers demur; they would say, in what else could matter? Nozick's thought experi-
effect, that happiness isn't everything. One of the ment suggests that there's more to a good life than
thinkers that has raised doubts about the primacy just having experiences, including the experience
of happiness in life is the Harvard philosopher of happiness. According to him, we don't just want
Robert Nozick (1938-2002). In a famous thought to have certain experiences, we want our lives to
experiment, he asks us to imagine an "experience be real: we want to do certain things, not just have
machine" that could give us any experience we the experience of doing them; we want be a cer-
desired: tain way, to be a certain kind of person; we want
Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate to live our own lives for ourselves in actual contact
your brain so that you would think and feel you with reality. Happiness may be an important part
were writing a great novel, or making a friend, of a good life, but it's not the only important part.
or reading an interesting book. All the time you Would you be willing to plug yourself into the
would be floating in a tank, with electrodes experience machine for two years or longer? Why
attached to your brain. Should you plug into
or why not? Which would you prefer-a life in the
this machine for life, preprogramming your life's
experiences? If you are worried about missing out experience machine in which you imagine yourself
on desirable experiences, we can suppose that doing all sorts of enjoyable things, or a real life in
business enterprises have researched thoroughly the real world actually doing those same enjoyable
the lives of many others. You can pick and choose things? And which of these two scenarios would
from their large library or smorgasbord of such you choose if, while living the real life and doing
experiences, selecting your life's experiences for, enjoyable things, you also had occasional hardships
say, the next two years. After two years have and disappointments?
passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out
of the tank, to select the experiences of your next *Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New
two years. Of course, while in the tank you won't York: Basic Books, 1974),42.
nonconsequentialist. Some people, after all, have it maintains that we travel an indirect route to that
ghastly preferences-preferences, say, for torturing goal. In rule-utilitarianism, the morally right action
children or killing innocent people for fun. Some is not the one that directly brings about the greatest
critics say that repairing this preference utilitari- good, but the one covered by a rule that, if followed
anism to avoid sanctioning objectionable actions consistently, produces the greatest good for all. In
seems unlikely without introducing some nonutili- act-utilitarianism, we must examine each action
tarian moral principles such as justice, rights, and to see how much good (or evil) it generates. Rule-
obligations. utilitarianism would have us first determine what
Like act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism aims rule an action falls under, then see if that rule would
at the greatest good for all affected individuals, but be likely to maximize utility if everyone followed it.
In effect, the rule-utilitarian asks, "What if every- developing country, killing hundreds of innocent
one followed this rule?" men, women, and children. He seems unstoppa-
An act-utilitarian tries to judge the rightness of ble. He always manages to elude capture. In fact,
actions by the consequences they produce, occa- because of his stealth, the expert assistance of a few
sionally relying on "rules of thumb" (such as "Usu- accomplices, and his support among the general
ally we should not harm innocents") merely to save population, he will most likely never be captured or
time. A rule-utilitarian, however, tries to follow killed. The authorities have no idea where he hides
every valid rule-even if doing so may not maxi- or where he will strike next. But they are sure that
mize utility in a specific situation. he will go on killing indefinitely. They have tried
In our example featuring Dr. X and the cure every tactic they know to put an end to the slaugh-
for heart disease, an act-utilitarian might compare ter, but it goes on and on. Finally, as a last resort,
the net happiness produced by performing the the chief of the nation's antiterrorist police orders
lethal operation and by not performing it, opting the arrest of the terrorist's family-a wife and seven
finally for the former because it maximizes happi- children. The chief intends to kill the wife and
ness. A rule-utilitarian, on the other hand, would three of the children right away (to show that he
consider what moral rules seem to apply to the situ- is serious), then threaten to kill the remaining four
ation. One rule might be "It is permissible to con- unless the terrorist turns himself in. There is no
duct medical procedures or experiments on people doubt that the chief will make good on his inten-
without their full knowledge and consent in order tions, and there is excellent reason to believe that
to substantially advance medical science." Another the terrorist will indeed turn himself in rather than
one might say "Do not conduct medical procedures allow his remaining children to be executed.
or experiments on people without their full knowl- Suppose that the chief has only two options:
edge and consent." If the first rule is generally (1) refrain from murdering the terrorist's family
followed, happiness is not likely to be maximized and continue with the usual antiterrorist tactics
in the long run. Widespread adherence to this rule (which have only a tiny chance of being success-
would encourage medical scientists and physicians ful); or (2) kill the wife and three of the children
to murder patients for the good of science. Such and threaten to kill the rest (a strategy with a very
practices would outrage people and cause them to high chance of success). According to utilitarian-
fear and distrust science and the medical profes- ism, which action is right?
sion, leading to the breakdown of the entire health As an act-utilitarian, the chief might reason like
care system and most medical research. But if the this: Action 2 would probably result in a net gain of
second rule is consistently adhered to, happiness is happiness, everyone considered. Forcing the terror-
likely to be maximized over the long haul. Trust in ist to turn himself in would save hundreds of lives.
physicians and medical scientists would be main- His killing spree would be over. The general level
tained, and promising research could continue as of fear and apprehension in the country might sub-
long as it was conducted with the patient's consent. side, and even the economy-which has slowed
The right action, then, is for Dr. X not to perform because of terrorism-might improve. The pres-
the gruesome operation. tige of the antiterrorism chief and his agents might
increase. On the downside, performing Action 2
Applying the Theory would guarantee that four innocent people (and
Let us apply utilitarianism to another type of perhaps eight) would lose their lives, and the terror-
case. Imagine that for more than a year a terrorist (whose welfare must also be included in the cal-
ist has been carrying out devastating attacks in a culations) would be imprisoned for life or executed.
=--
~
"~ Peter Singer, Utilitarian
The distinguished philosopher Peter Singer is argu- instead between persons and non-persons. Persons
ably the most famous (and controversial) utilitarian are beings that feel, reason, have self-awareness,
of recent years. Many newspaper and magazine and look forward to a future. Thus, fetuses and
articles have been written about him, and many some very impaired human beings are not persons
people have declared their agreement with, or in his view and have a lesser moral status than,
say, adult gorillas and chimpanzees.
vociferous opposition to, his views. This is how one
Given such views, it was no surprise that anti-
magazine characterizes Singer and his ideas: abortion activists and disability rights advo-
The New Yorker calls him "the most influential cates loudly decried the Australian-born Singer's
living philosopher." His critics call him "the most appointment at Princeton last year. Indeed, his
dangerous man in the world." Peter Singer, the language regarding the treatment of disabled
De Camp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton Uni- human beings is at times appallingly similar to the
versity's Center for Human Values, is most widely eugenic arguments used by Nazi theorists con-
and controversially known for his view that ani- cerning "life unworthy of life." Singer, however,
mals have the same moral status as humans.... believes that only parents, not the state, should
Singer is perhaps the most thoroughgoing have the power to make decisions about the fates
philosophical utilitarian since Jeremy Bentham. of disabled infants.*
As such, he believes animals have rights because
the relevant moral consideration is not whether a *Peter Singer, "The Pursuit of Happiness: Peter Singer
being can reason or talk but whether it can suffer. Interviewed by Ronald Bailey," Reason Magazine,
Jettisoning the traditional distinction between December 2000. Reprinted with permission from Rea-
humans and nonhumans, Singer distinguishes son Magazine and Reason.com.
In addition, many citizens would be disturbed by would apply to the situation, then determine which
the killing of innocent people and ~he flouting of one, if consistently followed, would yield the most
the law by the police, believing that these actions utility. Suppose he must decide between Rule 1 and
are wrong and likely to set a dangerous precedent. Rule 2. Rule 1 says, "Do not kill innocent people in
Over time, though, these misgivings might dimin- order to prevent terrorists from killing other inno-
ish. All things conSidered, then, Action 2 would cent people." Rule 2 says, "Killing innocent people
probably produce more happiness than unhappi- is permissible if it helps to stop terrorist attacks."
ness. Action 1, on the other hand, maintains the The chief might deliberate as follows: We can be
status quo. It would allow the terrorist to continue confident that consistently following Rule 2 would
murdering innocent people and spreading fear have some dire consequences for society. Innocent
throughout the land-a decidedly unhappy result. people would be subject to arbitrary execution,
It clearly would produce more unhappiness than civil rights would be regularly Violated, the rule
happiness. Action 2, therefore, would produce the of law would be severely compromised, and trust
most happiness and would therefore be the morally in government would be degraded. In fact, adher-
right option. ing to Rule 2 might make people more fearful and
As a rule-utilitarian, the chief might make a dif- less secure than terrorist attacks would; it would
ferent choice. He would have to decide what rules undermine the very foundations of a free society.
In a particular case 1killing innocent people to fight everyone get an equal share. Consider this famous
terror could possibly have more utility than not scenario from the philosopher H.J. McCloskey:
killing them. But whether such a strategy would be While a utilitarian is visiting an area plagued by
advantageous to society over the long haul is not racial tension, a black man rapes a white woman.
at all certain. Consistently following Rule 1 would Race riots ensue, and white mobs roam the streets,
have none of these unfortunate consequences. If beating and lynching black people as the police
S01 a society living according to Rule 1 would be secretly condone the violence and do nothing to
better off than one adhering to Rule 21 and there- stop it. The utilitarian realizes that by giving false
testimony, he could bring about the quick arrest
fore the innocent should not be killed to stop the
and conviction of a black man whom he picks at
terrorist.
random. As a result of this lie, the riots and the
lynchings would stop, and innocent lives would be
Evaluating the Theory spared. As a utilitarian, he believes he has a duty to
Bentham and Mill do not offer ironclad arguments bear false witness to punish an innocent person. 6
demonstrating that utilitarianism is the best moral
If right actions are those that maximize hap-
theory. Mi1l1 however1 does try to show that the
piness1 then it seems that the utilitarian would
principle of utility is at least a plausible basis for
be doing right by framing the innocent person.
the theory. After a1l 1 he says1 humans by nature
The innocent person 1 of course 1would experience
desire happiness and nothing but happiness. If S01
unhappiness (he might be sent to prison or even
then happiness is the standard by which we should
executed)1 but framing him would halt the riots
judge human conduct 1and therefore the principle
and prevent many other innocent people from
of utility is the heart of morality. But this kind of
being killed 1resulting in a net gain in overall happi-
moral argument is controversial because it rea-
ness. Framing the innocent is unjust1 though1 and
sons from what is to what should be. In addition1as
our considered moral judgments would be at odds
pointed out in the discussion of psychological ego-
with such an action. Here the commonsense idea
ism 1 the notion that happiness is our sole motiva-
of justice and the principle of utility collide. The
tion is dubious.
conflict raises doubts about act-utilitarianism as a
What can we learn about utilitarianism by
moral theory.
applying the moral criteria of adequacy? Let us
Here is another famous example:
begin with classic act-utilitarianism and deal with
rule-utilitarianism later. We can also postpone This time you are to imagine yourself to be a sur-
discussion of the minimum reqUirement of coher- geon, a truly great surgeon. Among other things
you do, you transplant organs, and you are such a
ence, because critics have been more inclined to
great surgeon that the organs you transplant always
charge rule-utilitarianism than act-utilitarianism take. At the moment you have five patients who
with having significant internal inconsistencies. need organs. Two need one lung each, two need
If we begin with Criterion 1 (consistency with a kidney each, and the fifth needs a heart. If they
considered moral judgments), we run into what some do not get those organs today, they will all die; if
have called act-utilitarianism'S most serious prob- you find organs for them today, you can transplant
lem: it conflicts with commonsense views about the organs and they will all live. But where to find
the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart? The time is
justice. Justice requires equal treatment of persons.
almost up when a report is brought to you that a
It demands, for example, that goods such as hap- young man who has just come into your clinic for
piness be distributed fairly-that we not harm one his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood type
person to make several other persons happy. Utili- and is in excellent health. Lo, you have a possible
tarianism says that everyone should be included donor. All you need do is cut him up and distribute
in utility calculations, but it does not require that his parts among the five who need them. You ask,
but he says, "Sorry. I deeply sympathize, but no." conflicts with our commonsense judgments both
Would it be morally permissible for you to operate about people's rights and about their obliga-
anyway?7 tions to one another. Consider first this scenario
This scenario involves the possible killing of an about rights: Mr. Y is a nurse in a care facility for
innocent person for the good of others. There seems the elderly. He tends to many bedridden patients
little doubt that carrying out the murder and trans- who are in pain most of the time, are financial and
planting the victim's organs into five other people emotional burdens to their families, and are not
(and thus saving their lives) would maximize util- expected to live more than a few weeks. Despite
ity (assuming, of course, that the surgeon's deed their misery, they do not wish for death; they want
would not become public and he would suffer no only to be free of pain. Mr. Y, an act-utilitarian,
untoward psychological effects). Compared with sees that there would be a lot more happiness
the happiness produced by doing the transplants, in the world and less pain if these patients died
the unhappiness of the one unlucky donor seems sooner rather than later. He decides to take mat-
minor. Therefore, according to act-utilitarianism, ters into his own hands, so he secretly gives them
you (the surgeon) should commit the murder a drug that kills them quietly and painlessly. Their
and do the transplants. But this choice appears to families and the facility staff feel enormous relief.
conflict with our considered moral judgments. No one will ever know what Mr. Y has done, and
Killing the healthy young man to benefit the five no one suspects foul play. He feels no guilt-only
unhealthy patients seems unjust. immense satisfaction knowing that he has helped
Look at one final case. Suppose a tsunami dev- make the world a better place.
astates a coastal area of Singapore. Relief agencies If Mr. Y does indeed maximize happiness in this
arrive on the scene to distribute food, shelter, and situation, then his action is right, according to act-
medical care to 100 tsunami victims-disaster aid utilitarianism. Yet most people would probably say
that amounts to, say, 1,000 units of happiness. that he violated the rights of his patients. The com-
There are only two options for the distribution monsense view is that people have certain rights
of the 1,000 units. Option 1 is to divide the 1,000 that should not be violated merely to create a better
units equally among all 100 victims, supplying balance of happiness over unhappiness.
10 units to each person. Option 2 is to give 901 Another typical criticism of act-utilitarianism is
units to one victim (who happens to be the rich- that it appears to fly in the face of our considered
est man in the area) and 99 units to the remaining moral judgments about our obligations to other
victims, providing 1 unit per person. Both options people. Suppose Ms. Z must decide between two
distribute the same amount of happiness to the actions: Action 1 will produce 1,001 units of hap-
victims-1,000 units. Following the dictates of piness; Action 2, 1,000 units. The only other sig-
act-utilitarianism, we would have to say that the nificant difference between them is that Action 1
two actions (options) have equal utility and so are entails the breaking of a promise. By act-utilitarian
equally right. But this conclusion seems wrong. It lights, Ms. Z should choose Action 1 because it
seems unjust to distribute the units of happiness yields more happiness than Action 2 does. But
so unevenly when all recipients are equals in all we tend to think that keeping a promise is more
morally relevant respects. Like the other examples, important than a tiny gain in happiness. We often
this one suggests that act-utilitarianism may be an try to keep our promises even when we know that
inadequate theory. doing so will result in a decrease in utility. Some
Detractors make parallel arguments against the say that if our obligations to others sometimes out-
theory in many cases besides those involving injus- weigh considerations of overall happiness, then
tice. A familiar charge is that act-utilitarianism act-utilitarianism must be problematic. 8
What can an act-utilitarian say to rebut these (in all its forms) requires that in our actions we
charges? One frequent response goes like this: The always try to maximize utility, everyone consid-
scenarios put forth by critics (such as the cases just ered. Say you are watching television. Utilitarian-
cited) are misleading and implausible. They are ism would have you ask yourself, "Is this the best
always set up so that actions regarded as immoral pro- way to maximize happiness for everyone?" Proba-
duce the greatest happiness, leading us to conclude bly not. You could be giving to charity or working
that utilitarianism conflicts with commonsense as a volunteer for the local hospital or giving your
morality and therefore cannot be an adequate moral coat to a homeless person or selling everything
theory. But in real life these kinds of actions almost you own to buy food for hungry children. What-
never maximize happiness. In the case of Dr. X, her ever you are doing, there is usually something
crime would almost certainly be discovered by phy- else you could do that would better maximize net
sicians or other Scientists, and she would be exposed happiness for everyone.
as a murderer. This revelation would surely destroy If act-utilitarianism does demand too much of
her career, undermine patient-physician trust, tar- us, then its usefulness as a guide to the moral life is
nish the reputation of the scientific community, suspect. One possible reply to this criticism is that
dry up funding for legitimate research, and prompt the utilitarian burden can be lightened by devising
countless lawsuits. Scientists might even refuse rules that place limits on supererogatory actions.
to use the data from Dr. X's research because she Another reply is that our moral common sense is
obtained them through a heinous act. As one philos- simply wrong on this issue-we should be willing
opher put it, "Given a clearheaded view of the world to perform, as our duty, many actions that are usu-
as it is and a realistic understanding of man's nature, ally considered supererogatory. If necessary, we
it becomes more and more evident that injustice will should be willing to give up our personal ambitions
never have, in the long run, greater utility than jus- for the good of everyone. We should be willing,
tice .... Thus injustice becomes, in actual practice, a for example, to sacrifice a very large portion of our
source of great social disutility.,,9 resources to help the poor.
The usual response to this defense is that the To some, this reply seems questionable pre-
act-utilitarian is probably correct that most viola- cisely because it challenges our commonsense
tions of commonsense morality do not maximize moral intuitions-the very intuitions that we use
happiness-but at least some violations do. At least to measure the plausibility of our moral judgments
sometimes, actions that have the best consequences and principles. Moral common sense, they say, can
do conflict with our credible moral principles or be mistaken, and our intuitions can be tenuous or
considered moral judgments. The charge is that the distorted-but we should cast them aside only for
act-utilitarian cannot plausibly dismiss all counter- good reasons.
examples, and only one counterexample is required But a few utilitarians directly reject this appeal
to show that maximizing utility is not a necessary to common sense, declaring that relying so heavily
and sufficient condition for right action. to on such intuitions is a mistake:
Unlike ethical egoism, act-utilitarianism (as
well as rule-utilitarianism) does not fail Criterion Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences
2 (consistency with our moral experiences), so we which are incompatible with the common moral
consciousness, but I tended to take the view "so
can move on to Criterion 3 (usefulness in moral
much the worse for the common moral conscious-
problem solving). On this score, some scholars ness." That is, I was inclined to reject the common
argue that act-utilitarianism deserves bad marks. methodology of testing general ethical principles
Probably their most common complaint is what by seeing how they square with our feelings in par-
has been called the no-rest problem. Utilitarianism ticular instances. 11
These utilitarians would ask, Isn't it possible Some rule-utilitarians respond to this criti-
that in dire circumstances, saving a hundred inno- cism by denying that rules with a lot of excep-
cent lives by allowing one to die would be the best tions would maximize utility. They say that people
thing to do even though allowing that one death might fear for their own well-being when others
would be a tragedy? Aren't there times when the make multiple exceptions to rules. You might be
norms of justice and duty should be ignored for the reassured by a rule such as tlDo not harm others,"
greater good of society? but feel uneasy about the rule "Do not harm others
To avoid the problems that act-utilitarianism except in this situation." What if you end up in that
is alleged to have, some utilitarians have turned to particular situation?
rule-utilitarianism. By positing rules that should be Those who criticize the theory admit that it is
consistently followed, rule-utilitarianism seems to indeed possible for an exception-laden rule to pro-
align its moral judgments closer to those of com- duce more unhappiness than happiness because
mon sense. And the theory itself is based on ideas of the anxiety it causes. But, they say, it is also
about morality that seem perfectly sensible: possible for such a rule to generate a very large mea-
In general, rule utilitarianism seems to involve two
sure of happiness-large enough to more than off-
rather plausible intuitions. In the first place, rule utili- set any ill effects spawned by rule exceptions. If so,
tarians want to emphasize that moral rules are impor- then rule-utilitarianism could easily slip into act-
tant. Individual acts are justified by being shown to utilitarianism, thus exhibiting all the conflicts with
be in accordance with correct moral rules. In the sec- commonsense morality that act-utilitarianism is
ond place, utility is important. Moral rules are shown supposed to have.
to be correct by being shown to lead, somehow, to the
maximization of utility.... Rule utilitarianism, in its
various forms, tries to combine these intuitions into a LEARNING FROM UTILITARIANISM
single, coherent criterion of morality. 12
Regardless of how much credence we give to the
But some philosophers have accused the theory arguments for and against utilitarianism, we must
of being internally inconsistent. They say, in other admit that the theory seems to embody a large part
words, that it fails the minimum requirement of of the truth about morality. First, utilitarianism
coherence. (If so, we can forgo discussion of our begs us to consider that the consequences of our
three moral criteria of adequacy.) They argue as fol- actions do indeed make a difference in our moral
lows: Rule-utilitarianism says that actions are right deliberations. Whatever factors work to make an
if they conform to rules devised to maximize utility. action right (or wrong), surely the consequences of
Rules with exceptions or qualifications, however, what we do must somehow be among them. Even
maximize utility better than rules without them. if lying is morally wrong primarily because of the
For example, a rule like tlDo not steal except in these kind of act it is, we cannot plausibly think that a
Circumstances" maximizes utility better than the lie that saves a thousand lives is morally equivalent
rule tlDo not steal." It seems, then, that the best to one that changes nothing. Sometimes our con-
rules are those with amendments that make them sidered moral judgments may tell us that an action
as specific as possible to particular cases. But if the is right regardless of the good (or evil) it does. And
rules were changed in this way to maximize utility, sometimes they may say that the good it does
they would end up mandating the same actions that matters a great deal.
act-utilitarianism does. They all would say, in effect, Second, utilitarianism-perhaps more than any
"Do not do this except to maximize utility." Rule- other moral theory-incorporates the principle of
utilitarianism would lapse into act-utilitarianism. impartiality, a fundamental pillar of morality itself.
~
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Cross-Species Transplants: What Would a Utilitarian Do?
Like any adequate moral theory, utilitarianism Would an act-utilitarian be likely to condone
should be able to help us resolve moral problems, cross-species transplants of organs? If so, on what
including new moral issues arising from advances grounds? Would the unprecedented, "unnatu-
in science and medicine. A striking example of one ral" character of these operations bother a utili-
such issue is cross-species transplantation, the trans- tarian? Why or why not? Would you expect an
planting of organs from one species to another, act-utilitarian to approve of cross-species organ
usually from nonhuman animals to humans. Scien- transplants if they involved the killing of one hun-
tists are already bioengineering pigs so that their dred pigs for every successful transplant? If only a
organs will not provoke tissue rejection in human very limited number of transplants could be done
recipients. Pigs are thought to be promising organ successfully each year, how do you think an act-
donors because of the similarities between pig and utilitarian would decide who gets the operations?
human organs. Many people are in favor of such Would she choose randomly? Would she ever be
research because it could open up new sources justified (by utilitarian considerations) in, say,
of transplantable organs, which are now in short deciding to save a rich philanthropist while letting
supply and desperately needed by thousands of a poor person die for lack of a transplant?
people whose organs are failing.
Everyone concerned counts equally in every moral categorical imperative. But suppose you don't
decision. As Mill says, when we judge the rightness believe in any of these justifying principles. You
of our actions, utilitarianism reqUires us to be "as think the universe is entirely physical-just atoms
strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent in motion, devoid of divinity and purpose. You
spectator." Discrimination is forbidden, and equal- believe reason can never yield an authoritative
ity reigns. We would expect no less from a plausible rational principle like the categorical imperative,
moral theory. and you are sure that utilitarianism is hopelessly
Third, utilitarianism is through and through unrealistic because people can never be trusted to
a moral theory for promoting human welfare. At promote the common good. At their core, people
its core is the moral principle of beneficence-the are egoistic and self-interested. And in service to
obligation to act for the well-being of others. Benef- their own needs and desires, they will, given the
icence is not the whole of morality, but to most chance, commit all manner of horrific cruelties
people it is at least close to its heart. and vile wrongs. In such a world, on what founda-
tion can morality rest? In such a perilous and cor-
rosive environment, how can morality ever find a
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
foothold?
So far we have examined several moral theories and For some, the answer is social contract
observed that each is based on, and justified by, theory (or contractarianism). This doctrine says
some distinctive fundamental feature. For utilitari- that morality arises from a social contract that
anism, that feature is utility; for the divine com- self-interested and rational people abide by in
mand theory, God's will; for Kant's theory, the order to secure a degree of peace, prosperity, and
well-ordered society, the rules are embodied in

laws and policies, enforced by the state and recog-
QUICK REVIEW
nized by most citizens as necessary and legitimate.
principle of utility-Bentham's "principle which They are deemed legitimate because they are the
approves or disapproves of every action what- result of an agreement among rational equals who
soever, according to the tendency which it understand that the contract, however restrictive,
appears to have to augment or diminish the is for the best.
happiness of the party whose interest is in
question." Hobbes's Theory
greatest happiness principle-Mill's principle that The first well-developed social contract theory in
"holds that actions are right in proportion as modern times was devised by the British philOSO-
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they pher and linguist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).
tend to produce the reverse of happiness." He argues for the necessity of a social contract by
social contract theory-The doctrine that moral- first giving us a glimpse of a world without one.
ity arises from a social contract that self- In his masterpiece Leviathan, he presents a pessi-
interested and rational people would abide by mistic picture of human beings in their natural,
in order to secure a degree of peace, prosper- unfettered, lawless state. They are, he says, greedy,
ity, and safety. selfish, violent, self-destructive, and desperate.
Their cutthroat struggle for advantage and sur-
vival rages on and on because they are roughly
equal in strength and ability, ensuring that no
safety. Without such an agreement, life would be one can win. So conflict, chaos, death, and loss
nearly unlivable, with each person competing with reign-and humankind is reduced to living in a
everyone else to promote his or her own interests, horrifying and gruesome "state of nature." This
to grab as much wealth and power as possible, and state is not merely a Hobbesian construct: it arises
to defend his or her person and property against in the real world when there is a breakdown in the
all comers. Humanity, as the saying goes, would forces that preserve law and order-in times of
be red in tooth and claw. But such a dog-eat-dog revolution, war, natural disaster, famine, and civil
world is in no one's interests. Only in a world unrest. According to Hobbes,
where people restrain their greed and try to coop-
erate with one another can they achieve a mod- Hereby it is manifest that during the time men
estly satisfying and secure life. And this kind of live without a common power to keep them all
in awe, they are in that condition which is called
restraint and cooperation, says the social contract
war; and such a war as is of every man against every
theorist, is possible only through a social contract man ....
in which people agree to obey practical, benefi- Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time
cial rules as long as everyone else does the same. of war, where every man is enemy to every man,
Obedience means relinquishing some personal the same is consequent to the time wherein men
freedom and giving up the option to kill, wound, live without other security than what their own
and cheat our neighbors at will, but it also ensures strength and their own invention shall furnish
them withal. In such condition there is no place
a better life and a measure of protection from the
for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncer-
ravages of continual conflict and fear. From this tain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no
social contract comes morality, for the rules consti- navigation, nor use of the commodities that may
tute morality. Morality comprises the social rules be imported by sea; no commodious building; no
that are in everyone's best interests to heed. In a instruments of moving and remOVing such things
CHAPTER 5: CONSEQUENTlALlST THEORIES: MAXIMIZE THE GOOD 0 111
as require much force; no knowledge of the face of But let's limit our discussion to Hobbes's theory
the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; (and those like it). Like every major moral theory,
no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, Hobbesian social contract theory has both appeal-
and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 13
ing and questionable features, so let's examine
both.
As long as people continue to trample others On the positive side, the theory provides an
on the way to steal the biggest piece of pie, life will answer to skeptics and relativists who question
remain a "war of every man against every man." whether morality is objective or consists of a set
The only rational alternative, says Hobbes, is to of beliefs we merely happen to accept. It says that
accept a social contract that mandates coopera- morality is objective because it consists of the
tion and restraint. By following the rules, everyone rules-the standards of right and wrong-that
wins. The agreement prohibits contract breaking as rational members of society have determined to
well as harming, threatening, and defrauding oth- be most beneficial for all. The source of moral-
ers, because such behavior threatens the peace and ity is therefore apparent. We need not ask-as
prosperity that the social contract makes possible. we would with many other theories-whether it
But people are people, and they will renege on is based on God's will, nature, or pure reason. Its
the deal if given half a chance. So what's needed is a rules make peaceful coexistence and productive
fearsome, powerful person or persons to enforce the cooperation pOSSible, and they are the very rules
rules, to threaten punishment, and to deliver it swiftly that would be enacted by rational people of equal
to rule breakers. Specifically, what's required is an status whose goal is to see that the rules benefit
absolute sovereign, what Hobbes refers to as the Levi- everyone.
athan (the name of a terrifying monster mentioned These attributes ensure that, at least in one
in the Bible). The Leviathan's job is to ensure that the respect, Hobbes's theory scores high on the moral
social contract is honored and that agreements are criterion of usefulness: there is no mystery about
kept. His subjects agree to cede to him much of their how to find out if an action is morally right or
freedom and right of self-determination in exchange wrong. The social rules are those that promote
for an orderly and secure society. social harmony. It is clear that theft, murder, fraud,
Before the Leviathan rules SOCiety, Hobbes says, promise breaking, exploitation, intolerance, and
there is no right and wrong: other malicious acts are contrary to social order, so
[In the state of nature] nothing can be unjust. The they are immoral.
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice But why should we be moral in the first place?
have there no place .... It is consequent also to Or to put it another way, What is the purpose of
the same condition, that there be no propriety, no morality? This is a difficult question for any moral
dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only theory. The social contract answer is straightfor-
that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so ward: We should be moral in a SOciety where the
long, as he can keep it.14 rules are generally followed because we are better
Morality comes into existence only when the Levi- off doing so. In addition, breaking the rules would
athan takes control and guarantees the strength bring punishment from the Leviathan, and trying
and stability of the social contract. to avoid the pain of such punishment is rational.
Philosophers have faulted Hobbes's theory on
Evaluating the Theory several counts. Among the most important of these
Many thinkers have tried to improve on Hobbes's is the charge that few people have ever actually
theory or offer alternatives, and as a result, several consented to the terms of a social contract. (CritiCS
types of social contract theory have been put forth. make this point against other forms of the theory,
not just Hobbes's.) The essence of a contract is that influential social contract theory comes from the
people freely agree to abide by its terms. Presum- philosopherJohn Rawls (1921-2002). He attempted
ably, if they don't give their consent, they are not to determine what moral principles a society would
obliged to obey the contract's rules. But who has accept if they were arrived at through a hypotheti-
explicitly agreed to be bound by a social contract? cal give-and-take that was as fair and impartial as
Who has raised their right hand and sworn alle- possible. According to Rawls, such prinCiples are
giance or signed on the dotted line? Most people what "free and rational persons concerned to fur-
have not. ther their own interests would accept in an initial
Some defenders of social contract theory reply position of equality as defining the fundamental
that people may not have given their explicit terms of their association." 15
consent, but they surely have given their implicit There is a stronger objection that has been made
consent. By enjoying the social and material advan- against Hobbes's theory and contractarian theories
tages that the social contract makes pOSSible, these generally: the category of individuals that we nor-
advocates say, people implicitly agree to abide by mally think should have moral status is restricted.
its rules. If they accept the benefits, they tacitly Living beings have moral status if they are suitable
agree to shoulder the obligations. candidates for moral concern or respect. This
But this notion of implicit consent will not do. means we cannot treat them just any way we want;
There are many who benefit from living in a well- we have direct moral duties to them. We know
ordered sOciety, but we cannot plausibly say they that normal, rational, adult human beings have
consented to be bound by any social contract. full moral status-they deserve our highest level
People are born into a particular society without of respect and consideration no matter their social
their consent; they have no choice in the matter. situation. And we typically think that vulnerable
They do not agree to be part of the social order. individuals-for example, the severely disabled,
And as adults, many may hate the society they find the very poor, nonhuman animals, children, and
themselves in but cannot leave it because the polit- infants-also have moral status: they also deserve
ical, finanCial, and social costs of trying to emigrate a measure of our respect and consideration. But
may be prohibitive. In any case, it is hard to see critics charge that social contract theories conflict
how such citizens could be said to implicitly accept with these intuitions. The theories generally hold
a social contract. that the only ones who have moral status are those
At this point the contractarian might say that who can legitimately be party to a social contract
we can be duty-bound to obey the moral tenets of a (the contractors), and that the only ones who can
social contract even if we don't consent to it, either participate in a social contract are those for whom
explicitly or implicitly. Our moral duties are estab- participation would be mutually beneficial. The
lished not because we accept the social contract vulnerable individuals who cannot take part in
from which they come, but because the contract this give-and-take for mutual benefit may have no
is one that we would embrace if we were rational moral status and no rights.
individuals searching for rules that would best Modern contractarians have responded to
serve everyone's interests. The social contract, in these complaints in several ways. Their general
other words, is hypothetical but nevertheless bind- contention is that although vulnerable individu-
ing. This is how most contemporary contractarians als may not be contractors, it does not follow that
view social contracts: they see them as fictions- they can be mistreated or left unprotected. They
but very useful fictions. For example, today's most point out, for example, that it may be mutually
advantageous for society to care for disabled morally right action is the one covered by a rule that if
children because some contractors (namely, par- generally followed would produce the most favorable
ents) care about such children, and this concern balance of good over evil, everyone considered.
makes the benevolent treatment of disabled chil- Critics argue that act-utilitarianism is not con-
dren a matter of the parents' self-interest. Also, it sistent with our considered moral judgments about
may be in everyone's interests for society to care justice. In many possible scenariOS, the action that
for the elderly, the chronically ill, and victims of maximizes utility in a situation also seems blatantly
accidents, because in the future we all may find unjust. Likewise, the theory seems to collide with
our notions of rights and obligations. Again, it seems
ourselves in one of these situations. Or benefiting
relatively easy to imagine scenarios in which utility
the vulnerable could be viewed as a psychological
is maximized while rights or obligations are short-
need of contractors, so fulfilling this need by help-
changed. An act-utilitarian might respond to these
ing the vulnerable may be in every contractor's
pOints by saying that such examples are unrealistic-
best interests. that in real life, actions thought to be immoral almost
never maximize happiness.
Rule-utilitarianism has been accused of being
internally inconsistent-of easily collapsing into act-
CHAPTER REVIEW utilitarianism. The charge is that the rules that maxi-
mize happiness best are specific to particular cases, but
such rules would sanction the same actions that act-
SUMMARY utilitarianism does.
Regardless of criticisms lodged against it, utilitaria-
Ethical egoism is the theory that the right action is nism offers important insights into the nature of moral-
the one that advances one's own best interests. It pro- ity: The consequences of our actions surely do matter in
motes self-interested behavior but not necessarily self- our moral deliberations and in our lives. The principle
ish acts. The ethical egoist may define his self-interest of impartiality is an essential part of moral decision
in various ways-as pleasure, self-actualization, making. And any plausible moral theory must some-
power, happiness, or other goods. The most impor- how take into account the principle of beneficence.
tant argument for ethical egoism relies on the theory Social contract theory is the view that morality
known as psychological egoism, the view that the arises from a social contract that self-interested and
motive for all our actions is self-interest. Psychologi- rational people would abide by to secure a degree of
cal egoism, however, seems to ignore the fact that security and prosperity. Restraint and cooperation
people sometimes do things that are not in their best are possible only through a social contract in which
interests. It also seems to misconstrue the relationship people agree to obey practical, beneficial rules as long
between our actions and the satisfaction that often as everyone else does the same.
follows from them. We seem to desire something
other than satisfaction and then experience satisfac-
tion as a result of getting what we desire. I<EY TERMS
Utilitarianism is the view that the morally right act-egoism (p. 93)
action is the one that produces the most favorable rule-egoism (p. 93)
balance of good over evil, everyone considered. Act- psychological egoism (p. 95)
utilitarianism says that right actions are those that principle of utility (p. 100)
directly produce the greatest overall happiness, every- greatest happiness principle (p. 100)
one considered. Rule-utilitarianism says that the social contract theory (p. 109)
EXERCISES 8. Does act-utilitarianism conflict with

commonsense judgments about rights? Why or
Review Questions
why not?
1. What is ethical egoism? What is the difference 9. Is there such a thing as a supererogatory
between act- and rule-egoism? (p. 93) act-or are all right actions simply our duty?
2. What is psychological egoism? (p. 95) What would an act-utilitarian say about
3. What is the psychological egoist argument for supererogatory acts?
ethical egoism? (pp. 95-96) 10. Suppose you had to decide which one of a
4. Is psychological egoism true? Why or why not? dozen dying patients should receive a lifesaving
(pp.96-97) drug, knowing that there was only enough of
5. In what way is ethical egoism not consistent the medicine for one person. Would you feel
with our considered moral judgments? comfortable making the decision as an act-
(p.98) utilitarian would? Why or why not?
6. What is the principle of utility? (p. 100)
7. According to Hobbes, where does morality come
from? (pp. 110-111) ETHICAL DILEMMAS
8. What is the difference between act- and rule- 1. Suppose you are an act-utilitarian, and you
utilitarianism? (pp. 102-103) must choose between two courses of action. In
9. How do act- and rule-utilitarians differ in their the first action, you could make a stranger very
views on rules? (p. 103) happy by giving her $100. In the second action,
10. Is act-utilitarianism consistent with our you could make another stranger even happier
considered moral judgments regarding justice? by giving him the same amount of money-but
Why or why not? (pp. 105-106) this action would involve breaking a promise to
a friend. According to act-utilitarianism, which
action is the morally right one? Do you agree
Discussion Questions
with this choice? Why or why not?
1. Is psychological egoism based on a conceptual 2. Imagine that your preferred moral theory
confusion? Why or why not? implies that racial discrimination is morally
2. Why do critics regard ethical egoism as an permissible-an implication that is in direct
inadequate moral theory? Are the critics right? conflict with your considered moral judgments.
Why or why not? Would such a conflict suggest to you that the
3. How would your life change if you became a theory must be defective? Why or why not?
consistent act-utilitarian? 3. Suppose your preferred moral theory is based
4. How would your life change if you became a entirely on love-that is, you believe that right
consistent rule-utilitarian? actions are those that issue from a feeling of
5. To what was Mill referring when he said, flIt is empathy, compassion, or mercy. Now imagine
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a that a homeless man assaults you and steals
pig satisfied"? Do you agree with this statement? your wallet, and then you see him do the same
Why or why not? thing to two other people. How would your
6. If you were on trial for your life (because of an love theory apply to this case? Would there be
alleged murder), would you want the judge a conflict between love and the principle of
to be an act-utilitarian, a rule-utilitarian, or justice or the community's moral standards?
neither? Why? Would your theory lead you to go against your
7. Do you agree with Hobbes's view of human considered moral judgments? Assess the worth
nature? Why or why not? of the love theory.
FURTHER READING Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:

jeremy Bentham, "Of the Principle of Utility," in An Intro- The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789; University Press, 2000).
reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879). Louis P. Pojman, ed., The Moral Life: An Introductory Reader
C. D. Broad, "Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives," in in Ethics and Literature, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford
Twentieth Century Ethical Theory, ed. Steven M. Cahn University Press, 2004).
and joram G. Haber (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice john Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Hall, 1995). University Press, 1999).
Steven M. Cahn and joram G. Haber, eds., Twentieth John Simmons, Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford
Century Ethical TheolJ' (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice University Press, 2008).
Hall, 1995). j. j. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,"
julia Driver, Conseqllentialism (London: Routledge, 2012). in Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected Philosophical
Fred Feldman, "Act Utilitarianism: Pro and Con," in Papers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, Nj: Prentice Hall, Paul W. Taylor, "Ethical Egoism," in Principles ofEthics: An
1978). Introduction (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975).
William Frankena, "Utilitarianism, Justice, and Love," judith Jarvis Thomson, "Goodness and Utilitarianism,"
in Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, Nj: Prentice Hall, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
1973). Association 67 (4) (1994): 7-21.
C. E. Harris, "The Ethics of Utilitarianism," in Apply- Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in Utili-
ing Moral Theories, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, tarianism: For and Against, ed. J. J. c. Smart and Bernard
1997). Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
Kai Nielsen, "A Defense of Utilitarianism," Ethics 82 Jonathan Wolff, An Introduction to Political Philosophy
(1972): 113-24. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Robert Nozick, "The Experience Machine," in Anarchy,
State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
READINGS
Egoism and Altruism

LOUIS P. POlMAN
Universal ethical egoism is the theory that everyone Her argument seems to go like this:
ought always to serve his or her own self-interest. That
1. The perfection of one's abilities in a state of hap-
is, everyone ought to do what will maximize one's
piness is the highest goal for humans. We have a
own expected utility or bring about one's own greatest
moral duty to attempt to reach this goal.
happiness, even if it requires harming others. Ethical
2. The ethics of altruism prescribes that we sacrifice
egoism is utilitarianism reduced to the pinpoint of the
our interests and lives for the good of others.
single individual ego. Instead of advocating the great-
3. Therefore, the ethics of altruism is incompatible
est happiness for the greatest number, as utilitarianism
with the goal of happiness.
does, it advocates the greatest happiness for myself,
4. Ethical egoism prescribes that we seek our own
whoever I may be. It is a self-preoccupied prudence,
happiness exclusively, and as such it is consistent
urging one to postpone enjoyment today for long-term
with the happiness goal.
benefits. In its more sophisticated form, it compares life
S. Therefore ethical egOism is the correct moral theory.
to a competitive game, perhaps a war-game, and urges
each person to try to win in the game of life.
Ayn Rand's argument for the virtue of selfish-
In her books The Virtue of Selfishness and Atlas
ness is flawed by the fallacy of a false dilemma. It
Shrugged, Ayn Rand argues that selfishness is a virtue
simplistically assumes that absolute altruism and
and altruism a vice, a totally destructive idea that leads
absolute egoism are the only alternatives. But this
to the undermining of individual worth. She defines
is an extreme view of the matter. There are plenty
altruism as the view that
of options between these two positions. Even a pre-
any action taken for the benefit of others is good, and dominant egoist would admit that (analogous to
any action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus, the the paradox of hedonism) sometimes the best way
beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of moral to reach self-fulfillment is for us to forget about our-
value-and so long as the beneficiary is anybody other selves and strive to live for goals, causes, or other
than oneself, anything goes. I persons. Even if altruism is not reqUired (as a duty),
As such, altruism is suicidal: it may be permissible in many cases. Furthermore,
self-interest may not be incompatible with other-
If a man accepts the ethics of altruism, his first concern regarding motivation. Even the Second Great Com-
is not how to live his life, but how to sacrifice it.... mandment set forth by Moses and Jesus states not
Altruism erodes men's capacity to grasp the value of an that you must always sacrifice yourself for the other
individual life; it reveals a mind from which the reality
person, but that you ought to love your neighbor as
of a human being has been wiped out.
yourself (Lev. 19: 19; Matt. 23). Self-interest and self-
Since finding happiness is the highest goal and good in love are morally good things, but not at the expense
life, altruism, which calls on us to sacrifice our happiness of other people's legitimate interests. When there is
for the good of others, is contrary to our highest good. moral conflict of interests, a fair process of adjudica-
tion needs to take place.
From Louis P. Pojman, "Egoism and Altruism: A Critique of Ayn
But Rand's version of egoism is only one of many.
Rand," Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, 10th ed., 461-65. (f:) 2016 by
Oxford University Press, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the We need to go to the heart of ethical egOism: the thesis
Licensor through PLSclear. that our highest moral duty is always to promote our
individual interests. Let us focus on the alleged prob- ethical egoism worth the price of letting the cat out of
lems of this thesis. the bag?)
Thus it would be self-defeating for the egOist to
FOUR CRITICISMS OF ETHICAL EGOISM argue for her pOSition, and even worse that she should
convince others of it. But it is perfectly possible to
The Inconsistent Outcomes Argument have a private morality that does not resolve conflicts
Brian Medlin argues that ethical egoism cannot be of interest. So the egoist should publicly advocate
true because it fails to meet a necessary condition of standard principles of traditional morality-so that
morality, that of being a guide to action. He claims society doesn't break down-while adhering to a pri-
that it will be like advising people to do inconsistent vate, nonstandard, solely self-regarding morality. So,
if you're willing to pay the price, you can accept the
things based on incompatible desires. 2 His argument
goes like this: solipsistic-directed norms of egoism.
If the egoist is prepared to pay the price, egoism
1. Moral principles must be universal and categorical. could be a consistent system that has some limita-
2. I must universalize my egoist desire to come out tions. Although the egoist can cooperate with others
on top over Tom, Dick, and Harry. in limited ways and perhaps even have friends-so
3. But I must also prescribe Tom's egoist desire to come long as their interests don't conflict with his-he has
out on top over Dick, Harry, and me (and so on). to be very careful about preserving his isolation. The
4. Therefore I have prescribed incompatible outcomes egoist can't give advice or argue about his position-
and have not provided a way of adjudicating con- not sincerely at least. He must act alone, atomistically
flicts of desire. In effect, I have said nothing. or solipsistically in moral isolation, for to announce
his adherence to the principle of egOism would be
The proper response to this is that of Jesse Kalin, who
dangerous to his project. He can't teach his children
argues that we can separate our beliefs about ethical
the true morality or justify himself to others or forgive
situations from our desires. 3 He likens the situation
others.
to a competitive sports event, in which you believe
that your Opponent has a right to try to win as much
as you, but you desire that you, not he, will in fact The Paradox of Egoism
win. An even better example is that of the chess game
The situation may be even worse than the sophisti-
in which you recognize that your opponent ought to cated, self-conscious egoist supposes. Could the ego-
move her bishop to prepare for checkmate, but you
ist have friends? And if limited friendship is pOSSible,
hope she won't see the move. Belief that A ought to do
could he or she ever be in love or experience deep
Y does not commit you to wanting A to do Y.
friendship? Suppose the egOist discovers that in the
pursuit of the happiness goal, deep friendship is
The Publicity Argument
in his best interest. Can he become a friend? What
On the one hand, in order for something to be a moral is necessary to deep friendship? A true friend is one
theory it seems necessary that its moral principles be who is not always preoccupied about his own inter-
publicized. Unless principles are put forth as univer- est in the relationship but who forgets about himself
sal prescriptions that are accessible to the public, they altogether, at least sometimes, in order to serve or
cannot serve as guides to action or as aids in resolving enhance the other person's interest. "Love seeketh
conflicts of interest. But on the other hand, it is not not its own." It is an altruistic disposition, the very
in the egoist's self-interest to publicize them. Egoists opposite of egoism. So the paradox of egoism is that
would rather that the rest of us be altruists. (Why did in order to reach the goal of egoism one must give up
Nietzsche and Rand write books announcing their egoism and become (to some extent) an altruist, the
pOSitions? Were the royalties taken in by announcing very antithesis of egOism.
The Argument from Counterintuitive In the past, linking ethics to evolution meant
Consequences justifying exploitation. Social Darwinism justified
The final argument against ethical egoism is that it is an imperialism and the principle that "Might makes right"
absolute ethics that not only permits egoistic behavior by saying that survival of the fittest is a law of nature.
but demands it. Helping others at one's own expense is This philosophy lent itself to a promotion of ruthless
not only not required, it is morally wrong. Whenever I egoism. This is nature's law, "nature red in tooth and
do not have good evidence that my helping you will end claw." Against this view ethologists such as Robert
up to my advantage, I must refrain from helping you. If Ardrey and Konrad Lorenz argued for a more benign
I can save the whole of Europe and Africa from destruc- view of the animal kingdom-one reminiscent of Rud-
tion by pressing a button, then so long as there is noth- yard Kipling's, in which the animal kingdom survives
ing for me to gain by it, it is wrong for me to press that by cooperation, which is at least as important as com-
button. The Good Samaritan was, by this logic, morally petition. On Ardrey's and Lorenz's view it is the group
wrong in helping the injured victim and not collect- or the species, not the individual, that is of primary
ing payment for his troubles. It is certainly hard to see importance.
why the egoist should be concerned about environ- With the development of sociobiology-in the
mental matters if he or she is profiting from polluting work of E. o. Wilson but particularly the work of Rob-
the environment. (For example, if the egoist gains 40 ert Trivers, J. Maynard Smith, and Richard Dawkins-
hedons in producing P, which produces pollution that a theory has come to the fore that combines radical
in tum causes others 1,000 dolors-units of suffering- individualism with limited altruism. It is not the
but suffers only 10 of those dolors himself, then by an group or the species that is of evolutionary impor-
agent-maximizing calculus he is morally obligated to tance but the gene, or, more precisely, the gene type.
produce P.) There is certainly no obligation to preserve Genes-the parts of the chromosomes that carry the
scarce natural resources for future generations. "Why blueprints for all our natural traits (e.g., height, hair
should I do anything for posterity?" the egoist asks color, skin color, intelligence)-copy themselves as
"What has posterity ever done for me?" they divide and multiply. At conception they com-
In conclusion, we see that ethical egoism has a bine with the genes of a member of the opposite sex to
number of serious problems. It cannot consistently form a new individual.
publicize itself, nor often argue its case. It tends In his fascinating sociobiological study, Richard
towards solipsism and the exclusion of many of the Dawkins describes human behavior as determined
deepest human values, such as love and deep friend- evolutionarily by stable strategies set to replicate the
Ship. It violates the principle of fairness, and, most gene. 4 This is not done consciously, of course, but by
of all, it entails an absolute prohibition on altruis- the invisible hand that drives consciousness. We are
tic behavior, which we intuitively sense as morally essentially gene machines.
required (or, at least, permissible). Morality-that is, successful morality-can be seen
as an evolutionary strategy for gene replication. Here's
an example: Birds are afflicted with life-endangering
EVOLUTION AND ALTRUISM parasites. Because they lack limbs to enable them to
If sheer unadulterated egoism is an inadequate moral pick the parasites off their heads, they-like much of
theory, does that mean we ought to aim at complete the animal kingdom-depend on the ritual of mutual
altruism, total self-effacement for the sake of others? What grooming. It turns out that nature has evolved two
is the role of self-love in morality? An interesting place basic types of birds in this regard: those who are dis-
to start answering these queries is with the new field posed to groom anyone (the non-prejudiced type?),
of sociobiology, which theorizes that social structures and those who refuse to groom anyone but who pres-
and behavioral patterns, including morality, have a ent themselves for grooming. The former type of bird
biological base, explained by evolutionary theory. Dawkins calls "Suckers" and the latter "Cheaters."
In a geographical area containing harmful para- someone who is willing to share with those willing to
sites and where there are only Suckers or Cheaters, cooperate.
Suckers will do fairly well, but Cheaters will not sur- Mackie may caricature the position of the religious
vive, for want of cooperation. However, in a Sucker altruist, but he misses the subtleties of wisdom involved
population in which a mutant Cheater arises, the Gesus said, "Be as wise as serpents but as harmless as
Cheater will prosper, and the Cheater gene-type will doves"). Nevertheless, he does remind us that there is
multiply. As the Suckers are exploited, they will gradu- a difference between core morality and complete altru-
ally die out. But if and when they become too few to ism. We have duties to cooperate and reCiprocate, but
groom the Cheaters, the Cheaters will start to die off no duty to serve those who manipulate us nor an obvi-
too and eventually become extinct. ous duty to sacrifice ourselves for people outside our
Why don't birds all die off, then? Well, somehow domain of special responsibility. We have a special duty
nature has come up with a third type, call them "Grudg- of high altruism toward those in the close circle of our
ers." Grudgers groom all and only those who reciprocate concern, namely, our family and friends.
in grooming them. They groom each other and Suck-
ers, but not Cheaters. In fact, once caught, a Cheater is
marked forever. There is no forgiveness. It turns out then CONCLUSION
that unless there are a lot of Suckers around, Cheaters Martin Luther once said that humanity is like a man
have a hard time of it-harder even than Suckers. How- who, when mounting a horse, always falls off on the
ever, it is the Grudgers that prosper. Unlike Suckers, they opposite side, especially when he tries to overcom-
don't waste time messing with unappreciative Cheat- pensate for his previous exaggerations. So it is with
ers, so they are not exploited and have ample energy to ethical egoism. Trying to compensate for an irra-
gather food and build better nests for their loved ones. tional, guilt-ridden, Sucker altruism of the morality
J. L. Mackie argues that the real name for Suckers of self-effacement, it falls off the horse on the other
is "Christian," one who believes in complete altru- side, embracing a Cheater's preoccupation with self-
ism, even turning the other cheek to one's assailant exaltation that robs the self of the deepest joys in life.
and loving one's enemy. Cheaters are ruthless egoists Only the person who mounts properly, avoiding both
who can survive only if there are enough naive altru- extremes, is likely to ride the horse of happiness to its
ists around. Whereas Grudgers are reciprocal altruists goal.
who have a rational morality based on cooperative
self-interest, Suckers, such as Socrates and Jesus, advo-
NOTES
cate "turning the other cheek and repaying evil with
good."s Instead of a Rule of Reciprocity, "I'll scratch 1. Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfislmess (New American Library,
your back if you'll scratch mine," the extreme altruist 1964), pp. vii and 27-32; 80ff.
substitutes the Golden Rule, "If you want the other fel- 2. Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Ego-
low to scratch your back, you scratch his-even if he ism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1957), pp. 111-118;
won't reciprocate." reprinted in Louis Pojman, Ethical Theor)" pp. 91-95.
The moral of the story is this: Altruist morality (so 3. See Jesse Kalin, "In Defense of EgOism," in Ethical Theory,
interpreted) is only rational given the payoff of eternal 4th ed., ed. Louis Pojman (Wadsworth, 2002), p. 95f.
life (with a scorekeeper as Woody Allen says). Take that 4. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford University Press,
away, and it looks like a Sucker system. What replaces 1976), Ch. 10.
the "Christian" vision of submission and saintliness 5.J. L. Mackie, "The Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and
is the reciprocal altruist with a tit-for-tat morality, Principles of Evolution," Philosophy 53 (1978).
From Utilitarianism
JOHN STUART MILL
CHAPTER II. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be
WHAT UTILITARIANISM IS gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation;
for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same
* * * to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which
The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, is good enough for the one would be good enough for
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and of happiness. Human beings have faculties more
the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the elevated than the animal appetites, and when once
privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral made conscious of them, do not regard anything as
standard set up by the theory, much more requires to happiness which does not include their gratification.
be said; in particular, what things it includes in the I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been
ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme
left an open question. But these supplementary expla- of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do
nations do not affect the theory of life on which this this in any sufficient manner, many StOic, as well as
theory of morality is grounded-namely, that plea- Christian elements require to be included. But there
sure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desir- is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not
able as ends; and that all desirable things (which are assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feel-
as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) ings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a
are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in them- much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere
selves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utili-
the prevention of pain. tarian writers in general have placed the superiority
Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater
and among them in some of the most estimable in feel- permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former-
ing and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than
has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utili-
no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit-they tarians have fully proved their case; but they might
deSignate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doc- have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher
trine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of ground, with entire consistency. It is qUite compatible
Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that
likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occa- some kinds of pleasure are more deSirable and more
sionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons valuable than others. It would be absurd that while,
by its German, French, and English assailants. in estimating all other things, quality is considered as
When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be
answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who supposed to depend on quantity alone.
represent human nature in a degrading light; since the If I am asked, what I mean by difference of qual-
accusation supposes human beings to be capable of ity in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more
no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except
its being greater in amount, there is but one possible
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2 (edited). answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which
all or almost all who have experience of both give contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is
a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable one form or other, and in some, though by no means in
pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are compe- exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which
tently acquainted with both, placed so far above the is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom
other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could
be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire
would not resign it for any quantity of the other plea- to them. Whoever supposes that this preference takes
sure which their nature is capable of, we are justified place at a sacrifice of happiness-that the superior
in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not hap-
in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, pier than the inferior-confounds the two very differ-
in comparison, of small account. ent ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low,
equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appre- has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied;
ciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked and a highly-endowed being will always feel that any
preference to the manner of existence which employs happiness which he can look for, as the world is consti-
their higher faculties. Few human creatures would con- tute, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfec-
sent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a tions, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make
promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the
no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the
no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no per- good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to
son of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; bet-
even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the ter to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if
dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because
they are with theirs. They would not resign what they they only know their own side of the question. The
possess more than he, for the most complete satisfac- other party to the comparison knows both sides.
tion of all the desires which they have in common with It may be objected, that many who are capable of
him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influ-
of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they ence of temptation, postpone them to the lower.
would exchange their lot for almost any other, how- But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation
ever, undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often,
faculties reqUires more to make him happy, is capable from infirmity of character, make their election for
probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly the nearer good, though they know it to be the less
accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior valuable; and this no less when the choice is between
type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily
wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the
existence. We may give what explanation we please of injury of health, though perfectly aware that health
this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name is the greater good. It may be further objected, that
which is given indiscriminately to some of the most many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for every-
and to some of the least estimable feelings of which thing noble, as they advance in years sink into indo-
mankind are capable; we may refer it to the love of lib- lence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those
erty and personal independence, an appeal to which who undergo this very common change, voluntarily
was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for choose the lower description of pleasures in prefer-
the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or the love ence to the higher. I believe that before they devote
of excitement, both of which do really enter into and themselves exclusively to the one, they have already
become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary
feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happi-
killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want ness, considered as the directive rule of human con-
of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it duct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition
speedily dies away if the occupations to which their to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that
position in life has devoted them, and the society into standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but
which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keep- the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it
ing that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is
high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no
because they have not time or opportunity for indulg- doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the
ing them; and they addict themselves to inferior plea- world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitari-
sures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but anism, therefore, could only attain its end by the gen-
because they are either the only ones to which they eral cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each
have access, or the only ones which they are any lon- individual were only benefited by the nobleness of
ger capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned,
anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare
classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly pre- enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders
ferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have bro- refutation superfluous.
ken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both. According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as
From this verdict of the only competent judges, above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to
I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question and for the sake of which all other things are desirable
which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or (whether we are considering our own good or that of
which of two modes of existence is the most grate- other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible
ful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both
from its consequences, the judgment of those who in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality,
are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being
that of the majority among them, must be admitted as the preference felt by those who, in their opportu-
final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept nities of experience, to which must be added their
this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, habits of self-conSCiousness and self-observation, are
since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even best furnished with the means of comparison. This
on the question of quantity. What means are there of being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end
determining which is the acutest of two pairs, or the of human action, is necessarily also the standard of
intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules
general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of
Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and which an existence such as has been described might
pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is be, to the greatest extent pOSSible, secured to all man-
there to deCide whether a particular pleasure is worth kind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of
purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the things admits, to the whole sentient creation.
feelings and judgment of the experienced? When,
therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the * * *
pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be pref- I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitari-
erable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to anism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that
those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of
higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own hap-
this subject to the same regard. piness, but that of all concerned. As between his own
happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice,
him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and and men are in general so little conscious of this vol-
benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of untary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest mis-
Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of understandings of ethical doctrines are continually
utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the
one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal per- greatest pretensions both to high principle and to
fection of utilitarian morality. As the means of mak- philosophy. We not uncommonly hear the doctrine
ing the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it
enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an
place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may assumption, we may say that the question depends
be called) the interest, of every indiVidual, as nearly as upon what idea we have formed of the moral charac-
possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; ter of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires,
and secondly, that education and opinion, which above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and
have so vast a power over human character, should that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is
so use that power as to establish in the mind of every not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly
individual an indissoluble association between his religiOUS than any other. If it be meant that utilitari-
own happiness and the good of the whole; especially anism does not recognise the revealed will of God as
between his own happiness and the practice of such the supreme law of morals, I answer, that an utilitar-
modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for ian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom
the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has
may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must ful-
to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the fil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. But
general gOOd, but also that a direct impulse to pro- others besides utilitarians have been of opinion that
mote the general good may be in every individual one the Christian revelation was intended, and is fitted, to
of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments inform the hearts and minds of mankind with a spirit
connected therewith may fill a large and prominent which should enable them to find for themselves what
place in every human being's sentient existence. If the is right, and incline them to do it when found, rather
impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it than to tell them, except in a very general way, what it
to their own minds in this its true character, I know is: and that we need a doctrine of ethics, carefully fol-
not what recommendation possessed by any other lowed out, to interpret to us the will of God. Whether
morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to
it: what more beautiful or more exalted developments discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or
of human nature any other ethical system can be sup- revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open
posed to foster, or what springs of action, not acces- to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use
sible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtful-
effect to their mandates. ness of any given course of action, by as good a right as
others can use it for the indication of a transcenden-
* * * tal law, having no connexion with usefulness or with
It may not be superfluous to notice a few more happiness.
of the common misapprehensions of utilitarian eth- Again, Utility is often summarily stigmatized as
ics, even those which are so obvious and gross that it an immoral doctrine by giving it the name of Expedi-
might appear impossible for any person of candour ency, and taking advantage of the popular use of that
and intelligence to fall into them: since persons, even term to contrast it with Principle. But the Expedient,
of considerable mental endowments, often give them- in the sense in which it is opposed to the Right, gener-
selves so little trouble to understand the bearings of ally means that which is expedient for the particular
interest of the agent himself: as when a minister sacri- that the violation, for a present advantage, of a rule of
fices the interest of his country to keep himself in place. such transcendent expediency, is not expedient, and
When it means anything better than this, it means that that he who, for the sake of a convenience to himself or
which is expedient for some immediate object, some to some other individual, does what depends on him to
temporary purpose, but which violates a rule whose deprive mankind of the good, and inflict upon them the
observance is expedient in a much higher degree. The evil, involved in the greater or less reliance which they
Expedient, in this sense, instead of being the same can place in each other's word, acts the part of one of
thing with the useful, is a branch of the hurtful. Thus, their worst enemies. Yet that even this rule, sacred as it
it would often be expedient, for the purpose of getting is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all
over some momentary embarrassment, or attaining moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding
some object immediately useful to ourselves or others, of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or
to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would pre-
of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity, is one serve some one (especially a person other than oneselO
of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feel- from great and unmerited evil, and when the withhold-
ing one of the most hurtful, things to which our con- ing can only be effected by denial. But in order that the
duct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even exception may not extend itself beyond the need, and
unintentional, deviation from truth, does that much may have the least possible effect in weakening reliance
towards weakening the trustworthiness of human on veracity, it ought to be recognized, and, if pOSSible, its
assertion, which is not only the principal support of limits defined; and if the principle of utility is good for
all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of anything, it must be good for weighing these conflict-
which does more than anyone thing that can be named ing utilities against one another, and marking out the
to keep back civilisation, virtue, everything on which region within which one or the other preponderates.
human happiness on the largest scale depends; we feel
* * *
From Leviathan
THOMAS HOBBES
any benefit to which another may not pretend as well

* * * as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has
strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND
machination or by confederacy with others that are in
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY AND MISERY
the same danger with himself.
Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside
and mind as that, though there be found one man the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill
sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called
mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together science, which very few have and but in few things, as
the difference between man and man is not so consid- being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained,
erable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself as prudence, while we look after somewhat else, I
find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 [Archive at socialsciences. strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal
mcmaster.ca]. time equally bestows on all men in those things they
equally apply themselves unto. That which may per- Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary
haps make such equality incredible is but a vain con- a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there
ceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think is no power able to overawe them all. For every man
they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is, looketh that his companion should value him at the
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs
by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours,
approve. For such is the nature of men that howso- as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no
ever they may acknowledge many others to be more common power to keep them in quiet is far enough
witty, or more eloquent or more learned, yet they will to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater
hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for value from his contemners, by damage; and from
they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a others, by the example.
distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that So that in the nature of man, we find three prin-
point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a cipal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly,
greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than diffidence; thirdly, glory.
that every man is contented with his share. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second,
From this equality of ability ariseth equality of for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use
hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any violence, to make themselves masters of other men's
two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to
they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile,
the way to their end (which is principally their own a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue,
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) either direct in their persons or by reflection in their
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And from kindred, their friends, their nation, their profeSSion,
hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no or their name.
more to fear than another man's single power, if one Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live
plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, oth- without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
ers may probably be expected to come prepared with are in that condition which is called war; and such a
forces united to dispossess and deprive him, not only war as is of every man against every man. For war con-
of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life or liberty. sisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in
And the invader again is in the like danger of another. a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle
And from this diffidence of one another, there is is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time
no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the
anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather
persons of all men he can so long till he see no other lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclina-
power great enough to endanger him: and this is no tion thereto of many days together: so the nature of
more than his own conservation requireth, and is gen- war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known
erally allowed. Also, because there be some that, tak- disposition thereto during all the time there is no assur-
ing pleasure in contemplating their own power in the ance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of
security reqUires, if others, that otherwise would be war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same
glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not consequent to the time wherein men live without
by invasion increase their power, they would not be other security than what their own strength and their
able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to own invention shall furnish them withal. In such con-
subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dition there is no place for industry, because the fruit
dominion over men being necessary to a man's con- thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of
servation, it ought to be allowed him. the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities
that may be imported by sea; no commodious build- against another, yet in all times kings and persons of
ing; no instruments of moving and removing such sovereign authority, because of their independency,
things as require much force; no knowledge of the face are in continual jealousies, and in the state and pos-
of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no ture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and
society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, gar-
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, risons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a
It may seem strange to some man that has not posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the
well weighed these things that Nature should thus industry of their subjects, there does not follow.from
dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy it that misery which accompanies the liberty of par-
one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to ticular men.
this inference, made from the passions, desire per- To this war of every man against every man, this
haps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The
him therefore consider with himself: when taking a notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have
journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accom- there no place. Where there is no common power, there
panied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud
even in his house he locks his chests; and this when are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice
he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind.
revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in
he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are
his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It
children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does is consequent also to the same condition that there be
he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct;
as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for
nature in it. The deSires, and other passions of man, so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill con-
are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that dition which man by mere nature is actually placed in;
proceed from those passions till they know a law that though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot partly in the passions, partly in his reason.
know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed The passions that incline men to peace are: fear of
upon the person that shall make it. death; desire of such things as are necessary to com-
It may peradventure be thought there was never modious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain
such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
it was never generally so, over all the world: but there peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement.
are many places where they live so now. For the sav- These articles are they which otherwise are called the
age people in many places of America, except the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more particularly
government of small families, the concord whereof in the two following chapters.
dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all,
and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said
before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS,
of life there would be, where there were no common AND OF CONTRACTS
power to fear, by the manner of life which men that The right of nature, which writers commonly call
have formerly lived under a peaceful government use jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his
to degenerate into a civil war. own power as he will himself for the preservation
But though there had never been any time of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and
wherein particular men were in a condition of war one consequently, of doing anything which, in his own
judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the things; and be contented with so much liberty against
aptest means thereunto. other men as he would allow other men against him-
By liberty is understood, according to the proper self. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of
signification of the word, the absence of external doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the
impediments; which impediments may oft take away condition of war. But if other men will not lay down
part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for
hinder him from using the power left him according anyone to divest himself of his: for that were to expose
as his judgement and reason shall dictate to him. himself to prey, which no man is bound to, rather
A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a precept, or gen- than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the
eral rule, found out by reason, by which a man is for- gospel: Whatsoever you require that others should do
bidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or to you, that do ye to them. And that law of all men,
taketh away the means of preserving the same, and quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.
to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best pre- To lay down a man's right to anything is to
served. For though they that speak of this subject use divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of
to confound jus and lex, right and law, yet they ought the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that
to be distinguished, because right consisteth in lib- renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any
erty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and other man a right which he had not before, because
bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as there is nothing to which every man had not right by
much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may
same matter are inconsistent. enjoy his own original right without hindrance from
And because the condition of man (as hath been him, not without hindrance from another. So that
declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war the effect which redoundeth to one man by another
of every one against every one, in which case every one man's defect of right is but so much diminution of
is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he impediments to the use of his own right original.
can make use of that may not be a help unto him in pre- Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it,
serving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in or by transferring it to another. By simply renouncing,
such a condition every man has a right to every thing, when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoun-
even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as deth. By transferring, when he intendeth the benefit
this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, thereof to some certain person or persons. And when
there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted
soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordi- away his right, then is he said to be obliged, or bound,
narily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a not to hinder those to whom such right is granted, or
precept, or general rule of reason: that every man ought abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought,
to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining and it is duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his
it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and own: and that such hindrance is injustice, and injury,
use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of as being sine jure; the right being before renounced or
which rule containeth the first and fundamental law transferred. So that injury or injustice, in the contro-
of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The versies of the world, is somewhat like to that which
second, the sum of the right of nature, which is: by all in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity. For
means we can to defend ourselves. as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what
From this fundamental law of nature, by which one maintained in the beginning; so in the world it
men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo that
this second law: that a man be willing, when others are which from the beginning he had voluntarily done.
so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself The way by which a man either simply renounceth or
he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all transferreth his right is a declaration, or Signification,
by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that granted, I will that this be yours: or of the future; as,
he doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced I will give, I will grant, which words of the future are
or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And called promise.
these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence
it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And of words; sometimes the consequence of silence;
the same are the bonds, by which men are bound and sometimes the consequence of actions; sometimes the
obliged: bonds that have their strength, not from their consequence of forbearing an action: and generally a
own nature (for nothing is more easily broken than a sign by inference, of any contract, is whatsoever suf-
man's word), but from fear of some evil consequence ficiently argues the will of the contractor.
upon the rupture. Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a
renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some free gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of
right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some the time to come, as, tomorrow I will give, they are a
other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my
act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it
is some good to himself. And therefore there be some by some other act....
rights which no man can be understood by any words, * * *
or other signs, to have abandoned or transferred. If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties
As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting perform presently, but trust one another, in the condi-
them that assault him by force to take away his life, tion of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every
because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion,
any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them
and chains, and imprisonment, both because there is both, with right and force sufficient to compel perfor-
no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to mance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has
the patience of suffering another to be wounded or no assurance the other will perform after, because the
imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition,
seeth men proceed against him by violence whether avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive some coercive power; which in the condition of mere
and end for which this renouncing and transferring of nature, where all men are equal, and judges of the just-
right is introduced is nothing else but the security of ness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.
a man's person, in his life, and in the means of so pre- And therefore he which performeth first does but betray
serving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never
man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself abandon of defending his life and means of living.
of the end for which those signs were intended, he is But in a civil estate, where there be a power set up
not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his to constrain those that would otherwise violate their
will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that
actions were to be interpreted. cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is
The mutual transferring of right is that which men obliged so to do.
call contract. * * *
* * *
Signs of contract are either express or by inference. OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE

Express are words spoken with understanding of what From that law of nature by which we are obliged to
they signify: and such words are either of the time transfer to another such rights as, being retained,
present or past; as, I give, I grant, I have given, I have hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third;
which is this: that men perform their covenants made; could be no reason why every man might not do what
without which covenants are in vain, and but empty he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to
words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, make, or not make; keep, or not keep, covenants was
we are still in the condition of war. not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit.
And in this law of nature consisteth the fountain He does not therein deny that there be covenants; and
and original of justice. For where no covenant hath that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and
preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and
every man has right to everything and consequently, the observance of them justice: but he questioneth
no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, whether injustice, taking away the fear of God (for the
then to break it is unjust and the definition of injus- same fool hath said in his heart there is no God), not
tice is no other than the not performance of covenant. sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to
And whatsoever is not unjust is just. every man his own good; and particularly then, when
But because covenants of mutual trust, where there it conduceth to such a benefit as shall put a man in a
is a fear of non performance on either part (as hath condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revil-
been said in the former chapter), are invalid, though ings, but also the power of other men. The kingdom
the original of justice be the making of covenants, yet of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be
injustice actually there can be none till the cause of gotten by unjust violence? Were it against reason so
such fear be taken away; which, while men are in the to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it?
natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore And if it be not against reason, it is not against justice:
before the names of just and unjust can have place, or else justice is not to be approved for good. From
there must be some coercive power to compel men such reasoning as this, successful wickedness hath
equally to the performance of their covenants, by the obtained the name of virtue: and some that in all other
terror of some punishment greater than the benefit things have disallowed the violation of faith, yet have
they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And
make good that propriety which by mutual contract the heathen that believed that Saturn was deposed by
men acquire in recompense of the universal right they his son Jupiter believed nevertheless the same Jupi-
abandon: and such power there is none before the ter to be the avenger of injustice, somewhat like to a
erection of a Commonwealth. And this is also to be piece of law in Coke's Commentaries on Littleton; where
gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the he says if the right heir of the crown be attainted of
Schools, for they say that justice is the constant will treason, yet the crown shall descend to him, and eo
of giving to every man his own. And therefore where instante the attainder be void: from which instances
there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injus- a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir
tice; and where there is no coercive power erected, apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in posses-
that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no sion, though his father, you may call it injustice, or by
propriety, all men having right to all things: therefore what other name you will; yet it can never be against
where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to
unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth in keep- the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
ing of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants reasonable that conduce most to their ends. This spe-
begins not but with the constitution of a civil power cious reasoning is nevertheless false.
sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is For the question is not of promises mutual, where
also that propriety begins. there is no security of performance on either side, as
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such when there is no civil power erected over the parties
thing as justice, and sometimes also with his tongue, promising; for such promises are no covenants: but
seriously alleging that every man's conservation and either where one of the parties has performed already,
contentment being committed to his own care, there or where there is a power to make him perform, there
is the question whether it be against reason; that is, the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot
against the benefit of the other to perform, or not. reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security:
And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation and therefore if he be left, or cast out of SOCiety, he
whereof we are to consider; first, that when a man doth perisheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors
a thing, which notwithstanding anything can be fore- of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon
seen and reckoned on tendeth to his own destruction, upon, and consequently against the reason of his pres-
howsoever some accident, which he could not expect, ervation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his
arriving may tum it to his benefit; yet such events do destruction forbear him only out of ignorance of what
not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that is good for themselves.
in a condition of war, wherein every man to every As for the instance of gaining the secure and per-
man, for want of a common power to keep them all in petual felicity of heaven by any way, it is frivolous;
awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own there being but one way imaginable, and that is not
strength, or wit, to himself from destruction without breaking, but keeping of covenant.
the help of confederates; where every one expects And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty
the same defence by the confederation that anyone by rebellion; it is manifest that, though the event fol-
else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks low, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected,
it reason to deceive those that help him can in reason but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so,
expect no other means of safety than what can be had others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the
from his own single power. He, therefore, that brea- attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore,
keth his covenant, and consequently declareth that he that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason
thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive
into any society that unite themselves for peace and to our life, and consequently a law of nature.
defence but by the error of them that receive him; nor * **
when he is received be retained in it without seeing
CHAPTER 6
Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your Duty
For the consequentialist, the rightness of an action of reason, for reason informs us of the moral law
depends entirely on the effects of that action (or just as surely as it reveals the truths of mathemat-
of following the rule that governs it). Good effects ics. Because of each person's capacity for reason, he
make the deed right; bad effects make the deed or she is a sovereign in the moral realm, a supreme
wrong. But for the nonconsequentialist (otherwise judge of what morality demands. What morality
known as a deol1tologist), the rightness of an action demands (in other words, our duty) is enshrined in
can never be measured by such a variable, contin- the moral law-the changeless, necessary, univer-
gent standard as the quantity of goodness brought sal body of moral rules.
into the world. Rightness derives not from the In Kant's ethics, right actions have moral value
consequences of an action but from its nature, its only if they are done with a "good will"-that is,
right-making characteristics. An action is right (or a will to do your duty for duty's sake. To act with
wrong) not because of what it produces but because a good will is to act with a desire to do your duty
of what it is. Yet for all their differences, both conse- simply because it is your duty, to act out of pure rev-
quentialist and deontological theories contain ele- erence for the moral law. Without a good will,
ments that seem to go to the heart of morality and your actions have no moral worth-even if they
our moral experience. So in this chapter, we look at accord with the moral law, even if they are done
ethics through a deontologicallens and explore the out of sympathy or love, even if they produce good
two deontological theories that historically have results. Only a good will is unconditionally good,
offered the strongest challenges to consequentialist and only an accompanying good will can give your
views: Kant's moral theory and natural law theory. talents, virtues, and actions moral worth. As Kant
explains,
l(ANT'S ETHICS Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world,
or even out of it, which can be called good with-
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-
out qualification, except a good will. Intelligence,
1804) is considered one of the greatest moral phi- wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind,
losophers of the modern era. Many scholars would however they may be named, or courage, resolu-
go further and say that he is the greatest moral tion, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are
philosopher of the modern era. As a distinguished undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects;
thinker of the Enlightenment, he sought to make but these gifts of nature may also become extremely
reason the foundation of morality. For him, reason bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use
alone leads us to the right and the good. There- of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is
called character, is not good. It is the same with the
fore, to discover the true path we need not appeal
gifts o'fortzme. Power, riches, honour, even health,
to utility, religion, tradition, authority, happiness, and the general well-being and contentment with
desires, or intuition. We need only heed the dictates one's condition which is called happiness, inspire
131
pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good maxim. If you steal a car, then your action implies
will to correct the influence of these on the mind .... a maxim such as "In this situation, steal a car if you
A good will is good not because of what it performs want one." So the first version of the categorical
or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of
imperative says that an action is right if you could
some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the
volition-that is, it is good in itself, and considered will the maxim of an action to become a moral law
by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that applying to all persons. That is, an action is permissi-
can be brought about by it in favour of any inclina- ble if (1) its maxim can be universalized (if everyone
tion, nay, even of the sum-total of all inclinations.} can consistently act on the maxim in Similar situa-
tions) and (2) you would be willing to let that hap-
So to do right, we must do it for duty's sake, pen. If you can so will the maxim, then the action
motivated solely by respect for the moral law. But is right (permissible). If you cannot, the action is
how do we know what the moral law is? Kant sees wrong (prohibited). Right actions pass the test of the
the moral law as a set of principles, or rules, stated categorical imperative; wrong actions do not.
in the form of imperatives, or commands. Impera- Some of the duties derived from the categorical
tives can be hypothetical or categorical. A hypo- imperative are, in Kant's words, perfect duties and
thetical im.perative tells us what we should do some, imperfect duties. Perfect duties are those
if we have certain desires: for example, "If you need that absolutely must be followed without fail; they
money, work for it" or "If you want orange juice, have no exceptions. Some perfect duties cited by
ask for it." We should obey such imperatives only Kant include duties not to break a promise, not to
if we desire the outcomes specified. A categorical lie, and not to commit suicide. Imperfect duties
imperative, however, is not so iffy. It tells us that are not always to be followed; they do have excep-
we should do something in all situations regardless of tions. As examples of imperfect duties, Kant men-
our wants and needs. A moral categorical imperative tions duties to develop your talents and to help
expresses a command such as "Do not steal" or "Do others in need.
not commit suicide." Such imperatives are universal Kant demonstrates how to apply the first ver-
and unconditional, containing no stipulations con- sion of the categorical imperative to several cases,
tingent on human desires or preferences. Kant says the most famous of which involves a lying prom-
that the moral law consists entirely of categorical ise. Imagine that you want to borrow money from
imperatives. They are the authoritative expression someone, and you know you will not be able to
of our moral duties. Because they are the products repay the debt. You also know that you will get
of rational insight and we are rational agents, we the loan if you falsely promise to pay the money
can straightforwardly access, understand, and know back. Is such deceptive borrowing morally permis-
them as the great truths that they are. sible? To find out, you have to devise a maxim for
Kant says that all our duties, all the moral cate- the action and ask whether you could consistently
gorical imperatives, can be logically derived from a will it to become a universal law. Could you con-
principle that he calls the categorical imperative. It sistently will everyone to act on the maxim, "If
tells us to "act only on that maxim through which you need money, make a lying promise to borrow
you can at the same time will that it should become some"? Kant's emphatic answer is no. If all per-
.
a unlversa IIaWe ,,2 (Kant actually devised three state- sons adopted this rule, then they would make lying
ments, or verSions, of the prinCiple, the one given promises to obtain loans. But then everyone would
here and two others; in the next few pages we will know that such promises are false, and the prac-
examine only the two most important ones.) Kant tice of giving loans based on a promise would no
believes that every action implies a general rule, or longer exist, because no promises could be trusted.
CHAPTER 6: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES: DO YOUR DUTY 0 133
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Sizing Up the Golden Rule
The Golden Rule-liDo unto others as you would think that the rule required him to part with his
have them do unto you"-has some resemblance goods under prime cost, or to give them away,
to Kant's ethics and has been, in one form or and thus to ruin himself. Now such a procedure
another, implicit in many religious traditions and would be absurd. ...
You have seen, then, that the golden rule was
moral systems. Moral philosophers generally think
far from being designed to impart to men the first
that it touches on a significant truth about moral-
notions of justice. On the contrary, it presupposes
ity. But some have argued that taken by itself,
that knowledge; and if we had no such notions,
without the aid of any other moral principles or we could not properly apply the rule. But the real
theory, the Golden Rule can lead to implausible design of it is to put us on our guard against the
conclusions and absurd results. Here is part of a danger of being blinded by self-interest. *
famous critique by Richard Whately (1787-1863):
How does the Golden Rule resemble Kant's theory?
Supposing anyone should regard this golden rule How does it differ? Do you agree with Whately's criti-
as designed to answer the purpose of a complete
cism? Why or why not? How could the Golden Rule
system of morality, and to teach us the difference
be qualified or supplemented to blunt Whately's
of right and wrong; then, if he had let his land
to a farmer, he might consider that the farmer critique? John Stuart Mill said that the Golden Rule
would be glad to be excused paying any rent for was the essence of utilitarianism. What do you think
it, since he would himself, if he were the farmer, he meant by this?
prefer having the land rent-free; and that, there-
fore, the rule of doing as he would be done by *Richard Whately, quoted in Louis P. Pojman and Lewis
requires him to give up all his property. So also Vaughn, The Moral Life (New York: Oxford University
the shopkeeper might, on the same principle, Press, 2007), 353-54.
The maxim, if acted on by everyone, would defeat action is permissible if everyone can consistently
itself. As Kant says, the "maxim would necessar- act on it in similar situations and you would be
ily destroy itself as soon as it was made a univer- willing to let that happen.) Kant asks us to con-
sal law. ,,3 Therefore, you cannot consistently will sider a maxim that mandates not contributing
the maxim to become a universal law. The action, anything to the welfare of others or aiding them
then, is not morally permissible. when they are in distress. If you willed this maxim
Kant believes that besides the rule forbidding to become a universal moral law (if everyone fol-
the breaking of promises, the categorical impera- lowed it), no self-defeating state of affairs would
tive generates several other duties. Among these he obtain. Everyone could conceivably follow this
includes prohibitions against committing suicide, rule. But you probably would not want people
lying, and killing innocent people. to act on this maxim, because one day you might
Some universalized maxims may fail the test need their help and sympathy. Right now you
of the categorical imperative (first version) not by might will the maxim to become universal law, but
being self-defeating (as in the case of a lying prom- later, when the tables are turned, you might regret
ise) but by constituting rules that you would not that policy. The inconsistency lies in wanting the
want everyone else to act on. (Remember that an rule to be universalized and not wanting it to be
universalized. Kant says that this alternative kind inhibit their free and autonomous actions by
of inconsistency shows that the action embodied enslaving or coercing them, or violate their equal-
in the maxim is not permissible. ity by discriminating against them. For Kant, lying
Kant's second version of the categorical impera- or breaking a promise is wrong because to do so is to
tive is probably more famous and influential than use people merely as a means to an end rather than
the first. (Kant believed the two versions to be vir- as an end in themselves.
tually synonymous, but they seem to be distinct Sometimes we use people to achieve some end,
principles.) He declares, "So act as to treat human- yet our actions are not wrong. To see why, we must
ity, whether in thine own person or in that of any understand that there is a moral difference between
other, in every case as an end withal, never as means treating people as a means and treating them merely,
only.,,4 This rule-the means-ends principle- or only, as a means. We may treat a mechanic as a
says that we must always treat people (including means to repair our cars, but we do not treat him
ourselves) as ends in themselves, as creatures of merely as a means if we also respect his status as a
great intrinsic worth, never merely as things of person. We do not treat him only as a means if we
instrumental value, never merely as tools to be used neither restrict his freedom nor ignore his rights.
for someone else's purpose. As noted earlier, Kant insists that the two ver-
This statement of the categorical imperative sions of the categorical imperative are two ways
reflects Kant's view of the status of rational beings, of stating the same idea. But the two principles
or persons. Persons have intrinsic value and dignity seem to be distinct, occasionally leading to differ-
because they, unlike the rest of creation, are ratio- ent conclusions about the rightness of an action.
nal agents who are free to choose their own ends, The maxim of an action, for example, may pass the
legislate their own moral laws, and assign value to first version (be permissible) by being universaliz-
things in the world. Persons are the givers of value, able but fail the second by not treating persons as
so they must have ultimate value. They therefore ends. A more plausible approach is to view the two
must always be treated as ultimate ends and never versions not as alternative tests but as a single two-
merely as means. part test that an action must pass to be judged mOf-
Kant's idea is that people not only have intrinsic ally permissible. So before we can declare a maxim
worth-they also have equal intrinsic worth. Each a bona fide categorical imperative, we must be able
rational being has the same inherent value as every to consistently will it to become a universal law and
other rational being. This equality of value cannot know that it would have us treat persons not only
be altered by, and has no connection to, social and as means but as ends.
economic status, racial and ethnic considerations,
or the possession of prestige or power. Any two per- Applying the Theory
sons are entitled to the same moral rights, even if How might a Kantian decide the case of the anti-
one is rich, wise, powerful, and famous-and the terrorist chief of police, discussed in Chapter 5,
other is not. who considers killing a terrorist's wife and chil-
To treat people merely as a means rather than dren? Recall that the terrorist is murdering hun-
as an end is to fail to recognize the true nature and dreds of innocent people each year and that the
status of persons. Because people are by nature chief has good reasons to believe that killing the
free, rational, autonomous, and equal, we treat wife and children (who are also innocent) will
them merely as a means if we do not respect these end the terrorist's attacks. Recall also the vef-
attributes-if we, for example, interfere with their dicts on this case rendered from the act- and rule-
right to make informed choices by lying to them, utilitarian perspectives. By act-utilitarian lights,
the chief should kill some of the terrorist's inno- Evaluating the Theory
cent relatives (and threaten to kill others). The Kant's moral theory meets the minimum require-
rule-utilitarian view, however, is that the chief ment of coherence and is generally consistent with
should not kill them. our moral experience (Criterion 2). In some trou-
Suppose the maxim in question is "When the bling ways, however, it seems to conflict with our
usual antiterrorist tactics fail to stop terrorists commonsense moral judgments (Criterion 1) and
from killing many innocent people, the authori- appears to have some flaws that restrict its useful-
ties should kill (and threaten to kill) the terrorists' ness in moral problem solving (Criterion 3).
relatives." Can we consistently will this maxim to As we saw earlier, some duties generated by
become a universal law? Does this maxim involve the categorical imperative are absolute-they are,
treating persons merely as a means to an end rather as Kant says, perfect duties, allowing no excep-
than as an end in themselves? To answer the first tions whatsoever. We have, for example, a perfect
question, we should try to imagine what would (exception less) duty not to lie-ever. But what
happen if everyone in the position of the relevant should we do if lying is the only way to prevent a
authorities followed this maxim. Would any incon- terrible tragedy? Suppose a friend of yours comes
sistencies or self-defeating states of affairs arise? We to your house in a panic and begs you to hide her
can see that the consequences of universalizing from an insane man intent on murdering her. No
the maxim would not be pleasant. The authorities sooner do you hide her in the cellar than the insane
would kill the innocent-actions that could be as man appears at your door with a bloody knife in his
gruesome and frightening as terrorist attacks. But hand and asks where your friend is. You have no
our willing that everyone act on the maxim would doubt that the man is serious and that your friend
not be self-defeating or otherwise contradictory. will in fact be brutally murdered if the man finds
Would we nevertheless be willing to live in a world her. Imagine that you have only two choices (and
where the maxim was universally followed? Again, saying "I don't know" is not one of them): either
there seems to be no good reason why we could you lie to the man and thereby save your friend's
not. The maxim therefore passes the first test of the life, or you tell the man where she is hiding and
categorical imperative. guarantee her murder. Kant actually considers such
To answer the second (means-ends) question, a case and renders this verdict on it: you should
we must inquire whether following the maxim tell the truth though the heavens fall. He says, as
would involve treating someone merely as a he must, that the consequences of your action here
means. The obvious answer is yes. This antiter- are irrelevant. Yet Kant's answer seems contrary to
rorism policy would use the innocent relatives of our considered moral judgments. Moral common
terrorists as a means to stop terrorist acts. Their sense seems to suggest that in a case like this, saving
freedom and their rights as persons would be vio- a life would be much more important than telling
lated. The maxim therefore fails the second test, the truth.
and the acts sanctioned by the maxim would not be Another classic example involves promise keep-
permissible. From the Kantian perspective, using ing, which is also a perfect duty. Suppose you
the innocent relatives would be wrong no mat- promise to meet a friend for lunch, and on your
ter what-regardless of how many lives the policy way to the restaurant you are called on to help
would save or how much safer the world would someone injured in a car crash. No one else can
be. So in this case, the Kantian verdict would coin- help her, and she will die unless you render aid.
cide with that of rule-utilitarianism but not that of But if you help her, you will break your promise
act-utilitarianism. to meet your friend. What should you do? Kant
would say that come what may, your duty is to consistently act on it and if you would be willing
keep your promise to meet your friend. Under to have that happen. At first glance, it seems to
these circumstances, however, keeping the prom- guarantee that moral rules are universally fair. But
ise just seems wrong. it makes the acceptability of a moral rule depend
These scenarios are significant because, con- largely on whether you personally are willing to live
trary to Kant's view, they suggest that we have no in a world that conforms to the rule. If you are not
absolute, or exceptionless, moral duties. We can willing to live in such a world, then the rule fails the
easily imagine many cases like those just men- first version of the categorical imperative, and your
tioned. Moreover, we can also envision situations conforming to the rule is wrong. But if you are the
in which we must choose between two allegedly sort of person who would prefer such a world, then
perfect duties, each one prohibiting some action. conforming to the rule would be morally permis-
We cannot fulfill both duties at once, and we must sible. This subjectivity in Kant's theory could lead
make a choice. Such conflicts provide plausible evi- to the sanctioning of heinous acts of all kinds. Sup-
dence against the notion that there are exception- pose the rule is "Kill everyone with dark skin" or
less moral rules. 5 "Murder all Jews." Neither rule would be contradic-
Conflicts of duties, of course, are not just defi- tory if universalized; everyone could consistently
ciencies under Criterion 1. They also indicate diffi- act on it. Moreover, if you were willing to have
culties with Criterion 3. Like many moral theories, everyone act on it-even willing to be killed if you
Kant's system fails to provide an effective means of have dark skin or are a Jew-then acts endorsed by
resolving major conflicts of duties. the rule would be permissible. Thus the first version
Some additional inconsistencies with our con- seems to bless acts that are clearly immoral.
sidered moral judgments seem to arise from Critics say that another difficulty with Kant's
applications of the first version of the categori- theory concerns the phrasing of the maxims to be
cal imperative. Remember that the first version universalized. Oddly enough, Kant does not pro-
says that an action is permissible if everyone can vide any guidance for how we should state a rule
- ~
"~
I<ant, Respect, and Personal Rights
Respect is the guiding value of Kantian ethics. something. (Positive rights are rights that obli-
Respect is owed all persons equally, Kant says, gate others to help us obtain something.) Persons
because they have intrinsic worth and dignity have the right not to be treated in certain ways:
due to their autonomy-that is, their capacity for not to be used or regarded as if they were mere
rational decisions, autonomous action, and moral instruments, and not to have their autonomous
choices. Kant made this point by insisting that we actions and free choices thwarted or constrained.
must always treat persons as ends in themselves, The principle of respect therefore would prohibit,
never merely as a means to an end (as tools to be among other things, lying to persons, cheating
used for someone else's purposes). Another way them, coercing them, falsely imprisoning them,
to express this is to say that, as persons, we have discriminating against them, and manipulating
rights-specifically, negative rights, which obli- them. Their negative rights can be violated or
gate others not to interfere with our obtaining overridden only for very strong reasons.
describing an action, an oversight that allows us to treating him merely as a cause of infection to others.
word a rule in many different ways. Consider, for But, if we refuse to isolate him, we are treating other
example, our duty not to lie. You might state the rel- people merely as means to his comfort and culture.6
evant rule like this: "Lie only to avoid injury or death Kant's means-ends principle captures an impor-
to others." But you could also say "Lie only to avoid tant truth about the intrinsic value of persons. But
injury, death, or embarrassment to anyone who apparently we cannot fully implement it, because
has green eyes and red hair" (a group that includes sometimes we are forced to treat people merely as a
you and your relatives). Neither rule would lead to means and not as an end in themselves.
an inconsistency if everyone acted on it, so they
both describe permissible actions. The second rule,
LEARNING FROM I<ANT'S THEORY
though, is obviously not morally acceptable. More to
the pOint, it shows that we can use the first version Despite these criticisms, Kant's theory has been
of the categorical imperative to sanction all sorts influential because it embodies a large part of the
of immoral acts if we state the rule in enough detail. whole truth about morality. At a minimum, it
This result suggests not only a problem with Crite- promotes many of the duties and rights that our
rion 1 but also a limitation on the usefulness of the considered moral judgments lead us to embrace.
theory, a fault measured by Criterion 3. Judging the Furthermore, it emphasizes three of morality's most
rightness of an action is close to impossible if the lan- important features: (1) universality, (2) impartial-
guage of the relevant rule can change with the wind. ity, and (3) respect for persons.
It may be feasible to remedy some of the short- Kant's first version of the categOrical imperative
comings of the first version of the categorical imper- rests firmly on universality-the notion that the
ative by combining it with the second. Rules such as moral law applies to all persons in relevantly simi-
"Kill everyone with dark skin" or "Lie only to avoid lar situations. Impartiality requires that the moral
injury, death, or embarrassment to anyone who law apply to everyone in the same way, that no one
has green eyes and red hair" would be unaccept- can claim a privileged moral status. In Kantian eth-
able because they would allow people to be treated ics, double standards are inherently bad. Ethical
merely as a means. But the means-ends principle egoism fails as a moral theory in large part because
itself appears to be in need of modification. The it lacks this kind of impartiality. The first version of
main difficulty is that our duties not to use people the categorical imperative, in contrast, enshrines
merely as a means can conflict, and Kant provides impartiality as essential to the moral life. Kant's
no counsel on how to resolve such dilemmas. Say, principle of respect for persons (the means-ends
for example, that hundreds of innocent people are imperative) entails a recognition that persons have
enslaved inside a brutal Nazi concentration camp, ultimate and inherent value, that they should not
and the only way we can free them is to kill the be used merely as a means to utilitarian ends, that
Nazis guarding the camp. We must therefore choose equals should be treated equally, and that there are
between allowing the prisoners to be used merely as limits to what can be done to persons for the sake of
a means by the Nazis or using the Nazis merely as a good consequences. To many scholars, the central
means by killing them to free the prisoners. flaw of utilitarianism is that it does not incorporate
Here is another example, a classic case from the a fully developed respect for persons. But in Kant's
philosopher C. D. Broad: theory, the rights and duties of persons override
Again, there seem to be cases in which you must any consequentialist calculus.
either treat A or treat B, not as an end, but as a means. So Kantian ethics has many of the most impor-
If we isolate a man who is a carrier of typhOid, we are tant qualities that we associate with adequate
moral theories. And no one has explained better and finally into an oak. The end toward which the
than Kant why persons deserve full respect and acorn strives is the good (for acorns)-that is, to be
how we are to determine whether persons are get- a well-formed and well-functioning oak. Natural
ting the respect they deserve. law determines how an oak functions-and indi-
cates how an oak should function. If the oak does
not function according to its natural purpose (if, for
NATURAL LAW THEORY example, it is deformed or weak), it fails to be as it
The natural law theory of morality comes to us from should be, deviating from its proper path laid down
ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (most nota- in natural law. Likewise, humans have a nature-
bly, Aristotle and the Stoics) through the theologian a natural function and purpose unique among all
and philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). living things. In human nature, in the mandates of
Aquinas molded it into its most influential form and the natural law for humanity, are the aims toward
bequeathed it to the world and the Roman Catholic which human life strives. In these teleological striv-
Church, which embraced it as its official system of ings, in these facts about what human nature is, we
ethics. To this day, the theory is the primary basis can perceive what it should be.
for the church's views on abortion, homosexuality, What is it, exactly, that human nature aims at?
euthanasia, and other controversial issues. Aquinas says that humans naturally incline toward
Here we focus on the traditional version of the preservation of human life, avoidance of harm,
theory derived from Aquinas. This form is theistic, basic functions that humans and animals have in
assuming a divine lawgiver that has given us the gift common (sexual intercourse, raising offspring,
of reason to comprehend the order of nature. But and the like), the search for truth, the nurturing of
there are other natural law theories of a more recent social ties, and behavior that is benign and reason-
vintage that dispense with the religious elements, able. For humans, these inclinations constitute the
basing objective moral standards on human nature good-the good of human flourishing and well-
and the natural needs and interests of humans. being. Our duty, then, is to achieve the good, to
According to Aquinas, at the heart of the tra- fully realize the goals to which our nature is already
ditional theory is the notion that right actions are inclined. As Aquinas says,
those that accord with the natural law-the moral [T]his is the first precept of law, that good is to be
principles that we can "read" clearly in the very done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other
structure of nature itself, including human nature. precepts of the natural law are based upon thiS; so
We can look into nature and somehow uncover that all things which the practical reason naturally
moral standards because nature is a certain way: it apprehends as man's good belong to the precepts of
is rationally ordered and teleological (goal-directed), the natural law under the form of things to be done
or avoided.
with every part having its own purpose or end at
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and
which it naturally aims. From this notion about evil, the nature of the contrary, hence it is that all
nature, traditional natural law theorists draw the those things to which man has a natural inclination
following conclusion: How nature is reveals how it are naturally apprehended by reason as good, and
should be. The goals to which nature inclines reveal consequently as objects of purSUit, and their contrar-
the values that we should embrace and the moral ies as evil, and objects of avoidance. Therefore, the
order of the precepts of the natural law is according to
purposes to which we should aspire. 7
the order of natural inclinations.
In conformity with an inherent natural pur-
pose or goal-that is, according to natural law-an In this passage, Aquinas refers to the aspect
acorn develops into a seedling, then into a sapling, of human nature that enables us to deCipher and
implement the precepts of natural law: reason. duties is that such inconsistencies cannot hap-
Humans, unlike the rest of nature, are rational crea- pen. The natural law tradition gives a different
tures, capable of understanding, deliberation, and answer: conflicts between duties are pOSSible, but
free choice. Because all of nature is ordered and ratio- they can be resolved by applying the doctrine
nal, only rational beings such as humans can peer of double effect. This principle pertains to
into it and discern the inclinations in their nature, situations in which an action has both good and
derive from the natural tendencies the natural laws, bad effects. It says that performing a good action
and apply the laws to their actions and their lives. may be permissible even if it has bad effects,
Humans have the gift of reason (a gift from God, but performing a bad action for the purpose of
Aquinas says), and reason gives us access to the laws. achieving good effects is never permissible. More
Reason therefore is the foundation of morality.Judg- formally, in a traditional interpretation of the
ing the rightness of actions, then, is a matter of con- doctrine, an action is permissible if four condi-
sulting reason, of considering rational grounds for tions are met:
moral beliefs.
It follows from these points that the natural 1. The action is inherently (without reference to con-
(moral) laws are both objective and universal. sequences) either morally good or morally neutral.
The general principles of right and wrong do not That is, the action itself must at least be morally
vary from person to person or culture to culture. permissible.
The dynamics of each situation may alter how a 2. The bad effect is not used to produce the good effect
principle is applied, and not every situation has a (though the bad may be a side effect of the good).
relevant principle, but principles do not change Killing a fetus to save the mother's life is never
with the tide. The natural laws are the natural permissible. However, using a drug to cure the
laws. Further, not only are they binding on all per- mother's life-threatening disease-even though
sons, but they can be known by all persons. Aqui- the fetus dies as a side effect of the treatment-
nas insists that belief in God or inspiration from may be permissible.
above is not a prerequisite for knowledge of moral- 3. The intention must always be to bring about the
ity. A person's effective use of reason is the only good effect. For any given action, the bad effect
requirement. may occur, and it may even be foreseen, but it
Like Kant's categorical imperative, traditional must not be intended.
natural law theory is, in the main, strongly abso-
4. The good effect must be at least as important as
lutist. Natural law theorists commonly insist on
the bad effect. The good of an action must be
several exception less rules. Directly killing the
proportional to the bad. If the bad heavily
innocent is always wrong (which means that
outweighs the good, the action is not permis-
direct abortion is always wrong). Use of contra- sible. The good of saving your own life in an act
ceptives is always wrong (on the grounds that it
of self-defense, for example, must be at least
interferes with the natural human inclination
as great as the bad of taking the life of your
toward procreation). Homosexuality is always
attacker.
wrong (again because it thwarts procreation).
For Aquinas, lying, adultery, and blasphemy are The doctrine of double effect is surprisingly ver-
always wrong. satile. Natural law theorists have used it to navigate
As we have seen, moral principles-especially moral dilemmas in medical ethics, reproductive
absolutist rules-can give rise to conflicts health, warfare, and other life-and-death issues, as
of duties. Kant's view on conflicting perfect we will see in the next section.
Applying the Theory the good effect. The loss of the fetus is an indirect,
Traditional natural law theory and its double-effect unintended result of the attempt to destroy the
doctrine figure prominently in obstetrics cases in cancer. The action therefore meets Condition 2.
which a choice must be made between harming The intention behind the action is to kill the can-
a pregnant woman or harming her fetus. A typi- cer and thereby save the woman's life-not to kill
cal scenario goes something like this: A pregnant the fetus. The woman and her doctors know that
woman has cancer and will die unless she receives the unfortunate consequence of treating the can-
chemotherapy to destroy the tumors. If she does cer will be the death of the fetus. They foresee the
take the chemotherapy, the fetus will die. Is it mor- death, but their intention is not to kill the fetus.
ally permissible for her to do so? Thus, the action meets Condition 3. Is the good
In itself, the act of taking the chemotherapy effect proportional to the bad effect? In this case, a
is morally permissible. There is nothing inher- life is balanced against a life, the life of the woman
ently wrong with using a medical treatment to and the life of the fetus. From the natural law per-
try to cure a life-threatening illness. So the action spective, both sides of the scale seem about equal
meets Condition 1. We can also see that the bad in importance. If the good effect to be achieved for
effect (killing the fetus) is not used to produce the the woman was, say, a nicer appearance through
good effect (saving the woman's life). Receiving cosmetic surgery, and the bad effect was the death
the chemotherapy is the method used to achieve of the fetus, the two sides would not have the same
level of importance. But in this case, the action does
meet Condition 4. Because the action meets all four
conditions, receiving the chemotherapy is morally
- ~
permissible for the woman.
"~
Now let us examine a different kind of sce-
QUICI< REVIEW nario. Remember that earlier in this chapter, we
hypothetical imperative-An imperative that tells applied both utilitarianism and Kant's theory
us what we should do if we have certain desires. to the antiterrorism tactic of killing a terrorist's
relatives. To stop the murder of many innocent
categorical imperative-An imperative that we
people by a relentless terrorist, the authorities
should follow regardless of our particular wants
consider killing his wife and three of his children
and needs; also, the principle that defines Kant's
ethical system. and threatening to kill the remaining four chil-
dren. What verdict would the doctrine of double
perfect duty-A duty that has no exceptions.
effect yield in this case?
imperfect duty-A duty that has.exceptions. The good effect of this action is preventing
means-ends principle-The rule that we must the deaths of innocent citizens; the bad effect is
always treat people (including ourselves) as the killing of other innocents. Right away we can
ends in themselves, never merely as a means. see that the action, in itself, is not morally good.
doctrine of double effect-The principle that Directly killing the innocent is never permissible,
performing a good action may be permissible so the action does not meet Condition 1. Failing to
even if it has bad effects, but performing a measure up to even one condition shows the action
bad action for the purpose of achieving good to be prohibited, but we will continue our analysiS
effects is never permissible; any bad effects anyway. Is the bad effect used to produce the good
must be unintended. effect? Yes. The point of the action is to prevent
further terrorist killings, and the means to that end
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Double Effect and the "Trolley Problem"

Consider the following thought experiment, first time than the five can, so you will kill him if you
proposed by the philosopher Philippa Foot and turn the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible
set forth here by the philosopher Judith Jarvis for you to turn the trolley?*
Thomson: If you were the driver of the trolley, which option
Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley would you choose? Would you consider it morally
rounds a bend, and there come into view ahead permissible to turn the trolley onto the one work-
five track workmen, who have been repairing the man to save the other five? Why or why not? What
track. The track goes through a bit of a valley at would the doctrine of double effect have you do in
that point, and the sides are steep, so you must this case? Does your moral intuition seem to conflict
stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the
with what the doctrine would have you do? What
five men down. You step on the brakes, but alas
reasons can you give for the choice you make?
they don't work. Now you suddenly see a spur of
track leading off to the right. You can turn the
trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the *Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Critical Thought: Double
straight track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has Effect and the 'Trolley Problem,'" Yale Law Journal,
arranged that there is one track workman on that vol. 94, no. 6, May 1985. Reprinted with permission
spur of track. He can no more get off the track in from the Yale Law Journal.
is killing the terrorist's wife and children. The bad Evaluating the Theory
is used to achieve the good. So the action does not Traditional natural law theory appears to contain
meet Condition 2, either. It does, however, meet no crippling internal inconsistencies, so we will
Condition 3 because the intention behind the regard it as an eligible theory for evaluation. But it
action is to bring about the good effect, prevent- does encounter difficulties with Criteria 1 and 3.
ing further terrorist killings. Finally, if we view The theory seems to fall short of Criterion 1 (it
the good effect (preventing the deaths of citizens) conflicts with commonsense moral judgments) in
as comparable to the bad effect (the killing of the part because of its absolutism, a feature that also
terrorist's wife and children), we should infer that encumbers Kant's theory. As we have seen, natural
the action meets Condition 4. In any case, because law theorists maintain that some actions are always
the action fails Conditions 1 and 2, we have to wrong: for example, intentionally killing the inno-
say that killing members of the terrorist's family is cent, impeding procreation (through contracep-
not permissible. tion, sterilization, or sexual preferences), or lying.
As suggested earlier, a Kantian theorist would Such absolutes, though, can lead to moral judg-
be likely to agree with this decision, and a rule- ments that seem to diverge from common sense.
utilitarian would probably concur. However, The absolute prohibition against directly killing
judging that the good consequences outweigh the innocent, for example, could actually result in
the bad, an act-utilitarian might very well say great loss of life in certain extreme circumstances.
that killing the wife and children to prevent Imagine that a thousand innocent people are taken
many other deaths would be not only permis- hostage by a homicidal madman, and the only way
sible, but Obligatory. to save the lives of nine hundred and ninety-nine
is to intentionally kill one of them. If the one is not problematic. The kinds of moral principles that
killed, all one thousand will die. Most of us would we might extract from nature depend on our con-
probably regard the killing of the one hostage as a ception of nature, and such conceptions can vary.
tragic but necessary measure to prevent a massive Taking their cue from Aquinas, many natural law
loss of life. The alternative-letting them all die- theorists see the inclinations of human nature as
would seem a much greater tragedy. But many nat- benign; others, as fundamentally depraved. His-
ural law theorists would condemn the killing of the torically, humans have shown a capacity for both
one innocent person even if it would save the lives great good and monstrous evil. Which inclination
of hundreds. is the true one? And even if we could accurately
Similarly, suppose a pregnant woman will die identify human inclinations, there seems to be no
unless her fetus is aborted. Would it be morally reliable procedure for uncovering the correspond-
permissible for her to have the abortion? Given the ing moral values or telling whether moral princi-
natural law prohibition against killing the inno- ples should be absolutist.
cent, many natural law theorists would say no.
Aborting the fetus would be wrong, even to save
LEARNING FROM NATURAL LAW
the mother's life. But most people would probably
say that this view contradicts our considered moral Like Kantian ethics, natural law theory is univer-
judgments. salist, objective, and rational, applying to all per-
The absolutism of natural law theory arises sons and requiring that moral choices be backed
from the notion that nature is authoritatively tele- by good reasons. The emphasis on reason makes
ological. Nature aims toward particular ends that morality independent of religion and belief in
are ordained by the divine, and the values inher- God, a distinction also found in Kant's ethics. At
ent in this arrangement cannot and must not be the heart of natural law theory is a strong respect
ignored or altered. How nature is reveals how it for human life, an attitude that is close to, but not
should be. Period. But the teleological character of quite the same thing as, Kant's means-ends prin-
nature has never been established by logical argu- ciple. Respect for life or persons is, of course, a pri-
ment or empirical science-at least not to the satis- mary concern of our moral experience and seems
faction of most philosophers and scientists. In fact, to preclude the kind of wholesale end-justifies-the-
science (including evolutionary theory) suggests means calculations that are a defining characteris-
that nature is not teleological at all, but instead tic of many forms of utilitarianism.
random and purposeless, changing and adapting Natural law theory emphasizes a significant
according to scientific laws, blind cause and effect, element in moral deliberation that some other
chance mutation, and competition among species. theories play down: intention. In general, inten-
Moreover, the idea that values can somehow be tion plays a larger role in natural law theory than
extracted from the facts of nature is as problematic it does in Kant's categorical imperative. To many
for natural law theory as it is for ethical egOism and natural law theorists, the rightness of an action
utilitarianism. From the fact that humans have a often depends on the intentions of the moral agent
natural inclination toward procreation it does not performing it. In our previous example of the preg-
follow that discouraging procreation through con- nant woman with cancer, the intention behind the
traception is morally wrong. act of taking the chemotherapy is to kill the cancer,
Natural law theory seems to falter on Crite- not the fetus, though the fetus dies because of the
rion 3 (usefulness) because, as just mentioned, treatment. So the action is thought to be morally
discovering what values are inscribed in nature is permissible. If the intention had been to kill the
fetus directly, the action would have been deemed moral prinCiples embedded in nature itself. How nature
wrong. In our everyday moral experience, we fre- is reveals how it should be. The inclinations of human
quently take intentions into account in evaluating nature reveal the values that humans should live by.
an action. We usually would think that there must Aquinas, who gave us the most influential form of
be some morally relevant difference between a ter- natural law theory, says that humans naturally incline
rorist's intentionally killing ten people and a police toward preservation of human life, procreation, the
officer's accidentally killing those same ten people search for truth, community, and benign and reason-
while chasing the terrorist, though both scenarios able behavior. Like Kant's theory, traditional natural
law theory is absolutist, maintaining that some actions
result in the same tragic loss of life.
are always wrong. These immoral actions include
directly killing the innocent, interfering with procre-
ation, and lying. The theory's absolutist rules do occa-
sionally conflict, and the proposed remedy for any such
inconsistencies is the doctrine of double effect. That
CHAPTER REVIEW principle applies to situations in which an action pro-
duces both good and bad effects. It says that perform-
ing a good action may be permissible even if it has bad
SUMMARY effects, but performing a bad action for the purpose of
achieving good effects is never permissible. Despite the
Kant's moral theory is perhaps the most influential of double-effect doctrine, the theory's biggest weakness
all nonconsequentialist approaches. In his view, right is still its absolutism, which seems to mandate actions
actions have moral value only if they are done with a that conflict with our considered moral judgments.
"good will" -for duty's sake alone. The meat of Kant's In some cases, for example, the theory might require
theory is the categorical imperative, a principle that someone to allow hundreds of innocent people to die
he formulates in three versions. The first of the two just to avoid the direct killing of a single person.
versions we discuss says that an action is right if you
could will the maxim of that action to become a moral
law applying to all persons. An action is permissible I(EY TERMS
hypothetical imperative (p. 132)
if (1) its maxim can be universalized (if everyone can
categorical imperative (p. 132)
consistently act on it) and (2) you would be willing to
have that happen. The second version of the categorical perfect duty (p. 132)
imperative says that we must always treat people as ends imperfect duty (p. 132)
means-ends principle (p. 134)
in themselves and never merely as means to an end.
doctrine of double effect (p. 139)
Kant's theory seems to conflict with our common-
sense moral judgments (Criterion 1) and has flaws
that limit its usefulness in moral problem solving (Cri- EXERCISES
terion 3). The theory falters under Criterion 1 mainly
Review Questions
because some duties generated by the categorical
imperative are absolute. Absolute duties can conflict, 1. What is the significance of a "good will" in
and Kant provides no way to resolve these incon- Kant's ethiCS? (pp. 131-32)
sistencies, a failure under Criterion 3. Furthermore, 2. What is the difference between a hypothetical
counterexamples suggest that we have no genuine and a categorical imperative? (p. 132)
absolute duties. 3. What is the moral principle laid out in the
Natural law theory is based on the notion that right first version of Kant's categorical imperative?
actions are those that accord with natural law-the (p. 132)
4. What is the difference between perfect and 8. Do you believe, as Kant does, that there are
imperfect duties? (p. 132) perfect (absolute) duties? Why or why not?
5. How does Kant distinguish between treating 9. According to the textbook, natural law
someone as a means and treating someone theory generates judgments that conflict with
merely as a means? (p. 134) commonsense morality. Do you agree with this
6. How can the absolutism of Kant's theory lead assessment? Why or why not?
to judgments that conflict with moral common 10. Is natural law theory more plausible than
sense? (pp. 135-36) utilitarianism? Why or why not?
7. How might the subjectivity of Kant's theory
lead to the sanctioning of heinous acts? ETHICAL DILEMMAS
(p. 136) Explain how Kant's theory could be applied in the
8. What is natural law theory? (pp. 138-39) following scenarios to determine the proper course
9. According to natural law theorists, how of action.
can nature reveal anything about morality? 1. Julie and Chan have been dating for three
(p.138) months, and their relationship has slowly
10. According to Aquinas, what is the good that blossomed into one of sincere affection and
human nature aims at? (p. 138) trust. At the time they began dating, Chan had
11. According to natural law theory, how are moral a sexually transmitted disease, but he never
principles objective? How are they universal? disclosed this information to Julie. Without
(p.139) Julie's knowledge, Chan sought treatment and
12. What is the doctrine of double effect? (p. 139) was eventually cured of the infection. Chan has
13. How can the absolutism of natural law theory kept his secret from the beginning and has no
lead to moral judgments that conflict with intention of ever revealing it to anyone. How
moral common sense? (p. 141) would Kant evaluate this situation? Would he
approve or disapprove of Chan's actions?
2. Imagine a World War II scenario in which
German soldiers strap innocent people to the
1. Which moral theory-Kant's or natural law- front of their tanks to dissuade Allied troops from
seems more plausible to you? Why? firing on the vehicles. If the Allies hold their fire,
2. What elements of Kant's theory do you think their positions will be overrun, and hundreds of
could or should be part of any viable moral their troops will be killed. The Allied commander
theory? gives the order for his troops to shoot at the tanks,
3. In what way is Kant's ethics independent of (not knowing that the civilians will perish. Should the
based on) religious belief? Is natural law theory Allies have killed these innocents?
independent of religious belief? Why or why not?
4. According to Kant, why is breaking a promise Explain how natural law theory could be applied in
or lying immoral? Do you agree with Kant's the following scenariO to determine the proper course
reasoning? Why or why not? of action.
5. How might your life change if you completely 3. A scientist is conducting an experiment using
one hundred adult subjects, hoping to finally
embraced Kant's theory of morality?
discover a cure for liver cancer. Conducting this
6. How might your life change if you adopted the
natural law theory of morality? one last study is the only way to identify the
substance that can cure the disease and save the
7. Would a Kantian and a natural law theorist
lives of countless people. But the experiment
agree on whether having an abortion is moral?
Why or why not? causes long-lasting, horrible pain in the
subjects, and they will not be able to benefit in C. E. Harris, chapters 6 and 8 in Applying Moral Theories,
any way from the study's success. The researcher 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1997).
would ordinarily never be able to enlist any Mark Murphy, "The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics,"
subjects for the study because of these two facts, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2002
so to ensure the cooperation of the subjects, ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu
/archives/win2002/entries/natural-Iaw-ethics (March 1,2015).
he lies to them: he says that being a part of the
Kai Nielsen, Ethics without God (London: Pemberton;
study will be painless and that it will increase
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1973).
their life span. The study is completed, the cure Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic
is found, and the subjects spend the next year Books, 1974).
in agony. What would natural law theory say Onora O'Neill, "Kantian Ethics," in A Companion to Ethics,
about the scientist's actions? ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Louis P. Pojman, "Natural Law," in Ethics: Discovering Right
and Wrong, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002).
FURTHER READING
James Rachels, chapter 9 in The Elements of Moral Philo-
Stephen Buckle, UNatural Law," in A Companion to Ethics,
sophy, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003).
ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Chris Surprenant, Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue (New
Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine
York: Routledge, 2014).
of Right: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Paul Taylor, chapter 5 in Principles of Ethics: An Introduc-
versity Press, 2010).
tion (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975).
Jonathan Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Basic Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. and annotated by
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clar-
Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945).
endon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
Robert N. Van Wyk, chapters 4 and 6 in Introduction to
Paul Guyer, Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysic ofMorals:
Ethics (New York: St. Martin's, 1990).
A Reader's Guide (New York: Continuum, 2007).
READINGS
From Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

IMMANUEL KANT
* * * therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power,
even out of it, which can be called good, without quali- riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being
fication, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judge- and contentment with one's condition which is called
ment, and the other talents ofthe mind, however, they happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if
may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as there is not a good will to correct the influence of these
qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole
desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of
may also become extremely bad and mischievous a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a
if the will which is to make use of them, and which, pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can
never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator.
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Prillciple$ oft/Ie Metaph)'$icofMora/$, Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispens-
trans. Thomas K. Abbott (edited). able condition even of being worthy of happiness.
~-
There are even some qualities which are of service reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will
to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet examine this idea from this point of view.
which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always
presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that * * *
we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides
them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections this, there are many minds so sympathetically consti-
and pasSions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not tuted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-
only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around
part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others
from deserving to be called good without qualification, so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such
although they have been so unconditionally praised by a case an action of this kind, however proper, how-
the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, ever amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral
they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g., the
villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to
directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with
he would have been without it. duty and consequently honourable, deserves praise
A good will is good not because of what it performs and encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim
or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be
proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition- done from duty, not from inclination. Put the case that
that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sor-
be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought row of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot
about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of of others, and that, while he still has the power to ben-
the sum-total of all inclinations. Even if it should hap- efit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble
pen that, Owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and
will should wholly lack power to accomplish its pur- performs the action without any inclination to it, but
pose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine
nothing, and there should remain only the good will moral worth. Further still, if nature has put little sym-
(not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of pathy in the heart of this or that man; if he, supposed to
all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indif-
still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its ferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps because in
whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of
neither add nor take away anything from this value. patience and fortitude and supposes, or even requires,
It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us that others should have the same-and such a man
to handle it the more conveniently in common com- would certainly not be the meanest product of nature-
merce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are but if nature had not specially framed him for a philan-
not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true thropist, would he not still find in himself a source from
connoisseurs, or to determine its value. whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a
There is, however, something so strange in this good-natured temperament could be? Unquestionabl~.
idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no It is just in this that the moral worth of the character IS
account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the brought out which is incomparably the highest of all,
thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, namely, that he is beneficent, not from inclination, but
yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be from duty.
the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may
have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning * * *
CHAPTER 6: NONCONSEQUENTIALIST THEORIES: DO YOUR DUTY () 147
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie must be well considered whether there may not here-
in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle of after spring from this lie much greater inconvenience
action which requires to borrow its motive from this than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all
expected effect. For all these effects-agreeableness of my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so
one's condition and even the promotion of the happi- easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much
ness of others-could have been also brought about by more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek
other causes, so that for this there would have been no to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it
need of the will of a rational being; whereas it is in this would not be more prudent to act herein according to
alone that the supreme and unconditional good can a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise
be found. The pre-eminent good which we call moral nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it
can therefore consist in nothing else than the concep- is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be
tion of law in itself, which certainly is only possible based on the fear of consequences. Now it is a wholly
in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and different thing to be truthful from duty, and to be so
not the expected effect, determines the will. This is a from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the
good which is already present in the person who acts first case, the very notion of the action already implies
accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about
first in the result. elsewhere to see what results may be combined with
it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the
* * * principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to
But what sort of law can that be, the conception be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often
of which must determine the will, even without pay- be very advantageous to me, although to abide by it
ing any regard to the effect expected from it, in order is certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an
that this will may be called good absolutely and with- unerring one, to discover the answer to this question
out qualification? As I have deprived the will of every whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to
impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to
law, there remains nothing but the universal confor- extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise)
mity of its actions to law in general, which alone is should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well
to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act as for others?" and should I be able to say to myself,
otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he
should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot oth-
simple conformity to law in general, without assum- erwise extricate himself?" Then I presently become
ing any particular law applicable to certain actions, aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means
that serves the will as its principle and must so serve will that lying should be a universal law. For with such
it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimeri- a law there would be no promises at all, since it would
cal notion. The common reason of men in its practical be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future
judgements perfectly coincides with this and always actions to those who would not believe this allegation,
has in view the principle here suggested. Let the ques- or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my
tion be, for example: May I when in distress make a own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it should be
promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.
distinguish here between the two significations which I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching pen-
the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or etration to discern what I have to do in order that
whether it is right, to make a false promise? The for- my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the
mer may undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly course of the world, incapable of being prepared for
indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou
a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If
not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and
a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to therefore merely contingent, knowledge; that it is
others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a just this purity of their Origin that makes them wor-
possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from thy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and
me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not that just in proportion as we add anything empirical,
indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this we detract from their genuine influence and from
the philosopher may inquire), but at least I under- the absolute value of actions; that it is not only of
stand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative pOint
far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by of view, but is also of the greatest practical impor-
inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure tance, to derive these notions and laws from pure rea-
respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, son, to present them pure and unmixed, and even to
to which every other motive must give place, because determine the compass of this practical or pure ratio-
it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the nal knowledge, Le., to determine the whole faculty
worth of such a will is above everything. of pure practical reason; and, in doing so, we must
not make its principles dependent on the particular
** * nature of human reason, though in speculative phi-
Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than losophy this may be permitted, or may even at times
that we should wish to derive it fro~ examples. For be necessary; but since moral laws ought to hold
every example of it that is set before me must be first good for every rational creature, we must derive them
itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is from the general concept of a rational being. In this
worthy to serve as an original example, i.e., as a pat- way, although for its application to man morality
tern; but by no means can it authoritatively furnish has need of anthropology, yet, in the first instance,
the conception of morality. Even the Holy One of the we must treat it independently as pure philosophy,
Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral Le., as metaphysic, complete in itself (a thing which
perfection before we can recognise Him as such; and in such distinct branches of science is easily done);
so He says of Himself, "Why call ye Me (whom you knowing well that unless we are in posseSSion of this,
see) good; none is good (the model of good) but God it would not only be vain to determine the moral ele-
only (whom ye do not see)?" But whence have we the ment of duty in right actions for purposes of specu-
conception of God as the supreme good? Simply from lative criticism, but it would be impossible to base
the idea of moral perfection, which reason frames a morals on their genuine principles, even for com-
priori and connects inseparably with the notion of a mon practical purposes, especially of moral instruc-
free will. Imitation finds no place at all in morality, tion, so as to produce pure moral dispositions, and
and examples serve only for encouragement, i.e., they to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of
put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law com- the greatest possible good in the world.
mands, they make visible that which the practical rule But in order that in this study we may not merely
expresses more generally, but they can never autho- advance by the natural steps from the common moral
rize us to set aside the true original which lies in reason judgement (in this case very worthy of respect) to the
and to guide ourselves by examples. philosophical, as has been already done, but also from a
popular philosophy, which goes no further than it can
* * * reach by groping with the help of examples, to meta-
From what has been said, it is clear that all moral physic (which does not allow itself to be checked by
conceptions have their seat and origin completely anything empirical and, as it must measure the whole
a priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the extent of this kind of rational knowledge, goes as far
commonest reason just as truly as in that which is as ideal conceptions, where even examples fail us), we
in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of
CHAPTER 6: NONCONSEQUENTIAlIST THEORIES: DO YOUR DUTY 0 149
reason, from the general rules of its determination to of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason,
the point where the notion of duty springs from it. which holds for every one.
Everything in nature works according to laws.
Rational beings alone have the faculty·of acting accord- * * *
ing to the conception of laws-that is, according to Now all imperatives command either hypotheti-
principles, that is, have a will. Since the deduction of cally or categorically. The former represent the practi-
actions from principles requires reason, the will is noth- cal necessity of a possible action as means to something
ing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly
the will, then the actions of such a being which are rec- will). The categorical imperative would be that which
ognised as objectively necessary are subjectively neces- represented an action as necessary of itself without ref-
sary also, that is, the will is a faculty to choose that only erence to another end, that is, as objectively necessary.
which reason independent of inclination recognises Since every practical law represents a possible
as practically necessary, that is, as good. But if reason action as good and, on this account, for a subject who
of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all
latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particu- imperatives are formulae determining an action which
lar impulses) which do not always coincide with the is necessary according to the principle of a will good in
objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means
itself completely accord with reason (which is actually to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical;
the case with men), then the actions which objectively if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as
are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent, being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself
and the determination of such a will according to objec- conforms to reason, then it is categorical.
tive laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the Thus the imperative declares what action possible
objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is by me would be good and presents the practical rule
conceived as the determination of the will of a rational in relation to a will which does not forthwith perform
being by principles of reason, but which the will from an action simply because it is good, whether because
its nature does not of necessity follow. the subject does not always know that it is good, or
The conception of an objective prinCiple, in so far because, even if it know thiS, yet its maxims might be
as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of opposed to the objective principles of practical reason.
reason), and the formula of the command is called an Accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says
imperative. that the action is good for some purpose, possible or
All imperatives are expressed by the word ought actual. In the first case it is a problematical, in the sec-
[or shaU], and thereby indicate the relation of an ond an assertorial practical principle. The categorical
objective law of reason to a will, which from its sub- imperative which declares an action to be objectively
jective constitution is not necessarily determined by necessary in itself without reference to any purpose,
it (an obligation). They say that something would i.e., without any other end, is valid as an apodeictic
be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will (practical) principle.
which does not always do a thing because it is con-
ceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, * * *
however, which determines the will by means of the Finally, there is an imperative which commands
conceptions of reason, and consequently not from a certain conduct immediately, without having as its
subjective causes, but objectively, that is, on princi- condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This
ples which are valid for every rational being as such. imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter of
It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which the action, or its intended result, but its form and the
influences the will only by means of sensation from principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essen-
merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense tially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let
the consequence be what it may. This imperative may arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contin-
be called that of morality. gent, and we can at any time be free from the precept
if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the uncon-
* * *
ditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose
[The] question how the imperative of morality is the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that
possible, is undoubtedly one, the only one, demand- necessity which we require in a law.
ing a solution, as this is not at all hypothetical, and Secondly, in the case of this categorical impera-
the objective necessity which it presents cannot rest tive or law of morality, the difficulty (of discerning
on any hypothesis, as is the case with the hypotheti- its possibility) is a very profound one. It is an a priori
cal imperatives. Only here we must never leave out synthetical practical proposition; and as there is so
of consideration that we cannot make out by any much difficulty in discerning the possibility of spec-
example, in other words empirically, whether there is ulative propositions of this kind, it may readily be
such an imperative at all, but it is rather to be feared supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the
that all those which seem to be categorical may yet be practical.
at bottom hypothetical. For instance, when the pre-
* * *
cept is: "Thou shalt not promise deceitfully"; and it is
assumed that the necessity of this is not a mere coun- In this problem we will first inquire whether the
sel to avoid some other evil, so that it should mean: mere conception of a categorical imperative may not
"Thou shalt not make a lying promise, lest if it become perhaps supply us also with the formula of it, contain-
known thou shouldst destroy thy credit," but that an ing the proposition which alone can be a categorical
action of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself, imperative; for even if we know the tenor of such an
so that the imperative of the prohibition is categorical; absolute command, yet how it is possible will require
then we cannot show with certainty in any example further special and laborious study, which we post-
that the will was determined merely by the law, with- pone to the last section.
out any other spring of action, although it may appear When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in
to be so. For it is always possible that fear of disgrace, general I do not know beforehand what it will contain
perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers, may until I am given the condition. But when I conceive
have a secret influence on the will. Who can prove a categorical imperative, I know at once what it con-
by experience the non-existence of a cause when tains. For as the imperative contains besides the law
all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to
it? But in such a case the so-called moral imperative, this law, while the law contains no conditions restrict-
which as such appears to be categorical and uncondi- ing it, there remains nothing but the general state-
tional, would in reality be only a pragmatic precept, ment that the maxim of the action should conform to
drawing our attention to our own interests and merely a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the
teaching us to take these into consideration. imperative properly represents as necessary.
We shall therefore have to investigate a priori the
* * *
possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not
in this case the advantage of its reality being given in There is therefore but one categorical imperative,
experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou
should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its canst at the same time will that it should become a
establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned universal law.
beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced
the purport of a practical law; all the rest may indeed from this one imperative as from their prinCiple, then,
be called principles of the will but not laws, since although it should remain undecided what is called
whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall
be able to show what we understand by it and what of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent
this notion means. with my whole future welfare; but the question now
Since the universality of the law according to is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-
which effects are produced constitutes what is prop- love into a universal law, and state the question thus:
erly called nature in the most general sense (as to "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?"
form), that is the existence of things so far as it is deter- Then I see at once that it could never hold as a uni-
mined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be versallaw of nature, but would necessarily contradict
expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that every-
to become by thy will a universal law of nature. one when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose
usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would
others, and into perfect and imperfect duties. become impossible, as well as the end that one might
have in view in it, since no one would consider that
* * * anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all
1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfor- such statements as vain pretences.
tunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in posses- 3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the
sion of his reason that he can ask himself whether it help of some culture might make him a useful man in
would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable cir-
his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of cumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather
his action could become a universal law of nature. His than to take pains in enlarging and improving his
maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether
shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agree-
bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then sim- ing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also
ply whether this principle founded on self-love can with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of
become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law
that a system of nature of which it should be a law to although men (like the South Sea islanders) should
destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives
nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of
contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a sys- their species-in a word, to enjoyment; but he can-
tem of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist not possibly will that this should be a universal law
as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural
be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills
all duty. that his faculties be developed, since they serve him
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to and have been given him, for all sorts of possible
borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to purposes.
repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him 4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees
unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. that others have to contend with great wretchedness
He desires to make this promise, but he has still so and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern
much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven
and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take no.thing
this way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: from him nor even envy him, only I do not WIsh to
then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: contribute anything to his welfare or to his assist~nce
"When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of think-
money and promise to repay it, although I know that ing were a universal law, the human race might very
I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state
in which everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or of every rational being to be wholly free from them.
even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired
on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays by our action is always conditional. Beings whose exis-
the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But tence depends not on our will but on nature's, have
although it is possible that a universal law of nature nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a rela-
might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is tive value as means, and are therefore called things;
impossible to will that such a principle should have rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons,
the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will because their very nature paints them out as ends in
which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch themselves, that is as something which must not be
as many cases might occur in which one would have used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts
need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, freedom of actions (and is an object of respect). These,
by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose exis-
would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires. tence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but
These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an
what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can
classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We be substituted, which they should subserve merely as
must be able to will that a maxim of our action should means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess
be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appre- absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and
ciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme
a character that their maxim cannot without contradic- practical principle of reason whatever.
tion be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in
from it being possible that we should will that it should respect of the human will, a categorical imperative,
be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility is not found, it must be one which, being drawn from the concep-
but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should tion of that which is necessarily an end for everyone
be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective
such a will would contradict itself. It is easily seen that principle of will, and can therefore serve as a univer-
the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; sal practical law. The foundation of this principle is:
the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessar-
completely shown how all duties depend as regards the ily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then
nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) this is a subjective prinCiple of human actions. But
on the same principle. every other rational being regards its existence simi-
larly, just on the same rational principle that holds for
*** me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle,
. Now I say: man and generally any rational being from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the
eXIsts as an end in himself, not merely as a means will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly
to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as
his actions, whether they concern himself or other to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in
rational beings, must be always regarded at the same that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never
time as an end. All Objects of the inclinations have as means only. We will now inquire whether this can
only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and be practically carried out.
the wants founded on them did not exist, then their
object would be without value. But the inclinations, * * *
themselves being sources of want, are so far from hav- To abide by the previous examples:
ing an absolute worth for which they should be desired Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to one-
that on the contrary it must be the universal wish self: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself
CHAPTER 6: NONCONSEQUENTlALlST THEORIES: DO YOUR DUTY 0 153
whether his action can be consistent with the idea of Looking back now on all previous attempts to dis-
humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in cover the principle of morality, we need not wonder
order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a why they all failed. It was seen that man was bound to
person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable con- laws by duty, but it was not observed that the laws to
dition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, which he is subject are only those of his own giving,
that is to say, something which can be used merely as though at the same time they are universal, and that
means, but must in all his actions be always consid- he is only bound to act in conformity with his own
ered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose will; a will, however, which is designed by nature to
in any way of a man in my own person so as to muti- give universal laws. For when one has conceived man
late him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics only as subject to a law (no matter what), then this law
proper to define this principle more precisely, so as required some interest, either by way of attraction or
to avoid all misunderstanding, for example, as to the constraint, since it did not originate as a law from his
amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself as own will, but this will was according to a law obliged by
to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve something else to act in a certain manner. Now by this
it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.) necessary consequence all the labour spent in finding a
Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost. For men
strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of never elicited duty, but only a necessity of acting from
making a lying promise to others will see at once that he a certain interest. Whether this interest was private or
would be using another man merely as a mean, without otherwise, in any case the imperative must be condi-
the latter containing at the same time the end in him- tional and could not by any means be capable of being
self. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for a moral command. I will therefore call this the principle
my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of of autonomy of the will, in contrast with every other
acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself con- which I accordingly reckon as heteronomy.
tain the end of this action. This violation of the princi- The conception of the will of every rational being
ple of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take as one which must consider itself as giving in all the
in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself
others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the and its actions from this point of view-this concep-
rights of men intends to use the person of others merely tion leads to another which depends on it and is very
as a means, without considering that as rational beings fruitful, namely that of a kingdom of ends.
they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, By a kingdom I understand the union of differ-
as beings who must be capable of containing in them- ent rational beings in a system by common laws. Now
selves the end of the very same action. since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards
their universal validity, hence, if we abstract from the
* * *
personal differences of rational beings and likeWise
Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties from all the content of their private ends, we shall
to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not be able to conceive all ends combined in a system-
violate humanity in our own person as an end in atic whole (including both rational beings as ends in
itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are themselves, and also the special ends which each may
in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which propose to himself), that is to say, we can conceive a
belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to kingdom of ends, which on the preceding principles
humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these is possible.
might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of For all rational beings come under the law that
humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advance- each of them must treat itself and all others never
ment of this end. merely as means, but in every case at the same time as
* * * ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic union
of rational being by common objective laws, that is, Morality consists then in the reference of all action
a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of
since what these laws have in view is just the relation ends possible. This legislation must be capable of exist-
of these beings to one another as ends and means. It is ing in every rational being and of emanating from his
certainly only an ideal. will, so that the principle of this will is never to act on
A rational being belongs as a member to the king- any maxim which could not without contradiction be
dom of ends when, although giving universal laws in also a universal law and, accordingly, always so to act
it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs that the will could at the same time regard itself as giv-
to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not ing in its maxims universal laws. If now the maxims of
subject to the will of any other. rational beings are not by their own nature coincident
A rational being must always regard himself as giv- with this objective principle, then the necessity of act-
ing laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom ing on it is called practical necessitation, that is, duty.
of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of Duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom
will. He cannot, however, maintain the latter position of ends, but it does to every member of it and to all in
merely by the maxims of his will, but only in case he the same degree.
is a completely independent being without wants and * * *
with unrestricted power adequate to his will.
From A Simplified Account of !(ant's Ethics

ONORA O'NEILL
Kant's theory is frequently and misleadingly assimi- results of action or at others' supposed entitlements
lated to theories of human rights. It is, in fact, a theory but, in the first instance, at the nature of the proposed
of human obligations; therefore it is wider in scope actions themselves.
than a theory of human rights. (Not all obligations When we engage in moral reasoning, we often
have corresponding rights.) Kant does not, however, need go no further than to refer to some quite specific
try to generate a set of precise rules defining human principle or tradition. We may say to one another, or
obligations in all possible circumstances; instead, he to ourselves, things like "It would be hypocritical to
attempts to provide a set of principles of obligation that pretend that our good fortune is achieved without
can be used as the starting pOints for moral reasoning harm to the Third World" or "Redistributive taxation
in actual contexts of action. The primary focus of Kan- shouldn't cross national boundaries." But when these
tian ethics is, then, on action rather than either results, specific claims are challenged, we may find ourselves
as in utilitarian thinking, or entitlements, as in theories pushed to justify or reject or modify them. Such moral
that make human rights their fundamental category. debate, on Kant's account, rests on appeals to what he
Morality requires action of certain sorts. But to know calls the Supreme Principle of Morality, which can (he
what sort of action is reqUired (or forbidden) in which thinks) be used to work out more specific principles
circumstances, we should not look just at the expected of obligation. This principle, the famous Categorical
Imperative, plays the same role in Kantian thinking
that the Greatest Happiness Principle plays in utilitar-
O'Nora Oneil, "Kantian Approaches to Some Feminine Prob-
lems," from Matters of Life and Death, Third Edition, pp. 258-262, ian thought.
edited by Tom Regan. Copyright © 1993 McGraW-Hill Education. A second reason why Kant's moral thought often
Reprinted by permission. appears difficult is that he offers a number of different
versions of this principle, which he claims are equiva- that would generate that pattern of activity are max-
lent but which look very different. A straightforward ims of action. Sometimes more than one principle
way in which to simplify Kantian moral thought is to might lie behind a given pattern of activity, and we
concentrate on just one of these formulations of the may be unsure what the maxim of the act was. For
Categorical Imperative. For present purposes I shall example, we might wonder (as Kant does) how to tell
choose the version to which he gives the sonorous whether somebody gives change accurately only out
name, The Fonnula of the End ill Itself. of concern to have an honest reputation or whether
he or she would do so anyhow. In such cases we can
THE FORMULA OF THE END IN ITSELF sometimes set up an "isolation test" -for example, a
The Formula of the End in Itself runs as follows: situation in which it would be open to somebody to
be dishonest without any chance of a damaged reputa-
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, tion. But quite often we can't set up any such situation
whether in your own person or in the person of any and may be to some extent unsure which maxim lies
other, never simply as a means but always at the same
behind a given act. Usually we have to rely on what-
time as an end.
ever individual actors tell us about their maxims of
To understand this principle we need in the first action and on what policymakers or social scientists
place to understand what Kant means by the term may tell us about the underlying principles of insti-
"maxim." The maxim of an act or policy or activity tutional or group action. What they tell us may well
is the underlying principle of the act, policy, or activ- be mistaken. While mistakes can be reduced by care
ity, by which other, more superficial aspects of action and thoughtfulness, there is no guarantee that we can
are guided. Very often interpretations of Kant have always work out which maxim of action should be
supposed that maxims can only be the (underly- scrutinized for purposes of judging what others do.
ing) intentions of individual human agents. If that On the other hand, there is no problem when we are
were the case it would limit the usefulness of Kantian trying to guide our own action: if we can find out what
modes of moral thought in dealing with world hun- duty demands, we can try to meet those demands.
ger and famine problems. For it is clear enough that It is helpful to think of some examples of maxims
individual action (while often important) cannot deal that might be used to guide action in contexts where
with all the problems of Third World poverty. A moral poverty and the risk of famine are issues. Somebody
theory that addresses only individual actors does not who contributes to famine-relief work or advocates
have adequate scope for discussing famine problems. development might have an underlying principle
As we have seen, one of the main attractions of utili- such as, "Try to help reduce the risk or severity of
tarianism as an approach to Third World poverty is world hunger." This commitment might be reflected
that its scope is so broad: it can be applied with equal in varied surface action in varied situations. In one
appropriateness to the practical deliberations of indi- context a gift of money might be relevant; in another
viduals, of institutions and groups, and even of nation some political activity such as lobbying for or against
states and international agencies. Kantian ethical certain types of aid and trade might express the
thinking can be interpreted (though it usually isn't) to same underlying commitment. Sometimes superficial
have equally broad scope. aspects of action may seem at variance with the under-
Since maxims are underlying principles of action, lying maxim they in fact express. For example, if there
they may not always be obvious either to the indi- is reason to think that indiscriminate food aid dam-
viduals or institutions whose maxims they are, or to ages the agricultural economy of the area to which
others. We can determine what the underlying prin- food is given, then the maxim of seeking to relieve
ciples of some activity or institution are only by seeing hunger might be expressed in action aimed at limit-
the patterns made by various more superficial aspects ing the extent of food aid. More lavish use of food aid
of acts, poliCies, and activities. Only those principles might seem to treat the needy more generously, but if
in fact it will damage their medium- or long-term eco- promise is given, the party that accepts the promise is
nomic prospects, then it is not (contrary to superficial not just used but used as a mere means, because it is
appearances) aimed at improving and securing their impossible for consent to be given to the fundamen-
access to subsistence. On a Kantian theory, the basis tal principle or project of deception that must guide
for judging action should be its fundamental principle every false promise, whatever its surface character.
or policy, and superficially similar acts may be judged Those who accept false promises must be kept igno-
morally very different. Regulating food aid in order rant of the underlying principle or maxim on which
to drive up prices and profit from them is one matter; the "undertaking" is based. If this isn't kept con-
regulating food aid in order to enable local farmers to cealed, the attempted promise will either be rejected
sell their crops and to stay in the business of growing or will not be a false promise at all. In false promising,
food is quite another. the deceived party becomes, as it were, a prop or
When we want to work out whether a proposed act tool-a mere means-in the false promisor's scheme.
or policy is morally required we should not, on Kant's Action based on any such maxim of deception would
view, try to find out whether it would produce more be wrong in Kantian terms, whether it is a matter of a
happiness than other available acts. Rather we should breach of treaty obligations, of contractual undertak-
see whether the act or policy is required if we are to ings, or of accepted and relied upon modes of inter-
avoid acting on maxims that use others as mere means action. Maxims of deception standardly use others as
and act on maxims that treat others as ends in them- mere means, and acts that could only be based on such
selves. These two aspects of Kantian duty can each be maxims are unjust.
spelled out and shown to have determinate implica- Other standard ways of using others as mere
tions for acts and policies that may affect the persis- means are by violence or coercion. Here too victims
tence of hunger and the risk and course of famines. have no possibility of refusing what is done to them.
If a rich or powerful landowner or nation destroys a
poorer or more vulnerable person, group, or nation
USING OTHERS AS MERE MEANS or threatens some intolerable difficulty unless a con-
We use others as mere means if what we do reflects some cession is made, the more vulnerable party is denied
maxim to which they could not in principle consent. Kant a genuine choice between consent and dissent. While
does not suggest that there is anything wrong about the boundary that divides violence and coercion from
using someone as a means. Evidently every coopera- mere bargaining and negotiation varies and is there-
tive scheme of action does this. A government that fore often hard to discern, we have no doubt about the
agrees to provide free or subsidized food to famine- clearer cases. Maxims of violence destroy or damage
relief agencies both uses and is used by the agencies; a agents or their capabilities. Maxims of coercion may
peasant who sells food in a local market both uses and threaten physical force, seizure of posseSSions, destruc-
is used by those who buy the food. In such examples tion of opportunities, or any other harm that the
each party to the transaction can and does consent to coerced party is thought to be unable to absorb with-
take part in that transaction. Kant would say that the out grave injury or danger. For example, a grain dealer
parties to such transactions use one another but do in a Third World village who threatens not to make or
not use one another as mere means. Each party assumes renew an indispensable loan without which survival
that the other has its own maxims of action and is not until the next harvest would be impossible, unless he
just a thing or prop to be used or manipulated. is sold the current crop at pitifully low prices, uses the
But there are other cases where one party to an peasant as mere means. The peasant does not have the
arrangement or transaction not only uses the other but possibility of genuinely consenting to the ((offer he
does so in ways that could only be done on the basis of can't refuse." In this way the outward form of some
a fundamental principle or maxim to which the other coercive transactions may look like ordinary commer-
could not in principle consent. If, for example, a false cial dealings: but we know very well that some action
that is superficially of this sort is based on maxims of a given situation nor more than a partial view of their
coercion. To avoid coercion, action must be governed likely consequences. In addition, abilities to assess
by maxims that the other party can choose to refuse and to use available information are usually quite lim-
and is not forced to accept. The more vulnerable the ited. Second, these cognitive limitations are standardly
other party in any transaction or negotiation, the less complemented by limited autonomy. Human action
that party's scope for refusal, and the more demanding is limited not only by various sorts of physical barrier
it is likely to be to ensure that action is noncoercive. and inability but by further sorts of (mutual or asym-
In Kant's View, acts done on maxims that endan- metrical) dependence. To treat one another as ends
ger, coerce, or deceive others, and thus cannot in in themselves such beings have to base their action
principle have the consent of those others, are wrong. on principles that do not undermine but rather sus-
When individuals, institutions, or nation states act tain and extend one another's capacities for autono-
in ways that can only be based on such maxims, they mous action. A central requirement for doing so is to
fail in their duty. They treat the parties who are either share and support one another's ends and activities
deceived or coerced unjustly. To avoid unjust action to some extent. Since finite rational beings cannot
it is not enough to observe the outward forms of free generally achieve their aims without some help and
agreement, cooperation, and market disciplines; it support from others, a general refusal of help and sup-
is also essential to see that the weaker party to any port amounts to failure to treat others as rational and
arrangement has a genuine option to refuse the funda- autonomous beings, that is, as ends in themselves.
mental character of the proposal. Hence Kantian principles require us not only to act
justly, that is, in accordance with maxims that don't
TREATING OTHERS AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES injure, coerce, or deceive others, but also to avoid
manipulation and to lend some support to others'
For Kant, as for utilitarians, justice is only one part of
plans and activities. Since hunger, great poverty, and
duty. We may fail in our duty, even when we don't
powerlessness all undercut the possibility of autono-
use anyone as mere means, if we fail to treat others as
mous action, and the requirement of treating others as
"ends in themselves." To treat others as ends in them-
ends in themselves demands that Kantians standardly
selves we must not only avoid using them as mere
act to support the possibility of autonomous action
means but also treat them as rational and autonomous
where it is most vulnerable, Kantians are required to
beings with their own maxims. In doing so we must
do what they can to avert, reduce, and remedy hunger.
also remember that (as Kant repeatedly stressed, but
They cannot of course do everything to avert hunger:
later Kantians have often forgotten) human beings
but they may not do nothing.
are finite rational beings in several ways. First, human
beings are not ideal rational calculators. We standardly * * *
have neither a complete list of the actions possible in
What Makes Right Acts Right?

w. D. Ross
... The point at issue is that to which we now pass, viz. being what it is, it makes it not unlikely that he will try
whether there is any general character which makes to bring it into being. But hedonistic utilitarianism in
right acts right, and if so, what it is. Among the main its turn needs a correction. On reflection it seems clear
historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think
right actions which is the foundation of their right- good in itself, that for instance we think the posses-
ness are those made by egoism and utilitarianism. sion of a good character, or an intelligent understand-
But I do not propose to discuss these, not because the ing of the world, as good or better. A great advance is
subject is unimportant, but because it has been dealt made by the substitution of 'productive of the greatest
with so often and so well already, and because there good' for 'productive of the greatest pleasure'.
has come to be so much agreement among moral phi- Not only is this theory more attractive than hedo-
losophers that neither of these theories is satisfactory. nistic utilitarianism, but its logical relation to that
A much more attractive theory has been put forward theory is such that the latter could not be true unless
by Professor Moore: that what makes actions right is it were true, while it might be true though hedonistic
that they are productive of more good than could have utilitarianism were not. It is in fact one of the logical
been produced by any other action open to the agent. bases of hedonistic utilitarianism. For the view that
This theory is in fact the culmination of all the what produces the maximum pleasure is right has for
attempts to base rightness on productivity of some its bases the views (1) that what produces the maxi-
sort of result. The first form this attempt takes is the mum good is right, and (2) that pleasure is the only
attempt to base rightness on conduciveness to the thing good in itself. If they were not assuming that
advantage or pleasure of the agent. This theory comes what produces the maximum good is right, the utilitar-
to grief over the fact, which stares us in the face, that ians' attempt to show that pleasure is the only thing
a great part of duty consists in an observance of the good in itself, which is in fact the point they take most
rights and a furtherance of the interests of others, pains to establish, would have been qUite irrelevant
whatever the cost to ourselves may be. Plato and oth- to their attempt to prove that only what produces
ers may be right in holding that a regard for the rights the maximum pleasure is right. If, therefore, it can be
of others never in the long run involves a loss of happi- shown that productivity of the maximum good is not
ness for the agent, that 'the just life profits a man'. But what makes all right actions right, we shall a fortiori
this, even if true, is irrelevant to the rightness of the have refuted hedonistic utilitarianism.
act. As soon as a man does an action because he thinks When a plain man fulfils a promise because he
he will promote his own interests thereby, he is acting thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does
not from a sense of its rightness but from self-interest. so with no thought of its total consequences, still less
To the egOistic theory hedonistic utilitarianism with any opinion that these are likely to be the best
supplies a much-needed amendment. It points out possible. He thinks in fact much more of the past
correctly that the fact that a certain pleasure will be than of the future. What makes him think it right to
enjoyed by the agent is no reason why he ought to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised
bring it into being rather than an equal or greater plea- to do so-that and, usually, nothing more. That his
sure to be enjoyed by another, though, human nature act will produce the best possible consequences is not
his reason for calling it right. What lends colour to
the theory we are examining, then, is not the actions
W.D. Ross, pp.16-32 from The Right and the Good, edited by Philip
Stratton-Lake. © Oxford University Press. 1930,2002. Reproduced (which form probably a great majority of our actions)
with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. in which some such reflection as 'I have promised' is
CHAPTER 6: NONCONSEQUENTIAlIST THEORIES: DO YOUR DUTY 0 159
the only reason we give ourselves for thinking a cer- example, should come before benevolence, but that
tain action right, but the exceptional cases in which when and only when the good to be produced by the
the consequences of fulfilling a promise (for instance) benevolent act is very great and the promise compara-
would be so disastrous to others that we judge it right tively trivial, the act of benevolence becomes our duty.
not to do so. It must of course be admitted that such In fact the theory of 'ideal utilitarianism', if I may
cases exist. If I have promised to meet a friend at a par- for brevity refer so to the theory of Professor Moore,
ticular time for some trivial purpose, I should certainly seems to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows. It
think myself justified in breaking my engagement if says, in effect, that the only morally significant relation
by doing so I could prevent a serious accident or bring in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being
2
relief to the victims of one. And the supporters of the possible beneficiaries by my action. They do stand in
view we are examining hold that my thinking so is this relation to me, and this relation is morally signifi-
due to my thinking that I shall bring more good into cant. But they may also stand to me in the relation of
existence by the one action than by the other. A dif- promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to
ferent account may, however, be given of the matter, husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow
an account which will, I believe, show itself to be the countryman to fellow countryman, and the like; and
true one. It may be said that besides the duty of fulfill- each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie
ing promises I have and recognize a duty of relieving duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according
distress, 1 and that when I think it right to do the latter to the circumstances of the case. When I am in a situa-
at the cost of not doing the former, it is not because I tion, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one
think I shall produce more good thereby but because I of these prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I
think it the duty which is in the circumstances more have to do is to study the situation as fully as I can until
of a duty. This account surely corresponds much more I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that
closely with what we really think in such a situation. in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent
If, so far as I can see, I could bring equal amounts of than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this
good into being by fulfilling my promise and by help- prima facie duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation.
ing some one to whom I had made no promise, I I suggest 'prima facie duty' or 'conditional duty'
should not hesitate to regard the former as my duty. as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite
Yet on the view that what is right is right because it is distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an
productive of the most good I should not so regard it. act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the
There are two theories, each in its way simple, that keeping of a promise), of being an act which ~ould
offer a solution of such cases of conscience. One is be a duty proper if it were not at the same tIme of
the view of Kant, that there are certain duties of per- another kind which is morally significant. Whether
fect obligation, such as those of fulfilling promises, an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on
of paying debts, of telling the truth, which admit of all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of.
no exception whatever in favour of duties of imper- The phrase 'prima facie duty' must be apologized
fect obligation, such as that of relieving distress. The for since (1) it suggests that what we are speaking
other is the view of, for instance, Professor Moore and of;s a certain kind of duty, whereas it is in fact not a
Dr. Rashdall, that there is only the duty of produc- duty but something related in a special way to duty.
ing good, and that all 'conflicts of duties' should be Stric;ly speaking, we want not a phrase in which
resolved by asking 'by which action will most good be duty is qualified by an adjective, but .a separ.ate
produced?, But it is more important that our theory noun. (2) 'Prima' facie suggests that one IS speakIng
fit the facts than that it be simple, and the account we only of an appearance which a moral situation pres-
have given above corresponds (it seems to me) bet- ents at first sight, and which may turn out to be illu-
ter than either of the simpler theories with what we sory; whereas what I am speaking of is an objective
really think, viz. that normally promise-keeping, for fact involved in the nature of the situation, or more
strictly in an element of its nature, though not, as to whom I stand in no such special relation-should
duty proper does, arising from its whole nature .... make no difference to my having a duty to produce
There is nothing arbitrary about these prima facie that good. But we are all in fact sure that it makes a
duties. Each rests on a definite circumstance which vast difference.
cannot seriously be held to be without moral signifi-
cance. Of prima fade duties I suggest, without claiming * * *
completeness or finality for it, the following division. If the objection be made, that this catalogue of
(1) Some duties rest on previous acts of my own. the main types of duty is an unsystematic one rest-
These duties seem to include two kinds, (a) those ing on no logical prinCiple, it may be replied, first,
resting on a promise or what may fairly be called an that it makes no claim to being ultimate. It is a prima
implicit promise, such as the implicit undertaking facie classification of the duties which reflection on
not to tell lies which seems to be implied in the act our moral convictions seems actually to reveal. And if
of entering into conversation (at any rate by civilized these convictions are, as I would claim that they are,
men), or of writing books that purport to be history of the nature of knowledge, and if I have not misstated
and not fiction. These may be called the duties of fidel- them, the list will be a list of authentic conditional
ity. (b) Those resting on a previous wrongful act. These duties, correct as far as it goes though not necessarily
may be called the duties of reparation. (2) Some rest on complete. The list of goods put forward by the rival
previous acts of other men, i.e. services done by them theory is reached by exactly the same method-the
to me. These may be loosely described as the duties of only sound one in the circumstances-viz. that of
gratitude. (3) Some rest on the fact or possibility of a direct reflection on what we really think. Loyalty to the
distribution of pleasure or happiness (or of the means facts is worth more than a symmetrical architectonic
thereto) which is not in accordance with the merit or a hastily reached simplicity. If further reflection
of the persons concerned; in such cases there arises a discovers a perfect logical basis for this or for a better
duty to upset or prevent such a distribution. These are claSSification, so much the better.
the duties of justice. (4) Some rest on the mere fact that It may, again, be objected that our theory that
there are other beings in the world whose condition there are these various and often conflicting types
we can make better in respect of virtue, or of intelli- of prima facie duty leaves us with no principle upon
gence, or of pleasure. These are the duties of benefi- which to discern what is our actual duty in particular
cence. (5) Some rest on the fact that we can improve circumstances. But this objection is not one which
our own condition in respect of virtue or of intelli- the rival theory is in a position to bring forward. For
gence. These are the duties of self-improvement. (6) I when we have to choose between the production of
think that we should distinguish from (4) the duties two heterogeneous goods, say knowledge and plea-
that may be summed up under the title of 'not injur- sure, the 'ideal utilitarian' theory can only fall back on
ing others'. No doubt to injure others is incidentally an opinion, for which no logical basis can be offered,
to fail to do them good; but it seems to me clear that that one of the goods is the greater; and this is no
non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct better than a similar opinion that one of two duties
from that of beneficence, and as a duty of a more is the more urgent. And again, when we consider
stringent character.... the infinite variety of the effects of our actions in the
The essential defect of the 'ideal utilitarian' theory way of pleasure, it must surely be admitted that the
is that it ignores, or at least does not do full justice claim which hedonism sometimes makes, that it offers
to, the highly personal character of duty. If the only a readily applicable criterion of right conduct, is
duty is to produce the maximum of good, the question quite illusory.
who is to have the good-whether it is myself, or my I am unwilling, however, to content myself with
benefactor, or a person to whom I have made a prom- an argumentum ad hominem, and I would contend that
ise to confer that good on him, or a mere fellow man in principle there is no reason to antiCipate that every
act that is our duty is so for one and the same reason. qua fulfilling a promise, or qua effecting a just distri-
Why should two sets of circumstances, or one set of bution of good, or qua returning services rendered, or
circumstances, not possess different characteristics, qua promoting the good of others, or qua promoting
anyone of which makes a certain act our prima facie the virtue or insight of the agent, is prima facie right,
duty? When I ask what it is that makes me in certain is self-evident; not in the sense that it is evident from
cases sure that I have a prima facie duty to do so and so, the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to
I find that it lies in the fact that I have made a promise; the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that
when I ask the same question in another case, I find when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and
the answer lies in the fact that I have done a wrong. have given sufficient attention to the proposition it
And if on reflection I find (as I think I do) that neither is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence
of these reasons is reducible to the other, I must not beyond itself. It is self-evident just as a mathematical
on any a priori ground assume that such a reduction axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evi-
is possible. dent. The moral order expressed in these propositions
is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the
* * * universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe
It is necessary to say something by way of clear- in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spa-
ing up the relation between prima facie duties and the tial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of
actual or absolute duty to do one particular act in par- geometry or arithmetic. In our confidence that these
ticular circumstances. If, as almost all moralists except propositions are true there is involved the same trust
Kant are agreed, and as most plain men think, it is in our reason that is involved in our confidence in
sometimes right to tell a lie or to break a promise, it mathematics; and we should have no justification for
must be maintained that there is a difference between trusting it in the latter sphere and distrusting it in the
prima facie duty and actual or absolute duty. When former. In both cases we are dealing with propositions
we think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed that cannot be proved, but that just as certainly need
morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve no proof.
some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease
to recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, * * *
and this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repen- Our judgements about our actual duty in concrete
tance, but certainly compunction, for behaving as we situations have none of the certainty that attaches
do; we recognize, further, that it is our duty to make to our recognition of the general principles of duty. A
up somehow to the promisee for the breaking of the statement is certain, i.e. is an expression of knowledge,
promise. We have to distinguish from the character- only in one or other of two cases: when it is either
istic of being our duty that of tending to be our duty. self-evident, or a valid conclusion from self-evident prem-
Any act that we do contains various elements in virtue isses. And our judgements about our particular duties
of which it falls under various categories. In virtue of have neither of these characters. (1) They are not
being the breaking of a promise, for instance, it tends self-evident. Where a possible act is seen to have two
to be wrong; in virtue of being an instance of relieving characteristics, in virtue of one of which it is prima
distress it tends to be right .... fade right, and in virtue of the other prima facie wrong,
we are (I think) well aware that we are not certain
* * * whether we ought or ought not to do it; that whether
Something should be said of the relation between we do it or not, we are taking a moral risk. We come
our apprehension of the prima facie rightness of cer- in the long run, after consideration, to think one
tain types of act and our mental attitude towards par- duty more pressing than the other, but we do not feel
ticular acts. It is proper to use the word 'apprehension' certain that it is so. And though we do not always rec-
in the former case and not in the latter. That an act, ognize that a possible act has two such characteristics,
and though there may be cases in which it has not, we Similarly we are more likely to do our duty if we reflect
are never certain that any particular possible act has to the best of our ability on the prima facie rightness
not, and therefore never certain that it is right, nor or wrongness of various possible acts in virtue of the
certain that it is wrong. For, to go no further in the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we
analysis, it is enough to point out that any particular act without reflection. With this greater likelihood we
act will in all probability in the course of time contrib- must be content.
ute to the bringing about of good or of evil for many
human beings, and thus have a prima facie rightness or * * *
wrongness of which we know nothing. (2) Again, our The general principles of duty are obviously not
judgements about our particular duties are not logical self-evident from the beginning of our lives. How do
conclusions from self-evident premisses. The only pos- they come to be so? The answer is, that they come to
sible premisses would be the general principles stating be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do.
their prima facie rightness or wrongness qua having We find by experience that this couple of matches
the different characteristics they do have; and even and that couple make four matches, that this couple
if we could (as we cannot) apprehend the extent to of balls on a wire and that couple make four balls: and
which an act will tend on the one hand, for example, by reflection on these and similar discoveries we come
to bring about advantages for our benefactors, and on to see that it is of the nature of two and two to make
the other hand to bring about disadvantages for fellow four. In a precisely similar way, we see the prima facie
men who are not our benefactors, there is no principle rightness of an act which would be the fulfilment of
by which we can draw the conclusion that it is on the a particular promise, and of another which would be
whole right or on the whole wrong. In this respect the the fulfilment of another promise, and when we have
judgement as to the rightness of a particular act is just reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms,
like the judgement as to the beauty of a particular nat- we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the
ural object or work of art. A poem is, for instance, in nature of any fulfilment of promise. What comes first
respect of certain qualities beautiful and in respect of in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima
certain others not beautiful; and our judgement as to facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type.
the degree of beauty it possesses on the whole is never From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-
reached by logical reasoning from the apprehension evident general principle of prima facie duty. From
of its particular beauties or particular defects. Both in this, too, perhaps along with the apprehension of the
this and in the moral case we have more or less prob- self-evident prima facie rightness of the same act in
able opinions which are not logically justified conclu- virtue of its having another characteristic as well, and
sions from the general principles that are recognized perhaps in spite of the apprehension of its prima facie
as self-evident. wrongness in virtue of its having some third charac-
There is therefore much truth in the description of teristic, we come to believe something not self-evident
the right act as a fortunate act. If we cannot be certain at all, but an object of probable opinion, viz. that this
that it is right, it is our good fortune if the act we do particular act is (not prima facie but) actually right.
is the right act. This consideration does not, however,
make the doing of our duty a mere matter of chance. * * *
There is a parallel here between the doing of duty and In what has preceded, a good deal of use has been
the doing of what will be to our personal advantage. made of 'what we really think' about moral ques-
We never know what act will in the long run be to our tions; a certain theory has been rejected because it
advantage. Yet it is certain that we are more likely does not agree with what we really think. It might be
in general to secure our advantage if we estimate to said that this is in principle wrong; that we should not
the best of our ability the probable tendencies of our be content to expound what our present moral con-
actions in this respect, than if we act on caprice. And sciousness tells us but should aim at a criticism of our
existing moral consciousness in the light of theory. sense-experience itself, which furnishes his real data.
Now I do not doubt that the moral consciousness of In ethics no such appeal is possible. We have no more
men has in detail undergone a good deal of modifica- direct way of access to the facts about rightness and
tion as regards the things we think right, at the hands goodness and about what things are right or good,
of moral theory. But if we are told, for instance, that we than by thinking about them; the moral convictions
should give up our view that there is a special obligato- of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of
riness attaching to the keeping of promises because it ethics just as sense-perceptions are the data of a natu-
is self-evident that the only duty is to produce as much ral science. Just as some of the latter have to be rejected
good as possible, we have to ask ourselves whether we as illusory, so have some of the former; but as the lat-
really, when we reflect, are convinced that this is self- ter are rejected only when they are in conflict with
evident, and whether we really can get rid of our view other more accurate sense-perceptions, the former are
that promise-keeping has a bindingness independent rejected only when they are in conflict with other con-
of productiveness of maximum good. In my own victions which stand better the test of reflection. The
experience I find that I cannot, in spite of a very genu- existing body of moral convictions of the best people
ine attempt to do so; and I venture to think that most is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of
people will find the same .... many generations, which has developed an extremely
I would maintain, in fact, that what we are apt delicate power of appreciation of moral distinctions;
to describe as 'what we think' about moral questions and this the theorist cannot afford to treat with any-
contains a considerable amount that we do not think thing other than the greatest respect. The verdicts of
but know, and that this forms the standard by refer- the moral consciousness of the best people are the
ence to which the truth of any moral theory has to foundation on which he must build; though he must
be tested, instead of having itself to be tested by first compare them with one another and eliminate
reference to any theory. I hope that I have in what any contradictions they may contain.
precedes indicated what in my view these elements
of knowledge are that are involved in our ordinary * * *
moral consciousness.
It would be a mistake to found a natural science NOTES
on 'what we really think', Le. on what reasonably 1. These are not strictly speaking duties, but things that tend
thoughtful and well-educated people think about the to be our duty, or prima facie duties.
subjects of the science before they have studied them 2. Some will think it, apart from other considerations, a
scientifically. For such opinions are interpretations, sufficient refutation of this view to point out that I also
and often misinterpretations, of sense-experience; stand in that relation to myself, so that for this view the
and the man of science must appeal from these to distinction of oneself from others is morally insignificant.
CHAPTER 7
Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person
Consequentialist moral theories are concerned with but in striving to be a particular kind of person-a
the consequences of actions, for the consequences virtuous person whose actions stem naturally from
determine the moral rightness of conduct. The pro- virtuous character.
duction of good over evil is the essence of morality. For Aristotle, every living being has an end
Nonconsequentialist moral theories are concerned toward which it naturally aims. Life is teleological;
with the moral nature of actions, for the right- it is meant not just to be something but to aspire
making characteristics of actions determine the toward something, to fulfill its proper function.
rightness of conduct. Virtue ethics, however, takes What is the proper aim of human beings? Aristotle
a different turn. Virtue ethics is a theory of moral- argues that the true goal of humans-their greatest
ity that makes virtue the central concern. When good-is eudaimonia, which means "happiness"
confronted with a moral problem, a utilitarian or or "flourishing" and refers to the full realization of
a Kantian theorist asks, "What should I do?" But a the good life. To achieve eudaimonia, human beings
virtue ethicist asks, in effect, "What should 1 be?" must fulfill the function that is natural and distinc-
For the former, moral conduct is primarily a matter tive to them: living fully in accordance with reason.
of follOwing or applying a moral principle or rule to The life of reason entails a life of virtue because the
a particular Situation, and morality is mainly duty- virtues themselves are rational modes of behav-
based. For the latter, moral conduct is something ing. Thus Aristotle says, "Happiness is an activity
that emanates from a person's moral virtues, from of the soul in accordance with complete or perfect
his or her moral character, not from obedience to virtue." The virtuous life both helps human beings
moral laws. In this chapter we try to understand achieve true happiness and is the realization of true
both the main attractions and the major criticisms happiness. Virtues make you good, and they help
of this virtue-centered approach to ethics and the you have a good life.
moral life. A virtue is a stable disposition to act and feel
according to some ideal or model of excellence. It
is a deeply embedded character trait that can affect
THE ETHICS OF VIRTUE actions in countless situations. Aristotle distin-
Most modern virtue ethicists trace their theo- guishes between intellectual and moral virtues.
retical roots back to the ancients, most notably to Intellectual virtues include wisdom, prudence, ratio-
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.). His ethics is a coherent, nality, and the like. Moral virtues include fairness,
virtue-based view that interlocks with his broader benevolence, honesty, loyalty, conscientiousness,
philosophical concerns-his theories about cau- and courage. He believes that intellectual virtues
sation, SOCiety, self, education, mind, and meta- can be taught, just as logic and mathematics can
physics. He says the moral life consists not in be taught. But moral virtues can be learned only
following moral rules that stipulate right actions through practice:
164
CHAPTER 7: VIRTUE ETHICS: BE A GOOD PERSON 0 165
CRITICAL THOUGHT: learning Virtues in the Classroom
Years ago the New York Times reported that the reporter noted, "there is an effort afoot to awaken
teaching of traditional virtues such as honesty the interest of youngsters in these subjects." *
and civility was becoming more common in public Would Aristotle approve of the methods cited
schools. The article highlighted Paul Meck, an ele- here (song, discussion, lecture)? Why or why not?
mentary school guidance counselor who spent much What type of virtue education would he approve
of his time teaching students about virtues and of? Which approach-Aristotle's or the one men-
values. Meck's approach was to visit classrooms and tioned in this news article-do you think would be
lead discussions on such topics as honesty, friendship, most effective? Give reasons for your answer.
and shoplifting. When he talked to younger stu-
dents, he played his guitar and sang lyrics that *Gene I. Maeroff, "About Education; Values Regain
underscored his points. "Whether through song, Their Popularity," New York Times, Science Desk,
discussion or simply a straightforward lecture," the April 10, 1984.
[M]oral virtue comes about as a result of habit .... Like Aristotle, contemporary virtue ethicists put
From this it is also plain that none of the moral vir- the emphasis on quality of character and virtues
tues arises in us by nature .... [B]ut the virtues we get (character traits), rather than on adherence to par-
by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of
ticular principles or rules of right action. They are
the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before
we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men of course concerned with doing the right thing, but
become builders by building and lyreplayers by play- moral obligations, in their view, are derived from
ing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, virtues. These thinkers are, for example, less likely
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing to ask whether lying is wrong in a particular situ-
brave acts. 1 ation than whether the action or person is honest
or dishonest, or whether honesty precludes lying in
Aristotle's notion of a moral virtue is what he this case, or whether an exemplar of honesty (say,
calls the "Golden Mean," a balance between two Gandhi or Jesus) would lie in these circumstances.
behavioral extremes. A moral virtue (courage, for Contemporary virtue ethicists are also Aristote-
example) is the midpoint between excess (an lian in believing that a pure duty-based morality of rule
excess of courage, or foolhardiness) and deficit (a adherence represents a barren, one-dimensional
deficit of courage, or cowardice). For Aristotle, then, conception of the moral life. First, they agree
the virtuous-and happy-life is a life of moderation with Aristotle that the cultivation of virtues is not
in all things. merely a moral requirement-it is a way (some
Modern virtue ethicists follow Aristotle's lead would say the only way) to ensure human flourish-
in many respects. Some thinkers take issue with his ing and the good life. Second, they maintain that a
teleological theory of human nature and his concept full-blown ethics must take into account motives,
of a virtue as a mean between opposing tendencies. feelings, intentions, and moral Wisdom-factors
And some have offered interesting alternatives to that they think duty-based morality neglects. This
his virtue ethics. But almost all virtue theories owe a view contrasts dramatically with Kant's duty-based
debt to Aristotle in one way or another. ethics. He argues that to act morally is simply to
act out of duty-that is, to do our duty because it is and feelings appropriate to the actions. Helen
our duty. We need not act out of friendship, loy- avoids dishonest dealings, and she does so because
alty, kindness, love, or sympathy. But in virtue eth- that is what a virtuous person would do, because
ics, acting from such motivations is a crucial part she has compassion and sympathy for innocent
of acting from a virtuous character, for virtues are people who are cheated, and because dishonesty is
stable dispositions that naturally include motiva- not conducive to human happiness and flourishing.
tions and feelings. Contrast the action of someone What guidance can Helen obtain in her strivings
who methodically aids his sick mother solely out of toward a moral ideal? Like most virtue ethicists, she
a sense of duty with the person who tends to her looks to moral exemplars-people who embody the
mother out of sympathy, love, and loyalty (perhaps virtues and inspire others to follow in their steps.
in addition to a sense of duty). Most people would (For exemplars of honesty, Helen has several moral
probably think that the latter is a better model of heroes to choose from-Socrates, Gandhi,jesus, the
the moral life, while the former seems incomplete. Buddha, Thomas Aquinas, and many others.) As the
philosopher Louis Pojman says of virtue systems,
V1RTUE 1N ACT10N The primary focus is not on abstract reason but on
ideal types of persons or on actual ideal persons. Dis-
If moral rules are secondary in virtue ethiCS, how covering the proper moral example and imitating
does a virtue ethicist make moral decisions or guide that person or ideal type thus replace casuistic reason
his or her conduct or judge the behavior of oth- as the most significant aspects of the moral life. Even-
ers? Suppose Helen, a conscientious practitioner tually, the apprentice-like training in virtue gained by
imitating the ideal model results in a virtuous person
of Aristotelian virtue ethics, hears William lie to a 2
wh? spontaneously does what is good.
friend to avoid paying a debt. She does not have to
appeal to a moral rule such as "Do not lie" to know
EVAlUAT1NG VIRTUE ETH1CS
that William's action is an instance of dishonesty
(or untruthfulness) and that William himself is dis- A case can be made for virtue ethics based on how
honest. She can see by his actions that he lacks the well it seems to explain important aspects of the
virtue of honesty. moral life. Some philosophers, for example, claim
But to Helen, honesty is more than just a charac- that the virtue approach offers a more plausible
ter trait: it is also an essential part of human happi- explanation of the role of motivation in moral
ness and flourishing. In her case, honesty is a virtue actions than duty-based moral systems do. By
that she has cultivated for years by behaving hon- Kantian lights your conduct may be morally accept-
estly and truthfully in a variety of situations (not able even if you, say, save a friend's life out of a sense
just in cases of lying). She has taken such trouble in of duty alone (that is, without any sincere regard for
part because cultivating this virtue has helped her your friend). But this motivation-your calculat-
become the kind of person she wants to be. She has ing sense of duty-seems a very cold and anemic
developed the disposition to act honestly; acting motivation indeed. Virtue theorists would say that
honestly is part of who she is. She sometimes relies a more natural and morally appropriate response
on moral rules (or moral rules of thumb) to make would be to save your friend primarily out of com-
moral deciSions, but she usually does not need passion, love, loyalty, or something Similar-and
them, because her actions naturally reflect her these motives are just what we would expect from a
virtuous character. virtuous person acting from fully developed virtues.
In addition, Helen's trained virtues not only Some philosophers also remind us that virtue
guide her actions but also inspire the motivations ethics puts primary emphasis on being a good
person and living a good life, a life of happiness

and flourishing. They say that these aims are obvi-
QUICI< REVIEW
ously central to the moral life and should be part of
any adequate theory of morality. Duty-based moral virtue ethics-A theory of morality that makes
systems, however, pay much less attention to these virtue the central concern.
essential elements. eudaimonia-Ha ppi ness, or flourish ing.
Many duty-based theorists are willing to concede
virtue-A stable disposition to act and feel
that there is some truth in both these claims. They
according to some ideal or model of excellence.
believe that motivation for moral action cannot be
derived entirely from considerations of duty, just Golden Mean-Aristotle's notion of a virtue as a
balance between two behavioral extremes.
as appropriate motivation cannot be based solely
on virtuous character. And they recognize that the
moral life involves more than merely honoring rules
and principles. As Aristotle insists, there should be
room for moral achievement in morality, for striv- virtuous person is the one who performs the right
ing toward moral ideals. But even if these claims of action. But this is to argue in a circle and to give us
the virtue ethicist are true, it does not follow that tra- no help in figuring out what to do. To avoid this cir-
ditional virtue ethics is the best moral theory or that cularity, they say, we must appeal to some kind of
an ethics without duties or principles is plausible. moral standard or principle to evaluate the action
Virtue-based ethics seems to meet the mini- itself. Before we can decide if a person is virtuous,
mum requirement of coherence, and it appears to we need to judge if her actions are right or wrong-
be generally consistent with our commonsense and such judgments take us beyond virtue ethics.
moral judgments and moral experience. Neverthe- Some argue in a similar vein by pointing out
less critics have taken it to task, with most of the that a person may possess all the proper virtues
strongest criticisms centering on alleged problems and still be unable to tell right from wrong actions.
with applying the theory-in other words, with Dr. Green may be benevolent and just and still
usefulness (Criterion 3). not know if stem cell research should be contin-
The critics' main contention is that appeals to ued or stopped, or if he should help a terminal
virtues or virtuous character without reference to patient commit suicide, or if he should perform
principles of duty cannot give us any useful guid- a late-term abortion. Likewise, we know that it is
ance in deciding what to do. Suppose we are try- possible for a virtuous person to act entirely from
ing to decide what to do when a desperately poor virtue-and still commit an immoral act. This
stranger steals money from us. Should we have him shows, critics say, that the rightness of actions does
arrested? Give him even more money? Ignore the not necessarily (or invariably) depend on the con-
whole affair? According to virtue ethics, we should tent of one's character. We seem to have indepen-
do what a virtuous person would do, or do what dent moral standardS-independent of character
moral exemplars such as Jesus or Buddha would considerations_by
. . which we J'ud ge th e mora I per-
do, or do what is benevolent or conscientious. missibility of actions.
But what exactly would a virtuous person do? Or Th .
, e Vlftue theorist can respond to these criti-
what precisely is the benevolent or conscientiouS t'
cisms by asse ring t h at there IS
. actually plenty
action? As many philosophers see it, the problem of. moral guida nce t 0 b e h ad In
. statements about
is that virtue ethics says that the right action is the VIrtues and vices. According to the virtue ethicist
one performed by the virtuous person and that the Rosalind Hursthouse ,
--
,,~.
~
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Warrior Virtues and Moral Disagreements
A 2005 report from Voice of America told of Assume that all these men were honorable and
a dispute over the war in Iraq among highly had all the appropriate warrior virtues such as courage
regarded war veterans. Democratic Represen- and loyalty. If they were then comparably virtuous in
tative John Murtha, a decorated Marine Corps the ways indicated, how could they have disagreed
veteran who fought in Vietnam, was a strong about the conduct of the war? Suppose they all pos-
supporter of the military-but thought the sessed exactly the same virtues to exactly the same
war in Iraq was a disaster and demanded that degree and had access to the same set of facts about
u.s. forces be withdrawn from Iraq within six the war. Would it still have been possible for them to
months. Democratic Senator John Kerry, also a disagree? Why or why not? Do you think that any of
decorated veteran of the Vietnam War, disagreed these considerations suggest that virtue ethics may be
with Murtha's timetable for troop withdrawal. a flawed moral theory? Why or why not?
He proposed that troops start to leave Iraq later,
in early 2007. Republican Senator John McCain, *Jim Malone, "Waning US Iraq War Support Stirs
a former Navy fighter pilot and POW in the New Comparisons to Vietnam Conflict," VOANews.
Vietnam conflict, supported the president's view com, November 22, 2005, https:llwww.voanews.
that the troops should stay in Iraq until the job com/archive/waning-us-iraq-war-support-stirs-new-
was done.* comparisons-vietnam-conflict (January 9, 2015).
[A] great deal of specific action guidance could be should you do if you have to choose between
found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms performing or not performing a particular action,
("v-rules") such as "Do what is honest/charitable; and each option involves the same two virtues but
do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable." (It is a in contradictory ways? Suppose your best friend
noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabu-
is on trial for murder, and under oath you must
lary that, although our list of generally recognised
virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice testify about what you know of the case-and
terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceed- what you know will incriminate her. The question
ing anything that anyone who thinks in terms of is, Should you lie? If you lie to save your friend,
standard deontological rules has ever come up you will be loyal but dishonest. If you tell the
with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from truth, you will be honest but disloyal. The virtues
avoiding courses of action that would be irrespon- of loyalty and honesty conflict; you simply cannot
sible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative,
be both loyal and honest. Virtue ethics says you
harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet,
tactless, arrogant ... and on and on.)3 should act as a virtuoUS person would. But such
advice gives you no guidance on how to do.that ~n
Hursthouse believes we can discover our moral this particular case. You ne~d ~o k~ow WhIC~ vu-
duties by examining terms that refer to virtues and tue is more important in thIS sItuatIon, but vutue
vices because moral guidance is implicit in these ethics does not seem to provide a useful answer.
terms. The proponent of virtue ethics has a ready reply
Another usefulness criticism crops up because to this criticism: some duty-based moral theories,
of apparent conflicts between virtues. What such as Kantian ethicS, are also troubled by conflicts
(conflicts of rules or principles, for example). Obvi- dispositions and traits? Must we choose? It is hard
ously the existence of such conflicts is not a fatal to see how a morality of principles can get off the
flaw in duty-based ethics, and so it must not be in ground except through the development of dispo-
virtue approaches either. When principles seem to sitions to act in accordance with its principles, else
all motivation to act on them must be of an ad hoc
conflict, the duty-based theorist must determine if
kind, either prudential or impulsively altruistic.
the conflict is real and, if so, if it can be resolved (by, Moreover, morality can hardly be content with a
say, weighting one principle more than another). mere conformity to rules, however willing and self-
Virtue ethics, the argument goes, can exercise the conscious it may be, unless it has no interest in the
same kinds of options. Some might observe, how- spirit of its law but only in the letter. On the other
ever, that incorporating a weighting rule or similar hand, one cannot conceive of traits of character
standard into virtue ethics seems to make the the- except as including dispositions and tendencies to
ory a blend of duty-based and virtue-based features. act in certain ways in certain circumstances. Hating
involves being disposed to kill or harm, being just
involves tending to do just acts (acts that conform
LEARNING FROM VIRTUE ETHICS to the principle of justice) when the occasion calls.
Again, it is hard to see how we could know what
Why does the ancient moral tradition of virtue traits to encourage or inculcate if we did not sub-
ethics persist-and not just persist, but thrive, even scribe to principles, for example, to the principle of
enjoying a revival in modern times? Many thinkers utility, or to those of benevolence and justice. 4
would say that virtue ethics is alive and well because
Kant would have us act out of duty alone, grant-
it is sustained by an important ethical truth: virtue
ing no bonus points for acting from virtue. Utili-
and character are large, unavoidable constituents
tarianism doesn't require, but also doesn't reject,
of our moral experience. As moral creatures, we
virtuous motives. Yet virtue seems to be as much
regularly judge the moral permissibility of actions-
a part of our moral experience as moral disagree-
and assess the goodness of character. If someone
ments, moral errors, and moral reasoning. The
commits an immoral act (kills an innocent human
question is not whether we should care about vir-
being, for example), it matters to us whether the act
tues but how much we should care and how we can
was committed out of compassion (as in euthana-
incorporate them into our lives.
sia), benevolence, loyalty, revenge, rage, or igno-
rance. The undeniable significance of virtue in
morality has obliged many philosophers to con-
sider how best to accommodate virtues into their CHAPTER REVIEW
prinCiple-based theories of morality or to recast
those theories entirely to give virtues a larger role.
The rise of virtue ethics has also forced many SUMMARY
thinkers to reexamine the place of principles in
Virtue ethics is a moral theory that makes virtue the
morality. If we have virtues, do we need prinCiples?
central concern. In virtue ethics, moral conduct is sup-
Most philosophers would probably say yes and
posed to radiate naturally from moral virtues. That is,
agree with the philosopher William Frankena that
moral actions are derived from virtues. A virtue is a
"principles without traits [virtues] are impotent stable disposition to act and feel according to an ideal
and traits without principles are blind": or model of excellence.
To be or to do, that is the question. Should we con- Most modern virtue ethicists take their inspira-
strue morality as primarily a following of certain tion from Aristotle. He argues that humankind's
principles or as primarily a cultivation of certain greatest good is happiness, or eudaimonia. To achieve
happiness, human beings must fulfill their natural 5. What, according to Aristotle, must humans do
function-to live fully in accordance with reason. to achieve eudaimonia? (p. 164)
To live this way is to cultivate the virtues, for they are 6. What is a virtue? Give three examples of moral virtues.
rational ways of being and flourishing. Aristotle sug- Give two examples of intellectual virtues. (p. 164)
gests that a moral virtue is a Golden Mean, a midpoint 7. What important elements do virtue ethicists
between two extreme ways of behaving. So he says that think are missing from traditional duty-based
the good life is a life in the middle, a life of moderation. ethics? (p. 165)
Virtue theorists think that acting out of duty alone 8. How do virtue ethiCists use moral exemplars?
is a distortion of true morality. A full-blown morality, (p.166)
they insist, must include motives, emotions, inten- 9. Does virtue ethics seem to offer a more plausible
tions, and moral wisdom. Acting morally means acting explanation of the role of motivation in moral
from virtue-from the appropriate motives and feel- actions than does Kantian ethics? If so, how?
ings, taking all the factors of the situation into account. (pp.166-67)
Virtue-based ethics seems to meet the minimum 10. What is the chief argument against virtue ethics?
requirement of coherence, and it fits with our com- How can the virtue ethicist respond? (p. 167)
monsense moral judgments and experience. But it
has been accused of not being useful. The main criti-
cism is that appeals to virtue alone (sans principles) Discussion Questions
give us little or no guidance about how to act. Critics 1. For Aristotle, what is the central task in morality
argue that virtue ethics defines virtue in terms of right and how does it differ from the central task in
actions and defines right actions in terms of virtue. utilitarianism?
But this is circular reasoning and provides no help for 2. How does Aristotle's conception of the virtuous
making moral decisions. Virtue theorists, however, life differ from Kant's?
can reply that guidance in moral decision making is 3. Is Aristotle's notion of the Golden Mean helpful
in fact available-it is inherent in statements about in identifying the virtues in any situation? Why
virtues and Vices. or why not?
4. Kant says that to act morally is to act out of
I<EY TERMS duty. How does this differ from the virtue ethics
virtue ethics (p. 164) approach? Are you likely to admire someone who
eudaimonia (p. 164) always acts out of duty alone? Why or why not?
virtue (p. 164) 5. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of
Golden Mean (p. 165) act-utilitarianism and virtue ethics. Which do
you think is the better theory? How would you
combine the two approaches to fashion a better
EXERCISES theory?
Review Questions 6. William Frankena says that morality requires
both principles and virtues. Do you agree? Why
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of
or why not?
Aristotle's virtue ethics theory? (pp. 166-69)
2. What does Aristotle mean when he says that the
virtuous life helps us achieve happiness and ;s ETHICAL DILEMMAS
happiness? (p. 164) Explain how virtue ethics could be applied in the fol-
3. How does virtue ethics differ from duty-based lowing scenarios to determine the proper course of
ethics? (p. 164) action.
4. In what way is Aristotle's virtue ethics 1. You are walking across town, and a homeless
considered teleological? (p. 164) person bumps into you. takes your wallet. and
runs away. What would a virtuous person do FURTHER READING

in this instance? Should the guiding virtue be Stephen Angle and Michael Slote (eds), Virtue Ethics and
compassion? Fairness? Honesty? ConfUcianism (New York: Routledge, 2013).
2. You are a physician treating a terminally ill G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philoso-
woman who is in a great deal of pain that no phy33,no.1240anuaryI958): 1-19.
drug can relieve. She says she has lived a full Paul Bloomfield, The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the
life and now wants you to end her anguish by Good Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
helping her die quickly and quietly. She has Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," in Virtues and Vices and
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of
no known relatives. The American Medical
California Press, 1978).
Association's code of ethics absolutely forbids
William K. Frankena, "Ethics of Virtue," in Ethics, 2nd ed.
physician-assisted suicide, and the hospital (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973).
where she is a patient has a similar policy. But Marilyn Friedman, "Feminist Virtue Ethics, Happiness
you want to alleviate her agony and give her and Moral Luck," Hypatia, 24 (2019): 29-40.
a chance to die with dignity. What would a Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics," in Stanford Encyclo-
virtuous person do? pedia of Philosophy, Fall 2003 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta,
3. Your father has stolen $30,000 from his employer https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa1l2003!entries!
to pay for surgery that his sister desperately ethics-virtue! (March 1,2015).
needs. Without the surgery, she will be dead Alasdair MacIntyre, liThe Nature of the Virtues," in
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN:
within six months. Only you know about his
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).
crime. You also know that no one will ever know
Greg Pence, "Virtue Theory," in A Companion to Ethics, ed.
who stole the money unless you report the theft Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
to the authorities. Should you turn your father in Michael Slote, The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle,
to the police? Should you keep quiet about the Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics (New York,
matter? What would a virtuous person do? Oxford University Press, 2011).
READINGS
From Nicomachean Ethics

ARISTOTLE
BOOK I their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is
1 health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy
Victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action
fall under a single capacity-as bridle-making and the
and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for
other arts concerned with the equipment of horses
this reason the good has rightly been declared to be
fall under the art of riding, and this and every military
that at which all things aim. But a certain difference
action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall
is found among ends; some are activities, others are
under yet others-in all of these the ends of the mas-
products apart from the activities that produce them.
ter arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends;
Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the
for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are
nature of the products to be better than the activities.
pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities
Now, as there are many actions, arts, and SCiences,
themselves are the ends of the actions, or something
Aristotle, Niclwmachca" ftllieS. tram;. \1\'. D. Ross, books I and II, else apart from the activities, as in the case of the
(edited) (t'Books(IIlAdelah.te. 200·41. sciences just mentioned.
2 will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference
we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired whether he is young in years or youthful in character;
for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything the defect does not depend on time, but on his living,
for the sake of something else (for at that rate the pro- and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs.
cess would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge
empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accor-
chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a dance with a rational principle knowledge about such
great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who matters will be of great benefit. These remarks about the
have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the
is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to deter- purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
mine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capaci-
ties it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most 4
authoritative art and that which is most truly the mas- Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact
ter art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is
that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some
this that ordains which of the sciences should be stud-
good, what it is that we say political science aims at and
ied in a state, and which each class of citizens should what is the highest of all goods achievable by action.
learn and up to what point they should learn them; and Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the
we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to general run of men and people of superior refinement
fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetOriC; now, say that it is happiness, and identify living well and
since politics uses the rest of the sdences, and since,
doing well with being happy; but with regard to what
again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we
happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the
are to abstain from, the end of this science must include
same account as the wise. For the former think it is some
those of the others, so that this end must be the good plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or hon-
for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man our; they differ, however, from one another-and often
and for a state, that of the state seems at all events some- even the same man identifies it with different things,
thing greater and more complete whether to attain or with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor;
to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those
merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to who proclaim some great ideal that is above their com-
attain it for a nation or for dty-states. These, then, are prehension. Now some thought that apart from these
the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political many goods there is another which is self-subsistent
science, in one sense of that term. and causes the goodness of all these as well. To exam-
ine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps
* * * somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are
3 most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of * * *
these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been
educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, 5
and the man who has received an all-round education Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point
is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men
proper hearer of lectures on political science' for he is lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem
inexperienced in the actions that occur in li~e but its (not without some ground) to identify the good, or hap-
discussions start from these and are about the~e' and piness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love
further, since he tends to follow his passions, his'stud; the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three
prominent types of life-that just mentioned, the polit- in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of
ical, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is
mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, pre- done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory,
ferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground in architecture a house, in any other sphere some-
for their view from the fact that many of those in high thing else, and in every action and pursuit the end;
places share the tastes ofSardanapallus. A consideration for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever
of the prominent types of life shows that people of supe- else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that
rior refinement and of active disposition identify hap- we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and
piness with honour, for this is, roughly speaking, the if there are more than one, these will be the goods
end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to achievable by action.
be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend So the argument has by a different course reached
on those who bestow honour rather than on him who the same point; but we must try to state this even more
receives it, but the good we divine to be something clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end,
proper to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and
men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be in general instruments) for the sake of something else,
assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practi- clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is
cal wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only
those who know them, and on the ground of their vir- one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if
tue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue there are more than one, the most final of these will
is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in
be, rather than honour, the end of the political life. itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is
But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for pos- worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and
session of virtue seems actually compatible with being that which is never desirable for the sake of something
asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the else more final than the things that are desirable both
greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was in themselves and for the sake of that other thing,
living so no one would call happy, unless he were main- and therefore we call final without qualification that
taining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the which is always desirable in itself and never for the
subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current sake of something else.
discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held
we shall consider later. to be; for this we choose always for self and never for
The life of money-making is one undertaken the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, rea-
under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the son, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves
good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the (for if nothing resulted from them we should still
sake of something else. And so one might rather take choose each of them), but we choose them also for the
the aforenamed objects to be ends; for they are loved sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we
for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one
ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for any-
support of them. Let us leave this subject, then. thing other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same
* * *
result seems to follow; for the final good is thought
to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not
7 mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, chil-
what it can be. It seems different in different actions dren, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow cit-
and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and izens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit
L
must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to
to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-
are in for an infinite series. Let us examine this ques- player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player
tion, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the func-
we now define as that which when isolated makes life tion of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an
desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think activity or actions of the soul implying a rational princi-
happiness to be; and further we think it most desir- ple, and the function of a good man to be the good and
able of all things, without being counted as one good noble performance of these, and if any action is well
thing among others-if it were so counted it would performed when it is performed in accordance with
clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human
the least of goods; for that which is added becomes good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with
an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accor-
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final dance with the best and most complete.
and self-sufficient, and is the end of action. But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swal-
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the low does not make a summer, nor does one day; and
chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man
what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if blessed and happy.
we could first ascertain the function of man. For just
* * *
as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in
general, for all things that have a function or activ-
BOOK II
ity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the
function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a 1
function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral,
certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and
~e born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires
In general each of the parts evidently has a function, experience and time), while moral virtue comes about
may one lay it down that man similarly has a func- as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one
tion apart from all these? What then can this be? Life that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos
seems to be common even to plants, but we are seek- (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral
ing what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists
the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For
a life of perception, but it also seems to be common instance the stone which by nature moves downwards
even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one
remains, then, an active life of the element that has a tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times;
~ational prinCiple;. of this, one part has such a principle nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor
m the sense of bemg obedient to one, the other in the can anything else that by nature behaves in one way
sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature,
as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings: then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us;
we must state that life in the sense of activity is what rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and
we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense are made perfect by habit.
of the ter~. Now if the function of man is an activity Again, of all the things that come to us by nature
of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the
and if we say 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so' have activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it
a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got
a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all these senses, but on the contrary we had them before
we used them, and did not come to have them by to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would
using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising have been of no use), we must examine the nature of
them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, determine also the nature of the states of character
we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we must
building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too act according to the right rule is a common principle
we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing and must be assumed-it will be discussed later, i.e.
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the
This is confirmed by what happens in states; for other virtues. But this must be agreed upon before-
legislators make the citizens good by forming habits hand, that the whole account of matters of conduct
in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said
those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in at the very beginning that the accounts we demand
this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. must be in accordance with the subject-matter; mat-
Again, it is from the same causes and by the ters concerned with conduct and questions of what is
same means that every virtue is both produced and good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of
destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from play- health. The general account being of this nature, the
ing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exact-
produced. And the corresponding statement is true ness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but
of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or the agents themselves must in each case consider what
bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the
if this were not so, there would have been no need of art of medicine or of navigation.
a teacher, but all men would have been born good or But though our present account is of this nature
bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the vir- we must give what help we can. First, then, let us con-
tues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transac- sider this, that it is the nature of such things to be
tions with other men we become just or unjust, and destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case
by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, of strength and of health (for to gain light on things
and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible
become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appe- things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys
tites and feelings of anger; some men become tem- the strength, and similarly drink or food which is
perate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and above or below a certain amount destroys the health,
irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the while that which is proportionate both produces and
appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case
of character arise out of like activities. This is why of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For
the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it the man who flies from and fears everything and does
is because the states of character correspond to the not stand his ground against anything becomes a cow-
differences between these. It makes no small differ- ard, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to
ence, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man
another from our very youth; it makes a very great dif- who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none
ference, or rather all the difference. becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns
every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insen-
sible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by
2 excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.
Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theo- But not only are the sources and causes of their orig-
retical knowledge like the others (for we are inquir- ination and growth the same as those of their destruc-
ing not in order to know what virtue is, but in order tion, but also the sphere of their actualization will be
the same; for this is also true of the things which are very conditions which result from often doing just
more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced and temperate acts.
by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, Actions, then, are called just and temperate when
and it is the strong man that will be most able to do they are such as the just or the temperate man would
these things. So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and
from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we temperate, but the man who also does them as just
have become so that we are most able to abstain from and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that
them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced,
being habituated to despise things that are terrible and and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; with-
to stand our ground against them we become brave, out doing these no one would have even a prospect of
and it is when we have become so that we shall be most becoming good.
able to stand our ground against them. But most people do not do these, but take refuge
in theory and think they are being philosophers and
* * * will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like
4 patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do
The question might be asked, what we mean by saying none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter
that we must become just by doing just acts, and tem- will not be made well in body by such a course of treat-
perate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and ment, the former will not be made well in soul by such
temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, a course of philosophy.
exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the
laws of grammar and of music, they are grammarians
and musicians. 5
Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that
to do something that is in accordance with the laws are found in the soul are of three kinds-passions, fac-
of grammar, either by chance or at the suggestion of ulties, states of character, virtue must be one of these.
another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence,
when he has both done something grammatical and envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation,
done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accor- pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied
dance with the grammatical knowledge in himself. by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of
Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of
are not similar; for the products of the arts have their becoming angry or being pained or feeling pi ty; by states
goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they of character the things in virtue of which we stand well
should have a certain character, but if the acts that are or badly with reference to the paSSions, e.g. with refer-
in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain ence to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too
character it does not follow that they are done justly or weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and Similarly
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain con- with reference to the other paSSions.
dition when he does them; in the first place he must Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions,
have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, because we are not called good or bad on the ground
and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his of our passions, but are so c~J)tcJ on the ground of
action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable OUt viJt~5~ncJ our vkt?s, ilnd because we ate neither
character. These are tint reckoneQ in "~~pnditions of ptalsed nor blamed fOf (jUt pi:l s 5ions (for the Inan who
t):),e P.O:);5tD§ion of the art9; ~~t:~vt the h~f~ knowledgei feels feat or anger is not praised, nor is the man who
but a§ a condition of the passE!ssion of th~ virtues simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in
~npwleoge hal) little Of no weight, while the other con- a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are
ditions count not for a little but for everything, Le. the praised or blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this
the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion.
Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken
moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to
are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a par- eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer
ticular way. will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much
For these reasons also they are not faculties; for for the person who is to take it, or too little-too little
we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exer-
blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; cises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a
again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the
made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this intermediate and chooses this-the intermediate not in
before. If, then, the virtues are neither paSSions nor the object but relatively to us.
faculties, all that remains is that they should be states If it is thus, then, that every art does its work weIl-
of character. by looking to the intermediate and judging its works
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its by this standard (so that we often say of good works of
genus. art that it is not possible either to take away or to add
anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the
goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it;
6 and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work),
We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any
character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality
remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for
into good condition the thing of which it is the excel- it is this that is concerned with passions and actions,
lence and makes the work of that thing be done well; and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermedi-
e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its ate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appe-
work gOOd; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we tite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and
see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in
horse both good in itself and good at running and at car- both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times,
rying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. with reference to the right objects, towards the right
Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is
also will be the state of character which makes a man what is both intermediate and best, and this is charac-
good and which makes him do his own work well. teristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also
How this is to happen we have stated already, but there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now vir-
it will be made plain also by the following consider- tue is concerned with passions and actions, in which
ation of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the
is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and
less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the being praised and being successful are both charac-
thing ito;plf or relatively to us; and the equal is an inter- teristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean,
rnc;diat~ belW~ej1 exc~ss ,Hid defect. By the inteTmedl- since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.
f}te in the ob\ect 1 mean that which is equidistitnt ttdt11 Agoin, it is ppssiph~ to fail in many ways (for evil
~acl1 of the extremes, which is one anti the Sitm~ fot all helongs to ttw dflSS of the U11limH£'tI, a!t; tli£' P}'tliagb-
men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is rean!) conln-turcd, and guod to that of th£' 11111it£'d),
neither too much nor too little-and this is not one, nor while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which
the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is reason also one is easy and the other difficult-to miss
few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also,
L
then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the general apply more widely, but those which are par-
mean of virtue; ticular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with
individual cases, and our statements must harmonize
For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.
with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with from our table. With regard to feelings of fear and con-
choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, fidence courage is the mean; of the people who exceed,
this being determined by a rational principle, and by he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of
that prinCiple by which the man of practical wisdom the states have no name), while the man who exceeds
would determine it. Now it is a mean between two in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and
vices, that which depends on excess and that which falls short in confidence is a coward. With regard to
depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the pleasures and pains-not all of them, and not so much
vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right with regard to the pains-the mean is temperance, the
in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard
and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in to the pleasures are not often found; hence such per-
respect of its substance and the definition which states sons also have received no name. But let us call them
its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best 'insensible' .
and right an extreme. With regard to giving and taking of money the
But not every action nor every passion admits of mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodi-
a mean; for some have names that already imply bad- gality and meanness. In these actions people exceed
ness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds
of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean
suchlike things imply by their names that they are man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. (At
themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies present we are giving a mere outline or summary, and
of them. It is not pOSSible, then, ever to be right with are satisfied with this; later these states will be more
regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does exactly determined.) With regard to money there are
goodness or badness with regard to such things depend also other dispositions-a mean, magnificence (for
on committing adultery with the right women, at the the magnificent man differs from the liberal man;
right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of the former deals with large sums, the latter with small
them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a
to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states
action there should be a mean, an excess, and a defi- opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference
ciency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess will be stated later. With regard to honour and dishon-
and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency our the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as
of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency a sort of 'empty vanity', and the deficiency is undue
of temperance and courage because what is interme- humility; and as we said liberality was related to
diate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small
have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and sums, so there is a state Similarly related to proper
deficiency, but however they are done they are wrong; pride, being concerned with small honours while
for in general there is neither a mean of excess and defi- that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire
ciency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean. honour as one ought, and more than one ought, and
less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called
ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious,
7 while the intermediate person has no name. The dis-
We must, however, not only make this general state- positions also are nameless, except that that of the
ment, but also apply it to the individual facts. For ambitious man is called ambition. Hence the people
among statements about conduct those which are who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place;
and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate by it mock-modest. With regard to pleasantness in
person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and the giving of amusement the intermediate person
sometimes praise the ambitious man and sometimes is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the
the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by
stated in what follows; but now let us speak of the rem- it a buffoon, while the man who falls short is a sort of
aining states according to the method which has been boor and his state is boorishness. With regard to the
indicated. remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhib-
With regard to anger also there is an excess, a defi- ited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the
ciency, and a mean. Although they can scarcely be right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness,
said to have names, yet since we call the intermedi- while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person
ate person good-tempered let us call the mean good if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at
temper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who his own advantage, and the man who falls short and
exceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome
and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of per- and surly sort of person.
son, and the deficiency inirascibility.
* * *
There are also three other means, which have a
certain likeness to one another, but differ from one
another: for they are all concerned with intercourse 9
in words and actions, but differ in that one is con- That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it
cerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one
pleasantness; and of this one kind is exhibited in giv- involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is
ing amusement, the other in all the circumstances of such because its character is to aim at what is interme-
life. We must therefore speak of these two, that we diate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently
may the better see that in all things the mean is praise- stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in
worthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to
right, but worthy of blame. Now most of these states find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for
also have no names, but we must try, as in the other him who knows; so, too, anyone can get angry-that
cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be is easy-or give or spend money; but to do this to the
clear and easy to follow. With regard to truth, then, right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with
the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for
mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both
which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person rare and laudable and noble.
characterized by it a boaster, and that which under-
* * *
states is mock modesty and the person characterized
From Virtue Ethics

JULIA DRIVER
Sometimes, in deciding on what we ought to do, we such as "right" and "wrong." It is important to note
first consider how we ought to be. For example, if that many virtue ethicists do not believe the theory
faced with a situation that involves social injustice, we to be incompatible with act evaluation at all. l Rather,
might pick someone whom we admired and wanted act evaluation is to be understood in tenns of charac-
to be like-Gandhi, let's say, or Mother Teresa-and ter evaluation. Virtue is the primary mode of evalua-
then ask "What would Gandhi do?" This doesn't give tion, and all other modes are understood and defined
us a rigid formula or decision procedure to employ. in terms of virtue. Thus, one popular version of virtue
Instead, it asks us to consider a virtuous person, to ethics defines right action in terms of virtue, rather
consider his or her virtues, and then ask what behavior than defining virtue in terms of right or good action.
people with these good traits and dispositions exem- For example, Rosalind Hursthouse offers the following:
plify. Some writers have thought that a picture like
(RA) An action is right iff [if and only if] it is what a
this better reflects how people should go about mak- virtuous agent would, characteristically, do in the
ing their moral decisions. They should do so on the circumstances ... 2
basis of concrete virtue judgments instead of abstract
principles, such as "Maximize the good" or "Never This is a virtue ethical characterization of "right
treat another person merely as a means," and so forth. action" because the rightness of the action is explained
in terms of virtue, and not the other way around. Most
* * * of the theoretical weight is therefore borne by the
... Virtue ethics has actually been around in one account of virtue provided in the theory. To un pack this
form or another for thousands of years. Current virtue account of right action, we need to know what the vir-
ethicists in fact tend to take their inspiration from tuous agent would do. We need to have an account of
Aristotle (382-322 BC), who was a student of Plato virtue that will give us some way to approach this issue.
(428-348 BC), and certainly one of the greatest phi-
losophers in the history of philosophy. Aristotle wrote * * *
the Nicomachean Ethics, which-as an aid to his son- Aristotle famously believed in the claim that virtue
spelled out the steps to a good life. Of course, "good" is is a mean state, that it lies between two opposed
a bit ambiguous-Is that morally good, or prudentially vices. This is referred to as the doctrine of the mean.
good, or intellectually good, or all of the above? Well, The basic idea is that virtue will tend to lie between
for Aristotle, the good human life had all these ingredi- two extremes, each of which is a vice. So, bravery lies
ents. A good human being was virtuous in the sense that between cowardice and foolhardiness; temperance lies
he embodied all the excellences of human character. between gluttony and abstinence; and so forth. Some
So, Aristotle is often held up as a paradigmatic vir- virtues can be hard to model on this view. Take hon-
tue ethicist. Again, though there is some lack of clarity esty. Of course, failure to tell the truth-telling a lie-
about what exactly virtue ethics is committed to, it is would be one extreme, but is there a vice of telling too
generally agreed that virtue ethics maintains that char- much truth? Maybe ... though I suspect there might
acter, human excellences, virtues are the basic modes of be some disagreement over this. Part of the mean state
evaluation in the theory, as opposed to act evaluations concerned our emotions, however, and not just our
actions. The virtuous person not only does the right
julia Driver, Chapter 8 from Ethics: The Fundamentals (Oxford,
thing, but he does the right thing in the right way-
Blackwell Publishing, 2017), pp. 136-138, 140-141, 151-152.
Copyright (f,) 2007 julia Driver. Reproduced with permission of
in the right sort of emotional or psychological state.
john Wiley & Sons, Inc. Our emotions can be excessive or deficient as well.
The person who runs into the battle to fight, but who as a very standard problem for the theory, but virtue
is excessively fearful, is not fully virtuous. The truly ethicists have spent a good deal of time trying to show
well-functioning person is able to control and regulate how their theories could be applied. Michael Slote,
his feelings and emotions, as well as act rightly. for example, has argued that we need to look at what
Aristotle's picture, then, of the virtuous person motivates a person's actions to determine the action's
is the person who functions harmoniously-his moral quality-so my guide will be what I consider
desires and emotions do not conflict with what he proper motivational structures. Rosalind Hursthouse
knows to be right. They go together. This leads him has argued that we can get perfectly serviceable rules
to view a person who acts rightly, but who feels badly from virtue ethiCS, what she terms the "v-rules"-such
about it, as not being virtuous. This person is merely as "Be honese' or "Be kind. 11 Further, this objection
"continent 11 -this person can control his actions, is no more a problem for the virtue ethicists than it
but needs to work on bringing his emotions in line is a problem for the consequentialist who offers an
with what reason tells him is the right and appropri- evaluative criterion rather than a decision procedure
ate thing to do. So the excellent human being is not (though at least the consequentialist does give us a
conflicted; he does not suffer inner turmoil and the way to evaluate decision procedures).
struggle between reason and passion. This challenge can be expanded by noting that vir-
tue ethics has trouble telling us the right thing to do
* * *
in conflict situations, where two virtues may conflict,
. John Doris proposes that the globalism of
and thus the corresponding rules-such as "Be hon-
traditional virtue ethics be rejected. 3 There is no one
ese' or "Be kind"-may conflict. But some virtue ethi-
"honesty" trait, for example. Instead, we may have 50
cists think that this is simply the way morality is-it is
or more "honesties 11 ; that is, narrowly circumscribed
messy, and for any situation there may be more than
traits or dispositions to tell the truth. So, Joe might
one right answer. Insisting that morality is neat and
not have honesty 1, which is the disposition to tell the
tidy is simply to impose a misleading clarity on moral
truth about how well he does on exams, but he might
decision-making.
have honesty 34, the disposition to tell the truth about
how tall he is. So, Doris thinks that Harman's view- * * *
that situation ism provides evidence that character ... Virtue ethics remains an interesting alternative
traits don't exist-is too radical. However, he does approach to moral evaluation and moral guidance.
think that the experimental evidence supports the
view that there are no robust traits; that is, traits to tell
the truth over all or even most contexts or situations. NOTES
And this is a problem for a virtue ethics that under- 1. The "eliminitavist" strategy is more associated with
stands virtue as a "stable 11 or "reliable 11 character trait. "anti-theory" or the view that we should do without moral
Another challenge has been that virtue ethics theory altogether.
doesn't provide a guide to action. "Be nice, dear"- 2. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford
Well, what is nice, and what are the circumstances University Press, 1999), p. 79.
under which I should be nice? That's what we really 3. John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behav-
want to know. This shows that it is these other reasons iour (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
that actually justify our behavior. This has been raised p. 64 ff.
CHAPTER 8
Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care
Beyond the moral theorizing of Aquinas, Kant, empirically, normatively, or symbolically with
Hobbes, and Mill, there is a different approach to men. For instance, western ethics is alleged to prefer
moral thinking and feeling that constitutes a seri- the supposedly masculine or male-associated values
of independence, autonomy, intellect, will, wari-
ous challenge to them: feminist ethics. Feminist
ness, hierarchy, domination, culture, transcendence,
ethics is not a moral theory so much as an alterna- product, asceticism, war and death over the suppos-
tive way of looking at the concepts and concerns edly feminine or female-associated values of interde-
of the moral life. It is an approach focused on pendence, community, connection, sharing, emotion,
women's interests and experiences and devoted to body, trust, absence of hierarchy, nature, immanence,
supporting the moral equality of women and men process, joy, peace and life. 1
and correcting the biases against women found
in traditional moral thinking. Some moral issues are more likely to arise from
women's experiences than men's, and these, too,
Those who see ethics from this perspective are
reacting to some hard facts. One is that most of the have been overlooked:
great ethical theorists (and many of their followers, Issues of special concern to women are said to have
past and present) have assumed that women are been ignored by modern moral philosophers, who
somehow morally inferior to men-less rational, have tended to portray the domestic realm as an
less important, less mature, or less moral. Coupled arena outside the economy and beyond justice, pri-
with this bias is a trend that is even more alarm- vate in the sense of being beyond the scope of legiti-
mate political regulation. Even philosophers like
ing: most women throughout the world are in a Aristotle or Hegel (1770-1831), who give some ethi-
thousand ways second-class citizens (or worse). By cal importance to the domestic realm, have tended
law, by religion, or by custom, they are the victims to portray the home as an arena in which the most
of Violence, stereotype, bigotry, coercion, forced fully human excellences are incapable of being real-
dependence, and social, political, and professional ized .... [Feminist philosophers] argued that the phil-
inequality. Modern Western societies are as guilty osophical devaluation of the domestic realm made
of some of these evils as many countries in the it impossible to raise questions about the justice of
developing world. the domestic division of labor, because it obscured
the far-reaching social significance and creativity
In the West, some ways of thinking and feeling of women's work in the home, and concealed, even
have been regarded as characteristic of women, and 2
legitimated, the domestic abuse of women and girls.
these ways, whether distinctive of women or not,
have been largely neglected by moral philosophers In the past few decades, feminist philosophers
(who have traditionally been men). According to and other thinkers (mostly women but some men)
the feminist philosopher Alison M.Jaggar, have tried to shed light on all of these dark corners.
Western moral theory is said to embody values The result-still an ongoing project-is feminist
that are "masculine,JI insofar as they are associated, ethics and its grandchild, the ethics of care.
182
CHAPTER 8: FEMINIST ETHICS AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 0 183
FEMINIST ETHICS to the interconnected and familiar small group-

to the people with whom we have close personal
Feminists are a diverse group with contrasting relationships. The relationships of interest are the
viewpoints, so it should not be a surprise that they ties of kinship, the bonds of friendship, or the con-
approach feminist ethics in different ways and nections between caregivers and the cared-for-the
arrive at different conclusions. Still, some general- sphere of the domestic and the private. This is the
izations are possible. realm of intimate relationships, sexual behavior,
An emphasis on personal relationships. For the child rearing, and family struggles-the place we
most part, traditional moral theories have been con- all come from and perhaps never leave, and where
cerned with what we could call "public life"-the we live a large part of our moral lives.
realm in which unrelated individuals try to figure Differing views on moral prindples. Some feminist
out how to behave toward one another and how to philosophers resist the temptation to map out moral
ensure that, among strangers, justice is done, rights actions according to moral principles. Whereas Kant
are respected, and utility is maximized. The focus wants to reduce all moral deliberation to adherence
has been mostly on moral judgments and theories to a single rule (the categorical imperative), some
pertaining to people as separate members of the feminists demur. They argue that principles such as
community, the polity, and the culture. But femi- autonomy, justice, and utility are too general and
nist ethics narrows down the area of moral concern too unwieldy to be of much use in the complicated,
CRITICAL THOUGHT: feminist Ethics in History
The increased contemporary focus on feminist not, should we strive to get men and women to
ethics is new, but some central questions in the adhere to the same morality: a one-size-fits-all
field are not. Rosemarie Tong and Nancy Williams human morality?*
explain: Do you think apparent differences between men
Feminist approaches to ethics, as well as debates and women's moralities are based in biology or in
about the gendered nature of morality, are not social conditioning? If men and women react to
recent developments. During the eighteenth and ethical dilemmas differently, and in ways typically
nineteenth centuries, a wide variety of thinkers associated with their gender, should moral theo-
including Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill,
rists delineate and appreciate those differences,
Catherine Beecher, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and
or should they seek a one-size-fits-all morality
Elizabeth Cady Stanton addressed topics related
instead?
to "women's morality." Each of these thinkers
raised questions such as: Are women's "feminine" Consider the many different cultural categories
traits the product of nature/biology or are they women across the globe might belong to. Whether
instead the outcome of social conditioning? Are biological or conditioned, is it possible that a single
moral virtues as well as gender traits connected "women's morality" could be shared by all?
with one's affective as well as cognitive capacities,
indeed with one's physiology and psychology? If *Rosemarie Tong and NancyWiliiams, "Feminist Ethics,"
so, should we simply accept the fact that men and in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter
women have different moral virtues as well as dif- 2016, ed. Edward N. Zalta, https:llplato.stanford.edu
ferent gender traits and proceed accordingly? If larch ives/wi n20 16/entries/fem i n ism-eth ics!.
multifaceted arena of the domestic, social, and per- agents are unaffected by poor living conditions and
sonal. Many feminist philosophers, however, are unjust institutions. As feminist philosopher Sarah
comfortable with moral prinCiples and see them as Clark Miller says,
essential to moral reasoning. Some of these thinkers
are working within the context of traditional moral Ideal theories commence and operate from the
theories and see these frameworks as compatible best of what humans can be, conveniently overlook-
ing the ways in which we break down, fail, and fall
with feminist ethics.
apart ... But real life is much messier and involves
Contrasting attitudes toward impartiality. Recall humans who are often irrational, who have histories
that the principle of impartiality is regarded as a of oppression, who only sometimes follow rules, and
defining characteristic of morality itself. Impar- who have a variety of complex needs.... Many femi-
tiality says that from the moral point of view, all nist ethicists appreciate the value of the nonideal and
persons are considered equal and should be treated make jt a cornerstone of feminist ethics. 3
accordingly. But in the domestic sphere we are
anything but impartial. We are naturally partial to THE ETHICS OF CARE
the people we care about-our family and friends.
Typically we would not think of treating our spouse The ethics of care is a good example of femi-
the same way we treat a store clerk or the bus driver. nist ethics. It is a perspective on moral issues that
We have moral duties to the former that we do not emphasizes close personal relationships and moral
have to the latter. Some feminists (most notably virtues such as compassion, faithfulness, kindness,
care ethicists) make these duties central to their love, and sympathy. It contrasts dramatically with
moral outlook instead of ignoring them as Kant traditional moral theories preoccupied with prin-
and Mill would have us do. ciples and legalistic moral reasoning.
A higher regard for emotions. As we've seen, Kant Much of the interest in the ethics of care was
has no place for emotions in his theory. Reading sparked by research done by the psychologist Carol
our moral duties off the categorical imperative is Gilligan on how men and women think about
all that is reqUired. But feminist philosophers have moral problems. 4 She maintained that men and
greater respect for the emotional side of our lives women think in radically different ways when
than many non-feminist ethicists do. Moral phi- making moral decisions. In moral decision making,
losophers of all stripes recognize the importance of she said, men deliberate about rights, justice, and
emotions. They understand that emotions can alert rules; women, on the other hand, focus on personal
us to moral evil, provide the motivation to pursue relationships, caring for others, and being aware
the good, and enable us to empathize with the suf- of people's feelings, needs, and viewpoints. She
fering of others. (Moral philosophers also caution dubbed these two approaches the ethic ofjustice and
that feelings without thinking are blind, and think- the ethic of care. Later she rejected the notion that
ing without feelings makes for a sterile morality.) women and men have distinct traits or essences
An emphasis on the nonideal. Feminist thinkers that lead them to different styles of moral reason-
take issue with the tendency of traditional moral ing. She now denies that these two styles are inher-
theories to assume an idealized view of human ently linked to being male or female.
beings, their capacities, and their social interac- More recent research has raised doubts about
tions. These philosophers charge that to the tra- whether there really is a gap between the moral
ditional theorist, the world consists of atomistic thinking styles of men and women. But these find-
individuals with perfect rationality living in an ings do not dilute the relevance of caring to eth-
idealized society without oppression, where moral ics. The ethics of care, regardless of any empirical
-
~
relations of caring that enable human beings to live
"~
and progress. All persons need care for at least their
QUICI< REVIEW early years. Prospects for human progress and flour-
ishing hinge fundamentally on the care that those
feminist ethics-An alternative way of looking needing it receive, and the ethics of care stresses
at the concepts and concerns of the moral life; the moral force of the responsibility to respond to the
an approach focused on women's interests and needs of the dependent. Many persons will become
experiences and devoted to supporting the ill and dependent for some periods of their later lives,
moral equality of women and men and correct- including in frail old age, and some who are perma-
ing the biases against women found in tradi- nently disabled will need care the whole of their lives.
tional moral thinking. Moralities built on the image of the independent,
autonomous, rational individual largely overlook the
ethics of care-A perspective on moral issues that
reality of human dependence and the morality for
emphasizes close personal relationships and which it calls. The ethics of care attends to this cen-
moral virtues such as compassion, faithfulness, tral concern of human life and delineates the moral
kindness, love, and sympathy. values involved. It refuses to relegate care to a realm
Uoutside morality.,,6
underpinnings, is a reminder that caring is a vital

and inescapable part of the moral life-a conclu-
sion that few philosophers would deny. If virtues CHAPTER REVIEW
are a part of the moral life (as they surely are), and if
caring (or compassion, sympathy, or love) is a vir-
tue, then there must be a place for caring alongside SUMMARY
principles of moral conduct and moral reasoning.
Feminist ethics is an alternative way of looking at
The philosopher Annette C. Baier, an early propo-
the concepts and concerns of the moral life. It is an
nent of the ethics of care, makes a case for both care
approach focused on women's interests and experi-
and justice: lilt is clear, I think, that the best moral
ences and devoted to supporting the moral equality of
theory has to be a cooperative product of women
women and men. The main elements of this approach
and men, has to harmonize justice and care. The
are an emphasis on personal relationships, a suspiCion
morality it theorizes about is after all for all per- of moral principles, the rejection of impartiality, and a
sons, for men and women, and will need their com- greater respect for emotions.
bined insights."s The ethics of care is a perspective on moral issues
Here is the feminist philosopher Virginia Held that emphasizes personal relationships and the virtues
explaining the need for care in the moral life: of compassion, love, sympathy, and the like. It can be
[T]he central focus of the ethics of care is on the com- thought of as an essential element in virtue ethics. The
pelling moral salience of attending to and meeting ethics of care is a reminder that caring is a crucial part
the needs of the particular others for whom we take of the moral life. Many philosophers have acknowl-
responsibility. Caring for one's child, for instance, edged this fact by trying to incorporate care into moral
may well and defenSibly be at the forefront of a per- theories containing principles.
son's moral concerns. The ethics of care recognizes
that human beings are dependent for many years of
their lives, that the moral claim of those dependent I(EY TERMS
on us for the care they need is pressing, and that there feminist ethics (p. 182)
are highly important moral aspects in developing the ethics of care (p. 184)
EXERCISES 7. What is the attitude of feminist ethics toward

moral principles? Compare it with Kant's view.
Review Questions
8. Are there instances of moral decision making
1. How does feminist ethics differ from Kantian in which moral impartiality is not appropriate?
ethics? (pp. 183-84) Explain.
2. What attitudes did many of the great ethical
theorists have toward women? (p. 182)
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
3. What ways of feeling and thinking have been
Explain how feminist ethics or the ethics of care could
regarded in the West as characteristic of women?
be applied in the following scenarios to determine the
(p.182)
proper course of action.
4. What kinds of moral issues are more likely to arise
1. Suppose your best friend is in the hospital
from women's experiences than men's? (p. 182)
battling a serious illness and would deeply
5. What elements of the moral life does feminist
appreciate a visit from you. But you are also on
ethics emphasize? What elements does it
spring break and, after a very stressful semester,
deemphasize? (pp. 183-84)
need to forget about all your commitments and
6. Why do feminist philosophers think an ethics
just relax. What might the ethics of care have
of care is needed? (pp. 184-85)
you do? What is a utilitarian likely to do?
7. What are the hard facts that have helped to
2. You want to help your brother overcome a
propel the rise of feminist ethics? (p. 182)
serious addiction to drugs. You know that
8. What are some of the fundamental elements of
because he is a member of your family, you have
the ethics of care? (p. 184)
a duty to help him. But your main reason for
9. What is Annette Baier's claim about care and
trying to help is that you love him and care
justice? (p. 185)
what happens to him. Which of these two
10. What is Carol Gilligan's thesis about moral
motivating factors (duty and love) would Kant
thinking? (p. 184)
approve of, and which would he reject? How
might the attitude of someone who embraces
DisCUSsion Questions feminist ethics differ from Kant's response?
1. What features of feminist ethics do you find 3. Imagine that your town has been hit by a
most plausible? Why? tornado, and you are in a pOSition to rescue
2. Do you think moral principles such as justice only one of a dozen people who are nearby
and rights have a place in any good moral and trapped in demolished houses. The victim
theory? Why or why not? who happens to be farthest from you, but still
3. What part do you think emotions should play reachable, is your mother. Which of these
in morality? twelve people should you rescue? Who would
4. Do you believe there are innate differences in you rescue if feminist ethics was your preferred
the ways men and women deliberate about moral outlook? Who would you rescue if you
moral issues? Or do you think any differences were a strict act-utilitarian?
are the result of cultural influences? Explain.
S. Do you believe there are situations in which
impartiality is important in moral reasoning?
fURTHER READING
Sandrine Berges, A Feminist Perspective on Virtue Ethics
If not, why not? If so, give an example.
(London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).
6. Suppose you have an opportunity to either Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory
(1) send $800 to Africa to save a dozen people and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
from starvation or (2) give the money to your University Press, 1982).
little sister to buy books for college. Which Sally Haslanger, ReSisting Reality: Social Constmction and
would you do? Why? Social Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Carol Hay, Kantianism, Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New
Oppression (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). York: Basic Books, 1989).
Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transfonning Culture, Alison Reiheld, "Just Caring for Caregivers: What Society
Society, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago and the State Owe to Those Who Render Care," Femi-
Press, 1993). nist Philosophy Quarterly, 1 (2, 2015): pp. 1-24.
Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford Univer- Rosemarie Tong and Nancy Williams, (lFeminist Ethics,"
sity Press, 2006). in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016,
Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu
(Totowa, NJ: Allenheld, 1983). / archives/win20 16/entries/feminism-ethics/.
Alison M. Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Shay Welch, A Theory of Freedom: Feminism and the Social
Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker Contract (London: Pal grave Macmillan, 2012).
(New York: Garland, 1992),361-70. Susan Wolf, The Variety ofValues: Essays on Morality, Mean-
Martha Nussbaum, (lThe Feminist Critique of Liberal- ing, and Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
ism," in Women's Voices, Women's Rights, ed. A. Jeffries Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication ofthe Rights of Woman,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999). ed. M. Brody (London: Penguin, 1988).
READINGS
Feminist Ethics
ALISON M. JAG GAR
Feminist approaches to ethiCS, often known col- Just as feminist ethics may be identified by its
lectively as feminist ethiCS, are distinguished by an explicit commitment to challenging perceived male
explicit commitment to correcting male biases they bias in ethiCS, so approaches that do not express such
perceive in traditional ethiCS, biases that may be mani- a commitment may be characterized as nonfeminist.
fest in rationalizations of women's subordination, or Nonfeminist approaches to ethics are not necessarily
in disregard for, or disparagement of, women's moral anti-feminist or male-biased; they mayor may not be so.
experience. Feminist ethics, by contrast, begins from
the convictions that the subordination of women THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY
is morally wrong and that the moral experience of FEMINIST ETHICS
women is as worthy of respect as that of men. The The history of western philosophy includes a num-
practical goals of feminist ethics, then, are the follow- ber of isolated but indisputable instances of moral
ing: first, to articulate moral critiques of actions and opposition to women's subordination. Noteworthy
practices that perpetuate women's subordination; examples are Mary Wollstonecraft's (1759-1797) A
second, to prescribe morally justifiable ways of resist- Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), John Stuart
ing such actions and practices; and, third, to envision Mill's (1806-1873) The Subjection of Women (1869),
morally desirable alternatives that will promote wom- Frederick Engels' (1820-1895) The Origin of the Fam-
en's emancipation. The meta-ethical goal of feminist ily, Private Property and the State (1884), and Simone de
ethics is to develop theoretical understandings of the Beauvoir's (1908-1986) The Second Sex (1949).
nature of morality that treat women's moral experi- In the late 1960s, however, as part of a general resur-
ence respectfully, though never uncritically. gence of feminist activism, an unprecedented explo-
sion of feminist ethical debate occurred, first among the
Alison M. Jaggar, "feminist Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed.
Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland general public, soon in academic discourse. Actions and
Publishing, 1992). Reproduced by permiSSion of Taylor and practices whose gendered dimensions hitherto either
Francis Group, LLC, a division of Informa pic. had been unnoticed or unchallenged now became foci
of public and philosophical attention, as feminists sub- seemed to demonstrate empirically that the moral
jected them to outspoken moral critique, developed development of women was significantly differ-
sometimes dramatic strategies for opposing them, and ent from that of men. Claiming that females tend
proposed alternatives that nonfeminists often per- to fear separation or abandonment while males, by
ceived as dangerously radical. First grassroots and soon contrast, tend to perceive closeness as dangerous,
academic feminist perspectives were articulated on top- Gilligan reported that girls and women often con-
ics such as abortion, equality of opportunity, domestic strue moral dilemmas as conflicts of responsibilities
labor, portrayals of women in the media, and a variety rather than of rights and seek to resolve those dilem-
of issues concerning sexuality, such as rape and com- mas in ways that will repair and strengthen webs
pulsory heterosexuality. A little later, feminists dis- of relationship. Furthermore, Gilligan described
played increasing ethical concern about pornography, females as supposedly less likely than males to
reproductive technology, so-called surrogate mother- make or justify moral decisions by the application
hood, militarism, the environment and the situation of of abstract moral rules; instead, she claimed girls
women in developing nations. and women were more likely to act on their feelings
Despite the long history of feminist ethical of love and compassion for particular individu-
debate, the term "feminist ethics" itself did not als. Gilligan concluded that whereas men typically
come into general use until the late 1970s or early adhere to a morality of justice, whose primary val-
1980s. At this time, a number of feminists began ues are fairness and equality, women often adhere to
expressing doubts about the possibility of fruitfully a morality of care, whose primary values are inclu-
addressing so-called women's issues in terms of the sion and protection from harm. For this reason,
conceptual apparatus supplied by traditional ethical studies of moral development based exclusively on
theory. For instance, a rights framework was alleged a morality of justice do not provide an appropriate
by some to distort discussions of abortion insofar standard for measuring female moral development
as it constructed pregnancy and motherhood as and may be said to be male-biased.
adversarial situations. Other feminists charged that Many feminists seized on Gilligan's work as offer-
certain assumptions widely accepted by traditional ing evidence for the existence of a characteristically
ethical theory were incompatible with what was now feminine approach to morality, an approach assumed
beginning to be claimed as a distinctively feminine to provide the basis for a distinctively feminist ethics.
moral experience or sensibility. Contract theory, for For some, indeed, feminist ethics became and remains
instance, was criticized for postulating a conception synonymous with an ethics of care. Just how an eth-
of human individuals as free, equal, independent ics of care should be delineated, however, was far from
and mutually disinterested, a conception claimed by evident; nor was it clear whether it should supplement
some to be contrary to the moral experience of most or supplant an ethics of justice. Many feminists today
women. Even the requirement of impartiality, usu- are exploring such questions, even though the con-
ally taken as a defining feature of morality, became nection between women and care is challenged by
the object of feminist criticism insofar as it was some psychologists who allege Gilligan's samples to
alleged to generate prescriptions counter to many be nonrepresentative, her methods of interpreting her
women's moral intuitions. Some feminists began data suspect, and her claims impossible to substanti-
to speculate that traditional ethics was more deeply ate, especially when the studies are controlled for
male-biased and needed more fundamental rethink- occupation and class.
ing than they had realized hitherto. Regardless of empirical findings in moral psychol-
Such speculations were fuelled by the much- ogy, debate continues over whether the fundamental
publicized work of developmental psychologist tenets of western ethics are male biased in some sense:
Carol Gilligan, whose 1982 book, In a Different Voice: if not in the sense that they express a moral sensibil-
Psychological Theory and Women's Development, ity characteristic of men rather than women, then
perhaps in that they promote a culturally masculine more likely than men to identify themselves as femi-
image of moral psychology, discourage preoccupation nists, and both non westerners and western people of
with issues defined culturally as feminine, or in other color are less likely than western whites either to be
ways covertly advance men's interests over women's. philosophers or, because of feminism's racist history,
Since feminism is essentially a normative stance, and to be feminists. "Womanist" is a term that many Afri-
since its meaning is continually contested by femi- can American authors currently prefer to "feminist"
nists themselves, all feminists are constantly engaged but they might not object to the description of their
in ethical reflection. In this sense, feminist ethics work as feminist ethics if feminism could be cleansed
is practiced both inside and outside the academy. of racism and ethnocentrism.
Within the academy, its main practitioners are schol-
ars in philosophy, religion and jurisprudence. These
scholars represent a variety of philosophical tradi- FEMINIST CRITICISMS OF WESTERN ETHICS
tions, secular and religious, Anglo-American and con- Since most feminist ethics is done in a western con-
tinental European; in challenging perceived male bias text, it is western ethics, particularly (though not
in those traditions, they draw extensively on feminist exclusively) the European Enlightenment tradition,
scholarship in other disciplines, such as literature, his- that is the most frequent target of feminist critique.
tory and psychology. The feminist challenges to this tradition may be
Scholarly work in feminist ethics often is also grouped conveniently under five main headings.
responsive to the ethical reflections of nonacademic Lack of concern for women's interests. Many of the
feminists as these occur, for instance, in much femi- major theorists, such as Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and
nist fiction and poetry. In addition, a considerable Rousseau (1712-1778), are accused of having given
body of nonfiction, written by nonacademics and insufficient consideration to women's interests, a
directed towards a nonacademic audience, presents lack of concern expressed theoretically by their pre-
itself as feminist ethics. Popular feminist books and scribing for women allegedly feminine virtues such as
journals frequently engage in ethical consideration obedience, silence, and faithfulness. Some feminists
of moral or public policy issues and sometimes also charge that many contemporary ethical discussions
offer more general discussions of supposedly "mas- continue the tendency to regard women as instrumen-
culine" and "feminine" value systems. There are tal to male-dominated institutions, such as the fam-
even grassroots journals of feminist ethics, such as ily or the state; in debates on abortion, for instance,
Lesbian Ethics, published in the United States, and the pregnant woman may be portrayed as little more
Gossip: A Journal ofLesbian Feminist Ethics, published than a container or environment for the fetus, while
in the United Kingdom. Feminist Ethics, published debates on reproductive technology are alleged to
in Canada, seeks to combine academic scholarship assume frequently that infertility is a problem only for
with accessibility to a general audience. One may heterosexual married women, i.e., women defined in
note striking parallels between many of the claims relationship to men.
made by feminists inside the academy and those on Neglect 0 f i l'·
women s Issues. " I ssues 0 f specia I con-
the outside. cern to women are said to have been ignored by mod-
Those who currently claim the field of feminist ern moral philosophers, who have tended to portray
ethics are mainly, though not exclusively, white west- the domestic realm as an arena outside the economy
ern women. Nevertheless, a few male philosophers are and beyond justice, private in the sense of being
doing significant work in feminist ethics, and people beyond the scope of legitimate pOlitical regulation.
of color have produced a conSiderable amount of Even philosophers like Aristotle or Hegel (1770-1831),
writing, both fiction and nonfiction, that seems com- who give some ethical importance to the domestic
patible with the moral and theoretical inspiration of realm, have tended to portray the home as an arena in
feminist ethics. It is predictable that women would be which the most fully human excellences are incapable
of being realized. Feminist philosophers began early to deeds. In addition, feminists have charged modern
criticize this conceptual bifurcation of social life. They moral theory with taking the contract as the paradig-
pointed out that the home was precisely that realm to matic moral relation and construing moral rational-
which women historically had been confined, and ity so narrowly as to exclude emotions of assessment,
that it had become symbolically associated with the sometimes called moral emotions. All these charac-
feminine, despite the fact that heads of households teristics have been asserted to be masculine in some
were paradigmatically male. They argued that the phil- sense. A feminine approach to ethics, by contrast,
osophical devaluation of the domestic realm made it has been supposed to avoid assuming that individu-
impossible to raise questions about the justice of the als ordinarily are free, equal and independent; to take
domestic division of labor, because it obscured the far- more account of the specificities of particular con-
reaching social Significance and creativity of women's texts; and to be more likely to resolve moral dilemmas
work in the home, and concealed, even legitimated, by relying on empathic feeling rather than by appeal-
the domestic abuse of women and girls. ing to rules.
Denial of women's moral agency. Women's moral Not all feminists endorse all of the above clus-
agency is said to have often been denied, not simply ters of criticisms-and even where they agree with
by excluding women from moral debate or ignoring the general statement, they may well disagree over
their contributions, but through philosophical claims its applicability in the case of specific philosophers
to the effect that women lack moral reason. Such or debates. Despite such differences of relative detail,
claims were made Originally by Aristotle, but they feminists tend generally to agree on the first three
have been elaborated and refined by modern theorists clusters of criticisms, whose correction seems not
such as Rousseau, Kant (1724-1804), Hegel, and Freud only attainable in principle within the framework of
(1856-1939). Enlightenment moral theory but even to be required
Depreciation of Llfeminine" values. Western moral by that framework. However, there is sharp feminist
theory is said to embody values that are "mascu- disagreement on the last two clusters of criticisms,
line," insofar as they are aSSOciated, empirically, nor- especially the fifth, which obviously contains clear
matively, or symbolically, with men. For instance, parallels with a number of nonfeminist criticisms
western ethics is alleged to prefer the supposedly of Enlightenment ethics made by proponents of, for
masculine or male-associated values of independence, example, situation ethics, virtue ethiCS, communitari-
autonomy, intellect, will, wariness, hierarchy, domi- anism and postmodernism.
nation, culture, transcendence, product, asceticism,
war and death over the supposedly feminine or female-
COMMON MISCONSTRUALS OF
associated values of interdependence, community,
connection, sharing, emotion, body, trust, absence of FEMINIST ETHICS
hierarchy, nature, immanence, process, joy, peace and Feminist ethics has sometimes been construed, both
life. Claims like this are common in both popular and by some of its proponents and some of its critics, as
academic feminist writings on ethics. a simple inversion of the criticisms listed above. In
Devaluation of women's moral experience. Finally, other words, it has sometimes been identified with one
prevailing western conceptualizations of the nature or more of the following: putting women's interests
of morality, moral problems, and moral reason- first; focusing exclusively on so-called women's issues;
ing are also charged with being masculine insofar as accepting women (or feminists) as moral experts or
they too are associated with men, an association that authorities; substituting "female" (or feminine) for
again may be empirical, symbolic or normative. For "male" (or masculine) values; or extrapolating directly
instance, feminists have accused modern moral theory from women's moral experience. These characteriza-
of being excessively preoccupied with rules, obsessed tions of feminist ethics are sufficiently pervasive that
with impartiality and exclusively focused on discrete it is worth noting just why they cannot be correct.
1. Putting women's interests first occasionally has industries. For these reasons, it would be a mistake to
been recommended as a way of achieving a "woman- identify feminist ethics with attention to some explic-
centered" ethics that transcends the covert bias of a itly gendered subset of ethical issues. On the con-
supposed humanism grounded in fact on male norms. trary, rather than being limited to a restricted ethical
Whatever might be said for or against this recom- domain, feminist ethics has enlarged the traditional
mendation, however, it cannot be definitive of femi- concerns of ethiCS, both through identifying previ-
nist ethics. This is because the formula, as it stands, ously unrecognized ethical issues and by introducing
raises more questions than it answers insofar as it fails fresh perspectives on issues already acknowledged as
to specify not only which women's interests should having an ethical dimension.
be preferred over which men's (or children's) and in 3. Feminist ethics certainly is being developed by
what circumstances, but also what should be done feminists, most of whom are women, but this does
about conflicts of interest between women and even not imply, of course, that any women, or even femi-
how interests should be identified at all. Most obvi- nists, therefore should be regarded as moral experts
ously, feminist ethics cannot be identified with "put- whose moral authority is beyond question. Not only
ting women's interests first" simply because many are there deep disagreements among women and
feminists would refuse to accept and, indeed, be mor- even among feminists such that it would be difficult
ally outraged by what they would perceive as blatant to know whom to select as an expert, but many pain-
partiality and immorality. ful examples of the failure of insight or principle on
2. Feminist ethics certainly is concerned to address the part of feminist leaders also demonstrate only too
issues of special concern to women, issues that have clearly that no women, even feminists, are morally
been neglected by modern moral theory, but it can- infallible.
not be identified with an exclusive focus on such 4. There are also serious difficulties with thinking
issues. This is partly because nonfeminists as well as of feminist ethics as the substitution of female or femi-
feminists have addressed these issues-and, indeed, nine for male or masculine values. These difficulties
are doing so increasingly as feminism grows stron- include problems with establishing that any values are
ger and more articulate. It is also because feminism male or female in the sense of being generally held by
rejects the notion that moral issues can be divided men or women, when both women's and men's values
cleanly into those that are and those that are not of vary so much, both within cultures as well as across
special concern to women. On the one hand, since them. Similar problems confront attempts to estab-
men's and women's lives are inextricably intertWined, lish that certain values are masculine or feminine in
there are no "women's issues" that are not also men's the sense of being considered socially appropriate for
issues; the availability or otherwise of child care and individuals of one gender or the other. Again, norms
abortion, for instance, has significant consequences of masculinity and femininity vary not only between
for the lives of men as well as women. On the other societies but even within the same society along such
hand, since men and women typically are not what axes as class and ethnicity: some social groups, for
lawyers call "Similarly situated" relative to each other, instance, value physical health, strength or athletic
it is difficult to think of any moral or public policy prowess in women; others value physical fragility,
("human") issue in which women do not have a spe- weakness or incompetence. But even if certain values
cial interest. For instance, such "human" issues as war, could be identified in some sense as male or female,
peace and world starvation have special Significance masculine or feminine, the conclusive objection to
for women because the world's hungry are dispropor- identifying feminist ethics with the elaboration of
tionately women (and children), because women are female or feminine values is that the feminine is not
primarily those in need of the social services neglected necessarily the feminist. Indeed, since the feminine
to fund military spending, and because women ben- typically has been constructed in circumstances of
efit relatively little from militarism and the weapons male domination, it is likely to be quite opposed to the
feminist. Personal charm, for example, may be valued ways in which gendered norms are different for differ-
not only in women but also by them; even if charm ent groups of women-or in which the same norms,
were, in these senses, a feminine value, however, it such as a cultural preference for slimness or blond-
would seem at least as likely to undermine feminist ness, affect different groups of women differently.
goals as to promote them. Ultimately feminism's concern for all women means
S. Similar problems apply to defining feminist that feminist ethics must address not only "domes-
ethics as the systematic extrapolation of women's tic" issues of racism or homophobia or class privilege
moral experience, exclusive of men's. While no but also such international issues as environmental
approach to morality can be adequate if it ignores the destruction, war, and access to world resources.
moral experience of women, it seems most unlikely 2. In order to offer guides to action that will tend
that women generally are similar enough to each to subvert rather than reinforce the present systematic
other and different enough from men that a single subordination of women, feminist approaches to eth-
distinctively female or feminine approach to ethics ics must understand individual actions in the context
can be identified. Attempts to establish such an iden- of broader social practices, evaluating the symbolic
tification frequently commit the fallacy of generaliz- and cumulative implications of action as well as its
ing about the experience of all or most women from immediately observable consequences. They must be
the moral experience of some women; this seems to equipped to recognize covert as well as overt mani-
have been one flaw at least in Gilligan's earlier work. festations of domination, subtle as well as blatant
Again, even if a distinctively feminine approach to forms of control, and they must develop sophisticated
morality could be identified, perhaps in terms of accounts of coercion and consent. Similarly, they
symbolic or normative connections with women must provide the conceptual resources for identifying
rather than empirical ones, there is no reason to and evaluating the varieties of resistance and struggle in
suppose that such an approach would be feminist. which women, particularly, have engaged. They must
Indeed, given the feminist commitment to a critical recognize the often unnoticed ways in which women
rethinking of cultural constructions of both mascu- and other members of the underclass have refused
linity and femininity, there is good prima facie reason cooperation and opposed domina~ion, while ac~nowl
to suppose that it would not. edging the inevitability of collUSIOn and the Impos-
sibility of totally clean hands. !~ short, feminist
approaches to ethics must be tranSItIOnal and n.0nuto-
MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF ADEQUACY pian, often extensions of, rather than alternatives to,
FOR FEMINIST ETHICS feminist political theory, exercises in non-ideal rather
Even though feminist ethics is far broader and more than ideal theory.
ope~ than it appears in the foregoing misconstru- 3. Since most of most women's lives have been
als, ItS. goals are sufficiently specific, especially when excluded from that domain con~e~tualized as pub-
taken In conjunction with its criticisms of traditional lic, a third requirement for feminist approaches to
ethics, as to generate certain minimum conditions of . . that they should be able to provide guidance
eth ICS IS . . . .
adequacy for any approach to ethics that purports to . f so called private hfe: IntImate relatIOns,
on Issues 0 - .
be feminist. 't nd childrearing. Thus, they must artIculate
sexua lI ya , ,
1. First of all, feminist ethics can never begin 'mensions of Issues that may not hlth-
the mora I dl , ,
b.y assuming that women and men are Similarly erto have been recognized as moral. In ~ddltton, we
situated-although it may discover that this is the have seen that feminist approaches to ethICS must pro-
c.ase in certain respects in specific contexts. In addi- vide appropriate guidance for dealing with n~tional
tion, not only does feminist ethics need constant vigi- and international issues, strangers and foreIgners.
lance to detect subtle as well as blatant manifestations In developing the conceptual tools for undertaking
of gender privilege, it must also be sensitive to the these tasks, feminist ethiCS cannot assume that moral
concepts developed originally for application to the of philosophical differences, including differing con-
so-called public realm, concepts such as impartiality ceptions of feminism itself, which, as we have seen, is
or exploitation, are appropriate for use in the so-called [a] constantly contested concept. The inevitability of
private; neither can it assume that concepts such as such divergence means that feminist ethics can never
care, developed in intimate relationships, will neces- be identified in terms of a specific range of topics,
sarily be helpful in the larger world. Indeed, the whole methods or orthodoxies. While feminist ethics is dis-
distinction between public and private life must be tinguished by its explicit commitment to developing
examined critically by feminist ethics, with no prior approaches to ethics that will respect women's moral
assumptions as to whether the distinction should be experience and avoid rationalizing women's subordi-
retained, redrawn or rejected. nation, attempts to define it more precisely or substan-
4. Finally, feminist ethics must take the moral tively than this are likely to disregard the richness and
experience of all women seriously, though not, of variety of feminist moral thinking and prematurely
course, uncritically. Though what is feminist often foreclose the feminist moral debate.
will turn out to be very different from what is femi-
nine, a basic respect for women's moral experience is
necessary to acknowledging women's capacities as CURRENT CONCERNS IN FEMINIST ETHICS
moralists and to countering traditional stereotypes of Despite the scope and diversity of feminist ethics,
women as less than full moral agents, as childlike or certain current preoccupations may be identified.
close to nature. Furthermore, empirical claims about These preoccupations are not definitive of femi-
differences in the moral sensibility of women and nist ethicS, but they are characteristic of its present
men make it impossible to assume that any approach stage of development. (They are also, sometimes in
to ethics will be unanimously accepted if it fails to different ways, preoccupations of much contempo-
consult the moral experience of women. Addition- rary nonfeminist ethics.) They include concern with
ally, it seems plausible to suppose that women's dis- issues of universality and particularity, sociality and
tinctive social experience may make them especially individuality, moral emotion and moral rationality.
perceptive regarding the implications of domina- These concerns are not independent of each other
tion, especially gender domination, and especially and they may be discerned underlying many con-
well equipped to detect the male bias that feminists temporary feminist approaches to practical issues,
believe has pervaded so much of male-authored west- such as equality, health care, or the environment, as
ern moral theory. well as being foci of feminist reflection on such tradi-
Most feminist, and perhaps even many nonfemi- tional philosophical issues as moral subjectivity and
nist, philosophers might well find the general state- moral epistemology.
ment of these conditions quite uncontroversial, but Feminist challenges to traditional views of moral
they will inevitably disagree sharply over when the subjectivity are not limited to assertions (contra Aris-
conditions have been met. Not only may feminists totle, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel) that women are as
disagree with nonfeminists, but they are likely even capable as men of moral virtue or rationality. Instead,
to differ with each other over, for instance, what many feminists have drawn on and extended non-
are women's interests, what are manifestations of feminist criticisms of the basic model of the moral self
domination and coercion, how resistance should be most characteristic of Enlightenment moral theory,
expressed, and which aspects of women's moral expe- a model derived from Descartes (1596-1650) and
rience are worth developing and in which directions. portraying the self as disembodied, asocial, autono-
Those who practice feminist ethics thus may be mous, unified, rational and essentially similar to all
seen both as united by a shared project and as diverg- other selves. This model, of course, has been under
ing widely in their views as to how this project may be attack for over a century from, among others, Marx-
accomplished. Their divergences result from a variety ists, Freudians, contemporary communitarians, and
postmodernists. Feminists often share many conclu- by considerations of particular attachment as much
sions with such nonfeminist critics of Enlightenment as abstract concern for duty, care as much as respect,
theory, but they arrive at those conclusions by different solidarity as much as dignity, responsibility as much
routes, and often they add to them the claim that the as right. Many feminists currently argue that much
Cartesian model is male-biased (as well as class- and Enlightenment moral psychology is inadequate inso-
possibly race-biased), in that it reflects the interests far as it fails to take adequate account of these propen-
and values of European bourgeois men and either sities, conceiving them at best as morally irrelevant,
ignores divergent interests and values or portrays at worst as morally subversive. In addition, noting the
them as less than fully human. ways in which the psyche is shaped by social practices,
One source of feminist challenge to the Cartesian especially childrearing and other gendered practices,
self is a growing philosophical interest in embodi- many feminists criticize the common Enlighten-
ment. This itself springs partly from feminist outrage ment assumption that people are essentially alike,
over the male control and exploitation of women's rational and autarchic. Noting the Significance of
bodies, partly from the feminist recognition that much fantasy in our lives, they deny that consciousness is
of the responsibility for physical reproduction and transparent and unified and that individuals always
bodily maintenance traditionally has been assigned know their own interests best. In general, they chal-
to women-both of which reinforce symbolic western lenge much Enlightenment moral psychology for its
associations between women and the body. Philosophi- failure to recognize that, if autonomy exists at all, it
cal reflection that begins from the body tends to high- is an achievement with complex material and social
light features of human nature very different from those preconditions.
emphasized by Cartesianism: temporality rather than That people in fact have certain psychologi-
timelessness, growth and decay rather than change- cal propensities of Course does not entail that those
lessness, particularity rather than universality, sociality propensities are morally relevant, let alone mor-
rather than isolation. These features, in tum, tend to ally deSirable; on the other hand, an adequate moral
generate concerns for ethics different from those that theory cannot be grounded in a psychology that
dominated much Enlightenment theory: inequality, is descriptively inadequate. Many feminists claim
dependence and interdependence, specificity, social that much Enlightenment moral psychology is so
embeddedness and historical community now must all alien to the ways in which people in fact do act and
be recognized as permanent circumstances of moral think morally that it cannot serve even as an accept-
life, never to be avoided or transcended by focusing able reconstruction of moral reasoning. For instance,
on equality, independence, autonomy, generality, by failing to appreciate the moral Significance of the
isolated individuals, ideal communities or the uni- psychological characteristics noted above, it offers a
versal human condition. It does not escape feminist model of moral rationality that is unduly narrow in
authors that concern with precisely the former disregarding emotion, and likely to generate morally
circumstances has been claimed by many to be dis- repugnant conclusions that ignore our responsibility
tinctively feminine-preoccupying women in virtue for the welfare of others, neglect the claims of conven-
of their social situation, associated symbolically with tional morality, and undervalue the moral weight of
women or defined culturally as appropriate to women. particular relationships. Some feminists go on to argue
Conceiving moral subjects as embodied also has that most Enlightenment models of moral rationality
psychological implications: insofar as their identity is are not only empirically and morally inadequate but
significantly constituted by their specific social rela- also serve, insofar as they are culturally accepted, as
tionships (relationships determined at least in part by oppressive norms for those social groups, including
the social meaning attributed to bodily characteris- perhaps some groups of women, whose moral think-
tics such as parentage, age or sex), moral subjects con- ing is stigmatized as amoral or immoral for failing to
ceived in this way are revealed as likely to be moved conform to these models.
Morality on most Enlightenment views is a system Though many feminists continue to defend vari-
of rationally justified rules or principles that guide ous versions of Enlightenment moral theory, many
action in specific cases. Many contemporary feminists, others are concerned not merely to criticize them but
by contrast, deny that morality is reducible to rules also to develop alternatives to them-alternatives
and assert the impossibility of justifying the claims of that will avoid their perceived shortcomings while
ethics by appeal to a universal, impartial reason. They meeting the conditions of adequacy identified earlier.
charge that undue emphasis on the epistemological Thus, contemporary feminists are exploring ways
importance of moral rules obscures the crucial role of thinking about moral subjects that are sensitive
of moral insight, virtue and character in determining both to their concrete particularity and their intrin-
the right course of action. Some give a feminist twist sic shared value-the ideal expressed in Enlighten-
to this essentially Aristotelian criticism by claiming ment claims about common humanity, equality and
that excessive reliance on rules reflects a juridical- impartiality; developing "particularist" epistemolo-
administrative interest that is characteristic of modern gies that recognize the moral validity of immediate,
masculinity-contemporary women, by contrast, are emotion-laden responses to particular others while
claimed to be more likely to disregard conventionally avoiding subjective relativism; and finding ways of
accepted moral rules because such rules are insensitive simultaneously acknowledging and criticizing the
to the specificities of particular situations. Some femi- claims of conventional morality-known colloqui-
nists assert, therefore, that a morality of rule devalues ally as living with contradictions. They are exploring
the moral wisdom of women and gives insufficient these approaches in the context of developing femi-
weight to such supposedly feminine virtues as kind- nist perspectives on many of the most pressing moral
ness, generosity, helpfulness and sympathy. issues of our time.
The Need for More Than Justice

ANNETTE C. BAIER
In recent decades in North American social and moral of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks
philosophy, alongside the development and discus- and women. Those who have only recently seen the
sion of widely influential theories of justice, taken correction or partial correction of long-standing racist
as Rawls takes it as the 'first virtue of social institu- and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the
tions/· there has been a counter-movement gathering philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one
strength, one coming from some interesting sources. virtue among many, and one that may need the pres-
For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group ence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied
who have in a variety of ways been challenging the value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical
assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and counterculture, as it were-but an increasingly large
social virtues are members of those sections of society counterculture-I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael
whom one might have expected to be especially aware Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slate, Laurence
Thomas, Claudia Card, AHson]aggar, Susan Wolf and a
whole group of men and women, myself included, who
Annette C. Baier, "The Need for More ThanJustice," Calladiall/our-
Ilal ofPlliiosopll)~ supplementary vol. 13 (1988): 41-56. Published have been influenced by the writings of Harvard edu-
by University of Calgary Press. Reprinted with permission of cational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a
University of Calgary Press. Different Voice (Harvard 1982; hereafter D.V.) caused a
considerable stir both in the popular press and, more for the care perspective (Laurence Thomas, Lawrence
slowly, in the philosophical journals. Blum, Michael Stocker) so that it cannot be the pre-
Let me say quite clearly at this early point that rogative of women. Nevertheless Gilligan still wants
there is little disagreement that justice is a social value to claim that women are most unlikely to take only the
of very great importance, and injustice an evil. Nor justice perspective, as some men are claimed to, at least
would those who have worked on theories of justice until some mid-life crisis jolts them into 'bifocal' moral
want to deny that other things matter. besides justice. vision (see D.V., ch. 6).
Rawls, for example, incorporates the value of freedom Gilligan in her book did not offer any explanatory
into his account of justice, so that denial of basic free- theory of why there should be any difference between
doms counts as injustice. Rawls also leaves room for a female and male moral outlook, but she did tend to link
wider theory of the right, of which the theory of jus- the naturalness to women of the care perspective with
tice is just a part. Still, he does claim that justice is the their role as primary care-takers of young children, that
'first' virtue of social institutions, and it is only that is with their parental and specifically maternal role. She
claim about priority that I think has been challenged. avoided the question of whether it is their biological
It is easy to exaggerate the differences of view that or their social parental role that is relevant, and some
exist, and I want to avoid that. The differences are as of those who dislike her book are worried precisely by
much in emphasis as in substance, or we can say that this uncertainty. Some find it retrograde to hail as a spe-
they are differences in tone of voice. But these differ- cial sort of moral wisdom an outlook that may be the
ences do tend to make a difference in approaches to product of the socially enforced restriction of women
a wide range of topics not just in moral theory but in to domestic roles (and the reservation of such roles
areas like medical ethics, where the discussion used to for them alone). For that might seem to play into the
be conducted in terms of patients' rights, of informed hands of those who still favor such restriction. (Marx-
consent, and so on, but now tends to get conducted in ists, presumably, will not find it so surprising that moral
an enlarged moral vocabulary, which draws on what truths might depend for their initial clear voicing on
Gilligan calls the ethics of care as well as that of justice. the social oppression, and memory of it, of those who
For 'care' is the new buzz-word. It is not, as Shake- voice the truths.) Gilligan did in the first chapter of
speare's Portia demanded, mercy that is to season jus- D.V. cite the theory of Nancy Chodorow (as presented
tice, but a less authoritarian humanitarian supplement, in The Reproduction of Mothering [Berkeley 1978]) which
a felt concern for the good of others and for community traces what appears as gender differences in personality
with them. The 'cold jealous virtue of justice' (Hume) is to early social development, in particular to the effects
found to be too cold, and it is 'warmer' more communi- of the child's primary care-taker being or not being of
tarian virtues and social ideals that are being called in to the same gender as the child. Later, both in 'The Con-
supplement it. One might say that liberty and equality quistador and the Dark Continent: Reflections on the
are being found inadequate without fraternity, except Nature of Love' (Daedalus [Summer 1984]), and 'The
that 'fraternity' will be quite the wrong word, if as Gil- Origins of Morality in Early Childhood' (in press), she
ligan initially suggested, it is women who perceive this develops this explanation. She postulates two evils that
value most easily. (,Sorority' will do no better, since it is any infant may become aware of, the evil of detach-
too exclUSive, and English has no gender-neuter word ment or isolation from others whose love one needs,
for the mutual concern of Siblings.) She has since modi- and the evil of relative powerlessness and weakness.
fied this claim, allowing that there are two perspectives Two dimensions of moral development are thereby
on moral and social issues that we all tend to alternate set-one aimed at achieving satisfying community
between, and which are not always easy to combine, with others, the other aiming at autonomy or equality
one of them what she called the justice perspective, the of power. The relative predominance of one over the
other the care perspective. It is increasingly obvious other development will depend both upon the rela-
that there are many male philosophical spokespersons tive salience of the two evils in early childhood, and
on early and later reinforcement or discouragement in level, in which such conventional rules are subjected to
attempts made to guard against these two evils. This tests, and where those tests are of a Utilitarian, or, even-
provides the germs of a theory about why, given current tually, a Kantian sort-namely ones that require respect
customs of childrearing, it should be mainly women for each person's individual rational will, or autonomy,
who are not content with only the moral outlook that and conformity to any implicit social contract such
she calls the justice perspective, necessary though that wills are deemed to have made, or to any hypotheti-
was and is seen by them to have been to their hard won cal ones they would make if thinking clearly. What
liberation from sexist oppression. They, like the blacks, was found when Kohlberg's questionnaires (mostly by
used the language of rights and justice to change their verbal response to verbally sketched moral dilemmas)
own social position, but nevertheless see limitations were applied to female as well as male subjects, Gilligan
in that language, according to Gilligan's findings as a reports, is that the girls and women not only scored
moral psychologist. She reports their discontent with generally lower than the boys and men, but tended to
the individualist more or less Kantian moral framework revert to the lower stage of the conventional level even
that dominates Western moral theory and which influ- after briefly (usually in adolescence) attaining the post-
enced moral psychologists such as Lawrence Kohlberg, conventional level. Piaget's finding that girls were defi-
to whose conception of moral maturity she seeks an cient in 'the legal sense' was confirmed.
alternative. Since the target of Gilligan's criticism is the These results led Gilligan to wonder if there might
dominant Kantian tradition, and since that has been not be a quite different pattern of development to be
the target also of moral philosophers as diverse in their discerned, at least in female subjects. She therefore
own views as Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, conducted interviews designed to elicit not just how
Philippa Foot, Susan Wolf, Claudia Card, her book far advanced the subjects were towards an apprecia-
is of interest as much for its attempt to articulate an tion of the nature and importance of Kantian auton-
alternative to the Kantian justice perspective as for its omy, but also to find out what the subjects themselves
impliCit raising of the question of male bias in Western saw as progress or lack of it, what conceptions of moral
moral theory, especially liberal-democratic theory. For maturity they came to possess by the time they were
whether the supposed blind spots of that outlook are adults. She found that although the Kohlberg ver-
due to male bias, or to nonparental bias, or to early trau- sion of moral maturity as respect for fellow persons,
mas of powerlessness or to early resignation to 'detach- and for their rights as equals (rights including that
ment' from others, we need first to be persuaded that of free association), did seem shared by many young
they are blind spots before we will have any interest in men, the women tended to speak in a different voice
their cause and cure. Is justice blind to important social about morality itself and about moral maturity. To
values, or at least only one-eyed? What is it that comes quote Gilligan, 'Since the reality of interconnexion
into view from the 'care perspective' that is not seen is experienced by women as given rather than freely
from the 'justice perspective'? contracted, they arrive at an understanding of life
Gilligan's position here is mostly easily described by that reflects the limits of autonomy and control. As a
contrasting it with that of Kohlberg, against which she result, women's development delineates the path not
developed it. Kohlberg, influenced by Piaget and the only to a less violent life but also to a maturity real-
Kantian philosophical tradition as developed by John ized by interdependence and taking care (D.V., 172).
Rawls, developed a theory about typical moral develop- She writes that there is evidence that 'women per-
ment which saw it to progress from a pre-conventional ceive and construe social reality differently from men,
level, where what is seen to matter is pleasing or not and that these differences center around experiences
offending parental authority-figures, through a con- of attachment and separation ... because women's
ventional level in which the child tries to fit in with a sense of integrity appears to be intertwined with an
group, such as a school community, and conform to ethics of care, so that to see themselves as women is
its standards and rules, to a post-conventional critical to see themselves in a relationship of connexion, the
major changes in women's lives would seem to involve non-interference, this old man begins to see it as recip-
changes in the understanding and activities of care' rocal attachment. 'Morality is ... essential ... for cre-
(D.V., 171). She contrasts this progressive understand- ating the kind of environment, interaction between
ing of care, from merely pleasing others to helping and people, that is a prerequisite to the fulfillment of indi-
nurturing, with the sort of progression that is involved vidual goals. If you want other people not to interfere
in Kohlberg's stages, a progression in the understand- with your pursuit of whatever you are into, you have
ing, not of mutual care, but of mutual respect, where to play the game,' says the spokesman for traditional
this has its Kantian overtones of distance, even of liberalism (D.V., 98). But if what one is 'into' is inter-
some fear for the respected, and where personal auton- connexion, interdependence rather than an individual
omyand independence, rather than more satisfactory autonomy that may involve 'detachment,' such a ver-
interdependence, are the paramount values. sion of morality will come to seem inadequate. And Gil-
This contrast, one cannot but feel, is one which ligan stresses that the interconnexion that her mature
Gilligan might have used the Marxist language of women subjects, and some men, wanted to sustain was
alienation to make. For the main complaint about the not merely freely chosen interconnexion, nor inter-
Kantian version of a society with its first virtue justice, connexion between equals, but also the sort of inter-
constructed as respect for equal rights to formal goods connexion that can obtain between a child and her
such as having contracts kept, due process, equal unchosen mother and father, or between a child and
opportunity including opportunity to participate in her unchosen older and younger siblings, or indeed
political activities leading to policy and law-making, between most workers and their unchosen fellow work-
to basic liberties of speech, free association and assem- ers, or most citizens and their unchosen fellow citizens.
bly, religiOUS worship, is that none of these goods do A model of a decent community different from the
much to ensure that the people who have and mutu- liberal one is involved in the version of moral matu-
ally respect such rights will have any other relation- rity that Gilligan voices. It has in many ways more in
ships to one another than the minimal relationship common with the older religion-linked versions of
needed to keep such a 'civil society' going. They may morality and a good society than with the modern
well be lonely, driven to suicide, apathetic about their Western liberal idea. That perhaps is why some find it
work and about participation in political processes, so dangerous and retrograde. Yet it seems clear that it
find their lives meaningless and have no wish to leave also has much in common with what we call Hegelian
offspring to face the same meaningless existence. versions of moral maturity and of social health and
Their rights, and respect for rights, are quite compat- malaise, both with Marxist versions and with so-called
ible with very great misery, and misery whose causes right-Hegelian views.
are not just individual misfortunes and psychic sick- Let me try to summarize the main differences, as
ness, but social and moral impoverishment. I see them, between on the one hand Gilligan's ver-
What Gilligan's older male subjects complain of sion of moral maturity and the sort of social structures
is precisely this sort of alienation from some dimly that would encourage, express and protect it, and on
glimpsed better possibility for human beings, some the other the orthodoxy she sees herself to be chal-
richer sort of network of relationships. As one of Gilli- lenging. I shall from now on be giving my own inter-
gan's male subjects put it, 'People have real emotional pretation of the significance of her challenges, not
needs to be attached to something, and equality does merely reporting them. The most obvious point is the
not give you attachment. Equality fractures society and challenge to the individualism of the Western tradi-
places on every person the burden of standing on his tion, to the fairly entrenched belief in the possibility
own two feet' (D.V., 167). It is not just the difficulty of and desirability of each person pursuing his own good
self-reliance which is complained of, but its socially in his own way, constrained only by a minimal for-
'fracturing' effect. Whereas the younger men, in their mal common good, namely a working legal apparatus
COllege years, had seen morality as a matter of reciprocal that enforces contracts and protects individuals from
undue interference by others. Gilligan reminds us that rules, but it is not so clear that the more communally
noninterference can, especially for the relatively pow- minded can be content with just those rules, nor be
erless, such as the very young, amount to neglect, and content to be tolerated and possibly exploited.
even between equals can be isolating and alienating. For the moral tradition which developed the con-
On her less individualist version of individuality, it cept of rights, autonomy and justice is the same tradi-
becomes defined by responses to dependence and to tion that provided 'justifications' of the oppression of
patterns of interconnexion, both chosen and uncho- those whom the primary right-holders depended on
sen. It is not something a person has, and which she to do the sort of work they themselves preferred not to
then chooses relationships to suit, but something that do. The domestic work was left to women and slaves,
develops out of a series of dependencies and interde- and the liberal morality for right-holders was surrep-
pendenCies, and responses to them. This conception titiously supplemented by a different set of demands
of individuality is not flatly at odds with, say, Rawls' made on domestic workers. As long as women could
Kantian one, but there is at least a difference of tone be got to assume responsibility for the care of home
of voice between speaking as Rawls does of each of and children, and to train their children to continue
us having our own rational life plan, which a just the sexist system, the liberal morality could continue
society's moral traffic rules will allow us to follow, to be the official morality, by turning its eyes away
and which mayor may not include close association from the contribution made by those it excluded. The
with other persons, and speaking as Gilligan does of long unnoticed moral proletariat were the domestic
a satisfactory life as involving 'progress of affiliative workers, mostly female. Rights have usually been for
relationship' (D.V., 170) where 'the concept of iden- the privileged. Talking about laws, and the rights those
tity expands to include the experience of intercon- laws recognize and protect, does not in itself ensure
nexion' (D.V., 173). Rawls can allow that progress to that the group of legislators and rights-holders will not
Gilligan-style moral maturity may be a rational life be restricted to some elite. Bills of rights have usually
plan, but not a moral constraint on every life-pattern. been proclamations of the rights of some in-group,
The trouble is that it will not do just to say 'let this ver- barons, landowners, males, whites, non-foreigners.
sion of morality be an optional extra. Let us agree on The 'justice perspective,' and the legal sense that goes
the essential minimum, that is on justice and rights, with it, are shadowed by their patriarchal past. What
and let whoever wants to go further and cultivate this did Kant, the great prophet of autonomy, say in his
more demanding ideal of responsibility and care.' moral theory about women? He said they were incapa-
For, first, it cannot be satisfactorily cultivated without ble of legislation, not fit to vote, that they needed the
2
closer cooperation from others than respect for rights guidance of more 'rational' males. Autonomy was not
and justice will ensure, and second, the encourage- for them, only for first-class, really rational persons.
ment of some to cultivate it while others do not could It is ironic that Gilligan's original findings in a way
easily lead to exploitation of those who do. It obvi- confirm Kant's views-it seems that autonomy really
ously has suited some in most societies well enough may not be for women. Many of them reject that ideal
that others take on the responsibilities of care (for the (D.V., 48), and have been found not as good at making
sick, the helpless, the young) leaving them free to pur- rules as are men. But where Kant concludes-'so much
sue their own less altruistic goods. Volunteer forces of the worse for women,' we can conclude-'so much the
those who accept an ethic of care, operating within a worse for the male fixation on the special skill of draft-
society where the power is exercised and the institu- ing legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule
tions designed, redeSigned, or maintained by those worship, and for the male exaggeration of the impor-
who accept a less communal ethic of minimally con- tance of independence over mutual interdependence.'
strained self-advancement, will not be the solution. It is however also true that the moral theories that
The liberal individualists may be able to 'tolerate' the made the concept of a person's rights central were not
more communally minded, if they keep the liberals' just the instruments for excluding some persons, but
also the instruments used by those who demanded best contemporary moral theorizing. Few may actu-
that more and more persons be included in the ally say that women's place is in the home, but there
favored group. Abolitionists, reformers, women, is much muttering, when unemployment figures rise,
used the language of rights to assert their claims to about how the relatively recent flood of women into
inclusion in the group of full members of a commu- the work force complicates the problem, as if it would
nity. The tradition of liberal moral theory has in fact be a good thing if women just went back home when-
developed so as to include the women it had for so ever unemployment rises, to leave the available jobs
long excluded, to include the poor as well as rich, for the men. We still do not really have a wide accep-
blacks and whites, and so on. Women like MaryWoll- tance of the equal rights of women to employment
stonecraft used the male moral theories to good pur- outside the home. Nor do we have wide acceptance of
pose. So we should not be wholly ungrateful for those the equal duty of men to perform those domestic tasks
male moral theories, for all their objectionable earlier which in no way depend on special female anatomy,
content. They were undoubtedly patriarchal, but they namely cooking, cleaning, and the care of weaned
also contained the seeds of the challenge, or antidote, children. All sorts of stories (maybe true stories), about
to this patriarchal poison. children'S need for one 'primary' parent, who must be
But when we transcend the values of the Kantians, the mother if the mother breast-feeds the child, shore
we should not forget the facts of history-that those up the unequal division of domestic responsibility
values were the values of the oppressors of women. between mothers and fathers, wives and husbands.
The Christian church, whose version of the moral law If we are really to transvalue the values of our patriar-
Aquinas codified, in his very legalistic moral theory, chal past, we need to rethink all of those assum ptions,
still insists on the maleness of the God it worships, and really test those psychological theories. And how will
jealously reserves for males all the most powerful posi- men ever develop an understanding of the 'ethics of
tions in its hierarchy. Its patriarchical prejudice is open care' if they continue to be shielded or kept from that
and avowed. In the secular moral theories of men, the experience of caring for a dependent child, which
sexist patriarchal prejudice is today often less open, complements the experience we all have had of being
not as blatant as it is in Aquinas, in the later natural cared for as dependent children? These experiences
law tradition, and in Kant and Hegel, but is often still form the natural background for the development of
there. No moral theorist today would say that women moral maturity as Gilligan's women saw it.
are unfit to vote, to make laws, or to rule a nation Exploitation aside, why would women, once
without powerful male advisors (as most queens had), liberated, not be content to have their version of
but the old doctrines die hard. In one of the best male morality merely tolerated? Why should they not
theories we have, John Rawls's theory, a key role is see themselves as voluntarily, for their own reasons,
played by the idea of the 'head of a household.' It is taking on more than the liberal rules demand, while
heads of households who are to deliberate behind a having no quarrel with the content of those rules
'veil of ignorance' of historical details, and of details themselves, nor with their remaining the only ones
of their own special Situation, to arrive at the 'just' that are expected to be generally obeyed? To see
constitution for a society. Now of course Rawls does why, we need to move on to three more differences
not think or say that these 'heads' are fathers rather between the Kantian liberals (usually con tractarians)
than mothers. But if we have really given up the age- and their critics. These concern the relative weight
old myth of women needing, as Grotius put it, to be put on relationships between equals, and the relative
under the 'eye' of a more 'rational' male protector and weight put on freedom of chOice, and on the author-
master, then how do families come to have anyone ity of intellect over emotions. It is a typical feature
'head,' except by the death or desertion of one parent? of the dominant moral theories and traditions, since
They will either be two-headed, or headless. Traces Kant, or perhaps since Hobbes, that relationships
of the old patriarchal pOison still remain in even the between equals or those who are deemed equal in
some important sense, have been the relations that the young, is obviously socially vital. One cannot
morality is concerned primarily to regulate. Rela- regard any version of morality that does not ensure
tionships between those who are clearly unequal in that it gets well done as an adequate 'minimal moral-
power, such as parents and children, earlier and later ity,' any more than we could so regard one that left
generations in relation to one another, states and cit- any concern for more distant future generations an
izens, doctors and patients, the well and the ill, large optional extra. A moral theory, it can plaUSibly be
states and small states, have had to be shunted to the claimed, cannot regard concern for new and future
bottom of the agenda, and then dealt with by some persons as an optional charity left for those with a
sort of 'promotion' of the weaker so that an appear- taste for it. If the morality the theory endorses is to
ance of virtual equality is achieved. Citizens collec- sustain itself, it must provide for its own continu-
tively become equal to states, children are treated as ers, not just take out a loan on a carefully encour-
adults-to-be, the ill and dying are treated as continu- aged maternal instinct or on the enthusiasm of a
ers of their earlier more potent selves, so that their self-selected group of environmentalists, who make
'rights' could be seen as the rights of equals. This pre- it their business or hobby to be concerned with what
tence of an equality that is in fact absent may often we are doing to mother earth.
lead to deSirable protection of the weaker, or more The recognition of the importance for all parties
dependent. But it somewhat masks the question of of relations between those who are and cannot but
what our moral relationships are to those who are be unequal, both of these relations in themselves
our superiors or our inferiors in power. A more real- and for their effect on personality formation and so
istic acceptance of the fact that we begin as helpless on other relationships, goes along with a recogni-
children, that at almost every point of our lives we tion of the plain fact that not all morally important
deal with both the more and the less helpless, that relationships can or should be freely chosen. So far I
equality of power and interdependency, between two have discussed three reasons women have not to be
persons or groups, is rare and hard to recognize when content to pursue their own values within the frame-
it does OCcur, might lead us to a more direct approach work of the liberal morality. The first was its dubious
to questions concerning the design of institutions record. The second was its inattention to relations of
structuring these relationships between unequals inequality or its pretence of equality. The third reason
(families, schools, hospitals, armies) and of the is its exaggeration of the scope of chOice, or its inat-
morality of our dealings with the more and the less tention to unchosen relations. Showing up the partial
powerful. One reason why those who agree with the myth of equality among actual members of a com-
Gilligan version of what morality is about will not munity, and of the undesirability of trying to pretend
want to agree that the liberals' rules are a good mini- that we are treating all of them as equals, tends to go
mal set, the only ones we need pressure everyone to along with an exposure of the companion myth that
obey, is that these rules do little to protect the young moral obligations arise from freely chosen associations
or the dYing or the starving or any of the relatively between such equals. Vulnerable future generations
powerless against neglect, or to ensure an education do not choose their dependence on earlier genera-
that will form persons to be capable of conforming to tions. The unequal infant does not choose its place in
an ethics of care and responsibility. Put baldly, and a family or nation, nor is it treated as free to do as it
in a way Gilligan certainly has not put it, the liberal likes until some association is freely entered into. Nor
morality, if unsupplemented, may unfit people to be do its parents always choose their parental role, or
anything other than what its justifying theories sup- freely assume their parental responsibilities any more
pose them to be, ones who have no interest in each than we choose our power to affect the conditions
others' interests. Yet some must take an interest in in which later generations will live. Gilligan's atten-
the next generation's interests. Women's traditional tion to the version of morality and moral maturity
work, of caring for the less powerful, especially for found in women, many of whom had faced a choice
of whether or not to have an abortion, and who had at most psychological theories. They need to love their
some point become mothers, is attention to the per- children, not just to control their irritation. So the
ceived inadequacy of the language of rights to help in emphasis in Kantian theories on rational control of
such choices or to guide them in their parental role. emotions, rather than on cultivating desirable forms
It would not be much of an exaggeration to call the of emotion, is challenged by Gilligan, along with the
Gilligan 'different voice' the voice of the potential challenge to the assumption of the centrality of auton-
parents. The emphasis on care goes with a recogni- omy, or relations between equals, and of freely chosen
tion of the often unchosen nature of the responsibili- relations.
ties of those who give care, both of children who care The same set of challenges to 'orthodox' liberal
for their aged or infirm parents, and of parents who oral theory has come not just from Gilligan and other
care for the children they in fact have. Contract soon women, who are reminding other moral theorists of
ceases to seem the paradigm source of moral obliga- the role of the family as a social institution and as an
tion once we attend to parental responsibility, and influence on the other relationships people want to
justice as a virtue of social institutions will come to or are capable of sustaining, but also, as I noted at the
seem at best only first equal with the virtue, whatever start, from an otherwise fairly diverse group of men,
its name, that ensures that each new generation is ranging from those influenced by both Hegelian and
made appropriately welcome and prepared for their Christian traditions (MacIntyre) to all varieties of
adult lives. other backgrounds. From this group I want to draw
This all constitutes a belated reminder to West- attention to the work of one philosopher in particu-
ern moral theorists of a fact they have always known, lar, namely Laurence Thomas, the author of a fairly
that as Adam Ferguson, and David Hume before him remarkable article3 in which he finds sexism to be a
emphasized, we are born into families, and the first more intractable social evil than racism .... Thomas
society we belong to, one that fits or misfits us for later makes a strong case for the importance of supple-
ones, is the small society of parents (or some sort of menting a concern for justice and respect for rights
child-attendants) and children, exhibiting as it may with an emphasis on equally needed virtues, and on
both relationships of near equality and of inequality in virtues seen as appropriate emotional as well as ratio-
power. This simple reminder, with the fairly consider- nal capacities. Like Gilligan (and unlike MacIntyre)
able implications it can have for the plausibility of con- Thomas gives a lot of attention to the childhood
tractarian moral theory, is at the same time a reminder beginnings of moral and social capacities, to the role
of the role of human emotions as much as human rea- of parental love in making that pOSSible, and to the
son and will in moral development as it actually comes emotional as well as the cognitive development we
about. The fourth feature of the Gilligan challenge to have reason to think both possible and desirable in
liberal orthodoxy is a challenge to its typical rational- human persons.
ism, or intellectualism, to its assumption that we need It is clear, I think, that the best moral theory has
not worry what paSSions persons have, as long as their to be a cooperative product of women and men, has
rational wills can control them. This Kantian picture of to harmonize justice and care. The morality it theo-
a controlling reason dictating to possibly unruly pas- rizes about is after all for all persons, for men and for
sions also tends to seem less useful when we are led to women, and will need their combined insights. As
consider what sort of person we need to fill the role Gilligan said (D.V., 174), what we need now is a 'mar-
of parent, or indeed want in any close relationship. It riage' of the old male and the newly articulated female
might be important for father figures to have rational insights. If she is right about the special moral apti-
control over their violent urges to beat to death the tudes of women, it will most likely be the women who
children whose screams enrage them, but more than propose the marriage, since they are the ones with
control of such nasty paSSions seems needed in the moral natural empathy, with the better diplomatiC
mother or primary parent, or parent-substitute, by skills, the ones more likely to shoulder responsibility
and take moral initiative, and the ones who find it NOTES
easiest to empathize and care about how the other
1. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Harvard University Press).
party feels. Then, once there is this union of male and
2. Immanuel Kant, MetapllYsics ofMorals, sec. 46.
female moral wisdom, we maybe can teach each other
the moral skills each gender currently lacks, so that 3. Laurence Thomas, 'Sexism and Racism: Some Concep-
the gender difference in moral outlook that Gilligan tual Differences,' Ethics 90 (1980), 239-50; republished in
Pililosophy, Sex and Language, Vetterling-Braggin, ed. (Totowa,
found will slowly become less marked.
NJ: Littlefield Adams 1980).
The Ethics of Care as Moral Theory

VIRGINIA HELD
The ethics of care is only a few decades old. Some form of virtue ethics. It is almost always developed
theorists do not like the term 'care' to designate this as emphasizing neglected moral considerations of at
approach to moral issues and have tried substitut- least as much importance as the considerations cen-
ing 'the ethic of love,' or 'relational ethics,' but the tral to moralities of justice and rights or of utility and
discourse keeps returning to 'care' as the so far more preference satisfaction. And many who contribute to
satisfactory of the terms conSidered, though dissatis- the understanding of the ethics of care seek to inte-
factions with it remain. The concept of care has the grate the moral considerations, such as justice, which
advantage of not losing sight of the work involved in other moral theories have clarified, satisfactorily
caring for people and of not lending itself to the inter- with those of care, though they often see the need to
pretation of morality as ideal but impractical to which reconceptualize these considerations.
advocates of the ethics of care often object. Care is
both value and practice.
By now, the ethics of care has moved far beyond its FEATURES OF THE ETHICS OF CARE
original formulations, and any attempt to evaluate it
Some advocates of the ethics of care resist generaliZing
should consider much more than the one or two early
this approach into something that can be fitted into
works so frequently cited. It has been developed as a
the form of a moral theory. They see it as a mosaic of
moral theory relevant not only to the so-called private
insights and value the way it is sensitive to contextual
realms of family and friendship but to medical prac-
nuance and particular narratives rather than making
tice, law, political life, the organization of SOCiety, war,
and international relations. the abstract and universal claims of more familiar
moral theories. Still, I think one can discern among
The ethics of care is sometimes seen as a poten-
tial moral theory to be substituted for such dominant various versions of the ethics of care a number of
major features.
moral theories as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, or
Aristotelian virtue ethicS. It is sometimes seen as a First, the central focus of the ethics of care is on
the compelling moral salience of attending to and
meeting the needs of the particular others for whom
Virginia Held, "The Ethics of Care as Moral Theory," in Tile Ethics
we take responsibility. Caring for one's child, for
of Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),9-20. © 2006 by instance, may well and defensibly be at the forefront
Oxford University Press, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the of a person's moral concerns. The ethics of care rec-
Licensor through PLSclear. ognizes that human beings are dependent for many
years of their lives, that the moral claim of those The emotions that are typically considered and
dependent on us for the care they need is pressing, rejected in rationalistic moral theories are the egoistic
and that there are highly important moral aspects in feelings that undermine universal moral norms, the
developing the relations of caring that enable human favoritism that interferes with impartiality, and the
beings to live and progress. All persons need care for aggressive and vengeful impulses for which morality
at least their early years. Prospects for human prog- is to provide restraints. The ethics of care, in contrast,
ress and flourishing hinge fundamentally on the typically appreciates the emotions and relational
care that those needing it receive, and the ethics of capabilities that enable morally concerned persons
care stresses the moral force of the responsibility to in actual interpersonal contexts to understand what
respond to the needs of the dependent. Many per- would be best. Since even the helpful emotions can
sons will become ill and dependent for some peri- often become misguided or worse-as when excessive
ods of their later lives, including in frail old age, and empathy with others leads to a wrongful degree of self-
some who are permanently disabled will need care denial or when benevolent concern crosses over into
the whole of their lives. Moralities built on the image controlling domination-we need an ethics of care,
of the independent, autonomous, rational indi- not just care itself. The various aspects and expres-
vidual largely overlook the reality of human depen- sions of care and caring relations need to be subjected
dence and the morality for which it calls. The ethics to moral scrutiny and evaluated, not just observed and
of care attends to this central concern of human life described.
and delineates the moral values involved. It refuses Third, the ethics of care rejects the view of the
to relegate care to a realm "outside morality." How dominant moral theories that the more abstract the
caring for particular others should be reconciled with reasoning about a moral problem the better because
the claims of, for instance, universal justice is an the more likely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the
issue that needs to be addressed. But the ethics of care more nearly to achieve impartiality. The ethics of care
starts with the moral claims of particular others, for respects rather than removes itself from the claims of
instance, of one's child, whose claims can be compel- particular others with whom we share actual rela-
ling regardless of universal principles. tionships. It calls into question the universalistic
Second, in the epistemological process of trying to and abstract rules of the dominant theories. When
understand what morality would recommend and what the latter consider such actual relations as between a
it would be morally best for us to do and to be, the eth- parent and child, if they say anything about them at
ics of care values emotion rather than rejects it. Not all all, they may see them as permitted and [indicative
emotion is valued, of course, but in contrast with the of] a preference that a person may have. Or they may
dominant rationalist approaches, such emotions as recognize a universal obligation for all parents to care
sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are for their children. But they do not permit actual rela-
seen as the kind of moral emotions that need to be cul- tions ever to take priority over the requirements of
tivated not only to help in the implementation of the impartiality. As Brian Barry expresses this view, there
dictates of reason but to better ascertain what morality can be universal rules permitting people to favor
recommends. Even anger may be a component of the their friends in certain contexts, such as deciding to
moral indignation that should be felt when people are whom to give holiday gifts, but the latter partiality is
treated unjustly or inhumanely, and it may contribute morally acceptable only because universal rules have
to (rather than interfere with) an appropriate interpre- already so judged it. The ethics of care, in contrast,
tation of the moral wrong. This is not to say that raw is skeptical of such abstraction and reliance on uni-
emotion can be a guide to morality; feelings need to be versal rules and questions the priority given to them.
reflected on and educated. But from the care perspective, To most advocates of the ethics of care, the compel-
moral inquiries that rely entirely on reason and rational- ling moral claim of the particular other may be valid
istic deductions or calculations are seen as deficient. even when it conflicts with the requirement usually
made by moral theories that moral judgments be "selfish individual" and "humanity" are recognized,
universalizeable, and this is of fundamental moral but what lies between these is often overlooked. The
importance. Hence the potential conflict between ethics of care, in contrast, focuses especially on the
care and justice, friendship and impartiality, loyalty area between these extremes. Those who conscien-
and universality. To others, however, there need be tiously care for others are not seeking primarily to
no conflict if universal judgments come to incor- further their own individual interests; their interests
porate appropriately the norms of care previously are intertwined with the persons they care for. Nei-
disregarded. ther are they acting for the sake of all others or human-
Annette Baier considers how a feminist approach ity in general; they seek instead to preserve or promote
to morality differs from a Kantian one and Kant's an actual human relation between themselves and
claim that women are incapable of being fully particular others. Persons in caring relations are act-
moral because of their reliance on emotion rather ing for self-and-other together. Their characteristic
than reason. She writes, "Where Kant concludes 'so stance is neither egoistic nor altruistic; these are the
much the worse for women,' we can conclude 'so options in a conflictual situation, but the well-being
much the Worse for the male fixation on the special of a caring relation involves the cooperative well-
skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic men- being of those in the relation and the well-being of
tality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration the relation itself.
of the importance of independence over mutual In trying to overcome the attitudes and prob-
interdependence.' " lems of tribalism and religious intolerance, dominant
Margaret Walker contrasts what she sees as moralities have tended to assimilate the domains
feminist "moral understanding" with what has tra- of family and friendship to the tribal, or to a source
ditionally been thought of as moral "knowledge." of the unfair favoring of one's own. Or they have
She sees the moral understanding she advocates seen the attachments people have in these areas as
as involving "attention, contextual and narrative among the nonmoral private preferences people are
appreciation, and communication in the event of permitted to pursue if restrained by impartial moral
moral deliberation." This alternative moral episte- norms. The ethics of care recognizes the moral value
mology holds that "the adequacy of moral under- and importance of relations of family and friendship
standing decreases as its form approaches generality and the need for moral guidance in these domains to
through abstraction." understand how existing relations should often be
The ethics of care may seek to limit the applica- changed and new ones developed. Having grasped
bility of universal rules to certain domains where the value of caring relations in such contexts as these
they are more appropriate, like the domain of law, more personal ones, the ethics of care then often
and resist their extension to other domains. Such examines social and political arrangements in the
rules may simply be inappropriate in, for instance, light of these values. In its more developed forms,
the contexts of family and friendship, yet relations the ethics of care as a feminist ethic offers suggestions
in these domains should certainly be evaluated, not for the radical transformation of SOciety. It demands
merely described, hence morality should not be lim- not just equality for women in existing structures of
ited to abstract rules. We should be able to give moral society but equal consideration for the experience
guidance concerning actual relations that are trust- that reveals the values, importance, and moral signifi-
ing, conSiderate, and caring and concerning those cance, of caring.
that are not. A fourth characteristic of the ethics of care is that
Dominant moral theories tend to interpret moral like much feminist thought in many areas, it recon-
problems as if they were conflicts between egoistic ceptualizes traditional notions about the public
individual interests on the one hand, and univer- and the private. The traditional view, built into the
sal moral principles on the other. The extremes of dominant moral theories, is that the household is a
private sphere beyond politics into which govern- A fifth characteristic of the ethics of care is the con-
ment, based on consent, should not intrude. Femi- ception of persons with which it begins. This will be
nists have shown how the greater social, political, dealt with in the next section.
economic, and cultural power of men has structured
this "private" sphere to the disadvantage of women
and children, rendering them vulnerable to domes- THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM
tic violence without outside interference, often leav- The ethics of care usually works with a conception of
ing women economically dependent on men and persons as relational, rather than as the self-sufficient
subject to a highly inequitable division of labor in independent individuals of the dominant moral the-
the family. The law has not hesitated to intervene ories. The dominant theories can be interpreted as
into women's private decisions concerning repro- importing into moral theory a concept of the person
duction but has been highly reluctant to intrude on developed primarily for liberal political and economic
men's exercise of coercive power within the "castles" theory, seeing the person as a rational, autonomous
of their homes. agent, or a self-interested individual. On this view,
Dominant moral theories have seen "public" life society is made up of "independent, autonomous
as relevant to morality while missing the moral signif- units who cooperate only when the terms of cooper-
icance of the "private" domains of family and friend- ation are such as to make it further the ends of each
ship. Thus the dOminant theories have assumed that of the parties," in Brian Barry's words. Or, if they are
morality should be sought for unrelated, indepen- Kantians, they refrain from actions that they could
dent, and mutually indifferent individuals assumed not will to be universal laws to which all fully rational
to be equal. They have pOSited an abstract, fully ratio- and autonomous individual agents could agree. What
nal "agent as such" from which to construct moral- such views hold, in Michael Sandel's critique of them,
ity, while missing the moral issues that arise between is that "what separates us is in some important sense
interconnected persons in the contexts of family, prior to what connects us-epistemologically prior as
friendship, and social groups. In the context of the well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals first
family, it is typical for relations to be between persons and then we form relationships. In Martha Nussbaum's
with highly unequal power who did not choose the liberal feminist morality, lithe flourishing of human
ties and obligations in which they find themselves beings taken one by one is both analytically and nor-
enmeshed. For instance, no child can choose her matively prior to the flourishing" of any group.
parents yet she may well have obligations to care for The ethics of care, in contrast, characteristically
them. Relations of this kind are standardly noncon- sees persons as relational and interdependent, mor-
tractual, and conceptualizing them as contractual ally and epistemologically. Every person starts out
would often undermine or at least obscure the trust as a child dependent on those providing us care, and
on which their worth depends. The ethics of care we remain interdependent with others in thoroughly
addresses rather than neglects moral issues arising fundamental ways throughout our lives. That we can
in relations among the unequal and dependent, rela- think and act as if we were independent depends on
tions that are often laden with emotion and invol- a network of social relations making it possible for us
untary, and then notices how often these attributes to do so. And our relations are part of what constitute
apply not only in the household but in the wider our identity. This is not to say that we cannot become
society as well. For instance, persons do not choose autonomous; feminists have done much interesting
which gender, raCial, class, ethnic, religious, national, work developing an alternative conception of auton-
or cultural groups to be brought up in, yet these sorts omy in place of the liberal individualist one. Feminists
of ties may be important aspects of who they are have much experience rejecting or reconstituting
and how their experience can contribute to moral relational ties that are oppressive. But it means that
understanding. from the perspective of an ethics of care, to construct
morality as if we were Robinson Crusoes, or, to use The conception of the person adopted by the
Hobbes's image, mushrooms sprung from nowhere, is dominant moral theories provides moralities at best
misleading. As Eva Kittay writes, this conception fosters suitable for legal, pOlitical, and economic interac-
the illusion that society is composed of free, equal, and tions between relative strangers, once adequate trust
independent individuals who can choose to associate exists for them to form a political entity. The ethics of
with one another or not. It obscures the very real facts care is, instead, hospitable to the relatedness of per-
of dependency for everyone when they are young, for sons. It sees many of our responsibilities as not freely
most people at various periods in their lives when they entered into but presented to us by the accidents of
are ill or old and infirm, for some who are disabled, and our embeddedness in familial and social and histori-
for all those engaged in unpaid "dependency work." cal contexts. It often calls on us to take responsibility,
And it obscures the innumerable ways persons and while liberal individualist morality focuses on how we
groups are interdependent in the modem world. should leave each other alone. The view of persons as
Not only does the liberal individualist conception embedded and encumbered seems fundamental to
of the person foster a false picture of society and the much feminist thinking about morality and especially
persons in it, it is, from the perspective of the ethics of to the ethics of care.
care, impoverished also as an ideal. The ethics of care
values the ties we have with particular other persons
and the actual relationships that partly constitute our JUSTICE AND CARE
identity. Although persons often may and should Some conceptions of the ethics of care see it as con-
reshape their relations with others-distancing trasting with an ethic of justice in ways that suggest
themselves from some persons and groups and devel- one must choose between them. Carol Gilligan's sug-
oping or strengthening ties with others-the auton- gestion of alternative perspectives in interpreting and
omy sought within the ethics of care is a capacity to organizing the elements of a moral problem lent itself
reshape and cultivate new relations, not to ever more to this implication; she herself used the metaphor of
closely resemble the unencumbered abstract ratio- the ambiguouS figure of the vase and the faces, from
nal self of liberal political and moral theories. Those psychological research on perception, to illustrate how
motivated by the ethics of care would seek to become one could see a problem as either a problem of justice
more admirable relational persons in better caring or a problem of care, but not as both simultaneously.
relations. An ethic of justice focuses on questions of fair-
Even if the liberal ideal is meant only to instruct ness, equality, individual rights, abstract principles,
us on what would be rational in the terms of its ideal and the consistent application of them. An ethic of
model, thinking of persons as the model presents care focuses on attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to
them has effects that should not be welcomed. As need, narrative nuance, and cultivating caring rela-
Annette Baier writes, "Liberal morality, if un supple- tions. Whereas an ethic of justice seeks a fair solution
mented, may unfit people to be anything other than between competing individual interests and rights,
what its justifying theories suppose them to be, ones an ethic of care sees the interests of carers and cared-
who have no interest in each others' interests." There for as importantly intertwined rather than as simply
is strong empirical evidence of how adopting a theo- competing. Whereas justice protects equality and free-
retical model can lead to behavior that mirrors it. Vari- dom, care fosters social bonds and cooperation.
ous studies show that studying economics, with its These are very different emphases in what moral-
"repeated and intensive exposure to a model whose ity should consider. Yet both deal with what seems of
unequivocal prediction" is that people will decide great moral importance. This has led many to explore
what to do on the basis of self-interest, leads econom- how they might be combined in a satisfactory moral-
ics students to be less cooperative and more inclined ity. One can persuasively argue, for instance, that jus-
to free ride than other students. tice is needed in such contexts of care as the family,
to protect against violence and the unfair division of of justice arise from within the practice of care itself
labor or treatment of children. One can also persua- and therefore are an important part of the ethic of
sively argue that care is needed in such contexts of care, properly understood." The ethics of care must
justice as the streets and the courts, where persons thus also concern itself with the justice (or lack of it) of
should be treated humanely, and in the wayeduca- the ways the tasks of caring are distributed in society.
tion and health and welfare should be dealt with as Traditionally, women have been expected to do most
social responsibilities. The implication may be that of the caring work that needs to be done; the sexual
justice and care should not be separated into different division of labor exploits women by extracting unpaid
"ethics," that, in Sara Ruddick's proposed approach, care labor from them, making women less able than
"justice is always seen in tandem with care." men to engage in paid work. "Femininity" constructs
Few would hold that considerations of justice have women as carers, contributing to the constraints by
no place at all in care. One would not be caring well for which women are pressed into accepting the sexual
two children, for instance, if one showed a persistent division oflabor. An ethic of care that extols caring but
favoritism toward one of them that could not be justi- that fails to be concerned with how the burdens of car-
fied on the basis of some such factor as greater need. ing are distributed contributes to the exploitation of
The issues are rather what constellation of values have women, and of the minority groups whose members
priority and which predominate in the practices of the perform much of the paid but ill-paid work of caring
ethics of care and the ethics of justice. It is quite possi- in affluent households, in day care centers, hospitals,
ble to delineate significant differences between them. nursing homes, and the like.
In the dominant moral theories of the ethics of justice, The question remains, however, whether justice
the values of equality, impartiality, fair distribution, should be thought to be incorporated into any ethic
and noninterference have priority; in practices of jus- of care that will be adequate or whether we should
tice, individual rights are protected, impartial judg- keep the notions of justice and care and their associ-
ments are arrived at, punishments are deserved, and ated ethics conceptually distinct. There is much to
equal treatment is sought. In contrast, in the ethics of be said for recognizing how the ethics of care values
care, the values of trust, solidarity, mutual concern, interrelatedness and responsiveness to the needs of
and empathetic responsiveness have priority; in prac- particular others, how the ethics of justice values fair-
tices of care, relationships are cultivated, needs are ness and rights, and how these are different emphases.
responded to, and sensitivity is demonstrated. Too much integration will lose sight of these valid dif-
An extended effort to integrate care and justice is ferences. I am more inclined to say that an adequate,
offered by Diemut Bubeck. She makes clear that she comprehensive moral theory will have to include the
"endorse[s] the ethic of care as a system of concepts, insights of both the ethics of care and the ethics of jus-
values, and ideas, ariSing from the practice of care tice, among other insights, rather than that either of
as an organic part of this practice and responding to these can be incorporated into the other in the sense
its material requirements, notably the meeting of of supposing that it can provide the grounds for the
needs." Yet her primary interest is in understanding judgments characteristically found in the other. Equi-
the exploitation of women, which she sees as tied to table caring is not necessarily better caring, it is fairer
the way women do most of the unpaid work of car- caring. And humane justice is not necessarily better
ing. She argues that such principles as equality in justice, it is more caring justice.
care and the minimization of harm are tacitly, if not Almost no advocates of the ethics of care are will-
explicitly, embedded in the practice of care, as carers ing to see it as a moral outlook less valuable than the
whose capacities and time for engaging in caring labor dominant ethics of justice. To imagine that the con-
are limited must decide how to respond to various cerns of care can merely be added on to the dominant
others in need of being cared for. She writes that "far theories, as, for instance, Stephen Darwall suggests,
from being extraneous impositions ... considerations is seen as unsatisfactory. Confining the ethics of care
to the private sphere while holding it unsuitable for Care is probably the most deeply fundamen-
public life, as Nel Noddings did at first and as many tal value. There can be care without justice: There
accounts of it suggest, is also to be rejected. But how has historically been little justice in the family, but
care and justice are to be meshed without losing care and life have gone on without it. There can be
sight of their differing priorities is a task still being no justice without care, however, for without care no
worked on. child would survive and there would be no persons to
My own suggestions for integrating care and jus- respect.
tice are to keep these concepts conceptually distinct Care may thus provide the wider and deeper
and to delineate the domains in which they should ethics within which justice should be sought, as
have priority. In the realm of law, for instance, jus- when persons in caring relations may sometimes
tice and the assurance of rights should have priority, compete and in doing so should treat each other
although the humane considerations of care should fairly, or, at the level of society, within caring rela-
not be absent. In the realm of the family and among tions of the thinner kind we can agree to treat each
friends, priority should be given to expansive care, other for limited purposes as if we were the abstract
though the basic requirements of justice surely should individuals of liberal theory. But although care may
also be met. But these are the clearest cases; others will be the more fundamental value, it may well be that
combine moral urgencies. Universal human rights the ethiCS of care does not itself provide adequate
(including the social and economic ones as well as theoretical resources for dealing with issues of
the political and civil) should certainly be respected, justice. Within its appropriate sphere and for its
but promoting care across continents may be a more relevant questions, the ethics of justice may be best
promising way to achieve this than mere rational rec- for what we seek. What should be resisted is the
ognition. When needs are desperate, justice may be traditional inclination to expand the reach of justice
a lessened requirement on shared responsibility for in such a way that it is mistakenly imagined to be
meeting needs, although this rarely excuses violations able to give us a comprehensive morality suitable for
of rights. At the level of what constitutes a SOCiety in all moral questions.
the first place, a domain within which rights are to
be assured and care provided, appeal must be made
to something like the often weak but not negligible IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIETY
caring relations among persons that enable them to Many advocates of the ethics of care argue for its
recognize each other as members of the same sOciety. relevance in social and political and economic life.
Such recognition must eventually be global; in the Sara Ruddick shows its implications for efforts to
meantime, the civil society without which the lib- achieve peace. I argue that as we see the deficien-
eral institutions of justice cannot function presume a cies of the contractual model of human relations
background of some degree of caring relations rather within the household, we can see them also in the
than of merely competing individuals ... Further- world beyond and begin to think about how society
more, considerations of care provide a more fruitful should be reorganized to be hospitable to care, rather
basis than considerations of justice for deciding much than continuing to marginalize it. We can see how
about how SOCiety should be structured, for instance, not only does every domain of society need trans-
how extensive or how restricted markets should be ... formation in light of the values of care but so would
And in the Course of protecting the rights that ought the relations between such domains if we took care
to be recognized, such as those to basic necessities, seriously, as care would move to the center of our
policies that express the caring of the community for attention and become a primary concern of SOciety.
all its members will be better poliCies than those that Instead of a society dominated by conflict restrained
grudgingly, though fairly, issue an allotment to those by law and preoccupied with economic gain, we
deemed unfit. might have a sOciety that saw as its most important
task the flourishing of children and the development Instead of seeing the corporate sector, and military
of caring relations, not only in personal contexts but strength, and government and law as the most impor-
among citizens and using governmental institutions. tant segments of society deserving the highest levels
We would see that instead of abandoning culture to of wealth and power, a caring society might see the
the dictates of the marketplace, we should make it tasks of bringing up children, educating its members,
possible for culture to develop in ways best able to meeting the needs of all, achieving peace and treasur-
enlighten and enrich human life. ing the environment, and doing these in the best ways
Joan Tronto argues for the political implications possible to be that to which the greatest social efforts
of the ethics of care, seeing care as a political as well of all should be devoted. One can recognize that
as moral ideal advocating the meeting of needs for something comparable to legal constraints and police
care as lithe highest social goal." She shows how unac- enforcement, including at a global level, may always
ceptable are current arrangements for providing care: be necessary for special cases, but also that caring soci-
"Caring activities are devalued, underpaid, and dis- eties could greatly decrease the need for them. The
proportionately occupied by the relatively powerless social changes a focus on care would require would be
in society." Bubeck, Kittay, and many others argue as profound as can be imagined.
forcefully that care must be seen as a public concern, The ethics of care as it has developed is most cer-
not relegated to the private responsibility of women, tainly not limited to the sphere of family and personal
the inadequacy and arbitrariness of private charities, relations. When its social and political implications are
or the vagaries and distortions of the market. In her understood, it is a radical ethic calling for a profound
recent book Starting at Home, Noddings explores what restructuring of society. And it has the resources for
a caring society would be like. dealing with power and violence ...
When we concern ourselves with caring relations
between more distant others, this care should not be
thought to reduce to the mere "caring about" that has THE ETHICS OF CARE AND VIRTUE ETHICS
little to do with the face-to-face interactions of caring Insofar as the ethics of care wishes to cultivate in per-
labor and can easily become paternalistic or patroniz- sons the characteristics of a caring person and the
ing. The same characteristics of attentiveness, respon- skills of activities of caring, might an ethic of care be
siveness to needs, and understanding situations from assimilated to virtue theory?
the points of view of others should characterize car- To some philosophers, the ethics of care is a form
ing when the participants are more distant. This also of virtue ethics. Several of the contributors to the vol-
requires the work of understanding and of expending ume Feminists Doing Ethics adopt this view. Leading
varieties of effort. virtue theorist Michael Slote argues extensively for
Given how care is a value with the widest pos- the position that caring is the primary virtue and that
sible social implications, it is unfortunate that many a morality based on the motive of caring can offer a
who look at the ethics of care continue to suppose it general account of right and wrong action and politi-
is a "family ethics," confined to the "private" sphere. cal justice.
Although some of its earliest formulations suggested Certainly there are some similarities between
this, and some of its related values are to be seen most the ethics of care and virtue theory. Both examine
clearly in personal contexts, an adequate understand- practices and the moral values they embody. Both
ing of the ethics of care should recognize that it elabo- see more hope for moral development in reforming
rates values as fundamental and as relevant to political practices than in reasoning from abstract rules. Both
institutions and to how society is organized, as those understand that the practices of morality must be
of justice. Perhaps its values are even more funda- cultivated, nurtured, shaped.
mental and more relevant to life in SOciety than those Until recently, however, virtue theory has not
traditionally relied on. paid adequate attention to the practices of caring in
which women have been so heavily engaged. Although The ethics of care, in my view, is a distinctive ethical
this might be corrected, virtue theory has characteristi- outlook, distinct even from virtue ethics. Certainly it has
cally seen the virtues as incorporated in various tradi- precursors, and such virtue theorists as Aristotle, Hume,
tions or traditional communities. In contrast, the ethics and the moral sentimentalists contribute importantly
of care as a feminist ethic is wary of existing traditions to it. As a feminist ethic, the ethics of care is certainly
and traditional communities: Virtually all are patriar- not a mere deSCription or generalization of women's
chal. The ethics of care envisions caring not as practiced attitudes and activities as developed under patriarchal
under male domination, but as it should be practiced conditions. To be acceptable, it must be a feminist ethic,
in postpatriarchal SOciety, of which we do not yet have open to both women and men to adopt. But in being
traditions or wide experience. Individual egalitarian feminist, it is different from the ethics of its precursors
families are still surrounded by inegalitarian social and and different as well from virtue ethics.
cultural influences. The ethics of care is sometimes thought inad-
In my view, although there are similarities between equate because of its inability to provide definite
them and although to be caring is no doubt a virtue, answers in cases of conflicting moral demands. Vir-
the ethics of care is not simply a kind of virtue ethics. tue theory has similarly been criticized for offering no
Virtue ethics focuses especially on the states of charac- more than what detractors call a "bag of virtues," with
ter of individuals, whereas the ethics of care concerns no clear indication of how to prioritize the virtues or
itself especially with caring relations. Caring relations apply their requirements, especially when they seem
have primary value. to conflict. Defenders of the ethics of care respond
If virtue ethics is interpreted, as with Slote, as that the adequacy of the definite answers provided by,
primarily a matter of motives, it may neglect unduly for instance, utilitarian and Kantian moral theories is
the labor and objective results of caring, as Bubeck's illUSOry. Cost-benefit analysis is a good example of a
emphasis on actually meeting needs highlights. Car- form of utilitarian calculation that purports to provide
ing is not only a question of motive or attitude or vir- clear answers to questions about what we ought to
tue. On the other hand, Bubeck's account is unduly do, but from the pOint of view of moral understand-
close to a utilitarian interpretation of meeting needs, ing, its answers are notoriously dubious. So, too, often
neglecting that care also has an aspect of motive and are casuistic reasonings about deontological rules. To
virtue. If virtue ethics is interpreted as less restricted advocates of the ethics of care, its alternative moral
to motives, and if it takes adequate account of the epistemology seems better. It stresses sensitivity to
results of the virtuous person's activities for the per- the multiple relevant considerations in particular
sons cared for, it may better include the concerns of contexts, cultivating the traits of character and of rela-
the ethics of care. It would still, however, focus on the tionship that sustain caring, and promoting the dia-
dispositions of individuals, whereas the ethics of care logue that corrects and enriches the perspective of any
focuses on social relations and the social practices and one individual. The ethics of care is hospitable to the
values that sustain them. The traditional Man of Vir- methods of discourse ethiCS, though with an emphasis
tue may be almost as haunted by his patriarchal past on actual dialogue that empowers its participants to
as the Man of Reason. The work of care has certainly express themselves rather than on discourse so ideal
not been among the virtuous activities to which he that actual differences of viewpoint fall away.
has adequately attended.
* * *
From What Is Feminist Ethics?

