THE S1-1RUGGLE FOR

PAKISTAN

Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi

UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI

1965
 Published by
The Director of Publications, University of Karachi,
under the authority of the University.

Copyright reserved. No part of this book

may be translated or reproduced in any
form, by print, photo print , microfilm or
any other means, without the written
permission of the University of Karachi.

FIRST PUBLISHED
1 965

'/

PRI�TED IN PAKISTAN
AT
THE INTER SERVICES PRESS LIMITED, KARACH!-4
 PREFACE

THERE are several books which deal with the fateful events leading
to the establishment of the sovereign States of India and Pakistan.
Most of them have been written by authors who were emotionally
unprepared for the partition of the sub-continent. Hence their
writings do not portray the attitudes of the Muslims correctly. It
is necessary, therefore, to put the record straight.

It has not been possible to do full justice to the theme. The

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was too busy to keep a
diary. His private papers are in the custody of his sister, Miss
Fatima Jinnah, and are not available to the students of the period.
His principal lieutenants and others who were intimately connected
with the hectic negotiations leading to the establishment of Pak­
istan have not left any memoirs. An attempt was made to inter­
view some persons, but they refused to co-operate for one reason
or another. This book is, therefore, mainly based on published
authorities or such archives as are available. It cannot claim to
disclose any new source material. This is not due to any lack of
effort on the part of the author or his collaborator, Dr. K. K. Aziz.
The latter went to several political leaders bearing letters from the
author but he received little co-operation. Either the persons con­
tacted were too busy or they expressed their intention to write
themselves. It is earnestly hoped that they commit to writing what
they still remember, because human memory is capable of playing
curious pranks with facts. One of the senior leaders has died re­
cently and history is poorer because he could not find time to write
his memoirs or narrate some of the events to Dr. Aziz.

However, every effort has been made to consult the available

material and records. Dr. Aziz was sent to England to supplement
the information that was available in Pakistan.
 An effort has been made to let the facts speak for themselves.
This is the reason for many quotations, but comments have not
been stinted.

My indebtedness to Dr. K. K. Aziz is very great. His services

were placed at my disposal by the West Pakistan Department of
Education. I could not have hoped for a better colleague. I found
him mature in judgment, industrious, scrupulous, balanced and
well-trained in modern methods of research. He lightened my
burden by coilecting a good deal of relevant material and prepar­
ing most of the first drafts. Without this help I would have found
the preparation of this treatise impossible in view of my other
commitments. I may, however, mention that the opinions in the
form in which they appear are mine and I take full responsibility
for them.

This book has been made possible by a gcncrcus grant from the
Government of Pakistan who also used their good offices in secur­
ing for me the services of Dr. K. K. Aziz.

I must record my gratitude to several friends and colleagues.

Mr. Hila! Ahmad Zubairi has helped me with reading the proofs,
Mr. Sharif-ul-Mujahid has checked the references and Mr. Anis
Khurshid has prepared the index. The staff of the Department of
Public2.tions and the authorities of the Inter Services Press
Limited have placed me under great obligation by their patience
and cooperation. Mr. S. Zoha, in particular, has gone through
the last proofs meticulously and has eliminated many errors.

I. H. QURESHI.
University of Karachi,
12 April 1965.
 CONTENTS

Preface

1. Introductory
2. The Formulation of Attitudes 18

3. Towards Responsible Government: 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 43

4. The Establishment of Provincial Autonomy 67

5. Congress Rule in the Provinces 88

6. The Movement for Pakistan 1 16

...,
'· The Impact of the Second World War 141

8. The Cripps M ission and C ongress R ev o lt 1 76

9. Gandhi-Jinnah Talks 1 99

10. Simla Conference and Elections 222

1 1. The Cabinet Mission 248

12. The I nte ri m Government 271

13. The T ran sfe r of Power 290

14. Retrospect 307

Appendices 321

Bib liograph_v 347

index 357
 Note on the transliteration of names

Some non-Pakistani readers will feel bewildered by the fact that

no uniform method has been adopted for the transliteration of
names. The same word occurring in different names has been trans­
literated in various ways. This is because the names of places have
been transliterated in accordance with the accepted official trans­
literation in the British days, which was chaotic because it was not
scientific. The names of persons have been spelt in the manner i n
which they themselves spelt them. Where the person concerned did
not use English, his name has been correctly transliterated but dia­
critical marks have not been used.
 CHAPT E R 1

Introductory

' India'
When the Muslims demanded a separate sovereign state embracing
the Muslim majority areas in the subcontinent, many neutral
observers of the Indian scene were taken aback. Even today
Pakistani writers find it necessary to explain the raison d'etre of
their country. When the world gets accustomed to the existence of
a geographical or political unit, it becomes exceedingly difficult
to argue that its dismemberment was justified or necessary.

It is an irony that the Muslims have to struggle against the

tyranny of a word which they themselves b.:gan to use in the
sense in which it was used until 1 947. Historically India is part
of the region that constitutes West Pakistan, because it is the
area drained and irrigated by the river Indus. Hind, fro m which
is derived the name India, is a phonetic variation of Sind, still
applied to the southern part of West Pakistan. Indeed the Indus
is locally called the Sind, and it seems that it is the river that
derives the name from the area and not vice-versa, because at the
time of the Arab conquest, the river was called Mehran. It was
2 ! f!l �I Rl'GGLE FOR PAKISTAN

after the Arab conquest that the name Sind came to be applied
to territories much beyond mo,1crn Sind and gradually it came
to pass that the rnriants Hind and Sind were used, as synonyms,
for the entire subcontinent. Slowly there entered a distinction and
Hind became the Muslim name for India. It gained currency be­
cause the Muslims found no indigenous name for the subconti­
nent. The conception of a land called India was created by t he
Muslims, l:>efcre w ho se rule its several parts were known by differ­
ent n a mes. In fact, h a v ing seldom known political unity it was a ,

collection of se\'eral countries with their distinctive language� and

Cll';toms, though it h ad a certain amount of homogeneity because
of a common ciYilintion and outlook on life. The various philo­
sophies and religions that sprang from its bosom were mostly
b'.lsed upcm a set of common assumptions regarding cosmology
and life. 1

ft was because of this homogeneity that the Muslims were led

into giving the same name to the entire area. However, they did
not discard the names of the various constituent units of the
subcontinent. When Europe came into contact with South and
South-East Asia after Yasco da Gama's successful trip to Calicut,
the word Indies was applied to a much larger area than the sub­
continent. Indonesia, a collection of many islands, some of which
have their own characteristics, was included. Of course Indonesia
is a modern name. To t he European trader or colonist, it sufficed
that the people, so different amongst themselves, \Vere not Euro­
peans and possessed some common characteristics being the in­
habitants of a t hat had been subject to certain Indian
region
influences. So far as India was concerned, it had been, at one
tim e with minor exceptions, under t he Muslim rulers of Delhi
,

in the fourteenth century and was once again being brought

rapidly under :Vlughul rule during the seventeenth century. Thus
Europeans and Indians themselve5 got used to the idea of India
being in fact or potentially a single political unit.

t I. H. Qureshi, The /\Iuslim Community of the !11do-Pakista11 Suh·

co11ti11enr (1he Hague: 1962), pp. 60, 61.
I N TR O D U C T O R Y 3

The establishment of British rule in the subcontinent and

its expansion to its farthest corners brought the territories
into much closer contact with Europe. When the nabobs returned
to England and bought rotten boroughs with wealth accumulated
in India, the fame of the subcontinent spread all over Europe.
Thus India became the source of British wealth and power and
Europe was dazzled with the brilliance of the brightest jewel in
the British crown. Thus was built a legend about India that entered
fiction and song. And this was one, undivided India. The fissures
remained hidden because they only helped the British in building
up their power and were of little concern to any one else.
It was assumed that India must be inhabited by Indians and as
such they would form a nation and if there were a few groups
somewhat different from the rest, they would be cultural, religious
or perhaps ethnic minorities. And because once the Muslims had
ruled the land, their existence was not totally unknown, but, then ,
as the term Muslim implies, these must be Indians with just a dif­
ferent religion. And, as a corollary, it was assumed that if they
demanded separation, it was only on religious grounds. But then
why should religion play such an important role in the twentieth
century that people, otherwise the same, should call themselves
a nation simply because they profess a different religion ?
This thought was reinforced with the success of Hindu propa­
ganda. Gandhi and other leaders posed the question : How can a
body of converts be a nation ?2 And this question has found an
echo in many parts of the world, because it embodies a plausible
half truth. Gandhi must have been aware that this was an over­
simplification of a much more complex problem, but because it
made a good propaganda point, it was repeated from many plat­
forms and in many statements. Let us examine the question a little
more closely.
Religion
Both Hinduism and Islam are different from the religions prevalent
in the West. Hinduism is not an attachment to a dogma, it is the

2 Vide infra, p. 214.

4 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K ISTAN

name of a social system. It has a basic philosophy, it is true, but

this philosophy is pervasive and does not assume the form of a
credo. I t is possible for a Hindu to hold any belief antagonistic to
one or all assumptions of the philosophy. In course of history large
sections of Hindu society have done so, but so deeply ingrained are
these basic assumptions in the thought of the people that the
rebellions have not lasted. The important fact is that it is possible
to deny the truth of any belief howsoever universally held and yet
to remain a Hindu. The reason is that if the Hindu social code
is not transgressed seriously in matters that integrate Hindu so­
ciety, there is no excommunication. And the essence of the social
code are the caste rules. Nevertheless it is possible even to break
the caste rules, because if it is done by a sufficiently large group,
it can constitute a caste group of its own. Sooner or later it begins
to conform to the general principles once again. These rebellions
being against particular points do not seriously militate against
the all powerful social bonds of Hinduism.

It is interesting to note that the institution of the caste plays a

dual role. It binds individuals and groups to Hindu society. The
caste system gives sufficient autonomy to groups to draw up their
own codes of belief as well as action, but because the all permeat­
ing philosophy is constantly influencing their thought and action
alike to an extent that it becomes the very air they breathe, the
homog1:neity of Hindu thought and society is maintained . This
autonomy also perm it\� the absorption of new groups, and i t was
in this manner that many immigrating tribes were integrated into
Hindu society. It was this quality of Hinduism that filled the
Muslims with the great apprehension. They wanted to maintain
their entity and were averse to any dilution of their creed . The
latter was an ever present danger because of the all pervasive
nature of Hindu philosophy which was woven into the warp and
woof of native thought .
The other quality of the caste system is somewhat contradic­
tory to the former. It breeds an exclusiveness which makes even
IN TRODUCTORY 5

social contacts somewhat difficult. By its interdiction of inter­

marriage, inter-dining and sometimes even touching persons be­
longing to other castes, it almost forbids familiar contacts with
others. This has been particularly true of the Hindu attitude to­
wards foreigners who have been branded as yavanas and me/ech­
chhas. The former comes from Ionia and was first applied to the
Greeks and the latter is indigenous in origin and applies to any
one outside the pale of Hinduism ; both are used contemptuously ;
both imply that the person is unclean and his touch would pollute
food, utensils, the dining area and even the fire place. Orthodox
Hindus would take a bath after the day's business if it has brought
them into contact with non-Hindus. 3 Under these circumstances
it is not surprising at all that the Hindus and the Muslims, despite
having lived as neighbours for centuries, remained distinct and
separate.

The Muslim attitude also did not help integration. In antithesis

to Hinduism, Islam is a religion with a credo and no one can
legitimately call himself a Muslim if he ceases to believe in God,
His unity and the mission of the Prophet, Muhammad. Islam
also has built up a system of law that governs society. It believes
in the existence of an organized community of believers and be­
cause there is no church, the Islamic law is the main cementing
agent in society. This law is in many way3 antithetical to the
Hindu code in its basic assumptions. Unlike the Hindu caste sys­
tem, Islam rejects birth or profession as a source of pride o r
superiority. I t believes i n the brotherhood and equality o f all
believers. It does not brand any one as inferior on the basis of
race, colour or descent. The non-believer is in error, it is true,
and, therefore, not like a Muslim, yet, as a human being, he i s
not inferior, because he i s potentially a believer through conver­
sion. It does not treat any person as physically unclean whose
touch could pollute anything. It, therefore, builds quite a different
J Nirad C. Chaudhari, The Allfobiography of an Unknown Indian (New
York: 1 95 1), pp. 381. 382.
 6 THE STR U G G L E FOR PAKIS TAN

kind of a society. Thus the Hind u and Muslim social systems

could exist side by side but they could not work for i ntegration .
Besides, because the Muslims were in a minority and were con­
scious of the possibility that the environment might weaken their
adherence to their principles, they were, most of the time, actively
engaged in preventing their absorption into th:: milieu.
Race

Soon much more got involved than religion alone. For this it 1 s
necessary to go back to the beginnings of Muslim society in the
subcontinent. As is wdl known, the earliest settlers were Arab
merchants who had established themselves i n important seaports.
Here they were permitted and sometimes even encouraged to re­
ceive some Hindus into their fold a; converts. Some of the settlers
married Hindu wivt:s and had children by them. The entire com­
munity so constituted was protected by the rulers who valued them
as agents for overseas trade. However, sometimes they were the
target of mob violence when, despite the patronage of the rulers,
they had to fend for themselves as best as they could. In such
pogroms they were treated as a single community; the local people
did not disti11guish bdween the Arabs and the converts. They were
all Muslims. -i
When Northern India was conquered by the Muslims, they were
confronted with the problem of controlling vast territories with
almost insignific:rnt man power. It must be remembered that the
native population was not docile. Whenever and wherever it
could, it was pron;: to rebel, withhold revenue and disrupt
communications. The efficacy of conciliation was recognised and
successful attempts were made to win over large sectors of Hindu
society through concessions and a liberal administration. s But in
a situ�i.tion where an alien minority imposes its rule upon a civil­

iz,.:d
: and proud p::ople, conciliation alone i� not enough. All gov­
ernments have to possess the ultimJte sanction of force. In parti-
4 I. H. Qureshi. TiI:! .\foi.1:"11 Cn1111'111fty of' rlzc llldo-Pakistan S11b­
contf,'1e11r. up. ci: . . p. 61.
5 I. H. Quresi1i. The 4dminisum!o11 of rize S11/tm:arc of Dchli (Karachi:
195'l). p. 217. ct seq.
INTRODUCTORY 7

cular, if the territories are far flung and the communications not
easy because of thick forests and large rivers, as was true of the
early Muslim Empire in the subcontinent, it is necessary to
guard the routes and to keep the local population u nder control .
This was achieved b y planting Muslim colonies i n strategic places
where they were entru<>ted with the responsibility of maintaining
peace. In view of the large areas under their control and their own
small numbers, this was by no means an easy assignment. In the
beginning every Muslim community was little better than an armed
camp in the midst of a hostile people, who were armed as well as
warlike. In that age the difference between an army and an armed
rabble was proverbially small. These settlements, when they start­
ed, were entirely Turkish and Central Asian, but soon small num­
bers of converts joined them. Because they faced common dangers
they were soon integrated into well knit communities. And what
is even more significant, the Hindus did not distinguish between
the Turk and the convert. In those days every Muslim was called
a Turk in the areas where Muslim rule h;id been established by
the Turks. 6
It is quite true that there are many descendants of Hindu con­
verts to Islam among the Muslims of the subcontinent. But G:.rndhi
was certainly exaggerating when he branded the entire Muslim
community as a body of ccnvcrts. There a.re larg.? sections of th�
Muslim population in the subcontinent who ar<! the progeny of
immigrants from other Muslim lands. Throughout the pcricd of
Muslim rule, migration from other Muslim countries was en­
couraged. This was true even in the twentieth century of the
Nizam's dominion. The Muslim rulers were so conscious of the
shortage of their man power that every immigrant was looked upon
as an asset. Administrators, poets, theologians, physicians, scho­
lars, engineers. mystics, ordinary soldiers and even humble crafts­
men were all welcome. There are innumerable families who trace
their origin from some foreign settler and all these claims are not
ill founded. The largest immigration took place because of the
6 I. H. Qureshi, The Afuslim Community of the lizdo-Pakistm1 Sub­
continent, op. cit., pp. 87, 88.
8 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I S T AN

ravages caused by the Mongol inroads into the Eastern lands of

Islam and as early as Balban's reign in the thirteenth century Delhi
was thronged with Muslim immigrants of distinction from many
lands.
The Muslim population of the subcontinent absorbed layer
upon layer of Arabs, Turks, Afghans, Iranians and others. 7 The
fact that the Muslims of India belong to so many racial stocks
has had a profound effect on their psychology. The Muslim com­
munity was integrated into a new group that transcended the
barriers that might have divided it if people of different origins
had adhered to their particular traditions too strictly. This integra­
tion was made easier by the fact that Islam is not only a religion,
but also a social sy�tem and a way of life. The Hindu convert also
was not only admitted to a new faith, but also to a new society.
That was the reason why, for a long time, the Hindus would say
of a fellow Hindu who had become a Muslim that he had "turned
a Turk". The convert adopted a " Muslim" name in the sense

that it was of Arab, Iranian or Central Asian origin, broke all

conscious ties with the culture of the society to which he had
belonged and integrated himself fully into the Muslim community. 8
Thus even the Hindu convert came to look upon the culture of
the Muslim community of the subcontinent as his own. Therefore
Gandhi's argument was wrong from another angle as well. The
Hindu convcns to Islam became culturally as foreign to Hindu
culture as the Muslims of a foreign origin.
The Muslim culture that developed in the subcontinent had, it
goes without saying, its roots in the teachings of Islam. In its
fundamentals Islamic culture is the same all over the world; and
yet in many ways it has b�en affected by the habitat it has entered .
These peculiarities have acco mp a nied people migrating from one
region to another. Because of the long contacts with Central Asia
through a la rge number of immigrants, ludo-Muslim culture is
overwhelmingly Central Asian in details. The Muslim rulers of
the subcontinent were mostly of Central Asian origin and so were
7 Ibid., pp. 80-82.
8 Ibid., pp. 93-101.
INTRODUCTORY 9

their courtiers, officials and soldiers. The communities that were

planted to consolidate the empire were mostly Central Asian i n
their composition. Except for their language they forgot very little
and most often without knowing it, perpetuated cuisine, habits,
customs and ideas that their forefathers had brought with them.
As Persian was the official language, the poetry and literature of
Iran also had a deep i nfluence which was strengthened when the
Mughuls encouraged Iranian migration a nd also because of the
conversion of some of the rulers of the Deccan to Shi'ism. The
Arab influence was pervasive because of Islam and the earlier
contacts with Arab lands.

Because of this history, Islamic culture in the subcontinent was

neither entirely Arab, nor Central Asian, nor Iranian . Nor for
that matter was it simply a mixture of all these. Indian influences
had crept into the life of the community. These occupied a minor
and subsidiary position, nevertheless they contributed a local fla­
vour to what otherwise would have been entirely foreign. In this
manner was evolved the culture of the Muslim community of the
subcontinent, which was predominantly Islamic and Central
Asian, but which evolved its own i ndividuality. 9 If the entire
subcontinent had been converted to Islam, this culture would have
been called I ndian, j ust as the Central Asian, Turkish, Iranian
and Arab cultures are known by the names of their habitats i n
spite o f being the variants o f the culture o f Islam. Indeed, the
Muslim world did call the Muslims of the subcontinent 'Indians'
and their culture also was dubbed by the same name. It must,
however, be remembered that this term was used exclusively for
the Muslims, 1 o because the Muslim world at that time was con­
cerned mainly with the Muslims of the subcontinent, and only
their achievements attracted any attention in Muslim writings. A
world in which numbers were not so important judged whether a
9 I. H. Qureshi, The Pakistani Way of Life (London: 1 957), pp . 5-1 4.
10 The Indian Muslims were called by Arab authors Hunud, precisely
the term that the Muslims of the subcontinent used for the Hindus. When in
the 20th century the Arabs woke up to the importance of the Hindus, they
began to refer to them as Hunudas, a corruption of the English word Hindus.
 10 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

land was Muslim er otherwise by the extent to which Islam exer­

cised supremacy in it.
Within the subcontinent, however, the Muslims could not call
themselves just 'Indians', because there were many more Indians.
who were so different from them . And their struggle to save their
entity cou ld not be just to protect their "Indianism". They
were anxious to live as Muslims, because only thus they
could protect their faiti1 which was the cornerstone of their
culture. They could no longer call themselves Turks, Iranians or
Arabs because they had ceased to be any of these. Hence they
adopted the name of 'Muslims of India' and within the subccrnti­
nent itself the.y called themselves merely 'Muslims' . I I
A nation without a name
Thus it came to p.i.ss that a distinct nation developed within the
subcontinent that continued to live without a name. And, despite
Shakespeare's dictum to the contrary, there is a good deal in a
name. For the better part of a century, they continued to look
upon themselves as a religious minority, simply because they had
failed to find a suitable name for themselves. In spite of their
instincts which led them in the direction of complete separation,
they sought the safeguards that they thought would ensure their
communal existence. They were also described and treated as a
religious minority by the British. In this m:mner the confusion
created by the absence of a nn1e c;mtinued as a sinister factor
to play h;ivoc with their own thinking and the thinking of the
world about them. If they were just a religious minority. then, it
seemed, it was preposterous that they should demand a sep;irate
existence. It was for this reason that Gandhi advanced his argu­
ment that mere converts could not claim to b� a separate nation.
Implied in all this thinking was the fallacious assumption that
the Muslims of the subcontinent had every thing in common with
the Hindus except their religion. The sitwltion in fact was that
the two peoples Jud littk in CJm:non. It Ins alr.::ady b;:en men­
tioned above that Islam a nd Hinduism build two entirely different
11 T!1�y pr�ferrd tJ c ill t'1-!.11>eh:�> :\fitsa!m.1•?.!fl-i-Hind. never Hindi
A1usalm:111. Som�tim�>. tho�rgh seldom, they used Hi11d11S1ani A1usa!man.
INTRO D U CTOR Y 11

kinds of society. But it was not only social structure that was
different. The variance ran through all the details.

For finding this one had only to walk from one street to another
and sometimes from one house in the same street to another house.
To start with, in spite of a superficial similarity i n architectura 1
forms, the houses were quite differently planned . The Muslim
houses would be spacious, airy and more open to light. A smaller
area would be covered to ensure larger space for sitting out in the
mornings and the afternoons and also for catching the breeze
during the hot nights. The Hindu house would, in the same area,
have more building, the rooms and verandahs would be smaller
and there would be less space left open to the sky. To the reader
the difference described here might look insignificant, but this
would not be the impression upon the visitor. The Hindu ho use
almost invariably exuded a sense of secretive exclusiveness which
was not found in Muslim houses. Then the visitor would notice
that the utensils were different ; they were not made even of the
same metal. The utensils in Muslim houses would be of copper
tinned to look white, or china or enamel, dep.::n ding upon the
means of the family. In the Hindu home they would be of brass,
their shapes would be different. The Muslims would use ewers,
basins, cups, dishes, trays and plates like the ones used in Central
Asia or Iran, whereas the Hindus would use spoutless mugs
(Iotas) and round trays (thalis). In most areas Muslim men and
women would be differently clad.
All this holds good even today, though in some of the highly
Westernized families, to the extent that Western articles have come
into use, the differences might be less marked. The cuisine also i s
entirely different and there has been very little borrowing. Recently
dishes of Mughul origin have been adopted in India for the pur­
pose of entertaining foreigners. If the visitor were to probe a
little deeper he would find that customs and ceremon ies were quite
different. There were no common festivals, no means of intimate
contacts, because there was no inter-dining or inter-marriage,
and no basis for a common outlook upon life.
12 THE STRU G G L E FOR PAKISTAN

If the same visitor were to walk further down the street, h e might
come across a mosque or a temple. Here the difference, as might
be expected, would be even greater. The average mosque has min­
arets and domes and the prayer hall is pierced with arches. There
is at least a hall, there may be cloisters on the three sides and a
place for ablutions. In the hall there would be a pulpit and near
it a niche to mark the place where the imam stands to lead the
prayers. The building is open and there is no atmosphere of mys­
tery. It is simply a place where believers gather to offer congrega­
tional prayers. The temple is not intended fo r a congregation, it
centres round the image of a deity, it may have subsidiary chapels
housing the images of other deities and devotees walk in single
file to see the image and to offer their homage. The image is gene­
rally in a semi-dark room lit with lamps, creating an atmosphere
of mystery and awe . The architecture is generally trabeate.
The d ivision runs through literature as well. Even when the
spoken languages approximated as they had to because the two
peoples lived next door to each other, there was a distinct differ­
ence in the flavour and vocabulary of the Hindu and the Muslim
idioms. The best example to illustrate this point are Hindi and
Urdu. Both possess a common Prakritic syntax. When used fo r the
exchange of common ideas in the bazars, they were called, very
often, Hindustani. At that kvel most, though, by no means, all, or
th e vocabulary was common. When Hindustani went beyond that
stage and was used for polite conversation or literary purposes,
it became either Urdu or Hindi. If it was Urdu, it was written in
a modified Arabic script and had a large percentage of Arabic,
Persian and Turkish words, in that order of frequency. Hindi was
written i n a Sanskritic script and had a similarly high percentage
of Sanskrit words. In this manner one language could become
quite unintelligible to one who knew only the other. And when
it came to poetry, the difference went much deeper. In Urdu the
forms, the thought and the imagery were borrowed from Iran and
Central Asia; i n Hindi they were indigenous. Urdu poetry exuded
the nostalgia for lands tha t had been left behind long a go but
never forgotten. It sang of "the cooler lands where roses bloomed
I N TR O D U C T O R Y 13

and nightingales sang, where lilies made the air fragrant and tulips
carpeted the forests, where the plane trees brightened the autumn
with their red leaves and cypresses stood sentinel on the running
springs." 1 2 It believes more in metaphor than in simile, more i n
abstraction than in description, more i n mystic verities than in
mundane love, more in the philosophy of emotions than i n actual
emotions. Hindi poetry relies for its charm upon a portrayal of
the local environment, upon telling similies to make its points,
upon appealing to ordinary human experience. Hindi and Urdu
have been chosen as examples because these trends arc clearly
defined in these two languages. In varying degrees the differences
in the Hindu and Muslim approaches persist in other languages
of the subcontinent as well, in case they have been used by approxi­
mately the same number of eminent Muslim and Hindu writers.
Tt would be tedious for the reader if this discussion is prolonged
too much to cover other fields as well. But the difference persists
almost every where. Whether it is painting or music, the difference
is quite obvious. 1 3
How could two peoples with such divergence in their outlook,
beliefs, mores. tastes and inclinations be moulded into one with­
out making one, or the other, or both to sacrifice something that
had entered into the innermost recesses of their very soul s ? Under
British rule Hindus had organized a number of revivalist move­
ments and were in haste to discard all traces of Muslim influence. 1 4
The Muslims knew that in such a situation, the sacrifice, if it had
to be made, would have to be entirely theirs. They were mortally
afraid of being forced to do so because it went against their grain
and their entire history, as their one concern ever since they set
their foot in the subcontinent had been to preserve their faith, their
culture and their separate entity. ts
12 I. H. Qureshi, "Islamic Elements in the Political Thought of Pakistan",
Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (D urham N.C.: 1 961),
p. 216.
13 I. H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Inda-Pakistan Subcon­
tinent, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
14 I. H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Inda-Pakistan Subcon­
tinent, op. cit. The entire book would illustrate this point.
ts Ibid., Chapter XI.
 14 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

Peoples s o entirely d i fferent m a y l ive together for centuries with­

out even understanding one another. It is only through intimate
contacts that d i fferences may tone down in course of t i me. It has
been shown that opportunities for such contacts were extremely
limited. A cementing force could have been a common experience
�in history. But they were not even willing to take the same view
of history. Muslim achievements were generally belittled by the
Hindus. The Muslim success in conquering such vast territories
and holding them aga i nst heavy odds was looked upon as a crime
because the period of Muslim rule had openly been called "an
age of slavery". The monarchs and genera ls who are the heroes of
Muslim history were dubbed robbers and tyrants. The fact that
the Musli ms saved the subcontinent from Mongol inroads which
had created such havoc in other Asian and European lands was
fo rgotten. The Muslim achievements in org;inizing an efficient and
benevolent administration, t he anxiety of the Muslim monarchs
to look after the people and the flowering of vernacular l iteratures
under their patromge were all forgotten. Hindu rebels against
l\Iuslim rule are cherished as heroes and e\en their treachery i s
extolled.
The period o f common subjugation under the British could ha Ye
created a feeling of unity but this could not happen because the
Hindus were a lways willing to take advantage of British partiality
towards them . After the fall of the Mughul Empire and the estab­
l ishment of British rule the Muslims were subjected to d iscrimina­
t ion and hostility.16 The Hindus had no scruples in taking advan­
tage of the situation. They showed n o fellow feeling for the Muslims
in their adversity. Of co urse the lesson was not lost upon the
Muslims. When the Hindus organized the Indian National Cong­
ress under British inspiration, the Muslims showed no confidence
in it. I 7 No two peoples, who have such different views of history,
can have that "sense of possessing common memories of triumphs
and humiliations" which is considered to be the ba sis of national
feeling.
16Ibid., pp. 247, 248.
17Gandhi·s letter dated 15 September 1 944: Ji1111ah-Gandhi Talks (Sep­
tember 1944) (Novemb�r 1944), p. 1 5 .
INTRODUCTORY 15

Not mereZv a religious minority

A few simple questions may clarify the position further : "Was the
Muslim, for instance, just an Indian with a different religious be­
lief, or did his differences with other Indians go deeper than
religion alone ? Was he, for instance, just as different from his
Hindu neighbour as the Roman Catholic Englishman is from his
compatriots who belong to the Church of England ? This may not
seem to be a fair comparison. because, after all, the Roman Catho­
lics and the Protestants are alike Christians. Was then the differ­
ence the same as between the American Jews and the followers
of other religious denominations in the United State s ? Here again
the parallel does not hold good for two reasons : the Jews and the
Christians share a good deal of the Semitic traditions as embodied
in the Old Testament; and the Jews, through their association
with the West and having lived so long in Europe and in America
have adopted a good deal of the same cultural tradition as their
Christian compatriots. Indeed, but for differences in religious doc­
trines and practices arising from those dcctrines, there is no differ­
ence in the way of life and culture of the Jews and the Christians
in the United States of America or in the U nited Kingdom." 1 8 It
has been explained above at some length that the differences bet­
ween the Hindus and the Muslims \Vere much deeper. It should,
however, be remembered that when the West thinks of a religious
minority, it has some such difference in view as exists between the
Protestants and the Catholics or at the utmost between the Christ­
ians and the Jews. Judging from that standpoint of view, it is
obvious that the Muslims of the subcontinent could not be called
merely a religious minority.
The Muslims had themselves been victims of the idea that they
were a religious minority. They were not familiar with life in the
West and when the British called them a religious minority, they
came to believe that the term represented their international stand­
ing correctly. Their instincts, however, could not be governed by
any nomenclature. Their holding themselves aloof from the Indian
1 8 I. H. Qureshi, "Islamic Elements in the Political Thought of Pakistan",
loc. cit., pp. 2 1 2-2 1 3 .
 16 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A KI S T A N

National Congress when it was organized was an open intimation

that they did not consider themselves to be a part of "the Indian
nation". When they demanded separate electorates, their deputa­
tion asked the viceroy "that the Muslims of India should not be
regarded as a mere minority, but as a nation within a nation whose
rights and obligations should be guaranteed by Statute". 1 9 The
status of being a mere minority continued to worry the Muslims.
Mohamed Ali said in the Round Table Conference that " . . . the
Musalmans constitute not a minority in the sense in which the
late war and its sequel has habituated us to consider European
minorities . . . A community that in India alone must be numbering
more than 70 millions cannot easily be called a minority. " 20
The discorerv
The liberation from the tyranny of this sinister phrase was not
far when doubts began to arise in the minds of their thinkers
regarding the status of the Muslims in the subcontinent. The ear­
lier leadership had come from the areas where the Muslims were
in a minority. They did not find it so easy to break away from
the notion of being a minority even though they had felt that the
term did not quite fit them. When the Muslim majority areas also
began to contribute to the leadership of the community, a change
was bound to occur. Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, for instance, saw the
greatest danger in the Muslims being called Indians. 21 And once,
after a process of self discovery, they realized that they were a
nation, the inhibitions created by the lack of a name, by erroneous
catchwords and phrases, and by misleading patterns of thought
vanished as if they had never existed. Then led by a great leader,
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the nation marched to its
destiny of sovereign status and won the battle for Pakistan.
The battle was not fought only to win a status and territories.
Valuable as these are for the preservation of the nation, it has
19 H. H. the Aga Khan III, The ·Memoirs of Aga Khan, World Enough
and Time(New York: 1954), p. 123.
20 Round Table Conference 1930-31. M inorities Committee, Documents,
Minutes, Meetings 1-6.
21 Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, The Millar and Afenace of "/ndianism'' (Cam­
bridge: 1 940) . Also, Pakistan (London: 1947), p. 241.
I N T R O D U C TORY 17

been inspired by the idea that without a separate existence, its

creative genius was likely to wither away. Given freedom and
opportunity it can help in the enrichment of human thought, be­
cause every people has a unique experience out of \Vhich comes
a contribution which only it can make. A suppressed and depen­
dent people may be intelligent, but its inhibitions do not permit
it to give its genius a free play. It would have been a pity if a
people which has not played an insignificant role in history had
been deprived the opportunities that freedom alone offers. It was
something of great value to themselves and the world that the
Muslims of the subcontinent were trying to defend when they
decided to fight for Pakistan.
 C H AP TE R 2

The Formulation of Attitudes

The holocaust of 1857

The events of 1857 have a two-fold significance in the history of
modern Muslim India. They dealt a final blow to the idea of the
Mughul Empire and they put a seal on the decline of the Mus­
lims in all walks of life.
With the final collapse of the Mughul Empire the Muslims
awakened to the futility of any attempts to revive their empire.
It is true that many years before 1 857 the Mughul Emperor
had become but a shadow of his ancestors and lately had lost all
authority, but in the minds of the people he was still a powerful
symbol of Muslim rule. His fall, therefore, was mourned by all
Muslims. They came to realize that a new epoch had opened in
the history of India, an epoch of a n ew empire established by a
foreign race which had its home thousands of miles away and
which was totally alien in its culture and outlook on life.
The British believed that the Muslims were responsible fo r the
anti-British uprising of I 857 and therefore they were subjected to
ruthless punishment and merciless vengeance. In e \ery department
of life where government patronage was essential, the doors were
closed on Muslims. The Muslims were hounded out of employ-
 THE F O RM U L AT I O N O F A T T I TC D E S 19

ment and opportunities. The landed gentry was disinherited

through large scale confiscations. Muslim education had been
ruined through deliberate negligence on the part of the British.
Persian had been ousted as the official language and replaced
with English. The Muslim qadis had lost employment when English
law replaced Muslim law. Even such subordinate government posts
as were still open tc the Indians and these were those that earned
miserable salaries, went to the Hindus. 1 The British had always
looked upon the Muslims as their adversaries because they had
ousted them from power. With the rebellion of 1 857 this feeling
was intensified and every attempt was made to ruin and suppress
the Muslims for ever.
From 1 858 up to about 1 870 nearly all British politicians,
authors and administrators unhesitatingly blamed the Muslims for
the "Mutiny". 2 But in the 1 870's a change in British opinion was
visible. Men like Sir Richard Temple, Sir John Strachey and
W. H. Gregory came forward to argue that Muslim India was not
disloyal and that the unpleasant past should b� forgotten . 3
Syed Ahmed Khan
It is true that the British reading of Indian history, which attri­
buted the "Mutiny" to Muslim instigation, was later corrected
by British historians themselves, but the most powerful single
factor which rehabilitated the Muslims and recovered for them
some of their lost political and intellectual influence was the atti­
tude of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.
Born at Delhi in 1 8 1 7 of a highly respectable family, Syed
Ahmed entered the service of the East India Comp:iny and rose
to the position of a Judge. During th.: " Mutiny" he served the
British loyally and with distinction and immediately after it wrote
1 For full details see \V. W. Hunter, Our Indian Aiusa!111a11s: A1.J thev
·

Botmd in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen? (London: 1 871).

2 Sec, for example, S. Laing, "Th e Convention with Turkey", J<ortnightly
Review, August 1 878; Samuel Smith, "India Revisited", Contemporary Review,
July, 1 886; Mortimer Durand, Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred Comy11 Lyall
(London: 1 9 1 3), pp. 68-86; and writings of Malcolm MacColl.
3 See Richard Temple,India in 1880 ( London: 1 880), p. 1 1 5 ; John Strachey,
India (London : 1 894 ed.), p. 240 ; and W. H. Gregory, "Loyalty of the
Indian Muhammadans", Nineteenth Century, December 1 886.
20 T H E S T R U G G LE F O R P A K I S T A N

the now famous pamphlet, Essay 011 the Causes of the Indian
Revolt. In the Loyal Muhammadans of India he defended the Mus­
lims against the British charge of sedition and disloyalty. In 1 875
he established the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Ali­
garh. Retiring from service in the following year, he worked as a
member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council from 1 878
to 1 883. He died in 1 89 8 . 4
This remarkable man left his unmistakable impact on the
Muslims in four different but inter-connected spheres : education,
religion, social life and politics.
Education was the foundation on which he built the super­
structure of his religious, social and political ideas. He alone
among his contemporaries realized that the plight of the Muslims
could not be improved without a revolution in their attitude to­
wards education. The Muslims were inimical to Western educa­
tion for three reasons : they considered it inferior to traditiona I
Islamic learning, it was being forced upon them by a fo reign
people, and they saw no need of it for themselves. To learn English
and acquire Western knowledge went against their pride, their
memory of bygone superiority and their attachment to the learning
of Islam. They thought that an education saturated with Christ­
ianity might corrupt their beliefs. s Syed fought these attitudes
with heroic courage. Through speeches, articles, pamphlets, Scien­
tific and Translation Societies and schools he slowly converted
his people to his line of thought. His crowning achievement in this
sphere was the foundation, in 1 875, of the Muhammadan Anglo­
Oriental College at Aligarh.
In religion Syed stood for a rational approach. He argued
that the revealed truth could be understood best through reason.
The revelations of physical sciences could not be ignored i n the
understanding of religion. He put it pithily when he said that there
4 See G. F. I. Graham, The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan
(London, first ed. 1885, rev. ed. 1 909) .

5 See Report of the ;\{embers of the Select Committee for the Better
Diffusion and Advancemem of the Learning among the Muhammadans of India,
1872; extracts quoted in C . H. Philips (ed .), The Evolution ofIndia and Pakistan,
1858-1947 (London : 1 962), pp. 1 78-1 80.
THE FOR M U L A T I O N O F ATTITUDES 21

could be n o contradiction between the word o f God (revealed

truth) and the work of God (the laws of physical science and the
phenomena of Nature). It may be argued that this attitude was
too naive in so far as it placed too much confidence in human
observation of phenomena at a particular time, nevertheless the
basic idea that truth can be understood and interpreted in the
light of human knowledge is sound.
His main purpose being to bring about some conciliation bet­
ween the rulers and the down trodden and persecuted Muslims,
he sought to bring out the close affinity between Islam and Christ­
ianity, and in pursuance of this wrote a commentary on the Bible.

In social life he stood for simplicity, honesty and other homely

virtues. In his highly readable but novel magazine, Tahdhib-u/­
Akhlaq, he taught the people to accept what was sound and
attractive in European manners and social life.
In politics Syed had three main ideas to inculcate : that poli­
tical awakening was imperative, that the British must be cultivated
as friends, and that it was not in the interests of the Muslims to
join the Congress. Again and again he told his followers that in a
subcontinent like India which was inhabited by many races and
people of different creeds any steps towards the introduction of
representative government based on the doctrine of the rule of
the majority would necessarily be disadvantageous to the Mus­
lims. 6 The Muslims had already suffered greatly by the bad
opinion which the British had of them. They must now make
friends with the rulers, hold aloof from the Congress, and develop
their own strength. Educationally and economically they were
backward and therefore not equipped for political agitation. He
argued that politics must be left alone by the Muslims until they
had brought themselves up to the level of the Hindus in pros­
perity and modern education. It was for these reasons that he
opposed the introduction of competitive examinations for entry
into government service and the principle of election in local and
6 Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council, vol. 22 (1 883), pp. 1 9-20.
 22 THE STRUGGLE FOR PA KI STAN

legislative bodies. All this must wait until such time as the Indians
developed a sense of real unity.7
If Syed Ahmed Khan's contribution to Muslim renaissance
in India need be expressed in one phrase, one might suggest
that it was the inculcation of "self-confidence". Before he appear­
ed on the scene, the Muslim community in India was afloa t ; he
supplied the rudder. The Muslims were under a cloud ; he made
them free of the stigma of disloyalty and showed them the path
to progress.They were bogged down in doubt and disappointment ;
he gave them hope. This was service enough. His greatness lies
in providing a firm fo undation on which those who came after
him could build with confidence. It is true that his political philo­
sophy of co-op..:ration with the British had serious limitations ;
his advocacy of uncritical acceptance of European education and
thought could not provide a firm foundation for building up a
nation with a wdl defined entity, and his concept of religious
truth was rather narrow and unphilosophical, yet at the time
when he advocated these ideas, they were opportune and saved
the Muslims from stagnation and even annihilation.
Constitutional changes: 1858-1892
ln the constitutional sphere the greatest result of the " Mutiny"
was the transfer of p::iwer from the East India Company to the
British Crown. For the first time the British Parliament was given
full authority and responsibility for governing India. The British
Indian Empire was officially established.
The Government of India Act, 1 858, pro vided for the appoint­
ment of a Secretary of State for India, who replaced the Court
of Directors and the Board of Control. A Council of sixteen
members advised the Secretary of State and was responsible for
co nducti n g the business that had to be transacted in Britain re­
garding the Government of India . All the a rmies of the East India
Company were merged into the military forces of the Crown.
In 1 86 1 the Indian Cou ncils Act was passed "to make better
' '

provisions for the Constitution of the Council of the Governor-

7 s�� his The Preseni Srate ofllldia11 Politics (Allahabad: 1 888), pp. 7-2 1 ,
3 1 -53.
THE FOR MU LATION OF ATTITUDES 23

General of India and for the local Government of the several

Presidencies and Provinces of India and for the temporary Gov­
ernment of India in the event cf vacancy in the office of the
Governor-Genera l". The Council was to consist of the Com­
mander-in-Chief, five ordinary members, and from six to twelve
members of the Council for the purpose of making laws and
regulations. The Governor-General was endowed with ordinance­
making power. Provincial administrative and legislative institu­
tions and procedures were prescribed, but the Governor-General
was authorized to veto provincial legislation. A distinction was
made between Presidencies, whose heads were to be known as
Governors, and non-Presidency Provinces, whose heads were
designated Lieutenant-Governors . 8
The Act of 1 86 1 was amended by the Indian Councils Act of
1 892. The Governor-General's Council was expanded. Any pro­
posal regarding expenditure in the annual financial statement to
be laid before the Council was to have the sanction of the Gov­
ernor-General. The Provincial Councils were enlarged and were
authorized to discuss the budget and raise administrative ques­
tions , though not to vcte on them. But the Governor-General's
Council was denied this power.9 Lord Dufferin was prepared to
concede a measure of election and proposed that, while some of
the non-official members should still be nominated, others should
be elected. But the Secretary of State for India, Lord Cross, did
not agree to the sanction of "a fundamental change of this des­
cription without much more positive evidence in its favour than
was forthcoming". 1 0 The result was a compromise. A few of the
non-official seats were still to be filled by simple nomination ; but
for a majority of them "recommendations" were to be made by
local bodies or corporations, like religious communities, muni­
cipalities, universities, chambers of commerce and the like.
This was a far cry from the usual British er Western pattern of
popular election. The Government of India acknowledged in 1 892
8 24 and 25 Viet., c. 67.
9 55 and 56 Viet., c. 14.
1 0 Quoted in Montagu-Chelmsford Report, Sect. 69.
24 T H E S TR U G G L E roR PAKISTAN

that India was "essentially a congeries of widely separated classes,

races and communities with d ivergences of i nterest and hereditary
sentiment which could be properly represented only by those who
knew and shared their sectional opinions." 1 1
Jfuslims and the Congress
A. W. Hume, a retired member of the Indian Civil Service, laid
the foundations of the Indian National Congress in 1 885. This
body had three objects : "First : the fusion into one national whole
of all the different, and till recently discordant, elements that con­
stitute the population of India ; second : the gradual regeneration
along all lines, mental, moral, social and political, of the nation
thus evolved ; and third : the consolidation of the union between
England and India, by securing the modification of such o f its
conditions as may be unjust or injurious to the latter country." 1 2
Here we must take notice of the important fact that the Congress
was founded by an Englishman, a retired official of the Indian
Government, and had the blessings of the then Governor-General
of India, Lord Dufferin. We have it on the authority of no less
a man than the first president of the Congress, W. C. Bonnerjee,
that "the Indian National Congress, as it was originally started
and as it has since been carried on, is in reality the work of the
Marquess of Dufferin and Ava when that nobleman was the
Governor-General of India". 1 3 When Hume took his scheme to
the Governor-General, the latter amended it and gave his blessings
to the effort of organizing the Congress but "made it a condition
with Mr. Hurne that his name in connection with the scheme of
the Congress should not be divulged so long as he remained in
the country, and his condition was faithfully maintained and none
but the men consulted by Mr. Hume knew anything about the
matter" 1 4 .

As we shall see i n the following pages the Congress was fond

of taunting the Muslim League that its fou ndation had been in-
1 1 Government of Ind ia's Despatch of 1 89.:!, Cd. 4426 ( 1 908), p . 2 .
1 2 C . H . P h i l i p s , op. cir., p. 141 .
1 3 W. C. Bonnerjee. Indian Politics (London : 1 898), p. vii.
14 Ibid. , p. \ i i i .
T H E F OR M U L AT I O N O F A T T I TU D E S 25

spired by the British. No evidence has yet been produced for this
assertion . The testimony quoted in the previous paragraph, how­
ever, makes it amply evident that the League would have had
greater justification, if it had so chosen, for charging the Congress
with being a "command performance". All evidence points to the
fact that the Congress was founded at British official instigation
and this was surreptitiously done by a Governor-General through
a retired English civilian.
Syed Ahmed Khan asked the Muslims not to join the Cong­
ress. This advice was followed by the vast majority of his people.
He never wavered in his opposition to the Congress and declared
that even if he was told that the Viceroy, the Secretary of State
and the whole House of Commons had openly supported the
Congress, he would still remain firmly opposed to it, and he
earnestly begged all Muslims to remain away from it. "It is my
deliberate belief," he said, "that should the resolutions of the
native Congress be carried into effect, it would be impossible for
the British Government to preserve the peace, or control in any
degree the violence and civil wars which would ensue . " 1 5
Naturally Hume was not pleased by this criticism. The sight of
his creation being strongly opposed \Vas tco much fo r him, and
he lampooned Syed Ahmed Khan a nd his followers in intem­
perate language. He called them "fc ssils", "wanting in under­
standing", men who "in their hearts hate British rule or are sec­
retly in the employ of England's enemies, " 16 and "time server�"
who hoped to be paid for their opposition to the Congress. He
did not believe that the Muslim opposition represented genuine
feeling, and called it artificial and mischievous. But even he ad­
mitted that active Congress propaganda had stirred up religious
rivalries which had, more or less, been dormant for sometime. 1 7
But facts were on the side of the Muslims rather than that of
Hume. A great m aj ori t y of British observers of the contemporary
is Quoted in The Times, 12 November, 1 888.
1 6 It i s revealing, indeed, to see him equating the Congress with British
rule.
1 1 W. Wedderburn, Allan Octavian Hume (London : 1 9 1 3), pp. 7 1 -73.
 26 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

scene attest to the strength of Sir Syed's influence, to the failure

of the Congress to attract Muslims, and to the increasing Hindu­
Muslim rift as a direct result of Congress activities.
William Lilly recorded that all Muslims stood contemptuously
a loof from the Congress. 1s Colonel Ward, a district officer of long
experience, declared that no Muslim of any standing or position
would have a word to say in favour of the Congress. 1 9 Sir George
Chesney went to the extent of asserting that the more sober and
sensible of the educated Indians were a stonished at the fact that
the Government suffered the Congress to go on. 2 °
Contemporary Muslim press in India was full of criticism of
the Congress. Newsp:ip�rs like the Muhammadan Observer, The
Victoria Paper, The Muslim Herald the Rajiq-i-Hind and the
,

Imperial Paper spoke with one voice against the Congress. 2 1 The
A/igarh Muslim Gazute, the venerable and powerful organ o f
Muslim India, was a source of strength t o the Muslims i n this
controversy. Among the Muslim organizations and institutions
which denounced the Congress and a ppealed to the Muslims not
to lend their ear to its bl(l.ndishments were : the Central National
Muhammadan Association, the Muhammadan Literary Society
of Bengal, the Anjuman-i-Islam of Madras, the Dindigal Anjuman,
and the Muhammadan Central Associa tion of the Panjab.
To counteract the efforts of the Congress Syed Ahmed Khan
took four concrete steps. He founded the Indian Patriotic Asso­
ciation, the Muhammadan Educational Conference, the Muham­
madan Defence Association of Upper India, and the Muhamma ­
dan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India.
In the light of these facts it is far from the truth to say that the
Congress represented all India or spoke for the Muslim commu­
nity. A Nationalist Muslim of the standing of Sayyid Tufail
1 8 W. S. Lilly, India and its Problems (London : 1 902), pp. 242-243.
1 9 W. C . E . Ward, "Difficulties of Indian District Officers", Imperial and
Asiatic Quarterly Review, April 1 896, p. 297.
20 G . Chesney, . . India : The Political Outlook", Nineteenth Century,
June 1 894, p. 901 .
2 1 Lal Bahadur, The 1\!11sli111 League (Agra : 1 954), p. 4.
 T H E F O R M U L A T I O N OF A T TI T U D E S 27

Ahmad Manglori has confessed that i n the early years the Muslims
meted out complete non-co-operation to the Congress. 2 2
The partition of Bengal
Perhaps nothing illustrates so well the validity of Syed Ahmed
Khan's reading of the Hindu mind as the agitation against the
partition of Bengal. Lord Curzon found the Bengal Presidency
too large a charge for one Governor and decided to redraw its
boundaries. I n 1 905 the provinces of Bengal and Assam were
reconstituted so as to form two provinces of manageable size :
Bengal, with a population of 54 million, of which 42 million would
be Hindus and 9 million Muslims, and Eastern Bengal and Assam,
with a population of 3 1 million, of which 1 8 million would be
Muslims and 12 million Hindus. The territories to be transferred
from Bengal to the new province consisted of the districts of
Chittagong and Dacca divisions, those of Rajshahi division except
Darjeeling, and the district of Malda. 2 3
This scheme was sent to London b y Curzon in February 1 905.
It was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India, St. John
Brodrick, in June, and the proclam3.tion of the formation of the
new province was issued in September. The province of Eastern
Bengal and Assam officially came into being on 1 6 October, 1 905.
This modification of the boundaries of Bengal was made a n
occasion for unprecedented agitation b y the Hindus-first o f
Bengal and later of other parts of India. Ulterior motives were
imputed to Curzon : he had deliberately tried to divide the Hindus
and the Muslims by drawing the line between Hindu and Muslim
halves of Bengal ; he had fa voured the Muslims by giving them a
new province i n which they were in a clear majority ; he had
"vivisected" the Bengali homeland ; he had struck a deadly blow
at Bengali "nationality" ; he had sought to weaken the "na­
tionalist" and "patriotic" movement of the people of India which
2 2 Tufail Ahmad Manglori, 1\fusalmanon ka Rawshan Mustaqbil (Delh i :
1945), p p . 275-370. H e attributed this to the influence of Theodore Beck, Sir
Theodore Morrison and William Archbold .
2 3 See East India: Reconstruction of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam
(London : 1905), Cd. 6258.
28 THE STRUG G L E FOR PAKI STAN

had i t s strongest centre in Bengal ; h e was the upholder o f the

devilish official policy of d ivide and rule.
Thus ran the indictment against Curzon and his government.
In reply Curzon said : "It is a calumny so preposterous that it
scarcely seems worthy of notice." The whole plan was nothing
more than the readjustment of the administrative boundaries of
a province. He warned that any revocation of the partition would
place a premium upon disloyal a gitation in India in future and
would render the governance of India well nigh impossible. 2 4
It is not difficult to discover the reasons behind the Hindu
agitation. The partition had resulted in the creation of a Muslim­
majority province. This was distasteful to the Hindus. Partition
wa s resented by the high-caste Hindus because they wanted "to
have the state of things which existed before the advent of the
Muslims and of the lower castes for jobs". 2 5
On the other hand, the Muslims welcomed the partition. The
partition was enforced on 1 6 October, 1 905. On 22 October,
a large Musli m meeting at Dacca appreciated the boon conferred
on the people by the change. Two days later another big gathering
offered thanks to God for the partition and declared that under
the new scheme, the Musl ims "would be spared many oppressions
which they had hitherto had to endure from the Hindus". The
Hindu agitation against the part ition was condemned. 2 6 In the
following year many Muslim meetings adopted a memorial to the
Secretary of State for India, expressing gratific ation that he had
declared the partition to be a "settled fact". 2 7 In September 1 908,
the Muslim League, which had been formed in 1 906 to safeguard
the interests of the Muslims, pa ssed a resolution which viewed
the anti-partition agitation with great anxiety and hoped that the
Government would adhere to this "settled fact" which "has
24 H. L. 1 9 1 . 4s, 30 June, 1 908, cols . 5 1 0-5 1 3 .
25 See Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, April , 1 907, pp. 293-294.
2 6 Manchester Guardian, 23 and 27 October. 1 905.
2 7 The Times, 6 November, 1 906.
T H E F O R M U L A T I O N OF A T T l T l: D E S 29

relieved the Muslims of Ea stern Bengal from the disabilities

which they suffered" .28
All contemporary evidence speaks of the popularity of the
partition among the Muslims and their opposition to Hindu
agitation a gainst i t. 29
The most serious result of the Hindu agitation was a steep rise
in Hindu-Muslim riots. The Sll'adeshi movement led to the boy­
cott campaign, and this, in its turn, resulted in communal clashes.
Muslim dealers in foreign cloth refused to shut their business i n
support of the Hindu boycott. When zealous Hindu "volunteers"
fo rced the Muslim shopkeepers to declare a hartal, bloodshed was
unavoidable. 30 This politica l agitation appealed to Hindu "religious
antipathy against the Muslims" . 3 1 Muslim meetings were broken
up, Muslim leaders were insulted, Muslim workers were assault­
ed . 3 2 Muslims \Vho refused to participate in the a gitation were
bitterly persecuted.
The net result of this was that the Hindu agitation definitely
estranged the Muslims from the Congress. 3 3 The important point
about this Hindu movement was that the driving force behind it
was not secular politics but religious revivalism. Jawaharlal Nehru
later admitted that the Swadeshi movement of this time was a
manifestation of a religious nationalism. 3 4
The Simla Deputation
The Indian Councils Act of 1 892 had, as has been mentioDed
above, i ntroduced the principles of representation and election in
India. The coming of another instalment of reforms was now indi­
cated in which the elective principle would be extended . The Hindu
attitude during the anti-partition agitation had convinced the
2 8 Ibid. , 7 September, 1 908.
29 See, among others, Mohamed Ali, Thoughts 011 the Present Dis­
content (Bombay : 1 907) and Sayyid Sirdar Ali Khan, India of Today
(Bombay : 1 908).
30 See Afanchester Guardian, 3 June, 1 907.
3 1 Henry Craik, Impressions of India (London : 1 908), p . 225.
3 2 J. D . Rees, The Real India (London : 1 908), p. 1 8 1 .
3 3 This i s admitted even b y a n Indian historian of the Congress. See
F. M. DeMello, The Indian National Congress: A Historical Sketch (London :
1938), pp. 41-49.
34 See his An Autobiography (London : 1 945), p . 2 3 .
 30 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

Muslims of the futility of expecting a n y justice or fairplay from

the Hindu majority. Therefore, to safeguard their interests, the
Muslim leaders now drew up a plan of separate electorates for
their community and presented it to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, at
Simla on 1 October, 1 906. The Simla Deputation, consisting of
representatives of all shades of Muslim opinion and led by the
Aga Khan, demanded two points of policy. First, in all local and
provincial elections Muslims must be separately represented and
their representatives must be separately elected by purely Muslim
electors. Secondly, Muslims must be given weightage in all elected
bodies, i.e . , they should have more seats than their ratio of
population warranted.
The first demand was made on two ground s : that in the then
existing state of communal tension no Muslim elected through a
joint electorate would genuinely reflect the will of the community,
and that in the absence of separate electorates every contested
election would lead to communal riots. The demand for weightage
was supported by another set of two arguments : that Muslims
still owned much of the landed property in India, and that they
formed a very large proportion of the Indian army. 3 5

The Viceroy, i n his prepared reply to the Deputation's address,

accepted both the demands contained in the memorial. 3 6
The Simla Deputation occupies a very important place in the
history cf modern Muslim India. For the first time the Hindu­
Muslim conflict was lifted to the constitutional plane. The rift in
society was now to be translated into legal and political institu­
tions. The Muslims had made it clear that they had no confidence
in the Hindu majority, that they were not prep:ued to put their
future in the hands of assemblies elected on the assumed basis
of a homogeneous Indian nation. By implication they rejected the
idea of a single Indian nation on the ground that the minority
35 The Simla Deputation address is reproduced in full in B. R . Ambedkar,
Pakistan or The Partition of India (Bombay : 1 945). The Muslim contention
that most of the agricultural land belonged to them is doubtful.
36 For long extracts from M inta's reply see Countess of Minto, llldia:
Minto and Morley, 1 905- 1 9 1 0 (London : 1 934),
pp. 46-47.
THE l' O R M. U L A T I O N O F A T T I T U D E S 31

could not trust the majority. From thi:;, it was but a short step to
demanding a separate state for the Muslims of India. It is in this
sense that in the beginnings of sepat ate electorates may be seen
the glimmerings of the two-nation theory. The significance of the
Simla demand lay in the reservations with which the Muslims
surrounded their Indian nationality. The Hindu allegation that the
Simla deputation was inspired by the British has to be rejected
for two reasons : No positive evidence is available in its support
and what the Muslims demanded was in complete consonance with
their thinking and philosophy.
The founding of the Muslim League
So far three factors had kept the Muslims away from the Congress :
Syed Ahmed Khan's advice to the Muslims to give it a wide
berth, the Hindu agitation against the partition of Bengal, and
Hindu religiou s revivalism and hostility to the Muslims injected
into the Congress by Bal Gangadhar Tilak. But as yet the Muslims
had not formed a political organization of their own. They were
still loyal to Syed Ahmed Khan's ideal of eschewing politics.
But events were fast changing the Indian scene. Politics was being
thrust on all sections of the population. At the same time the
Muslims were being increasingly disillusioned with the Congress.
The Aga Khan tried to persuade Sir Pheroz Shah Mehta that it
was important that the Congress should see the communal real­
ities and make itself more attractive to the Muslims.37 But such
efforts went unrewarded. By 1 906 Muslim leaders were convinced
that they must have their own party which should protect Muslim
interests and speak for the community on all important occasions.
The Simla Deputation strengthened this belief by demonstrating.
the potency of united action.
In pursuance of this resolve the Muslim leaders met in Dacca
in December 1 906. The Nawab of Dacca moved a resolution for
establishing a Muslim organization to be called the All India
Muslim League. Nawab Vaqarul Mulk delivered the presidential
address.3 8 The League adopted as its objects : "(a) To promote
37 The Memoirs ofAga Khan , op. cit., p. 1 05 .
3 8 See The Times, 2 January, 1 907.
32 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I STAN

among the Musalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British

Government and to remove any misconceptions that may arise
as to the intentions of Government with regard to any of its
measures ; (b) To protect and advance the political rights and
i nterests of Musalmans of lndia and respectfully to represen t their
needs and aspirations to Governmen t ; (c) To prevent the rise
among Musalmans of India of any feelings of hostility towards
other communities without prejudice to other objects of the
League . " 39

Many Hindu historians and several British writers have alleged

that the Muslim League was founded at official instigation. They
argue that it was Lord Minto who inspired the establishment of
a Muslim organization so that he could use it to break the Cong­
ress and thus to minimize the strength of the Indian freedom
movement . But these statements are not supported by any evi­
dence, not even of a corroborative nature.
The origin of the Muslim League can be easily explained. Two
factors went i nto its establishment. One was the Hindu attitude
towards Muslim interests ; the Ben gal agitation had confirmed it
beyond doubt. The second was the i ncubation of the Morley­
Minto Reforms. On one side the majority had alienated the
minority. On the other, a representative system of government
was soon to be introduced in India. It was not enough to keep
away from the Congress. It was also i mportant that a separate
body of Muslims should undertake to safeguard their interests.
After Minto's acceptance of the demand for separate representa­
tion it was ordinary common sense to have a political party to
fight the elections. It is unnecessary as well as futile to do violence
to facts and to l ogic by trying to seek fa r-fetched explanations of
a straightforward political development.
Jlfor!ey- Minto Reforms
It was during the latter half of 1 906 that Morley bega n to give
serious attention to the formulation of the next instalment of
constitutional reforms. He was i n touch with the Viceroy, and
39 C . H. Ph ilips, op. cit . , p. 1 94.
T H E FORM U LATI O N OF ATT I T U D E S 33

Minto, on his part, appointed a committee to go into details and

prepare a despatch. This despatch was ready in early I 907 and
was sent to London on I 9 March. It served as the basis of the
reforms which were enacted into law by the Indian Councils Act
of 1 909. 4 °
Under this Act the Provincial Councils were enlarged up to a
maximum of 50 members in the larger provinces and 30 in the
smaller. The method of election was partly indirect and partly
direct. Small non-official majorities were provided in the Provin­
cial Councils but an official majority wa s retained at the Centre.
Besides the Viceroy and his Executive Council, nearly 60 members
were added to the Central Legislative Council. Members could
raise questions relating to administration and policy, but the
Government had the majority in the house. The Secretary of State
for India, Morley, explained the retention of a permanent official
majority by the argument that "in its legislative, as well a s its
executive, character, it should continue to be so constituted as
to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the con­
stitutional obligations that it owes, must always owe, to His
Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament".
The new Councils were not invested with any powers to control
the Government. Interpellation was allowed, but questions could
be disallowed without giving any reason. Resolutions could be
moved, but they had no binding force. In short, as Professor
Coupland noted, the system of government now introduced was
representative but not responsible. But all English statesmen
refused to concede that this development was comparable to what
had happened in England or the colonies. The Councils were still
regarded as durbars rather than as parliaments. Morley told the
House of Lords that "if it could be said that this chapter of
reforms led directly or necessarily to the establishment of a parlia­
mentary system in India, I for one would have nothing at all to
do with it. " 4 1
40 9 Edw. vii, c. 4.
4 1 Morley, Indian Speeches (London : 1 9 1 0), p. 9 1 .
34 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

For the Muslims the most important change brought a bo u t by

the Morley-Minto Reforms was the establishment of separate
electorates. The Simla Deputation demand was met and a system
of separate Muslim representation was introduced. All Hindu and
several British observers o f the Indian scene have suggested that
the creation of communal electorates was a breach of d emocratic
principle. But Morley saw the force of Muslim argument that to
make Muslim seats dependent on Hindu votes would embitter
communal relations and would result in a deeper schism rather
than in the consciousness of a common citizenship. Mere reserva­
tion of seats would have provided no redress because Hindu votes
would not have gone to a Muslim ca ndidate who identified himself
wholeheartedly with the interests of his own community. Another
argument in su pport of the i nnovation was that it was the unani­
mous demand of a large community. Finally, Morley was doing
no violence to his convictions in sanctioning the creation of sepa­
rate electorates. His ideas a bout Indian government had nothing
to do with democrncy.

But Hindu politicians a nd the Congress immediately began a

campaign of criticism and opposition. At the 1 9 1 0 Session the
Congress condemned the provision of separate representation for
Muslims and demanded the removal of such "anomalous restric­
tions between different sections of His Majesty's subjects in the
matter of the franchise . " 4 2 From then on up to the passing of the
1 93 5 Act the Congress made a habit of it to pass a resolution at
its go.therings in condemnation of separate electorates and in
favour of their removal. The only occasion on which, as we will
see later, the Congress agreed to their retention was the Lucknow
Pact of 1 9 1 6 .
The Delhi Durbar

Muslim politics between 1 906 and 1 9 1 1 constitute a period of

content and calm in the history of modern Muslim I ndia. Though
their demands had not been completely met-the Muslim League's
request for the a ppointment of a Muslim member to the Viceroy's
42 D. Cha krabarty a nd C. Bhattacharyya, Congress in Evolution
(Calcutta : 1 93 5), p. 1 1 8.
THE F O R M U L A T I O N O F A T T I T U D E S 35

Executive Council was rejected-on the whole the Muslim com­

munity was satisfied with its constitutional and political status.
They had no cause to be disloyal to Britain. They enjoyed separate
representation in all elected bodies. They had been given more
seats than their population warranted. The partition of Bengal
stood intact.
But this peaceful and placid state of affairs was not destined to
last long.
Since 1 908 the Congress leaders had been spreading the story
that the G overnment w2.s contemplating the repeal of the parti­
tion of Bengal . 4 3 The Government stood firm on its resolve tc
treat the 1 905 decision as a "settled fact", but this did not dis­
courage the Hindu agitators. A virulent campaign a gainst the
partition continued, but with the passing of each year the enthu­
siasm and severity of the campaign decreased , so that in 1 9 10
the agitation had ebbed so low that for the first time the Gov­
ernment was bold enough to issue a notification saying that it
would not prohibit the demonstrations of protests organized for
the partition anniversary. 44 This confidence was well placed, be­
cause the 1 9 1 0 demonstrations were insipid and unimpressive.4 5
But next year all of a sudden the partition of Bengal was annulled.
In June 1 9 1 1 Sir John Jenkins, a member of the Viceroy's Coun­
cil , made a proposal for the reversal of the partition and for the
transfer of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi, and suggested that
these changes should be announced by the King on the occasion
of the forthcoming Coronation Durbar at Delhi. Lord Hardinge
who had succeeded Minto as the Viceroy in 1 9 1 0, at once agreed .
A "very secret" memorandum was drnwn up and rnbmitted to
the Council. It postulated : (a) transfer of the capital from Calcutta
to Delhi ; (b) the creation of United Bengal into a presidency with
a Governor in Council ; (c) the creation of Bihar and Orissa into

a Lieutenant Governorship ; and (d) restoration of the C h i e f

4 3 See The Times, 8 February, 1 909.
4 4 Ibid. , 5 October, 1 9 1 0.
45 Ibid. , 1 8 October, 1 91 0.
 36 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

Commissionership cf Assam . The Council gave its approval, and

in July the Viceroy wrote a letter to the Secretary of State for
India, the Marquess of Crewe, giving full details and urging im­
mediate action. In August Crewe wrote back, giving his sanction
to the scheme. When the King was told of this decision he was
pleased. 46

These decisions were kept strictly secret and were not revealed
to the world till 1 2 December, 1 9 1 1 , when the King announced
them as his "boons" at his Coronation Durbar held at Delhi. 41
Muslim reaction to these decisions was naturally bitter. For
years the Government of India and the Home Government had
been telling the Muslims that the decision regarding the partition
of Bengal was final and would not be re-opened. Such a flagrant
disregard for solemn promises created a feeling of distrust amongst
the Muslims. They lost all faith in British pledges. They were con­
vinced that the Government listened on ly to sedition and clamour,
that constitutional approaches did not pay, that loyalty was re­
warded with treachery. They looked upon the reversal a s nothing
less than an ignominious surrender to an unreasonable agitation.
They felt that they had been sacrificed to appease the Hindus.
The decision encouraged sedition, betrayed the officials who had
identified themselves with the policy of partition and alienated
the Muslims from the Government.48

The Delhi Durbar of 1 9 1 1 heralded a significant shift in Muslim

politics. The Muslim community was thoroughly disillusioned
and came to the decision that it could no longer put its trust in
the British Government or look to it for the protection cf its
legitimate rights and interests. The immediate manifestation was
that at the December 1 9 1 2-January 1 9 1 3 session the Muslim
46 Hardingc: My Indian Years (London : 1 948), pp. 36-40.
4 7 For the text of the announcement see Cd. 5979.
4 8 For the Muslim feel ing sec R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India
(London : 1 929). p. 1 4 7 ; M . F.O'Dwyer, India As l kn.cw It (London : 1 925) .
p. 1 7 5 ; The Times, 5 March, 1 9 1 2 ; J. D. Rees m Fortnightly Review,
February, 1 9 1 2, pp. 3 1 0-3 1 1 ; and Al Carthill, The lost Dominion
(London : 1 924), pp. 225-227.
THE FORMULATION OF ATTITUDES 37

League changed its a i m from loyalty to "a form of self- govern- f

ment suitable to India". 49
The new M uslim attitude now made it possible for the Muslim
League to come closer to the Congress or at least to find some
common ground on which the two organizations could stand to­
gether against the British. This was the beginning. Soon there
arose other circumstances which strengthened the Muslim aversion
to dependence upon the British Government.
The Khilafat Movement
Jt was towards the close of the nineteenth century that Turkey
began to attract the attention of Muslim India and to play a part
in her politics. This was due to two factors. The Muslims of
India, fo r many reasons, had a strong feeling of identity with the
world community of Islam. They had watched with deep anguish
the decline in the political fortunes of Islam during the period
when they themselves had been losing political power. Therefore
r
they listened eagerly to Jamaluddin Afghani's timely reminder
that the Muslims of the world were brothers who should come
together and defend Islam against all t hose who sought to destroy
it. They had helplessly seen the conquest of one Muslim land after
another by European powers. The Anglo:Russian Convention of
1 908 had reduced their next door neighbour Iran 1.o a mere
dependency. Afghanistan had been humiliated several times and
could no longer hope to take advantage of the rivalry between
Russia and Great Britain. Indeed it was now already under the
British sphere of influence. The Ottoman Empire was the only
Muslim power which had maintained a semblance of authority.
The Indian Muslims looked upon it as the bastion of Islam. They
felt that any diminution in its sovereignty or territory would mean
a blow to the independent existence of Islam as a world com­
munity. s o
They had reacted sharply to the establishment of European rule
in the Muslim North Africa. The gallant fight put up by the
49 See Civil and Military Gazette, 3 January, 1 9 1 3 .
so For a fuller discussion see I . H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of
the fltdo-Pakistan Subcontinent, op. cit., p. 266.
38 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

Muslims in Tripoli evoked great sympathy and admiration for

the defenders. Then came the Balkan wars and Turkey was re­
duced in Europe to Ea stern Thrace, Constantinople and the Straits.
The general impression among the Muslims of India was tha t the
Western powers were waging a war a gainst Isla m throughout the
world to rob it of all its power and influence . The Turkish Sultans
had claimed to be the Caliphs of the Muslim world. Their claim
had not been recognized by the Muslims of India so long as the
Mughul Empire had been in existence. Tipu Sultan was the first
Indian Muslim who having been frustrated in his attempts to gain
recognition from the Mughuls had turned to the Sultan of Turkey
to establish a legal right to his throne. Now that the Musli m�
had no sovereign of their own, they had begun to sec the necessity
of recognizing the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph. The Sultan
Abdul Hamid had assiduously propagated the importance of his
status as Caliph mostly to counteract European claims to extra­
territorial authority in the affairs of Christian minorities in the
Ottoman Empire. The Muslims of Cndia who could not openly
proclaim allegiance to a sovereign other than the British monarch,
found in the claim of the Sultan of Turkey an excellent excuse
for identifying themselves with the Turks in being obligated by a
common religious duty to recognize the sovereignty of the
Caliph. Though the Shi'ahs could not in accordance with their
doctrine recognize the Sultan as the Caliph, they, being motivated
by a common desire to save Islamic political power from extinc­
tion, joined hands with other Muslims in a movement to save the
Khilafat.

When Turkey chose to fight on the side of Germany against

the Allied powers, the sympathies of Indian Muslims were with
the Turks. though they could not express their sentiments openly.
The British hoped to neutralize Muslim hostility by promising
to respect the status of the Caliph and the right of the Turks to
their homeland. When the war came to an end, the Muslims of
India organized a movement to put pressure on the British fo
respect their promises.
THE FORMULATION O F ATTITUDES 39

When the Peace Conference met in Europe to negotiate the

peace treaties and to award punishment to the former enemies, it
was discovered that Britain was bent upon wreaking full vengeance
upon Turkey. Already in November 1 9 1 9 the All India Khilafat
Conference (a body recently formed to protect the status of Turkey
and the Khi/afat) had passed a resolution asking the Muslims, as
a religious duty, to abstain from participating in victory celebra­
tions, to boycott British goods, to non-co-op.::rate with the Gov­
ernment, and to send a delegation to Britain to acquaint the British
Government with Muslim feelings.5 1 When the terms of the Treaty
of Sevres were announced in 1 920 it caused deep resentment
among the Muslims. They felt that they had been..,duped and
betrayed. In June ninety influential Muslims wrot� to Lord
Chelmsford, the Viceroy, that they would non-co-operate with
the Government from 1 August, until the terms of the peace
treaty with Turkey were revised.s 2
But no change was visible in the attitude of the Government.
Lord Chelmsford was indifferent to Indian sentiment and Edwin
Montagu . the Secretary of State for India, found himself helpless
in face of Lloyd George's bitterly anti-Turkish policy. It was the
new Viceroy who brought the wind of change. Lord Reading . who
took up the Viceroyalty of India in April 1 92 1 , immediately saw
that the Khilafat movement in India was far from being an arti­
ficial excuse to make trouble for the Government. Even moderate
and "loyal" Muslims told him how deeprooted and genuine was
the feeling on the issue. Reading was quickly convinced o f this
and communicated this conviction to Montagu, but Montagu was
finding it difficult to overcome the indifference of his Cabinet
colleagues and the actual hostility of the Prime Minister. Finally,
in early 1 922 the Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated to such an
extent that Reading was alarmed. On 28 February he sent a tele­
gram to India Office making a formal request for a revision of
the Treaty of Sevres, particularly on three points : the evacuation
of Constantinople, suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places.
't Civil and Military Gazette, 25 November, 1 9 1 9.
s2 Ibid., 25 June, 1920.
 40 T H E S T R U G G L E FO R P A K I S T A N

and restoration of Ottoman Thrace and Smyrna. He u rged these

changes on two grounds : that the Indian Muslim interest in the
future of Turkey was so great as to rule out the possibility of a
peaceful India in the absence of a radical change i n the terms of
the Treaty ; and that Indian Muslim troops had rendered signal
service during the war and this should not go unrecognized. He
used the adjectives "just" and "equitable" for these Muslim aspi­
rations. 5 3 Reading also sought permission to publish this despatch
in India so that the agitated Muslims could know of tbe official
efforts being made by the Government of India on their behalf.
He informed Montagu that Governors and Ministers of every
province i � India agreed with his views.54
Montagu's efforts in assuaging Muslim feelings are on record .
He had continuously been remonstrating with Lloyd George and
C urzon on this point. He had been in favour of negotiating a mild
treaty with Turkey. But his pleadings had no effect and the Treaty
of Sevres had been the result. When Montagu received Reading's
telegram he at once sanctioned the publication of it without con­
sulting the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. This action, said Lloyd
George, was opposed to the doctrine of collective responsibility
of the Cabinet, and he asked for the resignation of the Secretary
of State for I ndia. It was i n these conditions tha t Montagu had
to leave the India Office.
In Indi a the virtual dismissal of a friendly Secretary of State
was greatly resented. The Muslims regarded the resignation a s a
blow to their campaign, and twenty Muslim members of the Indian
Legislative Assembly sent a protest against this high handedness
and expressed their conviction that Montagu had been sacrificed
because of his sympathy for the cause of the Khilafat.55 Many
Indian newspapers belonging to different political parties wrote
strong leaders condemning Lloyd George and buding Montagu.
Lloyd George was an i mplacable enemy of Turkey a nd, by
implication, of the Indian Khilafat movement. When, in 1 920, an
5 3 See The Times, 9 March, 1 922.
5 4 Read i n g , Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading (London : 1 945).
vol. I I , p. 226.
55 Cii'i/ and 1Wili1ary Gazette. 1 2 March, 1 922.
THE FORMULATION OF ATTITUDES 41

Indian Khilafat Deputation56 visited England to put their views

before the British Government he gave them a cold reception. On
the Deputation's demand for justice for Turkey, he told the mem­
bers that Turkey would get full justice. "Austria has had justice,
Germany has had justice-pretty terrible justice, why should
Turkey escape ?"5 7
Montagu's successor in the India Office was Lord Peel. Reading
did not stop pressing his views on His Majesty's Government and
Peel was regularly posted about the Indian agitation and the rising
temper of the Khilafat movement . Peel was not anti-Turkish l ike
Lloyd George and lent an ear to these despatches. Towards the
end of 1 922 the Coalition government of Lloyd George fell and
Baldwin became Prime Minister. This was a wholly satisfactory
development for the Muslims and also for the Viceroy. With
Baldwin at 10, Downing Street and Peel at the India Office, Reading
found a Home Government which had no anti-Turkish prejudices
like its predecessor.
At the same time the Turks, under the inspiring leadership of
Mustafa Kemal, were consolidating their position in Turkey and
driving the Greeks out of those parts of their territories which
had been occupied at Lloyd George's i nstigation. So successful was
this riposte that by the beginning cf 1 923 the British Government
realized that events had outdated the Treaty 0f Sevres. Lloyd
George had gone and the way now lay open for a new treaty,
which wa s signed at Lausanne in July 1 923. By its terms Turkey
retained Eastern Thrace (including Adrianople), demilitarised
zones were established on both sides of the Dardanelles and on
both sides of the Bosphorus, and na vigation of the Straits was
opened to the ships of commerce of all nations in time of peace
and of neutrals in time of war involving Turkey and to warships
of all nations in time of peace or Turkish neutrality. s s
5 6 It consisted of Mohamed Ali, Sayyid Mahmud, Sulaiman Nadvi and
H. M. Hayat.
5 7 Th e Times, 22 March, 1920.
58 For fuller details see R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy
(London: 1 922), pp. 298-308.
42 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

This brought some satisfaction t o the Muslims, though i t was

short lived. In the following year the Turkish Government decreed
the abolition of the Khilafat as an institution. This was a great
blow to the Indian Khilafatists who had been campaigning on
behalf of Turkey and the Khilafat and had made considerabl e
sacrifices . Gradually the enthusiasm of the pecple d ied down and
the Khilafat Conferences and Committees developed new interests
and in a short time nothing but their name remained to remind
the people of their origin and raison d'etre.
Though the Khilafat Movement achieved no ostensible success,
yet it was of considerable value as an instrument of creating poli­
tical consciousness in the Muslim masses. It produced a broad
based leadership and taught the techniques of organizing a mass
movement to the Muslims. These proved great assets i n the
struggle for Pakistan.
Many Hindu leaders resented the entry of the Muslim masses
into Congress politics and started the Hindu movements o f
Sangathan and Shuddhi. The former aimed a t organizing the
Hindus against the Muslims and the latter used social pressure
upon poor and ignorant Muslims to get converted to Hinduism.
The failure of Hindu Congress leaders to condemn these activi­
ties disillusioned the Muslims. 5 9
The result was that the Muslims emerged from the movement
with a feeling that they could neither trust the British nor the
Hindus and that they should look to their own strength for self
preservation.