HILDE LINDEMANN
A few years ago, a dentist in Ohio was convicted of hav- to have sex with one's anesthetized patients. But if you
ing sex with his female patients while they were under want to understand whether it's wrong to have large
anesthesia. I haven't been able to discover whether he signs in bars telling pregnant women not to drink, or
had to pay a fine or go to jail, but I do remember that to sort out the conditions under which an act is rape,
the judge ordered him to take a course in ethics. And it helps to know a little ethics. The analogy between
I recall thinking how odd that order was. Let's suppose, grammar and ethics isn't exact, of course. For one thing,
as the judge apparently did, that the dentist really there's probably more agreement about what's linguis-
and truly didn't know it was wrong to have sex with tically correct than about what's morally correct. For
his anesthetized patients (this'll stretch your imagina- another, grammarians are concerned only with the
tion, but give it a shot). Can we expect-again, as the structure of language, not with the meaning or usage of
judge apparently did-that on completing the ethics particular words. In both cases, though, the same point
course, the dentist would be a better, finer man? can be made: You already have to know quite a lot about
Hardly. If studying ethics could make you good, how to behave, either linguistically or morally, before
then those of us with PhDs in moral philosophy would there's much point in studying either grammar or ethics.
be absolute saints. I can't speak for all of us, of course,
but though my colleagues are decent enough, they're * * *
no more moral than anyone else. Ethics doesn't
improve your character. Its subject is morality, but its WHAT IS FEMINISM?
relationship to morality is that of a scholarly study to What, then, is feminism? As a social and political
the thing being studied. In that respect, the relation- movement with a long, intermittent history, femi-
ship is a little like the relationship between grammar nism has repeatedly come into public awareness,
and language. Let's explore that analogy. People who generated change, and then disappeared again. As an
are linguistically competent in English don't have to eclectic body of theory, feminism entered colleges and
stop and think about the correctness of the sentence universities in the early 1970s as a part of the wom-
"Bellatrix gave it to him. But here's a harder one.
11
en's studies movement, contributing to scholarship
Should you say, "Bellatrix gave it to him who must in every academic discipline, though probably most
not be named" or "Bellatrix gave it to he who must heavily in the arts, social sciences, literature, and the
not be named"? To sort this out, it helps to know humanities in general. Feminist ethics is a part of the
a little grammar: the systematic, scholarly descrip- body of theory that is being developed primarily in
tion of the structure of the language and the rules for colleges and universities.
speaking and writing it. According to those rules, the Many people think of feminism as a movement
object of the preposition "to" is the entire clause that that aims to make women the social equals of men,
comes after it, and the subject of that clause is "he." So, and this impression has been reinforced over the
even if it sounds peculiar to you, the correct answer decades by references to feminism and feminists in
is, "Bellatrix gave it to he who must not be named." the newspapers, on social media and television, and in
In a roughly similar vein, morally competent adults the movies. But bell hooks has pointed out in Feminist
don't have to stop to think about whether it's wrong Theory from Margin to Center (1984, 18-19) that this
way of defining feminism raises some serious prob-
lems. Which men do women want to be equal to?
Hilde Lindemann, from An Invitation to Feminist Ethics © 2020
Women who are socially well off wouldn't get much
by Oxford University Press. Reproduced with permission of the
Licensor through PLSclear. advantage from being the equals of the men who are
poor and lower class, particularly if they are black or According to this invention, which is widespread in
brown; here hooks makes an early nod to the concept "civilization as a whole," man represents the positive,
of intersectionality, about which more later. Her point typical human being, while woman represents only
is that there are no women and men in the abstract. the negative, the not-man. She's the Other against
They're poor, black, young, Hispanic, old, trans- whom man defies himself: she's all the things that he
gender, able-bodied, upper class, gay, down on their isn't. And she exists only in relation to him. In a later
luck, Native American, straight, and all the rest of it. essay called "One Is Not Born a Woman," Monique
When a woman doesn't think about this, it's prob- Wittig (1981, 49) adds that because women belong to
ably because she doesn't have to. And that's usually a men sexually as well as in every other way, women are
sign that her own social position is privileged. In fact necessarily heterosexual. For that reason, she argues,
(this is an example of Lindemann's ad hoc Rule Num- lesbians aren't women.
ber 39), privilege often means that there's something But, you're probably thinking, everybody knows
uncomfortable going on that others have to pay atten- what a woman is, and lesbians certainly are women.
tion to but you don't. So, when hooks asks which men You're absolutely right. These French feminists
women want to be equal to, she's reminding us that aren't denying that there's a perfectly ordinary use
there's an unconscious presumption of privilege built of the word woman by which it means exactly what
right in to this sort of demand for equality. you think it means. But they're explaining what this
There's a second problem with the equality defi- comes down to if you look at it from a particular pOint
nition. Even if we could figure out which men are of view. Their answer to the question, "What is a
the ones to whom women should be equal, that way woman?" is that women are different from men. But
of putting it suggests that the point of feminism is they don't mean this in a trivial sense. They're saying
somehow to get women to measure up to what (at that "woman" refers to nothing but difference from
least some) men already are. Men remain the pOint of men, so that apart from men, women are nothing
reference, theirs are the lives that women would natu- and everything. Think of "not iPhone" and you'll see
rally want to live. If the first problem with the equality what I mean. "Man" is the positive term, "woman" the
definition is "Equal to which men?" the second prob- negative one, but what matters is that she's not a man.
lem could be put as "Why equal to men?" Reforming A later generation of feminists have agreed with
a system in which men are the point of reference by Beauvoir and Wittig that women are different from
allowing women to perform as their equals encourages men, but rather than seeing the difference as sim-
women to concentrate on men and their preoccupa- ply negative, they put it in positive terms, affirming
tions instead of women themselves. For that reason, feminine qualities as a source of personal strength
many feminists believe that feminism is first and fore- and pride. For example, the philosopher Virginia
most about women. Held thinks that women's moral experience as moth-
But characterizing feminism as about women has ers, attentively nurturing their children, may serve
its problems too. What, after all, is a woman? In her as a better model for social relations than the con-
1949 book The Second Sex, the French feminist philoso- tract model the free market provides. The poet Adri-
pher Simone de Beauvoir famously observed, "One is enne Rich celebrated women's paSSionate nature (as
not born, but becomes a woman. No biological, psy- opposed, in stereotype, to the rational nature of men),
chological, or economic fate determines the figure regarding emotions as morally valuable rather than as
that the human female presents in society: it is civili- signs of weakness.
zation as a whole that produces this creature, interme- Defining feminism as about the positive differ-
diate between male and eunuch, which is described as ences between men and women, though, creates
feminine" ([1949] 1974, 301). Her pOint is that while yet another set of problems. In her 1987 Feminism
plenty of human beings are born female, "woman" is Unmodified, the feminist legal theorist Catharine A.
not a natural fact about them, it's a social invention. MacKinnon points out that this kind of difference,
as such, is a symmetrical relationship: If I'm different that women aren't entitled to, and it tells women that
from you, then you're different from me in exactly the they're supposed to defer to men and serve them. It
same respects and to exactly the same degree. "Men's says, for example, that men are supposed to occupy
differences from women are equal to women's dif- positions of religious authority and women are sup-
ferences from men," she writes. "There is an equality posed to run the church suppers. It says that women
there. Yet the sexes are not socially equal" (1987, 37). are supposed to take care of their children and frail
No amount of attention to the differences between elderly family members but fathers have more impor-
men and women explains why men, as a group, are tant things to do. And, in general, it says that the things
more socially powerful, valued, advantaged, or free associated with femininity are supposed to take a back
than women. For that, you have to see differences seat to the things coded masculine. Think of the many
as counting in certain ways, and certain differences tax dollars allocated to the military as compared with
being created precisely because they give men power the few tax dollars allocated to the arts. Think about
over women. (This theory, then, is sometimes called how nurses are paid as compared to how stockbro-
power feminism.) kers are paid. And think about how many presidents
My own view is that feminism isn't-or at least not of the United States have been women. Gender oper-
directly-about equality, and it isn't about women, ates through social institutions (like marriage and the
and it isn't about difference. It's about power. Specifi- law) and practices (like manufacture and medicine) by
caUy, it's about the pattern, widespread across cultures disproportionately conferring entitlements and the
and history, that distributes power asymmetrically control of resources on men, while disproportionately
to favor men over women, creating and maintain- assigning women to subordinate positions in the ser-
ing social institutions and practices that systemati- vice of men's interests.
cally put men's interests and preoccupations ahead To make this power relation seem perfectly natu-
of women's. This asymmetry has been given many ral, like the fact that plants grow up instead of down, or
names, including the subjugation of women, sexism, that female mammals nurse their young, gender con-
male dominance, patriarchy, systemic misogyny, structs its norms for behavior around what's supposed
phallocracy, and the oppression of women. A num- to be the natural biological distinction between the
ber of feminist theorists simply call it gender, and sexes. According to this distinction, people who have
throughout this book, I will too. penises and testicles, XY chromosomes, and beards as
adults belong to the male sex, while people who have
clitorises and ovaries, XX chromosomes, and breasts
WHAT IS GENDER? as adults belong to the female sex, and those are the
Most people think their gender is a natural fact about only sexes there are. God wills it so. Gender, then, is
them, like their hair and eye color: "J ack is five foot the complicated set of cultural meanings that sets up
eleven, red-headed, and a man." But gender is a norm, a binary. Your sex is either male or female, and your
not a fact. It's a prescription for how people are sup- gender, either masculine or feminine, corresponds
posed to act (or not act), what they must or mustn't socially to your sex.
wear, how they're supposed to sit, walk, or stand, what As a matter of fact, though, sex isn't quite so
kind of person they're Supposed to marry, what sorts straightforward. Some people with XY chromosomes
of things they're supposed to be interested in or good don't have penises and never develop beards, because
at, and what they're entitled to. And because it's an they don't have the receptors that allow them to make
effective norm, it actually creates the gender binary of use of the male hormones that their testicles produce:
differences between men and women in these areas. these are people with androgen insensitivity syndrome,
Gender doesn't just tell women to behave one way and they look like any other women. Some people
and men another, though. It's a power relation so it have ambiguouS genitals or internal reproductive
tells men that they're entitled to do and have t~ings structures that don't correspond in the usual manner
to their external genitalia. How should we classify Feminist ethicists also produce theory about the
these intersex people? People with Turner's syndrome moral meaning of various kinds of legitimate relations
don't have XX chromosomes at all-theirs are XO. of unequal power, including relationships of depen-
People with Klinefelter's syndrome have three sex dency and vulnerability, relationships of trust, and
chromosomes: XXV. Mother nature is a good bit looser relationships based on something other than choice.
in her categories than the simple male/female distinc- Parent-child relationships, for example, are neces-
tion acknowledges. Most human beings can certainly sarily unequal and for the most part unchosen. Even
be classified as either male or female, but a consider- for parents who choose to have children, most don't
able number of them fall somewhere in between. choose to have the particular children they do, nor do
The powerful norm of gender doesn't acknowl- children choose their parents. This raises questions of
edge the existence of the outliers, though. When, for involuntary obligations, and these too are topiCS for
example, have you ever filled out an application for feminist ethics. Similarly, when you trust someone,
a job or a driver's license or a passport that gave you that person has power over you. Whom should you
a choice other than M or F? By basing its distinction trust, for what purposes, and when is trust not war-
between masculine and feminine of the existence of ranted? What's involved in being trustworthy, and
two and only two sexes, gender makes the inequality what must be done to repair beaches of trust? These
of power between men and women appear natural too are questions for feminist ethics.
and therefore legitimate. Third, feminist ethicists look at the various forms
of power that are required for morality to operate
* * *
properly at all. How do we learn right from wrong in
the first place? We usually learn it from our parents,
POWER AND MORALITY whose power to permit and forbid, praise and punish,
If feminism is about gender, and gender is the name is essential to our moral training. For whom or what
for a social system that distributes power unequally are we ethically responsible? Often this depends on
among men, genderqueer people, trans and intersex the kind of power we have over the person or thing
people, and women, then you'd expect feminist eth- in question. If, for instance, someone is particularly
icists to try to understand, criticize, and correct how vulnerable to harm because of something I've done,
gender operates within our moral and social beliefs I might well have special duties toward that person.
and practices. They do just that. In the first place, Powerful social institutions such as the market, gov-
they challenge, on moral grounds, the powers men ernment, medicine, and religion typically dictate
have over women, and they claim for women, again what's morally required of us and to whom we are
on moral grounds, the powers that gender denies morally answerable. Relations of power set the terms
them. Since the moral reasons for Opposing gender for who must answer to whom, who has authority
are similar to the moral reasons for opposing power over whom, and who gets excused from certain kinds
systems based on social markers other than gen- of accountability to whom. But because so many of
der, feminist ethicists also offer moral arguments these power relations are illegitimate in that they're
against systems based on categories such as class, instances of gender, racism, or other kinds of bigotry,
race, physical or mental ability, sexuality, and age. figuring out which ones are morally justified is a task
And because all these systems, including gender, for feminist ethics.
are powerful enough to conceal many of the forces
that keep them in place, it's often necessary to make
the forces visible by explicitly identifying-and DESCRIPTION AND PRESCRIPTION
condemning-the various ugly ways they allow So far it sounds as if feminist ethics devotes consider-
some people to treat others. This is a central task for able attention to description, as if feminist ethicists
feminist ethics. were like poets or painters who want to show you
216 0 PART 3: THEORIES OF MORAliTY
something about reality that you might otherwise the forces at play within those relationships must be
have missed. Indeed, many feminist ethicists empha- understood. It's knowing how people are situated with
size the importance of understanding how social respect to these forces, what they're going through as
power actually works, rather than concentrating they're subjected to them, and what life is like in the
solely on how it ought to work-the debunking proj- face of them, that lets you decide which of the forces
ect, as it's been called. But why, you might ask, should are morally justified. Careful description of how things
ethicists worry about how power operates within soci- are is a crucial part of feminist methodology, because
eties? Isn't it up to sociologists and political scientists the power that puts certain groups of people at risk of
to describe how things are, while ethicists concentrate harm and denies them full access to the good things
on how things ought to be? their society has to offer, or treats them as if they were
As the philosopher Margaret Urban Walker has useful only for other people's purposes, is often hid-
pointed out in Moral Contexts, there's a tradition in den and hard to see. If this power isn't seen, it's likely
Western philosophy going all the way back to Plato, to remain in place, doing untold amounts of damage
to the effect that morality is something ideal and to great numbers of people.
that ethiCS, being the study of morality, properly All the same, feminist ethics is normative as well
examines only that ideal. According to this tradi- as descriptive. It's fundamentally about how things
tion, notions of right and wrong as they're found in ought to be, while description plays the crucial but
the world are unreliable and shadowy manifestations secondary role of helping us to figure that out. Nor-
of something lying outside of human experiences, mative language is the language of "ought" instead
something to which we ought to aspire but can't of "is," the language of "worth" and ((value," ((right"
hope to reach. Plato's Idea of the Good, in fact, is pre- and "wrong," ((good" and ((bad." Feminist ethicists
cisely not of this earth, and only the gods could truly differ on a number of normative issues, but as the
know it. Christian ethics incorporates Platonism philosopher Alison ]aggar has famously put it, they
into its insistence that earthly existence is fraught all share two moral assumptions: ((That the subor-
with sin and error and that heaven is our real home. dination of women is morally wrong and that the
Kant too insists that moral judgments transcend the moral experience of women is worthy of respect"
histories and circumstances of people's actual lives, (1991, 95). The first assumption-that women's
and most moral philosophers of the twentieth cen- interests ought not to be set systematically in the
tury have likewise shown little interest in how people service of men's-can be understood as a moral chal-
really live and what it's like for them to live that way. lenge to power under the guise of gender. The sec-
"They think," remarks Walker, "that there is little ond assumption-that women's experience must be
to be learned from what is about what ought to be" taken seriously-can be understood as a call to chal-
(2001,3). lenge how that power operates. These twin assump-
In Chapter 5 [omitted here] we'll take a closer look tions are the two normative legs on which any
at what goes wrong when ethics is done that way, but feminist ethics stands.
let me just point out here that if you don't know how
* * *
things are, your prescriptions for how things ought to
be won't have much practical effect. Imagine a doctor
trying to treat a patient without having a good diagno- MORALITY AND POLITICS
sis. She might have a very fine idea about the outcome If moral theorizing dates back over two thousand years
she hopes for, but if she doesn't know what's wrong, in Western thought, a newer tradition only a couple
at best she'll perform an irrelevant procedure and at of centuries old has split off morality from politiCS.
worst she'll kill the patient. If, as many feminists have According to this tradition, which can be traced to
noted, a crucial fact about human selves is that they're Kant and some other Enlightenment philosophers,
always embedded in a vast web of relationships, then morality concerns the relations between persons,
whereas politics concerns the relations among nation- that their work reflects their politiCS, because they
states, or between a state and its citizens. So, as Iris don't think it should. Their aim, by and large, has
Marion Young explains, ethicists have tended to focus been to develop ideal moral theory that applies to all
on intentional actions by individual persons, conceiv- people, regardless of their social position or experience
ing of moral life as "conscious, deliberate, a rational of life, and to do that objectively, without favoritism,
weighing of alternatives," whereas political philoso- requires them to leave their own personal politics
phers have focused on impersonal governmental behind. The trouble, though, is that they aren't really
systems, studying "laws, policies, the large-scale distri- leaving their own personal politiCS behind. They're
bution of social goods, countable quantities like votes merely refusing to notice that their politicS is inevita-
and taxes" (1990, 149). bly built right in to their theories. (This is an instance
For feminists, on the other hand, the line between of lindemann's ad hoc Rule Number 22: Just because
ethics and political theory isn't quite so bright as this you think you're doing something doesn't mean
tradition makes out. It's not always easy to tell where you're doing it.) Feminists, by contrast, are generally
feminist ethics leaves off and feminist political the- skeptical of the idealized moral theory nonfeminists
ory begins. There are two reasons for this. In the first favor, and they're equally doubtful that objectivity
place, while ethics certainly concerns personal behav- can be achieved by stripping away what's distinctive
ior, there is a long-standing insistence on the part of about people's experiences or commitments. Believ-
feminists that the personal is political. In a 1970 essay ing that it's no wiser to shed one's political allegiances
called "The Personal Is Political," the political activist in the service of ethiCS than it would be to shed one's
Carol Hanisch observed that "personal problems are moral allegiances, feminists prefer to be transparent
political problems. There are no personal solutions at about their politiCS as a way of keeping their ethics
this time" (204-5). What Hanisch meant is that even intellectually honest.
the most private areas of everyday life, including such
* * *
intensely personal areas as sex, can function to main-
tain abusive power systems like gender. If a heterosex-
BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES
ual woman believes, for example, that contraception
Baier, Annette. 1994. Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics.
is primarily her responsibility because she'll have to Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
take care of the baby if she gets pregnant, she's prop- Beauvoir, Simone de. [1949] 1974. The Second Sex. Trans. and
ping up a system that lets men evade responsibility not ed. H. M. Parshley. New York: Modern Library.
only for pregnancy, but for their own offspring as well. Bettcher, Talia Mae. 2007. 44 Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers:
On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion."
Conversely, while un just social arrangements such as
Hypatia 22, no. 3: 43-6S.
gender and race invade every aspect of people's per- Calef, Zach. 2002. "Double Standard in Rape?" Iowa State
sonal lives, "there are no personal solutions," either Daily, 24 october. Downloaded October 2, 2012, from
when Hanisch wrote those words or now, because to Strangetalk http://strangetalk.net/viewtopic. php ?f=S&t=
shift dominant understandings of how certain groups 26S0S&start=0
Hanisch, Carol. 1970. "The Personal Is Political." In Notes from
may be treated, and what other groups are entitled to
the Second Year: Women's Liberation. New York: Radical
expect of them, requires concerted political action, not
Feminism, 76-77.
just personal efforts. hooks, bell. 1984. Feminist Theory from Margin to Center. Boston:
The second reason why it's hard to separate femi- South End Press.
nist ethics from feminist politiCS is that feminists typi- Jaggar, Alison. 1991. "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems,
Prospects." In Feminist Ethics, ed. Claudia Card. Lawrence:
cally subject the ethical theory they produce to critical
University Press of Kansas, 78-10S.
political scrutiny, not only to keep untoward political MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1987. Feminism Unmodified. Cambridge,
biases out, but also to make sure that the work accu- MA: Harvard University Press.
rately reflects their feminist politicS. Many nonfemi- Scully, Jackie Leach. 2008. Disability Bioet/Jics: Moral Bodies,
nist ethicists, on the other hand, don't acknowledge Moral Difference. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Walker, Margaret Urban. 2001. "Seeing Power in Morality: A Wittig, Monique. 1981. "One Is Not Born a Woman." Feminist
Proposal for Feminist Naturalism in Ethics." In Feminists Issues I, no. 2: 103-9.
Doing Ethics, ed. Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh. Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 3-15. Princeton, N]: Princeton University Press.
Walker, Margaret Urban. 2003. Moral Contexts. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
PART
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4 ~~-----------
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~fn~
Eth ica I Issues
CHAPTER 9
Abortion
If somehow you had unobstructed access for a our most fundamental moral principles, and much
single day to all the public and private dramas pro- more. For many women, the abortion controversy
voked by the issue of abortion, you might see scenes is personal, involving judgments about their own
like this: a forty-year-old mother of five agonizing bodies, their own health and happiness, and their
over whether she should terminate her pregnancy own inner turmoil provoked by life-and-death
(which is both unexpected and unwanted); anti- decisions. Uncritical acceptance of particular moral
abortion activists shouting "Thou shall not kill!" perspectives on abortion seems to be the norm for
at a woman hurrying inside a clinic that performs people on all sides of the debate. Often, discus-
abortions; a frightened sixteen-year-old rape vic- sion of the issue is reduced to shouting; informed
tim having an abortion against her family's wishes; reflection, to knee-jerk conclusions; and reasoned
a Catholic bishop asserting on the eleven o'clock argument, to cases built on assumptions never
news that abortion in any form is murder; the questioned.
head of an abortion rights organization declaring In this chapter, we try to do better, relying
in a CNN interview that anti-abortion activists are heavily on critical reasoning and striving for a more
violent and dangerous; a politiCian getting elected objective approach. We begin with a review of the
solely because he favors a constitutional amend- (nonmoral) facts of abortion-biological, medi-
ment to ban virtually all abortions; two women cal, psychological, semantiC, and legal. Then we
who have been friends for years disagreeing bit- consider how the moral theories discussed in pre-
terly about whether a fetus has a right to life; and vious chapters can be applied to this issue. Finally,
state legislators angrily debating a bill requiring we examine a range of common arguments in the
any woman seeking an abortion to watch a fifteen- debate, from pro-life to pro-choice as well as some
minute Video titled "The Tragedy of Abortion." intermediate positions.
Such scenes are emblematic of the abortion
issue in that they are intensely emotional and usu-
ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND
ally accompanied by uncritical or dogmatic think-
ing. PaSSions surge because abortion touches on Abortion (also called induced abortion) is the delib-
some of Our deepest values and most basic beliefs. erate termination of a pregnancy by surgical or
When we grapple with the issue of abortion, we medical (with drugs) means. The unintentional ter-
must consider whose rights (the mother's or the mination of a pregnancy (due to a medical disorder
unborn's) carry the most moral weight, what or injury) is known as a spontaneous abortion, or mis-
the meaning of human being or person is, when- carriage. An abortion performed to protect the life or
if ever-the unborn achieves personhood, how health of the mother is referred to as a therapeutic
having an abortion affects the health and mind abortion. Therapeutic abortions are usually not
of the mother, how much importance to assign to thought to be morally problematic. (The Roman
221
222 0 PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
Catholic stance, however, is that induced abortion Abortion methods vary depending largely on
is always wrong, though the unintended death of the stage of a woman's pregnancy. Within the first
the fetus during an attempt to save the mother's seven weeks or so, drugs can be used to induce an
life is morally permissible.) But induced abortions abortion. A combination of mifepristone (RU-486)
are intensely controversial and are the focus of the and prostaglandins (hormonelike agents that pro-
ongOing moral debate. voke uterine contractions) can force the embryo
Throughout our discussion of abortion in out of the uterus and through the vagina. This
this chapter, we will use the word fetus to refer to approach, sometimes called a medical or medication
the unborn during its entire development from abortion, has an extremely high success rate.
conception to birth. But technically, the term With a method known as menstrual aspiration
indicates a particular phase of this development. (or manual vacuum aspiration), an abortion can
Development begins at conception, or fertil- be performed in the first three weeks. In this pro-
ization, when a sperm cell enters an ovum and cedure, a physician expands the opening of the
the two merge into a single cell called a zygote. uterus (the cervix) and uses a syringe to draw out
The zygote contains a complete set of forty-six the embryo from the uterine wall. Up until twelve
chromosomes, half of them from the mother, weeks of pregnancy (the period when most abor-
half from the father-all the genetic informa- tions are performed, also called the first trimester), a
tion needed to make a unique human individual. method called suction curettage (or dilation and suc-
Over the next few days the zygote inches down tion curettage) is often used. A physician widens the
the fallopian tube toward the uterus, expanding cervix, then inserts a thin, flexible tube through it
as cells divide. In three to five days it reaches the and into the uterus itself. A vacuum device attached
uterus, where it grows in a tiny orb of cells called a to the other end of the tube then provides suction
blastocyst. By day ten the blastocyst fully implants to empty the uterus. A method often used after
itself in the lining of the uterus, and from implan- twelve weeks is dilation and evacuation. After the
tation until the eighth week after fertilization it cervix is opened up, forceps and suction are used
is known technically as an embryo. In the embry- to extract the fetus. A nonsurgical technique used
onic phase, most major organs form (though the in some late abortions involves inducing the con-
brain and spinal cord will keep developing during tractions of labor so the fetus is expelled from the
pregnancy), and the embryo grows to just over an uterus. To force the contractions, phYSicians often
inch long. At about the third week the embryo use drugs as well as saline injection, the substitution
first acquires a human shape; by the eighth, doc- of saltwater for amniotic fluid in the uterus.
tors can detect brain activity. From the end of Like any medical procedure, abortion poses
the eighth week until birth (approximately week some risk of complications. Its risks, however, are
forty), the embryo is known in medical terminol- relatively low. Fewer than 0.05 percent of women
ogy as a fetus. who have a first-trimester abortion suffer from a
In the abortion debate, certain other aspects major complication. The risk of death for women
of fetal development are thought by some to be of who have an abortion at eight weeks or earlier is 0.3
special significance. For example, usually at about deaths per hundred thousand abortions. The risk of
sixteen to twenty weeks, the mother can feel the death for abortions performed at eighteen weeks or
fetus moving, an event known as quickening. later is 6.7 per hundred thousand. The health risks
At about twenty-three or twenty-four weeks, the linked to abortion are directly related to the timing
fetus may be able to live outside the uterus, a state of the procedure. The earlier in the pregnancy an
referred to as viability. abortion is performed, the lower the risk.
CHAPTER 9: ABORTION 0 223
Abortion in the United States: Facts and Figures
• Nearly half (45 percent) of all pregnancies • In 2014, nearly half of the women seeking an
among u.s. women in 2011 were unintended, abortion were living with a male partner, and 14
and about four in ten of these were terminated percent of them were married.
by abortion. • The reasons patients gave for having an abor-
• Nineteen percent of pregnancies (excluding mis- tion underscored their understanding of the
carriages) in 2014 ended in abortion. responsibilities of parenthood and family life.
• Approximately 926,200 abortions were performed The three most common reasons-each cited
in 2014, down 12 percent from 1.06 million in by three-fourths of patients-were concern
2011. In 2014, some 1.5 percent of women aged for or responsibility to other individuals; the
fifteen to forty-four had an abortion. inability to afford raising a child; and the belief
that having a baby would interfere with work,
• The abortion rate in 2014 was 14.6 abortions
school, or the ability to care for dependents.
per thousand women aged fifteen to forty-four,
Half said they did not want to be a single par-
down 14 percent from 16.9 per thousand in
ent or were having problems with their hus-
2011. This is the lowest rate ever observed in the
band or partner.
United States; in 1973, the year abortion became
legal, the rate was 16.3 per thousand. • A first-trimester abortion is one of the safest
medical procedures and carries minimal risk-
• Seventeen percent of abortion patients in 2014
less than 0.05 percent-of major complications
identified as mainline Protestant, 13 percent as
that might necessitate hospital care.
evangelical Protestant, and 24 percent as Catho-
lic; 38 percent reported no religious affiliation, • Leading experts have concluded that among
and the remaining 8 percent reported some women who have an unplanned pregnancy, the
other affiliation. risk of mental health problems is no greater if
they have a single first-trimester abortion than if
• More than half of all U.s. abortion patients
they carry the pregnancy to term.
in 2014 were in their twenties: patients aged
twenty to twenty-four obtained 34 percent of • The risk of death associated with abortion
all abortions, and patients aged twenty-five to increases with the length of pregnancy, from
twenty-nine obtained 27 percent. 0.3 for every hundred thousand abortions at or
before eight weeks to 6.7 per hundred thousand
• Twelve percent of abortion patients in 2014 were
at eighteen weeks or later.
adolescents: those aged eighteen to nineteen
accounted for 8 percent of all abortions, fifteen- • Medication abortions accounted for 31 per-
to seventeen-year-olds for 3 percent, and those cent of all nonhospital abortions in 2014 and
younger than fifteen for 0.2 percent. for 45 percent of abortions before nine weeks'
gestation. *
• White patients accounted for 39 percent of abortion
procedures in 2014, Black patients for 28 percent,
Hispanic patients for 25 percent, and patients of
*Derived from "Fact Sheet" and "National Reproduc-
other races and ethnicities for 9 percent.
tive Health Profile," data compiled and developed by
• In 2014, 59 percent of abortions were obtained the Alan Guttmacher Institute, January 2017, January
by women who had had at least one birth. 2018, www.guttmacher.org (March 7, 2018).
When we try to evaluate arguments in the abortions; and held that states may require a girl
abortion debate, we must distinguish between the under eighteen to obtain either the informed con-
moral question (Is abortion right?) and the legal sent of a parent or a court order before getting an
one (What should the law allow?). Our main con- abortion.
cern here is the former, not the latter. But to be fully
informed about the issue, we should understand,
MORAL THEORIES
at least in general terms, what the law does allow.
In 1973, in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the How would a utilitarian judge the moral permissi-
United States Supreme Court ruled that a woman bility of abortion? How would a Kantian theorist or
has a constitutional, but not unlimited, right to a natural law theorist evaluate it? Let us take utili-
obtain an abortion in a range of circumstances. tarianism first. An act-utilitarian would say that an
According to the court, in the first trimester of abortion is morally right if it results in the greatest
pregnancy, the woman's right is unrestricted. The overall happiness, everyone considered. To argue
decision to have an abortion is up to the woman in for abortion, she might point to all the unhappi-
consultation with her physician. After the first tri- ness that could be caused by the mother's remain-
mester, a state may regulate (but not ban) abortion ing pregnant against her wishes: the mother's
to protect the health of the mother. After viability, impaired mental and physical health (and possible
however, a state may regulate and even forbid abor- death), her loss of personal freedom and future
tions in the interests of "the potentiality of human opportunities, financial strain on the mother as
life," except when abortion is necessary to preserve well as on her family, the anguish of being preg-
the health or life of the woman. 1 nant as a result of rape or incest, the agony of bring-
In Roe the court maintained that a woman's ing a seriously impaired baby to term only to see
right to an abortion is based on a fundamental right it die later, and the stress that all these social and
of personal privacy and that this right, derived financial problems would have on a child after
from several constitutional amendments, applies birth. The philosopher Mary Anne Warren cites a
to numerous situations involving reproduction, possible consequentialist argument that says when
families, and children. The court also pointed women do not have the option of abortion, unhap-
out that the word person as used in the Constitu- piness can be created on a global scale:
tion "does not include the unborn" and that "the
In the long run, access to abortion is essential for the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as
health and survival not just of individual women and
persons in the whole sense.,,2
families, but also that of the larger social and biologi-
Over the next thirty years the Court handed cal systems on which all our lives depend. Given the
down other abortion deciSions that clarified or inadequacy of present methods of contraception
supplemented Roe. Among other things, the jus- and the lack of universal access to contraception,
tices prohibited or constrained the use of Medicaid the avoidance of rapid population growth gener-
(a government entitlement program) to subsidize ally requires some use of abortion. Unless popula-
tion growth rates are reduced in those impoverished
abortions; forbade the use of public employees and
societies where they remain high, malnutrition and
facilities to perform abortions (except to save the starvation will become even more widespread than at
life of the mother); declared that a woman seek- present.
3
ing an abortion does not have to notify her hus-

band of her intent; affirmed that states may not An act-utilitarian, of course, could also argue
impose restrictions that present an "undue bur- against abortion on exactly the same grounds-
den," or excessive impediment, to women seeking the overall happiness (or unhappiness) brought
CHAPTER 9: ABORTION '0 225
Majority Opinion in Roe v .. Wade
Seven justices concurred with the u.s.

Supreme these respective interests become sufficiently
Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade, including Justice compelling to sustain regulation of the factors
Harry Blackmun, who wrote it. Here is an excerpt: that govern the abortion decision. The privacy
right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in
absolute ....
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
We, therefore, conclude that the right of per-
sonalliberty and restrictions upon state action, as
sonal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined,
that this right is not unqualified and must be
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights
considered against important state interests in
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
regulation ....
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
[This] decision leaves the State free to place
pregnancy....
increasing restrictions on abortion as the period
[A]ppellant and some amici argue that the
of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restric-
woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled
tions are tailored to the recognized state interests.
to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in
The decision vindicates the right of the physician
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
to administer medical treatment according to his
chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's
profession'!.' judgment up to the points where
arguments that Texas either has no valid inter-
important state interests provide compelling justi-
est at all in regulating the abortion decision, or
fications for intervention. Up to those points, the
no interest strong enough to support any limita-
abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
tion upon the woman's sole determination, are
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibil-
unpersuasive. The Court's decisions recognizing
ity for it must rest with the physician. If an individ-
a right of privacy also acknowledge that some
ual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising
state regulation in areas protected by that right is
proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judi-
appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly
cial and intra-professional, are available. *
assert important interests in safeguarding health,
in maintaining medical standards, and in protect-
*Roe v. Wade, 410 U.s.~113, 153-54, 165-66 (1973).
ing potential life. At some point in pregnancy,
about by particular actions. She could contend, for results from adhering to it. He could argue on vari-
example, that not having an abortion would pro- ous grounds that generally following a rule such as
duce more net happiness than having one because "Abortion is not morally permissible except to save
having one would cause the mother tremendous the mother's life" would maximize happiness. Or
psychological pain, because the happiness brought he could claim that generally following this rule
into the world with the birth of the child would instead would maximize happiness: "Abortion is
be considerable, and because the social stigma of morally permissible for any reason during the first
having an abortion would be extremely painful for trimester and always in cases of rape, incest, fetal
both the mother and her family. impairment, and serious threats to the mother's
A rule-utilitarian could also view abortion as health or life."
either morally right or wrong depending on the A premise (often unstated) in many arguments
rule being followed and how much net happiness about abortion is that the fetus is (or is not) a
person-an entity with full moral rights. In general, intrinsic value and dignity-then he would insist
utilitarian arguments about abortion do not depend that it has all the rights and is due all the respect
heavily, if at all, on whether the fetus is regarded that any other person has. This would mean that the
as a person. Whether the fetus is a person is not unborn should not be regarded as just another quan-
likely to dramatically affect the hedonic calculus. tity in a utilitarian calculation of consequences. Like
The main issue is not personhood but utility. For any adult human, the fetus has rights, and these
the Kantian theorist, however, the moral status of rights cannot be overridden merely for utility's sake.
the fetus is likely to matter much more. (Whether Only for the most compelling moral reasons can
Kant himself thought the fetus a person is an open these rights be set aside. A Kantian might say that
question.) If the Kantian maintains that the fetus one such reason is self-defense: killing a person in
is a person-that is, an end in itself, a thing of self-defense is permissible. He might therefore argue
Abortion and the Scriptures
Do the Jewish or Christian scriptures forbid abor- whatever I command you you shall speak. Be
tion? Many people believe that they do, but the not afraid of them, for I am with you to deliver
philosopher James Rachels argues that they do not: you," says the Lord.
It is difficult to derive a prohibition of abortion Neither abortion, the sanctity of fetal life, nor any-
from either the Jewish or the Christian Scriptures. thing else of the kind is being discussed in this pas-
The Bible does not speak plainly on the mat- sage. Instead, Jeremiah is asserting his authority as
ter. There are certain passages, however, that a prophet. He is saying, in effect, "God authorized
are often quoted by conservatives because they me to speak for him; even though I resisted, he
seem to suggest that fetuses have full human sta- commanded me to speak." But Jeremiah puts the
tus. One of the most frequently cited passages is point more poetically; he has God saying that God
from the first chapter of Jeremiah, in which God had intended him to be a prophet even before
is quoted as saying: "Before I formed you in the Jeremiah was born ....
womb I knew you, and before you were born The scriptural passage that comes closest to
I consecrated you." These words are presented as making a specific judgment about the moral sta-
though they were God's endorsement of the con- tus of fetuses occurs in the 21st chapter of Exo-
servative position: They are taken to mean that dus. This chapter is part of a detailed description
the unborn, as well as the born, are "consecrated" of the law of the ancient Israelites. Here the pen-
to God. alty for murder is said to be death; however, it is
In context, however, these words obviously also said that if a pregnant woman is caused to
mean something quite different. Suppose we read have a miscarriage, the penalty is only a fine, to be
the whole passage in which they occur: paid to her husband. Murder was not a category
that included fetuses. The Law of Israel appar-
Now the word of the Lord came to me saying,
ently regarded fetuses as something less than full
"Before I formed you in the womb I knew you,
human beings. *
and before you were born I consecrated you;
I appointed you a prophet to the nations." Then
I said, "Ah, Lord God! Behold, I do not know
how to speak, for I am only a youth." But the *James Rachels, from The Elements of Moral Philoso-
Lord said to me, "00 not say, '1 am only a youth' phy, 4th Ed. pp. 59-60. -Copyright © 2003 McGraw Hill
for to all to whom I send you you shall go, and Education. Reprinted with permission.
that if the mother's life is being threatened by the

fetus she carries (if being pregnant is somehow life- QUICI< REVIEW
threatening), therapeutic abortion is permissible,
just as killing someone who is trying to kill you is abortion-The deliberate termination of a preg-
permissible. In this view, abortion would seem to nancy by surgical or medical (with drugs)
be only rarely justified. means.
On the other hand, if the Kantian does not therapeutic abortion-An abortion performed to
regard the fetus as a person, he may believe that protect the life or health of the mother.
abortion is often justified to protect the rights and conception-The merging of a sperm cell and an
dignity of the mother, who is a person. In other ovum into a single cell; also called fertilization.
words, the fetus-like any other nonperson-can
quickening-The point in fetal development
be used as a means to an end, whereas the mother
when the mother can feel the fetus moving (at
must be treated as an end in herself.
about sixteen to twenty weeks).
Traditional natural law theorists would view
abortion very differently, for two reasons. First, to viability-The stage of fetal development at
which the fetus is able to survive outside the
them, there is no question about the moral status
uterus.
of the fetus: it is a person with full moral rights. Sec-
ond, the theory is very clear about the treatment person-A being thought to have full moral
of innocent persons: it is always morally wrong rights.
to directly kill the innocent. So the direct, inten-
tional killing of a fetus through abortion is never
permissible. According to the doctrine of double is abortion morally permissible? Recall that in ethics
effect, killing an innocent person for the purpose the proper response to such a question is to provide
of achieving some greater good is immoral. But good reasons for a particular position. The usual
indirectly, unintentionally killing an innocent per- fireworks that accompany the abortion debate-
son while trying to do good may be permissible. strident denunciations of the other side, appeals to
Therefore, intentionally killing a fetus through emotion and pity, extremist rhetoric, exaggerated
abortion, even to save the mother's life, is wrong. claims, political posturing, and the like-are not
But trying to, say, cure a pregnant woman's can- appropriate, not germane, and not helpful. So here
cer by performing a hysterectomy on her or giving we try to cut through all that and examine a few of
her chemotherapy-treatment that has the unin- the main arguments offered for a range of views.
tended side effect of aborting the fetus-may be The prO-life position is that abortion is never,
morally acceptable. In this view, very few abortions or almost never, morally permissible. Typically the
are morally acceptable. "almost never" refers to situations in which abortion
may be permissible to save the life of the mother.
MORAL ARGUMENTS (Generally, both the pro-choice and pro-life posi-
tions hold that abortion may be permissible to save
Arguments for and against abortion are plentiful and the mother's life, usually on the grounds that the
diverse, their quality ranging from good to bad, and mother has a right of self-defense. But as mentioned
their conclUSions varying from "pro-life" (or anti- earlier, the Roman Catholic position is that in any
abortion) to "pro-choice" (abortion rights) with sev- case, the death of the fetus must be unintended.)
eral moderate positions in between. We can sum up Like many arguments about abortion, the pro-
the central issue of the debate like this: Wilen, ifever, life case is built on a proposition about the moral
status of the fetus. For most pro-lifers, the fetus is 2. It is wrong to kill an innocent person.
a person (a human being, as some would say) with 3. Abortion is the killing of an innocent person.
full moral rights, the same rights that any adult
4. Therefore, abortion is wrong.
human has, and these rights emerge at the moment
of conception. Of course, the moral right at the This argument is valid. The only significant
heart of it all is the right to life. Taking the life of difference between it and the previous one is Premise 1,
a fetal person is just as immoral as killing an inno- which asserts that the unborn is a being with full moral
cent adult human. rights from the very moment of fertilization. If Premise
Here is one version of the pro-life argument: 1 is true, then the argument is sound-the premises
are true and the conclusion follows from them.
1. The unborn is obviously a human life.
But is the premise true? The pro-lifer insists that
2. It is wrong to take a human life. it is and can argue for it in this fashion. Birth
3. Abortion is the taking of a human life. is generally thought to be the point at which the
4. Therefore, abortion is wrong. fetus is most clearly (and legally) a person. The
development of the unborn from conception to birth,
To evaluate this argument (or any argument), however, is one continuous process, with no obvious
we must determine (1) whether the conclusion points along the way that might signal a transition
follows from the premises; and (2) whether the into personhood. Moreover, whatever essential prop-
premises are true. A cursory glance at this argument erties a born human has that make it a person seem to
might suggest that the conclusion does follow from be present at the moment of conception. Therefore,
the premises and that the premises are true. But we because no unambiguous point of personhood can
must be careful. This argument commits the fallacy be located in this process, the most reasonable option
of eqUivocation. The term human life is assigned two is to identify personhood with conception.
different meanings in the premises, rendering the Opponents of this argument contend that it is
argument invalid. In Premise 1, "human life" means fallacious. We may not be able to pinpoint a pre-
something like "biologically human"-an entity cise moment when day becomes night, they say,
with human DNA, an entity that is from the human but that does not mean that day is night. Likewise,
species. But in Premises 2 and 3, the term means we may not be able to determine the precise point
"person"-a being entitled to full moral rights. in the continuous process of human development
If "human life" is used in different senses in the when a zygote becomes a full-fledged person. But
premises, then the argument is not valid (the con- that does not mean that a zygote is a person.
clusion does not follow from the premises)-even The pro-lifer, however, can propose a more
if the premises, using their respective meanings of nuanced reason for supposing that conception
the term, are true. As it stands, Premise 1 is unmis- marks the beginning of personhood:
takably true: a fetus born of human parents with
One evidence of the nonarbitrary character of the line
human DNA is certainly biologically human. And
drawn [at conception] is the difference of probabili-
in its present form, Premise 2 is also true: the killing ties on either side of it. If a spermatozoon is destroyed,
of a person is indeed wrong (except perhaps to save one destroys a being which had a chance of far ~ess
a life). Still, the argument fails and does not provide than 1 in 200 million of developing into a reasomng
us with good reasons to accept the conclusion. being, possessed of the genetic code, a heart and other
Yet there are pro-life arguments that do not organs, and capable of pain. If a fetus is destroyed, .
equivocate. Consider this one: one destroys a being already possessed of the gen~tlc
code, organs and sensitivity to pain, and one whICh
1. The unborn is an innocent person from had an 80 percent chance of developing further into
conception. a baby outside the womb who, in time, would reason.
~
-
"~
State Abortion laws
The legal status of abortion has been shaped not when the woman's life would be endangered if
only by the U.S. Supreme Court but also by many the pregnancy were carried to term. Most states
state statutes, some of which have been struck allow the purchase of additional abortion cover-
down by the court, and some that have been left age at an additional cost.
standing but are still challenged by many organiza- • Refusal: Forty-five states allow individual health
tions and groups. Here's a brief summary of current care providers to refuse to participate in an abor-
state requirements: tion. Forty-two states allow institutions to refuse
• Physician and Hospital Requirements: Thirty-nine to perform abortions, sixteen of which limit
states require an abortion to be performed by refusal to private or religious institutions.
a licensed physician. Nineteen states require an • State-Mandated Counseling: Eighteen states
abortion to be performed in a hospital after a mandate that women be given counseling
specified point in the pregnancy, and seventeen before an abortion that includes information on
states require the involvement of a second physi- at least one of the following: the purported link
cian after a specified point. between abortion and breast cancer (five states),
• Gestational Limits: Forty-three states prohibit the ability of a fetus to feel pain (thirteen states),
abortions, generally except when necessary to or long-term mental health consequences for
protect the woman's life or health, after a speci- the woman (eight states).
fied point in pregnancy. • Waiting Periods: Twenty-five states require a
• "Partial Birth" Abortion: Twenty-one states have woman seeking an abortion to wait a specified
laws in effect that prohibit "partial-birth" abor- period of time, usually twenty-four hours, between
tion. Three of these laws apply on Iyto post-via bi Iity when she receives counseling and when the pro-
abortions. cedure is performed. Twelve of these states have
• Public Funding: Sixteen states use their own laws that effectively require the woman make two
funds to pay for all or most medically necessary separate trips to the clinic to obtain the procedure.
abortions for Medicaid enrollees in the state. • Parental Involvement: Thirty-seven states require
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia some type of parental involvement in a minor's
prohibit the use of state funds except in those decision to have an abortion. Twenty-seven
cases when federal funds are available: where states require one or both parents to consent
the woman's life is in danger or the pregnancy to the procedure, while ten require that one or
is the result of rape or incest. In defiance of fed- both parents be notified. *
eral requirements, South Dakota limits funding
to cases of life endangerment only.
*Guttmacher Institute, "An Overview of Abortion
• Coverage by Private Insurance: Twelve states Laws, State Law and Policies," New York: Guttm-
restrict coverage of abortion in private insur- acher Institute, 2020, https:llwww.guttmacher.org
ance plans, most often limiting coverage only to Istate-policy/exploreloverview-abortion-Iaws.
The positive argument for conception as the deci- Notice that this argument and the pro-life
sion moment of humanization is that at conception one have a common premise: it is wrong to kill
the new being receives the genetic code. It is this an innocent person. Thus the pro-choicer and the
genetic information which determines his character-
pro-lifer agree on the immorality of murder. Their
istics, which is the biological carrier of the possibility
of human wisdom, which makes him a self-evolving disagreement is not over this fundamental moral
being. A being with a human genetic code is man. 4 prinCiple, but over the nature of persons and
who does or does not qualify as such an entity.
Others who oppose abortion argue that although Premise I, then, is the crux of the pro-choicer's
the fetus may not be a person, it has the potential argument (just as Premise 1 is the heart of the
to become a person and is therefore entitled to the pro-lifer's argument). How might the pro-choicer
same rights as full-fledged persons. But critics reject defend this premise?
this view: The obvious approach is to plausibly explain
This argument is implausible, since in no other case do what a person is and then show that the fetus does
we treat the potential to achieve some status entailing not qualify as one. The most influential argument
certain rights as itself entailing those same rights. For along these lines is that of Mary Anne Warren.
instance, every child born in the United States is a poten- "What characteristics entitle an entity to be
tial voter, but no-one under the age of 18 has the right considered a person?" she asks. What criteria, for
to vote in that country. If a fetus is a potential person,
example, would we use to decide whether alien
then so is an unfertilized human ovum, together with
enough viable spermatozoa to achieve fertilization; yet
beings encountered on an unknown planet deserve
few would seriously suggest that these living human to be treated morally or treated as, say, a source of
entities should have full and equal moral status. s food? How would we tell whether the creatures
are persons? Warren says that the characteristics
The pro-choice pOSition is that abortion is always most important to our idea of personhood are (1)
(or almost always) permissible. Like the pro-lifer's consciousness, (2) the ability to reason, (3) self-
argument, the pro-choicer's is based on a particular motivated activity, (4) the capacity to commu-
view of the moral status of the fetus. But in opposi- nicate, and (5) the presence of self-concepts and
tion to the pro-life view, the pro-choicer asserts that self-awareness. Any being that has all of these traits
the fetus is not a person, not a being with full moral we would surely regard as a person. Even a being
rights. Abortion therefore is morally permissible that has only some of these traits would prob-
because the fetus does not possess a right to life (unlike ably qualify as a person. More to the pOint, Warren
the mother, who has a full complement of rights). says, we must admit that any being that has none
Generally, for the pro-choicer, the event that makes of these traits is unquestionably not a person. And
the unborn a person is not conception but birth. since a fetus lacks all these, we have to conclude
Here is a version of a common pro-choice that it, too, is not a person.
argument: These considerations suggest that being geneti-
1. The unborn is not a person until birth (and thus cally human is not the same thing as being a person
does not have a right to life). in the moral sense, the sense of having full moral
rights. As Warren notes,
2. It is wrong to kill an innocent person.
3. Abortion before birth would not be the killing Now if [these five traits] are indeed the primary crite-
of an innocent person. ria of personhood, then it is clear that genetic human-
ity is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing
4. If abortion before birth is not the killing of an
that an entity is a person. Some human beings are
innocent person, it is permissible. not people [persons], and there may well be people
5. Therefore, abortion before birth is permissible. who are not human beings. A man or woman whose
consciousness has been permanently obliterated but advanced, self-aware robots or computers, should
who remains alive is a human being which is no lon- such be developed, and intelligent inhabitants of
ger a person; defective human beings, with no appre- other worlds, should such be found, as people in the
ciable mental capacity, are not and presumably never fullest sense, and to respect their moral rights. 6
will be people; and a fetus is a human being which is
not yet a person, and which therefore cannot coher- Against the pro-choicer's argument, the pro-
ently be said to have full moral rights. Citizens of the lifer can lodge the following objections. First, he
next century should be prepared to recognize highly can paint out that if Warren's view of personhood
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Fact-Checking Abortion Claims
Because abortion is so controversial, and because conflicts over it are so intense, abortion debates often
abound in falsehoods and half-truths. Here are some recent examples, along with the verdicts of the fact-
checking website PolitiFact.com:
Claim Verdict
"Abortion providers like Planned Parenthood do little more than False
provide abortions. "-Sean Duffy
"Today in America, between 40 and 50 percent of all African-American Mostly False
babies, virtually 1-in-2, are killed before they are born."-Trent Franks
Ohio budget item later signed into law by Gov. John Kasich requires False
women seeking an abortion to undergo a "mandatory vaginal
probe."-Rachel Maddow
Birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger "believed that people like me False
should be eliminated."-Ben Carson
"Upwards of 90 percent" of women seeking an abortion decide not to False
have an abortion after seeing an ultrasound.-Rachel Campos-Duffy
Mitt Romney "backed a bill that outlaws all abortions, even in cases of False
rape and incest."-Barack Obama
Joe Biden and Kamala Harris support abortion "up to the moment False
of birth."-Mike Pence
With a late-term abortion, "the mother meets with the doctor. They take care False
of the baby, they wrap the baby beautifully. And then the doctor and the
mother determine whether or not they will execute the baby."-Donald Trump
At his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Brett Kavanaugh said birth control False
methods could be considered "abortion-inducing drugs."-Kamala Harris
Can you trust advocacy groups such as NARAL and National Right to Life to provide accurate information
about abortion? Do you accept every claim they make just because you agree with their stand on the abor-
tion issue? How would you fact-check an abortion claim that you're not sure of?
is correct1then a fetus is not a person-but neither But this observation suggests, impiausiblY1 that per-
is a newborn. After all 1it is doubtful that a newborn sonhood depends on medical expertise. Quickening1
(or perhaps even an older baby) can meet War- the first detection of fetal movement by the mother,
ren 1s criteria for personhood. If a newborn is not a signifies nothing that can be plaUSibly linked to
person1 then killing it-the crime of infanticide- personhood. It does not indicate the start of fetal
would seem to be permissible. But we tend to think movement-the fetus begins moving in the very
that infanticide is obviously wrong. first week of life. Sentience refers to consciousness,
To this criticism the pro-choicer may say that specifically the capacity to have sense experiences. If
though a newborn is not a person1it still has value- being sentient (especially the capacity to feel pleasure
either because it is a potential person or because and pain) is proof of personhood, then personhood
it is valued by others. The pro-choicer might even must not arise in the fetus until the second trimester,
argue that though a baby is not a person1infanticide when neurological pathways are developed enough
should never be permitted because it is a gruesome to make sense experience possible. But why should
act that cheapens life or cultivates a callous attitude we regard sentience as a marker for personhood
toward it. in the first place? Kittens 1 birds 1 crabs 1 and spiders
The pro-lifer can offer a related objection to the are sentient1but few of us would insist that they are
pro-choicer1s position. The pro-choice argument persons with full moral rights.
implies that the unborn is a person at birth 1 but Some moderate positions can be mapped out
not a person a day or even an hour before birth1 and without reference to the issue of personhood. The
therefore that abortion is immoral after birth but most impressive argument for this sort of view is
permissible an hour before. But because the physi- that of Judith Jarvis Thomson. She contends that
ological and psychological differences between even if we grant that the fetus is a person with full
the newborn and unborn are virtually nil 1 the moral rights, abortion still may be permissible in
pro-choicer 1s distinction seems both arbitrary and certain cases-more cases than the prO-lifer would
ghastly. permit and fewer than the prO-Choicer would. She
The moderate rejects the claim that abortions argues that the fetus has a right to life 1 but not
are almost never permissible (as pro-lifers say) as a right to sustain that life by using the mother 1s
well as the notion that they almost always are (as body against her will. To underscore her argument 1
pro-choicers maintain). In a variety of ways1 mod- Thomson asks us to consider this strange scenario:
erates take intermediate positions between these
two ends of the spectrum1 asserting that abortion You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to
back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous
may be justified in more cases than prO-lifers would
unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a
allow and fewer than pro-choicers would like. fatal kidney ailment, and the SOCiety of Music Lov-
One moderate approach is to argue that the fetus ers has canvassed all the available medical records
becomes a person (and acquires full rights) at some and found that you alone have the right blood type
time after conception and before birth-at viabil- to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last
ity1 quickening1 sentience (sensory experience), or night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged
some other notable milestone. Each of these points, into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract
poisons from his blood as well as your own. The
however1 is problematic in one way or another.
director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're
The viability of the fetus (the pOint when it can sur- sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we
vive outside the womb) is largely a function of mod- would never have permitted it if we had known. But
em medical know-how. Physicians are getting better still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into
at sustaining fetal life outside the womb, gradually you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never
pushing viability further back toward conception. mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will
-
" --
"~
Abortions later in Pregnancy
Controversy, misunderstanding, and demagogu- Fetal Anomalies: Individuals also seek abortions
ery surround abortions performed after twenty- later in pregnancy due to medical reasons. With
one weeks-often mislabeled "partial-birth," medical advances, many genetic fetal anomalies
" late-term, " or "post-viability," terms criticized or can be detected early in pregnancy; for example,
chorionic villus sampling can diagnose Down
opposed by medical professionals. Here's a summary
Syndrome or cystic fibrosis as early as 10 weeks
of the facts from a reliable, nonpartisan source.
gestation. Structural fetal anomalies, however,
Abortions occurring at or after 21 weeks ges- are often detected much later in pregnancy....
tational age are rare. They are often difficult to A proportion of these are lethal fetal anomalies,
obtain, as they are typically costly, time-intensive meaning that the fetus will almost certainly die
and only performed by a small subset of abortion before or shortly after birth ....
providers. Yet these abortions receive a dispropor-
tionate amount of attention in the news, policy Health Risk to the Pregnant Person: Life threat-
and the law, and discussions on this topic are ening conditions may also develop later in preg-
often fraught with misinformation; for example, nancy. These include conditions like early severe
intense public discussions have been sparked after preeclampsia, newly diagnosed cancer requiring
several policymakers have theorized about abor- prompt treatment, and intrauterine infection
tions occurring "moments before birth" or even (chorioamnionitis) often in conjunction with pre-
"after birth." In reality, these scenarios do not mature rupture of the amniotic sac (PPROM). If
occur, nor are they legal, in the u.s .... these conditions arise before the fetus is viable,
Members of the medical community have criti- the pregnant individual may pursue termination
cized the term "Iate-term" abortion, as it implies of pregnancy to preserve their own health ....
abortions are taking place after a pregnancy has Fetal Pain: Many states restrict abortions at
reached "term" (37weeks) or "late term" (>41 weeks) 22 weeks gestational age or 20 weeks post-
which is false. In fact, the American College of fertilization, arguing the fetus has the ability to
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has written feel pain at this point in development, contrary
that "Iate-term abortion" has no medical meaning to medical evidence. A systematic review of litera-
and should not be used in clinical or legal settings. ture on fetal pain found that pain perception is
Why do people have abortions later in unlikely before weeks 29 or 30 gestational age.
ACOG has found "no legitimate scientific data
pregnancy?
or information" that supports the assertion that
Non-Medical Reasons: Individuals seek abortions
fetuses feel pain at 20 weeks post-fertilization,
later in pregnancy for a number of reasons. As
and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
part of the Turnaway study out of the University
cologists has also concluded fetal pain is not
of California San Francisco, from 2008-2010 over
possible before 24 weeks, given immature brain
440 women were asked about why they experi-
development and neural networks. Despite the
enced delays in obtaining abortion care, if any.
medical evidence, policymakers have enacted
Almost half of individuals who obtained an abor-
gestational limits using the rationale that a fetus
tion after 20 weeks did not suspect they were
can feel pain at earlier stages in pregnancy. *
pregnant until later in pregnancy, and other bar-
riers to care included lack of information about
where to access an abortion, transportation diffi- *KFF (Kaiser Family Foundation), "Abortions Later in
culties, lack of insurance coverage and inability to Pregnancy," December 5, 2019, https:llwww.kff.org/
pay for the procedure. This is unsurprising, given womens-health-policy/fact-sheetlabortions-Iater-in-
abortions can be cost-prohibitive for many .... pregnancyl (June 3, 2020).
have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be 3. The unborn uses the mother's body against her
,,7
unplugged f rom you. . will when the pregnancy is the result of rape,
Would you agree to such an arrangement? incest, or defective contraception.
Would you be morally obligated to do so? The vio- 4. Therefore, abortion is permissible in cases of
linist, like all persons, has a right to life. But does rape, incest, or defective contraception.
this right, in Thomson's phrase, "[outweigh] your
Probably the most common criticism of this
right to decide what happens in and to your body"?
argument is that the mother may in fact not have
Thomson concludes that the unborn's right to life
the right to disconnect herself from the fetus if she
does not entail the right to use the mother's body
bears some responsibility for being connected. In
without her consent; the mother has a right to
the case of Thomson's violinist, the woman was
defend herself against unauthorized exploitation
not at all responsible for being connected to him.
of her body. Abortion then is morally permissible
However, if the woman's own actions somehow
when pregnancy is forced on the mother-that is,
precipitated her being attached to the Violinist,
in cases of rape, incest, and defective contracep-
then she would be responsible for her predicament
tion. (Like most people involved in the abortion
and thus would have no right to disconnect herself.
debate, Thomson also thinks that abortion is mor-
Likewise, this objection goes, if a woman consents
ally acceptable to save the life of the mother.)
to sexual intercourse and knows that her actions
While laying out her argument, Thomson makes
can lead to pregnancy, she bears some responsibil-
a distinction that further moderates her views. She
ity for getting pregnant and therefore has no right
points out that though women have a right to ter-
to abort the fetus, even though it is using her body
minate a pregnancy in some cases, they do not have
to survive. If this view is right, an abortion would
a right to "secure the death of the unborn child":
seem to be justified only in cases of rape, when the
It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a woman is clearly not responsible for her pregnancy.
certain pOint in the life of the fetus it is not able to
survive outside the mother's body; hence removing
it from her body guarantees its death. But they are
importantly different. I have argued that you are not
morally required to spend nine months in bed, sus-
taining the life of that violinist; but to say this is by no CHAPTER REVIEW
means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there
is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to
turn round and slit his throat. You may detach your-
SUMMARY
self even if this costs him his life; you have no right
to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if Abortion is the deliberate termination of a pregnancy
unplugging yourself does not kill him. 8 by surgical or medical means. Therapeutic abortions are
Here is a greatly simplified version of Thomson's those performed to protect the life of the mother. An
basic argument: abortion can be performed at any point in the develop-
ment of the unborn-from conception to birth.
1. Whether or not the unborn has a right to life, it Abortion methods vary depending on how long the
does not have a right to sustain its life by using woman has been pregnant. Very early abortions can
the mother's body against her will. be done with drugs. Other types of abortions are per-
2. The mother has a right to defend herself against formed by widening the cervix and drawing out the
the unborn's use of her body against her will embryo from the uterus with a syringe (manual va.c-
(a right to have an abortion). uum aspiration), by opening the cervix and using a thIn
suction tube to empty the uterus (suction curettage), by by the pro-lifer and in fewer situations than would be
using forceps and suction to extract the fetus (dilation accepted by the pro-choicer. A moderate position can
and evacuation), and by using drugs or saline solution be formulated by arguing that the unborn is a person
to cause contractions to expel the fetus from the uterus. some time after conception and before birth-perhaps
In 1973, in the famous case Roe v. Wade, the at viability, quickening, or sentience.
United States Supreme Court ruled that a woman has
a constitutional, but limited, right to obtain an abor- I(EY TERMS
tion. According to the court, in the first trimester, the
abortion (p. 221)
woman's right is unrestricted. The decision to have an therapeutic abortion (p. 221)
abortion is up to the woman in consultation with her
conception (p. 222)
physician. After the first trimester, a state may regu-
quickening (p. 222)
late but not ban abortion to protect the health of the
viability (p. 222)
mother. After the fetus reaches viability, a state may
person (p. 226)
regulate and even forbid abortions in the interests of
the fetus, except when an abortion is necessary to pre-
serve the health or life of the woman. EXERCISES
Major moral theories offer different perspectives Review Questions
on the issue of abortion. An act-utilitarian would
1. What is a therapeutic abortion? (p. 221)
argue that an abortion is morally right (or wrong)
2. At what point in a woman's pregnancy is the
depending on its consequences. A rule-utilitarian
fetus thought to be viable? (p. 222)
could also judge abortion to be either morally right
3. What is a zygote? A blastocyst? (p. 222)
or wrong depending on the rule being followed and
4. What was the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in
hoW much net happiness results from adhering to it.
Roe v. Wade? (p. 224)
A Kantian theorist is likely to judge the issue according
5. What is an abortion? (p. 221)
to the moral status of the fetus. If the Kantian believes
6. In Roe v. Wade, the court held that a woman's
that the fetus is a person, then she would say that the
right to an abortion was based on what
fetus has full moral rights and that these rights cannot
fundamental right? (p. 224)
be overridden on utilitarian grounds. If she does not
7. In the last few years, has the abortion rate in the
think the fetus a person, she may believe that abortion
United States been going down or up? (p. 223)
is sometimes justified to protect the rights and dignity
8. In 2011, what percentage of unintended
of the mother.
pregnancies were terminated by abortion?
Arguments for and against abortion can be
(p.223)
roughly grouped into three major categories-
9. In 2014, White patients accounted for what
pro-life, pro-choice, and moderate. The pro-life posi-
percentage of abortion procedures? What
tion is that abortion is never, or almost never, morally
percentage of patients were Black? (p. 223)
permissible. The pro-life case is built on the supposi-
10. Do most medical experts think that abortion in
tion that the fetus is a person with full moral rights.
the first trimester is relatively safe? (p. 223)
The pro-choice position is that abortion is always, or
almost always, permissible. The pro-choicer asserts
that the fetus is not a person and therefore does not Discussion Questions
have a right to life. The moderate can take a number of 1. Why is personhood such an important concept
intermediate positions between these two extremes, in abortion debates?
asserting on various grounds that abortion may be 2. How might an act-utilitarian judge the moral
permissible in more situations than would be allowed permissibility of abortion?
3. What is the pro-life argument against abortion? Catherine Mills, Futures of Reproduction (Dordrecht:
4. What is the pro-choice argument for a woman's Springer, 2011).
right to an abortion? Ronald Munson, "Abortion," in Intervention and Reflec-
tion: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, ed. Ronald Munson,
5. What is Thomson's argument for a woman's
7th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004).
right to an abortion? Is it sound?
John T. Noonan jr., "An Almost Absolute Value in His-
6. What is Warren's abortion argument? Is it sound? tory," in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical
7. Why does Warren reject the argument that Perspectives, ed. john T. Noonan Jr. (Cambridge, MA:
because a fetus has a potential to become a person, Harvard University Press, 1970).
it has the same rights as a full-fledged person? Anne Phillips, Our Bodies, Whose Property? (Princeton:
8. Is being genetically human the same thing as Princeton University Press, 2013).
being a person? Why or why not? Louis P. Pojman and Francis J. Beckwith, eds., The Abor-
9. What argument can the pro-lifer lodge against tion Controversy: 25 Years after Roe v. Wade: A Reader,
Warren's view? 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998).
10. What claims about abortion does the moderate Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113-67 (1973). justice Harry
reject? Do you agree? Why or why not? Blackmun, Majority Opinion of the Court.
Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford:
Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press,
fURTHER READING 1983).
Daniel Callahan, "Abortion Decisions: Personal Moral- Helen Watt, The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion, and Child-
ity," in Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality (New York: birth: Exploring Moral Choices in Childbearing (New
Macmillan, 1970). York: Routledge, 2016).
Sidney Callahan, "A Case for Pro-Life Feminism," Com- Isheeta Zalpuri, Nancy Byatt, Stacey Gramann, Nehama
monweal25 (April 1986): 232-38. Dresner, and Rebecca Brendel, "Decisional capacity
Jane English, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person," in pregnancy: a complex case of pregnancy termina-
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (October 1975): tion", Psychosomatics, 56 (3; 2015): 292-7.
233-43.
Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Matters ofLife and Death, ed.
Tom Regan, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Sex-Selection Abortions
The illegal abortion of female foetuses solely to ensure that families have sons
is widely practised within some ethnic communities in Britain and has resulted
in significant shortfalls in the proportion of girls, according to an investigation by
The Independent.
The practice of sex-selective abortion is now so commonplace that it has affected
the natural 50:50 balance of boys to girls within some immigrant groups and has
led to the "disappearance" of between 1,400 and 4,700 females from the national
census records of England and Wales, we can reveal.
CHAPTER 9: ABORTION 0' 237
A government investigation last year found no evidence that women living in

the UK, but born abroad, were preferentially aborting girls. However, our deeper
statistical analysis of data from the 2011 National Census has shown widespread
discrepancies in the sex ratio of children in some immigrant families, which can only
be easily explained by women choosing to abort female foetuses in the hope of
becoming quickly pregnant again with a boy. The findings will reignite the debate
over whether pregnant women should be legally allowed to know the sex of their
babies following ultrasound scans at 13 weeks. *
Do you think sex-selection abortions are morally grounds: aborting female fetuses prevents eco-
permissible? What reasons can you provide to back nomic harm to the family. Is this a good moral
up your view? Some Chinese parents could argue argument? Why or why not?
that such abortions are acceptable on utilitarian
·Steve Connor, "The Lost Girls: Illegal Abortion Widely Used by Some UK Ethnic Groups to Avoid Daughters
'Has Reduced Female Population by Between 1,500 and 4,700,''' 17,e Independent, January 15, 2014,
https://www.independent.co.uk!news/science/the-Iost-girls-illegaI-abortion-widely-used-by-some-uk-ethnic-
groups-to-avoid-daughters-has-reduced-9059790.html. Reprinted by permission of ESI Media.
2. Parental Notification
A report in USA Today related the opposing views of two physicians about teenage
abortions. Sabrina Holmquist was a physician in low-income neighborhoods in the Bronx,
N.Y., where she said she witnessed many pregnant teenagers who were experiencing
serious family and health crises, including being abused at home. Dr. Holmquist came to
believe that sometimes doctors should be able to perform abortions on minors without
having to notify a parent. Linda W. Flower, who was an obstetrician in Texas for twenty
years, takes an opposing view. She says that most of the time when a teenager seeks an
abortion, guidance from a parent is beneficial. She says she's aware of young women
who had abortions and regretted it later.
Which doctor do you think is right about parental a parent or guardian? When the girl's life is at stake?
notification? Under what circumstances, if any, When she is a victim of sexual abuse, including
do you think it morally permissible for an under- incest? Would it be reasonable to require parental
eighteen girl to have an abortion without notifying notification in all cases without exception?
3. Abortion to Avert Health Risks
Medical News Today-The European Court of Human Rights on Tuesday began

considering the appeal of a Polish woman who says that in 2000 she was denied
an abortion despite warnings from physicians that she could become blind if she
continued the pregnancy, the Scotsman reports (Neighbour, Scotsman, 2/8). Alicja
Tysiac-who has three children-alleges that Poland's abortion law violated her
rights under Article 8 and Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantee "respect for privacy
and family life" and "prohibition of discrimination," respectively. Polish law allows
abortion only if a woman has been raped, if there is danger to the life of the woman
or if the fetus will have birth defects, according to the Jurist (Onikepe, Jurist, 2/8).
The European Court could rule that Tysiac's rights were violated but cannot mandate
that Poland change its abortion laws (Reuters, 217).*
Should Alicja Tysiac have been permitted an abor- is permissible (if ever)? When such health dan-
tion even though her life was not at risk? Why or gers are involved, why should-or should not-a
why not? How serious must pregnancy-related woman be allowed to decide for herself about
health problems be before a risk-lowering abortion whether to have an abortion?
*Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, "European Court of Human Rights Considers Appeal of Polish
Woman," published in Medical News Today, February 10,2006. Copyright © 2005 The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation. Reprinted with permission.
READINGS
A Defense of Abortion
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON
Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that a human being from conception through birth into
the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw
of conception. The premise is argued for, but, as I think, a line, to choose a point in this development and say
not well. Take, for example, the most common argu- "before this point the thing is not a person, after this
ment. We are asked to notice that the development of point it is a person" is to make an arbitrary choice, a
choice for which in the nature of things no good rea-
Judith Jarvis Thomson, excerpts from itA Defense of Abortion." son can be given. It is concluded that the fetus is, or
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(1): 47-66. Copyright © 1971 Black-
well Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permission of Blackwell
anyway that we had better say it is, a person from the
Publishing Ltd. moment of conception. But this conclusion does not
follow. Similar things might be said about the develop- what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would
ment of an acorn into an oak tree, and it does not follow grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger
that acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say they and more stringent than the mother's right to decide
are. Arguments of this form are sometimes called "slip- what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it.
pery slope arguments" -the phrase is perhaps self- So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be
explanatory-and it is dismaying that opponents of performed.
abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically. It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imag-
I am inclined to agree, however, that the pros- ine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself
pects for "drawing a line" in the development of the back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A
fetus look dim. I am inclined to think also that we famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to
shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music
become a human person well before birth. Indeed, it Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records
comes as a surprise when one first learns how early in and found that you alone have the right blood type
its life it begins to acquire human characteristics. By to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last
the tenth week, for example, it already has a face, arms night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged
and legs, fingers and toes; it has internal organs, and into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract
brain activity is detectable. On the other hand, I think poisons from his blood as well as your own. The direc-
that the premise is false, that the fetus is not a person tor of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry
from the moment of conception. A newly fertilized the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would
ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they
person than an acorn is an oak tree. But I shall not dis- did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To
cuss any of this. For it seems to me to be of great inter- unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's
est to ask what happens if, for the sake of argument, only for nine months. By then he will have recovered
we allow the premise. How, precisely, are we supposed from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from
to get from there to the conclusion that abortion is you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this
morally impermissible? Opponents of abortion com- situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you
monly spend most of their time establishing that the did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it?
fetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or
step from there to the impermissibility of abortion. longer still? What if the director of the hospital says,
Perhaps they think the step too simple and obvious IITough luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in bed,
to require much comment. Or perhaps instead they with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your
are simply being economical in argument. Many of life. Because remember this. All persons have a right
those who defend abortion rely on the premise that to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a
the fetus is not a person, but only a bit of tissue that right to decide what happens in and to your body, but
will become a person at birth; and why payout more a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide
arguments than you have to? Whatever the explana- what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever
tion, I suggest that the step they take is neither easy be unplugged from him." I imagine you would regard
nor obvious, that it calls for closer examination than this as outrageous, which suggests that something
it is commonly given, and that when we do give it this really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argu-
closer examination we shall feel inclined to reject it. ment I mentioned a moment ago.
I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a In this case, of course, you were kidnapped; you
person from the moment of conception. How does didn't volunteer for the operation that plugged the vio-
the argument go from here? Something like this, I take linist into your kidneys. Can those who oppose abor-
it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a tion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for
right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide a pregnancy due to rape? Certainly. They can say that
persons have a right to life only if they didn't come to grant-the sum of her rights now outweighing the
into existence because of rape; or they can say that all fetus' right to life?
persons have a right to life, but that some have less of The most familiar argument here is the follow-
a right to life than others, in particular, that those who ing. We are told that performing the abortion would
came into existence because of rape have less. But these be directly killingl the child, whereas doing nothing
statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the would not be killing the mother, but only letting her
question of whether you have a right to life at all, or die. Moreover, in killing the child, one would be kill-
how much of it you have, shouldn't tum on the ques- ing an innocent person, for the child has committed
tion of whether or not you are the product of a rape. no crime, and is not aiming at his mother's death. And
And in fact the people who oppose abortion on the then there are a variety of ways in which this might be
ground I mentioned do not make this distinction, and continued. (1) But as directly killing an innocent per-
hence do not make an exception in case of rape. son is always and absolutely impermissible, an abor-
Nor do they make an exception for a case in which tion may not be performed. Or, (2) as directly killing
the mother has to spend the nine months of her preg- an innocent person is murder, and murder is always
nancy in bed. They would agree that would be a great and absolutely impermissible, an abortion may not be
pity, and hard on the mother; but all the same, all performed. Or, (3) as one's duty to refrain from directly
persons have a right to life, the fetus is a person, and killing an innocent person is more stringent than
so on. I suspect, in fact, that they would not make an one's duty to keep a person from dying, an abortion
exception for a case in which, miraculously enough, may not be performed. Or, (4) if one's only options are
the pregnancy went on for nine years, or even the rest directly killing an innocent person or letting a person
of the mother's life. die, one must prefer letting the person die, and thus an
Some won't even make an exception for a case abortion may not be performed.
in which continuation of the pregnancy is likely to Some people seem to have thought that these are
shorten the mother's life; they regard abortion as not further premises which must be added if the con-
impermissible even to save the mother's life. Such clusion is to be reached, but that they follow from the
cases are nowadays very rare, and many opponents very fact that an innocent person has a right to life.
of abortion do not accept this extreme view. All the But this seems to me to be a mistake, and perhaps the
same, it is a good place to begin: a number of points of simplest way to show this is to bring out that while
interest come out in respect to it. we must certainly grant that innocent persons have a
1. Let us call the view that abortion is impermis- right to life, the theses in (1) through (4) are all false.
sible even to save the mother's life "the extreme view." Take (2), for example. If directly killing an innocent
I want to suggest first that it does not issue from the person is murder, and thus is impermissible, then the
argument I mentioned earlier without the addition of mother'S directly killing the innocent person inside
some fairly powerful premises. Suppose a woman has her is murder, and thus is impermissible. But it cannot
become pregnant, and now learns that she has a car- seriously be thought to be murder if the mother per-
diac condition such that she will die if she carries the forms an abortion on herself to save her life. It cannot
baby to term. What may be done for her? The fetus, seriously be said that she must refrain, that she must sit
being a person, has a right to life, but as the mother passively by and wait for her death. Let us look again
is a person too, so has she a right to life. Presumably at the case of you and the violinist. There you are, in
they have an equal right to life. How is it supposed to bed with the Violinist, and the director of the hospital
come out that an abortion may not be performed? If says to you, "It's all most distressing, and I deeply sym-
mother and child have an equal right to life, shouldn't pathize, but you see this is putting an additional strain
we perhaps flip a coin? Or should we add to the moth- on your kidneys, and you'll be dead within the month.
er's right to life her right to decide what happens in But you have to stay where you are all the same. Because
and to her body, which everybody seems to be ready unplugging you would be directly killing an innocent
violinist, and that's murder, and that's impermissible." here is very different. In our case there are only two
If anything in the world is true, it is that you do not people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one
commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible, who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is
if you reach around to your back and unplug yourself threatened is not threatened because of any fault, the
from that violinist to save your life. one who threatens does not threaten because of any
The main focus of attention in writings on abor- fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders
tion has been on what a third party mayor may not do cannot intervene. But the person threatened can.
in answer to a request from a woman for an abortion. In sum, a woman surely can defend her life against
This is in a way understandable. Things being as they the threat to it posed by the unborn child, even if
are, there isn't much a woman can safely do to abort doing so involves its death. And this shows not merely
herself. So the question asked is what a third party may that the theses in (1) through (4) are false; it shows also
do, and what the mother may do, if it is mentioned at that the extreme view of abortion is false, and so we
all, is deduced, almost as an afterthought, from what need not canvass any other possible ways of arriving at
it is concluded that third parties may do. But it seems it from the argument I mentioned at the outset.
to me that to treat the matter in this way is to refuse to 2. The extreme view could of course be weak-
grant to the mother that very status of person which is ened to say that while abortion is permissible to save
so firmly insisted on for the fetus. For we cannot sim- the mother'S life, it may not be performed by a third
ply read off what a person may do from what a third party, but only by the mother herself. But this cannot
party may do. Suppose you find yourself trapped in be right either. For what we have to keep in mind is
a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny that the mother and the unborn child are not like two
house, and a rapidly growing child-you are already tenants in a small house which has, by an unfortunate
up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the
you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness
hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the
stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it
he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free does more than this: it casts a bright light on the sup-
man. Now I could well understand it if a bystander position that third parties can do nothing. Certainly it
were to say, "There's nothing we can do for you. We lets us see that a third party who says "I cannot choose
cannot choose between your life and his, we cannot between you" is fooling himself if he thinks this is
be the ones to decide who is to live, we cannot inter- impartiality. If Jones has found and fastened on a cer-
vene." But it cannot be concluded that you too can do tain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing,
nothing, that you cannot attack it to save your life. but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing,
However innocent the child may be, you do not have then it is not impartiality that says "I cannot choose
to wait passively while it crushes you to death. Perhaps between you" when Smith owns the coat. Women
a pregnant woman is vaguely felt to have the status have said again and again "This body is my body!" and
of house, to which we don't allow the right of self- they have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has
defense. But if the woman houses the child, it should been like shouting into the wind. Smith, after all, is
be remembered that she is a person who houses it. hardly likely to bless us if we say to him, "Of course it's
I should perhaps stop to say explicitly that I am your coat, anybody would grant that it is. But no one
not claiming that people have a right to do anything may choose between you andJones who is to have it."
whatever to save their lives. I think, rather, that there We should really ask what it is that says "no one may
are drastic limits to the right of self-defense. If someone choose" in the face of the fact that the body that houses
threatens you with death unless you torture someone the child is the mother's body. It may be simply a failure to
else to death, I think you have not the right, even to appreciate this fact. But it may be something more inter-
save your life, to do so. But the case under consideration esting, namely the sense that one has a right to refuse to
lay hands on people, even where it would be just and For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes
fair to do so, even where justice seems to require that to, to have a right to life. In some views having a right
somebody do so. Thus justice might call for somebody to life includes having a right to be given at least the
to get Smith's coat back from Jones, and yet you have a bare minimum one needs for continued life. But sup-
right to refuse to be the one to lay hands on Jones, a right pose that what in fact is the bare minimum a man
to refuse to do physical violence to him. This, I think, needs for continued life is something he has no right
must be granted. But then what should be said is not at all to be given? If I am sick unto death, and the
"no one may choose," but only "I cannot choose," and only thing that will save my life is the touch of Henry
indeed not even this, but "I will not act," leaving it open Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the
that somebody else can or should, and in particular that same, I have no right to be given the touch of Henry
anyone in a position of authority, with the job of secur- Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow. It would be
ing people's rights, both can and should. So this is no frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast
difficulty. I have not been arguing that any given third to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt
party must accede to the mother's request that he per- well meant, if my friends flew out to the West Coast
form an abortion to save her life, but only that he may. and carried Henry Fonda back with them. But I have
I suppose that in some views of human life the no right at all against anybody that he should do this
mother's body is only on loan to her, the loan not for me. Or again, to return to the story I told earlier,
being one which gives her any prior claim to it. One the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the
who held this view might well think it impartiality to continued use of your kidneys does not establish that
say "I cannot choose." But I shall simply ignore this he has a right to be given the continued use of your
possibility. My own view is that if a human being has kidneys. He certainly has no right against you that you
any just, prior claim to anything at all, he has a just, should give him continued use of your kidneys. For
prior claim to his own body. And perhaps this needn't nobody has any right to use your kidneys unless you
be argued for here anyway, since, as I mentioned, the give him such a right; and nobody has the right against
arguments against abortion we are looking at do grant you that you shall give him this right-if you do allow
that the woman has a right to decide what happens in him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on
and to her body. your part, and not something he can claim from you
But although they do grant it, I have tried to show as his due. Nor has he any right against anybody else
that they do not take seriously what is done in grant- that they should give him continued use of your kid-
ing it. I suggest the same thing will reappear even more neys. Certainly he had no right against the Society of
clearly when we turn away from cases in which the Music Lovers that they should plug him into you in
mother's life is at stake, and attend, as I propose we the first place. And if you now start to unplug yourself,
now do, to the vastly more common cases in which a having learned that you will otherwise have to spend
woman wants an abortion for some less weighty rea- nine years in bed with him, there is nobody in the
son than preserving her own life. world who must try to prevent you, in order to see to
3. Where the mother's life is not at stake, the it that he is given something he has a right to be given.
argument I mentioned at the outset seems to have a Some people are rather stricter about the right to
much stronger pull. "Everyone has a right to life, so life. In their view, it does not include the right to be
the unborn person has a right to life." And isn't the given anything, but amounts to, and only to, the right
child's right to life weightier than anything other than not to be killed by anybody. But here a related diffi-
the mother's own right to life, which she might put culty arises. If everybody is to refrain from killing that
forward as ground for an abortion? Violinist, then everybody must refrain from doing a
This argument treats the right to life as if it were great many different sorts of things. Everybody must
unproblematic. It is not, and this seems to me to be refrain from slitting his throat, everybody must refrain
precisely the source of the mistake. from shooting him-and everybody must refrain
from unplugging you from him. But does he have a given him any such right. But we have to notice that in
right against everybody that they shall refrain from unplugging yourself, you are killing him; and violin-
unplugging you from him? To refrain from doing ists, like everybody else, have a right to life, and thus in
this is to allow him to continue to use your kidneys. the view we were considering just now, the right not
It could be argued that he has a right against us that to be killed. So here you do what he supposedly has a
we should allow him to continue to use your kid- right you shall not do, but you do not act unjustly to
neys. That is, while he had no right against us that him in doing it.
we should give him the use of your kidneys, it might The emendation which may be made at this pOint
be argued that he anyway has a right against us that is this: the right to life consists not in the right not
we shall not now intervene and deprive him of the to be killed, but rather in the right not to be killed
use of your kidneys. I shall come back to third-party unjustly. This runs a risk of circularity, but never mind:
interventions later. But certainly the violinist has no it would enable us to square the fact that the violin-
right against you that you shall allow him to continue ist has a right to life with the fact that you do not act
to use your kidneys. As I said, if you do allow him to unjustly toward him in unplugging yourself, thereby
use them, it is a kindness on your part, and not some- killing him. For if you do not kill him un justly, you do
thing you owe him. not violate his right to life, and so it is no wonder you
The difficulty I point to here is not peculiar to the do him no injustice.
right to life. It reappears in connection with all the But if this emendation is accepted, the gap in the
other natural rights; and it is something which an argument against abortion stares us plainly in the face:
adequate account of rights must deal with. For pres- it is by no means enough to show that the fetus is a
ent purposes i~ is enough just to draw attention to it. person, and to remind us that all persons have a right
But I would stress that I am not arguing that people do to life-we need to be shown also that killing the fetus
not have a right to life-quite to the contrary, it seems violates its right to life, Le., that abortion is unjust kill-
to me that the primary control we must place on the ing. And is it?
acceptability of an account of rights is that it should I suppose we may take it as a datum that in a case
turn out in that account to be a truth that aU persons of pregnancy due to rape the mother has not given
have a right to life. I am arguing only that having a the unborn person a right to the use of her body for
right to life does not guarantee having either a right to food and shelter. Indeed, in what pregnancy could it
be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued be supposed that the mother has given the unborn
use of another person's body-even if one needs it for person such a right? It is not as if there were unborn
life itself. So the right to life will not serve the oppo- persons drifting about the world, to whom a woman
nents of abortion in the very simple and clear way in who wants a child says "I invite you in."
which they seem to have thought it would. But it might be argued that there are other ways
4. There is another way to bring out the difficulty. one can have acquired a right to the use of another
In the most ordinary sort of case, to deprive someone person's body than by having been invited to use it by
of what he has a right to is to treat him unjustly. Sup- that person. Suppose a woman voluntarily indulges
pose a boy and his small brother are jointly given a box in intercourse, knowing of the chance it will issue in
of chocolates for Christmas. If the older boy takes the pregnancy, and then she does become pregnant; is she
box and refuses to give his brother any of the choco- not in part responsible for the presence, in fact the very
lates, he is unjust to him, for the brother has been existence, of the unborn person inside her? No doubt
given a right to half of them. But suppose that, hav- she did not invite it in. But doesn't her partial respon-
ing learned that otherwise it means nine years in bed sibility for its being there itself give it a right to the use
with that violinist, you unplug yourself from him. You of her body? If so, then her aborting it would be more
surely are not being un just to him, for you gave him like the boy's taking away the chocolates, and less like
no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have your unplugging yourself from the violinist-doing so
would be depriving it of what it does have a right to, or falls in. Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds
and thus would be doing it an injustice. drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your
And then, too, it might be asked whether or not windows, one may drift in and take root in your car-
she can kill it even to save her own life: If she volun- pets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix
tarily called it into existence, how can she now kill it, up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best
even in self-defense? you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very,
The first thing to be said about this is that it is very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is
something new. Opponents of abortion have been so defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the
concerned to make out the independence of the fetus, person-plant who now develops have a right to the use
in order to establish that it has a right to life, just as of your house? Surely not-despite the fact that you
its mother does, that they have tended to overlook voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly
the possible support they might gain from making out kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew
that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to that screens were sometimes defective. Someone may
establish that she has a special kind of responsibility argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it
for it, a responsibility that gives it rights against her does have a right to your house, because after all you
which are not possessed by any independent person- could have lived out your life with bare floors and furni-
such as an ailing violinist who is a stranger to her. ture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't
On the other hand, this argument would give the do-for by the same token anyone can avoid a preg-
unborn person a right to its mother's body only if her nancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or any-
pregnancy resulted from a voluntary act, undertaken way by never leaving home without a (reliable!) army.
in full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might It seems to me that the argument we are looking at
result from it. It would leave out entirely the unborn can establish at most that there are some cases in which
person whose existence is due to rape. Pending the the unborn person has a right to the use of its mother's
availability of some further argument, then, we would body, and therefore some cases in which abortion is
be left with the conclusion that unborn persons whose unjust killing. There is room for much discussion and
existence is due to rape have no right to the use of their argument as to precisely which, if any. But I think we
mothers' bodies, and thus that aborting them is not should sidestep this issue and leave it open, for at any
depriving them of anything they have a right to and rate the argument certainly does not establish that all
hence is not unjust killing. abortion is unjust killing.
And we should also notice that it is not at all plain 5. There is room for yet another argument here,
that this argument really does go even as far as it pur- however. We surely must all grant that there may be
ports to. For there are cases and cases, and the details cases in which it would be morally indecent to detach
make a difference. If the room is stuffy, and I there- a person from your body at the cost of his life. Suppose
fore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, you learn that what the violinist needs is not nine
it would be absurd to say, "Ah, now he can stay, she's years of your life, but only one hour: all you need do
given him a right to the use of her house-for she is to save his life is to spend one hour in that bed with
partially responsible for his presence there, having him. Suppose also that letting him use your kidneys
voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full for that one hour would not affect your health in the
knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and slightest. Admittedly you were kidnapped. Admittedly
that burglars burgle." It would be still more absurd to you did not give anyone permission to plug him into
say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, you. Nevertheless it seems to me plain you ought to
precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a allow him to use your kidneys for that hour-it would
burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It be indecent to refuse.
remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar Again, suppose pregnancy lasted only an hour,
who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders and constituted no threat to life or health. And
suppose that a woman becomes pregnant as a result of morally unacceptable. Take the case of Henry Fonda
rape. Admittedly she did not voluntarily do anything again. I said earlier that I had no right to the touch
to bring about the existence of a child. Admittedly she of his cool hand on my fevered brow, even though
did nothing at all which would give the unborn per- I needed it to save my life. I said it would be frightfully
son a right to the use of her body. All the same it might nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide
well be said, as in the newly emended violinist story, me with it, but that I had no right against him that he
that she ought to allow it to remain for that hour-that should do so. But suppose he isn't on the West Coast.
it would be indecent in her to refuse. Suppose he has only to walk across the room, place a
Now some people are inclined to use the term hand briefly on my brow-and 10, my life is saved. Then
"right" in such a way that it follows from the fact that surely he ought to do it, it would be indecent to refuse.
you ought to allow a person to use your body for the Is it to be said "Ah, well, it follows that in this case she
hour he needs, that he has a right to use your body for has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so
the hour he needs, even though he has not been given it would be an injustice in him to refuse"? So that I have
that right by any person or act. They may say that it a right to it when it is easy for him to provide it, though
follows also that if you refuse, you act unjustly toward no right when it's hard? It's rather a shocking idea that
him. This use of the term is perhaps so common that anyone's rights should fade away and disappear as it
it cannot be called wrong; nevertheless it seems to gets harder and harder to accord them to him.
me to be an unfortunate loosening of what we would So my own view is that even though you ought to
do better to keep a tight rein on. Suppose that box of let the violinist use your kidneys for the one hour he
chocolates I mentioned earlier had not been given to needs, we should not conclude that he has a right to
both boys jointly, but was given only to the older boy. do so-we should say that if you refuse, you are, like
There he Sits, stOlidly eating his way through the box, the boy who owns all the chocolates and will give
his small brother watching enviously. Here we are none away, self-centered and callous, indecent in fact,
likely to say "You ought not to be so mean. You ought but not unjust. And Similarly, that even supposing a
to give your brother some of those chocolates." My case in which a woman pregnant due to rape ought to
own view is that it just does not follow from the truth allow the unborn person to use her body for the hour
of this that the brother has any right to any of the he needs, we should not conclude that he has a right
chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, to do so; we should conclude that she is self-centered,
he is greedy, stingy, callous-but not unjust. I suppose callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she refuses. The
that the people I have in mind will say it does follow complaints are no less grave; they are just different.
that the brother has a right to some of the chocolates, However, there is no need to insist on this pOint. If
and thus that the boy does act unjustly if he refuses anyone does wish to deduce "he has a right" from
to give his brother any. But the effect of saying this is "you ought," then all the same he must surely grant
to obscure What we should keep distinct, namely the that there are cases in which it is not morally required
difference between the boy's refusal in this case and of you that you allow that violinist to use your kid-
the boy's refusal in the earlier case, in which the box neys, and in which he does not have a right to use
was given to both boys jointly, and in which the small them, and in which you do not do him an injustice if
brother thus had what was from any point of view you refuse. And so also for mother and unborn child.
clear title to half. Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right
A further objection to so using the term "right" that to demand it-and we were leaving open the possibil-
from the fact that A ought to do a thing for B, it follows ity that there may be such cases-nobody is morally
that B has a right against A that A do it for him, is that it required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other
is going to make the question of whether or not a man interests and concerns, of all other duties and com-
has a right to a thing turn on how easy it is to provide mitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in
him with it; and this seems not merely unfortunate, but order to keep another person alive.
246 0' PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
6. We have in fact to distinguish between two even trouble to pick up a phone to call the police. Min-
kinds of Samaritan: the Good Samaritan and what we imally Decent Samaritanism would call for doing at
might call the Minimally Decent Samaritan. The story least that, and their not having done it was monstrous.
of the Good Samaritan, you will remember, goes like After telling the story of the Good Samaritan, Jesus
this: said "Go, and do thou likewise." Perhaps he meant
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, that we are morally required to act as the Good Samari-
and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his rai- tan did. Perhaps he was urging people to do more than
ment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him is morally required of them. At all events it seems plain
half dead. that it was not morally required of any of the thirty-
And by chance there came down a certain priest eight that he rush out to give direct assistance at the
that way; and when he saw him, he passed by on the risk of his own life, and that it is not morally required
other side. of anyone that he give long stretches of his life-nine
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, years or nine months-to sustaining the life of a per-
came and looked on him, and passed by on the other son who has no special right (we were leaving open
side.
the possibility of this) to demand it.
But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came
Indeed, with one rather striking class of excep-
where he was; and when he saw him he had compas-
sian on him. tions, no one in any country in the world is legally
And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pour- required to do anywhere near as much as this for any-
ing in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and one else. The class of exceptions is obvious. My main
brought him to an inn, and took care of him. concern here is not the state of the law in respect to
And on the morrow, when he departed, he took out abortion, but it is worth drawing attention to the fact
two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto that in no state in this country is any man compelled
him, "Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest by law to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan
more, when I come again, I will repay thee." to any person; there is no law under which charges
(Luke 10:30-35) could be brought against the thirty-eight who stood
The Good Samaritan went out of his way, at some by while Kitty Genovese died. By contrast, in most
cost to himself, to help one in need of it. We are not states in this country women are compelled by law
told what the options were, that is, whether or not to be not merely Minimally Decent Samaritans, but
the priest and the Levite could have helped by doing Good Samaritans to unborn persons inside them. This
less than the Good Samaritan did, but assuming they doesn't by itself settle anything one way or the other,
could have, then the fact they did nothing at all shows because it may well be argued that there should be
they were not even Minimally Decent Samaritans, not laws in this country-as there are in many European
because they were not Samaritans, but because they countries-compelling at least Minimally Decent
were not even minimally decent. Samaritanism. But it does show that there is a gross
These things are a matter of degree, of course, injustice in the existing state of the law. And it shows
but there is a difference, and it comes out perhaps also that the groups currently working against liberal-
most clearly in the story of Kitty Genovese, who, as ization of abortion laws, in fact working toward hav-
you will remember, was murdered while thirty-eight ing it declared unconstitutional for a state to permit
people watched or listened, and did nothing at all to abortion, had better start working for the adoption
help her. A Good Samaritan would have rushed out of Good Samaritan laws generally, or earn the charge
to give direct assistance against the murderer. Or per- that they are acting in bad faith.
haps we had better allow that it would have been a I should think, myself, that Minimally Decent
Splendid Samaritan who did this, on the ground that Samaritan laws would be one thing, Good Samaritan
it would have involved a risk of death for himself. But laws quite another, and in fact highly improper. But
the thirty-eight not only did not do this, they did not we are not here concerned with the law. What we
should ask is not whether anybody should be com- I have in effect dealt (briefly) with this argument
pelled by law to be a Good Samaritan, but whether in section 4 above; but a (still briefer) recapitulation
we must accede to a situation in which somebody is now may be in order. Surely we do not have any such
being compelled-by nature, perhaps-to be a Good "special responsibility" for a person unless we have
Samaritan. We have, in other words, to look now at assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of parents
third-party interventions. I have been arguing that do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an
no person is morally required to make large sacri- abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do
fices to sustain the life of another who has no right to not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home
demand them, and this even where the sacrifices do with them, then they have assumed responsibility
not include life itself; we are not morally required to for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now
be Good Samaritans or anyway Very Good Samaritans withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because
to one another. But what if a man cannot extricate they now find it difficult to go on providing for it. But
himself from such a situation? What if he appeals to if they have taken all reasonable precautions against
us to extricate him? It seems to me plain that there are having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their
cases in which we can, cases in which a Good Samari- biological relationship to the child who comes into
tan would extricate him. There you are, you were kid- existence have a special responsibility for it. They may
napped, and nine years in bed with that violinist lie wish to assume responsibility for it, or they may not
ahead of you. You have your own life to lead. You are wish to. And I am suggesting that if assuming respon-
sorry, but you simply cannot see giving up so much of sibility for it would require large sacrifices, then they
your life to the sustaining of his. You cannot extricate may refuse. A Good Samaritan would not refuse-or
yourself, and ask us to do so. I should have thought anyway, a Splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifices that
that-in light of his having no right to the use of your had to be made were enormous. But then so would a
body-it was obvious that we do not have to accede Good Samaritan assume responsibility for that violin-
to your being forced to give up so much. We can do ist; so would Henry Fonda, if he is a Good Samaritan,
what you ask. There is no injustice to the violinist in fly in from the West Coast and assume responsibility
our dOing so. forme.
7. FOllowing the lead of the opponents of abortion, S. My argument will be found unsatisfactory on
I have throughout been speaking of the fetus merely as two counts by many of those who want to regard abor-
a person, and what I have been asking is whether or tion as morally permissible. First, while I do argue that
not the argument we began with, which proceeds only abortion is not impermissible, I do not argue that it is
from the fetus' being a person, really does establish its always permissible. There may well be cases in which
conclUSion. I have argued that it does not. carrying the child to term requires only Minimally
But of course there are arguments and arguments, Decent Samaritanism of the mother, and this is a stan-
and it may be said that I have simply fastened on the dard we must not fall below. I am inclined to think it
wrong one. It may be said that what is important is a merit of my account precisely that it does not give a
not merely the fact that the fetus is a person, but that general yes or a general no. It allows for and supports
it is a person for whom the woman has a special kind our sense that, for example, a sick and desperately
of responsibility issuing from the fact that she is its frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due
mother. And it might be argued that all my analo- to rape, may of course choose abortion, and that any
gies are therefore irrelevant-for you do not have that law which rules this out is an insane law. And it also
special kind of responsibility for that violinist, Henry allows for and supports our sense that in other cases
Fonda does not have that special kind of responsibil- resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would
ity for me. And our attention might be drawn to the be indecent in the woman to request an abortion, and
fact that men and women both are compelled by law indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is in her sev-
to provide support for their children. enth month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the
nuisance of postponing a trip abroad. The very fact thought of a child, a bit of herself, put out for adop-
that the arguments I have been drawing attention to tion and never seen or heard of again. She may there-
treat all cases of abortion, or even all cases of abortion fore want not merely that the child be detached from
in which the mother's life is not at stake, as morally on her, but more, that it die. Some opponents of abortion
a par ought to have made them suspect at the outset. are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt-
Secondly, while I am arguing for the permissibil- thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a pow-
ity of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for erful source of despair. All the same, I agree that the
the right to secure the death of the unborn child. desire for the child's death is not one which anybody
It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach
certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to the child alive.
survive outside the mother's body; hence removing At this place, however, it should be remembered
it from her body guarantees its death. But they are that we have only been pretending throughout that
importantly different. I have argued that you are not the fetus is a human being from the moment of con-
morally required to spend nine months in bed, sus- ception. A very early abortion is surely not the killing
taining the life of that violinist; but to say this is by no of a person, and so is not dealt with by anything I have
means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there said here.
is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to
turn round and slit his throat. You may detach your-
self even if this costs him his life; you have no right NOTE
to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if 1. The term "direct" in the arguments I refer to is a technical
unplugging yourself does not kill him. There are some one. Roughly, what is meant by "direct killing" is either kill-
people who will feel dissatisfied by this feature of my ing as an end in itself, or killing as a means to some end, for
argument. A woman may be utterly devastated by the example, the end of saving someone else's life.
From On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion

MARY ANNE WARREN
We will be concerned with both the moral status of not a human being, in the morally relevant sense of
abortion, which for our purposes we may define as that term, we ought not to conclude that the difficul-
the act which a woman performs in voluntarily termi- ties involved in determining whether or not a fetus is
nating, or allowing another person to terminate, her human make it impossible to produce any satisfactory
pregnancy, and the legal status which is appropriate solution to the problem of the moral status of abor-
for this act. I will argue that, while it is not possible tion. For it is possible to show that, on the basis of
to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman's right intuitions which we may expect even the opponents
to obtain an abortion without showing that a fetus is of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person, and hence
not the sort of entity to which it is proper to ascribe
full moral rights.
Mary Anne Warren, excerpts from "On the Moral and Legal Status
Of course, while some philosophers would deny
of Abortion" in The Monist Volume 57, pp. 43-61. Copyright © Tile
Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical
the possibility of any such proof, others will deny that
Inquiry, The Hegeler Institute, Peru, IL. Reprinted by permission. there is any need for it, since the moral permissibility of
abortion appears to them to be too obvious to require abortion a form of murder of the existence of any
proof. But the inadequacy of this attitude should be such right unless we are able to produce a clear and
evident from the fact that both the friends and the convincing refutation of the traditional antiabortion
foes of abortion consider their position to be morally argument, and this has not, to my knowledge, been
self-evident. Because proabortionists have never ade- done. With respect to the two most vital issues which
quately come to grips with the conceptual issues sur- that argument involves, i.e., the humanity of the fetus
rounding abortion, most if not all, of the arguments and its implication for the moral status of abortion,
which they advance in opposition to laws restricting confusion has prevailed on both sides of the dispute.
access to abortion fail to refute or even weaken the Thus, both proabortionists and antiabortionists
traditional antiabortion argument, i.e., that a fetus is a have tended to abstract the question of whether abor-
human being, and therefore abortion is murder. tion is wrong to that of whether it is wrong to destroy
These arguments are typically of one of two sorts. a fetus, just as though the rights of another person
Either they point to the terrible side effects of the were not necessarily involved. This mistaken abstrac-
restrictive laws, e.g., the deaths due to illegal abortions, tion has led to the almost universal assumption that
and the fact that it is poor women who suffer the most if a fetus is a human being, with a right to life, then
as a result of these laws, or else they state that to deny a it follows immediately that abortion is wrong (except
woman access to abortion is to deprive her of her right perhaps when necessary to save the woman's life), and
to control her own body. Unfortunately, however, the that it ought to be prohibited. It has also been gener-
fact that restricting access to abortion has tragic side ally assumed that unless the question about the status
effects does not, in itself, show that the restrictions are of the fetus is answered, the moral status of abortion
unjustified, since murder is wrong regardless of the con- cannot possibly be determined.
sequences of prohibiting it; and the appeal to the right
* * *
to control one's body, which is generally construed as
a property right, is at best a rather feeble argument for Judith Thomson is ... the only writer I am aware
the permissibility of abortion. Mere ownership does of who has seriously questioned this assumption; she
not give me the right to kill innocent people whom has argued that, even if we grant the antiabortion-
I find on my property, and indeed I am apt to be held ist his claim that a fetus is a human being, with the
responsible if such people injure themselves while on same right to life as any other human being, we can
my property. It is equally unclear that I have any moral still demonstrate that, in at least some and perhaps
right to expel an innocent person from my property most cases , a woman is under no moral 1
obligation to
when I know that doing so will result in his death. complete an unwanted pregnancy. Her argument is
Furthermore, it is probably inappropriate to describe worth examining, since if it holds up it may enable us
a woman's body as her property, since it seems natural to establish the moral permissibility of abortion with-
to hold that a person is something distinct from her out becoming involved in problems about what enti-
property, but not from her body. Even those who would tles an entity to be considered human, and accorded
object to the identification of a person with his body, or full moral rights. To be able to do this would be a great
with the conjunction of his body and his mind, must gain in the power and simplicity of the proabortion
admit that it would be very odd to describe, say, break- pOSition, since, although I will argue that these prob-
ing a leg, as damaging one's property, and much more lems can be solved at least as decisively as can any
appropriate to describe it as injuring oneself. Thus it is other moral problem, we should certainly be pleased
probably a mistake to argue that the right to obtain an to be able to avoid having to solve them as part of the
abortion is in any way derived from the right to own justification of abortion.
and regulate property. On the other hand, even if Thomson's argument
But however we wish to construe the right to abor- does not hold up, her inSight, i.e., that it requires argu-
tion, we cannot hope to convince those who consider ment to show that if fetuses are human then abortion
is properly classified as murder, is an extremely I

valuable one. The assumption she attacks is particu-
larly invidious, for it amounts to the decision that it We turn now to Professor Thomson's case for the
is appropriate, in deciding the moral status of abor- claim that even if a fetus has full moral rights, abortion
tion, to leave the rights of the pregnant woman out is still morally permissible, at least sometimes, and for
of consideration entirely, except possibly when her some reasons other than to save the woman's life. Her
life is threatened. Obviously, this will not do; deter- argument is based upon a clever, but I think faulty,
mining what moral rights, if any, a fetus possesses is analogy. She asks us to picture ourselves waking up
only the first step in determining the moral status of one day, in bed with a famous violinist. Imagine that
abortion. Step two, which is at least equally essen- you have been kidnapped, and your bloodstream
tial, is finding a just solution to the conflict between hooked up to that of the violinist, who happens to
whatever rights the fetus may have, and the rights of have an ailment which will certainly kill him unless
the woman who is unwillingly pregnant. While the he is permitted to share your kidneys for a period of
historical error has been to pay far too little attention nine months. No one else can save him, since you
to the second step, Ms. Thomson's suggestion is that alone have the right type of blood. He will be uncon-
if we look at the second step first we may find that a scious all that time, and you will have to stay in bed
woman has a right to obtain an abortion regardless of with him, but after the nine months are over he may
what rights the fetus has. be unplugged, completely cured, that is provided that
Our own inquiry will also have two stages. In Sec- you have cooperated.
tion I, we will consider whether or not it is possible Now then, she continues, what are your obliga-
to establish that abortion is morally permissible even tions in this situation? The antiabortionist, if he is
on the assumption that a fetus is an entity with a consistent, will have to say that you are obligated to
full-fledged right to life. I will argue that in fact this stay in bed with the violinist: for all people have a
cannot be established, at least not with the conclu- right to life, and violinists are people, and therefore it
siveness which is essential to our hopes of convinc- would be murder for you to disconnect yourself from
ing those who are skeptical about the morality of him and let him die [po 238]. But this is outrageous,
abortion, and that we therefore cannot avoid deal- and so there must be something wrong with the same
ing with the question of whether or not a fetus really argument when it is applied to abortion. It would cer-
does have the same right to life as a (more fully devel- tainly be commendable of you to agree to save the
oped) human being. violinist, but it is absurd to suggest that your refusal
In Section II, I will propose an answer to this ques- to do so would be murder. His right to life does not
tion, namely, that a fetus cannot be considered a mem- obligate you to do whatever is reqUired to keep him
ber of the moral community, the set of beings with alive; nor does it justify anyone else in forcing you to
full and equal moral rights, for the simple reason that do so. A law which required you to stay in bed with the
it is not a person, and that it is personhood, and not violinist would clearly be an unjust law, since it is no
genetic humanity, ... which is the basis for member- proper function of the law to force unwilling people
ship in this community. I will argue that a fetus, what- to make huge sacrifices for the sake of other people
ever its stage of development, satisfies none of the basic toward whom they have no such prior obligation.
criteria of personhood, and is not even enough like a Thomson concludes that, if this analogy is an apt
person to be accorded even some of the same rights on one, then we can grant the antiabortionist his claim
the basis of this resemblance. Nor, as we will see, is a that a fetus is a human being, and still hold that it is at
fetus's potential personhood a threat to the morality of least sometimes the case that a pregnant woman has
the right to refuse to be a Good Samaritan towards the
abortion, since, whatever the rights of potential people
fetus, Le., to obtain an abortion. For there is a great
may be, they are invariably overridden in any conflict
with the moral rights of actual people. gap between the claim that x has a right to life, and the
claim that y is obligated to do whatever is necessary to of any shred of responsibility for the situation, on the
keep x alive, let alone that he ought to be forced to do basiS of which it could be argued that you are obligated
so. It is y's duty to keep x alive only if he has somehow to keep the violinist alive. Only when her pregnancy is
contracted a special obligation to do so; and a woman due to rape is a woman clearly just as nonresponsible. 2
who is unwillingly pregnant, e.g., who was raped, Consequently, there is room for the antiabor-
has done nothing which obligates her to make the tionist to argue that in the normal case of unwanted
enormous sacrifice which is necessary to preserve the pregnancy a woman has, by her own actions, assumed
conceptus. responsibility for the fetus. For if x behaves in a way
This argument is initially quite plausible, and in which he could have avoided, and which he knows
the extreme case of pregnancy due to rape it is prob- involves, let us say, a 1 percent chance of bringing
ably conclusive. Difficulties arise, however, when we into existence a human being, with a right to life, and
try to specify more exactly the range of cases in which does so knowing that if this should happen then that
abortion is clearly justifiable even on the assumption human being will perish unless x does certain things to
that the fetus is human. Professor Thomson consid- keep him alive, then it is by no means clear that when it
ers it a virtue of her argument that it does not enable does happen x is free of any obligation to what he knew
us to conclude that abortion is always permissible. It in advance would be required to keep that human
would, she says, be "indecent" for a woman in her sev- being alive.
enth month to obtain an abortion just to avoid having The plausibility of such an argument is enough to
to postpone a trip to Europe. On the other hand, her show that the Thomson analogy can provide a clear
argument enables us to see that "a sick and desperately and persuasive defense of a woman's right to obtain
frightened schoolgirl pregnant due to rape may of an abortion only with respect to those cases in which
course choose abortion, and that any law which rules the woman is in no way responsible for her pregnancy,
this out is an insane law" [po 246]. So far, so good; but e.g., where it is due to rape. In all other cases, we would
what are we to say about the woman who becomes almost certainly conclude that it was necessary to
pregnant not through rape but as a result of her own look carefully at the particular circumstances in order
carelessness, or because of contraceptive failure, or to determine the extent of the woman's responSibil-
who gets pregnant intentionally and then changes ity, and hence the extent of her obligation. This is an
her mind about wanting a child? With respect to such extremely unsatisfactory outcome, from the view-
cases, the violinist analogy is of much less use to the point of the opponents of restrictive abortion laws,
defender of the woman's right to obtain an abortion. most of whom are convinced that a woman has a right
Indeed, the choice of a pregnancy due to rape, to obtain an abortion regardless of how and why she
as an example of a case in which abortion is permis- got pregnant.
sible even if a fetus is considered a human being, Of course a supporter of the violinist analogy
is extremely significant; for it is only in the case of might point out that it is absurd to suggest that forget-
pregnancy due to rape that the woman's situation is ting her pill one day might be sufficient to obligate a
adequately analogous to the violinist case for our intu- woman to complete an unwanted pregnancy. And
itions about the latter to transfer convincingly. The indeed it is absurd to suggest this. As we will see, the
crucial difference between a pregnancy due to rape moral right to obtain an abortion is not in the least
and the normal case of an unwanted pregnancy is that dependent upon the extent to which the woman is
in the normal case, we cannot claim that the woman is responsible for her pregnancy. But unfortunately, once
in no way responsible for her predicament; she could we allow the assumption that a fetus has full moral
have remained chaste, or taken her pills more faith- rights, we cannot avoid taking this absurd suggestion
fully, or abstained on dangerous days, and so on. If, seriously. Perhaps we can make this point more clear
on the other hand, you are kidnapped by strangers, by altering the violinist story just enough to make it
and hooked up to a strange violinist, then you are free more analogous to a normal unwanted pregnancy
and less to a pregnancy due to rape, and then seeing Whether or not this intuition is entirely correct, it
whether it is still obvious that you are not obligated to brings us back once again to the conclusion that once
stay in bed with the fellow. we allow the assumption that a fetus has full moral
Suppose, then, that violinists are peculiarly prone rights it becomes an extremely complex and difficult
to the sort of illness the only cure for which is the use question whether and when abortion is justifiable.
of someone else's bloodstream for nine months, and Thus the Thomson analogy cannot help us produce a
that because of this there has been formed a society clear and persuasive proof of the moral permissibility of
of music lovers who agree that whenever a violinist abortion. Nor will the opponents of the restrictive laws
is stricken they will draw lots and the loser will, by thank us for anything less; for their conviction (for the
some means, be made the one and only person capable most part) is that abortion is obviously not a morally
of saving him. Now then, would you be obligated to serious and extremely unfortunate, even though some-
cooperate in curing the violinist if you had volun- times justified act, comparable to killing in self-defense
tarily joined this society, knowing the possible conse- or to letting the violinist die, but rather is closer to
quences, and then your name had been drawn and you being a morally neutral act, like cutting one's hair.
had been kidnapped? Admittedly, you did not promise The basis of this conviction, I believe, is the real-
ahead of time that you would, but you did deliberately ization that a fetus is not a person, and thus does not
place yourself in a position in which it might happen have a full-fledged right to life. Perhaps the reason why
that a human life would be lost if you did not. Surely this claim has been so inadequately defended is that
this is at least a prima facie reason for supposing that it seems self-evident to those who accept it. And so it
you have an obligation to stay in bed with the violin- is, insofar as it follows from what I take to be perfectly
ist. Suppose that you had gotten your name drawn obvious claims about the nature of personhood, and
deliberately; surely that would be quite a strong reason about the proper grounds for ascribing moral rights,
for thinking that you had such an obligation. claims which ought, indeed, to be obvious to both the
It might be suggested that there is one important friends and foes of abortion. Nevertheless, it is worth
disanalogy between the modified violinist case and examining these claims, and showing how they dem-
the case of an unwanted pregnancy, which makes the onstrate the moral innocuousness of abortion, since
woman's responsibility significantly less, namely, the this apparently has not been adequately done before.
fact that the fetus comes into existence as the result of
the woman's actions. This fact might give her a right to II
refuse to keep it alive, whereas she would not have had
this right had it existed previously, independently, The question which we must answer in order to pro-
and then as a result of her actions become dependent duce a satisfactory solution to the problem of the
upon her for its survival. moral status of abortion is this: How are we to define
My own intuition, however, is that x has no more the moral community, the set of beings with full and
right to bring into existence, either deliberately or as a equal moral rights, such that we can decide whether a
foreseeable result of actions he could have avoided, a human fetus is a member of this community or not?
being with full moral rights (y), and then refuse to do What sort of entity, exactly, has the inalienable rights
what he knew beforehand would be required to keep to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? ... What
that being alive, then he has to enter into an agree- reason is there for identifying the moral community
ment with an existing person, whereby he may be with the set of all human beings, in whatever way we
called upon to save that person's life, and then refuse have chosen to define that term?
to do so when so called upon. Thus, x's responsibility
for y's existence does not seem to lessen his obligation 1. On the Definition of 'Human'
to keep y alive, if he is also responsible for y's being in a One reason why this vital ... question is so frequently
situation in which only he can save him. overlooked in the debate over the moral status of
abortion is that the term 'human' has two distinct, way of defining the moral community, which I will
but not often distinguished, senses. This fact results in argue for only to the extent of explaining why it is, or
a slide of meaning, which serves to conceal the falla- should be, self-evident. The suggestion is simply that
ciousness of the traditional argument that since (1) it the moral community consists of all and only people,
is wrong to kill innocent human beings, and (2) fetuses rather than all and only human beings;5 and probably
are innocent human beings, then (3) it is wrong to kill the best way of demonstrating its self-evidence is by
fetuses. For if 'human' is used in the same sense in considering the concept of personhood, to see what
both (1) and (2) then, whichever of the two senses is sorts of entity are and are not persons, and what the
meant, one of these premises is question-begging. And decision that a being is or is not a person implies about
if it is used in two different senses then of course the its moral rights.
conclusion doesn't follow. What characteristics entitle an entity to be con-
Thus, (1) is a self-evident moral truth,3 and avoids sidered a person? This is obviously not the place to
begging the question about abortion, only if 'human attempt a complete analysis of the concept of person-
being' is used to mean something like "a full-fledged hood, but we do not need such a fully adequate analy-
member of the moral community." (It mayor may not sis just to determine whether and why a fetus is or isn't
also be meant to refer exclusively to members of the a person. All we need is a rough and approximate list
species Homo sapiens.) We may call this the moral sense of the most basic criteria of personhood, and some
of 'human'. It is not to be confused with what we will idea of which, or how many, of these an entity must
call the genetic sense, Le., the sense in which any mem- satiSfy in order to properly be considered a person.
ber of the species is a human being, and no member In searching for such criteria, it is useful to
of any other species could be. If (1) is acceptable only look beyond the set of people with whom we are
if the moral sense is intended, (2) is non-question- acquainted, and ask how we would decide whether a
begging only if what is intended is the genetic sense. totally alien being was a person or not. (For we have no
In "Deciding Who is Human," [John] Noonan right to assume that genetic humanity is necessary for
argues for the classification of fetuses with human personhood.) Imagine a space traveler who lands on
beings by pointing to the presence of the full genetic an unknown planet and encounters a race of beings
code, and the potential capacity for rational thought. 4 utterly unlike any he has ever seen or heard of. If he
It is clear that what he needs to show, for his version wants to be sure of behaving morally toward these
of the traditional argument to be valid, is that fetuses beings, he has to somehow decide whether they are
are human in the moral sense, the sense in which it people, and hence have full moral rights, or whether
is analytically true that all human beings have full they are the sort of thing which he need not feel guilty
moral rights. But, in the absence of any argument about treating as, for example, a source of food.
showing that whatever is genetically human is also How should he go about making this decision? If
morally human, and he gives none, nothing more he has some anthropological background, he might
than genetic humanity can be demonstrated by the look for such things as religion, art, and the manufac-
presence of the human genetic code. And, as we will turing of tools, weapons, or shelters, since these fac-
see, the potential capacity for rational thought can at tors have been used to distinguish our human from
most show that an entity has the potential for becom- our prehuman ancestors, in what seems to be closer
ing human in the moral sense. to the moral than the genetiC sense of 'human'. And
no doubt he would be right to consider the presence
2. Defining the Moral Community of such factors as good evidence that the alien beings
Can it be established that genetic humanity is suffi- were people, and morally human. It would, however
cient for moral humanity? I think that there are very be overly anthropocentric of him to take the absenc~
good reasons for not defining the moral community of these things as adequate evidence that they were
in this way. I would like to suggest an alternative not, since we can imagine people who have progressed
beyond, or evolved without ever developing, these that he had no notion at all of what a person is-
cultural characteristics. perhaps because he had confused the concept of a per-
I suggest that the traits which are most central to son with that of genetic humanity. If the opponents
the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral of abortion were to deny the appropriateness of these
sense, are, very roughly, the following: five criteria, I do not know what further arguments
would convince them. We would probably have to
1. consciousness (of objects and events external and/ admit that our conceptual schemes were indeed irrec-
or internal to the being), and in particular the oncilably different, and that our dispute could not be
capacity to feel pain; settled objectively.
2. reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and I do not expect this to happen, however, since
relatively complex problems); I think that the concept of a person is one which is very
3. self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively nearly universal (to people), and that it is common
independent of either genetic or direct external to both proabortionists and antiabortionists, even
control); though neither group has fully realized the relevance
4. the capacity to communicate, by whatever means, of this concept to the resolution of their dispute. Fur-
messages of an indefinite variety of types, that thermore, I think that on reflection even the antiabor-
is, not just with an indefinite number of possible tionists ought to agree not only that (1)-(5) are central
contents, but on indefinitely many possible topiCS; to the concept of personhood, but also that it is a part
5. the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, of this concept that all and only people have full moral
either individual or raCial, or both. rights. The concept of a person is in part a moral con-
cept; once we have admitted that x is a person we have
Admittedly, there are apt to be a great many prob- recognized, even if we have not agreed to respect, x's
lems involved in formulating precise definitions of right to be treated as a member of the moral commu-
these criteria, let alone in developing universally valid nity. It is true that the claim that x is a human being is
behavioral criteria for deciding when they apply. But more commonly voiced as part of an appeal to treat x
I will assume that both we and our explorer know decently than is the claim that x is a person, but this is
approximately what (1)-(5) mean, and that he is also either because 'human being' is here used in the sense
able to determine whether or not they apply. How, which implies personhood, or because the genetic and
then should he use his findings to decide whether or moral senses of 'human' have been confused.
not the alien beings are people? We needn't suppose Now if (1)-(5) are indeed the primary criteria of
that an entity must have all of these attributes to be personhood, then it is clear that genetic humanity is
properly considered a person; (1) and (2) alone may neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing that
well be sufficient for personhood, and quite probably an entity is a person. Some human beings are not
(1)-(3) are sufficient. Neither do we need to insist that people, and there may well be people who are not
anyone of these criteria is necessary for personhood, human beings. A man or woman whose consciousness
although once again (1) and (2) look like fairly good has been permanently obliterated but who remains
candidates for necessary conditions, as does (3), if alive is a human being which is no longer a person;
'activity' is construed so as to include the activity of defective human beings, with no appreciable mental
reasoning. capacity, are not and presumably never will be people;
All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is and a fetus is a human being which is not yet a person,
not a person, is that any being which satisfies none of and which therefore cannot coherently be said to have
(1)-(5) is certainly not a person. I consider this claim to full moral rights. Citizens of the next century should
be so obvious that I think anyone who denied it, and be prepared to recognize highly advanced, self-aware
claimed that a being which satisfied none of (1)-(5) robots or computers, should such be developed, and
was a person all the same, would thereby demonstrate intelligent inhabitants of other worlds, should such
be found, as people in the fullest sense, and to respect in us almost the same powerful protective instinct as
their moral rights. But to ascribe full moral rights to an is commonly aroused by a small infant, nevertheless
entity which is not a person is as absurd as to ascribe it is not significantly more personlike than is a very
moral obligations and responsibilities to such an small embryo. It is somewhat more personlike; it can
entity. apparently feel and respond to pain, and it may even
have a rudimentary form of consciousness, insofar as
3. Fetal Development and the Right to Life its brain is quite active. Nevertheless, it seems safe to
Two problems arise in the application of these sugges- say that it is not fully conscious, in the way that an
tions for the definition of the moral community to the infant of a few months is, and that it cannot reason,
determination of the precise moral status of a human or communicate messages of indefinitely many sorts,
fetus. Given that the paradigm example of a person is a does not engage in self-motivated activity, and has no
normal adult human being, then (1) How like this par- self-awareness. Thus, in the relevant respects, a fetus,
adigm, in particular how far advanced since concep- even a fully developed one, is considerably less per-
tion, does a human being need to be before it begins sonlike than is the average mature mammal, indeed
to have a right to life by virtue, not of being fully a the average fish. And I think that a rational person
person as of yet, but of being like a person? and (2) To must conclude that if the right to life of a fetus is to be
what extent, if any, does the fact that a fetus has the based upon its resemblance to a person, then it cannot
potential for becoming a person endow it with some of be said to have any more right to life than, let us say,
the same rights? Each of these questions reqUires some a newborn guppy (which also seems to be capable of
comment. feeling pain), and that a right of that magnitude could
In answering the first question, we need not never override a woman's right to obtain an abortion,
attempt a detailed consideration of the moral rights at any stage of her pregnancy.
of organisms which are not developed enough, aware There may, of course, be other arguments in favor
enough, intelligent enough, etc., to be considered of placing legal limits upon the stage of pregnancy in
people, but which resemble people in some respects. which an abortion may be performed. Given the rela-
It does seem reasonable to suggest that the more like a tive safety of the new techniques of artifiCially induc-
person, in the relevant respects, a being is, the stronger ing labor during the third trimester, the danger to the
is the case for regarding it as having a right to life, and woman's life or health is no longer such an argument.
indeed the stronger its right to life is. Thus we ought Neither is the fact that people tend to respond to the
to take seriously the suggestion that, insofar as "the thought of abortion in the later stages of pregnancy
human individual develops biologically in a continu- with emotional repulSion, since mere emotional
ous fashion ... the rights of a human person might responses cannot take the place of moral reasoning in
develop in the same way.,,6 But we must keep in mind determining what ought to be permitted. Nor, finally,
that the attributes which are relevant in determining is the frequently heard argument that legalizing abor-
whether or not an entity is enough like a person to tion, especially late in the pregnancy, may erode the
be regarded as having some of the same moral rights level of respect for human life, leading, perhaps, to an
are no different from those which are relevant to increase in unjustified euthanasia and other crimes.
determining whether or not it is fully a person-Le., For this threat, if it is a threat, can be better met by edu-
are no different from (l)-(S)-and that being geneti- cating people to the kinds of moral distinctions which
cally human, or having recognizably human facial we are making here than by limiting access to abortion
and other physical features, or detectable brain activ- (which limitation may, in its disregard for the rights of
ity, or the capacity to survive outside the uterus, are women, be just as damaging to the level of respect for
simply not among these relevant attributes. human rights).
Thus it is clear that even though a seven- or eight- Thus, since the fact that even a fully developed
month fetus has features which make it apt to arouse fetus is not personlike enough to have any Significant
256 <:) PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
right to life on the basis of its personlikeness shows a few hundred thousand or more human beings, by
that no legal restrictions upon the stage of pregnancy breaking his body into its component cells, and using
in which an abortion may be performed can be justi- these to create fully developed human beings, with, of
fied on the grounds that we should protect the rights course, his genetic code. We may imagine that each of
of the older fetus; and since there is no other apparent these newly created men will have all of the original
justification for such restrictions, we may conclude that man's abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on, and also
they are entirely unjustified. Whether or not it would have an individual self-concept, in short that each of
be indecent (whatever that means) for a woman in her them will be a bona fide (though hardly unique) per-
seventh month to obtain an abortion just to avoid hav- son. Imagine that the whole project will take only
ing to postpone a trip to Europe, it would not, in itself, seconds, and that its chances of success are extremely
be immoral, and therefore it ought to be permitted. high, and that our explorer knows all of this, and also
knows that these people will be treated fairly. I main-
4. Potential Personhood and the Right to Life tain that in such a situation he would have every right
We have seen that a fetus does not resemble a per- to escape if he could, and thus to deprive all of these
son in any way which can support the claim that potential people of their potentiallivesi for his right to
it has even some of the same rights. But what about life outweighs all of theirs together, in spite of the fact
its potential, the fact that if nurtured and allowed to that they are all genetically human, all innocent, and
develop naturally it will very probably become a per- all have a very high probability of becoming people
son? Doesn't that alone give it at least some right to very soon, if only he refrains from acting.
life? It is hard to deny that the fact that an entity is a Indeed, I think he would have a right to escape
potential person is a strong prima facie reason for not even if it were not his life which the alien scientists
destroying it; but we need not conclude from this that planned to take, but only a year of his freedom, or,
a potential person has a right to life, by virtue of that indeed, only a day. Nor would he be obligated to stay
potential. It may be that our feeling that it is better, if he had gotten captured (thus bringing all these
other things being equal, not to destroy a potential people-potentials into existence) because of his own
person is better explained by the fact that potential carelessness, or even if he had done so deliberately,
people are still (felt to be) an invaluable resource, not knowing the consequences. Regardless of how he
to be lightly squandered. Surely, if every speck of dust got captured, he is not morally obligated to remain
were a potential person, we would be much less apt in captivity for any period of time for the sake of per-
to conclude that every potential person has a right to mitting any number of potential people to come into
become actual. actuality, so great is the margin by which one actual
Still, we do not need to insist that a potential per- person's right to liberty outweighs whatever right to
son has no right to life whatever. There may well be life even a hundred thousand potential people have.
something immoral, and not just imprudent, about And it seems reasonable to conclude that the rights of
wantonly destroying potential people, when doing so a woman will outweigh by a similar margin whatever
isn't necessary to protect anyone's rights. But even if a right to life a fetus may have by virtue of its potential
potential person does have some prima facie right to personhood.
life, such a right could not possibly outweigh the right Thus, neither a fetus's resemblance to a person,
of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the rights of nor its potential for becoming a person provides any
any actual person invariably outweigh those of any basis whatever for the claim that it has any significant
potential person, whenever the two conflict. Since right to life. Consequently, a woman's right to protect
this may not be immediately obvious in the case of a her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life/
human fetus, let us look at another case. by terminating an unwanted pregnancy, will always
Suppose that our space explorer falls into the hands override whatever right to life it may be appropriate
of an alien culture, whose scientists decide to create to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one. And
thus, in the absence of any overwhelming social need 3. Of course, the principle that it is (always) wrong to kill inno-
for every possible child, the laws which restrict the cent human beings is in need of many other modifications,
right to obtain an abortion, or limit the period of preg- e.g., that it may be permissible to do so to save a greater num-
nancy during which an abortion may be performed, ber of other innocent human beings, but we may safely ignore
are a wholly unjustified violation of a woman's most these complications here.
basic moral and constitutional rights. 4. John Noonan, "Deciding Who Is Human," Natural Law
Fonll1z13 (1968): 135.
5. From here on, we will use 'human' to mean genetically
NOTES
human, since the moral sense seems closely connected to, and
1. Judith Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy & perhaps derived from, the assumption that genetic humanity
Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (Fall 1971): 47-66. is sufficient for membership in the moral community.
2. We may safely ignore the fact that she might have avoided 6. Thomas L. Hayes, "A Biological View," Commonweal 85
getting raped, e.g., by carrying a gun, since by similar means (March 17, 1967): 677-78; quoted by Daniel Callahan, in
you might likewise have avoided getting kidnapped, and in Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality (New York: Macmillan,
neither case does the victim's failure to take all possible pre- 1970).
cautions against a highly unlikely event (as opposed to rea- 7. That is, insofar as the death rate, for the woman, is higher
sonable precautions against a rather likely event) mean that for childbirth than for early abortion.
he is morally responsible for what happens.
Why Abortion Is Immoral

DON MARQUIS
The view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, seri- The argument is based on a major assumption.
ously immoral has received little support in the recent Many of the most insightful and careful writers on the
philosophical literature. No doubt most philosophers ethics of abortion ... believe that whether or not abor-
affiliated with secular institutions of higher education is morally permissible stands or falls on whether
tion believe that the anti-abortion position is either or not a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seri-
a symptom of irrational religious dogma or a conclu- ously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will
sion generated by seriously confused philosophical assume, but not argue, that they are correct.
argument. The purpose of this essay is to undermine Also, this essay will neglect issues of great impor-
this general belief. This essay sets out an argument tance to a complete ethics of abortion. Some anti-
that purports to show, as well as any argument in eth- abortionists will allow that certain abortions, such as
ics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare abortion before implantation or abortion when the
cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral life of a woman is threatened by a pregnancy or abor-
category as killing an innocent adult human being. tion after rape, may be morally permissible. This essay
will not explore the casuistry of these hard cases. The
Don Marquis, "Why Abortion Is Immoral," Tile Journal o(Phiioso- purpose of this essay is to develop a general argument
phy LXXXVI, 4 (April 1989): 183-202. Reprinted by permission of for the claim that the overwhelming majority of delib-
the publisher and the author. erate abortions are seriously immoral.
I. always prima facie seriously wrong to take a human

life" or "It is always prima facie seriously wrong to end
A sketch of standard anti-abortion and pro-choice the life of a baby." Since these are generally accepted
arguments exhibits how these arguments possess cer- moral principles, her position is certainly not obvi-
tain symmetries that explain why partisans of those ously wrong. The pro-choicer will claim that her
positions are so convinced of the correctness of their position is supported by such plaUSible moral prin-
own positions, why they are not successful in con- ciples as "Being a person is what gives an individual
vincing their opponents, and why, to others, this issue intrinsic moral worth JJ or "It is only seriously prima
seems to be unresolvable. An analysis of the nature of faCie wrong to take the life of a member of the human
this standoff suggests a strategy for surmounting it. community." Since these are generally accepted
Consider the way a typical anti-abortionist argues. moral principles, the pro-choice position is certainly
She will argue or assert that life is present from the not obviously wrong. Unfortunately, we have again
moment of conception or that fetuses look like arrived at a standoff.
babies or that fetuses possess a characteristic such as a Now, how might one deal with this standoff? The
genetic code that is both necessary and sufficient for standard approach is to try to show how the moral
being human. Anti-abortionists seem to believe that principles of one's opponent lose their plausibility
(1) the truth of all of these claims is quite obvious, and under analysis. It is easy to see how this is possible. On
(2) establishing any of these claims is sufficient to the one hand, the anti-abortionist will defend a moral
show that abortion is morally akin to murder. principle concerning the wrongness of killing which
A standard pro-choice strategy exhibits similari- tends to be broad in scope in order that even fetuses at
ties. The pro-choicer will argue or assert that fetuses an early stage of pregnancy will fall under it. The prob-
are not persons or that fetuses are not rational agents lem with broad principles is that they often embrace
or that fetuses are not social beings. Pro-choicers seem too much. In this particular instance, the principle
to believe that (1) the truth of any of these claims is "It is always prima facie wrong to take a human life"
quite obvious, and (2) establishing any of these claims seems to entail that it is wrong to end the existence
is sufficient to show that an abortion is not a wrongful of a living human cancer-cell culture, on the grounds
killing. that the culture is both living and human. Therefore,
In fact, both the pro-choice and the anti-abortion it seems that the anti-abortionist's favored principle is
claims do seem to be true, although the "it looks like too broad.
a baby" claim is more difficult to establish the earlier On the other hand, the pro-choicer wants to find
the pregnancy. We seem to have a standoff. How can a moral principle concerning the wrongness of kill-
it be resolved? ing which tends to be narrow in scope in order that
As everyone who has taken a bit of logic knows, if fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with narrow
any of these arguments concerning abortion is a good principles is that they often do not embrace enough.
argument, it requires not only some claim characteriz- Hence, the needed principles such as "It is prima facie
ing fetuses, but also some general moral principle that seriously wrong to kill only persons" or "It is prima
ties a characteristic of fetuses to having or not having facie wrong to kill only rational agents" do not explain
the right to life or to some other moral characteristic why it is wrong to kill infants or young children or the
that will generate the obligation or the lack of obli- severely retarded or even perhaps the severely men-
gation not to end the life of a fetus. Accordingly, the tally ill. Therefore, we seem again to have a standoff.
arguments of the anti-abortionist and the pro-choicer The anti-abortionist charges, not unreasonably, that
need a bit of filling in to be regarded as adequate. pro-choice principles concerning killing are too nar-
Note what each partisan will say. The anti- row to be acceptable; the pro-chOicer charges, not
abortionist will claim that her pOSition is supported unreasonably, that anti-abortionist prinCiples con-
by such generally accepted moral principles as lilt is cerning killing are too broad to be acceptable.
Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficulties chromosomes in one's cells than on the color of one's
in their positions run into further difficulties. The anti- skin? If 'human being', on the other hand, is taken
abortionist will try to remove the problem in her posi- to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is a
tion by reformulating her principle concerning killing human being cannot be taken to be a premise in the
in terms of human beings. Now we end up with: "It is anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely what needs
always prima facie seriously wrong to end the life of to be established. Hence, either the anti-abortionist's
a human being." This principle has the advantage of main category is a morally irrelevant, merely biologi-
avoiding the problem of the human cancer-cell cul- cal category, or it is of no use to the anti-abortionist in
ture counterexample. But this advantage is purchased establishing (noncircularly, of course) that abortion is
at a high price. For although it is clear that a fetus is wrong.
both human and alive, it is not at all clear that a fetus Although this problem with the anti-abortionist
is a human being. There is at least something to be said position is often noticed, it is less often noticed that
for the view that something becomes a human being the pro-choice position suffers from an analogous
only after a process of development, and that therefore problem. The principle "Only persons have the right
first trimester fetuses and perhaps all fetuses are not to life" also suffers from an ambiguity. The term 'per-
yet human beings. Hence, the anti-abortionist, by this son' is typically defined in terms of psychological
move, has merely exchanged one problem for another. characteristics, although there will certainly be dis-
The pro-choicer fares no better. She may attempt agreement concerning which characteristics are most
to find reasons why killing infants, young children, important. Supposing that this matter can be settled,
and the severely retarded is wrong which are indepen- the pro-choicer is left with the problem of explaining
dent of her major principle that is supposed to explain why psychological characteristics should make a moral
the wrongness of taking human life, but which will difference. If the pro-choicer should attempt to deal
not also make abortion immoral. This is no easy task. with this problem by claiming that an explanation is
Appeals to social utility will seem satisfactory only to not necessary, that in fact we do treat such a cluster of
those who resolve not to think of the enormous dif- psychological properties as having moral Significance,
ficulties with a utilitarian account of the wrongness the sharp-witted anti-abortionist should have a ready
of killing and the Significant social costs of preserving response. We do treat being both living and human
the lives of the unproductive. A pro-choice strategy as having moral significance. If it is legitimate for the
that extends the definition of 'person' to infants or pro-choicer to demand that the anti-abortionist pro-
even to young children seems just as arbitrary as an vide an explanation of the connection between the
anti-abortion strategy that extends the definition of biological character of being a human being and the
'human being' to fetuses. Again, we find symmetries wrongness of being killed (even though people accept
in the two positions and we arrive at a standoff. this connection), then it is legitimate for the anti-
There are even further problems that reflect sym- abortionist to demand that the pro-choicer prOVide an
metries in the two positions. In addition to counterex- explanation of the connection between psychological
ample problems, or the arbitrary application problems criteria for being a person and the wrongness of being
that can be exchanged for them, the standard anti- killed (even though that connection is accepted).
abortionist principle "It is prima facie seriously wrong Ooel] Feinberg has attempted to meet this objec-
to kill a human being," or one of its variants, can be tion (he calls psychological personhood "common-
objected to on the grounds of ambiguity. If 'human sense personhood"):
being' is taken to be a biological category, then the The characteristics that confer commonsense person-
anti-abortionist is left with the problem of explain- hood are not arbitrary bases for rights and duties, such
ing why a merely biological category should make a as race, sex or species membership; rather they are traits
moral difference. Why, it is asked, is it any more rea- that make sense out of rights and duties and without
sonable to base a moral conclusion on the number of which those moral attributes would have no point or
function. It is because people are conscious; have a sense Furthermore, the pro-choicer cannot any more
of their personal identities; have plans, goals, and proj- escape her problem by making person a purely moral
ects; experience emotions; are liable to pains, anxieties, category than the anti-abortionist could escape by
and frustrations; can reason and bargain, and so on-it the analogous move. For if person is a moral category,
is because of these attributes that people have values
then the pro-choicer is left without the recourses for
and interests, desires and expectations of their own,
including a stake in their own futures, and a personal establishing (noncircularly, of course) the claim that a
well-being of a sort we cannot ascribe to unconscious or fetus is not a person, which is an essential premise in
nonrational beings. Because of their developed capaci- her argument. Again, we have both a symmetry and a
ties they can assume duties and responsibilities and can standoff between pro-choice and antiabortion views.
have and make claims on one another. Only because Passions in the abortion debate run high. There
of their sense of self, their life plans, their value hierar- are both plausibilities and difficulties with the stan-
chies, and their stakes in their own futures can they be dard positions. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising
ascribed fundamental rights. There is nothing arbitrary that partisans of either side embrace with fervor the
about these linkages. 1 moral generalizations that support the conclusions
The plausible aspects of this attempt should not be they preanalytically favor, and reject with disdain the
taken to obscure its implausible features. There is moral generalizations of their opponents as being sub-
a great deal to be said for the view that being a psy- ject to inescapable difficulties. It is easy to believe that
chological person under some description is a neces- the counterexamples to one's own moral principles
sary condition for having duties. One cannot have a are merely temporary difficulties that will dissolve
duty unless one is capable of behaving morally, and in the wake of further philosophical research, and
a being's capability of behaving morally will reqUire that the counterexamples to the principles of one's
having a certain psychology. It is far from obvious, opponents are as straightforward as the contradiction
however, that having rights entails consciousness or between A and 0 propositions in traditional logic.
rationality, as Feinberg suggests. We speak of the rights This might suggest to an impartial observer (if there
of the severely retarded or the severely mentally ill, are any) that the abortion issue is unresolvable.
yet some of these persons are not rational. We speak There is a way out of this apparent dialectical
of the rights of the temporarily unconscious. The quandary. The moral generalizations of both sides
New Jersey Supreme Court based their deCision in the are not quite correct. The generalizations hold for the
QUinlan case on Karen Ann Quinlan's right to privacy, most part, for the usual cases. This suggests that they
and she was known to be permanently unconscious at are all accidental generalizations, that the moral claims
that time. Hence, Feinberg's claim that having rights made by those on both sides of the dispute do not
entails being conscious is, on its face, obviously false. touch on the essence of the matter.
Of course, it might not make sense to attribute This use of the distinction between essence and
rights to a being that would never in its natural history accident is not meant to invoke obscure metaphysical
have certain psychological traits. This modest connec- categories. Rather, it is intended to reflect the rather
tion between psychological personhood and moral atheoretical nature of the abortion discussion. If
personhood will create a place for Karen Ann Quinlan the generalization a partisan in the abortion dispute
and the temporarily unconscious. But then it makes a adopts were derived from the reason why ending the
place for fetuses also. Hence, it does not serve Feinberg's life of a human being is wrong, then there could not be
pro-choice purposes. Accordingly, it seems that the pro- exceptions to that generalization unless some special
choicer will have as much difficulty bridging the gap case obtains in which there are even more powerful
between psychological personhood and personhood countervailing reasons. Such generalizations would
in the moral sense as the anti-abortionist has bridging not be merely accidental generalizations; they would
the gap between being a biological human being and point to, or be based upon, the essence of the wrong-
being a human being in the moral sense. ness of killing, what it is that makes killing wrong. All
this suggests that a necessary condition of resolving valued by me as I grow older and as my values and
the abortion controversy is a more theoretical account capacities change. When I am killed, I am deprived
of the wrongness of killing. After all, if we merely both of what I now value which would have been part
believe, but do not understand, why killing adult of my future personal Hfe, but also what I would come
human beings such as ourselves is wrong, how could to value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of
we conceivably show that abortion is either immoral the value of my future. Inflicting this loss on me is ulti-
or permissible? mately what makes killing me wrong. This being the
case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult
human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of
II.
his or her future.
In order to develop such an account, we can start from How should this rudimentary theory of the
the following unproblematic assumption concerning wrongness of killing be evaluated? It cannot be faulted
our own case: it is wrong to kill LIS. Why is it wrong? for deriving an 'ought' from an 'is', for it does not.
Some answers can be easily eliminated. It might be The analysis assumes that killing me (or you, reader)
said that what makes killing us wrong is that a killing is prima facie seriously wrong. The pOint of the analy-
brutalizes the one who kills. But the brutalization consis is to establish which natural property ultimately
sists of being inured to the performance of an act that explains the wrongness of the killing, given that it is
is hideously immoral; hence, the brutalization does wrong. A natural property will ultimately explain the
not explain the immorality. It might be said that what wrongness of killing, only if (1) the explanation fits
makes killing us wrong is the great loss others would with our intuitions about the matter and (2) there is
experience due to our absence. Although such hubriS no other natural property that provides the basis for
is understandable, such an explanation does not a better explanation of the wrongness of killing. This
account for the wrongness of killing hermits, or those analysis rests on the intuition that what makes kill-
whose lives are relatively independent and whose ing a particular human or animal wrong is what it
friends find it easy to make new friends. does to that particular human or animal. What makes
A more obvious answer is better. What primarily killing wrong is some natural effect or other of the
makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the mur- killing. Some would deny this. For instance, a divine-
derer nor its effect on the victim's friends and rela- command theorist in ethics would deny it. Surely this
tives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of one's life denial is, however, one of those features of divine-
is one of the greatest losses one can suffer. The loss of command theory which renders it so implausible.
one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, The claim that what makes killing wrong is the
projects, and enjoyments that would otherwise have loss of the victim's future is directly supported by two
constituted one's future. Therefore, killing someone considerations. In the first place, this theory explains
is wrong, primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) why we regard killing as one of the worst of crimes.
the greatest possible losses on the victim. To describe Killing is especially wrong, because it deprives the vic-
this as the loss of life can be misleading, however. The tim of more than perhaps any other crime. In the sec-
change in my biological state does not by itself make ond place, people with AIDS or cancer who know they
killing me wrong. The effect of the loss of my biologi- are dying believe, of course, that dying is a very bad
cal life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, thing for them. They believe that the loss of a future
experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise to them that they would otherwise have experienced
have constituted my future personal life. These activi- is what makes their premature death a very bad thing
ties, projects, experiences, and enjoyments are either for them. A better theory of the wrongness of killing
valuable for their own sakes or are means to something would require a different natural property associated
else that is valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my with killing which better fits with the attitudes of the
future are not valued by me now, but will come to be dying. What could it be?
The view that what makes killing wrong is the loss prohibition of active euthanasia, but that is another
to the victim of the value of the victim's future gains matter. Sanctity-of-human-life theories seem to hold
additional support when some of its implications are that active euthanasia is seriously wrong even in an
examined. In the first place, it is incompatible with the individual case where there seems to be good reason
view that it is wrong to kill only beings who are biolog- for it independently of public policy considerations.
ically human. It is possible that there exists a different This consequence is most implausible, and it is a
species from another planet whose members have a plus for the claim that the loss of a future of value is
future like ours. Since having a future like that is what what makes killing wrong that it does not share this
makes killing someone wrong, this theory entails that consequence.
it would be wrong to kill members of such a species. In the fourth place, the account of the wrongness
Hence, this theory is opposed to the claim that only of killing defended in this essay does straightforwardly
life that is biologically human has great moral worth, entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill chil-
a claim which many anti-abortionists have seemed to dren and infants, for we do presume that they have
adopt. This opposition, which this theory has in com- futures of value. Since we do believe that it is wrong to
mon with personhood theories, seems to be a merit of kill defenseless little babies, it is important that a the-
the theory. ory of the wrongness of killing easily account for this.
In the second place, the claim that the loss of one's Personhood theories of the wrongness of killing, on
future is the wrong-making feature of one's being the other hand, cannot straightforwardly account for
killed entails the possibility that the futures of some the wrongness of killing infants and young children.
actual nonhuman mammals on our own planet are Hence, such theories must add special ad hoc accounts
sufficiently like ours that it is seriously wrong to kill of the wrongness of killing the young. The plaUSibil-
them also. Whether some animals do have the same ity of such ad hoc theories seems to be a function of
right to life as human beings depends on adding to how desperately one wants such theories to work. The
the account of the wrongness of killing some addi- claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a kill-
tional account of just what it is about my future or the ing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future
futures of other adult human beings which makes it accounts for the wrongness of killing young children
wrong to kill us. No such additional account will be and infants directly; it makes the wrongness of such
offered in this essay. Undoubtedly, the provision acts as obvious as we actually think it is. This is a fur-
of such an account would be a very difficult matter. ther merit of this theory. Accordingly, it seems that
Undoubtedly, any such account would be quite con- this value of a future-like-ours theory of the wrong-
troversial. Hence, it surely should not reflect badly on ness of killing shares strengths of both sanctity-of-life
this sketch of an elementary theory of the wrongness and personhood accounts while avoiding weaknesses
of killing that it is indeterminate with respect to some of both. In addition, it meshes with a central intuition
very difficult issues regarding animal rights. concerning what makes killing wrong.
In the third place, the claim that the loss of one's The claim that the primary wrong-making fea-
future is the wrong-making feature of one's being ture of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of
killed does not entail, as sanctity of human life theo- its future has obVious consequences for the ethics of
ries do, that active euthanasia is wrong. Persons who abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes a set
are severely and incurably ill, who face a future of of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are
pain and despair, and who wish to die will not have identical with the futures of adult human beings and
suffered a loss if they are killed. It is, strictly speak- are identical with the futures of young children. Since
ing, the value of a human's future which makes kill- the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong
ing wrong in this theory. This being so, killing does to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason
not necessarily wrong some persons who are sick and that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is
dying. Of course, there may be other reasons for a prima facie seriously morally wrong.
This argument does not rely on the invalid infer- actions is a property of actions sometimes directed at
ence that, since it is wrong to kill persons, it is wrong individuals other than postnatal human beings. If the
to kill potential persons also. The category that is mor- structure of the argument for the wrongness of the
ally central to this analysis is the category of having a wanton infliction of pain on animals is sound, then
valuable future like ours; it is not the category of per- the structure of the argument for the prima facie seri-
sonhood. The argument to the conclusion that abor- ous wrongness of abortion is also sound, for the struc-
tion is prima facie seriously morally wrong proceeded ture of the two arguments is the same. The structure
independently of the notion of person or potential common to both is the key to the explanation of how
person or any eqUivalent. Someone may wish to start the wrongness of abortion can be demonstrated with-
with this analysis in terms of the value of a human out recourse to the category of person. In neither argu-
future, conclude that abortion is, except perhaps in ment is that category crucial.
rare circumstances, seriously morally wrong, infer This defense of an argument for the wrongness of
that fetuses have the right to life, and then call fetuses abortion in terms of a structurally similar argument
"persons" as a result of their having the right to life. for the wrongness of the wanton infliction of pain on
Clearly, in this case, the category of person is being animals succeeds only if the account regarding ani-
used to state the conclusion of the analysis rather than mals is the correct account. Is it? In the first place, it
to generate the argument of the analysis. seems plausible. In the second place, its major compe-
The structure of this anti-abortion argument can tition is Kant's account. Kant believed that we do not
be both illuminated and defended by comparing it to have direct duties to animals at all, because they are
what appears to be the best argument for the wrong- not persons. Hence, Kant had to explain and justify
ness of the wanton infliction of pain on animals. This the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals on the
latter argument is based on the assumption that it is grounds that llhe who is hard in his dealings with ani-
prima facie wrong to inflict pain on me (or you, reader). mals becomes hard also in his dealing with men.,,2 The
What is the natural property associated with the inflic- problem with Kant's account is that there seems to be
tion of pain which makes such infliction wrong? The no reason for accepting this latter claim unless Kant's
obvious answer seems to be that the infliction of pain account is rejected. If the alternative to Kant's account
causes suffering and that suffering is a misfortune. is accepted, then it is easy to understand why some-
The suffering caused by the infliction of pain is what one who is indifferent to inflicting pain on animals is
makes the wanton infliction of pain on me wrong. also indifferent to inflicting pain on humans, for one
The wanton infliction of pain on other adult humans is indifferent to what makes inflicting pain wrong in
causes suffering. The wanton infliction of pain on ani- both cases. But, if Kant's account is accepted, there is
mals causes suffering. Since causing suffering is what no intelligible reason why one who is hard in his deal-
makes the wanton infliction of pain wrong and since ings with animals (or crabgrass or stones) should also
the wanton infliction of pain on animals causes suf- be hard in his dealings with men. After aU, men are
fering, it follows that the wanton infliction of pain on persons: animals are no more persons than crabgrass
animals is wrong. or stones. Persons are Kant's crucial moral category.
This argument for the wrongness of the wan- Why, in short, should a Kantian accept the basic claim
ton infliction of pain on animals shares a number of in Kant's argument?
structural features with the argument for the serious Hence, Kant's argument for the wrongness of
prima facie wrongness of abortion. Both arguments inflicting pain on animals rests on a claim that, in a
start with an obvious assumption concerning what it world of Kantian moral agents, is demonstrably false.
is wrong to do to me (or you, reader). Both then look Therefore, the alternative analysis, being more plaUSible
for the characteristic or the consequence of the wrong anyway, should be accepted. Since this alternative analy-
action which makes the action wrong. Both recog- sis has the same structure as the anti-abortion argument
nize that the wrong-making feature of these immoral being defended here, we have further support for the
argument for the immorality of abortion being defended valuable experience to continue. Therefore, it might
in this essay. be said, what makes killing wrong is the discontinua-
Of course, this value of a future-like-ours argu- tion of that experience for the victim. Let us call this
ment, if sound, shows only that abortion is prima the discontinuation account. Another rival account is
facie wrong, not that it is wrong in any and all circum- based upon the obvious fact that people strongly desire
stances. Since the loss of the future to a standard fetus, to continue to live. This suggests that what makes kill-
if killed, is, however, at least as great a loss as the loss ing us so wrong is that it interferes with the fulfillment
of the future to a standard adult human being who of a strong and fundamental desire, the fulfillment
is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be jus- of which is necessary for the fulfillment of any other
tified only by the most compelling reasons. The loss desires we might have. Let us call this the desire account.
of one's life is almost the greatest misfortune that can Consider first the desire account as a rival account
happen to one. Presumably abortion could be justified of the ethics of killing which would provide the basis
in some circumstances, only if the loss consequent on for rejecting the anti-abortion position. Such an
failing to abort would be at least as great. Accordingly, account will have to be stronger than the value of a
morally permissible abortions will be rare indeed future-like-ours account of the wrongness of abor-
unless, perhaps, they occur so early in pregnancy that tion if it is to do the job expected of it. To entail the
a fetus is not yet definitely an individual. Hence, this wrongness of abortion, the value of a future-like-ours
argument should be taken as showing that abortion account has only to provide a sufficient, but not a
is presumptively very seriously wrong, where the pre- necessary, condition for the wrongness of killing. The
sumption is very strong-as strong as the presumption desire account, on the other hand, must provide us
that killing another adult human being is wrong. also with a necessary condition for the wrongness of
killing in order to generate a pro-choice conclusion
III. on abortion. The reason for this is that presumably
the argument from the desire account moves from the
How complete an account of the wrongness of killing claim that what makes killing wrong is interference
does the value of a future-like-ours account have to with a very strong desire to the claim that abortion
be in order that the wrongness of abortion is a conse- is not wrong because the fetus lacks a strong desire to
quence? This account does not have to be an account live. Obviously, this inference fails if someone's hav-
of the necessary conditions for the wrongness of killing the desire to live is not a necessary condition of its
ing. Some persons in nursing homes may lack valuable being wrong to kill that individual.
human futures, yet it may be wrong to kill them for One problem with the desire account is that we do
other reasons. Furthermore, this account does not regard it as seriously wrong to kill persons who have
obviously have to be the sole reason killing is wrong little desire to live or who have no desires to live or,
where the victim did have a valuable future. This anal- indeed, have a desire not to live. We believe it is seri-
ysis claims only that, for any killing where the victim ously wrong to kill the unconscious, the sleeping,
did have a valuable future like ours, having that future those who are tired of life, and those who are suicidal.
by itself is sufficient to create the strong presumption The value-of-a-human-future account renders stan-
that the killing is seriously wrong. dard morality intelligible in these cases; these cases
One way to overturn the value of a future-like-ours appear to be incompatible with the desire account.
argument would be to find some account of the wrong- The desire account is subject to a deeper difficulty.
ness of killing which is at least as intelligible and which We desire life, because we value the goods of this life.
has different implications for the ethics of abortion. The goodness of life is not secondary to our desire for
Two rival accounts possess at least some degree of plau- it. If this were not so, the pain of one's own premature
sibility. One account is based on the obvious fact that death could be done away with merely by an appro-
people value the experience of living and wish for that priate alteration in the configuration of one's desires.
This is absurd. Hence, it would seem that it is the loss of Is the discontinuation account just as good an
the goods of one's future, not the interference with the account as the value of a future-like-ours account?
fulfillment of a strong desire to live, which accounts The discontinuation account will not be adequate
ultimately for the wrongness of killing. at all, if it does not refer to the value of the experi-
It is worth noting that, if the desire account is ence that may be discontinued. One does not want
modified so that it does not provide a necessary, but the discontinuation account to make it wrong to kill
only a sufficient, condition for the wrongness of kill- a patient who begs for death and who is in severe
ing, the desire account is compatible with the value pain that cannot be relieved short of killing. (I leave
of a future-like-ours account. The combined accounts open the question of whether it is wrong for other
will yield an anti-abortion ethic. This suggests that reasons.) Accordingly, the discontinuation account
one can retain what is intuitively plausible about the must be more than a bare discontinuation account.
desire account without a challenge to the basic argu- It must make some reference to the positive value of
ment of this paper. the patient's experiences. But, by the same token,
It is also worth noting that, if future desires the value of a future-like-ours account cannot be a
have moral force in a modified desire account of the bare future account either. Just having a future surely
wrongness of killing, one can find support for an does not itself rule out killing the above patient. This
anti-abortion ethic even in the absence of a value of account must make some reference to the value of the
a future-like-ours account. If one decides that a mor- patient's future experiences and projects also. Hence,
ally relevant property, the possession of which is suf- both accounts involve the value of experiences, proj-
ficient to make it wrong to kill some individual, is the ects, and activities. So far we still have symmetry
desire at some future time to live-one might decide to between the accounts.
justify one's refusal to kill suicidal teenagers on these The symmetry fades, however, when we focus
grounds, for example-then, since typical fetuses will on the time period of the value of the experiences,
have the desire in the future to live, it is wrong to kill etc., which has moral consequences. Although both
typical fetuses. Accordingly, it does not seem that a accounts leave open the possibility that the patient
desire account of the wrongness of killing can provide in our example may be killed, this possibility is left
a justification of a pro-choice ethic of abortion which open only in virtue of the utterly bleak future for the
is nearly as adequate as the value of a human-future patient. It makes no difference whether the patient's
justification of an anti-abortion ethic. immediate past contains intolerable pain, or consists
The discontinuation account looks more promis- in being in a coma (which we can imagine is a situa-
ing as an account of the wrongness of killing. It seems tion of indifference), or consists in a life of value. If
just as intelligible as the value of a future-like-ours the patient's future is a future of value, we want our
account, but it does not justify an anti-abortion posi- account to make it wrong to kill the patient. If the
tion. Obviously, if it is the continuation of one's activi- patient's future is intolerable, whatever his or her
ties, experiences, and projects, the loss of which makes immediate past, we want our account to allow kill-
killing wrong, then it is not wrong to kill fetuses for that ing the patient. Obviously, then, it is the value of that
reason, for fetuses do not have experiences, activities, patient's future which is doing the work in rendering
and projects to be continued or discontinued. Accord- the morality of killing the patient intelligible.
ingly, the discontinuation account does not have the This being the case, it seems clear that whether
anti-abortion consequences that the value of a future- one has immediate past experiences or not does not
like-ours account has. Yet, it seems as intelligible as the work in the explanation of what makes killing wrong.
value of a future-like-ours account, for when we think The addition the discontinuation account makes to
of what would be wrong with our being killed, it does the value of a human future account is otiose. Its addi-
seem as if it is the discontinuation of what makes our tion to the value-of-a-future account plays no role at
lives worthwhile which makes killing us wrong. all in rendering intelligible the wrongness of killing.
Therefore, it can be discarded with the discontinua- Accordingly, Tooley concludes that abortion cannot
tion account of which it is a part. be seriously prima facie wrong. 3
What could be the evidence for Tooley's basic
IV.
claim? Tooley once argued that individuals have a
prima faCie right to what they desire and that the lack
The analysis of the previous section suggests that of the capacity to desire something undercuts the
alternative general accounts of the wrongness of kill- basis of one's right to it.4 This argument plainly will
ing are either inadequate or unsuccessful in getting not succeed in the context of the analysis of this essay,
around the anti-abortion consequences of the value however, since the point here is to establish the fetus's
of a future-like-ours argument. A different strategy for right to life on other grounds. Tooley's argument
avoiding these anti-abortion consequences involves assumes that the right to life cannot be established
limiting the scope of the value of a future argument. in general on some basis other than the desire for life.
More precisely, the strategy involves arguing that This position was considered and rejected in the pre-
fetuses lack a property that is essential for the value-of- ceding section of this paper.
a-future argument (or for any anti-abortion argument) One might attempt to defend Tooley's basic claim
to apply to them. on the grounds that, because a fetus cannot apprehend
One move of this sort is based upon the claim that continued life as a benefit, its continued life cannot be
a necessary condition of one's future being valuable is a benefit or cannot be something it has a right to or
that one values it. Value implies a valuer. Given this cannot be something that is in its interest. This might
one might argue that, since fetuses cannot value their be defended in terms of the general proposition that,
futures, their futures are not valuable to them. Hence, if an individual is literally incapable of caring about or
it does not seriously wrong them deliberately to end taking an interest in some X, then one does not have
their lives. a right to X or X is not a benefit or X is not something
This move fails, however, because of some ambi- that is in one's interest.
guities. Let us assume that something cannot be of Each member of this family of claims seems to be
value unless it is valued by someone. This does not open to objections. As John C. Stevens 5 has pointed
entail that my life is of no value unless it is valued by out, one may have a right to be treated with a certain
me. I may think, in a period of despair, that my future medical procedure (because of a health insurance
is of no worth whatsoever, but I may be wrong because policy one has purchased), even though one can-
others rightly see value-even great value-in it. Fur- not conceive of the nature of the procedure. And, as
thermore, my future can be valuable to me even if Tooley himself has pointed out, persons who have
I do not value it. This is the case when a young per- been indoctrinated, or drugged, or rendered tempo-
son attempts suicide, but is rescued and goes on to sig- rarily unconscious may be literally incapable of car-
nificant human achievements. Such young people's ing about or taking an interest in something that is
futures are ultimately valuable to them, even though in their interest or is something to which they have
such futures do not seem to be valuable to them at a right, or is something that benefits them. Hence,
the moment of attempted suicide. A fetus's future can the Tooley claim that would restrict the scope of the
be valuable to it in the same way. Accordingly, this value of a future-like-ours argument is undermined by
attempt to limit the anti-abortion argument fails. counterexamples.
Another similar attempt to reject the anti-abortion Finally, Paul Bassen6 has argued that, even though
position is based on [Michael] Tooley's claim that an the prospects of an embryo might seem to be a basis
entity cannot possess the right to life unless it has for the wrongness of abortion, an embryo cannot be a
the capacity to desire its continued existence. It fol- victim and therefore cannot be wronged. An embryo
lows that, since fetuses lack the conceptual capacity cannot be a victim, he says, because it lacks sentience.
to desire to continue to live, they lack the right to life. His central argument for this seems to be that, even
though plants and the permanently unconscious being victimized here seem far too strong. Perhaps this
are alive, they clearly cannot be victims. What is the author, due to his unrealistiC standards of excellence
explanation of this? Bassen claims that the explana- and his low self-esteem, regarded his work as unwor-
tion is that their lives consist of mere metabolism and thy of survival, even though it possessed genuine lit-
mere metabolism is not enough to ground victimiz- erary merit. Destruction of such work would surely
ability. Mentation is required. victimize its author. In such a case, empathy with the
The problem with this attempt to establish the victim concerning the loss is clearly impossible.
absence of victimizability is that both plants and the Of course, Bassen does not make the possibility of
permanently unconscious clearly lack what Bassen empathy a necessary condition of victimizability; he
calls "prospects" or what I have called "a future life requires only mentation. Hence, on Bassen's actual
like ours." Hence, it is surely open to one to argue that view, this author, as I have described him, can be a vic-
the real reason we believe plants and the permanently tim. The problem is that the basic intuition that ren-
unconscious cannot be victims is that killing them ders Bassen's view plausible is missing in the author's
cannot deprive them of a future life like ours; the real case. In order to attempt to avoid counterexamples,
reason is not their absence of present mentation. Bassen has made his thesis too weak to be supported
Bassen recognizes that his view is subject to this by the intuitions that suggested it.
difficulty, and he recognizes that the case of children Even so, the mentation requirement on victim-
seems to support this difficulty, for "much of what we izability is still subject to counterexamples. Suppose
do for children is based on prospects." He argues, how- a severe accident renders me totally unconscious
ever, that, in the case of children and in other such for a month, after which I recover. Surely killing me
cases, "potentially comes into play only where victim- while 1 am unconscious victimizes me, even though
izability has been secured on other grounds .... " I am incapable of mentation during that time. It fol-
Bassen's defense of his view is patently question- lows that Bassen's thesis fails. Apparently, attempts
begging, since what is adequate to secure victimiz- to restrict the value of a future-like-ours argument
ability is exactly what is at issue. His examples do not so that fetuses do not fall within its scope do not
support his Own view against the thesis of this essay. succeed.
Of course, embryos can be victims: when their lives
are deliberately terminated, they are deprived of their v.
futures of value, their prospects. This makes them
victims, for it directly wrongs them. In this essay, it has been argued that the correct ethic
The seeming plausibility of Bassen's view stems of the wrongness of killing can be extended to fetal
from the fact that paradigmatic cases of imagining life and used to show that there is a strong presump-
someone as a victim involve empathy, and empathy tion that any abortion is morally impermissible. If the
requires mentation of the victim. The victims of flood, ethic of killing adopted here entails, however, that
famine, rape, or child abuse are all persons with whom contraception is also seriously immoral, then there
we can empathize. That empathy seems to be part of would appear to be a difficulty with the analysis of
seeing them as victims. this essay.
In spite of the strength of these examples, the But this analysis does not entail that contracep-
attractive intuition that a situation in which there tion is wrong. Of course, contraception prevents the
is victimization requires the possibility of empathy actualization of a possible future of value. Hence, it
is subject to counterexamples. Consider a case that follows from the claim that futures of value should be
Bassen himself offers: "posthumous obliteration of an maximized that contraception is prima facie immoral.
author's work constitutes a misfortune for him only This obligation to maximize does not exist, however;
if he had wished his work to endure" ... The condi- furthermore, nothing in the ethics of killing in this
tions Bassen wishes to impose upon the possibility of paper entails that it does. The ethics of killing in this
essay would entail that contraception is wrong only to make killing an adult human being wrong, abor-
if something were denied a human future of value by tion is wrong. This way of dealing with the problem
contraception. Nothing at all is denied such a future of abortion seems superior to other approaches to the
by contraception, however. ethics of abortion, because it rests on an ethics of kill-
Candidates for a subject of harm by contracep- ing which is close to self-evident, because the crucial
tion fall into four categories: (1) some sperm or other, morally relevant property clearly applies to fetuses,
(2) some ovum or other, (3) a sperm and an ovum and because the argument avoids the usual equivo-
separately, and (4) a sperm and an ovum together. cations of 'human life', 'human being', or 'person'.
Assigning the harm to some sperm is utterly arbi- The argument rests neither on religious claims nor
trary, for no reason can be given for making a sperm on Papal dogma. It is not subject to the objection of
the subject of harm rather than an ovum. Assigning uspeciesism." Its soundness is compatible with the
the harm to some ovum is utterly arbitrary, for no moral permissibility of euthanasia and contracep-
reason can be given for making an ovum the subject tion. It deals with our intuitions concerning young
of harm rather than a sperm. One might attempt to children.
avoid these problems by insisting that contraception Finally, this analysis can be viewed as resolving a
deprives both the sperm and the ovum separately of standard problem-indeed, the standard problem-
a valuable future like ours. On this alternative, too concerning the ethics of abortion. Clearly, it is wrong
many futures are lost. Contraception was supposed to kill adult human beings. Clearly, it is not wrong to
to be wrong, because it deprived us of one future end the life of some arbitrarily chosen single human
of value, not two. One might attempt to avoid this cell. Fetuses seem to be like arbitrarily chosen human
problem by holding that contraception deprives cells in some respects and like adult humans in other
the combination of sperm and ovum of a valuable respects. The problem of the ethics of abortion is the
future like ours. But here the definite article mis- problem of determining the fetal property that settles
leads. At the time of contraception, there are hun- this moral controversy. The thesis of this essay is that
dreds of millions of sperm, one (released) ovum and the problem of the ethics of abortion, so understood,
millions of possible combinations of all of these. is solvable.
There is no actual combination at all. Is the subject
of the loss to be a merely possible combination?
Which one? This alternative does not yield an actual NOTES
subject of harm either. Accordingly, the immoral-
ity of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a 1. Joel Feinberg, "Abortion," in Matters of Life and Death: New
future-like-ours argument simply because there is no Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Tom Regan (New
York: Random House, 1986), p. 270.
nonarbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the
case of contraception. 2. "Duties to Animals and Spirits," in Lectures Oil Etllics, trans.
LOius Infeld (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 239.
3. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford,
VI.
1984), pp. 46-47.
The purpose of this essay has been to set out an argu- 4. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, pp. 44-45.
ment for the serious presumptive wrongness of 5. "Must the Bearer of a Right Have the Concept of That to
abortion subject to the assumption that the moral per- Which He Has a Right?" Etllics 95, no. 1 (1984): 68-74.
missibility of abortion stands or falls on the moral sta- 6. "Present Sakes and Future Prospects: The Status of Early
tus of the fetus. Since a fetus possesses a property, the Abortion," Philosoplly and Public Affairs II, no. 4 (1982):
possession of which in adult human beings is sufficient 314-37.
From Virtue Theory and Abortion

ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE
* * * have a moral right to do as they choose with their own

As everyone knows, the morality of abortion is com- bodies, or, more particularly, to terminate their preg-
monly discussed in relation to just two consider- nancies, then it may well follow that a law forbidding
ations: first, and predominantly, the status of the fetus abortion would be unjust. Indeed, even if they have
and whether or not it is the sort of thing that mayor no such right, such a law might be, as things stand
may not be innocuously or justifiably killed; and sec- at the moment, unjust, or impractical, or inhumane:
ond, and less predominantly (when, that is, the dis- on this issue I have nothing to say in this article. But,
cussion concerns the morality of abortion rather than putting all questions about the justice or injustice of
the question of permissible legislation in a just soci- laws to one side, and supposing only that women have
ety), women's rights. If one thinks within this familiar such a moral right, nothing follows from this supposi-
framework, one may well be puzzled about what virtue tion about the morality of abortion, according to vir-
theory, as such, could contribute. Some people assume tue theory, once it is noted (quite generally, not with
the discussion will be conducted solely in terms of particular reference to abortion) that in exercising a
what the virtuous agent would or would not do ... moral right I can do something cruel, or callous, or
Others assume that only justice, or at most justice and selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsid-
charity, will be applied to the issue, generating a dis- erate, disloyal, dishonest-that is, act viciously.2 Love
cussion very similar to )udith)arvis Thomson's.· and friendship do not survive their parties' constantly
Now if this is the way the virtue theorist's discus- insisting on their rights, nor do people live well when
sion of abortion is imagined to be, no wonder people they think that getting what they have a right to is of
think little of it. It seems obvious in advance that in preeminent importance; they harm others, and they
any such discussion there must be either a great deal of harm themselves. So whether women have a moral
extremely tendentious application of the virtue terms right to terminate their pregnancies is irrelevant
just, charitable, and so on or a lot of rhetorical appeal within virtue theory, for it is irrelevant to the question
to "this is What only the virtuous agent knows." But "In having an abortion in these circumstances, would
these are caricatures; they fail to appreciate the way in the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?"
which virtue theory quite transforms the discussion of What about the consideration of the status of the
abortion by dismissing the two familiar dominating fetus-what can Virtue theory say about that? One
considerations as, in a way, fundamentally irrelevant. might say that this issue is not in the province of any
In what way or ways, I hope to make both clear and moral theory; it is a metaphysical question, and an
plausible.
extremely difficult one at that. Must virtue theory then
Let us first consider women's rights. Let me wait upon metaphysics to come up with the answer?
emphasize again that we are discussing the morality At first sight it might seem so. For virtue is said to
of abortion, not the rights and wrongs of laws prohib- involve knowledge, and part of this knowledge con-
iting or permitting it. If we suppose that women do sists in having the right attitude to things. "Right"
here does not just mean "morally right" or "proper"
Rosalind Hursthouse. excerpts from "Virtue Theory and Abor- or "nice" in the modern sense; it means "accurate,
tion." Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(3): 233-44. Copyright © true." One cannot have the right or correct attitude to
1991 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permission of something if the attitude is based on or involves false
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. beliefs. And this suggests that if the status of the fetus
is relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion, other, nearly everything written on the status of the
its status must be known, as a truth, to the fully wise fetus and its bearing on the abortion issue would be
and virtuous person. consistent with the human reproductive facts (to say
But the sort of wisdom that the fully virtuous per- nothing of family life) being totally different from
son has is not supposed to be recondite; it does not what they are. Imagine that you are an alien extra-
call for fancy philosophical sophistication, and it does terrestrial anthropologist who does not know that
not depend upon, let alone wait upon, the discover- the human race is roughly 50 percent female and 50
ies of academic philosophers. 3 And this entails the percent male, or that our only (natural) form of repro-
following, rather startling, conclusion: that the status duction involves heterosexual intercourse, viviparous
of the fetus-that issue over which so much ink has birth, and the female's (and only the female's) being
been spilt-is, according to virtue theory, simply not pregnant for nine months, or that females are capable
relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion of childbearing from late childhood to late middle
(within, that is, a secular morality). age, or that childbearing is painful, dangerous, and
Or rather, since that is clearly too radical a conclu- emotionally charged-do you think you would pick
sion, it is in a sense relevant, but only in the sense that up these facts from the hundreds of articles written on
the familiar biological facts are relevant. By "the famil- the status of the fetus? I am quite sure you would not.
iar biological facts" I mean the facts that most human And that, I think, shows that the current philosophi-
societies are and have been familiar with-that, stan- cal literature on abortion has got badly out of touch
dardly (but not invariably), pregnancy occurs as the with reality.
result of sexual intercourse, that it lasts about nine Now if we are using virtue theory, our first ques-
months, during which time the fetus grows and devel- tion is not "What do the familiar biological facts
ops, that standardly it terminates in the birth of a liv- show-what can be derived from them about the sta-
ing baby, and that this is how we all come to be. tus of the fetus?" but "How do these facts figure in the
lt might be thought that this distinction- practical reasoning, actions and paSSions, thoughts
between the familiar biological facts and the status and reactions, of the virtuous and the nonvirtuous?
of the fetUS-is a distinction without a difference. But What is the mark of having the right attitude to these
this is not so. To attach relevance to the status of the facts and what manifests having the wrong attitude
fetus, in the sense in which virtue theory claims it is to them?" This immediately makes essentially rele-
not relevant, is to be gripped by the conviction that vant not only all the facts about human reproduction
we must go beyond the familiar biological facts, deriv- I mentioned above, but a whole range of facts about
ing some sort of conclusion from them, such as that our emotions in relation to them as well. I mean such
the fetus has rights, or is not a person, or something facts as that human parents, both male and female,
similar. It is also to believe that this exhausts the rel- tend to care passionately about their offspring, and
evance of the familiar biological facts, that all they are that family relationships are among the deepest and
relevant to is the status of the fetus and whether or not strongest in our lives-and, significantly, among the
it is the sort of thing that mayor may not be killed. longest-lasting.
These convictions, I suspect, are rooted in the These facts make it obvious that pregnancy is not
desire to solve the problem of abortion by getting it just one among many other physical conditions; and
to fall under some general rule such as "You ought hence that anyone who genuinely believes that an
not to kill anything with the right to life but may kill abortion is comparable to a haircut or an appendec-
anything else." But they have resulted in what should tomy is mistaken. 4 The fact that the premature termi-
surely strike any nonphilosopher as a most bizarre nation of a pregnancy is, in some sense, the cutting off
aspect of nearly all the current philosophical litera- of a new human life, and thereby, like the procreation
ture on abortion, namely, that, far from treating abor- of a new human life, connects with all our thoughts
tion as a unique moral problem, markedly unlike any about human life and death, parenthood, and family
relationships, must make it a serious matter. To dis- that matches the fact that deep grief over miscarriage
regard this fact about it, to think of abortion as noth- in the later stages is more appropriate than it is over
ing but the killing of something that does not matter, miscarriage in the earlier stages (when, that is, the
or as nothing but the exercise of some right or rights grief is solely about the loss of this child, not about,
one has, or as the incidental means to some desirable as might be the case, the loss of one's only hope of
state of affairs, is to do something callous and light- having a child or of having one's husband's child).
minded, the sort of thing that no virtuous and wise Imagine (or recall) a woman who already has chil-
person would do. It is to have the wrong attitude not dren; she had not intended to have more, but finds
only to fetuses, but more generally to human life and herself unexpectedly pregnant. Though contrary to
death, parenthood, and family relationships. her plans, the pregnancy, once established as a fact,
Although I say that the facts make this obvious, is welcomed-and then she loses the embryo almost
I know that this is one of my tendentious pOints. In immediately. If this were bemoaned as a tragedy, it
partial support of it I note that even the most dedi- would, I think, be a misapplication of the concept of
cated proponents of the view that deliberate abortion what is tragiC. But it may still properly be mourned
is just like an appendectomy or haircut rarely hold the as a loss. The grief is expressed in such terms as
same view of spontaneous abortion, that is, miscar- "I shall always wonder how she or he would have
riage. It is not so tendentious of me to claim that to turned out" or "When I look at the others, I shall
react to people's grief over miscarriage by saying, or think, 'How different their lives would have been
even thinking, "What a fuss about nothing!" would if this other one had been part of them.'" It would,
be callous and light-minded, whereas to try to laugh I take it, be callous and light-minded to say, or think,
someone out of grief over an appendectomy scar or a "Well, she has already got four children; what's
botched haircut would not be. It is hard to give this the problem?"; it would be neither, nor arrogantly
point due prominence within act-centered theories, intrusive in the case of a close friend, to try to cor-
for the inconsistency is an inconsistency in attitude rect prolonged mourning by saying, "I know it's sad,
about the seriousness of loss of life, not in beliefs but it's not a tragedy; rejoice in the ones you have."
about which acts are right or wrong. Moreover, an The application of tragic becomes more appropri-
act-centered theorist may say, "Well, there is nothing ate as the fetus grows, for the mere fact that one has
wrong with thinking 'What a fuss about nothing!' as lived with it for longer, conscious of its existence,
long as you do not say it and hurt the person who is makes a difference. To shrug off an early abortion is
grieving. And beSides, we cannot be held responSible understandable just because it is very hard to be fully
for our thoughts, only for the intentional actions they conscious of the fetus's existence in the early stages
give rise to." But the character traits that virtue theory and hence hard to appreciate that an early abor-
emphasizes are not simply dispositions to intentional tion is the destruction of life. It is particularly hard
actions, but a seamless disposition to certain actions for the young and inexperienced to appreCiate this,
and paSSions, thoughts and reactions. because appreciation of it usually comes only with
To say that the cutting off of a human life is experience.
always a matter of some seriousness, at any stage, is I do not mean "with the experience of having an
not to deny the relevance of gradual fetal develop- abortion" (though that may be part of it) but, quite
ment. NotWithstanding the well-worn point that generally, "with the experience of life." Many women
clear boundary lines cannot be drawn, our emotions who have borne children contrast their later pregnan-
and attitudes regarding the fetus do change as it cies with their first successful one, saying that in the
develops, and again when it is born, and indeed fur- later ones they were conscious of a new life growing
ther as the baby grows. Abortion for shallow reasons in them from very early on. And, more generally, as
in the later stages is much more shocking than abor- one reaches the age at which the next generation is
tion for the same reasons in the early stages in a way coming up close behind one, the counterfactuals "If
I, or she, had had an abortion, Alice, or Bob, would their connection with having the right attitude to par-
not have been born" acquire a significant application, enthood and family relationships. But it may well be
which casts a new light on the conditionals "If I or thought that failing to bring in women's rights still
Alice have an abortion then some Caroline or Bill will leaves some important aspects of the problem of abor-
not be born." tion untouched.
The fact that pregnancy is not just one among Speaking in terms of women's rights, people some-
many physical conditions does not mean that one times say things like, "Well, it's her life you're talking
can never regard it in that light without manifest- about too, you know; she's got a right to her own life,
ing a vice. When women are in very poor physical her own happiness." And the discussion stops there.
health, or worn out from childbearing, or forced to But in the context of virtue theory, given that we are
do very physically demanding jobs, then they cannot particularly concerned with what constitutes a good
be described as self-indulgent, callous, irresponsible, human life, with what true happiness or eudaimonia
or light-minded if they seek abortions mainly with a is, this is no place to stop. We go on to ask, "And is this
view to avoiding pregnancy as the physical condition life of hers a good one? Is she living well?"
that it is. To go through with a pregnancy when one is If we are to go on to talk about good human lives,
utterly exhausted, or when one's job consists of crawl- in the context of abortion, we have to bring in our
ing along tunnels hauling coal, as many women in thoughts about the value of love and family life, and
the nineteenth century were obliged to do, is perhaps our proper emotional development through a natu-
heroic, but people who do not achieve heroism are not rallife cycle. The familiar facts support the view that
necessarily vicious. That they can view the pregnancy parenthood in general, and motherhood and child-
only as eight months of misery, followed by hours if bearing in particular, are intrinsically worthwhile, are
not days of agony and exhaustion, and abortion only among the things that can be correctly thought to be
as the blessed escape from this prospect, is entirely partially constitutive of a flourishing human life. If
understandable and does not manifest any lack of this is right, then a woman who opts for not being a
serious respect for human life or a shallow attitude to mother (at all, or again, or now) by opting for abortion
motherhood. What it does show is that something is may thereby be manifesting a flawed grasp of what her
terribly amiss in the conditions of their lives, which life should be, and be about-a grasp that is childish,
make it so hard to recognize pregnancy and childbear- or grossly materialistic, or shortsighted, or shallow.
ing as the good that they can be. I said "may thereby": this need not be so. Consider,
for instance, a woman who has already had several
* * * children and fears that to have another will seriously
The foregoing discussion, insofar as it emphasizes affect her capacity to be a good mother to the ones she
the right attitude to human life and death, parallels to has-she does not show a lack of appreciation of the
a certain extent those standard discussions of abortion intrinsic value of being a parent by opting for abor-
that concentrate on it solely as an issue of killing. But tion. Nor does a woman who has been a good mother
it does not, as those discussions do, gloss over the fact, and is approaching the age at which she may be look-
emphasized by those who discuss the morality of abor- ing forward to being a good grandmother. Nor does a
tion in terms of women's rights, that abortion, wildly woman who discovers that her pregnancy may well
unlike any other form of killing, is the termination of kill her, and opts for abortion and adoption. Nor, nec-
a pregnancy, which is a condition of a woman's body essarily, does a woman who has decided to lead a life
and results in her having a child if it is not aborted. centered around some other worthwhile activity or
This fact is given due recognition not by appeal to activities with which motherhood would compete.
women's rights but by emphasizing the relevance of People who are childless by choice are sometimes
the familiar biological and psychological facts and described as "irresponsible," or "selfish," or "refusing
to grow up," or "not knowing what life is about." or guilt inappropriate. For, by virtue of the fact that
But one can hold that having children is intrinsi- a human life has been cut short, some evil has prob-
cally worthwhile without endorsing this, for we are, ably been brought about,S and that circumstances
after all, in the happy position of there being more make the decision to bring about some evil the right
worthwhile things to do than can be fitted into one decision will be a ground for guilt if getting into those
lifetime. Parenthood, and motherhood in particu- circumstances in the first place itself manifested a
lar, even if granted to be intrinsically worthwhile, flaw in character.
undoubtedly take up a lot of one's adult life, leaving What "gets one into those circumstances" in
no room for some other worthwhile pursuits. But the case of abortion is, except in the case of rape,
some women who choose abortion rather than have one's sexual activity and one's chOices, or the lack
their first child, and some men who encourage their of them, about one's sexual partner and about con-
partners to choose abortion, are not avoiding par- traception. The virtuous woman (which here of
enthood for the sake of other worthwhile pursuits, course does not mean simply "chaste woman" but
but for the worthless one of "having a good time," "woman with the virtues") has such character traits
or for the pursuit of some false vision of the ideals as strength, independence, resoluteness, decisiveness,
of freedom or self-realization. And some others who self-confidence, responsibility, serious-mindedness,
say "I am not ready for parenthood yet" are making and self-determination-and no one, I think, could
some sort of mistake about the extent to which one deny that many women become pregnant in circum-
can manipulate the circumstances of one's life so as stances in which they cannot welcome or cannot face
to make it fulfill some dream that one has. Perhaps the thought of having this child precisely because they
one's dream is to have two perfect children, a girl and lack one or some of these character traits. So even in
a boy, within a perfect marriage, in financially secure the cases where the decision to have an abortion is
circumstances, with an interesting job of one's own. the right one, it can still be the reflection of a moral
But to care too much about that dream, to demand failing-not because the decision itself is weak or cow-
of life that it give it to one and act accordingly, may ardly or irresolute or irresponsible or light-minded,
be both greedy and foolish, and is to run the risk of but because lack of the requisite opposite of these fail-
missing out on happiness entirely. Not only may fate ings landed one in the circumstances in the first place.
make the dream impossible, or destroy it, but one's Hence the common universalized claim that guilt
own attachment to it may make it impOSSible. Good and remorse are never appropriate emotions about
marriages, and the most promising children, can be an abortion is denied. They may be appropriate, and
destroyed by just one adult's excessive demand for appropriately inculcated, even when the deCision was
perfection. the right one.
Once again, this is not to deny that girls may Another motivation for bringing women's
quite properly say III am not ready for motherhood rights into the discussion may be to attempt to cor-
yet," especially in our society, and, far from mani- rect the implication, carried by the killing-centered
festing irresponsibility or light-mindedness, show approach, that insofar as abortion is wrong, it is a
an appropriate modesty or humility, or a fearfulness wrong that only women do, or at least (given the pre-
that does not amount to cowardice. However, even ponderance of male doctors) that only women insti-
when the deCision to have an abortion is the right gate. I do not myself believe that we can thus escape
decision-one that does not itself fall under a vice- the fact that nature bears harder on women than it
related term and thereby one that the perfectly virtu- does on men, but virtue theory can certainly correct
ous could recommend-it does not follow that there many of the injustices that the emphasis on women's
is no sense in which having the abortion is wrong, rights is rightly concerned about. With very little
amendment, everything that has been said above 3. This is an assumption of virtue theory, and I do not
applies to boys and men too. Although the abortion attempt to defend it here. An adequate discussion of it
would require a separate article, since, although most moral
decision is, in a natural sense, the woman's decision,
philosophers would be chary of claiming that intellectual
proper to her, boys and men are often party to it,
sophistication is a necessary condition of moral wisdom
for well or ill, and even when they are not, they are or virtue, most of us, from Plato onward, tend to write as if
bound to have been party to the circumstances that this were so. Sorting out which claims about moral knowl-
brought it up. No less than girls and women, boys and edge are committed to this kind of elitism and which can,
men can, in their actions, manifest self-centeredness, albeit with difficulty, be reconciled with the idea that moral
callousness, and light-mindedness about life and knowledge can be acquired by anyone who really wants it
parenthood in relation to abortion. They can be would be a major task.
self-centered or courageous about the possibility of 4. Mary Anne Warren, in "On the Moral and Legal Status of
disability in their offspring; they need to reflect on Abortion," Monist 57 (1973), sec. 1, says of the opponents of
their sexual activity and their choices, or the lack of restrictive laws governing abortion that "their conviction
them, about their sexual partner and contraception; (for the most part) is that abortion is not a morally serious
they need to grow up and take responsibility for their and extremely unfortunate, even though sometimes justi-
own actions and life in relation to fatherhood. If it fied, act, comparable to killing in self-defense or to letting
is true, as I maintain, that insofar as motherhood is the violinist die, but rather is closer to being a morally neu-
tral act, like cutting one's hair" (italics mine). I would like
intrinsically worthwhile, being a mother is an impor-
to think that no one genuinely believes this. But certainly in
tant purpose in women's lives, being a father (rather
discussion, particularly when arguing against restrictive laws
than a mere generator) is an important purpose in or the suggestion that remorse over abortion might be appro-
men's lives as well, and it is adolescent of men to turn priate, I have found that some people say they believe it (and
a blind eye to this and pretend that they have many often cite Warren's article, albeit inaccurately, despite its
more important things to do. age). Those who allow that it is morally serious, and far from
morally neutral, have to argue against restrictive laws, or the
* * *
appropriateness ofremorse, on a very different ground from
that laid down by the premise "The fetus is just part of the
NOTES
woman's body (and she has a right to determine what hap-
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," pens to her body and should not feel guilty about anything
Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (Fall 1971): 47-66. One she does to it)."
could indeed regard this article as proto-virtue theory (no 5. I say "some evil has probably been brought about" on
doubt to the surprise of the author) if the concepts of cal- the ground that (human) life is (usually) a good and hence
lousness and kindness were allowed more weight. (human) death usually an evil. The exceptions would be
2. One possible qualification: if one ties the concept of jus- (a) where death is actually a good or a benefit, because the
tice very closely to rights, then if women do have a moral baby that would come to be if the life were not cut short
right to terminate their pregnancies it may follow that in would be better off dead than alive, and (b) where death,
doing so they do not act unjustly. (Cf. Thomson, "A Defense though not a good, is not an evil either, because the life that
of Abortion.") But it is debatable whether even that much would be led (e.g., in a state of permanent coma) would not
follows. be a good.
CHAPTER 10
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide
For fifteen years, Terri Schiavo existed between life So it goes with all public debates on the moral
and death in that shadow land called a persistent permissibility of euthanasia. Passions rise, claims
vegetative state, a place where she was wakeful but and counterclaims collide, and stakes are high. In
without awareness or any purposeful behavior. the balance are issues of life and death, science and
Severe brain damage had left her there, with vir- religion, murder and mercy. The tragic end of Terri
tually no chance of recovery. And all the while, a Schiavo is only the most dramatic (and dramatized)
storm of caustic debate swirled around her, reach- case in a series of tragic ends that turned into widely
ing its greatest strength in the last few days before publicized moral battlegrounds (see the box "The
her death on March 31, 200S. In 1990 her heart had Death of Karen Ann Quinlan"). The moral ques-
stopped briefly because of a chemical imbalance, tions it incited are typical of such cases: Was remov-
leaving her in that twilight state, kept alive by a ing Terri Schiavo's feeding tube really a case of
feeding tube. She had left no living will, no written murder? Or was it a morally permissible act allow-
record of her wishes should she become indefinitely ing her to die with dignity and escape her bleak
incapacitated. Her husband, Michael Schiavo, condition? What if instead of stopping the tube
insisted that Terri had told him once that she would feeding, her doctors had never started it because
prefer death to being kept alive with machines. Her they deemed her situation hopeless? Would that
parents rejected his claim and demanded that Terri have been murder-or a permissible act of mercy?
be kept alive, holding out hope that with proper Or suppose that soon after Schiavo collapsed, her
care she might recover. doctors had decided to give her a lethal injection?
The battle between Michael Schiavo and Terri's Would such an act have been morally wrong? What
parents raged on in the courts for years. Again and if Schiavo had left a living will that clearly specified
again, state and federal courts sided with the hus- that she did not want to be kept alive by any means
band, while the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly if she fell into a persistent vegetative state? Would
refused to hear the case. In the final days before withdrawing the feeding tube or giving her a lethal
Terri died, President George W. Bush, the U.S. Con- injection then have been morally acceptable?
gress, the governor of Florida (where she lived), and Of course, in every instance of euthanasia there
Florida legislators weighed in on the controversy, are plenty of nonmoral questions too-primarily
supporting Terri's parents. legal, judicial, medical, scientific, and political. (In
Finally, a judge allowed the feeding tube to be the Schiavo case, for example, the moral questions
removed, and Terri Schiavo, age forty-one, died arose side by side with what most informed observ-
thirteen days later. The parents called the removal ers saw as the real issue: Who, if anyone, had the legal
"judicial homicide." A Vatican official called it "an right to decide for Schiavo what was to become of
attack against God." 1 her?) But these nonmoral concerns are intertwined
275
-
~
preserved in the Greek roots of euthanasia, which
literally means "easy death." Euthanasia makes
"~The Death of l<aren Ann Quinlan sense to many people because they believe that a
Like nothing else before it, the case of Karen quick and painless death would be preferable to a
Ann Quinlan focused the world's attention on slow and painful dying (such as the kind that some
the medical truths, the legal complexities, and terminal cancer patients endure) or a long, vegeta-
the moral problems of euthanasia. She was just tive sleep without a chance for a meaningful life.
twenty-one years old when she sustained acute As you might expect, the moral permissibility
brain damage after imbibing alcohol along with of euthanasia depends heavily on the consent of
a tranquilizer. She was left in a persistent vege- the patient (the person whose death is being con-
tative state, kept alive by a feeding tube and a sidered). Moral philosophers therefore distinguish
respirator, a machine that maintained her breath- between euthanasia that is voluntary, nonvolun-
ing mechanically. After several months, members tary, and involuntary. In voluntary euthanasia,
of her family came to accept that her recovery the patient requests or agrees to the act. She may
was hopeless and sought permission from the make the request in person or leave instructions to
courts to unplug the respirator to allow her to be followed in case she becomes incapacitated. Such
die. Finally in 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court instructions are usually in the form of an advance
granted their request. But to everyone's surprise, directive (for example, a living will), a legal docu-
she continued to breathe without the respirator ment allowing physicians to withhold or withdraw
until 1985, ten years after she slipped into the treatments if a patient becomes terminally ill and
vegetative state. She died on June 11.*
unable to express her wishes. For any voluntary
*See "Famous Cases: Karen Ann Quinlan," CBC News euthanasia request to be valid, the patient at the
Online, March 22, 200S, https://www.cbc.ca/news2/ time of the request must be competent-that is,
background/schiavo/vegetative_state.html aanuary capable of making an informed, rational choice. In
20, 201S); Barran H. Lerner, "Planning for the Long nonvoluntary euthanasia, others besides the
Goodbye," New York Times, June 18,2004.
patient (family or physicians, for example) choose
euthanasia for her because she is not competent
(due to illness or injury) and has left no instruc-
tions regarding her end-of-life preferences. Eutha-
with the moral concerns. Our task here is to apply nasia performed on infants and small children is,
moral reasoning to try to unravel the knot. of course, nonvoluntary. In involuntary eutha-
nasia, the act is carried out against the wishes of the
patient and is therefore illegal and widely regarded
as immoral.
Euthanasia is directly or indirectly bringing People also draw a distinction between active
about the death of another person for that person's and passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia is
sake. 2 It is thought to provide a benefit or a good for taking a direct action to kill someone, to carry out
the person by ending a life deemed no longer worth a "mercy killing." A doctor who gives a patient a
living-a situation that typically arises when some- lethal injection is performing active euthanasia,
one has an incurable or terminal disease that causes and so is a man who suffocates his dying brother
great suffering or when someone experiences an to spare him from an unbearably painful pass-
irreversible loss of consciousness (as in the Schiavo ing. Passive euthanasia is allowing someone
case). This notion of dying as a kind of blessing is to die by not doing something-by withholding
CHAPTER 10: EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 0 277
or withdrawing measures necessary for sustaining the agent who ultimately causes the death in active
life. A doctor, then, would be performing passive voluntary euthanasia is the physician, whereas the
euthanasia if she removed a patienes respirator, did ultimate causal agent in physician-assisted suicide is
not administer antibiotics to halt a life-threatening the patient. In the former, the physician is primarily
infection, or withdrew hydration and nutrition responsible for the killing; in the latter, the patient
(fluids and nutrients). is. In most cases, the physician provides help by pre-
Many believe that this active-passive distinc- scribing a lethal dose of drugs, which the patient
tion is essential to understanding the moral permis- then administers to himself.
sibility of euthanasia. It allows them to maintain In the United States, physician-assisted suicide is
that whereas active euthanasia is always wrong, in legal in nine states-Oregon, Washington, Hawaii,
some cases passive euthanasia may be permissible. Maine, New Jersey, Montana, Colorado, Vermont,
This view is widespread among physicians and fits and California-and in the District of Colum-
with the popular notion that killing people is mor- bia. U.S. Supreme Court rulings allow each state
ally worse than letting them die. Others, however, to decide for itself whether to legalize assisted sui-
argue that there is no moral difference between cide. The official position of the American Medical
killing and letting die: in both active and passive Association (AMA), the main professional group for
euthanasia the patient's death is caused, and they American physicians, is that "physician-assisted
are therefore morally equivalent. suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the
Taking into account the categories of VOluntary, physician's role as healer, would be difficult or
nonvoluntary, active, and passive (and disregarding impossible to control, and would pose serious soci-
involuntary), we can identify four kinds of euthana- etal risks.,,3
sia: (1) active voluntary (mercy killing at the patienes A factor that can complicate all the foregoing
request), (2) active nonvoluntary (mercy killing with- issues is the concept of death itself. One problem is
out the patienes consent or request), (3) passive that thanks to modern medical technology, deter-
voluntary (letting the patient die at her request), mining when a person is dead is not so straightfor-
and (4) passive nonvolllntary (letting the patient ward as it once seemed. Death has become more
die without his consent or request). Generally, the difficult to define. Years ago the prevailing notion
law forbids active euthanasia (either voluntary or was that a person is dead when his breathing and
nonvoluntary), and the medical profession is offi- blood flow stop (no respiration and no heartbeat).
cially opposed to it (though the views of individual But nowadays machines can keep an indiVidual's
physicians vary). Passive voluntary euthanasia is heart and lungs functioning long after the brain
legal; by law, competent patients have the right to permanently and completely shuts down. Thus we
refuse any kind of medical treatment. Passive non- can have an individual whose organs are mechani-
voluntary euthanasia may be legal provided that cally operated while he is in a coma or perSistent
someone (a family member, for example) can be des- vegetative state-for years. By the traditional defi-
ignated to make decisions on behalf of the patient. nition of death, such an individual would still
Related to, but distinct from, active voluntary be alive, but many people would insist that he is
euthanasia is physician-assisted suicide-the no longer there: he is dead. So the conventional
killing of a person by the person's own hand with notion of death seems to be inadequate.
the help of a physician. Like active voluntary eutha- Why does correctly defining death matter at
nasia, physician-assisted suicide is requested by the all? Sayan individual is in the kind of state just
patient, and the intended outcome is the patient's described. If we judge him to be dead and thus no
death for the relief of pain and suffering. But longer a person, then perhaps it would be morally
~
~
"~ landmark Court Rulings
In the past five decades, U.S. courts have several • 1997 The U.S. Supreme Court (in Vacco v. Qui/f)
times weighed in on the controversial issues of ruled that a New York State prohibition of physi-
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The fol- cian-assisted suicide did not violate the equal pro-
lowing are some of the more far-reaching rulings: tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
• 1976 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Court acknowledged a crucial distinction between
a life-sustaining respirator could be legally dis- withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and assisted
connected from Karen Ann Quinlan, a young suicide. People may refuse life-sustaining treat-
woman who had lapsed into a persistent vegeta- ment, but assisted suicide is prohibited.
tive state. After it was removed, she remained • 2006 In a 6-3 decision in Gonzales v. Oregon, the
comatose and lived for another ten years, finally U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. attorney
dying in June 1985. general is not authorized to ban controlled sub-
• 1990 The U.S. Supreme Court (in Cruzan v. Direc- stances used in physician-assisted suicide. The
tor; Missouri Department of Health) ruled that decision had the effect of upholding Oregon's
a feeding tube could be removed from Nancy Death with Dignity Act.
Cruzan, a woman in a persistent vegetative state • 2009 In a 4-3 decision in Baxter v. State of Mon-
due to an automobile accident, if "clear and tana, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that
convincing evidence" shows that she would have physician-assisted suicide is not "against public
approved of the withdrawal. The ruling recog- policy." The decision applied only to Montana.
nized the legitimacy of living wills, surrogates to The court also ruled that doctors who help
act for incapacitated individuals, and a qualified terminally ill patients commit suicide cannot be
"right to die." prosecuted under Montana state law.
• 1997 The U.S. Supreme Court (in Washington • 2015 In a 2-1 ruling, the New Mexico Court of
v. Glucksberg) ruled that a Washington State Appeals struck down a lower court ruling legal-
prohibition of physician-assisted suicide did not izing physician-assisted suicide, concluding that
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth "aid in dying is not a fundamental liberty inter-
Amendment. est under the New Mexico Constitution."
permissible to disconnect him from the machines, been suggested. According to the whole-brain defi-
or administer a fatal drug overdose, or remove his nition of death, an individual is dead when all
feeding tube, or even harvest his organs for trans- brain functions (including those performed in
plant into another person. Or would it? If we deem the brain stem) permanently stop. It has become
him alive and still a person, perhaps we are not jus- the primary standard in both medicine and the
tified in doing any of the above. Maybe taking any law for determining death. Critics of the whole-
one of these actions is to commit murder. Depend- brain standard, though, have pointed out that it
ing on the concept of death accepted by the legal is based on a faulty assumption: that the brain is
system, killing him or allowing him to die could the control center for all physiological functions.
have serious legal consequences. Yet some functions (such as respiration) are par-
To overcome the drawbacks of the traditional tially independent of brain activity. In addition,
definition of death, alternative definitions have by the whole-brain standard, individuals in an
rightly considered dead. By the higher-brain stan-

QUICI< REVIEW
dard, individuals in a persistent vegetative state
(who continue to breathe and have a heartbeat)
euthanasia-Directly or indirectly bringing about but whose higher brain functions have ceased are
the death of another person for that person's thought to be dead-also a result that some people
sake. find counterintuitive.
voluntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed on
a person with his or her permission. MORAL THEORIES
advance directive-A legal document allowing
physicians to withhold or withdraw treatments Utilitarianism, Kant's ethics, and natural law the-
if a patient becomes terminally ill and unable ory lead to divergent conclusions on the issue of
to express his or her wishes. euthanasia. An act-utilitarian would certainly try
to take into account how much overall happiness
nonvoluntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed
various possible actions could bring about, every-
on a person who is not competent to decide the
issue and has left no instructions regarding end-
one considered. But she could make this calcula-
of-life preferences. In such cases, family or physi- tion in different ways. The basic approach would
cians usually make the decision. be to consider the patient's suffering (as well as
that of others involved, such as family members)
involuntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed
and the likely success of any treatments and try to
on a person against his or her wishes.
determine how much overall happiness would be
active euthanasia-Euthanasia performed by tak- generated by different actions, including bring-
ing a direct action to cause someone's death;
ing about the patient's death. If the patient's situ-
"mercy killing."
ation were hopeless and his suffering great, an
passive euthanasia-Euthanasia performed by act-utilitarian could decide that the greatest net
withholding or withdrawing measures neces- happiness would result from killing the patient
sary for sustaining life. or letting him die. The patient's consent to eutha-
physician-assisted suicide-The killing of a per- nasia might or might not be a primary concern,
son by that person's own hand with the help depending on how his consent would affect overall
of a physician. happiness. On the other hand, the act-utilitarian
might say that euthanasia is contrary to the goal
of maximizing happiness because killing a person
rules out any possibility of his experiencing hap-
irreversible persistent vegetative state (who have piness in the future. Happiness does not occur in
some detectable brain activity) are thought to be a vacuum; it exists only when persons experience
alive-a result that some regard as counterintui- it. So eliminating a person eliminates potential
tive or puzzling. happiness.
The higher-brain definition of death says Some people-even those who are not thor-
that an individual is dead when higher brain oughgoing utilitarians-argue against euthanasia
functions-those that give rise to consciousness- on what amounts to rule-utilitarian grounds or
permanently stop. Some have maintained that something close to it. They contend that regard-
because consciousness is necessary for personhood, less of the moral permissibility of euthanasia in
an individual whose higher brain functions have specific cases, a general rule (that is, a social policy
disappeared is no longer a person and is therefore or law) permitting some types of euthanasia would
cause more harm than good. They offer slippery moral rights? If they are persons, then performing
slope arguments such as the following: Passing a euthanasia on them would be immoral. If they are
law (making a rule) permitting active voluntary not persons, then euthanasia might be morally
euthanasia would inevitably lead to abuses such as acceptable. In fact, a Kantian might argue that
more frequent use of nonvoluntary euthanasia and performing euthanasia on individuals in comas or
unnecessary killing; therefore, no such law should vegetative states may be morally permissible pre-
be passed. Similarly, some argue that a general rule cisely because persons have intrinSic worth and
allowing physician-assisted suicide would destroy dignity. The bioethicist Ronald Munson explains
the "moral center" of the medical profession; if this view well:
physicians are allowed to kill patients, they will
It may be more in keeping with our freedom and
violate their pledge to protect life and to heal, caus-
dignity for us to instruct others either to put us
ing patients to distrust them. Of course, it is also to death or to take no steps to keep us alive should
possible to argue for euthanasia on rule-utilitarian we ever be in such a state. Voluntary euthanasia
grounds. (Whether such arguments are sound is may be compatible with (if not required by) Kant's
another matter.) A rule-utilitarian could devise a ethics.
rule that he thinks would result in a maximization By a similar line of reasoning, it may be that
of happiness for everyone if the rule were consis- nonvoluntary euthanasia might be seen as a duty
that we have to others. We might argue that by put-
tently followed.
ting to death a comatose and hopeless person we
Like the utilitarian, the Kantian theorist could are recognizing the dignity that person possessed
also take several different positions on euthana- in his or her previous state. 5
sia, consistent with Kantian principles. She could
argue that euthanasia is never permissible because According to the dominant reading of natural
it would entail treating persons as mere disposable law theory, euthanasia is wrong in almost every
things. Kant underscores this view in his discus- instance. It is wrong because we have a moral
sion of SUicide. He maintains that "suicide is in duty to preserve life. So intentionally perform-
no circumstances permissible" because it robs ing any kind of euthanasia, active or passive, is
individuals of their personhood, which is the very impermissible. The doctrine of double effect,
foundation of all moral values. Furthermore, it however, allows one exception to this rule. Recall
treats persons as if they had no more value than that this doctrine makes a distinction between
a beast. As Kant puts it, "But the rule of moral- (1) performing a good action that happens to
ity does not admit of [suicide] under any condi- have a bad effect and (2) performing a bad action
tion because it degrades human nature below the to achieve a good effect. The former may be
level of animal nature and so destroys it.,,4 This permissible, but the latter is not. In the case of
stern prohibition against suicide mayor may not euthanasia, the doctrine implies that giving a
apply equally well to euthanasia-depending on pain-racked patient a large dose of morphine to
whether those considered for euthanasia are to end her life (a practice known as terminal seda-
be regarded as persons. Certainly those who are tion) is never morally acceptable. But giving her
competent (coherent and rational) are persons a large dose of morphine with the intention of
and therefore should not be killed or allowed to easing her pain-an act that has the side effect of
die. But what would Kant say about individuals expediting her death-is permissible. The hasten-
who have slipped from waking life into a coma or ing of the patient's death is permissible because
a vegetative state? Are they still persons with full even though it was foreseen, it was not intended.
----
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Dr .. I(evorkian and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Dr. Jack Kevorkian was known as a champion of the Do you agree with the verdict in this case? Why
right-to-die movement, having helped many incur- or why not? If you do not agree, would your opinion
ably ill people commit suicide. He was also known change if you knew that many of Dr. Kevorkian's sui-
as "Dr. Death," the physician who helped desper- cide patients were not mentally competent at the
ate people kill themselves. After many unsuccessful time of their deaths (because of depression), as some
tries, prosecutors finally won a conviction against people allege? If so, why? If you were terminally ill
him for murder: in 1999, he was sentenced to ten and in horrendous pain with no hope of relief, might
to twenty-five years in prison. The New York Times you think it morally permissible to use the services of
reported that the sentence was handed down someone like Dr. Kevorkian? If not, why not?
"despite emotional courtroom pleas on his behalf
from the widow and brother of the terminally ill *Dirk Johnson, "Kevorkian Sentenced to 10 to 25
man he was convicted of killing."* Years in Prison," New York Times, April 14, 1999.
In the doctrine of double effect, intention makes is morally permissible and that it should not be
all the difference. legalized-or vice versa. We might plausibly argue
that in some cases, performing active voluntary
euthanasia is the right thing to do but that legal-
MORAL ARGUMENTS
izing it would have terrible consequences. Legal-
Most plausible euthanasia arguments are about ization could, say, lead doctors to practice active
active euthanasia (mercy killing, as opposed to let- nonvoluntary euthanasia or encourage them to care
ting the patient die). As suggested earlier, passive less about preserving life or cause patients to fear
euthanasia (both voluntary and nonvoluntary) or mistrust doctors. To mix up these two kinds of
is legal, provided certain conditions are met, and issues-moral and legal-is to invite confusion.
both forms of it are widely believed to be morally We begin by examining arguments for active
acceptable. So let us confine our evaluation here voluntary euthanasia. The strongest of these are
to moral arguments for and against active voluntary built on two fundamental moral principles: per-
euthanasia (mercy killing at the patient's request). sons have (1) a right of self-determination and
The question these arguments address, then, is (2) an obligation to help someone in serious dis-
straightforward: Is active voluntary euthanasia mor- tress or peril (if they are in a position to help with-
ally permissible? out great risk to themselves). Principle 1 refers
As we proceed, we must keep an important dis- to the patient's right of self-determination, and
tinction in mind: moral permissibility is not the Principle 2 to other persons who might be able to
same thing as legal permissibility. Whether eutha- benefit her. Principle 1 assumes that persons have
nasia is morally acceptable is a separate issue from autonomy-the capacity, as Kant would have it,
whether it should be legalized. It is possible that we to use reason to guide their own actions and make
could be justified in believing both that euthanasia their own decisions. It asserts that persons have the
right to exercise this power to direct their lives as patient is in agony and asks to be put out of her
they see fit (with the proviso that their actions not misery (active voluntary euthanasia), rejecting her
violate the rights of others). Many who appeal to plea for mercy would be both cruel and wicked.
this principle argue that if it applies to how persons They also insist that merely withholding treatment
live, then it surely applies to how they die, because from her to hasten her death (passive euthanasia)
their dying is part of their life. This is how the bio- would only prolong her suffering.
ethicist Dan W. Brock explains the importance of Here is one way to incorporate both Principles
this end-of-life self-determination: 1 and 2 into a single argument for active voluntary
euthanasia:
Most people are very concerned about the nature of
the last stage of their lives. This reflects not just a fear 1. Competent persons have a right of self-
of experiencing substantial suffering when dying, determination (as long as exercising this right
but also a desire to retain dignity and control dur- does not violate others' rights).
ing this last period of life. Death is today increasingly
preceded by a long period of significant physical and 2. The right of self-determination includes the
mental decline, due in part to the technological inter- right of competent persons to decide the man-
ventions of modern medicine. Many people adjust to ner of their dying and to choose active (volun-
these disabilities and find meaning and value in new tary) euthanasia.
activities and ways. Others find the impairments and
3. We have an obligation to help others in serious
burdens in the last stage of their lives at some point
sufficiently great to make life no longer worth living. distress or peril (if we are in a position to help
For many patients near death, maintaining the qual- without great risk to ourselves).
ity of one's life, avoiding great suffering, maintaining 4. This duty of beneficence includes the duty,
one's dignity, and insuring that others remember us under appropriate conditions, to ease the pain
as we wish them to become of paramount importance
and suffering of competent dying persons by
and outweigh merely extending one's life. But there
is no single, objectively correct answer for everyone
performing active (voluntary) euthanasia.
as to when, if at all, one's life becomes all things con- 5. Therefore, active voluntary euthanasia for com-
sidered a burden and unwanted. If self-determination petent dying persons is permissible.
is a fundamental value, then the great variability
among people on this question makes it especially The central idea behind this argument is that
important that individuals control the manner, cir- if competent dying persons have a right to choose
6
cumstances, and timing of their dying and death. active euthanasia, and if the duty of beneficence
Principle 2 is a duty of beneficence (a duty includes performing active voluntary euthanasia,
to benefit others). Applied to euthanasia, it says then active voluntary euthanasia is morally permis-
that if we are in a position to ease the agony of sible. But does the conclusion follow from the prem-
another, and we can do so without excessive cost ises, and are the premises true? The answer to the
to ourselves, we should try to render aid. This tenet first part of this question is yes. The answer to the
applies to persons generally, but it carries extra second part is more complicated. Look at Premises 1
weight for people with a special relationship with and 3; they articulate the two basic moral principles
the suffering person, such as family members, close we began with. These principles qualify as consid-
friends, and doctors. Physicians have an explicit ered moral judgments and are accepted by virtually
obligation to try to relieve the misery of their all parties to the euthanasia debate. We have good
patients-especially dying patients who often must reason, then, to say that Premises 1 and 3 are true.
endure horrific pain and suffering. Many advocates Premises 2 and 4, however, are controversial.
of euthanasia contend that if a competent dying Critics of Premise 2 would say that we do indeed
Active Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in Europe
As of February 2020, both active euthanasia and Luxembourg (both euthanasia and PAS legal)
physician-assisted suicide (PAS) were illegal in Under the law, doctors have Legal immunity from
Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, sanctions and lawsuits for performing euthanasia
Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. At least or physician-assisted suicide if a patient with a
"grave and incurable condition" has asked repeat-
six European countries have legalized one or both:
edly for the procedure.
Belgium (both euthanasia and PAS legal)
The Netherlands (both euthanasia and PAS legal)
The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002,
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were
went into effect on Sep. 3, 2002, Legalizing both
Legalized on Apr. 1, 2002, by the Termination of
euthanasia and PAS for "competent" adults and
Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Pro-
emancipated minors suffering from "constant and
cedures) Act for Dutch citizens over 12 years old.
unbearable physical or mental suffering that can-
The Act states that physicians who perform the
not be alleviated." The patients do not have be
procedures will be exempt from criminal liabil-
suffering from terminal illnesses. On Feb. 13,2014,
the law was extended to minors. ity and set forth criteria for physicians to follow
to Legally euthanize or assist in the suicide of a
Finland (only PAS legal) patient.
The Jan. 1, 2012, ETENE statement released by the
Switzerland (only PAS legal)
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health that resulted
Assisted suicide is allowable if the person aiding
from the working group stated, "Assisted suicide
the suicide has good intentions and does not actu-
is not a crime in Finland. Assisted suicide is con-
ally commit the act that leads to death (such as
nected to end-of-life care when the patient takes
injecting medication). "Accompanied suicides"
the deadly dose of medicine himself/herself. Plac-
are frequently performed at the Dignitas Clinic in
ing the dose of medicine within the patient's reach
Forch, Switzerland, with barbituates. *
at the patient's request when he/she has decided
to end his/her life, is considered assisted suicide."
*"Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS)
Germany (only PAS legal) around the World," ProCon.org, February 26, 2020,
On Nov. 6, 2015, Germany Legalized physician- https:lleuthanasia.procon.org/euthanasia-physician-
assisted suicide that is performed on an "individ- assisted-suicide-pas-around-the-worldl (June 4, 2020).
ual basis out of altruistic motives." "[C]ommercial
euthanasia" or "suicide business" is Illegal.
have a right of self-determination but that this self-defense and killing in war. These are regarded
right does not include the right to opt for active vol- as justified killings; unjustified killings are known
untary euthanasia. The reason is that active eutha- as murder. So even though all killing may be regret-
nasia is killing, and killing is always wrong. We may table, not all killing is immoral. Active euthanasia
have all sorts of rights, but killing is still killing. may in fact be a form of acceptable killing.
This reply, though, is based on a superficial The opponent of active euthanasia can make a
understanding of prohibitions against killing. Some stronger reply along the same lines. He can say that
kinds of killing are considered by most people to the problem with active euthanasia is not that it is
be morally permissible-for example, killing in a type of killing, but that it is a type of unwarranted
often pain is not well managed (for a variety of

~ reasons, including the reluctance of health care
"~ 'Public Opinion and Euthanasia workers to administer large doses of pain-relieving
Many opinion polls have shown that most people drugs); the side effects of the best pain medications
favor some form of euthanasia or physician assis- (especially when used over the long term) often
tance in dying. A 2018 Gallup poll of 1,024 adults add to the suffering of the patient; and many dying
age eighteen and over echoed these findings: patients endure not physical pain, but psychologi-
cal suffering that is unbearable and untreatable by
• 72 percent of Americans say doctors should be
able to help terminally ill patients die. any medication.
Proponents can put forth another kind of argu-
• 51 percent of conservatives think assisted sui-
ment for active voluntary euthanasia, this one
cide should be legal; 79 percent of liberals
based on the moral significance of killing (active
think so.
euthanasia) and letting die (passive euthanasia). As
• 54 percent of Americans say they believe we saw earlier, active euthanasia is taking a direct
doctor-assisted suicide is morally acceptable. * action to kill someone, while passive euthanasia is
allowing someone to die by withholding or with-
*" Americans' Strong Support for Euthanasia Per-
drawing measures necessary for sustaining life. Pas-
sists," Gallup Poll, May 1-10, 2018, https:llnews.
gallup.com/poII/235145/americans-strong-support- sive euthanasia is legal (competent patients have
euthanasia-persists.aspx. the right to refuse treatment) and widely believed
to be morally permissible. Active euthanasia is gen-
erally illegal, and debate continues over its moral
permissibility. Opponents of active euthanasia
killing. A dying patient in the grip of unimagina- generally think that there is a profound moral dif-
ble pain, for example, does not have to be killed to ference between killing and letting die: killing is
escape her agony. Modern medicine is better than far worse than letting die; in fact, killing is morally
ever at alleviating pain-even very intense pain. wrong while letting die is permissible. But propo-
Spinal blocks, drug combinations, new ways to nents of active voluntary euthanasia assert that
deliver powerful analgesics (drugs that ease pain)- the two are morally equivalent. Using this alleged
these options and others can offer dying patients moral equivalence, proponents can construct an
unprecedented levels of pain relief. So euthanasia is argument like this:
uncalled for. If this claim is correct, then opponents
1. Passive euthanasia is morally permiSSible.
can argue that contrary to Premise 4, active eutha-
nasia will actually harm patients by cutting their 2. If passive euthanasia is morally equivalent to
lives short unnecessarily and thus depriving them active euthanasia, active euthanasia is also
of the benefits that may accrue in their remain- morally permissible.
ing days-benefits such as profoundly meaningful 3. Passive euthanasia is morally equivalent to
moments spent with their families, the chance to active euthanasia.
come to terms with their dying, and even the pos- 4. Therefore, active (voluntary) euthanasia is mor-
sibility of a newfound cure for their disease. 7 Pro- ally permissible.
ponents of active euthanasia, however, charge that
this upbeat view of pain management is not accu- The conclusion follows from the premises, and
rate. They point to several unpleasant facts: though Premises 1 and 2 are uncontroversial. The crux of
it is possible to manage even severe pain well, too the matter is Premise 3. What reasons are there for
thinking that it is true? Here is an argument for legal prohibition against this kind of mercy killing
Premise 3 in the form of a classic thought experi- will dilute respect for life and encourage a slow slide
ment. Suppose Smith will inherit a fortune if his from active voluntary euthanasia to active nonvol-
six-year-old cousin dies. So he decides to take mat- untary euthanasia and then perhaps to involuntary
ters into his own hands. He slips into the bathroom euthanasia. This argument is therefore consequen-
while his little cousin is taking a bath and drowns tialist: active volun tary euthanasia is wrong because
him. He makes the whole thing look like an acci- it leads to bad consequences. (The argument is also
dent and leaves undetected. Now consider jones, sometimes lodged against legalizing this form of
who also will inherit a fortune if his six-year-old euthanasia.) Here is how one bioethicist describes
cousin dies. He too decides to kill the child, and he the descent down the slope:
too slips into the bathroom while the boy is bath-
A person apparently hopelessly ill may be allowed
ing. But before jones has a chance to commit the
to take his own life. Then he may be permit-
deed, the boy slips in the tub, gets knocked uncon- ted to deputize others to do it for him should he
scious, and will surely drown unless jones rescues no longer be able to act. The judgment of others
him. jones is happy to do nothing and lets the then becomes the ruling factor. Already at this
boy drown on his own-a simple "accident." Now point euthanasia is not personal and voluntary,
which man behaves better morally? If there is a sig- for others are acting lion behalf of" the patient
nificant moral difference between killing and let- as they see fit. This may well incline them to act
ting die, we would want to say that jones's actions on behalf of other patients who have not autho-
rized them to exercise their judgment. It is only a
are less blameworthy than Smith's. But this distinc-
short step, then, from voluntary euthanasia (self-
tion doesn't seem correct. The motives and aims of inflicted or authorized), to directed euthanasia
both men are the same. 8 administered to a patient who has given no autho-
The line taken here is that if the difference rization, to involuntary euthanasia conducted as
between killing and letting die really is important . I pol'ICy. 10
part 0 f a sOCIa
morally, then we would judge one man's action
We can formulate a version of the argument
(either Smith's or jones's) to be more blamewor-
thus:
thy than that of the other. But our judgment is
the same for both, so there must be no moral 1. If the general acceptance or approval of active
difference. voluntary euthanasia leads to widespread abuses
Some reject this argument and insist that (unjustified killing), then the practice is mor-
there is in fact a moral difference between killing ally wrong.
and letting die but that the distinction is often 2. The general acceptance or approval of active
obscured in thought experiments like the Smith- voluntary euthanasia will lead to widespread
jones story. One critic claims, for example, that abuses (unjustified killing).
in this scenario the two men are equally repre-
3. Therefore, active voluntary euthanasia is morally
hensible and the two actions appear to be morally
wrong.
equivalent simply because both men were prepared
to kill. Remove this common factor, and the moral This is a valid argument, an instance of modus
difference between killing and letting die will be ponens, so we need to focus only on the truth or
apparent. 9 falsity of the premises. Probably most people who
Some of the strongest arguments against active have thought carefully about this kind of argu-
voluntary euthanasia take a slippery slope approach. ment accept Premise 1 or a variation of it. Premise
The gist of most of them is that lifting a moral or 2 is the sticking point. Because of a lack of solid
evidence on the subject, the social consequences end-of-life preferences. In involuntary euthanasia, the
of a general acceptance of active euthanasia are act is performed against the patient's wishes. Active
difficult to ascertain. For example, to prove their euthanasia is taking direct action to kill someone
case, some opponents of euthanasia cite reports (administering a lethal injection, for example); passive
on the Dutch experience with physician-assisted euthanasia is allowing the patient to die by Withhold-
suicide. Proponents point to the same reports to ing or withdrawing life-sustaining measures.
undermine that case. The difficulty is that the The traditional notion of death as the cessation
research is not robust enough to lend unequivo- of breathing and heartbeat has been revised in light
cal support to one side or the other. It therefore of new developments in medical technology. Accord-
does not show that Premise 2 is true. Many of the ing to the whole-brain view of death, the individual is
dead when all brain functions permanently stop. The
arguments for Premise 2 are arguments by analogy
higher-brain view of death says that an individual is
or inferences based on observations concerning
dead when higher brain functions permanently stop.
human behavior. Generally, these arguments, too,
An act-utilitarian might see euthanasia as morally
are weak and conjectural.
permissible because it results in the greatest happi-
Those who are skeptical of Premise 2 often sim-
ness for all concerned. She could also consistently say
ply point out that no good reasons have been pro- that euthanasia is contrary to the goal of maximizing
vided to support it. At best, they say, arguments for happiness because killing an individual rules out any
Premise 2 show only that dreadful consequences possibility of that person's future happiness. A rule-
from widespread use of active euthanasia are pos- utilitarian might say that a general rule permitting
sible. As one skeptic puts it, some kinds of euthanasia would do more harm than
good-or that such a rule would maximize happiness
Now it cannot be denied that it is possible that per-
mitting euthanasia could have these fateful con- in the long run. A Kantian theorist could consistently
sequences, but that cannot be enough to warrant reject euthanasia because it entails treating persons
prohibiting it if it is otherwise justified. A similar pos- as disposable things. Or he could consistently main-
sible slippery slope worry could have been raised to tain that individuals in comas or persistent vegetative
securing competent patients' rights to decide about states are no longer persons, and therefore euthanasia
life support, but recent history shows such a worry is morally acceptable.
would have been unfounded. 11 Arguments in favor of active voluntary euthanasia
are often based on a right of self-determination and
a duty to help others in distress. Some arguments for
euthanasia, however, depend on the alleged equiva-
lence between active and passive euthanasia. Some
CHAPTER REVIEW of the strongest arguments against euthanasia are of
the slippery slope type: active voluntary euthanasia is
wrong because it leads to bad consequences, such as
SUMMARY an increased risk of unjustified killings.
Euthanasia is directly or indirectly bringing about

the death of another person for that person's sake. Its I<EY TERMS
moral status depends in large measure on the consent euthanasia (p. 276)
of the patient. In voluntary euthanasia, the patient voluntary euthanasia (p. 276)
agrees to the act. In nonvoluntary euthanasia, others advance directive (p. 276)
besides the patient decide on euthanasia because he nonvoluntary euthanasia (p. 276)
or she is incompetent and has left no statement about involuntary euthanasia (p. 276)
active euthanasia (p. 276) 6. Do you consider Dr. Kevorkian's practice of

passive euthanasia (p. 276) physician-assisted suicide morally acceptable?
physician-assisted suicide (p. 277) Why or why not?
7. Is there a moral difference between killing and
letting die? Give reasons for your answer.
EXERCISES
8. How might an act-utilitarian argue for
Review Questions physician-assisted suicide? Critique this
1. What is euthanasia? What is physician-assisted argument.
suicide? (pp. 276-77) 9. How might a Kantian argue against physician-
2. What is the difference between voluntary assisted suicide?
euthanasia and nonvoluntary euthanasia? 10. Is the use of terminal sedation ever morally
(p.276) permissible? If so, in what situations?
3. What is the difference between active and
passive euthanasia? (p. 276) FURTHER READING
4. Who was Terri Schiavo, and what are the main M. Pabst Battim, The Ethics of Suicide: Historical Sources
medical and legal facts of her case? (p. 275) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
5. Who was Dr. Kevorkian, and what role did Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., Intending Death: The Ethics of
he play in the debate over physician-assisted Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
suicide? (p. 281) Prentice Hall, 1995).
6. What percentage of American adults R. B. Brandt, liThe Morality and Rationality of Suicide," in
think physician-assisted suicide is morally A Handbook for the Study of Suicide, ed. Seymour Perlin
permissible? (p. 284) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).
Lonnie R. Bristow, President of the American Medical
7. In what states is physician-assisted suicide legal?
Association, statement on physician-assisted suicide to
(p.277)
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the
8. What is the American Medical Association's Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, 104th
official view of physician-assisted suicide? (p. 277) Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 142 (April 29, 1996).
9. What is an advance directive? (p. 276) Dan W. Brock, "Medical Decisions at the End of Life," in
10. What is the higher-brain definition of death? A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter
(p.279) Singer (1998; reprint, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001).
Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok,"
II
Hastings Center Report 22, no. 2 (March/April 1992): 52-55.

Michael Cholbi, Suicide: The Philosophical Dimensions
1. Do you think voluntary active euthanasia is (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2011).
morally permissible in some cases? Why or why Philippa Foot, "Euthanasia," Philosophy & Public Affairs 6,
not? no. 2 (1977): 85-112.
2. Critique the Terri Schiavo case. Who was right Walter Glannon, "Medical Decisions at the End of Life,"
in their View of what should be done for Terri? in Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press,
Was the participation of politicians in the case 2005).
J.M. Hecht, Stay: A History of Suicide and the Philosophies
helpfUl? Distracting? Wrong?
Against It (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
3. Was remOVing Terri Schiavo's feeding tube a case John Lachs, "When Abstract MoraliZing Runs Amok,"
of murder? If not, what was it? Journal ofClinicai Ethics 5, no. 1 (1994): 10-13.
4. What actions (or lack of actions) should have Ronald Munson, "Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
been performed in her case? Suicide," in Interventioll and Reflection: Basic Issues in
5. Would you consider her a person in her brain- Medical Ethics, ed. Ronald Munson, 7th ed. (Belmont,
damaged state? Why or why not? CA: Wadsworth, 2004).
Jeffrey Olen and Vincent Barry, "Euthanasia," in Apply- Thomas D. Sullivan, "Active and Passive Euthanasia: An
ing Ethics: A Text with Readings, 6th ed. (Belmont, CA: Impertinent Distinction?" Human Life Review 3, no. 3
Wadsworth, 1999). (1977): 40-46.
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm (Oxford: Oxford
Problems in Medidne and Biomedical and Behavioral University Press, 2015).
Research (Washington, DC: Government Printing Robert Young, "Voluntary Euthanasia," in Stanford Ency-
Office, 1983). clopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2005 ed., ed. Edward
Bonnie Steinbock and Alastair Norcross, eds., Killing and N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/
Letting Die, 2nd ed. (New York: Fordham University entries/euthanasia-voluntary/ (March 1,2015).
Press, 1994).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Assisted Suicide or Murder?

One of the more bizarre cases of assisted suicide in recent times came to its con-
clusion on September 29, 2014, when New Yorker Kenneth Minor was convicted of
manslaughter after stabbing a Long Island motivational speaker. Minor claimed that
the man wished to die and had paid him to help him do so.
Minor received a sentence of twelve years when he accepted the prosecutors'
plea deal and pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter.
However, Minor's lawyer claims, "We will be back again ... Our hope is the
appellate division will once again reverse this case."
Minor's lawyer, Daniel J. Gotlin, hopes to overturn the conviction by bringing the
case to an appeals court. Gotlin argues that the verdict should be thrown out based
on procedural grounds. Minor's indictment includes murder charges and assisted
suicide charges, which Gotlin claims are mutually exclusive.
Minor has been incarcerated for more than five years, and, according to Gotlin,
accepted the plea deal because "he wants finality; he wants this to be over." If
Minor is unsuccessful in his appeal, he will have to serve five more years before he
is eligible to be released.
Moments before Minor entered his plea, Justice Laura A. Ward of the New York
Supreme Court in Manhattan denied Gotlin's request to dismiss the case, stating that
a man can be charged for both murder and assisted suicide. However, she did not
refute that Minor had a right to appeal her ruling, and said, "Perhaps we will get
a definite ruling from the appellate division."
The man who Minor admits to killing, Jeffrey Locker, was found tied up in his
car in East Harlem in July 2009. Multiple stab wounds were found on his chest.
Minor claims that Locker, a middle-aged father who had fallen deeply into debt,
had hired him to assist in his suicide plan. Minor says he held a knife to a steering wheel
while Locker flung himself against it multiple times. Minor's prosecutors found his story
incredible and brought a murder charge against him instead of a charge of assisting suicide.
In 2011, Minor was tried and convicted of second-degree murder by a jury. The
judge gave him twenty years to life in prison, but the verdict was invalidated two
years later by an appellate panel. They concluded that the trial judge had given the
jury an incorrect definition of assisted suicide.
Minor was given another trial in January. This time, a charge of assisting suicide
was added to his indictment at the request of Cyrus R. Vance Jr., Manhattan district
attorney. A jury could now convict him of a lesser charge.
During Minor's first trial, the defense and the prosecution agreed that Minor
had participated in Locker's suicide at the request of the deceased, who wished
to make his death look like a murder so that his family could claim life insurance.
However, prosecutors argued that it was a case of murder for hire, not assisted
suicide, as Minor was still the cause of Locker's death. According to a medical
expert, Minor did not simply hold a knife to a steering wheel, but stabbed Locker
as he lay in his car. He then used Locker's credit card to withdraw money from
an ATM.*
Suppose Minor killed Locker at Locker's request. Suppose Locker's motive for asking Minor for aid in
Would the killing then be morally permissible? Is dying, and for making the death look like murder,
there a moral difference between physician-assisted was that Locker's life insurance money would pay
suicide and Locker's murder when both actions are for the only medical treatment that could save his
taken at the victim's request? What is the differ- daughter's life. How would these facts change your
ence, if any, between murder and assisted suicide? moral judgment about the killing?
"Based onJames C. McKinley Jr., "Harlem Man Pleads Guilty to Assisting 2009 Death," New York Times, September
29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/nyregion/-harlem-man-pleads-guilty-to-assisting-2009-death.
html?_r=O (March 23, 2015).
2. Simply Want to End a Long Life
David Goodall killed himself earlier this month.

He was 104. He was not terminally ill, nor was he in physical pain. But as the
Australian scientist and right-to-die advocate told the New York Times, "1 no longer
want to continue life, and I'm happy to have a chance tomorrow to end it." And so
he traveled to a Swiss clinic to die via physician-assisted suicide.
H is death, as the Times portrayed it, was a celebration of the" dying with dignity"
movement: a chance for a man who had lived a long and full life to exit this world
on his own terms. His death was entirely on script-he died, the Times tells us, to
the closing strains of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy," the very song he'd chosen ....
By and large, media coverage of cases like Goodall's has been positive. Those
who make the decision are generally characterized as brave pioneers.
But Goodall's case and the right-to-die movement have their critics, in both the
religious and the secular sphere ....
But what makes Goodall's case particularly distinct was that he was not ill and
was in fact, though frail, in good health. He simply did not want to live any longer.
And, he argued, nobody else should have to either. He hoped he would live on "as
an instrument of freeing the elderly from the need to pursue their life irrespective."t
Provide reasons for your answers: unlike many peo- right to end his life even though he was not physi-
ple who seek to end their lives, Goodall was not in cally suffering? Does such a right outweigh the
physical pain or apparent mental agony. He simply inherent value of life?
didn't want to live anymore. Do you think he had a
tTara Burton, "What We Lose When We Gain the Right to Die," Vox.com, March 21, 2018. https:/Iwww.vox
.com/2018/5/21/17360978/right-to-die-assisted-dying-suicide-david-goodall. Reprinted by permission of Vox
Media,LLC.
3. The Suicide of Admiral Nimitz

The name of Chester W. Nimitz is legendary in the annals of naval warfare. In
June 1942, Admiral Nimitz commanded the U.S. forces assigned to block a Japanese
invasion of Midway.
In the Battle of Midway, Nimitz's fighter-bombers caught the Japanese fleet off
guard, as its carrier aircraft were being refueled on deck. His pilots swooped in and
sent to the bottom four of the Japanese carriers-Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi and Kaga-
that had led the attack on Pearl Harbor. Midway broke the back of Japanese naval
power and was among the most decisive battles in all of history.
Nimitz's son and namesake, Chester W. Nimitz Jr., would rise to the same rank
of admiral and become a hero of the Pacific war-a submarine commander who
would sink a Japanese destroyer bearing down on his boat by firing torpedoes
directly into its bow.
But Chester W. Nimitz Jr. achieved another kind of fame on Jan. 2. In a suicide
pact with his 89-year-old wife, the 86-year-old hero ended his life with an overdose
of sleeping pills.
Having lost 30 pounds from a stomach disorder, suffering from congestive heart
failure and in constant back pain, the admiral had been determined to dictate the
hour of his death. His wife, who suffered from osteoporosis so severe her bones
were breaking, had gone blind. She had no desire to live without her husband.
So, as the devoted couple had spent their lives together, they decided to end
their lives together. The admiral's final order read: flOur decision was made over a
considerable period of time and was not carried out in acute desperation. Nor is it
the expression of a mental illness. We have consciously, rationally, deliberately and
of our own free will taken measures to end our lives today because of the physical
limitations on our quality of life placed upon us by age, failing vision, osteoporosis,
back and painful orthopedic problems."
According to The New York Times obituary, "The Nimitzes did not believe in any
afterlife or God, and embraced no religion. But one of Mr. Nimitz's three surviving
sisters, Mary Aquinas, 70, is a Catholic nun .... Sister Mary said that she could not
condone her brother's decision to end his life, but that she felt sympathetic. 'If you
cannot see any value to suffering for yourself or others,' she said, 'Then maybe it
does make sense to end your life."'*
Provide reasons for your answers: Was Admiral suicide a matter of personal choice, morally permis-
Nimitz justified in his decision to commit suicide? sible if a person freely opts to end her life for what-
Is suicide morally wrong in all circumstances? Is ever reason?
*Patrickj. Buchanan, "The Sad Suicide of Admiral Nimitz," World Net Daily, january 18, 2002. Reprinted by per-
mission of Patrickj. Buchanan and Creators Syndicate, Inc.
READINGS
From Active and Passive Euthanasia

JAMES RACHELS
The distinction between active and passive eutha- However, a strong case can be made against this doc-
nasia is thought to be crucial for medical ethics. The trine. In what follows I will set out some of the relevant
idea is that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to arguments, and urge doctors to reconsider their views
withhold treatment and allow a patient to die, but it on this matter.
is never permissible to take any direct action designed To begin with a familiar type of situation, a patient
to kill the patient. This doctrine seems to be accepted who is dying of incurable cancer of the throat is in ter-
by most doctors, and it is endorsed in a statement rible pain, which can no longer be satisfactorily alle-
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American viated. He is certain to die within a few days, even if
Medical Association on December 4, 1973: present treatment is continued, but he does not want
The intentional termination of the life of one to go on living for those days since the pain is unbear-
human being by another-mercy killing-is contrary able. So he asks the doctor for an end to it, and his fam-
to that for which the medical profession stands and ily joins in the request.
is contrary to the policy of the American Medical Suppose the doctor agrees to withhold treatment,
Association. as the conventional doctrine says he may. The justifi-
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary cation for his doing so is that the patient is in terrible
means to prolong the life of the body when there is irre- agony, and since he is going to die anyway, it would
futable eVidence that biological death is imminent is be wrong to prolong his suffering needlessly. But now
the decision of the patient and/or his immediate fam-
notice this. If one simply withholds treatment, it may
ily. The advice and judgment of the physician should
take the patient longer to die, and so he may suffer
be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family. more than he would if more direct action were taken
and a lethal injection given. This fact provides strong
James Rachels, excerpts from "Active and Passive Euthana-
reason for thinking that, once the initial deciSion not
sia," from Tile New Ellg/ami Joumal o( Medicille, Vol. 292, No.2, to prolong his agony has been made, active euthana-
pp. 78-80. Copyright (c":) 1975 Massachusetts Medical Society. sia is actually preferable to passive euthanasia, rather
Reprinted with permission from Massachusetts Medical SOciety. than the reverse. To say otherwise is to endorse the
option that leads to more suffering rather than less, and Consider again the case of the infants with [Down]
is contrary to the humanitarian impulse that prompts syndrome who need operations for congenital defects
the decision not to prolong his life in the first place. unrelated to the syndrome to live. Sometimes, there
Part of my point is that the process of being is no operation, and the baby dies, but when there is
"allowed to die" can be relatively slow and painful, no such defect, the baby lives on. Now, an operation
whereas being given a lethal injection is relatively such as that to remove an intestinal obstruction is not
quick and painless. Let me give a different sort of prohibitively difficult. The reason why such opera-
example. In the United States about one in 600 babies tions are not performed in these cases is, clearly, that
is born with [Down] syndrome. Most of these babies the child has [Down] syndrome and the parents and
are otherwise healthy-that is, with only the usual doctor judge that because of that fact it is better for the
pediatric care, they will proceed to an otherwise nor- child to die.
mal infancy. Some, however, are born with congeni- But notice that this situation is absurd, no matter
tal defects such as intestinal obstructions that require what view one takes of the lives and potentials of such
operations if they are to live. Sometimes, the parents babies. If the life of such an infant is worth preserv-
and the doctor will decide not to operate, and let the ing, what does it matter if it needs a simple operation?
infant die. Anthony Shaw describes what happens Or, if one thinks it better that such a baby should not
then: live on, what difference does it make that it happens
to have an unobstructed intestinal tract? In either
... When surgery is denied [the doctor] must try to
keep the infant from suffering while natural forces sap case, the matter of life and death is being decided on
the baby's life away. As a surgeon whose natural incli- irrelevant grounds. It is the [Down] syndrome, and
nation is to use the scalpel to fight off death, standing not the intestines, that is the issue. The matter should
by and watching a salvageable baby die is the most be decided, if at all, on that basiS, and not be allowed
emotionally exhausting experience I know. It is easy at to depend on the essentially irrelevant question of
a conference, in a theoretical discussion, to decide that whether the intestinal tract is blocked.
such infants should be allowed to die. It is altogether What makes this situation possible, of course,
different to stand by in the nursery and watch as dehy- is the idea that when there is an intestinal block-
dration and infection wither a tiny being over hours age, one can /llet the baby die," but when there is no
and days. This is a terrible ordeal for me and the hospi-
such defect there is nothing that can be done, for one
tal staff-much more so than for the parents who never
must not "kill" it. The fact that this idea leads to such
set foot in the nursery. 1
results as deciding life or death on irrelevant grounds
can understand why some people are opposed to is another good reason why the doctrine should be
all euthanasia, and insist that such infants must be rejected.
allowed to live. I think I can also understand why One reason why so many people think that there
other people favor destroying these babies quickly and is an important moral difference between active and
painlessly. But why should anyone favor letting "dehy- passive euthanasia is that they think killing someone
dration and infection wither a tiny being over hours is morally worse than letting someone die. But is it?
and days"? The doctrine that says that a baby may be Is killing, in itself, worse than letting die? To investi-
allowed to dehydrate and wither, but may not be given gate this issue, two cases may be considered that are
an injection that would end its life without suffering, exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas
seems so patently cruel as to require no further refu- the other involves letting someone die. Then, it can be
tation. The strong language is not intended to offend, asked whether this difference makes any difference to
but only to put the point in the clearest possible way. the moral assessments. It is important that the cases
My second argument is that the conventional be exactly alike, except for this one difference, since
doctrine leads to decisions concerning life and death otherwise one cannot be confident that it is this dif-
made on irrelevant grounds. ference and not some other that accounts for any
variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us concerned are not like this at all. They do not involve
consider this pair of cases: personal gain or the destruction of normal healthy
In the first, Smith stands to gain a large inheri- children. Doctors are concerned only with cases in
tance if anything should happen to his six-year-old which the patient's life is of no further use to him,
cousin. One evening while the child is taking his or in which the patient's life has become or will soon
bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the become a terrible burden. However, the point is the
child, and then arranges things so that it will look like same in these cases: the bare difference between killing
an accident. and letting die does not, in itself, make a moral differ-
In the second, jones also stands to gain if anything ence. If a doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons,
should happen to his six-year-old cousin. Like Smith, he is in the same moral position as if he had given the
jones sneaks in planning to drown the child in his patient a lethal injection for humane reasons. If his
bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom jones decision was wrong-if, for example, the patient's
sees the child slip and hit his head, and fall face down illness was in fact curable-the decision would be
in the water. jones is delighted; he stands by, ready to equally regrettable no matter which method was used
push the child's head back under if it is necessary, but to carry it out. And if the doctor's decision was the
it is not necessary. With only a little thrashing about, right one, the method used is not in itself important.
the child drowns all by himself, "accidentally," as The AMA policy statement isolates the crucial
jones watches and does nothing. issue very well: the crucial issue is "the intentional ter-
Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones mination of the life of one human being by another."
"merely" let the child die. That is the only difference But after identifying this issue, and forbidding "mercy
between them. Did either man behave better, from killing," the statement goes on to deny that the ces-
a moral point of view? If the difference between kill- sation of treatment is the intentional termination of
ing and letting die were in itself a morally important a life. This is where the mistake comes in, for what is
matter, one should say that jones's behavior was less the cessation of treatment, in these circumstances, if
reprehensible than Smith's. But does one really want it is not "the intentional termination of the life of one
to say that? I think not. In the first place, both men human being by another"? Of course it is exactly that,
acted from the same motive, personal gain, and both and if it were not, there would be no point to it.
had exactly the same end in view when they acted. Many people will find this judgment hard to
It may be inferred from Smith's conduct that he is a accept. One reason, I think, is that it is very easy to
bad man, although that judgment may be withdrawn conflate the question of whether killing is, in itself,
or modified if certain further facts are learned about worse than letting die, with the very different ques-
him-for example, that he is mentally deranged. But tion of whether most actual cases of killing are more
would not the very same thing be inferred about jones reprehensible than most actual cases of letting die.
from his conduct? And would not the same further Most actual cases of killing are clearly terrible (think,
considerations also be relevant to any modification of for example, of all the murders reported in the news-
this judgment? Moreover, suppose jones pleaded, in papers), and one hears of such cases every day. On the
his own defense, "After all, I didn't do anything except other hand, one hardly ever hears of a case of letting
just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn't die, except for the actions of doctors who are moti-
kill him: I only let him die." Again, if letting die were vated by humanitarian reasons. So one learns to think
in itself less bad than killing, this defense should have of killing in a much worse light than of letting die.
at least some weight. But it does not. Such a "defense" But this does not mean that there is something about
can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral killing that makes it in itself worse than letting die,
reasoning. Morally speaking, it is no defense at all. for it is not the bare difference between killing and
Now, it may be pointed out, quite properly, letting die that makes the difference in these cases.
that the cases of euthanasia with which doctors are Rather, the other factors-the murderer's motive of
personal gain, for example, contrasted with the doc- show a moral difference between active and passive
tor's humanitarian motivation-account for different euthanasia. The reason why it is considered bad to be
reactions to the different cases. the cause of someone's death is that death is regarded
I have argued that killing is not in itself any worse as a great evil-and so it is. However, if it has been
than letting die: if my contention is right, it follows decided that euthanasia-even passive euthanasia-is
that active euthanasia is not any worse than passive desirable in a given case, it has also been decided that
euthanasia. What arguments can be given on the other in this instance death is no greater an evil than the
side? The most common, I believe, is the following: patient'S continued existence. And if this is true, the
liThe important difference between active and pas- usual reason for not wanting to be the cause of some-
sive euthanasia is that, in passive euthanasia, the doc- one's death simply does not apply.
tor does not do anything to bring about the patient's Finally, doctors may think that all of this is only of
death. The doctor does nothing, and the patient dies academic interest-the sort of thing that philosophers
of whatever ills already afflict him. In active euthana- may worry about but that has no practical bearing on
sia, however, the doctor does something to bring about their own work. After all, doctors must be concerned
the patient's death: he kills him. The doctor who gives about the legal consequences of what they do, and
the patient with cancer a lethal injection has himself active euthanasia is clearly forbidden by the law. But
caused his patient's death: whereas if he merely ceases even so, doctors should also be concerned with the fact
treatment, the cancer is the cause of the death." that the law is forcing upon them a moral doctrine that
A number of pOints need to be made here. The first is may well be indefensible, and has a considerable effect
that it is not exactly correct to say that in passive eutha- on their practices. Of course, most doctors are not now
nasia the doctor does nothing, for he does do one thing in the position of being coerced in this matter, for they
that is very important: he lets the patient die. "Letting do not regard themselves as merely going along with
someone die" is certainly different, in some respects, what the law requires. Rather, in statements such as
from other types of action-mainly in that it is a kind of the AMA policy statement that I have quoted, they
action that one may perform by way of not performing are endorsing this doctrine as a central point of medi-
certain other actions. For example, one may let a patient cal ethicS. In that statement, active euthanasia is con-
die by way of not giving medication, just as one may demned not merely as illegal but as "contrary to that for
insult someone by way of not shaking his hand. But for which the medical profession stands," whereas passive
any purpose of moral assessment, it is a type of action euthanasia is approved. However, the preceding Con-
nonetheless. The decision to let a patient die is subject siderations suggest that there is really no moral differ-
to moral appraisal in the same way that a decision to ence between the two, considered in themselves (there
kill him would be subject to moral appraisal: it may be may be important moral differences in some cases in
assessed as wise or unwise, compassionate or sadistic, their consequences, but, as I pointed out, these differ-
right or wrong. If a doctor deliberately let a patient die ences may make active euthanasia, and not passive
who was suffering from a routinely curable illness, the euthanasia, the morally preferable option). So, whereas
doctor would certainly be to blame for what he had doctors may have to discriminate between active and
done, just as he would be to blame if he had needlessly passive euthanasia to satisfy the law, they should not
killed the patient. Charges against him would then be do any more than that. In particular, they should not
appropriate. If so, it would be no defense at all for him to give the distinction any added authority and weight by
insist that he didn't "do anything." He would have done writing it into official statements of medical ethics.
something very serious indeed, for he let his patient die.
Fixing the cause of death may be very impor-
tant from a legal point of view, for it may determine NOTE
whether criminal charges are brought against the doc- 1. Anthony Shaw, "Doctor, Do We Have a Choice?" New York
tor. But I do not think that this notion can be used to Times Magazine, 30 January 1972, 54.
From Voluntary Active Euthanasia

DAN W. BROCK
* * * desire to retain dignity and control during this last

period of life. Death is today increasingly preceded
THE CENTRAL ETHICAL ARGUMENT FOR by a long period of significant physical and mental
VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA decline, due in part to the technological interven-
tions of modern medicine. Many people adjust to
The central ethical argument for euthanasia is famil- these disabilities and find meaning and value in new
iar. It is that the very same two fundamental ethical activities and ways. Others find the impairments and
values supporting the consensus on patient's rights to burdens in the last stage of their lives at some point
decide about life-sustaining treatment also support the sufficiently great to make life no longer worth living.
ethical permissibility of euthanaSia. These values are For many patients near death, maintaining the qual-
individual self-determination or autonomy and indi- ity of one's life, avoiding great suffering, maintaining
vidual well-being. By self-determination as it bears on one's dignity, and insuring that others remember us
euthanaSia, I mean people's interest in making impor- as we wish them to become of paramount impor-
tant decisions about their lives for themselves accord- tance and outweigh merely extending one's life.
ing to their own values or conceptions of a good life, But there is no single, objectively correct answer for
and in being left free to act on those decisions. Self- everyone as to when, if at all, one's life becomes all
determination is valuable because it permits people to things considered a burden and unwanted. If self-
form and live in accordance with their own concep- determination is a fundamental value, then the great
tion of a good life, at least within the bounds of justice variability among people on this question makes it
and consistent with others doing so as well. In exercis- especially important that individuals control the
ing self-determination people take responsibility for manner, circumstances, and timing of their dying
their lives and for the kinds of persons they become. A and death.
central aspect of human dignity lies in people's capac- The other main value that supports euthanasia is
ity to direct their lives in this way. The value of exercis- individual well-being. It might seem that individual
ing self-determination presupposes some minimum well-being conflicts with a person's self-determination
of decision making capacities or competence, which when the person requests euthanasia. Life itself is
thus limits the scope of euthanasia supported by self- commonly taken to be a central good for persons,
determination; it cannot justifiably be administered, often valued for its own sake, as well as necessary for
for example, in cases of serious dementia or treatable pursuit of all other goods within a life. But when a
clinical depreSSion. competent patient decides to forgo all further life-
Does the value of individual self-determination sustaining treatment then the patient, either explic-
extend to the time and manner of one's death? Most itly or implicitly, commonly decides that the best life
people are very concerned about the nature of the last possible for him or her with treatment is of sufficiently
stage of their lives. This reflects not just a fear of expe- poor quality that it is worse than no further life at all.
riencing substantial suffering when dying, but also a Life is no longer considered a benefit by the patient,
but has now become a burden. The same judgment
underlies a request for euthanasia: continued life is
Dan W. Brock, excerpts from "Voluntary Active Euthanasia" seen by the patient as no longer a benefit, but now a
from Hastings Cel1ter Report 22(2): 10-22. Copyright ([)1992 The burden. Especially in the often severely compromised
Hastings Center. Reproduced with permiSSion of John Wiley & and debilitated states of many critically ill or dying
Sons, Inc. patients, there is no objective standard, but only the
competent patient's judgment of whether continued WOULD THE BAD CONSEQUENCES OF

life is no longer a benefit. EUTHANASIA OUTWEIGH THE GOOD?
Of course, sometimes there are conditions, such
as clinical depression, that call into question whether The argument against euthanasia at the policy level is
the patient has made a competent choice, either to stronger than at the level of individual cases, though
forgo life-sustaining treatment or to seek euthanasia, even here I believe the case is ultimately unpersua-
and then the patient's choice need not be evidence sive, or at best indeCisive. The policy level is the place
that continued life is no longer a benefit for him or where the main issues lie, however, and where moral
her. Just as with decisions about treatment, a deter- considerations that might override arguments in
mination of incompetence can warrant not honoring favor of euthanasia will be found, if they are found
the patient's choice: in the case of treatment, we then anywhere. It is important to note two kinds of dis-
transfer decisional authority to a surrogate, though agreement about the consequences for public policy
in the case of voluntary active euthanasia a determi- of permitting euthanasia. First, there is empirical or
nation that the patient is incompetent means that factual disagreement about what the consequences
choice is not possible. would be. This disagreement is greatly exacerbated
The value or right of self-determination does not by the lack of firm data on the issue. Second, since
entitle patients to compel physicians to act contrary on any reasonable assessment there would be both
t~ their own moral or professional values. Physi- good and bad consequences, there are moral dis-
cians are moral and professional agents whose own agreements about the relative importance of dif-
self-determination or integrity should be respected ferent effects. In addition to these two sources of
as well. If performing euthanasia became legally disagreement, there is also no single, well-specified
p.ern;issible, but conflicted with a particular physi- policy proposal for legalizing euthanasia on which
CIan s reasonable understanding of his or her moral policy assessments can focus. But without such speci-
or profesSional responsibilities, the care of a patient fication, and especially without explicit procedures
who requested euthanasia should be transferred to for protecting against well-intentioned misuse and
another. ill-intentioned abuse, the consequences for policy
Most opponents do not deny that there are are largely speculative. Despite these difficulties, a
some cases in which the values of patient self- preliminary account of the main likely good and bad
determination and well-being support euthanasia. consequences is possible. This should help clarify
Ins~ead,. they commonly offer two kinds of arguments where better data or more moral analysis and argu-
agaInst It that on their view outweigh or override this ment are needed, as well as where policy safeguards
s~pport. The first kind of argument is that in any indi- must be developed.
VIdual case where conSiderations of the patient's self-
~~termination and well-being do support euthanaSia, Potential Good Consequences of
I~ IS nevertheless always ethically wrong or impermis- Permitting Euthanasia
Sible. The second kind of argument grants that in What are the likely good consequences? First, if eutha-
some individual cases euthanasia may not be ethi- nasia were permitted it would be possible to respect
cally wrong, but maintains nonetheless that public the self-determination of competent patients who
and legal policy should never permit it. The first kind want it, but now cannot get it because of its illegality.
of argument focuses on features of any individual case We simply do not know how many such patients and
of euthanaSia, while the second kind focuses on social people there are. In the Netherlands, with a popula-
or legal policy. In the next section I consider the first tion of about 14.5 million (in 1987), estimates in a
kind of argument. recent study were that about 1,900 cases of voluntary
active euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide occur
* * * annually. No straightforward extrapolation to the
United States is possible for many reasons, among with severe and unrelievable pain or suffering. When
them, that we do not know how many people here there is a life-sustaining treatment that, if forgone,
who want euthanasia now get it, despite its illegality. will lead relatively quickly to death, then doing so
Even with better data on the number of persons who can bring an end to these patients' suffering with-
want euthanasia but cannot get it, significant moral out recourse to euthanasia. For patients receiving no
disagreement would remain about how much weight such treatment, however, euthanasia may be the only
should be given to any instance of failure to respect a release from their otherwise prolonged suffering and
person's self-determination in this way. agony. This argument from mercy has always been the
One important factor substantially affecting the strongest argument for euthanasia in those cases to
number of persons who would seek euthanasia is the which it applies.
extent to which an alternative is available. The wide- The importance of relieving pain and suffering is
spread acceptance in the law, social policy, and medi- less controversial than is the frequency with which
cal practice of the right of a competent patient to forgo patients are forced to undergo untreatable agony
life-sustaining treatment suggests that the number of that only euthanasia could relieve. If we focus first on
competent persons in the United States who would suffering caused by physical pain, it is crucial to dis-
want euthanasia if it were permitted is probably rela- tinguish pain that could be adequately relieved with
tively small. modern methods of pain control, though it in fact is
A second good consequence of making euthana- not, from pain that is relievable only by death. For a
sia legally permissible benefits a much larger group. variety of reasons, including some physicians' fear of
Polls have shown that a majority of the American pub- hastening the patient's death, as well as the lack of a
lic believes that people should have a right to obtain publicly accessible means for asseSSing the amount
euthanasia if they want. 1 No doubt the vast majority of of the patient's pain, many patients suffer pain that
those who support this right to euthanasia will never could be, but is not, relieved.
in fact come to want euthanasia for themselves. Nev- Specialists in pain control, as for example the
ertheless, making it legally permissible would reassure pain of terminally ill cancer patients, argue that
many people that if they ever do want euthanasia they there are very few patients whose pain could not be
would be able to obtain it. This reassurance would sup- adequately controlled, though sometimes at the cost
plement the broader control over the process of dying of so sedating them that they are effectively unable
given by the right to decide about life-sustaining treat- to interact with other people or their enVironment.
ment. Having fire insurance on one's house benefits all Thus, the argument from mercy in cases of physical
who have it, not just those whose houses actually burn pain can probably be met in a large majority of cases
down, by reassuring them that in the unlikely event by providing adequate measures of pain relief. This
of their house burning down, they will receive the should be a high priority, whatever Our legal policy on
money needed to rebuild it. Likewise, the legalization euthanasia-the relief of pain and suffering has long
of euthanasia can be thought of as a kind of insurance been, quite properly, one of the central goals of medi-
policy against being forced to endure a protracted dying cine. Those cases in which pain could be effectively
process that one has come to find burdensome and relieved, but in fact is not, should only count signifi-
unwanted, especially when there is no life-sustaining cantly in favor of legalizing euthanasia if all reason-
treatment to forgo. The strong concern about losing able efforts to change pain management techniques
control of their care expressed by many people who have been tried and have failed.
face serious illness likely to end in death suggests that Dying patients often undergo substantial psycho-
they give substantial importance to the legalization of logical suffering that is not fully or even principally
euthanasia as a means of maintaining this control. the result of physical pain. The knowledge about how
A third good consequence of the legalization of to relieve this suffering is much more limited than
euthanasia concerns patients whose dying is filled in the case of relieving pain, and efforts to do so are
probably more often unsuccessful. If the argument forcefully stated in a paper by Willard Gaylin and his
from mercy is extended to patients experiencing great colleagues:
and unrelievable psychological suffering, the num- The very soul of medicine is on trial. ... This issue touches
bers of patients to which it applies are much greater. medicine at its moral center; if this moral center col-
One last good consequence of legalizing eutha- lapses, if physicians become killers or are even licensed
nasia is that once death has been accepted, it is often to kill, the profession-and, therewith, each physician-
more humane to end life quickly and peacefully, will never again be worthy of trust and respect as healer
when that is what the patient wants. Such a death will and comforter and protector of life in all its frailty.
often be seen as better than a more prolonged one.
These authors go on to make clear that, while they
People who suffer a sudden and unexpected death,
oppose permitting anyone to perform euthanasia,
for example by dying quickly or in their sleep from
their special concern is with physicians doing so:
a heart attack or stroke, are often considered lucky
to have died in this way. We care about how we die We call on fellow physicians to say that they will not
in part because we care about how others remember deliberately kill. We must also say to each of our fellow
us, and we hope they will remember us as we were in physicians that we will not tolerate killing of patients
and that we shall take diSciplinary action against doctors
"good times" with them and not as we might be when
who kill. And we must say to the broader community
disease has robbed us of our dignity as human beings.
that if it insists on tolerating or legalizing active eutha-
As with much in the treatment and care of the dying, nasia, it will have to find nonphysicians to do its killing. 2
people's concerns differ in this respect, but for at
least some people, euthanasia will be a more humane If permitting physicians to kill would undermine
death than what they have often experienced with the very "moral center" of medicine, then almost cer-
other loved ones and might otherwise expect for tainly physicians should not be permitted to perform
themselves. euthanasia. But how persuasive is this claim? Patients
Some opponents of euthanasia challenge how should not fear, as a consequence of permitting vol-
much importance should be given to any of these untary active euthanasia, that their physicians will
good consequences of permitting it, or even whether substitute a lethal injection for what patients want
some would be good consequences at all. But more and believe is part of their care. If active euthanasia is
frequently, opponents cite a number of bad conse- restricted to cases in which it is truly voluntary, then
quences that permitting euthanasia would or could no patient should fear getting it unless she or he has
produce, and it is to their assessment that I now turn. voluntarily requested it. (The fear that we might in
time also come to accept nonvoluntary, or even invol-
Potential Bad Consequences of untary, active euthanasia is a slippery slope worry
Pennitting Euthanasia I address below.) Patients' trust of their physicians
Some of the arguments against permitting euthanasia could be increased, not eroded, by knowledge that
are aimed specifically against physicians, while others physicians will provide aid in dying when patients
are aimed against anyone being permitted to perform seek it.
it. I shall first consider one argument of the former ... In spelling out above what I called the posi-
sort. Permitting physicians to perform euthanasia, it tive argument for voluntary active euthanasia, I sug-
is said, would be incompatible with their fundamen- gested that two principal values-respective patients'
tal moral and professional commitment as healers self-determination and promoting their well-being-
to care for patients and to protect life. Moreover, if underlie the consensus that competent patients, or
euthanasia by physicians became common, patients the surrogates of incompetent patients, are entitled
would come to fear that a medication was intended to refuse any life-sustaining treatment and to choose
not to treat or care, but instead to kill, and would from among available alternative treatments. It is
thus lose trust in their phYSicians. This position was the commitment to these two values in guiding
physicians' actions as healers, comforters, and pro- and others. Permitting euthanasia should not dimin-
tectors of their patients' lives that should be at the ish people's commitment and concern to maintain
"moral center" of medicine, and these two values sup- and improve the care of these patients.
port physicians' administering euthanasia when their A third possible bad consequence of permitting
patients make competent requests for it. euthanasia (or even a public discourse in which strong
What should not be at that moral center is a com- support for euthanasia is evident) is to threaten the
mitment to preserving patients' lives as such, without progress made in securing the rights of patients or their
regard to whether those patients want their lives pre- surrogates to decide about and to refuse life-sustaining
served or judge their preservation a benefit to them .... treatment. This progress has been made against the
A second bad consequence that some foresee backdrop of a clear and firm legal prohibition of eutha-
is that permitting euthanasia would weaken soci- nasia, which has provided a relatively bright line limit-
ety's commitment to provide optimal care for dying ing the dominion of others over patients' lives. It has
patients. We live at a time in which the control of therefore been an important reassurance to concerns
health care costs has become, and is likely to continue about how the authority to take steps ending life might
to be, the dominant focus of health care policy. If be misused, abused, or wrongly extended.
euthanasia is seen as a cheaper alternative to adequate Many supporters of the right of patients or their
care and treatment, then we might become less scru- surrogates to refuse treatment strongly oppose eutha-
pulous about providing sometimes costly support and nasia, and if forced to choose might well withdraw
other services to dying patients. Particularly if our their support of the right to refuse treatment rather
society comes to embrace deeper and more explicit than accept euthanasia. Public policy in the last fif-
rationing of health care, frail, elderly, and dying teen years has generally let life-sustaining treatment
patients will need to be strong and effective advocates decisions be made in health care settings between
for their own health care and other needs, although physicians and patients or their surrogates, and with-
they are hardly in a position to do this. We should do out the involvement of the courts. However, if eutha-
nothing to weaken their ability to obtain adequate nasia is made legally permissible greater involvement
care and services. of the courts is likely, which could in turn extend to
This second worry is difficult to assess because a greater court involvement in life-sustaining treat-
there is little firm evidence about the likelihood ment decisions. Most agree, however, that increased
of the feared erosion in the care of dying patients. involvement of the courts in these deCiSions would
There are at least two reasons, however, for skepticism be undesirable, as it would make sound decisionmak-
about this argument. The first is that the same worry ing more cumbersome and difficult without sufficient
could have been directed at recognizing patients' or compensating benefits.
surrogates' rights to forgo life-sustaining treatment, yet As with the second potential bad consequence
there is no persuasive evidence that recognizing the of permitting euthanasia, this third consideration
right to refuse treatment has caused a serious erosion in too is speculative and difficult to assess. The feared
the quality of care of dying patients. The second reason erosion of patients' or surrogates' rights to deCide
for skeptiCism about this worry is that only a very small about life-sustaining treatment, together with greater
proportion of deaths would occur from euthanasia if court involvement in those decisions, are both pos-
it were permitted. In the Netherlands, where eutha- sible. However, I believe there is reason to discount
nasia under specified circumstances is permitted by this generally worry. The legal rights of competent
the courts, though not authorized by statute, the best patients and, to a lesser degree, surrogates of incom-
estimate of the proportion of overall deaths that result petent patients to decide about treatment are very
from it is about 2 percent. 3 Thus, the vast majority of firmly embedded in a long line of informed consent
critically ill and dying patients will not request it, and and life-sustaining treatment cases, and are not likely
so will still have to be cared for by physicians, families, to be eroded by a debate over, or even acceptance
of, euthanasia. It will not be accepted without safe- Washington raises some doubt about this support).
guards that reassure the public about abuse, and if Thus, many more people seem to want the choice
that debate shows the need for similar safeguards for than would be made worse off by getting it. Second,
some life-sustaining treatment decisions they should if giving people the option of ending their life really
be adopted there as well. In neither case are the only makes them worse off, then we should not only pro-
possible safeguards greater court involvement, as hibit euthanasia, but also take back from people the
the recent growth of institutional ethics committees right they now have to decide about life-sustaining
shows. treatment. The feared harmful effect should already
The fourth potential bad consequence of permit- have occurred from securing people's right to refuse
ting euthanasia . . . turns on the subtle point that life-sustaining treatment, yet there is no evidence of
making a new option or choice available to people any such widespread harm or any broad public desire
can sometimes make them worse off, even if once to rescind that right. Third, since there is a wide range
they have the choice they go on to choose what is of conditions in which reasonable people can and do
best for them. Ordinarily, people's continued exis- disagree about whether they would want continued
tence is viewed by them as given, a fixed condition life, it is not possible to restrict the permissibility of
with which they must cope. Making euthanasia avail- euthanasia as narrowly as Velleman suggests without
able to people as an option denies them the alterna- thereby denying it to most persons who would want it;
tive of staying alive by default. If people are offered to permit it only in cases in which virtually everyone
the option of euthanasia, their continued existence is would want it would be to deny it to most who would
now a choice for which they can be held responsible want it.
and which they can be asked by others to justify. We A fifth potential bad consequence of making
care, and are right to care, about being able to justify euthanasia legally permissible is that it might weaken
ourselves to others. To the extent that our society is the general legal prohibition of homicide. This pro-
unsympathetic to justifying a severely dependent or hibition is so fundamental to civilized SOCiety, it is
impaired existence, a heavy psychological burden of argued, that we should do nothing that erodes it. If
proof may be placed on patients who think their ter- most cases of stopping life support are killing, as I have
minal illness or chronic infirmity is not a sufficient already argued, then the court cases permitting such
reason for dying. Even if they otherwise view their killing have already in effect weakened this prohibi-
life as worth living, the opinion of others around tion. However, neither the courts nor most people
them that it is not can threaten their reason for liv- have seen these cases as killing and so as challenging
ing and make euthanasia a rational choice. Thus the the prohibition of homicide. The courts have usually
existence of the option becomes a subtle pressure to grounded patients' or their surrogates' rights to refuse
request it. life-sustaining treatment in rights to privacy, liberty,
~hiS argument correctly identifies the reason why self-determination, or bodily integrity, not in excep-
offerIng some patients the option of euthanasia would tions to homicide laws.
not benefit them. [David] Velleman takes it not as a Legal permission for physicians or others to per-
~easo~ for opposing all euthanasia, but for restricting form euthanasia could not be grounded in patients'
It to cIrcumstances where there are "unmistakable and rights to decide about medical treatment. Permitting
overpowering reasons for persons to want the option euthanasia would require qualifying, at least in effect,
of euthanasia,,,4 and for denying the option in all the legal prohibition against homicide, a prohibi-
other cases. But there are at least three reasons why tion that in general does not allow the consent of the
such restriction may not be warranted. First, polls and victim to justify or excuse the act. Nevertheless, the
other evidence support that most Americans believe very same fundamental basis of the right to decide
euthanasia should be permitted (though the recent about life-sustaining treatment-respecting a per-
defeat of the referendum to permit it in the state of son's self-determination-does support euthanasia
as well. Individual self-determination has long been because doing so would result in its being performed
a well-entrenched and fundamental value in the law, in other cases in which it is not voluntary and would
and so extending it to euthanasia would not require be wrong. In this argument's most extreme form,
appeal to novel legal values or principles. That sui- permitting euthanasia is the first and fateful step
cide or attempted suicide is no longer a criminal down the slippery slope to Nazism. Once on the
offense in virtually all states indicates an accep- slope we will be unable to get off.
tance of individual self-determination in the taking Now it cannot be denied that it is possible that
of one's own life analogous to that required for permitting euthanasia could have these fateful con-
voluntary active euthanasia. The legal prohibi- sequences, but that cannot be enough to warrant pro-
tion (in most states) of assisting in suicide and hibiting it if it is otherwise justified. A similar possible
the refusal in the law to accept the consent of the slippery slope worry could have been raised to secur-
victim as a possible justification of homicide are ing competent patients' rights to decide about life
both arguably a result of difficulties in the legal pro- support, but recent history shows such a worry would
cess of establishing the consent of the victim after have been unfounded. It must be relevant how likely it
the fact. If procedures can be designed that clearly is that we will end with horrendous consequences and
establish the voluntariness of the person's request an unjustified practice of euthanasia. How like, and
for euthanasia it would under those procedures rep- widespread would the abuses and unwarranted exten-
resent a carefully circumscribed qualification on the sions of permitting it be? By abuses, I mean the perfor-
legal prohibition of homicide. Nevertheless, some mance of euthanasia that fails to satisfy the conditions
remaining worries about this weakening can be required for voluntary active euthanasia, for example,
captured in the final potential bad consequence, to if the patient has been subtly pressured to accept it. By
which I will now turn. unwarranted extensions of policy, I mean later changes
This final potential bad consequence is the cen- in legal policy to permit not just voluntary euthanasia,
tral concern of many opponents of euthanasia and, but also euthanasia in cases in which, for example, it
I believe, is the most serious objection to a legal pol- need not be fully voluntary. Opponents of voluntary
icy permitting it. According to this "slippery slope" euthanasia on slippery slope grounds have not pro-
worry, although active euthanasia may be morally vided the data or evidence necessary to turn their spec-
permissible in cases in which it is unequivocally ulative concerns into well-grounded likelihoods.
voluntary and the patient finds his or her condi- It is at least clear, however, that both the charac-
tion unbearable, a legal policy permitting euthana- ter and likelihood of abuses of a legal policy permit-
sia would inevitably lead to active euthanasia being ting euthanasia depend in significant part on the
performed in many other cases in which it would procedures put in place to protect against them. I will
be morally wrong. To prevent those other wrongful not try to detail fully what such procedures might be,
cases of euthanasia we should not permit even mor- but will just give some examples of what they might
ally justified performance of it. include:
Slippery slope arguments of this form are prob-
lematic and difficult to evaluate. From one per- 1. The patient should be provided with all relevant
spective, they are the last refuge of conservative information about his or her medical condition,
defenders of the status quo. When all the opponent's current prognosis, available alternative treat-
objections to the wrongness of euthanasia itself have ments, and the prognosis of each.
been met, the opponent then shifts ground and 2. Procedures should ensure that the patient's request
acknowledges both that it is not in itself wrong and for euthanasia is stable or enduring (a brief wait-
that a legal policy which resulted only in its being ing period could be required) and fully VOluntary
performed would not be bad. Nevertheless, the (an advocate for the patient might be appOinted to
opponent maintains, it should still not be permitted ensure this).
3. All reasonable alternatives must have been explored at odds with a proper understanding of the aims of
for improving the patient's quality of life and reliev- medicine, and so need not undermine patients' trust
ing any pain or suffering. in their physicians. If that argument is correct, then
4. A psychiatric evaluation should ensure that the physicians probably should not be prohibited, either
patient's request is not the result of a treatable by law or by professional norms, from taking part
psychological impairment such as depression. in a legally permissible practice of euthanasia (nor,
of course, should they be compelled to do so if their
These examples of procedural safeguards are all
personal or professional scruples forbid it). Most phy-
designed to ensure that the patient's choice is fully
sicians in the Netherlands appear not to understand
informed, voluntary, and competent, and so a true
euthanasia to be incompatible with their professional
exercise of self-determination. Other proposals for
commitments.
euthanasia would restrict its permissibility further-for
Sometimes patients who would be able to end
example, to the terminally ill-a restriction that cannot
their lives on their own nevertheless seek the assis-
be supported by self-determination. Such additional
tance of physicians. Physician involvement in such
restrictions might, however, be justified by concern for
cases may have important benefits to patients and
limiting potential harms from abuse. At the same time,
others beyond simply assuring the use of effective
it is important not to impose procedural or substantive
means. Historically, in the United States suicide has
safeguards so restrictive as to make euthanasia imper-
carried a strong negative stigma that many today
missible or practically infeasible in a wide range of justi-
believe unwarranted. Seeking a physician's assis-
fied cases.
tance, or what can almost seem a physician's bless-
These examples of procedural safeguards make
ing, may be a way of trying to remove that stigma and
clear that it is possible to substantially reduce, though
show others that the decision for suicide was made
not to eliminate, the potential for abuse of a policy
with due seriousness and was justified under the cir-
permitting voluntary active euthanasia. Any legaliza-
cumstances. The physician's involvement provides
tion of the practice should be accompanied by a well-
a kind of social approval, or more accurately helps
considered set of procedural safeguards together with
counter what would otherwise be unwarranted social
an ongOing evaluation of its use. Introducing eutha-
disapproval.
nasia into only a few states could be a form of carefully There are also at least two reasons for restricting
limited and controlled social experiment that would the practice of euthanasia to physicians only. First,
give us eVidence about the benefits and harms of the
physicians would inevitably be involved in some of
practice. Even then firm and uncontroversial data
the important procedural safeguards necessary to a
may remain eluSive, as the continuing controversy
defensible practice, such as seeing to it that the patient
over what has taken place in the Netherlands in recent
is well-informed about his or her condition, prognOSiS,
years indicates. 5
and possible treatments, and ensuring that all reason-
able means have been taken to improve the quality of
* * *
the patient's life. Second, and probably more impor-
tant, one necessary protection against abuse of the
practice is to limit the persons given authority to per-
THE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS
form it, so that they can be held accountable for their
If euthanasia is made legally permissible, should exercise of that authority. PhYSicians, whose training
physicians take part in it? Should only physicians be and professional norms give some assurance that they
permitted to perform it, as is the case in the Nether- would perform euthanasia responsibly, are an appro-
lands? In discussing whether euthanasia is incompat- priate group of persons to whom the practice may
ible with medicine's commitment to curing, caring be restricted.
for, and comforting patients, I argued that it is not * * *
NOTES 4. David Velleman commented on an earlier version of the

1. P. Painton and E. Taylor, "Love or Let Die," Time, 19 paper delivered at the American Philosophical Association
March 1990, 62-71; Boston Globe/Harvard University Poll, Central Division meetings.
Boston Globe, 3 November 1991. 5. Richard Fenigsen, "A Case against Dutch Euthanasia,"
2. Willard Gaylin, Leon R. Kass, Edmund D. Pellegrino, and Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report 19, no. 1 (1989):
Mark Siegler, "Doctors Must Not Kill," !oumal of the Americall 22-30.
Medical Association 259 (1988): 2139-40.
3. Paul J. Van der Maas et aI., "Euthanasia and Other Medi-
cal Decisions Concerning the End of Life," Lancet 338 (1991):
669-74.
l(illing and Allowing to Die

DANIEL CALLAHAN
* * * between physical causality, the realm of impersonal

events, and moral culpability, the realm of human
If a lessened worry about the consequences of legal responsibility.
euthanasia has been gaining ground, there has been The challenges encompass two pOints. The first is
an even more powerful threat to the traditional pro- that people can become equally dead by our omissions
hibition against it. No valid distinction, many now as well as our commissions. We can refrain from saving
argue, can be made between killing and allowing them when it is possible to do so, and they will be just
to die, or between an act of commission and one of as dead as if we shot them. It is our decision itself that
omission. The standard distinction being challenged is the reason for their death, not necessarily how we
rests on the commonplace observation that lives can effectuate that decision. That fact establishes the basis
come to an end as the result of: (a) the direct action of the second point: if we intend their death, it can be
of another who becomes the cause of death (as in brought about as well by omitted acts as by those we
shooting a person), and (b) the result of impersonal commit. The crucial moral point is not how they die,
forces where no human agent has acted (death by but our intention about their death. We can, then, be
lightning, or by disease). The purpose of the dis- responsible for the death of another by intending that
tinction has been to separate those deaths caused they die and accomplish that end by standing aside
by human action, and those caused by nonhuman and allowing them to die.
events. It is, as a distinction, meant to say some- Despite these criticisms-resting upon ambigui-
thing about human beings and their relationship to ties that can readily be acknowledged_the distinction
the world. It is a way of articulating the difference between killing and allowing to die remains, I con-
between those actions for which human beings can tend, perfec~ly valid. It not only has a logical validity
be held rightly responsible, or blamed, and those of but, no less Importantly, a social validity whose place
which they are innocent. At issue is the difference ~ust be c~n~ral .in ~oral judgments. As a way of put-
tmg t.h~ dlstmctlOn mto perspective, I want to suggest
that It IS best understood as expressing three differ-
Daniel Callahan, "Can We Return Death to Disease?" from
ent, though overlapping, perspectives on nature and
Hastings Center Report 19( 1): 4-6. Copyright © 1989 The Hastings human action. I will call them the metaphysical, the
Center. Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. moral, and the medical perspectives.
Metaphysical. The first and most fundamental between human agency and the action of external
premise of the distinction between killing and allow- nature. The ambiguity arises precisely because we
ing to die is that there is a sharp difference between can be morally culpable for killing someone (if we
the self and the external world. Unlike the childish have no moral right to do so, as we would in self-
fantasy that the world is nothing more than a projec- defense) and no less culpable for allowing someone
tion of the self, or the neurotic person's fear that he to die (if we have both the possibility and the obli-
or she is responsible for everything that goes wrong, gation of keeping that person alive). Thus there are
the distinction is meant to uphOld a simple notion: cases where, morally speaking, it makes no difference
there is a world external to the self that has its own, whether we killed or allowed to die; we are equally
and independent, causal dynamism. The mistake responsible. In those instances, the lines of physical
behind a conflation of killing and allowing to die is to causality and moral culpability happen to cross. Yet
assume that the self has become master of everything the fact that they can cross in some cases in no way
within and outside of the self. It is as if the conceit shows that they are always, or even usually, one and
that modern man might ultimately control nature the same. We can normally find the difference in all
has been internalized: that, if the self might be able but the most obscure cases. We should not, then, use
to influence nature by its actions, then the self and the ambiguity of such cases to do away altogether
nature must be one. with the distinction between killing and allowing to
Of course that is a fantasy. The fact that we can die. The ambiguity may obscure, but does not erase,
intervene in nature, and cure or control many dis- the line between the two.
eases, does not erase the difference between the self There is one group of ambiguous cases that is
and the external world. It is as "out there" as ever, especially troublesome. Even if we grant the ordi-
even if more under our sway. That sway, however nary validity between killing and allowing to die,
great, is always limited. We can cure disease, but not what about those cases that combine (a) an illness
always the chronic illness that comes with the cure. that renders a patient unable to carry out an ordi-
We can forestall death with modern medicine, but nary biological function (to breathe or eat on his
death always wins in the long run because of the own, for example), and (b) our turning off a respi-
innate limitations of the body, inherently and stub- rator or removing an artificial feeding tube? On the
bornly beyond final human control. And we can dis- level of physical causality, have we killed the patient
tinguish between a diseased body and an aging body, or allowed him to die? In one sense, it is our action
but in the end if we wait long enough they always that shortens his life, and yet in another sense his
become one and the same body. To attempt to deny underlying disease brings his life to an end. I believe
the distinction between killing and allowing to die it reasonable to say that, since his life was being
is, then, mistakenly to impute more power to human sustained by artificial means (respirator or feeding
action than it actually has and to accept the conceit tube) made necessary because of the fact that he had
that nature has now fallen wholly within the realm of an incapacitating disease, his disease is the ultimate
human control. Not so. reality behind his death. But for its reality, there
Moral. At the center of the distinction between would be no need for artificial sustenance in the
killing and allowing to die is the difference between first place and no moral issue at all. To lose sight of
physical causality and moral culpability. To bring the paramount reality of the disease is to lose sight
the life of another to an end by an injection kills the of the difference between our selves and the outer
other directly; our action is the physical cause of the world.
death. To allow someone to die from a disease we I quickly add, and underscore, a moral point: the
cannot cure (and that we did not cause) is to permit person who, without good moral reason, turns off a
the disease to act as the cause of death. The notion of respirator or pulls a feeding tube, can be morally cul-
physical causality in both cases rests on the difference pable; that the patient has been allowed to die of his
_ ,J
underlying condition does not morally excuse him. treatment can be as detrimental to that welfare as
The moral question is whether we are obliged to con- inadequate treatment. Put another way, the obliga-
tinue treating a life that is being artificially sustained. tion to resist the lethal power of disease is limited-it
To cease treatment mayor may not be morally accept- ceases when the patient is unwilling to have it resisted,
able; but it should be understood, in either case, that or where the resistance no longer serves the patient's
the physical cause of death was the underlying disease. welfare. Behind this moral premise is the recognition
Medical. An important social purpose of the dis- that disease (of some kind) ultimately triumphs and
tinction between killing and allowing to die has been that death is both inevitable sooner or later and not, in
that of protecting the historical role of the physician any case, always the greatest human evil. To demand
as one who tries to cure or comfort patients rather of the physician that he always struggle against dis-
than to kill patients. PhYSicians have been given spe- ease, as if it was in his power always to conquer it,
cial knowledge about the body, knowledge that can be would be to fall into the same metaphysical trap men-
used to kill or to cure. They are also given great privi- tioned above: that of assuming that no distinction can
leges in making use of that knowledge. It is thus all the be drawn between natural and human agency.
more important that physicians' social role and power A final word. I suggested earlier that the most
be, and be seen to be, a limited power. It may be used potent motive for active euthanasia and assisted sui-
only to cure or comfort, never to kill. They have not cide stems from a dread of the power of medicine.
been given, nor should they be given, the power to use That power then seems to take on a drive of its own
their knowledge and skills to bring life to an end. It regardless of the welfare or wishes of patients. No
would open the way for powerful misuse and, no less one can easily say no-not physicians, not patients,
importantly, represent an intrinsic violation of what it not families. My guess is that happens because too
has meant to be a physician. many have already come to believe that it is their
Yet if it is possible for phYSicians to misuse their choice, and their choice alone, which brings about
knowledge and power to kill people directly, are they death; and they do not want to exercise that kind
thereby required to use that same knowledge always of authority. The solution is not to erase the dis-
to keep people alive, always to resist a disease that can tinction between killing and allowing to die, but
itself kill the patient? The traditional answer has been: to underscore its validity and importance. We can
not necessarily. For the physician's ultimate obliga- bring disease as a cause of death back into the care of
tion is to the welfare of the patient, and excessive the dying.
Euthanasia for Disabled People?