� 9 For a fuller discussion of these movements and their impact on the

Muslims see I . H. Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Inda-Pakistan
Subcontinent, op. cit., pp. 280-284.
 C HAPT E R 3

Towards Responsible
<Jovernll1ent : 1 9 1 4- 1 93 5

India and the First World War

The impact of World War I created a minor revolution in India's
political and constitutional position. We have already seen how
the Muslims reacted to the War in so far as the Khilafat and
Turkish issues were concerned. It also gave considerable impetus
to the movement of political emancipation in India.
The most important factor was that India remained loyal to the
British Government. No large scale effort was made (unlike the
Congress revolt during World War II) to embarrass Britain in
her hour of travail or to exploit her weakness in order to gain
political concessions. Thousands of Indians volunteered to fight
for Britain. Legislative Councils readily voted all emergency
powers to the executive as well as full financial backing to War
expenditure. All parties supported the Government. Even those
who later organized the Khilafat movement were, until the last
stages of the War, quiescent and did not actually wage an anti­
war campaign. There were, it is true, a few anti-British conspira­
cies, but they did not gather much public support.
44 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

Another new development which stood out significantly was

that the Congress and the Muslim League drew closer. Two factors
made this possible. The repeal of the partition of Bengal had
made the Muslims resentful and bitter against the British. The
British animosity towards Turkey had aggravated this feeling.
This should not be taken to mean that the basic Hindu-Muslim
animosity had been overcome completely or that the causes be­
hind that animosity had disappeared. Under the i mmediate stress
of anti-British emotions, however, the basic differences had been
momentarily forgotten and it seemed that political exigency had
overcome d eep-rooted instincts and suspicions.

Therefore, there developed a desire to arrive at some under­

standing with the Hindus. Thus it came about that during the
years 1 9 1 3- 1 924 the observers of the Indian political scene wit­
nessed the astonishing spectacle of Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi
was quick to see that such an opportunity of bringing the Muslims
close to the Congress would not recur. He threw his influence
and prestige on the side of the Khilafat movement and carried
most of the Congressmen with him. The Muslims, on their part
welcomed this unexpected help, for it reinforced their movement
and brightened the chances of its ultimate success.

The War played yet another part in the evolution cf modern

political India. British politicians were repeatedly assuring the
world at large including India that Britain was fighting the War
to further the cause of freedom and self-determination. This might
or might not have been merely an important weapon in the
armoury of British war publicity. But the Indian intelligentsia
took it to be a solemn promise, and several Indian leaders remind­
ed the British Government that Indian support of \Var effort ,

though voluntary and unconstrained, was based o n the hope that

after the War India would be given another, and a vastly more
radical, instalment of reforms. This, they pointed out, was impli­
cit in British statements of policy as well as in Indian willingness
to fight the British battle.
T O W A R D S RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 45

As has already been mentioned, one section of Indian political

opinion had gone further and had seen no objection in taking
advantage of British preoccupation with the war. Several revolu­
tionary societies were formed, some possibly under the instiga­
tion of Germany, which believed and propagated that war present­
ed a splendid chance of liberation from British rule. Plans for an
organized rebellion were formed in 1 9 1 5 with the co-operation
of Afghanistan, Turkey and Russia. Disorders broke out at several
places in India. Secret societies intensified their programmes of
political dacoities and murder;;. The Sikhs and the Pathans were
inspired t o stage open revolts. In the end all these efforts proved
abortive. But they carried an important message to the British
and Indian Governments. Repression could be, and was, employed
in suppressing these revolutionary movements, but repression
alone was not enough. The forces of nationalism must be met
at least half way if the whole of India was not to be pushed into
the arms of insurrectionary bodies.
Thus British policy in India during the war was founded on two
principles : first, a determination to suppress and liquidate all revo­
lutionary and violent movements ; second, to grant a measure of
constitutional reform with a promise to lead India to the status
of a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth.
The Lucknow Pact
Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, began to think out a scheme of
post-war reforms, and to this purpose, invited practical sugges­
tions from Indian politicians. There was, then and a little later
when he and Montagu toured India, a spate of memoranda,
schemes and plans. But two of these carried real political weight
and must be taken notice of.
In October 1 9 1 6, nineteen elected members of the Imperial
Legislative Council addressed a memorandum to the Viceroy on
the subject of reforms. Their suggestions may be summarized as
follows : ( 1) Half the members of the Imperial and Provincial
Executive Councils should be popularly elected Indians ; (2) All
Legislative Councils should have substantial elected majorities ;
46 THE S TRU G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

(3) All Legislative Councils should enjoy fiscal autonomy and the
right of voting supplies ; (4) The Council of the Secretary of State
for India should be abolished ; (5) All provinces should have full
a utonomy ; (6) In any scheme of imperial Federation India should
be given a position similar to that of self-governing Domin ions :
and (7) All Indians should have the right to carry :.: rms, to en list
i n territorial units and to win commissions in the Army on cond i­
tions similar to those prescribed fo r Europeans.1
The memorandum did not make news when it was published ,
nor did it influence the mind of the Vicerny or of the Secretary
of State for India. But in I ndian politic:i! circles it was accorded
considerable importance. It was discussed, amended and accepted
at subsequent meetings of the Congress and the Muslim League.
Finally in December 1 9 1 6 the Co ngre ss a nd the League held a
joint session at Lucknow in which Hindu-Muslim unity was
passionately prc:i.ched from the platform and a scheme of reforms
was unanimously adopted as the irreducible minimum which
would satisfy India. The Congress-League scheme, a s it came to
be called, was the result of important concessions by both sides.
The Muslims won a unique victNy when the Congress, of its own
I free will and without any reservarions, accepted separate electo­
rates and made them the pivot of the scheme. Not only did the
Congress accept separate Musli. m representation where it had
already existed but also agreed to its introduction in the Panjab
and the Central Provinces where it had not existed hitherto . An­
other feature of the a greement was that the Muslims and the
Hindus were to have weightage i n provinces where they formed
minorities. The Muslims a greed to forego <>. quarter of the seats
to which they would have been entitled o n the basis of their p o p u ­
lation in Bengal . In the Panjab they were to surrender one-tenth
of their seats. In return they were given 30 per cent seats in the
United Provinces though they co mtituted only 14 per cent of the
population. In Madras, where they formed but 6. 1 5 per cent of
I Full text in East !rzdia ! Constit:aionaf Reforms): Addresses presented
in India to His Excelfcnc.v the Viceroy ml(f rize Rt. Hon. the Secrerary of State
for India, 19 1 8, Cd. 9 1 7�. pp. 9 5 -9 7 .
T O W A R D S R E S P ON S I B LE G O V E R N M E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 47

the population they got 1 5 per cent seats. At the Centre one-third
seats were allotted to the Muslims. The Muslims were to lose the
double advantage, that they were enjoying since 1 909, of also
voting in general electorates. No bill or resolution affecting a
community was t o be proceeded with in any Council if three­
fourths of the representatives of that community were opposed
to it.
The Muslims agreed to support the constitutional structure em­
bodied in the Congress-League scheme. This structure was based
on the following principles : (1) Provinces should be given the
maximum administrative and financial autonomy ; (2) Only one­
fifth of the provincial and central legislative councils should be
nominated ; the rest should be popularly elected ; (3) Not less than
half of the members of the central a nd provincial governments
should be elected by the elected members of their respective legis­
lative councils ; (4) Central and provincial governments would be
bound by the resolutions passed by their respective legislative
councils unless they were vetoed by the Governor-General or the
Governors-in-Council ; in the event of such a veto if the resolu­
tions were again passed after an interval of not less than one year,
they would be put into effect notwithstanding the veto ; (5) The
Central legislative council would have "no power to interfere with
the Government of India's direction of the milit2.ry a ffa irs and
the foreign and political relations of India, including the declara­
tion of war, the making of peace and the entering into treaties" :
(6) The relations of the Secretary of State with the Government
of India should be similar to those of the Secretary of State for
Colonies with the Governments of the Dominions, and India
should have an equal status with that of the Dominions in a ny
body concerned with imperial affairs.2
The scheme was by no means perfect. In the first place, it d id
not solve the fundamental and difficult problem of representative
government in a heterogeneous population. It gave the elected
2 Full text in Report of the 31st Indian National Congress ( 1 9 1 6), pp.
77 ff.
48 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

majorities much greater power t o obstruct their governments with­

out being in a position to replace those governments and take
over the responsibilities of administration. Thus an irremovable
executive was tagged on to a powerless legislature. The net result
would have been a stalemate in which real power would be exer­
cised by civil servants who were under the ultimate control of the
British parliament. The scheme, in this sense, could not be said
to envisage a fully representative or parliamentary system of gov­
ernment. This defect was probably due to the fact that the Cong­
ress and the League could not expect at that stage that the British
would concede full responsibility to the legislatures. The second
point worth mentioning is that the Muslims gained certain advan­
tages under the terms of the Lucknow Pact at the cost of their
majorities in Bengal and the Panjab. As subsequent events
showed, weightage in the minority provinces was not of much use
to them, whereas the loss of majorities in two major provinces
resulted in serious handicaps. Its full effect was felt after the
elections of 1 937 and 1 945, when the Muslim League encountered
grave difficulties in forming ministries in the Panjab and Bengal.
But these implications were forgotten in the new zeal of form­
ing a united front against the British Government and of pre­
senting a joint statement of demands.
The Montagu Declaration
In the meantime, Lord Chelmsford had sent a dispatch to Austen
Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, suggesting means
of conferring some concessions upon the representatives of the
Indian people. India Office wa s yet evolving its scheme when
Chamberlain left the Cabinet on the Mesopotamian issue and his
Under Secretary, Edwin Montagu, succeeded him. He gave close
attention to the Viceroy's dispatch and finally persuaded the War
Cabinet and Lloyd George to agree to make a definite and favour­
able statement in regard to Government's intentions of introduc­
ing a measure of constitutional reform in India .
There was considerable difference of opinion in the Cabinet on
the point of promising "self-government" to India, for this phrase
TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERN M E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 49

implied the creation of a parliamentary system based on the

British pattern. Lord Curzon took the matter in his hands and
played a prominent part in drafting the final announcement which
spoke of "responsible government" rather than of "self-govern­
ment". Curzon thought the former phrase was safer and less
committal.
It was thus on 20 August, 1 9 1 7, that Montagu, with the full
authority of the Cabinet, made the celebrated announcement of
British policy in India in reply to a question in the House of
Commons. The relevant passages read as follows : "The policy
of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of
India are in full accord, is that of the increasing association of
Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual
development of self-governing institutions with a view to the
progressive realization of responsible government in India as an
integral part oft he British Empire . . . . . I would add that progress
in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The
British Government and the Government of India, on whom the
responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian
peoples, must be judges of the time and measure of each advance,
and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those
upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred
and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be
reposed on their sense of responsibility. " -'
In spite of Curzon's deliberate choice of words the announce­
ment meant exactly what he did not want it to mean. "Respon­
sible government" implies "self-government" because it stand s
for parliamentary or cabinet government in which the govern­
ment is responsible to the elected representatives of the people.
Later when Curzon discovered the futility of his diction he
was, his biographer tells us, greatly perturbed. 4 But against the
historical and constitutional background of Britain and the
colonies "responsible government " could only mean a government
responsible to the people.
3 H. C. 5s. 97, 20 August, 1 9 1 7, col. 1 695.
4 See Lord Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon (London : 1 928), vol. II, Chap. X.
 50 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A '-1

JW ontagu-Chefm,�(ord Reforms
..

In pursuance of the policy laid down in the announcement

Montagu toured India in the winter of 1 9 1 7- 1 8 in company with
Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy. They interviewed political leaders
of all opinions, visited all provinces and discussed matters with
official advisers. In the summer of 1 9 1 8 appeared the results of
this tour and exchange of views in the shape of the Montagu­
Chelmsford Report.

The Report was, to use Coupland's words, a declaration of

belief in the philosophy of liberalism 5-that is, in the Indian
context. It frankly admitted the backwardness of the Indian
people, but it refused to wait till they were fit for freedom. By
this argument indirect election to provincial councils gave place
to direct election on as wide a franchise as would be practicable.
But the Hindu-Muslim antagonism was "the difficulty that out­
weighs all others". The Lucknow Pact was a "testimony to the
growing force of national feeling", but "to our minds so long as
the two communities entertain anything like their present views
as to the separateness of their interests, we are bound to regard
religious hostilities as still a very serious possibility. The Hindus
and Muhammadans of India have certainly not yet achieved unity
of purpose or community of interest. " 6 The Report d isapprovea
of separate electorates in principle, but retained them i n practice.
The Muslims regarded them as "their only adequate safeguards"
and they must be maintained . Separate representation was extend­
ed to the Sikhs, but refused to other minorities. 7
Coming tc t he Report's recommendations on the future con­
stitutional structure, it firmly rejected the Congress-League
scheme. 8 The outstanding new device applied to India was dy­
archy. Certain subjects in each province were to be "tran sferred"
to the control of Ministers chosen from and responsible to the
5 R. Coupland, The Indian Problem, 1833-1935 (London : 1 942), p. 54.
6 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, Sections 1 5 1 - 1 54.
1 Ibid. , Sections 227-232.
s Ibid., Sections 1 67-177.
 T O W A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G O V E R N �! E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 93 5 51

majority in the legislative council. In this sphere the Governor

was normally to act on the advice of the ministers. The other sub­
jects were to be "reserved" to remain under the control of the
Governor and his Executive Council, whose members would be
officials responsible, not to the provincial legislative council, but
to the Secretary of State. The Governor was empowered to enact
any bill, including a money bill, over the head of the legislative
council if he "certified" that it wa s essential . 9
A t the Centre, the central legislative council (which i n 1 9 1 8
was a small body o f 67, o f whom 3 5 were officials a nd 5 nominated
non-officials) was to be replaced by a bicameral legislature : the
Council of State a nd the Indian Legislative Assembly. In both a
great majority of members would be elected .
Finally, at the end of ten years a commission should be appoint­
ed to examine the working of the system and to advise as to
whether the time had come for complete responsible government
in any province or provinces or whether some subjects now
"reserved" should be "transferred". 1 o
These recommendations were incorporated in a Bill which,
after full consideration by a joint committee and d iscussion in
parliament, was passed as the Government of India Act of 1 9 1 9 .
The Act faithfully echoed the Report. Provincial legislatures
were enlarged and in no case was the elected element to be less
than 70 per cent. Franchise was extended mainly by lowering the
property qualification . Communal representation was (despite the
Report's recommendation to the contrary) extended to all minori­
ties. Devolution of authority from the Centre to the provinces
was for the first time made definite, precise and obligatory. In
the provinces, law and order and land revenue were "reserved"
subjects, while others, including education, agriculture, public
health and local govern ment, were "transferred" to ministers. The
Report's recommendation that the upper chamber of the central
legislature should be mainly nominated was rejected, and the
9 Ibid. , Sections 218-22 1 .
1 0 Ibid. , Section 261 .
52 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

Council of State was made partly electiYe and partly nominated.

Both houses were to be directly elected. The Governor-General's
Executive Council was to continue to be responsible only to the
Secretary of State for India. The Governor-General could "certi­
fy" and thus enact any law over the head of the legislature.
Tlze working of the 1919 Reforms: 1920-1927
In the elections held in 1 920 under the new Act, the Congress took
no part. It had attacked the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in 1 9 1 8
and the Act in 1 9 1 9 . But the National Liberals, who had come
into existence in 1 9 1 8 as the result of a split in the Congress over
the Report, participated and took office as ministers in most of
the provinces. In 1 923. hO\vever, the Congress decided to contest
the next elections, not with a view to working the Constitution
but to destroying it from within. This ws s done under the party
label of Swarajists.
Hindu-Muslim entente, forced during the hectic Khilafot days,
was now gradually falling to pieces. It was on the Khilafat issue
that in 1 920 the first civil disobedience mo\'ement had been start­
ed. For many months Hindus and Muslims worked side by side.
Communal fraternity was preached as well as practised. But a
grave blow at this unity was struck in the summer of 1921 when
the Moplahs of Malabar, a Muslim community of mixed Arab­
Nair descent, rose against the Government as well as their Hindu
landlords. Military action and a prolonged spell of martial law
succeeded in suppressing them. There was such bitter propaganda
in the Hindu press that the honeymoon period of Hindu-Muslim
relations came to an end. Savage punishment was meted out to
the Moplahs at which the Hindu press and leadership expressed
such satisfaction that the Muslims felt hurt . This rift emboldened
the go\'ernment to crush and try the Ali B rothers. The turn of
Hindu leaders also came and the mass mcvement against the
British fizzled out . This brought to a close the chapter of Hindu­
Muslim rapprochemrnt in the history of the subcontinent.
The 1 9 1 9 Constitution was also responsible for widening the gulf .
between the Hindus and the Muslims. Indi an Ministers were now
T O W A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G O V E R N :\1 E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 53

responsible to Indian polit icians. They enjoyed executive power.

Their policies accentuated communal differences.
The Muslims had reacted favourably to the Montagu-Chelms­
ford Report and the 1 9 1 9 Act. They were not completely satisfied,
but they did not reject the Constitution as the Congress did. But
in 1 9 1 9 the Muslim League went radical. It identified itself with
the Congress and did not meet as a separate body between 1 9 1 9
and 1 924. 1 1 When a t last i t did meet in 1 924, under Jinnah'spresi­
dentship, it insisted on an immediate and far-reaching constitu­
tional advance. Its resolution on Swaraj contained six "principles".
The first four dealt with minority safeguards and separate elec­
torates. But the last two introduced two new demands : India must
be a federal polity and any territoria l redistribution shall in no
way affect the Muslim majorities in the Panjab, Bengal and t he
North-West Frontier Province.
Prospects of parliamentary government were, thus, influencing
Muslim policy. The Muslim League foresaw that, even in a federal
India, the Centre was bound to be Hindu-dominated. Therefore
it demanded full provincial autonomy. It also wanted assurance
that its control over t he Muslim-majority provinces would not be
loosened through whittling down the Muslim majorities of the
Panjab, Bengal and the N.W.F.P. This fear of Hindu domination
was ultimately to lead to the idea of Pakistan.
As time passed communal disturbances increased in frequency
and scale. 1 2 The Hindus started the Shuddhi movement aimed at
reconverting those Hindus who had gone over to I slam. They
also set on foot the sangathan programme which wanted all
Hindus to learn drill and the use of arms. The Muslims replied
with the tabligh and tanzim movements. The struggle for power
had begun. 1 3
1 1 Indian Quarterly Regist<'r, vol . I, No. 2 .
1 2 A detailed l i s t is given i n Indian Statutory Commission, vol . I V , part I ,
pp. 1 08-120.
1 3 For details vide I . H . Qureshi, The Muslim Community (of the lndo­
Pakistan Subcontinent, op . cit., pp. 279-282.
54 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K ISTAN

Nehru Report
Towards the end of 1 927 the British Government, in pursuance
of the Government of India Act of 1 9 1 9, appointed a statutory
Commission to inquire into the working and future of the Indian
Constitution. It consisted of members of Parliament and no Indian
was represented on it. In a speech in the House of Lords, Lord
Birkenhead, the Secretary cf State for India, had explained the
all-white composition of the Commission by the argument that
no body on which Indians were represented could present a unani­
mous report. This stung the Congress leaders. The All-Parties
Conference, which had been convened by the Congress to protest
against the composition and terms of reference of the Statutory
Commission , was now asked by the Congress leaders to prepare
a Constitution for India to confound Birkenhead and the British
Government. The Conference appointed a committee, with Motilal
Nehru as Chairman, 1 4 to fulfil this task. The report of this Com­
mittee is generally known as the Nehru Report and contains what
the Congress would have prescribed and enforced had it been in
power.
Here we are concerned only with the Nehru Report's treatment
of the Muslim problem. It was treated as a purely religious and
cultural matter. "If the fullest religious liberty is given, and cul­
tural autonomy provided fo r, the communal problem is in effect
solved, although people may not realize it." With this assumption
before it the Report proceeded to lay down three proposals. A
Declaration of Rights should be inserted in the Constitution,
assuring the fullest liberty of conscience and religion. The
N.W.F.P. should be given full provincial status and Sind should
be taken away from Bombay and made a separate province ; as
a set-off io this a new Hindu Canarese-speaking province in

southern India should be created. Separate electorates should be

immediately abolished . No scats should be reserved for Muslims
1 4 Members : M . S. Aney, M. R. hyakar, G . R . Pradhan, Tej Bahadur
Sapru, M. N . Joshi, Mangal Singh, Ali Imam and Shoaib Qureshi.
TO W A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G O V E R N M EN T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 55

except at the Centre and in the provinces where they were in a

minority. No weightage should be allowed. is
Now the Muslims knew where they stood in Congress schemes.
Separate electorates had been given to them i_n 1 909 a nd no
British Government had even contemplated a withdrawal of this
concession. In 1 9 1 6 when the Congress wanted the Muslim
League's support it had cheerfully approYcd of them and inserted
their provision in the Congress-League scheme. But now the
Congress showed its true hand . Separate representation was to
go, and so was weightage.
Further, the Report clearly rejected federation as a possible
solution of the communal problem. The Nehru Constitution was
firmly based on the principle of a unitary government. The Muslim
League's resolution of 1 924 was not even mentioned in the Report .
A Muslim member of the Nehru Committee, Shoaib Qureshi,
disagreed with the proposals, but his pleadings were summarily
rejected. The immediate result of the publication of the Report
was that Muslims of all shades of opinion united in opposition
to it. The two wings into which the Muslim League had been split
since 1 924 came closer. In 1 929 nearly every shade of opinion in
Muslim politics was represented in the All India Muslim Con­
ference which met at Delhi under the Aga Khan and laid down
the demands of Muslim India in the clearest possible terms :
( 1 ) The only form of government suitable to Indian conditions
was a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary
powers vested in the provinces;
(2) Separate electorates were to continue ;
(3) Existing weightage for the Muslims in the Hindu-majority
. provinces was to continue ;
(4) Muslims should be given "their due share" in the central
and provincial cabinets ;
is All-Parties Conference, Report of the Commillee appointed by the Con­
ference to determine the Principles of the Constitution for India (Allahabad :
1 928).
56 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

(5) A due proportion of seats should b e given to Muslims i n the

public services and on all statutory self-governing bodies ;
(6) There must be safeguards for "the protection and promotion
of Muslim education, language, religion. personal laws, and
Muslim charitable ii1stitutions"' ;
(7) "No Constitution, by whomsoever proposed or devised, will
be acceptable to Indian Musalma ns unless it conforms with
the principles embodied in this resolution. " 1 6
This resolution was the Muslim reply to the Nehru Report. The
rejection of the Congress-inspired Constitution was complete,
unanimous and clear. On two points the Mus1ims were adamant.
Separate ekctorates must continue and I ndia must have a federal
form of govern ment. This postulated the irreducible conditions
under which they could liw i n India. The Nehru Report was
primarily repudiated because it denied these conditions.
It should be mentioned at this stage that Jinnah tried to persuade
the All Parties Convention which was meeting at Calcutta in 1 929
to accept some of the Muslim demands. He, along with Tasadduq
Ahmad Khan Sherwani, a nationalist Muslim, suggested it to the
Committee appointed by the Convention to negotiate with the
Muslims that the following modifications be made in the recom­
mendations of the Nehru Report :
"( l ) One-third of the elected representatives of both the houses
of the central legislature should be Mussalmans ;
(2) I n the Panjab and Bengal, in the event of adult suffrage not
being established, there should be reservation of seats for the
Mussalmans on the population basis for ten years subject to a
re-examination after that period, but they shall have no right to
contest add itional seats ;
(3) Residuary powers should be left to the provinces and should
not rest with the central legislature. " '
16 F ull t e x t o f the resol u t ion i n Report oj the Indian Statutory Commis­
sion, vol. II, pp. 84-85.
TOW A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G OV E R N M EN T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 57

The Committee rejected these suggestions. J innah then moved

them one by one in the open session of the Convention and in
spite of his arguments and appeals they wereJhrown out. 1 7
This was in January, 1 929. In March h e drew u p his famous
fourteen points which were endorsed by the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind
in its next session and greatly influenced Muslim thinking for the
better part of the next decade. i s
The Simon Report
The Statutory Commission, commonly referred to as the Simon
Commission after its Chairman, Sir John Simon, consisted of
Lord Burnham, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, Edward
Cadogan, Stephen Walsh, Richard Lane-Fox and C. R. Attlee.
Later Walsh resigned and was replaced by Vernon Hartshorn .
The Commission visited India i n February-Ma rch 1 928 and again
in October 1928-April 1929.
Indian reaction to the appointment of the Commission was
mixed. The Indian Legislative Assembly resolved to boycott it,
while the Council of State decided to extend co-opera ti on. 1 9 The
Congress was in favour of unqualified boycott of the Commission .
But the N ational Liberal Federation, the Scheduled Caste Federa­
tion, the Indian Christians, the Parsees and other small minorities
decided to work with it. The Muslim League was of two minds.
One wing, led by Jinnah, sided with the Congress and left the
Commission alone, while the other wing, led by Sir Muhammad
Shafi, opted for co-operation. One of the Commissioners, Sir
Edward Cadogan, later recorded that Muslims and Untouchables
co-operated out of an intense suspicion of the Brahmie ; Muslims,
in particular, were ready to co-operate in any thing provided they
received assurance of security from Hindu domination. 2 0
17 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims (Bombay : 1 959), pp. 2 1 3-21 5 .
18 Ibid., p p . 2 1 7-220; also Mohammad Naum1n, Muslim India (Allah­
abad : 1 942), p p. 283-287. For the text of the Fourteen Points, vide
infra, Appendix A.

1 9 Resolutions of 18 and 23 February, 1928 respectively.

2 0 E. C. G. Cadogan, The India We Saw (London : 1 933), pp. 23, 55.
 58 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A KI S T A N

The Simon Report was published in May 1 930. The first volume
surveyed the \Vhole Indian problem, the second presented the
Commission's recommendations and proposals. 2 1
The Report rejected the unitary system fo r India and was of
the opimon that the future framework must be federal. Therefore
the advance of the 1 9 1 9 Constitution must be a continuance of
the process of devolution from the centre to the provinces. Dy­
archy should be scrapped and the whole of the provincial go\ -
ernment should be in the hands of ministers responsible to popu­
larly elected legislatures . Thus every province would have full
responsible government. But provincial ca bin et would not be
formed entirely on the British model as the Governors would
choose the ministers who commanded a majority in the assemblies
s nd not merely appoint a Prime Minister who \Vould then name
the cabinet. The Prime Minister would be free from all control
by the Governor or the Central Government , except in some
stated matters like the safety of the province or the protection
of minorities. As the ministers were to exercise greater authority,
franchise was to be extended and provincial assemblies enlarged .
The N.W.F.P. should be given a legislative council but no
measure of responsible government. The question of separating
Sind ws s to be further examined .
At the centre, the Federal Assembly should be elected by the
provin cial councils. The election and nomination of the Council
of State should also be on a provincial ba sis, each province to
have three members in the Council.
No substantial change \Vas recommended for the central
executive. The government would be fully official, without res­
ponsibility, without even dyarchy. This was explained by the
need of a strong and stable government "while the provincial
councils were learning by experience to bear the full weight of
new and heavy responsibilities".
A Council of Greater India, representing both British India
and the States, would be set up. to discuss, in a consultative cap-
21 Cmd. 3658 and Cmd. 3659.
T O W A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G OV E R N �i E N T : 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 3 5 59

acity, all matters of common concern to all India. A list of such

matters would be drawn up and scheduled.
Finally, the procedure of periodical inquiries would be given
up. The new constitution would be so framed that it could develop
by itself.
Indian political parties reacted to the Report in different ways.
At its Lucknow session of December 1 929 the Congress had auth­
orised its Working Committee to start a "civil d isobedience"
movement as and when it deemed proper. In April 1 930 this
campaign was launched under Gandhi's command after the
Report's publication in March. Demonstrations and violence
accompanied the movement. The Working Committee was dec­
lared unlawful and Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were arrested .
The Muslims denounced Gandhi's campaign in no uncertain
terms and at a meeting of the All India Muslim Conference at
Bombay in April 1 930, Mohamed Ali bluntly said that while
Muslims were opposed to British domination they were equally
opposed to Hindu domination. "We refuse to join Mr. Gandhi, \
because his movement is not a movement fo r the complete in­
dependence of India but for making the seventy millions of Indian
Musalmans dependents of the Hindu Mahasabha. "22
On the Simon Report specifically the Muslims reserved their
j udgement, knowing that the Report's recommendations were not
final and that the matters would be finally decided at the Round
Table Conference. They stuck t o their charter of demands em­
bodied in the Muslim Conference resolution of January 1 929.

Round Table Conference : I st Session

The first session of the Conference opened i n London on 1 2 Nov­
ember 1 930. All the parties were represented except the Congress
which had given the ultimatum that unless the Nehru Report was
enforced in its entirety as the constitution of India it would have
nothing to do with further constitutional discussions.
The outstanding decision taken was the approval of a federal
system of government for India. The Maharaja of Bikaner sprang
a welcome surprise by declaring that the Princes would whole-
2 2 The Times of India, 24 April, 1930.
60 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K ISTAN

heartedly associate themselves with British India t o fo rm a n all­

India federation. The Princes could not be coerced, but they would
come in of their own free will provided their rights were gua­
ranteed. 23
There was a general unanimity on other points too. Muhammad
Shafi and Jinnah, for the Muslim League, supported Sapru in the
demands fo r Dominion Status and responsible government at
the Centre. All the parties welcomed the idea of an all-India
federation.24
After thus laying down the principles of a future constitution,
the Conference dealt with the details through eight sub-commit­
tees-on Federal Structure, Provincial Constitution, Franchise,
Simi, the North-West Frontier Province, Defence, Services, and
Minorities .
The deliberations of the minorities sub-committee were incon­
clusive, and, at the end, the Muslim delegation declared that in
those circumstances the only course was "to reiterate our claim
that no advance is possible or practicable, whether in the Provinces
or in the Central Government, without adequate safeguards fo r
the Muslims of India, and that n o constitution will b e acceptable
to the Muslims of I ndia without such safegua rds ."25
The session closed on 19 January 1 93 1 , with a statement by
the Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, that the Government
accepted the proposals for full responsible government in the
Provinces and for responsible government with "some features o f
dualism" a t a federated centre.26
Delhi or Gandhi-Irwin Pact

The Congress had been absent from the first session of the Con­
ference. But when preparations for the second session were under
way, the British Government decided to remove this deficiency
by making peace with the Congress. Wedgwood Benn, the Labour
2 3 Indian Ro1111d Table Conference ( First Section), Cmd. 3778, pp. 36-37.
24 See ibid., pp. 55, 1 4 7, 149.
25 Ibid., p. 246.
26 Ibid. , pp. 505-506.
T O W A R D S R E S PO N S I B L E G O V E R � �! E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 61

Secretary of State, wrote to Lord Irwin , t h e Viceroy, about the

desirability of coming to some sort of terms with the Congress
so t hat it s hould suspend its civil disobedience campaign and
attend the second session. 27 I t was in accordance with these i nstruc­
tions that Irwin released Gandh i unconditionally and this was
followed by the h istoric i nterview between the Viceroy and Gandhi
spread over four days, 1 7, 1 8, 1 9 and 27 February. The agreement
between the Government and t he Congress was signed on 5 March.
This Delhi or Gandhi-Irwin Pact stipul3 ted the following :
(1) The Congress would discontinue its civil disobedience move­
ment ; (2) The Congress would participate in the Round Table
Conference ; (3) The Congress would be permitted peaceful picket­
ing to persuade people to buy only Indian made goods ; (4) The
Government would withdraw all Ordinances issued to curb t he
Congress ; (5) The Government would withdraw all notifications
declaring certain associations unlawful ; (6) The Government
would withdraw all prosecutions relating to offences not involving
violence ; (7) The Government \vould release all persons under­
going sentences of imprisonment for their activities in the civil
disobedience movement ; (8) The Government would make certain
other concessions in respect of fines imposed, movable goods
seized and the location of punitive police during the unrest. 2 8
The implications of the Pact were obvious. Concessions were
made to Gandh i and the Congress at a time when they were resist­
ing lawful authority openly and deliberately. Gandhi's i nfluence
was redoubled . The prestige of t he Government wa s gravely
affected. Gandhi negotiated with the Viceroy on a footing of equal­
ity in a manner as if two potentates were deciding the future of
India . Parties other than the Congress were completely ignored .
Agitation was patronized. It was a serious blow to British auth­
ority in India. It also discouraged the Muslims who saw in it a
repeat performance of Lord Crewe's repeal of the partition of
Bengal.
27 See B. R. Nanda, ilvfa!zatma Gand/zi (Londo n : 1 958), p p . 3 0 1-303.
28 Full text in India i11 1930-31 (Delhi : 1 932), pp. 655, 659.
62 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K ISTAN

All evidence points to the conclusion that the British Govern­

ment was anxious to bring the Congress to the Conference table
and wnsidered no price too high to pay for attaining this.
The Muslims were feeling uneasy during the progress of Gandhi­
Irwin talks, 29 and when the Pact was published they did not
hesitate to express their disapproval and fears.
Round Table Conference : 2nd Session
Thus when the second session of the Conference opened on
7 September 1 93 1 , Gandhi was there as the sole representative
of the Congress. The main work of the Conference was done
through the two committees on Federal Structure and Minorities.
Gandhi was a member of both, but his performance was dis­
appointing.
Gandhi adopted an unreasonable attitude on practically all
points. He claimed that he represented all India because the
Congress spoke for all Indians irrespective of caste, religion and : '

race and , "by right of service" , "even the princes" 3 0• He dismissed ·

all other Indian delegates as unrepresentative because they did

not belong to the Congress. He dubbed them a s official hangers­
on becc.use they had been nominated by the Government . He alone
represented India on the Conference. 3 I
After claiming this pre-eminent status for himself he quietly sat
back and "seemed unwilling or unable to make any practical
suggestion of his own for bringing a settlement a bout". 3 2
The communal problem once a gain presented the most difficult
issue to the delegates. The Minorities Committee was almost per­
petually in session but agreement seemed as far away as ever.
When no solution was forthcoming, Gandhi, as his last bid at
:9 See The Times, 27 Febn:ary, 1 9 3 1 : India in 1930-I93I, op. cit., p. 1 1 9.
3 0 Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session): Proceedings of the
Conference, p. 390.
3 1 Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session): Proceedings of
Committees, p. 5 3 0 .
32 Coupland, op. cit., p. 1 25.
 T O WA R D S RE S P O N S I B LE G O V E R N �l E N T : 1 9 1 4- 1 9 3 5 63

resolving the issue, tabled the Congress scheme for a settlement

which was a reproduction of the Nehru Report.33 This stiffened
the attitude of all minorities, for they had repudiated the Nehru
Report as long ago as 1 928. As a counter to the Congress scheme
the Muslims, the Depressed Classe�, the Indian Christians, the
Anglo-Indians and the Europeans presented a joint statement of
claims which, they sa id, must stand or fall as an interdependent
whole. As their main demand was not acceptable to Gandhi the
communal issue was postponed for future discussion.
On the concluding day, 1 December, Ramsay :Macdonald made
a fervent appeal to all leaders to reach a communal settlement
and, at the end, told them that if such an agreement was
not forthcoming within a reasonable period the British Govern­
ment would have no alternative to laying down a provisional
scheme of its own . 3 4

Round Table Confermce : 3rd Session

On his return to India Gandhi once again started his civil dis­
obedience movement and was duly arrested. But this renewal of
disorder did not affect the prepara tions for the final session of
the Conference. Three important committees drafted their reports :
the Franchise Committee under Lord Lothian, the Federal Finance
Committee under Lord Eustace Percy, and the States' Inquiry
Committee under J. C. C. Davidson.

After vainly waiting for some mutual settlement amcng Indians

themselves, the British Government published their own Commu­
nal Award in August 1932. It retained separate electorates for
the Muslims and for all other minorities. Weightage was given to
the Muslims in the Hindu-majority provinces and to the Sikhs
and Hindus in the Panjab. But the Muslim majorities in the
Panjab and Bengal were reduced to minorities. In the Panjab,
where the Muslims formed 57 per cent, Hindus 27 per cent , and
the Sikhs 1 3 per cent of the population, Muslims received 49 per
33 Text of Gandhi's Scheme in Proceedings of Committees, p. 548.
3 4 Full text of the joint statement i n ibid., pp. 5 5 0-555.
64 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A 1'

cent, Hindus 2 7 per cent a n d the Sikhs 1 8 per cent of the total
seats in the legislature. Similarly, in Bengal where the Muslims
formed 55 per cent and Hindus 43 per cent of the total popula­
tion, Muslims received about 48 per cent and Hindus 43 per cent
of the total provincial seats. 3 5
The award was not popular with any Indian party, but it was
inevitable because there was lack of agreement among them.
The Congress was more outspoken and rejected the Awa rd in
toto. i t was only after Gandhi had, through a fast, blackmailed
Ambedkar into an agreement to renounce separate electorates
for the Untouchables that the Congress criticism of the Award
slightly abated . The Muslims were not pleased, particularly regard­
ing the disappearance of their majorities i n the Panjab and Bengal,
but they h?.d themselves suggested a British award , had promised
to abide by it and had limited their freedom of action much earlier
when they had entered the Lucknow Pact.
The third and last session of the Conference, which began on
17 November, was short and unimportant . The Congress was once
aga in absent ; so was the Labour opposition in the British Parlia­
ment. Reports of various committees were scrutinized, lost threads
were picked up, and the Conference ended on Christmas eve
a mid expressions of goodwill.
The emergence of Reforms
The rest of the story can be briefly told. The recommendations of
the Round Table Conference were embodied in a White Paper. 3 6
It wa s published in March 1 933 and debated in Parliament directly
afterwards . I n the next stage the White Paper \vas cons idered by

a Joint Select Committee of both houses of Parliament. It con­

sisted of sixteen members from each chamber. Twenty represent­
ative Indians from British India and seven from the States were
appointed to this committee as assessors ; they included five
35 Cmd. 4 1 47 of 1 932.
36 Cmd . 4268.
T O W A R D S R E S P O N S I B L E G O V E R N M E N T '. 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 3 5 65

Muslims : the Aga Khan, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Shafaat

Ahmad Khan, Abdur Rahim, .and A. H. Ghaznavi. Lord
Linlithgow presided over the deliberations of the committee.
The Committee sat from April 1 9 3 3 to November 1 934, and
finally reported to Parliament on 22November. The Report 3 7 was
not unanimous. Nineteen members signed the Report, and nine
did not. This minority consisted of 5 diehards who opposed any
concession to India and 4 labourites who thought the Report did
not go far enough.

The Report was debated in Parliament in December and

approved by the House of Commons on 1 2 December and the
House of Lords on 1 8 December. The second reading took place
in February 1 93 5 . After the final reading and the Royal Assent
the Bill at last reached the statute book on 24 July, 1 93 5 . 3 s

The Government of India Act, 1935

The 1 93 5 Act 3 9 contained 1 4 parts and 10 schedules. The whole
of it came into operation on 1 April 1 93 7, except Part II which
dealt with the All India Federation. Part II could not operate
until a specific number of States acceded to the Federation, and
as no State had done so till the outbreak of World War II the
federal part of the Constitution never came into operation.
The most important feature of the Act was that, for the first
time, it made the provinces separate legal entities. Three lists of
subjects were drawn up : the Federal List, the Provincial List and
the Concurrent List. The division of financial resources was de­
signed to strengthen provincial independence. Sind was separated
from Bombay and given the status of a separate province. The
North-West Frontier Province was, for the first time, invested with
full provincial powers. Provincial franchise was enlarged by
lowering property qualifications.
3 7 Parliamentary Paper H . L. 6 ( I Part I) a n d H . C . 5 ( I Part I ) of 1 954.
38 For a first hand account from the inside see Templewood, Nine Troub­
led Years (New York : 1 954). It was Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Secretary of
State for India, who piloted the bill.
39 2 5 and 26 Geo V, c. 42.
66 TH E S T Ru G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

Every province was given a Council of Ministers whose advice

was binding on the Governor e�cept in so far as he acted "in his
discretion" or exercised his "individual judgement". In the dis­
charge of his special responsibilities (summarized by the abcve
two phrases) the Governor was to act under the general control
of the "Governor-General in his discretion". Dyarchy was com­
pletely eliminated. There was to be a single cabinet, made up on
the British model, and normally the Governor was to act on its
advice.
The Council for the Secretary of State for India was abolished
and replaced by a body of Advisers, not less than three and not
more than six, to the Secretary of State. But their advice did not
bind the Secretary of State, except in regard to the public services.
The cost of the India Office was now to be charged to British
revenues.
 CHAPTER 4

The Establishment of
Provincial Autonomy

Princes and Federatio11

It will be recalled that during the deliberations of the Round Table
Conference the representatives of the Princely States had indicated
their willingness to enter the future Indian Federation . In fact,
one of the fundamental factors in favour of a projected federal
polity was the readiness of the States to join it. Later, however,
the Princes seem to have changed their mind about the desir­
ability of coming into the Federation. Though this States-Federa­
tion controversy lies beyond the scope of our subject, yet its
inherent significance and its complications fo r the postponement
of federation make it necessary to treat it in some detail.

As Sir Reginald Coupland has said, it seems in retrospect as if the

Princes had hardly realized the importance and gravity of their
commitment to enter an Indian Federation with responsible
government. 1 The attitude of the Princes may best be read in the
Views of Indian States on the Government of India Bill, which
1 R . Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Pt. JI.
lndian Politics 1936-1942 (London : 1 943), p. 2.
68 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T AN

contains both their comments and the comments thereupon of the

Secretary of State for India. 2
Paramountcy was the issue a t stake ; and this had already been
treated by the Report of the Indian States Committee (Butler
Committee). It had conceded that "the relationship between the
Paramount Power and the Princes should not be transferred,
without the agreement of the latter, to a new Government in
British India responsible to an Indian Legislature". 3 But on other
points the Princes' claims had been rejected in clear terms. For its
authority it had quoted what Lord Reading had declared in 1 926:
"The sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme in India, and
therefore no ruler of an Indian State can justifiably claim to
negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing. Its
supremacy is not based only upon treaties and engagements, but
exists independently of them . . "4 Realizing the difficulties in­
. .

volved in the operation, the Committee had wisely refrained from

defining Paramountcy. "Paramountcy must rernain paramount",
it said, "it must fulfil its obligations, defining or adapting itself
according to the shifting necessities of the time and the progressive
development of the States". 5
This was naturally unacceptable to the Princes, and they
objected to the Government of lndia Bill (1 935) because their own
interpretation of Paramountcy ran counter to the one adopted by,
and made the foundation of, the Bill. Therefore a meeting of the
Indian Princes and their representatives \vas held in Bombay on
25 February, 1 935, in which a resolution was passed saying that
"in many respects the Bill and the Instrument of Accession depart
from the agreements arrived at during the meetings of representa­
tives of the States with members of H. M. Government and [that]
the Bill and the Instrument of Accession do not secure those vital
2 Views ofIndian States on the Government of India Bill: Correspondence
relating to a meeting of States' Rulers held at Bombay to discuss the Govern·
ment ofIndia Bill and a provisional drafr lnstmment of Accession (March 1 935 )
,

Cmd . 4843.
3 Report ofrhe Indian Srates Committee ( 1 929), Crnd. 3302, p . 52.

4 Ibid., p . 1 8.
3 [bid., p. 3 1 .
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF P R O V I N C I A L A U TO N OM Y 69

interests and fundamental requisites c,f the states on which they

have throughout laid great emphasis" 6. Accession to the Federa­
tion would be "a derogation of their position" from absolute
rulers to subordinate units in a Federation. 7 They also objected
to the Governor-General's special responsibility to prevent "any
grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India or any part
thereof". This, they said, compromised their "sovereignty and
internal autonomy". 8
The Secretary of State for India, however, d id not accept the
validity of any of these claims or protests. He dismissed the vital
issue of Paramountcy as of no particular relevance and empha­
sized that the nature of the states' "relationship to the King
Emperor" was "a matter which admits of no dispute". 9 The
Princes could not claim to be treated as equals with the Crown.
But these arguments and counter-arguments were not the heart
of the matter. At most the Princes' complaints showed their dis­
satisfaction with certain constitutional provisions, while the British
Government's reply exhibited an understandable anxiety not to
compromise on the essence of Paramountcy. In short, the debate
was more academic than real. The significant point was that the
Princes were reluctant to join the Federation. And their reluctance
ws s not so much due to the unsatisfactory drafting of the Instru­
ment of Accession as to the political developments of this period,
to which we now turn.
After 1 936 the attitude of the Indian National Congress towards
the States contributed a great deal to the uneasy feeling of the
Princes.10 Most Congress leaders dismissed the States with one
derogatory adjective, "reactionary". The States were backward,
conservative, oppressive and undemocratic. They must be done
away with and a "free and united" India evolved out of this
6 Crnd . 4843, p. 1 3 .
7 Ibid. , p. 22.
8 Ibid. , p. 20.
9 Ibid., p. 30.
10 See Sir Frank Brown, ''Historic Viceroyalty Closes", Empire Review,
September, 1 943, p . 1 6 .
 70 T H E STR U G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

conglomeration o f provinces and principalities. Many intemperate

speeches were made which were hardly meant to attract the sym­
pathy of the Princes. What the Government of India Act ( 1 935)
conceded to the Princes did not satisfy them in the least. But when
the Congress attacked these "concessions" as signs of British
imperialism, rhe Princes could scarcely be expected to rejoice at
the prospect of having the Congress as their future partner
in an all-India legislature. Congress official policy from now
onwards was one of undisguised hostility to the States. It en­
couraged agitation and even sedition against the princes. Even
such comparatively progressive Statts as Mysore were not spared.
Trouble occurred in Hyderabad, Travancore, Kashmir and the
Orissa States. More or less violent disturbances took place every­
where. And Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee ap­
plauded this "revolt of the masses". When Congress ministries were
installed in 1937 this anti-State agitation was stepped up. Gandhi
laid down that Congress ministries had a moral duty to take
notice of any misrule in the States and to advise the Paramount
Power as tc how it should be ended. In an extremely significant
sentence he advised the Princes to "cultivate friendly relations
with an organization which bids fair in the future, not very distant,
to replace the Paramount Power-let me hope, by friendly a rrange­
ment" . 11 This amounted to no less than a threat that, on the one
hand, the Congress would soon wrest paramountcy from the
Crown and , on the other, that it would then treat the Princes a s
they should be treated . Ten days later Gandhi's pronounce­
ment was incorporated into official Congress policy when the
Working Committee passed a resolution on 1 4 December, 1 938,
asserting the right of the Congress to "protect" the peoples of
the States. I 2 Similar sentiments were expressed in stronger terms
by Jawaharlal Nehru in his presidential address to the All India
States' People Conference in February, 1 939.13 From this point
11 Harijan, 3 December 1 93 8 .
12 C oup l an d op. cit . p p . 1 73-174 .
! 3 For fu l l text of t h i s 3ddress see h i s The Unity of India (London : l 94 1 )
, .

pp. 27-46.
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T O F P R O V I N C I AL A U T O N O �IY 71

onwards the States were continually facing a danger from Congress

inspired attacks on their sovereignty and, what was far more
important, on their maintenance of law and order. 1 4
The States had been so far relatively free of communal friction
which abounded in British India. Now with the commencement
of the anti-State agitation communalism reared its ugly head in
the States too. Whether the Congress succeeded or not in democ­
ratising State Governments, it certainly disturbed the communal
harmony that the Princes had so far maintained in their territories .
In Hyderabad and Kashmir, where the religion of the ruler con­
flicted with that of most of his subjects, the so-called "democratic"
struggle easily degenerated into Hindu-Muslim riots.
Thus the impact of the Congress-States controversy was un­
fortunate in two respects. Jn the constitutional sphere, it hardened
the Princes in their opposition to a Federation in which they
would be the "subordinate allies" of a Congress dominated Gov­
ernment. It frightened them irrevocably, and the Congress must
take a major portion of the blame for helping to postpone the
operation of the federal part of the Government of India Act,
1 935. In the general political field, the Congress ignited the flame
of communal warfare in the States and widened the gulf between
Hindus and Muslims to an unbridgeable extent. In the anxiety of
the Congress to succeed the Paramount Power the Muslims saw
a real danger to their interests. If the Congress could so treat the
Princes who had independent relations with the Crown and were
afforded protection under treaty terms, there would be no limit
to its arrogance towards the Muslims. Thus thought the Muslim
leaders of the day who were witnessing t he Congress anti-States
policy, and what they saw was hardly conducive to a Congress­
Muslim rapprochement.1 5
To complete the story of the �rinces i t must be mentioned that
in 1 936-37 the Viceroy sent his personal representatives to almost
14 See Birdwood, A Continent Experiments (London : 1945), p . 1 6 8 ; L.F.
Rushbrook Williams, "Indian Constitutional Problems", Nineteenth Century
and After, May 1 939, p. 563.
15 For a good treatment of the Congress attitude towards the States
s ee Coupland, op. cit., Chapter XVI, pp. 1 67- 1 78.
72 THE S T RU G G LE FOR P A K I S T A N

all the states to discuss with the Princes the terms and prospects
of accession. Views gathered by this touring official party were
collected and considered by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State
for India. This took some time and it was early 1 939 when the
British Government \Vas in a position to communicate to the
States the fina 1 terms on which their accession to the Federation
would be considered as valid. All the Princes had yet not replied
to these terms when the War i ntervened and negotiations were
suspended. As far as is known, the Princes were never again
consulted on this point. Developments in the rest of India were
soon to make the great dream of an Indian Federation a political
impossibility. The Princes' incursion into all-India politics thus
came to a final end .
Elections
The new central legislature had come into being at the same time
as the new constitutional scheme. The Joint Select Committee had
presented its Report in October 1 934, and elections in British
I ndia had been held in the following winter. This election would..
in the ordina ry course of events, have been held i n 1 933, since the
statutory duration of the Legislative Assembly was three years.
This period was however extended for a further year. It must be
remembered that this election was held under the provisions of
t he GO\ ernment of I ndia Act of 1 9 1 9 .
The total electorate fo r t he 1 934 election was 1 ,4 1 5,892 but only
608, 198 votes were pollcd. 1 6 Unfortunately the white paper on the
election did not give the party position in the new legislature.
However. we know that it was as follows : 17
Congress 44
Congress Nationalists (mainly members of the
Hindu Mahasabha) 11
Independents (all but 3 were Muslims) 22
Europeans 11
Officials 26
Non-official nominated members 13
Total 127
1 6 Retum showing the Rl's11lts of the General Election to the Legislative
Assembly in India, 1934 (July 1 935), Cmd. 4939, p. 5 .
17
..
Coupland, op. cit., p . 9.
THE ESTABLISHMENT O F P R O V I N C I A L A U TONOMY 73

Elections to provincial legislative assemblies were held in 1 937.

Towards the end of 1 936 both the Muslim League and the Cong­
ress issued their election manifestos.
The Muslim League manifesto laid down two main princi­
ples on which its representatives would work : " ( l ) That the
present provincial constitution and proposed central constitution
should be replaced immediately by democratic full self-govern­
ment ; and (2) that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim
League in the various Legislatures will utilize the Legislatures i n
order to extract the maximum benefit out of the Constituti o n for
the uplift of the people in the various spheres of national life."
So long as separate electorates existed a Muslim League party
was to be formed as a corollary in every provincial assembly.
But "there would be free co-operation with any group or groups
whose aims and ideals are approximately t he same as those of
the League party". The League appealed to all Muslims "that they
should not permit themselves to be exploited on economic or any
other grounds which will break up the solidarity of the commu­
nity". In the last paragraph the manifesto indicated the
platform for the elections : "To protect religious rights of Musal­
m ans i n which connection for all matters of purely religious
character, due weight shall be given to opinions of the Jamiat
Ulama-i-Hind and the Mujtahids ; to make every effort to secure the
repeal of all oppressive laws ; to reject all measures which are
detrimental to the interests of India, which encroach upon the
fundamental liberties of the people and lead to economic
exploitation of the country ; to reduce the heavy cost of
administrative machinery, Central and Provincial, and allocate
substantial funds for nation-building departments ; to nationalise
the Indian Army and reduce military expenditure ; to encourage
development of industries, including cottage industries ; to
regulate currency, exchange and prices in the interest of the
economic development of the country ; to stand for social,
educational and economic uplift of the rural population ; to
sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural indebtednes s ;
to make elementary education free and compulsory ; to
 74 T H E S TR U G G LE F O R P A K I S TAN

protect and promote the Urdu language and script ; to devise

measures for the amelioration of the general conditions of the
Musalmans ; and to take steps to reduce the heavy burden of
taxation ; and to create healthy public opinion and general poli­
tical consciousness throughout the country. " 18
The Congress echoed most of the above mentioned sentiments.
It would work for "the establishment of civil liberty, for the
release of political prisoners and detenues, and to repair the
wrongs done to the peasantry and the public institutions in the
cause of the national struggle". The uplift of the masses was the
goal to be achieved through the reform of the system of land
tenure, the reduction of agricultural rent and the relief of rural
indebtedness . Some other points underlined by the manifesto
were : improvement of industrial conditions in the towns ; i nsur­
ance against old age, s ickness and unemployment ; the ma intenance
of trade unions ; and the removal of untouchability and sex dis­
abilities. The Communal Award was condemned as inconsistent
with democratic principles and d isruptive of Indian unity. But
no final opinion was expressed on future action on this contro­
versial problem. 1 9
It is obvious that the social policy of the two manifestos was
much the same. Nor did they diverge much on political issues.
Only on two points did the two documents differ. In the first
place, the Muslim League pledged itself to protect and promote
the Urdu language and script, while the Congress was "noto­
riously bent on making Hindi the national language of lndia". 2 0
In the second place, the Muslim League resolutely stood by sep­
arate electorates, while the Congress was critical of the system.
Though now the Congress was uncompromisingly opposed to
separate representation, in 1 9 1 6 it had gladly agreed to this prin­
ciple and since tha t date most Congress leaders had applauded
1 8 Full text in The Indian Annual Register, 1 936, vol. I, pp. 299-301 .
1 9 Ibid. , vol. I I , pp. 1 88- 1 9 1 . Full text also in Nehru, The Unity of India,
op. cit., p. 404.
20 Coupland, op. cit., p. 14.
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF P R O V I N C I A L A U T O N O M Y 75

the Lucknow Pact and recalled it as a n example o f Hindu-Muslim

unity which was worth repeating. That only left the language
issue, but was it so crucial as to prevent all future co-operation ?
There was nothing else in the Muslim League programme to stand
in the way of Hindu-Muslim compromise. We have it on the
testimony of an impartial observer that "the League manifesto was
clearly an offer of co-operaticn", and had the Congress leaders
accepted this offer the "whole constitutional controversy would
have been different". 2 1 But, as will be seen later, the Congress
spurned this hand ot friendship and rigidly refused to budge from
its claim that it was the only embodiment of Indian nationalism.
"But was it necessary for the Congress leaders to insist that Cong­
ress Muslims were the only authentic representatives of their
community ? Apparently not, since, at any rate, for the purposes
of the elections, something like a concordat was established with
the League. In the United Provinces the leaders of the two
organizations agreed on a common platform." 2 2
In all there were 1 585 seats in the provincial assemblies dis-
tributed as follows :-
General 809
Muslims 482
Commerce & Industry 56
Women 41
Labour 38
Land Holders 36
Sikhs 34
Europeans 26
Backward classes of tribes 24
Indian Christians 20
Anglo-Indians 11
Universities 8

Total 1 585

In addition there were 1 86 seats in the upper houses of six

provinces, viz. , Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Bombay, Madras and the
United Provinces. Thirty million electors were called upon to
2 1 /bid. , p. 1 5 .
2 2 Ibid.
 76 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

choose their representatives, of whom five million were \Vomen. 2 3

Out of a total of 1 77 1 seats the Congress won 706-less than
half. This was enough to prove that the Congress had no i
right to speak for all, or even a majority of, Indians. Further,
there were 2 1 1 Hindu seats which went to non-Congress Hindus.
So the Congress did not even represent all Hindus. A great maj­
ority of the Muslim seats was won by the Panjab Unionist Party
of Sir Fazl-i-Husain. It is true that the Muslim League won only
1 02 out of the maximum of 482 seats, but how far did the Cong­
ress succeed in capturing Muslim seats ? It contested only 58 seats
and won only 26. Thus it represented only about 5 per cent of
Indian Muslims. Moreover, most of the Congress successes in
Muslim constituencies were in the N.W.F.P. It was in the two
Muslim provinces of the Panja b and Bengal that the Congress
claim of representing Muslims was put to the hardest test ; and
in both it miserably failed . In the Panjab it captured only 1 8 seats
out cf 1 75, and in Bengal only 60 seats out of 250. Its perform­
ance in Sind was hardly better where it won 8 seats out of 60. 2 -1
The Congress was said t o have polled about 1 5,000,000 out of
a total of 35,000,000 votes and was thus a minority party in
India. 2 5 The election results confirmed that the Congress "held
Hindustan only, with an unfortunate stress on the first two
syllables". It had experienced difficulties in finding Muslim candi­
dates. In the United Provinces only one Muslim was elected on
the Congress ticket, and he was returned from the special Uni­
versity constituency under a joint electorate. The Muslim presi­
dent of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee
was defeated . 2 6
2 3 Government af bidia A ct 1935 Schedule V, Table of Seats, Provincial
Legisbtive Assemblies.
24 Return showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937 (November 1937),
Cmd . 5589, which gives details.
2 5 A. R. Barbour, letter to llfanchester Guardian, 23 September, 1 942.
2 6 P. Lacey, "Deadlock in India", Nineteenth Cemury, July 1 937, pp.
1 05-106.
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF P R O V I N C I A L AU T O N O M Y 77

Deadlock over Safeguards

In the general elections o f 1 937 the Congress had won clear
majorities in five provinces : Madras, United Provinces, Central
Provinces. Bihar and Orissa. In Bombay it was in the position
of forming a coalition in co-operation with two or three pro­
Congress groups. After the publication of election results arose
the question of forming provincial ministries under the provisions
of the 1935 Constitution. This resulted in a controversy over the
safeguards. Though t his controversy was, strictly speaking, one
between the Congress and the British Government, yet it had
great significance for the Muslims because these safeguards mainly
related to the protection of their interests.
The Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governc.rs under
the Government of India Act , 1 935, placed some special respon­
sibilities on the provincial heads. These included the "safeguarding
of all the legitimate interests of minorities as requiring him to
secure, in general, that those racial or religious communities fo r
the members of which special representation is accorded ie t he
Legislature, and those classes of the people committed to his
charge who, whc;ther on account of the smallness of their number
or their lack of educational or material advantages or from any
other cause, cannot as yet fully rely for their welfare upon joint
political action in the Legislature, shall not suffer, or have reason­
able cause to fear neglect or oppression". The Instrument also
required t he Governor "to secure a due proportion of appoint­
ments in Our Services to the several communities". 27 Another
special responsibility of the Governor was "to safeguard the mem­
bers of Our Services not only in any rights provided fo r them
by or under the said Act or any other law for the time being i n
force, but also against any action which, in his judgement, would
be inequitable". 2 8 In the executive sphere of his powers he was
authorized "to differ from his Ministers if in his individual judge­
ment their advice would have effects of the kind which it is the
27 Instruments of Instructions t o the Govemor-Genera/ and Govemors
(February 1 935), Cmd. 4805, ' " Instrument of Instructions to the Governor"
para X.
2 8 Ibid., para XI.
78 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S TA N

purpose of the said Chapter [III of Part V of the Act] to prevent,

even though the advice so tendered to him is not in conflict with
any specific provision of the said Act" . 2 9 In the exercise of his
powet s the Governor was to be guided by the advice of his Min­
isters, "unless in his opinion so to be guided would be inconsistent
with the fulfilment of any of the special responsibilities which are
by the said Act committed to him, or with the proper d ischarge
of any of the functions which he is otherwise by the said Act
required to exercise on his individual judgement". 3 o
These were the safeguards against which the Congress took up
a rms when the time came for the formation of ministries. It was
in February 1 937 that the results of the elections were known. I n
March the A l l India Congress Committee passed a resolution
which, after repeating its opposition to the 1 935 Act and its
intention of combating it, authorized and permitted "the ac,cept­
ance of offices i n the Provinces where the Congress commands
a majority in the legislature, provided the Ministersllips shall ne t
be accepted unless the leader of the Congress party in the legis­
lature ts satisfied and is able to state publicly that the Governor
will not use his special powers of i nterference or set aside the
advice of Ministers in regard to their constitutional activities". 3 I

When, on I April, 1 937, the provincial part of the 1 935 Act

came into operation, the Governors of Bombay, Madras. Central
Provinces, United Provinces, Orissa and Bihar invited the leaders
of the Congress parliamentary pa rties in their respective provinces
to form ministries. In reply to these invitations and in pursuance
of the All India Congress Committee resolution of 1 8 March, the
Congress leaders asked the Governors to give an a ssurance in the
following identical terms, dictated by the Working Committee :
"that in regard to the constitutional activities of his ministers,
His Excellency will not use his special powers of i nterference or
29Ibid., para XII.
para IX.
3 0 Ibid. ,
3 1 For full text of the resolution vide The Indian A nnual Register 1 937,
vol. J, pp. 1 77-1 78.
T H E E S T A B L I S H �I E N T O F P R O V I 1' C I A L A C T O N O .\I Y 79

set aside the advice of my Cabinet". 3 2 This amounted to asking

the Governors to undertake not to discharge the duties placed
upon them by the Instrument of Instructions, and they therefore
declined to give the required assurance. They said that "it was
impossible for the Governors to give any assurance as regards the
use of the powers vested in them under the Act". 3 3
On 8 April, the Secretary of State for India formally declared
in the House of Lords that since the Governors had been specially
given certain obligations under Section 52 of the Act, they "could
nc t give, within the framework of the Constitution, the assurance
which was asked of them". 3 4 In the House of Commons the Under­
Secretary of State for India said that had the Governor given the
assurances asked of him, "he would have had to divest himself
of the responsibilities specially placed upon him by Parliament
through the Act and the Instrument of Instructions and also in so
doing to have ignored the pledges given to minorities and others". 3 s
On 28 April the Congress Working Committee approved the
action of the Congress leaders and condemned the British official
statements as "utterly inadequate to meet the requirements of
Congress". 3 6
The Congress demand was widely disfavoured by British com­
mentators and organs of public opinion . It was pointed out that
the Muslims had accepted the Constitution only because of the
safeguards and that the demand for their abrogation would greatly
add to their fear and uneasiness. 3 7 "No Governor could lawfully
contract himself out of statutory provisions, and the Congress
demand was therefore unconstitutional."38 However, the Congress
persisted in its demand, and the deadlock was not resolved till
the third week of June.
32 Coupland, op. cit., p. 17.
33 The Indian Annual Register, 1 937, vol. I, p . 228.
34 H . L. 104. 5s. Col. 88 1 .
3 5 H . C. 322. 5s. Cols. 3 6 1 -363. He rep;-:ated this on 2 6 April; see H.C.
323. 5s. Col. 3.
3 6 Indian Annual Register, 1937, vol. I, p. 256.
37 The Observer, 1 1 April, 1 93 7 .
3 8 A. H. Watson, Political Advance i n India (London : 1 940), p p . 8-9.
80 THE STRUG G LE FOR P A K I S TA N

O n 2 1 June, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a long state­

ment. He said that three months' experience of the operation of
the Constitution had proved that assurances from the Governors
were not essential to the smooth and harmonious working of the
Constitution. "There is no foundation for any suggestion that a
Governor is free, or i s entitled . or would have the power to inter­
fere with the day to day administration of a province outside the
limited range of the responsibilities speci2 lly confined to him." A
Governor's special responsibilities d id not entitle him "to inter­
vene at random in the administration c f the Province". Each of
the responsibilities "represents the response of Parliament to
demands of substantial and legitimate interests". The Governors
would "leave nothing undone to avoid and to resolve" all conflicts
with their Ministers. The communities and interests which were to
be protected under the safeguards were assured that no "question
will arise of sacrificing their interests for political reasons". He
concluded by an appeal to the Congress : "I am convinced that
the shortest road to that fuller political life which many of you
sc greatly desire is to accept this Constitution and to work it fo r
all i t is worth . . . . . You may count o n me, i n face even o f
bitter disappointment, to strive untiringly towards the full and
final establishment in India of the principles of parliamentary
government ." 3 9
After this statemert, on 7 July, the Congress Working Com­
mittee passed a resolution permitting the Congress to accept
office. 4 0
Consequently Congress ministries took office in eight provinces,
and the interim Governments resigned. The question arises in
what way the Governor-General's statement altered the position .
Prima facie i t seems that the Congress was assured that the
Governor's special responsibilities would not be made a pretext
for interfering in the working of provincial autonomy. However,
39 Indian Annual Register, 1 93 7, vol. I, pp. 264-270.
40 P. Sitaram:iyya, History of the Indian National Congress (Bombay :
1 948), vol. II, p. 5 1 .
T H E E S T A B L I S H M EN T O F P R O V I N C I A L A U T O N O M Y 81

the attitude o f the Congress w a s s o rigid before t h e Governor­

General's statement that it seems unlikely that a mere reiteration
of the obvious would have changed it. Subsequent history shows
that in spite of loud complaints from the Muslims their interests
were not safeguarded even once. There were strong rumours even
when the Congress decided to accept office that secret assurances
had been given to the Congress by the Governor-General. As
time passed this suspicion became a cert'1inty in the minds of the
Muslims.
Provincial Gorermnents
Before examining in detail the reaction of Muslim India to the
working of Congress ministries, it is advisable to look briefly into
the functioning of provincial governments in different provinces
between 1 937 and 1943.

Bengal
In Bengal legislative assembly the party position at the time of
publication of the election results was :-
���s �
Non-Congress Hindus 42
Muslim Independents 43
Muslim League 40
Other Muslims 38
Europeans and Anglo-Indians 31
No Party (Muslims) 2

Total 250

Of the non-Muslim League Muslims the largest compact group

was the Krishak Proja Party which counted 35 members in its
fold. The party position necessitated some sort of a coalition.
And therefore the ministry which was formed in April 1 93 7 was
made up of the Muslim League, the Proja Party, the Scheduled
Castes, and the Independent or non-Congress caste Hindus. The
leader of the coalition was Fazlul Haq, and he appointed ten
ministers to his ministry, half of whom were Muslims and half
Hindus.
82 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

The ministry, however, d i d n o t have smooth sailing. The Cong­

ress was bitterly opposed to the government, and was continuously
trying to bring about the resignation of Sarkar, the Hindu Finance
Minister, who was a prominent ex-Congressite. But Congress
opposition had a desirable effect on the Muslims. Muslim unity
inside and outside the legislature increased in direct proportion
to Congress attacks on the ministry. Towards the end of 1 939
Sarkar left the ministry on the ground that he was not prepared
to support the official resolution which asked for Dominion Status
a fter the war with safeguards for minorities "based on their full
consent and approval". Sarkar thought that the acceptance of
this resolution would be tantamount to giving the minorities a
veto on India's constitutional progress.
When war was declared the ministry at once pledged its full
support to war effort, and for the next two years the government
did not face any trouble. It was only in 1 941 that there was a
threat of serious disunity within the ranks of the Muslims . Fazlul
Haq had joined the newly-established Defence Council without
consulting the All India Muslim League. When he, along with
the Chief Ministers of the Panjab and Assam, was asked by the
League to resign his seat in the Council, he protested against the
instructions, then obeyed them, and finally resigned from the
Muslim League Working Committee. His reluctance over the
issue had, however, made him unpopular among his Muslim
supporters, and Khwaja Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy led this
revolt o f the Leaguers against h i m . However, peace was tem­
porarily restored until in November a clash became inevitable.
Fazlul Haq formed a Progressive Coalition Party, consisting of
the Krishak Proja Party, the Congress Forward Block, and a few
minor eleme n t s . The o l d coalition was dissolved, and a new

Muslim League Party was fcrmed under Khwaja Nazimuddin .

On 1 7 December, 1 94 1 , Haq formed his new ministry of nine
members, of whom four were Hindus and five (including the
Chief Minister) Muslims. Of the four Hindus, two belonged to
the Congress Forward Block, one was a Scheduled Caste, and foe
fourth was S. P. Mookerjee, a Militant Hindu Mahasabhite.
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T O f P RO V I N C I A L A U T O N OM Y 83

T he new ministry enjoyed stability, but only at the cost of

Muslim disunity. By negotiating with the opposition and alienat­
ing his Muslim League friends Fazlul Haq could no longer claim
to enjoy the support of Muslim Bengalis. In early 1942 in a by­
election a government candidate (who had the full support of
Haq) was ignominiously defeated by a Muslim Leaguer, the vot­
ing being 10,843 to 840. In April 1 943 Haq resigned and was
succeeded by Khwaja Nazimuddin who formed a Muslim League
ministry.
Later developments in Bengal need not detain us, for by this
time the centre of political gravity had shifted to the centre, and
provincial politics were progressively controlled and guided by
the All I ndia Muslim League.
The Paniab

In the Panjab, where politics were complicated by the interpola­

tion of the Sikh minority between the Hindu a nd Muslim com­
munities, the party position in the legislature was :-
Congres> 18
Muslim League 2
Other Muslims 4
Non-Congress Hindus and Sikhs 36
Unionists 88
No-Party 27

Total 1 75
Soon the Unionist Party was joined by another eight members,
bringing its total strength to 96. The leader of this party, Sir
Sikandar Hayat K han. also enjoyed the support of the Khalsa
Nationalist Sikhs, who numbered het\\'ecn 1 5 and 20. Sikandar
formed a ministry of three Muslims, two Hindus and one Sikh.
I t was a strong ministry s upported by a compact majority i n the
house. The stability of the party position was demonstrated at
Sikandar's death in December 1 942 when there was a quiet change­
over in Chief Ministership, Malik Khizar Hayat Khan stepping
84 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

into Sikandar's shoes. This m inistry continued in power till all

the provincia l assemblies were dissolved in 1 945 with a view to
holding fresh general elections.
A ssam

In Assam there was a confusing multiplicity of parties : 4 1

Congress 35
Independent Muslims 9
Muslim League 9
Assam Valley Muslims 5
Surma Valley Muslims 5
Krishak Proja Party I
Independent Hindus 10
Labour 4
United People's Party 3
Indian Planters 2
Indian Christians I
Independent Women l
Europeans 9
Before the Congress decided to accept office, Sir Muhammad
Saadullah formed a government of four ministers : two Muslims,
one Indian Christian and one non-Congress Hindu. Even after
the Congress willingness to form ministries, Saadullah's ministry
continued in office for lack of unity within the Congress and the
reluctance on the part of the minorities to line up with the Cong­
ress. Towards the end of 1 937 the ministry was reconstituted, two
new Muslim Ministers replaced the old ones and an additional
minister was i ncluded from among the Scheduled Castes who
brought with him five supporters in the house. In September 1 938,
at last, Saadullah resigned for fe a r of a no-confidence motion,
and the Governor invited Gopinath Bardoloi, the Congress leader,
to form a government. After considerable delay Bardoloi was
successful in making a ministry of seven : four Hindus and three
Muslims. The difficulty of choosing Muslim ministers for a Cong­
ress Cabinet was fully i llustrated by the political affiliations of
41 Coupland, op. cit., p. 56.
T H E E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF P R O V I N C I A L A U T ON O M Y 85

these three Muslims. One was the only Muslim Congressite in the
house, the second was a deserter from the Assam United Party
and the third was one of the two ministers discarded by Saadullah
at the end of 1 937.
Though this ministry continued till the end of 1 939, yet it was
far from stable. The opposition consisted of the solid Muslim
block of the Assam United Party which could muster 47 members.
It must be remembered that the Bardoloi ministry was a coali­
tion one and that is why when, in company with other Congress
ministries, the Assam ministry resigned, it was possible for Saad­
ullah to return as Chief Minister at the head of a nine-man
Cabinet. But his government fell towards the end of 1 9 4 1 when,
because of the refusal of any C<J ngress leader to form an alternative
government which would fully participate in war effort, the
Governor took over the administration of the province in his
own hands under Section 93 of the Government of India Act,
1 9 3 5 . However, there was another change in 1 942 and Saadullah
returned to power on 25 August of that year.
Simi
The elections produced the following party position in a house
o f 60 :-
Sind United Party (Muslim) 18
Sind Hindu Sabha 1 1
Independent Muslims 9
Congress 8
Sind M uslim Party 4
Sind Azad Party (pro-Congress) 3
Independent Hindus 2
Labour Independent
No-party 4
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, the leader of the Sind United
Party, formed a coalition of three members with Hindu help.
But in March 1 938 the budget received an adverse vote and the
ministry resigned. Now Allah Bakhsh, the leader of the dissident
Muslims, became the Chief Minister. But he could command the
 86 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

support of only 2 2 members and therefore decided t o fo llow the

Congress programme in order to get the votes of the eight
Congress members. After a few months the ministry lost stability.
The Government proposed an increase in land revenue to pay for
the charges incurred in the execution of the Lloyd barrage scheme.
The Congress objected to this and, in spite of Vallabbhai Patel's
efforts at conciliation, maintained its objection. In the meantime
the Muslim League was exerting pressure on Allah Bakhsh to enter
its fold. However, the ministry was not only able to weather the
storm but also to receive a valuable recruit in Hidayatullah, who
left the Muslim League to join the Cabinet. The vastly strengthen­
ed ministry continued in office till the early part of 1 940.
Allah Bakhsh's successor was Mir Bande Ali Khan, the leader
of the new Nationalist Party, an odd combination of the Muslim
League and the Hindu Independents . Tht Congress supported the
Cabinet in the same indirect way in which it had supported the
previous regime. Bande Ali Khan thus carried on until a split
between him and Allah Bakhsh caused the downfall of the Cabinet
in March 1 94 1 . Allah Bakhsh was recalled to power and formed
a ministry wh ich, for the first time since 1 937, contained no
representa.ti\·e of the Ivluslim League. But it was not destined to
last long, a.nJ in O.:: t ober, 1942, Allah B'1khsh was dismissed by
the Governor of Sind on the ground that his renuncia tion of titles
and honours was inconsistent with his oath of allegiance. 42
Hidayatullah now succeeded Allah Bakhsh and formed a Cabinet
consisting of two Muslim Leaguers, one Independent Muslim and
two Hindus. On the following day the Chief Minister joined the
Muslim League because of Congress hostility. 4 3
Orissa

Orissa may be treated more briefly. In J uly 1937 the Congress

formed a ministry under Biswanath Das and continued to rule
the province till October 1939. 0:1 its resignation the province
was administered by the Governor, but the resignation of the
42 Civil & Ali!itary Gazette, 1 1 October, 1 942.
H Ibid. , 24 October. 1 942.
TH E E S TA B L I S H '.\1 E N T OF P R O V I N C I A L A U T O N O '.\I Y 87

Congress ministry had been resented much more in Orissa than

in other Hindu provinces. Consequently towards the end of 1 94 1
some Congress M.L.As. , headed by Godavari Misra, revolted
against the High Command and showed their anxiety to form a
government in co-operation with the other Congress groups. They
lent support to the Maharaja of Parlakiwedi, who had formed the
short-lived care-taker government of April-July 1 937, and it was
declared that the Parlakiwedi-Misra coalition could command the
support of about 36 members in a house of 60. On 23 November,
1 94 1 , therefore, Parlakiwedi formed his coalition ministry of three ;
the Maharaja himself, Misra and one Muslim. This ministry
continued to rule the province in face of bitter attacks from the
Congress High Command.
Congress Provinces

The six Congress provinces can be treated together, fo r there

ministry formation was uniform in character because the Cong­
ress High Command exercised a firm control over all provincial
party politics.
In Madras, where the Congress had captured 74 per cent seats,
Rajagopalacharia formed a government . In Bombay the Congress
had captured only 48 per cent seats, but it was able to form a
ministry under B. G. Kher with the help of a few like-minded
minor groups. In the United Provinces the Congress had gained
59 per cent of the seats, and G. B. Pant became the Chief Minister.
In Bihar, with a 62 per cent majority, Srikrishna Sinha formed the
government. [n Central Provinces, where the Congress had 63 per
cent seats, Khare and later Shukla were the Chief Ministers. In
the North-West Frontier Province only 3 8 per cent seats went t o
the Congress, but Khan Sahib succeeded in forming a ministry.
All these ministries were purely Congress governments. No
coalitions were allowed by the Congress High Command. And all
these ministries resigned at the outbreak of war.
 CHAPTE R 5

Congress Rule 111 the Provinces

A crucial period
The period of less than two and a half years, from July 1 937 to
October 1 939, when Congress ministries ruled eight of the eleven
Indian provinces, was extremely cruc ial in the history of
Hind u-Muslim relations. The reins of power came into the hands
of the Hindus. How they used this opportunity and what effect it
had on the future course of Indian political and constitutional
developments is the theme of this chapter.
Refusal to form coalitions
Immediately after the 1937 elections J i nnah had givi:n a statement
which contained this passage : "The Constitution and policy of
the League do not prevent us from co-operation with others. On
the contrary it is the pa rt and parcel of our basic principle that
wc arc free and ready to co-operate with any group or party
from the very incep tion outside or inside the legislature, if the
,

basic principles are determined by common consent."1 Willing­

ness to co-operate with the Congress could hardly be phrased
in clearer terms. Moreowr, as we have seen, the m anife sto s of
I Quot�d in Abdul Wa hid Khan, India Wins Freedom : The Other Side
(Karachi : 1961 ), pp. 73-74 .
CONGRESS RULE I N THE PROVIN CES 89

the Congress and the Muslim League had much in common and
all impartial observers of the contemporary scene assumed with
considerable justification that coalition ministries would be instal­
led in due course. Election results had strengthened this hope, for
Congress had not bothered to contest more than a small fraction
of Muslim seats and not won even a majority of that. Therefore,
everyone, including some Congressmen, confidently looked for­
ward to the formation of Congress-League coalition ministries in
all Hindu majority provinces. The refusal of the Congress to co­
operate with the League belied these hopes.
What happened in the United Provinces best illustrates the
policy of the Congress. The Muslims constituted only 1 6 per cent
of the province's population, but sometimes percentages are mis­
leading. The Muslim minority s till cherished the memory of a
glorious past and was proud of its traditions and culture. The
influence of the Muslim University at Aligarh was manifest i n the
desire to have a share in politic'.11 responsibility and power. In
the provincial legislature Muslims had 64 seats, which the election
distributed as follows :-
Muslim League 26
Independent Muslims 28
National Agricultural Party 9
Congress Muslim
In most constituencies captured by the Muslim League it s
majority was substantial; in several cases it was overwhelming. 2
The elections in the provinces had been fought in an atmosphere
of amiable neutrality, if not of co-operation. It was understood
that the Muslims expected to be given two places in a coalition
Cabinet. 3 Lengthy discussions took place between the Muslim
League and Congress leaders. At last Abul Kalam Azad, a member
of the Congress High Command, communicated to Chaudhri
Khaliquzzaman, the leader of the Muslim League, the following
terms on which the Congress was prepared to let t he Muslim
League enter the provincial government :
2 Cmd. 5589, p. 62-65.
3 Coupland, op. cir., p. 1 1 1 .
90 T H E STRU G G L E FOR P AKISTAN

"The Moslem League group in the United Provinces Legisla­

ture shall cease to function as a separate group.
"The existing members of the Moslem League Party in the United
Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party, and
will fully share with other members of the Party their privileges
and obligations as members of the Congress Party. They will
similarly be empowered to participate in the deliberations of the
Party. They will likewise be subject to the control and discipline
of the Congress Party in an equal measure with other members,
and the decisions of the Congress Party as regards work in the
l egislature and general behaviour of its members shall be binding
on them. All matters shall be decided by a majority vote of the
Party ; each indiYidual member having one vote.
"The policy laid down by the Congress Working Committee for
their members in the legislatures along with the instructions i ssued
by the competent Co 1:gress bodies pertaining to their work in
such legislatures shall be faithfully carried out by all members of
the Congress Party including these members .
"The Moslem League Parliamentary Board in the United Pro­
vinces will be dissolYed, and no candidates \viii thereafter be set up
by the said Board at any by-election. All members of the Party
shall actively support any candidate that may be nominated by
the Congress to fill up a vacancy occurring hereafter.
"All members of the Congress Party shall abide by the rules of
the Congress Party and offer their full a nd genuine co-operation
with a view to promoting the interests :md prestige of the Cong­
ress.
"In the event of the Congress Party deciding on resignation from
the Ministry or from the legislature the members of the above­
mentioned group wil l also be bound by that decision . " 4
When Azad sent these terms t o the press he added a short note
which said that "it was hoped that, if these terms were <J:greed
to and the Muslim League group of members joined the Congress
4 Coupland, op. cit., p . 1 1 1.
CONGRESS R U LE I N THE PROVINCES 91

Party a s full members, that group would cease t o exist a s a separate

group. In the formation of the Provincial Cabinet it was consi­
dered proper that they should have representatives." 5
No political party with an iota of self-respect could possibly
accept these terms and hope to live afterwards. The Muslim
League, therefore, rejected these terms and a purely Congress
ministry was formed in the province. Similarly, no co-operation
was forthcoming in other Hindu provinces, with the result that
the Muslim League was deliberately kept out of power by the
Congress in no less than eight of the eleven provinces in British
India. This, as we shall see later, was a shortsighted policy which
went a long way in not only alienating Muslim India but a lso
convincing the British Government of the irreconcilability of the
Hindus with the Muslims.
What is the explanation of this unwise arrogance ? All con­
temporary accounts lead to but one conclusion : that the Congress
seriously underrated the strength of Muslim nationalism. Instead
of making a genuine effort at reaching an agreement with the
Muslims, the Congress "saw its victory as an opportunity to
strengthen its position as the sole and exclusive embodiment of
Indian nationalism". 6 On 12 May 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru told
Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman that the former believed that the Hindu­
Muslim question in India "was confined to a few Muslim intellec­
tuals, landlords and capitalists who were cooking up a problem
which did not in fact exist in the m ind of the masses. He ridiculed
the idea of Muslims h aving any separate organization carried on
within the precincts of the Legislature". 7 Nehru's mistake lay
in his attempt at killing Muslim nationalism with ridicule. Later
events were to show the folly of this attitude, for it created nothing
but bitterness and bad blood.
Even such a biased commentator as the Marquess of Lothian
found , during his Indian visit in the winter of 1937-38, that
5 Ibid. , p. 1 1 1 .
6 E. W . R . Lumby, Tlze Transfer of Poll'er in India, I945-47 (London :
1 954), p. 2 1 .
7 Khaliquzzaman, Choudhri, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore : 1 961), p. 1 57.
92 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

Muslims "were profoundly disturbed from one end of India to

another" . The rise of Congress to power "made them feel fo r the
first time what it was to be in a minority". They had become
"acutely aware of the rising tide of Hindu rule", and that "pro­
d uced a cons0lidation of political opinion and political organiza­
tion in India". 8
Muslim reaction to Congress refusal to co-operate with the
League may be read in Jinnah's presidential address at the
Lucknow Session of the Muslim League in October 1 937. He
complained that wherever the Congress \Vas in a majority and
wherever it suited it, it refused to co-operate with the Muslim
League Parties and instead "demanded unconditional surrender
and signing of their pledges''. 9 The Congress "demand was in­
s istent : abjure your party and forswear your policy and pro­
gramme and liquidate Muslim League". 10 He correctly read the
Congress mind, and declared, "On the very threshold of what
little power and responsibility is given, the majority community
have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus ;
only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism,
whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words." He fore­
saw that the "result of the present Congress Party policy will
be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and streng­
thening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence''. 1 1 He felt that
"a fearful reaction will set in when the Congress has created more
and more divisions among Indians themselves, and made the
united front (against British imperialism) impossible". 1 2 Coming
to the chances of agreement with the Congress, he regretted that
"no settlement with majority community" was possible, as "no
Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or
genuine desire for it" . "Honourable settlement can only be achiev­
ed between equals, and unless the two parties learn to rcsp-:: c t and
8 Lothian, in Asiatic Rericw, April 1 93 8 , p. 274.
9 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Wrii i11g 1 vf
Mr. Jinnah (Lahore : 1 952 ed.), vol. J , p. 30.
1 0 Ibid., p . 30.
1 1 Ibid., p. 3 1 .
1 2 Ibid. , p . 3 1 .
C O N G RE S S R U L E I N T H E P H O V I N C E S 93

fear each other, there is no solid ground for a n y settlement." 1 3

This was Jinnah's answer to Nehru's ridicule. Towards the end
of his address he once again o ffered his hand of friendship to the
Congress in unequivocal terms, "we shall not hesitate to co­
operate with any party or group in any practical and constructive
programme for the welfare and advance of the provinces or the
country" .14 This was his answer to the Congress rebuff. And still
the British and Indian authors have created the myth that it was
Jinnah who was stubborn.
Professor Coupland, the Oxford historian, has summed up the
impact of Congress attitude by saying that Azad's terms of "coa­
lition" showed "that in the first action taken by the Congress
leaders under the new Constitution, in their first move in the field
of parliamentary politics, there was nothing of that spirit of com­
promise without which parliamentary government cannot be
expected to work successfully or long. The logic of 'majority rule'
was to be strictly enforced . . . . . If this ultimatum were accepted, it
was frankly hoped, and with good reason, that the League would
cease to exist." 1 5 The Congress rebuff "marked the beginning of
a reaction among the bulk of politically minded Muslims against
the idea of a 'Congress Majority' which was presently to make
the League a more powerful force throughout Muslim India than
it had ever been before". 1 6
The Muslim mass-contact campaign
Along with its refusal to share power with the Muslim League
the Congress pursued an anti-Muslim League policy in another
direction, as well. It was not enough to keep the Muslim League
out of power. Its power among the p:!ople should be weakened
and finally broken. The Congress must appe'.11 to the Muslims to
forsake the League and to come over to the Congress. Thus began
the ambitious but shortlivcd campaign of directly contacting the
Muslim masses with a viev.· to winning them over to the Congress .
1 3 Ibid. , p. 33.
1 4 Ibid., p. <:O.
15 Coupland, op. cit., p, 1 1 2.
16 Jbid. , p. 1 12.
94 THE S T RU GG L E FOR PA KISTAN

The philosophy behind this movement can best be studied in

Jawaharlal Nehru's statement of 27 April 1 937, which summarized
the Congress arguments for such a campaign . He began by assert­
ing that the "Muslim masse_s inevitably think more and more in
terms of common economic problems and common burdens
together with others". He bemoaned that "even Congressmen
sometimes fail to appreciate this and talk in terms of pacts and
compromises with Muslims or o ther religious groups". Power was
now crystallized in "two opposing ranks and we have in India
today two dominating powers-Congress India, representing
Indian nationalism, and British Imperialism" . Other parties "do
not count". The ministries were quite safe in the hands of the
Congress . "Only a lunatic can think that the Muslims can be
dominated and coerced by any religious majority in India." To
think of communal groups functioning as political groups "is to
think in terms of medievalism". Then came the admission that
"it is true that the Muslim masses have been largely neglected by
us in recent years". The Congress now wanted "to repair that
omission" and to carry its message to the Muslims. Those who
talked of the Congress entering into a pact or alliance with Mus­
lims "fail to understand the Congress". He was not prepared to
countenance even "semi-communal nationalist parties", like a
"Musli m Congress Party" : the Congress experience of the
Nationalist Muslim Party had not been a happy one. Communal
issues were "petty and unreal".1 7
Muslim reaction to this campaign was swift and unmistakable.
A fortnight before Nehru published his statement, Maulvi Abdul
Hakim Khan, the president of the Punjab Modaate Muslim
Association, had sharply criticized the Congress campaign, called
i t "conversion of Muslims" and a "threat" and warned his co­
religionists against its implications and dangers. 18 A "Nationa list
Musalman" analyzed the motives of, and prospects for, the
Congress strategy in early May. The Congress, he said, had realiz­
ed that in spite of its success in the provincial elections, it was
1 7 Civil and .\filitary G'1::ctte, 28 April, 1 93 7 .
1s See his letter t o Civil and .\filitaiy Gazette, 1 3 April, 1 93 7 .
C O N G R E S S R U L E I N T H E P R O V I :\ C E S 95

far from representing the people o f India a s a whole. O n the

other hand, in the light of past experience, "we Muslims feel less
i nclined than ever to tie ourselves even to what has been called
India's biggest political organizatiot1" . The Muslim notion of
patriotism was not consistent with the "narrow connotation"
which the Congress put upon it. The writer challenged Nehru to
disclaim Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya as a Congressman be­
fore asking the Muslims to shed 1 heir "reactionary" leaders. 19
The authoritative reply to the Congress campaign came from
J innah. In his presidential address to the Lucknow Session of the
Muslim League in October 1937, he said, "The Congress attempt
under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Musalmans
is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Musalmans,
and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders. It
is a dangerous move, and it cannot mislead anyone. All such
manoeuvres will not succeed, notwithstanding the various bland­
ishments, catchwords and slogans." 2 0 At the Patna Session in
December 1 938 he returned to this issue and pointed out that
the Assembly by-elections in the United Provinces, which was the
centre of the Congress Muslim mass contact campaign, had con­
clusively proved that the Congress movement had met the fate it
deserved. Not only was the Congress unsuccessful in recruiting
the followers of the Muslim League to its fold, but even Muslim
Congressmen were forsaking their party in favour of the League.
This was illustrated by the Congress refusal to set up their own
candidate in the by-election to the central legislature caused by
the death of Maulana Shaukat Ali.2'
The Congress campaign was, by the very nature of contempo­
rary political circumstances, doomed to failure. The more aggres­
sive the tone of the Congress the greater grew the confidence of the
Muslim League. The League countered the Congress campaign
19 A Nationalist Mussalman , "Congress strategy to snare Muslim",
Civil & Military Gazelle, 4 May, 1 937. For another Muslim analysis of the
problem see the statement of Haji Rahim B a k hsh (formerly working Sec­
retary of the All India Muslim Conference), dated 4 May, Civil & Military
Gazette, 5 May, 1937.
20 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op . cit. , pp. 35-36.
2 I Ibid. , p. 89.
96 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

with an equally spirited movement against Congress Raj. And

the latter made more headway than the former. The Congress
had grossly under-estimated the strength of Muslim feeling.
To the Congress argument that "communalism" was a spent
fo rce and an undesirable phenomenon, the Muslims replied by
narrating their hardships under the "secuhr" rule of the Congress.
When the Congress talked of its pledge to secure all legitimate
rights to the minorities, the Muslims pointed to the futility of
constitutional safeguards. The stronger the Congress pretensions
to democracy and freedom the greater were Muslim apprehensions
of a Hindu R:ij. The intelligentsia could easily assess the conse­
quences of Hindu Raj. Even in the villages it was not found
difficult to point out the dangers that lay ahead for an unassimilat­
ed minority if an intolerant majority came to possess power.
Dictatorship of the Congress
The outstanding constitutional feature of the Congress provincial
governments of 1937-39 was tint they did 118t conform to the
kind of parliamentary government envisaged in the 1 935 Act.
The Congress provinces were not autonomous in the sense in
which the 1 935 Constitution wanted them to be.
Immediately after the 1 937 elections, the Congress Working
Committee created, in March, a Parliamentary Sub-Committee,
consisting of Abul Kahm Azad, Rajendra Prasad <rn<l Vallabh­
bhai Patel . It was required "to be in close and constant touch
with the work of the GJngress p:irties in all the legislatures
in the provinces, to advise them in all their activities, and to take
necessary action in any case of emergency". The Sub-Committee
began by distributing work among its three members on regional
and territorial basi5. Azad was placed in charge of Benga l ,
United Provinces, the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Pro­
vince-a Muslim to deal with Muslim provinces. Rajendra Prasad
was allotted B ihar, Orissa and Assam. P:i.tel got Bombay, Madras,
the Central Provinces and Sind. In October 1 938 the Working
Committee enhanced the powers of the Sub-Committee by laying
down that the latter could act without any reference from the
 C O N GRESS R U L E I N T H E PROV I N C ES 97

Provincial Parliamentary Party or the Provincial Congress Com­

mittee. 2 2
The Congress ministries should have been responsible to their
respective provincial legislatures and Congress legislators should
have been accountable to their constituents. But in fact both the
ministers and the members of the assemblies were answerable to
the Congress Working Committee and the Parliamentary Sub­
Committee-in short, to the Congress " High Command". The
High Command made and unmade ministries. It appointed and
dismissed ministers. It controlled the policies pursued by the pro­
vincial Cabinets. It issued instructions to the Chief Ministers .
And later when the Congress ministries resigned en bloc at the
outbreak of war, the directive to lay down the reins of power
were issued by the High Command. And no secret was made of
it. Pandit Nehru defended, or rather explained, for in his opinion
it needed no defence, this practice in November 1 937 by a curious
logic, "It is to the Congress as a whole that the electorate gave
allegiance, and i t is the Congress that i s responsible to the elec­
torate. The Ministers and the Congress Parties in the legislatures
are responsible to the Congress and only through it to the elec7
torates." 2 3 Similarly, some Congress ministers in the Central
Provinces declared in the middle of 1 93 8 that "the resignation
of a minister in a Congress Government was not an individual
matter and, whatever the constitutional position might be, their
allegiance was to tlze Congress". 2 4
The result was that the Congress Cabinets \\·ere no more than
servile servants, acting on the commands of their masters, who
were constitutionally not responsible to any one. Most of India
was in the anomalous position of having in Gandhi, what Sir
Albion Banerji called, a "dictator by proxy". 25 He did not directly
rule. He had no official position. He occupied no post. But he
22 Coupland, op. <.:it., p . 90.
23 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India, op. cit., p. 82.
24 Quoted i n ibid., p. 100 fn. Italics not in the original.
2 5 A. R . Banerji, "Dictatorship by Proxy in India", Asiatic Reriew,
July 1 93 8, pp. 565-569.
98 T H E S T R U G G L E !' O R P A K I S T A N

dictated the policy and it was accepted, almost as a religious obli­

gation. There was no trace of democracy in Congress methods.
Congress was, in fact, "an oligarchy, dominated by Mr. Gandhi,
at whose bidding ministries are made and unmade irrespective
of the wishes of the elected representatives of the people". 2 6

There is no doubt that "the best interests of the country were

sacrificed upon the altar of party politics". The Congress leaders
"placed their actions and their consciences at the disposition of
an irresponsible central caucus, regardless of their duty to their
own constituents, to the Provinces over which they were called
upon to rule, to the elected chambers whose confidence was their
own claim to office". By so doing they gave to India a lesson "of
what Swaraj, as interpreted by the Congress, means". 2 7 This was
a dictatorship which "vitiated responsible party government, dep­
rived India of half the invaluable experience that she was gaining
in the responsibilities of her own government, and convinced the
Muslims and other minorities that weightages in the legislature
and like safeguards were valueless, since all was subordinated to
an irresponsible caucus at Wardha". 2 8 This policy was "far more
analogous to the concurrent Nazi regime in Europe than to any
form of democracy". 2 9

What were the results of this policy ? I n the first place, it

weakened the capacity of responsible government to fulfil its
primary purpose. In a democracy it is public opinion which rules.
But in the Congress provinces, once the elections were over, public
opinion was replaced by the fiat of the Congress High Command .
Congress voters had expressed a wish to be ruled by their Cong­
ress representatives, not by an Olympian Working Committee.
If the 1 93 5 Act was meant to train the Indians in the art of self­
government the Congress made this aim impossible by inter-
26 Sir William Barton, "Indian Muslims Rej ect Hindu Tyranny",
National Review, June 1939.
27 L . F. Rushbrook Williams, "Reflections on Indian Discontent," Nine­
teenth Century and After, March 1 94 1 .
2 S H. V. H o :ison, "Responsibilities i n India," Foreign Affairs, July 1 943 .
29 C. B . Bird wood, A Continent Experiments, op. cit., p. 1 8 .
 CONGRESS RU L E I N T H E PROVINCES 99

posing Gandhi and the Working Committee between the electorate

and the legislative decision-making.

In the second place, provincial autonomy was effectively nulli­

fied by the rule of the High Command. The federal principle
on which the Act of 1 935 was based was thus thrown overboard.
And with this principle went the acquiescence of the Muslims,
the Princes and other non-Congress electorates who had agreed
to work the Constitution in the belief that the federal idea was
the only expedient under the current political circumstances. The
ideal of a federation embracing all India receded into oblivion
with the destruction of provincial autonomy. Thus indirectly but
irretrievably the Congress drove a united India out of the bounds
of probability.

In the third place, the totalitarian principles of the Congress

made it extremely reluctant to negotiate on equal terms with any
other party. Totalitarianism produced arrogance. And arrogance
is the exact opposite of that give and take which is the essence
of politics. In coming years the Congress was to spurn all efforts
at compromise and to answer every move towards an en tente
with the rigid declaration that it alone spoke for Indian na­
t ionalism. Indeed it claimed to be the Indian nation.

Congress rule and the Muslims

For the Muslims of the Hindu-majority provinces the rule of the
Congress ministries from July 1 937 to October 1 939 was nothing
short of a nightmare. The Congress refusal to form coalition minis­
tries in co-operation with the Muslim League had already given
a note of warning to the Muslims ; but what followed during the
actual working of provincial autonomy went beyond the fears of
the Muslims .
On 20 March, 1938, the Council of the All India Muslim
League passed a resolution on the complaints reaching the League
office of the "hardships, ill treatment and i njustice that is meted
out to the Muslims i n various Congress Government Provinces
and particularly to those who are workers and members of the
Muslim League". A special committee of eight members was
1 00 T H E S T R 'C G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

appointed "to collect a l l information , make a l l necessary inqui­

ries, and take such steps as may be considered proper and to sub­
mit their report to the President and the Council from time to
time''. 30 This Committee , under the presidentship of Raja Syed
Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur, submitted its report 3 1 on 1 5 Nov­
ember 1 938. This well-written and balanced statement included a
summary account of events in all the Congress provinces except
the North-West Frontier Province. The information supplied was
based on personal inquiries made by the Committee. A compan­
ion volume to this was the Shareef Report, published in March
1 939, which mainly consisted of a full description of the atrocities
perpetrated by Hindus at various places in Bihar. 3 2 Still another
i ndictment of the Congress Governments was prepared and pub­
lished by Fazlul Haq in December 1 939. 3 3
These three documents, apart from the files of Muslim news­
papers of the period, supply the basic material of the Muslim
case against the undemocratic and anti-Muslim character of the
Congress provincial ministries. Since the conduct of the Congress
rule later popularized the idea of Pakistan and went a long way
in alienating the Muslims from the ideal of a United India , it i s
necessary to give a few details and t o examine the revelations
made by these inquiry reports.
The Pirpur Report began with the declaration that "no one
who is familiar with Indian affairs would deny the fact that the
Congress has failed to i nspire confidence in the minorities and
has failed to carry them with it in spite of its oft-repeated resolu-

30 Reso!ution No. 5 of 1 9 3 8 . Resolutions

of the All India Muslim League
from October 1937 to December, 1938, published by Honorary Secretary,
All India Muslim League, (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 1 2- 1 3 .
3 1 Full title : Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council
ofthe All India Muslim League to inqilire into Muslim Grievances in Congress
Provinces (Lucknow: 1 938).
32 Report of the Inquiry Conunittee appointed by the Working Committee
of the Bihrir Provincial Afus!im League to inquire into some grierances of
.Muslims in Bihar (Patna : 1 939).
33 Jfuslim Sufferings under Congress Rule (Calcutta : 1 939).
C ON G R E S S R U L E I N T H E P R O V I N C E S 101

tion guaranteeing religious and cultural liberty to the various

communities because its actions are not in conformity with its
words". The Congress continued to be a Hindu organization and
"intoxicated with power" it followed a "close-do o r policy" by
refusing to form coalitions with any other party in the legisla­
ture. The Congress's conception of nationalism was to work fo r
the establishment of a state controlled entirely b y the majority
community. The Muslims "think that no tyranny can be as great
as the tyranny of the majority and they believe that only that state
can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to
all communities no matter how small". The report emphasized
that it attached "great importance to this principle, which alone
can safeguard the rights of the Muslims and other minorities".
The aim of the Muslim League was not to wage war against other
communities but to organize the Muslims and to find a solution
of the political and economic problems facing India as a whole.
It was "to the advantage of the Muslims to have a truly national
and liberal programme so that others may co-operate with them".
The "just and legitimate demands" of the Muslims were ignored.
"Contemptuous offers" were made to the leaders of the Muslim
League. They were asked to "liquidate the Muslim League Parlia­
mentary Board, disband the League parties in the Legislatures
and to sign unconditionally the Congress pledge". To the Muslims
"such a course meant the denial of their right to organize them­
selves in order to maintain their separate identity and preserve
their culture, and a complete surrender to the party which, on its
own admission, was mostly composed o f Hindus and which had
failed to win the confidence of the Muslim voters in the general
election". Rival Muslim organizations were "started and spoon­
fed" by the Congress. The true representatives of the Muslims were
disregarded. A virulent campaign of vilification was started against
the League and its leaders with the help of a few Muslims who
signed the Congress pledge. By its Muslim mass contact move­
ment the Congress was trying to "destroy Muslim solidarity and
create disruption in the community". "A number of Muslim wor­
kers have been employed to fight their co-religionists by a political
 1 02 THE STRU G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

party which is predominantly Hindu." When the Congress won

the 1 937 elections in several provinces everyone believed that a
new era would set in, and it was generally taken for granted by
progressive Muslims that the gulf that had existed so long between
the various communities would be bridged once for all, that the
differences would disappear and that all progressive national ele­
ments, whose political ideas were similar, would be brought to·
gether for the service of India and would work a common pro­
gramme for the freedom of the people. But in its place came the
Muslim mass contact campaign, in which the Congress used
Mau/vis for creating splits among Muslims. The Muslims naturally
concluded from this that the Congress wanted to lure them into
its fold by a policy of "divide and rule". It was obvious that the
Congress wished to avoid a settlement with the Muslim commu­
nity "on the real issues". 3 4
The Shareef Report confined its field o f inquiry t o Bihar. It
was not as restrained in its language as the Pirpur Report, and
contained lurid accounts of Congress a nd Hindu high-handed­
ness. It depicted the reign of terror let loose upon the Muslims
of the province not only by the ministry and the local Congress
leaders, but also by the administrative and judicial services.35
Fazlul Haq's Muslim Sufferings zmder Congress Rule was a
republication in pamphlet form of a statement issued by him
soon after the resignation of the Congress ministries. The Congress,
said the statement, had set the stage "for the blatant arrogance
of the militant Hindu to burst the bounds of restraint which
non-partisan Governments had hitherto imposed". The Congress,
began by imposing their will on the Muslim minorities. What was
this will ? "Mother cow must be protected . . . Muslims must not
be allowed to eat beef . . . The religion of Muslims must be
humbled, because was not this the land of the Hindus ? Hence the
34 Pirpur Reporl, op. cit, pp. 1-5, 7- 1 6 .
35 Coupland, op. cit . , p. 1 86, gives a summary of t h e Report and its
findings.
CON G R E S S RULE IN T H E PROV I N C E S 103

forbidding of azan, attacks on worshippers in mosques, the in­

sistence on the triumphant passage of noisy processions before
mosques at prayer times." "Was it strange, then, that tragedy
followed tragedy ?" After this introduction followed a description
of 72 incidents in Bihar, 33 in the United Provinces and a more
brief account of events in the Central Provinces. Muslim griev­
ances were broadly enumerated. The use of beef by Muslims was
prohibited in areas where it had the sanction of tradition and
custom. If a Muslim had as much as killed a cow for sacrifice,
Muslims were killed, their houses were burnt and their women
and children assaulted. Muslim butchers were assaulted. Pigs were
thrown into mosques. The azan was denounced and interrupted.
Muslim shops and other business establishments were boycotted.
Muslims were prevented from using the village wells. Official
intervention was always biased in favour of the Hindus. On many
occasions peace was restored by means of a so-called "compro­
mise" which was in fact a pro-Hindu settlement "imposed by the
weight of authority on a helpless Muslim minority".36
Grievances listed i n these three reports did not exhaust the
Muslim indictment of Hindu rule. The intelligentsia among the
Muslims was equally perturbed by the plight of Muslim educa­
tion in India as a whole and particularly in the Congress provinces.
The Muslims had fallen behind in education during British rule,
and they realized the severe handicap under which they were
working. But certain aspects of Congress policy in the field o f
education now alarmed them. The All India Muslim Educational
Conference, at its fifty-second annual Session held at Calcutta
at the end of 1 938, found it necessary to appoint a Committee
under the chairmanship of Nawab Kamal Yar Jang Bahadur.
Its terms of reference included a thorough survey of the educa­
tional system in India and the framing of a scheme of Muslim
education with a view to "the preservation of the d istinctive
features of their culture and social order". 4- Sub-Committee
headed by Sir Azizul Haq, Speaker of the Bengal Legislative
Assembly and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta,
3 6 Coupland, op. cit., pp. 186- 187. Azan =adhan = Muslim call to prayers.
1 04 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TA N

toured India fo r gathering relevant information. The final Report

was published in the Spring of 1 942.
A detailed treatment of this Report 37 falls outside the scope
of this book, but it is relevant to look at its findings in relation
to the attitude of the Congress Governments towards education
in general and Muslim education in particular. The Report strong­
ly criticized the Wardha Scheme of education which was imple­
mented in its worst form in the Vidya lvfandirs of the Central
Provinces. It is true that the author of this scheme was a Muslim,
Zakir Husain, but the Muslims of the province had opposed
it and their protests had been ignored. When a Congress bill for
the confirmation and regulation of the Scheme was introduced in
the Central Provinces Assembly every Muslim member in the
House opposed it, so did some Hindus, including Dr. Khare. The
Muslim complaint was that it was intended to wean the Muslims
away from their traditions, culture and religion. Its impkmenta­
tion was even worse than the scheme itself. The schools were to
be managed by committees chosen through joint electorates. No
provision was made for Muslim schools. No effort was made to
train Urdu-speaking teachers. Small children were made to stand
with folded hands in front of Gandhi's portrait in postures of
H indu worship and sing hymns in his praise. The parent plan, the
Wardha Scheme . was a creation of Gandhi's mind. It inculcated
the Hindu doctrine of non-violence and sought to create in the
young minds respect for Hind u legendary heroes and mythical
religious personages. Teaching of religion was left out of the
Scheme. Muslim fears were coming t rue, for an education com­
pletely divorced from their traditions, culture and religion would
subvert all that they held dear. 3 s
Besides the fundamental principles of the Congress educational
policy, some of its details also caused considerable concern in
Muslim ranks. 0:1e example will illustrate this. In Bombay a new
series of primers were introduced as text books for schools. Local
37 Kamal Yar Jwzg Education Committl'e Report (Calcutta : 1 942).
38 See Coupland, op. cit., pp. 1 89- 1 9 1 .
C O N G RE S S R U L E I N T H E P R O V I N CE S 1 05

educational authorities could prescribe books only from among

those primers, which had been prepared under the supervision of
Zakir Husain, the author of the Wardha Scheme. Muslims
objected to this on the ground that the books glorified Hindu
traditions and observances and used Hinduized vocabulary. The
Bombay Provincial Muslim League was so agitated that it passed
a resolution, characterising the introduction of these primers as
"a subtle move on the part of the Congress to destroy Muslim
culture and civilization in India by bringing up the next genera­
tion of Muslims in total ignorance of it, and by saturating the
minds of Muslim children in their impressionable age with
notions of the Hindu culture and civilization". In the Bombay
Municipal Corporation the Muslim resolution asking for the
withdrawal of the primers was defeated : all the ten Muslim
League members staged a walk out. After the resignation of the
Congress ministry the primers were again examined by the
Urdu Text-Book Committee, which now reported that they were
not suitable for use ; and consequently they were rem0ved from
the approved list. 3 9
Throughout this period the Muslim League was, through the
resolutions of its Council and Working Committee, drawing atten­
tion to the anti-Muslim policies of the Congress and appealing ,
on the one hand, to the Muslim masses to keep calm and com­
posed, and , on the other, to the Congress to change its biassed
outlook. It condemned the Congress policy of " foisting Bande
J.fatram as the national anthem upon the country i n callous dis­
regard of the feelings of Muslims". 4 0 It deprecated and protested
against the formation of Congress ministries "in flagrant violation
of the letter and the spirit of the Government of India Act of
1 935 and instrument of instructions" ; it condemned the Governors
"for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them
for the safeguard of the interests of the Musalmans and other
39 For this controversy see The Times of India, 1 1 and 26 July and 14
December, 1 939.
40 Resolution No. 6 of 1 937, Resolutions of the All India Muslim League
from October 1937 to December 1938 published by the Hony. Secretary, All
India Muslim League (Delhi : n.d .), p . 4. Bande Matram was idolatrous
and anti-Muslim i n origin.
 106 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TA N

important minorities". 41 It feared that the attempt to replace Urdu

by Hindi might "adversely affect the growth of comradeship bet­
ween Hindus and Muslims". 4 2 It "viewed with alarm" the large
number of communal riots i n the United Provinces, Bihar, the
Central Provinces and Bombay, and believed that the Congress
Governments had "signally failed to discharge their primary duty
of protecting [the Muslims in] the Muslim minority provinces". 4 3
It threatened to resort to "direct action" as a result of the atroci­
ties committed on the Muslims of Bihar, the United Provinces and
the Central Provinces. 44 It enumerated its objections to the Wardha
Scheme of basic education : it would destroy Muslim culture and
secure the domination of Hindu culture, it sought to superimpose
upon education the ideology of the Hindu community, it aimed
at instilling the political ideals of one party, the Congress, into
the minds of the children, it ignored religious instruction, it en­
couraged highly Sanskritised Hindi at the cost of Urdu, and it led
to the introduction of highly objectionable text books. 4 5
Simultaneously the Quaid-i-Azam also continued to comment
upon the Congress policy and its reactions among the Muslims.
Speaking at an Osmania University dinner on 28 September, 1 938,
he said that he had always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact, but
"such a pact can only be an honourable one and not a pact which
will mean the destruction of one and the survival of the other".46
In the fo llowing month he accused the Congress of inability to
face realities and of aiming to revive "Hindu domination and
supremacy" over the entire subcontinent.47 In an interview to the
Manchester Guardian he declared that any observer of the Indian
scene between 1937 and 1 939 would see that "the sole aim and
4 1 Resolution No. 7, ibid., p. 4.
4 2 Resolution No. 1 1 , ibid. , p. 6.
4 3 Resolution No. 3 of 1 938, ibid. , p. 20.
44 Resolution No. 4, ibid. , pp. 56-57.
45 Resolution No. 16 of 1939, Resolutions ofthe All India
Muslim League
from December 1938 to March 1940, published by the Honorary Secretary,
All India Muslim League, (Delhi, n.d.), pp. 1 4- 1 5 .
4 6 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op . cit., p. 96.
47 Ibid., p. 98.
CONGRE S S R U L E IN THE P RO V I N C E S 1 07

object of the Congress is to annihilate every other organization

in the country and to set itself up as a fascist and authoritarian
organization of the worst type". It was impossible to work a parlia­
mentary government in India : democracy could only mean Hindu
raj. "This is a position to which Muslims will never submit."48
There is overwhelming evidence from impartial quarters i n
support o f the anti-Muslim conduct of the Congress ministries and
consequent Muslim alarm at the prospects of a majority rule i n
India. I n the United Provinces, the provincial government had
directed the district administrations to "consult local Congress­
men in regard to administrative matters" . 49 The Congress rule
taught the minorities that "administrative, or even constitutional,
safeguards are no effective protection against an attitude of mind
in the numerically dominant party which treats all other sections
of opinion as politically-defeated antagonists". The word "com­
promise" has "not entered into the vocabulary of Congress". The
Congress still remained, in its own view, the "sole repository of
progress, of patriotism, of wisdom". s o The whole Congress political
philosophy was "one of totalitarian control in which all forms of
opposition were to be absorbed into the one national machine". s t
Even an extreme Nationalist Muslim, Shaukatullah Ansari,
confessed that "the use of criminal law for the prevention of cow
slaughter by a Congress Government could not be defended."52
In the words of an Indian Christian, the Congress was at this time
"the Indian counterpart of the Nazi party in Germany" . s 3 It is
the testimony of a British visitor to India that during the first two
years of Congress government in the United Provinces "riots
doubled i n number, armed robbery increased by 70 per cent and
murder by 33 per cent" .54 The Congress chairman of a Local
48 Ibid., p. 99.
49 Sir William Barton, in Asiatic Review, October, 1 94 1 , p. 698.
so L. F. Rushbrook Williams, <;Reflections on Indian Discontent", Nine­
teenth Century and After, March 1 94 1 , pp. 238-239.
5 1 C. B. Birdwood, A Continent Experiments, op. cit., p. 1 9.
52 Shaukatullah Ansari, Pakistan: The Problem of India (Lahore : 1 944),
p. 10.
5 3 Rev. Pitt Bonarjee, letter to Manchester Guardian, 1 8 August, 1 942.
54 F. Yeats-Brown, The Indian Pageant (London : 1 942), p. 149.
 1 08 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

Board in the Central Provinces sent a directive to the Headmasters

of Urdu Schools, which were attended by Muslim boys, ordering
the students to worship Gandhi's portrait.55 Sir James Crerar ad­
mitted that incidents had occurred in the Congress provinces well
calculated to justify suspicions of the Muslims.56 In the opinion of
Sir Verney Lovett, a historian of Indian Nationalism, the fact was
that the unexpected accession to power warped the judgment of
Hindu leaders.57
Towards the close of Congress domination the subcontinent
was "in a state of suppressed civil war" and an explosion was only
prevented by the police and the British military system. 58
The Congress went even further. Not content with ruling a
majority of provinces singlehanded, it lost no opportunity of
harassing the Muslim governments in the Muslim-majority pro­
vinces . In connection with the Shahidganj agitation in the Panja b
the Sikhs were "thought to have been inspired and perhaps
financed by Congress-men in order to embarrass the Govern­
ment" .59 In Bengal the Congress was perenially trying to prevent
the formation of a stable ministry. Similarly in Sind the Congress
group neither helped to form a proper Government nor let the
Muslim League and its allies do so.
The result was that in the Hindu provinces the Muslims felt
that "a Hindu tide was rising which threatened in the long run
to submerge their faith and culture and traditions, not only in the
south where the Muslim-minority had always been small and
weak, but also in the north where it was more substantial and
important and where so noble an array of monuments recall to
55 Sir Michael O'Dwyer, "India Under the Congress'', National Review,
July 1939, p. 47. The words used were "puja k ijawe" .
5 6 See his "India and her Future", Fortnightly Review, March 1 940.
57 In Q uarterly Review, October 1 94 1 , pp. 264-265.
58 Sir Wi lliam Barton, "The Viceroy's Council and Indian Politics",
Fortnightly Review, August 1 942, p. 1 1 2.
59 Coupland, op. cit p. 48. Besides Congressmen were always fulminating
..

against the Sikandar regime. For a Unionist reply to Hindu criticism see
Mian Ahmad Yar Daultana, "Leaves from a Unionist's Diary", Civil and
Military Gazette, 6 and 12 January, 1 937.
CONGRESS RULE I N THE PRO V I N C E S 109

Muslims the grandeur of the Mughul age."60 The Congress was a

Hindu organization-and that was the "one cardinal and undeni­
able fact". "The psychological and philosophical background of
the Congress movement, its modes of thought and conduct, the
quality of what was known as 'Congress-mindedness' were essen­
tially Hindu, emphatically not Muslim."61 So blatant and bias­
sed had been the Congress attitude towards the Muslims that,
at the time the Congress ministries resigned, it seemed that in the
United Provinces and Bihar "constitutional government might
soon become impossible" without a "drastic change of
policy". 62 "Slowly but relentlessly the Congress was forcing the
Muslims of India into separation ."
Muslim League-Congress negotiations
Between 1 935 and the outbreak of war several attempts were made
by the Muslim League to come to an agreement with the Hindus.
The earliest of these efforts at an entente was made i n the begin­
ning of 1 935 when Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad, the Congress
President, held unity talks. These conversations lasted from
January to March, and were then abruptly terminated without
achieving any agreement. In the joint communique, issued by the
two leaders at the end of the talks, they regretted that their earnest
effort at finding a solution to the communal problem "which
would satisfy all the parties concerned" had ended in failure.63
The Congress explanation of the failure was that a substantial
measure of common agreement had been achieved and, "left to
t hemselves", the two leaders "would have reached a settlement",
which "they have every hope would have been endorsed by the
Congress and Muslim League", but "their attempt to make others
outside the two organizations agree to the same failed". 64 But
Jinnah stated, in May 1 937, that the talks had failed because
60 Coupland, op. cit., p. 192.
61 fbid., pp. 192- 1 9 3 .

6 2 Ibid. , p. 1 5 7 .
63 Durlab Singh (Ed.), A Complete Record of Unity Talks (Lahore:
n.d.), p . 1 2 .
6 4 Congress Bulletin of 20 March 1 935, quoted i n ibid.
1 10 THE S T R U G GLE F O R P A K I S TAN

Rajendra Prasad could not get the approval of "certain sections

of influential Congress leaders", not to speak of the Hindu Maha­
sabha, for the formula which he himself had approved. 65 However,
Rajendra Prasad's version was that the formula was agreeable to
the Congress, but Jinnah had insisted that Pandit Madan Mohan
Malaviyya, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, also put his
signature to the agreement. Malaviyya declined to do so and the
talks fell through. 66 To this Jinnah again sent a rejoinder, on
26 July 1 937, clarifying the issue on which the Delhi talks had
foundered . He reminded Prasad that it was he and other Congress
leaders who had requested him (Jinnah) for a meeting. The point
was that a substitute for the Communal Award was needed which
would be acceptable to all parties, and in the meantime the pro­
vincial part of the 1 935 Constitution should be worked for what
it was worth until "we secure a constitution for our country which
will satisfy our people" . This was not agreeable to the Congress
leaders. Obviously if a substitute for the Communal Award was
to be agreed upon, a proposal should have come from the Hindu
and Sikh leaders who opposed the Award. Finally, Jinnah repeat­
ed his offer of January 1 93 5 that if Rajendra Prasad was convinced
that his formula was acceptable to the Congress and informed him
(Jinnah) to that effect "with the authority and sanction of the
Congress", he would place it before the All India Muslim League
without delay. 67
In the winter of 1 937-38 Jinnah and Gandhi exchanged letters,
which were of no great intrinsic importance, but clearly brought
out, for the first time, the fundamental difference of outlook bet­
ween the two organizations that they led. In his letter of 3
March, 1 938, Jinnah put the heart of the matter in two sentences.
"You recognize the All India Muslim League", he wrote, "as the
one authoritative and representative organization of Musalmans
i n India, and on the other hand you represent the Congress and
other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis we
65 Ibid. , pp. 1 1 - 1 2 .
66 Rajendra Prasad's
Statemen t , ibid. , pp. 1 3- 1 4 .
67 Jami!-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 2 1 -26.
C O N G R E S S R U L E I K T H E P R O V I :"l C E S 111

can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach." To that,

on 8 March, Gandhi replied that he could not "represent either
the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean", but promised
to use his moral influence with the Hindus to secure an "honour­
able settlement". 68
Simultaneously Jinnah was also corresponding with Jawaharlal
Nehru. When Jinnah wrote to him about Muslim grievances in
Hindu provinces. Nehru immedi<itely came to the defence of the
Congress ministries and denied all charges levelled against them
by the Muslims. He said that he "was not aware of any attempt
on the part of the Congress to injure Urdu". He was also un­
aware of how "the Congress is trying to establish Hindu Raj" or
"who is doing it". The crux of the Congress point of view was
contained in Nehru's long letter of 6 April, 1 938, in which he tried
to reply to a list of inquiries made by Jinnah. He dismissed the
fourteen points of Jinnah as "somewhat out of date". The Com­
munal Award was an undesirable thing, and "if we think in terms
of an independent India we cannot possibly fit in that Award with
it". The fixing of Muslim share in the State Services should be done
by convention and not by a statutory enactment which "will
impede progress and development". The Congress was not pre­
pared to support the Muslims i n the Shahidganj controversy and
agitation. The Congress was not prepared to eliminate the Bande
Matram, for it "would be improper for a national organization
to do this". Nor did he see any objection to the use of the Congress
flag. The Muslim League was "an important communal organiza­
tion and we deal with it as such". Other Muslim organizations
could not be ignored, and therefore the question of recognizing
it as the o ne and only organization of Indian Muslims did not
arise. Finally, Nehru professed ignorance of "what is meant by
coalition ministries". A Ministry "must have a definite political
and economic programme and policy". The Congress had gone
to the assemblies with a definite programme a nd in furtherance
of a clear policy. On that basis it was ready to co-operate with
6 8 Full text of Jinnah-Gandhi letters in Durlab Singh, op. cit., pp. 16-32.
1 12 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

other groups. In simpler words, the Congress stood by its refusal

to share power with Muslims or any other groups in the pro­
vinces. Towards the end of this letter Nehru was frank and forth­
right : "Personally the idea of pacts and the like does not appeal
to me."69
Jinnah replied to this letter on 1 2 April . To him the long letter
h ad been "painful reading". He objected to its "tone and lang­
uage" which "display the same arrogance and militant spirit as
if the Congress is the sovereign power". He repeated that unless
the Congress recognized the Muslim League "on a footing of
complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a
Hindu-Muslim settlement" there was no chance of a peaceful
solution to the Indian problem.7°
This unsuccessful attempt was followed by Jinnah's corres­
pondence with Subhas Chandra Bose, the Congress President. In
May 1 938, i n reply to a note by Bose which Jinnah had put
before the Muslim League Executive Council , the League Council
passed a resolution asserting that it was not possible for it to
"treat or negotiate \Vith the Congress the question of Hindu­
Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is
the authoritative and representative organization of the Musal­
mans of India".71 On 2 August Jinnah wrote to Bose, saying that
the representative and authoritative status of the League "was
accepted when the Congress-League pact was arrived at in 1 9 1 6
at Lucknow and ever since till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad
conversations took place, it has not been questioned". Muslims
in the fold of the Congress "do not and cannot represent" Indian
Muslims. Nor \ms the Muslim League aware that any Muslim
political organization "has C\"Cr made a claim that it can speak
69 Text of this letter i n ibid., pp. 32-50.
70 Jinnah's letter of 1 2 April, ibid., pp. 50-53.
1 1 Resol11tio11s of the All India Afuslim League from October 1937 to

December 1 938, published by the Honorary Secretary, All India Muslim

League (Delhi, n.d.), p. 22.
 CON G R E S S R U L E I N T H E P R OV I N C E S 113

or negotiate o n behalf of the Muslims of India".72 To this the

Congress Working Committee gave an incredibly naive reply on
2 October. "The substance of your letter seems to be that the
League does not expect the Congress, whether implicitly or ex­
plicitly, to acknowledge its status as the authoritative Muslim
organization of India. If this view is accepted by the League, I
am authorized to state that the Working Committee will confer
with the Committee that may be appointed by the League to draw
up the terms of settlement. " 7 3 On 10 October the Muslim League
gave the only possible answer that the Congress had "entirely
misread" Jinnah's letter of 2 August and that the League was still
ready to proceed with the negotiations for settlement of the Hindu­
Muslim questions "on the basis defined by my letter". 74
Jinnah and Nehru once again corresponded with each other in
December 1 939. On 8 December Nehru read Jinnah's statement
fixing 22 December as a "Day of Deliverance" and thanksgiving
as a mark of relief that the Congress ministries had at last ceased
to function. This made him write to Jinnah on 9 December·and
tell him of his (Nehru's) realization that "our sense of values and
objectives in life and politics differ so very greatly". Now the
gulf appeared to be "wider than ever". To this Jinnah's reply was
a reassertion of his old claim that the Muslim League must be
accepted by the Congress as the authoritative spokesman of Mus­
lim India before a settlement could be arrived at. He also added
that the League could not endorse the Congress demand for a
declaration as laid down in the resolution of 10 October, 1 937,
of the All India Congress Committee till such time as an agree­
ment was reached with regard to the minority problem. But Nehru
was adamant and, in his letter of 1 4 December, clearly stated that
the Congress could not accept the League as representing Muslim
72 Letter of 2 August, 1 938, sent by M . A. Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim
League Executive Council to S. C. Bose, President of the Congress, ibid. ,
pp. 3 1 -3 3 . This was in reply to Bose's letter of 2 5 July for which see pp. 33-36.
73 Text in ibid. , p. 38.
7 4 Letter o f 10 October, 1 938, sent bv M. A. Jinnah on behalf ·of the
Muslim League Executive Council to S . C. Bose, President of the Congress,
ibid. , pp. 37-3 8 . The entire text of Jinnah-Bose correspondence is also avail­
able in Durlab Singh, op. cit.
1 14 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A KI STAN

India without dissociating itself from, or disowning, the non­

Muslim League Muslim organizations which "have adopted the
same political platform as we have done in the Congress". As for
the League's refusal to endorse the Congress demand of a declara­
tion of war aims from the British Government, "it thus seems
that politically we have no common ground and that our object­
ives are different", and that "makes discussion difficult and fruit­
less". In his next letter, of 1 6 December, Nehru repeated that the
Congress demand "has nothing to do with the Hindu-Muslim
problem".75
A study of these negotiations and letters leads to a number of
significant conclusions. First, the Congress denied all Muslim
charges of bias and tyranny levelled against the Congress provin­
cial ministries . As we have seen, Nehru refused to believe that any
Congress Government had offended the Muslim minority. Se­
condly, the Congress was not prepared to consider the Hindu­
Muslim problem as an important issue. It was dismissed as an
insignificant ebullition which time and changing circumstane:es
would sweep into oblivion. Thirdly, the Congress emphasized its
all-inclusive nature and its claim to represent the entire Indian
nationalist movement. It looked upon other parties and groups
as hardly less than mischievous manifestations of reaction and
primitiveness. The Congress was the only genuine national move­
ment speaking for all Indians irrespective of caste and creed. Many
Muslim political groups supported the Congress. Only the Muslim
League stood out, but how long could it afford to do so ? One
day, perhaps sooner than expected, the League would also step
in line with the Congress. Why should, therefore, the League
claims be taken seriously ? This attitude-a mixture of cynicism,
wishful thinking and arrogance-had expected repercussions, and
soon helped the League to strengthen itself beyond recognition.
It ultimately reinforced the foundations of Muslim separation.
But during the period with which we are now dealing the Congress
could not even dream of such future developments. It gravely
75 Full tex t of correspondence in ibid.
CONGRESS RULE I N THE PROVIN CES 115

underrated the strength of Muslim nationalism and naively over­

estimated its own popularity and prospects. The Muslim mass
contact campaign, mounted so confidently by Nehru and other
Hindu leaders, proved a flop and made the Congress a laughing­
stock among the Muslims. The Congress refusal to share power
made the Muslims close their ranks and present a united front
which otherwise they might not have been able to form for
years. Congress oppression in Hindu provinces strengthened the
forces of separation. Congress harassment of Muslim govern­
ments drove independent politicians, like Sir Sikandar Hayat
Khan, into the Muslim League fold .
The Congress policy during 1 936-39 was thus a colossal failure,
and it was only the jaundiced eye of its leaders which read in this
defeat the signs of a triumph of nationalism.
 CHAPTER 6

The Moven1ent For Pakistan

A significant turn
The changing attitude of the Muslim League towards the constitu­
tional issues between 1 938 and 1 940 provides an interesting study.
The League's policy underwent a radical change regarding the
provinces as well as the Centre in the light of Muslim experience
of the provincial autonomy-particularly in the Hindu-majority
provinces.
In December 1 938, at its annual session at Patna, the All India
Muslim League authorized Jinnah "to explore the possibility of
a suitable alternative which would completely safeguard the in­
terests of Musalmans and other minorities in India" .1 In pursu­
ance of this resolution, in March 1939, the League Working
Committee appointed a committee under Jinnah's presidentship,
"to examine various schemes already propounded and those that
may be submitted hereafter" and to report to the Working Com­
mittee their conclusions.2
I Resolutions of the A ll India l'vfu.slim League from October 1937 to De­
cember 1938, op. cit., p. 6 1 .
2 Resolutions of the A ll India Afuslim League from December 1938 to
March 1940, (Delhi : n.d.), pp. 1 -2 .
THE M O V E M E N T F O R P A KISTAN 1 17

Thus by the beginning of 1 940 Muslim politics had decidedly

taken a new and significant turn. The departure from the pre- 1937
policy was remarkable. The Muslims no longer wanted an Indian
federation. No longer was it a question of merely voting in favour
of or against a certain (or even any) federal scheme. Federation
would not do at all. The greater the Hindu emphasis on a strong
Centre the greater the Muslim revulsion to any Centre. The more
the Congress emphasized the principle of majority rule, the more
the Muslims talked of Muslim self-determination. As Congress
travelled towards the idea of a united India so did the League
turn towards "Muslim independence". The political unity oflndia ,
which had been taken for granted by the Muslim League before
1 937, was no longer looked upon as an axiom. Hindu insistence
on unity and nothing but unity had produced the Muslim reaction
of opposing this unity at any price. The Indian political situation
had undergone a fundamental, basic, vital change. Never again
was it to be the same.
The rise of separatism
Before the All India Muslim League passed its historic Lahore
(or Pakistan) Resolution in March 1940, the establishment of a
separate Muslim state or states in this subcontinent had been ad­
vocated by some public figures. What follows in this section is a
rapid survey of the contributions of these harbingers of Pakistan .
The concentration of Muslim majorities in tht: north-west and
north-east of the subcontinent could not remain unnoticed by
political thinkers. Saiyid Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, the famous
worker in the cause of world Islamic unity, first thought o f the
possibility of a Muslim Republic embracing the present Central
Asian Socialist Republics, Afghanistan and the Muslim majority
areas in the north-west of the subcontinent. 3
It is claimed by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali that as early as 1 9 1 5
he said i n a n address t o Bazm-i-Shibli that "North o f India i s
Muslim and we shall keep it Muslim. Not only that. W e will make
it a Muslim State. But this we can do only if and when we and
3 A History of the Freedm Movement, vol. I , (Karachi : 1 9 57), pp. 48-49.
 1 18 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

our North cease to be Indian. For that is a pre-requisite to it. So

sooner we shed 'Indianism', the better for us and for Islam." 4
Soon after i n 1 9 1 7 Dr. Abdul Jabbar Kheiri and Professor
Abdus Sattar Kheiri generally known as Kheiri Brothers, suggest­
ed a plan of the partition of India in the Stockholm Conference
of the Socialist International. 5
In March and April, 1 920, the Dhu'l- Qarnain of Badrun pub­
lished an open letter from one Muhammad Abdul Qadir Bilgrami
to Gandhi advocating partition of the subcontinent, in which he
gave even a list of the Muslim districts, which is, generally speak­
ing, not too different from the present boundaries of East and
West Pakistan. 6 These letters seem to have attracted some notice
because they were later published in the form of a pamphlet which
ran into two editions. The second edition is dated December,
1 925.
In the early days of the First World War one Lovat Fraser who
had been Editor of the Times of India published a map i n the
Daily Express of London in which he drew an arrow from Con­
stantinople to S�tharanpur, a city in the present Indian State of
Uttar Pradesh , showing a Muslim "corridor" where the Muslims
were in a majority. 7
The President of the Hindu Mahasabha, Savarkar, frequently
referred to the Hindu-> and the Muslims as two nations. Another
prominent member of the Congress ,is well as the Hindu Maha­
sabha, Lala Lajpatrai, suggested the partition of India in 1 924. 8
In 1923 Sardar Muhammad Gui Khan of the d istrict of Dera
Ismail Khan of the North-West Frontier Province advocated be­
fore the Frontier Inquiry Committee the division of India between
the Hind us and the Muslims, a l locating to the Musl i m s the area

4 Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, Pakistan, op. cit . , p. 2 1 7 .

s Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan (Lahore : 1963),pp. 68-90.
6 Muhammad Abdul Qadir Bilgrami, Hindu 1\.fuslim Ittihad per Khu/a
Khat Mahatma Gandhi ke nam ( Aligarh : 1925).
7 I. H. Qureshi, Tize MusUm Co.wnunity of the !lido-Pakistan Subco11-
ti11e11t, op. cit., pp. 295-296.
8 Richard Symonds, Tire Afaki11g of Pakistan (London : 1 950), p. 59.
THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 1 19

from Peshawar to Agra. Mohamed Ali was severely criticized

by the Hindu members when in supporting a resolution for
the introduction of reforms in the North-West Frontier Province
he mentioned the existence of the "Muslim corridor" mentioned
by Lovat Fraser. 9 He upheld stoutly, in an article in his review,
The Comrade, the right of self-determination of any areas in the
North-West Frontier. He was quite clear that the principle of
self-determination could not be applied only to areas situated in
the heart of India because then separation would be physically
impossible. 1 0
This was in line with his thinking because he said in the Round
Table Conference that "the Musalmans constitute not a minority
in the sense in which the late war and its sequel has habituated
us to consider European minorities . . . A community that in India
alone must be numbering more than 70 millions cannot easily
be called a minority." 1 0
In 1 928 Aga Khan III advocated independence for each pro­
vince at the Calcutta meeting of the All Parties Convention. 1 2
Sir Muhammad Iqbal i s generally credited with initiating the
idea of separation. As has been mentioned, there were people
before him who advocated partition, but Iqbal was the first im­
portant public figure to propound the idea from the platform of
the Muslim League. In his presidential address to the League's
annual session at Allahabad in 1 930, he discussed the problem in
India at length. The salient points of his address are summarized
below in almost in his own words :
"The various caste-units and religious units i n India have shown
no inclination to lose their individualities in a larger whole. Each
9 I. H. Qureshi, The l\faslim Community of the Inda-Pakistan Subco11ti-
11ent, op. cit . , p. 296.
10 Mohamed Ali, "The North-West Frontier and Hindu Fear", The
Comrade, Delhi, 22 May, 1 925, and 5 June, 1 925.
1 1 Indian Round Table Conference 1930-3 1 ( Minorities Committee,
documents, minutes, meetings 1-6).
12 Pattabhai Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress,
op. eit., vol. I, p . 334.
 1 20 T H E S TR U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

group is intensely jealous of its separate existence. The formation

of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence
of a nation is not possible in India. India is Asia in miniature. If
the principle that the Muslims are entitled to full and free develop­
ment on the lines of their own culture and traditions in their own
Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent com­
munal settlement, they will be ready to stake their all for the
freedom of India. Communalism, in the higher sense, is indispens­
able to the formation of a harmonious whole in India. The units
of Indian society are not territorial. The principles of European
democracy cannot be applied to India without recognizing the fact
of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation o f a
Muslim India within India is. therefore, perfectly justified . Thus
possessing full opportunity of development within its body politic,
the Muslims of the North-West will prove the best defenders of
India against any foreign invasion, be that invasion one of ideas
or of bayonets. A unitary form of government is simply unthink­
able in a self-governing India. What is called "residuary powers"
must be left entirely to self-governing states . I would never advise
the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or
of Indian origin, which negatives the principles of a true federa­
tion, or fails to recognize them as a distinct p.}litical unit. A
redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent
solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the
Indian Muslims."
The following portion of the address is quoted verbatim :
"The Muslim demand fo r the creation of a Muslim India within
India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All­
Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi, is, to my mind, wholly
inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead
of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes,
affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may
be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this House will
emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this reso­
lution. Personally, I would go further than the demands embodied
T H E M O V E M E N T F O R PA K I S T AN 121

i n it. I would like t o see the Panjab, North-West Frontier Province,

Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-gov­
ernment within the British empire or without the British empire,
the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State
appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of
North-West India."1 3
Some writers have taken Iqbal to mean that he wanted only a
consolidated Muslim unit within the confederation of India but
this is incorrect. If that were so, he would not have mentioned
self-government within the British empire or without it. A resolu­
tion of the All Parties Muslim Conference was, in his view, a
demand for the autonomy of Islam within a free I ndia. That is
the reason why he prefaced his remark by saying that personally
he would like to go even further which could mean only indepen­
dence. In the Third Round Table Conference Iqbal pleaded that
there should be no central government in the subcontinent and
that the provinces should be autonomous and independent domi­
nions. 1 4
Iqbal did not give a name to his projected Muslim state. That
was the work of Rahmat Ali, to whom we now turn again. In
January 1 933, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali and his three colleagues in
Cambridge, issued a pamphlet entitled Now or Never, in which the
idea of Partition was reiterated. They wanted a separate Muslim
State in India, Pakistan, comprising the Panjab, the N.W.F.P. ,
Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. They opposed the federal con­
stitution then on the anvil and said that Muslim delegates to the
Round Table Conference could not speak for their community.
"India is not the name of one single country, nor the home of
one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a state created
for the first time in history by the British." Regard ing Hindu­
Muslim differences, they stated, "we do not inter-dine, we do not
inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet
and dress are different." The Muslims "demand the recognition
of a separate national status . . . There can be no peace, and
1 3 Shamloo, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: 1 948), pp. 1 1 , 12.
1 4 B.R. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Pakistan (Bombay : 1 941), p. 336 footnote.
1 22 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A KISTAN

tranquillity in this land i f we, the Muslims, are duped into a

Hindu-dominated Federation where we cannot be the masters of
our own destiny and captains of our souls." I s
Simultaneously Rahmat Ali founded the Pakistan National
Movement aimed at translating his ideas into achievement. A
good elaboration of his ideas i s to be found in his statement i n
the Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement in 1 940.
In it he underlined the menace of what he called "Indianism". I t
had corrupted Islam spiritually and morally. I t had depressed the
Muslims, politically and economically. It had deprived the Mus­
lims of national sovereignty and reduced them to a "minority
community''. The Mil/at of the Muslims should have nothing to
do with India. North-West India should make up the nation-state
of Pakistan. But that was not enough. Muslims living in other
parts of India should also be set free. Bengal and Assam should
form another Muslim state of Bang-i-Islam. The Nizam's domin­
ion in Hyderabad must be another state name Usmanistan. These
three states should then form a triple alliance. 1 6
Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif o f Hyderabad believed, like the Muslim
League and Chaudhry Rahmat Ali, that India was not a nation,
but he thought, unlike them, that partition was not a desirable
solution. In two books 17 he expressed his own ideas on the political
future of India. He divided India into four cultural zones for the
Muslims and eleven for the Hind us. The Muslim zones were :
North-West Block, consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Panjab,
N.W.F.P. and the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpu r ; North­
East Block, comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam ; Delhi­
Lucknow Block ; and the Deccan Block. The Indian States scatter­
ed all over India were to be distributed among the different zones
in accordance with their natural affinities. Each zone "will form a
IS C . Rahmat Ali, Now or Never ( Cambridge : January 1 9 33) .
1 6 C. Rahmat Ali. The Mi!lat and the }.,fenace of 'Indianism' (Cambridge :
1 940).
1 1 Sayyid Abdul Latif, The Cultural Freedom of India (Bombay : 1 938),
The Muslim Problem in India (Bombay : 1 939).
T H E MOVEMENT FOR P AK I STAN 123

homogeneous state with a highly decentralized form of govern­

ment within . . . but fit ting along with similar states into an all­
India federation". The exchange of population was considered to
be inevitable. The author claimed that his scheme was "more
thoroughgoing and scientific, because according to the Congress
ideal, cultural distribution is to follow linguistic lines, whereas
under this, the cultural lines are fuller, comprehending the ling­
uistic as well". The Congress proposal gave no cultural autonomy
to the Muslims, while under this scheme every cultural unit, Hindu
or Muslim, was "given a homeland of its own, where it may
develop on its own lines in a spirit of goodwill towards every
other unit". Further, it offered to the smaller minorities "cantonal
lines" if they so desired. The scheme, concluded its framer, was a
"scheme for unity and not for d isruption".
His final and transitional scheme of constitution may be sum­
marized by saying that a federation of the existing provinces and
states must be established, with the powers of the Centre reduced
to the minimum. Both at the Centre and in the provinces "com­
posite stable executives" were to replace the purely parliamentary
system. Separate electorates should be retained, along with the
existing Muslim strength in the provincial legislatures. At the
Centre the Muslims were to have one-third representation . Zonal
boards were to work out common policies and to prepare the way
to an ultimate constitution.
Sir Abdullah Haroon, a Muslim League leader of Sind, present­
ed his own proposals in the autumn of 1 938. In a foreword that
he wrote for Latif's The Muslim Problem in India, he suggested
the division of India i nto two separate federations, "each reflect­
ing the strength of one of the two major communities". The
Muslim federation would consist of North-West Indian provinces
and Kashmir. He was silent on the future of Bengal and Assam. 1 8
The following year, another writer, writing under the pseu­
donym of "A Panjabi", put forward his solution i n this field. 1 9
18 Ibid, pp. v-vii.
1 9 It is g;:merally
believed that the author was Nawab Sir Muhammad
Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot. There is some doubt on this point.
1 24 THE STRU G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

Without conceding the necessity of a mass transfer of popu­

lation, he divided India into five "countries" : the Indus Region ,
the Hindu India (comprising all areas not covered by other
"countries"), Rajastan (consisting of Rajputana and Central
India), the Deccan States (Hyderabad and Mysore), and Bengal
(minus its Hindu d istricts plus parts of Assam). All these "coun­
tries" would be federations in themselves. He did not accept the
principle of outright separation : there should be no break away
from India : "ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out
of it". Muslims would think of separation only if the Hindus
would force it upon them. They should be "separationists-cum­
confederationists". These five "countries" should be "reassem­
bled" in a "Confederacy of India". However, the Confederacy
would not control the fiscal policy of the whole country. The
five "countries" would equally share the cost of defence. 20
The next proposal came from Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the
Chief Minister of the Panjab. In a pamphlet entitled Outline of a
Scheme of Indian Federation, which he issued in July 1 939, he
began by acknowledging that the federal scheme embodied in the
1 935 Act was not acceptable to any section of Indian pol itical
opinion. The problem, he said, was "whether it is possible to
devise a Federal Scheme to replace the one envisaged by the
framers of the Government of India Act, which would satisfy and
compose the conflicting interests of the various communities and
classes, or at least command a larger measure of support than the
present scheme". His solution to this problem was the division of
the subcontinent into seven areas : ( !) Assam plus Bengal plus
Bengal States plus Sikkim, (2) Bihar plus Orissa, (3) United Pro­
vinces plus U.P. States, (4) Madras plus Travancore plus Madras
States and Coorg. (5) Bombay plus Hyderabad plus Western
Indian States plus Bombay States plus Mysore and C.P. States,
(6) Rajputana States plus Gawaliar plus Central Indian States
plus Bihar and Orissa States plus Central Provinces and Berar,
(7) the Panjab plus Sind plus N.W.F.P. plus Kashmir plus the
Panjab States plus Baluchistan plus Bikaner and Jaisalmer. Each
20 A Punjabi, Confederacy of India (Lahore : 1 939).
 ,

T H E M O V E M E N T F O R P A K I ST A N 1 25

zone was to have a legislature, and all zonal assemblies were col­
lectively to constitute the Central Federal Assembly, one third of
whose membership was to be Muslim. The Federal Executive was
to consist of the Governor-General and a Council of Ministers.
The Council would have at least one third Muslim personnel. The
subjects given to the federation were Defence, External Affairs,
Communications, Customs, Coinage and Currency. In his opinion
a United Indian Federation of this kind would acquire Dominion
Status with the minimum of delay. 2 1
This problem of a constitutional alternative to the 1 935 Act
was agitating the minds of many Muslims, and in the same year
two professors of the Muslim University of Aligarh published their
suggestions in a booklet. They started with the axioms that the
Indian Muslims were "a nation by themselves", that their future
lay in "complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the
British, or for the matter of that, any other people," and that the
Muslim provinces could not be forced to join a single all-India
federation. This led to the conclusion of dividing India into three
separate and independent and sovereign states, viz. , (1) North­
West India, including the Panjab, the N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluch­
istan ; (2) Bengal, including the Purnea district of Bihar and the
Sylhet d ivision of Assam but excluding the districts of Howrah,
Midnapore and Darjeeling ; (3) Hindustan, comprising the rest of
India, but having two newly-created autonomous provinces of
Delhi and Malabar. Every city with a population of 50,000 or
more was to be a free city. Hyderabad would be a sovereign s tate.
The North-West federation would be a Muslim state and "may
well be called 'Pakistan' " . These three states of Pakistan, Bengal
and Hindustan should enter into a "defensive and offensive alli­
ance". Each of these would have separate treaties of alliance with
Great Britain. They would have a joint Court of Arbitration "to
settle any dispute that may arise between themselves or between
them and the Crown" . 22
2 1 Sikandar Hayat Khan, Outlines ofa Scheme of Indian Federation (Lahore :
1 939), extracts reproduced in Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 455-462.
22 Sayyid Zafar-ul-Hasan and Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri, The
Problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution (Aligarh : 1 939), text in ibid. ,
pp. 462-465.
 '

1 26 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I STAN

The Lahore Resolution

The S ind Provincial Muslim League held a conference at Karachi
in early October 1 938. It was on this occasion that a Musl i m
League meeting hinted fo r the first time a t the demand for Pakis­
tan . In Resolution No. 5. the Conference castigated the Congress
policy of dividing and ruling the Muslims, criticized its refusal
to share power in Hindu provinces, regretted that Hindu rule
had led to the oppression of the Muslims and characterized the
Congress organization as dictatorial and fascist. Next it enume­
rated such acts of Congress misconduct as the introduction of
the Vidya Mandir Scheme, the foisting of Bande Matram on
Muslims, attempts to make Hindi with Devanagari script the
lingua franca of India the enforcement of joint electorates in
local bodies, the discouragement of Urdu, and the denial o f
fundamental and customary rights t o the Muslims . In the light
of this, said the Resolution, it was necessary, for ensuring the
right of "political self-determination of the two nations known
as Hindus and Muslims", to review the entire "question of what
should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure
honourable and legitimate status due to them". It was recom­
mended that the All India Muslim League should devise a
scheme of Constitution "under which Muslims may attain full
independence". 2 3
For the first time a provincial branch of the Muslim League
had used the word "nation" for Hindus and Muslims sep:irately.
For the first time Muslims began to talk of self-determination.
And for the first time they indicated their demand for a constitu­
tion under which they might attain "full i ndependence" . They
were moving fast towards separatism.
During the whole of the following year Jinnah was delivering
speeches and issuing statements, the Muslim League was passing
resolutions and various Muslim leaders and pol itical commenta­
tors were evolving schemes-all planning for and leading to the
idea of partition. In September 1939 the Working Committee of
2 3 Resollltions of the A l l India t.fuslim League from October 1937 to De­
cember 1938, op . cit. , Annexure, pp. 65-68.
THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKI STAN 1 27

the All India Muslim Leagu<: resolved that it was "irrevocably

opposed" to any federal scheme in which a permanent majority
ruled over a permanent minority and thus reduced a democratic
and parliamentary system of government to a farce. This was
totally unsuited to the "genius of the peoples" of India who were
composed of various nationalities and did not constitute a national
state.24 On 22 October, the Committee reiterated that no constitu­
tion for India would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it com­
pletely scrapped the 1 935 federal constitution and met the approval
of the Muslim League. 2 s Towards the end of the year, Jinnah, in
a press interview to the Afanclzester Guardian, declared unequi­
vocally that "it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary
government in India". Democracy could only mean Hindu raj
all over the country. This "is a position to which the Musalmans
will never submit" . Muslim India wanted to be free and enjoy
liberty to the fullest extent and develop its own political, economic,
social and cultural institutions according to its own genius, and
not to be dcminated and crushed" . At the same time the Muslims
wished Hindu India well and did not grudge them the fu llest scope
to do likewise. It was incorrect to call the Muslims of India
a minority. "They are in a majority in the North-West and in
Bengal." 2 6

A little later, in an article which he contributed to Time and

Tide, an independent British weekly, he cogently argued the
Muslim case in India. Hinduism and Islam, he said, represented
two "distinct and separate" civilizations ; the Hindus and the
Muslims were, in fact, two different nations. From the fact that
in India there was a major nation and a minor nation, it followed
logically that parliamentary system based on the majority prin­
ciple "must inevitably mean the rule of the major nation". He
impressed upon the British mind two things : first, that democracy
of the usual Western variety was not suited to India, and secondly,

2 4 Resolutions ofthe All India lwuslim League from December 1938 to March
1940, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
25 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
26 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 98-102.
128 THE STRUGGLE FOR PA KISTAN

that party government was not possible in India. The sooner the
truth of these statements was realized the better for both the
Indians and the British and the earlier would come the freedom of
India. A constitution must be evolved that "recognizes that there
are in India two nations who both must share the governance of
their common motherland". 27 Britain wanted to rule over India ;
Gandhi wanted to rule o ver Muslim India ; the Muslims would
not allow either of them to rule over Muslim India, combined or
separately. 2 8 One thing was now obvious : the Muslims were by
no means a minority, but "a solid and distinct nation by ourselves
with a destiny of our own". 29
One final effort at reconciliation was made by the Muslims in
November 1 939. Jinnah promised to reach an agreement with the
Congress for the duration of the war if the latter conceded the
following five terms: coalition ministries in the provinces ; legis­
lation affecting Muslims not to be enforced if two-thirds of their
number in a provincial lower house were opposed to it ; the
Congress flag not to be flown over public institutions ; under­
standing regarding the use of the Bande Matram ; and the Cong­
ress to stop its efforts to destroy the Muslim League. The Viceroy
met Bhulabhai Desai in Bombay in early 1 940 and asked him
what the Congress thought or would think of the Muslim de­
mands. Desai replied that the Congress was prepared to include
in any provincial ministry a Muslim nominated by a majority of
Muslim representatives in a provincial assembly, subject to accept­
ance by that minister of the principle of collective responsibility
and ordinary Congress discipline. 3 0 Apparently the item relating
to the formation of coalition in provinces was the most important
of the five Muslim terms, and it was on find ing a solution of this
problem that the chances of a settlement depended. The Muslim
demand was by no standard unreasonable. With the experience
of Congress rule yet fresh in their memory, it was natural fo r the
21 Ibid. , pp. 1 28- 1 38.
2 8 Ibid. , p. 1 47.
29 Ibid. , p. 1 54.
30 V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Calcutta: 1 957), pp.72-73.
THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 1 29

Muslims to demand a share in provincial governments and to

make this demand a condition of a rapprochement. Desai's reply
was not a blank refusal and it was possible, perhaps probable,
that had further talks been carried on and had the majority
community exhibited a sense of realism as well as accommoda­
tion a reconciliation might have been achieved. But all hopes in
this direction were disrupted by Gandhi's intervention . With
regard to coalition ministries in the provinces he categorically
stated that there was no hope in that direction with the Muslim
League "in its present mood". He did not think that at that
stage "anything was to be gained by coalitions". 3 1
The Congress had learnt no lesson from the Muslim reaction
to Hindu rule. The League was rapidly growing in popularity and
power. People were flocking round Jinnah who was fast becoming
the sole leader of the Muslims. The League was tightening up its
organization and consequently winning all by-elections. But all
these signs of Muslim solidarity made no impression upon Cong­
ress minds. Wholly wrapped up in their own grandiose schemes
of hegemony over the entire subcontinent the Congress leaders
refused to read the signs of the time. They thought that they were
about to realize their dreams of a Hindu raj over the whole o f
India ; this pre-occupation denied them the capacity t o e st imate
properly the strength of the Muslim resistance to that ideal. As
always, so now, the depth of Muslim national sentiment was gross­
ly underrated. Because the Congress belittled the Muslims, the
Muslim question did not exist. Because the Congress pretended to
speak for the whole of India, the Muslim League did not exist.
Because the Muslim League did not exist, with whom should the
Congress deal ? This was how the Hindus argued to their own
satisfaction . Events were socn to show how shortsighted was their
obduracy. It pushed the Muslims into separatism.
The Congress was too confident of its power i n fighting the
British. The British were busy in ruling India and fighting the
Germans. Neither was prepared to consider the Muslim problem,
31 Ibid. , p. 77.
1 30 THE STRU G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

or to pay heed to the Muslim demands. In these conditions the

Muslims could only rely on their inherent strength and carve their
way out of the impasse through determination. Jinnah was now
convinced that the Muslims could not hope for fair treatment
in a Hindu dominated state. If the Hindus were bent upon
dreaming of themselves as rulers of all India, it was time they
were told that the Muslims had an equal right to rule over their
part of the subcontinent . If Muslims were denied their basic
rights, the Congress would not be allowed to exercise its sway on
Muslim areas. If the Congress wanted the whole of India, then
one India must vanish and be replaced by two Indias. Congress
arrogance was at last to reap its bitter harvest of retribution. The
Muslims would have nothing to do with one India if that one
India was to be ruled by the Hindus. For in such an India there
would be no room for their culture or their traditions.

So far ideas of Muslim separatism had been floating in the

Indian political atmosphere, but none had dared give them a
concrete shape. Iqbal had thrown out a suggestion and then re­
lapsed into silence. Rahmat Ali was more consistent but less
equipped. The smaller fry could only evolve schemes for their
elders ; they could not sell them to the public. An established
political party must father the idea by making it a plank in its
programme. This is precisely what the Muslim League d id at
Lahore in March 1 940.

At its annual session-historic in retrospect-at Lahore, the

League, for the first time, adopted the idea of partition as its
final goal. Jinnah's presidential address to the session is a land­
mark in the history of Muslim nationalism in India, for it made
an irrefutable case for a separate Muslim n at i o nh o o d and for
dividing India into Muslim and Hindu states. The Muslims of
India, he declared, stood unequivocally for the freedom of India,
but it must be freedom for all India and not for one section only.
If the Hindus were to be free and the Musalmans were to be
their slaves, it was hardly a freedom for which the Muslims could
be asked to fight. The Muslims were a nation by any definition.
 THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN 131
The problem of India could not be solved i f it was treated merely
as an inter-communal question . It was an international issue and
must be dealt with as such. That Hindus and Muslims could ever
evolve a common nationality was an idle dream. "The Hindus
and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social
customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine to­
gether and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which
arc based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions . Their
concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that
Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sour­
ces of history. They have different epics, different heroes and
different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the
other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke
together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical
minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing dis­
content and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built
up for the government of such a state . . . Musalmans are a
nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must
have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish to
live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and
independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest
our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way
that we think best and in consonance ·with our own ideals and
according to the genius of our people." Therefore Muslim India
could not accept any constitution which would necessarily result
in the permanent rule of a permanent majority. The only course
open to all was to permit the major nations to establish separate
homelands by dividing India into sovereign states. 3 2
When the mind of the audience had thus been prepared, the
main resolution of the session was introduced by Fazlul Haq .
It was "resolved that it is the considered view of this session of
the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would
be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless
it is designed on the following basic principles, vi::. , that geogra­
phically contiguous units are demarcated i nto regions which
32 Full text in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op . cit., pp. 159- 1 8 1 .
1 32 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

should be s o constituted, with such territorial readjustments as

may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numer­
ically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of
India, should b� grouped to constitute 'Indep�ndent States' in
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".
The last paragraph of the Resolution-which underlined the
fact that the separation demanded was to be complete and final­
read : "this session further authorizes the Working Committee to
frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic
principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective
regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communica­
tions, customs and such other matters as may be necessary. "33
This was the Lahore or as it has come to be called the Pakistan
Resolution. This was division, pure and simple. And this was the
Muslim answer to Congress ambitions. This was the "least fissi­
parous of several efforts by different authors to redraw the map" . 34
Hindu-Muslim antagonism had brought India to the verge of
division. Were the Muslims justified in thus despairing of getting
a place in the Indian sun ? There is no doubt that the Congress

was a Hindu body and that Gandhi behaved as if he were the

embodiment of the Hindu meta physician concept of Diety : sva
ichchhra, "self-determined, capricious, irresponsible, and unpre­
dictable".35 As years passed, the nationalism of Gandhi \Vas
"equated more and more with a broadly based, tolerant but still
very clear-cut Hinduism" . 3 6 The Hindu-Muslim conflict was not
merely religious but a "clash of two separate and distinct civil­
izations". 37
3 3 Resol11tio11s ofthe All India .\fuslim League from December 1938 to Afarch

1940, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

H Patrick Lacey, "Two Indias", Eastem Times, 2 August, 1 940.
3 5 T. C . Hodson (Professor of So�ia! Anthropology at the University of
Cambridge) in letter t o The Times, 24 January, 1 94 1 .
3 6 Paul Knapland, Britai11, Co11111zo11wea!t!z and Empire 1901-1955 ( London :
1 956), p. 2 1 5 .

3 7 Sir Alfred H. Watson, Polizical Advance in India, op. cit., p. 1 0.