LIZ CARR
If I said I wanted to die, the press, celebrities and the Yet when a healthy, non-disabled person wants
public would support my chOice, seeing it as rational to kill them self it's seen as a tragedy, and support and
and understandable. Hell, they would probably set up prevention tools are provided. If nothing else convinces
a GoFundMe campaign to help me make it happen. me that to legalise assisted suicide is not a safe option
for many of us, then this does. Suicide is not seen as
Liz Carr, "Legalising Assisted Dying Is Dangerous for Disabled
socially desirable-so why is assisted suicide seen as
People, Not Compassionate," Tile Guardiall, September 9, 2016. compassionate when it's for ill or disabled people?
Copyright <£) Guardian News & Media Ltd. 2018. Reprinted with Marieke Vervoort, the 38-year-old Belgian Para-
permission. lympian gold medallist, is only the most recent
disabled person to announce that she is considering may even find it easier to do so than abled people,
euthanasia, saying her "body is exhausted". She is not given the often precarious nature of their existences.
imminently dying. Yet no one seems to be trying to But that does not mean that when a fellow human
persuade her that life is worthwhile. Would Usain Bolt being-disabled or abled-expresses the Wish to die
be met with the same reaction if he announced his because their life is shit, that we should agree with
decision to end it all after his last Olympics? them. The value of a life is not just in its physicality
Although proponents of assisted suicide legisla- but in our relationships with those around us.
tion say it's only for those with six months or less to The bill, had it passed, would have licensed doc-
live, they propagandise with cases like that of Daniel tors to assist in the deaths of terminally ill people who
James, the 23-year-old man paralysed (but not dying) had less than six months to live, were mentally compe-
following a rugby accident, who killed himself at the tent and requested such assistance. But the direction
Swiss clinic Dignitas after he said he did not want legislation has taken in other countries shows that the
to live a "second-class" (that is, disabled) life. Jeffrey sympathy we disabled people evoke can be used to jus-
Spector, a 54-year-old man also not imminently dying, tify support for us to kill ourselves while non-disabled
also killed himself at Dignitas. people are told they have "everything to live for". How
The Netherlands, which legalised euthanasia to pro- many times has someone come up to me and said how
vide relief for the terminally ill, now regularly provides much they admired me just for existing because they
euthanasia for disabled people who can demonstrate could not, in my condition?
"unbearable suffering". Canada, the most recent nation There is a fine line between those who are termi-
to legalise euthanasia and assisted suicide, allows it for nally ill and those who are disabled in public percep-
"serious and incurable illness, disease or disability". tion, and the emotional power behind the campaign
Usually, the two sides of the argument are char- for assisted suicide is based on misplaced pity. Rather
acterised as "religious" (opposed to legalisation) or than telling us we have everything to live for-and
"secular" (in favour). But it's not that simple. we do-we are helped to the proverbial cliff edge and
Frustrated by the lack of opportunity to have the offered a push.
voices of people like me-of disabled people-heard People-disabled and not, with many years or
on this issue, I have decided to combine my activism only a few months ahead of them-become suicidal
with my career as a performer. for many, many reasons. We know from surveys in
I've never seen a piece of art or theatre which Oregon, one of just four states in the US where assisted
expresses opposition to legalising assisted suicide from suicide is legal, that the reasons people choose this
a disabled person's perspective-so I decided to try to option have little to do with pain, although this is
rectify that. The result is Assisted Suicide: The Musical- always the emphasis of supporters of assisted dying.
a show which premieres this weekend at the Royal Fes- In fact, loss of dignity, loss of autonomy, loss
tival Hall, London, and marks the first anniversary of of ability to do daily activities, and fear of being a
the defeat of the assisted dying bill in parliament. burden-reasons which are essentially more about the
There were of course religious people there with realities of living with a disability in our SOCiety-are
me and many others outside Westminster on Friday all more important than pain.
11 September 2015. But MPs who glanced out the It is worth keeping in mind, too, that, in the con-
window would have seen more Not Dead Yet (NOV) T- text of economic arguments about a health service
shirts and banners than religious ones. NDY is made overly concerned with "waste" of resources, disabled
up of disabled people opposed to a change in the law. people may be seen as a drain, just like the elderly. We
Every major disabled group in the UK, it should be also know from the US that some people have been
stressed, is opposed to this legislation. denied life-extending treatments because they are
Suicide is, of course, an individual choice. Dis- too costly while the cheaper assisted suicide option
abled people who are determined to take their lives has been offered as an alternative. Think this won't
happen here? Medical rationing is the reality of our Please, don't wish death upon us because you feel
overstretched NHS. pity for our condition. It is demoraliSing when dis-
No one wants us, those we love, or even those we abled people like Vervoort express-understandably-
don't to suffer and die in pain. But shouldn't we try exhaustion with the everyday struggle of existence
to get end-of-life care right before we throw physician- and discouragement with life and are met with sad,
assisted killing into the mix? Currently hospices and understanding nods. On Saturday, it is world suicide
palliative care are only available to the few, and hos- prevention day. Can we be included in suicide preven-
pices continue to rely on donations for their survival. tion efforts, too, please?
Why Doctors Must Not Kill

LEON R. KASS
Do you want your doctor licensed to kill? Should he or have trouble doing its proper work; without it, medi-
she be permitted or encouraged to inject or prescribe cine will have lost its claim to be an ethical and trust-
poison? Shall the mantle of privacy that protects the worthy profession; without it, all of us will suffer-yes,
doctor-patient relationship, in the service of life and more than we now suffer because some of us are not
wholeness, now also cloak decisions for death? Do soon enough released from life.
you want your doctor deciding, on the basis of his own Consider first the damaging consequences for
private views, when you still deserve to live and when the doctor-patient relationship. The patient's trust in
you now deserve to die? And what about the other the doctor's wholehearted devotion to the patient's
fellow's doctor-that shallow technician, that insen- best interests will be hard to sustain once doctors are
sitive boor who neither asks nor listens, that unprin- licensed to kill. Imagine the scene: you are old, poor,
cipled money-grubber, that doctor you used to go to in failing health, and alone in the world; you are
until you got up the nerve to switch: do you want him brought to the city hospital with fractured ribs and
licensed to kill? Speaking generally, shall the healing pneumonia. The nurse or intern enters late at night
profession become also the euthanizing profession? with a syringe full of yellow stuff for your intravenous
Common sense has always answered, "No." For drip. How soundly will you sleep? It will not matter
more than two millennia, the reigning medical ethic, that your doctor has never yet put anyone to death;
mindful that the power to cure is also the power to kill, that he is legally entitled to do so will make a world of
has held as an inviolable rule, "Doctors must not kill." difference.
Yet this venerable taboo is now under attack. Propo- And it will make a world of psychic difference too
nents of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide for conscientious physicians. How easily will they be
would have us believe that it is but an irrational vestige able to care wholeheartedly for patients when it is
of religious prejudice, alien to a true ethic of mediCine, always possible to think of killing them as a "thera-
which stands in the way of a rational and humane peutic option"? Shall it be penicillin and a respirator
approach to suffering at the end of life. Nothing could one more time, or, perhaps, this time just an overdose
be further from the truth. The taboo against doctors of morphine? Physicians get tired of treating patients
killing patients (even on request) is the very embodi- who are hard to cure, who resist their best efforts,
ment of reason and wisdom. Without it, medicine will who are on their way down-"gorks," "gomers," and
"vegetables" are only some of the less than affec-
Leon It Kass, "Why Doctors Must Not Kill," Commol1weal, tionate names they receive from the house officers.
Supplement 14, August 9, 1991,472-76. Won't it be tempting to think that death is the best
"treatment" for the little old lady "dumped" again on cost-containers) will soon rectify this injustice. The
the emergency room by the nearby nursing home? enactment of a law legalizing mercy killing (or assisted
suicide) on voluntary request will certainly be chal-
It is naive and foolish to take comfort from the fact lenged in the courts under the equal-protection clause
that the currently proposed change in the law proof the Fourteenth Amendment. Why, it will be argued,
vides "aid-in-dying" only to those who request it. For should the comatose or the demented be denied the
we know from long experience how difficult it is to dis- right to such a "dignified death" or such a "treatment"
cover what we truly want when we are suffering. Verbal just because they cannot claim it for themselves?
"requests" made under duress rarely reveal the whole With the aid of court-appointed proxy consenters, we
story. Often a demand for euthanasia is, in fact, an will quickly erase the distinction between the right
angry or anxious plea for help, born of fear of rejection to choose one's own death and the right to request
or abandonment, or made in ignorance of available someone else's-as we have already done in the
alternatives that could alleviate pain and suffering. termination-of-treatment cases.
Everyone knows how easy it is for those who control Clever doctors and relatives will not need to wait
the information to engineer requests and to manipu- for such changes in the law. Who will be around to
late choices, especially in the vulnerable. Paint vividly notice when the elderly, poor, crippled, weak, pow-
a horrible prognosis, and contrast it with that "gentle, erless, retarded, uneducated, demented, or gullible
quick release": which will the depressed or frightened are mercifully released from the lives their doctors,
patient choose, especially in the face of a spiraling hos- nurses, and next of kin deem no longer worth living?
pital bill or children who visit grudgingly? Yale Kamisar In Holland, for example, a recent survey of 300 phy-
asks the right questions: "Is this the kind of choice, sicians (conducted by an author who supports eutha-
assuming that it can be made in a fixed and rational nasia) disclosed that over 40 percent had performed
manner, that we want to offer a gravely ill person? Will euthanasia without the patient's request, and over
we not sweep up, in the process, some who are not 10 percent had done so in more than five cases. Is
really tired of life, but think others are tired of them; there any reason to believe that the average American
some who do not really want to die, but who feel that physician is, in his private heart, more committed
they should not live on, because to do so when there than his Dutch counterpart to the equal worth and
looms the legal alternative of euthanasia is to do a self- dignity of every life under his care? Do we really want
ish or cowardly act? Will not some feel an obligation to find out what he is like, once the taboo is broken?
to have themselves 'eliminated' in order that funds Even the most humane and conscientious physi-
allocated for their terminal care might be better used cian psychologically needs protection against him-
by their families or, financial worries aSide, in order to self and his weaknesses, if he is to care fully for those
relieve their families of the emotional strain involved?" who entrust themselves to him. A physician-friend
Euthanasia, once legalized, will not remain con- who worked many years in a hospice caring for dying
fined to those who freely and knowingly elect it-and patients explained it to me most convincingly: "Only
the most energetic backers of euthanasia do not really because I knew that J could not and would not kill my
want it thus restricted. Why? Because the vast major- patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately
ity of candidates who merit mercy-killing cannot into caring for them as they lay dying." The psycho-
request it for themselves: adults with persistent veg- logical burden of the license to kill (not to speak of the
etative state or severe depression or senility or aphasia brutalization of the physician-killers) could very well
or mental illness or Alzheimer's disease; infants who be an intolerably high price to pay for the physician-
are deformed; and children who are retarded or dying. assisted euthanasia.
All incapable of requesting death, they will thus be The point, however, is not merely psychological:
denied our new humane "assistance-in-dying." But it is also moral and essential. My friend's horror at the
not to worry. The lawyers and the doctors (and the thought that he might be tempted to kill his patients,
were he not enjoined from doing so, embodies a deep my life and my art." In forswearing the giving of
understanding of the medical ethic and its intrinsic pOison, the physician recognizes and restrains a
limits. We move from assessing consequences to look- god-like power he wields over patients, mindful that
ing at medicine itself. his drugs can both cure and kill. But in forswear-
ing the giving of poison, when asked for it, the Hip-
The beginning of ethics regarding the use of power gen- pocratic physician rejects the view that the patient's
erally lies in nay-saying. The wise setting of limits on choice for death can make killing him-or assisting his
the use of power is based on discerning the excesses to suicide-right. For the phYSician, at least, human life
which the power, unrestrained, is prone. Applied to the in living bodies commands respect and reverence-
professions, this principle would establish strict outer by its very nature. As its respectability does not depend
boundaries-indeed, inviolable taboos-against those upon human agreement or patient consent, revoca-
"occupational hazards" to which each profession is espe- tion of one's consent to live does not deprive one's
dally prone. Within these outer limits, no fixed rules of living body of respectability. The deepest ethical
conduct apply; instead, prudence-the wise judgment of principle restraining the physician's power is not the
the man-on-the-spot-finds and adopts the best course autonomy or freedom of the patient; neither is it his
of action in the light of the circumstances. But the outer own compassion or good intention. Rather, it is the
limits themselves are fixed, firm, and non-negotiable. dignity and mysterious power of human life itself,
What are those limits for medicine? At least three and, therefore, also what the oath calls the purity
are set forth in the venerable Hippocratic Oath: no and holiness of the life and art to which he has sworn
breach of confidentiality; no sexual relations with devotion. A person can choose to be a phYSician, but
patients; no dispensing of deadly drugs. These unqual- he cannot simply choose what physicianship means.
ified, self-imposed restrictions are readily understood The central meaning of physicianship derives not
in terms of the temptations to which the physician is from medicine's powers but from its goal, not from its
most vulnerable, temptations in each case regarding means but from its end: to benefit the sick by the activ-
an area of vulnerability and exposure that the practice ity of healing. The phYSician as physician serves only
of medicine requires of patients. Patients necessar- the sick. He does not serve the relatives or the hospi-
ily divulge and reveal private and intimate details of tal or the national debt inflated due to Medicare costs.
their personal lives; patients necessarily expose their Thus he will never sacrifice the well-being of the sick
naked bodies to the physician's objectifying gaze and to the convenience or pocketbook or feelings of the
investigating hands; patients necessarily expose and relatives or society. Moreover, the physician serves the
entrust the care of their very lives to the physician's sick not because they have rights or wants or claims,
skill, technique, and judgment. The exposure is, in all but because they are sick. The healer works with and
cases, one-sided and asymmetric: the doctor does not for those who need to be healed, in order to help make
reveal his intimacies, display his nakedness, offer up them whole. Despite enormous changes in medical
his embodied life to the patient. Mindful of the mean- technique and institutional practice, despite enor-
ing of such nonmutual exposure, the physician volun- mous changes in nosology and therapeutics, the cen-
tarily sets limits on his own conduct, pledging not to ter of medicine has not changed: it is as true today as it
take advantage of or to violate the patient's intimacies, was in the days of Hippocrates that the ill desire to be
naked sexuality, or life itself. whole; that wholeness means a certain well-working
The prohibition against killing patients, the first of the enlivened body and its unimpaired powers to
negative promise of self-restraint sworn to in the sense, think, feel, deSire, move, and maintain itself;
Hippocratic Oath, stands as medicine's first and most and that the relationship between the healer and
abiding taboo: leI will neither give a deadly drug to the ill is constituted, essentially even if only tacitly,
anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion around the desire of both to promote the wholeness of
to this effect .... In purity and holiness I will guard the one who is ailing.
Can wholeness and healing ever be compatible in prindple a project that must at some point fail. And
with intentionally killing the patient? Can one benefit here is where all the trouble begins: How does one deal
the patient as a whole by making him dead? There is, with "medical failure"? What does one seek when res-
of course, a logical difficulty: how can any good exist toration of wholeness-or "much" wholeness-is by
for a being that is not? But the error is more than logi- and large out of the question?
cal: to intend and to act for someone's good requires
his continued existence to receive the benefit. Contrary to the propaganda of the euthanasia move-
To be sure, certain attempts to benefit may in fact ment, there is, in fact, much that can be done. Indeed,
turn out, unintentionally, to be lethal. Giving ade- by recognizing finitude yet knowing that we will not
quate morphine to control pain might induce respi- kill, we are empowered to focus on easing and enhanc-
ratory depression leading to death. But the intent to ingthe lives of those who are dying. First of all, medicine
relieve the pain of the living presupposes that the liv- can follow the lead of the hospice movement and-
ing still live to be relieved. This must be the starting abandoning decades of shameful mismanagement-
point in discussing all medical benefits: no benefit provide truly adequate (and now technically feasible)
without a beneficiary. relief of pain and discomfort. Second, phYSicians (and
Against this View, someone will surely bring forth patients and families) can continue to learn how to
the hard cases: patients so ill-served by their bodies withhold or withdraw those technical interventions
that they can no longer bear to live, bodies riddled that are, in truth, merely burdensome or degrad-
with cancer and racked with pain, against which their ing medical additions to the unhappy end of a life-
"owners" protest in horror and from which they insist including, frequently, hospitalization itself. Ceasing
on being released. Cannot the person "in the body" treatment and allowing death to occur when (and iO
speak up against the rest, and request death for "per- it will seem to be quite compatible with the respect
sonal" reasons? life itself commands for itself. Doctors may and must
However sympathetically we listen to such allow to die, even if they must not intentionally kill.
requests, we must see them as incoherent. Such person- Ceasing medical intervention, allowing nature to
body dualism cannot be sustained. "Personhood" take its course, differs fundamentally from mercy kill-
is manifest on earth only in living bodies; our high- ing. For one thing, death does not necessarily follow
est mental functions are held up by, and are insepa- the discontinuance of treatment; Karen Ann Quinlan
rable from, lowly metabolism, respiration, Circulation, lived more than ten years after the court allowed the
excretion. There may be blood Without consciousness, "life-sustaining" respirator to be removed. Not the
but there is never consciousness without blood. Thus phYSiCian, but the underlying fatal illness becomes the
one who calls for death in the service of personhood is true cause of death. More important morally, in ceas-
like a tree seeking to cut its roots for the sake of growing ing treatment the physician need not intend the death
its highest fruit. No phYSician, devoted to the benefit of the patient, even when the death follows as a result
of the sick, can serve the patient as person by denying of his omission. His intention should be to avoid use-
and thwarting his personal embodiment. less and degrading medical additions to the already sad
To say it plainly, to bring nothingness is incom- end of a life. In contrast, in active, direct mercy kill-
patible with serving wholeness: one cannot heal-or ing the physician must, necessarily and indubitably,
comfort-by making nil. The healer cannot annihi- intend primarily that the patient be made dead. And
late if he is truly to heal. The physician-euthanizer is a he must knowingly and indubitably cast himself in
deadly self-contradiction. the role of the agent of death. This remains true even
But we must acknowledge a difficulty. The central if he is merely an assistant in suicide. A physician who
goal of medicine-health-is, in each case, a perish- provides the pills or lets the patient plunge the syringe
able good: inevitably, patients get irreversibly Sick, after he leaves the room is morally no different from
patients degenerate, patients die. Healing the sick is one who does the deed himself. "I will neither give a
deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a What humanity needs most in the face of evils is
suggestion to this effect." courage, the ability to stand against fear and pain and
Once we refuse the technical fix, physicians and thoughts of nothingness. The deaths we most admire
the rest of us can also rise to the occasion: we can learn are those of people who, knowing that they are dying,
to act humanly in the presence of finitude. Far more face the fact frontally and act accordingly: they set
than adequate morphine and the removal of burden- their affairs in order, they arrange what could be final
some machinery, the dying need our presence and our meetings with their loved ones, and yet, with strength
encouragement. Dying people are all too easily reduced of soul and a small reservoir of hope, they continue to
ahead of time to "thinghood" by those who cannot live and work and love as much as they can for as long
bear to deal with the suffering or disability of those they as they can. Because such conclusions of life require
love. Withdrawal of contact, affection, and care is the courage, they call for our encouragement-and for
greatest single cause of the dehumanization of dying. the many small speeches and deeds that shore up the
Not the alleged humaneness of an elixir of death, but human spirit against despair and defeat.
the humanness of connected living-while-dying is Many doctors are in fact rather poor at this sort of
what medicine-and the rest of us-most owe the encouragement. They tend to regard every dying or
dying. The treatment of choice is company and care. incurable patient as a failure, as if an earlier diagnosis or
The euthanasia movement would have us believe a more vigorous intervention might have avoided what
that the physician's refusal to assist in suicide or per- is, in truth, an inevitable collapse. The enormous suc-
form euthanasia constitutes an affront to human dig- cesses of medicine these past fifty years have made both
nity. Yet one of their favorite arguments seems to me doctors and laymen less prepared than ever to accept
rather to prove the reverse. Why, it is argued, do we put the fact of finitude. Doctors behave, not without some
animals out of their misery but insist on compelling reason, as if they have godlike powers to revive the
fellow human beings to suffer to the bitter end? Why, moribund; laymen expect an endless string of medical
if it is not a contradiction for the veterinarian, does the miracles. Physicians today are not likely to be agents of
medical ethic absolutely rule out mercy killing? Is this encouragement once their technique begins to fail.
not simply inhumane? lt is, of course, partly for these reasons that doctors
Perhaps inhumane, but not thereby inhuman. On will be pressed to kill-and many of them will, alas, be
the contrary, it is precisely because animals are not willing. Having adopted a largely technical approach
human that we must treat them (merely) humanely. to healing, having medicalized so much of the end of
We put dumb animals to sleep because they do not life, doctors are being asked-often with thinly veiled
know that they are dying, because they can make noth- anger-to provide a final technical solution for the
ing of their misery or mortality, and, therefore, because evil of human finitude and for their own technical
they cannot live deliberately-Le., humanly-in the failure: If you cannot cure me, kill me. The last gasp
face of their own suffering and dying. They cannot live of autonomy or cry for dignity is asserted against a
out a fitting end. Compassion for their weakness and medicalization and institutionalization of the end
dumbness is our only appropriate emotion, and given of life that robs the old and the incurable of most of
our responsibility for their care and well-being, we do their autonomy and dignity: intubated and electrified,
the only humane thing we can. But when a conscious with bizarre mechanical companions, once proud and
human being asks us for death, by that very action he independent people find themselves cast in the roles
displays the presence of something that precludes our of passive, obedient, highly disciplined children. Peo-
regarding him as a dumb animal. Humanity is owed ple who care for autonomy and dignity should try to
humanity, not humaneness. Humanity is owed the reverse this dehumanization of the last stages of life,
bolstering of the human, even or especially in its dying instead of giving dehumanization its final triumph
moments, in resistance to the temptation to ignore its by welcoming the desperate goodbye-to-all-that con-
presence in the sight of suffering. tained in one final plea for poison.
The present crisis that leads some to press for active abandoning their posts, their patients, and their duty
euthanasia is really an opportunity to learn the limits to care; they will set the worst sort of example for the
of the medicalization of life and death and to recover community at large-teaching technicism and so-
an appreciation of living with and against mortality. called humaneness where encouragement and human-
It is an opportunity for physicians to recover an ity are both required and sorely lacking. On the other
understanding that there remains a residual human hand, should physicians hold fast, should doctors
wholeness-however precarious-that can be cared learn that finitude is no disgrace and that human
for even in the face of incurable and terminal illness. wholeness can be cared for to the very end, medicine
Should doctors cave in, should doctors become may serve not only the good of its patients, but also,
technical dispensers of death, they will not only be by example, the failing moral health of modern times.
CHAPTER 11
Delivering Health Care
At the burning center of debates about health care justice demands impartiality-that is, it requires
in the United States-debates that rage in the U.S. that equals be treated equally unless there is a mor-
Congress, in the media, at kitchen tables, and in ally relevant reason for treating them differently.
medical and health organizations of all kinds- Based on this understanding of justice, many who
are a few seemingly simple moral questions: Who have thought carefully about the U.S. system of
should get health care, who should supply it, and distributing health care think it is unjust. This
who should pay for it? (Health care, in this context, judgment sits uneasily alongside an even more
includes medical treatment, disease prevention, common criticism: the system is ineffective and
emergency care, and public health measures.) unworkable.
This debate is not about the morality of individual
actions and decisions; it's about the morality of ISSUE FILE: BACl<GROUND
the poliCies and programs of a society as a whole.
It arises from disturbing facts about the citizens of Health care is expensive, which is why so many
such a prosperous nation: millions afflicted with Americans do not have access to it: they cannot
disease and disability have no access to health afford it. Health insurance exists to help people
care, and many suffer and die a~ a result. Reality cover the expense of health care, but health insur-
forces society to confront a host of related ques- ance itself is expensive, which is why millions
tions: What do we owe, if anything, to these mil- lack coverage. Here is a nonpartisan report on the
lions? Are the more fortunate obligated to help problem:
those in need? Are citizens entitled only to the In the past, gaps in the public insurance system and
health care they can pay for out of their own pock- lack of access to affordable private coverage left mil-
ets? Or should everyone-rich and poor-have lions without health insurance, and the number of
access to health care? If they should, what level of uninsured Americans grew over time, particularly
health care should they have-the best that medi- during economic downturns. By 2013, the year before
the major coverage provisions of the Affordable Care
cal science can offer, the same care that rich peo-
Act (ACA) went into effect, more than 44 million
ple can buy, a bare minimum package of health nonelderly individuals lacked coverage ....
care? Does everyone have a right to health care- Under the ACA, as of 2014, Medicaid coverage
such that a society's failure to provide it would be expanded to nearly all adults with incomes at or
morally wrong? below 138% of poverty in states that have adopted
The fundamental moral issue involved in the the expansion, and tax credits are available for
health care debate is justice, which is about persons people with incomes up to 400% of poverty who
getting what is fair or what is their due. With an eye purchase coverage through a health insurance mar-
ketplace. Millions of people enrolled in ACA cov-
to justice, we condemn racial discrimination and
erage, and the uninsured rate dropped to a historic
unequal punishments for the same crime because low by 2016. Coverage gains were particularly large
313
among low-income adults in states that expanded program supported jointly by the federal govern-
Medicaid. ment and the states, with the former providing
Despite large gains in health coverage, some matching funds to the latter. It covers some low-
people continued to lack coverage, and the ACA
income families, pregnant women, families and
remained the subject of political debate. Attempts
to repeal and replace the ACA stalled in summer
children, and people with disabilities. States may
2017, but there have been several changes to imple- cover additional groups, including individuals
mentation of the ACA under the Trump Adminis- receiving home-based care and children in foster
tration that affect coverage. In 2017, the number of care. But because of certain eligibility rules, Medic-
uninsured rose for the first time since implementa- aid does not cover many who are below the pov-
tion of the ACA to 27.4 million. Those most at risk erty line.
of being uninsured include low-income individu- In the U.S. health care system, a trou bUng contra-
als, adults, and people of color. The cost of coverage
diction hides in plain sight: while the United States
continues to be the most commonly cited barrier to
coverage.} spends an impreSSively large amount of money on
health care, the country earns shockingly low scores
Uninsured people pay a price for being without on standard assessments of national health. In
health insurance. They often have to forgo or delay 2018, the United States spent more on health care
treatment, skip medical tests that can detect dis- than any other country in the world: $10,586 per
ease early, go without prescription drugs, and pass capita. 4 Yet the United States scored worse on fun-
on life-saving surgery. They are forced to seek treat- damental measures of health than most other devel-
ment at hospital emergency departments and com- oped countries. In 2017, the average life expectancy
munity clinics, but these options cannot entirely in the United States was 78.6 years-below that in
make up for the more comprehensive health care Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden,
provided through adequate insurance coverage. France, and Japan. The infant mortality rate in
According to researchers, not having health insur- the United States was 4.8 deaths per 1,000, which
ance can be deadly: each year a lack of coverage is was higher than those in most other developed
responsible for 45,000 deaths. 2 countries-including the United Kingdom, Japan,
In 1999, 67 percent of people under 65 (the Korea, Switzerland, Poland, and Estonia. 5
"nonelderly") got their health coverage through The United States has a reputation for offering
their employer. But in 2019, only 55 percent of tithe best health care in the world," and in some
people got their coverage this way.3 Fewer employ- ways, its care really is the best. The U.S. system
ers provided health insurance as a benefit to their outperforms comparable countries in the devel-
employees, and many employees could not afford opment and use of medical technologies, and it
it or were ineligible for it. has shorter wait times for specialist visits, lower
For some, Medicare is a source of basic cover- in-hospital mortality rates for heart attack and
age. It's a federally funded insurance program that ischemic stroke, and higher five-year survival rates
covers people 65 and older, some adults under 65 for some cancers. But at the same time, the United
with disabilities, and people with end-stage kidney States has the highest rate of deaths that could
disease. The program is supported by payroll taxes have been prevented through better health care,
paid by workers during their years of employment. and it has more frequent hospital admissions for
It insures elderly people regardless of health or preventable diseases, fewer physicians per capita,
income, covering hospital care, short-term nursing higher rates of errors in care (medical, medication,
home services, physicians' bills, outpatient care, and laboratory errors), and longer wait times to
and prescription drugs. Medicaid is an insurance see a doctor. 6
CHAPTER 11: DELIVERING HEALTH CARE 0 315
c--- care plan (an HMO, PPO, or POS) to offer health

~
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care to a group of patients (members of the plan)
Health Care by Country
at discounted costs. The managed care plan agrees
Country Health Avg. Infant % of to pay the providers a fixed fee; the providers agree
care life mor- pop. to reduce the price of their services in exchange for
spend- expec- tality with the plan's pool of patients; and, to keep costs down,
ing (per tancy (deaths public the patients may be restricted to certain medical
capita) per cover- services and to only those providers that are part of
1,000) age the plan ("in the network").
United States $10,586 78.6 4.8 35.9 Managed care plans get credit for trying to contain
Canada $4,974 82.0 4.5 100 costs and improve efficiency, but some critics charge
United $4,070 81.3 2.8 100 that the emphasis on these business values could
Kingdom ultimately degrade the quality of care. They say that
Germany $5,986 81.1 2.8 89.4 physicians in these plans may spend less time with
Switzerland $7,317 83.6 3.0 100 patients, forgo necessary tests and treatments, avoid
Australia $5,005 82.6 3.3 100 treating serious health problems, and engender dis-
Sweden $5,447 82.5 2.3 100 trust in patients. Physicians, for their part, may worry
France $4,965 82.6 3.8 99.9
that their managed care organization will expect
Japan $4,766 84.2 1.7 100
them to practice a less compassionate, less conscien-
Source: Health at a Glance 2019, OECD Indicators. tious form of medicine. In any case, physicians are
expected to try to serve the needs of patients while
meeting the demands of a cost-conscious business.
The Affordable Care Act ClObamacare"), enacted
A 2014 study of the strengths and weaknesses in 2010, was an attempt by the administration of
of advanced health care systems around the world President Barack Obama to solve two of the most
reinforced the idea that the U.S. system was in trou- intractable problems of the U.S. health care system:
ble. The study findings were summarized like this: the lack of health insurance coverage among mil-
lions of Americans and the seemingly unstoppable
Despite having the most expensive health care
rise in health care costs. The administration believed
system, the United States ranks last overall among
11 industrialized countries on measures of health
that the best way to achieve these ends was to expand
system quality, efficiency, access to care, equity, both private and public health insurance. Here's a
and healthy lives, according to a new Common- brief summary of the ACA's major provisions:
wealth Fund report. The other countries included • It required employers to cover their work-
in the study were Australia, Canada, France, Ger-
ers or pay penalties, with exceptions for small
many, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. employers.
While there is room for improvement in every • It provided tax credits to certain small busi-
country, the U.S. stands out for having the highest nesses that cover specified costs of health insur-
costs and lowest performance .... 7
ance for their employees.
Much of the health care in the United States • It required individuals to have basic health
is delivered through managed care, a type of insurance, with some exceptions, such as for
health insurance in which providers (doctors and financial hardship or religious belief (this pro-
hospitals, for example) contract with a managed vision is known as the individual mandate).
• It required the creation of state-based (or

multi-state) insurance exchanges to help indi-
QUICI< REVIEW
viduals and small businesses purchase insur-
ance. Federal subsidies were established to Medicare-A federally funded U.S. health insur-
limit premium costs to between 2 percent of ance program that covers people 65 and older,
income, for those with incomes at 133 percent some adults under 65 with disabilities, and
of the federal poverty level, and 9.5 percent of people with end-stage kidney disease.
income, for those who earn between 300 per-
Medicaid-A health insurance program sup-
cent and 400 percent of the federal poverty
ported jointly by the u.s. federal government
level.
and the states, with the former providing
• It expanded Medicaid to cover people with matching funds to the latter. It covers some
incomes below [138] percent of federal poverty low-income families, pregnant women, and
level. people with disabilities.
managed care-A type of health insurance in
• It required the creation of temporary high-risk which providers contract with a managed care
pools for those who cannot purchase health plan to offer health care to a particular group
insurance on the private market due to preex- of patients (members of the plan) at discounted
isting health conditions. costs.
• It required health insurance plans to cover

young adults on their parents' policies.
• It required health insurance plans to cover cer- MORAL THEORIES
tain preventive care, such as immunizations,
preventive care for children, and specified health In Chapter 21 (Global Economic Justice), we dis-
screening tests for adults. 8 cuss justice as it applies to nations and their obli-
gations to the impoverished people of the world.
The ACA has been controversial since its Here we delve into theories of justice as they apply
debut, with political parties lining up for and to health care systems.
against it, supporters and detractors arguing over Broad questions about who should get health
key components, and repeated challenges to the care, who should provide it, and who should pay
law in federal courts. Supporters have embraced for it are ultimately questions about justice-in
it because it has increased access to health insur- particular, about distributive justice. This kind of
ance, made that insurance more affordable justice concerns the fair distribution of a society's
addressed concerns about fairness, and seems t~ benefits and burdens, such as taxes, jobs, income,
fit well with the notion of a right to health care. government services, social obligations, property,
Critics complain about increases in premiums and and rights. The idea of distributive justice is that in
out-of-pocket costs, object to the individual man- any society, morality demands that people receive
date, and insist that providing health insurance what they are due, what is fair. Debates about the
is not a legitimate role for the government. In distribution of health care are often, at their most
late 2017, the U.S. Congress eliminated the indi- fundamental level, clashes between rival theo-
vidual mandate; the loss of this key provision of ries of distributive justice. If you ask people why
the ACA is likely to add millions of people to the they think a particular allocation of health care
uninsured rolls. 9 resources is good or right, they may give you a
n
CHAPTER 11: DeliVERING HEALTH CARE '0 317
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The lore of Health Care Proposals
If health care in the United States is inadequate health insurance plans that you might have access
(too costly, too inefficient, too few people cov- to through your employer or through the indi-
ered, etc.), what's the best way to fix it? Many pro- vidual insurance exchanges, there would be an
posals have been put forward, and debates about option to buy into a government-run insurance
program, like Medicare. Private insurance would
them are ongoing. One problem is that the terms
still exist, but people could choose to get a gov-
describing them can be confusing. Here's some
ernment insurance plan instead. There are many
clarification:
kinds of public option proposals, and different
Single-Payer presidential candidates have their own ideas on
This is a kind of health care system where the how it would work, whether it's lowering the age
government provides insurance to everyone. Think for Medicare access or creating a new program
about it as if you're a doctor: a patient comes in, that's not Medicare or Medicaid that people could
and you treat them. Who's paying you for that buy into, among others. The idea is that the gov-
care? Under our current system, it could be a ernment might be able to offer a more affordable
variety of payers: state Medicaid programs, Medi- option for people, which could push down prices
care, or a private insurance company like Aetna in the private insurance world.
or Cigna or Blue Cross and Blue Shield-each with
"Government-Run" Health Care
different rates and different services that they
Many opponents of Medicare for All and other
cover. Instead, under the single-payer model,
health proposals use the term "government-run"
there's just one, single payer: the government.
as a dig against them, including President Trump.
Medicare for All (Sometimes the term "socialized medicine" is
If single-payer is fruit, Medicare for All is a banana. used as well.) In the U.K. and some other places,
In other words, single-payer is a category of the government doesn't just pay people's health
coverage, and Medicare for All is a specific pro- care bills, it also owns hospitals and employs doc-
posal, originally written by presidential candidate tors and other providers-that's a government-
Sen. Bernie Sanders (as he often reminds us). It run health care system. The single-payer concept
envisions the creation of a national health insur- being discussed in this country's presidential cam-
ance program, with coverage provided to every- paign would not operate like that-the industry
one, based on the idea that access to health care would still be mostly private, but the government
is a human right. Private health insurance would would pay the bills. (How the government would
mostly go away, and there would be no premiums generate the money to pay those bills is subject
or cost-sharing for patients. to debate.)
Important note: it would not actually just expand Universal Coverage
Medicare as it exists now for all people (as you This isn't a plan, it's a goal that everyone has
might guess from the name). Medicare doesn't health insurance-that health insurance coverage
cover a whole lot of things that this proposed is universal. *
program would cover, like hearing and vision and
dental and long-term care. *© 2020 National Public Radio, Inc. Excerpts from news
report titled "Medicare for All? A Public Option? Health
Public Option Care Terms, Explained" by Selena Simmons-Duffin were
The idea of a "public option" was floated back originally published on npr.org on January 14, 2020,
in 2009 when the Affordable Care Act was being and is used with the permission of NPR. Any unauthor-
debated. The idea is that along with the private ized duplication is strictly prohibited.
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, " CRITICAL THOUGHT: Comparing Health Care Systems
Consider the features of these four health care pays for health care through taxes, but also deliv-
systems: ers care through state-owned medical facilities.
• Canada. A single-payer, universal system in Some private health insurance is also available.
which the national government pays for health • United States. A less-than-universal mixed sys-
care through taxes while the private sector tem of health care consisting of private health
provides the care. Private health insurance is insurance obtained through employers, pri-
available to cover people who choose not to vate health insurance acquired through ACA
participate in the national plan. exchanges, single-payer Medicare, and state-
• Germany. A universal health care system in which financed and state-run Medicaid.
the government pays for care with mandatory Based on the information above and in the rest of
contributions, based on income, from employers this chapter, which health care system do you think
and employees. The private sector delivers the is best? Which system covers the most people, at
care. Most Germans obtain coverage through the lowest cost, with the best health outcomes?
the public system, but some can opt for private Why? Consider the u.S. system. What are its advan-
health insurance. tages and disadvantages? Would you like to see it
• United Kingdom. A universal single-payer system move closer to a system like the one in the United
of socialized medicine. The government not only Kingdom? Why or why not?
variety of reasons-and these reasons can often negative rights and to ensure that the economic
be traced back logically to a supporting theory of marketplace is free of fraud, theft, and contract
justice. Two types of theories have been especially breaches.
prominent in moral arguments about health care: Critics of the libertarian view of health care reject
libertarian and egalitarian theories. the theory's fundamental premise. For example:
Libertarian theories of justice say that the
advantages and disadvantages of SOciety must be The problem is, [the fundamental libertarian assump-
tion] leads directly to the conclusion that "if you
allotted in a way that does not curtail personal
don't have any money, you shouldn't be entitled to
liberty. People are entitled only to what they can any medicine." This is not a quibble. It's a very basic
freely acquire through their own legitimate efforts point about the trouble libertarians have with argu-
in a free market. To compel someone to help ments about fairness in health-care distribution.
others-say, to tax a person to pay for someone Essentially, libertarians don't believe in positive
else's health care-is a violation of personal lib- rights. They believe that no matter how rich a soci-
ety may be, no member of that society has a right to
erty. In other words, for the libertarian, there are
demand a minimal share of basic goods from that
no positive rights-rights that obligate others to
society. People have the right not to be interfered
help a person obtain something. There are only with, but they don't have the right to actually get
negative rights-rights that obligate others not anything. One can think of the pOSition in terms of
to interfere with a person's obtaining something. a desert-island castaway analogy. Let's say two cast-
The state should use coercion only to protect these aways wash up on a desert island, along with their
trunks. One is fantastically rich, and he has several taking resources away from the wealthy to give
trunks full of tinned meat, a water filter, and so on. to the less well-off. And some say that health care
The other guy just has a carry-on bag with a tooth-
should be divided equally among those most in
brush. The question is: is the rich guy morally obliged
to share his water filter with the poor guy? Does the
need. The libertarian, of course, rejects this argu-
poor guy have a right to potable water, given that the ment, declaring that economic equality should
filter makes adequate water available for everyone? never take precedence over personal liberties. Lib-
Or would it just be a nice thing, but not a rights-based erty trumps equality.
moral obligation, for the rich guy to share his water? Probably the strongest egalitarian claim is that
Libertarians believe the poor guy doesn't have people have a moral right to health care- a guaran-
a right to the water. Liberals believe he does. If teed positive right. As Norman Daniels, an influen-
there's enough water to ensure nobody goes thirsty,
tial advocate for this pOSition, says,
then the poor guy has a fundamental right to get
a decent share. There may be arguments over how [A] right to health care imposes an obligation
large that decent share is, but fundamentally, peo- on others to assist the right-bearers in obtain-
ple have the right to adequate water in a SOciety ing needed and appropriate services. Specifically,
where there's enough water to go around. to claiming a right to health care includes these other
claims: society has the duty to its members to
Egalitarian theories of justice maintain that allocate an adequate share of its total resources to
because every person is of equal value and is worthy health-related needs; SOciety has the duty to pro-
of equal moral consideration, the only just way to vide a just allocation of different types of health
distribute society's benefits and burdens is equally. care services, taking into account the competing
People are entitled to equal portions, and no per- claims of different types of health-care needs; each
person is entitled to a fair share of such services,
son is "more equal" than others. In the case of
where a "fair share" includes an answer to the ques-
health care, some egalitarians contend that every- tion, who should pay for the services? Health-care
one should get the same basic minimum allotment rights thus form a part of a broader family of posi-
of health care. Others assert that all health care tive "welfare" rights that includes rights to educa-
should be distributed equally, even if this means tion and to income support. 11
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Allocating a COVID-19 Vaccine
When a vaccine is needed everywhere to save lives, illness, and (2) to reduce overall transmission and
limit illness, and curb transmission, and when it is thus the risk of infection for people who haven't
in short supply, who should get it first, or second, been vaccinated. These aims, however, may not
or third? This query-which at first glance may coincide. If young people, who are less vulnerable
sound like it's about the mechanics of efficient to disease and death, are responsible for most of
distribution-is actually a moral question that calls the virus's transmission, then prioritizing them for
for answers that are bound to be both fraught and the vaccine over the elderly, who are at higher risk
complicated. for death and disease, may save more lives. In this
For example, consider that vaccination against case, vaccinating the young before the old may be
the COVID-19 virus (or any virus) has two aims: counterintuitive but might very well be the right
(1) to protect people from future infection and thing to do.
(continued)
;::::::
V\'\~
, ,,, CRITICAL THOUGHT: Allocating a COVID-19 Vaccine-cont'd
A common moral justification for allocation of been unfairly disadvantaged. It is also an example
a medical treatment is maximizing benefits, which of how egalitarian and utilitarian considerations
often means saving the most lives by prioritizing can sometimes be fully consonant. We can achieve
patients who are most likely to benefit from treat- maximum benefit and act in fairness by grant-
ment. But with vaccines, this rationale may be ing priority to communities that have historically
experienced high levels of health disparities. We
shortsighted. A report in the American Journal of
can do the right thing and the good thing at the
Medicine makes the following statement: same time. t
[P]rioritizing those individuals who are most likely
CDC officials responsible for making COVID-19
to directly benefit from vaccination, such as older
adults, may not maximize the overall number recommendations are keenly aware of the moral
of lives saved. Allocating vaccines to those most dimensions of the task, and they try to identify the
responsible for the transmission of COVID-19 may moral principles that apply. They have formally
confer more benefit to the population at large. stated that allocation of any vaccine that is in short
Allocation guidelines must balance the obligation supply should (1) maximize benefits and minimize
to assist individuals most likely to benefit against harms, (2) mitigate health inequities to make sure
the obligation to secure the greatest aggregate everyone has the opportunity to be as healthy
benefit across the population. * as possible, (3) advance justice to remove unfair,
Ethicists maintain that any morally acceptable unjust, and avoidable barriers to vaccination, and
allocation scheme must also take into account issues (4) promote transparency to ensure that decisions
of justice. Many vulnerable groups have experienced are clear, understandable, and open for review.*
social and political barriers to adequate health and As with any moral decision making, the main
have thus suffered more from COVID-19 than oth- challenge is figuring out how to reconcile these
ers. Gerald Winslow, founding director of the Insti- principles when they conflict.
tute of Health Policy and Leadership, says this: Would allocating a COVID-19 vaccine on a "first-
By now, most Americans should be aware of the come, first-served" basis be ethical? Why or why not?
disturbing differences in the way COVID-19 has
affected various communities. African Americans *Commentary, "Allocating Vaccines in a Pandemic:
and Native Americans, for example, have endured The Ethical Dimension," The American Journal of
much higher rates of infection and death, often Medicine 133, no. 11 (November 2020).
two to four times higher. Many factors such as tGerald Winslow, "Fairness in COVID-19 Vaccine Allo-
poverty, living conditions, access to care, and abil- cation," Lama Linda University Health (blog), LLU Insti-
ity to isolate affect these differences. From the tute for Health Policy Leadership, December 1, 2020.
perspective of fairness, it would make sense to *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "How
give priority to those communities at higher risk. CDC Is Making COVID-19 Vaccine Recommendations,"
This is one way to achieve a measure of compen- https:llihpl.llu.edu/blog/fairness-covid-19-vaccine-
satory justice for communities that have so often allocation, accessed December 3, 2020.
MORAL ARGUMENTS principles, but they would be disputed by libertar-

ians who reject the notion of positive rights and by
One of the more interesting arguments in health some utilitarians who reject rights that are weight-
care policy is the one Daniels uses to try to estab- ier than considerations of utility.
lish health care as a moral right. He thinks that a But how much health care does this right include?
right to health care can be derived from the theory The difficulty of answering this question is a challenge
of justice set forth by the philosopher John Rawls. to Daniels's view, but he recognizes the problem:
Rawls argues in his book A Theory of Justice that
people are entitled not to equal shares of the basic How equal must our rights to health care be? Specifi-
goods of SOciety, but to an equal chance to acquire cally, must everyone receive exactly the same kinds
them. A society is just when it ensures "fair equal- of health-care services and coverage, or is fairness
in health care compatible with a "tiered" system?
ity of opportunity" to obtain available benefits. 12
Around the world, even countries that offer univer-
Daniels contends that disease and disability sal health insurance differ in their answers to this
impair "normal species functioning" and that this question. In Canada and Norway, for example, no
impairment limits people's opportunities, under- supplementary insurance is permitted. Everyone
mining equality of opportunity. But, he says, is served solely by the national health-insurance
health care can equalize opportunities: schemes; though people who seek additional ser-
vices or more rapid service may go elsewhere, as
[H]ealth care in all its forms, whether public health or some Canadians do by crossing the border. In Brit-
medical, preventive or acute or chronic, aims to keep ain, supplementary private insurance allows about
people functioning as close to normally as possible .... 10 percent of the population to gain quicker access
Health care thus preserves for us the range of oppor- to services for which there is extensive queuing in
tunities we would have, were we not ill or disabled, the public system. Basing a right to health care on an
given our talents and skills.13 obligation to protect equality of opportunity is com-
We can outline Daniels's argument like this: patible with the sort of tiering the British have, but it
does not require it, and it imposes some constraints
1. Everyone is entitled to (has a right to) an equal on the kind of tiering allowed. 14
opportunity to obtain the basic goods of SOCiety
(but not to an equal share of them). It seems implausible that an equal right to health
care includes universal equal access to all available
2. To secure equal opportunity, a just society must
health care resources. Such a robust allocation would
ensure the "normal species functioning" of its
not be economically possible. A better idea, some
citizens.
argue, is a weaker right to a "decent minimum" of
3. Disease and disability weaken people's "normal health care. This proposal involves a two-tier system:
species functioning," limiting the opportuni- one tier would offer a universally available guaran-
ties open to them. teed package of basic health care; another tier would
4. Adequate health care can keep people function- provide additional health care options (such as elec-
ing as close to normally as possible and thus tive services) to anyone who could afford them.
preserve their normal range of opportunities. Specifying what's included in a decent mini-
5. Therefore, people have a positive right to ade- mum is problematiC. It might include basics such
quate health care. as immunizations, physical exams, and recom-
mended screening tests. But should it also include
This is a valid argument, so someone attacking hospice care, organ transplants, cosmetic surgery,
it must focus on the truth of the premises. Prem- care for special-needs children or institutional-
ises 3 and 4 are empirical claims that are very likely ized mentally impaired persons, and experimental
true. Premises 1 and 2 may be plaUSible moral treatments?
L
efforts in a free market. For the libertarian, there are no

CHAPTER REVIEW positive rights. Egalitarian theories of justice maintain
that because every person is of equal value and is wor-
SUMMARY thy of equal moral consideration, the only just way to
distribute society's benefits and burdens is equally.
Debates about health care in the United States are Norman Daniels believes that health care is a
mostly about who should get health care, who should moral right. He argues that a society is just when it
supply it, and who should pay for it. The fundamental ensures "fair equality of opportunity," and that dis-
moral issue involved in these debates is justice. Many ease and disability impair "normal species function-
who have thought carefully about the U.S. system of ing," undermining equality of opportunity. Because
distributing health care think it is unjust, and some health care can equalize opportunities, he argues, it is
claim that it is ineffective and unworkable. Even after a positive right.
the passage of the Mfordable Care Act ("Obamacare"),
millions of people have no access to health care, cannot
afford health insurance, and sometimes die as a result. l<EY TERMS
Medicare is a federally funded U.S. health insur- Medicare (p. 314)
ance program that covers people 65 and older, some Medicaid (p. 314)
adults under 65 with disabilities, and people with managed care (p. 315)
end-stage kidney disease. The program is supported
by payroll taxes paid by workers during their years of EXERCISES
employment. Medicaid is a health insurance program
Review Questions
supported jointly by the federal government and the
states that covers some low-income families, pregnant 1. What is the main reason why so many people
women, and people with disabilities. But Medicaid in the United States lack access to health care?
does not cover many who are below the poverty line. (pp.313-14)
2. What is Medicare? What is Medicaid? (p. 314)
The United States spends more money on health
care than any other developed country, yet it gets low 3. What is the troubling contradiction in the U.S.
scores on standard assessments of national health. health care system? (p. 314)
The average life expectancy in the United States is 4. In 2018 which country spent more money
lower than that of other developed countries, and the on health care per capita than any other?
infant mortality rate is higher. (p.314)
The United States has a less-than-universal mixed 5. In 2017 which of these countries had the highest
system of health care consisting of private insur- average life expectancy: Canada, the United
ance obtained through employers, private insurance Kingdom, Japan, or the United States? (p. 314)
acquired through Affordable Care Act exchanges, 6. What is managed care? (p. 315)
single-payer Medicare, and state-run Medicaid. In 7. Name three of the Affordable Care Act's major
contrast, Canada has a universal single-payer system provisions. (pp. 315-16)
in which the government pays for health care and the 8. What kind of health care system does the
private sector provides the care. United States have? What are its main features?
Two types of justice theories-libertarian and Is it a system of socialized medicine? How does
egalitarian-have been especially prominent in moral it differ from the health care system in the
arguments about health care. Libertarian theories of United Kingdom? (p. 318)
justice say that the advantages and disadvantages of 9. What is distributive justice? (p. 316)
society must be allotted in a way that does not cur- 10. What are the chief characteristics of libertarian
tail personal liberty. People are entitled only to what theories of justice? Of egalitarian theories of
they can freely acquire through their own legitimate justice? (pp. 318-19)
Discussion Qllestions FURTHER READING

1. Which theory of justice is more plausible- Aaron E. Carroll and Austin Frakt, "The Best Health Care
libertarian or egalitarian? Why? System in the World: Which One Would You Pick?"
2. Does the United States offer the best care in the New York Times, September 18, 2017, https://www.
world? Why or why not? n ytimes.com/in teractive/20 17/09/ 18/u pshot/best-
health-care-system-coun try-bracket.html.
3. Do libertarian theories favor positive rights?
Why or why not? Norman Daniels, lust Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
4. Do people have a moral right to health care?
Norman Daniels, "Justice and Access to Health Care," in Stan-
Explain.
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, October 20,2017, https://
5. What is Daniels's argument for a moral right plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-healthcareaccess/.
to health care? Do you think it sound? Why or The Guardian, "How Does the US Healthcare System Com-
why not? pare with Other Countries?" July 25, 2017, https://
6. Do you agree that everyone is entitled to an www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2017/
equal opportunity to obtain the basic goods of jul/25/us-healthcare-system-vs-other-countries.
society? Explain. Donna K. Hammaker and Thomas M. Knadig, Health Care
7. Do you agree with the view that if you don't Ethics and the Law (Burlington, MA:Jones & Bartlett, 2017).
have any money, you shouldn't be entitled to Kaiser Family Foundation, "Understanding Health
any medicine? Insurance," KFF.org, https://www.kff.org/understanding-
8. Is everyone entitled to a "decent minimum" of health-insurance/ (December 24,2017).
Medline Plus, U.S. National Library of Medicine, "Health
health care? Why or why not?
Insurance," https://medlineplus.gov/healthinsurance
9. Are there any circumstances in which it is .html (December 24, 2017).
reasonable to blame people for getting Rosamond Rhodes, Margaret P. Battin, and Anita Silvers,
sick and to therefore judge them to be eds., Medicine and Social Justice (New York: Oxford
undeserving of health care financed University Press, 2002).
by others? Explain. Elisabeth Rosenthal, An American Sickness (New York:
10. What should be done, if anything, for the Penguin Press, 2017).
millions of Americans who lack health care Leiyu Shi and Douglas A. Singh, Essentials ofthe U.S. Health
because they cannot afford it? Care System (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett, 2017).
Lewis Vaughn, Bioethics: Principles, Issues, and Cases
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Health Care for Undocumented Immigrants?

The U.S. Affordable Care Act makes no provisions for undocumented (unauthorized) immigrants
to that country. Consider the implications of this seldom-publicized aspect of the (ACA):
[T)he ACA's fundamental changes to the healthcare system exclude undocumented
immigrants entirely from any potential for improvement to their current situations,
and, arguably, will make their circumstances much worse .... The means and the
services on which they relied before the ACA-whether the volunteer work of
physicians, community health clinics, and/or emergency rooms-will likely undergo

policy changes that direct resources away from those without healthcare coverage. *
Lack of health care is likely to worsen the situa- morally permissible to deny health care to them?
tion of undocumented immigrants, who may have In any case, they have human rights. Do these
escaped from horrendous economic and politi- rights require the United States to provide basic
cal conditions in their native country. Is it then health care to them? Why or why not?
*Ken Och, "The Affordable Care Act and DistributiveJustice: Is It Ethical to Exclude Undocumented Immi-
grants?" Ethics and Sodety, February 25, 2014, https://ethicsandsociety.org/2014/02/25/the-affordable
-careact- and-distributive-justice-is-it-ethical-to-exc1ude-undocumented-immigrants/.
2. No Health Coverage for the "Undeserving Sick"?

In debates about health coverage, some have argued that we should distinguish between
healthy people who have lived their lives the "right way" and unhealthy people who have
not taken proper care of themselves. People in the latter group are the "undeserving
sick," and they don't deserve health care. For example:
In a CNN interview, Representative Mo Brooks, an Alabama Republican, makes the
case for Trumpcare in much starker terms: It will free healthy people from having
to pay the cost of the sick. "It will allow insurance companies to require people
who have higher health care costs to contribute more to the insurance pool that
helps offset all these costs, thereby reducing the cost to those people who lead
good lives, they're healthy, they've done the things to keep their bodies healthy,"
explained Brooks. "And right now, those are the people who have done things
the right way that are seeing their costs skyrocketing."t
Is there a morally relevant difference between deficiencies? Should a smoker who gets cancer
deserving and undeserving sick people? Is it be considered undeserving of affordable health
reasonable to blame people for getting cancer, care? Is a policy of denying health coverage to
asthma, heart disease, diabetes, and Parkinson's people because they have not led the right kind of
disease? Many diseases arise because of bad life morally defensible? If so, how?
genes-should people be blamed for their genetic
tJonathan Chait, "Republican Blurts Out That Sick People Don't Deserve Affordable Care," New York
Magazine, May 1, 2017, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/05/republican-sick-people-dont-deserve-
affordable-care.html.
3. When People Can't Afford Health Care

Study after study has shown that millions of Americans can afford neither health care nor
health insurance. Here's another one:
In a new survey of 9,200 people across 15 states by my organization, the Texas
Medical Center Health Policy Institute, 49% of respondents said they must cut
other expenses to pay for health care. And they aren't cutting back on frivolities
like expensive electronics. Most often, they said, they had to cut back on their
savings, as well as spending on food and clothing, to pay for health care.+
In the American health care system, those who system? Should health care be available only to
don't have the money to pay for health care-even those who can pay for it? Only to the well-off?
people with serious illnesses or injuries-often Why or why not?
simply get no medical care at all. Is this a fair
*Arthur "Tim" Garson Jr., "Half of America Skimps to Pay for Health Care. The Only Fix Is to Cut Waste,"
USA Toda}" October 23, 2017, https:/lwww.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/1 0/23/cut-health-costs-
put-doctors-on-salaries-arthur-tim-garson-jr-column!777179001/.
READINGS
Autonomy, Equality and a Just Health Care System

KAI NIELSEN
I respecting egalitarianism, a very different health care

system would come into being than that which exists
Autonomy and equality are both fundamental values
at present in the United States.
in our firmament of values, and they are frequently
I shall first turn to a discussion of autonomy and
thought to be in conflict. Indeed the standard liberal
equality and then, in terms of those conceptions, to a
view is that we must make difficult and often morally
conception of justice. In modernizing societies of West-
ambiguous trade-offs between them. 1 I shall argue
ern Europe, a perfectly just society will be a society of
that this common view is mistaken and that auton-
equals and in such societies there will be a belief held
omy cannot be widespread or secure in a society which
across the political spectrum in what has been called
is not egalitarian: where, that is, equality is not also a
moral equality. That is to say, when viewed with the
very fundamental value which has an operative role
impartiality required by morality, the life of every-
within the society.2 I shall further argue that, given
one matters and matters equally. 3 Individuals will, of
human needs and a commitment to an autonomy
course, and rightly so, have their local attachments
Kai Nielsen, "Autonomy, Equality and aJust Health Care System," but they will acknowledge that justice requires that
International Journal of Applied Pllilosoph}" vol. 4, no. 3 (Spring the social institutions of the society should be such
1989). Reprinted by permission of Philosophy Documentation that they work on the premiss that the life of everyone
Center. matters and matters equally. Some privileged elite or
other group cannot be given special treatment simply People committed to achieving and sustaining a
because they are that group. Moreover, for there to be society of equals will seek to bring into stable existence
a society of equals there must be a rough equality of conditions such that it would be possible for every-
condition in the society. Power must be sufficiently one, if they were personally capable of it, to enjoy an
equally shared for it to be securely the case that no equally worthwhile and satisfying life or at least a life
group or class or gender can dominate others through in which, for all of them, their needs, starting with
the social structures either by means of their frequently and giving priority to their more urgent needs, were
thoroughly unacknowledged latent functions or more met and met as equally and as fully as pOSSible, even
explicitly and manifestly by institutional arrangements where their needs are not entirely the same needs.
sanctioned by law or custom. Roughly equal material This, at least, is the heuristic, though we might, to gain
resources or power are not things which are desirable in something more nearly feasible, have to scale down
themselves, but they are essential instrumentalities for talk of meeting needs to providing conditions propi-
the very possibility of equal well-being and for as many tious for the equal satisfaction for everyone of their
people as possible having as thorough and as complete basic needs. Believers in equality want to see a world
a control over their own lives as is compatible with this in which everyone, as far as this is possible, have equal
being true for everyone alike. Liberty cannot flourish whole life prospects. This requires an equal consider-
without something approaching this equality of condi- ation of their needs and interests and a refusal to just
tion, and people without autonomous lives will surely override anyone's interests: to just regard anyone's
live impoverished lives. These are mere commonplaces. interests as something which comes to naught, which
In fine, a commitment to achieving equality of condi- can simply be set aside as expendable. Minimally, an
tion, far from undermining liberty and autonomy, is egalitarian must believe that taking the moral point of
essential for their extensive flourishing. view reqUires that each person's good is afforded equal
If we genuinely believe in moral equality, we will consideration. Moreover, this is not just a bit of egali-
want to see come into existence a world in which all tarian ideology but is a deeply embedded considered
people capable of self-direction have, and have as judgment in modern Western culture capable of being
nearly as is feasible equally, control over their own put into wide reflective equilibrium. 4
lives and can, as far as the institutional arrangements
for it obtaining are concerned, all live flourishing lives II
where their needs and desires as individuals are met as
fully as possible and as fully and extensively as is com- What is a need, how do we identify needs and what are
patible with that possibility being open to everyone our really basic needs, needs that are presumptively
alike. The thing is to provide institutional arrange- universal? Do these basic needs in most circumstances
ments that are conducive to that. at least trump our other needs and our reflective con-
People, we need to remind ourselves, plainly have Sidered preferences?
different capacities and sensibilities. However, even Let us start this examination by asking if we can
in the extreme case of people for whom little in the come up with a list of universal needs correctly ascrib-
way of human flourishing is possible, their needs and able to all human beings in all cultures. In doing
deSires, as far as pOSSible, should still also be satisfied in this we should, as David Braybrooke has, distinguish
the way I have just described. Everyone in this respect adventitious and course-at-life needs. s Moreover, it is
at least has equal moral standing. No preference or the latter that it is essential to focus on. Adventitious
pride of place should be given to those capable, in needs, like the need for a really good fly rod or com-
varying degrees, of rational self-direction. The more puter, come and go with particular projects. Course-of-
rational, or, for that matter, the more loveable, among life needs, such as the need for exercise, sleep or food,
us should not be given preference. No one should. Our are such that every human being may be expected to
needs should determine what is to be done. have them all at least at some stage of life.
·Sf
Still, we need to step back a bit and ask: how do we First there are needs connected closely to our physical
determine what is a need, course-of-life need or oth- functioning, namely the need for food and water, the
erwise? We need a relational formula to spot needs. need for excretion, for exercise, for rest (including sleep),
We say, where we are speaking of needs, B needs x in for a life supporting relation to the environment, and
order to y, as in Janet needs milk or some other form the need for whatever is indispensable to preserve the
of calcium in order to protect her bone structure. With body intact. Similarly there are basic needs connected
course-of-life needs the relation comes out platitudi- with our function as social beings. We have needs for
nously as in 'People need food and water in order to companionship, education, social acceptance and rec-
live' or 'People need exercise in order to function nor- ognition, for sexual activity, freedom from harassment,
mally or well'. This, in the very identification of the freedom from domination, for some meaningful work,
7
need, refers to human flourishing or to human well- for recreation and relaxation and the like.
being, thereby giving to understand that they are basic The list, as I remarked initially, is surely incom-
needs. Perhaps it is better to say instead that this is to plete. But it does catch many of the basic things which
specify in part what it is for something to be a basic are in fact necessary for us to live or to function well.
need. Be that as it may, there are these basic needs we Now an autonomy respecting egalitarian society with
must have to live well. If this is really so, then, where an interest in the well-being of its citizens-something
they are things we as individuals can have without moral beings could hardly be without-would (trivi-
jeopardy to others, no further question arises, or can ally) be a society of equals, and as a society of equals
arise, about the desirability of satisfying them. They it would be committed to (a) moral equality and (b) an
are just things that in such circumstances ought to equality of condition which would, under conditions
be met in our lives if they can. The satisfying of such of moderate abundance, in turn expect the equality
needs is an unequivocally good thing. The questions of condition to be rough and to be principally under-
'DoesJanet need to live?' and 'Does Sven need to func- stood (cashed in) in terms of providing the condi-
tion well?' are at best otiose. tions (as far as that is possible) for meeting the needs
In this context David Braybrooke has quite prop- (including most centrally the basic needs) of everyone
erly remarked that being "essential to living or to and meeting them equally, as far as either of these
functioning normally may be taken as a criterion for things is feasible.
being a basic need. Questions about whether needs
are genuine, or well-founded, come to an end of the
III
line when the needs have been connected with life
or health.,,6 Certainly to flourish we must have these What kind of health care system would such an
things and in some instances they must be met at least autonomy respecting egalitarian society have under
to a certain extent even to survive. This being so, we conditions of moderate abundance such as we find in
can quite properly call them basic needs. Where these Canada and the United States?
needs do not clash or the satisfying them by one per- The follOwing are health care needs which are
son does not conflict with the satisfying of the equally also baSic needs: being healthy and having condi-
basic needs of another no question about justifying tions treated which impede one's functioning well or
the meeting of them arises. which adversely affect one's well-being or cause suf-
By linking the identification of needs with what fering. These are plainly things we need. Where soci-
we must have to function well and linking course-of- eties have the economic and technical capacity to do
life and basic needs with what all people, or at least so, as these societies plainly do, without undermin-
almost all people, must have to function well, a list of ing other equally urgent or more urgent needs, these
basic needs can readily be set out. I shall give such a list, health needs, as basic needs, must be met, and the
though surely the list is incomplete. However, what will right to have such medical care is a right for everyone
be added is the same sort of thing Similarly identified. in the SOciety regardless of her capacity to pay. This
just follows from a commitment to moral equality and the basis of variable needs and unavoidable differences
to an equality of condition. Where we have the belief, in different places in supply and personnel, e.g., differ-
a belief which is very basic in non-fascistic modern- ences between town and country. Furthermore, these
izing societies, that each person's good is to be given latter differences should be remedied where technically
equal consideration, it is hard not to go in that way, and economically feasible. The underlying aim should
given a plausible conception of needs and reasonable be to meet the health care needs of everyone and meet
list of needs based on that conception. 8 If there is the them, in the sense explicated, equally: everybody's
need for some particular regime of care and the sodety needs here should be met as fully as possible; different
has the resources to meet that need, without under- treatment is only justified where the need is different or
mining structures protecting other at least equally where both needs cannot be met. Special treatment for
urgent needs, then, ceteris paribus, the society, if it is a one person rather than another is only justified where,
decent SOCiety, must do so. The commitment to more as I remarked, both needs cannot be met or cannot as
equality-the commitment to the belief that the life adequately be met. Constrained by ought implies can;
of each person matters and matters equally-entails, where these circumstances obtain, priority should
given a few plausible empirical premisses, that each per- be given to the greater need that can feasibly be met.
son's health needs will be the object of an equal regard. A moral system or a social policy, plainly, cannot be
Each has an equal claim, prima fade, to have her needs reasonably asked to do the impossible. But my account
satisfied where this is possible. That does not, of course, does not ask that.
mean that people should all be treated alike in the sense To have such a health care system would, I think,
of their all getting the same thing. Not everyone needs involve taking medicine out of the private sector
flu shots, braces, a dialysis machine, a psychiatrist, or altogether including, of course, out of private entre-
a triple bypass. What should be equal is that each per- preneurship where the governing rationale has to be
son's health needs should be the object of equal societal profit and where supply and demand rules the roost.
concern since each person's good should be given equal Instead there must be a health care system firmly in
9
consideration. This does not mean that equal energy the public sector (publicly owned and controlled)
should be directed to Hans's rash as to Frank's cancer. where the rationale of the system is to meet as effi-
Here one person's need for a cure is much greater than ciently and as fully as possible the health care needs
the other, and the greater need clearly takes prece- of everyone in the society in question. The health care
dence. Both should be met where possible, but where system should not be viewed as a business anymore
they both cannot then the greater need has pride of than a university should be viewed as a business-
place. But what should not count in the treatment of compare a university and a large hospital-but as a set
Hans and Frank is that Hans is wealthy or prestigious or of institutions and practices designed to meet urgent
creative and Frank is not. Everyone should have their human needs.
health needs met where possible. Moreover, where the I do not mean that we should ignore costs or effi-
need is the same, they should have (where possible), ciency. The state-run railroad system in SWitzerland,
and where other at least equally urgent needs are not to argue by analogy, is very efficient. The state can-
thereby undermined, the same quality treatment. No not, of course, ignore costs in running it. But the aim
differentiation should be made between them on the is not to make a profit. The aim is to produce the most
basis of their ability to payor on the basis of their being rapid, safe, efficient and comfortable service meeting
(one more so than the other) important people. There travellers's needs within the parameters of the overall
should, in short, where this is pOSSible, be open and free socio-economic priorities of the state and the society.
medical treatment of the same quality and extent avail- Moreover, since the state in question is a democracy, if
able to everyone in the SOciety. And no two- or three- its citizens do not like the poliCies of the government
tier system should be allowed to obtain, and treatment here (or elsewhere) they can replace it with a govern-
should only vary (subject to the above qualification) on ment with different priorities and poliCies. Indeed the
option is there (probably never to be exercised) to shift into the medical profession. People would go into it
the railroad into the private sector. more frequently because they were actually interested
Governments, understandably, worry with aging in medicine and less frequently because this is a rather
populations about mounting health care costs. This is good way (though hardly the best way) of building a
slightly ludicrous in the United States, given its mili- stock portfolio.
tary and space exploration budgets, but is also a reality There should also be a rethinking of the respec-
in Canada and even in Iceland where there is no mili- tive roles of nurses (in all their variety), paramedics
tary or space budget at all. There should, of course, be and doctors. Much more of the routine work done
concern about containing health costs, but this can be in medicine-taking the trout fly out of my ear for
done effectively with a state-run system. Modern soci- example-can be done by nurses or paramedics. Doc-
eties need systems of socialized medicine, something tors, with their more extensive training, could be
that obtains in almost all civilized modernizing societ- freed up for other more demanding tasks worthy of
ies. The United States and South Africa are, I believe, their expertise. This would require somewhat differ-
the only exceptions. But, as is evident from my own ent training for all of these different medical person-
country (Canada), socialized health care systems nel and a rethinking of the authority structure in the
often need altering, and their costs need monitoring. health care system. But doing this in a reasonable
As a cost-cutting and as an efficiency measure that way would improve the teamwork in hospitals, make
would at the same time improve health care, doctors, morale all around a lot better, improve medical treat-
like university professors and government bureau- ment and save a very considerable amount of money.
crats, should be put on salaries and they should work (It is no secret that the relations between doctors and
in medical units. They should, I hasten to add, have nurses are not good.) Finally, a far greater emphasis
good salaries but salaries all the same; the last ves- should be placed on preventative medicine than is
tiges of petty entrepreneurship should be taken from done now. This, if really extensively done, utilizing
the medical profession. This measure would save the the considerable educational and fiscal powers of the
state-run health care system a considerable amount state, would result in very considerable health care
of money, would improve the quality of medical care savings and a very much healthier and perhaps even
with greater cooperation and consultation resulting happier population. (Whether with the states we
from economies of scale and a more extensive division actually have we are likely to get anything like that
of labor with larger and better equipped medical units. is-to understate it-questionable. I wouldn't hold
(There would also be less duplication of equipment.) my breath in the United States. Still, Finland and
The overall quality of care would also improve with a Sweden are very different places from the United
better balance between health care in the country and States and South Africa.)
in the large cities, with doctors being systematically
and rationally deployed throughout the society. In
IV
such a system doctors, no more than university profes-
sors or state bureaucrats, could not just set up a prac- It is moves of this general sort that an egalitarian and
tice anywhere. They would no more be free to do this autonomy loving SOciety under conditions of mod-
than university professors or state bureaucrats. In the erate scarCity should implement. (I say 'general sort'
altered system there would be no cultural space for it. for I am more likely to be wrong about some of the
Placing doctors on salary, though not at a piece work specifics than about the general thrust of my argu-
rate, would also result in its being the case that the ment.) It would, if in place, limit the freedom of some
financial need to see as many patients as possible people, including some doctors and some patients, to
as quickly as possible would be removed. This would do what they want to do. That is obvious enough. But
plainly enhance the quality of medical care. It would any SOCiety, any society at all, as long as it had norms
also be the case that a different sort of person would go (legal and otherwise) will limit freedom in some
"
way.l0 There is no living in society without some With that being the case, autonomy and well-being
limitation on the freedom to do some things. Indeed as well [will] be neither as extensive nor so thorough
a sOciety without norms and thus without any limi- as it could otherwise be. Autonomy, like everything
tation on freedom is a contradiction in terms. Such a else, has its material conditions. And to will the end
mass of people wouldn't be a society. They, without is to will the necessary means to the end.
norms, would just be a mass of people. (If these are To take-to sum up-what since the Enlight-
'grammatical remarks,' make the most of them.) In enment has come to be seen as the moral point of
our societies I am not free to go for a spin in your car view, and to take morality seriously, is to take it as
without your permission, to practice law or medicine axiomatic that each person's good be given equal
without a license, to marry your wife while she is still consideration. I I I have argued that (a) where that is
your wife and the like. Many restrictions on our liber- accepted, and (b) where we are tolerably clear about
ties, because they are so common, so widely accepted the facts (including facts about human needs), and
and thought by most of us to be so reasonable, hardly (c) where we live under conditions of moderate abun-
seem like restrictions on our liberty. But they are all dance, a health care system bearing at least a family
the same. No doubt some members of the medical resemblance to the one I have gestured at will be put in
profession would feel quite reined in if the measures place. It is a health care system befitting an autonomy
I propose were adopted. (These measures are not part respecting democracy committed to the democratic
of conventional wisdom.) But the restrictions on the and egalitarian belief that the life of everyone matters
freedom of the medical profession and on patients and matters equally.
I am proposing would make for both a greater lib-
erty all around, everything considered, and, as well,
for greater wellbeing in the society. Sometimes we NOTES
have to restrict certain liberties in order to enhance 1. Isaiah Berlin, "On the Pursuit ofthe Ideal," The New York Review
the overall system of liberty. Not speaking out of turn ofBooks XXXV (March 1987), pp. 11-18. See also his "Equality"
in parliamentary debate is a familiar example. Many in his Concepts and Categories (Oxford, England: Oxford Univer-
people who now have a rather limited access to medi- sity Press, 1980), pp. 81-102. I have criticized that latter paper
cal treatment would come to have it and have it in in my "Formulating Egalitarianism: Animadversions on Berlin,"
Philosophia 13:3-4 (October 1983), pp. 299-315.
a more adequate way with such a socialized system
in place. Often we have to choose between a greater 2. For three defenses of such a view see Kai Nielsen, Equal-
or lesser liberty in a SOciety, and, at least under con- ity and Liberty (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld,
1985), Richard Norman, Free and Equal (Oxford, England:
ditions of abundance, the answer almost always
Oxford University Press, 1987), and John Baker, Arguing for
should be 'Choose the greater liberty'. If we really
Equality (London: Verso Press, 1987).
prize human autonomy, if, that is, we want a world
3. Will Kymlicka, "Rawls on Teleology and Deontology," PI,i-
in which as many people as possible have as full as is
losophy and Public Affairs 17:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 173-190
possible control over their own lives, then we will be
and John Rawls, "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,"
egalitarians. Our very egalitarianism will commit us Philosophy and Public Affairs 17:4 (Fall 1988), pp. 251-276.
to something like the health care system I described,
4. Kai Nielsen, "Searching for an Emancipatory Perspective:
but so will the realization that, without reasonable
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and the Hermeneutical Circle"
health on the part of the population, autonomy can in Evan Simpson (ed.), Anti-Folll1dationalism alld Practical
hardly flourish or be very extensive. Without the Reasoning (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Pub-
kind of equitability and increased coverage in health lishing, 1987), pp. 143-164 and Kai Nielsen, "In Defense of
care that goes with a properly administered social- Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in Douglas Odegard (ed.) Ethics
ized medicine, the number of healthy people will and Justification (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and
be far less than could otherwise feasibly be the case. Publishing, 1988), pp. 19-37.
5. David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton, New Jersey: 10. Ralf Dahrendorf, Essays in the Theory of Society (Stanford,
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 29. California: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 151-78 and
6. Ibid., p. 31. G.A. Cohen, "The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983), pp. 2-33.
7.1bid., p. 37.
11. Will Kymlicka, op cit., p. 190.
8. Will Kymlicka, op cit., p. 190.
9. Ibid.
Is There a Right to Health Care and, If SO, What Does It Encompass?

NORMAN DANIELS
IS THERE A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?

of the legal right to health care in these countries. Most
Legal vs moral rights to health care cover 'medically necessary' services, including a broad
One way to answer this question is to adopt the stance range of preventive, curative, rehabilitative and long-
of legal positivists, who claim that there are no rights term care for physical and mental diseases, disorders
except those that are embodied in actual institutions and disabilities. Most exclude uses of medical technol-
through law. We would then be able to reply that in ogies that enhance otherwise normal functioning or
nearly every advanced industrial democracy in the appearance, such as purely cosmetic surgery. The legal
world, there is a right to health care, since institutions rights vary in significant ways, however, for example,
exist in them that assure everyone access to needed ser- in the degree to which they cover new reproductive
vices regardless of ability to pay. The notable exception technologies, or in the types of mental health and
is the United States, where many poor and near poor long-term care services that are offered.
people have no insurance coverage for, and thus no In the context of rising costs and the rapid dissem-
assured access to, medically necessary services, although ination of new technologies, there is growing debate
by law they cannot be denied emergency services. in many countries about how to set limits on the scope
The legal right to health care is embodied in a wide of a right to health care. This debate about the scope of
variety of types of health-care systems. These range rights to health care pushes moral deliberation about
from national health services, where the government such a right into the forefront, even where a legal right
is the provider of services, as in Great Britain, to public is recognized. Legal entitlements, most people believe,
insurance schemes, where the government finances should reflect what society is morally obliged to pro-
services, as in Canada, to mixed public and private vide by way of medical services. What, then, is the
insurance schemes, as in Germany and the Nether- basis and scope of a moral right to health care?
lands. Despite these differences in the design of sys-
Positive vs negative rights
tems, there is a broad overlap in the scope or content
A right to health care is a positive as opposed to a nega-
Norman Daniels, "Is There a Right to Health Care and, If So, What
tive right. Put quite simply, a positive right requires
Does it Encompass?" from A Companioll to Bioetilics, pp. 316-25, others to do something beneficial or enabling for
edited by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Copyright © 1998, 2001 right-bearers, whereas a negative right requires oth-
by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permission of John ers to refrain from doing something, usually harm-
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
ful or restrictive, to right-bearers. To say that others
are required to do something or to refrain from doing individuals into providing 'needed' resources or skills
something is to say they must so act or refrain even (Nozick, 1974). Libertarians generally recognize an
if they could produce more good or improve the 'imperfect' duty to act beneficently or charitably, but
world by not doing so (Thomson, 1990). For exam- this duty involves discretion. It can be discharged
ple, a negative right to free expression requires oth- in different ways that are matters of choice. People
ers to refrain from censuring the expression of the denied charity have no right to it and have no com-
right-bearer even if censuring this speech would plaint against people who act charitably in other ways.
make a better world. Some public-health measures Though some have argued that the difficulty of coor-
that protect people against interference with their dinating the delivery of charitable assistance might
health, such as environmental protections that pro- justify coercive measures (Buchanan, 1984), and oth-
tect people against polluters of air, water and food ers have tried to show that even libertarians must
sources, might be construed as requirements of a recognize some forms of welfare rights (Sterba, 1985),
negative right. More generally, however, a right to most libertarians resist any weakening of the property
health care imposes an obligation on others to assist rights at the core of their view (Brennan and Fried-
the right-bearers in obtaining needed and appropri- man, 1981).
ate services. Specifically, claiming a right to health A spectre sometimes raised by libertarians against
care includes these other claims: society has the the idea of a right to health care is that such a right
duty to its members to allocate an adequate share is a 'bottomless pit'. Since new technologies continu-
of its total resources to health-related needs; society ously expand the scope of 'medical needs', a right to
has the duty to provide a just allocation of different health care would give rise to unlimited claims on the
types of health care services, taking into account the resources of others (Fried, 1969; Engelhardt, 1986).
competing claims of different types of health-care Protecting such an expansive right to health care
needs; each person is entitled to a fair share of such would thus not be compatible with the function of a
services, where a 'fair share' includes an answer to the libertarian 'minimal state' to assure the non-violation
question, who should pay for the services? (Daniels, of rights to liberty and property.
1985). Health-care rights thus form a part of a broader Though there remains controversy about whether
family of positive 'welfare' rights that includes rights utilitarians can provide a basis for recognizing true
to education and to income support. Because posi- moral rights, there are strong utilitarian arguments in
tive rights require other people to contribute their favour of governments assuring access to at least some
resources or skills to benefit right-bearers, rather than broad range of effective medical services. Preventing
merely refraining from interfering with them, they or curing disease or disability reduces suffering and
have often been thought more difficult to justify enables people to function in ways that contribute to
than negative rights, and their scope and limits have aggregate welfare. In addition, knowing that health-
been harder to characterize. care services are available increases personal security
and strengthens the ties of community. Utilitarians
Theories of justice and rights to health care can also justify redistributing the burden of delivering
If we are to think of a right to health care as a require- these benefits to society as a whole, citing the de~reas
ment of justice, then we should look to more general ing marginal utility of money to support progressive
theories of justice as a way to specify the scope and financing of health-care services (Brandt, 1979).
limits of that right. On some theories of justice, how- Beneath these quite general arguments, how-
ever, there is little basis for requiring people to assist ever, there lies a more specific controversy about
others by meeting their health care or other needs. the scope of utilitarian entitlements to health care.
Libertarians, for example, believe that fundamental There seems to be little utilitarian justification for
rights to property, including rights to personal assets, investing resources in health care if those resources
such as talents and skills, are violated if SOCiety coerces would produce more net welfare when invested in
other things, yet many people believe they have enabling conditions for the exercise of other rights or
moral obligations to assist others with their health- liberties, or as practical presuppositions of all views
care needs even at a net cost in utility. For example, of justice (Braybrooke, 1987) or as a way of avoid-
some highly expensive and effective medical treating vulnerability and exploitation (Goodin, 1988).
ments that most people believe should be offered to One approach that has been developed in some
people might not be 'cost beneficial' and thus not detail views a right to health care as a special case of a
defensible on utilitarian grounds. Similarly, many right to equality of opportunity (Daniels, 1985). This
forms of long-term care, especially for those who approach shows how the most important contractar-
cannot be restored to productive social activity, are ian theory of justice, Rawls' (1971) account of justice
also difficult to defend on utilitarian grounds, yet we as fairness, can be extended to the problem of health
insist our health-care systems are obliged to provide care, since that theory gives prominence to a princi-
such services. ple protecting equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1993).
Lack of moral acceptance of the distributive Without endorsing that account here, we shall use it
implications of utilitarianism makes many uncomfort- to illustrate further the complexity surrounding the
able with the use of methods, such as cost-effectiveness concept of a right to health care.
analysis, that are intended to guide decisions about
resource allocation in health care. For example, an Equal opportunity and a right to health care
assumption of cost-effectiveness analysis is that a unit The central observation underlying this account of a
of health benefit, such as a quality-adjusted life year right to health care is that disease and disability restrict
(QALY), is of equal value or importance regardless of the range of opportunities that would otherwise be
where it is distributed. But this assumption does not open to individuals. This is true whether they shorten
capture the concerns many people have about how our lives or impair our ability to function, includ-
much priority to give to the sickest patients, or when ing through pain and suffering. Health care in all its
aggregating modest benefits to large numbers of peo- forms, whether public health or medical, preventive
ple it outweighs the moral importance of delivering or acute or chronic, aims to keep people functioning
more significant benefits to fewer people (Nord, 1993; as close to normally as possible. Since we are complex
Daniels, 1993). social creatures, our normal functional capabilities
Two pOints about a utilitarian framework for a include our capabilities for emotional and cognitive
right to health care are worth noting. Recognizing functioning and not just physical capabilities. Health
a right to health care is compatible with recogniz- care thus preserves for us the range of opportunities
ing limits on entitlements that result from resource we would have, were we not ill or disabled, given our
scarcity and the fact that there are competing uses of talents and skills.
those resources. Consequently, recognizing a right to The significant contribution health care makes
health care need not open a bottomless pit. Second, to protecting the range of opportunities open to
just what entitlements to services follow from a right individuals is nevertheless limited in two important
to health care cannot be specified outside the context ways. It is limited because other things, such as the
of a system properly designed to deliver health care in distribution of wealth and income and education,
a way that promotes aggregate utility. For the utili- also profoundly affect equality of opportunity. It is
tarian, entitlements are system-relative. The same two also limited because health care, by restricting its aim
points apply to other accounts of the foundations to protecting normal functioning, leaves the nor-
and limits of a right to health care. mal distribution of talents and skills unmodified. It
Because many people reject the utilitarian ratio- aims to help us function as 'normal' competitors, not
nales for health care (and other welfare) rights, theo- strictly equal ones.
rists have explored other ways to ground such rights. Some argue that an equal opportunity account of
Some claim that these rights are presupposed as health care should abandon the limit set by a focus
on normal functioning (see Arneson, 1988; G. A. WHAT DOES A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
Cohen, 1989; Sen, 1992). They claim our concerns INCLUDE?
about equality, including equality of opportunity,
System-relative entitlements
require us to use health-care technologies whenever
doing so would equalize opportunity for welfare By making the right to health care a special case of rights
or equalize capabilities. For example, if through to equality of opportunity, we arrive at a reasonable,
medical intervention we can 'enhance' the otherwise albeit incomplete and imperfect, way of restricting its
normal capabilities of those who are at a competi- scope while still recognizing its importance. The account
tive disadvantage, then our commitment to equality does not give individuals a basic right to have all of their
of opportunity requires us to do so. Obviously, health-care needs met. At the same time, there are social
this version of an equal opportunity account would obligations to design a health-care system that protects
vastly expand the moral requirements on medicine, opportunity through an appropriate set of health-care
yielding a right to health care much more expan- services. If social obligations to provide appropriate
sive than any now embodied in actual systems health care are not met, then individuals are definitely
and, arguably, one that would make administra- wronged. For example, if people are denied access-
tion of a health-care system unwieldy (Sabin and because of discrimination or inability to pay-to a basic
Daniels, 1994). tier of services adequate to protect normal function-
This expansive version of the appeal to equal ing, injustice is done to them. If the baSic tier available
opportunity ignores an important fact about justice: to people omits important categories of services without
our concern for equality must be reconciled with con- consideration of their effects on normal functioning, for
siderations of liberty and efficiency in arriving at the example, whole categories of mental health or long-term
overall requirements of justice (see Sen, 1992; Cohen, care or preventive services, their rights are violated.
1995; Daniels, 1996). Such a reconciliation seems Still, not every medical need gives rise to an enti-
to underlie the limits we commonly accept when tlement to services. The scope and limits of rights to
we appeal to equality of opportunity. We generally health care, that is, the entitlements they actually
believe that rights to equal opportunity are violated carry with them, will be relative to certain facts about
only if unfair social practices or preventable or cur- a given system. For example, a health-care system can
able diseases or disabilities interfere with the pursuit protect opportunity only within the limits imposed
of reasonable plans of life within our society by mak- by resource scarcity and technological development
ing us lose competitive advantage. We accept, how- within a society. We cannot make a direct inference
ever, the fact that the natural distribution of talents from the fact that an individual has a right to health
and skills, working in an efficient market for them, care to the conclusion that this person is entitled to
will both enhance the social product and lead to some specific health-care service, even if the service
inequalities in social outcomes. A just society will would meet a health-care need. Rather the individual
try to mitigate the effects of these inequalities in is entitled to a specific service only if, in the light of
competitive advantage in other ways than by elimi- facts about a society's technological capabilities and
nating all eliminable differences in capabilities. For resource limitations, it should be a part of a system
example, on Rawls' account, transfers that make the that appropriately protects fair equality of oppor-
worst off as well off as they can be mitigate the effects tunity. The equal opportunity account of a right to
on equality of allowing the natural distribution of health care, like the utilitarian account, makes entitle-
talents and skills to enhance productivity. In what ments to health care system-relative.
follows, the account of a right to health care rests on
a more limited appeal to equal opportunity, one that Effective treatment of disease and disability
takes the maintenance of normal functioning as a The health care we have strongest claim to is care that
reasonable limit. effectively promotes normal functioning by reducing
the impact of disease and disability, thus protecting an entitlement in a health-care system. Some national
the range of opportunities that would otherwise be health-insurance schemes do not cover infertility ser-
open to us. Just what counts as 'effective', however? vices. Yet infertility is a departure from normal function-
And what should we do about hard cases on the ing' even if some people never want to bear children.
boundary between treatment of disease or disability Controversy may remain about how much social
and enhancement of capabilities? obligation we have to correct this form of impaired
It is a common feature of public and private insur- opportunity, especially where the costs of some inter-
ance systems to limit care to treatments that are not ventions, such as in vitro fertilization, are high and their
'experimental' and have some 'proven effectiveness'. effectiveness is modest. Different societies will judge
Unfortunately, many services that count as standard this question differently, in part because they may place
treatment have little direct evidence about outcomes different values on the rearing of biologically related
to support their use (Hadorn, 1992). They are often children or on the experience of child-bearing.
just customary treatment. Furthermore, it is often con- Hard cases involve non-reproductive technologies
troversial just when new treatments or technologies as well. In the United States, for example, many insur-
should count as 'safe and efficacious'. What counts as ers will cover growth hormone treatment only for chil-
'reasonably effective' is then a matter of judgement dren deficient in growth hormone, not for those who
and depends on the kind of condition and the conse- are equally short but without any pathology. Yet the
quences of not correcting it. We might, for example, children denied therapy will suffer just as much as those
want to lower our standards for effectiveness when we who are eligible. Similar difficulties are involved in
face a treatment of last resort, or raise them if resource drawing a line between covered and non-covered uses
scarcity is very great. On the other hand, we do not of mental health services (Sabin and Daniels, 1994). As
owe people a chance to obtain miracles through what- in the cases of reproductive technologies, there is room
ever unproven procedures they prefer to try. for different societies to 'construct' the concept of men-
By focusing a right to health care on the mainte- tal disorder somewhat differently, with resulting varia-
nance of normal functioning, a line is drawn between tion in decisions about insurance coverage.
uses of medical technologies that count as legitimate
'treatments' and those that we may want but which Rights and limits on effective treatments
do not meet our 'health-care needs'. Although we may Even when some health-care service is reasonably
want medical services that can enhance our appear- effective at meeting a medical need, not all such needs
ance, like cosmetic (as opposed to reconstructive) plas- are equally important. When a disease or disability
tic surgery, or that can optimize our otherwise normal has little impact on the range of opportunities open to
functioning, like some forms of counselling or some someone, it is not as morally important to treat as other
uses of Prozac, we do not truly need these services to conditions that more seriously impair opportunity.
maintain normal functioning. We are obliged to help The effect on opportunity thus gives us some guidance
others achieve normal functioning, but we do not 'owe' in thinking about resource allocation priorities.
each other whatever it takes to make us more beautiful Unfortunately, the impact on our range of oppor-
or strong or completely happy (Daniels, 1985). tunities gives only a crude and incomplete measure of
Though this line is widely used in both public the importance or priority we should give to a need or
and private insurance practices, it leaves us with hard service. In making decisions about priorities for pur-
cases. Some of the hardest issues involve reproduc- poses of resource allocation in health care, we face dif-
tive technologies. Abortion, where there is no preven- ficult questions about distributive fairness that are not
tive or therapeutic need, does not count as 'treatment' answered by this measure of importance. For example,
because an unwanted pregnancy is not a disease or dis- we must sometimes make a choice between investing
ability. Some nevertheless insist that reqUirements of in a technology that delivers a significant benefit to
justice, including a right to control one's body, means few people or one that delivers a more modest benefit
that non-therapeutic abortion should be induded as to a larger number of people. Sometimes we must make
a choice between investing in a service that helps the to gain quicker access to services for which there is
sickest, most impaired patients or one that helps those extensive queuing in the public system. Basing a right
whose functioning is less impaired. Sometimes we must to health care on an obligation to protect equality of
decide between the fairness of giving a scarce resource to opportunity is compatible with the sort of tiering the
those who derive the largest benefit or giving a broader British have, but it does not require it, and it imposes
range of people some chance at getting a benefit. In some constraints on the kind of tiering allowed.
all of these cases, we lack clear principles for deciding The primary social obligation is to assure everyone
how to make our choices, and the account of a right access to a tier of services that effectively promotes
to health care we are discussing does not provide those normal functioning and thus protects equality of
principles either (Daniels, 1993). Some methodologies, opportunity. Since health care is not the only impor-
like cost-effectiveness analysis, are intended to help us tant good, resources to be invested in the baSic tier are
make appropriate resource allocation decisions in these appropriately and reasonably limited, for example,
kinds of cases. But these methodologies may themselves by democratic decisions about how much to invest in
embody controversial moral assumptions about dis- education or job training as opposed to health care.
tributive fairness. This means they cannot serve as deci- Because of their very high 'opportunity costs', there
sion procedures for making these choices and can at best will be some beneficial medical services that it will be
serve as aids to decision-makers who must be explicit reasonable not to provide in the basic tier, or to pro-
about the moral reasoning that determines the distribu- vide only on a limited baSiS, for example, with queu-
tive choices they make (Gold et al., 1996). ing. To say that these services have 'high opportunity
In any health-care system, then, some choices costs' means that providing them consumes resources
will have to be made by a fair, publicly accountable, that would produce greater health benefits and pro-
decision-making process. Just what constitutes a fair tect opportunity more if used in other ways.
decision-making procedure for resolving moral dis- In a society that permits significant income and
putes about health care entitlements is itself a matter wealth inequalities, some people will want to buy
of controversy. It is a problem that has been addressed coverage for these additional services. Why not let
little in the literature. Our rights are not violated, them? After all, we allow people to use their after-tax
however, if the choices that are made through fair income and wealth as they see fit to pursue the 'qual-
decision-making procedures turn out to be ones that ity of life' and opportunities they prefer. The rich can
do not happen to meet our personal needs, but instead buy special security systems for their homes. They can
meet needs of others that are judged more important buy safer cars. They can buy private schooling for their
(Daniels and Sabin, 1997). children. Why not allow them to buy supplementary
health care for their families?
How equal must our rights to health care be? One objection to allowing a supplementary tier is
How equal must our rights to health care be? Specifi- that its existence might undermine the basic tier either
cally, must everyone receive exactly the same kinds economically or politically. It might attract better-
of health-care services and coverage, or is fairness in quality providers away from the basic tier, or raise costs
health care compatible with a 'tiered' system? Around in the basic tier, reducing the ability of society to meet its
the world, even countries that offer universal health social obligations. The supplementary tier might under-
insurance differ in their answers to this question. In mine political support for the basic tier, for example, by
Canada and Norway, for example, no supplemen- undercutting the social solidarity needed if people are
tary insurance is permitted. Everyone is served solely to remain committed to protecting opportunity for all.
by the national health-insurance schemes, though These objections are serious, and where a supplementary
people who seek additional services or more rapid tier undermines the basic tier in either way, economi-
service may go elsewhere, as some Canadians do by cally or politically, priority must be given to protecting
crOSSing the border. In Britain, supplementary private the basic tier. In principle, however, it seems possible to
insurance allows about 10 percent of the population design a system in which the supplementary tier does
not undermine the basic one. If that can be done, then Braybrooke, David (1987). Meeting Needs. Princeton, NJ:
a system that permits tiering avoids restricting liberty in Princeton University Press.
ways that some find seriously objectionable. Brennan, Geoffrey and Friedman, DaVid (1981). A libertarian
perspective on welfare. In Peter G. Brown, Conrad Johnson
A second objection is not to tiering itself but to the
and Paul Vernier (eds), Income Support: Conceptual and
structure of inequality that results. Compare two sce- policy issues. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
narios. In one, most people are adequately served by Buchanan, Allen (1984). The right to a decent minimum of
the basic tier and only the best-off groups in society health care. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13,55-78.
have the means and see the need to purchase supple- Cohen, G. A. (1989). On the currency of egalitarian justice.
Ethics, 99, 906-44.
mentary insurance. That is the case in Great Britain. In
Cohen, Joshua (1995). Amartya Sen: Inequality Reexamined.
the other, the basic tier serves only the poorest groups JOlimalofPhiiosophy, 92/5, 275-88.
in sOciety and most other people buy supplementary Daniels, N. (1985). Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge
insurance. The Oregon plan to expand Medicaid eli- University Press.
gibility partly through rationing the services it covers - - (1991). Is the Oregon rationing plan fair? Journal of the
American Medical Association, 265, 2232-5.
has aspects of this structure of inequality, since most
--(1993). Rationing fairly: programmatic considerations.
people are covered by plans that avoid these restric- Bioet/lies, 7, 224-33.
tions (Daniels, 1991). The first scenario seems pref- - - (1996). JlIstice and Justification: reflective equilibrium in the-
erable to the second on grounds of fairness. In the ory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
second, the poorest groups can complain that they Daniels, N. and Sabin, J. (1997). Limits to health care: fair
are left behind by others in society even in the protec- procedures, democratic deliberation, and the legitimacy
problem for insurers. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26/4,
tion of their health. In the first, the majority has less 303-50.
grounds for reasonable resentment or regret. Engelhardt. H. Tristram (1986). Tile Foundations of Bioeti1ics.
If the basic tier is not undermined by higher tiers, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
and if the structure of the inequality that results is not Fried, Charles (1969). An Anatomy of Value. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
objectionable, then it is difficult to see why some tier-
Gold, Marthe, Siegel, Joanna, Russell, Louise and Weinstein,
ing should not be allowed. There is a basic conflict here Milton (eds) (1996). Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medi-
between concerns about equality and concerns about cine: recommendations of tile Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in
liberty, between wanting to make sure everyone is Health and Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press.
treated properly with regard to health care and want- Goodin, Robert (1988). Reasons for Welfare. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
ing to give people the liberty to use their resources
Hadorn, David (ed.) (1992). Basie Benefits and Clinical Guide-
(after tax) to improve their lives as they see fit. In prac- lines. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
tice, the crucial constraint on the liberty we allow peo- Nord, Eric (1993). The relevance of health state after treat-
ple seems to depend on the magnitude of the benefit ment in prioritizing between different patients.
available in the supplementary tier and unavailable JOllmal ofMedical Ethics, 19,37-42.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarc/ly, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic
in the basic tier. Highly visible forms of saving lives Books.
and improving function would be difficult to exclude Rawls, J. (1971). A Tileor), of!lIstice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
from the basic tier while we make them available in a University Press.
supplementary tier. In principle, however, some forms - - (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia
of tiering will not be unfair even when they involve University Press.
Sabin, James and Daniels, Norman (1994). Determining
medical benefits not available to everyone. 'medical necessity' in mental health practice. Hastings
Center Report, 24/6, 5-13.
REFERENCES Sen, Amartya (1992).lneqllalit)' Reexamined, Cambridge. MA:
Harvard University Press.
Arneson, Richard (1988). Equality and equal opportunity for Sterba, James (1985). From liberty to welfare. Social Theory and
welfare. Philosophical Studies, 54, 79-95. Practice, 11,285-305.
Brandt, Richard (1979). A Tlleor), o( tile Good mlfl tile Rig/It. Thomson, Judith (1990). The Realm ofRig/Its. Cambridge, MA:
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harvard University Press.
CHAPTER 12
The Ethical Treatment of Animals
One of philosophy's most important functions explicit about humans' proper attitude toward
is to help us critically examine beliefs that we animals:
often simply accept without question. Philosophy Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is
seems to have played this role especially well in the sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine
issue of animal rights, for it was a philosopher who providence they are intended for man's use in the
helped engender the current animal rights move- natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make
ment by arguing that something was very wrong use of them, either by killing them or in any other
with the traditional attitude toward animals (that way whatever. 2
is, nonhuman animals) and their treatment. The Aquinas also says that we should avoid being cruel
traditional notion is that an animal is merely a to animals-but only because cruelty to animals
resource that humans may dispose of as they see might lead to cruelty to humans. Animal cruelty
fit: an animal is food, fuel, or fun-something in itself, he explains, is no wrong. Likewise, Rene
with instrumental value only. Peter Singer was Descartes thinks animals are ours to use any way we
the philosopher who challenged the received wis- want. After aU, he asserts, animals are not sentient-
dom, declaring in his 1975 book Animal Liberation they are machines, like mechanical clocks, devoid
that its subject was the "tyranny of human over of feelings and incapable of experiencing pleasure
nonhuman animals. This tyranny has caused and or pain. Immanuel Kant, who thinks that people
today is still causing an amount of pain and suf- are not means to an end but ends in themselves,
fering that can only be compared with that which contends that animals are means to the end known
resulted from the centuries of tyranny by white as man. Today few would agree with Descartes that
humans over black humans."l animals cannot experience pain, but the traditional
The traditional attitude toward animals has idea that animals have no (or low) moral standing
been influential in the West for centuries. It is widespread.
sprang from several sources, including Judeo- Those who reject the traditional attitude remind
Christian thought and the arguments of several us that beliefs about the moral status of animals
distinguished philosophers. The book of Gen- influence how animals are treated in the real world-
esis declares that God created humans in his own and that treatment, they say, is horrendous on a vast
image, "saying to them, 'Be fruitful, multiply, fill scale. In 2015 and 2016 in the United States alone,
the earth and conquer it. Be masters of the fish of more than 18 billion animals were slaughtered for
3
the sea, the birds of heaven and all living animals food-cows, poultry, calves, pigs, sheep, and lambs.
on the earth'" (Genesis 1:28). Aristotle claims Critics have charged that the animals are subjected
that all of nature exists "speCifically for the sake to appalling suffering, including lifelong confine-
of man," that animals are merely instruments ment in spaces so small the animals can hardly move,
for humankind. Thomas Aquinas is remarkably isolation of veal calves in small crates (and, some say,
338
CHAPTER 12: THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 0 339
in almost total darkness), routine mutilation or sur- concern at all? Is it morally permiSSible to experi-
gery such as branding and cutting off pigs' tails and ment on animals, to raise and kill them for food, to
chickens' beaks, and the slaughter of chickens and cause them unnecessary pain and suffering? Do ani-
livestock without first stunning them or using any mals have the same moral worth as an infant, a men-
other methods to minimize pain and suffering. 4 tally incompetent man, a woman with severe senile
In addition, each year millions of animals- dementia, or a man in a persistent vegetative state?
from mice to dogs to primates-are used in labora-
tory experiments all over the world. Some of this
research-no one knows how much-causes sig-
nificant animal suffering. According to a U.S. gov- Fortunately, on these issues there is at least a parcel
ernment report, in 2007 about 8 percent of larger of common ground. First, almost no one believes, as
animals used in experiments (excluding mice and Descartes did, that animals are equivalent to windup
rats) endured "pain or distress" that could not be clocks, mechanisms without feelings. Science and
relieved with medication. common sense suggest that many animals (mostly
Arguments for and against the use of animals vertebrates) are sentient-that is, that they can have
in scientific research have had to take into account experiences. They can experience bodily sensations
some inescapable facts: (1) animals often do not such as pain and pleasure as well as emotions such as
receive even minimal care (for example, adequate fear and frustration. Sentient beings are thought to
pain control and environments that meet their have the capacity to suffer. Second, virtually everyone
physical and psychological needs), (2) the benefits to thinks that being cruel to animals-unnecessarily
humans derived from animal experimentation have causing them pain or misery-iS wrong. Even when
been enormous (better understanding of disease, we consider this judgment carefully and critically,
new drugs, new surgeries, cures, and preventives), it seems inescapable. Third, there is general agree-
(3) a great deal of animal research has no benefit ment, among philosophers at least, that sentient
for humans at all, and (4) there are research alterna- animals are worthy of some degree of moral respect
tives to animal testing (using non-living models, for or concern. Most disputes turn on interpretations
example), but often useful knowledge can only be of this last point: Exactly how much moral concern
gained by using living subjects. do we owe animals? Do they deserve the same level
Laws have been enacted in the United States and of moral consideration that we give to humans? Do
the United Kingdom to regulate animal research. they deserve less? How should we treat them?
Two U.S. laws passed in 1985 established a commit- Such questions are essentially about the moral
tee to review research proposals and monitor the status, or moral considerability, of animals.
treatment of animals in laboratories, mandated Something has moral status if it is a suitable candi-
adequate veterinary care to minimize pain and suf- date for moral concern or respect in its own right,
fering, set standards for physical environments that regardless of its relationships to humans. Ethically,
promote the "psychological well-being of primates," we cannot treat a being that has moral status just
banned multiple surgeries on animals except for any way we want, as if it were a mere thing. A being
"scientific necessity," and required investigators to with moral status is of moral importance regardless
consider alternatives to painful procedures. of whether it is a means to something else, and in
These concerns push us toward the key moral our dealings with it, we must somehow take this fact
questions that we try to sort out in this chapter: into account. Another way of expressing the notion
Do animals have instrumental value only? Do they of moral status is to say that any being with moral
have rights? Do we owe them any moral respect or status is an object of direct moral consideration
or concern. That is, such a being is worthy of moral deserve some degree of direct moral consideration.
concern for its own sake, not because of its relation- But often the term is used in a more restricted way
ship to others. A being that is the object of indirect to refer to a particularly strong type of moral status.
m.oral consideration is granted respect or con- In this stronger sense, for an animal to have rights
cern because of its relationship to other individuals. is for it to be entitled to a kind of moral respect that
Human beings are objects of direct moral consider- cannot be overridden (or cannot be overridden eas-
ation; some say that animals such as dogs, pigs, and ily) by other considerations. Those who accept this
rabbits are too. A screwdriver is not the kind of thing notion of animal rights may argue that animals
that can be the object of direct moral concern, but it should never be condemned to factory farms or used
may be of indirect moral concern because of its value in medical experimentation, even if such treat-
to a human being. Some people insist that all nonhu- ment would make millions of humans happy. Such
man animals are of indirect moral concern, deriving rights are analogous to rights that people are sup-
whatever value they have from their usefulness to posed to have. People are thought to have a right,
humans. Many others reject this view, asserting that for instance, not to be unjustly imprisoned-even
sentient animals have independent moral status. if their imprisonment would increase the overall
Moral status is typically understood to be happiness of SOciety as a whole. (We take a closer
something that comes in degrees and that can be look at strong animal rights in the next section.)
overridden or discounted in some circumstances. Before examining arguments that animals have
Philosophers speak of varying levels or weights moral status or rights, we should cite a few argu-
of moral considerability. Some contend that ani- ments to the contrary. Some people claim that
mals have the same moral status as normal adult only human beings have moral status and that ani-
humans-that, for example, the interests of animals mals, if they matter at all, have only indirect value
are as morally important as the comparable inter- as resources or tools for people. If cruelty to animals
ests of humans. Some argue that humans deserve is wrong, it is wrong only because it makes humans
more moral respect or concern than animals, that callous or upsets people or damages personal prop-
the interests of humans always take precedence over erty. The usual tack of those who reject moral status
those of animals. Many maintain that moral confor animals is to argue that only beings that possess
siderability varies depending on the species (human a particular property have moral status-a property
or nonhuman), with humans enjoying the greatest that animals do not possess but humans do. The
degree of moral considerability and other species proposed status-granting properties are numerous
being assigned lower degrees on a sliding scale. But and include having a soul, nurturing strong family
philosophers disagree on the basis for assigning the bonds, using language, being a member of the
different rankings. Whatever a being's moral status, human species, and being a person or a moral agent.
it is usually not viewed as absolute; sometimes it may The notion that animals lack souls and there-
be overridden or canceled by factors thought to be fore have no moral status is, of course, a traditional
more important. Some people think, for example, religious view defended on traditional religioUS
that a dog's moral status prohibits humans from grounds. Generally, philosophers do not take this
beating it just for fun but may allow beatings under path because their focus is on reason and argu-
some circumstances-say, to prevent it from stray- ments rather than on faith, and because philO-
ing into traffic and causing an accident. sophical analysis has rendered the concept of a soul
Frequently people use the term animal rights problematic or controversial.
as a synonym for moral status. When they say that The claim that animals have no moral standing
animals have rights, they mean only that animals because they do not have the kind of strong family
-~
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: What's Wrong with Eating Meat?
Questions about the moral standing of animals are wrongfully produced, so consuming it is wrong. Or
intertwined with pressing issues that are at once that to consume wrongfully produced meat is to
personal, social, and environmental. For example, derive a benefit from that wrongdoing, and that
millions of people are vegetarians; they don't eat benefiting from wrongdoing is wrong. Or that to
meat. And many are vegans; they refrain from con- consume wrongfully produced meat is to participate
suming all animal products-meat, dairy, and eggs. in that wrongful production, and that participat-
Many who exclude meat from their diets do so ing in wrongful production is wrong.
for religious, cultural, and health reasons. Moral Regarding this latter argument, philosophers
vegetarians, however, refuse to eat meat on the have wondered what it really means to participate
grounds that it is morally wrong to do so. Their in wrongful meat production. What about Alicia,
moral stance is a reaction to the enormous amount who will not buy wrongfully produced meat but
of pain, suffering, and death inflicted on animals eats it when she has dinner with her family, or
by the meat industry. The main moral vegetarian who has a salad at a restaurant that serves meat?
argument (which can have many variations) is that: Or what of Adam, who never buys wrongfully
produced meat but does nothing politically to try
1. Producing meat is wrong. (Because it causes
to end wrongful meat production? Do Alicia and
unnecessary animal pain, suffering, and
Adam participate in wrongdoing? For some, the
death, endangers slaughterhouse work-
wrongfulness attaches only to meat production
ers, harms the environment, or wastes
and not to meat consumption. They then might
resources.)
conclude that it's important to oppose wrongful
2. If it is wrong to produce meat, it is wrong
meat production, but that eating wrongfully pro-
to eat it.
duced meat is morally permissible.
3. Therefore, it is wrong to eat meat.
Some critics question the truth of Premise 2. Is eating meat morally wrong? Why or why not? If
They ask, how does the wrongness of producing eating meat is wrong only if it is wrongfully produced,
meat make eating it wrong? Moral vegetarians then what counts as wrongful production? Is it wrong
have offered several responses to this concern. to consume meat from animals raised on free-range
They have argued that consuming meat that's farms (where animals can live more natural lives) out-
wrongfully produced only causes more meat to be side the industrial farm system? Why or why not?
relationships exhibited by humans has been under- maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals,
mined not by philosophy but by science. The same such as chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and ele-
goes for the parallel claim regarding animals' lan- phants maintain extended family units built upon
guage skills. One philosopher sums up the relevant complex individual relationships, for long periods
of time. Meerkats in the Kalahari desert are known
empirical findings:
to sacrifice their own safety by staying with sick or
[M]any species of non-humans develop long- injured family members so that the fatally ill will
lasting kinship ties-orangutan mothers stay not die alone .... While the lives of many, perhaps
with their young for eight to ten years and while most, non-humans in the wild are consumed with
they eventually part company, they continue to struggle for survival, aggression and battle, there
="'---
v"~
I I' CRITICAL THOUGHT: Using Animals to Test Consumer Products
Animals are used not only to test the safety and Martin Stephens, vice president for animal research
effectiveness of medical treatments, but also to issues at the Humane Society of the United States.
determine the safety of consumer products such as "It's as bad as it gets, poisoning animals to death."
cosmetics. This practice has been fraught with con- Allergan officials say they have no choice. With-
troversy for many years. For example: out a federally approved safety test that does not
use animals, a company spokeswoman says, LDso
Each year, American doctors inject more than
"is by default the required test."*
3 million doses of Botox to temporarily smooth
their patients' wrinkles and frown lines. But Is this kind of animal testing morally permissible,
before each batch is shipped, the manufacturer considering that its purpose is commercial and not
puts it through one of the oldest and most contro- medical? Why or why not? Would your using prod-
versial animal tests available. ucts that have been thoroughly tested using LDso
To check the potency of its product under federal be morally acceptable? Would you change your
safety rules, Allergan Inc. injects mice with Botox answer if you knew the testing was done on dogs
until it finds a dose at which half of the animals or horses instead of mice or guinea pigs?
die-a rough gauge of potential harm to humans.
Animal protection groups consider this " lethal *Gilbert M. Gaul, "In U.S., Few Alternatives to
dose 50 (LDso)" test to be "the poster child for Testing On Animals," Washington Post, April 12, 2008,
everything that's wrong with animal testing," said washingtonpost.com.
are some non-humans whose lives are character- extraterrestrial creatures who have all the same
ized by expressions of joy, playfulness, and a great attributes and capabilities that we have-self-
deal of sex. Recent studies in cognitive ethology consciousness, intelligence, language skills, rea-
have suggested that some non-humans engage in soning ability, emotions, and more. We would
manipulative and deceptive activity, can construct
"cognitive maps" for navigation, and some non-
presumably have to admit that these beings have
humans appear to understand symbolic representa- full moral status, just as we do. Yet they are not
tion and are able to use language. s human. They may not even be carbon-based
life forms. Physically they may be nothing like
A more common claim is that just being human- any member of the human species. This strange
having the DNA of the human species, in other (but possible) state of affairs suggests that being
words-is the property that gives a being moral con- human is not a necessary condition for having
siderability. If so, then nonhumans do not and can- moral status.
not have moral status. This view has seemed initially Taking a cue from Kant, some philosophers
plaUSible to some, but critics have wondered why contend that only persons or moral agents can be
simply having human DNA would bestow moral sta- candidates for moral considerability-and that
tus on a creature. animals do not make the cut. Persons are typically
Perhaps the most telling objection against regarded as rational beings who are free to choose
the human species argument is based on a simple their own ends and determine their own actions
thought experiment. Suppose we humans encounter and values. Moral agents are beings who can make
MORAL THEORIES
QUICI< REVIEW How might a utilitarian assess the treatment of non-
moral status (or moral considerability)-The
human animals? What would he or she say about
property of being a suitable candidate for their moral status? The most famous answers to
direct moral consideration or respect. these questions come from the utilitarian philoso-
pher Peter Singer, credited with kindling through
direct moral consideration-Moral consideration
his writings what is popularly known as the ani-
for a being's own sake, rather than because of
its relationship to others.
mal rights movement. His most celebrated book,
Animal Liberation, helped spark serious debates
indirect moral consideration-Moral consideration
about the treatment of animals, the meat industry,
on account of a being's relationship to others.
and vegetarianism-debates that continue to this
animal rights-Possession by animals of (1) moral day. Classic utilitarianism says that the right action
status; (2) strong moral consideration that is the one that produces the best balance of happi-
cannot be easily overridden.
ness over unhappiness (or pleasure over pain), every-
speciesism-Discrimination against nonhuman one considered. Singer's approach is to include both
animals just because of their species. animals and humans in this "everyone. n The pain
moral vegetarians-Vegetarians who refuse to and pleasure of all sentient beings must be consid-
eat meat on the grounds that it is morally ered when we are deciding which action maximizes
wrong to do so. the good.
This inclusion of all animals (human and non-
human) in utilitarian calculations is not new,
however-it was, in fact, advocated by utilitarian-
moral judgments and act according to moral rea- ism's founder, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832):
sons or principles. So the basic claim is that because The day may come when the rest of the animal cre-
all or most animals are not persons or moral agents, ation may acquire those rights which never could
they can have no moral standing. They simply lack have been withholden from them but by the hand
the necessary property. of tyranny. The French have already discovered that
As many critics have pointed out, using person- the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human
being should be abandoned without redress to the
hood and moral agency as criteria for determining
caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be
moral status has a troublesome drawback: it not only recognized that the number of the legs, the villosc-
excludes animals from moral considerability but ity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum,
some humans as well. This difficulty is common to all are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a
lack-of-some-necessary-property arguments, which sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that
we will examine more closely in the next section. should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty
In any case, many think that all these standards of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But
a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a
for moral status are in a sense beside the paint. To
more rational, as well as a more conversable animal,
them it is obvious that regardless of whether an ani- than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month,
mal possesses these lthigher" capacities and char- old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would
acteristics, it can suffer. They reason that if it can it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor
suffer, then it can be wronged by deliberately caus- Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
ing it to suffer. If deliberately hurting it is wrong, it For both Bentham and Singer, what makes a
must have some level of moral considerability. being worthy of moral concern, what requires us
to include it in the moral community, is its ability But when interests are not comparable, we need not
to experience pain and pleasure-its ability to suf- pretend that they are. We may, for example, give
fer. Why do humans have moral status? Not, says weight to a woman's interest in enjoying a good
the utilitarian, because of their capacity for reason, book, but we would give no weight to this interest in
social relationships, and personhood-but because a dog, because a dog has no such interest.
of their capacity for suffering. Likewise, because What are the implications of Singer's view for the
sentient animals can suffer, they too have moral sta- treatment of animals? For one thing, it implies that
tus. Furthermore, Bentham and Singer argue that our system of meat production is wrong and should
because both humans and animals can suffer, they be abolished. There is general agreement that the
both deserve equal moral consideration. As Singer says, meat industry currently causes immense suffering
to millions of sentient creatures. In standard utili-
(T]he interests of every being affected by an action tarian calculations, if we weigh this extreme suffer-
are to be taken into account and given the same
ing against the moderate pleasures it produces (the
weight as the like interests of any other being....
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifica-
gustatory enjoyment of humans), we see that the
tion for refusing to take that suffering into consid- meat industry generates a net balance of evil over
eration. No matter what the nature of the being, good. The alternative to having a meat industry-
the principle of equality reqUires that its suffer- vegetarianism-would result in far more good than
ing be counted equally with the like suffering-in evil. As Singer puts it,
so far as rough comparisons can be made-of any
other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, Since, as I have said, none of these (meat industry]
or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is practices cater for anything more than our pleasures
nothing to be taken into account. 7 of taste, our practice of rearing and killing other ani-
mals in order to eat them is a clear instance of the sac-
According to Singer, those who do not give equal rifice of the most important interests of other beings
moral consideration to human and nonhuman in order to satiSfy trivial interests of our own. To avoid
animals are guilty of speciesism-discrimination speciesism we must stop this practice, and each of
us has a moral obligation to cease supporting this
against nonhuman animals just because of their . 8
practIce.
species. Speciesism, he says, is wrong for the same
reason that racism and sexism are wrong: it vio- Some see a problem in Singer's stance, however,
lates the principle of equal consideration-that is, because his call for eliminating meat production and
equal consideration of comparable interests. embracing vegetarianism does not seem to be fully
Equal consideration of comparable interests, warranted by his arguments. By Singer's own lights,
however, does not mean equal treatment. Humans a humane form of meat production might be mor-
and animals have some interests in common (such ally permissible. If animals could be raised and killed
as avoiding pain), and they differ dramatically in the without suffering-if their lives could be pleasant
possession of other interests (humans are capable of and their deaths painless-then there might be a net
enjoying art and studying philosophy, but animals balance of good over evil in the process. Then both
are not). Singer's utilitarianism demands that when meat production and meat eating might be accept-
comparable interests are involved, those of humans able. It seems that Singer's arguments could be used
and those of animals must be given equal weight. to support reform of the meat production industry
A pig's suffering is just as important as a man's or a just as easily as its total elimination.
woman's. If a pig and a man are both experiencing As for scientific experimentation on animals,
intense pain, we must not assume that the man's Singer thinks that it might be permissible if the
pain should be taken more seriously. We should benefits gained from the research outweigh any
regard the agony of both beings with equal concern. suffering involved. "[I]f a single experiment could
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Should We Experiment on Orphaned Babies?
Consider this controversial argument against spe- experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned
ciesism by Peter Singer: human infant, then his readiness to use nonhu-
mans is simple discrimination, since adult apes,
In the past, argument about vivisection has often
cats, mice, and other mammals are more aware
missed the point, because it has been put in abso-
of what is happening to them, more self-directing
lutist terms: Would the abolitionist be prepared to
and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to
let thousands die if they could be saved by experi-
pain, as any human infant. *
menting on a single animal? The way to reply
to this purely hypothetical question is to pose What is Singer's point here? Is he advocating the
another: would the experimenter be prepared to practice of experimenting on orphaned human
perform his experiment on an orphaned human infants? Suppose you disagree with Singer. What
infant, if that were the only way to save many argument would you make against his position?
lives? (J say "orphan" to avoid the complication of
parental feelings, although in doing so I am being *Peter Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," Philosophic
overfair to the experimenter, since the nonhuman Exchange 1 (1974). Copyright © Peter Singer 1974.
subjects of experiments are not orphans.) If the Reprinted by permission of author.
cure a major disease, that experiment would be Regan maintains that such equal inherent value
justifiable," he says.9 However, he believes that in and equal rights apply to animals just as much as
practice, animal experimentation usually results in they do to humans. More specifically, he says, they
more evil than good because often the benefits to apply to all mature mammals, human and nonhu-
humans are negligible. man. Creatures with inherent value must be treated,
How would a nonconsequentialist view the in Kant's famous phrase, as ends in themselves,
treatment of animals? Probably the most influen- not merely as means to an end. Their value or their
tial example of the nonconsequentialist approach treatment does not depend on some utilitarian cal-
is that of Tom Regan, another philosopher who has culation of pain and pleasure. According to Regan,
helped define and inspire the animal rights move- humans and animals have equal value and equal
ment. He argues for animal rights proper-that rights because they share particular mental capaci-
is, animal rights in the restricted sense of having ties; they are sensitive, experiencing beings-or as
moral considerability that cannot be easily overrid- Regan says, "experiencing subjects of a life":
den, not in the weaker, generic sense of simply pos-
[W]e are each of us the experiencing subject of a life,
sessing moral status. According to Regan, a conscious creature having an individual welfare
that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to
The genius and the retarded child, the prince and others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel
the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, things, recall and expect things. And all these dimen-
Mother Theresa and the most unscrupulous used car sions of our life, including our pleasure and pain,
salesman-all have inherent value, all possess it equally, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and
and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be frustration, our continued existence or our untimely
treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of death-all make a difference to the quality of our life
things, as if they exist as resources for others. to as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the
same is true of those animals who concern us (those 4. Therefore, nonhuman animals have equal
who are eaten and trapped, for example), they too moral rights.
must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life,
with inherent value of their own. 11
This is a valid argument; the conclusion does
How should we treat animals, then, if they follow from the three premises. So we have good
have such rights and if these rights are equal to reason to accept the conclusion if the premises
our own? Regan's theory (what he calls the rights are true. Are they? Premise 1 is an empirical claim
view) implies that if it would be wrong to dissect, about the mental capacities of animals (again, nor-
hurt, torture, eat, cage, hunt, or trap a human, mal, fully developed mammals). There is scientific
then it would also be wrong to do the same to an evidence suggesting that animals do have at least
animal-and that the amount of good that might most of the capacities in question. For simplicity's
be produced by such acts is irrelevant. Therefore, sake, then, let us assume that Premise 1 is true.
Regan concludes, all forms of animal experimenta- Premises 2 and 3 are much more difficult to
tion should be abolished. "Because these animals sort out. We should not accept them unless there
are treated routinely, systematically as if their value are good reasons for doing so. Good reasons would
were reducible to their usefulness to others," Regan involve separate arguments that support each of
says, "they are routinely, systematically treated them. Regan has provided such arguments, and
with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights several critics have responded to them. Some
routinely, systematically violated.,,12 On the same have said, for example, that the notion of inher-
grounds, he thinks that commercial animal agri- ent value is obscure and that the link between
culture and commercial and sport hunting and inherent value and moral rights is unclear. Many
trapping should also be abolished. others have sidestepped these issues and attacked
the conclusion directly, arguing that regardless
MORAL ARGUMENTS of whether animals have some moral rights, they
surely do not have the same moral rights that
Do animals really have equal rights in the strict sense humans do-that is, the equal right to be treated
just mentioned? That is, do nonhuman animals with respect.
have the same right to respect and moral concern Those who take this latter approach begin with
that humans have? Using Tom Regan's rights view as an advantage. Our moral common sense suggests
inspiration without sticking strictly to his line of rea- that there must be some sort of difference between
soning, let us examine some simple (and simplified) the moral status of most humans and that of most
arguments for and against this proposition. animals. We tend to think that accidentally run-
For our purposes, we can state the argument for ning over a man with our car is morally worse than
the rights view like this: doing the same to a rabbit. Most of us believe that
there is an important moral difference between
1. Nonhuman animals (normal, fully developed
imprisoning women in cages for later slaughter
mammals) are experiencing subjects of a life and doing the same to chickens or hogs-even if
(or "experiencing subjects," for short), just as we also deem the latter cruel and immoral.
humans are.
Our intuition about such things can be wrong,
2. All experiencing subjects have equal inherent of course. So those who reject equal moral rights
value. for animals have offered other considerations.
3. All those with equal inherent value are enti- The philosopher Mary Anne Warren, for example,
tled to equal moral rights (the equal right to be argues that animals do indeed have some moral
treated with respect). rights, but that there are reasons for thinking that
these rights are weaker or less demanding than the "deficient humans" as we would nonhuman
rights of humans. For one thing, she notes, the animals. "But it is not true," he says, "that such
human right to freedom is stronger or more exten- humans ... have less inherent value than you or I.
sive than the animal right to freedom. This right Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the view
prohibits the unlawful imprisonment of humans, that animals like them in being experiencing sub-
even if the prison is comfortable and spacious. jects of a life have less inherent value. All who have
Human dignity and the satisfaction of human aspi- inherent value have it equally, whether they be
rations and desires demand a higher degree of free- human animals or not.,,14
dom of movement than would be required for the
satisfaction of the needs or interests of many non-
human animals. Imprisonment of animals in areas
that allow them to satisfy their needs and pursue
their natural inclinations, Warren says, "need not CHAPTER REVIEW
frustrate the needs or interests of animals in any
significant way, and thus do not clearly violate
SUMMARY
their rights." In a similar vein, Warren argues that
both humans and animals have a prima facie right The traditional attitude toward animals is that they are
to life, but this right is generally weaker for animals merely resources that humans can dispose of as they
than for humans. As she puts it, "Human lives, one see fit; that is, that animals have instrumental value
might say, have greater intrinsic value, because only. But many reject the traditional view and put for-
they are worth more to their possessors." 13 Humans ward reasons for supposing that animals have moral
have hopes, plans, and purposes that make them status. Something has moral status if it is a suitable
value continued existence; animals, apparently, candidate for moral concern or respect in its own right.
lack this forward-looking perspective. Warren adds Some people claim that only humans have moral
that nonhuman animals nevertheless have a right status and that animals have only indirect moral con-
to life because, among other things, their prema- siderability. The usual approach of those who reject
ture demise robs them of any future pleasures they moral status for animals is to argue that a being is
might have had. entitled to moral status only if it possesses particular
Regan has responded to such arguments for properties-and that animals do not possess them.
unequal rights for animals by offering a com- These status-granting properties include having a
mon counterargument. In general, the argu- soul, having strong family bonds, using language,
ments contend that animals have less inherent being a member of the human species, and being a
person or a moral agent.
value (and therefore weaker moral rights) because
One of the more common claims is that one must
animals lack something that adult humans
be human to have moral status. Critics, however, have
have-perhaps the ability to reason, intelligence,
asked what it is about being human that gives one moral
autonomy, intellect, or some other valuable
status. A thought experiment used against this claim
property. But, Regan says, if this contention is
asks us to imagine meeting extraterrestrial creatures who
true, then we must say that some humans who are like ourselves in many ways. We would presumably
lack these characteristics (retarded children or have to admit that the aliens have moral status just as
people with serious mental illness, for example) we do, even though they are not human. Being human,
also have less inherent value than normal adult then, seems not to be necessary for having moral status.
humans and therefore less robust moral rights. The most famous utilitarian approach to the
In other words, if these critics of equal rights are treatment of animals is that of the philosopher Peter
correct, we are fully justified in treating these Singer. He argues that the pain and pleasure of animals
as well as that of humans must be included in utilitar- 9. What is speciesism? (p. 344)
ian calculations. What makes a being worthy of moral 10. What is Peter Singer's view on animal rights?
concern, he says, is its capacity for suffering, and (pp. 343-44)
because both humans and animals can suffer, they
deserve equal moral consideration. Consequently, Discussion Questions
Singer maintains that our system of meat production
1. How might a utilitarian assess the treatment of
is wrong and should be abolished.
nonhuman animals?
The most notable nonconsequentialist approach
2. What reasons do people give for thinking that
to the treatment of animals is that of Tom Regan. He
animals do not have moral status? Do you agree
argues for strong animal rights on the grounds that all
with any of these reasons?
"experiencing subjects of a life" have equal inherent
3. Is having human DNA the property that gives a
value and therefore an equal right to be treated with
being moral considerability? Why or why not?
respect. Experiencing subjects of a life include healthy,
4. What is the most telling objection against the
mature mammals (humans and nonhumans). Regan
human species argument?
maintains that because such animals have equal
5. For Bentham and Mill, what makes a being
rights, all commercial animal agriculture and sport
worthy of moral concern?
hunting and trapping should be abolished.
6. Which view of animal rights-Singer's
or Regan's-do you think is morally
l<EY TERMS reasonable? Why?
moral status (or moral considerability) (p. 339) 7. What is Warren's critique of Regan's view of
direct moral consideration (pp. 339-40) animal rights? Do you agree with her?
indirect moral consideration (p. 340) 8. What is the traditional attitude toward animals?
animal rights (p. 340) Is it reasonable? Why or why not?
speciesism (p. 344) 9. What do you believe it is about being human
moral vegetarians (p. 341) that gives humans moral status? Why?
10. What conclusion do Bentham and Singer draw
EXERCISES from the fact that animals can suffer?
Review Questions
FURTHER READING
1. What does it mean for a creature to have moral Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Bio-
status? (p. 339) medical Research," New England Journal of Medicine 315
2. What are the two meanings of "animal rights"? (October 2, 1986): 865-70.
(p.340) Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, and Matthew C.
3. What is Aquinas's view on the treatment of Halteman (eds.), Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments
animals? (p. 338) About the Ethics ofEating (New York: Routledge, 2015).
4. What does Descartes believe about animals' David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction
ability to experience pain? (p. 348) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
R. G. Frey, "Animals," in The Oxford Handbook of Practical
5. What does "sentient" mean in relation to
Ethics, ed. Hugh LaFollette (New York: Oxford Univer-
animals and humans? (p. 349)
sity Press, 2003).
6. What is Regan's view on animal rights? R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals (Oxford:
(pp.345-46) Clarendonj New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
7. What is "direct moral consideration"? What is Lori Gruen, "Animals," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter
"indirect moral consideration"? (pp. 339-40) Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
8. Do animals have the kind of strong family Christine M. Korsgaard, "Getting Animals in View", Tile
relationships exhibited by humans? (pp. 340-41) Point, 6 (2013).
Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Harmond- Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (Oxford:
sworth: Penguin, 1983). Oxford University Press, 2004).
James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications Bonnie Steinbock, "Speciesism and the Idea of Equality,"
ofDarwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Philosophy 53, no. 204 (April 1978): 247-56.
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: Univer- Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds., Animal
sity of California Press, 1983). Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford:
Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and Oxford University Press, 2004).
Human Obligations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- Gary E. Varner, Personhood, Ethics, and Animal Cognition:
tice Hall, 1989). Situating Animals in Hare's Two Level Utilitarianism (New
Mark Rowlands, Can Animals Be Moral? (New York: Oxford York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
University Press, 2012). Mary Anne Warren, "The Rights of the Nonhuman
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New World," in Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of
York Review of Books, 1990). Readings, eds. Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (University
Peter Singer, "Ethics beyond Species and beyond Instincts," Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983).
in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed.
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Animal Testing
The Guardian-Protesters for and against animal testing have predicted an escalating
conflict after the two sides dashed during weekend demonstrations in Oxford. Both
groups pledged to step up campaigns which have already resulted in death threats
aimed at advocates of animal testing and panic buttons installed at the home of a
leading provivisection protester.
Pro-Test, the group which organised the Oxford rally of scientists, students and
patients, plans a march in London which it hopes will draw 5,000 supporters. A
spokesman for Speak, the animal rights group campaigning against a new animal
research laboratory in Oxford, said the Pro-Test demonstration had left it "fired up"
to take tougher action.
Spokesman Mel Broughton said: "They should be worried, not because they are
in any danger of violence, but because they have fired us up even more against
them and the university." ...
Many researchers stayed away from the march, fearing reprisals against them
and their families. Professor Tipu Aziz, a leading neurosurgeon, said: "This country
has thousands of researchers paralysed by fear. That's a travesty of democracy." ...
A spokesman for the Animal Liberation Front, Robin Webb, yesterday described
the Pro-Test marchers as "irrelevant."
"The ALF supporters will completely ignore this protest group and will continue
targeting institutions and companies which are directly involved in building the
proposed facility," he said.
The Medical Research Council's chief executive, Colin Blakemore, described the
Pro-Test demonstration as "immensely gratifying. For a long time, we have needed
this kind of collective response. The people want this thuggery and nastiness off
the streets of Oxford."*
Which side in this conflict do you sympathize What arguments could you make for the banning
with more? Why? Suppose you are a member of of most (or all) animal testing? Is either side justi-
Pro-Test. How would you argue in favor of scien- fied in using violence or the threat of violence to
tific animal testing? Say you are an ALF supporter. further its cause? Why or why not?
*Robert Booth, "Opposing Sides in Animal Testing Row Pledge to Step Up Action," from Tile Guardian,
February 27, 2006. Copyright © 2006 Guardian News and Media Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
2. Seal Hunting and the Fate of the Inuit
Boston Globe-In the 1980s, postcards were distributed to 12 million United States
and United Kingdom households depicting the infamous Canadian Atlantic fisher
swinging a bat at a baby seal and eliciting an overwhelming emotional response. Major
legislative bodies relented to public pressure with a staggering impact on wildlife
management. The collapse of the sealskin market marked a victory for protesters who
had waged the most effective, international mass media campaign ever undertaken.
The moral victory for animal rights activists not only hurt Newfoundlanders,
it adversely affected thousands of Canadian Inuit living in tiny, remote, Arctic
hamlets. Antifur protesters lump all seal-hunting methods together. It is tragic but
not surprising that there has been virtually no media coverage of the devastating
economic, social, and cultural impact of the collapse of the seal skin market on Inuit.
If outsiders had known more about Inuit life, perhaps they would not have so easily
dismissed all seal-hunting as unethical and cruel.
Canadian Inuit, who number about 46,000, are part of a circumpolar Inuit
community numbering about 150,000 in Greenland, Alaska, and Russia. For Canadian
Inuit, the seal is not just a source of cash through fur sales, but the keystone of
their culture. Although Inuit harvest and hunt many species that inhabit the desert
tundra and ice platforms, the seal is their mainstay....
Inuit no longer use seal oil lamps or kudlik for heating, as did their grandparents.
But seal meat, which is extremely high in protein, minerals, and vitamins and very low
in fat, is still the most valued meat in many parts of the Arctic. Seal skin mittens and
boots continue to provide the greatest protection against the harsh Arctic climate.
Like most people, Inuit respond to structural changes by adapting and innovating.
They were already dependent on costly hunting supplies by the 1980s. When fur
prices plummeted after the sealskin boycott, their credit and cash flow from furs
dried up while the cost of supplies rose. Many families could no longer afford
hunting equipment. Their fragile economy was imperiled and their vulnerability
increased. Their social order was ruptured as they were deprived of the complex
social aspect of sharing seal meat.
Their historical, legal, social, and economic situation already placed them at
alarmingly higher risks of poverty and violence than other Canadians even when they live
outside the North, as 10,000 Inuit have chosen to do. Life expectancy among the Inuit is
10 years lower than other Canadians. Rates of infant mortality, unemployment, illnesses
such as diabetes, violence against women, and overcrowded housing are chillingly high.
One of the most brutal aspects of the lack of cultural continuity is the epidemic
of youth suicide striking small communities in clusters where one death rapidly
engenders another. But the Inuit, having endured myths and misinformation about
their culture for decades, have carried on ....
The Inuit are resourceful people who deserve more respectful attention from
outsiders. t
Would a utilitarian like Peter Singer be likely to sup- Tom Regan disapprove of the hunting of the seals
port a ban on all seal hunting even though it would under all circumstances? If the fate of the Inuit
devastate the Inuit? Would he be likely to approve and the seals was to be decided by either Singer or
of the Inuit's hunting if they could always kill the Regan, which philosopher do you think the Inuit
seals painlessly? Would a nonconsequentialist like would prefer? Provide reasons for your answers.
tKirt Ejesiak and Maureen Flynn-Burhoe, "Animal Rights vs. Inuit Rights," The Boston Globe, May 8, 2005.
Reprinted by permission of the authors.
3. Should We Keep Animals in Zoos?

After some tragic incidents at zoos resulting in both human and animal deaths and
severe criticism from animal advocacy groups, the very idea of zoos has once again been
called into question.
Change is already happening around the globe, PETA Senior Vice President Lisa Lange
said this year after SeaWorld made the stunning announcement that it's moving
away from housing killer whales and ending its breeding program. SeaWorld faced
growing pressure about its orca policies and then declining park attendance after
the release of "Blackfish," which documented the 2010 death of a trainer pulled
underwater by a 12,000-pound orca. The current generation of killer whales will be
the last orcas housed in captivity at the park, SeaWorld said. *
Is keeping animals in zoos morally permissible? wrong? If zoo captivity is morally wrong, is it also
Does it amount to cruelty? Why or why not? Is wrong to visit animals in zoos?
using animals for the entertainment of humans
*Kelly Wallace, "After Gorilla Shooting, Are Zoos Becoming 'Obsolete'?", from CNN.com, May 31,2016.
READINGS
All Animals Are Equal

PETER SINGER
In recent years a number of oppressed groups have attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental
campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and
instance is the Black Liberation movement, which practices that consistently operates so as to benefit
demands an end to the prejudice and discrimina- one group-usually the one to which we ourselves
tion that has made blacks second-class citizens. The belong-at the expense of another. In this way we
immediate appeal of the black liberation movement may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation
and its initial, if limited success made it a model for movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this
other oppressed groups to follow. We became familiar mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices
with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, towards a very large group of beings: members of spe-
gay people, and a variety of other minorities. When cies other than our own-or, as we popularly though
a majority group-women-began their campaign, misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am
some thought we had come to the end of the road. Dis- urging that we extend to other species the basic prin-
crimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the ciple of equality that most of us recognise should be
last universally accepted form of discrimination, prac- extended to all members of our own species.
ticed without secrecy or pretense even in those liberal All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a
circles that have long prided themselves on their free- parody of other liberation movements than a serious
dom from prejudice against racial minorities. objective. In fact, in the past the idea of "The Rights
One should always be wary of talking of "the last of Animals" really has been used to parody the case for
remaining form of discrimination." If we have learnt women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a fore-
anything from the liberation movements, we should runner of later feminists, published her Vindication
have learnt how difficult it is to be aware of latent prej- of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely
udice in our attitudes to particular groups until this regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anon-
prejudice is forcefully pointed out. ymous publication entitled A Vindication of tile Rights
A liberation movement demands an expansion of of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas
our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpreta- Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried
tion of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices to refute Wollstonecraft's reasonings by showing that
that were previously regarded as natural and inevi- they could be carried one stage further. If sound when
table come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable applied to women, why should the arguments not be
prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or applied to dogs, cats and horses? They seemed to hold
her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we equally well for these "brutes": yet to hold that brutes
wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppres- had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reason-
sors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most ing by which this conclusion had been reached must
fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it
from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by must also be unsound when applied to women, since
our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these the very same arguments had been used in each case.
One way in which we might reply to this argu-
Peter Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," Philosophic Exchange ment is by saying that the case for equality between
Vol. 1 (1974). Copyright © Peter Singer 1974. Reprinted by men and women cannot validly be extended to non-
permission of the author. human animals. Women have a right to vote, for
instance, because they are just as capable of making applies to so-called "brutes." I believe that we reach
rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, this conclusion if we examine the basis on which our
are incapable of understanding the significance of vot- opposition to discrimination on grounds of race or sex
ing, so they cannot have the right to vote. There are ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be on
many other obvious ways in which men and women shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks,
resemble each other closely, while humans and other women, and other groups of oppressed humans while
animals differ greatly. So, it might be said, men and denying equal consideration to non-humans.
women are similar beings, and should have equal When we say that all human beings, whatever
rights, while humans and non-humans are different their race, creed or sex, are equal, what is it that we
and should not have equal rights. are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchi-
The thought behind this reply to Taylor's analogy cal, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that
is correct up to a paint, but it does not go far enough. by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that
There are important differences between humans all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the
and other animals, and these differences must give fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes;
rise to some differences in the rights that each have. they come with differing moral capacities, differing
Recognizing this obviOUS fact, however, is no barrier intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent
to the case for extending the basic principle of equal- feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differ-
ity to non-human animals. The differences that exist ing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing
between men and women are equally undeniable, capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short,
and the supporters of Women's Liberation are aware if the demand for equality were based on the actual
that these differences may give rise to different rights. equality of all human beings, we would have to stop
Many feminists hold that women have the right to an demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable
abortion on request. It does not follow that since these demand.
same people are campaigning for equality between Still, one might cling to the view that the demand
men and women they must support the right of men to for equality among human beings is based on the
have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abor- actual equality of the different races and sexes.
tion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Although humans differ as individuals in various
Since a pig can't vote, it is meaningless to talk of its ways, there are no differences between the races and
right to vote. There is no reason why either Women's sexes as Stich. From the mere fact that a person is black,
Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that
in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with rac-
of equality from one group to another does not imply ism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites are
that we must treat both groups in exactly the same superior to blacks, but this is false-although there are
way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. differences between individuals, some blacks are supe-
Whether we should do so will depend on the nature rior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities
of the members of the two groups. The basic principle that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of
of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide
and equal consideration for different beings may lead to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable
to different treatment and different rights. to discriminate on the basis of sex.
So there is a different way of replying to Taylor's This is a possible line of objection to racial and
attempt to parody Wollstonecraft's arguments, a way sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way
which does not deny the differences between humans that someone really concerned about equality would
and non-humans, but goes more deeply into the ques- choose, because taking this line could, in some cir-
tion of equality, and concludes by finding nothing cumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian
absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality SOciety. The fact that humans differ as individuals,
rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to some- It would be folly for the opponent of racism to
one who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South stake his whole case on a dogmatic commitment to
Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue
all blacks. The existence of individual variations that which is still a long way from being settled. While
cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides attempts to prove that differences in certain selected
us with no defence at all against a more sophisticated abilities between races and sexes are primarily genetic
opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same
interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be pre- must be said of attempts to prove that these differences
ferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. are largely the result of environment. At this stage of
Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so the investigation we cannot be certain which view is
much better than one based on race or sex? I think correct, however much we may hope it is the latter.
not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for
factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as equality to one particular outcome of this scientific
a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not investigation. The appropriate response to those who
provide us with any baSis for objecting to this kind of claim to have found evidence of genetically-based dif-
inegalitarianism. ferences in ability between the races or sexes is not to
There is a second important reason why we ought stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must
not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may
kind of factual equality, even the limited kind [that] turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that
asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence,
spread evenly between the different races and sexes: moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of
we can have no absolute guarantee that these abili- fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of
ties and capacities really are distributed evenly, with- fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assum-
out regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far ing that a factual difference in ability between two
as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be people justifies any difference in the amount of con-
certain measurable differences between both races sideration we give to satisfying their needs and inter-
and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear ests. The principle of the equality of human beings is
in each case, but only when averages are taken. More not a description of an alleged actual equality among
important still, we do not yet know how much of these humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat
differences is really due to the different genetic endow- humans.
ments of the various races and sexes, and how much Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis
is due to environmental differences that are the result of moral equality into his utilitarian system of eth-
of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of ics in the formula: "Each to count for one and none
the important differences will eventually prove to be for more than one." In other words, the interests of
environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed every being affected by an action are to be taken into
to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will account and given the same weight as the like inter-
be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimina- ests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidg-
tion a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to wick, put the point in this way: "The good of anyone
rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief individual is of no more importance, from the point of
that all significant differences are environmental in view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of
origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this any other."t More recently, the leading figures in con-
line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differ- temporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal
ences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presup-
connection with race, racism would in some way be pOSition of their moral theories some similar require-
defensible. ment which operates so as to give everyone's interests
equal consideration-although they cannot agree on suffering-or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoy-
how this requirement is best formulated. ment or happiness-is not just another characteristic
It is an implication of this principle of equality like the capacity for language, or for higher mathemat-
that our concern for others ought not to depend on ics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark
what they are like, or what abilities they possess- "the insuperable line" that determines whether the
although precisely what this concern requires us to interests of a being should be considered happen to
do may vary according to the characteristics of those have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity
affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case for suffering and enjoying things is a pre-requisite for
against racism and the case against sexism must both having interests at all, a condition that must be satis-
ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this prin- fied before we can speak of interests in any meaning-
ciple that speciesism is also to be condemned. If pos- ful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in
sessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by
one human to use another for his own ends, how can a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it
it entitle humans to exploit non-humans? cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could pos-
Many philosophers have proposed the principle Sibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on
of equal consideration of interests, in some form or the other hand, does have an interest in not being tor-
other, as a basic moral principle; but, as we shall see mented, because it will suffer if it is.
in more detail shortly, not many of them have recog- If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifica-
nised that this principle applies to members of other tion for refusing to take that suffering into consider-
species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the ation. No matter what the nature of the being, the
few who did realize this. In a forward-looking pas- principle of equality requires that its suffering be
sage, written at a time when black slaves in the Brit- counted equally with the like suffering-in so far as
ish dominions were still being treated much as we now rough comparisons can be made-of any other being.
treat non-human animals, Bentham wrote: If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing
enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken
The day may come when the rest of the animal cre-
into account. This is why the limit of sentience (using
ation may acquire those rights which never could
have been witholden from them but by the hand of the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, short-
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the hand for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoy-
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being ment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary
should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of of concern for the interests of others. To mark this
a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or
the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way.
termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insuf- Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin
ficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same color?
fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable The racist violates the principle of equality by giv-
line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty ing greater weight to the interests of members of his
of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond own race, when there is a clash between their interests
comparison a more rational, as well as a more convers-
and the interests of those of another race. Similarly
able animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even
a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to
would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? override the greater interests of members of other spe-
nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?2 cies. The pattern is the same in each case. Most human
beings are speciesists. I shall now very briefly describe
In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for some of the practices that show this.
suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being For the great majority of human beings, especially
the right to equal consideration. The capacity for in urban, industrialized societies, the most direct form
of contact with members of other species is at meal- animals are comparable to dogs in intelligence, and
times: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as need a varied, stimulating environment if they are not
means to our ends. We regard their life and well-being to suffer from stress and boredom. Anyone who kept a
as subordinate to our taste for a particular kind of dish. dog in the way in which pigs are frequently kept would
I say "taste" deliberately-this is purely a matter of be liable to prosecution, in England at least, but because
pleasing our palate. There can be no defence of eating our interest in exploiting pigs is greater than our inter-
flesh in terms of satisfying nutritional needs, since it est in exploiting dogs, we object to cruelty to dogs while
has been established beyond doubt that we could sat- consuming the produce of cruelty to pigs. Of the other
isfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients animals, the condition of veal calves is perhaps worst of
far more efficiently with a diet that replaced animal all, since these animals are so closely confined that they
flesh by soy beans, or products derived from soy beans, cannot even turn around or get up and lie down freely.
and other high-protein vegetable products. 3 In this way they do not develop unpalatable muscle.
It is not merely the act of killing that indicates They are also made anaemic and kept short of rough-
what we are ready to do to other species in order to age, to keep their flesh pale, since white veal fetches a
gratify our tastes. The suffering we inflict on the ani- higher price; as a result they develop a craving for iron
mals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer and roughage, and have been observed to gnaw wood
indication of our speciesism than the fact that we off the sides of their stalls, and lick greedily at any rusty
are prepared to kill them. 4 In order to have meat on hinge that is within reach.
the table at a price that people can afford, our society Since, as I have said, none of these practices cater
tolerates methods of meat production that confine for anything more than our pleasures of taste, our prac-
sentient animals in cramped, unsuitable conditions tice of rearing and killing other animals in order to
for the entire durations of their lives. Animals are eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most
treated like machines that convert fodder into flesh, important interests of other beings in order to satisfy
and any innovation that results in a higher "conver- trivial interests of our own. To avoid speciesism we
sion ratio" is liable to be adopted. As one authority on must stop this practice, and each of us has a moral obli-
the subject has said, "cruelty is acknowledged only gation to cease supporting the practice. Our custom
when profitability ceases."s So hens are crowded four is all the support that the meat-industry needs. The
or five to a cage with a floor area of twenty inches by decision to cease giving it that support may be diffi-
eighteen inches, or around the size of a single page of cult, but it is no more difficult than it would have been
the New York Times. The cages have wire floors, since for a white Southerner to go against the traditions of
this reduces cleaning costs, though wire is unsuitable his society and free his slaves; if we do not change our
for the hens' feet; the floors slope, since this makes dietary habits, how can we censure those slaveholders
the eggs roll down for easy collection, although this who would not change their own way of living?
makes it difficult for the hens to rest comfortably. In The same form of discrimination may be observed
these conditions all the birds' natural instincts are in the widespread practice of experimenting on other
thwarted: they cannot stretch their wings fully, walk species in order to see if certain substances are safe for
freely, dust-bathe, scratch the ground, or build a nest. human beings, or to test some psychological theory
Although they have never known other conditions, about the effect of severe punishment on learning, or to
observers have noticed that the birds vainly try to per- tryout various new compounds just in case something
form these actions. Frustrated at their inability to do turns up. People sometimes think that all this experi-
so, they often develop what farmers call "vices," and mentation is for vital medical purposes, and so will
peck each other to death. To prevent this, the beaks of reduce suffering overall. This comfortable belief is very
young birds are often cut off. wide of the mark. Drug companies test new shampoos
This kind of treatment is not limited to poultry. Pigs and cosmetics that they are intending to put on the
are now also being reared in cages inside sheds. These market by dropping them into the eyes of rabbits, held
open by metal clips, in order to observe what damage members of other species are very real. This is, again,
results. Food additives, like artificial colorings and pre- a clear indication of speciesism.
servatives, are tested by what is known as the "LDso"-a In the past, argument about vivesection has often
test designed to find the level of consumption at which missed this point, because it has been put in absolut-
50% of a group of animals will die. In the process, ist terms: would the abolitionist be prepared to let
nearly all of the animals are made very sick before some thousands die if they could be saved by experiment-
finally die, and others pull through. If the substance is ing on a single animal? The way to reply to this purely
relatively harmless, as it often is, huge doses have to be hypothetical question is to pose another: would the
force-fed to the animals, until in some cases sheer vol- experimenter be prepared to perform his experiment
ume or concentration of the substance causes death. on an orphaned human infant, if that were the only
Much of this pointless cruelty goes on in the uni- way to save many lives? (I say "orphan" to avoid the
versities. In many areas of science, non-human ani- complication of parental feelings, although in doing
mals are regarded as an item of laboratory equipment, so I am being overfair to the experimenter, since the
to be used and expended as desired. In psychology nonhuman subjects of experiments are not orphans.)
laboratories experimenters devise endless variations If the experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned
and repetitions of experiments that were of little value human infant, then his readiness to use non humans is
in the first place. To quote just one example, from the Simple discrimination, since adult apes, cats, mice and
experimenter's own account in a psychology journal: other mammals are more aware of what is happening
at the University of Pennsylvania, Perrin S. Cohen to them, more self-directing and, so far as we can tell,
hung six dogs in hammocks with electrodes taped to at least as sensitive to pain, as any human infant. There
their hind feet. Electric shock of varying intensity seems to be no relevant characteristic that human
was then administered through the electrodes. If the infants possess that adult mammals do not have to
dog learnt to press its head against a panel on the left, the same or a higher degree. (Someone might try to
the shock was turned off, but otherwise it remained on argue that what makes it wrong to experiment on a
indefinitely. Three of the dogs, however, were required human infant is that the infant will, in time and if
to wait periods varying from 2 to 7 seconds while left alone, develop into more than the nonhuman,
being shocked before making the response that turned but one would then, to be consistent, have to oppose
off the current. If they failed to wait, they received abortion, since the fetus has the same potential as the
further shocks. Each dog was given from 26 to 46 infant-indeed, even contraception and abstinence
"sessions" in the hammock, each session conSisting might be wrong on this ground, since the egg and
of 80 "trials" or shocks, administered at intervals of sperm, considered jointly, also have the same poten-
one minute. The experimenter reported that the dogs, tial. In any case, this argument still gives us no reason
who were unable to move in the hammock, barked for selecting a nonhuman, rather than a human with
or bobbed their heads when the current was applied. severe and irreversible brain damage, as the subject for
The reported findings of the experiment were that our experiments.)
there was a delay in the dogs' responses that increased The experimenter, then, shows a bias in favor of
proportionately to the time the dogs were reqUired to his own species whenever he carries out an experi-
endure the shock, but a gradual increase in the inten- ment on a nonhuman for a purpose that he would not
sity of the shock had no systematic effect in the timing think justified him in using a human being at an equal
of the response. The experiment was funded by the or lower level of sentience, awareness, ability to be self-
National Institutes of Health, and the United States directing, etc. No one familiar with the kind of results
Public Health Service. yielded by most experiments on animals can have
In this example, and countless cases like it, the the slightest doubt that if this bias were eliminated
possible benefits to mankind are either nonexistent the number of experiments performed would be a
or fantastically remote; while the certain losses to minute fraction of the number performed today.
Experimenting on animals, and eating their flesh, of philosophy to challenge accepted beliefs. Still, phi-
are perhaps the two major forms of speciesism in our losophers have found it difficult to discuss the issue
society. By comparison, the third and last form of of human equality without raising, in a paragraph or
speciesism is so minor as to be insignificant, but it is two, the question of the status of other animals. The
perhaps of some special interest to those for whom reason for this, which should be apparent from what
this paper was written. I am referring to speciesism in I have said already, is that if humans are to be regarded
contemporary philosophy. as equal to one another, we need some sense of "equal"
Philosophy ought to question the basic assump- that does not require any actual, descriptive equality of
tions of the age. Thinking through, critically and care- capacities, talents or other qualities. If equality is to be
fully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, related to any actual characteristics of humans, these
the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that characteristics must be some lowest common denomi-
makes philosophy a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, nator, pitched so low that no human lacks them-but
philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. then the philosopher comes up against the catch that
Philosophers are human beings and they are subject any such set of characteristics which covers all humans
to all the preconceptions of the society to which they will not be possessed only by humans. In other words, it
belong. Sometimes they succeed in breaking free of turns out that in the only sense in which we can truly
the prevailing ideology: more often they become its say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal,
most sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, phi- at least some members of other species are also equal-
losophy as practiced in the universities today does not equal, that is, to each other and to humans. If, on the
challenge anyone's preconceptions about our rela- other hand, we regard the statement "All humans are
tions with other species. By their writings, those phi- equal" in some non-factual way, perhaps as a prescrip-
losophers who tackle problems that touch upon the tion, then, as I have already argued, it is even more
issue reveal that they make the same unquestioned difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere of
assumptions as most other humans, and what they say equality.
tends to confirm the reader in his or her comfortable This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher
speciesist habits. originally intended to assert. Instead of accepting
I could illustrate this claim by referring to the writ- the radical outcome to which their own reasonings
ings of philosophers in various fields-for instance, naturally point, however, most philosophers try to
the attempts that have been made by those interested reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal
in rights to draw the boundary of the sphere of rights inequality by arguments that can only be described as
so that it runs parallel to the biological boundaries of devious.
the species homo sapiens, including infants and even As a first example, I take William Frankena's
mental defectives, but excluding those other beings well-known article "The Concept of Social Justice."
of equal or greater capacity who are so useful to us at Frankena opposes the idea of basing justice on merit,
mealtimes and in our laboratories. I think it would because he sees that this could lead to highly inegali-
be a more appropriate conclusion to this paper, how- tarian results. Instead he proposes the principle that:
ever, if I concentrated on the problem with which
we have been centrally concerned, the problem of ... all men are to be treated as equals, not because
equality. they are equal, in any respect but simply because they
are human. They are human because they have emo-
It is Significant that the problem of equality, in tions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are
moral and political philosophy, is invariably formu- capable of enjoying a good life in a sense in which other
lated in terms of human equality. The effect of this is animals are not. 6
that the question of the equality of other animals does
not confront the philosopher, or student, as an issue in But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life
itself-and this is already an indication of the failure which all humans have, but no other animals? Other
animals have emotions and desires, and appear to goes back to both classical and Judeo-Christian
be capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt doctrines. Contemporary philosophers have cast
that they can think-although the behavior of some off these metaphysical and religious shackles and
apes, dolphins and even dogs suggests that some of freely invoke the dignity of mankind without need-
them can-but what is the relevance of thinking? ing to justify the idea at all. Why should we not
Frankena goes on to admit that by lithe good life" attribute "intrinsic dignity" or "intrinsic worth"
he means "not so much the morally good life as the to ourselves? Fellow-humans are unlikely to reject
happy or satisfactory life," so thought would appear the accolades we so generously bestow on them,
to be unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact and those to whom we deny the honor are unable
to emphasise the need for thought would make diffi- to object. Indeed, when one thinks only of humans,
culties for the egalitarian since only some people are it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the
capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives- dignity of all human beings. In so doing, we implic-
or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see itly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations
what Frankena's principle of equality has to do with of human rights. We admit that we ourselves are in
simply being human. Surely every sentient being is some fundamental sense on a par with the poor-
capable of leading a life that is happier or less misera- est, most ignorant members of our own species. It
ble than some alternative life, and hence has a claim is only when we think of humans as no more than
to be taken into account. In this respect the distinc- a small sub-group of all the beings that inhabit our
tion between humans and non-humans is not a planet that we may realize that in elevating our own
sharp division, but rather a continuum along which species we are at the same time lowering the relative
we move gradually, and with overlaps between the status of all other species.
species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and The truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dig-
satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex nity of human beings appears to solve the egali tarian's
ones. problems only as long as it goes unchallenged. Once
Faced with a situation in which they see a need we ask why it should be that all humans-including
for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly infants, mental defectives, psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin
thought to separate humans and animals, but can find and the rest-have some kind of dignity or worth that
no concrete difference that will do the job without no elephant, pig or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we
undermining the equality of humans, philosophers see that this question is as difficult to answer as our
tend to waffle. They resort to high-sounding phrases original request for some relevant fact that justifies
like tithe intrinsic dignity of the human individual,,;7 the inequality of humans and other animals. In fact,
they talk of the "intrinsic worth of all men" as if men these two questions are really one: talk of intrinsic
(humans?) had some worth that other beings did not,S dignity or moral worth only takes the problem back
or they say that humans, and only humans, are "ends one step, because any satisfactory defence of the
in themselves," while "everything other than a person claim that all and only humans have intrinsic dig-
can only have value for a person.,,9 nity would need to refer to some relevant capacities
This idea of a distinctive human dignity and or characteristics that all and only humans possess.
worth has a long history; it can be traced back Philosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity,
directly to the Renaissance humanists, for instance respect and worth at the point at which other reasons
to Pica della Mirandola's Oration on the Dignity of appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough.
Man. Pica and other humanists based their estimate Fine phrases are the last resource of those who have
of human dignity on the idea that man possessed run out of arguments.
the central, pivotal position in the "Great Chain of In case there are those who still think it may be
Being" that led from the lowliest forms of matter possible to find some relevant characteristic that dis-
to God himself; this view of the universe, in turn, tinguishes all humans from all members of other
species, I shall refer again, before I conclude, to the may be, it would be a monstrous sentimentality to
existence of some humans who quite clearly are below attribute to him interests that could be weighed in
the level of awareness, self-consciousness, intelli- an equal balance with those of human beings ...
gence, and sentience, of many non-humans. I am if, for instance, one had to decide between feeding
a hungry baby or a hungry dog, anyone who chose
thinking of humans with severe and irreparable brain
the dog would generally be reckoned morally defec-
damage, and also of infant humans. To avoid the com-
tive, unable to recognize a fundamental inequality
plication of the relevance of a being's potential, how- of claims.
ever, I shall henceforth concentrate on permanently This is what distinguishes our attitude to animals
retarded humans. from our attitude to imbeciles. It would be odd to say
Philosophers who set out to find a characteris- that we ought to respect equally the dignity or per-
tic that will distinguish humans from other animals sonality of the imbecile and of the rational man ...
rarely take the course of abandoning these groups but there is nothing odd about saying that we should
of humans by lumping them in with the other ani- respect their interests equally, that is, that we should
mals. It is easy to see why they do not. To take this give to the interests of each the same serious consider-
line without re-thinking our attitudes to other ani- ation as claims to considerations necessary for some
standard of well-being that we can recognize and
mals would entail that we have the right to perform
endorse.
painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial
reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the Benn's statement of the basis of the consider-
right to rear and kill these humans for food. To most ation we should have for imbeciles seems to me
philosophers these consequences are as unacceptable correct, but why should there be any fundamental
as the view that we should stop treating non-humans inequality of claims between a dog and a human
in this way. imbecile? Benn sees that if equal consideration
Of course, when discussing the problem of depended on rationality, no reason could be given
equality it is possible to ignore the problem of against using imbeciles for research purposes, as we
mental defectives, or brush it aside as if somehow now use dogs and guinea pigs. This will not do: IIBut
insignificant. This is the easiest way out. What else of course we do distinguish imbeciles from animals
remains? My final example of speciesism in contem- in this regard," he says. That the common distinc-
porary philosophy has been selected to show what tion is justifiable is something Benn does not ques-
happens when a writer is prepared to face the question; his problem is how it is to be justified. The
tion of human equality and animal inequality with- answer he gives is this:
out ignoring the existence of mental defectives, and
... we respect the interests of men and give them pri-
without resorting to obscurantist mumbo-jumbo. ority over dogs not insofar as they are rational, but
Stanley Benn's clear and honest article "Egalitarian- because rationality is the human norm. We say it is
ism and Equal Consideration of Interests"l0 fits this unfair to exploit the deficiencies of the imbecile who
description. falls short of the norm, just as it would be unfair,
Benn after noting the usual "evident human and not just ordinarily dishonest, to steal from a
inequalities" argues, correctly I think, for equality of blind man. If we do not think in this way about
consideration as the only possible basis for egalitari- dogs, it is because we do not see the irrationality of
anism. Yet Benn, like other writers, is thinking only the dog as a deficiency or a handicap, but as nor-
mal for the species. The characteristics, therefore,
of "equal consideration of human interests." Benn is
that distinguish the normal man from the normal
quite open in his defence of this restriction of equal
dog make it intelligible for us to talk of other men
consideration: having interests and capacities, and therefore
... not to possess human shape ;s a disqualifying claims, of precisely the same kind as we make on our
condition. However faithful or intelligent a dog own behalf. But although these characteristics may
provide the point of the distinction between men rigid division in the amount of consideration due to
and other species, they are not in fact the qualifying members of different species, despite admitted cases
conditions for membership, or the distinguishing of overlap. If the original did not, at first reading
criteria of the class of morally considerable persons;
strike us as being as outrageous as the revised version
and this is precisely because a man does not become
does, this is largely because although we are not rac-
a member of a different species, with its own stan-
dards of normality, by reason of not possessing these ists ourselves, most of us are speciesists. Like the other
characteristics. articles, Benn's stands as a warning of the ease with
which the best minds can fall victim to a prevailing
The final sentence of this passage gives the argu- ideology.
ment away. An imbecile, Benn concedes, may have
no characteristics superior to those of a dog; never-
theless this does not make the imbecile a member of NOTES
"a different species" as the dog is. Therefore it would
1. Tile Methods ofEtllics (7th Ed.) p. 382.
be "unfair" to use the imbecile for medical research
2. Introduction to tile Principles of Morals and Legislation,
as we use the dog. But why? That the imbecile is not
ch. XVII.
rational is just the way things have worked out, and
the same is true of the dog-neither is any more 3. In order to produce 1 lb. of protein in the form of beef or
veal, we must feed 21 lbs. of protein to the animal. Other
responsible for their mental level. If it is unfair to take
forms of livestock are slightly less inefficient, but the aver-
advantage of an isolated defect, why is it fair to take
age ratio in the U.S. is still 1:8. It has been estimated that the
advantage of a more general limitation? I find it hard amount of protein lost to humans in this way is equivalent to
to see anything in this argument except a defence of 90% of the annual world protein deficit.
preferring the interests of members of our own spe-
4. Although one might think that killing a being is obviously
cies because they are members of our own species. the ultimate wrong one can do to it, I think that the inflic-
To those who think there might be more to it, I sug- tion of suffering is a clearer indication of speciesism because
gest the following mental exercise. Assume that it has it might be argued that at least part of what is wrong with kill-
been proven that there is a difference in the average, ing a human is that most humans are conscious of their exis-
or normal, intelligence quotient for two different tence over time, and have desires and purposes that extend
races, say whites and blacks. Then substitute the term into the future. Of course, if one took this view one would
"white" for every occurrence of "men" and ublack" have to hold that killing a human infant or mental defective
for every occurrence of Udog" in the passage quoted; is not in itself wrong, and is less serious than killing certain
and substitute "high I.Q." for "rationality" and when higher mammals that probably do have a sense of their own
existence over time.
Benn talks of uimbeciles" replace this term by udumb
whites"-that is, whites who fall well below the S. Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (Stuart, London, 1964).
normal white I.Q. score. Finally, change "species" 6. In R. Brandt (ed.) Socia/Justice (Prentice Hall, Englewood
to "race." Now re-read the passage. It has become a Cliffs, 1962): the passage quoted appears on p. 19.
defence of a rigid, no-exceptions division between 7. Frankena, op. cit., p. 23.
whites and blacks, based on I.Q. scores, not withstand- 8. H. A. Bedau, "Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality" in
ing an admitted overlap between whites and blacks in Nomos IX: Equality, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman,
this respect. The revised passage is, of course, outra- New York, 1967.
geous, and this not only because we have made fic- 9. G. Vlastos, "Justice and Equality" in Brandt. Socia/Justice,
titious assumptions in our substitutions. The point p.48.
is that in the original passage Benn was defending a 10. Nomos IX: Equality: the passages quoted are on p. 62ff.
The Case for Animal Rights

TOM REGAN
I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights-as a our resources-the rest is as predictable as it is regret-
part of the animal rights movement. That movement, table. Why worry about their loneliness, their pain,
as I conceive it, is committed to a number of goals, their death? Since animals exist for us, to benefit
induding: us in one way or another, what harms them really
doesn't matter-or matters only if it starts to bother
• the total abolition of the use of animals in science;
us, makes us feel a trifle uneasy when we eat our veal
• the total dissolution of commercial animal agri-
escalope, for example. So, yes, let us get veal calves
culture;
out of solitary confinement, give them more space,
• the total elimination of commercial and sport
a little straw, a few companions. But let us keep our
hunting and trapping.
veal escalope.
There are, I know, people who profess to believe in But a little straw, more space and a few compan-
animal rights but do not avow these goals. Factory ions won't eliminate-won't even touch-the basic
farming, they say, is wrong-it violates animals' wrong that attaches to our viewing and treating these
rights-but traditional animal agriculture is all right. animals as our resources. A veal calf killed to be eaten
Toxicity tests of cosmetics on animals violates their after living in close confinement is viewed and treated
rights, but important medical research-cancer in this way: but so, too, is another who is raised (as
research, for example-does not. The clubbing of baby they say) 'more humanely'. To right the wrong of our
seals is abhorrent, but not the harvesting of adult seals. treatment of farm animals requires more than making
I used to think I understood this reasoning. Not any rearing methods 'more humane'; it requires the total
more. You don't change unjust institutions by tidying dissolution of commercial animal agriculture.
them up. How we do this, whether we do it or, as in the case
What's wrong-fundamentally wrong-with the of animals in science, whether and how we abolish
way animals are treated isn't the details that vary from their use-these are to a large extent political ques-
case to case. It's the whole system. The forlornness of tions. People must change their beliefs before they
the veal calf is pathetic, heart wrenching; the pulsing change their habits. Enough people, especially those
pain of the chimp with electrodes planted deep in her elected to public office, must believe in change-
brain is repulsive; the slow, tortuous death of the rac- must want it-before we will have laws that protect
coon caught in the leg-hold trap is agonizing. But what the rights of animals. This process of change is very
is wrong isn't the pain, isn't the suffering, isn't the depri- complicated, very demanding, very exhausting, call-
vation. These compound what's wrong. Sometimes- ing for the efforts of many hands in education, pub-
often-they make it much, much worse. But they are licity, political organization and activity, down to
not the fundamental wrong. the licking of envelopes and stamps. As a trained and
The fundamental wrong is the system that allows practising philosopher, the sort of contribution I can
us to view animals as our resources, here for us-to be make is limited but, I like to think, important. The
eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport currency of philosophy is ideas-their meaning and
or money. Once we accept this view of animals-as rational foundation-not the nuts and bolts of the
legislative process, say, or the mechanics of commu-
nity organization. That's what I have been exploring
Tom Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights" from In Defense of Ani-
over the past ten years or so in my essays and talks and,
mals, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 13-26.
Copyright IC) 1985 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with most recently, in my book, The Case for Animal Rights.
permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. I believe the major conclusions I reach in the book are
true because they are supported by the weight of the our duties regarding animals are indirect duties to one
best arguments. I believe the idea of animal rights has another-to humanity.
reason, not just emotion, on its side. How could someone try to justify such a view?
In the space I have at my disposal here I can only Someone might say that your dog doesn't feel anything
sketch, in the barest outline, some of the main features and so isn't hurt by your neighbour's kick, doesn't
of the book. [Its] main themes-and we should not be care about the pain since none is felt, is as unaware of
surprised by this-involve asking and answering deep, anything as is your windshield. Someone might say
foundational moral questions about what morality this, but no rational person will, since, among other
is, how it should be understood and what is the best conSiderations, such a view will commit anyone who
moral theory, all considered. I hope I can convey holds it to the pOSition that no human being feels pain
something of the shape I think this theory takes. The either-that human beings also don't care about what
attempt to do this will be (to use a word a friendly critic happens to them. A second possibility is that though
once used to describe my work) cerebral, perhaps too both humans and your dog are hurt when kicked, it is
cerebral. But this is misleading. My feelings about how only human pain that matters. But, again, no rational
animals are sometimes treated run just as deep and person can believe this. Pain is pain wherever it occurs.
just as strong as those of my more volatile compatriots. If your neighbour's causing you pain is wrong because
Philosophers do-to use the jargon of the day-have a of the pain that is caused, we cannot rationally ignore
right side to their brains. If it's the left side we contrib- or dismiss the moral relevance of the pain that your
ute (or mainly should), that's because what talents we dog feels.
have reside there. Philosophers who hold indirect duty views-
How to proceed? We begin by asking how the and many still do-have come to understand that
moral status of animals has been understood by think- they must avoid the two defects just noted: that is,
ers who deny that animals have rights. Then we test both the view that animals don't feel anything as
the mettle of their ideas by seeing how well they stand well as the idea that only human pain can be mor-
up under the heat of fair criticism. If we start our think- ally relevant. Among such thinkers the sort of view
ing in this way, we soon find that some people believe now favoured is one or other form of what is called
that we have no duties directly to animals, that we owe contractarianism.
nothing to them, that we can do nothing that wrongs Here, very crudely, is the root idea: morality con-
them. Rather, we can do wrong acts that involve ani- sists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree
mals, and so we have duties regarding them, though to abide by, as we do when we sign a contract (hence
none to them. Such views may be called indirect duty the name contractarianism). Those who understand
views. By way of illustration: suppose your neighbour and accept the terms of the contract are covered
kicks your dog. Then your neighbour has done some- directly; they have rights created and recognized by,
thing wrong. But not to your dog. The wrong that has and protected in, the contract. And these contractors
been done is a wrong to you. After all, it is wrong to can also have protection spelled out for others who,
upset people, and your neighbour's kicking your dog though they lack the ability to understand morality
upsets you. So you are the one who is wronged, not and so cannot sign the contract themselves, are loved
your dog. Or again: by kicking your dog your neigh- or cherished by those who can. Thus young children,
bour damages your property. And since it is wrong to for example, are unable to sign contracts and lack
damage another person's property, your neighbour rights. But they are protected by the contract none
has done something wrong-to you, of course, not to the less because of the sentimental interests of others,
your dog. Your neighbour no more wrongs your dog most notably their parents. So we have, then, duties
than your car would be wronged if the windshield involving these children, duties regarding them, but
were smashed. Your neighbour's duties involving your no duties to them. Our duties in their case are indirect
dog are indirect duties to you. More generally, all of duties to other human beings, usually their parents.
As for animals, since they cannot understand breath away ... as if, for example, there would be noth-
contracts, they obviously cannot sign; and since they ing wrong with apartheid in South Africa if few white
cannot sign, they have no rights. Like children, how- South Africans were upset by it. A theory with so little
ever, some animals are the objects of the sentimental to recommend it at the level of the ethics of our treat-
interest of others. You, for example, love your dog or ment of our fellow humans cannot have anything
cat. So those animals that enough people care about more to recommend it when it comes to the ethics of
(companion animals, whales, baby seals, the Ameri- how we treat our fellow animals.
can bald eagle), though they lack rights themselves, The version of contractarianism just examined is,
will be protected because of the sentimental interests as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to those
of people. I have, then, according to contractarian- of a contractarian persuasion it must be noted that
ism, no duty directly to your dog or any other animal, much more refined, subtle and ingenious varieties are
not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffer- possible. For example, John Rawls, in his A Theory of
ing; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to those Justice, sets forth a version of contractarianism that
people who care about what happens to them. As for forces contractors to ignore the accidental features
other animals, where no or little sentimental interest of being a human being-for example, whether one
is present-in the case of farm animals, for example, is white or black, male or female, a genius or of mod-
or laboratory rats-what duties we have grow weaker est intellect. Only by ignoring such features, Rawls
and weaker, perhaps to vanishing point. The pain and believes, can we ensure that the prinCiples of justice
death they endure, though real, are not wrong if no that contractors would agree upon are not based on
one cares about them. bias or prejudice. Despite the improvement a view such
When it comes to the moral status of animals, as Rawls's represents over the cruder forms of contrac-
contractarianism could be a hard view to refute if it tarianism, it remains deficient: it systematically denies
were an adequate theoretical approach to the moral that we have direct duties to those human beings who
status of human beings. It is not adequate in this latter do not have a sense of justice-young children, for
respect, however, which makes the question of its ade- instance, and many mentally retarded humans. And
quacy in the former case, regarding animals, utterly yet it seems reasonably certain that, were we to torture
moot. For consider: morality, according to the (crude) a young child or a retarded elder, we would be doing
contractarian pOSition before us, consists of rules that something that wronged him or her, not something
people agree to abide by. What people? Well, enough that would be wrong if (and only if) other humans
to make a difference-enough, that is, collectively to with a sense of justice were upset. And since this is
have the power to enforce the rules that are drawn up true in the case of these humans, we cannot rationally
in the contract. That is very well and good for the sig- deny the same in the case of animals.
natories but not so good for anyone who is not asked Indirect duty views, then, including the best
to sign. And there is nothing in contractarianism of among them, fail to command our rational assent.
the sort we are discussing that guarantees or requires Whatever ethical theory we should accept rationally,
that everyone will have a chance to participate equally therefore, it must at least recognize that we have some
in framing the rules of morality. The result is that this duties directly to animals, just as we have some duties
approach to ethics could sanction the most blatant directly to each other. The next two theories I'll sketch
forms of social, economic, moral and political injus- attempt to meet this requirement.
tice, ranging from a repreSSive caste system to system- The first I call the cruelty-kindness view. Simply
atic racial or sexual discrimination. Might, according stated, this says that we have a direct duty to be kind
to this theory, does make right. Let those who are the to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them.
victims of injustice suffer as they will. It matters not Despite the familiar, reassuring ring of these ideas, I do
so long as no one else-no contractor, or too few of not believe that this view offers an adequate theory.
them-cares about it. Such a theory takes one's moral To make this clearer, consider kindness. A kind person
acts from a certain kind of motive-compassion or be affected, and where the best results are most likely
concern, for example. And that is a virtue. But there to lie-which option, in other words, is most likely to
is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act. If I am a bring about the best results, the best balance between
generous racist, for example, I will be inclined to act satisfaction and frustration. That option, whatever it
kindly towards members of my own race, favouring may be, is the one I ought to choose. That is where my
their interests above those of others. My kindness moral duty lies.
would be real and, so far as it goes, good. But I trust The great appeal of utilitarianism rests with its
it is too obvious to require argument that my kind uncompromising egalitarianism: everyone's interests
acts may not be above moral reproach-may, in fact, count and count as much as the like interests of every-
be positively wrong because rooted in injustice. So one else. The kind of odious discrimination that some
kindness, notwithstanding its status as a virtue to be forms of contractarianism can justify-discrimination
encouraged, simply will not carry the weight of a the- based on race or sex, for example-seems disallowed in
ory of right action. principle by utilitarianism, as is speciesism, systematic
Cruelty fares no better. People or their acts are discrimination based on species membership.
cruel if they display either a lack of sympathy for or, The equality we find in utilitarianism, however,
worse, the presence of enjoyment in another's suf- is not the sort an advocate of animal or human rights
fering. Cruelty in all its guises is a bad thing, a tragiC should have in mind. Utilitarianism has no room for
human failing. But just as a person's being moti- the equal moral rights of different individuals because
vated by kindness does not guarantee that he or she it has no room for their equal inherent value or worth.
does what is right, so the absence of cruelty does not What has value for the utilitarian is the satisfaction
ensure that he or she avoids doing what is wrong. of an individual's interests, not the individual whose
Many people who perform abortions, for example, are interests they are. A universe in which you satisfy your
not cruel, sadistic people. But that fact alone does not desire for water, food and warmth is, other things
settle the terribly difficult question of the morality of being equal, better than a universe in which these
abortion. The case is no different when we examine desires are frustrated. And the same is true in the case
the ethics of our treatment of animals. So, yes, let us be of an animal with similar desires. But neither you nor
for kindness and against cruelty. But let us not suppose the animal have any value in your own right. Only
that being for the one and against the other answers your feelings do.
questions about moral right and wrong. Here is an analogy to help make the philosophical
Some people think that the theory we are looking point clearer: a cup contains different liquids, some-
for is utilitarianism. A utilitarian accepts two moral times sweet, sometimes bitter, sometimes a mix of the
principles. The first is that of equality: everyone's two. What has value are the liquids: the sweeter the
interests count, and similar interests must be counted better, the bitterer the worse. The cup, the container,
as having similar weight or importance. White or has no value. It is what goes into it, not what they go
black, American or Iranian, human or animal- into, that has value. For the utilitarian you and I are
everyone's pain or frustration matter, and matter just like the cup; we have no value as individuals and thus
as much as the equivalent pain or frustration of any- no equal value. What has value is what goes into us,
one else. The second principle a utilitarian accepts is what we serve as receptacles for; our feelings of satis-
that of utility: do the act that will bring about the best faction have positive value, our feelings of frustration
balance between satisfaction and frustration for every- negative value.
one affected by the outcome. Serious problems arise for utilitarianism when
As a utilitarian, then, here is how I am to approach we remind ourselves that it enjoins us to bring about
the task of deciding what I morally ought to do: I must the best consequences. What does this mean? It
ask who will be affected if I choose to do one thing doesn't mean the best consequences for me alone, or
rather than another, how much each individual will for my family or friends, or any other person taken
individually. No, what we must do is, roughly, as fol- wrong? Anything immoral? One would have thought
lows: we must add up (somehow!) the separate satisfac- that I had. Not according to utilitarianism. Since
tions and frustrations of everyone likely to be affected what I have done has brought about the best bal-
by our choice, the satisfactions in one column, the ance between totalled satisfaction and frustration for
frustrations in the other. We must total each column all those affected by the outcome, my action is not
for each of the options before us. That is what it means wrong. Indeed, in killing Aunt Bea the physician and
to say the theory is aggregative. And then we must I did what duty required.
choose that option which is most likely to bring about This same kind of argument can be repeated in
the best balance of totalled satisfactions over totalled all sorts of cases, illustrating, time after time, how the
frustrations. Whatever act would lead to this outcome utilitarian's position leads to results that impartial
is the one we ought morally to perform-it is where people find morally callous. It is wrong to kill my Aunt
our moral duty lies. And that act quite clearly might Bea in the name of bringing about the best results for
not be the same one that would bring about the best others. A good end does not justify an evil means. Any
results for me personally, or for my family or friends, adequate moral theory will have to explain why this is
or for a lab animal. The best aggregated consequences so. Utilitarianism fails in this respect and so cannot be
for everyone concerned are not necessarily the best for the theory we seek.
each individual. What to do? Where to begin anew? The place
That utilitarianism is an aggregative theory- to begin, I think, is with the utilitarian's view of
different individuals' satisfactions or frustrations are the value of the individual-or, rather, lack of value.
added, or summed, or totalled-is the key objection to In its place, suppose we consider that you and I, for
their theory. My Aunt Bea is old, inactive, a cranky, sour example, do have value as individuals-what we'll
person, though not physically ill. She prefers to go on call inherent value. To say we have such value is to
living. She is also rather rich. I could make a fortune if I say that we are something more than, something
could get my hands on her money, money she intends different from, mere receptacles. Moreover, to ensure
to give me in any event, after she dies, but which she that we do not pave the way for such injustices as
refuses to give me now. In order to avoid a huge tax bite, slavery or sexual discrimination, we must believe
I plan to donate a handsome sum of my profits to a local that all who have inherent value have it equally,
children's hospital. Many, many children will benefit regardless of their sex, race, religion, birthplace
from my generOSity, and much joy will be brought to and so on. Similarly to be discarded as irrelevant
their parents, relatives and friends. If I don't get the are one's talents or skills, intelligence and wealth,
money rather soon, all these ambitions will come to personality or pathology, whether one is loved and
naught. The once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make a admired or despised and loathed. The geniUS and
real killing will be gone. Why, then, not kill my Aunt the retarded child, the prince and the pauper, the
Bea? Oh, of course I might get caught. But I'm no fool brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Teresa
and beSides, her doctor can be counted on to co-operate and the most unscrupulous used-car salesman-all
(he has an eye for the same investment and I happen have inherent value, all possess it equally, and all
to know a good deal about his shady past). The deed have an equal right to be treated with respect, to
can be done . . . professionally, shall we say. There is be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the
very little chance of getting caught. And as for my con- status of things, as if they existed as resources for
science being guilt-ridden, I am a resourceful sort of others. My value as an individual is independent
fellow and will take more than sufficient comfort-as I of my usefulness to you. Yours is not dependent on
lie on the beach at Acapulco-in contemplating the joy your usefulness to me. For either of us to treat the
and health I have brought to so many others. other in ways that fail to show respect for the other'S
Suppose Aunt Bea is killed and the rest of the independent value is to act immorally, to violate the
story comes out as told. Would I have done anything individual's rights.
Some of the rational virtues of this view-what individuals. As the same is true of those animals that
I call the rights view-should be evident. Unlike (crude) concern us (the ones that are eaten and trapped, for
contractarianism, for example, the rights view in prin- example), they too must be viewed as the experienc-
ciple denies the moral tolerability of any and all forms ing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.
of racial, sexual or social discrimination; and unlike Some there are who resist the idea that animals
utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can have inherent value. 'Only humans have such value,'
justify good results by using evil means that violate an they profess. How might this narrow view be defended?
individual's rights-denies, for example, that it could Shall we say that only humans have the requiSite intel-
be moral to kill my Aunt Bea to harvest beneficial con- ligence, or autonomy, or reason? But there are many,
sequences for others. That would be to sanction the many humans who fail to meet these standards and
disrespectful treatment of the individual in the name yet are reasonably viewed as having value above and
of the social good, something the rights view will not- beyond their usefulness to others. Shall we claim that
categorically will not-ever allow. only humans belong to the right species, the species
The rights view, I believe, is rationally the most sat- Homo sapiens? But this is blatant speciesism. Will it be
isfactory moral theory. It surpasses all other theories said, then, that all-and only-humans have immor-
in the degree to which it illuminates and explains the tal souls? Then our opponents have their work cut out
foundation of our duties to one another-the domain for them. I am myself not ill-disposed to the proposi-
of human morality. On this score it has the best rea- tion that there are immortal souls. Personally, I pro-
sons, the best arguments, on its side. Of course, if it foundly hope I have one. But I would not want to rest
were possible to show that only human beings are my position on a controversial ethical issue on the even
included within its scope, then a person like myself, more controversial question about who or what has an
who believes in animal rights, would be obliged to immortal soul. That is to dig one's hole deeper, not to
look elsewhere. climb out. Rationally, it is better to resolve moral issues
But attempts to limit its scope to humans only can without making more controversial assumptions than
be shown to be rationally defective. Animals, it is true, are needed. The question of who has inherent value is
lack many of the abilities humans possess. They can't such a question, one that is resolved more rationally
read, do higher mathematics, build a bookcase or make without the introduction of the idea of immortal souls
babaghanoush. Neither can many human beings, how- than by its use.
ever, and yet we don't (and shouldn't) say that they Well, perhaps some will say that animals have some
(these humans) therefore have less inherent value, inherent value, only less than we have. Once again,
less of a right to be treated with respect, than do oth- however, attempts to defend this view can be shown to
ers. It is the similarities between those human beings lack rational justification. What could be the basis of
who most clearly, most non-controversially have such our having more inherent value than animals? Their
value (the people reading this, for example), not our lack of reason, or autonomy, or intellect? Only if we
differences, that matter most. And the really crucial, are willing to make the same judgement in the case of
the basic similarity is simply this: we are each of us humans who are Similarly deficient. But it is not true
the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature that such humans-the retarded child, for example, or
having an individual welfare that has importance to the mentally deranged-have less inherent value than
us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and you or I. Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the
prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect view that animals like them in being the experiencing
things. And all these dimensions of our life, including subjects of a life have less inherent value. All who have
our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, inherent value have it equally, whether they be human
our satisfaction and frustration, our continued exis- animals or not.
tence or our untimely death-all make a difference to Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those
the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as who are the experiencing subjects of a life. Whether
it belongs to others-to rocks and rivers, trees and gla- systematically as if their value were reducible to their
ciers, for example-we do not know and may never usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically
know. But neither do we need to know, if we are to treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights
make the case for animal rights. We do not need routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true
to know, for example, how many people are eligible when they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary
to vote in the next presidential election before we can or unwise research as it is when they are used in studies
know whether I am. Similarly, we do not need to know that hold out real promise of human benefits. We can't
how many individuals have inherent value before we justify harming or killing a human being (my Aunt
can know that some do. When it comes to the case for Bea, for example) just for these sorts of reason. Neither
animal rights, then, what we need to know is whether can we do so even in the case of so lowly a creature as
the animals that, in our culture, are routinely eaten, a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement or reduction
hunted and used in our laboratories, for example, that is called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not just
are like us in being subjects of a life. And we do know more generous use of anaesthetic or the elimination
this. We do know that many-literally, billions and of multiple surgery, not just tidying up the system. It
billions-of these animals are the subjects of a life in is complete replacement. The best we can do when it
the sense explained and so have inherent value if we comes to using animals in science is-not to use them.
do. And since, in order to arrive at the best theory of That is where our duty lies, according to the rights
our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal view.
inherent value as individuals, reason-not sentiment, As for commercial animal agriculture, the rights
not emotion-reason compels us to recognize the view takes a similar abolitionist position. The funda-
equal inherent value of these animals and, with this, mental moral wrong here is not that animals are kept
their equal right to be treated with respect. in stressful close confinement or in isolation, or that
That, very roughly, is the shape and feel of the case their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences
for animal rights. Most of the details of the support- are ignored or discounted. All these are wrong, of
ing argument are missing. They are to be found in the course, but they are not fundamentally wrong. They
book to which I alluded earlier. Here, the details go are symptoms and effects of the deeper, systematic
begging, and I must, in closing, limit myself to four wrong that allows these animals to be viewed and
final pOints. treated as lacking independent value, as resources for
The first is how the theory that underlies the case us-as, indeed, a renewable resource. Giving farm ani-
for animal rights shows that the animal rights move- mals more space, more natural environments, more
ment is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights companions does not right the fundamental wrong,
movement. The theory that rationally grounds the any more than giving lab animals more anaesthesia
rights of animals also grounds the rights of humans. or bigger, cleaner cages would right the fundamental
Thus those involved in the animal rights movement wrong in their case. Nothing less than the total disso-
are partners in the struggle to secure respect for lution of commercial animal agriculture will do this,
human rights-the rights of women, for example, or just as, for similar reasons I won't develop at length
minorities, or workers. The animal rights movement is here, morality requires nothing less than the total
cut from the same moral cloth as these. elimination of hunting and trapping for commercial
Second, having set out the broad outlines of the and sporting ends. The rights view's implications,
rights view, I can now say why its implications for then, as I have said, are clear and uncompromising.
farming and science, among other fields, are both clear My last two points are about philosophy, my pro-
and uncompromising. In the case of the use of animals fession. It is, most obviously, no substitute for politi-
in Science, the rights view is categorically abolition- cal action. The words I have written here and in other
ist. Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their places by themselves don't change a thing. It is what
kings. Because these animals are treated routinely, we do with the thoughts that the words express-our
acts, our deeds-that changes things. All that philoso- disciplined passion. Of the discipline enough has been
phy can do, and all I have attempted, is to offer a vision seen. As for the passion: there are times, and these not
of what our deeds should aim at. And the why. But not infrequent, when tears come to my eyes when I see, or
the how. read, or hear of the wretched plight of animals in the
Finally, I am reminded of my thoughtful critic, the hands of humans. Their pain, their suffering, their
one I mentioned earlier, who chastised me for being loneliness, their innocence, their death. Anger. Rage.
too cerebral. Well, cerebral I have been: indirect duty Pity. Sorrow. Disgust. The whole creation groans under
views, utilitarianism, contractarianism-hardly the the weight of the evil we humans visit upon these mute,
stuff deep passions are made of. I am also reminded, powerless creatures. It is our hearts, not just our heads,
however, of the image another friend once set before that call for an end to it all, that demand of us that
me-the image of the ballerina as expressive of disci- we overcome, for them, the habits and forces behind
plined passion. Long hours of sweat and toil, of loneli- their systematic oppression. All great movements, it is
ness and practice, of doubt and fatigue: those are the written, go through three stages: ridicule, discussion,
discipline of her craft. But the passion is there too, the adoption. It is the realization of this third stage, adop-
fierce drive to excel, to speak through her body, to do tion, that requires both our passion and our discipline,
it right, to pierce our minds. That is the image of phi- our hearts and our heads. The fate of animals is in our
losophy I would leave with you, not 'too cerebral' but hands. God grant we are equal to the task.
Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position

MARY ANNE WARREN
Tom Regan has produced what is perhaps the defini- the scope of the rights claim to include all sentient
tive defense of the view that the basic moral rights of animals, that is, all those capable of having experi-
at least some non-human animals are in no way infe- ences, including experiences of pleasure or satisfac-
rior to our own. In The Case for Animal Rights, he argues tion and pain, suffering, or frustration. 2 However, I do
that all normal mammals over a year of age have the not think that the moral rights of most non-human
same basic moral rights. 1 Non-human mammals have animals are identical in strength to those of persons. 3
essentially the same right not to be harmed or killed as The rights of most non-human animals may be over-
we do. I shall call this "the strong animal rights posi- ridden in circumstances which would not justify over-
tion," although it is weaker than the claims made by riding the rights of persons. There are, for instance,
some animalliberationists in that it ascribes rights to compelling realities which sometimes require that we
only some sentient animals. kill animals for reasons which could not justify the
I will argue that Regan's case for the strong ani- killing of persons. I will call this view "the weak ani-
mal rights pOSition is unpersuasive and that this posi- mal rights" pOSition, even though it ascribes rights to
tion entails consequences which a reasonable person a wider range of animals than does the strong animal
cannot accept. I do not deny that some non-human rights position.
animals have moral rights; indeed, I would extend I will begin by summarizing Regan's case for the
strong animal rights position and noting two prob-
lems with it. Next, I will explore some consequences
Mary Anne Warren, "A Critique of Regan's Animal Rights Theory," of the strong animal rights position which I think are
Between tile Species Vol. 2, No.4 (Fall 1987): 433-441. Reprinted unacceptable. Finally, I will outline the case for the
with permission from Between the SpeCies. weak animal rights position.
REGAN'S CASE In the third phase of the argument, Regan uses the
Regan's argument moves through three stages. First, thesis of equal inherent value to derive strong moral
he argues that normal, mature mammals are not only rights for all subjects-of-a-life. This thesis underlies
sentient but have other mental capacities as well. the Respect Principle, which forbids us to treat beings
These include the capacities for emotion, memory, who have inherent value as mere receptacles, Le., mere
belief, desire, the use of general concepts, intentional means to the production of the greatest overall good.
action, a sense of the future, and some degree of self- This principle, in turn, underlies the Harm Principle,
awareness. Creatures with such capacities are said to which says that we have a direct prima facie duty not to
be subjects-of-a-life. They are not only alive in the harm beings who have inherent value. Together, these
biological sense but have a psychological identity over principles give rise to moral rights. Rights are defined
time and an existence which can go better or worse for as valid claims, claims to certain goods and against cer-
them. Thus, they can be harmed or benefited. These tain beings, i.e., moral agents. Moral rights generate
are plaUSible claims, and well defended. One of the duties not only to refrain from inflicting harm upon
strongest parts of the book is the rebuttal of philoso- beings with inherent value but also to come to their
phers, such as R. G. Frey, who object to the application aid when they are threatened by other moral agents.
of such mentalistic terms to creatures that do not use a Rights are not absolute but may be overridden in cer-
human-style language. The second and third stages of tain circumstances. Just what these circumstances are
the argument are more problematic. we will consider later. But first, let's look at some dif-
In the second stage, Regan argues that subjects- ficulties in the theory as thus far presented.
of-a-life have inherent value. His concept of inherent
value grows out of his opposition to utilitarianism.
Utilitarian moral theory, he says, treats individuals THE MYSTERY OF INHERENT VALUE
as "mere receptacles" for morally significant value, in Inherent value is a key concept in Regan's theory. It
that harm to one individual may be justified by the is the bridge between the plausible claim that all nor-
production of a greater net benefit to other individu- mal, mature mammals-human or otherwise-are
als. In opposition to this, he holds that subjects-of-a- subjects-of-a-life and the more debatable claim that
life have a value independent of both the value they they all have basic moral rights of the same strength.
may place upon their lives or experiences and the But it is a highly obscure concept, and its obscurity
value others may place upon them. makes it ill-suited to play this crucial role.
Inherent value, Regan argues, does not come in Inherent value is defined almost entirely in nega-
degrees. To hold that some individuals have more tive terms. It is not dependent upon the value which
inherent value than others is to adopt a "perfection- either the inherently valuable individual or anyone
ist" theory, i.e., one which assigns different moral else may place upon that individual's life or experi-
worth to individuals according to how well they are ences. It is not (necessarily) a function of sentience or
thought to exemplify some virtue(s), such as intel- any other mental capacity, because, Regan says, some
ligence or moral autonomy. Perfectionist theories entities which are not sentient (e.g., trees, rivers, or
have been used, at least since the time of Aristotle, to rocks) may, nevertheless, have inherent value (p. 246).
rationalize such injustices as slavery and male domi- It cannot attach to anything other than an individual;
nation, as well as the unrestrained exploitation of ani- species, eco-systems, and the like cannot have inher-
mals. Regan argues that if we reject these injustices, entvalue.
then we must also reject perfectionism and conclude These are some of the things which inherent value
that all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value. is not. But what is it? Unfortunately, we are not told.
Moral agents have no more inherent value than moral Inherent value appears as a mysterious non-natural
patients, i.e., subjects-of-a-life who are not morally property which we must take on faith. Regan says that
responsible for their actions. it is a postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent
value, a postulate justified by the fact that it avoids Regan's theory requires us to divide all living things
certain absurdities which he thinks follow from a into two categories: those which have the same inher-
purely utilitarian theory (p. 247). But why is the pos- ent value and the same basic moral rights that we do,
tulate that subjects-o(-a-Iife have inherent value? If the and those which have no inherent value and presum-
inherent value of a being is completely independent of ably no moral rights. But wherever we try to draw the
the value that it or anyone else places upon its experi- line, such a sharp division is implausible.
ences, then why does the fact that it has certain sorts It would surely be arbitrary to draw such a sharp
of experiences constitute evidence that it has inherent line between normal, mature mammals and all other
value? If the reason is that subjects-of-a-life have an living things. Some birds (e.g., crows, magpies, parrots,
existence which can go better or worse for them, then mynahs) appear to be just as mentally sophisticated as
why isn't the appropriate conclusion that all sentient most mammals and thus are equally strong candidates
beings have inherent value, since they would all seem for inclusion under the subject-of-a-life criterion.
to meet that condition? Sentient but mentally unso- Regan is not in fact advocating that we draw the line
phisticated beings may have a less extensive range of here. His claim is only that normal mature mammals
possible satisfactions and frustrations, but why should are clear cases, while other cases are less clear. Yet, on
it follow that they have-or may have-no inherent his theory, there must be such a sharp line somewhere,
value at all? since there are no degrees of inherent value. But why
In the absence of a positive account of inher- should we believe that there is a sharp line between
ent value, it is also difficult to grasp the connection creatures that are subjects-of-a-life and creatures that
between being inherently valuable and having moral are not? Isn't it more likely that "subjecthood" comes
rights. Intuitively, it seems that value is one thing, in degrees, that some creatures have only a little self-
and rights are another. It does not seem incoherent awareness, and only a little capacity to anticipate the
to say that some things (e.g., mountains, rivers, red- future, while some have a little more, and some a good
wood trees) are inherently valuable and yet are not the deal more?
sorts of things which can have moral rights. Nor does Should we, for instance, regard fish, amphibians,
it seem incoherent to ascribe inherent value to some and reptiles as subjects-of-a-life? A simple yes-or-no
things which are not individuals, e.g., plant or animal answer seems inadequate. On the one hand, some
species, though it may well be incoherent to ascribe of their behaVior is difficult to explain without the
moral rights to such things. assumption that they have sensations, beliefs, desires,
In short, the concept of inherent value seems to emotions, and memories; on the other hand, they do
create at least as many problems as it solves. If inherent not seem to exhibit very much self-awareness or very
value is based on some natural property, then why not much conscious anticipation of future events. Do
try to identify that property and explain its moral sig- they have enough mental sophistication to count as
nificance, without appealing to inherent value? And subjects-of-a-life? Exactly how much is enough?
if it is not based on any natural property, then why It is still more unclear what we should say about
should we believe in it? That it may enable us to avoid insects, spiders, octopi, and other invertebrate ani-
some of the problems faced by the utilitarian is not a mals which have brains and sensory organs but whose
sufficient reason, if it creates other problems which are minds (if they have minds) are even more alien to us
just as serious. than those of fish or reptiles. Such creatures are prob-
ably sentient. Some people doubt that they can feel
pain, since they lack certain neurological structures
IS THERE A SHARP LINE? which are crucial to the processing of pain impulses
Perhaps the most serious problems are those that arise in vertebrate animals. But this argument is inconclusive,
when we try to apply the strong animal rights posi- since their nervous systems might process pain in ways
tion to animals other than normal, mature mammals. different from ours. When injured, they sometimes
act as if they are in pain. On evolutionary grounds, the continuum of life forms-this time, a line demar-
it seems unlikely that highly mobile creatures with cating the limits of the benefit of the doubt principle.
complex sensory systems would not have developed a The weak animal rights theory provides a more
capacity for pain (and pleasure), since such a capacity plausible way of dealing with this range of cases, in
has obvious survival value. It must, however, be admit- that it allows the rights of animals of different kinds to
ted that we do not know whether spiders can feel pain vary in strength ....
(or something very like it), let alone whether they have
emotions, memories, beliefs, desires, self-awareness, * * *
or a sense of the future.
Even more mysterious are the mental capacities (if
any) of mobile microfauna. The brisk and efficient way WHY ARE ANIMAL RIGHTS WEAKER THAN
that paramecia move about in their incessant search HUMAN RIGHTS?
for food might indicate some kind of sentience, in spite How can we justify regarding the rights of persons as
of their lack of eyes, ears, brains, and other organs asso- generally stronger than those of sentient beings which
ciated with sentience in more complex organisms. It is are not persons? There are a plethora of bad justifica-
conceivable-though not very probable-that they, tions, based on religious premises or false or unprov-
too, are subjects-of-a-life. able claims about the differences between human and
The existence of a few unclear cases need not non-human nature. But there is one difference which
pose a serious problem for a moral theory, but in has a clear moral relevance: people are at least some-
this case, the unclear cases constitute most of those times capable of being moved to action or inaction
with which an adequate theory of animal rights by the force of reasoned argument. Rationality rests
would need to deal. The sUbject-of-a-life criterion upon other mental capacities, notably those which
can provide us with little or no moral guidance in Regan cites as criteria for being a subject-of-a-life. We
our interactions with the vast majority of animals. share these capacities with many other animals. But
That might be acceptable if it could be supplemented it is not just because we are subjects-of-a-life that we
with additional principles which would provide such are both able and morally compelled to recognize one
guidance. However, the radical dualism of the theory another as beings with equal basic moral rights. It is
precludes supplementing it in this way. We are forced also because we are able to "listen to reason" in order
to say that either a spider has the same right to life as to settle our conflicts and cooperate in shared projects.
you and I do, or it has no right to life whatever-and This capacity, unlike the others, may require some-
that only the gods know which of these alternatives thing like a human language.
is true. Why is rationality morally relevant? It does not
Regan's suggestion for dealing with such unclear make us "better" than other animals or more "per-
cases is to apply the "benefit of the doubt" principle. fect." It does not even automatically make us more
That is, when dealing with beings that mayor may intelligent. (Bad reasoning reduces our effective intel-
not be subjects-of-a-life, we should act as if they are. ligence rather than increasing it.) But it is morally
But if we try to apply this principle to the entire range relevant insofar as it provides greater possibilities
of doubtful cases, we will find ourselves with moral for cooperation and for the nonviolent resolution of
obligations which we cannot possibly fulfill. In many problems. It also makes us more dangerous than non-
climates, it is virtually impossible to live without swat- rational beings can ever be. Because we are potentially
ting mosquitoes and exterminating cockroaches, more dangerous and less predictable than wolves, we
and not all of us can afford to hire someone to sweep need an articulated system of morality to regulate our
the path before we walk, in order to make sure that conduct. Any human morality, to be workable in the
we do not step on ants. Thus, we are still faced with the long run, must recognize the equal moral status of
daunting task of drawing a sharp line somewhere on all persons, whether through the postulate of equal
basic moral rights or in some other way. The recog- theory of the sort Aristotle endorsed. There is no
nition of the moral equality of other persons is the excuse for refusing to recognize the moral equality of
price we must each pay for their recognition of our some people on the grounds that we don't regard them
moral equality. Without this mutual recognition of as quite as rational as we are, since it is perfectly clear
moral equality, human society can exist only in a state that most people can reason well enough to determine
of chronic and bitter conflict. The war between the how to act so as to respect the basic rights of others (if
sexes will persist so long as there is sexism and male they choose to), and that is enough for moral equality.
domination; racial conflict will never be eliminated so But what about people who are clearly not ratio-
long as there are racist laws and practices. But to the nal? It is often argued that sophisticated mental
extent that we achieve a mutual recognition of equal- capacities such as rationality cannot be essential for
ity, we can hope to live together, perhaps as peacefully the posseSSion of equal basic moral rights, since nearly
as wolves, achieving (in part) through explicit moral everyone agrees that human infants and mentally
principles what they do not seem to need explicit incompetent persons have such rights, even though
moral principles to achieve. they may lack those sophisticated mental capacities.
Why not extend this recognition of moral equal- But this argument is inconclusive, because there are
ity to other creatures, even though they cannot do the powerful practical and emotional reasons for pro-
same for us? The answer is that we cannot. Because tecting non-rational human beings, reasons which
we cannot reason with most non-human animals, are absent in the case of most non-human animals.
we cannot always solve the problems which they Infancy and mental incompetence are human condi-
may cause without harming them-although we are tions which all of us either have experienced or are
always obligated to try. We cannot negotiate a treaty likely to experience at some time. We also protect
with the feral cats and foxes, requiring them to stop babies and mentally incompetent people because we
preying on endangered native species in return for care for them. We don't normally care for animals in
suitable concessions on our part. the same way, and when we do-e.g., in the case of
much-loved pets-we may regard them as having spe-
if rats invade our houses ... we cannot reason with
them, hoping to persuade them of the injustice they do cial rights by virtue of their relationship to us. We pro-
us. We can only attempt to get rid of them." tect them not only for their sake but also for our own,
lest we be hurt by harm done to them. Regan holds
Aristotle was not wrong in claiming that the capac- that such "Side-effects" are irrelevant to moral rights,
ity to alter one's behavior on the basis of reasoned and perhaps they are. But in ordinary usage, there is
argument is relevant to the full moral status which he no sharp line between moral rights and those moral
accorded to free men. Of course, he was wrong in his protections which are not rights. The extension of
other premise, that women and slaves by their nature strong moral protections to infants and the mentally
cannot reason well enough to function as autonomous impaired in no way proves that non-human animals
moral agents. Had that premise been true, so would have the same basic moral rights as people.
his conclusion that women and slaves are not quite
the moral equals of free men. In the case of most non-
human animals, the corresponding premise is true. If, WHY SPEAK OF "ANIMAL RIGHTS" AT ALL?
on the other hand, there are animals with whom we If, as I have argued, reality precludes our treating
can (learn to) reason, then we are obligated to do this all animals as our moral equals, then why should
and to regard them as our moral equals. we still ascribe rights to them? Everyone agrees
Thus, to distinguish between the rights of persons that animals are entitled to some protection against
and those of most other animals on the grounds that human abuse, but why speak of animal rights if we
only people can alter their behavior on the basis of rea- are not prepared to accept most animals as our moral
soned argument does not commit us to a perfectionist equals? The weak animal rights position may seem
an unstable compromise between the bold claim nearly all significant moral claims tend to be expressed
that animals have the same basic moral rights that in terms of rights. Thus, the denial that animals have
we do and the more common view that animals have rights, however carefully qualified, is likely to be taken
no rights at all. to mean that we may do whatever we like to them, pro-
It is probably impossible to either prove or disprove vided that we do not violate any human rights. In such
the thesis that animals have moral rights by producing a context, speaking of the rights of animals may be the
an analysis of the concept of a moral right and check- only way to persuade many people to take seriously
ing to see if some or all animals satisfy the conditions protests against the abuse of animals.
for having rights. The concept of a moral right is com- Why not extend this line of argument and speak
plex, and it is not clear which of its strands are essen- of the rights of trees, mountains, oceans, or anything
tial. Paradigm rights holders, Le., mature and mentally else which we may wish to see protected from destruc-
competent persons, are both rational and morally tion? Some environmentalists have not hesitated to
autonomous beings and sentient subjects-of-a-life. speak in this way, and, given the importance of pro-
Opponents of animal rights claim that rationality tecting such elements of the natural world, they can-
and moral autonomy are essential for the possession not be blamed for using this rhetorical device. But,
of rights, while defenders of animal rights claim that I would argue that moral rights can meaningfully be
they are not. The ordinary concept of a moral right is ascribed only to entities which have some capacity
probably not precise enough to enable us to determine for sentience. This is because moral rights are protec-
who is right on purely definitional grounds. tions designed to protect rights holders from harms or
If logical analysis will not answer the question of to provide them with benefits which matter to them.
whether animals have moral rights, practical consid- Only beings capable of sentience can be harmed or
erations may, nevertheless, incline us to say that they benefited in ways which matter to them, for only such
do. The most plausible alternative to the view that ani- beings can like or dislike what happened to them or
mals have moral rights is that, while they do not have prefer some conditions to others. Thus, sentient ani-
rights, we are, nevertheless, obligated not to be cruel mals, unlike mountains, rivers, or species, are at least
to them. Regan argues persuasively that the injunc- logically possible candidates for moral rights. This
tion to avoid being cruel to animals is inadequate to fact, together with the need to end current abuses
express our obligations towards animals, because it of animals-e.g., in scientific research ... provides a
focuses on the mental states of those who cause ani- plausible case for speaking of animal rights.
mal suffering, rather than on the harm done to the
animals themselves (p. IS8). Cruelty is inflicting pain
or suffering and either taking pleasure in that pain or CONCLUSION
suffering or being more or less indifferent to it. Thus, I have argued that Regan's case for ascribing strong
to express the demand for the decent treatment of ani- moral rights to all normal, mature mammals is unper-
mals in terms of the rejection of cruelty is to invite the suasive because (1) it rests upon the obscure concept
too easy response that those who subject animals to of inherent value, which is defined only in nega-
suffering are not being cruel because they regret the tive terms, and (2) it seems to preclude any plausible
suffering they cause but Sincerely believe that what answer to questions about the moral status of the vast
they do is justified. The injunction to avoid cruelty is majority of sentient animals ....
also inadequate in that it does not preclude the killing The weak animal rights theory asserts that (1) any
of animals-for any reason, however trivial-so long creature whose natural mode of life includes the pur-
as it is done relatively painlessly. suit of certain satisfactions has the right not to be
The inadequacy of the anti-cruelty view provides forced to exist without the opportunity to pursue
one practical reason for speaking of animal rights. those satisfactions; (2) that any creature which is
Another practical reason is that this is an age in which capable of pain, suffering, or frustration has the right
that such experiences not be deliberately inflicted 2. The capacity for sentience, like all of the mental capacities
upon it without some compelling reason; and (3) that mentioned in what follows, is a disposition. Dispositions do
no sentient being should be killed without good rea- not disappear whenever they are not currently manifested.
son. However, moral rights are not an all-or-nothing Thus, sleeping or temporarily unconscious persons or non-
affair. The strength of the reasons required to override human animals are still sentient in the relevant sense (Le.,
still capable of sentience), so long as they still have the
the rights of a non-human organism varies, depend-
neurological mechanisms necessary for the occurrence of
ing upon-among other things-the probability that
experiences.
it is sentient and (if it is clearly sentient) its probable
3. It is possible, perhaps probable, that some non-human
degree of mental sophistication.
animals-such as cetaceans and anthropoid apes-should
be regarded as persons. If so, then the weak animal rights
NOTES position holds that these animals have the same basic moral
1. Tom Regan, The Case for Al1imal Rigllts (Berkeley: Univer- rights as human persons.
sity of California Press, 1983). All page references are to this 4. Bonnie Steinbock, "Speciesism and the Idea of Equality,"
edition. Philosophy 53 (1978): 253.
The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research

CARL COHEN
Using animals as research subjects in medical inves- and so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully,
tigations is widely condemned on two grounds: first, therefore, we must know who holds the right, against
because it wrongly violates the rights of animals,} whom it is held, and to what it is a right.
and second, because it wrongly imposes on sentient Alternative sources of rights add complexity. Some
creatures much avoidable suffering. 2 Neither of these rights are grounded in constitution and law (e.g.,
arguments is sound. The first relies on a mistaken the right of an accused to trial by jury); some rights are
understanding of rights; the second relies on a mis- moral but give no legal claims (e.g., my right to your
taken calculation of consequences. Both deserve keeping the promise you gave me); and some rights
definitive dismissal. (e.g., against theft or assault) are rooted both in morals
and in law.
WHY ANIMALS HAVE NO RIGHTS The differing targets, contents, and sources of
rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a
A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential
tangled web. Notwithstanding all such complications,
claim, that one party may exercise against another.
this much is clear about rights in general: they are in
The target against whom such a claim may be regis-
every case claims, or potential claims, within a com-
tered can be a single person, a group, a community, or
munity of moral agents. Rights arise, and can be intel-
(perhaps) all humankind. The content of rights claims
ligibly defended, only among beings who actually do,
also varies greatly: repayment of loans, nondiscrimi-
or can, make moral claims against one another. What-
nation by employers, noninterference by the state,
ever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily
human; their possessors are persons, human beings.
Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical
Research," the New Euglaud /ollmal o( Medicine 315 (October 2, The attribut«:s of human beings from which this
1986): 865-70. Copyright ICI 1986 Massachusetts Medical Society. moral capability arises have been described vari-
Reprinted with permission from Massachusetts Medical Society. ously by philosophers, both ancient and modern: the
inner consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine3); because they are alive and have interests, also possess
the grasp, by human reason, of the binding charac- the "right to life" 10 is an abuse of that phrase, and
ter of moral law (Saint Thomas4); the self-conscious wholly without warrant.
participation of human beings in an objective ethi- It does not follow from thiS, however, that we
cal order (Hegel s); human membership in an organic are morally free to do anything we please to animals.
moral community (Bradley6); the development of the Certainly not. In our dealings with animals, as in our
human self through the consciousness of other moral dealings with other human beings, we have obliga-
selves (Mead 7); and the underivative, intuitive cogni- tions that do not arise from claims against us based
tion of the rightness of an action (Prichard8 ). Most on rights. Rights entail obligations, but many of the
influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the things one ought to do are in no way tied to another's
universal human possession of a uniquely moral will entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals
and the autonomy its use entails. 9 Humans confront of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose
choices that are purely moral; humans-but certainly that they are.
not dogs or mice-lay down moral laws, for others and Illustrations are helpful. Obligations may arise
for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, mor- from internal commitments made: physicians have
ally auto-nomous. obligations to their patients not grounded merely
Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordi- in their patients' rights. Teachers have such obliga-
nary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free tions to their students, shepherds to their dogs, and
moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable cowboys to their horses. Obligations may arise from
of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals differences of status: adults owe special care when
therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This playing with young children, and children owe spe-
is the core of the argument about the alleged rights of cial care when playing with young pets. Obligations
animals. The holders of rights must have the capac- may arise from special relationships: the payment
ity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all includ- of my son's college tuition is something to which he
ing themselves. In applying such rules, the holders may have no right, although it may be my obligation
of rights must recognize possible conflicts between to bear the burden if I reasonably can; my dog has no
what is in their own interest and what is just. Only right to daily exercise and veterinary care, but I do
in a community of beings capable of self-restricting have the obligation to provide these things for her.
moral judgments can the concept of a right be cor- Obligations may arise from particular acts or circum-
rectly invoked. stances: one may be obliged to another for a special
Humans have such moral capacities. They are in kindness done, or obliged to put an animal out of its
this sense self-legislative, are members of communities misery in view of its condition-although neither the
governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Ani- human benefactor nor the dying animal may have
mals do not have such moral capacities. They are not had a claim of right.
morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members of Plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans
a truly moral community, and therefore cannot pos- and to animals are manifold and cannot be formu-
sess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects, lated simply. Some hold that there is a general obli-
therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they gation to do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures
have none to violate. (the principle of nonmaleficence); some hold that
To animate life, even in its simplest forms, we there is a general obligation to do good to sentient
give a certain natural reverence. But the possession creatures when that is reasonably within ones power
of rights presupposes a moral status not attained by (the principle of beneficence). In our dealings with
the vast majority of living things. We must not infer, animals, few will deny that we are at least obliged to
therefore, that a live being has, simply in being alive, act humanely-that is, to treat them with the decency
a "right" to its life. The assertion that all animals, only and concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings,
to other sentient creatures. To treat animals humanely, families and those of monkeys, or between human
however, is not to treat them as humans or as the hold- communities and those of wolves, and the like, are
ers of rights. entirely beside the point. Patterns of conduct are
A common objection, which deserves a response, not at issue. Animals do indeed exhibit remarkable
may be paraphrased as follows: behavior at times. Conditioning, fear, instinct, and
If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, intelligence all contribute to species survival. Mem-
to grasp and apply moral laws, then many humans- bership in a community of moral agents nevertheless
the brain-damaged, the comatose, the senile-who remains impossible for them. Actors subject to moral
plainly lack those capacities must be without rights. judgment must be capable of grasping the generality
But that is absurd. This proves [the critic concludes] of an ethical premise in a practical syllogism. Humans
that rights do not depend on the presence of moral act immorally often enough, but only they-never
capacities. 1,10 wolves or monkeys-can discern, by applying some
This objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essen- moral rule to the facts of a case, that a given act ought
tial feature of humanity as though it were a screen for or ought not to be performed. The moral restraints
sorting humans. The capacity for moral judgment that imposed by humans on themselves are thus highly
distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be abstract and are often in conflict with the self-interest
administered to human beings one by one. Persons of the agent. Communal behavior among animals,
who are unable, because of some disability, to perform even when most intelligent and most endearing, does
the full moral functions natural to human beings are not approach autonomous morality in this funda-
mental sense.
certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral
community. The issue is one of kind. Humans are of Genuinely moral acts have an internal as well as
such a kind that they may be the subject of experi- an external dimension. Thus, in law, an act can be
ments only with their voluntary consent. The choices criminal only when the guilty deed, the actus reus,
they make freely must be respected. Animals are of is done with a guilty mind, mens rea. No animal can
such a kind that it is impossible for them, in princi- ever commit a crime; bringing animals to criminal
ple, to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make trial is the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of
a moral choice. What humans retain when disabled, moral right are Similarly inapplicable to them. Does a
animals have never had. lion have a right to eat a baby zebra? Does a baby zebra
A second objection, also often made, may be para- have a right not to be eaten? Such questions, mistak-
phrased as follows: enly invoking the concept of right where it does not
belong, do not make good sense. Those who condemn
Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans biomedical research because it violates "animal rights"
from the other animals. Animals also reason; ani- commit the same blunder.
mals also communicate with one another; animals
also care passionately for their young; animals also
exhibit deSires and preferences. nol2 Features of moral IN DEFENSE OF "SPECIESISM"
relevance-rationality, interdependence, and love-
are not exhibited uniquely by human beings. Therefore Abandoning reliance on animal rights, some critics
(this critic concludes], there can be no solid moral dis- resort instead to animal sentience-their feelings of
tinction between humans and other animals. IO pain and distress. We ought to desist from the imposi-
tion of pain insofar as we can. Since all or nearly all
This criticism misses the central paint. It is not experimentation on animals does impose pain and
the ability to communicate or to reason, or depen- could be readily forgone, say these critics, it should be
dence on one another, or care for the young, or the stopped. The ends sought may be worthy, but those
exhibition of preference, or any such behavior that ends do not justify imposing agonies on humans, and
marks the critical divide. Analogies between human by animals the agonies are felt no less. The laboratory
use of animals (these critics conclude) must therefore such differences has led to outright horror. The same
be ended-or at least very sharply curtailed. is true of the sexes, neither sex being entitled by right
Argument of this variety is essentially utilitarian, to greater respect or concern than the other. No dis-
often expressly S013; it is based on the calculation of pute here.
the net product, in pains and pleasures, resulting from Between species of animate life, however-
experiments on animals. Jeremy Bentham, comparing between (for example) humans on the one hand and
horses and dogs with other sentient creatures, is thus cats or rats on the other-the morally relevant differ-
commonly quoted: "The question is not, Can they rea- ences are enormous, and almost universally appreci-
son? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" 14 ated. Humans engage in moral reflection; humans
Animals certainly can suffer and surely ought are morally autonomous; humans are members of
not to be made to suffer needlessly. But in inferring, moral communities, recognizing just claims against
from these uncontroversial premises, that biomedical their own interest. Human beings do have rights;
research causing animal distress is largely (or wholly) theirs is a moral status very different from that of
wrong, the critic commits two serious errors. cats or rats.
The first error is the assumption, often explic- I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausi-
itly defended, that all sentient animals have equal ble: it is essential for right conduct, because those who
moral standing. Between a dog and a human being, will not make the morally relevant distinctions among
according to this view, there is no moral difference; species are almost certain, in consequence, to misap-
hence the pains suffered by dogs must be weighed prehend their true obligations. The analogy between
no differently from the pains suffered by humans. speciesism and racism is insidious. Every sensitive
To deny such equality, according to this critic, is to moral judgment requires that the differing natures of
give unjust preference to one species over another; the beings to whom obligations are owed be consid-
it is "speciesism." The most influential statement ered. If all forms of animate life-or vertebrate animal
of this moral equality of species was made by Peter life?-must be treated equally, and if therefore in eval-
Singer: uating a research program the pains of a rodent count
The racist violates the principle of equality by giving equally with the pains of a human, we are forced to
greater weight to the interests of members of his own conclude (1) that neither humans nor rodents possess
race when there is a clash between their interests and rights, or (2) that rodents possess all the rights that
the interests of those of another race. The sexist vio- humans possess. Both alternatives are absurd. Yet one
lates the principle of equality by favoring the interests or the other must be swallowed if the moral equality of
of his own sex. Similarly the speciesist allows the inter- all species is to be defended.
ests of his own species to override the greater interests Humans owe to other humans a degree of
of members of other species. The pattern is identical in moral regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some
each case. 2 humans take on the obligation to support and heal
This argument is worse than unsound; it is atro- others, both humans and animals, as a principal
cious. It draws an offensive moral conclusion from a duty in their lives; the fulfillment of that duty may
deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly require the sacrifice of many animals. If biomedical
specious. Racism has no rational ground whatever. investigators abandon the effective pursuit of their
Differing degrees of respect or concern for humans for professional objectives because they are convinced
no other reason than that they are members of differ- that they may not do to animals what the service
ent races is an injustice totally without foundation in of humans requires, they will fail, objectively, to do
the nature of the races themselves. Racists, even if act- their duty. RefUSing to recognize the moral differ-
ing on the basis of mistaken factual beliefs, do grave ences among species is a sure path to calamity. (The
moral wrong precisely because there is no morally rel- largest animal rights group in the country is People
evant distinction among the races. The supposition of for the Ethical Treatment of Animals; its codirector,
Ingrid Newkirk, calls research using animal subjects achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if
"fascism" and "supremacism." "Animal liberation- the decision is made now to desist from such research
ists do not separate out the human animal," she says, or to curtail it.
"so there is no rational basis for saying that a human Medical investigators are seldom insensitive to the
being has special rights. A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. distress their work may cause animal subjects. Oppo-
They're all mammals."IS) nents of research using animals are frequently insensi-
Those who claim to base their objection to the use tive to the cruelty of the results of the restrictions they
of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning would impose. 2 Untold numbers of human beings-
of the net pleasures and pains produced make a sec- real persons, although not now identifiable-would
ond error, equally grave. Even if it were true-as it is suffer grievously as the consequence of this well-
surely not-that the pains of all animate beings must meaning but shortsighted tenderness. If the morally
be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation relevant differences between humans and animals are
requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use, borne in mind, and if all relevant considerations are
and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. weighed, the calculation of long-term consequences
Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights must give overwhelming support for biomedical
may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research using animals.
research, rights being trump cards to which interest
and advantage must give way. But an argument that is
explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all CONCLUDING REMARKS
over the long run must attend also to the disadvanta- Substitution
geous consequences of not using animals in research, The humane treatment of animals requires that we
and to all the achievements attained and attainable desist from experimenting on them if we can accom-
only through their use. The sum of the benefits of plish the same result using alternative methods-in
their use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimi- vitro experimentation, computer simulation, or others.
nation of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, Critics of some experiments using animals rightly
the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the make this pOint.
improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and It would be a serious error to suppose, however,
for animals) achieved through research using animals that alternative techniques could soon be used in
is so incalculably great that the argument of these crit- most research now using live animal subjects. No
ics, systematically pursued, establishes not their con- other methods now on the horizon-or perhaps
clusion but its reverse: to refrain from using animals in ever to be available-can fully replace the testing of
biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally a drug, a procedure, or a vaccine, in live organisms.
wrong. The flood of new medical possibilities being opened
When balancing the pleasures and pains result- by the successes of recombinant DNA technology
ing from the use of animals in research, we must not will turn to a trickle if testing on live animals is for-
fail to place on the scales the terrible pains that would bidden. When initial trials entail great risks, there
have resulted, would be suffered now, and would long may be no forward movement whatever without the
continue had animals not been used. Every disease use of live animal subjects. In seeking knowledge that
eliminated, every vaccine developed, every method of may prove critical in later clinical applications, the
pain relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, unavailability of animals for inquiry may spell com-
every prosthetic device implanted-indeed, virtually plete stymie. In the United States, federal regulations
every modern medical therapy is due, in part or in require the testing of new drugs and other products
whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we on animals, for efficacy and safety, before human
ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable gains beings are exposed to them. 16 ,17 We would not want
in human (and animal) well-being that are probably it otherwise.
Every advance in medicine-every new drug, whereas access to appropriate animal subjects may
new operation, new therapy of any kind-must be awkward, costly, and burdened with red tape.
sooner or later be tried on a living being for the first Physician-investigators have often had more expe-
time. That trial, controlled or uncontrolled, will be rience working with human beings and know pre-
an experiment. The subject of that experiment, if it cisely where the needed pool of subjects is to be
is not an animal, will be a human being. Prohibit- found and how they may be enlisted. Animals, and
ing the use of live animals in biomedical research, the procedures for their use, are often less familiar to
therefore, or sharply restricting it, must result either these investigators. Moreover, the use of animals in
in the blockage of much valuable research or in the place of humans is now more likely to be the target
replacement of animal subjects with human sub- of zealous protests from without. The upshot is that
jects. These are the consequences-unacceptable to humans are sometimes subjected to risks that ani-
most reasonable persons-of not using animals in mals could have borne, and should have borne, in
research. their place. To maximize the protection of human
subjects, I conclude, the wide and imaginative use
Reduction of live animal subjects should be encouraged rather
Should we not at least reduce the use of animals in bio- than discouraged. This enlargement in the use of
medical research? No, we should increase it, to avoid animals is our obligation.
when feasible the use of humans as experimental sub-
jects. Medical investigations putting human subjects ConSistency
at some risk are numerous and greatly varied. The risks Finally, inconsistency between the profession and
run in such experiments are usually unavoidable, and the practice of many who oppose research using ani-
(thanks to earlier experiments on animals) most such mals deserves comment. This frankly ad hominem
risks are minimal or moderate. But some experimental observation aims chiefly to show that a coherent posi-
risks are substantial. tion rejecting the use of animals in medical research
When an experimental protocol that entails sub- imposes costs so high as to be intolerable even to the
stantial risk to humans comes before an institutional critics themselves.
review board, what response is appropriate? The inves- One cannot coherently object to the killing of ani-
tigation, we may suppose, is promising and deserves mals in biomedical investigations while continuing
support, so long as its human subjects are protected to eat them. Anesthetics and thoughtful animal hus-
against unnecessary dangers. May not the investiga- bandry render the level of actual animal distress in the
tors be fairly asked, Have you done all that you can to laboratory generally lower than that in the abattoir. So
eliminate risk to humans by the extensive testing of long as death and discomfort do not substantially dif-
that drug, that procedure, or that device on animals? fer in the two contexts, the consistent objector must
To achieve maximal safety for humans we are right to not only refrain from all eating of animals but also
require thorough experimentation on animal subjects protest as vehemently against others eating them as
before humans are involved. against others experimenting on them. No less vigor-
Opportunities to increase human safety in this ously must the critic object to the wearing of animal
way are commonly missed; trials in which risks hides in coats and shoes, to employment in any indus-
may be shifted from humans to animals are often trial enterprise that uses animal parts, and to any com-
not devised, sometimes not even considered. Why? mercial development that will cause death or distress
For the investigator, the use of animals as sub- to animals.
jects is often more expensive, in money and time, Killing animals to meet human needs for food,
than the use of human subjects. Access to suitable clothing, and shelter is judged entirely reasonable
human subjects is often quick and convenient, by most persons. The ubiquity of these uses and the
virtual universality of moral support for them con- must not assume the moral equality of all animate
front the opponent of research using animals with an species.
inescapable difficulty. How can the many common
uses of animals be judged morally worthy, while their
NOTES
use in scientific investigation is judged unworthy?
The number of animals used in research is but 1. Regan T. The case for animal rights. Berkeley, Calif.: Univer-
the tiniest fraction of the total used to satisfy assorted sity of California Press, 1983.
human appetites. That these appetites, often base 2. Singer P. Animal liberation. New York: Avon Books, 1977.
and satisfiable in other ways, morally justify the far 3. St. Augustine. Confessions. Book Seven, 397 A.D. New York:
larger consumption of animals, whereas the quest for Pocket-books, 1957: 104-26.
improved human health and understanding cannot 4. St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologica. 127, A.D. Philo-
justify the far smaller, is wholly implausible. Aside sophic texts. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960:353-66.
from the numbers of animals involved, the distinction 5. Hegel GWF. Philosophy of right. 1821. London: Oxford
in terms of worthiness of use, drawn with regard to University Press, 1952:105-10.
any single animal, is not defensible. A given sheep is 6. Bradley FH. Why should I be moral? 1876. In: Melden AI. ed.
surely not more justifiably used to put lamb chops on Ethical theories. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950:345-59.
the supermarket counter than to serve in testing a new
7. Mead GH. The genesis of the self and social control. 1925.
contraceptive or a new prosthetic device. The need- In: Reck Aj. ed. Selected writings. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
less killing of animals is wrong; if the common killing 1964:264-93.
of them for our food or convenience is right, the less
8. Prichard HA. Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake?
common but more humane uses of animals in the ser- 1912. In: Cellars W. Hospersj.eds. Readings in ethical theory.
vice of medical science are certainly not less right. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952:149-63.
Scrupulous vegetarianism, in matters of food,
9. Kant I. Fundamental principles of the metaphysic of mor-
clothing, shelter, commerce, and recreation, and in all als. 1785. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1949.
other spheres, is the only fully coherent position the
10. Rollin BE. Animal rights and human morality. New York:
critic may adopt. At great human cost, the lives of fish
Prometheus Books, 1981.
and crustaceans must also be protected, with equal
11. Hoff C. Immoral and moral uses of animals. N Engl j Med
vigor, if species ism has been forsworn. A very few
1980; 302:115-8.
consistent critics adopt this position. It is the reduc-
tio ad absurdum of the rejection of moral distinctions 12. jamieson D. Killing persons and other beings. In:
Miller HB. Williams WH, eds. Ethics and animals. Clifton,
between animals and human beings.
N.j.: Humana Press, 1983:135-46.
Opposition to the use of animals in research is based 13. Singer P. Ten years of animal liberation. New York Review
of Books, 1985: 31:46-52.
on arguments of two different kinds-those relying on
the alleged rights of animals and those relying on the 14. Bentham j. Introduction to the principles of morals and
legislation. London: Athlone Press, 1970.
consequences for animals. I have argued that argu-
ments of both kinds must fail. We surely do have obliga- 15. McCabe K. Who will live, who will die? Washingtonian
tions to animals, but they have, and can have, no rights Magazine, August 1986:115.
against us on which research can infringe. In calculating 16. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 21, Sect. 505(i).
the consequences of animal research, we must weigh Food, drug, and cosmetic regulations.
all the long-term benefits of the results achieved-to 17. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 16, Sect. 1500.40-2.
animals and to humans-and in that calculation we Consumer product regulations.
CHAPTER 13
Environmental Ethics
For most of its history, Western ethics has focused Does a dolphin have more moral value than a rat?
on the moral values, rights, and obligations of Or a rat more than a redwood? Or an individual
humans. The relevant questions have been, What mongoose more than its species? What obliga-
is the good for humans? What value should we tions, if any, do humans have to the natural world?
place on a human life or person? What obligations Should the interests of people take precedence
or duties do we have to our fellow humans? What over the interests or needs of the environment?
moral rights, if any, do humans have? In large part, Is it morally permissible, for example, to halt the
the rest of the planet seems to have been left out of construction of a dam that will bring prosperity
our moral equations. The nonhuman animals, the to thousands of poor people but will also destroy a
plants, the waters, the land-these have mattered, species of crayfish?
if at all, largely because they affect the well-being of Then there are the questions that arise from the
humankind. largest, most calamitous, most intractable environ-
But the planet is not what it used to be. The mental threat of all: climate change. It is the one
world's natural resources are being depleted. Human environmental problem that is entangled with all the
technology, culture, and avarice are devouring for- others, the one that humans are causing globally
ests and meadows, poisoning water and air, wip- while suffering from it locally. The science behind
ing out ecosystems and species-and threatening it, at least in broad outlines, is well understood:
the interests of the very beings who have wielded Greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (C 0 2)
so much technological and cultural power. Some absorb heat (infrared radiation) emitted from Earth's
observers predict doom. They say that humans have surface. Increases in the atmospheric concentra-
gone too far and that the world as we know it will tions of these gases cause Earth to warm by trapping
more of this heat. Human activities-especially the
end not with a bang or a whimper, but a gasp: a gasp
burning of fossil fuels since the start of the Indus-
for uncontaminated air, water, or food. But whether trial Revolution-have increased atmospheric C02
the situation is or is not this dire, the profound envi- concentrations by about 40%, with more than half
ronmental changes that humans have produced on the increase occurring since 1970. Since 1900, the
earth have inspired many to see the proper purview global average surface temperature has increased
of ethics as encompassing not just humans but the by about O.soC (l.4°F). This has been accompanied
whole natural world. Consequently a new set of by warming of the ocean, a rise in sea level, a strong
decline in Arctic sea ice, and many other associ-
ethical questions is demanding our attention: Is the
ated climate effects. Much of this warming has
environment valuable in its own right, regardless occurred in the last four decades. Detailed analyses
of its usefulness for people? Do animals or plants have shown that the warming during this period
have moral rights? Are they somehow intrinsically is mainly a result of the increased concentrations
valuable? If they are intrinsically valuable or wor- of C02 and other greenhouse gases. Continued
thy of moral consideration, what makes them so? emissions of these gases will cause further climate
382
CHAPTER 13: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 0 383
change, including substantial increases in global As you would expect, serious disputes about
average surface temperature and important changes environmental issues involve both the nonmoral
in regional climate.)
and the moral-nonmoral facts (often scientific or
Scientists say the worldwide consequences of technical) and moral principles or judgments. More
this process are alarming and ominous: a global often than not, there is substantial agreement on
rise in sea level, ocean warming, the retreat of gla- the former but serious divergence on the latter. All
ciers everywhere, severe droughts, coastal flooding, parties may agree, for instance, that building a road
the receding of Arctic ice, increased acidity in the through a forest would help a struggling town pros-
oceans, frequent heat waves, heavy rainfalls, and per and that the project would wipe out a rare spe-
increased species extinction. cies of butterfly, but the debate rages over whether
Given this runaway train of global warming, the prosperity is more valuable than the butterfly.
moral questions hit home hard: What is an indi- Moral arguments in environmental ethics de-
vidual morally obligated to do about it? What are pend heavily on notions of value and moral status.
countries duty-bound to do about it? Should we The distinction between instrumental and intrinsic
do something even if our efforts cause widespread value is especially important. Recall that something
economic hardship, loss of jobs, social upheaval, with instrumental (or extrinsic) value is valuable as
and the demise of whole industries? Should we do a means to something else; something with intrin-
something now even though the only people who sic value is valuable in itself, for its own sake. For
will benefit from our sacrifices will be future genera- many people, nature possesses instrumental value
tions? What, after all, do we owe the future? Do we (some think it has instrumental value only). They
have a moral obligation notto act in ways that might may therefore believe that a forest has value because
contribute, even slightly, to global warming? For of its economic worth, because it provides the raw
example, are we obligated not to drive a gas guzzler, materials for making houses, furniture, and paper.
use an inefficient heating system, run the air condi- Or because it helps make the environment livable
tioner nonstop, avoid recycling, or waste water? for humans by cleaning the air as it absorbs carbon
Trying to answer such questions through criti- diOXide and releases oxygen. Or because it adds to
cal reasoning is the main business of environmental the quality of human life simply by being beauti-
ethics, a branch of applied ethics. Let us explore ful, inspiring, or impressive. Or because it provides
how these questions arise, determine whether tra- a home to many animal and plant species that are
ditional moral theories can shed any light on them, themselves instrumentally valuable to humans. In
and evaluate arguments that are frequently used to all these cases, the value of the forest is measured
address important environmental issues. by its positive effects on human well-being. The for-
est is good because it is good for human beings. On
ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND the other hand, for many other people, nature has
intrinsic value-it is valuable regardless of its use-
Environmental issues can emerge from a variety fulness to humanity. (Keep in mind that nature or
of real-world challenges besides climate change: objects in nature can have both instrumental and
endangered species, pollution, wilderness preser- intrinsic value.) So they might say that the forest
vation, treatment of animals, ecosystem protec- should be cherished for what it is, for its own sake,
tion, waste disposal, global population, resource regardless of whether it can contribute to the wel-
allocation, energy use, economics, food produc- fare or happiness of humankind. The forest has
tion, world hunger, social justice, and the welfare intrinsic value because of its aesthetic qualities,
of future generations. its organizational complexity, its status as a living
thing, or some other value-granting property. Even any individual of a species? As we will soon see,
without utility, it can have great intrinsic worth. many people, on various grounds, give priority to
Many debates in environmental ethics revolve one or more species over others, some think all
around the concept of moral status, or moral consid- living things equal, and some rank species over
erability. As we saw in the previous chapter, some- individuals.
thing has moral status if it is a suitable candidate In light of these considerations, we should not
for moral concern or respect in its own right. Every- be surprised that a central question in environmen-
one agrees that humans have moral status; many tal ethics is, What entities have moral status and to
believe that nonhuman animals also have moral what degree do they have it? The answer that has
status; some insist that all living things have moral been assumed in the Western world for much of
status (including plants and even one-celled crea- its history is known as anthropocentrism, the
tures); some think that the natural environment notion that only humans have moral standing.
generally-mountains, oceans, rivers, and all- By anthropocentric (human-centered) lights, the
has moral status; and a few believe Planet Earth rest of nature has only instrumental value-that
as a whole has moral status. A fundamental issue is, nonhuman animals, plants, mountains, and
in environmental ethics is precisely what sorts of streams have value only because they are valuable
entities have moral status-and why. in some way to humans. An anthropocentrist
Many things can have instrumental or intrinsic sees animals, plants, and ecosystems as means to
value yet have no moral status-that is, they may enhance the well-being of humankind, to serve the
not deserve our direct moral concern. A bicycle can ends of human beings. This stance, however, does
have instrumental value as a mode of transporta- not imply a disregard for the environment. He may
tion, but it is not the kind of thing that can have be genuinely concerned about the destruction of
moral status. Michelangelo's magnificent sculp- rain forests, the extinction of species, river and lake
ture David is generally thought to have intrinsic pollution, the destruction of wetlands, animal cru-
aesthetic value, but few philosophers would think elty, and global warming-but only because these
that it has moral status. Some theorists draw such calamities might lead to a less livable environment
a distinction as follows: "We can have obligations for humans, or their loss of enjoyable aesthetic or
regarding a painting, but not to a painting. We ought spiritual experiences of nature, or their feelings of
to treat beautiful paintings with respect, but not distress at the thought of animal suffering, or dra-
because we have obligations to the paintings. We matic climate changes that could endanger human
ought to respect them because they are beautiful lives. On what groundS should humans be granted
(or because their owners have rights), not because this exclusive moral status? The traditional justifi-
they have rights. 712 cation has been along Kantian lines: that humans
Often the question at issue in environmen- are moral agents or persons-they are capable of
tal debates is not whether something has moral making free, rational moral choices.
status, but whether it has greater or lesser moral Another influential answer to our question is
status than something else. Does an ape have the what could be called zoocentrism, the notion that
same moral status as a domestic cow? Do animals animals-both human and nonhuman-have moral
(human and nonhuman) deserve the same level of status. As we saw in the previous chapter, advocates
moral concern as plants? Do humans and nonhu- for animal rights, notably the philosophers Peter
man animals have the same moral status? Is a cat Singer and Tom Regan, take this view, insisting
as morally important as a cabbage? Does a species that human and nonhuman animals are equally
have a stronger claim on our moral concern than deserving of moral considerability or respect. Singer
-
~
"~ Climate Change: How We I(now It's Real
If global warming and climate change are actu- Space Studies, Britain's Hadley Centre for Climate
ally happening (and have been happening), then Change, the Japan Meteorological Agency, and
humans are faced with a dreadful moral decision: NOAA's National Climatic Data Center have used
to take action now to help save the future, or to these raw measurements to produce records of
do nothing and suffer through an uncertain pres- long-term global surface temperature change.
These groups work carefully to make sure the
ent. But deciding rationally requires knowing the
data aren't skewed by such things as changes in
facts-knowing whether climate change is real.
the instruments taking the measurements or by
Ninety-seven percent of all climate scientists and other factors that affect local temperature, such
most of the world's leading scientific organizations as additional heat that has come from the gradual
affirm that it is. But how do they know this? Here's growth of cities.
the answer from NASA, one of the world's leading
These analyses all show that Earth's average
climate research agencies. surface temperature has increased by more than
The overwhelming majority of climate scientists 1.4°F (O.8°C) over the past 100 years, with much of
agree that human activities, especially the burn- this increase taking place over the past 35 years.
ing of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), are responsi- A temperature change of 1.4°F may not seem like
ble for most of the climate change currently being much if you're thinking about a daily or seasonal
observed. fluctuation, but it is a significant change when
But how has this conclusion been reached? you think about a permanent increase averaged
Climate science, like all science, is a process of across the entire planet ....
collective learning that relies on the careful gath-
ering and analyses of data, the formulation of How do we know that greenhouse gases lead to
hypotheses, the development of models to study warming?
key processes and make testable predictions, and
the combined use of observations and models to As early as the 1820s, scientists began to appreci-
test scientific understanding. Scientific knowl- ate the importance of certain gases in regulating
edge builds over time as new observations and the temperature of the Earth. Greenhouse gases-
data become available .... In the case of climate which include carbon dioxide (C02), methane,
change, scientists have understood for more than nitrous oxide, and water vapor-act like a blan-
a century that emissions from the burning of fossil ket in the atmosphere, keeping heat in the lower
fuels could lead to increases in the Earth's average atmosphere. Although greenhouse gases com-
surface temperature. Decades of research have prise only a tiny fraction of Earth's atmosphere,
confirmed and extended this understanding. they are critical for keeping the planet warm
enough to support life as we know it.
How do we know that Earth has warmed? Here's how the "greenhouse effect" works: as
the Sun's energy hits Earth, some of it is reflected
Scientists have been taking widespread measure- back to space, but most of it is absorbed by the
ments of Earth's surface temperature since around land and oceans. This absorbed energy is then
1880. These data have steadily improved and, radiated upward from Earth's surface in the form
today, temperatures are recorded by thermom- of heat. In the absence of greenhouse gases, this
eters at many thousands of locations, both on heat would Simply escape to space, and the plan-
the land and over the oceans. Different research et's average surface temperature would be well
groups, including the NASA Goddard Institute for below freezing. But greenhouse gases absorb and
(continued)
"~
--
~
redirect some of this energy downward, keeping by the burning of fossil fuels, the raising of live-
heat near Earth's surface. As concentrations of stock, the decay of landfill wastes, the production
heat-trapping greenhouse gases increase in the and transport of natural gas, and other activities,
atmosphere, Earth's natural greenhouse effect increased sharply through the 1980s before start-
is enhanced (like a thicker blanket), causing sur- ing to level off at about two-and-a-half times its
face temperatures to rise. Reducing the levels of preindustrial level. Nitrous oxide has increased
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would cause by roughly 15% since 1750, mainly as a result of
a decrease in surface temperatures. agricultural fertilizer use, but also from fossil fuel
burning and certain industrial processes. Certain
How do we know that humans are causing industrial chemicals, such as chlorofluorocarbons
greenhouse gas concentrations to increase? (CFCs), act as potent greenhouse gases and are
long-lived in the atmosphere. Because CFCs do not
[O]nce humans began digging up long-buried have natural sources, their increases can be attrib-
forms of carbon such as coal and oil and burn- uted unambiguously to human activities....
ing them for energy, additional CO 2 began to be In addition to direct measurements of C02
released into the atmosphere much more rapidly concentrations in the atmosphere, scientists have
than in the natural carbon cycle. Other human amassed detailed records of how much coal, oil,
activities, such as cement production and cutting and natural gas is burned each year. They also esti-
down and burning of forests (deforestation), also mate how much C02 is being absorbed, on aver-
add CO 2 to the atmosphere .... age, by the oceans and the land surface. These
To determine how CO 2 concentrations var- analyses show that about 45% of the C02 emitted
ied prior to such modern measurements, scien- by human activities remains in the atmosphere.
tists have studied the composition of air bubbles Just as a sink will fill up if water is entering it
trapped in ice cores extracted from Greenland faster than it can drain, human production of CO2
and Antarctica. These data show that, for at least is outstripping Earth's natural ability to remove it
2,000 years before the Industrial Revolution, from the air. As a result, atmospheric C02 levels
atmospheric CO 2 concentrations were steady and are increasing and will remain elevated for many
then began to rise sharply beginning in the late centuries. Furthermore, a forensic-style analysis of
1800s. Today, atmospheric C02 concentrations the C02 in the atmosphere reveals the chemical
exceed 390 parts per million-nearly 40% higher "fingerprint" of carbon from fossil fuels. Together,
than preindustrial levels, and, according to ice these lines of evidence prove conclusively that the
core data, higher than at any point in the past elevated CO 2 concentration in the atmosphere is
800,000 years. the result of human activities. *
Human activities have increased the atmo-
*NASA Science, Climate Change: How Do We Know?,
spheric concentrations of other important green-
January 2, 2018, https:llc1imate.nasa.gov/evidencel.
house gases as well. Methane, which is produced
contends that moral status is justified for nonhu- however, object to this kind of animal egalitarianism,
man animals when they, like humans, possess the affirming that all sentient animals do have moral sta-
psychological property of sentience. Sentient non- tus but that humans have greater moral considerabil-
human animals can experience pain and pleasure, ity than nonhuman animals.
just as humans can; therefore, he says, they are enti- Some theorists want to expand the sphere of
tled to the same level of moral respect. Some critics, moral status to include more than just animals.
They hold to biocentrism, or life-centered eth- considering our moral obligations to the environ-
ics, the view that all living entities have moral ment, the good of the whole will always outweigh
status, whether sentient or not. People, cats, trees, the good of an individual. An elk, for example,
weeds, algae, amoebas, germs-all these are worthy may be killed to preserve a species of plant or to
of some sort of moral concern simply because they ensure the health of its ecosystem. As one theorist
are alive. This moral concern, many biocentrists expressed it, "A thing is right when it tends to pre-
say, is justified by the teleological nature of liv- serve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
ing things (telos is Greek for "goal"). Living things community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.,,3
are goal-directed, striving consciously or uncon- What properties might confer moral considerabil-
sciously toward some good. They therefore have ity on the biotic community or an ecosystem? A
moral status. But biocentrists differ on how much holist might say that such an environmental whole
respect to grant living things. Some assert that all deserves our respect because it is a unity of beauti-
living things have equal moral status: exactly the fully integrated parts, or it is a self-regulating sys-
same moral considerability is accorded to human tem, or its destruction would diminish the world's
beings, dogs, redwood trees, and amoebas. These genetic possibilities.
biocentrists are therefore species egalitarians.
Other biocentrists, species nonegalitarians,
MORAL THEORIES
think that not all living beings are created equal-
some have more moral worth than others. A none- On environmental issues, some traditional moral
galitarian might argue that a human deserves more theories have been strongly anthropocentric. Kant's
respect than an elk, an elk more than a rat, and a rat theory is a good example, mandating duties to
more than a cactus. people because they are ends in themselves but
In either form, biocentrism implies that in our establishing no direct duties to animals. For Kant,
moral deliberations we cannot ignore how our animals have instrumental value only. As he puts
actions might affect both sentient and non sentient it, "Animals ... are there merely as means to an
living beings, as some forms of anthropocentrism end. That end is man.,,4 Thomas Aquinas, author
might have us do. If we want to build a shopping of the most famous version of natural law theory,
mall on wetlands, we must consider all the plants also thinks animals are tools to be employed at the
and animals that the project would destroy-and discretion of humans. In addition, the Bible has
judge whether their deaths would outweigh any seemed to many to suggest an anthropocentric
benefits that the mall would provide to humans attitude toward nature, commanding that humans
and other living things. "subdue" the earth and "have dominion over the
In both zoocentrism and biocentrism, the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over
fundamental unit of moral consideration is the every living thing that moves upon the earth"
individual-the individual animal or plant. Only (Genesis 1:28). But traditional theories can also
individuals have moral status. This perspective, be-and have been-construed in various ways to
then, is individualistic, its advocates being called support nonanthropocentric approaches to envi-
ecological individualists. In contrast, some ronmental ethics.
theorists say that the proper focus of moral concern As we have seen, some theorists adopt a non-
is not the individual but the entire biosphere and consequentialist or Kantian perspective on nature.
its ecosystems-what has been called the "biotic They reject instrumentalist views in favor of the
community." This view, then, is holistic; its propo- notion that the environment or its constituents
nents are ecological holists. It implies that in have intrinsic value, just as persons are thought to
-
~
"~
Ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, is a move-
Ecofeminism
problematic dualisms such as human/animal,

ment embodying numerous related philosophical male/female, reason/emotion; in each case the
perspectives that seek to understand and critique latter is considered inferior and peripheral to the
how both women and nature are treated by male- former. Karen Warren has argued that these value
centered society. It occupies a major chapter in the dualisms are then added to a "Iogic of domina-
tion" whereby (supposed) superiority is taken
history of environmental ethics:
to justify subordination. Thus, according to such
The origins of ecological feminism can be traced a patriarchal conceptual framework, women,
back to the mid-1970s, with the term "eco- animals, and nature ought to be controlled and
feminism" being coined in 1975 by Fran~oise dominated ....
d'Eaubonne in her Le Feminisme ou la Mort
Another important connection concerns the
("Feminism or Death"). This book, along with
differing impacts of environmental degradation
Rosemary Radford Ruether's New Woman /
upon men and women. Ecofeminists have argued
New Earth (1975), can plausibly be seen as initial
that women and children often bear the worst
roots for this rich and wide-ranging movement.
impacts of environmental harms-in the effects
Still, ecofeminism fully came into its own during
of pollution, in having to work harder to main-
the mid to late 1980s with the publication
tain a subsistence livelihood, and so on. Further-
of several articles, books, and special editions
more, Western development policies have often
of journals.
adversely affected those in developing nations,
Karen J. Warren characterizes ecofeminist phi- again particularly women and children. Some
losophy as embracing "the view that there are ecofeminists have also argued that women, due
important connections between the domination to their life experiences and circumstances, may
of women (and other human subordinates) and be more in tune with the natural world than men
the domination of nature and that a failure to and thus both feel and understand the health or
recognize these connections results in inadequate degradation of the land more keenly than men. *
feminisms, environmentalism, and environmental
philosophy." A central focus of much ecofeminist
* Jason Kawall, "A History of Environmental Ethics,"
philosophical thought has thus been to discover
in The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics,
and elaborate these connections and to consider
pp. 20-21. ed. Stephen M. Gardiner and Allen
their implications.
Thompson. Copyright © Oxford University Press 2017.
Ecofeminists have argued that Western societ- Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through
ies have tended to embrace a series of related, PLSciear.
be intrinsically valuable. Probably the most overtly as human well-being, is something to be realized
Kantian theorist is the philosopher Paul Taylor, a as an end in itself"S Some zoo centrists also have a
biocentrist who argues that "it is the good (well- Kantian bent. For example, Tom Regan argues that
being, welfare) of individual organisms, considered sentient animals, human and nonhuman, possess
as entities having inherent worth, that determines equal intrinsic worth and therefore have an equal
our moral relations with the Earth's wild commu- moral right not to be treated as mere things. 6 In
nities of life" and that "[their] well-being, as well this account, just as there are certain things that we
farming in which animals suffer greatly before

QUICI< REVIEW
being slaughtered is wrong. But it also seems to
suggest that if the animals could be raised without
anthropocentrism-The notion that only humans such suffering, factory farming may be morally per-
have moral status. missible, even if they are killed in the end.
zoocentrism-The notion that both human and Our moral obligations regarding climate change
nonhuman animals have moral status. can be derived from any of the moral theories just
biocentrism-The view that all living entities mentioned. A nonconsequentialist, for example,
have moral status, whether sentient or not. might argue that we have a duty to protect or save
the earth because the planet as a whole has intrin-
species egalitarian-One who believes that all
sic value. A utilitarian could make a strong case that
living things have equal moral status.
we should try to reverse climate change because the
species nonegalitarian-One who believes that consequences of not doing so would be apocalyptic.
some living things have greater moral status
than others.
MORAL ARGUMENTS
ecological individualist-One who believes that
the fundamental unit of moral consideration in Serious environmental issues and the arguments
environmental ethics is the individual. that surround them are numerous, varied, and com-
ecological holist-One who believes that the plex, so for the purposes of evaluation, let us focus
fundamental unit of moral consideration in on arguments pertaining to the one question that
environmental ethics is the biosphere and its has concerned us most throughout this chapter:
ecosystems. When, if ever, do environmental entities or beings have
moral status? As we have seen, environmental phi-
losophers and other thinkers have argued for and
against different kinds of entities having moral con-
should not do to humans regardless of the result- siderability and for and against various justifications
ing utilitarian benefits, so there are ways of treating for that status. The entities thought to be worthy of
nonhuman animals that are wrong regardless of such moral concern include human beings exclu-
the advantages to humans. According to Regan, the sively (anthropocentrism), human and nonhuman
result of applying this outlook to the treatment of animals (zoocentrism), living things (biocentrism),
animals would be the eradication of factory farm- and collections or systems of living things such
ing, animal experimentation, and hunting. as species or ecosystems (ecological holism). The
Utilitarianism has also been put to use in properties that are supposed to validate their claim
defense of nonhuman animals. Following the lead to moral worth range across a broad spectrum of
of the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, utilitarian- possibilities-from moral agency or sentience to
ism's founder, Peter Singer maintains that in calcu- complexity to self-regulation to beauty.
lating which action will produce the greatest overall To begin, let us examine a simple argument con-
satisfaction of interests (for example, an interest in taining a premise that offers a common answer to
avoiding pain), we must include the interests of our question-the answer that entities in the envi-
all sentient creatures and give their interests equal ronment have moral status because they are natural
weight. The pain suffered by a human is no more (lacking human interference or contrivance).
important than that experienced by a nonhuman 1. All natural entities have moral status (intrinsic
animal. This view seems to imply that any factory value or rights, for example).
"~
--
~
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Should Pandas Pay the Price?
Some of the most controversial disputes in environ- smaller ones, increasing the risk of degeneration
mental ethics involve conflicts between concern for of the species....
endangered species and the economic needs and Wang estimated that the annual cost to pro-
demands of humans. Here is just one of many tect one wild panda exceeds 5 million yuan
examples: (US$617,000). *
(China Daily)-The more than 100 wild giant pan- Which should be given more moral weight-the
das in Northwest China's Gansu Province are now people or the pandas? What are your reasons for
stepping onto the verge of extinction because of preferring one over the other? If you agree that
a decline in their ability to reproduce, according we should try to save endangered species like
to Xinhua reports.
the panda, how much should we be willing to
Researchers from the Gansu Baishuijiang Giant pay to do so? Is $617,000 per panda an accept-
Panda Nature Reserve said the giant pandas in the able price? How about $1 million? Suppose saving
province now live in five separate habitats, mak- one panda would put one thousand people out
ing mating among the groups almost impossible.
of a job, forcing scores of families into poverty.
According to basic principles of genetics and the Would saving the pandas be worth that cost?
pandas' reproduction habits, a group of less than Why or why not? What moral principle would
50 giant pandas are predicted to become extinct you devise to help you answer these questions
at some point as a result of a weakening repro-
(and similar questions regarding any endangered
ductive ability caused by inbreeding.
species)?
Wang Hao, a giant panda expert of Peking Uni-
versity, said the fragmentation of wild pandas' *Guo Nei, reprinted with permission of SydiGate
habitats had become the biggest threat to the Media Inc. from "Road Construction Segregates Giant
survival of the species. Pandas' Habitats in Gansu," China Daily, December 5,
Wang said that the construction of highways 2006; permission conveyed through Copyright Clear-
is cutting large panda habitats into smaller and ance Center, Inc.
2. Old-growth forests are natural entities. One reason that could be put forth is that Prem-
3. Therefore, old-growth forests have moral status. ise 1 is supported by our moral intuitions (our con-
sidered moral judgments, for example). To test this
We can see right away that this is a valid idea, mull over this thought experiment:
argument, but-as is so often the case in moral
Imagine that a certain mine requires the destruc-
arguments-the moral premise (Premise 1) is not
tion of a group of trees on a rocky outcrop and of
obviously true (though the other premise definitely the outcrop itself. Environmentalists protest that
is). What reasons might someone give to support such destruction involves an uncompensated loss
the statement that objects in nature deserve our of value. The mining company promises to recon-
respect just because their properties are due solely struct the outcrop from synthetic parts and to
to natural processes? replace the trees with plastic models. This bit of
artificial environment will be indistinguishable, of natural erosion, the falls deteriorate over time
except by laboratory analysis, from what was origi- and-without human intervention-would suffer
nally there. It will be exactly as appealing to look at,
so much damage that they would no longer look
no animals will be harmed as a consequence, and
no ecosystem will be disrupted. 7 much like the falls people have come to expect.
Through reconstruction and control of water flow,
What, if anything, would be wrong with replac- engineers have saved Niagara Falls, a now largely
ing these natural entities with synthetic ones? artificial phenomenon that people would almost
A few trees would be destroyed, and thus there is a certainly prefer over the natural but less impressive
loss of living things, but let us mentally discount version. 10
the loss. Would this substitution of nonnatural Let us now consider a "higher-level" sort of
for natural make a moral difference? Would the argument, one that tries to establish the truth of a
mining company be guilty of wrongdoing? If this particular environmental theory, in this case bio-
scenario suggests to us that the property of natu- centric egalitarianism. Recall that this doctrine
ralness does confer some kind of moral standing asserts that all living things possess equal moral
on objects, then perhaps our moral intuitions do status-no being is superior to any other in moral
support Premise 1. considerability. Humans, then, are not entitled to
The obvious move for a critic is to assert that more respect than apes or redwoods or elk. Here
it is not at all clear whether moral intuitions offer is how the philosopher Paul Taylor argues for this
such support. Perhaps we are merely confused, position: 11
actually worrying not about unnaturalness but 1. Humans are members of earth's community of
about harm to ecosystems or extermination of life in exactly the same way that all other living
wildlife. s things are members.
A defender of Premise 1 could try another tack.
2. Human beings and all other living things con-
She could attempt to take our moral intuitions in a
stitute a dynamic system of interlinked and
different direction, declaring that just as fake works
interdependent parts.
of art seem to have less value for us than the origi-
nals, so synthetic objects in the environment have 3. Each living thing is a "teleological center of life,
less intrinsic value than their natural counterparts purSuing its own good in its own way."
or originals. We simply do not appreciate replicas of 4. Human beings are not superior to other species.
fine sculptures as much as we do the originals, and 5. Therefore, all living things have equal moral
we do not respect artificial trees as much as we do status.
natural ones. The property of being natural, then, This argument is complex and deserves far more
appears to confer some value on objects-and thus close analYSis than we can provide here. But we can
some level of moral standing. 9 home in on a few interesting elements.
A detractor could cast doubt on this line by ConSider Premise 4. At the outset, note that
pointing out that there seem to be instances the argument is not valid: the conclusion does
in which we do in fact value the artificial more not follow from the first four premises. Taylor
than the natural. For example, Niagara Falls on acknowledges this fact but suggests that if we accept
the American side of the border with Canada is Premises 1-4, then it would at least be more reason-
undeniably beautiful and majestic, exemplifying able than not to accept the conclusion. He says the
the ideal waterfall in its natural state. But oddly same thing about Premise 4: if we accept Premises
enough, the majestic, "natural" state of the falls 1-3, it would not be unreasonable to accept the
is largely a product of human ingenuity. Because fourth premise. But some argue that Premise 4 does
----
~
"~The carbon footprint has become an important

Carbon Footprints
Carbon calculators usually start by asking for your

measure of how much people-individuals, organi- location. Regardless of your personal consumption,
zations, and countries-are contributing to global your carbon footprint is partly determined by the
warming. Here's a clear explanation of what it is state you live in. Some states rely more on dirtier
and what factors can increase or decrease it. sources of power like coal; others use larger per-
centages of renewable sources that produce less CO2 •
Carbon footprints measure how much carbon
dioxide (C0 2) we produce just by going about our Most calculators also ask for the size of your
daily lives. A drive to work, a flip of a light switch household. The calculator can then differentiate
and a flight out of town all rely on the combustion between your personal carbon footprint and that
of the house as a whole ....
of fossil fuels like oil, coal and gas. When fossil
fuels burn, they emit greenhouse gases like CO2 Carbon footprints also include the C02 produced
that contribute to global warming. Ninety-eight by transportation. Most people don't know their
percent of atmospheric CO 2 comes from the com- annual fuel usage, so calculators usually ask for
bustion of fossil fuels. an estimated annual mileage and the car's make,
People concerned with the environment and model and year. The calculator divides mileage
by the car's fuel efficiency to determine annual
global warming usually try to reduce their carbon
output by increasing their home's energy effi- fuel usage. This figure is then multiplied by the
ciency and driving less. Some start by calculating emissions factor of gasoline or diesel fuel, which
their carbon footprint to set a benchmark-like a converts it to pounds of CO 2 •
weigh-in before a diet. A carbon footprint is simply For air travel, some carbon calculators ask for
a figure-usually a monthly or annual total of CO 2 an annual estimate of mileage. Other calculators
output measured in tons. Web sites with carbon account for increased emissions during takeoff
calculators turn easy-to-supply information like and ask for the number of short, medium, long or
annual mileage and monthly power usage into a extended flights.
measurable tonnage of carbon. Most people try After compiling all the figures, the calculator
to reduce their carbon footprint, but others aim produces a total CO2 output in tons-a carbon foot-
to erase it completely. When people attempt car- print. Some calculators even put footprints in con-
bon neutrality, they cut their emissions as much as text by comparing them with the national or global
possible and offset the rest. Carbon offsets let
averages. If you have the data ready, the whole
you pay to reduce the global greenhouse gas process takes the calculator about 30 seconds. *
total instead of making radical reductions of
your own. When you buy an offset, you fund
projects that reduce emissions by restoring *Sarah Dowdey, "How Carbon Footprints Work."
forests, updating power plants and factories or From HowStuffWorks.com, August 16, 2007. © 2007
increasing the energy efficiency of buildings and HowStuffWorks.com. All rights reserved. Used under
transportation .... license.
not follow from Premises 1-3. More to the point, it their own good, we are not necessarily being unrea-
could be argued that even if we accept that humans sonable if we then reject the idea that humans are
are part of an interdependent community of life in on a par with all other species. Even if Premises 1-3
which all members are teleological centers pursuing are true, we are not obliged to accept Premise 4.
Some philosophers have argued directly against something with intrinsic value is valuable in itself. An
Taylor's conclusion (Statement 5) by drawing out entity has moral status if it is a suitable candidate for
its implications. If all species are morally equal, moral concern or respect in its own right.
what would that imply about how we treat various Several positions have been staked out regarding
species? One critic gives this answer: the proper attitude of humans toward nature. Anthro-
pocentrism is the view that only humans have moral
What seems far more problematic for species egali- standing; zoocentrism, that animals do; and biocen-
tarianism is that it seems to suggest that it makes no trism, that all living things do. Species egalitarians
difference what we kill. Vegetarians typically think
believe that all living things have equal moral status;
it worse to kill a cow than to kill a carrot. Are they
wrong? Yes they are, according to species egalitari- species nonegalitarians, that they do not. Ecological
anism. In this respect, species egalitarianism can- individualists think that only individuals have moral
not be right. I believe we have reason to respect status; ecological holists, that only the biosphere and
nature. But we fail to give nature due respect if we its ecosystems do.
say we should have no more respect for a cow than Some theorists have adopted a Kantian perspective
for a potato. 12 on the environment. Paul Taylor insists that organ-
isms have inherent worth and should not be treated
This counterargument is, of course, another merely as means to ends. Tom Regan asserts that sen-
appeal to our moral intuitions. We are asked to tient beings possess equal intrinsic worth and should
reflect on whether it would be morally permis- not be considered mere things. A utilitarian stance is
sible to treat a cow as if it had the same moral sta- also POSSible, as Peter Singer has demonstrated in his
tus as a potato. If they do deserve the same level pOSition on animal rights.
of respect, then if we must kill one of them, we
should not care which. They are moral equals.
But if we think that it does matter which one I(EY TERMS
we kill, we have reason to reject the notion that anthropocentrism (p. 384)
they are moral equals-and thus deny biocentric zoocentrism (p. 384)
egalitarianism. biocentrism (p. 387)
species egalitarian (p. 387)
species nonegalitarian (p. 387)
ecological individualist (p. 387)
ecological holist (p. 387)
CHAPTER REVIEW
EXERCISES
SUMMARY Review Qllestions
Environmental ethics, a branch of applied ethics, 1. What is moral status? (p. 384)
explores questions about the value of nature and its 2. What is anthropocentrism? (p. 384)
constituents, the relationship between the environ- 3. Define zoocentrism and biocentrism. (pp. 384,
ment and humans, and the moral obligations that 387)
humans have toward the environment. Logical argu- 4. What is a species egalitarian? (p. 387)
ments in the field rely on several key concepts, includ- S. What is the difference between instrumental
ing instrumental value, intrinsic value, and moral and intrinsic value? (p. 383)
status or considerability. Something with instrumen- 6. On what grounds might someone believe that
tal value is valuable as a means to something else; nature has intrinsic value? (p. 383)
(.,I:,~
7. What is the difference between species 2002 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford
egalitarianism and species nonegalitarianism? .edu/archives/sum2002/ en tries / ethics-environmental
(p.387) / (March 1, 2015).
8. What is an ecological holist? An ecological J. Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental
individualist? (p. 387) Ethic," in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory
9. What was Kant's attitude toward animals? Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Tom Regan, 2nd ed.
(New York: Random House, 1986).
(p.387)
Andrew Dessler, Introduction to Climate Change (Cam-
10. What pieces of evidence have convinced
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
scientists that climate change is happening? Robert Elliot, "Environmental Ethics," in A Companion
(pp. 385-86) to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell,
Discussion Questions 1993).
Robert Heilbroner, "What Has Posterity Ever Done
1. Who or what has moral status-humans, for Me?" New York Times Magazine, january 19, 1975,
nonhuman animals, trees? Explain. 14-15.
2. Do you believe that all living things have equal Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in A Sand COllnty
moral status? Why or why not? Almanac: And Sketches Here and There (1949; reprint,
3. Are you an anthropocentrist? Are you a New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
zoocen trist? jennifer Marohasy, ed., Climate Change: The Facts 2017
4. Do you think that humans and animals have (Melbourne, VIC: Connor Court, 2017).
equal moral status? Why or why not? Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep: Long-Range
5. Does a human baby have the same moral status Ecological Movement," Inquiry 16 (Spring 1973):
as a dog or horse? Explain. 95-100.
Holmes Rolston III, "Values in and Duties to the Natural
6. Do you think Kant was wrong about animals
World," in Ecology, Economics, Ethics: The Broken Circle,
having only instrumental value? Why or why ed. F. Herbert Bormann and Stephen R. Kellert (New
not? Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
7. Do entities in the environment have moral Albert Schweitzer, "Reverence for Life," in Civilization and
status because they are natural? Explain. Ethics, trans. john Naish (London: Black, 1923).
8. Critique Paul Taylor's argument for biocentric Walter Sinnot-Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth, eds.,
egalitarianism. Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics,
9. Critique the claim that climate change is not a Ethics (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005).
real phenomenon. Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?
10. Do you believe that you have a moral Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects" in Should Trees
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects
obligation to try to help counteract global
(Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman, 1974).
warming? Explain.
Lynn White Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis," Science 155 (March 1967): 1203-7.
FURTHER READING
Jeffrey Bennett, A Global Warming Primer (Boulder, CO:
Big Kid SCience, 2016).
Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Environmental
Ethics," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. The Moral Dilemma of Climate Change

Climate change presents us with a moral dilemma that we cannot escape. The problem
presented by climate change and our attempts to solve it will affect not only us but
also our children and grandchildren. Climate change is no ordinary puzzle: it's a serious
intergenerational challenge. Here's one way of expressing it:
It boils down to this: We benefit mightily from burning cheap coal and will shoulder
most of the expense associated with switching the global economy to low-carbon
fuel sources. But our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will pay the price for
our profligate energy ways and will reap the majority of the benefit of our shift to
cleaner-burning fuels. *
Should we pay now to try to rein in global warm- generations, to people who don't yet exist? If we
ing and its awful effects, or should we let our do have obligations to them, how much should we
kids pay? Do we have moral obligations to future sacrifice now to do our duty?
*Nicole Heller and Douglas Fischer, "Ethical Dilemma Profoundly Sways Economics of Climate Change,"
Climate Central, January 27, 2011, https:/Iwww.climatecentral.org/news/ethical-dilemma-profoundly-
sways-economics-of-climate-change.
2. Saving the Glaciers

The glaciers have been disappearing from Glacier National Park in Montana and adjoining
Waterton National Park in Canada. In 1850, Glacier is said to have had 150 glaciers; in
2006, there were 27. In response to this trend, various organizations petitioned for the
parks to be designated endangered by being placed on the danger list of the World
Heritage Committee. As one report says,
Endangered status would require the World Heritage Committee to find ways to
mitigate how climate change affects the park, [the law professor who wrote the
petition] said ... Better fuel efficiency for automobiles and stronger energy efficiency
standards for buildings and appliances are among the ways to reduce greenhouse
pollution that contributes to warming, the petition [said].
But some denounced the petition as unnecessary and unsupported by scientific data,
while one group of scientists estimated that if climate trends continue, Glacier Park's
glaciers will disappear completely by 2030. t
Suppose the glaciers' melting would have no they would no longer exist. Would conservation-
appreciable effect on the environment except that ists still be justified in trying to save the glaciers?
If SO, how could they justify their efforts? If not, controls-money that would have to be taken away
why not? Suppose the glaciers could be saved only from social programs. Would this cost be worth it?
if the government spends $10 billion on pollution Why or why not? Justify your answers.
tAssociated Press, "Endangered Status for Glacier National Park?" NBCNEWS.com, February 16, 2006,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11389665/ns/us_news-environment!t/endangered-status-glacier-national
-park/#.VOj_IlPF9RY (February 21,2015).
3. Ivory-Billed Woodpecker v. Irrigation

While ornithologists continue to debate whether the ivory-billed woodpecker still lingers
in the bayous of Arkansas, the rare bird, once presumed extinct, is now being used by
conservationists in their fight against a federally funded and potentially devastating
irrigation project.
A Little Rock federal court will hear a case against the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers'
Grand Prairie Area Demonstration Project. Plaintiffs ask that all work be halted on the
project until appropriate environmental studies can be performed to evaluate its effect
on the woodpecker.
Lisa Swann of the National Wildlife Federation states that the Grand Prairie project
would be "a recipe for disaster" for the near extinct bird, though the u.s. Army Corps
maintains that the $319 million project, which would replenish exhausted groundwater
aquifers in a 242,OOO-acre agricultural region, is completely safe.
The corps biologist, Ed Lambert, argues that their "biological assessment" perfor-
med last spring has proven that the Grand Prairie project will bring no harm to the
woodpecker.
Plans for Grand Prairie have been underway since the 1980s, when studies found
that the groundwater aquifers of east-central Arkansas were in danger of depletion by
rice growers. The corps has been working with area farmers to build reservoirs that will
eventually be filled with water pumped from the White River.
According to the corps, Grand Prairie will not only aid farmers, but also create new
wetland habitat for waterfowl and shorebirds. The water piped in from the White River
could also replenish the slowly shrinking hardwood forests of Arkansas and reintroduce
thousands of acres of native grassland.
However, Swann's group and other environmentalists see the project differently. They
argue that the project will waste huge amounts of tax dollars and benefit only farmers.
The National Wildlife Federation stated in one publication that the "mammoth sucking
machine" will damage wetlands and pollute the water, threatening ducks, mussels, and a
variety of other species in the region that rely on clean and safe water.
The celebrity among these species is the ivory-billed woodpecker, long believed to be
extinct. Sightings since the 1940s were given little credit by experts, as the smaller pileated
woodpecker, which has similar coloring, is commonly mistaken for the ivory-bill.
One expert, however, began to investigate these sightings. Tim Gallagher, of the
Cornell Lab of Ornithology and editor of Living Bird magazine, began to study the
mysterious ivory-bill in the 1970s. Eventually, his research led him to Gene Sparling,
who claimed to have seen a red-crested male while kayaking in the wetlands of
eastern Arkansas.
During the winter of 2004, Gallagher set out to catch a glimpse of the elusive bird
himself, accompanied by Sparling and a fellow birder, and on February 27, Gallagher
succeeded in spotting a male ivory-bill. Further expeditions ensued, and on April 28,
2005, an article in Science was published proclaiming that the ivory-bill was no longer
extinct.;
Assume that the woodpecker does exist and that a species egalitarian (biocentrist) answer this?
the water project would wipe it out. Should the A species nonegalitarian? An ecological holist?
project proceed or be cancelled? Why? How might
*Based on Mike Stuckey, "New Star of the Bird World Stars in Lawsuit, Too," MSNBC.com, January 25,2006,
www.nbcnews.com/idI109293371 (january 20, 2012).
READINGS
People or Penguins
WILLIAM F. BAXTER
I start with the modest proposition that, in dealing With regard to clean air, for example, one may ask,
with pollution, or indeed with any problem, it is help- "how clean?" and "what does clean mean?" It is even
ful to know what one is attempting to accomplish. reasonable to ask, "why have clean air?" Each of these
Agreement on how and whether to pursue a particu- questions is an implicit demand that a more general
lar objective, such as pollution control, is not possible community goal be stated-a goal sufficiently general
unless some more general objective has been identified in its scope and enjoying sufficiently general assent
and stated with reasonable precision. We talk loosely among the community of actors that such l'why"
of having clean air and clean water, of preserving our questions no longer seem admissible with respect to
wilderness areas, and so forth. But none of these is a that goal.
sufficiently general objective: each is more accurately If, for example, one states as a goal the proposition
viewed as a means rather than as an end. that //every person should be free to do whatever he
wishes in contexts where his actions do not interfere
with the interests of other human beings," the speaker
William F. Baxter, "A 'Good' Environment: Just One of the Set of
Human Objectives," from People or Penguins: Tile Case for Opti-
is unlikely to be met with a response of l'why." The
ma/ Pollution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 1-13. goal may be criticized as uncertain in its implications
Copyright © 1974 Columbia University Press. Reprinted with per- or difficult to implement, but it is so basic a tenet of
mission of the publisher. our civilization-it reflects a cultural value so broadly
shared, at least in the abstract-that the question 4. Both the incentive and the opportunity to improve
"why" is seen as impertinent or imponderable or both. his share of satisfactions should be preserved to
I do not mean to suggest that everyone would agree every individual. Preservation of incentive is dic-
with the "spheres of freedom" objective just stated. tated by the "no-waste" criterion and enjoins
Still less do I mean to suggest that a society could sub- against the continuous, totally egalitarian redis-
scribe to four or five such general objectives that would tribution of satisfactions, or wealth; but subject to
be adequate in their coverage to serve as testing criteria that constraint, everyone should receive, by con-
by which all other disagreements might be measured. tinuous redistribution if necessary, some minimal
One difficulty in the attempt to construct such a list is share of aggregate wealth so as to avoid a level of
that each new goal added will conflict, in certain appli- privation from which the opportunity to improve
cations, with each prior goal listed; and thus each goal his situation becomes illusory.
serves as a limited qualification on prior goals.
Without any expectation of obtaining unanimous The relationship of these highly general goals to
consent to them, let me set forth four goals that I gen- the more specific environmental issues at hand may
erally use as ultimate testing criteria in attempting to not be readily apparent, and I am not yet ready to
frame solutions to problems of human organization. demonstrate their pervasive implications. But let me
My pOSition regarding pollution stems from these give one indication of their implications. Recently
four criteria. If the criteria appeal to you and any part scientists have informed us that use of DDT in food
of what appears hereafter does not, our disagreement production is causing damage to the penguin popula-
will have a helpful focus: which of us is correct, ana- tion. For the present purposes let us accept that asser-
lytically, in supposing that his position on pollution tion as an indisputable scientific fact. The scientific
would better serve these general goals. If the criteria fact is often asserted as if the correct implication-
do not seem acceptable to you, then it is to be expected that we must stop agricultural use of DDT-followed
that our more particular judgments will differ, and the from the mere statement of the fact of penguin dam-
task will then be yours to identify the basic set of crite- age. But plainly it does not follow if my criteria are
ria upon which your particular judgments rest. employed.
My criteria are as follows: My criteria are oriented to people, not penguins.
Damage to penguins, or sugar pines, or geological mar-
1. The spheres of freedom criterion stated above. vels is, without more, simply irrelevant. One must go
2. Waste is a bad thing. The dominant feature further, by my criteria, and say: Penguins are impor-
of human existence is scarcity-our available tant because people enjoy seeing them walk about
resources, our aggregate labors, and our skill in rocks; and furthermore, the well-being of people
employing both have always been, and will con- would be less impaired by halting use of DDT than by
tinue for some time to be, inadequate to yield to giving up penguins. In short, my observations about
every man all the tangible and intangible satisfac- environmental problems will be people-oriented, as
tions he would like to have. Hence, none of those are my criteria. I have no interest in preserving pen-
resources, or labors, or skills, should be wasted- guins for their own sake.
that is, employed so as to yield less than they It may be said by way of objection to this pOSition,
might yield in human satisfactions. that it is very selfish of people to act as if each person
3. Every human being should be regarded as an end represented one unit of importance and nothing else
rather than as a means to be used for the better- was of any importance. It is undeniably selfish. Nev-
ment of another. Each should be afforded dignity ertheless I think it is the only tenable starting place
and regarded as having an absolute claim to an for analysis for several reasons. First, no other position
evenhanded application of such rules as the com- corresponds to the way most people really think and
munity may adopt for its governance. act-Le., corresponds to reality.
Second, this attitude does not portend any massive know how those proxy-holders are to be selected: self-
destruction of nonhuman flora and fauna, for people appointment does not seem workable to me.
depend on them in many obvious ways, and they will Sixth, and by way of summary of all the foregoing,
be preserved because and to the degree that humans let me paint out that the set of environmental issues
do depend on them. under discussion-although they raise very complex
Third, what is good for humans is, in many technical questions of how to achieve any objective-
respects, good for penguins and pine trees-clean air ultimately raise a normative question: what ought we
for example. So that humans are, in these respects, sur- to do. Questions of ought are unique to the human
rogates for plant and animal life. mind and world-they are meaningless as applied to a
Fourth, I do not know how we could administer nonhuman situation.
any other system. Our decisions are either private or I reject the proposition that we ought to respect the
collective. Insofar as Mr. Jones is free to act privately, he "balance of nature" or to "preserve the environment"
may give such preferences as he wishes to other forms unless the reason for doing so, express or implied, is
of life: he may feed birds in winter and do with less the benefit of man.
himself, and he may even decline to resist an advanc- I reject the idea that there is a "right" or "morally
ing polar bear on the ground that the bear's appetite correct" state of nature to which we should return.
is more important than those portions of himself that The word "nature" has no normative connotation.
the bear may choose to eat. In short my basic premise Was it "right" or "wrong" for the earth's crust to heave
does not rule out private altruism to competing life- in contortion and create mountains and seas? Was it
forms. It does rule out, however, Mr. Jones's inclina- "right" for the first amphibian to crawl up out of the pri-
tion to feed Mr. Smith to the bear, however hungry the mordial ooze? Was it "wrong" for plants to reproduce
bear, however despicable Mr. Smith. themselves and alter the atmospheric composition in
Insofar as we act collectively on the other hand, favor of oxygen? For animals to alter the atmosphere in
only humans can be afforded an opportunity to par- favor of carbon dioxide both by breathing oxygen and
ticipate in the collective decisions. Penguins cannot eating plants? No answers can be given to these ques-
vote now and are unlikely subjects for the franchise- tions because they are meaningless questions.
pine trees more unlikely still. Again each individual All this may seem obvious to the point of being
is free to cast his vote so as to benefit sugar pines if tedious, but much of the present controversy over
that is his inclination. But many of the more extreme environment and pollution rests on tacit normative
assertions that one hears from some conservation- assumptions about just such non normative phenom-
ists amount to tacit assertions that they are specially ena: that it is "wrong" to impair penguins with DDT,
appointed representatives of sugar pines, and hence but not to slaughter cattle for prime rib roasts. That it
that their preferences should be weighted more heav- is wrong to kill stands of sugar pines with industrial
ily than the preferences of other humans who do not fumes, but not to cut sugar pines and build housing
enjoy equal rapport with "nature." The simplistic for the poor. Every man is entitled to his own preferred
assertion that agricultural use of DDT must stop at definition of Walden Pond, but there is no definition
once because it is harmful to penguins is of that type. that has any moral superiority over another, except by
Fifth, if polar bears or pine trees or penguins, like reference to the selfish needs of the human race.
men, are to be regarded as ends rather than means, From the fact that there is no normative definition
if they are to count in our calculus of social organi- of the natural state, it follows that there is no norma-
zation, someone must tell me how much each one tive definition of clean air or pure water-hence no
counts, and someone must tell me how these life- definition of polluted air-or of pollution-except by
forms are to be permitted to express their preferences, reference to the needs of man. The "right" composi-
for I do not know either answer. If the answer is that tion of the atmosphere is one which has some dust
certain people are to hold their proxies, then I want to in it and some lead in it and some hydrogen sulfide
in it-just those amounts that attend a sensibly orga- openers. That is the meaningful sense in which the
nized society thoughtfully and knowledgeably pur- dam is costly.
suing the greatest possible satisfaction for its human Quite apart from the very important question of
members. how wisely we can combine our resources to produce
The first and most fundamental step toward solu- goods and services, is the very different question of
tion of our environmental problems is a clear recog- how they get distributed-who gets how many goods?
nition that our objective is not pure air or water but Dollars constitute the claim checks which are distrib-
rather some optimal state of pollution. That step uted among people and which control their share of
immediately suggests the question: How do we define national output. Dollars are nearly valueless pieces
and attain the level of pollution that will yield the of paper except to the extent that they do represent
maximum possible amount of human satisfaction? claim checks to some fraction of the output of goods
Low levels of pollution contribute to human and services. Viewed as claim checks, all the dollars
satisfaction but so do food and shelter and education outstanding during any period of time are worth, in
and music. To attain ever lower levels of pollution, we the aggregate, the goods and services that are available
must pay the cost of having less of these other things. to be claimed with them during that period-neither
I contrast that view of the cost of pollution control more nor less.
with the more popular statement that pollution con- It is far easier to increase the supply of dollars than
trol will "cost" very large numbers of dollars. The pop- to increase the production of goods and services-
ular statement is true in some senses, false in others; printing dollars is easy. But printing more dollars
sorting out the true and false senses is of some impor- doesn't help because each dollar then simply becomes
tance. The first step in that sorting process is to achieve a claim to fewer goods, Le., becomes worth less.
a clear understanding of the difference between dol- The point is this: many people fall into error
lars and resources. Resources are the wealth of our upon hearing the statement that the decision to build
nation; dollars are merely claim checks upon those a dam, or to clean up a river, will cost $X million. It
resources. Resources are of vital importance; dollars is regrettably easy to say: "It's only money. This is a
are comparatively trivial. wealthy country, and we have lots of money." But you
Four categories of resources are sufficient for our cannot build a dam or clean a river with $X million-
purposes: At any given time a nation, or a planet if you unless you also have a match, you can't even make a
prefer, has a stock of labor, of technological skill, of fire. One builds a dam or cleans a river by diverting
capital goods, and of natural resources (such as min- labor and steel and trucks and factories from mak-
eral depOSits, timber, water, land, etc.). These resources ing one kind of goods to making another. The cost in
can be used in various combinations to yield goods dollars is merely a shorthand way of describing the
and services of all kinds-in some limited quantity. extent of the diversion necessary. If we build a dam for
The quantity will be larger if they are combined effi- $X million, then we must recognize that we will have
ciently, smaller if combined inefficiently. But in either $X million less housing and food and medical care and
event the resource stock is limited, the goods and ser- electric can openers as a result.
vices that they can be made to yield are limited; even Similarly, the costs of controlling pollution are
the most efficient use of them will yield less than our best expressed in terms of the other goods we will
population, in the aggregate, would like to have. have to give up to do the job. This is not to say the job
If one considers building a new dam, it is appro- should not be done. Badly as we need more housing,
priate to say that it will be costly in the sense that it more medical care, and more can openers, and more
will require x hours of labor, y tons of steel and con- symphony orchestras, we could do with somewhat
crete, and z amount of capital goods. If these resources less of them, in my judgment at least, in exchange
are devoted to the dam, then they cannot be used to for somewhat cleaner air and rivers. But that is the
bUild hospitals, fishing rods, schools, or electric can nature of the trade-off, and analysis of the problem
is advanced if that unpleasant reality is kept in mind. quieter, more pastoral nation up to-and no further
Once the trade-off relationship is clearly perceived, it than-the point at which we value more highly the
is possible to state in a very general way what the opti- next washing machine or hospital that we would have
mal level of pollution is. I would state it as follows: to do without than we value the next unit of envi-
People enjoy watching penguins. They enjoy ronmental improvement that the diverted resources
relatively clean air and smog-free vistas. Their health would create.
is improved by relatively clean water and air. Each of Now this proposition seems to me unassailable
these benefits is a type of good or service. As a soci- but so general and abstract as to be unhelpful-at
ety we would be well advised to give up one washing least unadministerable in the form stated. It assumes
machine if the resources that would have gone into we can measure in some way the incremental units of
that washing machine can yield greater human sat- human satisfaction yielded by very different types of
isfaction when diverted into pollution control. We goods. The proposition must remain a pious abstrac-
should give up one hospital if the resources thereby tion until I can explain how this measurement process
freed would yield more human satisfaction when can occur.... But I insist that the proposition stated
devoted to elimination of noise in our cities. And so describes the result for which we should be striving-
on, trade-off by trade-off, we should divert our pro- and again, that it is always useful to know what your
ductive capacities from the production of existing target is even if your weapons are too crude to score a
goods and services to the production of a cleaner, bull's eye.
It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations

WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG
Previous [essaysJ have focused on scientific research, roughly accurate, but none is certain, and I will not try
economic projections, and government policies. How- to justify them here. Instead, I will simply take them
ever, even if scientists establish that global warming for granted for the sake of argument.
is occurring, even if economists confirm that its costs First, global warming has begun and is likely to
will be staggering, and even if political theorists agree increase over the next century. We cannot be sure
that governments must do something about it, it is exactly how much or how fast, but hot times are coming.
still not clear what moral obligations regarding global Second, a significant amount of global warming
warming devolve upon individuals like you and me. is due to human activities. The main culprit is fossil
That is the question to be addressed in this essay. fuels.
Third, global warming will create serious problems
1. ASSUMPTIONS for many people over the long term by causing climate
To make the issue stark, let us begin with a fewassump- changes, including violent storms, floods from sea
tions. I believe that these assumptions are probably level rises, droughts, heat waves, and so on. Millions
of people will probably be displaced or die.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. "It's Not My Fault: Global Warming
Fourth, the poor will be hurt most of all. The rich
and IndiVidual Moral Obligations" in Perspectil'es 011 Climate
Clrange: Sciellce, ECOIlOt1Iics, Politics, Etllics. ed. Walter Sinnott-
countries are causing most of the global warming, but
Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth (Amsterdam: Elsevier. 2005). they will be able to adapt to climate changes more
285-307. (f:) 2005 Emerald Publishing Limited. All rights reserved. easily. Poor countries that are close to sea level might
Reprinted with permission. be devastated.
Fifth, governments, especially the biggest and That issue is not as simple as many people assume.
richest ones, are able to mitigate global warming. They I want to bring out some of its complications.
can impose limits on emissions. They can require or It should be clear from the start that "individual"
give incentives for increased energy efficiency. They moral obligations do not always follow directly from
can stop deforestation and fund reforestation. They "collective" moral obligations. The fact that your gov-
can develop ways to sequester carbon dioxide in ernment morally ought to do something does not
oceans or underground. These steps will help, but the prove that "you" ought to do it, even if your govern-
only long-run solution lies in alternatives to fossil ment fails. Suppose that a bridge is dangerous because
fuels. These alternatives can be found soon if govern- so much traffic has gone over it and continues to go
ments start massive research projects now. over it. The government has a moral obligation to
Sixth, it is too late to stop global warming. Because make the bridge safe. If the government fails to do its
there is so much carbon dioxide in the atmosphere duty, it does not follow that I personally have a moral
already, because carbon dioxide remains in the atmo- obligation to fix the bridge. It does not even follow
sphere for so long, and because we will remain depen- that I have a moral obligation to fill in one crack in the
dent on fossil fuels in the near future, governments bridge, even if the bridge would be fixed if everyone
can slow down global warming or reduce its severity, filled in one crack, even if I drove over the bridge many
but they cannot prevent it. Hence, governments need times, and even if I still drive over it every day. Fixing
to adapt. They need to build seawalls. They need to the bridge is the government's job, not mine. While I
reinforce houses that cannot withstand storms. They ought to encourage the government to fulfill its obliga-
need to move populations from low-lying areas. tions, I do not have to take on those obligations myself.
Seventh, these steps will be costly. Increased All that this shows is that government obligations
energy efficiency can reduce expenses, adaptation do not "always" imply parallel individual obligations.
will create some jobs, and money will be made in Still, maybe "sometimes" they do. My government has
the research and production of alternatives to fossil a moral obligation to teach arithmetic to the children
fuels. Still, any steps that mitigate or adapt to global in my town, including my own children. If the govern-
warming will slow down our economies, at least in the ment fails in this obligation, then I do take on a moral
short run. That will hurt many people, especially obligation to teach arithmetic to my children. Thus,
many poor people. when the government fails in its obligations, some-
Eighth, despite these costs, the major govern- times I have to fill in, and sometimes I do not.
ments throughout the world still morally ought to What about global warming? If the government
take some of these steps. The clearest moral obliga- fails to do anything about global warming, what am
tion falls on the United States. The United States I supposed to do about it? There are lots of ways for
caused and continues to cause more of the problem me as an individual to fight global warming. I can
than any other country. The United States can spend protest against bad government policies and vote
more resources on a solution without sacrificing basic for candidates who will make the government fulfill
necessities. This country has the scientific expertise to its moral obligations. I can support private organi-
solve technical problems. Other countries follow its zations that fight global warming, such as the Pew
lead (sometimes!). So the United States has a special Foundation, or boycott companies that contribute
moral obligation to help mitigate and adapt to global too much to global warming, such as most oil com-
warming. panies. Each of these cases is interesting, but they all
differ. To simplify our discussion, we need to pick one
act as our focus.
2. THE PROBLEM My example will be wasteful driving. Some people
Even assuming all of this, it is still not clear what I as an drive to their jobs or to the store because they have no
individual morally ought to do about global warming. other reasonable way to work and eat. I want to avoid
issues about whether these goals justify driving, so I will Still, I do not feel confident in this judgment. I know
focus on a case where nothing so important is gained. that other people disagree (even though they are also
I will consider driving for fun on a beautiful Sunday concerned about the environment). I would probably
afternoon. My drive is not necessary to cure depression have different moral intuitions about this case if I had
or calm aggressive impulses. All that is gained is plea- been raised differently or if I now lived in a different cul-
sure: Ah, the feel of wind in your hair! The views! How ture. My moral intuition might be distorted by overgen-
spectacular! Of course, you could drive a fuel-efficient eralization from the other cases where I think that other
hybrid car. But fuel-efficient cars have less "get up and entities (large governments) do have moral obligations
go." So let us consider a gas-guzzling sport utility vehicle. to fight global warming. I also worry that my moral intu-
Ah, the feeling of power! The excitement! Maybe you do ition might be distorted by my desire to avoid conflicts
not like to go for drives in sport utility vehicles on sunny with my environmentalist friends. The issue of global
Sunday afternoons, but many people do. warming generates strong emotions because of its politi-
Do we have a moral obligation not to drive in such cal implications and because of how scary its effects are.
circumstances? This question concerns driving, not It is also a peculiarly modern case, especially because it
"buying" cars. To make this clear, let us assume that operates on a much grander scale than my moral intu-
I borrow the gas-guzzler from a friend. This question itions evolved to handle long ago when acts did not have
is also not about "legal" obligations. So let us assume such long-term effects on future generations (or at least
that it is perfectly legal to go for such drives. Perhaps people were not aware of such effects). In such circum-
it ought to be illegal, but it is not. Note also that my stances, I doubt that we are justified in trusting our moral
question is not about what would be "best." Maybe intuitions alone. We need some kind of confirmation.
it would be better, even morally better, for me not to One way to confirm the truth of my moral intu-
drive a gas-guzzler just for fun. But that is not the issue itions would be to derive them from a general moral
I want to address here. My question is whether I have principle. A principle could tell us why wasteful driv-
a "moral" obligation not to drive a gas-guzzler just for ing is morally wrong, so we would not have to depend
fun on this particular sunny Sunday afternoon. on bare assertion. And a principle might be supported
One final complication must be removed. I am by more trustworthy moral beliefs. The problem is
interested in global warming, but there might be other "which" principle?
moral reasons not to drive unnecessarily. I risk caus-
ing an aCcident, since I am not a perfect driver. I also
will likely spew exhaust into the breathing space of 3. ACTUAL ACT PRINCIPLES
pedestrians, bicyclists, or animals on the side of the One plausible prinCiple refers to causing harm. If one
road as I drive by. Perhaps these harms and risks give person had to inhale all of the exhaust from my car,
me a moral obligation not to go for my joyride. That this would harm him and give me a moral obligation
is not clear. After all, these reasons also apply if I drive not to drive my car just for fun. Such cases suggest:
the most efficient car available, and even if I am driv-
The harm principle: We have a moral obligation not to
ing to work with no other way to keep my job. Indeed,
perform an act that causes harm to others.
I might scare or injure bystanders even if my car gave
off no greenhouse gases or pollution. In any case, This principle implies that I have a moral obliga-
I want to focus on global warming. So my real question tion not to drive my gas-guzzler just for fun "if" such
is whether the facts about global warming give me any driving causes harm.
moral obligation not to drive a gas-guzzler just for fun The problem is that such driving does "not" cause
on this sunny Sunday afternoon. harm in normal cases. If one person were in a posi-
I admit that I am "inclined" to answer, "Yes." To tion to inhale all of my exhaust, then he would get
me, global warming does "seem" to make such waste- sick if I did drive, and he would not get sick if I did
ful driving morally wrong. not drive (under normal circumstances). In contrast,
global warming will still occur even if I do not drive worst offenders to get better. The most efficient and
just for fun. Moreover, even if I do drive a gas-guzzler effective way to do this is to reserve our condemnation
just for fun for a long time, global warming will not for those who are well below average. This means that
occur unless lots of other people also expel greenhouse we should not hold people responsible for harms by
gases. So my individual act is neither necessary nor calling their acts causes of harms when their acts are
sufficient for global warming. not at all unusual, assuming that they did not intend
There are, admittedly, special circumstances in the harm.
which an act causes harm without being either neces- The application to global warming should be clear.
sary or sufficient for that harm. Imagine that it takes It is not unusual to go for joyrides. Such drivers do not
three people to push a car off a cliff with a passenger intend any harm. Hence, we should not see my act
locked inside, and five people are already pushing. If of driving on a sunny Sunday afternoon as a cause of
I join and help them push, then my act of pushing is global warming or its harms.
neither necessary nor sufficient to make the car go off Another argument leads to the same conclusion:
the cliff. Nonetheless, my act of pushing is a cause (or the harms of global warming result from the massive
part of the cause) of the harm to the passenger. Why? quantities of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Because I intend to cause harm to the passenger, and Greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide and water
because my act is unusual. When I intend a harm to vapor) are perfectly fine in small quantities. They help
occur, my intention provides a reason to pick my act plants grow. The problem emerges only when there is
out of all the other background circumstances and too much of them. But my joyride by itself does not
identify it as a cause. Similarly, when my act is unusual cause the massive quantities that are harmful.
in the sense that most people would not act that way, Contrast someone who pours cyanide poison into
that also provides a reason to pick out my act and call a river. Later someone drinking from the river down-
it a cause. stream ingests some molecules of the poison. Those
Why does it matter what is usual? Compare molecules cause the person to get ill and die. This is
matches. For a match to light up, we need to strike it very different from the causal chain in global warm-
so as to create friction. There also has to be oxygen. ing, because no particular molecules from my car
We do not call the oxygen the cause of the fire, since cause global warming in the direct way that particular
oxygen is usually present. Instead, we say that the fric- molecules of the poison do cause the drinker's death.
tion causes the match to light, since it is unusual for Global warming is more like a river that is going to
that friction to occur. It happens only once in the life flood downstream because of torrential rains. I pour
of each match. Thus, what is usual affects ascriptions a quart of water into the river upstream (maybe just
of causation even in purely physical cases. because I do not want to carry it). My act of pouring
In moral cases, there are additional reasons not the quart into the river is not a cause of the flood.
to call something a cause when it is usual. Labeling Analogously, my act of driving for fun is not a cause of
an act a cause of harm and, on this basis, holding its global warming.
agent responsible for that harm by blaming the agent Contrast also another large-scale moral problem:
or condemning his act is normally counterproduc- famine relief. Some people say that I have no moral
tive when that agent is acting no worse than most obligation to contribute to famine relief because the
other people. If people who are doing "no" worse famine will continue and people will die whether or
than average are condemned, then people who are not I donate my money to a relief agency. However,
doing "much" worse than average will suspect that I could help a certain individual if I gave my donation
they will still be subject to condemnation even if they directly to that individual. In contrast, if I refrain from
start doing better, and even if they improve enough to driving for fun on this one Sunday, there is no indi-
bring themselves up to the average. We should distrib- vidual who will be helped in the least. I cannot help
ute blame (and praise) so as to give incentives for the anyone by depriving myself of this joyride.
The point becomes clearer if we distinguish global influential than they really are. On a realistic view,
warming from climate change. You might think that however, it is unlikely that anyone would drive waste-
my driving on Sunday raises the temperature of the fully if I did and would not if I did not. Moreover, waste-
globe by an infinitesimal amount. I doubt that, but, ful driving is not that habit forming. My act of driving
even if it does, my exhaust on that Sunday does not this Sunday does not make me drive next Sunday. I do
cause any climate change at all. No storms or floods not get addicted. Driving the next Sunday is a separate
or droughts or heat waves can be traced to my indi- decision. And my wasteful driving will not undermine
vidual act of driving. It is these climate changes that my devotion to environmentalism. If my argument in
cause harms to people. Global warming by itself causes this chapter is correct, then my belief that the govern-
no harm without climate change. Hence, since my ment has a moral obligation to fight global warming is
individual act of driving on that one Sunday does not perfectly compatible with a belief that I as an individ-
cause any climate change, it causes no harm to anyone. ual have no moral obligation not to drive a gas-guzzler
The point is not that harms do not occur from for fun. If I keep this compatibility in mind, then my
global warming. I have already admitted that they do. driving my gas-guzzler for fun will not undermine my
The point is also not that my exhaust is overkill, like poi- devotion to the cause of getting the government to do
soning someone who is already dying from poison. My something about global warming.
exhaust is not sufficient for the harms of global warm- Besides, the indirect harm principle is misleading.
ing, and I do not intend those harms. Nor is it the point To see why, consider David. David is no environmen-
that the harms from global warming occur much later talist. He already has a habit of driving his gas-guzzler
in time. If I place a time bomb in a building, I can cause for fun on Sundays. Nobody likes him, so nobody
harm many years later. And the point is not that the follows his example. But David still has a moral obli-
harm I cause is imperceptible. I admit that some harms gation not to drive his gas-guzzler just for fun this
can be imperceptible because they are too small or for Sunday, and his obligation has the same basis as mine,
other reasons. Instead, the point is simply that my indi- if I have one. So my moral obligation cannot depend
vidual joyride does not cause global warming, climate on the factors cited by the indirect harm principle.
change, or any of their resulting harms, at least directly. The most important problem for supposed indirect
Admittedly, my acts can lead to other acts by me harms is the same as for direct harms: even if I create
or by other people. Maybe one case of wasteful driving a bad habit and undermine my personal environmen-
creates a bad habit that will lead me to do it again and talism and set a bad example that others follow, all of
again. Or maybe a lot of other people look up to me and this would still not be enough to cause climate change
would follow my example of wasteful driving. Or maybe if other people stopped expelling greenhouse gases.
my wasteful driving will undermine my commitment So, as long as I neither intend harm nor do anything
to environmentalism and lead me to stop supporting unusual, my act cannot cause climate change even if
important green causes or to harm the environment in I do create bad habits and followers. The scale of cli-
more serious ways. If so, we could apply: mate change is just too big for me to cause it, even
The indirect harm principle: We have a moral obligation "with a little help from my friends."
not to perform an act that causes harm to others indi- Of course, even if I do not cause climate change,
rectly by causing someone to carry out acts that cause I still might seem to contribute to climate change in
harm to others. the sense that I make it worse. If so, another principle
applies:
This principle would explain why it is morally
wrong to drive a gas-guzzler just for fun if this act led The contribution principle: We have a moral obligation
to other harmful acts. not to make problems worse.
One problem here is that my acts are not that This prinCiple applies if climate change will be
influential. People like to see themselves as more worse if I drive than it will be if I do not drive.
The problem with this argument is that my act of Maybe the reason is risk. It is sometimes morally
driving does not even make climate change worse. Cli- wrong to create a risk of a harm even if that harm
mate change would be just as bad if I did not drive. The does not occur. I grant that drunk driving is immoral,
reason is that climate change becomes worse only if because it risks harm to others, even if the drunk
more people (and animals) are hurt or if they are hurt driver gets home safely without hurting anyone. Thus,
worse. There is nothing bad about global warming or we get another principle:
climate change in itself if no people (or animals) are
The risk principle: We have a moral obligation not to
harmed. But there is no individual person or animal
increase the risk of harms to other people.
who will be worse off if I drive than if I do not drive
my gas-guzzler just for fun. Global warming and cli- The problem here is that global warming is not
mate change occur on such a massive scale that my like drunk driving. When drunk driving causes harm,
individual driving makes no difference to the welfare it is easy to identify the victim of this particular drunk
of anyone. driver. There is no way to identify any particular vic-
Some might complain that this is not what they tim of my wasteful driving in normal circumstances.
mean by "contribute." All it takes for me to contrib- In addition, my earlier pOint applies here again.
ute to global warming in their view is for me to expel If the risk principle were true, it would be unbeliev-
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. I do "that" ably restrictive. Exercising and boiling water also expel
when I drive, so we can apply: greenhouse gases, so they also increase the risk of global
warming if my driving does. This principle implies that
The gas principle: We have a moral obligation not to
almost everything we do violates a moral obligation.
expel greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
Defenders of such principles sometimes respond
If this principle were true, it would explain why by distinguishing significant from insignificant risks
I have a moral obligation not to drive my gas-guzzler or increases in risks. That distinction is problematic, at
just for fun. least here. A risk is called significant when it is "too"
Unfortunately, it is hard to see any reason to accept much. But then we need to ask what makes this risk
this principle. There is nothing immoral about green- too much when other risks are not too much. The rea-
house gases in themselves when they cause no harm. sons for counting a risk as significant are then the real
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide and water reasons for thinking that there is a moral obligation not
vapor, which occur naturally and help plants grow. to drive wastefully. So we need to specify those reasons
The problem of global warming occurs because of directly instead of hiding them under a waffle-term like
the high quantities of greenhouse gases, not because "significant. "
of anything bad about smaller quantities of the same
gases. So it is hard to see why I would have a moral 4. INTERNAL PRINCIPLES
obligation not to expel harmless quantities of green-
None of the principles discussed so far is both defen-
house gases. And that is all I do by myself.
sible and strong enough to yield a moral obligation
Furthermore, if the gas principle were true, it
not to drive a gas-guzzler just for fun. Maybe we can do
would be unbelievably restrictive. It implies that
better by looking inward.
I have a moral obligation not to boil water (since
Kantians claim that the moral status of acts
water vapor is a greenhouse gas) or to exercise (since I
depends on their agents' maxims or "subjective princi-
expel carbon dioxide when I breathe heavily). When
ples of volition" -roughly what we would call motives
you think it through, an amazing array of seemingly
or intentions or plans. This internal focus is evident in
morally acceptable activities would be ruled out by
Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative:
the gas principle. These implications suggest that
we had better look elsewhere for a reason why I The universalizability principle: We have a moral obliga-
have a moral obligation not to drive a gas-guzzler tion not to act on any maxim that we cannot will to be
just for fun. a universal law.
The idea is not that universally acting on that maxim Another inner-directed theory is virtue ethics.
would have bad consequences. (We will consider that This approach focuses on general character traits
kind of principle below.) Instead, the claim is that some rather than particular acts or intentions. It is not clear
maxims "cannot even be thought as a universal law of how to derive a principle regarding obligations from
nature without contradiction." However, my maxim virtue ethics, but here is a common attempt:
when I drive a gas-guzzler just for fun on this sunny
Sunday afternoon is simply to have harmless fun. There The virtue principle: We have a moral obligation not to
is no way to derive a contradiction from a universal law perform an act that expresses a vice or is contrary to
that people do or may have harmless fun. Kantians might virtue.
respond that my maxim is, instead, to expel greenhouse
gases. I still see no way to derive a literal contradiction This principle solves our problem if driving a gas-
from a universal law that people do or may expel green- guzzler expresses a vice, or if no virtuous person would
house gases. There would be bad consequences, but that drive a gas-guzzler just for fun.
is not a contradiction, as Kant requires. In any case, my How can we tell whether this principle applies?
maxim (or intention or motive) is not to expel green- How can we tell whether driving a gas-guzzler for
house gases. My goals would be reached completely if fun "expresses a vice"? On the face of it, it expresses a
I went for my drive and had my fun without expelling desire for fun. There is nothing vicious about having
any greenhouse gases. This leaves no ground for claim- fun. Having fun becomes vicious only if it is harmful
ing that my driving violates Kant's first formula of the or risky. But I have already responded to the principles
categorical imperative. of harm and risk. Moreover, driving a gas-guzzler for
Kant does supply a second formulation, which is fun does not always express a vice. If other people did
really a different principle: not produce so much greenhouse gas, I could drive my
gas-guzzler just for fun without anyone being harmed
The means principle: We have a moral obligation not to
by global warming. Then 1 could do it without being
treat any other person as a means only.
vicious. This situation is not realistic, but it does show
It is not clear exactly how to understand this formu- that wasteful driving is not essentially vicious or con-
lation, but the most natural interpretation is that for me trary to virtue.
to treat someone as a means implies my using harm to Some will disagree. Maybe your notions of virtue
that person as part of my plan to achieve my goals. Driv- and vice make it essentially vicious to drive waste-
ing for fun does not do that. I would have just as much fully. But why? To apply this principle, we need some
fun if nobody were ever harmed by global warming. antecedent test of when an act expresses a vice. You
Harm to others is no part of my plans. So Kant's prin- cannot just say, "I know vice when I see it," because
ciple cannot explain why I have a moral obligation not other people look at the same act and do not see.vice,
to drive just for fun on this sunny Sunday afternoon. just fun. It begs the question to appeal to what you
A similar point applies to a traditional principle see when others do not see it, and you have no reason
that focuses on intention: to believe that your vision is any clearer than theirs.
The doctrine ofdouble effect: We have a moral obligation
But that means that this virtue principle cannot be
not to harm anyone intentionally (either as an end or applied without begging the question. We need to
as a means). find some reason why such driving is vicious. Once we
have this reason, we can appeal to it directly as a rea-
This principle fails to apply to my Sunday driv- son why I have a moral obligation not to drive waste-
ing both because my driving does not cause harm to fully. The side step through virtue does not help and
anyone and because I do not intend harm to anyone. only obscures the issue.
I would succeed in doing everything I intended to do Some virtue theorists might respond that life
if I enjoyed my drive but magically my car gave off no would be better if more people were to focus on gen-
greenhouse gases and no global warming occurred. eral character traits, including green virtues, such as
moderation and love of nature. One reason is that (because they allow more freedom), then the ideal law
it is so hard to determine obligations in particular principle cannot yield a moral obligation not to drive
cases. Another reason is that focusing on particular a gas-guzzler now.
obligations leaves no way to escape problems like Moreover, the connection between law and moral-
global warming. This might be correct. Maybe we ity cannot be so simple. Suppose that the government
should spend more time thinking about whether morally ought to raise taxes on fossil fuels in order to
we have green virtues rather than about whether reduce usage and to help pay for adaptation to global
we have specific obligations. But that does not show warming. It still seems morally permissible for me and
that we do have a moral obligation not to drive gas- for you not to pay that tax now. We do not have any
guzzlers just for fun. Changing our focus will not moral obligation to send a check to the government
bring any moral obligation into existence. There are for the amount that we would have to pay if taxes were
other important moral issues besides moral obliga- raised to the ideal level. One reason is that our checks
tion, but this does not show that moral obligations would not help to solve the problem, since others would
are not important as well. continue to conduct business as usual. What would
help to solve the problem is for the taxes to be increased.
S. COLLECTIVE PRINCIPLES Maybe we all have moral obligations to try to get the
Maybe our mistake is to focus on individual persons. taxes increased. Still, until they are increased, we as
We could instead, focus on institutions. One institu- individuals have no moral obligations to abide by the
tion is the legal system, so we might adopt: ideal tax law instead of the actual tax law.
Analogously, it is actually legal to buy and drive
The ideal law principle: We have a moral obligation not
gas-guzzlers. Maybe these vehicles should be illegal. I
to perform an action if it ought to be illegal.
am not sure. If gas-guzzlers morally ought to be ille-
I already said that the government ought to fight gal, then maybe we morally ought to work to get them
global warming. One way to do so is to make it ille- outlawed. But that still would not show that now,
gal to drive wastefully or to buy (or sell) inefficient while they are legal, we have a moral obligation not to
gas-guzzlers. If the government ought to pass such drive them just for fun on a sunny Sunday afternoon.
laws, then, even before such laws are passed, I have a Which laws are best depends on side effects of for-
moral obligation not to drive a gas-guzzler just for fun, mal institutions, such as enforcement costs and loss of
according to the ideal law principle. freedom (resulting from the coercion of laws). Maybe
The first weakness in this argument lies in its we can do better by looking at informal groups.
assumption that wasteful driving or gas-guzzlers Different groups involve different relations between
ought to be illegal. That is dubious. The enforcement members. Orchestras and political parties, for example,
costs of a law against joyrides would be enormous. plan to do what they do and adjust their actions to other
A law against gas-guzzlers would be easier to enforce, members of the group in order to achieve a common
but inducements to efficiency (such as higher taxes goal. Such groups can be held responsible for their joint
on gas and gas-guzzlers, or tax breaks for buying fuel- acts, even when no individual alone performs those
efficient cars) might accomplish the same goals with acts. However, gas-guzzler drivers do not form this kind
less loss of individual freedom. Governments ought of group. Gas-guzzler drivers do not share goals, do not
to accomplish their goals with less loss of freedom, make plans together, and do not adjust their acts to
if they can. Note the llif." I do not claim that these each other (at least usually).
other laws would work as well as an outright prohibi- There is an abstract set of gas-guzzler drivers, but
tion of gas-guzzlers. I do not know. Still, the point is membership in a set is too arbitrary to create moral
that such alternative laws would not make it illegal responsibility. I am also in a set of all terrorists plus me,
(only expensive) to drive a gas-guzzler for fun. If those but my membership in that abstract set does not make
alternative laws are better than outright prohibitions me responsible for the harms that terrorists cause.
The only feature that holds together the group moral obligation not to join the group by cashing your
of people who drive gas-guzzlers is simply that they all check, since you cannot change what the group does.
perform the same kind of act. The fact that so many It might be morally good or ideal to protest by tearing
people carry out acts of that kind does create or worsen up your check, but it does not seem morally obligatory.
global warming. That collective bad effect is supposed Thus, the group principle fails. Perhaps it might be
to make it morally wrong to perform any act of that saved by adding some kind of qualification, but I do
kind, according to the following: not see how.
The group principle: We have a moral obligation not to

perform an action if this action makes us a member of 6. COUNTERFACTUAL PRINCIPLES
a group whose actions together cause harm. Maybe our mistake is to focus on actual circumstances.
So let us try some counterfactuals about what would
Why? It begs the question here merely to assume
happen in possible worlds that are not actual. Differ-
that if it is bad for everyone in a group to perform acts
ent counterfactuals are used by different versions of
of a 'kind, then it is morally wrong for an individual
rule-consequentialism.
to perform an act of that kind. Besides, this principle
One counterfactual is built into the common
is implausible or at least questionable in many cases.
question, "What would happen if everybody did
Suppose that everyone in an airport is talking loudly.
that?" This question suggests a principle:
If only a few people were talking, there would be no
problem. But the collective effect of so many people The general action principle: I have a moral obligation
talking makes it hard to hear announ~ements, ~o not to perform an act when it would be worse for
e people miss their flights. Suppose, 10 these CIr- everyone to perform an act of the same kind.
som dl ) "I . h
cumstances, I say loudly (but not too lou y, WIS It does seem likely that, if everyone in the world
everyone would be quiet." My speech does not seem drove a gas-guzzler often enough, global warming
immoral, since it alone does not harm anyone. Maybe would increase intolerably. We would also quickly run
there should be a rule (or law) against such loud out of fossil fuels. The general action principle is, thus,
speech in this setting (as in a library), but i~ there is supposed to explain why it is morally wrong to drive a
not (as I am assuming), then it does not seem Immoral gas-guzzler.
to do what others do, as long as they are going to do it Unfortunately, that popular principle is indefen-
anyway, so the harm is going to occur anyway. sible. It would be disastrous if every human had no
Again, suppose that the president sends every~n.e children. But that does not make it morally wrong for
(or at least most taxpayers) a check for $600. If all recIpI- a particular individual to choose to have no children.
ents cash their checks, the government deficit will There is no moral obligation to have at least one child.
grow, government programs will have to be. slashed, The reason is that so few people "want" to remain
and severe economic and social problems wIll result. childless. Most people would not go without children
You know that enough other people will cash their even if they were allowed to. This suggests a different
checks to make these results to a great degree inevita- principle:
ble. You also know that it is perfectly legal to cash your
The general permission principle: I have a moral obligation
check, although you think it should be illegal, because
the checks should not have been issued in the first not to perform an act whenever it would be worse for
everyone to be permitted to perform an act of that kind.
place. In these circumstances, is it morally wrong for
you to cash your check? I doubt it. Your act of cashing This principle seems better because it would not
your check causes no harm by itself, and you have no be disastrous for everyone to be permitted to remain
intention to cause harm. Your act of cashing your check childless. This principle is supposed to be able to
does make you a member of a group that collectively explain why it is morally wrong to steal (or lie, cheat,
causes harm, but that still does not seem to give you a rape, or murder), because it would be disastrous for
everyone to be permitted to steal (or lie, cheat, rape, or always morally wrong when it would (counterfactu-
murder) whenever (if ever) they wanted to. ally) be disastrous for everyone to know that everyone
Not quite. An agent is permitted or allowed in the is allowed to do it.
relevant sense when she will not be liable to punish- The lesson of this example applies directly to my
ment, condemnation (by others), or feelings of guilt case of driving a gas-guzzler. Disaster occurs in the
for carrying out the act. It is possible for someone to airplane case when too many people do what is harm-
be permitted in this sense without knowing that she less by itself. Similarly, disaster occurs when too many
is permitted and, indeed, without anyone knowing people burn too much fossil fuel. But that does not
that she is permitted. But it would not be disastrous for make it wrong in either case for one individual to per-
everyone to be permitted to steal if nobody knew that form an individual act that is harmless by itself. It only
they were permitted to steal, since then they would creates an obligation on the part of the government
still be deterred by fear of punishment, condemna- (or airline) to pass regulations to keep too many people
tion, or guilt. Similarly for lying, rape, and so on. So from acting that way.
the general permission principle cannot quite explain Another example brings out another weakness
why such acts are morally wrong. in the public permission principle. Consider open
Still, it would be disastrous if everyone knew that marriage. Max and Minnie get married because each
they were permitted to steal (or lie, rape, etc.). So we loves the other and values the other person's love.
simply need to add one qualification: Still, they think of sexual intercourse as a fun activ-
The public permission principle: I have a moral obliga- ity that they separate from love. After careful discus-
tion not to perform an act whenever it would be worse sion before they got married, each happily agreed that
for everyone to know that everyone is permitted to each may have sex after marriage with whomever he
perform an act of that kind. or she wants. They value honesty, so they did add one
condition: every sexual encounter must be reported
Now this principle seems to explain the moral to the other spouse. As long as they keep no secrets
wrongness of many of the acts we take to be morally from each other and still love each other, they see
wrong, since it would be disastrous if everyone knew no problem with their having sex with other people.
that everyone was permitted to steal, lie, cheat, and They do not broadcast this feature of their marriage,
soon. but they do know (after years of experience) that it
Unfortunately, this revised principle runs into works for them.
trouble in other cases. Imagine that 1000 people want Nonetheless, the society in which Max and Min-
to take Flight 38 to Amsterdam on October 13, 2003, nie live might be filled with people who are very dif-
but the plane is not large enough to carry that many ferent from them. If everyone knew that everyone
people. If all 1,000 took that particular flight, then it is permitted to have sex during marriage with other
would crash. But these people are all stupid and stub- people as long as the other spouse is informed and
born enough that, if they knew that they were all agreed to the arrangement, then various problems
allowed to take the flight, they all would pack them- would arise. Merely asking a spouse whether he or
selves in, despite warnings, and the flight would crash. she would be willing to enter into such an agreement
Luckily, this counterfactual does not reflect what would be enough to create suspicions and doubts
actually happens. In the actual world, the airline is in the other spouse's mind that would undermine
not stupid. Since the plane can safely carry only 300 many marriages or keep many couples from getting
people, the airline sells only 300 tickets and does not married, when they would have gotten or remained
allow anyone on the flight without a ticket. If I have happily married if they had not been offered such
a ticket for that flight, then there is nothing morally an agreement. As a result, the society will have less
wrong with me taking the flight along with the other love, fewer stable marriages, and more unhappy
299 who have tickets. This shows that an act is not children of unnecessary divorce. Things would be
much better if everyone believed that such agree- spouse, even if the spouse knows and consents. It
ments were not permitted in the first place, so they might seem that Max and Minnie could not reason-
condemned them and felt guilty for even considerably reject this rule as a public social rule, because
ing them. I think that this result is not unrealistic, they want to avoid problems for their own sOciety.
but here I am merely postulating these facts in my If so, Scanlon's principle leads to the same question-
example. able results as the public permiSSion principle. If
Scanlon replies that Max and Minnie "can" reason-
The point is that, even if other people are like this,
so that it would be worse for everyone to know that ably reject the anti-adultery rule, then why? The
everyone is permitted to have sex outside of marriage most plausible answer is that it is their own business
with spousal knowledge and consent, Max and Min- how they have fun as long as they do not hurt any-
nie are not like this, and they know that they are not body. But this answer is available also to people who
drive gas-guzzlers just for fun. So this principle can-
like this, so it is hard to believe that they as individuals
have a moral obligation to abide by a restriction that not explain why that act is morally wrong.
is justified by other people's dispositions. If Max and More generally, the test of what can be rejected
Minnie have a joint agreement that works for them, ccreasonably" depends on moral intuitions. Envi-
but they keep it secret from others, then there is noth- ronmentalists might think it unreasonable to reject
ing immoral about them having sex outside of their a principle that prohibits me from driving my gas-
marriage (whether or not this counts as adultery). If guzzler just for fun, but others will think it reasonable
this is correct, then the general permission principle to reject such a principle, because it restricts my free-
fails again. dom to perform an act that harms nobody. The appeal
As before, the lesson of this example applies to reasonable rejection itself begs the question in the
directly to my case of driving a gas-guzzler. The rea- absence of an account of why such rejection is unrea-
son why Max and Minnie are not immoral is that sonable. EnVironmentalists might be able to specify
they have a right to their own private relationship as reasons why it is unreasonable, but then it is those rea-
long as they do not harm others (such as by spread- sons that explain why this act is morally wrong. The
ing disease or discord). But I have already argued that framework of reasonable rejection becomes a distract-
my driving a gas-guzzler on this Sunday afternoon ing and unnecessary side step.
does not cause harm. I seem to have a right to have
fun in the way I want as long as I do not hurt anybody
7. WHAT IS LEFT?
else, just like Max and Minnie. So the public permis-
sion principle cannot explain why it is morally wrong We are left with no defensible principle to support
to drive a gas-guzzler for fun on this sunny Sunday the claim that I have a moral obligation not to drive a
afternoon. gas-guzzler just for fun. Does this result show that this
One final counterfactual approach is contractu- claim is false? Not necessarily.
alism, whose most forceful recent proponent is Tim Some audiences have suggested that my journey
Scanlon. Scanlon proposes: through various principles teaches us that we should
not look for general moral principles to back up our
The contractualist principle: I have a moral obligation moral intuitions. They see my arguments as a "reduc-
not to perform an act whenever it violates a general tio ad absurdum" of principlism, which is the view
rule that nobody could reasonably reject as a public that moral obligations (or our beliefs in them) depend
rule for governing action in society. on principles. PrinCiples are unavailable, so we should
Let us try to apply this principle to the case of focus instead on particular cases, according to the
Max and Minnie. Consider a general rule against opposing view called particularism.
adultery, that is, against voluntary sex between a However, the fact that we cannot find any
married person and someone other than his or her principle does not show that we do not need one.
I already gave my reasons why we need a moral who drive wastefully should feel guilty for their acts
principle to back up our intuitions in this case. This and ashamed of themselves, at least if they perform
case is controversial, emotional, peculiarly modern, such acts regularly; and we should bring up our chil-
and likely to be distorted by overgeneralization and dren so that they will feel these emotions. All of these
partiality. These factors suggest that we need confir- reactions are available even if we cannot truthfully
mation for our moral intuitions at least in this case, say that such driving violates a moral "obligation."
even if we do not need any confirmation in other And these approaches might be more constructive
cases. in the long run than accusing someone of violating a
For such reasons, we seem to need a moral prin- moral obligation.
ciple, but we have none. This fact still does not show Moreover, even if individuals have no moral obli-
that such wasteful driving is not morally wrong. It gations not to waste gas by taking unnecessary Sun-
only shows that we do not "know" whether it is mor- day drives just for fun, governments still have moral
ally wrong. Our ignorance might be temporary. If obligations to fight global warming, because they can
someone comes up with a defensible principle that make a difference. My fundamental point has been
does rule out wasteful driving, then I will be happy that global warming is such a large problem that it
to listen and happy if it works. However, until some is not individuals who cause it or who need to fix it.
such principle is found, we cannot claim to know Instead, governments need to fix it, and quickly. Find-
that it is morally wrong to drive a gas-guzzler just ing and implementing a real solution is the task of
for fun. governments. Environmentalists should focus their
The demand for a principle in this case does not efforts on those who are not doing their job rather
lead to general moral skepticism. We still might know than on those who take Sunday afternoon drives just
that acts and omissions that cause harm are morally for fun.
wrong because of the harm principle. Still, since that This focus will also avoid a common mistake.
principle and others do not apply to my wasteful driv- Some environmentalists keep their hands clean by
ing, and since moral intuitions are unreliable in cases withdrawing into a simple life where they use very
like this, we cannot know that my wasteful driving is little fossil fuels. That is great. I encourage it. But
morally wrong. some of these escapees then think that they have
This conclusion will still upset many environ- done their duty, so they rarely come down out of
mentalists. They think that they know that wasteful the hills to work for political candidates who could
driving is immoral. They want to be able to condemn and would change government policies. This atti-
those who drive gas-guzzlers just for fun on sunny tude helps nobody. We should not think that we
Sunday afternoons. can do enough simply by buying fuel-efficient cars,
My conclusion should not be so disappointing. insulating our houses, and setting up a windmill to
Even if individuals have no such moral obligations, make our own electricity. That is all wonderful, but
it is still morally better or morally ideal for individu- it neither does little or nothing to stop global warm-
als not to waste gas. We can and should praise those ing, nor does this focus fulfill our real moral obliga-
who save fuel. We can express our personal dislike for tions, which are to get governments to do their job to
wasting gas and for people who do it. We might even prevent the disaster of excessive global warming. It is
be justified in publicly condemning wasteful driving better to enjoy your Sunday driving while working to
and drivers who waste a lot, in circumstances where change the law so as to make it illegal for you to enjoy
such public rebuke is appropriate. Perhaps people your Sunday driving.
Are All Species Equal?