T H E M O V E M E N T F O R P A K I S T AN 1 33

We have said above that the passing of the Lahore Resolution

was a historic event in retrospect. At the time when it was passed
its significance was not completely apprehended by many obser­
vers. In India, of course, there was a hue and cry among the
Hindus. The Hindu-controlled press indulged in unashamed and
bitter recrimination and the Congress leaders faithfully took up
the refrain. In fact, it was the Hindu press which "dubbed" the
Lahore Resolution as a demand for Pakistan . In Britain, on the
other hand, the Resolution went almost unnoticed. Only one or
two papers published a summary of it. Comments were few and
uninformed. The A1anchester Guardian, the so-called liberal con­
science of Britain and an old friend of the Hindus, was furious
and accused Jinnah of "re-establishing the reign of chaos in Indian
politics" . The demand "struck at the heart of Indian nationalism"
and would retard India's progress towards self-government.3s
These "liberal" obiter dicta \vere severely criticized by Patrick
Lacey, a distinguished British journalist. In a letter to the journal
he called it prejudiced a nd biassed and asserted, in favour of
the Muslim demand, that "it is only the unifying bond of in­
difference, submission, or hostility to alien rule that has held India
together". That bond was now being removed. The Muslims "do
not seek supremacy over all India . . . They simply want to be sure
that, if harmonious co-operation with Hinduism proves finally im­
possible, they will not be denied on that account the next best
thing in constitutional advance" . 39
The most favourable British comment on the Lahore Resolution
appeared in Nature, the scientific weekly : "Apart from the fact
that the voice of a minority of some 80 million or more, sectional
differences for once forgotten, cannot be ignored, it is based upon
a very real difference in a cultural tradition, as every student of
Indian civil ization is aware ; for the M uslim trad ition fosters de­
mocratic outlook while fearing and resenting Hindu domination

38 Manchester Guardian, 2 April, 1 940.

3 9 Patrick Lacey, letter to Manchester Guardian, 4 April, 1 940.
 1 34 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

in an independent India, which would from its immemorial tradi­

tion of caste be essentially oligarchic in practice. However, im­
practicable the Muslim demand may be, no solution will secure
the future of India in world affairs or internally which attempts
to ignore or override these fundamental differences of culture and
tradition" . 40
From now onwards the Muslim League policy was clear and
unmistakable. It did not want one India with a clear and inescap­
able Hindu m ajority which t h rough a parliamentary system of
,

government and "· so-called democratic process would nullify

Muslim rights and interests. India must be split. There was no
alternative The Muslims wanted this and would not be satisfied
.

by anything less. The way lay clear and open to Pakistan.

TVhy Pakistan ?
At the Laho re session o f 1 940 the ideal of Pakistan was
formaliy adopted by the M uslim League. But the mere passage
of a resolution did not make the pursuit of this ideal an integral
part of the League's objectives or constitution. Therefore, at its
next annual session at M adras in April 1 94 1 , this omission was
rectified Resolution No . 2 of the sess.ion amended the aims and
.

objects of the All India Muslim League. Section 2(a) of the Con­
stitution was substituted with this :
''(i) The es tabli shmen t o f completely independent states formed
by dem3.rcating geographically contiguous units into
region s which shall be so constituted, with such territorial
readjustments as may be necessary, that areas in \Vhich the
Musalmans are necessarily in a majority, as in the North
Western and Eastern zones of India, shall be grouped to­
gether to constitute Independent States as Muslim Free
National Homelands in which the constituent units shall be
autonom ous and sowreign.
(ii) That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be
specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the
40 Nature, 6 April, 1 940.
T H E MOV E M E N T F O R P A K I ST A N 1 35

above mentioned units and regions for the protection of

their religious, cultural, economic. political, administrative
and other rights and interests in consultation with them;
(iii) That in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in
a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards
shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them
and other minorities for the protection of their religious,
cultural, economic, political, administrative and other
rights and interests in consultation with them."41
During this session, Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman of the
Reception Committee, declared that the demand fer Pakistan
"does not run counter to the idea of India's political unity, nor
does it mean the vivisection of India", "since because that unity
was never real, the basis of Pakistan has existed all the time in this
country" 42 One significant feature of this session was the presence
.

of a large number of non-Muslim leaders.43

The Muslim leaders and political workers were not content with
passing these resolutions. They busied themselves carrying on an
effective propaganda in favour of Pakistan. Again and aga in
J i nnah spoke on the political future of India and emphasized the
two-nations theory, the desirability, in fact, the inevitability of
Pakistan, the necessity of a peaceful Hindu-Muslim entente and
the need of unity among all the Muslims of India. He cleared
many misunderstandings, both in Muslim and Hindu minds, and
clarified the details of the Pakistan scheme. The greatest merit of
those speeches was that they put the Pakistan plan in its proper
context of Indian historical, political, social, religious and con­
stitutional conditions.
The Hindus and some Muslims had spread the false idea that the
Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces would have to
41 Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1940 to April 1941,
published by the Honorary Secretary, All India Muslim League (Delhi :
n.d.) , pp. 39-40.
42 Civil and Military Gazette, 1 5 April, 1 94 1 .

4 3 They included Sir R. K . S. Chetty, Sir K . V. Reddy, S i r A. P. Patro,

M . A. M. Chettiar, C. R . Srinivasan, Rao Bahadur M . C. Rajah and
N. Sivaraj, ibid.
 136 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A KISTAN

migrate e n bloc if Pakistan was realized. The Quaid-i-Azam told

the Muslims that this was not merely wrong but an insidious move
to frighten the Muslims and thus to alienate them from the
Muslim League. He explained that, whether India was partitioned
or not, the Muslims of the Hindu provinces would always remain
minorities. By opposing the division of India they could not im­
prove their position, but they would obstruct the freedom of a
majority of Muslims in the subcontinent. At the same time he
told the Sikhs of the Panjab that they would have a better and
more honourable existence in the "sovereign state" of the Panjab
than in a united Hindu-dominated India. Simultaneously he ap­
pealed to Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Patiala and other states of the
north-western Muslim zone that the League would be glad to
"come to a reasonable and honourable agreement" with them if
they were willing to enter the Muslim homeland, but that it had
no desire to force them or coerce them "in any way" . India was
not the sole property of the Congress. Pakistan would not be a
"vivisection of the motherland". India was not the motherland
of the Hindus only. If longer habitation was the criterion, then
India was the motherland only of the Dravidians and still further
the Aborigines" .44 India was already divided and partitioned by
nature. Muslim India and Hindu India existed on the physical
map. Where was the country which was going to be partitioned ?
Where was the nation which was going to be divided ? Where was
the Central National Government whose authority was going to
be violated ?45
To the charge that the Pakistan scheme was impracticable,
J innah pointed out that autonomous provinces were already in
existence under the 1 935 constitution, and in some of them the
Muslims predominated while others were mainly Hindu. Their
reconstitution into "geographical, contiguous, homogeneous, in­
dependent zones" was the most feasible and practicable scheme.
The ideal of Pakistan presupposed Indian freedom and indepen­
dence. In fact, the achievement of independence would be brought
44 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit. , pp. 1 83 - 1 8 7 .
45 /bid., p p . 1 89- 1 90.
T H E M O V E M E N T F O R P A K I S T AN 1 37

very much nearer by quickly agreeing to the principle of partition

than by any other method.46 The Muslims did not want to harm
or injure any other community or interest. They did not want to
block progress. They asked for the barest justice. They wanted
to live "an honourable life as free men, and we stand for free
Islam and free India" .47 To yield to the demands of the Congress
would "amount to prejudging the consideration of the future
constitution" of India and would put Muslim India "under the
heels of a Hindu Raj". Muslim India would resist this "with all
the power it can command".48
He warned that if the Hindus tried to get the whole of India
they would lose the whole, but if they gave one-third to the
Muslims they would get two-thirds. 49 Again referring to the
apprehension of the Muslims of the Hindu provinces, he asked
them whether by subjecting the sixtyfive million Muslims of the
Pakistan area to Hindu rule as a perpetual minority under an all
India unitary government, the remaining twentyfive million Mus­
lims were going to be benefited. 5 0 The Muslims were not demanding
Pakistan from the Hindus, because the Hindus never possessed
the whole of India. It was the Muslims who took India and ruled
over her for seven hundred years. It was the British who took
India from the Musalmans. The Muslim demand was addressed
to the British, who were in possession of India. It was "utter
nonsense" to say that Hindustan belonged to the Hindus. 51
The Quaid-i-Azam's plea that India was never a united nation
and that Muslim India had always been a separate entity was
echoed by two provi ncial leaders. Nawab Shah Nawaz Khan of
Mamdot thought that Pakistan had existed in India for nearly
12 centuries and that the Muslim League was only seeking con­
stitutional sanction for its independent future. The region lying to
46 Ibid., pp. 1 90 - 192.
47 Ibid., p . 1 9 3 .
48 Statesman, 25 December, 1 941.
49 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., p. 238.
5 0 Ibid. , pp. 242-243 .
5 1 Ibid. , p p , 252-253.
 1 38 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

the west of the river Jumna had been for over a thousand years
inhabited by Musalmans and, as such, was their national home or
Pakistan. 5 2 A month later, G. M. Syed, a member of the Work­
ing Committee of the Muslim League and a Sindhi leader, asserted
that the Indus valley civilization as revealed by Moen-jo-Daro
was a clear indication that the Pakistan territories had never form­
ed part of India. He went so far as to say that Sind, the Panjab,
Afghanistan and the N.W.F.P. "formed part of the Middle East
rather than of the Far East. " s 3
To discover the full gamut of arguments given in favour of
Pakistan, \Ve should also look at the reasoning of some other
Muslim politicians and intellectuals. El Hamza attributed the
Muslim hardening of attitude to the "ideology of hatred and pas­
sive insult" fostered by Gandhi and his followers. A "few months"
of Congress rule under the dictation of Gandhi had given the
Muslims an unforgettable taste of things to come. s 4 Z . A. Suleri
gave three main reasons behind the formulation of the demand
for Pakistan : Muslims, having ruled India before the advent of
the British, were entitled to rule at least the Muslim majority area s ;
Hindu and Muslim philosophies o f life and ways of life were s o
fa r apart from each other that i t was impossible "for them to live
together" ; Muslims were convinced that their economic and social
problems could be solved only by an approach to Islam, and this
was impracticable until they had a state of their own. s s
Among the politicians, Liaquat Ali Khan underlined that once
the chief cause of friction-the ambition of the majority commu­
nity to rule over the whole of India-was removed, there would be
peace and comentment in India. 5 6 Carimbhoy Ibrahim regretted
that the attitude of the Congress had always been communal and
s2 Presidential Address to Pakistan Conference, Lucknow, on 29 November,
· 1 94 1 , Civil and Afilitary Ga=ette, 30 November, 1 94 1 .
5 3 Civil and Military Gazette, 2 1 December, 1 94 1 .

S 4 E l Hamza, Pakistan : A Nation (Lahore · 1 944), pp. 98-107.

55 Z. A . Suleri, Tire Road to Peace and Pakistan (Lahore : 1 945), p. 50.
S 6 Quoted in Pakistan (Delhi : 1 940 eJ.), p. 1 7 . This book which is in the
form of a symposium on Pakistan was published by Adabistan and carried
a foreword by K. M. Ashraf.
T H E MOVE MENT FOR PAKI STAN 1 39

that it had never taken the Muslims into confidence when it wield­
ed power. It always wanted to establish a Hindu Raj by intro­
ducing the Vidya Mandir Scheme, the Wardha Scheme, the Bande
Matram song and other Hindu practices and beliefs. Not once
in any way had it shown a desire to accommodate the Muslims.57
For the first time in the history of modern Muslim India a
serious effort was made to publicize the Muslim League stand and
the Pakistan ideal. A Committee of writers of the All India
Muslim League was constituted with Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad of the
Aligarh Muslim University as convener. Small pamphlets were
written by well-known authorities and published by Shaikh
Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore under the collective title of "Pakis­
tan Literature Series". Some of these slim volumes deserve notice.
Kazi Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad, an Aligarh geographer, wrote the
Communal Pattern of India to prove that India was not a nation
and to substantiate the two-nations theory. In India he saw four
clearly demarcated geographical areas-Western Region (Indus
Basin), Eastern Region (Gangetic Delta), Northern Region (Upper
Gangetic Basin) and the Deccan Plateau. 5 8 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad
brought out the significant point that a free Pakistan a nd a free
Hindustan would live in amity and brotherhood as the ambition
of domination would be eliminated. Indian unity was a myth and
a falsification of history. 5 9
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Muslim propaganda
and the most signal proof of the correctness of the Muslim case
was the fact that an impartial non-Muslim observer, like
Ambedkar, was convinced that the Pakistan scheme, despite all
its disadvantages, offered a feasible way out of the Indian political
impasse. In his scholarly Thoughts on Pakistan, first published in
1 94 1 , he considered the Muslim League plan from all possible
5 7 Ibid., p. 23.
S S Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad, The Communal Pattern of India, Pakistan Lit­
erature Series No. 2 (Lahore: 1 945 ed.) .
59 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Some Aspects of Pakistan, Pakistan Literature
Series No. 3 (Lahore : n.d.) .
1 40 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A )<

angles. The first part of the book stated the Muslim case, the
second dealt with the Hindu case against Pakistan, and the third
described some alternatives to the Pakistan scheme. He saw no
substance in the Hindu objections and, as an Untouchable, shared
all the Muslim fears of a caste Hindu domination. With his own
and his community's experience of Brahmanical tyranny and
caste rule he could not dismiss Muslim apprehensions as airily
as the Congress leaders were in the habit of doing. For showing
this "partiality" to the Muslims, Ambedkar was severely casti­
gated, even abused, by the Hindus, but he persisted in his opinion
and his book sold well, going into another edition in 1 945.
The Muslim League propaganda was complete and effective. To
the Muslim masses it explained the inevitability of the coming of
Pakistan and the dire necessity of unity and discipline. To the
non-Muslims it explained , in simple and ea sy terms, the Muslim
motive in asking for division and the historical and political justi­
fication for the demand. By and large, the propaganda was success­
ful . It united the Muslims . If it failed to com ince the Hindus, it
was not so m uch because of its weakness as because of the inherent
Hindu unwillingness to see a Muslim point of view which denied
them their vainglorious ambition to rule all India.
 C HAPTER 7

The In1pact of th e Second

World War

Tlze declaration of war

On the declaration of war by Britain against Germany the Viceroy

simultaneously declared that India was at war also. This declara­
tion was resented by various Indian political parties, which were
not pleased to find that India could be committed to a war, with
which it was not directly concerned, without the consent or ap­
proval of its legislatures or its leaders.

The Congress took the initiative and on 14 September 1 939 its

Working Committee passed a lengthy resolution on the Viceroy's
declaration of war. It insisted that the issue of war and peace for
India "must be decided by the Indian people, and no outside
authority can impose its decision upon them, nor can the Indian
people permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends".
If Britain was fighting for democracy it must first practise it in
India. There was a bitterly sarcastic reference to the Indian
Princes' declaration of support to war effort. The British Govern­
ment was i nvited "to declare in unequivocal terms what their war
a ims a rc in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new
order that is envisaged, in particular, how these aims are going to
apply to India and to be given effect to in the present". More speci­
fically the Committee posed three questions to the Viceroy. First,
142 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

what were the objectives of H i s Majesty's Government in t h e War '!

Secondly, what was the future that was contemplated in the con­
stitutional sphere for India ? Thirdly, in what way was the desire
of India for a close and effective association with the prosecution
of the war to be best satisfied ? It was threatened that in case these
questions were not answered to the satisfaction of the Congress,
it would withdraw from all provincial governments and start an
anti-war non-co-operation campaign. 1
Before proceeding to describe the Muslim League policy on this
issue, it is interesting to state briefly that the Congress demand
made in the resolution of 14 September was criticized by British
public opinion in clear terms. The Times attacked Gandhi for
claiming an "all inclusive" status for the Congress ; how could
the British Government bind themselves to concede to what would
amount to a monopoly of the representation of Indian public
opinion. 2 The Observer believed that this was no time for playing
politics and that the Congress was acting with ulterior motives. 3
The Manchester Guardian4 and the Sp2ctator5 also chided the
Congress for trying to drive a political bargain during the severe
war crisis.
The Muslim League showed its hand on 1 8 September. In a
clear-worded resolution the Working Committee appreciated the
Viceroy's declaration that the federal scheme as embodied in the
1 935 Act had been suspended. It wished that instead of being sus­
pended the scheme should have been abandoned. It urged upon
the British Government "to review and revise the entire problem
of India's future constitution de novo in the light of experience
gained by the working of the present provincial Constitution of
India and developments that have taken place since 1935 or may
take pb ce hereafter" . Though it was in favour of a free India,
1 Resolution on War Crisis passed by the Working Commitiee of the
Indian National Con gress on 1 4th September 1 939, Gwyer and Appadorai,
op. cit . , vol. If, pp. 484-488.
2 The Times, IO October, 1 939.
3 Obserrer, 19 November, 1 939.
4 i\fanc!zester Guardian, 18 October, 1 939.
5 Spectator, 22 September, 1 939.
T H E I M P A C T OF T H E S E C O N D W O R L D \\' A R 143

yet, "it is equally opposed to the domination of the Hindu majority

over Musalmans and other minorities and the vassalization of
Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed lo any 'federal objective'
which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under
the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of Govern­
ment". After expressing its "deep sympathy" with Poland, Eng­
land and France, it went on to state that "real and solid Muslim
co-operation and support to Great Britain in this hour of her trial
cannot be secured successfully if His Majesty's Government and
the Viceroy are unable to secure to the Musalmans justice and
fairplay in the Congress governed provinces . . . " Then came the
heart of the resolution : "while the Muslim League stands for the
freedom of India, the Committee further urge upon His Majesty's
Government and ask for an assurance that no declaration regard­
ing the question of constitutional advance for India should be
made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim
League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by
His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without
such consent and approval". If full, effective and honourable co­
operation of the Musalmans was desired in that grave crisis, the
British Government should "take into its confidence the Muslim
League which is the only organization that can speak on behalf
of Muslim India". 6
The Viceroy replied to the Congress and League demands in
a long statement on 18 October, 1 939. The first half of the
statement contained seriatim a reply to the three questions asked
by the Congress. The first question was : What are the objectives
of His Majesty's Government in the War ? To what extent are they
of such a character that India, \Vith her long history and great
traditions, can, with a clear conscience, associate herself with
them ? To this the official reply was that His Majesty's Govern­
ment "have not themselves yet defined with any ultimate precision
their detailed objectives in the prosecution of the war". But their
6 Full text of the resolution in India and the War: Swtemcnt issued by the
Governor-General of India on 18 October, 1939, Cmd. 6 1 2 1 , Appendix D,
pp. 1 7- 1 9.
144 T H E STRUGGLE FOR PAK ISTAN

motives were known to all . "We are fighting to resist aggression

whether directed against ourselves or others . . . we are seeking no
material advantage for ourselves. We are not aiming only at
victory, but looking beyond it to the laying of a foundation of a
better international system which will mean that war is not to be
the inevitable lot of each succeeding generation. We . . . . long for
peace, but it must be a real and settled peace, not an uneasy truce
interrupted by constant alarms and threats." The second question
had been : "what is the future that has been contemplated in the
constitutional sphere for the Indian continent ?" The answer to
this, the Viceroy said, was contained in the Instrument of Instruc­
tions issued to him as Governor-General by the King Emperor in
May 1 937 which laid down upon him "a direction so to exe; ·cise
the trust which His Majesty has reposed in me 'that the partner­
ship between India and the U.K. within our Empire may be
furthered to the end that India may attain its due place among
our Dominions' ". Moreover, at the end of war, His Majesty's
Government would enter into consultation with representatives of
the several communities, parties and interests in India and with
the Indian Princes, with a view to securing their aid and co·
operation in the framing of such modifications as may seem desir­
able. To the third question-in what way can the desire of India
and of Indian public opinion for a closer association, and an
effective association, with the prosecution of the war best be
satisfied ?-the Viceroy's solution was the establishment of a
"consultative group", representative of all "major political par­
ties" in British India and of the Indian Princes, and with himself
as its president, which would have as its object "the association
of Public interest in India with the conduct of war and with
questions relating to war activities" . Its personnel would be
drawn from panels prepared by the various major political
parties.
Having thus disposed of the three specific inquiries, the Viceroy
proceeded to make three significant declarations. In an oblique
T H E I M P A C T O F T H E S E C O N D WO R L D W A R 1 45

reference to the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly, he

rebuked the Con gress in these terms :
"There is nothing to be gained by phrases which, widely and
generally expressed, contemplate a state of things which is un­
l i kely at the present point of pol itica l development to stand the
test of practical application or to result in that unified effort by
all parties and all communities in India on the basis of which
alone India can hope to go forward as one and to occupy the
place to which her history and her destinies entitle her . "
The second declaration related to t h e future of t h e fed eral
scheme. His Majesty's Government recognized that when the t ime
came to resume consideration of the p lan for the future federa l
govern ment of India. it would be necessary to reconsider i n the
light of t he then ci rcumstances to what extent the details of the
plan embodied in the Act of 1 935 remained appropriate. Thus a
reconsideration of the 1 935 Act was promised, though not a de
nova reconsideration of the entire constitutional problem which
the M uslim League had asked for.
The final statement was about the minorities. The Viceroy
said that d uring his conversations with the representatives of the
minorities, the latter had most strongly urged on him the " neces­
sity of a clear assurance that full weight should be given to their
views and to their interests i n any modifications tha t may be con­
templated" . On t hat, he said, "it i s unthinkable that we should
now proceed to plan afresh, or to modify in any respect, any
important part o f India's future Constitution without again tak­
ing counsel with those who have in the recent past been s o closely
associated in a l i ke task with His Majesty's Government and with
Parliament".
In conclusion he hoped that his explanations would remove m is­
understandings and urged that this was not a moment at which
to risk the splitting of the unity of India on the rock of particular
phrases. All parties and interests, he said , should continue to aim
 1 46 T H E STRU G G L E FOR PAK fSTAN

at the unity of India even i f differences of greater or l e s s signi­

ficance continued to exist.7
The Viceroy's reply has been treated i n detai l because o f its
inherent importance. Basically it represented the official British
view not only at the time when it was issued but up to the coming
of Sir Stafford Cripps in March l 942. For the next two years or
more the fundamental British policy on India remained unchanged.
The war was being fought for democracy. India's final goal was
Dominion Status. The Congress demand for a Constituent As­
sembly to draw up the future Constitution was impracticable. The
minorities would be consulted on all future actions. The 1935
Constitution was suspended and would be reconsidered after the
war. During the war the Government was prepared to associate
Indian public opinion with official war efforts. With slight changes
this broad policy continued to hold the field till early 1 942.
On I November the Viceroy had conversations with J i nnah,
Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad, and told them that the Govern­
ment was unable to go beyond the establishment of a "Consulta­
t ive group" because of the lack of prior agreement between the
Hindus and the Muslims "such as would contribute to harmo­
nious working in the Centre". He, therefore, requested his visitors
to have talks among themselves on the provincial position with a
view thereafter to putting forward an agreed proposal about the
Centre. s These talks took place but failed to lead to any agree­
ment.
On 3 November Rajendra Prasad wrote to the Viceroy charging
him with sidetracking the "moral issue raised by the Congress
about the clarification of the war aims". Therefore, it was i m­
possible for the Congress to consider any subsidiary proposal. The
crisis, he said, was created by the outbreak of war, was entirely
political and "is not related to the communal issue in India". 9
7 Ibid.
s Viceroy·s statement of 5 November. 1 939. Speeches and S1atc111e11ts of the
Marquess ofLinlithgow, 1936-1943 ( Delh i : 1 945), pp. 2 1 2-21 3 .
9 Rajendra Prasad's letter to Lord Linl ithgow of 3 November, 1939,
Indian Annual Register, 1 939, vol. II, pp. 243-244.
T H E IMPACT OF T H E S E C O N D WOR L D WAR 1 47

On 1 1 November, Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy,10 saying that he

had conferred with the Hindu leaders but they were not prepared
to discuss the question of the reconstitution of the provincial and
central governments until the British Government had complied
with the Congress demand for the declaration of i ndependence.
On 8 November, Gandhi issued a statement which confused the
situation and gave a clear indication of the stubbornness of the
Congress. In it he accused the British of holding India "by playing
the minorities against the so-called majority" and of making "an
agreed solution among the component parts well-nigh impos­
sible" . 1 1
Gandhi's attitude accurately anticipated the decision of the
Congress Working Committee which, on 1 9-23 November, flatly
rejected the Viceroy's statement of 1 8 October as "entirely un­
satisfactory" and as an attempt to create m isunderstanding and to
"befog the main and moral issue". It alleged that "no communal
consideration arose in meeting the demand of the Congress".
These arc "irrelevant issues" and are aimed at maintaining im­
perialist domination i n India "in alliance with the reactionary
elements in the country". The British Government must imme­
d iately promise complete independence to India, and concede the
right to frame a Constitution through an Indian Constituent
Assembly which will also be competent to deal with the communal
problem. 1 2
To compare the Congress stand with that of the Muslims, it
must be remembered that already, on 5 November, Jinnah had
sent the Viceroy a l ist of the Muslim demands. The two most
important demands were :-
1 . "That as soon as circumstances may permit or immediately
after the war the entire problem of India's future Constitution
shall be examined and reconsidered de novo" ; and
10 See Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit. , vol. I I , p. 495, fn. 2.
1 1 Jbid. , pp. 495-496.
1 2 Full text in Congress and the War Crisis (Allahabad : 1 940), pp. 1 37-1 38.
1 48 T H I: S T R C G G L E F O R P A K I S T A 'I

2. "That n o declaration shall, either i n principle or other\\ise,

be made or any Constitution be enacted by H is Majesty's Gov­
ernment or Parliament without the approval and the consent o f
the two major communities i n India, vi:: . , the Musal mans and the
Hindus . " 1 3
The Viceroy's reply to these was fairly sa tisfactory. His an swer
to the first demand was that his previous declaration of 18 October
"did not exclude exami nation of any part ei ther of the Act o f
1 935 or of the pol icy a n d plans o n which i t i s based". On the
second demand he assured J i n n ah that His Majesty's Government
"are not under any misapprehen sion as to the importance of the
contentment of the Muslim commun ity to the stability and success
of any const itutional d evelopments in I ndia. You n eed, therefore,
have no fear that the weight which your community's position in
India necessarily gives thei r v iews w i l l be underrated" . 1 4
Thus the contrast between the Congress and Muslim League
points of view was obvious. The Congress was showing a complete
lack of realism i n insisting on a declaration of war aims without
any reference to the Muslim problem . I n fact, in its resolution o f
1 9-23 N ovember, the Working Committee had accused the British
Government of fol lowing the policy of divide and rule and d ubbed
the Muslims as " reactionary elements" in Indian population who
were siding with the British rather than with the "natio nalists".
At the same time the Congress l eaders had refused to come to an
agreement with J i n nah o n the future of provincial and central
governments. The two points of view could hardly be less irre­
concilable.
The Congress attitude also made it clear that no rapproche­
ment between it and the Viceroy was possible . A few days later,
therefore, the Congress H igh Command issued orders for the resig­
nation of all Congress ministries in the provinces. This d ecision
to recall the governments, without any reference to the provincial
assemblies who had elected them or to the voters whom they
1 3 Linlithgow, op . cit . , pp. 397-398.
14 Ibid. , pp. 399-400.
T H E ! �! P A C T O F T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R 1 49

claimed to represent, was made by the H igh Command and not

by a representative body. This was to have far-reaching conse­
quences, both for the Hind us and the Muslims.
The resignation of Congress ministries
To the Muslims o f India, and i n particular to the Muslims of the
Hindu provinces, the resignation of the Congress from office was
a matter of rejoicing. However, before we examine the Musli m
reaction t o t his radical development, let us briefly consider how
this n ews was received in Britain .
The House of Lords had debated the Congress threat o f resig­
nation on 2 N ovember, 1939, when, on behalf of the Government,
the Marquess of Salisbury had stated that the Congress was trying
to force further concessions out of Britain because of the i nter­
national situation. He was emphatic that not only was Britain
bound in honour to protect the M uslims but not to d o so in the
prevailing state of i nternational politics was "sheer madness". 1 5
Later he again expressed the opinion that the real reason behind
the Congress m ove was to wring more concessions out of IJritain,
and compared this with the Irish precedent.1 6 The Congress deci­
sion to resign was severely criticized b y many political observers.
Lord Samuel , the Liberal peer, called it a "negation of d emoc­
racy".1 7 The Marquess of Crewe thought that the action was
"somewhat more in the spirit of Berli n than i n the spirit o f
Washington".18 I n the House o f Commons, Sir Stanley Reed, with
his long Indian experience, said that the Congress ministries
"threw up office in obedience to the orders of a jun ta " . I f that
was democracy, he commented, "then the word 'democracy' has a
meaning i n India which is totally different from its implications
in any other part of the world" . 19 Sir William Barton called i t
"undemocratic and foolish". 20
i s See H.L. 1 14. 5s, 2 November, 1 939, cols. 1 664-1678.
1 6 H.L. 1 1 6. 5s, 8 April, 1 940, cols. 1 85-188.
11 H.L . 1 1 9. 5 s , 5 August. 1 941 , col. 1 070.
18 H.L. 1 16. 5s, 8 April, 1 940, col . 1 84.
1 9 H.C. 338. 5s, 1 1 September, 1 942, col. 584 .
20 Sir William Barton, "Political Deadlock i n India", Empire Review,
July 1 946, pp. 1 2- 1 5 .
 1 50 T H E S T R U G GL E F O R P A K I STAN

Whether t h e Congress d ecision was d emocratic and wise or the

contrary was, for the M usli ms of India, not as i mportant as the
fact that by this action of t he Congress t hey were freed from a
regime of ruthless communal ism which t hey were now finding it
i ncreasingly di fficult to bear. O n 2 December J innah i ssued an
appeal t o M uslim India to observe t he 22nd of December (a
Friday) as the " Day of Deliverance". It was to be a day o f thanks­
giving "as a mark of rel ief that the Congress regime has at last
ceased t o function". He asked all provi ncial , district and primary
bran ches of the League to hold meetings on that day and pass a
resolution (of which h e suppl ied the text) saying that the Congress
mi nistries had failed to safeguard the rights and interests of the
M usl ims, t hat their t ermi nation brought a d ee p sense of relief,
and ask i ng the Governors to i nstitute inquiries i nto the misdeeds
of the various provincial governments of the Hindu prov i nces.21

A few days later Jinnah issued a statement, clarifying his appeal

of 2 D ecember and mak ing out a reasoned case aga inst the
Con gr•ss regime. He recalled that i n December 1 938, at the Patna
Session, the Musl im League Council had passed a resolution t o
the effect t hat, in v i e w o f Congress tyranny a n d of t h e failure o f
t h e Governors to protect M uslim rights i n t h e U n ited Provinces,
the Central Provinces and Bi har, the time had now come to auth­
o rise the League Working Committee "to resort t o ' Direct Action'
i f and when necessary" .22 He clarified that the Musli m decision
did not mean that t hey were in favour of provinces being ruled by
G overnors under Sect ion 93 of the I 935 Act ; in fact he said ,
prayer should be offered "for the establishment of truly popular
m i nistries which would do even justice to all commun ities and
interests". He demanded t he appoi n tment of a royal commission
with a purely j ud icial personnel and under one o f the Law Lords
of the P rivy Council to i n vestigate and report upon the charges

2 ' J i nnah's appeal o f 2 December, 1939 : Jam i!-ud-Din Ahmad, Some

Recent Spr'eches a11d Writi11gs of !>fr. Ji1111ah, op. cit. , vol. I, pp. 1 1 0- 1 12 .
2 2 For full text o f t h i s resolu t ion see Resolutions of the All India ,\111sli111

League fro111 Octobc:r 1937 ro Daember 1938, op. cir., pp. 56-57.
T H E ! \\ P A C T O F T H E S E C O S D W O R L D \\' A R 1 51

level led against the Congrc�s min istries by the Musl ims. Fina lly,
denying that the observation of the "Deliverance Day" m ight
provoke communal i ll-wi ll, he asked his fo llowers to behave with
perfect calmness and appealed : "Let there be no hartals, proces­
sions or any such demonstrations, but let a spirit of humility and
a mood of reflection prevail . There is relief and gratitude in our
hearts, not joy and triumph. "23
The last sentence quoted above makes non sense of the general
charge m ade against J i nnah that he was full of hatred and venom
and deliberately provoked Hind u-Muslim conflict. If any further
evidence is required on this point it is supplied by the peaceful
and d isciplined way i n which the " Deliverance Day" was observed.
There were no communal frays, n o "Hindu baiting", no leering
expression of triumph. On t he other hand , the day passed off
serenely and soberly with M uslims thanking God for His grace
i n protecting them from Congress oppression and praying to Him
for the sol idarity and progress of t he Muslim nation. I t i s signi­
ficant that the day was celebrated not only by the Muslims but
also by t hose Hindus and Parsis who were not happy with the
Congress rule. 24 Large numbers of Christians and hundreds o f
thousands of untouchables joi ned i n the demonstrations.25 I n the
words of the Round Table this action clearly showed the "depths
of communal feeli ngs".26 Sir Alfred Watson, a former editor o f
the Statesman o f Calcutta, was far-seeing enough to comment
that it postponed the hope of India's attainment of full nation­
hood . 27 The Musli m opinion o f Congress rule i s attested by a
reputable British historian : "by the end of 1 939 it was w idely
believed that, if the Congress Governments had l asted m uch
longer, communal fighting would have broken out o n an un­
precedented scale. The idea of a 'civil war" had been a n almo st
2 3 Full text of statement in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 1 1 2- 1 20.
2 4 See The Times, 2 7 December, 1 939.
2 5 S . Srinivasan, "Communal Problem in India", Empire Review, January
1 94 1 , p. 2 5 .
26 Round Table, March 1 940, p . 398.
27 Sir Alfred \Vatson, letter to Manchester Guardian, 1 4 December, 1939.
 1 52 T H E S T RU G G L E FO R PAKISTAN

inconceivable idea s o l o n g a s British rule was still unquestioned,

but now many I ndians \vere saying that it was coming " . 28
I t may be reievant here to mention the n ature of the Congress
demand for a Constituent Assembly. ln fact, the idea of having a
Constituent Assembly i n I ndia to frame the Constitution was
evolved by Nehru, Cripps and Lord Attlee before the war.29 This
suggestion was , for obvious reasons, unacceptable to the Muslims,
for any such body elected o n an all I nd ia basis was bound t o be
predominantly Hindu and, therefore, incapabk of safegua rding
Musli m i nterests or satisfying their demands. The Times was
prophetic i n its criticism of this Hindu scheme : "The convening
o f such a Constituent Assembly now, or even after the war, could
o nly prove t o the world the extent of Ind ian political d isunity,
and there are many who hold that an attempt to solve the
communal problem o n a simple majority basis would spl it India
from top to bottom, perhaps irretrievably."3° I t went on t o say
that the working of Congress ministries had already intensified
communal bitterness, and it was i llogical for Congress leaders t o
assume that an even greater extension of majority rule would be
l ikely t o lessen communalism i n the future.31 The Economist point­
ed out that the significance of the Congress demand for a Con­
s tituent Assembly was that it would give the Hindu majority the
power to impose a Constitution on the minorities.32

With the advantage of hind sight on our side we can now clearly
see that by the close of the year 1 939 Musli m patience with
Congress tactics had very nearly come to the end of its tether. The
22nd day of December, 1 939, was, therefore, a symbol of Indian
. d isuni ty-irretrievable and i rrevocable. Losing all hopes of a place
in the Indian sun, the M usli m masses began to think of having
a sun of their own. A feel i ng of revulsion for Hindu rule awakened
i n their hearts the desire for Muslim rule. Musli m separatism was
28 R. Coupland, India: A Restatement ( London : 1 945), p. 1 87.
29 C . R . Attlee, As It Happened (London : 1 954), p. 1 8 1 .
3 0 The Times, 5 December, 1 939.
3 1 Ibid.
32 For an elaboration of this idea see the Economist, 1 6 December, 1 939.
THE I MPACT O F T H E SECOND WORLD WAR 1 53

the logical result of Hindu intolerance. The idea of Pakistan was

capturing popular i m agination.
The Muslims had tried to seek an understanding that would
give them a sense of security. All such attempts had been frus­
trated because the Congress was suffering from an incorrigible
dislike for sharing power with any other group. This attitude was
based upon the conviction that the massive support of the numer­
ically superior Hindus made its position invincible. In its dealings
with the Muslims it was unable to rise higher than the general
H i ndu hatred of the Musl ims nursed for long because of the
Muslim conquest, which led the Hindus to think of Muslim pre­
sence in the subcontinent as an affront to Hindu self-respect and
d ignity. The Muslims had little comfort in the thought that Hindu
political attitudes were deeply embedded in Hindu intolerance of
Muslim traditions, culture and mores. The Hindus proved them­
selves averse to principles of l iberal governance. The Muslim fore­
taste of Hindu rule was unpleasant and inspired the worst fears
about Hindu majority rule. lf the Hindus could behave like this
when the real authority was still in the hands of the British and
the battle of freedom yet to be brought to a successful end, the
Muslims dreaded to think of a future when the Hindus would
become the unquestioned rulers of the destinies of the entire
subcontinent. Any efforts of the Muslims to improve their posi­
tion met with fierce and arrogant opposition. Thus the Congress
itself drove them from one position to another until they reached
a point of no return.
Gandhi's totalitarian attitude
We have already described how the coming of war affected Indian
politics, and particularly Muslim politics, and how Jinnah­
Congress and Jinnah-Viceroy negotiations towards the end of 1939
ended in a sorry stalemate. The new year brought no new develop­
ments. Both the Muslim League and the Congress were not wholly
of one mind. It will be wrong and misleading to say that there
was a split or difference of opinion within the League. But there
certainly was a difference of feeling, however politely it was
1 54 T H E S T R U G G L E FO R P A KISTAN

C\presse d . T h e most prom inent member o f t he M u s l i m League

to d i verge fro m the genera l ly accepted l i ne of thought was S i r
S i kandar Hayat K ha n , t h e s o l d ier Prem ier o f t h e Panjab. He
wanted al l t h e comm un i ties to cal l a t ruce t i l l t he danger from t he
commo n enemy was averted .33 He suggested, i n M ay, 1 940, the
s u m m o n i n g of a small representati ve body, i ncludi n g t he former
a n d present Chief M i n i sters o f a l l provinces, to d i scuss the o ut­
l i nes o f a future Const itut i o n to secure Dom in i o n Status fo r the
subco n ti nent.34 H e deplored the fact t h at fndian leaders were not
facing real it ies and warned them t h at in t he absence o f a settle­
ment among t h em they would i rreparably i njure t he country's
i nterests.35 He could not therefore t h i n k i n terms o f a s ingle
Constitution fo r t he e n t i re subco n t inent . But t hese appeals d id
not represent the m i n d o f the M us l i m League. Jinnah was, at t h i s
t i me, engaged in evol v i ng a scheme of d iv i s i o n and at t he same
t i me negoti a t i n g w i t h t he British on t he one hand and t he H i n d u s
on the other. He believed that t he q uestion of t he future of t he
1 ndian M us l i m s was m u c h m o re i m p o rtant than a temporary gain
on the pol i t ical chess-board. The two-nations t heory had been
proclai med and its logical conclus i o n , part ition, accepted and
adopted . Nor cou l d he part icipate in an all India Government­
any al l Ind i a Government would have been a reversal of his basic
pol icy a n d thought. And, anyway, what k i nd of government was
t hen i n existence ? The Cen t ra l Government was not federal, not
even of the k i n d which m ight o nce have been acceptab l e t o J i nnah.
He made it p l a i n that to share in the working o f a government
c o m m i tted to a un ited India would prej ud i ce h i s cla i m that t h e
M us l i m s were a n at io n apart entitled t o a n equal treatment with
t he H in d u s . To j o i n such a government would mean h i s w i l l ing­
ness t o estab l i sh H i nd u raj . And the fact that t h i s i dea was not a

fantasy of the M us l i m s was demonstrated by Gandhi h imself.

In June 1 940 G a n d h i \\Tote an art icle i n the Harijan which

scouted all offers o f agreement and repudiated the very
33 Statement of I I May. 1 940. Ciril and Milirary Ga::etrc, 1 2 May, 1 940.
34 Statement of 23 May. 1 940. Cii"il and Milirary Ga::crtc. 24 May, 1 940.
3 5 Statement of 19 June, 1 940. Cid/ and lvfilitary Ga::ctte, 20 June, 1 940.
THE I M P A C T O F T H E S E C O N D \V O R L D \V A R 155

idea o f a n i n ter-party rec o n c i l i at i o n . Let Gandhi speak fo r

himself:-

"Public and private appeals are be i n g made to m e to call all

parties together a nd arrive at a common agreement, and the n ,
they say, we shall get what we want fro m Great Brita i n . These
good friends forget one central fact. The Congress, which professes
to speak for llldia, and wants unadulterated i ndependence, cannot
strike a common measure of agreement w ith those who do not
. . . . . The British Government would n o t ask for <t common agree­
ment, if they recognized any one party to be strong enough to
take delivery. The Congress, it must be admitted, has not that
strength today. It has come to its present position in the face o f
opposition. I f i t does n o t weaken a n d h a s enough patience, i t
will develop sufficient strength t o take del i very. It is a n i//usion
created by ourselves that we must come to an agreement with all
parties before ire can make any progress. There is only one d e moc­
ratic, elected political o rganizat i o n , i.e., the Congress. All the
others are self-appointed or elected on a sectional bas i s . Thus for
the present purpose there are only two part ies-the Con gress a n d
those who s i d e w i t h the Congress, a n d t h e parties who do not .
Between the two there is no meeting ground without the o ne o r
the other surrendering i t s purpose. "36
This was total itarianism-pure and undiluted. The Congress
was to take delivery from the Brit i s h , i f not n o w , in the near
future. Other parties did not count. They d id not matter. The
Congress was the only party in the field . [t spoke fo r all Ind ia.
It would not wait fo r a n agreement w i th others. It stood alone­
proud and patrician. This was a challenge to Britain. But it was
a greater challenge to the Muslims. If Gandhi was right, the
Muslims stood nowhere. The Con gress would negotiate w ith Bri­
tain and Musl i ms would b� sold l i ke chattel in the market place
of politics.

Jinnah took up this challenge. G and hi i ns i sted upon the right

of the maj ority to rule. J i nnah answered him w ith the only logical

36 M. K. Gand h i , ''Two Parties"', Harijw1, 15 J u ne, 1 940. Italics not in the

original.
1 56 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I ST A N

alte r native. The Hindus were i n a majority i n the greater part o f

India and therefore entitled to speak fo r i t . But the Muslims were
a nation in themselves. I ndia was not a nation. N obody could
speak for all India. As a nation the Muslims could speak fo r
themselves-for Muslim I ndia. As such they were ent itled to equal
treatment with the other nation-the H i ndus.
This clash between the two leaders produced two results. In
the first place, i t enhanced J i nnah's authority with t he Muslim
masses. If G andhi was t he supreme leader of the Hindus, the
Q uaid-i-Azam had fast grown to an equal position among the
Muslims. Rec:.ilcitrant or h esitant Musl im polit icians were strictly
controlled and at t imes rebuked . The Musl im League Working
Committee endorsed Jinnah's policy and authorized h i m t o pro­
ceed with his negot iations with the Viceroy. No other member o f
t h e Committee could n o w negotiate with Congress leaders without
Jinnah's permission.3 7 Muslims could not serve on war committees
pending further instructions from J innah.38
I n the second place, J i nnah hardened his tone in his conversa­
tions with the Viceroy. The Muslim League must be firm with the
Government, lest the Congress, i n pursuance of the policy enun­
ciated by Gandhi, persuade the Government t o acknowledge it a s
t h e sole spokesman o f Ind i a . So J innah had an i nterview with the
Viceroy o n 27 June, 1 940, and a t the latter's request put forward
the Muslim League's terms for co-operation with the government .
These terms were to the following effec t :
The government should not make any pronouncement which
would militate against the basis of the Lahore Resolution. The
Government should give t he Muslims a categorical assurance that
n o interim o r final scheme of constitution would be adopted
without the previous approval and consent of Musli m India .
Muslim leadership must b e treated as equals and should have an
equal share i n the authority and control of the Governments,
3 7 Resolutions ofthe All India Muslim League from April 1940 to April 194I,
op. cit., Resolution No. 1, pp. 1 -4 and Resolution No. 3, pp. 4-5.
38 Ibid., Resolution No. 2, p. 4 .
T H E I M P A C T O F T H E S E C ON D W O R L D W A R 1 57

Central and Provi ncial. Provisio nally a nd d uring t he period o f war,

three steps should be taken .
I . The Viceroy's Council should be en la rged s o that Musl i m
representation must be equal to that o f the Hindus if the Cong­
ress joins i n, otherwise Musl i ms should have the majority of the
additional members.
2. I n the provinces under Governors' rule, n on-offic ial advisers
should be appointed of whom a majority should be the representa­
tives of M uslims.
3. There should be a War Council consisti n g of not less than
15 members to be presided over by the Viceroy. Lt would review
the general situation and adv ise the G overn ment with regard t o
matters i n connection with t he prosecution of the war generally
a nd , in particular, the fullest possible development of the defence
and finance and to make a t horough economic and i ndustrial
drive. Here agai n Musl im representation should be equal to that
of the Hindus i f the Congress comes in and p reponderant if it does
not. Finally, the Muslim League shall choose the Musl im repre­
sentatives on the proposed War Council and the Viceroy's Council
and o n the board of non-official advisers to the provi ncial Gov­
ernors.39
The Viceroy expressed his views on Jinnah's tentative proposals
in his letter of 6 J uly. As for the expansi o n of the Viceroy's Council
and Musli m representation on it, he agreed with the expansion
but not with the Muslim share i n it. " I t is not a case of striking
a balance between the different i nterests or preserving the propor­
tions between the important parties." But " I read ily accept the
importance, i n the event of any expansion . of securing adequate
representation of Musl i m i nterests, and that is a point which I
would bear i n mind". He also rejected the idea of .I innah nominat­
ing the Musl i m members of the Council. That was the privilege
of the Secretary of State for India and members of the Council
could not be the nominees of political parties. The Viceroy was
also averse to the appointment of non-official advis ers to provin-
39 Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 502-503.
1 58 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

cial Governors. The idea o f a War Council was "well worth while
considering though de tails would have to be worked out".40
Jinnah's conditions were thus rejected. But he was too well­
schooled a politician to be d isappointed. In political negotiations
success comes at the end of a long and dusty road . And it was
yet only the beginning of a long series of conversations .
The British offer of A ugust 1940
The British G overnment was not disheartened by the lack o f
agreement e ither between the Congress and the League or between
the two of them on the one hand and the Viceroy on the other.
On 8 August, 1 940, His Majesty's Government issued what came
to be popularly known as the August offer. The white paper em­
bodyi ng the offer began by asserting that the Government felt
that it should not, because of differences, postpone either the ex­
pansion of the Viceroy's Council or the establishment o f a body
which would more closely associate Indian public opinion with
the conduct of the war. To remove any d oubts two points were
clarifie d . In the first place, full weight was to be given to the
views of m i norities in any revision of the Constitution. "It goes
without saying that they [His Majesty's Government] could not
contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace
and welfare of India to any system of government whose auth­
ority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's
national l ife . Nor could they be parties to the coercion o f such
elements i nto admission to such a Government." In the second
place, the declaration sympathized w ith the idea of an Indian
constituent assembly and undertook to assent to the setting up of
"a body representative of the principal elements in India's national
l ife i n order to devise the framework of the new Constitution".
But two conditions went w i t h t h i s promise. First , t h i s body would
o nly be set up after the conclusion of the war. Secondly, the
promise was "subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations which
Great Brita i n's long connection w ith India has i mposed o n her
and for which His Majesty's Government cannot d ivest them-
4 0 Ibid. , pp. 503-504.
THE IMPACT OF T H E SECOND WORLD WAR 1 59

selves of responsibility". Before such a constituent assembly came

into existence and for the duration of the war, it was hoped that
all parties and communities i n India would co-operate in the war
effort and by thus working together pave the way for India's
attainment of free and equal partnership in the British Com­
monwealth.4 1
This statement contained some new ideas. In the first place,
for the first time in Indo-British history, a constituent assembly
composed of Indians was promised. So far the will of the British
Parliament had been supreme, and the Government of India Act,
1935, had only confirmed this supremacy. Now the conception
of an Indian constitution-making body was not only supported,
but an undertaking was given to set up such an assembly imme­
diately after the cessation of hostilities. In the second place, and
allied to this, was the clear repudiation of the Congress idea of a
constituent assembly. The assembly that His Majesty's Govern­
ment promised to bring into being was to be one whose establish­
ment did not adversely affect the rights of the minorities and the
Princes. In the third place, Dominion Status was still assumed t o
b e the goal o f India. I n his explanatory speech i n the House of
Commons, Amery, the Secretary of State for India, declared that
the status of a Dominion "is one not inferior to that of nations
that perforce stand alone, but superior . . . . . . There is no higher
status in the world". 42
In the fourth place, the fear of the Muslims, and that of all
other minorities, that the Government might surrender to Cong­
ress demands was set at rest. Whatever the pressure from the
Congress the Government was not to acquiesce in the imposition
of a Congress Raj. No further political move or development
which did not satisfy the minorities was to be approved by His
Majesty's Government. This was not, a s the Congress leaders
declared ad nauseum, the giving of a veto to minorities on con-
4 1 India and the War : statement issued with the authority of His Afajesty's
Government by the Governor-Genera/ on A ugust 8, 1940. Cmd. 621 9.
42 H.C. 364. 5s. Col. 876.
1 60 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A KI STAN

stitut ional ad vance. ln the \\ O rds of the Secretary of Sta te fo r

Ind ia, .. agreement means n o t \'eto b y a n y element, b u t compro­
mise; and willi ngness to compromise. in fndia as el sewhere, i s an
essential test of that sense of responsibil ity on which free govern­
ment m ust be based " .4-'
But t here were also some unwelcome aspects of t he o ffer. And
this was well brought o ut in the resolutions o f the League and the
Congress o n it.
J innah met the Viceroy on 1 2 a n d 14 A ugust and t he two ex­
changed notes on t he proposal s . But the final decision was taken
by the Working Comm ittee of the Muslim League which sat at
Bo mbay on I and 2 September. The Committee noted with satis­
faction t hat t he G overn ment has "on t he whole practically met
t he demand of the Muslim League fo r a clear assurance" to the
Muslims t hat no fut ure Constitution wo uld be adopted by the
G overnment w it hout their approval and consent .44 At the same
sitting. t he Committee t hought it proper to declare t hat t he
League stood by the Lahore Resol ution and the basic prin ci ples
underlying its terms. t hat t he M uslims of India were "a
nation by themselves" . and t hat they alone "are the final j udges
and arbiters of their own future destiny". 45 However, the British
o ffer regarding interim arrangements was "most unsatis­
factory" and did not meet the requirements o r t he spirit indicated
in the Muslim League Working Committee's resolution of 16 June,
J 940. Five reasons were given for not accepting i t . First, neither
t he League President nor t he Working Committee were consulted
as to t he number proposed to be a dded to the Viceroy's Execu­
t ive Co uncil . Secondly, the Committee was n o t i nformed of the
manner in which t he Council was to be re-const ituted. Thirdly, t he
Committee had no i n formation as to the o t her parties w it h whom
the League would be called upon to work . Fourthly, the League
had yet no idea about the manner in which portfolios were to be
4 3 H.C. 364. 5s. Co l . 8 7 8 .
4 4 Ri'so/urions ofrlze A ll !11ctia .\lu,/i111 L<'llglli' from April 1940 to April 1941,
op. cit., Reso l u t ion N o . 2. µp. 1 0- 1 1 .
4 5 Ibid. , Reso l u t ion 1'\ o . 3 , pµ. 1 1 - 1 2 .
T H E I M P A C T OF T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R 161

assigned to the new members o f the Council. Finally, the proposal

on the War Advisory Council was vague and obscure.46
The Committee authorized J innah to seek clarification from
the Viceroy regarding the proposed Constitution, the composition
and functions of the proposed War Council and also the expansion
of the Viceroy's Executive Council.
J innah had another interview with the Viceroy on 24 September
and the next day the Viceroy sent a formal reply to League in­
quiries. This discussion and the letter were considered by the
Working Committee on 28 September at New Delhi. The offer
was not acceptable, because the inclusion of only two League re­
presentatives i n the Council would not give it "any real and sub­
stantial share i n the authority of the Government at the Centre",
beca u se the Government was not willing to appoint non-official
advisers in the Governor-ruled provinces, and because most of
the objections raised in the resolution of 1 - 2 September had not
been met.47
Thus the Muslim League neither accepted nor rejected the offer.
In his presidential address to the Bengal Provincial Muslim League
Conference at Serajgunj on 1 5 February, 1 942, J innah referring
to the August offer, said that the League had accepted it "in
principle" though the details were not satisfactory.48
The Congress reaction to the offer was violent in the extreme.
On 1 0 August A. K. Azad, the President of the Congress, refused
to see the V iceroy to d iscuss the offer, for it was "totally at
variance" with Congress policy.49 Meeting in the same uncom­
promising mood on 1 8-22 August, the Congress Working Com­
mittee rejected the offer in clear terms. The Government, it said,
did not want to part with power, and this was "a d irect encourage­
ment and incitement to civil discord and strife". The issue of the
minorities had been made i nto an insuperable barrier to India's
46 Ibid., Resolution No. 4, pp. 1 2- 1 5 .
47 Ibid. ,
Resolution No. 1 of 28 September, 1940, pp. 20-22.
48 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 386-387.
49 Indian Annual Register, 1 940, vol. II, p. 201 .
 1 62 T H E STR U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A �-1

progress. The resolution c:1ded o n a note of threat : t he Congress

would have to take firm action . so
The Congress claimed to spea k for all I ndia and rejected the
offer under that pretence. But what it ignored was the fact that
by ha rping conti nually on its al l-embracing character it was m o re
and more pushing the m inorities i nto j llstifiable intran sigence . I f
only the Congress could i n fact si:eak, a s i t professed t o speak ,
for all India, i t s rejection would have at least made sense. B u t it:>
refusal t o come to terms with, or even recognize the existence o f,
the minorities and at the same time to claim the al legiance of all
political elements i n India, was hardly consi stent. And when, o n
t o p o f that, it charged t h e G overnment with encou raging civil
strife, even the greatest enemy of the Brit ish could not agree with
the Congress.
The Viceroy regretted tha t his offer had not been accepted by
all the parties, though he had the sati sfaction to know that it had
met with the su pport of a large body of opinion. He still thought
that its acceptance would have afforded '·the most hopeful contri ­
bution which I ndian leaders could make a t this critica l time to­
wards the preservation of Indian un ity, and towards an agreed
constitutional settlement for the future''. The offer was not with­
d rawn and could be i mplemented as soon as "a sufficient d egree
o f representati\'e support" was forthcom i ng. For the t i me being,
however, the G overnment could not proceed with the expansion
of the Executive Coun cil o r the establisl1ment of the War Advisory
Council.5 1
The August offer thus produced n o practical or i mmed iate
results. But in terms of ultimate resul t s it was a considerable ga i n
fo r t h e Muslims. H i s Majesty's G overnment h a d read ily agreed
to give the i m portant undertaking that Muslim satisfaction would
be sought in any futu re constitutional arrangement, i nterim o r
final. To have extracted this unequivocal declaration within less
5 0 Ibid. , vol. IT. pp. 1 96 - 1 98. This threat is examined in detail i n the fo l low­
ing sect i o n ,
51 Viceroy's ctd d rcs'; to t h e Ce n t ra l L c g i s Lt t u re L)f 20 � o vcmbcr, 1 940 ;
e,\ trnct qc1otcd in G ;1yer crnd A p padorai, op. ci:., vol. I I . p. 5 0 9 .
T H E I M P A C T OF T H E S E C O N D WO R L D W A R 1 63

than a year of the beginning of the war and within five months
of the Lahore session w<ts no mean achievement of the Muslim
League. But it should also be remembered that the Congress play­
ed a significant part in this achievement. By its conduct in poli­
tical bargaining and its attitude towards the Muslims, it had helped
in convincing the Government that it would hardly be i n the
fitness of things to leave the fate of the minorities in the hands
of Congress leaders.
Congress civil disobedience movement
and the Muslims
So far the Congress had been negotiating with and threatening
the British Government in turns. It had, however, taken no definite
steps beyond talking of independence and the establishment of a
"national Government" before the conclusion of the war. It took
no cognizance of the feelings of other political groups and com­
munities. By the autumn of 1 940, Gandhi had brought the
Congress to a point where a definite stand had to be taken.
Gandhi met Lord Linlithgow on 27 and 30 September, 1 940.
The Viceroy, appreciative of Gandhi's professed views on war and
violence, informed him how pacifists were treated in Britain. He
explained that the conscientious objector may not fight and is
allowed to profess his faith in public, but he was not permitted
to persuade others to oppose war or obstruct it. Similar concession
could be given to Indian pacifists. But this was not enough fo r
the Congress leader, who wanted that a l l Indians must be free
'"to call upon people throughout the country to refrain from
assisting India's war effort". This the Viceroy obviously could
not concede. On 1 3 October, Gandhi outlined his line of action
in a meeting of the Congress Working Committee which endorsed
it and promised him "the fullest co-operation" in the prosecution
of his plans.
The plan was to start "individual" satyagrah, whereby certain
individuals , chosen by Gandhi in his discretion, would offer civil
disobedience and court arrest. The first person to offer satyagrah
under Gandhi's direction was Vinoba Bhave, who made an anti-
 1 64 T H E STRU GGLE FOR P A K I STAN

w a r speech on 1 7 October. O n 1 7 November the second stage o f

t h e campaign began. Gandhi termed i t "representative satyagrah".
Individuals were chosen from gro ups, they roamed i n the streets,
shouted a nti-war slogans and were arrested . By the end of the
year about five to six hundred persons had been arrested and sent
to prison. They i ncluded top-most leaders l i ke Rajagopalacharia
and Azad . But the campaign " provoked little public excitement" . 52
I f the idea behind the campaign was slowly to develop a popular
and mass movement so that it might lead up to a national revolt,
the satyar,rah was a total failure . Every day the normal l ife of
the Ind ians went on at its accustomed p2cc. There was no dis­
organization , no mass protests, no general discontent a mong the
populace. The average Hindu , especially the average Congress­
man, felt as if pol itical thinking and action could safely be left
to Gandhi and his elite advisers .
Nor was Gandhi's non-violence in word and deed followed by
all . One example will il lustrate this. Dev Raj Sethi, a Congress
Member of the Legislative Assembly of t he Panjab, was selected
by Gandhi for offering satyagralz on 1 1 Dece;nber, 1 940. But he
made two powerful speeches before that date and was arrested
on 7 December. In his second speech he had exhorted the aud i­
ence to emulate the spirit o f those brave German pilots who were
then bombing London. Such sentiments may or may not have
been wicked-as the D istrict Magistrate trying Sethi described
them-but they were certai nly not in keeping \Vith Gandhi's pro­
fessed non-violence and hatred o f war of any ki nd . Or, perhaps
they were, for had not Gandhi extolled Bhagat Singh to the skies
at the Karachi Congress Session of 1 93 1 and called him a martyr ?
B hagat Singh, i t may be recalled, had t hrown a bomb i nto the
central legislature where many I ndians would have been slaught­
ered ; compared to him t he G c nrnm pi lots were greater martyrs,
for they were engaged in killing o nly the British i mperial ists �
5 2 R. Coupland. lildian Politics 1936-194:!, op . cit . , p. 249. Sar. rngrah =
l i te;·::;ily, endeavo u r in ( rursuit of) t r u t h , a term used by G a n d h i and his
fo llowers for passi\ e resistar.ce. Saryagralzi= a p e r s o n who offers passive
resistance.
THE ! \! P A C T O F T H E S E C o �.; o \\' O R L D W AR 1 65

Tt is significant that the camp:tign made the least fuss or commo­

t ion in the M uslim provinces. In Beng�t! people were l ittle attract­
ed by these occurrences. The North-W est Frontier Province was
the least affected i n the whole of Ind ia. At the outset Khan
Sahi b had been reluctant to participate in the movement, and when
he did so on 14 December, his arrest d id not create more than a
ripple o n the calm surface of public feeling or opinion.
I t was probably the apathy shown by the public which persuad­
ed Gand hi, in April 1 94 1 , to throw the satyagrah open to all
Con gressmen. By the middle of the year the peak had been
reached : 20,000 had been convicted and at one t i me there were
1 4,000 i n prison. But by n o standard was this a remarkable
achievement. In proportion to the total Congress membership
this was but an in significant figure. Many Congressmen concluded
from this that the movement was dying down and their enthu­
siasm also d ecreased . On 1 5 Apri l the Hindu called for a cessation
of the campaign. By October only 5 , 600 persons remained i n
prison . Those who were released d i d not, as Gandhi had hoped,
care to re-court arrest. G radually the number of satyagrahis
dwi:1dled to i nsignificant proportions t hough the movement l i n­
gered on for another few months. But i t was hardly more than a
token gesture of defiance, not a zealous natio na l protest.
The M us l ims were undoubtedly opposed to the Congress policy.
This cpposition is easy to explain . The Congress policy towards
the war was, to put it mildly,. d i fferent from the League's . The
Congress was uncompromisingly against the war and had given
a point-blank refusal to any offer of co-operation u nt i l its i n flex­
i ble demand of i ndependence-right then a nd i n ful l measure­
was conceded . The League was also opposed to the war, but i n
much m ilder terms and to a much smaller extent. For this there
were four reasons. First, the League wanted time to consolidate
i ts strength and to popularize the idea o f Pakistan. It was in no
dec.perate hurry for " independence", for a quick decision on this
point might well have left the Pakistan i ssue in the lurch. Secondly,
it was good strategy, from the Muslim point of v iew, n o t to have
1 66 T H E STRU G G LE FOR P A K I STA�

a complete break with the British Government. A m i nority gene·

ral ly tends to be Jess extreme in o pposition to the rulers than the
majority, particula rly when the m ajority m a kes no secret of its
future designs to rule o ver the mino rity. And here we must
remember how completely t he Con gress rule o f 1 937-39 had
a lienated t he Musli ms. Thirdly, the Congress ca mpaign of civil
disobedience was palpably ill-conceived . I t was clea r even to the
meanest pol itical i ntelligence t hat no :.: m o unt of movements­
violent o r non-violent-were going to persuade the British to
grant India independence in the middle of a Ii fe-and-death struggle.
This was the card inal psychological error t hat G a nd hi m ade. H e
underrated t he great d anger that the war offered to British national
existence and he overrated his own n uisance value. And, finally,
the m a i n M uslim demand-that no major constitutional advance
should be contemplated or enacted without reference to the i r in­
terests-had been clearly conceded in both the official statements
of 18 October, 1 939, and 8 August, 1 940.
The M uslim League, t herefore, did not look kindly on the
satyagrah movement launched by Gand h i . I n N ovember 1 940,
i n a speech delivered at Delhi, J i nnah rid iculed the Congress cla im
that its campa ign had been launched fo r the freedom and inde­
pendence of India. ft was clear to him, a s it was clear to t he
British Govern ment , that it was intended "to coerce the British
G overnment to recognize the Congress as the only authoritative
and representat ive o rgan ization of the people of fndia". The
Congress attitude was : "Come to a settlement with us. Come to
terms with us and ignore the Musalmans and other minorities . "
The Congress \\ anted power, includ i ng the power to coerce other
commun ities. I t was trying to coerce the British Government to
surrender power t o i t . T h i s was a " ' process o f black m a i l . The
G overn ment know it and we know it. "53
This opinion was endorsed by the Council of the Muslim
League which passed a resolution i n February 1 94 1 o n the
Congress movement . It \Vas laid down that the Congress campaign
53 J a rn i l - u d - D i n A h mad , Of'. cir . . rr. 200-205.
T H E I M P A C T O F T H E S E C O N D W O R L D \\' A R 167

w a s '"designed t o bring pressure o n the British Government to

resilc from the position it has taken in regard to the future Con­
stitution of India relating to the Muslims and other minorities
and concede to the Congress demands which are fundamentally
opposed by Muslim India". It recalled that in November 1 939,
G andhi had himself written in the Harijan that "So long as there
is no workable arrangement with the Muslim League, civil resist­
ance must involve resistance against the League." This, said the
resolution, clearly indicated the intention of the Congress in
starting the movement. It warned the Government that if it con­
ceded anything to the Congress which "adversely a ffects or mili­
tates against the Muslim demands", the Muslim League would
resist it and, if the situation demanded , the League would "not
hesitate to i ntervene and play such part in the struggle as may
be necessary for the protection of the rights and interests of the
Musnlmans of this country".54
Jn its Madras annual session of April 194 1 , the Muslim League
again reiterated that the Congress civil resistance was aimed at
coercing the British Government into transferring sovereign
power to the Hindus and "thus relegate the Muslim nation of
1 00 millions and the Indian minorities to the status of mere
subjects of Hindu Raj throughout the country" . It warned the
Government that any constitutional change enacted under Cong­
ress threat would constitute "a flagrant breach of faith" and
would be "contrary to the solemn declarations and promises"
made by His Majesty's Government from time to time. If any
such weakness was shown by the British Government or the
Viceroy, the Muslims reserved to themselves the right "to resort
io every measure and method to resist it with all the power they
can command".55
S4Resolution No. 6 of the Council of the All India Muslim League of
in Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from
23 February, 1 94 1 ; text
April 1940 to April 1941, op. cit., pp. 32-34.
ss Full text in ibid., pp. 43-44. This resolution was proposed by
I. I. Chundrigar.
1 68 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A h: I S T A :S

Tlze Liberal Party proposals of 1941

The policies of the two major parties, the Congress a nd t he
Muslim League, have been dealt with i n t he preceding pages.
Before we proceed to discuss the next constitutional and polit ical
development, it is advisable as well as i nteresting to look briefly
at the attitude of the National Liberal Federation . The Liberals
formed a small m i n ority i n publi c l i fo as well as in the legislatures.
But some of t hem, l i ke Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Chi manlal
H . Setalvad and Sir Srinavasa Sastri, were men of great ex pe­
rience and considerable ability. They were. so to speak, con s i­
dered o utside the everyday '"communal" politics, and therefore
i t might have been expected that their del i berations could show
a way out of the i mpasse.
In their Calcutta annual session o f December 1 940 the Libero ls
laid down their pri n ci ples o f policy which they thought could
serve as the basis of a solution. These proposals may be summar­
i zed t hu s : ( I ) The war effort should be whole-heartedly supported ;
(2) Britain should i mmediately declare t hat India would be a
Dom i n ion within two years of the end of the war ; (3) The Central
Govern ment should be re-constituted so that the Viceroy was the
constitutional head of a ''fully nationa l" government : (4) Parti­
t ion should be ruled out and communal electorates should be
gradually eliminated ; (5) The Congress civil d isobedience move­
ment was dcplorable.s6
Tn March 1 94 1 , the Liberals called a " non-party conference"
at Bombay. It was dom i nated by Hindu Li berals, and the three o r
fou r Muslims who participated could not speak for their com­
mun ity. It was sign ificant that this Conference was dominated by
the Hindu Mahasabha. Three lead ing Mahasabhites-Savarkar,
Moonje and Mookerj i-attcnded . Sapru presided and Sir N r i ­
pendra Sirca r moved the followi ng resolution : " . . . . . this Con­
ference is of the opin ion t hat the whole Executive Council should
·-
consist of n o n -official I ndians d rawn from i mportant clements i n
the publi c life o f th e country . . . . . the reco nstructed Government
56 f!zdia11 A1111ua! Rer;isrer, 1 94 1 , \ v l . 1 1 , pp. 309-3 1 5 .
T H E Dl P A C T O F T H E S E C O >l D W O R L D W A R 1 69

should not merely be a collection of departmental heads, but

should deal with all important matters of policy on a basis of
joint and collective responsibility. In regard to a 1 1 i nter-imperial
and international matters, the reconstructed G overnment should
be treated on the same footing as the Dominion Governments . . . . .
[Simultaneously His Majesty's Govern ment should make a dec­
laration] that within a specified t i me limit after the conclusion o f
the war [ndia will enjoy the same measure of freedom as w il l be
enjoyed b y Britain and the Dominions".5 7
On 29 J une the Council o f the National Liberal Federati o n
met at Poona, criticized t h e British G overnment fo r not having
accepted the L iberal solution, deplored the Secretary o f State's
alleged refusal to advance t i l l the Musl im League had agreed,
and expressed "unqualified condemnation o f the scheme of parti­
t i oning India which is known as Pakistan" and called upon all
Indians to resist it. s s
Some features of the Sapru proposals merit analysis. First of
all, i t was not a "non-party" conference. It i s true that both the
Congress and the League were absent, but eight distinct groups
were present : the Hindu Mahasabha, the Con gress N ationalist
Party, the Hindu League, the Liberal Federation, the Sikhs, the
Indian Christians, the Parsis, and the scheduled castes. Secondly,
the absence of the Congress and t he Musl im League gave an air
of unreality t o the proceedings of the Conference ; it would not
be an exaggeration t o say that the real political [ndia was not
represented at all (only i n that sense i t was really a "non-party''
Conference). Thirdly, the Conference in its resolutions, a. n d Sapru
i n his presidential speeches, went out of their way to criticise the
Pakistan plan. If the Conference was c alled to bring about a
rapprochement between the Hindus a.nd t he Musl ims, this could
hardly be achieved by castigating, without argument, the profess­
ed aim of one of the parties to the d ispute. And askin g the Indians
t o resist the part i t i o n was n o t h i n g less than decl aring war upon

57 Fu l l te-;t i n M . Gwycr and A . Appadorai, op. cit. . vol. I f, pp. 5 1 0- J I ,

which also gin!s extracts from S a rru·s president i a l speech.
58 lndi.111 A11111wl RegistC'r, 1 94 1 , v o l . ] [ , p. 3 3 3 .
1 70 T H E S TR u G G L E FOR PA K ISTAN

one o f the m ajor gro u ps . Condemn ing Pak istan and not
saying a word abo ut Congress plans was to take sides. Obviously,
therefore, the Conference could not be said to be a neutral body
a im ing at suggest ing a solution , but a part isan attempt at bringing
about a one-sided agreement. Fourthly, the Conference demanded
a " nat ional government" with the Viceroy as a mere constitutional
head : a demand which made n onsense of the Government of
I ndia Act of 1 935. A m a n of Sapru's constitutional experience
should have known that any s uch change was i mpossi ble without
radical amendments in the 1 93 5 Constitution. F i fthly, Sapru's
proposal was precisely the demand of the Congress. The
Congress had started a civil resistance campaign because its
demand fo r an i m mediate " national government" had not been
accepta ble to the British G overnment. And , finally, by giving the
H i ndu Mahasabha a predominant voice in the counsels of the
Conference, the Li berals had d riven the last nail into the coffin
of the i r pretence o f neutrality. The Conference proposals carried
an unm istakable i mp ress of the Hindu Mahasabha's policy. And
in spite of this the Hindu Mahasabha later i ssued a statement to
the effect that they were not committed to the proposals.59 It i s
d ifficult to see how the Sapru proposals d i ffered fro m the Congress
demands, and why the Liberals expected the B ritish Government
and the Musli m s t o accept them while they had earlier rejected
the Congress overtures of the same nature. It must be remembered
that the Hindu favourably commented on the proposals i n these
word s , "These proposals n o t only constitute a considerable ap­
prox i mation to the Congress demand but they represent a very
substantial agreement amongst all the progressive elements o f
t h e country . "60
The Musl i m reaction t o the Liberal "non-party Conference"
was the same as to the Congress demand for i mmediate i ndepend­
ence. J innah pointed out that the Sapru recommendat ions met
the Congress Poona demand for a "national government" at the
5 9 India Office, Reriew of Constitutional Dcrelopments in India from the
Outhreak of War till July 1941 (London : 1 94 1 ) . p. 1 0.
6 0 Quoted by J innah i n his statement of 4 May, 1 94 1 , Jamil-ud-Din
A hmad, op. cit., p. 307.
T H E I MP A CT O F T H E S E C O N D W O R L D W A R 171

centre. They "stood fo r nothing but a n immediate, united and

democratic government at the centre with the pretence that only
for the duration of the war it would be responsible to the Crown
and would assume the permanent character of a Dominion Gov­
ernment after a certain period by virtue of the new declaration''.
Acceptance of this would be a complete cancellation of the
British declaration of 8 August, I 940. 61
lt remains to notice the British official attitude to the Liberal
proposals. On 22 April, 1 94 1 , L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State
for India, spoke i n the House of Commons on this point. He
began by pointing out that the Sapru scheme amounted not to a
modification of the prevailing form of government but to its
replacement by an entirely different type of government. This was
not only i nadvisable in the midst of a grave war, but would also
create "internal constitutional problems of no l ittle d ifficulty"
both in relation to the provinces and to the Princes. His second
point of criticism was that the proposals were "directed to the
wrong address". There was a constitutional impasse in Tndia not
because Britain did not want to give India her independence, but
because India was not united in her demand. The difficulty of a
Hindu-Muslim disagreement on their relative claims was not
lessened but enhanced by a "suggestion of new type of Executive
with more extensive powers". 1t would be difficult to persuade
the Parliament to confer Dominion status on a body constituted
on the lines suggested by the non-party conference. His advice to
men like Sapru was that they should concentrate their attention
on bringing about an agreement between the Congress and the
Muslim League. either by using their powers of persuasion upon
the existing party leaders or by building up a strong central party
which could speak for l ndia without going to the extremes.6 2
In reply to this speech Gandhi made a bitter pronouncement
on the Hindu-Muslim problem. Amery had i nsulted Indian intelli-
6 1 Jinnah's statement o n the Sapru Proposals circulated to all branches of
the All India Muslim League in May 1 94 1 , ihid. , p. 3 14-3 1 9 .
62 H . C . 37 1 . Ss. , 22 A p r i l . 1 94 1 . cols. 53-57. Also printcd i n L . S . Amery,
India and Freedom (London : 1 942), pp. 73-74.
1 72 T HE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I S T A ]';

gen cc . \\Tote Gand hi , b y sayi n g that freedom was being

delayed because o r d i s u n i ty i n I nd ia. '·it is the British statesmen
who are responsible for t he d iv i s i o n s in Indi a s ran ks and the
'

d ivisions will continue so long as the British sw o rd holds India

under bondage. I admit that there is unfortunately a n unbridge­
able gulf between the Congress and the Muslim League. Why do
not B ritish statesmen admit that it is after all a domestic q uarrel ?
Let them withdraw from India, and I promise that the Congress
and the League and a l l other parties will find it to their i nterest
to come tcgether and devise a home-made solution for the gov­
ernment of India. It may not be scientific ; it may not be after any
Western pattern ; but i t w i l l be durable. It may be that before
we come t o that happy state of affairs, we mar have tofigh t amongst
oursefres. B u t , i f we agree not t o i nvite the assistance o f any out­
s id e Power, t he trouble w i l l last perhaps a fortnight" .63 In other
words, if the British withdrew, the H i ndus would be s ufficient­
ly powerful to bring the minorities, especially the Musli ms, t o
their senses. Such statements could n o t ga i n the ir confiden ce .
Gandhi \\'en t on repeat i n g this till July 1 947.
The Defence Council episode
Tn the sum m e r o f 1 94 1 occurred an ewr.t which showed to what
remarkable extent J i nnah had gro w n in importance <i s the leader
of the Musl ims of lnd ia since the anxious days of 1 936-37.
On 20 July, 1 94 1 , S i r R o ger Lumely, the Governor of Bombay,
wrote a letter to Jinnah conveying to him a message from the
V i cero y to the effect that with the approval of His Majesty's
Go\ ernment, the Viceroy had decided to expand his Executive
Council by creati n g five new portfolios. The new members , who
had been offer.;;d and had accepted the membership, were Sir
Horny Mody, Sir Akbar Hyci ari, R . Rao, M. S. Ancy and Sir
Feroz Khan Noon. S i multa neously a National Defence Council
was being estab l i shed , c o n ta i n i n g about 30 members, n ine of
whom would be d rawn from the States. " Th e Viceroy reg ar d s it
as essential that the grea t Musl i m community sh o u l d be repre-
fj 3 Indian Amwal Register, J 94 1 . vol. I, p . 327, italics in the original.
1 HE I MPACT OF THE S E C O N D W O R L D WAR 1 73

sented o n t he Council by persons of the highest prominence and

capacity. He has, accordingly, invite d the Premiers o f Assam,
Bengal, the Panjab and Sind t o serve as members o n it, and he
has extended invitations also t o certain other prominent Muslims,
such as Sir Muhammad Usman. He has considered whether he
should invite you t o let him have any suggestions as to the possible
personnel of this Council, but being aware, as he is, o f your
general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable n o t
to embarrass y o u by i nviting y o u to make suggestions."
On the following day J i nnah replied expressing his strong dis­
approval o f the Viceroy's action in inviting the Muslim Premiers
or any other Muslim Leaguers "because it is obvious that it would
embarrass the Muslim League organization, and I do hope and
trust that His Excellency wil l avoid such a contingency". It was
improper, he said, that these persons should have been approached
by the Viceroy "over the head of the President and the executive
of the A l l India Muslim League, knowing ful l well the position
and the attitude that the All India Muslim League has adopted".64
On the same day, 2 1 July, the expansion of the Executive
Council and the constitution of the N ational Defence Council
were officially announced in a white paper.65 In his speech in the
Ho use o f Commons on 1 August, 1 94 1 , the Secretary of State for
India, L. S. Amery, explained in detail and defended i n principle
the measures laid out in the white paper. The Defence Council,
he said, was a body of patriotic men who had "readily come for­
ward to help their country at a critical moment". It was an
advisory body and its main purpose was "to bring the war effort
in the Provinces and the States as wel l as i n the ranks of com­
merce, industry and labour into more direct and effective touch
with the Central Government " . The i mmediate o bject of these
measures was t o "increase the efficiency of Government, and, at
the same time, to make a fuller use of the vast and hitherto insuffi­
ciently t a pped reservoir o f Indian abi l i t y and patriotism". lt was

64 Both letters reproduced by Jinnah in his statement of 28 August, 1 94 1 ,

Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op . cit . , pp. 3 3 1-335.
65 Cmd. 6293 of 1941.
1 74 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

also an earnest of "our desire to transfer to Indian hands a steadily

increasing share in the control of India's destiny. They mark a
change in spirit, if not in letter, of India's constitution. "6 6
The Working Committee of the Muslim League met at B ombay
on 24-26 Aug ust to consider the new measures. On 25 August a
resolution was passed unanimously calling upon Sir Sikandar
Hayat Khan, Fazlul H a q and Sir Muhammad Saadu!lah, Premiers
of the Panjab, Bengal a nd Assam, respectively, to resign from the
National Defence Council. On 26 Augu st another resolution was
passed condemning Amery's observations and castigating the
expansion of the Viceroy's Executive Council and the setting up
of the National Defence Council as "a concession to the demands
of the Hindus in utter d isregard of the wishes of the Muslims
of India and the solemn pr omise made to them and is i ntended
to mislead public opinion in Great B r it ain and abroad". The
resolution held out the threat that if no steps were taken "to
reassure the Muslims", the Muslim League would be compelled
to revise of necessity its policy and adopt s u ch measures as it
may deem necessary "to resist . . . the British Government". 67
Eight Muslims had accepted the Viceroy's i nvitation to join
the National Defence Council. Five of them were Sikandar Hayat,
Fazlul Haq, Saadullah, Begum Shah Nawaz and Nawab of
Chhatari. J innah i nsisted that they must resign. The three Premiers
of the Panjab, Bengal and Assam did so on 1 1 September. The
Nawab of Chhatari had already resigned on his appointment as
President of the Hyderabad Executive Council . Begum Shah
Nawaz was defiant and was i mmediately expelled from the Mus­
lim League for five years. Sir Sultan Ahmad, who had succeeded
Sir Zafrulla Khan in the Executive Council, was also asked to
resign his post. He refused and was expelled from the League for
five years. These actions and decisions were confirmed by the
Working Committee and the Council of the League i n their
66 See H . C . 373 . 5s, cols. 1 682- 1 690.
6 7 See K . P. Bh:igat. A D::c;i:/e ofInda-British Rcl<itions 1 937-1947 I Bombay :
1 9 59). pp, 1 �4- 145.
T H E I MP A C T O F T H E S E CO N D W O R L D W A R 175

meetings o f 26-27 October a t Delhi . It was decided t o withdraw

from the Central Assembly for the entire session. This was at
once put into operation and on 28 October the Party walked out
of the House, stating that its decision was prompted by the
refusal of the British Government to grant a real share of res­
ponsibility and authority at the Centre and in t he Provinces. 68
Thus the episode ended i n a triumph fo r Jinnah. The whole
proceedings may or may not have been obstructive tactics, as
other parties described them, but there is no doubt that they
proved the efficacy of the stern control exercised by the Quaid-i­
Azam over the League. It also showed that the Panjab ministry,
though not a Muslim League government, was not prepared to
quarrel with the League. The prestige of the League 'vas mounting
rapidly, and it was confirmed when, a little later, Fazlul Haq
was also expelled when he resiled from his earlier promise and
disobeyed the party's directive. The League was quickly learning
discipline-a quality which was to play an important role in the
coming years.

68 Indian A11nua/ Register, 1 94 1 , vol . 1 1, pp. 2 1 6-2 1 9 .

 CHAPTE R 8

The Cripps Mission and

Congress Revolt

Pro-Jap anese feelings

The winter o f 1 94 1 -42 was bringing war closer to India. The
J apanese advance in Burma was gradually but relentlessly closing
the gap between Indian safety and Japanese arms. Singapore,
that great A l l ied bastion in the Fa r East , had fallen . Fortune
certainly did not seem to favour the A llies.
I n India the impact o f these developments was confused. The
Congress at best was neutral i n i ts attitude. I t saw in the mis­
fortunes of the Allies o n ly a n opportunity to extract more con­
cessions from the British. There were sections of opinion which
were secretly i n sympathy with Japan. Being i n antipathy with the
Congress, the Muslims d id not rejoice i n the misfortunes of the
British, but they felt that more positive i ncentives should come
from the British t o ensure their active support. Therefore they
i nsisted that their future must be guaranteed before they could
pledge their whole-hearted co-operation. However, the Muslim
Chief Ministers continu(!d to co-operate with the Government
and i ndividual Muslim Leaguers were free to render all aid t o
T H E C R I P P S M I S S ION AND C O N G R E S S R E V O L T 177

the official machinery. On the other hand, most of the Congress

leaders refused to distinguish between Britain and her enemies.
Gandhi said that Hitler was a divine chastisement for the evil
deeds of British imperialism. Some Congress leaders believed that
Britain's record as an imperialist power was no better than Japan's.
At the time of General and Madame Chiang Kai-Sheks' visit to
India, when the Chinese visitors related the story of Chinese
sufferings under Japanese rule, one Congress leader declared ,
"Let nobody imagine that it can make any possible difference to
us whether it is the Japanese or the British who rule India." 1
Nor was the imminence of a Japanese invasion a help in the solu­
tion of the Hindu-Muslim problem. The impasse continued with
the same old intensity and stubbornness. The Hindus did not feel
any necessity of coming to terms with the Muslims on the Pakistan
issue.
At the time of the visit of the Cripps Mission to India the only
new set of proposals emerged from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and his
non-party conference, which, as we have seen, rejected the
Muslim demand for Pakistan and i nsisted on the immediate
formation of a "national government". Sapru had sent a copy of
his scheme to Churchill in February 1 942 to which the British
Prime Minister had replied that the Go\'ernment of India had
been invited to send representatives to sit in the British War
Cabinet and on the Pacific Council . This was meant to improve
the national status of India. On the formation of a "national
government" Churchill was silent, except saying that this raised
"far-reaching issues" . This is where matters stood in March 1 942.
The Draft Declaration
This suspense was ended on 1 1 March, four days after the fall
of Rangoon, when Churchill rose to make a n important state­
ment in the House of Commons. The War Cabinet had agreed
initially upon conclusions which, if accepted by India, "would
avoid the alternative dangers either that the resistance of a power­
ful minority might impose an indefinite veto upon the wishes of
I Quoted in R. Coupland. The Cripps Mission (London : 1 942), p. 20.
178 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

the majority or that a majority decision might be taken which

would be resisted to a point destructive of internal harmony and
fatal to the setting up of a new constitution". Sir Stafford Cripps,
the Lord Privy Council and the Leader of the House of Com­
mons and a member of the War Cabinet, was being sent to India
"to satisfy himself upon the spot by personal consultation that the
c0nclusions upon which we have agreed, and which we believe
represent a just and final solution, will achieve their purpose". 2

The conclusions agreed upon by the Cabinet were embodied in

a Draft Declaration which Cripps brought with him to India.

This Declaration \\'as published on 30 March, 1942 .

The Declaration opened with the preamble that the object was
the creation of a new Indian Dominion which would be "associat­
ed with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a
common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every
respect, in no way subordinate in any respect of its domestic
or external affairs". As soon as the war ended a Constitution­
making body would be set up in India to frame a Constitution.
This body would be elected by the lower houses of all provincial
legislatures by proportional representation after the first post-war
general elections. The States would be represented on this body.
Any Constitution made by this body would be acceptable to
Britain, subject only to three conditions : (1) Any province would
be free to keep itself out of the proposed Union and to retain
its prevailing constitutional position. If such non-acceding pro­
vinces so desired they could have their own separate Union
analogous to the proposed Indian Unio n . (2) Britain and the
Constitution-making body would enter into a treaty covering all
necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of respon­
sibility from British to Indian hands. This treaty would make provi­
sion for the protection of racial and religious minorities. (3) Whe­
ther the States adhered to this future Constitution or not, it would
be necessary to negotiate a revision of their treaty arrangements.
:? H.C. 378. 5s. 1 1 March, 1 942, cols. 1069- 1 07 1 .
T H E C R I P P S M I S S I O N AND C O N G R E S S R E V O L T 1 79

Until such time as the war ended and such a Constitution was
framed, His Majesty's Government must inevitably "bear the
responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence
oflndia as part of their world war effort" . But the task of organiz­
ing to the full the military, moral and material resources of India
must be the responsibility of the Government of India. 3
The terms of the Draft Declaration were elaborated and ex­
plained in a broadcast by Cripps from New Delhi on 30 March,
1 942. He made it clear that the nature and character of the pro­
posed Constitution-making body could be changed if "the leaders
of the principal sections of Indian opinion" agreed among t hem­
selves before the end of the war. He defended the non-accession
clause of his Declaration in these terms : "If you want to persuade
a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter
the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in ,
there is no way out-they are to be fo r ever locked in together.
It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they find that
they cannot come to a common decision, then there is nothing to
prevent those who wish from leaving again by another door.
They are much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge
that they can by their free will go out again if they cannot agree . "
I n the short-term plan the most essential point was defence . I f
Britain were t o take full responsibility fo r the conduct o f the
naval, military and air defence of India, then the defence of India
must be dealt with by the British Government and the direction
of that defence must rest in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief
under the War Cabinet. But as the Government of India must also
have an effective share in the defence counsels, it was decided that
the Commander-in-Chief would retain his position a � member
of the Viceroy's Executive Council.
Cripps concluded his broadcast by an appeal to all Indian
leaders to accept his scheme. " Our proposals are definite and
precise. If they were to be rejected by the leaders of Indian
opinion, there would be neither the time nor the opportunity
3 Cmd. 6350.
1 80 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

to reconsider this matter till after the war and it would be a bitter
blow to the friends of India all over the world."4
Four things about the Draft Declaration should be noticed
here. First, it dealt with three separate though closely linked
matters : the future independence of India, the method by which
the new Constitution would be framed and the interim constitu­
tional procedure to be adopted until the new Constitution could
be made. Secondly, the Declaration did not mean a drastic change
of policy. Its terms \Vere virtually the same as those of the August
1 940 offer. But it was more concrete and constructive. It made
the meaning of the Dominion status clear. It stated that the new
Constitution would be the sole, not merely the primary, respon­
sibility of the Indians themselves. It proposed a practical method
of reaching an agreement and bringing the Indians together in a
Constitution-making body. It clearly promised that a Constitu­
tion thus made would be acceptable to the British Government.
Thirdly, the Declaration was the policy of the War Cabinet
determined unanimously. There was no question of an uneasy
alliance between the Labour and Tory opinions i n the Cabinet.
"If I alone had drafted the document," sai<l Cripps, "it would
have been in substance exactly what it is." Fourthly, the Declara­
tion ruled out any major constitutional change during the war.

Indian reaction
Negotiations between Sir Stafford Cripps and the Indian leaders
of various parties centred round three main points : the non­
accession clause, the representation of the States in the Constitu­
tion-making body, and the immediate formation of a responsible
government. The Muslims were not satisfied with the non­
accession clause by which certain provinces could , i f they liked,
refuse to jo i n the proposed Indian U n i o n . This, it was said, was
not enough, for it did not ensure the creation of Pakistan as
envisaged by the League. The Hindus saw in this clause the
seeds of Indian d isintegration. They called it a grave blow to
4 Extracts from his broadcast speech in M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai,
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 5 2 1-524.
THE CRIPPS MISSION AND CONGRESS REVOLT 181

Indian unity and, therefore, totally unacceptable. The second

question related to the nature of the representation of the States
in the Constitution-making body. The Congress wanted the
representatives to be elected by the people rather than appointed
by the Princes. Elected representatives would be predominantly
Congress-minded and, therefore, an accession to Congress
strength. The Muslims did not interest themselves much in this
problem because they had no clear-cut policy about the States. It
is quite possible that the League secretly sympathized with the
Princes, for the simple reason that popularly elected members
would have increased the following of the Congress as well as the
strength of the Hindu membership. The third question was super­
ficially related to the problem of Defence, but really to the point
of having or not having a fully responsible government at the
Centre during the war. Here again the Congress was adamant in
its demand that a responsible government be immediately in­
stalled and defence made a subject under the exclusive jurisdic­
tion and control of an Indian member of the Viceroy's Executive
Council. The League found itself on the horns of a dilemma. If
it did not support the Congress and acquiesced in the continuance
of the prevailing system of government, it might be charged with
being undemocratic and reactionary. If, on the contrary, it also
demanded a fully responsible government, it certainly would
jeopardise the Muslim interests, for any kind of responsible
government was bound to be a Hindu and a Congress government.
Negotiations dragged on for a few days. Cripps and the
Congress president exchanged letters to clarify several points.
But Cripps was unable to accept the Congress contentions and
finally, on 1 1 April, the Congress published the resolution of
rejection which had already been passed on 2 April by the
Working Committee of the party. It objected to, what it chose
to call, the "complete ignoring of 90 millions of people in the
Indian States" ; it saw the danger that the States would "become
a barrier to the growth of Indian freedom". It castigated the
non-accession clause as a "severe" blow to the conception oflndian
unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble
 1 82 THE STRCGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

in the Provinces". The Committee found any prospect of the

break up of the unity of India too painful to contemplate, though
it conceded that it could not think in terms of compelling the
people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union
against their declared and established will. Finally, it was critical
of the proposals pertaining to the immediate future. It wanted
defence to be controlled by India and insisted on the immediate
formation of a responsible national government . In brief, the
British proposals were unacceptable to the Congress. The rejec­
tion was complete, uncompromising and related to the whole set
of proposals. �
Simultaneously, the Muslim League announced its rejection of
the scheme. The Working Committee's resolution began with
appreciating the fact that the Draft Declaration embodied only
the proposals of His Majesty's Government and not their deci­
sion, and that they were subject to an agreement between the main
Indian elements. In this respect, the Declaration was in line with
the August offer which had promised the Muslims that no cons­
titutional advance would be made or implemented without the
approval and consent of Muslim India. It was gratifying also that
the possibility o f Pakistan was recognized by implication by
providing for the establishment of two or more independent
Unions in India. But it was regretted that the proposals were not
open to modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals
were invited . So far as the scheme was concerned it was found
unacceptable for the following reasons :
(I) The Muslims were not prepared to live in one Indian Union
as a minority. The non-accession provision was "purely illusory"
because the creation of Pakistan is "relegated only to the realm
of remote possibility".
(2) The proposals set up only one Constitution-making body
with a view to the creation of one Indian Union. The League
believed in Pakistan and, therefore, in the establishment of two
5 Text of the Congress resolution in M. Gwyer and A . Appadora i , op. cit.,
vol. II, pp. 524-526.
T H E C R I P P S M IS S I O N A N D C O N G RE S S R E V O LT 183

separate Constitution-making bodies. The method of electing the

Constitution-making body was also defective and detrimental to
Muslim interests for the right to elect their representatives by
separate electorates had been taken away from them. Further,
this body would take decisions by a bare majority on a l l ques­
tions of the most vital and paramount character. This was not
only a departure from the fundamental principles of justice and
contrary to constitutional practices so far followed in the various
countries and Dominions, but also gravely unjust to the Muslims
who would be in the minority of about 25 per cent in the Con­
stitution-making body.

(3) The non-accession right had been given to the existing pro­
vinces which had been formed from time to time for administra­
tive reasons and on no logical basis. Moreover, the draft proposals
contained no procedure for obtaining the verdict of the provinces
for or against non-accession.
(4) It was the considered opinion of the League that it was for
the States to Jecide whether or not to join a Union.
(5) The proposals did not indicate as to what would happen in
case of disagreement on the terms of the proposed treaty between
the Crown and the Indian Union or Unions.
(6) The League was unable to express its opinion on the i n terim
arrangements until a complete picture was available.
The resolution concluded by asserting that unless the principle
of the Pakistan Scheme, as enunciated in the Lahore Resolution
of 24 March, 1 940, was unequivocally accepted and the right of
the Muslims to self-determination was conceded "by means of a
machinery which could reflect the true verdict of Muslim India",
it would not be possible for the Muslim League to a ccept any
proposal or scheme regarding the future. 6
6 Resol11tio11s of the All India Muslim League from April 1942 to May 1943,
published by the Hon. Secretary, All India Muslim League (Delhi: n.d.),
pp. 1- 7. The Pakistan Resolution was introduced on 23 March, 1940 but
was actually passed on 24 March.
 1 84 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

Two days later Jinnah commented upon the question of the

national government which had been left untouched by the resolu­
t ion. He said that he had had no discussions with Cripps on the
interim arrangements, except that the details would be worked
out and settled by the Viceroy with the parties concerned . But if
the alternative proposals of the Congress were accepted-which
amounted to immediate freedom, the Cabinet to be nominated
by major parties with collective responsibility, the Viceroy to act
as a constitutional Governor-General and the Secretary of State
and His Majesty's Government having no power to interfere-it
would have meant the setting up of a Cabinet "irremovable and
responsible to nobody but the majority, which would be at the
command of the Congress in the Cabinet". This would have been
a "Fascist Grand Council" and the Muslims and other minorities
would have been entirely at the mercy of the Congress. "Then
to say that the future would be considered after the war is to my
mind absurd, because there would be nothing left of the future
to discuss, except details. "7
The Congress and the Cripps offer

It was widely believed in April 1 942 that the Muslim League had
rejected the Cripps offer because the Congress had rejected it, and
that if the Congress had been more agreeable, the League ,
too, might have softened its rejection. There is some evidence in
support of this opinion, because both the Congress and the
League passed their resolutions on 2 April, but did not publish
them till 1 1 April . The Congress delayed its reply because i t was
negotiating with Cripps on the question of the formation of a
national government-a d iscussion in which Jinnah and the
Muslim League <l id not participat e . It a ppears, therefore, that

the League held up its final reply till the Congress had announced
its resolution . To say this is not to blame the League for indulging
7 Jinnah's statement at a press conference on 13 April 1 942, Civil and
Military Ga:.ette, 1 4 April, 1 942. For details of his views on the Cripps offer
see his Presidential Address to the A l l India Muslim League a t the Allahabad
session of 4 April, 1 942 ; text in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 403-414.
THE CRIPPS M ISSION AND CONGRESS REVOLT 1 85

in delaying tactics, for the League's final opinion had to be deter­

mined by the outcome of the Congress-Cripps negotiations.
Whether Cripps accepted or rejected the Congress alternative
proposals was a vital point, and it was impossible for the Muslims
to say yes or no until Cripps had given his decision.
Thus the attitude of the Congress conditioned the policy of
the Muslim League. It is, therefore, pertinent to study the mind
of the Congress and to analyse the motives and implications of
its alternative proposals.
On his return to London Cripps explained in detail the nature
and failure of his mission in a speech in the House of Commons
on 28 April, 1942. He made it clear that disagreement came upon
the way in which self-determination was to be exercised and upon
the transitional provisions for the Government of India until the
new Constitution could come into force. The Congress objected
to the non-accession clause, but it forgot that the Draft Declara­
tion did no more than what Gandhi and other Congress leaders
had constantly stated they were prepared to do-to keep open
the issue of Pakistan. This was as fair a compromise as possible
between the two extreme views. It was the duty of His Majesty's
Government to find an agreement by compromise and not to give
either party all of what it wanted and then force it upon the
other.
The crucial objection of the Congress regarding interim arrange­
ments, according to Cripps, was that relating to defence. The
Congress wanted the Government of India to have full control
over defence. This wa s unacceptable not only to His Majesty's
Government but also to the minorities who contained some of
the finest fighting elements in India. The final break came upon
the issue of the form of transitional government. On this the
Congress was not prepared to compromise although it had been
made clear to all that a major constitutional change during the
war was out of the question. The " position of complete power
asked for by the Congress-which was not demanded by any
other section of opinion in India-would leave the matter in an
 186 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TA N

impossible situation . Once chosen, the Executive Council would

not have been responsible to anyone but themselves. There would
have been no protection for any of the minorities. I am quite
confident that none of the minorities would have accepted such
a position and least of all the Muslims." It was "on this issue that
the final break came" . s
The gist of this statement was repeated by the Duke of Devon ­
shire, the Under Secretary o f State for India, i n the House of
Lords. The Congress leaders insisted, he said, on a "p:Jsition for
themselves of complete power during the interim period". None
of the minorities-"certainly not Muslims"-would have accept­
ed this for a moment. 9
For this bid at complete control of I ndia the Congress was
soundly rated by practically all parties. The Spectator realized
that the Congress sought "to subject India to an irresponsible
Cabinet in which it would have much the largest party representa­
tion"9a. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru regretted the failure of the Cripps
Mission and, prophetically, feared that "if the deadlock continues
there may again be a conflict between the Government and o ne
or other of the political parties which, in view of the present war
situation, will be disastrous''. I o
Pakistan Plan and the Cripps Proposals
ft is difficult to determine with certainty whether the real motive
behind the Congress' rejection of the Cripps offer was the British
Government's refusal to agree to the formation of a national
government or the original scheme's non-accession clause. But
there is no doubt that the provinces were given the option to stay
out of an Indian Union because of the strength of the Pakistan
sentiment among the Indian Muslims. Lord Hailey's impression
was that this provision was designed, not with a view to the
realization of Pakistan, but to impress on the Hindus the necessity
8 H. C. 379 . 5s., 28 April, 1 942, cols. 826-843.
9 H.L. 122. 5s., 29 April, 1 942, col. 755.
9a. Spectator, 17 June, 1 942.
1 0 Statement of 28 April, 1 942, issued from Allahabad and carried by all
newspapers· of 29 April, 1 942.
 THE CRIPPS M I SSION AND CONGRESS REVOLT 1 87

of coming to some form of terms with the Muslims. If this result

was not attained, he feared, then the scheme involving the dis­
ruption of India would have been inserted in vain . 1 1 Professor
Coupland, who was working with the Cripps Mission, also believ­
ed that, instead of encouraging partition, the clause in fact pointed
the way by which alone partition could be avoided, and was
based on a profound psychological truth. "The story of the for­
bidden fruit applies to great affairs of life a s much as small. The
certain method of whetting a nation's or a community's appetite
for something is to say that it is the one thing they may not have.
Thus, just as there is small chance of India wanting to stay in
the British Commonwealth unless she is free to get out, so the
best hope of a single Indian Union is to assure the people of the
predominantly Muslim areas that they need not join it unless
they wish." 1 2 If this reading of the War Cabinet's intentions is
correct then the generally held opinion that the offer conceded
Pakistan in principle is mistaken.
But there is no doubt that Indians of all parties did not inter­
pret the Draft Declaration in the same manner as Coupland did,
They believed that the British Government had come round to
the view that some sort of partition was inevitable. That is why
the Hindus of all complexions (Congress as well as t he Hindu
Mahasabha) rejected it in bitter terms and commented on this
concession to the Muslims in intemperate language. That is also
why the Muslims did not react to it in too unfavourable a way.
It is true that the Muslim League turned down the offer, but it is
also true that in Jinnah's words "the recognition given to the
principle of partition, however, was very much appreciated by
Muslim India". 1 3 There was ample reason for Jinnah's optimistic
view of developments. The Pakistan Resolution was passed in
March 1 940 and within exactly two years the British War Cabinet
had conceded it in principle. This was a great victory for the
1 1 H.L. 122. 5s., 29 April, 1 942, cols. 771-772.
I 2 R. Coupland, The Cripps Mission, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
t 3 Jinnah's statement of 13 April, 1 942, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad , op . cit.,
p. 4 16.
1 88 T H E STRUG G L E FOR PAK ISTAN

Muslims, no matter how the Draft Declaration was interpreted.

The intentions of the War Cabinet were known only to its mem­
bers ; and until the archives of the period are released, there is
no way of being certain about Cripps motives. But his speech in
the House of Commons shows that the Go\'ernment was prepared
to concede the Muslim demand simply because the Muslims would
have rejected any scheme outright if it had left them at the mercy
of the Hindu majority.
Anyway, in India, the offer was read as an admission that the
British Government was prepared (at least) to consider the
Pakistan plan as a solution of the communal impasse. That is
why Jinnah's attitude to the proposal was less hostile than
Gandhi's. Jinnah did not reject the scheme in toto or all along
the line. He complained that it failed to lay down clearly and
categorically that Pakistan would be created. The possibility of
a Muslim State was of course implicit in the Declaration, never­
theless its main object was the establishment of a single Indian
Union . Moreover, Cripps based his plans on the existing provin­
cial boundaries, while Jinnah contended that those frontiers were
out-dated and worked against Muslims interest .
On the other hand, the Congress thought that this concession
to the Muslims went tc . o far. As soon as the Declaration was
published the Congress and Hindu press was unanimous in de­
nouncing this clause. In fact, till the publication of the Congress
rejection on 1 1 April, the press attacked the offer mainly on the
ground that it opened the way to separation . The emphasis on
the formation of a national government came later. The Hindu
Mahasabha was naturally more outspoken and reflected the will
of all Hindus when its Working Committee declared that India
is " one and indivisible" as the main reason for its rejection .
Failure of Cripps mission
Why did the Cripps mission fail ? An answer to this question lies
in a study of the Congress mind .
Some clear and definite reasons can be given for its rejection
by the Congress. First, and above all, Gandhi was opposed to
T H E C R I P P S M I S S I O N A N D C O l\" G R E S S R E V O L T 1 89

the o ffer and used his great influence to mould the Congress
Working Committee's resolution on the subj ect. He even told
the Committee that if it finally chose to accept the scheme he
would withdraw from active politics and leave the Congress to
deal with future developments. For the Congress to hold office i n
a Government without Gandhi's blessings was worse than not
holding any office at all. Secondly, the whole history of the
Congress was based in the traditions of non-coc peration with the
Government. The only occasion on which it hsd accepted office
was after the 1 937 elections. And this had been done in face o f
stiff opposition from a strong minority opinion, headed by
Jawaharlal Nehru. After the resignation of Congress ministries
in 1 939 this ''anti-office" minority had gained strength. Nehru's
view, repeatedly stated, was that it was foolish to co-operate till
such a crisis came in I ndia that the British Government found it
inevitable to surrender; and he had often h inted that the out­
break of a world war would certainly create one. Thirdly, as we
have already seen, the Congress was allergic to any concession,
howsoever minor, to the Muslim League. The non-accession pro­
vision was completely unacceptable to it merely because it went
some way to meet the Pakistan plan.
But perhaps the most important factor which weighed in the
Congress mind against the Lord Privy Seal's offer was its timing.
During several months before the arrival of the Mission the Allied
Powers had been receiving one set-back after another. The
Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbour in December 1941 . In
February 1942 Singapore had fallen. By March, Burma had been
lost. In North Africa Rommel was ready to strike at Egypt and
the Suez Canal. In Europe the British and French forces were being
rolled back by the German might. In face of these grave reverses
it was but natural for most Hindus to read in the offer a confession
of weakness and to exploit the situation. The Congress sympathies
with the Japanese, however veiled and secret, were known to all.
Gandhi and many others did not consider Japan a danger to India
and told the people that Japan was corning as an enemy of
 1 90 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

British imperialism and a friend o f India. Under these conditions

the Congress found it easy to believe that the offer was, according
to Gandhi, no more than "a p ost-dated cheque on a bank that
was obviously failing". It was not sure if after the war Britain
would be in a position to fulfil its promises made in the Declara­
tion. Who knew what the end would b e ? And the Congres�.
in its wisdom, decided that it was unsafe to co-operate with the
Government and thus to convey to the Japanese that it was a
party to British war effort .
The aftermath
After the failure of the Cripps mission the Congress became
bitterly frustrate d . It had made a bid to get the power to rule
the subcontinent through a proposed national government, but
its plans had neither been approved by the British Government nor
supported by other elements of the population. Instead of trying
to come to an agreement with the Muslims, which should have
been a proper step, the Congress made another effort to gain
supremacy. this time unconstitutionally and violently.
In May 1 940, taking for granted that Britain had lost the war,
Gandhi had written to the Viceroy, "this manslaughter must be
stopped. You are losing ; if you persist, it will only result in greater
bloodshed. Hitler is not a bad man. If you will cal l it off today,
he will follow s ui t " . To this piece of, what one observer called,
"insolent and impudent treachery", the Viceroy gave a polite
answer, "we are engaged in a struggle ; s o long as we do not
achieve our a i m , we arc not going to budge. I know your soli­
citude for us, but everything is going to be all right" . 14 Gandhi,
however, was still not satisfied with the answer and on 6 July
he issued a n a ppeal "to every Briton" in which he asked the
British to "lay down the arms you have as being useless for saving
you or h u manity''. "You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor
Mussolini to take what they want of the countries you call your
possessions. Let them take possession of your beautiful island,
with your many beautiful buildings. " 1 5
1 4 Both the letters are quoted i n G . D . Birla, In the Shadow of the Afahatma:
A Personal Memoir (Bombay : 1 953), p. 302.
1 5 Quoted in full in Homer A . Jack (ed.), The Gandhi Reader: A Source
Book ofHis Life and Writings (New York : 1 958), pp. 344-347.
THE C R I P P S M ISSION AND CONGRESS REVOLT 191

Immediately after Cripps' return to London, the Working

Committee of the Indian National Congress, meeting at Allaha­
bad on 2 May, 1 942, passed a resolution calling upon all Indians
to resist the Japanese invasion by"non-violent non-cooperation" .16
On 15 July, at Wardha, the Working Committee passed another
resolution enunciating the Congress policy vis-a-vis the current
developments. The Congress, it said, had "tried their utmost"
to bring about a solution of the Hindu-Muslim tangle. But this
was made impossible by the presence of a foreign power. It was
only after ending foreign domination and intervention that this
issue could be faced and solved "on a mutual and agreed basis".
Nor could foreign invasion be met effectively as long as India
was not a free country. Therefore, the British should immediately
withdraw from India and leave her in the hands of her n atural
masters. If this was not done, concluded the resolution, the Cong­
ress would be compelled to "utilize all the non-violent strength
it has gathered since 1 920".17
Britain and the non-Congress elements in India naturally did
not take kindly to this threat in the middle of a grave war . On
3 1 July Jinnah regretted the Congress plan and realized that it
was the culminating point in Gandhi's policy of "black-mailing
the British and coercing them" to concede Hindu raj. It was
childish to say that no agreement could be reached so long as
Britain ruled India. But one thing was certain : no agreement
could be reached on the basis of the terms that Gandhi dictated
to the Muslims. The Congress resolution was a challenge to the
British Government who were quite capable of looking after
themselves. It was also a challenge to Muslim India, for Gandhi,
without reference to or consultation with the Muslims, was
launching a movement whose one and only object was to destroy
the Pakistan scheme. 1 8
1 6 Full text in Documents 011 the Indian Situation since the Cripps Mission
(New York : 1 9 42), pp. 28-29.

17 Text in ibid. , pp. 3 1 -33.

1 8 Statement issued to the Foreign Press on 31 July, 1942, Jamil-ud-Din
Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 434-439.
1 92 T H E STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

S i r Tej Bahadur Sapru called it a n "ill considered and in­

opportune resolution" , 1 9 while P. V. Naidu, the Vice-President
of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, felt gravely concerned over
Gandhi's decision to resist the Government.20
In Britain the Congress plan was universally condemned. The
Economist called it "one of the most dramatic acts of political
blackmail in world history", and agreed with Jinnah that Gandhi
wanted to replace the British by Congress raj .21 The Glasgow
Herald chided Gandhi for playing Congress politics "on the brink
of an abyss" and for trying to force upon India a Congress
Government .22 To the Scotsman Gandhi's threat was "a real
service to Hitler" .23 Even the British leftist press, ever indulgent
to the Hindus, spoke out against the Congress scheme. The Dai�v
Herald was convinced that in thinking of resistance Gandhi was
not "interpreting the will of the toiling and suffering Indian
masses" and that he was rating political strategy higher than the
prospect of liberty, equality and fraternity.H In the opinion of
New Statesman and Nation, Congress had made its claim for
India's independence not merely in a form which Britain could
not accept, but in a form which it could not believe would be
accepted. There were two reasons why the British Government
could not accept the demand. First, it suggested a surrender of
power before any interim government had been constituted which
was capable of taking over. Secondly, withdrawal was asked for
without any understanding that a free India would offer military
resistance to the Japanese. The Congress found negation and
protest and resistance congenial, but shrank from risks and power
and responsibility. It lacked political courage and the positive
genius of construction. 2s
1Y Ciril and .Hifitwy Ga:ette, 26 July, 1 9 4 2.

20 Quoted i n Documents on the Indian Si111atio11 since the Cripps !\fission,

p. 46.
21 Economist, 25 J uly, 1 942.
2 2 Glasgow Herald, 1 6 July, 1 942.
2 3 Scotsman, 1 7 July, 1 942.
24 Daily Herald, 21 July, 1 942.
2 5 New Statesman and Nation, 25 July, 1 942.
T H E C R I P P S M I S SI O N A N D C O N G R E S S R E V O L T 193

In a broadcast to the people of the United States, on 26 July,

Sir Stafford Cripps traced the background of Congress politics
from the time of his Indian visit to the latest threat. No respon­
sible government could possibly consider the Congress demand.
The Muslims were "deeply opposed" to the Congress domination,
and so were the tens of millions of the depressed classes. To agree
to Gandhi's demand would bring about "inevitable chaos and
disorder". "We cannot allow," he said, "the action of a visionary,
however d istinguished in the fight for freedom in the past,
to thwart the United Nations' drive for victory in the east. The
issue is too grave and too great for the whole world ."26
Pandit Nehru's reply to this was a truculent rejoinder, i n which
he called Cripps the "devil's advocate". The right way for Britain
was to "approach us in all humility with repentcnce for all the
evils she has done to India and is still doing to her". He dis­
missed the Muslim opposition to Congress demand by the glib
declaration that "I know my Muslim countrymen a little better
than Sir Stafford does and I know that what he says about them
is a calumny . " 27
. .

Quit India
Undaunted by widespread condemnation, the All India Congress
Committee proceeded to pa ss its 'Quit India' resolution at
Bombay on 8 August, 1 942. It approved and endorsed the working
committee's resolution of 14 July and declared that the immediate
ending of British rule in India was an "urgent necessity". No future
promises or guarantees could remedy the prevailing situation.
India should immediately be declared an independent country. A
provisional government would then be formed with the co­
operation of the principal parties and groups in the country,
whose primary duty would be the defence of India and resistance
against aggression "with all the armed as well as the non-violent
forces at its command". The provisional government would also
evolve the scheme for a constitw!nt assembly which would prepare
26 Documents on the Indian Situation since the Cripps Mission, pp. 47-48.
21 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
 194 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

a Constitution for a federation in which the units would enjoy

the largest measure of autonomy. The Committee sanctioned,
"for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and
independence", the starting of a "mass struggle on non-violent
lines on the widest possible scale" .28
This, what Gandhi himself called an "open rebellion", could
not be tolerated by any government. All Congress leaders were
a rrested on 9 August and the Congress was declared an unlawful
body throughout India. However, this prompt official action d id
not quite succeed in nipping the Congress programme in the bud.
Grave and widespread disturbances broke out in all the Hindu
provinces. Railway stations were burnt, rail tracks were uprooted,
telegraph wires were cut, post offices were looted and then burnt
down, other means of communications were disrupted and air­
fields and airstrips were destroyed. At most places there was
open violence and hundreds of persons were killed before order
was restored. 29
The Congress did not receive support from several sections of
the population. The Depressed Classes kept themselves aloof from
the movement and their leader, Ambedkar, strongly criticised
the Congress campaign. 3o The Liberals were no less critical, and
Sapru and Jayakar minced no words in expressing their dis­
approvaJ.31 The Indian Nationalist League condemned Gandhi
for this 'foolish' action.32 The Communist Party of lndia was also
in the opposite camp.33 Bhai Parmanand, the Vice-President of
the Hindu Mahasabha, criticised the 'Quit India' move34 and on
10 August, V. D. Savarkar, the President, asked his followers not
2 8 Full text in M . Gwyer and A. Appadorai, op. cit., vol. II,
pp . 541-544.
29 For details see Indian Newspapers for the period 10 August-30 Sep·
tember, 1942.
3 0 See his statement in Cfril and Military Gazette, 30 July, 1 942.
3 1 See Saoru·s letter to The Times of India, reproduced in Civil and Military
Gazette, 30 July, 1 942, and his and Jayakar's appeals in Civil and Military
Gazette, 6 August, 1 942.
3 2 J. D. Mehta's statement in Civil and Military Gazette, 1 August, 1 942.
3 3 Statements of Teja Singh Swatentra, M .L.A. and P. C . Joshi in Civil
and Military Gazette, 6 August, 1 942.
34 His statement in Civiland Military Gazelle, 6 August, 1 942.
T H E C R I P P S M I SS I O N A N D C O N G R E S S R E V O L T 195

to lend support to the Congress campaign.35 The Working Com­

mittee of Majlis-i-Ahrar resolved that a civil disobedience move­
ment "in the present critical circumstances is not only unnecessary
but also inadvisable" .36
For the Muslims it was difficult to put on the revolt any con­
struction but that it was a Hindu bid at controlling all India.
The fact that the Congress had made no move towards an agree­
ment with the Muslims strengthened this conviction. And the
Muslim League was clear on the point that the revolt was directed
not only at coercing the British Government to hand over power
to a Hindu oligarchy and thus disabling the British from carrying
out their obligations to the Muslims and other minorities, but
a lso at forcing the Muslims to submit and surrender to Congress
terms. The Muslim League stood squarely for Indian indepen­
dence, but there was no doubt that the Congress movement did
not aim at freedom but at the establishment of a Hindu raj and
at the destruction of Pakistan. Finally the League called upon the
Muslims to abstain from participating in the 'Quit India' move­
ment and warned the Congress that any intimidation, coercion
or molestation by the Hindu enthusiasts would lead to resistance
and thus to serious troublc.37 The molestation of Muslims was,
however, a common feature of the events that ensued.
Jinnah called the "Quit India" movement as tantamount to
"forcing their demands at the point of bayonet" and "internecine
civil war". 38 In his opinion the Government w;i,s faced with what
was "legally high treason". He fully approved of the arrest of
Congress leaders and of the firm measures taken to quell the
riots. 39 The revolt was no less than a declaration of war against
the Muslim League and all other non-Congress organizations,
35 Civil and Military Gazette, 1 1 August, 1 942. See also Afanchestcr
Guardian, 1 1 August, 1 942.
3 6 Text in Civil and Military Gazette, 20 August, 1 942.
3 7 Resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee of 1 6-20 August,
1942, Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from April 1942 to May
1943 (published by the Hon. Secretary, All India Muslim League), (Delhi :
n.d.), p. 9-1 5.
3 8 Statement of 9 August, 1 942, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., vol. I,
pp. 443-445.
3 9 Interview to Daily Herald correspondent on 14 August, 1 942, ibid.,
pp. 445-448.
196 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

who were neither consulted n o r referred to. In fact, the move­

ment was launched in spite of the disapproval and in utter d is­
regard of the opinions of these bodies. It was axiomatic to say
that the Congress movement was unlawful and unconstitutional,
because its avowed object was to subvert the Government estab­
lished by law. It was, in fact, much more . It was an invitation to
civil war. 4 0
In Britain the reaction to the revolt was, except fo r some leftist
circles, one of universal and unreserved condemnation. The Times
attributed the calamity to the rejection of the Cripps offer and
held the Congress, and specially Gandhi. responsible for the rejec­
tion as well as the resulting disaster.4 1 The Dai�y Telegraph called
it "irresponsible folly"41 and the "imbecility of Wardha" . 43 Gandhi
and his lieutenants were "infatuated with the lust of power".44
What the movement asked fo r was not the withdrawal of the
British but the entry of the Japancse.45 The Observer had no respect
for a single party, perhaps a single man, demanding a d ictator­
ship which facts did not justify, and "muttering rebellion and
anarchy".4 6 The Spectator realized that by starting this campaign
at that critical time Gandhi had placed the Jap:..n ese under a deep
obligation.47 For the Economist the campaign wa s nothing but a
proof of the Congress conviction that Britain's extremity was
India ' s opportunity.48 The revolt was an attempt at a seizure of
power by an autocratic minority.49
The Earopean and American press was equally e mphatic and
stern in deno uncing the 1 942 revolt. The New York Times wrote
"The present uprising in India is not a struggle for what all
Indians, or, as far as we know, the majority of Indians, call
40 Speech at a Press Conference on 1 3 September, 1 942, ibid., pp. 449-458.
41 The Times, 12 August, 1 942.
42 Daily Telegraph, 16 July, 1 942.
43 Jbid., 23 July, 1942.
44 Ibid., 6 August, 1 942.
4 5 Ibid., JO August, 1 942.
46 Observer, 1 9 July, 1 942.
47 Spectator, 14 August, 1 942.
48 Economist, 7 April, 1 945.
49 J . C. French, "The Indian Congress in Action", NatioMI Review,
December 1 942, p. 508.
THE CRIPPS M ISSION AND CONGRESS REVOLT 197

freedom. It is a struggle for what the Congress party . . . says is

freedom . . . Behind the murmur of Gandhi's noble words may
be heard the roar of mobs and the rattle of chains, and not
British chains eithef."50 Similar comments appeared in many
Swedish, Australian and Turkish newspapers. 5 1
Fazit
The Muslim charge that the 1942 events constituted a Congress
endeavour to succeed the British in the seat of authority has
now been proved to be right by the confession of the Congress
President himself. In his memoirs, Abul Kalam Azad says that
the scheme in his mind was that as soon as the Japanese reached
Bengal and the British forces withdrew towards Bihar, the
Congress would "step in and take over the control of the country".
This plan was developed in May and June 1 942. But Gandhi
had different ideas. He bdieved that Japan was coming to India
not as India's enemy but as the enemy of the British, and that if
the British withdrew from India Japan would not invade the
subcontinent. Further, Gandhi was of the opinion that the British
would allow him to develop his movement of resistance ; he did
not foresee his immediate arrest. 52
The fact w a s that "with a Japanese i nvasion an imminent pro­
bability, Congress was less i nterested in the 'uncertain future'
than in the immediate present".53 The Hindu masses generally
believed that the 'Quit India' campaign would synchron ise with
Japan's entry i n t o India.54 Whatever the professed sentiments of
Hindu leaders. a t least some of them looked forward to peace
with the Japanese. We have already seen that Gandhi was de5irous
of negotiating with Japan. Jawaharlal Nehru was, we are told .
"thrilled" by the thought of a Japanese invasion of lndia.55 I n
Sil New York Times, 1 1 August, 1 942.
s 1 See The Times, 12 August, 1 942 anJ Manchester Guardian, 1 1 August,
1942.
52 A . K. Azad, India Wins Freedom : A n Auto-biographical Narrative
(Bombay : 1 959), pp. 73-74 and 8 1 .
5 3 E . W . R . Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945-1947, op . cit.,
p. 30.
5 4 A. W. Khan, India Wins Freedom: The Other Side (Karachi : 1 96 1 ),
p. 1 52.
55 Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru (New York : 1956), p. 293 .
1 98 T HE S T RU G G LE FOR P A KISTAN

their attempt a t ousting the British and t::i king over the imperial
a uthority, the Congress leaders were not averse to e mploying
tactics which were hardly respectable. For example, one observer
reported that in the "Quit Ind ia" campaign and consequent d is­
turbances the Congress enlisted the aid of hooligans. 5 6
Only one comment i s necessary here. The Congress conduct i n
these turbulent days shows, as nothing e lse d oes, its extreme
anxiety to arrogate all power to itself, even i f the process i nvolved
d i re conseq uences for most Indians and grave setbacks to the
Allied war effort. The same reasons as led the Congress to reject
the Cr i pps o ffer. led it to its 1 942 revolt. One other reason may
perhaps be added here. I t can be argued t hat the Con gress feared
that if i ndependence was postponed to the postwar period, a
d ivided India would be a reality. And one fundamental and ir­
revocable principle from which all Congress policies flowed was
that the emergence of Pakistan must be sto pped. It is, of course,
an irony of history that in 1 947 it was the Congress itself which
was forced by events to agree to a d ivision o f India.

5 6 H . G . Rawlinson , "The Indian Political Scene'", Asiatic Rerirn , Jul)

! 943, p . 286.
 CHAPTER 9

Gandhi-Jinnah Talks

The Consolidation of the Muslim League

The full story Gf the phenome na l rise in the popularity of the
Muslim Le ag ue between 1942 and 1945 ha s yet to be written. In
the 1 937 e lect io n s t he Leag ue had done poorly, but the i mp:i.ct
of Congress rule in Hindu provinces had awakened t h e Muslims
to their peril. Nehru's campaign of mass contact among th.:
Muslims had the effect of heightening political consciousness
among Muslim m asse s. J innah had skilfully exploited Congre�.s
mistakes and miscalculations and had t urned every Congress crw r
of jud gment into a politic:il victory for the Muslim League. The
� League was growing apace in popu'larity and power and thi� pro­
gress was reflected in the results of by-elections hdd after 1 937.
When t h e Congress ministries resigned i n a h u ff at n o t bein g
consulted about I ndia's involvement in the war, the League was
given an unexpected opportunity to extend its influenC\!·-an
opportunity which only Congress miscalculation could have crea t ­
ed. By giving up this point of vantage, the Congress m1d u abtedly
" s h owed a l am e nt abl e lack of foresight and political wisd c m . " 1

l V . P . Menon, The Transfer ofPoirer in India (Calcutta : l 9 '.'- 7), p . 1 �2.

200 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

I t is a n interesting question, though to o u r purpose somewhat

irrelevant, as to why the Congress chose to surrender its power
i n the provi nces at this hour. The only possible explanation that
suggests itself is that the Congress overrated its importance in the
country and its stock with the Indian and British Governments.
It thought that it controlled I ndia so thoroughly that, in volun­
tarily surrendering office , i t was not running any political risk. It
was under the i mpression, soon t o be proved erroneous, that as
soon as i ts return to political wilderness was announced Delhi
and London would leave no stone unturned to persuade it to
come back, because, it so argued, Britain could not afford to l ose
its support i n her hour of great peril . Of course it considered the
opposition of the Muslims to its policies and plans of little signi­
ficance. The Congress was so blind to the depth and genuineness
of Muslim sentiment that it seems to have been d riven by an
inexorable fate into blind alleys so far as a settlement with the
Muslims was concerned, otherwise how can it be explained that
it never seriously weighed the con sequences of a lienating such a
l arge and , important element i n the population while planning its
strategy ? It grossly underrated the strength of Muslim political
consciousness. The success in the 1 93 7 elections, the exercise of
power in the provinces and an arrogant contempt for the Muslims
combined to shut the eyes of the Congress t o the realities of the
situation. It remembered the League's poor performance in the
elections, without reminding itself of the results of the ensuing
by-elections. It ha rped upon its ideal of a u nited India and upon
its ability to achieve t his, without taking note of the apprehensions
created among the Muslims by its policies.
But that was not all. After resigning from office it made no
effort to canvass Muslim support for its policies.
The passing of
the Lahore Resolution i n March 1 940 should hav.:: o pened its
eyes t o Musl im fears, and a political party endowed with any
sense of realism and foresight should have faltered a little and
taken cognizance of the separatism which was then winn.ing
Muslim mass support. But the Congress persisted in ignoring
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 201

Muslim fears. It considered political abuse to be the sole effective

weapon against the Muslims which further exasperated them.
In 1 942, the turn of events gave to the Congress another, and
as it happened the last, opportunity of heart-searching. The Cripps
draft declaration contained the pregnant provision by which
provinces could, if they preferred, opt out of the proposed Indian
Union and form their own separate Union. To the meanest intelli­
gence it was clear that the British Government was now coming
round to the Muslim solution of the Indian problem, and that if
all alternatives failed, it was probable that a divided India would
emerge by the force of circumstances. But even then the Congress
refused to read the writing on the wall . To them the "non­
accession" clause was merely another British attempt at divide
and rule, yet another devilish device of the "satanic" rulers.
Congress leaders did not see, as they should have seen, in it signs
of the growing strength of Muslim nationalism. The opportunity
however did not knock again at the Hindu door and the gulf
that separated the Muslims from the Congress continued to widen
and deepen.
The Congress reply to the Cripps offer was the "Quit India"
revolt of August 1 942. If the British were reluctant to part with
power, the Congress thought that it was by then strong enough
to take delivery by force. The attempt failed but left an indelible
impact on all Indian parties. As has been stated before, the
Congress alone stood for "Quit India", no other party, not even
the Hindu Mahasabha, supported it in this single-handed folly.
The Muslims kept strictly aloof, being fully convinced that it was
an attempt at by-passing the minorities and at forcing the issue to
establish undiluted Hindu rule.
Such a series of political mistakes were bound to come home
to roost. The resignation of Congress Ministries gave the League
a valuable chance to build itself up more rapidly than it had
hoped. The Congress failure to keep its ears to the ground and
to understand Muslim feelings enabled the League to convince
the middle-of-the-way Muslims that their future lay with it rather
202 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

than with the Congress. The Congress rejection o f the Cripps

offer, on the professed ground that its acceptance would be a
blow a t Indian unity, not only confirmed the Muslims in their
opinion of its implacable hostility to any concession to their
position, but also left them with no alternative except that of
strengthening the Pakistan platform. The 1 942 revolt was the last
straw-for the Muslims as much as for the British . To the
Muslims, it came as the clearest proof of Congress determination
to rule over them against their will . To the British, it was little
less than stark betrayal.
The Congress had to pay a heavy price for the attempted re­
bellion. Its leaders were arrested and put in prison where they were
to stay-fretting and frustrated-for nearly three years. Its orga­
nization was outlawed . It was a dangerous period to be cut o ff
from the mainstream o f political developments. While Congress
leaders were contemplating the future in their prison cells in a
state o f impot€nt rage, the Muslim L<lague was reaping the harvest
of the folly of its rivals.
Jinnah used this opportunity for improving the League's
organization as well as raising its prestige. Branches were opened
in districts, tahsi/s and even in some villages. The control of the
party's Working Committee was tightened over provincial and
local offices. Jinnah's own power and influence were greatly aug­
mented. The demand for Pakistan was popularised. Wide publicity
was given to all League activities. Leaders at all levels toured
India extensively and spoke to the masses living in far-flung areas
which had never before been visited by League workers or speakers.
Meetings were frequently held and the case for Pakistan presented
in persuasive terms. New MU5lim student organizations were
established : the old ones were strengthened and streamlinecl .

Good and efficient organ ization, however, was only the means
to an end . Hand in hand with the improvement in organizing
· the Muslims went Ji nn?.h's efforts at persu::i.d ing the Viceroy, and
through him the British Government , to accept him as the spokes­
n�an of Muslim India. and the League as t h e only [lla rty entitled
G A N D H I-JI N N A H T A L K S 203

to speak for the Indian Muslims. The Muslim League had grown
so much in power that the Viceroy could not afford to alienate it.
This has generally been interpreted by Hindu and several British
historians as a deliberate effort by the Viceroy to win Jinnah's
sympathy so that the Congress could be browbeaten.
This is, however, a prejudiced view propagated, on the one
hand, to play down the progressively increasing strength of the
League, and, on the other, to paint the British as the upholders
of the criminal policy of divide and rule. A much more rational
explanation is available, and one that fits the circumstances much
better than the Hindu thesis. The British were involved in a life­
and-death struggle and in 1 942-43 the tide of war was not going
their way. India was no longer a far-flung colony isolated from
the main theatres of war. With the fall of Singapore and the
capture of Burma, war clouds had come to India herself. Bengal
and Madras had attracted Japanese bombers. Assam was very
nearly a war front area. It needed no military genius to see that
India was the next objective of Japanese advance. In Europe,
British and Allied arms were not achieving any conspicuous
success. In these circumstances, the Indian Government was
bound to rely heavily on those clements of the population which
were not jubilant at Japanese successes. The Congress had, in
British and Muslim eyes, taken the s ide of Japan in so far as it
had organized a rebellion when the Japanese forces were knock­
ing at India's door. The Muslim League had, from the start,
made no effort to impede war effort and had not only completely
abstained from participation in the 1 942 Congress revolt but had
also condemned it. In the light of these facts, to accuse the Viceroy
of being pro-Muslim and anti-Congress or of following a deli­
berate policy of encouraging Muslims in their intransigence, can
only be attributed to political cussedness.
The second factor which facilitated Jinnah's work was the wide
support given him by the Muslim masses. Neither the most pliable
Viceroy nor the most cringing Muslim leader could have made
the League strong and powerful had the masses not been behind
it. This is where the improvement in its organization helped the
204 T H E S TR U G G L E FO R P A K I S T A 1'

League. The Government, unlike the Congress, was not blind to

the accession of strength to the League. As the Government was
convinced of the fact, as it was by 1 943, that the League spoke
for the overwhelming majority of the Muslim masses, political
wisdom decreed that no constitutional arrangements should be
made or contemplated unless they had a chance of placating
Muslim sentiment. To give this undertaking was not to arm
Jinnah with a veto on constitutional advance, as several Hindus
have argued, 2 but to make sure that any political solution must
satisfy all parties if it was not to lead to a civil war. It i s a measure
of J i nnah's success, and proportionately of Congress failure, that,
within a few years, he made the Muslim League a power to reckon
with and developed the sentiment for Pakistan into a political
programme of reasonable validity.
The most promising results of Jinnah's success were achieved
in the sphere of provincial ministry making. In 1 93 7, as we have
seen, the League had won only a handful of seats and in no pro­
vince, except for a time in Bengal, did a League ministry hold
office. But gradually as the League grew in strength and numbers,
its influence over Muslim provinces became visible. A glance at
Muslim provincial politics during the years 1 939- 1 943 will show
the growth of the influence of the Muslim League. In Assam,
the resignation of the Congress ministry was followed by a coali­
rion ministry headed by Sir Muhammad Saadullah. In December
1 94 1 the Education Minister, R. K. Chaudhri , resigned and form­
ed a party of his own. This resulted in the downfall of the coali­
tion and the administration of the province was taken over by
the Governor. But in August 1 942 Saadullah came back to power
through the support of the European members of the Assembly.
Seon afterwards, several Congress M.L.As. were imprisoned for
2 Hindu h i storians, like V. P. l\kr. on, who castigate Linli thgow and
Wavell for having cultivated and, t herefore, encouraged Jinnah. should re­
member that a y.:ar later Gandhi held talks with Jinnah on Pa kistan with the
clearly implied acceptance of J inr.ah as the leader of the M uslims. To con­
demn the Viceroy for doing something i n 1 943 which Gandhi had to do in
1 944 may be good propaganda but it is b:!d history.
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 205

their participation in the Congress revolt and this made Saad­

ullah's position as Chief Minister secure.
In Bengal, as we have seen, Fazlul Haq had formed a Ministry
in 1 937. He had originally belonged to the Krishak Proja Party.
Later he joined the Muslim League and his ministry was a League
ministry. Towards the close of 1 941 , however, his d i fferences
of opinion with the League forced him to resign from the party
and to form a new coalition ministry. This united all Muslim
League members of the Assembly who had been strengthened
through better discipline and by election successes-against
Haq's coalition. In March 1 943, Haq resigned and the province
was governed for one month under Section 93 of the Govern­
ment of India Act, 1 935. In April, Khawaja Nazimuddin took
over as Chief Minister when he formed a Muslim League minis­
try. Many of the erstwhile supporters of Fazlul Haq transferred
their loyalty to the new Chief Minister and a stable League
ministry worked in the province.
In Sind the Allah Ba khsh ministry did not resign in 1 939 along
with other Congress ministries, though it was being kept in office
by the Congress M.L.As. But in October, the Governor, Sir Hugh
Dow, dismissed the Chief Minister, after he had refused to resign,
on the ground that his renunciation of titles was inconsistent with
the oath of allegiance which he had taken at the time of his
appointment and with his retention of office. The Congress made
quite an issue of this, but the Governor-General and the Secretary
of State for India supported the Governor's action. Sir Ghulam
Husain Hidayatullah, who had been a member of the dismissed
ministry, now became Chid Minister with the support of the
Muslim League. His Ministry consisted of two Muslim Leaguers,
one Muslim Independent and two Hindus. The Congress ordered
picketing in front of the houses of Hindu ministers and in other
ways threatened them. This hostility compelled Hidayatullah to
join the Muslim League and soon many of Allah Bakhsh's former
supporters crossed over to the Chief Minister's side and a stable
Muslim League ministry began to function. It was then that Sind
won the distinction, on 3 March 1 943, of being the first Indian
206 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

province whose Legislative Assembly passed a resolution saying

that Indian Muslims were a separate nation and endorsing their
demand fo r a separate State. 3
In the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress had formed
a ministry in 1 937 under Khan Sahib. This ministry resigned
in October 1 939 along with other Congress provincial ministries.
As the Muslim League was weak and poorly represented in the
provincial assembly and no other group was strong enough either
singly or in coalition to form a government, the Governor took
over the administration of the province in his own hands and
this state of things continued till May 1 943, when Sardar Aurang­
zeb Khan, the provincial League Leader, was promised support
by 20 Muslim members of the Assembly. In a house of 50, the
Congress had 22 seats, but 10 of Congress members were in
prison. Seven seats were lying vacant. Aurangzeb was therefore
able to have a majority in this attenuated house with his 20
supporters.
In the Panjab, Jinnah-Sikandar Pact gave the League a strong,
though unofficial, position in provincial politics. Sikandar Hayat's
death in December 1 942 did not, in the beginning, change the
situation, because his successor, Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana,
decided to uphold his predecessor's policy of supporting the
League in its all-India policy. The break between Tiwana and the
Muslim League came later.
Thus in 1 943 and 1 944, Muslim League ministries were in office
in Bengal, Assam, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province.
In the Panjab, the Unionist ministry was not a League admin­
istration, but its head and the leader of the Unionist Muslims
supported the League dehland for Pakistan. Thanks to Jinnah's
adroit handling, Muslim League's growing strength, and Congress
leaders' short-sighted policy, the League could now claim that
it controlled, directly or i ndirectly, the provincial ministries of all
the provinces which it included in the proposed Pakistan. The
League had come a long way since 1 937. It now possessed confi-
3 Full text of the resolution in Civil and J.filitary Gazette, 5 March, 1 944.
G A N D H I -J I N N A H T A L K S 207

deuce born of roots among the people and of exercise of power.

The Viceroy and His Majesty's Government had given an under­
taking that no constitutional arrangements would be made without
consulting the League. The Congress alone stood aloof and
haughty. disdaining to recognize the League as representing the
Muslims, in fact persisting in its claim to speak for all India and
all Indians.
The C.R. Formula
But even the Congress could not maintain this position for long.
Much against its will, it was now coming round to the view that
the League did represent Muslim India, that the Pakistan plan
was rooted in popular support, and that no progress was likely
unless some compromise was reached with the Muslims. As later
events showed, this attempt to come to an agreement with the
Muslims was, unfortunately, a half-hearted affair.
Primarily, it was the stress of political circumstances which
compelled the Congress to approach the League with some sort
of a proposal. The Congress was by now persuaded of its folly
in staging the 1 942 revolt which had resulted in the incarceration
of its leaders. For some time Congress leaders sat frustrated and
confused in their prison cells, but soon they, and especially
Gandhi, began to probe for some expediency which could bring
an end to Congress isolation without bringing upon it the charge
o f blatant opportunism.
On 27 July, 1 943, Gandhi wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell,
saying that he was prepared to advise the Congress Working
Committee "to renounce mass civil disobedience and to give full
co-operation i n the war effort, if a declaration of i mmediate
Indian i ndependence were made and a national government res­
ponsible to Central Assembly were formed, subject to the provision
that during the pendency of the war, military operations should
continue as at present, but without any financial burden on
India".4
4 V. P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 1 60- 1 6 1 .
208 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

A reply to this letter came on I 5 August. The Viceroy refused

to be beguiled by the wording of the letter, and saw that Gandhi's
proposals were almost identical with those which the Congress
president had made to Sir Stafford Cripps in April 1942 and which
had been firmly rejected at that time by His Majesty's Govern­
ment.5 The British were prepared to offer India unqualified free­
dom after the war after the framing of a constitution agreed to
by the main elements of India's national life and the negotiation
of a treaty with Britain. If now the Government was to be made
responsible to the central legislature as Gandhi demanded, the
constitution would have to be altered . I t was not pos� ble to do
this during the period of war. As long as the war lasted, Britain
was not agreeable to parting with her responsibility for defence
and military operaticns . Nor could the British Government hand
over other responsibilities in India to a government of Gandhi's
wishes as long as the current constitution was in force. All Indian
parties, concluded the Viceroy, were welcome to co-operate in a
transitional government u nder the constitution, but such a gov­
ernment would have better chances of successful wcrking if these
parties first reached an agreement in principle on the method and
procedure of framing the future constitution.
To this Gandhi gave the characteristic answer that it was " a s
clear as crystal that the British Government d i d not propose t o
give u p the power they possess over the four hundred millions
unless the latter develop strength enough to wrest it from them".6
This exchange of letters has been recounted in some detail be­
cause it provides the essential background against which Gandhi
carried on his negotiations with Jinnah.
After receiving this rebuff from the Viceroy, some Congress
leaders turned again to Jinnah. They would have been ha ppy if
the Congress alone had secured some agreement with the Gov­
ernment, but now thi:it this was impossible, a compromise with
5 For details of this, see previous chapter.
6 Quoted in V. P . Menon, op. cit . , p . H i2.
Incidentally, this remark not
only makes nonsense o f Gandhi's claim that the Congress did not want a
showdown in August 1 942, but also reveals his intention of st.iging another
violent struggle to '"wrest'· power from t he British.
G AN D H I-J I N N AH T A L K S 209

Jinnah , or at least the sho\\ of an effort to reach one, was consi­

dered desirable.
Prior to this change in Congress opinion, Rajagopalacharia was
the only Congress leader of importance to have come to the
conclusion that some sort of partition was unavoidable if con­
stitutional advance was not to be permanently halted. He began
to propagate this stand in public meetings and tried to persuade
the Congress leadership of its validity and utility. "I stand for
Pakistan", he said, "because I do not want that State where we
Hindus and Muslims are both not honoured. Let Muslims have
Pakistan. If we agree then our country will be saved. If the British
raise further difficulties, we will overcome those difficulties . . . I
stand for Pakistan, but I do not think the Congress wiil agree to
this." 7 He was shrewd enough to see that freedom for India was
contingent upon a solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, and
that this problem could not be successfully tackled without accept­
ing the principle of Pakistan and countenancing some kind of a
division oflndia. "If we want to abolish British rule," he repeated,
"we must settle the political differences between Hindus and
Muslims by recognizing the Muslim League, which represents the
political feelings of the Muslims \vho want their claims to be
accepted, the most important of which is Pakistan.'" 8
In 1 943, Rajagopalacharia had prepared a formula which could
serve as a basis for a settlement between the Congress and the
League. In February, during Gandhi's fast in the prison, he
(Rajagopalacharia) had met him and showed him the formula.
Gandhi gave his approval to it. On 10 July, the formula was pub­
lished. It read as follows :-
"Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National
Congress and the All India Muslim League to which Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour
respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve.
7 Speech in Madras of about April 1 943, quoted in Khaliq-uz-Zaman,
op. cit., p. 309.
8 Speech of 12 February, 1 944, at Belgaum, Civil and Military Gazette,
1 3 February, 1 944.
210 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A JS

(1) Subject t c the terms set out below as regards the constitution
of Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for
independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the forma­
tion of a provisional interim government for the transitional
period .
(2) After the termination of the \\ar, a commission shall be
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west
and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the
inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practic­
able franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from
Hindustan. If the majority decides i n favour of forming ( a] sover­
eign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to, without prejudice to the right o f districts o n the border
to choose to join either state.
(3) It will be open to all parties to r.dvocate their points of
\ iew before the plebiscite is held .
(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be
entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communica­
tions and for other essential purposes .
(5) Any tramfer of population shall only be on an absolutely
voluntary basis.
(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by
Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of
Ind ia."9
In April 1 944 Rajagopalacharia communicated this formula to
J innah, but J innah refused to take personal responsibility for
accepting or rejecting it and agreed to place it before the Muslim
League Working Committee. But Rajagopalacharia disapproved
of this procedure on the ground that no purpose would be served
by reference to the working committee "so long as it (the formula)
does not han� your own support" . 1 ''
9 llldian A 111111al Ri?gisrer, 1 944, \ O I . !L rp. 1 29- 1 30 .
10
For Rajagopalacharia-Jinnah correspondence of April-July 1 944, see
Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit . , \·ol. II, pp. 1 27- 1 32 .
G A N D H I-J I N :S A H T A L K S 211

Then on 1 7 July, Gandhi wrote to Jinnah suggesting a meeting

to which Jinnah immediately agreed . The Working Committee of
the Muslim League met in Lahore on 30 July to discuss the
Formula and the coming Jinnah-Gandhi talks. In his opening
speech, Jinnah left no doubt among the minds of his hearers that
he did not like the Formula . It was •·a parody and a negation of,
and i ntended to torpedo, the Muslim League's resolution of
March, 1 940" . It was "the grossest travesty" to say, a s Raja­
gopalacharia claimed, that the Formula conceded all that the
League had ever demanded. After pointing out certain inconsist­
encies in the text of the Formula , he appealed to Gandhi to "join
hands with the League on the basis of Pakistan in plain and
unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer independence for
the peoples of India which is so dear to the heart of not only
Mr. Gandhi but of the millions in this country" . In conceding the
terms of the Formula, Gandhi was offering " a shadow and a husk,
a maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan" and thus "trying
to pass off as having met our Pakistan scheme and the Muslim
demand" . The only clear merit he saw in the Formula, and he
did not underestimate its significance, was that at last Gandhi
"has at any rate in his personal capacity accepted the principle
of Pakistan " . 1 1
The \'forking Committee, however, gave Jinnah full authority
to negotiate with Gandhi.
Before going into the details of this conversation one or two
things about the C.R. Formula and Gandhi's approval of it must
be considered.
lt must be remembered that Rajagopalacharia began his cam­
paign of persuading the Congress to conciliate the Muslims only
when the August 1 942 revolt had failed and Gandhi's efforts at
wringing concessions out of the Viceroy had proved unfruitful.
Thus the Congress willingness to negotiate on the basis of Pakistan
was neither a sign of political large-heartedness nor a conscious­
ness of the inevitability of partition. It was born partly of expedi-
1 1 Ibid. , pp. 1 35-147.
212 THE STRU G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

ency a n d partly o f frustration. Expediency, because this was the

only way i n which the Congress could re-enter politics from
which it had been banished in August 1942. Frustration, because
two years of prison life had worried the Congress leaders who
were consumed with jealousy at the League's growth and success.
The Congress had rejected the Cripps offer primarily because the
non-accession clause was not acceptable to it. Then a violent
struggle was staged in a desperate attempt to wrest power from
British hands. The rejection of the Cripps offer was a constitu­
tional "no" to the Pakistan demand. The 1 942 revolt was an
extra-constitutional effort at annihilating the Muslim demand by
replacing British with Hindu rule.
Against this background it is d ifficult to see any genuine desire
for agreement in Gandhi's readiness to talk on the principle of
Pakistan. Nothing had happened between August 1942 and August
1 944 to have wrought such a radical change in Congress policy.
The League had built itself up, but this was not acknowledged by
the Ccngress even in 1 945 when the Simla Conference failed be­
cause the Congress persisted i n its claim of representing all
Indians. Gandhi may have changed his mind because now the
war was going in favour of the Allies. He had raised the slogan
of "Quit India" when the Allies were hard pressed , when the
Germans were advancing i n Europe and the Japanese in Asia.
Now when the erstwhile victors were fast retreating before British
and American arms and when the chances of pushing around a
weak and pre-occupied Government of India were remote,
Gandhi saw the wisdom of making a show of negotiating with
Jinnah.
The progress of the talks
It remains to give an account of the talks which took place during
September 1944 at Jinnah's residence in Bombay.
The first point raised by Jinnah was that Gandhi was. by his
own confession, only an individual seeking an agreement and not
a representative of the Hindus or of the Congress or of any other
segment of Indian political opinion. Nor did Gandhi have the
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 213

authority t o sign a n agreement, if one was reached. Jinnah said

that he was negotiating as the president of the All India Muslim
League and had a mandate from the Working Committee of his
party. He pointed out, in his letter of 10 September to Gandhi,
that this arrangement whereby the leader of one party carried on
negotiations with an individual who denied any representative
status, had no precedent and would create great difficulties. 12
Apparently Jinnah feared that if an agreement was reached, it
would always be open to the Congress to reject it on the ground
that it had given no authority to Gandhi to make it ; and Gandhi
would issue a statement expressing his regrets at his inability to
convince the Congress and carry it with him. And so the matter
would end with Jinnah and the League left only with the realiza­
tion that they had been duped. This was not the first time that
the two leaders were negotiating and Jinnah knew, through exper­
ience, that Gandhi was well practised in the a rt of putting different
constructions on his words after the event. That explains his mis­
givings about talking to a party which had no credentials and his
repeated references to this aspect of the situation. However, it
speaks volumes for his anxiety to reach an agreement that in spite
of obvious risks he continued the negotiations.
Jinnah's next objection was to the first clause of the Formula,
which stated that the Muslim League "endorses the Indian demand
for independence". What did this mean ? Did it mean the demand
made by the Congress in its resolution of August 1 942 or was it
the intention to propagate the idea that the League was not
anxious to win freedom ? Gandhi was well aware that the League
stood for the freedom and independence of the whole of India
and that applied to Pakistan as well as Hindustan. Then Jinnah
inquired about the basis on which the "provisional interim gov­
ernment" (in the formation of which the League was asked , under
clause I , to co-operate with the Congress) was to be constituted .
As to the plebiscite commission stipulated in clause No. 2 ,
Jinnah asked a few questions. Who would appoint this commis-
1 2 Jamil-ud-D in Ahmad, op. cit . , pp. 1 58-1 59.
214 T H E S T R li G G L E F O R P A i,; I S TA �

sion ? Who would give effect t o its findings ? O n what basis wo uld
the plebiscite be taken ? Who would determine the franchise on
which the plebiscite was t o be taken ?
In clause No 3 , what did "all parties" stand for ? I n clause
No . 4, between whom and thro ugh \vhat machinery would the
"mutual agreements" be entered i nto ? As to clause N o . 5, to
whom and when, and through what agency, would Britain transfer
"full power and responsibility fo r the Government of India" ?13
In his letter of 1 1 September, Gandhi tried to answer these
inquiries seriatim. On his locus standi he confirmed that "I have
approached you as an individual . . . Of course, I am pledged to
use all the i nfl uence I may have with the Congress to ratify my
agreement with you" . To Jinnah's first i nquiry he gave no answer.
merely saying that " I have already answered this in the fo re­
going" , which he had not. The basis for the fo rmation of the
provisional i nteri m government " w i l l have to be agreed to bet­
ween the League and the Congress" . The commission would be
appointed by the provisional government. The fo rm of plebiscite
and the franchise "must be a matter fo r d iscussion". "All parties"
meant "parties interested " . "M utual agreement" meant "agree­
ment between contracting pan ies' ' . Power would be transferred
to "the nation, that is, to the proYisional government" . Before
giving these replies to J innah's inquiries, Gandh i had let one
i mportant sentence quietly slip into his letter, vi::: "The League
. •

Resolution is indefinite. Rajaj i has taken from it the substance

and given it a shape . " 1 4
On the same day J i nnah sent a reply to the above letter in which
he expressed his dissatisfaction with Gandhi's answers and re­
quested him to be more precise and defin ite . On Gandhi's claim
that the Form u la had given substance and shape to the Lahor�
Resolution, Jinnah remarked, "on the contrary, he has not only
put it out of shape but m utila ted it " ' . 1 5
l 3 Ibid. , pp. 1 60- 1 6� .
14 Ibid., pp. 1 62- 1 64 .
1 5 Ibid. , p p . 1 64-167.
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 215

Gandhi replied t o this o n 1 4 September and this letter gave a

complete twist to the talks. After insisting, without argument ,
that Rajagopalacharia "not only has not put the Lahore Resolu­
tion out of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and
form", he said that he had put the Formula "out of my mind"
and "I am now concentrating on the Lahore Resolution in the
hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement". He was con­
vinced that unless "we oust the third party", Hindu-Muslim peace
would not be possible. He had no scheme of a provisional interim
government , except the opinion that it should represent all
parties. 1 6
Jinnah's answer to this was a repetition of his request for
clarifications, particularly about the constitution of the interim
government. " Unless I have some outlines or scheme, however
rough", he reiterated, "from you, what are \ve to discuss in order
to reach any agreement". He also asked Gandhi to indicate in
what way he found the Lahore Resolution "indefinite". 1 7
Gandhi's views on the Lahore Resolution were contained in
his letter of 1 5 September. He began by saying that the Resolu­
tion made no reference to the two-nations theory , but as Jinnah
had argued for it in his talks, Gandhi had been alarmed. "I find
no parallel in history", he said, "for a body of converts and their
descendants claiming to be a nation apart from their parent stock .
If India was one nation before the advent oflslam, it must remain
one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her
children." Then he proceeded to pose fifteen queries about the
contents and implications of the Resolution. 18
In his second letter of the same date Gandhi made it clear that
"we reach by joint effort independence for India as it stands.
India, become free. will proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and
partition if the people concerned vote for partition." The interim
government would be responsible to "the elected members of the
16 Jbid., pp. 1 67-1 70.
11 Ibid., pp. 1 70-1 72.
18 Ibid., pp. 1 73 - 1 77.
 216 T H E S TR U G G L E FOR P A K I ST A N

present Assembly or a newly elected one". It would have all powers

except that of the Commander-in-Chief during the war and full
powers after that. It would be "the authority to give effect to the
agreement that might be arrived at between the League and the
Congress and ratified by other parties" . 1 9
J innah's reply to Gandhi's denial of Muslim nationality was the
oft-quoted passage : "we maintain and hold that Muslims and
Hindus are two major nations by any defin ition or test of a nation.
We are a nation of a hundred million and, what is more, we are
a nation with o ur own distinctive culture and civilization, language
and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature,
sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes,
customs and calendar, history and traditions . aptitudes and ambi­
tions. In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and
of life. By all canons of international la\v we are a nation.":o
Jinnah might well have added that all Muslims were not children
of Indian converts, nor for that matter all Indians were of the
same racial stock. Racially also the people of the areas proposed
to be included in Pakistan were distinct .
To this, on 1 9 September, Gandhi could only answer '"can we
not agree to differ on the question of 'two nations' and yet solve
the problem on the basis of self-determination ?"2 1 J innah's reply
was that Muslims claimed the right of self-determination as a
nation and not as a territorial unit. The Muslim case was of d ivi­
sion and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of
a settlement between two major nations, and not of st.>verance or
secession from any existing union. The right of self-determina­
tion which the League claimed postulated that the Muslims were
a nation, and therefore, it would be the self-determination of
Muslims, and they alone were entitled to exercise that right. More­
over, there would not be any matter of "common concern" bet-
19 Ibid., pp. 1 7 7- 1 79. Italics not in the original. The last clause of the last
sentence in troduced an ent irely new element in the talks, but Jinnah seems to
have ignored it because of lack of agreement on essent ials.
20 Ibid. , p p . 1 79- 1 84.
21 Ibid., pp. 1 84- 1 85.
GAND H I-JINNAH T A L KS 217

ween Pakistan and Hindustan, as these would be two separate

independent sovereign states. 22
But Gandhi was unable to accept the proposition that the
Muslims of India were a nation distinct from the rest of the in­
habitants of India. Nor was he prepared to be a party to a division
"which does not provide for the simultaneous safeguarding of
common interests such as defence, foreign affairs and the like". 23
On 24 September, Gandhi once again gave a new twist to the
negotiations by stopping the discussion on the Lahore Resolu­
tion and, instead, offering a new set of five terms, which was a
mere rehash of the Formula. 24 Jinnah rejected these terms on
three grounds, viz., that Gandhi did not accept that Indian
Muslims were a nation, that he did not accept that Muslims had
an inherent right of self-determination, and that he did not accept
that Muslims alone were entitled to exercise this right. Moreover,
Congress was still bound by the resolution of the All India
Congress Committee of May 1 942 and the resolution of August
1 942. Both of these rejected partition and emphasized the ideal
of a united India. They were thus a bar to any settlement on the
basis of a division of India. 2 5
Gandhi went on insisting that the Congress resolutions did not
preclude a settlement with the Muslims and that they were mainly
concerned with the Congress-British stalemate. In his last letter,
written on 26 September, he showed some exasperation when he
said, "I confess I am unable to understand your persistent refusal
to appreciate the fact that the formula presented to you by me
in my letter of September 24, as well as the formula presented to
you by Rajaji, give you virtually what is embodied in the Lahore
Resolution. "26
It was by now obvious that there was no meeting ground on
which the two leaders could negotiate. So the talks were called o ff.
22 Ibid., pp. 1 8 5 - 1 90.

2 3 Jbid. , pp. 190-192.

2 4 Text i n ibid. , pp. 1 97-198.
2S Ibid., pp. 198-205.
2 6 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
 2 18 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A "1

It must be kept i n mind that the letters quoted above, though

full and detailed, do not provide a recor<l of the conversations.
The real discussions took place when the two leaders met face to
face. No record of this tete-a-tete was kept and neither of the
participants has left a journal of these negotiations. Therefore,
for the Muslim view of the failure of this attempt at an agreement
we must depend on Jinnah's statement of 30 September and his
interview of 6 October, 1944 to a foreign correspondent. 27
A study of these documents makes it clear that the most weighty
a rgument against the acceptance of Gandhi's terms was that he
wanted the British withdrawal to take place first and the ques­
tion of the division of India to be decided afterwards, while Jinnah
insisted on a partition before British authority was brought to an
end. Under Gandhi's time-table, an interim government respons­
ible to the central assembly as then constituted , was to tak�
delivery from the British, to hold a plebiscite and to implement
its verdict. To this Jinnah was firmly opposed . "It would, there­
fore, be a Hindu majority government which would, when it
becomes a permanent Federal Government, set up the post-war
Commission for demarcating frontiers and arranging the plebis­
cite. I am asked to agree, before the plebiscite and therefore be­
fore I know what Pakistan will be, to making arrangements on
Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Customs, Com­
munications, etc. , as a condition of our being allowed to have
any kind of Pakistan at all ; and it will be a 75 per cent Hindu
majority government with which we shall have to agree . . . This
is not independence. It is a form of provincial autonomy subject
always in the most vital matters to an overwhelmingly Hindu
federal authority."
This was the central point on which the talks broke down.
Stripped of all dialectical frills and political polemics, the Gan­
dhian o ffer did not amount to more than a half promise of a
mutilated and non-sovereign Pakistan at some future date. Even
for this the only guarantee was the goodwill of the Hindus. It i�
l 7 Both these are set o u t in full in ibid. , p p . 2 1 0-220 and 220-223.
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 219

only fa i r t o point out that had such goodwill been present , the
demand for Pakistan would hardly have been formulated . Who
could blame Jinn<l.h for turning down a proposal which, instead
of solving the constitutional problem of Indi a , intensified Muslim
fears and if accepted would have placed them at the mercy o f a
Hindu Government without even the chance of British inter­
vention '!

Causes offailure
Many questions arise in connection with these negotiations. What
was Gandhi's motive in holding these talks ? What was the
Congress attitude towards them '! What d id the other parties think
of this top-level attempt at a settlement ? What was the net result
of these conversations ?

All these questions cannot be answered i n the absence of inside

information which has never been supplied. However, a few facts
are known with some certainty and these may help us in seeing
the Bombay talks in their proper perspective.

It is not easy to understand Gandhi's motives in accepting the

C. R. Formula and in entering into a d iscussion with J i nnah on
its basis. Obviously, he was not mentally prepared to counte­
nance partition in any shape. His letters to Jinnah, referred to
above, show that he was implacably opposed to Pakistan and
one s uspects that he negotiated with a v iew to convincing the
public, perhaps in foreign countries, of his anxiety to reach a
settlement and of his conciliatory policy towards the Muslims. 28
He made no serious effort to understand the reasons behind the
Muslim insistence on partition. He never apprehended the nature
or extent of Muslim fears. There was an i nconsistency between
his reiteration that India was one united nation and the Muslim
principle of two-nations which he impliedly accepted when he
agreed to negotiate on the basis of Pakistan.29 While on one side
he was offering terms to the Muslims, on the other he was v i ndi-
2s See J.C. French, "India under Lord Wavell", Natio11al Review, October,
1 944, p. 3 1 2.
29 Sir Frederick Puckle, "The G andhi-Jinnah Conversations", Foreign
Affairs, January, 1 945, p. 32 1 .
220 THE STR U G G L E FOR PAKISTAN

eating h i s August 1 942 action which had frightened the minorities,

especially Muslims, into hardening their stand.30 His method of
conducting his correspondence with Jinnah reveals his unwilling­
ness to come to an agreed solutio n . First he insisted on his indivi­
dual capacity and denied that he was negotiating o n behalf of
the Congress. Then he championed the C . R . Formula and went
on claiming that it gave to the Muslims everything that they had
demanded in the Lahore Resolution. Then abruptly he dropped
the Formula and took up the Lahore Resolution, but at the end
once again reverted to his claim, unsupported by argument, that
the Formula and the Resolution were identical. But above all, he
blithely asked the Muslims to trust the Hindus to such an extent
that they should agree to a British withdrawal leavin g the deci­
sion on a non-sovereign Pakistan to a predominantly Hindu
government endowed with sovereign powers. Gandhi must have
known that his insistence on this point would break the talks ,
and that casts doubts on his sincerity.