DAVID SCHMIDTZ
I. RESPECT FOR NATURE (b) The belief that the human species, along with all
Species egalitarianism is the view that all species have other species, are integral elements in a system of
equal moral standing. 1 To have moral standing is, at interdependence.
a minimum, to command respect, to be something (c) The belief that all organisms are teleological cen-
more than a mere thing. Is there any reason to believe tres of life in the sense that each is a unique indi-
that all species have moral standing in even this most vidual pursuing its own good in its own way.
minimal sense? If so-that is, if all species command (d) The belief that humans are not inherently superior
respect-is there any reason to believe they all com- to other living beings.
mand equal respect?
The following sections summarise critical res- Taylor concludes, 'Rejecting the notion of human
ponses to the most famous philosophical argument for superiority entails its positive counterpart: the doc-
species egalitarianism. I then try to explain why other trine of species impartiality. One who accepts that
species command our respect but also why they do not doctrine regards all living things as possessing inher-
command equal respect. The intuition that we should ent worth-the same inherent worth, since no one
have respect for nature is part of what motivates people species has been shown to be either higher or lower
to embrace species egalitarianism, but one need not than any other.'3
be a species egalitarian to have respect for nature. I close Taylor does not claim that this is a valid argument,
by questioning whether species egalitarianism is even but he thinks that if we concede (a), (b), and (c), it
compatible with respect for nature. would be unreasonable not to move to (d), and then
to his egalitarian conclusion. Is he right? For those
:v ho accept Taylor's three premises (and who thus
II. THE GROUNDING OF SPECIES mterpret those premises in terms innocuous enough
EGALITARIANISM t~ render them acceptable), there are two responses.
According to Paul Taylor, anthropocentrism 'gives Fust, we may go on to accept (d), following Taylor but
th en stl'Il deny that there is any warrant for moving'
either exclusive or primary consideration to human
2 from there to Taylor's egalitarian conclusion. Having
interests above the good of other species: The alter-
accepte~ that our form of life is not superior, we might
native to anthropocentrism is biocentrism, and it is
biocentrism that, in Taylor's view, grounds species ~hoo~e mst:ad to regard it as inferior. More plaUSibly,
. e mIght VIew our form of life as noncomparable. We
egalitarianism:
The beliefs that form the core of the biocentric SImply do not have the same kind of value as nonhu-
mans. The question of how we compare to nonhu-
outlook are four in number:
mans has a simple answer: we do not compare to them.
(a) The belief that humans are members of the Earth's Alternatively, we may reject (d) and say humans
Community of life in the same sense and on the are indeed inherently superior but our superiority is a
same terms in which other living things are mem- moot paint. Whether we are inherently superior (that
bers of that community. is, superior as a form of life) does not matter much.
Even if we are superior, the fact remains that within
the web of ecological interdependence mentioned in
David Schmidtz, "Are All Species Equal?" from /ollmal of Applied premises (a) and (b), it would be a mistake to ignore
Philosophy 15(1): 57-66. Copyright lei 1998 Blackwell Publishing the needs and the telos of the other species referred
Ltd. Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. to in premise (c). Thus, there are two ways of rejecting
Taylor's argument for species egalitarianism. Each, on that we must kill in order to eat, though, for there is
its face, is compatible with the respect for nature that no aVOiding that. Species egalitarianism is compatible
motivates Taylor's egalitarianism in the first place. with our having a limited license to kill.
Taylor's critics, such as James Anderson and Wil- What seems far more problematic for species egali-
liam French, have taken the second route. They reject tarianism is that it seems to suggest that it makes no
(d). After discussing their arguments, and building on difference what we kill. Vegetarians typically think
some while rejecting others, I explore some of our rea- it is worse to kill a cow than to kill a potato. Are they
sons to have respect for nature and ask whether they wrong? Yes they are, according to species egalitarian-
translate into reasons to be species egalitarians. ism. In this respect, species egalitarianism cannot be
right. I do believe we have reason to respect nature. But
we fail to give nature due respect if we say we should
III. IS SPECIES EGALITARIANISM have no more respect for a cow than for a potato.
HYPOCRITICAL?
Paul Taylor and Arne Naess are among the most
intransigent of species egalitarians, yet they allow that IV. IS SPECIES EGALITARIANISM ARBITRARY?
human needs override the needs of nonhumans. 4 Wil- Suppose interspecies comparisons are possible. Sup-
liam C. French argues that they cannot have it both pose the capacities of different species, and whatever
s
ways. French perceives a contradiction between the else gives species moral standing, are commensurable.
egalitarian principles that Taylor and Naess officially In that case, it could turn out that all species are equal,
endorse and the unofficial principles they offer as but that would be quite a fluke.
the real principles by which we should live. Having Taylor says a being has intrinsic worth if and only
proclaimed that we are all equal, French asks, what if it has a good of its own. Anderson does not disagree,
licenses Taylor and Naess to say that, in cases of con- but he points out that if we accept Taylor's idea of a
flict, nonhuman interests can legitimately be sacri- thing having a good of its own, then that licenses us
ficed to vital human interests? to notice differences among the various kinds of 'good
French has a point. James C. Anderson makes a of its own.' (We can notice differences Without being
6
similar point. Yet, somehow the inconsistency of committed to ranking them.) For example, we can dis-
Taylor and Naess is too obvious. Perhaps their posi- tinguish, along Aristotelian lines, vegetative, animal,
tion is not as blatantly inconsistent as it appears. Let and cognitive goods of one's own. To have a vegetative
me suggest how Taylor and Naess could respond to nature is to be what Taylor, in premise (c), calls a teleo-
French. Suppose I find myself in a situation of mor- logical centre of life. A being with an animal nature
tal combat with an enemy soldier. If I kill my enemy is a teleological centre of life, and more. A being with
to save my life, that does not entail that I regard my a cognitive as well as animal nature is a teleological
enemy as inherently inferior (Le., as an inferior form centre of life, and more still. Cognitive nature may be
of life). Likewise, if I kill a bear to save my life, that does something we share with whales, dolphins, and higher
not entail that I regard the bear as inherently inferior. primates. It is an empirical question. Anderson's view
Therefore, Taylor and Naess can, without hypocrisy, is that so long as we do not assume away this possibil-
deny that species egalitarianism requires a radically ity, valuing cognitive capacity is not anthropocentric.
self-effacing pacifism. The question is what would make any species superior
What, then, does species egalitarianism require? It to another (p. 348).
requires us to avoid mortal combat whenever we can, As mentioned earlier, Taylor defines anthropo-
not just with other humans but with living things centrism as giving exclusive or primary consideration
in general. On this view, we ought to regret finding to human interests above the good of other species.
ourselves in kill-or-be-killed situations that we could So, when we acknowledge that cognitive capacity is
have avoided. There is no point in regretting the fact one valuable capacity among others, are we giving
exclusive or primary considerations to human inter- turn, humans (and possibly dolphins, apes, and so on)
ests? Anderson thinks not, and surely he is right. Put have an animal's capacities plus more. The comparison
it this way: if biocentrism involves resolving to ignore between Socrates and swine therefore is less a matter
the fact that cognitive capacity is something we of comparing swine to non-swine and more a matter
value-if biocentrism amounts to a resolution to value of comparing swine to 'swine-plus' (Anderson, p. 361).
only those capacities that all living things share- Crucially, Anderson's argument for the superiority of
then biocentrism is at least as arbitrary and question- Socrates over swine does not presume that one capac-
begging as anthropocentrism. ity is higher than another. We do not need to make any
It will not do to defend species egalitarianism by sin- assumptions about the respective merits of animal or
gling out a property that all species possess, arguing that vegetative versus cognitive capacities in order to con-
this property is morally important, and then concluding clude that the capacities of 'swine-plus' are superior to
that all species are therefore of equal moral importance. those of Swine.
The problem with this sort of argument is that, where We may of course conclude that one of the grounds
there is one property that provides a basis for moral stand- of our moral standing (Le., our vegetative natures) is
ing, there might be others. Other properties might be something we share with all living things. Beyond
possessed by some but not all species, and might.provide that, nothing about equality even suggests itself. In
bases for different kinds or degrees of moral standing. particular, it begs no questions to notice that there are
grounds for moral standing that we do not share with
all living things.
V. THE MULTIPLE BASES OF MORAL STANDING
Taylor is aware of the Aristotelian classification
scheme, but considers its hierarchy of capacities to be VI. IN PRAISE OF SPECIESISM
question-begging. Taylor himself assumes that human William French invites us to see species rankings not
rationality is on a par with a cheetah's foot-speed. In 'as an assessment of some inherent superiority, but
this case, though, perhaps it is Taylor who begs the rather as a considered moral recognition of the fact
question. It hardly seems unreasonable to see the dif- that greater ranges of vulnerability are generated by
ference between the foot-speed of chimpanzees and broader ranges of complexity and capacities' (p. 56).
cheetahs as a difference of degree, while seeing the One species outranks another not because it is a supe-
difference between the sentience of a chimpanzee and rior form of life but rather because it is a more vulner-
the nonsentience of a tree as a difference in kind. able form of life. French, if I understand correctly,
Anthropocentrists might argue that the good asso- interprets vulnerability as a matter of having more
ciated with cognitive capacity is superior to the good to lose. This interpretation is problematic. It implies
associated with vegetative capacity. Could they be that a millionaire, having more to lose than a pau-
wrong? Let us suppose they are wrong. For argument's per, is by that fact more vulnerable than the pauper.
sake, let us suppose vegetative capacity is the superior Perhaps this interpretation is forced upon French,
good. Even so, the exact nature of the good associated though. If French had instead chosen a more natural
with an organism's vegetative capacity will depend interpretation-if he had chosen to interpret vulner-
upon the organism's other capacities. For example, ability as a matter of probability of loss-then a ranking
Anderson (p. 358) pOints out that even if health in a by vulnerability would not be correlated to complex
human and health in a tree are instances of the same capacities in the way he wants. Ranking by probabil-
thing, they need not have the same moral standing. ity of loss would change on a daily baSiS, and the top-
Why not? Because health in a human has an instru- ranked species often would be an amphibian.
mental value that health in a tree lacks. John Stuart If we set aside questions about how to interpret vul-
Mill's swine can take pleasure in its health but trees nerability, there remains a problem with French's pro-
cannot. Animals have a plant's capacities plus more. In posal. If having complex capacities is not itself morally
important, then being in danger of losing them is not level without thereby taking any position on whether
morally important either. Vulnerability, on any inter- rationality makes a moral difference at the token level.
pretation, is essentially of derivative importance; any A speciesist could say humanity's characteristic ratio-
role it could play in ranking species must already be nality mandates respect for humanity, not merely for
played by the capacities themselves. particular humans who exemplify human rationality.
Yet, although I reject French's argument, I do not Similarly, once we note that chimpanzees have charac-
reject his inegalitarian conclusion. The conclusion teristic cognitive capacities that mice lack, we do not
that mice are the moral equals of chimpanzees is about need to compare individual chimpanzees and mice on
as insupportable as a conclusion can be. Suppose that, a case by case basis in order to have a moral justifica-
for some reason, we take an interest in how chimpan- tion for planning to use a mouse rather than a chim-
zees rank compared to mice. Perhaps we wonder what panzee in an experiment.
we would do in an emergency where we could save a Of course, some chimpanzees lack the character-
drowning chimpanzee or a drowning mouse but not istic features in virtue of which chimpanzees com-
both. More realistically, we might wonder whether, mand respect as a species, just as some humans lack
other things equal, we have any reason to use mice in the characteristic features in virtue of which humans
our medical experiments rather than chimpanzees. command respect as a species. It is equally obvious
Species egalitarianism seems to say not. that some chimpanzees have cognitive capacities (for
Suppose we decide upon reflection that, from our example) that are superior to the cognitive capacities
human perspective, chimpanzees are superior to mice of some humans. But whether every human being is
and humans are superior to chimpanzees. Would the superior to every chimpanzee is beSide the point. The
perceived superiority of our form of life give us reason point is that we can, we do, and we should make deci-
to think we have no obligations whatsoever to mice, sions on the basis of our recognition that mice, chim-
or to chimpanzees? Those who believe we have fewer panzees, and humans are relevantly different types.
obligations to inferior species might be pressed to say We can have it both ways after all. Or so a speciesist
whether they also would allow that we have fewer could argue.
obligations to inferior human beings. Lawrence john-
son, for example, rhetorically asks whether it is worse
to cause a person pain if the person is a Nobel Prize VII. EQUALITY AND TRANSCENDENCE
7
winner. Well, why not? EchOing Peter Singer, john- Even if speciesists are right to see a nonarbitrary dis-
son argues that if medical researchers had to choose tinction between humans and other species, though,
between harvesting the organs of a chimpanzee or a the fact remains that, as Anderson (p. 362) points out,
brain-damaged human baby, lone thing we cannot claims of superiority do not easily translate into justi-
justify is trying to have it both ways. If rationality is fications of domination. We can have reasons to treat
what makes the basic moral difference, then we can- nonhuman species with respect, regardless of whether
not maintain that the brain-damaged infant ought we consider them to be on a moral par with h01110 [sic}
to be exempt from utilisation just because it is human sapiens.
while at the same time allowing that the animal can be What kind of reasons do we have for treating other
used if utility warrants' (p. 52). species with respect? We might have respect for chim-
Does this seem obvious? It should not. johnson panzees or even mice on the grounds that they are sen-
presumes that rationality is relevant to justification tient. Even mice have a rudimentary pOint of view and
at the token level when speciesists (Le., those who rudimentary hopes and dreams, and we might well
believe some species, the human species in particu- respect them for that. But what about plants? Plants,
lar, are superior to others) presumably would invoke unlike mice and chimpanzees, do not care what hap-
rationality as a justification at the type level. One can pens to them. It is literally true that they could not
say rationality makes a moral difference at the type care less. So, why should we care? Is it even possible for
us to have any good reason, other than a purely instru- light of our sensibilities, knowledge, and cultural!
mental reason, to care what happens to plants? personal histories .... The limits of moral regard are set
When we are alone in a forest wondering whether only by the limitations of one's own (or one's species'
it would be fine to chop down a tree for fun, our per- or one's community's) ability to respond in a caring
spective on what happens to the tree is, so far as we manner.'9 Should we believe Cheney's rather startling
know, the only perspective there is. The tree does not proposal that moral regard is appropriate whenever we
have its own. Thus, explaining why we have reason to can manage it? One reason to take it very seriously is
care about trees requires us to explain caring from our that exercising our capacity for moral regard is a way of
point of view, since that (we are supposing) is all there expressing respect for that capacity. Developing that
is. In that case, we do not have to satisfy trees that we capacity is a form of self-realization.
are treating them properly; rather, we have to satisfy Put it this way. I am arguing that the attitude we
ourselves. So, again, can we have noninstrumental rea- take toward gazelles (for example) raises issues of self-
sons for caring about trees-for treating them with respect insofar as we see ourselves as relevantly like
respect? gazelles. My reading of Cheney suggests a different
One reason to care (not the only one) is that gratu- and complementary way of looking at the issue. Con-
itous destruction is a failure of self-respect. It is a repu- sider that lions owe nothing to gazelles. Therefore,
diation of the kind of self-awareness and self-respect if we owe it to gazelles not to hunt them, it must be
that we can achieve by repudiating wantonness. So far because we are unlike lions, not (or not only) because
as I know, no one finds anything puzzling in the idea we are like gazelles.
that we have reason to treat our lawns or living rooms Unlike lions, we have a choice about whether to
with respect. Lawns and living rooms have instrumen- hunt gazelles, and we are capable of deliberating about
tal value, but there is more to it than that. Most of us that choice in a reflective way. We are capable of car-
have the sense that taking reasonable care of our lawns ing about the gazelle's pain, the gazelle's beauty, the
and living rooms is somehow a matter of self-respect, gazelle's hopes and dreams (such as they are), and so
not merely a matter of preserving their instrumental forth. And if we do care, then in a more or less literal
value. Do we have similar reasons to treat forests with way, something is wrong with us-we are less than
respect? I think we do. There is an aesthetic involved, fully human-if we cannot adjust our behaviour in
the repudiation of which would be a failure of self- the light of what we care about. If we do not care, then
respect. (Obviously, not everyone feels the same way we are missing something. For a human being, to lack
about forests. Not everyone feels the same way about a broad respect for living things and beautiful things
lawns and living rooms, either. But the point here is and well-functioning things is to be stunted in a way.
to make sense of respect for nature, not to argue that Our coming to see other species as command-
respect for nature is in fact universal or that failing to ing respect is itself a way of transcending our animal
respect nature is irrational.)8 If and when we identify natures. It is ennobling. It is part of our animal natures
with a Redwood, in the sense of being inspired by it, unthinkingly to see ourselves as superior, and to try to
having respect for its size and age and so on, then as a dominate accordingly; our capacity to see ourselves
psychological fact, we really do face moral questions as equal is one of the things that makes us different.
about how we ought to treat it. If and when we come Thus, our capacity to see ourselves as equal may be one
to see a Redwood in that light, subsequently turning of the things that makes us superior. Coming to see all
our backs on it becomes a kind of self-effacement. The species as equal may not be the best way of transcend-
values that we thereby fail to take seriously are our val- ing our animal natures-it does not work for me-but
ues, not the tree's. it is one way. Another way of transcending our animal
A related way of grounding respect for nature is natures and expressing due respect for nature is simply
suggested by Jim Cheney's remark that (moral regard to not worry so much about ranking species. This lat-
is appropriate wherever we are able to manage it-in ter way is, I think, better. It is more respectful of our
own reflective natures. It does not dwell on rankings. It to me, which suggests the burden of proof lies with
does not insist on seeing equality where a more reflec- those who claim we should have respect for other
tive being simply would see what is there to be seen species.
and would not shy away from respecting the differ- I would not say, though, that this burden is unbear-
ences as well as the commonalities. The whole idea of able. One reason to have regard for other species has to
ranking species, even as equals, sometimes seems like do with self-respect. (As I said earlier, when we mistreat
a child's game. It seems beneath us. a tree that we admire, the values we fail to respect are
our values, not the tree's.) A second reason has to do
with self-realisation. (As I said, exercising our capacity
VIII. RESPECT FOR EVERYTHING for moral regard is a form of self-realisation.) Finally,
Thus, a broad respect for living or beautiful or well- at least some species seem to share with human beings
functioning things need not translate into equal precisely those cognitive and affective characteristics
respect. It need not translate into universal respect, that lead us to see human life as especially worthy
either. I can appreciate mosquitoes to a degree. My of esteem. johnson describes experiments in which
wife (a biochemist who studies mosquito immune rhesus monkeys show extreme reluctance to obtain
systems) even finds them beautiful, or so she says. My food by means that would subject monkeys in neigh-
own appreciation, by contrast, is thin and grudging bouring cages to electric shock (p. 64n). He describes
and purely intellectual. In neither degree nor kind is the case of Washoe, a chimpanzee who learned sign
it anything like the appreciation I have for my wife, language. Anyone who has tried to learn a foreign
or for human beings in general, or even for the rab- language ought to be able to appreciate how astonish-
bits I sometimes find eating my flowers in the morning an intellectual feat it is that an essentially nonlin-
ing. Part of our responsibility as moral agents is to be guistic creature could learn a language-a language
somewhat choosy about what we respect and how we that is not merely foreign but the language of another
respect it. I can see why people shy away from openly species.
accepting that responsibility, but they still have it. johnson believes Washoe has moral standing
johnson says speciesism is as arbitrary as racism (pp. 27-31), but he does not believe that the moral
unless we can show that the differences are morally standing of chimpanzees, and indeed of all living
relevant (p. 51). This is, to be sure, a popular sentiment creatures, implies that we must resolve never to kill
among radical environmentalists and animal libera- (p. 136). Thus, johnson supports killing introduced
tionists. But are we really like racists when we think it is animal species (feral dogs, rabbits, and so forth) to pre-
worse to kill a dolphin than to kill a tuna? The person vent the extermination of Australia's native species,
who says there is a relevant similarity between specie- including native plant species (p. 174),
sism and racism has the burden of proof: go ahead and Is johnson guilty of advocating the speciesist
identify the similarity. Is seeing moral significance in equivalent of ethnic cleansing? Has he shown himself
biological differences between chimpanzees and pota- to be no better than a racist? I think not. johnson is
toes anything like seeing moral Significance in biologi- right to want to take drastic measures to protect Aus-
cal differences between races? I think not. tralia's native flora, and the idea of respecting trees is
Is it true that we need good reason to exclude intelligible. Certainly one thing I feel in the presence
plants and animals from the realm of things we regard of Redwoods is something like a feeling of respect. But
as commanding respect? Or do we need reason to I doubt that what underlies johnson's willingness to kill
include them? Should we be trying to identify prop- feral dogs is mere respect for Australia's native plants.
erties in virtue of which a thing forfeits presumptive I suspect that his approval of such killings turns on the
moral standing? Or does it make more sense to be try- needs and aesthetic sensibilities of human beings, not
ing to identify properties in virtue of which a thing just the interests of plants. 10 For example, if the endan-
commands respect? The latter seems more natural gered native species happened to be a malaria-carrying
mosquito, I doubt that Johnson would advocate wip- Equating these three projects has important rami-
ing out an exotic but minimally intrusive species of fications. Suppose for the sake of argument that what
amphibian in order to save the mosquitoes. makes us morally important is that we are capable of
Aldo Leopold urged us to see ourselves as plain suffering. If what makes us morally important is neces-
citizens of, rather than conquerors of the biotic com- sarily the same property that constitutes our essence,
munity, but there are some species with whom we can then our essence is that we are capable of suffering.
never be fellow citizens. 11 The rabbits eating my flow- And if our essence necessarily is what makes us dif-
ers in the back yard are neighbours, and I cherish their ferent from all other species, then we can deduce that
company, minor frictions notwithstanding. I feel no dogs are not capable of suffering.
sense of community with mosquitoes, though, and Likewise with rationality. If rationality is our
not merely because they are not warm and furry. Some essence, then rationality is what makes us morally
mosquito species are so adapted to making human important and also what makes us unique. Therefore, we
beings miserable that moral combat is not accidental; can deduce that chimpanzees are not rational. Alter-
rather, combat is a natural state. It is how such creatures natively, if some other animal becomes rational,
live. Recall Cheney's remark that the limits of moral does that mean our essence will change? Is that why
regard are set by the limits of our ability to respond in some people find Washoe, the talking chimpanzee,
a caring manner. I think it is fair to say human beings threatening?
are not able to respond to malaria-carrying mosqui- The three projects, needless to say, should not be
toes in a caring manner. At very least, most of us would conflated in the way philosophy seems historically to
think less of a person who did respond to them in a have conflated them, but we can reject species equal-
caring manner. We would regard the person's caring ity without conflating them. If we like, we can select
as a parody of respect for nature. a property With respect to which all species are the
The conclusion that all species have moral stand- same, then argue that that property confers moral
ing is unmotivated. For human beings, viewing apes as standing, then say all species have moral standing. To
having moral standing is a form of self-respect. View- infer that all species have the same standing, though,
ing viruses as having moral standing is not. It is good would be to ignore the possibility that there are other
to have a sense of how amazing living things are, but morally important properties with respect to which
being able to marvel at living things is not the same as not all species are equal.
thinking all species have moral standing. Life as such There is room to wonder whether species egali-
commands respect only in the limited but nonetheless tarianism is even compatible with respect for nature.
important sense that for self-aware and reflective crea- Is it true that we should have no more regard for dol-
tures who want to act in ways that make sense, delib- phins than for tuna? Is it true that the moral standing
erately killing something is an act that does not make of chimpanzees is no higher than that of mosquitoes?
sense unless we have good reason to do it. Destroying I worry that these things are not only untrue, but also
something for no good reason is (at best) the moral disrespectful. Dolphins and chimpanzees command
equivalent of vandalism. more respect than species egalitarianism allows.
There is no denying that it demeans us to destroy
IX. THE HISTORY OF THE DEBATE species we find beautiful or otherwise beneficial.
What about species in which we find neither beauty
There is an odd project in the history of philosophy
nor benefit? It is, upon reflection, obviously in our
that equates what seem to be three distinct projects:
interest to enrich our lives by finding them beautiful
1. determining our essence; or benefiCial, if we can. By and large, we must agree
2. specifying how we are different from all other with Leopold that it is too late for conquering the
species; biotic community. Our most pressing task now is to
3. specifying what makes us morally important. find ways of fitting in. Species egalitarianism is one
way of trying to understand how we fit in. In the 7. LawrenceJohnson (1991) A Morally Deep World (New York, Cam-
end, it is not an acceptable way. Having respect for bridge University Press), p. 52.
nature and being a species egalitarian are two differ- 8. Thus, the objective is to explain how a rational agent could have
respect for trees, not to argue that a rational agent could not faiJ
ent things.
to have respect. In utilitarian terms, a person whose utility func-
tion leaves no room to derive pleasure from respecting trees is
not irrational for failing to respect trees, but people whose utility
NOTES functions include a potential for deriving pleasure from respect-
1. A species egalitarian mayor may not believe that individual ing trees have reason (other things equal) to enrich their lives by
living things all have equal moral standing. A species egalitarian realising that potential.
may think a given whooping crane matters more than a given 9.Jim Cheney (1987) Eco-feminism and deep ecology, Environmen-
bald eagle because the cranes are endangered, despite believing tal Ethics 9: 115-45, here p. 144.
that the differences between the two species qua species are not
to. Johnson believes ecosystems as such have moral standing
morally important.
and that, consequently, 'we should always stop short of entirely
2. Paul W. Taylor (1983) In defense of biocentrism, Environmental destroying or irreparably degrading any ecosystem' (p. 276).
Ethics, 5: 237-43, here p. 240. 'Chopping some trees is one thing, then, but destroying a forest
3. Taylor (1994), [Respect for Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- is something else' (p. 276). But this is impossible to square with
versity Press)], p. 35. his remark that there 'is an ecosystem in a tiny puddle of water
in a rotting stump' (p. 265). Thus, when Johnson says ecosystems
4. Arne Naess (1973) The shallow and the deep, long-range ecol-
should never be destroyed, he does not mean ecosystems per se.
ogy movement: a summary, Inquiry, 16: 95-100.
Rather he means forests, deserts, marshes, and so on-ecosystems
5. William C. French (1995) Against biospherical egalitarianism, that are recognisable as habitat either for humans or for species
Environmental Ethics, 17: 39-57, here pp. 44ft. that humans care about.
6. James c. Anderson (1993) Species equality and the foundations 11. Aldo Leopold (1966, first published in 1949) Sand County Alma-
of moral theory, Environmental Values, 2: 347-65, here p. 350. nac (New York, Oxford University Press) p. 240.
From The Land Ethic

ALDO LEOPOLD
When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home. The ethical
Troy, he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls structure of that day covered wives, but had not yet
of his household whom he suspected of misbehavior been extended to human chattels. During the three
during his absence. thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical cri-
This hanging involved no question of propriety. teria have been extended to many fields of conduct,
The girls were property. The disposal of property was with corresponding shrinkages in those judged by
then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and expediency only.
wrong. This extension of ethics, so far studied only by
Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolu-
from Odysseus' Greece: witness the fidelity of his wife tion. Its sequences may be described in ecological as
through the long years before at last his black-prowed well as in philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically,
is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for
existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentia-
Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic" from A Sand County Almanac,
tion of social from anti-social conduct. These are two
2nd Edition, pp. 201-226. Copyright (() 1949, 1977 by Oxford
University Press, Inc. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the
through PLSclear. tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to
evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls thesecompete for his place in the community, but his ethics
symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced sym- prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that
bioses in which the original free-far-all competition there may be a place to compete for).
has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mecha- The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of
nisms with an ethical content. the community to include soils, waters, plants, and
The complexity of co-operative mechanisms has animals, or collectively: the land.
increased with population density, and with the effi- This sounds simple: do we not already sing our love
ciency of tools. It was simpler, for example, to definefor and obligation to the land of the free and the home
of the brave? Yes, but just what and whom do we love?
the anti-social uses of sticks and stones in the days of
the mastodons than of bullets and billboards in the Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-
age of motors. skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which we
The first ethics dealt with the relation between assume have no function except to turn turbines, float
individuals; the Mosaic Decalogue is an example. barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants,
Later accretions dealt with the relation between the of which we exterminate whole communities without
individual and society. The Golden Rule tries to inte- batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which
grate the individual to society; democracy to integrate we have already extirpated many of the largest and
social organization to the individual. most beautiful species. A land ethic of course cannot
There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's rela- prevent the alteration, management, and use of these
tion to land and to the animals and plants which grow 'resources,' but it does affirm their right to continued
existence, and, at least in spots, their continued exis-
upon it. Land, like Odysseus' slave-girls, is still prop-
tence in a natural state.
erty. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entail-
ing privileges but not obligations. In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo
The extension of ethics to this third element in sapiens from conquerer of the land-community to
human environment is, if I read the evidence correctly,plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for
an evolutionary possibility and an ecological neces- his fellow-members, and also respect for the commu-
nity as such.
sity. It is the third step in a sequence. The first two have
already been taken. Individual thinkers since the days In human history, we have learned (I hope) that
of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the despolia- the conquerer role is eventually self-defeating. Why?
tion of land is not only inexpedient but wrong. Soci- Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror
knows, ex cathedra, just what makes the community
ety, however, has not yet affirmed their belief. I regard
the present conservation movement as the embryo of clock tick, and just what and who is valuable, and what
such an affirmation. and who is worthless, in community life. It always
An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance turns out that he knows neither, and this is why his
for meeting ecological situations so new or intricate, conquests eventually defeat themselves.
or involving such deferred reactions, that the path In the biotic community, a parallel situation exists.
of social expediency is not discernible to the average Abraham knew exactly what the land was for: it was to
individual. Animal instincts are modes of guidance for drop milk and honey into Abraham's mouth. At the
the individual in meeting such situations. Ethics are present moment, the assurance with which we regard
possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making. this assumption is inverse to the degree of our education.
The ordinary citizen today assumes that science
knows what makes the community clock tick; the sci-
THE COMMUNITY CONCEPT entist is equally sure that he does not. He knows that
All ethiCS so far evolved rest upon a single premise: the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings
that the individual is a member of a community of may never be fully understood.
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to * * *
SUBSTITUTES FOR A LAND ETHIC on: witness the impending erasure of the timber wolf
When the logic of history hungers for bread and we by fiat of Congress, the Conservation Bureaus, and
hand out a stone, we are at pains to explain how much many state legislatures.
the stone resembles bread. I now describe some of the Some species of trees have been 'read out of the
stones which serve in lieu of a land ethic. party' by economics-minded foresters because they
One basic weakness in a conservation system grow too slowly, or have too Iowa sale value to pay as
based wholly on economic motives is that most timber crops: white cedar, tamarack, cypress, beech,
members of the land community have no economic and hemlock are examples. In Europe, where forestry
value. Wildflowers and songbirds are examples. Of the is ecologically more advanced, the non-commercial
22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wiscon- tree species are recognized as members of the native
sin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 percent can be forest community, to be preserved as such, within rea-
sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet son. Moreover some (like beech) have been found to
these creatures are members of the biotic community, have a valuable function in building up soil fertility.
and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity, The interdependence of the forest and its constitu-
they are entitled to continuance. ent tree species, ground flora, and fauna is taken for
When one of these non-economic categories is granted.
threatened, and if we happen to love it, we invent Lack of economic value is sometimes a charac-
subterfuges to give it economic importance. At the ter not only of species or groups, but of entire biotic
beginning of the century songbirds were supposed communities: marshes, bogs, dunes, and 'deserts' are
to be disappearing. Ornithologists jumped to the res- examples. Our formula in such cases is to relegate their
cue with some distinctly shaky evidence to the effect conservation to government as refuges, monuments,
that insects would eat us up if birds failed to control or parks. The difficulty is that these communities
them. The evidence had to be economic in order to are usually interspersed with more valuable private
be valid. lands; the government cannot possibly own or con-
It is painful to read these circumlocutions trol such scattered parcels. The net effect is that we
today. We have no land ethic yet, but we have at have relegated some of them to ultimate extinction
least drawn nearer the point of admitting that birds over large areas. If the private owner were ecologically
should continue as a matter of biotic right, regard- minded, he would be proud to be the custodian of a
less of the presence or absence of economic advan- reasonable proportion of such areas, which add diver-
tage to us. sity and beauty to his farm and to his community.
A parallel situation exists in respect of predatory
* * *
mammals, raptorial birds, and fish-eating birds. Time
was when biologists somewhat overworked the evi- To sum up: a system of conservation based solely
dence that these creatures preserve the health of game on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It
by killing weaklings, or that they control rodents for tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate,
the farmer, or that they prey only on 'worthless' spe- many elements in the land community that lack com-
cies. Here again, the evidence had to be economic mercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential
in order to be valid. It is only in recent years that we to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think,
hear the more honest argument that predators are that the economic parts of the biotic clock will func-
members of the community, and that no special inter- tion without the uneconomic parts. It tends to rel-
est has the right to exterminate them for the sake egate to government many functions eventually too
of a benefit, real or fancied, to itself. Unfortunately large, too complex, or too widely dispersed to be per-
this enlightened view is still in the talk stage. In the formed by government.
field the determination of predators goes merrily
* * *
THE LAND PYRAMID depends on the co-operation and competition of its

An ethic to supplement and guide the economic diverse parts.
relation to land presupposes the existence of some In the beginning, the pyramid of life was low
mental image of land as a biotic mechanism. We can and squat; the food chains short and simple. Evolu-
be ethical only in relation in something we can see, tion has added layer after layer, link after link. Man
feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in. is one of thousands of accretions to the height and
The image commonly employed in conservation complexity of the pyramid. Science has given us
education is 'the balance of nature.' For reasons too many doubts, but it has given us at least one cer-
lengthy to detail here, this figure of speech fails to tainty: the trend of evolution is to elaborate and
describe accurately what little we know about the land diversify the biota.
mechanism. A much truer image is the one employed Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of
in ecology: the biotic pyramid. energy flOwing through a circuit of soils, plants, and
animals. Food chains are the living channels which
* * * conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to
Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy is dis-
flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be sipated in decay, some is added by absorption from the
represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bot- air, some is stored in soils, peats, and long-lived forests;
tom layer is the soil. A plant layer rests on the soil, an but it is a sustained Circuit, like a slowly augmented
insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the revolvi~g fund of life. There is always a net loss by
insects, and so on up through various animal groups to downhIll wash, but this is normally small and offset
the apex layer, which consists of the larger carnivores. by the decay of rocks. It is deposited in the ocean and
The species of a layer are alike not in where they in the Course of geological time, raised to form ne~
came from, or in what they look like, but rather in lands and new pyramids.
what they eat. Each successive layer depends on The velocity and character of the upward flow of
those below it for food and often for other services, energy depend on the complex structure of the plant
and each in turn furnishes food and services to and animal community, much as the upward flow of
those above. Proceeding upward, each successive sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organi-
layer decreases in numerical abundance. Thus, for zation. Without this complexity, normal circulation
every carnivore there are hundreds of his prey, thou- would presumably not occur. Structure means the
sands of their prey, millions of insects, uncountable characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic
plants. The pyramidal form of the system reflects this kinds and functions, of the component species. This
numerical progression from apex to base. Man shares interdependence between the complex structure of
an intermediate layer with the bears, raccoons, and the land and its smooth functioning as an energy unit
squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables. is one of its basic attributes.
The lines of dependency for food and other ser- When a change occurs in one part of the circuit,
vices are called food chains. Thus soil-oak-deer-Indian many other parts must adjust themselves to it. Change
is a chain that has now been largely converted to soil- does not necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of energy;
corn-caw-farmer. Each species, including ourselves, is evolution is a long series of self-induced changes,
a link in many chains. The deer eats a hundred plants the net result of which has been to elaborate the flow
other than oak, and the cow a hundred plants other mechanism and to lengthen the circuit. Evolutionary
than corn. Both, then, are links in a hundred chains. changes, however, are usually slow and local. Man's
The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of
seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope.
it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning
* * *
THE OUTLOOK all land relations hinges on investments of time, fore-

It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to thought, skill, and faith rather than on investments of
land can exist without love, respect, and admiration cash. As a land-user thinketh, so is he.
for land, and a high regard for its value. By yalue, I I have purposely presented the land ethic as a
of course mean something far broader than mere product of social evolution because nothing so impor-
economic value; I mean value in the philosophical tant as an ethic is ever 'written.' Only the most super-
sense. ficial student of history supposes that Moses 'wrote'
the Decalogue; it evolved in the minds of a thinking
* * * community, and Moses wrote a tentative summary
The 'key-log' which must be moved to release the of it for a 'seminar.' I say tentative because evolution
evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit never stops.
thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic The evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual as
problem. Examine each question in terms of what well as emotional process. Conservation is paved with
is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is good intentions which prove to be futile, or even dan-
economically expedient. A thing is right when it gerous, because they are devoid of critical understand-
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty ing either of the land, or of economic land-use. I think
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends it is a truism that as the ethical frontier advances from
otherwise. the individual to the community, its intellectual con-
It of course goes without saying that economic ten t increases.
feasibility limits the tether of what can or cannot be The mechanism of operation is the same for any
done for land. It always has and it always will. The fal- ethic: social approbation for right actions: social dis-
lacy the economic determinists have tied around our approval for wrong actions.
collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is By and large, our present problem is one of attitudes
the belief that economics determines all land use. This and implements. We are remodeling the Alhambra
is simply not true. An innumerable host of actions with a steam-shovel, and we are proud of our yardage.
and attitudes, comprising perhaps the bulk of all land We shall hardly relinquish the shovel, which after all
relations, is determined by the land-users' tastes and has many good points, but we are in need of gentler
predilections, rather than by his purse. The bulk of and more objective criteria for its successful use.
From A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change

STEPHEN GARDINER
* * * consequence of this is that, even if the difficult ethi-

cal questions could be answered, we might still find it
My thesis is this. The peculiar features of the climate difficult to act. For the storm makes us extremely
change problem pose substantial obstacles to our vulnerable to moral corruption. 1
ability to make the hard choices necessary to address Let us say that a perfect storm is an event consti-
it. Climate change is a perfect moral storm. One tuted by an unusual convergence of independently
harmful factors where this convergence is likely
to result in substantial, and possibly catastrophic,
Stephen Gardiner, The Perfect Moral Storm: Tile Ethical Tragedy of
negative outcomes. The term "the perfect storm"
Climate Change, pp. 22-35, 38-47. Copyright © 2011 Oxford Uni-
versity Press, inc. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor seems to have become prominent in popular culture
through PLSclear. from Sebastian Junger's book of that name, and the
associated film. 2 Junger's tale is based on the true story In the spatial dimenSion, this feature is usually
of the Andrea Gail, a fishing vessel caught at sea during understood as ariSing out of the shape of the current
a convergence of three particularly bad storms. The international system, as constituted by states. Then
sense of the analogy is that climate change appears to the problem is that, given that there is not only no
be a perfect moral storm because it involves the con- world government but also no less centralized system
vergence of a number of factors that threaten our abil- of global governance (or at least no effective one), it
ity to behave ethically. 3 is very difficult to coordinate an effective response to
As climate change is a complex phenomenon, I global climate change.
cannot hope to identify all of the ways in which its
features cause problems for ethical behavior. 4 Instead, * * *
I will identify three especially salient problems- This brings us to the third characteristic of the
analogous to the three storms that hit the Andrea climate change problem, institutional inadequacy.
Gail- that converge in the climate change case. These There is wide agreement that the appropriate means
three "storms" arise in the global, intergenerational, for resolving commons problems under the favorable
and theoretical dimensions, and I will argue that their conditions just mentioned is for the parties to agree to
interaction helps to exacerbate and obscure a lurking change the existing incentive structure through the
problem of moral corruption that may be of greater introduction of a system of enforceable sanctions ....
practical importance than anyone of them. This transforms the decision situation by foreclosing
the option of free-riding, so that the collectively ratio-
THE GLOBAL STORM nal action also becomes individually rational. Theo-
retically, then, matters seem Simple; but in practice
The climate challenge is usually understood in spatial,
things are different. The need for enforceable sanctions
and especially geopolitical, terms. We can make sense
poses a challenge at the global level because of the lim-
of this by pointing out three important characteristics
its of Our current (largely national) institutions, and
of the problem: dispersion of causes and effects, frag-
the lack of an effective system of global governance. In
mentation of agency, and institutional inadequacy.
essence, addressing climate change appears to require
global regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, where
* * *
this includes establishing a reliable enforcement
Let us begin with the dispersion ofcauses and effects. mechanism; but the current global system-or lack of
Climate change is a truly global phenomenon. Emis- it-makes this difficult, if not impOSSible.
sions of greenhouse gases from any geographicalloca- The implication of the familiar (spatial) analy-
tion on the earth's surface enter the atmosphere and sis, then, is that the main thing needed to solve the
then playa role in affecting climate globally. Hence, climate problem is an effective system of global gover-
the impact of any particular emission of greenhouse nance (at least for this issue). There is a sense in which
gases is not realized solely at its source, either indi- this is still good news. In principle at least, it should
vidual or geographical; instead, impacts are dispersed be possible to motivate countries to establish such a
to other actors and regions of the earth. Such spatial regime, since they ought to recognize that it is in their
dispersion has been widely discussed. long-term interests to eliminate the possibility of free
The second characteristic is fragmentation of riding and so make genuine cooperation the rational
agency. Climate change is not caused by a single agent, strategy at the individual as well as collective level.
but by a vast number of individuals and institutions
(including economiC, social, and political institu- * * *
tions) not unified by a comprehensive structure of Unfortunately, however, this is not the end of the
agency. This is important because it poses a challenge story. There are other features of the climate change
to humanity's ability to respond. case that make the necessary global agreement more
difficult, and so exacerbate the basic global storm. 5 bias in the face of uncertainty. Contemplating Change
Prominent amongst these is scientific uncertainty is often uncomfortable; contemplating basic Change
about the precise magnitude and distribution of may be unnerVing, even distressing. Since the social
effects, particularly at the national level. 6 One reason ramifications of action appear to be large, perspicuous,
for this is that the lack of trustworthy data about the and concrete, but those of inaction appear uncertain,
costs and benefits of climate change at the national elusive, and indeterminate, it is easy to see why uncer-
level casts doubt on the collective rationality claim- tainty might exacerbate social inertia. 8
that no one wants serious climate change. Perhaps, A third and very important feature of the climate
some nations wonder, we might be better off with at change problem that exacerbates the basic global
least a moderate amount of climate change than with- storm is that of skewed vulnerabilities. The climate
out it. More importantly, some might ask whether, challenge interacts in some unfortunate ways with
faced with a given serious change, they will at least be the present global power structure. For one thing,
relatively better off than other countries, and so might the responsibility for historical and current emis-
get away with paying less to avoid the associated costs. 7 sions lies predominantly with the richer, more pow-
Such factors complicate the game theoretic situation, erful nations, and the poor nations are badly situated
and so make agreement more difficult. to hold them accountable. For another, the limited
In other contexts, the problem of Scientific uncer- evidence on regional impacts suggests that it is the
tainty might not be so serious. But a second character- poorer nations that are most vulnerable to the worst
istic of the climate problem exacerbates matters in this impacts of climate change, at least in the short- to
setting. The source of climate change is located deep medium-term. 9 Finally, action on climate change cre-
in the infrastructure of current civilizations; hence, ates a moral risk for the developed nations. Implicitly,
attempts to combat it may have substantial ramifi- it embodies a recognition that there are international
cations for social life. Climate change is caused by norms of ethics and responSibility, and reinforces the
human production of greenhouse gases, primarily car- idea that international cooperation on issues involv-
bon dioxide. Such emissions are brought about by the ing such norms is both possible and necessary. Hence,
burning of fossil fuels for energy. But it is this energy it may encourage attention to other moral defects of
that supports existing economies. Hence, if halting the current global system, such as global poverty and
climate change reqUires deep cuts in projected global inequality, human rights violations, and so on. If the
emissions over time, we can expect that such action developed nations are not ready to engage on such
will have profound effects on the basic economic orga- topics, this creates a further reason to avoid action on
nization of the developed countries and on the aspira- climate change. Indeed, the unwillingness to engage
tions of the developing countries. puts pressure on the claim that there is a broader con-
The "deep roots" problem has several salient text of interaction within which the climate problem
implications. First, it suggests that those with vested can be solved. If some nations do not wish to engage
interests in the continuation of the current system- with issues of global ethics, and they believe that cre-
for example, many of those Who have substantial ating a climate regime leads down this path, then this
political and economic power, or who expect to gain lessens the incentive to cooperate. 10
such power, through selling emissions-intensive
resources-will resist such action. Second, unless
ready substitutes are found, real mitigation can be THE INTERGENERATIONAL STORM
expected to have profound impacts on how humans The global storm emerges from a spatial reading of
live and how human societies evolve. Hence, action the characteristics just mentioned (Le., dispersion of
on climate change is likely to raise serious, and per- causes and effects, fragmentation of agency, and insti-
haps uncomfortable, questions about who we are and tutional inadequacy). However, an even more serious,
what we want to be. Third, this suggests a status quo yet sorely neglected, challenge emerges when we see
them from a temporal perspective. Let us call this "the not easily reversible. Hence, a goal of stabilizing and
intergenerational storm." then reducing carbon dioxide concentrations requires
advance planning. Second, climate change impacts
* * * are seriously backloaded. The climate change that the
Consider first the dispersion of causes and effects. earth is currently experiencing is primarily the result
Human-induced climate change is a severely lagged of emissions from some time in the past, rather than
phenomenon. This is partly because some of the basic current emissions. As an illustration, it is widely
mechanisms set in motion by the greenhouse effect, accepted that by 2000 we had already committed our-
such as sea level rise, take a very long time to be fully selves to a rise of at least 0.5 and perhaps more than
realized. But it is also because by far the most impor- 1 degree Celsius over the then-observed rise of O.6C. 1S
tant greenhouse gas produced by human activities is Third, climate change is a substantially deferred phe-
carbon dioxide, and once emitted molecules of car- nomenon. Backloading implies that the full, cumula-
bon dioxide can spend a surprisingly long time in the tive effects of our current emissions will not be realized
atmosphere. 11 for some time in the future.
Let us dwell for a moment on this second factor. In Temporal dispersion creates a number of prob-
the past, the IPCC has said that the average time spent lems. First, as is widely noted, the resilience of climate
by a molecule of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere change implies that sustained action across many
is in the region of 5-200 years. This estimate is long decades is required, and that this needs to anticipate
enough to create a serious lagging effect; nevertheless, (and so avoid or moderate) negative impacts that are
it obscures the fact that a significant percentage of some way off. Given this, periods of procrastination
carbon dioxide molecules remain in the atmosphere and vacillation have serious repercussions for our
for much longer periods of time, of the order of thou- ability to manage the problem. Second, backloading
sands and tens of thousands of years. For instance, the implies that climate change poses serious epistemic
climatologist David Archer says: difficulties, especially for normal political actors.
Backloading makes it hard to grasp the connection
The carbon cycle of the biosphere will take a long time between causes and effects, and this may undermine
to completely neutralize and sequester anthropogenic
the motivation to act 16; it also implies that by the
C02. We show a wide range of model forecasts of
this effect. For the best-guess cases ... we expect that time we realize that things are bad, we will already be
17-33% of the fossil fuel carbon will still reside in the committed to much more change, undermining the
atmosphere 1 kyr from now, decreasing to 10-15% at ability to respond. Third, the deferral effect calls into
10 kyr, and 7% at 100 kyr. The mean lifetime of fossil question the ability of standard institutions to deal
fuel C02 is about 30-35 kyr. 12 with the problem. Democratic political institutions
have relatively short time horizons-the next election
This is a fact, he states, which has not yet "reached cycle, a politician's political career-and it is doubtful
general public awareness." 13 Hence, he suggests that "a whether such institutions have the wherewithal to
better shorthand for public discussion [than the IPCC deal with substantially deferred impacts. Even more
estimate] might be that C02 sticks around for hun- seriously, substantial deferral is likely to undermine
dreds of years, plus 25% that sticks around forever." 14 the will to act. This is because there is an incentive
The fact that carbon dioxide is a long-lived green- problem: the bad effects of current emissions are likely
house gas has at least three important implications. to fall, or fall disproportionately, on future genera-
The first is that climate change is a resilient phenom- tions, whereas the benefits of emissions accrue largely
enon. Given that currently it does not seem practical to the present. 17
to remove large quantities of carbon dioxide from These three points already raise the specter of insti-
the atmosphere, or to moderate its climatic effects, tutional inadequacy. But to appreciate this problem
the upward trend in atmospheric concentration is fully, we must first say something about the temporal
fragmentation of agency. To begin with, there is some likely to be catastrophic. If in the long-term there are
reason to think that this might be worse than spatial positive feedback mechanisms, or dangerous nonlin-
fragmentation even considered in isolation. In prin- earities in the system (as some scientists suspect), this
ciple, spatially fragmented agents may actually become worry increases.
unified and so able to act as a single agent; but tem-
porally fragmented agents cannot actually become * * *
unified, and so may at best only act as if they were a Intergenerational buck-passing is bad enough
single agent. Hence, there is a sense in which tempo- considered in isolation. But in the context of climate
ral fragmentation may be more intractable than spatial change it is also subject to morally relevant multiplier
fragmentation. At a minimum, theoretical accounts of effects. First, climate change is not a static phenome-
how we might act so as to overcome temporal fragmen- non. In failing to act appropriately, the current genera-
tation seem even more pressing than in the spatial case. tion does not simply pass an existing problem along to
More substantively, the kind of temporal disper- future people. Instead, it adds to it, making the prob-
sion that characterizes climate change seems clearly lem substantially worse. For one thing, it increases
much more problematic than the associated spatial the costs of coping with climate change. Failing to act
fragmentation. Indeed, the presence of backloading now increases the magnitude of future climate change
and deferral together brings on a new kind of collec- and so its effects. For another, in failing to act now
tive action problem that not only adds to the global the current generation makes mitigation more diffi- .
storm, but is also more difficult to resolve. This prob- cult because it allows additional investment in fossil
lem might aptly be described as one of "intergenera- fuel-based infrastructure in developed and especially
tional buck-passing." less developed countries. Hence, inaction raises transi-
We can illustrate the buck-passing problem in the tion costs, making future change harder than change
case of climate change if we relax the assumption that now. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the cur-
countries can be relied upon adequately to represent rent generation does not add to the problem in a linear
the interests of both their present and future citizens. way. Rather, it rapidly accelerates the problem, since
Suppose that this is not true. Assume instead that global emissions are increasing at a substantial rate ....
existing national institutions are biased towards the
concerns of the current generation: they behave in * * *
ways that give excessive weight to those concerns rela-
tive to the concerns of future generations. Then, if the
benefits of carbon dioxide emission are felt primar- THE THEORETICAL STORM
ily by the present generation 18 (in the form of cheap The final storm I want to highlight is constituted by
energy), whereas the costs are substantially deferred our current theoretical ineptitude. We are extremely
to future generations (in the form of the risk of severe ill-equipped to deal with many problems characteris-
and perhaps catastrophic climate change), climate tic of the long-term future. Even our best moral and
change may provide an instance of a severe intergen- political theories face fundamental and often severe
erational collective action problem. For one thing, difficulties addressing basic issues such as intergen-
the current generation may "live large" and pass the erational equity, international justice, scientific
bill on to the future. For another, the problem may be uncertainty, contingent persons, and the human
iterated. As each new generation gains the power to relationship to animals and nature more generally.
decide whether or not to act, it faces the same incen- But climate change involves all of these matters and
tive structure, and so if it is motivated primarily by more. Given this, our theories are poorly placed to
generation-relative concerns, it will continue the over- respond. Theoretically, we are currently "inept," in the
consumption. Thus, the impacts on those generations (nonpejorative) sense of lacking the skills and basic
further into the future are compounded, and more competence for the task.
...cit!:
One sign of our theoretical problems comes from on other people. It facilitates the exploitation of the
the leading economic approach, cost-benefit analysis poor by the rich in the global storm, and of the future
(CBA). Much work has been done trying to analyze cli- by the present in the intergenerational storm. 22 Such
mate change in these terms. But it tends to point in injustice is made vivid even in narrowly instrumental
radically different directions. There is an explanation terms. Environmental injustice impacts the wealth,
for this. Here is what John Broome, White's Professor health, and so on of vulnerable human beings.
of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, and formerly a Profes- Nevertheless, there may be more to consider if one
sor of Economics at the University of Bristol, has to say thinks that nature may have noninstrumental value.
about the method when applied to climate change: To see thiS, consider an example. Many years ago, I
came across a magaZine article by an economist that
Cost-benefit analysiS, when faced with uncertainties argued that climate change is not a problem because
as big as these, would simply be self-deception. And in future generations of humanity could always live in
any case, it could not be a Sllccessful exercise, because the
massive domes on the earth's surface if they needed
issue of our responsibility to future generations is too 23
to. (Call this scenario dome world.) This claim is
poorly understood, and too little accommodated in the
current economic theory. 19 troubling for many reasons. But one that is especially
striking is that it suggests that the disappearance of
Unlike many concerned with environmental issues, nonhuman animals and the rest of nature would not
20
Broome is a defender of CBA in normal contexts. be a serious loss (or, at best, that it would be a com-
Nevertheless, he thinks that there are special prob- pensable one). I take this to be a profound claim with
lems in this setting that undermine its application .... which many people would disagree. On the one hand,
Given such worries, we should be surprised at the con- many will object because they believe that a good
tinued predominance of economiC analysis in policy relationship with the natural world is, or should be,
discourse. Why indulge in "self-deception"? Unfortu- constitutive of a flourishing human life. In that case,
nately, other components of the perfect moral storm dome world involves another important manifesta-
provide an answer.... tion of the global and intergenerational storms. On
A second sign of our theoretical problems comes the other hand, some will insist that the dome world
from the relative silence of most of the prominent scenario is also morally horrifying because the loss of
olitical philosophies of the day on global environ- other living beings and systems on the planet would
~ental problems. 21 Of course, there is a feeling that be a tragedy in itself, independently of its effects on
such theories ought to have something to say about human interests. This suggests a further, "ecological
climate change. After all, such change is likely to be storm."
severely detrimental to concerns that they hold dear, It is plausible to think that the structure of the dis-
such as happiness, individual rights, and the integrity tinctively ecological storm bears some Similarity to the
of national cultures. Still, in practice, these approaches tragedy of the commons or intergenerational buck-
seem peculiarly reticent in the face of the threat. This passing models. Consider the following simple meta-
raises the worry that they may facilitate the perfect phor, which I shall call kick the dog. In the old story,
moral storm .... the farmer kicks his wife, his wife kicks the child, and
A third sign of possible theoretical trouble comes the child kicks the dog. In the perfect moral storm, the
from the fact that the global test is stated in purely parallel is likely to be that the current rich "kick" the
anthropocentric terms, and instrumental ones at that. current poor, and both "kick" future generations. But
But surely a more general worry about the human the "kicking" is unlikely to stop there. Chances are
exploitation of nature also lurks in the background. that many of the costs of our problematic ways of life
To be sure, to a significant extent, the prob- will be passed on to other species through the ecologi-
lem posed by the perfect moral storm is that nature cal systems on which they depend. Some of this will be
becomes a vehicle through which injustice is visited done directly by the rich, but some will also be done by
l
the initial victims, the current poor and future genera- a moment on the intergenerational storm. Acknowl-
tions. In other words, the initial bad behavior may set edging that one is engaging in intergenerational buck-
off a chain reaction towards the end of which stands passing is morally uncomfortable, especially when the
not just the most vulnerable humans, but also many consequences of such buck-passing may be severe, or
animals, plants, and places. Moreover, if and when the even catastrophic, for the victims. Presumably, this
natural world kicks back, it may just induce a further is discomfort that we would like to avoid. Given this,
cycle of further buck-passing.... if the current generation engages in buck-passing, it
The kick the dog scenario has strong initial plaUSi- will welcome ways to obscure what it is doing. This
bility. The signs are that such ecological buck-passing is important because it suggests that climate policy is
is already rife in the global environmental tragedy not made or discussed in a neutral evaluative context.
more generally. Humanity as such is kicking the atmo- The perfect moral storm clouds the debate.
sphere, the rainforests, the Arctic, and so on, and One way to facilitate buck-passing is by avoid-
through them the polar bear, the big cats, and many ing real engagement with the issue. This might be
other species. Much of this buck-passing is disguised achieved in a wide variety of ways, many of which are
by the complicated causal routes through which it familiar from other contexts. ConSider, for example:
occurs. But the fact that it is disguised does not mean
that it is not happening. • Distraction
What should we say about the status of the eco- • Complacency
logical storm? It is tempting to include it as one of • Selective attention
the main constituents of the perfect moral storm • Unreasonable doubt
proper, instead of subsuming it under the theoretical • Delusion
storm. I have not done so both for the sake of sim- • Pandering
plicity and because its existence as a distinct "storm" • Hypocrisy
is itself a matter of theoretical controversy. This does Now, I suspect that close observers of two decades
not imply that it is not important or central. (I have of political debate about climate change will recognize
not counted the problem of skewed vulnerabilities many of these mechanisms as being in play. In their
separately for similar reasons. Yet it is of profound most obvious forms, they facilitate a relatively quick
importance.) Instead, it reflects my attempt ... to beg evasion of the whole topic. But such strategies are also
as few theoretical questions as possible in the sketch- relevant to more substantive discussions.
ing of the basic moral problem. This does not in any Of special concern from an ethical and philosoph-
way preclude those with strong ethical commitments ical point of view is the fact that, if the current genera-
to animals and the rest of nature from conceiving of tion favors buck-passing, but does not want to face up
the ecological storm as a distinct problem that should to what it is doing, it is likely to welcome any rationale
be addressed by any positive account that deserves our that appears to justify its behavior. Hence, it may be
respect. (A similar point can be made about the prob- attracted to weak or deceptive arguments that appear
lem of skewed vulnerabilities.) These are simply mat- to license buck-passing, and so give them less scrutiny
ters to be taken up elsewhere. 24 than it ought. A particularly deep way of doing this
is through the corruption of the very terms of the
debate, moral and otherwise. In other words, the per-
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL CORRUPTION
fect moral storm may work to subvert our understand-
This brings us to the last problem I wish to identify. ing of what is at stake.
When the global, intergenerational and theoreti- The idea that agents may subvert moral language
cal storms meet, they encourage a distinct problem and arguments for their own purposes is hardly unfa-
for ethical action on climate change, the problem of miliar in normal political life. Moreover, it is highly
moral corruption. This can be illustrated if we focus for plaUSible to think that the self-serVing approach to
morality has been alive and well in much of what has ethics, which tend to demand it. Thus, an emphasis
passed for social and political discourse about climate on the global storm at the expense of the other prob-
change in the last twenty years or so. Still, the pres- lems may facilitate a strategy of procrastination and
ence and prevalence of the intergenerational storm delay. On the other hand, since it usually stipulates
reveals a new and powerful potential for such trouble. that the relevant actors are nation-states who repre-
In many normal contexts, the tendency towards the sent the interests of their citizens in perpetuity, the
corruption of discourse faces a strong challenge from global storm analYSis has the effect of assuming away
the likely victims of immoral behavior. But this is not the intergenerational aspect of the climate change
the case in the intergenerational setting. Since the vic- problem. For one thing, it presumes that there is no
tims are not yet around to defend the discourse, the motivation problem. It is just taken for granted that
potential for moral corruption is especially high. 25 current governments and populations automatically
This problem is exacerbated by the iteration of buck- take the interests of their successors into account, and
passing, which implies that when they are around, to the appropriate extent. For another, it suggests that
future people may themselves become vulnerable to failure to act will result in a collectively self-inflicted
moral corruption. harm (by those states to themselves), rather than in
a potentially severe injustice to innocent and vulner-
* * *
able others.
At the level of practical politiCS, such strategies As the intergenerational analysis makes clear,
are all too familiar. For example, many political actors these last claims are too quick. First, the current gen-
emphasize considerations that appear to make i.nac- eration contributes significantly to climate change,
tion excusable, or even desirable (such as uncertamty, but the effects will predominantly fall in the future, to
or simple economic calculations with high discount other people (and species). Hence, the issue of how to
rates) and action more difficult and contentious (such understand and motivate appropriate moral concern,
as the need for lifestyle change) at the expense of those and especially intergenerational concern, is right at
that seem to impose a clearer and more immediate the heart of the climate problem. Second, these are
burden (such as scientific consensus and intergenera- not predominantly "self-inflicted" harms, but some-
tional buck-passing). thing significantly morally worse. Given these points,
However, selective attention strategies may also an undue emphasis on the global storm obscures
manifest themselves more generally. This prompts much of what is at stake in making climate policy, and
an unpleasant thought. Perhaps there is a problem of in a way that benefits present people.
corruption in the standard way in which we frame the In conclUSion, the threat of moral corruption
issue itself. Most prominently, perhaps the prevalence of reveals another sense in which climate change may
the global storm model is not independent of the existence be a "perfect" moral storm. Its complexity may turn
of the intergenerational storm, but instead is encouraged out to be perfectly convenient for us, the current gen-
by it. eration, and indeed for each successor generation as it
In particular, perhaps it simply suits our buck-passing comes to occupy our pOSition. For one thing, it pro-
purposes to continue discussing clim~te change pri- vides each generation with the cover under which it
marily in geopolitical terms, assummg that states can seem to be taking the issue seriously-by negoti-
represent the interests of their citizens in perpetuity. ating weak and largely substanceless global accords,
After all, the current generation may find such a fram- for example, and then heralding them as great
ing highly advantageous. On the one hand, a focus achievements ... -when really it is simply exploiting
on the global storm tends to draw attention towards its temporal pOSition. For another, all of this can occur
various issues of global politiCS and scientific uncer- without the exploiting generation actually having to
tainty (mentioned above) that seem to problematize acknowledge that this is what it is doing. If it can avoid
action, and away from issues of intergenerational the appearance of overtly selfish (or self-absorbed)
behavior, an earlier generation can take advantage of and that it is uncertainties about national impacts that under-
the future without the unpleasantness of admitting mines regime formation (Dimitrov 2003).
it-either to others, or, perhaps more importantly, 7. This consideration appears to have played a role in U.S.
to itself. deliberation about climate change, where it is often asserted
that the U.S. faces lower marginal costs from climate change
NOTES than other countries. See, for example, Mendelsohn 2001,
1. One might wonder why, despite the widespread agreement
Nitze 1994, Posner and Sunstein 2008.
that climate change involves important ethical questions, 8. Much more might be said here. I discuss some psychologi-
there is relatively little public discussion of them. The answer cal aspects of political inertia and the role these play indepen-
to this question is no doubt complex. But my thesis may con- dently of scientific uncertainty in chapter 6.
stitute part of that answer. 9. This is because they tend to be located in warmer lower
2. Junger 1999. latitudes, because a greater proportion of their economies are
3. The term Wperfect storm'" is in wide usage. However, it in climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, and because-
is difficult to find definitions. An online dictionary of slang being poor-they are worse placed to deal with those impacts.
offe~s the following: ClWhen three events, usually beyond See Stern 2007, 139, citing Tol et al. 2004.
one s control, converge and create a large inconvenience for 10. Of course, it has not helped that over much of the
an individual. Each event represents one of the storms that last decade climate discussion has occurred in an unfor-
collided on the Andrea Gail in the book/movie titled The Per- tunate geopolitical setting. International negotiations
~t ~tom:" (Urbandictionary.com, 3/25/05). More recently, have taken place against a backdrop of distraction, mis-
lkipedla states: ClThe phrase perfect storm refers to the trust, and severe inequalities of power. For many years,
simultaneous occurrence of events which, taken individu- the dominant global actor and lone superpower, the
ally, would be far less powerful than the result of their chance United States, refused to address climate change, and was
combination. Such occurrences are rare by their very nature, distracted by the threat of global terrorism. Moreover,
so that even a slight change in anyone event contributing to the international community, including many of Ameri-
the perfect storm would lessen its overall impact" (Wikipedia, ca's historical allies, distrusted its motives, its actions, and
accessed 6/29/2007). especially its uses of moral rhetoric; so there was global
4. For example, Chrisoula Andreou draws our attention to the discord. This unfortunate state of affairs was especially
relevance of the psychological and philosophical literature problematic in relation to the developing nations, whose
on procrastination for understanding environmental deci- cooperation must be secured if the climate change prob-
sion making (Andreou 2006, 2007). She does not apply this lem is to be addressed. One issue was the credibility of the
analysis to climate change speCifically; but I suspect that it is developed nations' commitment to solving the climate
r~levant, and worth pursuing. Nevertheless, the procrastina- change problem. Another was the North's focus on mitiga-
tIOn model is unlikely to be dominant in this case. It focuses tion to the exclusion of adaptation. A third concern was the
on the challenges to decision making faced by a single, uni- South's fear of an Clabate and switch" strategy on the part
fied agent; hence, it does not reveal, and is unlikely to account of the North. (Note that considered in isolation, these factors
for, the practical and moral import of the fragmentations of do not seem sufficient to explain political inertia. After all,
agency I am emphasizing. the climate change problem originally became prominent
during the 1990s, a decade with a much more promising
5. There is one fortunate convergence. Several writers (e.g., geopolitical environment.)
Shue 1999, Singer 2002) have emphasized that the major
11. For more on both claims, see IPCC 2001a, 16-17.
ethical arguments all point in the same direction: that
the developed countries should bear most of the costs of 12. Archer 2006, 5. "Kyr" means Clthousand years." See also
the transition-including those accruing to developing Archer 2009; Archer, Eby et al. 2009.
countries-at least in the early stages of mitigation and 13. Archer 2005.
adaptation.
14. Archer 2005; a similar remark occurs in Archer 2006, 5.
6. Rado Dimitrov argues that we must distinguish between The discrepancy between the IPeC's range and Archer's is
different kinds of uncertainty when we investigate the effects apparently caused by a terminological confusion rather than
of Scientific uncertainty on international regime building, any scientific dispute. See Archer, Eby el al. 2009.
15. Wigley 2005; Meehl et al. 2005; Wetherald et al. 2001. - - 2006. UFate of Fossil Fuel CO 2 in Geologic Time."
16. This is exacerbated by the fact that the climate is an inher- Journal ofGeopJzysical Research 110: 1-6.
ently chaotic system in any case, and that there is no control Archer, Eby, et a1. 2009. The Long Thaw (Princeton, Nj:
Princeton University Press).
against which its performance might be compared.
Broome, john. 1992. Counting the Cost of Global Wanning
17. The possibility of nonlinear effects, such as in abrupt (Isle of Harris, UK: White Horse Press).
climate change, complicates this point, but I do not think Dimitrov, R. 2003. "Knowledge, Power and Interests in
it undermines it. See chapter 6. Environmental Regime Formation." International Studies
Quarterly 47: 123-50.
18. Some may object to this assumption on the grounds that
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (lPCC). 2001a.
such benefits drive economic growth that does benefit future
Climate Cllange 2001: Tile Scientific Basis (Cambridge:
generations. This issue does complicate matters. Still, the Cambridge University Press).
assumptions (a) that economic growth will continue even in junger, Sebastian. 1999. A Perfect Stoml: A True Story of Men
the face of catastrophic climate change, and (b) that it com- Against tile Sea (New York, NY: Harper).
pensates for climate risks need to be scrutinized. Meehl, G.A., et aI., 2005. uHow much more global warming
19. Broome 1992, 19; emphasis added. and sea level rise?" Science, 307, 1769-1772.
Mendelsohn, Robert 0., ed. 2001. Global Wanning and the
20. Broome 1992, 18-19. American Economy. (London: Edward Elgar).
21. In the last few years, the situation has shifted from one of Nitze, W. A. 1994. "A Failure of Presidential Leadership." In
complete silence. But a much fuller engagement is needed. Irving Mintzer and j. Amber Leonard, eds., Negotiating
Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention
22. Such worries are at the heart of much green political (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 189-90.
theory and environmental ethics. See, for example, Shrader- Palmer, Clare. 2011. "Does Nature Matter? The Place of
Frechette 2002, Schlosberg 2007. the Nonhuman in the Ethics of Climate Change."
23. Unfortunately, I no longer have either the article or In Denis Arnold, ed., The Etllics of Climate Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
the reference. (If others do, I would be glad to know.) Still,
Posner, Eric, and Cass Sunstein. 2008. "Climate Change
I hope that this does not undermine the example: the point
justice." Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565-612.
would hold even if I were talking about a merely hypothetical
Schlosberg, David. 2007. Environmental Justice. (Oxford:
economist. Oxford University Press).
24. For suggestions that climate change poses problems for Shrader-Frechette, Kristen. 2002. Environmental Justice:
conventional environmental ethics, see Palmer 2011. Creating Equality. Reclaiming Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
25. The same issue arises in the kick the dog scenario. The
Shue, Henry. 1999. "Global Environment and International
potential for moral corruption is also high in the global storm Inequality." International Affairs 75: 531-45.
when the victims are contemporaries but spatially distant and Singer, Peter. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization
relatively close to powerless. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Stern, Nicholas. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
REFERENCES Tol, R. S.J., T. E. Downing, O.J. Kuik, andJ. B. Smith. 2004.
Andreou, Chrisoula. 2006. "Environmental Damage and the "Distributional Aspects of Climate Change Impacts."
Puzzle of the Self-Torturer." PllilosoplW & Public Affairs Global Environmental Change 14(3): 259-72.
34(1): 95-108. Wetherald, Richard T., RonaldJ. Stouffer, and Keith W. Dixon.
_ _.2007. "Environmental Preservation and Second- 2001. uCommitted Warming and Its Implications for
Order Procrastination." Philosophy & Public Affairs 35(3): Climate Change." Geophysical Research Letters 28: 1535-38.
233-48. Wigley, T. M. L. 2005. 41A Combined Mitigation/
Archer, David. 2005. "How Long Will Global Warming Last?" Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization."
Real Climate, 15 March 2005. Science 314: 452-54.
CHAPTER 14
Racism, Equality, and Discrimination
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a forty-six-year- suffocated to death as the result of an officer's
old Black man, was killed by a Minneapolis police chokehold, applied as Garner, like Floyd, cried,
officer who pinned him to the street by jamming a "I can't breathe"; seventeen-year-old Laquan
knee into his neck for almost nine minutes as Floyd McDonald, shot dead in Chicago as he walked down
gasped, "I can't breathe." Three officers looked on a street holding a knife; Walter Scott, pulled over by
as Floyd became unresponsive. police for having a defective light on his car, shot in
Floyd's death triggered massive public protests the back five times as he ran away from the police
in thousands of U.S. cities and provoked many sym- officer; twenty-six-year-old Breonna Taylor, shot
pathetic demonstrations throughout the world. dead by Louisville police during a nighttime raid
Day after day, massive, diverse crowds filled the at her home; thirty-seven-year-old Tanisha Ander-
streets, demanding an end to what they saw as son, who died during an encounter with Cleveland
systemic police racism and violence directed dis- police as a result of being physically restrained in a
proportionately toward people of color. prone position; and twenty-eight-year-old Atatiana
It soon became clear that the outrage was about Jefferson, shot to death by a police officer from out-
more than just police brutality. Protesters and their side her bedroom window.
many supporters called out structural and implicit On Friday, August II, 2017, we got another
racism in every part of society and condemned the eerie reminder that our present racial woes are
racial disparities that still haunt American life gen- inextricably tied to our racist past. In Charlottes-
erations after the abolition of slavery. Suddenly it ville, Virginia-beloved city of Thomas Jefferson,
seemed that people everywhere were concerned site of the university he founded, and bastion of
about the racial injustice that scholars, Scientists, the Confederacy-white supremacists marched on
and writers had been documenting for decades. the campus of the University of Virginia, carrying
Before the Floyd incident, there were many torches and chanting Nazi slogans. On Saturday
other tragic police killings of Black people-not they rallied again in Charlottesville, yelling racial
all of them unambiguous, but all of them happen- slurs and displaying swastikas, Confederate flags,
ing against the backdrop of considerable evidence and Ku Klux Klan symbols. They were accompa-
of widespread racial bias in the American crimi- nied by militiamen toting automatic weapons. The
nal justice system generally and in policing in ostensible purpose of the gathering was to protest
particular. 1 The list of disturbing incidents is long the removal of a statue dedicated to the memory
and includes Stephon Clark, shot dead in Sacra- of Robert E. Lee, the famous Confederate general.
mento by officers who thought his cell phone was Counterprotesters shouted progressive slogans,
a gun; twelve-year-old Tamir Rice, shot dead in carried anti-racist signs, and sang civil rights-era
Cleveland as he held a toy gun; forty-three-year- songs. Skirmishes broke out between the two sides,
old Eric Garner, arrested for selling cigarettes and and a woman was killed and several others injured
434
CHAPTER 14: RACISM, EQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION 0 435
when a twenty-year-old man from Ohio drove his Racism in North America has drawn into its
car into a crowd of counterprotesters. Two Virginia maelstrom of struggle and pain African Americans,
State Police troopers who had been monitoring the Indigenous Americans, Hispanic/Latino Americans,
conflict also died when their helicopter crashed Asian Americans, and White Americans. Here we
near Charlottesville. will focus on African Americans because so much
All these heartrending events are among the of the psychological, social, and moral trauma of
latest in America's long history of racial conflict, racial conflict in the United States flows from Black
prejudice, and injustice. Such incidents seem all the experience, beginning with the institution of Black
more painful because they afflict a nation whose slavery in the seventeenth century.
professed ideals include liberty, justice, and equal- To make sense of the issues that have emerged
ity. If, because of these ideals, the United States has from this history, we have to start at the begin-
been considered "a shining city on a hill," beaming ning with an understanding of the moral impli-
hope to the world, today that light seems to many cations of race and racism and our responses to
observers to have dimmed. them.
Many people, however, still think that despite
incidents like the death of George Floyd and the ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND
Charlottesville tragedy, America as a society is past
all that now. They believe that after the 1960s civil Race
rights movement, the enactment of a generation What is race? Who is a racist? For many people,
of anti-discrimination laws, the dramatic decline these questions seem to pose no conceptual diffi-
in public expressions of blatant racism (except culties at all. They think it is perfectly obvious what
online), and the election of the nation's first Black race is, for they can point to people who seem to
president (as well as, more recently, the nation's belong to one race, and they can pOint to others
first multiracial vice-president), we are living in a who seem to belong to a different race. And even
"post-racial" world where racial hate and discrimi- though there is less agreement about what racism
nation are nearly nonexistent. They declare that or racist means, many believe they know a racist
our society is now color-blind and that they ((don't when they see one. At the same time, unless they
see color, only people." are resolute bigots, most people want never to be
But an army of sociologists, historians, philoso- guilty of racism, however it's defined, and never
phers, and other analysts disagree. The philoso- to be called a raCist, whether or not they are guilty
pher Naomi Zack, editor of The Oxford Handbook of of the charge. But after a hundred years of study-
Philosophy and Race, asks: ing race and racism, scholars (mostly sociologists
How is it that in a post-civil rights age of racial equal- and philosophers) have concluded that our under-
ity, people of color are disproportionately underedu- standing of these ideas may be simplistic or even
ca ted, poor, incarcerated, and more likely to be treated morally suspect.
violently by police? The contradiction between The core idea of race-that is, the notion of
equality as stated in law and humanitarian and sci- discrete groups of people who share distinct biologi-
entific consensus versus the reality of social inequal- cal and cultural traits-is actually relatively new, aris-
ity and injustice cannot be adequately addressed
ing in different forms over time beginning around
as a psychological or ethical issue, on the level of
individuals. Deeper cultural, political, and economic the sixteenth century and changing in the Americas
analyses are required to explain why and how people and Europe in response to colonization and slavery.
behave in ways that appear to violate their highest As Europeans subjugated and enslaved Africans and
and most general legal and moral principles. 2 native peoples in the Americas, the idea of superior
and inferior races took hold and was used to jus- scientists, however, uncovered a multitude of
tify inhumane treatment of whole cultures. But in errors and biases in this research and debunked the
ancient times, no one thought to categorize humans claim of European superiority.
into exclusive racial groups. To the ancients, cultures A host of historians and sociologists have
might differ in various ways, but dividing the world shown that the notion of race was created to serve
into races the way you might sort jellybeans into sep- practical but immoral ends. In its tlStatement on
arate piles by color was not done. For example, the Race," the American Anthropological Association
philosopher Lawrence Blum says that declares:
[I]n the ancient Greco-Roman world, Africans were Today scholars in many fields argue that "race" as
identified primarily by skin color, nose shape and it is understood in the United States of America was
th
hair texture .... The Greeks were quite interested in a social mechanism invented during the 18 cen-
the dark skin of Ethiopians, which they attributed tury to refer to those populations brought together
to climatic conditions; but they did not homog- in colonial America: the English and other Euro-
enize all darker-skinned persons into a single pean settlers, the conquered Indian peoples, and
social grouping. They were clearly aware of distinct those peoples of Africa brought in to provide slave
shades of dark skin. labor ....
The Greeks were respectful of dark-skinned Afri- [Race] subsumed a growing ideology of inequal-
cans, whom they encountered in war, as both allies ity devised to rationalize European attitudes and
and adversaries, and in commerce. Nubia, an African treatment of the conquered and enslaved peoples.
th
civilization south of Egypt inhabited by persons of Proponents of slavery in particular during the 19
"Negroid" features, was respected as a military power. century used "race" to justify the retention of slav-
Dark-skinned Africans were identified generally as ery. The ideology magnified the difference among
"human beings with the capacity for freedom and Europeans, Africans, and Indians, established a
justice, piety, and wisdom.,,3 rigid hierarchy of socially exclusive categories,
underscored and bolstered unequal rank and status
In the late eighteenth century, science was differences, and provided the rationalization that
the inequality was natural or God-given ....
establishing itself as a relatively new way of acquir-
As they were constructing US SOciety, leaders
ing reliable knowledge about the world. In the among European-Americans fabricated the cultural!
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several behavioral characteristiCS associated with each
thinkers tried to apply its principles to the study of "race," linking superior traits with Europeans and
race. The result was what is now known as scientific negative and inferior ones to blacks and Indians."
racism. Several scientifically minded investigators
In the twenty-first century, science still has
examined the physical characteristics of people
not firmly established that there are such things as
from different cultures and parts of the world and
races that differ in certain essential, inherent char-
concluded that (1) humanity can indeed be divided
acteristics. The traditional idea is that race con-
into separate and distinct races, (2) race enables us
sists of heritable biological features common to all
to explain the most basic differences among people,
members of a racial group, features that explain the
and (3) some races are superior to others-and the
character and cultural traits of those members. But
White European race is superior to all. Using sus-
the consensus among scientists and philosophers
pect assumptions, skull and brain measurements,
is that this view is false. As the sociologist Tanya
Uintelligence" tests, and travel accounts, these
Maria Golash-Boza explains:
men argued that White European men were more
biologically advanced and more intelligent than Race is a social construction, an idea we endow
any other racial group-and that this superior- with meaning through daily interactions. It has
ity explained their dominance in the world. Later no biological basis. This might seem odd to read,
CHAPTER 14: RACISM. EQUALITY. AND DISCRIMINATION 0 437
-~
"~
Slavery and Racism in u.S. History
• 1619 English colonists bring the first African • 1896 The Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy v.
slaves to the colony of Jamestown. Ferguson permits increased segregation and
• 16605 "Slave codes" are enacted to outlaw interra- Jim Crow practices.
cial marriage and the freeing of slaves by their mas- • 1875-1950 Over 4,000 Black men, women, and chil-
ters (manumission). Slavery becomes a life sentence. dren are murdered in racial terror lynchings. They
• Late 17005 The United States' founding docu- are hanged, burned alive, and hacked to death.
ment, the Constitution, establishes a new nation • 1921 In what is now known as the Tulsa Race
but grants no rights to slaves. Almost half of Massacre, one of the worst incidents of racial
the men who craft the Constitution own slaves. violence in American history, a White mob
Thomas Jefferson insists that Africans and their assaults the prosperous, mostly Black Green-
descendants are less than human. wood neighborhood of Tulsa, Oklahoma, killing
• 1857 In the case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, the U.S. hundreds of people and destroying over twelve
Supreme Court proclaims that slaves are not citizens of hundred houses, leaving thousands homeless.
the United States and that all Black people have "no The violence was sparked in this already racially
rights which the White man was bound to respect." tense area by an unfounded rumor that a Black
teenager had sexually assaulted a White girl.
• 1861-1865 Slavery becomes the main issue that
precipitates the Civil War, which cost 620,000 • 1955 During the Montgomery bus boycott, Rosa
lives-including those of 38,000 Black soldiers Parks is arrested for not relinquishing her bus
who fought in the Union Army. seat to a White man.
• 1863 President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) • 1958 Twenty-four states throughout the country
delivers the Emancipation Proclamation, which have laws that ban marriage between people
declares that slaves in the states of the Confed- of different races. Some people are arrested
eracy shall be free. Two years later, after the and jailed for violating the prohibitions. Inter-
Civil War, slavery is officially abolished, but racist marriage laws stand until 1967, when the U.S.
doctrines that justify slavery and the lower status Supreme Court rules them unconstitutional.
of Black people remain widespread. • 19605 Black people are discriminated against in
• 1866-18705 The Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist orga- restaurants, restrooms, classrooms, lunch counters,
nization known as "The Invisible Empire of the hospitals, theaters, and train cars, and at cemeter-
South," beats, tortures, and hangs Black Ameri- ies and on buses. Killings and beatings of peaceful
cans for asserting their rights or for simply being Black protesters and their White supporters shock
Black. The Klan has thousands of members and the nation with their brutality and frequency.
survives well into the twenty-first century. • 1965 The Voting Rights Act passes, allowing the
• 18805 Former Confederacy states enact Jim Crow federal government to intervene to help Black
laws-legislation designed to deny Black citizens Americans vote.
the right to vote and to ensure unequal segre- • 1968 In Memphis, Tennessee, James Earl Ray
gation in virtually every area of public life. Jim assassinates Martin Luther King Jr., the leader of
Crow laws do not exist in Northern states, but the civil rights movement and a tireless advocate
widespread racial discrimination persists. of change through nonviolence.
as the physical differences between a Kenyan, a construct. As the political scientist Michael James
Swede, and a Han Chinese, for example, are obvi- explains:
ous. However, these physical differences do not
necessarily mean that the world can be divided Race constructivists accept the skeptics' dismissal
into discrete racial groups. If you were to walk from of biological race but argue that the term still
Kenya to Sweden to China, you would note incre- meaningfully refers to the widespread grouping
mental gradations in physical differences between of individuals into certain categories by society,
people across space, and it would be difficult to indeed often by the very members of such racial
decide where to draw the line between Africa and ascriptions. Normatively, race constructivists argue
Europe and between Europe and Asia. There may be that since society labels people according to racial
genetic differences between Kenyans and Swedes, categories, and since such labeling often leads to
but the genetic variations within the Kenyan pop- race-based differences in resources, opportunities,
ulation are actually greater than those between and well-being, the concept of race must be con-
Swedes and Kenyans. Although race is a social, as served, in order to facilitate race-based social move-
opposed to a biological, construction, it has a wide ments or policies, such as affirmative action, that
range of consequences in our society, especially compensate for socially constructed but socially
when used as a sorting and stratifying mechanism. 5 relevant racial differences. 8
According to Blum, popular thinking about The view of many researchers and scholars is
race generally dispenses with the biological compo- that races (in the biological sense) don't exist, but
nent, but not with the idea of inherency-the notion "racialized groups" -groups that people believe are
that "certain traits of mind, character, and tem- discrete and immutable races and treat as such-
perament are inescapably part of a racial group's do. Throughout American history, people have
(nature' and hence define its racial fate.,,6 A group's believed (and still believe) that there are identifi-
nature is thought to be fixed and unalterable. This able races called "whites" and "Blacks," and society
view of race says that White people are naturally has treated these groups accordingly.9
this way; Asian people are naturally that way; Black Blum and many other commentators argue that
people have this inherent character trait; Jewish despite the nonexistence of race, giving up entirely
people exhibit this inherent disposition. our ability to talk and think about racialized groups
Some philosophers who accept that race has no and racial realities would have unfortunate moral
physical scientific basis argue that the concept of implications-which is why so many observers
race itself is harmful. Blum maintains that condemn the notion of racial color blindness:
the contemporary American conception of race Yet jettisoning race in the two ways I've mentioned
contains certain morally troubling features inde- (racial language and racial thinking) would have
pendent of its use in specifically racist contexts: important moral costs as well. Many would be mis-
exaggerated difference and moral distance between led into thinking that if there are no races, there
those of different races, which discourages an can be no racism, no groups to be its target. But to
experienced sense of common humanity; an over- be a target of racism requires only that a group is
drawn and falsely grounded sense of commonality racialized, not that it is actually a race.
among members of the same race; a notion of being More fundamentally, race is part of our his-
trapped in one's racial fate; encouragement of ste- tory and our current social arrangements. Groups
reotyping racial others rather than seeing them as defined by race are continuing targets of discrimi-
individuals; and an implication that, because of nation, inferiorizing, and stigmatizing. These
their racial membership, some persons have greater groups, especially blacks, Native Americans, and
worth or ability than others. 7 some Latino/Hispanic groups, also live with accu-
mulated deficits from even more horrendous injus-
Many philosophers agree that biological race tices in the past. Whites possess a range of unearned
is a myth but are reluctant to jettison the social advantages in virtually every major domain of
social existence-education, jobs, health care, races exist and that significant differences (such as
and political power; and often they harbor subtle moral, intellectual, or cultural differences) among
assumptions that they are "all right" while other races can be distinguished. What pushes this view
groups are defective in some way. If we give up
about race into racisDl is the additional belief that
race entirely, we abandon the ability to name these
racial wrongs .... Color blindness has assumed the some races are inferior in these significant respects
status of an almost absolute principle that further or otherwise deserving of dislike or hostility.
motivates whites to be blind to continuing racial The key concepts in this definition are what Blum
discrimination and injustice. to calls inferiorization and antipathy. He suggests that all
forms of racism can be related to these two themes:
Racism
Inferiorization is linked to historical racist doc-
A commitment to either the traditional (biological) trine and racist social systems. Slavery, segregation,
or the inherency view of race is a presupposition of imperialism, apartheid, and Nazism all treated cer-
racism. Racism is based on the belief that distinct tain groups as inferior to other groups ...
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Slavery and Race
Some people associate slavery exclusively with included access to education, the potential to
Black people or only with the institution as it was obtain freedom for themselves and their children,
practiced in the southern United States in previous the right to marry, and the right to own property.
centuries. But this view is historically inaccurate. Until the eighteenth century, no society categori-
Race scholar Tanya Maria Golash-Boza argues cally denied the humanity of slaves. It was not seen
as necessary to rationalize slavery by denying that
otherwise:
slaves were fully human. Although slaves were at
Slavery was not new to the Americas: the practice times treated brutally, the humanity of slaves was
of enslaving people has existed since antiquity. In never put into question, and slavery was never
African, European, and Middle Eastern societies, attributed to racial inferiority. *
conquered peoples often became slaves in the
aftermath of war. As agricultural societies grew, Some have argued that slavery in previous eras
so did the demand for labor, leading peoples was necessary to ensure prosperity and a high level
such as the Greeks and Phoenicians to raid other of culture. As an example, they point to ancient
societies for slaves. Slavery existed not only across Greek civilization-with its great achievements
societies but also within societies: people lacking in art, philosophy, science, and mathematics-
the support of a family often had no place other and contend that it would not have been pos-
than as slaves, and some people became enslaved sible without slaves. Supposing this is true, would
as a means of paying off debt or as punishment these achievements have justified the institution of
for a crime. Slavery of this latter form almost
slavery? Can slavery ever be morally justified on the
always involved persons of the same ethnic group
grounds that it makes life more pleasant for free
as their masters ....
The status of slaves varied across societies. In people? Why or why not?
some instances, slaves were adopted as kin after
serving for a certain number of years; in other cases, *Tonya Maria Golash-Boza, Race and Racisms,
slaves were permitted to marry and own property. pp. 5-6, 52. Copyright © 2016 Oxford University Press.
Many slaves were granted rights not found in the Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through
system of slavery in the New World. These rights PLSclear.
Though race-based antipathy is less related to but not racism, people should be able to see that for
the original concept of "racism," today the term what it is. I2
unequivocally encompasses racial bigotry, hostil- We should not, however, infer from any of
ity, and hatred. Indeed, the racial bigot is many
this that the magnitude of racism and inequality
people's paradigm image of a "racist." ...
Historical systems of racism did of course in society has been exaggerated. In fact, it's likely
inevitably involve racial antipathy as well as infe- that indirect or veiled racism and inequality are
riorization. Hatred of Jews was central to Nazi more serious than we might imagine. Here's a
philosophy; and it is impossible to understand sketch of a few of the more egregious problems,
American racism without seeing hostility to blacks from the social scientist and race scholar Eduardo
and Native Americans as integral to the nexus of
Bonilla-Silva:
attitudes and emotions that shored up slavery and
segregation. I I
Blacks and dark-skinned racial minorities lag well
Blum hopes that an understanding of racism behind whites in virtually every area of social
as defined by these two concepts will help stanch life; they are about three times more likely to be
what has been called the "conceptual inflation" of poor than whites, earn about 40 percent less than
whites, and have about an eighth of the net worth
the words radst and radsm. He and other scholars
that whites have. They also receive an inferior edu-
see the terms losing their moral import and abil- cation compared to whites, even when they attend
ity to shame because they are overused and misap- integrated institutions. In terms of housing, black-
plied. People, words, symbols, policies, practices, owned units comparable to white-owned ones
institutions-such things are clearly racist if they are valued at 35 percent less. Blacks and Latinos
involve inferiorization and antipathy directed at also have less access to the entire housing market
racial groups. But many other things labeled racist, because whites, through a variety of exclusion-
ary practices by white realtors and homeowners,
according to the definition above, are not racist. As
have been successful in effectively limiting their
Blum says, entrance into many neighborhoods. Blacks receive
Some feel that the word [racist] is thrown around so impolite treatment in stores, in restaurants, and in
much that anything involving "race" that someone a host of other commercial transactions. Research-
does not like is liable to castigation as "racist." ... ers have also documented that blacks pay more
A local newspaper called certain blacks "racist" for for goods such as cars and houses than do whites.
criticizing other blacks who supported a white over Finally, blacks and dark-skinned Latinos are the
a black candidate for mayor. A white girl in Virginia targets of racial profiling by the police, which,
said that it was ((racist" for an African American combined with the highly racialized criminal court
teacher in her school to wear African attire . . . . system, guarantees their overrepresentation amon.g
Merely mentioning someone's race (or racial des- those arrested, prosecuted, incarcerated, and If
ignation), using the word ((Oriental" for Asians charged for a capital crime, executed. Racial profil-
without recognizing its origins and its capacity for ing on the highways has become such a prevalent
insult, or socializing only with members of one's phenomenon that a term has emerged to describe
own racial group are called "racist." ... it: driving while black. In short, blacks and most
Not every instance of racial conflict, insensi- minorities are "at the bottom of the well."t3
tivity, discomfort, miscommunication, exclusion,
injustice, or ignorance should be called "racist." Racism often involves racial prejudice-
Not all racial incidents are racist incidents. We need antipathy toward a racial group based on a faulty
a more varied and nuanced moral vocabulary for view of that group. Racial discrindnation is
talking about the domain of race .... All forms of
unfavorable treatment of people because of their
racial ills should elicit concern from responsible
individuals. If someone displays racial insensitivity, race. Prejudice and discrimination can be directed
CRITICAL THOUGHT: White Privilege
What is white privilege, and what does it have nonracists still partake of white privilege. . . .
to do with racism? White privilege refers to the What is so disturbing about white privilege is that
advantages or benefits that whites enjoy simply you need not be in any way personally blamewor-
because they are White. The philosopher Law- thy for having it, but it is still unfair that you do. It
is not personally racist to have white privilege....
rence Blum says that there are two distinct forms
[W]hite privilege is a different sort of racial ill
of white privilege:
than personal racism. But it is morally wrong to be
One is simply that of being spared racial dis- complacent about or accepting of racial privileges
crimination, stigmatizing, indignities, stereotyp- once one knows one possesses them; one is (often)
ing, and other race-based wrongs.... A second, thereby being complicit with injustice. *
however, consists in material benefits accruing
to whites because of discrimination against racial The eminent philosopher of race Naomi Zack
minorities. When a black is denied a job because argues that white privilege is real and pervasive,
of discrimination, there is one more job avail- but that how we talk about white privilege is
able to a non-black (usually a white). When poor problematic:
schooling leaves many blacks and Latinos inade-
[White privilege discourse] goes too far in blam-
quately prepared for higher education or the job
ing all whites for all forms of racism and it does
market, jobs and places in colleges become more
not go far enough in directly addressing injus-
available to whites (and to others, such as some
tice against nonwhites.... [W]hite privilege dis-
Asian groups, positioned to take advantage of
course may miss the importance of racial injustice
these opportunities).*
and degenerate into just another display of the
To Whites, racial privilege can seem almost advantages that white people have of not being
invisible. Tanya Maria Golash-Boza explains: required to respond to racial injustice against
their racial group .... Yes, whites are privileged,
If you are white, it can be difficult to notice that you
but no amount of exhortation to "check" their
are not being followed around the store [by secu-
privilege or confessional discourse in response will
rity]; that people are smiling at you on the street
correct the legal injustice of police homicide based
instead of clutching their purses; that no one asks
on racial profiling. **
you if you speak English; that you are not asked
for identification when paying with a credit card. *Lawrence Blum, Excerpts from I'm Not a Racist,
Instead, you are likely to think that these things are but . . .: The Moral Quandary of Race, by Lawrence
t
normal-that this is simply how things are. Blum. Copyright @ 2002 by Cornell University. Used by
permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press
Some define racism as a system of privilege and
tTonya Maria Golash-Boza, Race and Racisms, pp. 5-6,
believe that being part of such a system makes you
52. Copyright @ 2016 Oxford University Press. Repro-
a racist, which of course makes all whites racist. But
duced with permission of the Licensor through
Blum thinks it's a mistake to conflate white privi- PLSclear.
lege with personal racism: **Naomi Zack, "Uses and Abuses of the Discourse of
The whole point of the idea of white privilege White Privilege," Philosopher (blog), June 24, 2016,
is that it does not depend on the attitudes of its https:llpoliticalphilosopher.netl2016/06/24/featured-
beneficiaries toward disadvantaged racial groups; philosopher-naomi-zackl. Reprinted with permission.
442 0. PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
at traits other than race, including sexual orienta- claim to be "racist." Most whites assert they "don't
see any color, just people"; that although the ugly
tion, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, and national
face of discrimination is still with us, it is no lon-
origins. Discrimination based on any of these can be ger the central factor determining minorities' life
a violation of law or policy. Many people probably chances; and, finally, that, like Dr. Martin Luther
think that racism is essentially individual racism, KingJr., they aspire to live in a society where "people
person-to-person acts of intolerance or discrimina- are judged by the content of their character, not
tion. But as Bonilla-Silva points out, a prevalent, by the color of their skin." More poignantly, most
almost invisible kind of racism is institutional or whites insist that minorities (especially blacks)
structural racism, unequal treatment that arises are the ones responsible for what "race problem"
we have in this country . . . . Most whites believe
from the way organizations, institutions, and social that if blacks and other minorities would just stop
systems operate. The people who work within such thinking about the past, work hard, and complain
systems mayor may not be racially prejudiced, but less (particularly about racial discrimination), then
the systems themselves cause racial discrimination Americans of all hues could "all get along."ls
and inequality. Consider this example:
If whites do see contemporary racial inequal-
Another practice . . . is employers' recruiting by ity, says Bonilla-Silva, they are likely to blame it on
word of mouth among current workers in the com-
nonracial factors:
pany rather than advertising in job listings. There is
a nonracial business rationale for doing so: it saves [W]hites rationalize minorities' contemporary sta-
publicity costs, and it garners job applicants for tus as the product of market dynamiCS, naturally
whom a reliable worker has vouched, thus saving occurring phenomena, and blacks' imputed cul-
on the costs of assessing job suitability in a larger turallimitations. For instance, whites can attribute
group of unknown applicants. Nevertheless, such Latinos' high poverty rate to a relaxed work ethic
recruiting has a disparate racial impact ... in many ("the Hispanics are manana, manana, manana-
occupations blacks and Latinos constitute a smaller tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow") or residential
proportion of the workforce than their percentage segregation as the result of natural tendencies
in the population, and workers' networks are gen- among groups ("Does a cat and dog mix? I can't see
erally race-specific. Thus word-of-mouth recruiting it. You can't drink milk and scotch. Certain mixes
perpetuates racial injustice and sustains the legacy don't mix.,,).16
of racial discrimination .... Hence, in the service
Like many other scholars, Bonilla-Silva also
of racial justice, [word-of-mouth recruiting] should
generally be abandoned; employers should seek maintains that today the forces that create racial
qualified black and Latino applicants, or at least inequality are often nearly invisible:
not employ practices that discourage them. l4 [C]ontemporary racial inequality is reproduced
through "new racism" practices that are subtle,
Many race scholars (and many whites of all pro-
institutional, and apparently nonracial. In contrast
fessions) believe that individual racism and discrim- to the Jim Crow era, where racial inequality was
ination have declined markedly since the 1960s. enforced through overt means (e.g., signs saying
And the more obvious signs of racism have indeed "No Niggers Welcomed Here" or shotgun diplo-
diminished, which is perhaps why most whites macy at the voting booth), today racial practices
believe that racism is no longer a significant prob- operate in a "now you see it, now you don't" fash-
ion. For example, residential segregation, which
lem. Other social SCientists, however, argue that rac-
is almost as high today as it was in the past, is no
ism in less overt forms is widespread. Bonilla-Silva longer accomplished through overtly discrimina-
explains: tory practices. Instead, covert behaviors such as not
Nowadays, except for members of white suprema- showing all the available units, steering minorities
cist organizations, few whites in the United States and whites into certain neighborhoods, quoting
Microaggressions
Microaggressions are defined as commonplace effect, baking "aggression" into that term is hugely
slights or insults conveyed intentionally or unin- confusing. What's more, the confusion seems likely
tentionally by words or actions to disadvantaged to needlessly increase the tension between the per-
groups. Each instance of microaggression may son experiencing the grievance and the person who
seem harmless to those expressing it but not to is ostensibly responsible. t
those who are regularly on the receiving end of Nick Haslam also questions the usefulness
such comments. Cumulatively such occurrences can of viewing social bias or hostility through the
be physically and psychologically detrimental to "microaggression" lens:
those affected. Microaggressions occur, for exam-
The challenge in responding to criticisms of the
ple, when White people ask an Asian American microaggression concept is not to throw the baby
classmate in what country he was born. Or when out with the bathwater. Subtle prejudice and
they ask an African American what the Black view unconscious bias are real and consequential. It
of rap music is. Or when they say "You're really is also beyond question that the general decline
pretty for a dark-skin girl." Or they ask a Black in overt expressions of bigotry in recent decades
friend why she sounds White. * does not signal the end of prejudice. People who
But critics representing a variety of racial claim to be free of it may harbour troubling atti-
and social backgrounds have found fault with tudes and behave in discriminating ways.
the concept. While acknowledging that cumu- However, "microaggression" is not the best
way to think about subtle prejudice. Its definition
lative slights or insults can indeed be harmful,
is amorphous and elastic. It fails to appreciate the
and that even subtle forms of prejudice should
ambiguity of social interaction, relies too exclu-
be addressed, they argue that using the concept
sively on subjective perceptions, and too readily
of microaggression can itself be harmful and ascribes hostile intent. By doing so, the idea of
counterproductive. microaggression contributes to a punitive and
Conor Friedersdorf, for example, says that the accusatory environment that is more likely to cre-
term "microaggression" is inapt: ate backlash than social progress. *
To be sure, there are minor, objectionable,
*American Psychological Association, "Microaggres-
cumulatively burdensome actions that can accu-
sions: What They Are, and How They Are Associated
rately be called "aggressive." Catcalling is a
with Adjustment Outcomes," April 10, 2019, Microag-
familiar example. A man who crowds alongside
gressions: What They Are, And How They Are Associ-
a woman for a half-block while trying to get her ated With Adjustment Outcomes (apa.org).
phone number is behaving aggressively.... But
a well-intentioned white or black student ask- tConor Friedersdorf, "Why Critics of the 'Microaggres-
ing an Asian American classmate, "What coun- sion' Framework Are Skeptical," Atlantic, September
try are you from?" is unfortunate even as it is 14, 2015, https:llwww.theatlantic.com/politicslarchivel
unaggressive. 2015/09/why-critics-of-the-microaggressions-framework
-are-skepticaI/4051 06/.
Aggression is "hostility" or "violent behavior"
or "the forceful pursuit of one's interests." If there's *Nick Haslam, "The Trouble with 'Microaggressions,'" The
going to be a term for behavior that is burdensome Conversation, January 16, 2017, https:lltheconversation
partly because the often well-intentioned people .comlthe-trouble-with-microaggressions-71364.
who do it are blind to its wrongness and cumulative
higher rents or prices to minority applicants, or not Native American posts the words "Goddamn White
advertising units at all are the weapons of choice to people!" Such statements are unequivocally racist,
maintain separate communities. In the economic and they would be racist even if the person mak-
field, "smiling face" discrimination ("We don't ing them did not bear any antipathy or inferioriz-
have jobs now, but please check later"), advertising attitude toward the targeted group. Whether
ing job openings in mostly white networks and
the person making the racist statement is in fact a
ethnic newspapers, and steering highly educated
people of color into poorly remunerated jobs or racist is a separate issue. Someone who harbors no
jobs with limited opportunities for mobility are animosity or inferiorizing attitude toward a racial
the new ways of keeping minorities in a secondary group but who nevertheless utters a racist statement
position. Politically, although the civil rights strug- is no racist-but instead may be racially insensitive,
gles have helped remove many of the obstacles ignorant, uncomfortable, or self-deceived. In gen-
for the electoral participation of people of color, eral, a racist is someone whose racist attitudes are
racial gerrymandering, multimember legislative
districts, election runoffs, annexation of predomi-
persistent and entrenched.
It is possible for whites to hold or act on racist
nately white areas, at-large district elections, and
anti-single-shot devices (disallowing concentrating beliefs about non-whites without realizing that
votes [on] one or two candidates in cities using at- their beliefs are racist. Naomi Zack calls this "unac-
large elections) have become standard practices to knowledged racism":
disenfranchise people of color.I7
For example, someone who thinks that most black
All these indirect, institutional, covert means of men are dangerously violent, and as a result fears
creating racial inequality are what Bonilla-Silva calls and regards with hostility any black male stranger,
"racism without racists." With this form of racism , knows that they hold the generalization about black
Black people and other minorities can be disadvan- male violence, but fails to acknowledge that it is a
negative racial stereotype, and racist on that count.
taged while the individuals responsible for the in justice Another kind of unacknowledged racism,
may be difficult to identify-or may not exist at all. which has been mistakenly called 'unconscious,'
occurs when people un reflectively put racist beliefs
Racist Acts and Motives and assumptions that they have not critically
examined into practice, through habit, obedience
If racism involves either antipathy or inferioriza-
to custom, or early childhood training . . . . [For
tion directed at a racial group, then we can make example] a small business owner who always hired
some important distinctions about personal rac- whites for a particular job because that is what his
ism (as opposed to institutional racism mentioned father did and what his customers expect. 18
earlier). Racial antipathy is revealed in attitudes
and actions expressing contempt, disrespect, and Should people be held morally responsible for
hostility, and racial inferiorization is embodied in unacknowledged racism? Zack thinks so:
attitudes and actions that treat one racial group as Regarding other vices that harm others, we hold
somehow inferior to another. Actions (like state- offenders morally responsible for their actions,
ments) can be raCist, and attitudes (like motives) even when they have failed to label them correctly,
and the excuses of obedience to custom or child-
can be racist, but racism in the former does not nec-
hood training are generally not exonerating. Par-
essarily involve racism in the latter. ents who neglect or abuse their children are held
Consider the following scenarios. An angry responsible for their actions, even though they
White person calls a Black person the n-word; themselves may have been abused or neglected as
a Black person says Mexicans are lazy; an Asian children. A family background in which animals
American blurts out llFilthy Black people!"; a White were routinely treated with cruelty is not a defense
man tells a joke that demeans Black people; a against present cruelty to animals. Why should not
CHAPTER 14: RACISM, EQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION () 445
racists who fail to acknowledge their own racism be we encounter it. Defining racist, sexist, or hetero-
held responsible in the same way these other perpe- sexist speech solely, or even primarily, by reference
trators are? 19 to audience responses means that the same utter-
ance made by the same person to the same audi-
Every instance of a racist action or attitude
ence can be innocent one day and prejudiced the
should be of concern to any morally aware per- next simply because, in the meantime, the listener
son, but we must recognize that racism comes in has had experiences that affect the way he or she
degrees. Historically, the most morally evil occur- responds. It means that any statement whatsoever
rences of racism have been slavery, segregation, could be deemed prejudiced, since if someone sin-
apartheid, massacres, and lynchings. But beyond cerely claims to be offended, oppressed, demeaned,
these extremes, there are often gradations to take or marginalized by something said, then that emo-
into account. Clearly, racist violence itself is worse tional response, in itself, validates their complaint.
This is not to imply that audience response is
than preaching racist violence. Believing that
irrelevant. Obviously, one important indicator
another race is inferior or that it deserves to be that something you've said might be objectionable
hated is not as morally heinous as trying to harm is that someone objects to it; and if this happens
that group. Having unexpressed racist attitudes is repeatedly and with various audiences, it behooves
not as morally bad as trying to convince others to you to reflect critically on the charges being made
have them. Telling a racist joke about a racial group against you. After all, accusations of prejudice usu-
is not as bad as discriminating against that group ally are prompted by words or deeds that express
prejudice. But the mere fact that your listeners
in business or employment. An artistic creation-a
object or feel offended does not prove that their
movie, painting, song, or book-can be slightly rac- response is justified. They may have misunderstood
ist or savagely racist in the way it depicts people of your meaning or intention. They may be overreact-
color. Racism is a serious moral matter, but we need ing. Their reaction may be irrational.
to address each instance with the degree of serious- . . . The subjective response of a listener or
ness and moral censure that it deserves. Otherwise reader is never sufficient evidence that some-
we risk treating racism simplistically and distorting one's words are raCist, sexist or heterosexist since
much-needed conversations about it. one can always ask the question: Is the response
reasonable ?20
If racism is about racial antipathy and inferi-
orization, then we can make objective judgments
about whether actions, attitudes, and people are Justice and Respect
racist by assessing whether they meet the relevant The most elementary moral question we can ask
criteria. We can argue that a remark is racist, for about racism and discrimination is, Why are they
example, by pointing out that it exemplifies disre- wrong? To the consequentialist, the answer is easy:
spect, hatred, or contempt toward a racial group. they are wrong because they hurt people. It is dif-
But whether the remark is racist does not depend ficult to imagine a racist belief or action resulting
on someone's subjective response to it. The philos- in a favorable balance of good over bad. The non-
opher Emrys Westacott says that concluding that a consequentialist answer is also straightforward. It
speaker's use of a word is racist solely on the basis of is likely to appeal to two fundamental moral prin-
the listener's subjective response is a serious error: ciples: respect for persons and justice. The principle
In fact this sort of reasoning is not just unsound; it is of respect for persons is the cornerstone of Kantian
harmful. For if we give it credence we will be forced ethics and several other moral theories. It says that
to embrace a shifting, unstable notion of what con- each person has equal inherent value, regardless
stitutes prejudice, a concept that will be far less of social status, power, prestige, and racial or eth-
useful as a tool for criticizing real prejudice when nic identity. We fail to respect persons if we inhibit
their freedom of choice, speech, or action; violate unconstitutional, but that in some situations the
their rights; coerce or enslave them; disadvan- use of race or minority status in admissions deci-
tage or harm them; discriminate against them; or sions may be permissible.
use them to achieve an end that is not their own. This famous Supreme Court case-Regents of
The principle of justice says that equals must be the University of California v. Bakke (1978)-is one
treated equally and fairly; that is, persons must be of many to grapple with the issue of affirmative
treated the same unless there is a morally relevant action, a social policy that is still being ferociously
difference between them, and they must get what debated almost forty years after the Bakke decision
is due them. Racial discrimination is contrary to was handed down. It illustrates why this issue is so
justice because it treats one group differently than explosive, so complicated, and so important: dis-
it does another, even though no morally relevant putes over affirmative action invariably involve
differences exist between them. complex collisions of beliefs and values about rac-
A painful and divisive issue that illustrates ism, sexism, discrimination, civil rights, justice,
the many conflicts about race, racism (especially equality, desert, opportunity, and social utility.
institutional racism), and discrimination that can Little wonder, then, that disagreements flare where
arise is affirmative action. Affirmative action agreement would be expected, and that people
is a way of making amends for, or eradicating, often presumed to have different perspectives on
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and gen- the issue-liberals and conservatives, Black people
der. It takes the form of policies and programs and White people, men and women-may be just
(usually mandated by government) designed to as likely to take the same side.
bring about the necessary changes in buSinesses, Affirmative action is notorious for touching
colleges, and other organizations. Consider this off strong feelings that evoke Simplistic, knee-
famous case: A White man named Alan Bakke jerk answers-precisely the kind of answers we
applies for admission to the School of Medicine want to avoid here. Only reflective, well-reasoned
at the University of California, Davis. Only one responses will do for moral questions like these: Are
hundred slots are available, and there are many quota systems such as the one cited in the Bakke
other applicants. His grades and admissions test case morally permissible? Should people be given
scores, however, are good. The medical school preference in college admissions or employment
denies him admission anyway-and grants admis- because they are members of a particular minor-
sion to several others whose grades and scores ity group? Should members of a minority group
are lower than his. As it turns out, the school has that was discriminated against in the past be given
reserved sixteen of the available slots for minority preferential treatment as compensation for that
students, and many of the students who fill those earlier discrimination? Is preferential treatment for
slots have lower grades and test scores than Bakke. minorities and women permissible even though
He sues, claiming that he has been denied admis- it deprives White males of equal opportunities?
sion solely because of his race. His case goes all the Can affirmative action help create a more just and
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is strongly diverse society-or does it lead to a less just one,
divided but eventually decides in his favor. The divided by race and culture?
majority opinion says that preferring members of The ideal that spawned affirmative action is
a group solely on account of their race or ethnic that all persons deserve equal respect and equal
origin is a clear-cut instance of discrimination. opportunity in employment and education. It is
The court finds that quota systems like the one an expression of the principle of justice that equals
used at the School of Medicine at UC Davis are should be treated equally.
Affirmative action in the United States evolved the proportion of such individuals in the whole
over the past half century from several ground- community or the total workforce). But achiev-
breaking laws, executive orders, and court cases. ing fair or proportional representation has often
Most notable among these is the Civil Rights Act required preferential treatment for the desig-
of 1964, enacted at a time when racial discrimina- nated groups. Through the use of quotas or other
tion in the United States was a deeply implanted means, members of the preferred groups have
infection-painful, injurious, and widespread. been favored over nonmembers, who are typically
Discrimination against minorities and women White males.
was rampant in the workplace, in college admis- Thus we can say that there are actually two
sions offices, in government contracting, and in kinds of affirmative action-weak and strong. 22
countless places of buSiness, from barbershops to Weak affirmative action is the use of poliCies
factories. Amounting to a direct assault on unequal and procedures to end discriminatory practices
treatment, the act outlawed discrimination in and ensure equal opportunity. It hews close to the
public accommodations (such as restaurants and spirit and the letter of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
hotels), public schools and universities, and busi- which decrees in Title VI that "[no] person in the
ness organizations of all kinds. Regarding the latter, United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
the act declares: or national origin, be excluded from participation
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
employer- crimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal finanCial assistance." Weak affirmative
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individ- action can involve many strategies for expanding
ual or otherwise to discriminate against any indi- equal opportunity, but it stops short of preferen-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, tial treatment. As the philosopher Louis P. Pojrnan
conditions, or privileges of employment, because explains it,
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or [Weak affirmative action] includes such things
as dismantling of segregated institutions, wide-
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
spread advertisement to groups not previously
or applicants for employment in any way which
represented in certain privileged pOSitions, special
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
scholarships for the disadvantaged classes (e.g., the
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
poor, regardless of race or gender), and even using
affect his status as an employee, because of such
diversity or under-representation of groups with a
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
history of past discrimination as a tie breaker when
origin. 21
candidates for these goods and offices are relatively
Later, as the executive branch and the courts equal. The goal of Weak Affirmative Action is equal
Opportunity to compete, not equal results. We seek
tried to interpret or implement antidiscrimina-
to provide each citizen regardless of race or gender a
tion poliCies, affirmative action took on a broader fair chance to the most favored positions in SOciety.
meaning. Many U.S. companies and universities There is no more moral requirement to guarantee
have gone beyond simply banning discrimina- that 12% of professors are Black than to guarantee
tory practices. With prompting from the federal that 85% of the players in the National Basketball
government, they have tried to institute equal ASSOciation are White. 23
opportunity ("to level the playing field") by ensur- Weak affirmative action, then, is hardly con-
ing that minority groups and women are repre- troversial. Probably few people nowadays would
sented in fair numbers (that is, numbers reflecting object to efforts to end discrimination against
minorities and women and to give people an equal is usually implemented through favoring plans,
chance to get ahead. But strong affirmative action quota systems, or other approaches. The point of a
is a different matter. quota system is to ensure that an organization has
Strong affirmative action is the use of a predetermined number or percentage of minor-
policies and procedures to favor particular individ- ity or women members. Typically, a proportion of
uals because of their race, gender, or ethnic back- available positions or slots are reserved for the pre-
ground. It is a kind of preferential treatment that ferred people, as was the arrangement at the School
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Reparations
In the century and a half since the end of the Civil harms. Cash payments would seem an important
War, there have been many calls for reparations to component of reparations, but I will suggest that
be paid to African Americans today for the wrongs would not suffice. On the one hand, moral wrongs
suffered during and after slavery. Contemporary are not reducible to material harms and cannot
arguments for and against reparations have been be fully repaired by material compensation. On
discussed by several philosophers and writers, the other hand, slavery and Jim Crow were not
just a collection of wrongs, such as unpaid labor
including Hugo 8edau, Randall Robinson, David
and poor housing. They were all-encompassing
Horowitz, David Lyons, and Ta-Nehisi Coates. Like systems that prevented African Americans from
some other scholars, David Lyons supports repa- developing their interests, their intellects, and
rations not just for slavery but also for Jim Crow indeed their lives as they were morally entitled to
brutalities and their present-day consequences. He do. This subordination of African Americans was
summarizes his argument: justified by a profoundly insulting ideology of
white supremacy that has greatly affected Ameri-
I develop the case for reparations to African
can culture and has contaminated the attitudes of
Americans today, based on wrongdoing that
whites and blacks. A morally adequate program
began in slavery. Critics of such claims remind us
of reparations would enable the survivors of those
that slavery was abolished a century and a half
systems to rebuild their lives, free of oppressive
ago; no one who was either a slave or a slave
racism, as far as that is possible.*
holder is alive today; and moral culpability cannot
be inherited, from which they infer that the time Do you favor reparations for today's African
for reparations is long past. Defenders of repara- Americans? Why or why not? If you are for repara-
tions reply that racial subordination did not end tions, what form do you think they should take? If
with the abolition of slavery but was maintained you are against reparations, what is the basis for
under Jim Crow; that the wrongs of those systems your objection? Would you be in favor of them
have caused deeply entrenched, lasting harms;
if members of a different racial or ethnic group-
and that state and federal governments, as well
perhaps one that reflects your own background-
as today's corporations, universities, and individu-
als, are morally accountable because they helped had been enslaved and, later, targeted by Jim
establish or support slavery or Jim Crow or have Crow-type laws?
profited from them.
References to the harms that were caused by *David Lyons, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and
slavery and that were sustained or caused by Jim Race, edited by Naomi Zack, p. 505. © 2017 Oxford
Crow may suggest that reparations could consist University Press. Reproduced with permission of the
of cash payments to compensate for any persisting Licensor through PLSciear.
of Medicine at UC Davis in the Bakke case. Some- But strong affirmative action is strongly oppo-
times the result of using a quota system is that less sed by many who see it as reverse discrimination-
qualified people are hired or accepted while equally unequal, preferential treatment against some
or more qualified people are not-with the differ- people (mostly White males) to advance the inter-
ence being only that the preferred ones are women ests of others (minorities and women). The main
or members of a minority group. charge is that preferential treatment on the basis of
Defenders of strong affirmative action have race, gender, or minority status is always wrong. It
offered several justifications for it. A leading argu- is just as immoral when used against White males
ment is that because in generations past minori- as it is when used against Black people or women.
ties were treated cruelly and unjustly, they now Speaking specifically of racial preferences, the
deserve compensation for those terrible wrongs.
Giving minorities preferential treatment in
- ~
"~
employment and education is the best way to
make amends. As one philosopher puts it, "Rac- QUICI< REVIEW
ism was directed against Blacks whether they were racism-The belief that distinct races exist, that
talented, average, or mediocre, and attenuating significant differences (such as moral, intellec-
the effects of racism requires distributing remedies tual, or cultural differences) among races can
similarly. Affirmative action policies compensate be distinguished, and that some races are infe-
for the harms of racism (overt and institutional) rior in these significant respects or otherwise
through antidiscrimination laws and preferential deserving of dislike or hostility.
policies. ,,24
racial prejudice-Antipathy toward a racial
Another argument is that strong affirma- group based on a faulty view of that group.
tive action is necessary to foster diversity in a
racial discrimination-Unfavorable treatment
population-diversity of race, ethnicity, gender,
of people because of their race. Prejudice and
culture, and outlook. Diversity is rightly thought
discrimination can be directed at traits other
to be an extremely valuable commodity for any
than race, including sexual traits.
free society. It promotes understanding of cultures
individual racism-Person-to-person acts of
and viewpoints different from one's own, which in
intolerance or discrimination.
turn encourages tolerance and cooperation in an
increasingly heterogeneous world. Some think it institutional or structural racism-Unequal treat-
valuable enough to use strong affirmative action to ment that arises from the way organizations,
achieve it. institutions, and social systems operate.
As you would expect, diversity is thought to affirmative action-A way of making amends
be critical to education-especially in universities, for, or eradicating, discrimination based on
where the issue of promoting diversity through race, ethnicity, and gender.
admission preferences has been vigorously weak affirmative action-The use of policies and
debated. Many universities have tested the use of procedures to end discriminatory practices and
preferences for diversity's sake, encouraged by the ensure equal opportunity.
majority opinion in the Bakke case, which states strong affirmative action-The use of policies
that "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and procedures to favor particular individu-
and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher als because of their race, gender, or ethnic
education-is widely believed to be promoted by a background.
diverse student body. ,,25
philosopher Carl Cohen provides a succinct state- the United States will continue to be pervaded
ment of this claim: by racial divisions as long as the most lucr.a-
tive, satisfying, and important careers remam
It uses categories that must not be used to distinguish mainly the prerogative of members of the white
among persons with respect to their entitlements race, while others feel themselves systematically
in the community. Blacks and whites are equals, as excluded from a professional and social elite. The
blondes and brunettes are equals, as Catholics and second is a calculation of strategy: that increas-
Jews are equals, as Americans of every ancestry are ing the number of blacks who are at work in
equal. No matter who the beneficiaries may be or the professions will, in the long run, reduce the
who the victims, preference on the basis of race is
sense of frustration and injustice and racial self-
morally wrong. It was wrong in the distant past and consciousness in the black community to the
in the recent past; it is wrong now; and it will always point at which blacks may begin to think of them-
be wrong. Race preference violates the principle of selves as individuals who can succeed like others
human equality.26
through talent and initiative. At that future point
the consequences of nonracial admissions pro-
grams, whatever these consequences .might .be,
MORAL THEORIES could be accepted with no sense of raCial barners
or in justice. 27
In the debates over strong affirmative action,
those who oppose it as well as those who endorse
Many opponents of strong affirmative action
it appeal to conventional moral theories-both
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist. Many also make utilitarian appeals. Their most straight-
who support strong affirmative action make the forward counterargument is that those who favor
utilitarian argument that these poliCies can have race or gender preferences are simply wrong
enormous benefits for minorities and women about the consequences of the policies: the con-
as well as for society as a whole. They contend, sequences either are not as beneficial as supposed
as suggested earlier, that preferential programs or are actually injurious. Opponents try to under-
can increase racial and cultural diversity, which mine the diversity argument by insisting that
racial and ethnic diversity does not necessarily
helps promote tolerance, mutual understanding,
result in diversity of ideas or outlooks, that no sci-
and better use of people's talents, and-in higher
education-enhances learning. They also argue entific evidence supports the notion that diversity
that preferential pOlicies can have great social policies yield benefits in education or lear~ing,
utility by creating role models for minorities and and that giving priority to racial or gender dIver-
sity in the workplace would severely undermine
women whose self-esteem and hopes for success
have been dimmed by generations of discrimina- competence and efficiency, which are highly val-
tion. They assert that role models are essential for ued by society. They reject the role model argu-
demonstrating to young people that significant ment on the grounds that role models selected by
achievement is possible. Finally, some think the race or gender are not necessarily the role models
we need. The best role models in education, they
best argument is that strong affirmative action
say, are people who are the best-the most com-
may be able to eradicate racism and transform our
petent, knowledgeable, inspiring, and decent-
race-conscious society. A proponent of this view
outlines the argument as follows: whatever the color of their skin, their background, or
their gender. Many opposed to racial preferences
rAffirmative action programs] rest on two judg- doubt that such treatment can help eliminate
ments. The first is a judgment of social theory: that racism and promote a color-blind society. In fact,
CHAPTER 14: RACISM. EQUALITY. AND DISCRIMINATION 0' 451
COVID-19 Exposes and Deepens Racial Inequalities
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how vulner- Jones, whose work examines the impacts
able high-tech society is to low-tech mass conta- of racism on the health and well-being of the
gions, spreading death and destruction across the nation ... points to residential segregation as a
globe and at every level of society. It has hit African driver of broad health disparities.
Americans and other vulnerable groups the hard;,. "It's segregation in terms of access to healthy
foods, and to green space, and excess exposure to
est and shed more light on something experts were
environmental hazards, which is why we have things
already aware of: the depth and breadth of racial
like more obesity leading to more diabetes and more
disparities in many measures of health and well-
heart disease and more kidney failure," said Jones.
being. Consider this report from Harvard specialists Similarly, those and other social and economic
in multiple disciplines: inequities also have led to the higher rates of
Past work by a range of scholars has shown that African Americans contracting the coronavirus, a
"200 black people die every single day in these range of experts say, as opposed to any genetic or
United States who would not have died if the biological predisposition.
health experience of African Americans was "The coronavirus is really exposing class- and
equivalent to that of whites," said Harvard social race-based vulnerabilities, particularly in the form
scientist David Williams during an online discus- of what I think of as toxic inequality, especially the
sion about race and health care last week. clustering of COVID-19 cases by community," said
And the coronavirus pandemic provides new Robert Sampson, Henry Ford II Professor of the
figures to support that grim statistic. Social Sciences.
A recent CDC report found that among "580 "African Americans, even if they're at the
hospitalized COVID-19 patients with race!ethnic- same level of income or poverty as white Ameri-
ity data, approximately 45 percent were white, cans or Latino Americans, are much more likely to
33 percent were black, and 8 percent were His- live in neighborhoods that have concentrated pov-
panic, suggesting that black populations might be erty, polluted environments, lead exposure, higher
disproportionately affected by COVID-19." And a rates of incarceration, higher rates of violence-so
Washington Post analysis revealed that in places that goes beyond individual poverty ... and we
such as Chicago and Louisiana, African Ameri- know that many of these things lead to long-term
cans account for 67 and 70 percent of COVID-19- health consequences," he said ....
related deaths respectively, while representing Adding to the risk amid the current pan-
only 32 percent of the population. Experts expect demic, said Williams . . . is the fact that many
to see more numbers like these as more states and African Americans work in service jobs that
cities report .... can't be done from home, placing them directly
"It's been hard for Americans to understand in harm's way. He also cited the implicit bias
that there are racial structural disparities in this in the nation's health care system-studies
country, that racism exists," said Camara Phyllis have shown African American patients receive
Jones, an epidemiologist, family physician, and poorer-quality health care than whites-"as
senior fellow at the Morehouse School of Medi- another dimension at which racism could also be
cine. " If you asked most white people in this coun- affecting the death rates for African Americans."*
try today, they would be in denial that racism
exists and continues to have profound impacts on *Colleen Walsh, "COVID-19 Targets Communities of
opportunities and exposures, resources and risks. Color," The Harvard Gazette, April 14, 2020, https:1I
But COVID-19 and the statistics about black excess news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/04/health-care-
deaths are pulling away that deniability." disparities-in-the-age-of-coronavirus! (June 6, 2020).
they argue that racial preferences can often have MORAL ARGUMENTS
the opposite effect:
Let us look a little more closely at the argument
Preference puts distinguished minority achieve- from compensatory justice, giving particular atten-
ment under a cloud. It imposes upon every member tion to how a supporter of strong affirmative action
of the preferred minority the demeaning burden of might articulate and defend it. Consider this ver-
presumed inferiority. Preference creates that bur- sion of the argument, narrowly focused on com-
den; it makes a stigma of the race of those who are pensatory claims that Black people might have
preferred by race. An ethnic group given special
against White people for historical discrimination:
favor by the community is marked as needing spe-
cial favor-and the mark is borne prominently by 1. In the past, Black people have been cruelly and sys-
everyone of its members. Nasty racial stereotypes
tematically discriminated against by White people.
are reinforced, and the malicious imputation of
inferiority is inescapable because it is tied to the 2. Black people thus are owed just compensation
color of the skin. 28 for this ill treatment.
3. Strong affirmative action in the form of racial
As noted earlier, a common nonconsequen-
preferences is the most morally appropriate
tialist argument for strong affirmative action is
form of such compensation.
based on the notion of compensatory justice: his-
torically, minorities (Black people, Native Ameri- 4. Therefore, racial preferences (in employment
cans, Hispanics, and others) were the victims of and education) should be used to compensate
racism by the White majority; justice requires that Black people for past discrimination.
members of those minorities now be compen- First, note that this argument is valid and that
sated for that past mistreatment; racial preferences Premise 1 is true. Both those for and those against
in employment and education are appropriate racial preferences would be likely to accept this
compensation; therefore, racial preferences are premise, a statement of historical fact that few
morally permissible. As you might guess, many thoughtful people would dispute. Premises 2 and
who wish to counter this argument also appeal 3, on the other hand, are very contentious claims.
to justice. They argue that compensation is just The most common way to support Premise 2 is
only (1) if it is given in proper measure to spe- to appeal to our moral intuitions about the justice of
cific persons who have been harmed, and (2) if compensating people who have been wronged. We
the specific persons who caused the harm do the tend to think that people who have been wronged
compensating. But with racial preferences, this do in fact deserve reparations, that valid grievances
direct connection that morality seems to require warrant redress. Many argue that Black people have
is missing. The result, they contend, is that often been mistreated and discriminated against for so
the nonminority person who suffers because of many generations that today they still suffer the lin-
compensatory justice (because he is well quali- gering effects-they are disadvantaged before they
fied but denied admission, for example) has had even begin to compete for jobs, school admissions,
nothing to do with past raCism, and the per- and grades. Racial preferences help give them the
son who benefits from compensatory justice edge that they need-and that they justly deserve as
has suffered very little from racism (because, for repayment for cruelties suffered in the past.
example, he or she is well educated with above- Those who reject Premise 2 counter that the
average income). They conclude that racial pref- principle of just compensation is certainly legiti-
erences are unjust. mate, but compensation in the form of racial
preferences is not just. Compensation, they argue, penalized so that the debt can be paid. The claim
should go to the particular persons who have been is that racial preferences are unjust because they
wronged, and the compensation should be paid by punish people who have done nothing to merit
the specific persons who wronged them. But with punishment. When Black people get preferential
racial preferences, they contend, the Black people treatment in employment, the argument goes,
who benefit are not all equally deserving of redress. some White males end up losing out-even though
The ancestors of contemporary Black people were they had no part in past racism and may have never
almost certainly not equally wronged, not all discriminated against anyone. Clearly, penalizing
wronged in the same fashion, and not all wronged people for wrongdoing that they did not-and
more than some poor White males were wronged. could not-commit is unjust; therefore, racial pref-
As Carl Cohen says, erences are unjust.
A frequent reply to this argument is that the
[M]any of Hispanic ancestry now enjoy here, and White males thought to be innocent victims of
have long enjoyed, circumstances as decent and as
reverse discrimination are not as innocent as we
well protected as those enjoyed by Americans of
all other ethnicities. The same is true of African
might think. According to this response, White
Americans, some of whom are impoverished and males are the recipients of advantages and privi-
some of whom are rich and powerful. Rewards leges that have been unjustly extracted from Black
distributed on the basis of ethnic membership people for generations-therefore, strong affirma-
assume that the damages suffered by some were tive action does not take from White males anything
suffered by all-an assumption that we know to be that is rightfully theirs. The philosopher Judith Jar-
false. 29 vis Thomson, an advocate of racial preferences,
makes the point in the following way:
Advocates of racial preferences can counter
this criticism with an analogy. In the United No doubt few, if any, [young white male applicants]
States, military veterans receive preferential treat- have themselves, individually, done any wrongs
to blacks and women. But they have profited from
ment when they apply for civil service jobs. Their
the wrongs the community did. Many may actu-
applications are automatically given extra weight, ally have been direct beneficiaries of poliCies which
which means that sometimes veterans may land excluded or downgraded blacks and women-
jobs even when nonveteran applicants are equally perhaps in school admissions, perhaps in access to
qualified. The notion behind this policy is that a finanCial aid, perhaps elsewhere; and even those
grateful nation owes veterans something for their who did not directly benefit in this way had, at any
service. The policy assumes that all veterans are rate, the advantage in the competition which comes
owed preferential treatment even though some of of confidence in one's full membership, and of one's
30
rights being recognized as a matter of course.
them have served longer and more courageously
than others. So, the advocate of preferences asks, Critics have tried to rebut this argument by
why should not Black people be treated accord- questioning its underlying assumption-the
ing to a similar policy? Why should not all Black notion that, as one philosopher puts it, "if some-
people be owed preferential treatment because of one gains from an unjust practice for which he is
past discrimination-and owed it in equal mea- not responsible and even opposes, the gain is not
sure even though some Black people have been really his and can be taken from him without injus-
wronged more than others? tice.,,31 This rebuttal relies on the commonsense
Another kind of attack on Premise 2 focuses moral principle that a person who wrongs others
not on the people compensated, but on those is morally obligated to compensate them for that
wrong, but the wrongdoer's descendants are not.

The sins of the parents cannot be transferred to the CHAPTER REVIEW
children.
Premise 3-that racial preferences are just
and appropriate moral compensation for past SUMMARY
discrimination-is defended by many, but probably
most ably by Thomson: The core idea of race-that is, the notion of discrete
groups of people who share distinct biological and
cultural traits-is relatively new, arising in differ-
[In] fact the nature of the wrongs done is such as
to make jobs the best and most suitable form of ent forms over time beginning around the sixteenth
compensation. What blacks and women were century and changing in the Americas and Europe in
denied was full membership in the community; response to colonization and slavery.
and nothing can more appropriately make amends In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
for that wrong than precisely what will make several thinkers tried to apply scientific principles to
them feel they now finally have it. And that means the study of race. The result was what is now known as
jobs. Financial compensation (the cost of which scientific racism. Later scientists discredited this body
could be shared equally) slips through the fingers; of research.
having a job, and discovering you do it well, yield- In the twenty-first century, science still has not
perhaps better than anything else-that very self-
firmly established that there are such things as races
respect which blacks and women have had to do
without. 32 that differ in certain essential, inherent characteris-
tics. The traditional idea is that race consists of heri-
table biological features common to all members of
Though several arguments can be tried
a racial group that explain the character and cultural
against Premise 3, one in particular goes to
traits of those members. But the consensus among sci-
the heart of the debate on racial preferences. It entists and philosophers is that this view is false.
says that preferential treatment is not fitting Racism is based on the belief that distinct races
compensation because it ignores the true stan- exist and that significant differences (such as moral,
dard by which jobs and pOSitions should be intellectual, or cultural differences) among races can
awarded-competence: be distinguished. What pushes this view about race
into racism is the additional belief that some races
{T]he normal criterion of competence is a strong are inferior in these significant respects or otherwise
prima facie consideration when the most impor- deserving of dislike or hostility.
tant POSitions are at stake. There are three reasons Racism often involves racial prejudice-racially
for this: (1) treating people according to their mer- biased opinions based on incomplete or erroneous
its respects them as persons, as ends in themselves, information. Racial prejudice can be either the result
rather than as means to social ends (if we believe of racism or a pretext for it. Racial discrimination is
that individuals possess a dignity that deserves to unfavorable treatment of people because of their race.
be respected, then we ought to treat that individ-
Prejudice and discrimination can be directed at traits
ual on the baSis of his or her merits, not as a mere
other than race, including sexual orientation, age, gen-
instrument for social policy); (2) society has given
people expectations that if they attain certain lev- der, ethnicity, religion, and national origins. Discrimi-
els of excellence they will be awarded appropri- nation based on any of these traits can be a violation of
ately; and (3) filling the most important positions law or policy. Individual racism consists of person-to-
with the best qualified is the best way to ensure person acts of intolerance or discrimination, whereas
efficiency in job-related areas and in SOCiety in the prevalent, almost invisible kind of racism known
genera1. 33 as institutional or structural racism consists of unequal
treatment that arises from the way organizations, insti- l<EY TERMS
tutions, and social systems operate. racism (p. 439)
From a nonconsequentialist perspective, racism is racial prejudice (p. 440)
wrong because it violates two important moral prin- racial discrimination (p. 440)
ciples: respect for persons and justice. The principle individual racism (p. 442)
of respect for persons says that each person has equal institutional or structural racism (p. 442)
inherent value, regardless of social status, power, pres- affirmative action (p. 446)
tige, or racial or ethnic identity. The principle of jus- weak affirmative action (p. 447)
tice says that equals must be treated equally and fairly. strong affirmative action (p. 448)
Affirmative action is meant to make up for or
eliminate minority and gender discrimination, which
is a form of unwarranted mistreatment. Affirmative EXERCISES
action seeks to realize the ideal of equal respect and Review Questions
opportunity for all in employment and education.
1. Is racism part of humankind's nature? That is,
Weak affirmative action is generally not controversial
because it uses policies and procedures to ensure equal have people always sorted one another into
racial groups and then considered some groups
opportunity without demanding that one group be
preferred over another. Strong affirmative action, on inferior or deserving of malice? (pp. 435-36)
the other hand, is controversial because it makes use 2. What is scientific racism? Has science definitely
of minority and gender preferences. established that there are such discrete things as
Those who defend strong affirmative action argue races? (p. 436)
that it is needed to compensate certain groups for 3. What is inherency? (p. 438)
mistreatment and discrimination of the past. It is also 4. What is racism? What two key elements does
thought to level the playing field-to give minorities Blum say are contained in the concept of
and women an edge in the competition for jobs and racism? (p. 439)
educational admissions. Some also contend that such S. Why does Blum say that not every instance
preferences are justified because they help promote of racial conflict, insensitivity, ignorance, or
cultural, ethnic, and intellectual diversity, a benefi- miscommunication should be called racist?
cial force in free societies. Strong affirmative action is (p.440)
opposed by many who think it is reverse discrimina- 6. What is racial prejudice? What is racial
tion, unequal treatment that penalizes White males discrimination? (p. 440)
to give advantages to Black people and women. These 7. What is institutional racism? Is it always easy to
critics generally reject all forms of preferential treat- detect? Why or why not? (pp. 442-44)
ment whether they favor White males or not. 8. What is white privilege? (p. 441)
Arguments for and against strong affirmative 9. What is weak affirmative action? What is strong
action can appeal to both consequentialist and non- affirmative action? (pp. 447-49)
consequentialist theories. Some argue that preferential 10. What are racialized groups? (p. 438)
treatment is justified because it has positive conse-
quences for minorities and for society as a whole. Oth- Discussion Questions
ers argue that such policies do not work as advertised 1. Name three of the more egregious examples
and actually harm the people they are meant to help. of inequality and racism that Bonilla-Silva
Nonconsequentialist arguments appeal to justice, mentions. Do you agree that they are racist?
asserting that affirmative action programs are just Why or why not?
(doing compensatory justice, for example) or unjust 2. What does Bonilla-Silva mean by the phrase
(distorting compensatory justice). "racism without racists"?
3. Why does Naomi Zack think that white Kwame Anthony Appiah, "Racisms," in Anatomy ofRadsm,
privilege discourse is problematic? ed. David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of
4. Do you believe, as Bonilla-Silva does, that covert Minnesota Press, 1990).
forms of racism are widespread? Why or why Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist But . .. The Moral Quan-
II :
daryofRace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

not?
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 5th ed.
5. Do you believe that strong affirmative action is
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018).
morally acceptable? Why or why not? Tanya Maria Golash-Boza, Racism and Racisms: A Critical
6. Is a White person who benefits from white Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
privilege a racist? Is he a racist if he denies that David Theo Goldberg, ed., Anatomy ofRacism (Minneapo-
white privilege exists? Explain. lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
7. What arguments can be lodged against strong Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist (New York: One
affirmative action? World, 2019).
8. According to Bonilla-Silva, how can racial Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The
inequality and its effects be nearly invisible? Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (New
9. Is weak affirmative action morally preferable to York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
strong affirmative action? Why or why not? Ali Rattansi, Racism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
10. Are there such things as distinct races, and can
Shannon Sullivan, Good White People: The Problem with
significant moral and intellectual differences be Middle-Class White Anti-Racism (Albany, NY: SUNY
distinguished among them? Press, 2014).
Naomi Zack, The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after
FURTHER READING the History of Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (New York: The Littlefield, 2011).
New Press, 2012). Naomi Zack, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and
Andrew Altman, "Discrimination," in Stanford Encyclope- Race (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
dia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, Naomi Zack, White Privilege and Black Rights: The Injustice
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries of u.s. Police Racial Profiling and Homicide (Lanham, MD:
/discrimination/. Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Is Racial Identity a Choice?

Rachel Dolezal, the white woman who for 10 years pretended she was black before
being publicly outed, has called for racial fluidity to be recognised in the same way as
transgenderism.
The former National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
leader said race is "less biological than gender" and believes the term "transracial" is a
useful term to describe how race should be considered in the future.
Ms. Dolezal also claimed "race is a lie, so how can you lie about a lie?" in response
to her public shaming in 2015 when she was outed by her parents as "biologically
Caucasian. "
"Gender is understood-we have progressed, we have evolved into understanding

gender is not binary, it is not even biological but what strikes me as so odd is that race
is not biological either and actually race has been to some extent less biological than
gender," she told Newsnight's Emily Maitlis.
The former civil rights activist claims she can no longer work because of the
controversy and is "ostracised" in Spokane, Washington, where she is forced to remain
due to a custody arrangement with her son's father.
"As a result of me being discredited, called a liar and a fraud, a con-and not
just distrusting my work but everything I did, including my resume, was called into
question," she said ....
"The thing that hurt the worst was from the black community because I still feel
like that is home for me and even if I get evicted or get pushed to the fringe or some
people don't see me as part of that group, it is still where I feel like I fit and where I
feel at home," she said ....
Ms. Dolezal was fired as head of the Spokane chapter of the NAACP and kicked off
a police ombudsman commission when she was outed. She also lost her job teaching
African studies at Eastern Washington University in nearby Cheney and has been accused
of cultural appropriation by both the white and black community.*
Is Ms. Dolezal right-is race a lie? Is it "less biologi- pretending to be something she's not-or was it
cal than gender"? Whether race is or isn't biologi- that she challenged society's assumptions about
cal, did she do anything wrong in assuming a Black what race is?
identity? If so, what is her transgression? Was it
*Lucy Pasha-Robinson, "Rachel Dolezal: White Woman Who Identifies as Black Calls for 'Racial Fluidity' to Be
Accepted," Ti,e Independent, March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/rachel-dolezal-white-
woman-black-racial-fluidity-accepted-transracial-naacp-a7653131.html. Reprinted by permission of ESI Media.
2. Racial Preferences for White People?

Affirmative action is most often thought of as a racial preference for marginalized
peoples-a way to ensure that those who are often discriminated against have places
in schools and in the workforce. But some insist that the roots of affirmative action are
firmly grounded in a racial preference for White people.
One commentator argues that the abolition of White indentured servitude perfectly
encapsulates White racial preference, for though White slavery was no longer legal in
the United States as of the nineteenth century, Black and indigenous workers remained
in bondage. Racial preference for White people was the guiding principle behind the
1790 Naturalization Act, which granted U.S. citizenship to almost any immigrant of
European ancestry, but excluded Black people, Asians, and American Indians. Asian
exclusion laws, segregation, and the concept of manifest destiny, which led to the
annexation of half of Mexico, are also products of affirmative action for White people.
He points out that as recently as the 1960s, the Federal Housing Administration
provided loans almost exclusively to White families. From the 1930s to the 1960s,
approximately 15 million White families were able to obtain homes with FHA loans,
while people of color received no such aid.
He concludes that the group that has benefited most through affirmative action
programs is White America. The laws and public policies of the United States have been
shaped and molded by White racial preference, and many of the social and economic
inequalities we face today are the result of years of affirmative action for White people. t
Do you agree with this commentator that racial preferences for White people have indeed always
preferences for White people have always been a been widespread, were they always unjust as well?
major part of U.S. history? If so, do you think that Suppose they were unjust. Would racial prefer-
the U.S. government should make amends for ences in favor of nonwhite people now be just?
such past inequalities? Why or why not? If racial Why or why not?
tBased on Tim Wise, "The Mother of All Racial Preferences," Znet, May 24, 2003, https:/lzcomm.org
/zcommentary/the-mother-of-all-racial-preferences-by-tim-wise/. Originally appeared as a ZNet commentary at
www.zmag.org.
3. Are Racial Preferences Harmful?

Over the past few years, researchers have begun to produce large datasets that make it
possible to compare the fortunes of minority students who attend universities that use
varying levels of admissions preferences. In many contexts, scholars find that students
perform better, both in the short-term and the long-term, when students' credentials
are closer to those of their classmates. When students are surrounded by peers who have
much higher credentials, they often have more trouble persisting in a difficult major,
graduating from college or getting a good job.
This phenomenon is known as the "mismatch effect," and last month I published
a study in the Stanford Law Review, trying to determine whether the mismatch effect
operates in law schools .... My study focused on black law students and compared black
and white outcomes.
I found that law schools almost universally use very large preferences for blacks
to achieve something very close to racial proportionality. The credentials gap
between white and black students is about 30 times larger than it would be in a race-
blind regime.
Starting a highly competitive curriculum with a large academic disadvantage, blacks
wind up clustered in the bottom tenth of the class at nearly all law schools. I estimate
the mismatch effect increases the number of black dropouts from law school by 40%,
and increases the number of blacks failing their first bar exam by 80%.
The mismatch effect appears to operate in the job market as well. Law firms-once
thought to be single-minded in their determination to recruit lawyers from the most
elite schools possible-turn out to weigh law school grades more heavily than school
prestige. The typical black law graduate, I estimate, loses about $10,000 in annual
earnings because large preferences induce her to make a bad trade-off between law
school prestige and law school grades.*
Sander's study is controversial, but suppose it shows them? Why or why not? Some people advocate
what he says it does. Would you then favor disman- using preferences in higher education to redress the
tlingpreferences for Black law students? Would you wrongs of past discrimination. To be logically con-
favor maintaining law school preference systems sistent, should they disregard evidence suggesting
if they helped Black students rather than harmed that preferences hurt Black students?
*Richard Sander, "Preferences Hurt Black Law Students," UCLA Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (February 2005). Used by
permission of the author.
READINGS
Racisms
KWAME ANTHONY ApPIAH
If the people I talk to and the newspapers I read are rep- they had some difficulty in identifying what exactly rac-
resentative and reliable, there is a good deal of racism ism was. We see it everywhere, but rarely does anyone
about. People and policies in the United States, in Eastern stop to say what it is, or to explain what is wrong with
and Western Europe, in Asia and Africa and Latin Amer- it. Our visitors from Mars would soon grasp that it had
ica are regularly described as "racist." Australia had, until become at least conventional in recent years to express
recently, a racist immigration policYi Britain still has abhorrence for racism. They might even notice that those
onei racism is on the rise in Francei many Israelis support most often accused of it-members of the South African
Meir Kahane, an anti-Arab racisti many Arabs, according Nationalist party, for example-may officially abhor it
to a leading authority, are anti-Semitic racistsi} and the also. But if they sought in the popular media of our day-
movement to establish English as the "official language" in newspapers and magazines, on television or radiO, in
of the United States is motivated by racism. Or, at least, novels or films-for an explicit definition of this thing
so many of the people I talk to and many of the journal- "we" all abhor, they would very likely be disappointed.
ists with the newspapers I read believe. Now, of course, this would be true of many of our
But visitors from Mars-or from Malawi-unfamiliar most familiar concepts. Sister, chair, tomato-none of
with the Western concept of racism could be excused if these gets defined in the course of our daily business.
But the concept of racism is in worse shape than these.
Kwame Anthony Appialz, "Racisms," in Anatomy ofRacism, ed. For much of what we say about it is, on the face of it,
David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota inconsistent.
Press, 1970),3-17. © 1990 University of Minnesota Press. It is, for example, held by many to be racist to
Reprinted by permission of University of Minnesota Press. refuse entry to a university to an otherwise qualified
"Negro" candidate, but not to be so to refuse entry to rationally articulated: and they are worth articulating
an equally qualified "Caucasian" one. But "Negro" rationally in order that we can rationally say what we
and "Caucasian" are both alleged to be names of races, object to in them.
and invidious discrimination on the basis of race is
usually held to be a paradigm case of racism. Or, to
take another example, it is widely believed to be evi- RACIST PROPOSITIONS
dence of an unacceptable racism to exclude people There are at least three distinct doctrines that might
from clubs on the basis of race; yet most people, even be held to express the theoretical content of what
those who think of "jewish" as a racial term, seem to we call "racism." One is the view-which I shall call
think that there is nothing wrong with jewish clubs, racialism 2-that there are heritable characteristics,
whose members do not share any particular religious possessed by members of our species, that allow us to
beliefs, or Afro-American societies, whose members divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that
share the juridical characteristic of American citizen- all the members of these races share certain traits and
ship and the "racial" characteristic of being black. tendencies with each other that they do not share with
I say that these are inconsistencies "on the face of members of any other race. These traits and tendencies
it," because, for example, affirmative action in univer- characteristic of a race constitute, on the racialist view,
sity admissions is importantly different from the ear- a sort of racial essence; and it is part of the content of
lier refusal to admit blacks or jews (or other "Others") racialism that the essential heritable characteristics of
that it is meant, in part, to correct. Deep enough analy- what the nineteenth century called the uRaces of Man"
sis may reveal it to be quite consistent with the abhor- account for more than the visible morphological char-
rence of racism; even a shallow analysis suggests that acteristics-skin color, hair type, facial features-on
it is intended to be so. Similarly, justifications can be the basis of which we make our informal classifica-
offered for "racial" associations in a plural SOciety that tions. Racialism is at the heart of nineteenth-century
are not available for the racial exclusivism of the coun- Western attempts to develop a science of racial differ-
try club. But if we take racism seriously we ought to be ence; but it appears to have been believed by others-
concerned about the adequacy of these justifications. for example, Hegel, before then, and many in other
In this essay, then, I propose to take our ordinary parts of the non-Western world since-who have had
ways of thinking about race and racism and point up no interest in developing scientific theories.
some of their presuppositions. And since popular con- Racialism is not, in itself, a doctrine that must
cepts are, of course, usually fairly fuzzily and untheo- be dangerous, even if the racial essence is thought
retically conceived, much of what I have to say will to entail moral and intellectual dispositions. Pro-
seem to be both more theoretically and more precisely vided positive moral qualities are distributed across
committed than the talk of racism and racists in our the races, each can be respected, can have its "sepa-
newspapers and on television. My claim is that these rate but equal" place. Unlike most Western-educated
3
theoretical claims are required to make sense of racism people, I believe-and I have argued elsewhere -that
as the practice of reasoning human beings. If anyone racialism is false; but by itself, it seems to be a cogni-
were to suggest that much, perhaps most, of what goes tive rather than a moral problem. The issue is how the
under the name uracism" in our world cannot be given world is, not how we would want it to be.
such a rationalized foundation, I should not disagree: Racialism is, however, a presupposition of other
but to the extent that a practice cannot be rationally doctrines that have been called llracism," and these
reconstructed it ought, surely, to be given up by rea- other doctrines have been, in the last few centuries,
sonable people. The right tactic with racism, if you the basis of a great deal of human suffering and the
really want to oppose it, is to object to it rationally in source of a great deal of moral error.
the form in which it stands the best chance of meet- One such doctrine we might call Uextrinsic racism":
ing objections. The doctrines I want to discuss can be extrinsic racists make moral distinctions between
members of different races because they believe that There are interesting possibilities for complicating
the racial essence entails certain morally relevant these distinctions: some racists, for example, claim,
qualities. The basis for the extrinsic racists' discrimi- as the Mormons once did, that they discriminate
nation between people is their belief that members of between people because they believe that God requires
different races differ in respects that wQrrQntthe differ- them to do so. Is this an extrinsic raCism, predicated
ential treatment, respects-such as honesty or cour- on the combination of God's being an intrinsic racist
age or intelligence-that are un controversially held and the belief that it is right to do what God wills? Or is
(at least in most contemporary cultures) to be accept- it intrinsic racism because it is based on the belief that
able as a basis for treating people differently. Evidence God requires these discriminations because they are
that there are no such differences in morally relevant right? (Is an act pious because the gods love it, or do
characteristics-that Negroes do not necessarily lack they love it because it is piOUS?) Nevertheless, the dis-
intellectual capacities, that Jews are not especially tinctions between racialism and racism and between
avaricious-should thus lead people out of their rac- two potentially overlapping kinds of racism provide
ism if it is purely extrinsic. As we know, such evidence us with the skeleton of an anatomy of the proposi-
often fails to change an extrinsic racist's attitudes tional contents of racial attitudes.
substantially, for some of the extrinsic racist's best
friends have always been Jewish. But at this point-if
the racist is sincere-what we have is no longer a false RACIST DISPOSITIONS
doctrine but a cognitive incapacity, one whose signifi- Most people will want to object already that this dis-
cance I shall discuss later in this essay. cussion of the propositional content of racist moral
I say that the sincere extrinsic racist may suffer and factual beliefs misses something absolutely crucial
from a cognitive incapacity. But some who espouse to the character of the psychological and sociological
extrinsic racist doctrines are simply insincere intrinsic reality of raCism, something I touched on when I men-
racists. For intrinsic racists, on my definition, are peo- tioned that extrinsic racist utterances are often made
ple who differentiate morally between members of dif- by people who suffer from what I called a "cognitive
ferent races because they believe that each race has a incapacity." Part of the standard force of accusations of
different moral status, quite independent of the moral racism is that their objects are in some way irrational.
characteristics entailed by its racial essence. Just as, for The objection to Professor Shockley's claims about the
example, many people assume that the fact that they intelligence of blacks is not just that they are false; it is
are biologically related to another person-a brother, rather that Professor Shockley seems, like many people
an aunt, a cousin-gives them a moral interest in that we call "raCist," to be unable to see that the evidence
person, 4 so an intrinsic racist holds that the bare fact does not support his factual claims and that the con-
of being of the same race is a reason for preferring one nection between his factual claims and his policy pre-
person to another. (I shall return to this parallel later scriptions involves a series of non sequiturs.
as well.) What makes these cognitive incapacities espe-
For an intrinsic racist, no amount of evidence that cially troubling-something we should respond to
a member of another race is capable of great moral, with more than a recommendation that the individ-
intellectual, or cultural achievements, or has charac- ual, Professor Shockley, be offered psychotherapy-is
teristics that, in members of one's own race, would that they conform to a certain pattern: namely, that it
make them admirable or attractive, offers any ground is especially where beliefs and policies that are to the
for treating that person as he or she would treat simi- disadvantage of nonwhite people that he shows the
larly endowed members of his or her own race. Just so, sorts of disturbing failure that have made his views
some sexists are "intrinsic sexists," holding that the both notorious and notoriously unreliable. Indeed,
bare fact that someone is a woman (or man) is a reason Professor Shockley's reasoning works extremely well
for treating her (or him) in certain ways. in some other areas: that he is a Nobel Laureate in
physics is part of what makes him so interesting an who fail, by virtue of their ideological attachments, to
example. recognize what is in their own best interests at all.
This cognitive incapacity is not, of course, a rare My business here is not with the psychological
one. Many of us are unable to give up beliefs that play or social processes by which these forms of ideologi-
a part in justifying the special advantages we gain (or cal resistance operate, but it is important, I think, to
hope to gain) from our positions in the social order- see the refusal on the part of some extrinsic racists to
in particular, beliefs about the positive characters of accept evidence against the beliefs as an instance of
the class of people who share that position. Many peo- a widespread phenomenon in human affairs. It is a
ple who express extrinsic racist beliefs-many white plain fact, to which theories of ideology must address
South Africans, for example-are beneficiaries of themselves, that our species is prone both morally
social orders that deliver advantages to them by virtue and intellectually to such distortions of judgment, in
of their "race," so that their disinclination to accept particular to distortions of judgment that reflect par-
evidence that would deprive them of a justification tiality. An inability to change your mind in the face
for those advantages is just an instance of this general of appropriateS evidence is a cognitive incapacity; but
phenomenon. it is one that all of us surely suffer from in some areas
So too, evidence that access to higher education is of belief; especially in areas where our own interests or
as largely determined by the quality of our earlier edu- self-images are (or seem to be) at stake.
cations as by our own innate talents, does not, on the It is not, however, as some have held, a tendency
whole, undermine the confidence of college entrants that we are powerless to resist. No one, no doubt, can
from private schools in England or the United States be impartial about everything-even about every-
or Ghana. Many of them continue to believe in the thing to which the notion of partiality applies; but
face of this evidence that their acceptance at "good" there is no subject matter about which most sane peo-
universities shows them to be intellectually better ple cannot, in the end, be persuaded to avoid partiality
endowed (and not just better prepared) than those in judgment. And it may help to shake the convictions
who are rejected. It is facts such as these that give sense of those whose incapacity derives from this sort of ide-
to the notion of false consciousness, the idea that an ological defense if we show them how their reaction
ideology can prevent us from acknowledging facts fits into this general pattern. It is, indeed, because it
that would threaten our position. generally does fit this pattern that we call such views
The most interesting cases of this sort of ideologi- "racism"-the suffix "-ism" indicating that what we
cal resistance to the truth are not, perhaps, the ones have in mind is not simply a theory but an ideology. It
I have just mentioned. On the whole, it is less surprising, would be odd to call someone brought up in a remote
once we accept the admittedly problematic notion corner of the world with false and demeaning views
of self-deception, that people who think that certain about white people a "racist" if that person gave up
attitudes or beliefs advantage them or those they care these beliefs quite easily in the face of appropriate
about should be able, as we say, to "persuade" them- evidence.
selves to ignore evidence that undermines those beliefs Real live racists, then, exhibit a systematically dis-
or attitudes. What is more interesting is the existence torted rationality, the kind of systematically distorted
of people who resist the truth of a proposition while rationality that we are likely to call "ideological." And
thinking that its wider acceptance would in no way it is a distortion that is especially striking in the cogni-
disadvantage them or those individuals about whom tive domain: extrinsic racists, as I said earlier, however
they care-this might be thought to describe Profes- intelligent or otherwise well informed, often fail to
sor Shockley; or who resist the truth when they rec- treat evidence against the theoretical propositions of
ognize that its acceptance would actually advantage extrinsic racism dispassionately. Like extrinsic racism,
them-this might be the case with some black people intrinsic racism can also often be seen as ideological;
who have internalized negative racist stereotypes; or but since scientific evidence is not going to settle the
issue, a failure to see that it is wrong represents a cog- prejudice generally, may threaten an agent's auton-
nitive incapacity only on controversially realist views omy, making it appropriate to treat or train rather
about morality. What makes intrinsic racism similarly than to reason with them.
ideological is not so much the failure of inductive or But once someone has been offered evidence both
deductive rationality that is so striking in someone (1) that their reasoning in a certain domain is distorted
like Professor Shockley but rather the connection that by prejudice, and (2) that the distortions conform to a
it, like extrinsic racism, has with the interests-real or pattern that suggests a lack of impartiality, they ought
perceived-of the dominant group.6 Shockley's racism to take special care in articulating views and proposing
is in a certain sense directed against nonwhite people: poliCies in that domain. They ought to do so because,
many believe that his views would, if accepted, operas I have already said, the phenomenon of partiality
ate against their objective interests, and he certainly in judgment is well attested in human affairs. Even if
presents the black "race" in a less than flattering light. you are not immediately persuaded that you are your-
I propose to use the old-fashioned term "racial self a victim of such a distorted rationality in a certain
prejudice" in the rest of this essay to refer to the defor- domain, you should keep in mind always that this is
mation of rationality in judgment that characterizes the usual position of those who suffer from such prej-
those whose racism is more than a theoretical attach- udices. To the extent that this line of thought is not
ment to certain propositions about race. one that itself falls within the domain in question, one
can be held responsible for not subjecting judgments
that are within that domain to an especially extended
RACIAL PREJUDICE scrutiny; and this is a fortiori true if the policies one is
It is hardly necessary to raise objections to what I am recommending are plainly of enormous consequence.
calling "racial prejudice"; someone who exhibits such If it is clear that racial prejudice is regrettable, it is
deformations of rationality is plainly in trouble. But also clear in the nature of the case that providing even
it is important to remember that propositional racists a superabundance of reasons and evidence will often
in a racist culture have false moral beliefs but may not not be a successful way of removing it. Nevertheless,
suffer from racial prejudice. Once we show them how the racist's prejudice will be articulated through the
society has enforced extrinsic racist stereotypes, once sorts of theoretical propositions I dubbed extrinsic
we ask them whether they really believe that race in and intrinsic racism. And we should certainly be able
itself, independently of those extrinsic racist beliefs, to say something reasonable about why these theoreti-
justifies differential treatment, many will come to give cal propositions should be rejected.
up racist propositions, although we must remember Part of the reason that this is worth doing is pre-
how powerful a weight of authority our arguments cisely the fact that many of those who assent to the
have to overcome. Reasonable people may insist on propositional content of racism do not suffer from
substantial evidence if they are to give up beliefs that racial prejudice. In a country like the United States,
are central to their cultures. where racist propositions were once part of the
Still, in the end, many will resist such reasoning; national ideology, there will be many who assent to
and to the extent that their prejudices are really not racist propositions simply because they were raised to
subject to any kind of rational control, we may won- do so. Rational objection to racist propositions has a
der whether it is right to treat such people as morally fair chance of changing such people's beliefs.
responsible for the acts their racial prejudice moti-
vates, or morally reprehensible for holding the views
to which their prejudice leads them. It is a bad thing EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC RACISM
that such people exist; they are, in a certain sense, bad It is not always clear whether someone's theoretical
people. But it is not clear to me that they are responsi- racism is intrinsic or extrinsic, and there is certainly
ble for the fact that they are bad. Racial prejudice, like no reason why we should expect to be able to settle
the question. Since the issue probably never occurs to Indeed, it seems to me that there is a significant pat-
most people in these terms, we cannot suppose that tern in the modern rhethoric of race, such that the dis-
they must have an answer. In fact, given the definition course of racial solidarity is usually expressed through
of the terms I offered, there is nothing barring some- the language of intrinsic racism, while those who have
one from being both an intrinsic and an extrinsic rac- used race as the basis for oppression and hatred have
ist, holding both that the bare fact of race provides a appealed to extrinsic racist ideas. This point is impor-
basis for treating members of his or her own race dif- tant for understanding the character of contemporary
ferently from others and that there are morally rel- racial attitudes.
evant characteristics that are differentially distributed The two major uses of race as a basis for moral
among the races. Indeed, for reasons I shall discuss in solidarity that are most familiar in the West are vari-
a moment, most intrinsic racists are likely to express eties of Pan-Africanism and Zionism. In each case it
extrinsic racist beliefs, so that we should not be sur- is presupposed that a "people," Negroes or jews, has
prised that many people seem, in fact, to be commit- the basis for shared political life in the fact of being
ted to both forms of racism. of the same race. There are varieties of each form of
The Holocaust made unreservedly clear the threat "nationalism" that make the basis lie in shared tradi-
racism poses to human decency. But it also blurred tions; but however plausible this may be in the case
our thinking because in focusing our attention on the of Zionism, which has in judaism, the religion, a real-
racist character of the Nazi atrocities, it obscured their istic candidate for a common and nonracial focus for
character as atrocities. What is appalling about Nazi nationality, the peoples of Africa have a good deal less
racism is not just that it presupposes, as all racism does, in common culturally than is usually assumed. I dis-
false (racialist) beliefs-not simply that it involves a cuss this issue at length in In My Father's House: Essays
moral incapacity (the inability to extend our moral in the Philosophy of African Culture, but let me say here
sentiments to all our fellow creatures) and a moral fail- that I believe the central fact is this: what blacks in the
ing (the making of moral distinctions without moral West, like secularized jews, have mostly in common
differences)-but that it leads, first, to oppression and is that they are perceived-both by themselves and by
then to mass slaughter. In recent years, South African others-as belonging to the same race, and that this
racism has had a similar distorting effect. For although common race is used by others as the basis for dis-
South African racism has not led to killings on the criminating against them. "If you ever forget you're
scale of the Holocaust-even if it has both left South a jew, a goy will remind you." The Black National-
Africa judicially executing more (mostly black) people ists, like some Zionists, responded to their experience
per head of population than most other countries and of racial discrimination by accepting the racialism it
led to massive differences between the life chances of presupposed. 7
white and nonwhite South Africans-it has led to the Although race is indeed at the heart of Black
systematic oppression and economic exploitation of Nationalism, however, it seems that it is the fact of a
people who are not classified as ('white," and to the shared race, not the fact of a shared racial character,
infliction of suffering on citizens of all racial classifica- that provides the basis for solidarity. Where racism
tions, not least by the police state that is required to is implicated in the basis for national solidarity, it
maintain that exploitation and oppreSSion. is intrinsic, not (or not only) extrinsic. It is this that
Part of our reSistance, therefore, to calling the makes the idea of fraternity one that is naturally
racial ideas of those, such as the Black Nationalists of applied in nationalist discourse. For, as I have already
the 1960s, who advocate racial solidarity, by the same observed, the moral status of close family members is
term that we use to describe the attitudes of Nazis or not normally thought of in most cultures as depend-
of members of the South African Nationalist party, ing on qualities of character; we are supposed to love
surely resides in the fact that they largely did not our brothers and sisters in spite of their faults and not
contemplate using race as a basis for inflicting harm. because of their virtues. Alexander Crummell, one of
the founding fathers of Black Nationalism, literalizes was of another race would be no reason to treat them
the metaphor of family in these startling words: worse-or better-than someone of my race. In our
public lives, people are owed treatment indepen-
Races, like families, are the organisms and ordinances
of God; and race feeling, like family feeling, is of divine dently of their biological characters: if they are to be
origin. The extinction of race feeling is just as possible differently treated there must be some morally rele-
as the extinction of family feeling. Indeed, a race is a vant difference between them. In our private lives, we
family.8 are morally free to have aesthetic preferences between
people, but once our treatment of people raises moral
It is the assimilation of "race feeling" to "family issues, we may not make arbitrary distinctions. Using
feeling" that makes intrinsic racism seem so much race in itself as a morally relevant distinction strikes
less objectionable than extrinsic racism. For this meta- most of us as obviously arbitrary. Without associated
phorical identification reflects the fact that, in the moral characteristics, why should race provide a better
modern world (unlike the nineteenth century), intrin- basis than hair color or height or timbre of voice? And
sic racism is acknowledged almost exclusively as the if two people share all the properties morally relevant
basis of feelings of community. We can surely, then, to some action we ought to do, it will be an error-a
share a sense of what Crummell's friend and co-worker failure to apply the Kantian injunction to universalize
Edward Blyden called "the poetry of politiCS," that is, our moral judgments-to use the bare facts of race as
"the feeling of race," the feeling of "people with whom the basis for treating them differently. No one should
we are connected.,,9 The racism here is the basis of acts deny that a common ancestry might, in particular
of supererogation, the treatment of others better than cases, account for similarities in moral character. But
we otherwise might, better than moral duty demands then it would be the moral similarities that justified
of us. the different treatment.
This is a contingent fact. There is no logical impos- It is presumably because most people-outside
sibility in the idea of racialists whose moral beliefs lead the South African Nationalist party and the Ku Klux
them to feelings of hatred for other races while leaving Klan-share the sense that intrinsic racism requires
no room for love of members of their own. Neverthe- arbitrary distinctions that they are largely unwilling to
less most racial hatred is in fact expressed through express it in situations that invite moral criticism. But
extrinsic racism: most people who have used race as I do not know how I would argue with someone who
the basis for causing harm to others have felt the need was willing to announce an intrinsic racism as a basic
to see the others as independently morally flawed. It is moral idea; the best one can do, perhaps, is to provide
one thing to espouse fraternity without claiming that objections to possible lines of defense of it.
your brothers and sisters have any special qualities that
deserve recognition, and another to espouse hatred of
others who have done nothing to deserve it. to DE GUSTIBUS
Many Afrikaners-like many in the American It might be thought that intrinsic racism should be
South until recently-have a long list of extrinsic racist regarded not so much as an adherence to a (moral)
answers to the question why blacks should not have full proposition as the expression of a taste, analogous,
civil rights. Extrinsic racism has usually been the basis say, to the food prejudice that makes most English
for treating people worse than we otherwise might, for people unwilling to eat horse meat, and most West-
giving them less than their humanity entitles them to. erners unwilling to eat the insect grubs that the !Kung
But this too is a contingent fact. Indeed, Crummell's people find so appetizing. The analogy does at least
guarded respect for white people derived from a belief this much for us, namely, to provide a model of the
in the superior moral qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race. way that extrinsic racist propositions can be a reflec-
Intrinsic racism is, in my view, a moral error. Even tion of an underlying prejudice. For, of course, in
if racialism were correct, the bare fact that someone most cultures food prejudices are rationalized: we say
insects are unhygienic and cats taste horrible. Yet a the prospects of a philosophical defense of intrinsic
cooked insect is no more health-threatening than a racism. This is because such a defense of the family
cooked carrot, and the unpleasant taste of cat meat, involves-like intrinsic racism-a denial of the basic
far from justifying our prejudice against it, probably claim, expressed so clearly by Kant, that from the per-
derives from that prejudice. spective of morality, it is as rational agents simpliciter
But there the usefulness of the analogy ends. For that we are to assess and be assessed. For anyone who
intrinsic raCism, as I have defined it, is not simply a follows Kant in this, what matters, as we might say,
taste for the company of one's "own kind," but a moral is not who you are but how you try to live. Intrinsic
doctrine, one that is supposed to underlie differences racism denies this fundamental claim also. And, in so
in the treatment of people in contexts where moral doing, as I have argued elsewhere, it runs against the
evaluation is appropriate. And for moral distinctions mainstream of the history of Western moral theory.ll
we cannot accept that "de gustibus non est disputan- The importance of drawing attention to the simi-
dum." We do not need the full apparatus of Kantian larities between the defense of the family and the
ethics to require that public morality be constrained defense of the race, then, is not merely that the met-
by reason. aphor of family is often invoked by racism: it is that
A proper analogy would be with someone who each of them offers the same general challenge to the
thought that we could continue to kill cattle for beef, Kantian stream of our moral thought. And the paral-
even if cattle exercised all the complex cultural skills lel with the defense of the family should be especially
of human beings. I think it is obvious that creatures appealing to an intrinsic raCist, since many of us who
that shared our capacity for understanding as well have little time for racism would hope that the family
as our capacity for pain should not be treated the way is susceptible to some such defense.
we actually treat cattle-that "intrinsic speciesism" The problem in generalizing the defense of the
would be as wrong as racism. And the fact that most family, however, is that such defense standardly begin
people think it is worse to be cruel to chimpanzees at a point that makes the argument for intrinsic racism
than to frogs suggests that they may agree with me. immediately implausible: namely, with the family as
The distinction in attitudes surely reflects a belief in the unit through which we live what is most intimate,
the greater richness of the mental life of chimps. Still, as the center of private life. If we distinguish, with Ber-
I do not know how I would argue against someone who nard Williams, between ethical thought, which takes
could not see this; someone who continued to act on seriously "the demands, needs, claims, desires, and
the contrary belief might, in the end, simply have to generally, the lives of other people,,,12 and morality,
be locked up. which focuses more narrowly on obligation, it may
well be that private life matters to us precisely because
THE FAMILY MODEL
it is altogether unsuited to the universalizing tenden-
cies of morality.
I have suggested that intrinsic racism is, at least some- The functioning family unit has contracted sub-
times, a metaphorical extension of the moral priority stantially with industrialization, the disappearance of
of one's family; it might, therefore, be suggested that the family as the unit of production, and the increas-
a defense of intrinsic racism could proceed along the ing mobility of labor, but there remains that irreduc-
same lines as a defense of the family as a center of moral ible minimum: the parent or parents with the child or
interest. The possibility of a defense of family relations children. In this "nuclear" family, there is, of course,
as morally relevant-or, more precisely, of the claim a substantial body of shared experience, shared atti-
that one may be morally entitled (or even obliged) tudes, shared knowledge and beliefs; and the mutual
to make distinctions between two otherWise morally psychological investment that exists within this group
indistinguishable people because one is related to one is, for most of us, one of the things that gives meaning
and not to the other-is theoretically important for to our lives. It is a natural enough confusion-which
we find again and again in discussions of adoption in I need hardly say that rational defense of intrin-
the popular media-that identifies the relevant group sic racism along the lines I have been conSidering are
with the biological unit of genitor, genetrix, and off- not easily found. In the absence of detailed defenses
spring rather than with the social unit of those who to consider, I can only offer these general reasons for
share a common domestic life. doubting that they can succeed: the generally Kantian
The relations of parents and their biological tenor of much of our moral thought threatens the
children are of moral importance, of course, in part project from the start; and the essentially unintimate
because children are standardly the product of behav- nature of relations within "races" suggests that there is
ior voluntarily undertaken by their biological parents. little prospect that the defense of the family-which
But the moral relations between biological siblings seems an attractive and plausible project that extends
and half-Siblings cannot, as I have already pointed ethical life beyond the narrow range of a universaliz-
out, be accounted for in such terms. A rational defense ing morality-can be applied to a defense of races.
of the family ought to appeal to the causal responsibil-
ity of the biological parent and the common life of the
domestic unit, and not to the brute fact of biological CONCLUSIONS
relatedness, even if the former pair of considerations I have suggested that what we call "racism" involves
defines groups that are often coextensive with the both propositions and dispositions.
groups generated by the latter. For brute biological The propositions were, first, that there are races
relatedness bears no necessary connection to the sorts (this was racialism) and, second, that these races are
of human purposes that seem likely to be relevant at morally significant either (a) because they are con-
the most basic level of ethical thought. tingently correlated with morally relevant proper-
An argument that such a central group is bound to ties (this was extrinsic racism) or (b) because they are
be crucially important in the lives of most human beings intrinsically morally significant (this was intrinsic
in societies like ours is not, of course, an argument for racism).
any specific mode of organization of the "family": femi- The disposition was a tendency to assent to false
nism and the gay liberation movement have offered propositions, both moral and theoretical, about
candidate groups that could (and sometimes do) occupy races-propositions that support policies or beliefs
the same sort of role in the lives of those whose sexu- that are to the disadvantage of some race (or races) as
alities or whose dispositions otherwise make the nuclear opposed to others, and to do so even in the face of evi-
family uncongenial; and these candidates have been dence and argument that should appropriately lead to
offered specifically in the course of defenses of a move giving those propositions up. This disposition I called
toward societies that are agreeably beyond patriarchy "racial prejudice."
and homophobia. The central thought of these feminist I suggested that intrinsic racism had tended in
and gay critiques of the nuclear family is that we cannot our own time to be the natural expression of feelings
continue to view anyone organization of private life as of community, and this is, of course, one of the rea-
"natural," once we have seen even the broadest outlines sons why we are not inclined to call it racist. For, to
of the archaeology of the family concept. the extent that a theoretical position is not associated
If that is right, then the argument for the family with irrationally held beliefs that tend to the disadvan-
must be an argument for a mode of organization of life tage of some group, it fails to display the directedness
and feeling that subserves certain positive functions; of the distortions of rationality characteristic of racial
and however the details of such an argument would prejudice. Intrinsic racism may be as irrationally held
proceed it is highly unlikely that the same functions as any other view, but it does not have to be directed
could be served by groups on the scale of races, simply against anyone.
because, as I say, the family is attractive in part exactly So far as theory is concerned I believe racialism
for reasons of its personal scale. to be false: since theoretical racism of both kinds
presupposes racialism, I could not logically support situation. In mid-nineteenth-century America, in New England
racism of either variety. But even if racialism were true, quite as much as in the heart of Dixie, the pervasiveness of
both forms of theoretical racism would be incorrect. the institutional support for the prevailing system of racist
Extrinsic racism is false because the genes that account belief-the fact that it was reinforced by religion and state,
for the gross morphological differences that underlie and defended by people in the universities and colleges, who
had the greatest cognitive authority-meant that it would
our standard racial categories are not linked to those
have been appropriate to insist on a substantial body of evi-
genes that determine, to whatever degree such mat-
dence and argument before giving up assent to racist propo-
ters are determined genetically, our moral and intel- sitions. In California in the 1980s, of course, matters stand
lectual characters. Intrinsic racism is mistaken because rather differently. To acknowledge this is not to admit to a
it breaches the Kantian imperative to make moral dis- cognitive relativism; rather, it is to hold that, at least in some
tinctions only on morally relevant grounds-granted domains, the fact that a belief is widely held-and especially
that there is no reason to believe that race, in se, is mor- by people in positions of cognitive authority-may be a
ally relevant, and also no reason to suppose that races good prima facie reason for believing it.
are like families in providing a sphere of ethical life 6. Ideologies, as most theorists of ideology have admitted,
that legitimately escapes the demands of a universal- standardly outlive the period in which they conform to the
izing morality. objective interests of the dominant group in a society; so even
someone who thinks that the dominant group in our society
no longer needs racism to buttress its pOSition can see rac-
NOTES ism as the persisting ideology of an earlier phase of SOciety. (I
say "group" to keep the claim appropriately general; it seems
l. Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites (New York: Norton,
1986). to me a substantial further claim that the dominant group
whose interests an ideology serves is always a class.) I have
2. I shall be using the words "racism" and "raCialism" with the argued, however, in "The Conservation of 'Race'" that rac-
meanings I stipulate: in some dialects of English they are syn- ism continues to serve the interests of the ruling classes in
onyms, and in most dialects their definition is less than pre- the West; in Black American Literature Forum, 23 (Spring 1989),
cise. For diSCUSSion of recent biological evidence see M. Nei and pp.37-60.
A. K. Roychoudhury, "Genetic Relationship and Evolution of
7. As I argued in "The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the
Human Races," Evolutionary BiOlogy, vol. 14 (New York: Plenum,
Illusion of Race." The reactive (or dialectical) character of this
1983), pp. 1-59; for useful background see also M. Nei and A. K.
move explains why Sartre calls its manifestations in Negritude
Roychoudhury, "Gene Differences between CaucaSian, Negro,
an "antiracist racism"; see "Orphee Noir," his preface to Seng-
and Japanese Populations, " Science, 177 (August 1972), pp.
434-35. hor's Antl1ologie de fa nonvelle poesie negre et mafagaclle de lallgue
/Tancaise (PariS: PUF, 1948). Sartre believed, of course, that the
3. See my "The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illu- synthesis of this dialectic would be the transcendence of rac-
sion of Race," Critical Inquiry, 12 (Autumn 1985); reprinted in ism; and it was his view of it as a stage-the antithesis-in that
Henry Louis Gates (eds.), "Race," Writing, and Difference (Chi- process that allowed him to see it as a positive advance over the
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 21-37. original "thesis" of European racism. I suspect that the reactive
4. This fact shows up most obviously in the assumption that character of antiracist racism accounts for the tolerance that is
adopted children intelligibly make claims against their natu- regularly extended to it in liberal circles; but this tolerance is
ral siblings: natural parents are, of course, causally respon- surely hard to justify unless one shares Sartre's optimistic inter-
sible for their child's existence and that could be the basis of pretation of it as a stage in a process that leads to the end of all
moral claims, without any sense that biological relatedness racisms. (And unless your view of this dialectic is deterministic,
entailed rights or responsibilities. But no such basis exists you should in any case want to play an argumentative role in
for an interest in natural siblings; my sisters are not causally moving to this next stage.)
responsible for my existence. See "The Family Model," later For a similar Zionist response see Horace Kallen's "The Ethics
in this essay. of Zionism," Maccabaean, August 1906.
5. Obviously what evidence should appropriately change 8. "The Race Problem in America," in Brotz's Negro Social and
your beliefs is not independent of your social or historical Political Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 184.
9. Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (1887j reprinted Edin- 11. See my "Racism and Moral Pollution," Philosophical Forum,
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967), p. 197. 18 (Winter-Spring 1986-87), pp. 185-202.
to. This is in part a reflection of an important asymmetry: 12. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass: Har-
loathing, unlike love, needs justifyingj and this, I would vard University Press, 1985), p. 12. I do not, as is obvious, share
argue, is because loathing usually leads to acts that are in se William's skepticism about morality.
undesirable, whereas love leads to acts that are largely in se
desirable-indeed, supererogatorily so.
Racism: What It Is and What It Isn't

LAWRENCE BLUM
We in the United States are notoriously poor at com- carries unpleasant associations with them, and they
municating about racial matters. David Shipler, in his would rather avoid it. They may think we should all
informative and insightful book A Nation ofStrangers, be "color-blind," that it is somehow wrong even to
rightly says, "Blacks and Whites do not listen well to take notice of or make reference to other people's
each other (Shipler, 1997, p. 447). Native Americans, racial identity. This idea of color-blindness is both
Latinos, Chicanos, and Asian-Americans are not all particularly strong, yet also particularly misplaced,
that much better. We find honest discussion about among teachers, especially at the pre-college level.
race across racial lines especially difficult. Ironically, Teachers can not serve their students fully unless
race is the subject of scores of books and articles. And they are aware of the full range of factors affecting
one often hears impatience expressed about race. their lives, and race is very likely to be one of those
"Race is talked to death," it is said. factors (Schofield, 1989).
There may be a lot of words written about race. Some reasons for reluctance to engage in race
But there is a good deal less honest, open, and pro- discussions are more race-specific. Blacks, and to a
ductive conversation about it among persons of lesser extent other people of color, may want to avoid
different races than there needs to be. For the past what they assume will be offensive or at least annoy-
several years I have taught courses on race and racing remarks from others. Or they might not want to
ism to undergraduates, graduate students in educa- have to be in a position of correcting others' (espe-
tion, and high school students. Most of my classes cially whites') ignorance. Latinos, Native Americans,
are quite racially and ethnically diverse. In my expe- and ASian-Americans may not be certain how to insert
rience a range of reasons accounts for the lack of themselves into a discourse which seems to them
productive conversation. People are afraid of giving dominated by "black/white" issues, or they may feel
offense. They are afraid of revealing prejudices they resentful of this dominance, and assume their specific
know are not socially acceptable. They are afraid of concerns will not be adequately attended to. Notwith-
appearing prejudiced, even if they are actually not. standing these obstacles, I have also found a great deal
They feel ignorant of groups other than their own of good will among students, and an anxious desire
and are afraid to risk revealing their ignorance and for their teachers to create contexts that facilitate con-
trying to remedy it. The whole idea of "race" just structive interracial interchange.
Each of the cited obstacles is deserving of further
attention. However, I wish in this lecture to focus on
Lawrence Blum, reprinted by permission from Springer Nature: a different obstacle, though one that bears on sev-
Studies in Philosophy and Education, "Racism: What it is and What eral of those just mentioned. It is the idea of "racism"
it isn't," Vol. 21 (2002), pp. 203-218, Copyright © 2002. itself. There is a great deal of confusion surrounding
the meaning of "racism" and "racist." Yet one thing or they might simply fail to recognize the harm caused
is clear-few people wish to be, or to be thought of as, by their actions. Similarly, no one admits to being rac-
"racists." Fear of being thought racist, together with a ist. Those who are, or are thought to be, might say their
good deal of confusion as to "what" being racist con- remarks were just a joke; they did not intend any harm;
sists in, is a potent formula for inhibition regarding people are just being oversensitive; it was a personal,
discussion of racial matters, most especially for whites not a racial, thing; and the like. One expects people
who are, understandably, in most danger of being who are accused of being racist to deny it and new-
thought to be, and indeed of actually being, racists. spapers should stop regarding this as newsworthy.
Clarifying meanings is the professional task of
the philosopher, and I think that if we become clearer
about what "racism" actually consists in, and what OVERUSING "RACISM"
lies outside of the scope of racism yet may still be mor- Yet the widely-shared reproach carried by "racist" is
ally problematic, we will be better equipped to engage threatened by a current tendency to overuse the term.
in productive discussions about race. Of course I have Some feel that the word is thrown around so much that
no illusions that merely clarifying meanings will bring anything involving "race" that someone does not like
about either racial justice or racial harmony, or even the is liable to castigation as "racist" -for example, merely
more minimal goal of producing helpful conversations mentioning someone's race (or racial designation),}
about these matters. But it seems an essential first step. using the word "Oriental" for Asians without recog-
The words "racism" and "racist" have become nizing its origins and its capacity for insult, or social-
deeply entrenched in the moral vocabulary of the izing only with members of one's own racial group.
United States and Western Europe. "Is television a Many people would not agree, or would not be sure,
racist institution?" asks an article concerning the that any of the four examples in the paragraph before
NAACP's criticizing the fall 1999 prime-time network the previous one constitute "racism." A few observers
shows for having no "minority" actors in lead roles go even further and suspect that the word has lost all
in twenty-seven new series (Weinraub, 1999, pp. AI, significant meaning. "Racism is ... what black activists
AI4). Blacks who criticized other blacks for supporting define it to be .... When words lose coherent meaning,
a white over a black candidate in a mayoral race were they also lose the power to shame. 'Racism,' 'sexism,'
called racist. A white girl in Virginia said that it was and 'homophobia' have become such words. Labels
racist for an African-American teacher in her school that should horrify are simply shrugged off" (Nuech-
to wear African attire (Shipler, p. 92). The Milton, terlein, 1996, p. B9). Time columnist Lance Morrow
Wisconsin, school board voted to retire its "Redmen" sees social damage in this same development: "The
name and logo depicting a Native American wearing words 'racism' and 'racist' are a feckless indulgence,
a headdress, because they have been criticized as rac- corrosive to blacks and whites alike and to relations
ist. "Racist" has become the standard way to condemn between them" (Morrow, 1996, p. 18).
and deplore people, actions, policies, symbols, and A major reason for what Robert Miles calls the "con-
institutions for malfeasance in the racial domain. ceptual inflation" (Miles, 1989, pp. 41-68), to which
In serving as a term of moral reproach, "racism" the idea of "racism" has been subject is its having
has joined more time-honored vices such as "dishon- become the central or even only notion used to mark
esty," "cruelty," "cowardice," and "hypocrisy." Apart morally suspect behavior, attitude, and social practice
from a small number of avowed white supremacists, regarding race. The result-either something is racist,
most Americans wish very much to avoid being called or it is morally in the clear. In Boston a white police
"racist." In this regard, "racist" operates Similarly to officer, as a bizarre joke and apparently with no malice
"cruel." Few admit to being cruel. Persons who are intended, placed a hangman's noose on the motorcycle
cruel might say the target of their cruelty deserved it, of a black police officer. "Police probe sees no racism in
noose prank," says the headline of an article reporting propensity toward lactose intolerance; but no untow-
the findings of an investigation into the incident. Per- ard motives, or failures of sensitivity, need have
haps the white officer was not "a racist," nor operating prompted the original policies favoring milk for them
from racist motives; but, as the victim in the incident to be of concern. Similarly, it is troubling if prime-
said, "You cannot hang a noose like that near any black time TV fails adequately to reflect its viewers', and the
man who knows his history and say it does not have society's, ethnoracial diversity; but it is not necessarily
tremendous significance" (Boston Globe, p. B1).2 If our "racist.,,3 Someone who exhibits a culpable ignorance
only choices are to label an act "racist" or "nothing to about racial matters bearing on an interaction with
get too upset about," those who seek to garner moral an acquaintance or co-worker should feel a degree of
attention to some racial malfeasance will be tempted to shame about this, and be motivated to correct that
call it "racist." That overuse in tum feeds a diminishing ignorance-without her having to think she has been
of "racism's" moral force, and thus contributes to weak- "racist." We should not be faced with the cboice of
ened concern about racism and other racial ills. "racism or nothing."
Not all racial incidents are racist incidents. Not "Racism's" conceptual inflation and moral overload
every instance of racial conflict, insensitivity, dis- can arise from a another source as well-designating as
comfort, miscommunication, exclusion, injustice, or "racism" any prejudice, injustice, domination, inferi-
ignorance should be called "racist." This more varied orizing, bigotry, and the like, against human groups
and nuanced moral vocabulary needs to be more fully defined in any manner, for example, by gender, dis-
utilized, complementing "racise' and "racism." All ability, nationality. In The Decent Society, Avishai
forms of racial ills should elicit concern from respon- Margalit, an Israeli philosopher, defines racism as
sible citizens. If someone displays racial insensitiv- the denying of dignity to any human group, and uses
ity, but not racism, people should be able to see that as a particular test case "retarded" persons (Margalit,
straightforwardly as a matter of moral concern. In a 1996, pp. 80-83). This inflated use of racism pays
soccer game, a nine-year-old white boy said "Boy, pass indirect tribute to the centrality of racism as a form of
the ball over here" to one of his black teammates, and oppression and denial of dignity in contemporary
"was virtually accused of being a racist by the father Western consciousness. That centrality is reflected
of one of his teammates," says an article on the inci- also in later COinages, such as "sexism," "ableism"
dent. (That description may itself reflect the loss of an (discrimination against the disabled), "racism," and
evaluative vocabulary other than "racist" and "rac- "heterosexism"-all consciously modeled on "racism,"
ism," rather than what the black boy's father actually and attempting to draw on racism's moral opprobrium
said.) In any case, the white boy was almost surely not to condemn other phenomena seen as in important
"a racist" and the article itself goes on to express more ways analogous to racism. 4 This "racism"-influenced
accurately the racial ill involved in his remark: "The proliferation of other "isms" at least avoids the confu-
word 'boy' is a tripwire attached to so much charged sion wrought by Margalit's conflating all of them with
racial baggage that it is no longer safely used as a term "racism" itself. At least it encourages us to explore the
for a prepubescent male." similarities between discrimination, exploitation, and
If a policy has a racially unjust effect, or unequally denials of dignity based on race, and those based on
affects already unequally placed racial groups, this other human attributes, such as gender, sexual orien-
too should be reason for concern, even if there is no tation, disability, national membership, and the like,
suggestion that it arises from racist motives, or is part thereby allowing the possibility of significant disanal-
of the sort of entrenched pattern strongly rooted in ogies. Margalit's subsuming all these moral ills under
historical racism. For example, school lunch pro- "racism" cuts off that inquiry at the starting line, and,
grams have been criticized for relying too strongly on in so doing, contributes to a counterproductive infla-
milk, in light of the African-Americans' substantial tion of the term "racism."
RACIST JOKES AND RACIST PERSONS American warrior attire and wielded tomahawks. A
A different source of confusion and moral overload second, again a fraternity, involved staging a mock
regarding racism concerns what one might call rac- slave auction. In both cases, members of the fraterni-
ism's location. Many different kinds of entity can be ties in question defended themselves by saying that
racist-actions, institutions, practices, symbols, state- they did not mean to offend anyone. But the moral
ments, jokes, persons, to name a few. The moral sig- shortcoming in both cases did not lie in setting out to
nificance of an attribution of racism differs depending deliberately demean Native Americans and African-
on its location. Take racist jokes for instance. A person Americans. It lay in their failing to realize that what
who tells a racist joke is not necessarily "a racist," in the they were doing was demeaning to Native Americans
sense of a person who harbors pervasive racial animos- and African-Americans, whether they intended this or
ity or inferiorizing attitudes toward a racially defined not. It is not even clear that ignorance of the affront
group. He may tell the joke without sharing the racist would be morally more acceptable than an intention
sentiments the jokes expresses. People often tell jokes to affront.
as a way of trying to win acceptance; they might tell Still, engaging in racist humor does not make one
whatever they think will bring a laugh. Imagine, for a racist. More generally, clarity and racial understand-
example, someone telling a joke that makes fun of ing would be advanced if people attempted to take
Asian-Americans in a particularly demeaning man- greater care in locating the racism they allege in a situ-
ner, in order to gain acceptance in a group. (The group ation. Is it a practice that is racist, whether the persons
could consist of any ethnoracial group, except Asian- who participate in the practice are racist or not? Is
Americans. I am not assuming that only whites tell it the motive of an act that is racist? Is it an attitude
racist jokes [or are racists, for that matter].)5 This indi- taken to be expressed in a remark, or the remark itself?
vidual does not necessarily hold racist views of Asians Is it a person about whom one knows enough to say
or Asian-Americans. The joke is racist, but the teller of that he or she is "a racist?"
the joke is not. To help us avoid the first form of confusion
Of course, this does not mean that, as long as one about racism-conceptual inflation-I will suggest
does not share the racist views a joke expresses, it is a core meaning rooted in the history of its use, that
perfectly fine to tell such a joke. To think that it is all confines "racism" to phenomena deserving of the
right is to reason in precisely the all-or-nothing man- severest moral condemnation (within the appropri-
ner I have been criticizing. It is a very bad thing to tell ately located type, that is, act, statement, joke, per-
a racist joke. One often hears public figures who have son, and so on). Fixing on such a definition should
been caught out telling a racist joke or making a rac- encourage us to make use of the considerable other
ist remark defending themselves by saying that they resources our language affords us for describing and
did not intend any offense to the group in question, evaluating race-related ills that do not characteristi-
that they are not racist. Often this defense is quite dis- cally rise to the level of racism-racial insensitivity,
ingenuous, and the individual in fact does hold the racial conflict, racial injustice, racial ignorance, racial
racist attitudes implied in the joke. But even when it discomfort, and others. Such an agreed-upon mean-
is not, this is a feeble defense from a moral pOint of ing for "racism" should facilitate interracial commu-
view. It is bad to tell a racist joke, whether one means nication, at least in diminishing a free-floating and
to offend, or holds racist attitudes, or not. pervasive fear of the dreaded charge of "racism"-by
Jokes, and humor more generally, raise a com- making clearer what is and what is not to be counted
mon locational issue about racism-the difference as racism-while at the same time encouraging a
between intention and effect-illustrated in two wider scope of moral concern to race-related phe-
examples of racist humor that came to public atten- nomena. In doing so, my suggested definition of
tion in the late 1990s. One was a fraternity party, in racism should stanch the creeping loss of moral
which the fraternity members dressed up in Native cachet of the term "racism" itself, with its attendant
undermining of moral concern toward racism and in the tribe's youth. The hunt was permitted by the
other race-related ills. government, and the tribe killed a whale in May of
that year. Many non-Native American Washington
residents were outraged by this act. Amidst arguably
DEFINING "RACISM"
reasonable objections to the whale hunting were
In proffering a definition of racism, it would be folly expressions of outright antipathy racism toward the
to claim that one was doing no more than articulating Makah, and toward Native Americans more gener-
"our concept" of racism. Even apart from inflationary ally. One letter to the Seattle Times, for example, said,
usages, it is not likely that all employments of that "I have a very real hatred for Native Americans now.
concept cohere in an overall, self-consistent whole. It's embarrassing, but I would be lying if I said it wasn't
Nevertheless, especially in light of the history of this the truth" (Tizon, 1999).
concept, I hope my proposal can reasonably be viewed Inferiorizing and antipathy racism are distinct.
as a plausible candidate for a core meaning. Some superiority racists do not hate the target of their
"Racism" was first used by German social scientists beliefs. They may have a paternalistic concern and
in the 1930s to refer to the ideology of race superior- feelings of kindness for persons they regard as their
ity central to Nazism, and its core historical meaning human inferiors. This form of racism was prevalent
broadened out to other systems of racial domination among slave owners, and characterized many whites'
and oppression, such as segregation, South African views of blacks during the segregation era in the
apartheid, and European colonialism. In this light, United States. The concern and kindness are misdi-
I want to suggest that all forms of racism can be related rected, and demeaning, because the other is not seen
to either of two general "themes" -inferiorization, and as an equal, or even as a full human being; it is a racist
antipathy. Inferiorizing is treating the racial other as form of concern. Nevertheless such attitudes are dis-
inferior or lesser value and, secondarily, viewing the tinct from antipathy and hatred.
racial other as inferior. Racial antipathy is simply a On the other side, not every race hater regards the
strong dislike, often tinged with hostility, toward target of her hatred as inferior. In the U.S. antipathy
individuals or groups because of their race. Of the two toward Asians and Jews often accompanies, and is in
modes, inferiorization is more obviously linked to part driven by a kind of resentment of those seen as in
historical racist doctrines and social systems. Slavery, some ways superior (e.g., more successful). And some
segregation, imperialism, apartheid, and Nazism all whites Who hate blacks do not really regard blacks as
involved certain groups being regarded as and treated inferior; they may fear and be hostile to them, but
as inferior to other groups. fear and hostility are not the same as contempt and
But race-based hatred was also central to the ideo- other forms of inferiorizing. (Again, antipathy and
logical and attitudinal components of Nazism, and, contempt may accompany one another.) Survey
for whatever reason, racial bigotry, hostility, and research suggests that pure superiority racism toward
hatred are now securely linked to the contemporary blacks has substantially decreased since segregation,
idea of "racism" in both Europe and the United States. more so than hostility-based racism (Schuman et al.,
Indeed, the racial bigot is many people's paradigm pp. 156-157.) Nevertheless, the great and persistent
image of "a raCist," and few would now deny appli- racial inequalities in our society provide a standing
cation of the appellation "racist" to such persons. encouragement to advantaged groups to see disadvan-
A disturbing but illuminating example of appellation taged groups as somehow deserving their lower status.
"racist" to such persons. A disturbing but illuminating However, antipathy and inferiorizing racism are
example of contemporary antipathy racism occurred not entirely separate either. The paternalistic inferioriz-
in Washington state in 1999. The Makah tribe of the ing racist (e.g., a white segregationist) often hates those
Olympic Peninsula announced its intention to hunt members of the racial group who do not accept the infe-
for whales as a way of instilling pride and tradition rior social POSition he regards as appropriate to their
inferior natures-for example, blacks who do not engage historical resonance would not be. Other stereotypes
in the deference behavior the paternalistic racist expects. lacking such historical resonance are, for example,
Emmett Till was lynched in 1955 out of hatred directed Asians as poor drivers, blacks as poor swimmers, and
toward a young black man who had transgressed the whites as not being able to jump. All are objectionable,
rules of racial deference and constraint defining him as racial (race-based) stereotypes. But it is moral overload
an inferior being. In addition, many racists both hate and to call them racist stereotypes, and to do so contrib-
regard as inferior members of a particular racial group utes to a cheapening of the moral force of the idea of
(and not only a particular subcategory of such members, "racism."
such as those who do not "stay in their place").
RACIAL DISCOMFORT OR ANXIETY

RACIAL AND RACIST STEREOTYPES
Another application of the definition of racism is the
If we confine racism to manifestations or representa- difference between racial antipathy and what I will
tions of racial antipathy or racial inferiorizing, we can call "racial discomfort" or "racial anXiety." Consider
see that many things can go wrong in the area of race the following example.
without being racist. ConSider two objectionable ste- Ms. Verano is a white fourth grade teacher. She
reotypes of blacks, for instance-blacks as intellectu- feels comfortable with all the children in her very
ally deficient, and blacks as good dancers. The first is racially-mixed class. She holds all students to equally
a straightforwardly racist stereotype; it portrays blacks high standards of performance. But, though she has
as inferior in regard to a fundamental human attribute. never admitted this to herself, she is not really com-
The second, however, is not racist, on my account. It fortable with most of the black parents. She does not
attributes a positive rather than a negative quality. It is dislike blacks, nor does she think they are inferior.
a far less objectionable stereotype than the inferiority However, she is not particularly familiar with African-
stereotype. American culture, knows very few blacks other than
Nevertheless, the stereotype of blacks as good her students, and is not confident about her ability
dancers is still an objectionable one. Like any stereo- to communicate with blacks other than her students,
type, it wildly overgeneralizes about a group; it blinds and is not confident about her ability to communicate
us to the internal diversity of the group-some blacks with black adults. As a result Ms. Verano is somewhat
are bad dancers, some are good, some are so-so (and defensive when speaking with black parents in parent
this is so of every racial group). Also, all stereotyping conferences, and is not able to listen to their concerns
discourages recognizing the individuality of members and viewpoints about their children as well as she
of the group. does with parents in other racial groups. Because she
The stereotype of blacks as good dancers is also does not glean as much information from the black
objectionable in a more specific, historically contex- parents about their children as she does from the
tual sense, which can be recognized in the more var- other parents, she is not able to serve these children
iegated moral vocabulary revealed by loosening our as well as the other children in her class. Ms. Verano
fixation on "racism" and "racist." This stereotype does not have antipathy or inferiorizing attitudes
hearkens back to the slave era, when viewing blacks as toward blacks. To call her a "racist" would be concep-
good dancers was bound up with their being seen as tual inflation. She bears no antipathy towards blacks.
mentally inferior. While this direct implication is no I have built this feature into the example. Nor does she
longer clearly attached to the "good dancer" stereo- regard blacks as inferior.
type, stereotypes must be viewed historically as well Ms. Verano's situation is best described by
as contemporarily, and a given stereotype's resonance saying that she is uncomfortable with black adults
with a much more distinctly racist stereotype renders (not children). She has "racial discomfort" or "racial
it objectionable in a way that stereotypes Without such anxiety."
Racial anxiety is quite common in the United individuality of members of the group. It feeds into (in
States, especially, I believe, among whites, although addition to drawing on) the homogenizing of racial
it can be found in any racial group. Racial anxiety can groups that is a typical pitfall in the racial arena.
stem from different sources, and one of them can be Racial discomfort is also inimical to the devel-
anxiety that one's racist prejudices be revealed. In this opment of interracial community and other forms
case racial anxiety would be a manifestation of racism. of productive interracial relationship. It inhibits a
However, racial anxiety is not always racist in its gen- sense of identification across racial lines, and rein-
esis. We can realize that a group of persons is different forces a sense (particularly found among high school
from us in some socially important way, and we can and some college students) that it is somehow more
feel that we are just not knowledgeable enough about "natural" to socialize with members of one's own
this group to feel comfortable in the presence of its racial group than of other groups. We should strive
members. We can be anxious that we will embarrass for a SOCiety in which people feel as comfortable as
ourselves by saying or doing the "wrong thing." We possible interacting in all public and private venues
may worry that the group will dislike or reject us if we with members of ethnic and racial groups other than
attempt to approach it. This social anxiety is perfectly their own. Such comfort would not only make social
familiar regarding cultural differences; the individual existence more pleasant, varied, and interesting for
is anxious approaching a culture about which she lacks members of all groups, but would serve the purpose
knowledge. Members of different racial groups are of civic attachment and civic engagement as well.
also often quite ignorant of one anothers' modes of life Teachers in a position to do so would do well to make
(sometimes but not always because cultural and racial an effort to decrease racial discomfort and anxiety
differences correspond), even if they interact in schools in their classes, for example by forming interracial
and workplaces. In a sense racial anxiety is even more groups for various tasks, encouraging interracial com-
likely than mere cultural anXiety, since differences in munication, explicitly discussing its importance and
"race" are more socially charged than are cultural dif- pitfalls, and the like. 6 Individuals are well advised to
ferences. If one is equally ignorant of the other group, look for signs of racial discomfort in themselves and,
there is more reason to be anxious that one will violate if they discover them, do what they can to relieve this
some unforeseen norm with regard to a racially differ- discomfort, for example by reaching out to persons
ent group than a culturally different one. of other racial groups or by becoming more familiar
In itself, racial anxiety or discomfort is not racism. with and knowledgeable about the modes of life of
Nor is racial discomfort the sort of thing for which its those groups.
possessor is subject to moral criticism. It is not mor- Furthermore, the fact that it is generally difficult
ally bad to be racially anxious, as it is morally bad to to tell whether reluctance to engage with racial oth-
be racially prejudiced. However, racial discomfort is ers is a product of antipathy or mere discomfort itself
still a bad thing, and an individual who recognizes takes a toll on racial minorities who have to worry
her racial anxiety should not rest content with it just and wonder about the source of some troubling racial
because it is not a moral blot on her character. This interaction. '"In waiting rooms or lobbies ... I've tried
is so, in part, because, as in Ms. Verano's case, it can to initiate a conversation [with whites], and I could
lead to acts of a discriminatory character; Ms. Verano tell they don't want to talk,' says Sharon Walter, an
is unlikely to be able to educate her black pupils to African-American. 'But when a white person walks
the same degree as she does her other students, since in, conversation begins. I don't want to think it's rac-
she will lack information pertinent to them. ism ... The better part of me wants to think otherwise'"
In addition racial anxiety reinforces a sense of sep- (Shipler, p. 448). Merely having such thoughts is itself
arateness and "otherness" concerning those of other a psychic cost.
racial groups. It makes it difficult to recognize inter- In summary, then, racial anxiety or discomfort is
nal diversity in such groups, and to appreciate the not, in itself, racist (although it can be a manifestation
of underlying racism). Yet it is still a bad thing, destruc- The two officers had ordered the male friend to
tive to interracial relationships. drop his gun, which he did, and they then turned
to Officer Young and ordered him to do so as well.
It is not clear whether Young heard the order, but
RACE, IDENTITY, AND RECOGNITION in any case he did not comply, and the two officers,
Another race-related ill distinct from racism is illus- who were white, shot and killed him. It emerged that,
trated in the following example. A Haitian-American despite the officers' failing to recognize Officer Young,
girl is one of two black students in her class. When a one of the officers had been a police academy class-
race-related issue arises in discussion, the teacher turns mate of Young's, and both had graduated in the same
to her and asks her what "the black paint of view" is on class three years earlier.
the question at hand. The killing sparked community outrage and
There seem several distinct though related wrongs anguish. Charges of racism were made. It was said that
this teacher has committed. He has failed to recognize the killing was "racially motivated." Eventually a fed-
Haitian-Americans as a distinct ethnic group within eral civil rights investigation took place, and the two
the larger "black" umbrella. He has treated a racial officers were cleared of having intended to deprive
group in an overly homogeneous manner, implying Officer Young of his civil rights, or of acting out of
that there could be something that could coherently racial animosity.
be called "the black point of view" on an issue. Finally, It is impossible to know whether the two officers
he has failed to recognize the student as an individual were racially biased against blacks. However, their
with her own individual views. ' behavior is perfectly consistent with their lacking any
These three related forms of misrecognition are form of racial prejudice or racial motivation. It is not
directed toward an individual or a group of which the likely that they shot at Young because they disliked
individual is a member. The latter two-racial homog- black people. Some people, recognizing this, then felt
enization, and not acknowledging individuality-are some relief. The incident turned from one involving
particularly serious failings in a teacher. However, that racism to a (mere) "tragic accident."
is not to say that they are "racist." The teacher's behav- But this response oversimplifies. Racism may be
ior need not imply that he harbors animus toward absent in motivations and attitudes but be present
blacks, or regards them as inferior. elsewhere. In this situation, it is much more plausible
to think that it lay in the stereotypes that the officers
carried in their minds about blacks. That is why, or
RACIAL MOTIVES AND RACIAL STEREOTYPES part of why, they reacted to a black man with a gun in
Confusion about both the location and the meaning plainclothes as if he were a perpetrator, even though
of racism infected public understanding of a particu- they actually knew him as a fellow officer. In another
larly tragic event that took place in Providence, Rhode widely-reported case around the same time, four white
~sland, in January, 2000. Several women were fighting officers in New York City killed an innocent black man
In a late-night diner. The night manager threw the whom they wrongly took to be reaching for a gun.
patrons out of the diner, at which point some male Treating blackness as if it were an indicator of suspi-
friends got involved, one of whom drew a gun. Inside ciousness or criminality is referred to as "racial profil-
the diner, an off-duty patrolman, Cornel Young, Jr., ing" and has come in for a good deal of public criticism
an African-American, was waiting for a take-out order. as a result of these and similar incidents, not only ones
Meanwhile, the police had been called to the scene involving fatalities.
outside. Officer Young, after warning the patrons The white officers who killed Officer Young
to get down, rushed outside to help the two officers were apparently genuinely remorseful and upset
on the scene, his gun drawn. (Providence police are by their having unwittingly killed a fellow officer.
required to carry their firearms when off duty.) But this does not mean they were not prey to racial
stereotypes linking blackness to criminality. Officer social segregation might have contributed to the racial
Young's mother was surely correct when she said that homogenization that in turn contributed to his failing
her son would be unlikely to have been shot had he to recognize Officer Young.
been white. But it is important to be careful about
what we mean if we say that he was killed "because
he was black." It does not necessarily mean "out of CONCLUSION
hostility or animosity toward black persons." It could Gaining some clarity about what "racism" means will
mean "because he was seen in the moment as a dan- help us engage in productive conversations about
gerous person and this was so in part because he was racial matters-conversations that are too infrequent,
black." I believe it is also plausible to refer to this both inside and outside classroom settings. We have
racial stereotype as "racist." But my point here is not seen three ways by which we might gain that clar-
so much to defend that position as to encourage clarity. First, within a given category (actions, jokes, ste-
ity as to the location of what is, or was, racially objec- reotypes, remarks, stereotypes, persons), we should
tionable in the situation. It was in the stereotype, not confine "racism" to especially egregious wrongs in
in the motives of the white officers. And it shows the that category. Not every stereotype is racist. Not every
tremendous danger that can accompany racist ste- remark that is racially offensive is racist. Not every
reotypes even in the absence of racial antipathy; they racially insensitive action is a racist action. I have sug-
can be life threatening. gested that the distinct opprobrium attaching to "rac-
I have given a stripped down version of this com- ism" and "racist" can be retained and protected if we
plex racial situation, and want to mention only two recognize that racism refers to racial inferiorization
other points. First, some members of the community or racial antipathy, and that the different categorical
placed some of the blame on the Providence pOlice forms of racism can all be related to either of those two
departmenes failure to educate its police force about definitions.
the dangers and wrong of racial stereotyping and Second, we should not confuse racism in one cat-
racial profiling. That is, they have seen the fault in a egorywith racism in another. A person who is prey to
kind of institutional irresponsibility regarding race, a racist stereotype is not necessarily "a racist"; nor does
in the context of a recognition that antiblack stereo- she necessarily operate from racist motives. A remark
types are particularly troubling in a police force that can be unquestionably racist without the person mak-
is meant to be protectors of their community. ing the remark being a racist, or making the remark for
The second race-related matter is more speculative a racist reason, or motive.
on my part. Even though the white officers, and espe- Finally, in endeavoring to protect the distinct moral
cially the one who graduated from the police academy opprobrium of the accusation of "racism" from con-
with Office Young, knew him, it is possible that a form ceptual inflation and moral overload, as well as from
of racial homogenization was involved in their failure categorical drift and confuSion, we must at the same
to recognize him. Perhaps the officer in some sense time recognize that "racism" by no means captures all
still sawall blacks, or black men, as "looking alike." of what can go wrong in the domain of race. There is
Perhaps in the heat of the moment the image of black- a much larger terrain of moral ills in the racial domain
ness blocked his seeing Officer Young as an individual than racism itself, and we should draw on our manifold
person. Racial thinking does, in general, inhibit the linguistic resources-racial insensitivity, failure to rec-
perception of others as individuals; the case of the ognize racial identity, racial ignorance, racial anxiety,
teacher asking the black student for "the black point of racial injustice, racial homogenization, and so on-to
view" would be another version of this same homoge- express and describe moral disvalue in this domain.
nization. Perhaps-again I am speculating-although Moral concern is appropriately directed toward this
the white officer did know Officer Young, whites and wider domain, and should not be confined to racism
blacks did not interact much on or off the job; if so this appropriately so called.
l
NOTES REFERENCES
1. I do not believe that there are races in the sense in which Black, White Officers Cited in Noose Incident, Boston Globe,
"races" is generally understood in popular discourse, April 29, 1999, B1.
so I regard it as misleading to say that someone l'is of a Blum, L. (2002). I'm not a racist, but . .. Tile moral quandary of
certain race." It is more accurate to say that someone has, race. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
or has been assigned, a racial designation, or that she is a Margalit, A. (1996). The decent society. Cambridge: Harvard
member of a racial group; I will generally use the latter University Press.
expression. Miles, R. (1989). Racism. London: Routledge.
2. The black officer seemed clearly to be referring to lynching. Morrow, L. (1994). Time, b[12/S/94] cited in Extra!, vol. 9, #2,
March/April 1996.
3. It is noteworthy that it was the newspaper article, rather
Nuechterlein,J., in First tl1ings, August-September, 1996, from
than the NAACP itself, that called the networks "racist,"
Chronicle ofHigher Education, September 6.
or framed the issue as one of racism. Kweisi Mfume, the
Schofield,J.W. (1989). Black and white in school: Trust, tension,
president of the NAACP, said only that the program-
or tolerance? New York: Teachers College Press.
ming was "a virtual whitewash." New York Times, Sept 20,
Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L. & Krysan, M. (1997). Racial
1999, AI.
attitudes in America: Trends and interpretation, revised edn.
4. Of these listed, only "sexism" has fully succeeded in Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
attaching moral condemnation to its referent-discrimina- Shipler, D.K. (1997). A country ofstrangers: Blacks and whites ill
tion against, or the denial of dignity to, women, or discrimi- America. New York: Vintage Books.
nation on the basis of sex in general-in popular thought Stephan, W. (1999). Reducing prejudice and stereotyping in
and speech. schools. New York: Teachers College Press.
5. In "I'm Not a Racist, But . .. " I argue that members of any Tizon, A., Whale killing uncovers anti-Indian hatred, Boston
group can be racist. For instance, I counter the view that only Globe, May 30, 1999.
whites can be racist because only whites hold power as a racial Weinraub, B., Stung by criticism of fall shows, TV Networks
group. add minority roles, New York Times, 1999.
6. Stephan 1999 provides a wealth of information about how
to improve intergroup relations in schools.
Dear White America

GEORGE YANCY
I have a weighty request. As you read this letter, I want We don't talk much about the urgency of love
you to listen with love, a sort of love that demands these days, especially within the public sphere. Much
that you look at parts of yourself that might cause pain of our discourses these days is about revenge, name
and terror, as James Baldwin would say. Did you hear calling, hate, and divisiveness. I have yet to hear it
that? You may have missed it. I repeat: I want you to from our presidential hopefuls, or our political pun-
listen with love. Well, at least try. dits. I don't mean the Hollywood type of love, but the
scary kind, the kind that risks not being reciprocated,
the kind that refuses to flee in the face of danger. To
make it a bit easier for you, I've decided to model, as
George Yancy, "Dear White America," New York Times, December
24, 2015. @ 2015 The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used best as I can, what I'm asking of you. Let me demon-
under license. strate the vulnerability that I wish you to show. As
a child of Socrates, James Baldwin and Audre Lorde, desire to oppress them. It means that despite my best
let me speak the truth, refuse to err on the side of intentions, I perpetuate sexism every day of my life.
caution. Please don't take this as a confession for which I'm
This letter is a gift for you. Bear in mind, though seeking forgiveness. Confessions can be easy, espe-
that some gifts can be heavy to bear. You don't have to cially when we know that forgiveness is immediately
accept it; there is no obligation. I give it freely, believ- forthcoming.
ing that many of you will throw the gift back in my As a sexist, I have failed women. I have failed to
face, saying that I wrongly accuse you, that I am too speak out when I should have. I have failed to engage
sensitive, that I'm race hustler, and that I blame white critically and extensively their pain and suffering
people (you) for everything. in my writing. I have failed to transcend the rigidity
I have read many of your comments. I have even of gender roles in my own life. I have failed to chal-
received some hate mail. In this letter, I ask you to lenge those poisonous assumptions that women are
look deep, to look into your souls with silence, to "inferior" to men or to speak out loudly in the com-
quiet that voice that will speak to you of your white pany of male philosophers who believe that feminist
"innocence." So, as you read this letter, take a deep philosophy is just a nonphilosophical fad. I have been
breath. Make a space for my voice in the deepest part complicit with, and have allowed myself to be seduced
of your psyche. Try to listen, to practice being silent. by, a country that makes billions of dollars from sexu-
There are times when you must quiet your own voice aUy objectifying women, from pornography, com-
to hear from or about those who suffer in ways that mercials, video games, to Hollywood movies. I am not
you do not. innocent.
What if I told you that I'm sexist? Well, I am. Yes. I have been fed a poisonous diet of images that
I said it and I mean just that. I have watched my male fragment women into mere body parts. I have also
students squirm in their seats when I've asked them been complicit with a dominant male narrative that
to identify and talk about their sexism. There are few says that women enjoy being treated like sexual
men, I suspect, who would say that they are sexists, toys. In our collective male imagination, women are
and even fewer would admit that their sexism actually "things" to be used for our visual and physical titil-
oppresses women. Certainly not publicly, as I've just lation. And even as I know how poisonous and false
done. No taking it back now. these sexist assumptions are, I am often ambushed
To make things worse, I'm an academic, a phi- by my own hidden sexism. I continue to see women
losopher. I'm supposed to be one of the "enlightened" through the male gaze that belies my best inten-
ones. Surely, we are beyond being sexists. Some, who tions not to sexually objectify them. Our collective
may genuinely care about my career, will say that male erotic feelings and fantasies are complicit in
I'm being too risky, that I am jeopardizing my aca- the degradation of women. And we must be mindful
demic livelihood. Some might even say that as a black that not all women endure sexual degradation in the
male, who has already been stereotyped as a "crotch- same way.
grabbing, sexual fiend," that I'm at risk of reinforcing I recognize how my being a sexist has a differential
that stereotype. (Let's be real, that racist stereotype has impact on black women and women of color who are
been around for centuries; it is already part of white not only victims of raCism, but also sexism, my sexism.
America's imaginary landscape.) For example, black women and women of color not
Yet, I refuse to remain a prisoner of the lies that only suffer from sexual objectification, but the ways
we men like to tell ourselves-that we are beyond in which they are objectified is linked to how they
the messiness of sexism and male patriarchy, that we are raCially depicted, some as "exotic" and others as
don't oppress women. Let me clarify. This doesn't "hyper-sexual." You see, the complicity, the responsi-
mean that I intentionally hate women or that I bility, the pain that I cause runs deep. And, get this.
480 <) PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
I refuse to seek shelter; I refuse to live a lie. So, every N-word in your life, you may hate the K.K.K., but that
day of my life I fight against the dominant male nar- does not mean that you don't harbor racism and ben-
rative, choosing to see women as subjects, not objects. efit from racism. After all, you are part of a system that
But even as I fight, there are moments of failure. Just allows you to walk into stores where you are not fol-
because I fight against sexism does not give me clean lowed, where you get to go for a bank loan and your
hands, as it were, at the end of the day; I continue to skin does not count against you, where you don't need
falter, and I continue to oppress. And even though the to engage in "the talk" that black people and people
ways in which I oppress women is unintentional, this of color must tell their children when they are con-
does not free me of being responsible. fronted by white police officers.
If you are white, and you are reading this letter, As you reap comfort from being white, we suffer
I ask that you don't run to seek shelter from your own for being black and people of color. But your comforts
racism. Don't hide from your responsibility. Rather, is linked to our pain and suffering. Just as my comfort
begin, right now, to practice being vulnerable. Being in being male is linked to the suffering of women,
neither a "good" white person nor a liberal white per- which makes me sexist, so, too, you are racist. That is
son will get you off the proverbial hook. I consider the gift that I want you to accept, to embrace. It is a
myself to be a decent human being. Yet, I'm sexist. form of knowledge that is taboo. Imagine the impact
Take another deep breath. I ask that you try to be "un- that the acceptance of this gift might have on you and
sutured." If that term brings to mind a state of pain, the world.
open flesh, it is meant to do so. After all, it is painful Take another deep breath. I know that there are
to let go of your "White innocence," to use this let- those who will write to me in the comment section
ter as a mirror, one that refuses to show you what you with boiling anger, sarcasm, disbelief, denial. There
want to see, one that demands that you look at the lies are those who will say, "Yancy is just an angry black
that you tell yourself so that you don't feel the weight man." There are others who will say, "Why isn't Yancy
of responsibility for those who live under the yoke of telling black people to be honest about the violence
whiteness, your whiteness. in their own black neighborhoods?" Or, "How can
I can see your anger. I can see that this letter is Yancy say that all white people are racists?" If you
being misunderstood. This letter is not asking you are saying these things, then you've already failed to
to feel bad about yourself, to wallow in guilt. That is listen. I come with a gift. You're already rejecting the
too easy. I'm asking for you to tarry, to linger, with gift that I have to offer. This letter is about YOli. Don't
the ways in which you perpetuate a racist society, the change the conversation. I assure you that so many
ways in which you are racist. I'm now daring you to black people suffering from poverty and joblessness,
face a racist history which, paraphrasing Baldwin, has which is linked to high levels of crime, are painfully
placed you where you are and that has formed your aware of the existential toll that they have had to face
own racism. Again, in the sprit of Baldwin, I am asking because they are black and, as Baldwin adds, "for no
you to enter into battle with your white self. I'm ask- other reason."
ing that you open yourself up; to speak to, to admit to, Some of your white brothers and sisters have made
the racist poison that is inside of you. this leap. The legal scholar Stephanie M. Wildman,
Again, take a deep breath. Don't tell me about how has written, "I simply believe that no matter how
many black friends you have. Don't tell me that you hard I work at not being racist, I still am. Because part
are married to someone of color. Don't tell me that of racism is systemic, I benefit from the privilege that
you voted for Obama. Don't tell me that I'm the rac- I am struggling to see." And the journalism professor
ist. Don't tell me that you don't see color. Don't tell Robert Jensen: "I like to think I have changed, even
me that I'm blaming whites for everything. To do though I routinely trip over the lingering effects of
so is to hide yet again. You may have never used the that internalized racism and the institutional racism
around me. Every time I walk into a store at the same show me a white self that love has unmasked? I'm
times as a black man and the security guard follows asking for love in return for a gift; in fact, I'm hoping
him and leaves me alone to shop, I am benefiting from that this gift might help you to see yourself in ways
white privilege." that you have not seen before. Of course, the history
What I'm asking is that you first accept the rac- of white supremacy in America belies this gesture
ism within yourself, accept all of the truth about what of black gift-giving, this gesture of non-sentimental
it means for you to be white in a society that was cre- love. Martin Luther KingJr. was murdered even as he
ated for you. I'm asking for you to trace the blinds that loved.
tie you to forms of domination that you would rather Perhaps the language of this letter will encourage
not see. When you walk into the world, you can walk a split-not a split between black and white, but a fis-
with assurance; you have already signed a contract, so sure in your understanding, a space for loving a Tray-
to speak, that guarantees you a certain form of social von Martin, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Aiyana Jones,
safety. Sandra Bland, Laquan McDonald and others. I'm sug-
Baldwin argues for a form of love that is "a state of gesting a form of love that enables you to see the role
being, or state of grace-not in the infantile American that you play (even despite your anti-racist actions)
sense of being made happy but in the tough and uni- in a system that continues to value black lives on the
versal sense of quest and daring and growth." Most of cheap.
my days, I'm engaged in a personal and society battle Take one more deep breath. I have another gift.
against sexism. So many times, I fail. And so many If you have young children, before you fall off to
times, I'm complicit. But I refuse to hide behind that sleep tonight, I want you to hold your child. Touch
mirror that lies to me about my "non-sexist nobil- your child's face. Smell your child's hair. Count the
ity." Baldwin says, "Love takes off the masks that we fingers on your child's hand. See the miracle that is
fear we cannot live without and know we cannot live your child. And then, with as much vision as you
within." In my heart, I'm done with the mask of sex- can muster, I want you to imagine that your child is
ism, though I'm tempted every day to wear it. And, black.
there are times when it still gets the better of me. In peace,
White America, are you prepared to be at war George Yancy
with yourself, your white identity, your white
power, your white privilege? Are you prepared to
Uses and Abuses of the Discourse of White Privilege

NAOMI ZACK
White privilege in real life is something real that exists. an invisible weightless knapsack of special proviSions,
White privilege discourse is thought, talk, and writing maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and
about white privilege-it is not the thing itself. blank checks." The idea lives on in exhortations to
Our present idea of white privilege was introduced Check YOllr privilege! on college campuses and through
by Peggy McIntosh in 1989: UWhite privilege is like broader public and social media. But the discourse of
Naomi Zack. "Uses and Abuses of the Discourse of White Privilege," white privilege is problematic from two angles-it
Philosopher (hlng). June 24, 2016, politicalphilosopher.net. goes too far in blaming all whites for all forms of rac-
Reprinted with permission. ism and it does not go far enough in directly addressing
L
injustice against nonwhites. Both perspectives are will serve social justice. It's as though the discourse
worth consideration but the second is more important of foodies about their abundant culinary choices and
because it involves violations of fundamental human self-indulgent practices could correct the problems of
rights. world hunger!
Whites cannot call or email or log onto a Bureau White privilege discourse is largely about the
of White Privilege to check their white accounts, draw facts of white racial advantage and what white people
on their white assets, withdraw white funds, or use think and feel about that. Building awareness of racial
white credits to make purchases. But whites are gen- imbalances is progressive. But as a leading response to
erally better off than nonwhites-in health, wealth, contemporary injustice, white privilege discourse may
freedom, education, longevity, and a host of other miss the importance of racial injustice and degenerate
human goods. That is, although overt oppression into just another display of the advantages that white
expressed by an official ideology of white supremacy is people have of not being required to respond to racial
largely past in our post-civil rights era of formal equal- injustice against their racial group. After all, and for
ity, racist historical effects persist. White (European the most part, whites are treated justly, in wealthy,
and American) "privileges" endure. White privilege is democratic, capitalistic societies.
a network of dispositions in society whereby individu- Awareness by whites of their privilege, in an
als behave differently, that is, better to whites than ongoing discourse that whites conduct, is neither
nonwhites, solely because whites are white. Attitudes, cognitively nor rhetorically adequate for addressing
beliefs, and emotions are the internal psychic compo- injustice. If black people can be killed or executed by
nent of white privilege and they include freedom from police officers, without trial or even the appearance
worrying about or suffering from racism. of criminal action, while white people are left alone,
However, not all whites, all of the time, enjoy privi- this is not wholly or solely a matter of white privilege.
leges compared to nonwhites or are responsible for the Yes, white people are better off, but to confine resis-
comparative disadvantages of nonwhites. And even tance to the injustice done to nonwhites to discourse
though some whites may be complicit with the racism about how whites are privileged in being left alone
of others, their expressed non-racist views and cultural (Le., to only talk about white privilege), minimizes
contributions should not be dismissed solely on the or trivializes the injustice against nonwhites. This
grounds of their race. That is, to shut down speech just injustice could only be wholly or solely a matter of
because it is uttered by a white person would be unfair white privilege if we lived in and accepted the norms
and when racial ad hominem is robustly denounced of a maximally repressive totalitarian society where
on behalf of people of color, the fallacy should be rec- it was customary for government officials to execute
ognized in an even-handed way. (We continue to be anyone without trial or even the appearance of crim-
shocked by Kant's, "This fellow was quite black ... a inal action. Against that background, we could say
clear proof that what he said was stupid.") Still, "Check that those who were not treated that way were privi-
your privilege!" or white privilege discourse has more leged. They would be privileged in enjoying that perk
serious pitfalls than such insults to white people. The of exceptional leniency. But we do not live in such a
discourse seems to be incapable of addressing injustice system or accept a normative totalitarian description
against people of color. of the system we do live in. We live in a system where
In progressive, left-liberal society, it is virtuous everyone, regardless of race is supposed to have the
not to exaggerate one's disadvantage or ignore unfair same basic rights. That nonwhites are not recognized
or unearned advantage. The motivation for white as having these rights is not a privilege of whites, but
privilege discourse is that the person being asked a violation of the rights of nonwhites.
or told to check her privilege will be ashamed after Nevertheless, human rights have only an ideal
recognizing that she has unfair or unearned advan- status. Philosophically they are only posits and mor-
tages solely due to being white-and that insight ally those who are outraged by the injustice of rights
violation have little power. But, the basis for outrage dismantling affirmative action. Yes, whites are privi-
concerning the recent high profile cases of summary leged, but no amount of exhortation to "check" their
execution of unarmed young black men by police offi- privilege or confessional discourse in response, will
cers is a legal issue, a matter of positive law in U.S. juris- correct the legal injustice of police homicide based on
dictions. U.S. citizens are constitutionally protected racial profiling.
by certain rights that most, especially whites, still Police racial profiling and its attendant violence is
correctly assume are in force for them: the right to not the only form of rights violation that corresponds
privacy from unjustified government search and sei- to nonwhite race in the United States and is neglected
zure (where death is a form of seizure); the right to due by white privilege discourse. Unequal educational
process; the right to equal protection by government resources in materials and teacher skills have perSisted
officials. after Brown v. Board of Education called for integrated
The Fourth Amendment states that "the people" education "with all deliberate speed" in 1954. But
have a right "to be secure in their persons, houses, K-12 schools are funded by local property taxes that
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches are directly related to real estate values. It's been
and seizures ... but upon probable cause." The Four- widely publicized since the 1970s that the differ-
teenth Amendment reads in part that that no state ences in tax-based educational resources per child are
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the as much as 1000 percent between mainly black and
equal protection of the laws." Police racial profil- brown neighborhoods, as residential racial segrega-
ing followed by summary execution violates both tion has persisted due to differences in wealth and
amendments. However, these constitutional rights income, along with social preferences regarding the
have been steadily eroded by the U.S. Supreme Court race of neighbors. All modern democracies uphold
in recent decades. In Graham v. Connor in 1989, the public education as a fundamental right at this time,
Justices ruled that claims that police have used exces- but that right cannot be fully implemented in the
sive force must be analyzed under an "objective rea- United States given the disparities in opportunities
sonableness" standard referring to officer behavior, for children that result from ongOing residential
rather than rules of due process or probable cause. In segregation. No amount of positive descriptions of
Plumhof{ et al. v. Richard (2012), the Court ruled that the privileges of white middle class school children
Fourth Amendment rights must be balanced against mitigates the deprivations of poor nonwhite chil-
the "qualified immunity" of officers. These rulings dren who do not have comparable learning oppor-
and similar ones come to bear in cases like the shoot- tunities. Needed is egalitarian educational reform to
ing of Michael Brown, where all an officer need do enlarge those opportunities. No amount or intensity
to avoid indictment or conviction for manslaughter of discourse about the privilege of white children a
or murder is claim that he believed his life was in few blocks away could fill in for what poor nonwhite
danger. children lack. And again, if equal adequate educa-
To protect the rights of minorities against police- tion is a right, a structure in which nonwhite children
really everyone's rights, but the recent killings of are deprived of that right is a problem of injustice in
unarmed young men concern minorities-it will likely and of itself. And that problem is not addressed by
be necessary to revisit at least Graham and Plumhoff. talking about the fact that white children enjoy the
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s were right! (That there are structural inequalities that per-
led by impassioned and brilliant lawyers, constantly petuate rights violations of nonwhites underscores
bringing cases before the courts. These days, the legal the importance of resistance that attends to rights
cases that get the most attention are those aimed at instead of privileges.)
How Not to Accuse Someone of Prejudice

EMRYS WESTACOTT
A colleague recently responded to a memo I circu- admixture of knowledge, understanding, self-aware-

lated by telling me they considered it unintentionally ness, sensitivity, and reason, can be difficult. Still, I
heterosexist. I didn't agree. After a brief exchange of believe that in our attempts to manage this, it is impor-
e-mails that served only to sandpaper each other's sore tant that we recognize and respect basic logical param-
spots, my colleague called my attention to the follow- eters. If we fail to do this, we do our cause a disservice.
ing passage in Allen Johnson's book Privilege, Power, In discussions of sexism, racism, heterosexism,
and Difference: heteronormativism, and other forms of prejudice, I
If someone confronts you with your own behavior have sometimes encountered two particular forms of
that supports privilege, step off the path of least resis- specious reasoning. I will label these the appeal to sub-
tance that encourages you to defend and deny. Don't jective response and the accusation of privilege. My pur-
tell them they're too sensitive or need a better sense of pose here is simply to explain what these are and what
humor.... Listen to What's being said. Take it seriously. is wrong with them.
Assume for the time being it's true, because given the The appeal to subjective response involves infer-
power of paths of least resistance, it probably is. (Allen ring that an action or statement expresses some sort
Johnson, Privilege, Power and Difference (New York: of prejudice solely on the grounds that someone is
McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed., 200S), p. 141.) hurt or offended by it. Reasoning in this fashion is
The passage is well-intended and, up to a pOint, rea- unsupportable and leads to all kinds of problems.
sonable. But in my opinion it should be read with cau- To see how this is so, let us consider two specific
tion, since it can easily encourage fallacious thinking examples.
and thereby harm the very cause it hopes to advance-
Example 1: A teacher says to a class: 'Imagine a doctor
a cause with which I fully sympathize. Of course, the and nurse who work together and fall in love. Should
tenor of the passage is to encourage a self-critical atti- he continue as her boss?'
tude, and we're all in favor of that. But the same kind
of reasoning could also be used to fend off the advice This statement is possibly both sexist and hetero-
being given. After all, one can easily imagine rewriting sexist. I say 'possibly' because context in such cases
the passage to put the boot on the other foot: is everything. It need not be objectionable if, for
instance, it is just one of many varied scenarios
If someone tells you you're being hypersensitive or
thrown out by a creative writing instructor to illus-
unreasonable, step off the path of least resistance that
encourages you to defend and deny. Don't tell them trate plot possibilities. But if it belongs to a persistent
their behavior supports privilege. Listen to what's pattern of stereotyped thinking, then it is open to
?~ing said. Take it seriously. Assume for the time being criticism.
It s true, because given the power of the paths of least How would we justify the claim that the utterance
resistance, it probably is. is sexist? The standard procedure is to define the rele-
vant concept and then show how a particular instance
As my colleague and I found, navigating these shoals
falls under it. So in this case, we would offer a defini-
in our everyday interactions, achieving the proper
tion of sexism that includes the act of presupposing
Emrys Westacott, "How Not to Accuse Someone of Prejudice," h(l rmful gender stereotypes or oppressive notions of
Think 14, no. 41 (Autumn 2015). © The Royal Institute of normality and argue that the teacher in Example 1 is
Philosophy 2015. Reproduced with permission of the doing just that. The charge of heterosexism would be
Licensor through PLSclear. supported in a similar way.
Now contrast that with the following: In fact this sort of reasoning is not just unsound; it
is harmful. For if we give it credence we will be forced
Example 2: A teacher says to a class: 'Imagine a doctor
and a nurse who work together and fall in love. Should to embrace a shifting, unstable notion of what consti-
they keep working together?' tutes prejudice, a concept that will be far less useful as
a tool for criticizing real prejudice when we encounter
This seems unobjectionable: no sexist or heterosex- it. Defining racist, sexist, or heterosexist speech solely,
ist assumptions are being made. But suppose a stu- or even primarily, by reference to audience responses
dent did object, saying that when they hear talk of means that the same utterance made by the same per-
a 'doctor and nurse' relationship, this conjures up in son to the same audience can be innocent one day and
their mind-and makes them painfully aware of-a prejudiced the next simply because, in the meantime,
long history of hierarchical doctor-nurse relation- the listener has had experiences that affect the way he
ships in which the doctors are male and dominant, or she responds. It means that any statement whatso-
the nurses are female and subservient, and gay rela- ever could be deemed prejudiced, since if someone sin-
tionships of any kind are excluded from the picture. cerely claims to be offended, oppressed, demeaned, or
So although what the teacher says may not explicitly marginalized by something said, then that emotional
reinforce oppressive stereotypes, it may still be judged response, in itself, validates their complaint.
sexist and heterosexist in some sense-namely, rela- This is not to imply that audience response is
tive to this student's subjective response informed by irrelevant. Obviously, one important indicator that
her particular experiences. something you've said might be objectionable is that
Is this a reasonable argument? Absolutely not. someone objects to it; and if this happens repeatedly
Yet some accusations of prejudice take essentially and with various audiences, it behooves you to reflect
this form. One well-known example concerns the critically on the charges being made against you. After
use of the word 'niggardly.' In 1999 a student at the all, accusations of prejudice usually are prompted by
University of Wisconsin-Madison complained to the words or deeds that express prejudice. But the mere
faculty senate about a professor of English who had fact that your listeners object or feel offended does not
used the word while teaching a class on Chaucer. She prove that their response is justified. They may have
charged the professor with using racially offensive misunderstood your meaning or intention. They may
language. It is, of course, possible to imagine some- be overreacting. Their reaction may be irrational.
one using this word, perhaps emphasizing it repeat- The key point here is easily demonstrated. The
edly in remarks directed at African-Americans in a subjective response of a listener or reader is never suf-
manner designed to produce discomfort. In that case, ficient evidence that someone's words are racist, sexist
its use could certainly be judged racist. And if I was or heterosexist since one can always ask the question:
aware that my audience might dislike the term, per- Is the response reasonable? Of course, this question
haps because they mistakenly believed it to contain a itself does not always have a clear-cut answer, for the
racial slur, then my decision to use it could perhaps parties in dispute are likely to disagree here, too. But
be criticized as insensitive. But notice, in both these that is a different problem. The point still holds that
situations we look at more than just the audience's the reasonableness of a person's response is always an
reaction to decide whether the speaker is at fault. open question.
We also consider the speaker's intentions, or at least Often, when there is a disagreement over this
the speaker's levels of self-awareness and sensitivity. question, a secondary quarrel ensues about whether
To conclude that the speaker's use of the word is an apology is in order and, if so, what form it should
racist-or blameworthy in some other way-solely take. Suppose you say something that I find hurtful or
on the basis of the listener's subjective response is a offensive and I tell you this. How should you respond?
serious error. Unless you are going out of your way to be aggressively
dismissive of my feelings, you will probably say that This secondary exchange leads us to the second
you are sorry. But 'sorry' can be said in many ways. fallacy mentioned earlier, the accusation of privilege,
You could be: which might arise in something like the following way.
Imagine Pat to be a straight white male, and Kim to be
a) Expressing remorse-You're sorry that you said
someone who lacks one or more of these attributes. Pat
something objectionable or insensitive, and
says something that Kim criticizes as racist, seXist, or
you're asking for forgiveness.
heterosexist. The conversation proceeds as follows:
b) Expressing sympathy-You're sorry that I am suf-
fering in some way. Pat: I just don't get it. I don't see anything wrong with
c) Expressing regret-You're sorry that what you said what I said.
hurt or annoyed me. If you had known it would Kim: That's because you don't know what it's like to be
have this effect you might not have said it. unprivileged, oppressed, and marginalized.
Pat: Well I just think you're being hypersensitive and
Notice that neither the expression of sympathy nor unreasonable.
the expression of regret need carry any admission of Kim: That's what the voice of privilege always says.
wrongdoing. Both are, in fact, quite compatible with Your attitude is dismissive.
your belief that my reaction is unreasonable. Now Kim's claim that privilege often defends itself by
The wounded party naturally wants to hear an accusing others of hypersensitivity or illogicality is
expression of remorse-in effect, an admission of undoubtedly true. But that doesn't make her riposte
guilt. But should you offer this if it is not sincere? appropriate. On the contrary, it is misguided for at
Admitting guilt when we don't believe we've done least two reasons.
anything wrong is something most of us find very First of all, it is logically irrelevant. Pat is denying
hard to do. And any moral credit we might receive for that what he said is sexist. The appropriate response
our apparently self-critical receptivity to the perspec- to this-to say it again-is to define the concept of
tive of others is more than offset by our insincerity. sexism clearly and then show how what has been said
One could even speak here of a lack of integrity. falls under it. But in the above exchange, Kim evades
Faced with this dilemma-tom between want- this task. Instead, Kim first offers an explanation of
ing to be responsive yet also wanting to be sincere- why Pat 'doesn't get it' in terms of Pat's life story, and
we typically say we are sorry in one of the other two then tries to account for his charge of unreasonable-
senses. The word 'sorry' then seems to convey the form ness by claiming it is typical of his type. The expla-
of an apology; but in truth it merely expresses sympa- nations may be psychologically and sociologically
thy or regret. For the person offended, of course, this astute, but they still evade rather than engage the
is not good enough. In fact, it seems to compound the issue at hand.
initial offense by being patronizing. To them we seem Recall a key pOint made earlier: it is always possible
to be saying: 'Yes, yes, I know you're offended, but that one's subjective response to what another says
there's really nothing to be offended about,' rather as or does is unreasonable. This is relevant here, too; it
we'd say to a child, 'I know you're afraid, but trust me, means that Pat might be right. Imagine, for instance,
there's nothing to be afraid of.' Yet what is one sup- this extreme situation. A female student tells a male
posed to do? To express indifference would be callous. teacher that she finds his wearing a tie threatening:
To admit guilt would be insincere. Their asking me it smacks of authority, privilege, bondage, and ulti-
to try to understand why they might be offended is mately, she says, threatens her subtly and symboli-
all very well; but shouldn't they, by the same token, cally with the noose. His response is to say, 'I don't get
try to understand why I don't feel able to apologize in it. How can my wearing a tie suggest a threat to harm
good faith? you? I think you're being unreasonable.'
Now if something like this occurs in normal cir- lack of respect. The subtle implication is that what
cumstances, the chances are that the student is men- they say is not the result of reason or reflection but
tally ill. Yet she can still respond to the charge that merely a consequence of other forces at work on
she's being unreasonable by saying, 'That's what them. Exactly the same strategy has been used count-
privilege always says.' But the fact that privilege very less times by men against women, whenever an idea
often does defend itself in this way is obviously beside has been dismissed as 'exactly the sort of thing women
the point here. It isn't a valid piece of reasoning or an would say.' This move is insulting. Just how insult-
additional bit of evidence that helps to justify her ini- ing can be gauged by considering the sort of occasion
tial complaint. It's a substitute for a justification, a big when we might consider it appropriate. One instance
fat red herring. that comes to mind is when we are dealing with people
A second objection to the statement 'that's what who are mentally deranged. Then there may, sadly,
privilege typically says' is that it closes down discus- be times when we would be justified in ignoring the
sion. Moreover, it does so in a pernicious way. content of what they say and choose to focus, instead,
How is Pat supposed to respond to the observation on the condition responsible for their utterances ('It's
that he is saying 'what privilege typically says'? Pre- not him that's saying those terrible things-it's the ill-
sumably by stopping in his tracks, reflecting on things, ness'). Thus, whatever the intention behind an obser-
and becoming more self-aware, more culturally sensi- vation like 'that is what privilege typically says,' such
tive, and so on. These would doubtless be excellent responses are more likely to insult than to persuade.
outcomes: we could all benefit from enhanced self- And they are more likely to produce frustration than
awareness and sensitivity. And pointing out to some- a renewed commitment to self-criticism. The accused,
one that what they are saying is what members of a after all, is in a position akin to that of}oseph K in Kafka's
group to which they belong typically say can certainly The Trial who, when he protests to a priest that he is
sometimes be useful. This is no doubt how Kim would innocent, is told, 'But that is how the guilty speak.'
defend her remark. It is a wonderful thing that we have reached
But Kim's observation moves the debate from a a point in history when sophisticated critiques of
discussion about reasons to one about causes. This prejudice, injustice, and oppression in their many
is what makes it pernicious. It says to Pat: 'I'm not and often subtle forms abound. It is a fine thing to
going to bother showing how your claim is false or cultivate awareness of the many ways that we unwit-
unjustified. Instead, I'm just going to point out what tingly participate in forms of speech and behavior
is causing you to speak as you do-viz. your position that perpetuate prejudice. But just as we try to avoid
of privilege.' prejudice, we must also be careful to avoid specious
Treating someone's utterances as mere effects of reasoning which risks bringing a good cause into
causes is one way of showing that person a profound disrepute.
CHAPTER 15
Sexual Morality
Sex has probably always been controversial, a vola- People generally give one of three answers: (1) sex
tile subject that triggers intense emotions, social is permissible only in a marriage between a man
angst, and legal and religious sanctions. Fortu- and a woman; (2) sex is permissible between
nately, it has also attracted the interest of moral phi- informed, consenting adults; and (3) sex is permis-
losophers who have tried to shed light on its ethical sible between informed, consenting adults who are
uncertainties. Typically, the moral issues involved bound by love or commitment.
are of two kinds: (1) those that focus on the moral- The first answer is the conventional view:
ity of specific types of sexual acts and the context of sex is morally acceptable only between one man
those acts, and (2) those that concern an individual's and one woman who are married to each other by
free consent to such acts. Regarding the first group legal authority. Sex involving the unmarried or sex
of issues, many people commend or condemn oral in adulterous relationships is impermissible-that
sex, anal sex, masturbation, homosexual sex, group is, premarital sex and extramarital sex are wrong.
sex, premarital sex, promiscuous sex, transgender- In a religious strain of the conventional view, some
ism, prostitution, contraception, pornography, and sex acts performed by married partners-acts that
whatever is labeled "sexual perversion." The sec- are incompatible with procreation-are also pro-
ond group of issues involve consent to sexual acts hibited. These acts include masturbation, oral sex,
and violations of consent, or sexual assault, now a anal sex, and sex using contraceptives.
source of excruciating and passionate conflicts on The conventional attitude has been championed
college and university campuses. Transgender per- by Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and has been
sons do not fit easily into either group, since to some vigorously defended in the natural law teachings of
people, their very existence is a moral issue. the Roman Catholic Church. For a long time it was
Unfortunately, people's positions on these ques- the dominant view of sexual ethics in the West, but
tions usually have more to do with their upbring- since the 1960s its influence has faded. In a 2014
ing, religious traditions, or cultural background public opinion poll, 66 percent of respondents said
than with plausible moral arguments. So let's see they believe it morally acceptable for a man and
what critical thinking can tell us about the ethics woman to have sex before marriage. 1 And whatever
of sexuality. people say they believe about the subject, their actual
behavior is a far cry from the conventional standard.
ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND Research shows that sex before marriage is almost
universal among Americans. By age forty-four, 95
Sexual Behavior 2
percent have had premarital sexual relations.
The central question in the morality of sexual The second answer is the liberal view (not
behavior is, What kind of sexual behavior is mor- to be confused with the political outlook with the
ally permissible, and under what circumstances? same name). Directly counter to the conventional
488
CHAPTER 15: SEXUAL MORALITY 0 489
stance, it says that as long as basic moral stan- love, affection, or mutual caring; for others it's a
dards are respected (for example, no one is harmed commitment to sustaining the relationship. Pro-
or coerced), any sexual activity engaged in by vided that the necessary element is present, both
informed, consenting adults is permissible. Pro- premarital and extramarital sex could be per-
vided that people adhere to the relevant moral mitted, but promiscuous sex would probably be
principles, all kinds of sexual behavior condemned disallowed.
by the conventionalist would be morally accept- As you would expect, the conventionalist and
able, including premarital sex, extramarital sex, the liberal take opposing views on the rightness of
group sex, masturbation, and homosexuality. homosexuality (sexual relations between people
The third answer is the moderate view, of the same sex). The conventionalist denounces it
which says that sex is permissible, whether in as abnormal, unnatural, harmful, or dangerous. It
marriage or not, if the consenting partners have a is always and everywhere wrong. The liberal sees
serious emotional connection. Moral sex does not no morally relevant difference between hetero-
require marriage, but it does entail more than just sexual and homosexual sex. The behavior is mor-
the informed, freely given consent of the people ally permissible if it conforms to legitimate moral
involved. For some, this needed connection is standards and involves consenting adults.
-~
"~
Vital Stats: Sexual Behavior
• By age 20, 77 percent of adults have had sex, and • Among teenagers and young adults (age 1 5-21),
75 percent have had premarital sex. 11 percent of women and 4 percent of men
• By age 44, 94 percent of women and 96 percent have reported a same-sex sexual experience.
of men have had premarital sex. • On average, men experience first intercourse at
• Among adults aged 25-44, 98 percent of women 16.9 years; women at 17.4.
and 97 percent of men have had vaginal inter-
course; 89 percent of women and 90 percent of
men have had oral sex with an opposite-sex part- Statistic from CBSINew York Times Poll, January 11-15,
ner; and 36 percent of women and 44 percent 2009, N = 1,112 adults nationwide, MoE ± 3; The Alan
of men have had anal sex with an opposite-sex Guttmacher Institute, published and unpublished
partner. data, 2002, 2011, www.guttmacher.org (May 3,
2012); Lawrence B. Finer, "Trends in Premarital Sex in
• Half or more of women ages 18 to 39 report giv-
the United States, 1954-2003," Public Health Reports
ing or receiving oral sex in the past 90 days. 122 (January-February 2007), https:llwww.ncbLnlm.
• The sexual repertoires of U.S. adults vary dramat- nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC18021081 (February 16,
ically, with more than 40 combinations of sexual 2015); National Health Statistics Reports, "Sexual
activity described at adults' most recent sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in
event. Adult men and women rarely engage in the United States (2006-2008)," number 36, March 3,
just one sex act when they have sex. 2011; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
"Trends in the Prevalence of Sexual Behaviors,"
• 46 percent of high school students report hav- National YRBS, 1991-2009; compiled data from The
ing sexual intercourse; 14 percent report sexual Kinsey Institute.
intercourse with four or more persons.
All these diverse views are related to issues This level of violence against women has engen-
involving the sale and use of pornography: sexu- dered both moral indignation and fervent action.
ally explicit images or text meant to cause sexual As the author and sociologist Alison E. Hatch says,
excitement or arousal. Many who take a conven-
tional view of sexual morality are likely to favor cen- Sexual assault on college campuses is not a new phe-
nomenon. And unfortunately, statistics indicate it
sorship of pornographic material on the grounds
happens with alarming frequency. The privilege of
that it encourages the very behavior they oppose-
attending an institution of higher learning should
premarital sex, extramarital sex, and unacceptable not, but regrettably does, come with a 1 in 5 chance
sexual behavior. They may oppose pornography a woman, or 1 in 20 chance a man, will be sexually
because they believe it is bad for people and insti- assaulted while in pursuit of a degree. Naturally, in
tutions. Personal and institutional immorality, low- light of such statistics, many people are outraged.
ering of moral standards, decay of religious values Contemporary student activists, taking a page out
and traditions, the undermining of personal vir- of history from antirape activists in the 1970[s] and
1980s, are fighting for change. They are educating
tue, the debasement and subordination of women,
others on the reality of campus sexual assault and
increases in crime and social disorder, psychologi- rape culture, they are fighting for their schools to
cal damage-these and other ills are said to be the be held accountable for their all-tao-often poor
possible results of producing or using pornography. treatment of survivors, and they are fighting for
Those who adopt a liberal view of sexual morality their schools to take sexual assault seriously and
are likely to condone the use of pornography (but hold perpetrators responsible for their actions.
oppose child pornography and underage exposure Some contemporary politicians have entered
the dialogue, fighting for tougher legislation and
to pornography). They may reject claims about the
demanding that schools cease to turn a blind eye to
harm that pornography causes, pOinting to a lack the assaults occurring on their campuses. 4
of supporting evidence for them. Many who argue
against censorship may also appeal to a principle Concerns about sexual violence against college
of individual liberty. They may hold that the only women have increased at a time when the MeToo
legitimate reason for limiting liberty is the preven- movement (expressed as #MeToo on social media)
tion of harm to others. We are free to think, believe, has raised alarms about the prevalence of sexual
say, desire, and choose as we see fit-as long as we harassment and assault against women through-
do not harm our fellow citizens. out society. This influential movement began in
2006 and shocked audiences online and in the
Ca:mpus Sexual Assault
mainstream in 2017 when several famous actresses
SOciologists, psychologists, and journalists who spoke up about sexual harassment they had expe-
study sexual Violence have uncovered an unset- rienced in the film industry. Social media posts
tling fact that has for years been hidden in plain about sexual violence with the hash tag #MeToo
sight: sexual assault against college and university still appear frequently.
women on campus is shockingly common, and There is also a growing awareness that sexual
often responses to it by both government officials assault can have serious psychological and physical
and school administrators have been remarkably affects. In addition to physical injuries caused by
ill-informed, naIve, even callous. A statistic that forcible rape, sexual assault can lead to PTSD (post-
has been regularly misunderstood or misused, but traumatic stress disorder), depression, and thoughts
well supported by research is that one in five female of suicide. Incapacitated rape-rape while the victim
undergraduates will be sexually assaulted while is unconscious or intoxicated-can induce the same
attending college. 3 kind of psychological harm.
of sexual assault. The journalist Vanessa Grigoria-

dis says that the chief cause is college life itself:
QUICI< REVIEW
We're better off focusing on what is largely causing
conventional view (of sexuality)-The idea that sexual assault: the number of times that one comes
sex is morally acceptable only between a man into contact with acquaintances or, in particular,
and a woman who are legally married to each what sociologists call "in-network strangers," often at
other. a party or at an off-campus apartment. An in-network
stranger is the friend of a friend from the next dorm
liberal view (of sexuality)-The idea that as long over, someone's brother visiting for the weekend,
as basic moral standards are respected, any sex- a guy who strikes up a conversation with you in the
ual activity engaged in by informed, consent- library stacks. . . . [A]t college, although students
ing adults is permissible. perceive themselves as being among peers, they are
moderate view (of sexuality)-The idea that sex is actually surrounded by strangers. The risk is college
permissible, whether in marriage or not, if the itself, as defined in the popular imagination, those
heavenly expanses of pretty quads, homecoming
consenting partners have a serious emotional
games, and rowdy frats. 5
connection.
homosexuality-Sexual relations between people One part of college life that is strongly linked to
of the same sex. sexual assault is partying. As Grigoriadis explains,
pornography-Sexually explicit images or text A small cohort of students used to spend their col-
meant to cause sexual excitement or arousal. lege years in a YOLO haze; sociologists now think
many undergrads do so. Given this environment,
the term acquaintance rape, which replaced date rape
in colloquial language long ago-date rape sounded
Part of the difficulty of grappling with this topic too romantic-has been shifted to the side by some
is that the terms sexual assault and rape are fre- experts by another, more specific phrase: party rape.
quently misunderstood, and sometimes equated. This means the assault comes after a social, sexual-
They are distinct. Rape is the penetration of the ized atmosphere, even if it doesn't happen between
vagina or anus with any body part or object, or a girl and a guy she likes. 6
the penetration of the mouth by the sex organ Some observers think that a lot of the blame
of another person, without the consent (verbal for the sexual assault phenomenon should be laid
or nonverbal) of the victim. Legally and morally, on campus hookup culture. Today's college students
consent cannot be given when the victim is forced, seldom have traditional dates as their parents
harmed, threatened, or tricked; neither can con- did; instead, they hookup-they have no-strings-
sent be assumed when the victim is silent, uncon- attached sexual encounters disconnected from the
scious, drunk, drugged, underage, or mentally or messiness of romantic commitments. One worry
physically disabled. Sexual intercourse with an is that hookups naturally seem to involve alcohol,
unconscious victim is rape. and alcohol is a risk factor for sexual assault. And
Sexual assault is a broader term, which includes some are concerned that hookup culture dilutes
rape as well as nonpenetrative sexual acts such as a sense of personal responsibility for any nega-
attempted rape, forced kissing, and unwanted groping tive ramifications of sex and shields perpetrators
of sexual parts. Sexual assault, then, is not a synonym of assault from blame for the harm they cause.
for rape, although some people assume that it is. On the other hand, campus sexual assaults have
Research has identified many of the factors asso- been happening for decades without the help of
ciated with college life that increase the likelihood hookup culture.
Research shows that the perpetrators of sexual educational institution receiving federal funds. If a
assault are almost all male, whether the gender of school violates Title IX, it could lose that funding.
their victims is male or female. As Hatch says, Sexual assault is considered a form of discrimina-
tion that interferes with the victim's equal right
The vast majority, approximately 90 percent, of to an education, so Title IX applies. The statute, as
campus sexual assaults are perpetrated by someone
interpreted by the U.S. Department of Education,
a victim knows. Typically, assailants are boyfriends,
exboyfriends, classmates, acquaintances, cowork-
requires schools to stop campus sexual assault, pre-
ers, or friends. For some survivors, knowing their vent future occurrences, adjudicate the competing
perpetrator complicates their decisions to report claims of supposed victim and assailant, and mete
the assault to officials and likely plays a role in the out justice for both.
overall low report rates. Other possible risk factors Under this system, survivors of sexual assault
for assailants include men who hold negative atti- who think their school's response is inadequate or
tudes toward women, accept rape mythS, consume unjust can file a complaint with the U.S. Depart-
violent/degrading pornography, are controlling,
ment of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR),
lack empathy, and/or perceive a lack of sanctions
for abusive behavior. 7 which then must investigate the school's handling
of the allegations. An alternative is to sue their
Aside from the activities of activists and sur- school under Title IX.
vivors, the single most powerful influence on But there is considerable skepticism among
how sexual assault is handled at u.s. colleges and survivors and activists about the ability of colleges
universities has been Title IX, a federal law that and universities to deal effectively with charges of
forbids discrimination based on gender in any sexual assault. As Hatch says,
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Proving Sexual Assault
Sexual assault is maddeningly difficult to prove. Most court cases and formerly at some schools, is the "clear
campus sexual assaults are not reported; when and convincing" rule, which requires a much higher
they are, few of the accused are judged guilty likelihood (perhaps as high as 70 percent) that the
(responsible); and of the few judged guilty, even accused did in fact commit sexual assault. Critics
fewer are ever punished. The victims' suffering is argue that the preponderance standard introduces
often compounded because they believe they have considerable doubt about the verdict and den-
been denied justice. But many of the accused make ies the accused a fair and just hearing. Many victims
the same claim; they, too, think they have been believe that the higher standard would allow only
treated unjustly. They believe that at least part a tiny percentage of guilty verdicts. {Recently, the
of this injustice stems from the rules of evidence Department of Education has sought to weaken the
that the OCR has required schools to follow. The requirement to use the preponderance standard.}
rules are based on a "preponderance of evidence" Which standard of evidence is more just in
standard. By this criterion, a school hearing or panel campus sexual assault cases? Why? Does the pre-
can find the accused responsible even if it is only ponderance of evidence standard presume that
slightly more likely than not that he has committed false allegations are rare? Does the fact that sexual
a wrongful act-that is, a likelihood of only 50.1 assault is hard to prove justify the use of the pre-
percent. The alternative standard, one used in many ponderance standard?
Many campus sexual assault survivors believe that called "affirmative consent." In this approach, sex-
their college or university failed to take their sexual ual activity must begin with a crystal-clear verbal yes
assault seriously. Survivors have reported all kinds
of institutional mismanagement, at a range of dif-
or an equally unambiguous nonverbal yes (such as
ferent colleges and universities across the nation, sounds of pleasure or removal of clothing). This yes
including experiencing the following from campus must precede each phase of action, from kissing to
officials: callousness, disbelief, defamation, retri- fondling to penetration and beyond. Some interpret
bution for reporting, failure to provide support and affirmative consent as a series of awkward interrup-
protection, failure to hold perpetrators responSible, tions and step-by-step formalities, but others think
and efforts to cover up allegations .... it can be practiced in a smoother, less burdensome
The existing research on school responses largely
way. In any case, affirmative consent is now stan-
supports the criticisms that universities and col-
leges are not holding perpetrators accountable. 8 dard policy in hundreds of schools, and it has been
signed into law in New York, California, and Illinois.
Moral questions surface at every turn in these "Yes means yes," however, does have critics.
cases, but mostly concern (1) whether and how They object to what some regard as its mood-killing
justice is served after a sexual assault occurs and awkwardness, and they worry about the inherent
(2) whether the requirement of consent is met in fuzziness of nonverbal cues; the risk of misinterpre-
any kind of sexual encounter. The first concern tation is high. They must admit, though, that there is
focuses on how the college or university handles more clarity in "yes means yes" than "no means no."
an allegation of assault and how it treats the per-
son claiming assault as well as the accused. One
flash point here is how the evidence for assault MORAL THEORIES
is weighed, a question that often arises in an
atmosphere in which complainants demand to Major moral theories have important implications
be believed and defendants charge that proce- for the morality of sexual behavior. As we have seen
dures are biased against them (see the box Critical (in Chapter 6), natural law theory holds that right
Thought: Proving Sexual Assault). actions are those directed toward the aims revealed
The second concern is crucial because without in nature. According to the Roman Catholic
clear consent by both individuals, a hookup is, by account of the theory, because procreation is fore-
definition, sexual assault. The requirement of con- most among these aims, actions consistent with it
sent is that in sexual activity, mutual consent (per- are permissible and actions incompatible with it are
mission to engage in sex) must be clear and freely forbidden. Sexual intercourse between a man and a
granted (without coercion, violence, or threats) by woman is the supreme act of procreation, and mar-
individuals capable of giving consent (not drunk, riage provides the necessary stable context to nur-
drugged, or underage, for example). ture the fruits of procreation-children. Thus, only
The long-standing policy on college campuses sex between a man and a woman joined by marriage
regarding consent has been "no means no," which can be morally legitimate. The Vatican declares:
says essentially that sexual activity can proceed Experience teaches us that love must find its safe-
until one partner says no. Sexual activity that takes guard in the stability of marriage, if sexual intercourse
place beyond that point is assault. The problem is truly to respond to the requirements of its own
with this standard is that silence alone or lack of finality and to those of human dignity. These require-
resistance does not necessarily mean yes, and when ments call for a conjugal contract sanctioned and
guaranteed by society-a contract which establishes
people are intimidated, fearful, or threatened, they
a state of life of capital importance both for the exclu-
may feel that they cannot say no. A better standard, sive union of the man and the woman and for the
some experts say, is "yes means yes," or what is good of their family and of the human community.9
Premarital sex is, therefore, proscribed, as is contra- On the issue of sexual assault, it's easy to see
ception and sexual activity not directed at procreation, how both consequentialist and nonconsequen-
such as oral sex, masturbation, and homosexuality. tialist theories would condemn any such act. By
Although Immanuel Kant favored a conven- virtually any calculation of utility, sexual vio-
tional approach to sex and marriage, some thinkers lence would be counted as an instance of seriously
have derived from his theory a liberal view of sexual immoral action. And as an action against a person
ethics. Recall Kant's dictum that we must always without his or her consent, sexual assault is, on
treat people as ends in themselves, never merely as a almost any nonconsequentialist view, a violation of
means to an end. Thomas Mappes says that to treat the rights of personhood.
someone merely, or solely, as a means is to use that
person, to treat that person without the respect that MORAL ARGUMENTS
they deserve. He defines using another person as vio-
lating the requirement that interactions with that The key difference between the conventional and
person be based on her voluntary informed con- the liberal view of sexuality is that the former
sent. This implies that "using another person (in the insists that sexual behavior has a morally signifi-
morally significant sense) can arise in at least two cant goal, and the latter assumes that sex has no
ways: via coercion, which is antithetical to voluntary goal at all. This, anyway, is the central premise
consent, and via deception, which undermines the in an argument for sexual liberalism put forth by
informed character of voluntary consent."lO Alan Goldman. He says that several faulty theories
According to these guidelines, any sexual activ- of sexuality are based on the idea that sex's rightful
ity in which one person deceives or coerces another goal is procreation, communication, or the expres-
is wrong. But when the principle of voluntary sion of love and that "sex which does not fit one
informed consent is respected, a broad range of of these models or fulfill one of these functions is
sexual practices is permissible. in some way deviant or incomplete."l1 The Roman
A utilitarian is likely to sanction many kinds of Catholic view, for example, is that homosexuality,
sexual activity on the grounds that they produce masturbation, and oral or anal sex are not aimed
the greatest overall happiness or good for all con- at the prescribed goal of procreation and are there-
cerned. Sexual behavior that results in the great- fore immoral or perverted. Goldman, however,
est net good (the greatest utility) is morally right rejects this goal-directed (or, as he says, "means-
regardless of whether it is unconventional, "unnat- end") analysis of sex. He maintains instead that
ural," deViant, marital, extramarital, procreative, or sex is not a means to some other goal-sex is just
recreational. "plain sex." Sexual desire, he says, is "desire for
Maximizing utility in sexual matters, how- contact with another person's body and for the
ever, requires weighing many possible harms and pleasure which such contact produces .... "
benefits. Those involved in a sexual relationship The desire for physical contact with another person
may risk sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy, is a minimal criterion for (normal) sexual desire, but
emotional distress (such as humiliation, disap- is both necessary and sufficient to qualify normal
pointment, or guilt), disruptions in family life (as a desire as sexual. Of course, we may want to express
result of adultery, for example), and social or legal other feelings through sexual acts in various con-
texts; but without the desire for the physical con-
censure. But they may also experience a great deal
tact in and for itself, or when it is sought for other
of sexual pleasure, attain a sense of well~being and reasons, activities in which contact is involved are
psychological satisfaction, and forge strong bonds not predominantly sexual. Furthermore, the desire
of affection and mutual caring. for physical contact in itself, without the wish to
express affection or other feelings through it, is physical events; they involve the commingling of
sufficient to render sexual the activity of the agent persons' spiritual and moral selves. As such, they
which fulfills it. 12
express and affirm moral values, and the right kind
Sexual pleasure, he says, is what is most valuable of sex expresses and affirms the right kind of val-
about sex, and pleasure is intrinsically valuable. So ues (specifically, the conventional values of mutual
sex does not need to be assigned some larger goal or commitment through marriage). Sex that is devoid
purpose. On this point, Igor Primoratz agrees: of these values is morally deficient or perverse.
One of the more contentious-and divisive-
We have no reason to believe that there is only one
issues in sexual ethics is homosexuality. The most
morally acceptable aim or purpose of human sexual
experience and behavior, whether prescribed by heated arguments concern whether homosexual
nature or enjoined by society ... Sex has no special behavior is immoral, and many of these arguments
moral significance; it is morally neutral. No act is center around the charge that homosexuality is
either morally good or bad, right or wrong, merely unnatural or abnormal.
in virtue of being a sexual act .... Accordingly, there Some people take unnatural to mean something
is neither need nor room for a set of moral consid- like "not commonly done by animals." If homo-
erations that apply only to sex and constitute sexual
morality in the strict sense of the terms. What does
sexual behavior is not found among animals in
apply to choices, acts, and practices in the field of sex nature, then it is unnatural and, therefore, morally
are the same moral rules and principles that apply in unacceptable. But biologists and others dispute this
nonsexual matters. J3 contention. For example:
We know that in species after species, right through
Goldman and Primoratz do not affirm that
the animal kingdom, students of animal behavior
sexual behavior can never be immoral, only that report unambiguous evidence of homosexual attach-
it cannot be immoral merely because it is sexual. If ments and behavior-in insects, fish, birds, and lower
sexual behavior is immoral, it is so because it vio- and higher mammals .... Whatever the moral impli-
lates moral principles or rules that apply to any cations of homosexuality and naturalness may be, it
other kinds of actions. "Our first conclusion regard- is false that homosexuality is immoral because it does
ing morality and sex," Goldman says, "is therefore not exist amongst animals. IS
that no conduct otherwise immoral should be For many who denounce homosexuality, unnat-
excused because it is sexual conduct, and nothing ural means "out of the norm," "a deviation from
in sex is immoral unless condemned by rules which the usual pattern," and this unnaturalness is reason
apply elsewhere as well.,,14 enough to call homosexual behavior immoral. A
According to Goldman, the views that posit a common counterargument is that it does not fol-
proper goal for sex (the means-end analyses) inevi- low from an action's statistical abnormality that
tably fall into inconsistency. For example, the sex- it is immoral. Many acts are statistically out of
as-procreation theory condemns oral-genital sex the norm-skydiving, composing operas, eating
(because it is not a reproductive function) yet fails snails-but we do not necessarily think them mor-
to denounce kissing or handholding, which are ally wrong.
also sexual but not reproductive. While acknowledging the weaknesses of the
As you would expect, those who champion foregOing definitions, some conventionalists offer
conventional sexual morality reject "plain sex" more sophisticated abnormality arguments. Con-
arguments. They hold that sexual encounters have sider this line of reasoning:
a deeper, more significant meaning than sexual lib- This paper defends the view that homosexuality is
erals would admit. Sexual experiences are not just abnormal and hence undesirable-not because it is
~>-- -
immoral or sinful, or because it weakens society or and (2) those that concern an individual's free con-
hampers evolutionary development, but for a purely sent to such acts. Regarding the first kind of issue,
mechanical reason. It is a misuse of bodily parts. the key question is, What kind of sexual behavior is
Clear empirical sense attaches to the idea of the use morally permissible, and under what circumstances?
of such bodily parts as genitals, the idea that they The most common answers are: (1) sex is permissible
are for something, and consequently to the idea of only in a marriage between a man and a woman (the
their misuse. I argue on grounds involving natural
conventional view); (2) sex is permissible between
selection that misuse of bodily parts can with high
probability be connected to unhappiness .... I ... informed, consenting adults (the liberal view); and
draw a seemingly evident corollary from my view (3) sex is permissible between informed, consenting
that homosexuality is abnormal and likely to lead to adults who are bound by love or commitment (the
unhappiness. 16 moderate view).
Natural law theory offers a conventional account
The argument here is that homosexuality is of sexual morality, exemplified by Roman Catholic
a misuse of a bodily part-specifically, the penis, teachings on the subject. Premarital and extramarital
which is for injecting sperm into the vagina, not for sex are forbidden, as well as contraception, oral and
the abnormal functions that gay men prefer. This anal sex, masturbation, and homosexuality. A liberal
misuse leads to unhappiness because it frustrates view of sexual ethics can be derived from Kantian
"an innately rewarding desire." Society has an theory; this view says that any sexual activity in which
interest in promoting happiness; and since homo- one person deceives or coerces another is wrong, but
sexuality makes for unhappiness, society ought to when the principle of voluntary informed consent is
discourage it by not legalizing it. respected, a broad range of sexual practices is permis-
A typical rejoinder to this argument is that sible. Utilitarianism is likely to endorse many kinds
evolutionary adaptations, whatever their form, of sexual activity on the grounds that they maximize
tell us nothing about how people ought to behave. utility.
Just because blind accidents of nature have shaped Some philosophers reject the idea that sex's right-
ful goal is procreation, communication, or the expres-
humans in a particular way, that doesn't mean
sion of love. This goal-oriented view implies that sex
peqple are obligated to stay as they are. As one phi-
that does not aim at one of these objectives is deviant
losopher puts it, "Human beings are completely at
or incomplete. But for many sexual liberals, sex does
liberty to dispose of their work, their behavior, and
not have a lofty goal; its value is simply the sexual
even such things as their anatomy and physiology
pleasure that comes from physical contact. Pleasure is
as they see fit.,,17 Contrary to natural law theory,
intrinsically valuable, so a further goal for sexual acts
knowing how nature is tells us nothing about how
is not needed.
we ought to be. A common charge against homosexuality is that
it is unnatural or abnormal. People rebut these claims
by trying to show that they are unfounded or con-
fused, or by arguing that abnormality does not imply
immorality.
CHAPTER REVIEW The second kind of moral issue involves con-
sent to sexual acts and violations of consent, or sex-
ual assault, a topic of major interest on college and
SUMMARY
university campuses. Rape is the penetration of the
The moral issues relating to sexuality are of two vagina or anus with any body part or object, or the
kinds: (1) those that focus on the morality of specific penetration of the mouth by the sex organ of another
types of sexual acts and the context of those acts, person, without the consent (verbal or nonverbal) of
the victim. Sexual assault is a broader term, which 9. What is the argument that Goldman offers against
includes rape as well as non penetrative sexual acts the goal-directed view of sex? (pp. 494-95)
such as attempted rape, forced kissing, and unwanted 10. What are the arguments for and against the
groping of sexual parts. claim that homosexuality is unnatural and
The moral questions mostly concern (1) whether therefore immoral? (pp. 495-96)
and how justice is served after a sexual assault occurs
and (2) whether the requirement of consent is met
Discussio1l Questions
in any kind of sexual encounter. The first question
applies to how a college or university handles an alle- 1. What is the difference between the
gation of assault and how it treats the person claim- conventional and the moderate view of
ing assault as well as the accused. One flash point here sexual behavior? Which approach seems more
is how the evidence for assault is weighed, a question plausible?
that often arises in an atmosphere in which complain- 2. On what grounds would a utilitarian sanction or
ants demand to be believed and defendants charge condemn particular kinds of sexual activity? Do
that procedures are biased against them. you ever use the utilitarian perspective to assess
the morality of sexual acts? If so, how?
3. What is goal-directed sexual activity? Why do
I<EY TERMS Goldman and Primoratz reject this view of sex?
conventional view (of sexuality) (p. 488) 4. On the conventional view of sex, sexual
liberal view (of sexuality) (pp. 488-89) behavior has a morally significant goal. What
moderate view (of sexuality) (p. 489) does this statement mean? Do you agree? Why
homosexuality (p. 489) or why not?
pornography (p. 490) 5. Which view of sexual behavior (conventional,
liberal, or moderate) comes closest to your
own perspective? What are your reasons for
EXERCISES favoring it?
Review Questio1ls 6. What does consent have to do with
determining whether sexual assault has
1. What is the conventional moral view of sex? Occurred?
(p.488) 7. What factors do you think most influence the
2. What is the difference between the liberal view incidence of sexual assault on campus? Do you
and the moderate view of sexual behavior? think hookup or partying culture has an effect?
(p.489) Explain.
3. What is homosexuality, and what is the 8. How has Title IX influenced the way colleges
conventionalist view of it? (p. 489) and universities deal with sexual assault?
4. What is sexual assault? What is rape? (p. 491) 9. Research shows that most campus sexual
5. Is campus sexual assault a rare occurrence or a assaults happen early in the first year of college.
common one? (p. 490) Does this fact suggest any particular precautions
6. Typically, what are the characteristics of a or behavior changes that freshmen should take
perpetrator of campus sexual assault? (p. 492) into account?
7. What is the campus policy known as "yes means 10. Do you think that the "yes means yes" standard
yes"? (p. 493) for ensuring consensual sex is reasonable? Does
8. What is the view of sexuality according following this standard make sex awkward or
to the Catholic version of natural law less enjoyable? Is it superior to the "no means
theory? (p. 493) no" approach?
FURTHER READING Alison E. Hatch, Campus Sexual Assault (Santa Barbara,