Another significant point is that the Congress did not express

its feelings about the talks. We know that in 1942, when Raja­
gopalacharia had just begun to spe.i.k of the possibility of an
agreement on the basis of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru and other
Congress leaders had seriously objected. Nehru had remarked,
"it appears to me that he is breaking to pieces the weapon which
the Congress have fashioned after twenty-two years of innumer­
able sacrifices" .3 1 Rajagopalacharia had retorted by resigning from
the Congress, but this did not awaken the Congress rank and file
to the urgency of his call. When the talks were held and fo r some
time after that the Congress leaders were still in prison and
therefore not i n a position to give public utterance to their views.
But Menon, who was in their confidence and can justly be ta ken
as representing their views, is of the opinion that Ga ndhi's move
of talking to Jin nah about the pa rtition of India was "inoppor­
tune . . . and was calculated only to strengthen Jinnah's hands
30 The Times, 9 August, 1 944.
3 1 Quoted in Menon, op. cit. , p. 1 40.
G A N D H I-J I N N A H T A L K S 221

and further the cause of the Musl i m League . . . " This, he confirms,
"was a view which was shared by some prominent Congress­
men" .32 If this estimate of Congress reacti o n is correct, and there
is no evidence to suggest the contrary, J innah was justified i n
in sisting that Gandhi should have a manda te from the Congress
for the negotiations . But J i nnah received no satisfaction from
Gandhi on this point, which must have put Jinnah in the difficult
position of negotiating with a party whose credentials were doubt­
ful and who could always back out of any commitment merely
through a Congress resolution.

The attitude of other parties was reflected i n their reaction to

the news of the failure of the talks. The Liberals did n ot regret
the failure because the negotiations were based on the accept­
ance by Gandhi of the "vicious principle of partition of H i ndustan
and Pakistan" .33 The All India Sikh Conference passed a resolu­
tion rejecting the basis of the talks and calling upon the Sikhs to
carry on a "ceaseless agitation unless the scheme is finally dropped
and the Sikhs are assured that no similar proposal will be put
forward".34 The Indian Christians regretted the breakdown but
made it clear that, on this point, they "consider the point of view
of Mr. Gandhi to be more fair and more reasonable than that of
Mr. Jinnah". 35

32 Ibid., p. 1 6 3 .
33 Statement by Setalvad and Chandavarkar, Indian A111111a/ Register, 1 944,
vol. II, p. 1 56.
34 Text in ibid., p. 220.
35 Statement by Sir Maharaj Singh and B. L. Rallia Ram, ibid. , p. 1 5 8.
 C H AP T E R 1 0

Simla Conference A nd Elections

Repercussioils
On the whole, the failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks was taken
philosophically in India. A number of parties even expressed their
pleasure at the breakdown . It appears that the failure was con­
sidered inevitable in view of the wide gulf between the Congress
and League opinion s ; and therefore the news of the final break­
down did not ccme as a shock to public opinion. The result \\"<1 S
an expected stalemate. The Congress leaders were still in gaol.
Jinnah had tried his best to convince Gandhi of the sincerity and
righteoumcss of his stand . Gandhi had offered nothing new. The
British Government also had yet no new proposals to break the
impasse.
Sapru Proposals
No non-Muslim leader was willing to lend any support to the
Muslim cause. Only Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru seems to have gone
so far as to think that some agreement with the Muslims would
be desirable. It would be recalled that he had convened in 1 94 1
a Non-Party Conference. Soon after the suspension of Jinnah­

Gandhi talks, he wrote to Gandhi suggesting the holding of a n -

S I M LA C O N FE R E N C E A N D E L E C T I O N S 223

other session of the Conference. But Sapru himself was doubtful

if this would help and, after a short d i scussion with Gandhi, he
withdrew his suggestion. Then he proposed to Gandhi that the
latter should call a National Convention , but Gandhi declined
to do sc . Finally, Sapru suggested that the Standing Committee
of the Non-Party Conference should appoint a committee to go
into the matter of the future of Ind ia. The committee v.:as not to
be charged with the duty of bringing about a settlement i n the
:.ense that "the document would be executed, signed, sealed and
delivered" . It was to understand the point of view of each party
and to act as a "conciliation board" by establishing contacts with
leading party leaders . so that subsequently i t could recommend
a solution based on the views of all parties. The parties would then
be free to accept it in part or in full or to reject it. Gandhi a greed
to this plan but stipulated that the committee should not contain
any representatives o f the Congress, the Muslim League, the
Hindu Mahasabha or any other recognized political party, and
that persons chosen to serve on the committee should be those
"who had not definitely committed themselves to any particular
view since the breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks" . 1

T h e standing committee met i n New Delhi o n 19 November,

1944, and resolved "to appoint a committee which will examine
the whole communal and minorities question from a constitutional
and political point of view, put itself i n touch with different parties
and their leaders including the minorities interested in the ques­
tion and present a solution within two months to the Standing
Committee of the Non-Party Conference . . . [ and it] will take all
reasonable steps to get that solution accepted by all parties con­
cerned".2

Sapru told a press conference o n the same day that the com­
mittee would con sist of persons who were not actively associated
with any recognized political party and who had not publicly
expressed thei r views on the communal problem. The basic idea,
1 V. P . Menon, op. cit . . Menon does not give the dates of this exchange of
views between Sapru and Gandhi. But it must have been in October, I 944.
:! Indian A1111ual Register, 1 944, vol. II, p. 239.
224 T H E S T R U G G LE F O R P A K I S T A N

according to him . was t o lift the discussion of the communal

and political problem from the partisan to a judicial and scientific
level. He hoped that two former judges of the High Court, and
possibly one or two Englishmen, would serve on the committee.
He explained that if any party declined to co-operate, there would
be no recrimination, though the fact would be recorded. He dec­
lared that he enjoyed Gandhi's support and hoped that the Gov­
ernment of India would adopt a reasonable attitude towards the
committee's request for information or statistics .3

The Standing Committee met again at Allahabad on 3 Decem­

ber and named the members of the "Conciliation Co m m ittee" .
Sapru said that it was his intention to write to the leaders of
various parties, requesting them to agree to interviews. The
Committee would determine its own procedure. He reiterated that
the Committee was not going to write a detailed constitution.
Its purpose was to investigate whether there was a possibility of
reconciling conflicting views and of suggesting a basis on which
a constitutional structure might be built.4 The personnel of the
Committee was declared to be : Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (Chairman),
M. R. Jayakar (who could not attend), B ishop Foss Westcott,
S. Radhakrishnan, S i r Homi Mody, Sir Maharaj Singh, Muham­
mad Yunus, N. R . Sarkar, Frank Anthony, and Sant Singh.

On 10 December Sapru wrote to Jinnah explaining the raison

d'etre of the "Conciliation Committee" and asking him if he
would "allow me and one or two other members of the Com­
mittee to see you in order to obtain clarification on the practical
aspects of the problem" .5 In his reply of 14 December, J innah
regretted that he could not recognize the Non-Party Conference
or its Standing Committee, and therefore "I cannot recognize the
Committee recently appointed by the Standing Committee of the
Non-Party Conference for the purpose and the manner in which
3 Full statement i n ibid. , pp. 239-241 .
4 See ibid. , pp. 241 -242.
5 Text of Sapru's letter in Jami!-ud-Din Ahmad, op . cit., vol . II, pp. 239-240.
S I M L A C ON F E RE N C E A N D E L E C T I O N S 225

yo u propose to proceed and d eal with the present pol it ical situa­
tion" .6 J in nah's stand was <J m ply justified by t he trend of thought
which was likely to, and d id , dom inate the committee.
The proposals o f the "Conci liation Committee" were published
on 8 Apri l , 1 945. In its final session at New Delhi, the Committee
unanimously passed fifteen resolutions dealing with the broad
outline of the future constitution of Ind ia. Its main proposals may
be summarized as follows :-
First, the division o f India i n any form or shape to be opposed.
Secondly, a Constitution-making body of 1 60 persons, to be
established for d rafting the future Constitution.
Third ly, native states to be allowed to join the proposed Union
of J ndia as units.
Fourthly, "no province of B ritish I nd i a may elect not to accede
to the U n io n , nor may any unit-whether a province or a state
w hich has acceded-be entitled to secede therefrom " .
F i fthly, a l ist of fundamental rights t o be i ncorpo rated in the
future Constitution.
S ixthly, an i ndependent "minority commission" to look after
the rights and i nterests of the minorities to be provided for.

Seventhly, separate electorates to be abolished .

Finally, the Constitution-m aking body, the central legislature

and the central executive t o be constituted on the basis of parity
between H indus (other than scheduled castes) and Muslims.

The report of the Committee concluded by recommending that

"in the event o f these proposals being unacceptable t o the various
communities and parties and t he i r failure t o reach an agreement
on any other basis, His Majesty's Government should set up an
interim government in India and proceed t o establish machinery
for drafting the new Constitution generally on the basis of the
6 Text of Jinnah's letter in ibid., pp. 240-24 1 .
7 Indian Annual Register, 1 945, vol. I , pp. 3 10-3 1 6 .
226 T H E STRU G G L E F O R PA K I S T A N

pri nciples u n derlyi n g these proposals, enact i t i n parliament and

put it i nto operation at the e'.!.rliest possible date".�
It i s i nteresting t o s t ud y the reaction of I n d ian po l i tical pa r t ie s
to the Sapru proposals.
K. M . Munshi, the leader o f the A k h a n d H ind ustan Movement,
welcomed them as "a h i ghly workable solution o f the I nd ia n
deadlock". But N. N . Sirkar, N. C. Chatterjee (both o f the H ind u
Mahasabha) and thi rt e e n o t her H i n d u leaders of Bengal L'pposed
the proposal s on the ground that they prov i d ed fo r H i n d u-Musl i m
parity.9 Th e S ikhs a l s o objected t o the p r i n ci p le o f p a ri t y a nd
rej ect ed the ent ire report as i n adequate for t he protect ion of Sik h
interests. 1 0
On behal f c f t h e Musl ims, Nawab M uhammad I smail K h a n ,
Chairman o f the Musl i m League Committee o f Act ion, a t tached
n o i mportance to Sa pru·s fi ndings or recommendations a n d was
of the opi nion that the pol itical deadlock could only be o ver­
come i f t h e Congress and the League agreed on the essentials or
the future Constitution a n d the interim arrangements . 1 1 J i nnah
characterized the Conci l iation Comm ittee as "nothing but hand­
maids of t h e Congress who have played and are p l ayi ng to the
tune of M r . Gand hi", and warned that Muslim Ind ia will not
..

accept any attempt t o change the present Constitution i n any way

which would , d i rectly or i n d i rectl y be on the basis of a united
,

India.12
Even such an observer a s V. P. Men o n , who can hardly be
called d i si nterested, thinks that the Concil iation Committee
"failed i n its efforts to advance t h e posi t i o n " . Its rejection o f the
Pakistan idea and the recommendation fo r joint e l ectorates "made
the Musl i m League's attitude all the more hostile".13
8 /bid. , p . 3 1 6 .
9 Both quoted in K. P. Bhagat, A Decade of !ndo-British Refations
(Bombay : 1959), p. 300. Akha11d= Indivisible, undivided.
1 0 Ibid., pp. 301 -302.
1 1 Indian A111111af Register, 1 945, vol. I. p. 304.
12 Quoted in A. A. Ravoof, i\1eet Mr. Ji1111ah (Lahore, 3rd ed. : 1 955), p. 1 5 7.
1 3 Y. P . Menon, op. cit., p. 1 79.
S I M L A C O N F E R E N C E A N D E L E C TI O N S 227

There is no doubt that Sapru"s proposals faithfully reflected

the Congress mind . But t hey were unbelievably unrealistic. In
1 942 the Bri tish Go vernment . by the Draft Declaration sent
through Cripps, had accepted the principle underlying the Pakistan
plan and had carried a prevision permitting provinces to stay
out of the I nd ian Union. But the Conciliation Committee was
not prepared to concede even this. Similarly, separate electorates
h a d for many years been placed beyond controversy, a nd even
Gandhi , d uring his talks with Jinnah, had not reopened this
question. But the Conciliation Committee had gone farther than
even the Congress and recommended i:nmediate abo lition o f
separate representation. Caste Hind u-Muslim parity was obviously
meant to be a substitute. B u t the Comm ittee could not h a ve been
unaware of the fact that this would n o t meet the Muslim objec­
tion to bei n g reduced to a permanent minority. The Committee
first tried to ensure that Muslims of doubtful loyalty to the
community would be elected through overwhelmingly Hindu elec­
t o rates and then proceeded to put them at the mercy of an un­
alterable non-Muslim majority.

Thus the Sapru proposals were intended to reinforce the

Congress stand and not t o find a solution of the problem. In
the face of the i ncreasing strength of the Muslim League, o f the
hold that the idea o f Pakistan had come t o have over Muslim
masses, of the Cripps offer, of Jinnah-Gandhi talks, and of t h e
essential nature of the Muslim problem-in the face of a l l these
no other i nterpretation can hold water. It is difficult to under­
stand how a man of Sir Tej Bahad ur's brilliance and experience
and the tea m of his "eminent and reputed" 1 4 colleagues could be
so naive as to think that their proposals would be taken seriously
by any one.

Desai-Liaquat Pact
In order to complete the story of the Sapru proposals we have
recounted the developments up to April 1 945. Now we must
1 4 The adjectives are Menon's, ibid., p. 1 79 .
228 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I S T A \!

retrace our steps a l ittle t o take notice of an attempt ofa different

ki n d to bring the Muslim League and the Congress together.
When the yea r 1 945 opened Indian newspapers were full of
rumours o f a Congress-League alliance. Congress members o f the
central l egislative assem bly, who had then been attending the
legislature for some months, were \vorking i n some sort of co­
operation with the M uslim League assembly party. J n particular
B hulabhai Desai, the l eader of the Congress parliamentary party,
and Liaquat Ali Khan, the de facto leader of the League assembly
party, were said to be w ork ing in close harmony. There were
persistent rumours that these two leaders had reached an agree­
m ent on the Constitution of a provisional national government.
Desai saw Sir Evan Jenkins, then private secretary to the Viceroy,
on 1 3 January, and this was followed by a Desai-Viceroy meeting
on 20 J a nuary. Terms of what later came to be known as Desai­
Liaquat pact were conveyed to the Viceroy i n this meeting. Desai
claimed that these proposals had Gandhi's support. He also clai m­
ed that J in nah was aware of his negotiations with Liaquat A l i
Khan and of the agreement reached between them and had
approved of them.
The pact stipulated the followi n g :-
"The Congress and the League agree that they will join in
forming a n interim government in the Centre. The composition
of such government will be o n the following l i nes :
(a) An equal number of persons n ominated by the Congress
and the League (the persons nom inated need not be mem­
bers of the Central Legislature).
(b) Representatives of m inorities (in particular the Sched uled
Castes and the Sikhs).
(c) The Command er-in-Chief.

" The G overnment w i l l be formed and [will] function within the

framework o f the existing Government o f India Act. I t is, how­
ever, understood that, if the Cabinet cannot get a particular
measure passed by the Legislative A ssembly, they will not enforce
the same by resort to any of the reserve powers of the G overnor-
SIMLA CONFERENCE AND ELECTIONS 229

General or the Viceroy. This will make them sufficiently indepen­

dent of the Governor-General.

"lt is agreed between the Congress and the League that, if such
interim government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.

"The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end

are at present indicated t o take the following course :

"On the basis of the above understanding some way should be

found to get the Governor-General to make a proposal or a
suggestion that he desires an i nterim government to be fo rmed
in the Centre on the agreement between the Congress and the
League and when the Governor-General i nvites Mr. Jinnah and
Mr. Desai either jointly or separately, the above proposals would
be made declaring that they are prepared to join in forming the
Government.

"The next step would be to get the withdrawal o f Section 93 in

t h e provinces and t o fo r m a s soon a s possible provisional govern­
ments on the lines of a coalitio n . " 1 5

W h e n these proposals were conveyed t o the Viceroy, he trans­

mitted them to the Secretary of State for India with the opinion
that they a fforded an excellent opportunity o f going forward in
the political and constitutional spheres. But His Majesty's Gov­
ernment raised some important questions. What was the guarantee
that the interim government would support the war effort ? Was
the pact aimed at depriving the Governor-General o f his right to
select the members o f his Council ? How far would the new
Councillors be subject to the discipline and control of their party
caucuses ? How far would the Congress support Desai ? How
would the minorities and non-Congress Hindus and non-Muslim
League Muslims be provided fo r ?

To enable himself to answer these questions the Viceroy planned

to see Jinnah and Desai and seek clarific ation. But, in the mean­
time, Jinnah had issued a statement d isclaiming any knowledge
15 M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds.), op. cit., vol. II, pp. 556-557.
230 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

of the pact. But t h i s d id not deter Desai fro m persist i ng i n the

pact's Yal idity and canvassing support for i t . As J i n nah was t hen
a t Bombay, t he Viceroy asked Sir J oh n Co l v i l l e, t he Governor of
Bombay, t o see J i nnah on his behal f and to find o ut if in his
(J i nnah's) opinion the Desai pro posals were wort h pursuing and
if they were, t o request J i nnah t o jo urney north to Delhi t o
d i scuss matters w i t h t h e Viceroy a n d Desa i . When Colv i l le met
J i n nah, the latter stated tha t he kne\\' nothing of t he Dcsai­
Liaquat talks and t ha t t he pact wa s " itho u t t he authority o f the
Mus l i m League. 1 6
M uch uncerta inty attaches to this pact a n d n o n e o f the 1n rti­
cipants in t hese talks have removed the vei l of secrecy. Our o n l y
source of i n format ion is Menon b u t there i s o b \ i c us exaggeration
in h i s acco unt. At the utm ost one may assume that Liaquat Al i
K han and Desai reached some sort o f agreemen t . tentative or
defin i te, and that J i nnah l ater repud iated it. Whet her t h i s 11 as
done because Liaquat had overstepped his sphere o f authority
o r because J i n na h had c hanged his m ind we 1Yi l l never kn01v.
Desa i , t o o . was repud iated by t he leaders of t he Congress, despite
Gandhi's s upport . I n fact, Desa i s uffered much more t h a n Liaquat
Ali Khan whose d iscomfiture was temporary. For his a udacity
in draft i n g this agreement Desai paid the price of political ex­
tinction.
But the so-called Desai-Liaquat pact was, i n another sense,
not at all a fa ilure. It paved t he way for s ubsequent negotiations
at Simla. Congress-League parity was for the first t ime mentioned,
and conceded , in t h i s pact. f t is true t hat it left many questions
unanswered, but i t confirmed the fact of Congress acqui escence
in the League's status as representi ng M uslim I ndia.
The Wave!/ P/a11, 1 945

In spite of t he fai lure of "the Desai-Liaquat Pact" t o get t he

backing o f J i n nah or o f Congress leaders . the Viceroy went to
London i n May 1 945 for talks w i t h t he Brit ish G overnment. He
16 This account is based on Menon , op. cit . . pp. 1 7 7- 1 78, which is the only
avai lable source o f i n formation for these occurrences.
S l \I L A C O N F E R E N C E A N D E L E C T I O N S 231

carried with hi m certa in proposals which. it seems . were not un­

like those contained in the Des<ti-Liaquat agreement. The London
talks resulted in the formulation of a definite plan of action which
was officially made publ ic by the Secretary of State fo r India i n
a statement i n the House of Commons o n 14 June, 1 945. His

speech contained the following important points :-

The British G overnment was most anxious to do their utmost
to assist the Ind ians in the working o ut of a new constitutional
settlement , but it would be a contrad iction in terms to speak o f
the imposition b y Britain of sel f-governing institutions upon an
unwill ing Ind ia. It was not the intention of His Majesty's Govern­
ment to i ntrod uce any change contrary to the w ishes of the major
Indian com m unities. " But they are willing t o make possible some
step fo rward d uring the interi m period if the leaders of the prin­
ci pal Ind ian parties are prepared to agree to their suggestions and
t o co-operate in the successful conclusion of the war against Japan
as well as in the reconstruction in India which must follow the
final victory." ft was proposed that the Viceroy's Executive Co un­
cil he reconst ituted so that the Viceroy selects for nomination to
his Coun cil from a mongst leaders of I nd ian political parties "in
proportion which would give a balanced representat i on of the
main communities includ i ng equal proportions of Muslims and
Caste H i ndus". For this p urpose, the Viceroy would call a con­
ference of al l political leaders and put before them the above
proposal and invite from them a list of names from which he
would choose his new Council lors. All such members would be
Ind ians except the Viceroy <l lld the Commander-in-Chief. If this
co-operation is achieved in the centre, Section 93 would b e with­
d rawn from all provinces and popular m inistries formed "which
would be based on the participation of the main parties". External
Affairs (other than those tribal and frontier matters which fel l t o
b e dealt with a s p a r t of the defence or India) would b e placed in
the charge or an Indian member of the Council . "None of the
changes suggested wil l in any \Vay prejudice or prejudge the
232 THE S T R U G G LE FOR P A K I S T A N

essential form o f the future permanent Constitution or Constitu­

tions for India. 1 1

Some of the features of this plan were elaborated by the Viceroy,

Lord Wavell, in a broadcast speech at Delhi on the same d a y.
He made it clear that the new Council would work under the then
existing Constitution. There was no question o f the Governor­
General agreei ng not t o exercise his constitutional power of
control though it would .. o f course , not be exercised unreasonably.
He reaffirmed that the formation of the i nterim government would
i n no way prejudice the final constitutional settlement. After con­
sidering the best means of forming the new Council, he had
decided to i nvite the following to the Conference : all provincial
Chief M inisters ; for provinces under Governors' rule, all those
who last held the office o f Chief Min ister ; the leader o f the
Congress party and the deputy leader of the Muslim League party
i n the central assembly ; t he leaders o f the Congress and the
Muslim League in t he Council of State ; leaders of the Nationalist
P a rty and the European group i n the central assembly ; Gand h i
a n d J i n nah ··as the recognized leaders of the t w o m a i n political
parties" ; N. Shiva Raj to represent the sched uled castes ; and
Master Tara S i ngh to represent the Sikhs . 1 8

O n e point about the nature of the proposed Council was signi­

ficant. The extent of the powers to be enjoyed by it were not to
depend o n the letter o f the constitution or upon any future con­
ventio ns, but upon the fact that its members would be selected
by the m a i n political parties. "This reliance upon the support o f
t h e main political parties would b e a substitute for responsibi l i ty
to the Legislature which was ruled out because the Muslim
League would never agree t o participate i n a Council responsible
to a body 'Nith a H i nd u majority." 1 9

The reactions of Gandhi and Jinnah to the Wavell plan once

again underl ined the wide d i fference in their a pproaches t o the

17 His Majesty's Government's statement 011 India, 14 J1111e, 1945 ( London:

1 945) .
18 Speeches of Lord Ware!l, 1943-47 (New Delhi : 1 948), pp. 73-76.

19 E. W . R . Lumby, The Transfer ofPower in India (London : 1 954), p. 4 6

.
SIMLA CONFERENCE AND ELECTIONS 233

Indian problem. Gandhi, in a telegram to the Viceroy on 1 7 June,

regretted that "the fixity of parity between the Caste Hindus and
Muslims as an unchangeable religious division will become offi­
cially stereotyped on the eve of independence". He refused to
subscribe to it and assured the Viceroy that on this point the
Congress was of his mind. "You will quite unconsciously, but
equally surely, defeat the purpose of the Conference if parity
between Caste Hindus and Muslims is unalterable. Parity between
the Congress and the League is u nderstandable."20
Consequently, on 2 1 -22 June, the Congress Working Committee
instructed its representatives attending the Conference that they
should ensure that (1) the suggested arrangements were of a purely
temporary nature, (2) the principle of communal parity was un­
a ccepta bl e , (3) this communal parity was n o t applicable to the
provinces and (4) the acceptance of the principle of parity for the
restricted purposes of the Conference would not mean that all the
Muslim members of the N ational Government would be nomi­
nated by the Muslim Lea gue. 2 l
Jinnah issued a statement on the Wavell proposals on 29 J une,
by which t ime he knew the Congress reaction and the instructions
summarized in the preceding paragraph. He emphasized the point
that, in the projected national government, the Congress would
be in a position to count on the support of the scheduled castes
and the Sikhs. He was anxious for a settlement and for a com­
promise, but he could not surrender the principle that the League
alone was entitled to nominate all Muslim members of the gov­
ernment. The Caste Hindus-Musli m parity conceded by the
Viceroy was not an unqualified concession, because in the whole
Council the Muslim quota would not be more than one-third.
As the representatives of the Sikhs, the Scheduled Castes and other
communities would be, a.s far as the Muslim demand for Pakistan
was concerned, on the side of the Congress rather than on the
side of the League, the Congress would command a clear majority
in the Council. There was no firm provision against Congress
20 The Indian Annual Register, 1 945, vol. I , p . 245.
21 Ibid., p. 224.
234 T H E S T R L' G G L E FOR P ..\ K I S T A N

s team ro l l i n g . The V i ce ro y had h i s veto . a n d he had declared

t ha t he would not let i t l ie unused , but he would be pl aced i n
a very i nvid i o us p o s i t i o n i f h e was t o exercise h i s special powers
const a n t l y and a s a normal p ract ice. Therefor,.; t here w:.i s no
adequate safeguard aga inst the Congress forc i n g its deci s i o ns by
a majority vote aga i n s t t he Musl i m bloc. " We w i l l have t o con­

sider how t c p rovide aga i n st t h i s pos i t i o n . " 22

Tiu, Sil/I/a Co11fere11ce

The Conference assembled at S i m l a on 25 J u n c . 2J In t he first ses­
s i o n the V i ceroy made a long ex planatory speech, fi l l i ng in the
deta i l s o f t he plan o f l4 J un e . a nswe r i n g quest ions raised b y
t he disti ngu ished ga the r i n g a n d a ppeal i n g fo r t he co-operation
and active sympathy o f all the partici pants. I n t he seco nd session
(afternoo n ) , Azad asserted that the Con gress could not be a party
to anyt h i n g , however t e m pora ry , t hat ' " prejudiced its nat ional

characte r, tended t o i mp a i r the growth of nationa l i s m . or reduced

t he Congress d i rectly or i nd i rect l y t o the level o f a c o mmunal
body" . J i n na h made i t clear that t he League could n ot i n any
c i rcumsta nces agree to a con stitution o n a n y basi s other than t h a t
o f Pak istan. H e d id n o t co m m i t h i mself t o any definite conclu­
s ions, but " a p peared to s u pport t he p ro pos:.i l s subject to a deci­
s io n acceptable to him on t he q uest ion of c o m munal parity".

On 26 J une, the Confe rence d i scussed a statement , prepared by

t h e Viceroy and his ad v i sers, wh ich spl i t up t he proposals fo r
d i scussion i nt o t he i r c o m ponent elements under two he:i.d s, vi:: . .
( 1 ) those p r i ma r i ly fo r agreement between t h e part ies and t h e
22 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., vol. I I , pp. 263-268.
2 3 The
Conference was attended by : Abu! Kalam Azad ( Congress),
P. N. Banerjee (Nationalist Party). Bhulabhai Desai (Congress). G. H. HicJa­
yatullah (Sind Premier), Husain Imam ( M uslim League), M . A . J i n n ah
(Musl i m League), Liaquat Ali Khan ( Muslim League), Khizr Hayat Khan
(Punjab Premier), B. G. Kher (Bombay e:c-Premier), G . S. Motilal (Congress),
K hwaja Nazimuddin (B.:ngal ex-Premier), G. B. Pant ( U. P. ex-Premier),
Ma harajah of Parlikemcdi (Orissa ex-Premier), C. Rajgopalacharia (Madras
ex-Prem ier), Henry Richardson (European Group), Muhammad Saadullah
(Assam Premier) . Khan Sahib (N.W . F . P . Premier) , R. S . Shukla (C.P. ex­
Premier), Tara Singh (Sikhs). S. K. Sinha (Bihar ex-Premier), and N. S ivaraj
(Scheduled Castes). This makes a t o t a l of 2 1 .
S Bt L A C O N F E R E N C E A N D E L E C T I O :'< S 235

Viceroy, anJ (2) those pri mari l y for settlement between the parties
themselves. The d i scussion proceeded s moothly on all the points
unti l the provision relatin g to communal parity was reached .
On 27 J une the Conference met briefly and decided to adjourn
so that J i nnah and Pant could continue thei r exploratory talks
which had begun the day before. On the evening of the same day
Jinnah saw the Viceroy and told him that t hough he was opposed
to the appoi ntment of non-League Muslims tc; the Council, he
would place before his Working Committee any formula which
the Viceroy thought suitable.
When the Conference re-assembled on 28-29 J unc, i t was i n­
formed t hat J i nnah-Pant talks had failed . The Viceroy then
suggested a d i fferent <tppro�tch. f f all the parties and i nterests
attend ing t he Conference would send him l ists of the person s
who m t hey would l i ke to be i ncluded in the Counci l , h e would
con sider them and try tl) produce on p;iper a l ist o f p�rso ns who
would be acceptable to all con cern ed . He presumed that J i nnah
and Azad would send him l i sts from the Muslim League and
Congress respectively. He would l i ke to receive not less than
eight and not more than twelve names fro m each of the parties.
The Conference was adjourned till 1 4 July. 2 4
The Congress Working Commitkc met on 3 July and, b y
6 July, they had prepared a list o f names which was forwarded
to the Viceroy. The Musli m League Working Committee met o n
6 July, and on the following day J innah wrote t o the Viceroy
makin g three suggestion s : ( I ) the Musl i m League should not be
asked to submit a panel of names, but its representatives should
be chosen on the basis of a persona I discussion between the
Viceroy and himself; (2) all the Musl i m members of the Council
should be chosen from the Musl i m League ; "the Working Com­
mittee feels very strongly on the point a nd regards it as one of
the fundamental principles" ; and (3) some effective safeguards,
other than the Viceroy's veto, should be provided to protect
2 4 This account is based on Menon, op. rit., pp. 1 9 1 -205, \Vh ich is our only
source for what happened at the Confe re nce table. The quotations are from
Menon, not from the persons i n whose mouths Menon puts these words.
236 T H E S T R U G G L E f O R P A K I ST A N

Muslim interests from majority decisions o f the Council. Jinnah

and the Viceroy had a long conversation on these points on
8 July. On 9 July the Viceroy sent him a written reply in which
he regretted that he could not give him a guarantee that all the
Muslim Councillors would be chosen from among the Muslim
League. He could not commit himself to giving similar guarantee
to any other party. He said that he was trying "to form an
Executive Council representative, competent and generally accept­
able". On the same day Jinnah wrote back saying that since the
required assurances were not forthcoming his Working Com­
mittee felt unable to "send the names on behalf of the Muslim
League for inclusion in the proposed Executive Council". 2 5
There was another meeting between Jinnah and the Viceroy on
11 July, when the Viceroy said that he was prepared to include
four members of the Muslim League but that the fifth place
would have to be given to a non-League Panjabi Muslim. Jinnah
at once rejected this and asserted that he stood by the demands
made in his letter o f 7 Juiy. When the Viceroy refused to accept
these conditions, Jinnah said that the League could not co­
operate.26

The Conference met for the last time on 14 July. The Viceroy
made a statement announcing the fa ilure of his efforts and accept­
ing full responsibility for the failure. "The main idea underlying
the conference was mine. If it had succeeded , its success would
have been attributed to me, and I cannot place the blame for its
failure upon any of the parties. " 2 7 Jinnah reminded the Confer­
ence that, before embarking upon an uncritical condemnation of
the League for causing the failure, it must be remembered that the
League and the Congress had entirely different angles of approach.
If t he proposed Executive Council had been formed, every matter
before it would have been looked at by the two parties from
entirely different points of view. The idea of Pakistan and the
25 Text of J innah-Viceroy correspondence in The Indian Annual Register,
1 945, vol. II, pp. 1 39-140 .
2 6 Menon, op. cit., p . 206.
2 7 Full text in Speeches ofLord Wave/I, 1943-47, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
SIMLA CONrERENCE A N D E LECTIONS 237

idea of a un ited I nd ia \\·ere incompatible. The Congress would

have had a permanent majority in the new Council . The Viceroy"s
veto was an i nadequate safeguard, and the League could not be
content without a provision that if a decision were challenged by
a League member i t could be carried only by a specified majority.
Moreover, i f the League was t o be given administrative respon­
sibility it must also be given the right to choose i t s own members
to sit i n the Council . Finally, he feared that the Congress would
make use of any i nterim arrangement to consol idate its position
a nd gradually t o strangle the Pakistan Plan. 2 8
All the participants felt sorry that these efforts at a settlement
had failed and the Conference ended on a note of regret and un­
certainty.
Jn lndia as well as Brita i n it were the M uslims who were gene­
rally blamed for the failure of the Simla Conference. J i n na h came
under heavy fire for what his crit ics chose to call h i s stubborn ness
and unwillingness to compromise. Tlzc Times, normally fairly
balanced in its v iews , said that the n atural disposition, i n spite
o f Wavell's confession of fai l ure, would be t o place the blame on
Jinnah and the Musl i m League.29 The Daily Telegraph ascribed
the failure to the ancient hosti lity between the Musl ims and the
Hindus. 3 0 For the News Clzro11icle the responsibility for the fa i lure
was "Mr. J innah's and Mr. J innah's alone" ; but, i t added , "the
Muslim League is no more completely representative of Musli m
India than the Congress is completely representative of Hind u
India" . 3 1 The Observer contented itself with the remark that "the
more obvious blame" falls on J i nnah.32
However no blame can be attached to J innah i n the matter.
It is true that it was his refusal to let any party other than the
28 Menon, op. cit., pp. 2 ! 0-2 12. J i nnah elabora ted these points in a state­
ment issued on the same day, see Indian A 111111al Register, 1 945, vol. JI,
pp. 1 37- 1 39.
2 9 Tlze Times, 16 July, 1 945.
30 Daily Telegraph, 16 July, 1 945.
31 News Chronicle, 16 July, 1 945.
32 The Obsen•er, 1 8 July, 1 945.
238 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

Musl i m L�ague name t h e Muslim Councillors that cau sed the

breakdown. But three things must be kept i n mind while appor­
tioning blame or praise a mong the I ndian parties and leaders.

I n the first place, J innah was not only, as he always claimed ,

the leader o f Mus l i m I ndia, but during the Conference he also
enjoyed the support o f some non-Congress non-Muslim elements
o f the I nd i a n population . The president o f the Indian Christian
Association, Robert Albert Jesudasan, had w i red to J innah,
pointing out that the Christian commun ity had not been invited
to the Conference, and requesting J innah to look after their
i nterests at the Conference table. S i milarly the Secretary of the
South Indian Liberal Federation, M. Damodaran Naid u, resented
the Congress claim of representing the whole of India a nd told
J inna h , "in the absence of any representative of ours i n the Con­
ference at Simla . we authorise you to put forward our cla i m .
W e have every confidence in yo ur wisdom and sense of
fai rness".33

Thus J innah could r ightly cla im that he spoke for at least

as many non-Muslims as the Muslims for whom the Congress
could speak. Even then few questioned the right of the Congress
to speak for all non-Muslims. How could then it be argued that
J i nnah could not speak for the Muslims only because a hand ful
of them were with the Congress o r formed splinter groups t o
question h i s leadership ?

In the second place, Jinnah's principal clai m was that the

League alone was entitled to send Muslim members to the pro­
posed Council . He made this claim on two grounds : that the
Muslims o f India were a separate nation, and that the League
alone could speak for that nation. At Simla these very principles
were at stake. If the Muslims were a separate nation, they coul d
speak only through their national organizati o n . the League. I f
J i nnah h a d yielded o n these points, he would have given away
his whole case and posterity would not have forgiven h i m . Even
if the claim of the Muslims to be a nation could not be conceded

3 3 A . A. Ravoof, /.,feet i'1r. Jinnah, op. cit., p. 1 6 5 .

S I M L A C O N F E R EN C E A N D E L E C T I O N S 239

at that time, any group of persons can be represented in govern­

ment only through the majority of its representatives . Though as
yet there had been no elections, it was fairly well known that
Jinnah and the League enjoyed overwhelming support of Muslim
India.34 The general elections held soon after the Con ference con­
firmed beyond doubt that J i nnah's clai m was based on solid
facts. With this certainty Jinnah could not agree to the Muslim
representation being shared by other groups who had no follow­
ing.

In the third place, the League's policy vis-a-vis the Conference

must be studied in relation to its over-all strategy . It related the
Conference to its own grand o bjective. " Would i t s acquisition o f
a few seats on the Central Executive brin g it any nearer t o achiev­
ing Pakistan ? Judging by his statements to the press, J i n nah was
by no means sure that it would . " He thought it probable that the
Wavell plan would play i nto the hands of the Congress because
i n the new Council Muslims would be a minority of one-third.
O n all fundamental issues "Congress would i nvariably command
a majority and the Muslims would as i nvariably be outvoted " .
" I n fact, the more British spokesmen, with a view to convincing
India and t he world of the genuineness o f their proposals, empha­
sized that the new Council would enjoy the reality of power, the
more cause did J innah find to apprehend that the plan would
mean the establishment of that Hindu domination which would
kill all hope of Pakistan." To Jinnah a weak executive, lacking
the support of any political party, was "infinitely preferable to a
strong executive with a Congress majority". It may not be far
from the truth to say that Muslim League policy was then con­
cerned "less with acquiring power for itself than with denying i t
to its opponents".35

In conclusion, i t may be sa id, that the League d i d not lose

much by the fa ilure of the Conference and, given the then exist­
ing Hindu-Muslim rela tions, it would not have gai ned much by

34 This had been amply proved by bye-elections , Coupland, India, a

Restatemellt (London : 1 945), p. 184.
35 The point made in this paragraph is well argued in E. W. R. Lumby,
The Transfer of Power i11 India, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
240 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

the success of the Conference. Those who think that a golden

opportun ity of having a " national" government was foo l ishly lost
m ust remember the way in which the i nterim government of 1 946-
47 worked . Moreover. t he abandonment of the Wavell plan
strengthened J innah m o re than t he Congress . It wea kened the
position of the non-League Muslims who realized that, in spite
of thei r loyalty to other parties, J i nnah alone could settle affairs
on behalf of the Mus l ims.
Genera l elections

The Simla Conference had failed to bring about a political

rapproche111c11t primarily because it was not possible t hen t o
verify t h e claims made by t he Congress and the Musl i m League
regardi ng their representative character. This omission was now
rectified. On 2 1 August, l 945 the Viceroy made two i mportant
a nnouncements . The first was that elections t o the central a nd
provincial legislatures would be held i n t he coming \\ i nter. The
second i n fo rmed the public that he would shortly be going to
London f o r consultations with the British Government . H i s visit
to Britain lasted from 24 August to 16 September. O n 19 Sep­
tember Wavell made a statement on behalf of His Majesty's
G overnment. After confirming that general elections would be
held , the announcement \vent on to say that after the elect ions a
Constitut ion-making body would be set up. The Viceroy would
also take steps to bring i nto being an E xecutive Counci l "which
will have the support of the main Indian Parties". 36
[ndian reaction to this pronouncement was not favourable.
J i nnah declared on behalf of the Muslim League that no settle­
ment would be acceptable except on the basis of Pakistan.3 7 The
Al l [ndia Congress Committee characterized the proposals as
"vague a nd inadequate and u nsatisfactory" and pointed o u t the
omission of any reference to i ndependence.3 8
After thus expressing their disapproval of the official plan,
both the parties began earnest preparations for the corning
3 6 Wavell, op. cit., pp. 83-85 .
3 7 Menon. op. cit., p. 220.
3 8 Indian Annual Register, 1 945. rnl. II, pp. 93-94.
 S I M LA C O N F E R E N C E A N D E L E C T I O N S 241
electoral conflict. It was clear to all that the elections would be
crucial and would decide the future of India. Not only would
they determine the standing of the two main parties but their
result would materially affect the ultimate decision.
The elections were fought on one of the simplest possible
platforms. The League was fighting to vindicate its claim of
speaking for Muslim India and to prove the popular backing for
the Pakistan demand. Its manifesto may be summarized i n two
sentences : the Muslims of India are a nation ; Pakistan is the only
sensible solution of the Indian problem. The Congress, on the
other hand, stood on two exactly opposed slogans : the Congress
represents all Indians ; India will remain one undivided country.
Between two such far-flung ideals there could be no compromise.
It was a fight between two irreconcilable nationalisms.
Jinnah toured India in order to attract wavering Muslims to his
party. He spoke o f the dire need for unity, for the sinking of all
differences, for facing the enemy with resolution and confidence,
and for standing as one united nation. The hour made one per­
emptory demand : to "vindicate not only your national character
but your national claim". He appealed to all non-League Muslims
to join the party at that critical j uncture. 39
The Congress countered this propaganda with political abuse.
The Congress press painted Jinnah in the blackest hues and char­
acterized the Pakistan demand as "vivisection of Mother India",
"reactionary primitivism" and "religious barbarism". It accused
the Muslim League of being an ultra-conservative clique of
Knights and Khan Bahadurs, capitalists and landlords, toadies
and Government pensioners. The Congress strengthened its links
with such m inor and insignificant non-League Muslim groups as
the Momins, the Ahrars, the Shia Conference and the Jamiat
Ulama-i-Hind . In the Panjab it supported the Unionist Party
against the League.40
39 Jinnah made innumerable speeches during this hectic election campaign.
Some of them are reproduced in Jami!-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., vol. I I ,
pp. 282-290, 292-305, 307-355, 360-374.
4 0 A. B. Rajput, Muslim League Yesterday a11d Today (Lahore : 1 948), p. 97.
242 T H E STRU G G L E FOR P A K ISTAN

The elections were held i n two stages. I n December 1 945 the

central legislative assembly was elected. The results showed how
finely the assembly was d i vided between the League and the
Congress. The Musl i m League won every single Muslim seat, the
"Nationalist Muslims fo rfeiting their deposits i n many instan­
ces" . 4 1 The Congress success in the non-Muslim constituencies
was equally spectacular. The League won 86.6 per cent of the
total Muslim votes, and the Congress 9 1 .3 per cent of the total
"general" votes . The final figures for the central Assembly were :

Congress 57
Musli m League 30
Independents 5
Aka li S ikhs 2
Europeans 8

Total 102

In the previous Assembly, elected in 1934, the figures at the time

of d i ssolution were :

Congres� 36
Muslim League 25
Independents 21
National ist Party 10
European� 8

Total 1 00

The Central Election Board o f the Congress i ssued a bulletin

on 6 January, 1 946, in which it claimed that the election results
had vindicated the Congress as "the biggest, strongest and most
representative organization in the country" . This clai m was not
justified because out of a total of 102 seats the Congress had won
only 57, a little over half. With such success i t could not be
claimed tha t the Congress represented all India.
41 :-,,k non, op . cit., p. 226.
SIMLA CONFERENCE AND E LECTIONS 243

Provincial elections were held in early 1 946, and here again the
two main parties swept their resp�ctive constituencies . The
Congress won a total of 930 seats, gaining an absolute majority
in eight provinces. The Muslim League captured 428 out of the
possible 492 Muslim seats. The case of Sind calls for special men­
tion. After the elections the League commanded exactly half the
votes in the assembly. Therefore a fresh election was held in
December 1946 in which the League gained a majority over all
other parties.
Formation ofprovincial ministries
I n Assam the Congress had a clear majority and it formed a
ministry under Gopinath Bardolai. One Nationalist Muslim was
included in the Cabinet. Two seats were offered to the Muslim
League on condition that it agreed to work the Congress parlia­
mentary programme, but the League rejected the offer because of
the presence of a Nationalist Muslim i n the ministry.
Similarly, the Congress formed ministries in Bihar, the United
Provinces, Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces and Orissa. In all
these provinces the Congress offered to co-operate with the
League offering however its own terms. The League could not
but reject such offers.
As for the Muslim provinces, the North-West Frontier Province
can be dealt with briefly. The Congress won a clear majority and
formed the ministry under Khan Sahib.
In Sind the League won 27 seats and one Cndependent Muslim
joined the party later. Three seats went t o the Nationalist Muslims
and four to G. M. Sayyid's group which Ind left the Muslim
League just before the elections. The Congress had 21 seats, the
Europeans three and there was one Independent Labour member.
The Sayyid group (4) formed a coalition with Congress (21 ) and
the Nationalist Muslims (3). Thus each of the two sides came to
have 28 seats. The Governor asked the League leader, G. H.
Hidayatullah, t o fo rm the government. He o ffered 2 Hindu seats
to the Congress, but it insisted that G.M. Sayyid, the leader of
the coalition, should be approached. As the League did not, on
244 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A !'\

principle, deal with non-League Muslims, the offer was suspend­

ed. Later another election was held in which the League won a

clear majority.
In Bengal, H. S. Suhrawardy, the leader of the League parlia­
mentary party, was i nvited to form a ministry. As the League had
won only 1 1 3 seats in a house of 250, Suhrawardy negotiated with
the Congress for forming a coalition . but the talks ended without
success and a League ministry was installed with the support of
independent elements.
In the Panjab, the League had won 75 out of 86 Muslim seats.
The ruling Unionist Party had, in spite of Congress and Sikh
support, suffered an ignominious defeat and had been reduced to
an insignificant group of 20. Four Unionists later joined the
League (raising the League strength to 79) and six went over
to independent and other benches, leaving the Unionist group
with a total following of 1 0. It was the Unionist group whose
representative was sought to be i ncluded in the proposed i nterim
government under the Wavell plan, which led to the failure of
the Simla Conference. Thanks to the Communal Award of 1 932,
the League, by far the largest party in the house, could not form
a ministry by itself. The Congress and the Sikhs entered into an
alliance and stipulated three conditions fo r their co-operation
with the League : first, that the Congress would be free to nominate
as ministers persons belonging to any community ; secondly, that
the Congress-Akali group would have half the seats in govern­
ment ; and thirdly, that extra-provincial questions, like Pakistan,
would not be brought before the assembly. These terms were
obviously unacceptable to the League, which then tried to reach
an understanding with the Akali Sikhs alone, but they insisted,
as a condition of co-operation, that in the event of the creation
of Pakistan a Sikh State would be formed in the Panjab. As the
League was unable to give such an assurance, the Sikh-League
coalition failed to materialize . It was then tha t the Congress en-
S I M L A CONFERENCE A N D ELECTION S 245

tered into an alliance with the Akali S ikhs a nd the Unionists to

form a coalition ministry.42
The developments in the Panjab call for two comments. In the
first place, the Congress anxiety to forge alliances with the enemies
of the League showed that it was prepared to go to any length
to keep the League out of office in a province which was generally
considered the "heart" of Pakistan. The conditions which the
Congress, in co-operation with the Sikhs, laid down for the
League to accept were a reminder of the insulting conditions d ic­
tated by the United Provinces Congress party to the provincial
League in 1 937. In view of the League antipathy to the nomina­
tion of Muslim ministers by the Congress it is manifest that the
Congress offer of coalition was an empty gesture without any
intention of working with the League. The Congress attitude
appeared to b� that as it could not fo rm a ministry by itself it
would see to it that the League also was not allowed to enter
office.
In the second place, the Congress keenness on forming a
coalition with the Unionists was not only in contrad iction to its
election manifesto but also to all its past claims and history. In
1937 the Congress had refused its co -operation to the League
because, according to the Congress leaders, the League was a
reactionary party and the Congress could not compromise its
progressive spirit by working with it. But now the Unionists were
discovered to be a progressive lot, co-operation with whom would
advance the Congress plans for social and economic uplift . Fur­
ther, the Unionists were a discredited group whose policy and plan
of action had been repudiated by all but ten members, because
during the short interval between the end of the election and the
formation of the coalition the 20 member-group had dwindled to
a mere ten. Most of them were landlords who did not look kindly
upon enlightened views and were by any standards more backward
and old-fashioned than even the most reactionary among Muslim
Leaguers. But all these considerations were thrown to the wind
42 For details see Civil and Military Gazette, 7 and 21 March, 1 946.
246 THE STRUG G L E FOR P A K I STAN

and Abul Kalam Azad triumphantly announced the alliance bet­

ween the Congress and the Unionists. To crown all, this ministry,
which was formed by 5 1 Congress members, 22 Akali Sikhs and
10 Unionists, was headed by the leader of the smallest component
of the coalition, Sir Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, whose party had
been swept into limbo in the elections. Political opportunism
could hardly go further.
The general policy of the Congress towards ministry-making
in Muslim provinces was thus one of obstruction and intrigue.
The idea was to harry and harass the League parliamentary parties
so that no League ministry could come into office and, if this was
unfruitful, to intrigue against the League administrations with a
view to breaking them. Sind and the Panjab conclusively prove
the truth of this estimate.
Muslim League Legislators' Conrention
In April 1 946 J innah called at Delhi a convention of all those
persons \Vho had been elected members of provincial and central
legislatures on Muslim League ticket . Over five hundred members
attended this unique gathering which one writer has aptly called
a "Muslim Constituent Assembly'' .43 Among the visitors were
some Akali leaders including G i a n i Kartar Singh.44
In his opening speech Jinnah concentrated on the Pakistan
problem, elaborating its details, arguing for its creation and fore­
casting dire things for the Muslims of India if a Hindu majority
g overnment succeeded the British. Re-affirming his faith in Pak­
istan, he said. "they may check us. They may obstruct, but nobody
can prevent us from reaching our goa I. They can only delay u s
fo r a little time. With hope, courage and faith we shall win."
H. S . Suhrawardy moved the ma in resolution wh ich demanded
"a sovereign independent state, comprising Bengal and Assam in
the north-east zone a.nd the Panjab, the N .W.F.P . , Sind, and
Baluchistan in the north-west zone". It declared that "the Muslim
4 3 A . A. RaYoof, op. cit . . p. 1 8 6.
44 M . H. Saiyid, .\faltammad Ali Jinnah : A polirical study (Lahore : 1 96�
ed.), p. 405.
SIMLA CONFERENCE A�U E L E C T i O :S S 247

nation will never submit to any constitution for a united India

and will never participate in any single constitution-making machi­
nery set up for the purpose". The British Government was told
that the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan
and its implementation without delay were "the sine qua non for
Muslim League co-operation and participation in the formation
of an i nterim government at the Centre''.
Before the convention was dissolved every member of the
Central and Provincial Legislative Assemblies took the following
oath :
"I do hereby solemnly decla re my firm conviction t hat the safety
and security, the salvation and destiny of the Muslim nation in­
habiting the sub-continent of I ndia lie only i11 the achievement of
Pakistan, which is the only equitable, honourable and j ust solu­
tion of the constitutional problem and which will bring peace,
freedom and prosperity to the various nationalities and commu­
nities of this great sub-continent.
"I most solemnly affirm that T shall willingly and unflinchingly
carry out all the directions and instructions which may be issued
by the All India Muslim League in pursuance of any movement
that may be launched by it for the attainment of the cherished
national goal of Pakistan. Believing as I do in the righteousness
and the j ustice of my cause, I pledge to undergo any danger ,
trial or sacrifice which may be demanded of me".45

4S Text of Jinnah's speech, resolution and pledge in Civil and Afilitary

Gazette, 1 0 and 1 1 April, 1946.
 CHAPTER 11

The Ca bin et Mission

A new effort
The failure of the Simla Conference had created a dangerous stale­
mate in Indian politics. The results of the general elections, which
presented the Hindu-Muslim problem in its stark real ity, gave
urgency to the need of a solution. The Viceroy had tried his hand
and fa iled . It was now the turn of the British Government to take
the initiative.
On 19 February, 1 946, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary
of State for I ndia, in the House of Lords, and C. R. Attlee, the
Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, made an important
announcement. In view of the paramount importance of the Indian
problem, it said, His Majesty's Government had decided to send
out to India "a special mission of Cabinet Ministers" consisting
of the Secretary of State for India (Lord Pethick-Lawrence), the
President of the Board of Trade (Sir Stafford Cripps) and the
First Lord of the Admiralty (A. V. Alexander). The Viceroy was
to be fully associated with the acts and deliberations of the
Mission. The Mission would consider the most fruitful method of
giving effect to the following programme : "first. preparatory
T H E C A B I N E T M I S S I ON 249

discussions with elected representatives of British India and with

Indian States in order to secure the widest measure of agreement
as to the method of framing a Constitution ; second , the setting up
of a Constitution-making bod y ; and third, the bringing into be­
ing of an Executive Council having the support of the main
Indian parties" . 1
Any move towards breaking the frustrating deadlock w a s bound
to be well received in India. The fact that this announcement was
non-committal made the reception even more enthusiastic. The
general feeling was that at least some step was being taken i n
right earnest and not merely contemplated in the direction o f
finding a solution.
Jinnah said that he hoped to make the Cabinet Mission realize
the true situation and to convince them that the division of India
into Pakistan and Hindustan was the only j ust and sensible solu­
tion of the problem.2
In a debate in the House of Commons on 1 5 March on the
Mission's visit to India, Attlee intervened to make a significant
declaration, "We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and
the minorities should be able to live free from fear. On the other
hand, we cannot allow a minority to place their veto on the advance
of the majority" .3 This pleased the Congress very much, and some
of the Congress newspapers believed that Britain had finally made
up its mind to by-pass the Muslims.4 Gandhi was "very cheerful
about it". 5
But Jinnah was naturally perturbed. Attlee, he said, had "fallen
into a trap of false propaganda that has been carried on for some
time". There was no question of a minority holding up the ad­
vance of constitutional progress or of obstructingthe independence
of India . "I want to reiterate that the Muslims of India are not a
I The Indian A nnual Register, 1 946, vol. I, p. 1 29.
2 Sec Menon, op . cit., p. 234.
3 H. C. 420. 5s, col. 1422. Italics not in the original.
4 See The Times, 18 and 19 March, 1 946.
s K. P. Bhagat, op. cit., p. 340.
 250 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

minority, but a nation. and self-determination is their birth­

right .")
The negotiations
The Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi on 24 March. For the next
fourteen days the Mission interviewed and exchanged notes with
party leaders, provincial chief ministers, leaders of the opposition,
spokesmen of minorities, representatives of special interests, rulers
of native states and their ministers and advisers.
Abul Kalam Azad met the Mission on 3 April to argue the
Congress case. He built up his argument on the basis of indepen­
dence and on the a ssumption that the future Constitution would
be drawn up by a Constitution-making body. The Congress wanted
a federal government with a limited number of compulsory federal
subjects, such as defence, communications and foreign affairs,
autonomous provinces in which would vest the residuary powers.
It would never agree to the partition of India. G andhi was the
next to be interviewed. He was brief and bitter. In his opinion
the substance of Pakistan was "independence of culture and the
satisfaction of legitimate ambitions". The C. R. formula had met
these points and could be ma.de the basis for negotiations. He
could not go further because, beyond that, Pakistan was an
"untruth" .
Jinnah saw the Mission on 4 April . Underlining the disunity
of India he said that differences in India were far greater than
those between European countries :.rnd were of a vital and funda­
mental character. There was no other solution but the division of
India. There were in that ccuntry two totally different and deeply­
rooted civilizations existing side by side and the only solution was
to have two states.7
After meeting other leaders and acquainting themselves with
the views of various parries, the Mission saw Jinnah again on
6 Quoted in Muhammad Ashraf. Cabinet Mission and After (Lahore :
1 946), p. 3 .
7 The t hree in terviews are recounted in some detail b y Menon, op. cit. •
p p . 23 7-242. This is our o n l y source for the private negotiations conducted
by the Mission.
THE CABINET M I SSION 25 1

1 6 April, and the Secretary of State told him that the Mission
had come to the conclusion that "the full and complete demand
in the form presented by J innah" had little chance of acceptance.
He gave Jinnah the choice between a sovereign but smaller
Pakistan and a non-sovereign but larger Pakistan. If the full
territories (six provinces of the Lahore Resolution) were insisted
upon some element of sovereignty would have to be relinquished.
If full sovereignty was desired the League claim to non-Muslim
territories could not be accepted. Jinnah replied that if once the
principle of Pakistan was conceded the question of territories could
be discussed later. If the Congress would say that on that basis
they wanted certain defined areas taken away from Pakistan, he
was prepared to discuss whether what they proposed was reason­
able, fair and practicable. He undertook to try his best to reach
agreement with the Congress, but if what they proposed struck
at the heart of Pakistan, or i f the principle of Pakistan was not
accepted, it was useless to pursue the matter. 8
Azad was called i n on 1 7 April and told of the Mission's talk
with Jinnah. He expressed his inability to discuss matters without
consulting his Working Committee. Later Gandhi and Nehru
informed the Mission that the latter's suggestion was unaccept­
able to them.9 The Cabinet Mission then proceeded to Kashmir
for a short holiday.
On his return from Kashmir, Cripps again saw Azad 011 26 April
and found him more amenable to a discussion 011 a three-tier
Constitution which he and Gandhi and Nehru had previously
rejected. Azad felt that he could get the Congress Working Com­
mittee to agree to "a single federation which would be broken up
into two parts, legislating for optional subjects". He was prepared
to advise his party to participate in talks with the Mission and
the League in order to discuss this proposal . Then Cripps saw

s Ibid., pp. 248-25 1 .

9 Ibid.,
pp. 252-253. He does not give the date on which this rejection was
conveyed to the Mission.
252 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A1'

Jinnah and explained the situation to him. Jinnah also agreed to

consider the suggestion i n a joint meeting with the Congress and
the Mission. 1 0
On 27 April, therefore, the Secretary of State fo r India sent
identical letters to Jinnah and Azad, requesting each of them to
send four negotiators to meet the Mission with a view to discuss­
ing the possibility of agreement upon a scheme based on the
following fundamental principles. "A Union Government dealing
with the following subjects : Foreign Affairs, Defence and Com­
munications. There will be two groups of provinces, the one of
the predominantly Hindu provinces and the other of the pre­
dominantly Muslim provinces, dealing with all other subjects
which the provinces in the respective groups desire to be dealt
with in common. The Provincial Governments will deal with all
other subjects and will have all the residuary sovereign rights . " 1 1
The conference which took place a t Simla o n 5- 1 2 May was
thus a tripartite affair. The three members of the Cabinet Mission
parleyed with four Muslim Leaguers (Jinnah, Muhammad Ismail
Khan, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar) and four
Congressmen (Azad , Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Ghaffar
Khan).
After some preliminary and exploratory talks the Mission put
forward on 8 May suggested points of agreement between the
Congress and the League. These were :-
1 . There shall be an all-India Union Government and Legisla­
ture dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications,
Fundamental Rights, and having the necessary powers to obtain
for itself the finances it requires for these subjects.
2. All other powers shall vest in the Provinces.
3. Groups of provinces may be formed and such groups may
determine the provincial subjects which they desire to take in
common.
10 Ibid. , p. 254.
11 Cmd. 6829, No. I, p. 3 .
THE CABINET MISSION 253

4. The groups may set up their own Executives and Legislatures.

5. The Legislature of the Union shall be composed of equal
proportions from the Muslim-majority Provinces and from the
Hindu-majority Provinces whether or not these or any of them
have formed themselves into groups ; together with representatives
of the States.
6. The Government of the Union shall be constituted in the
same proportion as the Legislature.
7. The Constitutions of the Union and the groups (if any) shall
contain a provision whereby any Province can by a majority vote
of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of the terms
of the Constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at
10-yearly intervals after that.
8. The Constitution-making machinery to arrive at a constitu­
tion on the above basis shall be as follows :
A. Representatives shall be elected from each Provincial As­
sembly in proportion to the strengths of the various parties in
that assembly on the basis of one-tenth of their numbers.
B. Representatives shall be invited from the States on the basis
of their population in proportion to the representation from
British India.
C. The Constituent Assembly so formed shall meet at the earliest
date possible in New Delhi.
D . After its preliminary meeting at which the general order of
business will be settled it will divide into three sections, one section
representing the Hindu-majority provinces, one section represent­
ing the Muslim-majority provinces and one representing the
States.
E . The first two sections will then meet separately to decide the
Provincial constitutions for their group and, if they wish, a group
constitution.
F. When these have been settled it will be open to any Province
to decide to opt out of its original group and into the other group
or to remain outside any group.
254 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K ISTAN

G. Thereafter the three bodie5 will meet together to settle th(:

Constitution for the Union on the lines agreed in paragraphs I
to 7 above.
H. No major point in the Union Constitution which affects the
communal issue shall be deemed to be passed by the Assembly
unless a majority of both the two major communities vote in its
favcur.
9. The Viceroy shall forthwith call together the above constitu­
tion-making machinery which shall be governed by the provisions
stated in paragraph 8 a bove. I:�
These points were discussed on 9 and 1 1 May, and when there
was disagreement the Mission asked each of the two pa rties to
fnrnish a statement settin g out its attitude on the points that were
stil l outstanding.
The Muslim League sent its memorandum on 1 2 May contain­
ing the following terms of offer :
( 1 ) The six Muslim provinces (Panjab, N.W.F.P. , Baluchistan ,
Sind, Bengal and Assam) shall be grouped together as one group
and will deal with all other subjects except Foreign Affairs, De­
fence and Communications necessary for Defence.
(2) There shall be a separate constitution-making body for the
six Muslim provinces which will frame Constitutions for the group
and the provinces in the group.
(3) The method of election of representatives to the constitution
making body will be such as will secure proper representation to
the various communities in proportion to their population in each
province of the Muslim provinces group (called Pakistan group).
(4) After the constitutions of the Pakistan Federal Government
and the Provinces are finally framed by the constitution-making
body it will be open to any province of the Group to decide to
opt out of its group, provided that the wishes of the people of
that province are ascertained by a referendum.
1 2 Gwyer and A ppadorai, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 5 72-573.
T H E C A B I N E T M I S S I O :-.; 255

(5) It must be open to discussion in the joint constitution mak·

ing body as to whether the Union will have a Legislature or not.
The method of providing the Union with finance should also be
left for decision of the joint meeting of the two constitution mak­
ing bodies, but in no event shall it be by means of taxation.
(6) There should be parity of representation between the two
groups of provinces in ihe Union Executive and the Legislature,
if any.
(7) No major point in the U nion Constitution which affects the
communal issue shall be deemed to be passed in the joint con­
stitution-making body unless the majority of the members of the
constitution making body of the Hindu provinces and the majority
of the members of the constitution-making body of the Pakistan
group, present and voting, arc separately in it s favour.
(8) No decision, legislative, executive, or administrative, shall
be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of controversial
nature except by a majority of three-fourths.
(9) In Group and Provincial Constitutions fundamental rights
and safeguards covering religion, culture and other matters
affecting the different communities will be provided for.
( I O) The Constitution of the Union shall contain a provision
whereby any Province can, by a majority vote of its Legislative
Assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the Constitu­
tion and will have the liberty to secede from the Union at any
time after an initial period of 10 years. i 3
The League delegation made it clear that this offer stood in its
entirety and all matters mentioned in it were interdependent.
On the same day the Congress also sent in its terms of offer,
which read as follows :
( I) The Constituent Assembly to be formed as follows :
(i) Representatives shall be elected by each provincial assembly
by proportional representation through single transferable vote.
t 3 Ibid. , pp. 573-574.
256 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A :-1

The number s o elected should b e one-fifth of the number o f mem­

bers of the Assembly and they may be members of the Assembly
or others.
(ii) Representatives from the States shall be elected on the basis
of their population in proportion to the representation from
British India .
(2) The Constituent Assembly shall draw up a Constitution for
the Federal Union. This shall consist of an all-India Federal
Government a nd Legislature dealing with Foreign Affairs, De­
fence, Communications, Fundamental Rights, Currency, Customs
and Planning as well as such other subjects as, on closer scrutiny,
may be found to be intimately allied to them. The Federal Union
will have necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it re­
quires for these subjects and the power to raise revenues in its own
right. The Union must also have power to take remedial action in
cases of breakdown of the Constitution or in grave public
emergencies.
(3) All the remaining powers shall vest in the Provinces or
Units.
(4) Groups of Provinces may be formed and such groups may
determine the provincial subjects which they desire to take in
common.
( 5) After the Constituent Assembly has decided the Constitution
for the all-India Federal Union as laid down in paragraph 2 above,
the representatives of the Provinces may form groups to decide
the Provincial Constitutions for their group and , if they wish, a
group Constitution.
(6) No major point in the all-India Federal Constitution which
affect s the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed by the
Constituent Assembly unless majority of the members of the
community or communities concerned present in the Assembly
and voting are separately in its favour : Provided that in case
there is no agreement on any such issue, it will be referred to
arbitration . In case of doubt as to whether any point is a major
T H E C AB I N E T M I S S I O N 257

communal issue, the Speaker will decide. or, if so cbired , it may

be referred to the Federal Court .

( 7) Jn the event of a dispute arising iu the process of constitu­
tion-making, the specific issue shall b� referred to a rbitration .
(8) The Constitution should provide machinery for its revision
at any time subject to such checks as ma.y be desired . I f so desired .
it may be specifically stated that the whole Constitution may be
reconsidered after 1 0 year s . 1 ·1
Along with these "terms of offer" the Congress also submitted
a note showing the respects in which its own proposals differed
from those contained in the Muslim League " terms of offer". It
enumerated ten points of divergence between the two parties :
"( l ) The proper procedure is for one constitution-making body
or constituent assembly to meet for the whole of India and later
for groups to be formed if so desired by provinces concerned.
The matter should be left to the provinces . . . . In any event,
Assam has obviously no place in the group mentioned, a nd the
North-West Frontier Province, as the elections show, is not in
favour of this proposal.
"(2) We have agreed to the residuary powers, apart from the
Central subjects, vesting in the provinces . . . .
"(3) The most suitable method of election would be by single
transferable vote. If the population proportion is taken we have
no particular objection, but this would lead to difficulties in all
the provinces where there is weightage in favour of certain
communities . . . .
"(4) There is no necessity for opting out of a province from its
group as the previous consent of the provi nces is necessary for
joining the group.
" ( 5) The Federal Union must have Legislature, and the
a

Union must have power to raise its own revenue.

14 Ibid. , pp. 574-575.
258 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P AK I S T A N

"(6) and ( 7) We are entirely opposed to parity of representation

as between groups of provinces in the Union Executive or
Legislature . . . .
"(8) This proposal is so sweeping in its nature that no Govern­
ment or Legislature can function at all. Once we have safeguarded
major communal issues other matters, however controversial,
require no safeguard . . . .
" (9) We are entirely agreeable to the inclusion of fundamental
rights and safeguards concerning religion, culture and like matters
in the Constitution . . . . The proper place for this is the All
India Federal Union Constitution.
"(IO) The Constitution of the Union will inevitably contain
provisions for its revision . . . . We would avoid reference to
secession as we do not wish to encourage this idea."15
Instead of summn rizing or paraphrasing the m . these terms of
discussion, terms of o ffer and terms of difference have been given
in toto and in the original so that the basic divergence between the
Congress <�nd the League approach is clearly brGught out. The
gap bet ween t he two parties was evidently too large to be bridged
over. It will be noticed, however, that while the League made a
substantial compromise i n scaling its Pakistan demand down to
a three-tie;· f�Jernl un io n the Congress s h o\Y ed no desire to make
,

comparnbk concessions. It stuck to its i d ea o f a united India

w it h a sovcr.:ign fede ra l centre clothed with full financial auth ­

ority. Ir only conceded the creation of �roups. but even therCTt

mu.de e.\ceptions of Assam and the North-\Vest Frontier Province.
It made no effort w mod i fy its original views to meet the other
party half way. On the contrary, the League had gone to a con­
si d era bl e length in forsaking an i ndependent Pakistan and choos­
ing to enter an all India Federal Union.
The Plan
After the failure of the Simla talks the Cabinet Mission had no
alternative to putting fo rward their own plan ·which they consi-
1 ' Ibid., pp. 575-577.
T H E C AB I N EI M I S S I O N 259

dered to be the best possible arrangements by which Ind ians

might decide for themselves the future Constitution of India. This
plan was publi shed on 1 6 May.
The Mission claimed that it had exam ined "closely and impar­
tially" the possibility of a partition o f India because "we were
greatly impicssed by the very genui t1c and acute anxiety of the
Muslims lest they should find themseives subjected to a perpetual
Hindu-majority rule". It confessed that "this feeling has become
so strong and widespread amongst the Muslims that it cannot be
allayed by mere paper safeguards". But the Pakistan solution was
not considered feasible. If a separate sovereign state o f Pakistan
on the lines claimed by the Muslim League was established it
would not solve the communal minority problem because it would
leave a large non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and a large non­
Hindu minority in Hindustan. If a smaller sovereign Pakistan was
created by confining it to the Muslim majority areas alone, this
would please neither the Muslims who considered it impracticable
nor the Hindus who were opposed to a division of the Panjab
and Bengal . "We haYe therefore been forced to the conclusion
that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state of Pakistan
would provide an acceptable solution of the communal problem."
There were, besides, other "weighty" a rguments against partition.
To disintegrate the whole of the transportation and postal and
telegraphic systems would gravely injure both parts of India. The
case for a w1ited defence was even stronger. A further considera­
tion was that the Indian States would find it very difficult to asso­
ciate themselves with a divided British India. Finally , there was
the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed Pakistan
state were separated by "some seven hundred miles" and the
communications between them both in war and peace "would be
dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan". The mission was there­
fore "unable to advise the British Government that the power
which at present resides in British hands should be handed over
to two entirely separate sovereign statcs".1 6
1 6 Cmd. 6821 , paras. 4-1 I .
260 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A :S

A ftc:r t h ti> d i sposing o f t he Musli m claim t h e Mission pro­

ceeded to indicate the nature of its own s o l ut i o n which
in their view "would be j us t to t he essential claims of all

parties and would at t he same time be most l i ke l y to bring

a b o ut a sta hle a nd practicable form o r Constitution for all

India " .

There would b e a Union o f India, comprising both British India

and the Indian States, which should deal with Foreign Affairs.
Defence and Communications and should have the power neces­
t he finances required for these subjects. The Union
� a ry to rai�e
h
would av e an Executive and a Legislature. Any quest i o n raising
a major communal issue i n the Legislature would require fo r its
decision a majority of the representatives present and voting, o f

each o f th<.! t \ 1 o major comnmnities as well a s a majority of all

t he m e mb e rs present and voting. A l l resid uary powers would be­

lon g hi the Pro v i nces. Provinces would be free to form gro u p s

with f'i.e.;; m i \ e > and Legislatures, and each group could determine
the Prvvincial subjcch to be taken i n common . Any Pro­
vince rnu!J by a majority rntc o f its Legislative Assembly
call for a reconsiderat i o n of t h e terms of the Constitution
after : rn initial per iod of 1 0 years and a t I O-yearly i ntervals

thereafrer. 1 '

For t he p urplise of ekc1ing �'· cons tit uent a��mbly each Pro­
' in1:e \\ ould be alloitcd a tl)tal n u m be r or seats proportional to
it> populatio n . rough ly in t he rntio of one t o ::i m i l l io n ; this pro-
1i incial quota 11 o uld be d i vided among t he ma i n commun ities in
each Province in proportion ro !heir pop ulation ; and t he repre­

sentatives allocated to each c o m munity in a Province would be

elected by members of that co mmun ity i n it:; Legislative Assembly.
Th;; three main communit ic� recognized for this purpose were
General ( : d i non-Muslim,; and non-Sik h s) , i\luslim and Sikh. The

Ii Jbid , p:Jr'.h 1 5 - J -:' .

THE CAB! NE1 M I S S IO� 26 1

communal composition of the Con stituent A.ssl'mbly wa� to be as

follows >- -
SECTION A
Province General Muslim Total
- ---- ·--- ------- -- ---·-- - · -

Madras 45 4 49
Bombay 19 2 21
United Provinces 47 8 55
Bihar 31 5 16
Central Provinces 16 1 17
Orissa 9 0 9

Total : 1 67 20 1 87

SECTION B
. ··- --·----- -···---- ---
-·-·-·------

Province General Muslim Sikh Total

----- --- · --··-- ·- - �-----

Panjab 8 16 4 28
N .W.F.P. 0 3 0 3
Sind 1 3 0 4

Total : 9 22 4 35

SECTION C
Province General Muslim Total
---- ··

Bengal 27 33 60
Assam 7 3 IO
---- ----

Total : 34 36 70
Total for British India : 292
Total for Indian States : 93

Tota l : 385
After a preliminary meeting to decide the general order of
business, the provincial representatives would divide up into three
Sections (shown in the above table). These Sections would pro­
ceed to settle Provincial Constitutions for the Provinces included
in each Section and would also decide whether any group consti­
tution should be set up for those Provinces and if so with what
Provincial subjects the group should deal. After the coming into
262 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A l'i

operation o f the new constitutional �1.rran gernents it would be:

open to any Province to ekct to come out of nny group in which
it had been placed. Such a decision would be taken by the
Legisl at ure of the Prnvince after the first gener::il dection under
the new Con�titution . 1 "
The M is5ion attached '"the greatest importance . . . t o t he
setting up at once of an lnterim Government having the support
of the major pol itical parties". The Viceroy ha d started discus­
sions t o this end and it was hoped that an I nterim Government
would soo n be formed in which all the portfolios. including that
of War Member, would be held by "Indian leaders having the
full confidence of the people" 1 9 .

Indian reaction to the Plan

Gandhi was the first to comment upon the Cabinet Mission
pro p o sa l� and V.P. Menon gives the best summary of his
opinio n . " I t \'. as open t o the Constituent Assembly t o vary
the pro th''-'l l s , to reject or improve upon them ; otherwise the
Constituen t A�sembly could not be a s o vere i g n body. Thus the
Mission had suggested certain subjects for the Union Centre : the
Constituent A.ssembly could, if they chose, add to them or reduce
them. Similarly, it was open to the Constituent Assembly to
abolish the di stinction of Muslims and non-Muslims which the
Missio n hud ft:lt forced to recognize. As regardi ng groups, no
province could be c o mpelled to belong to a group against i t s will.
Su�;ect lo t!1cse interpretations. Gandhiji said the Missilm had
bro ught �omething of which they had every reason to be proud. " 20
This was a �trange welcome indeed. The plan was praised after
all its fundamental provisions had been washed away with fateful
reservations. We will see later how this opinion of Gandhi was
echoed by Ja waharlal Nehru and other Congress leaders and how
1 g Ibid, pare• '> . 1 8- 1 9.
111 Ibid., para 23. The full text of the Plan is also available in H. C. 422. 5s.
Cols. 2 1 09-2 1 20, and in The Indian Annual Register, 1946, vol. I , pp. 1 44- 1 50.
20 Menon, op. cit . , p. 269. Italics not in the original.
THE CABINET MISSION 263

this " acceptance" made nonsense of the entire plan and of the
intentions of the Cabinet Mission.

The National Herald, Nehru's daily, wrote triumphantly of the

plan : "Pakistan, the Pakistan of Mr. Jinnah's conception, receives
a state burial in the document submitted by the Cabinet Mission.
And lest there should be any doubt about its d emi se or any fear
of the possibility of its resurrection, it is emphatically announced
that the Cabinet Mi�sion's sentence of death on Mr. Jinnah's
Pakistan has already obtained the approval of the British Gov­
crnment."21 This opinion was widely shared by Congress leaders
and press, and the Observer was constrained to remark that
"Congress can and well afford to welcome a plan which comes
down on its side by ruling out the Muslim dream of Pakistan" .22
On 22 M ay Jinnah issued a st at emen t embodying his views on
the plan. He regretted that the Mission had negatived the Muslim
demand which "we still hold is the only solution of the constitu­
tional problem of India and which alone can secure stable Gov­
ernments and lead to the happi ness and welfare not only of the
two major communities, but of all the peoples of this subconti­
nent". The Mission "had thought fit to advance commonplace
and exploded arguments against Pakistan and resorted to special
pleading couched in a deplorable lauguag:! which is calculated
to hurt the feelings of Muslim India". It seemed that this was
done simply to appease and placate the Congress. Then he pointed
out certain defects in the plan, but refrained from accepting or
rejecting it. The final decision, he sa i d, would be taken by the
Working Committee and the Council of the Muslim League.23

Though the Cabinet Mission Plan wa s generally well received

in Britain, the Daily Telegraph at once put its finger on the
weakest point in the Mission's reasoning. The plan's attempt to

meet the Muslim demand foll short of the separate Siutc free from
21 Quoi:ed in A . A. Ravoof, op. cit., p. 196.
2 2 Observer, 19 May, 1946.
2 3 Full text of statement in Cmd. 6835. For Jinnah\, views see also Jamil­
ud-Din Ahmad, op. cir., vol. II, pp. 389-40 1 .
264 T H E S T R C: Ci G L E H> R l' A K l � I A :\

Hindu domination which had become the main p l a n k of t h e

Musli m League platform and h a d secured 85 per cent of t he
Muslim \ Otes i n the elec t io ns . The arguments g iven by the
Mission i n rejecting Pakistan were perhaps soun d . yet " t he id ea
of a Muslim S t a te has t aken so firm a hold of the i magination
of t he Muslim people t hat it has become a religious faith ignoring
alike questions of economics and of the p l ac e that Ind i a m igh t
hold in t h e world as a u n ited n at io n " . c4

On 24 May t h e Congress Working Com m ittee passed a reso lu­

t ion which found t he proYision fo r i n itial grouping inconsistent
w it h the freedom promi sed to t he provinces. This co m p ul s io n
would i nfringe t he basic principle of provincial a uto n o m y . The
Comm i ttee m ad e i t clear that i t read paragraph 1 5 of the plan
to mean t ha t . '"in t he first inst ance. the respect i ve provi nces will
m a ke their c h o i ce whether or not to belong t o the Section in
which they ar.: placed " . N o final d ec i si on was possible u n t i l t h is
point \O S c l a ri lied .25

On 25 M a y . t he re fore . t he Cab i n et
Mission ;.in<l t he Viceroy
i s su ed a stJ.temerH s<< ying t hat the interpretat ion put by the Cong­
ress r.:-solu t i o n on paragra p h 1 5 .. does not accord w i t h t he Dele­
gation's intention s ' ' . They went further and laid d o w n that ·' t hi ,
is an esse n t i a l feature of the s c hem e and can only be nwdi fied b�
agrt'em.:nt bet wee n t h e parties " . 21'

The Co u n c i l o l' t he Muslim Lea gue met i n Delhi rin 6 J u ne tu

co n side r the Cabinet M i ssion Plan. In his i n a ugura l speech Jinnah
reminded the Counc i l or t h e ··momentous i s.;; ue�" which faced the
M usl i m s . He was sure t h at Muslim India wo u ld not rest content .
un t i l i t had e�tabl ishc<l ful l . complete and sovereign Pa k i s ta n . ··111
fact . the fo un dation and t he bas i s of Pakistan arc there in their
o w n [Cabinet Mission] Scheme. ""7 The resolution o r the Cou n cil
began by protesting a ga i n q t he \ l i ssion's .. unwarranted . u nj u st i ­
fied and unc,) rn i ncing·· rl.'m a r k ;. on Pak i stan . S u ch sen t i rn e n h

24 Dail; Telegraph, l 7 M a � . I lJ46.

25 Crnd. 683 5 , p p . 29-30.
26 Cmd. 6835.
27 Jamil-ud -Din Ahmad, "I' · , ir .. ' "' · II. pp. 401 -4D7.
T H E C' A B I N L l M I S S I O N 265

should not have found a place in a s tate document issued on

behalf and with the authority of the British Government. To
remove all doubts the Council reiterated that "the attainment of
the goal of a complete sovereign Pakistan still remains the un­
alterable objective of the Muslims in India for the achievement
of which they will, if necessary, employ every means in their
power. and consider no sacrifice or suffering too great" . All the
same. the League accepted the plan for two reasons. First, grave
issues were involved and the League was prompted by its earnest
desire for a peaceful solution. Secondly, "the basis and the
foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission's plan by
virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim Provinces
in Sections B and C".28 The Council hoped that the plan would
ultimately result in the establishment of a comple°tely sovereign
Pakistan. On the short-term plan for the formation of an J nterim
G overnment the Council authorized Jinnah t o negotiate with the
Viceroy and to take such decisions and actions as he deemed fit
and proper.29
The Muslim League's acc eptance of the plan was generally wel­
comed in India and Britain, and J i nnah was congratulated for
his farsightedness and statesmanship in sacrificing the demand for
Pakistan in the interest of the common progress of the sub­
continent.30 But neither the Cabinet Mission nor the Congress
said a word in recognition of what it had cost the League to
abandon its basic and original demand. The only response was a
spate of derisive news. articles and cartoons in the Hindu press
gleefully announcing the defeat of the League and the resolve of

2 8 Thi� i ,; u f u tm os t i mportance and conclusively pnwes that the League'>

accep tance was grounded on paragraph 1 5 of the plan, the para on which
the Congress was putting its own interpretation and was to continue to accept
no other version, not even of the authors t>f the plan.