C. Bohmer, Sexual Assault on Campus: The Problem and the CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017).
Solution (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1993). Catherine Kaukinen, Michelle Hughes Miller, and
A. Clark and A. Pino, We Believe You: Survivors of Campus Rachael A. Powers, eds., Addressing Violence against
Sexual Assault Speak Out (New York: Henry Holt and Women on College Campuses (Philadelphia: Temple Uni-
Company, 2016). versity Press, 2017).
K. Dick and A. Ziering, The Hunting Ground: The Inside R. Maimo, ed., Perspectives on Col/ege Sexual Assault (New
Story of Sexual Assault on American College Campuses York: Springer Publishing, 2015).
(New York: Skyhorse, 2016). Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (New York:
Vanessa Grigoriadis, Blurred Lines: Rethinking Sex, Power, Penguin, 2017).
and Consent (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2017).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Avoiding Morality in Sex Lessons

London (The Sunday Times)-Parents should avoid trying to convince their teenage
children of the difference between right and wrong when talking to them about
sex, a new government leaflet is to advise.
Instead, any discussion of values should be kept "light" to encourage teenagers
to form their own views, according to the brochure, which one critic has called
"amoral."
"Talking to Your Teenager About Sex and Relationships" will be distributed in
pharmacies from next month as part of an initiative led by Beverley Hughes, the
children's minister.
The leaflet comes in the wake of the case of Alfie Patten, the 13-year-old boy
from East Sussex who fathered a child with a 15-year-old girl and sparked a debate
about how to cut rates of teenage parenthood.
It advises: "Discussing your values with your teenagers will help them to form
their own. Remember, though, that trying to convince them of what's right and
wrong may discourage them from being open."*
Should parents keep issues of right and wrong not? In school sex education, should discussions of
out of discussions about sex with their children? ethics be forbidden? Is ethics irrelevant to contem-
Should parents convey the idea that right and porary sexual behavior?
wrong has nothing to do with sex? Why or why
*jack Grimston, "Parents Told: Avoid Morality in Sex Lessons," Times Online, February 22,2009. Reprinted
by permission of News licenSing.
2. Premarital Abstinence Pledges

(Washington PostJ-Teenagers who pledge to remain virgins until marriage are just
as likely to have premarital sex as those who do not promise abstinence and are
significantly less likely to use condoms and other forms of birth control when they
do, according to a study released today.
The new analysis of data from a large federal survey found that more than half
of youths became sexually active before marriage regardless of whether they had
taken a "virginity pledge," but that the percentage who took precautions against
pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases was 10 points lower for pledgers than
for non-pledgers. t
Suppose, as this report suggests, abstinence pledges teen pregnancy or STDs have any bearing on the
are ineffective and can reduce condom use and morality of promoting the pledges? Is premarital
increase the risk of teen pregnancy. Would it be sex among teens morally wrong regardless of its
immoral to promote the pledges among teens? physical and social risks? Give reasons for your
Should the effectiveness of the pledges in reducing answers.
tRob Stein, "Premarital Abstinence Pledges Ineffective, Study Finds," from Tile Washington Post, Decem-
ber 29, 2008.
3. Evidence of Sexual Assault

An intense debate is under way about what level of evidence should be required in
campus adjudication hearings to find a student guilty of campus sexual assault. Putative
victims of sexual assault want a minimal standard (a "preponderance of evidence") that
requires only slightly more than 50 percent likelihood of gUilt. Because sexual assault
is so hard to prove, they argue, the lower standard is the most reasonable and just;
otherwise, very few alleged rapists would ever be found gUilty. But the former secretary
of the u.s. Department of Education wanted a higher standard-"clear and convincing"
evidence, which amounts to approximately 70 percent likelihood of guilt.
(New York Times)-Education Secretary Betsy DeVos on Friday scrapped a key part
of government policy on campus sexual assaUlt, saying she was giving colleges more
freedom to balance the rights of accused students with the need to crack down on
serious misconduct.
The move, which involved reScinding two sets of guidelines several years old, was
part of one of the fiercest battles in higher education today, over whether the
Obama administration, in trying to get colleges to take sexual assault more seriously,
had gone too far and created a system that treated the accused unfairly.*
If the lower standard of evidence makes it eas- also allow many blameworthy students to escape
ier to prove the culpability of accused students, blame? Which approach is fairer? Are they both
would it also implicate many blameless students? bad? Explain.
If the higher standard is more just or fair, would it
iStephanie Saul and Kate Taylor, "Betsy DeVos Reverses Obama-Era Policy on Campus Sexual Assault Inves-
tigations," September 22, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/20l7/09/22/us/devos-colleges-sex-assault.html.
READINGS
From Plain Sex

ALAN H. GOLDMAN
I which such contact produces; sexual activity is activ-
ity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent.
* * * Whereas Aristotle and Butler were correct in holding
I shall suggest here that sex continues to be misrep- that pleasure is normally a byproduct rather than a
resented in recent writings, at least in philosophical goal of purposeful action, in the case of sex this is not
writings, and I shall criticize the predominant form so clear. The desire for another's body is, principally
of analysis which I term "means-end analysis." Such among other things, the desire for the pleasure that
conceptions attribute a necessary external goal or pur- physical contact brings. On the other hand, it is not
pose to sexual activity, whether it be reproduction, a desire for a particular sensation detachable from its
the expression of love, simple communication, or causal context, a sensation which can be derived in
interpersonal awareness. They analyze sexual activity other ways. This definition in terms of the general
as a means to one of these ends, implying that sexual goal of sexual desire appears preferable to an attempt
desire is a desire to reproduce, to love or be loved, or to to more explicitly list or define specific sexual activi-
communicate with others. All definitions of this type ties, for many activities such as kissing, embracing,
suggest false views of the relation of sex to perversion massaging, or holding hands mayor may not be sex-
and morality by implying that sex which does not fit ual, depending upon the context and more specifi-
one of these models or fulfill one of these functions is cally upon the purposes, needs, or desires into which
in some way deviant or incomplete. such activities fit. The generality of the definition
The alternative, simpler analysis with which I also represents a refusal (common in recent psycho-
will begin is that sexual desire is desire for contact logical texts) to overemphasize orgasm as the goal of
with another person's body and for the pleasure sexual desire or genital sex as the only norm of sexual
activity (this will be hedged slightly in the discussion
of perversion below).
Alan H. Goldman, "Plain Sex" from Pililosophy and Public Affairs
6(3): 268-75 and 278-87. Copyright <f> 1977 Blackwell Publis'ling Central to the definition is the fact that the goal
Ltd. Reproduced with permission of Blackwell Publishing Ltd. of sexual desire and activity is the physical contact
itself, rather than something else which this contact or protosexual. It will differ nevertheless from full-
might express. By contrast, what I term "means-end fledged sexual desire in being more amorphous, not
analyses" posit ends which I take to be extraneous to directed outward toward another specific person's
plain sex, and they view sex as a means to these ends. body. It may also be that what the infant uncon-
Their fault lies not in defining sex in terms of its gen- sciously desires is not physical contact per se but
eral goal, but in seeing plain sex as merely a means to signs of affection, tenderness, or security, in which
other separable ends. I term these "means-end analy- case we have further reason for hesitating to charac-
ses" for convenience, although "means-separable-end terize its wants as clearly sexual. The intent of our
analyses," while too cumbersome, might be more response to the baby is often the showing of affec-
fully explanatory. The desire for physical contact with tion, not the pure physical contact, so that our defi-
another person is a minimal criterion for (normal) nition in terms of action which fulfils sexual desire
sexual desire, but is both necessary and sufficient to on the part of the agent does not capture such actions,
qualify normal desire as sexual. Of course, we may whatever we say of the baby. (If it is intuitive to char-
want to express other feelings through sexual acts in acterize our response as sexual as well, there is clearly
various contexts; but without the desire for the physi- no problem here for my analysis.) The same can be
cal contact in and for itself, or when it is sought for said of signs of affection (or in some cultures polite
other reasons, activities in which contact is involved greeting) among men or women: these certainly
are not predominantly sexual. Furthermore, the desire need not be homosexual when the intent is only to
for physical contact in itself, without the wish to show friendship, something extrinsic to plain sex
express affection or other feelings through it, is suffi- although valuable when added to it.
cient to render sexual the activity of the agent which Our definition of sex in terms of the desire for
fulfills it. Various activities with this goal alone, such physical contact may appear too narrow in that a
as kissing and caressing in certain contexts, qualify as person's personality, not merely her or his body, may
sexual even without the presence of genital symptoms be sexually attractive to another, and in that look-
of sexual excitement. The latter are not therefore nec- ing or conversing in a certain way can be sexual in a
essary criteria for sexual activity. given context without bodily contact. Nevertheless,
This initial analysis may seem to some either it is not the contents of one's thoughts per se that are
over- or underinclusive. It might seem too broad sexually appealing, but one's personality as embod-
in leading us to interpret physical contact as sexual ied in certain manners of behavior. Furthermore, if a
desire in activities such as football and other contact person is sexually attracted by another's personality,
sports. In these cases, however, the desire is not for he or she will desire not just further conversation,
contact with another body per se, it is not directed but actual sexual contact. While looking at or con-
toward a particular person for that purpose, and it versing with someone can be interpreted as sexual in
is not the goal of the activity-the goal is winning given contexts it is so when intended as preliminary
or exercising or knocking someone down or display- to, and hence parasitic upon, elemental sexual inter-
ing one's prowess. If the desire is purely for contact est. Voyeurism or viewing a pornographic movie
with another specific person's body, then to inter- qualifies as a sexual activity, but only as an imagina-
pret it as sexual does not seem an exaggeration. A tive substitute for the real thing (otherwise a devia-
slightly more difficult case is that of a baby's desire tion from the norm as expressed in our definition).
to be cuddled and our natural response in wanting The same is true of masturbation as a sexual activity
to cuddle it. In the case of the baby, the desire may without a partner.
be simply for the physical contact, for the pleasure That the initial definition indicates at least an
of the caresses. If so, we may characterize this deSire, ingredient of sexual desire and activity is too obvious
especially in keeping with Freudian theory, as sexual to argue. We all know what sex is, at least in obvious
cases, and do not need philosophers to tell us. My past, the ever present possibility of children rendered
preliminary analysis is meant to serve as a contrast to the concepts of sex and sexual morality different
what sex is not, at least, not necessarily. I concentrate from those required at present. There may be good
upon the physically manifested desire for another's reasons, if the presence and care of both mother and
body, and I take as central the immersion in the father are beneficial to children, for restricting repro-
physical aspect of one's own existence and attention duction to marriage. Insofar as society has a legiti-
to the physical embodiment of the other. One may mate role in protecting children's interests, it may be
derive pleasure in a sex act from expressing certain justified in giving marriage a legal status, although
feelings to one's partner or from awareness of the this question is complicated by the fact (among oth-
attitude of one's partner, but sexual desire is essen- ers) that children born to single mothers deserve no
tially desire for physical contact itself: it is a bodily penalties. In any case, the point here is simply that
desire for the body of another that dominates our these questions are irrelevant at the present time to
mental life for more or less brief periods. Traditional those regarding the morality of sex and its potential
writings were correct to emphasize the purely physi- social regulation ....
calor animal aspect of sex; they were wrong only It is obvious that the desire for sex is not neces-
in condemning it. This characterization of sex as sarilya desire to reproduce, that the psychological
an intensely pleasurable physical activity and acute manifestation has become, if it were not always, dis-
physical desire may seem to some to capture only its tinct from its biological roots. There are many par-
barest level. But it is worth distinguishing and focus- allels, as previously mentioned, with other natural
ing upon this least common denominator in order to functions. The pleasures of eating and exercising are
avoid the false views of sexual morality and perver- to a large extent independent of their roles in nour-
sion which emerge from thinking that sex is essen- ishment or health (as the junk-food industry discov-
tially something else. ered with a vengeance). Despite the obvious parallel
with sex, there is still a tendency for many to think
II
that sex acts which can be reproductive are, if not
We may turn then to what sex is not, to the argu- more moral or less immoral, at least more natural.
ments regarding supposed conceptual connections These categories of morality and "naturalness'" or
between sex and other activities which it is necessary normality, are not to be identified with each other,
to conceptually distinguish. The more comprehen- as will be argued below, and neither is applicable to
sible attempt to build an extraneous purpose into sex by virtue of its connection to reproduction. The
the sex act identifies that purpose as reproduction, tendency to identify reproduction as the conceptu-
its primary biological function. While this may be ally connected end of sex is most prevalent now in
"nature's" purpose, it certainly need not be ours (the the pronouncements of the Catholic church. There
analogy with eating, while sometimes overworked, is the assumed analysis is clearly tied to a restrictive
pertinent here). While this identification may once sexual morality according to which acts become
have had a rational basis which also grounded the immoral and unnatural when they are not oriented
identification of the value and morality of sex with towards reproduction, a morality which has inde-
that applicable to reproduction and child rearing, the pendent roots in the Christian sexual ethic as it
development of contraception rendered the connec- derives from Paul. However, the means-end analYSis
tion weak. Methods of contraception are by now so fails to generate a consistent sexual ethic: homosex-
familiar and so widely used that it is not necessary to ual and oral-genital sex is condemned while kissing
dwell upon the changes wrought by these develop- or careSSing, acts equally unlikely to lead in them-
ments in the concept of sex itself and in a rational selves to fertilization, even when properly charac-
sexual ethic dependent upon that concept. In the terized as sexual according to our definition, are not.
III but this is relatively rare in comparison to passing

Before discussing further relations of means-end sexual desires for others; and while the former often
analyses to false or inconsistent sexual ethics and con- indicates a weakness or fault in the marriage relation I
cepts of perversion, I turn to other examples of these the latter does not.
analyses. One common position views sex as essen- If love is indeed more exclusive in its objects than
tially an expression of love or affection between the is sexual desire, this explains why those who view sex
partners. It is generally recognized that there are other as essentially an expression of love would again tend
types of love besides sexual, but sex itself is taken as an to hold a repressive or restrictive sexual ethic. As in
expression of one type, sometimes termed "romantic" the case of reproduction, there may be good reasons
love. 1 VariOUS factors again ought to weaken this iden- for reserving the total commitment of deep love to
tification. First, there are other types of love besides the context of marriage and family-the normal
that which it is appropriate to express sexually, and personality may not withstand additional divisions
"romantic" love itself can be expressed in many other of ultimate commitment and allegiance. There is no
ways. I am not denying that sex can take on height- question that marriage itself is best sustained by a
ened value and meaning when it becomes a vehicle deep relation of love and affection; and even if love
for the expression of feelings of love or tenderness, but is not naturally monogamous, the benefits of family
so can many other usually mundane activities such as units to children provide additional reason to avoid
getting up early to make breakfast on Sunday, clean- serious commitments elsewhere which weaken fam-
ing the house, and so on. Second, sex itself can be used ily ties. It can be argued similarly that monogamous
to communicate many other emotions besides love, sex strengthens families by restricting and at the
and, as I will argue below, can communicate nothing same time guaranteeing an outlet for sexual desire
in particular and still be good sex. in marriage. But there is more force to the argument
On a deeper level, an internal tension is bound that recognition of a clear distinction between sex
to result from an identification of sex, which I have and love in SOCiety would help avoid disastrous mar-
described as a physical-psychological desire , with riages which result from adolescent confusion of the
love as a long-term deep emotional relationship
I two when sexual desire is mistaken for permanent
between two individuals. As this type of relationship, love, and would weaken damaging jealousies which
love is permanent, at least in intent , and more or less arise in marriages in relation to passing sexual desires.
exclusive. A normal person cannot deeply love more The love and affection of a sound marriage certainly
than a few individuals even in a lifetime. We may be differs from the adolescent romantic variety, which
suspicious that those who attempt or claim to love is often a mere substitute for sex in the context of a
many love them weakly if at all. Yet, fleeting sexual repressive sexual ethic.
desire can arise in relation to a variety of other indi- In fact, the restrictive sexual ethic tied to the
viduals one finds sexually attractive. It may even be, means-end analysis in terms of love again has failed
as some have claimed that sexual desire in humans
I to be consistent. At least it has not been applied con-
I
naturally seeks variety, while this is obviously false sistently, but forms part of the double standard which
of love. For this reason, monogamous sex , even if has curtailed the freedom of women. It is predict-
justified, almost always represents a sacrifice or the able in light of this history that some women would
exercise of self-control on the part of the spouses I now advocate using sex as another kind of means I
while monogamous love generally does not. There is as a political weapon or as a way to increase unjustly
no such thing as casual love in the sense in which I denied power and freedom. The inconSistency in the
intend the term "love." It may occasionally happen sexual ethic typically attached to the sex-love analysiS,
that a spouse falls deeply in love with someone else according to which it has generally been taken with a
(especially when sex is conceived in terms of love), grain of salt when applied to men, is simply another
example of the impossibility of tailoring a plausible kissing or holding hands; the communication account
moral theory in this area to a conception of sex which holds voyeurism to be perverted but cannot accom-
builds in conceptually extraneous factors. modate sex acts without much conscious thought or
I am not suggesting here that sex ought never to seductive nonphysical foreplay; the sex-love model
be connected with love or that it is not a more signifi- makes most sexual desire seem degrading or base. The
cant and valuable activity when it is. Nor am I denying first and last condemn extramarital sex on the sound
that individuals need love as much as sex and perhaps but irrelevant grounds that reproduction and deep
emotionally need at least one complete relationship commitment are best confined to family contexts. The
which encompasses both. Just as sex can express love romanticization of sex and the confusion of sexual
and take on heightened significance when it does, desire with love operate in both directions: sex outside
so love is often naturally accompanied by an inter- the context of romantic love is repressed; once it is
mittent desire for sex. But again love is accompanied repressed, partners become more difficult to find and
appropriately by desires for other shared activities as sex becomes romanticized further, out of proportion
well. What makes the desire for sex seem more inti- to its real value for the individual.
mately connected with love is the intimacy which is What all these analyses share in addition to a com-
seen to be a natural feature of mutual sex acts. Like mon form is accordance with and perhaps derivation
love, sex is held to lay one bare psychologically as from the Platonic-Christian moral tradition, accord-
well as physically. Sex is unquestionably intimate, ing to which the animal or purely physical element of
but beyond that the psychological toll often attached humans is the source of immorality, and plain sex in
may be a function of the restrictive sexual ethic itself, the sense I defined it is an expression of this element,
rather than a legitimate apology for it. The intimacy hence in itself to be condemned. All the analyses
involved in love is psychologically consuming in a examined seem to seek a distance from sexual desire
generally healthy way, while the psychological tolls of itself in attempting to extend it conceptually beyond
sexual relations, often including embarrassment as a the physical. The love and communications analyses
correlate of intimacy, are too often the result of arti- seek refinement or intellectualization of the desire;
ficial sexual ethics and taboos. The intimacy involved plain physical sex becomes vulgar, and too straightfor-
in both love and sex is insufficient in any case in light ward sexual encounters without an aura of respectable
of previous pOints to render a means-end analysis in cerebral communicative content are to be avoided.
these terms appropriate. [Robert] Solomon explicitly argues that sex cannot be
a "mere" appetite, his argument being that if it were,
* * * subway exhibitionism and other vulgar forms would
be pleasing. 2 This fails to recognize that sexual desire
can be focused or selective at the same time as being
v physical. Lower animals are not attracted by every
I have now criticized various types of analysiS sharing other member of their species, either. Rancid food
or suggesting a common means-end form. I have sug- forced down one's throat is not pleasing, but that
gested that analyses of this form relate to attempts to certainly fails to show that hunger is not a physical
limit moral or natural sex to that which fulfills some appetite. Sexual desire lets us know that we are physi-
purpose or function extraneous to basic sexual desire. cal beings and, indeed, animals; this is why traditional
The attempts to brand forms of sex outside the ideal- Platonic morality is so thorough in its condemnation.
ized models as immoral or perverted fail to achieve Means-end analyses continue to reflect this tradition,
consistency with intuitions that they themselves do sometimes unwittingly. They show that in conceptu-
not directly question. The reproductive model brands alizing sex it is still difficult, despite years of so-called
oral-genital sex a deviation, but cannot account for revolution in this area, to free ourselves from the
lingering suspicion that plain sex as physical desire is in sex is immoral unless condemned by rules which
an expression of our "lower selves," that yielding to apply elsewhere as well. The last clause requires fur-
our animal natures is subhuman or vulgar. ther clarification. Sexual conduct can be governed by
particular rules relating only to sex itself. But these
precepts must be implied by general moral rules when
VI these are applied to specific sexual relations or types
Having criticized these analyses for the sexual ethics of conduct. The same is true of rules of fair business,
and concepts of perversion they imply, it remains to ethical mediCine, or courtesy in driving a car. In the
contrast my account along these lines. To the question latter case, particular acts on the road may be repre-
of what morality might be implied by my analysis, the hensible, such as tailgating or passing on the right,
answer is that there are no moral implications what- which seem to bear no resemblance as actions to any
ever. Any analysis of sex which imputes a moral char- outside the context of highway safety. Neverthe-
acter to sex acts in themselves is wrong for that reason. less their immorality derives from the fact that they
There is no morality intrinsic to sex, although general place others in danger, a circumstance which, when
moral rules apply to the treatment of others in sex acts aVOidable, is to be condemned in any context. This
as they apply to all human relations. We can speak structure of general and speCifically applicable rules
of a sexual ethic as we can speak of a business ethic, describes a reasonable sexual ethic as well. To take an
without implying that business in itself is either moral extreme case, rape is always a sexual act and it is always
or immoral or that special rules are required to judge immoral. A rule against rape can therefore be consid-
business practice which are not derived from rules ered an obvious part of sexual morality which has no
that apply elsewhere as well. Sex is not in itself a moral bearing on nonsexual conduct. But the immorality of
category, although like business it invariably places rape derives from its being an extreme violation of a
us into relations with others in which moral rules person's body, of the right not to be humiliated, and
apply. It gives us opportunity to do what is otherwise of the general moral prohibition against using other
recognized as wrong, to harm others, deceive them or persons against their wills, not from the fact that it is
manipulate them against their wills. Just as the fact a sexual act.
that an act is sexual in itself never renders it wrong or The application elsewhere of general moral rules
adds to its wrongness if it is wrong on other grounds to sexual conduct is further complicated by the fact
(sexual acts towards minors are wrong on other that it will be relative to the particular desires and
grounds, as will be argued below), so no wrong act is preferences of one's partner (these may be influenced
to be excused because done from a sexual motive. If a by and hence in some sense include misguided beliefs
"crime of passion" is to be excused, it would have to be about sexual morality itself). This means that there
on grounds of temporary insanity rather than sexual will be fewer specific rules in the area of sexual eth-
context (whether insanity does constitute a legitimate ics than in other areas of conduct, such as driving
excuse for certain actions is too big a topiC to argue cars, where the relativity of preference is irrelevant
here). Sexual motives are among others which may to the prohibition of objectively dangerous conduct.
become deranged, and the fact that they are sexual has More reliance will have to be placed upon the general
no bearing in itself on the moral character, whether moral rule, which in this area holds simply that the
negative or exculpatory, of the actions deriving from preferences, desires, and interests of one's partner or
them. Whatever might be true of war, it is certainly potential partner ought to be taken into account. This
not the case that all's fair in love or sex. rule is certainly not specifically formulated to govern
Our first conclusion regarding morality and sex is sexual relations; it is a form of the central principle
therefore that no conduct otherwise immoral should of morality itself. But when applied to sex, it prohib-
be excused because it is sexual conduct, and nothing its certain actions, such as molestation of children,
which cannot be categorized as violations of the rule partner for one's own pleasure, which might appear to
without at the same time being classified as sexual. I be prohibited on the formulation of Kant's principle
believe this last case is the closest we can come to an which holds that one ought not to treat another as a
action which is wrong because it is sexual, but even means to such private ends. A more realistic rendering
here its wrongness is better characterized as deriv- of this formulation, however, one which recognizes
ing from the detrimental effects such behavior can its intended equivalence to the first universalizabil-
have on the future emotional and sexual life of the ity principle, admits no such absolute prohibition.
naive victims, and from the fact that such behavior Many human relations, most economic transactions
therefore involves manipulation of innocent persons for example, involve using other individuals for per-
without regard for their interests. Hence, this case sonal benefit. These relations are immoral only when
also involves violation of a general moral rule which they are one-sided, when the benefits are not mutual,
applies elsewhere as well. or when the transactions are not freely and rationally
Aside from faulty conceptual analyses of sex and endorsed by all parties. The same holds true of sexual
the influence of the Platonic moral tradition, there acts. The central principle governing them is the Kan-
are two more plausible reasons for thinking that tian demand for reciprocity in sexual relations. In
there are moral dimensions intrinsic to sex acts per order to comply with the second formulation of the
se. The first is that such acts are normally intensely categorical imperative, one must recognize the subjec-
pleasurable. According to a hedonistic, utilitarian tivity of one's partner (not merely by being aroused by
moral theory they therefore should be at least prima her or his desire, as [Thomas] Nagel describes). Even
facie morally right, rather than morally neutral in in an act which by its nature "objectifies" the other,
themselves. To me this seems incorrect and reflects one recognizes a partner as a subject with demands
unfavorably on the ethical theory in question. The and desires by yielding to those desires, by allowing
pleasure intrinsic to sex acts is a good, but not, it oneself to be a sexual object as well, by giving pleasure
seems to me, a good with much positive moral sig- or ensuring that the pleasures of the acts are mutual.
nificance. Certainly I can have no duty to pursue It is this kind of reciprocity which forms the basis for
such pleasure myself, and while it may be nice to give morality in sex, which distinguishes right acts from
pleasure of any form to others, there is no ethical wrong in this area as in others. (Of course, prior to
requirement to do so, given my right over my own sex acts one must gauge their effects upon potential
body. The exception relates to the context of sex acts partners and take these longer range interests into
themselves, when one partner derives pleasure from account.)
the other and ought to return the favor. This duty to
reCiprocate takes us out of the domain of hedonistic VII
utilitarianism, however, and into a Kantian moral I suggested earlier that in addition to generating
framework, the central prinCiples of which call for confusion regarding the rightness or wrongness of
just such reciprocity in human relations. Since inde- sex acts, false conceptual analyses of the means-end
pendent moral judgments regarding sexual activities form cause confusion about the value of sex to the
constitute one area in which ethical theories are to be individual. My account recognizes the satisfaction
tested, these observations indicate here, as I believe of desire and the pleasure this brings as the central
others indicate elsewhere, the fertility of the Kantian, psychological function of the sex act for the individ-
as opposed to the utilitarian, principles in reconstruct- ual. Sex affords us a paradigm of pleasure, but not a
ing reasoned moral consciousness. cornerstone of value. For most of us it is not only a
It may appear from this alternative Kantian view- needed outlet for desire but also the most enjoyable
pOint that sexual acts must be at least prima facie form of recreation we know. Its value is nevertheless
wrong in themselves. This is because they invariably easily mistaken by being confused with that of love,
involve at different stages the manipulation of one's when it is taken as essentially an expression of that
emotion. Although intense, the pleasures of sex are communicating (or unsuccessful seduction attempts
brief and repetitive rather than cumulative. They would be perverted). It is a deviation from a norm, but
give value to the specific acts which generate them, the norm in question is merely statistical. Of course,
but not the lasting kind of value which enhances not all sexual acts that are statistically unusual are
one's whole life. The briefness of these pleasures con- perverted-a three-hour continuous sexual act would
tributes to their intensity (or perhaps their intensity be unusual but not necessarily abnormal in the requi-
makes them necessarily brief), but it also relegates site sense. The abnormality in question must relate to
them to the periphery of most rational plans for the the form ofthe desire itself in order to constitute sexual
good life. perversion; for example, desire, not for contact with
By contrast, love typically develops over a long another, but for merely looking, for harming or being
term relation; while its pleasures may be less intense harmed, for contact with items of clothing. This con-
and physical, they are of more cumulative value. cept of sexual abnormality is that suggested by my
The importance of love to the individual may well definition of normal sex in terms of its typical desire.
be central in a rational system of value. And it has However not all unusual desires qualify either, only
perhaps an even deeper moral significance relating those with the typical physical sexual effects upon
to the identification with the interests of another the individual who satisfies them. These effects, such
person, which broadens one's possible relationships as erection in males, were not built into the original
with others as well. Marriage is again important in definition of sex in terms of sexual desire, for they do
preserving this relation between adults and children, not always occur in activities that are properly charac-
which seems as important to the adults as it is to the terized as sexual, say, kissing for the pleasure of it. But
children in broadening concerns which have a ten- they do seem to bear a closer relation to the definition
dency to become selfish. Sexual desire, by contrast, of activities as perverted. (For those who consider only
is desire for another which is nevertheless essentially genital sex sexual, we could build such symptoms into
self-regarding. Sexual pleasure is certainly a good for a narrower definition, then speaking of sex in a broad
the individual, and for many it may be necessary in sense as well as "proper" sex.)
order for them to function in a reasonably cheerful Solomon and Nagel disagree with this statisti-
way. But it bears little relation to those other values cal notion of perversion. For them the concept is
just discussed, to which some analyses falsely suggest evaluative rather than statistical. I do not deny that
a conceptual connection. the term "perverted" is often used evaluatively (and
purely emotively for that matter), or that it has a neg-
ative connotation for the average speaker. I do deny
VIII that we can find a norm, other than that of statisti-
While my initial analysis lacks moral implications in cally usual deSire, against which all and only activi-
itself, as it should, it does suggest by contrast a concept ties that properly count as sexual perversions can be
of sexual perversion. Since the concept of perversion is contrasted. Perverted sex is simply abnormal sex,
itself a sexual concept, it will always be defined relative and if the norm is not to be an idealized or romanti-
to some definition of normal sex; and any conception cized extraneous end or purpose, it must express the
of the norm will imply a contrary notion of perverse way human sexual desires usually manifest them-
forms. The concept suggested by my account again selves. Of course not all norms in other areas of dis-
differs sharply from those implied by the means-end course need be statistical in this way. PhYSical health
analyses examined above. Perversion does not rep- is an example of a relatively clear norm which does
resent a deviation from the reproductive function not seem to depend upon the numbers of healthy
(or kissing would be perverted), from a loving rela- people. But the concept in this case achieves its
tionship (or most sexual desire and many hetero- clarity through the connection of phYSical health
sexual acts would be perverted), or from efficiency in with other clearly desirable physical functions and
in homosexual relationships? Relatively few people ones (Le., that they should be acted upon). But that
read Sanskrit, pilot ships, play the mandolin, breed assumption is clearly false. Research suggests that
goats, or write with both hands, yet none of these some people are born with a predisposition toward
activities is immoral simply because it is unusual. As violence, but such people have no more right to stran-
the Ramsey Colloquium, a group of Jewish and Chris- gle their neighbors than anyone else. So while people
tian scholars who oppose homosexuality, writes, "The like Tommy and Jim may be born with homosexual
statistical frequency of an act does not determine tendencies, it doesn't follow that they ought to act on
its moral status." So while homosexuality might be them. Nor does it follow that they ought not to act on
unnatural in the sense of being unusual, that fact is them, even if the tendencies are not innate. I probably
morally irrelevant. do not have any innate tendency to write with my left
hand (since I, like everyone else in my family, have
What Is Not Practiced by Other Animals Is always been right-handed), but it doesn't follow that it
Unnatural would be immoral for me to do so. So simply asserting
Some people argue, uEven animals know better than that homosexuality is a lifestyle choice will not show
to behave homosexually: homosexuality must be that it is an immoral lifestyle choice.
wrong." This argument is doubly flawed. First, it Do people uchoose" to be homosexual? People
rests on a false premise. Numerous studies-including certainly don't seem to choose their sexual feelings, at
Anne Perkins's study of gay" sheep and George and
U least not in any direct or obvious way. (Do you? Think
Molly Hunt's study of "lesbian" sea gulls-have shown about it.) Rather, they find certain people attractive
that some animals do form homosexual pair-bonds. and certain activities arousing, whether they "decide"
Second, even if animals did not behave homosexu- to or not. Indeed, most people at some point in
ally, that fact would not prove that homosexuality their lives wish that they could control their feelings
is immoral. After all, animals don't cook their food, more-for example, in situations of unrequited love-
brush their teeth, participate in religious worship, or and find it frustrating that they cannot. What they can
attend college; human beings do all of these without control to a considerable degree is how and when they
moral censure. Indeed, the idea that animals could act upon those feelings. In that sense, both homosexu-
provide us with our standards-especially our sexual ality and heterosexuality involve lifestyle choices. But
standards-is simply amUSing. in either case, determining the origin of the feelings
will not determine whether it is moral to act on them.
What Does Not Proceed from Innate Desires
Is Unnatural What Violates an Organ's Principal Purpose
Recent studies suggesting a biological basis for homo- Is Unnatural
sexuality have resulted in two popular positions. One Perhaps when people claim that homosexual sex is
side proposes that homosexual people are "born that unnatural they mean that it cannot result in procre-
way" and that it is therefore natural (and thus good) ation. The idea behind the argument is that human
for them to form homosexual relationships. The other organs have various natural purposes: eyes are for see-
side maintains that homosexuality is a lifestyle chOice, ing, ears are for hearing, genitals are for procreating.
which is therefore unnatural (and thus wrong). Both According to this argument, it is immoral to use an
sides assume a connection between the origin of homo- organ in a way that violates its particular purpose.
sexual orientation, on the one hand, and the moral Many of our organs, however, have multiple
value of homosexual activity, on the other. And inso- purposes. Tommy can use his mouth for talking, eat-
far as they share that assumption, both sides are wrong. ing, breathing, licking stamps, chewing gum, kissing
Consider first the pro-homosexual side: "They are women, or kissing Jim; and it seems rather arbitrary to
born that way; therefore it's natural and good." This claim that all but the last use are "natural." (And if we
inference assumes that all innate desires are good say that some of the other uses are "unnatural, but not
immoral," we have failed to specify a morally relevant What Is Disgusting or Offensive Is Unnatural
sense of the term "natural.") It often seems that when people call homosexu-
Just because people can and do use their sexual ality "unnatural" they really just mean that it's
organs to procreate, it does not follow that they disgusting. But plenty of morally neutral activities-
should not use them for other purposes. Sexual handling snakes, eating snails, performing autop-
organs seem very well suited for expressing love, for sies, cleaning toilets, and so on-disgust people.
giving and receiving pleasure, and for celebrating, Indeed, for centuries, most people found interracial
replenishing, and enhancing a relationship-even relationships disgusting, yet that feeling-which has
when procreation is not a factor. Unless opponents by no means disappeared-hardly proves that such
of homosexuality are prepared to condemn hetero- relationships are wrong. In sum, the charge that
sexual couples who use contraception or individuals homosexuality is unnatural, at least in its most com-
who masturbate, they must abandon this version of mon forms, is longer on rhetorical flourish than on
the unnaturalness argument. Indeed, even the Roman philosophical cogency. At best it expresses an aes-
Catholic Church, which forbids contraception and thetic judgment, not a moral judgment.
masturbation, approves of sex for sterile couples and
of sex during pregnancy, neither of which can lead to HOMOSEXUAL SEX IS HARMFUL
procreation. The Church concedes here that intimacy
and pleasure are morally legitimate purposes for sex, One might instead argue that homosexuality is harm-
even in cases where procreation is impOSSible. But ful. The Ramsey Colloquium, for instance, argues that
since homosexual sex can achieve these purposes as homosexuality leads to the breakdown of the fam-
well, it is inconsistent for the Church to condemn it ily and, ultimately, of human society, and it pOints to
on the grounds that it is not procreative. the "alarming rates of sexual promiscuity, depression,
One might object that sterile heterosexual cou- and suicide and the ominous presence of AIDS within
ples do not intentionally turn away from procreation, the homosexual subculture." Thomas Schmidt mar-
whereas homosexual couples do. But this distinction shals copious statistics to show that homosexual activ-
doesn't hold. It is no more possible for Tommy to pro- ity undermines physical and psychological health.
create with a woman whose uterus has been removed Such charges, if correct, would seem to provide strong
than it is for him to procreate with Jim. By having sex evidence against homosexuality. But are the charges
with either one, he is intentionally engaging in a non- correct? And do they prove what they purport to prove?
procreative sexual act. One obvious (and obviously problematic) way to
Yet one might press the objection further and insist answer the first question is to ask people like Tommy
that Tommy and the woman could produce children ifthe and Jim. It would appear that no one is in a better
woman were fertile: whereas homosexual relationships position to judge the homosexual lifestyle than those
are essentially infertile, heterosexual relationships are who know it firsthand. Yet it is unlikely that critics
only incidentally so. But what does that prove? Granted, would trust their testimony. Indeed, the more homo-
it might require less of a miracle for a woman without a sexual people try to explain their lives, the more critics
uterus to become pregnant than for Jim to become preg- accuse them of deceitfully promoting an agenda. (It's
nant, but it would require a miracle nonetheless. Thus it like trying to prove that you're not crazy. The more
seems that the real difference here is not that one couple you object, the more people think, "That's exactly
is fertile and the other not, nor that one couple "could" what a crazy person would say.")
be fertile (with the help of a miracle) and the other not, One might instead turn to statistics. An obvious
but rather that one couple is male-female and the other problem with this tack is that both sides of the debate
male-male. In other words, sex between Tommy andJim bring forth extensive statistics and "expert" testi-
is wrong because ifs male-male-Le., because ifs homo- mony, leaving the average observer confused. There is
sexual. But that, of course, is no argument at all. a more subtle problem as well. Because of widespread
antigay sentiment, many homosexual people won't support." And they point to the increasing prevalence
acknowledge their romantic feelings to themselves, of divorce and premarital sex among heterosexuals
much less to researchers. I have known a number of as evidence that such support is declining. Yet they
gay men who did not "come out" until their forties refuse to concede that the complete absence of similar
and fifties, and no amount of professional compe- support for homosexual relationships might explain
tence on the part of interviewers would have been many of the alleged problems of homosexuals. The
likely to open their closets sooner. Such problems critics can't have it both ways: if heterosexual mar-
compound the usual difficulties of finding represen- riages are in trouble despite the various social, eco-
tative population samples for statistical study. nomic, and legal incentives for keeping them together,
Yet even if the statistical claims of gay rights oppo- society should be little surprised that homosexual
nents were true, they would not prove what they pur- relationships-which not only lack such supports, but
port to prove, for several reasons. First, as any good face overt hostility-are difficult to maintain.
statistician realizes, correlation does not equal cause. One might object that if social ostracism were
Even if homosexual people were more likely to com- the main cause of homosexual people's problems,
mit suicide, be promiscuous, or contract AIDS than then homosexual people in more "tolerant" cities
the general population, it would not follow that their like New York and San Francisco should exhibit fewer
homosexuality causes them to do these things. An such problems than their small-town counterparts;
alternative-and very plausible-explanation is that yet statistics do not seem to bear this out. This objec-
these phenomena, like the disproportionately high tion underestimates the extent of anti gay sentiment
crime rates among African Americans, are at least in our society. By the time many gay and lesbian
partly a function of society's treatment of the group in people move to urban centers, they have already been
question. Suppose you were told from a very early age exposed to (and may have internalized) considerable
that the romantic feelings that you experienced were hostility toward homosexuality. Moreover, the visibil-
sick, unnatural, and disgusting. Suppose further that ity of homosexuality in urban centers makes gay and
expressing these feelings put you at risk of social ostra- lesbian people there more vulnerable to attack (and
cism or, worse yet, physical violence. Is it not plausi- thus more likely to exhibit certain difficulties). Finally,
ble that you would, for instance, be more inclined to note that urbanites in general (not just homosexual
depression than you would be without such obstacles? urbanites) tend to exhibit higher rates of promiscuity,
And that such depression could, in its extreme forms, depression, and sexually transmitted disease than the
lead to suicide or other self-destructive behaviors? (It rest of the population.
is indeed remarkable that couples like Tommy and Jim But what about AIDS? Opponents of homosexu-
continue to flourish in the face of such obstacles.) ality sometimes claim that even if homosexual sex is
A similar explanation can be given for the alleged not, strictly speaking, immoral, it is still a bad idea,
promiscuity of homosexuals. The denial of legal mar- since it puts people at risk for AIDS and other sexu-
riage, the pressure to remain in the closet, and the ally transmitted diseases. But that claim is mislead-
overt hostility toward homosexual relationships are ing: it is infinitely more risky for Tommy to have sex
all more conducive to transient, clandestine encoun- with a woman who is HIV-positive than withJim, who
ters than they are to long-term unions. As a result, is HIV-negative. Obviously, it's not homosexuality
that which is challenging enough for heterosexual that's harmful, it's the virus; and the virus may be car-
couples-settling down and building a life together- ried by both heterosexual and homosexual people.
becomes far more challenging for homosexual couples. Now it may be true (in the United States, at least)
Indeed, there is an interesting tension in the crit- that homosexual males are statistically more likely to
ics' pOSition here. Opponents of homosexuality com- carry the virus than heterosexual females and thus
monly claim that "marriage and the family ... are that homosexual sex is statistically more risky than
fragile institutions in need of careful and continuing heterosexual sex (in cases where the partner's HIV
status is unknown). But opponents of homosexuality Of course, there's more to a flourishing life than
need something stronger than this statistical claim. avoiding harm. One might argue that even if Tommy
For if it is wrong for men to have sex with men because and Jim are not harming each other by their relation-
their doing so puts them at a higher AIDS risk than ship, they are still failing to achieve the higher level
heterosexual sex, then it is also wrong for women to of fulfillment possible in a heterosexual relationship,
have sex with men because their doing so puts them at which is rooted in the complementarity of male and
a higher AIDS risk than homosexual sex (lesbians as a female. But this argument just ignores the facts: Tommy
group have the lowest incidence of AIDS). Purely from and Jim are homosexual predsely because they find
the standpoint of AIDS risk, women ought to prefer relationships with men (and, in particular, with each
lesbian sex. other) more fulfilling than relationships with women.
If this response seems silly, it is because there is Even evangelicals (who have long advocated "faith
obviously more to choosing a romantic or sexual part- healing" for homosexuals) are beginning to acknowl-
ner than determining AIDS risk. And a major part of edge that the choice for most homosexual people is not
the decision, one that opponents of homosexuality between homosexual relationships and heterosexual
conSistently overlook, is considering whether one relationships, but rather between homosexual rela-
can have a mutually fulfilling relationship with the tionships and celibacy. What the critics need to show,
partner. For many people like Tommy and Jim, such therefore, is that no matter how lOving, committed,
fulfillment-which most heterosexuals recognize to mutual, generous, and fulfilling the relationship may
be an important component of human flourishing-is be, Tommy and Jim would flourish more if they were
only possible with members of the same sex. celibate. Given the evidence of their lives (and of others
Of course, the foregoing argument hinges on like them), this is a formidable task indeed.
the claim that homosexual sex can only cause harm Thus far I have focused on the allegation that
indirectly. Some would object that there are certain homosexuality harms those who engage in it. But
activities-anal sex, for instance-that for anatomi- what about the allegation that homosexuality harms
cal reasons are intrinsically harmful. But an argument other, nonconsenting parties? Here I will briefly con-
against anal intercourse is by no means tantamount to sider two claims: that homosexuality threatens chil-
an argument against homosexuality: neither all nor dren and that it threatens SOciety.
only homosexuals engage in anal sex. There are plenty Those who argue that homosexuality threatens
of other things for both gay men and lesbians to do in children may mean one of two things. First, they
bed. Indeed, for women, it appears that the most com- may mean that homosexual people are child molest-
mon forms of homosexual activity may be less risky ers. Statistically, the vast majority of reported cases
than penile-vaginal intercourse, since the latter has of child sexual abuse involve young girls and their
been linked to cervical cancer. fathers, stepfathers, or other familiar (and presum-
In sum, there is nothing inherently risky about ably heterosexual) adult males. But opponents of
sex between persons of the same gender. It is only homosexuality argue that when one adjusts for rela-
risky under certain conditions: for instance, if they tive percentage in the population, homosexual males
exchange diseased bodily fluids or if they engage in appear more likely than heterosexual males to be
certain "rough" forms of sex that could cause tear- child molesters. As I argued above, the problems with
ing of delicate tissue. Heterosexual sex is equally risky obtaining reliable statistics on homosexuality render
under such conditions. Thus, even if statistical claims such calculations difficult. Fortunately, they are also
like those of Schmidt and the Ramsey Colloquium unnecessary.
were true, they would not prove that homosexuality is Child abuse is a terrible thing. But when a het-
immoral. At best, they would prove that homosexual erosexual male molests a child (or rapes a woman
people-like everyone else-ought to take great care or commits assault), the act does not reflect upon
when deciding to become sexually active. all heterosexuals. Similarly, when a homosexual
male molests a child, there is no reason why that act were homosexual, there would be no society-is false;
should reflect upon all homosexuals. Sex with adults and even if it were true, it would not establish that
of the same sex is one thing; sex with children of the homosexuality is immoral.
same sex is quite another. Conflating the two not The Ramsey Colloquium commits a similar fallacy.
only slanders innocent people, it also misdirects Noting (correctly) that heterosexual marriage promotes
resources intended to protect children. Furthermore, the continuation of human life, it then infers that
many men convicted of molesting young boys are homosexuality is immoral because it fails to accomplish
sexually attracted to adult women and report no the same. But from the fact that procreation is good, it
attraction to adult men. To call such men "homosex- does not follow that childlessness is bad-a point that
ual," or even "bisexual," is probably to stretch such the members of the colloquium, several of whom are
terms too far. Roman Catholic priests, should readily concede.
Alternatively, those who charge that homo- I have argued that Tommy and Jim's sexual rela-
sexuality threatens children might mean that the tionship harms neither them nor SOciety. On the
increasing visibility of homosexual relationships contrary, it benefits both. It benefits them because
makes children more likely to become homosexual. it makes them happier-not merely in a short-term,
The argument for this view is patently circular. One hedonistic sense, but in a long-term, "big picture"
cannot prove that doing X is bad by arguing that it sort of way. And, in turn, it benefits society, since it
causes other people to do X, which is bad. One must makes Tommy and Jim more stable, more produc-
first establish independently that X is bad. That said, tive, and more generous than they would otherwise
there is not a shred of evidence to demonstrate that be. In short, their relationship-including its sexual
exposure to homosexuality leads children to become component-provides the same kinds of benefits that
homosexual. infertile heterosexual relationships provide (and per-
But doesn't homosexuality threaten society? A haps other benefits as well). Nor should we fear that
Roman Catholic priest once put the argument to me accepting their relationship and others like it will
as follows: "Of course homosexuality is bad for soci- cause people to flee in droves from the institution of
ety. If everyone were homosexual, there would be no heterosexual marriage. After all, as Thomas Williams
sOciety." Perhaps it is true that if everyone were homo- points out, the usual response to a gay person is not
sexual, there would be no society. But if everyone were "How come he gets to be gay and I don't?"
a celibate priest, society would collapse just as surely,
and my friend the priest didn't seem to think that he HOMOSEXUALITY VIOLATES BIBLICAL
was doing anything wrong simply by failing to procre- TEACHING
ate. Jeremy Bentham made the point somewhat more
acerbically roughly 200 years ago: "If then merely out At this point in the discussion, many people turn to
of regard to popUlation it were right that [homosexuals] religion. "If the secular arguments fail to prove that
should be burnt alive, monks ought to be roasted alive homosexuality is wrong," they say, "so much the
by a slow fire." worse for secular ethics. This failure only proves that
From the fact that the continuation of society we need God for morality." Since people often justify
requires procreation, it does not follow that everyone their moral beliefs by appeal to religion, I will briefly
must procreate. Moreover, even if such an obligation consider the biblical position.
existed, it would not preclude homosexuality. At best, At first glance, the Bible's condemnation of homo-
it would preclude exclusive homosexuality: homosexual activity seems unequivocal. Consider, for
sexual people who occasionally have heterosexual sex example, the following two passages, one from the
can procreate just fine. And given artificial insemina- "Old" Testament and one from the "New":
tion, even those who are exclusively homosexual can You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an
procreate. In short, the priest's claim-if everyone abomination. (Lev. 18:22)
For this reason God gave them up to degrading pas- may not abide in the Lord's tent or dwell on his holy
sions. Their women exchanged natural intercourse hill (1-5). Ezekiel calls usury "abominable"; com-
for unnatural, and in the same way also the men, pares it to adultery, robbery, idolatry, and bribery;
giving up natural intercourse with women, were and states that anyone who "takes advanced or
consumed with passion for one another. Men com-
accrued interest ... shall surely die; his blood shall
mitted shameless acts with men and received in their
be upon himself" (18:13).
own persons the due penalty for their error. (Rom.
1:26-27) Should believers therefore close their savings
accounts? Not necessarily. According to orthodox
Note, however, that these passages are surrounded Christian teaching, the biblical prohibition against
by other passages that relatively few people consider usury no longer applies. The reason is that economic
binding. For example, Leviticus also declares, conditions have changed substantially since biblical
The pig ... is unclean for you. Of their flesh you shall times, such that usury no longer has the same nega-
not eat, and their carcasses you shall not touch; they tive consequences it had when the prohibitions were
are unclean for you. (11:7-8) issued. Thus, the practice that was condemned by the
Bible differs from contemporary interest banking in
Taken literally, this passage not only prohibits eat-
morally relevant ways.
ing pork, but also playing football, since footballs
Yet are we not in a similar position regarding
are made of pigskin. (Can you believe that the Uni-
homosexuality? Virtually all scholars agree that homo-
versity of Notre Dame so flagrantly violates Levitical
sexual relations during biblical times were vastly dif-
teaching?)
ferent from relationships like Tommy and Jim's. Often
Similarly, St. Paul, author of the Romans passage,
such relations were integral to pagan practices. In
also writes, "Slaves, obey your earthly masters with
Greek SOciety, they typically involved older men and
fear and trembling, in singleness of heart, as you obey
younger boys. If those are the kinds of features that the
Christ" (Eph. 6:5)-morally problematic advice if
biblical authors had in mind when they issued their
there ever were any. Should we interpret this passage
condemnations, and such features are no longer typi-
(as Southern plantation owners once did) as implying
cal, then the biblical condemnations no longer apply.
that it is immoral for slaves to escape? After all, God
As with usury, substantial changes in cultural context
himself says in Leviticus,
have altered the meaning and consequences-and
[Y]ou may acquire male and female slaves ... from thus the moral value-of the practice in question.
among the aliens residing with you, and from their Put another way, using the Bible's condemnations of
families that are with you, who have been born in your
homosexuality against contemporary homosexuality
land; and they may be your property. You may keep
is like using its condemnations of usury against con-
them as a possession for your children after you, for
them to inherit as property. (25:44-46) temporary banking.
Let me be clear about what I am not claiming
How can people maintain the inerrancy of the Bible here. First, I am not claiming that the Bible has been
in light of such passages? The answer, I think, is that wrong before and therefore may be wrong this time.
they learn to interpret the passages in their historical The Bible may indeed be wrong on some matters,
context. but for the purpose of this argument I am assuming
Consider the Bible's position on usury, the lend- its infallibility. Nor am I claiming that the Bible's
ing of money for interest (for any interest, not just age renders it entirely inapplicable to today's issues.
excessive interest). The Bible condemns this prac- Rather, I am claiming that when we do apply it, we
ticle in no uncertain terms. In Exodus God says must pay attention to morally relevant cultural differ-
that "if you lend money to my people, to the poor ences between biblical times and today. Such attention
among you, you shall not exact interest from them" will help us distinguish between specific time-bound
(22:25). Psalm 15 says that those who lend at interest prohibitions (for example, laws against usury or
homosexual relations) and the enduring moral val- just because there are no good reasons to oppose
ues they represent (for example, generosity or respect interracial or homosexual relationships, it does not
for persons). And as the above argument shows, my follow that there are no good reasons to oppose inces-
claim is not very controversial. Indeed, to deny it is to tuous, pOlygamous, or bestial relationships. One
commit oneself to some rather strange views on slav- might argue, for instance, that incestuous relation-
ery, usury, women's roles, astronomy, evolution, and ships threaten delicate familial bonds, or that polyga-
the like. mous relationships result in unhealthy jealousies (and
Here, one might also make an appeal to religious sexism), or that bestial relationships-do I need to say
pluralism. Given the wide variety of religious beliefs it?-aren't really "relationships' at aU, at least not in
(e.g., the Muslim belief that women should cover their the sense we've been discussing. Perhaps even better
faces, the Orthodox jewish belief against working on arguments could be offered (given much more space
Saturday, the Hindu belief that cows are sacred and than I have here). The point is that there is no logical
should not be eaten), each of us inevitably violates connection between homosexuality, on the one hand,
the religious belief of others. But we normally don't and incest, polygamy, and bestiality, on the other:
view such violations as occasions for moral censure, Why, then, do critics continue to push this objec-
since we distinguish between beliefs that depend on tion? Perhaps it's because accepting homosexuality
particular revelations and beliefs that can be justified requires them to give up one of their favorite argu-
independently (e.g., that stealing is wrong). Without ments: "It's wrong because we've always been taught
an independent justification for condemning homo- that it's wrong." This argument-call it the argument
sexuality, the best one can say is, liMy religion says from tradition-has an obvious appeal: people reason-
so." But in a SOciety that cherishes religious freedom, ably favor tried-and-true ideas over unfamiliar ones,
that reason alone does not normally provide grounds and they recognize the foolishness of trying to invent
for moral or legal sanctions. That people still fall morality from scratch. But the argument from tradi-
back on that reason in discussions of homosexual- tion is also a dangerous argument, as any honest look
ity suggests that they may not have much of a case at history will reveal.
otherwise. I conclude that Tommy and jim's relationship,
far from being a moral abomination, is exactly what
it appears to be to those who know them: a morally
CONCLUSION positive influence on their lives and on others. Accept-
As a last resort, opponents of homosexuality typically ing this conclusion takes courage, since it entails that
change the subject: "But what about incest, polyg- our moral traditions are fallible. But when these tradi-
amy, and bestiality? If we accept Tommy and jim's tions interfere with people's happiness for no sound
sexual relationship, why shouldn't we accept those reason, they defeat what is arguably the very point of
as well?" Opponents of interracial marriage used a morality: promoting individual and communal well-
similar slippery-slope argument in the 1960s when being. To put the argument simply, Tommy and Jim's
the Supreme Court struck down antimiscegenation relationship makes them better people. And that's
laws. It was a bad argument then, and it is a bad argu- not just good for Tommy and jim: that's good for
mentnow. everyone.
From Seduction, Rape, and Coercion

SARAH CONLY
* * * circumstances of harm to understand when consent is

If physical force or the threat of physical force is used and is not valid.
to get a woman to agree to have sex, that is rape. If psy-
* * *
chological force is used, can that also be rape?
[T]here is controversy about what (if any) kind
1. VERBAL COERCION of emotional pressure should count as coercive.
Campus behavior codes, freed from the evidentiary
What is at issue here? The question is about what is
requirements of a court of law (and freed from the
sometimes called verbal coercion, but the issue is not
responsibility of sending the perpetrator to prison),
merely about the use of words rather than actual phys-
have recently seen more prosecutions for what once
ical violence. Of course words alone can result in rape,
would have been considered consensual sex, precisely
if the words threaten physical violence. The issue here
because some have adopted standards of assault which
is distinct. Proponents of an expansion of our defini-
include overbearing of the other's will through emo-
tion of rape argue that, just as physical force is a form
tional pressure. In such cases, the charge of rape seems
of coercion which invalidates consent so that ensuing
to stem from the fact that, while the victims were not
sex is rape, it is "verbal coercion" if a person agrees to
physically constrained to have sex, they were in some
have sex because of the use of words which cause or
sense browbeaten into having intercourse they would
threaten to cause (only) emotional duress.
not otherwise have chosen to have. Thus, it is argued,
* * * the sex was not truly voluntary. Even the widely
The question is whether such pressure, if it results accepted admonition that "No Means No" has been
in a person having sex who would not otherwise have the subject of controversy for this reason: what fol-
wanted to, is indeed coercive; that is, whether it is truly lows from a woman's saying "no" to sex? To proceed
sufficiently harmful and sufficiently wrongful that we immediately to penetration would clearly be wrong,
may say that the person who changes her mind as a but what about trying to talk her into sex, to press
result of such pressure has been raped. What if the with blandishments or tears, to harangue; in short, to
motivation to have sex comes not from fear of physi- refuse to give up? Opinion is divided: some feel that
cal violence but from fear of emotional harm? What "no" means simply that you should not advance phys-
if the force used to overcome a woman's resistance is ically on someone who has told you to stop, but oth-
not physical force but emotional pressure? Can this be ers feel that spirit of the rule is violated by continuing
rape? The answer, I think, is that it mayor may not to verbally press the issue after one person has stated
be. Infliction of emotional harm can invalidate con- her desire. Especially in the conditions in which such
sent, and sex that arises as a result of this can thus be pressure is likely to occur (when it is late and we are
rape. Other emotional harms (even if perhaps more tired and/or to some degree inebriated) the pursuit of
painful) can be consistent with valid consent. What the sexual goal in the face of opposition has seemed
we need to do is differentiate between the different to some to constitute a force which, while not violent,
nullifies consent in the same way physical force does. 1
Proponents of such changes, and corresponding
From Sarah Conly, "Seduction, Rape, and Coercion," Ethics 115 changes in the law, worry about the susceptibility
(October 2004): 96-121. (t:J 2004 by The University of Chicago. of one person to certain sorts of psychological force
Reprinted by permiSSion of The University of Chicago Press. brought to bear by another. The psychological forces
brought to bear may be various and may be used sin- that whenever someone gives into irrational suasion
gly, or ... conjointly. The aggressor may implore and to have sex, or has sex only out of fear of displeasing
wheedle until the other feels guilt; he may tease her someone she cares for, or out of a desire to please, a
with jealousy, berate her for her coldness and imma- rape has occurred.
turity, chastise her for the harm she does him, refute
her reasoning when she tries to articulate her position, Deciding to Have Sex
and subject her to a barrage of angry words. Ultimately The differing notions of choice and rape turn in part
she may find herself in a state of psychological exhaus- on different accounts of the psychology involved-
tion, feeling unable to resist in the face of what seems on how the decision about having sex is made. One
an implacable will. In these cases, it is argued, the central issue seems to be whether or not the woman
woman has been forced against her will as surely as if wanted to do what she did, but this is a complex ques-
the aggressor had used physical violence. tion. What is it not to want to have sex? We are seldom
To some, then, the recognition of the potency of univocal as to reasons for doing anything. A woman
some sorts of speech, of the psychological pressure may want to have sex to express love, even if she is not
it can convey, is a long-delayed recognition of the physically aroused. Perhaps she is tired, but her hus-
true dynamics of (some, many, or all, depending on band is leaving for a two-week trip, and she wants to
whom you talk to) sexual encounters. To others this have sex to feel closer to him. Perhaps she even wants
sort of interpretation of a sexual encounter repre- to do it just because he wants to do it. He has read a
sents a deviation from good sense. It may be unjust lot of feminist literature, however, and is a sensitive
in that it castigates as rapists those who simply are guy and won't sulk or become angry if she doesn't
persuasive at getting what they want. It may also have sex; he just won't feel as happy as he would if she
be harmful to those who concede to such pressure, did. She loves him, however, and wants him to feel
in particular to women, since they are most often loved. Even in the latter case, where his attitude con-
thought of as the victims of such verbal coercion. If tributes to her decision-where indeed, were it not for
we accept that (some) women are unable to withstand his desire she WOUldn't want to have sex-her having
the psychological force brought to bear upon them, sex doesn't plausibly seem to be rape, any more than
this makes them seem like less than autonomous my buying Girl Scout cookies only to avoid hurting
agents. If these women had sex when they didn't the feelings of the little girl selling them means I've
want to, why then did they have sex?2 Physical force been robbed. Having a reason to oppose having sex
or the threat of it makes sense of having sex against as well as positive reasons to have sex doesn't mean
one's will, it is thought, but absent physical force, how that when she does have sex at another's behest it
are we to make sense of someone who does something must be rape. Similarly, however, we cannot say that
she really doesn't want to do? For some, accepting if a woman had some positive motivation to have sex
that psychological pressure could be a means to rape that means any ensuing sex must have been consen-
wrongly suggests that women are weak minded, prone sual. Anyone might have a desire to have sex (she was
to collapse under "emotional pressure" and to con- physically aroused, she wants to please the man she
cede to the desires of the stronger-minded male. 3 •.. is in love with) and have lots of reasons not to have
This is a dilemma. It seems intuitively right to sex-she's afraid of sexually transmitted diseases, she
many (and certainly to me) that we should hold the has contrary religious convictions, and so forth. Say-
delinquent fathers and foster fathers who threatened ing that she wanted to have sex in some ways does not
their children into sex responsible for being rapists determine whether the ensuing sex is consensual.
and that the man who had intercourse with the eight- What seems to determine the question, then, is
year-old girl was clearly forcing himself upon an inno- not simply whether or not the person had some desire
cent victim, whether or not he threatened to hit her if to have or not have sex, or even whether the desire to
she WOUldn't have sex. Yet, it seems implausible to say have sex is a function of another person's antecedent
desire, but whether the motivation which decides her or legally in the wrong. Rather, the perpetrator has
to have sex is a result of coercive pressure. If she weighs simply to know that the victim did not consent or to
the religious conviction against her physical arousal be in a situation where he should have known. The
and decides that all things conSidered, she prefers to fact that he may sincerely believe himself to be in the
have sex, she has not been raped. If she weighs her right (because the woman owed him sex, or whatever)
desire not to have sex against the threat of violence does not excuse him. Similarly, while the person who
by a knife-wielding rapist and decides that, given the places psychological pressure may believe himself to
choice of sex or death, she, all things considered, pre- be in the right in having achieved the other's consent
fers to have sex, she has been raped. If her desire to by threatening (mere) psychological pain, this does
have sex is a result of coercive pressure, then the fact not suffice to excuse him from the charge of rape. If
that she did what she wanted to do is neither here he knows that the other's consent was obtained only
nor there, because the options from which she had to through the pressure he has brought to bear, he is
choose were illegitimately narrow. The question here, aware of the relevant facts. The question is whether
then, is when is psychological pressure coercive? what he has done invalidates consent in the way phys-
ical force does, so that the ensuing sex is rape.
Choice. Some may argue that psychological pres-
II. BUT WHAT IS COERCION? sure cannot be properly coercive because in typical
We need to examine when the criteria we generally cases of psychological pressure one has a choice of
feel are required for coercion to be present are also whether or not to yield, whereas in cases of physical
present in cases of psychological pressure. None of force no such decision is possible. It is possible that,
these is seen as sufficient for coercion, but all are seen in some cases of psychological pressure, the victim of
as necessary, and when psychological pressure doesn't pressure is so demoralized as to literally lose the abil-
meet these criteria, it is not coercive. ity to choose-and this may be true [of young incest
Intent. One requirement for coercion is that the victims]-but we cannot assume that this is typical, at
coercer is doing what he does intentionally. Acciden- least among adults. More normally, in the case of psy-
tally doing something which causes another to decide chological pressure, the victim is not forced to have
to have sex with you can't be considered coercive. sex, but rather chooses to have sex in order to prevent
The question of mens rea has long played a role in the losing a relationship, to avoid an angry confrontation,
legal determination of rape. While our discussion is or to avoid other pain. In cases of physical force, it is
not of what constitutes legal rape but of what consti- argued, no such choice is possible.
tutes rape from the moral perspective, it may still be This looks like a distinction initially, but it does
held that there can be no wrongdoing unless there is a not reflect our modern beliefs about rape. While at
perpetrator who has acted with a blameworthy frame one paint in time it was true that, both culturally and
of mind. In the case of legal rape, the idea is that the legally, sex was only considered rape if the woman was
perpetrator either knows that the woman has given no literally physically overwhelmed such that she could
valid consent, or should have known, in that he would not stop the assailant in any way, this narrow con-
have known with a reasonable amount of perspicacity cept of rape is outmoded. A woman confronted with
or concern. Can the person who has placed psycho- an armed rapist may yield to the mere threat of force,
logical pressure be in a sufficiently culpable frame of without our saying she consented to have sex. There
mind to be held a rapist when he has sex with some- is a sense, no doubt, in which she chooses to have sex
one who, without threat of violence, has said that she when she chooses to have sex rather than to be beaten
would, given the circumstances, prefer to have sex? or killed. She was nonetheless raped because the choice
It seems possible. The culpable frame of mind is not free, and to say that the choice is not free is to
required for the legal designation of rape is not one say that she is placed under coercive pressure and made
where the perpetrator recognizes that he is morally to choose between illegitimate options. 4 Choice under
psychological pressure might, then, be equally unfree: Assuming that the woman has the normal capac-
the mere ability to choose the better of two alterna- ity for pain, has no peculiar traumas associated with
tives doesn't mean that there was insufficient force for pinching, and so forth, then the threat of a slight
sex to count as rape. That she can choose whether or pain would probably not count as coercive, whatever
not to have sex or suffer psychological harm does not the intent of the threatener, because being pinched
in itself mean she has not been raped, any more than is a reasonable option to choose over having sex with
the fact that a woman might choose to have sex rather someone you don't want to have sex with. If she con-
than be violently abused means she hasn't been raped. cedes to his wishes, we will probably think she didn't
Harm. For a choice to be coerced, however, it is really mind having sex to begin with, even given
necessary that the person doing the choosing has no the uncouthness of his advance. We won't think she
reasonable choice between doing what the coercer was raped.
wants and the bad option which the coercer has intro- The point is that, with both physical and psycho-
s
duced. Not every threat constitutes coercion, because logical threats, there will be greater and lesser pains.
some threats don't introduce harms great enough to Precisely what degree of pain constitutes coercive force
affect my decision procedure. My neighbor can't say will be difficult to say, but there is no reason to think
he was coerced into supporting my bid for election that psychological pain cannot be awful, so awful that
because I told him I would make terribly unfriendly it makes unwanted sex the more reasonable option. 6
faces at him if he didn't do so; while I shouldn't be Legitimacy. For an offer to be coercive, however,
making faces at people who don't support me, it's not it must do more than constrain the options of the
so bad that he can claim that he had no other option chooser. It must do this illegitimately.7 Whether or
than to vote my way. Can psychological pain be suf- not I coerce my son in telling him he cannot go to
ficient to say that the person subjected to threats of the Rollerworld dance unless he does his homework
psychological harm has no reasonable choice but to depends on whether I have the right to control his
succumb to the will of the coercer? activities in this particular way.8 Sometimes a pres-
Why not? Clearly, psychological pain can be sure may be brought to bear to make someone do
extreme. A person might recover more quickly from a something that he or she doesn't want to do and that
physical beating than an emotional breakup; indeed, pressure is entirely within the rights of the individual
it may be the emotional component of a beating that doing the pressuring. If I tell an employee I will fire
makes it so bad-the same amount of harm suffered him if he doesn't do a better job, I may cause him
from falling down the stairs would be far less trau- great distress and overbear his will to play computer
matic. The picture the critic has here seems to be of games at work, but I haven't done anything wrong.
someone who agrees to have sex to avoid some slight If, on the other hand, I tell him that I will shoot him
loss, say, so her boyfriend won't break a date with her or even that I will ridicule his appearance around the
in order to go watch football, and such critics think office, then I have proffered a sanction which is not
not having a date just doesn't seem so awful an option legitimate, even though my goal may be a reason-
as to constrain a person's choice. This is true: one may able one. Or, if I threaten to fire him, not because
agree to have sex for foolish reasons, like wanting to he is doing a bad job but because he refuses to enter
brag to friends that her boyfriend has never left her the basketball pool, I extend my control into realms
alone on Saturday night. To say the choice to have sex where I have no right of control. I have a right of
for such slight goods should not count as coerced does sanction, but only in certain ways and only on cer-
not, however, show that psychological pressure gen- tain grounds. There are ways we can bend others to
erally can't be coercive. The same slippery slope can our will and ways we can't, and what these are seem
occur with physical force. What if someone threatens to be determined by the nature of the specific rela-
that he will pinch the woman if she does not have tionship. Is it legitimate to pressure someone to have
sex with him? If she agrees, has she been coerced? sex? This will depend on the kind of pressure brought
to bear and the legitimate parameters of the relation- with we may think of them as simply constitutive of
ship in which it is brought to bear. there being a relationship, but they may in fact be
Clearly, in some relationships it is not legitimate conditions set by one partner for another. Person A
to pressure someone to have sex. The cases of [fathers may say she wants Person B to communicate more if
and daughters] are ones where the authority of father- they are to stay together. Person B may insist that Per-
hood does not extend into the realm of sex, and son A remain faithful and that, without this condition
using it is clearly an abuse. Demands for sex in such being met, person B will leave. We don't look upon
relationships are illegitimate. In the realm of merely these demands as being coercive, but rather as the
social relationships, though, where there is no per- sorts of conditions most people set on relationships,
sonal or institutional authority being extended to a as a legitimate attempt to craft the relationship they
use beyond its justified parameters, the issue is not want, even if that requires finding a different part-
so clear. Can a person legitimately threaten to break ner. This may be manipulative, in that the intent is to
off with someone if she refuses to have sex, intending make someone do something she wouldn't otherwise
that this threat will make her have sex where normally want, but it seems manipulative in a way which we
she would choose not to? Can he legitimately do this accept in dealing with others, where introducing sys-
knowing that her pain at his prospective departure tems of rewards and sanctions to get others to do what
will be the determining factor in her decision to have you want, in this less than ideal world, is sometimes
sex with him? There are two cases: he threatens to necessary and often goes by the name of compromise.
break off because that is his sincere intent if no sex is We may say that, if you will do the dishes, I will do
included in the relationship and he feels he should let the cooking; if you won't do the dishes, I won't do the
her know this. Or, he may threaten to break off, sin- cooking. It would be much nicer if we didn't pressure
cerely intending to leave this unsatisfactory relation- one another to change behaviors, as it would be nicer
ship but also hoping that his threat will motivate her if we never even wanted the other to change. In the
to have sex, even if her other desires not to have sex real world, though, this happens, and we recognize
remain in place. That is, in the second case he hopes to that this sort of trade-off is an unfortunate need when
manipulate her into doing what he wants. Reflection people of different desires try to stay together. Rela-
shows that, while the second of these may be less than tionships are founded on odd precepts, and if one of
admirable, neither case constitutes rape. the partners is unilaterally responsible for making the
Clearly, as the boss may fire the employee, one continuance of the relationship conditional on the
person may break up with another. Clearly, as the relationship including some particular activity, that is
boss may threaten the employee with firing in order in itself legitimate.
to improve his performance, one may threaten the
other person in a relationship with a break-up if things * * *
don't improve. Can the specific area of improvement Are such conditions always legitimate? No. As with
be sexual? It is not that a romantic partner has a duty, employer-employee relationships, there are limits to
explicit or implicit, to provide sex, in the way that an what you may demand and limits to what sanctions
employee does have a duty to do the work associated you may threaten if even your legitimate demands
with the job. At the same time, the absence of this duty are not met. Demands placed within a relationship
in a romantic relationship is a function of the fact should have reasonable bearing on the health of the
that such relationships are open ended. Just as being relationship, and should not be inherently immoral,
in a relationship does not, per se, give one any duties, and sanctions offered for failure to meet even reason-
it is also the case that one can, without stepping out able demands are limited. I am assuming, however,
of bounds, make the relationship dependent on vari- that engaging in sex, all things being equal, is not
ous conditions that suit one's own needs. Often the immoral and has reasonable bearing on the relation-
things which are asked are those we are so familiar ship is, as argued above, a justified response. 9
$0, it does seem within a person's rights to want strong motivation to engage in sexual activity and
sex to be a part of a romantic relationship and also on the other hand there are many desires and values
within that person's rights to tell the partner that, if which mitigate against it. This in itself, however, may
there is no sex, he will decamp. This does amount to have nothing to do with coercion. Two people can
a demand, indeed a threat, insofar as the fear of los- weakly and mutually succumb to the lure of romance
ing the relationship is an incentive to have sex and (or whatever) without their roles being that of victim
the one intends this fear to motivate the other to have and villain. While weakness is no doubt morally prob-
sex, just as the wife who says she'll divorce if her hus- lematic in terms of each person's assessment of his
band is unfaithful again intends this fear to motivate or her own character, neither has anything to blame
him to change his ways. When you enter into a rela- the other for, any more than the dieter can blame the
tionship, however, you lay yourself open to the pos- whipped cream. The problem arises when one feels
sibility of being hurt in various ways. One is that the that one's weakness has somehow been induced by
other person may tell you you'll be dumped if you another.
, don't change, and that may place you in a painful
dilemma, that is, doing something you don't want to A. Seduction
do or losing the relationship. This can be true if you Weakness induced by another is what we've come to
are asked to be faithful, and it can be true if you are know as seduction. In seduction, a person does not
asked to have sex. Just as the one person has the right simply act weakly because she finds the prospect of
to ask, the other has the right to decide not to do any sex overwhelmingly tempting; she is brought to this
of the things she is asked. But no one has the right to weakness by the interference of someone else. There
insist that a relationship cause no pain, and no one are two ways this can happen: the victim of seduction
can claim to have been coerced just because the pros- can be brought to do something that she in many ways
pect of pain changes behavior. likes but which she is trying to resist. She can be led to
succumb to temptation so that desire overcomes con-
viction. Or, she may be importuned to do something
III. DECIDING TO HAVE SEX, REDUX that she is not attracted to, and distracted by grief or
Not every case of deciding to have sex is so clear, how- fear, she may give in, without fully rational consider-
ever. It would be nice if every person who decided to ation. It is this which might lead one to see seduction
have sex weighed all the advantages and disadvan- as a species of rape, because pressure is brought to bear
tages of doing so, decided correctly which consider- on the woman to act in a way that runs counter not
ations have the most weight for her or him, and acted just to what she would not want without that pres-
accordingly. In such cases we may say the person did sure but also to what she really wants even given that
what he or she wanted to do. What do we say, though, pressure ....
when we confront an agent whose actions do not The proximity of the lure causes her to see it most
accurately reflect her strongest desire? Many persons vividly and to feel its attractions most poignantly, and
engage in sex in a way which they later regret, not just this causes her to choose weakly, to give in to tempta-
because of unforeseen consequences but because the tion. The important thing is that these appeals do not
act was, even at that time, contrary to their overall contribute to any rational decision-making process,
motivational structure; it was in some sense not what but rather undercut it. The seducer does not allow
they truly wanted at the time. Some people have sex the other time to collect herself, to think about what
out of weakness of will it really would be best to do. Thus, the circumstances
may be as relevant as the content of the appeal in deter-
* * * mining whether or not this is seduction: what in mid-
Not surprisingly, this happens frequently in the afternoon over coffee in the student union might be a
realm of sexuality, where on the one hand there is a rational discussion about the desirability of including
sex in the relationship may well be productive of an Eminem is bound to have around the house. And most
emotional maelstrom at 2:00 A.M. in the dark of his of all, whatever he says, he doesn't let you think. He
room. Were she in control of herself, she might resist, looks for a point of vulnerability, a weakness through
or she might, upon reflection, have a change of heart which he can corrupt the solid reasoning process with
and decide that, if having sex is the only way to con- which you came in and convince you that what he
tinue the relationship, then that is worth it. But in wants is really what you want.
this circumstance reflection is not an option, and no Would this work? It depends, of course, on the
exertion of self-control is forthcoming. She gives in, person. For one thing, you've got to be tempted by
unable to resist the pressure of the moment, unable the a. but e. item to begin with and to have a suf-
to act on the decision she would make if the circum- ficiently ingenuous character not to recognize that
stances of his demands did not induce weakness. this is essentially an adversarial relationship. As with
Weakness and positive temptation. If a man con- sedUction, only some people are vulnerable to the
sciously tries to undercut a woman's decision-making pressure. But, as with seduction, some people are vul-
process by arousing emotion and is successful in this, nerable, and they give in, only to rue an action which
is the ensuing sex rape? Consider, first, an analogous was expressive neither of their heartfelt desires nor
case, where the seduced is already attracted to what- their considered principles. This is bad. We look down
ever it is that she is trying to resist and where the on high pressure salesmen as being manipulative and
seducer increases her desires while trying to undercut self-interested. But while this is true, such a sales tech-
her appreciation of the reasons to resist. You go into nique is not assault. The salesman does not rob you.
a store, where your eye is caught by the attractive but He does not even misrepresent issues of fact. He aids
expensive item you've always wanted but know to be you to pursue something you want by increasing your
a luxury you can't afford. As you stand contemplating desire for it and decreasing your recognition of the rea-
it, you are approached by the High Pressure Salesman, sons against it. This is like a person who wants you off
who is paid by commission and who is not going to your diet and wafts fresh bread under your nose while
be dissuaded from trying to sell you this piece by con- telling you that just this once won't hurt. It wouldn't
siderations of your welfare. It's him against you, and work if you weren't enticed by the smell of fresh bread.
he does everything he can to overcome your defenses. It might not work if they weren't also talking to you
Well, not everything he can-he doesn't pull a gun to reduce your resistance. Combining the two things,
and threaten you with death if you don't buy the item; though, sometimes does work. In the realm of sexual-
he doesn't tell you that your safety or the security of ity, it is like someone who increases the other's already
your children is at stake. He doesn't use violence as a existing desire to have sex, perhaps by touch, perhaps
threat in any sense nor induce terror. Rather, he tries by words, while trying to dispose of their reasons not
to subvert your reasoning process. When you tell him, to have sex.
weakening, that you can't afford the a. but e. item, he Such a person is not admirable, but just as the high
tells you that in the long run the item isn't really that pressure salesman is not a robber and the bread-wafter
expensive; if, for example, you calculate how much is not guilty of assault by force-feeding, the seducer who
you will be paying per hour, the amount is negligible. persuades you to do something you are attracted to but
He argues that, in certain cases, the item may even be might otherwise have been able to resist is not guilty of
construed as saving you money-you'll be using the a. rape. If he touches you when you have told him to stop,
but e. item so much that you won't spend on all those he is guilty of assault, but if you don't try to stop him
other less attractive items and, anyway, when it's time from touching you and you let him talk to you about
for resale you might well get rid of the a. but e. item for why it is okay to have sex, changing your mind is ulti-
more than you paid for it. He astutely perceives whom matelya decision for which you are responsible.
you are likely to admire and tells you that this is the Weakness and negative sanctions. What if you are
sort of item Michael Jordan/Hillary Rodham Clinton/ led to act weakly, though, not because of a positive
attraction but because of a threat of emotional pain? by investing in this great opportunity, when she says
And what if the other has induced this emotional she'd hoped that you would finally have caught up
pain just in order to subvert your thinking pro- to her in taste and acumen and would thus take the
cesses and get you to do what they want? This is not cousins up on this proposition, you quail. Vou've been
so much temptation as anxiety and as such it looks worn down by a youth of inferiority, and it's as hard to
much more like coercion. Again, let us take a (puta- muster the strength to withstand her judgment now
tive) analogy which has been defused by avoiding as it was then.
sexual content. Let us imagine your sleazy Cousin Cousin Beau is a sleaze. Cousin Flo has a despi-
Beau. Beau is a charming ne'er do well. He's always cable character. But for all thiS, I don't think we can
had a kind word for you, his little cousin, and when say that they are thieves, nor even that they are extor-
you were young, he would take you for piggy-back tionists. It isn't that you haven't reasonable alter-
rides when your more sober relatives engaged in bor- natives to giving them money. It is rather that you
ing conversations and imitate their irritable admo- don't, as Beau gazes at you appealingly, or as Flo curls
nitions at the dinner table. Now, though, you are a her lip, see your way clearly as to what your choice
young adult, with a good job and a disposable income, should be. The cousins have placed pressure of a sort
and Beau approaches you with dollar signs in his eyes. an honorable person wouldn't, and we evaluate their
His proposition is vague but urgent-that you should character accordingly, but they have not forced your
invest your savings in a business opportunity directed compliance ....
by Beau himself. Vou are not so blinded by affection Are these analogous to seduction? They have in
as to think that this looks like a golden opportunity, common that they feature people who coax, cajole,
but you don't know how to handle the situation. Beau wheedle, importune, harangue, berate, and browbeat
has always been so funny and kind, and he looks so another into doing their bidding. Certainly there are
sincere, and the imagined prospect of your refusal differences. Strangely, women may be more vulner-
seems to cut him, a member of your own family with able when it comes to giving up their bodies than to
whom you've enjoyed so many youthful hours, to the giving up money. On the one hand, we recognize the
quick. If you had time you could think more clearly, body to be the locus of autonomy, not to be inter-
but giving you time to think is just what he doesn't fered with, but on the other hand we romanticize a
want. He stresses his own suffering, hearkens back to man's pursuit of a hesitant woman in a way that may
the many times he's helped you, and suggests that he make a woman feel unnaturally cold, inferior, and
can't possibly feel the same in the future if you won't guilty if she doesn't yield to his passion. to Further-
do this little thing, which can't possibly hurt you and more, the use of the body by another can be much
which could help him so much. You feel guilty, you more of a loss than the loss of money; few things hit
feel sorry, you feel Beau may turn against you if you as close to home as having one's very body taken
fail him, and, most of all, you feel confused. The more over by another. But the fact that seduction is worse
Beau sees this, the harder he pushes. And, suppose that than having money wormed out of you, just as rape
he is joined in the pursuit of your money by Cousin Flo. is worse than theft, doesn't mean the analogy is not
Flo has never been a buddy. She has spent both your apt. The point is that the difference between seduc-
youths making you feel inferior for your poor sense of tion and rape is the same as finagled money loss and
fashion, your inability to attract boyfriends, your ugly robbery. The seducer tries to suborn the person's
nose. As such things often happen, instead of reject- thought process just the way Cousin Beau does. The
ing Flo as unworthy of your attention, you tried all the thief and the rapist don't try to undercut the vic-
harder to live up to her standards-after all, she was tim's ability to decide what she should do: they don't
older, prettier, and obviously cooler. The one thing need to, because they present her with a choice-her
you want to do is avoid that sneer. When Cousin Flo money or her life, sex or being beaten-that she can
castigates you for once again failing to make the grade make quite rationally.
The question, then, is not so much whether a per- decision; sanctions should only be those one has
son is acting weakly or fully in accordance with her a right to impose, like ending the relationship, not
own judgment, or whether she is acting in a way she violence; there should be no use of authority derived
would not were it not for the pressures of another, from extraneous positions (as father, employer, etc.).
rather than acting uniquely on her own desires. The No one has a right to control our bodies or to touch us
question is whether these pressures placed on her, and when we do not want to be touched, but it is a part of
which may make her decide against her own most our lives as moral agents that people close to us have
considered desires, are placed on her appropriately. the right to talk to us about things we may not want
But, one might ask, can it ever be proper to place to hear, even when that means they are being down-
pressure on adults to do what they really don't want right nasty. We can go away if we want and not see
to do, either by increasing a desire they are trying to the person any more but, if we want to be involved
fight or by diminishing or outweighing a desire which in a relationship, we cannot reasonably insist that we
is really in accord with their overall motivational never hear anything we don't want to hear. It is part
structure? of our life as moral agents that we need to learn to
negotiate through others' desires.
* * *
When it comes to sex, there is no doubt that, in * * *
some cases, the lover who tries to sell sex to his reluc-
tant partner truly thinks that she will be better off once CONCLUSION
she sees how great sex with him is. In others, the effort We need to expand our conceptual framework and
is surely not so disinterested, but it is again within the our terminology so that we can capture greater differ-
normal scope of relationships that we try to persuade ences than we typically do. There is a cultural tradition
others to do what we want and that that persuasion which has divided sexual intercourse into either mor-
is not purely rational. We need perhaps a more gen- ally unacceptable rape or morally acceptable nonrape.
eral recognition of the fact that, when it comes to sex, The truth is that there are many finer distinctions
the two parties involved may have a conflict of inter- which we need to recognize and to which we need to
ests and that cultural stereotypes and ideologies have develop a sensitivity. We do this in other areas, where
been invented which try to hide this fact. I I We cannot we recognize actions of deceit, hurtfulness, and dam-
assume that even the most romantic of encounters is age which are not the worst of transgressions and yet
not at heart adversarial. But adversarial interests may which are not morally neutral. We know generally
not make an action immoral. It is often fair enough that there is a difference between actions which (a)
that we want different things and that we try to get the infringe others' rights (say, stealing), (b) don't infringe
other person to do what we want. others' rights but are nonetheless wrong (like failing
And where such actions are immoral, where to give to someone in need), (c) are not wrong but
we go beyond the normal degree of dishonesty or which nonetheless evince bad character (giving to the
manipulation implicit in human relationships, the needy but only to feel your own superiority), and (d)
resulting intercourse may not be rape. It is not rape are none of these yet may nonetheless be regrettable
if the person asking for sex stays within what he has for their repercussions. What we need to understand is
a right to ask for. This is not to say that there are con- that sex is at least as complex as other areas of human
ditions where one has a right to have sex even if the interaction and has just as many varieties of wrong as
other person does not consent: there aren't. Rather, well as of good, and as we have been accustomed to
one has a right to ask for the other's consent and to differentiate within other areas of human interaction
try to persuade the other to give consent as long as so should we here.
one does this within legitimate parameters: the other To subsume all areas of sexual wrong under the
should be a competent adult, capable of making a heading of rape does a disservice to all concerned. It
hurts those whose laudable goal is just to show that sex explaining these actions again denigrates these women's
can be dark and hurtful; they lose credibility when they claim to autonomy. Perhaps the idea is that a truly autono-
are perceived as exaggerating, and their perfectly appro- mous being should be able to rise above cultural influence
priate criticisms of sexual practice may be dismissed. It when it comes to decisions about sex.
is bad for those who are the aggressors in any sexual 3. See Katie Roiphe's popular The Morning After: Sex, Fear, and
situation, who may feel that, as long as they have not Feminism on Campus (New York: Little, Brown, 1993). A more
committed rape, their actions are morally neutral: they balanced assessment of widening the scope of what is consid-
ered rape may be found in Linda Lemoncheck's "When Good
need to learn that actions outside of rape can be despi-
Sex Turns Bad: Rethinking a Continuum Model of Sexual
cable and to cultivate awareness as to which are and
Violence against Women," in A Most Detestable Crime, ed.
which are not morally acceptable forms of suasion. To Keith Burgess-Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
call all sexual wrongdoing rape also does a disservice to 1999), pp. 159-82.
those who have suffered the absolute terror of violent
4. Here, and generally, I am following Alan Wertheimer's
assault and whose suffering can't, I think, be compared account of coercion, as presented in Coercion (Princeton, N.].:
to that of the person who has reluctantly agreed to have Princeton University Press, 1987). Wertheimer explicates and
sex to avoid emotional distress. This may be a case where defends what he calls a two-pronged account of coercion,
analytical philosophy, with its conceptual distinctions where for A's threat to be coercive (1) A leaves B with no rea-
and semantic precision, can indeed explain something sonable choice and (2) A's proposal is wrongful, where the
to our sense of order and can actually be useful. wrongfulness relies on more than just the fact that A leaves
B no reasonable choice (pp. 30-31 ff.). One way in which A's
proposal can be wrongful is that it may be a proposal A has no
NOTES
right to make. Naturally, not everyone accepts this account
1. One well-known example of a college sexual offense policy of coercion. In particular, there are those who think coercion
which deviates greatly from the law is the Antioch College is a morally neutral term, so that to sayan act is coercive is
Sexual Offense policy. While the Antioch policy does not not to say that it is (even prima facie) morally wrong. Samuel
specifically address verbal coercion, it articulates two com- Dubois Cook in "Coercion and Social Change," in Coercion,
mon concerns: first, it says that rape can occur even where ed. Roland Pennock and John Chapman (Chicago: Aldine
there is no physical force or threat of physical force; second, it Atherton, 1972), pp. 107-43, argues, e.g., that a legitimate
introduces a far more stringent standard of what real consent government can rightfully coerce its citizens in some cases.
is than that in use in rape law. At Bates College, where I was For my purposes, this difference is simply one of word use.
teaching when writing this article, the description of rape in Those who think coercion is in itself a morally neutral term
the sexual offense policy includes acts of intercourse which can look at the question I address as whether coercion in the
have been consented to because of emotional pressure. When case of sex is legitimate.
asked, an administrator gave as an example of emotional 5. Again, I am following Wertheimer.
pressure a person repeatedly telling his girlfriend he would 6. The degree of harm reqUired to make the choice of sex the
break up with her if she would not have sex. See also an inter- only reasonable one open to the victim is naturally an issue of
esting exchange on the use of Pineau's article "Date Rape: debate. If a boss threatens to fire an employee if she does not
A Feminist AnalYSis" in the training of the student judicial have sex, some will argue that, while the use of power is clearly
board at Pomona College in its student paper, The Student illegitimate here, the harm is not sufficient to say the woman
Life, October 12 and November 2, 200l. has no reasonable choice. Those who agree with such a low
2. Of course, some will immediately answer this question estimate of harm will argue that this is rather merely sexual
by pointing to the inculcation of cultural mores, specifi- harassment. In the case of the young daughters threatened
cally those which make women feel they have an obliga- with the anger of their parent, I think such a harm is suffi-
tion to have sex, as mentioned earlier in this article. Some ciently great to make the pressure to have sex genuinely coer-
of those who propose holding women entirely respon- cive, and the ensuing sex rape. It may also be that, in the case
sible for their choices in these conditions, however, seem to of children and parents, the children have less than a com-
believe that pointing to the acceptance of cultural mores in plete ability to judge the degree of harm the parent may be
able to do them, since the parent's authority interferes with 11. Just as culture has veiled the conflict of interest which
their own ability to use their judgment. In such a case the may rise within romantic encounters, it has perhaps exag-
pressure to have sex may be seen as not only coercive but also gerated the danger to women from strangers. The idea that
as what I call seductive, in that it interferes with the reasoning predators lie in wait for women has been used to convince
process of the victim. I discuss seduction in Sec. III. women that they need protectors, which, in turn, may
7. This follows Wertheimer's account. make them more vulnerable to the men whom they see as
close to them: boyfriends, family members, even dates. See
S. We may assume here that not going to the dance would
Susan Griffin's seminal "Rape: The All American Crime,"
cause my son great pain.
first published in Ramparts (10 [September 1971]: 23-36),
9. Marcia Baron has influenced my views here on the and Claudia Card's "Rape as a Terrorist Institution," in
parameters of demands that may be made within Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, ed. R. G. Frey and Christo-
relationshi ps. pher W. Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
10. Remember what an insult it has been for a woman to be 1991), pp. 296-319.
called "frigid."
Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification

RAJ A HAL W ANI
Little has been written philosophically about casual Usually, but not invariably, the parties who engage
sex. In any case, casual sex is not usually considered in it do so with the sole intention of deriving sexual
morally good, even if there is agreement that its prac- pleasure from the act. Typical examples include two
titioners tend to find it pleasurable. I shall discuss the people picking each other up in a bar for the purpose
ethics of casual sex, arguing that from the point of of sex, people meeting through the Internet for sex,
view of virtue whether casual sex is immoral depends and anonymous encounters in gay bath houses and
on the case, but that in general it is not morally wrong straight swingers' clubs ("Plato'S Retreat" in New York
in itself. I also discuss objectification, a phenomenon City). Note some departures. First, the parties to a
that is thought to find a natural home in casual sex, casual sexual encounter may not be motivated solely
concluding that it does not deserve a sweeping nega- by sexual pleasure. Some do it for the money, as in sex
tive moral judgment; it, too, requires case-sensitive between a prostitute and client and sex between por-
judgments. nography actors. Second, people sometimes engage
in casual sex without intending to do so. Two people
I. WHAT IS CASUAL SEX? might pick each other up in a bar, proceed to have sex,
yet they intended (or hoped) that it would lead to a
It is difficult to define "casual sex" if we understand this
relationship. As it happens, the sex does not lead to a
to mean the prOVision of necessary and sufficient con-
relationship, so they end up having casual sex despite
ditions (Halwani 2006). Casual sex is sexual activity
their intentions.
that occurs outside the context of a love relationship.
Note also that casual sex is not promiscuity. 1
Raja Halwani, "Virtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and Objectification,"
Promiscuity has a built-in temporal and quantita-
from The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, ed. Alan Soble tive reqUirement lacking in the former, namely, that
and Nicholas Power, 337-49. © 2008. Used by permiSSion of a person engages in sex (which might not be casual
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. All rights reserved. in the usual sense) multiple times over a particular
period of time. (Specifying the number and the dura- To be virtuous, the agent must speak up because an
tion of the period is difficult.) Casual sex is not like innocent victim must be defended and an injustice
that; one can do it even only once in one's life (or a stopped, not because he is motivated by anticipated
lot). Second, some sexual practices fit the above char- rewards for doing so.
acterization of casual sex, but calling them "casual" Thus the virtuous agent is one who makes the right
seems bizarre: rape, bestiality, and necrophilia. decision about what to do in a particular situation,
If it is incorrect to label these "casual sex," then more makes this decision for the right reason, and feels the
needs to be done to ·fix the definition. I leave these s
right kind and amount of any associated emotion.
issues open, focusing on paradigmatic instances of Not all virtuous actions require the display of emotion,
casual sex. however. Some virtues have no necessary connection
to emotions, for example, magnanimity and magnifi-
cence (Hursthouse 1980-1981, 58). And some virtues
II. VIRTUE ETHICS deal with deSires, rather than emotions, as is the case
Virtue ethics is often construed as a moral theory with temperance. (This does not mean that emotions
independent of, and perhaps rivaling, other theo- are never experienced along with temperate action:
ries, such as consequentialism and Kantian ethics. 2 realizing that my hunky neighbor lusts after me as
Most virtue ethicists mine the writings of the ancient I lust after him, I strip for the ensuing sexual activity
Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, to develop a feeling not only desire but also joy and gratitude.)
plausible version. 3
Virtues and vices are character traits that dispose
their possessor, the agent, to act according to their III. CASUAL SEX AND VIRTUE
dictates (so to speak). On an Aristotelian view, the A virtue ethics approach is neither inherently hostile
virtues are infused with wisdom, a form of practi- to nor inherently in favor of sexual behavior. Aristo-
cal intelligence that allows the agent to differenti- tle's views on sex are found mostly in his treatment of
ate between what is right or proper to do, and what temperance-the virtue that best expresses the proper
is wrong or improper to do. The virtues incline their attitudes and actions towards bodily desires (Halwani
agents not only to behave rightly, thereby judging 2003 [chap. 3], 2007a; Young 1988). Whether a sexual
rightly how to proceed in a particular situation, but action or desire is permissible or worthwhile depends
also to exhibit, when applicable, the proper emotions. on the object of the action or deSire, much like
Consider courage. According to Aristotle, this whether fear is appropriate depends on its object (NE
virtue allows its agent to handle fear and dangerous 1118b2S). One question, then, is: Are people's desires
situations properly.4 He claims that the courageous for casual sex permissible or worthwhile? Is there any-
agent feels the right amount of fear when in danger; thing wrong with desiring to have casual sex?
otherwise he would be either rash or cowardly (NE Further, assuming that desires for casual sex are
111Sb17-20). The goods for the sake of which the morally permissible, ought they be acted on? The type
agent faces fear must be worthwhile (NE 111Sa10-1S). of desire, say, a desire for heterosexual, vanilla sex,
Overcoming one's fear and stepping into the bath- might be morally impeccable, yet acting on it in a par-
room despite the presence of a cockroach does not ticular case (having sex with my best friend's spouse)
count as being courageous-the good at stake is trivial. might not be. There might be types of casual sex such
By contrast, overcoming fear of retribution and repri- that desiring them is wrong and indicative of a lack of
sals and speaking up in a crowded and hostile room in virtue. For example, rape is wrong; if it is casual sex,
defense of an innocent victim would count as being then it is wrong casual sex, and both desiring it and
courageous. Aristotle also requires (NE 110Sa30- acting on the desire would be wrong. Similar reason-
110Sb1) that the agent must act for the right reason or ing applies to sex with children. Moreover, if sex with
out of the right motive (this is also required by Kant). animals or with corpses is wrong, and it is casual sex,
then it would be wrong casual sex, and so desiring it pleasures and goods of sex, though intense, are brief
would be wrong. But these cases are not exhaustive. and tend to vanish (as opposed to, say, the pleasures
Indeed, they are not even the types of casual sex that and goods of reading a book). One can fondly remem-
first come to mind, which include one-night stands, ber sexual encounters, and can even dwell on these
anonymous sexual encounters, and swinger sex. What memories, but this is not worthwhile, if the activities
seems to be wrong about rape, pedophilia, and so that one dwells on are not worthwhile to begin with.
forth, is something other than the fact that they are One can manifest excellence when it comes to sex, but
casual. They involve coercion, manipulation, decep- this, too, amounts to little if the activity at which one
tion, and harm, to name a few moral faults. In these excels is not worthwhile.
cases, desire indicates a defective character. I think this view is largely correct. Although sex
If we focus on the usual cases of casual sex, they is pleasurable, it is not the sort of activity to which
seem not to include these faults. 6 If two adults pick devoting one's life would be good. It is not an activity
each other up in a bar with the intention and the that ordinarily enriches the agent or leaves its mark on
knowledge that they are to have casual sex, what humanity. Here casual sex might be especially vulner-
might be wrong? Setting objectification aside for a able, since one cannot redeem it even on the grounds
moment, and assuming-contra Kane -that sexual that one meets interesting people and thereby
desire is not inherently morally suspicious, it would enriches one's life (as is often said about taxi drivers).
seem that nothing is wrong with desiring casual sex or The meetings tend to be fleeting; they involve super-
acting on the desire as long as, from a virtue-centered ficial conversations (if any) between strangers; one's
perspective, two conditions are satisfied (beyond that partner (and oneself) may well be dull and shallow.
the type of casual sex desired must avoid the standard Casual sex seems not to merit letting one's life revolve
wrong-making features). around it, let alone letting it consume one's life. How-
The first condition is one on which the advo- ever, the argument has limits: if casual sex and the
cates of virtue ethics must insist, given virtue theory's desire for it are not all-consuming, they could satisfy
inclusion of character and motives under the moral the first condition.
umbrella: the agent's desire for casual sex should not The second condition is another one on which
consume his or her life. That is, desires should not be advocates of virtue ethics would insist: what motivates
so strong or numerous that they overshadow other the parties is subject to moral assessment, and casual
important aspects of life. Further, there might be sex must be engaged in for the right reason. Some-
something especially pernicious about letting sexual times those who are motivated by desire for sexual
desire take control of one's life. s The first condition is pleasure have other motives that actually account for
bound to be controversial. Why should no single activ- their behavior. (Similarly, one might desire casual sex
ity take over one's life, if that activity is worthwhile? yet for some virtuous reason not engage in it.) One's
And if there is nothing morally wrong or vicious in motives or reasons must be morally permissible or
general with a worthwhile activity taking control of commendable. Having casual sex with X in order
one's life, why be suspicious of sex? Perhaps when to spite Y, to make Y jealous, or to exact revenge on
it comes to casual sex the idea is that an agent's life Yare morally pernicious motives. Morally permis-
being consumed by it is hard to defend, because sex sible motives might include making money, engag-
is not sufficiently worthwhile to justify sacrificing ing in leisurely activity, and wanting sexual pleasure.
other things. But casual sex is not special here, for life- Morally commendable motives go beyond what is
consuming sex between a loving couple would per- expected of people, for example, having casual sex
haps not redeem such lives. with X out of compassion for X, or having sex with X
There is a tradition in philosophy and theology, so that X knows what to do on X's wedding night.
which includes Plato, Augustine, and even John Stuart An Aristotelian virtue ethicist would also consider
Mill, that doesn't view sexual pleasure as valuable. The the role of casual sex in a flourishing-well-lived,
eudaimon-life. The concept of a flourishing life is cen- Furthermore, they might have very little going for
tral to Aristotle's ethics since it explains why people them under a philosophical (perhaps elitist) notion of
should be virtuous (NE 1097a15-1098a20). Casual sex what it is to live a worthwhile life: they are not astro-
might not consume one's life, might be done for the nauts, Proust scholars, or Piet Mondrians. They might
right reasons, and might not involve the usual wrong- be slow-witted or otherwise have bland personalities.
making features. Still, could it contribute to a flourish- Yet if they are physically attractive, the availability of
ing life? casual sex might be something that makes their lives
Sexual activity is often experienced as an urge that, better. Casual sex would help them lead enjoyable,
if not satisfied, leaves the agent agitated; it is generally even if not flourishing, lives.
pleasurable; in this and other ways it is an important
source of leisure; and it often functions as a release,
whereby the agent is able, afterward, to attend more IV. OBJECTIFICATION
freely and less anxiously to other matters. Consider, To objectify a person is to treat him or her only as
in this light, an agent who has a healthy sexual drive an object. For example, a person treats another as
but who either has no room for a romantic commit- an object if the first uses the second as a chair while
ment in her life or who, for some good reason, does reading the paper. If objectification is always morally
not desire such a commitment. She prefers to pursue wrong and is an essential feature of casual sex, casual
activities and projects central to her life. She might sex is always wrong. It would not avoid one of the stan-
then opt to conduct her sexual life by engaging in dard wrong-making characteristics of acts. Further,
casual sex, meeting sexual partners in bars, online, or it would be tainted to the extent that the desire for
having one or two "fuck buddies." Such a sex life helps casual sex included the vicious motive of objectifying
the agent flourish in the ways described above, Le., one's partner. Objectification poses a problem for any-
casual sex allows her to avoid the agitation of unsatis- one who thinks that casual sex is morally permissible.
fied deSire, it refreshes her for a return to her work, and Why assume that objectification is always morally
so forth. wrong? Its moral wrongness cannot simply be read
Now consider a couple, X and Y, who decide to jet- off from the definition; it is not obvious why treating
tison sexual fidelity. They might do so because their sex an entity that is not an object (in particular, a person)
has become boring or because they desire sexual vari- only as an object constitutes conclusive grounds for
ety. Extramarital sexual behavior should be conducted moral condemnation. Something else must be added,
cautiously, because it can lead to jealousy and insecu- to the effect that the person does not merit object-like
rity that endangers the relationship X and Y desire to treatment in virtue of some characteristic he has that
continue to have. Still, if conducted wisely, it might morally blocks object-like treatment. So, in treating
lead to enriching their sexual lives without detracting the person only as an object, one is trespassing this
from their lives and pursuits. It might even strengthen moral boundary. For persons, it might be their ratio-
their love, allowing them to see how valuable they are nality, sophisticated desires and mental structures,
to each other and how much they want to be with each hopes, Wishes, happiness, capacity for flourishing
9
other. And their casual sex may make their lives more or eudaimollia, or their affinity to God that morally
pleasant. If properly and wisely engaged in, casual sex elevates them above objects. Note that any of these
can enrich an otherwise eudaimoll life by making it features-not only rationality-could be the basis on
more pleasant and allowing the agents to pursue their which persons can legitimately demand nonobjectify-
life-projects more comfortably. ing treatment. Objectification, then, though it has its
Finally, consider people who are not especially natural home and origin in Kantian ethics, is a concept
Virtuous, but are not vicious, either. Because the that fits well with other moral frameworks, including
virtues are necessary for flourishing, according to virtue ethics. If the feature specified cannot do the job
Aristotle, these people are not living their lives well. of morally elevating us above objects (or animals),
those who think objectification is always morally gum, in a civil fashion, is a form of respect: I respect his
wrong will have to find other arguments (Soble 2002, wishes to be treated as a seller and kindly, not merely
chap. 2). I shall not pursue this approach. someone to be abused and robbed. This is no less true
Why assume that objectification is an essential in casual sex; in typical cases, the partners attend to
feature of casual sex? In typical cases of casual sex, two each other's sexual needs, desires, and wishes. Indeed,
people engage in sex only for sexual pleasure. In doing even when X complies with Y's demand, "Yes! Use me
so, we might argue, they use each other-treating like a lemon sucked dry:' X would not be objectify-
each other as objects, as sophisticated dildos or plas- ing Y, for in treating Y as nothing but a body part, X
tic vaginas-for the purpose of pleasure. Even when is doing Y's bidding. The operative phrase is "doing
one party has other reasons or motives (money), there Y's bidding," and it is hard to see how abiding by Y's
is still objectification, for X uses Y to fulfill that pur- wishes and desires one is objectifying Y, that is, treat-
pose. This argument need not rely on the implausible ing Y merely as an object.
assumption that in typical cases of casual sex the par- Note that this argument does not deny that objec-
ties intend to objectify each other. Even if X does not tification occurs in some cases of casual sex, in which,
intend to objectify Y, X still does so in and by using Y say, one partner treats the other as a piece of meat.
for sexual pleasure. Such cases are unlikely to be frequent, since the used
The defender of casual sex can adopt two strate- person, realizing that he or she is being used in self-
gies. First, it can be argued that although objectifica- ish ways, opts out of the activity (unless he or she is
tion is an essential feature of casual sex, objectification unable or afraid to), and since such behavior is largely
is not always wrong. Second, it can be argued that confined to deranged individuals. Note also that this
objectification is not an essential feature of casual sex, argument does not deny that in casual sex the focus
and that whether casual sex objectifies depends on the is on sex itself and the body of one's partner, rather
particular case. I adopt the second strategy. than on some purportedly more substantial feature.
How can a particular casual sex act not be objecti- Indeed, few things can disrupt the mood of casual
fying? If objectification is to treat someone who is not sex act as well as intellectual conversation. But it does
an object merely as an object, attending to the phe- not follow that objectification is occurring, unless
nomenology involved in casual sex helps us see how. to it also follows (which I cannot see that it does) from
Casual sex partners do not usually think of each other my focusing on a dancer's body that I am objectifying
as mere objects. A woman who picks up a man in a bar her, or focusing on a chef's hands as he swiftly dices an
does so precisely because she thinks him a man, not onion is objectification. If so, objectification is not an
a cleverly constructed robot or a penis with some sort essential feature of casual sex, and casual sex cannot
of body attached to it. A gay man who sucks another's be sweepingly faulted on this score.
peniS through a glory hole does so precisely because he Perhaps the defense of casual sex has gone through
thinks the penis is attached to a man, a man whom he so easily because we have been employing a superfi-
likely saw earlier and was attracted to. Thus, the parties cial definition of objectification. As argued by Martha
to casual sex usually desire interaction with other per- Nussbaum (1995), objectification may be more com-
sons, not objects. On its own, this fact means little, for plex, and treating someone as an object can take many
even as we know that our casual sexual partner is a performs and have different meanings. If so, a defense of
son, we can nonetheless proceed to objectify him or casual sex should take this complexity into account. Of
her. But the fact is still important in reminding us that the seven senses of "objectification" Nussbaum lists,
casual sexual interaction is close to many other types however, only two pose difficulties; the other five-
of human interaction, sexual and nonsexual. In casual denial of autonomy, inertness, violability, ownership,
sex, as elsewhere, we are aware of the humanity of and denial of subjectivity-do not. On the contrary,
others, and we usually attempt to respect their wishes, what typically occurs during casual sex is the opposite.
desires, and wants. Paying the grocer for the chewing In taking into account my partner's sexual deSires, I
consider him to have autonomy, sell-determination, Does this argument show that fungibility is mor-
and agency. Furthermore, I do not consider him to be ally innocuous objectification, or that fungibility is
violable, for I attribute to him boundaries and integrity not objectification, period? If objectification is always
in two ways: first, by not treating him contrary to his morally wrong, as I have presumed, then fungibility
desires and, second, precisely by treating him in accor- cannot be objectification, because not all cases of treat-
dance with his desires. I also, for the same reasons, do ing people as fungible are morally wrong. We can add
not treat him as an owned object. Finally, in taking his that in permissible fungibility-buying and selling
sexual desires into account, I certainly do not treat him merchandise, selecting hotels for vacationing, pick-
"as something whose experience and feelings ... need ing up people in bars, hiring people for jobs-those
not be taken into account" (257). making the choices treat others in a fungible way, but
This leaves us with two objectifications, instru- they do not treat them as objects, because both the
mentality and fungibility. Instrumentality is a prob- selected and rejected people have made the choice to
lem only if the person is treated merely as a tool (which compete with others for special attention, whether
Nussbaum acknowledges, 265). But people frequently this attention be economic, sexual, academic, etc. The
use each other as tools (students use teachers for edu- respectful treatment of others that occurs here nulli-
cational purposes; teachers use students for career pur- fies objectification.
poses). In interactions with each other, if we use each The reason why fungibility seems wrong is that
other as tools but also, in doing so, act in accordance it is like treating people like pens or paper cups, dis-
with each other's Wishes and deSires, it seems that carding one and using another for our own purposes.
objectification disappears. Since in casual sex the part- But this indicates that fungibility is wrong when it
ners typically do this, instrumentalization, understood occurs with actions that are otherwise wrong, in
as the mere use of another as a tool, is not a problem. which case fungibility itself is not the problem,11 or
Fungibility-the treatment of something or when it occurs in special relationships. For example,
someone ((as interchangeable (a) with other objects were I to own five slaves whom I treated like pens,
of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other consigning each to the trash bin when they ceased
types" (Nussbaum 1995, 257)-is an interesting type to be useful, I would be treating them fungibly.
of objectification. When we objectify someone, he The wrongness here, however, stems from my
would make perfect sense were he to say, ((I demand treating them as objects to begin with, not the result-
that I not be treated this way," given that we ought ing fungibility. If I kidnap my neighbor's child and
not to objectify people. However, fungibility does not bring them a child from the local shelter, declaring
license such reactions. Suppose I enter a coffee shop, "Have this one. He'll do," the wrongness is fungibil-
do not like the selection, and go somewhere else. In ity, but only because I acted, wrongly, as if no spe-
doing so, I treat the owner of the store as fungible with cial relationship had existed between parent and
other coffee shop owners. Yet for him to protest that child, that is, as if any child of a certain age would
I have wronged him in this treatment would be silly. for them be an adequate substitute. Now, if I were in
Similarly, if I go to a bar in search of casual sex, no one a bar cruising for a one-night stand, eyeing poten-
can demand that I pick him or her up. In conSidering tial sexual partners, I would be treating them as
people as ((interchangeable with other objects of the fungible; I view them, individually, as interchange-
same type" I do nothing wrong. When objectification able with other men in general or with other men
is wrong, others can demand of objectifiers that they, of a particular sort, say, thirty-something Indian or
the objectified, not be objectified. This seems out of Pakistani men ("of the same type"). But since none
place regarding fungibility. Unless I have preexisting of them can rightly demand of me that I sleep with
obligations, no one can demand of me that I purchase him, and since I cannot sexually impose myself on
coffee from his shop rather than another shop or that I anyone of them or demand of anyone of them
have sex with him instead of someone else. that he sleep with me, in treating them as fungible
I not only do not do them wrong, I do not objectify REFERENCES

them. So fungibility, when it comes to casual sex, Anscombe, G. E. M. 1972. "Contraception and Chastity." The
should be stricken from the list of possible ways to Human World 7, 9-30.
objectify others. Aristotle. 1999. [ca. 330 BCE] Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.
Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett.
I have argued that virtue ethics morally permits Baumrin, Bernard. 1984. "Sexual Immorality Delineated."
casual sex in some cases but not in others. Virtue eth- In Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston, eds., Philosophy
ics also allows that an otherwise flourishing life can and Sex, 2nd ed. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 300-11.
be enriched by casual sex. Moreover, objectification Carnes, Patrick. 1983. The Sexual Addiction. Minneapolis,
in casual sex is much less frequent than thought; it Minn.: Compcare.
Denis, Lara. 1999. "Kant on the Wrongness of 'Unnatural
requires morally nasty behavior in which casual sex- Sex.''' History ofPhilosophy Quarterly 16: 225-48.
ual partners do not usually engage. _ _ 2007. "Sex and the Virtuous Kantian Agent." In
Raja Halwani, ed., Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality,
Virtue, and the Good Life. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
37-48.
NOTES
Dent, N. j. H. 1984. The Moral Psychology of the Virtues.
1. One essay whose title claims to "revisit" casual sex is about Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
promiscuity (Kristjansson 1998). For more on casual sex and Driver, julia. 2001. Uneasy Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge
promiscuity, see Anscombe 1972; Ellis 1986; Elliston 1975; University Press.
Halwani 2003 (chap. 3), 2006, and 2007b. Ellis, Anthony. 1986. "Casual Sex." International Journal of
Moral and Social Studies 1:157-69.
2. See Foot 2001 and Hursthouse 1999. Elliston, Frederick. 1975. "In Defense of Promiscuity." In
3. Not all do. See Swanton 2003 for a Nietzschean version of Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston, eds., Philosophy and
some virtues. Sex, 1st ed. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 223-43.
Finnis,john. 1994. "Law, Morality, and 'Sexual Orientation.'"
4. Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth NE).
Notre Dame Law Review 69: 1049-76.
5. Not all virtue ethiCists agree; see Driver 2001, especially Foot, Philippa. 2001. Natural Goodness. New York: Oxford
chap. 5, for an account not requiring right motives. University Press.
Halwani, Raja. 2003. Virtuous Liaisons: Care, Love, Sex, and
6. There might be manipulation, such as using cosmetics to
Virtue Ethics. Chicago: Open Court.
conceal wrinkles, but this does not seem to be morally objec- - _ 2006. "Casual Sex." In Alan Soble, ed., Sex from Plato
tionable (Baumrin 1984, 301). to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia. Westport, Conn.:
7. Kant argued that sexual acts were objectifying in virtue Greenwood Press, 136-42.
of the nature of sexual desire (Lectures on Ethics, 162-70). - _ 2007a. "Sexual Temperance and Intemperance."
On Kant, see Mappes 2002; Denis 1999, 2007; Soble 2007b. In Raja Halwani, ed., Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality,
Virtue, and the Good Life. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
8. See Dent 1984, especially chap. 2 and 5; Carnes 1983; Soble 122-33.
2007a,241-47. - _ 2007b. "Casual Sex, Promiscuity, and Temperance."
9. This case indicates that wedding sex to love or intimacy In Raja Halwani, ed., Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality,
is not necessary, as some (Finnis 1994; Scruton 1986, chap. 11) Virtue, and the Good Life. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
have maintained. 215-25.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1980-1981. "A False Doctrine of
10. See Scruton 1986, especially chap. 5, 6, and 11, for a simi- the Mean." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:
lar argument that has a different conclusion. 57-72.
11. Nussbaum seems to accept this point about fungibility, - - . 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University
unwittingly, when she states, "the suspicion remains that Press.
Kant, Immanuel. [ca. 1780] Lectures on Ethics. Trans. Louis
there may ... be some connection between the spirit of fungi-
Infield. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1963.
bility and a focus on these superficial aspects of race and class
Krist jansson, Krist jan. 1998. "Casual Sex Revisited." Journal of
and penis Size, which do in a sense dehumanize, and turn Social Philosophy 29: 97-108.
people into potential instruments" (287). The problem here Mappes, Thomas. 2002. "Sexual Morality and the Concept
is dehumanization and instrumentalization, not fungibility. of Using Another Person." In Thomas Mappes and Jane
Zembaty, eds., Sodal Ethics: Morality and Sodal Policy, 6th _ _ 2007a. "Concealment and Exposure: A Mostly Tem-
ed. Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 157-64. perate and Courageous Afterword." In Raja Halwani, ed.,
Nussbaum, Martha. 1995. "Objectification." Philosophy and Sex and Ethics: Essays 011 Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good
Public Affairs 24: 249-91. Life. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 229-52.
Plato. [ca. 380 BCE] Symposium. Trans. Alexander Nehemas _ _ 2007b. "Sexual Use." In this volume, chapter 18.
and Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1989. Swanton, Christine. 2003. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View.
Scruton, Roger. 1986. Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the New York: Oxford University Press.
Erotic. New York: Free Press. Young, Charles. 1988. "Aristotle on Temperance." PIli/osoplri-
Soble, Alan. 2002. Pornography, Sex, and Feminism. Amherst, cal Review 97: 521-42.
N.Y.: Prometheus.
CHAPTER 16
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~ ~
~"'~
Tolerance, Civility, and Free Speech
Modern democracies are teeming ecosystems of when we don't prevent or prohibit someone from
racial and cultural diversity that value pluralism, voicing views or doing things that we don't like.
striving to make coexistence work with minimal We may be wrong to dislike those views or actions,
rips in the social fabric. They would soon tear them- and our motivations for our dislike may be deplor-
selves to pieces if it were not for some commitment able, but we can still be said to be tolerant when
to political and social tolerance. we object to, or disagree with, something but toler-
But tolerance can take-and has taken-many ate it anyway. In this sense, we say that someone
forms, and there is often disagreement and conflict tolerates the bad habits of a friend, a theocratic
about how the realities of tolerance and intoler- state tolerates a minority religion, an autocratic
ance affect people's lives. Although most citizens regime tolerates dissent, a church tolerates hereti-
would probably say tolerance is a good thing, there cal priests, a religious community tolerates gay
is often confusion about what it is. The philosopher people.
Christine T. Sistare gives this example: Civility is more than tolerance. It essentially
The following exchange, which occurred in one involves showing respect for people-not just put-
of my classes, provides us with an anecdotal start- ting up with them, not just avoiding hurting them
ing point. "You're being intolerant," one of my or infringing on their rights. The philosopher Joan
students said to another during discussion. The McGregor explains it this way:
accused student promptly fell silent. I, who had
thought all was proceeding well, asked, "Intoler- Civility encompasses everything from good man-
ant? How?" "Because," responded the offended ners to the so-called civic virtues. Civility requires
party, "She thinks some ideas are better than oth- that we use the "magic words" with strangers as well
ers." To my dismay, the student described in these as with friends and family: we must say "please"
terms blushed, mumbled an embarrassed demur- and "thank you" for services given. It reqUires that
ral, and refused to participate further. Indeed, no we address others formally until given permission
one else was willing to take up the topic, again, to do otherwise.
and what had been a lively conversation simply Civility is essentially about our treatment of
ended."} strangers; it is an ethic for relating to strangers.
Civility requires in some basic sense that we exhibit
The error here is thinking that tolerance respect toward them. Some of this respect is in the
implies an absence of norms, that to be tolerant is form of accepted conventions about good man-
to approve of everything or to have no objections ners, and other forms of respect are exemplified in
to anyone's beliefs or behavior. The core meaning more generalized but less ritualized treatment of
strangers. Civility involves treating others as if they
of political and social tolerance, however, is put-
matter. The standards are those that go beyond the
ting up with or enduring beliefs, actions, or prac- moral minimum; that is, they include more than
tices that we consider to be wrong. We are tolerant merely not violating people's rights. 2
535
ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND of toleration, including one he calls the respect

conception:
What's the good of tolerance? Why should we tol-
erate the views or conduct of others? Philosophers [In this paradigm] the tolerating parties respect one
another in a more reciprocal sense. Even though
have offered several answers. First, we have a moral
they differ fundamentally in their ethical beliefs
obligation to respect the autonomy and freedom of about the good and true way of life and in their
others to choose their own way. Second, no one is cultural practices, citizens recognize one another as
infallible, and if we don't know for certain what the moral-political equals in the sense that their com-
truth is, we have no reason to suppress other views. mon framework of social life should-as far as fun-
That is, the sincere search for truth and knowledge damental questions of rights and liberties and the
requires tolerance. Third, tolerance allows differing distribution of resources are concerned-be guided
by norms that all parties can equally accept and
ideas and contrasting ways of life to mingle and
that do not favor one specific ethical or cultural
compete, which leads to better societies. Diver-
community.3
sity, in other words, is good for human flourish-
ing. Fourth, tolerance has been the fairest and most He notes two versions of this conception:
effective means devised for dealing with serious The ["formal equality" model] operates on a strict
social and political disagreement. distinction between the political and the private
In the West, the idea of political tolerance, or realm, according to which ethical (Le., cultural
toleration, was first seriously entertained during or religious) differences among citizens of a legal
the religious wars in Europe between Catholics state should be confined to the private realm,
and Protestants. Attempts to impose one common so that they do not lead to conflicts in the politi-
religion on all the people had resulted in horren- cal sphere. This version is clearly exhibited in the
"secular republicanism" of the French authorities
dous suffering and bloodshed and seemingly end-
who held that headscarves with a religious mean-
less conflict. Some form of peaceful coexistence ing have no place in public schools in which chil-
through toleration seemed far preferable. The first dren are educated to be autonomous citizens ....
attempts at political tolerance now would seem In other words, the "formal equality" model tends
intolerable: a ruler preferring his own religion over to be intolerant toward ethical-cultural forms of life
others agrees to tolerate their existence while treat- that require a public presence that is different from
ing their adherents as less than equal citizens and traditional and hitherto dominant cultural forms.
reserving the right to revoke toleration on a whim. The "qualitative equality" model is less concerned
One example of the latter is the Revocation of the about maintaining this public/private distinction:
Edict of Nantes in 1685, which ended nearly a cen-
On the "qualitative equality" model, persons
tury of political toleration of the Protestant French
respect each other as political equals with a certain
Huguenots. distinct ethical-cultural identity that needs to be
Philosophers and theologians went to work on respected and tolerated as something that (a) is espe-
toleration and devised various justifications for cially important for a person and (b) can provide
it, as well as theories on how it should be imple- good reasons for certain exceptions from or gen-
mented in political systems. Today every modern eral changes in existing legal and social structures.
democracy includes toleration (although imper- Social and political equality and integration are thus
seen to be compatible with cultural difference-
fectly) as an essential element, but the best way to
within certain (moral) limits of reciprocity.4
ensure a truly tolerant society has been, and will
continue to be, debated. Political tolerance is an attribute of govern-
Rainer Forst, author of Toleration in Conflict: ments expressed through laws, regulations, and
Past and Present, outlines several major conceptions policies. SOCial, or interpersonal, tolerance is a
CHAPTER 16: TOLERANCE, CIVILITY, AND FREE SPEECH 0 537
moral virtue expressed in people's attitudes and how tolerant a society should be in the face of intol-
behavior toward one another. Both kinds of toler- erance. But he saw the threat of intolerance differ-
ance come in degrees, as Sistare explains: ently than Popper did. He thought a decent and
The significance of allowing others to speak and just society should tolerate the intolerant when-
be heard, of maintaining an open forum for the ever possible and should suspend tolerance only
expression of ideas, explains, in part, the common when the intolerant are resolved to destroy SOciety.
association of tolerance with rights of free speech A Rawlsian society is willing to tolerate a great deal
and expression. But tolerance also requires leaving of intolerant speech and behavior.
open the possibility for people to live their lives, The central moral question about tolerance is
engage in religious practices, and otherwise con-
where to draw the line between what to tolerate
duct themselves in ways of which we disapprove. A
low degree of tolerance is exhibited when lifestyles and what is intolerable. On this question theo-
and practices outside the mainstream are permitted rists remind us that there is a difference between
on condition of their being kept private. The now respecting others' views and respecting their right
infamous Udon't ask; don't tell" policy adopted by to hold such views. Tolerance does not demand
the U.S. military toward its gay and lesbian mem- that we accept or value anyone's opinions-only
bers exemplifies this conditional toleration .... that we grant them the right to have and voice
We can picture a continuum of degrees of tol-
those opinions.
eration, using homosexuality as an example. At
one end, the state does not criminalize, and to that In recent years, civility among competing fac-
extent allows, homosexuality; at the other end, tions has become almost as troubling an issue as tol-
gays and lesbians are given full legal rights, includ- erance has, especially in debates about free speech
ing legal recognition of lifetime partnerships, pro- on college campuses. In the name of civility, many
tection from discrimination in any form, and so have called for sanctions against those who speak
on. Between and beyond these official modes of the uncivil language of racism, bigotry, and intoler-
tolerance, subtler forms and gradations of social
ance. Those accused of such incivility have asserted
tolerance will be found: non heterosexuals are read-
ily accepted in all professions, open expressions of their right to speak as they please. And many who
antipathy to homosexuals are deemed as offensive are targets of uncivil speech have resented the con-
as racist slurs, the marginal location of homosexuals straints that rules of civility have put on their abil-
and those who are intolerant of them is inverted. s ity to respond to such abuse. Civility as a moral
requirement is more complicated than many sup-
In the concept of tolerance there lurks a para-
pose. Sigal R. Ben-Porath, author of Free Speech on
dox, one that vexes those who wonder why they
Campus, for example, cautions that adherence
must be tolerant of the intolerant. In 1945, just as
to overly strict conventions of civility can be an
Nazi aggreSSion and racism had finally been van-
impediment to free speech and open debate:
quished, the philosopher Karl Popper declared that
in order to survive, a tolerant SOciety must, para- Civility requires both too little and too much: it
doxically, claim the right not to be tolerant of the reqUires too little in that it is based on norms of
intolerant. Otherwise, the intolerant will eventu- respectability and reasonableness rather than on
ally destroy the SOCiety. He said he didn't mean that substance (which could make it acceptable, for
we should suppress all intolerant philosophies, but instance, to express racist views as long as it is done
that we should consider any incitement to intoler- in a civil manner); it requires too much in that it
further marginalizes those whose anger, frustra-
ance and persecution as equivalent to incitement
tion, and other emotions are deemed uncivil and
to crimes like murder or kidnapping. thus unacceptable ....
John Rawls, another great twentieth-century [Civilitylleans too strongly to the side of order,
philosopher, agreed that there must be limits to reasonableness, and avoidance of challenge. To
l
protect inclusive free speech, much more room not get sidetracked by personal issues, matters
should be made for messy, inappropriate, challeng- of personality, or other facts irrelevant to the
ing, and sometimes uncivil expression .... argument. Pointing out your opponent's bad
Calls for civility in the exercise of free speech grammar or poor spelling is unnecessary and
can too easily be used to suppress and exclude others
by posing requirements of decorum and politeness distracting.
and demands about content of speech, focusing on • Show your opponent moral respect, and expect
what can permissibly be discussed "in polite com- them to do the same. Give them a fair hearing;
pany." Instead, inclusive freedom should be satis-
don't make unwarranted assumptions about
fied with what Teresa Bejan calls "mere civility," or
the minimal, even begrudging norms of respectful their motives, politics, values, or background.
behavior needed to keep the conversation going. 6 Avoid sarcasm, rudeness, snide comments, and
remarks that you would consider discourteous
Incivility, of course, is a defining characteristic if they were directed at you. Name-calling dis-
of life in cyberspace. Even if you manage to side- rupts, diverts, or ends conversations.
step all the fake news, delusional thinking, bad
arguments, hoaxes, and hype, you must still some- • Try to thoroughly understand your opponent's
how contend with the wastewater of incivility that objections. By doing so you increase your
washes through social media 24/7. There are at chances of winning the argument and learning
least two challenges here. One is about surviving something you didn't know.
in this nasty arena-aVOiding pointless conflicts • Empathize. Try to understand not just the
and playing offense and defense when necessary other person's argument and point of view but
without violating your own sense of civility and what motivates it and what their deepest con-
self-respect. The other is more important and more cerns are. Your show of empathy can calm the
rewarding than online pugilism. It's about intellec- discussion and help you both reach mutual
tual civility-the skills you need to engage in sin- understanding.
cere, honest, productive debate on an important
issue. Intellectual civility constitutes the unwritten • Control your emotions. If you get angry, frus-
rules of all scholarly exchanges, rational argument, trated, or exasperated, your thinking may
and fruitful airing of differences. become impaired, you may start appealing to
Yes, there is such a thing as productive, civil feelings instead of arguments, and the con-
online debate. It happens most often in serious and versation may veer off in an unproductive
thoughtful blogs, websites, e-journals, nonparti- direction.
san forums, and comment streams. Here's how to • Stay away from forums that are too truncated or
ensure a bare minimum of intellectual civility and too rambunctious for serious argument or care-
get the most out of the experience: fully wrought opinions (Twitter, for example).
o First, avoid people who are interested only in Nowhere have concerns about intolerance and
baiting or trolling you, grandstanding, scoring incivility intersected more fiercely than on the
points, proving a pet theory, letting off steam, issue of free speech on college cam puses. For exam-
or killing time. Gravitate toward those who, ple, in 2017 at Middlebury College in Vermont,
like you, are looking for an intelligent discus- student protesters disrupted a speech by a contro-
sion where they hope to learn something. versial scholar, shouting him down, turning their
o Keep the focus on the argument, on the quality backs to him, shoving him, pulling fire alarms,
of the logic and the truth of the premises. Do and injuring a faculty member in the melee. The
CHAPTER 16: TOLERANCE. CIVILITY. AND FREE SPEECH 0 539
-
"""--
"~
The Intolerance of liberals and Conservatives
Liberals accuse conservatives of intolerance. Con- Science. They asked a variety of Americans about
servatives accuse liberals of the same. Who is really their political ideologies; how much they valued
more intolerant? Here's a summary of some of the traditionalism, egalitarianism and self-reliance;
relevant research on the topic. and their feelings toward eight groups of people,
four of them liberal (feminists, atheists, leftist pro-
Research over the years has shown that in indus- testers and pro-choice people) and four of them
trialized nations, social conservatives and religious conservative (supporters of the traditional fam-
fundamentalists possess psychological traits, such ily, religious fundamentalists, Tea Party protest-
as the valuing of conformity and the desire for ers and pro-life people). Participants reported
certainty, that tend to predispose people toward how much each group violated their "core values
prejudice. Meanwhile, liberals and the nonreli- and beliefs," and they assessed how much they
gious tend to be more open to new experiences, supported discrimination toward that group,
a trait associated with lower prejudice. So one by rating their agreement with statements such
might expect that, whatever each group's own as "Feminists should not be allowed to make a
ideology, conservatives and Christians should be speech in this city" and "Prolife people deserve
inherently more discriminatory on the whole. any harassment they receive."
But more recent psychological research . . . As predicted, conservatives were more dis-
shows that it's not so simple. These findings con- criminatory than liberals toward liberal groups,
firm that conservatives, liberals, the religious and and liberals were more discriminatory than con-
the nonreligious are each prejudiced against those servatives toward conservative groups. Conserva-
with opposing views. But surprisingly, each group tives' discrimination was driven by their higher
is about equally prejudiced. While liberals might traditionalism and by liberal groups' apparent vio-
like to think of themselves as more open-minded, lation of their values. Liberals' discrimination was
they are no more tolerant of people unlike them driven by their lower traditionalism and by conser-
than their conservative counterparts are. vative groups' apparent violation of their values.
Political understanding might finally stand a Complicating matters, conservatives highly valued
chance if we could first put aside the argument self-reliance, which weakened their discrimina-
over who has that bigger problem. The truth is tion toward liberal groups, perhaps because self-
that we all do. reliance is associated with the freedom to believe
When Mark Brandt, an American-trained psy- or do what one wants. And liberals highly valued
chologist now at Tilburg University in the Nether- universalism, which weakened their discrimina-
lands, first entered graduate school, he wondered tion toward conservative groups, likely because
why members of groups that espouse tolerance universalism espouses acceptance of all.
are so often intolerant. "I realized that there was But these differences didn't affect the larger
a potential contradiction in the literature," he told picture: Liberals were as discriminatory toward
me. "On the one hand, liberals have a variety of per- conservative groups as conservatives were toward
sonality traits and moral values that should protect liberal groups. And Brandt's findings have been
them from expressing prejudice. On the other hand, echoed elsewhere: Independently and concur-
people tend to express prejudice against people who rently, the labs of John Chambers at St. Louis Uni-
do not share their values." So, if you value open- versity and Jarret Crawford at The College of New
mindedness, as liberals claim to do, and you see another Jersey have also found approximately equal preju-
group as prejudiced, might their perceived prejudice dice among conservatives and liberals. *
actually increase your prejudice against them?
Brandt approached this question with Geoffrey *Matthew Hutson, "Why Liberals Aren't as Tolerant as
Wetherell and Christine Reyna in a 2013 paper They Think," Politico.com, May 9,2017. Reprinted by
published in Social Psychological and Personality permission of Politico LLC.
speaker was Charles Murray, author of The Bell groups through offensive speech that many con-
Curve and Coming Apart, who argues that race and sider a form of violence.
intelligence determine social and economic status. The response of many colleges and universities
Many have charged him with racism, and scholars to hate speech has been to enact speech codes-
have denounced his work as pseudoscience and campus regulations that ban the use of language or
bigotry. A conservative student group had invited symbols thought to embody hate speech. The free
Murray to Middlebury, but hundreds of students speech scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard
and alumni opposed the invitation. The protesters Gillman provide this illustration:
chanted, "Racist, sexist, anti-gay, Charles Murray One of the most prominent examples involved the
go away!" University of Michigan, which was motivated to
Earlier in the year, an even more violent pro- devise a hate speech code after some truly horren-
test against an invited speaker occurred at the Uni- dous events on campus. In 1987, flyers were distrib-
versity of California-Berkeley. A group of student uted that declared "open season" on blacks. Blacks
were referred to as Usaucer lips," uporch monkeys,"
Republicans had invited the right-wing provoca-
and Ujigaboos." A student disc jockey allowed racist
teur and writer Milo Yiannopoulos to speak on jokes to be broadcast on the campus radio station,
campus. They billed the speech as a way to rattle and student demonstrations were interrupted by
the liberal campus with a seldom-heard conserva- the display of a KKK uniform from a nearby dorm
tive viewpoint. But the speech was canceled when window. Another flyer proclaimed, "Niggers get off
a large group of student protesters gathered and campus" and "Darkies don't belong in classrooms-
activists exploded fireworks, hurled bricks, set fires, they belong hanging from trees." The university
and smashed windows. had to respond to such horrific expression. 7
The same kind of scenario has played out at The perceived harm of offensive speech has also
other institutions of higher learning. Speakers have prompted calls for: "trigger warnings" on course
been disinvited or prevented from speaking by loud materials that are considered demeaning or trau-
or violent protests. In most cases, students were matic; the resignations of newspaper editors after
objecting to speech that they thought demeaned, publishing provocative articles; the dismissal of
subordinated, or marginalized vulnerable groups administrators when their views contradict those
like African Americans, women, and the LGBTQ held by some campus organizations; and "safe
community. In their view, free speech must not be spaces" for students who wish to retreat from expo-
used as an excuse to harm already disadvantaged sure to offensive or unwelcome speech.
groups. The central conflict in campus free speech
In many other instances, speech on campus has controversies is between two moral goods that are
been censored or punished because it was deemed crucial to higher education: (1) free speech that
harmful or offensive. In all such cases, students enables the expression of all ideas and the unfet-
believe the moral evil to be avoided or defeated is tered search for truth, and (2) a campus envi-
hate speech-oral or written words used to insult, ronment that protects and respects the learning
disparage, or attack people based on their social experiences of all students. Many who are caught
or racial/ethnic group. Hate speech, they insist, up in free speech debates seem to accept that there
should be banned, censored, or punished because is no way to accommodate both moral ideals. A
it harms those who are its victims. It can harm peo- large number of students believe that offensive
ple, some say, by causing emotional and physical speech, especially hate speech, should be sup-
distress, insulting the dignity of individuals, sub- pressed or punished. Protecting minorities from
ordinating minorities, and "assaulting" vulnerable verbal harm, they insist, is more important than
freedom of speech. Others favor the unimpeded holds dear. Under U.S. law, the reasons for limit-
exercise of free speech-regardless of its effects on ing speech are few and narrowly defined, and they
others. Their view is that for the sake of democ- include such things as libel, threats, and obscenity.
racy and the search for knowledge, speech-even if Much of American history is the story of free
offensive, racist, politically incorrect, or divisive- speech-how the Founders wove it into the fabric
must not be restricted. of our democratic ideals, how it was challenged and
Some see a middle path between these opposing strengthened through the years, how it gave dis-
positions where both values can be accommodated. senters and reformers the means to fight for social
Ben-Porath, for example, argues for what she calls justice, how the courts came to see it as the funda-
inclusive freedom-an approach to free speech on mental right that supported all the others, and how
campus that takes into account the necessity of it made social and intellectual progress possible.
protecting free speech in order to protect democ- Many free speech historians remind citizens
racy and the pursuit of knowledge while recogniz- of how much depends on their right to speak and
ing the equal necessity of making sure that all are write freely. The philosopher John Arthur explains:
included in the ensuing conversation. s
Part of the difficulty in reaching well-reasoned First, as J. S. Mill argued long ago, free and unfet-
conclusions about free speech is the lack of under- tered debate is vital for the pursuit of truth. If
knowledge is to grow, people must be free to put
standing of what free speech is, what the Constitu-
forth ideas and theories they deem worthy of con-
tion and the Supreme Court say about protected sideration, and others must be left equally free to
(allowed) and unprotected speech, what the his- criticize them. Even false ideas should be protected,
toric connection has been between free speech and Mill argued, so that the truth will not become mere
struggles for social justice, and what reasons people dogma, unchallenged and little understood. "How-
have for their views on free speech. ever true [an opinion] may be," he wrote, "if it is
Free speech-the right to express one's opin- not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it
ions or ideas without burdensome restraints from will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth." ...
Free speech is also an essential feature of demo-
government or SOciety-is both a moral and a legal! cratic government. Fair, democratic elections can-
political value. It is enshrined in the U.S. Constitu- not Occur unless candidates are free to debate and
tion's First Amendment, which guarantees freedom criticize each other's policies, nor can government
of expression by barring Congress from restricting be run efficiently unless corruption and abuses can
what the press can disseminate and what individu- be exposed by a free press ....
als can say. Under the First Amendment, a vast A third value, individual autonomy, is also
range of speech-most of the speech we encounter served by free speech. In chapter III of On Liberty,
"Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well
every day-is protected. Most liberal democracies
Being," Mill writes that "He who lets the world,
recognize their citizens' right to free expression, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for
and several international bodies have declared free- him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-
dom of expression a human right. Here "speech" or like one of imitation." ... Mill's suggestion is that
"expression" refers to a variety of actions: not just the best life does not result from being forced to
speaking, but writing, yelling, acting, painting, live a certain way, but instead is freely chosen with-
burning flags, carrying signs, singing, and more. out coercion from outside. But if Mill is right, then
freedom of speech as well as action are important
The first point to understand about the right of
to achieve a worthwhile life. Free and open discus-
free speech is that it is not absolute. Every society sion helps people exercise their capacity of reason-
places limits on free speech; speech must be lim- ing and judgment, capacities that are essential for
ited when it conflicts with other values that society autonomous and informed choices. 9
But what of offensive speech, racist speech, have failed. Often the courts found that the codes
hate speech? Should these be censored-or given were too vague to be useful and so broad that they
First Amendment protection? In 2015 a survey identified obviously protected speech as banned
suggested that students would opt for censorship. speech. Worse, in too many instances, the codes
It showed that almost three-quarters of students were used not to punish hate speech, but to criticize
favor disciplinary action for "any student or fac- opinions and political views that people disliked.
ulty member on campus who uses language that is The courts may have more or less agreed that
considered racist, sexist, homophobic or otherwise hate speech codes are unconstitutional or unwork-
offensive. ,,10 able, but the bigger question is whether the codes are
In the twentieth century, especially during the morally acceptable. Should colleges and universities
1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court gradually, use them to stamp out verbal harm to minorities?
case by case, extended First Amendment protection Many on both sides of this debate agree that
to a wider range of controversial, offensive, and hate speech can indeed cause harm. Richard
dissenting speech. Court rulings made it clear, for Delgado and Jean Stefancic argue that hate speech
example, that the speech of civil rights protest- can do damage to targeted groups in several ways:
ers could not be banned or punished just because
Hate speech is not merely unpleasant or offensive.
segregationists (and others) found their dissenting It may leave physical impacts on those it visits,
words deeply offensive. The court also ruled that particularly when uttered in one-on-one situations
protected speech includes anti-war protests, anti- accompanied by at least an implicit threat ....
government rhetOriC, blasphemy, (some) obscene The immediate, short-term harms of hate
speech, and "offensive utterances" of all kinds. speech include rapid breathing, headaches, raised
In fact, the court has concluded that the govern- blood pressure, dizziness, rapid pulse rate, drug-
ment cannot forbid or punish any speech unless taking, risk-taking behavior, and even suicide.
The stresses of repeated racial abuse may have
it is an instance of libel, incitement to lawlessness, long-term consequences, including damaged self-
obscenity, harassment, serious threats, or "fight- esteem, lower aspiration level, and depression ... .
ing words" (epithets or insults spoken face to face In addition to the immediate physical harms .. .
and likely to injure or provoke an immediate, vio- hate speech can cause mental and psychological
lent action). The upshot is that, as far as the court effects. These include fear, nightmares, and with-
is concerned, offensive speech and hate speech are drawal from sOciety ....
protected speech. The harms of hate speech go beyond damage
to the psyches and bodies of its victims. It can also
It should not be surprising then that over the ll
affect their pecuniary prospects and life chances.
years, the courts have repeatedly ruled against hate
speech codes at colleges and universities. (State To these harms, some would add another: the
schools are bound by the First Amendment; private damage done when hate speech increases hatred
schools are not, but they generally try to honor it (racial or otherwise) in others, which can lead to
in practice anyway.) Hundreds of schools have violence and discrimination.
adopted such codes, many of which have been Thus the most frequently heard arguments
challenged in court-and all of these have been about campus free speech concern whether hate
ruled unconstitutional. Despite the schools' laud- speech should be regulated to prevent harm to vul-
able motives to rid their campuses of foul racist slurs nerable groups. Those who support speech regula-
and hateful stigmatizing messages, their efforts to tion maintain that harms caused by hate speech
craft codes that would condemn offensive speech are substantial, that this fact is reason enough to
while not infringing on protected speech seem to ban it, and that any harms caused by speech codes
are minimal. On the other side, those who reject

speech regulation maintain that speech codes cause
QUICK REVIEW
far more harm than they prevent. Chemerinsky
and Gillman argue that speech codes are so inher-
hate speech-Qral or written words used to
ently vague and overly broad that people are pun-
insult, disparage, or attack people based on
ished for their political views, that the codes often their social or racial/ethnic group.
end up punishing people other than their intended
speech codes-Campus regulations that ban the
targets, and that speech codes inescapably "ban the
use of language or symbols thought to embody
expression of unpopular ideas and views, which
hate speech.
never is tolerable in colleges and universities.,,12
Some critics of speech codes insist that it's pos- free speech-The right to express one's opinions
sible to have unfettered free speech on campus or ideas without burdensome restraints from
while protecting students from hate and bigotry. government or society.
According to Ben-Porath:
Both those committed to pure free speech and
those favoring the protection of vulnerable groups
often assume that one needs to choose, that there is ends in themselves rather than merely as a means
an inherent tension between the two principles .... to ends. A nonconsequentialist perspective on free
But in fact this tension can be alleviated by an speech is embedded in the First Amendment: free
ongOing, clear commitment by college leaderShip
speech is a moral right that is not justified by its
and members to create and sustain an environ-
good consequences (even though the Founders did
ment conducive to open expression. While such an
environment must operate within the boundaries recognize the power of free speech to undergird a
of legal requirements, a more nuanced, responSive, young democracy). This does not mean, however,
and relational approach can often accomplish what that the right of free speech is necessarily absolute.
a hundred regulations cannot. 13 Typically, free speech must be balanced against
Chemerinsky and Gillman concur: competing values such as justice, equality, security,
and the right to privacy.
[Campuses] cannot and should not punish speech If free speech is viewed as an equal, nonconse-
because it is offensive. But certain speech can be
quentialist right, then certain norms follow. First,
punished: true threats, harassment, destruction
of property, and disruptions of classes and cam- the right of free speech is so central to morality
pus activities. Campuses can create time, place, that very strong reasons (like conflicts with other
and manner restrictions that protect the learning important rights) would be required to overrule it.
environment while also protecting free expres- Second, the right of free speech does not allow exer-
sion. Moreover-and this is too often forgotten- cising that right if doing so interferes with someone
campus leaders can engage in more speech, pro- else's free speech rights. Free speech rights cannot
claiming the type of community they seek and
justify shouting down or physically attacking a
condemning speech that is inconsistent with it. 14
speaker because his views are deemed offensive
or upsetting. If free speech can be banned simply
MORAL THEORIES because someone is offended, then any speech can
be banned, and the right of free speech is no right
A nonconsequentialist could take a strong stand for at all. Third, it is wrong to censor or punish some
free speech, arguing that to respect people's right of speakers and not others based solely on the views
free speech is, as Kant would say, to treat them as or ideas expressed.
v,'\~
-
~
, I" CRITICAL THOUGHT: Is Hate Speech Violence?
Hate speech can cause psychological and physio- continuum of acceptable speech, language and
logical distress in some who hear it (or read it), and violence should not be confused. The way to pre-
some speech, such as serious threats and "fighting serve our freedom of expression is to insist that
words," can provoke violence. But can speech itself speech, no matter how offensive, cannot justify
violent reprisal. Otherwise we risk becoming like
be violence? Can words be equivalent to physically
China, Turkey, Iran and other autocracies, where
violent acts?
brutality against journalists and draconian punish-
Many have thought so, and some have used ments for dissenting ideas are normal. ...
this belief as a pretext for committing violence [T]he power that speech holds to visit serious
against those who utter offensive speech. Speak- harm does not make it, in itself, violent. It is risky
ing of the uproar over the controversial invited even to make this comparison, because it helps
speaker Milo Yiannopoulos at the University of give cover to the idea that noxious speech may be
California-Berkeley, one woman said, "His words answered with brute force. t
are violent, or a form of violence." Is violence ever a justified response to offen-
Several commentators have echoed this speech- sive speech? If so, in what circumstances? If you
equals-violence view, but many others disagree. use violence against someone who demeans a
Catherine Rampell, a columnist for the Washington racial group, is he then justified in using violence
Post, says this: against you if he considers your speech offen-
Here's the problem with suggesting that upset- sive? How do you think society would change if
ting speech warrants "safe spaces," or otherwise violence were widely considered an appropriate
conflating mere words with physical assault: If response to any speech perceived to be offensive
speech is violence, then violence becomes a justifi- or harmful?
able response to speech.
Just ask college students. A fifth of under- * Catherine Rampell, "A Chilling Study Shows How
grads now say it's acceptable to use physical force Hostile Students Are toward Free Speech," Washington
to silence a speaker who makes "offensive and Post, September 18, 2017, https:llwww.washingtonpost.
hurtful statements."* com/opinions/a-chilling-study-shows-how-hostile-
Suzanne Nossel, executive director of PEN college-students-are-toward-free-speech/20 17/09/181
cbb1a234-9ca8-11 e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2_story.htm I?utm_
America, an international organization that de-
term:.ea6296c00091.
fends free expression, makes this observation:
tSuzanne Nossel, "No, Hateful Speech Is Not the
It's true that insults or slurs or incitement can Same Thing as Violence," Washington Post, June 22,
lead to confrontation. (Hutu broadcasts during 2017, https:llwww.washingtonpost.com/outlooklno-
the 1994 Rwanda genocide and Hitler's entreat- hateful-speech-is-not-the-same-thing-as-violencel
ies to German national pride, for instance, coaxed 2017/06/22/63c2c07a-5137-11e7-be25-3a519335381c_
violence on a mass scale.) But while there is a story.html?utm_term=.ae80288dc545.
Both those who seek to restrict free speech grounds that it causes great harm (which is not
and those who reject restrictions argue from a counterbalanced by the possible benefits):
consequentialist perspective. Delgado and Stefan- The harms of hate speech include its adverse
cic argue for the banning of hate speech on the impacts-sometimes devastating ones-on the victim,
the speaker, and society at large. The harms vary, 3. Speech codes may do good by preventing some
of course, according to the type of hate speech. The harm to vulnerable groups, but the good does
more diffuse kind-for example, uAll niggers are not outweigh the harm the codes cause.
inferior and should go back to Africa"-is apt to be
more harmful to society in general. The more 4. Therefore, speech codes should be eliminated.
targeted variety-uyou goddamn nigger, go back
to Africa"-harms society as well, particularly This is a valid argument, so we must focus
cumulatively, but its principal impact is felt by the on the truth of the premises. Premise 1 would be
individual victim. 15 accepted by many on both sides of the debate. It
is the least controversial premise. Premises 2 and
Some have argued that speech critical of an
3 are the heart of the argument. What evidence
identity group or speech that upsets people in the
or reasoning supports Premise 2? The history of
group is in fact a form of violence. If so, they con-
speech codes shows that they have indeed been
tend, such speech is definitely harmful (and has no
used to censor political views, unwelcome opin-
counterweight of sufficient benefits) and on those
ions, protected speech, and ideas expressed by
grounds should be banned.
people other than those for whom the codes
As we have seen, some who reject censorship
were intended.
recognize the harms of hate speech but argue
Premise 3 is likewise open to question. Those
that censoring it causes even more harm, and
who reject speech codes accept it; those who
the benefits of free speech outweigh by far any
favor them tend to deny it. The disagreement is
supposed disadvantages. As Chemerinsky and
about the extent of harm and good involved. The
Gillman say:
pro-code side contends that the damage done
[P]rotecting hate speech is necessary because the to vulnerable groups by hate speech is immense
alternative-granting governments the power to and that this kind of harm is much more
punish speakers they don't like-creates even more serious than any caused by censorship. The
harm. The argument in favor of hate speech laws
anti-code side maintains that even though the
is essentially an argument for granting people in
authority the power to censor or punish individu- harm caused by censorship is clear, there is no
als who insult, stigmatize, or demean others, and evidence that speech codes have lessened hate
it is inevitable that such vague and broad authority speech on campus.
will be abused or used in ways that were not con-
templated by censorship advocates. 16
MORAL ARGUMENTS CHAPTER REVIEW

One way to argue against speech codes is to try to
show that they do more harm than good. SUMMARY
1. If, on balance, speech codes do more harm than
The core meaning of tolerance is putting up with or
good, they should be eliminated.
enduring beliefs, actions, or practices that we consider
2. Speech codes do harm (by impeding the wrong. Among the philosophical justifications for tol-
search for knowledge, undermining democ- erance is that we have a moral obligation to respect the
racy, banning the expression of unpopular ideas autonomy and freedom of others to choose their own
and views, and hampering free and open way, that any sincere search for truth and knowledge
dialogue). requires tolerance, and that tolerance allows differing
ideas and contrasting ways of life to mingle and com- In response to what they consider hate speech, col-
pete, which leads to better societies. Historically, tol- leges and universities have enacted speech codes,
erance has been the fairest and most effective means campus regulations that ban the use of symbols or
devised for dealing with serious social and political language thought to embody hate speech.
disagreement. The central conflict in campus free speech con-
Political tolerance, or toleration, is an attribute troversies is between two moral goods that are crucial
of governments expressed through laws, regula- to higher education: (1) free speech that enables the
tions, and policies. Social, or interpersonal, tolerance expression of all ideas and the unfettered search for
is a moral virtue expressed in people's attitudes and truth, and (2) a campus environment that protects
behavior toward one another. Both kinds of tolerance and respects the learning experiences of all students.
come in degrees. Some free speech scholars believe that both these val-
The paradox of tolerance is that in order to sur- ues can be accommodated, while many students think
vive, a tolerant society must sometimes not be toler- they cannot be.
ant of the intolerant. Otherwise, the intolerant could Under the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment, a
eventually destroy the sOciety. The paradox suggests vast range of speech is protected, including offensive
that for any society, there must be limits to how much language or ideas and hate speech. Unprotected speech
tolerance is permitted. includes serious threats, libel, and "fighting words."
Civility among competing factions has become The most frequently heard arguments about
almost as troubling an issue as tolerance has, espe- campus free speech concern whether hate speech
cially in debates about free speech. In the name of should be regulated to prevent harm to minorities
civility, many have called for sanctions against those and other vulnerable groups. Those against speech
who speak the uncivil language of racism, bigotry, codes argue that they undermine democracy and the
and intolerance. Those accused of such incivility have search for knowledge and violate free speech rights.
asserted their right to speak as they please. And many Those who favor speech codes insist that they are
who are targets of uncivil speech have resented the needed to protect Black people and other minorities
constraints that rules of civility have put on their abil- from harmful speech.
ity to respond to such abuse.
Incivility is notoriously prevalent in cyberspace.
One challenge is to cope with all the nastiness. But I<EY TERMS
another challenge is to practice intellectual civility- hate speech (p. 540)
the skills you need to engage in serious, honest, pro- speech codes (p. 540)
ductive debate on important issues. Intellectual civil- free speech (p. 541)
ity constitutes the unwritten rules of all informative
scholarly exchanges and rational argument.
Issues of tolerance and civility are inherent in EXERCISES
debates about campus free speech. Speech on campuses
Review Questions
has been censored or punished, and invited speakers
have been disinvited or shouted down. Many students 1. What is the core meaning of political and social
believe these actions are needed to curtail hate speech, tolerance? (p. 535)
oral or written words used to insult or disparage peo- 2. Cite three reasons why tolerance is important.
ple because of their social or racial/ethnic group. Hate (p.536)
speech, they contend, can harm people by causing 3. What is the paradox of tolerance? (p. 537)
emotional and physical distress, insulting the dignity 4. What is intellectual civility? (p. 538)
of individuals, subordinating minorities, and "assault- 5. What is hate speech? What are speech codes?
ing" vulnerable groups through offensive language. (p.540)
6. What is the central conflict in campus free 7. How could speech codes be used not to ban hate
speech controversies? (p. 540) speech but to censor political views that are
7. What reasons do free speech advocates give for unpopular or unwelcome?
not censoring offensive speech? (p. 541) 8. The Supreme Court has ruled that hate speech
8. According to John Arthur, what are three is protected speech. Do you agree with this
important benefits of having the right to speak decision? Explain.
and write freely? (p. 541) 9. Why does Catherine Rampell say that equating
9. What has been the courts' prevailing speech with violence is a problem? Do you
attitude toward speech codes at colleges and agree?
universities? (p. 542) 10. In what ways can a college or university
10. What argument could a nonconsequentialist foster tolerance and an inclusive learning
make for free speech? (p. 543) environment-without banning offensive
speech?
1. Do you think authorities should be tolerant of FURTHER READING
the intolerant? If so, should there be a limit to American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), https://www.
such tolerance? What speech or actions of the aclu.org/.
intolerant should be deemed intolerable? That Peter Balint, Respecting Toleration: Traditional Liberalism
is, where should the line be drawn between the and COil temporary Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017).
tolerable and the intolerable?
Sigal R. Ben-Porath, Free Speech on Campus (Philadelphia:
2. Consider the "formal equality" notion of
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).
tolerance embodied in the secular republicanism Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, Free Speech 011
of French authorities (as described by Rainer Campus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).
Forst). Would you find such a system morally Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech . .. and It's
acceptable? Why or why not? a Good Thing Too (New York: Oxford University Press,
3. Do you think that a university's "rules of 1994).
ciVility" will inevitably silence minority views? Rainer Forst, "Toleration," in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Why or why not? Philosophy, July 12, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/
4. Do you believe that shouting down a controversial entries/toleration/ .
speaker so they can't be heard is morally David van Mill, "Freedom of Speech," in Stanford Ency-
clopedia ofPhilosophy, Summer 2017 ed., ed. Edward N.
permissible? Why or why not? If your silendng a
Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/
controversial speaker is morally permissible, would
entries/freedom -speech/.
it be morally permissible for others to shout down Christine T. Sistare, ed., Civility and Its Discontents
a speaker you like but they disdain? (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).
5. Do you think hate speech should be banned? Tom Slater, ed., Unsafe Space: The Crisis of Free Speech 011
Why or why not? Campus (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
6. Is free speech (including the right to use hate Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge:
speech) necessary for the search for knowledge? Harvard University Press, 2012).
Explain.
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Free Speech and the Hangman's Noose

One way to express hatred and bias toward Black people and other minorities is to
display objects that represent such attitudes. Consider this report from the Southern
Poverty Law Center about nooses found on academic campuses:
Since the day after the 2016 presidential election through March 31, the Southern
Poverty Law Center has documented 1,863 bias incidents. Of these, 292, or 15.67%,
were anti-black motivated incidents. One of the most pervasive manifestations of
these happenings is the display of nooses.
Several examples have surfaced on academic campuses in the past month. In
May, bananas with odious messages were found hanging from nooses on American
University's campus in Washington, D.C. Just over a week later, two Maryland men
were arrested for hanging a noose outside Crofton Middle School. Similarly, four
students were recently identified as being involved with hanging a black teddy bear
from a noose at Wakefield High School in North Carolina. *
Displaying certain recognizable symbols in public display nooses on campus? That is, should such
or private space is thought to be a form of speech. displays be allowed on the grounds of free speech?
To Black people, nooses are offensive symbols that Serious threats are not protected by law. Can the
represent the crime of lynching and the hor- display of a noose on campus be construed as a
rific history of lynchings during and after the Jim threat and therefore be banned and punished?
Crow era. Should students have the right to Explain your response.
"Southern Poverty Law Center, "Frequency of Noose Hate Crime Incidents Surges," by Hatewatch Staff. Hate-
watch Blog, Southern Poverty Law Center, June S, 2017. Reprinted with permission.
2. Intolerance Online
The Guardian-Matthew Prince had the power to kill the white supremacist hate
site the Daily Stormer for years, but he didn't choose to pull the trigger until 16
August. That's when the chief executive of website security company Cloudflare
"woke up ... in a bad mood and decided to kick them off the Internet", as he
told his employees in an internal email. Without Cloudflare's protection, the Daily
Stormer was forced to retreat to the darknet, where it is inaccessible to the majority
of internet users.
Cloudflare is just one of many internet companies that cleaned house amid a
wave of public outrage following a deadly white supremacist rally in Charlottesville.
Critics charge that technology platforms have enabled a disparate network of racist
extremists to seek one another out, raise funds, and plan and execute such rallies. But
unlike consumer facing companies such as Facebook, YouTube, PayPal and Discord,
and even as liberal voices-including the Guardian editorial board-applaud it,
Cloudflare won't defend its actions. t
Should hate speech websites be allowed to freely speech rights? If hate websites are to be regulated,
spread their offensive white supremacist message who should do the regulating? The government?
online? Why or why not? If internet companies Internet companies? Some other entity?
shut them down, is that a violation of their free
t Julia Carrie Wong, "The Far Right is Losing Its Ability to Speak Freely Online, Should the Left Defend It?" The
Guardian, 28 August 2017. Copyright © Guardian News &: Media Ltd 2017. Reprinted with permission.
3. Offensive Speech and Racial Violence

Is uttering a racial slur-even in an attempt to explain its use in literature-an act of
racial violence or discrimination? Consider this example:
HuffPost-Colleges and universities have long been considered places where one
can challenge dominant ideas in order to provoke a robust intellectual discussion.
But with what some say is a growing push for political correctness, critics contend
academia has lost the ability to have a free-flowing scholarly discourse.
Lawyer and author Wendy Kaminer found herself at the center of that heated
debate this year when she joined a free speech panel discussion at Smith College
and used a racial slur while discussing its use in literature and academia.
"I was accused of committing an explicit act of racial violence because
I questioned our growing list of words we can only know by their initials,"
Kaminer said .... *
Do you think that even in an academic setting, would using the term to explain its offensive-
using a racial slur to explain its function in ness and hurtfulness also be unacceptable? If not,
literature is an instance of racial violence? If so, why not?
*Rahel Gebreyes, "Author Wendy Kaminer Defends Her Use of a Racial Slur during a Free Speech Panel," HuffPost,
June 5, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/wendy-kaminer_racial_slur-free-speech_n_7521858.html.
READINGS
From When Protest and Speech Collide

DAVID ESTLUND
1. INTRODUCTION see. My goal here is not to argue that the protesters in

In March 2001, student protesters at Brown University those cases acted well or badly, but to straighten out
confiscated stacks of that morning's Brown Daily Her- some distinctions without which our thinking about
ald, the student newspaper, before they were distrib- freedom of speech will be muddled. It might seem as
uted. David Horowitz, a right-wing provocateur, had if there are two positions: opposing the protesters, or
purchased space for a large ad that had been refused supporting them. I hope to show that finding a cor-
by several other student papers, consisting of a bullet- rect verdict about such cases is not as simple as that
point panel arguing against racial reparations, and suggests. Protest that interferes with speech on cam-
including especially provocative statements such as, pus might be permissible only rarely. But few would
II • in the thousand years of [slavery's] existence,
••
say absolutely never, and it is important to know
there never was an anti-slavery movement until white when and why it is justified, and subject to what con-
Christians-Englishmen and Americans-created straints. More pointedly, I want to argue that the enor-
one." That ad appeared in the paper a few days earlier. 1 mous moral presumption, which seems to' be widely
In October 2013, also at Brown University, Ray Kelly, accepted, against speech-interfering protests, is not, in
the N.Y.P.D. commissioner closely associated with the its enormity, warranted by a close look at the issues.
policy of "stop and frisk," rose to speak by the invitation Even when it is not violent, a disruptive public
of a campus center. Before long protesters, including protest often raises our hackles. Sometimes it is illegal,
students and other Providence community members, but even when it is not we might wonder whether it
began disrupting the event with verbal outbursts harshly is morally justifiable. 3 Of the many ways a protest can
criticizing Kelly. Within a few minutes, university offi- be disruptive, one way in particular-interfering with
cials had cancelled the event, and Kelly did not speak. He the ability of others to speak or express themselves-is
was later invited back and spoke without interference.
2 thought to be especially damning. A protest that inten-
Brown University, then and now my own institutionally interferes with other speech (and let us limit
tion, is hardly unique in facing occasional occurrences ourselves to such intentional cases) is often vilified,
of speech-interfering student protests. I lead with as if it flies in the face of the principle of freedom of
examples from my own institution because they have speech, or even of the Constitution itself. Depressingly
especially occupied my thoughts over these years, and often, in U.S. discussions, the vilification is mistak-
also so as not to throw stones at other colleges from enly grounded on the First Amendment. 4 In any case,
a glass house. The issues the two examples raise are if there is a principle of free speech independent of the .
not special to one university, and some have appli- Constitution's legal force, it is rarely stated or explained.
cation even beyond the setting of college campuses. Broadly, my question is whether, and in what ways, a
When speech interferes with speech, the set of values protest's interfering with the speech of others ought to
gathered under the deceptively simple phrase "free count against that protest-is it presumptively forbid-
speech" are multiple and intricately related, as we will den by a moral principle of free speech?
Two broad ways in which a protest might be
problematic are: legally and morally. Each of these,
David Estlund, "When Protest and Speech Collide," Academic
in turn, divides into (at least) two. A protest (or any
Freedom, edited by Jennifer Lackey, pp. 151-169. © the several
contributors 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. Repro-
other speech) might have features that render the
duced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. speech itself illegal. We may put aside that question
about what legal regulations on speech there actu- even always wrong in the more familiar range of cases.
ally are (and, of course, there are many). Instead, the When protesters are told that their obstructions are
speech-interfering feature might, while not rendering seriously wrong, this should not be credible to them
a protest illegal, override the protest's prima facie pro- or to us unless some thoughtful account can be pro-
tection against legal interference. That kind of legal vided of what it would take-what conditions would
matter will be pertinent here, among other things. In have to be like, however infrequent or unlikely such
the moral category, there is the question whether a a scenario may be-to render such obstructions right-
protest's interfering with speech ever morally grounds ful. Only with such an account on hand of the line
a moral permission for others (state or non-state actors) that would have to be crossed can people be expected
to interfere with the protest itself. This will arise indi- to accept the claim that conditions have not crossed
rectly. A second moral question, and the central one the relevant line.
here, is whether and when a protest's interfering with
speech is enough to render the protest morally wrong.
There's speech. There's interference with speech. And 2. LEGAL QUESTIONS
there's speech that interferes with speech. In light of I begin with legal questions. Nothing is more central
legal and moral principles of freedom of speech, this to the protections of the First Amendment, as widely
presents us with a number of questions, including at interpreted, than public political expression, and
least these: Does a protest's interfering with speech especially protest. 5 Nevertheless, lots of activities
ever render it illegal, legally regulable, morally wrong, that clearly have a public, even dissenting, message
or (to coin a phrase) morally interferable (by law or are nevertheless ultimately unprotected. Graffiti, for
otherwise)? After a brief survey of some points about example, often makes its dissident message explicit,
its legality, I will concentrate mainly on the moral per- but it may be forbidden by law when it is applied to
missibility of speech-obstructing non-violent protest, someone else's property. Indeed, for another exam-
refining our question as I go along. ple, the destruction of the Twin Towers was intended
Even if everything I say below were granted, it partly to convey political messages. Those messages,
would be possible to hold that a proper balancing of along with much graffiti, and many other forms of
considerations supports the conclusion that protests protest are, as a matter of their content, in the core of
on campus that interfere with the speech of others First Amendment protection, and yet those protec-
are virtually never permissible. The absolutist judg- tions are decisively overridden by non-message fea-
ment that such interference could never be permissible tures of those acts.
even in principle could only rest on a failure of imagi- An important anchoring point is that if, in some
nation. History's variety allows us to imagine, if not case, the protest's protection is overridden, it is not
cite, dark possibilities in which, for example, speak- because the speech interfered with by the protest has
ers are granted platforms at universities only at the constitutional protection. Interference by protest-
approval of censorious and externally controlled cam- ers would not violate anything in the Constitution,
pus administrations highly motivated to insulate a which only prohibits governmental interference. If a
rising dangerous national governmental regime from protest violates some principle of freedom of speech,
dissent. Free speech rhetoric can be abused: Consider that principle is not the First Amendment, but some-
the absolutist position that even then it would be mor- thing else, presumably a moral principle. I turn to the
ally wrong (strategic questions aside) for protesters moral questions shortly, focusing first on some points
to interfere with the anointed speakers' publications about law.
or performances, because this is contrary to the mis- One important feature of the campus context,
sion of universities which is to fearlessly ... , etc. I familiar to legal scholars but less well-understood
hope this would be widely rejected, even among those in public discussion, is that private universities are
who believe such interference is almost always or constitutionally permitted to interfere with speech,
L
roughly, however they see fit. The reason, again, is the of others are acceptable rationales. "Time, place, man-
anchoring point that the First Amendment forbids ner" restrictions must remain viewpoint neutral'? but
only governmental interference with speech. Public regulating a protest on the ground that it interferes
universities, by contrast, are governmental agencies, with the speech of others need not have any view-
and so any restrictions they impose on speech are gov- point-based element. The Supreme Court has held
ernmentally imposed, triggering the protection of the that even public universities may regulate speech in
First Amendment, though of course many regulations some ways properly related to the school mission that
on speech are permissible even so. would not be permissible regulation outside of that
Fortunately, we can simplify our topic by put- context. Very likely, universities may constitutionally
ting aside private universities (or other institutions) place some restrictions on speech with the rationale
that do not (as they legally need not) emulate the of preventing protesters and others from interfering
protections of the First Amendment. That is, many if with the ability of other campus speakers to express
not most private universities voluntarily vow not to themselves. 8 But we must keep in mind the anchor-
restrict speech on campus in any way that the First ing fact that even if universities may restrict speech
Amendment would have forbidden if it had applied, that interferes with the speech of others, that would
even though it does not apply.6 Leaving aside private not be for the sake of the protection of First Amend-
universities that decline to emulate the First Amend- ment rights of the speakers against protesters' interfer-
ment, we can now suppose that, for our purposes here, ence. There are no such rights. Also to be kept in mind
the protection of speech on campus tracks the protec- is that regulability on that ground does not begin to
tions (which are sometimes violated in both cases) of show that the protesters' speech-interfering behav-
the First Amendment. ior is indefensible or wrong. It would only show that
While universities can and often do bind them- the state or university has the legal option to restrict
selves to the shape of the First Amendment in this way, it. And, one further pOint, having that legal option
there is no reason to think that private actors generally has no bearing on whether such legal or institutional
are under any such promise or aspiration to limit their restrictions would themselves be morally permissible
own interference with speech to that shape. Protest- or even a good idea. 9
ers, for example, could make some such declaration,
but there is no basis for a presumption that they have
done so (and, in fact, I've never heard of such a thing). 3. MORAL QUESTIONS
If there is some principle of free speech to which pro- We began with, and now return to, the outrage and
testers can legitimately be held when they have not so vilification often directed at protesters who interfere
vowed, it would, as I have said, not be a legal standard, with other speakers on college campuses. Are such
but a moral one. protests wrong, and when, and how severely wrong?
Turning from evaluation of the protests, to evalu- Legal questions now aside, there is the question of
ation of university actions: Maya public or emulating when political protest that interferes with expression
college interfere with speech (such as a protest) that is morally permissible and when not. In this section,
would otherwise be protected, in order to prevent it I introduce a series of points and distinctions that
from interfering with the speech of others? Are pro- will give us a usefully focused question, which I then
tests on campus regulable on the ground that they pursue in the remainder.
interfere with other speech? It is, in fact, clear that the A natural starting point might seem to be to assume
government or emulating university has latitude in that there is a broad moral presumption against inter-
the restriction of speech, even protest, when the ratio- fering with the speech of others, but that is too broad.
nale and effect are mainly matters of the time, place, We interfere with each other's speech all the time, often
or manner of the regulated speech, and the prevention permissibly so, even without any particular special jus-
of interference with the speech or even convenience tification. Interruption is ubiquitous, some talk louder
than others at parties, we put our names on "no call" the interference involved, and which is not unconsti-
lists for advertising, and a million other things. But our tutional. Universities might have such internal rules.
narrower interest here allows us to focus on the case of There is a general question about when, if ever, laws
interference with relatively formal cases of expression. and similar rules can bring along moral obligations to
Two useful categories are publications and perfor- obey, but that is not our question. Briefly, we know
mances. The idea of a publication will be clear enough from the widely accepted category of civil disobedi-
for present purposes. We might construe a category ence that many people accept that even illegal activ-
called "performances" as gatherings or meetings for (at ity might sometimes be morally permissible, even
least in significant part) the purpose of certain people admirable. We should not assume that obstructive
expressing themselves to an audience. That would protests count as civil disobedience; they often do
cover speeches, debates, spoken-word or poetry events, not. And even there we may wonder whether a case
concerts, dance or theatrical performances, and more. of civil disobedience faces an extra burden of justifica-
The question I want to consider, now refining it, is tion insofar as it obstructs speech, if it does. There is,
whether and when a protest that would otherwise be in any case, the underlying question, which applies
morally permissible is impermissible on the grounds whether or not an obstructive protest is in violation
that it interferes with other speech in the form of pub- of laws or rules: Is there a prima facie moral prohibi-
lication or performance. Simplifying along one more tion on protest insofar as it is obstructive of the speech
dimension, we can focus on "interference" with speech of others?
where this intentionally and significantly limits the It is tempting, but misleading, to think of obstruc-
ability of the speaker to speak or reach the audience. tive speech as a form of censorship. Censorship, even
This is not precise but it is meant to put aside uninten- broadly construed, is only one way to intentionally
tional or minimal interference, just for simplicity. interfere with speech. If a case of speech-interference
A final narrowing of our focus is also appropriate: is carried out by agents who are not in real or apparent
I focus on the especially salient cases, namely those pOSitions of authority or formal power, then whatever
where the intentional interference with the speech else it is (and while it might or might not be wrong) it
of others is viewpoint-based, targeting speech toward is not censorship. This matters because there are tra-
which the protesters have antipathy. 10 Here, then, are ditional objections to censorship that do not apply
the defining features of the kind of protest I want to to speech-interference by people outside of formal
consider, referring to them for convenience as speech- power and authority. One traditional anti-censorship
obstructive protests, or for short: thought is that the state should not interfere with
speech partly because it is unjust and dangerous for
Obstructive protests it to exert control over criticism and scrutiny, spe-
Cifically, of the state itself. Another is that the state,
Acts of protest that intentionally interfere with
or the university administration, already have such
the publication or performance of expression by
great power over many matters that their influence
others on the basis of antipathy with that speech's
on the course of discussion (now about matters of all
viewpoint.
kinds) is in danger of being profound and overbear-
As a further focusing device, I will simply assume for ing, whereas interference by agents of lesser power
the sake of argument that there is a moral reason of poses less of a threat. Neither of these objections
some weight against such obstruction with speech. to censorship will normally apply when speech is
Granting that, the question becomes what consider- interfered with by a group of protesters confiscating
ations, if any, should be thought to override the moral newspapers, or disrupting a speech. Whatever there
presumption against obstructive protest. is to be said morally against obstructive protests, it is
A special set of cases would arise where there is plausibly less than it would be if they were cases of
already a law, or the campus equivalent, that prohibits censorship.
4. HOW INTERFERENCE CAN AMPLIFY be known in advance, that is true, and obstructive pro-
Even supposing there is a presumption against test cannot possibly disseminate the very message that
obstructive protest, here is a potentially mitigating never sees the light of day. However, the point that is
factor: What if interference with some speech, for easily overlooked is that there are cases of both kinds.
example interference by protesters, does not, in fact,
suppress the dissemination of the message? There is * * *
a subtle point to consider about the sense in which
5. CIVILITY AND NON-IDEAL CONDITIONS
a protest interferes with the expression of the mes-
sage: it does not always reduce its dissemination, What background assumptions might lend support to
and in fact it often increases it, and these effects are the widely accepted view that it (at least) tends to be
often fully known in advance by protesters. This is morally wrong to interfere with the speech of others?
more common than it sounds. In both of our open- I want to think about two such assumptions that seem
ing examples, the message of the opposed speaker often to be held conjointly:
was, among other things, amplified, and predict-
Ideal:
ably so. David Horowitz gained notoriety, and the
message of his ad was spread far and wide. The Ray So long as there is general non-interference with
Kelly case is more complex, but certainly his message speech, the course of discussion will not be skewed
of aggressive policing was, as a result of the protest, contrary to reason, and then social conclusions and
made known to a larger audience than before. (I con- decisions will tend toward the truth,
fess that I came to learn more about it, including argu-
and,
ments for and against.) Even if the event might also
have been embarrassing to him, it may not have been Approximation:
only embarrassing (if it was at all), but also a badge of
Since general non-obstruction would (in certain
honor amongst some of his more vehement support-
circumstances) be good as described in Ideal, then
ers, as well as a Source of sympathetic attention from
in non-ideal conditions (so conceived) less obstruc-
certain new audiences. The question is not whether
tion is better than more.
the protest results in a net gain for the speaker's aims,
but whether the speaker's message was disseminated Suppose that in some very general way, and under
less widely, or more widely, along with whatever else certain conditions, things would go best if there were
happened, than it would have been without the pro- little or no obstruction of speech as we are under-
test. Probably, the dissemination of Kelly's message standing it. It takes a moment to embrace this sim-
was Wider, due to press coverage and public discussion plifying assumption, since it is clear that general
of the protest, than it otherwise would have been. It non-obstruction would not always guarantee that
matters, as well, that he returned later to speak with- things would go better, since it depends on the other
out interference. circumstances. That is especially questionable if, say,
I do not mean to exaggerate the point. The pub- there are members who are prone to lying and attack-
licity around a suppressed piece of expression tends to ing others through speech, or if there are structural
disseminate messages with which the speaker is ante- imbalances in the access of certain viewpoints to the
cedently associated. Sometimes this correlates impor- channels of communication, and so on. This point is
tantly with what would have been said, and that is important, and we will come back to it. But there is
the point I am calling attention to, but that will not an important fallacy to guard against, and it is best
always be so. Insofar as the speaker's message would seen if we imagine that the background conditions
have been novel or less well-known there is indeed an are not unfortunate in that way, but are indeed favor-
important loss. One might say there is no way to know able. Even in that imaginary circumstance, think
in advance, but that is patently not so. It cannot always about cases where there would regrettably be some
obstruction. It is tempting to suppose (along with than those two, and less toleration might be better
Approximation) that in that case it is best to keep than some patterns of partial toleration.
such obstruction to a minimum-that zero obstruc- How might this be so? Alexander Meiklejohn (as
tion would be best, but if that will not happen it is it happens, a former student, professor, and Dean at
best to have as little as possible. But that is a fallacy Brown University) famously framed some valuable
(by which I mean an invalid form of reasoning that is pOints about free speech in terms of the context of a
widely tempting) and one that has real interest in the town meeting. 12 Of course, that is not an accurate
context of free speech. microcosm of the diverse social universe of public
Before looking at the free speech context itself, it is political expression in every way, despite its value for
helpful to see the very general reason that is a fallacy. illustrating certain points. On the other hand, this
It is that the ingredients or elements in any valuable limitation of the metaphor is, perhaps, not as telling
condition might only have their contributing value in the context that especially concerns us, the col-
when combined with all the others. Think first of a lege campus, a form of association that gets much of
cocktail of three medications you need to take daily. its pOint from the value of deliberation and debate,
Now suppose one of them is missing. It is tempting, and the aspiration of moving the state of opinion in a
but fallacious, to infer that it is best if you at least take sound or correct direction.
the other two rather than only one, or none. That all The town meeting is a useful starting point for sev-
depends, and taking those two without the third could eral reasons. 13 In the context of a town meeting, not
be dangerous, even if, when combined with the third, only are the normal standards of civil behavior clear,
they are good for you. For real medical examples, dia- but they coexist with other sets of behavioral rules
chronic cases are especially common. If you will not that are quasi-legal-publicly known and enforced
finish a prescribed course of antibiotics (you can't or rules of procedure such as Robert's Rules of Order. Such
you just won't), you may be better off not to take the official rules of a town meeting are distinct from what
incomplete course. A synchronic case, slightly styl- also might be present and quite clear: the standards of
ized, would be this: there is a medication that will help civility or good meeting behavior. For example, the
you very much, but the side effects are profound. There official rules of order may permit (presumably by their
is a second medication that suppresses the side effects. silence) a recognized speaker to ridicule opponents
If you can't or won't take the second medication you in a way calculated to disturb the meeting, but that
could be better off not taking the first one either. We would not settle whether this was within the speak-
might call the general form of the mistaken thought er's duties of civility. So the standards of civility are
that you should at least take the subset of medications, not just the same as the official rules of the meeting,
the fallacy ofapproximation. 11 and this distinction in a meeting context mirrors the
That fallacy is easily seen to apply to the case of structure of a broader political context, where there
general tolerance or non-obstruction with each oth- are laws permitting and regulating expression but also
er's speech: It does not follow from the fact that gen- separate standards of civility with no force except that
eral toleration would be valuable that if there is some a citizen's duty.
obstruction or intolerance, obstruction ought still to Let civility be whatever standard for participation
be minimized. This is a bad form of argument, since in public deliberation (broadly conceived) is morally
(under the favorable conditions) the many instances appropriate under whatever background conditions
of what we might call "toleration" of disapproved obtain. There is no general reason to assume that the
viewpoints rather than obstructing them might only content of civility is, under all conditions, similar to
have their value in the presence of all the others. Like politeness. Let them be fairly polite in especially ideal
the two pills out of three, the incomplete pattern of conditions such as full compliance by all with these
tolerance might be very bad, worse than certain pat- standards, and with other applicable rules, as well as
terns of lesser tolerance. Zero pills might be better other favorable circumstances we will come to shortly.
Even so, it is implausible to think there are no adjusted not hypothetical, but describes the ironically titled
standards of conduct when the background condi- "International Town Meeting" held at Ohio State
tions fall short in certain ways-call these cases of University in February 1998. 14
breakdown of various degrees and kinds. Suppose that The disruptive behaviors listed above, as plausi-
others are interrupting, or being disruptive, or that bly impermissible at the Local Town Meeting, were
certain interests or viewpoints have special access to all apparently engaged in by protesters at the Interna-
audiences, etc. If applicable standards of civility vary tional Town Meeting, and the setting puts them in a
according to the type and degree of breakdown, this different light. There is much to be said for the view
allows us to see how certain forms of sharp or disrup- of a protester at Ohio State who said, "If we had just
tive expression can be accounted for within a theory been sitting there quietly listening, people watching
of civility rather than as outside any applicable norms on television would have thought we were supporters
of civility at all. of the war, which we certainly were not. Sometimes
Here is a simple second pair of examples, bring- you've just got to say what you think and make sure
ing us, again, face to face with protest that interferes that your voice is heard. And, if they won't listen in
with speech. In the first, suppose that attendance at a a polite manner, then you've just got to be rude."
town meeting is limited by space and that passes are The two town meetings, between them, capture the
distributed on a first-come-first-served basis. Opportu- distinction for which I would like to find some plau-
nities to speak are ample and fairly administered, and sible normative basis: narrow standards of civility
the public officials are respectful and responsive to the that apply in some conditions, alongside wider, more
public. Suppose further that the matter under discus- permissive standards that apply in others.
sion is whether to pay for high school athletic uni-
forms with public money. Call this the "Local Town
Meeting." Under these conditions let us suppose that 6. MARCUSE AND THE TOWN MEETING
some or all of the following expressive tactics are con- Herbert Marcuse, in 1965 amidst a rising tide of anti-
demnable by appropriate standards of civility, stan- war and pro-civil rights protests, offered a defense of
dards that I will call "narrow": sharp and disruptive interventions in political expres-
sion, including what I have called obstructive pro-
• obtaining entrance with counterfeit passes in
test. IS Marcuse wonders when private citizens might
order to participate uninvited
permissibly interfere with public political expression,
• ignoring moderator's rules a question he takes up from John Stuart Mill in order
to offer a different answer. Marcuse agrees with Mill
• stepping to the microphone to speak out of turn
on a great deal. He agrees that there are objectively cor-
• shouting questions from the floor out of turn rect answers to many normative political questions,
such as what is just or unjust. He also evidently agrees
• disrupting the meeting with chants.
with Mill that under favorable conditions the truth
Contrast the Local Town Meeting with a different will tend to prevail in the course of full and open pub-
meeting, an internationally televised public forum lic deliberation. He agrees that among the set of con-
held at a government's request at a location chosen by ditions that are most favorable to the social discovery
that government, broadcast exclusively by one global of truth is a widespread tolerance. By "tolerance" Mar-
network handpicked by the government, with atten- cuse means, roughly, restraining oneself from interfer-
dance screened, and with the right to speak granted ing with the expression by others of views with which
only to participants screened by the government's one strongly disagrees. Tolerance is not simply one of
handpicked network. Suppose also that the issue to the social conditions favorable to the social discovery
be discussed is not athletic uniforms but whether the of truth; that epistemic function is what gives toler-
United States should drop bombs on Iraq. This case is ance its pOint. Marcuse succinctly says, "The te/os of
tolerance is truth.,,16 Tolerance is plausibly supported result, certain favored pOints of view can be made to
by other rather different values as well, such as a cer- attract support on grounds other than their merits,
tain kind of respect, but the Marcuse argument can the actual reasons that exist in their favor. Behavior
usefully be seen as granting to his objectors that pro- outside of the narrow bounds that would make sense
motion and pursuit of truth is a great value and one under more ideal conditions is permitted in order to
of the central points of social practices of toleration of restore partially the truth-promoting value of public
disagreeable views. discussion. Marcuse calls for "selective intolerance,"
Tolerance does not, by itself, promote truth, how- acts by private citizens that suppress messages that are
ever. It promotes truth only in conjunction with cer- so advantaged by power.
tain other conditions. This gives rise to questions that
Mill said little about: What are the other conditions * * *
that join with tolerance to promote truth? What is the The background epistemology of Marcuse's view is
effect of tolerance when those other conditions are one according to which the truth would be promoted
violated in various ways? What implications does this if views prevailed according to their rational mer-
have for the practical question facing a citizen, "Ought its. That is a contestable position for reasons that we
I to be tolerant of this highly disagreeable view?" On cannot pursue here. 17 I am not defending Marcuse's
Marcuse's view, wider more permissive standards of substantial view but pointing to his identification, in
civility come into their own when there is a failure in, effect, of the Fallacy of Approximation in some famil-
or breakdown of, the conditions in which tolerance iar liberal thought: just because pure tolerance would
serves its purpose. be an essential part of a certain highly desirable condi-
Consider the International Town Meeting, with tion does not mean it would be desirable without the
these questions in mind. Here is the U.S. government, other conditions. Sometimes when there is a missing
hoping to mobilize public opinion behind bombing a element from some valuable or even ideal condition A,
faraway country. We do not need to decide whether we can ask what value is thereby lost in that condition
that bombing would be wrong in order to notice B: what kind, how much, etc. For example, if one per-
important distortions in the Millean truth-seeking son regularly interrupts others at a meeting, we might
function of free public discussion. For one thing, offi- conclude that this lets his power skew the course of
cials in the Clinton administration handed the cable discussion in a non-rational or non-epistemic direc-
television network C.N.N. exclusive rights to broad- tion. We could restore that value without even think-
cast the event. C.N.N. was free to share the event with ing about the nature of the missing value if we could
competing outlets but refused to do so, presumably provide the missing element itself-stop his interrupt-
in order to reap the ratings and consequent prof- ing. But suppose that we will not or cannot provide
its for itself. C.N.N. clearly had strong incentives to it. In that case, only by thinking about the kind and
structure the event so as to favor the administration's extent of lost value can we think about whether there
aims, which included not only mobilizing support is some alternative way to partly or wholly restore that
for bombing but also displaying public support to the value. If there is, it would make the resulting situation,
leaders and citizens of other countries, including Iraq. call it C, less similar to the ideal scenario A than B is. It
How do wider standards of civility serve the epis- would be a further deviation. Even so, in principle, the
temic goal in these defective conditions? Marcuse's addition of the new element-the further departure-
own argument does not discuss the context of a town could, in principle, fully restore the lost value. That
meeting, but its structure is similar and instructive. would be what I call a countervailing deviation.
He argued that there is a systematic cluster of interests Here are a few things that it does not mean. The
(especially those associated with owners of productive idea of countervailing deviation is not the crude prin-
capital) that have disproportionate control over the ciple that "turnabout is fair play." The profound dis-
course of public, especially political, discussion. As a value of someone being raped is not, to any degree,
558 .0 PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
restored by the perpetrator being raped in response, an epistemic point of view. It may be a prima facie
and the same will be true for many forms of wrong and justification for acts of protest that seek to counter
injustice. That is no part of the idea that a countervail- those power advantages with the assertion of speech-
ing deviation can sometimes restore certain kinds of interfering power, such as obstructive protests, on the
value that an initial deviation damages. This approach model of countervailing deviation.
is also entirely different from either (a) justifying dis-
obedience to some norm, such as "free speech," by * * *
showing that conditions of political obligation have
simply been violated, leaving one morally free to
disobey, or from (b) justifying disobedience on the 8. CONCLUSION
ground that there is a certain outcome that would be I conclude by pulling the points together. Universities'
good, which the disobedience aims at and will cred- central mission involving production and transmis-
ibly promote. The idea of countervailing deviation sion of knowledge depends on certain kinds of free-
makes neither of those claims. It claims rather that dom of expression, even though it cannot be simply
some value that the process would have had but for read off from the speech clause of the First Amend-
the triggering deviation would be partly restored by ment. There are legal aspects to it, along with quasi-
the countervailing deviation. The idea of countervail- legal aspects around a university's own rules, but there
ing deviation is essentially proceduralist in that way. are also moral aspects. In particular, political protest,
The idea of countervailing deViation, then, sug- despite its protection (to varying degrees) in law and
gests a principled basis not for censorship-not the university rules, is sometimes disruptive, and is often
restriction of expression under the color of authority- subjected to moral criticism when it not only expresses
but for selective interference by some individuals with a point of view but also interferes with performances
the ability of others whose message has unfair (from or publications which are efforts at speech and expres-
the standpoint, roughly, of reason) advantages. I8 The sion themselves. That kind of interference is not itself a
rationale of the interference is not simply to promote violation of anyone's constitutional rights, and even if
one's own views or aims, but to repair a severe struc- it is permissibly restricted or punished (by law or rules)
tural flaw in a collective epistemic process of debate that would not suffice to show that it is always wrong.
and discussion. The account raises plenty of questions, AddreSSing that question requires going beyond issues
and the value it points to must surely be weighed with about permissible regulation of such activity. Speech-
other values and requirements, but it also has prom- obstructive protest certainly interferes with some lib-
ise for understanding the ethics of disruptive protests, erty of others, but so does protest that merely blocks
including those that obstruct speech. a Sidewalk, slows traffic, or breaks the quiet. There is
no compelling basis for thinking that interfering with
speech in particular raises the bar for the protest's
7. THE CAMPUS OR THE BROADER
moral permissibility to an especially great height.
COMMUNITY?
Certainly, any of those kinds of disruption still call
for justification: plausibly in terms of what might be
* * * achieved, why less disruptive methods are not suffi-
... Suppose that there were a credible case to be cient, how the disruption is proportionate given the
made that certain interests and viewpoints have a specific goals, and so on. But the idea that interference
powerful advantage in the course of public debate with speech is always or almost certainly wrong may
owing to social-structural features, and that there rest on an idealized picture of the discursive ecology in
is no credible case that those structural advantages a society or a university community. If, however, some
for certain views are owed to any superior rational points of view are systematically disfavored either by
merits of those views. This would be troubling from illegitimate uses of institutional or other power, or by
structural social features with a similar effect, it is hard 2. See an account of the events and of a Brown University report
to see the value in freezing and ratifying those distor- issued later at, Scott Jaschik, "How a Talk Got Aborted," Inside
Higher Ed, February 21, 2014, https://www.insidehighered.com/
tions by insisting on a blanket moral prohibition on
news/2014/02/21/brown-releases-analysis-how-lecture-got-canceled-
interfering with speech. due-protests.
This suggests a permitting rationale for some 3. I do not assume that "moral" standards are nothing but per-
obstructive protests, what I have called countervail- sonal ethics, or that they are never essentially political in their
ing deviation, though this idea faces challenges about nature, so I use the term perhaps more broadly than some. For my
what counts as a countervailing point of view, and best attempt to answer the related view that political normativ-
about which is the relevant unit (the society or the ity is not a species of moral normativity, see my "Methodological
Moralism in Political Philosophy," Critical Review of International
campus) for assessing the question of such institu-
Social and Political Philosoph)" 20(3) (2017), pp. 365-79.
tional skewing. These challenges for the countervail-
4. In an exchange about the Herald case, Stephen J. Fortunato Jr.,
ing deviation model are serious, but they do not show a Rhode Island Superior Court judge, replied to an op-ed of mine:
that it is never sufficiently determinate in practice. "Professor Estlund said that the First Amendment 'does [not] for-
Those inclined to act on that basis must subject their bid remedial actions of the kind taken by the students... .' The
analysis to these challenges, and in some cases they jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts is quite
will turn up difficulties, but other times perhaps not. to the contrary." For reasons in the text above, this is a serious
mistake. Both pieces were in The Providence Journal: "Stealing
It will naturally be asked whether this framework is Newspapers for Free Speech?," April 6, 2001; "Brown Professor
too easily abused. But it is not clear what kind of objec- No Friend of Freedom," April 13, 2001.
tion that is. If the relevant kind of skewing is present 5. See e.g. Terminiel/o v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949).
then the intervention is corrective, even though this 6. For a critique of such emulation, see Randall Kennedy, "Private
is bound to be controversial even where it is true. It Universities and the First Amendment?," The Chronicle of Higher
might seem as though there is an additional question Education, September 21, 1994. http://www.chronicle.com/
about whether there is a justification one could give article/Private-Universitiesthe/84740.
in publicly acceptable terms. That would certainly be 7. Even speech that enjoys the most extensive First Amendment
harder to provide, since the claims of distortion will protection may be subject to "regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tai-
usually be controversial. But, even if it might be prag-
lored to serve a Significant government interest, and leave open
matically helpful to protesters when they can provide ample alternative channels of communication." Frisb)' v. Schultz,
one, it is not obvious that any such demand for pub- 487 U.S. 474,481 (1988).
licly acceptable justification is appropriate here, even 8. An Iowa case (1993) upheld the conviction for "disorderly con-
if it is appropriate in the case of state action. As I have duct" of politically motivated hecklers at a speech by Bush (Sr.).
emphasized, the issues about obstructive protest are This was not in a campus setting, but if such regulation is consti-
tutional off-campus then it would seem a fortiori to be constitu-
quite different in light of the fact that the interference
tional as a provision of a public university. Emulating universities
in question is not an exercise of state or institutional could then place themselves under cover of that option to restrict
authority. It still raises moral questions, and obstruc- such speech (498 N.W.2d 677 (1993), STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
tive protest will certainly be morally wrong in many v. Charles HARDIN, Appellant. No. 91-1777. Supreme Court of
cases. But, for the reasons I have laid out, the moral Iowa. April 21, 1993). The regulation of speech in a school setting
seems to be constitutionally permissible when credibly aimed at
presumption against protest that interferes with the
avoiding disruption of university activities, and not aimed at the
speech of others, even in the setting of a college cam- content or viewpoint of the disruptive speech. Its interfering with
pus, is not as overwhelming as is often supposed. 19 lectures or classes would naturally count as a disruption of the reg-
ulable kind. Cases seem mainly to follow Tinker v. Des Moines 1llde-
NOTES pelldellt Commullity School District 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and, with
some differences, United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968). As for
1. For an account of the events before, during, and after the pub- the university setting, see Appendix IV of the Strauss Report from
lication of the ad, see Kira Lesley, "Paying for Controversy," Brown the University of Chicago, January 2014 regarding the definition
Dail)' Herald, September 22, 2004: http://www.browndailyherald. of "disruptive" for purposes of university regulation of protest. It
com/2004/09/22/paying-for-controversy/. clearly counts interference with expression, in certain contexts,
as a significant warrant for regulation: https://provost.uchicago. Estlund, David. 2001. "Deliberation Down and Dirty." In:
edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Report%20Protest%20 T.R. Hensley, ed. The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression
and%20Dissent. pdf. and Order in American DemocraC)'. Kent, OH: Kent State
9. My question here is not what rules would be appropriate. Like University Press, pp. 49-67.
civil disobedience, such protests could in some cases be morally Estlund, David. 2001. "Stealing Newspapers for Free Speech?"
permitted even if they are properly forbidden and even punished The Providence Journal, April 6.
according to legal or institutional rules. Estlund, David. 2017. "Methodological Moralism in Political
Philosophy." Critical Review of International Social and
10. Antipathy for Ray Kelly's anticipated message at Brown in
Political Philosophy 20 (3): pp. 365-79.
favor of intensive policing was central to the protesters' motives.
Forbes. "Best U.S. Colleges for International Students: 2016
In our other example, the Horowitz ad that had triggered dis-
Ranking." http://www.forbes.com/colleges/brown-
pute was not in the copies of the Herald confiscated by protesters,
university/.
but had appeared several days earlier. See Lesley, "Paying for
Fortunato]r., Stephen]. 2001. uBrown Professor No Friend of
Controversy."
Freedom." The Providence Journal, Apri113.
11. This is a simplified presentation of what Lipsey and Lancaster Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
called the question of "second best." R.G. Lipsey and Kelvin ]aschik, Scott. 2004. "How a Talk Got Aborted." Inside Higher
Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best," The Review of Ed, February 21. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
Economic Studies 24(1) (1956-7), pp. 11-32. 2014/02/21/brown-releases-analysis-how-Iecture-got-
12. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self- canceled-due-protests.
Government (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, [1948]). ]aschik, Scott. 2012. "Moving Further to the Left." Inside
13. From about here through the following section I draw freely Higher Ed, October 24. https://www.insidehighered.com/
on Estlund, "Deliberation Down and Dirty," in T.R. Hensley (ed.), news/2012/l0/24/survey-finds-professors-already-liberal-
The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American have-moved-further-Ieft.
Democracy (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), pp. 49-67. Kennedy, Randall. 1994. uPrivate Universities and the
14. For documentation of my characterization here and below of First Amendment?" The Chronicle of Higher Educa-
the events, see Estlund, "Deliberation Down and Dirty." tion, September 21. http://www.chronicle.com/article/
Private-Universitiesthe/84740.
15. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore,]r., and Herbert Marcuse, A
Lesley, Kira. 2004. "Paying for Controversy." Brown Daily
Critique ofPure Tolerance (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 95-137. Herald, September 22. http://www.browndailyherald.
16. Wolff, Moore,]r., and Marcuse (1965, p. 90). com/2004/09/22/payi ng-for-con troversyI.
17. One challenge is that there is no reason to believe the true posi- Lipsey, R.G., and Kelvin Lancaster. 1956-7. "The General The-
tion will be the one with the most reasons available in a given his- ory of Second Best." The Review of Economic Studies 24 (1):
torical or institutional setting. In general, evidence is not bound to pp.11-32.
favor the truth. As I say, I won't pursue these questions. Meiklejohn, Alexander. [1948]. Free Speech and Its Relation
18. There are interesting issues in some cases about what counts to Self-Government. New York: Harper Brothers
as a countervailing view, but I cannot pursue the question here. Publishers.
I should also add that there is no presumption here that a discur- Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.s. 1,4 (1949).
sive climate that, so to speak, leans to the left or the right must be Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 393
skewed to the left or the right. That would require a further find- U.S. 503 (1969).
ing, about an imbalance in non-rational influences. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
University of Chicago. 2014. Strauss Report, Report of
19. Thanks to Corey Brettschneider, Alison McQueen, Martha
the Ad Hoc Committee on Protest and Dissent.
Nussbaum, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments
January. https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/
on drafts.
documents/reports/ReportO/020ProtestO/020and%20
Dissent.pdf.
REFERENCES Wolff, Robert Paul, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert
498 N.W.2d 677. 1993. STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles Marcuse. 1965. A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston, MA:
HARDIN, No. 91-1777. Supreme Court of Iowa. April 21. Beacon Press.
From A Tolerant Society

PETER BALINT
Examples of toleration and its absence are not hard Baptist Roman Catholic Church was told its 7 a.m. bell
to find. After Sini Saarela, a Finnish Greenpeace activ- was too loud and could lead to a $ 700 daily fine if it vio-
ist and vegan, was arrested by Russian officials and lated the city's noise ordinance-a woman had com-
charged with piracy in 2013, she was apparently starv- plained that the bell was 'disrupting her quality of life'.
ing in prison because her dietary requests were not On a much broader scale, a 2009 Swiss referendum led
being met. In the same year a United States (US) Fed- to the banning of the building of any new minarets on
eral judge ordered the Florida prison system to rein- either existing or future mosques.
state their Kosher meal plan for all prisoners with a These sorts of cases-and there are a great many
'sincere religious basis'. In the United Kingdom (UK), more possible examples-pervade contemporary life.
Hull Council seems to have tried to conceal its Muslim Sometimes these issues make it into the media and
women-only swimming sessions by telling other users occasionally even stay there for more than one news
of the Beverley Road Baths that they were closed for cycle. Often, though, unless we are participants, we
staff training. But in the Australian state of Victoria, do not hear of them at all. For those involved, media
several local councils successfully applied for exemp- focus often matters little. What matters to them is that
tions from anti-discrimination legislation to run such they can undertake meaningful religious and cultural
women-only swimming classes. Or take the case of practices, use the toilet of their choice, be left alone
gender identity: in 2013 the Education Department on public transport, follow their chosen occupation,
of the US state of Massachusetts ruled that transgen- or engage in their hobbies. In other words, they can
der students can access the locker room and changing do or be the thing they want relatively unimpeded
facility that corresponds with their own gender iden- by the actions of others. For people who are restricted
tity. And similarly in 2013 the city council of Brighton in these ways, the easing of impediments-whether
and Hove in the UK announced its intention to degen- institutional or social, intentional or unintentional-
der its public toilets, stating that it wished to promote matters a great deal. Of course, often these impedi-
'gender neutrality' and 'build facilities which are open ments are entirely justified; we all wish we could do all
to all, regardless of sex'. Or take the case of racist abuse. sorts of things unimpeded by the actions of others. But
In 2014, in what is an all too common event, a young often the justifications for these restrictions are insuf-
mother was subjected to racist abuse on a Dublin bus as ficient and unreflected upon.
she travelled with her three-month-old baby. Earlier, ... Applying toleration and its cognate neutrality
on a Melbourne bus, Fanny Desaintjores was subjected in this sphere commonly suggests radical change, and
to racist abuse by other passengers after she started sing- change that can challenge the status quo and benefit
ing in French as she travelled home. Or take the case many minOrities. My argument will not be that the
of traditional pastimes and animal rights. Traditional claims of those who want to do or be somehow differ-
fox hunting has been illegal in the UK since 2004, but ent need recognition and that their differences should
over in Ireland traditional hunts still continue. And be respected-whether by the state or their fellow
finally, take the case of cultural/religious practices and citizens-but that the things that are making their
their impact on others. In Philadelphia, the Stjohn the ends more difficult to achieve may not be justified,
Peter Balint, "A Tolerant Society ," Respecting Toleration: Traditional and alternative arrangements may well be possible. In
Liberalism and Contemporary' Diversity, pp. 1-18. © Peter Palin brief, this is the good of a tolerant society; it is a society
2017. Published by Oxford University Press. Reproduced with per- in which, comparatively speaking, people are freer to
mission of the Licensor through PLSclear. do or be what they want.
THREE CHALLENGES FOR TOLERATION objection, and intentionally not acting in this way.
My defence of the ideal and the practice of political But if toleration involves an objection and the power,
toleration will be both conceptual and normative, and even if withheld, to act negatively upon this objec-
needs to deal with at least three distinct challenges. The tion, then being tolerated starts to look less than ideal.
Multicultural Challenge comes from the literature on Nobody, it seems, wants to be in a pOSition where
multiculturalism and group-differentiated rights. The those who have power over them object to their exis-
main argument here has been that the traditional lib- tence, or some aspect of it, and whose non-interfer-
eral approach to diversity has failed to accommodate ence may be reversed at any time. Wendy Brown, for
minorities adequately, and that fair accommodation example, sees it as a 'discourse of power and a practice
requires some sort of positive respect or recognition of govern mentality' .
of minority practices, ways of life, or identities. Those Linking up with The Multicultural Challenge, those
supporting this position have been wary of liberal who make The Despotism Challenge commonly argue
toleration and neutrality because of its perceived bias that mere toleration is not enough and some type
towards the majority and its failure to see that treat- of much more respectful relationship is required.
ing ways of life fairly may require treating minorities Michael Walzer, for example, writes: 'To tolerate
differently. Tariq Modood, for example, in arguing someone else is an act of power; to be tolerated is an
for multiculturalism and group-differentiated rights, acceptance of weakness. We should aim to something
writes that 'multiculturalism is clearly beyond tolera- better than this combination, something beyond
tion and state neutrality for it involves active support toleration, something like mutual respect'.
for cultural difference, active discouragement against This is not a new view. Two centuries earlier,
hostility and disapproval and the remaking of the Thomas Paine wrote that '[t]oleration is not the oppo-
public sphere in order to fully include marginalised site of intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it. Both
identities'. Bikhu Parekh, similarly, writes that the are despotisms'. Likewise, Adeno Addis argues that
'demand for recognition goes far beyond the familiar 'the toleration model ... "nourish[es] false charity"
plea for toleration, for the latter implies conceding the towards minorities. What we need is to explore insti-
validity of society's disapproval and relying on its self- tutional structures and processes that would simul-
restraint. Rather they ask for the acceptance, respect taneously allow us to affirm and respect plurality
and even public affirmation of their differences'. while also cultivating some notion of solidarity'.
And finally, Will Kymlicka, one of the most well- The third is The Neutrality Challenge, which is more
known proponents of multiculturalism and group- conceptual and although expressed in various ways
differentiated rights, writes: '[T]he ideal of "benign purports to show an inconsistency in liberal theory.
neglect" is not in fact benign. It ignores the fact the A widely held view (and one I share) is that the con-
members of a national minority face a disadvantage temporary liberal state should be neutral among its
which the members of the majority do not face. In any citizens' (justice-respecting) ways of life; that is, it
event, the idea that the government could be neutral should not favour one way of life over any other. This
is patently false'. type of state could then be said to place no value at
The second is The Despotism Challenge, which all on particular differences. Such a state should not,
focuses on the nature of the relationship that tol- for example, have an official line on religion, or on a
eration describes. Toleration is commonly taken to whole host of other 'private' matters. Yet if this is true,
involve an agent, such as the state or another institu- it would no longer have the sort of values on which
tion, having an objection to another agent and not it may object and withhold power (recall that on the
acting on it despite the power to do so. On this under- orthodox view of toleration, objection is an essential
standing, which is the current theoretical orthodoxy, requirement). According to this challenge, then, tol-
toleration must always have three basic components: eration has been superseded by neutrality. Toleration
an objection, the power to negatively act on this is at best redundant, and at worst incompatible with
liberal neutrality, and cannot describe the actions of objection is still very much present. It can also be
contemporary liberal democracies. quickly revoked-witness, for example, the Revoca-
Thus Glen Newey writes: tion of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, overturning close
to a century of political toleration of French Hugue-
[I]n neutralist theory ... political authority is thought nots. And in relation to The Neutrality Challenge, given
of as a normative vacuum. Since toleration requires
that this ruler has a religion, one cannot describe them
that the tolerator have reasons for disapproving of the
as neutral in this sense, even if they are being tolerant.
practice, and must nonetheless have reasons for regard-
ing non-intervention as good, the normative vacuum If, on the other hand, they somehow did not have a
is filled, and neutrality disappears. religion, then they might be neutral, but would not
seem to be acting tolerantly any more.
Robert Paul Churchill, meanwhile, argues, 'far from While in theoretical circles at least, this interpre-
being neutral, "liberal toleration" may paradoxically tation of toleration has become the dominant ortho-
endorse hostility ("intolerance") towards the persons, doxy, it is certainly not the only way to understand
values, and beliefs others are said to be tolerating'. the concept. There is a much broader understanding
My defence of toleration and neutrality does not that does not require objection, but simply power and
set the above concerns aside, nor will I simply reject intentional non-hindrance. It is this understanding
the normative premises underlying the first two chal- of toleration that is present when somebody or some
lenges. Instead, by examining the concepts them- environment is described as particularly tolerant.
selves, I want to show how all three challenges can be When a university, for example, is described as par-
resisted and how toleration is both normatively desir- ticularly tolerant, what is not meant is that this insti-
able and conceptually coherent. tution has a great many objections, which, despite
As mentioned above, according to the current the- having the power, are not acted upon. What is usually
oretical orthodoxy, toleration must always have three meant is that the institution has few, if any, objections
basic components: an objection, the power to nega- to things that others might find objectionable (as well
tively act on this objection, and intentionally not act- as having the power to act negatively in these areas if
ing in this way. It is, therefore, a type of forbearance. it so wished).
Many views are even stricter, requiring the reasons for This broader understanding of toleration is permiS-
the objection and the withholding of negative inter- sive in two crucial ways. First, as stated, it is wider than
ference to be of the morally right kind, rather than the narrow and much more moralized view that has
more pragmatic or less unrefIected upon. In political come to dominate recent political philosophy-and
contexts, the paradigmatic case of this understanding which, it is worth noting, was certainly not the under-
of toleration is taken to be a traditional ruler who tol- standing used by the liberal pioneers of toleration
erates their subjects practicing religions that rival their such as John Locke, Pierre Bayle, and Roger Williams.
own. As the sovereign, there is the power to intervene, This understanding matches our everyday language.
as well as clear objection, and moreover in this case The way certain societies are described as particularly
the objection can be seen as morally grounded in rival tolerant, for example, does not mean they contain a
scriptures. lot of people and institutions constantly overcoming
If this is taken as the paradigmatic case, then all their deeply grounded moral objections, but simply
three challenges have serious bite. In relation to The that most people and institutions in such a society
Multicultural Challenge, by maintaining and prefer- do not really care about a great many things to which
ring one religion over others, the practising of these others would object, and consequently are relatively
non-preferred religions will likely be harder, and the permissive. A tolerant society usually involves signifi-
status of their adherents as equal citizens may also cantly more indifference than it does forbearance.
come into question. In relation to The Despotism Chal- Second, toleration is permissive in a more literal
lenge, this toleration is at the whim of the ruler whose sense. The more toleration that is practised the more
permissive a society is, and with it the more freedom On most understandings, sexuality, for example, is
its citizens enjoy. This does not mean that toleration neither a culture nor a conception of the good-even
should not have limits, but these limits, however well if some parts of sexuality can appear cultural or like
justified, are restrictions, and make such a society less a conception of the good. The same can be said for
permissive, even if rightly so. Generally speaking we many issues of race, which for some is cultural, but
might want to say toleration is better than intolerance. for others is simply an unchosen characteristic. Even
But there will be many occasions-such as when harm things like obesity, which can certainly be grounds for
is likely to be caused to others-where intolerance is to discrimination and exclusion, does not fall neatly into
be preferred. This is to say nothing more than any lib- these categories. As these examples-and countless
eral regime of toleration will have a range. Everything other possibilities-show, not all issues of diversity
within its range will be permitted-either because simply reduce into culture or conceptions of the good
there is no objection, or any objection is outweighed as usually understood.
by another consideration such as freedom of con- One approach here is to come up with a norma-
science or freedom of association. Beyond this range tive hierarchy with certain types of difference being
things will, and should, be subject to intolerance. seen as more important than others. Take, for exam-
None of this is to dismiss the more philosophi- ple, the use of 'societal culture', 'identity', or 'consci-
cally orthodox understanding of toleration as for- entious belief'. While these categories may seem to
bearance. As I will show, a full understanding of the focus on what is important, they seem unnecessarily
liberal practice of political toleration will require both narrow, and certainly do not capture the political
the permissive and the orthodox senses of toleration: ramifications of the full range of human diversity. Of
one certainly does not cancel the other out. In both course, these narrower understandings are norma-
a descriptive and normative sense, both understand- tive, and so in the end will be my approach. But I want
ings are required, and so resisting the three challenges to avoid starting with too narrow an understanding
is much more than a linguistic exercise. of what sorts of diversity matter, and instead use an
approach that takes people's expressed preferences
seriously.
DIVERSITY There are two basic reasons for this move. First, it
As explained earlier, it is the issues of diversity that is consistent with my freedom-based justification of
occur in contemporary liberal democracies that lead toleration. I will expand on this in the section after
to the need for toleration. Sometimes people's dif- next, but basically it means toleration is primarily
ferences are self-chosen; sometimes they are not. But justified through negative freedom, and toleration
most of the time it is not at all clear whether they are is valuable to the extent that this type of freedom is
(and even if they could be) chosen. What matters, at valuable. There is then no wrong kind of diversity,
least if one cares about the lives of these individuals, is except those that threaten this freedom for others or
that all these forms of diversity can be grounds for the other significant wrongs. Second, the alternatives do
type of discrimination that can make some people's not seem to adequately capture the politically salient
lives relatively more difficult, and can lead to social types of human difference. The reasons people want
exclusion. to do different things (or sometimes the same thing
I use the term 'diversity' (and sometimes 'differ- but they themselves are different in some salient fash-
ence') in a very broad and entirely mundane sense. ion) do not fall neatly into the chosen/unchosen, the
Often discussion in this area is about culture (hence autonomous/adaptive preference, the ascriptive/non-
'multiculturalism') or about 'conceptions of the ascriptive, the alterable/non-alterable, or the deeply
good' (common with those working in a Rawlsian held/just trying it out. And even when they do fit
paradigm). But diversity and its political implications such categories there is little way of actually knowing
can be much broader than these two understandings. this in individual cases. Take, for example, the case of
gender identity-it is not hard to think of cases that and housing; and citizens abusing and assaulting each
match both sides of these various dichotomies. other in public spaces. All of these things, and more,
Taking people's expressed preferences seriously make it much more difficult for those who are in some
may sound like an impossible challenge; when there way different from the norm to live their lives as they
is a clash between two ways of doing things, it would see fit.
seem that more weight must be given to those who As we saw in The Multicultural Challenge, the mul-
hold sincere and deep beliefs or to those whose actions ticultural and difference-sensitive critique of liberal
are less chosen over those who are simply express- theory and practice has raised and objected to these
ing a preference. But as I argue in ... , such a choice intolerant pressures before. The common prescrip-
is often not necessary as institutions themselves are tion has been that liberalism must change and that
commonly able to change and adapt to all types of to continue the status quo is to continue to perpe-
diversity. The question is not whose beliefs are more trate injustice on those with divergent ways of life. As
serious, but whether the mainstream practice that is a result, we see calls for exemptions from general
being challenged can be both justified neutrally and its rules, recognition of particular identities, and other
aims met by doing things differently; that is, whether difference-sensitive poliCies and obligations. These
the institution itself can be made more tolerant and modifications to liberal theory or practice can broadly
thus more permissive. be described as respect for difference, and at their base
A tolerant sOciety is not one that is only tolerant of all share the concern for removing intolerant pres-
the right kind of diversity, but tolerant of a wide vari- sures that impede minorities from doing or being the
ety of beliefs and practices. To an important degree, thing they want. While not always expressed in this
the more a society is tolerant, the more it is liberal. way, to the extent that they are liberal-and virtually
But this statement is true only up to a point. Beyond all contemporary theories of multiculturalism and
this point, into the realm of harming and threatening group-differentiated rights are-it is concern for free-
others, and undermining justice and security, we dom that matters.
could in fact say the more tolerant a society is, the less But liberal theory does not require radical modi-
liberal the society is. Or to put this another way, tol- fication in order to accommodate diverSity. All the
eration matters a great deal, but it is not the only thing ingredients exist in traditional liberalism to enable
that matters. And while the practice of toleration lies a high degree of accommodation, and more so than
at the heart of liberalism, it is but one component. directly respecting or recognizing difference. This is
not to let the status quo off the hook. A defence of
the status quo has formed the backbone of the early
ACCOMMODATING DIVERSITY twenty-first-century backlash against multicultural-
A tolerant society is an accommodating society. And ism and group-differentiated rights. This backlash-
by caccommodating' I simply mean someone is rela- led theoretically by Brian Barry, and politically by a
tively free to do the thing they want to do/be, and any number of European state leaders-has been less about
political or social restriction is properly justified. Intol- whether liberal states actually allowed or helped peo-
erant pressures, whether institutional or social, make ple lead divergent lives, but that such a project, at least
accommodation more difficult. Sometimes these when focusing on differing cultures, was neither legit-
pressures will be justified or at least unaVOidable, and imate, nor salutatory. PoliticaIIy there has been great
sometimes they will not. If we look to contemporary concern in Europe over cseparate and parallel lives'
societies, there are many intolerant pressures which and a need to emphasize commonness rather than
do not seem to be justified. We see privileged status difference. This coincided with a more general ccivic
given to majority practices, religions, and beliefs; state turn' and with it an emphasis on duties rather than
proclamations of the rightness (or wrongness) of par- rights. Theoretically, using culture to differentiate citi-
ticular ways of life; discrimination in employment zens has been seen as undermining equal treatment,
and cultural rights as potentially oppressive to 'minor- actually is, there is no reason not to tolerate. If the best
ities within minorities'-particularly women-as well way of life cannot be known for certain, then there is
as an underminer of redistributive policies. In politi- no justification for repressing other ways of life. One
cal practice, the backlash seemed to quickly legitimate of Locke's justifications for religious toleration, for
strong national cultures, urging, if not in some cases example, was the inability to know whether rulers and
coercing, assimilation. In the more theoretical writ- magistrates were actually enforcing the correct path to
ings, the claims of those with divergent ways of life salvation. Second, and sometimes related to the first
were either overly minimized or rejected entirely out argument, it has been argued that tolerating different
of hand, and certainly seen as significantly less impor- practices will ultimately lead to the emergence and
tant than other liberal values. maintenance of the truth.
This is not the argument I am making. The multi- While these epistemic issues were a main part of
cultural critique was on to something: people should John Stuart Mill's argument for toleration, Mill's case
be able to live divergent lives, and too often liberal for increased toleration was deliberately consequen-
states have both explicitly and implicitly favoured tial: increased toleration and the exposure to compet-
dominant groups. Insisting that those who wish to ing ideas and ways of life would lead both to better
lead divergent lives are still free to do lots of other societies and better individuals. Another prominent
things, or are simply holding themselves back with consequential justification is the claim that people's
their beliefs, or are subject to the same rules as every- lives tend to go better when they choose for them-
body else, or need to properly integrate, is both to priv- selves, rather than have choices thrust upon them.
ilege the status quo unnecessarily and unfairly, and to For others, toleration has been seen as a prag-
fail to be adequately tolerant. While it may be true, to matic good; as a workable solution to disagreement-
use Barry's phrase, 'that this is the way we do things historically often very violent disagreement-on the
here', the question is: does it have to be? Could things issue of how people should lead their lives. Indeed,
be done differently and restrict people's freedom less? this was one of the strongest motivations for the
Could institutions become more neutral and more emergence in the West of toleration in early modern
tolerant? And while the 'civic turn' has placed more political thought and practice. It was realized that
demands on the Citizen, many demands ultimately trying to impose a way of life, in this case an inter-
seem unnecessary, and certainly antithetical to lead- pretation of Christianity, onto unwilling others led
ing a divergent life. to endless rounds of bloodshed as one side after the
In putting forward a reworked traditional liberal other seized power and tried to coercively enforce
approach to the issues associated with contemporary its beliefs. Practising toleration was seen as a way of
diversity, I am not claiming that people's different finally breaking out of this cycle of violence.
ways of life do not matter and that cultural claims are With the exception of the first purely epistemic
unimportant; quite the opposite. But in order to real- justification, all of these justifications rely on tol-
ize this important and most basic of liberal goods, it is eration producing some other good-whether it be
traditional toleration and neutrality that provide the peace, truth, or better lives. I do not want to argue
solution, rather than cause the problem. directly against any of these types of justifications, but
instead use what I see as a prior, indeed much weight-
ier, and among liberals more widely held justification:
JUSTIFYING TOLERATION freedom.
I take it as a fundamental tenet of liberalism
* * * that it is interference, rather than non-interference,
From an epistemic perspective, there have been that must be justified. That is, the non-use of politi-
two main arguments for practising toleration. The cal power does not require special jUstification in the
first argument is that if we do not know what the truth same way that the use of political power does. If one
accepts this, then it is the wrong starting point to ask matters is simply that people follow their own life
what justifies toleration, the question instead should plans. But because it takes expressed preferences seri-
be what justifies non-toleration. It is the negative inter- ously, it is not consistent with thicker understandings
ference of intolerance that needs proper justification, of autonomy, where preferences must be formed in
and not the non-hindrance of toleration. the right way-that is, by using rationality to choose
On this freedom-based approach, toleration is a consciously from a sufficient range of decent options
pro tanto good; that is, all things being equal, tolera- and with minimal external pressures. This freedom is
tion is better than intolerance. Often things are not prior to any other goods-whether they be perfection-
equal, though, and toleration will be limited: either ist or welfare related. And it is not simply a starting
because of other people's freedom, or because of other point, but a constant and weighty reference and limi-
values that may not easily (or at all) reduce to nega- tation on political power. This position is broadly anti-
tive freedom. But as a pro tanto good, these potential perfectionist. The state's primary role is not to make
limits need to have genuine and important weight. us better persons, or fulfil some metaphysical or aes-
While on one level there is not much more to say thetic ideal, but to give us the space and security to live
about a freedom-based justification, there is a danger our lives as we see fit. While not all liberals will agree
that this reversal of onus may leave freedom and tol- with this understanding-at least at a deep level-it is
eration inadequately defended. For while it is correct a view that is shared by most liberals, even if in vary-
to say that toleration in the political sphere needs no ing degrees; and it is the argumentative starting point
special justification-other than liberalism-this may of this book. It is also, as Glen Newey has argued, the
unfortunately allow other values to override it too only justification for toleration that resists counter-
quickly and render its practice too rare. (I see a paral- factual idealization: With all the other justifications,
lel case with privacy, whose vital importance seems to if the world was slightly different, and toleration did
be continually trumped by security whenever there is not bring about a particular good, or the good could be
a 'balance' that needs to be struck. Saying something achieved in some other way, then the practice would
is important, or even very important, does not always no longer be justified.
seem enough.) So in order to show a little of the true
weight of toleration-even if only, but importantly, * * *
so that it can remain a fighting political value and
practice-more is going to have to be said. I am wary, TWO TYPES OF AGENT: STATE AND CITIZEN
however, that in saying more, my position may not be In normative discussions of diversity, all too often the
consistent with the broadest possible liberal support agent with power is simply 'we': how should we treat
for toleration. In the end, though, what is important is those who are different to us? What should we toler-
simply that the reader thinks that this sort of freedom ate? Should we respect or recognize a particular group?
is significant, rather than necessarily accepting the Witness: 'should we tolerate the Burqua?', or 'should
following justification for it. we respect indigenous cultural practices?', or 'should
It is the importance-whether through natu- we recognize gay marriage?'
ral right or otherwise-of controlling our own lives But this 'we' can mean either the state as our col-
that adds something more positive in justifying lective agent or the majority of citizens (it cannot be
non-interference. This is more than the importance all of us, because then such issues would not arise).
of autonomy-although it can include it-and it is From a liberal perspective, at least, these are not the
more than the claim that people's lives tend to go same things: Liberalism keeps majoritarian democ-
better when they choose for themselves. It is about a racy in check, and the question of state power is not
fundamental freedom to live one's life as one sees fit, simply answered by democratic means. The question
regardless of any consequential good. Such a view is of what the state should do is different from what 'we'
consistent with weak autonomy views, where what may want it to do.
In this book, I will focus on two agents of tol- as well as, of course, between majorities and minori-
eration: the state and the citizen. These are distinct ties. This can be seen, for example, in the relationship
agents, and it is unfortunate when they are either between Sunni and Shia Muslims in many parts of the
run together, or only one agent-usually the state- western world, or between Hasidic Jews and African-
is focused upon. When the citizen is discussed, it is Americans in New York City, or between bisexuals and
generally assumed the citizen should simply do the homosexuals in many gay communities, or between
same thing as the state-that is, recognize minority many Black and Asian people in the UK, to name but
identities/cultures etc. a few instances. The use of 'we' is best aVOided in this
Let me begin with the state. Like many writers context and, at least when discussing agents of tolera-
working in this field, I assume a world of states. I do tion, I will endeavour to avoid using the term.
not, however, assume a world of nation-states, nor the Citizens and states are importantly different enti-
world as it is now. My only assumption is that there ties. Their capacities are different, and usually it is
are states (or state-like entities, such as substate politi- citizens, not states, who are thought to have rights.
cal units or other institutions), and that they should This means that whatever the duties of states in rela-
be guided by liberal prinCiples. As should already be tion to diversity (whether expansive or non-eXistent),
evident, my view of the liberal state is, at least cul- these are not necessarily the obligations that citizens
turally, very 'thin'. It is this thinness-essentially an have to each other. Take for example the claim that
argument against majority rights-that allows me to 'we' should respect difference. Perhaps it is possible
argue against the necessity of minority rights. If one for the state to accede to such a demand, by granting
takes the position that states need nations to legiti- an exemption, or perhaps making a proclamation of
mize them, then minority group-differentiated rights equal worth. But what about the citizen? Citizens are
may seem necessary protection against the majority not neutral agents without views or sincerely held
cultural nation building that will ensue (at least if one beliefs about how life should be lived. They are people
cares about fair background conditions). If, as I argue, with a whole range of strongly held beliefs and atti-
one pushes for political toleration to be realized by tudes on this very topic. Perhaps in some very ideal-
making the state and its laws, policies, and institutions ized world such views would at least be 'reasonable',
as neutral as pOSSible, then the need for minority pro- if not entirely compatible with one another, but this
tection is greatly weakened. does not seem like a human world, nor a world that,
But a tolerant SOciety requires more than tolerant somewhat ironically, takes difference seriously. It
states-it requires citizens to be tolerant too. Citizens seems entirely disrespecting of one citizen's differ-
not only have political power when participating in ence to ask them to respect another's difference which
democratic processes, but also when acting in the pub- they may find deeply objectionable: how is the ani-
lic sphere. Citizens can be landlords, employers, fellow mal activist, for example, to respect the fox hunter's
bus passengers, and so forth, and a tolerant society will way of life? We may wish that some people did not
reqUire them to be also agents of toleration. It is here, have negative views about other people's ways of
among the citizenry, that the 'we' language is par- life-especially if they are unreasonable-but they
ticularly unhelpful; especially when 'we' means the do, and the question is how to manage these views-
majority, and those who may need respecting or toler- and more importantly, the actions they can give rise
ating are 'our' minorities. Issues of respect and tolera- to. Telling people they cannot have such views fails
tion do not neatly track majorities and minorities, and on freedom of conscience grounds; it fails to take
with it the presumption that only majorities have the into account the intransigence of human beliefs and
power to be intolerant or fail to respect appropriately. attitudes; and on its own grounds fails to take people's
It is not unusual for there to be a great deal of animos- differences seriously.
ity, as well as the power to hinder, between different Any discussion of contemporary diversity that is
minorities, and from minorities towards majorities, political-where there is some contestation and not
everyone can get what they want-cannot assume may engage in forbearance tolerance with their differ-
a compatibility of ways of life. It may seem obvious, ence, both of which can also lead to accommodation.
but is worth stating: not everyone will be able to do or In fact, in cases of forbearance tolerance, it may be that
be what they want, and the permissible acts or beliefs it is respect for another agent's sameness that provides
of others may be ones you deeply disagree with. In a the reason for withholding the power to negatively
doctrinal dispute between citizens with divergent interfere. Without this respect, intolerance may occur.
readings of the same scriptures, for example, asking While I keep sharp the distinction between states
one party or the other to respect the other's reading and citizens in understanding what can be asked of
entirely misses the nature of the dispute and trivializes tolerant agents, and using this distinction is much
its importance. This is quite distinct from asking the better than ignoring or downplaying it, such a dis-
parties to respect each other's right to such views and tinction is also a little simplistic. The political sphere
to tolerate the actions that may then follow. contains more than simply states and their citizens.
Respect for difference needs to be kept distinct There are also formal and informal groups-from cor-
from respect for sameness (whether this is seen as porations to sporting clubs to cultural groups-and
dignity, humanity, or citizenship). Some have argued substate political institutions such as local councils.
that respect for difference is implied by respect for It is a little reductionist just to talk about states and
sameness-that is, to respect someone's dignity, for citizens and not include civil-society organizations
example, means respecting what is unique about or corporations and the like. My aim, though, is not
them-but we need to be careful here. It cannot be to map out precisely the different duties and rights
the case that respecting sameness-whether dignity, that are attached to this range of potential agents,
humanity, or citizenship-always means respecting but simply to show that there is a range and that the
particular difference. Besides the problems already range matters when it comes to assigning rights and
discussed, this ignores the other possibilities that can duties of toleration. I leave it to the reader to consider
lead to the successful accommodation of difference. the roles of particular intermediary agents (and also
An agent (whether citizen or state) may respect the decide which things can rightfully ever be considered
sameness of a person, yet may only be indifferent or agents in the first place).
Putting Civility in Its Place

SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH
Students come to college primarily to learn; while col- and the free exchange of ideas take place. In what ways
leges are often in the headlines these days when speech is speech protected in the classroom today, and how
and political issues arise, in fact political expression does the inclusive freedom framework affect teaching
and civic development are not the main purposes of and learning on campus? Academic freedom protects
college. Most of the speech cases discussed so far, and much of what happens within the classroom, and it
those that animate public debate, occur outside of is more central and more significant to the function-
class, but it is inside the four walls of the classroom ing of the university than the general guidelines,
that the most meaningful and productive opportu- where those are available, organizing free speech. This
nities for discussion, the development of knowledge, chapter considers the need for distinctions between
Sigal R. Ben-Porath, from Free Speech Oil Campus, pp. 85-102. responding to speech inside and outside the class-
© 2017 University of Pennsylvania Press. Reprinted with permis- room, differences in the notion of safety in these
sion of the University of Pennsylvania Press two distinct contexts, and a way to preserve access
570 0- PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
and dignity in class. I consider how cases involving their favorite poems rather than teach. In other words,
tensions about speech that arise during class can be academic freedom is more demanding and more limit-
addressed within an inclusive freedom framework. ing than free speech rules, and it is academic freedom,
I examine the importance of not only allowing but rather than the more general contours of free speech,
encouraging and managing student speech in class, that should guide classroom (and lab and clinic)
and I comment on the incentives for and the dangers work. Second, college teaching should contribute to
of instituting a civility regime that avoids conflict by the development of civic skills and values. These
discouraging impassioned speech. I also offer alterna- civic goals can be more or less central in different
tive civil yet engaged classroom practices. classrooms-an introductory lecture hall in biology
Applying the framework of inclusive freedom would be different from a small seminar in politiCS or
inside the classroom requires another look at the dis- a constitutional law class-but in all these, instructors
tinction between intellectual safety and harm on the are never solely transmitters of knowledge. A good
one hand and dignitary safety and harm on the other. college education would include at least some-and
In the classroom, intellectual safety should be rejected ideally many-instructors who see themselves not
to allow open-minded research and teaching to take only as teaching in their field but also as educators
place, and intellectual harm, such as the harm caused who prepare their students for their broader roles in
by inaccurate and misleading speech, should be regu- SOciety. In this regard, instructors should devote some
lated. At the same time, dignitary safety should be pro- thought to the ways in which dissent, harm, and other
tected as a way to ensure full access to campus by all forms of expression can present themselves in the
members. Such protection includes attention to forms classroom and how they might productively respond
of speech and responses to them while refraining from to free speech challenges.
strictly regulating or curtailing speech. In what fol- The goal of work in the classroom is learning-
lows, I consider what these principles would mean to namely, the development, exchange, and transmis-
the professors' (or instructors') speech and expression, sion of knowledge. To achieve this goal, the ground
and then to the students' expression, in class. rules in class have to include a commitment to
intellectual honesty, which requires adherence to
discipline-appropriate, scientific- and evidence-based
THE PROFESSOR SPEAKS: ACADEMIC practices. When learning about climate, there is no
FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION room for questioning SCientific evidence, even if one's
Academic freedom gives professors broad discretion ideological pOSition runs counter to the information
over expressions and interactions in the classroom. laid out in class. Similarly, there is no need to accom-
Free speech guidelines and First Amendment protec- modate religious or ideological objections to accepted
tions permit students to speak their minds too, but knowledge. But in practice, that does not mean that
they offer very limited guidance as to how classrooms objections should be silenced; in many cases, shutting
should operate. While professors should obviously down speech is neither justified nor an effective way of
work within free speech parameters in the class- countering intellectual dishonesty or inaccurate per-
room, there are two additional principles that should ceptions. Oftentimes the instructor can think ahead
guide their work: the first intellectual and the second about what opposing arguments might be raised and
civic. First, as part of their commitment to teaching- plan effective ways to engage with them, which is not
developing and disseminating knowledge-instruc- only more respectful but also more productive as a
tors are bound by intellectual honesty in ways that teaching method.
can in fact limit their expression. For example, they This does not mean that instructors should, or
must not lie in class, even as free speech permits them do, promote ideological views in class. Politicians are
to lie; they must focus on the relevant and important sometimes concerned that colleges are promoting a
subject matter, even as free speech allows them to read liberal ideology, a perception enhanced by surveys,
such as one indicating that 32 percent of first-year open access to the classroom by inviting all students,
students considered themselves liberal or far left, com- independent of their identities, current views, or
pared with 60 percent of faculty members. While this beliefs, to participate in the process. Protecting free
concern may be understandable, it must not result in speech requires that faculty consider a broad range of
political interventions into academic work. In 2016, relevant views and that they are protected when mak-
the Wisconsin state legislature demanded informa- ing decisions about classroom materials. Students on
tion about syllabi used in Wisconsin's public univer- more liberal campuses who feel marginalized because
sity system. The sentiment leading to this demand of their conservative or other right-leaning political
was summarized in statements such as, "Ideological ideologies should sense that their views are respected
conformity has been institutionalized on the nation's and valued whether or not they are reflected in a
campuses. Students are encouraged to look upon particular syllabus. Minority students on mostly white
American society from a perspective of righteous campuses should feel the same.
indignation." The legislators zeroed in on a course Polarization on campus and concerns about los-
about "whiteness" as a reason to de fund or otherwise ing control over the lesson plan or class discussion
punish public universities in the state. They seemed can lead professors to avoid controversy as much as
to presume that the course represented an attack on possible. This is even more likely when the professor
white people and an attempt to elevate ethnic and in question is not a tenured member of the faculty.
racial minorities over whites and that it was a waste Tenured (and tenure-track) faculty are becoming a
or misuse of public dollars to fund the instruction smaller share of the faculty overall, and many of the
of such a course. Without looking at the merits of instructors that students see in class have limited job
the course itself, which are immaterial to the discus- security and academic protections. The urge to avoid
sion, it should be clear that the legislature should not controversy as a way of protecting one's job, of adher-
have had the power to censor or otherwise affect the ing to the lesson plan, or simply of avoiding the pos-
content of teaching. Similar attacks on free speech in sible tensions that might arise when one wades into
college-including in the classroom-in the name of touchy, painful, or charged topics is understandable.
moral and political views are becoming more com- It also must be overcome.
mon: various colleges are also instituting "bias report- In many fields, teaching difficult topics is unavoid-
ing systems," whereby committees are set up to invite able. Some law professors have become careful about
and investigate students' reports on their professors' teaching rape laws, for example, but this is clearly not
speech in the classroom. Students may worry about a viable solution when one is charged with training
discriminatory or ideological expressions the pro- lawyers. Controversial topics come up when teaching
fessors make in class, but such reporting systems are history, engineering, business, or philosophy. Tread-
bound to chill speech and harmfully limit teaching ing around them is intellectually dishonest; (some)
and learning, especially among untenured (or non- lawyers need to know about rape laws, history stu-
tenure-track) professors whose jobs are not secure. dents should be able to address colonialism or nation-
The response to such attacks on academic freedom alism, and students in professional schools need to
should be an unwavering commitment to protecting understand ethical controversies in their fields.
the broadest possible range of teaching and research. But intellectual honesty is only one reason to make
When professors are protected and free to plan their charged topics a palt of the lesson plan. One other rea-
classes, expose students to knowledge, and invite son is that a college does more than train profession-
them to contribute to the process, they can present als in specific fields, and its role goes beyond that of a
unpopular views and question current perspectives. vocational program. Higher education institutions are
This process has to be open if it is to advance knowl- always responsible as well for training citizens who are
edge rather than simply repeat accepted orthodoxies almost inevitably going to be part of SOciety by con-
without question. It has to be done while preserving tributing to its development as leaders, professional
experts, and CIVIC participants. Shying away from to see how they respond or how resilient they are. Pre-
controversy in the college classroom (and in college paring for class requires reading the material, thinking
more generally) by stemming speech and averting ahead, and planning. Trigger warnings-or whatever
debate teaches students that there is no proper way else one might call the courteous forewarning by a
to disagree, no room for considering other opinions, professor ("tough topic ahead!")-should be seen as a
and no way to bridge the gap between opposing views. matter of good pedagogy and academic practice rather
Delving into controversial issues (including those that than a surrender to weakness and laziness of thought.
are politically charged), scientific disagreements, and In most cases, there is no need or strong justifica-
other difficult topics is key to the education of both tion to permit students to avoid a class because of its
researchers and citizens. "triggering"-painful, traumatic, harmful-content,
This kind of engagement by no means requires a but sometimes that allowance is acceptable. It's a small
rejection of sound pedagogical practices-including, price for a criminal law class to pay if a student who
in some cases, indications in class or on the syllabus suffered trauma avoids class discussion on rape laws.
that painful and difficult topics are ahead. "Trigger She would still need to pass the same requirements
warnings" themselves have become a controver- and do the same (or equivalent) work as decided in
sial topiC in recent years, despite having had a long- consultation with her professor. Deriding her for her
standing quiet presence in many courses for years. difficulty does nothing to improve the discussion or
The controversial August 2016 letter by the dean of strengthen her knowledge and educational experi-
students to freshmen at the University of Chicago ence. On the other hand, expanding the demand for
specifically addressed trigger warnings, stating, "Our trigger warnings to include exemptions from classes or
commitment to academic freedom means that we assignments for trivial reasons undermines the overall
do not support so-called 'trigger warnings. III justified cause of this pedagogic mechanism.
The response penned by faculty members raised Political and civic skills and dispositions develop
an important objection: "Those of us who have signed best in structured contexts like school and college
this letter have a variety of opinions about requests for classrooms, in which controversial topics are dis-
trigger warnings and safe spaces. We may also disagree cussed in an engaged and respectful manner and in
as to whether free speech is ever legitimately inter- which people feel empowered to express their views
rupted by concrete pressures of the political. That is as and consider different positions. In many cases, this
it should be. But let there be no mistake: such requests is also a practical way to increase engagement and
often touch on substantive, ongoing issues of bias, therefore improve learning. Introducing controversial
intolerance, and trauma that affect our intellectual topics in a planned and thoughtful way supports the
exchanges. To start a conversation by declaring that development of informed, critical, and engaged citi-
such requests are not worth making is an affront to the zens and is an integral part of the ethics of pedagogy
basic principles of liberal education and participatory in higher education contexts. Clearly, the main loca-
democracy. " tion where such efforts should take place is the K-12
The position expressed by the faculty members is classroom, where almost all future citizens can benefit
sound, and as is clear from their letter, it stems from from it (rather than only those who make it to college).
experience in the classroom rather than an effort to Still, college classrooms can provide a Significant con-
respond to political demands or to carve a niche of text for similar development. To the extent that they
intellectual honesty within an imagined sea of intol- provide spaces for interaction with peers and institu-
erance and prudery. An instructor will be smart to let tional authorities and contexts for increasing knowl-
her students know what is coming ahead in a course so edge and expertise, they help develop some civic skills
that they can decide how to prepare and even whether and dispositions, even if that is not their main goal.
participating is in their best interest. Intellectual can- Therefore, it is best to be conscious about the kinds of
dor does not demand springing surprises on students opportunities afforded in class for students to become
engaged and especially to develop and express their There were various reasons for this rejection, but
views and listen to those of others. some were related to the concern that if such a virus
In the concluding chapter, I suggest some practi- were to be discovered and related to homosexuality in
cal ways to plan and organize an inclusive classroom some way, it would be seen by adversaries of the gay
environment that is committed to the protection of community as justification for physical and public
free speech. For now I would just note broadly that attacks or for quarantine of suspected carriers (as in
to facilitate such a context, it is best not to avoid fact happened during the early years of the epidemic).
controversy-neither when the professor brings it Some gay liberation advocates refused to consider the
up nor when students raise controversial issues. It is possibility that promiscuity or unprotected sex with
likewise important not to let the controversy get out multiple partners could be causing or exacerbating the
of control, taking over the lesson plan or damaging epidemic. Only the open-minded and professional
the relationships among students or between stu- commitment of many researchers, citizens, gay advo-
dents and their instructor. Containing the process of cates, and HIV/ AIDS patients allowed for the epidemic
discussing controversial issues makes it possible to to begin to be understood and treated. It is dishearten-
have an open and free exchange while avoiding both ing to realize that the good intentions of some advo-
dignitary and intellectual harms. cates who worked to reject the association between
It is important to note that these considerations homosexuality and social and physical ills may have
are not limited to classrooms where texts are being been one of the hurdles on the way to understand-
interpreted or historical significance and meaning the epidemic in its early stages (though it by no
ing of events are being debated. While it is easy to means was a main reason for the prolonged delay in
see how humanities and social sciences classrooms developing treatment). Hence an open and inclusive
can readily implement suggestions related to criti- inquiry that takes into account the perspectives of
cal thinking and discussion in class, opportunities those affected along with other views and seeks the
abound-and are urgently required-in the class- truth beyond prejudice and orthodoxies of thought
rooms of other disciplines. Some of the most chal- can push forward knowledge in a broad range of fields
lenging free speech concerns that administrators from the humanities classroom to the lab.
encounter have to do with professors who teach
climate science and are concerned about some stu-
dents' expression of doubt and with students in the THE STUDENTS SPEAK
medical professions who suggest that some of their Given that discussion is a key tool for engaging
professors stigmatize ethnic groups as culpable for students, allowing them to express and extend
health challenges. Early during the AIDS epidemic their involvement in subject matter while helping
in the United States, when the scope of the tragedy them develop their civic capacities, it is helpful to
was not widely known and it was commonly termed think ahead about what these discussions should
Gay-Related Immune Deficiency (GRID), research look like.
was hampered by competing ideological standpoints Many commentators point to civility as a key con-
that prevented the development of accurate knowl- cept around which conversational ground rules can be
edge of the deadly disease. Conservatives-including set, mostly because civility seems to preclude intoler-
President Ronald Reagan-seemed to assume that ant expressions and therefore prevent the pitfalls of
this was an illness limited to the gay community harm and hurt that are the immediate risks of a candid
and borne of promiscuity or other moral failings conversation unlimited by strict civility demands. As
and thus did not deserve the public's attention, noted earlier, civility in itself is not a useful tool for
whereas some advocates, including gay physicians, protecting free speech, supporting an inclusive and
rejected the possibility that this new mysterious free inquiry, or enabling the development of open-
illness could be tied to a new virus. mindedness and engagement in class.
In class, civility justly forbids outright mocking, challenges to the content of class, based on their
racist and misogynic declarations, and physical harm. beliefs? Should a professor engage with a student
However, it still permits "muted and surreptitious in her class who is questioning the validity of scien-
attitudes of disdain" that serve as the basic currency tific knowledge about climate change? There are two
of dignitary harms and as an effective and persistent main reasons to consider doing so: the first based on
mechanism of shutting members of marginalized intellectual commitments and the second based on
groups out of the conversation. The widespread sense dignitary ones.
of members of newer groups-women, first-generation First, unsubstantiated views are endorsed by many
students, members of many minority groups-that in broader SOciety, and indeed some of them are rela-
they do not belong or that they are imposters is (at tively widespread. By dismissing them, we do little
least in part) a result of messages expressed through to counter their hold on some minds, and in that we
these "acceptable" muted responses to their contribu- neglect our obligation to disseminate accurate and
tions or even to their presence. reliable information. Not only does the student who
Moreover, the civility expectation of the college brings up perspectives such as climate-change denial
classroom, if and when it is implemented, prioritizes remain set in her views, but the professor also misses
what is traditionally seen as proper behavior and an opportunity to illustrate to other students how
restricts expressions of emotions like anger, frustra- one might respond to questions like this, which they
tion, and disaffection. Seen from a historical per- might face in the course of their professional and civic
spective, civility seems to allow only "appropriate'" lives. Having a model or blueprint for how to respond
noble forms of expression to count as civil, whereas is useful for other students as they develop their
those that are traditionally ascribed to women and to knowledge and skills, and therefore should be seen as
"lesser" cultures-eXcitement, anger, tears-continue an opportunity for learning rather than as a waste of
to be rejected and censored. In this respect, it leaves valuable class time.
limited tools in the hands of those who continue to Moreover, shutting down a student who raises
suspect that they are still treated as less than full mem- an objection to the content presented in class might
bers. Civility constrains speech, which is one strike constitute harm to the student's dignity, which is a
against it; another strike is that it replicates exclusive concern as a matter of principle as well as in regard to
practices without providing students with the breadth its effects. The student might raise the concern inno-
of expression they could use in class. Neither does it cently, or she might be politically motivated to try
clarify how the diSCUSSion should proceed when harm to get a rise out of the professor or her classmates. It
or hurt occurs. is sometimes hard to judge in the moment what the
Rejecting civility as the guiding principle does not motivation might be. Usually, it is advisable to assign
mean that the classroom need not have ground rules the best motivations to students unless they have
related to both conversational practices and desirable proven otherwise. It is better to assume students have
content to ensure the opportunity for all to participate innocuous or positive motivations than mistakenly
in a productive and focused discussion on the issues at to ascribe to them negative goals that they do not in
hand, as deemed relevant (at least initially) by the pro- fact espouse, like disruption or empty challenges. A
fessor. Inclusive freedom aims to limit the possibility response from a professor who presumes the student
that students will be restricted from expressing their to be earnest is more likely to preserve the student's
views and questions in class, including preventing to dignity and therefore her inclination to continue
the best extent possible their exclusion from participa- expressing herself in class. A student who raises a sig-
tion due to harm related to speech they hear in class nificant, if misguided, objection to a topic that is part
from the professor or their peers. of the lesson plan should most commonly be treated
Clearly, lesson plans often call for focus on a par- with respect and his position receive due consider-
ticular topic. Should students be permitted to raise ation, at least briefly. It is clearly not always possible
to take up class time to consider objections to the demand that professors recognize political opposition
material. It might be too disruptive or too irrelevant, when discussing controversial topics. The protection
or the time might not suffice. The objection also may of marginalized groups from harm can and should be
not have the intellectual merits to justify a disruption considered within the context of the discussion.
of the lesson plan. This still is not a reason to reject Objections to topiCS raised in class are not the only
the speaker in ways that harm his dignity. Inasmuch way students can create concerns about free speech in
as dignity is a necessary condition for the student to class. What about students who demean others? Or
be able to access the curriculum and the learning in students who raise questions that not only challenge
class, it is important to preserve his dignity even when the facts the professor was presenting ("Stem cells are
his specific comment, dissent, or question is being not in fact a useful tool for curing disease") but also
put aside. Some cases are easier than others. Climate- challenge the dignity or fitness of their peers e'Poor
change denial may be an easy case because it is clear people don't actually care about education; that's why
enough to the professor and hopefully to most others they remain poor")? Elizabeth Anderson considers
in class where the truth can be found. The main chal- the case of a student who, unimpressed by an African
lenge is how to clarify the correct position to a student American peer's question in class, states, "That's what
who holds an incorrect one. you get with affirmative action." She suggests that
But what about pOlitical rather than evidence- it is sometimes reasonable to silence students who
based views? For some liberals and progressives-who breach classroom norms or democratic expectations
are the majority among the faculty-issues such as by making racist or other hateful statements. Their
marriage equality hold the same moral force as factual candor may come at too high a price. But silencing
claims do, in that their validity cannot be denied and would be justified only after making an honest effort
counterarguments should be patently rejected. Some to understand the offending student's view or at the
on the left seem to suggest that political, religious, very least engaging with him so as not to leave his
or moral objections to liberal positions regarding offensive comment unanswered. An instructor should
equality or social justice can and should be dismissed not expect the offended student to resolve the matter,
or even shut down so as to preserve both truth and especially when-as in this case-the affront to his
access. For many on the left, voicing opposition to dignity is based on his identity.
marriage equality is reprehensible. An opposition to It is never appropriate for a professor or a fellow
allowing trans people to use the bathroom of their student to call upon a specific student to represent an
choice indicates a rejection of their equal rights and identity group to which he or she belongs or is pre-
is thus a form of bigotry. But opposing views are com- sumed to belong. Being the one minority student in
mon on the conservative right and beyond, making class is burden enough. Being asked to represent "the
the tension between groups espousing these oppos- African American view" or "the Muslim perspective"
ing views raw and sometimes explosive. These have on a certain matter constitutes both an intellectual
to be accommodated in the classroom in contexts harm (because there is not a view that would be shared
where they are relevant because the classroom offers across all members of an identity group) and a digni-
a productive context for exploring them and consid- tary harm because, at that moment, the student is not
ering opportunities for exchanging ideas. This can be viewed as a person but rather as a symbol, reduced to
done within ground rules that respect all members one aspect of his humanity for the others' purpose.
of the class, including those who are members of the Similarly, it is inadvisable to make assumptions
discussed groups, as well as both those who support about what "we" in the room think. This is a common
and those who oppose the specific accommodations. practice by both professors and students, and it often
Shutting down speech to protect accepted views from inadvertently excludes and shames. If during a class
political challenges is an affront to free speech as well discussion in a selective college a student says, "We
as to the requirements of intellectual honesty, which all come from privileged backgrounds," she is casually
demanding that some in the class clarify that they by intellectual honesty and courage as well as a com-
grew up in poverty or else to remain silent and llpass" mitment to creating an inclusive environment. An
as more privileged than they are. It is the instructor's inclusive environment should be seen as conducive to
responsibility to correct statements like these, which intellectual honesty because when all are welcome to
often are innocent or ignorant rather than malicious. participate in the conversation, each student can bet-
When instructors or students assume that all in class ter learn. If some are assumed to be unfit or are casu-
share the same ideology, those who have different ally rejected from the debate, the debate itself becomes
views are pressured to remain silent or to present a poorer.
clear opposition, both uncomfortable options. Assum- Applying the framework of inclusive freedom to
ing a broader u we" in class can resolve this tension and the college classroom does not mean developing a set
thus improve the quality of discussion. of stringent and detailed PC guidelines about what
The goal of these suggestions . . . is not to regu- should not be said. Inclusive freedom calls on profes-
late or limit speech. An open, wide-ranging, inclusive sors to develop explicit classroom ground rules that
atmosphere is a necessary condition for learning. No focus on engagement and inclusion and directs the
student (or instructor) should feel that she needs to students to think critically about the subject mat-
monitor her words, worry about retaliation, or fear ter and to listen to both their instructors and their
an explosive exchange. Rather than using administra- classmates. Speech codes in class are unhelpful, but
tive or legal tools to monitor speech, it is better to use creating an inclusive environment by setting clear
pedagogic tools for thinking, planning, and managing expectations is hardly a high price to pay for the open-
a productive discussion in class, one that is informed minded and inclusive pursuit of knowledge.
CHAPTER 17
Drugs, Guns, and Personal Liberty
In our personal lives, in society, and in morality of females. 1 Marijuana was the illicit drug most com-
itself, few values are counted more precious than monly used (19.8 million users), followed by the
individual liberty, our right of self-governance nonmedical use of prescription drugs (4.5 million),
or self-determination. Countless moral conflicts cocaine (1.5 million), hallucinogens (1.3 million),
that cause both personal anguish and social strife inhalants (496,000), and heroin (289,000).2 The
begin with perceived threats to individual freedom. resulting injury to the heart, liver, kidneys, lungs,
Often the heart of the matter is someone's claim- brain, and many other systems is well documented,
ing a right to exercise personal freedom by doing and annual drug-related deaths number in the tens
something-using drugs, owning a gun, having an of thousands. The National Institute on Drug Abuse
abortion, marrying a same-sex partner-while oth- sums up the effects of drug abuse like this:
ers declare that no such right exists. No such right
Drug-related deaths have more than doubled since
exists, the argument usually goes, because exercis- the early 1980s. There are more deaths, illnesses,
ing it causes harm to persons or society at large. and disabilities from substance abuse than from any
Debates about drug use and gun ownership thus other preventable health condition. Today, one in
have much in common. They also seem to be blaz- four deaths is attributable to alcohol, tobacco, and
ing as hot as ever on social media, in the news, and illicit drug use. 3
anywhere ethics and arguments are taken seriously.
Some commentators say the war on drugs has
caused more misery than the actual use of drugs.
ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND Violence has always accompanied drug trafficking
by dealers and cartels, and death and injury are
Drugs: Sodal Harms versus Personal unavoidable in efforts to enforce drug laws. Thou-
Freedom
sands have been killed in drug-related violence,
No matter how drug use and its accompanying including many innocents who had nothing to do
harms are measured, the conclusion to be drawn is with illegal drugs. In 2016, there were 1,572,579
the same: the damage to society's institutions and arrests for violating drug laws. The great majority
people's lives has been both pervasive and tragic. In of these were for posseSSion; only 15.3 percent were
2016, over 64,000 Americans died from overdoses for selling or producing drugs. 4
of illicit drugs and prescription opioids. Between State and federal prisons have been filled to
2006 and 2010, excessive alcohol use led to 88,000 capacity With people arrested for drug violations,
deaths. Cigarette smoking and exposure to tobacco many of them sentenced to long prison terms for pos-
smoke cause almost a half million deaths per year. sessing small amounts of marijuana. Thousands of
In 2015, over 27 million Americans (aged twelve lengthy prison terms for breaking drug laws have been
and older) were users of illegal drugs. That's 12.5 handed down because many statutes-often enacted
percent of males in this age group, and 7.9 percent as part of zero-tolerance drug policies-require
577
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Does Legalizing Medical Marijuana

Encourage Use among Teenagers?
Between 1999 and 2006, ten states legalized medi- What do these data suggest about teen mari-
cal marijuana: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, juana use? Do they show that marijuana use is
Maine, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and harmless? Do they prove that medical marijuana
Washington. How did these changes affect recre- should be legalized in every state? What claim
ational marijuana use among teenagers? Existing about medical marijuana do they disprove?
data show that during this period there was no
statistically significant rise in teen marijuana use in *Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin-
any of these states. There was, however, a statisti- istration (SAMHSA), National Household Surveys on
cally significant drop in four of the states: Alaska, Drug Abuse (NHSDA), 1999-2006; Statistical Assess-
California, Hawaii, and Montana. * ment Service (STATS).
mandatory minimum sentences. Some states, how- the word dnlgs, they mean substances designed
ever, have repealed laws that mandate tough sen- to treat or prevent disease. In this category are all
tences for nonviolent drug offenses, and two-thirds prescription drugs and nonfood over-the-counter
of Americans agree with these changes. s (OTe) medicines (not including vitamins, which
In the United States, attitudes toward drug use are considered food substances). Drug abuse and
and drug law enforcement are changing. Two- drug habit usually refer to the nonmedical, pro-
thirds of Americans now think the government scribed use of psychotropic (mind-altering) sub-
should pay more attention to treatment for users stances. Marijuana, prescription medicines (used
of hard drugs (cocaine and heroin, for example) nonmedically), alcohol, nicotine, and cocaine are
than to prosecution of these users. Some states are all drugs in this sense.
abandoning mandatory prison sentences for those Several terms prominent in discussions of drugs
guilty of nonviolent drug offenses. In 2001, only 47 are important but are often misused and misunder-
percent thought such a move was a good idea; in stood. Drug addiction, like drug, is a term whose
2014,63 percent thought so. definition is debated by experts and nonexperts
The legalization of marijuana is receiving much alike. An authoritative medical manual says that
more support from the public than it did a few drug addiction is
years ago. In 2004, 60 percent of Americans were an intense craving for the drug and compulsive,
against legalization; 32 percent were for it. In 2016, uncontrolled use of the drug despite harm done to
only 37 percent were against legalization; 57 percent the user or other people. People who are addicted
were for legalization. 6 spend more and more time obtaining the drug,
using the drug, or recovering from its effects. Thus,
The term drug has been surprisingly difficult
addiction usually interferes with the ability to work,
to define to everyone's satisfaction. A general defi- study, or interact normally with family and friends.
7
nition that can aid our discussions is "a nonfood

chemical substance that can affect the functions or Drug dependence is a condition in which dis-
makeup of the body." Thus, cocaine and marijuana continuing the use of a drug is extremely difficult,
are drugs, but so are nicotine, alcohol, and caffeine. involving psychological or physical symptoms. In
When doctors, nurses, and medical researchers use physical dependence, discontinuing the drug leads to
CHAPTER 17: DRUGS. GUNS. AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 0 579
uncomfortable physical symptoms of withdrawal-

--
~
"~
symptoms that can be physically painful, even life
Diverse Views on
threatening. In psychological dependence, there is
Legalizing Marijuana
both a strong craving (an acute desire to repeat tak-
ing the drug) and an unpleasant experience of with- Percentage of U.S. adults saying use of marijuana
drawal (an intense distress when not taking the drug). should be ...
The intense desire and compulsion to use a drug lead Legal (%) Illegal (%)
to using it in larger amounts, more frequently, or over Total 67 32
a longer period than at first intended. People who are Men 69 30
Women 65 33
psychologically dependent on a drug give up social 30
White 69
and other activities because of drug use. They also Black 67 33
continue to use the drug even though they know that Hispanic 63 32
the drug is physically harmful or interferes with other Oem/Lean Oem 78 20
aspects of their life, including family and work.s Rep/Lean Rep 55 44
College degree 63 35
Debates about the morality of producing, selling, Some college 68 31
or using illicit drugs are often muddied by misunder- HS or less 67 31
standings of the terms legalization, criminalization, Pew Research Center, survey conducted September
and decriminalization. Legalization is the making 3-15,2019, https:/Iwww.pewresearch.org/fact-tankl
of the production and sale of drugs legal-that is, 2019/11/141americans-support-marijuana-legalizationl.
making their sale and production no longer a pun-
ishable crime. Drugs could be legalized by giving
the government the exclusive right to regulate and
sell them to the public, much as states now regulate decreasing the number of users or the quantity
and sell alcohol. Or they could be legalized by allow- of available drugs in society, but on reducing the
ing individuals to freely buy and sell them without harm that arises from drugs and drug laws. Douglas
incurring criminal punishment. Criminalization Husak explains this option:
is making the use (and possession) of drugs a crimi-
Many sensible and enlightened commentators pro-
nal offense. Under a criminalized system, merely pose that the best drug policy is whatever will mini-
possessing drugs in a specified amount can be pun- mize harm. Their basic insight is that current drug
ished by fines or prison. Decriminalization is policy initiatives are almost always evaluated by a
allowing people to use drugs without being liable to criterion we should reject: the test of use-reduction (or
criminal prosecution and punishment. prevalence-reduction). In other words, at the present
How different states apply these policies can vary. time, no suggestion about how to improve our pol-
icy will be accepted unless it offers the potential to
They can criminalize the use of particular drugs or
reduce the numbers of persons who use drugs. Theo-
virtually all of them. They can punish the produc- rists who favor a standard of harm-reduction point
tion and sale of drugs while decriminalizing their use. out that the total amount of harm that drugs cause in
(Even in full deCriminalization, drug use under partic- our society might actually decrease, even though the
ular circumstances-while driving a car or flying an number of drug users would increase. If the average
airplane, for example-would likely remain a crime.) harm caused per user were reduced, total social harm
Or they can opt for a strict zero-tolerance policy and might go down while the number of users went up.
outlaw their use, production, and sale. The most promising harm-reduction programs
are needle exchange programs for heroin addicts
A much-debated alternative to punishing peo-
and medical programs for patients whose symp-
ple for drug offenses is what experts call harm toms are alleViated by smoking marijuana. Both of
reduction. The idea is to concentrate not on these ideas can effectively reduce harm in society.9
From whatever perspective we wish to view the psychiatric institution-leave eligible many people
issue of drug use and abuse, there are moral questions with troubling histories that suggest a degree of dan-
gerousness. Eligible buyers include persons convicted
that demand our attention. These questions fall into
of violent misdemeanors (except domestic violence),
two broad categories: (1) the moral permissibility of individuals with substantial records of alcohol abuse,
using drugs; and (2) the morality of legal and social and many people who have significant psychiatric
policies that address the use of drugs. Questions of problems but have not been hospitalized for them:
the first type are concerned with personal autonomy, stalkers under temporary restraining orders are not
individual liberty, moral and legal rights, harm to required to surrender firearms they already own. 13
oneself, and harm to others. Questions of the second Debates about gun control may seem intracta-
type are about the ethics of drug laws and policies, ble, in part because each side appeals implicitly to
and the prosecution and punishment of drug users. different basic moral values and fails to appreciate
the other side's moral commitment. Lester H. Hunt
Gun Ownership: Security versus describes an aspect of this conflict:
Individual Rights
One side focuses on the [Western] liberal value of
Stubborn realities make debates about guns and gun empathy for injury and suffering, while the other
control in the United States disconcertingly com- emphasizes the equally liberal ideas of dignity and
plex, uninformative, and exasperating. Gun vio- autonomy. I am tempted to call the former tradition
lence in the nation is shockingly prevalent, more "compassion-based," but for the fact that both are
so than in any other developed country. In 2017, based on compassion of a sort. What each has compas-
there were 39,773 firearm deaths (suicides, homi- sion {oris somewhat different, though. For the former,
what is important is rescuing human beings from
cides, and accidental shootings). This is a death rate
of 12.0 deaths per 100,000 population. In 2016,
the firearm death rate for the United Kingdom -~
"~
was 0.2 per 100,000; for Japan, 0.06; for Canada, QUICI< REVIEW
2.05; for Poland, 0.26. 10 And the rate of gun owner-
ship in the United States is among the highest in drug-A nonfood chemical substance that can
the world-in 2007, the U.S. rate was 89 guns per affect the functions and makeup of the body.
100 people. Yemen had the next highest, at 55 guns drug addiction-An intense craving for a drug
per 100 people. It's estimated that there is a gun in and compulsive, uncontrolled use of the drug
35 percent of American households. tt About 8 million despite harm done to the user or other people.
people have a license or permit to carry a concealed drug dependence-A condition in which discon-
handgun, and an unknown number of people carry tinuing the use of a drug is extremely difficult,
t2 involving psychological or physical symptoms.
concealed handguns without legal permission.
Another factor is that in the United States, legalization-Making the production and sale of
obtaining a gun is not difficult. Weak or non- drugs legal.
criminalization-Making the use (and possession)
existent gun regulations make it so. As firearms
of drugs a criminal offense.
scholar David Degrazia pOints out,
decriminalization-Allowing the use of drugs
High ownership rates are presumably related, in part, without criminal penalties.
to gun regulations that make it very easy to purchase harm reduction-A drug policy aimed at reducing
and possess firearms in this country. American adults the harm that arises from drugs and drug laws.
who lack any specific disqualifying criminal or psy- gun control-Laws and policies designed to restrict
chiatric history are eligible buyers. While state laws
the possession, use, and availability of firearms.
vary, federal exclusionary criteria-such as having
a felony conviction or having been committed to a
CHAPTER 17: DRUGS, GUNS, AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 0 581
-
~
"~ Vital Stats: Guns in the United States
• In 2017, there were 39,773 firearm deaths (sui- *"Deaths: Final Data for 2017," CDC, National Center
cides, homicides, and accidental shootings), for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports,
which is a death rate of 12.0 deaths per 100,000 June 24, 2019, https:llwww.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
population, one of the highest rates in the world. nvsr68/nvsr68_09-508.pdf (June 15, 2020); "Six Coun-
tries in the Americas Account for Half of All Firearm
(In 2016, the death rate for the United Kingdom
Deaths," Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation,
was 0.3 per 100,000, and 0.2 per 100,000 for
August 28, 2018, http://www.healthdata.org/news-
Japan, Singapore, China, and Oman.)
release/six-countries-americas-account-ha If-a II-fi rea rm-
• In 2018, the states with the highest firearm death deaths (June 15, 2020); "Firearm Mortality by State,"
rates were Mississippi (22.9), Alabama (21.8), CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, 2018,
Missouri (21.S), Wyoming (21.5), and Louisiana https:llwww.cdc.gov/nchslpressroom/sosmap/firearm_
(21.4); states with the lowest were Rhode Island mortality/firearm.htm (June 15, 2020); Erin Grinshteyn
(3.3), Massachusetts (3.5), Hawaii (4.0), New York and David Hemenway, "Violent Death Rates in the US
(4.1), and New Jersey (4.8). Compared to Those of the Other High-Income Coun-
• In 201S, the firearm homicide rate in the United tries, 2015," Nursing and Health Professions Faculty
States (4.1 per 100,000 population) was many Research and Publications, 2019, https:/!repository.
times higher than that of any other high-income usfca.edulcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147 &context=
nursing_fac (June 15, 2020); German Lopez and Kavya
country.
Sukumar, "After Sandy Hook, We Said Never Again,
• Since the Sandy Hook Elementary School shoot-
and Then We Let 2,539 Mass Shootings Happen," Vox,
ing in 2012 (in which twenty children and six June 15, 2020, https:/!www.vox.com/a/mass-shootings-
adults were killed), at least 2,539 mass shoot- america-sandy-hook-gun-violence (June 15, 2020);
ings have occurred, with at least 2,830 killed and "America's Complex Relationship with Guns,"
10,581 wounded. (A mass shooting is defined Pew Research Center, June 22, 2017, https:/!www.
as an incident in which four or more people are pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/americas-complex-
shot, not including the shooter). relationship-with-gunsl (June 15, 2020); Christopher
• 30 percent of American adults say they person- Ingraham, "3 Million Americans Carry Loaded Handguns
ally own a gun; 42 percent say they live in a gun- with Them Every Single Day, Study Says," Washington
owning household.
Post, October 19, 2017, https:/lwww.washingtonpost.
com/news/won klwp/20 17/1 O/19/3-m i II ion-a merica ns-
• About 3 million Americans carry loaded hand-
carry-Ioaded-handguns-with-them-every-single-day-
guns with them daily, and about 9 million do so
study-finds! (June 15, 2020); "Underlying Cause of
at least once a month. Death 1999-2017," CDC, National Center for Health
• In 2017, gun violence was the second leading Statistics, CDC WONDER online database, http://
cause of death among children and teens; 3,410 wonder.cdc.gov/ucd-icd 1O. html.
children and teens were killed with guns. *
pain, while the latter places importance on repair- Gun control refers to laws and policies designed
ing individual dignity and self-respect. I, personally, to restrict the possession, use, and availability of fire-
have a good deal of sympathy for the dignity and self-
respect side of this divide, but for the moment that is
arms. tS Gun control supporters stake out a range
not my point. Rather, I urge the reader to understand of pOSitions, from an absolute ban on all firearms
that the gun debate is separated by contrasting ethical (except those used by the police and military) to
ideas, and that unless we keep this in mind we are apt a variety of restrictions that are generally tougher
to seriously miss the point of the debate. 14 than what exists now. Pro-gun (gun rights)
advocates are committed to opposing almost all -

" '-
"~
restrictions on the ownership and use of guns. Survey: Views of u.S.
Existing federal gun laws limit the government's Adults on Gun Policy
role in firearm control to licensing and inspecting
gun dealers, regulating the sale and transfer of guns View Percentage of
U.S. adults
across state and international borders, preventing
Gun laws should be more strict. 52
the ownership of guns by high-risk groups (such Gun laws are about right. 30
as felons), and limiting the availability of machine Gun laws should be less strict. 18
guns and armor-piercing bullets. States and cities Strongly favor preventing people
with mental illnesses from 73
have their own regulations, which may reinforce or purchasing guns.
augment federal laws. Strongly favor creating a federal
Degrazia says the United States currently has a government database to track all 50
gun sales.
"very minimal level of gun control" and should enact Strongly favor allowing people 19
more rigorous measures-what he calls a "moder- to carry concealed guns in more
ately extensive set of gun regulations." His list of places.
Strongly favor banning assault style
policy recommendations includes the following: weapons. 53
Strongly favor barring gun purchases
1. Purchase of a gun should be legally permitted by people on no-fly or watch lists. 66
only upon obtaining a license, and the first step
in acquiring a license should be demonstration Pew Research Center, "America's Complex Relation-
of special need for a firearm. ship with Guns," Survey of U.S. Adults conducted
March 13-17 and April 4-18, 2017.
2. Those who demonstrate special need for a firearm
should have to pass a rigorous training course on
firearm use and safety before obtaining a license.
3. No one should be legally permitted to purchase, regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
own, or use a gun prior to age twenty-one. a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." As generations of legal
4. Laws should stipulate that only properly licensed
scholars and judges have pointed out, and as con-
adults may use a gun, and that one may not use
temporary disputants in gun control debates have
someone else's gun except in a life-threatening
discovered, this wording is peculiar and ambigu-
emergency calling for forceful defense.
ous, and disagreements about its meaning abound.
S. Guns should be acquirable only from federally As firearms scholars Glenn H. Utter and Robert J.
licensed dealers while private sales and the gift- Spitzer, however, point out:
ing of guns should be illegal.
6. Federally licensed dealers should be permitted Although the issues arising over the interpretation
of the Amendment have been many, two tend to
to sell a firearm to a given individual only after
predominate. First, does it protect a collective (in
completing a criminal and psychiatric back- other words, state) right related to militia service,
ground check (no exceptions).16 or an individual right, and second, assuming that it
does in fact protect the right of individuals to keep
Probably very few extended debates about guns
and bear arms, does it apply to the states as well as
proceed without at least a mention of the Second the national government?)7
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Pro-gun
advocates consider it the lynchpin of their case for In past decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has
the right to own and use firearms. It reads: "A well weighed in only occasionally on the issue of
individual vs. collective rights. Early rulings on the which experts disagree. She might finally conclude
matter suggested that the right to keep and bear that the cost of using a particular drug far outweighs
arms was a collective right connected to militia ser- the benefits. Or she might assess the evidence differ-
vice. But in 2008, in the case of District ofColumbia v. ently and decide that the negatives for all concerned
HeUer, the court overturned Washington, DC's 1976 are not as bad as some people suggest.
ban on individual handgun possession. The ruling These considerations of course pertain to the
affirmed an individual's right to keep and bear arms morality of personal drug use, but our utilitarian
for self-defense. Heller and a similar ruling issued could also make a similar calculation about drug
two years later in McDonald v. City ofChicago did not laws and policy generally. For example, based on
invalidate all gun control laws, but they did crush her assessment of the overall effects of an antidrug
the old gun control dream of banning all handguns. law, she might conclude that enforcement of the
No matter what interpretation of the Second law causes more unhappiness than the drug itself
Amendment we prefer, the moral questions about does, or that using the drug does more harm to
gun rights and gun control remain, and we must more people than the law does.
seek answers through moral philosophy. The central Kantian ethics is likely to condemn the use of
moral questions are: Is there a moral right to own illicit drugs on the grounds that it violates a ver-
firearms, and do individuals have a moral right to sion of the categorical imperative: never use persons
use them in self-defense? The law cannot provide merely as a means to an end but always"as an end in
answers here, but we have a good chance of finding themselves. Kant would have us include ourselves
some through moral theories and moral arguments. in this formula. When we use illicit drugs, he might
say, we use ourselves merely as a means to the end of
drug-induced pleasure, stress reduction, or altered
MORAL THEORIES
consciousness. What's more, we impair the very
Traditional moral theories have interesting impli- thing that constitutes our personhood-our auton-
cations for drug use. A utilitarian would judge the omy, our capacity for reasoned self-determination.
moral permissibility of using illicit drugs by how Some commentators argue that in full-blown drug
well that choice maximizes happiness, everyone addiction, our autonomy is destroyed altogether. In
considered. So she might reason like this: on the pos- addiction, they say, the addict's freedom to choose
itive side, using drugs (non medically or recreation- is lost, for he is a slave to his chemical master. Others
ally) could provide the user with pleasure, euphoria, contend, however, that free will is not diminished
a respite from stress, a break from the mundane, or as much as some critics say, especially if the drug
some other desirable experience. She might then addict freely chooses to use drugs in the first place.
balance these benefits with several alleged negatives It's hard to see how natural law theory could ever
(depending on the kind of drug): addiction, depen- condone hard drug use. Recall that in this theory,
dence, withdrawal, physical disability, psychologi- the morally right action is one that follows the dic-
cal impairment, loss of employment, damage done tates of nature. Whatever people do, they must fulfill
to personal relationships, and harm to other people. their God-given, natural purpose. Lying is immoral,
On the list of negatives she must also include the for example, because it goes against human nature,
legal ramifications of drug use: the possibility of which naturally inclines toward social living where
arrest, prosecution, imprisonment, and having a truth contributes to peaceful coexistence. Using mind-
criminal record. She would have to make a judgment altering drugs, however, can lead to addiction, which
about the extent and likelihood of all these legal forces the mind into an unnatural state in which
and nonlegal problems, difficult calculations about autonomy is weakened and the moral law is obscured.
Historically, the moral implications of gun con- not significantly affect murder rates at the state
trol have been explored using both consequential- level" and "states with restrictions on the carrying
ist and nonconsequentialist theories. But for many of concealed weapons had higher gun-related mur-
ders." While gun ownership doubled in the twenti-
people, the most straightforward way to argue for
eth century, the murder rate decreased. John R. Lott,
or against guns is through some form of utilitarian- Jr., PhD, author of More GUllS, Less Crime: Understand-
ism: judging a gun policy by its balance of good and ing Crime and Gun Control Laws, stated, "States with
bad effects, everyone considered. A gun control the largest increases in gun ownership also have
advocate might point to a long list of possible tragic the largest drops in violent crimes ... The effect on
consequences of not having appropriate gun laws 'shall-issue' [concealed gun] laws on these crimes
in place and conclude that the argument against [where two or more people were killed] has been dra-
matic. When states passed these laws, the number of
guns (and for gun control) is extremely strong.
multiple-Victim shootings declined by 84 percent.
Here's one way to make this case: Deaths from these shootings plummeted on average
Gun control supporters offer empirical evidence of by 90 percent and injuries by 82 percent." A Dec. 10,
a positive correlation between murder rates and the 2014 Pew survey found that 57% of people believe
availability of guns (especially handguns). Availability that owning a gun protects them from being victim-
of guns is also positively correlated with suicide and ized. Journalist John Stossel explained, "Criminals
accident rates. This empirical evidence is best under- don't obey the law ... Without the fear of retaliation
stood against the background of the following arm- from victims who might be packing heat, criminals
chair argument: (1) Guns (and especially handguns) in possession of these [illegal] weapons now have a
are the easiest way to kill others or oneself. People much easier job ... As the saying goes, 'If guns are
can stand at a relatively safe distance and pull the outlawed, only outlaws will have guns."d9
trigger. (2) When people are angry, they act in ways
they do not normally act. They may strike out at oth- As with any utilitarian argument, much depends
ers. If they have a gun, they are more likely to use that on the empirical support for the premises. In the gun
gun. Although they could resort to a knife or a base- control debate, the nonmoral facts aren't always
ball bat, they are less likely to do so, and, even if they clear. One reason for this is that solid evidence for
do, those weapons are less likely to cause a serious or various claims is often lacking because of the diffi-
fatal injury. (3) When people are depressed, they act culty of establishing cause and effect relationships.
in ways they would not act normally. If they have a
(Does the availability of guns cause more crime or
gun close to hand, they are more likely to kill them-
selves. Although they might slit their wrists or take diminish it? Does carrying concealed guns deter
pills, they are less likely to do so, and, even if they do, crime?) Another reason is that partisans in the ver-
they are less likely to kill themselves. (4) When people bal conflicts are susceptible to the usual biases that
handle guns, even for a legitimate purpose, the prob- plague arguments in any emotionally charged
ability of serious or fatal injury to themselves or others debate-and disputes about gun control can be
increases. When children have access to guns, the like- especially vehement. In the supercharged atmo-
lihood of an accident increases still more. sphere, evidence is frequently ignored, downplayed,
The conclusion of the armchair argument is
clear: the more widely available guns are, the more
misconstrued, and exaggerated.
people will be murdered, will commit suicide, and
will die of accidents. 18 MORAL ARGUMENTS
A gun rights advocate could argue in similar Some of the more compelling arguments for and
fashion: against drug use involve questions of the second
Gun control laws do not deter crimei gun owner- type, those concerning the morality of legal restric-
ship deters crime. A Nov. 26, 2013 study found that, tions or bans on the use of drugs. The essential query
between 1980 and 2009, "assault weapons bans did is, Under what circumstances is the government
justified in preventing or stopping people from "The notion that abusing drugs such as cocaine is a
using drugs recreationally? The answers, or justifi- 'victimless crime' is not only absurd but dangerous. ,,21
cations, are usually derived from three principles: Proponents of decriminalization counter that
(1) the harm principle; (2) the paternalism prin- the harms of illicit drug use are exaggerated, are
ciple; or (3) the legal moralism principle. When based on worst-case scenarios, and lack supporting
people try to explain their reasons for advocating evidence. Furthermore, they maintain that most
a "war on drugs" or any other kind of interference of the harms that accompany drug use are not the
with drug use, they almost always appeal to one or direct result of drug use but of antidrug laws and
more of these fundamental ideas. policies. Douglas Husak itemizes some of these
The harlD principle says that authorities are alleged harms:
justified in restricting some people's freedom to
In the first place, prohibition [of drugs and drug use]
prevent harm to others. The government claims for
has always been aimed-or selectively enforced-
itself the right to arrest, subdue, punish, or quar- against minorities .... In addition, drug prohibition
antine anyone if doing so will prevent harm to the is destructive of public health. Since the vast major-
public. Numerous civil laws, criminal laws, and ity of illicit drugs taken for recreational purposes are
judicial rulings rest firmly on the harm prinCiple. purchased on the street from unlicensed sellers, con-
The great utilitarian John Stuart Mill articulated sumers can have no confidence about what they are
this principle best when he said, "The only purpose buying.... Street drugs may contain deadly impuri-
ties, and unknown potencies can contribute to deaths
for which power can be rightfully exercised over
from overdose. . . . Truth is among the foremost
any member of a civilized community, against his casualties of our misguided drug policy. The demoni-
will, is to prevent harm to others. ,,20 zation of illicit drugs is so pervasive that frank and
Many who are opposed to recreational drug use honest discourse is all but impossible .... There may
assert that drug users hurt plenty of people. Users, be no greater threat to the rule of law than corruption
they say, are more likely to neglect their children, and abuse of authority among government officials.
abuse their spouses, cheat their employers by doing Prohibition and the huge amounts of money in the
illicit drug trade create irresistible temptations for
poor work, steal to support their drug habit, and hurt
law-enforcement agents to place themselves above
other people through accidents and negligence. In the law .... Our punitive drug policies cost exorbi-
addition, drug users burden SOCiety with the costs of tant amounts of money.... Most of this money has
drug-law enforcement, drug treatment, legal prosecu- been wasted. If we stopped punishing drug users, tax-
tion, and imprisonment. As James Q. Wilson says, payers would reap enormous savings. 22
~
-
"~- CRITICAL THOUGHT: Who Is to Blame for the Opioid Crisis?
One of the greatest health catastrophes of the disorders linked to these substances. How did this
last two decades has been the opioid epidemic- happen? Consider this analysis of how the crisis
the widespread use and addiction to opioids, unfolded:
which include prescription painkillers, heroin,
and the synthetic opioid fentanyl. In 2017, in the It was like a perfectly running machine: there
United States, 47,000 people died of opioid over- was a demand, a supply, and little to no obstacles
doses, and 1.7 million suffered from substance use between.
(continued)
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Who 15 to Blame for the Opioid Crisis?-cont'd
The drugs-oxycodone (OxyContin), diaz- Prescription practices and laws began to con-
epam (Valium), and so on-were more effective strict on the flow of prescriptions, but it was too
than anything physicians had seen for pain treat- late. Droves of addicted patients simply turned to
ment. Insurers and developers saw a product that heroin, and then to synthetic narcotics like fen-
couldn't be matched, and an opportunity to treat tanyl. The history of the opioid epidemic remains
one of the greatest patient populations in the possibly the most complicated and multifaceted
world. crisis in American history....
Patients felt better. Doctors felt good about The epidemic reached its peak burden on
their work, and profits were soaring. Nothing the US population in 2017, when more than
stopped the machine. 70,000 people overdosed. In 2018, still 68,000
"The expectation was that you're going to overdosed.
get these drugs from a doctor, so drug companies It's only with hindsight that experts discuss
were pushing it, doctors were writing [prescrip- how tighter initial regulations on the production,
tions], patients were demanding it, pharmaceuti- promotion, and sale of opioids could have limited
cal companies were selling it, and it's all financed the damage that would take 20 years to play out
by health insurance," Richard D. Blondell, MD, on the country.
told HCPLive®. Poor education on both the physician and
The federal agencies responsible for regula- patient standpoint can be attributed to the com-
tion, Blondell said, were asleep at the wheel. plex and unquantifiable nature of pain ....
Nothing about what generated the opioid With the individual nature of pain, coupled
crisis was surprising. People discovered the very with a poor understanding from physicians and
potent high from these very accessible drugs, and a push in the 1990s to prescribe opioids to treat
very few of the involved clinical parties were dili- virtually any type of pain, it was no surprise the
gent to this issue. Even fewer were able to drive epidemic spread as quickly as it did. *
the national crisis; Blondell estimates 1% of physi-
Assuming that this analysis is accurate, who, if
cians were prescribing 50% of the opioid doses.
anyone, is morally culpable for the opioid trag-
Only developers know who.
These companies kept researching and devel- edy? Did doctors have a moral duty to consider
oping more powerful, potent, and addictive more carefully the long-term consequences of
drugs. At some point, everyone involved caught prescribing so many opioids? Did they have a duty
on to the big problem, but still, no one broke line. to say no to patients who begged for opioids to
"[Physicians] kind of knew it was wrong, but relieve their pain? Did drug companies have a
it's just easier to write a prescription than it was moral obligation to assess honestly the poten-
to talk to patients," Blondell, professor emeritus tial harm of pushing opioids on the public and to
of Family Medicine at the Jacobs School of Medi- act accordingly? Did they have a duty not to sell
cine and Biomedical Sciences at the University of
opioids? Did patients have a duty to educate them-
Buffalo, said. "And patients came to expect the
selves about the risks of opioid use? Explain your
doctors are going to relieve their pain."
responses.
By the time the collective industrial con-
science opted to put a stop to some of the irre-
sponsible practices, it was too late, and addiction *" A Perfect Storm of Missteps Brought the Opioid
was spreading throughout the country. It had no Epidemic," by Kenny Walter. Reprinted with permis-
limit on demographic-gender, age, location, sion from HCP Live, March 9, 2020
income.
For some who favor decriminalization, trying on the supreme value of autonomy. Whatever the
to judge the issue by some utilitarian standard- form of such laws, they say, they are still unaccept-
that is, by weighing harms and benefits-is able assaults on individual liberty, even if they are
entirely wrongheaded. The real issue, they say, intended to somehow protect autonomy.
is not harms but justice. The decision to punish The legal moralism principle is the doctrine
someone for breaching a law should be decided that the government is justified in curbing people's
according to what is just. If Jones commits a freedom in order to force them to obey moral rules.
crime, we don't decide his fate by balancing the For the legal moralist, if an act is immoral, that's
good and bad effects of his actions. The utilitar- reason enough to make it a crime and prosecute
ian calculus is useless here. We try instead to those who violate the law. Estimations of harm
determine what a just treatment of him would need not be involved. The principle of course can
be, what his rights are, and what he deserves. be applied not just to drug use but to any action
Underlying this view is the idea that people are thought to breach moral standards. Wilson's atti-
rational, autonomous beings whose freedom to tude toward antidrug laws is decidedly moralistic:
choose and act should not be constrained with-
Even now, when the dangers of drug use are well-
out strong justification. understood, many educated people still discuss the
The paternalism principle asserts that drug problem in almost every way except the right
authorities are sometimes justified in limiting way. They talk about the "costs" of drug use and the
people's freedom to prevent them from harming "socioeconomic factors" that shape that use. They
themselves. To act paternally is to curtail a person's rarely speak plainly-drug use is wrong because it is
liberty for her own good, regardless of what her immoral and it is immoral because it enslaves the
mind and destroys the soul. 24
preferences are. A paternalistic drug law would, say,
criminalize a drug user's actions to prevent him A common reply to the doctrine of legal mor-
from doing something that might injure or impair alism is that it conflicts with other commonsense
him. One paternalistic argument concludes that moral beliefs or policies we have. Decriminaliza-
people must be protected from freely and know- tion supporters ask why drug use, and not other
ingly choosing to take addictive drugs that can kinds of behavior, should be outlawed simply
undermine their autonomy. because it is deemed immoral. Many actions are
Peter de Marneffe takes a paternalistic view. He thought to be immoral-cheating at golf, plagia-
declares that there is only one good reason for drug rizing, lying to a spouse, breaking a solemn vow,
prohibition-that some people will be worse off if betraying a confidence-but few think these
drugs are legalized. He argues: actions should be regarded as crimes and pros-
Drug prohibition is justified, in my view, as reduc- ecuted as such. Critics of legal moralism say that
ing the independent harms of drug abuse [harms legal moralists must explain why drug use should
besides those caused by drug-law enforcement]. be a crime just because it's immoral, but not other
But it is commonly objected that drug laws "don't presumably immoral acts like betraying a confi-
work." If so, it is no argument for drug legalization. dence. Why is drug use a crime and not cheating
In this sense laws against murder and theft do not
at golf or lying to a spouse? Decriminalization
work either, but this does not mean that we should
abolish them. 23 proponents say legal moralists have yet to explain
this inconsistency, so the doctrine of legal moral-
As you might expect, those who condemn ism is an inadequate justification for making drug
paternalistic drug laws usually base their arguments use illegal.
6. In present-day circumstances in the United States,

adequate self-defense requires that competent
QUICI< REVIEW
adults have the option of gun ownership.
harm principle-The view that authorities are 7. Thus, competent adults in the United States
justified in restricting some people's freedom today have a moral right to gun ownership.26
to prevent harm to others.
paternalism principle-The view that authorities Degrazia finds fault with several parts of the
are sometimes justified in limiting people's free- argument, but focuses mostly on Premise 6. He
dom to prevent them from harming themselves. asks, "Does the option of owning firearms enable
legal moralism-The doctrine that the govern- more adequate self-defense and physical secu-
ment is justified in curbing people's freedom in rity than would be possible if this option were
order to force them to obey moral rules. unavailable ?"
His answer is "no":
An even-handed examination of available evidence
suggests that, in the United States today, posses-
A common pro-gun argument appeals not to sion of guns does not, generally speaking, enable
consequences but to rights. The idea is that the more adequate self-defense and physical security.
right to own a gun derives from a more funda- First, the evidence suggests that owning guns tends
mental right: the right of self-defense. The Sec- to be self-defeating in the sense of making house-
ond Amendment scholar Nelson Lund says, "The hold members, on balance, less safe than they
right to self-defense and to the means of defend- would be if the house were free of firearms. Second,
ing oneself is a basic natural right that grows out the evidence casts doubt on the proposition that,
in the event of a break-in while one is at home,
of the right to life," and that "many [gun control
having a gun, on balance, promotes the goal of
laws] interfere with the ability of law-abiding self-defense. 27
citizens to defend themselves against violent
criminals. ,,25
David Degrazia, an advocate for moderate gun
control, lays out what he believes is a plaUSible
CHAPTER REVIEW
self-defense argument for gun ownership and
then critiques it. Here's a shortened version of the SUMMARY
argument:
A drug is a nonfood chemical substance that can affect
1. People have a basic right to physical security. the functions or makeup of the body. Drug addiction
2. This right is violated by (unjustified) assaults is "an intense craving for the drug and compulsive,
and is threatened by burglaries. uncontrolled use of the drug despite harm done to the
user or other people." Drug dependence is a condition in
3. People have a moral right to take necessary
which discontinuing the use of a drug is extremely dif-
measures to prevent their basic rights from
ficult, involving psychological or physical symptoms.
being violated.
Drug legalization refers to making the production and
4. The right to take such measures supports a sale of drugs legal-that is, making their sale and pro-
moral right to self-defense. duction no longer a punishable crime. Criminalization
S. The right to self-defense includes the freedom makes the use (and possession) of drugs a criminal
to use adequate means to defend oneself. offense. Decriminalization allows people to use drugs
without being liable to criminal prosecution and I<EY TERMS

punishment. drug (p. 578)
A utilitarian would judge the moral permissi- drug addiction (p. 578)
bility of using illicit drugs by how well that choice drug dependence (p. 578)
maximizes happiness, everyone considered. Kantian legalization (p. 579)
ethics is likely to condemn the use of illicit drugs criminalization (p. 579)
on the grounds that it violates a version of the cat- decriminalization (p. 579)
egorical imperative: never use persons merely as a harm reduction (p. 579)
means to an end but always as an end in themselves. gun control (p. 581)
Natural law theorists condemn hard drug use on the harm principle (p. 585)
grounds that mind-altering drugs can lead to addic- paternalism principle (p. 587)
tion, which forces the mind into an unnatural state legal moralism (p. 587)
in which autonomy is weakened and the moral law
is obscured.
Arguments against decriminalization are often EXERCISES
derived from three principles: (1) the harm principle; Review Questions
(2) the paternalism principle; or (3) the legal moralism
1. What is the difference between drug addiction
principle. When people try to explain their reasons
and drug dependence? (p. 578)
for advocating a "war on drugs" or any other kind of
2. What is the difference between legalization and
interference with drug use, they almost always appeal
criminalization? (p. 579)
to one or more of these fundamental ideas.
3. What is the drug policy known as harm
Gun control refers to laws and policies designed
reduction? (p. 579)
to restrict the possession, use, and availability of
4. What is the harm prinCiple? How is the
firearms. Gun control supporters stake out a range
harm prinCiple used to justify government
of positions, from an absolute ban on all firearms
interference with drug use? (p. 585)
(except those used by the police and military) to a
5. What is the paternalism principle? (p. 587)
variety of restrictions that are generally tougher than
6. What is legal moralism? (p. 587)
what exists now. Pro-gun (gun rights) advocates are
7. What is gun control? (p. 581)
committed to opposing almost all restrictions on
8. What is the Second Amendment? How is it related
the ownership and use of guns. Existing federal gun
to debates about gun control? (pp. 582-83)
laws limit the government's role in firearm control
9. What is the rate of gun ownership in the United
to licensing and inspecting gun dealers, regulating
States? (p. 580)
the sale and transfer of guns across state and inter-
10. How many firearms deaths occurred in 201 7?
national borders, preventing the ownership of guns
How does this death rate compare to that of
by high-risk groups (such as felons), and limiting
other developed countries? (p. 580)
the availability of machine guns and armor-piercing
bullets.
Pro-gun advocates consider the Second Amend- Discussion Questions
ment the lynchpin of their case for the right to own 1. Is legal moralism ever justified? Why or
and use firearms. But its wording is ambiguous, and why not?
disagreements about its meaning abound. The cen- 2. How might a utilitarian argue for or against
tral moral questions in gun control are: Is there a drug criminalization?
moral right to own firearms, and do individuals have 3. Should hard drugs like cocaine be legalized?
a moral right to use them in self-defense? Give reasons for your answer.
4. Is harm reduction a better response to drug use David Degrazia and Lester H. Hunt, Debating Gun Control:
than criminalization? Why or why not? How Much Regulation Do We Need? (New York: Oxford
5. In general, are paternalistic drug laws justified? University Press, 2016).
That is, is it ever morally permissible to curtail Douglas Husak and Peter de Marneffe, Tile Legalization of
Drugs: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
people's freedom to prevent them from harming
sity Press, 2005).
themselves?
National Institute of Drug Abuse, "Medical Consequences
6. How can gun ownership be justified by an of Drug Abuse," December 2012, http://www.drugabuse
appeal to a right of self-defense? .gov/related-topics/medical-consequences-drug-abuse
7. Should gun control laws be stricter than they /mortality.
are now? Why or why not? Pew Research Center, "America's New Drug Policy Landscape,"
8. Should gun purchases be allowed only after April 2, 2014, https:/Iwww.pewresearch.org/politics/
purchasers obtain a license? Explain. 2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-Iandscape/.
9. Should there be an absolute legal ban on all Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Adminis-
guns? Why or why not? tration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and
10. Evaluate the self-defense argument that Degrazia Quality, September 4,2014, "The NSDUH Report: Sub-
sets forth. Is it sound? Are its premises true? stance Use and Mental Health Estimates from the 2013
National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Overview of
Findings," Rockville, MD.
FURTHER READING Glen H. Utter and Robert J. Spitzer, Tile Gun Debate: An
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Angela Hawken, Beau Kilmer, and Encyclopedia of Gun Rights & Gun Control ;n the United
Mark Kleiman, Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone States (Amenia, NY: Grey House, 2016).
Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). James Q. Wilson, "Against the Legalization of Drugs,"
Philip J. Cook and Kristina A. Goss, The Gun Debate: What Commentary, February 1990.
Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Mass Shootings and Gun laws