29 Cmd. 686 1 . Full text also i n The lndia11 A nnual l?cgister, 1946, vol. I .
pp. 1 82- 1 8 3 .

30 See Madras Mail, as q uote d i n A . . \ . Ravoof, op. cit., p . 1 9 9 and Dai/_.,

Telegraph, 7 June, 1 946.
266 THE STRU G G L E FOR PA KISTAN

the C ongress t o follow up this victory b y forcing t he Mission to

yield on all points.31
Jinnah's accept ance of the plan was not received well hy t he
rank and tile of the Mu sl i m League or the Muslim co m muni ty
in generr.l, except in those circles \\ hi ch were opposed to Pakis tan .
It speaks volumes for Jinnah·s influence that Muslim discontent
did not result in a revol t . The instincts of t he people were sound.
Once a Union government had been established c onst i tu t i on a l
procedures could hardly sustain the authority of the provinces
or of the groups, much less enhance i t . The Congress press wa s
right when it thought that the acceptance of the plan by the
Le ag ue meant the burial of the chances of Pakistan c om in g into
existence.
On 8 June, J i nnah wrote to the Viceroy saying that, during their
conversation, the latter had assured him that there would be 1 2
po rtfo li o s i n the proposed Interim Government : 5 fo r the L ea gue ,
5 for the C ongres s , one for t h e Si khs and one fo r the A ngl o­
Indians or Indian Christians, and that the i mportant p ortfo l i o s
would be e qua lly divided between the League and the Congress.
He info rm e d Wavell that this assurance had weighed w it h the
Council in accepting the plan and that any dep arture from this
assurance wc uld result in the fo rfeitu re of the co-operation of
the League.32 In reply the Viceroy dC'nied that he had given any
such assurance, but "I to ld you, as I t o l d the C on g re s s , that this
was what I had in m i nd". He hoped that an agreement on the
5 : 5 : 2 ratio would be possible.33
On 1 2 June the Viceroy saw Nehru who s uggested that there
should be 1 5 members i n cl udi n g 5 C o ngress men (all Hindus) ,
four Muslim Leaguers, one n on -League Muslim, one non-Congress
Hindu. one Scheduled Caste, one Indian Christian, one Sikh and
one Congress woman. Wavell refused to accept this as a ba s i s for
3 t This is the opinion of a British journalist of Indian experience who
cannot be accused of pro-Muslim sympathies. See Arthur Moore, "Wishfu l
Thinking about India .. , Nincteenrh Century, January 1 947, p p 1 2-13.
3 2 Cmd. 686 1 .

33 Ibid.
THE CABINET MISSION 267

negotiations.34 On 1 3 Jun e Azad wrote to the Viceroy that the

,

Congress Working Committee was opposed to parity in any shape

and that therefore Wavell's proposal of 5 : 5 : 2 was unaccept­
able.35 The Viceroy then suggested a new formula : thirteen min­
isters in ithe ratio of 6 Congressmen, 5 Muslim Leaguers and two
others (minorities). But this was also turned down by the Cong­
ress. 3 6
To resolve this deadlock the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy
issued their own proposals on 16 June. The Executive Council
was now to consist of 14 persons. 37 Six congressmen, five Muslim
Leaguers, one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsi. It was
made clear that "in the event of the two major parties or either
of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition
Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy
to proceed with the formation of the Interim Government which
will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the
statement of 1 6 May".3 8
On 25 June the Congress Working Committee rejected the
proposals for an Interim Government but decided that the Cong­
ress should "join the proposed Constituent Assembly with a view
to framing the Constitution of a free, united and democratic
India". 3 9
On the same day the Muslim League Working Committee had
decided in favour of joining the Interim Government on the ba sis
of the statement of 16 June.40 Now arose the controversy about
the i nterpretation of Paragraph 8 of the Cabinet Mission and
the Viceroy's statement of 16 June (quoted above in full). Jinnah
3 4 Menon, op. cit., p. 274.
35 Cmd. 6861 .
36 Menon, op. cit., p. 275.
37 They were mentioned by name : Ba!dcv Singh, Sir N. P. Engineer,
Jagjivan Ram, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, H. K. Mahtab, John
Matthai, Muhammad Ismail Khan, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Abdur Rab
N ishtar , C. Rajagopalacharia, Rajendra Prasad and Patel.
38 Cmd . 686 1 .
3 9 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
268 THE STRUGGLE FOR P A K I S TA �

interpreted it to mean that ''the Delegation and the Viceroy were

in honour bound to go ahead with the formation or the Interim
Government immediately with those who were will i n g to come
into the Interim Government on the basis and principles set out
in their statement of 1 6 June"'. ln other words, if the Congress
rejected the Interim Government proposals, but the League
accepted them, the Viceroy was obliged to form a government
consisting of the nominees of the Muslim League and of any other
parties which had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan of I 6 May.
Jinnah told this to the Viceroy in a letter on 27 June.4 1 On 28
June the Viceroy wrote back, disagreeing with Jinnah's interpreta­
tion and denying that he was then bound to form a government
without the Congress, which had rejected the short-term pro­
posals.4 2 Jinnah replied on the same day, charging the Viceroy
with having chosen "to go back upon your pledged word ."43
Wavell's answer was curt and uncompromising : "We are quite
unable to accept your suggestion that we have gone back on our
word . . . our course of action was determined by what had heen
laid down in paragraph 8 of the statement of 1 6 June."44
Wavell had chosen to postpone the formation of the Interim
Government rather than to form one without the Congress. By
so doing he had exposed himself to valid cri ticism . Commonsense
and political decency did not support his contentio n . A definite
undertaking had been given in paragraph 8 of the statement of
16 June and this was ignored or rather explained away. All i mpar­
tial opinion supported Jinnah on this point. The Round Table
asserted that not only the League but the British observers also
expected a government to be formed with Jinnah at its head and
that that seemed the obvious consequence of acceptance by one
party and rejection by the other. The neutral view was that. on
the wording cf the Viceroy's statement of 1 6 June, the "balance
of logic lay with Jinnah" .45
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
4 4 Ibid.
4 S The Round Table, September, 1 946, pp. 340, 3 6 1 .
T H E C A B I N E T M I S S IO N 269

To the Economist the Viceroy's action gave support to the idea

that British policy was "when Congress refuses to play, the
Muslims get nothing, but when Musl ims also refuse to play,
Congress gets power". 4 6

I n I ndia, t h e Statesman remarked, "Politicians m a y d o s o , but

it is not the business of statesmen to eat their words. They should
not risk bold, sweeping, unequivocal public undertakings unless
they mean them, and can be relied upon to fulfil them. What was
so emphatically considered needful and proper on 1 6 June cannot
well, within ten days, have radically transformed its nature . " 4 7

H o w do w e explain Wavcll 's action ? It has been said that the

Cabinet Mission and the V iceroy had overworked themselves so
much i n long, difficult negotiations amid unbearable heat that they
were "genuinely unable to i nterpret plain words l ike ordinary
uninvol ved mortals" . Another explanation has been offered that
the shift of words (paragraph 8 alternated between "coal ition"
a nd "Interim") was deliberate. 1f that was so, the "Mission's
striving after compromise had altogether overreached ibelr' ; i n
their "efforts t o b e a l l things to all men, they had engaged i n
irreversible ambiguities, putting themselves i n moral as well a s a
verbal quagmire". 4 8 The truth of the matter seems to be that the
Cabinet Mission had expected the rejection of the plan by the
League because Pakistan had not been conceded. For t hat reason
it had also expected the Congress to accept it. The intention,
therefore, was to try to have a coalition, but i fthe effort failed,
to proceed with the formation of a Government by the Congress
alone. When the unexpected Jw.p11ened and the Viceroy was left
with the choice of forming an i nter i m government with the League
alone, he found himself i n a dilemma. He chose to g�) back on
his pledged word rather than have a League government. The
reason was that the format ion of a go, crnment by the League
46 Economist, 7 August, 1 946.
47 Quot,ed in Ian Stephens, Pakistan ( l ondon : 1 963 ) , p. 98. He was then
the editor of the Statesman.
48 /bid. ,, pp. 98-99.
270 1 H E STRUGG L E F OR P A K ISTA N

with the Congress in opposition would have offered no solution

to the problem of having a broad based government that would
have commanded general support. But then people in authority
should not make statements without weighing all contingencies
that may arise. The Viceroy and the British Government must have
been fully aware of the fact that their pledged \Vord was being
d ishonoured.
The Cabinet Mission left India for Britain on 29 June, leaving
the paragraph 8 controversy, leaving the Viceroy to sort out
things, and leaving India on the brink of a civil war unparalleled
in the history of the world.
 C H AP T E R 12

The Interim Government

Muslim League rejects the Plan

The All India Congress Committee met at Bombay on 6 July
and ratified the Working Committee's resolution of 25 June which
had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan. In commending the resolu­
tion1 to the house Azad, the retiring president of the Congress,
said, "The Cabinet Mission's proposals also have once for all
time cleared all doubts about the question of the d ivision of
India. These proposals have made it clear beyond a shadow of
doubt that India shall remain an undivided single unit with a
strong Central Government composed of the federating units." 2
In winding up the proceedings of the Committee, Nehru, the
new president of the Congress, declared, "so far as I can see, it
is not a question of our accepting any plan, long or short. It is
only a question of our agreeing to go into the Constituent As­
sembly. That is all, and nothing more than that. We will remain
in the Assembly so long as we think it is good for India, and
we will <:ome out when we think it is injuring our cause and then
1 Text of the resolution in The Indian Annual Register, 1 946, vol. II,
pp. 1 32- 1 3 3.
.
2 Ibid ., p. 1 32. Italics not in the original.
2 72 THE STRU G G LE FOR PAKISTAN

offer our battle. We are n o t bound by a single thing except

that we have decided for the moment to go to the Constituent
Assembly . . " 3 On 10 July, Nehru held a press conference
.

and amplified his �tatements in the All India Congress Com­

mittee . According to him the Congress had agreed to go
into the Constituent Assembly and "we have agreed to nothing
else''. ' ' Wh a t we do there, we are entirely and absolutely free to
determine. We have committed ourselves on no single matter
to anybody." On the grouping clause he said "there will be no
grouping". He also ind icated that the Union Government would
be much stronger than it was contemplated in the Mission Plan. 4
All competent observers of the l ndian scene of that time are
unanimous that these statements of Nehru made nonsense of the
Congress acceptance of the Cabinet M ission Plan. They fortified
the Muslim suspicion that the Congress was utilizing the Mission
Plan for creating a fully unitary, strong Congress-dominated gov­
ernment under which the minorities would inevitably be at the
mercy of the majority. Lumby thinks that Nehru's speeches con­
stituted a deliberate misinterpretation of facts and goes on to
say, "the overriding motive for his posture of defiance was surely
the belief that now at last the day of power was at hand. The
imminent departure of the British was assured and the Muslim
League could be pushed aside or swamped by the national will
for freedom in unity . . . [this] under-estimate of the strength of
Muslim feeling Jed it [the Congress] to suppose that its supremacy
was unassailable and so to make the tragic error of over-playing
its hand". 5 Azad himself unequivocally characterizes these state­
ments as "one of those unfortunate en nts which change the course
of history". 6 Nehru's admiring biographer calls them "the most
fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life". 7
Penderel Moon writes that it was as if a curse had been laid o n
3 See the full p roceedings o f the session i n ibid. , pp. 1 30- 1 44.
4 fb id. , pp. 145- 1 47 .
5 E . W . R. Lumby, op. cit., p p . 1 09- 1 1 0.
6 A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical narrative,
op. cit., pp. 1 54- 1 5 5 .
7 Michael Brecher, Jawaharial Nehru: A Political Biography ( London :

1 959), p. 3 1 6.
T H E I N TE R I M G O V E R N M E N T 273

Nehru and some of his colleagues, causing them "to act in s u ch

a way as to bring about exactly the opposite result to that which
they intended. They passionately desired to preserve the unity
of Ind ia ; they consistently acted so as to make its partition
certain ." 8
Leonard Mosley, the historian of t he last days of the British
raj, is worth quoting on this point : "Did Nehru realise what he
was saying ? He was telling the world that once in power, Congress
would use its strength at the Centre to alter the Cabinet Mission
Plan as i t thought fit. But the Muslim League had accepted the
Plan (as had Congress) as a cut and dried scheme to meet objec­
tions from both sides. l t was a compromise plan which obviously
could not afterwards be altered in favour or one side or another.
In the circumstances. Nehru's remarks were a direct act of
sabotage:. ' ' 9
The B ritish Government's reaction was not far different from
this consensus. On 1 8 July Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary
of State for India, referred to Nehru's and his colleagues' speeches
and said, " . . . they can put forward their views as to how the
Constituent Assembly should conduct its business. B ut having
agreed to the statement of 16 May and the Constituent Assembly
elected in accordance with that statement, they cannot, of course,
go outside the terms of what has been agreed. To d o so would
not be fair to other p<irties who come in and it is on the basis of
that agreed procedure that His Majesty's Government have said
they will accept the decisions of the Constituent Assembly." In
the Home of Commons, on the same day, Sir Stafford Cripps,
alluding to Nehru's declaration that grouping of provinces would
not materialize, said, "I do not know myself how such a thing
would be possible, but if anything of that kind were to be attempt­
ed it would be a clear breach of the basic understanding of the
scheme " . 1 0
B Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (London : 1 962). p. 1 4 .
9 Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj (London : 196 1 ) ,p. 28.
to Both quoted by Menon, op. cit. . pp. 28 1 -!8�.
274 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A ;o.(

But from the lips o f neither of the two authors of the Cabinet
Mission Plan fell a word of reprimand for the Congress on this
volte face nor a word of solace (not to speak of assurance) to the
Muslim League that the Congress would not be allowed to get
away with t hese threats.
In view of these developments, the League was forced to revise
its stand. The, Council of the party met at Bombay on 27 July to
deliberate on the new turn of events. Jinnah, ''like an army
leader who has come in for armistice discussions under a flag of
truce and finds himself looking down the barrel of a cocked
revolver," 1 1 spoke with some bitterness of the "pettifogging and
higgl ing attitude" of the Congress and of the bad faith of the
Cabinet Mission. The League had made concessions to the limit
of its capacity but the Congress had shown no appreciation of
the sacrifice the Muslims had made. 12
The Council then proceeded to pass two resolutions of para­
mount importance. The first stated that, in accepting the long­
term plan of the Mission, the League had been influenced by the
assurance given to Jinnah that there would be five members each
belonging to the Congress and the League in the Interim Gov­
ernment together with two members representing the minorities.
The Cabinet Mission had gone back on this assurance. The
Congress had not in fact accepted the long-term plan, as was
shown by their resolutions about groupi ng, and that, therefore,
even according to the i nterpretation which the Mission put upon
the grouping clause in their statement of 1 6 June, the Congress
was not eligible to participate in the formation of the Interim
Government. "The Congress have not accepted it because their
acceptance is conditional and subject to their own i nterpretation
which is contrary to the authoritative statements of the Delegation
and the Viceroy issued on the 1 6th and the 25th of May." The
result was that "of the two major parties the Muslim League
alone has accepted the statements of May 1 6th and 25th, accord­
ing to the spirit and letter of the proposals embodied therein".
1 1 Leonard Mosley, op. cit., p . 28.
12 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 407-419.
T H E I N T E R I M G O V ER N M E N T 275

Neither Pethick-Lawrence nor Cripps has"provided or suggested

any mea n s or machinery to prevent the Constituent As s embly
from taking d e ci si on s which would b::: ultra vircs and not com­
peten t for the Assembly to d o so". All this "leaves no doubt
that in t he s e circumstances th e participation of the Muslims in
th(.' p roposed constitution making machinery is fraught with
dan ger and the C o uncil therefore, hereby withdraws its accept­
,

a nce of the Cabinet M i ssion's proposal s " . "

The second resolution sta.ted that " now the time has come for
the Muslim Nation to re sort to direct a ct i o n to nchicvc Pakistan,
to a ssert their j ust rights, to vindicate their honour and to get
rid of t he British slavery and the contemplated future
present
Caste-Hindu domination ". The Working Committee was d i rected
to prcpue "a programme of d i rect act ion'' lo carry out the policy
embodied in t he resolution. All Muslims who had received titles
from the British Government were as ked to renounce them "as a
pro t e st against and in token of t h e i r d eep resentment of the atti­
tude of the British". t 4

In a sta tem ent issued i m m ed i a tely a fter the Council session

Jinnah declare d , ''what we have done tod a y is the most hi storic
act in our history. NeYer have wc in the whole history of the
League done : :mything exc ept by const itutiomtl method�:. " 1 5
r t was en t h i s decision that Blitz . the pro-Congress Bombay
weekly. wr o t e the following oft-quoted ka<lcr : "The worst ene­
mies of the M u slim League cannot help envying the leadership
of Mr. Jinnah . . Last week's cataclysmic transformation of the
.

Leag ue . . . compels us to express the snea ki n g national wish that

a dipl o m at and a strategist of Ji nnah s r.roven calibre were at the
'

h elm of the- Indian National Congre ss . There is no denying the

fact that by his l atest master-stroke of diplomacy Jinnah has
outbid. o ut w i tted a nd out-manoeuvred the British ;md Cangress
alike and co n fo u n ded the common national indictment that the
rr parasite of British l m pcrialism . " 1
Muslim League is 6
t3 Full text in Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit . . vol. It pp. 6J 8.,620.
14 Full text in ibid., pp. 620-621 .
1 .5 Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 419-423 .
t6 Quoted in A. W. Khan, op. cit., pp. 239-240.
276 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A M

But Biit:: <lid not represent t h e general opinion on the League's

revolutionary step. Most non-Muslim groups i n India and several
organs of public opinion i n Britai n accused the League of haste
and of "sacrificing patriotism to piquc".1 7 But was this true ?
The League was convinced that the acceptance of the plan by
the Congress was neither genuine nor frank. Too many reserva­
tions had figured in the Congress resolution of acceptance. Nehru's
statements on the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly and the
impossibility of the grouping of provinces had intensified Muslim
fears. Gandhi was simultaneously asking Assam to keep away
from Section C and assuring the Sikhs that they could not be
compelled against their will i nto Section B. The British Govern­
ment was either too i ndifferent or too weak to put their foot down
firmly and tell the Congress either to accept the plan as it stood
or to reject it i n clear terms. The League had made a major sacrifice
in abandoning its demand for Pakistan and agreeing to the
Mission plan. It had done so on the solitary g round that the
grouping of provinces would result i n some sort of Pakistan, or
at least in two Muslim blocks, which could not be treated with
contempt by the Hindu-dominated Centre. This ground was now
cut away from under their feet by the Congress declaration that
grouping would not materialize and by Nehru's pronouncement
that the powers of the Centre would certainly be enhanced. The
Congress was not talking of the Cabinet Mission Plan, but of some
plan of its own which i t was determined to put i nto practice as
soon as the Constituent Assembly came i nto existence. The British
Government knew this but \Vere not inclined to take a firm stand.
The Muslims stood in peril between Congress i ntentions and
British i nd i fference. Their acquiescence in the Mission plan had
not brought them any advantage. Their sacrifice had gone waste.
Now their rejection could not possibly worsen the situation.
In one of his prayer meetings in July Gandhi had said that if
the negotiations broke down it would be God's will. "Some
persons may be forgiven if they thought it was not God's will,
17 See The Tim!!s, 13 September, 1 946, Daily Telegraph, 29 July, 1 946, and
Spectator, 2 August, 1 946.
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT 277

but Gandhi's. The Congress had reintroduc.:d issues upon which

deci sio n had already been reached and had raised questions that
made compromise impossible." 1 8 A British official of life-long
Indian experience concluded that "if common sen se is an el ement
in pol iti cal maturity, Congress seems to h a v e little claim to that
particular quality'".1Q
Congress leaders then began to explain away their attitude by
saying that they bad not object ed to g roup i ng in principle but to
"grouping being forced upon a p rovi nce b y the weight of the
majority of a bigger province placed in the same s ection ; and "

that they had called the Constituent Assembly '·sovereign" in the

sense that "it would not be subject to control from any external
authority".20 But this was palpably wrong for, later in December,
the Congress aga in refused to accept the British Government's
verd ict that the grouping clause m eant what His Majesty's Gov­
ernment and ihc Musl im League had taken it to mean.
The fact was that the Congress resolution of acceptance was
"clad in such involved l a n guage t hat the average person might well
be excused fer thinking it lacked any meaning21 . . . to the eyes of
common sense, the party's resolution amounted to a rejection .22 "

Congress en ters t�f}icc

On 22 July the Viceroy wrote to the presidenb of the Muslim
League and the Congress, setting out the proposals for the forma­
tion of an "Interim Coalition Govcmmenf' . There would be 14
members of the Government : 6 Congress men 5 Musl im Leaguers,
,

3 representatives of the minori ties . " ' It will not be open to either
the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the names sub­
mitted by the other party, provided they are accepted by the
18 Robert Aura Smith, Divided India (New York : 1 947), p. 2 1 9 .
19 Sir William Barton, "The Cabinet �fosion tn India", Fortnightly Review
July 1 946, p . 14.
20 Menon, op . cit., p. 284.
21 Th is is also tr ue of Menon's summary of Cougrl!�s explanations quoted
in the preceding paragraph .
22 Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. CJ7.
278 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

Viceroy." The two major parties would "each have a n equitable

share of the most important portfolios". �3

Nehru wrote on 23 July conveying his i nability to accept the

terms. Jinnah sent a letter on 31 July saying that there was no
chance of his Working Committee accepting the Viceroy's pro­
posals.2i

Thus both the parties had rejected the proposals and there
appeared to be no chance of the formation of an Interim Gov­
ernment. B ut then there was a radical change in the p ol icy of
the British Government. Without any warning or any reasonable
ground the Secretary of State for India asked the Viceroy to
make an offer to Nehru to form a Government and not to see
Jinnah with a view to persuading him to enter the Government.
He "fully shared the Viceroy's dislike of an interim Government
dominated by one party, but in view of the grave political situa­
tion in the country he agreed on the necessity for forming an
interim Government with popular support".25

On 6 August, the Viceroy wrote to Nehru, inviting him to form

the Interim Government "on the basis of the assurances contained
in his letter of 30 May to Azad". On 8 August the Con gress
Working Committee accepted the invitation and authorized Nehru
to negotiate �ith the Viceroy. On 1 7 August Nehru told the
Viceroy that he intended to constitute the Government in full
strength, filling the 5 Muslim seats with non-League Muslims.
The Viceroy differed with this proposal and suggested that the
Muslim seats be left open for a time, but Nehru did not agree
and insisted on his proposal. 26

It has recently been disclosed that just before the Congress

Interim Government was sworn in the Viceroy once again wrote
2 3 Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 640-641 .
2 4 /bid., pp. 641-643.
25 Menon, op. cit., p. 289. His account is disingenuous. The Secretary of
State had not agreed but had ordered Wavell to invite Nehru to form the
Government. The Viceroy, in fact, did not wholly approve of the idea.
2 6 /bid., pp. 289-295
THE I N T E R I M G O VE R N ME N T 279

to the British Government arguing for the postponement of the

swearing in until the Musli m League could be persuaded to come
in. Attlee overruled the Viceroy on the ground tha t any delay
would "only exacerbate the tempers of the Congress Party leaders
and perhaps lead to a definite break bc t>veen them and the
British authorities" .27 Accordingly, on 24 A ugust a communique
was issued from Delhi, announcing the appointment of a new
Executive Council which would take office on 2 September.28

After thus dispasing of a matter which went agai n st his grain,

.

the Viceroy went to Bengal to see the ravages wrought by the

communal riots in Calcutta . This visit convinced him that if
some s o rt of an agreement b�tween the C:mgress and the League
was not brought about soon. the \Vholc of fodia would b� thrown
into a deadly civil war. On h i s rdurn he madi: another effort t o
influence the Congress leaders and to this purpose saw Gandhi
and Nehru on 27 August . After describing the G>lcutta scene
(which neither of the Hindu leaders had cared to visit), he suggest­
ed setting up of coalition governments both in Bengal and at the
Centre. He argued th:lt the whole controversy related to the inter­
pretation of the grouping clause. The Congress should, therefore,
make a categorical s tateme nt tha t it accepted the position that
the provinces must remain in their section s until after the first
elections under the new Constitution. He told thej ,1 formally that
he would not summon the Constituent A ssembly until this point
was cleared. He gave them a d raft formula which he thought would
satisfy the Muslim League. It read as follows :

"The Congress are p repared in the i nterests of communal har­

mony to accept the intention of the statement of 1 6 May that
provinces cannot exercise any option a ffecti ng their membership
of the sections or of the groups if forme d , until the decision
contemplated in paragraph 19 (viii) of the statement of 1 6 May
11 Leonard Mosley, op . cit., pp. 48-49.
::.s The Indian Annual Register, 1 946, vol. II, p. 228. Persons named were :
Nehru, Patel, Rajcndra Prasad, Asaf Ali, Rajagopalacharia, S. C. Bose, John
Matthai, Baldev Singh, Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Jagjivan Ram, Ali Zahcer
and C.H. Bhabha. Two more Muslim members were to be appointed later.
280 T H E STRUGGLE FOR P A K I STAN

is taken by the new legislature after the new constitutional arrange­

ments have come int o operation and the first general elections
had been held."
In the discussion that followed the Viceroy was aghast at the in­
difference of the Congress leaders to bloodshed that had already
started and was likely to spread to other parts of India if there
was no political settlement. He made every possible appeal but
failed to change their attitude. The Ccngress leaders could at the
most agree to taking the formula with them and putting it before
the Working Committee.29 On 28 August Nehru informed the
Viceroy that the Working Committee had rejected the formula.
This talk had vital repercussions. On their return from the
Viceroy's house both Gandhi and Nehru sat down to write letters.
Gandhi first sent a cable to Attlee saying that the Viceroy's "state
of mind" was such as required some immediate action. Alleging
that he was "unnerved owing to the Bengal tragedy", Gandhi said
that he should be replaced with "an abler and legal mind". Then
he wrote a letter to the Viceroy, charging him with minatory talk,
and concluding with the suggestion that if the Viceroy was afraid
of increasing communal warfare and of using British forces to
suppress it, the British should immediately withdraw and leave
the matter of keeping the peace to the Congress. Simultaneously
Nehru wrote to a number of influential friends in Britain to the
effect that Wavell was a weak man who had lost all flexibility of
mind and, in his desire to appease Jinnah, was leading India to
disaster. He said that Wavell was pursuing this policy on the advice
of Sir Francis Mudie and George Abell, both of whom were in
Nehru's opinion. rabidly pro-Muslim (Nehru actually called them
"English Mullahs"). • Wavell must go' was the burden of all his

correspondence that night.30

29 For a full account of this dramaric talk see Leonard Mosley, op. cit.,
pp. 42-44. Menon practically ignores this meeting and its aftermath.
JO See ibid., pp. 44-47. Gandhi's letter to Wavell is reproduced in full in Pyare­
lal's Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase (Ahmedabad : 1 956). Menon has not a
word to say on this, which makes an objective reader completely lose confi­
dence in him.
THE I NTERIM GOVERNMENT 28 1

These overtures were to bring a rich harvest to the Congress,

but let us revert to the interim government.

The Interim Government was installed in office on the appoin ted

date, 2 September, 1 946. The Congress was j ubilant. Pattabhi
Sitaramayya, for example, had declared, "within the next few
days India will have a National Government. Muslim League may
come or not. That would make no difference. The caravan will
move on We must now consider ourselves rulers of this
land."31
The Le ague joins the Council
All Muslim India and several observers in Britain regretted the
installation of a one-party government in India at this grave
moment. Jinnah had issued a strongly worded statement on 25
August. He had regretted the Viceroy's decision which, he said,
was inconsistent with his earlier assurances to the Muslim League
and with his previous commitments.32 On the day the new Gov­
ernment took office, the Muslims throughout India flew black
flags on their houses and shops.33

In Britain Sir Winston Churchill led the attack on the Govern­

ment for this decision. He connected the installation of Congress
rule with the ensuing "series of massacres" unparalleled "since
the Indian mutiny of 1857". He warned that "any attempt to
establish the reign of a Hindu majority will never be achieved
without a civil war". Cripps had "used his undue influence to
give advantage to the Hindus".34 Later he called it a "cardinal
mistake" to have entrusted the Government of India to "the
caste Hindu, Mr. Nehru".35 Lord Templewood, who as Sir Samuel
Hoare had piloted the 1 935 Act, had already warned the Gov­
ernment against forming a government with the co-operation of
one community alone.36 Lord Scarborough had predicted that
31 Quoted in Ravoof, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
3 2 The Indian Annual Register, 1 946, vol. II, pp. 230-23 1 .
3 3 Jan Stephens, op. cit., p , 107.

34 H.C. 43 1. Ss., 12 December, 1 946, cols. 1 363- 1 3 69.

3S H.C. 435. Ss., 6 May, 1 947, col. 669.
36 H.L. 142. Ss., 18 July, 1 946, col. 590.
282 T H E STRUGGLE FOR P A K ISTAN

there would be strong pressure on the British Government from

India to transfer power to one party only and he had hoped that
such pressure would be resisted.37 Lord Cranborne took the Gov­
ernment to task for having broken its faith with the Muslims in
June and having allowed the Congress to take office in August,
and asked if anything could be more calculated to destroy Muslim
confidence in the good faith of the British Government.38
The National Review pointed out that even before the Con­
stituent Assembly had met the Indian Constitution had been
scrapped and power handed over to a party which was Caste
Hindu by composition, quisling hy its war record and fascist by
policy.39 The Economist a sked for the grounds on which this deci­
sion had been taken at the moment of maximum conflict between
the Hindus and the Muslims.40
Within a month of the formation of the Interim Government
the Muslim League realized that its exclusion from the Govern­
ment was playing havoc with Muslim interests. On principle the
League had refused to enter office and that principle stood. But
political necessity combined with the active hostility of the
Home Government (which to the Muslims was best exemplified
by the installation of a Hindu Government) compelled the League
to change its policy. Muslims would continue to suffer as long as
the League was in wilderness. The Jaw and order situation was
deteriorating and Muslims stood in great danger of being wiped
off in several areas.41 The Congress was not worried at all. Indeed
mischief mongers seemed to be encouraged by having a
Hindu government in office. Therefore, the League must join
the government to protect Muslim India. Jinnah was now of the
opinion that he could conduct the battle for Pakistan better if
bis party was i nside the coalition than outside i t .
3 7 H . L . 142. 5s., 1 8 July, 1946, cols. 6 1 6-6 1 7 .
JS H.L. 1 4 5 . 5s., 2 6 Fo!bruary, 1 947, cols. 1050- 1 05 1 .
39 See J.C. French, "The Cabinet Mission's Legacy", National Re1·iew,
October 1 946.
40 24 August, 1 946.
Economist,
41 account of the ri ots,
For an impartial see Sir Francis Tukcr, lf?hile
Memory Serres (London : ! 950),
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT 283

The Viceroy was anxious to have the League in the coalition

because he was aware of the dangers ahead. Hence long and
complicated negotiations were carried on between, on the one
hand, Nehru and Jinnah and, on the other, Wavell and
Jinnah.42 Finally, on 2 5 October the Executive Council was
reconstituted as follows43 :-
CONGRESS
Jawaharlal Nehru (External Affairs & Commonwealth Re-
lations).
Vallabhbhai Patel (Home, Information and Broadcasting)
Rajendra Prasad (Food and Agriculture)
C. Rajgopalacharia (Education and Arts)
Asaf Ali (Transport and Railways)
Jagjivan Ram (Labour)
MUSLIM LEAGUE
Liaquat Ali Khan (Finance)
I. I. Chundrigar (Commerce)
Abdur Rab Nishtar (Communications)
Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Health)
J. N. Mandal (Legislative)
MINORITIES
John Matthai (Industries and Supplies)
Bhabha (Works, Mines and Power)
Baldev Singh (Defence)
The Congress did not welcome the entry of the Muslim League
in the Government. Their monopoly was broken and this was
not a pleasing thought. Moreover, Jinnah had agreed to send his
party into the Council on Wavell's request, not on Nehru's though
the terms offered by each were identical. This must have hurt
Nehru's pride. Further, the new Council was no longer to be
under Nehru's influence and authority. Jinnah's astonishing deci­
sion to include a scheduled caste in the League quota was another
blow to Congress professions that it alone was the protector of
42 For texts of correspondence see The Indian Annual Register, 1 946, vol. JJ,
pp. 265-269 , 273-774, 2 8 1 .
43 Gwyer and Appadorai, op. cit., pp. 654-655.
284 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K IS T A N

that unfortunate community as well as to its repeated allegation

that the League was a purely communal organization . All these
factors combined to harden even further the Congress attitude to­
wards the League. The Hindu-Muslim conflict raging in India had
now also entered the Council chamber.
Nehru lost no time in writing to the Viceroy (on 26 October)
that he regretted the choice of nominees which the League had
made. "The choice itself indicated a desire to have conflict rather
than to work in co-operation."44 Gandhi declared that the
League's entry into the Government was not "straight".45
By entering the Government the Muslim League gained four
distinct advantages. In the first place, Jinnah was able to circum­
vent the conditions laid down earlier by the Viceroy. In June the
League had been kept o ut of office in spite of having accepted
both the long-term and short-term plans of the Cabinet Mission.
Now it joined the Government in spite of having refused to com­
mit itself even to the short-term plan. Secondly, the inclusion of a
scheduled caste member among its nominees was the Muslim
retort to the Congress claim to represent Nationa list Muslims.
Thirdly, the League was now in a position to look after the
interests of the Muslims. Finally. the League bloc in the Govern­
ment would be an effective check against the attempts of the
Congress to introduce vital changes which might prejudice the
Muslim case for Pakistan.46
Besides expressing his dislike for the League personnel, Nehru
was also obdurate in the matter of distribution of portfolios. The
Viceroy wanted the League to be given one of the three important
departments, viz. , External Affairs, Home or Defence. Nehru
strongly opposed this.47 Ultimately it was decided to give the
following five portfolios to the League : Finance, Commerce,
Communications, Health and Law. It was said that the Congress
44 Quoted in Menon, op. cit. , p. 3 17.
<4 5Quoted i n ibid., p . 3 1 7 .
4 6 S ee M. H. Saiyid, op. cit., p p . 420-42 1 .
4 7 Menon, op. cir., p . 320.
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT 285

agreed to giving Finance to the League on the calculation that

the Muslims would not be able to handle this subject and "would
make fools of themselves".48 Later Abul Kalam Azad bitterly
regretted this decision and attributed it to the bad judgment of
his Congress colleagues.49

The Constituent Assemb�y

By the end of July 1 946 British India had elected its 296 represent­
atives to the Constituent Assembly. The Congress had won all
the general seats except nine and the Muslim League all the
Muslim seats except five. The first meeting of the Assembly had
been tentatively called for 9 December. But the League refused
to participate in the Assembly proceedings o r even to recognize
it as a valid body until the Congress gave an undertaking that it
accepted the Muslim League interpretation of the clause regarding
the grouping of the provinces (which, the League rightly said, was
the only correct interpretation). As has been mentioned above,
the Viceroy had tried to persuade the Congress leaders to accept
this interpretation but had been rewarded with secret cables and
letters from Gandhi and Nehru to British Government urging
the Viceroy's removal. Now he warned the Secretary of State
that India was very near to open civil war and that calling the
Assembly into session would probably precipitate the outbreak.50
But he realized that it was not possible t o delay the Assembly
without changing the whole official policy. On 20 November,
therefore, he issued invitations for the meeting of the Constituent
Assembly under the Cabinet Mission Plan.
Jinnah at once characterized this as "one more blunder of a
very grave and serious character". "The Viceroy did not appre­
ciate the serious situation and its realities and was trying to
41 Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 1 14.
49 See A . K. Azad, op. cit., p. 1 67, 1 68.
'o Menon, op. cit., p. 324.
286 HIE S T R U G G L E r O R P A K I S T A >.;

appe a�e the Congress.'' N o M u�l im League repn;sentat i\'c was

to a ttend the Assembl y when it met o n 9 Deccmber.5 1

In fa ce o r these irreconcilable attitudes o f" the Congrl'SS and
the League, the British Government decided to m ak e one mo re
effo r t tti bring about a settlemenl. Two Congress leaders and two
Muslim League leaders were invited to Lond on t<:i r !al ks. On the
Viceroy's suggestion a Sikh reprt"�cntatiw wa' a l �o i n cl ud ed
among the invitee�.
In the mea ntime the Congress was gettin g more and more
aggressive in its demand for the remov al of the lvf oslim L eague
from the G overnm e n t unless i t �i greed to participate i n the
A s s em b l y deliberat ions. N ehr u went even further and not only
cha rgerl the L ea gue with being the " K ing's Party" in the G ov­
ernment but also a lk ged that theic was a "mental allia n ce" be­
tween the League and the senior Brit ish official s . "Our patience i s
fa r re a ching the limit", h e sai d , "if t hese t hings c on t i n ue . a struggle
o n a large scale i s inevitable". 5z
The fl imsy basis of the s e allegations was revealed soon after.
When L ! aquat Ali K han prot ested a gai nst these ali cgations and
declared that the League bloc i n the Counc il had n ever i nvoked
the Viceroy'� spe ci ai powers or asked for h i s intervention , N e hru
persish:d in his o p i nion t h a t , h y "it� p olicy of stressing the legal
pos ition and preventing the G overnment from funct ion i n g as a

Cabinet' ' , the League had m ad e i t self i nt o a "King's Party".53 Tf

Meno n has correctly quoted Nehru. the reason fo r Congress asper­
sions o n the League is not far to seek. The League Councillors
had refused t o recognize Nehru as the head of the Interi m G ov­
ernment o r even a s t he head o f the non-League bloc. J i n nah had
pointed o u t that the Interi m Government was nothing but the
Viceroy's Executi\'e; Council reconstituted on political l i nes. The
Viceroy rem ained i t s he ad and retained d! hi s special powers.
Nehru was merely the Vice-president or the Council who presided
51 Tile Indian Annual Rcgi.lfcr, 1 946, vol. I I, p. ':!.79. This statement was
issued on 21 November. See also h is speech at a press conference at Karach i
on 26 November, Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit . , ' ol. J J , pp. 482-489.
Sc Quot.:d in Menon, •'r cit .. pp. 326-327.
'3 Ibid. , p. 327.
T H E I N T E R I M G O V E R N M EN T 287

when the Viceroy was absent but enjoyed no more powers and
had no higher status than the other Councillors. It was grossly
misleading to call the Interim Government a "National Govern­
ment" or to characterize the Council as a "Cabinet". But Congress
leaders continued to harp upon the "collective responsibility" of
the "Cabinet" which the League had disrupted. Some Hindu
newspapers even called Nehru the "Prime Minister" of india.54
It was obvious that the League could not have supported these
pretensions without damaging the Muslim cause irretrievably.
Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru and Baldev Singh arrived
in London on 2 December, 1946. for talks with the British Gov­
ernment. The discussions were unfruitful and on 6 December
the Government issued a statement regretting that n o agreement
had been reached and resolving the controversy about the group­
ing clause by giving their own authoritative interpretation.
"The Cabinet Mission have throughout maintained the view
that the decisions of the sections should, in the absence of agree­
ment to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote o f the
representatives in the Sections. This view has been accepted by
the Muslim League, but the Congress have put forward a different
view . . . His Majesty's Government have had legal advice, which
confirms that the statement of 1 6 May means what the Cabinet
Mission have always stated was their intention. This part of the
statement as so interpreted must therefore be considered as an
essential part of the scheme of 1 6 May for enabling the Indian
people to formulate a Constitution which His Majesty's Govern­
ment would be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should there­
fore be accepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly."55
Nehru said that this statement amounted to "a variation and
extension" of the Cabinet Mission plan of 16 May, and there-
s • This was repeated in the pro-Congress leftist press in Britain. The New
Statesman, for example, called the Interim Government a "Cabinet bound
by collective responsibility, with Nehru as Premier", 7 September, 1 946. In
his memoirs published i n 1 960 Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff
in India , calls Nehru the "Deputy Prime Minister", The Memoirs of General
the Lord Ismay (London : 1 960), p, 4 1 8 . Of course the term used by Ismay is even
more absurd. Was the Viceroy the Prime Minister whose Deputy was Nehru ?
s s The Indian Annual Register, 1946, vol. II, p. 301 .
 288 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I STA :S

fore the Congress would have to consider the whole situation 56

On 22 December the Congress Working Committee reiterated
that the British Government's interpretation was not in conform­
ity with the "fundamental basis" of the Cabinet Mission plan.
But the Committee did not commit itself and left the decision to
the All India Congress Committee. 57 The AH J ndia Congress Com­
mittee met on 5 January, 1 947, and rejected the official interpreta­
tion.58 The Muslim League Working Committee passed a lengthy
resolution on 3 1 January, whjch took notice of the British Gov­
ernm ent's i nterpretation (which was the same as the League's)
and of the Congress rejection of it. As the Congress, the Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs had refused to accept this interpretation, and
therefore the Cabinet Mission plan of which it was an essential
part, the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the sum­
m o ning of it were "ab initio void, invalid and illegal'' and its
continuation, proceedings and decisions were "ultra vires, invalid
and illegal". The Assembly should be dissolved at once. In these
circumstances there was no need of calling the Muslim League
Council to reconsider its decision of July 1 946.�9
The British Government's statement of 6 December had con­
tained one pregnant paragraph : "There has never been any pros­
pect of success for the Constituent Assembly except on the basis
of an agreed procedure. Should a Constitution come to be framed
by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian
population had not been represented, His Majesty's Government
could not cf course contemplate--as the Congress have stated
they would not contemplate-forcing such a Constitution upon
any unwilling parts of the country".
This , as Lumby says . was the first admission from the side of
the British Government that the Cabinet Mission plan might be
abandoned. It was also the first official announcement since the
Cripps o ffer which foreshadowed some form of Pakistan. Speak-
�6 Menon , op. cit., p. 3 3 1 .
5 7 The Indian Annual Register, 1 946, vol. I , pp. l '.'.7- 1 29.
58 Menon, op. cit. , pp. 332-33 3 .
59 The Indian Annual Register, 1 947, vol. I. pp. 1 47- 1 5 1 .
THE I NTERIM GOVERNMENT 289

ing in the House of Commons, Sir Stafford Cripps summarized

the above quoted paragraph in even clearer terms, "If the Muslim
League cannot be persuaded to come into the Constituent Assemb­
ly, then the parts of the country where they are in a majority
cannot be held to be bound by the results."60 Events had con­
vinced him of what he h ad refused to believe in May 1 946. The
Cabinet Mission plan was, for all practical purposes, dead.

6 0 E. W. R. Lumby, op. cit., p. 1 29 .

 CHAPTER 1 3

The Transfer of Power

A new statement by Attlee

By this time the confusion in Indian politics had become more
confounded. The British Government had laid down the Cabinet
Mission plan, installed an Interim Government, and then shown
their willingness (in the statement of 6 December, 1 946) to scrap
the plan i f Indians did not come to an agreement . The Muslim
League had earlier accepted the plan in both its long-term and
short-term aspects, but its act of self-abnegation in sacrificing
Pakistan to the prospects of an agreed solution had gone un­
noticed and unrecognized both in official and Congress circles.
The Congress had persisted in its own interpretation of the clause
concerning the grouping of the provinces even after the official
clarification of 6 December. The British Government had, on the
one hand, installed a purely Hindu Government despite their
earlier assurances and, on the other, refused to be firm with the
Congress in making them accept the plan as interpreted by its
authors. The League had therefore rejected the plan as a whole
and called for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. The
T H E TR A N S FE R OF P O W E R 29 1

Congress attitude was becoming increasingly aggressive which

made the Muslims proportionately apprehensive regarding their
future.
The Congress was now concentrating on one target alone. The
Muslim League must either get out of the Interim Government
or enter the Constituent Assembly (and, by implication, accept
the Congress interpretation of the disputed grouping clause). On
5 February, all the non-League Councillors asked the Viceroy fo r
the resignation o f the League members of the Government. On
13 February Nehru wrote to the Viceroy reiterating this demand.1
On 1 5 February, Patel threatened that if the Muslim League did
not quit the Government the Congress would withdraw. 2
It was in this atmosphere of mutual recriminations and impend­
ing civil war that Attlee made a statement on 20 February, 1947.
The existing state of uncertainty could not be indefinitely pro­
longed. "His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that
it is their definite intention to take necessary steps to effect the
transfer of power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later
than J une 1948." If an agreed Constitution was not worked out
"by a fully representative Assembly" by that date, the Govern­
ment "would have to consider to whom the power of the Central
Government i n British India should be handed over on the due
date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government
for British India, or in some areas to the existing Provincial Gov­
ernments, or i n such other way as may seem most reasonable and
in the best i nterests of the India n people".
In the same statement it was also announced that Wavell was

being recalled and replaced by Admiral the Viscount Mount­

batten.3
Five days later the Secretary of State for India declared in the
House of Lords that this decision was taken on advice received
I Menon, op. cit., pp. 335-337.
2 The Indian Annual Register, 1 947, vol. I , p. 36.
3 Cmd. 7047. Also in H.C. 433. 5s. Cols. 1 396- 1 398.
 292 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

from "responsible authorities" in India and was meant t o shock

the Indian parties into some sort of agreement.4
In India the "time limit" speech was generally well received,
though Jinnah refused to commit himself and declared that the
League would not surrender on the Pakistan issue. But in Britain
several organs of public opinion were quick to notice the dan­
gerous implications of the announcement. The Times felt that.
instead of bringing harmony, this inflexible commitment would
probably seriously affect Indian welfare. 5 The Dai�y Telegraph
described it as "reckless folly" which would certainly intensify
differences which had already led to widespread massacres. 6 For
the Spectator the date fixed was demonstrably too early : a little
less precipitancy would have been in India's own interest.7
In the opinion of Lumby, who had been attached to the Cabinet
Mission's Secretariat, Attlee's announcement was "surely mis­
conceived, in that it assumed that the British could profitably name
a date for handing over power without taking the responsibility
of determining, or making provision for Indians themselves to
determine, the succession authorities". This "led to a hardening
of communal claims, opened a new phase in the violent clash of
communities, and generally intensified the prevailing uncertainty
and uneasiness". 8
Now we turn to the second part of the statement. Wavell was
recalled because, as the Prime Minister said, his had been a war­
time appointment. But that was not the true explanation. Attlee's
references to Wavell in his speech in the House of Commons were
"cold and perfunctory" .9 On 5 March, Sir Stafford Cripps made
a long speech on the opening of the Indian debate but he did not
even mention Wavell's name.
4 H. L. 145. 5s. 25 February, 1 947, col. 948.
s The Times, 21 February and 6 March, 1 947.
6 Daily Telegraph, 21 February, 1 947.
7 Spectator, 7 March, 1 947.
s E. W. R. Lumby, op. cit., p. 263.
9 The words are those of Campbell-Johnson, the mouthpiece of Mount­
batten, who can hardly be accused of sympathy for Wavell.
T H E T R AN S FER OF P O \V E R 293

D id Wavell go because he had basic differences of opinion with

Attlee and his Cabinet ? There is no evidence to support this. In
the last letter that the Viceroy wrote to King George VI he had
propounded his scheme of phased withdrawal from India which,
he complained, had not been approved by the Cabinet. In this
proposal the date for final transfer of power was to be 3 1 March,
1 948 . 10 This proposal was rej ected by Attlee because his Cabinet
regarded it as "altogether too precipitate a retreat". 1 1 But shortly
afterwards Attlee himself announced the decision to withdraw
from India by June 1 948. This was surely not such a wide margin
of difference as to lead to the Viceroy's removal. On broad lines
of Indian policy, therefore, the British and fndian Governments
had no serious differences. The explanation must lie elsewhere.
lt will be remembered that Wavell was initially very popular
with the Congress for having refused , in J une 1 946, to let the
League form the Interim Government and later for having put
the Congress into office . Much earlier he had asserted that the
geographical unity of India could not be ignored which had
created resentment among the Muslims. But subsequently the
Viceroy-Congress relations had begun to cool. When Calcutta
was rocked by widespread riots the Congress asked the Viceroy
to dismiss the Bengal Muslim League Ministry irrespective of the
constitutional rights of the provinces under the 1 935 Act. The
Viceroy refused to do so and thereby earned Congress animosity.
Later when Wavell refused to dismiss the Muslim League Coun­
cillors as demanded by the Congress, the breach between the
Viceroy and the Congress was complete. 1 2 We have already seen
that Gandhi had written to Attlee asking for Wavell's removal
ostensibly on the ground that he had lost grip on the situation.
Nehru had sent similar messages to his British friends. It is record­
ed that Nehru was pleased on Wavell's recall.13 Was then Wavell
1 0 T his letter is reproduced i n fu l l in J.W. Wheeler- Bennett, King George VI :
His Life and Reign (London : 1958 ) , pp. 708-709.
1 1 Ibid., p. 709.
12 See The Timis, 23 and 26 November, 1 946, and 22 March, 1 947.
13 M. Brecher, op. cit., p. 3 3 7 .
294 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

removed on Congress demand ? In the evidence made available

so far there is nothing to suggest the contrary.
The new viceroy
Lord Mountbatten reached Delhi on 22 March. His appointment
had been greatly welcomed by the Congress and his relations with
Nehru were said to be good. 1 4 The British Government had been
warned by Lord Ismay that Mountbatten's appointment would
be considered a concession to the Congress and an affront to the
Muslims, 1 5 but the warning had gone unheeded. The following
pages will show how far these forebodings came true.
In their first meeting, on 25 March, Mountbatten asked Nehru
to give him his opinion of Jinnah, and Nehru proceeded to paint
a Hindu picture of the Muslim leader. 16 When Jinnah met Mount­
batten no request was made by the Viceroy to Jinnah to express
any views regarding Nehru. Further, the only Indian on the
Viceroy's staff was a Congress-minded Hindu, V. P. Menon, who
had, as later events showed, great influence on Mountbatten and
was allowed to prepare single-handed the final plan of the transfer
of power. Campbell-Johnson, who was, during this period, writing
his tendentious diary, "maintained a fairly loose liaison with the
N ehru household and became a welcome guest at the Nehru
breakfast table, a firm friend of Nehru's daughter, Indra--whose
influence on her father was considerable-and a successful lubri­
cant of the Nehru-Mountbatten axis" . 1 7 Lady Mountbatten be­
came one of Nehru's closest friends, and Azad tells us that her
influence on the Congress president was greater than that of Patel
or Mountbatten. is
The evolution of'3 June Plan
By the Instrument of Instructions issued to Mountbatten on his
appointment he was required to find an agreed solution for a u nited
1 4 Manchester Guardian, 2 5 February, 1 947.

1 5 Se� A. Cam;i! nll-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London : 1 954),

p. 23.
1 6 Ibid., p. 44.
1 7 Leonard Mosley, op . cit., p. 102.
18 A . K . Azad, op. cit., p. 1 84.
THE TRANSFER O F POWER 295

India on the basis of the Cabinet Mission plan. But soon after
his arrival he was persuaded by events and the attitudes of party
leaders of the improbability of an agreed solution and of a united
India. He had therefore to fall back upon the Prime Minister's
statement of 20 February and prepare a plan accordingly.
In consultation with his advisers Mountbatten drew up an
outline of a plan of transfer of power, the "broad basis of which
was the demission of authority to the provinces, or to such con­
federations of provinces as might decide to group themselves i n
t h e intervening period before the actual transfer of power". O n
1 1 April Ismay sent this outline to Menon fo r h i s amendments
and for working out a rough time table. Menon carried out this
order, but appended his own opinion that the plan was "a bad
one and certainly would not work". The finished plan was put
before the Governors' Conference on 1 5 and 16 April and approv­
ed. On 2 May Ismay and George Abell left fo r London carrying
the plan with them for the sanction of Whitehall. The Viceroy
wanted to receive the approval of His Majesty's Government by
I O May, for he planned to call a meeting of party leaders on 1 7
May i n o rder to know their reactions.
After thus finishing his labours on the plan Mountbatten, accom­
panied by Sir Eric Mieville and Menon, went to Simla. Here fo r
the first time Menon had a n opportunity o f talking t o the Viceroy
frankly and at length. He argued against the plan which had been
sent to London and said that it would not work. The Viceroy was
yet contemplating the import of Menon's views when Nehru and
Krishna Menon arrived on 8 May to stay with Mountbatten.
The Viceroy at once asked Menon to talk to Nehru about the
alternative plan which he (Menon) had suggested in place of the
one sent to London. On 9 May Menon expounded his scheme to
Nehru by which power was to be transferred on the basis of
Dominion status to two Indias, not to provinces or groups of
prcvinces. On 1 0 May this plan was discussed in a meeting attend­
ed by Mountbatten, Nehru, Menon and Sir Eric Mieville. The
proceedings of this discussion were recorded in the "Viceregal
Minutes" and are a part of Government of India Records.
296 THE STRU G G L E FOR PAKISTAN

O n the same day ( 1 0 May) the Viceroy received from London

the plan which he had sent to the Cabinet. It had been approved
by the Government with certain amendments. In the evening
Mountbatten took Nehru to his study after dinner and showed
him the plan as sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Nehru
was furious when he had finished reading it and told Mountbatten
that this would never be accepted by him, by the Congress and
by India.
On the morning of 1 1 May Mountbatten summoned Menon,
told him of Nehru's reaction to the official plan, and asked what
he should do next. Menon at once replied that his plan, which
they had d iscussed on 9 and 10 May, should be accepted and
worked upon : "whereas the plan approved by His Majesty's
Government would break up the country into several units, my
plan would retain the essential unity of India while allowing
those areas to secede which did not choose to remain part of it".
A staff meeting was at once called to which Nehru was i nvited.
At this meeting Nehru's objections to the official plan were form­
ally written into the minutes. Then the Viceroy asked Nehru i f
Menon's plan would b e acceptable to him. Nehru wanted t o see
the plan in writing before expressing his approval. This created a
problem fo r Nehru was leaving fer Delhi by the evening train
and Mountbatten was anxious to show him the finished plan
before his departure and win his approval. Menon was therefore
asked to put his plan on paper in double-quick time.
"It was by now 2 p.m. Menon walked to his hotel, poured him­
self a stiff whisky (he had never before had a whisky before six
in the evening) and settled down to work." By 6 p.m. he had
written the last sentence and the plan was immediately taken to
the Viceregal Lodge by Mieville. There it was shown to Nehru
who gave his approval.
Mountbatten returned to Delhi on 14 May and left for London
on 1 8 May to argue for the plan and persuade the Cabinet to
sanction it. Both Lord Ismay and George Abell were opposed
to Menon's scheme but the Viceroy put all his weight behind it
THE TRANSFER O F POWER 29 7

and threatened that he would resign i f it was not accepted by

His Majesty's Government. His threat worked and the lndia­
Burma Committee of the Cabinet approved it "witho ut the altera­
tion of a comma". Attlee and the whole Cabinet gave their sanc­
tion in a meeting which lasted exactly five minutes. The Viceroy
and his party returned to India on 3 1 May. 1 9
Thus it came to pass that the plan which was to bring the
British Indian Empire to an end and change the face of Asia and
of the world was drawn up by a Congress-minded Hindu adviser
of the Viceroy in collaboration with Nehru and perhaps of
Krishna Menon. It was not considered necessary to take J i nnah
into confidence. In fact, in none of the contemporary accounts
occurs even the remotest hint that J innah should have been con­
sulted or at least informed of the developments that were taking
place at break-neck speed. He was completely ignored .
The 3 June Plan
The plan for the transfer of power to I ndia spelt out the procedure
in detail.20 The provincial legislative assemblies of Bengal and the
Panjab would each be asked to meet in two parts, one represent­
ing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the
province. The members of the two parts of each Legislative
Assembly sitting separately would be empowered to vote whether
or not the province should be partitioned. If a simple majority
of either part decided in favour of partition, d ivision would take
place. If partition was decided upon, each part of the Legislative
Assembly would, on behalf of the areas the:y represent, decide
whether to join the existing Constituent Assembly or a new Con­
stituent Assembly. As soon as this was decided the Governor­
General would appoint a Boundary Commission "to demarcate
the boundaries of t he two parts of the Panjab on the basis of
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-
1 9 This account is based on Menon, op. cit., Leonard M osley, op. cit.,
A. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., Ismay, op. cit., and E. W. R . Lumby, op. cit.
20 Cmd. 7 1 36. Full text also in The Indian Annual Register, 1 947, vol. I,
pp. 143-146.
298 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

Muslims". The Commission would also "be i nstructed to take

into account other factors". Similar instructions would be given
to the Bengal Boundary Commission.
The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding its European
members) would, at a special meeting, decide between joining the
existing Constituent Assembly and joining the new one. In the
North-West Frontier Province a reft:rendum would be held among
the electors of the existing Legislative Assembly to choose which
Constituent Assembly they would like to join. Baluchistan would
also be given an opportunity to express its opinion on the issue.
If Bengal decided in favour of partition, a referendum would be
held in the Sylhet district of Assam to decide whether it would
continue to form part of Assam or be amalgamated with the new
province of Eastern Bengal. If the vote was in favour of joining
the new province a Boundary Commission would demarcate the
boundaries.
If the two provinces of the Panjab and Bengal decided in favour
of partition new elections to the two Constituent Assemblies
would be held on the following basis :
Province General Muslims Sikhs Total
Seats
Sylhet District 1 2 0 3
West Bengal 15 4 0 19
East Bengal 12 29 0 41
West Panjab 3 12 2 17
East Panjab 6 4 2 12
His Majesty's Government were willing to transfer power to
India before the previously announced June 1 948, and therefore
legislation would be introduced in the current session of Parlia­
ment for the transfer of power "this year" on a Dominion status
basis to one or two successive authorities according to the deci­
sions taken.
On 2 June the Viceroy called a meeting of seven leaders-Nehru,
Patel, Kripalani , Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdur Rab Nishtar,
and Baldev Singh. The plan was put before them and approved .
 T H E T R A N S F E R O F P O W ER 299

Then Mountbatten went to see Gandhi, who was still opposing

the division, ostensibly to persuade him that the plan was the
best in the circumstances. In reality this was merely an exercise
in make-believe, because the plan had had Gandhi's consent be­
fore it was taken to England . Both Nehru and Gandhi had gone
on opposing Partition to deceive the world in general and the
Muslim League in particular. 2 1
On 3 June the plan was published to the world. On 4 June
Mountbatten held a press conference where he opened his remarks
with a palpable lie : "he pointed out that at every stage and a t
every step he had worked hand in hand with the leaders and that
the plan had come as no shock or surprise to them". It was o n
this occasion that 1 5 August, 1 947, was mentioned as the ten­
tative date for the transfer of power. 22
The Muslim League Council met on I 0 June and gave full
authority to Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the
plan as a compromise.
The All India Congress Committee met on 14 June and resolved
to accept the plan, but proceeded to assert the following on the
partition of India : "Geography and the mountains and the seas
fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change that
shape or come in the way of her final destiny . . . The A.I.C.C.
earnestly trusts that when ther,present passions have subsided,
India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and
the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and discard­
ed by all". Azad said that "I am sure it is going to be a short·
lived partition. " 23 The Hindu Mahasabha paraphrased the same
idea in stronger and clearer terms : "India is one and indivisible
and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas
are brought back into the Indian�!Union and made integral parts
thereof. "24
21 Azad, op. cit., pp. 188 ff; A. W. Khan, op . cit., p. 291 .
2 2 Menon, op. cit., pp. 380-382. Full text i n Mountbatten, Time On/1 to
look Forward (London : 1 950), pp. 19-25.
23 Quoted in Menon, op. cit., pp. 384-385.
24 Quoted in ibid., p. 382.
300 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

This hope for a future re-unity of India was shared by several

Hindu leaders, authors and newspapers and was expressed before,
at, and i m mediately a fter partition. Gandhi declared on 15 August
that he was s ure that a time would come when the d ivision would
be undone.25 The enthusiastic Congress daily, the Hindustan Times,
was pleased to write editorially on June 3 Plan, "The saving feature
is that it will be possible to un ite aga in once the glamour of d i vi­
sion has passed and national fo rces come into play."26 Menon,
the man who had written the plan and k new the m i nds of Congress
leaders, laid down that "the part ition of August 1 947 was surely
not intended to sunder for a l l time the ties that for a century
and a hal f have bound I ndia together . "27 The leader of the
. .

Pa11cjab Congress Party hoped to see a united Ind ia soon.23 There

was a general belief among the Hindus and Congressmen that
the partitio n would not end ure, that Pakistan would soon collapse
and that India would o nce again be a united country under the
Congress.29
The controversy abozu Go vernor-Generalship

D uring these hectic days e veryone-that is, i n the Congress and

i n the Viceregal Lodge-seems to have assumed that the two
new Dominions would have o ne Governor-General and that he
would be Mountbatten. So confident were Menon and the Viceroy
(and also Nehru who was in their confidence) of this that a clause
to this effect was incorporated in the draft of the fndian Inde­
pendence Bill.
A little earlier Jinnah had suggested that there should b e a
super Governor-General over the Governor-Generals o f the two
Dominions. The idea probably was that such a person would be
able to smoothen the operation of partition from a detached and
impartial pedestal. But Mountbatten disagreed and his opinion
was upheld by Whitehall.
25 See H . S. Polak. et. al. 1\fahat111a Ga11dlzi (London : 1958), p. 295.
.

26 Q uoted in Andrew M � l lor, India Since Par tition ( London : 1 95 1 ), p. 3 2 .

2 7 Menon, op . cit., p. 442.
2 8 ,\fanchester Guardian, 2 5 June, 1 947.
29 s�e Indian dispatches published i n Economist, 17 May, 1 947, Sunday
Times, 1 June, 1 947, i\fanchester Guardian, 1 5 August, 1 949, and Round
Table, September, 1 947, p. 370; see also Guy Wint, The British in Asia
(London : 1 954 ed), p. 1 79 .
 T H E T R A N S F E R OF P O W E R 30 1

All evidence30 shows that Mountbatten had set his heart on

becoming the Joint Governor-General of both the Dominions.
The idea appealed to him. When Nehru offered him the Governor­
Generalship of India, Mountbatten accepted the offer but told
Nehru and Patel that he hoped to receive a similar i nvitation from
the Muslim League. This was on 1 7 May, one day before Mount­
batten left for London with the Menon plan. After his talk with
Nehru and Patel he saw Jinnah and tackled him on this point.
But Jinnah parried the question and said that he would think
over it. The Viceroy "jogged" him for he "was determined that
he should not go away without some concession having been
extracted" . But he had aroused Jinnah's suspicions by his anxiety
to get a reply and the talk ended i nconclusively, Jinnah only
promising to send a letter to Mieville. This letter never arrived.
When Mountbatten returned from London he was "more
determined than ever to persuade the Muslim League leader that
he (the Viceroy) should become joint Governor-General". For
him it was now "a matter of pride". At one point he thought
of calling in Sir Walter Monckton (an eminent constitutional
lawyer who was then legal adviser to the N izam of Hyderabad)
and asking him to "concoct a convincing case for the Viceroy's
assumption of the twin positions", but Ismay dissuaded him. On
20 June Mieville was sent to Liaquat Ali Khan to read his mind
and to ask him to speak to J innah about the matter. Mieville
"pressed upon him the urgency of this matter and emphasized
how impossible it would be to get any sort of continuity or any
sort of orderly partition if each Dominion had a separate Gov­
ernor-General". 3 1 Liaquat promised to speak to Jinnah.
But still no answer came from Jinnah and Mountbatten was
getting anxious. On 23 June the two men met and Mountbatten
again stressed the advantages of having, during the partition
30 The following account is broadly based on Leonard Mosley, op . cit.,
pp. 1 50-1 56, who writes with the unique advantage of having the secret
Government of India Records before h i m .
3 1 Was this a threat ? If i t was, later events showed that i t was n o t an empty
one.
302 THE STRU G G L E FOR P AK I STAN

period, a common Governor-General for beth Dominions, but

said that he was not asking for the appointment for himself.
Jinnah again did not commit h imself and said that he would let
the Viceroy have his decision in two or three days' t ime. Finally
on 2 July Jinnah's answer arrived : he himself had decided to be
the first Governor-General o f Pak istan .
But even then Mountbatten d id not believe that he had lost.
On the same day a staff meeting was called by Ismay "to consider
the consequences of Mr. Jinnah ' s declared wish to be Governor­
General of Pakistan". The main purpose of the meeting was "to
devise a formula whereby His Excellency the Viceroy could
remain Governor-General of both Dominions and, at the same
time, satisfy Mr. J innah's vanity." The Viceroy decided to make
one more effort . He sent for the Nawab of Bhopal, and asked
him to see J inna h and try to dissuade him from becoming
Governor-General of Pakistan . But Bhopal's m ission d id not
succeed . Only then was Mountbatten fully convinced that he had
lost the battle.32
I t i s strange that thro ughout this controversy everyone "assum­
ed" and "hoped" and "took for granted" that the two Dominions
would have one Governor-General and that Mountbatten would
fill this post. There is no evidence anywhere to indicate that this
matter was d iscussed at any meeting with party leaders. All the
participants in this drama who have written their memoirs, like
Menon, Ismay and Attlee-and all those who have inside infor­
mation and have shared i t with the world-like Ian Stephens,
Leonard Mosley, M ichael Brecher, E . W. R. Lumby and
Campbell-Johnson-speak of "hopes" and "assumptions" rather
than facts and minutes. Menon, who was at the centre of things,
says that "it was assumed that Jinnah would make a similar

offer" (i.e. , of inviting Mountbatten to be the Governor-General

of Pakistan).>3 l smay s a ys tha t "\\'e got the i mpression" that
Jinnah would "in the end" invite Mountbatten .34 Michael
32 Mosley·s account ends here.
JJ Menon, op. cit .. p. 393.
34 The .'vfemoirs of General the Lord hmay. op. cit . , pp. 428-429.
T H E T R A N S FE R O F P O W E R 303

Beecher, the pri\ iledged biographer of Nehru who was given

access to secret official records, also uses the word "assump­
tion" .3 5 The argument is clinched when the official records of the
Government of India say that the "India Office appear to be
assuming" that Mountbatten would be asked by both parties to
become Governor-General. 3 6
Among those who expressed their disappointment at Mount­
batten's failun." to win the dual laurd are Attlee 37 a nd Menon. 3 8
Non e of them can be accused of sympathy for the Muslims, and
that strengthens the feeling that Mountbatten's stewardship of
Pakistan would not have benefited that country.
There is no doubt that Mountbatten was greatly riled by this
development. He was a vain man and Jinnah's rebuff had hurt
his pride. 39 Does that explain his later behaviour towards Pak­
istan ? Only he himself can tell the truth. Jinnah has been criticized
by all and sundry for n ot agreeing to Mountbatten's appointment
as the common Governor-General. Apart from the great import­
ance to Pakistan of ga ining recognition as a separate entity which
is essential for a seceding country to win, can Jinnah be really
blamed for not accepting a man like Mountbatten who had been
confiding in Nehru and working on his promptings a nd had cold
shouldered Jinna h ? Could the man whose one passion was not
to place the Muslims at a d isadvantage agree to put a man like
Mountbatten in a key position from where he could cause much
graver injury to Pakistan than he did as a political Governor­
General of I ndia ?
Whatever may have been the reasons, Mountbatten did every
thing in his power to i njure the interests of Pakistan. He brought
about the d issolution of the Joint Defence Council and the re­
moval of Field Marshal Auchinleck because he was, in spite of
3 5 Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 352.
3 6 Quoted in Leonard Mosley, op. cit., p. 1 50.
37 See his statement in the House of Commons, H.C. 439. Ss, 1 0 July, 1 947,
col. 2450.
38 Menon, op. cit., p. 3 94 .

39 Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 1 76.