Politico.com-A majority of Americans support passing new gun control legislation,
according to a new Gallup poll released on Thursday-marking the first time a
majority of those surveyed has expressed such a view since Gallup started tracking
the issue in 2000.
The poll-taken in the month between the deadly mass shootings in Las Vegas
on Oct. 1 and in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on Nov. 5-found that 51 percent of
Americans were in favor of increased gun legislation. *
Mass shootings often increase support for gun con- what policies can and cannot prevent these shoot-
trollaws to deter such violence. But how likely is it ings? Do citizens have a duty to press the govern-
that gun regulations will prevent mass shootings? ment for action?
Is the government morally obligated to find out
*Christiano Lima, "Gallup Poll: Majority of Americans Now Favor More Gun Laws," Politico, November 9, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/09/gun-control-gallup-poll-244759.
2. Against Legalization or Decriminalization of Drugs

Position Statement from Drug Watch International: The legalization or decriminalization
of drugs would make harmful, psychoactive, and addictive substances affordable,
available, convenient, and marketable. It would expand the use of drugs. It would
remove the social stigma attached to illicit drug use, and would send a message of
tolerance for drug use, especially to youth ....
The use of illicit drugs is illegal because of their intoxicating effects on the
brain, damaging impact on the body, adverse impact on behavior, and potential
for abuse. Their use threatens the health, welfare, and safety of all people, of users
and non-users alike. t
Do you agree with this position statement? decriminalization imply that the government
Is the description of the effects of drug use approves of drug use? Explain your answers.
accurate or exaggerated? Does legalization or
tOrug Watch International, "Position Statement," August 1, 1994, http://www.drugwatch.org/resources/publica
tions/position-statements-and-resolutions/ (February 15, 2015).
3. Is Marijuana Medicine?
The marijuana plant contains several chemicals that may prove useful for treating
a range of illnesses or symptoms, leading many people to argue that it should be
made legally available for medical purposes. In fact, a growing number of states
(29 as of March 2018) have legalized marijuana's use for certain medical conditions.
The term" medical marijuana" is generally used to refer to the whole unprocessed
marijuana plant or its crude extracts, which are not recognized or approved as
medicine by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). But scientific study of
the active chemicals in marijuana, called cannabinoids, has led to the development
of two FDA-approved medications already, and is leading to the development of
new pharmaceuticals that harness the therapeutic benefits of cannabinoids while

minimizing or eliminating the harmful side effects (including the "high") produced
by eating or smoking marijuana leaves.*
Should marijuana be made available to people marijuana for medical or recreational purposes is
for medical reasons? It is not legal in most states; immoral or harmful to society. Would you change
should it stay that way, or should all states legal- your mind about its use if it were found to be a cure
ize it? Why or why not? Suppose you think using for hard-to-treat cancers? Explain.
*National Institute on Drug Abuse, "DrugFacts: Is Marijuana Medicine?" December 2014, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications
/drugfacts/marijuana-medicine (February 15,2015).
READINGS
The Ethics of Addiction

THOMAS SZASZ
Lest we take for granted that we know what drug psychiatric problems in which psychiatrists define the
addiction is, let us begin with some definitions. patient's dangerousness to himself and others. Actu-
According to the World Health Organization's ally, physicians regard as detrimental what people
Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce do to themselves but not what they do to people. For
Addiction, example, when college students smoke marijuana,
that is detrimental; but when psychiatrists administer
Drug addiction is a state of periodic or chronic intoxi-
cation detrimental to the individual and to SOciety, psychotropic drugs to involuntary mental patients,
produced by the repeated consumption of a drug that is not detrimental.
(natural or synthetic). Its characteristics include: (1) an The rest of the definition proposed by the World
overpowering desire or need (compulsion) to continue Health Organization is of even more dubious value.
taking the drug and to obtain it by any means, (2) a It speaks of an "overpowering desire" or "compul-
tendency to increase the dosage, and (3) a psychiC (psy- sion" to take the drug and of efforts to obtain it "by
chological) and sometimes physical dependence on any means." Here again, we sink into the conceptual
the effects of the drug. 1 and semantic morass of psychiatric jargon. What is an
Since this definition hinges on the harm done to "overpowering desire" if not simply a desire by which
the individual and to society by the consumption of we choose to let ourselves be overpowered? And what
the drug, it is clearly an ethical one. Moreover, by not is a "compulsion" if not simply an unresisted incli-
specifying what is "detrimental" or who shall ascer- nation to do something, and keep on doing it, even
tain it and on what grounds, this definition immedi- though someone thinks we should not be doing it?
ately assimilates the problem of addiction with other Next, we come to the effort to obtain the addic-
tive substance "by any means." That suggests that
the substance is prohibited, or is very expensive for
some other reason, and is hence difficult to obtain
Thomas Szasz, "The Ethics of Addiction," from The Theology of
Medicine (1977). Reprinted with permission from the Estate of for the ordinary person rather than that the person
Thomas Szasz. who wants it has an inordinate craving for it. If there
were an abundant and inexpensive supply of what Until recently, masturbation-or self-abuse, as it was
the "addice' wants, there would be no reason for him called-was professionally declared and popularly
to go to 44any means" to obtain it. Does the World accepted as both the cause and the symptom of a vari-
Health Organization's definition mean that one can be ety of illnesses. 2
addicted only to a substance that is illegal or otherwise To be sure, it is now virtually impossible to cite a
difficult to obtain? If so-and there is obviously some contemporary American (or foreign) medical author-
truth to the view that forbidden fruit tastes sweeter, ity to support the concept of self-abuse. Medical opin-
although it cannot be denied that some things are ion now holds that there is simply no such thing, that
sweet regardless of how the law treats them-then whether a person masturbates or not is medically irrel-
that surely removes the problem of addiction from the evant, and that engaging in the practice or refraining
sphere of medicine and psychiatry and puts it squarely from it is a matter of personal morals or life-style. On
into that of morals and law. the other hand, it is now virtually impossible to cite a
The definition of addiction offered in Webster's contemporary American (or foreign) medical author-
Third New Intemational Dictionary of the English ity to oppose the concept of drug abuse. Medical
Language, Unabridged exhibits the same difficulties. It opinion now holds that drug abuse is a major medi-
defines addiction as 44the compulsory uncontrolled cal, psychiatric, and public-health problem; that drug
use of habit-forming drugs beyond the period of medi- addiction is a disease similar to diabetes, requiring
cal need or under conditions harmful to society." This prolonged (or lifelong) and carefully supervised medi-
definition imputes lack of self-control to the addict cal treatment; and that taking or not taking drugs is
over his taking or not taking a drug, a dubious propo- primarily, if not solely, a matter of medical concern
sition at best; at the same time, by qualifying an act and responsibility.
as an addiction depending on whether or not it harms
society, it offers a moral definition of an ostensibly Like any social policy, our drug laws may be exam-
medical condition. ined from two entirely different points of view-
Likewise, the currently popular term drug abuse technical and moral. Our present inclination is
places this behavior squarely in the category of ethics. either to ignore the moral perspective or to mistake
For it is ethics that deals with the right and wrong uses the technical for the moral.
of man's powers and possessions. An example of our misplaced overreliance on a
Clearly, drug addiction and drug abuse cannot be technical approach to the so-called drug problem is
defined without specifying the proper and improper the professionalized mendacity about the dangerous-
uses of certain pharmacologically active agents. The ness of certain types of drugs. Since most of the pro-
regular administration of morphine by a physician to a pagandists against drug abuse seek to justify certain
patient dying of cancer is the paradigm of the proper use repressive poliCies by appeals to the alleged danger-
of a narcotic, whereas even its occasional self-adminis- ousness of various drugs, they often falsify the facts
tration by a physically healthy person for the purpose of about the true pharmacological properties of the
pharmacological pleasure is the paradigm of drug abuse. drugs they seek to prohibit. They do so for two rea-
I submit that these judgments have nothing what- sons: first, because many substances in daily use are
ever to do with medicine, pharmacology, or psychia- just as harmful as the substances they want to pro-
try. They are moral judgments. Indeed, our present hibit; second, because they realize that dangerous-
views on addiction are astonishingly similar to some ness alone is never a sufficiently persuasive argument
of our former views on sex. Intercourse in marriage to justify the prohibition of any drug, substance, or
with the aim of procreation used to be the paradigm artifact. Accordingly, the more the "addiction-mon-
of the proper use of one's sexual organs, whereas inter- gers" ignore the moral dimensions of the problem,
course outside of marriage with the aim of carnal plea- the more they must escalate their fraudulent claims
sure used to be the paradigm of their improper use. about the dangers of drugs.
To be sure, some drugs are more dangerous than some drugs-notably heroin, the amphetamines, and
others. It is easier to kill oneself with heroin than with LSD among those now in vogue-may have undesir-
aspirin. But it is also easier to kill oneself by jumping able personal or social consequences, I favor free trade
off a high building than a low one. In the case of drugs, in drugs for the same reason the Founding Fathers
we regard their potentiality for self-injury as justifica- favored free trade in ideas: in an open society, it is
tion for their prohibition; in the case of buildings, we none of the government's business what idea a man
do not. puts into his mind; likewise, it should be none of the
Furthermore, we systematically blur and confuse government's business what drug he puts into his
the two quite different ways in which narcotics may body.
cause death-by a deliberate act of suicide and by acci- It is a fundamental characteristic of human
dental overdosage. beings that they get used to things: one becomes
As I have suggested elsewhere, we ought to con- habituated, or addicted, not only to narcotics, but to
sider suicide a basic human right. If so, it is absurd to cigarettes, cocktails before dinner, orange juice for
deprive an adult of a drug (or of anything else) because breakfast, comic strips, sex, and so forth. It is similarly
he might use it to kill himself. To do so is to treat every- a fundamental characteristic of living organisms that
one the way institutional psychiatrists treat the so- they acquire increasing tolerance to various chemi-
called suicidal mental patient: they not only imprison cal agents and physical stimuli: the first cigarette may
such a person but take everything away from him- cause nothing but nausea and headache; a year later,
shoelaces, belts, razor blades, eating utensils, and so smoking three packs a day may be pure joy. Both alco-
forth-until the "patient" lies naked on a mattress hol and opiates are addictive, then, in the sense that
in a padded cell, lest he kill himself. The result is the the more regularly they are used, the more the user
most degrading tyrannization in the annals of human craves them and the greater his tolerance for them
history. becomes. However, there is no mysterious process of
Death by accidental overdose is an altogether dif- "getting hooked" involved in any of this. It is simply
ferent matter. But can anyone doubt that this danger an aspect of the universal biological propensity for
now looms so large precisely because the sale of nar- learning, which is especially well-developed in man.
cotics and many other drugs is illegal? People who buy The opiate habit, like the cigarette habit or the food
illicit drugs cannot be sure what drug they are getting habit, can be broken-usually without any medical
or how much of it. Free trade in drugs, with govern- assistance-provided the person wants to break it.
mental action limited to safeguarding the purity of the Often he doesn't. And why indeed should he if he has
product and the veracity of the labeling, would reduce nothing better to do with his life? Or as happens to be
the risk of accidental overdose with "dangerous drugs" the case with morphine, if he can live an essentially
to the same levels that prevail, and that we find accept- normal life while under its influence? That, of course,
able, with respect to other chemical agents and physi- sounds completely unbelievable, or worse-testimony
cal artifacts that abound in our complex technological to our "addiction" to half a century of systematic offi-
society. cial mendacity about opiates, which we can break only
Although this essay is not intended as an exposi- by suffering the intellectual withdrawal symptoms
tion on the pharmacological properties of narcotics that go with giving up treasured falsehoods.
and other mind-affecting drugs, it might be well to Actually, opium is much less toxic than alcohol.
say something more about the medical and social dan- Moreover, just as it is possible to be an alcoholic and
gers they pose. Before proceeding to that task, I want work and be productive, so it is (or rather, it used to
to make clear, however, that in my view, regardless be) possible to be an opium addict and work and be
of their dangerousness, all drugs should be legalized productive. Thomas De Quincey and Samuel Taylor
(a misleading term I employ reluctantly as a conces- Coleridge were both opium takers, and "Kubla
sion to common usage). Although I recognize that Khan," considered one of the most beautiful poems
in the English language, was written while Coleridge males who are, in principle at least, capable of work-
was under the influence of opium. 3 According to a ing and supporting themselves. But they refuse: they
definitive study by Light and others published by the drop out, adopting a life-style in which not working,
American Medical Association in 1929, "morphine not supporting oneself, not being useful to others, are
addiction is not characterized by physical deteriora- positive values. These people challenge some of the
tion or impairment of physical fitness .... There is no most basic values of our society. It is hardly surpris-
evidence of change in the circulatory, hepatic, renal, ing, then, that society wants to retaliate, to strike back.
or endocrine functions. When it is considered that Even though it would be cheaper to support addicts
these subjects had been addicted for at least five years, on welfare than to "treat" them, doing so would be
some of them as long as twenty years, these negative legitimizing their life-style. That, "normal" society
observations are highly significant.,,4 In a 1928 study, refuses to do. Instead, the majority acts as if it felt that,
Lawrence Kolb, an assistant surgeon general of the so long as it is going to spend its money on addicts, it
United States Public Health Service, found that of 119 is going to get something out of it. What society gets
persons addicted to opiates through medical practice, out of its war on addiction is what every persecutory
90 had good industrial records and only 29 had poor movement provides for the persecutors: by defining a
ones .... minority as evil (or sick), the majority confirms itself
I am not citing this evidence to recommend the as good (or healthy). (If that can be done for the vic-
opium habit. The point is that we must, in plain hon- tim's own good, so much the better.) In short, the war
esty, distinguish between pharmacological effects on addiction is a part of that vast modern enterprise
and personal inclinations. Some people take drugs to which I have named the "manufacture of madness."
cope-to help them function and conform to social It is indeed a therapeutic enterprise, but with this gro-
expectations. Others take them to cop out-to ritualize tesque twist: its beneficiaries are the therapists, and its
their refusal to function and conform to social expec- victims are the patients.
tations. Much of the drug abuse we now witness- Most of all perhaps, the idea of free trade in nar-
perhaps nearly all of it-is of the second type. But cotics frightens people because they believe that vast
instead of acknowledging that addicts are unable or masses of our population would spend their days and
unfit or unwilling to work and be normal, we prefer to nights smoking opium or mainlining heroin instead
believe that they act as they do because certain drugs- of working and shouldering their responsibilities as
especially heroin, LSD, and the amphetamines-make citizens. But that is a bugaboo that does not deserve
them sick. If only we could get them well, so runs this to be taken seriously. Habits of work and idleness are
comfortable and comforting view, they would become deep-seated cultural patterns; I doubt that free trade in
productive and useful citizens. To believe that is like drugs would convert industrious people from hustlers
believing that if an illiterate cigarette smoker would into hippies at the stroke of a legislative pen.
only stop smoking, he would become an Einstein. The other side of the economic coin regarding
With a falsehood like that, one can go far. No wonder drugs and drug controls is actually far more impor-
that politicians and psychiatrists love it. tant. The government is now spending millions of
The idea of free trade in drugs runs counter to dollars-the hard-earned wages of hard-working
another cherished notion of ours-namely, that Americans-to support a vast and astronomically
everyone must work and that idleness is acceptable expensive bureaucracy whose efforts not only drain
only under special conditions. In general, the obliga- our economic resources and damage our civil liberties
tion to work is greatest for healthy adult white males. but create ever more addicts and, indirectly, the crime
We tolerate idleness on the part of children, women, associated with the traffic in illicit drugs. Although my
blacks, the aged, and the sick, and we even accept the argument about drug taking is moral and political and
responsibility of supporting them. But the new wave does not depend upon showing that free trade in drugs
of drug abuse affects mainly young adults, often white would also have fiscal advantages over our present
policies, let me indicate briefly some of the economic strongly that civil liberties are precious. At the same
aspects of the drug-control problem. time, it is not possible in the United States to walk
On April 1, 1967, New York State's narcotics addic- into a store and walk out with a bottle of barbiturates,
tion-control program, hailed as "the most massive ever codeine, or other drugs. We are now deprived of that
tried in the nation," went into effect. llThe program, right because we have come to value medical paternal-
which may cost up to $400 million in three years," ism more highly than the right to obtain and use drugs
reported The New York Times, l'was hailed by Gover- without recourse to medical intermediaries.
nor Rockefeller as 'the start of an unending war.,,,5 I submit, therefore, that our so-called drug-abuse
Three years later, it was conservatively estimated that problem is an integral part of our present social ethiC,
the number of addicts in the state had tripled or qua- which accepts "protections" and repressions justi-
drupled. New York State Senator John Hughes reported fied by appeals to health similar to those that medi-
that the cost of caring for each addict during that eval societies accepted when they were justified by
time was $12,000 per year (as against $4,000 per year appeals to faith.s Drug abuse (as we now know it) is
for patients in state mental hospitals).6 It was a great one of the inevitable consequences of the medical
time, though, for some of the ex-addicts themselves. monopoly over drugs-a monopoly whose value is
In New York City's Addiction Services Agency, one ex- daily acclaimed by science and law, state and church,
addict started at $6,500 a year on November 27, 1967, the profeSSions and the laity. As the Church formerly
and was making $16,000 seven months later. Another regulated man's relations to God, so Medicine now
started at $6,500 on September 12, 1967, and went up regulates his relations to his body. Deviation from the
to $18,100 by July 1, 1969. 7 The salaries of the medi- rules set forth by the Church was then considered to
cal bureaucrats in charge of the programs are similarly be heresy and was punished by appropriate theologi-
attractive. In short, the detection and rehabilitation of cal sanctions, called penance; deviation from the rules
addicts is good business; and so was, in former days, the set forth by Medicine is now considered to be drug
detection and rehabilitation of witches. We now know abuse (or some sort of mental illness) and is punished
that the spread of witchcraft in the late Middle Ages by appropriate medical sanctions, called treatment.
was due more to the work of witchmongers than to the The problem of drug abuse will thus be with us so
lure of witchcraft. Is it not possible that, similarly, the long as we live under medical tutelage. This is not to
spread of addiction in our day is due more to the work say that if all access to drugs were free, some people
of addictmongers than to the lure of narcotics? ... would not medicate themselves in ways that might
upset us or harm them. That of course is precisely what
* * * happened when religious practices became free.
Clearly, the argument that marijuana-or heroin, or
methadone, or morphine-iS prohibited because it is What I am suggesting is that although addiction is
addictive or dangerous cannot be supported by facts. ostensibly a medical and pharmacological problem,
For one thing, there are many drugs-from insulin actually it is a moral and political problem. We talk
to penicillin-that are neither addictive nor danger- as if we were trying to ascertain which drugs are toxic,
ous but are nevertheless also prohibited-they can but we act as if we were trying to decide which drugs
be obtained only through a physician's prescription. ought to be prohibited.
For another, there are many things-from dynamite We ought to know, however, that there is no nec-
to guns-that are much more dangerous than nar- essary connection between facts and values, between
cotics (especially to others) but are not prohibited. As what is and what ought to be. Thus, objectively quite
everyone knows, it is still possible in the United States harmful acts, objects, or persons may be accepted
to walk into a store and walk out with a shotgun. We and tolerated-by minimizing their dangerousness.
enjoy that right not because we do not believe that Conversely, objectively quite harmless acts, objects,
guns are dangerous, but because we believe even more or persons may be prohibited and persecuted-by
exaggerating their dangerousness. It is always neces- That is why we applaud the systematic medical use
sary to distinguish-and especially so when dealing of methadone and call it "treatment for heroin addic-
with social policy-between description and prescription," but decry the occasional nonmedical use of
tion, fact and rhetoric, truth and falsehood. marijuana and call it "dangerous drug abuse."
To command adherence, social policy must be Our present concept of drug abuse thus articulates
respected; and to be respected, it must be considered and symbolizes a fundamental policy of scientific
legitimate. In our society, there are two prinCipal medicine-namely, that a layman should not medi-
methods of legitimizing policy-social tradition and cate his own body but should place its medical care
scientific judgment. More than anything else, time is under the supervision of a duly accredited physician.
the supreme ethical arbiter. Whatever a social practice Before the Reformation, the practice of true Christian-
might be, if people engage in it generation after gen- ity rested on a similar policy-namely, that a layman
eration, then that practice becomes acceptable. should not himself commune with God but should
Many opponents of illegal drugs admit that nico- place his spiritual care under the supervision of a duly
tine may be more harmful to health than marijuana; accredited priest. The self-interests of the Church
nevertheless, they argue that smoking cigarettes and of Medicine in such policies are obvious enough.
should be legal but smoking marijuana should not be, What might be less obvious is the interest of the laity
because the former habit is socially accepted while the in them: by delegating responsibility for the spiritual
latter is not. That is a perfectly reasonable argument. and medical welfare of the people to a class of authori-
But let us understand it for what it is-a plea for legiti- tatively accredited specialists, those policies-and
mizing old and accepted practices and illegitimizing the practices they ensure-relieve individuals from
novel and unaccepted ones. It is a justification that assuming the burdens of those responsibilities for
rests on precedence, not on evidence. themselves. As I see it, our present problems with drug
The other method of legitimizing policy, increas- use and drug abuse are just one of the consequences of
ingly more important in the modern world, is through our pervasive ambivalence about personal autonomy
the authority of science. In matters of health, a vast and responsibility.
and increasingly elastic category, physicians thus play
important roles as legitimizers and illegitimizers. One * * *
result is that, regardless of the pharmacological effects I propose a medical reformation analogous to
of a drug on the person who takes it, if he obtains it the Protestant Reformation-specifically, a "protest"
through a physician and uses it under medical supervi- against the systematiC mystification of man's rela-
sion, that use is, ipso facto, legitimate and proper; but if tionship to his body and his professionalized separa-
he obtains it through nonmedical channels and uses it tion from it. The immediate aim of the reform would
without medical supervision (and especially if the drug be to remove the physician as intermediary between
is illegal and the individual uses it solely for the pur- man and his body and to give the layman direct access
pose of altering his mental state), then that use is, ipso to the language and contents of the pharmacopoeia.
facto, illegitimate and improper. In short, being medi- It is significant that until recently physicians wrote
cated by a doctor is drug use, while self-medication preSCriptions in Latin and that medical diagnoses
(especially with certain classes of drugs) is drug abuse. and treatments are still couched in a jargon whose
That too is a perfectly reasonable arrangement. chief aim is to awe and mystify the laity. If man had
But let us understand it for what it is-a plea for legiti- unencumbered access to his own body and the means
mizing what doctors do, because they do it with good, of chemically altering it, it would spell the end of
therapeutic intent; and for illegitimizing what laymen Medicine, at least as we now know it. That is why, with
do, because they do it with bad, self-abusive (mas- faith in MediCine so strong, there is little interest in
turbatory) intent. It is a justification that rests on the this kind of medical reform: physicians fear the loss of
principles of profeSSionalism, not of pharmacology. their privileges; laymen, the loss of their protections.
Our present policies with respect to drug use and The same principle applies to sexual conduct. Sex-
drug abuse thus constitute a covert plea for legitimiz- ual intercourse, especially between husband and wife,
ing certain privileges on the part of physicians and is surely a right. But it is a right that must be exercised
illegitimizing certain practices on the part of everyone at home or at some other appropriate location; it is
else. The upshot is that we act as if we believed that not a right in a public park or on a downtown street.
only doctors should be allowed to dispense narcotics, It makes sense that what is a right in one place may
just as we used to believe that only priests should be become, by virtue of its disruptive or disturbing effect
allowed to dispense holy water. on others, an offense somewhere else.
Finally, since luckily we still do not live in The right to self-medication should be hedged in
the utopian perfection of one world, our techni- by similar limits. Public intoxication, not only with
cal approach to the drug problem has led, and will alcohol but with any drug, should be an offense pun-
undoubtedly continue to lead, to some curious ishable by the criminal law. Furthermore, acts that
attempts to combat it. may injure others-such as driving a car-should,
when carried out in a drug-intoxicated state, be pun-
* * * ished especially strictly and severely. The habitual
I believe that just as we regard freedom of speech use of certain drugs, such as alcohol and opiates, may
and religion as fundamental rights, so we should also also harm others indirectly by rendering the subject
regard freedom of self-medication as a fundamental unmotivated for working and thus unemployed. In a
right; and that instead of mendaciously opposing or society that supports the unemployed, such a person
mindlessly promoting illicit drugs, we should, para- would, as a consequence of his own conduct, place
phrasing Voltaire, make this maxim our rule: I disap- a burden on the shoulders of his working neighbors.
prove of what you take, but I will defend to the death How society might best guard itself against that sort
your right to take it! of hazard I cannot discuss here. However, it is obvious
To be sure, like most rights, the right of self- that prohibiting the use of habit-forming drugs offers
medication should apply only to adults; and it should no protection against that risk, but only adds to the tax
not be an unqualified right. Since these are important burdens laid upon the productive members of society.
qualifications, it is necessary to specify their precise The right to self-medication must thus entail
range. unqualified responsibility for the effects of one's drug-
John Stuart Mill said (approximately) that a per- intoxicated behavior on others. For unless we are will-
son's right to swing his arm ends where his neighbor's ing to hold ourselves responsible for our own behavior
nose begins. Similarly, the limiting condition with and hold others responsible for theirs, the liberty to
respect to self-medication should be the inflicting of ingest or inject drugs degenerates into a license to
actual (as against symbolic) harm on others. injure others. But here is the catch: we are exceedingly
Our present practices with respect to alcohol reluctant to hold people responsible for their misbe-
embody and reflect this individualistic ethic. We havior. That is why we prefer diminishing rights to
have the right to buy, possess, and consume alcoholic increasing responsibilities. The former requires only
beverages. Regardless of how offensive drunkenness the passing of laws, which can then be more or less
might be to a person, he cannot interfere with another freely violated or circumvented; whereas the latter
person's right to become inebriated so long as that per- requires prosecuting and punishing offenders, which
son drinks in the privacy of his own home or at some can be accomplished only by just laws justly enforced.
other appropriate location and so long as he conducts The upshot is that we increasingly substitute tender-
himself in an otherwise law-abiding manner. In short, hearted tyranny for tough-spirited liberty.
we have a right to be intoxicated-in private. Public Such then would be the situation of adults were we
intoxication is considered to be an offense against oth- to regard the freedom to take drugs as a fundamental
ers and is therefore a violation of the criminal law. right similar to the freedom to read and to worship.
What would be the situation of children? Since many drinking alcohol, or smoking marijuana, or ingesting
people who are now said to be drug addicts or drug amphetamines?
abusers are minors, it is especially important that we The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are silent
think clearly about this aspect of the problem. on the subject of drugs. Their silence would seem to
I do not believe, and I do not advocate, that chil- imply that the adult citizen has, or ought to have, the
dren should have a right to ingest, inject, or otherwise right to medicate his own body as he sees fit. Were that
use any drug or substance they want. Children do not not the case, why should there have been a need for
have the right to drive, drink, vote, marry, or make a constitutional amendment to outlaw drinking? But
binding contracts. They acquire those rights at vari- if ingesting alcohol was, and is now again, a constitu-
ous ages, coming into their full possession at maturity, tional right, is ingesting opium, or herOin, or barbi-
usually between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. turates, or anything else not also such a right? If it is,
The right to self-medication should Similarly be with- then the Harrison Narcotic Act is not only a bad law
held until maturity. but unconstitutional as well, because it prescribes in a
legislative act what ought to be promulgated in a con-
* * *
stitutional amendment.
In short, I suggest that "dangerous" drugs be The nagging questions remain. As American
treated more or less as alcohol and tobacco are treated citizens, do we and should we have the right to take
now. (That does not mean that I believe the state narcotics or other drugs? Further, if we take drugs
should make their use a source of tax revenue.) Nei- and conduct ourselves as responsible and law-abiding
ther the use of narcotics nor their possession should citizens, do we and should we have a right to remain
be prohibited, but only their sale to minors. Of course, unmolested by the government? Lastly, if we take
that would result in the ready availability of all kinds drugs and break the law, do we and should we have a
of drugs among minors-though perhaps their avail- right to be treated as persons accused of a crime rather
ability would be no greater than it is now but only than as patients accused of being mentally ill?
more visible and hence more easily subject to proper These are fundamental questions that are conspic-
controls. That arrangement would place responsibility uous by their absence from all contemporary discus-
for the use of all drugs by children where it belongs: sions of problems of drug addiction and drug abuse.
on parents and their children. That is where the major In this area as in so many others, we have allowed a
responsibility rests for the use of alcohol and tobacco. moral problem to be disguised as a medical question
It is a tragic symptom of our refusal to take personal and have then engaged in shadowboxing with meta-
liberty and responsibility seriously that there appears phorical diseases and medical attempts, ranging from
to be no public desire to assume a similar stance toward the absurd to the appalling, to combat them.
other dangerous drugs. The result is that instead of debating the use of
drugs in moral and political terms, we define our task as
* * *
the ostensibly narrow technical problem of protecting
Sooner or later, we shall have to confront the basiC people from poisoning themselves with substances for
moral dilemma underlying our drug problem: does a whose use they cannot possibly assume responsibility.
person have the right to take a drug-any drug-not That, I think, best explains the frightening national
because he needs it to cure an illness, but because he consensus against personal responsibility for taking
wants to take it? drugs and for one's conduct while under their influ-
The Declaration of Independence speaks of our ence. In 1965, for example, when President Johnson
inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of sought a bill imposing tight federal controls over "pep
happiness." How are we to interpret that phrase? By pills" and "goof balls," the bill cleared the House by a
asserting that we ought to be free to pursue happi- unanimous vote, 402 to O.
ness by playing golf or watching television but not by
* * *
Finally, those repeated unanimous votes on far- The other way out of it lies through confronta-
reaching measures to combat drug abuse are bitter tion: by recognizing the problem for what it is, we can
reminders that when the chips are really down, that choose to maximize the sphere of action of the state
is, when democratic lawmakers can preserve their at the expense of the individual or of the individual at
intellectual and moral integrity only by going against the expense of the state. In other words, we can com-
certain popular myths, they prove to be either mind- mit ourselves to the view that the state, the represen-
less or spineless. They prefer running with the herd to tative of many, is more important than the individual
courting unpopularity and risking reelection. and that it therefore has the right, indeed the duty, to
After all is said and done-after millions of words regulate the life of the individual in the best interests
are written, thousands of laws are enacted, and of the group. Or we can commit ourselves to the view
countless numbers of people are "treated" for "drug that individual dignity and liberty are the supreme
abuse" -it all comes down to whether we accept or values of life and that the foremost duty of the state is
reject the ethical principle John Stuart Mill so clearly to protect and promote those values.
enunciated in 1859: In short, we must choose between the ethic of
collectivism and the ethic of individualism and pay
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, the price of either-or of both.
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war-
rant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or fore- NOTES
bear because it will make him happier, because, in the 1. Quoted in L. C. Kolb, NDyes' MDdern Clinical Psychiatry, 7th
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even ed. (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1968), p. 516.
right .... In the part [of his conduct] which merely con-
2. See my The Manufacture DfMadness: A CDmparative Study oftile
cerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.
InquisitiDn and tile Mental Health MDvement (New York: Harper &
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the indi- Row, 1970), pp. 180-206.
vidual is sovereign. 9
3. A. Montagu, "The Long Search for Euphoria," Reflections 1
The basic issue underlying the problem of (May-June 1966): 65.
addiction-and many other problems, such as sexual 4. A. B. Light et aI., Opium Addiction (Chicago: American Medi-
activity between consenting adults, pornography, cal Association, 1929), p. 115; quoted in Alfred R. Lindesmith,
contraception, gambling, and suicide-is simple but AddictiDn and Opiates (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 40.
vexing: in a conflict between the individual and the 5. The New YDrk Times, April 1, 1967.
state, where should the former's autonomy end and
6. Editorial, "About Narcotics," Syracuse Herald-Journal,
the latter's right to intervene begin? March 6,1969.
One way out of the dilemma lies through conceal-
7. The New YDrk Times, June 29,1970.
ment: by disguising the moral and political question
as a medical and therapeutic problem, we can, to pro- 8. See my IdeDlogy and Insanity: Essays 0.11 tile Psychiatric Dellu-
manization o.f Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor
tect the physical and mental health of patients, exalt
Press, 1970).
the state, oppress the individual, and claim benefits
for both. 9.J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Chicago: Regnery, 1955), p. 13.
Against the Legalization of Drugs

JAMES Q. WILSON
In 1972, the President appointed me chairman of the few new recruits. In 1976 the average age of heroin
National AdviSOry Council for Drug Abuse Preven- users who appeared in hospital emergency rooms was
tion. Created by Congress, the Council was charged about twenty-seven; ten years later it was thirty-two.
with providing guidance on how best to coordinate More than two-thirds of all heroin users appearing in
the national war on drugs. (Yes, we called it a war emergency rooms are now over the age of thirty. Back
then, too.) In those days, the drug we were chiefly con- in the early 1970's, when heroin got onto the national
cerned with was heroin. When I took office, heroin use political agenda, the typical heroin addict was much
had been increasing dramatically. Everybody was wor- younger, often a teenager. Household surveys show
ried that this increase would continue. Such phrases as the same thing-the rate of opiate use (which includes
"heroin epidemic" were commonplace. heroin) has been flat for the better part of two decades.
That same year, the eminent economist Milton More fine-grained studies of inner-city neighborhoods
Friedman published an essay in Newsweek in which confirm this. John Boyle and Ann Brunswick found
he called for legalizing heroin. His argument was on that the percentage of young blacks in Harlem who
two grounds: as a matter of ethics, the government has used heroin fell from 8 percent in 1970-71 to about
no right to tell people not to use heroin (or to drink or 3 percent in 1975-76.
to commit suicide); as a matter of economics, the pro- Why did heroin lose its appeal for young people?
hibition of drug use imposes costs on SOCiety that far When the young blacks in Harlem were asked why
exceed the benefits. Others, such as the psychoanalyst they stopped, more than half mentioned "trouble
Thomas Szasz, made the same argument. with the law" or "high cost" (and high cost is, of
We did not take Friedman's advice. (Government course, directly the result of law enforcement). Two-
commissions rarely do.) I do not recall that we even thirds said that heroin hurt their health; nearly all
discussed legalizing heroin, though we did discuss (but said they had had a bad experience with it. We need
did not take action on) legalizing a drug, cocaine, that not rely, however, simply on what they said. In New
many people then argued was benign. Our marching York City in 1973-75, the street price of heroin rose
orders were to figure out how to win the war on her- dramatically and its purity sharply declined, probably
oin, not to run up the white flag of surrender. as a result of the heroin shortage caused by the suc-
That was 1972. Today, we have the same number cess of the Turkish government in reducing the sup-
of heroin addicts that we had then-half a million, ply of opium base and of the French government in
give or take a few thousand. Having that many her- closing down heroin-processing laboratories located
oin addicts is no trivial matter; these people deserve in and around Marseilles. These were short-lived gains
our attention. But not having had an increase in that for, just as Friedman predicted, alternative sources
number for over fifteen years is also something that of supply-mostly in Mexico-quickly emerged. But
deserves our attention. What happened to the "heroin the three-year heroin shortage interrupted the easy
epidemic" that many people once thought would recruitment of new users.
overwhelm us? Health and related problems were no doubt part of
The facts are clear: a more or less stable pool of the reason for the reduced flow of recruits. Over the
heroin addicts has been getting older, with relatively preceding years, Harlem youth had watched as more
and more heroin users died of overdoses, were poi-
James Q. Wilson, "Against the Legalization of Drugs." Reprinted soned by adulterated doses, or acquired hepatitis from
from COl1lmelltar}', February 1990. Reprinted by permission of the dirty needles. The word got around: heroin can kill
Estate of James Q. Wilson. you. By 1974 new hepatitis cases and drug-overdose
deaths had dropped to a fraction of what they had have been readily available at the neighborhood drug-
been in 1970. store, probably at the same counter where the heroin
Alas, treatment did not seem to explain much of was sold. No need to travel to big cities or unfamiliar
the cessation in drug use. Treatment programs can neighborhoods-heroin could have been purchased
and do help heroin addicts, but treatment did not anywhere, perhaps by mail order.
explain the drop in the number of new users (who There would no longer have been any financial or
by definition had never been in treatment) nor even medical reason to avoid heroin use. Anybody could
much of the reduction in the number of experi- have afforded it. We might have tried to prevent chil-
enced users. dren from buying it, but as we have learned from our
No one knows how much of the decline to attribute efforts to prevent minors from buying alcohol and
to personal observation as opposed to high prices or tobacco, young people have a way of penetrating mar-
reduced supply. But other evidence suggests strongly kets theoretically reserved for adults. Returning Viet-
that price and supply played a large role. In 1972 the nam veterans would have discovered that Omaha and
National Advisory Council was especially worried by Raleigh had been converted into the pharmaceutical
the prospect that U.S. servicemen returning to this equivalent of Saigon.
country from Vietnam would bring their heroin habits Under these circumstances, can we doubt for a
with them. Fortunately, a brilliant study by Lee Robins of moment that heroin use would have grown expo-
Washington University in St. Louis put that fear to rest. nentially? Or that a vastly larger supply of new users
She measured drug use of Vietnam veterans shortly after would have been recruited? Professor Friedman is a
they had returned home. Though many had used her- Nobel Prize-winning economist whose understanding
oin regularly while in Southeast Asia, most gave up the of market forces is profound. What did he think would
habit when back in the United States. The reason: here, happen to consumption under his legalized regime?
heroin was less available and sanctions on its use were Here are his words: "Legalizing drugs might increase
more pronounced. Of course, if a veteran had been will- the number of addicts, but it is not clear that it would.
ing to pay enough-which might have meant travel- Forbidden fruit is attractive, particularly to the young."
ing to another city and would certainly have meant Really? I suppose that we should expect no increase
making an illegal contact with a disreputable dealer in in Porsche sales if we cut the price by 9S percent, no
a threatening neighborhood in order to acquire a (possi- increase in whiskey sales if we cut the price by a com-
bly) dangerous dose-he could have sustained his drug parable amount-because young people only want
habit. Most veterans were unwilling to pay this price, fast cars and strong liquor when they are "forbidden."
and so their drug use declined or disappeared. Perhaps Friedman's uncharacteristic lapse from the
obvious implications of price theory can be explained
by a misunderstanding of how drug users are recruited.
RELIVING THE PAST In his 1972 essay he said that "drug addicts are deliber-
Suppose we had taken Friedman's advice in 1972. What ately made by pushers, who give likely prospects their
would have happened? We cannot be entirely certain, first few doses free." If drugs were legal it would not
but at a minimum we would have placed the young pay anybody to produce addicts, because everybody
heroin addicts (and, above all, the prospective addicts) would buy from the cheapest source. But as every drug
in a very different position from the one in which they expert knows, pushers do not produce addicts. Friends
actually found themselves. Heroin would have been or acquaintances do. In fact, pushers are usually reluc-
legal. Its price would have been reduced by 9S percent tant to deal with non-users because a non-user could
(minus whatever we chose to recover in taxes.) Now be an undercover cop. Drug use spreads in the same
that it could be sold by the same people who make aspi- way any fad or fashion spreads: somebody who is
rin, its quality would have been assured-no poisons, already a user urges his friends to try, or simply shows
no adulterants. Sterile hypodermic needles would already-eager friends how to do it.
But we need not rely on speculation, however Compared to the United States, the numbers were
plausible, that lowered prices and more abundant sup- small. In 1960 there were 68 heroin addicts known
plies would have increased heroin usage. Great Britain to the British government; by 1968 there were 2,000
once followed such a policy and with almost exactly in treatment and many more who refused treatment.
those results. Until the mid-1960's, British physicians (They would refuse in part because they did not want
were allowed to prescribe heroin to certain classes of to get methadone at a clinic if they could get heroin on
addicts. (Possessing these drugs without a doctor's pre- the street.) Richard Hartnoll estimates that the actual
scription remained a criminal offense.) For many years number of addicts in England is five times the num-
this policy worked well enough because the addict ber officially registered. At a minimum, the number of
patients were typically middle-class people who had British addicts increased by thirtyfold in ten years; the
become dependent on opiate painkillers while under- actual increase may have been much larger.
going hospital treatment. There was no drug culture. In the early 1980's the numbers began to rise again,
The British system worked for many years, not because and this time nobody doubted that a real epidemic was
it prevented drug abuse, but because there was no at hand. The increase was estimated to be 40 percent a
problem of drug abuse that would test the system. year. By 1982 there were thought to be 20,000 heroin
All that changed in the 1960's. A few unscrupu- users in London alone. Geoffrey Pearson reports that
lous doctors began passing out heroin in wholesale many citieS-Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and
amounts. One doctor prescribed almost 600,000 her- Sheffield among them-were now experiencing a drug
oin tablets-that is, over thirteen pounds-in just one problem that once had been largely confined to Lon-
year. A youthful drug culture emerged with a demand don. The problem, again, was supply. The country was
for drugs far different from that of the older addicts. being flooded with cheap, high-quality heroin, first
As a result, the British government required doctors to from Iran and then from Southeast Asia.
refer users to government-run clinics to receive their The United States began the 1960's with a much
heroin. larger number of heroin addicts and probably a bigger
But the shift to clinics did not curtail the growth at-risk population than was the case in Great Britain.
in heroin use. Throughout the 1960's the number of Even though it would be foolhardy to suppose that the
addicts increased-the late John Kaplan of Stanford British system, if installed here, would have worked the
estimated by fivefold-in part as a result of the diver- same way or with the same results, it would be equally
sion of heroin from clinic patients to new users on the foolhardy to suppose that a combination of heroin
streets. An addict would bargain with the clinic doc- available from leaky clinics and from street dealers
tor over how big a dose he would receive. The patient who faced only minimal law-enforcement risks would
wanted as much as he could get, the doctor wanted to not have produced a much greater increase in heroin
give as little as was needed. The patient had an advan- use than we actually experienced. My guess is that if
tage in this conflict because the doctor could not be we had allowed either doctors or clinics to prescribe
certain how much was really needed. Many patients heroin, we would have had far worse results than were
would use some of their "maintenance" dose and sell produced in Britain, if for no other reason than the
the remaining part to friends, thereby recruiting new vastly larger number of addicts with which we began.
addicts. As the clinics learned of this, they began to We would have had to find some way to police thou-
shift their treatment away from heroin and toward sands (not scores) of physicians and hundreds (not
methadone, an addictive drug that, when taken dozens) of clinics. If the British civil service found it
orally, does not produce a "high" but will block the difficult to keep heroin in the hands of addicts and out
withdrawal pains associated with heroin abstinence. of the hands of recruits when it was dealing with a few
Whether what happened in England in the 1960's hundred people, how well would the American civil
was a mini-epidemic or an epidemic depends on service have accomplished the same tasks when deal-
whether one looks at numbers or at rates of change. ing with tens of thousands of people?
BACK TO THE FUTURE mood disorders. Besharov estimates that about 30,000
Now cocaine, especially in its potent form, crack, is to 50,000 such babies are born every year, about
the focus of attention. Now as in 1972 the government 7,000 in New York City alone. There may be ways to
is trying to reduce its use. Now as then some people are treat such infants, but from everything we now know
advocating legalization. Is there any more reason to the treatment will be long, difficult, and expensive.
yield to those arguments today than there was almost Worse, the mothers who are most likely to produce
two decades ago? crack babies are precisely the ones who, because of
I think not. If we had yielded in 1972 we almost poverty or temperament, are least able and willing
certainly would have had today a permanent popula- to obtain such treatment. In fact, anecdotal evidence
tion of several million, not several hundred thousand, suggests that crack mothers are likely to abuse their
heroin addicts. If we yield now we will have a far more infants.
serious problem with cocaine. The notion that abusing drugs such as cocaine is a
Crack is worse than heroin by almost any mea- "victimless crime" is not only absurd but dangerous.
sure. Heroin produces a pleasant drowsiness and, if Even ignoring the fetal drug syndrome, crack-depen-
hygienically administered, has only the physical side dent people are, like heroin addicts, individuals who
effects of constipation and sexual impotence. Regular regularly victimize their children by neglect, their
heroin use incapacitates many users, especially poor spouses by improvidence, their employers by lethargy,
ones, for any productive work or social responsibil- and their co-workers by carelessness. Society is not
ity. They will sit nodding on a street corner, helpless and could never be a collection of autonomous indi-
but at least harmless. By contrast, regular cocaine use Viduals. We all have a stake in ensuring that each of us
leaves the user neither helpless nor harmless. When displays a minimal level of dignity, responsibility, and
smoked (as with crack) or injected, cocaine produces empathy. We cannot, of course, coerce people into
instant, intense, and short-lived euphoria. The expe- goodness, but we can and should insist that some stan-
rience generates a powerful desire to repeat it. If the dards must be met if society itself-on which the very
drug is readily available, repeat use will occur. Those existence of the human personality depends-is to
people who progress to "bingeing" on cocaine become persist. Drawing the line that defines those standards
devoted to the drug and its effects to the exclusion of is difficult and contentious, but if crack and heroin use
almost all other considerations-job, family, children, do not fall below it, what does?
sleep, food, even sex. Dr. Frank Gawin at Yale and Dr. The advocates of legalization will respond by sug-
Everett Ellinwood at Duke report that a substantial gesting that my picture is overdrawn. Ethan Nadel-
percentage of all high-dose, binge users become unin- mann of Princeton argues that the risk of legalization
hibited, impulsive, hypersexual, compulsive, irritable, is less than most people suppose. Over 20 million
and hyperactive. Their moods vacillate dramatically, Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
leading at times to violence and homicide. five have tried cocaine (according to a government
Women are much more likely to use crack than survey), but only a quarter million use it daily. From
heroin, and if they are pregnant, the effects on their this Nadelmann concludes that at most 3 percent of all
babies are tragic. Douglas Besharov, who has been fol- young people who try cocaine develop a problem with
lowing the effects of drugs on infants for twenty years, it. The implication is clear: make the drug legal and we
writes that nothing he learned about heroin prepared only have to worry about 3 percent of our youth.
him for the devastation of cocaine. Cocaine harms the The implication rests on a logical fallacy and a fac-
fetus and can lead to physical deformities or neuro- tual error. The fallacy is this: the percentage of occa-
logical damage. Some crack babies have for all practi- sional cocaine users who become binge users wilen tile
cal purposes suffered a disabling stroke while still in drug is illegal (and thus expensive and hard to find)
the womb. The long-term consequences of this brain tells us nothing about the percentage who will become
damage are lowered cognitive ability and the onset of dependent when the drug is legal (and thus cheap and
abundant). Drs. Gawin and Ellinwood report, in com- What the nation accomplished then was what most
mon with several other researchers, that controlled efforts to save people from themselves accomplish:
or occasional use of cocaine changes to compulsive the problem was contained and the number of victims
and frequent use "when access to the drug increases" minimized, all at a considerable cost in law enforce-
or when the user switches from snorting to smoking. ment and increased crime. Was the cost worth it?
More cocaine more potently administered alters, per- I think so, but others may disagree. What are the lives
haps sharply, the proportion of "controlled" users of would-be addicts worth? I recall some people saying
who become heavy users. to me then, "Let them kill themselves." I was appalled.
The factual error is this: the federal survey Nadel- Happily, such views did not prevail.
mann quotes was done in 1985, before crack had Have we lost today? Not at all. High-rate cocaine
become common. Thus the probability of becoming use is not commonplace. The National Institute of
dependent on cocaine was derived from the responses Drug Abuse (NIDA) reports that less than 5 percent
of users who snorted the drug. The speed and potency of high-school seniors used cocaine within the last
of cocaine's action increases dramatically when it is thirty days. Of course this survey misses young people
smoked. We do not yet know how greatly the advent who have dropped out of school and miscounts those
of crack increases the risk of dependency, but all the who lie on the questionnaire, but even if we inflate
clinical evidence suggests that the increase is likely to the NIDA estimate by some plausible percentage, it
be large. is still not much above 5 percent. Medical examiners
It is possible that some people will not become reported in 1987 that about 1,500 died from cocaine
heavy users even when the drug is readily available use; hospital emergency rooms reported about 30,000
in its most potent form. So far there are no scientific admissions related to cocaine abuse.
grounds for predicting who will and who will not These are not small numbers, but neither are they
become dependent. Neither socioeconomic back- evidence of a nationwide plague that threatens to
ground nor personality traits differentiate between engulf us all. Moreover, cities vary greatly in the pro-
casual and intensive users. Thus, the only way to settle portion of people who are involved with cocaine. To
the question of who is correct about the effect of easy get City-level data we need to turn to drug tests carried
availability on drug use, Nadelmann or Gawin and out on arrested persons, who obviously are more likely
Ellinwood, is to try it and see. But that social experi- to be drug users than the average citizen. The National
ment is so risky as to be no experiment at all, for if Institute of Justice, through its Drug Use Forecasting
cocaine is legalized and if the rate of its abusive use (DUF) project, collects urinalysis data on arrestees
increases dramatically, there is no way to put the genie in 22 cities. As we have already seen, opiate (chiefly
back in the bottle, and it is not a kindly genie. heroin) use has been flat or declining in most of these
cities over the last decade. Cocaine use has gone up
sharply, but with great variation among cities. New
HAVE WE LOST? York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., all report
Many people who agree that there are risks in legaliz- that two-thirds or more of their arrestees tested posi-
ing cocaine or heroin still favor it because, they think, tive for cocaine, but in Portland, San Antonio, and
we have lost the war on drugs. "Nothing we have Indianapolis the percentage was one-third or less.
done has worked" and the current federal policy is In some neighborhoods, of course, matters have
just "more of the same.;' Whatever the costs of greater reached crisis proportions. Gangs control the streets,
drug use, surely they would be less than the costs of shootings terrorize residents, and drug-dealing occurs
our present, failed efforts. in plain view. The police seem barely able to contain
That is exactly what I was told in 1972-and her- matters. But in these neighborhoods-unlike at Palo
oin is not quite as bad a drug as cocaine. We did not Alto cocktail parties-the people are not calling for
surrender and we did not lose. We did not win, either. legalization, they are calling for help. And often not
much help has come. Many cities are willing to do To obtain this fiscal dividend, however, legal-
almost anything about the drug problem except spend ization's supporters must first solve an economic
more money on it. The federal government cannot dilemma. If they want to raise a lot of money to pay
change that; only local voters and politicians can. It is for welfare and treatment, the tax rate on the drugs
not clear that they will. will have to be quite high. Even if they themselves
It took about ten years to contain heroin. We have do not want a high rate, the politicians' love of "sin
had experience with crack for only about three or taxes" would probably guarantee that it would be
four years. Each year we spend perhaps $11 billion on high anyway. But the higher the tax, the higher the
law enforcement (and some of that goes to deal with price of the drug, and the higher the price the greater
marijuana) and perhaps $2 billion on treatment. Large the likelihood that addicts will turn to crime to find
sums, but not sums that should lead anyone to say, the money for it and that criminal organizations will
"We just can't afford this any more." be formed to sell tax-free drugs at below-market rates.
The illegality of drugs increases crime, partly If we managed to keep taxes (and thus prices) low, we
because some users tum to crime to pay for their hab- would get that much less money to pay for welfare and
its, partly because some users are stimulated by cer- treatment and more people could afford to become
tain drugs (such as crack or PCP) to act more violently addicts. There may be an optimal tax rate for drugs
or ruthlessly than they otherwise would, and partly that maximizes revenue while minimizing crime,
because criminal organizations seeking to control bootlegging, and the recruitment of new addicts, but
drug supplies use force to manage their markets. These our experience with alcohol does not suggest that we
also are serious costs, but no one knows how much know how to find it.
they would be reduced if drugs were legalized. Addicts
would no longer steal to pay black-market prices for
drugs, a real gain. But some, perhaps a great deal, of THE BENEFITS OF ILLEGALITY
that gain would be offset by the great increase in the The advocates of legalization find nothing to be said
number of addicts. These people, nodding on heroin in favor of the current system except, possibly, that
or living in the delusion-ridden high of cocaine, would it keeps the number of addicts smaller than it would
hardly be ideal employees. Many would steal simply to otherwise be. In fact, the benefits are more substantial
support themselves, since snatch-and-grab, opportu- than that.
nistic crime can be manged [sic] even by people unable First, treatment. All the talk about providing IItreat-
to hold a regular job or plan an elaborate crime. Those ment on demand" implies that there is a demand for
British addicts who get their supplies from government treatment. That is not quite right. There are some drug-
clinics are not models of law-abiding decency. Most dependent people who genuinely want treatment and
are in crime, and though their per-capita rate of crimi- will remain in it if offered; they should receive it. But
nality may be lower thanks to the cheapness of their there are far more who wan t only short-term help after a
drugs, the total volume of crime they produce may be bad crash; once stabilized and bathed, they are back on
quite large. Of course, society could decide to support the street again, hustling. And even many of the addicts
all unemployable addicts on welfare, but that would who enroll in a program honestly wanting help drop
mean that gains from lowered rates of crime would out after a short while when they discover that help
have to be offset by large increases in welfare budgets. takes time and commitment. Drug-dependent people
Proponents of legalization claim that the costs of have very short time horizons and a weak capacity for
having more addicts around would be largely if not commitment. These two groups-those looking for
entirely offset by having more money available with a quick fix and those unable to stick with a long-term
which to treat and care for them. The money would fix-are not easily helped. Even if we increase the num-
come from taxes levied on the sale of heroin and ber of treatment slots-as we should-we would have
cocaine. to do something to make treatment more effective.
One thing that can often make it more effective fundamental moral Significance attaches to either. But
is compulsion. Douglas Anglin of UCLA, in common if we believe-as I do-that dependency on certain
with many other researchers, has found that the lon- mind-altering drugs is a moral issue and that their ille-
ger one stays in a treatment program, the better the gality rests in part on their immorality, then legalizing
chances of a reduction in drug dependency. But he, them undercuts, if it does not eliminate altogether,
again like most other researchers, has found that drop- the moral message.
out rates are high. He has also found, however, that That message is at the root of the distinction we
patients who enter treatment under legal compulsion now make between nicotine and cocaine. Both are
stay in the program longer than those not subject to highly addictive; both have harmful physical effects.
such pressure. His research on the California civil- But we treat the two drugs differently, not simply
commitment program, for example, found that heroin because nicotine is so widely used as to be beyond the
users involved with its required drug-testing program reach of effective prohibition, but because its use does
had over the long term a lower rate of heroin use than not destroy the user's essential humanity. Tobacco
similar addicts who were free of such constraints. If shortens one's life, cocaine debases it.- Nicotine alters
for many addicts compulsion is a useful component one's habits, cocaine alters one's soul. The heavy use
of treatment, it is not clear how compulsion could be of crack, unlike the heavy use of tobacco, corrodes
achieved in a society in which purchasing, possessing, those natural sentiments of sympathy and duty that
and using the drug were legal. It could be managed, constitute our human nature and make possible our
I suppose, but I would not want to have to answer the social life. To say, as does Nadelmann, that distin-
challenge from the American Civil Liberties Union guishing morally between tobacco and cocaine is "lit-
that it is wrong to compel a person to undergo treat- tle more than a transient prejudice" is close to saying
ment for consuming a legal commodity. that morality itself is but a prejudice.
Next, education. We are now investing substan-
tially in drug-education programs in the schools.
Though we do not yet know for certain what will THE ALCOHOL PROBLEM
work, there are some promising leads. But I wonder Now we have arrived where many arguments about
how credible such programs would be if they were legalizing drugs begin: is there any reason to treat
aimed at dissuading children from doing something heroin and cocaine diffe,rently from the way we treat
perfectly legal. We could, of course, treat drug educa- alcohol?
tion like smoking education: inhaling crack and inhal- There is no easy answer to that question because,
ing tobacco are both legal, but you should not do it as with so many human problems, one cannot decide
because it is bad for you. That tobacco is bad for you simply on the basis either of moral principles or of
is easily shown; the Surgeon General has seen to that. individual consequences; one has to temper any pol-
But what do we say about crack? It is pleasurable, but icy by a common-sense judgment of what is possible.
devoting yourself to so much pleasure is not a good Alcohol, like herOin, cocaine, PCP, and marijuana,
idea (though perfectly legal)? Unlike tobacco, cocaine is a drug-that is, a mood-altering substance-and
will not give you cancer or emphysema, but it will lead consumed to excess it certainly has harmful conse-
you to neglect your duties to family, job, and neigh- quences: auto aCcidents, barroom fights, bedroom
borhood? Everybody is doing cocaine, but you should shootings. It is also, for some people, addictive. We
not? cannot confidently compare the addictive powers of
Again, it might be possible under a legalized these drugs, but the best evidence suggests that crack
regime to have effective drug-prevention programs, and heroin are much more addictive than alcohol.
but their effectiveness would depend heavily, I think, Many people, Nadelmann included, argue that
on first having decided that cocaine use, like tobacco since the health and financial costs of alcohol abuse
use, is purely a matter of practical consequences; no are so much higher than those of cocaine or heroin
abuse, it is hypocritical folly to devote our efforts to for changing it-living in drug-free therapeutic com-
preventing cocaine or drug use. But as Mark Kleiman munities, becoming faithful members of Alcoholics
of Harvard has pOinted out, this comparison is quite Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous-require great
misleading. What Nadelmann is doing is showing that personal commitment, a quality that is, alas, in short
a legalized drug (alcohol) produces greater social harm supply among the very persons-young people, dis-
than illegal ones (cocaine and heroin). But of course. advantaged people-who are often most at risk for
Suppose that in the 1920's we had made heroin and addiction.
cocaine legal and alcohol illegal. Can anyone doubt Suppose that today we had, not 15 million alcohol
that Nadelmann would now be writing that it is folly abusers, but half a million. Suppose that we already
to continue our ban on alcohol because cocaine and knew what we have learned from our long experience
heroin are so much more harmful? with the widespread use of alcohol. Would we make
And let there be no doubt about it-widespread whiskey legal? I do not know, but I suspect there would
heroin and cocaine use are associated with all manner be a lively debate. The Surgeon General would remind
of ills. Thomas Bewley found that the mortality rate of us of the risks alcohol poses to pregnant women.
British heroin addicts in 1968 was 28 times as high as The National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
the death rate of the same age group of non-addicts, tion would point to the likelihood of more highway
even though in England at the time an addict could fatalities caused by drunk drivers. The Food and Drug
obtain free or low-cost heroin and clean needles from Administration might find that there is a nontrivial
British clinics. Perform the following mental experi- increase in cancer associated with alcohol consump-
ment: suppose we legalized heroin and cocaine in this tion. At the same time the police would report great
country. In what proportion of auto fatalities would difficulty in keeping illegal whiskey out of our cities,
the state police report that the driver was nodding off officers being corrupted by bootleggers, and alcohol
on heroin or recklessly driving on a coke high? In what addicts often resorting to crime to feed their habit. Lib-
proportion of spouse-assault and child-abuse cases ertarians, for their part, would argue that every citizen
would the local police report that crack was involved? has a right to drink anything he wishes and that drink-
In what proportion of industrial accidents would ing is, in any event, a "victimless crime."
safety investigators report that the forklift or drill- However the debate might turn out, the central
press operator was in a drug-induced stupor or frenzy? fact would be that the problem was still, at that pOint,
We do not know exactly what the proportion would a small one. The government cannot legislate away
be, but anyone who asserts that it would not be much the addictive tendencies in all of us, nor can it remove
higher than it is now would have to believe that these completely even the most dangerous addictive sub-
drugs have little appeal except when they are illegal. stances. But it can cope with harms when the harms
And that is nonsense. are still manageable.
An advocate of legalization might concede that
social harm-perhaps harm equivalent to that already
produced by alcohol-would follow from making SCIENCE AND ADDICTION
cocaine and heroin generally available. But at least, One advantage of containing a problem while it is still
he might add, we would have the problem "out in the containable is that it buys time for science to learn
open" where it could be treated as a matter of "pub- more about it and perhaps to discover a cure. Almost
lic health." That is well and good, if we knew how to unnoticed in the current debate over legalizing drugs
treat-that is, cure-heroin and cocaine abuse. But we is that basic science has made rapid strides in identify-
do not know how to do it for all the people who would ing the underlying neurological processes involved in
need such help. We are having only limited success in some forms of addiction. Stimulants such as cocaine
coping with chronic alcoholics. Addictive behavior is and amphetamines alter the way certain brain cells
immensely difficult to change, and the best methods communicate with one another. That alteration is
complex and not entirely understood, but in simpli- at a reasonable cost will be much greater than if the
fied form it involves modifying the way in which a problem is a few million chronic users of legal sub-
neurotransmitter called dopamine sends signals from stances. Once a drug is legal, not only will its use
one cell to another. increase but many of those who then use it will prefer
When dopamine crosses the synapse between two the drug to the treatment: they will want the pleasure,
cells, it is in effect carrying a message from the first cell whatever the cost to themselves or their families, and
to activate the second one. In certain parts ofthe brain they will resist-probably successfully-any effort
that message is experienced as pleasure. After the mes- to wean them away from experiencing the high that
sage is delivered, the dopamine returns to the first cell. comes from inhaling a legal substance.
Cocaine apparently blocks this return, or "reuptake,"
so that the excited cell and others nearby continue to
send pleasure messages. When the exaggerated high IF I AM WRONG ...
produced by cocaine-influenced dopamine finally No one can know what our society would be like if we
ends, the brain cells may (in ways that are still a matter changed the law to make access to cocaine, heroin,
of dispute) suffer from an extreme lack of dopamine, and PCP easier. I believe, for reasons given, that the
thereby making the individual unable to experience result would be a sharp increase in use, a more wide-
any pleasure at all. This would explain why cocaine spread degradation of the human personality, and a
users often feel so depressed after enjoying the drug. greater rate of accidents and violence.
Stimulants may also affect the way in which other I may be wrong. If I am, then we will needlessly
neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and noradrena- have incurred heavy costs in law enforcement and
line, operate. some forms of criminality. But if I am right, and the
Whatever the exact mechanism may be, once it legalizers prevail anyway, then we will have consigned
is identified it becomes possible to use drugs to block millions of people, hundreds of thousands of infants,
either the effect of cocaine or its tendency to produce and hundreds of neighborhoods to a life of oblivion
dependency. There have already been experiments and disease. To the lives and families destroyed by
using desipramine, imipramine, bromocriptine, car- alcohol we will have added countless more destroyed
bamazepine, and other chemicals. There are some by cocaine, heroin, PCP, and whatever else a basement
promising results. scientist can invent.
Tragically, we spend very little on such research, Human character is formed by SOciety; indeed,
and the agencies funding it have not in the past human character is inconceivable without society,
occupied very influential or visible posts in the fed- and good character is less likely in a bad society. Will
eral bureaucracy. If there is one aspect of the "war on we, in the name of an abstract doctrine of radical
drugs" metaphor that I dislike, it is its tendency to individualism, and with the false comfort of suspect
focus attention almost exclusively on the troops in the predictions, decide to take the chance that somehow
trenches, whether engaged in enforcement or treat- individual decency can survive amid a more general
ment, and away from the research-and-development level of degradation?
efforts back on the home front where the war may ulti- I think not. The American people are too wise for
mately be decided. that, whatever the academic essayists and cocktail-
I believe that the prospects of scientists in control- party pundits may say. But if Americans today are less
ling addiction will be strongly influenced by the size wise than I suppose, then Americans at some future
and character of the problem they face. If the problem time will look back on us now and wonder, what kind
is a few hundred thousand chronic, high-dose users of of people were they that they could have done such a
an illegal product, the chances of making a difference thing?
Gun Control
HUGH LAFOLLETTE
Many of us assume that we must either oppose or and offer the broad outline of an appropriate solution.
support gun control. Not so. We have a range of alter- To simplify discussion, I adopt the following locutions:
natives. Even this way of speaking oversimplifies our those opposed to most abolition and most restrictions
choices since there are two distinct scales on which to advocate a "serious right to bear arms," while those
place alternatives. One scale concerns the degree (if at supporting more widespread abolition and more sub-
all) to which guns should be abolished. This scale moves stantial restrictions are "gun control advocates." This
from those who want no abolition (NA) of any guns, simplification, of course, masks significant disagree-
through those who want moderate abolition (MA)- ments among advocates of each position.
that is, to forbid access to some subclasses of guns-to
those who want absolute abolition (AA). The second I. JUSTIFYING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF GUNS
scale concerns the restrictions (if any) on those guns that
are available to private citizens. This scale moves from A. A Moral Question
those who want absolute restrictions (AR) through those Do citizens have a Clserious right to bear arms"? This is
who want moderate restrictions (MR) to those who a moral question, not a constitutional one. For even if
want no restrictions (NR) at all. Restrictions vary not the Constitution did grant this right, we should deter-
only in strength but also in content. We could restrict mine if there are suffiCiently compelling arguments
who owns guns, how they obtain them, where and how against private gun ownership to warrant changing
they store them, and where and how they carry them. the Constitution. By contrast, if this were not a consti-
Our options are further complicated by the union tutional right, we should determine if there are strong
of these scales. On one extreme no private citizen can reasons why the state should not ban or control guns
own any guns (AA, which is functionally equivalent and if these reasons are sufficiently compelling to
to AR), while at the other extreme, every private citi- make this a constitutional right. Most defenders
zen can own any gun with no restrictions (NA+NR). of private gun ownership claim we do have a moral
But once we leave those extremes, which few people right-as well as a constitutional one-and that this
hold, the options are defined by a pair of coordinates right is not an ordinary right but a fundamental one.
along these distinct scales. While most people embrace 1. A fundamental right.-If they are correct, they
pOSitions on the Cl same " end of both scales, others would have the justificatory upper hand. Were this a
embrace more exotic mixtures: some will want few fundamental right, it would not be enough to show
weapons available to private citizens but virtually no that society would benefit from controlling access
restrictions on those guns that are available (MA+NR), to guns.) The arguments for gun control would have
while others may prefer making most guns available to be overwhelming. Yet there is also a hefty cost in
but want to seriously restrict them (NA+MR). claiming that this is a fundamental right: the evidence
So our choice is not merely to support or oppose gun for the right must meet especially rigorous standards.
control but to decide who can own which guns under What makes a right fundamental? A fundamental
what conditions. Although I cannot pretend to provide right is a non-derivative right protecting a fundamental
a definitive account here, I can isolate the central issues interest. Not every interest we individually cherish is
fundamental. Since most interests are prized by some-
one, such a notion of "fundamental interest" would be
Hugh LaFollette, "Gun Control," Ethics 110 Uanuary 2000): 263-
81, (!;; 2000 by The University of Chicago. Reprinted by permission
anemic, serving no special justificatory role. Fundamen-
of The University of Chicago Press. tal interests are special; they are integrally related to a
person's chance of living a good life, whatever her particu- a significant social payoff-although most fundamen-
lar interests, desires, and beliefs happen to be. For example, tal rights do. Still, we minimally assume fundamental
living in a society that protects speech creates an envi- rights (right types) do not harm society.
ronment within which each of us can pursue our partic- This provides a framework for evaluating people's
ular interests, goals, needs, and development, whatever claims that a right is fundamental. Advocates must
our interests happen to be. Is the purported right to bear show that and how granting the right protects individu-
arms like this paradigmatic fundamental right? als' fundamental interests, and they must be prepared to
Even if it were, that would not establish straight- respond to objections that granting that right type will
forwardly that it is impermissible to abolish or restrict harm SOciety. These are serious obstacles for gun advo-
private ownership of guns. After all, fundamental cates. It is difficult to see that a serious right to bear arms
rights standardly have conditions, boundaries, or satisfies either of these requirements, let alone both.
restrictions on them. Some rights, like the right to First, I see no compelling reason to think that own-
vote, are conditional upon reaching a specified age, ing a gun is a fundamental interest. Other fundamental
and they can be forfeited by emigrants and imprisoned interests are necessary to one's flourishing no matter
felons. In addition, most right tokens can be restricted what her particular desires, interests, and beliefs. It
or overridden when the exercise of that right harms is difficult to see how this is true of guns. Moreover,
others. For example, my right to free religious expres- the interests protected by paradigmatic fundamental
sion gives me wide discretion in how I exercise my rights-our interests in unfettered speech, freedom of
religion. I can remove my kids from high school and religion, and freedom of association-are not merely
exclude them from selected school activities (Wiscon- means to my flourishing, they are elements constitut-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 [1972]; Moody v. Cronin, 484 ing it. By contrast, having a gun in my bed stand, in
F. Supp. 270 [1979]). I can sacrifice animals (Church of my closet, or on my person might be a means for me
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 to achieve my ends, but they are not constitutive ele-
[1993]). Nonetheless, it does not permit me to sacri- ments of my flourishing. Hence, owning guns is not a
fice humans. Nor does my right to free speech permit fundamental interest.
me to slander someone or to preach outside her win- Wheeler disagrees. He argues that the right to
dow at 2:00 A.M. Tokens of fundamental rights may be bear arms is fundamental since guns are the best way
restricted to protect others from serious harms arising to protect our fundamental interest in self-defense. 4
from the exercise of those rights. However, on his view, guns are not inherently valu-
Of course rights would not be worth much if they able; they are valuable only as a means of self-defense. 5
were subject straightforwardly to the wishes of the I fail to see how this could make the right to bear arms
majority. We fiercely defend fundamental right types fundamental. Not every means to a fundamental inter-
although their tokens sometimes undercut society's est is a fundamental right. That would arguably make
interests. We cannot restrict or put conditions on fun- most actions protected by fundamental rights. None-
damental rights except for compelling reasons, and theless, the connection between owning guns and self-
individuals cannot forfeit their fundamental rights (if defense is an important issue that I address later.
they can forfeit them at all) except for overwhelming Others might claim that gun ownership is an essen-
reasons. Still, although tokens of a right sometimes run tial element for the flourishing of a proper citizen.
counter to the majority's wishes, we should not infer A proper citizen, on this view, is one capable of prOvid-
that rights standardly undermine the public interest. 2 ing for and defending his family. Although each citizen
Fundamental rights (freedom of speech, freedom of can (generally) fend for himself, citizens come together
association, etc.) benefit society as well as individu- to form a limited government to provide those few
als. Permitting free speech, religion, and association needs they cannot easily satisfy on their own. However,
is the best-and arguably the only-way for society to this vision of the citizen is very controversial, more con-
uncover the truth. 3 Of course, not every right has such troversial than the interest in gun ownership it seeks to
justify. It assumes each of us has far more control over risky to others, the state can legitimately restrict drink-
our lives than we arguably do have. Furthermore, even ing while driving. Whether privately owning guns is
if this conception were defensible, it would not estab- Similarly risky is something we must discover.
lish a fundamental right to bear arms since guns are
mere means to independent citizenship. They are not B. Bad Public Policy
constitutive of that citizenship. Hence, it is doubtful If private gun ownership were not a derivative right,
that the purported right to bear arms satisfies the first it might still be bad policy to substantially restrict or
requirement of a fundamental right. abolish guns. There are always costs of enforcing a
Second, we have evidence that granting this right law. Sometimes these costs are prohibitive, especially
type does harm society. If this evidence is at all cred- when the public does not support that law. If the pub-
ible, then granting this purported right would not lic will not voluntarily comply with the law, then the
satisfy the second requirement either. But this does state must try to force compliance. In their efforts to
not resolve the issue. Although people do not have a do so, they invariably employ excessively intrusive
fundamental right to own guns, gun control might be methods. Such methods never entirely succeed, and,
wrong because it violates some derivative right or sim- to the extent that they do, they undermine public con-
ply because it is bad public policy. fidence in and support for all law. Consider America's
2. A derivative right.-Suppose we determined that experience with Prohibition. Although one of Prohi-
the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right but a bition's aims-to protect innocents from harm caused
derivative right. This would still be a significant find- by those under the influence-was laudable, the law
ing since derivative rights, like fundamental ones, can- was unenforceable and excessively costly. Conse-
not be restricted without good evidence. Prima facie, quently, less than two decades after Prohibition was
I think we have such a derivative right. Each of us has passed via constitutional amendment, it was repealed.
a fundamental right of noninterference: we should be The cost of enforcing any law-and especially an
allowed to live our lives as we wish so long as we do not unpopular law-weighs against making any behavior
thereby harm others. This is a right each of us needs no illegal unless we have solid evidence that the behavior
matter what our particular interests. That general right is seriously harmful. If we adopt a weaker standard-if
derivatively protects personally important activities. we criminalize every action type whose tokens occa-
For instance, I would be furious if the state forbade sionally lead to some harm-then we would criminal-
me from sharing a pint with a friend. Nonetheless, ize most behavior. As a result, even if there were no
although consuming alcohol is a particular inter- right to bear arms, we should still not seek to substan-
est and enjoyment I have, it is not a constitutive ele- tially limit private ownership of guns unless we had
ment of the good life in the way that the freedoms good reason to think that would prevent serious harm.
of speech, religion, and association are. That is why
I do not have a fundamental right to consume alco-
C. Summing Up: Justifying tile Private Ownership
hol. Consequently, the conditions under which my
of Guns
consumption of alcohol can be legitimately restricted
are more lax than they would be if the activity were a The preceding analysis isolates three questions we must
fundamental interest. answer in deciding whether people should be permit-
Nonetheless, since I have a prima facie derivative ted to own guns: (1) How important is owning a gun
right to consume alcohol, the state can legitimately to some people? (2) What are the consequences of pri-
abolish or restrict alcohol consumption only if it can vate gun ownership? and (3) Is abolishing or restricting
show that doing so is an effective means of protecting private ownership of guns bCl~ policy? Although gun
the public from harm. They can do that in some cases: ownership is not a fundamental interest, many people
people who consume substantial amounts of alcohol are want to own guns and think they have good reason to
dangerous drivers. Since this behavior is unacceptably do so. That is sufficient to show that serious gun control
would undermine gun owners' interests. Moreover, is such that we can confidently predict they will cause
there is some reason to think that serious gun control harm. The two questions are intricately related since
in countries with a strong tradition of gun ownership inherently dangerous objects are more likely to cause
would be bad policy. Therefore, we should certainly serious harm. Yet they are separable because some dan-
not abolish, and arguably should not restrict, private gerous objects are not inherently so. Automobiles, alco-
ownership of guns without good reason. Are there good hol, and Cigarettes were not designed to cause harm,
reasons? To answer this question, we must determine but all are causally implicated in many people's deaths.
the effects of private gun ownership: (a) How likely is it Other things being equal, we are more prone to control
that private gun ownership seriously harms others? and inherently dangerous objects than objects that merely
(b) Are there substantial benefits of gun ownership that have harm as an unwanted side effect.
might counterbalance any harm? Guns, unlike autos, are inherently dangerous.
Guns were invented for the military; they were
designed to cause (and threaten) harm. 6 The same
II. HARM, DANGER, AND RISK aims determine the ways in which guns are rede-
We must be careful when we say that guns cause harm. signed: they are changed to make them more effi-
Guns kill people because agents use them to kill people cient at causing harm. In contrast, a significant aim
(or misuse them in ways that cause people to be killed). of redesigning automobiles is to make them less dan-
As the National Rifle Association (NRA) puts it: "Guns gerous. To some extent these efforts have succeeded.
don't kill people, people do." In one sense their claim is Although the absolute number of annual traffic fatali-
uncontroversial: murder is the act of an agent, and guns ties has not noticeably declined, the number of fatali-
are not agents. In another way, their claim is irrelevant. ties per mile traveled has declined 75 percent since the
No gun control advocate claims, hints, or suggests that 1950s. 7 We have enhanced the auto's original aim of
guns are moral agents. Guns are objects, and objects do efficient transportation while lessening harmful side
no evil. But not all objects are created equal. Imagine the effects. That is why we can sensibly say that the auto-
NNWA (National Nuclear Weapons Association) claim- mobile is not inherently dangerous despite the fact
ing that "tactical nuclear weapons don't kill people, that it causes harm. We cannot say the same for guns.
people do." While in one sense their claim would be The literature of gun advocates supports my con-
true, in a more profound way, it would be ludicrous. tention that guns are inherently dangerous. Theyadvo-
Of course guns are not nuclear weapons. Guns are cate the private ownership of guns to prevent crime
not as dangerous as nuclear weapons, and some guns and to arm the militia. Guns can serve these purposes
have seemingly legitimate uses. The question is whether only because they are an effective means of inflicting
the character of guns makes them especially harmful. and threatening harm. Even guns normally not used
We know that some objects-tactical nuclear weapons, to harm humans have purposes that ride piggyback
biochemical weapons, live grenades, and so forth, are on this fundamental purpose. Shotguns are used to
much more dangerous than feathers, ice cream, and kill animals, and target guns are designed to be espe-
butter knives. Where do guns fall along this continuum? cially accurate. Taken together, this evidence supports
There are two distinct but related questions: (1) Are the common view that guns are inherently dangerous.
guns inherently dangerous? and (2) What is the empiri- That is why we have special reasons to regulate them.
cal probability that guns cause serious harm? "Inher- Although inherently dangerous, guns are far less
ently dangerous" objects are those whose nature or dangerous than weapons of mass destruction, and
design is sufficient to justify our prediction that they they do have seemingly legitimate uses. That is why
will cause harm independent of any empirical evi- we must show just how risky they are before we can
dence. We do not need double-blind empirical studies legitimately abolish or seriously restrict them. We
to know that nuclear weapons are inherently danger- must also determine if they have sufficient benefits
ous: they were designed to cause harm, and their nature such that we should permit them, even if risky.
A. An Intennediate Conclusion we think Roger (an adult) stupidly engages in a danger-

We have shown that owning guns is not a fundamen- ous activity (sky diving or boxing or racing), we might
tal interest and that guns are inherently dangerous. think Roger's autonomy requires that we permit it.
That is why we cannot categorically dismiss all forms Our commitment to individual liberty weighs against
of gun control. However, this is a weak conclusion. For the government's abolishing or restricting the private
although guns are inherently dangerous, they may ownership of guns as a way of limiting harm. s Sec-
not be so dangerous as to justify more than a system ond, some actions (smoking in public places) that are
of minimal registration. What seems clear is that their acceptably risky to Roger might be unacceptably risky
inherent dangerousness precludes the idea that guns to others. Are guns also unacceptably risky to others?
cannot be subject to governmental control. Some Put differently, gun control does not concern
form of gun control cannot be categorically dismissed. what private individuals should do but what govern-
Before determining the actual danger that guns pres- ments should allow private individuals to do. We must
ent, we should first determine how risky an action determine the risk of permitting the private ownership
must be before we can justifiably restrict it. of guns, constrained by these complicating consider-
ations. To illustrate how this might work, consider the
B. Risk following example. We have evidence that a number
Humans are notoriously bad at judging risk. Often we of wrecks are caused by drivers using cellular phones.
are unaware of, or are inattentive to, the seriousness of Roger wants to use his cellular phone while commut-
risks. For instance, we may drive while inebriated. At ing to work. He decides the inconvenience of not using
other times we overestimate the risks. For instance, we the cellular phone is worse than the small probability
may refuse to fly because we think it is too dangerous. of personal harm. He might overestimate the incon-
A proper determination of risk would be based on a venience of not being able to use his cellular phone
careful accounting of the action's costs and benefits. We or insufficiently appreciate the seriousness of the
should determine (1) the probability of harm, (2) the risk. However, since he is an adult, we might think we
seriousness of harm (the product of the gravity and should not interfere with his decision to use a cellular
extent of the harm), (3) the probability of achieving the phone while driving. That is what autonomy requires.
benefits, (4) the significance of the benefits (the product Yet Roger is not the only person at risk. Passengers in
of the importance and extent of the benefit), and then his or other cars may also be harmed. The seriousness
act accordingly. Of course even if we reach the same of harm to them must also be conSidered in deciding to
determination to the above questions, we might still permit or restrict drivers' use of cellular phones.
disagree about whether to act: we might disagree about These judgments of risk must be further tem-
what risks are worth which benefits. Nonetheless, we pered by the costs of enforcement mentioned earlier.
can all agree that (a) as the likelihood and seriousness Although we know that using cellular phones while
of harm increase, we have increased reason to refrain driving may lead to accidents, we also know other activ-
from acting, while (b) as the likelihood and importance ities may do the same-drinking coffee while driving,
of the benefits increase, we have increased reasons to eating a donut, looking at a map, talking to a passenger,
act. We can import these lessons into the law. driving more than two hours without stopping, driv-
ing on less than six hours of sleep, driving home after
C. Legal Rules a bad day at the office, and so forth. We can reasonably
But not straightforwardly. The issue is not whether we presume that we should not make all these activities
should own guns if they are legal, although that is a illegal. The probabilities of serious harm are small, and
fascinating question. The question is whether the state enforcing such laws would require far-reaching intru-
should curtail private gun ownership. The foregoing sions into everyone's life. When the risks of an activity's
considerations are relevant but not decisive. The deci- causing grave harm to many others are small and the
sion to permit private ownership of guns is shaped by costs of interference are Significant, then we should not
two factors pulling in opposite directions. First, even if criminalize the action. But as the probability of grave
and widespread harm increases, then, other things are inherently dangerous but because-if gun-control
being equal, we should criminalize the action. advocates are right-permitting private ownership of
For instance, when people are released from prison guns is very risky.
(and not just on parole) they have "paid theirdebtto soci-
ety." Yet we do not permit them to own a gun. We jUdge
that they are more likely to harm others. Of course not all III. WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW
of them-and likely not a majority of them-would harm We can now specify what we must know in order to
others if they were permitted to own a gun. They are pre- intelligently decide whether to prohibit or restrict gun
vented from owning guns because they are members of ownership (or any other risky action): (1) Is there a
a group statistically more likely to cause harm: we judge statistically significant correlation between the action
that allowing former felons to own guns is unacceptably (private ownership of guns) and harm (homicides,
risky. The NRA and most other gun advocates agree. accidental deaths, suicides, armed robbery, etc.)?
Someone might counter, though, that we deny fel- (2) Do we have good reason to think this correlation
ons the right to own guns not because we judge that indicates that the purportedly risky action causes the
permitting them to own guns is risky but that they, by harm? (3) How serious are these resultant harms? and
their actions, have forfeited the right to own guns. But (4) How important is the activity that the state wishes to
that is not the best justification for our action. Why control (a) to the individual agent and (b) to the society?
should felons forfeit their right after they have served In deciding whether to restrict the behavior, we
their time and are free of all obligations to the state? For must balance these considerations using the follow-
instance, while imprisoned in the United States, felons ing general guidelines: (1) If we have evidence that
do forfeit their right against unlawful searches and the behavior causes harm, then we have some reason
seizures. But once they are released from prison (and to limit the behavior. As the evidence increases, the
are no longer on parole or probation), a former felon reasons for prohibiting the behavior increase. As the
has an unconditional right against unlawful searches probability that the behavior will lead to serious harm
and seizures-the same as every other United States (the product of the gravity and extent of the harm)
resident. approaches certainty, then the reasons for forbidding
At first glance, there is some reason to think that fel- the behavior become very strong. (2) The more grave
ons who use guns in the commission of a crime could and widespread the potential harm, the more reason
forfeit their right to own a gun in the same way that we have to constrain the behavior. If the gravity and
drunk drivers lose their licenses. However, drunk drivers extent of the harm are substantial, we might constrain
do not lose their license forever, while in most jurisdic- the behavior even if our evidence that the behavior
tions felons are never permitted to own guns. Moreover, causes the harm is moderate. (3) The higher the prob-
the prohibition against former felons' owning guns is ability that allowing the action will have important
not limited to those who use guns in the commission benefits, the stronger the reason to permit it. The
of a crime. Hence, it is more plausible to think that we greater the benefits, the greater the reason to permit it.
can prevent released felons from owning guns because Libertarians might claim that individuals' rights are
we judge that they are more likely to commit crimes so strong that the state cannot justifiably intervene even
with guns. to constrain those who put others at extreme risk. The
This is our rationale for all laws proscribing risky state should not proscribe risky actions, although they
actions. Every drunk driver does not cause an accident. can intervene after harm has occurred. This use of ('risk"
Most do not. Yet we do not flinch at laws forbidding is misleading. If on one occasion I drive while inebri-
drunk driving. For it is not merely that drunk drivers ated, I engage in a risky action: there is some probability
are statistically more likely to cause harm; they are more that I and others will be harmed. However, permitting
likely to cause harm because they are inebriated. We can people to drive while inebriated will definitely cause
arguably use the same rationale to justify restricting harm, although we cannot specify in advance who will
access to guns. We restrict access not only because guns be harmed. A personal decision to own a gun is risky in
the former sense. A decision to permit citizens to pri- would be more likely to use that gun. Although they
vately own guns is-depending on the evidence-risky could resort to a knife or a baseball bat, they would be
in the latter sense. If gun control advocates are right less likely to do so, and, even if they did, those weapons
about the evidence, then we have good grounds to con- are less likely to cause a serious or fatal injury. (3) When
strain private gun use. The question is, are they right? people are depressed, they can act in ways they would
not act normally. If they had a gun close to hand, they
would be more likely to kill themselves. Although they
IV. ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE
might slit their wrists or take pills, they would be less
A. Annchair Arguments likely to do so, and, even if they did, they would be less
Debates over gun control typically begin, and some- likely to kill themselves. (4) When people handle guns,
times end, with armchair arguments. Both sides offer even for a legitimate purpose, the probability of serious
armchair explanations of why (and how) the presence or fatal injury to themselves or others increases. When
(or absence) of guns will increase (or decrease) violent children have access to guns, the likelihood of an acci-
crime. It is tempting to categorically dismiss armchair dent increases still more.
arguments since they seem to be poor substitutes for The conclusion of the armchair argument is clear:
empirical evidence. However, it would be a mistake the more widely available guns are, the more people
to assume we could devise sound empirical studies or will be murdered, will commit suicide, and will die
understand their results without armchair arguments. of accidents. This is a plausible armchair prediction.
In a study to discover if widespread availability of guns Perhaps it is wrong. Maybe it is reasonable but overin-
increases the number of homicides or decreases crime, flated. Or it might be that the prediction is well founded
we need armchair arguments to tell us which vari- but that the widespread availability of guns is nonethe-
ables we should control. 9 Without them we would not less justified. What is apparent is that the claim that
know that we should control for the extent of poverty, widespread availability of guns increases the number
the incidence of drug use, increases in the number of of homicides, SUicides, and accidental deaths is highly
police officers, or the introduction of tougher (or more plausible. It is difficult to imagine that it is false.
lax) penalties. Without them we would not know that 2. Availability of guns prevents or stops crimes.-Gun
we do not need to control for the price of mayonnaise, advocates offer empirical evidence supporting the
the criminal's eye color, or who won the World Series. claim that guns prevent crime; their armchair argu-
Armchair arguments also take center stage in eval- ments undergird and explain those studies. The moti-
uating empirical studies, in criticizing experimental vating idea is simple: most criminals want to minimize
design, and in reinterpreting the reported findings. 10 their risks when committing a crime. If they know that
So before I discuss the empirical evidence, I summa- someone in a house is armed, they will be less likely to
rize some Significant armchair arguments employed enter that house, at least when the person is home and
by gun advocates and gun-control advocates. awake. Potential criminals are also less likely to assault or
1. More weapons, more violence.-Gun control sup- rob someone whom they believe is carrying a weapon.
porters offer empirical evidence of a positive correlation Finally, when criminals try to rob or assault an armed per-
between murder rates and the availability of guns (espe- son, the person is more likely to foil the crime. This, too,
cially handguns). Availability of guns is also positively is a plausible armchair prediction. Perhaps it is wrong.
correlated with suicide and accident rates. This empiri- Maybe the claim is overinflated. Perhaps guns have these
cal evidence is best understood against the background benefits, but there are other effects of owning guns-for
of the following armchair arguments. (1) Guns (and example, those mentioned above-which outweigh
especially handguns) are the easiest way to kill others them. What is apparent is that the claim that the wide-
or oneself. People can stand at a relatively safe distance spread availability of guns would prevent or thwart some
and pull the trigger. (2) When people are angry, they crimes is highly plaUSible. It is difficult to imagine that
can act in ways they would not act normally. They may it is false. Of Course we cannot stop with these armchair
strike out at others. If they had a gun close to hand, they arguments. We must assess the empirical evidence.
B. The Data regulate guns as tightly as most European countries, our

The empirical evidence is difficult to assess, and, to murder rates arguably would fall, but they would not
the extent that we can, it does not univocally support plummet immediately to European levels.
either side. You might not know this from listening We might settle the issue if we could conduct
to the public policy debate. Some gun-control advo- controlled experiments, randomly dividing our popu-
cates imply that strict gun laws would all but eliminate lation in half, giving half of them guns, removing all
murder, while some gun advocates imply that having the guns from the other half, and then monitoring the
a gun in every home would virtually end crime. Both murder rate. Of course, that would be morally unac-
claims are unfounded. Gun control will not virtually ceptable, politically unrealistic, and probably even sci-
eliminate murder. Arming all citizens will not virtu- entifically unachievable. Before we had enough time to
ally eliminate crime. About that we can be confident. exclude all possible intervening causes, sufficient time
The problem is determining the precise effects of per- might have elapsed so that new intervening causes
mitting or restricting guns. The available evidence is could have emerged. But we are not left in the dark. We
less than compelling But we must make a judgment have empirical evidence that helps adjudicate between
based on the best evidence we have. competing explanations of the correlation.
1. The connection between availability of guns and First, we have empirical evidence, bolstered by arm-
murder.-Perhaps the most well-established statistic is chair arguments, that guns are more lethal than other
this: the more widely available guns (especially hand- weapons. Some claim the ratio is 5:1; no estimates are
guns) are, the more people are murdered. The figures lower than 2: 1. 12 This partly explains the strong cor-
are duplicated time and again in country after coun- relation between guns and homicides. If people get
try. Here is the bottom line: "The correlation between angry the same number of times, those using the most
any gun-prevalence and the overall murder rate is .67, lethal weapons are more likely to kill their victims.
while it is .84 between handgun prevalence and overall Second, the nature of secondary gun markets
murder rate." 11 These figures are significant to the .01 helps explain how the widespread availability of guns
level; that is, the chance that these correlations could increases crime in general and homicides in particu-
occur merely by chance is less than one out of 100. This lar. Various opponents of gun control claim that "If we
correlation meets the statisticians' gold standard. outlaw guns, only outlaws will have guns." Armchair
But this does not resolve the issue, for it does not arguments suggest why this is a silly claim. Where,
establish what gun control advocates claim it shows, one might ask, do criminals get their guns? They often
namely, that gun control is an effective way of sub- steal them or buy them from those who purchased
stantially lessening the murder rate. First, a statisti- them legally. Even guns obtained from other criminals
cal correlation shows that two things are linked, but are usually traceable to people who purchased them
it does not tell us if the first caused the second, the legally. Empirical evidence supports this armchair
second caused the first, or if there is some third factor supposition. Most criminals report having stolen their
which caused both. Second, even if the items are caus- guns, received them from a friend or family member,
ally related, we do not know that changing the cause or purchased them from someone who had stolen it.
will straightforwardly change the effect since another At least half a million guns are stolen each year, and
factor might intervene to sustain the effect. these swell the numbers of guns available illegally. 13
Gun advocates proffer their own armchair explana- Not only does the primary (legal) market affect the
tion for the correlations: these correlations reflect the availability of guns on secondary markets, it also affects
character of the respective social and political systems. the price of guns on those markets, much "like the
The European countries where murder rates are lower analogous markets for motor vehicles or prescription
have more social solidarity and are more heterogeneous drugs. ,,14 As we restrict the availability of guns in the pri-
than the United States. Whether these social factors mary market, the supply of guns in the secondary mar-
explain all of the correlation is debatable, but I am con- kets decreases and their cost increases. IS This increase in
fident they explain some of it. Were the United States to cost will diminish teenagers' ability to obtain guns since
they are least able to afford hefty prices. Since teenagers those who have saved their lives by having a gun, can-
commit most deadly crimes, decreasing the availability not be cavalierly dismissed by gun control advocates.
of legal guns will thereby decrease the number of homi- However, these figures are inflated, likely dramati-
cides. The converse is true as well: having huge numbers cally so. First, Kleck's methodology is flawed. Surveys
of legally available guns increases the number of guns have an inherent tendency to overestimate rare events.
on secondary markets and typically lowers their price. Kleck made his estimates based on phone interviews
This makes it easier for prospective criminals, including with people in 5,000 dwelling units. One percent of those
teenagers, to obtain guns. units claimed to have used a gun defensively in the past
Third, having a gun around the house (or on year. Kleck inferred from these responses that there are
the person)-even for self-protection-apparently 2.5 million defensive handgun uses per year. However,
increases the chance that someone in the family since this inference is based on an affirmative answer by
will kill themselves with the gun or will be the vic- one person out of a hundred, that means that for every
tim of a homicide or an accident. One study found chance for a false negative (someone who falsely denies
that ufor every time a gun in the home was involved using a gun defensively) there are ninety-nine chances
in a self-protection homiCide, they noted 1.3 unin- for a false positive (someone who falsely claims to have
tentional deaths, 4.5 criminal homicides, and 37 used a gun defensively).2o The probability that this or
firearm suicides.,,16 This implies that for every case some other bias skews the findings is substantial.
where someone in a gun-owning household uses a gun Second, Kleck's findings are inconsistent with find-
to successfully stop a life-threatening attack, nearly ings by the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS),
forty-three people in similar households will die from which interviewed far more people and interviewed
a gunshot. Taken together the evidence does not them more regularly.21 Kleck's estimates even clash with
prove that widespread availability of guns increases the findings of the NCVS on the incidence and circum-
the number of homicides. However, that empirical stances of robberies (which seems less subject to report-
evidence, bolstered by earlier armchair arguments, ing bias). If Kleck's figures were correct, then uKleck asks
makes the claim highly plausible. us to believe that burglary victims in gun owning house-
2. The use of guns to prevent crime.-The biggest holds use their guns in self-defense more than 100% of
ugun" in the anti-gun-control lobby is the claim that the time, even though most were initially asleep. ,,22
having (and perhaps carrying) a gun prevents crime. As Finally, if there were 2.5 million defensive gun
I noted earlier, this is a sensible armchair claim. Some- uses each year, how many of those were necessary?
one contemplating a robbery is more likely to proceed Given the negative results of private gun ownership,
if they think they can succeed with little risk to them- gun advocates should show not only that guns deter
selves. So if a prospective robber believes the tenants are crime but that they are the best way of doing so. Some
at home and have a gun they know how to use, then he people plausibly claim that owning a dog is an effec-
likely will seek another target. Two surveys support this tive deterrent. If true, then a not insignificant percent-
belief. According to one survey, 4 percent of all Ameri- age of those who used a gun defensively could have
cans have used a handgun in the past five years to avert achieved the same results without the accompanying
a crime. Given those figures, researchers estimate that danger. In summary, there is no doubt that guns deter
there are at least 600,000 defensive uses of guns per year. some crime and stop the completion of other crimes,
Kleck uses these results, in conjunction with another just not in the numbers that Kleck claims.
survey, to claim that the number might be as high as John Lott supplements Kleck's argument by claim-
2.S million. 17 Given the number of violent crimes using ing that the widespread use of concealed weapons
guns, "the best evidence indicates that guns are used would decrease the annual number of homicides by
about as often for defensive purposes as for criminal 1,400; rapes by 4,200; aggravated assaults by 60,000; and
purposes.,,18 If true, that is a powerful reason to resist robberies by 12,000. 23 If true, and if there were no coun-
attempts to limit availability of guns. 19 Such statistics, tervailing costs, this would be a powerful reason not
particularly when bolstered by moving anecdotes of only to permit guns but to encourage people to have and
• _ •• I IVi';;~
carry them. However, Lott's conclusions have also come it is not only that fewer guns would directly cause
under severe criticism: "The central problem is that crime some decline in violent crimes-which it should. It is
moves in waves, yet Lott's analysis does not include vari- also likely to reshape the cultural values which, along
ables that can explain these cycles. For example, he used with the ready availability of deadly weapons, led to
no variables on gangs, on drug consumption, or commu- such an extraordinarily high murder rate in America.
nity policing. As a result, many of Lott's findings make However, the statistical evidence that guns prevent
no sense. He finds for instance, that both increasing the or thwart crimes is suggestive and cannot be ignored
rate of unemployment and reducing income reduces the despite its identified weaknesses. In summary, the over-
rate of violent crimes.,,24 Perhaps the most compelling all statistical evidence tilts in favor of gun control advo-
critique comes from Jens Ludwig, who compares the rate cates, although the evidence is disputable. But we should
of violent crime toward youths and adults in states that not expect nor do we need indisputable evidence. We
passed shall-issue carrying permits. Most of these states can act on the best evidence we have while being open
issue gun permits only to people over twenty-one. Arm- to new evidence. If widespread availability of guns
chair considerations predict that younger people, who were responsible for even one-fourth of the increase
cannot legally carry, will not receive the full benefits in the number of murders, that would be a Significant
from the purported deterrent effect of shall-issue laws. harm that the state should prevent if it could do so in a
Thus, those under twenty-one years of age are a natural relatively unintrusive and morally acceptable way.
control group to track general swings in crime. Once we There is little doubt that we could do that, at least
include this factor, we find that shall-issue laws lead to to some degree. If nothing else, we could control some
higher-not lower-homicide and robbery rates. 25 types of guns and ammunition. To take one obvious
I also have an overarching worry about Lott's example, teflon-coated bullets are designed to pierce
conclusions. The one correlation in the gun control protective vests. People do not use these bullets to
debate that seemingly is beyond dispute is the high pierce the vests on a deer or a squirrel, on a target or
correlation between the presence of guns-especially a clay pigeon. They use them to pierce the vests on
handguns-and homicide rates. Gun advocates offer people, usually law-enforcement officers. This ammu-
explanations for the correlation, but no one I have nition has no purpose except to cause harm. Hence, we
seen seriously challenges it. I find it difficult to square are justified in abolishing teflon bullets and in estab-
this correlation with Kleck's and Lott's claims that hav- lishing severe criminal penalties for those possessing
ing more guns-and toting them-will lower crime. them. This would not save large numbers of lives. But,
assuming the enforcement of this ban is not impracti-
C. An Overall Assessment of the Empirical Evidence
cal, then, if it saved even a few lives, that would be a
The strong correlation between the presence of guns compelling reason to outlaw such bullets.
and a higher murder rate is compelling. Since the cor- Some guns, however, have a much wider use, even
relation is statistically significant to a .01 level, it is dif- if they occasionally are used for ill. People have seem-
ficult to believe that limiting private gun ownership ingly legitimate uses for shotguns and single-shot rifles.
will not have a noticeable effect on the numbers of Consequently, barring strong evidence to the contrary,
murders. Gun advocates disagree: they claim that cul- we should not abolish them. We should, however, study
tural factors explain the correlation. Although I think their contributory role in causing harm and explore ways
they are partly correct, they draw the wrong inference. we might reduce this harm in a relatively unintrusive way.
For one crucial difference between European and The central debate concerns handguns. The evidence
American cultures is the widespread presence of guns. we have shows that handguns are disproportionately
Each culture is the way it is, at least in part, because of used in homicides and in robberies. Although "there are
the role guns (or their absence) played in its creation approximately three times as many long guns as hand-
and maintenance. Therefore, curtailing the private guns in the US, more than 80 percent of gun homicides
possession of guns might well change the American and 90 percent of gun robberies involve handguns. ,,26
culture so that it would be less violent. Consequently, The experience in Canada suggests that criminals will
620 () PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
not switch to long guns if handguns are unavailable. kills someone while robbing them, then Jones will
Given the special role handguns play in causing harm, owe the victim compensatory damages. And if Jones
we have compelling reasons to extensively control, or were negligent in the storing of the gun, he could be
perhaps even abolish, handguns. But policy consider- subject to punitive damages as well. Perhaps if he were
ations, mentioned earlier, should give us pause. grossly negligent in storing the gun (he left it lying in
his front yard, next to a school playground), we might
v. A THIRD WAY even bring criminal charges against him.
In the past we not only assumed that we must either This procedure is justified since guns are inher-
support or oppose gun control, we assumed that the ently dangerous, and it is only reasonable to expect
only way to control guns is to legally proscribe access people to take responsibility for their risky actions.
to them. We should consider other options. Although The benefits are notable: many people would be disin-
I find the idea of a world without handguns immensely clined to own guns, while those owning guns would
appealing, there are reasons to seek alternatives, espe- likely take greater care in storing, handling, and using
cially in countries like the United States with a deeply them. This arguably could achieve the central aims of
entrenched gun culture. In the present political cli- gun control without direct government intervention.
mate, the abolition or serious control of guns in the Doubtless that means that some people will be forced
United States is unlikely to work and unlikely to hap- to pay for the misdeeds or mistakes of others in ways
pen. There are far too many people who desperately we might dislike. However, that is a more attractive
want guns. There are far too many people who own policy than continuing the current scheme in which
guns. Any attempt to disarm the society would be beset guns are easily obtained in the United States or com-
with problems like those that plagued Prohibition. We pletely denying individuals' interest in owning guns.
have other possibilities. To make this option more palatable, we could let
We could employ elements of a policy that we use gun owners purchase liability insurance to cover poten-
to control another inherently dangerous object: dyna- tial losses. We might even require them to purchase
mite. Dynamite has many beneficial uses. That is why insurance. After all, most states require drivers to have
we permit people to own it under specifiable condi- automobile insurance. This insurance-based system of
tions, for example, to build a road. But it is also inher- strict liability would make people take more care with
ently dangerous. That is why we heavily restrict its any guns they own while providing financial remuner-
purchase, storage, and use. I cannot own dynamite for ation to those harmed by the use of those guns.
recreation (lUke the flash), for hunting (I am a lousy Perhaps this will not work. Other proposals might
shot), or for protection (I would not hear an intruder). work better. What seems clear to me is that we need to
Owning dynamite is rarely a significant interest and do something: we cannot continue with the status quo.
never a fundamental one. More important to the pres-
NOTES
ent point, even when we do permit people to own
1. Todd C. Hughes and Lester H. Hunt, "The Liberal Basis of
dynamite, we subject them to strict legal liability. The
the Right to Bear Arms," Public Affairs Quarterly (in press).
owner is finanCially liable for any harm caused by his
dynamite, even if he was not negligent. 2. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth,
1977).
I propose we make handgun owners (and perhaps
ultimately all gun owners) strictly liable for harm 3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978).
caused by the use of their guns. If Jones's child takes 4. Samual C. Wheeler, Jr., "Self-Defense: Rights and Coerced
his gun and kills someone while committing a crime, Risk Acceptance," Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (1997): 431-43.
then Jones will be financially responsible to those 5. Ibid., pp. 433-38.
harmed. If jones's child accidentally kills a neigh- 6. Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall, and Treavor Wil-
bor's child, Jones will be financially responsible to liams, A History ofTecl1l1ology, 7 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University
the child's family. If someone steals Jones's gun and Press, 1956), vol. 2, p. 367.
7. David Hemenway, "Guns, Public Health, and Public Safety," 13. Cook, Mollinoni, and Cole, p. 81.
in Guns and the Constitution, ed. Dennis A. Henigan, E. Bruce
14. Ibid., p. 71.
Nicholson, and David Hemenway (Northampton, Mass.: Ale-
theia Press, 1995), pp. 49-82, p. 52. 15. Ibid., p. 73.
8. Hughes and Hunt. 16. Reiss and Roth, eds., p. 267.
9. John R. Lott, More GullS, Less Crime: Understanding Crime 17. Gary Kleck, Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America (New
and Gun-Control Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1991), pp. 105-6.
1998), pp. 21-24. 18. Ibid., p. 107.
10. Dan Black and Daniel Nagin, "Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter 19. Gary Kleck, Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control (New
Violent Crime?" Journal ofLegal Studies 27 (1998): 209-20; Philip York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997).
J. Cook, Stephanie Mollinoni, and Thomas B. Cole, "Regulating 20. David Hemenway, "Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun
Gun Markets," Journal ofCrimillal Law and Criminology 86 (1995): Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates," Journal of
59-92; Phillip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and David Hemenway, "The Criminal Law and Criminology 87 (1997): 1430-45.
Gun Debate's New Mythical Number: How Many Defensive Uses
21. U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the
Per Year?" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16 (1997):
United States, 1993: A National Crime Victimization Survey
463-69; David Hemenway, "The Myth of Millions of Annual
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).
Self-Defense Gun Uses: A Case Study of Survey Overestimates of
Rare Events," Chance 10 (1997): 6-10, uReview of More Guns, Less 22. Hemenway, "Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use:
Crime," New England Journal of Medidne 339 (1998): 2029-30; An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates," p. 1442.
Lott; Wheeler. 23. Lott, p. 54.
11. Gregg Lee Carter, The GUll Control Movement (New York: 24. Hemenway, "Review of More Guns, Less Crime," p. 2029.
Twayne Publishers, 1997), p. 3. 25.Jens Ludwig, "Concealed Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent
12. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Jeffrey A. Roth, eds., Understanding Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data," International Review
and Preventing Violence (Washington, D.C.: National Academy ofLaw and Economics 18 (1998): 239-54.
Press, 1993), p. 260. 26. Hemenway, "Guns, Public Health, and Public Safety," p. 60.
Political Philosophy and the Gun Control Debate:

What Would Bentham, Mill, and Nozick Have to Say?
STACEY NGUYEN
Last Monday, in a press release that marked the one- checks and keeping dangerous firearms out of the
year anniversary of the shooting at Aurora, House wrong hands." After this press release, several parties
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D) said: "We must proceeded to criticize Pelosi's comments.
uphold our oath to 'protect and defend' the Consti- For example, CNS News pointed out that Pelosi's
tution and all Americans by expanding background oath does not include the phrase "to protect and defend
the Constitution," which is found in the President's
oath. Part of her oath reads: "I do solemnly swear that I
Stacey Nguyen, "Political Philosophy and the Gun Con-
will support and defend the Constitution of the United
trol Debate: What Would Bentham, Mills, and Nozick Have
to Say?" Berkele)' Political R£'view, August 5, 2013, https:/Ibpr States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."
.berkeley.edu/2013/08/0S/political-philosophy-and-the-gun Moreover, Erich Pratt, director of communica-
-control-debatewhat-would-bentham-mills-and-nozick-have tions for Gun Owners of America, claimed that the
-to-say/. Reprinted with permiSSion. American constitution makes no allowances for gun
control. "If Pelosi really wants to apply the lessons the "living document" approach finds that the Second
from Aurora, Colorado in order to save lives," Pratt Amendment was written in a different context. Firstly,
said, "she will work to repeal gun laws that discourage people still used guns to hunt for food and ward off fre-
good people from carrying firearms." quent foreign invasions two hundred years ago. Back
These trivial arguments lead one to wonder how use- then, guns were also used to suppress slave rebellions
ful rhetorical and philosophical approaches are for public and fight Native Americans. This is not to say that gun
policy-or in this case, toothless nitpicking. While gun rights advocates are racists, but rather that the Founders'
rights advocates claim that we just need to better enforce intents were geared towards state protection, not indi-
current laws, it is the loopholes and weak policies, cou- vidual rights. Moreover, major advances in gun technol-
pled with gun lobbying, that make it more difficult to do ogy mean that semi-automatic weapons with enhanced
so and much easier to illegally acquire guns. In April, new magazine capacities are more lethal. Today' semi-auto-
gun measures considered by the Senate failed miserably, matic weapons, like the Colt AR-lS, resemble military-
with only two out of nine amendments passing. Some of style firearms and are a far cry from colonial-era muskets
the measures that failed included comprehensive back- and rifles. Advanced technology calls for advanced safety
ground checks, bans and limits on assault weapons, and precautions. In short, gun poliCies should not reflect a
crackdown strategies on gun trafficking. With recent blind adherence to the Constitution, but instead grow
mass shootings and the tens of thousands of gun-related with human and technological advancements.
deaths that occur each year in the United States, the lack Now, I would like to argue for the necessity for gun
of gun regulation is absolutely unacceptable. legislation on the grounds of SOCial welfare and individ-
But while I can't argue against policy being more ualliberty, using the two political philosophies of utili-
tangible than philosophizing, I believe that there is tarianism and possessive libertarianism. Ultimately,
value in understanding the micro-foundations of legal there's no correct way to approach this complex and
policies. Through understanding and applying differ- contentious issue, but exploring different philosophi-
ent philosophical approaches to justice, we can expand cal approaches invites greater insight. I don't claim to
our appreciation for the significance and complexity of have a complete analysis or even the solutions to the
political issues. And more importantly, we can learn to prOblem-at most, just some food for thought.
rigorously question our fundamental beliefs and stray
a bit further from the traditional left-right dichotomy.
First, let's talk about the contentious document BENTHAMITE AND MILLIAN UTILITARIANISM
itself-the one and only, Second Amendment. Many Many arguments for gun control are grounded in
politicians and scholars have argued over the philoso- utilitarian thought. jeremy Bentham, the founder
phy of the Second Amendment, imposing a historical of modern utilitarian thought, held that the moral-
analysis of the Constitution and regarding it as either an ity of an action was determined by its contribution
original, inviolable piece or a living document. In 2008, to overall happiness-an act should be done if it pro-
the Supreme Court decided in District of Columbia vs. duces the greatest amount of happiness over unhap-
Heller that the Second Amendment provides an indi- piness. Articulated by j. S. Mill, the Harm Principle,
vidual right to bear arms independent of any collective one of the tenets of modern utilitarianism, states that
right. So while people cannot have tanks or missiles, they individuals are free to do as they please unless their
have an individual right to handguns, because as justice actions harm other individuals. Applying the Harm
Scalia puts it, "handguns are the most popular weapon Principle, the general stance is that guns produce
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a more harm than happiness or social utility. First,
complete prohibition of their use is invalid." and foremost, guns cost lives. Two out of three homi-
The originalist argument is self-explanatory-the cides, half of all suicides, and a third of all robberies
Constitution was set in stone when it was ratified in 1787 are committed with guns. In the United States, the
and it is not an evolving document. On the other hand, total number of handgun deaths from 1980 to 2006
CHAPTER 17: DRUGS. GUNS, AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 0 623
exceeds 32,000 per year, according to UPenn's Health But for the same reasons, libertarian philoso-
System. Additionally, the fiscal costs of gun inju- phy can be used to support the necessity for gun
ries are disadvantageous in the utilitarian calculus. control. Firstly, the idea that individuals should be
According to the CDC, firearm related deaths cost held accountable for their actions complements
the United States health care system $37 billion, and libertarian philosophy. As Dr. Jack Russell, profes-
nonfatal gunshot wounds cost another $3.7 billion sor of philosophy at the University of North Dakota
in 2005 alone. This means that the taxpayer money School of Law, puts it: "Nothing is more consistent
that has gone toward healthcare for firearm injuries with the libertarian point of view than registering
could have been invested in more socially beneficial guns and including serial numbers on every bullet. It
causes, such as education and mental health care. is only when a person's property is traceable, when
One might say that having less gun regulation is we can figure out who shot whom, that we can live
more utilitarian, because having access to guns may in a libertarian world." Members of the NRA them-
save lives. The research reflects otherwise. Firstly, the selves care about the responsibility that comes with
Harvard Injury Control Research Center (HICRC) gun ownerShip-roughly 75% of the NRA believes
showed that across states and high-income nations, in background checks, that concealed carry permits
more guns mean more homicides. Secondly, research shouldn't be granted to individuals with violent
shows that guns are used more often for intimida- misdemeanors or assaults under their belts, that per-
tion than as weapons of self-defense. For example, a mits should only be granted to those who have gone
survey found that nearly 1% of Americans reported through gun safety training, and that being arrested
using guns to defend themselves or their property for domestic violence disqualifies individuals from
while 500/0 used guns in an aggressive manner, such gun ownership. Moreover, government interference
as in escalating an argument. Additionally, another with gun acquisition reflects not a hoarding of power,
survey found that if an assault victim is carrying a but rather a responsibility for protecting its citizens'
gun, they are 4.5 times more likely to be shot and negative rights. All in all, it appears that stronger gun
4.2 times more likely to be killed. The self-defense regulation is consistent with libertarian philosophy.
argument may ostensibly appear utilitarian, but it is Utilitarianism and possessive libertarianism are two
not backed up by the evidence at hand. fundamental philosophies of justice, but neither is right
nor wrong. This particular interpretation of both theo-
ries reflects a strong need for more rigorous gun policies
POSSESSIVE LIBERTARIANISM and constructive conversations on the basis of individ-
In contrast to utilitarianism, possessive libertarian- ual responsibility and greater social concerns. Undoubt-
ism is the main philosophical approach for reducing edly, there remain many more philosophical questions
gun regulation. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, politi- to ponder. Should there be borders for gun control? Is
cal philosopher Robert Nozick fleshed out the base- bearing arms even a fundamental human right like the
line for modern American libertarian thought. A freedom of speech or the right to assembly?
proponent of the inviolability of individuals, Nozick Ultimately, the problem is not whether the individ-
supported a minimal state that would only protect ual is an end or a means to an end; the problem is simply
negative rights like individuals' right to privacy gun violence, which hurts both society and the individ-
and right to not be killed, but not promote positive ual. The solution is not simple, and will also have to take
rights such as social welfare programs or education. into consideration structural issues of poverty, educa-
A Nozickian thinker would supposedly be opposed to tion, and health care. But the solution, in any case, will
gun control because of choice-based liberty and indi- have to start with stronger federal gun policies and more
vidual autonomy. effective leadership from our elected representatives.
CHAPTER 18
Capital Punishment
Few moral issues provoke the kind of fiery emo- Adolf Eichmann (who facilitated the murder of
tions and fervent debate that capital punishment millions during the Holocaust). Abolitionists, on
does. In some circles, the very mention of the the other hand, tell of the horrors that often accom-
words death penalty is enough to set off a cross fire pany the death penalty: innocent people who are
of opinions from all sides of the subject-as well wrongly convicted and executed, executions that
as an onslaught of zealotry and moral confusion. go wrong and cause excruciating pain to those
At the center of all the commotion is a clash of executed, and the suspiciously high percentage of
fundamental moral values, a conflict heightened poor and minority people who are executed in the
by the realization that weighing in the balance United States. Commonplace in the capital punish-
is, ultimately and tragically, the life or death of a ment debate, such facts may move us to anger, pity,
human being. disgust, or sadness, and they may inform our think-
In this controversy, the abolitionists (those ing in important ways. But we should not allow our
who wish to abolish capital punishment) most emotional reaction to them to interfere with the
often appeal to basic moral principles such as "Do vital task that we begin in this chapter-the care-
not kill," "Honor the sanctity of life," or "Respect ful evaluation of arguments for and against capital
human dignity." The retentionists (those who punishment.
wish to retain the death penalty) are likely to appeal
to other principles: "Punish the guilty," "Give mur- ISSUE FilE: BACI<GROUND
derers the punishment they deserve," "A life for a
life," or "Deter the ultimate crime (murder) with In the legal sense, punishment is the deliberate
the ultimate punishment." On the most general and authorized causing of pain or harm to some-
and fundamental of these principles-not kill- one thought to have broken a law. It is a legal
ing, respecting human dignity, and punishing the sanction imposed by society on offenders for vio-
guilty-almost all parties to the dispute agree. But lating society's official norms. The justification
retentionists and abolitionists are usually at odds for punishment-the reason why SOciety uses it-
over how these principles should be interpreted. generally takes one of two forms. As we will see later,
Retentionists like to remind us of murderers many believe that the sole reason we should pun-
whose crimes are so horrific that the death penalty ish the wrongdoer is because he morally deserves
may seem the only fitting punishment. Thus they punishment. His desert is the only justification
bring up such moral monsters as Timothy McVeigh required, and meting out punishment to those who
(who used a bomb to kill 168 men, women, and deserve it is morally obligatory and a morally good
children), Ted Bundy (who murdered, by his own thing. Others believe that the only proper justifica-
count, more than 100 women), John Wayne Gacy tion is the good consequences for society that the
(who raped and murdered 33 boys and men), and punishment of offenders will bring-most notably,
624
CHAPTER 18: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 0 625
the prevention of future crimes and the mainte- the number of executions in 2004 dropping to
nance of an orderly society. 59, in 2013 to 39, and in 2019 to 30. The gradual
Capital punishment is punishment by decrease in executions has coincided with signifi-
execution of someone officially judged to have cant public support for the death penalty for con-
committed a serious, or capital, crime. For thou- victed murderers. Gallup polls show that between
sands of years, this extreme sanction has been 1994 and 2014, the percentage of American adults
used countless times in the Western world for a in favor of capital punishment for murder has fluc-
variety of offenses-rape, murder, horse theft, tuated annually but always stayed within the 60 to
kidnapping, treason, sodomy, spying, blasphemy, 80 percent range. 3 In a 2019 Gallup poll, a record
witchcraft, and many others. A wide assortment 60 percent of Americans said life without possibil-
of execution methods have also been employed, ity of parole was a "better penalty for murder" than
ranging from the ancient and medieval (cruci- the death penalty. 4
fixion, drawing and quartering, burning alive, Most other countries have officially abolished
impalement, etc.) to the handful of standard tech- the death penalty or simply stopped using it. One
niques of the past two centuries (hanging, firing hundred six nations-including Canada, Mexico,
squad, lethal gas, electrocution, and lethal injec- and all the western European countries-are in this
tion). In twenty-first century America, most death category. In 2019, twenty countries carried out exe-
penalty states (twenty-eight in 2019) reserve capi- cutions. Most executions took place in China, Iran,
tal punishment for the crime of murder, and lethal Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. China is thought to
injection is authorized in all of them. Twenty-one be the world's leading executioner, but 86 percent
states authorize other modes of execution, includ- of executions took place in the other four leading
ing electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, and firing countries. s
squad. 1 The use of capital punishment in the United
In 2019, there were 2,656 prisoners on death States has been shaped by several landmark
row in the United States, and states conducted Supreme Court decisions. In 1972, in Furman v.
fewer than thirty executions and imposed fewer Georgia, the court ruled that capital punishment
than fifty new death sentences for the fifth year in as it was then being applied in certain states was
a row. Forty-two percent of death row inmates were unconstitutional. The ruling put a halt to execu-
White, 42 percent were Black, and 13 percent were tions across the country. Yet the court did not
Latino. Texas executed nine inmates, more than declare that the death penalty itself was unconsti-
any other state; Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee tutional. The majority on the court thought that
executed three each; Florida executed two; and its usual administration-which allowed juries to
Missouri and South Dakota executed one each. The impose the death penalty arbitrarily without any
number of documented death row exonerations legal guidance-constituted "cruel and unusual
increased to 167 since 1973. 2 punishment," a violation of the Eighth Amend-
The trend in executions in the United States ment of the Constitution.
has varied over the past few decades. The num- Many states then promptly rewrote their death
ber of executions carried out each year between penalty statutes to try to minimize administrative
the mid-1930s and the 1970s gradually declined, arbitrariness. A few states passed laws decreeing
from a high of 200 down to 0 in 1976. But from that the death penalty would be mandatory for
1977 to 1999, the annual toll ramped up again, particular capital crimes. But in Woodson v. North
from 1 in 1977 to 98 in 1999. Since this high Carolina (1976), the Supreme Court declared man-
pOint, another downward trend has set in, with datory death sentences unconstitutional. Some
states instituted sentencing guidelines to provide drunk. Usually, only first-degree murder makes a
standards for the judge or jury deliberating about defendant eligible for the death penalty.
whether to impose the death penalty. In Gregg v.
Georgia (1976), the court ruled that such death
MORAL THEORIES
penalty laws prescribing proper guidelines were
constitutional, at least in cases of murder. This Both retentionists and abolitionists appeal to con-
ruling in effect reinstated capital punishment in sequentialist and nonconsequentialist moral theo-
the country, and executions resumed in the fol- ries. Retentionist arguments are often thoroughly
lowing year. Since 1976, few state statutes have utilitarian, contending that use of capital punish-
allowed the death penalty for anything but homi- ment can create a favorable balance of happiness
cide cases. over unhappiness for society. One common argu-
More recently the court has banned the use of ment is that the death penalty achieves such util-
the death penalty for particular kinds of offend- ity through prevention-by preventing the criminal
ers. In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the court held from striking again. Better than any other form
that the execution of mentally disabled persons of punishment, the retentionist says, the death
is cruel and unusual punishment and is therefore penalty protects society from repeat criminals,
unconstitutional. In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the those violent and dangerous offenders who can-
court held that executing those who were under not be reformed. The retentionist claims that life in
the age of eighteen when they committed their prison without parOle-the usual alternative to the
crimes is also a violation of Eighth Amendment death penalty-is an inadequate substitute. Vio-
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. lent lifers can kill other inmates and prison guards,
Before Roper, seven states had no minimum age or they can escape to terrorize society again. By also
for execution, and fifteen states had set the mini- appealing to utility, the abolitionist may object to
mum at between fourteen and seventeen years this line of argument by insisting that the reten-
old. In Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), the court ruled tionist produce empirical evidence showing that
a Louisiana statute unconstitutional. The law per- executing violent criminals does indeed protect
mitted the death penalty for child rape in cases in society better than the use of life sentences. After
which the child did not die. all, such premises about deterrence are empirical
An important tradition in law that bears on claims, and empirical claims reqUire supporting
capital punishment is the distinction between types evidence.
of punishable killing: namely, between first-degree A related retentionist argument asserts that the
murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. death penalty, more than any other form of pun-
Statutes vary by jurisdiction, but generally first- ishment (including life in prison), can achieve great
degree murder is killing (1) with premeditation; overall utility through deterrence-the dissuading of
(2) while performing a major crime (felony) such as pOSSible offenders from committing capital crimes.
armed robbery, kidnapping, or rape; or (3) involv- This utilitarian argument is thought by many to be
ing particular egregious circumstances such as the the retentionists' strongest. The utilitarian philoso-
deaths of several people or of a child or police offi- pher John Stuart Mill claims that for a particular
cer. Second-degree murder is killing without pre- kind of would-be criminal, capital punishment is
meditation but with some degree of intent ("malice the most effective deterrent of all:
aforethought"). Manslaughter is killing without But the influence of punishment is not to be esti-
premeditation or intent, as when one person kills mated by its effect on hardened criminals. Those
another in "the heat of passion" or by driving whose habitual way of life keeps them, so to speak,
at all times within sight of the gallows, do grow to influence, availability of lethal weapons, incidence
care less about it; as, to compare good things with of illegal drug use, history of violence, income level,
bad, an old soldier is not much affected by the
and on and on. No two jurisdictions are exactly
chance of dying in battle. I can afford to admit all
that is often said about the indifference of the pro- alike, and many differences (both known and
fessional criminals to the gallows. Though of that unknown) could contribute to the rise or fall of
indifference one-third is probably bravado and serious crime rates.
another third confidence that they shall have the Despite these research problems, many reten-
luck to escape, it is quite probable that the remain- tionists still consider the case for deterrence strong.
ing third is real. But the efficacy of a punishment They argue that even if science does not yet offer
which acts principally through the imagination, is
unequivocal support for the death penalty's power
chiefly to be measured by the impression it makes
on those who are still innocent; by the horror to deter capital crimes, common sense does. The
with which it surrounds the first promptings of philosopher Louis Pojman takes this tack. He con-
guilt; the restraining influence it exercises over tends that it is obvious that most people want to
the beginning of the thought which, if indulged, avoid jail and that long sentences will deter most
would become a temptation; the check which potential criminals better than short ones-and
it exerts over the graded declension towards the that there are good reasons to believe that the death
state-never suddenly attained-in which crime
penalty deters better still. One reason, he says, is
no longer revolts, and punishment no longer
terrifies. 6 that a large proportion of crimes are committed
by Criminals who weigh the risks and benefits of
Like the prevention appeal, the deterrence argu- their Criminal activity and become more attracted
ment requires supporting evidence-specifically, to particular crimes the milder the punishments
evidence showing that the execution of criminals are. And there are good indications that the death
really does deter serious criminal behavior better penalty would exert maximum deterrence in these
than lesser punishments such as imprisonment. cases: "The fact that those who are condemned to
Abolitionists, however, are quick to question any death do everything in their power to get their sen-
such evidence. In fact, even many retentionists tences postponed or reduced to long-term prison
agree that the relevant scientific studies on the sentences, in the way lifers do not, shows that they
deterrence question are conflicting or otherwise fear death more than life in prison.,,7
inconclusive. The abolitionist can offer a couple of responses
The central difficulty in conducting these studies to this argument from common sense. First, even
is the number of variables that must be controlled if the death penalty is a more severe punishment
to get reliable results. A social scientist, for example, than life in prison, it does not follow that the death
could select two very similar jurisdictions, one with penalty deters murderers better. The prospect of
the death penalty and one without, and compare the life in prison may very well deter future murderers
murder rates in each. Presumably, if capital punish- just as effectively as the death penalty can. Second,
ment deters murderers, then the jurisdiction using it is possible that the threat of capital punishment
the death penalty should have a lower murder rate motivates potential killers not to avoid killing but
than the jurisdiction without it. But it is virtually to try harder not to get caught.
impossible to rule out the influence of extraneous Recognizing the uncertainties in trying to assess
factors on the study results. Besides being influenced levels of deterrence, some retentionists argue that
by the penal system, murder rates may be affected despite the unknowns, our wisest and most morally
by many variables-unemployment, cultural con- responsible move is to bet that capital punishment
ventions, moral beliefs, political climate, media does deter murderers. The reasoning that leads to
--~
v'''~
, l" CRITICAL THOUGHT: The Morality of Botched Executions
In recent years, controversy has surrounded execu- gurney and moaned. He died 43 minutes after
tions by lethal injection because in a disconcerting the process began.
number of cases, the executions have gone horri- Executions have been on hold in Ohio since
bly wrong. In 2014, for example, in at least three a troubling 26-minute execution in 2014 during
which a prisoner getting a first-ever two-drug
executions, instead of dying within ten or fifteen
combo repeatedly gasped and snorted. In Arizona,
minutes, the prisoners writhed or gasped for much
officials were cleared of any wrongdoing in an
longer, up to nearly two hours in one instance.
execution that lasted nearly two hours, but they
Consider this more recent report on the problem: nevertheless changed the drugs they use to put
WASHINGTON-A deeply divided u.s. Supreme inmates to death. *
Court upheld the use of a controversial drug in
Do you think botched executions like these con-
lethal-injection executions Monday, even as two
stitute "cruel and unusual punishment" that is
dissenting justices said for the first time they
prohibited by the Constitution? Are executions
think it's "highly likely" the death penalty itself is
unconstitutional. morally permissible (or impermissible) regardless
The justices voted 5-4 in a case from the state of of their cruelty? Why or why not? Do you believe
Oklahoma that the sedative midazolam can be used botched executions offer good reasons to do away
in executions without violating a constitutional pro- with the death penalty? Or do they merely suggest
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment. there should be a ban on lethal injections but not
The drug that was used in executions in Ari- other forms of execution? Why or why not?
zona, Ohio and Oklahoma in 2014 took longer
than usual and raised concerns that it did not per- *Mark Sherman, "u.s. Court Oks Use of Drug Implicated
form its intended task of putting inmates into a in Botched Executions," Associated Press, June 29,2015,
coma-like sleep. http://globalnews.ca/news/2081474/u-s-court-oks-use-
In Oklahoma, state officials tried to halt the of-drug-implicated-in-botched-executionsl (August 22,
lethal injection after the inmate writhed on the 2015). © The Associated Press. Reprinted by permission.
this conclusion is essentially a utilitarian calcula- penalty. "I believe we have no right to risk addi-
tion. The philosopher Ernest van den Haag was the tional future victims of murder for the sake of spar-
first to articulate this argument. The choice we are ing convicted murderers," van den Haag asserts,
faced with, he says, is either to use the death pen- "on the contrary, our moral obligation is to risk the
alty or not to use it-and we must choose while not possible ineffectiveness of executions.,,8
knowing for sure whether it is a superior deterrent. A common abolitionist reply to this argument
If we use the penalty, we risk killing convicted mur- is that the utilitarian calculation is incomplete. The
derers (and saving innocent lives). If we abolish the assessment of net happiness, says the abolitionist,
penalty, we risk bringing about the deaths of inno- fails to take into account the possibility that the
cent victims (and saving the lives of murderers). If death penalty could encourage violent crime instead
we must risk something, he says, it is better to risk of just deterring it. How? Some argue that vio-
the lives of convicted murderers than those of inno- lent criminals who know they are likely to get the
cent people. Thus, our best bet is to retain the death death penalty may commit murder to avoid being
captured. In addition, some abolitionists maintain dignity of human life. For them, regardless of its
that capital punishment has a brutalizing effect on social utility, the death penalty is wrong because
society-it makes killing human beings seem more it violates these principles. For example, they may
morally and psychologically acceptable. If so, exe- argue that everyone has a right to life (a basic moral
cuting people could cause more harm than good principle), even hardened criminals, and that the
and be a very poor bet for society. death penalty is a violation of this right-therefore,
On utilitarian grounds, abolitionists can attack executing criminals is wrong. To this argument,
capital punishment directly (as opposed to simply retentionists usually reply along these lines: people
countering retentionist arguments). In perhaps the do indeed have a right to life, but this right is not
most common of such approaches, the abolitionist absolute. That is, a person's right to life can some-
argues that more net happiness is created in soci- times be overridden for good reasons. For example,
ety by sentencing murderers to life in prison with- if your life is being threatened, it is morally permiS-
out parole than by executing them. Life sentences sible to kill an attacker in self-defense. So the right to
promote the welfare of society by preventing mur- life does not hold in every situation no matter what.
derers from killing again-and they do so without It may be morally permissible, then, to sometimes
generating the disadvantages and pain inherent in set this right aside.
a system of capital punishment. To make their case, abolitionists often appeal to
Another utilitarian argument against the death notions of fairness or justice. One prevalent argu-
penalty is that this form of punishment is simply ment is based on the assertion that our penal system
too costly: is inherently unjust, sometimes executing innocent
The death penalty is much more expensive than people (numerous cases have come to light in which
its closest alternative-life imprisonment with no people who had been executed or who were on
parole. Capital trials are longer and more expen- death row were later found to be innocent). Because
sive at every step than other murder trials. Pre- the death penalty is irrevocable-that is, there is no
trial motions, expert witness investigations, jury way to "undo" an execution or to compensate the
selection, and the necessity for two trials-one on executed-the execution of the innocent is an espe-
guilt and one on sentencing-make capital cases
cially egregious miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we
extremely costly, even before the appeals process
begins. Guilty pleas are almost unheard of when the should get rid of the death penalty, since abolition
punishment is death. In addition, many of these tri- is the only way to avoid such tragedies. Retention-
als result in a life sentence rather than the death pen- ists are generally unmoved by this argument, offer-
alty, so the state pays the cost of life imprisonment ing counterarguments like this one:
9
on top of the expensive trial.
Miscarriages of justice result in innocent people
Retentionists often respond to this argument by being sentenced to death and executed, even in
questioning whether the costs have been calculated criminal-law systems in which greatest care is
accurately and fairly. Perhaps more often, they offer taken to ensure that it never comes to that. But
a nonconsequentialist reply: if the death penalty this does not stem from the intrinsic nature of the
is a just punishment, then the costs involved are institution of capital punishment; it results from
irrelevant. deficiencies, limitations, and imperfections of the
criminal law procedures in which this punishment
In the death penalty debate, appeals to noncon-
is meted out. Errors of justice do not demonstrate
sequentialist theories are common on both sides the need to do away with capital punishment; they
of the issue. Abolitionists devise arguments against Simply make it incumbent on us to do everything
capital punishment using what they take to be fun- possible to improve even further procedures of
damental moral principles regarding the value or meting it out. 10
The main nonconsequentialist argument innocent person, says the retributivist, is so hei-
for the death penalty is based on the theory of nous a crime, such an intolerable evil, that it merits
punishment known as retributivism-the view the ultimate punishment-the death of the mur-
that offenders deserve to be punished, or "paid derer. So when the killer takes a life, she must forfeit
back," for their crimes and to be punished in pro- her own. As Kant says,
portion to the severity of their offenses. Retribu-
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with
tivism says that offenders should be punished the consent of all its members ... the last murderer
because they deserve to be punished. Punishment is lying in prison ought to be executed before the res-
a matter of justice, not social utility. If offenders olution was carried out. This ought to be done in
are not punished, justice is not done. Kant, prob- order that everyone may realize the desert of his
ably the most influential retributivist, declares deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain on
that there is only one reason to punish someone the people; for otherwise they will all be regarded as
participants in the murder as a public violation of
for his offenses:
justice. 12
Juridical punishment can never be administered
merely as a means for promoting another good Perhaps surprisingly, often the retributivist also
either with regard to the criminal himself or to appeals to the dignity and worth of the murderer.
civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only As Kant notes, treating persons with respect means
because the individual on whom it is inflicted has treating them as rational agents who make free
committed a crime. l1
choices and are responsible for their actions. To justly
We can distinguish two kinds of retributiv- punish persons-to give them what they deserve-
ism according to the nature of the penal payback is to acknowledge their status as responsible agents
required. Kant accepts retributivism based on the deserving of respect. He asserts, then, that executing
doctrine of lex talionis-the idea that the punish-
ment should match the crime in kind, that justice
demands "an eye for an eye, a life for a life." He
thinks that whatever harm the criminal does to
the innocent, that same kind of harm should be QUICI< REVIEW
done to the criminal. Thus, the only just punish- abolitionist-One who wishes to abolish capital
ment for a man who wrongfully and deliberately punishment.
takes someone's life is the taking of his life. Other
retentionst-One who wishes to retain the death
retributivists are uncomfortable with the notion
penalty.
of punishing in kind (should rapists be raped?
should torturers be tortured?). They favor propor- punishment-The deliberate and authorized caus-
ing of pain or harm to someone thought to have
tional retributivism, in which punishment reflects
broken a law.
the seriousness of the crime but does not neces-
sarily resemble the crime. For these retributivists, capital punishment-Punishment by execution of
murder is the worst possible crime and deserves someone officially judged to have committed a
the worst possible punishment-the death of the serious, or capital, crime.
offender. retributivism-The view that offenders deserve
Underpinning many retributive views of capital to be punished, or "paid back," for their crimes
punishment is a Kantian emphasis on respect for and to be punished in proportion to the sever-
persons. Persons have dignity and inherent worth ity of their offenses.
and are ends in themselves. Deliberately killing an
a murderer is not an affront to human dignity but a They say, for example, that Black people convicted
recognition of it. of murder are more likely to be sentenced to death
A frequent reaction to the retributivist view is than White people convicted of murder. How is
that penal retribution is not justice but revenge. this claim supported? Here is one way:
The retributivist replies that this charge is mud-
dled: vengeance refers to making the offender suffer [T]he Reverend jesse jackson, in his book LegaJ Lynch-
because of one's sense of outrage, grief, or frustra- ing, argues that "[n]umerous researchers have shown
conclusively that African American defendants are
tion toward her and her crime; retribution involves
far more likely to receive the death penalty than are
moral deliberation about an offender's just deserts. white defendants charged with the same crime." The
support for this claim is said to be the undisputed
fact that when compared to their percentage in the
MORAL ARGUMENTS overall population African Americans are overrepre-
Is the death penalty a morally permissible form sented on death row. For example, while 12 percent
of the population is African American, about 43
of punishment? As you know by now, many argu-
percent of death row inmates are African American,
ments have been put forth on both sides of this and 38 percent of prisoners executed since 1977 are
issue-too many for any single book to tackle, let African American. 13
alone a single chapter. But we can dissect one of the
more widely used (and interesting) examples. Let But such statistical comparisons can be mis-
us begin with a popular argument against the death leading, say some retentionists:
penalty:
The relevant population for comparison is not the
1. If the death penalty discriminates against Black general population, but rather the population of
people, it is unjust. murderers. If the death penalty is administered
2. If the death penalty is unjust, it should be without regard to race, the percentage of African
American death row inmates found at the end of the
abolished.
process should not exceed the percentage of African
3. The death penalty discriminates against Black American defendants charged with murder at the
people. beginning. The available statistics indicate that is
precisely what happens. The Department of justice
4. Therefore, the death penalty should be abolished.
found that while African Americans constituted 48
This argument is valid, so our evaluation of it percent of adults charged with homicide, they were
should focus on the truth of the premises. Premises 1 only 41 percent of those admitted to prison under
sentence of death. In other words, once arrested for
and 2 are moral statements; Premise 3 is an empirical
murder, blacks are actually less likely to receive a cap-
statement about the use of the death penalty against ital sentence than are whites. 14
African Americans. (Arguments like this are used
with equal force when focusing on other minority This comparison, however, is not the whole
groups as well as the poor and uneducated; for sim- story. Sophisticated studies have found strong
plicity's sake we focus on Black people, who make up racial bias in capital cases, especially when the race
the largest segment of minority death row inmates.) of the victim is taken into account. According to
Let us examine the empirical claim first: is Prem- the Death Penalty Information Center,
ise 3 true? We can give it more precision by recast-
Nationally, nearly 80% of murder victims in cases
ing it like this: The administration of the death resulting in an execution have been white, even
penalty is biased against Black people. Many abo- though nationally only 50% of murder victims
litionists insist that this claim is indeed accurate. generally are white. A 1990 examination of death
;:::::::
l\l"'.~"'" CRITICAL THOUGHT: Different Cases, Same Punishment
Consider the contrasts in the description of two murder and touted the thrill it gave him. Few asked
men executed on the same day for a capital crime: for mercy for Brewer.
What do these very different cases suggest
One is Troy Davis, a black man who was convicted
of killing a white off-duty police officer in Savan- about the system of capital punishment in the Unit-
nah, Georgia, in 1989. The other is Lawrence ed States? Despite the contrast between these two
Brewer, a white man who in 1998 participated in men-one despicable and clearly guilty, the other a
the grisly murder of James Byrd Jr., a black man sympathetic character whose guilt was in doubt-
whom Brewer and two other men attacked. * they were both executed by the state. Does this
outcome suggest that an injustice was perpetrated?
Davis said to the last that he was innocent, no
Should the nature of the crime, the character of the
physical evidence or weapon tied him to the crime,
accused, or the degree of certainty about guilt affect
and many witnesses against him at the trial later re-
the penalty for a crime? Based on the information
canted their testimony. Millions of people, includ-
given here, would you say that justice was done?
ing the pope, pleaded for mercy for Davis. Brewer
admitted his crime, in which he and two other men *Trymaine Lee, "Troy Davis and Lawrence Brewer, a
chained a Black man to a pickup truck and dragged Tale of Two Executions," Huffington Post, September
him until his body was torn into pieces. Later, in 21, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09121
letters he wrote in jail, Brewer bragged about the Itroy-davis-and-lawrence-b_n_97 4293.htm I.
penalty sentencing conducted by the United States is unjust. On a straightforward reading, this asser-
General Accounting Office noted that, "In 82% of tion would seem to be acceptable to both retention-
the studies [reviewed], race of the victim was found ists and abolitionists. Few would deny that applying
to influence the likelihood of being charged with the death penalty in a discriminatory fashion is
capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e.,
unjust, for equals must be treated equally. On this
those who murdered whites were found more likely
to be sentenced to death than those who murdered reading, the premise is almost certainly true. But
blacks." Individual state studies have found similar many abolitionists would interpret the statement
disparities. In fact, race of victim disparities have differently. They would contend that if the admin-
been found in most death penalty states. IS istration of the death penalty is biased against Black
Then there are the many potentially biasing fac- people, then the death penalty itself is unjust. Some
tors that lead up to death sentences for Black people: abolitionists accept this view because they believe
there is no way to apply the death penalty fairly;
Today there is growing evidence that racial bias
the administration of capital punishment is inher-
continues in SOciety, particularly within the crimi-
nal justice system. The existence of implicit racial ently unjust. Others would say that there is no way
bias among some law enforcement officers, wit- to separate the "death penalty itself" from the way
nesses, jurors, and others allows harsher punish- it is administered. In the real world, there is only the
ment of minorities, even without legal sanction or death-penalty-as-actually-applied, which is ines-
intention. 16 capably unfair.
As we did with Premise 3, we can restate Premise 1 A common reply to the abolitionist under-
to make it more specific: If the administration of standing of Premise 1 is that it misses an impor-
the death penalty is biased against Black people, it tant distinction: the unjust administration of a
punishment does not entail the injustice of the is the abolitionist view that injustice in the system
punishment itself. As one retentionist says, of capital punishment is the same as injustice in
[fhis charge of unfairness] is not an argument, either capital punishment itself. If abolitionists can estab-
against the death penalty or against any other form lish this equivalence, the argument is much more
of punishment. It is an argument against unjust and likely to succeed. The other links in the chain of
inequitable distribution of penalties. If the trials of reasoning-the injustice of discrimination and the
wealthy men are less likely to result in convictions need to abolish unjust punishments-are generally
than those of poor men, then something must be accepted by all parties to the dispute.
done to reform the procedure in criminal courts....
We have also learned something about the
But the maldistribution of penalties is no argument
against any particular form of penalty. 17 retentionist position. We have discovered how
retentionists can readily agree that the application
It seems that we cannot decide the truth of of the death penalty discriminates against Black
Premise 1 without a much more thorough exami- people, that this biased treatment is unconscionable
nation of the arguments for and against it, a task and unjust, and that such a discriminatory system
beyond the scope of this discussion. So let us move should be reformed or abolished-and still consis-
to our revised Premise 2: If the administration of the tently believe that it can be morally permissible for
death penalty is unjust, it should be abolished. As the state to put a convicted murderer to death.
you can see, this premise has the same kind of ambi-
guity that we see in Premise 1. Again the abolition-
ist reading is that an unjust application of the death
penalty is an indictment against capital punishment
itself, so capital punishment should be abolished. CHAPTER REVIEW
Thus the same arguments and counterarguments
surrounding Premise 1 also apply here.
At this pOint, we have not determined whether SUMMARY
this abolitionist argument is a good one. But we Capital punishment is a form of legal punishment-
have gained insight into this part of the capital execution-reserved for someone convicted of
punishment debate. Look again at the argument in committing a capital crime, usually some form of
its revised form: murder. Abolitionists wish to abolish capital pun-
ishment; retentionists want to retain it. In several
1. If the administration of the death penalty is deciSions, the U.S. Supreme Court has sanctioned
biased against Black people, it is unjust. and circumscribed the use of the death penalty. In
2. If the administration of the death penalty is Gregg v. Georgia, the court ruled that administration
unjust, it should be abolished. of the death penalty-if used according to proper
guidelineS-is constitutional in cases of murder.
3. The administration of the death penalty is
Other rulings banned the execution of disabled per-
biased against Black people.
sons and of those who were under eighteen when
4. Therefore, the death penalty should be abolished. they committed their crimes.
Both retentionists and abolitionists appeal to
We have seen how difficult it can be to make utilitarianism and nonconsequentialist moral theo-
this argument work. If anyone of the premises is ries to make their case. Retentionists often argue that
false, the conclusion is not supported and the argu- the death penalty maximizes the welfare of society by
ment fails. (Also, the argument is now valid only preventing repeat crimes or deterring future crimes.
on the reading preferred by abolitionists.) But we Retributivists argue on nonconsequentialist grounds
have also found that the lynchpin of the argument that capital punishment is morally permissible because
it accords with the demands of justice. Abolitionists, 2. What is the retentionist's main non-
on the other hand, often contend that the death pen- consequentialist argument? Do you accept it?
alty does more harm than good to society and that life 3. What moral theories can the abolitionist
in prison without parole results in more net happiness appeal to? Which one do you think provides
than executions do. Many abolitionists also take the the strongest reasons for abolishing capital
nonconsequentialist route by insisting that the death punishment?
penalty violates some fundamental moral principles- 4. What evidence is needed to shore up the
the right to life, the dignity of human beings, and the deterrence argument? Is this evidence obviously
injustice of executing the innocent. strong? What counterargument can the
abolitionist make?
l<EY TERMS 5. The abolitionist argues that more net happiness
abOlitionist (p. 624) is created in society by sentencing murderers
retentionist (p. 624) to life in prison without parole than by
punishment (p. 624) executing them. How would you counter
capital punishment (p. 625) this argument?
retributivism (p. 630) 6. How does Pojman frame the deterrence argument?
Is his argument sound or strong? Explain.
7. What is van den Haag's retention argument?
EXERCISES
How would you respond to it?
Review Questions 8. What is the lex talionis doctrine of retributivism?
1. What is an abolitionist? A retentionist? (p. 624) Do you accept it? Why or why not?
2. What moral principles do abolitionists generally 9. How can a Kantian respect for persons
appeal to? (p. 624) underpin a retributive view of capital
3. What moral principles do retentionists appeal punishment?
to? (p. 624) 10. Is capital punishment ever a just punishment
4. What fundamental moral principles do both for murder? Why or why not?
abolitionists and retentionists accept? (p. 624)
5. For what crime is the death penalty usually FURTHER READING
reserved? (p. 625) Hugo Adam Bedau, "Capital Punishment and Social
6. How many states now use capital punishment Defense," in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory
in their criminal justice system? (p. 625) Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Tom Regan, 2nd ed. (New
York: Random House, 1986).
7. In 1972, what Supreme Court case temporarily
Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul Cassell, eds., Debating the
halted executions in the United States? (p. 625)
Death Penalty: Should America Have Capital Punishment?
8. For what kinds of offenders has the Supreme Court The Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case (Oxford:
banned the use of the death penalty? (p. 626) Oxford University Press, 2004).
9. What is the deterrence argument against capital Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153-207 (1976). Justice
punishment? (pp. 626-27) Potter Stewart et al., Opinion of the Court.
10. What is the difference between first-degree Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-41 (1976). Justice
murder, second-degree murder, and ThurgOOd Marshall, Dissenting Opinion.
manslaughter? (p. 626) Sidney Hook, "The Death Sentence," New Leader, April 3,
1961.
Discussion Questions Alex KOZinski, "Tinkering with Death," New Yorker,
February 10, 1997, 48-52.
1. What consequentialist arguments can Daniel LaChance, Executing Freedom: The Cultural Life of
retentionists use to support their case? Do you Capital Punishment in the United States (Chicago: Uni-
accept any of these arguments? Why or why not? versity of Chicago Press, 2016).
Burton Leiser, "The Death Penalty Is Permissible," in America Have Capital Punishment? The Experts on Both
Liberty, Justice and Morals: Contemporary Value Conflicts, Sides Make Their Best Case, eds. Hugo Bedau and Paul
3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986). Cassell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
John Stuart Mill, "Speech in Favor of Capital Punish- William H. Shaw, "Punishment and the Criminal Justice
ment," 1868, http://ethics.sandiego.edu/books/Mill System," in Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utili-
/Punishment/ (March 1, 2015). tarianism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999).
Stephen Nathanson, "An Eye for an Eye?" in An Eye for Ernest van den Haag, "On Deterrence and the Death
an Eye? The Morality of Punishing by Death (Totowa, Nl: Penalty," Journal ofCriminal Law, Criminology, and Police
Rowman and Littlefield, 1987). Science 60, no. 2 (1969): 141-47.
Louis P. Pojman, "Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Benjamin S. Yost, Against Capital Punishment (New York:
Permissible," in Debating the Death Penalty: Should Oxford University Press, 2019).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Redemption and Capital Punishment

In 2005, 51-year-old Stanley Tookie Williams, convicted murderer and Crips gang
co-founder, was executed by the State of California. His many supporters-including
celebrities such as Jamie Foxx and Snoop Dogg-denounced the execution as unjust
because while in prison he had sought and found redemption. As one report says,
The case became the state's highest-profile execution in decades. Hollywood stars
and capital punishment foes argued that Williams' sentence should be commuted
to life in prison because he had made amends by writing children's books about the
dangers of gangs and violence.
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger rejected Williams' plea for clemency on the grounds
that Williams was not genuinely remorseful about the Crips' killings. Williams was
convicted of murdering four people-a 26-year-old store clerk and a couple and
their 43-year-old daughter. At the trial, witnesses said he bragged and laughed
about the murders.
The Associated Press quoted Williams saying, "There is no part of me that existed
then that exists now."*
Suppose Williams was guilty of the murders for compatible with justice? If a murderer mends his
which he was convicted, and suppose he had a ways, should this change have an effect on his
genuine change of heart and performed many punishment? Is mercy (giving someone a break)
commendable deeds while in prison. Should compatible with justice (giving someone what he
Williams's sentence then have been commuted deserves)?
to life in prison? Why or why not? Is redemption
*"Tookie Williams Is Executed," CBSNews.com, December 13,2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/tookie-wil

liams-is-executed-13-12-2005/ Uanuary 27, 2015).
2. Poor Representation
Delma Banks, Jr. was charged in the 1980 murder of Richard Whitehead of Texas. The
only evidence against Banks was the testimony of an informant who in exchange for his
testimony received $200 and the dismissal of an arson charge that could have resulted in
his [sic] life sentence as a habitual offender. Banks' lawyer did not vigorously cross-examine
the informant, nor did he investigate the case. Had he done so, he would have learned of
strong evidence that Banks was in another city at the time of the crime. Banks received
such poor representation that former FBI director and United States District Court Judge
William Sessions weighed in to urge the Supreme Court to temporarily stay his execution.
On April 21, 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court accepted Banks' case for review. t
Do you think Banks should have gotten a new trial? someone who is duly sentenced to die got excellent
Assuming capital punishment is morally permissi- legal representation except for one minor point-
ble, would it ever be right to put someone to death her lawyer dozed off for fifteen seconds during her
who had not received adequate legal representa- trial. Should this small lapse be a good enough
tion? Why or why not? What do you think would reason to throw out her conviction and demand a
constitute adequate legal representation? Suppose new trial?
tAmerican Civil Liberties Union, "Inadequate Representation," from ACLU.org, October 8, 2003. Copyright
© 2003 American Civil Liberties Union, www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/inadequate-representation. Reprinted
with permission.
3. The Morality of Criminal Exonerations

How many are sentenced to death in the United States for crimes they did not commit?
A new study believes the figure is 1 in every 2S-or 4.1 percent.
The study, released Monday in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
"tells you that a surprising number of innocent people are sentenced to death," Samuel
R. Gross, the lead author, said in an interview with Newsweek. "It tells you that a lot of
them haven't been exonerated. Some of them no doubt have been executed.":!:
If a significant number of innocent people are our system of justice suggest that the whole system
being sentenced to death, and many of these should be scrapped? If we decide to retain capital
people are wrongly executed, is this an argument punishment, shouldn't we at the same time try
against capital punishment? That is, if there is a hard to eliminate mistakes? How hard? To what
real possibility of mistakenly executing the inno- lengths should we go to ensure a just system of
cent, should the death penalty be abolished? Why punishment?
or why not? Does the possibility of fatal errors in
*Pema Levy, "One in 25 Sentenced to Death in the U.S. Is Innocent, Study Claims," Newsweek, April 28, 2014,
http://www.newsweek.com/one-25-executed-us-innocent-study-c1aims-248889 (August 22, 2017).
READINGS
The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG
In an average year about 20,000 homicides occur the finality of the death penalty, the most grievous
in the United States. Fewer than 300 convicted maldistribution occurs when it is imposed upon the
murderers are sentenced to death. But because no innocent. However, the frequent allegations of dis-
more than thirty murderers have been executed in crimination and capriciousness refer to maldistribu-
any recent year, most convicts sentenced to death tion among the guilty and not to the punishment of
are likely to die of old age. 1 Nonetheless, the death the innocent.
penalty looms large in discussions: it raises impor- Maldistribution of any punishment among those
tant moral questions independent of the number of who deserve it is irrelevant to its justice or morality.
executions. 2 Even if poor or black convicts guilty of capital offenses
The death penalty is our harshest punishment. 3 It suffer capital punishment, and other convicts equally
is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished, guilty of the same crimes do not, a more equal dis-
instead of temporarily imprisoning them. Further, tribution, however desirable, would merely be more
although not intended to cause physical pain, execu- equal. It would not be more just to the convicts under
tion is the only corporal punishment still applied sentence of death.
to adults. These Singular characteristics contribute to Punishments are imposed on persons, not on
the perennial, impassioned controversy about capital racial or economic groups. Guilt is personal. The only
punishment. relevant question is: does the person to be executed
deserve the punishment? Whether or not others
I. DISTRIBUTION who deserved the same punishment, whatever their
Consideration of the justice, morality, or usefulness economic or racial group, have avoided execution
of capital punishment is often conflated with objec- is irrelevant. If they have, the guilt of the executed
tions to its alleged discriminatory or capricious dis- convicts would not be diminished, nor would their
tribution among the guilty. Wrongly so. If capital punishment be less deserved. To put the issue starkly,
punishment is immoral in se, no distribution among if the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks,
the guilty could make it moral. If capital punishment but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a
is moral, no distribution would make it immoral. lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discrimina-
Improper distribution cannot affect the quality of tory or capricious distribution would neither make
what is distributed, be it punishment or rewards. Dis- the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly
criminatory or capricious distribution thus could not punished, despite the undue impunity bestowed
justify abolition of the death penalty. Further, mal- on others.
distribution inheres no more in capital punishment Equality, in short, seems morally less impor-
than in any other punishment. tant than justice. And justice is independent of dis-
Maldistribution between the guilty and the inno- tributional inequalities. The ideal of equal justice
cent is, by definition, unjust. But the injustice does demands that justice be equally distributed, not that
not lie in the nature of the punishment. Because of it be replaced by equality. Justice requires that as many
of the guilty as possible be punished, regardless of
Ernest van den Haag, republished with permission of Harvard Law whether others have avoided punishment. To let these
Review Association, from "The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense," others escape the deserved punishment does not do
Harvard Law Review 99: 1662-69. Copyright © 1986 by Harvard justice to them, or to society. But it is not unjust to
Law Review Association.
those who could not escape.
These moral considerations are not meant to deny Analogously, for those who think the death penalty
that irrational discrimination, or capriciousness, just, miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral ben-
would be inconsistent with constitutional require- efits and the usefulness of doing justice. For those who
ments. But I am satisfied that the Supreme Court has think the death penalty unjust even when it does not
in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional miscarry, miscarriages can hardly be decisive.
requirement of equality as much as is possible. Some
inequality is indeed unavoidable as a practical matter III. DETERRENCE
• 4
In any system. But, ultra posse nemo obligatur. (Nobody
Despite much recent work, there has been no conclu-
is bound beyond ability.)
sive statistical demonstration that the death penalty
Recent data reveal little direct racial discrimina- is a better deterrent than are alternative punishments.
tion in the sentenCing of those arrested and con- However, deterrence is less than decisive for either
victed of murder. 5 The abrogation of death penalty side. Most abolitionists acknowledge that they would
for rape has eliminated a major source of racial continue to favor abolition even if the death penalty
discrimination. Concededly, some discrimination were shown to deter more murders than alternatives
based on the race of murder victims may exist; yet, could deter. 9 Abolitionists appear to value the life of
this discrimination affects criminal victimizers in a convicted murderer or, at least, his non-execution,
an unexpected way. Murderers of whites are thought more highly than they value the lives of the innocent
more likely to be executed than murderers of blacks. victims who might be spared by deterring prospective
Black victims, then, are less fully vindicated than
murderers.
white ones. However, because most black murder- Deterrence is not altogether decisive for me
ers kill blacks, black murderers are spared the death either. I would favor retention of the death penalty
penalty more often than are white murderers. They as retribution even if it were shown that the threat
6
fare better than most white murderers. The moti- of execution could not deter prospective murder-
vation behind unequal distribution of the death ers not already deterred by the threat of imprison-
penalty may well have been to discriminate against ment. 10 Still, I believe the death penalty, because of
blacks, but the result has favored them. Maldistri- its finality, is more feared than imprisonment, and
bution is thus a straw man for empirical as well as deters some prospective murderers not deterred by
analytical reasons. the threat of imprisonment. Sparing the lives of even
a few prospective victims by deterring their murder-
II. MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE ers is more important than preserving the lives of
In a recent survey Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and convicted murderers because of the possibility, or
Michael Radelet found that 7000 persons were exe- even the probability, that executing them would
cuted in the United States between 1900 and 1985 and not deter others. Whereas the lives of the victims
7
that 25 were innocent of capital crimes. Among the who might be saved are valuable, that of the mur-
innocents they list Sacco and Vanzetti as well as Ethel derer has only negative value, because of his crime.
and Julius Rosenberg. Although their data may be Surely the criminal law is meant to protect the
questionable, I do not doubt that, over a long enough lives of potential victims in preference to those of
period, miscarriages of justice will occur even in capi- actual murderers.
tal cases. Murder rates are determined by many factors; nei-
Despite precautions, nearly all human activi- ther the severity nor the probability of the threatened
ties, such as trucking, lighting, or construction, cost sanction is always decisive. However, for the long run,
the lives of some innocent bystanders. We do not I share the view of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: 41Some
give up these activities, because the advantages, men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear
s that if they committed murder they would be hanged.
moral or material, outweigh the unintended losses.
Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they be unpleasant, it is seldom argued that they legitimize
regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard the unlawful imposition of identical unpleasantness.
it with horror is that murderers are hanged.',n Penal Imprisonment is not thought to legitimize kidnap-
sanctions are useful in the long run for the forma- ping; neither are fines thought to legitimize robbery.
tion of the internal restraints so necessary to control The difference between murder and execution, or
crime. The severity and finality of the death penalty between kidnapping and imprisonment, is that the
is appropriate to the seriousness and the finality of first is unlawful and undeserved, the second a lawful
murder. 12 and deserved punishment for an unlawful act. The
physical similarities of the punishment to the crime
IV. INCIDENTAL ISSUES: COST, RELATIVE are irrelevant. The relevant difference is not physical,
SUFFERING, BRUTALIZATION but social. 14
Many nondecisive issues are associated with capi-
tal punishment. Some believe that the monetary V. JUSTICE, EXCESS, DEGRADATION
cost of appealing a capital sentence is excessive. Yet We threaten punishments in order to deter crime. We
most comparisons of the cost of life imprisonment impose them not only to make the threats credible
with the cost of execution, apart from their dubious but also as retribution (justice) for the crimes that
relevance, are flawed at least by the implied assump- were not deterred. Threats and punishments are nec-
tion that life prisoners will generate no judicial costs essary to deter and deterrence is a sufficient practical
during their imprisonment. At any rate, the actual justification for them. Retribution is an indepen-
monetary costs are trumped by the importance of dent moral justification. Although penalties can be
doing justice. unwise, repulsive, or inappropriate, and those pun-
Others insist that a person sentenced to death ished can be pitiable, in a sense the infliction of legal
suffers more than his victim suffered, and that this punishment on a guilty person cannot be unjust.
(excess) suffering is undue according to the lex talio- By committing the crime, the criminal volunteered
nis (rule of retaliation). We cannot know whether to assume the risk of receiving a legal punishment
the murderer on death row suffers more than his that he could have avoided by not committing the
victim suffered; however, unlike the murderer, crime. The punishment he suffers is the punishment
the victim deserved none of the suffering inflicted. he voluntarily risked suffering and, therefore, it is no
Further, the limitations of the lex talionis were more unjust to him than any other event for which
meant to restrain private vengeance, not the social one knowingly volunteers to assume the risk. Thus,
retribution that has taken its place. Punishment- the death penalty cannot be unjust to the guilty
regardless of the motivation-is not intended to criminal. 15
revenge, offset, or compensate for the victim's suf- There remain, however, two moral objections. The
fering, or to be measured by it. Punishment is to penalty may be regarded as always excessive as retri-
vindicate the law and the social order undermined bution and always morally degrading. To regard the
by the crime. This is why a kidnapper's penal con- death penalty as always excessive, one must believe
finement is not limited to the period for which he that no crime-no matter how heinous-could pos-
imprisoned his victim; nor is a burglar's confine- sibly justify capital punishment. Such a belief can
ment meant merely to offset the suffering or the be neither corroborated nor refuted; it is an article
harm he caused his victim; nor is it meant only to of faith.
offset the advantage he gained. 13 Alternatively, or concurrently, one may believe
Another argument heard ... is that, by killing a that everybody, the murderer no less than the victim,
murderer, we encourage, endorse, or legitimize unlaw- has an imprescriptible (natural?) right to life. The law
ful killing. Yet, although all punishments are meant to therefore should not deprive anyone of life. I share
Jeremy Bentham's view that any such "natural and it seems quite warranted. It is also the only fitting
imprescriptible rights" are "nonsense upon stilts." 16 retribution for murder I can think of.
Justice Brennan has insisted that the death pen-
alty is "uncivilized," "inhuman," inconsistent with
"human dignity" and with "the sanctity of life," that NOTES
it "treats members of the human race as nonhumans, 1. Death row as a semipermanent residence is cruel, because
as objects to be toyed with and discarded," that it is convicts are denied the normal amenities of prison life. Thus,
"uniquely degrading to human dignity" and "by its unless death row residents are integrated into the prison
very nature, [involves] a denial of the executed per- population, the continuing accumulation of convicts on
son's humanity." Justice Brennan does not say why death row should lead us to accelerate either the rate of
he thinks execution "uncivilized." Hitherto most civi- executions or the rate of communications. I find little objec-
lizations have had the death penalty, although it has tion to integration.
been discarded in Western Europe, where it is currently 2. The debate about the insanity defense is important for
unfashionable probably because of its abuse by totali- analogous reasons.
tarian regimes. 3. Some writers, for example, Cesare Bonesana, Marchese
By "degrading," Justice Brennan seems to mean di Beccaria, have thought that life imprisonment is more
that execution degrades the executed convicts. Yet severe. However, the overwhelming majority of both abo-
litionists and of convicts under death sentence prefer life
philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and G. W. F.
imprisonment to execution.
Hegel, have insisted that, when deserved, execution,
far from degrading the executed convict, affirms his 4. The ideal of equality, unlike the ideal of retributive justice
(which can be approximated separately in each instance),
humanity by affirming his rationality and his respon-
is dearly unattainable unless all guilty persons are appre-
sibility for his actions. They thought that execution,
hended, and therefore tried, convicted and sentenced by the
when deserved, is required for the sake of the convict's same court, at the same time. Unequal justice is the best we
dignity. (Does not life imprisonment violate human can do; it is still better than the injustice, equal or unequal,
dignity more than execution, by keeping alive a which occurs if, for the sake of equality, we deliberately allow
prisoner deprived of all autonomy?) some who could be punished to escape.
Common sense indicates that it cannot be 5. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
death-our common fate-that is inhuman. BULLETIN No. NjC-98,399, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984, at 9
Therefore, Justice Brennan must mean that death (l985); Johnson, The Executioner'S Bias, NAT'L REV., Nov. 15,
degrades when it comes not as a natural or acci- 1985, at 44.
dental event, but as a deliberate social imposition. 6. It barely need be said that any discrimination agail1st (for
The murderer learns through his punishment that example, black murderers of whites) must also be discrimina-
his fellow men have found him unworthy of living; tion for (for example, black murderers of blacks).
that because he has murdered, he is being expelled 7. Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
from the community of the living. This degrada- Cases (lst draft, Oct. 1985) (on file at Harvard Law School
tion is self-inflicted. By murdering, the murderer Library).
has so dehumanized himself that he cannot remain 8. An excessive number of trucking accidents or of miscar-
among the living. The social recognition of his self- riages of justice could offset the benefits gained by trucking
degradation is the punitive essence of execution. To or the practice of doing justice. We are, however, far from
believe, as Justice Brennan appears to, that the deg- this situation.
radation is inflicted by the execution reverses the 9. For most abolitionists, the discrimination argument,
direction of causality. see supra pp. 1662-64, is similarly nondecisive: they
Execution of those who have committed heinous would favor abolition even if there could be no racial
murders may deter only one murder per year. If it does, discrimination.
10. If executions were shown to increase the murder rate on the physical aspects of the punishment, rather than
in the long run, I would favor abolition. Sparing the inno- the nature of the crime and the suffering of the victim, a
cent victims who would be spared by the nonexecution of televised execution would present the murderer as the vic-
murderers would be more important to me than the execu- tim of the state. Far from communicating the moral sig-
tion, however just, of murderers. But although there is a nificance of the execution, television would shift the focus
lively discussion of the subject, no serious evidence exists to the pitiable fear of the murderer. We no longer place in
to support the hypothesis that executions produce a higher cages those sentenced to imprisonment to expose them to
murder rate. public view. Why should we so expose those sentenced to
11. H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 489 (1979) execution?
(attributing this passage to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen). IS. An explicit threat of punitive action is necessary to
12. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), suggests that the justification of any legal punishment: nulla poena sine
penalties be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime- lege (no punishment without [preexisting] law). To be suf-
a common theme of the criminal law. Murder, therefore, ficiently justified, the threat must in turn have a rational
demands more than life imprisonment, if, as I believe, it is a and legitimate purpose. "Your money or your life" does
more serious crime than other crimes punished by life impris- not qualify; nor does the threat of an unjust law; nor,
onment. In modern times, our sensibility requires that the finally, does a threat that is altogether disproportionate to
range of punishments be narrower than the range of crimes- the importance of its purpose. In short, preannounce-
but not so narrow as to exclude the death penalty. ment legitimizes the threatened punishment only if the
threat is warranted. But this leaves a very wide range of
13. Thus restitution (a civil liability) cannot satisfy the puni-
justified threats. Furthermore, the punished person is
tive purpose of penal sanctions, whether the purpose be
aware of the penalty for his actions and thus volunteers
retributive or deterrent.
to take the risk even of an unjust punishment. His victim,
14. Some abolitionists challenge: if the death penalty is just however, did not volunteer to risk anything. The ques-
and serves as a deterrent, why not televise executions? The tion whether any self-inflicted injury-such as a legal
answer is simple. The death even of a murderer, however punishment-ever can be unjust to a person who know-
well-deserved, should not serve as public entertainment. It ingly risked it is a matter that requires more analysis than
so served in earlier centuries. But in this respect our sensibil- is possible here.
ity has changed for the better, I believe. Further, television
16. THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM lOS U. Bowring ed.
unavoidably would trivialize executions, wedged in, as they
1972).
would be, between game shows, situation comedies and
the like. Finally, because televised executions would focus
From Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag
JEFFREY H. REIMAN
On the issue of capital punishment, there is as clear a should die; and others (once, but no longer, nearly a
clash of moral intuitions as we are likely to see. Some majority of Americans) feel deeply that the state ought
(now a majority of Americans) feel deeply that justice not be in the business of putting people to death. 1
requires payment in kind and thus that murderers Arguments for either side that do not do justice to
the intuitions of the other are unlikely to persuade
Jeffrey H. Reiman, excerpts from "Justice, Civilization, and the anyone not already convinced. And, since, as I shall
Death Penalty." Pililosophy & Public Affairs 14(2): 115-42. Copy- suggest, there is truth on both sides, such arguments
right © 1985 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permis- are easily refutable, leaving us with nothing but con-
sion of Blackwell Publishing Ltd. flicting intuitions and no guidance from reason in
distinguishing the better from the worse. In this con- offender suffer, and since deriving satisfaction from
text, I shall try to make an argument for the abolition the suffering of others seems primitive, the policy
of the death penalty that does justice to the intuitions of imposing suffering on the offender for no other
on both sides. I shall sketch out a conception of retrib- purpose than giving satisfaction to his victim seems
utive justice that accounts for the justice of executing primitive as well. Consequently, defending retribu-
murderers, and then I shall argue that though the death tivism requires showing that the suffering imposed
penalty is a just punishment for murder, abolition of on the wrongdoer has some worthy point beyond
the death penalty is part of the civilizing mission of the satisfaction of victims. In what follows, I shall try
modern states. to identify a proposition-which I call the retributiv-
ist principle-that I take to be the nerve of retributiv-
* * * ism. I think this principle accounts for the justice of
the lex talionis and indicates the paint of the suffering
[I.] JUST DESERTS AND JUST PUNISHMENTS demanded by retributivism. Not to do too much ofthe
In my view, the death penalty is a just punishment work of the death penalty advocate, I shall make no
for murder because the lex talionis, an eye for an eye, extended argument for the principle beyond suggest-
and so on, is just, although, as I shall suggest at the ing the considerations that make it plausible. I shall
end of this section, it can only be rightly applied when identify these considerations by drawing, with con-
its implied preconditions are satisfied. The lex talionis siderable license, on Hegel and Kant.
is a version of retributivism. Retributivism-as the I think that we can see the justice of the lex talio-
word itself suggests-is the doctrine that the offender nis by focusing on the striking affinity between it and
should be paid back with suffering he deserves because the golden rule. The golden rule mandates "Do unto
of the evil he has done, and the lex talionis asserts others as you would have others do unto you," while
that injury equivalent to that he imposed is what the the lex talionis counsels "Do unto others as they have
offender deserves. 2 But the lex talionis is not the only done unto you." It would not be too far-fetched to say
version of retributivism. Another, which I shall call that the lex talionis is the law enforcement arm of the
"proportional retributivism," holds that what retribu- golden rule, at least in the sense that if people were
tion requires is not equality of injury between crimes actually treated as they treated others, then every-
and punishments, but "fit" or proportionality, such one would necessarily follow the golden rule because
that the worst crime is punished with the society's then people could only willingly act toward others
worst penalty, and so on, though the society's worst as they were willing to have others act toward them.
punishment need not duplicate the injury of the worst This is not to suggest that the lex talionis follows from
.
cnme. 3
Later, I shall try to show how a form 0 f propor- the golden rule, but rather that the two share a com-
tional retributivism is compatible with acknowledg- mon moral inspiration: the equality of persons. Treat-
ing the justice of the lex talionis. Indeed, since I shall ing others as you would have them treat you means
defend the justice of the lex talionis, I take such com- treating others as equal to you, because adopting the
patibility as a necessary condition of the validity of golden rule as one's guiding principle implies that one
any form of retributivism. counts the suffering of others to be as great a calam-
There is nothing self-evident about the justice of ity as one's own suffering, that one counts one's right
the lex talionis nor, for that matter, of retributivism. to impose suffering on others as no greater than their
The standard problem confronting those who would right to impose suffering on one, and so on. This leads
justify retributivism is that of overcoming the suspi- to the lex talionis by two approaches that start from
cion that it does no more than sanctify the victim's different pOints and converge.
desire to hurt the offender back. Since serving that I call the first approach "Hegelian" because Hegel
desire amounts to hurting the offender simply for the held (roughly) that crime upsets the equality between
satisfaction that the victim derives from seeing the persons and retributive punishment restores that
equality by "annulling" the crime. 4 As we have seen, I call the second approach "Kantian" since Kant
acting according to the golden rule implies treat- held (roughly) that, since reason (like justice) is no
ing others as your equals. Conversely, violating the respecter of the sheer difference between individu-
golden rule implies the reverse: Doing to another als, when a rational being decides to act in a certain
what you would not have that other do to you violates way toward his fellows, he implicitly authorizes simi-
the equality of persons by asserting a right toward lar action by his fellows toward him. 5 A version of the
the other that the other does not possess toward you. golden rule, then, is a requirement of reason: acting
Doing back to you what you did "annuls" your viola- rationally, one always acts as he would have others act
tion by reasserting that the other has the same right toward him. Consequently, to act toward a person as
toward you that you assert toward him. Punishment he has acted toward others is to treat him as a rational
according to the lex talionis cannot heal the injury being, that is, as if his act were the product of a rational
that the other has suffered at your hands, rather it decision. From this, it may be concluded that we have
rectifies the indignity he has suffered, by restoring a duty to do to offenders what they have done, since
him to equality with you. this amounts to according them the respect due ratio-
"Equality of persons" here does not mean equality nal beings. 6 Here too, however, the assertion of a duty
of concern for their happiness, as it might for a utilitar- to punish seems excessive, since, if this duty arises
ian. On such a (roughly) utilitarian understanding of because doing to people what they have done to oth-
equality, imposing suffering on the wrongdoer equiv- ers is necessary to accord them the respect due rational
alent to the suffering he has imposed would have little beings, then we would have a duty to do to all rational
point. Rather, equality of concern for people's hap- persons everything-good, bad, or indifferent-that
piness would lead us to impose as little suffering on they do to others. The point rather is that, by his acts,
the wrongdoer as was compatible with maintaining a rational being authorizes others to do the same to
the happiness of others. This is enough to show that him, he doesn't compel them to. Here too, then, the
retributivism (at least in this "Hegelian" form) reflects argument leads to a right, rather than a duty, to exact
a conception of morality quite different from that the lex talionis. And this is supported by the fact that
envisioned by utilitarianism. Instead of seeing moral- we can conclude from Kant's argument that a rational
ity as administering doses of happiness to individual being cannot validly complain of being treated in the
recipients, the retributivist envisions morality as way he has treated others, and where there is no valid
maintaining the relations appropriate to equally sov- complaint, there is no injustice, and where there is
7
ereign individuals. A crime, rather than representing no injustice, others have acted within their rights. It
a unit of suffering added to the already considerable should be clear that the Kantian argument also rests
suffering in the world, is an assault on the sovereignty on the equality of persons, because a rational agent
of an individual that temporarily places one person only implicitly authorizes having done to him action
(the criminal) in a position of illegitimate sovereignty similar to what he has done to another, if he and the
over another (the victim). The victim (or his represen- other are similar in the relevant ways.
tative, the state) then has the right to rectify this loss The "Hegelian" and "Kantian" approaches arrive
of standing relative to the criminal by meting out a at the same destination from opposite sides. The
punishment that reduces the cri~inal's sov~rei~n~y!n ((Hegelian" approach starts from the victim's equality
the degree to which he vaunted It above hiS victim s. with the criminal, and infers from it the victim's right
It might be thought that this is a duty, not just a right, to do to the criminal what the criminal has done to
but that is surely too much. The victim has the right to the victim. The UKantian" approach starts from the
forgive the violator without punishment, which sug- criminal's rationality, and infers from it the criminal's
gests that it is by virtue of having the right to punish authorization of the victim's right to do to the crimi-
the violator (rather than the duty), that the victim's nal what the criminal has done to the victim. Taken
equality with the violator is restored. together, these approaches support the following
proposition: The equality and rationality of persons death and then revived (or to within a moment of execu-
implies that an offender deserves and his victim has tion and then reprieved) as many times as he has killed
the right to impose suffering on the offender equal (minus one), and then finally executed. But surely this is
to that which he imposed on the victim. This is the a degree of cruelty that would be monstrous.
proposition I call the retributivist principle, and I shall Since the retributivist principle establishes the
assume henceforth that it is true. This principle pro- lex talionis as the victim's right, it might seem that
vides that the lex talionis is the criminal's just desert the question of how far this right should be exercised
and the victim's (or as his representative, the state's) is "up to the victim." And indeed, this would be the
right. Moreover, the principle also indicates the case in the state of nature. But once, for all the good
point of retributive punishment, namely, it affirms reasons familiar to readers of John Locke, the state
the equality and rationality of persons, victims and comes into existence, public punishment replaces pri-
offenders alike. And the point of this affirmation is, vate, and the victim's right to punish reposes in the
like any moral affirmation, to make a statement, to the state. With this, the decision as to how far to exercise
criminal, to impress upon him his equality with his this right goes to the state as well. To be sure, since
victim (which earns him a like fate) and his rationality (at least with respect to retributive punishment) the
(by which his actions are held to authorize his fate), victim's right is the source of the state's right to pun-
and to the society, so that recognition of the equality ish, the state must exercise its right in ways that are
and rationality of persons becomes a visible part of faithful to the victim's right. Later, when I try to spell
our shared moral environment that none can ignore out the upper and lower limits of just punishment,
in justifying their actions to one another. these may be taken as indicating the range within
which the state can punish and remain faithful to the
* * * victim's right.
The truth of the retributivist principle estab- I suspect that it will be widely agreed that the
lishes the justice of the lex talionis, but, since it estab- state ought not administer punishments of the sort
lishes this as a right of the victim rather than a duty, described above even if required by the letter of the lex
it does not settle the question of whether or to what talionis, and thus, even granting the justice of lex talio-
extent the victim or the state should exercise this nis, there are occasions on which it is morally appro-
right and exact the lex talionis. This is a separate moral priate to diverge from its requirements. We must, of
question because strict adherence to the lex talionis course, distinguish such morally based divergence
amounts to allowing criminals, even the most barbaric from that which is based on practicality. Like any
of them, to dictate our punishing behavior. It seems moral principle, the lex talionis is subject to "ought
certain that there are at least some crimes, such as rape implies can." It will usually be impossible to do to an
or torture, that we ought not try to match. And this is offender exactly what he has done-for example, his
not merely a matter of imposing an alternative punish- offense will normally have had an element of surprise
ment that produces an equivalent amount of suffering, that is not possible for a judicially imposed punish-
as, say, some number of years in prison that might "add ment, but this fact can hardly free him from having to
up" to the harm caused by a rapist or a torturer. Even if bear the suffering he has imposed on another. Thus,
no amount of time in prison would add up to the harm for reasons of practicality, the lex talionis must nec-
caused by a torturer, it still seems that we ought not essarily be qualified to call for doing to the offender
torture him even if this were the only way of making as nearly as possible what he has done to his victim.
him suffer as much as he has made his victim suffer. Or, When, however, we refrain from raping rapists or tor-
consider someone who has committed several murders turing torturers, we do so for reasons of morality, not
in cold blood. On the lex talionis, it would seem that such of practicality. And, given the justice of the lex talio-
a criminal might justly be brought to within an inch of nis, these moral reasons cannot amount to claiming
that it would be unjust to rape rapists or torture tor- justice of the death penalty for murderers proves the
turers. Rather the claim must be that, even though justice of beating assaulters, raping rapists, and tortur-
it would be just to rape rapists and torture torturers, ing torturers. Nonetheless, I believe, and suspect that
other moral considerations weigh against doing so. most would agree, that it would not be right for us to
beat assaulters, rape rapists, or torture torturers, even
* * * though it were their just deserts-and even if this were
This way of understanding just punishment the only way to make them suffer as much as they had
enables us to formulate proportional retributivism so made their victims suffer. Calling for the abolition of
that it is compatible with acknowledging the justice the death penalty, though it be just, then, amounts to
of the lex talionis: If we take the lex talionis as spell- urging that as a society we place execution in the same
ing out the offender'S just deserts, and if other moral category of sanction as beating, raping, and torturing,
considerations require us to refrain from matching the and treat it as something it would also not be right for
injury caused by the offender while still allowing us to us to do to offenders, even if it were their just deserts.
punish justly, then surely we impose just punishment To argue for placing execution in this category,
if we impose the closest morally acceptable approxi- I must show what would be gained therefrom; and to
mation to the lex talionis. Proportional retributivism, show that, I shall indicate what we gain from placing
then, in requiring that the worst crime be punished torture in this category and argue that a similar gain
by the society's worst punishment and so on, could is to be had from doing the same with execution.
be understood as translating the offender'S just desert I select torture because I think the reasons for placing
into its nearest equivalent in the society's table of mor- it in this category are, due to the extremity of torture,
ally acceptable punishments. Then the two versions of most easily seen-but what I say here applies with
retributivism (lex talionis and proportional) are related appropriate modification to other severe physical pun-
in that the first states what just punishment would be ishments, such as beating and raping. First, and most
if nothing but the offender's just desert mattered, and evidently, placing torture in this category broadcasts
the second locates just punishment at the meeting the message that we as a society judge torturing so
point of the offender's just deserts and the society's horrible a thing to do to a person that we refuse to do
moral scruples. And since this second version only it even when it is deserved. Note that such a judgment
modifies the requirements of the lex talionis in light does not commit us to an absolute prohibition on tor-
of other moral considerations, it is compatible with turing. No matter how horrible we judge something to
believing that the lex talionis spells out the offender's be, we may still be justified in doing it if it is necessary
just deserts, much in the way that modifying the obli- to prevent something even worse. Leaving this aside
gations of promisers in light of other moral consid- for the moment, what is gained by broadcasting the
erations is compatible with believing in the binding public judgment that torture is too horrible to inflict
nature of promises. even if deserved?
I think the answer to this lies in what we under-
* * *
stand as civilization. In The Genealogy of Morals,
Nietzsche says that in early times ((pain did not hurt
[II.] CIVILIZATION, PAIN, AND JUSTICE as much as it does today."s The truth in this puzzling
As I have already suggested, from the fact that some- remark is that progress in civilization is character-
thing is justly deserved, it does not automatically fol- ized by a lower tolerance for one's own pain and that
low that it should be done, since there may be other suffered by others. And this is appropriate, since, via
moral reasons for not doing it such that, all told, the growth in knowledge, civilization brings increased
weight of moral reasons swings the balance against pro- power to prevent or reduce pain and, via growth in the
ceeding. The same argument that I have given for the ability to communicate and interact with more and
more people, civilization extends the circle of people Refraining from torture in particular and corporal
with whom we empathize. If civilization is character- punishment in general, we both refuse to put a fellow
ized by lower tolerance for our own pain and that of human being in this grip and refuse to show our ability
others, then publicly refusing to do horrible things to to resist this Wish. The death penalty is the last corpo-
our fellows both signals the level of our civilization ral punishment used officially in the modern world.
and, by our example, continues the work ofcivilizing. And And it is corporal not only because administered via
this gesture is all the more powerful if we refuse to do the body, but because the pain of foreseen, humanly
horrible things to those who deserve them. I contend administered death strikes us with the urgency that
then that the more things we are able to include in characterizes intense physical pain, causing grown
this category, the more civilized we are and the more men to cry, faint, and lose control of their bodily func-
civilizing. Thus we gain from including torture in this tions. There is something to be gained by refusing to
category, and if execution is especially horrible, we endorse the hardness of heart necessary to impose
gain still more by including it. such a fate.
By placing execution alongside torture in the
* * * category of things we will not do to our fellow human
Thus far, by analogy with torture, I have argued beings even when they deserve them, we broadcast
that execution should be avoided because of how the message that totally subjugating a person to
horrible it is to the one executed. But there are reasons the power of others and confronting him with the
of another sort that follow from the analogy with tor- advent of his own humanly administered demise is
ture. Torture is to be avoided not only because of what too horrible to be done by civilized human beings
it says about what we are willing to do to our fellows, to their fellows even when they have earned it: too
but also because of what it says about us who are will- horrible to do, and too horrible to be capable of
ing to do it. To torture someone is an awful spectacle doing. And I contend that broadcasting this mes-
not only because of the intensity of pain imposed, but sage loud and clear would in the long run contribute
because of what is required to be able to impose such to the general detestation of murder and be, to the
pain on one's fellows. The tortured body cringes, using extent to which it worked itself into the hearts and
its full exertion to escape the pain imposed upon it-it minds of the populace, a deterrent. In short, refus-
literally begs for relief with its muscles as it does with ing to execute murderers though they deserve it both
its cries. To torture someone is to demonstrate a capac- reflects and continues the taming of the human spe-
ity to resist this begging, and that in turn demon- cies that we call civilization. Thus, I take it that the
strates a kind of hardheartedness that a society ought abolition of the death penalty, though it is a just pun-
not parade. ishment for murder, is part of the civilizing mission
And this is true not only of torture, but of all severe of modern states.
corporal punishment. Indeed, I think this constitutes
* * *
part of the answer to the puzzling question of why we
refrain from punishments like whipping, even when NOTES
the alternative (some months in jail versus some
1. Asked, in a 1981 Gallup Poll, "Are you in favor of the death
lashes) seems more costly to the offender. Imprison-
penalty for persons convicted of murder?" 66.25% were in
ment is painful to be sure, but it is a reflective pain,
favor, 25% were opposed, and 8.75% had no opinion. Asked
one that comes with comparing what is to what might the same question in 1966,47.5% were opposed, 41.25% were
have been, and that can be temporarily ignored by in favor, and 11.25% had no opinion (Timothy j. Flanagan,
thinking about other things. But physical pain has an David]. van Alstyne, and Michael R. Gottfredson, eds., Source-
urgency that holds body and mind in a fierce grip. Of book of Criminal Justice Statistics-1981, U.S. Department of
physical pain, as Orwell's Winston Smith recognized, justice, Bureau of justice Statistics [Washington, D.C.: U.S.
"you could only wish one thing: that it should stop.,,9 Government Printing Office, 19821, p. 209).
2. I shall speak throughout of retribution as paying back for right is a certain equality of sovereignty between the wills of
"harm caused," but this is shorthand for "harm intention- individuals, crime disrupts that equality by placing one will
ally attempted or caused"; likewise when I speak of the death above others, and punishment restores the equality byannul-
penalty as punishment for murder, I have in mind premedi- ling the illegitimate ascendance. On these grounds, as I shall
tated, first-degree murder. Note also that the harm caused suggest below, the desire for revenge (strictly limited to the
by an offender, for which he is to be paid back, is not neces- desire "to even the score") is more respectable than philOSO-
sarily limited to the harm done to his immediate victim. It phers have generally allowed. And so Hegel writes that "The
may include as well the suffering of the victim's relatives or annulling of crime in this sphere where right is immediate
the fear produced in the general populace, and the like. For [Le., the condition prior to conscious morality] is principally
simplicity's sake, however, I shall continue to speak as if the revenge, which is just in its content in so far as it is retribu-
harm for which retributivism would have us pay the offender tive" (ibid., p. 73).
back is the harm (intentionally attempted or done) to his 5. Kant writes that "any undeserved evil that you inflict on
immediate victim. Also, retribution is not to be confused someone else among the people is one that you do to yourself.
with restitution. Restitution involves restoring the status quo If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you
ante, the condition prior to the offense. Since it was in this steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself." Since
condition that the criminal's offense was committed, it is this Kant holds that "If what happens to someone is also willed by
condition that constitutes the baseline against which retribu- him, it cannot be a punishment," he takes pains to distance
tion is exacted. Thus retribution involves imposing a loss on himself from the view that the offender wills his punishment.
the offender measured from the status quo ante. For example, "The chief error contained in this sophistry," Kant writes,
returning a thief's loot to his victim so that thief and victim "consists in the confusion of the criminal's [that is, the mur-
now own what they did before the offense is restitution. Taking derer's] own judgment (which one must necessarily attribute
enough from the thief so that what he is left with is less than to his reason) that he must forfeit his life with a resolution of
what he had before the offense is retribution, since this is just the will to take his own life" (Immanuel Kant, The Metaphy-
what he did to his victim. sical Elements of Justice, Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals,
3. "The most extreme form of retributivism is the law of retali- trans. by J. Ladd [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965; originally
ation: 'an eye for an eye'" (Stanley I. Benn, "Punishment," published in 1797], pp. 101, 105-106). I have tried to capture
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 7, ed. Paul Edwards [New York: this notion of attributing a judgment to the offender rather
Macmillan, 1967J, p. 32). Hugo Bedau writes: "retributive jus- than a resolution of his will with the term 'authorizes.'
tice need not be thought to consist of lex talionis. One may 6. "Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common
reject that principle as too crude and still embrace the retribu- agreement of all its members ... , the last murderer remain-
tive principle that the severity of punishments should be ing in prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly
graded according to the gravity of the offense" (Hugo Bedau, receive what his actions are worth" (Kant, ibid., p. 102).
"Capital Punishment," in Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom
7. "It may also be pointed out that no one has ever heard
Regan [New York: Random House, 1980], p. 177).
of anyone condemned to death on account of murder who
4. Hegel writes that "The sole positive existence which the complained that he was getting too much [punishment]
injury [Le., the crime] possesses is that it is the particular will and therefore was being treated unjustly; everyone would
of the criminal [Le., it is the criminal's intention that distin- laugh in his face if he were to make such a statement" (Kant,
guishes criminal injury from, say, injury due to an accident]. MetaphYSical Elements oflustice, p. 104; see also p. 133).
Hence to injure (or penalize) this particular will as a will 8. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy
determinately existent is to annul the crime, which otherwise of Morals, trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday,
would have been held valid, and to restore the right" (G. W.
1956), pp. 199-200.
F. Hegel, The Philosophy ofRight, trans. by T. M. Knox [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1962; originally published in German in 9. George Orwell, 1984 (New York: New American Library,
1821], p. 69, see also p. 331n). I take this to mean that the 1983; originally published in 1949), p. 197.
The Case against the Death Penalty

HUGO ADAM BEDAU
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL DEFENSE must try to get out of the way, lest unnecessary violence
The Analogy with Self-Defense be used to resist aggression. Now suppose that unjust
aggression is imminent, and there is no path open for
Capital punishment, it is sometimes said, is to the
escape. How much violence may justifiably be used to
body politic what self-defense is to the individual. If
ward off aggression? The answer is: No more violence
the latter is not morally wrong, how can the former
than is necessary to prevent the aggressive assault.
be? To assess the strength of this analogy, we need first
Violence beyond that is unnecessary and therefore
to inspect the morality of self-defense.
unjustified. We may restate the principle governing
Except for absolute pacifists, who believe it is
the use of violence in self-defense by reference to the
morally wrong to use violence even to defend them-
concept of "deadly force" by the police in the discharge
selves or others from undeserved aggression, most of
of their duties. The rule is this: Use of deadly force is
us believe that it is not morally wrong and may even
justified only to prevent loss of life in immediate jeop-
be our moral duty to use violence to prevent aggres-
ardy where a lesser use of force cannot reasonably be
sion directed against either ourselves or innocent
expected to save the life that is threatened.
third parties. The law has long granted persons the
In real life, violence in self-defense in excess of
right to defend themselves against the unjust aggres-
the minimum necessary to prevent aggression, even
sions of others, even to the extent of using lethal force
though it is not justifiable, is often excusable. One can-
to kill an assailant. It is very difficult to think of any
not always tell what will suffice to deter an aggressor
convincing argument that would show it is never
and avoid becoming a victim; thus the law looks with
rational to risk the death of another to prevent death a certain tolerance upon the frightened and innocent
or grave injury to oneself. Certainly self-interest dic- would-be victim who in self-protection turns upon a
tates the legitimacy of self-defense. So does concern vicious assailant and inflicts a fatal injury even though
for the well-being of others. So also does justice. If it a lesser injury would have been sufficient. What is not
is unfair for one person to inflict undeserved violence justified is deliberately using more violence than is nec-
on another, then it is hard to see how morality could essary to avoid becoming a victim. It is the deliberate,
require the victim to acquiesce in the attempt by not the impulsive or the unintentional, use of violence
another to do so, even if resistance involves risks or that is relevant to the death-penalty controversy, since
injury to the assailant. the death penalty is enacted into law and carried ?ut
The foregoing account assumes that the person in each case deliberately-with ample time to weigh
acting in self-defense is innocent of any provocation alternatives. Notice that we are assuming that the act
of the assailant. It also assumes that there is no alter- of self-defense is to protect oneself or a third party. The
native to victimization except resistance. In actual life, reasoning outlined here does not extend to the defense
both assumptions-especially the second-are often of one's property. Shooting a thief to prevent one's auto-
false, because there may be a third alternative: escape, mobile from being stolen cannot be excused or justified
or removing oneself from the scene 0 f Immme · . nt
in the way that shooting an assailant charging with a
aggression. Hence, the law imposes on us the "duty to knife pointed at one's face can be. Our criterion must
retreat." Before we use violence to resist aggression, we be that deadly force is never justified to prevent crimes
against property or other violent crimes not immedi-
From Hugo Adam Bedau, "Capital Punishment," in Matters of ately threatening the life of an innocent person.
Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993),
177-79, 181-91. Copyright © 1993 McGraw-Hill Education.
The rationale for self-defense as set out above illus-
Reprinted by permission. trates two moral principles of great importance to our
discussion .... One is that if a life is to be risked, then better deterrent than the alternative of imprisonment.
it is better that it be the life of someone who is guilty Their verdict, while not unanimous, is nearly so. What-
(in this context, the initial assailant) rather than the ever may be true about the deterrence of lesser crimes
life of someone who is not (the innocent potential vic- by other penalties, the deterrence achieved by the
tim). It is not fair to expect the innocent prospective death penalty for murder is not measurably any greater
victim to run the added risk of severe injury or death than the deterrence achieved by long-term imprison-
in order to avoid using violence in self-defense to the ment. In the nature of the case, the evidence is qUite
extent of possibly killing his or her assailant. Rather, indirect. No one can identify for certain any crimes
fairness dictates that the guilty aggressor ought to be that did not occur because the would-be offender was
the one to run the risk. deterred by the threat of the death penalty and could
The other principle is that taking life deliberately not have been deterred by a less severe threat. Likewise,
is not justified so long as there is any feasible alterna- no one can identify any crimes that did occur because
tive. One does not expect miracles, of course, but in the offender was not deterred by the threat of prison
theory, if shooting a burglar through the foot will even though he or she could have been deterred by
stop the burglary and enable one to call the police for the threat of death. Nevertheless, such evidence as we
help, then there is no reason to shoot to kill. Likewise, have fails to show that the more severe penalty (death)
if the burglar is unarmed, there is no reason to shoot is really a better deterrent than the less severe penalty
at all. In actual life, of course, a burglar is likely to be (imprisonment) for such crimes as murder.
shot at by an aroused householder who does not know If the death penalty and long-term imprisonment
whether the burglar is armed, and prudence may seem are equally effective (or ineffective) as deterrents to
to dictate the assumption that he or she is. Even so, murder, then the argument for the death penalty on
although the burglar has no right to commit a felony grounds of deterrence is seriously weakened. One
against a person or a person's property, the attempt of the moral principles identified earlier now comes
does not give the victims the right to respond in into play: Unless there is a good reason for choos-
whatever way they please, and then to excuse or jus- ing a more rather than a less severe punishment for a
tify such conduct on the ground that they were "only crime, the less severe penalty is to be preferred. This
acting in self-defense." In these ways the law shows a principle obviously commends itself to anyone who
tacit regard for the life even of a felon and discourages values human life and who concedes that, all other
the use of unnecessary violence even by the innocent; things being equal, less pain and suffering is always
morality can hardly do less. better than more. Human life is valued in part to the
degree that it is free of such experiences when they
***
serve no known purpose. If the death penalty is not a
more effective deterrent than imprisonment, then its
The Death Penalty and Deterrence greater severity amounts to nothing less than gratu-
Determining whether the death penalty is an effec- itous suffering and deprivation. Accordingly, we must
tive deterrent is even more difficult than determin- reject it in favor of some less severe alternative, unless
ing its effectiveness as a crime preventive. In general, we can identify some more weighty moral principle
our knowledge about how penalties deter crimes and that the death penalty serves better and that any less
whether in fact they do-whom they deter, from which severe mode of punishment ignores. Whether there is
crimes, and under what conditions-is distressingly any such principle is unclear.
inexact. Most people nevertheless are convinced that
punishments do deter, and that the more severe a pun- A Cost/Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty
ishment is the better it will deter. For half a century, A full study of the costs and benefits involved in the
social scientists have studied the questions whether practice of capital punishment would not be con-
the death penalty is a deterrent and whether it is a fined solely to the question of whether it is a better
deterrent or preventive of murder than imprisonment. What If Executions Did Deter?

Any thoroughgoing utilitarian approach to the death- From the moral point of View, it is quite important to
penalty controversy would need to examine carefully determine what one should think about capital pun-
other costs and benefits as well, because maximizing ishment if the evidence were clearly to show that the
the balance of all the social benefits over all the social death penalty is a distinctly superior method of social
costs is the sole criterion of right and wrong according defense by comparison with less severe alternatives.
to utilitarianism .... Let us consider, therefore, some Kantian moralists, as we have seen, ... would have no
of the other costs and benefits to be calculated. Clini- use for such knowledge, because their entire case for
cal psychologists have presented evidence to suggest the morality of the death penalty rests on the way it
that the death penalty actually incites some persons is thought to provide just retribution, not on the way
of unstable mind to murder others, either because it is thought to provide superior social defense. For a
they are afraid to take their own lives and hope that utilitarian, however, such knowledge would be con-
society will punish them for murder by putting them clusive. Those who follow Locke's reasoning would
to death, or because they fancy that they, too, are also be gratified, because they defend the morality of
killing with justification analogously to the lawful the death penalty both on the ground that it is retribu-
and presumably justified killing involved in capital tively just and on the ground that it provides needed
punishment. If such evidence is sound, capital pun- social defense.
ishment can serve as a counter·preventive or even an What about the opponents of the death penalty,
incitement to murder; such lncited murders become however? To oppose the death penalty in the face of
part of its social cost. Imprisonment, however, has not incontestable evidence that it is an effective method of
been known to incite any murders or other crimes of social defense violates the moral principle that where
violence in a comparable fashion. (A possible excep- grave risks are to be run, it is better that they be run
tion might be found in the imprisonment of terrorists, by the guilty than by the innocent. Consider in this
which has inspired other terrorists to take hostages connection an imaginary world in which executing
as part of a scheme to force the authorities to release the murderer would invariably restore the murder vic-
their imprisoned comrades.) The risks of executing the tim to life, whole and intact, as though no murder had
innocent are also part of the social cost. The histori- ever occurred. In such a miraculous world, it is hard
cal record is replete with innocent persons arrested, to see how anyone could oppose the death penalty on
indicted, convicted, sentenced, and occasionally moral grounds. Why shouldn't a murderer die if that
legally executed for crimes they did not commit. will infallibly bring the innocent victim back to life?
This is quite apart from the guilty persons unfairly What could possibly be morally wrong with taking the
convicted, sentenced to death, and executed on the murderer's life under such conditions? The death pen-
strength of perjured testimony, fraudulent evidence, alty would be an instrument of perfect restitution, and
subornation of jurors, and other violations of the it would give a new and better meaning to lex talionis,
civil rights and liberties of the accused. Nor is this all. "a life for a life." The whole idea is fanCiful, of course,
The high costs of a capital trial and of the inevitable but it shows as nothing else can how opposition to
appeals, the costly methods of custody most prisons the death penalty cannot be both moral and wholly
adopt for convicts on "death row," are among the unconditional. If opposition to the death penalty is to
straightforward economic costs that the death pen- be morally responsible, then it must be conceded that
alty incurs. Conducting a valid cost/benefit analysis there are conditions (however unlikely) under which
of capital punishment would be extremely difficult; that opposition should cease.
nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence we have, it is But even if the death penalty were known to be a
quite possible that such a study would show that abo- uniquely effective social defense, we could still imag-
lition of all death penalties is much less costly than ine conditions under which it would be reasonable to
their retention. oppose it. Suppose that in addition to being a slightly
better preventive and deterrent than imprisonment, no more than does executing one in a hundred and no
executions also have a slight incitive effect (so that for more than does a random pattern of executions.
every ten murders an execution prevented or deterred, Many people contemplating situation (1) would
another murder was incited). Suppose also that the regard this as a reasonable trade-off: The execution
administration of criminal justice in capital cases was of each additional guilty person saves the lives of ten
inefficient and unequal, and tended to secure convic- innocent ones. (In fact, situation (1) or something like
tions and death sentences only for murderers who it may be taken as a description of what most of those
least "deserved" to be sentenced to death (including who defend the death penalty on grounds of social
some death sentences and a few executions of the defense believe is true.) But suppose that, instead of
innocent). Under such conditions, it would be reason- saving 10 lives, the number dropped to 0.5, Le., one
able to oppose the death penalty, because on the facts victim avoided for each two additional executions.
supposed more (or not fewer) innocent lives would be Would that be a reasonable price to pay? We are on
threatened and lost by using the death penalty than the road toward the situation described in (2), where a
would be risked by abolishing it. It is important to drastic 90 percent reduction in the number of persons
remember throughout our evaluation of the deterrence executed causes the level of social defense to drop by
controversy that we cannot ever apply the principle ... only 0.0002 percent. Would it be worth it to execute so
that advises us to risk the lives of the guilty to save the many more murderers to obtain such a slight increase
lives of the innocent. Instead, we must r~ly on a weaker in social defense? How many guilty lives is one inno-
principle: Weigh the risk for the general public against cent Uf~ worth? (Only those who think that guilty
the execution of those who are found guilty by an lives are worthless-or of worth eqlHll to that of the
imperfect system of criminal justice. These hypotheti- innocent-can avoid facing this problem.) In situation
cal factual assumptions illustrate the contingencies (3), of course, there is no basis for executing all con-
upon which the morality of opposition to the death victed murderers, since there is no gain in social defense
penalty rests. And not only the morality of opposition; to show for each additional execution after the first out
the morality of any defense of the death penalty rests of each hundred has been executed. How, then, should
on the same contingencies. This should help us under- we determine which out of each hundred convicted
stand why, in resolving the morality of capital punish- murderers is the unlucky one to be put to death?
ment one way or the other, it is so important to know, If a complete and thoroughgoing cost/benefit
as well as we can, whether the death penalty really does analYSis of the death penalty were possible, we might
prevent or incite crime, whether the innocent really be able to answer such questions. But an appeal
are ever executed, and how likely is the occurrence of merely to the moral principle that if lives are to be
these things in the future. risked then let it be the lives of the guilty rather than
of the innocent will not suffice. (We have already
How Many Guilty Lives Is One Innocent Life Worth? noticed ... that this abstract principle is of little
The great unanswered question that utilitarians must use in the actual administration of criminal justice,
face concerns the level of social defense that executions because the police and the courts do not deal with
should be expected to achieve before it is justifiable the guilty as such but only with those judged guilty.)
to carry them out. Consider three possible situations: Nor will it suffice to agree that society deserves all
(1) At the level of a hundred executions per year, each the crime prevention and deterrence it can get as a
additional execution of a convicted murderer reduces result of inflicting severe punishments. These prin-
the number of murder victims by ten. (2) Executing ciples are consistent with too many different poli-
every convicted murderer reduces the number of mur- cies. They are too vague by themselves to resolve
.1 •
ders to 5,000 victims annually, whereas executing only the chOice on grounds of social defense when one IS
one out of ten reduces the number to 5,001. (3) Execut- confronted with hypothetical situations like those
ing every convicted murderer reduces the murder rate proposed above.
Since no adequate cost/benefit analysis of the we thought that the most important single thing to
death penalty exists, there is no way to resolve these do with social resources is to punish crimes. Fortu-
questions from that standpoint at this time. Moreover, nately, this principle need not be in dispute between
it can be argued that we cannot have such an analysis proponents and opponents of the death penalty.
without already establishing in some way or other the Even defenders of the death penalty must admit that
relative value of innocent lives versus guilty lives. Far putting a convicted murderer in prison for years is
from being a product of cost/benefit analysis, a com- a punishment of that criminal. The principle that
parative evaluation of lives would have to be available crime must be punished is neutral to our controversy,
to us before we undertook any such analysis. Without because both sides acknowledge it.
it, no cost/benefit analysis of this problem can get off The other principle of retributive justice is the
the ground. Finally, it must be noted that our knOWl- one that seems to be decisive. Under lex talionis, it
edge at present does not indicate that we are in any- must always have seemed that murderers ought to be
thing like the situation described above in (1). On the put to death. Proponents of the death penalty, with
contrary, from the evidence we do have it seems we rare exceptions, have insisted on this point, and even
achieve about the same deterrent and preventive effects opponents of the death penalty must give grudging
whether we punish murder by death or by impris- assent to the seeming fittingness of demanding capital
onment.... Something like the situation in (2) or in punishment for murder. The strategy for opponents
(3) may therefore be correct. If so, this shows that the of the death penalty is to argue either that (1) this
choice between the two policies of capital punishment principle is not really a principle of justice after all,
and life imprisonment for murder will probably have or that (2) to the extent it is, it does not require death
to be made on some basis other than social defense; for murderers, or that (3) in any case it is not the only
on that basis alone, the two policies are equivalent and principle of punitive justice. As we shall see, all these
therefore equally acceptable. objections have merit.
Is Murder Alone to Be Punished by Death?

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT Let us recall, first, that not even the biblical world lim-
AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ited the death penalty to the punishment of murder.
No discussion of the morality of punishment would Many other non homicidal crimes also carried this
be complete without taking into account the two penalty (e.g., kidnapping, witchcraft, cursing one's
leading principles of retributive justice relevant to parents). In our own nation's recent history, persons
the capital punishment controversy. One is the prin- have been executed for aggravated assault, rape, kid-
ciple that crimes ought to be punished. The other is napping, armed robbery, sabotage, and espionage. It
the principle that the severity of a punishment ought is not possible to defend any of these executions (not
to be proportional to the gravity of the offense. These to mention some of the more bizarre capital stat-
are moral principles of recognized weight. Leaving aside utes, like the one in Georgia that used to provide an
all questions of social defense, how strong a case for optional death penalty for desecration of a grave) on
capital punishment can be made on their basis? How grounds of just retribution. Either such executions
reliable and persuasive are these principles themselves? are not justified or they are justified on some ground
other than retribution. In actual practice, few if any
Crime Must Be Punished defenders of the death penalty have ever been will-
Given the general rationale for punishment sketched ing to rest their case entirely on the moral principle
earlier, ... there cannot be any dispute over the prin- of just retribution as formulated in terms of Ita life
ciple that crime ought to be punished. In embracing for a life." (Kant was a conspicuous exception.) Most
it, of course, we are not automatically making a fetish defenders of the death penalty have implied by their
of "law and order," in the sense that we would be if willingness to use executions to defend not only life
but limb and property as well, that they did not place Similar skepticism has been expressed on the reliabil-
much value on the lives of criminals when compared ity and rationality of death-penalty statutes that give
with the value of both lives and things belonging to the trial court the discretion to sentence to prison or to
innocent citizens. death. As justice john Marshall Harlan of the Supreme
Court observed some two decades ago,
Are All Murders to Be Punished by Death?
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of
European civilization for several centuries has tended actually attempting to draft means of channeling capi-
to limit the variety of criminal homicides punishable tal sentencing discretion have confirmed the lesson
by death. Even Kant took a casual attitude toward a taught by history.... To identify before the fact those
mother's killing of her illegitimate child. ("A child born characteristics of criminal homicide and their perpe-
into the world outside marriage is outside the law ... , trators which call for the death penalty, and to express
and consequently it is also outside the protection of these characteristics in language which can be fairly
the law."l) In the United States, the development two understood and applied by the sentencing authority,
hundred years ago of the distinction between first- and appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.3
second-degree murder was an attempt to narrow the
class of criminal homicides deserving the death pen-
alty. (First-degree murder has been variously defined. The abstract prindple that the punishment of death
Typically it consists of (a) any willful, deliberate, pre- best fits the crime of murder turns out to be extremely
meditated homicide or (b) any homicide during the difficult to interpret and apply.
commission of another felony, e.g., armed rObbery, If we look at the matter from the standpoint of
rape, burglary. Second-degree murder is any other the actual practice of criminal justice, we can only
intentional homicide.) Yet those dead owing to man- conclude that "a life for a life" plays little or no role
slaughter, or to any kind of unintentional, accidental whatever. Plea bargaining (in which a person charged
unpremeditated, unavoidable, unmalicious killing ar~ with a crime pleads guilty in exchange for a less severe
just as dead as the victims of the most ghastly murder. sentence than he might have received if his case went
Both the law in practice and moral reflection show to trial and he was found guilty), even where murder
how difficult it is to identify all and only the criminal is concerned, is widespread. Studies of criminal jus-
homicides that are appropriately punished by death tice reveal that what the courts (trial or appellate) in a
(assuming that any are). Individual judges and juries given jurisdiction decide on a given day is first-degree
differ in the conclusions they reach. The history of murder suitably punished by death could just as well
capital punishment for homicides reveals continual have been decided in a neighboring jurisdiction on
efforts, uniformly unsuccessful, to specify the criteria another day either as second-degree murder or as first-
defining those homicides for which the slayer should degree murder but without the death penalty. The
die. Sixty years ago, justice Benjamin Cardozo of the factors that influence prosecutors in determining the
United States Supreme Court said of the distinction charge under which they will prosecute go far beyond
between degrees of murder that it was the simple principle of "a life for a life." CyniCS, of
course, will say that these facts show that our soci-
... so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time ety does not care about justice. One might also reply
can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand that either justice in punishment does not consist
it. I am not at all sure that I understand it myself after of retribUtion, because there are other principles of
trying to apply it for many years and after diligent justicej or there are other moral considerations
study of what has been written in the books. Upon besides justice that must be honoredj or retributive
the basis of this fine distinction with its obscure and justice is not adequately expressed in the idea of lla
mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to life for a life"j or justice in the criminal justice system
their death. 2 is beyond our reach.
Is Death Suffidently Retributive? on him and who, from that moment onward, had con-
fined him at his mercy for months. Such a monster is
Those who advocate capital punishment for mur-
not encountered in private life. 4
der on retributive grounds must face the objection
that, on their own principles, the death penalty in Differential Severity Does Not Require Executions
some cases is morally inadequate. How could death
What, then, emerges from our examination of retribu-
in the electric chair or the gas chamber or before a
tive justice and the death penalty? If retributive justice
firing squad or by lethal injection suffice as just ret-
is thought to consist in lex talionis, all one can say is
ribution, given the savage, brutal, wanton character
that this principle has never exercised more than a
of so many murders? How can retributive justice be
crude and indirect effect on the actual punishments
served by anything less than equally savage meth-
meted out by SOCiety. Other moral principles interfere
ods of execution? From a retributive point of view,
with a literal and single-minded application of this
the oft-heard exclamation, "Death is too good for
one. Some homicides seem improperly punished by
him!," has a certain truth. Are defenders of the death
death at all; others would require methods of execu-
penalty willing to embrace this consequence of their
tion too horrible to inflict. In any case, proponents of
own doctrine?
the death penalty rarely confine themselves to reli-
If they were, they would be stooping to the squalor
ance on nothing but this principle of just retribution,
of the murderer. Where the quality of the crime sets
since they rarely confine themselves to supporting the
the limits of just methods of punishment, as it will if
death penalty only for murder.
we attempt to give exact and literal implementation
But retributive justice need not be identified with
to lex talionis, society will find itself descending to the
lex talionis. One may reject that principle as too crude
cruelties and savagery that criminals employ. What is
and still embrace the retributive principle that the
worse, society would be deliberately authorizing such
severity of punishments should be graded according
acts, in the cool light of reason, and not (as is usually
to the gravity of the offense. Even though one need
true of vicious criminals) impulsively or in hatred and
not claim that life imprisonment (or any kind of pun-
anger or with an insane or unbalanced mind. Moral
ishment other than death) "fits" the crime of murder
one can claim that this punishment is the proper on~
constraints, in short, prohibit us from trying to make
executions perfectly retributive. Once we grant that
for murder. To do this, the schedule of punishments
such constraints are proper, it is unreasonable to insist
accepted by SOCiety must be arranged so that this
that the principle of "a life for a life" nevertheless by
mode of imprisonment is the most severe penalty
itself justifies the execution of murderers.
used. Opponents of the death penalty can embrace
Other considerations take us in a different direction.
this principle of retributive justice, even though they
Few murders, outside television and movie scripts,
must reject a literal lex talionis.
involve anything like an execution. An execution, after
all, begins with a solemn pronouncement of the death
Equal Justice and Capital Punishment
sentence from a judge; this is followed by detention of
the convicted person in maximum security awaiting During the past generation, the strongest practical
the date of execution, during which various complex objection to the death penalty has been the inequity
and protracted appeals will be pursued; after this there with which it has been applied. As the late Supreme
is a clemency hearing before the governor, and then Court Justice William O. Douglas once observed,
lithe last mile" to the execution chamber itself. As the "One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution
French writer Albert Camus once remarked, of any member of the affluent strain of the society."s One
does not search our chronicles in vain for the crime of
For there to be an equivalence, the death penalty would murder committed by the affluent. All the sociologi-
have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim cal evidence pOints to the conclusion that the death
of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death penalty is the poor man's justice; hence the slogan,
"Those without the capital get the punishment." The argued against the death penalty before the Supreme
death penalty is also racially sensitive. Every study Court during 1972, "It is a freakish aberration, a ran-
of the death penalty for rape (unconstitutional only dom extreme act of violence, visibly arbitrary and
since 1977) has confirmed that black rapists (especially discriminatory-a penalty reserved for unusual appli-
where the victim is white) are far more likely to be sen- cation because, if it were usually used, it would affront
tenced to death and executed than white rapists. Con- universally shared standards of public decency.,,6 It is
victed black murderers are more likely to end up on difficult to dispute this judgment, when one considers
"death row" than are others, and the killers of whites that there have been in the United States during the
(whether white or nonwhite) are more likely to be sen- past fifty years about half a million criminal homi-
tenced to death than are the killers of nonwhites. cides, about a third of a million persons arrested for
Let us suppose that the factual basis for such a crit- these crimes, but fewer than four thousand executions
icism is sound. What follows for the morality of capi- (all but three dozen of which were of men).
tal punishment? Many defenders of the death penalty We can look at these statistics in another way
have been quick to point out that since there is noth- to illustrate the same pOint. If we could be assured
ing intrinsic about the crime of murder or rape dictat- that the nearly four thousand persons executed were
ing that only the poor or only racial-minority males the worst of the bad, repeated offenders impossible
will commit it, and since there is nothing overtly rac- to incarcerate safely (much less to rehabilitate), the
ist about the statutes that authorize the death penalty most dangerous murderers in captivity-the ones
for murder or rape, capital punishment itself is hardly who had killed more than once and were likely to kill
at fault if in practice it falls with unfair impact on the again, and the least likely to be confined in prison
poor and the black. There is, in short, nothing in the without chroniC danger to other inmates and the
death penalty that requires it to be applied unfairly staff-then one might accept half a million murders
and with arbitrary or discriminatory results. At worst and a few thousand executions with a sense that
such results stem from defects in the system of admin- rough justice had been done. But the truth is other-
istering criminal justice. (Some, who dispute the wise. Persons are sentenced to death and executed
facts cited above, would deny even this.) There is an not because they have been found to be uncontrolla-
adequate remedy-execute more whites, women, and bly violent or hopelessly poor risks for safe confine-
affluent murderers. ment and release. Instead, they are executed because
Presumably, both proponents and opponents of at trial they had a poor defense (inexperienced or
capital punishment would concede that it is a funda- overworked counsel); they had no funds to bring
mental dictate of justice that a punishment should sympathetic witnesses to court; they are transients
not be unfairly-inequitably or unevenly-enforced or strangers in the community where they are tried;
and applied. They should also be able to agree that the prosecuting attorney wanted the publicity that
when the punishment in question is the extremely goes with "sending a killer to the chair"; there were
severe one of death, then the requirement to be fair no funds for an appeal or for a transcript of the trial
in using such a punishment becomes even more record; they are members of a despised racial or
stringent. There should be no dispute in the death political minority. In short, the actual study of why
penalty controversy over these principles of justice. particular persons have been sentenced to death and
The dispute should begin only when one attempts executed does not show any careful winnowing of
to connect the principles with the actual use of this the worst from the bad. It shows that those executed
punishment. were usually the unlucky victims of prejudice and
In this country, many critics of the death pen- discrimination, the losers in an arbitrary lottery that
alty have argued, we would long ago have got rid of it could just as well have spared them, the victims of
entirely if equal and fair application had been a con- the disadvantages that almost always go with pov-
dition of its use. In the words of the attorneys who erty. A system like this does not enhance human
life; it cheapens and degrades it. However heinous 2. Benjamin Cardozo, "What Medicine Can Do for Law"
murder and other crimes are, the system of capital (1928), reprinted in Margaret E. Hall, ed., Selected Writings of
punishment does not compensate for or erase those Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. New York: Fallon, 1947, p. 384.
crimes. It tends only to add new injuries of its own to 3. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), at p. 204.
the catalogue of human brutality. 4. Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death. New York:
Knopf, 1961, p. 199.
***
5. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), at pp. 251-252.
6. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Brief for Peti-
NOTES
tioner in Aikens v. California, O.T. 1971, No. 68-5027, reprinted
1. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements oflustice (1797), in Philip English Mackey, ed., Voices Against Death: American
Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill (1965), translated by John Opposition to Capital Punishment, 1787-1975. New York: Burt
Ladd, p. 106. Franklin, 1976, p. 288.
CHAPTER 19
War, Terrorism, and Torture
When has HOl1l0 sapiens ever been nonviolent? issues arising from political violence in the form
Probably never. The evolution of humans parallels of war, terrorism, and torture. They have clarified
the evolution of their instruments for killing each concepts, sharpened the focus of moral debate, and
other. Violence seems as much a part of human arrived at some well-argued answers to the major
life as it ever was, except that the efficiency of our questions. In this chapter, we examine some of this
violent methods has improved. Spears can dispatch important philosophical work.
one person at a time, but smart bombs can kill by
the dozens, and nuclear weapons can eliminate the
human race altogether. ISSUE FILE: BACI<GROUND
Fortunately, while human beings have been We all know what violence is. Or do we? In fact,
inflicting violence, they have also been raising moral the term violence in common usage has multiple
questions about its use. The central concern is this: meanings and is difficult to pin down. Consider:
When, if ever, are we morally justified in resorting we often refer to the violence of a storm, or to a
to it? Is every use of violence wrong, as Buddhist Violent mood, or to the violence of social injus-
and Christian doctrines have insisted? To just about tice, or to the violence done by anything we dis-
everyone, violence is inherently bad, an evil in itself. approve of (as in ucensorship is violence against
If so, how can perpetrating it ever be morally permis- the human spirit" or uyour remarks are violent
sible? If we condemn an aggressor for his assault on acts against minorities"). But if we are to make
the innocent, what should we say when the inno- sense of moral arguments regarding violence, we
cent rise up and kill him in self-defense? Should must be clear about the meaning of the term. For
we condemn them too? Is violence ever justified to the purposes of this discussion, we can define
protect something less valuable than your life-your violence (against people) as some philosophers
property, your rights, your reputation, your income? have: the physical or psychological attack on, or
All these questions apply with double force to the vigorous abuse of, persons, causing their suf-
political violence, the resort to violence for political fering, injury, or death. (Violence can also involve
ends. War, terrorism, torture, revolution, assassina- the destroying or damaging of property.) By this
tion, civil war, and violent demonstrations-these definition, striking, shoving, stabbing, raping,
are all paradigm cases of violence with political and shooting someone are clear instances of vio-
aims. Unlike personal violence (for example, mug- lence, and so are political acts such as wars, terror-
gings, shootings, and rapes), political violence is ism, torture, and the like. We would also count as
large in its scale and its effects. A war can involve violence the severe harming of a person psycho-
millions; terrorism can terrify thousands. logically through verbal abuse or humiliation.
In recent years, philosophers have paid a lot of Denying people the right to vote, perpetuating
attention to the morality of violence, especially to social inequalities, and defaming a person may
657
be immoral or illegal, but these actions are not Niccolb Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Thomas
examples of violence as just defined. Hobbes (1588-1679); modern realists include Rein-
Most people hold that because violence is inher- hold Niebuhr and Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secre-
ently bad, it should be used only if there is strong tary of state for the Nixon administration.
moral justification for it. In other words, violence Realists may argue that morality has no part
is prima facie wrong-wrong unless there are good to play in warfare because all moral statements
reasons for thinking it morally permissible. Thus are meaningless or unknowable or because moral
people often speak of war and other modes of vio- norms do not apply to states, just to persons. The
lence as things to be resorted to, actions to be taken former claim denies that there can be appeals to
only after other options are exhausted. any moral standards at all and is therefore vulnera-
But why is violence wrong? One answer often ble to the usual arguments that philosophers make
given is that it constitutes a violation of people's against such moral skepticism (see Chapter 2).
rights-their right to life, self-determination, respect To the latter view, some nonrealists may reply that
as a person, or immunity from harm. Another view there is no good reason to think that states are
is that violence is prima facie wrong because it runs exempt from moral judgments. Nonrealists may
afoul of the moral principles of justice, freedom, and also insist that despite the seemingly unrestrained
utility (human welfare). Some argue that the wrong- brutality of war, common sense suggests that some-
ness of violence arises from its detrimental effects times moral norms do apply to warfare. According
on society: it's wrong because it makes sOciety worse to this pOSition, even when people favor a war of
off than if no violence were present. This is one way extreme, indeed savage, measures, they tend to
to articulate a consequentialist notion of violence, believe that there are at least some moral limits to
but there are others, all based on the premise that what can be done. Most would probably balk at the
violence is (generally) wrong because its bad conse- use of nuclear weapons, or the deliberate killing
quences (usually) outweigh the good. of children, or the mass rape of all noncombatant
The most destructive, horrifying violence known women.
to humans is practiced in war. War is a form of politi- Pacifism is the view that war is never morally
cal violence because its essence is violent conflict permissible. (The term is also often used to refer
between political communities, usually for the pur- to the broader idea that all violence is wrong or
pose of deciding who gets to effect political changes. that all killing is wrong.) Pacifists in this sense are
Ever since philosophers began examining the eth- opposed to all wars regardless of the reasons behind
ics of war over two millennia ago, the main moral them. They mayor may not, however, be against
questions have been (1) How-if at all-can war be all uses of personal violence, or violence between
justified? and (2) Assuming it can be justified, how individuals. They may believe, for example, that
should it be conducted? Most serious responses to personal violence in self-defense or in law enforce-
these questions have fallen into three major catego- ment may be justified. To make their case, pacifists
ries, traditionally labeled realism, padfism, and just may argue in a consequentialist vein that war is
war theory. never justified, because it always produces more
Realism (as applied to warfare) is the view that bad than good. The catastrophic loss of life and
moral standards are not applicable to war, which the widespread destruction of war can never offset
must be judged only on prudence, on how well whatever political or material gains are achieved;
war serves state interests. War cannot be immoral, riches, land, oil, or power cannot outweigh the car-
only more or less advantageous for the state. Emi- nage. Pacifists may also rely on a nonconsequen-
nent realists of the past include the philosophers tialist argument like this: War is always wrong,
CHAPTER 19: WAR. TERRORISM. AND TORTURE 0 659
because in the deliberate killing of human beings and (2) the moral permissibility of acts in war
it violates a fundamental right-the right to life. (jus in bello, or "justice in war").
This right-which may have either a religious or a Theorists have addressed jus ad bellum by
secular basis-is absolute, admitting no exceptions. specifying that going to war can be morally per-
The usual objection to the consequentialist missible only if certain requirements are met.
approach is that though war is horrific and often Aquinas urged the first three requirements in the
(perhaps usually) produces more bad than good, at following list, and later thinkers embraced them
least sometimes the results may be good overall. It and added several more. According to the theory,
is possible, this argument goes, that waging a war only if all the requirements are met can a war be
could save the lives of many more people than considered just.
are killed in the conflict or that fighting one small 1. The cause must be just. War is such a horrify-
war could prevent a much larger one. A common ing bUSiness that only a just cause-a morally legit-
objection to the pacifist's nonconsequentialist line imate reason-can justify going to war. The most
is that even though a person has a right to life, we commonly cited just cause is self-defense against
may be morally justified in killing him or her in attack. The usual thinking is that precisely as indi-
self-defense if there is no other way to save our own viduals are entitled to use violence to defend them-
lives. Thus sometimes killing in war is regrettable selves against violent personal attacks, so states
but necessary-and therefore morally permissible. have the right to defend against unjust attacks from
Just war theory is the doctrine that war may another state. The implication here is that states
be morally permissible under stipulated conditions. have no right to instigate a war.
It is a centuries-old attempt to understand how Many theorists define a just cause broadly: a
war-an enduring form of systematic killing-can just cause is resistance to substantial aggression,
be reconciled with our moral presumptions against which has been defined as "the type of aggression
killing. It specifies when resorting to war may be that violates people's most fundamental rights.,,2
morally justified and how armed conflict should be This resistance includes self-defense against exter-
conducted to meet the minimal demands of moral- nal threat, of course. But it also may encompass
ity. Thomas Aquinas produced the most influential defending the innocent from deadly attack (as
discourse on the doctrine, which has been evolv- in genOcide or "ethniC cleansing," for example),
ing ever since as both religious and secular think- defending people whose basic human rights are
ers have tried to improve it. Just war theory has being violated by a brutal regime, or defending
become the most widely used lens through which other states from unjust external attack. Some early
the ethics of war is viewed these days. As one theo- theorists thought that wars could be justifiably
rist points out, fought to convert or punish those of a different
To be sure, this tradition has often found expres- religion-a view now rejected by Western philoso-
sion in church law and theological reflection; yet it phers and theologians but still strongly supported
also appears in codifications and theories of inter- in some parts of the world.
national law, in military manuals on how rightly to Some people argue that war in self-defense
conduct war, and-as Michael Walzer has shown in
is justified only in response to an actual attack;
Just and Unjllst Wars-in the judgments and reac-
tions of common people. 1 others maintain that an attack need not be
actual but only feared-that is, a "preventive
Just war theory is concerned with two main issues: war" may be justified. But many contend that to
(1) the justification for resorting to war (tradition- start a war on such grounds is to act on a mere
ally labeled jus ad bellum, or "the justice of war") fear of the unknown and to invite other states to
launch attacks for no good reason (or for ulterior rightful government. As Aquinas says, a just war
motives). In response to this worry, a number of requires "the authority of the sovereign by whose
theorists maintain that a war is justified only if command the war is to be waged. For it is not the
the threat of attack from another state is "imme- business of a private individual to declare war.,,3
diate and imminent," which means something 3. The war should be fought with the right inten-
like "clearly about to happen." Such a war is prop- tions. Wars must be waged for the sake of the just
erly called preemptive. Much of the debate about cause, not moved by some illegitimate motive such
the United States' launching a preemptive strike as bloodlust, greed, empire expansion, or ethnic
against Iraq in 2003 has been about whether this hatred. Aquinas continues,
((immediate and imminent" standard was met as
[Ilt is necessary that the belligerents should have a
well as about whether the standard is relevant rightful intention, so that they intend the advance-
when there might be a danger from weapons of ment of good, or the avoidance of evil. ... For it may
mass destruction. happen that the war is declared by the legitimate
2. The war must be sanctioned by proper author- authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
ity. The resort to war must be approved by a state's unlawful through a wicked intention.
-
~
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Preemptive War on Iraq
According to most forms of just war theory, a an imminent, not merely a speculative threat to
preemptive attack against a state is justified only the United States. In addition, Bush said that he
if that state presents a substantial danger that is was not required to wait for the United States to
"immediate and imminent." As some commenta- be attacked, or even to wait for all of the evidence
tors on just war theory explain, "To establish this needed to show that Iraq might attack. t
condition [of immediate and imminent threat], Assume this passage is an accurate depiction of the
evidence of planning that is virtually completed pre-war situation and is the only relevant informa-
needs to be shoWFl."* Now consider this description available to you. Would you judge the threat
tion of the run-up'"to the u.s. preemptive strike on from Iraq to be "immediate and imminent"? Why
Iraq in 2003. or why not? Based on what you have learned about
[President George W. Bush] claimed that he was just war theory in this chapter, do you think a
justified [in going to war with Iraq] so as to pre- fair-minded just war theorist would say the attack
vent (really to preempt) Iraq from attacking on Iraq was justified or unjustified? Why? Do you
the United States. But such talk of prevention is believe that starting the war was just? What are
imprecise, for it may refer either to a necessary your reasons?
preemption of an impending attack or merely to
an unjustified fear as a pretext for war based on
other motivations. In his 2003 State of the Union *Larry May, Eric Rovie, and Steven Viner, introduction
speech, Bush said that "The British government to The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought Readings, eds. May, Rovie, and Viner (Upper Saddle
significant quantities of uranium from Africa." River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006), xi.
Such a claim was meant to show that Iraq posed tlbid.
4. Armed conflict should be a last resort. For a war never deliberately targeting the latter. People who
to be just, all peaceful means of sorting out differ- should not be intentionally attacked are said to
ences between adversaries should be tried first. have noncombatant immunity, a status tradi-
Diplomacy, economic pressure, world opinion- tionally reserved for women, children, the elderly,
all these avenues and others should be exhausted and the sick and injured. Though some noncom-
before employing guns and bombs. batants are almost certain to be killed or harmed in
5. The good resulting from war must be proportional any war, such tragedies are supposed to be unavoid-
to the bad. The good expected to come from fighting able or unintended and therefore pardonable.
for a just cause must be weighed against the tremen- The distinction between combatant and non-
dous evils that will inevitably accompany war- combatant is often not very clear, especially when
death, destruction, pain, and loss on a mass scale. a conflict involves fighters wearing civilian clothes
6. There must be a reasonable chance of success. and operating among peaceful inhabitants. Michael
Futile wars should not be waged. Mass killing with Walzer offers a helpful distinction by saying that
no likelihood of achieving anything is unjust. So noncombatants are those who are not "engaged in
only if success is reasonably probable should a state harm." But some thinkers have tended to blur the
resort to war. line between people usually thought to have immu-
Just war theorists believe that it is possible for nity and those who do not. They ask, Should people
a resort to war to be morally permissible while the be given immunity if they cheer on their combat-
conduct of that war is morally abhorrent. They ants, give them food, and shelter them? Are they
therefore are concerned not only with jus ad bellum really to be regarded as "innocent civilians"?
but also with jus in bello, right action during the In any case, the prohibition against intentionally
meting out of the violence. They explicitly reject attacking noncombatants is enshrined in interna-
the popular notion that once war commences, tional law and widely regarded as the most funda-
there are no moral restraints whatsoever on what mental "rule of war."
can be done to anyone or anything during the con- 2. Proportionality. The use of force should be
flict. Michael Walzer, the leading contemporary proportional to the rightful aims of the war-
advocate for just war theory, asserts that the popu- "overkill" is disallowed. Even in bitter conflict,
lar view is "profoundly wrong": combatants should not kill or destroy more than
War is indeed ugly, but there are degrees of ugliness
necessary to achieve the just ends for which the
and humane men must, as always, be concerned war is waged.
with degrees .... Surely there is a point at which the 3. No evil means. Many just war theorists main-
means employed for the sake of this or that political tain that certain tactics and weapons in war are
goal come into conflict with a more general human "evil in themselves" and thus should never be used
purpose: the maintenance of moral standards and regardless of a war's aims. Such evil means are said
the survival of some sort of international SOciety. At to include genOcide, biological or chemical warfare
that pOint, political arguments against the use of such
means are overshadowed, or ought to be, by moral
(use of anthrax and nerve gas, for example), nuclear
arguments. At that pOint, war is not merely ugly but attack, and rape.
crimina1. 4 4. Benevolent quarantine. Soldiers who surrender
to their enemies have rights and should be treated
Traditionally, requirements for jus in bello-the accordingly. They must be given "benevolent quar-
so-called rules of war-have included the following: antine" as prisoners of war (POWs)-humane cap-
1. Discrimination. Those fighting a war must dis- tivity in safe confines removed from the battlefield.
tinguish between combatants and noncombatants, In that environment they must not be subjected
to execution, torture, starvation, or other forms of executing thousands of mostly ordinary citizens.
serious abuse. In the nineteenth century, anarchists aimed to
inspire the masses to revolution with terrifying
Blood brother to war is the grisly phenomenon of deeds against established regimes. They achieved
terrorism, an old scourge that has persisted into the worldwide attention and spread public alarm-but
twenty-first century. The ethical questions it evokes no revolution-by assassinating several state lead-
are thornier than they might seem at first glance: ers, including President William McKinley in the
What is terrorism? Is terrorism ever justified? Who United States and Tsar Alexander II in Russia.
commits terrorist acts? Can states commit terror- The twentieth century had a shockingly large
ist acts? Is the United States or any other country share of terrorism, in both old and new forms
guilty of terrorism? For example, was the Allied driven by familiar and unfamiliar motives. Ter-
bombing of German cities in World War II (in rorism in the first half of the century was mostly
which hundreds of thousands of civilians died) a nationalist (as were terrorist groups in Ireland, Pal-
case of state terrorism? How should we treat terror- estine, Algeria, and the Balkans), state-sponsored
ists? How should we respond to terrorist violence? (by, for example, the Serbian and Bulgarian gov-
How much, if at all, should we curtail civil liberties ernments), and state-administered (as in Nazi
to protect ourselves against terrorism? Can we eval- Germany, Stalinist RUSSia, and several South Ameri-
uate the morality of terrorism in the same way we can dictatorships). Its preferred form was assassina-
assess the morality of war (by using, for example, tion and mass killing. The second half witnessed
just war theory)? more state-sponsored terrorism as well as the pre-
Most people probably think they know what dominance of terrorism, which was ideological or
terrorism is, yet it is notoriously difficult to define. religious. Terrorism in this period was distinguished
One of the main challenges is to differentiate ter- by its heavy reliance on the horrors of airline
rorism from acts of war and violent crimes. In the hijackings, kidnappings, and suicide bombings.
definition adopted by the U.S. Department of State, According to the Center for Defense Information,
terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the numbers of
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
those groups that might be described as terror-
by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually ist swelled to include not only nationalists, but
intended to influence an audience."s According to those motivated by ethnic and ideological consid-
a 1974 British government definition, terrorism is erations. The former included groups such as the
"the use of violence for political ends, and includes Palestinian Liberation Organization (and its many
any use of violence for the purpose of putting affiliates), the Basque ETA, and the Provisional
the public, or any section of the public, in fear.,,6 For Irish Republican Army, while the latter comprised
organizations such as the Red Army Faction (in
our discussion we can use a definition that comprises
what was then West Germany) and the Italian Red
key elements in common usage or philosophical Brigades. As with the emergence of modern terror-
writing: terrorisDl is violence against noncomba- ism almost a century earlier, the United States was
tants for political, religious, or ideological ends. not immune from this latest wave, although there
Some think terrorism is a recent phenomenon. the identity-crisis-driven motivations of the white
But scholars who define terrorism broadly main- middle-class Weathermen starkly contrasted with
tain that its history is long and bloody. The term the ghetto-bred malcontent [sic) of the Black Pan-
ther movement. 7
terrorism sprang from the French Revolution's Reign
of Terror, in which the new state sanctioned the Since around the mid-1990s, the threat of reli-
use of terror against its enemies, real or imagined, giously inspired terrorism has expanded dramatically.
CHAPTER 19: WAR, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE 0 663
In 1998, there were 37 incidents of religious ter- Saudi and French security forces retook the shrine
rorism worldwide resulting in 758 deaths. In 2001, after an intense battle in which some 2S0 people were
there were 99 incidents and 3,275 deaths, most of killed and 600 wounded.
which occurred in the September 11 attacks on the Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988: Pan
American Airlines Flight 103 was blown up over
United States. In 2005, religious terrorists killed
Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb believed to have been
2,061 people throughout the world in 606 inci- placed on the aircraft by Libyan terrorists in Frankfurt,
dents. 8 In 2009, there were nearly 15,000 deaths West Germany. A1l2S9 people on board were killed.
from terrorist attacks of all kinds; 9,280 of these World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993:
were caused by Sunni Islamic extremists, while The World Trade Center in New York City was badly
1,052 were committed by Christian extremists. 9 As damaged when a car bomb planted by Islamic ter-
the Council on Foreign Affairs reported, rorists exploded in an underground garage. The
bomb left 6 people dead and 1,000 injured. The
Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further
men carrying out the attack were followers of Umar
what they see as divinely commanded purposes,
Abd aI-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric who preached
often targeting broad categories of foes in an in the New York City area.
attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Reli-
Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma
gious terrorists come from many faiths, as well as
City, April 19, 1995: Right-wing extremists Timothy
from small cults .... Because religious terrorists are
McVeigh and Terry Nichols destroyed the Federal
concerned not with rallying a constituency of fel-
Building in Oklahoma City with a massive truck
low nationalists or ideologues but with pursuing
bomb that killed 166 and injured hundreds more in
their own vision of divine will, they lack one of the
what was up to then the largest terrorist attack on
major constraints that historically has limited the American soil.
scope of terror attacks, experts say. As [the terrorism
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Homeland, September II,
expert Bruce] Hoffman puts it, the most extreme
2001: Two hijacked airliners crashed into the twin
religious terrorists can sanction "almost limitless
towers of the World Trade Center. Soon thereafter,
violence against a virtually open-ended category of
the Pentagon was struck by a third hijacked plane.
targets: that is, anyone who is not a member of the
A fourth hijacked plane, suspected to be bound for
terrorists' religion or religious sect.")O
a high-profile target in Washington, crashed into a
Among the more infamous terrorist incidents field in southern Pennsylvania. The attacks killed
of the past half century are the following, as 3,025 U.S. citizens and other nationals. President
described by the U.S. Department of State: Bush and Cabinet officials indicated that Osama
bin Laden was the prime suspect and that they
Munich Olympic Massacre, September 5, 1972: Eight considered the United States in a state of war with
Palestinian "Black September" terrorists seized eleven international terrorism ....
Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village in Munich, Car Bomb Explosion in Bali, October 12, 2002:
West Germany. In a bungled rescue attempt by West A car bomb exploded outside the Sari Club Disco-
German authorities, nine of the hostages and five ter- theque in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, killing 202
rorists were killed. persons and wounding 300 more. Most of the casu-
Iran Hostage Crisis, November 4, 1979: After alties, including 88 of the dead, were Australian
President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran tourists. Seven Americans were among the dead.
into the United States, Iranian radicals seized the AI-Qaeda claimed responsibility. Two suspects were
U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American later arrested and convicted. Iman Samudra, who
diplomats hostage. Thirteen hostages were soon had trained in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda and was
released, but the remaining S3 were held until their suspected of belonging to Jemaah Islamiya, was
release on January 20, 1981. sentenced to death on September 10, 2003. 11
Grand Mosque Seizure, November 20, 1979: 200
Islamic terrorists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, To this list we could add many more incidents,
Saudi Arabia, taking hundreds of pilgrims hostage. and probably most shocking among them would
be the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid and the the ability to inspire followers around the world.
July 7, 2005, bombings in London. In Madrid a In the West, several individuals acting alone have
coordinated series of bombs exploded on four launched terrorist attacks in the name of ISIS, kill-
commuter trains, killing 191 people and injuring dozens of innocent people.
ing more than 1,500. Investigators blamed Islamic The question that all terrorism provokes is,
militants connected to cells in Europe. In London, What should be our moral response to it? Many
four jihadists set off bombs almost simultaneously argue that a violent response is the wrong response,
on a double-decker bus and three subway trains, that a "war on terror" is misguided and morally
killing themselves and fifty-two other people and impermissible. The proper response, they say, is dia-
injuring hundreds. In 2008, in Mumbai, India, logue with aggressors, a criminal justice approach
Pakistan-based militants killed 174 people in a instead of military force, and the eradication of the
shooting rampage. And in 2011, a man described as true causes of terrorism-poverty, oppression, suf-
a Christian right-wing extremist set off a large bomb fering, and injustice. As one observer has said,
in Oslo, Norway, killing 8 people, then systemati-
In my view, the most effective counterterrorism
cally murdered 69 others at an island youth camp.
approach would arise from a foreign policy that
The most recent events in global terrorism are took the sufferings of people in other countries
also the most frightening. In 2014, large swaths seriously. A progressive orientation would stand in
of Iraqi and Syrian territory were taken over by a contrast to today's official counterterrorism, which
group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria views suffering as irrelevant, or even as a reason to
(ISIS). It is made up of thousands of Islamist mili- inflate the terrorist danger. 13
tants drawn from the Syrian civil war, jihadist ele-
ments in Iraq, and volunteers from Europe, the The opposing view is that violence may in
United States, and elsewhere. ISIS aspires to be a fact be a morally justified reaction to terrorism-
caliphate, an Islamic nation, calling itself the Islamic that is, morally justified by the lights of just
State, but its methods are terrorist on a mass scale: war theory. As noted earlier, just war theory is
the timeworn doctrine that war may be morally
The stories, the videos, the acts of unfathomable permissible if particular requirements are met.
brutality have become a defining aspect of ISIS,
It lays out the conditions under which resorting
which controls a nation-size tract of land and has
now pushed Iraq to the precipice of dissolution.
to war would be morally justified and specifies
Its adherents kill with such abandon that even the the criteria for judging the morality of how it is
leader of al-Qaeda has disavowed them .... fought. Some contend that all the criteria can
[I] n terms of impact, the acts of terror have been sometimes be met, justifying a carefully measured
wildly successful. From beheadings to summary military response to terrorist attacks. Thus one
executions to amputations to crucifiXions, the ter- observer argues that
rorist group has become the most feared organi-
zation in the Middle East. That fear, evidenced in according to just war theory, defending against this
fleeing Iraqi soldiers and 500,000 Mosul residents, sort of terrorism is a just cause; that within signifi-
has played a vital role in the group's march toward cant constraints sovereign political authorities can
Baghdad. In many cases, police and soldiers liter- have authority to undertake military actions for the
ally ran, shedding their uniforms as they went, sake of this just cause, notwithstanding the nature
abandoning large caches of weapons. 12 of organization of the terrorists; and that a political
community can pursue such a cause with right inten-
ISIS as an occupying power in Iraq and Syria tion, even though in the world as it is military efforts
has now been crushed by the United States and its to defend against terrorism may well not meet this
allies. But it is still a transnational movement with condition. 14
..... .-.-4" .•
Others say that government antiterrorism indiscriminate attack on the innocent. He thinks
activities and policies (what has been called the that a terrorist attack is worse than rape or murder
"war on terror") have gone too far by undermining because these crimes are at least directed at specific
civil liberties in the name of security. A prime con- persons for particular reasons, even if those rea-
cern is that some overreaching antiterrorism laws sons are perverse. But terrorist violence is aimed at
meant to be temporary can easily become perma- no one in particular for no purpose that could be
nent. Critics have also charged that repressive gov- linked to a specific person. For the terrorist, any
ernments have used the war on terror as an excuse innocent person who happens to fit into a broad
to violate the human rights and civil liberties of category is as good a target as any other. "Terrorists
innocent people deemed undesirable by the state. are like killers on a rampage/' says Walzer, "except
A more fundamental-and controversial-moral that their rampage is not just expressive of rage or
issue is whether terrorist actions can ever be mor- madness; the rage is purposeful and programmatic.
ally justified. Many argue on various grounds that It aims at a general vulnerability: Kill these people
terrorism is never morally permissible, regardless of in order to terrify those." 16
the merits of the terrorists' cause. The philosopher Not everyone agrees, however. A few thinkers,
Haig Khatchadourian, for example, argues that while deploring terrorist violence, argue that in
acts of terrorism are always wrong because (1) they some cases terrorism may be morally permissible.
violate basic principles of just war theory and In fact, some maintain that particular instances of
(2), except in rare cases in which other overriding terrorism can even meet the requirements of just
moral principles apply, they violate their victims' war theory and can therefore be justified in the
right to be treated as moral persons. Regarding same way that acts of war are justified. For example,
reason (1), Khatchadourian claims that terror- one proponent of this view argues that when a
ism in all forms violates the just war principles of stateless group has its right of self-determination
discrimination and proportionality. Concerning thwarted, it may have a just cause-and an orga-
reason (2), he says that nization representing the group can be "a morally
[tJreating people as moral persons means treating legitimate authority to carry out violence as a last
them with consideration in two closely related resort to defend the group's rights.,,17
ways. First, it means respecting their autonomy as Disputes about the moral permissibility of ter-
individuals with their own desires and interests, rorist actions can quickly bring us back to arguments
plans and projects, commitments and goals. That about a plausible definition of terrorism. Suppose,
autonomy is clearly violated if they are humili-
for instance, that the preferred definition of ter-
ated, coerced and terrorized, taken hostage or
rorism is a variation on the one proposed earlier:
kidnapped, and above all, killed. Second, consider-
ation ... includes sensitivity to and consideration deliberate use of violence against noncombatants
of their feelings and desires, aspirations, projects, for political or ideological purposes. This definition
and goals. That in turn is an integral part of treat- would apply to many acts that seem to be unam-
ing their life as a whole-including their relation- biguous examples of terrorism-the September 11
ships and memories-as a thing of value. Finally, attacks, the Munich Olympics massacre, the Bali
it includes respecting their "culture or ethnic, reli- car bombing of October 2002, and many others.
gious or racial identity or heritage." These things
But what about the following cases in which non-
are the very antithesis of what terrorism does to its
victims and the victimized. IS combatants were also deliberately killed for politi-
cal reasons: the Allied bombings of Dresden and
Similarly, the just war theorist Michael Walzer other German cities in World War II and the atomic
asserts that terrorism is wrong because it is an obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? According
to our revised definition, aren't these also terrorist For generations the United States officially
acts? And if so, could not the United States and Brit- opposed torture and prosecuted both American
ain be classified as terrorist states? soldiers and the nation's enemies for using harsh
Some are willing to accept such implications methods against captives. But the administration
of our definition (or similar ones). They think that of President George W. Bush was accused of autho-
deliberately targeting noncombatants for political or rizing and employing interrogation tactics that had
ideological purposes is never morally acceptable- long been regarded as torture. The subjects were
no matter who does the targeting. So for them, the suspected terrorists, and the purpose of the severe
World War II city bombings were indeed instances approach was to wrest from them some informa-
of terrorism, and the states doing the bombing tion that might help authorities crush terrorist
were acting as terrorists. Others avoid these repug- groups or prevent future terrorist attacks. Reports
nant implications by working from a definition that show that "waterboarding" (simulated drowning)
confines terrorism to nonstate actors-that is, to and other extreme techniques were used against
individuals or groups that are not sovereign states. detainees in U.S.-run facilities overseas.
(Recall the definition of terrorism offered by the Three issues dominate the debates over the
U.S. Department of State-"premeditated, politically morality of torture: (1) Does torture work? (2) Is tor-
motivated violence perpetrated against noncomba- ture ever morally acceptable? and (3) What should
tant targets by subnational groups or clandestine be the state's policy regarding the use of torture? .
agents[.]") Terrorism then would be the killing of As usually understood, question 1 is about
innocents by al-Qaeda or the Red Brigades, but not whether torture is effective in getting reliable infor-
by a sovereign polity like the United States. Walzer, mation from suspects. Science has yet to defini-
however, takes the line that terrorism is never mor- tively answer this question, and the views of expert
ally justified, but that some of the city bombings in interrogators conflict. Many intelligence officers
World War II were justified (and therefore were not claim that torture rarely, if ever, yields useful infor-
terrorism) because they were done in a "supreme mation; other experts assert that torture occasion-
emergency" -circumstances in which civilization ally produces valuable data. People in both camps
itself is threatened with imminent destruction. worry about the indirect effect of using harsh meth-
Often where there is war or terrorism, there is ods: the damage to American prestige and influ-
also torture. As with other forms of political vio- ence, the increased likelihood of our enemies using
lence, the vexing question is whether torture is ever torture against us, and the slide down the slippery
morally justified. And the most challenging version slope toward the wider use of more brutal means.
of this question is whether it is permissible to use For many nonconsequentialists, the answer
torture to prevent terrorist carnage. to question 2 is an absolutist "no" -torture is the
Torture is the intentional inflicting of severe use of a person merely as a means, a clear instance
pain or suffering on people to punish or intimidate of a lack of respect for a human being. Torture is
them or to extract information from them. It has therefore always wrong. But most people are prob-
been used by both secular and religious authorities ably not absolutists; they think that in rare cases
for centuries and continues to this day to be applied there could be exceptions to a no-torture rule. (We
to hapless victims throughout the world-despite consider a popular argument for this view in the
worldwide condemnation of the practice and its "Moral Arguments" section.)
absolute prohibition in international law, includ- Question 3 is a separate issue entirely. Whether
ing by United Nations treaties and the Geneva or not we believe that torture would be morally jus-
Conventions. tified in a particular instance, we might take a very
different view about legalizing or institutionalizing grounds-the consequences of refusing to go to war

it. On this matter, there are three main positions: will never be as bad as the war itself would be, even
(1) torture should be illegal and never sanctioned in if atrocities were not committed. Or in a more sophis-
any circumstances; (2) torture should be illegal and ticated vein it might be claimed that a uniform policy
officially condemned but unofficially (and secretly) of never resorting to military force would do less harm
in the long run, if followed conSistently, than a policy
used when necessary; and (3) torture should be a
of deciding each case on utilitarian grounds (even
legal instrument of the state, although adminis- though on occasion particular applications of the
tered under strict guidelines and oversight. pacifist policy might have worse results than a specific
Those taking the first approach insist that legal- utilitarian decision).18
izing torture would have devastating consequences.
It would corrupt democratic institutions, diminish Whether good consequences produced by a
pacifist stance would always in fact outweigh the
our moral authority in the world, cause torture to
become routine and widespread in SOciety, and bad of war making is, of course, a question of non-
arouse worldwide resentment and anger toward us. moral fact-and some utilitarians assert that the
Those who prefer the second approach believe facts do not help the pacifist's case. These critics say
that torture may sometimes be necessary, but that there is no evidence to support the notion that a
acknowledging its use could cause many of the prob- policy of paCifism always results in less death and
lems that worry those in the first group. Their critics suffering. As one philosopher says,
accuse them of hypocrisy, but they see no good alter- [I]t is worthwhile to point out that the general history
native to this clandestine, "under the radar" strategy. of the human race certainly offers no support for the
The third approach is preferred by many who supposition that turning the other cheek always pro-
deplore the hypocrisy of the second group but are duces good effects on the aggressor. Some aggressors,
convinced that the use of torture is inevitable. They such as the NaziS, were apparently "egged on" by the
hold that if torture is legalized, its use can be better "pacifist" attitude of their victims. 19
controlled than in any unofficial arrangement, and Utilitarians can push this kind of argument even
its abuses and proliferation can be limited. Alan Der- further and say that resorting to war is sometimes
showitz advocates this third way, recommending a
justified because it results in a better balance of good
system in which official interrogators may use tor- Over bad, everyone conSidered, than not going to
ture only after they acquire permission-"torture war. (Obviously, they too would need to back up such
warrants"-from a judge. an empirical claim.) To be consistent, they would also
want to base the moral rightness of military actions
MORAL THEORIES in war (jus in bello) on utilitarian considerations.
As we saw earlier, utilitarian elements are built
Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist per-
into just war theory, which is a coherent system
spectives have been given major roles in the ethics of
of both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist
war and peace. On the consequentialist side, utilitar-
reqUirements. In our previous list of jus ad bellum
ianism has been used both to support and to under-
conditions, the last three requirements are usually
mine paCifism. Some have argued, for example,
taken as consequentialist: (4) last resort, (5) good
that by utilitarian lights, antiwar pacifism must be
proportional to the bad, and (6) reasonable chance
true. The philosopher Thomas Nagel provides some
of success. And the jus in bello conditions of dis-
examples of such pacifist arguments:
crimination and proportionality are often viewed
It may even be argued that war involves violence on as rules for maximizing the good for both combat-
such a scale that it is never justified on utilitarian ants and noncombatants.
When justifying views on the resort to war, the best overall results in a situation-and "best
both pacifists and nonpacifists may take a non- overall results" is the overriding factor here. But a
consequentialist approach, appealing to funda- utilitarian could not consistently condone terrorist
mental moral principles rather than to the results actions that served only the interests of a particular
of actions. As we have seen, pacifists typically rest group, for the theory demands that right actions
their case on the right to life; nonpacifists, on the produce the greatest overall happiness, everyone
right of self-defense or the defense of basic human considered. Many (or perhaps most) acts of terrorism
rights generally. The former regard their moral are clearly meant to exclusively favor a specific seg-
principle as absolute-it allows no exceptions-but ment of a population; everyone is deliberately not
the latter may not. considered.
As you would expect, there can be stark dif- Some writers contend that even though conse-
ferences on many critical matters between the quentialist moral theories can justify terrorism, the
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist. One theories can do so "only under conditions that ter-
such issue is the treatment of noncombatants. rorists in the flesh will find it difficult to satisfy.,,21
Absolutist nonconsequentialists maintain that Consider: Consequentialism would demand that
the intentional killing of noncombatants is always the terrorist acts be effective and efficient and that
morally wrong regardless of the circumstances, but there be no nonterrorist actions likely to yield
consequentialists insist that sometimes there are better or equal results. Such theories would require
exceptions: that the aim to be achieved be worth the horrific
damage that a terrorist act can produce.
Regarding the absolute prohibition on intentional
Terrorists themselves sometimes justify their
killing of noncombatants, absolutists have been
termed "immunity theorists/' Immunity theo- actions on consequentialist grounds: they assert
rists hold that it is always morally impermissible that only terrorism can help them achieve their
to intentionally kill noncombatants in war. Non- objectives. But many observers are skeptical of ter-
combatants are "innocent" and thus immune from rorism's power to attain any political ends, espe-
attack .... cially the goal of liberation from an oppressive
. . . Consequentialists believe that actions in regime. Walzer observes, "I doubt that terrorism has
war can be morally justified depending on the
ever achieved national liberation-no nation that
end or aim of the action. If it is morally suffi-
cient, the end can justify the means .... From this I know of owes its freedom to a campaign of ran-
perspective, consequentialists, unlike absolutists, dom murder.,,22 Certainly terrorism can frighten
can morally justify the intentional killing of non- the public and increase the terrorists' notoriety, but
combatants or "innocents" in war. A controversial winning a political struggle is a much rougher road.
example addresse~ in this debate is the bombing If terrorism is indeed an ineffective strategy, then
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Con- this fact could form the backbone of a consequen-
sequentialists can morally justify these bombings.
tialist argument against terrorist acts.
Absolutists, however, contend that these bombings
were immoral because these bombings targeted
Nonconsequentialist moral theories (or non-
noncombatants. 2o consequentialist moral principles) often yield con-
demnations of terrorism in all forms. A traditional
How would traditional moral theories have us natural law theorist would insist that terrorism is
view the moral justification of terrorism? It seems always wrong because it violates the prohibition
that act-utilitarianism would have to sanction at against intentionally killing the innocent. Natural
least some terrorist attacks. The act-utilitarian must law's doctrine of double effect-which disallows
admit that it is possible for a terrorist action to yield intentional bad actions even if they achieve good
results-would lead to this conclusion (assum- Violence is inherently wrong; there are no good rea-
ing the definition of terrorism given earlier). sons to suppose that it is ever justified; therefore, vio-
Some people, of course, could try to counter this lence (including political violence) is always wrong.
view by rejecting the doctrine of double effect or This argument puts the burden of proof on those
by questioning the concept of moral innocence. who allege that sometimes violence is permissible.
A Kantian theorist or other nonconsequentialist But the problem for anyone who relies on this
could argue tha t terrorism is not morally permissible line is that many people have been happy to take up
because it violates innocent persons' human rights, this burden, arguing in the case of war, terrorism,
their right to life, or their autonomy or because or torture that there are indeed strong reasons why
terrorism uses people merely as a means to an end. violence is occaSionally justified. Likewise, many
Many philosophers view terrorism from the who insist on nonviolence have not been content
perspective of just war theory. Some of them argue to rest their case on this burden-of-proof argument.
that terrorism is wrong because it violates key con- They have tried to show that strong arguments can
ditions of just war theory-in particular, discrimi- independently support their position.
nation, proportionality (both jus ad bellum and As we have seen, it's possible to argue for and
jus in bello), last resort, and just cause. As we saw against the resort to war using either a consequen-
earlier, some reject this claim and maintain that tialist or nonconsequentialist tack. Just war theory
just war theory, rightly interpreted, shows that in is a mix of both these approaches, and it has prob-
some instances terrorism may be justified because ably been the focus of most of the philosophical
it meets all the conditions. disputes concerning war and peace.
A nonconsequentialist is likely to consider tor- One set of arguments about war that contin-
ture wrong in all Circumstances-wrong because it ues to provoke intense debate is humanitarian
violates the rights of persons, primarily by severely intervention. The conventional model of a jus-
diminishing their autonomy as individuals. A con- tified resort to war is one sovereign state defend-
sequentialist could either accept or reject the use of ing itself against another's aggression. A state's
torture, depending on her assessment of the likely self-defense is thought to be just cause for unleash-
effects. She could decide that torture is justified in ing the dogs of war. But humanitarian intervention
rare cases in which it could prevent a massive terror- is a different sort of scenario, for it involves a state
ist attack or lead to the destruction of a terrorist cell (or states) going to war to defend people of another
involved in the killing of hundreds or thousands state against the murderous aggression of their own
of people. She could also argue that when all the regime. The aggression may appear in the form of
consequences of torturing someone are carefully genOCide, ethnic cleansing, forced starvation, and
weighed, torture is never the best option. Its nega- mass imprisonment or slavery-the kinds of atroci-
tive ramifications always outweigh the positive. ties that occurred forty years ago in Cambodia and
Uganda, and more recently in Somalia, East Timor,
MORAL ARGUMENTS Kosovo, Rwanda, and Libya. The situations that are
said to cry out for humanitarian intervention are
Perhaps the Simplest argument against political both compelling and alien to early just war theory:
violence is based on the commonsense presump-
tion that violence of any kind is inherently (prima The standard cases have a standard form: a govern-
ment, an army, a police force, tyrannically con-
facie) wrong and therefore requires very strong rea-
trolled, attacks its own people or some subset of its
sons for believing that in a particular case it is jus- own people, a vulnerable minority, say, territorially
tified. One form this argument could take is this: based or dispersed throughout the country.... The
begin the war. But they come into a situation where

the moral stakes are clear: the oppressors or, better,
QUICI< REVIEW the state agents of oppression are readily identifi-
23
able; their victims are plain to see.
realism (as applied to warfare)-The view that
moral standards are not applicable to war, and To get to the heart of these matters, we want
that war instead must be judged on how well it to ask, Is humanitarian intervention ever mor-
serves state interests. ally permissible? Those who say yes-the inter-
ventionists-might offer an argument like this:
pacifism-The view that war is never morally
permissible. 1. An individual has a duty to try to stop an unjust
just war theory-The doctrine that war may be and potentially fatal attack against someone (to
morally permissible under stipulated conditions. intervene), even if defending the victim requires
jus ad bellum-The justification for resorting to using violence against the attacker (assuming
war; the justice of war. that the defender is capable of acting without
jus in bello-The moral permissibility of acts in too much personal risk, and there is no other
war; justice in war. way to stop the attack).
noncombatant immunity-The status of a person 2. Humanitarian intervention by a state (or states) is
who should not be intentionally attacked in war. exactly analogous to this type of personal inter-
vention on behalf of seriously threatened victims.
terrorism (as defined in this chapter)-Violence
against noncombatants for political, religious, 3. Therefore, states have a duty of humanitarian
or ideological ends. intervention (under the right circumstances).
terrorism (the definition preferred by the U.S. This argument is, of course, inductive-an
Department of State)-Premeditated, politically
argument by analogy. Probably few people would
motivated violence perpetrated against non-
balk at Premise 1: it is a simple moral principle
combatant targets by subnational groups or clan-
drawn from commonsense morality. Some might
destine agents, usually intended to influence an
insist that a principle declaring that we have a duty
audience.
to intervene is too strong-better to say that in the
nonstate actors-Individuals or groups that are right circumstances, intervening is morally pennis-
not sovereign states.
sible, not obligatory. Though this complaint may
torture-The intentional inflicting of severe pain have merit, let us stay with the original wording for
or suffering on people to punish or intimidate simplicity's sake.
them or extract information from them. Premise 2 is the weak link here. For an argument
humanitarian intervention-The act of a state by analogy to be strong, the two things being com-
(or states) going to war to defend people of pared must be sufficiently similar in relevant ways.
another state against the murderous aggres- In this case, the intervention of an individual to
sion of their own regime. halt an attack on another person must be relevantly
similar to an intervention by sovereign states to
stop aggreSSion by another state against people
attack takes place within the country's borders; within the state's borders. But nonintervention-
it doesn't require any boundary crossings; it is an
ists might claim that the argument is weak because
exercise of sovereign power. There is no aggression,
no invading army to resist and beat back. Instead, the personal and national circumstances are dif-
the rescuing forces are the invaders; they are the ferent in important respects. One difference is the
ones who, in the strict sense of international law, well-established doctrine of international conduct
•• --=....iI
that one sovereign state may not meddle in the human rights-yet state sovereignty is itself a
internal affairs of another. This noninterference well-established principle of international rela-
principle, says the noninterventionist, seems much tions. So we have a conflict of moral principles.
stronger than any analogous rule on the personal In a utilitarian vein, noninterventionists may also
level. Even interfering in a family conflict in which argue that a policy of humanitarian intervention
one family member is being brutally assaulted by that ignores state sovereignty and attends to the
the others may seem morally permissible some- countless violations of rights by a state could lead
times, while analogous interference in a state's to perpetual wars everywhere. Some noninterven-
internal conflicts seems less morally clear cut. tionists allow that intervention may indeed be
There is much more that can be said both for necessary in certain extraordinary cases involv-
and against Premise 2, but let us turn to another ing genocide, massacres, and other extreme hor-
interventionist argument: rors. But they think that intervention should be
reserved for these horrors; otherwise, perpetual war
1. All persons have certain supremely important, will in fact be the norm.
basic rights-for example, rights to life, to self- In this era of the "war on terror" and the world-
determination, and to freedom from harm- wide threat of terrorist acts, moral arguments
rights that must not be violated by either people on terrorism are both extremely important and
or states. often controversial. Probably the liveliest-and,
2. People who have these basic rights violated are to some, the most disturbing-disputes have to do
entitled to use force to defend them, and it is With the moral permissibility of terrorist acts. Con-
morally permissible for other people or states to sider the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Many
use force to help in that defense (humanitarian people the world over assume without question
intervention). that those who caused that horrific loss of life com-
3. People or states that violate others' basic rights mitted acts of terrorism that were morally wrong
forfeit their own right not to have force used and monstrously evil. And many careful think-
against them. ers have come to the same conclusions, albeit by a
4. Therefore, humanitarian intervention in more reflective, reasoned route. Plenty of people in
defense of basic rights is morally permissible. both groups believe that terrorism is always morally
wrong. But some equally reflective observers who are
Interventionists are likely to get very little dis- just as horrified by September 11 argue that terror-
agreement about either Premise 1 or Premise 3. ism may sometimes be permissible (and that many
For a majority of moral philosophers, the concepts who disagree are being inconsistent, perhaps even
hypocritical). We may even hear arguments for the
of moral rights and their forfeiture are plausible
permissibility of terrorism from people sympathetic
elements in most of the major moral traditions.
But Premise 2 is controversial. The idea of people to certain terrorist causes. Let us look more closely at
using force in self-defense (to protect their lives some of these disputes. First, consider this argument:
or property, for example) is part of commonsense
morality, but noninterventionists have ques- 1. If the killing of innocents is sometimes morally
tioned the defense of others' rights that involves permissible in war, then it is morally permissi-
crossing borders and violating state sovereignty. ble in terrorism (defined here as the intentional
A critical problem, they would argue, is that the killing of innocents for political purposes).
principle embodied in Premise 2 would have us 2. The killing of innocents is sometimes morally
ignore the rights of sovereign states to defend permissible in war.
3. Therefore, the killing of innocents is sometimes aim. We would certainly reject this defense. But if
morally permissible in terrorism. we would reject the appeal to double effect in this
24
case, then we should do so in others.
This conclusion asserts that we cannot con-
demn all acts of terrorism out of hand, for some Not everyone would agree with this reasoning,
may be morally justified. The argument is that, as but let us move on to a related argument:
most people believe, killing innocents in wartime is 1. Deliberately killing innocents for political or
sometimes permissible. Noncombatants are usually ideological reasons is morally wrong.
killed and maimed in war because combat so often 2. Deliberately killing noninnocents for such rea-
happens near or among them. Still, most people sons may be morally permissible (as in war or
are willing to accept this "collateral damage" as revolution, for example).
the inevitable-but regrettable-consequence of
3. Some people commonly thought to be inno-
waging war. Some civilian deaths are unavoidable
cents are actually non innocents (they are
but morally permissible. Yet if they are morally
pseudo-innocents).
acceptable in war, they must be morally acceptable
aspects of terrorism. After all, both kinds of vio- 4. Therefore, deliberately killingpseudo-innocents
lence involve the death of innocents during hostili- for political or ideological reasons may in some
ties directed at political ends. cases be morally permissible.
Many critics of this argument would accept This argument states formally what is often
Premise 2 but reject Premise 1, insisting that there alleged more casually: that some actions usually
is a morally significant difference between the condemned as instances of terrorism (involving the
killing of innocents in war and in terrorist attacks. deliberate killing of innocents) are not terrorist acts
They would say that the killing of noncombatants at all because the "innocents" are not really inno-
in war is morally permissible because it is unin- cent. This claim (common in some cultures and
tended; noncombatant deaths happen inadver- often uttered by terrorists themselves) is that some
tently as combatants are targeted. Terrorist killings, people should be judged noninnocents if they, for
however, are wrong because they are intentional. example, indirectly aid or sympathize with a hated
The deliberate slaughter of innocents is never regime, or happen to belong to the same race or
morally acceptable. Obviously, this response is an religion as those presumed guilty of committing
appeal to the doctrine of double effect. some acts of injustice or oppression, or are simply
But some would not accept this appeal, reason- part of a system or enterprise that adversely affects
ing along the following lines: a favored group. Such an attitude has been held by
While the principle of double effect is plausible in many, most infamously by Osama bin Laden:
some cases, it is severely defective. To see this, suppose
that the September 11 attackers had only intended to The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-
destroy the Pentagon and the World Trade Center and civilian and military-is an individual duty for every
had no desire to kill anyone. Suppose that they knew, Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
however, that thousands would die in the attack on possible to do, in order to liberate the Al Aksa Mosque
the buildings. And suppose, following the attack, and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for
they said "We are not murderers. We did not mean to their families to move out of all the lands of Islam,
25
kill these people." defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.
What would be our reaction? I very much doubt The precise distinction between innocents and
that we would think them less culpable. They could
noninnocents (or combatants and noncombatants)
not successfully justify or excuse their actions by
saying that although they foresaw the deaths of in war is controversial among philosophers. But
many people, these deaths were not part of their most of these thinkers do acknowledge a clear
difference between the two concepts, and many Some take a deontological approach to this
reject the sort of blurring of the distinctions com- issue and declare that torture is always wrong in
mon among those who wish to justify terrorism. A all circumstances (a common absolutist position).
typical argument against such justifications is that Critics of this view say that it is suspect because
if the distinctions are discarded, then anyone and torturing people usually seems to be morally not as
everyone could be deemed guilty and therefore a bad as killing them. If so, it would be implausible to
legitimate target of terrorism. For example, if ordi- assert that torturing the terrorist is absolutely for-
nary individuals who buy bananas and thereby bidden but that not torturing him and letting thou-
contribute to an economy run by a bloodthirsty sands die would be morally permissible.
dictatorship somehow share the blame for the Others who are opposed to torture believe that
regime's crimes, then any man, woman, or child ticking-bomb scenarios are too contrived to be
could share the guilt-and deserve the terrorist's taken seriously; such states of affairs simply don't
justice. Attributing guilt to people because of such happen in the real world. The usual response to
remote connections to wrongdoing, critics say, this is that in light of what we know about terror-
seems to reduce the notions of guilt and innocence ist tactics and aims (and about police cases that
to absurdity. resemble ticking-bomb scenarios), we have good
Probably the strongest-and most controver- reasons to believe the opposite-ticking-bomb situ-
sial-argument for the political use of torture is ations are indeed possible.
based on the so-called ticking-bomb scenario. Sup-
pose a bomb will soon detonate in a major Ameri-
can city, killing a hundred thousand innocent
people. The only way to prevent this massive loss of
CHAPTER REVIEW
life is to torture the terrorist who planted the bomb
until he reveals its location. Would it be morally
permissible to waterboard or electrocute him until SUMMARY
he talks? (Note that this is a separate question from
torture's legality.) Many think the obvious answer Political violence is the resort to violence for political
is yes and that there is strong moral justification ends. War, terrorism, torture, revolution, assassina-
for using torture in this case. What considerations tion, civil war, and violent demonstrations are exam-
could lead to this conclusion? Here is one philoso- ples. Violence is the physical or psychological attack
pher's answer (referring to a similar version of the on, or the vigorous abuse of, persons, causing their
ticking-bomb situation): suffering, injury, or death. (Violence can also involve
the destroying or damaging of property.) Violence is
Consider the following points: (1) The police reason- considered prima facie wrong-wrong unless there are
ably believe that torturing the terrorist will probably good reasons for thinking it morally permissible. Thus
save thousands of lives; (2) the police know that there people often speak of war and other modes of violence
is no other way to save those lives; (3) the threat to
as things to be resorted to, actions to be taken only after
life is more or less imminent; (4) the thousands about
to be murdered are innocent-the terrorist has no other options are exhausted.
good, let alone decisive, justificatory moral reason Violence is thought to be wrong for several reasons.
for murdering them; (5) the terrorist is known to be Some argue that violence constitutes a violation of
(jointly with other terrorists) morally responsible people's rights-their right to life, self-determination,
for planning, transporting, and arming the nuclear respect as a person, or immunity from harm. Another
device and, if it explodes, he will be (jointly with view is that Violence is wrong because it runs afoul of
other terrorists) morally responsible for the murder of the moral prindples of justice, freedom, and utility
thousands. 2tl (human welfare). The consequentialist position is that
violence is (generally) wrong because its bad conse- and (3) What should be the state's policy regarding the
quences (usually) outweigh the good. use of torture?
The main ethical questions regarding war and
peace are (1) how-if at all-the resort to war can be I<EY TERMS
justified, and (2) assuming it can be justified, how it realism (as applied to warfare) (p. 658)
should be conducted. Most serious answers to such pacifism (p. 658)
questions come from three distinct perspectives. Real- just war theory (p. 659)
ism is the view that moral standards are not appli- jus ad bellum (p. 659)
cable to war, though considerations of prudence are. jus in bello (p. 659)
Pacifism is the view that war is never morally permis- noncombatant immunity (p. 661)
sible. Just war theory is the doctrine that war may be terrorism (as defined in this chapter) (p. 662)
morally permissible under stipulated conditions. terrorism (the definition preferred by the U.S.
Depending on how they judge the empirical evi- Department of State) (p. 662)
dence, utilitarians may with logical consistency take nonstate actors (p. 666)
either a pacifist or a nonpacifist stance on war. Non- torture (p. 666)
consequentialists may also consistently support or humanitarian intervention (p. 669)
reject pacifism. Pacifists typically rest their case on
the nonconsequentialist principle of the right to life. EXERCISES
Nonpacifists may back their case with the nonconse- Review Questions
quentialist principles of the right to self-defense or of
1. What is violence, as some philosophers have
human rights generally.
Terrorism is violence against noncombatants defined it? (p. 657)
2. What is realism as it applies to warfare? (p. 658)
for political, religiOUS, or ideological ends. The key
3. What is pacifism? (p. 658)
question that terrorism provokes is what our moral
4. What is just war theory? (p. 659)
response to it should be. Should it always and every-
5. What are the two main moral issues addressed
where be condemned? Or is terrorism sometimes jus-
in just war theory? (p. 659)
tified? One way to grapple with terrorism is to try to
6. Identify three requirements in just war theory
apply the reqUirements of just war theory to terrorist
that must be met to justify war. (pp. 659-61)
acts. Many philosophers argue that by the lights of
7. What are the jus in bello requirements for moral
just war theory, terrorism is never morally permissible.
conduct in war? (p. 661)
Others contend that it is possible for terrorism to meet
8. What is noncombatant immunity? (p. 661)
just war criteria and thereby prove itself justified. Even
9. How is terrorism defined in this text? How does
without reference to just war theory, some argue that
the U.S. Department of State define it? (p. 662)
terrorism is always wrong because it violates the vic-
10. What is torture? What reasons have torturers given
tims' right to be treated as moral persons, or because it
to explain or justify their use of torture? (pp. 666-67)
is an indiscriminate attack on the innocent.
A consequentialist moral theory would probably
condone terrorism if it maximized happiness or wel-
fare for all concerned, but in actual cases this require- 1. If violence is wrong, why is it wrong? Is it that
ment may make terrorism very difficult to justify. violence is a violation of people's rights? Or is
Torture is the intentional inflicting of severe pain there some other reason?
or suffering on people to punish or intimidate them or 2. Are you a realist regarding war? Are there any
to extract information from them. Three issues domi- moral restraints on the use of political violence?
nate the debates over the morality of torture: (1) Does 3. Can war ever be morally justified? If so, how? If
torture work? (2) Is torture ever morally acceptable? not, why not?
4. Do you believe there are circumstances in Robert Fullinwider, "TerrOrism, Innocence, and War," in
which torturing a suspected terrorist is morally War after September 11, ed. Verna V. Gehring (Lanham,
permissible? Explain. MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
5. How might someone use just war theory to David Luban, "The War on Terrorism and the End of
justify the Allied participation in World War II? Human Rights," Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 22,
6. Can terrorism ever be morally justified? Why or no. 3 (Summer 2002): 9-14.
Larry May, Eric Rovie, and Steve Viner, eds., The Moral-
why not?
ity of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Upper
7. Was the atomic obliteration of Hiroshima and
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006).
Nagasaki in World War II an act of terrorism? Explain. Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre," Philosophy & Public
8. How might pacifists (who argue that all wars Affairs 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 123-43.
are wrong) justify their position? How might Jan Narveson, "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis," Ethics
someone argue against it? 75, no. 4 (1965): 259-71.
9. What is the difference between a preventive and Lucy Noakes, Claire Langhamer, and Claudia Siebrecht,
a preemptive war? Can a preventive war ever be eds., Total War: An Emotional History (London: British
justified? Why or why not? Academy, 2020).
10. Is a pacifist being consistent if she opposes all Brian Orend, "War," in Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy,
wars but condones personal violence used in self- Winter 2005 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford
.edu/archives/win200S/entries/war/ (March 1, 2015).
defense or in law enforcement? Why or why not?
Louis P. Pojman, "The Moral Response to Terrorism and
the Cosmopolitan Imperative," in Terrorism and Inter-
national Justice, ed. James P. Sterba (New York: Oxford
FURTHER READING University Press, 2003).
G. E. M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in Nuclear Weap- Henry Shue, "War," in The Oxford Handbook ofPractical Ethics,
ons: A Catholic Response, ed. Walter Stein (New York: ed. Hugh lafollette (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Sheed and Ward, 1961). Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Second Part of the (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Second Part, Questions 40,64, and 69. Andrew Valls, "Can Terrorism Be Justified?" in Ethics in
Joseph M. Boyle Jr., "Just War Doctrine and the Military International Affairs, ed. Valls (Lanham, MD: Rowman
Response to Terrorism," Journal of Political Philosophy and Littlefield, 2000).
11, no. 2 (2003): 153-70. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
Michael J. Boyle, ed., Non-Western Responses to Terrorism with Historical Illustrations, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019). Books, 1992).
R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, eds., Violence, Terrorism, John Howard Yoder, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-
and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). War Thinking, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Intervention to Stop ISIS

In 2014, President Barack Obama authorized U.s. air strikes against a group of militant Islamists
known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to prevent them from possibly committing
genocide against members of the Yezidi sect, a religious minority trapped on a mountaintop
in northwest Iraq. In a speech, the president sought to justify the intervention:
[A]t the request of the Iraqi government-we've begun operations to help save
Iraqi civilians stranded on the mountain. As ISll [ISIS] has marched across Iraq, it has
waged a ruthless campaign against innocent Iraqis. And these terrorists have been
especially barbaric towards religious minorities, including Christian and Yezidis, a
small and ancient religious sect. Countless Iraqis have been displaced. And chilling
reports describe ISIL militants rounding up families, conducting mass executions,
and enslaving Yezidi women.
In recent days, Yezidi women, men and children from the area of Sinjar have fled
for their lives. And thousands-perhaps tens of thousands-are now hiding high up on
the mountain, with little but the clothes on their backs. They're without food, they're
without water. People are starving. And children are dying of thirst. Meanwhile, ISIL
forces below have called for the systematic destruction of the entire Yezidi people, which
would constitute genocide. So these innocent families are faced with a horrible choice:
descend the mountain and be slaughtered, or stay and slowly die of thirst and hunger.
I've said before, the United States cannot and should not intervene every time
there's a crisis in the world. So let me be clear about why we must act, and act now.
When we face a situation like we do on that mountain-with innocent people facing
the prospect of violence on a horrific scale, when we have a mandate to help-in
this case, a request from the Iraqi government-and when we have the unique
capabilities to help avert a massacre, then I believe the United States of America
cannot turn a blind eye. We can act, carefully and responsibly, to prevent a potential
act of genocide. That's what we're doing on that mountain.*
Was President Obama justified in ordering the then? Why or why not? How would just war theory
armed intervention? What if the Iraqi govern- apply? How might a utilitarian evaluate the per-
ment had not requested military action from the missibility of the United States' military action?
United States? Would the intervention be justified What might a nonconsequentialist say about it?
*Barack Obama, "Statement by the PreSident," August 7, 2014, http://www.whitehollse.gov/the-press-of
ficeI2014/08/07/statement-president (February 27,2015).
2. War in Afghanistan
Consider this time line detailing the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
September 11-Hijacked airliners are flown into the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York and the Pentagon, outside Washington DC. A fourth plane crashes in
Pennsylvania. In an address to the nation, President Bush describes the attacks as "deliberate
and deadly terrorist acts." He says he has directed the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
communities "to find those responsible and bring them to justice," adding that the U.S.
"will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts -3nd those who
harbor them."
September 12-President Bush declares that the attacks were "acts of war." The
United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 1368, recognizing "the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense" and calling on all states to work together to bring the
perpetrators of the attacks to justice. The North Atlantic Council for the first time invokes
Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, stating that an armed attack against any member state
shall be considered as an attack against all.
September 18-Congress passes a resolution giving the President authorization for the
use of force "against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons."
September 20-ln an address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush says all the
evidence suggests al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks, and warns the Taliban regime
that they must "hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate." The Department
of Justice issues an Interim Rule stating that non-citizens can be detained for 48 hours
without charge, or in the event of an "emergency or other extraordinary circumstance"
for "an additional reasonable period of time." ...
October 4-The British government issues a statement saying it is confident that
Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network "planned and carried out the atrocities of
11 September," and setting out the evidence for their conclusion.
October 7-U.S. military forces launch 'Operation Enduring Freedom' against Taliban
and al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan. In a televised address, President Bush says U.S. actions
"are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to
attack the military capability of the Taliban regime."t
Was the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks to warfare square with each of the just war condi-
a legitimate act of self-defense? Why or why not? tions? If not, why not? How does the decision to go
According to just war theory, was the U.S. invasion to war fail any just war requirements?
of Afghanistan justified? If so, how does the resort
t Anthony Dworkin and Ariel Meyerstein, "A Defining Moment-International Law since September 11: A Timeline,"
Crimes of War Project, February 18, 2006. Reprinted with permission of the Crimes of War Project and the authors.
3. Terrorism and Torture

WASHINGTON-Most Americans and a majority of people in Britain, France and South
Korea say torturing terrorism suspects is justified at least in rare instances, according to
AP-Ipsos polling.
The United States has drawn criticism from human rights groups and many governments,
especially in Europe, for its treatment of terror suspects. President Bush and other top
officials have said the U.S. does not torture, but some suspects in American custody have
alleged they were victims of severe mistreatment.
The polling, in the United States and eight of its closest allies, found that in Canada,
Mexico and Germany people are divided on whether torture is ever justified. Most people
opposed torture under any circumstances in Spain and Italy.
"1 don't think we should go out and string everybody up by their thumbs until somebody
talks. But if there is definitely a good reason to get an answer, we should do whatever it
takes," said Billy Adams, a retiree from Tomball, Texas.
In America, 61 percent of those surveyed agreed torture is justified at least on rare
occasions. Almost nine in 10 in South Korea and just over half in France and Britain felt
that way.*
Do you agree with most Americans that the use of might a utilitarian justify (or oppose) torture? How
torture is sometimes morally permissible in fight- might a Kantian theorist argue against torturing
ing terrorism? If so, what circumstances do you suspected terrorists?
think would justify torture? If not, why not? How
*Associated Press, "Poll Finds Broad Approval of Terrorist Torture," published on MSNBC.com, December 9,2005.
© The Associated Press. Reprinted by permission.
READINGS
Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists

JAMES P. STERBA
Traditionally pacifism and just war theory have rep- defensible interpretations, can be substantially recon-
resented radically opposed responses to aggression. ciled both in theory and practice.
Pacifism has been interpreted to rule out any use of In traditional just war theory there are two basic
violence in response to aggression. Just war theory has elements: an account of just cause and an account of
been interpreted to permit a measured use of violence just means. Just cause is usually specified as follows:
in response to aggression. It has been thought that the
1) There must be substantial aggression;
two views might sometimes agree in particular cases-
2) Nonbelligerent correctives must be either hopeless
for example, that pacifists and just war theorists might
or too costly; and
unconditionally oppose nuclear war, but beyond that
3) Belligerent correctives must be neither hopeless
it has been generally held that the two views lead to
nor too costly.
radically opposed recommendations. In this paper,
I hope to show that this is not the case. I will argue that Needless to say, the notion of substantial aggression
pacifism and just war theory, in their most morally is a bit fuzzy, but it is generally understood to be the
type of aggression that violates people's most fun-
James 1'. Sterba, excerpts from "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War
damental rights. To suggest some specific examples
Theorists," Social Theory and Practice Vol. 18, No.1 (Spring 1992): of what is and is not substantial aggression, usu-
21-38. Reprinted with permission of Social Theory and Practice. ally the taking of hostages is regarded as substantial
--~
aggression while the nationalization of particular because it recognizes a right to life yet rules out any use
firms owned by foreigners is not so regarded. But even of force in defense of that right. 1 The view is incoher-
when substantial aggression occurs, frequently non- ent, Narveson claims, because having a right entails
belligerent correctives are neither hopeless nor too the legitimacy of using force in defense of that right at
costly. And even when nonbelligerent correctives are least on some occasions.
either hopeless or too costly, in order for there to be Given the cogency of objections of this sort, some
a just cause, belligerent correctives must be neither have opted for a form of pacifism that does not rule out
hopeless nor too costly. all violence but only lethal violence. We can call this
Traditional just war theory assumes, however, that view "nonlethal pacifism." It maintains that
there are just causes and goes on to specify just means
Any lethal use of force against other human beings is
as imposing two requirements:
morally prohibited.
1) Harm to innocents should not be directly
In defense of nonlethal paCifism, Cheyney Ryan has
intended as an end or a means.
argued that there is a substantial issue between the
2) The harm resulting from the belligerent means
pacifist and the nonpacifist concerning whether we
should not be disproportionate to the particular
can or should create the necessary distance between
defensive objective to be attained.
ourselves and other human beings in order to make
While the just means conditions apply to each defen- the act of killing possible. 2 To illustrate, Ryan cites
sive action, the just cause conditions must be met by George Orwell's reluctance to shoot at an enemy sol-
the conflict as a whole. dier who jumped out of a trench and ran along the
It is important to note that these requirements top of a parapet half-dressed and holding up his trou-
of just cause and just means are not essentially about sers with both hands. Ryan contends that what kept
war at all. Essentially, they constitute a theory of Orwell from shooting was that he couldn't think of the
just defense that can apply to war but can also apply soldier as a thing rather than a fellow human being.
to a wide range of defensive actions short of war. However, it is not clear that Orwell's encounter
Of course, what needs to be determined is whether supports nonlethal pacifism. For it may be that what
these requirements can be justified. Since just war kept Orwell from shooting the enemy soldier was not
theory is usually opposed to pacifism, to secure a his inability to think of the soldier as a thing rather
non-question-begging justification for the theory than a fellow human being but rather his inability to
and its requirements we need to proceed as much as think of the soldier who was holding up his trousers
possible from premises that are common to pacifists with both hands as a threat or a combatant. Under
and just war theorists alike. The difficulty here is that this interpretation, Orwell's decision not to shoot
there is not just one form of pacifism but many. So would accord well with the requirements of just war
we need to determine which form of pacifism is most theory.
morally defensible. Let us suppose, however, that someone is attempt-
Now when most people think of pacifism they ing to take your life. Why does that permit you, the
tend to identify it with a theory of nonviolence. We defender of nonlethal pacifism might ask, to kill
can call this view "nonviolent pacifism." It maintains the person making the attempt? The most cogent
that: response, it seems to me, is that killing in such a case
Any use of violence against other human beings is is not evil, or at least not morally evil, because any-
morally prohibited. one who is wrongfully engaged in an attempt upon
your life has already forfeited his or her right to life by
It has been plausibly argued, however, that this form engaging in such aggression. 3 So, provided that you
of pacifism is incoherent. In a well-known article, Jan are reasonably certain that the aggressor is wrongfully
Narveson rejects nonviolent paCifism as incoherent engaged in an attempt upon your life, you would be
morally justified in killing, assuming that it is the only elements of an action is the Counterfactual Test.
way of saving your own life. According to this test, two questions are relevant:
There is, however, a form of pacifism that remains
untouched by the criticisms I have raised against 1) Would you have performed the action if only the
both nonviolent pacifism and nonlethal pacifism. good consequences would have resulted and not
the evil consequences?
This form of pacifism neither prohibits all violence
nor even all uses of lethal force. We can call the view 2) Would you have performed the action if only the
"anti-war pacifism" because it holds that evil consequences resulted and not the good con-
sequences?
Any participation in the massive use of lethal force in
If an agent answers "Yes" to the first question and
warfare is morally prohibited.
"No" to the second, some would conclude that
In defense of anti-war pacifism, it is undeniable that (1) the action is an intended means to the good
wars have brought enormous amounts of death and consequences; (2) the good consequences are an
destruction in their wake and that many of those who intended end; and (3) the evil consequences are
have perished in them are noncombatants or inno- merely foreseen.
cents. In fact, the tendency of modern wars has been But how well does this Counterfactual Test work?
to produce higher and higher proportions of non- Douglas Lackey has argued that the test gives the
combatant casualties, making it more and more diffi- wrong result in any case where the "act that produces
cult to justify participation in such wars. At the same an evil effect produces a larger good effect.,,-t Lackey
time, strategies for nonbelligerent conflict resolution cites the bombing of Hiroshima as an example. That
are rarely intensively developed and explored before bombing is generally thought to have had two effects:
nations choose to go to war, making it all but impos- the killing of Japanese civilians and the shortening
sible to justify participation in such wars. of the war. Now suppose we were to ask:
To determine whether the requirements of just
1) Would Truman have dropped the bomb if only
war theory can be reconciled with those of anti-war
the shortening of the war would have resulted but
pacifism, however, we need to consider whether
not the killing of the japanese civilians?
we should distinguish between harm intentionally
2) Would Truman have dropped the bomb if only
inflicted upon innocents and harm whose infliction
the japanese civilians would have been killed and
on innocents is merely foreseen. On the one hand,
the war not shortened?
we could favor a uniform restriction against the
infliction of harm upon innocents that ignores the And suppose that the answer to the first question
intended/foreseen distinction. On the other hand, is that Truman would have dropped the bomb if only
we could favor a differential restriction which is more the shortening of the war would have resulted but not
severe against the intentional infliction of harm the killing of the Japanese civilians, and the answer
upon innocents but is less severe against the inflic- to the second question is that Truman would not
tion of harm that is merely foreseen. What needs have dropped the bomb if only the japanese civilians
to be determined, therefore, is whether there is any would have been killed and the war not shortened.
rationale for favoring this differential restriction on Lackey concludes from this that the killing of civil-
harm over a uniform restriction. But this presupposes ians at Hiroshima, self-evidently a means for short-
that we can, in practice, distinguish between what is ening the war, is by the Counterfactual Test classified
foreseen and what is intended, and some have chal- not as a means but as a mere foreseen consequence.
lenged whether this can be done. So first we need to On these grounds, Lackey rejects the Counterfactual
address this challenge. Test as an effective device for distinguishing between
Now the practical test that is frequently appealed to the foreseen and the intended consequences of an
in order to distinguish between foreseen and intended action.
Unfortunately, this is to reject the Counterfactual intended means to the good consequences of short-
Test only because one expects too much from it. It is to ening the war.
expect the test to determine all of the following: Assuming then that we can distinguish in prac-
tice between harm intentionally inflicted upon inno-
1) Whether the action is an intended means to the
cents and harm whose infliction on innocents is
good consequences;
merely foreseen, we need to determine whether there
2) Whether the good consequences are an intended
is any rationale for favoring a differential restriction
end of the action; and
that is more severe against the intentional infliction
3) Whether the evil consequences are simply fore-
of harm upon innocents but is less severe against
seen consequences.
the infliction of harm that is merely foreseen over
In fact, this test is only capable of meeting the first two a uniform restriction against the infliction of harm
of these expectations. And the test clearly succeeds in upon innocents that ignores the intended/foreseen
doing this for Lackey's own example, where the test distinction.
shows the bombing of Hiroshima to be an intended Let us first examine the question from the perspec-
means to shortening the war, and shortening the war tive of those suffering the harm. Initially, it might
an intended consequence of the action. appear to matter little whether the harm would be
To determine whether the evil consequences are intended or just foreseen by those who cause it. From
simply foreseen consequences, however, an additional the perspective of those suffering harm, it might
test is needed, which I shall call the Nonexplanation appear that what matters is simply that the overall
Test. According to this test, the relevant question is: amount of harm be restricted irrespective of whether
it is foreseen or intended. But consider-don't those
Does the bringing about of the evil consequences help
who suffer harm have more reason to protest when
explain why the agent undertook the action as a means
to the good consequences? the harm is done to them by agents who are directly
engaged in causing harm to them than when the
If the answer is "No," that is, if the bringing about of harm is done incidentally by agents whose ends and
the evil consequences does not help explain why the means are good? Don't we have more reason to protest
agent undertook the action as a means to the good when we are being used by others than when we are
consequences, the evil consequences are merely fore- affected by them only incidentally?
seen. But if the answer is "Yes," the evil consequences Moreover, if we examine the question from the
are an intended means to the good consequences. perspective of those causing harm, additional support
Of course, there is no guaranteed procedure for for this line of reasoning can be found. For it would
arriving at an answer to the Nonexplanation Test. seem that we have more reason to protest a restriction
Nevertheless, when we are in doubt concerning against foreseen harm than we have reason to pro-
whether the evil consequences of an act are simply test a comparable restriction against intended harm.
foreseen, seeking an answer to the Nonexplanation This is because a restriction against foreseen harm
Test will tend to be the best way of reasonably resolv- limits our actions when our ends and means are good
ing that doubt. For example, applied to Lackey's whereas a restriction against intended harm only
example, the Nonexplanation Test comes up with a limits our actions when our ends or means are evil or
"Yes," since the evil consequences in this example harmful, and it would seem that we have greater
do help explain why the bombing was undertaken to grounds for acting when both our ends and means are
shorten the war. For according to the usual account, good than when they are not. Consequently, because
Truman ordered the bombing to bring about the we have more reason to protest when we are being used
civilian deaths which by their impact upon Japanese by others than when we are being affected by them
morale were expected to shorten the war. So, by the only incidentally, and because we have more reason to
Nonexplanation Test, the civilian deaths were an act when both our ends and means are good than when
they are not, we should favor the foreseen/intended dis- So far, I have argued that there are grounds for
tinction that is incorporated into just means. favoring a differential restriction on harm to inno-
It might be objected, however, that at least some- cents that is more severe against intended harm and
times we could produce greater good overall by violat- less severe against foreseen harm. I have further argued
ing the foreseen/intended distinction of just means that this restriction is not absolute so that when the
and acting with the evil means of intentionally harm- evil intended is trivial, easily repairable or greatly
ing innocents. On this account, it might be argued outweighed by the consequences, intentional harm
that it should be permissible at least sometimes to to innocents can be justified. Moreover, there is no
intentionally harm innocents in order to achieve reason to think that anti-war pacifists would reject
greater good overall. either of these conclusions. Anti-war pacifists are
Now it seems to me that this objection is well- opposed to any participation in the massive use of
taken in so far as it is directed against an absolute lethal force in warfare, yet this need not conflict with
restriction upon intentional harm to innocents. the commitment of just war theorists to a differential
It seems clear that there are expectations to such a but nonabsolute restriction on harm to innocents as
restriction when intentional harm to innocents is a requirement of just means. 5 Where just war theory
goes wrong, according to anti-war pacifists, is not in its
1) trivial (for example, as in the case of stepping on
restriction on harming innocents but rather in its fail-
someone's foot to get out of a crowded subway);
ure to adequately determine when belligerent correc-
2) easily repairable (for example, as in the case of
tives are too costly to constitute a just cause or lacking
lying to a temporarily depressed friend to keep
in the proportionality required by just means. Accord-
him from committing suicide); or
ing to anti-war paCifists, just war theory provides insuf-
3) greatly outweighed by the consequences of the
ficient restraint in both of these areas. Now to evaluate
action, especially to innocent people (for example,
this criticism, we need to consider a wide range of
as in the case of shooting one of two hundred civil-
cases where killing or inflicting serious harm on oth-
ian hostages to prevent in the only way possible
ers in defense of oneself or others might be thought to
the execution of all two hundred).
be justified, beginning with the easiest cases to assess
Yet while we need to recognize these executions to an from the perspectives of anti-war paCifism and the just
absolute restriction upon intentional harm to inno- war theory and then moving on to cases that are more
cents, there is good reason not to permit simply maxi- difficult to assess from those perspectives.
mizing good consequences overall because that would Case 1 where only the intentional or foreseen killing of
place unacceptable burdens upon particular individu- an unjust aggressor would prevent one's own death. 6 This
als. More specifically, it would be an unacceptable case clearly presents no problems. In the first place,
burden on innocents to allow them to be intention- anti-war pacifists adopted their view because they
ally harmed in cases other than the exceptions we were convinced that there were instances of justified
have just enumerated. And, allowing for these excep- killing. And, in this case, the only person killed is an
tions, we would still have reason to favor a differential unjust aggressor. So surely anti-war pacifists would
restriction against harming innocents that is more have to agree with just war theorists that one justifi-
severe against the intentional infliction of harm upon ably kill an unjust aggressor if it is the only way to save
innocents but is less severe against the infliction of one's life.
harm upon innocents that is merely foreseen. Again, Case 2 where only the intentional or foreseen killing of
the main grounds for this preference is that we would an unjust aggressor and the foreseen killing ofone innocent
have more reason to protest when we are being used bystander would prevent one's own death and that of five
by others than when we are being affected by them other innocent people. 7 In this case, we have the fore-
only incidentally, and more reason to act when both seen killing of an innocent person as well as the killing
our ends and means are good than when they are not. of the unjust aggressor, but since it is the only way to
save one's own life and the lives of five other innocent and five other innocent people. Since in this case the
people, anti-war pacifists and just war theorists alike intentional or foreseen killing of the unjust aggressor
would have reason to judge it morally permissible. In is the only way of preventing serious injury to one-
this case, the intended life-saving benefits to six inno- self and five other innocent people, then, by analogy
cent people is judged to outweigh the foreseen death with Cases 1-3, both anti-war pacifists and just war
of one innocent person and the intended or foreseen theorists alike would have reason to affirm its moral
death of the unjust aggressor. permissibility. Of course, if there were any other way
Case 3 where ol1ly the intentional or foreseen killing of stopping unjust aggressors in such cases short of
of an unjust aggressor and tile foreseen killing of one inno- killing them, that course of action would clearly be
cent bystander would prevent the death offive otller ;'1110- required. Yet if there is no alternative, the intentional
cent people. In this case, despite the fact that we lack or foreseen killing of the unjust aggressor to prevent
the justification of self-defense, saving the lives of five serious injury to oneself and/or five other innocent
innocent people in the only way possible should still people would be justified.
provide anti-war pacifists and just war theorists with In such cases, the serious injury could be bodily
sufficient grounds for granting the moral permissibil- injury, as when an aggressor threatens to break one's
ity of killing an unjust aggressor, even when the killing limbs, or it could be serious psychological injury, as
of an innocent bystander is a foreseen consequence. In when an aggressor threatens to inject mind-altering
this case, the intended lifesaving benefits to five inno- drugs, or it could be a serious threat to property. Of
cent people would still outweigh the foreseen death course, in most cases where serious injury is threat-
of one innocent person and the intended or foreseen ened, there will be ways of stopping aggressors short
death of the unjust aggressor. of killing them. Unfortunately, this is not always
Case 4 where only the intentional or foreseen kill- possible.
ing of an unjust aggressor and the foreseen killing of five In still other kinds of cases, stopping an unjust
innocent people would prevent the death of two innocent aggressor would require indirectly inflicting serious
people. In this case, neither anti-war pacifists nor just harm, but not death, upon innocent bystanders.
war theorists would find the cost and proportionality Consider the following cases.
requirements of just war theory to be met. Too many Case 6 where only the intentional or foreseen infliction
innocent people would have to be killed to save too of serious harm upon an unjust aggressor and the foreseen
few. Here the fact that the deaths of the innocents infliction of serious harm upon one innocent bystander
would be merely foreseen does not outweigh the fact would prevent serious harm to oneself and five other inno-
that we would have to accept the deaths of five innocent people.
cents and the death of the unjust aggressor in order to Case 7 where only the intentional or foreseen infliction
be able to save two innocents. of serious harm upon an unjust aggressor and the foreseen
Notice that up to this point in interpreting these infliction of serious harm upon one innocent bystander
cases, we have simply been counting the number of would prevent serious hann to five other innocent people.
innocent deaths involved in each case and opting for In both of these cases, serious harm is indirectly
whichever solution minimized the loss of innocent inflicted upon one innocent bystander in order to
lives that would result. Suppose, however, that an prevent greater harm from being inflicted by an
unjust aggressor is not threatening the lives of inno- unjust aggressor upon other innocent people. In
cents but only their welfare or property. Would the Case 6, we also have the justification of self-defense,
taking of the unjust aggressor's life in defense of the which is laCking in Case 7. Nevertheless, with regard
welfare and property of innocents be judged propor- to both cases, anti-war pacifists and just war theorists
tionate? Consider the following case. should agree that preventing serious injury to five or
Case 5 where only the intentional or foreseen killing of six innocent people in the only way possible renders
an unjust aggressor would prevent seriolls injury to oneself it morally permissible to inflict serious injury upon
an unjust aggressor, even when the serious injury of reason to think that a trade-off that is unacceptable in
one innocent person is a foreseen consequence. In standard police practice would be acceptable in larger
these cases, by analogy with Cases 2 and 3, the fore- scale conflicts. Thus, for example, even if the Baltic
seen serious injury of one innocent person and the republics could have effectively freed themselves from
intended or foreseen injury of the unjust aggressor the Soviet Union by infiltrating into Moscow several
should be judged proportionate given the intended bands of saboteurs who would then attack several
injury-preventing benefits to five or six other innocent military and government installations in Moscow,
people. causing an enormous loss of innocent lives, such
Up to this point there has been the basis for gen- trade-offs would not have been justified. Accordingly,
eral agreement among anti-war pacifists and just war it follows that if the proportionality requirement of
theorists as to how to interpret the proportionality just war theory is to be met, we must save more inno-
requirement of just means, but in the following case cent lives than we cause to be lost, we must prevent
this no longer obtains. more injuries than we bring about, and we must not
Case 8 where only the intentional or foreseen killing of kill innocents, even indirectly, simply to prevent seri-
an unjust aggressor and the foreseen killing ofone innocent ous injuries to ourselves and others.
bystander would prevent serious injuries to the members of Of course, sometimes our lives and well-being are
a much larger group ofpeople. threatened together. Or better, if we are unwilling to
The interpretation of this case is crucial. In this sacrifice our well-being then our lives are threatened
case, we are asked to sanction the loss of an innocent as well. Nevertheless, if we are justified in our use of
life in order to prevent serious injuries to the mem- lethal force to defend ourselves in cases where we will
bers of a much larger group of people. Unfortunately, indirectly kill innocents, it is because our lives are also
neither anti-war pacifists nor just war theorists have threatened, not simply our well-being. And the same
explicitly considered this case. Both anti-war pacifists holds for when we are defending others.
and just war theorists agree that we can inflict seri- What this shows is that the constraints imposed
ous injury upon an unjust aggressor and an innocent by just war theory on the use of belligerent correctives
bystander to prevent greater injury to other innocent are actually much more severe than anti-war pacifists
people, as in Cases 6 and 7, and that one can even have tended to recognize. In determining when bel-
intentionally or indirectly kill an unjust aggressor to ligerent correctives are too costly to constitute a just
prevent serious injury to oneself or other innocent cause or lacking in the proportionality required by just
people as in Case S. Yet neither anti-war pacifists nor means, just war theory under its most morally defen-
just war theorists have explicitly addressed the ques- sible interpretation
tion of whether we can indirectly kill an innocent
1) allows the use of belligerent means against unjust
bystander in order to prevent serious injuries to the
aggressors only when such means minimize the
members of a much larger group of innocent people.
loss and injury to innocent lives overall;
Rather they have tended to confuse Case 8 with Case
2) allows the use of belligerent means against unjust
5 where it is agreed that one can justifiably kill an
aggressors to indirectly threaten innocent lives
unjust aggressor in order to prevent serious injury to
only to prevent the loss of innocent lives, not sim-
oneself or five other innocent people. In Case 8, how-
ply to prevent injury to innocents; and
ever, one is doing something quite different: one is
3) allows the use of belligerent means to directly or
killing an innocent bystander in order to prevent seri-
indirectly threaten or even take the lives of unjust
ous injury to oneself and five other innocent people.
aggressors when it is the only way to prevent seri-
Now this kind of trade-off is not accepted in
ous injury to innocents.
standard police practice. Police officers are regularly
instructed not to risk innocent lives simply to prevent Now it might be objected that all that I have shown
serious injury to other innocents. Nor is there any through the analysis of the above eight cases is that
killing in defense of oneself or others is morally per- give them one dollar, I think, and I would hope that
missible, not that it is morally required or morally you would also think, that each of you now has an
obligatory. That is true. I have not established any obligation to give the thugs one dollar when before
obligation to respond to aggression with lethal force you had no such obligation. Likewise, I think that
in these cases, but only that it is morally permissible to the actions of unjust aggressors can put us into situa-
do so. For one thing, it is difficult to ground an obligations where it is morally permissible or even morally
tion to use lethal force on self-defense alone, as would required for us to seriously harm or kill when before
be required in Case 1 or in one version of Case 5. Obli- it was not.
gations to oneself appear to have an optional quality Now it might be contended that anti-war pacifists
that is absent from obligations to others. In Cases 2-3 would concede the moral permissibility of Cases 1-3
and 5-7, however, the use of force would prevent seri- and 5-7 but still maintain that any participation in
ous harm or death to innocents, and here I contend it the massive use of lethal force in warfare is morally
would be morally obligatory if either the proposed use prohibited. The scale of the conflict, anti-war pacifists
of force required only a relatively small personal sacri- might contend, makes all the difference. Of course, if
fice from us or if we were fairly bound by convention this simply means that many large-scale conflicts will
or a mutual defense agreement to come to the aid of have effects that bear no resemblance to Cases 1-3
others. In such cases, I think we can justifiably speak of or 5-7, this can hardly be denied. Still, it is possible
a moral obligation to kill or seriously harm in defense for some large-scale conflicts to bear a proportionate
of others. resemblance to the above cases. For example, it can be
Another aspect of Cases 1-3 and 5-7 to which argued plausibly that India's military action against
someone might object is that it is the wrongful actions Pakistan in Bangladesh and the Tanzanian incursion
of others that put us into situations where I am claim- into Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin resemble
ing that we are morally justified in seriously harm- Cases 3, 5, or 7 in their effects upon innocents. s
ing or killing others. But for the actions of unjust What this shows is that anti-war pacifists are not jus-
aggressors, we would not be in situations where I am tified in regarding every participation in the massive
claiming that we are morally permitted or required to use of lethal force in warfare as morally prohibited.
seriously harm or kill. Instead, anti-war pacifists must allow that at least in
Yet doesn't something like this happen in a wide some real-life cases, wars and other large-scale mili-
range of cases when wrongful actions are performed? tary operations both have been and will be morally
Suppose I am on the way to the bank to deposit permissible.
money from a fund-raiser, and someone accosts me This concession from anti-war pacifists, however,
and threatens to shoot me if I don't hand over the needs to be matched by a comparable concession from
money. If I do hand over the money, I would be forced just war theorists themselves, because too frequently
to do something I don't want to do, something that they have interpreted their theory in morally inde-
involves a loss to myself and others. But surely it is fensible ways. When just war theory is given a mor-
morally permissible for me to hand over the money ally defensible interpretation, I have argued that the
in this case. And it may even be morally required for theory favors a strong just means prohibition against
me to do so if resistance would lead to the shooting of intentionally harming innocents. I have also argued
others in addition to myself. So it does seem that bad that the theory favors the use of belligerent means
people, by altering the consequences of our actions, only when such means 1) minimize the loss and
can alter our obligations as well. What our obligations injury to innocent lives overall; 2) threaten innocent
are under nonideal conditions are different from lives only to prevent the loss of innocent lives, not
what they would be under ideal conditions. If a group simply to prevent injury to innocents; and 3) threaten
of thugs comes into this room and make it very clear or even take the lives of unjust aggressors when it is
that they intend to shoot me if each of you doesn't the only way to prevent serious injury to innocents.
Obviously, just war theory, so understood, is going 5. This is because the just means restrictions protect inno-
to place severe restrictions on the use of belligerent cents quite well against the infliction of intentional harm.
means in warfare. In fact, most of the actual uses of 6. By an "unjust aggressor" I mean someone who the defender
belligerent means in warfare that have occurred turn is reasonably certain is wrongfully engaged in an attempt
out to be unjustified. For example, the u.s. involve- upon her life or the lives of other innocent people.
ment in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Panama, Soviet 7. What is relevant in this case is that the foreseen deaths are
involvement in Afghanistan, Israeli involvement in a relatively small number (one in this case) compared to the
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip all violate the just number of innocents whose lives are saved (six in this case).
cause and just means provisions of just war theory The primary reason for using particular numbers in this case
and those that follow is to make it clear that at this stage of
as I have defended them. Even the recent U.S.-led
the argument no attempt is being made to justify the large-
war against Iraq violated both the just cause and just
scale killing that occurs in warfare.
means provisions of just war theory.9 In fact, one
8. Although there is a strong case for India's military action
strains to find examples of justified applications of
against Pakistan in Bangladesh and the Tanzanian incursion
just war theory in recent history. Two examples I have
into Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin, there are questions
already referred to are India's military action against that can be raised about the behavior of Indian troops in
Pakistan in Bangladesh and the Tanzanian incursion Bangladesh following the defeat of the Pakistanian forces and
into Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin. But after about the regime Tanzania put in power in Uganda.
mentioning these two examples it is difficult to go 9. The just cause provision was violated because the
on. What this shows is that when just war theory and extremely effective economic sanctions were not given
anti-war pacifism are given their most morally defen- enough time to work. It was estimated that when compared
sible interpretations, both views can be reconciled. In to past economic blockades, the blockade against Iraq had
this reconciliation, the few wars and large-scale con- a near 100% chance of success if given about a year to work.
flicts that meet the stringent requirements of just war (See The New York Times, January 14, 1991.) The just means
theory are the only wars and large-scale conflicts to provision was violated because the number of combatant
which anti-war pacifists cannot justifiably object. to and noncombatant deaths was disproportionate. As many
We can call the view that emerges from this reconcili- as 120,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed, according to U.S. intel-
ligence sources.
ation "just war pacifism." It is the view which claims
that due to the stringent requirements of just war 10. Of course, anti-war pacifists are right to point out that vir-
theory, only very rarely will participation in a massive tually all wars that have been fought have led to unforeseen
use of lethal force in warfare be morally justified. It is harms and have been fought with less and less discrimination
as the wars progressed. Obviously, these are considerations
the view on which I rest my case for the reconciliation
that in just war theory must weigh heavily against going to
of pacifism and just war theory.11 war.
NOTES 11. Of course, more needs to be done to specify the require-

ments of just war paCifism. One fruitful way to further
1. Jan Narveson, "Pacifism: A Philosophical AnalYSiS," Etllies specify these requirements is to appeal to a hypothetical
75 (1965): 259-71. social contract decision procedure as has been done with
2. Cheyney Ryan, "Self-Defense, Pacifism and the Possibility respect to other practical problems. Here I have simply tried
of Killing," Ethics 93 (1983): 514-24. to establish the defensibility of just war pacifism without
3. Alternatively, one might concede that even in this case appealing to any such procedure. Yet once the defensibility
killing is morally evil, but still contend that it is morally jus- of just war pacifism has been established, such a decision
tified because it is the lesser of two evils. procedure will prove quite useful in working out its particu-
lar requirements.
4. Douglas P. Lackey, "The Moral Irrelevance of the Counterforce/
Countervalue Distinction," The Monist 70 (l987): 255-76.
Drones, Ethics, and the Armchair Soldier

JOHN KAAG
Ten years ago, I watched the Iraq invasion unfold on action. I know that effective military operations have
TV. It was for me, like most Americans, a remote-control traditionally been based on the chain of command
event, the type that you tuned into occasionally to and that this looks a little like the command and con-
see how it was going before changing the channel, like trol structure of robots. When someone is shooting at
the Olympics. And, as often happens in the Olympics, you, I can only imagine that you need to follow orders
we crushed the opposition. But we Americans at home mechanically. The heat of battle is neither the time
were not the only ones with remote controls. Many of nor the place for cool ethical reflection.
our soldiers also had them, and used them to direct Warfare, unlike philosophy, could never be con-
one of the most devastating military assaults in the ducted from an armchair. Until now. For the first time
history of modern warfare. The technological supe- in history, some soldiers have this in common with
riority of the United States-its ability to strike with philosophers: they can do their jobs sitting down.
precision from a distance-produced something like They now have what I've always enjoyed, namely "lei-
the "shock and awe" the media had relentlessly adver- sure," in the Hobbesian sense of the word, meaning
tised. And it inspired a similar reaction in moral and they are not constantly afraid of being killed. Hobbes
legal theorists who were concerned about the relation- thought that there are certain not-so-obvious perks to
ship between advanced military technologies and the leisure (not being killed is the obvious one). For one,
legitimation of warfare. you get to think. This is what he means when he says
Ten years later, I'm a philosopher writing a book that "leisure is the mother of philosophy." I tend to
about the ethics of drone warfare. Some days I fear agree with Hobbes: only those who enjoy a certain
that I will have either to give up the book or to give amount of leisure can be philosophers.
up philosophy. I worry that I can't have both. Some Ethics has long been taught-at least in passing-
of my colleagues would like me to provide decision to officer candidates and battlefield soldiers. But this
procedures for military planners and soldiers, the type new breed of remote control soldier will have the time
that could guide them, automatically, unthinkingly, and the space to think through unprecedentedly com-
mechanically, to the right decision about drone use. plex moral quandaries, like the question of using a
I try to tell them that this is not how ethics, or philoso- drone to kill an unarmed human being who may be
phy, or humans, work. in the early planning stages of a terrorist attack. A 2011
I try to tell them that the difference between Pentagon study (which anticipated the results of the
humans and robots is precisely the ability to think psychological examination of pilots earlier this year)
and reflect, in Immanuel Kant's words, to set and pur- showed that nearly 30 percent of drone pilots expe-
sue ends for themselves. And these ends cannot be set rience what the military calls "burnout," defined by
beforehand in some hard and fast way-even if Kant what the military describes, in unusually sophisti-
sometimes thought they could. cated language, as "an existential crisis."
What disturbs me is the idea that a book about You might be under the impression that philoso-
the moral hazard of military technologies should be phy is in the business of causing rather than allevi-
written as if it was going to be read by robots: input ating existential crises. And so you may think that
decision procedure, output decision and correlated acquainting soldiers with the Gordian knots of phi-
losophy will do little to increase their job satisfaction.
John Kaag, "Drones, Ethics, and the Armchair Soldier," New York But this is only partially correct.
Times, March 17, 2013. ((:) 2013 The New York Times. All rights Working one's way through the complexities of
reserved. Used under license. "just war" and moral theory makes it perfectly clear
that ethics is not about arriving easily at a single in several important ways. He suggested that the
right answer, but rather coming to understand the tenets of a revised theory apply not only to govern-
profound difficulty of doing so. Experiencing this ments, traditionally represented by commanders and
difficulty is what philosophers call existential respon- heads of state, but also to individual soldiers. This is
sibility. One of the jobs of philosophy, at least as a significant revision since it broadens the scope of
I understand it, is neither to help people to avoid these responsibility for warfare beyond political institu-
difficulties nor to exaggerate them, but rather to face tions to include the men and women who engage in
them in resolute and creative ways. In short, the job combat. This has always been the case with the prin-
of philosophy is not to create existential crises, but to ciples of jus in bello (the conventions or rules that
handle or work through existential responsibility. govern military conduct) but McMahan intends indi-
In the past, the leaders and military strategists viduals to be held responsible for the additional stan-
who initiated and oversaw military operations were dards of jus ad bellum, those guidelines that describe
supposed to shoulder the brunt of existential responsi- the permissibility of initiating military operations.
bility. This was appropriate, since they did so from the Specifically, McMahan believes that individuals are
relative safety of their fortified bunkers or, at the very to bear at least some responsibility in upholding "just
least, from behind a row of protective ground troops. cause" requirements. McMahan expects more of sol-
These ground troops, unfortunately, had more press- diers and, in this age of drones and leisure, he is right
ing concerns than existential responsibility. They did to do so.
not have leisure, unlike their commanders, who also I suspect many armchair soldiers would welcome
often had the philosophical training to think through some new intellectual tools to handle this newfound
the complexities of their jobs. responsibility. As it turns out, some of these "new"
Here we could think about President Obama's tools have been around since Plato and Augustine
being schooled in Aquinas and Augustine or, even bet- (fathers of Western moral theory and the just war tra-
ter, Alexander the Great's studying under Aristotle. dition, respectively), but some are in fact new, or at
This training was not simply a degree requirement at least newer, and have yet to be introduced in the train-
Officer Candidate School or one of the United States ing of armchair soldiers. Warfare, until this point, had
military academies, but a sustained, ongoing, and been too brutal, too immediate, too threatening, for
rigorous engagement with a philosophical tradition. soldiers to spend much time on the theoretical mat-
Alexander lived with Aristotle. This type of training, ters of ethics. But as technology makes warfare more
I would like to think, helped commanders face the leisurely it has, for the first time, the chance to be
challenge of moral responsibility (if it did not nec- genuinely-and complexly-philosophical. My point
essarily lead them to the right moral choice). To be here is not that these new armchair soldiers are to be
clear, studying philosophy does not hard-wire a stu- criticized for failing in their moral responsibilities. My
dent to be moral or to always do the right thing. Once point is rather that while drones are to be applauded
again, this is the way that robots, not humans, work. for keeping these soldiers out of harm's way physi-
Humans cannot be fully hard-wired. But it does give a cally, we would do well to remember that they do not
student some practice at shouldering the responsibil- keep them out of harm's way morally or psychologi-
ity of being a moral agent. And if we give our soldiers cally. The high rates of "burnout" should drive this
the tools to make informed moral decisions, then we home. Supporting our troops requires ensuring that
should think about giving them the freedom to do they are provided not just with training and physical
so by making more legal space for selective consci- armor, but with the intellectual tools to navigate these
entious objection or for disobeying orders on moral new difficulties.
grounds. To be sure, the question of what new responsibili-
In a recent post in The Stone, Jeff McMahan argued ties soldiers have is not the only, nor even the most
that traditional "just war theory" should be reworked important, ethical question concerning the use of
drones. Hannah Arendt claimed, in her analysis of 10 years ago, the most important questions we should
World War II, that "in general, the degree of respon- be asking should not be directed to armchair soldiers
sibility increases as we draw further away from the but to those of us in armchairs at home: What wars are
man who uses the fatal instrument with his own being fought in our name? On what grounds are they
hands." Just as was the case in the invasion of Iraq being fought?
Can Terrorism Be Moralo/ Justified?

STEPHEN NATHANSON
Can terrorism be morally justified? indistinguishable from other acts that are branded
Even asking this question can seem like an insult- with this negative label. On other occasions, moral
both to victims of terrorist actions and to moral com- judgments of terrorism rest on biased, uneven applica-
mon sense. One wants to say: if the murder of innocent tions of moral principles to the actions of friends and
people by terrorists is not clearly wrong, what is? foes. Principles that are cited to condemn the actions
But the question is more complicated than it of foes are ignored when similar actions are commit-
looks. We can see this by broadening our focus and ted by friends.
considering some of the other beliefs held by people We need to ask then: Can people who believe that
who condemn terrorism. Very few of us accept the war is sometimes morally permissible consistently
pacifist view that all violence is wrong. Most of us condemn terrorist violence? Or are such condemna-
believe that some acts of killing and injuring people tions necessarily hypocritical and self-serving?
are morally justified. Indeed, most of us think that war If we are to avoid hypocrisy, then we need both
is sometimes justified, even though it involves orga- (a) a definition of terrorism that is neutral with respect
nized, large-scale killing, injuring, and destruction to who commits the actions, and (b) moral judg-
and even though innocent civilians are usually among ments of terrorism that derive from the consistent,
the victims of war. So, most of us believe that even the even-handed applications of moral criteria.
killing of innocent people is sometimes morally justi- This paper aims to achieve both of these things.
fied. It is this fact that makes the condemnation ofter- First, I begin with a definition of terrorism and then
rorism morally problematic. We pick out terrorism for discuss why terrorism is always wrong. In addition,
special condemnation because its victims are civilian I want to show that the condemnation of terror-
noncombatants rather than military or governmen- ism does not come without other costs. A consistent
tal officials, but we also believe that such killings are approach to terrorism requires us to revise some com-
sometimes morally permissible. mon judgments about historical events and forces us to
Seen in a broader context, moral judgments of reconsider actions in which civilians are killed as "col-
terrorism often seem hypocritical. They often presup- lateral damage" (Le., side effects) of military attacks.
pose self-serving definitions of "terrorism" that allow My aim, then, is to criticize both terrorist actions
people to avoid labeling actions that they approve as and a cluster of widespread moral views about violence
instances of terrorism, even though these actions are and war. This cluster includes the following beliefs:
Stephen Nathanson, from "Can Terrorism Be Morally Justified?" 1. Terrorism is always immoral.
in Morality ill Practice, ed. James P. Sterba, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA: 2. The Allied bombing of cities in World War II was
Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004), 602-10. Reprinted with permission morally justified because of the importance of
from Stephen Nathanson. defeating Nazi Germany and Japan.
3. It is morally permissible to kill civilians in war if legitimate way to promote them. Condition 3 is fre-
these killings are not intended. quently met by permissible actions, as when we punish
some criminals to deter other people from committing
The trouble with this cluster is that the first belief
crimes. Condition 4 seems closer to what is essentially
expresses an absolute prohibition of acts that kill
wrong with terrorism. If terrorism is always immoral,
innocent people while the last two are rather permis-
it is because it kills and injures innocent people.
sive. If we are to avoid inconsistency and hypocrisy,
As I have already noted, however, morally consci-
we must revise our views either (a) by accepting that
entious people sometimes want to justify acts that kill
terrorism is sometimes morally permissible, or (b)
innocent people. If a blanket condemnation of terror-
by judging that city bombings and many collateral
ism is to be sustained, then we must either condemn
damage killings are morally wrong. I will defend the
all killings of innocent people, or we must find morally
second of these options.
relevant differences between the killing of innocents
by terrorists and the killing of innocents by others
DEFINING TERRORISM whose actions we find morally acceptable.
I offer the following definition of terrorism to launch
my discussion of the moral issues. Terrorist acts have
TERRORISM AND CITY BOMBING:
the following features:
THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?
1. They are acts of serious, deliberate violence or Many people who condemn terrorism believe that
destruction. city bombing in the war against Nazism was justified,
2. They are generally committed by groups as part of even though the World War II bombing campaigns
a campaign to promote a political or social agenda. intentionally targeted cities and their inhabitants.
3. They generally target limited numbers of people This view is defended by some philosophical theorists,
but aim to influence a larger group and/or the including Michael Walzer, in his book !ust and Unjust
leaders who make decisions for the group. Wars, and G. Wallace in "Terrorism and the Argument
4. They either kill or injure innocent people or pose a from Analogy." 1 By considering these theorists, we
serious threat of such harms to them. can see if there are relevant differences that allow us to
This definition helps in a number of ways. First, it say that terrorism is always wrong but that the World
helps us to distinguish acts of terrorism from other War II bombings were morally justified.
acts of violence. Nonviolent acts are not terrorist acts; One of the central aims of Michael Walzer's !ust
nor are violent actions that are unrelated to a politi- and Unjust Wars is to defend what he calls the "war con-
calor social agenda. Ironically, some terrible kinds of vention," the principles that prohibit attacks on civil-
actions are not terrorist because they are too destruc- ians in wartime. Walzer strongly affirms the principle
tive. As condition 3 tells us, terrorism generally tar- of noncombatant immunity, calling it a "fundamental
gets limited numbers of people in order to influence principle [that] underlies and shapes the judgments we
a larger group. Acts of genocide that aim to destroy a make of wartime conduct." He writes:
whole group are not acts of terrorism, but the reason
A legitimate act of war is one that does not violate the
why makes them only worse, not better.
rights of the people against whom it is directed ....
Second, the definition helps us to identify the [N]o one can be threatened with war or warred against,
moral crux of the problem with terrorism. Condi- unless through some act of his own he has surrendered
tion 1 is not the problem because most of us believe or lost his rights. 2
that some acts of violence are morally justified.
Condition 2 can't be the problem because anyone Unlike members of the military, civilians have not sur-
who believes in just causes of war must accept that rendered their rights in any way, and therefore, Walzer
some causes are so important that violence may be a says, they may not be attacked.
Given Walzer's strong support for noncomba- While Walzer's discussion begins with the spe-
tant immunity and his definition of terrorism as the cial threat posed by Nazism, he believes that supreme
"method of random murder of innocent people," it is emergencies can exist in more ordinary situations. In
no surprise that he condemns terrorism. At one pOint, the end, he supports the view that if a single nation
after describing a terrorist attack on an Algerian milk is faced by "a threat of enslavement or extermina-
bar frequented by teenagers, he writes: tion[,]" then its "soldiers and statesmen [may] over-
ride the rights of innocent people for the sake of their
Certainly, there are historical moments when armed
struggle is necessary for the sake of human freedom. own political community.... ,,5 While he expresses
But if dignity and self-respect are to be the outcomes this view with "hesitation and worry," he neverthe-
of that struggle, it cannot consist of terrorist attacks less broadens the reach of the concept of "supreme
against children. 3 emergency" to include circumstances that arise in
many wars.
Here and elsewhere, Walzer denounces terrorism The problem for Walzer is that his acceptance of
because it targets innocent people. the broad "supreme emergency" exception threat-
Nonetheless, he claims that the aerial attacks on ens to completely undermine the principle of non-
civilians by the British early in World War II were jus- combatant immunity that lies at the heart of his own
tified. In order to show why, he develops the concept view of the ethics of warfare. How can the principle
of a "supreme emergency." Nazi Germany, he tells us, of noncombatant immunity be fundamental if it can
was no ordinary enemy; it was an "ultimate threat to be overridden in some cases? Moreover, his condem-
everything decent in our lives.,,4 Moreover, in 1940, nation of terrorism is weakened because it seems to
the Nazi threat to Britain was imminent. German be possible that people might resort to terrorism in
armies dominated Europe and sought to control the cases that qualify as supreme emergencies, as when
seas. Britain feared an imminent invasion by a country their own people are threatened by extermination
that threatened the basic values of civilization. or enslavement. Walzer's defense of the bombing of
According to Walzer, the combination of the enor- Cities, then, seems to be inconsistent with his sweep-
mity and the imminence of the threat posed by Nazi ing denunciation of terrorism.
Germany produced a supreme emergency, a situation
in which the rules prohibiting attacks on civilians no
longer held. If killing innocents was the only way to WALLACE'S ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
ward off this dreadful threat, then it was permissible. While Walzer does not directly address the tension
Since air attacks on German cities were the only means between the two parts of his view, G. Wallace explic-
Britain had for inflicting harm on Germany, it was itly tries to defend the view that terrorism is wrong
morally permissible for them to launch these attacks. and that the bombing of cities was justified. Accord-
Walzer does not approve all of the city bombing ing to Wallace, the bombing campaign was justified
that occurred in World War II. The emergency lasted, because it satisfied all four of the following criteria:
he thinks, only through 1942. After that, the threat
diminished, and the constraints of the war conven- 1. It was a measure of last resort.
tion should once again have been honored. In fact, 2. It was an act of collective self-defense.
the bombing of cities continued throughout the war, 3. It was a reply in kind against a genocidal, racist
climaxing in massive attacks that killed hundreds of aggressor.
thousands of civilians: the bombing of Dresden, the 4. It had some chances of success.
fire bombings of Japanese cities by the United States, He then asks whether acts of terrorism might be justi-
and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. fied by appeal to these very same criteria.
According to Walzer, none of these later attacks were Wallace's answer is that the [acts of] terrorism can-
justified because the supreme emergency had passed. not meet these criteria. Or, more specifically, he says
that while anyone of the criteria might be met by a faces our own society. We condemn terrorists for
terrorist act, all four of them cannot be satisfied. Why intentionally killing innocent people while we think
not? The problem is not with criteria 2 and 3; a com- it was right to use tactics in our own wars that did the
munity might well be oppressed by a brutal regime and same. Either we must accept the view that terrorism
might well be acting in its own defense. In these respects, can sometimes be justified, or we must come to see our
its situation would be like that of Britain in 1940. own bombings of cities as violations of the prohibi-
But, Wallace claims, conditions 1 and 4 cannot tions on killing civilians in wartime.
both be satisfied in this case. If the community has a
good chance of success through the use of terrorism
(thus satisfying condition 4), then other means of TERRORISM, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, AND
opposition might work as well, and terrorism will fail THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
to be a last resort. Hence it will not meet condition 1. Many of us believe that wars are sometimes justified,
At the same time, if terrorist tactics are a last resort but we also know that even if civilians are not inten-
because all other means of opposition will fail, then tionally killed, the deaths of civilians is a common
the terrorist tactics are also likely to fail, in which case feature of warfare. Indeed, during the twentieth cen-
condition 4 is not met. tury, civilian deaths became a larger and larger propor-
What Wallace has tried to show is that there are tion of the total deaths caused by war. A person who
morally relevant differences between terrorism and the believes that wars may be justified but that terrorism
city bombings by Britain. Even if some of the criteria cannot be must explain how this can be.
for justified attacks on civilians can be met by would-be One common approach focuses on the difference
terrorists, all of them cannot be. He concludes that between intentionally killing civilians, as terrorists
It[E]ven if we allow that conditions (1) and (4) can be do, and unintentionally killing civilians, as some-
met separately, their jOint satisfaction is impossible.,,6 times happens in what we regard as legitimate acts of
Unfortunately, this comforting conclusion-that war. According to this approach, terrorism is wrong
the British city bombing was justified but that terror- because it is intentional while so-called "collateral
ism cannot be-is extremely implausible. Both terror- damage" killings and injuries are morally permissible
ism and city bombing involve the intentional killing because they are not intended.
of innocent human beings in order to promote an This type of view is developed by Igor Primoratz in
important political goal. Wallace acknowledges this "The Morality of Terrorism.,,7 Primoratz attempts to
but claims that the set of circumstances that justified show why terrorism is morally wrong and how it dif-
city bombing could not possibly occur again so as to fers from other acts of wartime killing that are morally
justify terrorism. permissible.
There is no basis for this claim, however. Wallace First, he makes it clear that, by definition, terror-
accepts that the right circumstances occurred in the ism always involves the intentional killing of innocent
past, and so he should acknowledge that it is at least people. He then offers a number of arguments to show
possible for them to occur in the future. His conclu- why such killings are wrong. The first two have to do
sion ought to be that if city bombing was justifiable, with the idea that persons are moral agents who are
then terrorism is in principle justifiable as well. For due a high level of respect and concern. He writes:
these reasons, I believe that Wallace, like Walzer, is
logically committed to acknowledging the possibility IE]very human being is an individual, a person sepa-
rate from other persons, with a unique, irreproducible
of morally justified terrorism.
thread of life and a value that is not commensurate
This is not a problem simply for these two authors.
with anything else. fI
Since the historical memory of city bombing in the
United States and Britain sees [such tactics] as justifi- Given the incommensurable value of individual
able means of war, the dilemma facing these authors persons, it is wrong to try to calculate the worth of
some hoped-for goal by comparison with the lives some acts of war that kill innocent people. While he
and deaths of individual people. This kind of calcula- acknowledges that the "suffering of civilians . . . is
tion violates the ideal of giving individual lives our surely inevitable not only in modem, but in almost all
utmost respect and concern. Terrorists ignore this wars," Primoratz stresses that the moral evaluation of
central moral ideal. They treat innocent people as acts of killing requires that we "attend not only to the
political pawns, ignoring their individual worth and suffering inflicted, but also to the way it is inflicted." 10
seeing their deaths simply as means toward achieving By this, he means that we need, among other things,
their goals. to see what the person who did the act intended.
In addition, Primoratz argues, terrorists ignore the To illustrate his paint, he contrasts two cases of
moral relevance of guilt and innocence in their treat- artillery attacks on a village. In the first case, the artil-
ment of individuals. They attack people who have lery attack is launched with the explicit goal of killing
no responsibility for the alleged evils that the terror- the civilian inhabitants of the village. The civilians are
ists oppose and thus violate the principle that people the target of the attack. This attack is the equivalent
should be treated in accord with what they deserve. of terrorism since both intentionally target innocent
Terrorists, Pirmoratz tells us, also forsake the ideal people, and just like terrorism, it is immoral.
of moral dialogue amongst equals. They not only In a second case, the artillery attack is aimed at
decide who will live and who will die, but they feel no "soldiers stationed in the village." While the soldiers
burden to justify their actions in ways that the victims know that innocent people will be killed, that is not
might understand and accept. People who take moral their aim.
ideas seriously engage in open discussion in order
to justify their actions. They engage others in moral Had it been possible to attack the enemy unit with-
debate. Ideally, according to Primoratz, a moral person out endangering the civilians in any way, they would
who harms others should try to act on reasons that are certainly have done so. This was not pOSSible, so they
so compelling that they could be acknowledged by attacked although they knew that the attack would
their victims. Terrorist acts cannot be justified to their cause civilian casualties too; but they did their best to
reduce those inevitable, but undesired consequences as
victims, and terrorists are not even interested in trying
much as possible. 11
to do so.
Though these ideas are sketched out rather than In this second case, the civilian deaths and injuries
fully developed, Primoratz successfully expresses some are collateral damage produced by an attack on a
important moral values. Drawing on these values, he legitimate military target. That is the key difference
concludes that terrorism is incompatible with "some between terrorism and legitimate acts of war. Terror-
of the most basic moral beliefs many of us hold.,,9 ism is intentionally directed at civilians, while legiti-
mate acts of war do not aim to kill or injure civilians,
Primoratz VS. Trotsky even when this is their effect.
Having tried to show why terrorism is wrong, Primoratz concludes that Trotsky and other
Primoratz considers an objection put forward by defenders of terrorism are wrong when they equate
Leon Trotsky, who defended terrorism as a revolution- war and terrorism. No doubt, the intentional killing
ary tactic. Trotsky claims that people who approve of Civilians does occur in war, and when it does Pri-
traditional war but condemn revolutionary violence moratz would condemn it for the same reason he con-
are in a weak position because the differences between demns terrorism. But if soldiers avoid the intentional
these are morally arbitrary. If wars that kill innocent killing of Civilians, then their actions can be morally
people can be justified, Trotsky claims, then so can justified, even when civilians die as a result of what
revolutions that kill innocent people. they do. As long as soldiers and revolutionaries avoid
Primoratz replies by arguing that there is an the intentional killing of innocent people, they will
important moral difference between terrorism and not be guilty of terrorist acts.
Problems with Primoratz's View damage killings and if the distinction between these
Primoratz's view has several attractive features. None- killings and terrorism cannot rest solely on whether
theless, it has serious weaknesses. the killings are intentional, then the criteria that he
In stressing the role of intentions, Primoratz uses may justify at least some terrorist acts. Like the
appeals to the same ideas expressed by what is soldiers in his example, the terrorists may believe that
called the "principle of double effect." According to the need for a particular attack is "so strong and urgent
this principle, we should evaluate actions by their that it prevailed over the prohibition of killing or
intended goals rather than their actual consequences. maiming a comparatively small number of civilians."
An act that produces collateral damage deaths is an Consistency would require Primoratz to agree that the
unintentional killing and hence is not wrong in the terrorist act was justified in this case.
way that the same act would be if the civilians' deaths Recall, too, Primoratz's claim that actions need
were intended. to be capable of being justified to the victims them-
While the principle of double effects is plausible selves. Would the victims of the artillery attack accept
in some cases, it is actually severely defective. To see the claim that the military urgency justified "killing
this, suppose that the September 11 attackers had only or maiming a comparatively small number of civil-
intended to destroy the Pentagon and the World Trade ians?,,12 Why should they accept the sacrifice of their
Center and had no desire to kill anyone. Suppose that own lives on the basis of this reasoning?
they knew, however, that thousands would die in the In the end, then, Primoratz does not succeed in
attack on the buildings. And suppose, following the showing why terrorism is immoral while collateral
attack, they said "We are not murderers. We did not damage killing can be morally justified. Like Wallace
mean to kill these people." and Walzer, he has trouble squaring the principles
What would be our reaction? I very much doubt that he uses to condemn terrorism with his own
that we would think them less culpable. They could approval of attacks that produce foreseeable collateral
not successfully justify or excuse their actions by say- damage deaths.
ing that although they foresaw the deaths of many The problem revealed here is not merely a prob-
people, these deaths were not part of their aim. We lem for a particular author. The view that collateral
would certainly reject this defense. But if we would damage killings are permissible because they are unin-
reject the appeal to double effect in this case, then we tended is a very widespread view. It is the view that
should do so in others. United States officials appealed to when our bombings
In Primoratz's example, the artillery gunners in Afghanistan produced thousands of civilian casual-
attack the village with full knowledge of the high ties. Our government asserted that we did not intend
probability of civilian deaths. The artillery gunners these deaths to occur, that we were aiming at legiti-
know they will kill innocent people, perhaps even mate targets, and that the civilian deaths were merely
in large numbers, and they go ahead with the attack collateral damage. Similar excuses are offered when
anyway. If it would not be enough for my imagined civilians are killed by cluster bombs and land mines,
September 11 attackers to say that they did not intend weapons whose delayed detonations injure and kill
to kill people, then it is not enough for Primoratz's people indiscriminately, often long after a particular
imagined soldiers to say that they did not mean to kill attack is over.
the villagers when they knew full well that this would There are many cases in which people are mor-
result from their actions. ally responsible for harms that they do not intend
If we accept Primoratz's defense of collateral dam- to bring about, but if these harms can be foreseen,
age killings, his argument against terrorism is in dan- their claims that they "did not mean to do it" are not
ger of collapsing because terrorists can use Primoratz's taken seriously. We use labels like "reckless disregard"
language to show that their actions, too, may be justi- for human life or "gross negligence" to signify that
fiable. If Primoratz succeeds in justifying the collateral wrongs have been done, even though they were not
deliberate. When such actions lead to serious injury specifics might have to be amended, but the key point
and death, we condemn such actions from a moral is that serious efforts must be made to avoid harm to
point of view, just as we condemn terrorism. The civilians. Not intending harm is not enough. In addi-
principle of double effect does not show that these tion, military planners must really exert themselves.
condemnations are mistaken. If we want to differenti- They must, as we say, bend over backwards to avoid
ate collateral damage killings from terrorism so as to harm to civilians. For example, they must:
be consistent in our moral judgments, we will need
something better than the principle of double effect 1. Target attacks as narrowly as possible on military
and the distinction between intended and unin- resources;
tended effects. 2. Avoid targets where civilian deaths are extremely
likely;
3. Avoid the use of inherently indiscriminate weap-
A SKETCH OF A DEFENSE ons (such as land mines and cluster bombs) and
I want to conclude by sketching a better rationale for inherently indiscriminate strategies (such as
the view that terrorist attacks on civilians are always high-altitude bombing of areas containing both
wrong but that some attacks that cause civilian deaths civilian enclaves and military targets); and
and injuries as unintended consequences are morally 4. Accept that when there are choices between dam-
justified. age to civilian lives and damage to military per-
I have argued that a central problem with stan- sonnel, priority should be given to saving civilian
dard defenses of collateral damage killings is that they lives.
lean too heavily on the distinction between what is
intended and what is foreseen. This distinction, when If a group has a just cause for being at war and adheres
used with the doctrine of double effect, is too slippery to prinCiples like these, then it could be said to be
and too permissive. As I noted above, it might provide acknowledging the humanity and value of those who
an excuse for the September 11 attacks if (contrary to are harmed by its actions. While its attacks might
fact) the attacks were only targeting the World Trade expose innocent people to danger, its adherence to
Center building and the Pentagon building and did not these principles would show that it was not indifferent
actually aim to kill innocent civilians. to their well-being. In this way, it would show that its
Michael Walzer makes a similar criticism of the actions lack the features that make terrorism morally
double effect principle. "Simply not to intend the objectionable.
death of civilians is too easy," he writes. CCWhat we Why is this? Because the group is combining its
look for in such cases is some sign of a positive com- legitimate effort to defend itself or others with seri-
mitment to save civilian lives.,,13 Walzer calls his ous efforts to avoid civilian casualties. The spirit of
revised version the principle of "double intention." It their effort is captured in the phrase I have already
requires military planners and soldiers to take positive used: "bending over backwards." The "bend over
steps to avoid or minimize these evils, even if these backwards" ideal is superior to the principle of
precautions increase the danger to military forces. double effect in many ways. First, it goes beyond the
Walzer's rule is a step in the right direction, but we weak rule of merely requiring that one not intend to
need to emphasize that the positive steps must be sig- kill Civilians. Second, while the double effect rule's
nificant. They cannot be pro forma or minimal efforts. distinction between intended and unintended results
In order to show a proper respect for the victims of permits all sorts of fudges and verbal tricks, the
these attacks, serious efforts must be made to avoid "bend over backwards" rule can be applied in a more
death and injury to them. I suggest the following set objective and realistic way. It would be less likely to
of requirements for just, discriminate fighting, offer- approve sham compliance than is the doctrine of
ing them as a sketch rather than a full account. The double effect.
The "bend over backwards" rule might even sat- would include actions that cause civilian casualties
isfy Primoratz's requirement that acts of violence be but that adhere to the "bend over backwards" principle.
justifiable to their victims. Of course, no actual victim I believe that this sort of approach achieves what
is likely to look favorably on attacks by others that nonpacifist critics of terrorism want to achieve. I pro-
will result in the victim's death or serious injury. But vide a principled basis for condemning terrorism, no
suppose we could present the following situation to matter who it is carried out by, and a principled justi-
people who might be victims of an attack (a condi- fication of warfare that is genuinely defensive. More-
tion that most of us inhabit) and have them consider over, the perspective is unified in a desirable way.
it from something like Rawls's veil of ignorance. We Terrorist actions cannot be morally justified because
would ask them to consider the following situation: the intentional targeting of civilians is the most obvi-
ous kind of violation of the "bend over backwards"
• Group A is facing an attack by group Bi if success- rule.
ful, the attack will lead to death or the severest At the same time that these principles allow for
oppression of group A. the condemnation of terrorism, they are immune to
• The only way that group A can defend itself is by charges of hypocrisy because they provide a basis for
using means that will cause death and injury to critiCizing not only terrorist acts but also the acts of
innocent members of group B. any group that violates the "bend over backwards"
• You are a member of one of the groups, but you do rule, either by attacking civilians directly or by failing
not know which one. to take steps to avoid civilian deaths.
Would you approve of means of self-defense that will

kill and injure innocent members of B in order to CONCLUSION
defend group A? Can terrorism be morally justified? Of course not.
In this situation, people would not know whether But if condemnations of terrorism are to have moral
they would be victims or beneficiaries of whatever credibility, they must rest on principles that constrain
policy is adopted. In this circumstance, I believe that our own actions and determine our judgments of
they would reject a rule permitting either intentional what we ourselves do and have done. To have moral
or indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Thus, they credibility, opponents of terrorism must stand by the
would reject terrorism as a legitimate tactic, just as principles underlying their condemnations, apply
they would reject indiscriminate attacks that kill and their principles in an evenhanded way, and bend over
injure civilians. backwards to avoid unintended harms to civilians.
At the same time, I believe that they would Only in this way can we begin inching back to a world
approve a rule that combined a right of countries to in which those at war honor the moral rules that pro-
defend themselves against aggression with the restric- hibit the taking of innocent human lives. As long as
tions on means of fighting contained in the "bend condemnations of terrorism are tainted by hypocrisy,
over backwards" rule. This would have the follow- moral judgments will only serve to inflame people's
ing benefits. If one were a member of a group that hostilities rather than reminding them to limit and
had been attacked, one's group would have a right of avoid serious harms to one another.
self-defense. At the same time, if one were an innocent
citizen in the aggressor country, the defenders would
be required to take serious steps to avoid injury or NOTES
death to you and other civilians. 1. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust wtlrs (New York: Basic
If people generally could accept such a rule, then Books, 1977); Gerry Wallace, "Terrorism and the Argument
actions that adhere to that rule would be justifiable from Analogy," Journal of Moral and Social Studies, vol. 6
to potential victims as well as potential attackers. This (1991), 149-160.
2. Walzer, 135. 8. Primoratz, 224.

3. Walzer, 205. 9. Primoratz,225.
6. Wallace, 155-156. 12. Primoratz,228.
7. Igor Primoratz, "The Morality of Terrorism?" Journal of 13. Walzer, 155-156.
Applied Philosophy, vol. 14 (1997),222.
The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist

ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ
The arguments in favor of using torture as a last resort If the torture of one guilty person would be
to prevent a ticking bomb from exploding and kill- justified to prevent the torture of a hundred inno-
ing many people are both simple and simple-minded. cent persons, it would seem to follow-certainly to
Bentham constructed a compelling hypothetical case Bentham-that it would also be justified to prevent
to support his utilitarian argument against an absolute the murder of thousands of civilians in the ticking
prohibition on torture: bomb case. Consider two hypothetical situations that
Suppose an occasion were to arise, in which a suspi- are not, unfortunately, beyond the realm of possibil-
cion is entertained, as strong as that which would be ity. In fact, they are both extrapolations on actual situ-
received as a sufficient ground for arrest and commit- ations we have faced.
ment as for felony-a suspicion that at this very time a Several weeks before September 11, 2001, the hruni-
considerable number of individuals are actually suffer- gration and Naturalization Service detained Zacarias
ing, by illegal violence inflictions equal in intenSity to Moussaoui after flight instructors reported suspicious
those which if inflicted by the hand of justice, would statements he had made while taking flying lessons
universally be spoken of under the name of torture. and paying for them with large amounts of cash. The
For the purpose of rescuing from torture these hun-
government decided not to seek a warrant to search
dred innocents, should any scruple be made of apply-
his computer. Now imagine that they had, and that
ing equal or superior torture, to extract the requisite
information from the mouth of one criminal, who they discovered he was part of a plan to destroy large
having it in his power to make known the place where occupied buildings, but without any further details.
at this time the enormity was practising or about to They interrogated him, gave him immunity from pros-
be practised, should refuse to do so? To say nothing of ecution, and offered him large cash rewards and a new
wisdom, could any pretence be made so much as to the identity. He refused to talk. They then threatened him,
praise of blind and vulgar humanity, by the man who tried to trick him, and employed every lawful tech-
to save one criminal, should determine to abandon 100 nique available. He still refused. They even injected
innocent persons to the same fate? him with sodium [pentothal] and other truth serums,
but to no avail. The attack now appeared to be immi-
Alan M. Dershowitz. "The Case for Torturing the Ticking Bomb nent, but the FBI still had no idea what the target was
Terrorist" in Why Terrorism Works (New Haven: Yale University or what means would be used to attack it. We could
Press, 2002). Copyright (i;:) 2002 by Alan M. Dershowitz. Reprinted not simply evacuate all buildings indefinitely. An FBI
with permiSSion from Yale University Press. agent proposes the use of nonlethal torture-say, a
sterilized needle inserted under the fingernails to pro- P. E. Twining, have argued that torture is unaccept-
duce unbearable pain without any threat to health or able even if it is restricted to an extremely limited cat-
life, or the method used in the film Marathon Man, a egory of cases:
dental drill through an unanesthetized tooth.
There is at least one good practical reason for drawing
The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing
a distinction between justifying an isolated act of tor-
such nonlethal torture seems overwhelming: it is ture in an extreme emergency of the kind postulated
surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one guilty above and justifying the institutionalisation of torture as
terrorist who is illegally withholding information a regular practice. The circumstances are so extreme in
needed to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit which most of us would be prepared to justify resort to
a large number of innocent victims to die. Pain is a torture, if at all, the conditions we would impose would
lesser and more remediable harm than death; and the be so stringent, the practical problems of devising and
lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued enforcing adequate safeguards so difficult and the risks
more than the bodily integrity of one guilty person. If of abuse so great that it would be unwise and dangerous
the variation on the Moussaoui case is not sufficiently to entrust any government, however enlightened, with
compelling to make this pOint, we can always raise such a power. Even an out-and-out utilitarian can sup-
port an absolute prohibition against institutionalised
the stakes. Several weeks after September 11, our gov-
torture on the ground that no government in the world
ernment received reports that a ten-kiloton nuclear can be trusted not to abuse the power and to satisfy in
weapon may have been stolen from Russia and was practice the conditions he would impose.
on its way to New York City, where it would be deto-
nated and kill hundreds of thousands of people. The Bentham's own justification was based on case or
reliability of the source, code named Dragonfire, was act utilitarianism-a demonstration that in a particu-
uncertain, but assume for purposes of this hypotheti- lar case, the benefits that would flow from the limited
cal extension of the actual case that the source was a use of torture would outweigh its costs. The argu-
captured terrorist-like the one tortured by the Philip- ment against any use of torture would derive from
pine authorities-who knew precisely how and where rule utilitarianism-which considers the implications
the weapon was being brought into New York and was of establishing a precedent that would inevitably be
to be detonated. Again, everything short of torture is extended beyond its limited case utilitarian justifica-
tried, but to no avail. It is not absolutely certain torture tion to other possible evils of lesser magnitude. Even
will work, but it is our last, best hope for preventing a terrorism itself could be justified by a case utilitarian
cataclysmic nuclear devastation in a city too large to approach. Surely one could come up with a singular
evacuate in time. Should nonlethal torture be tried? situation in which the targeting of a small number of
Bentham would certainly have said yes. civilians-blowing up a German kindergarten by the
The strongest argument against any resort to tor- relatives of inmates in a Nazi death camp, for example,
ture, even in the ticking bomb case, also derives from and threatening to repeat the targeting of German
Bentham's utilitarian calculus. Experience has shown children unless the death camps were shut down.
that if torture, which has been deemed illegitimate The reason this kind of Single-case utilitarian jus-
by the civilized world for more than a century, were tification is simple-minded is that it has no inherent
now to be legitimated-even for limited use in one limiting principle. If nonlethal torture of one person
extraordinary type of situation-such legitimation is justified to prevent the killing of many important
would constitute an important symbolic setback in people, then what if it were necessary to use lethal
the worldwide campaign against human rights abuses. torture-or at least torture that posed a substantial
Inevitably, the legitimation of torture by the world's risk of death? What if it were necessary to torture the
leading democracy would provide a welcome justi- suspect's mother or children to get him to divulge
fication for its more widespread use in other parts of the information? What if it took threatening to kill
the world. Two Bentham scholars, W. L. Twining and his family, his friends, his entire village? Under a
simple-minded quantitative case utilitarianism, any- break. For example, if nonlethal torture were legally
thing goes as long as the number of people tortured limited to convicted terrorists who had knowledge
or killed does not exceed the number that would of future massive terrorist acts, were given immunity,
be saved. This is morality by numbers, unless there and still refused to provide the information, there
are other constraints on what we can properly do. might still be objections to the use of torture, but they
These other constraints can come from rule utilitari- would have to go beyond the slippery slope argument.
anisms or other principles of morality, such as the pro- The case utilitarian argument for torturing a tick-
hibition against deliberately punishing the innocent. ing bomb terrorist is bolstered by an argument from
Unless we are prepared to impose some limits on the analogy-an a fortiori argument. What moral principle
use of torture or other barbaric tactics that might be could justify the death penalty for past individual mur-
of some use in preventing terrorism, we risk hurtling ders and at the same time condemn nonlethal torture
down a slippery slope into the abyss of amorality and to prevent future mass murders? Bentham posed this
ultimately tyranny. Dostoevsky captured the com- rhetorical question as support for his argument. The
plexity of this dilemma in The Brothers Karamazov death penalty is, of course, reserved for convicted mur-
when he had Ivan pose the following question to Alyo- derers. But again, what if torture was limited to con-
sha: "Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human victed terrorists who refused to divulge information
destiny with the object of making men happy in the about future terrorism? Consider as well the analogy
end, giving them peace at least, but that it was essen- to the use of deadly force against suspects fleeing from
tial and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny arrest for dangerous felonies of which they have not
creature-that baby beating its breast with its fist, for yet been convicted. Or military retaliations that pro-
instance-and to found that edifice on its unavenged duce the predictable and inevitable collateral killing
tears, would you consent to be the architect on those of some innocent civilians. The case against torture, if
conditions? Tell me the truth." made by a Quaker who opposes the death penalty, war,
A willingness to kill an innocent child suggests self-defense, and the use of lethal force against fleeing
a willingness to do anything to achieve a necessary felons, is understandable. But for anyone who justifies
result. Hence the slippery slope. killing on the basis of a cost-benefit analYSiS, the case
It does not necessarily follow from this under- against the use of nonlethal torture to save multiple
standable fear of the slippery slope that we can never lives is more difficult to make. In the end, absolute
consider the use of nonlethal infliction of pain, if opposition to torture-even nonlethal torture in the
its use were to be limited by acceptable principles of ticking bomb case-may rest more on historical and
morality. After all, imprisoning a witness who refuses aesthetic considerations than on moral or logical ones.
to testify after being given immunity is designed to be In debating the issue of torture, the first question
punitive-that is painful. Such imprisonment can, on I am often asked is, "Do you want to take us back to the
occasion, produce more pain and greater risk of death Middle Ages?" The association between any form of
than nonlethal torture. Yet we continue to threaten torture and gruesome death is powerful in the minds
and use the pain of imprisonment to loosen the of most people knowledgeable of the history of its
tongues of reluctant witnesses. abuses. This understandable association makes it diffi-
It is commonplace for police and prosecutors to cult for many people to think about nonlethal torture
threaten recalcitrant suspects with prison rape. As one as a technique for saving lives.
prosecutor put it: "You're going to be the boyfriend of The second question I am asked is, "What kind
a very bad man." The slippery slope is an argument of torture do you have in mind?" When I respond by
of caution, not a debate stopper, since virtually every describing the sterilized needle being shoved under
compromise with an absolutist approach to rights the fingernailS, the reaction is visceral and often
carries the risk of slipping further. An appropriate visible-a shudder coupled with a facial gesture of
response to the slippery slope is to build in a principled disgust. Discussions of the death penalty on the other
hand can be conducted without these kinds of reac- using nonlethal torture in the ticking bomb situation.
tions, especially now that we literally put the con- In the late 1980s the Israeli government appointed a
demned prisoner "to sleep" by laying him out on a commission headed by a retired Supreme Court jus-
gurney and injecting a lethal substance into his body. tice to look into precisely that situation. The commis-
There is no breaking of the neck, burning of the brain, sion concluded that there are "three ways for solving
bursting of internal organs, or gasping for breath that this grave dilemma between the vital need to preserve
used to accompany hanging, electrocution, shooting, the very existence of the state and its citizens, and
and gassing. The executioner has been replaced by a maintain its character as a law-abiding state." The first
paramedical technician, as the aesthetics of death is to allow the security service to continue to fight ter-
have become more acceptable. All this tends to cover rorism in "a twilight zone which is outside the realm
up the reality that death is forever while nonlethal of law." The second is "the way of the hypocrites: they
pain is temporary. In our modern age death is under- declare that they abide by the rule of law, but turn a
rated, while pain is overrated. blind eye to what goes on beneath the surface." And
I observed a similar phenomenon several years the third, "the truthful road of the rule of law," is that
ago during the debate over corporal punishment that the "law itself must insure a proper framework for the
was generated by the decision of a court in Singapore activity" of the security services in seeking to prevent
to sentence a young American to medically super- terrorist acts.
vised lashing with a cane. Americans who support the There is of course a fourth road: namely to forgo
death penalty and who express little concern about any use of torture and simply allow the prevent-
inner-City prison conditions were outraged by the able terrorist act to occur. After the Supreme Court
specter of a few welts on the buttocks of an American. of Israel outlawed the use of physical pressure, the
It was an utterly irrational display of hypocrisy and Israeli security services claimed that, as a result
double standards. Given a choice between a medically of the Supreme Court's decision, at least one pre-
administered whipping and one month in a typical ventable act of terrorism had been allowed to take
state lockup or prison, any rational and knowledgeable place, one that killed several people when a bus
person would choose the lash. No one dies of welts or was bombed. Whether this claim is true, false, or
pain, but many inmates are raped, beaten, knifed, and somewhere in between is difficult to assess. But it is
otherwise mutilated and tortured in American pris- clear that if the preventable act of terrorism was of
ons. The difference is that we don't see-and we don't the magnitude of the attacks of September 11, there
want to see-what goes on behind their high walls. would be a great outcry in any democracy that had
Nor do we want to think about it. Raising the issue of deliberately refused to take available preventive
torture makes Americans think about a brutalizing action, even if it required the use of torture. During
and unaesthetic phenomenon that has been out of numerous public appearances since September 11,
our consciousness for many years. 2001, I have asked audiences for a show of hands as
to how many would support the use of nonlethal
torture in a ticking bomb case. Virtually every hand
THE THREE-OR FOUR-WAYS is raised. The few that remain down go up when I ask
The debate over the use of torture goes back many how many believe that torture would actually be
years, with Bentham supporting it in a limited cate- used in such a case.
gory of cases, Kant opposing it as part of his categorical Law enforcement personnel give similar responses.
imperative against improperly using people as means This can be seen in reports of physical abuse directed
for achieving noble ends, and Voltaire's views on the against some suspects that have been detained follow-
matter being "hopelessly confused." The modern ing September 11, reports that have been taken quite
resort to terrorism has renewed the debate over how a seriously by at least one federal judge. It is confirmed
rights-based society should respond to the prospect of by the willingness of u.S. law enforcement officials
to facilitate the torture of terrorist suspects by repres- which they are unaware. We have learned the lesson of
sive regimes allied with our intelligence agencies. As history that off-the-book actions can produce terrible
one former CIA operative with thirty years of experi- consequences. Richard Nixon's creation of a group
ence reported: "A lot of people are saying we need some- of "plumbers" led to Watergate, and Ronald Reagan's
one at the agency who can pull fingernails out. Others authorization of an off-the-books foreign policy in
are saying, 'Let others use interrogation methods that Central America led to the Iran-Contra scandal. And
we don't use.' The only question then is, do you want these are only the ones we know about!
to have CIA people in the room?" The real issue, there- Perhaps the most extreme example of such a hypo-
fore, is not whether some torture would or would not be critical approach to torture comes-not surprisingly-
used in the ticking bomb case-it would. The question from the French experience in Algeria. The French
is whether it would be done openly, pursuant to a previ- army used torture extensively in seeking to prevent
ously established legal procedure, or whether it would terrorism during a brutal colonial war from 1955 to
be done secretly, in violation of existing law. 1957. An officer who supervised this torture, General
Several important values are pitted against each Paul Aussaresses, wrote a book recounting what he
other in this conflict. The first is the safety and security had done and seen, including the torture of dozens of
of a nation's citizens. Under the ticking bomb scenario Algerians. "The best way to make a terrorist talk when
this value may require the use of torture, if that is the he refused to say what he knew was to torture him,"
only way to prevent the bomb from exploding and he boasted. Although the book was published decades
killing large numbers of civilians. The second value is after the war was over, the general was prosecuted-
the preservation of civil liberties and human rights. but not for what he had done to the Algerians. Instead,
This value requires that we not accept torture as a he was prosecuted for revealing what he had done, and
legitimate part of our legal system. In my debates with seeking to justify it.
two prominent civil libertarians, Floyd Abrams and In a democracy governed by the rule of law, we
Harvey Silverglate, both have acknowledged that they should never want our soldiers or our president to take
would want nonlethal torture to be used if it could any action that we deem wrong or illegal. A good test
prevent thousands of deaths, but they did not want of whether an action should or should not be done is
torture to be officially recognized by our legal system. whether we are prepared to have it disclosed-perhaps
As Abrams put it: "In a democracy sometimes it is nec- not immediately, but certainly after some time has
essary to do things off the books and below the radar passed. No legal system operating under the rule of
screen." Former presidential candidate Alan Keyes law should ever tolerate an "off-the-books" approach
took the pOSition that although torture might be nec- to necessity. Even the defense of necessity must be jus-
essary in a given situation it could never be right. He tified lawfully. The road to tyranny has always been
suggested that a president should authorize the tortur- paved with claims of necessity made by those respon-
ing of a ticking bomb terrorist, but that this act should sible for the security of a nation. Our system of checks
not be legitimated by the courts or incorporated into and balances requires that all presidential actions, like
our legal system. He argued that wrongful and indeed all legislative or military actions, be consistent with
unlawful acts might sometimes be necessary to pre- governing law. If it is necessary to torture in the tick-
serve the nation, but that no aura of legitimacy should ing bomb case, then our governing laws must accom-
be placed on these actions by judicial imprimatur. modate this practice. If we refuse to change our law to
This understandable approach is in conflict with accommodate any particular action, then our govern-
the third important value: namely, open account- ment should not take that action.
ability and visibility in a democracy. "Off-the-book Only in a democracy committed to civil liber-
actions below the radar screen" are antithetical to ties would a triangular conflict of this kind exist.
the theory and practice of democracy. Citizens can- Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes experience
not approve or disapprove of governmental actions of no such conflict, because they subscribe to neither
the civil libertarian nor the democratic values that is unlikely they will succeed in time. Or say we have no
come in conflict with the value of security. The hard communication with the jet and all we know is that it
question is: which value is to be preferred when an is off course and heading toward Washington, D.C., or
inevitable clash occurs? One or more of these values some other densely populated city. Under these more
must inevitably be compromised in making the tragic questionable circumstances, the question becomes
choice presented by the ticking bomb case. If we do who should make this life and death choice between
not torture, we compromise the security and safety of evils-a decision that may turn out tragically wrong?
our citizens. If we tolerate torture, but keep it off the No reasonable person would allocate this decision
books and below the radar screen, we compromise to a fighter jet pilot who happened to be in the area or
principles of democratic accountability. If we create a to a local airbase commander-unless of course there
legal structure for limiting and controlling torture, we was no time for the matter to be passed up the chain of
compromise our principled opposition to torture in all command to the president or the secretary of defense.
circumstances and create a potentially dangerous and A decision of this kind should be made at the highest
expandable situation. level pOSSible, with visibility and accountability.
In 1678, the French writer Franc;ois de La Roche- Why is this not also true of the decision to torture
foucauld said that "hypocrisy is the homage that vice a ticking bomb terrorist? Why should that choice of
renders to virtue." In this case we have two vices: evils be relegated to a local policeman, FBI agent, or
terrorism and torture. We also have two virtues: CIA operative, rather than to a judge, the attorney
civil liberties and democratic accountability. Most general, or the president?
civil libertarians I know prefer hypocrisy, precisely There are, of course, important differences between
because it appears to avoid the conflict between the decision to shoot down the plane and the decision
security and civil liberties, but by choosing the way to torture the ticking bomb terrorist. Having to shoot
of the hypocrite these civil libertarians compro- down an airplane, though tragic, is not likely to be a
mise the value of democratic accountability. Such recurring issue. There is no slope down which to slip.
is the nature of tragic choices in a complex world. Moreover, the jet to be shot down is filled with our
As Bentham put it more than two centuries ago: fellow citizens-people with whom we can identify.
"Government throughout is but a choice of evils." In The suspected terrorist we may choose to torture is a
a democracy, such choices must be made, whenever "they"-an enemy with whom we do not identify but
pOSSible, with openness and democratic accountabil- with whose potential victims we do identify. The risk
ity, and subject to the rule of law. of making the wrong deCision, or of overdoing the
Consider another terrible choice of evils that torture, is far greater, since we do not care as much
could easily have been presented on September 11, what happens to ((them" as to "us." Finally, there is
ZOOI-and may well be presented in the future: a something different about torture-even nonlethal
hijacked passenger jet is on a collision course with a torture-that sets it apart from a quick death. In addi-
densely occupied office building; the only way to pre- tion to the horrible history associated with torture,
vent the destruction of the building and the killing of there is also the aesthetic of torture. The very idea
its occupants is to shoot down the jet, thereby killing of deliberately subjecting a captive human being to
its innocent passengers. This choice now seems easy, excruciating pain violates our sense of what is accept-
because the passengers are certain to die anyway and able. On a purely rational basis, it is far worse to shoot
their somewhat earlier deaths will save numerous a fleeing felon in the back and kill him, yet every civi-
lives. The passenger jet must be shot down. But what lized SOCiety authorizes shooting such a suspect who
if it were only probable, not certain, that the jet would poses dangers of committing violent crimes against the
crash into the building? Say, for example, we know police or others. In the United States we execute con-
from cell phone transmissions that passengers are victed murderers, despite compelling evidence of the
struggling to regain control of the hijacked jet, but it unfairness and ineffectiveness of capital punishment.
Yet many of us recoil at the prospect of shoving a steril- alone, could not be used to convict, but it was used to
ized needle under the finger of a suspect who is refus- obtain a torture warrant. That torture warrant was in
ing to divulge information that might prevent multiple turn used to obtain a confession, which then had to
deaths. Despite the irrationality of these distinctions, be independently corroborated-at least in most cases
they are understandable, especially in light of the sor- (witchcraft and other such cases were exempted from
did history of torture. the requirement of corroboration).
We associate torture with the Inquisition, the Torture was also used against persons already con-
Gestapo, the Stalinist purges, and the Argentine colo- victed of capital crimes, such as high treason, who
nels responsible for the "dirty war." We recall it as a were thought to have information necessary to pre-
prelude to death, an integral part of a regime of gratu- vent attacks on the state.
itous pain leading to a painful demise. We find it dif- Langbein studied eighty-one torture warrants,
ficult to imagine a benign use of nonlethal torture to issued between 1540 and 1640, and found that in
save lives. many of them, especially in lithe higher cases of
Yet there was a time in the history of Anglo-Saxon treasons, torture is used for discovery, and not for evi-
law when torture was used to save life, rather than to dence." Torture was "used to protect the state": and
take it, and when the limited administration of nonle- "mostly that meant preventive torture to identify and
thal torture was supervised by judges, including some forestall plots and plotters." It was only when the legal
who are well remembered in history. This fascinating system loosened its requirement of proof (or intro-
story has been recounted by Professor John Langbein duced the "black box" of the jury system) and when
of Yale Law School, and it is worth summarizing here perceived threats against the state diminished that
because it helps inform the debate over whether, if torture was no longer deemed necessary to convict
torture would in fact be used in a ticking bomb case, guilty defendants against whom there had previously
it would be worse to make it part of the legal system, been insufficient evidence, or to secure preventive
or worse to have it done off the books and below the information.
radar screen. The ancient Jewish system of jurisprudence came
In his book on legalized torture during the six- up with yet another solution to the conundrum of
teenth and seventeenth centuries, Torture and the convicting the guilty and preventing harms to the
Law of Proof, Langbein demonstrates the trade-off community in the face of difficult evidentiary bar-
between torture and other important values. Torture riers. Jewish law required two witnesses and a spe-
was employed for several purposes. First, it was used to cific advance warning before a guilty person could
secure the evidence necessary to obtain a guilty ver- be convicted. Because confessions were disfavored,
dict under the rigorous criteria for conviction required torture was not an available option. Instead, the
at the time-either the testimony of two eyeWitnesses defendant who had been seen killing by one reliable
or the confession of the accused himself. Circumstan- witness, or whose guilt was obvious from the circum-
tial evidence, no matter how compelling, would not stantial evidence, was formally acquitted, but he was
do. As Langbein concludes, "no society will long toler- then taken to a secure location and fed a concoction of
ate a legal system in which there is no prospect in con- barley and water until his stomach burst and he died.
victing unrepentant persons who commit clandestine Moreover, Jewish law permitted more flexible forms of
crimes. Something had to be done to extend the sys- self-help against those who were believed to endanger
tem to those cases. The two-eyewitness rule was hard the community.
to compromise or evade, but the confession invited Every society has insisted on the incapacitation
'subterfuge.'" The subterfuge that was adopted per- of dangerous criminals regardless of strictures in the
mitted the use of torture to obtain confessions from formal legal rules. Some use torture, others use infor-
suspects against whom there was compelling circum- mal sanctions, while yet others create the black box
stantial evidence of guilt. The circumstantial evidence, of a jury, which need not explain its commonsense
l.,
704 () PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
verdicts. Similarly, every society insists that, if there believe that most judges would require compelling
are steps that can be taken to prevent effective acts of evidence before they would authorize so extraordi-
terrorism, these steps should be taken, even if they nary a departure from our constitutional norms, and
require some compromise with other important law enforcement officials would be reluctant to seek a
principles. warrant unless they had compelling evidence that the
In deciding whether the ticking bomb terror- suspect had information needed to prevent an immi-
ist should be tortured, one important question is nent terrorist attack. A record would be kept of every
whether there would be less torture if it were done warrant granted, and although it is certainly possible
as part of the legal system, as it was in sixteenth- and that some individual agents might torture without a
seventeenth-century England, or off the books, as it warrant, they would have no excuse, since a warrant
is in many countries today. The Langbein study does procedure would be available. They could not claim
not definitively answer this question, but it does pro- "necessity," because the decision as to whether the
vide some suggestive insights. The English system torture is indeed necessary has been taken out of their
of torture was more visible and thus more subject to hands and placed in the hands of a judge. In addition,
public accountability, and it is likely that torture was even if torture were deemed totally illegal without
employed less frequently in England than in France. any exception, it would still occur, though the public
"During these years when it appears that torture would be less aware of its existence.
might have become routinized in English criminal I also believe that the rights of the suspect would
procedure, the Privy Council kept the torture power be better protected with a warrant requirement. He
under careful control and never allowed it to fall into would be granted immunity, told that he was now com-
the hands of the regular law enforcement officers," pelled to testify, threatened with imprisonment if he
as it had in France. In England "no law enforcement refused to do so, and given the option of providing the
officer ... acquired the power to use torture without requested information. Only if he refused to do what he
special warrant." Moreover, when torture warrants was legally compelled to do-prOVide necessary infor-
were abolished, ((the English experiment with tor- mation, which could not incriminate him because of
ture left no traces." Because it was under centralized the immunity-would he be threatened with torture.
control, it was easier to abolish than it was in France, Knowing that such a threat was authorized by the
where it persisted for many years. law, he might well provide the information. If he still
It is always difficult to extrapolate from history, refused to, he would be subjected to judicially moni-
but it seems logical that a formal, visible, account- tored physical measures designed to cause excruciating
able, and centralized system is somewhat easier pain without leaving any lasting damage.
to control than an ad hoc, off-the-books, and Let me cite two examples to demonstrate why
under-the-radar-screen nonsystem. I believe, though I think there would be less torture with a warrant
I certainly cannot prove, that a formal requirement requirement than without one. Recall the case of
of a judicial warrant as a prerequisite to nonlethal the alleged national security wiretap placed on the
torture would decrease the amount of physical vio- phones of Martin Luther King by the Kennedy admin-
lence directed against suspects. At the most obvious istration in the early 1960s. This was in the days when
level, a double check is always more protective than the attorney general could authorize a national secu-
a single check. In every instance in which a warrant rity wiretap without a warrant. Today no judge would
is requested, a field officer has already decided that issue a warrant in a case as flimsy as that one. When
torture is justified and, in the absence of a warrant Zacarias Moussaoui was detained after raising suspi-
requirement, would simply proceed with the torture. cions while trying to learn how to fly an airplane, the
Requiring that decision to be approved by a judicial government did not seek a national security wiretap
officer will result in fewer instances of torture even because its lawyers believed that a judge would not
if the judge rarely turns down a request. Moreover, I have granted one. If Moussaoui's computer could have
been searched without a warrant, it almost certainly Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army pro-
would have been. gram for deporting and detaining these dtizens of japa-
It should be recalled that in the context of nese extraction. But a judidal construction of the due
searches, our Supreme Court opted for a judicial process clause that will sustain this order is a far more
check on the discretion of the police, by requiring a subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the
search warrant in most cases. The Court has explained order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional,
the reason for the warrant requirement as follows: is not apt to last longer than the military emergency.
"The informed and deliberate determinations of Even during that period a succeeding commander may
revoke it all. But once a judidal opinion rationalizes such
magistrates . . . are to be preferred over the hurried
an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution,
action of officers." justice Robert jackson elaborated:
or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law time has validated the prindple of radal discrimina-
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which tion in criminal procedure and of transplanting Ameri-
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection can citizens. The prindple then lies about like a loaded
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that and thinking and expands it to new purposes. All who
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinter- observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge
ested determination to issue a search warrant will jus- Cardozo described as "the tendency of a prindple to
tify the officers in making a search without a warrant expand itself to the limit of its logic." A military com-
would reduce the Amendment to nullity and leave the mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality,
people's homes secure only in the discretion of pOlice and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that
officers. passing inddent becomes the doctrine of the Constitu-
tion. There it has a generative power of its own, and all
Although torture is very different from a search, the that it creates will be in its own image.
policies underlying the warrant requirement are rele-
vant to the question whether there is likely to be more
A similar argument can be made regarding tor-
torture or less if the decision is left entirely to field offi-
ture: if an agent tortures, that is "an inddent," but if
cers, or if a judicial officer has to approve a request for the Courts authorize it, it becomes a precedent. There is,
a torture warrant. As Abraham Maslow once observed, however, an important difference between the deten-
to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail. tion of Japanese-American citizens and torture. The
If the man with the hammer must get judicial approval detentions were done openly and with presidential
before he can use it, he will probably use it less often accountability; torture would be done secretly, with
and more carefully. official deniability. Tolerating an off-the-book system of
There are other, somewhat more subtle, consid- secret torture can also establish a dangerous precedent.
erations that should be factored into any decision A variation on this "legitimation" argument
regarding torture. There are some who see silence would postpone consideration of the choice between
as a virtue when it comes to the choice among such authorizing torture and forgoing a possible tactic
horrible evils as torture and terrorism. It is far better, necessary to prevent an imminent act of terrorism
they argue, not to discuss or write about issues of this until after the choice-presumably the choice to
sort, lest they become legitimated. And legitimation is torture-has been made. In that way, the discussion
an appropriate concern. justice jackson, in his opin- would not, in itself, encourage the use of torture. If
ion in one of the cases concerning the detention of it were employed, then we could decide whether it
japanese-Americans during World War II, made the was justified, excusable, condemnable, or something
following relevant observation: in between. The problem with that argument is that
no FBI agent who tortured a suspect into disclosing Even if government officials decline to discuss
information that prevented an act of mass terrorism such issues, academics have a duty to raise them and
would be prosecuted-as the policemen who tortured submit them to the marketplace of ideas. There may
the kidnapper into disclosing the whereabouts of his be danger in open discussion, but there is far greater
victim were not prosecuted. In the absence of a prose- danger in actions based on secret discussion, or no dis-
cution, there would be no occasion to judge the appro- cussion at all.
priateness of the torture. Whatever option our nation eventually adopts-
I disagree with these more passive approaches and no torture even to prevent massive terrorism, no tor-
believe that in a democracy it is always preferable to ture except with a warrant authorizing nonlethal
decide controversial issues in advance, rather than torture, or no "officially" approved torture but its
in the heat of battle. I would apply this rule to other selective use beneath the radar screen-the choice is
tragic choices as well, including the possible use of a ours to make in a democracy. We do have a choice, and
nuclear first strike, or retaliatory strikes-so long as we should make it-before local FBI agents make it for
the discussion was sufficiently general to avoid giving us on the basis of a false assumption that we do not
our potential enemies a strategic advantage by their really "have a choice."
knowledge of our policy.
***
My Tortured Decision
ALI SOUFAN
For seven years I have remained silent about the false agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I ques-
claims magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called tioned him from March toJune 2002, before the harsh
enhanced interrogation techniques like waterboard- techniques were introduced later in August. Under tra-
ing. I have spoken only in closed government hear- ditional interrogation methods, he provided us with
ings, as these matters were classified. But the release important actionable intelligence.
last week of four Justice Department memos on inter- We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh
rogations allows me to shed light on the story, and on Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.
some of the lessons to be learned. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the
One of the most striking parts of the memos is so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had
the false premises on which they are based. The first, found throughout my counterterrorism career: tradi-
dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh tional interrogation techniques are successful in iden-
interrogation techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, tifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods There was no actionable intelligence gained from
hadn't been working. The next three memos cite the using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu
successes of those methods as a justification for their Zubaydah that wasn't, or couldn't have been, gained
continued use. from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on
had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.1. more than a few occasions-all of which are still clas-
sified. The short sightedness behind the use of these
techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods,
Ali Soufan, excerpt from "My Tortured Decision," New York Times,
April 22,2009. Copyright (() 2009 Ali Soufan, used by permission the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus
of The Wylie Agency LLC. operandi of the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques have claimed that That would be a mistake. Almost all the agency offi-
they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information lead- cials I worked with on these issues were good people
ing to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide who felt as I did about the use of enhanced tech-
to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This niques: it is un-American, ineffective and harmful to
is false. The information that led to Mr. Shibh's cap- our national security.
ture came primarily from a different terrorist operative Fortunately for me, after I objected to the enhanced
who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for techniques, the message came through from Pat
Mr. Padilla, the dates just don't add up: the harsh tech- D'Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, that "we don't do
niques were approved in the memo of August 2002, that," and I was pulled out of the interrogations by the
Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May. F.B.I. director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in
One of the worst consequences of the use of the report released last year by the Justice Department's
these harsh techniques was that it reintroduced inspector general).
the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and My C.I.A. colleagues who balked at the techniques,
F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that on the other hand, were instructed to continue. (It's
prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 worth nothing that when reading between the lines of
attacks. Because the bureau would not employ these the newly released memos, it seems clear that it was
problematic techniques, our agents who knew the contractors, not C.I.A. officers, who requested the use
most about the terrorists could have no part in of these techniques.)
the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who As we move forward, it's important to not
knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than allow the torture issue to harm the reputation, and
anyone in the government was not allowed to speak thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The agency is
to him. essential to our national security. We must ensure
It was the right decision to release these memos, that the mistakes behind the use of these techniques
as we need the truth to come out. This should not be are never repeated. We're making a good start: Presi-
a partisan matter, because it fs in our national security dent Obama has limited interrogation techniques
interest to regain our position as the world's foremost to the guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and
defenders of human rights. Just as important, releas- Leon Panetta, the C.I.A. director, says he has banned
ing these memos enables us to begin the tricky process the use of contractors and secret overseas prisons for
of finally bringing these terrorists to justice. terrorism suspects (the so-called black sites). Just as
The debate after the release of these memos has important, we need to ensure that no new mistakes
centered on whether C.I.A. officials should be prose- are made in the process of moving forward-a real
cuted for their role in harsh interrogation techniques. danger right now.
On Following Orders in an Unjust War

DAVID ESTLUND
Is a soldier morally obligated to obey ordinary pro-authority impulse, but rather a conviction that this
(included lethal) commands, even when the war kind of authority depends on demanding background
is unjust? I will argue that under the right condi- conditions. Counterbalancing the authoritarian aspect
tions, the answer is "yes." What drives me is hardly a of my argument is (among other things) a democratic
imperative that warring nations have not often heeded.
David Estlund, "On Following Orders in an Unjust War," /ollmaf of To this extent, declarations of war have often lacked
Political Philosoph}' 15, no. 2 (2007): 213-34. the authority that would require soldiers to obey.
The view taken here stands between two extant be affected in certain ways by treaties and other legal
views of the matter. Some have held that if the war is issues, but it is better thought of as more discovered
unjust then the soldier is morally equivalent to a mur- than created.
derer. Others have held that the soldier's obedience to There are questions about how soldiers come to be
his state automatically sanitizes his participation in an under the authority of their commanders at aU, but
unjust war (even if there might yet be impermissible to concentrate on my issue I will assume there are no
ways of fighting it). I will argue that when the political problems of that kind in our examples. Suppose, if it
and institutional process producing the commands is helps, that our soldiers have volunteered and given
duly looking after the question whether the war is just, informed consent to the rule of their superiors.
the soldier would be wrong to substitute his own pri- So, I will mean by the term, normally binding
vate verdict and thwart the state's will. On the other orders:
hand, these preconditions are substantial, and the sol-
orders that, at least if the army is justly in the war, a.)
dier will need to think for himself about whether they are issued with legitimate authority, and b.) command
are met. The soldier is not exonerated simply because acts that soldiers would be required to carry out if the
he was following orders. On the other hand, when the war were just.
state and its procedures are of the right kind the sol-
dier's participation in an unjust war is sanitized pre- Now, suppose the soldier's army is unjustly at war, or
cisely because he was following orders. that the soldier believes it is. Either way, the soldier faces
Ius in bello, or justice in the conduct of war, is tra- the same question, and I will take it up in this form:
ditionally contrasted with jus ad bellum, or the justice Ought I to obey this normally binding command,
of going to war. This traditional bifurcation (I will even though my side is (apparently) unjust in pursuing
sometimes call it the ad/in distinction) leaves my ques- this war?
tion more or less out of the picture. The issue I want to
consider arises for soldiers even if all issues of the jus- I. SOME EXTANT VIEWS
tice of a war, and all issues of justice in the conduct of
Vitoria, in a brief but fascinating treatment of this
war are settled. Suppose that a war which is unjust to
question, argues that:
wage will nevertheless be fought with otherwise just
means. This allows us to take all issues of both kinds as if the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must
settled. And yet my question remains: should the sol- not fight, even if he is ordered to do so by the prince.
dier obey the order to fight? This seems closer to the This is obvious, since one may not lawfully kill an
standard questions about conscientious refusal. But innocent man on any authority, and in the case we are
speaking of the enemy must be innocent. Therefore it is
these are ordinarily posed in the context of conscrip-
unlawful to kill them. I
tion: when maya drafted citizen refuse to join or fight
on the baSis of moral objection to this or to all wars? Vitoria's argument anticipates the modern rejection of
But my question arises even if all soldiers have joined the "Nuremberg defense," in which someone defends
the armed forces voluntarily, as I will assume here. their participation in grave wrongs by pointing out,
The fact that a soldier joined the services voluntarily as Nazi officials did at the Nuremberg trials, that they
is clearly not a blanket permission to engage in atroci- were only following orders. 2 I believe Vitoria is wrong
ties in the conduct of war. Similarly, I think, it does about thiS, and that our attitude toward the Nurem-
not immediately answer whether he is obligated to berg defense needs to be refined.
fight even an unjust war. I will take for granted that if A few terminological preliminaries: First, by "law-
the war is just and the commands are within the rules fully," let's assume Vitoria means permissibly, morally
of war, the soldier normally has a duty to obey. By the speaking. Second, by "innocent" we will not mean
"rules of war," I mean whatever the moral content of non-combatants, which is how the term is often used
jus in bello and jus ad bellum really is. This is bound to in discussing the ethics of war. 3 Vitoria realizes that the
victims of un just wars are often combatant soldiers, II. THE JAILER
but he counts them as innocent when the war against
Knowingly killing an innocent person is not always
them is unjust. Their killing wrongs them, and they
wrong. Indeed, even when the killing wrongs the
are innocent in that sense. Defining innocence in that
person, the person doing the killing is not always act-
way might seem to build the answer to our question
ing wrongly. 1 begin with the more general question
into the definition. If the victim is wronged, doesn't
whether it is always wrong intentionally to harm an
that already guarantee that the soldier is wrong to do
innocent person. A good illustration for our purposes
it? I do not believe that it does, and this is important
concerns a jailer:
in understanding my argument. My thesis is precisely
that under the right conditions, even though the vic- jason the jailer has seen the convict's trial on televi-
tim is wronged by the unjustly warring side, the sol- sion. The jury was fooled, and exonerating evidence
dier on that side is nevertheless morally obligated (and was presented but ignored. They have made a grave
so morally permitted) to follow all normally binding mistake and the jailer knows it: the man is innocent.
orders-those that would be binding at least if the war The trial was properly conducted, under fair and sound
procedural rules duly protective of a defendant's inter-
were just.
ests. These rules were not broken by the participants.
Vitoria says that the soldier on the unjust side is The jurors were of normal capacities and made a good-
morally wrong, and surely the wrong is question is a faith effort at a strong presumption of innocence. The
grave one. Robert Nozick takes a similar view, argu- jailer could look the other way, and allow the convicted
ing that if the soldier doesn't manage to get himself man to escape his 20 year sentence, without anyone
out of such a situation, he is indeed at a "moral dis- knowing it was intentional. Maybe the prisoner would
advantage."" One way to make this sound plausible be recaptured, maybe not. What should the jailer do?
is to say that the description of the action, "know-
My strong intuitive reaction to this case, and I expect
ingly killing an innocent person," still applies even
it is widely held, is that the jailer acts permissibly if he
if it is also correctly described as "obeying orders,"
puts the man in jail. The jailer is not morally required
or "obeying the law." If knowingly killing an inno-
under the circumstances to let the man go free. (I will
cent person is always wrong, then it is wrong even
in these cases. 5 shortly argue that he is also obligated not to do so.)
On the other side, there is Michael Walzer's posi- If you are not persuaded, then consider a slightly
tion, that the soldier who is following normally bind- less elegant variant, but the most compelling one for
my purposes:
ing commands is not to blame for the injustice of the
war. 6 Walzer's view is that there are duties of patrio- jason the jailer realizes the defendant is guilty, but
tism, a nobility to answering the call of one's coun- knows that the sentence of 20 years in jail is excessive.
try, that puts the soldier beyond criticism unless he Suppose the crime is embezzling $1000. jason sees that
violates the rules of jus in bello. Walzer's view is dis- anything more than 5 years is morally indefensible.
concerting, knowing as we do that armies are often jason is legally ordered to keep the prisoner for 20 years,
ordered into the most flagrantly immoral wars by the but suppose he could easily let him escape after S. Is
most flagrantly criminal governments, even if the Jason permitted to carry out the full punishment?
rules of jus in bello might happen to be respected. We It seems clear to me that he is. If so, he is knowingly
would need to know what morally accounts for the jailing as innocent person after the first 5 years have
overriding value of such a blind patriotism, when a passed. The view I want to reject, call it the primacy
more discerning version of patriotism might be avail- of private judgment view, says that the jailer is neither
able. One thing that Walzer's view gets right, though, is obligated nor permitted to keep an innocent person in
that sometimes a person's moral duty is to follow even jail. He ought to follow his private judgment and set
unjust orders. We can see this by turning to non- the man free. (By calling it private I mean to mark that
military contexts first. his own judgment differs from the public judgment.
It might be based on considerations that are private to avoid carrying out an unjust punishment. So we can
in some further sense, or it might not, but it counts as grant and put aside the right to resign with due notice.
private in my sense either way.) I believe most people The question is whether the jailer is permitted to
will find it implausible to think that the jailer may resign immediately to avoid this order. The view that
substitute his own private judgment for the court's he is has some appeal, since resigning is different from
verdict, but I know not everyone is persuaded by this thwarting the will of the authority, since the punish-
case. We can strengthen it, though, by considering a ment will, suppose, be carried out by the replacement
number of points that will also be important when I jailer. This appeal, though, depends on granting that
return to the military context. the authority's will should not be thwarted, that if it
First, the operative element, the thing that per- decides the person should be jailed, then the person
mits and obligates the jailer to obey, is the nature of should be jailed. The thought that the jailer should
the process that generates the command, in this case, resign rather than set the man free, gets its appeal from
a responsible trial. So the view is not that the jailer its leaving in place the eventual jailing of the convict.
should punish whomever comes his way regardless of The view that the jailer is permitted to resign suggests
the process that generated the conviction or set the that replacement jailers are also permitted to resign.
punishment. If, for example, the government were In that case, no one is obligated to carry out the pun-
rounding up and jailing political opponents simply ishment. This is in severe tension with the stipulation
for their inconvenient views, there is no plausibility to that the authority's will should be done.
the idea that the jailer ought simply to do as he is told. Fifth, we must avoid being misled by another
Second, regardless of the nature of the process that consideration, namely, that the institution ought to
generated the command, there are limits on what the make humane provisions for a jailer who is offended,
jailer should do. For example, there are some punish- or made uncomfortable by the prospect of carrying
ments, such as torture, that are not even approximately out the order. We can assume for the sake of argu-
just even if the person were guilty of the alleged crime. ment that jailers who are deeply offended or discom-
Third, saying that the jailer must follow the orders fited by the injustice of the punishment should not be
leaves open the possibility that he should first contest forced to carry out the punishment, nor should they
them in some way. So, for now, allow that this is so. be punished if they decline under such emotional
In truth, there are complexities about such a right duress. This is a question about how the jailer should
or duty of contestation that we will need to consider be treated, however, not any resolution to the question
later at greater length. For now, the point is only that of what his moral responsibilities are.
a responsible process might duly consider the protest Sixth, we should reject the idea that if the proce-
and yet proceed with its original order. The right or dure is good then the verdict will be correct, or that
duty to contest mistakes would not be an argument it will at least be everyone's best evidence about the
against the duty to comply with them after the process truth. These are both mistaken. Even properly carried
of contestation is duly concluded. out trial procedures must be assumed to be fallible.
Fourth, we should acknowledge that there is a There are many reasons for this, but one is that some-
middle ground between carrying out the order and times the questions they face are exceedingly difficult.
seeing that it is not carried out. The jailer could resign. Nor is the proper trial's verdict bound to be everyone's
If resigning is permitted, then it would be false to say best evidence about the truth. Again, letting a single
the jailer is obligated to carry out the order. Surely, jail- example suffice, there are lots of conSiderations that
ers don't have special obligations to stay at the same might give an outsider an epistemic advantage even
job forever. So resigning must, in some way, be per- though it is not, and should not be, available to the
missible. This can be accounted for by assuming that jury. Perhaps you grew up with the defendant, and
the jailer may resign with due notice. That would not know that the accusation is incompatible with his
help us to know whether he may resign immediately nature. Of course, you might be wrong. The point is
only that this could give you good epistemic reason to same, mainly because the punishment in question-
doubt the verdict even if the trial procedure were com- death-is so much more severe. Many people believe
pletelyadequate. that the legal infliction of the punishment of death
Seventh, and finally, there might be an exception is never morally justified. I mean to argue only that
to the jailer's duty to obey in certain cases of first-hand if capital punishment can be justified for the perpe-
knowledge. Suppose the jailer had actually witnessed trators of certain crimes, then under the right con-
the crime and saw with his own two eyes that the ditions the executioner can be permitted to execute
convict was not the perpetrator. Obviously, the jailer knowingly even an innocent person. Moreover, she
should offer this information, and we can assume it can have a moral duty to do it. It is crucial, then, to
was aired at trial. The trial might still wrongly convict assume for the sake of argument both that capital
because even procedurally appropriate trials will still punishment would have been a just punishment if
be fallible (or so we must assume). Should the jailer the convict had been guilty of the crime in question,
put the innocent man in jail, even for a long sentence, and that the trial procedure, along with its social and
knowing with as much certainty as life allows that he cultural background, is not so irrational or prejudiced
is innocent? Of course, the jailer should contest the that it no longer counts as an adequate (though fal-
order in whatever ways are possible, but this doesn't lible) legal method for accurately punishing the guilty
solve the problem, since the sentence might stand Without punishing the innocent. I don't mean that
even after due contestation. there is a bright line here, but objections of those
What should the jailer do? The problem is only kinds to capital punishment should be put aside for
sharper in the case of the executioner, discussed next. present purposes.
An adequate treatment is not possible here, but a few To bring the elements of the example together
points are important. If some such exception were then:
granted, so that the jailer mayor should, say, resign
rather than jail a person whose innocence he knows Elizabeth, the executioner for the state of Texas, is in
as a first-hand eyeWitness, this would not mean that charge of arranging the execution, and then throw-
ing the switch. The condemned man was convicted in
anything central to my account is being conceded to
a fair trial by an honest jury. But they were fooled by
opposing views. First, there isn't a clear analogue to
the prosecuting attorney, and very strong exculpating
that kind of certainty when the question is whether
eVidence was inappropriately ignored. No one behaved
a war is just, and that is my main topic. Second, an badly: the prosecutor believed his case, and the jurors
exception of that kind wouldn't reqUire conceding were persuaded. But Elizabeth can see that the man is
that the jailer ought only to carry out what he thinks innocent. If Elizabeth carries out her appointed task,
are just punishments. I still deny that. There would she will knowingly kill an innocent person. She could,
remain a duty to carry out many punishments even instead, rig the switch to fail. Maybe he will be executed
when they are wrong, and believed to be wrong by the anyway or maybe he will escape. (But assume there is
jailer. Therefore the narrow exception would need a no reason to think he will some day be exonerated.
basis other than the idea that the jailor is under a duty The official view of his guilt will never change.) What
to carry out only just punishments. I must leave the should the executioner do?
matter here, except for a brief note in the discussion of First, is Elizabeth even morally permitted to throw
democracy below. 7 the switch? Or should executioners substitute their
own judgment about the justice of the sentence in
each individual case? Second, if she is permitted to
III. THE EXECUTIONER
throw the SWitch, is she also morally duty-bound to
My strategy will be to extend these pOints to the case do so?
of an executioner, and then to a soldier in an unjust Arthur Applbaum considers the historical case
war. The executioner's situation is not exactly the of Sanson, the Executioner of Paris, in great detail. 8
I,
II
g Jizii.',L",._
Sanson was widely reviled for, as he saw it, simply McMahon briefly anticipates this sort of argu-
doing his job, even as the authorities above him ment, and rejects it:
changed constantly. Sanson argued that it was not
There are ... some types of act that are so seriously
his place to decide who lives and who dies, but that objectionable that they cannot become permissible
this was to be decided by the government. If Sanson even if they are demanded by insti tutions that are both
was knowingly killing innocent people, and if this is just and important.... [I]t may not be permissible for
always wrong, then doing it under the authority of them to punish, and would certainly be impermissible
law cannot make it right. The jailer's story shows that for them to execute, a person they know to be innocent
even punishments that are unjust to their victims can, of violating the law, even if that is what their institu-
under the right conditions, be morally permissible tional role requires. 9
and even mandatory acts of those duly ordered to do Many readers might agree with him. My argument
so. The trial procedure can be a legitimate and compe- shows only that they must either bite the bullet, say-
tent method for officially trying to punish the guilty ing that not just the executioner but also the jailer
without punishing the innocent, even if it is fallible. should ignore the jury's verdict, or explain the rea-
In that case, the jailer can be permitted and required son why he should only do so when the punishment
to leave that job to others, such as the judge and jury, would be death.
and simply be the jailer. The question is what relevant McMahon is certainly correct that some acts are
difference it might make if the punishment is death too objectionable to be sanitized by being officially
rather than imprisonment. commanded. Boiling a person in oil would be one
While death is more severe, the severity of example. But that would be wrong even if the person
extended imprisonment should not be underes- were guilty. McMahon is suggesting a different class
timated. If the primacy of private judgment were of punishments: punishments that are fine if the per-
necessary as an extra protection when death is the son is guilty and duly conVicted, but impermissible if
punishment, why not also for imprisonment? I don't the person is duly convicted but innocent. He says,
propose to foreclose all possible ways of distinguish- in effect, that perhaps all punishment is in this class,
ing the two cases. I limit myself to a few points. First, but certainly execution is. His choice, as I have said, is
as I have just said, it is not at all clear how the dif- between biting the bullet to say the jailer must ignore
ference between very severe and more severe would the verdict, or explaining the reason why only death
explain the different duties of the jailer and the execu- makes this difference.
tioner (putting aside, as a separate issue, any chance
of later exoneration). Second, if it is to be shown that
the executioner should indeed substitute her private IV. PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS
judgment it is important to see that this does not rest The examples so far suggest that following orders is
on any such principle as one forbidding the carrying not by itself enough to let the jailer, the executioner,
out of punishments that are unjust to their victims. or the soldier off the hook morally. Sanson the execu-
If I am right about the jailer case, it strongly suggests tioner was following orders too, but he was wrong to
that there is no such principle. Third, the intuitive carry them out. What is missing in his case is the ori-
plausibility of my saying that Elizabeth is obligated gin of his orders in an honest, competent and legally
to execute the innocent man depends on rehearsing legitimate, though necessarily fallible, effort to inflict
the points we added to the jailer case about the back- the harm only if it is just to do so. Mistakes might still
ground process, limits on what can be required, the have been made in that case, but they would have
rights and duties to contest the command, and the been honest mistakes.
need for institutional accommodations for execu- I want to concentrate on the epistemic, or
tioners unable or unwilling to obey what they believe knowledge-seeking, aspect of this standard. In the
to be an unjust command. punishment cases, it is a crucial part of the story that
-~'
there was a fair trial. In a fair trial, a fair and compe- or punishments. I will call this the honest mistake
tent effort is made not to convict unless the defendant standard.
is guilty. If we remove this epistemic aspect from the
story, I doubt that we still think that Jason and Eliza-
V. THE SOLDIER: VITORIA
beth are permitted simply to do their jobs even when
they know the defendant is innocent. Suppose, for The case of the soldier can be placed under the same
example, that we substitute for a trial a process ofpref- template we have applied to the cases of the jailer and
erence voting by the citizens. For our purposes we need executioner. What sort of epistemic authoritative pro-
to imagine that people are not voting on the basis of cedure would be required and sufficient to sanitize the
their judgment of innocence or guilt, but on the basis soldier's fighting an unjust war, and even to make this
of whatever reasons they might have for wishing the a duty?
person to be incarcerated or killed. Perhaps the defen- I want to contrast this kind of standard with the
dant is a political opponent, or from a warring family, view sketched by Vitoria. Vitoria's view combines his
or a business competitor, or a friend, or ally, for exam- conviction that authority cannot sanitize the injustice
ple. There's no epistemic tendency or even aim in this of killing an innocent person, with a subtle explana-
process to accurately determine guilt or innocence. tion about why and when people should defer to the
If prisoners were delivered to jailers and execution- commanding authority. In particular, he has an epis-
ers by a preference voting process, it is hard to see what temic model that points in a useful direction. Vitoria
justification Jason or Elizabeth would have for doing says that, for most dtizens, it should be enough that
their work even when they think the convict is guilty. the war is waged on public authority. And yet he also
What would their justification be? They can no longer argues that if the prince sins in ordering me to kill an
say, "my job is to carry out the punishment; the deter- innocent (foreign or domestic), then I sin too if I obey:
mination of gUilt or innocence has been duly looked "one may not lawfully kill an innocent man on any
after elsewhere." This is not true. It is not being looked authority.,,10 A clue to how we might reconcile these
after anywhere. can be found in his argument that,
The jailer and executioner might put their case the king is not capable of examining the causes of war
differently. They might say that there is a justified on his own, and it is likely that he may make mistakes,
and legally legitimate procedure for determining who or rather that he will make mistakes, to the detriment
gets punished. The question is whether any procedure and ruin of the many. So war should not be declared on
without a Significant epistemic element-an effort and the sole dictates of the prince, nor even on the opinion
tendency to get the right answer-could be a justified of the few, but on the opinion of the many, and of the
way of sending defendants to prison or their death. wise and reliable. 11
Notice that our preference-voting procedure could be War should be declared only on the basis of some col-
a fair procedure. Each person gets one vote; no one lective opinion. We don't know what collective this
counts more than anyone else. In fact, let the defen- is yet. He speaks of "the opinion of the many and of
dant get a vote too. This is about as fair as a procedure the wise and reliable." (We are tempted to ask him to
could be, short of introducing the epistemic aim of make up his mind.) I'll return to this. But the reason
only convicting guilty people, the element our exam- for requiring collective opinion is explicit: it is to avoid
ple is designed to exclude. I doubt that anyone thinks mistakes. The authority of war declarations derives
this gives the jailer or the executioner any moral basis from their being arrived at through a process with
for knowingly jailing or executing innocent people. significant epistemic value, a tendency to get things
This gives us some reason to think that when right.
authoritative commands arise out of an epistemic pro- No one is permitted to prosecute an unjust war
cedure of a certain kind there can be a duty to obey simply because the prince orders it. But if the war
commands to carry out even some unjust policies is declared by way of the appropriate deliberative
procedure, most citizens ought to regard it as authori- be presumed to be correct. That is not the only way to
tative because this is now the citizen's best evidence about include an epistemic element.
whether the war is just.
So understood, Vitoria seems excessively optimis-
tic about the epistemic value of collective delibera- VI. THE SOLDIER: DEMOCRATIC
tion (whichever collective he might have in mind, be IMPLICATIONS
it the many or the most reliable). He seems to believe Let me only briefly suggest how we might get from
that it is a reliable enough procedure to remove the Vitoria's ideas to the more democratic conclusions
individual citizen's antecedent doubts about the jus- that are likely to seem more plausible to us. Vitoria
tice of a war. The citizen could never be permitted to recognizes the epistemic value of collective delibera-
kill an innocent person. Since he thinks the citizen tion. The prince operating alone will make mistakes.
may obey after the collective deliberation, then he This explains why Vitoria thinks the declaration of
must think that citizens would no longer have any war must come from a decision made in conjunction
reason for thinking it is unjust. The public author- with the "wise and the reliable." He also mentions
ity, after due deliberation, should be assumed to "the many," but this does not obviously imply a demo-
be making a correct decision, but not to have some cratic procedure. It leaves open the possibility of what
other kind of authority that would survive an incor- we might call a consultative epistocracy: 12 an elite of
rect decision. This might set us on the question of wise and reliable decision-makers make the decisions
what collective deliberation procedure would be so after consulting the views of the many. This incorpo-
good that its decisions would be those the citizens rates the epistemic aim, the epistemic value of a col-
normally had the most epistemic reason to believe. lective decision-making body, and the epistemic value
But this is hopeless. No real deliberative political of hearing from the many. None of this yet requires
procedure could rise to that level of reliability from including the many in the actual decision-making-
the citizen's point of view. If Vito ria is right that the not even in the form of electing representatives to
soldier may not fight unless he believes the war is make the decision.
just, and if, as I believe, the declaration of war would We can get the stronger democratic conclUSion, I
only provide very uncertain and questionable evi- would argue, if we add a constraint on political justi-
dence of the war's justice, it would by no means auto- fication of the following form: political justifications
matically permit the citizen to go to wars merely on must be generally acceptable (at least to all points of
public authority. Where the authority seems to them view that are not, in Rawls's term, "unreasonable," or
to be mistaken, Vitoria would have to say they must beyond certain limits). 13 Notice, then, that the consul-
not fight. tative epistocracy, or any form of epistocracy, would
Since we should not believe that political author- require identifying those who are better at knowing
ity could be presumed correct often enough to explain and doing the right thing. Even assuming, as I think
a general duty of a soldier to obey, we either have to we must, that some are better than others at this, there
conclude that soldiers will often still think the war will be wide and reasonable disagreement about who
wrong and should refuse to fight on that ground, or we they are. Catholics might think the Pope and his advi-
need an alternative account of the duty to fight even sors in the Vatican are best. Others, like John Stuart
the unjust wars. From reflecting on the jailer's case, Mill, might think those with more education are best.
we have seen that even acts that would wrong their No generally acceptable political justification can
victims can sometimes be rendered permissible by make either of these claims, or any claim like them. H
suitable authoritative sources. So in order to generate My hypothesis is that certain kinds of democratic
a reasonably broad duty of obedience for soldiers, we decision-making do have epistemic value, and yet
do not need to follow Vitoria's implausible optimism saying this does not involve any controversial claims
about how often a government's war declarations can about who is wiser than whom. I can't pursue this
matter further here. But this is the reason I would offer such a sweeping acqUittal, but he mentions two kinds
for thinking of certain democratic political arrange- of consideration: coercion, and the moral value of
ments as the epistemic authoritative procedure that patriotism. If soldiers have no acceptable alternative
is the counterpart to the jury trial: it is the epistemic to fighting, then this must certainly limit their moral
device that allows the authoritative order to go to war responsibility. Perhaps they will be shot if they refuse,
to sanitize the soldier's (otherwise impermissibly) or their family's prospects ruined. It is hard to know
knowingly killing innocent people. It is important to where to draw this line, of course, but coercion would
emphasize that a society could count as democratic tend to be exculpating. On the other hand, Walzer
(for example, having free and fair elections) without believes that "soldiers are not, however, entirely
having the relevant features. My claim is only that without volition."t5 This is why they can indeed be
having the relevant features would depend on a soci- held responsible for violations of the rules of jus in
ety's being democratic in certain ways. bello. But, in both cases-choices of how to fight, and
Naturally, it would be good to have more specific choices of whether to fight-there might be severe
institutional prescriptions in order to clarify the ques- social pressure, institutional sanction including threat
tions that a soldier ought to ask. I doubt that much can of Violence, imprisonment for disobedience, and so
be said that would make it a straightforward empirical on. It is hard to see how there can be enough volition
matter. One fruitful direction for further work on this for the one category but not for the other. 16
question would involve studying historical examples, Walzer quotes a penetrating remark from Vitoria:
with an eye to this question. Certain facts would clearly "A prince is not able, and ought not always to render
raise doubts and concerns, such as: severely restricted reasons for the war to his subjects, and if the subjects
public political debate; a cultural incapacity to know cannot serve in the war except they are first satisfied
relevant facts (about history, psychology, strategy, of its justice, the state would fall into grave peril.,,17 I
likely effects, conditions on the ground, nature of the agree with this, and it is part of what lies behind the
opponent, and so on); profound official corruption view I am developing. But it does not lead-logically,
or deception; a radical imbalance of political power or in Vitoria's own thought-straight to the view that
favoring those more eager for war; and so on. On the Walzer sympathetically quotes from Shakespeare's
other hand, politics will often contain these flaws to Henry V: "We know enough if we know we are the
variouS degrees and their mere presence is not obvi- king's men. Our obedience to the king wipes the crime
ously enough to destroy the ability of a polity to duly out of us." Walzer qualifies this only by saying that
look after the justice of war making in a way that sup- when the soldier violates the rules of jus in bello, "supe-
ports the soldier's duty to comply even when he dis- rior orders are no defense. The atrocities are his own;
agrees. Like many moral matters, we can identify some the war is not."
relevant elements more easily than we can state a clear This leads Walzer (unenthusiastically) to exon-
theory of their weight or significance. erate Erwin Rommel, one of Hitler's generals, who
fought for Hitler but evidently obeyed the rules of jus
in bello. Here we see the second kind of consideration
VII. THE SOLDIER: WALZER
that seems to motivate Walzer's pOSition, the moral
Michael Walzer argues that there is no special moral value of patriotism. The issue is no longer coercion.
cloud over soldiers so long as they are complying Walzer exploits a more normative meaning of the
with the moral rules of ius ill bello. This goes too far. term II servant": IIRommel was a servant, not a ruler,
It differs from the view defended here by absolVing all of the German state; he did not choose the wars he
soldiers regardless of whether the justice of the war fought but, like Prince Andrey, served his ITsar and
is, in any significant way, being duly looked after by country.' ... [H]e is ... a loyal and obedient subject
the process or authority that issued the command to and Citizen, acting sometimes at great personal risk in
fight. It is not entirely clear what reason Walzer has for a way he thinks is right. ,IIS The suggestion is not that
Rommel had no choice, but that there is something might not be morally permissible. That, too, might
noble in his answering his country's call without depart from common sense, though to a lesser extent.
question-the call of Hitler's Germany. In any case, I don't know if it is correct, and I leave the
The general topic of patriotism is clearly too much matter open here.
to take up here. I can only note the different con- How contestation and dissent should be handled
clusion that my own view supports in this case. It is is not always the same in military contexts as in cases
indeed a mistake to assume that soldiers are acting involving jailers and executioners. I briefly note just
wrongly whenever the war is unjust, but it cannot be one important example. There seems reason to think
correct to assume that they are never acting wrongly that a jailer's opinion about the correctness of a crimi-
in obeying the order to fight even when there is no rea- nal verdict is less important to the overall system's
son to think the justice of the war is being duly looked epistemic value than the soldier's opinion about the
after at any point. In Nazi Germany I would hold at justice of a war. While there are pragmatic difficulties
least some soldiers responsible for their abdication of with allowing soldiers the same rights of expression,
a responsibility to ask whether justice is being duly dissent and protest as civilians, these must not be over-
looked after. They knew, or should have known, that stated, and they are subject to manipulation by gov-
Hitler's aggression was without justification. Insofar as ernments seeking to control dissent for political, not
they had an acceptable alternative they should have military, purposes. The perspective of soldiers prior
refused to fight and done what they could to obstruct to and during a conflict might very often contribute
the German effort. Soldiers lower down in the chain of information and arguments that a responsible justice-
command also have a responsibility to ask themselves loving people would need to know in order to make
whether justice is being looked after, but it will some- a decision worthy of a soldier's obedience. How this
times be much harder for them to make this determi- is to be institutionally achieved goes beyond the
nation. Moreover, they are more likely than generals to purview of the sort of philosophical framework I am
be without an acceptable alternative to obeying. How sketching here.
much blame is reasonable in their case is, for these rea-
sons, often less clear. This does not mean that they are
not to blame; I believe that they often are when they VIII. ON SOLDIERS AND GANGSTERS
know or should know that the war is without justifica- I judge soldiers more harshly than Walzer does. Some
tion, fought on a pretext, or based entirely on lies. theorists, following Vitoria, take a hard line. They
If I am right that the soldier in an unjust war is not judge soldiers even more harshly than I do, holding
acting wrongly in obeying his orders when the back- that if the war is unjust the soldier is wrong to fight
ground conditions are right, then surely he is not act- it. 2o As we've seen, they seem forced to say that the
ing wrongly in defending himself against the soldiers jailer is wrong to keep the convict in jail for his full
he is obligated to fight. This might accord better with sentence if only a shorter sentence would truly have
our ordinary view of a soldier's right to self-defense, been just. So far, I have developed that analogy as my
whereas the hard-line view would be harder to swal- main argument against the hard-line view. It faces
low. It says that when a war is unjust, a soldier carry- another difficulty, which is worth mentioning briefly.
ing out the war orders of a responsible and democratic A difficulty for the view that the soldier acts
nation, and obeying the rules of war, is not only wrong wrongly if the war is unjust concerns the question of
to attack enemy soldiers, but is wrong to defend him- a right to self-defense. Soldiers have traditionally been
self if attacked. 19 This is a matter of intuitions, and thought to be permitted to defend themselves even
while they are worth noting they are hardly decisive. if their side is unjust. The victims are wrongly killed,
Indeed, based on my own less hard-line view I might and so the killers are morally equivalent to murderers.
be forced to say that when the political background It is absurd, this view continues, to think a murder-
cannot support a soldier's duty to fight, self-defense ous mugger who encounters vigorous and dangerous
resistance has a moral right to defend himself. Sol- adequate source of the commands, and this is patently
diers fighting an unjust war have no better right to absent in Nazi Germany.
self-defense than murderous muggers. It's true, these What about Sanson, the executioner of Paris? He
views concede, soldiers might get some moral leeway was follOwing orders too, but not in a context that
if they are coerced or non-negligently uninformed. would support his thinking that the justice of the
This doesn't much alter the analogy, since the same punishment was being duly looked after by the legal
could be said for muggers. The core of the analogy is and political process that delivered the prisoners to
that when these mitigating conditions are absent, the him for execution. Sanson worked through a number
soldier fighting the unjust war is morally equivalent to of regimes, and in many cases people were executed for
the mugger. blatant political purposes, or other reasons radically
In important ways, however, soldiers are not like disconnected from the question of whether they had
muggers. They are acting under political authority, violated any legitimate law. 23
not simply for their own purposes. Certainly, the This raises the question whether any political
mugger's having a boss (an "authority") wouldn't nor- arrangements could ever meet the epistemic stan-
mally permit him to defend himself against appropri- dard I have sketched. Any actual political process will
ate violence from his victims. But political authority, involve elements of ignorance, deception, bias and
in the cases 1 am defending, is not like a criminal boss. manipulation. But this would not show that no possi-
We are imagining soldiers wrongly sent to war by their ble pOlitical process could have the capacity to sanitize
government after fair and competent public determi-
the pursuit, by soldiers, of unjust wars. It is a difficult
nation that the war is just, and that their government judgment in any given case whether these devia-
does have authority to conduct just wars. This doesn't, tions from some ideal epistemic process are egregious
of course, settle our main question-whether these enough, or whether despite being damaging on their
governments also can obligate their soldiers when the own they might be countervailed by other elements of
war is unjust. It does, however, dispose of the analogy the political environment.
with outlaws who have no corresponding authority,
To allow the soldier to excuse his actions by point-
competence or fairness. Keep in mind, too, that as
ing to the fact that he was obeying orders might seem
the jailer analogy should make clear, my argument in
to treat the soldier as something less than an auton-
defense of the soldier does not hinge on a right to self-
omous agent, as a mere instrument of the military
defense, or on some inability of the soldier to know
system. There are ways in which we ought to be instru-
whether t h e war . . t t 21
IS JUs or no .
ments of larger systems in a certain sense. We ought to
make ourselves available for the pursuit of certain col-
IX. THE NUREMBERG DEFENSE lectively authorized purposes. Still, jailers and soldiers
ought to do their best to do the morally right thing,
Does my argument vindicate the Nuremberg defense, and nothing in my view denies this. The view I defend
"1 was following orders"? It would be easy, I think, to here is a view about what the right thing is, about what
show that Nazi soldiers and officers had no basis for they will do if their deliberations are sound. Some-
thinking that the political source of their commands times the responsible and courageous conclusion is to
was duly looking after the question of whether the acknowledge a moral obligation to obey a command
22
war was just. I don't mean the question of the mer- even though you disagree with it, and even though, in
its of each decision to invade another country, but your own view, others will be unjustly harmed. Your
the question of the political background in Germany. own view of whether the order is just is one thing, and
There was no decent reason to believe that justice was nothing here tells the soldier to ignore the question.
being looked out for. In any case, the mere fact that the But your own view of what you ought to do when it
soldiers were following orders is not sanitizing on my is unjust is another. The very idea of agency is hardly
account. It must be combined with an epistemically incompatible with a being's having moral duties of
obedience. Obedience is a substantive moral question materials, the jailer is not obligated (and probably not
that agents must face. permitted, though that is separate from my main ques-
tion) to carry out the order, even if the procedure that
produced the order meets the honest mistake standard.
X. BEYOND THE AD/IN DISTINCTION Otherwise, the order carries authority.24
The distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello The phrase "not even close" is, of course, vague.
cannot bear too much weight, and it is not bearing as The structure of the view, however, seems to me to be
much weight in my account as it might seem. There correct. On one hand, there is a range of error within
are questions about legitimate authority in both cases, which the authority is entitled to obedience even
and there are moderate and more severe wrongs that when it is mistaken. On the other hand, authority
fall into each category. It can't be that even the mildest does not extend to every error without limit. The lim-
violation of jus in bello is the soldier's own responsibil- its of this range of error would be very difficult to treat
ity, while even significant violations of jus ad bellum in a general way. In any case, my aim is not to draw this
are entirely the "business of kings," as Walzer's view line with any specificity, but only to propose a philo-
seems to suggest. Some commands to act in violation sophical framework.
of the rules of war (in bello) should be regarded as still This structure, giving authority a range of error,
authoritative under the proper background condi- transfers more or less neatly to the two contexts of war.
tions. Likewise, some orders to enter unjustly into I will call it the range of error approach. If an order to
war (ad bellum) lack authority even if the background go to war or an order to fight in a certain way is not
conditions meet the criterion I have sketched above. even close to what would be just if the facts were as the
This criterion is legally legitimate procedures subject authority states them to be, or if the stated view of the
to robust public deliberation resulting in a publicly justifying facts is not even close to a reasonable con-
evident (though fallible) tendency to go to war only clusion based on the appropriate materials, the soldier
justly. Rather than the sharply different treatment of is not obligated (and probably not permitted) to carry
the ad and in realms, we should try for a more unified out the order even if the procedure that produced the
criterion. order meets the honest mistake standard.
The trial context can help us get our bearings. The We can see how this range of error criterion is
obvious analogy to the ad/in distinction is the justice compatible with my main thesis: if war is sometimes
of punishing a person versus the justice of the chosen a just response to the facts, such as when it is a defense
punishment (jus ad poena7 jus in poena?). Pushing that against certain kinds of aggression, then a nation that
analogy too far raises complexities I'd rather avoid, judges that those facts obtain can morally obligate
but something close to it will be evident in what fol- its soldiers to fight even if this judgment is a mistake,
lows. As a first step we can ask which punishments so long as it is not too unreasonable a conclusion
the jailer should not carry out even if they have been based on the appropriate materials, and the proce-
produced by adequate background procedures. Their dures leading to this decision meet the stated honest
being unjust is not enough to disqualify them, so what mistake standard. The same criterion appears to give
is? We know, for example, that the jailer must not boil plausible results both for when the order to go to war,
anyone in oil, or rape or torture them, even if ordered and for when orders to fight in certain ways, should
to do so by (ostensibly) the right kind of process. be thought of as going beyond the authority's range
Here is a rule for determining which punishments of error.
lack authority regardless of their source: The range of error criterion also gives the outlines
If the punishment is not even close to what would of an account of when orders violating the rules of war
be just if the person were indeed guilty of the crime ought to be obeyed. This shows us that the ad/in dis-
in question, or if the verdict of guilt is not even close tinction is not the morally crucial one for purposes of
to a reasonable conclusion based on the appropriate ascertaining the limits of authority. The crucial issue,
to put it in a succinct form, is whether the command is They commit a serious injustice by going to war in
(or is not) too far from a just response, ill light of a reason- that case, but the premise for going to war might be
able view oftile facts, by a legitimate authority that has, in reasonable enough that the order to wage war retains
a publicly recognizable way, a general capacity to respect its authority over the soldier (assuming the other pro-
justice of waging and fighting wars. cedural standards I call the honest mistake standard
I note just a few cases that suggest the plausibility are also met).
of this criterion. Consider very minor mistreatment of
prisoners. Suppose that jus ill bello stipulates that pris-
oners ought to be given three meals a day, and they are XI. CURRENT EVENTS
only given two in order to conserve resources. This is Consider next the U.S war on Iraq that began in 2003,
unjust. But this might be close enough that the order which raises significant questions about duties of both
retains authority, obligating soldiers to comply with it the war-waging and the war-fighting kind. First, con-
(after due contestation if applicable, and so forth). sider the order to wage war. For simplicity, suppose
Suppose, in a more serious violation, a soldier is that a major and necessary basis for the war's counting
ordered to attack a certain non-combatant. This is as just was that Iraq either possessed weapons of mass
seriously wrong by traditional rules of war. But sup- destruction, or that it represented a critical support for
pose the authority believes, erroneously but not too terrorist organizations that were a serious threat. To
unreasonably, that the person is actually a combat-
apply my criterion to a case like this, we should sim-
ant. Depending, of course, on many more details of
plify further. Assume for our purposes that the U.S.
the particular case, the commanded soldier might be political system meets the honest mistake standard, so
obligated (after due contestation if applicable) to carry it is a process in which public debate and electoral dis-
out the order. Cipline give the process an adequate and generally rec-
Turn to the question of jus ad bellum, the justice of ognizable epistemic value, that is, a tendency (fallible,
waging war. Consider a minor violation. Suppose that of course) to go to war only justly. If it does not, the
jus ad bellum requires seeking the approval of some
implications of my view are clear: the orders to wage
international political body before proceeding (such
war would lack authority. Now, consider a soldier who
as the U.N. or some such thing, but suitably altered
believes with good reason that Iraq is not actually a
so that this would really be a requirement of justice).
Significant threat either through any weapons of its
But suppose that in a particular case there was some
own or by its support for terrorists. Would this fact,
time pressure (though not enough to cancel the duty which would indeed make the U.S. war a serious injus-
to get approval), and everyone knows that the inter- tice, cancel the soldier's duty to obey the order to wage
national body would indeed have approved, even war? On my view it would not. So long as the mistaken
though approval was not actually sought. This would view about Iraq's threat is nevertheless not too unrea-
be unjust, but it might be a minor enough infraction sonable, the authority'S judgment is within an accept-
that the order to wage war retains its authority in a able range of error, and the soldier'S duty is to carry
way that it would not if the international body might out the orders. The justice of the war is being duly
not have approved.
looked after elsewhere by his nation, and that nation
To consider a more serious kind of violation, sup- is entitled to have its will done under the conditions
pose the attacked country is not actually aggressive we have specified, even when it is making a mistake.
or a threat, and suppose jus ad bellum only allows war If, on the other hand, the soldier believes that not
under those conditions. This looks like a very serious only are the attributions of threat mistaken, but they
injustice. However, suppose that the attacking nation's are either utterly irrational or even disingenuous, the
government mistakenly believes that the other coun- graveness of his concerns might cross a line such that
try is an imminent threat, and suppose further that he mayor even must refuse the order to fight. This is
under the circumstances this is not too unreasonable. the structure provided by the range of error approach,
though drawing a specific line would require reflection to be very sure it is (moderately) wrong. In any case,
on many more details. my question is not what the soldier's legal obligations
Turn to orders to fight the war in certain ways. are, but what his moral obligations are. If a command
Supposing that orders concerning many of the forms is outside the scope of the commanding agent's legiti-
of physical and psychological torment and degrada- mate authority, my view implies that it does not cre-
tion to which Iraqi prisoners were subjected by U.S. ate any moral obligation to obey. This still leaves the
military personnel are beyond the range of error possibility of an authoritative command that violates
within which the authority is entitled to obedience, the rules of war, but only modestly.28 Under the right
the soldiers who might have been ordered to perform background conditions, the range of error view says it
these acts were not obligated to do so (and were very retains authority.
probably obligated not to do SO).25 (I leave aside what
sort of defense might be open to them at law.) XII. DISSENT AND DEMOCRACY (OR HOW TO
Next, consider much milder forms of mistreat- SUPPORT OUR TROOPS)
ment, such as keeping prisoners awake for, say, 24 Alfred Lord Tennyson captured part of the self-
hours in order to increase the chance of obtaining conception of the soldier in his famous lines, "theirs
information that might save lives. Suppose this is not to reason why; theirs but to do and die.,,29 I have
unjust by appropriate moral rules of war. Those who argued that even though this smacks of the Nurem-
ordered the treatment are to be blamed. But those berg defense, under favorable conditions it is correct.
ordered to carry it out might retain an obligation to Naturally, this would be important to the soldier.
do so, since it is a relatively mild infraction, and might When we are urged to support our troops, we can't be
be close enough to what justice would allow. The ques- expected to say to them, absurdly, that our country
tion isn't whether the 24 hour treatment is the right never has and never will wage an unjust war, so they
place to draw the line. The aim is only to illustrate the can rest assured that this war too is just. Soldiers know
form of my criterion. Small deviations from jus in bello better than anyone the folly and mendacity of many
might be small enough that the authority's range of declarations of war. So that is not the kind of support
error is not exceeded. (If this example is not persua- the troops could reasonably expect. However, they
sive, readers can construct a case of their own in which might worry that their actions are under a moral cloud
there is a deviation, but it is very small.) The authority if the war is unjust. I have argued that under the right
acts unjustly, but the soldier does no wrong by follow- conditions there is no moral cloud. But this depends
ing orders, even if he acts without duress. on the background conditions in the political system
There is much discussion of the Uniform Code of that produced that order to go to war.
26
Military /ustice in connection with the abuses in Iraq. The soldier often proceeds on the faith that, what-
That code determines the soldier's legal duties, and ever these background requirements are, they are met.
sets the standards by which any court martial would One way to support our troops, then, is to see to it that
proceed. It directs soldiers to obey "lawful" orders, these conditions are met-that if our decisions to go
and precedent suggests that illegal orders are illegal to to war are mistakes, they are at least honest mistakes.
obey. This has no evident range of error built into it, no This requires that citizens work to protect or restore or
scope for the legal authority of a command that is only create the free, open and often adversarial epistemic
a small violation of the applicable law. On the other forum of political deliberation that could sanitize the
hand, the Code says that the fact that something has soldiers the way a jury trial sanitizes the jailer. The
been ordered should be taken by the ordered soldier adversarial element is crucial for epistemic reasons, as
as providing a presumption that it is legal. 27 This doc- is clear from its importance to a properly conducted
trine makes allowances for uncertainty by the soldier, jury trial. Adversarial deliberation often means dis-
but unlike my view, does not allow a range of error in sent, protest and demonstration in addition to rea-
the command in the case where the soldier has reason soned engagement with opposing arguments.
In one way, soldiers and protesters have common in honor of T. M. Penner, ed. Naomi Reshotko (Kelowna, BC:
cause. They both want the background political culture to Academic Printing and Publishing, 2003), pp. 53-69. This
support the supposition that while mistakes will be made, suggests one possible explanation for a narrow exception
they will be honest mistakes, and that soldiers who "do for jailers and executioners, when they have, say, first-hand
and die" as their country asks of them are under no darker eyewitness knowledge of the convict's innocence. A properly
moral cloud than every other citizen of the country which narrow exception of that kind might improve the epistemic
value of the overall process in a way that could be generally
has, despite its best efforts, mounted an unjust war.
accepted. Broader exceptions, such as only jailing or execut-
ing those who you believe or even know to be guilty would be
NOTES more open to dispute. This doesn't mean the jailer couldn't
1. Francisco de Vitoria, "On the law of war," Political Writ- be right, or even be more reliable than the trial procedure.
ings, ed. Anthony Pagden and jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: The point is that his being so would not usually be generally
Cambridge University Press, 1991, originally published 1539), accepted, except in a certain very narrow kind of case such as
p.307. first-hand eyewitness knowledge.
2. For a thorough account of the Nuremberg Trials see 15. lust and Unjust War, p. 40.
Robert E. Conot, !ustiee at Nuremberg (New York: Harper and 16. Lionel McPherson makes this point in "Innocence and
Row, 1983). responsibility. "
3. Lionel McPherson critically discusses uses of innocence 17. Quoted by Walzer, Just and Unjust War, p. 39. All Walzer
and the combatant/non-combatant distinction in these quotes in this paragraph are from p. 39.
contexts in "Innocence and responsibility in war," Calladian
18. Walzer, lust and Unjust War, p. 39.
Journal of Philo sop II}', 34 (2004), 485-506.
19. Again, McPherson, "Innocence and responsibility," takes
4. Robert Nozick, Allarelz)~ State and Utopia (New York: Basic
this view, as does McMahon, "The ethics of killing in war."
Books, 1974), p. 100. jeff McMahon takes a similar view in,
"The ethics of killing in war," Ethics, 114 (2004), 693-733. 20. McPherson, "Innocence and responsibility," takes this
pOSition.
5. Arthur Applbaum discusses the significance of this fact that
"descriptions persist"; Ethics for Adl'ersaries (Princeton, N.j.: 21. See McMahon's discussion of these points in "The ethics
Princeton University Press, 2000). OfkilIing in war," pp. 698-702.
6. !lIst and Unjust ~lrS, Basic Books, 1977, ch. 3, esp. pp. 34-40. 22. Two useful sources are: Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler's
Willing Executioners (New York: Vintage, 1997); and Alan S.
7. See note 14.
Rosenbaum, Prosecuting Nazi War Crimes (Boulder, Colo.:
8. Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries, esp. ch. 2. WestView Press, 1993).
9. McMahon, "The ethics of killing in war," p. 705. 23. Applbaum, "Innocence and responsibility," p. 17.
10. Vitoria, "On the law of war," p. 306. 24. DaVid Luban, in written comments on this paper, offers
11. Ibid., p. 308. this historical note (quoted by permission): ((This rule, and
12. I have coined the term "epistocracy" to refer to the rule of [EstIund's] range-of-error account, is very close to Radbruch's
the knowers. Formula, devised in the wake of World War 11 by Gustav Rad-
bruch to explain when judges should not enforce the law.
13. john Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Uni-
According to Radbruch, "The conflict between justice and
versity Press, 1993), p. 137.
legal security can be resolved by saying that the positive
14. This is a line of argument I develop elsewhere. See "Mak- law ... will have priority even when it is unjust or unsuitable
ing truth safe for democracy," Tile Idea of Democracy, ed. unless the contradiction between the positive law and justice
David Copp, jean Hampton and john Roemer (Cambridge: reaches such an unbearable degree that the statute-as 'incor-
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 71-100; "Beyond fair- rect law'-must give way to justice." [Gustav Radbruch,
ness and deliberation: the epistemic dimenSion of democratic "Gesetzliches Unrecht und Ubergesetzliches Recht," Siidde-
authority," Deliberative Democmq, ed. james Bohman and utschen !uristen-Zeitung, 1 (1946), 105 reprinted in 3 Gustav
William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 173-204; Radbrucll Gesamtausgabe, volume 3, ed. Arthur Kaufmann
"Why not epistocracy,?" Desire, Identity and Existence: Essays (Heidelberg: D.F. Miiller, 1990), p. 89.] Interestingly, Radbruch
thought that judges should be bound by this formula, but he (2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by
exonerated executioners who carried out unjust executions. any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to
Radbruch's Formula is not well-known in the English-speak- obey, fails to obey the order; or
ing world, but it is familiar within German jurisprudence, (3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
and figured prominently in the trial of the East German bor- shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
der guards after 1989." See Peter E. Quint, liThe border guard
trials and the East German past-seven arguments," American 27. UNITED STATES, Appellee v WILLIAM L. CALLEY, JR.,
Journal ofComparative Law, 48 (2000), 541-72. First Lieutenant, U.S. Army, Appellant. No. 26,875, United
States Court of Military Appeals, 22 U.S.C.M.A 534,
25. On the abuses of Iraqi prisoners by u.S. forces, see
December 21, 1973.
Seymour Hersh, "Torture at Abu Ghraib," The New Yorker,
May 10, 2004. 28. I leave open the possibility that for some rules of war, such
as rules against torture, there is no such thing as a modest
26. Article 92, "Failure to obey order or regulation," says:
deviation.
Any person subject to this chapter who-
29. "The charge of the Light Brigade," 1854.
(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or
regulation;
From Proportionality in the Morality of War

THOMAS HURKA
Just war theory, the most widely accepted theory of specific judgments about war. But first I must place the
the morality of war, contains two proportionality con- proportionality conditions in the larger context of just
ditions that say a war or an act in war is justified only war theory as a whole.
if the damage it causes is not excessive. These condi-
tions have figured prominently in recent debates about I. PROPORTIONALITY CONDITIONS
the morality of particular wars, including the Gulf,
Just war theory lays down a series of conditions that
Kosovo, and Iraq wars. But commentators often say
a war must satisfy to be morally justified; if it vio-
the conditions are poorly understood, so it is unclear
lates any of the conditions it is wrong, although
exactly what they do and do not forbid. In this chapter
how wrong it is depends on how many conditions it
I will try to clarify the idea of proportionality in war, or
violates, how important they are, and how seriously
explain what makes damage in war excessive. I will not,
it violates them. These conditions are standardly
however, arrive at simple conditions that can be applied
divided into two groups. The illS ad bellum conditions
mechanically to acts in war. This is partly because judg-
concern the resort to war and are directed to political
ments about proportionality in war require empirical
leaders deciding whether to initiate war or whether
assessments that are complex and controversial, but
to respond to another state's doing so with military
also because the conditions themselves can be formu-
force of their own. The ius in bello conditions concern
lated in different ways that have different implications
the means used to fight war. They are again directed
even given an agreed-on set of facts. I will try to iden-
at political leaders when they make tactical decisions
tify some of these differences and show how they affect
such as Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima, but
also at soldiers as they fight from day to day. It is usu-
Thomas Hurka, "Proportionality in the Morality of War," from
ally assumed that the two sets of conditions are inde-
Drawing Morals: Essa>,s in Etllicai Tileory, pp. 238-264. Copyright ©
2011 Oxford University Press. Reproduced with permission of the pendent, so a state can be justified in its resort to war
Licensor through PLSclear. but violate the in bello conditions in how it fights, or
initiate war unjustly but use only tactics that are mor- here turns on the doctrine of double effect, which says
ally allowed. it is more objectionable to intend evil as one's end or
The most important ad bellum condition says the a means to one's end than merely to foresee that evil
resort to war is justified only given a just cause. The will result from what one does. On this reading, the
most widely accepted just cause for war is resist- discrimination condition forbids intending the deaths
ing aggression, or an armed attack on one's own or of noncombatants as an end or means, as in terror
another state, but there can also be a just cause when bombing that aims to demoralize an enemy by killing
one state sponsors or allows deadly attacks on anoth- its civilians, but does not forbid acts that merely fore-
er's citizens without threatening the other's territory; see the deaths of noncombatants, as when one bombs
this was the trigger for the Afghanistan war of 2001. an arms factory knowing that some civilians nearby
Many theorists now also allow humanitarian just will be killed. Just war theory would be unacceptable
causes, which protect the citizens of another state if it said there is no objection at all to killing civilians
from rights violations by their own government. Two collaterally, but two further conditions prevent this.
less important ad bellum conditions say a war must be The necessity condition, which parallels the ad bel-
declared by a legitimate authority and fought with lum last-resort condition, says that killing soldiers and
right intentions, and three final conditions concern especially civilians is forbidden if it serves no military
the consequences of war. One says a just war must have purpose; unnecessary force is wrong. And the in bello
a reasonable hope of success; if there is no probability proportionality condition says the collateral killing
of achieving the just causes, the war's destructiveness of civilians is forbidden if the resulting civilian deaths
will be to no purpose. Another says war must be a last are out of proportion to the relevant good one's act
resort; if the just causes can be achieved by less violent will do; excessive force is wrong. This proportionality
means such as diplomacy, fighting is wrong. Last is condition is included in Additional Protocol I to the
the ad bel/unl proportionality condition, which says Geneva Conventions, which forbids attacks "which
the destructiveness of war must not be out of propor- may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
tion to the relevant good the war will do. Even if there life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or
is a just cause and no way of achieving it other than a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
war, resorting to war can be wrong if the damage it relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
will cause is excessive. For example, the Soviet Union's anticipated."t The condition allows bombing a vital
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 gave NATO a just munitions factory if that will unavoidably kill a few
cause for war, but most people think a military defense ciVilians, but forbids killing thousands of civilians as a
of that country would have been horribly wrong side effect of achieving some trivial military goal.
because it risked starting a global nuclear war. The proportionality conditions are actually more
There are three ill bello conditions, of which the important than this initial account suggests, since, if
first, the discrimination condition, distinguishes formulated properly, they can incorporate the other
between those people who are and those who are not just war conditions about consequences. Imagine that
legitimate targets of military force. There is contro- a war has no chance of achieving any relevant goods.
versy about exactly who these people are, but the tradi- This fact, which makes it violate the reasonable hope
tional view is that deadly force may be directed only at of success condition, surely also makes it dispropor-
combatants, including soldiers and munitions factory tionate, since its destructiveness now serves no pur-
workers, but not at noncombatants. The discrimina- pose whatever. The same is true if the war has only
tion condition does not forbid all killing of civilians. It some small probability of achieving relevant goods,
concerns only targeting and therefore allows the kill- since then its expected harm is excessive compared
ing of noncombatants as a side effect of force directed to its expected good. If it takes account of probabili-
at properly military targets, or as "collateral damage." ties in this way, as on any plausible view it must, the
In many versions of just war theory, the distinction ad bellum proportionality condition incorporates
724 :0 PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
hope-of-success considerations, and it can also incor- at the time. Both versions must make some probabil-
porate last-resort considerations. Now imagine that a ity estimates: of the likely effects of alternatives that
war will achieve certain goods at not too great a cost, are not chosen (for comparative conditions like last
but that the same goods could be achieved by diplo- resort) and of the magnitude of evils the war does good
macy. Here the war may not be disproportionate by preventing. But given their different assumptions
in itself, but it is disproportionate compared to the about a war's positive effects the two can yield differ-
alternative, since it causes additional destruction for ent results, so a war can be objectively proportionate
no additional benefit. The same is true in the more but subjectively disproportionate, or vice versa.
realistic case where the war will achieve some minor Despite their differences, the various proportion-
relevant goods to a slightly higher degree. Here too it ality conditions-ad bellum and in bello, simple and
is disproportionate compared to diplomacy, since it comparative, objective and subjective-all say a war or
imposes significant additional harms for the sake of act in war is wrong if the relevant harm it will cause is
insignificant benefits. Michael Walzer has said that, out of proportion to its relevant good. This raises three
if taken literally, the last resort condition would make questions: (1) What are the relevant goods that count
war morally impossible, since "we can never reach in favor of a war's or aces proportionality? (2) What
lastness ... there is always something more to do: are the relevant evils that count against it? (3) How do
another diplomatic note, another UN resolution, these goods and evils weigh against each other? I will
another meeting/,2 For precisely this reason the con- begin with the first question, about goods. But first a
dition must not be read literally, but must assess the more general comment is in order.
alternatives to war in the same way as it does war: for As many writers have noted, the structure of just
the relevant good they may produce, their probabil- war theory closely parallels that of the morality of self-
ity of producing it, and any costs that will result if the defense. 4 The latter too allows the use of force only for
alternatives are tried and fail, such as making an even- certain ends, namely to protect ones own or another's
tual war more bloody. But then the last resort condi- rights, and limits that force by proportionality and
tion is in effect a comparative version of the initial, necessity conditions. An act of self-defense is wrong
simple proportionality condition. For war and each if the harm it causes the attacker is out of proportion
of its alternatives it does a proportionality calcula- to the harm he threatens, or if the threat could just as
tion, identifying the relevant goods and evils it will well have been averted by less violent means. These
produce compared to a baseline of doing nothing, or parallels suggest a promising line of argument. Since
continuing to act as one would have had there been our intuitions about self-defense are often clearer than
no just cause. 3 This yields the net good or bad effects our intuitions about war, we can try to make progress
of each, and it then says war is permitted only if its with just war proportionality by considering parallel
net outcome is better than those of all alternatives. If cases involving individuals: if we think certain uses of
the ad bellum proportionality condition is extended force are not permitted by individuals, we can reach
to make these comparative judgments, it incorporates parallel conclusions about force in war. This type of
last-resort considerations, and the in bello condition argument cannot be decisive, since there is no guar-
can likewise incorporate necessity considerations if antee that what holds in the two domains is identical.
it compares the net effects of a particular tactic in war But it is suggestive, and I will use it in that spirit.
with those of alternatives that may be less harmful.
Each proportionality condition allows two for-
mulations. An objective version assesses a war or act II. RELEVANT GOODS
in light of its actual effects, that is, the relevant good The simplest view of proportionality in war is a quasi-
it actually produces and its actual destructiveness; a consequentialist one that counts all the goods and
subjective version does so considering only an item's evils that result from a war or act in war and weighs
likely effects given the evidence available to agents them equally, so a choice is disproportionate if the
CHAPTER 19: WAR, TERRORISM. AND TORTURE 0 725
total evil it causes is greater than its total good. James research and thereby speed the development of tech-
Turner Johnson defends this view about ad bellum pro- nologies such as nuclear power; it may also satisfy
portionality, saying it requires the "total good" caused the desires of soldiers tired of training and eager for
by war to outweigh the "total evil," or that "the overall real combat. Neither of these goods seems relevant
good achieved by the use of force ... be greater than to proportionality or able to justify killing; an other-
the harm done.,,5 His view does not result in a com- wise disproportionate war cannot become permissible
pletely consequentialist theory of war, for two rea- because it has these effects.
sons. First, even a war with overall optimal effects Some restriction is needed on the goods that
can be wrong if it violates other just war conditions, count toward proportionality, and it seems obvious
for example, by lacking a just cause. Second, his view what it should be: the relevant goods are only those
does not require a war to have overall optimal effects, contained in the just causes. If a war has certain just
only ones that involve more good than evil. But aims, the goods involved in achieving those aims
Johnson's view does have consequentialist elements, count toward its proportionality but goods incidental
since it counts all the goods and evils a war produces to them, such as boosting the economy or science, do
and weighs them equally against each other. not. This restriction is included, even if implicitly, in
A related view retains the first of these elements many traditional formulations of ad bellum propor-
but weighs good effects somewhat more heavily than tionality, which equate the just cause with the preven-
bad ones, so a war can be proportionate even if it causes tion of some injury and say the destructiveness of war
somewhat more harm than good. The United States must not be excessive compared to that injury. Thus,
Catholic bishops may take this line when they formu- Joseph C. McKenna says that ad bellum proportional-
late ad bellum proportionality as saying, "the damage ity requires "the seriousness of the injury [to] be pro-
to be inflicted and the costs to be incurred must be proportionate to the damages that the war will cause,"
portionate to the good expecte d b y ta ki ng up arms. ,,6 while Richard J. Regan calls the resort to war justified
By speaking simply of "costs" and "good expected" only if "the wrong to be prevented equals or surpasses
they seem to count all resulting goods and evils, but in the reasonably anticipated human and material costs
requiring the evils only to be proportionate to, rather of the war."s These statements concern simple pro-
than no greater than, the goods, they may allow the portionality, but a similar point applies to compara-
goods to be somewhat smaller. This more permissive tive proportionality, or the last resort condition. It too
view is explicitly defended by Douglas Lackey, who weighs the destructiveness of war and its alternatives
likewise counts all resulting goods and evils but says it against only their contribution to the just causes, and
would be "too-restrictive" to weigh them equally and therefore counts as relevant only alternatives that pur-
concludes that "a war for a just cause passes the test sue those causes. This is why the condition does not
of proportionality unless it produces a great deal more require a war to have overall optimal effects: a war can
harm than good.,,7 be proportionate even if it produces less good than
I think both views are wrong to count all the goods some alternative that does not achieve the just causes.
a war will produce. Imagine that our nation has a just Thus, the Gulf War would have been disproportionate
cause for war but is also in an economic recession, and if there had been some less destructive way of evicting
that fighting the war will lift both our and the world's Iraq from Kuwait, but not simply if the money it cost
economies out of this recession, as World War II ended would have done more good if spent on development
the depression of the 1930s. Although the economic aid to Africa.
benefits of war here are real, they surely cannot count In formulating this restriction we should distin-
toward its proportionality or make an otherwise dis- guish, as traditional formulations do not, between
proportionate conflict proportionate. Killing cannot two types of just cause that Jeff McMahan and
be justified by merely economic goods, and the same Robert McKim call "sufficient" and "contributing" just
is true of many other goods. A war may boost scientific 9
causes. Sufficient just causes suffice by themselves to
fulfill the just cause condition; they include resist- contributing causes. Imagine that a war will not give
ing aggression and preventing major humanitarian the world's economy a boost but will prevent it from
wrongs such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. Con- being harmed by being pushed into recession. If the
tributing just causes do not suffice to satisfy the just harm will come from another country's exercise of its
cause condition; given only these causes, one is not legal rights, such as shutting off its own oil exports,
permitted to fight. But once there is a sufficient just preventing that harm is neither a sufficient nor a
cause, contributing causes can be further legitimate contributing just cause. But imagine that in 1990
aims in war and can contribute to its justification. Iraq had occupied both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and
They include disarming an enemy and thereby inca- stopped all their oil production. In that case the eco-
pacitating it for future aggression, as well as deterring nomic harm would have resulted from an unjust act
aggression by showing this nation and others that of aggression, and preventing it would have been a rel-
aggression does not pay. If incapacitation is only a evant benefit of war.
contributing cause, the fact that an enemy has arma- In assessing these contributing causes we must
ments it may use aggressively in the future is not a suf- continue to compare them with the do-nothing base-
ficient justification for military action; there is no such line of having a just cause but not pursuing it. This
far-reaching right of pre-emption. On this view Israel's is vital because often acquiescing in aggression not
1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak reactor was wrong. But once only fails to deter future aggression but positively
Iraq supplied a sufficient just cause for war by invad- encourages it, by allowing a precedent of successful
ing Kuwait, disarming Iraq became a legitimate goal. aggression. In the lead-up to the Gulf War many com-
The coalition forces were permitted to pursue that goal mentators called for a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal
into Iraqi territory after liberating Kuwait, and also to from Kuwait, but it was evident that any such outcome
include conditions about disarmament in the ceasefire would require concessions to Iraq, for example, about
agreement that ended the war. The benefits of inca- some disputed islands on the Iraq-Kuwait border.12
pacitation and deterrence also count toward the war's And these concessions would have encouraged future
proportionality, and wars that are not proportionate aggression by showing that one can invade a neighbor
in themselves, such as perhaps the Falklands War, and come out ahead. The United States and its clos-
can become so given their effects on international est allies strenuously resisted this approach, insisting
security. The situation exactly parallels that of crimi- that there be "no rewards for aggression." Whatever
nal punishment. If a person has not yet committed a its overall merits, their stance recognized that once
crime, the fact that he mayor even is likely to do so in aggression has occurred, the status quo before the
the future is not a sufficient ground for imprisoning aggression may no longer be an option. One can resist
him now. Once he has committed a crime, however, the aggression, which will deter future aggression, or
incapacitating him from committing further crimes not reSist, which will encourage it, and the benefits of
and deterring other would-be criminals become legiti- the first choice must include avoiding the harms of
mate aims of punishment, and his sentence can be the second.
adjusted to better achieve them. 10 The same holds for The view I am proposing about ad bellum propor-
other contributing causes, such as lesser humanitarian tionality is intermediate between the quasi-conse-
aims. I think most people would say that the Taliban's quentialist and traditional views. It does not count
repression of Afghan women was not a sufficient just all the goods a war will produce nor only those in the
cause; a war fought only to end that repression would sufficient just causes, but supplements the latter with
have been wrong. But once there was a sufficient just a finite number of contributing just causes. This raises
cause in the Taliban's harboring of terrorists, the fact the question of whether there is some unifying fea-
that the war would improve the lot of Afghan women ture that gives these contributing causes their status.
became a factor that counted in its favor and helped So far as I can see, there is not; like the sufficient just
make it proportionate. \1 There can also be economic causes, they are merely the items on a list. But there
are intuitive limits on what can go on this list. Shortly or spend billions of dollars to save a few enemy civil-
after its end, it looked as if the Gulf War would help ians. If so, in bello proportionality must consider as
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, through the relevant goods an act's contribution not only to the
Oslo Accords it made possible. The effects here were war's just causes but also to reducing the costs of
of the right kind to be contributing causes, since they achieving them.
involved preventing violence and reducing interna- If in bello proportionality looks even partly at the
tional tension. But I do not think that, even if realized, just causes for war, it cannot be assessed indepen-
they would have counted toward the war's proportion- dently of ad bellum considerations, and especially
ality, because they would not have been connected of the moral importance of those causes. Intuitively
to it in the right way. They would not have resulted this seems right. The level of destruction permitted
directly from the war's sufficient just causes but would in a war against a genocidal enemy such as Nazi Ger-
have been side effects of the process of achieving many is surely greater than in the Falklands War. But
them, namely the building of a UN-sponsored coali- this claim contradicts the dominant view in the just
tion combining Western and Arab states. But similar war tradition, which treats the jus in bello as entirely
effects that do arise directly from a war's sufficient independent of the jus ad bellum, so the same in bello
just causes can count. If the Iraq War, by eliminat- rules apply to both sides of a conflict whatever the
ing Iraq's payments to the families of Palestinian sui- justice of their aims. This independence is affirmed in
cide bombers, had reduced Palestinian terrorism and the Preamble to Additional Protocol I, which says its
thereby encouraged an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, provisions apply to all persons "without any adverse
that would have been relevant to the war's propor- distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
tionality because eliminating support for terrorism is a conflict or on the causes espoused or attributed to the
legitimate aim. Parties to the conflicts." It is also reflected in the Proto-
If ad bellum proportionality counts only the goods col's statement of in bello proportionality, which says
in a war's just causes, something similar must be true damage to civilians must not be excessive "in relation
of in bello proportionality. When a particular act in to the direct military advantage anticipated," with
war is justified it is primarily because it contributes no reference to the further goods such advantage will
to the just causes, by increasing either the likelihood promote. 13 Now, the independence of in bello con-
or the degree of their achievement. That the act will siderations is plausible for the discrimination con-
boost scientific research by testing some new weapons dition as traditionally understood, since, whatever
system or please soldiers who enjoy testing weapons their war aims, both sides can refrain from targeting
is irrelevant. Here again contributing just causes must noncombatants. But it does not fit the in bello condi-
be counted. If disarming an aggressor is a legitimate tions about consequences, namely proportionality
war aim, particular acts leading to disarmament will and necessity. If "military advantage" justifies killing
be proportionate only if that contributing cause is Civilians, it does so only because of the further goods
relevant; the same goes for lesser humanitarian aims. such advantage will lead to, and how much it justifies
But in the in bello case there is another consideration. depends on what those goods are. Compelling though
Sometimes an act that will foreseeably kill more civil- it is, this view has the radical implication that no act
ians than some alternative will, while not contribut- by soldiers on a side without a just cause can satisfy
ing more to the just causes, reduce either the number proportionality: if their acts produce no relevant
of our military casualties or our economic costs, per- goods, they can never be just. It does not follow that
haps because it uses less expensive and therefore less these soldiers should be punished. Since soldiers nor-
accurate weapons. Often this fact will not make the act mally cannot be expected to evaluate their nations'
proportionate; we must accept the greater casualties or war aims, they are not to blame for acting wrongly,
expense. But the demand here cannot be unlimited: and international law is probably best formulated as
we cannot be required to sacrifice hundreds of soldiers it is, with no "adverse distinction" against soldiers on
an unjust side. The alternative approach might even any restriction about remoteness. But the objection
lead to more destructive wars since, notoriously, often is much more persuasive for third-party interveners
both sides in a conflict believe their cause is just. 14 than for a nation that is itself under attack. Imagine
Nonetheless, if we consider the morality of war rather that we face aggression from our eastern neighbor.
than its legality, the independence of its two branches We may know that if we defend ourselves success-
cannot be maintained. Whether an act in war is in bello fully this will encourage our western neighbor to
proportionate depends on the relevant good it does, expand its military, once it sees how useful a military
which in turn depends on its ad bellum just causes. 15 can be. And that will cause its further western neigh-
bor, with whom it has various disputes, to expand its
military, leading to an arms race and eventually to war
III. RELEVANT EVILS between them. Now, war between our neighbors is
When we turn to the evils relevant to proportionality, the right type of evil for proportionality calculations,
we seem to find no restriction on their content paral- but it is not clear that it is one we must weigh heav-
lel to the one on relevant goods. That a war will boost ily in our decision or that can take away our right of
the world's economy does not count in its favor, but national defense. Surely we would not be condemned
that it will harm the economy surely counts against it. if, despite knowing the consequences, we chose to
Whereas economic benefits are not relevant goods for resist the aggression. The parallel certainly holds in
proportionality, economic harms are relevant evils. individual self-defense. If my defending myself against
It is also relevant that a war will hamper scientific an attacker will lead to increased attacks on others,
research or cause pain to the soldiers who fight; these perhaps because my attacker will vent his frustra-
effects too can make a war disproportionate. In assess- tion on weaker victims, this fact, though regrettable,
ing a war for proportionality, it seems we count evils does not make my defending myself wrong. Many
of all the kinds it will cause, with no limits on their will say the reason is that, even if the later attacks
content. There is therefore a thumb pressed down on would not have occurred but for my defense, the
one side of the proportionality scale, with more responsibility for them belongs not to me but to the
counting on the negative than on the positive side. attacker who launches them. Similarly, in the interna-
But there may be another, compensating thumb on tional case many will say that if defending ourselves
the positive side. from our eastern neighbor leads to war between our
Although restricted in their content, the goods western neighbors, that is their responsibility, not
relevant to proportionality seem not to be restricted ours. Although the right type of effect for proportion-
by their remoteness from a war or act either in time ality, that war is too remote from our choice to weigh
or causally. If defending a nation will ensure that its heavily against it.
citizens are self-determining a century from now, that The suggestion here is that the intervention of
helps to make the defense proportionate, and the another's wrongful choice can reduce our responsi-
same holds if defending them will deter wars a century bility for a bad outcome, and in fact this possibility
from now. If some war really would end all war forever, arises frequently in war. Imagine that we have a just
that would count massively in its favor, and it would cause but know that if we pursue it some fanatics on
do so even if the good effects required intervening the other side will with no moral excuse launch sui-
good decisions by other agents, namely decisions not cide attacks on our civilians. In deciding whether to
to go to war. The same view can in principle be taken fight we may have to weigh the potential deaths of our
of relevant evils. One objection raised before both Civilians, but what about those of the suicide bomb-
the Gulf and Iraq wars was that they would increase ers? Is the fact that they will die in unjust attacks one
instability in the Middle East and so lead to further that could make our choice of war disproportionate?
violence in the region. This objection counts encour- That is hard to believe. Nor must the relevant wrong
aging war as a relevant evil and seems to do so without choice come after our act. Imagine that in the same
war enemy civilians with likewise no moral excuse the marines into the populated areas," saying, "We
act as voluntary shields, placing themselves around will engage the enemy wherever he is." 19
the enemy's military installations in the hope of Or consider the coalition bombing campaign in
deterring us from attacking those installations. Here the Gulf War. It initially caused around 2,000 Iraqi
the fact that our attack will foreseeably kill noncom- civilian deaths, but many more followed from its after-
batants is not morally irrelevant; if we have a choice effects, especially the damage to Iraq's water filtration
between attacking two installations of equal military plants. Some of these later deaths were unavoidable,
importance, only one of which has shields, we should but others could have been prevented had the Iraqi
prefer attacking the other. But by placing themselves government repaired the country's infrastructure
near the installations the shields arguably take upon more quickly, as it arguably had a moral duty to do.
themselves some responsibility for their deaths and In assessing the bombing for proportionality, then,
remove it from us, so their deaths count less against do we count all the civilian deaths that resulted given
our attack's proportionality. the Iraqi government's actual behavior, or only those
In these examples the intervening choices are that would have resulted had that government acted
by the individuals who will suffer the harms, but as it should? A similar issue arises about the economic
this too is not necessary. Consider, first, involuntary sanctions that followed the war. Critics say they caused
shields, who are placed near military targets against the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children; defenders reply
their will or, more commonly, have military person- that the deaths were Saddam Hussein's responsibility
nel and equipment located in their neighborhoods, rather than the UN's, since he could have prevented
again in the hope of deterring attack. Additional many of them by making fuller use of the UN's oil-
Protocol I forbids all use of civilians as shields but for-food program, and could have prevented all of
immediately adds that the violation by one party of them by openly abandoning his pursuit of weapons
its obligations under the Protocol does not release of mass destruction, as he had promised in the cease-
other parties from their obligations, suggesting that fire agreement to do. Since these failures of his were
the protections for involuntary shields are in no way necessary for the sanctions to cause the deaths, those
reduced. 16 Not everyone takes this view, however. deaths are properly charged to him and not to the
Discussing the Vietnam War, in which Viet Cong sanctioning nations. 20
uerriUas hid among the Vietnamese peasantry, Paul The question of whether others' wrongful choices
~amsey says, "the onus for having placed mUltitudes can reduce our responsibility for bad outcomes is
of peasants within range" of fire belongs to the guer- vital for the analysis of just war proportionality, but
rillas and not the United States, since "[tlo draw any it is very difficult to answer decisively. One extreme
other conclusion would be like, at the nuclear level, view says another's wrong choice always completely
granting an enemy immunity from attack because he removes our responsibility for resulting evils, but this
had the shrewdness to locate his missile bases in the in effect eliminates proportionality as an independent
heart of his cities."l? William V. O'Brien concurs: "It just war condition. Any time we have a just cause, an
seems fair to assign the major responsibility to the enemy's resisting us is wrong, and any evils that fol-
Communist forces for the civilian losses, destruction, low from his resisting, namely all the evils of the war,
and displacement caused by turning the population are his responsibility, not ours. On this view, if NATO
centers into battlefields."ls A similar view may have had challenged the Soviet invasion of Czechoslova-
been taken by the U.S. military in the Iraq War. Early kia in 1968 despite knowing that nuclear war would
in that war a fight outside Nasiriyah moved into the result, there would have been nothing objection-
city when Iraqi forces retreated there, with resulting able about its choice. That is very hard to accept.21 A
civilian casualties. The commander of a U.S. artillery contrary extreme view ignores others' agency com-
battalion firing on Nasiriyah "placed responsibility pletely and counts all resulting evils, whatever other
for any civilian deaths on the Iraqi soldiers who drew causal conditions they may have. It is not so decisively
730 0. PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
objectionable and may even be correct, but it is at unresolved, despite its vital importance for just war
least questionable when it gives the deaths of suicide proportionality. The more the proportionality con-
bombers and voluntary shields completely unreduced ditions discount resulting evils for others' wrongful
weight. And there are further views intermediate agency, the more permissive those conditions are; the
between these extremes. less the conditions discount, the more wars and acts
First, a view can give evils that depend on oth- they forbid. On the one view, the sanctions against
ers' agency only diminished rather than zero weight, Iraq may have been entirely unobjectionable; on the
holding only that others' cooperation in produc- other, grossly disproportionate.
ing a bad outcome reduces our responsibility for it
somewhat. Second, a view can make this reduction
only in some cases and not others. One possibility is IV. WEIGHING GOODS AND EVILS:
to discount evils only when the intervening choice is DEFENDING SOVEREIGNTY
by the very person who will suffer the evil; this view Having identified their relevant goods and evils, the
discounts for suicide bombers and voluntary shields proportionality conditions must then weigh them
but in few other cases. 22 This view may again be cor- against each other. To isolate the distinctive issues here
rect, but it will not be attractive to those who want to I will assume that resulting evils are not discounted for
discount even a little for involuntary shields, when others' agency, but instead count fully against relevant
an enemy fails to rebuild after a bombing, or for eco- goods. Even so, the task of weighing is complex, with
nomic sanctions. And there are several ways of cap- as many aspects as there are pairs of relevant goods
turing these cases short of adopting the extreme view and evils. Thus, a full account of just war proportion-
that discounts for all intervening agency. For example, ality must weigh the defense of a nation's sovereignty
a view can reduce our responsibility for resulting evils against environmental harms, the benefit of liberating
only when the intervening choice either (1) is by the women against economic costs, and more. I cannot
person who will suffer the evil, or (2) only affects the discuss all these comparisons, but will instead focus
amount of harm our act will cause without introduc- on two issues I take to be central: whether defending
ing new causal processes leading to new harms. 23 sovereignty against aggression ever justifies killing,
This view's second clause applies to the three cases and how a nation should weigh its own citizens' lives
just mentioned, since in all of them the enemy's against lives on the other side.
choice affects only how much harm our bombing or Resisting aggression is usually considered the par-
sanctions cause. But it does not apply to the case of adigm just cause for war and one that almost always
Czechoslovakia in 1968, since then the nuclear war satisfies proportionality. Immediately after introduc-
would have resulted from a Soviet military response to ing the ad bellum condition, McKenna adds that "Self-
NATO that created new harmful processes. There is in defense ... almost always justifies resistance.,,24 On this
fact a whole range of intermediate views about interview there may be special circumstances, such as those
vening agency, depending on how much they reduce of Czechoslovakia in 1968, where the consequences of
responsibility (a lot or only a little) and in how many national self-defense are so catastrophiC as to make it
cases (almost all or only a few). It is difficult to choose wrong, but where reSisting aggression will lead only
between these views, as well as between them and the to conventional war it is normally proportional. This
simpler view that counts all resulting evils. I cannot view makes sense given a traditional understanding
find any abstract argument that favors one view over of just war theory, on which the entities with rights
the rest, nor do intuitive judgments about particular in the international realm are states, understood as
cases yield a decisive result. On the contrary, there indivisible entities with a status parallel to that of
are sharp disagreements about, for example, the U.S. individuals in the morality of self-defense. Then a
treatment of Vietnamese peasants and the sanctions state facing aggression faces a threat to its existence,
against Iraq. I will therefore have to leave this issue just as an individual does whose life is attacked; and
just as the individual may kill an attacker to protect political status but not much else about their lives. The
his existence, so may the state kill. But this "statist" aggressor will kill the nation's citizens if they resist its
view has been persuasively criticized on the ground attack, but not if they do not. The unavoidable threat
that all rights belong ultimately to individuals. It is it poses is therefore only to the citizens' political
individuals who at bottom matter morally, and any rights, such as their rights to participate in collective
rights states have must derive from and concern the political self-determination. Two writers, Richard Nor-
rights of their citizens. 25 This "individualist" view has man and David Rodin, have argued that these rights
important practical implications, but it also tightens are not important enough to justify killing. If some-
the relation between just war theory and the morality one tries to prevent me from voting, for example, I am
of self-defense, making the former not just parallel to not permitted to kill him in response. Norman and
but derivative from the latter. If the only just cause for Rodin conclude that if a nation faces aggression that
war is to protect the rights of individuals, then legiti- does not threaten further rights of its citizens, it is not
mate military action always is an instance of defend- permitted to defend itself with lethal military force. 27
ing individuals. And if the state acts legitimately only Some may find this a philosophers' argument in
when it acts on authority given it by its citizens, as the pejorative sense, one completely divorced from
many liberal theories hold, then any limitations on reality. In the real world of international relations
their enforcement rights must extend to its own. The there is no debate about the right of national self-
morality of individual self-defense permits a person to defense, which is firmly entrenched in the UN Char-
defend not only himself or one other person but also a ter. But if this consensus is correct it must be possible
group; if a hundred people are attacked on the street, to show why, and I will now attempt this. While grant-
he may try to defend them all. It also permits people ing that the rights relevant to ad bellum proportional-
to coordinate their defensive acts, so a hundred act ity belong only to individuals, I will argue that they
jointly to defend one. The individualist view makes it have three features that differentiate the situation of
natural to see legitimate military action as extending a nation facing aggression from that of an individual
these two possibilities, so in it a large group of indi- protecting his right to vote. I will not claim that any of
viduals act collectively, through their political institu- these features alone justifies killing, only that they do
tl"ons , to protect the rights of another26 large group of so together.
individuals, who may be themselves. Then cases of The first and most obvious feature is the number
individual defense are not just analogous to cases in of people whose rights are threatened. Whereas the
war; they concern the same topic. voting example involves just one person, aggression
The most-noticed practical implication of the threatens the political rights of all a nation's citizens,
individualist view has been for humanitarian inter- who can number tens or even hundreds of millions. In
vention. Whereas the statist view forbids armed inter- addition, if resisting the threat will deter future aggres-
ference by one state in the internal affairs of another, Sion, it protects the rights of many other nations' citi-
the individualist alternative allows such intervention zens, and in each case the protection is for an extended
to prevent serious violations of citizens' rights by their time, since a successful invasion violates rights not
own government, as in Rwanda or Kosovo. But this momentarily but for many years. The question then
view also has implications for national defense, which is whether this factor of greater numbers affects the
it says satisfies proportionality only if it protects rights amount of defensive force a victim is permitted to
of citizens that are important enough to justify kill- use. In some aspects of the morality of self-defense it
ing. This condition is satisfied if the aggressor plans does not. If a person is attacked by a group of aggres-
genocide or other serious crimes against the nation's sors and can save his life only by killing them all, he is
citizens, such as rape, but often an aggressor has no permitted to do so no matter how large the group. So
such aim. It seeks only to absorb the nation's territory numbers do not count on the side of aggressors, and in
and replace its government, changing the citizens' some cases they do not make a difference on the side
of victims. Not only may one person not kill to prevent victim is presumably not permitted to break a thief's
himself from being tickled, but a group may not kill arm to prevent him from taking a dollar, but he may
to stop themselves all from being tickled. Not even a be permitted to do so if the thief backs up his attempt
million people may kill to save themselves from that with the threat to kill. It is instructive to consider Nor-
trivial a threat. 28 But it seems that in other cases the man's and Rodin's analysis of this case. Both say the
number of victims does make a difference. More spe- thief's action has two components: the direct attempt
cifically, I think the number of victims can boost the on the victim's dollar and the conditional threat to
amount of force permitted in response to a threat to the victim's life should he resist that attempt. The first
some degree even if not always to the point of killing. element on its own does not justify killing, since that
Thus, although one person is not permi tted to break an would be a disproportionate response to a threat to
assailant's arm to prevent himself from being tickled, a one's dollar. Nor does the second element, since kill-
large enough group may be permitted to break an arm ing is unnecessary when one can escape the threat by
to prevent themselves from being tickled. Similarly handing over the dollar. If neither component on its
for duration: while a person may not be permitted to own justifies killing, Norman and Rodin conclude, the
break an arm to prevent himself from being confined thief's action as a whole cannot. 30 But this analysis
in a room for five minutes, he is surely permitted to do implies that from the thief's point of view threaten-
that and more to prevent himself from being confined ing the victim's life provides benefits at no cost, since
for fifty years. Parallel claims are certainly plausible it increases his chance of getting the dollar while not
for other cases in war: surely more force is permitted increasing the force his victim may use against him.
to prevent 100,000 Kosovar Albanians from being One does not have to be consequentialist to find this
expelled from their homes than to prevent one from troubling. I think it is more plausible to see an attempt
being expelled. So while granting that there is a limit at a victim's dollar backed by a threat to kill as a single
on the extra defensive force a large number of victims violation that is more serious than a simple attempt at
permits against a threat, one can hold that it boosts the dollar and less serious than a direct attempt to kill,
that force somewhat. When a nation faces aggression, so it justifies more defensive force than the former but
the threat is to an immense number of people's rights less than the latter. This is exactly the view I suggested
for an immense period of time. Even if this does not by above: that a threat to kill boosts the amount of force
itself justify killing, it justifies more force than is per- permitted in self-defense, but only somewhat. And it
mitted to protect one person's one-time exercise of his applies naturally to the case of aggression, where the
right to vote. threat to kill citizens who resist an assault on their
Second, a military aggressor backs up its attack political rights can likewise boost the amount of force
on another nation with the threat to kill its citizens if they may use in response.
they resist. Although no citizens will be harmed if they Finally, aggression threatens more than only citi-
surrender, they will be killed if they do not. McMa- zens' right of political self-determination. To see how,
han has argued that this conditional threat by itself consider the law of individual self-defense. Most juris-
licenses a victim to kill in self-defense: by threatening dictions limit the right of self-defense by proportion-
one's life an attacker brings one's right to life into play ality conditions, and these usually allow less force in
and permits whatever degree of force defense of that defense of one's property than in defense of one's per-
right allows. 29 Norman and Rodin reply persuasively son. Whereas a victim may kill to prevent himself from
that this is not so: if a thief threatens to kill you if you being killed or badly injured, he may not kill to protect
do not give him a dollar, you may not kill him to pro- his property. But the law often makes a partial excep-
tect your dollar. But it does not follow, as Norman and tion of a person's home. On the ground that "a man's
Rodin seem to assume, that the threat has no effect on house is his castle," it allows more force to be used in
the amount of force one may use; on the contrary, the protecting one's home than in protecting other forms
threat again seems to boost this amount somewhat. A of property, in some jurisdictions even allowing killing
CHAPTER 19: WAR. TERRORISM. AND TORTURE 0. 733
3
to prevent mere forcible entry into one's home. } It invades a national home. Even if no one of these fea-
also allows a person to stand and resist an attack in tures by itself justifies killing, together they surely do.
his home that he would be required to retreat from Given everything that aggreSSion threatens, killing to
elsewhere. This view has an intuitive rationale. If rape prevent it need not be disproportionate.
is a serious crime, it is not only because of the bodily
harm it causes; it is also and more importantly because ***
it violates what should be most intimate and private to
a person. Similarly, though to a lesser degree, forcible V. WEIGHING GOODS AND EVILS:
entry into a person's home invades space that should COMPARING LIVES
be personal; this is why its victims feel violated. While My second issue concerns how a nation should weigh
the parallel with rape must not be exaggerated, it lives when it kills some enemy citizens in order to save
seems that just as in that case the violation of intimate citizens of its own. This can be an ad bellum issue when
space increases the seriousness of the crime and the a just cause for war is to prevent terrorist attacks like
amount of force permitted to prevent it, so invasion of those of September 11, 2001; it also arises in the jus in
one's home justifies more defensive force than other bello, where soldiers must often choose between tactics
crimes against property. that will cause more or fewer enemy casualties at the
A similar idea applies to international aggression. cost of more or fewer casualties for themselves. There is
As the recent literature on nationalism has under- obviously no preCise formula for making these choices,
scored, a nation's citizens typically regard it as a kind such as that 2.7 enemy lives equal one of ours. But
of home. They feel emotionally attached to its land- we can try to describe the general parameters within
scape, architecture, and cultural life, some of which which they should be made. Since there are two main
are threatened by aggression. They also feel attached categories of personnel on each side, combatants and
to its political institutions, seeing them as another noncombatants, there are four relevant comparisons:
aspect of their national home and resenting interfer- our soldiers against their soldiers, our civilians against
ences with them. The culture of English-speaking their soldiers, our civilians against their civilians, and
Canada does not differ radically from that of the our soldiers against their civilians. 32
United States, yet most Canadians would find the In bello proportionality as standardly understood
armed incorporation of Canada into the United States seems to allow a nation to kill virtually any number
and the replacement of Canadian political institu- of enemy soldiers to save just one of its own soldiers.
tions by those of the United States a violation similar Once a war has begun, enemy soldiers are essentially
in kind to intrusion by a burglar into their home. For free targets that one may attack at any time. 33 The in
them, a U.S. attack would be an invasion not only lit- bello necessity condition forbids killing them wan-
erally but also metaphorically. But then it is a mistake tonly, or for no military purpose. But if killing enemy
to see the only rights of citizens threatened byaggres- soldiers now will prevent them from killing one of
sion as rights of political self-determination; they also our soldiers in the future, it seems we may kill almost
include the right to be secure in a political and cultural any number to achieve that end. Radical though it
home. Just as in individual defense the protection of a seems, this claim mirrors one from the morality of
home justifies some additional force, so protecting a self-defense, where a person may kill any number of
political home does so in the morality of war. attackers if that is necessary to save his own or anoth-
Three features, then, differentiate aggression er's life. It also fits the charges of disproportionality
against a nation from interference with one person's leveled against the Gulf War, which concerned only
right to vote: the large number of people whose rights the number of Iraqi civilians killed and not the num-
are threatened, the fact that aggression is backed by a ber of Iraqi soldiers. 34 Or consider the movie Saving
conditional threat to kill, and the fact that the attack Private Ryan, in which a troop of U.S. soldiers rescue a
is not only on rights of political participation but also fellow soldier caught behind enemy lines. There is no
..
suggestion in the movie or in the common response to of the moral comparison wrong. In the Afghan case
it that there is some number of German soldiers such the relevant U.S. number is not that of civilians killed
that the troop must be careful not to kill more than on September 11; their lives were already lost. It is the
that number while saving Ryan. Some theorists have number of U.S. civilians saved by the war, or the num-
argued that the traditional distinction between com- ber of additional lives that would have been lost to ter-
batants and noncombatants should be rejected, on rorism had the war not been fought. In the Israeli case
the ground that morally innocent conscript soldiers it is likewise the number of additional terrorist victims
are less legitimate targets of force than civilians who there would have been without the counterattacks.
culpably contributed to the start of an unjust war. 35 Setting this aside, however, both views assume that
Although important, this argument raises issues civilian lives on the two sides must be weighed equally.
beyond the scope of this chapter; and if we assume The idea of equal weighting is familiar from moral
the traditional distinction or consider only volun- views such as utilitarianism, which require equal con-
teer enemy soldiers, it seems we may kill virtually any sideration of all people's interests. But these views are
number to save one of our soldiers. 36 sharply at odds with commonsense morality, which
If so, however, we may also kill virtually any num- does not tell a father to care no more about his daugh-
ber of enemy soldiers to save one of our civilians. A ter than about a stranger. On the contrary, it says he
governmenes duty to protect its civilians is surely as may and should give his daughter's welfare consider-
great as its duty to protect its soldiers; any preference it ably greater weight, so if he has a choice between sav-
shows the latter it may also show the former. In addi- ing his daughter's life and those of several strangers, he
tion, civilians have not, by volunteering for military may and should do the former. 37 The relations among
service, accepted any risk of dying in war, so the gov- citizens of a nation are not as close as between parents
ernment's responsibility to them is if anything greater. and children, and the partiality they justify is not as
There may be limits on the priority a government may strong. But common sense still calls for some partial-
give its civilians' lives in the jus ad bellum. While it is ity toward fellow citizens and certainly demands that
permissible to initiate a war that will kill enemy sol- partiality of governments. Although they have some
diers to prevent large-scale attacks on our civilians, duty to relieve poverty in other countries, they have
this may not be permissible to save one or two civil- a stronger duty to do so in their own; in formulat-
ians. Once war has begun, however, it seems the pri- ing trade, immigration, and other policies govern-
ority is virtually absolute. If we can prevent an attack ments should consider primarily the effects on their
that will kill one of our civilians by killing a number citizens. 38 Applied to just war theory, this view says a
of enemy soldiers, it seems we may do so almost what- government should weigh its own civilians' lives more
ever that number is. heavily than enemy civilians', and may therefore kill
The more difficult issues concern weighing enemy more of the latter if that is necessary to save somewhat
civilian lives, first against our Civilians' lives. Whereas fewer of the former.
enemy soldiers have, in becoming soldiers, given up It may be objected that this view mistakes the
certain protections and become legitimate targets of proper limits of justified partiality. Common sense
force, enemy civilians retain those protections, and one permits us to prefer those closer to us when we are
conclusion is that their lives must be weighed equally giving benefits, but not when the issue is causing
against those of our civilians. In 2001 many watched harm. On the contrary, it gives everyone equal rights
the death toll of Afghan civilians with the hope that against such harm and requires those rights to be
it would not exceed the 3,000 Americans killed on equally respected. A father may and even should pre-
September 11; Similarly, some critics condemn Israel's fer saving his daughter's life to saving five strangers.
attacks on suicide bombers in the occupied territories but he may not kill those strangers in order to save his
for killing more Palestinian civilians than the bomb- daughter. The same goes for governments. They may
ers have killed Israelis. Both these claims get one term prefer their citizens' interests when giving benefits
like those of poverty relief or trade policy, but not to this conclusion by her rejection of the double effect
when killing. distinction, and if we accept either that distinction or
Despite its appeal to equality, this argument would some other between targeted and collateral harms,
have very restrictive implications in the context of as both just war theory and international law do, we
war. After all, a father is not only forbidden to kill five can use it to justify the more permissive claim that the
strangers to save his daughter; he is also forbidden father may kill some bystanders if that is unavoidable
to kill one stranger to save five daughters. To adapt a in saving his daughter. And I think most will find this
familiar example, if he has five daughters who need claim more intuitive than Thomson's; surely few in
different organ transplants and no organs are avail- the father's position would fail to save their daughter.
able, he is not permitted to kill one innocent person The fact that he is killing rather than failing to save
in order to divide up her organs among his daugh- is not irrelevant; it still plays a Significant moral role,
ters. Applied to war, then, the argument would make and in particular reduces the degree of partiality he
it disproportionate to kill a much smaller number of may show below what would be permitted if he were
enemy civilians in the course of saving a much larger merely distributing benefits. To put it a little techni-
number of one's own. This is counterintuitive, and the cally, there is some number such that he would be
reason is that it mistakes the important distinction in permitted to save his daughter rather than save that
'ust war theory. This is not the distinction between number of strangers but may not kill that number of
~auSing harm and failing to prevent it; it is the distinc- strangers as a side effect of saving his daughter. Given
tion between targeting people for harm and harming that limit, however, he is permitted to show some
them collaterally, which is a distinction within the partiality toward his daughter even when he does kill
category of causing. This latter distinction is usually bystanders.
understood using the doctrine of double effect, so it The situation of a nation weighing its own against
becomes the distinction between intending harm enemy civilians' lives is analogous. The nation is, say,
as an end or means and merely foreseeing that harm attacking a government that has sponsored terrorist
will result. But whatever its exact basis (and others attacks against its citizens and find that, while direct-
have been proposed),39 the targeted/collateral distinc- ing force only at that government's agents, it will
tion is central to just war theory, so to test our view unavoidably kill some enemy civilians. I think that in
about weighing civilians' lives we need a nonmilitary this case the nation's government is permitted to give
example that involves it. Imagine that a victim is being somewhat greater weight to its own civilians' lives, and
attacked by an aggressor and that the only way a third the case for partiality here may even be stronger than
party can save the victim's life is by thrOWing. a gre- in that of individual defense. Even Thomson, who
nade that will kill the attacker and also, unaVOidably, rejects the targeted/collateral distinction in individual
an innocent bystander. It is arguable that if the third cases, acknowledges that it has considerable intui-
party is unrelated to any of the other participants he tive force in the context of war, force that she needs
may not throw the grenade, and in particular may not to but cannot explain away.41 In fact the distinction is
prefer the victim's innocent life to the bystander's. But impliCit in the very idea of in bello proportionality. The
now imagine that the defender is the victim's father. It pOint of the in bello condition, recall, is to determine
seems to me that he may throw the grenade, and may when acts that are not forbidden in themselves-for
do so even if this will kill some number of bystanders example, just killings of noncombatants-are for-
greater than one. If he is not aiming at the bystanders bidden because they cause excessive harm. But this
but killing them collaterally, he may show some pref- issue would not arise unless some acts of killing were
erence for his daughter. This claim will be contested not forbidden in themselves, that is, unless there was
by some. Thus, Judith Jarvis Thomson has denied that something like a targeted/collateral distinction. So
one may kill a bystander while defending not only a any discussion of ill bello proportionality must assume
40
loved one but also oneself. But she may feel forced the distinction, and once it is in place there is room
736 0' PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES
for a government to give somewhat greater weight to NOTES

its own civilians' lives. The fact that the government's 1. 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to tile Geneva Conventions
acts will kill enemy civilians remains important, and of 12 August 1949, and Relating to tile Protection of Victims of
in particular permits less partiality than is appropriate International Armed Conflicts, Art. 51 (5) (b), in Adam Roberts
in trade or immigration policy. I wish I could say more and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War,
precisely what this degree is, or how many enemy 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 449. This
civilian deaths are proportionate side effects of saving Protocol has not been ratified by the United States, but its
one of our civilians. But I do think that when weigh- military accepts very similar statements. Thus, the United
ing its own civilians' lives against those of enemy civil- States Army's Field Manual 27-10 says, about the bombing
ians it will merely collaterally kill, a nation may give of defended places, that "loss of life and damage to prop-
erty incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation
some preference to the former: more than zero prefer-
to the concrete and direct military advantage to be gained"
ence, but not as much as is permitted when no killing
(U.S. Department of the Army, Tile Law of Land Warfare [Field
is involved. If the nation is trying to prevent terrorist
Manual 27-10, 1956], par. 41).
attacks like those of September 11, 2001, then tragic
2. Michael Walzer, JlIst and Unjllst Wars, 2d ed. (New York:
though the result will be, and assuming the nation
Basic Books, 1992), p. xiv.
makes serious efforts to minimize collateral harm,
3. For a lucid defense of this "do-nothing" baseline for
it may kill somewhat more enemy civilians if that is
proportionality judgments, see David Mellow, "A Critique of
unavoidable in saving a smaller number of its own.
Just War Theory" (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 2003).
*** 4. See, e.g., the discussion of the "domestic analogy" in
Walzer, lust and Unjust Wars, pp. 58-59.
VI. CONCLUSION
5. james Turner johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare
Judgments about proportionality in war cannot be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 27-28; see also
made simply or mechanically. Even if we have speci- his lust War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton, NJ:
fied the types of good and evil relevant to these judg- Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 204, and Can Modem War
ments, we must identify the specific effects of a given Be lust? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 3,25,62.
war or act, which requires comparing that war or act 6. U.S. Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Prom-
with alternatives that are merely hypothetical and ise and Our Response, reprinted in jean Bethke Elshtain, ed.
can only be estimated given our available evidence. Just War Tlleory (New York: New York University Press, 1992),
In addition, once the relevant effects are identified p.101.
they must be weighed against each other, which often 7. Douglas P. LaCkey, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood
involves some indeterminacy because they are of irre- Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp. 40-41.
ducibly different types. But that proportionality judg- 8. joseph C. McKenna, "EthicS and War: A Catholic View,"
ments involve some indeterminacy does not mean American Political Science Review 54 (1960): 651; Richard j.
they can never be made. The common argument that Regan, lust War: Principles and Cases (Washington, D.C.:
what cannot be measured precisely cannot be mea- Catholic University of America Press, 1996), p. 63. The need
sured at all is as fallacious here as elsewhere. And we for this restriction is explicitly defended in jeff McMahan and
surely can make some determinate proportionality Robert McKim, "The just War and the Gulf War," Canadian
judgments. Thus, we can say that a conventional war Journal ofPhiiosoplly 23 (1993): 512-13.
fought to defend a nation's sovereignty against aggres- 9. McMahan and McKim, "The Just War and the Gulf War,"
sion is normally proportional, while a tactic that kills pp.502-06.
many enemy civilians rather than sacrifice a few sol- 10. I borrow this analogy from McMahan and McKim, "The
diers is not. In the first case the relevant goods clearly Just War and the Gulf War," pp. 504-05.
outweigh the relevant evils; in the second they do not. 11. It may be argued that lesser humanitarian aims are in fact
sufficient just causes, just not ones that on their own satisfy
***
proportionality; this is especially plausible if we think of the 21. Paul Christopher comes close to adopting this view. To the
just cause condition as specifying types of goal that can justify charge that the first Gulf War was disproportionate because it
war, whether or not every instance of them does. Even so, the caused the deaths of 40,000 Iraqi soldiers, he replies that "the
point remains that goals that would not by themselves justify responsibility for the deaths of Iraqi soldiers must rest with
war can contribute to a war's proportionality when joined the Iraqi government," since "Iraq could have prevented or
with other, weightier goals. ended the war at any time by complying with the mandate of
12. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, Tile Gulf War the United Nations Security Council" (The Ethics of War and
1990-91: Diplomacy and War in tile New World Order (London: Peace: An Illtroduction to Legal and Mora/Issues, 2d ed. [Upper
Faber & Faber, 1993), chs. 11, 19. Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999], pp. 84-85).
13. Additional Protocol I, Preamble and Art. 51 (5) (h), in 22. The intuitive conclusion about suicide bombers and vol-
Roberts and Guelff, Docllments 011 tI,e Laws of War, untary shields can also be reached in another way, by a view
pp. 422-23, 449. that discounts all deaths on the enemy side by their victims'
14. This worry is expressed in Judith Gail Gardam, "Propor- moral culpability with respect to the war or to acts in it. But
tionality and Force in International Law," American Joumal of this view raises issues beyond the scope of this article and
International Law 87 (1993): 392-94. departs, as I am trying not to, from the assumptions about
legitimate targets found in international law.
15. The most prominent recent defender of the independence
of the jus ad bellllm and jlls ill bello has been Walzer, but his 23. The first disjunct is needed because the second disjunct,
Just and Unjust Wars also downplays the importance of the while discounting for voluntary shields, does not do so for
proportionality conditions. These features of his view may be suicide bombers.
connected. While the discrimination condition Walzer con- 24. McKenna, "Ethics and War," p. 651.
centrates on is indeed, on his reading, independent of the jus
25. See, e.g., David Luban, "Just War and Human Rights,"
ad bellum, the ill bello proportionality condition depends on it.
Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1979/80): 160-81.
More general attacks on the independence of the jus in bello,
extending to the discrimination condition, are mounted in 26. lowe this last argument to Jeff McMahan.
Jeff McMahan, "Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War," 27. Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War (Cambridge:
Journal of Political Pililosophy 2 (1994): 193-221, and Mellow, Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 4; David Rodin, War
"A Critique of Just War Theory." and Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), ch. 6.
16. Additional Protocol I, Art. 51, (7-8), in Roberts and Guelff, 28. In F. M. Kamm's terminology, the benefit of not being
Documents 011 the Laws of War, p. 449. tickled is here an "irrelevant utility"; in Samantha Brennan's,
17. Paul Ramsey, The JlIst Wclr: Force alld Political Responsibility it does not satisfy the "universal constraint" a benefit must
(New York: Scribner's, 1968), p. 437. satisfy if it is to help justify killing. See Kamm, Morality, Mor-
tality, Vol. I: Death and Whom to Save from It (New York: Oxford
18. William V. OBrien, The Conduct of a Just and Limited War
University Press, 1993), p. 146; and Brennan, "Thresholds for
(New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 100. Johnson takes a similar
Rights," Southern Journal ofPhilosophy 32 (1995): 149-53.
view of Israel's response to the PLO in the early 1980s; see Call
Modern War Be Just? pp. 57, 59. I take it there is no point in 29. McMahan, "Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War," p. 196.
assigning the "major" responsibility for civilian deaths to the 30. Norman, EtllieS, Killing and War, pp. 130-31; Rodin, War
side that uses them as involuntary shields unless this reduces and Self-Defense, pp. 132-38.
the other side's responsibility.
31. See Stuart P. Green, "Castles and Carjackers: Proportional-
19. "Marines Wade into Dreaded Urban Battie," Tile Globe and ity and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and
Mail, March 25, 2003. Vehicles," University of Illinois Law Review 1999 (1999): 1-41.
20. Kenneth Pollack, Tile Tllreatell;llg Storm: TIle Case for In endorsing the general idea that more defensive force is
Invading IratI (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 133-37, permitted in one's home I do not endorse these extreme
139-40; Marcus Gee, "Stick to Your Poetry and Pianos," Tile "make my day" laws.
Globe and Mail, Sept. 27, 2002, p. A 17; and Margaret Wente, 32. Further relevant categories are those of allied soldiers and
"Who's Killing the Children of Iraq?" Tile Globe alld Mail, civilians, and neutral soldiers and civilians. I leave these aside
Oct. 8, 2002, p. A23. in this article.
33. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 138-51. 38. I defend a moderate degree of national partiality in liThe
34. After the war Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf expressed con- Justification of National Partiality," in Robert McKim and
tempt for Sad dam Hussein's willingness to squander Iraqi Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York:
soldiers' lives. But he thought the responsibility to protect Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 139-57.
those soldiers belonged only to Saddam; Schwarzkopf's own 39. F. M. Kamm has proposed grounding the distinction in
duty was only to U.S. soldiers. See Jack Anderson and Dale a more complex causal condition; see her "Justifications for
Van Atta, Stomlin' Norman: An American Hero (New York: Zebra Killing Noncombatants in War," Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Books, 1991), p. 164, cited in A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War 24 (2000): 219-28. But her condition implies that if we drop
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 221. a bomb on a factory and a piece of the bomb flies through
35. McMahan, "Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War," the air and kills a civilian, this is forbidden; whereas if we
passim; Mellow, "A Critique of Just War Theory," passim. drop a bomb and a piece of the factory flies through the air
and kills a civilian, that is not. I take it this is absurd. In my
36. I say "virtually" because there may be some number
view double effect gives the best grounding for the targeted/
(1,000? 10,000?) such that it is wrong to kill that many enemy
collateral distinction, but I cannot rule out a priori the
soldiers to save one of ours. My point is simply that even if
possibility of alternative groundings.
there is such a number, it is very high.
40. Judith JarviS Thompson, "Self-Defense," Philosophy &
37. Commonsense morality therefore incorporates what C. D.
Public Affairs 20 (1991): 289-90, 296, 307-08.
Broad called "self-referential altruism"; see his "Self and Oth-
ers," in Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. David 41. Thomson, "Self-Defense," pp. 292-98.
Cheney (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 262-82.
CHAPTER 20
The Ethics of Immigration
The history of U.S. immigration is long; the ISSUE FILE: BAC1(GROUND

nation's immigration policy has always been
controversial (and variable); and debates about From the beginning of the republic, Americans have
the morality of immigration have been rumbling often viewed immigrants with suspicion or fear,
since its founding. The moral issues are many and even while admiring the contributions they made to
complex: Are nations morally obligated to accept the nation. And immigration policies have reflected
all immigrants (to have more or less open bor- this ambivalence. In 1790, a law was passed to spell
ders)? Do nations have the moral right to reject out who could be naturalized (made a citizen). The
all immigrants (to have more or less closed bor- applicant had to be a resident for two years, a per-
ders)? If a nation admits immigrants, what are the son of "good moral character," and a "free White
selection criteria it can use to decide which immi- person." From 1875 to 1917, new restrictions lim-
grants to accept? Is it morally right, for example, ited or banned immigration from many parts of the
to accept all White Christians but turn away all world, espedally Asia. Immigrants with contagious
dark-skinned Pakistanis? Do rich nations have a diseases were banned, as were criminals, "lunatics,"
moral obligation to accept refugees-the poor, epileptics, polygamists, anarchists, political extrem-
oppressed, or persecuted? What rights, if any, ists, beggars, and others. In the early 1920s, laws
do undocumented ("illegal" or "unauthorized") were passed to limit the number of immigrants from
immigrants have? Are countries obligated to southern and eastern Europe (who were thought
grant citizenship to undocumented immigrants to be detrimental to American society) and to favor
who have for years lived peacefully within their immigrants from northern and western Europe.
borders, paid taxes, contributed to the economy, Throughout U.S. history, anti-immigration feel-
supported their community, and never broken ings have always run strong, even though America
a law? itself is a land of immigrants. For example,
As with any moral questions, intelligent Benjamin Franklin warned about the damaging
answers about immigration must rest on moral effects of the Germans on U.S. society (1753). Dur-
principles or reasons and nonmoral facts. The ing the Civil War General Ulysses s. Grant issued
moral reasoning involved is straightforward, and an expulsion order for all Jews within the parts of
the moral principles appealed to are familiar. The the territory he controlled (1862). The largest single
nonmoral facts, however, have too often been mass lynching in U.S. history took place in New
Orleans in 1891 when 11 Sicilians (who had been
hard to come by. It is likely that a great deal of
accused of murder but had been found not guilty)
what you think you know about immigration is were attacked by an angry mob of 10,000 people.
false. Perhaps this chapter can remedy some of New immigrants from many racial or ethnic groups
this confusion. often struggled to make a place for themselves in
739
America amid public sentiment that portrayed green-card immigrants can apply for citizenship
them as dirty, criminally inclined, unhealthy, or after living continuously in the country for five
otherwise undesirable. 1
years. Most of them are sponsored by family mem-
bers who are already U.S. citizens. 7
In 1965, Congress passed the Immigration and As immigrants are entering the United States,
Nationality Act, which radically changed immigra- others are leaving via deportation, defined by the
tion policy. Before that time, immigration had been U.S. government as the formal removal of a foreign
driven by a quota system that gave preference to national from the United States for violating an
immigrants from Western Europe. But the new pol- immigration law. About 344,000 immigrants were
icy favored skilled immigrants and those who, by deported in 2016. Between 2001 and 2008, the Bush
immigrating, could help reunite families. Since the administration deported 2 million immigrants;
law took effect, most immigrants have arrived from between 2009 and 2016, the Obama administra-
Latin America, South Asia, and East ASia, while a tion deported about 3 million. Most deportees are
smaller number have come from Western Europe. In not criminals, but are deported for other reasons. 8
2015,27 percent of immigrants living in the United In 2018, there were 337,287 immigrants deported.
States came from Mexico; 27 percent from Asia According to the Department of Homeland Secu-
(mostly China and India); 14 percent from Europe rity, "removals remained below the levels recorded
and Canada; and 4 percent from the Middle East. 2 during much of the Obama administration, includ-
In 2017, the number of foreign-born individuals ing a three-year period between fiscal 2012 and 2014
in the United States rose to more than 44 million, or ,,9
when there were more than 400,000 per year.
nearly 14 percent of the total population. This per-
The federal government defines a refugee
centage of immigrants is actually much lower than
as "someone who has fled from his or her home
that of many other developed nations, including
country and cannot return because he or she has a
Canada (21 percent), Switzerland (30 percent), and
well-founded fear of persecution based on religion,
Austria (19 percent).3 (The immigrant portion of the
race, nationality, political opinion or membership
overall U.S. population was actually larger in 1890, in a particular social group." From 1975 to 2017,
when it was 14.8 percent, the highest in U.S. history.4)
the United States resettled about 3 million refu-
Americans tend to overestimate immigrants' share of
gees within its borders. In 2016 alone, the United
the population, believing that it is over twice as large
States resettled almost 85,000 refugees, most of
(33 percent) as it actually is (less than 14 percent).5
them from the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Many people-including many politicians and
but also many from Syria, Myanmar, Iraq, and
commentators-also overestimate the number of
Somalia. Nearly 39,000 of them were Muslims, and
unauthorized immigrants living in the United over 37,000 were Christians.\O Refugees are allowed
States. In 2015, the number was about 11 million, to remain indefinitely in the United States as legal
making up one-quarter of all immigrants and 304 permanent residents, although they may apply {or
percent of the country's overall population. The citizenship after being a resident for five years.
other immigrants were lawful residents (tempo- Americans have several worrying misconceptions
rary or permanent) and naturalized citizens- about immigration. Here's a sketch of some of them.
nearly 34 million. 6
Each year, about a million immigrants enter • In a few years, Hispanic people will be the
the United States, while over a million immigrants majority in the United States, and White
become lawful permanent residents-that is, they people will be a minority. This assumption is
get a green card, which means they are on their false. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, no pop-
way to becoming full-fledged citizens. In general, ulation group is projected to be in the majority
CHAPTER 20: THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION 0 741
(more than 50 percent of the whole population) dollars help to fund. As a result, undocumented
in 2044 or even in 2060. Non-Hispanic White immigrants provide an enormous subsidy to
people will still be the largest population group. 11 the Social Security system in particular. Each
year, Social Security taxes are withheld from
• IDJ.DJ.igrants cOlDlDit more crimes than
native-born people do. Experts reject this billions of dollars in wages earned by workers
claim. Immigration scholar and author Cari whose names and Social Security numbers do
Lee Skogberg Eastman summarizes the evidence: not match the records of the Social Security
"Scholarship on the topic spanning decades has Administration (SSA). According to the SSA,
overwhelmingly found that immigrants actu- undocumented immigrants paid $13 billion in
ally show less propensity toward crime than payroll taxes into the Social Security Trust Funds
in 2010 alone."
native-born citizens and that immigration can
even be considered a factor in the decrease of
• Immigration harms the economy. Many
violent crime in the United States.,,12
people insist that immigration has an adverse
• IDlDJ.igrants are taking jobs away from ~ffect on the U.S. economy, but if it does, the
Anterican citizens. Available evidence sug- Impact is minimal. Most research on the sub-
gests that this assertion is unfounded. As East- ject shows that immigration generally benefits
man says, ltThere are specific segments of the the economy. As the economic writer Eduardo
U.S. labor force in which unauthorized immi- Porter says, "[f]he proposition that immi-
grants may compete with native labor pools, but gr.ation weighs on productivity is in tension
because employment is not a zero-sum game, ~lth many studies that show that immigra-
most immigrants don't compete directly with tIon tends to raise productivity and increase
U.S. citizens for jobs. Research shows that immi- econ.omic output, mostly by multiplying the
gration actually helps create jobs and sometimes earnIngs of immigrants themselves. Immi-
boosts wages for native workers, and that immigration to the United States increases inno-
grant labor is particularly necessary for STEM vation, slows the aging of the work force and
(science, technology, engineering, mathemat- opens new opportunities for some domestic
workers." 14
ics) jobs because there are not enough U.S.-born
applicants to fill those positions.,,13
• Unauthorized immigration is getting
• UndoculDented ilDlDigrants pay no taxes. Worse. Despite widespread belief in this claim
Evidence from a variety of sources shows that there are plenty of reasons to doubt it. Unau~
undocumented immigrants do in fact pay ~horized immigration (which includes both
taxes. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce explains: Illegal border crOssings and people who over-
"Undocumented immigrants pay sales taxes, ~ay their visas) has been generally declining
just like every other consumer in the United sln~e 2007, when the total unauthorized popu-
States. Undocumented immigrants also pay latlOn was 12.2 million. There has also been a
property taxes-even if they rent housing. More decrease in the number of attests of unauthor-
than half of undocumented immigrants have ized immigrants, an upsurge in the number of
federal and state income, Social Security, and U.S. Border Patrol agents, and a rise in the num-
Medicare taxes automatically deducted from ber of immigrants leaving the United States to
their paychecks. However, undocumented immi- go back to their home countries. IS
grants working 'on the books' are not eligible for Political opposition to granting undocumented
any of the federal or state benefits that their tax immigrants amnesty or a "path to citizenship" is
often expressed like this: "Why don't they just get which should be distinguished from political or
in line and wait their turn?" The answer, as immi- economic cosmopolitanism.) Cosmopolitanism,
gration experts point out, is "There is no line." then, inclines toward open borders.
As the America Immigration Council puts it, Anticosmopolitanism is the contrary posi-
tion: wealthy nations able to ease the suffering of
Immigration to the United States on a temporary
the world's poor and oppressed have a moral obli-
or permanent basis is generally limited to three dif-
ferent routes: employment, family reunification, or gation to do so, but they also have moral obliga-
humanitarian protection. While the U.S. immigra- tions to their own citizens that may be weightier
tion system is generous, each of these possibilities than those concerning foreigners. According to
is highly regulated and subject to numericallimita- anticosmopolitanism, closed borders can be justi-
tions and eligibility requirements. Most unauthor- fied. Stephen Macedo sums up his brand of anticos-
ized immigrants do not have the necessary family mopolitanism like this:
or employment relationships and often cannot
access humanitarian protection, such as refugee or I argue that if high levels of immigration have
asylum status. 16 detrimental impact on our least well-off citizens,
that is a reason to limit immigration, even if those
Eastman says: who seek admission seem to be poorer than our
[M]ost of the unauthorized persons currently liv- own poor whose condition is worsened by their
ing in the United States would not qualify to come entry. IS
legally under [U.S. immigration laws]. Many do
not have family members already living legally in Thinkers have made their case for cosmopoli-
the United States. Even for those who do, the visa tanism in different ways. Those who appeal to
backlogs for certain categories of family members equality and freedom (cosmopolitan egalitarians)
(especially siblings or children of U.S. citizens) can contend that everyone-both compatriots and
be decades long. In November 2015, the wait time noncitizens-is entitled to equal moral rights and
to bring a sibling from the Philippines was 23 years;
consideration and that allowing open borders is
for Mexico it was 17 years. On top of that, annual
caps are established for most visa categories, and
the key to eliminating the vast economic inequali-
there is a 7 percent per-county limit on the number ties in the world. A libertarian perspective appeals
of visas issued. Overwhelmingly, demand exceeds to property rights and a person's right to freedom
supply in the majority of those categories. In 2015, of movement. Libertarians argue that restricted
for example, the per-country visa limit was 25,900, immigration (1) interferes with citizens' right to
but there were 1,323,978 applicants from Mexico allow foreigners to enter their property and (2)
alone .... Legal immigration to the United States
impedes foreigners' right to freedom of movement. -
today is a very complicated process that requires
Those who appeal to utilitarian considerations
specific resources or requirements for eligible appli-
cants. For many of the poor or disadvantaged who argue that restricting immigration has adverse con-
come seeking economic opportunities, there sim- sequences, especially economically. Closed borders
ply is no legal way to enter the United States. 17 restrict trade, waste talents, and impede prosperity.
The reasons given for restricting immigration
Two general perspectives on the morality of are varied-and usually controversial:
immigration dominate serious debate. Cosmo-
politanism is the view that wealthy nations • Security. Nations are obligated to protect their
able to ease the suffering of the world's poor and citizens from external threats (such as terror-
oppressed have a moral obligation to do so, and ism), and many people regard limitations on
that this obligation is as strong concerning a immigration as an obvious way to do this. But
nation's own citizens as it is concerning foreigners. there is substantial disagreement over whether
(This outlook is a kind of moral cosmopolitanism, immigration limitations would be effective.
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Deporting Children
WASHINGTON-President Trump on Tuesday [2017] liberal justices, was a significant setback for
ordered an end to the Obama-era program Mr. Trump, who had promis~ his election cam-
that shields young undocumented immigrants paign to "immediately terminar" the program. t
from deportation, calling it an "amnesty-first
In January 2021, President Joe Biden launched
approach" and urging Congress to pass a replace-
ment before he begins phasing out its protections into his term of office by Signing several immigra-
in six months. tion orders, including a presidential memorandum
As early as March, officials said, some of the directing the government to preserve the DACA
800,000 young adults brought to the United program. He also proposed legislation that included
States illegally as children who qualify for the an immediate pathway to citizenship for those in
program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals the program.
[DACA], will become eligible for deportation. The The children protected by the DACA program
five-year-old policy allows them to remain with- were not r~sponsible for their immigration into
out fear of immediate removal from the country the United States and for their being undocu-
and gives them the right to work legally:
mented. Should they still have been deported?
The Supreme Court blocked the Trump adminis- Should they have been permitted to stay and
tration on Thursday [2020] from going ahead with work? Does this situation seem like punishing
its plan, announced in 2017, to end a program children for the actions of their parents? Explain
called DACA that protects about 700,000 young your responses.
immigrants known as Dreamers from deportation.
The ruling did not address the merits of the *Michael D. Shear and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Trump
program or the decision to end it; the court ruled Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act,"
only on whether the administration had acted law- New York Times, September 5, 2017.
fully in trying. The White House is free to try again. tCaitlin Dickerson, "What Is DACA? And How Did
Still, the 5-4 ruling, with Chief Justice John It End Up in the Supreme Court?" New York Times,
G. Roberts Jr. joining with the court's four more June 19, 2020.
• Culture. Many favor closed borders to preserve ask-if a minority of workers want to main-
what they perceive as their nation's distinc- tain closed borders while the majority would
tive culture. Critics, however, ask whether the benefit greatly from opening them-is it
empirical assumptions about cultural iden- morally permissible to keep things as they
tity and change are actually true, and whether are for the sake of the minority?
citizens have a moral right either to resist or to
impose changes to their culture. • Welfare. Some argue that a wealthy nation
that offers substantial welfare benefits to its
• Economy. A very common assumption is that citizens (such as Sweden and other Scan-
allowing immigrants into a country will wreck dinavian countries) cannot afford to have
its economy. Critics often reject this view, open borders. If such a welfare state placed
admitting that open borders may harm certain no limits on immigration, it would be inun-
workers but benefit many other workers and dated by poor and needy people from impov-
the economy as a whole. If this is the case, they erished countries seeking benefits. The
halted to protect the nation's distinctive culture.

Allowing immigrants to pour in through open
QUICI< REVIEW
borders, they argue, will irrevocably alter the cul-
deportation-The formal removal of a foreign ture or destroy it altogether. This nonmoral asser-
national from a country for violating an immi- tion would have to be supported by empirical
gration law. facts, and they mayor may not be at hand. Cul-
refugee-Someone who has fled from his or her
tural change-whether caused by immigration or
home country and cannot return because he or
by internal factors-is often difficult to predict,
she has a well-founded fear of persecution based and identifying objectively the features of a cul-
on religion, race, nationality, political opinion or ture worth preserving can be tricky. Citizens can
membership in a particular social group. also argue that borders should be closed for other
utilitarian reasons: because immigration will dis-
cosmopolitanism-The view that wealthy nations
rupt the economy, break the welfare system, turn
able to ease the suffering of the world's poor and
oppressed have a moral obligation to do so and
control of the country over to foreigners, or unac-
that this obligation is as strong concerning a ceptably change the nature of the political system.
nation's own citizens as it is concerning foreigners. These claims, of course, would also require empiri-
cal support.
anticosmopolitanism-The view that wealthy
Some arguments for and against immigration are
nations able to ease the suffering of the world's
based not on utility, but on one or more moral prin-
poor and oppressed have a moral obligation to
do so, but they also have moral obligations to
ciples. Christopher Heath Wellman, for example,
their own citizens that may be weightier than argues that nations have a right to close their borders,
those concerning foreigners. a right derived from the more fundamental right to
freedom of association. People, he says, clearly have
a right to associate with particular individuals and to
disassociate from others. As he puts it,
welfare system would collapse, and the nation we take for granted that each individual has a right to
would no longer be a welfare state. Some argue, choose his or her marital partner and the associates
however, that this predicament of the welfare with whom he or she practices his or her religion ....
state does not provide a justification for closing [J]ust as an individual has a right to determine whom
borders. There may be ways to distribute ben- (if anyone) he or she would like to marry, a group
efits, they say, while keeping borders open-by, of fellow-citizens has a right to determine whom (if
anyone) it would like to invite into its political com-
for example, delaying welfare benefits to new
munity. And just as an individual's freedom of asso-
immigrants until after a few years of residency. ciation entitles one to remain Single, a state's freedom
of association entitles it to exclude all foreigners from
MORAL THEORIES its political community. )9
Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist

theories have been used to formulate arguments MORAL ARGUMENTS
and claims about immigration. Those who think
nations should restrict or forbid immigration It's not possible here to examine all the arguments
(that is, anti cosmopolitans) often argue in a utili- that have been marshaled in the battles over
tarian vein, pointing out that open borders would immigration, but we can look closely at one of
have objectionable consequences. They contend, them. Stephen Macedo argues for his position in
for example, that immigration must be limited or a nonconsequentialist vein-specifically, he appeals
CRITICAL THOUGHT: Accepting or Rejecting Refugees
Consider how U.S. policy regarding refugees is refugee admissions. It had previously led the
changing: world on this measure for decades, admitting
more refugees each year than all other countries
The United States plans to admit a maximum of combined.
18,000 refugees in fiscal year 2020, down from The decline in U.S. refugee admissions comes
a cap of 30,000 in the one that ended Sept. 30, at a time when the number of refugees worldwide
2019, under a new refugee admissions ceiling set has reached the highest levels since World War II. *
by the Trump administration. This would be the
lowest number of refugees resettled by the U.S. Does the United States have a moral obligation to
in a single year since 1980, when Congress created resettle refugees? If so, why? If not, why not? If the
the nation's refugee resettlement program. United States has such an obligation, what propor-
Even before the administration's announce- tion of the world's refugees must the country reset-
ment, refugee resettlement in the U.S. had tle? What would constitute a legitimate reason for
dropped to historic lows during Donald Trump's
turning away some refugees and accepting others?
presidency, according to a Pew Research Center
analysis of State Department data. As a result, *Jens Manuel Krogstad, "Key Facts about Refugees to
the U.S. is no longer the world's top country for the U.S.," Pew Research Center, October 7,2019.
to a particular concept of justice. He asks, "How Macedo says that in aiding our fellow citizens,
should we think about the apparent ethical con- we should give priority to those compatriots who
flict between, on the one hand, the cosmopolitan need our help the most:
humanitarian impulse to admit less well-off persons
We must consider the justifiability of policies
from abroad who wish to immigrate to the United from the standpoint of the least well-off among
States and, on the other hand, the special obliga- our citizens. John Rawls's theory of justice stands
tion we have to less well-off Americans, induding or for the proposition that the political equality of
especially African Americans?,,2o His answer is that citizens requires this sort of "distributive" justi-
seeing to the needs of one's own citizens is generally fication among citizens: it is not reasonable to
a weightier obligation than helping noncitizens: expect our less-well-off fellow citizens to accede to
a policy on the grounds that it makes those with
Citizens have special obligations to one another: we the luck of superior endowment by nature and
have special reasons to be concerned with the distri- birth even better off. Immigration policy-as part
bution of wealth and opportunities among citizens. of the basic structure of social institutions-ought
The comparative standing of citizens matters in to be answerable to the interests of the poorest
some ways that the comparative standing of citizens Americans.
and noncitizens does not .... I argue against what is
sometimes characterized as a "cosmopolitan" posi- Here's one way of using Macedo's justice prin-
tion with respect to distributive justice and defend ciple in a simple argument:
the idea that distributive justice is an obligation that
holds among citizens ... What is the basis of these 1. If high levels of immigration by low-skilled
special obligations among citizens? I argue that it is as workers make it unlikely that we will fulfill
members or co-participants in self-governing politi- our moral obligations to the poorest Ameri-
cal communities that we have special obligations to cans, then we should reduce or stop such
our fellow members.21 immigration.
--
~
"~ CRITICAL THOUGHT: Conditions at Immigrant Detention Centers
Numerous human rights organizations have com- • More than 70 percent of people held in deten-
plained about inhumane conditions at U.S. immi- tion centers built under the Trump administra-
gration detention centers run by President Trump's tion are under the purview of the New Orleans
administration. Here's a summary of a report on field office, which denied 99.1 percent of all
the subject released jointly by the American Civil applications for release on parole for asylum
seekers between March and December 2019.
Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, and the
• Asylum seekers interviewed for this report
National Immigrant Justice Center:
shared dramatic stories of the lengths immi-
People are held in conditions that are inhumane, gration officers went to obfuscate the
and access to medical care is paltry-even before situation, including denying the existence of
the pandemic. parole or claiming it's only for people who
• Since 2017, 39 adults have died in ICE [Immi- are dying.
gration and Customs Enforcement] custody or
"We did the research for this report before the
immediately after being released. Independent
Covid-19 pandemic," said Eunice Cho, senior staff
medical expert analyses of these deaths have
attorney at the ACLU's National Prison Project.
found subpar care contributed to these deaths.
"Even before this crisis, detained people were
• Twelve of these deaths were by suicide while
unable to get basic care, they were held in a cul-
in detention. Two of the five detention centers
ture of fear, without any clear way to get out of
our researchers visited had no mental health
detention. In a global pandemic, these condi-
professional on staff.
tions-overcrowding, lack of access to medical
• Detained immigrants told researchers about
care, staff who don't speak Spanish, etc.-become
facilities taking a week to set a broken bone
even more deadly. This is not the kind of country
and that necessary medications, such as inhal-
we want to be."*
ers for asthma, were often not available.
• Multiple people interviewed by researchers Assuming that this report is accurate, should the
at one Louisiana facility reported no access to conditions described be of moral concern? That
soap for bathing or cleaning supplies for their is, does the U.S. government have a moral duty to
cells or bathrooms. ensure that people housed in detention centers are
Detention is a black box, with no way out for treated humanely regardless of their immigration
detained people. status? Why or why not?
• Immigrants in detention centers opened under
the Trump administration are extremely iso- * American Civil Liberties Union, Copyright © 2020
lated from access to counsel. Facilities opened American Civil Liberties Union. "Justice-Free Zones: U.S.
before 2017 have four times as many immi- Immigration Detention Under the Trump Administra-
gration attorneys available within a 100-mile tion. https:/Iwww.aclu.org/reportljustice-free-zones-us
radius as those which have been opened under -immigration-detention-under-trump-administration.
the Trump administration. Reprinted with permission.
2. Currently high levels of immigration by low- KEY TERMS

skilled workers do make it unlikely that we deportation (p. 740)
will fulfill our moral obligations to the poorest refugee (p. 740)
Americans. cosmopolitanism (p. 742)
3. Therefore, we should reduce or stop high levels anticosmopolitanism (p. 742)
of immigration by low-skilled workers.
This is a valid argument. Premise 1 is a moral EXERCISES

statement derived from Macedo's distributive justice Review Questions
principle, which he defends at length. Premise 2 is
1. What is a refugee? What is deportation? (p. 740)
a nonmoral statement that must be supported by
2. What is cosmopolitanism? Is cosmopolitanism
empirical evidence.
now the immigration policy of the United
States? (p. 742)
3. What is anticosmopolitanism? How does it
differ from cosmopolitanism? (p. 742)
CHAPTER REVIEW 4. Have immigrants coming to America
always been welcomed with open arms?
(To answer this question, provide examples.)
SUMMARY (pp. 739-40)
s. In 2015, how many foreign-born individuals
Immigration policies have changed repeatedly through- were living in the United States? (p. 740)
out American history and have often embodied anti- 6. In 2015, what percentage of the entire U.S.
immigrant outlooks. The immigration system for the population was foreign-born? (p. 740)
past several decades has favored skilled workers and 7. How many immigrants were deported during
family reunification. Misconceptions that Americans the George W. Bush presidency? The Obama
have about immigration include the notions that iIruni- presidency? The Trump presidency? (p. 740)
grants commit more crimes than native-born people do, 8. Do immigrants commit more crimes than
that undocumented immigrants pay no taxes, and that native-born people do? (p. 741)
immigrants are taking jobs away from American citizens. 9. Is it true that immigrants pay no taxes?
Two general perspectives dominate serious debate (p.740)
about immigration. Cosmopolitanism is the view 10. Why don't all immigrants "get in line" to
that wealthy nations able to ease the suffering of the wait their turn to become citizens instead of
world's poor and oppressed have a moral obligation entering the country illegally? (p. 742)
to do so and that this obligation is as strong con-
cerning foreigners as it is concerning a nation's own
citizens. Anticosmopolitanism is the contrary posi- Discussion Questions
tion: wealthy nations able to ease the suffering of the 1. Which view makes the most sense to you-
world's poor and oppressed have a moral obligation cosmopolitanism or anticosmopolitanism?
to do so, but they also have moral obligations to their Why?
own citizens that may be weightier than those con- 2. Should children brought into a country illegally
cerning foreigners. Both consequentialist and non- ever be deported? Why or why not?
consequentialist theories have been used to formulate 3. Is "preserving the culture" a good reason to
arguments and claims about immigration. restrict immigration? Why or why not?
4. Does the United States have a moral FURTHER READING

G. Brock, Giobai/listice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
obligation to resettle refugees? Under what
Joseph H. Carens, The Ethics of Immigratio11 (New York:
circumstances would the country not have
Oxford University Press, 2013).
such an obligation? Phillip Cole and C. Wellman, Debating the Ethics of Immi-
S. Does a country have the right to close its borders? gration: Is There a Right to Exclude? (New York: Oxford
Explain. University Press, 2011).
6. Is seeing to the needs of one's own citizens Cari Lee Skogberg Eastman, Immigration: Exami11i11g tile
generally a weightier obligation than helping Facts (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017).
noncitizens? Why or why not? C. Kukathas, "Immigration," in The Oxford Handbook of
7. How does Macedo justify his anticosmopolitanism? Practical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press,
8. What is Wellman's justification for his 2002),567-90.
view that nations have a right to close Pew Research Center, "Immigration," http://www.pewre
their borders? search.org/topics/immigration/ (November 29, 2017).
Alex Sager, ed., The Ethics and Politics of Immigratio11
9. Is there anything wrong in offering
(London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).
unauthorized immigrants Ita path to
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
citizenship"? Explain. University Press, 1993).
10. Would it ever be just to ban the Christopher Heath Wellman, "Immigration," in Stanford
immigration of people because they Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Summer 2015 ed., ed. Edward
profess a particular religion? Is so, why? N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immigra
If not, why not? tion/ (March 23, 2015).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Rejecting Jewish Refugees

The modern refugee policy of the United States was shaped partly in response to the
nation's callous treatment of refugees during Nazi rule in Europe. As one observer says,
The US (and other countries in the Western Hemisphere) could have saved thousands
of Jews from the Nazis. They didn't. At one point, the US literally turned away a
ship of 900 German Jews. Shortly afterward, it rejected a proposal to allow 20,000
Jewish children to come to the US for safety. *
The name of the ship was the st. Louis, which set sail from Hamburg, Germany, in May 1939.
It eventually ended up in waters off the coast of Miami, Florida, waiting for permission to land.
But the United States, which could have easily accommodated the passengers, wouldn't allow it.
The St. Louis was forced to sail back across the Atlantic, and most of the passengers were diwied
up among a handful of European countries, all of which were eventually taken over by the Nazis.
Out of the original 900 passengers, 254 perished in the Holocaust.
=-
Was the United States morally obligated to take so, what moral principle or principles could have
in the refugees from Nazi-dominated Europe? If justified that action? If not, why not?
*Dara Lind, "How America's Rejection of Jews Fleeing Nazi Germany Haunts Our Refugee Policy Today," Vox,
January 27,2017, https:/ /www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/27/14412082/refugees-history-holocaust.
2. The UWhite Australia" Policy

Consider the history of Australia's former immigration law, known as the "White
Australia" policy:
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, concern was growing in the Australian
colonies about the level of "coloured" immigration to Australia, particularly from
China, and many colonies passed restrictive immigration legislation. Following
Federation in 1901, one of the first pieces of Commonwealth legislation passed was
the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, based on the earlier colonial legislation. The
overall aim of this and other related legislation was to limit non-white immigration
to Australia, particularly Asian immigration, and thereby preserve the predominance
of the British within Australia. t
Is an immigration policy that accepts only White color, religion, or country of origin morally accept-
Europeans morally acceptable? Is any immigration able? Why or why not?
policy that selects immigrants according to race,
tNational Archives of Australia, "Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (commonly known as the White Australia
Policy)," 2017, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/a-z/immigration-restriction-act.aspx. © Commonwealth of
Australia (National Archives of Australia) 2018. Reprinted with permission.
3. Ideological Tests
Washington Post-Donald Trump called Monday for a Cold War-style mobilization

against "radical Islamic terror," repeating and repackaging calls for strict immigration
controls-including a new ideological litmus test for Muslim visitors and migrants-
and blaming the current level of worldwide terrorist attacks on President Obama
and Hillary Clinton ....
The principal new initiative was what Trump called "extreme vetting" for "any
hostile attitude towards our country or its principles, or who believed sharia law
should supplant American law.*
Trump's proposed ideological test for immigrants universal ideological test used to weed out danger-
was short on specifics, although it seemed to ous extremists generally? Would you, for example,
entail more than the loyalty statement currently think it morally acceptable to use a test asking all
required under u.s. naturalization law, which asks applicants if they approved of (1) suicide bombings
for adherence to "the principles of the Constitu- against people of other religions, (2) laws severely
tion." Critics feared that Trump's test (ostensibly restricting the rights of women, or (3) making
designed to identify terrorists) would be used to homosexuality a capital crime? Why or why not?
discriminate against Muslims. But what about a
+Karen DeYoung, "Trump Proposes Ideological Test for Muslim Immigrants and Visitors to the U.S.," Washington
Post, August 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-to-propose-ideological
-testfor-m uslim-immigran ts-and-visitors-to-the-us/2016/08115/3192fdba-62fc-l1 e6-be4e-23fc4d 4d 12b4_story
.html?utm_term:::::.a3dd8fdc95be.
READINGS
The Morality of Migration

SEYLA BENHABIB
In announcing the Department of Homeland Secu- migrants increased nearly sevenfold, from roughly
rity's policy directive on june 15 stating that undocu- 33 million to more than 200 million.
mented migrant youths who meet certain conditions Migrations pit two moral and legal principles,
would no longer be deported, President Obama said foundational to the modern state system, against each
that "It was the right thing to do." What he did not other. On one hand, the human right of individuals to
say was whether he meant "the right thing" legally or move across borders whether for economic, personal
morally. or professional reasons or to seek asylum and refuge is
Obviously, he considered the action to be legal, even guaranteed by Articles 13 and 14 of the 1948 Univer-
though this invocation of his administration's power sal Declaration of Human Rights. On the other hand,
drew strong criticism from many, including Supreme Article 21 of the declaration recognizes a basic right
Court justice Antonin Scalia. But the president's to self-government, stipulating that "the will of the
grounds for believing it moral were much less clear. people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
This should come as no surprise: the morality ment." Under the current regime of states, that fun-
and politics of migration are among the most divisive damental right includes control over borders as well
issues in much of the world. In the United States, dis- as determining who is to be a citizen as distinguished
cussions of immigration flow seamlessly into matters from a resident or an alien.
of national security, employment levels, the health of The international system straddles these dual
the American economy, and threats to a presumptive principles but it has not been able to reconcile them.
American national identity and way of life. Much the The irony of global developments is that while state
same is true in Europe. Not a week goes by without a sovereignty in economic, military, and technological
story of refugees from Africa or Asia perishing while domains is eroded and national borders have become
trying to arrive at the shores of the European Union. more porous, they are still policed to keep out aliens
Nor are such developments restricted to the and intruders. The migrant's body has become the
resource-rich countries of the Northern Hemisphere. symbolic site upon which such contradictions are
The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Singapore, Israel and enacted.
jordan are countries with the highest percentage share Why not advocate a "world without borders"
of migrants among their total population, while the then? From a moral point of view, no child deserves to
United States, the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi be born on one side of the border rather than another,
Arabia, Canada and France lead in the actual number and it is deeply antithetical to our moral principles to
of international migrants. Migrations are now global, punish individuals for what they cannot help being
challenging many societies in many parts of the world. or doing. Punishment implies responsibility and
Whereas from 1910 to 2012, the world's popu- accountability for one's actions and choices; clearly,
lation increased slightly more than fourfold, from children who through their parents' choices end up
1.6 billion to more than 7 billion, the number of on one side of the border rather than another cannot
people living in countries other than their own as be penalized for these choices.
A strong advocate of the right to self-government
Seyla Benhabib, "The Morality of Migration," New York Times, might retort that rewarding certain children for the
July 29,2012. © 2012 The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used wrongs committed by their parents, in this case illegal
under license. immigration, by legalizing undocumented youths is
illogical as well as immoral and that "the right thing to in nation-centric terms, always have transnational
do" would be to deport all undocumented migrants- causes and consequences. It is impossible to address
parents and children alike. Apart from the sheer Mexican migration into the United States, for example,
impracticality of this solution, its advocates seem to without considering the decades-long dependency
consider undocumented "original entry" into a coun- of the rich California agricultural fields upon the
try as the analog of "original sin" that no amount of often undocumented and unorganized labor of Mexi-
subsequent behavior and atonement can alter. can workers, some of whose children have now grown
But such punitive rigor unfairly conflates the up to become "Dreamers" (so named after the Devel-
messy and often inadvertent reasons that lead one to opment, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
become an undocumented migrant with no criminal introduced to Congress in 2001). Among the three
intent to break the law. million students who graduate from United States
If conditions in a person's native country so high schools, 65,000 are undocumented.
endanger his life and well-being [that] he becomes The United States owes these young people a spe-
willing to risk illegality in order to survive, his right cial duty of hospitality, not only because we, as a
to survival, from a moral point of view, carries as SOciety, have benefited from the circumstances under
much weight as does the new country's claim to con- which their parents entered this country, but also
trol borders against migrants. Immanuel Kant, there- because they have formed strong affiliations with
fore, called the moral claim to seek refuge or respite this society through being our friends, students,
in the lands of another, a "universal right of hospi- neighbors and coworkers. In a liberal-democratic
tality," provided that the intentions of the foreigner society the path to citizenship must follow along
upon arriving on foreign lands were peaceful. Such these associative ties through which an individual
a right, he argued, belonged to each human being shows him or herself to be capable and worthy of
placed on this planet who had to share the earth citizenship.
with others. Migratory movements are sites of imperfect jus-
Even though morally the right to hospitality is tice in that they bring into play the individual right
an individual right, the socioeconomic and cultural to freedom of movement, the universal right to hos-
causes of migrations are for the most part collective. pitality and the right of collectives to self-government
Migrations occur because of economic, environmen- as well as specific associative moral obligations. These
tal, cultural and historical "push" and "pull" factors. rights cannot always be easily reconciled. Further-
UWe are here," say migrants, "because in effect you more, international law does not as yet recognize a
were there." uWe did not cross the border; the border "human right to citizenship" for migrants, and con-
crossed us." siders this a sovereign prerogative of individual states.
We do have special obligations to our neighbors, Nonetheless, the responsible politician is the one
as opposed to moral obligations to humanity at large, who acts with a lucid understanding of the neceSSity
if, for example, our economy has devastated theirs; if to balance these principles rather than giving in to a
our industrial output has led to environmental harm punitive rigorism that would deny, in Thomas Jeffer-
or if our drug dependency has encouraged the forma- son's words, "the right which nature has given to all
tion of transnational drug cartels. men of departing from [and I would add, from join-
These claims of interdependence require a third ing with] the country in which chance, not choice has
moral principle-in addition to the right of univer- placed them" (1774).
sal hospitality and the right to self-government-to Whether or not President Obama considered all
be brought into consideration: associative obligations these moral aspects of the matter, his handling of
among peoples arising through historical factors. this issue shows that he acted as a uresponsible politi-
States cannot ignore such associative obligations. cian," and not opportunistically as some of his critics
Migration poliCies, though they are often couched charged. It was Uthe right thing to do."
Selecting Immigrants
DAVID MILLER
In the developed liberal democracies today, the immi- shape their immigration policies in the light of their
gration issue has become intractable as a result of overall national goals and priorities, whether these are
three conflicting pressures. The first is the increasing economic, cultural, environmental, humanitarian etc.
number of people from developing countries who An important aspect of national self-determination is
wish to enter, whether to escape poverty or civil war or deciding who is going to form part of the 'self in future.
simply to improve their material prospects. Polling by The third is that this right of self-determination is nev-
Gallup, for example, suggests that 38% of those living ertheless limited by what I call 'the weak cosmopoli-
in Sub-Saharan Africa and 21% of those living in the tan premise', according to which all human beings are
Middle East and North Africa would prefer to migrate equally entitled to moral consideration when agents
permanently. 1 The second is the increasing reluctance (whether states or individual people) decide how to act
of citizens within those societies to accept large num- towards them. This means in particular that a prospec-
bers of incoming migrants. In the UK, for example, an tive migrant seeking to enter must have her claim con-
opinion poll in late 2013 found that 80% of those who sidered, and if it is denied she must be presented with
were asked thought that current levels of net inward reasonable grounds for refusal. 6
migration were too high, 85% thought that immi- Selecting between potential immigrants is jus-
gration was putting too much pressure on public ser- tifiable, therefore, but how should it be done? There
vices such as schools, hospitals and housing, and 64% are two dimensions that we need to consider: the
thought that over the last decade immigration had first is the inherent nature of the claim to enter that
not been good for British society as a whole. 2 Broadly the immigrant is making; the second is the nature
the same picture holds across Europe. 3 The third is the of the connection (if any) that already exists between
diminished capacity of governments to control immi- the immigrant and the receiving state. On one dimen-
gration flows by means that are judged acceptable by Sion, we have the familiar distinction between refu-
international law and opinion. Even setting aside the gees and economic migrants, where refugees are those
special case of the EU with its principle of internal whose claim is based on the threat to their human
free movement, the prevailing human rights culture rights created by remaining in their current state of
stays the hand of governments who seek peremptorily residence, and economic migrants are all those who
either to prevent unwanted immigrants from entering have an interest in moving to a new society, whether
or to deport them once they have gained a foothold to study, to find work, or to pursue some personal proj-
inside. ect, but who cannot cite a threat to their human rights
Under these circumstances, developing a defen- as grounds for admission. On the second dimension,
sible policy for selecting which immigrants to admit, there are those who qualify as what I call 'particularity
and on what terms, becomes a priority. In sketching claimants' and those who do not. Particularity claim-
the outlines of such a policy, I make three assumptions, ants are people who assert that one particular state
which I shall not defend here (though I have done so owes them admission by virtue of what has happened
elsewhere4 ). The first is that there is no human right to in the past. A clear case would be one in which a group
immigrate: the simple fact of being refused entry by a of people have been led to believe that they had a
state does not, in itself, violate anyone's human rights. s right to immigrate should their circumstances require
The second is that democratic states can legitimately 7
it. Another example would be people who have per-
formed some service for the state, and claim now that
David Miller, "Selecting Immigrants," CSSJ Working Paper Series, being allowed to immigrate is the appropriate form
SJ034, April 2015. Reprinted by permission of the author. of recompense. 8 Particularity claimants might also
be refugees or economic migrants, but what distin- there may justifiably be selection among those who
guishes them (and justifies the rather awkward label are claiming refugee status. First, it is a responsibility
I am applying to them) is that their claim is held that falls upon all states able to provide the necessary
against one particular state, whereas refugees and eco- refuge, and each state, therefore, is only required to
nomic migrants, although they have chosen to apply discharge its fair share of that responsibility. Ideally
in one place, might in many cases find that their rights this would be done by entering into an international
or interests were equally well served by being admitted scheme for placing refugees according to each state's
elsewhere. capacity to absorb them. 9 In the absence of such a
The distinctions I have drawn suggest two prior- scheme, it is permissible for states to enter into bilat-
ity rules that states should follow in selecting immi- eral or multilateral agreements whereby states who
grants: 1. Refugees as a category should have priority over receive more asylum applications that they are obliged
economic migrants; 2. Within each category, particularity to accept can pass asylum-seekers on to other places
claimants should have priority over others. The rationale willing to take them in, provided always that their
for the first rule is that states have an obligation to human rights will be adequately safeguarded in those
admit refugees (the nature and extent of which will places. Second, the obligation is an obligation to
be explored shortly) whereas they have no such obli- provide temporary sanctuary, and it only becomes
gation to admit economic migrants. The rationale an obligation to grant permanent residence in cases
for the second rule is that a state has more reason to where it becomes clear that the refugee has no realistic
acknowledge a claim that stems from an existing rela- prospect of returning safely to her own society within
tionship with the immigrant than one that is general a reasonable space of time.
in nature. This, however, does not yet settle whether On these assumptions, receiving states may have
a refugee without a particularity claim should always to select, among those who can prove their claim to
get precedence over an economic migrant who has refugee status, people they will take in themselves and
one. Consider the following case: suppose the UK others who they will pass on under one of the arrange-
Border Agency has (for some reason) to make a choice ments outlined above. So what grounds for selection
between two applicants for admission: a refugee from are permissible? Consider four possibilities: 1) The
South Sudan, who can credibly show that her life is in refugee's need for permanent settlement; 2) The causal
danger because she has been an outspoken critic of the role played by the receiving state in creating the situa-
regime, but who has no previous connection to the tion from which the refugee is escaping; 3) The likely
UK, and a young man from Iraq who worked as a trans- economic contribution of the refugee to the receiving
lator for the British Army during the Gulf War, but society; 4) The degree of cultural affinity between refu-
who can no longer find work (so he is poor but not yet gee and host political community.
in desperate straits). Who should be taken first? Well, 1) This seems a relevant consideration. Although
perhaps the Sudanese, since time is of the essence and the places to which refugees are transferred must be
she needs immediate help. But maybe she can claim human rights compliant, and this means that they
less than the Iraqi eventually: if the Agency has made provide all the opportunities that are needed to live
an arrangement for refugees from Sudan to be accom- a decent human life and not just food, shelter and
modated in neighbouring Kenya, that may offer suffi- the other immediate necessities, under the kind of
cient protection for her human rights. The Iraqi man, arrangement envisaged (realistically one in which
on the other hand, may have a desert claim that can rich developed states pass on a proportion of those
only be redeemed if he is provided with the opportu- who apply for asylum to less developed countries)
nities that come with being allowed into Britain. there will inevitably be less assurance that the same
In presenting this case as a test of our moral intu- opportunities will continue to be available far into
itions, I have already assumed that the obligation to the future. This matters less if the stay is only going to
accept refugees is not unlimited, and therefore that be temporary.
2) Consider next situations in which the state have been granted asylum elsewhere, and when they
to which the asylum-seeker applies is at least in part do so it is reasonable to take account of the refugee's
responsible for making her into a refugee. These prospective contribution. 12
will typically be cases in which it has intervened in 4) Can states select in favour of their cultural kin
her country of origin, creating conflicts between when deciding who to admit as refugees? The ratio-
national or ethnic groups that expose her to threats of nale for this is set out clearly by Carens, though it is
persecution-for example the position of some Iraqi not so clear whether he accepts it himself:
Kurds after the Iraq war. The granting of asylum may
As an empirical matter, it is almost certainly the
then be viewed as a form of reparation. 10 This makes case that a state's willingness to take in refugees will
the refugee into a particularity claimant, and provides depend in part on the extent to which the current
grounds why she should be admitted to the state in population identifies with the refugees and their
question rather than to some other place-her repara- plight. Moreover, other things being equal, it will
tive claim is a claim against that state in particular, and be easier for the refugees themselves to adapt to the
may not be satisfied by a promise of refuge somewhere new society and for the receiving society to include
else (this will depend on the extent of her loss). As them, the more the refugees resemble the existing
Souter argues, refugees' choices about where to claim population with respect to language, culture, religion,
asylum gain additional significance in these circum- history, and so on. 13
stances: 'after causing or contributing to their dis- To take a concrete example, the wars in Syria and
placement, heeding refugees' wishes is the least that Iraq in 2014 led to calls in some quarters for tradition-
responsible states can do'. 11 Indeed they may be able to ally Christian countries such as the UK to give priority
claim not just temporary asylum but permanent resi- to Christian refugees escaping from these countries.
dence on reparative grounds. This was in justified in part on the grounds that Chris-
3) Many states choose which immigrants to tian families were undergoing particularly severe per-
accept by examining whether they bring special secution, but also on the grounds that Christian states
skills that will contribute to the economy. But can had special obligations to people who shared their
this criterion also be used, legitimately, when decid- national religion. The first part of this claim is clearly
ing which asylum-seekers to admit? Keeping in mind relevant, but what about the second?
that the refugee's claim is based on the threat to his Such an argument from common culture seems
human rights, not on his potential contribution, it hard to defend, unless it can be presented as a way of
might seem arbitrary to give him any kind of prior- dividing responsibilities between states. In the IraqI
ity on this basis. Certainly it would be unacceptable Syria case it was claimed that Muslim refugees would
if the asylum claim itself were to be assessed more be more likely to be offered sanctuary by neighbour-
generously in the case of those who were seen as having Islamic states such as]ordan. Assuming this is true,
ing valuable skills. But assume that the latter claim and that states more generally are inclined to give pre-
is assessed strictly on the grounds of the seriousness cedence to those who share their citizens' cultural or
of the threat to the asylum-seeker's human rights, religious values, then it would be justifiable for each
could productive skill nevertheless count at the sec- state to take this into account. But without such a
ond stage, when deciding whether asylum is offered background, and considering the nature of the obliga-
in the state of first entry or somewhere else? I believe tion towards refugees, cultural selection does not seem
this would be legitimate only in cases where the defensible.
state is offering something more than asylum to the I turn now to selection criteria for immigrants
refugee-when it is offering permanent resettlement who make no claim to refugee status-'economic
to someone who does not automatically qualify for migrants' in the broad sense. Since states have dis-
it. States are surely permitted to do this, in the same cretion over whether to admit such immigrants in
way that they can offer resettlement to refugees who the first place, it might seem that they have carte
blanche as to whom they select, even if this means excluded candidates for admission, and this seems to
choosing on grounds of race or national origin put the emphasis in the wrong place.
(such as occurred with the notorious 'White Aus- Although an economic migrant cannot assert a
tralia' policy of the 1920s and 1930s). How can we right to be admitted, she does typically have a strong
show that this does not follow? It might appear to claim, based on how her interests will be advanced by
be ruled out by the human right against discrimi- moving-for example through working in a differ-
nation. But on closer inspection this turns out to be ent kind of job, or for a much higher wage, than she
too weak an instrument, since there are contexts in could hope to obtain at home. According to the weak
which it seems perfectly permissible to discriminate cosmopolitan premise stipulated above, to turn down
on grounds, for example, of gender, language, or reli- such a claim without giving relevant reasons for the
gion. It isn't a breach of human rights if a political refusal is to show disrespect for the person making it.
party decides to draw up an all-women short list to It is to treat her as though she were of no moral signifi-
select its candidate in a particular constituency, if a cance. This extends also to the selection of immigrants
public broadcaster chooses only among those able to from the pool of applicants. It is not sufficient merely
read the news in Welsh, or a church confines mem- to put forward the general reasons in favour of immi-
bership to those who belong to its own faith. So the gration controls. If John is going to be granted entry
human right against discrimination must be inter- while Jaime is turned away, the latter must be offered
preted as prohibiting discrimination on grounds relevant reasons for his unequal treatment.
that are irrelevant to the right or benefit being allocated. This appeal to weak cosmopolitanism explains
Those who in the past defended selecting immigrants why the state is not entitled to use merely arbitrary
by race or national origin thought that they could methods in choosing which immigrants to admit,
justify using these criteria by appeal to the need to but it does not yet settle which reasons should count
preserve the 'character' or 'moral health' of their in making the selection, and so far, therefore, does not
societies. To defeat these arguments requires show- explain what is wrong about using race, ethnicity, and
ing that such claims are either false, or irrelevant, for other such criteria. One way to narrow down the list
substantive reasons. is to say that the reasons must be ones that the immi-
An initially more promising avenue is to argue grants themselves can accept. It is obvious enough that
that selecting immigrants on grounds such as race no immigrant will regard her own skin colour as legiti-
or religion is an injustice to some existing citizens, mate grounds for exclusion. But a problem then arises
namely those who belong to the group or groups that in cases where the receiving state and the prospective
the immigration policy disfavours. 14 By discriminat- immigrant hold different views about what should
ing in this way, the state appears to be labelling these count as relevant. Suppose, for example, that a state
people as second-class citizens. As Michael Blake decides to admit only high-skilled immigrants on the
has put the pOint, 'the state making a statement of grounds that it has a greater economic need for these
racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a than for low-skilled workers. An immigrant without
statement of racial preference domestically as weIl'.15 the relevant skills might reject this on the grounds that
This will often provide states with strong reasons he (and others like him) deserves a chance to improve
not to pursue discriminatory admissions policies, his condition. So it is asking too much to say that the
but a limitation of this approach is that it would not reasons the state gives must also be ones that the immi-
apply to a state that was already religiously or ethni- grants can accept (if 'can accept' means 'will in fact
cally homogeneous and whose members wished it accept once these reasons are explained'). Instead the
to remain SO.16 Notice also that the argument hinges relevant condition is that the reasons the state gives for
upon the injustice that is done to existing citizens its selective admissions policy must be good reasons,
whose status is lowered by the discriminatory pol- reasons that the immigrants ought to accept given the
icy, not on any wrong that is done specifically to the general aims of the policy. 17
A more difficult question is whether it can be and has enacted multicultural policies (e.g. Canada),
justifiable to select in favour of those who already have and cases in which it is more culturally homoge-
the political or cultural attributes that will enable them neous (e.g. Japan): the issue becomes more pressing
to fit more easily into the society they are joining. Con- in the latter circumstances. Immigrants who speak
sider political attributes first: can liberal democracies a different language, practise a different religion, or
choose immigrants who have already demonstrated have a different lifestyle from the majority may pose
their democratic credentials as opposed to those who two kinds of problems. The first is simply the cost of
espouse other political values, assuming that this can incorporating them into the host society on terms
be reliably established? Most commentators, includ- of equality. There will, for example, be the cost of
ing strong liberals such as Carens, agree that states translating public documents into a new language or
may exclude people who pose a threat to national of providing translators in courts and social service
security by virtue of the beliefs that they hold, such agencies; or if religion is the source of the division,
as those liable to engage in terrorist acts. IS But in such the cost of accommodating religiOUS practices where
cases it is the disposition to act, rather than the beliefs these impose different requirements on believers
themselves, that forms the reason for exclusion. What outside of the mainstream. Some of these costs can
about those whose political beliefs are such that they be passed to the immigrants themselves, but others
do not acknowledge the authority of the state they will be borne by the state, and indirectly, therefore,
wish to join, even though they have no intention of by citizens at large.
sabotaging it by violent or other means? All states, not There are of course likely to be compensating ben-
least liberal states, depend on their members comply- efits that come with increasing cultural diversity. The
ing voluntarily with their laws most of the time, and point is simply that if we look at (economic) immigra-
presumably a belief in the state's legitimacy is one of tion as a practice that is governed by the logic of mutual
the main sources of compliance. Someone who lacks advantage, both costs and benefits need to be factored
that belief may keep the law for other reasons (pru- in when considering selection policy. Some of the costs
dence, respect for the rights of others) but is likely to mayonlybeapparentwithhindsight,asitbecomesclear
be less reliable in carrying out her duties as a citizen. So what the equal treatment of minority cultures actually
there is some reason for favouring already committed requires. This also applies to the second potential prob-
democrats when choosing immigrants. On the other lem. Culture is not only a matter of belief or of prac-
hand, liberal democracies do not require all of their tice, but also of personal identity. This raises a concern
existing citizens to sign up personally to their found- about the way in which culture can come to constitute
ing principles: they are prepared to tolerate anarchists, a line of fracture within a political community, possibly
fascists and others, leaving them free to express their leading to the formation of 'parallel societies', whose
beliefs and to attempt to persuade others of their members have very little contact with those beyond
correctness within the limits of the law. On balance, their own community; and also a concern about the
then, selection on political grounds would be justifi- effects of cultural diversity on social trust, and through
able only in cases where illiberal or anti-democratic that on people's willingness to support welfare states
immigrants were applying in sufficient numbers that and other instruments of social justice. These are by
their presence would create social conflicts or disrupt no means inevitable consequences of admitting immi-
the working of democratic institutions. 19 grants with cultural backgrounds different from those
The argument that can be made for cultural selec- of the majority, but they are possible consequences, and
tion raises different questions. We are contemplating avoiding them may again prove to be somewhat costly,
here immigrant groups whose cultural affiliations this time in the form of support for active integration
are different from those of the majority of existing programmes. This is the point at which the state's exist-
citizens-though we should also distinguish between ing cultural character becomes important: a state that
cases where the existing state is already multicultural is already well-equipped with multicultural policies can
l.
more easily tackle these problems than one that is not. Political Philosophy of Immigratio11 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
There is, however, no independent requirement that a University Press, 2016).
state should embrace multiculturalism prior to decid- 5. In some cases, however, it might lead to a violation of that
ing upon its admission policy. Democracies are entitled person's human rights: the distinction is important.
to decide how far they wish to protect their inherited 6. Someone might ask why, if there is no human right to
national cultures, and how far to encourage cultural immigrate, states have to justify their refusal to those they
diversity within their borders. exclude. But compare applicants for a job: no-one has a right
To sum up, selective immigration requires that to that job, but they are nonetheless entitled to be selected by
states give reasons for the policies they apply, and a fair procedure, and to be given reasons for why they were
these reasons must relate to the legitimate purposes not chosen.
of the state itself, as manifested in its other policy 7. For example the Ugandan Asians who held British passports
decisions. Selection on economic grounds is the least but whose right to immigrate was abruptly removed by the
controversial example, but other forms of positive dis- Immigration Act of 1971. When Idi Amin came to power and
crimination cannot be ruled out: if a society wants to threatened to expel them at short notice, the British Govern-
enhance its sporting reputation, for example, I can- ment recognized its obligation and allowed them to enter. The
episode is described in R. Winder, Bloody Foreigners: Tile Story
not see why it should not seek to attract immigrants
ofImmigration to Britain (London: Little Brown, 2004), ch. 22.
who will later qualify for the national teams. Giving
reasons of this kind shows suffiCient respect for those 8. Consider the case of the Nepalese Ghurkhas who, after
who are refused entry, disappointed though they serving in the British Army, have sought the right to reside
in Britain after retiring. This right was granted to them by a
may be. Recall that the later part of the discussion
High Court decision in 2008. According to the actress Joanna
relates only to economic migrants. Where refugees are
Lumley who spearheaded their campaign, 'The whole cam-
concerned, there is much less scope for selecting on paign has been based on the belief that those who have fought
grounds other than the refugee's own need for sanctu- and been prepared to die for our country should have the right
ary and the opportunity for a decent life. to live in our country' (http://www.gurkhajustice.org.uk/).
9. There is a substantial literature on refugee burden-sharing
NOTES schemes, and the criteria that might be used to judge each
1. N. Esipova, J. Ray, and R. Srinivasan, The World's Potential state's quota. For a helpful review, see T. Kritzman-Amir, 'Not
Migrants: Who They Are, Where They Want to Go, and Why It in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in
Matters (Gallup Inc., 2010-2011). Overall, 40% of those living Refugee Law', Brooklyn/oumal of International Law, 34 (2009),
in the poorest quartile of countries have expressed a wish to Part III.
migrate-see P. Collier, Exodus: Immigration and Multicultural- 10. See J. Souter, 'Towards a Theory of Asylum as Reparation
ism in the 21st Century (London: Allen Lane, 2013) p. 167. for Past Injustice', Political Studies, 62 (2014), 326-42 who
2. See http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/HI_UK_News provides a detailed analysis of the conditions under which
_Daily_Mail_PolI-Nov13.pdf. asylum claims of this kind are valid.
3. See E. Iversflaten, 'Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive 11. Souter, 'Asylum as Reparation for Past Injustice',
asylum and immigration poliCies appeal to western Europe- pp.335-36.
ans', /oumal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 15 (2005), 12. Could those who are moved elsewhere under a burden-
21-45. sharing arrangement complain about the unequal treatment
4. For shorter defences, see D. Miller, 'Immigration: the case they are receiving? I do not think so. The important point is
for limits' in A. Cohen and C. Wellman (eds.), Contemporary that they are treated equally at the point at which their claim
Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); D. Miller, to asylum is assessed, and thereafter in ways that respect their
lIs there a Human Right to Immigrate?' in S. Fine and L. Ypi human rights. That the state does more for some refugees
(eds.), Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and than it is obliged to do is not an injustice to the others.
MemberShip (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). My most 13. J. Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (New York: oxford
complete treatment is D. Miller, Strangers in Our Midst: The University Press, 2013), p. 214.
14. It is followed in]. Carens, 'Who Should Get In? The Ethics Martin Robertson, 1983, pp. 35-51) and the discussion in
of Immigration Admissions', Ethics and International Affairs, Blake, 'Immigration'.
17 (2003), 95-110, and at greater length in M. Blake, 'Dis- 17. A rather similar position is taken in Blake, 'Immigration and
cretionary Immigration', Philosophical Topics 30 (2002), Political Equality', where it is formulated in the language of
273-89, and M. Blake, 'Immigration', in R. Frey and C. Well- 'reasons that immigrants could not reasonably reject' (p. 971).
man (eds.), A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell,
18. Carens, The Ethics ofImmigration, ch. 9.
2003). I also used the argument in an earlier discussion: D.
Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: 19. As Carens puts it 'the problem is not with any single immi-
Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 8. grant's views, but with the collective effect of ideas hostile to
democracy' (Carens, The Ethics ofImmigration, p. 176).
15. M. Blake, 'Discretionary Immigration', p. 284.
16. This is conceded by Blake in Blake, 'Discretionary Immi-
gration', p. 285. See also M. Walzer, Spheres oflustice (Oxford:
From Immigration and Freedom of Association

CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN
In this article I appeal to freedom of association to I. THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO CLOSED
defend a state's right to control immigration over its BORDERS
territorial borders. Without denying that those of us To appreciate the presumptive case in favor of a state's
in wealthy societies may have extremely demand- right to control its borders that can be built upon
ing duties of global distributive justice, I ultimately the right to freedom of association, notice both that
reach the stark conclusion that every legitimate state (1) freedom of association is widely thought to be
has the right to close its doors to all potential immi- important and that (2) it includes the right not to asso-
grants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum ciate and even, in many cases, the right to disassociate.
from incompetent or corrupt political regimes that
That freedom of association is highly valued is
are either unable or unwilling to protect their citi-
evident from our views on marriage and religion. In
zens' basic moral rights.
the past, it was thought appropriate for one's father to
This article is divided into four sections. First,
select one's marital partner or for one's state to deter-
I argue for a presumptive case in favor of a state's
mine the religion one practiced, but, thankfully, those
right to limit immigration as an instance of its more
times have (largely) passed. Today, virtually everyone
general right to freedom of association. In the sec-
agrees that we are entitled to marital and religiOUS
ond and third sections, I respond to egalitarian
freedom of association; we take it for granted that each
and libertarian cases for open borders. Finally, in
individual has a right to choose his or her marital part-
the fourth section, I consider the permissibility of
ner and the associates with whom he or she practices
screening immigrants based upon their race, ethnic-
his or her religion. Put plainly, among our most firmly
ity or religion.
settled convictions is the belief that each of us enjoys a
morally privileged position of dominion over our self-
Christopher Heath Wellman, "Immigration and Freedom of
regarding affairs, a position which entitles us to free-
Association," Ethics 119 (October 2008), 109-41. © 2008 by The dom of association in the marital and religiOUS realms.
University of Chicago. Reprinted by permission of The University Second, notice that freedom of association includes
of Chicago Press. a right to reject a potential association and (often) a
right to disassociate. As Stuart White explains: "Free- differences might explain why only individuals can
dom of association is widely seen as one of those basic have a right to self-determination. Second, even if it
freedoms which is fundamental to a genuinely free is possible for groups to have rights, presumably the
society. With the freedom to associate, however, there interests a group of citizens might have in control-
comes the freedom to refuse association. When a group ling immigration are nowhere near as important as an
of people get together to form an association of some individual's interest in having a decisive say regarding
kind (e.g., a religious association, a trade union, a sports who he or she marries. Let us consider these two issues
club), they will frequently wish to exclude some people in turn.
from joining their association. What makes it their asso- In response to concerns about the differences
ciation, serving their purposes, is that they can exercise between individuals and groups, let me begin by high-
this 'right to exclude.' ,,1 lighting some commonly held convictions which
In the case of matrimony, for instance, this free- illustrate that we typically posit at least a presump-
dom involves more than merely having the right to tive group right to freedom of association. Think,
get married. One fully enjoys freedom of association for instance, of the controversy that has surrounded
only if one may choose whether or not to marry a groups like the Boy Scouts of America or the Augusta
second party who would have one as a partner. Thus, National Golf Club, both of which have faced con-
one must not only be permitted to marry a willing siderable public pressure and even legal challenges
partner whom one accepts; one must also have the disregarding their rights to freedom of association.
cretion to reject the proposal of any given suitor and In particular, some have contested the Boy Scouts'
even to remain single indefinitely if one so chooses. right to exclude homosexuals and atheists, while
As David Gauthier puts it, "I may have the right to others have criticized Augusta National's exclusion of
choose the woman of my choice who also chooses women. 3 These cases raise a number of thorny issues.
me, but not the woman of my choice who rejects We need not adjudicate either of these conflicts here,
me.,,2 We understand religious self-determination however, because the requisite point for our purposes
similarly: whether, how, and with whom I attend to is a minimal one. Specifically, notice that even those
my humanity is up to me as an individual. If I elect who insist that the Boy Scouts should be legally forced
to explore my religious nature in community with to include gays and atheists or that Augusta National
others, I have no duty to do so with anyone in par- cannot justify their continued exclusion of women
ticular, and I have no right to force others to allow me typically concede that there are weighty reasons in
to join them in worship. favor of allowing these groups to determine their own
In light of our views on marriage and religious membership. That is, even activists lobbying for inter-
self-determination, the case for a state's right to convention usually acknowledge that there are reasons to
trol immigration might seem straight-forward: just as respect these groups' rights to autonomy; the activists
an individual has a right to determine whom (if any- claim only that the prima facie case in favor of group
one) he or she would like to marry, a group of fellow- self-determination is liable to be outweighed in suffi-
citizens has a right to determine whom (if anyone) it ciently compelling instances (e.g., when society as a
would like to invite into its political community. And whole discriminates against women or privileges the-
just as an individual's freedom of association entitles ism and heterosexuality over atheism and homosexu-
one to remain single, a state's freedom of association ality). The key pOint, of course, is that questioning
entitles it to exclude all foreigners from its political Augusta National's group right to determine its own
community. There are at least two reasons that this membership does not require one to deny that groupS
inference from an individual's to a state's right to free- have a presumptive right to freedom of association
dom of association might strike some as problematic, because one could simply assert that this presumptive
however. First, presumably there are morally relevant right is vulnerable to being overridden. And because
differences between individuals and groups, and these I seek at this stage to defend only a presumptive case
.:~
in favor of a state's right to control its own borders, it permissible for the United States to forcibly annex
is enough to note how uncontroversial it is to posit a Canada? I assume without argument that, even if the
group's right to freedom of association. United States could execute this unilateral merger
There is still room to question my slide from an without disrupting the peace or violating the indi-
individual's to a state's right to freedom of association, vidual rights of any Canadians, this hostile takeover
however, because, unlike the Boy Scouts and the would be impermissible. The crucial point for our
Augusta National Golf Club, political states do not purposes is that one cannot explain the wrongness of
owe their membership to the autonomous choices unilateral annexations like this unless one supposes
of their constituents. The nonvoluntary nature of that countries like Canada enjoy a right to autonomy,
political states can raise complex problems for those a right which accords Canadians the freedom to asso-
who would defend a state's right to political self- ciate with others as they see fit. s
determination (problems I address at length else- If the analysis to this point has been sound, then
where), but here I would like merely to highlight there is no reason to doubt that groups, even politi-
some of the unpalatable implications that follow cal states, can have rights to autonomy analogous to
from denying a country's right to freedom of associa- those enjoyed by individuals. Even if one agrees that
tion. 4 In particular, consider the moral dynamics of legitimate states can have rights to self-determination,
regional associations like the North American Free though, one might still question the argument
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union (EU). sketched above on the grounds that the intimacy of
If legitimate states did not enjoy a right to freedom of marriage makes freedom of association immeasurably
association-a right which entitles them to decline more important in the marital context than in the
invitations to associate with others-then they would political realm. After all, in the vast majority of cases,
not be in a position to either accept or reject the terms fellow citizens will never even meet one another. On
of these regional associations. Think of Canada's this point, consider Stuart White's contention that
choice to join NAFTA, or Slovenia's decision to enter ((if the formation of a specific association is essential
the EU, for instance. No one believes that it would be to the individual's ability to exercise properly his/
permissible to force Canada into NAFTA or to coerce her liberties of conscience and expression, or to his/
Slovenia to join the EU. (Of course, nor may Canada her ability to form and enjoy intimate attachments, then
or Slovenia unilaterally insert themselves into these exclusion rules which are genuinely necessary to
associations!) And the reason it is wrong to forcibly protect the association's primary purposes have an
include these countries is because Canada's and Slove- especially strong presumption of legitimacy.,,6 Trans-
nia's rights to self-determination entitle them to asso- posing White's reasoning, one might insist that, since
ciate (or not) with other countries as they see fit. Put there is no intimacy among compatriots, it is not at all
plainly, if one denies that legitimate states like Canada clear why we need to respect freedom of association
and Slovenia have a right to freedom of association, for groups of citizens. 7
one could not explain why they would be righteously I concede that freedom of association is much
aggrieved at being forced into these mergers. more important for individuals in the marital con-
Indeed, there would be even more awkward impli- text than for groups of citizens in the political realm,
cations because, without positing a right to freedom but my argument does not rely upon these two types
of association, we could not satisfactorily explain of freedom of association being equally important.
what is wrong with one country forcibly annexing Notice, for instance, that being able to choose the
another. Imagine, for instance, that a series of plebi- associates with whom one worships is also less impor-
scites revealed both that an overwhelming major- tant than having discretion over one's marital part-
ity of Americans wanted to merge with Canada and ner, but no one concludes from this that we need not
that an equally high proportion of Canadians pre- respect freedom of association in the religiOUS realm.
ferred to maintain their independence. Would it be It is important to recognize that I seek at this stage to
establish only that there is a prima facie case in favor dramatically increase the number of members, for
of each legitimate state's right to control immigration instance, because the increased numbers will mean
(it will be the burden of the remainder of this article that each individual is required to pay less. Other
to show that competing considerations are not as members might oppose expanding the membership
weighty as one might think). Nonetheless,let me say a because of concerns about the difficulty of securing
bit more about this presumptive case. desirable tee times, the wear and tear on the course,
In my view, autonomous individuals and legiti- and the increased time it takes to playa round if there
mate states both have rights to autonomy. This means are more people on the course at any given time.
that they occupy morally privileged positions of And if there is nothing mysteriOUS about people
dominion over their self-regarding affairs. Such a posi- caring about who are (or could become) members of
tion can be outweighed by sufficiently compelling con- their golf clubs, there is certainly nothing irrational
siderations, of course, but in general people and states about people being heavily invested in their country's
have a right to order their own affairs as they please. immigration policy. Again, to note the lack of intimacy
Freedom of association is not something that requires among compatriots is to miss an important part of the
an elaborate justification, then, since it is simply one story. It is no good to tell citizens that they need not
component of the self-determination which is owed to personally (let alone intimately) associate with any
all autonomous individuals and legitimate states. As a fellow citizens they happen to dislike because fellow
consequence, I think that there is a very natural and citizens nonetheless remain political associates; the
straightforward case to be made in favor of freedom of country's course will be charted by the members of
association in all realms. Just as one need not explain this civic association. The point is that people rightly
how playing golf is inextricably related to the devel- care very deeply about their countries, and, as a con-
opment of one's moral personality, say, in order to sequence, they rightly care about those policies which
justify one's right to play golf, neither must one show will effect how these political communities evolve. And
that one's membership in a golf club is crucial to one's since a country's immigration policy affects who will
basic interests to establish the club members' right share in controlling the country's future, it is a matter
to freedom of association. And if no one doubts that of considerable importance.
golf clubs have a presumptive right to exclude others, These examples of the golf club and the political
then there seems no reason to suspect that a group of state point toward a more general lesson that is worth
citizens cannot also have the right to freedom of asso- emphasizing: because the members of a group can
ciation, even if control over membership in a country change, an important part of group self-determination
is not nearly as Significant as control regarding one's is having control over what the uself" is. In other
potential spouse. words, unlike individual self-determination, a sig-
What is more, for several reasons it seems clear nificant component of group self-determination is
that control over membership in one's state is having control over the group which in turn gets to
extremely important. To see this, think about why be self-determining. It stands to reason, then, that if
people might care about the membership rules for there is any group whose self-determination we care
their golf club. It is tempting to think that club mem- about, we should be concerned about its rules for
bers would be irrational to care about who else are (or membership. This explains why freedom of associa-
could become) members; after all, they are not forced tion is such an integral part of the self-determination
to actually play golf with those members they dislike. to which some groups (including legitimate states) are
But this perspective misses something important. entitled. If so, then anyone who denies that we should
Members of golf clubs typically care about the mem- care about the freedom of association of nonintimate
bership rules because they care about how the club groups would seem to be committed to the more
is organized and the new members have a say in how sweeping claim that we should not care about the self-
the club is organized. Some members might want to determination of any nonintimate groups. But, unless
.. ~
one implausibly believes that we should care only to political states nor the fact that (2) freedom of asso-
about intimate groups, then why should we suppose ciation is much more important for individuals in
that only the self-determination of intimate groups the marital context than for groups of citizens in the
matters? Thus, people rightly care deeply about their political realm should lead us to abandon our initial
political states, despite these states being large, anon- comparison between marriage and immigration. As a
ymous, and multicultural, and, as a consequence, consequence, we have no reason to abandon the claim
people rightly care about the rules for gaining mem- that, like autonomous individuals, legitimate political
bership in these states. Or, put another way, the very regimes are entitled to a degree of self-determination,
same reasoning which understandably leads people to one important component of which is freedom of
jealously guard their state's sovereignty also motivates association. In sum, the conclusion initially offered
them to keep an eye on who can gain membership in only tentatively can now be endorsed with greater
this sovereign state. conviction: just as an individual has a right to deter-
A second, less obvious, reason to care about immi- mine whom (if anyone) he or she would like to marry,
gration policy has to do with one's duties of distribu- a group of fellow-citizens has a right to determine
tive justice. As I will argue in the next section, it seems whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its politi-
reasonable to think that we have special distributive cal community. And just as an individual's freedom of
responsibilities to our fellow citizens. If this is right, association entitles him or her to remain single, a state's
then in the same way that one might be reluctant freedom of association entitles it to exclude all foreign-
to form intimate relationships because of the moral ers from its political community.
freight attached, one might want to limit the number Before turning to the case against political
of people with whom one shares a morally significant freedom of association, I would like to highlight
political relationship. Thus, just as golf club members two features of the view I am advancing here: (1) I
can disagree about the costs and benefits of adding defend a deontological right to limit immigration
new members, some citizens might want to open the rather than a consequential account of what would
doors to new immigrants (e.g., in order to expand the be best, and (2) my view might be dubbed "univer-
labor force), while others would much rather forgo salist" rather than "particularist" insofar as it nei-
these advantages than incur special obligations to a ther suggests nor implies that only distinct nations,
greater number of people. cultures, or other "communities of character" are
Finally, rather than continue to list reasons why entitled to limit immigration.
citizens ought to care about issues of political member-
***
ship, let me merely point out that citizens tOday obvi-
ously do care passionately about immigration. I do not
insist that the current fervor over political member- II. THE EGALITARIAN CASE FOR OPEN
ship is entirely rational, but it is worth noting that BORDERS
anyone who submits that freedom of association in Egalitarians survey the vast inequalities among states
this context is of no real importance is committed to and then allege that it is horribly unjust that people
labeling all those who care about this issue as patently should have such dramatically different life prospects
irrational. Thus, even though the relationship among simply because they are born in different countries.
citizens does not involve the morally relevant intimacy The force of this view is not difficult to appreciate.
of that between marital partners, the considerations Given that one's country of birth is a function of brute
quickly canvassed above, as well as the behavior of luck, it seems grossly unfair that one's place of birth
actual citizens, indicate that we need not conclude would so profoundly affect one's life prospects. Some
that control over immigration is therefore of negligible believe that the solution is clear: political borders
significance. If so, then neither the observation that must be opened, so that no one is denied access to the
(1) individual persons are importantly disanalogous benefits of wealthy societies. Although he couches his
argument in terms of a principle of humanity rather understanding of equality does not require us to
than equality, Chandran Kukathas makes this point guarantee that no one's life prospects are affected by
particularly forcefully: "A principle of humanity sug- matters of luck; more minimally, equality demands
gests that very good reasons must be offered to jus- that we address those inequalities that render people
tify turning the disadvantaged away. It would be bad vulnerable to oppressive relationships. If this is cor-
enough to meet such people with indifference and to rect, then the particular theory of equality required
deny them positive assistance. It would be even worse to motivate the egalitarian case for open borders is
to deny them the opportunity to help themselves. suspect and should be rejected in favor of a theory of
To go to the length of denying one's fellow citizens relational equality. Second, even if luck egalitarianism
the right to help those who are badly off, whether by is the best theory of equality, it would not generate a
employing them or by simply taking them in, seems duty to leave borders open, because a wealthy state's
even more difficult to justify-if, indeed, it is not redistributive responsibilities can be discharged with-
entirely perverse."s out including the reCipients in the union. Consider
For several reasons, this case for open borders each of these responses in turn.
presents an especially imposing obstacle to the prima I should begin by acknowledging the obvious
facie case for the right to restrict immigration outlined appeal of luck egalitarianism. After all, it does seem
above. For starters, both its moral and empirical prem- unfair that some people's life prospects are dramati-
ises appear unexceptionable. How could one plausibly cally worse than others when neither the poorly off
deny either that all humans are in some fundamen- nor the well off did anything to deserve their initial
tal sense equally deserving of moral consideration or starting points. And it is hard to deny that the world
that the staggering inequalities across the globe dra- would be better if everyone enjoyed roughly equal
matically affect people's prospects for living a decent prospects for a rewarding life. It is important to recog-
life? Indeed, looked at from this perspective, sorting nize, though, that luck egalitarianism is not the only
humans according to the countries in which they game in town. In Political Philosophy, for instance, Jean
were born appears tantamount to a geographical caste Hampton recommends an approach she ascribes to
system. As Joseph Carens famously argues: "Citizen- Aristotle: "We want, he says, a society in which people
ship in Western liberal democracies is the modern treat each other as equals (no one should be allowed to
equivalent to feudal privilege-an inherited status be the master of another or the slave of another) and
that greatly enhances one's life chances. Like feudal in which these equals treat each other as partners-
birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to or 'civic friends.' The way to get that is to pursue not
justify when one thinks about it closely.,,9 What is exact equality of resources but sufficient equality to
more, notice that advocating this position does not ensure that no one is able to use his greater wealth to
require one to deny the importance of freedom of gain political advantage over others in a way that dam-
association: an egalitarian who presses this objection ages their partnership." 10
can agree that we should generally be free to choose Now, one might be struck by Hampton's sugges-
our aSSOCiates, as long as the resulting associations do tion that we need not pursue "exact" equality, but I
not lead to unjust arrangements. Thus, allowing states want to call attention to another, related feature of
to limit immigration is regarded as problematic on this her view: its relational nature. As Hampton empha-
view only because countries cannot enjoy this form of sizes, Aristotle is concerned with equality because
freedom of association without people's life prospects he sees it as necessary to sustain the desired relation-
being seriously affected by morally irrelevant matters, ships among fellow citizens. We need not concern
that is, factors entirely beyond their control. ourselves with securing exact equality, then, because
Despite the intuitive appeal of this line of rea- (political) relationships are not undermined by slight
soning, I will counter this objection with two argu- disparities in wealth; clearly, compatriots can interact
ments. First, I suggest that the most compelling as political equals even if some have more than others,
regardless of whether or not their unequal resources theory of equality. In my view, luck equality matters,
are deserved. but it matters considerably less than relational equal-
Others share Hampton's preference for relational ity. In other words, although I would not hesitate
theories of equality, but no one, to my knowledge, has to eliminate the inequality between the As and Bs if
better motivated this approach than Elizabeth Ander- I could do so by waving a magic wand, this inequal-
son. 11 Key to Anderson's defense of relational equality ity is not sufficiently worrisome that I would neces-
is the question: "What is the point of equality?" In her sarily interfere in the internal affairs of the As in order
view, answering this question reveals most clearly why to eliminate the inequality between them and the Bs.
relational theories are preferable to those which fix- However, because I am much more concerned about
ate on luck. The crucial point is that we should care the inequality among the Cs, I would be correspond-
about inequality principally to the extent that subor- ingly less reluctant to demand that the wealthy Cs
dinates are dominated in oppressive relationships. For take measures to ensure that the less well off Cs are not
this reason, Anderson insists that we should be "fun- entangled in oppressive relationships.
damentally concerned with the relationships within As a consequence, while I do not think that
which the goods are distributed, not only the distribu- there is nothing of moral consequence to be gained
tion of goods themselves.,,12 from realizing luck equality, I do accept a more mod-
To appreciate the force of this pOint, compare two est claim: even if achieving relational equality is
possible inequalities. The first exists between two soci- important enough to trump other values like free-
eties, A and B. Assume that everyone in A is equally dom of association, realizing luck equality is not
well off; everyone in B is doing equally poorly; and important enough to deny people their rights to self-
no one in either A or B knows anything of the other determination. And this more modest conclusion has
society's existence, since they are on opposite sides of important implications for the morality of immigra-
the earth and have never had any contact. The second tion. Most obviously, even if we would prefer a world
inequality mirrors the disparity between the As and Bs, with no inequality between the As and the Bs, elimi-
except that it exists within a single SOciety C. And nating this inequality is not important enough to jus-
because the Cs share a single political community, not tify limiting the As' right to freedom of association. In
only are they aware that others are faring considerably short, given that the moral importance of any particu-
better/worse but also their relationships are affected lar inequality is a function ofthe relationship in which
by these inequalities. I take it as uncontroversial that the goods are distributed, the lack of a robust rela-
the inequality among the Cs is much more worrisome tionship between the constituents of a wealthy state
than the same inequality between the As and Bs. In and the citizens of a poorer country implies that this
other words, whether or not we should care about the admittedly lamentable inequality does not generate
inequality between the As and Bs, clearly we should sufficient moral reasons to obligate the wealthy state
be much more concerned to eliminate the inequality to open its borders, even if nothing but luck explains
among the Cs. Based in part upon reasoning like this, why those living outside of the territorial borders have
Anderson concludes: "Negatively, people are entitled dramatically worse prospects of living a rewarding life.
to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable
***
them to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive
relationships. Positively, they are entitled to the capa-
bilities necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in III. THE LIBERTARIAN CASE
a democratic state."B FOR OPEN BORDERS
Arguments like Anderson's convince me that we To motivate the libertarian case· for open borders,
should be keenly aware of the relationships within Carens imagines the following scenario. "Suppose a
which the goods are distributed, but I stop short of farmer from the United States wanted to hire workers
concluding that relational equality is the one correct from Mexico. The government would have no right
to prohibit him from doing this. To prevent the Mexi- have priority in claiming the right to freedom of asso-
cans from coming would violate the rights of both the ciation, it is the individual, not the state.
American farmer and the Mexican workers to engage In response, I concede that there is a conflict
in voluntary transactions.,,14 As this example illus- between a state's sovereignty over its territory and an
trates, libertarian arguments against restricting immi- individual property owner's dominion over her land,
gration can take either of two forms, depending upon but in this case I am inclined to favor the claims of a
whether they focus on property rights or rights to free (duly limited) state. I am a staunch defender of indi-
movement. The former emphasizes the rights of those vidual self-determination, but the crucial point here is
within the state and contends that limiting immi- that one cannot conSistently insist that property rights
gration violates individual property owners' right to are totally unlimited without committing oneself to
invite foreigners to visit their private property. The lat- anarchism. This is because political states are function-
ter stresses the rights of foreigners, claiming that clos- ally incompatible with extending unlimited dominion
ing territorial borders wrongly restricts an individual's to their constituents. States must be sufficiently terri-
right to freedom of movement. torially contiguous in order to perform their requisite
According to the first type of argument, states functions, and achieving contiguity requires them to
may not limit immigration because doing so wrongly nonconsensually coerce all those within their territo-
restricts their constituents' rights to private property. rial borders. IS Thus, while it is perfectly intelligible to
The appeal of this idea is apparent: if a farmer owns claim that individual dominion should always take
a piece of property, then she occupies a pOSition of precedence over state sovereignty, one cannot main-
moral dominion over that land which gives her the tain this position without implicitly endorsing anar-
discretion to determine who may and who may not chism. To reiterate, effective political society would not
enter that land. If the farmer's government denies be possible unless some crucial decisions were made
foreigners access to its political territory, however, by the group as a whole, and (as this example of the
then it thereby effectively denies the farmer the right conflict between a state's controlling its territory and
to invite foreigners onto her land. Thus, since a state an individual controlling her land indicates) all areas
cannot limit immigration to its territory without also of group sovereignty imply a corresponding lack of
limiting its constituents' property rights, political individual dominion. In light of this, I suggest that, in
communities clearly are not morally entitled to con- the choice between unlimited property rights and the
trol who crosses their borders. anarchy it entails versus limited property rights and
It is worth nothing that this argument is not skep- the statism it allows, one should favor the latter.
tical of the moral importance of freedom of associa- Of course, one might eschew anarchism and still
tion; it merely questions why the state should get to suggest that individual property rights take prece-
enjoy this right when its doing so necessarily limits dence over a state's right to control its borders, but
the ability of its individual constituents to do so. In a this pOSition would require an additional argument
conflict between an individual's right versus a state's designed specifically to show why the individual should
right, a libertarian will typically argue that the indi- take precedence over the group in matters of freedom
vidual's right should take precedence. When the state of association. We should not presume in advance that
as a whole gets to limit immigration, however, its such an argument could not be furnished, but there are
doing so effectively curtails the rights of its citizens several reasons to be skeptical of this approach.
to unilaterally invite foreigners onto their land. And
because inviting others to join one on one's privately ***
owned land is one type of freedom of association, it is Although I think the preceding considerations
impossible to grant a state the right to control its bor- show why the libertarian is wrong to assume that the
ders without stripping property owners of their rights states right to freedom of association must give way
to freedom of association. So if either party should to individual property rights, I do think there is room
for an intermediate position that accommodates in a basic human freedoms. If freedom of movement within
principled way both associational and property rights, the state is so basic that it overrides the claims of local
giving each right its due. And this is important because political communities, on what grounds can we restrict
a state should not restrict individual dominion any freedom of movement across states?,,17 Thus, unless
more than is necessary. In particular, while I am skep- one is prepared to accept a state's right to deny either
tical that an individual has the right to invite foreign- emigration or internal migration, consistency appears
ers to live on her land indefinitely, I do not see why to demand that states not limit immigration either. IS
property owners may not invite outsiders to visit for My response to this second prong of the libertar-
limited periods. In fact, one need not even object to ian case for open borders is analogous to my argu-
a guest worker arrangement, as long as the worker ments above: I concede that there is a right to freedom
does not stay too long. 16 Indeed, this strikes me as an of movement, and I certainly believe that states must
appealing compromise, because allowing for these take great care not to violate the individual rights of
sponsored visits gives property owners greater domin- either constituents or foreigners, but I do not think
ion over their land than the status quo without creat- that the right to free movement is perfectly general
ing any additional imposition upon their compatriots and absolute. My right to freedom of movement
(since citizens are not obligated to extend the benefits does not entitle me to enter your house without
of political membership to those foreigners visiting your permission, for instance, so why think that this
for a limited amount of time). What is more, this solu- right gives me a valid claim to enter a foreign coun-
tion enables us to avoid the standard practical prob- try without that country's permission? Some might
lem of foreigners entering the country on a limited counter that this response essentially denies the right
visa and then staying indefinitely, because the state in question, but this is not so. No one says that I am
could require the property owner to be responsible denied my right to marriage merely because I cannot
(putting up collateral, perhaps) for all those she invites unilaterally choose to marry you against your will. So,
to visit. In the end, then, [ am inclined to conclude just as my freedom of association in the marital realm
that a property owner's dominion over her land might remains intact despite your right to not associate with
well entitle her to invite foreigners to visit her land but me, there seems no reason why my right to freedom
that it would not justify a more sweeping curtailment of movement does not Similarly remain intact despite
of a state's right to control immigration into its terri- foreign states' retaining the right to exclude me. David
tory. And once we make room for this additional right Miller captures this point nicely:
for property owners, one gets a better sense of why the
remaining restrictions upon their dominion over their
The right of exit is a right held against a person's cur-
property is rarely terribly onerous. rent state of residence not to prevent her from leav-
At this stage a libertarian might concede all that ing the state (and perhaps aiding her in that endeavor
I have argued so far and still insist that states may not by, say, providing a passport). But it does not entail
restrict immigration, not because doing so unjustifiably an obligation on any other state to let that person in.
limits the property rights of its citizens but because it Obviously if no state were ever to grant entry rights to
violates foreigners' rights to freedom of movement. people who were not already its citizens, the right of
Surely each of us has a right to migrate as we please; if exit would have no value. But suppose that states are
not, then states would be justified prohibiting emigra- generally willing to consider entry applications from
tion or even free migration within the country. And just people who might want to migrate, and that most
people would get offers from at least one such state:
as our rights to freedom of movement allow us to leave
then the position as far as the right of exit goes is pret-
or travel within our country, they entitle us to enter ty much the same as with the right to marry, where
other countries as well. As Carens emphasizes: "No lib- by no means everyone is able to wed the partner they
eral state restricts internal mobility. Those states that would ideally like to have, but most have the opportu-
•
do restrict internal mobility are criticized for denying mty to marry someone. 19
What is more, there is no inconsistency in insist- race, religion or ethnicity? What if a country wanted to
ing upon freedom of emigration and internal migra- admit only whites, for instance ?22 This question is espe-
tion, on the one hand, and allowing states to restrict cially difficult, I think, because, if the state is genuinely
immigration, on the other hand. First and most at liberty to exclude everyone, how could an applicant
important, distinguishing between immigration and righteously complain about not being admitted? On
emigration makes perfect sense given that freedom of the other hand, most take it for granted that, even if a
association includes the option not to associate; one business is not required to hire anyone, it may not adopt
may unilaterally emigrate because one is never forced a policy to hire only whites. And if a company cannot
to associate with others, but one may not unilater- select employees in this way, presumably a state may
ally immigrate because neither are others required to not screen potential immigrants according to this type
associate with you. Second, as we have seen above, of criterion.
immigration is importantly different because, unlike Walzer explores this question in terms of "White
either emigration or internal migration, it can involve Australia," Australia's erstwhile policy to admit only
costs to those who must include you as an equal in whites. Walzer concludes that Australians would in
their political community.20 Third, a state that denies fact be permitted to admit only whites, but only if
emigration (or perhaps even one that denies internal they ceded a portion of their territory to those who
migration, for that matter) treats its citizens as tanta- needed it to survive. He writes: "Assuming, then, that
mount to political property insofar as it forces them there actually is superfluous land, the claim of neces-
to remain in the union, regardless of their preferences. sity would force a political community like that of
As unpleasant as it might be to be denied the right to White Australia to confront a radical choice. Its mem-
enter a country, on the other hand, this rejection no bers could yield land for the sake of homogeneity, or
more treats one like property than does a romantic they could give up homogeneity (agree to the creation
partner who declines one's marriage proposal. Thus, of a multiracial society) for the sake of the land. And
there appears to be nothing inconsistent about requir- those would be their only choices. White Australia
ing states to permit open emigration while simultane- could survive only as Little Australia.,,23 Thus, Walzer
ously allowing them to limit immigration. appears to believe that, while Australia was not at lib-
*** erty to simply turn its back upon needy nonwhites,
there is nothing inherently unjust about an immigra-
tion policy that discriminates based upon race.
IV. A QUESTION OF CRITERIA Miller diverges from Walzer on this question, argu-
ing that, even if the state is at liberty to exclude every-
In Who Are We? Samuel Huntington worries not only
one, it wrongs potential applicants for admission by
about the raw number of immigrants entering the
excluding them based on a category like race. As he
United States but is especially concerned that so many
puts it:
are from Mexico. 21 He views the United States as defined
not just in terms of its distinctive American creed but
also by its Anglo-Protestant culture. Thus, unless it more I have tried to hold a balance between the interest that
stringently limits the flow of Mexican immigrants, migrants have in entering the country they want to live
America will forever lose its distinctive-and distinctly in, and the interest that political communities having
(sic) in determining their own character. Although the
valuable-character. This provocative proposal raises a
first of these interests is not strong enough to justify
difficult and important question, a question to which a right of migration, it is still substantial, and so the
Walzer and Miller give two distinct answers, neither of immigrants who are refused entry are owed an expla-
which I find fully satisfying. Assuming that states have nation. To be told that they belong to the wrong race
the right to control who, if anyone, may enter their or sex (or have the wrong color) is insulting, given
territories, does it follow that a country may adopt a that these features do not connect to anything of
policy that explicitly excludes people based upon their real significance to the society they want to jOin. Even
J
tennis clubs are not entitled to discriminate among equal partners, someone might still question how an
applicants on grounds such as these. 24 immigration policy (which cannot evict any current
I must admit to being torn between these two views. citizens) could possibly affect any of a state's constitu-
I am tempted by Walzer's position because, as much ents. To see how such a policy might disrespect exist-
as I abhor racism, I believe that racist individuals can- ing Citizens, consider the analogous situation from
not permissibly be forced to marry someone (or adopt the familial context. Rather than focusing upon rac-
a child) outside of their race. And if the importance ists who are unwilling to marry outside of their race,
of freedom of association entitles racist individuals to imagine a family of two white parents with two chil-
marry exclusively within their race, why does it not sim- dren, one white and another black. (For the purposes
ilarly entitle racist citizens to exclude immigrants based of this thought-experiment, imagine that white par-
upon race? At the very least, one must explain why the ents sometimes gave birth to black children and vice
immigration case is dissimilar to the marital one. In the versa.) Now, imagine the parents announc~g that, as
end, though, I reject Walzer's position because I think much as they would love to have a third child, they
that such an explanation can be furnished. Yet I am also have decided against it for fear that she might be black.
not entirely persuaded by Miller's explanation. I take it as obvious how hurtful this announcement
As noted above, Miller suggests that a state may could be to the existing black child, even though the
not exclude immigrants based upon a category like decision not to have any additional children obviously
race because doing so wrongly insults applicants of the do.es not threaten his or her chances of coming into
rejected race. I am not sure that this account suffices, eXIstence. In light of this analogy, it is not difficult to
though. I do not doubt that the rejected applicants see how black Australians, for instance, might feel dis-
might feel horribly insulted, but I am not convinced respected by an immigration policy banning entry to
that they have a right not to be insulted in this way. By nonwhites. Even though this policy in and of itself in
analogy, I would expect a black person to be insulted no way threatens blacks with expulsion, it sends a clear
by a racist white who would never consider marrying message that, qua blacks, they are not equally valued
someone who is black, but I would not say that this as partners in the political union. As Blake comments:
black person has a right not to be insulted in this way. "Even if a hypothetical pure society could close the bor-
Because of these concerns, I would like to suggest an ders to preserve itself, a modern multi-ethnic democ-
alternative explanation as to why states may not limit racy could not do so without implicitly treating some
immigration according to racist criteria. 25 In doing so, individuals already present within the society as sec-
I will focus upon the rights of those already within the ond class citizens. Seeking to eliminate the presence of
political community rather than the rights of those a given group from your society by selective immigra-
who might want to enter. I shift the emphasis from for- tion is insulting to the members of that group already
eign immigrants to citizens of the state whose policy present.,,27 Thus, unless Australia were already com-
is in question because, given the relational theory of posed exclusively of white constituents (and no state
equality detailed above, it makes sense to presume that is completely homogenous), it would be impermissible
we may have responsibilities to our compatriots that to institute immigration policies designed to approxi-
we do not equally owe to foreigners. 26 In particular, we mate a "White Australia," not because such policies
have a special duty to respect our fellow citizens as might insult potential black immigrants (though no
equal partners in the political cooperative. With this doubt it WOUld) but because they would fail to treat
in mind, I suggest that a country may not institute an nonwhite Australians as equals. And because no state
immigration policy which excludes entry to members is completely without minorities who would be dis-
of a given race because such a policy would wrongly respected by an immigration policy which invoked
disrespect those citizens in the dispreferred category. racial/ethnic/religious categories, no state may exclude
Even if we assume that there is a special respon- potential immigrants on these types of criteria.
sibility not to treat one's compatriots as less than
***
What is more, there is no inconsistency in insist- race, religion or ethnicity? What if a country wanted to
ing upon freedom of emigration and internal migra- admit only whites, for instance ?22 This question is espe-
tion, on the one hand, and allowing states to restrict cially difficult, I think, because, if the state is genuinely
immigration, on the other hand. First and most at liberty to exclude everyone, how could an applicant
important, distinguishing between immigration and righteously complain about not being admitted? On
emigration makes perfect sense given that freedom of the other hand, most take it for granted that, even if a
association includes the option not to associate; one business is not required to hire anyone, it may not adopt
may unilaterally emigrate because one is never forced a policy to hire only whites. And if a company cannot
to associate with others, but one may not unilater- select employees in this way, presumably a state may
ally immigrate because neither are others required to not screen potential immigrants according to this type
associate with you. Second, as we have seen above, of criterion.
immigration is importantly different because, unlike Walzer explores this question in terms of "White
either emigration or internal migration, it can involve Australia," Australia's erstwhile policy to admit only
costs to those who must include you as an equal in whites. Walzer concludes that Australians would in
their political community.20 Third, a state that denies fact be permitted to admit only whites, but only if
emigration (or perhaps even one that denies internal they ceded a portion of their territory to those who
migration, for that matter) treats its citizens as tanta- needed it to survive. He writes: "Assuming, then, that
mount to political property insofar as it forces them there actually is superfluous land, the claim of neces-
to remain in the union, regardless of their preferences. sity would force a political community like that of
As unpleasant as it might be to be denied the right to White Australia to confront a radical choice. Its mem-
enter a country, on the other hand, this rejection no bers could yield land for the sake of homogeneity, or
more treats one like property than does a romantic they could give up homogeneity (agree to the creation
partner who declines one's marriage proposal. Thus, of a multiracial society) for the sake of the land. And
there appears to be nothing inconsistent about requir- those would be their only choices. White Australia
ing states to permit open emigration while simultane- could survive only as Little Australia.,,23 Thus, Walzer
ously allowing them to limit immigration. appears to believe that, while Australia was not at lib-
*** erty to simply turn its back upon needy nonwhites,
there is nothing inherently unjust about an immigra-
tion policy that discriminates based upon race.
IV. A QUESTION OF CRITERIA Miller diverges from Walzer on this question, argu-
ing that, even if the state is at liberty to exclude every-
In Who Are We? Samuel Huntington worries not only
one, it wrongs potential applicants for admission by
about the raw number of immigrants entering the
excluding them based on a category like race. As he
United States but is especially concerned that so many
puts it:
are from Mexico. 21 He views the United States as defined
not just in terms of its distinctive American creed but
also by its Anglo-Protestant culture. Thus, unless it more I have tried to hold a balance between the interest that
stringently limits the flow of Mexican immigrants, migrants have in entering the country they want to live
in, and the interest that political communities having
America will forever lose its distinctive-and distinctly
(sic) in determining their own character. Although the
valuable-character. This provocative proposal raises a
first of these interests is not strong enough to justify
difficult and important question, a question to which a right of migration, it is still substantial, and so the
Walzer and Miller give two distinct answers, neither of immigrants who are refused entry are owed an expla-
which I find fully satisfying. Assuming that states have nation. To be told that they belong to the wrong race
the right to control who, if anyone, may enter their or sex (or have the wrong color) is insulting, given
territories, does it follow that a country may adopt a that these features do not connect to anything of
policy that explicitly excludes people based upon their real significance to the society they want to join. Even
tennis clubs are not entitled to discriminate among equal partners, someone might still question how an
applicants on grounds such as these. 24 immigration policy (which cannot evict any current
I must admit to being torn between these two views. citizens) could possibly affect any of a state's constitu-
I am tempted by Walzer's position because, as much ents. To see how such a policy might disrespect exist-
as I abhor racism, I believe that racist individuals can- ing citizens, consider the analogous situation from
not permissibly be forced to marry someone (or adopt the familial context. Rather than focusing upon rac-
a child) outside of their race. And if the importance ists who are unwilling to marry outside of their race,
of freedom of association entitles racist individuals to imagine a family of two white parents with two chil-
marry exclusively within their race, why does it not sim- dren, one white and another black. (For the purposes
ilarly entitle racist citizens to exclude immigrants based of this thought-experiment, imagine that white par-
upon race? At the very least, one must explain why the ents sometimes gave birth to black children, and vice
immigration case is dissimilar to the marital one. In the versa.) Now, imagine the parents announcing that, as
end, though, I reject Walzer's position because I think much as they would love to have a third child, they
that such an explanation can be furnished. Yet I am also have decided against it for fear that she might be black.
not entirely persuaded by Miller's explanation. I take it as obvious how hurtful this announcement
As noted above, Miller suggests that a state may could be to the existing black child, even though the
not exclude immigrants based upon a category like decision not to have any additional children obviously
race because doing so wrongly insults applicants of the does not threaten his or her chances of coming into
rejected race. I am not sure that this account suffices, existence. In light of this analogy, it is not difficult to
though. I do not doubt that the rejected applicants see how black Australians, for instance, might feel dis-
might feel horribly insulted, but I am not convinced respected by an immigration policy banning entry to
that they have a right not to be insulted in this way. By nonWhites. Even though this policy in and of itself in
analogy, I would expect a black person to be insulted no way threatens blacks with expulSion, it sends a clear
by a racist white who would never consider marrying message that, qua blacks, they are not equally valued
someone who is black, but I would not say that this as partners in the political union. As Blake comments:
black person has a right not to be insulted in this way. "Even if a hypothetical pure society could close the bor-
Because of these concerns, I would like to suggest an ders to preserve itself, a modern multi-ethnic democ-
alternative explanation as to why states may not limit racy could not do so without implicitly treating some
immigration according to racist criteria. 25 In doing so, individuals already present within the society as sec-
I will focus upon the rights of those already within the ond class citizens. Seeking to eliminate the presence of
political community rather than the rights of those a given group from your society by selective immigra-
who might want to enter. I shift the emphasis from for- tion is insulting to the members of that group already
eign immigrants to citizens of the state whose policy present.,,27 Thus, unless Australia were already com-
is in question because, given the relational theory of posed exclusively of white constituents (and no state
equality detailed above, it makes sense to presume that is completely homogenous), it would be impermissible
we may have responsibilities to our compatriots that to institute immigration policies designed to approxi-
we do not equally owe to foreigners. 26 In particular, we mate a "White Australia," not because such policies
have a special duty to respect our fellow citizens as might insult potential black immigrants (though no
equal partners in the political cooperative. With this doubt it would) but because they would fail to treat
in mind, I suggest that a country may not institute an nonwhite Australians as equals. And because no state
immigration policy which excludes entry to members is completely without minorities who would be dis-
of a given race because such a policy would wrongly respected by an immigration policy which invoked
disrespect those citizens in the dispreferred category. racial/ethnic/religious categories, no state may exclude
Even if we assume that there is a special respon- potential immigrants on these types of criteria.
sibility not to treat one's compatriots as less than
***
CONCLUSION 10. Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy (Boulder, CO: West-

view, 1996), 158.
In this article I have tried first to construct a presump-
tive case in favor of a state's right to set its own immi- 11. Other prominent defenses include David Miller, "What
gration policy and then to defend this prima facie Kind of Equ,ality Should the Left Pursue?" in Equality, ed.Jane
case against the formidable arguments that have been Franklin (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997),
83-99; Jonathan Wolff, "Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitar-
made on behalf of open borders. If my arguments are
ian Ethos," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998): 97-122;
sound, then we should conclude that, even if egalitar-
Andrew Mason, "Equality, Personal Responsibility, and
ians are right that those of us in wealthy societies have
Gender Socialisation," Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 100
demanding duties of global distributive justice and (1999-2000): 227-46; and Samuel Scheffler, "What Is Egali-
even if libertarians are correct that individuals have tarianism?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39.
rights both to freedom of movement and to control
12. Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?"
their private property, legitimate states are entitled to Ethics 109 (1999), 287-337, 314.
reject all potential immigrants, even those desperately
13. Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" 316.
seeking asylum from corrupt governments.
14. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,"
253.
NOTES
15. This inference from libertarianism to anarchism is admit-
1. Stuart White, "Freedom of Association and the Right to
tedly very quick. I defend this claim at greater length in my
Exclude," Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 5 (1997): 373-91, 373.
essay "Liberalism, Samaritanism and Political Legitimacy,"
2. David Gauthier, "Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2S (1996): 211-37. Very briefly,
Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 24 (1994): 357-92, 360-61. though, notice that even the most minimal state must non-
3. Some also object to the Boy Scouts' refusal to admit girls. consensually force all constituents within the territory to do
at least two things: (1) defer to the state's judgments regard-
4. For an extended discussion of some of the issues associated
ing criminal punishments (e.g., individuals must refrain
with group autonomy, see chap. 3 of my book A Theory of
from Vigilante justice) and (2) pay taxes so that the state has
Secession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
enough money to maintain its monopolistic coercive power
5. Here one might be tempted to object that Canada's right to over the criminal law.
independence is more straightforwardly accounted for in terms
16. I suspect that Walzer himself would not even object to this,
of its right to self-determination. But, as I shall argue below,
it is misleading to contrast freedom of association with self- since presumably a key factor triggering his concern about
determination because freedom of association is actually a cen- the Turkish guest workers in Germany was the extended dura-
tion of their stays.
tral component of the more general right to self-determination.
In the case of political states, for instance, a state cannot fully 17. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,"
enjoy the right to political self-determination unless its rights 267.
to freedom of association are respected. 18. As Phillip Cole puts it, "one cannot consistently assert
6. White, "Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude," that there is a fundamental human right to emigration
381 (emphasis added). but no such right to immigration; the liberal asymmetry
7. It should be noted White is not necessarily committed to this pOSition is not merely ethically, but also conceptually, inco-
herent" (Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Tlleory
line of argument because his analysis is explicitly restricted to
and Immigration [Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press,
"secondary" groups (which I take to be groups within states)
2000], 46).
which adopt "categorical" exclusion (Le., exclUSion based
upon an individual's race, gender, sexuality, or religion). 19. Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Limits," 197.
8. Chandran Kukathas, "The Case for Open Immigration," in 20. I should acknowledge that, when the level of welfare
Cohen and Wellman, Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, benefits varies considerably from province to province, the
207-20,211. stakes of internal migration can also be much higher.
9. Joseph H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open 21. Samuel Huntington, Wllo Are We? (New York: Simon &
Borders," Review of Politics 49 (1987): 251-73, 252. Schuster, 2004).
j
22. Although this is less clear, it may be that a country which view. Carens invokes the distinction between the private
de facto discriminates according to these types of criteria may and public spheres to explain why, while you "can pick
be just as blameworthy as one which has a de jure policy to your friends on the basis of whatever criteria you want,"
do so. See, e.g., Dummett's discussion of British immigration you may not invoke categories like race to discriminate
practices in On Immigration and Refugees. among applicants for immigration ("Aliens and Citizens:
23. Walzer, Spheres ofJustice, 47. The Case for Open Borders," 267). For reasons that the rela-
tional theory of equality helps illuminate, though, even if
24. Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Limits," 204.
one should not use racial categories to discriminate among
25. The view I advance here is similar to that which Michael applicants (for positions within the public sphere) within
Blake develops in "Immigration," in A Companion to Applied a given community, it does not follow that these catego-
Ethics, ed. R.G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman ries may not be used when deciding who should get in to
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 224-37. this community.
26. My favoring the relational theory of equality also 27. Blake, "Immigration," 233.
explains why I do not accept Carens's rejection of Walzer's
Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer

SARAH FINE
Cosmopolitan liberals have long argued that, contrary case for the state's right to exclude would-be immi-
to prevailing practices and assumptions, there is a ten- grants. 2 As Wellman points out, we must not over-
sion between liberal principles, on the one hand, and look the potentially exclusionary implications of the
the coercively enforced borders and exclusive mem- liberal commitment to freedom of association. There
bership practices that are familiar features of nation is a widespread and apparently uncontroversial view
states, on the other hand. 1 In that vein, it has become of the relationship between freedom of association
common to emphasize the liberal commitments to and exclusion: few would argue with Amy Gutmann's
universalism and moral equality and to highlight the statement that "the freedom to associate ... entails
moral arbitrariness of birth place in order to question the freedom to exclude.,,3 Thus, if Wellman can estab-
the relevance of borders in relation to a person's rights lish that states-like individuals-should enjoy the
and opportunities. It is notable, too, that liberal prin- freedom to associate and that this includes a right to
ciples are often regarded as the universalist antidote exclude prospective members, then we would have
to the more particularist or exclusionary tendencies clear foundations at least for the state's prima facie
of the other features (sovereignty, nationality, democ- right to exclude.
racy) that make up the modern state. In fact, Wellman's position appears to be doubly
This is one of the reasons why Christopher Heath contentious; not only does he make a liberal case for
Wellman's article "Immigration and Freedom of a right to exclude voluntary immigrants, but he also
Association" is so novel and interesting: Wellman maintains that states actually have the right to "close
puts forward what appears to be a distinctly liberal [their] doors to all potential immigrants, even refu-
gees desperately seeking asylum from incompetent
Sarah fine, "Freedom of Association Is Not the Answer," Etllics or corrupt political regimes that are either unable or
120, January 2010, 338-56. \~l 2010 by The University of Chicago. unwilling to protect their citizens' basic moral rights"
Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. (109). In this respect he seems to go further than other
progressive political philosophers who have offered is indicative of a common conviction Uthat each of
more qualified defenses of immigration restrictions. 4 us enjoys a morally privileged position of dominion
In short, this is a bold argument, which makes a sig- over our self-regarding affairs," or, in short, a com-
nificant contribution to a most topical debate. mitment to individual self-determination (110). The
I outline the key pOints of Wellman's two-stage freedom to associate is part of what it means to be
argument in Section I. In Sections II and III, I develop self-determining.
an internal critique of Wellman's position. The main And what does a commitment to freedom of asso-
target of my response is his central claim that llthe ciation imply? Wellman contends that it includes Uthe
commonly prized value of freedom of association right not to associate and even, in many cases, the
provides the basic normative building blocks for a pre- right to associate and even, in many cases, the right to
sumptive case in favor of each legitimate state's right disassociate" (109). Freedom of marital association, for
to exclude others from its territory" (119). I highlight example, comprises a right to marry a willing partner
the way in which exclusion has the potential to harm but also the right not to marry a given suitor and even
the interests of would-be immigrants, and I point out not to marry anyone. Freedom of religious aSSOciation
some crucial distinctions between the state and asso- similarly means a right to associate with consenting
ciations in civil society. s In Section IV, I contend that, others for religious purposes, as well as the right not to
beyond the issues of external harm and the distinc- associate with anyone in particular or indeed anyone
tiveness of the state, a successful defense of the state's at all. Neither marital nor religious associational free-
right to exclude others from its territory could not rest dom includes a right to associate with non consenting
on the appeal to freedom of association alone: it also others (110).
would require a justification of the state's territorial From these apparently uncontroversial liberal
rights, something that is conspicuous by its absence premises, Wellman reaches the following somewhat
from Wellman's argument. The search for the nor- more controversial conclusion: uJust as an individual
mative foundations of the state's purported right to has a right to determine whom (if anyone) he or she
exclude would-be immigrants continues: freedom of would like to marry, a group of fellow-citizens has a right
association is not the answer. to determine whom (if anyone) it would like to invite
into its political community. And just as an individual's
freedom of association entitles one to remain single, a
I state's freedom of association entitles it to exclude all
There are two main steps on Wellman's path to the foreigners from its political community" (110-11).
conclusion that states have the right to exclude all Wellman then responds to a number of potential
prospective immigrants. First, he seeks to establish objections to his move from premises to conclusion.
that there is a prima facie case for the state's right to None of these objections deters him from confidently
exclude; second, he aims to illustrate that the pre- contending that he has established at least a prima
sumption in favor of a right to exclude is not out- facie case for a state's right to exclude all would-be
weighed by potentially competing Uegalitarian" and immigrants (119). If the first part of Wellman's argu-
lllibertarian" considerations. 6 ment is correct, then, all other things being equal, we
Wellman's case for a presumptive right to exclude should favor states' rights to exclude over would-be
is quite straightforward. He begins with the claim immigrants' claims to be admitted.
that everybody seems to think freedom of associa- The prima facie case, he acknowledges, could be
tion is important. Taking marriage and religion as his outweighed by competing claims. First, the presump-
central examples, Wellman draws attention to the tion in favor of a state's right to restrict immigra-
widespread agreement that people should be free to tion might be trumped by what Wellman calls Uthe
choose their own (willing) marital partners and their egalitarian case for open borders." Wellman accepts
own (willing) religious associates. This, he suggests, that individuals and states have significant duties to
outsiders living in abject poverty, and, in line with even those desperately seeking asylum from corrupt
his relational view of equality, he maintains that, as governments" (141).
relationships between insiders and outsiders become Wellman's defense of the state's right to exclude
more "robust," the inequalities between them are a rests on two debatable claims. The first is that the
greater cause for concern (120-30). He argues, how- state has a right to freedom of association, which is
ever, that states may choose to "export justice" rather a component of its right to self-determination. All
than open their borders to immigrants. 7 Export options liberals are familiar with the claim that individuals
include, in Wellman's view, the transfer of aid to poor have associational rights, and many would accept
countries in place of admitting immigrants who are that groups formed by consenting individuals also
fleeing poverty, and, rather more contentiously, mili- can have associational rights. However, Wellman
tary intervention to protect those whose governments does not elaborate on the precise sense in which the
are "unable or unwilling to secure their ... basic moral state has a right to freedom of association. He does
rights" instead of admitting refugees of corrupt or inept not explain whether we should understand the state
regimes (129). as the right-holder or whether the state exercises the
Next, Wellman critically appraises "the libertar- right on behalf of its citizens. At times he refers to
ian case for open borders." Opponents might contend "the citizens' right," at others he refers to the "state's
that the state's right to exclude illegitimately restricts right." If the state acts on behalf of its citizens as a col-
the citizens' freedom to invite outsiders onto their lective body, then presumably the state has no right
property and/or the would-be immigrants' freedom to exclude those with whom the citizens collectively
of movement. Wellman argues that the state's "sov- choose to associate. He also does not reveal exactly
ereignty over its territory" must take precedence over how this purported collective right relates to the indi-
the individual citizen's right to invite others onto vidual right to freedom of association. The citizens'
her property and, anyway, inviting people into the (or the state's) right to freedom of association does not
state for indefinite periods of time actually has far- emerge from the citizens exercising their individual
reaching, costly consequences for one's fellowcitizens, rights and choosing to associate together as a group
which means that this sort of decision should not be in the first place; as Wellman acknowledges, ordinar-
made unilaterally. Furthermore, the right to freedom ily membership of the political community is nonvol-
of movement is not absolute: I have no right to enter untary (112). Moreover, as he points out, the citizens'
your house without permission, so why should I have collective right to refuse to associate with outsiders
a right to enter another country without its consent may conflict with the associative rights of those indi-
(130-36)? Yet he claims that states should not inter- vidual citizens who wish to associate with the excluded
fere with self-determining individuals "any more than outsiders (131). In lieu of a response to these questions
is necessary" (134). Hence, states can have no reason- about the nature of the state's right to freedom of asso-
able objection to individuals inviting outsiders onto Ciation, Wellman simply suggests that there are some
their property or to foreigners entering the territory unpalatable consequences of denying that states have
provided that these visits are for "duly limited" peri- such a right. For example, without positing that right,
ods (136-37). he argues, we would be unable to identify the wrong
Despite these apparent concessions, Wellman that occurs when one state forcibly annexes another
does not shy away from his stark conclusion that state (112-13). Despite the lack of clarification, let us
"even if egalitarians are right that those of us in accept for the sake of argument that the state may
wealthy societies have stringent duties of global dis- have a right to freedom of association.
tributive justice, and even if libertarians are correct The second controversial claim is that the state's
that individuals have rights both to freedom of move- freedom to associate includes a right to exclude would-
ment and to control their private property, legitimate be immigrants. In order to understand the basis of that
states are entitled to reject all potential immigrants, claim, it is useful to distinguish between a state's right
to exclude outsiders from its territory (from simply society, where they remain free to choose to aSSOCiate,
crossing its borders), its right to exclude them from or not to associate, with newcomers and with other
settling within that territory, and its right to exclude citizens in their private lives. In addition, it seems to
them from membership of the political community be compatible with the collective right of citizens, as
(from acquiring citizenship status). Although Well- a group, to associate or not to associate with others in
man obscures these distinctions by writing, inter- their political community.
changeably, of a state's right to "control immigration The issue of movement across territorial borders
over its territorial borders," "close its doors," and "set and subsequent settlement (as opposed to full mem-
its own immigration policy," it transpires that the bership) only enters Wellman's argument insofar as
central focus of his freedom of association position is he agrees with Michael Walzer that all long-term resi-
actually the state's right to exclude would-be immi- dents of a state should have the option of acquiring
grants from obtaining citizenship status. Wellman's equal rights of membership to protect them against
argument is that the citizens together ought to enjoy political oppression. For states to function effectively,
a collective right to determine the membership rules Wellman contends, they must "nonconsensually
for their political community, and so it is the free- coerce all those within their territorial borders" (131).
dom of the citizens, as a group, to choose their fellow The state, then, is both a nonvoluntary, coercive, ter-
political associates that is at stake. Access to citizen- ritorial institution and the site (and representative?) of
ship matters because "the country's course will be a self-determining political community. The require-
charted by the members of this civic association"- ment to offer citizenship status to long-term residents
that is how Wellman connects the citizens' collective is a democratic one; in the absence of that guarantee,
right to self-determination and their right to freedom resident noncitizens are subject to the state's coercive
of association (114-15). In short, Wellman is primar- authority without any say over the state's actions and
ily concerned with the state's control of its "civic" they are comparable to ((live-in servants," governed by
boundaries, "which regulate membership."s a "band of citizen tyrants."n In other words, a demo-
How does Wellman move from the contention cratic state is not entitled permanently to withhold
that the state should have control of its civic bound- citizenship status from those residing (for indefinite
aries to the argument that the state should have con- periods) within its territory. The citizens' collective
trol of its "territorial" boundaries, "which regulate freedom to associate (and to refuse association) does
movement?,,9 At first it might appear as though the not extend to excluding long-term residents of the
attempt to defend the state's right to exclude would-be state from the political community.
immigrants from its territory by appeal to freedom of Thus, while Wellman cannot defend the right to
association is something of a nonstarter. David Miller, exclude outsiders from the state's territory by direct
for example, swiftly dismisses this line of argument. appeal to the citizens' individual or collective rights
According to him, it depends on the notion that "we to freedom of association, because their mere pres-
have a deep interest in not being forced into associa- ence within the state's territorial boundaries is not a
tion with others against our wishes," a notion that has problem from that perspective, the democratic state's
little force in the context of the modern liberal state right to exclude would-be immigrants from settling
since it is implausible to claim that the "mere pres- indefinitely in the territory indirectly becomes a nec-
ence" of immigrants within the state's territory harms essary extension of the right to exclude them from
the (associational) interests of the citizens. 10 In that full membership of the political community. The
respect, Miller must be correct. The mere presence of citizens' collective freedom to choose their political
immigrants within the state's borders cannot be a seri- associates (their fellow citizens) relies on their free-
ous problem with regard to the associational rights of dom to exclude would-be long-term residents at the
individual citizens-it is certainly compatible with territorial borders. Wellman's defense of a right to
their individual rights to associate freely within civil exclude would-be immigrants by appeal to freedom
of association therefore depends both on the assump- others obstructs his path to the conclusion that the
tion that states have a right to freedom of association state enjoys a right to exclude.
and on the validity of the claim that all long-term resi- To explain, there is no denying that Wellman's
den ts must be offered the option of acquiring the com- claim about the importance of individual self-
plete rights of full membership; if the latter claim is determination has a good liberal pedigree. We are
without substance, then Wellman's argument would familiar with this as an argument in favor of allowing
fail because the citizens could control access to mem- people the freedom "to be the authors of their own
bership of the political community and enjoy the lives." 15 It is a "let them be" position and one that
collective right to freedom of association without con- makes perfect sense with reference to the beliefs or
trolling access to the state's territory.12 Furthermore, actions of an individual. "You do not like the way that
the citizens' collective claim to freedom of associa- Ali chooses to live her life? If she is not harming any-
tion must be weighty enough to override not only the one then you have no say in the matter. Let her be!"
would-be immigrants' claims to become members of In Wellman's words, "it is her life.,,16 The presumptive
the political community but also their claims to settle case lies with Ali.
in the state's territory. From Wellman's conception of individual self-
Even if we do not challenge these two foundations determination, we might extrapolate a comparable
of Wellman'S position, the argument that the state has notion of group self-determination: groups enjoy a
a right to exclude would-be immigrants by virtue of morally privileged position of dominion over their
its right to freedom of association still fails on its ownself-regarding affairs and should be allowed to choose
terms. In what follows, I raise three objections, focus- freely when their behavior is not harmful to others.
ing on harm to others, the distinctiveness of the state, Matters become more complicated here because of
and the absence of a justification for the state's territo-
the clear potential for groups illegitimately to restrict
rial rights. the autonomy of their own members. One common
liberal response is to "let groups be" on the condi-
tion that the members of the group enjoy a right of
II 17
exit. The individual right of exit represents a form
The first central problem emerges on closer inspection of safeguard against the group's potential to abuse its
of Wellman'S conception of self-determination. As power. IS
indicated in Section I, Wellman describes the individ- Yet the actions of groups affect not only the auton-
ual right to self-determination in the following terms: omy of their members; just like the actions of individu-
"Each of us enjoys a morally privileged position of als, they may (directly or indirectly) affect third parties
dominion over our self-regarding affairs," and this is a as well. When a private club in a residential area regu-
position "which entitles us to freedom of association" larly arranges noisy late-night gatherings, the group'S
(110). Although he does not elaborate on the idea of actions have spill-over effects for the local residents. In
self-determination in the immigration discussion, in that way, while seemingly going about its own busi-
a previous article he notes that "it is not always clear ness, the private club has the potential to harm the
when any given action is purely self-regarding," but interests of nonmembers. And, whereas a right of exit
"many people believe that we should be allowed to migh t go some way toward protecting the individual
choose freely when our behavior is not harmful to autonomy of the members, outsiders often are unwill-
others." 13 Behavior that is harmful to others wrongly ingly exposed to the effects of a group's decisions. In
causes them to be worse off than they would be oth- such instances, where the nonmembers do not seek
erwise (where "worse off" means that their interests to interfere in the affairs of others for paternalist rea-
are set back or thwarted). 14 Wellman's omission of the sons, "let them be" is not an appropriate response
harm clause in the immigration piece is significant to their appeals. Clearly, it is not the case that every
because, as I will show, the potential to cause harm to action with potentially harmful effects ought to be
prohibited, but, once the potential for harm to oth- we might distinguish between those who are unable
ers enters the picture, the presumption in favor of the to live a minimally decent life in their present coun-
group members' freedom to do as they please is called try and those whose basic needs are currently met
into question, as is implied by Wellman's claim that but who wish to settle elsewhere in order to further
"we should be allowed to choose freely when our behav- their (various) interests. We know that emigration is
ior is not harmful to others.,,19 In fact, the potential for generally accompanied by significant costs, including
harm represents a good, if not a conclusive, reason for separation from family and friends, from a wider com-
intervening in the group's affairs in order to prevent munity, and from familiar surroundings, and often
the harm. involves moving to somewhere unfamiliar, some-
There is also another way in which the actions where in which one is a stranger. It seems reasonable
of groups, unlike those of individuals, necessarily to assume, therefore, that those who are willing (or
affect and even potentially harm third parties. As are forced) to incur such costs have substantial inter-
Wellman explains, "an important part of group self- ests in living in another state and that thwarting their
determination is having control of what the 'self' is," pursuit of those interests may be detrimental to the
and this is why he is so concerned with the citizens' well-being of the excluded. This is particularly true
freedom to select their political associates (115). Having if, as Wellman contends, in order to control access to
control of that "self" means choosing "who is in and membership of the political community, states must
who is out," which, in turn, means including some also enjoy a right to exclude outsiders from settling
people and excluding others. zo The very act of exclud- indefinitely within their territorial borders, because it
ing people may thwart their interests, either making means that those who are excluded from membership
them worse off than they are at present, or making of the political community are unable to further any of
them worse off than they would be otherwise, if they their interests in long-term residence within the state
were left to act on their own plans and the group did (just as teachers who are excluded from the teaching
not act to exclude them. For example, when a patch of union are unable to further their career interests).
green land, open to the general public, is purchased by Those who cannot live a minimally decent life in
a private group which plans to reserve the land for the their country have an interest in meeting their basic
use of members only, then current users of the land needs. Wellman maintains that states must not ignore
who are excluded from the group are made worse off. that interest but are free to "export justice" to them
In another case, if a necessary condition of securing instead of granting them access to the state's territory
work in the teaching profession is membership of a and political community. Even if this were a plausible
national teachers' trade union, then qualified teach- and legitimate option, it could not fully resolve the
ers excluded from the union are made worse off than question of harm to would-be immigrants. ZI In a world
they would be otherwise-exclusion bars them from where all the adverse political and economic (and,
pursuing their chosen career. Again, though not every we might add, ecological and social) causes of forced
action with potentially harmful effects can or should migration had been eliminated, as Joseph Carens has
be prohibited, sometimes the interests in question are emphasized, "people might have powerful reasons to
so substantial, and thwarting them is so detrimental want to migrate from one state to another."zz Most
to the well-being of the excluded, that exclusion itself importantly for our purposes, the interests in living in
becomes a cause for concern. state A are not always interchangeable with the inter-
The potential to cause harm to others has impor- ests in living in state B or state C. Prohibiting outsiders
tant implications for Wellman's argument regarding from settling in and becoming members of a particu-
the state's right to exclude. Would-be immigrants seek lar state hinders or prevents their pursuit of all the
to leave one state and to enter another for a variety of many familial, social, religious, cultural, political, or
reasons. Some effectively have no choice but to leave economic interests tied to residence and citizenship in
their state of origin, while others elect to move. Here that state, despite the fact that some, if not all, of their
basic needs could be met elsewhere. Once more, this Amy Gutmann and Stuart White, for example, that
potential for harm to others represents a good, though there is a particularly compelling case for freedom of
not conclusive, reason against permitting the group to association, and by extension exclusion, in intimate
exclude some or all would-be members. or expressive contexts. 24 According to White's view,
Therefore, while we may grant that there is a as quoted by Wellman himself, "if the formation of a
strong presumption in favor of individuals enjoying specific association is essential to the individual's abil-
"dominion over their self-regarding affairs," group ity to exercise properly his/her liberties of conscience
rights to self-determination are, by definition, always and expression, or to his/her ability to form and enjoy
more troublesome, because groups consist of indi- intimate attachments, then exclusion rules which are
viduals who may be harmed by their group's actions genuinely necessary to protect the association's pri-
and because the very act determining the group "self" mary purposes have an especially strong presumption
is necessarily exclUSionary, possibly at significant cost, of legitimacy.,,25 The idea is that it would be objection-
even harm, to the excluded would-be members. Well- able to compel individuals to form or maintain inti-
man thinks he establishes that there is a presump- mate attachments against their will or to betray their
tion in favor of the state's right to exclude prospective own consciences. Does the modern liberal state enjoy
immigrants because he does not pause to consider a privileged status on a similar basis?
the possibility that the act of exclusion is potentially Although the liberal state obviously cannot be
harmful to them insofar as it thwarts the interests viewed as an intimate association, perhaps it has more
that they have in long-term settlement or in acquiring of a claim to be viewed primarily as an expressive asso-
membership. And, as I have sought to illustrate, when ciation, certainly not in the sense that it subscribes to
the acts of a self-determining group are accompanied a particular religious doctrine but at least insofar as it
by potential harm to others, there does not appear is (supposedly) committed to a set of principles that
to be a clear presumption on the group's side-the represent its liberal character. While there is a great
potential for harm represents a parallel reason to inter- deal of debate between liberals about how compre-
fere with the group's actions. hensive or perfectionist those principles may be, and
liberals of various stripes will disagree about the basic
list and ranking, it is uncontroversial to claim that a
III
liberal state is committed, in some way, to toleration,
In response, Wellman might wish to invoke the exam- equality before the law, and individual liberty, for
ples of marriage and religion again to illustrate that example. However, the liberal state's adherence to a
the refusal of a marriage proposal or exclusion from basic set of common principles is not sufficient to sug-
a religious group both may "damage the interests of gest that it constitutes an expressive association. The
others" and cause "pain or loss" in some sense, and yet label 'expressive association' implies, as Gutmann
everyone appears to assume that there is a clear pre- notes, "that the primary purpose of an association is
sumption in favor of the refuser and the excluder in expression of a point of view. ,,26 The members of lib-
23
those cases. However, this only serves to highlight eral states are a diverse bunch, many of whom do not
why Wellman's inference from the examples of mar- see themselves as making any sort of principled state-
riage and religion to the example of a state is prob- ment by remaining resident within the borders of a
lematic in the first place. While liberals are likely to particular state. Citizens in a liberal state may endorse
accept that the presumption lies with the excluder in a variety of liberal principles, or may be indifferent to
the marriage and religion cases despite the potential them, or may reject them altogether. Freedom of asso-
for causing "pain or loss" to the excluded, for many ciation within a liberal state is supposed to facilitate
of them this is because there is something special the citizens' freedom to express various points of view,
about certain forms of aSSOCiation, which gives them including views antithetical to liberalism. When gov-
a privileged status. They might argue, in line with ernments mistake the state itself for something akin
to an expressive association with a single, compre- This suggests that there might well be a presump-
hensive point of view, the result is often distinctly and tion in favor of a group's right to exclude would-be
disturbingly illiberal, as in the case of the American members in two quite different cases. The first case,
government's clampdown on communist views in the as in the examples of marital and religious freedom
McCarthy era or the suppression of political opposi- of association, is when the associational freedom and
tion in the former Soviet Union. Hence, since the lib- accompanying exclusion are intricately connected
eral state cannot claim to be primarily an intimate or to intimate attachments or expressive purposes. The
expressive association, the initial case for exclusion second case, as in the golf club example, is when asso-
then must be weaker than in the examples of marriage ciations are not intimate or expressive but exclusion
and religion. is generally fairly innocuous. Although Wellman
Wellman acknowledges that freedom of associa- invokes both sorts of case in his attempt to support
tion is "much more important for individuals" in the the state's presumptive right to exclude, neither is
examples of marriage and religion, but he denies that relevantly comparable to that of the state, and so the
this imperils his position regarding a presumptive examples do very little to help his cause. Interestingly
right to exclude because he believes that "there is a enough, however, when particular clubs or associa-
very natural and straightforward case to be made in tions start to look a bit more like states in the sense
favor of freedom of association in all realms" (114). He that outsiders have significant interests in becoming
points out that freedom of association for members members and exclusion brings with it high costs to
of a golf club is obviously not as important as marital the nonmembers without serving clear expressive or
and religiOUS freedom of association, and yet, "if no intimate purposes, the argument in favor of exclu-
one doubts that golf clubs have a presumptive right to sion seems weaker. That certainly appears to have
exclude others, then there seems no reason to suspect been the view of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
that a group of citizens cannot also have the right to of Roberts v. United States, 1984. The Court ruled that
freedom of association, even if control over member- it was not unconstitutional to deny the U.S. Junior
ship in a country is not nearly as significant as control Chamber Uaycees)-a nonintimate, nonexpressive,
regarding one's potential spouse" (114). and formerly all-male association, which was under-
The freedom of association principle, Wellman stood to have clear career-enhancing advantages for
maintains, applies collectively to citizens of a state, its members-a right to exclude its regional chap-
28
just as it applies to members of a golf club. This argu- ters that chose to admit women as full members.
ment by analogy is awkward again, though, because As Gutmann puts it, with reference to nonintimate,
one might be reluctant to accept that a state has a nonexpressive associations within civil SOCiety, there
presumptive right to exclude precisely because of the is no obvious presumption in favor of the excluders:
ways in which a state differs dramatically from a golf "We cannot claim a presumption in favor of a right
club. As a number of theorists have emphasized over to exclude or a presumption in favor of a right not to
the years, states are not like clubs. 27 For one thing, it be discriminated against without begging the ques-
is not possible today for would-be immigrants to get tion: which side carries the weight of argument in
together and set up a state of their own. Moreover, it cases of conflict between the values of free associa-
is generally fair to assume that exclusion from a golf tion and those of nondiscrimination ]"29 With refer-
club is unlikely to have a devastating impact on the ence to the state and prospective members, we might
life of the would-be member, whereas exclusion from rephrase Gutmann's statement and argue that we
a particular state-as the bearer of an enormous range cannot claim a presumption in favor of the state's
of resources and options, many of which are not inter- right to exclude or a presumption in favor of the
changeable with those on offer in other states and are would-be immigrant's interests in cases of conflict
not accessible to nonresidents and noncitizens-may between the importance of free association and not
have exactly that effect. harming others.
In summary, then, without denying that citizens that their visits are temporary. As the state is under no
have an interest in setting the rules of membership for obligation to extend the full rights of membership to
their political community in order to maintain some temporary visitors, their presence within the state does
control over the policy direction of their state, I have not pose a problem for the citizens' collective right to
illustrated that, contra Wellman, the appeal to self- self-determination and freedom of association. Hence,
determination and freedom of association does not he stresses that his argument ('would leave much more
deliver a presumptive case in favor of a state's right room for freedom of movement than the status quo,
to exclude would-be immigrants from settling within since it would allow most people to travel freely around
its borders and obtaining citizenship status. Exclud- the world (as tourists, to family or doctors, or even to
ing would-be immigrants from a state clearly has the study or work) as long as they did not stay indefinitely
potential to harm their interests to a significant degree, in some place without the permission of the host
and this potential for harm also represents a good rea- political community" (137). Nevertheless, again, this
son for challenging the citizens' right to exclude them. response does not serve to mitigate the harms that may
Groups may enjoy a presumptive right to exclude out- accompany exclusion from permanent residence and
siders when the associations in question are intimate citizenship. People who are not free to settle within a
or primarily expressive or when exclusion is ordinarily state are not at liberty to form or maintain long-term
reasonably "harmless," but the state does not meet the intimate relationships with citizens; to take advantage
criteria necessary to qualify for that presumption. of the political, religious, and social options in that
Furthermore, once it becomes clear that the poten- state; or, generally, to make a stable life for themselves
tial for harming the would-be immigrants' interests there. The opportunity to travel "freely around the
negates the case for the state's presumptive right to world" surely is of little comfort to those whose inter-
exclude based on the citizens' collective right to free- ests in settlement and membership are thwarted.
dom of association, it is also apparent that Wellman's
response to the ((egalitarian" objection to the state's
right to exclude is insufficient. Even if the state is able IV
and willing to fulfill its duties to outsiders living in pov- Wellman does not deliver a conclusive case in favor
erty or the victims of incompetent or brutal regimes of the citizens' position-that would require him to
by "exporting justice" abroad, excluding people who explain why the citizens' claim to self-determination
wish to pursue interests specific to that particular state is sufficiently strong to outweigh the harm to would-
is still potentially harmful, and that potential for harm be immigrants. I will add that the argument in favor
remains an important challenge to Wellman's position. of preventing harm to the would-be immigrants
Wellman might argue that he does directly con- seems more appealing once we recognize that we are
front that potential for harm to outsiders since he con- not being asked to make a stark choice between self-
siders whether the citizens' right to exclude, grounded determination and the interests of outsiders: while
in their collective right to freedom of aSSOciation, con- "having control of what the 'self' is" may be one ele-
flicts with the would-be immigrants' right to freedom ment of group self-determination, it is not the only,
of movement. In a sense, this is something of a red her- or even a necessary, component. In the absence of full
ring; as I emphasized at the outset, the citizens' collec- control over access to membership, a group still can be
tive right to freedom of association could not support self-determining to the extent that it is free to set its
a right to prevent outsiders crossing the state's borders own internal policy agenda without external interfer-
anyway because their mere presence has no bearing ence. That freedom might be limited by the lack of con-
on the citizens' individual or collective associational trol over membership rules, but liberal and democratic
freedoms. Thus, it is not a surprise when Wellman con- principles already constrain the extent of the citizens'
cludes that the right to exclude is compatible with the discretion to control the membership of their politi-
rights of outsiders to enter the state's territory, provided cal community. Wellman accepts the democratic
requirement that long-term residents are offered citi- to enter a foreign country without that country's per-
zenship rights, and presumably that same requirement mission?" (135). The reason why one might agree that
extends to prohibiting the arbitrary expulsion of exist- Ali's right to freedom of movement does not entitle her
ing members. Moreover, as Walzer argues, in theory, to enter Ben's house without Ben's permission is that
states also could control membership by regulating one assumes Ben is the legitimate owner of the house
birth rates and selectively awarding the right to give and that this grants him a set of rights over that prop-
birth, choosing between different ethnic groups, or set- erty, including a right to exclude unwanted visitors. If
ting "class or intelligence quotas." This, he contends, states are the legitimate owners of their territory, then
"would require very high, and surely unacceptable, lev- we would have good additional grounds for concluding
els of coercion: the dominance of political power over that they enjoy a right to exclude outsiders from that
kinship and love.,,3o Therefore, since denying a group territory. Yet, ultimately, Wellman does not appear to
full control over membership rules is not an automatic conceive of the state's relationship to its territory as one
denial of its right to self-determination, the citizens are of ownership since, as we have seen, he contends that
not forced to sacrifice all control over their common life "even legitimate states," presumably unlike the owners
in order to prevent significant harm to others. of private property, "do not necessarily have the right
Nonetheless, aside from the issue that Wellman's to bar foreigners from visiting for a duly limited period"
argument about controlling the rules of membership (136). And if, as is implied by Wellman's claims about
is inconclusive, there is an additional difficulty for viSitors, the state's relationship to its territory is not one
Wellman's defense of the right to exclude based on a of ownership, in what sense does the state enjoy territo-
commitment to freedom of association. As Wellman rial rights?31
contends that citizens must enjoy not only a right to Wellman does refer to the speCifically territorial
exclude would-be members from the political com- requirements of states when he claims that, in order
munity but also would-be residents from the state's for states to fulfill their functional imperatives, they
territory, his position calls for a further justification of must be "sufficiently territorially contiguous" and
the state's purported rights over that particular terri- thiS, in turn, means that states must (nonconsensu-
tory. To see why the freedom of association argument ally) coerce those within their borders (131). Else-
is insufficient here, consider the example of a private where Wellman explains why he considers that it
club. The club members might enjoy the right to is legitimate for states to coerce their citizens in this
exclude outsiders from membership and from using way despite the value that he attaches to individual
the club's property and resources, provided that they self-determination: "The reason that I have no moral
have rights of ownership over the premises. How- right to be free from political coercion . . . is that,
ever, while a yoga group that meets in Central Park even if I would rather forego the benefits of political
might be free to reject prospective members, it is not SOciety, my state may permissibly coerce me in order
entitled to bar them from making use of Central Park to secure political stability for my fellow citizens.,,32
itself because the park is not the members' property. States, he asserts, are necessary for people to enjoy
In other words, Wellman's position begs the question the benefits of political stability and states must be
whether citizens and/or their states have the relevant territorial in order to fulfill those functions. Wellman
rights over the territory from which they wish to employs the territorial contiguity point against Hillel
exclude others and thus whether they are within their Steiner's argument that individual citizens of a state
rights not just to control the rules of membership but should enjoy the freedom to associate with those not
also to control settlement within that territory. resident within that state and that the state's right to
Perhaps a territorial argument is to be found lurking exclude illegitimately restricts that freedom. 33 How-
behind Wellman's claim that freedom of movement is ever, although the purported territorial requirement
not absolute: "My right to freedom of movement does might support the state's claim to coerce those within
not entitle me to enter your house without your permis- its borders, and thus may offer something of a general,
sian ... , so why think this right gives me a valid claim consequentialist justification for a state's authority
over territory (though not for any particular state's freedom of association alone cannot deliver a right
claims to its particular territory), it does not bear on to exclude would-be immigrants from entering and
the state's right to exclude would-be immigrants from settling within a state: absent a further argument in
settling in a territory. Once individuals are within support of states' rights over the territory they claim
the state's borders, they become subject to the state's for themselves, we are left wondering whether states
authority. It will coerce them, as it coerces all other are entitled to control access to their territory at all.
residents-excluding them is not a necessary condi-
tion for maintaining the state's territorial contiguity.
Offering all long-term residents the option of becom- NOTES
ing full members of the state may be "costly" for the 1. See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for
existing citizens, as Wellman proposes, but that argu- Open Borders," Review ofPolitics 49 (1987): 251-73; and Phillip
ment is not enough to support the state's right to Cole, Philosophies ofExclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immi-
exclude outsiders from settling in its territory either: gration (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
just as the yoga group in Central Park is not entitled 2. Christopher Heath Wellman, "Immigration and Freedom
to prohibit nonmembers from making use of the park of Association," Ethics 119 (2008): 109-41. Page numbers in
despite its control over its own membership rules, so the main text refer to this article.
the citizens of a state are not entitled to stop nonciti- 3. Amy Gutmann, "Freedom of Association: An Introductory
zens from settling there, despite their claim to control Essay," in Freedom of Assoaation, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princ-
access to membership, without a further entitlement eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998),3-32,11.
to control access to the territory in the first place. 4. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Wellman must engage with this question if he is to Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), chap. 2; and
establish that states have a right to exclude outsiders David Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Umits," in Contempo-
from settling within their territorial borders. rary Debates in Applied Ethics, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christo-
pher Heath Wellman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 193-206.
S. This is an internal critique insofar as it seeks to illustrate that
V Wellman's freedom of association argument in defense of a right
to exclude does not succeed on its own terms. Given the pur-
Wellman maintains that it is possible to defend
poses of this article and the limits of space here, I do not develop
a state's presumptive right to exclude would-be
an important external line of criticism recently advanced by
immigrants by appeal to the liberal commitment to
Arash Abizadeh. To summarize very briefly, Abizadeh argues
freedom of association. He draws attention to the that state border control regimes subject would-be immigrants
widespread conviction that individuals "should be to coercion and democratic theory demands that coercion is jus-
allowed to choose freely when [their] behavior is not tified to all those subject to it, where justification means rights
harmful to others," but I have argued that there is of democratic partidpation. This simultaneously challenges any
no clear presumption in favor of the state's position appeal to collective self-determination as the normative core of
based upon the freedom to associate since exclu- the state's right to exclude would-be immigrants: if those subject
sion from the state obviously has the potential to to coerdon are entitled to partidpate in the relevant dedsion-
harm the interests of others-interests that would making process, and coercion extends beyond the boundaries of
the state, then the "self' is not simply equivalent to "all residents
not disappear even if wealthy liberal states did, to
of the state" or "all members of the political community." For
use Wellman's words, "export justice" and thereby
the full argument, see Arash Abizadeh, "Democratic Theory and
fulfill some of their duties to outsiders (128-29). Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own
The potential for exclusion to result in harm must Borders," Political Theory 36 (2008): 37-65. I also make the case
be taken seriously, in line with Wellman's own argu- that democratic prindples do not support a unilateral right to
ment, and more must be said about why the freedom exclude in Sarah Fine, "Immigration and the Right to Exclude"
of citizens takes precedence over the interests of the (DPhil diss., University of Oxford, 2009).
would-be immigrants, especially since states are nei- 6. In the final part of his article, Wellman explores the ques-
ther intimate nor expressive associations. Moreover, tion of whether it is permissible for states to exclude would-be
immigrants primarily on the basis of their race, ethnicity, or against the "larger society." See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural
religion, but I do not assess that aspect of his argument here. Citizens/zip: A Liberal Theory ofMi11ority Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 35, cited in Wellman, "Liberalism,
7. Indeed, egalitarians may be committed to the conclusion
that states have a duty to export justice rather than open their Communitarianism and Group Rights," 14 n. 4.
borders to "unfortunate people" if it is true that aid is a more 19. Wellman, "The Paradox of Group Autonomy," 265,
effective response to poverty. See Wellman, "Immigration emphasis added.
and Freedom of Association," 127-28. 20. Michael Walzer, "Exclusion, Injustice, and the Demo-
8. Abizadeh, "Democratic Theory and Border CoerCion," 38. cratic State," Dissent 40 (1993): 55-64, 55.
9. Ibid. 21. Not to mention the various cases in which there is no appar-
10. David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice ent "export" alternative, as in the example of people who wish
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 210-11. to emigrate to escape specific violent individuals.
11. See Walzer, Spheres of/ustice, chap. 2. 22. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," 258.
12. For a challenge to Walzer's (and thus also to Wellman's) 23. Mill, "On Liberty," 94-95.
"bundling" of membership and residence claims, see Ryan 24. See Gutmann, "Freedom of Association," 7-13; Stuart
Pevnick, "Social Trust and the Ethics of Immigration Policy," White, "Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude,"
Journal ofPoliticai Philosophy 17 (2009): 146-67. Journal ofPoliticai Philosophy 5 (1997): 373-91.
13. Christopher Heath Wellman, "The Paradox of Group 25. White, "Freedom of Association and the Right to Exclude,"
Autonomy," Social Policy and Philosophy 20 (2003): 265-85, 265. 381, cited in Wellman, "Immigration and Freedom of Associa-
14. Christopher Heath Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The tion," 113.
Case for Political Self-Determination (New York: Cambridge 26. Gutmann, "Freedom of Association," 11.
University Press, 2005), 11 n. 7, 12 n. 9. Wellman is following 27. See, e.g., Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion, esp. 70-73;
joel Feinberg's analysis of the harm principle. For a full discus- Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," 267-68; Melissa Lane, "A Phil-
Sion, seejoel Feinberg, The Moral Limits ofCriminal Law, vol. 1, osophical View on States and Immigration," in Globalizing
Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Migration Regimes: New Challenges to TrallSnational Coopera-
15. Wellman, A Theory ofSecession , 2. tion, ed. Kristof Tamas and joakim Palme (Aldershot: Ash-
16. Wellman, "The Paradox of Group Autonomy," 266, gate, 2006), 131-43; and jonathan Seglow, "The Ethics of
author's emphasis. Immigration," Political Studies Review 3 (2005): 317-34, 322.
17. See, e.g.,john Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in On Liberty and Other 28. For further discussion, see Gutmann, "Freedom of Asso-
Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University ciation," esp. 8-9.
Press, 1989), 91-92, where Mill considers the example of Mor- 29. Ibid., 11.
mons; and Chandran Kukathas, Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of 30. Walzer, Spheres oflustice, 34-35.
Diversity and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
31. For a selection of different arguments concerning the nor-
95-96. It worth noting that this response is not considered suf-
mative grounds for territorial rights, see Tamar Meisels, Territo-
ficient by many (liberals and nonliberals alike), owing, e.g., to the
rial Rights (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005); Cara Nine, "A Lockean
possibility of crippling costs imposed on leavers-as in the case
Theory of Territory," Political Studies 56 (2008): 148-65; Avery
of "shunning."
Kolers, Land, Conflict, and Justice: A Political Theory of Territory
18. Wellman is alert to the possibility that groups might ille- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Anna
gitimately restrict the autonomy of their members; on that Stilz, "Why Do States Have Territorial Rights?" International
basis, he has argued that liberal principles point to a presump- Theory 1 (2009): 185-213.
tion (though not a conclusive case) against the sort of group
32. Wellman, A Theory ofSecession, 16-17, author's emphasis.
rights that grant groups control over their own members. See
Christopher Heath Wellman, "Liberalism, Communitarian- 33. Hillel Steiner, "Hard Borders, Compensation, and ClaSSical
ism and Group Rights," Law and Philosophy 18 (1999): 13-40, Liberalism," in Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspec-
esp. 33. Will Kymlicka refers to these as "internal restrictions," tives, ed. David Miller and SohaB H. Hashmi (Princeton, Nj:
in contrast to "external protections" that defend the group Princeton University Press, 2001), 79-88.
J
CHAPTER 21
Global Economic Justice
A plain fact of the moral life is that in ethical mat- impoverished, hungry, dying strangers who are
ters small and large, personal and abstract, we half a world away and whom we will never meet?
wrestle with issues of justice. Whatever our moral
outlook, we must sometimes ask, What is just?
ISSUE FILE: BACKGROUND
Justice is about persons getting what is fair or
what is their due. In the name of justice, we con- For many people, this moral issue is compelling
demn racial discrimination, unequal pay for equal because the wretchedness of the world's poor is
work, and judicial punishment based on a judge's profound and the economic gap between rich and
prejudice. For justice's sake, we strive to treat poor is wide. According to the latest estimates,
people the same unless there is a morally relevant 836 million people are living in extreme poverty,
reason for treating them differently-that is, we barely surviving on less than $1.90 a day. About
try to treat equals equally. For reasons of justice, 200 million children under age five are under-
we act-or feel obliged to act-to change the way nourished, suffering from stunting or wasting,
things are, to try to make the world or ourselves while 340 million suffer from hidden hunger. In
more just. the developing world, the mortality rate for chil-
Among the more vexing questions of justice dren under five is forty-three deaths per thousand
are those that emerge when we become aware of live births. 1
people in dire need of something we have, some- Economic inequality across the globe has
thing we could easily supply. Then the questions always been with us, but now its scale is larger than
are, Do we have a duty to give to the needy in order most people realize. The eighty-five richest people
to somehow ease their misery? Do they have a right on the planet now own as much as the entire poor-
to some of what we have? If so, how much should est half of the world's population. People in the
we relinquish to them? Would we be justified in poorest half of the world's population possess only
refusing to give? Such queries trouble us on two about 0.7 percent of the world's wealth. The richest
levels-locally (pertaining to needy people nearby: 1 percent of people own almost half of all wealth-
in our neighborhood, community, or country) and which amounts to $110 trillion. Perhaps it is not
globally (regarding the poor and hungry in other surprising that in 2005 the wealthiest 20 percent
countries). The former has always been a concern. of the world's people consumed over 75 percent
The latter presses us harder than ever because, of its goods, whereas the poorest consumed only
thanks to our technology and wealth, we now 1.5 percent. 2
know a great deal about the suffering of people in Most careful thinkers agree on such facts and
distan t lands and we have the wherewithal to do react with dismay and sympathy, but they disagree
something about it. In this chapter, we explore the on the proper moral response to the massive suf-
global question, What are our obligations to the fering. The disagreements hinge on which moral
783
theory is accepted and on how certain elements of lives. They may, out of a sense of charity, give to
morality are interpreted. the destitute, but they are not morally required to
One factor is our distance from those who need give anything. Others argue that people have both
help. Suppose you come upon a child drowning in negative and positive rights and that we are there-
a stream. With very little inconvenience to yourself fore obligated to aid the less fortunate, including
you could easily save her, and you are the only per- the poor and hungry of the world. They may con-
son in a position to do so. If you walk away, no one tend that everyone has a right to the necessities of
will be the wiser. Would you save her? Most people life and that the affluent are, therefore, duty bound
probably would, and many would think they had to provide them. The have-nots possess a right to
a duty to save her. That is, not to save her would be the resources of the haves. Exactly how much the
wrong. have-nots are entitled to, however, is a matter of
But imagine that the child is not 20 feet away debate.
from you but 1 mile or 100 miles or 5,000 miles Some argue that we must aid the needy of other
away. If you somehow had the power to rescue lands because we have a duty of beneficence, a
her despite the distance involved, would you moral obligation to benefit others. The impover-
be obligated to do so? Most of us assume that we ished may not have a right to our resources, but we
have duties to help those close to us-our family, nevertheless should give what we can to them. If we
friends, neighbors, or fellow citizens. After all, we can help the poor without sacrificing too much of
have relationships with these people, and we are what we have, the argument goes, we should do so.
often in a good position to aid them. But many For a few conscientious people, beneficence
believe we have no duty at all to help distant seems to require extraordinary sacrifice-they feel
peoples, strangers with whom we have no social obliged to give until their own standard of living
or emotional connection. Distance changes our is jeopardized. Others accept a duty of beneficence
moral obligations; charity begins at home. Others toward the distant needy but try to balance it
argue that distance is irrelevant. As one philoso- against other duties, including those to their fami-
pher says, "It makes no moral difference whether lies and to themselves.
the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards People in this latter group often appeal to a
from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never common distinction in morality-that between
know, ten thousand miles away.,,3 obligatory and supererogatory actions. Obligatory
Another important element in debates over aid actions are what duty requires; supererogatory
to the needy is the notion of rights. A right is a per- actions are above and beyond the demands of
son's claim or entitlement to something, a moral duty. Supererogatory conduct is not required, but
demand that obligates others to act accordingly. it is praiseworthy. Some think their duty of benefi-
Someone's negative right obligates others not to cence is limited and that giving more than required
interfere with that person's obtaining something. is supererogatory-commendable but optional.
Someone's positive right obligates others to help Others (many utilitarians, for example) do not
that person obtain something. recognize supererogatory actions. To them, duty
Many insist that people possess only nega- demands that we benefit others as much as possible
tive rights-that is, persons are entitled to be free all the time. If maximum moral effort is required
of coercion or harm or improper restraint. Those of all our actions, then no actions are supereroga-
who take this line maintain that they have no tory. On this view, we should give until it hurts,
duty to help the needy, whether near or far. Their perhaps to the point of greatly reducing our own
obligation is to refrain from interfering in others' wealth.
CHAPTER 21: GLOBAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE () 785
MORAL THEORIES not obligated to share our resources with those less
fortunate. If we aid the needy, we do so as an act of
Concerns about justice emerge in different regions
charity, not because duty commands.
of the moral life. As we saw in earlier chapters, they
Critics of the libertarian doctrine say that it
appear in deliberations about fair punishment for
conflicts with commonsense morality. In strictly
wrongdoing, an issue known as retributive jus-
libertarian terms, we have no duty to save a drown-
tice. Questions regarding the fair distribution
ing child even though we could do so with mini-
of society's goods (income, rights, welfare aid,
mal trouble. But surely when saving her life costs
etc.) are topics of distributive justice. The lat-
us so little, the critics say, we have a strong duty of
ter applies not only to justice within a society but
beneficence to pull her from the water. The notion
also to justice among societies-for example, to the
that saving her is not morally obligatory but merely
global distribution of wealth and resources among
optional seems implausible.
rich and poor countries and among rich and poor
Consequentialist or utilitarian theories ha:e
individuals.
been marshaled both to commend the aiding of dIS-
Theories of distributive justice try to explain
tant peoples and to deplore it. Taking a utilitarian
what makes a particular allocation of economic
tack, Peter Singer argues that we can increase the
goods fair or just. They may be part of a broader
moral theory such as Kantian ethics or utilitarian- overall good, or utility, in the world if the afflue~t
ism, or they may stand alone as distinct conceptions give large portions of their wealth to the needy In
of justice. Either way, they often have something other countries. He thinks his approach would dra-
interesting to say about the morality of helping or matically lower the standard of living for the rich
not helping impoverished people of distant lands. and drastically reduce the suffering of the poor,
resulting in a general decrease in misery, starvation,
Libertarian theories of justice emphasize
individual liberties and negative rights. Exempli- and death. He tries to show that transferring our
fied in the writings of Robert Nozick,John Hospers, surplus of goods to those who have little or nothing
and others, these perspectives reject positive rights is not a supererogatory gesture but an inescapable
as a violation of personal freedom, because such moral obligation.
rights force people to contribute to the welfare of Others who argue in a consequentialist vein
others. The central point is that people have a right have ended up opposing aid to the world's starving
not to be interfered with and to do whatever they millions. In their view, uncontrolled population
want with their own property as long as they do not growth is the cause of global poverty and starva-
violate the liberty rights of others. John Hospers tion. They contend that in developing countries,
expresses the view like this: population growth is usually unrestrained, so pop-
ulation increases over time, inevitably outstripping
The political philosophy that is called libertari- available food supplies. Famine soon follows, and
anism ... is the doctrine that every person is the many die; but then the balance between popula-
owner of his own life, and that no one is the owner tion and available food is restored. Giving the starv-
of anyone else's life; and that consequently every
ing people food to avert famine would temporarily
human being has the right to act in accordance
with his own choices, unless those actions infringe prevent mass starvation and allow the population
on the equal liberty of other human beings to act in to increase again-but that would only postpone
accordance with tlleir choices:' the inevitable famine. When this catastrophe does
come, many more people will suffer and die than
The libertarian asserts that we have no duty if food were never donated. Thus, on consequen-
to help the poor and hungry of the world; we are tialist grounds, these critics of food aid argue that
"~
--
5::::-
Economic Inequality in the United States
The underlying issue in global economic justice is 3. The black-white income gap in the U.S. has per-
inequality-the discrepancy between those who sisted over time. The difference in median house-
are economically well off and those who have hold incomes between white and black Americans
little or almost nothing. But economic inequal- has grown from about $23,800 in 1970 to roughly
ity has been a disconcerting feature of life inside $33,000 in 2018 (as measured in 2018 dollars).
the United States as well and is likely to become Median black household income was 61 % of
even more pronounced and more fiercely debated median white household income in 2018, up
as the COVID-19 pandemic does its damage. modestly from 56% in 1970-but down slightly
Here are some basic facts about American eco- from 63% in 2007, before the Great Recession,
nomic inequality, compiled by the Pew Research according to Current Population Survey data.
Center. 4. Overall, 61 % of Americans say there is too much
1. Over the past 50 years, the highest-earning economic inequality in the country today, but
20% of U.S. households have steadily brought views differ by political party and household
in a larger share of the country's total income. income level. Among Republicans and those
In 2018, households in the top fifth of earners who lean toward the GOP, 41 % say there is too
(with incomes of $130,001 or more that year) much inequality in the U.S., compared with 78%
brought in 52% of all U.S. income, more than the of Democrats and Democratic leaners, a Pew
lower four-fifths combined, according to Census Research Center survey conducted in September
Bureau data. 2019 found ....
In 1968, by comparison, the top-earning 20% 5. The wealth gap between America's richest and
of households brought in 43% of the nation's poorer families more than doubled from 1989 to
income, while those in the lower four income 2016, according to a recent analysis by the Center. *
quintiles accounted for 56% ....
2. Income inequality in the U.S. is the highest of *"6 Facts about Economic Inequality in the U.S.,"
all the G7 nations, according to data from the Pew Research Center, February 7, 2020, https:/Iwww.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and pewresea rch .org/fact-ta n kl2020/02/07/6-facts-a bout-
economic-inequality-in-the-u-sl (June 21, 2020).
Development....
feeding the hungry in countries where population Egalitarian theories of justice hold that
is unchecked will just lead to greater tragedy. Our justice requires equal distribution of goods among
moral duty, they say, is not to feed the hungry. all persons. Some egalitarians insist that everyone
Critics question nearly every assumption behind be allotted a certain minimum amount of vital
this argument. They dispute the notions that popu- goods such as food and medical care. Others claim
lation growth is the primary cause of famine, that that only a truly equal share of everything is just.
giving food aid is the only option for preventing Since all persons have equal value and deserve
starvation, and that rich nations bear no respon- equal respect, they have equal rights to the world's
sibility for the plight of the poor in developing resources. The world's food, for example, should
countries. be shared equally by everyone on the planet. This
-
CHAPTER 21: GLOBAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE 0 787
global equality is the supreme value, even though MORAL ARGUMENTS

it requires taking goods from the better-off to give
to the needy, thus curtailing the personal liberties Among the more influential arguments on obliga-
of some for the betterment of others. tions to the world's needy is Peter Singer's utilitar-
This latter point provokes considerable criti- ian case for making major personal sacrifices to aid
cism from those who believe that individual impoverished, starving people. His argument is
liberties should take precedence over economic straightforward:
equality-libertarians, for example. They think 1. "[S]uffering and death from lack of food, shel-
ensuring that people can use their own legiti- ter, and medical care are bad."s
mately acquired resources as they see fit is more
2. "[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad
important than guaranteeing that everyone's
from happening, without thereby sacrificing
needs are met.
anything of comparable moral importance, we
ought, morally, to do it.,,6
3. Therefore, we are morally obligated to prevent
QUICI< REVIEW suffering caused by the lack of these necessities.
justice-The morality of persons getting what is Singer asserts that our moral duty applies to
fair or what is their due. needy people regardless of their distance from
right-A claim or entitlement to something; a us. "If we accept any principle of impartiality,
moral demand that obligates others to honor it. universalizability, equality, or whatever," he says,
negative right-A person's right that obligates "we cannot discriminate against someone merely
others not to interfere with that person's because he is far away from us (or we are far away
obtaining something. from him).,,7
positive right-A person's right that obligates The argument shows, Singer says, that giving
others to help that person obtain something. money to famine relief is not an act of charity-a
duty of beneficence-A moral obligation to benefit supererogatory gesture-but a moral duty:
others. Because giving money is regarded as an act of char-
supererogatory actions-Conduct that is above and ity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong
beyond duty; not required, but praiseworthy. with not giving.... On the contrary, we ought to
give the money away, and it is wrong not to do SO.8
retributive justice-Justice concerning the fair
use of punishment for wrongdoing. But how much should we give? The second
distributive justice-Justice concerning the fair premise reqUires a drastic change in conventional
distribution of society's goods. moral attitudes toward the extent of our obligations:
libertarian theory of justice-A doctrine empha- [W]e ought to give until we reach the level of mar-
sizing individual liberties and negative rights, ginal utility-that is, the level at which, by giving
and rejecting positive rights as a violation of more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or
personal freedom. my dependents as I would relieve by my gift. This
would mean, of course, that one would reduce one-
egalitarian theory of justice-A doctrine hold- self to very near the material circumstances of a
ing that justice requires equal distribution of Bengali refugee. 9
goods and social benefits among all persons.
Singer offers a weaker version of the second
premise, even though he thinks the stronger one is
closer to the truth: we are duty bound to prevent summer fishing. Must our industrious farmer ignore
something bad from happening as long as we can his hard work and give the surplus away because his
prevent it without "sacrificing anything morally neighbor or his family will suffer? What again seems
clear is that we have more than one factor to weigh.
significant."l0 This principle would require us to
Not only should we compare the consequences of
contribute to famine relief when doing so would his keeping it with his giving it away; we also should
not cost us anything of real importance. If by aid- weigh the fact that one farmer deserves the food,
ing the poor we would have to forgo buying new he earned it through his hard work. 13
clothes or a fancier car, so be it.
Even if we all adopted only the weaker principle, Others who question Singer's view concede
Singer says, society would likely be transformed: that we have an obligation to aid distant people but
maintain that we also have a duty to help those
Even if we accepted the principle only in its moder- with whom we have a special relationship. As one
ate form, however, it should be clear that we would
philosopher explains,
have to give away enough to ensure that the con-
sumer society, dependent as it is on people spend- I may have a duty to give of my surplus to help save
ing on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, drowning children in a distant land, but I have a
would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely.ll stronger duty to help those with whom I have inti-
mate or contractual ties. 14
Critics of Singer's strong premise charge that
it disregards essential features of the moral life.
We may have a duty to help those in need, but we
also have obligations involving rights. John Arthur
contends, for example, that each person has rights CHAPTER REVIEW
that should not be relinquished even to help others
in dire need. Each of us could help others by giv-
ing away a kidney or an eye-we could save a life or SUMMARY
restore sight to a blind person, and our loss would
not be comparable to the terrible loss experienced Justice is about persons getting what is fair or
by someone who will die or be blind for lack of our what is their due. Distributive justice pertains
help. But this much sacrifice is not obligatory: to the fair distribution of society's goods and
applies to both national and international issues.
If anything is clear, however, it is that our [moral] A central justice issue in global economics is, What
code does not require such heroism; you are entitled is the moral duty of the affluent to the needy of
to keep your second eye and kidney.... The reason
the world?
for this is often expressed in terms of rights; it's
In answering this question, libertarian theories-
your body, you have a right to it, and that weighs
against whatever duty you have to help. To sacrifice which emphasize negative rights-say that we have
a kidney to a stranger is to do more than is reqUired, no duties to the poor. The poor have only negative
it's heroic. 12 rights of noninterference; they have no positive rights
to be aided by others. Consequentialist theories have
Singer's critics hold that desert is another factor been used both to advocate helping the poor and to
we must weigh when deciding whether to give food refrain from helping them, their proponents argu-
to the hungry. As Arthur says, ing that the overall benefits and harms of aid are the
Suppose, for example, an industrious farmer man- deciding factor. Egalitarian theories maintain that
ages through hard work to produce a surplus of justice requires equal distributions of goods among
food for the winter while a lazy neighbor spends his all persons.
Peter Singer argues that we should make huge sac- Discussion Questions
rifices to aid the impoverished of the world: if it is in
1. Do we have a duty to give to the needy to
our power to prevent something bad from happen-
help ease their suffering? If so, under what
ing without sacrificing anything of comparable moral
circumstances do we have such a duty?
importance, we should do it. John Arthur argues that
2. Would you have a moral duty to save a drowning
Singer's view disregards essential features of the moral
child if you could easily do so with very little
life-namely, rights and desert.
inconvenience to yourself? Why or why not?
3. Do you believe in positive rights-that is, rights
that obligate others to help someone obtain
I<EY TERMS
something?
justice (p. 783)
4. Are you a (distributive justice) libertarian? Why
right (p. 784)
or why not?
negative right (p. 784)
5. What aspects of libertarian theories do you find
positive right (p. 784)
most appealing? What aspects do you find most
duty of beneficence (p. 784)
unattractive? What do you think is most plausible
supererogatory actions (p. 784)
and implausible about egalitarian theories?
retributive justice (p. 785)
6. How do libertarians and egalitarians differ in
distributive justice (p. 785)
their views about personal liberty?
libertarian theory of justice (p. 785)
7. Suppose you could transform society into a
egalitarian theory of justice (p. 786)
system of distributive justice based strictly
on libertarian principles. What would be the
real-world implications of such a change? What
EXERCISES
changes would we see in welfare, health care,
Review Questions poverty relief, and other programs based on
1. What is justice? How is the concept of justice positive rights? Who would be helped or hurt in
related to issues such as racial discrimination this libertarian world?
and unequal pay for equal work? (p. 783) 8. How might the strict application of an egalitarian
2. To what does the phrase "economic gap theory of justice change society? Who would
between the world's rich and poor" refer? likely be helped or hurt in such a system?
(p. 783) 9. How strong is your duty of beneficence? Should
3. What is a right? What is the difference between you give to the needy only if you have resources
a negative and a positive right? (p. 784) to spare? Should you give until your own
4. What is the duty of beneficence? (p. 784) standard of living is reduced? Explain.
S. Give two examples of positive rights and two 10. You may have a duty of beneficence to your
examples of negative rights. (p. 784) immediate family, but do you have a similar
6. What are supererogatory actions? (p. 784 duty to needy people in your neighborhood? To
7. What is distributive justice? What is retributive starving people in a faraway land? If you help your
justice? (p. 785) family live comfortably but refuse to aid anyone
8. What characterizes libertarian theories of else, are you morally blameworthy? Explain.
distributive justice? (p. 785)
9. What characterizes egalitarian theories of
FURTHER READING
distributive justice? (p. 786) William Aiken and Hugh laFollette, eds., World Hunger and
10. On what grounds do libertarians reject positive Morality, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
rights? (p. 785) 1996).
Lester R. Brown, Tough Choices: Facing the Challenge ofFood Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmo-
Scarcity (New York: Norton, 1996). politan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:
Joel E. Cohen, How Many People Can the Earth Support? Polity Press, 2008).
(New York: Norton, 1995). Louis P. Pojman, "World Hunger and Population," in Life
Nigel Dower, "World Poverty," in A Companion to Ethics, and Death: Grappling with the Moral Dilemmas of Our
ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993). Time, rev. 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000).
Steven Luper-Foy, ed., Problems of International Justice MichaelJ. Sandel, ed., Justice: A Reader (New York: Oxford
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). University Press, 2007).
William W. Murdoch and Allan Oaten, "Population and Food: Robert N. Van Wyk, "Perspectives on World Hunger
Metaphors and the Reality," BioSdence 25 (1975): 561-67. and the Extent of Our Positive Duties," Public Affairs
Onora O'Neill, Faces ofHunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, Quarterly 2, no. 2 (April 1988): 75-90.
and Development (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
ETHICAL DILEMMAS
1. Averting Famine
For years the small nation of Malawi in southern Africa remained on the verge of
famine, with high rates of acute child hunger, begging for emergency food aid from
richer countries. But now the tables have turned, and Malawi is growing enough
food to feed its people and sell much of the surplus to other nations. Rates of child
hunger have dropped dramatically.
Why the change? With the soil in Malawi overfarmed and depleted, it was
impossible for the country to feed itself. The situation improved only when Malawi
began to ignore the advice of the World Bank and rich countries, which advised
Malawi to get rid of fertilizer subsidies and to rely on the workings of free
markets. After the disastrous harvest of 2005, Malawi reversed the trend and
subsidized farmers' use of fertilizer-just as many Western countries do for their
own farmers.
Malawi's success has prompted reappraisals of the capacity of agriculture to
eliminate poverty and of a government's ability to spur self-sufficiency and growth
through investments in agricultural production and know-how. *
If, as this story suggests, the World Bank and rich shortages? Does the experience of the Malawi
nations offered bad advice to Malawi, do they show that advice from agricultural experts should
bear some responsibility for the subsequent food always be ignored?
*Based on Celia W. Dugger, "Ending Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts," New York Times, December 2,2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/world/africa/02malawLhtml?scp:::::1&sq::ending+famine+simply+by+igno
ring+the+experts&st::nyt&_r=O (March 1,2015).
2. Developed Countries Failing the Poor
UNITED NATIONS-In criticism aimed primarily at the United States, Japan and the
European Union, a U.N. report said rich donor nations have failed to deliver on
promises to help the world's poorest countries and must increase aid by $18 billion
a year.
The report released Thursday also criticized the failure of rich and poor nations
to reach a trade pact in seven years of negotiations that would expand global trade
opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty. It called for redoubled
efforts to conclude negotiations.
The report was issued ahead of a Sept. 25 meeting of world leaders at U.N.
headquarters to step up efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals,
adopted by world leaders at a summit in 2000. The goals include cutting extreme
poverty by half, ensuring universal primary school education and starting to reverse
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all by 2015 ....
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told a press conference that the report
"sounds a strong alarm."
"The main message is that while there has been progress on several counts,
delivery on commitments made by member states has been deficient, and has fallen
behind schedule," he said. "We are already in the second half of our contest against
poverty. We are running out of time." ...
Ban noted that total aid from the world's major donor nations amounts to
only 0.25% of their combined national income, far below the U.N. target of 0.7%.
The only countries to reach or exceed that target were Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.t
Is the failure of rich nations to aid the world's supererogatory act? What conclusion do you draw
poorest countries morally wrong? Is the giving from the United States' failure to contribute its
of aid a moral obligation for rich nations-or a promised share of aid?
tAssociated Press, "U.N. Report: Developed Countries Failing Poor," published on USAToday.com, September 4,
2008. © The Associated Press. Reprinted by permission.
3. Singer or Arthur?
CBC News-The Church World Service aid agency is warning that "immediate,
massive intervention and assistance" are needed to prevent mass starvation in Kenya.
A team from the humanitarian agency reported recently that many fields are
barren and cracked, dried out by the drought that is threatening a third of the east
African country's population, or about 10 million people.
What was once among the most fertile land in Africa can now only support a
few struggling plants suitable only for grazing cattle.
"We don't have any food," farmer Lizy Bimba, a Kwale resident, said in Swahili.
In one area, a local official reported that 85 per cent of 5,600 people are facing
starvation, the Church World Service team said.
Other farmers have left the land to find what work they can.
"We have been forced to do this so that we get money to buy food," Musa Charo
said in Swahili as he broke rocks to earn money to feed his 10 children.
The government declared the food shortage a national disaster on Jan. 16, the
UN is appealing for international help and aid agencies warn that the problem will
only get worse.*
What would be the proper moral response of rich to feed the hungry? Or Arthur's way, in which the
nations to this impending tragedy? Do you favor rich would have a duty to give some aid but would
Peter Singer's path in which affluent individuals also have obligations to themselves and to their
would be obligated to give much of their wealth family and friends? Explain.
*CBC News Staff, "Kenya Facing Mass Starvation: Aid Group." eBe News, January 31, 2009. Reprinted by
permission of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
READINGS
From Famine, Affluence, and Morality

PETER SINGER
As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying sums to relief funds; they have not written to their
in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical parliamentary representatives demanding increased
care. The suffering and death that are occurring there government assistance; they have not demonstrated in
now are not inevitable, not unavoidable in any fatalis- the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else
tic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and directed toward providing the refugees with the means
a civil war have turned at least nine million people into to satisfy their essential needs. At the government
destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond the level, no government has given the sort of massive aid
capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance that would enable the refugees to survive for more than
to reduce any further suffering to very small propor- a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more
tions. The decisions and actions of human beings can than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000.
prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human For comparative purposes, Britain's share of the non-
beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the recoverable development costs of the Anglo-French
individual level, people have, with very few excep- Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000,
tions, not responded to the situation in any significant and on present estimates will reach £440,000,000. The
way. Generally speaking, people have not given large implication is that the British government values a
supersonic transport more than thirty times as highly
as it values the lives of the nine million refugees. Aus-
Peter Singer, excerpts from "Famine, Affluence, and Morality."
tralia is another country which, on a per capita basis,
Philosoph}' (md Public Affairs 1(3): 229-36, 238, and 240-43. Copy-
right () 1972 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permis- is well up in the "aid to Bengal" table. Australia's aid,
sion of Blackwell Publishing Ltd. however, amounts to less than one-twelfth of the cost
I
.~
of Sydney's new opera house. The total amount given, hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps from
from all sources, now stands at about £65,000,000. The some of them it would not follow that death by star-
estimated cost of keeping the refugees alive for one year vation is in itself bad. It is difficult, perhaps impos-
is £464,000,000. Most of the refugees have now been in sible, to refute such positions, and so for brevity I will
the camps for more than six months. The World Bank henceforth take this assumption as accepted. Those
has said that India needs a minimum of £300,000,000 who disagree need read no further.
in assistance from other countries before the end of My next point is this: if it is in our power to pre-
the year. It seems obvious that assistance on this scale vent something bad from happening, without thereby
will not be forthcoming. India will be forced to choose sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,
between letting the refugees starve or diverting funds we ought, morally, to do it. By "without sacrificing
from her own development program, which will mean anything of comparable moral importance" I mean
that more of her own people will starve in the future. I without causing anything else comparably bad to
These are the essential facts about the present situ- happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself,
ation in Bengal. So far as it concerns us here, there is or failing to promote some moral good, comparable
nothing unique about this situation except its mag- in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent.
nitude. The Bengal emergency is just the latest and This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the
most acute of a series of major emergencies in vari- last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and
ous parts of the world, arising both from natural and not to promote what is good, and it requires this of us
from man-made causes. There are also many parts of only when we can do it without sacrifidng anything
the world in which people die from malnutrition and that is, from the moral point of view, comparably
lack of food independent of any special emergency. important. I could even, as far as the application of
I take Bengal as my example only because it is the my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned,
present concern, and because the size of the problem . if't'
qualify the pOint so as to make It: I IS I'n our power to
has ensured that it has been given adequate public- prevent something very bad from happening, without
. 'ficant we
ity. Neither individuals nor governments can claim to thereby sacrificing anything moral Iy Slgnl . '.
be unaware of what is happening there. ought, morally, to do it. An application of thIS prm-
ast a shal-
What are the moral implications of a situation ciple would be as follows: if I am walking P
like this? In what follows, I shall argue that the way low pond and see a child drowning in it, I ough~ to
people in relatively affluent countries react to a situ- wade in and pull the child out. This will mean gettIng
ation like that in Bengal cannot be justified; indeed, my clothes muddy, but thIS . IS . . 'flcant, while the
. mSlgnI
the whole way we look at moral issues-our moral death of the child would presumably be a very bad
conceptual scheme-needs to be altered, and with it, thing. . . I
the way of life that has come to be taken for granted The uncontroversial appearance of the pnnclP. e
in our society. just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even In
In arguing for this conclusion I will not, of course, .
its qualified form our lIves, our SOCI.ety, and our world
claim to be morally neutral. I shall, however, try to would be funda~entally changed. For the principle
argue for the moral position that I take, so that anyone "ty or distance . It
takes, firstly, no account 0 f proxlml
who accepts certain assumptions, to be made explicit, makes no moral difference whether the person I can
will, I hope, accept my conclusion. help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Ben-
I begin with the assumption that suffering and gali whose name I shall never know, ten tho~s~nd
death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care miles away. Secondly, the principle makes no dIstInc-
are bad. I think most people will agree about this, tion between cases in which I am the only person who
although one may reach the same view by differ- could possibly do anything and cases in which I am
ent routes. I shall not argue for this view. People can just one among millions in the same position.
I do not think I need to say much in defense of the no further away than I am, who have also noticed the
refusal to take proximity and distance into account. The child but are doing nothing? One has only to ask this
fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers
personal contact with him, may make it more likely lessen obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for
that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils-
ought to help him rather than another who happens to poverty, overpopulation, pollution-are problems in
be further away. If we accept any principle of impartial- which everyone is almost equally involved.
ity, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot The view that numbers do make a difference can
discriminate against someone merely because he is far be made plausible if stated in this way: if everyone in
away from us (or we are far away from him). Admit- circumstances like mine gave £S to the Bengal Relief
tedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shel-
judge what needs to be done to help a person near to ter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no
us than one far away, and perhaps also to provide the reason why I should give more than anyone else in
assistance we judge to be necessary. If this were the case, the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no
it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. obligation to give more than is. Each premise in this
This may once have been a justification for being more argument is true, and the argument looks sound. It
concerned with the poor in one's own town than with may convince us, unless we notice that it is based on a
famine victims in India. Unfortunately for those who hypothetical premise, although the conclusion is not
like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant stated hypothetically. The argument would be sound
communication and swift transportation have changed if the conclusion were: if everyone in circumstances
the situation. From the moral point of view, the devel- like mine were to give is, I would have no obliga-
opment of the world into a "global village" has made tion to give more than is. If the conclusion were so
an important, though still unrecognized, difference to stated, however, it would be obvious that the argu-
our moral situation. Expert observers and superVisors, ment has no bearing on a situation in which it is not
sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently the case that everyone else gives is. This, of course, is
stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a the actual situation. It is more or less certain that not
refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it everyone in circumstances like mine will give is. So
to someone in our own block. There would seem, there- there will not be enough to provide the needed food,
fore, to be no possible justification for discriminating shelter, and medical care. Therefore by giving more
on geographical grounds. than £S I will prevent more suffering than I would if
There may be a greater need to defend the sec- I gave just is.
ond implication of my principle-that the fact that It might be thought that this argument has an
there are millions of other people in the same posi- absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to
tion, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does be that very few people are likely to give substantial
not make the situation significantly different from a amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar
situation in which I am the only person who can pre- circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that
vent something very bad from occurring. Again, of is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one
course, I admit that there is a psychological difference would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and
between the cases; one feels less gUilty about doing one's dependents-perhaps even beyond this point
nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving
who have also done nothing. Yet this can make no real more one would cause oneself and one's dependents
difference to our moral obligations. 2 Should I consider as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal. If
that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out everyone does this, however, there will be more than
of the pond if on looking around I see other people, can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some
of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary. Thus, if distinction between duty and charity cannot be
everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw
be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded
than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they as an act of charity in our society. The bodies which
ought to do. collect money are known as "charities." These organi-
The paradox here arises only if we assume that zations see themselves in this way-if you send them
the actions in question-sending money to the relief a check, you will be thanked for your "generosity."
funds-are performed more or less simultaneously, Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity,
and are also unexpected. For if it is to be expected it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not
that everyone is going to contribute something, then giving. The charitable man may be praised, but the
dearly each is not obliged to give as much as he would man who is not charitable is not condemned. People
have been obliged to had others not been giving too. do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spend-
And if everyone is not acting more or less simultane- ing money on new clothes or a new car instead of giv-
ously, then those giving later will know how much ing it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not
more is needed, and will have no obligation to give occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter can-
more than is necessary to reach this amount. To say not be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep
this is not to deny the principle that people in the ourselves warm but to look "well-dressed" we are not
same circumstances have the same obligations, but to providing for any important need. We would not be
point out that the fact that others have given, or may sacrificing anything significant if we were to con~ue
be expected to give, is a relevant circumstance: those to wear our old clothes, and give the money to faffilne
giving after it has become known that many others relief. By doing so, we would be preventing anoth~r
are giving and those giving before are not in the same person from starving. It follows from what I have saId
circumstances. So the seemingly absurd consequence earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than
of the principle I have put forward can occur only if spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep ~s
people are in error about the actual circumstances- warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor IS
that is, if they think they are giving when others are it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians
not, but in fact they are giving when others are. The have called "supererogatory"-an act wh IC · h 1't would
result of everyone doing what he really ought to do be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On ~he con-
cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing trary, we ought to give the money away, and it IS wrong
less than he ought to do, although the result of every- not to do so.
one doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do I am not maintaining that there are no acts which
could be. are charitable, or that there are no acts which it would
If my argument so far has been sound, neither be good to do but not wrong not to do. It may be
our distance from a preventable evil nor the number possible to redraw the distinction between duty and
of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the charity in some other place. All I am arguing her~ is
same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to miti- that the present way of drawing the distinction, WhICh
gate or prevent that evil. I shall therefore take as estab- makes it an act of charity for a man living at the level
lished the principle I asserted earlier. As I have already of affluence which most people in the "developed
said, I need to assert it only in its qualified form: if it nations" enjoy to give money to save someone else
is in our power to prevent something very bad from from starvation cannot be supported. It is beyond the
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else scope of my ar~ment to consider whether the dis-
morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. tinction should be redrawn or abolished altogether.
The outcome of this argument is that our tra- There would be many other possible ways of drawing
ditional moral categories are upset. The traditional the distinction-for instance, one might decide that it
is good to make other people as happy as possible, but be less effective than we would otherwise have been.
not wrong not to do so. Nevertheless, when all considerations of this sort have
Despite the limited nature of the revision in our been taken into account, the conclusion remains: we
moral conceptual scheme which I am proposing, the ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can
revision would, given the extent of both affluence and without sacrificing something else of comparable
famine in the world today, have radical implications. moral importance. This conclusion is one which we
These implications may lead to further objections, may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why
distinct from those I have already considered. I shall it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for
discuss two of these. which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our
One objection to the pOSition I have taken might ordinary standards of behavior. Since most people are
be simply that it is too drastic a revision of our moral self-interested to some degree, very few of us are likely
scheme. People do not ordinarily judge in the way to do everything that we ought to do. It would, how-
I have suggested they should. Most people reserve ever, hardly be honest to take this as evidence that it is
their moral condemnation for those who violate some not the case that we ought to do it.
moral norm, such as the norm against taking another
* * *
person's property. They do not condemn those who
indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief. But [Another] pOint raised by the conclusion reached
given that I did not set out to present a morally neutral earlier relates to the question of just how much we all
description of the way people make moral judgments, ought to be giving away. One possibility, which has
the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do already been mentioned, is that we ought to give until
with the validity of my conclusion. My conclusion we reach the level of marginal utility-that is, the level
follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suf-
and unless that prinCiple is rejected, or the arguments fering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by
shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would
stand, however strange it appears. reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances
* * * of a Bengali refugee. It will be recalled that earlier I put
forward both a strong and a moderate version of the
The second objection to my attack on the present principle of preventing bad occurrences. The strong
distinction between duty and charity is one which has version, which required us to prevent bad things from
from time to time been made against utilitarianism. It happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing
follows from some forms of utilitarian theory that we something of comparable moral Significance, does
all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase seem to require reducing ourselves to the level of mar-
the balance of happiness over misery. The pOSition I ginal utility. I should also say that the strong version
have taken here would not lead to this conclusion in seems to me to be the correct one. I proposed the more
all circumstances, for if there were no bad occurrences moderate version-that we should prevent bad occur-
that we could prevent without sacrificing something rences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something
of comparable moral importance, my argument would morally significant-only in order to show that even
have no application. Given the present conditions in on this surely undeniable principle a great change
many parts of the world, however, it does follow from in our way of life is required. On the more moderate
my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full principle, it may not follow that we ought to reduce
time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might
a result of famine or other disasters. Of course, mitigat- hold that to reduce oneself and one's family to this
ing circumstances can be adduced-for instance, that level is to cause something significantly bad to hap-
if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall pen. Whether this is so I shall not discuss, since, as
I have said, I can see no good reason for holding the Nor, I think, is it disputed that we can do something
moderate version of the principle rather than the about it, either through orthodox methods of fam-
strong version. Even if we accepted the principle only ine relief or through population control or both.
in its moderate form, however, it should be clear that This is therefore an issue on which philosophers are
we would have to give away enough to ensure that the competent to take a position. The issue is one which
consumer society, dependent as it is on people spend- faces everyone who has more money than he n~e~s
ing on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would to support himself and his dependents, or who IS In
slow down and perhaps disappear entirely. There are a position to take some sort of political action, These
several reasons why this would be desirable in itself. categories must include practically every teacher and
The value and necessity of economic growth are now student of philosophy in the universities of the West-
being questioned not only by conservationists, but by ern world. If philosophy is to deal with matt~rs ,that
economists as well. There is no doubt, too, that the are relevant to both teachers and students, thIS IS an
consumer society has had a distorting effect on the issue that philosophers should discusS.
goals and purposes of its members. Yet lOOking at Discussion, though, IS . not enough . What is the
the matter purely from the point of view of overseas pOInt of relating philOsoph Y to public (and personal)
, . '
aid, there must be a limit to the extent to which we , 'ously? In
affairs if we do not take our conclUSIOns sen .
should deliberately slow down our economy; for it this instance taking our conclUSlon ' seriously means
might be the case that if we gave away, say, forty per- actmg, upon 'it. The philosop
' her will not find it anyf
cent of our Gross National Product, we would slow ' ttl'tudes and way 0
easier than anyone else to alter h IS a "
down the economy so much that in absolute terms we life to the extent that, if I am right, is involved m domg
would be giving less than if we gave twenty-five per- ' At the very least,
everything that we ought to be d omg.
hilosopher who
cent of the much larger GNP that we would have if we though one can make a start. The P h
limited our contribution to this smaller percentage. ' , f the benefits of t e
does so will have to sacrifice some 0 "h
mpensation m t e
I mention this only as an indication of the sort consumer society but he can fi n d co
, , h and prac-
of factor that one would have to take into account in satisfaction of a way of life in which t eory h
working out an ideal. Since Western societies generally ing toget er.
tice, if not yet in harmony, are at least com
consider one percent of the GNP an acceptable level
for overseas aid, the matter is entirely academic. Nor
does it affect the question of how much an individual NOTES
should give in a society in which very few are giving "I' ,that India would go to
1. There was also a third posslbllty, S'
substantial amounts. t their lands, mce
war to enable the refugees to return 0 "
, ' o u t , The SItuatIon
It is sometimes said, though less often now than I wrote this paper, IndIa has taken thIS way
th's does not affect my
it used to be, that philosophers have no special role to is no longer that described above, b ut I
play in public affairs, since most public issues depend argument, as the next paragraph indicates,
, h s often give to
primarily on an assessment of facts. On questions of 2, In view of the special sense philosoP er ,
I, f " SImply as the
fact, it is said, philosophers as such have no special the term, I should say that I use "ob Iga Ion I'
" h" that "I have an ob 1-
expertise, and so it has been possible to engage in abstract noun derived from oug t, so ht t "
h n "I oug 0,
philosophy without committing oneself to any posi- gation to" means no more, and no less, t a "
, h d finition of "ought
This usage is in accordance WIth t e e
tion on major public issues. No doubt there are some
given up by the Shorter oxford Englrs, h D'Ie ti 0 nary'" "the
issues of social policy and foreign policy about which , '
general verb to express duty or oblIgatIon, " I do not, thmk
it can truly be said that a really expert assessment of ,
any Issue of substance hangs on t h e way the term IS used; ,
the facts is required before taking sides or acting, but sentences in which I use "obligation" could all be rewnt-
the issue of famine is surely not one of these. The facts ten, although somewhat clumsily, as sentences m, w hich a
about the existence of suffering are beyond dispute. clause containing "ought" replaces the term "obligation,"
From World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The Case Against Singer
JOHN ARTHUR
INTRODUCTION a greater evil by giving them away. PrOViding others

My guess is that everyone who reads these words is with food, clothing, and housing would generally
wealthy by comparison with the poorest millions of be of more importance than buying luxuries, so the
people on our planet. Not only do we have plenty of greater moral evil rule now requires substantial redis-
money for food, clothing, housing, and other necessi- tribution of wealth.
ties, but a fair amount is left over for far less important Certainly there are few, if any, of us who live by
purchases like phonograph records, fancy clothes, that rule, although that hardly shows we are justified
trips, intoxicants, movies, and so on. And what's in our way of life; we often fail to live up to our own
more, we don't usually give thought to whether or standards. Why does Singer think our shared moral-
not we ought to spend our money on such luxuries ity requires that we follow the greater moral evil rule?
rather than to give it to those who need it more; we What arguments does he give for it?
just assume it's ours to do with as we please. He begins with an analogy. Suppose you came
Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," across a child drowning in a shallow pond. Certainly
argues that our assumption is wrong, that we should we feel it would be wrong not to help. Even if saving
not buy luxuries when others are in severe need. But [is the child meant we must dirty our clothes, we would
he] correct? .. He first argues that two general moral emphasize that those clothes are not of comparable
principles are widely accepted, and then that those significance to the child's life. The greater moral evil
principles imply an obligation to eliminate starvation. rule thus seems a natural way of capturing why we
The first prindple is simply that "suffering and death think it would be wrong not to help.
from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad." But the argument for the greater moral evil rule
Some may be inclined to think that the mere existence is not limited to Singer's claim that it explains our
of such an evil in itself places an obligation on others, but feelings about the drowning child or that it appears
that is, of course, the problem which Singer addresses. I "uncontroversial." Moral equality also enters the pic-
take it that he is not begging the question in this obvious ture. Besides the jeffersonian idea that we share certain
way and will argue from the existence of evil to the obli- rights equally, most of us are also attracted to another
gation of others to eliminate it. But how, exactly, does he type of equality, namely that like amounts of suffering
establish this? The second prindple, he thinks, shows (or happiness) are of equal significance, no matter who
the connection, but it is here that controversy arises. is experiendng them. I cannot reasonably say that,
This principle, which I will call the greater moral while my pain is no more severe than yours. I am some-
evil rule, is as follows: how special and it's more important that mine be alle-
viated. Objectivity requires us to admit the opposite,
If it is in our power to prevent something bad from hap- that no one has a unique status which warrants such
pening, without thereby sacrificing anything of com- special pleading. So equality demands equal consider-
parable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
ation of interests as well as respect for certain rights.
In other words, people are entitled to keep their But if we fail to give to famine relief and instead
earnings only if there is no way for them to prevent purchase a new car when the old one will do, or buy
fancy clothes for a friend when his or her old ones
"Equality, Entitlements, and the Distribution of Income," by John are perfectly good, are we not assuming that the rela-
Arthur. IC) 1991 by John Arthur. Previously published in Applying
tively minor enjoyment we or our friends may get is as
Ethics: A Text with Readings 2nd Ed., edited by John Barry (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth, 1985). Reprinted by permission of the Estate of important as another person's lfe? And that is a form
John Arthur, Amy Shaprio, executor, [email protected]. of prejudice; we are acting as if people were not equal
in the sense that their interests deserve equal consider- Property rights, the right to privacy, and the right to
ation. We are giving special consideration to ourselves exercise religious freedom are also negative, requiring
or to our group, rather like a racist does. Equal consid- only that people leave others alone and not interfere.
eration of interests thus leads naturally to the greater Positive rights, however, are rights of recipience. By
moral evil rule. not putting their children up for adoption, parents give
them various positive rights, including the rights to be
RIGHTS AND DESERT fed, clothed, and housed. If I agree to share in a business
Equality, in the sense of giving equal consideration to venture, my promise creates a right of recipience, so
equally serious needs, is part of our moral code. And that when I back out of the deal, I've violated your right.
so we are led, quite rightly I think, to the conclusion Negative rights also differ from positive in that
that we should prevent harm to others if in doing so the former are natural; the ones you have depend on
we do not sacrifice anything of comparable moral what you are. If lower animals lack rights to life or lib-
importance. But there is also another side to the cOin, erty it is because there is a relevant difference between
one which Singer and Watson ignore. This can be them and us. But the positive rights you may have are
expressed rather awkwardly by the notion of entitle- not natural; they arise because others have promised,
ments. These fall into two broad categories, rights and agreed, or contracted to give you something.
desert. A few examples will show what I mean. Normally, then, a duty to help a stranger in need is
All of us could help others by giving away or allow- not the result of a right he has. Such a right would be
ing others to use our bodies. While your life may be positive, and since no contract or promise was made,
shortened by the loss of a kidney or less enjoyable if no such right exists. An exception to this would be a
lived with only one eye, those costs are probably not lifeguard who contracts to watch out for someone's
comparable to the loss experienced by a person who children. The parent whose child drowns would
will die without any kidney or who is totally blind. We in this case be doubly wronged. First, the lifeguard
can even imagine persons who will actually be harmed should not have cruelly or thoughtlessly ignored the
in some way by your not granting sexual favors to them. child's interests, and second, he ought not to have
Perhaps the absence of a sexual partner would cause violated the rights of the parents that he help. Here,
psychological harm or even rape. Now suppose that unlike Singer's case, we can say there are rights at
you can prevent this evil without sacrificing anything stake. Other bystanders also act wrongly by cruelly
of comparable importance. Obviously such relations ignoring the child, but unlike the lifeguard they do
may not be pleasant, but according to the greater moral not violate anybody's rights. Moral rights are one fac-
evil rule, that is not enough; to be justified in refuSing, tor to be weighed, but we also have other obligations; I
you must show that the unpleasantness you would am not claiming that rights are all we need to consider.
experience is of equal importance to the harm you are That view, like the greater moral evil rule, trades sim-
preventing. Otherwise, the rule says you must consent. plicity for accuracy. In fact, our code expects us to hel~
If anything is clear, however, it is that our code does people in need as well as to respect negative and POSI-
not require such heroism; you are entitled to keep your tive rights. But we are also entitled to invoke our own
second eye and kidney and not bestow sexual favors on rights as justification for not giving to distant strang~rs
anyone who may be harmed without them. The reason or when the cost to us is substantial, as when we gIve
for this is often expressed in terms of rights; it's your up an eye or a kidney....
body, you have a right to it, and that weighs against Desert is a second form of entitlement. Suppose,
whatever duty you have to help. To sacrifice a kidney for example, an industrious farmer manages through
for a stranger is to do more than is required, it's herOic. hard work to produce a surplus of food for the win-
Moral rights are normally divided into two cat- ter while a lazy neighbor spends his summer fishing.
egories. Negative rights are rights of noninterference. Must our industrious farmer ignore his hard work
The right to life, for example, is a right not to be killed. and give the surplus away because his neighbor or his
family will suffer? What again seems clear is that we the rejection of rules which provide for distribution
have more than one factor to weigh. Not only should according to rights and desert. Certainly the fact that
we compare the consequences of his keeping it with in the past our moral code condemned suicide and
his giving it away; we also should weigh the fact that racial mixing while condoning slavery should not
one farmer deserves the food, he earned it through convince us that a more enlightened moral code, one
his hard work. Perhaps his deserving the product of which we would want to support, would take such
his labor is outweighed by the greater need of his lazy positions. Rules which define acceptable behavior
neighbor, or perhaps it isn't, but being outweighed is are continually changing, and we must allow for the
in any case not the same as weighing nothing! replacement of inferior ones.
Desert can be negative, too. The fact that the Why should we not view entitlements as exam-
Nazi war criminal did what he did means he deserves ples of inferior rules we are better off without? What
punishment, that we have a reason to send him to could justify our practice of evaluating actions by
jail. Other considerations, for example the fact that looking backward to rights and desert instead of just
nobody will be deterred by his suffering, or that he is to their consequences? One answer is that more fun-
old and harmless, may weigh against punishment and damental values than rights and desert are at stake,
so we may let him go; but again that does not mean he namely fairness, justice, and respect. Failure to reward
doesn't still deserve to be punished. those who earn good grades or promotions is wrong
Our moral code gives weight to both the greater because it's unfair; ignoring past guilt shows a lack of
moral evil principle and entitlements. The former regard for justice; and failure to respect rights to life,
emphasizes equality, claiming that from an objec- privacy, or religious choice suggests a lack of respect for
tive pOint of view all comparable suffering, who- other persons.
ever its victim, is equally significant. It encourages Some people may be persuaded by those remarks,
us to take an impartial look at all the various effects feeling that entitlements are now on an acceptably
of our actions; it is thus forward-looking. When we firm foundation. But an advocate of equality may well
consider matters of entitlement, however, our atten- want to question why fairness, justice, and respect for
tion is directed to the past. Whether we have rights persons should matter. But since it is no more obvious
to money, property, eyes, or whatever, depends on that preventing suffering matters than that fairness,
how we came to possess them. If they were acquired respect, and justice do, we again seem to have reached
by theft rather than from birth or through gift an impasse ....
exchange, then the right is suspect. Desert, like The lesson to be learned here is a general one;
rights, is also backward-looking, emphasizing past The moral code it is rational for us to support must be
effort or past transgressions which now warrant practical; it must actually work. This means, among
reward or punishment. other things, that it must be able to gain the support
Our commonly shared morality thus requires that of almost everyone.
we ignore neither consequences nor entitlements, But the code must be practical in other respects as
neither the future results of our action nor relevant well. I have emphasized that it is wrong to ignore the
events in the past. It encourages people to help oth- possibilities of altruism, but it is also important that a
ers in need, especially when it's a friend or someone code not assume people are more unselfish than they
we are close to geographically, and when the cost is are. Rules that would work only for angels are not the
not significant. But it also gives weight to rights and ones it is rational to support for humans. Second, an
desert, so that we are not usually obligated to give to ideal code cannot assume we are more objective than
strangers .... we are; we often tend to rationalize when our own
But unless we are moral relativists, the mere fact interests are at stake, and a rational person will also
that entitlements are an important part of our moral keep that in mind when choosing a moral code. Finally,
code does not in itself justify such a role. Singer ... can it is not rational to support a code which assumes we
perhaps best be seen as a moral reformer, advocating have perfect knowledge. We are often mistaken about
the consequences of what we do, and a workable code is trivial, as dirtying one's clothes would normally be,
must take that into account as well .... then an ideal moral code would not allow rights over-
It seems to me, then, that a reasonable code would ride the greater evil that can be prevented. Despite our
require people to help when there is no substantial cost code's unclear and sometimes schizophrenic posture,
to themselves, that is, when what they care sacrificing it seems to me that these judgments are not that differ-
would not mean significant reduction in their own or ent from our current moral attitudes. We tend to blame
their families' level of happiness. Since most people's people who waste money on trivia when they could
savings accounts and nearly everybody's second kid- help others in need, yet not to expect people to make
ney are not insignificant, entitlements would in those large sacrifices to distant strangers. An ideal moral code
cases outweigh another's need. But if what is at stake thus might not be a great deal different from our own.
The Case jor Aid

JEFFREY SACHS
I have long believed in foreign aid as one tool of eco- Professor William Easterly of New York University
nomic development. This is not an easy position to has long been a vocal opponent of aid, and recently
maintain, especially in the United States, where pub- declared that the aid debate was "over," claiming vic-
lic misunderstanding, politiCS, and ideology all tend tory for his theory that large-scale aid projects are
to keep aid an object of contempt for many people. doomed to fail. This blanket claim flies in the face
Yet the recent evidence shows that development aid, of recent experience. Prof. Easterly has been proven
when properly designed and delivered, works, saving wrong in both diagnosis and prescription.
the lives of the poor and helping to promote economic During the past 13 years, the greatest breakthroughs
growth. Indeed, based on this evidence, Bill and in aid quantity and quality came from the field of pub-
Melind~ Gates released a powerful letter to the public lic health (unlike other social sectors, such as educa-
today also underscoring the importance and efficacy tion and sanitation, where aid increases were far less
of foreign aid. notable). As a result, the outcomes in public health
As experience demonstrates, it is possible to use in poor countries have also advanced markedly. Not
our reason, management know-how, technOlogy, and only did aid quantities for public health improve; new
learning by doing to design highly effective aid pro- public health institutions, such as the Global Fund to
grams that save lives and promote development. This Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the Global
should be done in global collaboration with national Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, were created
and local communities, taking local circumstances to promote the effective delivery of the increased aid.
into account. The evidence bears out this approach. The approach of increased aid that is well targeted
Of course, I do not believe that aid is the sole or through innovative institutions has been enormously
main driver of economic development. I do not believe successful in improving public health in low-income
that aid is automatically effective. Nor should we con- countries. One could cite many examples ranging from
done bad governance in Africa-or in Washington, the scale-up of vaccine coverage (largely through GAVI
for that matter. Aid is one development tool among and UNICEF) to increased treatment coverage for HIV/
several; it works best in conjunction with sound eco- AIDS and expanded tuberculosis control (through the
nomic policies, transparency, good governance, and Global Fund and the U.S. PEPFAR program), but I will
the effective deployment of new technologies. focus specifically on malaria control, since Prof. Easterly
was particularly pOinted in his opposition to the mass
Jeffrey Sachs, "The Case for Aid," Foreigll Polic}", January 21,2014. scale-up of malaria control that has proved to be so suc-
if
i 2014 Thl' Slate Group. Reprinted by permission. cessful. Fortunately, the global community did not
heed Easterly's erroneous advice, and followed a path mass-action phenomenon of course strongly argued
that the public health community strongly advocated. for a malaria control strategy that would lead to a high
At the turn of the new century, malaria was front level of bed net coverage.
and center of the global aid debate. Research by myself There was one more detail of great policy signifi-
and others, and evidence garnered in the report of cance: Not all bed nets are equal. The high-quality
the World Health Organization (WHO) Commission bed nets work not only mechanically (by covering the
on Macroeconomics and Health that I had the honor body) but also chemically, by a treatment with insec-
to chair, showed that in addition to being a health ticide that repels or kills mosquitoes that land on the
catastrophe, malaria imposes a significant economic bed net. A bed net without insecticide treatment is far
burden, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Luckily, less effective than a treated net. Until the early 2000s,
though, the world was starting to take notice. In 2000, bed nets required frequent retreatment with insecti-
the U.N. Millennium Declaration, The African Sum- cide (e.g. by bathing the nets in tubs filled with insec-
mit on Malaria, and the G8 Declaration all addressed ticide) in order to remain effective. Then, Sumitomo
the burden of malaria and committed the world to Chemical developed long-lasting insecticide-treated
action. The debate soon turned to the issue of policy: nets (LLlNs) that were specially engineered to keep the
how could the malaria burden be reduced? insecticide intact even when the nets were repeatedly
Here we must look at some key details in order washed. The new nets could therefore remain effective
to keep aid in careful perspective. Starting in the for around five years or even more. Other companies,
late 1990s, malariologists at WHO, in academia, and such as Vestergaard and BASF, also developed their
in various government agencies around the world, own varieties of LLlNs. This was a great breakthrough,
described how malaria control could be made highly but the new nets were more expensive to manufacture
effective. The malariologists emphasized the ability than the preceding generation of simpler nets.
of insecticide-treated bed nets to reduce the trans- All of these developments-new nets, new medi-
mission of the disease. They also emphasized the cines, improved diagnostics, and a surging epidemic-
urgency of shifting to a new generation of first-line were crucial to developing a successful malaria control
medicines, notably those using artemisinin (a power- policy after the year 2000. Taken together, they moti-
ful anti-malaria drug developed by Chinese scientists) vated the case for increased donor aid to support the
in combination with other medicines, because the mass free-distribution of LUNs and free access to
old-line medicines (mainly chloroquine) were losing the new generation of artemisinin-based medicines
efficacy to growing drug resistance. The combination and rapid diagnostic tools. Without financial sup-
of bed nets and effective medicines (known in the port, poor people could not afford either the LUNs
jargon as "vector control" and "case management" or the new medicines. Attempts to sell the nets at a
respectively), supported by rapid diagnosis of infec- discount, known as social marketing, had very little
tions, makes for a powerful one-two punch in saving take up, since many poor families simply lacked any
lives and reducing malaria transmission. cash income at all. The prospect of achieving Cl mass
Indeed, epidemiological theory and practical action" protection through social marketing was very
experience strongly suggested that if bed net cover- small. Moreover, impoverished households would
age could be raised to a sufficiently high rate (typically often scrape together the needed money only to buy
around three-quarters, depending on local condi- the cheaper but ineffective nets, rather than the more
tions), the transmission of malaria would be sharply expensive but more effective LLlNs.
reduced even for those not directly protected by their Governments of low-income African countries
own bed nets. The "spillover" of protection to the needed donor support for the scale-up effort since
non-users is called a mass-action effect, similar to the their own domestic tax revenues, even when amply
way that high vaccine coverage protects even unvac- allocated to public health, could not cover the costs
cinated people because the disease stops spreading of a basic primary health system including scaled-up
when fewer people are susceptible to infection. This malaria control. The financial calculations, laid out
.J.
by the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, freely distributed from 2008-2010, With the Global
showed that an impoverished country with a GDP of Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and
around $500 per capita, typical for a poor country in the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative program paying
Africa, may be able to muster around $15 per person for a substantial share of the scale-up.
per year out of domestic revenues for primary health The evidence is overwhelming that malaria decl-
(directing 15 percent of domestic revenues to health, ined precipitously as a result of these bold measures.
as the Abuja target for health spending recommends), WHO's latest report finds a stunning 51 percent drop
while the costs of a basic public health system (mea- in malaria deaths of African children under the age of
sured in 2014 dollars) would be around $50-$60 per five between the years 2000 and 2012. These results are
person per year. historic. Roughly a half-million children, if not more,
Prof. Easterly would have none of it. He took speare being saved each year that otherwise would have
cial and early aim at these recommendations in his succumbed to malaria. Even more success is possible,
2006 book The White Man's Burden, claiming that free but only if development aid continues to back the
nets "are often diverted to the black market, become effective control of malaria. The Global Fund is strug-
out of stock in health clinics, or wind up being used gling to fill its request for $5 billion per year of fund-
as fishing nets or wedding veils." After this specious ing, essential to supplement the health budgets of
claim, he then went on to write that "a study of a pro- poor countries. Prof. Easterly's continued denuncia-
gram to hand out free [malaria bed] nets in Zambia to tions of aid, and his declarations that large-scale aid
people . . . found that 70 percent of the recipients has failed, are injurious to the public support needed
didn't use the nets." Yet this particular study, which for the replenishment.
was conducted by the American Red Cross and CORE, Across the board, the post-2000 improvements
actually showed the program was a success, With high in public health in sub-Saharan Africa have been
rates of net adoption. Prof. Easterly's claim miscon- dramatic, strongly supported by scaled-up aid. Up to
strued this and other evidence being developed by the 10 million HIV-infected individuals are now receiving
ARC and others about the mass distribution of nets, life-saving, anti-retroviral medicines thanks at least
which had found that the free distribution of malaria in part to aid programs. Tuberculosis (TB) patients are
bed nets was achieving high coverage and adoption being treated and cured, with a global TB mortality
rates. rate drop of 45 percent since 1990, and an estimated
Prof. Easterly's arguments added to a highly visible 22 million people alive due to TB care and control
narrative against the needed global action on malaria from 1995-2012, thanks to Global Fund support,
control. Yet despite this anti-aid narrative, a global which provides the lion's share of donor financing
turning point finally came in 2007-08. This turning to fight TB. With increased donor support, antenatal
point was helped by the early success of Kenya. Kenya's health viSits, institutional deliveries, and access to
Minister of Health at the time, Charity Ngilu, led a gov- emergency obstetrical care are all on the increase, con-
ernment effort during 2006-7 to scale up mass bed net tributing to a decline in sub-Saharan Africa's maternal
distribution based, in part, on the example of free LLIN mortality rate (the annual number of female deaths
distribution in the Sauri Millennium Village. Kenya's per 100,000 live births) from 850 in 1990 to 740 in
policies led to a sharp drop of malaria nationwide. 2000 to 500 in 2010. Deaths of children under five
Next, WHO swung its powerful weight behind worldwide have declined from 12.6 million a year in
the mass free distributions of bed nets throughout 1990 and 10.8 million in 2000 to 6.5 million in 2012.
sub-Saharan Africa. Soon after, U.N. Secretary-General These successes demonstrate a key lesson: that
Ban Ki-moon established the mass free distribution well-designed aid programs with sound operating
of bed nets as policy for all U.N. agencies, and called principles, including clear goals, metrics, milestones,
on the world's governments and NGOs to support deliverables, and financing streams, can make an enor-
the scale-up effort. Ban's leadership tipped the global mous difference, and that such programs should be
scales decisively. Close to 300 million bed nets were devised and applied on a large scale in order to benefit
l ......
as many people as possible. Such quality design needs Of course, aid didn't cause this success by itself,
to be based on the details of best practices, such as the as there are m any 1,Cactors in play. But aid has helped.
combination of medicines, bed nets, and diagnostics Research distinguishing the types and timing of aid has
used in cutting-edge, community-based malaria con- shown that development aid raises economic growth,
trol. The economics profeSSion needs to do a much though the effects will differ acro.ss countries. and depend
better job working with experts in other fields, such on the quality of aid. The malana example IS one of the
as public health, in order to design effective aid inter- clearest and most dramatic examples, but across the con-
ventions that reflect the nitty-gritty of high-quality tinent, aid has helped with improvements in education,
systems delivery. While Prof. Easterly begrudgingly agriculture, sanitation, infrastructure, and more.
admits that some health aid programs have worked, In The White Man's Burden, Prof. Easterly declared,
for him this contradiction seems to make no difference "You just have to do whatever you discover works with
to his overarching claim that aid is doomed to fail, for your modest resources to make a difference in the lives
reasons that are hard to explain. All the evidence and of poor people." Prof. Easterly's emphasis on "mod-
all the exceptions have not mattered to his rhetoric, or est resources" mischaracterizes our real global situa-
for that matter, to his harsh attacks on me personally. tion. We are living in a world of great wealth. We need
The aid successes of the past decade have saved not accept the fallacy perpetuated by the rich that
millions of lives, a worthy use of money (which has global resources available are quite so "modest," when
totaled just a tiny fraction of rich world income) on total aid to sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 amounted to
its own. Yet aid has delivered more than lives saved roughly 0.1 percent of the GOP of the donor coun-
and improved. Various kinds of aid, including public tries (around $45 billion per year). We can and should
health outlays, debt cancellation under the IMF and mobilize more support. Just fractions of 1 percent of
World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries ini- GOP of the rich countries can make a profound dif-
tiative (providing debt relief and cancellation for the ference to ending extreme poverty throughout the
poorest countries), and other programmatic and bud- world. Of course, we should also certainly agree to
get support, have helped to put sub-Saharan Africa on focus on what works, and take effective programs to
a path of much higher economic growth and develop- large scale. The positive evidence since 2000 shows
ment. For the first time in decades, Africa's poverty that well-designed aid has made a tremendous impact.
rate has come down notably (from 58 percent in 1999 The issue is not "yes" or "no" to aid. Aid is needed,
to 48.4 percent in 2010) and the region's economic and can be highly successful. The issue is how to deliver
growth is now around 5 percent per year, making it the high-quality aid to the world's poorest and most vulner-
region with the second fastest growth (following Asia). able people.
From A Theory of Justice

JOHN RAWLS
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient

THE ROLE OF JUSTICE
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability
is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and founded on justice that even the welfare of society as
economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies
that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a
From John Rawls, A Theory of/llstice, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard
greater good shared by others. It does not allow that
University Press, 1999) 3-6,10-15,52-54. Copyright i'(i 1971, ]999
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by per-
the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the
mission of the publisher. larger sum of advantages en joyed by many. Therefore in
a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken basic social institutions generally satisfy and are gen-
as settled, the rights secured by justice are not subject to erally known to satisfy these principles. In this case
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. while men may put forth excessive demands on one
The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erro- another, they nevertheless acknowledge a common
neous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an point of view from which their claims may be adjudi-
injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid cated. If men's inclination to self-interest makes their
an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human vigilance against one another necessary, their public
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising. sense of justice makes their secure association together
These propositions seem to express our intuitive possible. Among individuals with disparate aims and
conviction of the primacy of justice. No doubt they are purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the
expressed too strongly. In any event I wish to inquire bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice
whether these contentions or others similar to them are limits the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a
sound, and if so how they can be accounted for. To this public conception of justice as constituting the funda-
end it is necessary to work out a theory of justice in the mental charter of a well-ordered human association.
light of which these assertions can be interpreted and Existing societies are of course seldom well-ordered
assessed. I shall begin by considering the role of the prin- in this sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in
ciples of justice. Let us assume, to fix ideas, that a SOciety dispute. Men disagree about which principles should
is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who define the basic terms of their association. Yet we may
in their relations to one another recognize certain rules still say, despite this disagreement, that they each
of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in have a conception of justice. That is, they understand
accordance with them. Suppose further that these rules the need for, and they are prepared to affirm, a char-
specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the acteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights
good of those taking part in it. Then, although a soci- and duties and for determining what they take to be
ety is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of
typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity social cooperation. Thus it seems natural to think of
of interests. There is an identity of interests since social the concept of justice as distinct from the various con-
cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any ceptions of justice and as being specified by the role
would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. which these different sets of principles, these different
There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indif- conceptions, have in common. 1 Those who hold dif-
ferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their ferent conceptions of justice can, then, still agree that
collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are
ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. A set of made between persons in the assigning of basic rights
principles is required for choosing among the various and duties and when the rules determine a proper bal-
social arrangements which determine this division of ance between competing claims to the advantages of
advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the social life. Men can agree to this description of just
proper distributive shares. These prinCiples are the prin- institutions since the notions of an arbitrary distinc-
ciples of social justice: they provide a way of assigning tion and of a proper balance, which are included in the
rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and concept of justice, are left open for each to interpret
they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits according to the principles of justice that he accepts.
and burdens of social cooperation. These principles single out which similarities and dif-
Now let us say that a society is well-ordered when ferences among persons are relevant in determining
it is not only designed to advance the good of its rights and duties and they specify which division of
members but when it is also effectively regulated by a advantages is appropriate. Clearly this distinction
public conception of justice. That is, it is a society in between the concept and the various conceptions of
which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the oth- justice settles no important questions. It simply helps
ers accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the to identify the role of the principles of social justice.
Some measure of agreement in conceptions of jus- Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. 2 In order to do this we are
tice is, however, not the only prerequisite for a viable not to think of the original contract as one to enter a
human community. There are other fundamental particular society or to set up a particular form of gov-
social problems, in particular those of coordination, ernment. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles
efficiency, and stability. Thus the plans of individu- of justice for the basic structure of SOciety are the object
als need to be fitted together so that their activities of the original agreement. They are the principles that
are compatible with one another and they can all be free and rational persons concerned to further their
carried through without anyone's legitimate expec- own interests would accept in an initial position of
tations being severely disappointed. Moreover, the equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
execution of these plans should lead to the achieve- association. These principles are to regulate all further
ment of social ends in ways that are efficient and con- agreements; they specify the kinds of social coopera-
sistent with justice. And finally, the scheme of social tion that can be entered into and the forms of govern-
cooperation must be stable: it must be more or less ment that can be established. This way of regarding the
regularly complied with and its basic rules willingly principles of justice I shall call justice as fairness.
acted upon; and when infractions occur, stabilizing Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in
forces should exist that prevent further violations and social cooperation choose together, in one joint act,
tend to restore the arrangement. Now it is evident that the principles which are to assign basic rights and
these three problems are connected with that of jus- duties and to determine the division of social benefits.
tice. In the absence of a certain measure of agreement Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate
on what is just and unjust, it is clearly more difficult their claims against one another and what is to be the
for individuals to coordinate their plans efficiently in foundation charter of their society. Just as each person
order to insure that mutually beneficial arrangements must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his
are maintained. Distrust and resentment corrode the good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for
ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once
to act in ways they would otherwise avoid. So while the and for all what is to count among them as just and
distinctive role of conceptions of justice is to specify unjust. The choice which rational men would make in
basic rights and duties and to determine the appropri- this hypothetical situation of equal liberty assuming
ate distributive shares, the way in which a conception for the present that this choice problem has a solu-
does this is bound to affect the problems of efficiency, tion, determines the principles of justice.
coordination, and stability. We cannot, in general, In justice as fairness the original position of equal-
assess a conception of justice by its distributive role ity corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional
alone, however useful this role may be in identifying theory of the social contract. This original position is
the concept of justice. We must take into account its not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of
wider connections; for even though justice has a cer- affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It
tain priority, being the most important virtue of insti- is understood as a purely hypothetical situation charac.-
3
tutions, it is still true that, other things equal, one terized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.
conception of justice is preferable to another when its Among the essential features of this situation is that
broader consequences are more desirable. no one knows his place in society, his class position or
social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the
* * * distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that
the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or
THE MAIN IDEA OF THE THEORY OF JUSTICE their special psychological propensities. The principles
My aim is to present a conception of justice which gen- of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This
eralizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged
familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in in the chOice of principles by the outcome of natural
chance or the contingency of social circumstances. cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal
Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in
design principles to favor his particular condition, the some particular position in some particular SOCiety,
principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement and the nature of this position materially affects his
or bargain. For given the circumstances of the original life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles
position, the symmetry of everyone's relations to each of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to
other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles
moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own which free and equal persons would assent to under
ends and capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice. circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members
The original position is, one might say, the appropri- are autonomous and the obligations they recognize
ate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agree- self-imposed.
ments reached in it are fair. This explains the propriety One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the
of the name "justice as fairness": it conveys the idea parties in the initial situation as rational and mutu-
that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial ally disinterested. This does not mean that the par-
situation that is fair. The name does not mean that the ties are egOists, that is, individuals with only certain
concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more kinds of interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domi-
than the phrase "poetry as metaphor" means that the nation. But they are conceived as not taking an inter-
concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same. est in one another's interests. They are to presume
Justice as fairness begins, as I have said, with that even their spiritual aims may be opposed, in
one of the most general of all choices which persons the way that the aims of those of different religions
might make together, namely, with the choice of may be opposed. Moreover, the concept of rational-
the first principles of a conception of justice which ity must be interpreted as far as possible in the nar-
is to regulate all subsequent criticism and reform of row sense, standard in economic theory, of taking
institutions. Then, having chosen a conception of the most effective means to given ends. I shall mod-
justice, we can suppose that they are to choose a con- ify this concept to some extent, as explained later,
stitution and a legislature to enact laws, and so on, all but one must try to avoid introducing into it any
in accordance with the principles of justice initially controversial ethical elements. The initial situation
agreed upon. Our social situation is just if it is such must be characterized by stipulations that are widely
that by this sequence of hypothetical agreements accepted.
we would have contracted into the general system In working out the conception of justice as fairness
of rules which defines it. Moreover, assuming that one main task clearly is to determine which principles
the original position does determine a set of prin- of justice would be chosen in the original position. To
ciples (that is, that a particular conception of justice do this we must describe this situation in some detail
would be chosen), it will then be true that when- and formulate with care the problem of choice which
ever social institutions satisfy these principles those it presents. These matters I shall take up in the imme-
engaged in them can say to one another that they diately succeeding chapters. It may be observed, how-
are cooperating on terms to which they would agree ever, that once the principles of justice are thought of
if they were free and equal persons whose relations as ariSing from an original agreement in a situation of
with respect to one another were fair. They could all equality, it is an open question whether the principle
view their arrangements as meeting the stipulations of utility would be acknowledged. Offhand it hardly
which they would acknowledge in an initial situa- seems likely that persons who view themselves as
tion that embodies widely accepted and reasonable equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another,
constraints on the choice of principles. The general would agree to a principle which may require lesser life
recognition of this fact would provide the basis for prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum
a public acceptance of the corresponding principles of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires
of justice. No society can, of course, be a scheme of to protect his interests, his capacity to advance his
conception of the good, no one has a reason to acqui- of the social world that seem arbitrary from a moral
esce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring point of view.
about a greater net balance of satisfaction. In the The problem of the choice of principles, however,
absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a is extremely difficult. I do not expect the answer I shall
rational man would not accept a basic structure merely suggest to be convincing to everyone. It is, therefore,
because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages worth noting from the outset that justice as fairness,
irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic like other contract Views, consists of two parts: (1) an
rights and interests. Thus it seems that the principle interpretation of the initial situation and of the prob-
of utility is incompatible with the conception of social lem of choice posed there, and (2) a set of principles
cooperation among equals for mutual advantage. It which, it is argued, would be agreed to. One may accept
appears to be inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity the first part of the theory (or some variant thereof), but
implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society. Or, at not the other, and conversely. The concept of the initial
any rate, so I shall argue. contractual situation may seem reasonable although
I shall maintain instead that the persons in the the particular principles proposed are rejected. To be
initial situation would choose two rather different sure, I want to maintain that the most appropriate con-
principles: the first requires equality in the aSSignment ception of this situation does lead to principles of jus-
of basic rights and duties, while the second holds tice contrary to utilitarianism and perfectionism, and
that social and economic inequalities, for example therefore that the contract doctrine provides an alter-
inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if native to these views. Still, one may dispute this con-
they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and tention even though one grants that the contractarian
in particular for the least advantaged members of soci- method is a useful way of studying ethical theories and
ety. These principles rule out justifying institutions on of setting forth their underlying assumptions.
the grounds that the hardships of some are offset by Justice as fairness is an example of what I have
a greater good in the aggregate. It may be expedient called a contract theory. Now there may be an objec-
but it is not just that some should have less in order tion to the term "contract" and related expressions,
that others may prosper. But there is no injustice in but I think it will serve reasonably well. Many words
the greater benefits earned by a few provided that have misleading connotations which at first are likely
the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby to confuse. The terms "utility" and "utilitarianism"
improved. The intuitive idea is that since everyone's are surely no exception. They too have unfortunate
well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation suggestions which hostile critics have been willing to
without which no one could have a satisfactory life, exploit; yet they are clear enough for those prepared to
the division of advantages should be such as to draw study utilitarian doctrine. The same should be true of
forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part the term "contract" applied to moral theories. As I have
in it, including those less well situated. The two prin- mentioned, to understand it one has to keep in mind
ciples mentioned seem to be a fair basis on which that it implies a certain level of abstraction. In partic-
those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social ular, the content of the relevant agreement is not to
position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, enter a given society or to adopt a given form of govern-
could expect the willing cooperation of others when ment, but to accept certain moral principles. Moreover,
some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the the undertakings referred to are purely hypothetical: a
welfare of all. 4 Once we decide to look for a concep- contract view holds that certain principles would be
tion of justice that prevents the use of the accidents accepted in a well-defined initial situation.
of natural endowment and the contingencies of social The merit of the contract terminology is that it
circumstance as counters in a quest for political and conveys the idea that principles of justice may be con-
economic advantage, we are led to these principles. ceived as principles that would be chosen by rational
They express the result of leaving aside those aspects persons, and that in this way conceptions of justice
may be explained and justified. The theory of justice TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the
I shall now state in a provisional form the two prin-
theory of rational choice. Furthermore, principles of
ciples of justice that I believe would be agreed to in
justice deal with conflicting claims upon the advan-
the original position The first formulation of these
tages won by social cooperation; they apply to the
principles is tentative. As we go on I shall consider
relations among several persons or groups. The word
several formulations and approximate step by step
((contract" suggests this plurality as well as the con-
the final statement to be given much later. I believe
dition that the appropriate division of advantages
that doing this allows the exposition to proceed in a
must be in accordance with principles acceptable to
natural way.
all parties. The condition of publicity for principles
The first statement of the two principles reads as
of justice is also connoted by the contract phraseol-
follows.
ogy. Thus, if these principles are the outcome of an
agreement, citizens have a knowledge of the prin- First: each person is to have an equal right to the
ciples that others follow. It is characteristic of con- most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties
tract theories to stress the public nature of political compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
principles. Finally there is the long tradition of the others.
contract doctrine. Expressing the tie with this line of
thought helps to define ideas and accords with natu- Second: social and economic inequalities are to
ral piety. There are then several advantages in the use be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably
of the term ((contract." With due precautions taken expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b)
it should not be misleading. ' attached to pOSitions and offices open to all.
A final remark. Justice as fairness is not a complete
contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian * * *
idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an These principles primarily apply, as I have said, to
entire ethical system, that is, to a system including the basic structure of society and govern the assign-
principles for all the virtues and not only for justice. ment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution
Now for the most part I shall consider only principles of social and economic advantages. Their formula-
of justice and others closely related to them; I make tion presupposes that, for the purposes of a theory
no attempt to discuss the virtues in a systematic way. of justice, the social structure may be viewed as hav-
Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably ing two more or less distinct parts, the first principle
well, a next step would be to study the more general applying to the one, the second principle to the other.
view suggested by the name ((rightness as fairness." Thus we distinguish between the aspects of the social
But even this wider theory fails to embrace all moral system that define and secure the equal basic liberties
relationships, since it would seem to include only and the aspects that specify and establish social and
our relations with other persons and to leave out of economic inequalities. Now it is essential to observe
accoun t how we are to conduct ourselves toward ani- that the basic liberties are given by a list of such liber-
mals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the ties. Important among these are political liberty (the
contract notion offers a way to approach these ques- right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom
tions which are certainly of the first importance; and of speech and assembly: liberty of conscience and
I shall have to put them aside. We must recognize the ~reedom of thought: freedom of the person, which
limited scope of justice as fairness and of the general mcludes freedom from psychological oppression and
type of view that it exemplifies. How far its conclu- physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the
sions must be revised once these other matters are person); the right to hold personal property and free-
understood cannot be decided in advance. dom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by
the concept of the rule of law. These liberties are to be
* * * equal by the first principle.
The second principle applies, in the first approxi- assumptions that I must eventually try to explain
mation, to the distribution of income and wealth and and justify. For the present, it should be observed
to the design of organizations that make use of dif- that these principle are a special case of a more gen-
ferences in authority and responsibility. While the eral conception of justice that can be expressed as
distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, follows.
it must be to everyone's advantage and at the same All social values-liberty and opportunity, income
time, positions of authority and responsibility must and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect-are
be accessible to all. One applies the second principle to be distributed equally unless an unequal distri-
by holding positions open, and then, subject to this bution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's
constraint, arranges social and economic inequalities advantage.
so that everyone benefits.
These principles are to be arranged in a serial Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not
order with the first principle prior to the second. to the benefit of all. Of course, this conception is
This ordering means that infringements of the basic extremely vague and requires interpretation.
equal liberties protected by the first principle cannot
be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and NOTES
economic advantages. These liberties have a central 1. Here I follow H. L. A. Hart, The Concepto{Law (Oxford, The
range of application within which they can be lim- Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 155-159.
ited and compromised only when they conflict with 2. As the text suggests, I shall regard Locke's Second Treatise or
other basic liberties. Since they may be limited when Government, Rousseau's The Social Contract, and Kant's ethical
they clash with one another, none of these liberties works beginning with Tile Foundations o{the Metapllysics orMor·
is absolute; but however they are adjusted to form als as definitive of the contract tradition. For all of its greatness,
one system, this system is to be the same for all. It is Hobbes's Leviathan raises special problems. A general historical
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to give a complete survey is provided by J. W. Gough, The Social Contract, 2nd ed.
specification of these liberties independently from (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1957), and Otto Gierke, Natural
the particular circumstances-social, economic, and Law and tile Theory or Society, trans. with an introduction by
technological-of a given society. The hypothesis is Ernest Barker (Cambridge, The University Press, 1934). A pre·
sentation of the contract view as primarily an ethical theory is
that the general form of such a list could be devised
to be found in G. R. Grice, The Grounds orMora/Judgment (Cam·
with sufficient exactness to sustain this conception
bridge, The University Press, 1967). See also §19, note 30.
of justice. Of course, liberties not on the list, for
example, the right to own certain kinds of property 3. Kant is clear that the original agreement is hypothetical. See
The Metaphysics orMora/5, pt. I (Rec/lt5/eilre), especially §§47, 52;
(e.g., means of production) and freedom of contract
and pt. II of the essay "Concerning the Common Saying: This
as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire are not
May Be True in Theory but It Does Not Apply in Practice," in
basic; and so they are not protected by the priority Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss and trans. by H. B. Nisbet
of the first principle. Finally, in regard to the second (Cambridge, The University Press, 1970), pp. 73-87. See Georges
principle, the distribution of wealth and income, and Vlachos, La Pensee politique de Kant (Paris, Presses Universitaires
positions of authority and responsibility, are to be de France, 1962), pp. 326-335; and j. G. Murphy, Kant: Tile
consistent with both the basic liberties and equality Philosophy of Right (London, Macmillan, 1970), pp. 109-112,
of opportunity. 133-136, for a further discussion.
The two principles are rather specific in their 4. For the formulation of this intuitive idea I am indebted to
content, and their acceptance rests on certain Allan Gibbard.
The Entitlement Theory of Justice

ROBERT NOZICK
The term "distributive justice11 is not a neutral one. holdings, the appropriation of unheld things. This
Hearing the term "distribution," most people presume includes the issues of how unheld things may come
that some thing or mechanism uses some prindple or to be held, the process, or processes, by which unheld
criterion to give out a supply of things. Into this process things may come to be held, the things that may come
of distributing shares some error may have crept. So it to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes
is an open question, at least, whether redistribution to be held by a particular process, and so on. We shall
should take place; whether we should do again what refer to the complicated truth about this topic, which
has already been done once, though poorly. However, we shall not formulate here, as the principle of justice
we are not in the position of children who have been in acquisition. The second topic concerns the transfer
given portions of pie by someone who now makes last of holdings from one person to another. By what pro-
minute adjustments to rectify careless cutting. There is cesses maya person transfer holdings to another? How
no central distribution, no person or group entitled to may a person acquire a holding from another who
control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are holds it? Under this topic come general descriptions of
to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from voluntary exchange, and gift and (on the other hand)
others who give to him in exchange for something, or as fraud, as well as reference to particular conventional
a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different details fixed upon in a given society. The complicated
resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary truth about this subject (with placeholders for con-
exchanges and actions of persons. There is no more a ventional details) we shall call the principle of justice
distributing or distribution of shares than there is a disin transfer. (And we shall suppose it also includes prin-
tributing of mates in a society in which persons choose ciples governing how a person may divest himself of a
whom they shall marry. The total result is the product
holding, passing it into an unheld state.)
of many individual decisions which the different indi- If the world were wholly just, the following induc-
viduals involved are entitled to make. Some uses of the tive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of
term "distribution," it is true, do not imply a previous
justice in holdings.
distributing appropriately judged by some criterion (for
example, "probability distribution "); nevertheless, ...
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance
it would be best to use a terminology that clearly is
with the principle of justice in acquisition is enti-
neutral. We shall speak of people's holdings; a prinCiple
tled to that holding.
of justice in holdings describes (part of) what justice tells
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance
us (requires) about holdings. I shall state first what I take
with the principle of justice in transfer, from
to be the correct view about justice in holdings, and
someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to
then turn to the discussion of alternate views.
the holding.
THE ENTITLEMENT THEORY 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by
(repeated) applications of 1 and 2.
The subject of justice in holdings consists of three
major topics. The first is the original acquisition of
The complete prindple of distributive justice would say
simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled
From Robert Nozick, Anarchr, State, and Utopia (New York: to the holdings they possess under the distribution.
Basic Books, 1994), 149-57, 160-63, 167-74. Copyright © 1974. A distribution is just if it arises from another just
Reprinted by permission of John Wiley &: Sons. distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate
means of moving from one distribution to another injustices done in them (as defined by the first two
are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. principles of justice and rights against interference),
The legitimate first "moves" are specified by the prin- and information about the actual course of events that
ciple of justice in acquisition. 1 Whatever arises from a flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it
just situation by just steps is itself just. The means of yields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the
change specified by the principle of justice in transfer SOciety. The principle of rectification presumably will
preserve justice. make use of its best estimate of subjunctive informa-
tion about what would have occurred (or a probability
* * *
distribution over what might have occurred, using the
Not all actual situations are generated in accor-
expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If
dance with the two principles of justice in holdings:
the actual description of holdings turns out not to be
the principle of justice in acquisition and the princi- one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then
ple of justice in transfer. Some people steal from oth- 2
one of the descriptions yielded must be realized.
ers, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their The general outlines of the theory of justice in
product and preventing them from living as they
holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he
choose, or forcibly exclude others from competing in is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acqui-
exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of
sition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification
transition from one situation to another. And some
of injustice (as specified by the first two principles).
persons acquire holdings by means not sanctioned by If each person's holdings are just, then the total set
the principle of justice in acquisition. The existence
(distribution) of holdings is just.
of past injustice (previous violations of the first two
principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major * * *
topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of
injustice in holdings. If past injustice has shaped pres-
ent holdings in various ways, some identifiable and HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES AND
some not, what now, if anything, ought to be done to END-RESULT PRINCIPLES
rectify these injustices? What obligations do the per- The general outlines of the entitlement theory illu-
formers of injustice have toward those whose position minate the nature and defects of other conceptions
is worse than it would have been had the injustice not of distributive justice. The entitlement theory of
been done? Or, than it would have been had compen-
justice in distribution is historical; whether a distri-
sation been paid promptly? How, if at all, do things
bution is just depends upon how it came about. In
change if the beneficiaries and those made worse off
contrast, current time-slice principles of justice hold
are not the direct parties in the act of injustice, but,
that the justice of a distribution is determined by
for example, their descendants? Is an injustice done
how things are distributed (who has what) as judged
to someone whose holding was itself based upon an
unrectified injustice? How far back must one go in by some structural principle(s) of just distribution.
wiping clean the historical slate of injustices? What A utilitarian who judges between any two distribu-
may victims of injustice permissibly do in order to rec- tions by seeing which has the greater sum of util-
tify the injustices being done to them, including the ity and, if the sums tie, applies some fixed equality
many injustices done by persons acting through their criterion to choose the more equal distribution,
government? I do not know of a thorough or theoreti- would hold a current time-slice principle of justice.
cally sophisticated treatment of such issues. Idealizing As would someone who had a fixed schedule of
greatly, let us suppose theoretical investigation will trade-offs between the sum of happiness and equal-
produce a principle of rectification. This principle uses ity. According to a current time-slice principle, all
historical information about previous situations and that needs to be looked at, in judging the justice of
a distribution, is who ends up with what; in com- under A what the workers are entitled to under D,
paring any two distributions one need look only at and the workers receive under A what the owners are
the matrix presenting the distributions. No further entitled to under D, namely very little. This socialist
information need be fed into a principle of justice. rightly, in my view, holds onto the notions of earning,
It is a consequence of such principles of justice producing, entitlement, desert, and so forth, and he
that any two structurally identical distributions rejects current time-slice principJes that Jook onJy to
are equally just. (Two distributions are structurally the structure of the resulting set of holdings. (The set
identical if they present the same profile, but per- of holdings resulting from what? Isn't it implausible
haps have different persons occupying the particu- that how holdings are produced and come to exist has
lar slots. My having ten and your having five, and no effect at all on who should hold what?) His mistake
my having five and your having ten are structurally lies in his view of what entitlements arise out of what
identical distributions.) Welfare economics is the sorts of productive processes.
theory of current time-slice principles of justice. We construe the position we discuss too narrowly
The subject is conceived as operating on matrices by speaking of current time-slice principles. Nothing
representing only current information about dis- is changed if structural principles operate upon a
tribution. This, as well as some of the usual con- time sequence of current time-slice profiles and, for
ditions (for example, the choice of distribution is example, give someone more now to counterbalance
invariant under relabeling of columns), guarantees the less he has had earlier. A utilitarian or an egalitar-
that welfare economics will be a current time-slice ian or any mixture of the two over time will inherit
theory, with all of its inadequacies. the difficulties of his more myopic comrades. He is
not helped by the fact that some of the information
Most persons do not accept current time-slice
others consider relevant in assessing a distribution
principles as constituting the whole story about dis-
is reflected, unrecoverably, in past matrices. Hence-
tributive shares. They think it relevant in assessing the
forth, we shall refer to such unhistorical principles
justice of a situation to consider not only the distribu-
of distributive justice, including the current time-
tion it embodies, but also how that distribUtion came
slice prinCiples, as end-result principles or end-state
about. If some persons are in prison for murder or war
principles.
crimes, we do not say that to assess the justice of the
distribution in the SOciety we must look only at what In contrast to end-result principles of justice, his-
this person has, and that person has, and that person torical principles of justice hold that past circumstances
or actions of people can create differential entitle-
has, ... at the current time. We think it relevant to ask
ments or differential deserts to things. An injustice
whether someone did something so that he deserved
can be worked by moving from one distribution to
to be punished, deserved to have a lower share. Most
another structurally identical one, for the second, in
will agree to the relevance of further information with
profile the same, may violate people's entitlements or
regard to punishments and penalties. ConSider also
deserts; it may not fit the actual history.
desired things. One traditional SOcialist view is that
workers are entitled to the product and full fruits of
their labor; they have earned it; a distribution is unjust PATTERNING
if it does not give the workers what they are entitled The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that
to. Such entitlements are based upon some past his- we have sketched are historical principles of justice. To
tory. No socialist holding this view would find it com- better understand their precise character, we shall dis-
forting to be told that because the actual distribution tinguish them from another subclass of the historical
A happens to coincide structurally with the one he principles. ConSider, as an example, the principle of
desires D, A therefore is no less just than D; it differs distribution according to moral merit. This principle
only in that the "parasitic" owners of capital receive reqUires that total distributive shares vary directly
l,
with moral merit; no person should have a greater is not patterned. 3 There is no one natural dimension
share than anyone whose moral merit is greater. (If or weighted sum or combination of a small number
moral merit could be not merely ordered but mea- of natural dimensions that yields the distributions
sured on an interval or ratio scale, stronger principles generated in accordance with the principle of enti-
could be formulated.) Or consider the principle that tlement. The set of holdings that results when some
results by substituting "usefulness to society" for persons receive their marginal products, others win
"moral merit" in the previous principle. Or instead of at gambling, others receive a share of their mate's
"distribute according to moral merit," or "distribute income, others receive gifts from foundations, oth-
according to usefulness to society," we might con- ers receive interest on loans, others receive gifts from
sider "distribute according to the weighted sum of admirers, others receive returns on investment, others
moral merit, usefulness to society, and need," with make for themselves much of what they have, others
the weights of the different dimensions equal. Let us find things, and so on, will not be patterned.
call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies
* * *
that a distribution is to vary along with some natural
dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or
lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions. And HOW LIBERTY UPSETS PATIERNS
let us say a distribution is patterned if it accords with It is not clear how those holding alternative con-
some patterned principle. (I speak of natural dimen- ceptions of distributive justice can reject the enti-
sions, admittedly without a general criterion for them, tlement conception of justice in holdings. For
because for any set of holdings some artificial dimen- suppose a distribution favored by one of these non-
sions can be gimmicked up to vary along with the entitlement conceptions is realized. Let us suppose
distribution of the set.) The principle of distribution it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution
in accordance with moral merit is a patterned histori- D 1; perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps
cal principle, which specifies a patterned distribution. shares vary in accordance with some dimension
"Distribute according to I.Q." is a patterned principle you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is
that looks to information not contained in distribu- greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great
tional matrices. It is not historical, however, in that it gate attraction. (Also suppose contracts run only
does not look to any past actions creating differential for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs
entitlements to evaluate a distribution; it requires only the following sort of contract with a team: In each
distributional matrices whose columns are labeled home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each
by I.Q. scores. The distribution in a society, however, ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the ques-
may be composed of such simple patterned distribution of whether he is "gouging" the owners, letting
tions, without itself being simply patterned. Different them look out for themselves.) The season starts, and
sectors may operate different patterns, or some com- people cheerfully attend his team's games; they buy
bination of patterns may operate in different propor- their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-
tions across a society. A distribution composed in this five cents of their admission price into a special box
manner, from a small number of patterned distribu- with Chamberlain's name on it. They are excited
tions, we also shall term "patterned." And we extend about seeing him play; it is worth the total admis-
the use of "pattern" to include the overall designs put sion price to them. Let us suppose that in one sea-
forth by combinations of end-state principles. son one million persons attend his home games, and
Almost every suggested principle of distributive Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much
justice is patterned: to each according to his moral larger sum than the average income and larger even
merit, or needs, or marginal product, or how hard than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this income?
he tries, or the weighted sum of the foregoing, and Is this new distribution D2, unjust? If so, why? There
so on. The principle of entitlement we have sketched is 110 question about whether each of the people was
entitled to the control over the resources they held would like them as part of his regular allotment (under
in Dt; because that was the distribution (your favor- Dt). Thus, persons either must do without some extra
ite) that (for the purposes of argument) we assumed things that they want, or be allowed to do something
was acceptable. Each of these persons chose to give extra to get some of these things. On what basis could
twenty-five cents of their money to Chamberlain. the inequalities that would eventuate be forbidden?
They could have spent it on going to the movies, or Notice also that small factories would spring up in a
on candy bars, or on copies of Dissent magazine, or socialist society, unless forbidden. I melt down some
of Monthly Review. But they all, at least one million of my personal possessions (under Dt) and build a
of them, converged on giving it to Wilt Chamber- machine out of the material. I offer you, and others,
lain in exchange for watching him play basketball. a philosophy lecture once a week in exchange for your
If Dt was a just distribution, and people voluntarily cranking the handle on my machine, whose products
moved from it to D z , transferring parts of their shares I exchange for yet other things, and so on. (The raw
they were given under D t (what was it for if not to materials used by the machine are given to me by oth-
do something with?), isn't Dz also just? If the people ers who possess them under Dh in exchange for hear-
were entitled to dispose of the resources to which ing lectures.) Each person might participate to gain
they were entitled (under D t ), didn't this include things over and above their allotment under Dt· Some
their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, persons even might want to leave their job in social-
Wilt Chamberlain? Can anyone else complain on ist industry and work full time in this private sector.
grounds of justice? Each other person already has his I shall say something more about these issues in the
legitimate share under Dt. Under Db there is noth- next chapter. Here I wish merely to note how private
ing that anyone has that anyone else has a claim of property even in means of production would occur
justice against. After someone transfers something in a socialist SOCiety that did not forbid people to use
to Wilt Chamberlain, third parties still have their as they wished some of the resources they are given
legitimate shares; their shares are not changed. By under the socialist distribution Dt. The socialist
what process could such a transfer among two per- society would have to forbid capitalist acts between
sons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive jus- consenting adults.
tice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third The general point illustrated by the Wilt Cham-
party who had no claim of justice on any holding of berlain example and the example of the entrepreneur
the others before the transfer?4 To cut off objections in a socialist society is that no end-state principle or
irrelevant here, we might imagine the exchanges distributional patterned principle of justice can be
occurring in a socialist society, after hours. After play- continuously realized without continuous interfer-
ing whatever basketball he does in his daily work, or ence with people's lives. Any favored pattern would
doing whatever other daily work he does, Wilt Cham- be transformed into one unfavored by the prin-
berlain decides to put in overtime to earn additional ciple, by people choosing to act in various ways; for
money. (First his work quota is set; he works time over example, by people exchanging goods and services
that.) Or imagine it is a skilled juggler people like to with other people, or giving things to other people,
see, who puts on shows after hours. things the transferrers are entitled to under the
Why might someone work overtime in a society in favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern
which it is assumed their needs are satisfied? Perhaps one must either continually interfere to stop people
because they care about things other than needs. I like from transferring resources as they wish to, or con-
to write in books that I read, and to have easy access tinually (or periodically) interfere to take from some
to books for browsing at odd hours. It would be very persons resources that others for some reason chose
pleasant and convenient to have the resources of Wid- to transfer to them.
ener Library in my back yard. No society, I assume,
will provide such resources close to each person who ***
REDISTRIBUTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS this way and not to characteristics, is an interesting
Apparently, patterned principles allow people to and puzzling question.
choose to expend upon themselves, but not upon Proponents of patterned principles of distribu-
others, those resources they are entitled to (or rather, tive justice focus upon criteria for determining
receive) under some favored distributional pattern who is to receive holdings; they consider the rea-
Dl. For if each of several persons chooses to expend sons for which someone should have something,
some of his Dl resources upon one other person, and also the total picture of holdings. Whether or
then that other person will receive more than his Dl not it is better to give than to receive, proponents
share, disturbing the favored distributional pattern. of patterned principles ignore giving altogether.
Maintaining a distributional pattern is individual- In considering the distribution of goods, income,
ism with a vengeance! Patterned distributional prin- and so forth, their theories are theories of reCipient
ciples do not give people what entitlement principles justice; they completely ignore any right a person
do, only better distributed. For they do not give the might have to give something to someone. Even
right to choose what to do with what one has; they do in exchanges where each party is simultaneously
not give the right to choose to pursue an end involv- giver and recipient, patterned principles of justice
ing (intrinsically, or as a means) the enhancement focus only upon the recipient role and its supposed
of another's position. To such views, families are rights. Thus discussions tend to focus on whether
disturbing; for within a family occur transfers that people (should) have a right to inherit, rather
upset the favored distributional pattern. Either fami- than on whether people (should) have a right to
lies themselves become units to which distribution bequeath or on whether persons who have a right
takes place, the column occupiers (on what ratio- to hold also have a right to choose that others hold
nale?), or loving behavior is forbidden. We should in their place. I lack a good explanation of why the
note in passing the ambivalent position of radicals usual theories of distributive justice are so reCipient
toward the family. Its loving relationships are seen oriented; ignoring givers and transferrers and their
as a model to be emulated and extended across the rights is of a piece with ignoring producers and their
whole society, at the same time that it is denounced entitlements. But why is it all ignored?
as a suffocating institution to be broken and con- Patterned principles of distributive justice neces-
demned as a focus of parochial concerns that inter- sitate redistributive activities. The likelihood is small
fere with achieving radical goals. Need we say that it that any actual freely-arrived-at set of holdings fits a
is not appropriate to enforce across the wider society given pattern; and the likelihood is nil that it will con-
the relationships of love and care appropriate within tinue to fit the pattern as people exchange and give.
a family, relationships which are voluntarily under- From the point of view of an entitlement theory, redis-
taken?s Incidentally, love is an interesting instance tribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it
of another relationship that is historical, in that (like does, the violation of people's rights. (An exception is
justice) it depends upon what actually occurred. those takings that fall under the principle of the recti-
An adult may come to love another because of the fication of injustices.) From other points of view, also,
other's characteristics; but it is the other person, it is serious.
and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with
is not transferrable to someone else with the same forced labor.6 Some persons find this claim obvi-
characteristics, even to one who "scores" higher for ously true: taking the earnings of n hours labor is
these characteristics. And the love endures through like taking n hours from the person; it is like forc-
changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it. ing the person to work n hours for another's pur-
One loves the particular person one actually encoun- pose. Others find the claim absurd. But even these,
tered. Why love is historical, attaching to persons in if they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing
unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the unnecessary for his happiness? Why should the man
needy. 7 And they would also object to forcing each who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn
person to work five extra hours each week for the money for a ticket) be open to the required call to
benefit of the needy. But a system that takes five aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking
hours' wages in taxes does not seem to them like one at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money)
that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers is not? Indeed, isn't it surprising that redistribution-
the person forced a wider range of choice in activi- ists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are
ties than does taxation in kind with the particular so easily attainable without extra labor, while add-
labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation of ing yet another burden to the poor unfortunate who
systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a must work for his pleasures? If anything, one would
particular activity, to one that gives a choice among have expected the reverse. Why is the person with
two activities, to ... ; and so on up.) Furthermore, the nonmaterial or non consumption desire allowed
people envisage a system with something like a pro- to proceed unimpeded to his most favored feasible
portional tax on everything above the amount nec- alternative, whereas the man whose pleasures or
essary for basic needs. Some think this does not force desires involve material things and who must work
someone to work extra hours, since there is no fixed for extra money (thereby serving whomever con-
number of extra hours he is forced to work, and since siders his activities valuable enough to pay him) is
he can avoid the tax entirely by earning only enough constrained in what he can realize? Perhaps there is
to cover his basic needs. This is a very uncharacter- no difference in principle. And perhaps some think
istic view of forcing for those who also think people the answer concerns merely administrative conve-
are forced to do something whenever the alternatives nience. (These questions and issues will not disturb
they face are considerably worse. However, neither those who think that forced labor to serve the needy
view is correct. The fact that others intentionally or to realize some favored end-state pattern is accept-
intervene, in violation of a side constraint against able.) In a fuller discussion we would have (and want)
aggression, to threaten force to limit the alterna- to extend our argument to include interest, entrepre-
tives, in this case to paying taxes or (presumably the neurial profits, and so on. Those who doubt that this
worse alternative) bare subsistence, makes the taxa- extension can be carried through, and who draw the
tion system one of forced labor and distinguishes it line here at taxation of income from labor, will have
from other cases of limited choices which are not to state rather complicated patterned historical prin-
forcings. ciples of distributive justice, since end-state princi-
The man who chooses to work longer to gain ples would not distinguish sources of income in any
an income more than sufficient for his basic needs way. It is enough for now to get away from end-state
prefers some extra goods or services to the leisure principles and to make clear how various patterned
and activities he could perform during the possible principles are dependent upon particular views
nonworking hours; whereas the man who chooses about the sources or the illegitimacy or the lesser
not to work the extra time prefers the leisure activi- legitimacy of profits, interest, and so on; which
ties to the extra goods or services he could acquire particular views may well be mistaken.
by working more. Given this, if it would be illegiti- What sort of right over others does a legally
mate for a tax system to seize some of a man's leisure institutionalized end-state pattern give one? The
(forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, central core of the notion of a property right in X,
how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize relative to which other parts of the notion are to be
some of a man's goods for that purpose? Why should explained, is the right to determine what shall be
we treat the man whose happiness requires certain done with X; the right to choose which of the con-
material goods or services differently from the man strained set of options concerning X shall be real-
whose preferences and desires make such goods ized or attempted. The constraints are set by other
principles or laws operating in the society; in our them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property
theory, by the Lockean rights people possess (under right in you. Just as having such partial control and
the minimal state). My property rights in my knife power of decision, by right, over an animal or inani-
allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your mate object would be to have a property right in it.
chest. I may choose which of the acceptable options End-state and most patterned principles of dis-
involving the knife is to be realized. This notion of tributive justice institute (partial) ownership by others
property helps us to understand why earlier theorists of people and their actions and labor. These principles
spoke of people as having property in themselves involve a shift from the classical liberals' notion of
and their labor. They viewed each person as having self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights
a right to decide what would become of himself and in other people.
what he would do, and as having a right to reap the * * *
benefits of what he did. Maya person emigrate from a nation that has
institutionalized some end-state or patterned dis-
* * * tributional principle? For some principles (for
When end-result principles of distributive justice example, Hayek's) emigration presents no theo-
are built into the legal structure of a society, they (as do retical problem. But for others it is a tricky matter.
most patterned principles) give each citizen an enforce- Consider a nation having a compulsory scheme
able claim to some portion of the total social product; of minimal social provision to aid the neediest (or
that is, to some portion of the sum total of the indi- one organized so as to maximize the position of the
vidually and jointly made products. This total product worst-off group); no one may opt out of participat-
is produced by individuals laboring, using means of ing in it. (None may say, "Don't compel me to con-
production others have saved to bring into existence, tribute to others and don't provide for me via this
by people organizing production or creating means to compulsory mechanism if I am in need.") Every-
produce new things or things in a new way. It is on this one above a certain level is forced to contribute to
batch of individual activities that patterned distribu- aid the needy. But if emigration from the country
tional principles give each individual an enforceable were allowed, anyone could choose to move to
claim. Each person has a claim to the activities and the another country that did not have compulsory
products of other persons, independently of whether social provision but otherwise was (as much as
the other persons enter into particular relationships possible) identical. In such a case, the person's only
that give rise to these claims, and independently of motive for leaving would be to avoid participating
whether they voluntarily take these claims upon them- in the compulsory scheme of social provision. And
selves, in charity or in exchange for something. if he does leave, the needy in his initial country will
Whether it is done through taxation on wages receive no (compelled) help from him. What ratio-
or on wages over a certain amount, or through sei- nale yields the result that the person be permitted
zure of profits, or through there being a big social to emigrate, yet forbidden to stay and opt out of the
pot so that it's not clear what's coming from where compulsory scheme of social provision? If providing
and what's going where, patterned principles of dis- for the needy is of overriding importance, this does
tributive justice involve appropriating the actions militate against allowing internal opting out; but it
of other persons. Seizing the results of someone's also speaks against allowing external emigration.
labor is equivalent to seizing hours from him and (Would it also support, to some extent, the kidnap-
directing him to carryon various activities. If ping of persons living in a place without compulsory
people force you to do certain work, or un rewarded social provision, who could be forced to make a con-
work, for a certain period of time, they decide tribution to the needy in your community?) Perhaps
what you are to do and what purposes your work the crucial component of the position that allows
is to serve apart from your decisions. This process emigration solely to avoid certain arrangements,
whereby they take this decision from you makes while not allowing anyone internally to opt out of
them, is a concern for fraternal feelings within the to the transfer independently had used their holdings in this
country. "We don't want anyone here who doesn't fashion?) I discuss this question below, but note here that
contribute, who doesn't care enough about the oth- this question concedes the pOint for distributions of ultimate
ers to contribute." That concern, in this case, would intrinsic non instrumental goods (pure utility experiences, so
have to be tied to the view that forced aiding tends to speak) that are transferable. It also might be objected that the
transfer might make a third party more envious because it wors-
to produce fraternal feelings between the aided and
ens his position relative to someone else. I find it incomprehen-
the aider (or perhaps merely to the view that the
sible how this can be thought to involve a claim of justice....
knowledge that someone or other voluntarily is not Here and elsewhere in this chapter, a theory which incor-
aiding produces un fraternal feelings). porates elements of pure procedural justice might find what
I say acceptable, ifkept in its proper place; that is, if back-
NOTES
ground institutions exist to ensure the satisfaction of certain
1. Applications of the principle of justice in acquisition conditions on distributive shares. But if these institutions
may also occur as part of the move from one distribution to are not themselves the sum or invisible-hand result of
another. You may find an unheld thing now and appropriate people's voluntary (nonaggressive) actions, the constraints
it. Acquisitions also are to be understood as included when, to they impose reqUire justification. At no point does our argu-
simplify, I speak only of transitions by transfers. ment assume any background institutions more extensive
2. If the principle of rectification of violations of the first two than those of the minimal night-watchman state, a state
principles yields more than one description of holdings, then limited to protecting persons against murder, assault, theft,
some choice must be made as to which of these is to be real- fraud, and so forth.
ized. Perhaps the sort of considerations about distributive jus- 5. One indication of the stringency of Rawls' difference prin-
tice and equality that I argue against playa legitimate role in ciple, which we attend to in the second part of this chap-
this subsidiary choice. Similarly, there may be room for such ter, is its inappropriateness as a governing principle even
considerations in deciding which otherwise arbitrary fea- within a family of individuals who love one another. Should
tures a statute will embody, when such features are unavoid- a family devote its resources to maximizing the position of
able because other considerations do not specify a precise its least well off and least talented child, holding back the
line; yet a line must be drawn. other children or using resources for their education and
3. One might try to squeeze a patterned conception of dis- development only if they will follow a policy through their
tributive justice into the framework of the entitlement con- lifetimes of maximizing the position of their least fortunate
ception, by formulating a gimmicky obligatory "principle sibling? Surely not. How then can this even be considered
of transfer" that would lead to the pattern. For example, the as the appropriate policy for enforcement in the wider soci-
principle that if one has more than the mean income one ety? (I discuss below what I think would be Rawls' reply: that
must transfer everything one holds above the mean to per- some principles apply at the macro level which do not apply
sons below the mean so as to bring them up to (but not over) to micro-situations.)
the mean. We can formulate a criterion for a "principle of 6. I am unsure as to whether the arguments I present below
transfer" to rule out such obligatory transfers, or we can say show that such taxation merely is forced labor; so that "is on
that no correct principle of transfer, no principle of transfer a par with" means "is one kind of." Or alternatively, whether
in a free society will be like this. The former is probably the the arguments emphasize the great similarities between
better course, though the latter also is true. such taxation and forced labor, to show it is plausible and
Alternatively, one might think to make the entitlement illuminating to view such taxation in the light of forced
conception instantiate a pattern, by using matrix entries that labor. This latter approach would remind one of how John
express the relative strength of a person's entitlements as Wisdom conceives of the claims of metaphYSicians.
measured by some real-valued function. But even if the limi- 7. Nothing hangs on the fact that here and elsewhere I speak
tation to natural dimensions failed to exclude this function, loosely of needs, since I go on, each time, to reject the crite-
the resulting edifice would not capture our system of entitle- rion of justice which includes it. If, however, something did
ments to particular things. depend upon the notion, one would want to examine it more
4. Might not a transfer have instrumental effects on a third carefully. For a skeptical view, see Kenneth Minogue, The
party, changing his feasible options? (But what if the two parties Liberal Mind, (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 103-112.
I
GLOSSARY
abolitionist-One who wishes to abolish capital pun- argument-A group of statements, one of which is sup-
ishment. (Ch. 18) posed to be supported by the rest. (Ch. 3)
abortion-The deliberate termination of a pregnancy by availability error-The tendency to rely on evidence
surgical or medical (with drugs) means. (Ch. 9) not because ies reliable but because it's vivid or memo-
act-egoism-The theory that to determine right action, rable. (Ch. 3)
you must apply the egoistic principle to individual acts. begging the question-The fallacy of arguing in a
(Ch.5) circle-that is, trying to use a statement as both a prem-
active euthanasia-Euthanasia performed by taking ise in an argument and the conclusion of that argu-
a direct action to cause someone's death; "mercy kill- ment. Such an argument says, in effect, p is true because
ing." (Ch. 10) p is true. (Ch. 3)
act-utilitarianism-A utilitarian theory asserting biocentrism-The view that all living entities have
that the morally right action is the one that directly moral status, whether sentient or not. (Ch. 13)
produces the most favorable balance of good over evil, capital punishment-Punishment by execution of
everyone considered. (Ch. 4) someone officially judged to have committed a serious,
advance directive-A legal document allowing physi- or capital, crime. (Ch. 18)
cians to withhold or withdraw treatments if a patient categorical imperative-An imperative that we
becomes terminally ill and unable to express his or her should follow regardless of our particular wants and
wishes. (Ch. 10) needs; also, the principle that defines Kant's theory.
affirmative action-A way of making amends for, or (Ch. 4, 6)
eradicating, discrimination based on race, ethnicity, cogent argument-A strong argument with true prem-
and gender. (Ch. 14) ises. (Ch. 3)
animal rights-Possession by animals of (1) moral sta- conception-The merging of a sperm cell and an ovum
tus; (2) strong moral consideration that cannot be eas- into a single cell; also called fertilization. (Ch. 9)
ily overridden. (Ch. 12) conclusion-The statement supported in an argument.
anthropocentrism-The notion that only humans (Ch.3)
have moral status. (Ch. 13) confirmation bias-Paying attention only to evidence
anticosmopoIitanism-The view that wealthy nations that confirms our beliefs while ignoring opposing evi-
able to ease the suffering of the world's poor and dence. (Ch. 3)
oppressed have a moral obligation to do so, but they also consequentialist theory-A theory asserting that
have moral obligations to their own citizens that may be what makes an action right is its consequences.
weightier than those concerning foreigners. (Ch. 20) (Ch.4)
appeal to authority-The fallacy of relying on the considered moral judgment-A moral assessment
opinion of someone thought to be an expert who is that is as free from bias and distorting passions as
not. (Ch. 3) possible. We generally trust such a judgment unless
appeal to ignorance-The fallacy of arguing that the there is a reason to doubt it. (Ch. 4)
absence of evidence entitles us to believe a claim. (Ch. 3) conventional view (of sexuality)-The idea that sex is
appeal to the person-The fallacy (also known as ad morally acceptable only between a man and a woman
hominem) of arguing that a claim should be rejected who are legally married to each other. (Ch. 15)
solely because of the characteristics of the person who cosmopolitanism-The view that wealthy nations
makes it. (Ch. 3) able to ease the suffering of the world's poor and
applied ethics-The application of moral norms to spe- oppressed have a moral obligation to do so and that
cific moral issues or cases, particularly those in a profes- this obligation is as strong concerning foreigners as it
sion such as medicine or law. (Ch. 1) is concerning a nation's own citizens. (Ch. 20)
G-1
G-2 0 GLOSSARY
criminalization-Making the use (and possession) of emotivism-The view that moral utterances are neither
drugs a criminal offense. (Ch. 17) true nor false but are expressions of emotions or atti-
cultural relativism-The view that an action is mor- tudes. (Ch. 2)
ally right if one's culture approves of it. (Ch. 2) equivocation-The fallacy of assigning two different
decriminalization-Allowing the use of drugs without meanings to the same term in an argument. (Ch. 3)
criminal penalties. (Ch. 17) ethical egoism-A theory asserting that the morally
deductive argument-An argument that is supposed to right action is the one that produces the most favorable
give logically conclusive support to its conclusion. (Ch. 3) balance of good over evil for oneself. (Ch. 4)
deportation-The formal removal of a foreign national ethics (or moral philosophy)-The philosophical
from a country for violating an immigration law. study of morality. (Ch. 1)
(Ch.20) ethics of care-A perspective on moral issues that
descriptive ethics-The scientific study of moral beliefs emphasizes close personal relationships and moral vir-
and practices. (Ch. 1) tues such as compassion, faithfulness, kindness, love,
direct moral consideration-Moral consideration for and sympathy. (Ch. 8)
a being's own sake, rather than because of its relation- eudaimonia-Happiness, or flourishing. (Ch. 7)
ship to others. (Ch. 12) euthanasia-Directly or indirectly bringing about
distributive justice-Justice concerning the fair distri- the death of another person for that person's sake.
bution of society's benefits and costs (such as income, (Ch.10)
taxes, jobs, and public service). eCho 4, 21) extrinsically valuable-See instrumentally valuable.
divine command theory-A theory asserting that the (Ch.1)
morally right action is the one that God commands. faulty analogy-The use of a flawed analogy to argue
(Ch.4) for a conclusion. (Ch. 3)
doctrine of double effect-The principle that per- feminist ethics-An alternative way of looking at the
forming a good action may be permissible even if it has concepts and concerns of the moral life; an approach
bad effects, but performing a bad action for the purpose focused on women's interests and experiences and
of achieving good effects is never permissible; any bad devoted to supporting the moral equality of women
effects must be unintended. (Ch. 6) and men and correcting the biases against women
drug-A nonfood chemical substance that can affect the found in traditional moral thinking. (Ch. 8)
functions and makeup of the body. (Ch. 17) fertilization-See conception. (Ch. 9)
drug addiction-An intense craving for a drug and free speech-The right to express one's opinions or
compulsive, uncontrolled use of the drug despite harm ideas without burdensome restraints from government
done to the user or other people. (Ch. 17) or SOCiety. (Ch. 16)
drug dependence-A condition in which discontinu- Golden Mean-Aristotle's notion of a virtue as a balance
ing the use of a drug is extremely difficult, involving between two behavioral extremes. (Ch. 7)
psychological or physical symptoms. (Ch. 17) greatest happiness principle-Mill's principle that
Dunning-Kruger effect-The common human failing "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend
of being ignorant of how ignorant we are. (Ch. 3) to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
duty of beneficence-A moral obligation to benefit the reverse of happiness." (Ch. 5)
others. (Ch. 21) gun control-Laws and policies designed to restrict the
ecological holist-One who believes that the funda- posseSSion, use, and availability of firearms. (Ch. 17)
mental unit of moral consideration in environmental harm principle-The view that authorities are justified
ethics is the biosphere and its ecosystems. (Ch. 13) in restricting some people's freedom to prevent harm
ecological individualist-One who believes that the to others. (Ch. 17)
fundamental unit of moral consideration in environ- harm reduction-A drug policy aimed at reducing the
mental ethics is the individual. (Ch. 13) harm that arises from drugs and drug laws. (Ch. 17)
egalitarian theory of justice-A doctrine holding hasty generalization-The fallacy of drawing a con-
that justice requires equal distribution of goods and clusion about an entire group of people or things based
social benefits among all persons. (Ch. 21) on an undersized sample of the group. (Ch. 3)
.--"IIi
GLOSSARY 0 G-3
hate speech-Oral or written words used to insult, dis- legal moralism-The doctrine that the government is
parage, or attack people based on their social or racial! justified in curbing people's freedom to force them to
ethnic group. (Ch. 16) obey moral rules. (Ch. 17)
homosexuality-Sexual relations between people of liberal view (of sexuality)-The idea that as long as
the same sex. (Ch. 15) basic moral standards are respected, any sexual activity
humanitarian intervention-The act of a state (or engaged in by informed, consenting adults is permis-
states) going to war to defend people of another state sible. (Ch. 15)
against the murderous aggression of their own regime. libertarian theory of justice-A doctrine emphasiz-
(Ch.19) \~ in<iividualliOerties.!1JT.J.d ~t1iJ1e:rights~ ,and reject-
hypothetical imperative-An imperative that tells ing positive rights as a violation ot personal freedom.
us what we should do if we have certain desires. (Ch.21)
(Ch.6) managed care-A type of health insurance in which
imperfect duty-A duty that has exceptions. (Ch. 6) providers contract with a managed care plan to offer
indicator words-Terms that often appear in argu- health care to a particular group of patients (members
ments to signal the presence of a premise or conclu- of the plan) at discounted costs. (Ch. 11)
sion, or to indicate that an argument is deductive or means-ends principle-The rule that we must always
inductive. (Ch. 3) treat people (including ourselves) as ends in them-
indirect moral consideration-Moral consideration selves, never merely as a means. (Ch. 6)
on account of a being's relationship to others. (Ch. 12) Medicaid-A health insurance program supported
individual racism-Person-to-person acts of intoler- jointly by the u.S. federal government and the states,
ance or discrimination. (Ch. 14) with the former providing matching funds to the latter.
inductive argument-An argument that is supposed It covers some low-income families, pregnant women,
to offer probable support to its conclusion. (Ch. 3) and people with disabilities. (Ch. 11)
institutional or structural racism-Unequal treat- Medicare-A federally funded U.S. health insurance
ment that arises from the way organizations, institu- program that covers people 65 and older, some adults
tions, and social systems operate. (Ch. 14) under 65 with disabilities, and people with end-stage
instrumentally (or extrinsically) valuable-Valuable kidney disease. (Ch. 11) .
as a means to something else. (Ch. 1) metaethics-The study of the meaning and lOgIcal
intrinsically valuable-Valuable in itself, for its own structure of moral beliefs. (Ch. 1)
sake. (Ch. 1) moderate view (of sexuality)-The idea that sex is
invalid argument-A deductive argument that does permissible, whether in marriage or not, if the con-
not offer logically conclusive support for the conclu- senting partners have a serious emotional connection.
sion. (Ch. 3) (Ch.15)
involuntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed on a morality-Beliefs concerning right and wrong, good
person against his or her wishes. (Ch. 10) and bad; they can include judgments, rules, values,
jlls ad bell"nl-The justification for resorting to war; principles, and theories. (Ch. 1)
the justice of war. (Ch. 19) moral philosophy-See ethics. (Ch. 1)
jlls in bello-The moral permissibility of acts in war; moral statement-A statement affirming that an action
justice in war. (Ch. 19) is right or wrong or that a person (or one's motive or
justice-The morality of persons getting what is fair or character) is good or bad. (Ch. 3)
what is their due. (Ch. 21) moral status (or moral considerability)-The prop-
just war theory-The doctrine that war may be morally erty of being a suitable candidate for direct moral con-
permissible under stipulated conditions. (Ch. 19) cern or respect. (Ch. 12)
Kant's theory-A theory asserting that the morally moral theory-An explanation of what makes an action
right action is the one done in accordance with the right or what makes a person or thing good. (Ch. 4)
categorical imperative. (Ch. 4) moral vegetarians-Vegetarians who refuse to eat
legalization-Making the production and sale of drugs meat on the grounds that it is morally wrong to do so.
legal. (Ch. 17) (Ch.12)
G-4 0 GLOSSARY
motivated reasoning-Reasoning for the purpose prima facie principle-A principle that applies in a
of supporting a predetermined conclusion, not to situation unless exceptions are justified. (Ch. 4)
uncover the truth. (Ch. 3) principle of utility-Bentham's "principle which
natural law theory-A theory asserting that the mor- approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever,
ally right action is the one that follows the dictates of according to the tendency which it appears to have to
nature. (Ch. 4) augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
negative right-A person's right that obligates others interest is in question." (Ch. 5)
not to interfere with that person's obtaining some- principlism-A moral theory consisting of multiple
thing. (Ch. 4,21) moral principles that must be weighed and balanced
noncombatant immunity-The status of a person who against one another to determine right actions. (Ch. 4)
should not be intentionally attacked in war. (Ch. 19) psychological egoism-The view that the motive for
nonconsequentialist theory-A theory asserting that all our actions is self-interest. (Ch. 5)
the rightness of an action does not depend on its con- punishment-The deliberate and authorized causing of
sequences. (Ch. 4) pain or harm to someone thought to have broken a law.
nonmoral statement-A statement that does not (Ch.18)
affirm that an action is right or wrong or that a person quickening-The point in fetal development when the
(or one's motive or character) is good or bad. (Ch. 3) mother can feel the fetus moving (at about sixteen to
nonstate actors-Individuals or groups that are not twenty weeks). (Ch. 9)
sovereign states. (Ch. 19) racial discrimination-Unfavorable treatment of
nonvoluntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed people because of their race. Discrimination and preju-
on a person who is not competent to decide the issue dice can be directed at traits other than race, including
and has left no instructions regarding end-of-life pref- sexual traits. (Ch. 14)
erences. In such cases, family or physicians usually racial prejudice-Antipathy toward a racial group
make the decision. (Ch. 10) based on a faulty view of that group. (Ch. 14)
normative ethics-The study of the principles, rules, or racism-The belief that distinct races exist, that signifi-
theories that guide our actions and judgments. (Ch. 1) cant differences (such as moral, intellectual, or cultural
objectivism-The theory that moral truths exist and differences) among races can be distinguished, and that
that they do so independently of what individuals or some races are inferior in these significant respects or
societies think of them. (Ch. 2) otherwise deserving of dislike or hostility. (Ch. 14)
pacifi.sm-The view that war is never morally permis- realism (as applied to warfare)-The view that moral
sible. (Ch. 19) standards are not applicable to war, which must
passive euthanasia-Euthanasia performed by with- be judged instead on how well it serves state interests.
holding or withdrawing measures necessary for sus- (Ch.19)
taining life. (Ch. 10) refugee-Someone who has fled from his or her home
paternalism principle-The view that authorities are country and cannot return because he or she has a
sometimes justified in limiting people's freedom to pre- well-founded fear of persecution based on religion,
vent them from harming themselves. (Ch. 17) race, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
perfect duty-A duty that has no exceptions. (Ch. 6) particular social group. (Ch. 20)
person-A being thought to have full moral rights. (Ch. 9) retentionist-One who wishes to retain the death pen-
physician-assisted suicide-The killing of a person alty. (Ch. 18)
by the person's own hand with the help of a physician. retributive justice-Justice concerning the fair use of
(Ch.l0) punishment for wrongdoing. (Ch. 4, 21)
pornography-Sexually explicit images or text meant retributivism-The view that offenders deserve to be
to cause sexual excitement or arousal. (Ch. 15) punished, or "paid back," for their crimes and to be
positive right-A person's right that obligates others to punished in proportion to the severity of their offenses.
help that person obtain something. (Ch. 4,21) (Ch.18)
premise-A supporting statement in an argument. right-A claim or entitlement to something; a moral
(Ch.3) demand that obligates others to honor it. (Ch. 21)
GLOSSARY 0 G-5
rule-egoism-The theory that to determine right action, structural racism-See institutional radsm. (Ch. 14)
you must see if an act falls under a rule that, if consis- subjective relativism-The view that an action is mor-
tently followed, would maximize your self-interest. ally right if one approves of it. (Ch. 2)
(Ch.S) supererogatory actions-Conduct that is above
rule-utilitarianism-A utilitarian theory asserting and beyond duty; not required, but praiseworthy.
that the morally right action is the one covered by a (Ch.21)
rule that, if generally followed, would produce the most terrorism (as defined in Chapter 19)-Violence against
favorable balance of good over evil, everyone consid- noncombatants for political, religious, or ideological
ered. (Ch. 4) ends. (Ch. 19)
self-evident statement-An assertion that a person is terrorism (the definition preferred by the U.S. Depart-
justified in believing merely by understanding it, such ment of State)-Premeditated, politically motivated
as "No bachelors are married." (Ch. 4) violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
slippery slope-The fallacy of using dubious premises by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually
to argue that doing a particular action will inevitably intended to influence an audience. (Ch. 19)
lead to other actions that will result in disaster, so that therapeutic abortion-An abortion performed to pro-
first action should not be done. (Ch. 3) tect the life or health of the mother. (Ch. 9)
social contract theory-The theory that morality torture-The intentional inflicting of severe pain or
arises from a social contract that self-interested and suffering on people to punish or intimidate them or
rational people would abide by in order to secure a extract information from them. (Ch. 19)
degree of peace, prosperity, and safety. (Ch. 5) utilitarianism-A theory asserting that the morally
sound argument-A valid argument with true prem- right action is the one that produces the most favor-
ises. (Ch. 3) able balance of good over evil, everyone considered.
species egalitarian-One who believes that all living (Ch.4)
things have equal moral status. (Ch. 13) valid argument-A deductive argument that does in
speciesism-Discrimination against nonhuman ani- fact provide logically conclusive support for its conclu-
mals just because of their species. (Ch. 12) sion. (Ch. 3)
species nonegalitarian-One who believes that some viability-The stage of fetal development at which the
living things have greater moral status than others. fetus is able to survive outside the uterus. (Ch. 9)
(Ch.13) virtue-A stable disposition to act and feel according to
speech codes-Campus regulations that ban the use of some ideal or model of excellence. (Ch. 7)
language or symbols thought to embody hate speech. virtue ethics-A theory of morality that makes virtue
(Ch.16) the central concern. (Ch. 7)
statement-An assertion that something is or is not the voluntary euthanasia-Euthanasia performed on a
case. (Ch. 3) person with his or her permission. (Ch. 10)
straW man-The fallacy of misrepresenting someone's weak affirmative action-The use of poliCies and
claim or argument so it can be more easily refuted. (Ch. 3) procedures to end discriminatory practices and ensure
strong affirmative action-The use of policles and equal opportunity. (Ch. 14)
procedures to favor particular individuals because of weak argument-An inductive argument that does not
their race, gender, or ethnic background. (Ch. 14) give probable support to the conclusion. (Ch. 3)
strong argument-An inductive argument that does in zoocentrism-The notion that both human and non-
fact provide probable support for its conclusion. (Ch. 3) human animals have moral status. (Ch. 13)
ANSWERS TO ARGUMENT EXERCISES (CHAPTER 3)
-
~ - ~
~"'~
1. If John works out at the gym daily, he will be 9. Can people without strong religiOUS beliefs be
healthier. He is working out at the gym daily. moral? Countless people have been nonbe-
So he will be healthier. lievers or nontheists and still behaved according
+ 2 to lofty moral principles. For example: the
Buddhists of Asia and the Confucianists of
1
3
China. Consider also the great secular philoso-
phers from the ancient Greeks to the likes of
David Hume and Bertrand Russell. So it's not
3. Ghosts do not exist. There is no reliable evidence true that those without strong religious beliefs
showing that any disembodied persons exist cannot be moral.
anywhere. 2 3 4
2
!
S. The mayor is soft on crime. He cut back on
misdemeanor enforcement and told the police
\11 5
11. We shouldn't pay the lawnmower guy so much

department to be more lenient on traffic money because he never completes the work,
violators. and he will probably just gamble the money
2 3 away because he has no self-control.
2 4
\/ 3
I
7. The president is either dishonest or incom-
petent. He's not incompetent, though, because
he's an expert at getting self-serving legislation
through Congress. I guess he's just dishonest.
1 + 2
3
A-1
l
NOTES AND REFERENCES
CHAPTER 1: Ethics and the Examined Life 2. Guy P. Harrison, Think before You Like (Amherst, NY:
1. Paul W. Taylor, Principles of Ethics: An Introduction Prometheus Books, 2017), 185.
(Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975),9-10.
2. G. W. von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," in
CHAPTER 4: The Power of Moral Theories
Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: SCribner, 1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge,
1951),292. MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1999).
3. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
4th ed. (Boston: MCGraw-Hill, 2003), 51. Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (1948; reprint, New York:
4. Jonathan Berg, "How Could Ethics Depend on Reli- Harper & Row, 1964),88.
gion?" in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, 3. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford
corr. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),525-33. University Press, 1930).
4. See, for example, Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and
CHAPTER 2: Subjectivism, Relativism, and Ethical Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Emotivism 1997); and Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A
1. Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (1937; reprint, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
New York: Macmillan, 1965),8-58.
2. Phillip Montague, "Are There Objective and Abso- CHAPTER 5: Consequentialist Theories: Maxi-
lute Moral Standards?" in Reason and Responsibility:
mize the Good
Readings in Some Basic Problems in Philosophy, ed. Joel
1. Joel Feinberg, "Psychological Egoism," in Moral Phi-
Feinberg, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1978),
490-91. losophy: Selected Readings, ed. George Sher (San Diego:
3. Solomon Asch, Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 11-12.
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1952),378-79. 2. Jeremy Bentham, "Of the Principle of Utility," in An
4. See, for example, Clyde Kluckhohn, "Ethical Relativ- Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
ity: Sic et Non," Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955): (1789; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 1-7.
663-77, and E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (1978; 3. John Stuart Mill, "What Utilitarianism Is," Chapter 2
reprint, New York: Bantam, 1979). in Utilitarianism, 7th ed. (London: Longmans, Green,
1879).
5. A. J. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics and Theology," in
Language, Truth and Logic (1936; reprint, New York: 4. Mill, Chapter 2.
Dover, 1952), 107. 5. Mill, Chapter 2.
6. Ayer,112. 6. H. J. McCloskey, CIA Non-Utilitarian Approach to
7. This scenario is inspired by some of Brand Blan- Punishment," Inquiry 8 (1965): 239-49.
shard's examples from "Emotivism," in Reason and 7. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "The Trolley Problem," in
Goodness (1961; reprint, New York: G. Allen and Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory,
VnwiIlJ )978). ed. William Parent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1986),95.
8. Blanshard,204-5.
8. This case is based on one devised by W. D. Ross in
The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
CHAPTER 3: Evaluating Moral Arguments
1930), 34-35.
1. David Dunning, "Confident Idiots," Pacific Stcmciard, 9. Paul \V. Taylor, Pr;ncip}~~ \)~- ~CfI(G'S; ,.:t,~ 7NI";ro/JumOTJ
October 27,2014. (EnCino, CA: Dickenson, 1975), 77-78.
N-1
N-2 0 NOTES
10. The points in this and the preceding paragraph were CHAPTER 8: Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of
inspired by James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Care
Philosophy, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 1. Alison M. jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," in Encyclopedia
111-12. of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B.
U. J. C. Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Becker (New York: Garland, 1992),364.
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 68. 2. Alison M.Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," 363-64.
12. Fred Feldman, Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, 3. Sarah Clark Miller, "Feminist EthiCS," in Kantianistn,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), 77-78. Liberalism, and Feminism: Resisting Oppression, ed.
13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651. [Archive at Carol Hay (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),
socialsciences.mcmaster.ca] 204-205.
14. Hobbes, Leviathan. 4. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA:
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 10. Harvard University Press, 1982).
5. Annette C. Baier, "The Need for More Than Justice,"
CHAPTER 6: Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do
Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, supplementary vol. 13
Your Duty
(1988): 41-56.
1. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Meta- 6. Virginia Held, "The EthicS of Care as Moral Theory,"
physic of Morals, trans. Thomas K. Abbott, 2nd ed. in The Ethics of Care (Oxford: Oxford University
(London: Longmans, Green, 1879), 1-2. Press, 2006), 10.
2. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of
Morals, 52.
3. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of CHAPTER 9: Abortion
Morals, 55. 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
4. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 2. Roe, 158, 162.
Morals, 66-67. 3. Mary Anne Warren, "Abortion," in A Companion to
5. lowe this pOint to james Rachels, The Elements of Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Cambridge, MA:
Moral Philosophy, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, Blackwell, 1993),304.
2003),126. 4. john T. Noonan jr., "An Almost Absolute Value in
6. C. D. Broad, Five Types ofEthical Theory (1930; reprint, History," in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and
London: Routledge &. Kegan Paul, 1956), 132. Historical Perspectives, ed. John T. Noonan Jr.
7. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Basic Writ- (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970),
ings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. and annotated by 56-57.
Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), 5. Warren, 312.
First Part of the Second Part, Question 94, Article 2. 6. Mary Anne Warren, "On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion," The Monist 57, no. 4 (1973): 56.
CHAPTER 7: Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 7. judith Jarvis Thomson, CIA Defense of Abortion,"
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 48-49.
book II, chapter 1 (eBooks@Adelaide, 2004). 8. Thomson, 66.
2. Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong,
4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), 165.
CHAPTER 10: Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
3. Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics," in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2003 ed., ed. Edward
Suicide
N. Zalta, http://plato. stanford .edu/archives/fa1l2003/ 1. Larry Copeland and Laura Parker, "Terri Schiavo's
entries/ethics-virtue/ (January 9,2015). Case Doesn't End with Her Passing," USA Today,
4. William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood March 31, 2005, www.usatoday.com/news/nation
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973),65. /2005-03-31-schiavo_x.htm (January 13, 2012).
NOTES 0 N-3
2. lowe the notion of a good death "for the sake" of the https:/Iwww.census.gov/library/publications/2020
person dying to Philippa Foot (in "Euthanasia," /demo/p60-271.html#:-:text=In%202019%2C%20
Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 2 [1977]: 85-112); the%20percentage%200f,to%2055.4%20percent
and to Helga Kuhse (in "Euthanasia,,' in Companion %20in%202019.
to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. [Oxford: Black- 4. Health at a Glance 2019, OECD Indicators.
well, 1993],294-302). 5. Health at a Glance 2019, OECD Indicators.
3. Issued June 1994 based on the reports "Decisions 6. Kaiser Family Foundation, "US Improving in Health
Near the End of Life," adopted june 1991, and Care Quality, But Still Lagging Behind Other Coun-
"Physician-Assisted Suicide," adopted December 1993 tries, New Analysis Finds," September 10, 2016,
(lAMA); updated june 1996. https:/lwww.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/us
4. Immanuel Kant, "Suicide," in Lectures on Ethics, trans. -improving-in-heaIth-care-quality-but-still-lagging-
Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 147-54. behind-other-countries-new-analysis-finds/.
5. Ronald Munson, Intervention and Reflection: Basic 7. Commonwealth Fund, "US Health System Ranks
Issues in Medical Ethics, ed. Ronald Munson, 7th ed. Last Among Eleven Countries on Measures of Access
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), 696-97. Equity, Quality, Efficiency, and Healthy Lives," June
6. Dan W. Brock, "Voluntary Active Euthanasia," Hast- 16,2014, http://www.commonweaIthfund.org/pub
ings Center Report 22, no. 2 (March/April1992): 11. lications/pressreleases/ 2014/jun/us-heaIth-system
7. lowe this point to Thomas F. Wall, Thinking Critically -ranks-last.
about Moral Problems (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 8. National Conference of State Legislatures, "Affordable
2003),176. Care Act: A Brief Summary," March 2011. http://
8. james Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia," www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/health/HRACA
New England Journal ofMedicille 292, no. 2 Uanuary 9, .pdf. Reprinted by permission.
1975): 79. 9. Tami Luhby, "Will Obamacare Survive t h e rrlax B'IP"
I .
9. Winston Nesbitt, "Is Killing No Worse Than Letting CNNMoney, December 15, 2017, http://money.cnn
Die?" Journal ofApplied PIli/OSOp/IY 12, no. 1 (1995): 101-5. .com/2017/12/15/news/economy/obamacare
10. j. Gay-Williams, "The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia," -individual-mandate-tax/index.html.
in Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, 10. The Economist (editorial), "Libertarians, Health Insur-
(selected by] Ronald Munson, 7th ed. (Belmont, CA: ance, and Rights," September 2, 2009.
Wadsworth, 2004),710-11. 11. Norman Daniels, "Is There a Right to Health Care
11. Brock, 20. and, If So, What Does It Encompass?" in A Compan-
ion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer
CHAPTER 11: Delivering Health Care (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998,2001),317.
12. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, rev. ed. (Cambridge,
1. Kaiser Family Foundation, "The Uninsured and the
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
ACA: A Primer-Key Facts about Health Insurance
13. Norman Daniels, 319.
and the Uninsured amidst Changes to the Afford-
14. Norman Daniels, 323.
able Care Act," January 25, 2019, https:/Iwww.kff
.org/uninsured/report/the-uninsured-and-the-aca
-a -pri mer- key-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the CHAPTER 12: Animal Welfare
-uninsured-amidst-changes-to-the-affordable-care 1. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York:
-actl. New York Review of Books, 1990), i.
2. A. P. Wilper et al., "Health Insurance and Mortality 2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, from Basic
in U.S. Adults," American Journal of Public Health Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. and annotated
99:2289-95. by Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House,
3. United States Census, "Health Insurance Coverage 1945), Second Part of the Second Part, Question 64,
in the United States: 2019," September IS, 2020, Article 1.
N-4 0 NOTES
3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricul- 3. Aldo Leopold, tiThe Land Ethic," in A Sand Country
tural Statistical Services, Livestock Slaughter: 2016 Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981),
Summary; USDA, NASS, Poultry Slaughter: 2016 237-65.
Summary. 4. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis
4. Tadlock Cowan, "Humane Treatment of Farm Infield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 239-40.
Animals: Overview and Issues," Congressional 5. Paul W. Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature,"
Research Service Report RS21978, May 9,2011, www Environmental Ethics 3, no. 3 (19B1): 198.
.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS2197B.pdf 6. Tom Regan, "Animal Rights, Human Wrongs," Envi-
(August 20, 2017); People for the Ethical Treatment ronmental Ethics 2, no. 2 (Summer 1980): 99-120.
of Animals, "Petition for Agency Action to Fully 7. Robert Elliot, "Environmental Ethics," in A Compan-
Comply with the Mandates of Humane Methods of ion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, corr. ed. (Oxford: Black-
Livestock Slaughter Act," December 11, 2001, well, 1993), 291.
www.peta.org/feat/usda/petition.html (December 8. Elliot, 292.
3,2006). 9. This argument is a vastly oversimplified rendering
5. Lori Gruen, "The Moral Status of Animals," in Stan- of Robert Elliot's argument in "Faking Nature,"
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2003 ed., ed. Inquiry 25, no. 1 (1982): Bl-93.
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries 10. This example is adapted from Martin H. Krieger,
/moral-animal/ (February 23, 2015). "What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?" Science 179
6. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to Principles of (1973): 446-55.
Morals and Legislation (1789; reprint, New York: 11. Taylor, 207.
Hafner, 1948), 311. 12. David Schmidtz, "Are All Species Equal?" Journal of
7. Peter Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," Philosophic Applied Philosophy IS, no. 1 (1998): 59.
Exchange 1 (1974): 106, 107-8.
B. Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," 109. CHAPTER 14: Racism, Equality, and Discrimi-
9. Singer, Animal Liberation, 77-78. nation
10. Tom Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," in In l. Radley Balko, "There's Overwhelming Evidence
Defense of Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Black- That the CriminaIJustice System Is Racist. Here's the
well, 1985), 2l. Proof," Washington Post, June 10, 2020, https://www
11. Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," 22. .washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions
12. Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," 24. /systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-justice
13. Mary Anne Warren, "The Rights of the Nonhuman -system/ (June 14, 2020).
World," in Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of 2. Naomi Zack, "Introduction," Tile Oxford Handbook of
Readings, ed. Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (University Philosophy and Race (New York: Oxford University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), 116. Press, 2019), 5-6.
14. Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights," 23. 3. Lawrence Blum, lI['m Not a Racist But ... ": Tile Moral
Quandary of Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
CHAPTER 13: Environmental Ethics Press, 2002), 110. Copyright © 2002 by Cornell Uni-
1. National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society, versity. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell
Climate Change: Evidence and Causes, "Summary," University Press.
February 26, 2014, http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static 4. American Anthropological Association, "AAA State-
-assets/exec-office-other/climate-change_full.pdf. ment on Race," May 17, 1998, https://www
2. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth W ill ott , "Introduc- .americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA/Content
tion," in Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, .aspx?ItemNumber:::2583.
What Really Works (New York: Oxford University 5. Tanya Maria Golash-Boza, Race and Racisms: A Critical
Press, 2002), xvii. Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3.
NOTES 0 N-5
6. Blum, 133. 28. Cohen, Af{irmativeAction, 110.

7. Blum, 131. 29. Cohen, Af{irmativeAction, 27-28.
8. Michael James, "Race," in Stanford Encyclopedia of 30. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Preferential Hiring," Philo-
Philosophy, Spring 2017 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, sophy & Public Af(airs 2, no. 4 (Summer 1973): 383-84.
h ttps://plato.stanford .edu/archives/spr2017/entries 31. Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith
/race/. JarviS Thomson," Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, no. 3
9. Blum, 147-64. (Spring 1974): 318.
10. Blum, 165. 32. Thomson, "Preferential Hiring," 382-83.
11. Blum, 8-9. 33. Pojman, "The Case against Affirmative Action," 101.
12. Blum, 1-2.
13. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Excerpts from Racism without CHAPTER 15: Sexual Morality
Racists, 4e by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Copyright © 1. Gallup Poll, "Marriage," May 8-11, 2014, gallup.com
2014. Used by permission of Rowman & Littlefield /poll/117328/marriage.aspx (February 16, 2015).
Publishing Group. All rights reserved. 2. Lawrence B. Finer, "Trends in Premarital Sex in the
14. Blum, 23-24. United States, 1954-2003," Public Health Reports 122
15. Bonilla-Silva, 1. Oanuary-February 2007), www.publichealthreports
16. Bonilla-Silva, 2. .org/issueopen.cfm?articleID=1784 (February 16, 2015).
17. Bonilla-Silva,3. 3. Catherine Kaukinen, et aI, ed., Addressing Violence
18. Naomi Zack, "Race and Racial Discrimination," in against Women on College Campuses (Philadelphia:
The oxford Handbook ofPractical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford Temple University Press, 2017), 18-30.
University Press, 2003), 255. 4. Alison E. Hatch, Campus Sexual Assault (Santa
19. Zack, 256. Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 3-4.
20. Emrys Westacott, "How Not to Accuse Someone of 5. Vanessa Grigoriadis, Blurred Lines: Rethinking Sex,
Prejudice," Think 14, no. 41 (Autumn 2015). Power, and Consent on Campus (Boston: Houghton
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 601 of Title VI. Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), xix.
22. Terms used by Louis P. POjman in "The Case against 6. Grigoriadis, xx.
Affirmative Action," International Journal of Applied 7. Hatch, 16.
Philosophy 12 (1998): 97-115 (reprinted in Philosophy: 8. Hatch,51.
The Quest for Truth, ed. Louis P. Pojman and LeWis 9. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
Vaughn. 6th ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, "Persona Humana: Declaration on Certain Questions
2006], 632-45). I attach very roughly the same Concerning Sexual Ethics" (December 29,1975).
meanings to them that POjman does. 10. Thomas A. Mappes, "Sexual Morality and the
23. pojman, "The Case against Affirmative Action," 98. Concept of Using Another Person," in Social Ethics:
24. Albert Mosley, "The Case for Affirmative Action," in Morality and Social Policy, ed. Thomas A. Mappes
Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Jane S. Zembaty, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-
and Lewis Vaughn, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford Uni- Hill, 2007), 171.
versity Press, 2006), 630. 11. Alan H. Goldman, "Plain Sex," Philosophy and Public
25. Regents ofthe University ofCalifomia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. Affairs 6, no. 3 (Spring 1977): 267-87.
265,312 (1978). 12. Goldman, 269.
26. Carl Cohen, in Affirmative Action and Racial Prefer- 13. Igor Primoratz, Ethics and Sex (London: Routledge,
ence: A Debate, by Carl Cohen and James P. Sterba 1999), 173.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 25. 14. Goldman, 280.
27. Ronald Dworkin, "Bakke's Case: Are Quotas Unfair?" 15. Michael Ruse, "Is Homosexuality Bad Sexuality?" in
in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Homosexuality: A Philosophical Inquiry (Oxford: Black-
University Press, 1985),294. well, 1988), 179-192.
N-6 0 NOTES
16. Michael Levin, "Why Homosexuality Is Abnormal," CHAPTER 17: Drugs, Guns, and Personal
The Monist (April 1984). Liberty
17. Timothy F. Murphy, "Homosexuality and Nature:
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Happiness and the Law at Stake," Journal of Applied
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/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
(December 29, 2017); Centers for Disease Control
CHAPTER 16: Tolerance, Civility, and Free and Prevention (CDC). A Ico/wl-Rela ted Disease Impact
Speech
(ARDl), Atlanta, GA: CDC (December 29, 2017);
1. Christine T. Sistare, Civility and Its Discontents: Civic M. Stahre, J. Roeber, D. Kanny, R. D. Brewer, and
Virtue, Toleration, and Cultural Fragmentation (Lawrence: X. Zhang, "Contribution of Excessive Alcohol
University Press of Kansas, 2004), 72. Consumption to Deaths and Years of Potential
2. Joan McGregor, "Civility, Civic Virtue, and Citizen- Life Lost in the United States, Prevo Chronic Dis.
ship," in Civility and Its Discontents: Civic Virtue, 2014;11:130293 (December 29, 2017); Substance
Toleration, and Cultural Fragmentation, ed. Christine T. Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
Sistare (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, (SAMHSA), uTobacco" (December 29, 2017); SAM-
2004),26. HSA, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and
3. Rainer Forst, "Toleration," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Quality, "National Survey on Drug Use and Health,"
Philosophy, July 12, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu 2014 and 2015 (December 29,2017).
/entries/toleration/ Oune 29, 2020). 2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admin-
4. Forst. istration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and
S. Sistare, 74-75. Quality, September 4, 2014, "The NSDUH Report:
6. Sigal R. Ben-Porath, Free Speech on Campus (Philadel- Substance Use and Mental Health Estimates from the
phia: University of Pennsylvania, 2017), 70-71, 77. 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Over-
7. Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman, Free view of Findings," available at http://jpo.wrlc.org
Speech on Campus (New Haven, CT: Yale University /bitstream/handle/11204/3782/2013%20
Press, 2017), 98. Subst%20Use%20and%20Ment%20Hlth%20
8. Ben-Porath,12. Ests.SAMHSA.pdf?sequence=1 (February 15,2015).
9. John Arthur, "Sticks and Stones," in Et/tics in Practice: 3. National Institutes of Health, National Institute of
An Anthology, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Oxford: Blackwell, Drug Abuse, uMedical Consequences of Drug Abuse,"
2007),399. December 2012, http://www.drugabuse.gov/related
10. Survey: Half of U.S. College Students "Intimidated" -topics/medical-consequences-drug-abuse/mortality
When Sharing Views, William F. Buckley, Jr. Pro- (February 15,201 5).
gram at Yale, October 26, 2015, http://mclaughli- 4. "Crime in the United States 2016-Arrests," FBI
non Ii ne .com/201 5/ 10/26/t he-wi Ilia m-f- buckley- jr Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: US Dept.
-program-at-yale-almost-half-49-of-u-s-college of Justice, September 2017), p. 2; Table 18, Estimated
-students-intimidated-by-professors-when-sharing Number of Arrests, United States 2016; Table 21A,
-differing-beliefs-survey/. Arrests by Race and Ethnicity 2016; and email cor-
11. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Ul1derstallc/i1lg respondence between the editor and Stephen G.
Words That Wound (New York: Westview Press, 2004). Fischer Jr., Chief-Multimedia Productions, FBI-
12. Chemerinsky and Gillman, 103-10. CJIS Division.
13. Ben-Porath, 27-28. S. Pew Research Center, 44America's New Drug Policy
14. Chemerinsky and Gillman, 20. Landscape," April 2, 20l4, http://www.people-press
15. Oelgado and Stefancic. .org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-Iandscape
16. Chemerinsky and Gillman, 108. /(February 15, 2015).
NOTES 0 N-7
6. Pew Research Center, uAmerica's New Drug Policy 22. Husak, The Legalization of Drugs: For and Against,
Landscape"; Abigail Geiger, Pew Research Center, 92-95.
"Support for Marijuana Legalization Continues to 23. De Marneffe, The Legalization ofDrugs: For and Against,
Rise," October 12, 2016, http://www.pewresearch 110.
.orgl fact -ta n k/20 161 101 12/su pport-for-mari ju ana 24. John Q. Wilson, quoted in Body Count: Moral
-legalization-continues-to-risel. Poverty . .. and How to Win America's War on Drugs, by
7. The Merck Manual (Home Edition), "Overview of William J. Bennett, John Dilulio, Jr., and John
Drug Abuse," January 2009, http://merckmanuals Walters (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 140-41.
.com/home/special_subjects/drug_use_and_abuse 25. Nelson Lund, "The Second Amendment and the
loverview_ o C dru g_abuse.html?qt=%220verview Inalienable Right to Self-Defense," www.heritage.org,
0/020ofO/020Drug%20Abuse%22&alt=sh (Feburary 15, April 17, 2014.
2015). 26. DegraZia and Hunt, 149-50.
8. The Merck Manual (Home Edition), uOverview of Drug 27. Degrazia and Hunt, 157-58.
Abuse."
9. Douglas Husak and Peter de Marneffe, The Legaliza- CHAPTER 18: Capital Punishment
tion ofDrugs: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge 1. "The Death Penalty in 2019: Year End Repor t ,"
University Press, 2005), 34-35. Death Penalty Information Center, 2019, https:/!
10. CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, National deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpiC
Vital Statistics Reports, "Deaths: Final Data for -reports/dpic-year-end-reports/the-death-penalty
2017," june 24, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data -in-2019-year-end-report aune 17,2020); "Methods
/nvs r/nvsr68/nvsr68_09-508.pdf; World Population of Execution," Death Penalty Information Center,
Review, "Gun Deaths by Country 2020," Gun Deaths 2019, https:/!deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions
by Country 2020 (worldpopulationreview.com). /methods-of-execution aune 17,2020).
11. David Degrazia and Lester H. Hunt, Debating Gun 2. "The Death Penalty in 2019: Year End Repor, t"
Control: How Much Regulation Do We Need? (New Death Penalty Information Center, 2019, https://
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 121. deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic
12. Philip J. Cook and Kristina A. Goss, The GUll Debate: _reports/dpic_year_end_reports/the-death-penalty
What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford -in-2019-year-end-report aune 18, 2020); "Racial
University Press, 2014), 22. Demographics," Death Penalty Information Center,
13. Degrazia and Hunt, 121-22. https:/!deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview/
14. Degrazia and Hunt, 12. demographics Gune 18, 2020); "Execution Data-
15. This definition is based on one given by Degrazia. base," Death Penalty Information Center, https://
16. Degrazia and Hunt, 247-48. deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution
17. Glen H. Utter and Robert J. Spitzer, The GUll Debate: -database aune 18,2020).
An Encyclopedia of Gun Rights & GUll COlltrol ill the 3. "Execution Database," Death Penalty Information
United States (Amenia, NY: Grey House, 2016), 274. Center, https://d eathpenaltyinfo.org/executions
18. Hugh LaFollette, "Gun Control," Ethics 110 (2000). /execution-database aune 18, 2020).
19. ProCon.org, "Should More Gun Control Laws Be 4. "The Evolution of Public Opinion on Capital Punish-
Enacted?" https://gun-control.procon.org/. ment," Death Penalty Information Center, 2019,
20. jon Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research
21. james Q. Wilson, "Against the Legalization of Drugs," /public-opinion-polls/national-polls-and-studies
Commentary, February 1990, https:/lwww.commen Oune 18,2020); "The Death Penalty in 2019: Year End
tarymagazine.com/article/against-the-Iegalization Report," Death Penalty Information Center, 2019,
-of-drugs/ (Feburary 15,2015). https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research
N-8 0 NOTES
/dpic-reports/dpic-year-end-reports/the-death 2. James P. Sterba, "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War

-penalty-in-2019-year-end-report (June 17,2020). Theorists," Social Theory and Practice 18, no. 1 (Spring
5. "Death Penalty: Overview," "Death Penalty in 2019: 1992): 21.
Facts and Figures," Amnesty International, https:// 3. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Basic Writings
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/death- ofSaint Thomas Aquinas, ed. and annotated Anton C.
penalty-in-2019-facts-and-figures/ (June 18, 2020). Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), Second Part
6. John Stuart Mill, "Speech in Favor of Capital Punish- of the Second Part, Question 40, Article 1.
ment," to the English Parliament, 1868, http://ethics 4. Michael Walzer, "Moral Judgment in Time of War,"
.sandiego.edu/books/Mill/Punishment/ (January 26, Dissent 14, no. 3 (May-June 1967): 284.
2015). 5. U.S. Department of State, Patterns ofGlobal Terrorism
7. Louis P. POjman, "Why the Death Penalty Is Morally 2003 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State
Permissible," in Debating the Death Penalty: Should 2004), xii.
American Have Capital Punishment? The Experts on 6. International Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 1997 ed., s.v.
Both Sides Make Their Best Case, eds. Hugo Adam "The Official View"; quoted in A Military Guide to
Bedau and Paul G. Cassell (Oxford: Oxford University Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, U.S. Army Train-
Press, 2004), 60-61. ing and Doctrine Command, August 15, 200S, ver-
8. Ernest van den Haag, uOn Deterrence and the Death sion 3.0, available at www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism
Penalty," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and /index (December 4, 2006),1-3.
Police Science 60, no. 2. (1969). 7. Mark Burgess, "A Brief History of Terrorism," Center for
9. Richard C. Dieter, uMillions Misspent: What Politi- Defense Information, July 2, 2003, http://www.pogo
cians Don't Say about the High Cost of the Death .org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/cdi
Penalty," Fall 1994, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node -archive/a-brief-history-of-terrorism.html
/599 (January 26,2015). (February 24,2015).
10. Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment (Atlantic 8. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), Terrorism (MIPT), Terrorism Knowledge Base, www
165. .tkb.org/Home.jsp (January 27,2006).
11. Immaneul Kant, The Philosophy of Law, trans. 9. National Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report 011
W. Hastie (Edinburgh: Clark, 1887), 195. Terrorism, April 30, 2010, http://www.riskintel.com/
12. Kant, 198. wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/10/2009
13. Paul G. Cassell, "In Defense of the Death Penalty," in _report_on_terrorism.pdf (February 24,2015).
Bedau and Cassell, eds., Debating the Death Penalty, 10. Council on Foreign Relations, "Types of Terrorism,"
201. Council on Foreign Affairs, http://cfrterrorism.org
14. Cassell, 201. /terrorism/types.html (January 27,2006).
15 "Ways That Race Can Affect Death SentenCing," 11. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,
Death Penalty Information Center, June 17, 2020, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Inci-
h ttps: / /deathpena It yin fo.org/pol iCy-issues/race dents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology," March 2004,
/ways-that-race-can-affect-death-sentencing. http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html (Feburary
16. Death Penalty Information Center. 24,201S).
17. B. M. Leiser, Liberty, Justice and Morals: Contemporary 12. Terrence McCoy, "ISIS, Beheadings and the Success of
Value Conflicts (New York: Macmillan, 1973),225. Horrifying Violence," Washington Post,June 13,2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning
CHAPTER 19: Political Violence: War, Terror- -mix/wp/2014/06/13/isis-beheading-and-the-success-
ism, and Torture of-horrifying-violence/ (October 31,2014).
1. James Turner Johnson, "Threats, Values, and Defense: 13. Richard Falk, "Thinking about Terrorism," The Nation,
Does the Defense of Values by Force Remain a Moral June 28,1986; note that this view was expressed long
POSSibility?" Parameters 15, no. 1 (Spring 1985). before the events of September 11,2001.
NOTES 0 N-9
14. Joseph M. Boyle Jr., "Just War Doctrine and the 2. Pew Research Center, "Key Findings about U.S. Immi-
Military Response to Terrorism," Joumal of Political grants," May 3, 2017, http://www.pewresearch
Philosophy 11, no. 22 (2003): 157-70. .org/topics/search/?query=key findings immigration.
15. Haig Khatchadourian, The Morality of Terrorism 3. Pew Research Center, "Key Findings about U.S. Immi-
(New York: Peter Lang, 1998),31-32. grants," August 20, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.
16. Michael Walzer, "Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses," org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-
in Problems of International Justice, ed. Steve Luper- immigrants/; Pew Research Center, "Immigrant
Foy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988),238. Share in U.S. Nears Record High," January 30,2019,
17. Andrew Valls, "Can Terrorism Be Justified?" in Ethics https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01
ill Intemational Affairs: Theories and Cases, ed. Valls /30/immigrant-share-in-u-s-nears-record-high-but
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 65-79. -remains-below-that-of-many-other-countries/.
18. Thomas Nagel, "War and Massacre:' Philosophy & 4. Pew Research Center, "Key Findings."
Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 123-43. 5. Ipsos Survey, "The Perils of Perception: Americans'
19. Jan Narveson, "Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis:' Estimates of Number of Immigrants, Atheists, and
Ethics 75, no. 4 (1965): 623-24. Those Living Rurally Radically Out of Step with Real-
20. Larry May, Eric Rovie, and Steve Viner, in The Moral- ity," December 1, 2015, https://www.ipsos.com/en
ity of War: Classical and Contemporary Readings, eds. -us/perilsperceptions-americans-estimates-number
May, Rovie, and Viner (Upper Saddle River, NJ: -immigrants-atheists-and-those-living-rurally.
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006), 200.
6. Pew Research Center, "Key Findings."; "5 Key Facts
21. R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, "Terrorism:' in about U.S. Lawful Immigrants," August 3,2017, http://
Violence, Terrorism, and Justice, eds. Frey and Morris
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/03/5-key
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1-11. -facts-about-u-s-Iawful-immigrants/.
22. Walzer, ltTerrorism:' 240.
7. Pew Research Center, "Key Findings."
23. Michael Walzer, "The Argument about Humanitar- 8. USA.gov, "Deportation," https:/Iwww.usa.gov
ian Intervention," Dissent 49, no. 1 (Winter 2002), /deportation; Pew Research Center, "Key Findings."
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-argument 9. Pew Research Center, "How Border ApprehenSions,
_about-humanitarian-intervention (February 26,
ICE Arrests and Deportations Have Changed under
2015).
Trump," March 2, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.
24. Stephen Nathanson, "Can Terrorism Be Morally Justi- org/fact-tank/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions
fied?" in Morality ill Practice, ed.James P. Sterba, 7th ed. -ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004), 607. -trump/
2 5 . From Jeffrey Goldberg, "Inside Jihad U.: The Educa- 10. U.S. Department of State, "Refugee Admissions,"
tion of a Holy Warrior," New York Times Magazine, https:/Iwww.state.gov/j/prm/ra/, (December 4, 2017);
June 2000; quoted in Louis P. POjman, "The Moral https:/Iwww.state.gov/j/prm/ra/; Pew Research Center,
Response to Terrorism and the Cosmopolitan "Key Findings."
Imperative," in Terrorism and International Justice, ed. 11. U.S. Census Bureau, "New Census Bureau Report
James P. Sterba (New York: Oxford University Press, Analyzes U.S. Population Projections," March 3, 2015,
2003). https:/Iwww.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases
26. Seumas Miller, "Torture," in Sta1lford Ellcyclopedia of /2015/CbI5-tpsI6.html.
Pililosoph}" Summer 2017 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, 12. Cari Lee Skogberg Eastman, Immigration, 121.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/torture/ (February 13. Cari Lee Skogberg Eastman, Immigration, 38.
26,2015). 14. Eduardo Porter, "Can Immigration Hurt the Econ-
omy? An Old Prejudice Returns," New York Times,
CHAPTER 20: The Ethics of Immigration
February 14, 2017, https:/Iwww.nytimes.com/2017
1. Cari Lee Skogberg Eastman, Immigration: Examining /02/14/business/economy/immigration-productivity
the Facts (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 16. -economists.html.
N-10 0 NOTES
15. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel, and D'Vera 2. Oxfam International, "Working for the Few," 2014,
Cohn, "5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S.," http://www.oxfam.org/en/research/working-few
Pew Research Center, April 27, 2017, http://www. (February 28, 2015); United Nations Development
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/2715-facts-about- Programme (UNDP), "Human Development Report
illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s/; Cari Lee Skogberg 1998: Consumption for Human Development"
Eastman, Immigration, 79-85. (New York, 1998), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default
16. American Immigration Council, "Fact Sheet: Why /files/reports/2S9/hdr_1998_en_complete_nostats
Don't They Just Get in Line?" August 12,2016, https: .pdf (February 28,2015).
//www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/ 3. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality,"
why-don't-they-just-get-line. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972),
17. Cari Lee Skogberg Eastman, Immigration, 22-24. 23-32.
18. Stephen Macedo, "The Moral Dilemma of U.S. 4. John Hospers, "What Libertarianism Is," in The
Immigration Policy: Open Borders versus Social Libertarian Alternative, ed. Tibor R. Machan (Chicago:
Justice?" in Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain Nelson-Hall, 1974),3.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 64. S. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," 231.
19. Christopher Heath Wellman, "Immigration and 6. Singer, 231.
Freedom of Association," Ethics 119 (2008): 109-41. 7. Singer 232.
20. Stephen Macedo, "The Moral Dilemma," 64. 8. Singer, 235.
21. Stephen Macedo, "The Moral Dilemma," 64 9. Singer, 241.
10. Singer, 231.
11. Singer, 241.
CHAPTER 21: Global Economic Justice 12. John Arthur, "Equality, Entitlements, and the Dis-
1. "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015," tribution of Income," Philosophy for the 21st Century,
United Nations, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals ed. Steven M. Cahn (New York: Oxford University
/2015 _MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%20201S%20PR Press, 2003), 677.
%200verview.pdf (June 21, 2020); "The State of the 13. Arthur, 677.
World's Children 2019," UNICEF, October 2019, 14. Louis P. Pojman, ed., Life and Death: A Reader in Moral
https://data.unicef.org/resources/state-of-the Problems, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000),
-worlds-children-2019! Uune 21, 2020). 180.
1 N 0 EX
A and religion, 221-22,226,227 adequacy criteria, 76, 77-80

Abizadeh, Arash, 781n5 and responsibility, 234, 243-44, and ethical egoism, 97-98
abnormality, 33-35 247, 251, 252, 257nl and feminist ethics, 192-93
abortion, 221-74 and rights of mother, 225, 227, and utilitarianism, lOS
and animal rights, 263-64 249,250,256-57,269,272, ad hominem (appeal to the person)
and biological facts, 270, 272 273-74, 274n2 fallacy, 63
and burdens on mother, 272 and right to life, 242-43, 245, adoption, 248
and consent, 232, 234, 239-40, 243 255-56,266 advance directives, 276
and contraception, 267-68 and self-defense, 226-27, 241 adventitious needs, 326
and cultural relativism, 25 seriousness of, 270-71, 274n4 advocacy groups, 59
defined, 221 and sex selection, 236-37 affirmative action, 446-50, 452-54,
and desire account, 264-65, 266 and size of sacrifice, 244-45 457-58
and discontinuation account, 264, therapeutic, 221-22, 227 affirmative consent, 493
265-66 and third-party intervention, affirming the consequent, 50
and emotions, 221, 270 241-42 Affordable Care Act (ACA)
fact-checking on, 231 utilitarianism on, 224-26,237 (Obamacare),315-16,
facts and figures on, 223 Violinist analogy, 232, 234, 239, 323-24
and generalizations, 260-61 240-41,242-44,245,250, Mghanistan, U.S. invasion of (2001),
and Good Samaritan, 246-47, 251-52 676-77,694,723,726,734
250-51 and virtue ethics, 269-74 "Against the Legalization of Drugs"
and health care rights, 335 See also personhood of fetus (Wilson), 601-9
and health of mother, 238, 240, Abrams, Floyd, 701 agency, fragmentation of, 425,
241-42, 257n7 absolutism, 20 427-28
issue background, 221-22,224 and Kantian ethics, 82 alcohol, 491, 607-8
and justice, 243, 245, 269, 274n2 and naturallaw theory, 139, 141, Alexander II (tsar of Russia), 662
Kantian ethics on, 226-27 142 Alexander the Great, 688
and killing as loss of future, 261-62, and utilitarianism, 82 Algerian War, 701
264,266,267 abstinence pledges, 499 alienation, 198
and killing of innocent persons, act-egoism, 93 "All Animals Are Equal" (Singer),
227,228,230,240-41,249, "Active and Passive Euthanasia" 352-61
253, 257n3 (Rachels), 291-94 Allen, Woody, 119
later in pregnancy, 233, 255, 271 active euthanasia, 276, 281, 284-85, "all-natural theory," 79
legal contexts, 224, 225, 229 291-94,303-5 al-Qaeda, 677
methods of, 222 See also euthanasia alternative views, 65, 67-68
moderate positions on, 232, 234 act-utilitarianism altruism, 116, 118, 119,801
moral arguments on, 227-28, on abortion, 224-25 See also beneficence
230-32,234,258 applying, 103-4 Amin, Idi, 758n7
motivations for, 272-73 defined, 74 analogies, 62
natural law theory on, 140, 142, on euthanasia, 279 anal sex, 488, 489,494, 513
227 evaluating, 105-8 anarchism, 767, 771n15
parental notification for, 237 on happiness, 100-101 Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick), 623
and prima facie principles, 258-59 and preferences, 101-2 Anderson, Elizabeth, 575, 765
and rape, 239-40,243,244,251, on terrorism, 668 Anderson, James c., 414, 415, 416
257n2 on torture, 698-99 Anderson, Tanisha, 434
readings on, 238-74 Addis, Adeno, 562 Andreou, Chrisoula, 432n4
1-1
1-2 0 INDEX
Anglin, Douglas, 607 antecedent, 50 on moral status, 373

Animal Liberation (Singer), 338 anthropocentrism, 384, 389, and natural law theory, 138
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), 349 398-400,413,414,429 on sexual morality, 500, 528
animal rights, 338-81 anthropology, 23,33-35 and virtue ethics, 164-65, 167,
and abortion, 263-64 "Anthropology and the Abnormal" 171-79,180,181,528
and animals as subjects of a life, (Benedict),33-35 Arthur, John, 541, 788, 798-804
345-46,347,367-68,370-71 anticosmopolitanism, 742 Asch, Solomon, 25
and consumer product testing, 342, antipathy, 439, 440, 444, 445 Assisted Suicide: The Musical (Carr),
349-50,356-57,362 anti-war pacifism, 680, 682 306
and cruelty, 364-65, 374 appeal to authority fallacy, 61 assisted suicide, 288-89, 301
and current treatment of animals, appeal to ignorance fallacy, 62-63 See also physician-assisted suicide
338-39 appeal to the person (ad hominem) associative obliga tions, 752
and equality, 353-55, 358-61, 365, fallacy, 63 asylum, 745
378 Appiah, Kwame Anthony, 459-69 See also refugees
issue background, 339-43 Applbaum, Arthur, 711-12, 721n5 Atkins v. Virginia, 626
Kantian ethics on, 263-64, 338, 345 applied ethics, 5-6 Atlas Shrugged (Rand), 116
legal contexts, 339 approximation fallacy, 555, 557 uA Tolerant Society" (Balint), 561-69
and means-ends principle, 338, 345 Aquinas, Thomas Augusta National Golf Club, 760, 761
and meat production, 341, 344, on animal rights, 338 Augustine, Saint
356,361n3, 368,389 on divine command theory, 10 on moral status, 376
moral arguments on, 346-47 on environmental ethics, 387 and Barack Obama, 688
and moral status, 339-43, 344, 363, and feminist ethics, 202 on sexual morality, 529
364,375-76,384,386 male bias of, 200 on war, 688
and personal relationships, 340-42 on moral status, 376 Aussaresses, Paul, 701
and personhood, 342-43 and natural law theory, 138-39, Australian immigration policy, 751,
and racism, 353-54,355,361,378, 142 756,768,769
466 and Barack Obama, 688 Autonomy, Equality and a JlISt Health
readings on, 352-81 on reason, 9 Care System (Nielsen), 325-31
rights view on, 366-67 on war, 659, 660 autonomy
and scientific research, 339, Archer, David, 427 and animal rights, 367, 370, 373,
344-45,357,362,368, Ardrcy, Robert, 118 374,377,378
375-81 "Are All Species Equal" (Schmidtz), and drug use, 583
and seal hunting, 350-51, 362 413-20 and equality, 325, 326, 327, 330
social contract theory on, 363-64 Arendt, Hannah, 689 ethics of care on, 206-7
and speciesism, 344, 358, 361n4, arguments and euthanasia, 281-82, 295, 306,
367,377-79 defined,46 311
strong position on (Regan), 345-46, diagramming, 52-55 feminist ethics on, 194, 197, 198,
347,362-72,373,374,384, evaluating, 48, 49-51, 52, 57 199,202
388-89 fallacies, 60-64, 68 and freedom of association,
and suffering, 339, 343-44, 355, implied premises in,S 1-52, 57 761,762, 770nn5,7, 775,
361n4, 377-78 structure of, 46-47 782nn17-18
and unexamined beliefs, 338, 358 types of, 48-49 and free speech, 541
utilitarianism on, 104,343-45, See also moral arguments and health care, 329-30
352-61,365-66,370,378, Aristotle Kantian ethiCS on, 153, 198,376
379 and Alexander the Great, 688 and means-ends principle, 157
and vegetarianism, 341, 344, 356, 381 on animal rights, 338 and respect, 83, 136
weak position on (Warren), 346-47, on domestic realm, 189-90 and sexual assault, 518,526
372-75 and egalitarianism, 764-65 and tolerance/intolerance, 567
and women's rights, 352-53 and environmental ethics, 414, 415 See also freedom; respect
and zoos, 351 and ethics of care, 211 availability error, 65
See also environmental ethics on moral principles, 195 Ayer, A.J., 28
INDEX 0 1-3
B biotic pyramid, 423 and cost-benefit analYSiS, 649-50,

Baier, Annette C., 185, 195-203,205, birth control. See contraception 651-52
207 Blackmun, Harry, 225 crimes deserving, 652-53
Baldwin,james, 478, 481 Black Nationalism, 464-65 defined, 625
Balint, Peter, 561-69 Blake, Michael, 756, 769 and deterrence, 626-28, 638-39,
Ban Ki-moon, 803 Blanshard, Brand, 30 640n9,649,650-51
Baron, Marcia, 527n9 blastocyst, 222 distribution of, 637-38
Barry, Brian, 204, 206 Blum, Lawrence, 195, 196,436, and equality, 638, 640n4, 642-43
Bassen, Paul, 266-67 438-39,440,441,469-78 and executions of innocent people,
Baxter, William F., 397-401 Blyden, Edward, 465 636, 638, 640n8, 641n10,
Baxter v. State of Montana, 278 Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 440, 442, 444 651
Bayle, Pierre, 563 Boyle, john, 601 incidence of, 625
Beauvoir, Simone de, 187,213 Boy Scouts of America, 760, 761 inequitable application of, 631-33,
Beccaria, Cesare, 640n3 Bradley, F. H., 376 638, 640n6,9, 654-56
Bedau, Hugo Adam, 638, 647n3, Brandt, Mark, 539 issue background, 624-26
648-56 Braybrooke, David, 326, 327 and justice, 629-30, 639
Beecher, Catherine, 183 Brennan, Samantha, 737n28 Kantian ethics on, 630-31, 643-44,
begging the question fallacy, 60-61 Brewer, Lawrence, 632 647nn5-7,650,652,653
Benedict, Ruth, 33-35 Broad, C. D., 137, 738n37 legal contexts, 625-26
beneficence Brock, Dan W., 282, 295-303 methods of, 625
and euthanasia, 282 Brooks, Mo, 324 moral arguments on, 631-33
and global economic justice, 784, Broome, John, 429 and poor representation, 636
785 The Brothers Karamazov (Dostoevsky), and prevention, 626
and Kantian ethics, 146 10,699 public opinion on, 641, 646n1
as prima facie principle, 84-85 Brown, Michael, 483 and raCism, 631-33, 638, 640n6,9,
and utilitarianism, 84, 85, 109 Brown, Wendy, 562 655
benevolent quarantine, 661-62 Brown v. Board ofEdlicatiol1, 483 readings on, 637-56
Benhabib, Seyla, 751-52 Brunswick, Ann, 601 and redemption, 635
Benn, Stanley, 360-61 Bubeck, Diemut, 208, 210, 211 and respect, 630
Ben-Porath, Sigal R., 537, 541, 543, Bundy, Ted, 624 and restitution, 641n13
569-76 Bush, George W. retentionist arguments, 624
Bentham,jeremy, 105 and euthanasia, 275 and retributive justice, 630, 639,
on animal rights, 343-44,354,355, and immigration, 740 641nnI2,15,642-45,
389 and torture, 666, 677 647nn2-3,652-56
and gun rights/gun control, 622-23 and war, 660, 676-77 and right to life, 629
on happiness, 100, 101 and self-defense, 648-49
on homosexuality, 514 C severity of, 637, 640n3, 645-46
on torture, 697, 698, 702 Callahan, Daniel, 303-5 and suffering, 639
Berg, jonathan, 11 campus free speech. See free speech; and televised executions, 641n14
Besharov, Douglas, 604 obstructive protests and time on death row, 637,
Bewley, Thomas, 608 campus sexual assault, 490-93, 640n1
Bible 499-500, 517, 526nl and torture, 645-46, 699-700
and abortion, 226 Camus, Albert, 654 utilitarianism on, 626-27, 628-29,
and animal rights, 338 ClCan Terrorism Be Morally Justified" 649-50,651
and environmental ethics, 387 (Nathanson), 689-97 carbon footprints, 392
on homosexuality, 514-15 Can't We Make Moral Judgments? Card, Claudia, 195, 197
See also religion (Midgley), 22 Cardozo, Benjamin, 653
Biden,Joe,743 capital punishment, 624-56 Carens, Joseph, 755, 757, 759n19,
bin Laden, Osama, 663, 672, 677 abolitionist arguments, 624 764,765-66,767, 771n22,
biocentrism, 387,388,389,391-93, botched executions, 628 776
413-14 and civilization, 645-46 Carr, Liz, 305-7
1-4 0 INDEX
Cartesian self, 193-94 on political decision-making, 714 and harm, 517, 520, 526-27n6
"The Case against the Death Penalty" on sexual behavior, 488,493-94, and immigration, 774, 781n5
(Bedau), 648-56 502,S04-S,511,SI4 and intention, 519
"The Case for Aid" (Sachs), 801-4 See also Bible and legitimacy, 520-22, 527nn8-9
"The Case for Animal Rights" Christopher, Paul, 737n21 and seduction, 522-25, 527nn6,10
(Regan), 362-69 Churchill, Robert Paul, 563 cogent arguments, 49
"The Case for the Use of Animals citizenship cognitive biases, 64-66
in Biomedical Research" and gun rights/gun control, 611-12 cognitivism, 28
(Cohen),375-81 and immigration, 741-42, 774 Cohen, Carl, 375-81, 450, 453
"The Case for Torturing the civil disobedience, 8 Cohen, Perrin S., 357
Ticking Bomb Terrorist" civility coherence criteria
(Dershowitz),697-706 defined,535 defined,76-77
casualsex,527-34 and free speech, 537-38, 573-74 and ethical egoism, 97
categorical imperative and obstructive protests, S55-S6, and Kantian ethics, 135
applying, 132-34, 136 557 and utilitarianism, 105, 108
defined,74-75, 132, 149-51 Civil Rights Act (1964), 447 and virtue ethics, 167
and duties, 132, 135 claims, 45, 66-67 Cole, Phillip, 768n 18
and environmental ethics, 406-7 See also statements Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 594-95
and means-ends principle, 134, Clark, Stephon, 434 collateral damage, 672, 689, 692,
135,137,152 Clifford, W. K., 48 693,694-95,723
and moral disagreements, 154 climate change, 424-33 See also innocents, killing of;
as prima facie principle, 81 and anthropocentrism, 429 noncombatants
See also Kantian ethics; means-ends and carbon footprints, 392 common sense
principle and cost-benefit analysis, 429 and devising moral theories, 80-81
Catholicism and dome world scenario, 429 and emotivism, 30
on abortion, 221-22, 227 and glacier disappearance, 395-96 and self-evidence, 86-87
and male bias, 200 as global issue, 425-26, 431, and Socratic method, 14
and natural law theory, 138 432nn5,7,9-10 and utilitarianism, 80, 81,107
on political decision-making, 714 and individual moral obligations, See also moral judgments
on sexual behavior, 488, 493-94, 401-12 compensatory justice, 452-54
502,511,514 as intergenerational issue, 395, conception, 222, 228, 230
on war, 725 427-28,431,432nI4, "The Concept of Social Justice"
See also religion 433nn16-18 (Frankena),358-59
causes and effects, dispersion of, and kick the dog scenario, 429-30, conclusions
425 433n25 and argument structure, 48
censorship, 541, 553 and moral corruption, 430-31 defined,46
character, 164, 165 as moral dilemma, 395, 424-2S diagramming, S3
charity vs. duty, 785, 785, 787, 795 and procrastination, 432n4 and identifying arguments, 47
Charlottesville Unite the Right rally scientific facts on, 382-83, 385-86, predetermined, 65
(2017),434-35,548-49 401-2 conditional arguments, 49-50
Chemerinsky, Erwin, 540, 543 and scientific uncertainty, 426, confirmation bias, 64-65
Cheney,Jim, 417, 419 432n6 conflicting evidence, S9
<:hild sexual abuse, 513-14, 521, and theoretical ineptitude, 428-30 Conly, Sarah, 517-27
526-27n6 cocaine, 604-6 "The Conquistador and the Dark
Chodorow, Nan<:y, 196 coercion, 517-27 Continent: Reflections
choi<:e, 519-20, 526-27nn4,6 and campus sexual assault policies, on the Nature of Love"
Christianity 517,526nl (Chodorow),196
on abortion, 221-22, 226, 227 and choice, 519-20, 526-27nn4,6 consent
and ideal, 216 and conflict of interests, 525, and abortion, 232,234,239-40,
and male bias, 200 527nll 243
and natural law theory, 138 and decision-making, 518-19, 522 affirmative, 493
l_
INDEX 0 1-5
and euthanasia, 276, 277 centrality of, 4-5 UA Defense of Abortion" (Thomson),
and harm, 517 evaluating arguments, 49-51, 52 238-48
and means-ends principle, 156 implied premises in, 51-52 Deferred Action for Childhood
and sexual morality, 491, 493, 494 logical argument as basis of, 6 Arrivals (DACA), 743
and social contract theory, 111-12 as moral issue, 48 Degrazia, David, 580, 582, 588
consequent, 50 Socratic method, 14-16 Delgado, Richard, 542, 544-45
consequentialist moral theories, 73-74 statements in, 45-46 denying the antecedent, 50, 51
readings on, 158-63 See also moral arguments deontological theories. See
See also ethical egoism; cross-species transplantation, 109 nonconsequentialist moral
social contract theory; cruel and unusual punishment, 625, theories
utilitarianism 626 dependent premises, 54
conservatism, as criterion of Crummell, Alexander, 464-65 deportation, 740, 743
adequacy, 77 Cruzan, Nancy, 278 derivative rights, 612
considered moral judgments, 72-73 Cruzan Y. Director, Missouri Dershowitz, Alan M., 667, 697-706
See also moral judgments Department ofHealth, 278 Descartes, Rene
consistency in moral theories, 76, cultural relativism, 23-28 on animal rights, 338, 339
77-78, 135 and abortion, 25 and feminist ethicS, 193, 194
consumer product testing, 342, and belonging to multiple societies, on reason, 10
349-50,356-57,362 28 descriptive ethicS, 5
contraception defined, 20 desire account of killing as wrong,
and abortion, 267-68 and female genital cutting, 24 264-65,266
and sexual morality, 488, 502 and moral disagreements, 24, 25-27 deterrence, and capital punishment,
contractarianism. See social contract and moral infallibility, 26 626-28, 638-39, 640n9, 649,
theory and moral progress, 27 650-51
contract theory. See social contract and nonmoral beliefs, 25 Development, Relief, and Education
theory readings on, 33-42 for Alien Minors (DREAM)
contribution principle, 405-6 and social reform, 26 Act, 752
conventional view of sexual DeVos, Betsy, 499
behavior, 488, 490, 494, 495 D diagramming arguments, 52-55
Corvino, John, 509-16 DACA (Deferred Action for 14Difficulties with the Strong Animal
cosmopolitanism, 742, 753, 756 Childhood Arrivals), 743 Rights position" (Warren),
cost-benefit analysis D' Amuro, Pat, 707 369-75
and capital punishment, 649-50, Daniels, Norman, 319, 321, 331-37 dilation and evacuation, 222
651-52 Darwall, Stephen, 208 dilation and suction curettage, 222
and climate change, 429 Davis, Troy, 632 Dimitrov, Rado, 432n6
and ethics of care, 211 Dawkins, Richard, 118-19 direct moral consideration, 339-40
and immigration, 757 "Dear White America" (Yancy), disabled people
and torture, 698 478-81 and euthanasia, 292, 305-7
cost-effectiveness analysis, 333, 336 death utilitarianism on, 104
counterexample method for definitions of, 277-79 discontinuation account of killing as
evaluating arguments, 51 humanity of, 311 wrong, 264,265-66
coun terfactuals See also capital punishment; discrimination
on environmental ethics, 409-11 euthanasia; killing defined,440,442
on war, 680-81 death penalty. See capital and ethical egoism, 98
course-of-Iife needs, 326 punishment and freedom of association, 760,
CO VI 0-19 pandemic, 319-20 Death with Dignity Act (Oregon), 278 778
crack cocaine, 604-6 d'Eaubonne, Fran~oise, 388 and homosexuality, 512
criminalization of drugs, 579 decriminalization of drugs. and immigration, 755-56, 759n17,
critical reasoning, 45-55 See drug legalization/ 768-69, 771n22
argument structure in, 46-47 decriminalization and impartiality, 8
argument types, 48-49 deductive arguments, 48-49, 57 See also racism
1-6 0 INDEX
discrimination condition for just and law enforcement, 605-6 ecofeminism, 388
war, 661, 665, 669, 723, 727, marijuana, 578, 579 ecological holism, 387, 389
737n15 and market forces, 602-3 ecological individualism, 387
distributive justice 1970s recommendations for, 601, economic inequality
defined,84 602 extent of, 783-84, 786
entitlement theory of, 811-19, and paternalism principle, 587 and immigration, 764
819nnl-7 and treatment, 606-7 See also global economic justice
and global economic justice, 785 drug use egalitarianism
and health care, 316-17, 333, and addiction, 578, 583, 592-94, and cosmopolitanism, 742
335-36 608-9 on global economic justice, 786-87
and immigration, 745, 747, 763 decrease in, 601-2 on immigration, 763-65, 772-73,
District of Columbia v. HeUer, 583 definition~578-79,592-93 779, 782n7
diversity, 449, 535, 562 and harm, 579, 585, 600, 604, 608 on justice, 319
divine command theory, 10-11, and idleness, 595 species, 387, 413-20
16-19,75 issue background, 577-80 "Egalitarianism and Equal
Dolezal, Rachel, 456-57 and law enforcement, 577-78, Consideration of Interests"
dome world scenario, 429 595-96,605-6 (Benn), 360-61
Doris, john, 181 and means-ends principle, 583 Eichmann, Adolf, 624
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 10,699 and medical domination, 596, Eighth Amendment, 625, 626
double effect doctrine 597-98 elenchus, 15
and abortion, 140,227 moral arguments on, 584-85 Ellinwood, Everett, 604, 605
defined, 139 natural law theory on, 583 Elshtain,jean Bethke, 22
and environmental ethics, 407 opioid epidemic, 585-86 embodiment, 194
and euthanasia, 280-81 and paternalism principle, 587 embryo, 222
and just war theory, 723, 735, readings on, 592-609 emotions
738n39 and right to self-medication, and abortion, 221, 270
and terrorism, 668-69, 672, 694, 598-99 appeals to, 61
695 technical approach to, 593-94 and emotivism, 21, 28-30
and trolley problem, 141 utilitarianism on, 583 and empathy, 7
double standards, 137 dualism, 388 and ethics of care, 204
See also impartiality Dunning, David, 65-66 and evaluating premises, S9
Douglas, William 0., 656 Dunning-Kruger effect, 65-66 feminist ethics on, 184, 190, 202
Douglass, Frederick, 26 duties and Kantian ethicS, 205
Down syndrome, 292 vs. charity, 784, 785, 787, 795 and logical argument, 6, 7
Driver, julia, 180-81 conflicting, 82, 136, 139, 159, as moral guide, 4
"Drones, Ethics, and the Armchair 168-69 and virtue ethicS, 180-81,528
Soldier" (Kaag), 687-89 and ethical egOism, 119 emotivism, 21, 28-30
drone warfare, 687, 688 and Kantian ethics, 132, 135, empathy, and emotions, 7
drug addiction, 578, 583, 592-94, 151-52,165-66 endangered species, 390, 396-97
608-9 perfect vs. imperfect, 132, 135, 159, Engels, Frederick, 187
drug dependence, 578-79 332 Enligh tenmen t
drug legalization/decriminalization, prima facie, 82, 83, 84, 159-63,370 feminist ethics on, 189, 190,
602-9 of rescue, 85, 785 193-95
and accidental overdose, 594 and social contract theory, 112 and impartiality, 330
and addiction, 608-9 and virtue ethics, 165-66, 167 and Kantian ethiCS, 131
and alcohol, 607-8 See also beneficence; moral and politiCS, 216-17
cocaine, 604-6 principles entitlement theory of distributive
and education, 607 justice, 811-19, 819nn1-7
and harm, 585, 591, 596-97, 604, E environmental ethics, 382-433
608 Easterly, William, 801, 802, 803, 804 and anthropocentrism, 384, 389,
and justice, 587 Eastman, Cari Lee Skogberg, 741 398-400,413,414,429
INDEX 0 1-7
biocentrism on, 387, 388, 389, epistemology, 5 ethics of care

391-93,413-14 equality defined, 184
and biotic pyramid, 423 and animal rights, 353-55, 358-61, features of, 203-6
and carbon footprints, 392 365,378 and individualism, 204, 206-7
and contribution principle, 405-6 and autonomy, 325, 326, 327, 330 and justice, 185,188,207-9
counterfactuals on, 409-11 and capital punishment, 638, and moral development, 197-98
and dome world scenario, 429 640n4,642-43 and oppression of women, 200
and endangered species, 390, and feminism, 212-13 and personal relationships, 196,
396-97 and global economic justice, 205
and extrinsic vs. intrinsic value, 798-99 readings on, 203-11
383-84 and health care, 328, 330, 336-37 and responsibility, 202
and feminism, 388 and justice, 84, 319, 321, 325-26 and sex differences, 184-85, 196-97
and glacier disappearance, 395-96 luck theories of, 765 societal implications of, 209-10
goals of, 397-98,400 and needs, 327 and virtue ethics, 203, 210-11
and group principle, 409 of opportunity, 321, 333-34 liThe Ethics of Care as Moral Theory"
and harm, 391,399,403-5 relational, 764-65, 771n26 (Held), 203-11
and individual moral obligations, and respect, 83,136 eudaimonia,164
401-12 and retributive justice, 643 eugenics, 104
as intergenerational issue, 395, and suffering, 798 European Union (EU), 761
427-28 traditional ethics assumption of, euthanaSia, 255, 275-312
issue background, 383-84, 386-87 200-201 active vs. passive, 276-77, 284-85,
Kantian ethics on, 387-89,406-7 See also egalitarianism; impartiality 291-94,303-5
and kick the dog scenario, 429-30 equivocation fallacy, 61, 228 and beneficence, 282
and land ethic, 420-24 Estiund, David, 550-60, 707-22 and consent, 276, 277
legal contexts, 408-9 ethical egoism, 74,93-99 defined, 276
and means-ends principle, 398, act- vs. rule-, 93-94 and definitions of death, 277-79
399,407 applying, 94-95 and disabled people, 292, 305-7
moral arguments on, 389-93 counterintuitive consequences European laws, 283
and moral corruption, 430-31 against, 118 and health care costs, 299, 306-7
and moral status, 384, 386-87, criticisms of, 117-18, 158 high-profile cases, 275, 276,278
389-93 defined, 93 incidence of, 296-97, 299
natural law theory on, 387, 407 evaluating, 95-99 and individual well-being, 295-96
and naturalness, 390-91 inconsistent outcomes argument issue background, 276-79
and natural state, 399-400 against, 117 Kantian ethics on, 280
and preservation of incentive, 398 paradox of, 117 legal contexts, 278, 281, 283,
and procrastination, 432n4 publicity argument against, 117 296-97
readings on, 397-433 readings on, 116-19 moral arguments on, 281-86
and respect, 417-19, 420n8 vs. utilitarianism, 100 natural law theory on, 280-81
and risk principle, 406 ethics and pain management, 283-84,
scientific facts on, 382-83,385-86, defined, 3 297
401-2 doing, 3, 4, 11 physicians' roles in, 302, 307-12
social contract theory on, 411 elements of, 6-8 and power, 309
and species egalitarianism, 387, importance of, 3-5 procedural safeguards for, 301-2
413-20 landscape of, 5-6 and prohibitions on killing,
and spheres of freedom, 397-98 male bias in traditional, 182, 187, 300-301,309
utilitarianism on, 389, 420n8 188-90, 194, 199-200 and psychological suffering,
virtue ethics on, 407-8 readings on, 14-19 297-98
and waste, 398 and religion, 8-9 public opinion on, 284, 297, 300
See also climate change and values, 3 readings on, 291-312
Epicureanism, 120 Tile Ethics ofAddiction (Szasz), and right to refuse treatment, 277,
Epicurus.94 592-600 284,299-300
1-8 0 INDEX
euthanasia (Continued) Feminism U11modified (MacKinnon), Franklin, Benjamin, 739

and self-determination, 281-83, 213-14 freedom
295,296,297,298-99,301 feminist ethics, 182-85 and doing ethics, 4
slippery slope arguments against, on Cartesian self, 193-94 and Socratic method, 15
280,285-86,298,301 current concerns in, 193-95 spheres of, 397-98
utilitarianism on, 279-80 description vs. prescription in, and tolerance/intolerance, 563-64,
"Euthanasia for Disabled People" 215-16 566-67
(Carr), 305-7 development of, 187-88 See also free speech
Euthyphro (Plato), 10-11, 16-19 and embodiment, 194 freedom of association, 744, 759-63,
evaluating moral theories, 75-80 on emotions, 184, 190,202 768,769,771-82
ethical egoism, 95-99 evaluating, 192-93 and autonomy, 761, 762, 770nn5,7,
feminist ethics, 192-93 historical contributions to, 187 775,782nn17-18
Kantian ethics, 135-37 on impartiality, 184, 188, 190 and harm, 775-76
natural law theory, 141-42 on individualism, 199-200 and self-determination, 731n5,
social contract theory, 111-13 on justice, 188, 195-203 760,761,762-63,772,773,
utilitarianism, 105-8 on male bias in traditional ethics, 775,777,779
virtue ethics, 166-69 182, 187, 188-90, 194, "Freedom of Association Is Not the
evidence 199-200 Answer" (Fine), 771-82
and cognitive biases, 64-66 misconstruals of, 190-92 freedom of movement, 751, 752, 766,
conflicting, 59 on moral principles, 183-84, 195 767, 770nn18,20, 780
lack of, 62-63 nonideal emphasis in, 184, 192,216 free speech
of sexual assault, 492, 493, on personal relationships, 183, 184, and academic freedom, 570-73
499-500 188,194,200-202 and civility, 537-38, 573-74
exceptions, 82, 108 on politiCS, 216-17 classroom practices for, 574-76
existential responsibility, 688 and power, 215-16 defined,541
"experience machine," 102 readings on, 187-218 First Amendment on, 541-42, 543,
expert opinion, 61 on rights, 199-200 550,551,559nn4,7
extrinsic (instrumental) value, 6, 383, and unequal relationships, and hate speech, 540-41, 542-43,
429 200-201,202,215 544-45,548-49,575
extrinsic raCism, 460-61,462-64,465 See also ethics of care issue background, 538,540-43
"Feminist Ethics" Oaggar), 187-95 Kantian ethics on, 543
F Femi11ist Ethics (journal), 189 legal contexts, 551-52, 559-60nn8-9
fairness. See impartiality; justice Femi11ist Theory from Margin to Ce11ter moral arguments on, 545
fallaCies, 60-64, 68 (hooks),212-13 and racism, 540, 548, 549
family model of intrinsic racism, 461, Ferguson, Adam, 202 readings on, 550-60, 569-76
465,466-67, 468n4,469n10 fetus, 222 right to, 541-42, 543
"Famine, Affluence, and Morality" See also abortion and speech codes, 540, 542-43, 545
(Singer), 792-97, 798 FGC (female genital cutting), 24 and trigger warnings, 540, 572
famine, 790, 792-97, 798-801 Fine, Sarah, 772-83 See also obstructive protests
faulty analogy fallacy, 62 First Amendment, 541-42, 543, 550, Free Speech 011 Campus (Ben-Porath),
feelings. See emotions 551, 559nn4,7 537
Feinberg, Joel, 96,259-60 fitting premises, 52, 57 French, William c., 414, 415-16
female genital cutting (FGC), 24 Floyd, George, 434 French Revolution, 662
feminism following orders. See obedience in Freud, Sigmund, 190, 508
and environmental ethics, 388 unjust war Frey, R. G., 370
and equality, 212-13 food chains, 423 Friedersdorf, Conor, 443
and gender, 214-15 Foot, Philippa, 197 Friedman, Milton, 601, 602
and power, 213-14, 215 Forst, Rainer, 536 fruitfulness, 77
See also feminist ethics Fortunato, Stephen ]., 559n4 Fundamental Principles ottlIe Metaphysic
Le Feminisme ou la Mort (d'Eaubonne), Franken, AI, 97 otMomis (Kant), 145-54
388 Frankena, William, 169,358-59 fundamental rights, 610-11
INDEX 0 1-9
fungibility, 532-33, 533n11 Golden Mean, 165 hand-me-down morality, 4

Fumzan v. Georgia, 625 See also mean, doctrine of Hanisch, Carol, 217
future, killing as loss of, 261-62, 264, Golden Rule, 133, 642 happiness
266,267 Goldman, Alan, 494-95, 500-509 and abortion, 224-25, 272
Gonzales v. Oregon, 278 and drug use, 599
G Goodall, David, 289-90 and euthanasia, 279
Gacy,John Wayne, 624 Good Samaritan and ((experience machine," 102
Gandhi, Mohandas, 26 and abortion, 246-47, 250-51 and Kantian ethics, 145
Gardiner, Stephen, 424-33 ethical egoism on, 118 Ayn Rand on, 116
Garner, Eric, 434 good will, 131-32,145-46 and sexual morality, 496
Gates, Bill, 801 Gossip: A Journal ofLesbian Feminist units of, 72, 101
Gates, Melinda, 801 Ethics, 189 utilitarianism on, 72, 100-101, 105,
Gauthier, David, 761 Graham v. Connor, 483 120-23,279
Gawin, Frank, 604, 605 Grant, Ulysses S., 739 in virtue ethics, 164, 169,172-74,
gender, 214-15 greater moral evil rule, 798-99 272
The Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche), greatest happiness principle, 100, See also utilitarianism
645 120-22 Harlan, John Marshall, 653
general action principle, 409 green cards, 740 harm
general permission principle, 409 Gregg v. Georgia, 626 and animal rights, 370, 374, 376
genetic testing, 10 Grigoriadis, Vanessa, 491 and beneficence, 84, 85
Geneva Conventions, 666,723,727, GrotiUs,201 and coercion, 517, 520,
729 group-differentiated rights, 562 526-27n6
genocide, 27, 659, 675-76,690 group principle, 409 and consent,S 17
Genovese, Kitty, 246 Gulf War, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, and contraception, 268
gifts of fortune, 145 737n21 and drug legalization!
Gilligan, Carol, 184, 188, 195-96, "Gun Control" (LaFollette), 610-21 decriminalization, 585, 591,
197-99,200,201,202,207 gun rights/gun control 596-97,604,608
Gillman, Howard, 540, 543 and citizenship, 611-12 and drug use, 579, 585, 600, 604,
Gilman, Charlotte Perkins, 183 and crime control, 616, 618-19 608
glaciers, 395-96 and harm, 612, 613, 619-20, and environmental ethiCS, 391,
global economic justice, 783-819 622-23 399,403-5
and beneficence, 784, 785 issue background, 580-83 and ethiCS of care, 188,208
and distributive justice, 785 legal contexts, 581-83, 612, and freedom of association,
egalitarianism on, 786-87 614-15,621-22 775-76
and famine, 790, 792-97,798-801 and mass shootings, 590-91 and gun rights!gun control, 612,
issue background, 783-84 moral arguments on, 588 613,619-20,622-23
Kantian ethics on, 785 polarization on, 580-81 and homosexuality, 511-14
libertarianism on, 785, 787 public opinion on, 582 and immigration, 775, 776-77, 779,
moral arguments on, 787-89 readings on, 610-23 782n21
and population growth, 785-86 and right to bear arms, 582-83, and social contract theory, 111
and positive vs. negative rights, 610-12 and speech codes, 545
784,785 and risk, 614, 615-16 and war, 681-82, 683-84,709-11
readings on, 790-819 and self-defense, 588, 611, 618 See also beneficence
and responsibility, 789, 790-92 statistics on, 580, 581 Harrison, Guy P., 66
and supererogatory actions, 784, utilitarianism on, 584, 622-23 Hartnoll, Richard, 603
787,795 and violence, 616, 617-18, 619 Haslam, Nick, 443
utilitarianism on, 785, 787-88, Gutmann, Amy, 77l, 777 hasty generalization fallacy,
792-97 63-64
global warming. See climate change H Hatch, Alison E., 490, 492, 493
Golash-Boza, Tanya Maria, 436, 438, Halwani, Raja, 527-34 hate speech, 540-41, 542-43,
439,441 Hampton,Jean,764-65 544-45,548-49,575
1-10 0 INDEX
health care, 313-37 and origins of social contract hypothetical imperatives, 132, 149,
and autonomy, 329-30 theory, 110-11, 124-30 150
costs of, 299, 306-7, 313-14, 325, and realism, 658 hypothetical syllogisms, 50
328-29,331 Holocaust. See Nazi Germany
and distributive justice, 316-17, homosexuality,509-16 I
333,335-36 defined,489 I'm Not a Racist, Butl... J(Blum),
and effective treatment, 334-35 and discrimination, 512 478n5
and equality, 328, 330, 336-37 and freedom of association, 761 ideology
and equality of opportunity, 321, and harm, 511-14 and immigration, 750-51, 758,
333-34 and HIV/AIDS, 512-13,573 759n19
issue background, 313-16 natural law theory on, 495-96 and racism, 462-63, 468n6
and justice, 313, 316, 318-19, 320, and procreation, 494, 510-11, and tolerance, 539
321,332 514 if-then argument form, 49-50
legal contexts, 331 honesty, 14, 15 immigrants, undocumented
moral arguments on, 321 See also lying and DACA, 743
needs for, 327-28 honor killing, 20-21 deportation of, 740, 743
readings on, 325-37 hooks, bell, 212-13 detention center conditions, 746
and reproductive technologies, hookup culture, 491, 493 health care for, 323-24
335 Horowitz, David, 550, 554, misconceptions on, 740
rights to, 331-37 560nl0 and right to self-government,
state-run systems for, 328-29 Hospers, John, 785 751-52
statistics by country, 315 hospitality, right of, 752 routes to citizenship, 741-42
and undeserving sick, 324-25 "How Not to Accuse Someone of statistics on, 740
for undocumented immigrants, Prejudice" (Westacott), immigrants
323-24 484-87 suspicion of, 739-40
utilitarianism on, 332-33 humanitarian intervention, 669-71, See also immigrants,
vaccine allocation, 319-20 675-76,723,731,732 undocumented;
hedonic calculus, 100-101 human rights immigration; refugees
hedonism, 94,100,158,506 and detention center conditions, immigration, 738-82
See also utilitarianism 746 anticosmopolitanism on, 742
Hegel, G. W. F. and ethics of care, 209 and associative obligations, 752
on domestic realm, 189-90 and humanitarian intervention, and asylum, 746
and ethics of care, 198 669-71,675-76,723,731, and citizenship, 741-42, 774
male bias of, 200 732 and civic boundaries, 774
on moral status, 376 and immigration, 751, 753, and coercion, 774, 781n5
and racism, 460 758nn5-6 cosmopolitanism on, 742, 753, 756
on retributive justice, 249n4, and Kantian ethics, 154 cultural impacts of, 743, 744,
642-43 and racism, 482-83 757-58,768
Held, Virginia, 185,203-11,213 See also rights desire for, 751, 758nl, 776
Herodotus, 36 Hume, David, 196,202,211 and discrimination, 755-56,
heroin, 601-3 Hunt, George, 510 759nI7,768-69,771n22
higher-brain definition of death, 279 Hunt, Lester H., 580-81 economic impact of, 740, 743
Hippocratic Oath, 309 Hunt, Molly, 510 and economic inequality, 764
Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombing, hunting, and animal rights, 350-51, egalitarianism on, 763-65, 772-73,
665-66,680,691,722 362 779, 782n7
Hitler, Adolf. See Nazi Germany Huntington, Samuel, 768 and freedom of association, 7..J.4,
HIV/AIDS, 512-13,573 Hurka, Thomas, 722-38 759-63,768,769,771-82
Hobbes, Thomas Hursthouse, Rosalind, 167-68, 180, and freedom of movement, 751,
assumption of equality by, 200-201 181,269-74 752,766,767,770nn18,20,
and individualism, 207 Husak, Douglas,S 79, 585 780
on leisure, 687 Hussein, Saddam, 729, 738n34 and green cards, 740
INDEX 0 1-11
and harm, 775, 776-77, 779, independent premises, 54 Iran-Contra scandal, 701
782n21 indicator words, 47, 48-49, 53 Iraq War (2003)
and health care, 323-24 indirect harm principle, 405 and drone warfare, 687
and human rights, 751, 753, indirect moral consideration, 340 and just cause condition, 660, 686,
758nn5-6 individualism 686n9
ideological tests for, 749-50, 757, ecological, 387 and just war proportionality, 727,
759n19 and ethics of care, 204, 206-7 728,729
issue background, 739-44 feminist ethics on, 199-200 and obedience in unjust war,
and justice, 745 individual racism, 442, 444 719-20
libertarianism on, 765-68, 773 inductive arguments, 48, 49, 62, and refugees, 755
misconceptions on, 740-41 63-64 irrelevancies, 53-54
moral arguments on, 744-47 infanticide, 231-32 ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria),
and national partiality, 742, inferiorization, 439, 440, 444, 445 664,675-76
745-46 infertility, 335 Islam, 488, 664
particularity claimants, 753-54, inherent value, 366-67, 370-71 See also religion
755, 758nn7-8 innocents, killing of Is There a Right to Health Care and, If
and private property rights, 766, abortion as, 227, 228, 230, 240-41, So, What Does It Encompass?
767, 770n16 249, 253, 257n3 (Daniels),331-37
and racism, 749, 756, 768-69 and capital punishment, 636, 638, flIt's Not My Fault: Global Warming
readings on, 751-82 640n8,641nl0, 651 and Individual Moral
resistance to, 739-42, 753 and just war proportionality, Obligations" (Sinnott-
and right of hospitality, 752 733-36,738nn36-39 Armstrong),401-12
selection policies, 751-59 and obedience in unjust war,
statistics on, 740 708-9,713,721nn3~ J
utilitarianism on, 742, 744 and war, 680-81, 682-83, 686n7, jackson, Robert, 705
and welfare, 743-44 690,692-93,695-96 jaggar, Alison M., 182, 187-95,216
"Immigration and Freedom of See also terrorism james, Daniel, 306
Association" (Wellman), institutional (structural) racism, 442, james, Michael, 438
759-71 483 japanese-American internment,
Immigration and Nationality Act institutional inadequacy and climate 705
(1965),740 change, 425,427-28 jefferson, Atatiana, 434
immunity theorists, 668 instrumental (extrinsic) value, 6, 383 jensen, Robert, 480-81
impartiality, 7-8 instrumentalization, 532 jesus
and abortion, 241 intellectual civility, 538 and altruism, 119
and emotions, 204 intellectual virtues, 164 on Good Samaritan, 246
and ethical egoism, 98 intention on moral judgments, 22
and ethics of care, 204-5 and coercion, 519 See also Christianity
feminist ethics on, 184, 188, 190 and gun rights/gun control, 613 jews
and justice, 84, 325-26 and just war theory, 660,723 as immigrants, 739
and Kantian ethics, 137 and natural law theory, 142-43 as refugees, 748-49
and racism, 8, 463 and terrorism, 694-95 See also judaism
and tolerance/intolerance, See also double effect doctrine johnson, Allen, 484
562-63 international law, 666 johnson, James Turner, 725
and utilitarianism, 100, 108-9 internet, 65 johnson, Lawrence,416,418,
See also equality intersectionality,213 420nl0
imperfect duties, 132,332 intersex people, 214-15 judaism
implied premises, 51-52 intrinsic racism, 461, 463-64, 465-67 and abortion, 226
In a Different Voice: Psychological intrinsic value, 6, 383, 429 on sexual behavior, 488
Theor)' and Women's Inuit, 350-51 on torture, 703
Development (Gilligan), 188, invalid arguments, 48, 50 See also Bible; religion
195-96 involuntary euthanasia, 276 junger, Sebastian, 424-25
1-12 0 INDEX
jus ad bellum Rawls on, 195,196,197,321,333, and individual soldiers, 688

defined, 659 334,364,804-10 intention condition, 660, 723
and individual soldiers, 688 readings on, 804-10 just cause condition, 665, 667, 669,
and just war proportionality, 723, and reason/rationality, 819 686n9,723,725-26,727-28,
727,734, 737n15 retributive, 84, 630, 639, 729,730-31,737n21
and obedience in unjust war, 708, 641nnI2,15,642-43, last-resort condition, 661, 665, 667,
718,719 647n2-3,652-56 669,692,697,723,724,725
requirements for, 659-61 and sexual assault, 492, 493 overview, 659-61
and terrorism, 669 and social contract theory, 806-10 and pacifism, 678-79, 682-86,
utilitarianism on, 667 and utilitarianism, 84, 105, 106 686nn5-7,9
See also just war theory See also distributive justice; global and political decision-making, 660
jus in bello economic justice and self-defense, 724
defined,659 just war pacifism, 686, 686n 11 on terrorism, 664, 665,669,
and individual soldiers, 688 just war proportionality, 722-38 671-72,689
and just war proportionality, defined,661 See also just war proportionality;
722-23, 727, 733, 735-36, and discrimination condition, 727, obedience in unjust war
737n15 737n15
and obedience in unjust war, 708, and enemy soldiers, 733-34, K
718,719 738nn34,37 Kaag, john, 687-89
requirements for, 661-62 and Geneva Conventions, 727, 729, Kalin, Jesse, 117
and terrorism, 669 736nl Kamm, R. M., 737n29, 738n39
utilitarianism on, 667 and humanitarian intervention, Kant, Immanuel, 145-54
See also just war theory 726,731,732,736-37n11 and Enlightenment, 131
jus naturale, 126-27 as inclusive of other conditions, male bias of, 190, 199, 200, 205
lust and Unjust Wars (Walzer), 690, 723-24 racism of, 482
737n15 and invasion, 732-33 See also Kantian ethics
"Justice, Civilization, and the Death and involuntary civilian shields, Kantian ethics, 131-38
Penalty: Answering van den 729 on abortion, 226-27
Haag" (Reiman), 641-47 and just cause condition, 725-26, absolutism of, 82
justice 727-28,729,730-31,737n2l on animal rights, 263-64, 338,
and abortion, 243, 245, 269, and killing of innocents, 733-36, 345
274n2 738nn36-39 applying, 134-35
and affirmative action, 452 and national partiality, 734-35, assumption of equality in, 200
and animal rights, 364 738n38 on capital punishment, 630-31,
and capital punishment, 629-30, and paCifism, 679, 682, 683, 684 643-44,647nn5-7,650,652,
639 and relevant evils, 728-30, 653
compensatory, 452-54 737nn21-23 and drone warfare, 687
defined, 783 and relevant goods, 724-28 on drug use, 583
and drug legalization/ and self-defense, 724, 730-33, elements of, 131-34
decriminalization, 587 737nn28,31 and emotions, 205
egalitarian theories of, 319 and suicide bombers/voluntary on environmental ethics, 387-89,
and equality, 84, 319, 321,325-26 shields, 730, 737nn22-23 406-7
and ethics of care, 185, 188,207-9 and terrorism, 665, 669 ethics of care on, 197, 198
feminist ethics on, 188, 195-203 and utilitarianism, 667, 734-35, on euthanasia, 280
and health care, 313, 316, 318-19, 738n37 evaluating, 135-37
320,321,332 just war theory on free speech, 543
and immigration, 745 defined,659 on global economic justice, 785
libertarianism on, 318-19, 332, discrimination condition, 661, 665, good will in, 131-32, 145-46
811-19 669,723,727,737n15 ideal in, 216
as prima facie principle, 84 hope of success condition, 661, individualism in, 206
and racism, 446, 452-54 667,686n9,692,723-24 lessons from, 137-38
INDEX 0 1-13
and moral judgments, 80, 81,135, Kleiman, Mark, 608 libertarianism

136 Kohlberg, Lawrence, 197, 198 and cosmopolitanism, 742
on moral status, 376 Kolb, Lawrence, 595 on global economic justice, 785,
on objectification, 530 Kukathas, Chandran, 764 787
overview, 74-75 Kymlicka, Will, 562 on gun rights/gun control, 615, 623
perfect and imperfect duties in, on immigration, 766-69, 773
132,135,159 L onjustic~318-19,332,811-19
on politics, 216-17 Lackey, Douglas, 680-81, 725 Lindemann, Hilde, 212-18
on racism, 445-46, 465, 466, 467 LaFollette, Hugh, 610-21 Lipsey, R. G., 560n11
readings on, 145-57, 159 Lancaster, Kelvin, 560n11 living wills, 278
and reason/rationality, 9, 131, 197, "The Land Ethic" (Leopold), Locke,]ohn, 563,566,644,806
202 420-24 Locker,]effrey, 288-89
on refugees, 752 Langbein, john, 703, 704 logie,S
and religion, 11 La Rochefoucauld, Fran~ois de, 702 logical argument, 6-7
respect in, 83, 136, 137-38 legal contexts London terrorist attacks (2005), 664
on sexual morality, 494, 506, 529, abortion, 224, 225, 229 Lorenz, Konrad, 118
533n76 animal rights, 339 Lott, john, 618-19
simplicity of, 81 capital punishment, 625-26 love,503-4,507,509n1,533n9
and social contract theory, 806 environmental ethics, 408-9 luck equality, 765
on terrorism, 669 euthanasia, 278, 281, 283, 296-97 Ludwig,jens,619
on torture, 700 free speech, 551-52, 559-60nn8-9 Lumley, joanna, 758n8
and virtue ethics, 165-66,528 gun control, 581-83, 612, 614-15, Lund, Nelson, 588
See also means-ends principle 621-22 Luther, Martin, 119
Kaplan, john, 603 gun rights/gun control, 581-83, lying, 41,75,132-33,135
Kass, Leon R., 307-12 612,614-15,621-22 Lyons, David, 448
Kelly, Ray, 550, 554, 560n10 health care, 331
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 626 physician-assisted suicide, 277, M
Kerry, john, 168 278,281,283 Macedo,Stephen,742,744,745,747
Kevorkian, jack, 281 racism, 446-47, 483 Machiavelli, Niccolb, 658
Keyes, Alan, 701 sexual assault, 492, 517 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 195, 197,202
Khatchadourian, Haig, 665 terrorism, 700-701 Mackie,J. L., 119
kick the dog scenario, 429-30 torture,666-67,703-6 MacKinnoq, Catharine A., 213-14
Kierkegaard, S0ren, 15 See also drug legalization/ Madrid terr'orist attacks (2004), 664
killing decriminalization "make my day" laws, 737n31
assisted suicide, 288-89 legalization of drugs. See malaria programs, 801-4
desire account of, 264-65, 266 drug legalization! male bias, 182, 187, 188-90, 194,
discontinuation account of, 264, decriminalization 199-200
265-66 legal moralism, 587 managed care, 315
honor killing, 20-21 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 10, 11 manual vacuum aspiration
as loss of future, 261-62, 264, 266, Leiser, Burton, 509 (menstrual aspiration), 222
267 Leopold, Aldo, 419, 420-24 Mappes, Thomas, 494
unwarranted, 283-84 Lesbian Ethics (journal), 189 Marcuse, Herbert, 556-57
See also capital punishment; Leviathan (Hobbes), 110-11, Margalit, Avishai, 471
euthanasia; innocents, 124-30 marijuana
killing of; war lex natllmlis, 127 legalization of,S 78, 579
.. Killing and Allowing to Die" lex talionis, 630,639,642,643,644, medical, 578, 591-92
(Callahan),303-5 647n3,650 Marneffe, Peter de, 587
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 26 See also retributive justice MarquiS, Don, 257-68
Kipling, Rudyard, 118 liberalism, 566-67 Marxism, and ethics of care, 198
Kissinger, Henry, 658 liberal view of sexual behaVior, Maslow, Abraham, 70S
Kittay, Eva, 207, 210 488-89,490,494 mass shootings, 590-91
1-14 0 INDEX
masturbation, 488, 494, 501, 593 Mill, John Stuart, 120-24 on torture, 673
McCain, John, 168 on capital punishment, 626-27 on war, 669-70
McCloskey, H.J., 105 and environmental ethics, 415 moral codes, 72
McDonald, Laquan, 434 and feminist ethics, 183, 187 moral considerability. See moral
McDonald v. City ofChicago, 583 on free speech, 541, 556-57 status
McGregor, Joan, 535 on Golden Rule, 133 Moral Contexts (Walker), 216
McIntosh, Peggy, 481 on happiness, 100, 101, 105 moral development, 197-98
McKenna, Joseph c., 725, 730 on harm prinCiple, 585, 600, 622 moral disagreements
McKim, Robert, 725-26 on impartiality, 100, 109 and categorical imperative, 154
McKinley, William, 662 on political decision-making, 714 and cultural relativism, 24, 25-27
McMahan, Jeff, 688,725-26,732 on rights, 598 and emotivism, 29
McPherson, Lionel, 721n3 on sexual morality, 529 and religion, 9
McVeigh, Timothy, 624 and social reform, 100 and subjective relativism, 22-23
Mead, G. H., 376 on tolerance, 566 moral exemplars, 166, 167, 180
mean, doctrine of, 165, 179, Miller, David, 753-59, 767, 768-69, moral infallibility, 22, 26
180-81 774 morality
means-ends principle Miller, Sarah Clark, 184 defined, 3
and abortion, 226 Minor, Kenneth, 288-89 as evolutionary strategy, 118-19
and animal rights, 338, 345 miscarriage, 271 purpose of, 111
applying, 135 mismatch effect, 458-59 and religion, 8, 9-11
defined, 134 moderate view of sexual behavior, liThe Morality of Migration"
and drug use, 583 489 (Benhabib), 751-52
and environmental ethics, 398, Modood, Tariq, 562 moral judgments
399,407 modus ponens, 50 and beneficence, 85
and euthanasia, 280 modus tollens, 50 considered, defined, 72-73
evaluating, 137 Montaigne, Michel de, 15 and devising moral theories, 80-81,
and free speech, 543 moral arguments, 45, 55-60 85-86
readings on, 152-53,155-57 on abortion, 227-28, 230-32, 234, and ethical egoism, 98
and respect, 136 258 and evaluating moral theories, 77,
and sexual morality, 494, 500-501, on animal rights, 346-47 78,98,106,135
502-5 on capital punishment, 631-33 Jesus on, 22
Meck, Paul, 165 and cognitive biases, 64-66 and Kantian ethics, 80, 81, 135, 136
Medicaid, 314 and discussions on moral issues, and natural law theory, 80, 81,
medical care. See health care 66-68 141-42
medical marijuana, 578, 591-92 on drug use, 584-85 and utilitarianism, 80, 81,106, 107,
Medicare, 314 on environmental ethics, 389-93 108
Medlin, Brian, 117 on euthanaSia, 281-86 moral norms, 8
Meiklejohn, Alexander, 555 evaluating premises in, 58-60 moral objectivism
menstrual aspiration (manual on free speech, 545 vs. cultural relativism, 24-25, 27
vacuum aspiration), 222 on global economic justice, defined, 20
mercy killing. See euthanasia 787-88 vs. subjective relativism, 23
metaethics, 5 on gun rights/gun control, 588 and tolerance, 26
metaphysics,S on health care, 321 moral philosophy, 3, 5
methadone, 603 on immigration, 744-47 moral principles
#MeToo movement, 490 implied premises in, 52, 57 and absolutism, 20, 139
Mfume, Kweisi, 478n3 moral and unmoral premises in, conflicting, 82, 85-86
microaggressions, 443 55-57 and devising moral theories, 81
Midgley, Mary, 22 and moral theories, 72 and environmental ethics, 411-12
migration,7S1-52 on political violence, 669-73 and evaluating moral theories, 79
See also immigration on sexual morality, 494-96 feminist ethiCS on, 183-84, 195
Mile'i, Robert, 470 on terrorism, 671-73 and moral judgments, 80-81
INDEX 0 1-15
and moral norms, 8 Nagel, Thomas, 506, 507,667 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle),
and moral theories, 71, 72, 73 Narveson, Jan, 679 171-79,180
in nonconsequentialist theories, 74 Nathanson, Stephen, 689-97 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 658
normative ethics on, 5 national partiality, 734-35, 738n38, Nielsen, Kai, 325-31
prima facie, 81-86, 87, 258-59 742,745-46 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 117, 645
and relativism, 24, 25-26 A Nation ofStrangers (Shipler), 469 Nimitz, Chester W., 290-91
and utilitarianism, 100, 105 natural law theory, 138-43 Nixon, Richard, 701
moral problem solving. See usefulness on abortion, 140, 142,227 Noddings, Nel, 209, 210
criteria absolutism of, 139, 141, 142 "no means no" consent, 493, 517
moral reasoning, 6-7, 9, 11,63 applying, 140-41 noncognitivism, 28
See also critical reasoning and common sense, 80 noncombatants
moral statements, 55, 58-59 defined, 75 immunity principle, 661, 668,
moral status on drug use, 583 690-91
and animal rights, 339-43, 344, on environmental ethics, 387, 407 See also innocents, killing of
363,364,375-76,384,386 on euthanaSia, 280-81 nonconsequentialist moral theories
and environmental ethics, 384, evaluating, 141-42 on animal rights, 344-45
386-87,389-93 lessons from, 142-43 defined, 73
moral theories, 71-87 male bias in, 200 divine command theory, 10-11,
and climate change, 428-30 and moral judgments, 80, 81, 16-19,75
and conflicting principles, 85-86 141-42 on environmental ethics, 389
consequentialist, 73-74, 158-63 principles in, 82 overview, 74-75
defined, 71 on sexual behavior, 488 respect in, 83
devising, 80-87 on sexual morality, 493-94, See also Kantian ethics; natural law
and moral arguments, 72 495-96,509-10 theory
vs.moralcodes,72 on terrorism, 668-69, 672 nonlethal pacifism, 679-80
and moral judgments, 72-73, See also double effect doctrine nonmoral statements, 55, 56-57
80-81 Nazi Germany nonstate actors, 666
and normative ethics, 5 and cultural relatiVism, 27 nonviolent pacifism, 679
and self-evidence, 86-87 and eugenics, 104 nonvoluntary euthanasia, 276
See also evaluating moral theories; and Jewish refugees, 748-49 Noonan, John, 253
nonconsequentialist moral and just war proportionality, 727 nooses, 548
theories; specific theories and obedience in unjust war, no-rest problem, 107
moral values, 3,6 715-16,717 normality, 33-35
moral vegetarians, 341 and racism, 464 Norman, Richard, 731, 732
moral virtues, 164-65, 174 and subjective relativism, 22 normative ethics, 5
Morrow, Lance, 470 and terrorism, 691 norms, moral, 5, 8
motivated reasoning, 65 and tolerance/intolerance, 464, 537 North American Free Trade
Moussaoui, Zacarias, 697-98, 704-5 liThe Need for More Than Justice" Agreement (NAFTA), 761
movement, freedom of, 751,752, (Baier), 195-203 Nossel, Suzanne, 544
766, 767, 770nnI8,20, 780 needs, 326-27 Nozick, Robert, 102,623,709,785,
Mueller, Robert, 707 negative rights, 83-84,136,318-19, 811-19
Mumbai terrorist attacks (2008), 664 331-32,784,785,799 Nuremberg defense, 708, 717-18,
Munson, Ronald, 280 Nelson, Leonard, 15 720
Murray, Charles, 540 neutrality, 562-63 Nussbaum, Martha, 206, 530-31,
Murtha,John, 168 See also impartiality 533n11
"My Tortured Decision" (Soufan), Newey, Glen, 563, 567
706-7 Newkirk, Ingrid, 379 o
New Woman, New Earth (Ruether), Obama, Barack
N 388 and immigration, 740, 743, 751,
Nadelmann, Ethan, 604, 607-8 Ngilu, Charity, 803 752
Naess, Arne, 414 Nguyen, Stacey, 621-23 and war, 675-76, 688, 707
1-16 0 INDEX
Obamacare (Affordable Care Act) online debate, 538 personal relationships

(ACA), 315-16,323-24 "On the Moral and Legal Status of and animal rights, 340-42
obedience in unjust war, 707-22 Abortion" (Warren), 248-57 coercion in, 521-22, 527n9
executioner analogy, 711-12 opinions vs. arguments, 47 and ethics of care, 196,205
and Iraq War, 719-20 opioid epidemic, 585-86 feminist ethics on, 183, 184, 188,
jailer analogy, 709-11, 718 oral sex, 488, 489, 494 194,200-202
and killing of innocents, 708-9, orders, following. See obedience in and global economic justice, 789
713, 721nn3,5 unjust war unequal, 200-201, 202, 206, 215
and Nuremberg defense, 708, The Origin of the Family, Private personhood
717-18,720 Property and the State (Engels), and animal rights, 342-43
and patriotism, 709, 715-16 187 See also personhood of fetus
and political decision-making, "The Origins of Morality in Early personhood of fetus
712-15,717,720, Childhood" (Chodorow), 196 arguments against, 248-49
721nn12,14 Orwell, George, 646, 679 Christian andjewish scripture on,
and protest, 720-21 Oslo terrorist attacks (2011), 664 226
and Radbruch's Formula, and continuity of development,
721-22n24 p 238-39,271
range of error approach, 718-19, pacifism and definitions of human, 228,
721nn24,28 defined, 658-59 230-31,252-53, 257n5,259
and self-defense, 716-17 and just war theory, 678, 680, and infanticide, 231-32
and Uniform Code of Military Justice, 682-85, 686, 686nn6-8,10 and Kantian ethics, 226-27
720,722n26 and moral theories, 667-68 moderate positions on, 232
objectification, 530-33, 533n11 nonlethal,679-80 and moral arguments, 225-26, 258
objectivism. See moral objectivism nonviolent, 679 and moral community, 250, 252,
obligations Paine, Thomas, 562 253-55, 257, 257n5
defined, 797n2 pain management, 283-84, 297 potential for, 230, 232, 250,253,
and social contract theory, 112 Pan-Africanism, 464 255,256-57,262-63
vs. values, 6 Panetta, Leon, 707 and prima facie principles, 258, 259
See also duties; moral theories paradox of egoism, 117 and psychological personhood,
O'Brien, William V., 729 Parekh, Bikhu, 562 259-60
obstructive protests, 538, 540, particularity claimants to and right to life, 255-56
550-60 immigration, 753-54, 755, Roe v. Wade on, 224
and amplification, 554 758nn7-8 and third-party intervention, 241
and approximation fallacy, 555, party rape, 491 and victimizability, 266-67
557 passive euthanasia, 276-77, 284-85, and virtue ethics, 269-70
and censorship, 553 291-94,303-5 persuasion, 29, 47
and civility, 555-56, 557 paternalism principle, 587 perverSion, 507-8
and countervailing deviation, patriotism, 709, 715-16 Phillips, Christopher, 14-16
557-58, 560n18 PelOSi, Nancy, 621-22 philosophy, moral, 3, 5
defined,553,560nl0 People for the Ethical Treatment of physician-assisted suicide
and First Amendment, 550, 551, Animals (PETA), 378-79 defined,277
559nn4,7 People or Penguins (Baxter), 397-401 European laws, 283
legal contexts, 551-52 perfect duties, 132, 135, 159 legal contexts, 277, 278, 281, 283
and publication vs. performance, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical and right to die, 289-90
553 Tragedy of Climate Change slippery slope arguments against,
and tolerance/intolerance, 556-57 (Gardiner),424-33 280,298
O'Neill, Onora, 154-57 The Perfect Storm Ounger), 424-25, and trust, 281, 298
"One Is Not Born a Woman" (Wittig), 432n2 See also euthanasia
213 Perkins, Anne, 510 Piaget, Jean, 197
"On Following Orders in an Unjust "The Personal Is Political" (Hanisch), Pico della Mirandola, 359
War" (Estlund), 707-22 217 "Plain Sex" (Goldman), 500-509
INDEX.O 1-17
Plato implied, 51-52, 57 raCialism, 460-61, 464-65, 468n7

on divine command theory, 10-11, truth of, 49, 52 racial prejudice, 440, 442, 443, 463,
16-19 Prichard, H. A., 376 484-87
on homosexuality, 34 primacy of private judgment view on ((Racism: What It Is and What It
on ideal, 216 obedience, 709-10 Isn't" (Blum), 469-78
on just life, 158 prima facie duties, 82, 83, 84,159-63, racism, 434-87
on sexual morality, 504-5, 506, 529 370 acts vs. motives, 444-45
on war, 688 prima facie principles, 81-86,87, and affirmative action, 446-50,
plausible premises, 52, 57 258,658,669 452-54,457-58
pleasure, 495,500-502, 506-7,529 Primoratz, Igor, 495, 692-93, 694, and animal rights, 353-54, 355,
See also happiness 696 361,378,466
Plum/Joffet al. v. Richard, 483 principle of utility, 100, 105 and capital punishment, 631-33,
Pojman, Louis P., 116-19,166,447, principlism,83 638, 640n6,9, 655
627 prisoners of war (paWs), 661-62 conceptual inflation of, 470-71,
police violence, 434, 476-77, 483 privacy, right of, 225 474,478nn3,4
political Philosophy (Hampton), private property rights, 766, 767, and COVID-19 pandemiC, 451
764-65 770n16 defined, 439, 440, 459-60, 472-74
"political Philosophy and the Gun privilege, 213, 441, 453-54, 481-83, and definitions of race, 435-36,
Control Debate: What 486-87 438-39, 478n1
Would Bentham, Mill, procreation, 493-94, 495, 496, difficulty of discussion on, 469
and Nozick Have to Say" 502-3,510-11,514 and discomfort/anxiety, 474-76
(Nguyen),621-23 promiscuity, 527-28, 533n1 extrinsic, 460-61, 462-64, 465
political tolerance, 536-37 promise keeping, 75, 132-33, 135-36 family model of, 461, 465, 466-67,
political violence, 657-738 proportionality condition for 468n4,469n10
issue background, 657-58 just war. See just war and free speech, 540, 548, 549
moral arguments on, 669-73 proportionality and homogenization, 476, 477
readings on, 678-738 uProportionality in the Morality of and human rights, 482-83
See also terrorism; torture; war War" (Hurka), 722-38 and humor, 472
Pol Pot, 22 proportional retributivism, 630, and ideology, 462-63, 468n6
popper, Karl, 537 641n12,642,644-45 and immigration, 749, 756, 768-69
population growth, 785-86 Pro-Test, 349 and impartiality, 8, 463
pornography, 490, 494, 501 psychological egOism, 95 intrinsic, 461, 463-64, 465-67
porter, Eduardo, 740 public permission principle, 410-11 issue background, 435-50
positive rights, 83, 136,318-19, punishment, 624-25 and justice, 446, 452-54
331-32,784,785,799 UPutting Civility in Its Place" Kantian ethics on, 445-46,465,
possessive libertarianism, 623 (Ben-Porath),569-76 466,467
power key concepts of, 439-40, 442
and euthanasia, 309 Q legal contexts, 446-47,483
and feminism, 213-14, 215 quickening, 222, 232 and microaggressions, 443
feminist ethics on, 215-16 Quincey, Thomas De, 594 and mismatch effect, 458-59
social contract theory on, 111 Quinlan, Karen Ann, 260, 276, 278, and police violence, 434, 476-77,
Pratt, Erich, 621-22 310 483
preconceptions, 59 and prejudice, 440, 442, 443, 463,
preemptive war, 660 R 484-87
prejudice, 440, 442, 443, 484-87 race and racialism, 460-61, 464-65,
premarital sex, 488,489 definitions of, 435-36, 438-39, 478n1 468n7
premises as identity, 456-57 readings on, 459-87
and argument structure, 48 and immigration, 740-41 and reason/rationality, 461-63,
defined, 46 See also racism 466, 468n5
diagramming, 53 Rachels, James, 35-42, 226, 291-94 and reparations, 448
evaluating, 58-60 racial discrimination, 440 and respect, 445-46
1-18 0 INDEX
racism (Continued) feminist ethics on, 194,195, 197, The Reproduction of Mothering
scientific, 436 199,202 (Chodorow), 196
and sexism, 479-80 and justice, 820 Republic (Plato), 34
and stereotypes, 474, 476-77 and Kantian ethics, 9, 131, 197,202 rescue, duty of, 85, 784
structural (institutional), 442, 483 and natural law theory, 139, 142 respect
and subjective response appeals, and racism, 461-63, 466, 468n5 and animal rights, 368, 370
484-85 and speciesism, 416 and capital punishment, 630
2020 mass demonstrations against, and virtue ethics, 164 and environmental ethics, 417-19,
434 reasons 420n8
unacknowledged, 444-45 and emotivism, 29 and Kantian ethics, 83, 136,
U.S. history of, 437 and universalizability principle, 7 137-38
utilitarianism on, 450, 452 "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War and natural law theory, 142
white acknowledgement of, 480-81 Theorists" (Sterba), 678-86 as prima facie principle, 83-84
and white privilege, 441, 453-54, redemption, 635 and racism, 445-46
481-83 Reeve, C. D. c., 15 and tolerance/intolerance, 536, 562
white supremaCists, 434-35 reflective equilibrium, 73, 78 See also means-ends principle
Racisms (Appiah), 459-69 refugees responsibility
Radbruch's Formula, 721-22n24 burden-sharing arrangements, 754, and abortion, 234, 243-44, 247,
Radelet, Michael, 638 758n12 251, 252, 257n1
Rampell, Catherine, 544 defined, 740 and ethics of care, 202
Ramsey, Paul, 729 and immigrant selection policies, and global economic justice, 789,
Ramsey ColloqUium, 510, 511, 513, 753,754-55 790-92
514 Jewish, 748-49 and sexual assault, 526n2
Rand, Ayn, 116, 117 Kantian ethics on, 752 and war, 688
rape Regan, RichardJ., 725 restitution, 641n13, 647n2, 650
and abortion, 239-40, 243, 244, Regan, Tom, 345-46, 347, 362-72, retributive justice
251,257n2 373,374,384,388-89 and capital punishment, 630,
defined, 491 Regents of the University of Cali fomi a v. 639, 641nn12,15, 642-45,
See also sexual assaul t Bakke, 446, 449 647nn2-3,652-56
Rasmussen, Knud, 36 Reiman, Jeffrey H., 641-47 defined, 84
rationality. See reason/rationality relational equality, 764-65, 771n26 and global economic justice, 785
Rawls, John relativism reverse discrimination, 449-50
difference principle of, 819n5 cultural, 20, 23-28, 33-42 revolution, 693
and immigration, 745 and evaluating moral theories, 76 Rice, Tamir, 434
on individualism, 200 subjective, 20, 21-23 Rich, Adrienne, 213
on justice, 195, 196,197,321,333, reliability,58-59 rights
334,364,804-10 religion, 8-11 and abortion, 226, 228, 230
male bias of, 200 and abortion, 221-22, 226, 227 to bear arms, 582-83, 610-12
on moral judgments, 78 and animal rights, 340 defined,784
on moral principles, 112 and cultural relativism, 23 derivative, 612
on political decision-making, 714 and ethics, 8-9 to die, 278, 281,289-90
on tolerance, 537 on homosexuality, 494, 514-15 feminist ethics on, 199-200
Reagan, Ronald, 573, 701 and male bias, 200 to freedom of movement, 7S 1,752,
realism, on war, 658 and morality, 8, 9-11 766,767, 770nn18,20, 780
reasoning and natural law theory, 138 to free speech, 541-42, 543
moral, 6-7,9, 11,63 on sexual behavior, 488, 493-94, fundamental,610-11
See also critical reasoning 502,511,514 and global economic justice, 788,
reason/rationality and terrorism, 662-63, 664 799
and animal rights, 372-73 and tolerance/intolerance, 536, 566 to health care, 331-37
and capital punishment, 643 on violence, 657 of hospitality, 752
and ethics of care, 204 reparations, 448 and inherent value, 366-67,370-71
INDEX 0 1-19
Kantian ethics on, 226 Sander, Richard, 458-59 September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
political, 731 Santayana, George, 15 663
positive vs. negative, 83-84, 136, Sartre,Jean-Paul, 10, 468n7 and Afghanistan invasion, 676-77
318-19,331-32,784,785 Saving Private Ryan, 733-34 double effect doctrine on, 694, 695
of privacy, 225 Scalia, Antonin, 751 and just war proportionality, 733,
private property, 766, 767, 770n16 Scanlon, Tim, 411 734,737
retributive justice as, 643, 644 Schiavo, Terri, 275, 276 moral arguments on, 671, 672
to self-government, 751-52 Schick, Theodore, Jr., 97 and torture, 697-98, 700, 702,
to self-medication, 598-99 Schmidt, Thomas, 511, 513 706-7
and violence, 658 Schmidtz, David, 413-20 sex education, 498
See also animal rights; human Schwarzkopf, Norman, 738n34 sexism
rights; right to life scientific method, 15,77,78-79 and animal rights, 353-54, 355
right to life scientific racism, 436 and conceptual inflation, 478n5
and abortion, 242-43, 245, 255-56, scientific research, 339, 344-45, 357, and feminist ethics, 182, 187,
266 362,368,375-81 188-89
and capital punishment, 629 Scott, Walter, 434 and freedom of association, 760,
and pacifism, 679 seal hunting, 350-51, 362 778
and war, 659, 668 Second Amendment, 582-83, 622 and racism, 479-80
risk The Second Sex (Beauvoir), 187, See also women's rights
and environmental ethics, 406 213 sex selection, 236-37
and gun rights/gun control, 614, "SedUction, Rape, and Coercion" sexual assault
615-16 (Conly), 517-27 campus, 490-93, 499-500, 517,
Roberts v. United States, 778 seduction, 522-25, 527nn6,10 526nl
Robins, Lee, 602 "Selecting Immigrants" (Miller), child sexual abuse, 513-14,521,
Rodin, David, 731, 732 754-60 526-27n6
Roe v. Wade, 224,225 self-defense defined,491
Rommel, Erwin, 715 and abortion, 226-27, 241 legal contexts, 492, 517
Roper v. Simmol1s, 626 and capital punishment, 648-49 and psychological coercion, 517-27
Ross, W. D., 83, 84, 158-63 and gun rights/gun control, 588, and responsibility, 526n2
Rousseau, Jean-Jacque, 189, 190,806 611,618 standards of evidence in, 492, 493,
RU-486,222 and just war proportionality, 724, 499-500
Ruddick, Sara, 208, 209 730-33,737nn28,31 See also coercion
Ruether, Rosemary Radford, 388 and obedience in unjust war, sexual morality, 488-534
rule-egoism, 93-94 716-17 and abstinence pledges, 499
rule-utili tarianism and terrorism, 691 casual sex, 527-34
on abortion, 225 and war, 659-60, 677, 679-80, 683, and contraception, 488, 502
applying, 104-5 686n3,696, 724, 730-33, and homosexuality, 509-16
defined, 74, 102-3 737nn28,31 and hookup culture, 491, 493
on euthanasia, 279-80 self-determination issue background, 488-93
evaluating, 108 and euthanaSia, 281-83, 295, 296, Kantian ethics on, 494, 506, 529,
on torture, 698 297,298-99,301 533n76
Russell, Bertrand, 509n 1 and freedom of association, 731n5, and love, 503-4,507, 509nl,533n9
Russell, Jack, 623 760,761,762-63,772,773, and means-ends principle, 494,
Rwanda genocide, 27 775,777,779 500-501,502-5
Ryan, Cheyney, 679 and immigration, 753, 773 moral arguments on, 494-96
self-evidence, 86-87 natural law theory on, 493-94,
S self-interest 495-96,509-10
Saarela, Sini, 561 Ayn Rand on, 116 and objectification, 530-33, 533nll
Sachs, Jeffrey, 803-4 and social contract theory, 109-10 and perversion, 507-8
saline injection, 222 See also ethical egOism and pleasure, 495, 500-502, 506-7,
Sandel, Michael, 206 self-referential altruism, 738n37 529
1-22 0 INDEX
utilitarianism (Continued) evaluating, 166-69 and harm, 681-82, 683-84,709-11

lessons from, 108-9 and Kantian ethics, 165-66,528 and humanitarian intervention,
and moral judgments, 80, 81,106, lessons from, 169 669-71,675-76,723,731,
107,108 and moral exemplars, 166, 167, 180 732
and prima facie duties, 159, 160 readings on, 171-81 issue background, 658-62
on racism, 450, 452 on sexual morality, 527-34 and killing of innocents, 680-81,
readings on, 120-24 Virtue Ethics (Driver), 180-81 682-83, 686n7, 690,692,
on sexual morality, 494, 506 jjVirtue Ethics, Casual Sex, and 695-96
simplicity of, 72,81,99 Objectification" (Halwani), moral arguments on, 669-70
on terrorism, 668 527-34 and noncombatants, 661, 668, 680,
on torture, 697,698-99 The VirtueofSel{islmess (Rand), 116 690-91
on war, 667, 671 virtues pacifism on, 658-59, 667, 668,
Utter, Glenn H., 582 defined, 164, 176-78 678,680,682-85,686,
intellectual vs. moral, 164-65, 174 686n6-8,10
V teaching, 165 and philosophical training, 687-88
vaccine allocation, 319-20 warrior, 168 readings on, 678-89, 707-38
Vacco v. Quill, 278 See also virtue ethics realism on, 658
validity, 48, 49, 50-51, 57 jjVirtue Theory and Abortion" and self-defense, 659-60, 677,
value (Hursthouse),269-74 679-80, 683,686n3, 696,
extrinsic vs. intrinsic, 6, 383-84, Vitoria, Francisco de, 708-9, 713, 724, 730-33,737nn28,31
429 714,715, 716 terrorism as justification for,
inherent, 366-67, 370-71 Vlastos, Gregory, 14 676-77
values Voltaire, 700 utilitarianism on, 667, 671
and definition of ethics, 3 UVoluntary Active Euthanasia" See also just war theory; obedience
and feminist ethics, 191-92 (Brock),295-303 in unjust war
vs. obligations, 6, 71 voyeurism, 501 Warren, KarenJ., 388
Van Den Haag, Ernest, 628, 637-41 vulnerable individuals Warren, Mary Anne
vegetarianism, 341, 344, 356, 381 and euthanasia, 299 on abortion, 224, 230-31, 232,
Velleman, David, 300 feminist ethics on, 200-201, 202 248-57, 274n4
Vervoort, Marieke, 305-6 and individualism, 207 on animal rights, 346-47, 369-75
viability, 222, 224, 232 and social contract theory, 112-13 warrior virtues, 168
Vietnam War, 729 Washington v. Glucksberg, 278
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman W waterboarding, 666
(Wollstonecraft), 187,352 Walker, Margaret Urban, 205, 216 Watergate scandal, 701
violence Wallace, G., 690, 691-92, 694 weak affirmative action, 447-48
defined,657-58 Walter, Sharon, 475 weak arguments, 49
and gun rights/gun control, 616, Walzer, Michael welfare rights, 319, 332
617-18,619 on immigration, 768, 770n16, Wellman, Christopher Heath, 744,
and hate speech, 544 771n22,774 759-71
paCifism on, 679 on jus in bel/o, 661 Fine on, 772-83
as prima facie wrong, 658, 669 on last-resort condition, 724 Wertheimer, Alan, 526nn4-5,
and self-defense, 648 on noncombatant immunity, 661, 527n7
and war on drugs, 577 690,691 Westacott, Emrys, 445, 484-87
See also killing; political violence; war on obedience in unjust war, 709, Whately, Richard, 133
virtue ethics, 164-81 715-16,718 UWhat Is Feminist Ethics"
and abortion, 269-74 on terrorism, 665, 666, 668, 690, (Lindemann),212-18
defined, 164 691,692,694,695 "When Protest and Speech Collide"
and doctrine of the mean, 165, 179, on tolerance/intolerance, 562 (Estlund), 550-60
]80-8] war White, Stuart, 761, 770n7, 777
on environmental ethics, 407-8 drone warfare, 687 white Australia policy, 749, 756, 768,
and ethics of care, 203, 210-11 and existential responsibility, 688 769
INDEX 0 1-23
The White Man's Burden (Easterly), Wilson, E. 0., 118 Japanese-American internment,
803,804 Wilson, James Q., 585, 601-9 705
white privilege, 441, 453-54, 481-83 Winslow, Gerald, 320 and moral arguments, 62
white supremacists, 434-35 Wittig, Monique, 213 and relevant goods, 725
whole-brain definition of death, Wolf, Susan, 195, 197
278-79 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 26, 183, 187, y
"Why Abortion Is Immoral" 200,352,353 Yancy, George, 478-81
(Marquis), 257-68 womanism, 189 "yes means yes" (affirmative)
"Why Doctors Must Not Kill" (Kass), women's rights consent, 493
307-12 and abortion, 249, 250,256-57, Yiannopoulos, Milo, 540, 544
"Why Morality Is Not Relative" 269, 272, 273-74, 274n2 Young, Iris Marion, 217
(Rachels), 35-42 and animal rights, 352-53
"Why Shouldn't Tommy and Jim See also sexism Z
Have Sex?" (Corvino), 509-16 Woodson v. North Carolina, 625-26 Zack, Naomi, 435, 441, 444-45,
Wildman, Stephanie M., 480 World Hunger and Moral Obligation: 481-83
Williams, Bernard, 197 The Case Against Singer Zionism, 464
Williams, Nancy, 183 (Arthur), 798-801 zoocentrisrn, 384-85, 388-89
Williams, Roger, 563 World War II zoos, 351
Williams, Stanley Tookie, 635 Allied city bombings, 665-66, 689, Zubaydah, Abu, 706, 707
Williams, Thomas, 514 690,691-92 zygotes, 222, 228
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MORAL REASONING, THEORY, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Moral Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary Issues

Moral Reasoning, Theory, and Contemporary Issues

All rights reserved

Editor: Pete Simon

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Vaughn, Lewis, author.

ISBN: 978-0-393-53251-7 (pbk.)

CHAPTER 1 Ethics and the Examined life 3

CHAPTER 2 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism 20

PART 2: MORAL REASONING

CHAPTER 3 Evaluating Moral Arguments 45

CHAPTER 4 The Power of Moral Theories 71

PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY

CHAPTER 5 Consequentialist Theories: Maximize the Good 93

CHAPTER 6 Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your DUty 1 31

CHAPTER 7 Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 164

CHAPTER 8 Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 182

PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES

CHAPTER 9 Abortion 221

CHAPTER 10 Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 275

CHAPTER 11 Delivering Health Care 313

CHAPTER 12 The Ethical Treatment of Animals 338

CHAPTER 13 Environmental Ethics 382

CHAPTER 14 Racism, Equality, and Discrimination 434

CHAPTER 15 Sexual Morality 488

CHAPTER 16 Tolerance, Civility, and Free Speech 535

CHAPTER 17 Drugs, Guns, and Personal Liberty 577

CHAPTER 18 Capital Punishment 624

CHAPTER 19 War, Terrorism, and Torture 657

CHAPTER 20 The Ethics of Immigration 739

CHAPTER 21 Global Economic Justice 783

CHAPTER 1 Ethics and the Examined Life 3

The Ethical Landscape 5

CHAPTER 2 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism 20

PART 2: MORAL REASONING

CHAPTER 3 Evaluating Moral Arguments 45

Avoiding Bad Arguments 60

Writing and Speaking about Moral Issues 66

CHAPTER 4 The Power of Moral Theories 71

Theories of Right and Wrong 71

o CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS 78

Devising a Coherent Moral Theory 80

PART 3: THEORIES OF MORALITY

CHAPTER 5 Consequentialist Theories: Maximize the Good 93

Applying the Theory 1 03

Social Contract Theory 1 09

REVIEW QUESTIONS 114

ETHICAL DILEMMAS 114

FURTHER READING 115

CHAPTER 6 Nonconsequentialist Theories: Do Your Duty 1 31

Applying the Theory 1 34

Learning from Kant's Theory 137

Evaluating the Theory 1 41

What Makes Right Acts Right? by W. D. Ross 158

CHAPTER 7 Virtue Ethics: Be a Good Person 164

The Ethics of Virtue 1 64

~ QUICK REVIEW 167

Learning from Virtue Ethics 1 69

CHAPTER 8 Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care 182

The Ethics of Care 184

PART 4: ETHICAL ISSUES

CHAPTER 9 Abortion 221