3 04 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

his earlier o pposition to the d ivision of the armed forces, trying

to perform his duty in an honest and impartial manner. Mount­
batten was aware that Pakistan would object to such arbitrary
action, but that did not deter him. 40 He also dissolved the Parti­
tion Committee even though Pakistan had not received its share
of assets and stores. He accepted the Instrument of Accession
filed by the Maharaja of Kashmir to give the Indians an excuse
to send their troops to the State. All this he might have done
because he had felt annoyed at not having been a ppointed Gov­
ernor-General of Pakistan. But why did he change the draft of
agreement with Hyderabad at the behest of Patel ? Hyderabad
had not been guilty of any personal affron t to him.41 The fact
of the matter is that Mountbatten had been throughout under
the influence of the Congress leaders and would have gone to
any length to please them. He would have been, if appointed,
because of his policies and inclinations, an Indian Governor­
General of Pakista n. Jinnah saved the country from such a
calamity.
The implementation of June 3 Plan
The rest of the story can be briefly told.
In Bengal the Legislative Assembly met on 20 July and decided
by 1 26 to 90 votes in favour of joining a new Constituent As­
sembly. Then the members from the non-Muslim majority areas
of West Bengal met and decided by 58 to 2 1 votes that the pro­
vince should be partitioned and that West Bengal should join
the existing Indian Constituent Assembly. The members from the
Muslim majority areas of East Bengal met and voted, 1 06 to 35,
that the province should not be partitioned and then, by the
same majority of votes, that East Bengal should join a new Con­
stituent Assembly and that Sylhet should be amalgamated with
that province. The Panjab Legislative Assembly decided by 9 1
t o 2 7 votes t o join a new Constituent Assembly. Then the members
from the Muslim majority areas of West Panjab decided by 69
40 John Connel l : Auchinleck (London : 1 959),
pp. 9 1 5 If.
41 Mir Laik Ali. The Tragedy of Hyderabad (Karachi : 1 962), pp. 216-223
T H E T R A N S F E R OF P O W E R 305

to 27 votes against the partition of the province ; while the mem­

bers from the non-Muslim majority areas of Ea st Panjab decided
by 50 to 22 votes that the province should be partitioned and
the East Panjab should join the existing Indian Constituent
Assembly.
The Sind Legislative Assembly met on 26 June and decided by
30 votes to 20 to join a new Constituent Assembly. In Baluchistan
the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of the Quetta Muni­
cipality met and unanimously decided to join a new Constituent
Assembly. The referendum in Sylhet was held in early July and a
majority voted in favour of separation and joining East Bengal.
In the North-West Frontier Province the terms of referendum
gave the usual two choices to the voters : either to join the existing
Indian Constituent Assembly or to join a new Constituent
Assembly. But Ghaffar Khan . the Red Shirt leader, insisted that
the people should have a third choice, i.e. , to vote for an inde­
pendent Pakhtunistan. The Congress leaders, especially Gandhi
and Nehru, supported Ghaffar Khan, but the Viceroy overruled
them on the ground that the procedure laid down in the 3 June
Plan could not be altered without the consent of both parties,
and Jinnah was not agreeable to the change. Ghaffar Khan
replied by asking his followers to take no part in the voting.
The referendum was held on 6- 1 7 July and 289,244 votes were
cast in favour of joining the new Constituent Assembly as against
2,874 for continuing with the existing Indian Constituent As­
sembly.
In the meantime the Indian Independence Bill was drafted,
shown to Indian party leaders and to Gandhi and introduced in
the House of Commons by Prime Minister Attlee himself on
4 July. It was passed on 15 July by the Commons and on 16 July
by the Lords. There \Vere no a mendments. The Bill received the
Royal Assent on 1 8 July, exactly twelve years after the passing
of the Government of lndia Act of 1 935.
Separate provisional governments were set up for India and
Pakistan on 20 July. On 7 August Jinnah left India for the last
306 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

time and flew to Karachi, the capital o f the new Dominion o f

Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan met on 1 1
August and elected him a s its President. On 1 3 August Mount­
batten came to Karachi and on 14 August addressed the
Constituent Assembly. Pakistan officially became free on 1 5
August 1 947, when Jinnah was sworn i n as Governor-General
and the new Pakistan Cabinet took office.
It was fo rtunate that the Muslims possessed a leader of Jinnah's
calibre during the struggle for Pakistan. It is true that the destinies
of nations are moulded by their innermost urges and their deter­
mination to achieve their purpose, but if they fail to produce a
leader of the necessary ability and stature at the crucial moment,
their urges may be frustrated and their determination may prove
of little avail. Even without Jinnah Pakistan would have come,
but it would have been delayed for decades and would have en­
tailed much greater conflict and travail. It was he who guided his
people aright at every step, saved them from many a pitfall and,
through his single-minded devotion to the cause of the freedom
of his people, led them to victory within an incredible period of
seven years.
 C H AP T E R 1 4

Retrospect

A calumny
Long before the beginning of the story narrated i n the previous
chapters, the Indian National Congress had built up a well
. organized machinery for carrying on publicity i n the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. It had established
relations with the Labour Party in Britain and several sectors of
liberal opinion in America. The reputation of Gandhi as the most
Christ-like man within living history had spread throughout the
Christian world. Jawaharlal Nehru's brilliance had captured the
imagination of many intellectua ls in the West. And because the
two great Western democracies exercise a tremendous i nfluence
upon the thought of the world, the fame of Gandhi and Nehru
spread i n all directions. These advantages were skilfully exploited
by the Congress publicists not only to their own advantage, which
was legitimate, but also to smear the name of Muslim India and
its leaders in an irresponsible and dishonest manner.
When the Muslims were struggling to seek safeguards against
the intolerant use of power by the Hindus, they were painted as
obstructionists and agents of British imperialism. When they,
308 THE STRU G G L E FOR PAK ISTAN

driven to exasperation because of their failure to secure justice

from the Congress and losing all hope of being treated with fair­
ness under an overwhelmingly Hindu government, demanded
independence, they were abused as reactionaries and obscurant­
ists. When through a bitter struggle, they did succeed in carving
out a sovereign state for themselves, that state, Pakistan, was
maligned as a British creation brought into existence for the pur­
pose of serving as a tool of Western imperialism in Asia.1 So
successful was this campaign of calumny that these statements
came to be believed even in many Muslim lands. In the strong­
holds of "Western Imperialism", the United Kingdom and the
United States of America, it is the common experience of Pak­
istanis to hear regrets from well meaning but ignorant victims of
Indian propaganda on the partition of a great and beautiful
country. Little do such persons realize that they could not proffer
a greater insult to the national sentiments of the Pakistanis than
to wish that Pakistan had never come into existence and having
been created should once again be destroyed and handed over to
India.
These pages, one hopes, will dispel such ideas. The Pakistanis
did not receive Pakistan on a silver platter. They have paid a
heavy price for it. In fighting for it they have tasted more despair
than hope, more disappointment than success and more chastise­
ment than reward. Theirs has not been an easy victory, nor for
that matter has it brought them all that they had fought for.
Surely they would not have struggled so hard i f they had not
thought that something o f real value was at stake. What it was
has been described earlier.
A perusal of the foregoing chapters will bring out one point
quite clearly. At no stage was British imperialism in alliance with
the Muslims. Whenever there was a crucial decision to be made
by the British, it was not made in favour of the Muslims. Some­
times remedial measures were adopted to redress some grievous
wrong, but essentially the British policies were antagonistic to
the Muslims. This was partly due to the terrible prejudice that
1 See, for instance, Nehru's interview in Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir
(Princeton : 1954), p. 30.
RETRO SPECT 309

exists in Western lands against Islam and partly because in the

beginning, the Muslims were more hostile to British rule. Having
been ousted from all positions of profit they had been reduced
to penury and left for long to sink i n despair. Only then some
attention, far from any standards of adequacy, was paid to them.
When it was found that neither through influence, nor through
wealth, nor through the charity of their neighbours, the Hindus,
because that charity was never forthcoming, could they hope to
be elected to local bodies, were separate electorates conceded to
them. And the Congress all the time, except in the Congress­
League Pact of 1 9 1 6, tried to undo the separate electorates and
the British never stopped expressing their regret that such an
institution had to be conceded. Of course, the Congress and the
British both knew that no Muslim with any regard for Muslim
interests and with an iota of independence could be elected
through any other system. The other concession they received was
weightage in the provinces where they were in a minority, that
is, they were given more seats than their numbers warranted. The
Muslims had to pay a heavy price for this "boon". They had to
sacrifice their majorities in the Panja b and Bengal.
Throughout the Muslim struggle for safeguards they had to
fight for every single demand. And every demand was tenaciously
resisted by the Congress. The British yielded only when it became
manifest to them that otherwise it would result in such gross
injustice that the Muslims would become desperate. As rulers they
had to maintain some semblance of holding the balance even.
Besides, they had learnt from the bitter experience of dealing with
the Muslims that they could not be thrown into a state of des­
peration without serious consequences.
The Muslims had earlier been the most doughty fighters against
the British Government in spite of their grinding poverty. Saiyid
Ahmad Shahid had fought against the Sikhs for five years when
he lost his life in the Battle of Balakot in May 1 83 1 . Despite a
crushing blow that the movement received in that disaster, the
Saiyid's followers, dubbed somewhat incorrectly as 'Indian
310 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P AK I S TA N

Wahabis' by British writers, did not give u p the effort and they
continued to give trouble to the Sikhs and later to the British
when they annexed the Sikh territories. Indeed in 1 863 the British
had to send two European and six native regiments against the
'Wahabi' stronghold of Sithana in the north-western hills, which
was bravely defended and the British force was held at bay. The
expedition suffered such severe losses that at one time the gov­
ernment thought of withdrawing it. Saiyid Ahmad Shahid's move­
ment was not limited to fighting on the north-west frontier. It
spread disaffection against British rule among the Muslims of
North India , Bihar and Bengal. It caused considerable headache
to the British wbo did not find it easy to cope with it despite
stern measures and deterrent punishments. 2 In 1 857 the Muslims
had provided a number of outstanding generals, organizers and
fighters to the rebellion. 3 Even with the help of a leader like
Syed Ahmed Khan, the British had not found it easy to wean
the Muslims away from their sullen dislike of British rule. 4 After
the First World War, the Muslims had organized a mass move­
ment of tremendous proportions to protest a gainst the dismember­
ment of the Ottoman Empire. 5 During the Khilafat Movement,
the Muslims co-operated with the Congress with great abandon,
so that in the word s of the famous "untouchable" leader Ambed­
kar : "the effect . . . upon the dimensions of the Congress was
tremendous". "The Congress", in the words of the same author,
"was really made great and powerful not by the Hindus but by
the Muslims. "6 Once roused, the Muslims could not be suppressed
easily. Therefore they could be ignored or alienated only upto a
point . This was understood by the British because of their long
experience in dealing with the Indian Muslims. The British had
2 I. H. Qureshi, The Afuslim Comm1111ity oftlze Inda-Pakistan Subcontinelll,
op. cit., Chapter X.
3 Ibid., Chapter XI .
4 Ibid. , Chapter XII .
5 Ibid. , Chapter XIII.
6 Quoted in A . B. Rajput, op. cit., p. 53.
RETROSPECT 31 1

learnt not to exasperate the Muslims. This lesson was never learnt
by the Hindus who never tried to conciliate them and always
resisted any demand put forward by the Muslims.
Muslims not favoured
It has been described in the previous chapters how the British
plans were drawn to appease the Hindus rather than to meet the
demands of the Muslims. At every turn the British discouraged
the Muslims from seeking their destiny of independent existence.
The Cripps offer included the clause regarding the right of the
provinces to refrain from accession to the Indian Union because
the British Government had felt that this would persuade the
Muslims to remain within the Indian Union. At least this was
their hope. Besides, if the Muslims of Bengal had been pushed
into exasperation, the very purpose of the o ffer would have been
lost, because Bengal was on the front line of the war with the
Japanese. A Bengal in flames would have invited Japanese inva­
sion. The 'Quit India' Movement of 1 942 l aunched by the Cong­
ress resulted in a short-lived cessation of British rule in the Hindu
majority areas of Bihar and Eastern United Provinces. If this had
happened in East Bengal with its delta and riverine terrain, the
story might have been different. The Cabinet Mission Plan was
calculated to kill Pakistan. And when it came to the installation
of an interim government, the plighted word of the British Gov­
ernment was dishonoured because it was considered unthinkable
that the League should be installed into office. When the erst­
while allies of the Congress, the Labour Party came into power,
the advice of the Viceroy was ignored and a Congress govern­
ment was installed as the rulers of India. The fact that undiluted
Congress rule in the provinces had resulted in gross injustice to
the Muslim minorities and had inflamed Muslim opinion was
forgotten. The dangerous state of tension that had been built up
since then was ignored. Muslim sentiment was treated with con­
tempt. And yet it was the Muslim nation that was dubbed as
the ally and agent of British imperialism by the Congress.
312 T H E STR U G G L E F O R P AK I ST A N

I t was not the British who ultimately created Pakistan. The

perverse policies of the Congress which knew no compromise
reduced the Cabinet Plan to an absurdity. If the Congress argu­
ments were correct, where was the need of the elaborate scheme ?
A simple statement regarding the constitution of a Union Con­
stituent Assembly would have been sufficient. Only when it was
apparent that otherwise the Muslims would be massacred in large
numbers was the League permitted to join the Interim govern­
ment. Then it became apparent that any Hindu-Muslim coalition,
unless it was totally subservient to the Hindus, could not work.
And it also became apparent that a single Hindu dominated Con­
stituent Assembly would have neither the grace nor the wisdom
to write a constitution that could be even remotely acceptable to
the Muslims. The British knew that the Muslims would rather
die than sacrifice their right to exist as a people ; but the Hindus
refused to take the Muslims seriously even at that juncture.
When all possibilities of compromise were brushed aside by
Hindu obduracy, the British at last prevailed upon the Hindus
to realize that a community of a hundred million could not be
made the unwilling citizens of a new state. It was ultimately this
realization that made Pakistan possible.
A Hindu plan
The Hindu propaganda ignores the fact that the 3 June plan which
brought Pakistan into existence was drawn up by Menon, a
Congress minded Hindu who was the only Indian on the staff
of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. They forget that an earlier
plan, because obviously it was a little more favourable to the
Muslims, was condemned by Menon and indignantly rejected by
Nehru, who approved Menon's scheme. During all this time
Jinnah was not consulted. Indeed he was not even given an inkling
that such important matters were under discussion.
Indeed so obliging was Attlee's government that Wavell had
been dismissed at the request of the Congress without as much
as a word of appreciation for his services. In his place was
appointed Mountbatten, once again to please the Congress. He
R E T RO S P E CT 313

fully justified his choice by assiduously cultivating Nehru's friend­

ship. Even Lady Mountbatten befriended Nehru to an extent
that, according to Abul Kalam Azad, she came to exercise greater
influence upon Nehru than even his clcsest associates. One only
wonders who exercised greater influence upon whom, but one is
certain that all these friendships cost the Muslims dear. So did
the friendship between Nehru's daughter Indira and Mount-
'
batten's trusted Campbell-Johnson. 7
Of course Mountbatten's pet aversion was Jinnah as would be
apparent to any one who reads Campbell-Johnson's tendentious
but revealing book. When the plan was put before Attlee's cabinet
it took it not more than five minutes to approve it, even though
it was to decide the fate of millions of human beings. It is obvious
that what the Prime Minister and his cabinet had in view was the
pleasure of Nehru. The plan must be all right if it had his approval.
Attlee was not able to conquer his aversion to Jinnah even twelve
years after the creation of Pakistan, when he said in a filmed
television interview that he had never liked Jinnah. The main
reason for this dislike conveyed by the interview is that Attlee
had not liked the partition of India.8 If Attlee found the founda­
tion of Pakistan so disagreeable in 1959, how could he have been
partial to it in 1 947 ? It is obvious that Pakistan was wrested by
the Muslims under Jinnah's determined leadership and not con­
ceded either by the British or the Hindus. All that can be said is
that Attlee saw the wisdom in overcoming his aversion in the
interest of an orderly withdrawal from the subcontinent .
Subsequent policies o f Great Britain and the USA alike have
shown that there has always been the desire to woo India, which is
natural in view of India's size and importance. But this does not
support the thesis that Pakistan is the creation of British imperial­
ism to secure for it a base in Asia for furthering its policies. It
was India which was to play this role. The well known Indian
historian, Pannikar, outlined before Indian independence the role
7 Vide supra, p. 294.
s The film was shown on BBC television on 3 January, 1 959. The details
of the interview appeared in Dawn (Karachi), 4 January 1 9 59.
 3 14 T H E S T RU G G L E F O R P A K I ST A N

of lndia as a stabilizing factor in Asia .9 Obviously this was to be

done in co-operation with the western powers. That dream is
finding fulfilment now in the shape of massive assistance to India
to enable her ostensibly to resist China.
A raw deal
If further proof were needed to counter Hindu propaganda, it
would be found in the unfair boundary award in which all legiti­
mate Muslim interests were sacrificed with the dual purpose of
placating the Hindus and injuring the viability of Pakistan. Not a
single area on which the Hindus could have staked even the
shadow of a claim fell to the lot of the Muslims. Areas where
the Muslims were in a majority went to the Hindus. headworks
of canals that irrigated Pakistan areas went to the Hindus,
corridors through overwhelming Muslim areas to provide access
to India to isolated tracts went to the Hindus, and, most of all,
the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur went to the Hindus
so that they might have access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Wherever it was even remotely possible to fa vour India, Pakistan
was given a raw deal.
The Muslim pleas for a better organized division were dis­
missed . The implementation was hastened purposely. The Pakistan
sector of the government was given no time to develop even a
skeleton organization. The Centrnl secretariat began to function
in hastily improvised shacks, without records, without furniture,
and even without paper or pencils. Officials sat on deal boxes and
organized an administration as best as they could . India refused
to transfer any movable assets that had been assigned to Pakistan.
Even the working cash balances were transferred later at Gandhi's
intervention. It is obvious why the Hindus and the British alike
expected Pakistan to collapse within the first few weeks. The
transfer of authority was a mere legal formality so far as Pakistan
was concerned. What had really been handed over was undiluted
chaos. The two major provinces of Panjab and Bengal were dis-
9 K. M. Pannikar, lrtdia and the Indian Ocean (London: 1 9 5 1 ) . The 1 945
edition-now out of print-is much more revealing.
RETROSPECT 315

organized because of a hasty partition. Lahore was in flames and

the North-West Frontier Province was in the hands of a Congress
ministry, Kalat was intriguing with India and there was no
central administration worth the name. All this was due to the
fact that in implementing the 3 June plan no heed was given to
the need of handing over Pakistan territories to the League gov­
ernment in a reasonably orderly condition. Could this possibly
have been done to help the Muslims ?
The Hindus had high hopes that Pakistan would not survive
and that the Muslims would go back begging for reunion. The
basis of these hopes was not that the Muslims would suffer pangs
of separation and would yearn to be taken back into the affect­
ionate arms of Mother India. The hope was based on the solid
fact that all that was humanly possible to make the survival of
Pakistan impossible had been done. Her boundaries had been
mutilated, a stranglehold had been established upon her irriga­
tion system, her legitimate shsre of the necessary assets to run an
orderly government was unlawfully seized, and even the records
so necessary for con tinuing the administration were either not
transferred or destroyed in transit. It is sufficient to prove the
ma/a jides of the boundary award that otherwise there could be
no sense in putting the headworks just on the wrong side of the
border, because those hcadworks could have no use for the
Indians except the malicious one of stopping water from flowing
into Pakistan.
It was "a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan" which was more
or less flung into the face of the Muslims in the hope that they
would either reject it or after accepting it, would find it impossible
to keep it alive. So great, however, was the Muslim desire for
independent existence that they accepted the challenge and kept
the country alive despite the expectations of their opponents.
Western interest

Western interest i n the survival of Pakistan can be judged by the

fact that in the first instance Mountbatten moved heaven and
earth to become the common Governor-General of India and
316 T H E S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A N

Pakistan. By his previous record . it would have been rank folly

to accept that prop.Jsition . As he was never motivated by affec­
tion fo r the M uslims, or for Pakistan, or for Jinnah, the desire
could not have been based on friendly intentions towards Pakistan.
As Governor-General of pre-p3rtition India and later as Gover­
nor-General of India, he d id all he could to injure the Muslims.
His i nsistence upon being nominated the Governor-General of
Pakistan as well could only reflect his intention , once in a position
of vantage, to demonstrate to the world that Pakistan could not
be made a workable proposition. His identification with India
was so complete that on Independence Day in New Delhi people
shouted "Pandit Mountbatten ki jai". Surely this popularity was
not earned solely for being the presiding agent in the liquidation
of British rule in the subcontinent.
It is common knowledge that during the height of American
influence in Pakistan, pressure was continuously exercised upon
the government to enter into some kind of a confedera tion with
India. Of course it could not be unknown to experienced American
politicians that such a step would be the end of Pakistan's inde­
pendent existence.
The western powers follow what they call "their global stra­
tegy". This strategy is better served by a strong India. It does not
favour the existence of small countries. A big united subcontinent
can be a better arsenal of western arms than a small Pakistan . This
strategy cannot waste any thought on such petty considerations
as the right of a people to a sep1rate existence, if it desires it,
for strategy is amoral and has n o room fo r higher values like
justice. The democratic right of peoples to live can be bartered
away in the defence of "democracy". In such a dispensation,
Pakistan is expendable. In the defence of "democracy" the crea­
tion of a subordinate Indian imperialism is necessary, therefore
it is justified . First attempts were made to build up the leadership
of India in South Asia through diplomacy and propaganda. A s
that d id not succeed, Indian leadership should be imposed b y
building India up as the mightiest power in Asia and in the
RETRO SPECT 317

Indian Ocean for the purposes o f "stability". How can i t be

argued under these circumstances that Pakistan could possibly
become a mainstay of western imperialism in Asia without court­
ing destruction ?
Therefore the thesis that Pakistan was created by the British
to serve the i nterests of "Western imperialism" should be dis­
missed as a gross travesty of known facts and developments.
Nations do not come into existence to oblige others. Countries
do not strive to remain alive if they do not possess a soul and the
soul of a country is its intense desire for separate existence.
Pakistan came into existence as the result of the successful struggle
of the Muslims of the subccntinent against two imperialisms,
British and Hindu.
There would have been no incentive to carry on this struggle
if the Muslims had not been impelled by the forces of history to
seek self-realization as a sovereign and independent people. These
forces were created by their own outlook on life and their intense
consciousness of their uniqueness. They were sustained by their
desire to maintain their entity and not to lose it by being reduced
to a mere minority struggling all the time to keep its head barely
above the tides of influences subversive of its sense of values and
spiritual heritage. These feelings being the essence of all nation­
alism, the Muslims were a nation, distinct and separate from the
other communities of the subcontinent. They had possessed the
ingredients of nationhood even when nationalism was not the
force in the world that it is today. Only they had not discovered
their nationhood . This discovery could not have been delayed
much longer. When the fetters of a common bondage were snapp­
ed, the illusion of a single nationhood would have perished
without any other impetus, because the distinctiveness and the
desire to maintain it had always been there.
It was fortunate that the fact of the nationhood of the Muslim
community of this subcontinent was emphasized and recognized
at the opportune time. Any delay would have caused too great a
dislocation and misery, because if it had been d iscovered and
318 T H E STRU G GL E FOR PAKISTAN

asserted after the transfer of po\ver to the Hindus in a united

India, efforts wou!J have been made by the Indian government
to supp1ess its manifestations and nothing but conflict would
have emerged from such efforts. Either a strong and intolerant
Hindu imperia lism would have reduced a nation of a hundred
million to a sullen and useless minority nursing a grievance against
life and therefore open to all subversive influences or a rebellion
le::tding to a protracted civil war would haw sapped the resources
of India and stopped the development of the areas now con­
stituting Pakistan . Any of these contingencies would have retarded
the progress of Asia :ind tempted selfish powers to intervene and
establish their held in an area whose freedom is vital for the
freedom of the major portion of the entire continent.

A union could not last

There are some who express regret at the fact that the Congress
d id not permit the implementation of the Cabinet Plan whereby
the unity of the subcontinent could have been maintained. This
hope would have proved a delusion . The fissures went too deep to
be removed by such flimsy patching. Quarrels would have arisen
over the jurisdiction of the Union government and would have
brought about constant friction. The net result would have been
the same as was intended to be avoided by not establishing a
simple federation. The Muslims would have discovered that their
quarrels with the Union government were treated as domestic
squabbles by world opinion and that they were helpless in the
face of a determined central authority backed by a community
that possessed superior resources in addition to being in an over­
whelming majority. If the plain terms of the plan could be inter­
preted to their disadvantage even when the Congress had yet not
captured power, how could a nicely balanced constitutional
arrangement l ike the one envisaged in the Plan be operated with
fairness when those very interpreters were to be in power ?
It is true that an unjust boundary award has caused headaches
to the Pakistanis and created problems for them with which they
have been struggling all these years. It is also true that a hasty
RETROSPECT 3 19

and utterly mismanaged partition created chaos in the beginning

a nd Pakistan was deprived cf its proper share in the assets. Des­
pite all this and the resultant frustration in the minds of the
people of Pakistan, it is obvious that the outcome has proved
infinitely better than any attempt at union with India could have
been for all concerned. The PElkistanis have attained a sovereign
status which they are busy u tilizing for their economic growth
and for removing ignorance and poverty from their homeland.
The psychological adjustment to much reduced territories has not
been as difficult as it would have been to the inferior status of
being a dependent people. India has found it more difficult to
reconcile herself to the existence of Pakistan but this is an unwise
attitude. The suppression of the desires of such a large community
for independent existence would have put too great a strain upon
her material and moral resources. Those who regret the partition
of the subcontinent from the standpoint of view of their 'global
strategy' forget that a smaller u nited India can be a better prop
for their policies than a bigger India torn by inner dissensions and
reeking with discontent could ever be.
In any case Pakistan has contributed to the stability, peace and
prosperity of the region. This has already made life richer and
more fruitful for its people. Their freedom from the inhibitions
that lack of independence would have imposed may lead to the
flowering of their genius in a manner that they make some signifi­
cant contribution to the thought and culture of the world.
 A ppendix A

Jinnah's Fourteen Points

The following draft resolution circulated to members of the Mus­

lim League embodies the points :
"Whereas the basic idea on which the All Parties Conference
was called in being and a Convention summoned at Calcutta
during Christmas Week 1 928, was that a scheme of reforms should
be formulated and accepted and ratified by the foremost political
organizations in the country as a National Pact ; and whereas the
Report was adopted by the Indian National Congress only con­
stitutionally for the one year ending 3 1 st December 1 929, and i n
the event o f the British Parliament not accepting it within the time
limit, the Congress stands committed to the policy and programme
of complete independence by resort to civil disobedience and non­
payment of taxes ; and whereas the attitude taken up by the Hindu
Mahasabha from the commencement through their represent­
atives at the Convention was nothing short of an ultimatum, that,
if a single word in the Nehru Report in respect of communal settle­
ment was changed they would immediately withdraw their support
to it; and whereas the National Liberal Federation delegates at
322 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I STAN

the Convention took up an attitude of benevolent neutrality, and

subsequently in their open session at Allahabad, adopted a non­
committal policy with regard to the Hindu-Muslim differences ;
and whereas the non-Brahmin and depressed classes are entirely
opposed to it ; and whereas the reasonable and moderate propo­
sals put fo rward by the delegates of the All-India Muslim League
at the Convention in modification were not accepted, the Muslim
League is unable to accept the Nehru Report.
"The League after anxious and careful consideration most earn­
estly and emphatically lays down that no scheme for the future
constitution of the Government of India will be acceptable to
Mussalmans of India until and unless the following basic principles
are given effect to and provisions are embodied therein to safe­
guard their rights and interests :
( 1 ) The form of the future constitution should be federal with
the residuary powers vested in the provinces ;
(2) A uniform measure of autonomy shall be granted to all
provinces ;
(3) Ali legislatures in the country and other elected bodies shall
be constituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective
representation of minorities in every province without reducing
the majority in any province to a minority or even equality ;
(4) Jn the Central Legislature, Mussalman representation shall
not be less than one third ;
(5) Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by
means of separate electorates as at present : provided it shall be
open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate
electorate in favour of joint electorate ;
(6) Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be
necessary shall not in any way, affect the Muslim majority in the
Panjab, Bengal and North-West Frontier Province ;
(7) Full religious liberty i. e . , liberty of belief, worship and ob­
servance, propaganda, association and education, shall be gua­
ranteed to all communities ;
APPENDIX A 323

(8) No bill or resolution or any part thereof shall be passed i n

any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the
members of any community in that particular body oppose such
a bill, resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would . be
injurious to the i nterests of that community or i n the alternative,
such other method is devised as may be found feasible and prac­
ticable to deal with such cases ;
(9) Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency :
(10) Reforms should be i ntroduced i n the North-West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as i n the other
provinces ;
( 1 1 ) Provision should be made i n the constitution giving Mus­
lims an adequate share alongwith the other Indian s, in all the
services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due
regard to the requirements of efficiency ;
( 1 2) The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for
the protection of Muslim culture and for the protection and pro­
motion of Musli m education, language, religion . personal laws
and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in the
grants-in-aid given by the State and by local self-governing bodies ;
( 1 3) No cabinet, either central or provincial, should be formed
without there being a proportion of at least one-third Muslim
ministers ;
( 1 4) No change shall be made i n the constitution by the Central
Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting
the Indian Federation."
The draft resolution also mentions a n alternative to some of
the above provisions i n the following terms :
"That, i n the present circumstances, representation of Mussal­
mans in the different legislatures of the country and other elected
bodies through the separate electorates is inevitable and further,
the Government being pledged over and over again not to disturb
this franchise so granted to the Muslim community since 1 909
till such time as the Mussalmans choose to abandon it, the Mussa!-
324 T H E S T R U G G LE FOR P A K I S TAN

mans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is actually

constituted into a separate province and reforms in fact are intro­
duced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on
the same footing as in other provinces.
"Further, it is provided that there shall be reservation of seats
according to the Muslim population in the various provinces ; but
where Mussalmans are in a majority they shall not contest more
seats than their population warrants.
"The question of excess representation of Mussalmans over and
above their population in Provinces where they are in a minority
is to be considered hereafter."
Appendix B
Extract from Iqbal's Presidential Address before
All India Muslim League (29 December, 1930)
What, then, is the problem and its implications ? Is religion a
private affair ? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and poli­
tical ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of lslam as Christ­
ianity has already met in Europe ? Is it possible to retain Islam
as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national
polities, in which a religious attitude is not permitted to play any
part ? This question becomes of special importance in India where
the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that
religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the
lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as
a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its
gaze entirely on the world of spirit led, by a logical process of
thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of
the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Qur'an,
however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense
of a purely biological event, happening inside the experient and
necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is indivi­
dual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome
is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose
civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin
is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organ­
ically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection
of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. There­
fore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a
displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, i s simply un­
thinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present
moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man", says
Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion , nor
by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges.
A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart,
creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation". Such a
326 T H E S T RU G G L E FOR P AK I S T A N

formation is quite possible, though it involves the l o n g a n d a r­

duous process of practica l ly remaking men and furnishing them
with a fresh emotiona l equipment . It might have been a fact in
India if the teachings of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had
seized the i magination of the ma sses of thi s country. Experience,
however, shows that the various caste-units and rel igious units in
I ndia have shown no incl ination to sink their respective ind i vi­
dualities i n a larger whole. Each group i s intensely jealous of its
collective existence. The format ion of the kind of moral conscious­
ness which constitutes t he essence of a nation in Renan's sense
demands a price which the peoples of Indi a are not prepared to
pay. The unity of an Ind ian nation. therefore, must be sought,
not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation
of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however
unpleasant they may be . The only practical course is not to assume
the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to
recognize facts a s they are, a nd to exploit them to our greatest
advantage . . . And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this
direction that the fate of India as well a s Asia really depends.
India i s Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affini­
ties with nations in the east a nd part with nations in the middle
and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is dis­
covered in India, it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this
ancient land wh ich has suffered so long, more because of her
situation in historic space than because of a ny inherent incapacity
of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire politica l
problem of Asia.
It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to d iscover
such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed . Why have
they fa i led ? Perhaps we suspect each other's intent i o ns and in­
wardly a i m at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher i n­
terests of mutual co-operation, we cannot a fford to part with the
monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands a nd
concea l our egoism under the cloak of a n ationalism, outw8rdly
simulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narro w­
m inded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling t o recognize
A P P EN D IX B 327 ·

that each group has a right to free development according to its

own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our
failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direc­
tion of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been
able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring
that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and
free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in
his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of permanent
communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the
freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free
development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of
narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communal­
isms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will toward
other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest res­
pect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of
other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teaching
of the Qur'an, even to defend their places of worship, if need be.
Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life
and behaviour and which has formed me what I am by giving me
its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby re­
creating its whole past as a living factor in my present conscious­
ness . . .
Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the
formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The
units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries.
India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races,
speaking different languages and professing different religions.
Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-con­
sciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group.
The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India
without recognizing the fact of communal groups. The Muslim
demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, there­
fort>, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim
Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble
ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the
328 T H E S TR U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them

chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent
in them. And I have no doubt that this House will emphatically
endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution . Per­
sonally, I would go further than the demands embodied in it.
I would like to see the Panjab, North- West Frontier Province,
Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-gov­
ernment within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the
formation of a consolidated North- West Indian Muslim State
appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of
North- West India.1

1 The italics are n o t in t h e original.

 Appendix C
Pakistan Resolution of the All India Muslim League
(24 March, 1940)
While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council
and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as
indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 1 7th and
1 8th of September and 22nd of October 1 939, and 3rd of Feb­
ruary 1 940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All­
India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of
federation embodied in the Government o f India Act, 1 935, is
totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of
this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.
It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration
dated the 1 8th of October 1 939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of
His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares
that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act,
1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various
parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will
not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered
de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the
Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.
,,

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the

All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be
workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it
is designed on the following ba sic principles 1•iz. , that geogra­
phically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which
should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as
may be necessa ry, that the areas in which the Muslims are numer­
ically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of
India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in
which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be
specifically provided in the Constitution for Minorities in these
units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cul·
330 THE STRU G G L E FOR P A K I S TAN

tural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and in­

terests in consultation with them and m other parts of India
where the Mussalmans a re in a m inority adequate, effective and
mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the Con­
stitution for them and other Minorities for the protection of their
religious, cultural , economic, p;:ilitical, admin istrative and other
rights and interests in consultation with them .

This Session further authorizes the working Committee to

frame a scheme of Constitution in accordance with these bas ic
principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective
regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communi­
cations, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.
 Appendix D
Extract from Jinnah's speech supporting
the Resolution
The problem in India i s not of an inter-communal character but
manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such.
So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any
Constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will
prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans but
to the British and Hindus also. If the British Government are
really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the
people of this subcontinent, the only course open to us all is to
allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India
into 'autonomous national states' . There is no reason why these
states should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand
the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one
to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy
over the other in the government of the country will disappear.
It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts
between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their
neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the
more easily with regard to Minorities by reciprocal arrangements
and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which
will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and
interests of Muslims and various other Minorities.
It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail
to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are
not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact,
different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the
Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and
this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the
limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead
India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The
Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philoso­
phies, social customs, literatures. They neither inter-marry nor
inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civil-
332 TH E S TRU G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

izations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and concep­

tions. Their concepts on life and of life are different. It is quite
clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their i nspiration from
different sources of history. They have different epics, different
heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe
of the other and , likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To
yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a
numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to
growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may
be so built up for the government of such a state . . .
Mussalmans are not a Minority as it is commonly known and
understood. One has only got to look around. Even today, accord­
ing to the British map of India, 4 out of 1 1 provinces, where the
Muslims dominate more or less, are functioning notwithstanding
the decision of the Hindu Congress High Command to non­
co-operate and prepare for civil disobedience. Mussalmans are a
nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must
have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish to
live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and
independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest
our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way
that we think best and i n consonance with our own ideals and
according to the genius of our people. Honesty demands and the
vital interests of millions of our people impose a sacred duty
upon us to find an honourable and peaceful solution, which
would be just and fair to all . But at the same time we cannot be
moved or diverted from our purpose and objective by threats or
intimidations. We must be prepared to face all difficulties and con­
sequences, make all the sacrifices that may be required of us to
achieve the goal we have set in front of us.
 Appendix E
Cripps Proposals (30 March, 1942)
His Majesty's Government therefore make the following decla­
ration :
(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be
taken to set up in India , in the manner described hereafter, an
elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution
for India.
(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participa­
tion of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.
(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and imple­
ment forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to :
(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not pre­
pared to accept the new constitution to retain its present
constitutional position, provision being made for its sub­
sequent accession if it so decides. With such non-acceding
Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Govern­
ment will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution,
giving them the same full status as Indian Union , and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.
(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making
body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising
out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British
to Indian hands ; it will make provision, in accordance with
the undertakings given by His Majesty's government, for
the protection of racial and religious minorities ; but will
not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian
Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other
member States of the British Commonwealth.
(iii) Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the
constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of
its treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in
the new situation.
334 THE S TR U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as follows,

unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities
agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities :
Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial
elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire
membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures
shall, as a single electoral college, prcceed to the election of the
constitution-making body by the system of proportional repre­
sentation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of
the number of the electoral college.
Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the
same proportion to their total population as in the case of the
representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same
powers as the British Indian members.
(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until
the new constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government
must inevitably bear the respon sibility for and retain control and
direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort,
but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and
material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Gov­
ernment of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India .
His Majesty's government desire and invite the immediate and
effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of
the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Common­
wealth and of the United Nations . Thus they will be enabled t o
give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task
which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.
 Appendix F
Cabinet Mission Proposals

1 5. . . .
We recommend that the Constitution should take the following
basic form :
( 1 ) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British
India and the States which should deal with the following subjects :
Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications ; and should have
the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above
subjects.
(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature con­
stituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any ques­
tion raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should
require for its decision a majority of the representatives present
and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a
majority of all the members present and voting.
(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary
powers should vest in the Provin ces.
(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than
those ceded to the Union.
(5) Provinces should be free to form groups with Executives and
Legislatures, and each group could determine the Provincial sub­
jects to be taken in common.
(6) The Constitutions of the Union and of the groups should
contain a provision whereby any Province could by a majority
vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a reconsideration of the
terms of the Constitution after an initial period of ten years and
at ten-yearly intervals thereafter.
1 6 . It is not our object to lay out the details of a Constitution
on the above programme but to set in motion machinery whereby
a Constitution can be settled by Indians for Indians.
It has been necessary, however, for us to make this recommenda­
tion as to the broad basis of the future Constitution because it
336 T H E S T R U G G LE F O R P A K I STAN

became clear to us in the course of our negotiations that not until

that had been done was there any hope of getting the two major
communities to join in the setting up of the constitution-making
machinery.
1 7. We now indicate the constitution-making machinery which
we propose should be brought into being forthwith in order to
enable a new Constitution to be worked out.
1 8 . In fo rming any assembly to decide a new constitutional
structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate
a representation of the whole population as is possible. The most
satisfactory method obviously would be by election based on adult
franchise, but any attempt to introduce such a step now would
lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new
Constitution . The only practicable course is to utilize the recently
elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as electing bodies. There
are , however, two factors in their composition which make this
difficult. First, the numerical strengths of Provincial Legislative
Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total popuia­
tion in each Province. Thus, Assam, with a population of 10
million, has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal,
with a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only
250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to Minorities by the
Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in
each Provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to
their numbers in the Province. Thus the number of seats reserved
for Moslems in the Benga l Legislative Assembly is only 48 per
cent of the total, although they form 55 per cent of the provincial
population. After a most careful consideration of the various
methods by which these points might be corrected, we have come
to the conclusion that the fairc:st and most practicable plan would
be-
(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional
to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million,
as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage ;
 AP P EN D I X F 337

(b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main

communities in each Province in proportion to their popula­
tion ;
(c) to provide that the representatives allocated to each com­
munity in a Province shall be elected by members of that
community in its Legislative Assembly.
We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognize
only three main communities in India, General, Moslem and Sikh,
the 'General' community including all persons who are not Mos­
lems or Sikhs. As smaller Minorities would upon a population
basis have little or no representation, since they would lose the
weightagc which assures them seats in Provincial Legislatures, we
have made the arrangements set out in paragraph 20 below to give
them a full representation upon all matters of special interest to
Minorities.
1 9 . (i) . . .1
(ii) It is the intention that the States would be given i n the final
Constituent Assembly appropriate representation which would
not, on the basis of the calculation of population adopted for
British India, exceed 93 ; but the method of selection will have to
be determined by consultation. The States would in the prelimi­
nary stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee.
(iii) Representatives thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as
soon as possible.
(iv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general
order of business will be decided, a chairman and other officers
elected and an Advisory Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on
rights of citizens, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas set
up. Thereafter the Provincial representatives will divide up into
three Sections shown under A, B and C in the Table of Representa­
tion in sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph.
t. The omitted portion in Paragraph 19 gives the grouping of the
provinces into sections as: (A) Madras. Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar,
Central Provinces and Orissa; (B) Punjab, North-West Frontier Province
and Sind and (C) Bengal and Assam. It also gives the number of seats
allocated community-wise to each province.
338 THE S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

(v) These Sections shall proceed to settle Provincial Constitu­

tions for the Provinces included in each Section and shall also
decide whether any group constitution shall be set up for those
Provinces and if so with what Provincial subjects the group should
deal. Provinces should have power to opt out of groups in accord­
ance with the provisions of sub-clause (viii) below.
(vi) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States
shall reassemble for the purpose of settlin g the Union Cons­
titution .
(vii) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the
provisions of paragraph 1 5 above or raising any major communal
issue shall require a majority of the representatives present and
voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of
the Assembly shall decide which, if any, res olu tio n s raise m ajor
communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the
representatives of either of the major communities, consult the
Federal Court before giving his decision.
(viii) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come
into operation it shall be open to any Province to elect to come
out of any group in which it has been placed. Such a d ecision shall
be taken by the Legislature of the Province after the first general
election under the new Constitution.
20. The Ad visory Committee on the rights of citizens, Minori­
ties and Tribal and E xcluded Areas V.'ill contain due representation
of the interests affected and their function will be a report to the
Union Constituent Assembly upon the list of fundamental rights,
clauses for protecting Minririties, and a scheme for the administra­
tion of Tribal and Excluded Areas, and to advise whether these
rights should be incorporated in the Provincial, the group or the
Union Constitutions.
2 1 . His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the Pro­
vincial Legislatures to proceed with the election of their repre­
sentatives and the States to set up a negotiating committee.
APPENDIX F 339

It is hoped that the process of constitution-making can proceed

as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the
interim period may be as short as possible.
22. It will be necessary to negotiate a treaty between the Union
Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for
certain matters arising out of the transfer of power.
Appendix G
Plan of 3 June, 1947
I . On February 20th, 1947, His Majesty's Government announc­
ed their intention of transferring power in British India to Indian
hands by June 1 948. His Majesty's Government had hoped that
it would be possible for the major parties to co-operate in the
working out of the Cabinet M ission's Plan of May 1 6th, 1946,
and evolve for India a Constitution acceptable to all concerned.
This hope has not been fulfilled .
2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of
Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces
and Berar, Assam, Orissa and the North-West Frontier Province,
and the representatives of Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have
already made progress in the task of evolving a new Constitution .
On the other hand, the Muslim League Party, including i n it a
majority of the representatives of Bengal, the Panjab and Sind as
also the representative of British Baluchistan, have decided not
to participate in the Constituent Assembly.
3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty's Government
that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of
the Indian people themselves. This task would have been greatly
facilitated if there had been agreement among the Indian political
parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the task of devising
a method by which the wishes of the Indian people can be as­
certained has devolved upon His Majesty's Government. After
full consultation with political leaders in India, His Majesty's Gov­
ernment have decided to adopt for this purpose the plan set out
below. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that they
have no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate Constitu­
tion for India ; this is a matter for the Indians themselves. Nor is
there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between com­
munities for a united India.
4. It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to inter­
rupt the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that
APPENDIX G 34 1

provision is made for certain Provinces specified below, His Maj­

esty's Government trust that, as a consequence of this announce­
ment the Muslim League representatives of those Provinces, a
majority of whose representatives are already participating i n it,
will now take their due share in its labours. At the same time, it
is clear that any Constitution framed by this Assembly cannot
apply to those parts of the country which are unwilling to accept
it . His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the procedure out­
lined below embodies the best practical method of ascertaining
the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether their
Constitution is to be framed : (a) in the existing Constituent
Assembly; or (b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly
consisting of the representatives of those areas which decide not
to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly. When this has
been done, it will be possible to determine the authority or autho­
rities to whom power should be transferred.
5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the
Panjab (excluding the European members) will therefore each be
asked to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim-majority
districts and the other the rest of the Province. For the purpose
of determining the population of districts, the 1 941 census figures
will be taken as authoritative. The Muslim-majority districts in
these two Provinces are set out in the Appendix to this announce­
ment .
6. The Members o f the two parts o f each Legislative Assembly
sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the
Province should be partitioned. If a simple m ajority of either part
decides in favour of partition, division will take place and arrange­
ments will be madl! accordingly.
7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desir­
able that the representatives of each part should know in advance
which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole would join
in the event of the two parts subsequently deciding to remain
united. Therefore, if any member of either Legislative Assembly
so demands, there shall be held a meeting of all members of the
342 T H E S T R U G G LE F O R P A KI S T A N

Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision

will be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the
Province as a whole would join if it were decided by the two
parts to remain united.
8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of
the Legislative Assembly wiil, on behalf of the areas they repre­
sent, decide which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to
adopt.
9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of parti­
tion, the Members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and
the Panjab will sit in two parts according to Muslim-majority dis­
tricts (as laid down in the Appendix) and non-Muslim-majority
districts. This is only a preliminary step of a purely temporary
nature as it is evident thc.t for the purposes of a final partition of
these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions will
be needed ; and as soon as a decision involving partition has been
taken for either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up
by the Governor-General, the membership and terms of reference
of which will be settled in consultation with those concerned. It
will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts
of the Panjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be instructed to
take into account other factors. Similar instructions will be given
to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report ofa Bound­
ary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional bounda­
ries indicated in the Appendix will be used.
10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European
Members) will, at a special meeting, also take its own decision
on the alternatives in paragraph 4 above.
1 1 . The position of the North-West Frontier Province is excep­
tional. Two of the three representatives of this Province are already
participating in the existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear,
in view of its geographical situation, and other considerations,
that if the whole or any part of the Panjab decides not to join the
existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to give the
APPEND I X G 343

North-West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its

position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made
to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North­
West Frontier Province to choose which of the alternatives men­
tioned in paragraph 4 above they wish to adopt. The referendum
will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General and in con­
sultation with the Provincial Government.
1 2 . British Baluchistan has elected a Member but he has not
taken his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its
geographical situation, this Province will also be given an oppor­
tunity to reconsider its position and to choose which of the alter­
native in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency the Gov­
ernor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be
done.
1 3. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province,
the district of Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predomi­
nantly Muslim. There has been a demand that, in the event of
the partition of Bengal, Sylhet should be amalgamated with the
Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if it is decided that Bengal
should be partitioned, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district
under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with
the Assam Provincial Government to decide whether the district
of Sylhet should continue to form part of the Assam Province or
should be amalgamated with the new Province of Eastern Bengal,
if that Province agrees. If the reforendum results in favour of
amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Commission with
terms of reference similar to those for the Panjab and Bengal will
be set up to demarcate Muslim-Majority areas of Sylhet district
and contiguous Muslim-majority areas of adjoining districts,
which will then be transferred to Eastern Bengal. The rest of the
Assam Province will in any case continue to participate in the
proceedings of the existing Constituent Assembly.
1 4. If it is decided that Bengal and the Panjab should be parti­
tioned, it will be necessary to hold fresh elections to choose their
representatives on the scale of one for every million of population
 344 T H E S T R U G G LE F O R P A K I S T A N

according to the principle contained in the Cabinet Mission's Plan

of May 1 6th, 1 946. Similar elections will also have to be held for
Sylhet in the event of it being decided that this district should
form part of East Bengal. The number of representatives to which
each area would be entitled is as follows :-

Province General Muslims Sikhs Total

Sylhet District I 2 Nil 3

West Bengal 15 4 Nil 19
East Bengal 12 29 Nil 41
West Panjab 3 12 2 17
East Panjab 6 4 2 12

1 5. I n accordance with the mandates given t o them, the repre­

sentatives of the various areas will either join the existing Con­
stituent Assembly or form the new Constituent Assembly.
16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible
on the administrative consequences of any partition that may have
been decided upon
(a) between the representatives of the respective successor auth­
orities about all subjects now dealt with by the Central
Government including Defence, Finance and Communica­
tions ;
(b) between different successor authorities and His Majesty's
Government for treaties in regard to matters arising out of
the transfer of power ;
(c) i n the case of Provinces that may be p:irtitioned, a s to the
administration of all Provincial subjects, such as the divi­
sion of assets and liabilities, the police and other Services,
the High Courts, provincial institutions, etc.
1 7. Agreements with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India
will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority.
1 8 . His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that the
decisions announced above relate only to British India and that
APP E N D I X G 345

their policy towards Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mis­

sion Memorandum of May 1 2th, 1 946, remains unchanged.
1 9. In order that the successor authorities may have time to
prepare themselves to take over power, it is important that all the
above processes should be completed as quickly as possible. To
avoid delay, the different Provinces or parts of Provinces will
proceed independently as far as practicable within the conditions
of this Plan. The existing Constituent Assembly and the new Con­
stituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame Constitutions
for their respective territories ; they will, of course, be free to frame
their own rules.
20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasized their
desire that there should be the earliest possible transfer of power
in India. With this desire His Majesty's Government are in full
sympathy, and they are willing to anticipate the date June 1 948
for the handing over of power by the setting up of an independent
Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier date. Ac­
cordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practic­
able way of meeting this desire, His Majesty's Government pro­
pose to introduce legislation during the current session for the
transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or
two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a
result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice to the
right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course
whether or not the part of India in respect of which they have
authority will remain within the British Commonwealth.
2 1 . His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time
make such further announcements as may be necessary in regard
to procedure or any other matters for carrying out the above
arrangements.
Annexure A

Muslim-majority districts of the Panjab and Bengal

according to 1941 Census (vide paragraph 5 of the statement)
1. P ANJAB

Lahore Division: Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhu­

pura, and Sialkot.
Rawalpindi Division: Attack, Gujrat, Jhelum, Mianwali, Rawal­
pindi, and Shahpur.
Multan Division: Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgo­
mery, Multan, and Muzaffargarh.
2. BENGAL
Chittagong Division: Chittagong, Noakhali, and Tipperah.
Dacca Division: Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur, and Mymensingh.
Presidency Division: Jessore, Murshidabad, and Nadia.
Rajshahi Division: Bogra, Dinajpur, Maida, Pabna, Rajshahi,
and Rangpur.
 Bibliography

Only such authorities have been included as have been actually

cited .
1. BOOKS

Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, Some Aspects of Pakistan (Lahore : 1 945).

Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, (Ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings
of Mr. Jinnah ( Lahore : 1 952, ed), (2 vols.).
Ahmad, Saeeduddin, The Communal Pattern of India (Lahore :
1 945 ed).
Al Carthill, The Lost Dominion (Edinburgh-London : 1 924).
Ali , C. Rahmat, Now or Never (Cambridge : 1 933).
Ali, C. Rahmat, The Mi/lat and tlze Menace of "Indianism"
(Cambridge : 1 940).
Ali, C. Rahmat, Pakistan (London : 1 947).
Ali, Mohamed, Select Writings and Speeches of Mau/ana
Mohamed Ali, compiled and edited by Afzal Iqbal (Lahore :
second edition, 1 963).
Ali, Mohamed, Thoughts on the Present Discontent (Bombay :
1907).
348 TH E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T A :S

All India Muslim League, Report of the Inquiry Committee

appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial
Muslim League to inquire into some grievances of Muslims in
Bihar (Patna : 1939) .
All India Muslim League, Report of the Inquiry Committee appoint­
ed by the Council of the A ll India Muslim League to inquire
into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces ( Delhi : 1 938) .
All India Muslim League, Resolutions of the A ll India Muslim
League from October 1937 to December 1938 (Delhi : n.d.).
All India Muslim League, Resolutions of the A ll India Muslim
League from December 1938 to March 1940 (Delhi : n.d.).
All I ndia Muslim League, Resolutions of the All India Muslim
League from April 1940 to April 1941 (Delhi : n.d.).
All India Muslim League, Resolutions of the A ll India Muslim
League from April 1942 to May 1943 ( Delhi : n.d.).
All Parties Conference, Report of tlze Committee appointed by
the Conference to determine the Principles of the Constitution
for India (Alla ha bad : 1928) .
Ambedkar, B . R . , Thoughts on Pakistan (Bombay : 1941).
Ambedkar, B . R . , Pakistan or the Partition of India ( Bombay :
1946).
Amery, L.S., India and Freedom (London : 1 942).
Ansari, Shaukatullah, Pakistan : The Problem of India (Lahore :
1 944).
Ashraf, Muhammad (comp), Cabinet .1.l!ission and After ( Lahore :
1946) .
Attlee, C.R., As It Happened (London : 1954).
Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom (Bombay : 1 959).
Bahadur, Lal, Tlze Muslim League (Agra : 1954).
Bhagat, K.P., A Decade of Inda-British Relations, 1 937- 1947
( Bombay : 1 959).
Bilgrami, Muhammad Abdul Qadir, Hindu-Muslim Ittihad par
khula khat Mahatma Gandhi ke nam (Aligarh : 1 925).
BIB LI O G RA P H Y 349

Birdwocd, Lord, A Continent Experiments (London : 1 945).

Birla, G.D . , In the Shadow of the lvfalzatma (Bombay : 1 953) .
Bonnerjee, W.C., Indian Politics (London : 1 898).
Braibanti, Ralph and Spengler, Joseph J., Tradition.. Values and
Socio-Economic Development (Durham N. C. : 1 96 1).
Brecher, Michael, Nehru: A Political Biography (Lendon : 1 9 59).
Cadogan, E .C.G., India We Saw (London : 1 933).
Campbell-Joh nson, A., Mission with Mountbatten (London :
1954).
Chakrabarty and Bhattacharyya, Congress in Evolution, Parts
I & II (Calcutta : 1935) .
Chaudhari, Nirad C. , The Autobiography of An Unknown Indian
(New York : 1951).
Connell, John, Auchin!ek, A Critical Biography (London : 1 959) .
Coupland, Reginald, India: A Re-statement (London : 1 945).
Coupland, Reginald, Report on the Constitutional Problem in
India (London : 1 942-43) (3 parts).
Coupland, Reginald, The Cripps Mission (London : 1 942).
Craddock, R.H., The Dilemma in India ( London : 1 929).
Craik, Henry, Impressions of India ( London : 1 908).
DeMello, F . M . , The Indian National Congress (London : 1 938).
Durand, Mortimer, Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir A lfred Comyn
Lyall (London : 1 9 13).
Durrani, F.K. K . , The Meaning of Pakistan (Lahore : 1944) .
El Hamza, Pakistan: A Nation (Lahore : 1 944).
Gopal , Ram, Indian Muslims, A Political Histo1�v (1858-194 7)
(Bombay : 1 9 59).
Graham, G.F.I., The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan
(London : 1 909 ed. ) .
Gwyer, Maurice and Appadorai , A. (Eds.), Speeches and Docu­
ments on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947 (Bombay : 1 957)
(2 vols.).
3 50 T H E S T R lJ G G L E F O R PA KISTAN

Haq, A.K . Fazlul, Muslim Sufferings under Congress R ule

(Calcutta : 1 939) .
Hardinge, Lord, My Indian Years 1910-1916 (London : 1 948).
History of the Freedom j\fovement (Karachi : 1 957-63)
( 3 vols.).
Hunter, W.W. , Our Indian Musa/mans (London : 1 871).
Indian National Congress, Congress and the War Crisis (Allah­
abad : 1 940).
Institute of Pacific Relations, Documents on the Indian Situation
since the Cripps Mission (New York : 1 942) .
Ismay, Lord, Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (London :
1960) .
Jack, Homer A . , (Ed .), The Gandhi Reader (New York : 1 958).
Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhri, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore :
1 961 ).
Khan, Abdul Waheed, India Wins Freedom : The O ther Side
(Karachi : 1961).
Khan, Sayyid Sirdar Ali, India of Today (Bombay : 1 908).
Khan, Sikandar Hayat, Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federa­
tion (Lahore : 1939).
Khan, Syed Ahn1cd, The Present State of Indian Politics
(Allahabad : 1 888) .
Khan, The Aga, Memoirs of the Aga Khan, World Enough and
Time (New York : 1 954) .
Knapland , Paul, Britain, Commonwealth and Empire, 1901-1955
(London : 1956).
Korbel, Joseph, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton : 1 954) .
Latif, S . Abdul, Th2 Cultural Problem of India (Bombay : 1 938).
Latif, S . Abdul, The Muslim Problem in India (Bombay: 1 939).
Lilly, W.S., India and its Problems ( London : 1 902).
Linlithgow, Lord, Speeches and Statements of the Marquess of
Linlithgow, 1936-1943 (Delhi : 1 945).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 35 1

Lumby, E.W. R . , The Transfer of Power in India, 1945- 1947

(London : 1 954.)
Manglori, Saiyid Tufail Ahmad, Musalmanon ka Rawshan Mus-
taqbil (Delhi : 1 945).
Mellor, Andrew, India since Partition (London : 1951).
Menon, V.P., The Transfer of Power in India (Calcutta : 1 957).
Minto, M.C. , India: Minto and Morley 1905-1910, compiled by
Mary, Countess of Minto (London : 1 934).
Mohamed Ali, See Ali, Mohamed,
Moon, Penderel, Divide and Quit ( London : 1 962).
Moraes, Frank, Jawaharlal Nehru (New York : 1 956).
Morley. John, Indian Speeches (London : 1 910).
Mosley, Leonard, The Last Days of the British Raj (London :
1 96 1 ) .
Mountbatten, Lord, Tim:: Only to Look Forward (London : 1 950).
Mowat, R.B., A History of European Diplomacy from 1815-1914
(London : 1 922).
Nanda, B.R., Mahatma Gandhi (London : 1 958)
Nehru, Jawaharlal, An Autobiography (London : 1 945).
Nehru, Jawaharlal, The Unity of India (London : 1 941).
Noman, Mohammad, Muslim India (Allahabad : 1 942).
O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, India as I knew it (London : 1 925).
Philips, C.H. (Ed.), The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-
1947 (London : 1 962).
Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, Evolution ofPakistan (Lahore : 1 963).
Polak, H.S. et-al, Mahatma Gandhi (London : 1 948).
Punjabi, A . Confederacy of India (Lahore : 1 939).
..

Pyarelnl, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase (Ahmedabad : 1 956).

(2 vols).
Qureshi, I.H., The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi
(Karachi : 1 958) .
352 T H E S TR U G G LE F O R P A K I S T A N

Qureshi, I . H . , The Muslim Community of the Inda-Pakistan Sub­

continent (The Hague : 1 962).
Qureshi, I.H . The Pakistani Way of Life (London : 1 957).
.

Rajput, A.B., Muslim League : Yesterday and Today (Lahore :

1 948) .
Ravoof, A.A. , Meet Mr. Jinnah (Lahore : 1 945 ed.).
Reading, Lord Gerald Rufus, Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of
Reading ( London : 1 942-45) .
Rees, J.D., The Real India (London : 1 908) .
Ronaldshay, Lord, Life ofLord Curzon (London : 1 928) (3 vols.).
Saiyid, M.H., Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study (Lahore :
1 962 ed .).
Shamloo, Speeches and State1nents of Iqbal (Lahore : 1 948).
Singh, Durlab, (Ed .), A Complete Record of Unity Talks (Lahore :
n.d.).
Sitaramayya, Pithabhi, History of the Indian National Congress,
Volume 1 (Madras : 1 935) ; Volume 2 (Bombay : 1 947).
Smith, Robert Aura, Divided India (New York : 1 947).
Stephens, Ian, Pakistan (London : 1 963).
Strachey, John, India ( London : 1 894 ed.) .
Suleri, Z . A . , The Road to Peace and Pakistan ( Lahore : 1 945) .
Symonds, Richard, The Making of Pakistan (London : 1 9 50).
Temple, Richard, India in 1880 (London : 1 880) .
Templewood, Lord, Nine Troubled Years (New York : 1 954) .
Tuker, Sir Francis, While Memory Serves (London : 1 950) .
Watson, A.H., Political Advance in India (London : 1 940).
Wavell, Lord, Speeches ofLord Wavell, 1943-1947 (Delhi : 1 948).
Wedderburn, W.J. , Allan Octavian Hume (London : 1 9 1 3) .
Wheeler-Bennett, W., King George VI: His Life and Reign
(London : 1 958) .
B I B LIOG R A P H Y 353

Wint, Guy, The British in Asia (London : 1 954 ed.).

Yeats-Brown, F., The Indian Pageant (London : 1 942) .
2. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

(Chronological�v arranged')
Reconstruction of the Provinces of Bengal and Assam (London :
1 905). Cmd. 6258.
Constitutional Reforms: Addresses presented in India to His Ex­
cellency the Viceroy afd the Rt. Hon. the Secretary of State
for India (London : 1 9 1 8) Cmd., 9 1 78.
Report of the Indian States Committee (London, 1 929) Cmd.,
3302.
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (London : 1930) Cmd.
3658, and Cmd . 3659.
Indian Round Table Conference (First Session) (London : 1 9 3 1 )
Cmd. 3778.
India in 1930-1931 (Delhi : 1 932).
Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session): Proceedings of
Committees (London : 1 932).
Communal Award (London : 1 932) Cmd., 4 1 47.
Proposals on the Indian Constitutional Reforms (London : 1 933)
Cmd . , 4268.
Government of India Act, 1935 ( London : 1 935).
Instruments of Instructions to the Governor-General and Gover­
nors (London : 1935) Cmd . , 4805.
Views of Indian States on the Government of India Bill: Corres­
pondence . . . Draft Instrument of Accession (London : 1 935)
Cmd., 4843.
Return Showing the Results of the General Election to the Legis­
lative Assembly in India, 1934 (London : 1935) Cmd . , 4939.
Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937 (London :
1935) Cmd., 5589.
354 T H E S T RU G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

India and the War (London : 1939) Cmd . , 6 1 2 1 .

India and the War ( London, 1 940) Cmd . , 621 9.
Review of Constitutional Developments in India from the Out­
break of War till July 1941 (London : 1 941).
Lord Privy Seal's Mission to India (London : 1 942) Cmd., 6350.
His j'lfajesty's Government's Statement on India of 14 June, 1945
(London : 1945)
Cabinet Mission Statement of 16 llfay, 1946 ( London : 1946)
Cmd . , 682 1 .
Prime Minister's Statement of 20 February, 1947 (London : 1 947)
Cmd . , 7047.
3. JoURNALS
Asiatic Review, London.
Comrade, Delhi.
Dhu' 1-qarnain, Badaun.
Eastern Times, Lahore.
Economist, London .
Empire Review, London.
Foreign Affairs, New York.
Fortnightly Review, London .
Harijan, Ahmedabad .
National Review, London.
New Statesmen. London.
Nineteenth Century, London .
Observer, London.
Quarterly Review, London.
Round Table, London.
Spectator, London .
Sunday Times, London.
Time and Tide, London .
4. DAILY NEWSPAPERS
Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore.
Daily Herald, London .
B I B LIO GRAPHY 355

Daily Telegrap h, London.

Glasgow Herald, Glasgow.
,�anchester Guardian, Manchester.
New York Times, New York.
News Chronicle, London.
Scotsman, Glasgow.
Statesman, Calcutta.
The Times. London.
The Times of India, Bombay.
5. OTHER PERIODICAL LITERATURE
House of Commons Debates, London.
House of Lords Debates, London.
Indian Annual Register, Calcutta.
Proceedings of the Indian Legislative Council, Calcutta.
 I n dex

Abdul Latif, Sayyid, 122-123-The 3 1 0-'.ldvises Muslims to keep away

Muslim Pl'ob/Pm in Jndia, 123-Sc­ from politics, 2 1 , 3 1 -attitude of, to­
heme for division of India, 1 22-123.
wards British rule in India, 1 9. 2 1 ,
Abdur Rahim, 6 5 .
22--career, 1 9-20-commentary o n
Abell, George, 280, 295, 296-opposcs
Bible, 2 1 -contribution of, t o Mus­
V. P. Menon·s alternative Plan, 296.
lim renaissance in India, 22-coun­
Aborigines, 1 36.
teracts Congress activities, 26-­
Acts. See Under Government of India
Essay on the Causes of the Indian
A cts .
Revolt, 20-establishes Muham­
Administration, 14.
madan Anglo-Orient:il College
Admiralty, First Lord of, 248.
and Scientific and Translation
Adrianople, 4 1 .
Societies, 20-Hume's criticism
Afghan, Afghanistan, 8, 1 1 7, 1 38-
of, 25-impact of, on Indian Mus­
anti-British activities in India with
co-operation of, 45-under British lims, 20, 22, 26-Loyal M11ham-

influence, 3 7. 111ada11S of lndia, 20-on religic n,

Afghani, Saiyid Jamaluddin, 37, 1 1 7. 20, 2 1 -opposes Competitive Ex­

Africa, North, 37, 1 89. anfna>i,ms, 2 1 -opposcs Muslims

Aga Khan IIT, 30, 3 1 , 55, 65, 1 1 9. joining the Congress, 21, 25-
Agra, 1 1 9 . opposcs representative govern­

Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, 1 39. ment, 2 1-political philosophy of,

Ahmad, Kazi Saeed-ud - Din, The 2 1 , 24, 3 1 -Tahdhib-ul-Akhlaq, 2 1 .
Communal Pattern of India 1 39 . Ahrars, 241 .
Ahmad, S i r Sultan. See Sultan Ahmad. Akalis (see also Sikhs), alliance of,
Ahmed Khan, Sir Syed, 1 9 -22, 25, 27, with Congress in Panjab, 244, 245,
 358 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A KI ST A N

246-party pos1t10n of, in the 1 94-on Pakistan scheme, 1 3 9-

Central Assembly ( 1 945), 242 . 1 40-renounces separate electorate,
Akbar, Emperor, Divine Faith of, 326 64-- Thoughts on Pakistan, 1 39.
(Appendix B ) . America, American, 15, 1 96.
Akhand Hindustan Movement, 226. Aney, M .S., 54 f.n., 1 72.
Alexander, A . V . , 248. Anglo-Indians, joint statement by, at
A li , Asaf. See Asaf Ali. the Round Table Conference, 63-
Ali, Chaudhary Rahmat. See Rahmat party position in Bengal Legis­
Ali, Chaudhary. lative A ssembly ( 1 937), 8 1-seats
Ali, Maulana Mohamed. See Moha­ in the Interim Government, 266-
med Ali, Maulana. seats in the provincial assemblies
Ali, Maulana Shaukat. See Shaukat ( 1 937), 75.
Ali, Maulana. Anglo-Russian Convention ( 1 908), 37.
Ali Brothers, trial of, 52. Anjuman-i-Islam of Madras, 26.
A li Imam, 54 f.n. Ansari, Shaukatullah, 1 07.
A li Zaheer, 279 f.n. Anthony, Frank, 224.
A ligarh Afuslim Gazette, 26. Anti-British conspiracies, 43 -of
Allahabad, 1 1 9 , 1 84, 1 86 f.n . , 1 9 1 , 224. ( 1 9 1 5), 45.
Allah Bakhsh, 85, 86, 205. Anti-states agitation, Congress atti­
Allied Powers, 38, 1 76, 1 89, 1 98 , 203, 2 1 2. tude towards, 70.
A ll India Khilafat Conference. See Arabic, 1 2 .
K h i lafat Conference.
Arabs, 8 , J O-Arab-Nair descent, 5 2
All India Muslim Conference, Bom­
-conquest, 1 , 2-culture, 9 : in­
bay Session, 59--Delhi Sessio n :
fluence on ludo-Muslim culture, 9
demands, 55-56, 120, 327-328
-lack of distinction between, and
(Appendix B).
converts, 6-merchants, 6-name
A ll India Muslim Educational Con­
for Indian Muslims and Hindus,
ference, appoints a committee o n
9 f.n.
Muslim education (1 938), 1 03-
Arbitration, 256, 257.
Report, 1 04.
Architecture, difference between Hindu
All India Muslim League. See M u slim
and Muslim architecture, 1 1 .
League.
Asaf Ali, 279 f. n., 283.
All India Sikh Conference, 221 .
All India States Peoples Conference, 70. Ashraf, Shaikh Muhammad. See Mu­
hammad Ashraf, Shaikh.
All Parties Conference, appoints Nehru
Asia, Asian, 14, 1 20, 297, 308 , 3 1 3,
Committee, 54.
3 1 4, 3 1 7, 3 1 8 .
All Parties Convention (Calcutta,
Asia, South, 3 1 6.
1 929), 56, 57, 1 1 9 .
Assam, 27, 36, 82, 84-85, 96, 173,
A l l Parties Muslim Conference. See
All India Muslim Conference . 1 74, 234 f . n. - Bardoloi coali-

Ambedkar, B . R . , criticises Civil Dis­ tion ministry in ( 1 938), 84-

obedience Movement (of Congress), 85-communal representation

INDEX 359

from, (in Constituent Assembly 272-on Simla Conference, 234-­

under Cabinet Mission Plan), 261- refusal of, to discuss August offer
Congress ministry in, 204, 243- with Viceroy, 1 6 1-terms of coa­
Governor's rule in (1941), 85- lition to Khaliquzzaman, 89-90, 93.
grouping of, with Muslim provin­ Azizul Haq, Sir, 103.
ces, 1 22, 124, 125, 246, 254, 257,
258, 276-Muslim League ministry Backward classes (Tribes), seats for,
in, (1 944- 1945), 206-Muslims in in Provincial Assemblies (1937), 75.
Assam Valley, 84-party position Badaun, 1 1 8.
in Provincial Assembly ( 1937), Bahawalpur State, 1 36-grouping of,
84-Seats in Upper House, 75- with Muslim provinces, 1 22 .
Saadullah ministry in, 84, 85, 204-­ Bakhsh, Allah. See Allah Bakhsh.
separation of Sylhet from, 298, Balakot, Battle of ( 1 8 3 1 ), 309.
305. Balban, 8.
Attlee, C.R., 57, 248, 279, 293, 3 12, Baldev Singh, 267 f.n., 279 f.n., 283,
3 1 3-approves V.P. Menon's plan, 287, 298.
297-Gandhi's letter to, for re­ Baldwin, 4 1 .
moval of Wavell, 280-introduces Balkan Wars, 38.
Indian Independence Bill, 305- Baluchistan, grouping of, with
refuses Wavell's scheme for phased Muslim provinces . 1 2 1 , 122, 124,
withdrawal, 293-on offer of joint 1 25, 246, 254--I qbal on amalga­
Governor-Generalship to Mount­ mation of, with North-West Indian
batten, 302, 303-statement (of Muslim State, 1 2 1 , 328 (Appendix
Feb. 20, 1 947), 290-294. B)--joins new Constituent As­
Auchinleck, Field Marshal, removal sembly (Pakistan), 305-referen­
of, 303, 304. dum in, 298, 305.
August offer ( 1 940�, 1 58-1 63, 180, 1 82. Bande Matram, 105, 1 39-Muslim
Aurangzeb Khan, Sardar, 206. League on, 126, 128-Nehru on,
Australia, Australian, 1 97. 111.
Austria, 4 1 Banerjee, P.N., 234 f.n.
Autonomy, 4, 46, 1 2 1 , 123, 1 94. Banerji, Sir Albion, calls Gandhi a
Azad, Abu! Kalam, 89, 90, 96, 1 64, 235, dictator by proxy, 97.
246, 252, 271 , 278-correspondence Bang-i-Islam, 122.
with Wavell, 267-Cripps talk with, Bardoloi, Gopinath, forms ministry in
251-presents Congress case to Assam, 84, 243 .
Cabinet Mission, 250-on Finance Barton, Sir William, on resignation o f
portfolio to Muslim League, 285- Congress ministries, 1 49 .
on Japanese invasion of India, 1 97 Bazm-i-Shibli, 1 1 7.
-on Lady Mountbatten's influence Bengal , 26, 35, 46, 48, 53, 56, 96, 1 6 1 ,
on Nehru, 294, 3 1 3-on Nehru 1 65, 1 73, 1 74, 1 97, 203, 226, 234
and Gandhi's opposition to parti­ f.n ., 244, 279, 280, 309, 3 1 0, 3 1 1-
tion, 299-on Nehru's statements, and Communal Award, 63, 64--
 360 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

Boundary Commission, 298-coa­ Assembly under Cabinet Mission

lition governments in, 8 1 , 82- Plan, 261-Congress ministry in,
communal representation from, (in 87, 243-Fazlul Haq's statement
Constituent Assembly under Cabi­ on communal disturbances in,
net M ission Plan), 261-Congress 1 03-grouping of, with Muslim
government in, 8 1 -83-Congress provinces, 1 25- League on com­
position in, ( 1 937), 76-Congress munal disturbances in, 1 06-
role in, 1 08-first partition of, Lieutenant-Governorship for, 3 5-
( 1 905), 27-29 : [-agitation by Quit India agitation in, 3 1 1-
Hindus against, 27, 28, 3 1 , 32- riots and disorders in, 1 00, 1 02,
annulment of, 35, 36, 44, 6 1 -, 1 03 , 106--s eats in Upper House,
reaction of Muslims to, 28]­ 75-Shareef Report on Hindu
grouping of, with Muslim provin­ atrocities in, 100, 1 02.
ces, 1 22, 1 24, 1 25, 254-League Bikaner, 1 24-- M aharajah of, 59, 60.
ministry in, 204, 205, 206, 293- Bilgrami, Muhammad AbdulQadir, 1 1 8 .
Muslim majority districts of, ( 1 941 Birkenhead, Lord, 54.
Census), 346 (Appendix G Anncxure Blitz, on Jinnah's diplomacy, 275, 276.
A)-partition of, under Cabinet Board of Control, 22.
Mission Plan, 259-party position Bombay, 54, 65, 68, 77, 78, 96, 1 04,
in, Provincial Assembly ( 1 937), 105, 124, 1 60, 1 68, 1 74, 193, 2 1 2,
8 1 -seats in Upper House, 75- 2 1 9, 230, 234 f.n., 271 , 274, 275-
second partition of, ( 1 947), 297, communal representation from, i n
298, 304, 3 14, 3 1 5-riots, 29-Su­ Constituent Assembly under Cabi­
hrawardy's resolution for inclusion net Mission Plan, 261-Congress
of, in a sovereign independent ministry in, 87, 243-riols in, 1 06-­
state, 246. seats in Upper House, 75-separa­
Beng:ll, East, Eastern, 27, 49, 1 22, tion of Sind from, 54, 65--States,
293, 304. 1 24.
Bengal, West, 298, 304. Bonnerjee, W.C., on establishment of
Benn, \Vedgwood, 60. Congress under Governor-Gene­
Berar, 1 24. ral's inspiration, 24.
B �rlin, 149. Bose, S.C., 279 f.n.-correspondence
Bhabha, C.H., 279 f.n., 283. with Jinnah, 1 12-1 1 3 .
Bhagat Singh, 1 64. Bosphorus, 4 1 .
Bhave, Vinoba, 1 63 . Boundaries-provincial boundaries
Bhopal, Nawab of, 302. in Cripps proposals, I 88.
Bible, commentary on, by Sir Syed Boundary Commission, 297-Bengal,
Ahmed Khan, 2 1 . 298.
Bicameral Legislature, 5 ! . Brahmi11, 57.
Bih1r, 77, 78, 96, 1 09, 1 24, 1 50, 1 97, Brecher, Michael, on offer of joint
234 f.n., 3 1 0-communal repre­ Governor-Generalship to Mount­
sentation from, in Constituent batten, 302-303.
I N D EX 361

Britain, British, 3, 2 1 , 25, 3 1 , 32, 39, War, 1 85-186-promises to respect

42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 58, 66, 68, Turkish Caliphate, 38-reaction of,
79, 1 08, 1 2 1 , 1 25, 1 27, 128, 1 29, to Congress demand for declara­
1 37, 1 38, 1 4 1 , 143, 146, 147, 1 5 1 , tion of war aims, 142-reaction of,
1 5 3 , 1 54, 1 55, 1 58, 1 59, 1 60, 1 62, to Congress failure to attract
1 63, 1 64, 166, 1 68, 1 69, 1 7 1 , 1 72, Muslims, 25, 26-reaction of, to
1 75, 1 76, 1 77, 178, 1 80, 1 82, 1 89, Congress rule in U.P., 1 07-reac­
1 90, 1 9 1 , 192, 1 93, 195, 1 96, 197, tion of, to Lahore Resolution, 1 33-
200, 202, 203, 208, 209, 2 10, 212, reaction of, to Muslim League, 32-
2 1 4, 2 1 7, 2 1 8, 219, 220, 224, 23 1 , reaction of, to one-party govern­
237, 239, 240, 246, 249, 259, 265, ment (Interim), 281-reaction o f,
268, 270, 272, 275, 276, 277, 278, to Quit India movement, 1 96-
279, 280, 28 1 , 286, 292, 307, 308, reaction of, to resignation of Con­
3 1 1 , 3 12, 3 1 3, 3 14-Afghanistan gress ministries, 149-rivalry of,
under influence of, 37-and Con­ with Russia, 37-Sir Syed on
gress resolution on Quit India, friendship with, 2 1 -treatment of
1 9 1 -and Muslim demand for Muslims as religious minority by,
Pakistan, 1 87-animosity of, to­ 10, 1 5 .
wards Indian Muslims, 1 8, 1 9- British Commonwealth, 4 5 , 1 59, 1 87.
animosity of, towards Turkey, British Crown, 68, 69, 70, 7 1 , 1 78, 1 8 3 .
39, 44-anti-British uprising, 1 8- 1 9 British Empire, 49, 1 2 1 .
-appeasement o f Congress by, B ritish Government (See also His
269, 3 1 1 - 3 1 3-attempt at compro­ Majesty's Government), 40, 49,
mise with Indian demands, 1 85- 54, 6 1 , 63, 68, 69, 72, 9 1 , 142, 1 55,
attitude of, towards Jinnah, 93- 1 66, 1 67, 170, 186, 1 88, 190, 195,
attitude of, towards nation::il go­ 200, 201 , 202, 208, 222, 247, 248,
vernment, 190, 192 -Commander­ 259, 263, 265, 270, 276, 277, 279,
in-Chief in Viceroy's Council, 1 79- 282, 285, 290, 291 , 293, 296, 309,
criticism of, on Jinnah's withdrawal 3 1 1-asked to declare war aims,
of acceptance of Cabinet Mission 1 1 3, 1 14, 141-attitude of, towards
Plan, 276-defencc of India by, self-government to India, 48, 49-
during War, 1 79-disregard of Cabinet Mission in India, 248-
promises by, regarding partition of 270-Congress demand for com­
Bengal, 36-cstablishment of Con­ plete independence of India, 1 47-
gress under inspiration of, 14, 24- controversy with Congress over
India's loyalty to, 43-mistrust of safeguards, 77-criticism of, 1 69,
Muslims by, 1 8-Muslim League's 1 74, 175-divide and rule policy
loyalty towards, 32-partiality to­ of, 28, 148-Draft Declaration,
wards Hir.dus, 14--policy of divide 1 77-1 80, 227-interpretation of
and rule, 201-policy regarding grouping clause by, 287, 288-
India, ( 1 9 1 7), 49-policy regarding Lord lsmay's warning to, on ap­
transfer of complete power during pointment of Mountbatten, 294-
 362 T H E S TR L' G G L E F O R PA K I ST A N

Montagu - Chelmsford reforms, criticism of, b y Jinnah, 2 1 2-2 1 4-

48-53-0ffer of August ( 1 940), 1 58· Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence on,
1 63-on failure of Cabinet Mission 2 1 4-21 7.
Plan, 288, 289-on separate electo­ Cabinets. See M i nistries.
rate, 55-Quit India movement, Cabinet government, 49.
1 93-1 97-talks with Indian leaders Cabinet Mission, 248-270-
(Dec. 1 946), 286, 287-talks with Attlee's declaration on, 249-
·Indian leaders (Round Table Con­ Congress terms of offer to, 255-
ference), 59-63-talks with Wavell, 258-Indian reaction to, 249-
230-23 1 , 240-transfer of power to Jinnah and Cabinet M ission, 249,
India, 290-306-White Paper on 250, 25 1 , 274-League terms of
Round Table Conference, 64-65. offer to, 254-255 , 257, 258-nego­
British imperialism, 70, 92, 94, 1 90, tiations with Indian Leaders, 250-
275, 307, 3 1 7. 258-points of agreement between
British India (See also India), 58, 60, Congress and League suggested by,
68, 72, 9 1 , 1 20, 1 44, 225, 248, 253, 252-254-terms of reference of,
256, 259, 260, 261 , 285, 29 1 , 297. 248-249-tripartite talks at Simla,
British Parliament, 22, 33, 47, 64, 65, 252. [See also below.]
79, 143, 145, 148, 1 59-debatc in, Cabinet Mission Plan, 258-262, 271 ,
on the recommendation of the 272, 273, 276, 288, 290, 295, 3 1 I ,
Round Table Conference, 64-65. 3 1 2, 3 1 8-and demand for Pakistan,
British rule in India, 3, 14, 1 8, 1 03, 265-Azad on, 271 -Congress on,
1 52, 273, 309, 3 10-conspiracies 262, 263, 264, 267-draft formula
against, 45-Hindu revivalist move­ on grouping clause in, 279, 280-
ments during, 1 3-Hume's equation Gandhi on, 262-Indian reaction
of Congress with British rule, 25- to, 262-270-Jinnah on, 263, 274-
transfer of power from East India June 16 Proposal, 267, 268, 269-
Company to British, 22-transfer London talks on grouping clause
of power to India by British, 290- in, 287-Muslim League acceptance
306. of, 265, 284-Muslim League on,
264-Muslim League withdraws
Brodrick, St. John, 27. acceptance of, 247, 271 -277-Nehru
Burma, 1 76, 1 89, 203. on, 263, 272, 273-official clari­
Burnham, Lord, 57. fication of, ri>garding grouping
Butler Committee. See Indian States clause (controversy), 264, 273,
287-scrapping of, 288, 289, 290-
Committee.
text of, 335-339 (Appendix F).
B y-elections, 83, 1 99-Government
Cadogan, Sir Edward, on Muslims,
candidate's defeat in, (Bengal), 83.
fear of Hindu domination, 57.
Calcutta, 56, 103, 1 5 1 , 1 68-riots and
disturbances in, 279, 293-shifting
C.R. Formula, 207-212, 219, 220, 250- of capital from, to Delhi, 35, 36.
INDEX 363

Calicut, 2. Chelmsford, Lord, 39, 45, 48-Mon-

Caliph, 38. tagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 50-52.
Cambridge, 1 2 1 . Chesney, Sir George, 26.
Campbell-Johnson, A . , 3 1 3-influence Chhatari, Nawab of, 1 74 .
on Congress, 294-on joint Gover­ Chiang Kai-Shek, 1 77.
nor-Generalship to Mountbatten, China, Chinese, 1 77, 3 14.
302. Chittagong, 27.
Canarese, 54. Christ, 307.
Carimbhoy Ibrahim. See Ibrahim, Christianity, 20.
Carimbhoy. Christians, 1 5, 307-Indian, 57, 63,
Caste Hindus, 23 1 , 233. 75, 81, 84, 107, 1 5 1 , 221 , 238, 266,
Caste system, breeds exclusiveness, 267-minorities in Turkey, 38.
4, 5-compared with Islamic social Chundrigar, I.I., 1 67 f.n. 283,
system, 5, 6-qualities of, 4. Church of England, 1 5.
Central Asia, Central Asian-culture, Churchill, Sir Winston, criticism of
9, 1 1-influence of, on Indo­ British government on installation
Muslim culture, 8, 9-influence of, of Congress rule in India, 281-
on Urdu literature and poetry, 1 2- on formation of 'national govern­
Socialist Republics of, 1 1 7. ment' in India, 1 77.
Central Government (See also Govern­ Civil disobedience movements (See
ment of India), 47, 55, 58, 60, 273, also Quit India movement), in
276. 1 920 on Khilafat issue, 52-in 1 93 0
Central India. See India, Central. o n Simon Report, 59, 6 1 -in 1 93 1
Central legislature, 5 1 , 72. o n communal settlement, 63-in
Central National Muhammadan As­ 1940 on war aims, 1 63-1 68-'open
sociation, 26. rebellion' in (1942), 1 94, 195, 1 96,
Central Provinces, Central Provinces 2 1 1 , 212.
Berar, and 46, 78, 96, 1 24, 1 50, 234 Civil servants, 48.
f.n., 243--communal representation Coalition government, 269, 282-
from, in Constituent Assembly un­ Azad'stermsfor, to Muslim League,
der Cabinet Mission Plan), 261 -Co­ 89, 90, 93-Congress refusal to
ngress anti-Muslim policy in, 108- form, 88-93, 1 0 1 , 1 1 1-at Centre,
Congress ministry in, 87-Congress 279-in Assam, 84-85-in Bengal,
position in, i n general elections 8 1 , 279-in Panjab, 83-84-in Sind,
( 1937), 77-Muslim League on 85, 86-June 16 proposal for
formation of, 267.
riots and disorders in, 1 06-riots
Colonies, 47, 49.
and disorders in, 103, 1 06-States,
Colville, Sir John, 230.
1 24-Wardha Scheme, 104.
Commander-in-Chief, 23, 179.
Chamberlain, Austen, 48.
Commerce, 218, 284.
Chatterjee, N.C., 226. Communal Award ( 1932), 63, 1 10, 244
Chaudhri, R.K., 204. -criticism of, in Congress
364 T HE S TR U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

Manifesto, 74-Nehru's criticism 262, 273, 275, 279, 282, 285-289,

of, I l l . 290, 29 1 -communal composition
Communal problems, 55, 1 1 4, 1 20, of, in Cabinet Mission Plan, 261-
255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260-dis­ Congress decides to join, 267-
cussion on, in Round Table Con­ Congress explanation for, 277-
ference, 62-64-Iqbal on settlement election of, 1 78, 1 80, 1 83 , 288, 298
of, 326-327 (Appendix B). -League's demand for dissolution
Communal riots. See Hindu-Muslim of, 288, 289, 290-League's refusal
riots. to participate in, proceedings, 275,
Communications, 2 1 8, 250, 252, 256, 285, 286, 29 1-Nehru on joining of,
260, 284-between two parts of by Congress, 27 1 , 272-Nehru onso­
Pakistan, 259. vereignty of, 272, 276-of Pakistan,
Communist Party of India, 1 94. 306-option to provinces for join­
Competitive Examinations, 2 1 . ing, (June 3 plan), 297, 298-pro­
( The) Comrade, 1 1 9. vinces joining Indian Constituent
Conciliation Committee, 223-227. Assembly, 304, 305-provincesjoin­
Concurrent List, 65. ing new Constituent Assembly
Confederation, 1 24. 304, 305.
Conferences : All India Muslim Con­ Constitution, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60,
ference, 55-56, 59, 1 20,-All India 65, 1 10, 1 23 , 1 94, 249, 250, 254,
Muslim Educational Conference, 255, 261 . 267, 279, 282, 287, 288,
103, 1 04-All India Sikh Conference, 291 -Federal, 1 2 1 -Cabinet Mis­
221 -All India States Peoples Con­ sion discussions and Plan on, 25 1 ,
ference, 70-All Parties Conference, 258-262--Congress terms of offer
54-All Parties Convention, 56-57, on, (Cabiaet Mission Plan), 255-
1 1 9-Khilafat Conference, 39, 42- 258-for the Dominion of India
Simla Conference, 2 1 2, 222, 240,
(Draft Declaration), 1 78, 1 79, 1 80,
244, 248.
1 82, 1 83, 1 85-formation of minis­
Congress. See Indian National Con­
tries under 1935 Constitution, 77,
gress.
79, 80, 96-Muslim League Mani­
Congress Forward Block, 82.
festo on, 73-Muslim Le<lgue offer
Congress League Scheme, 46-48, 50,
on (Cabinet Mission Plan), 254-
55-attitude of Muslims towards,
46, 47-criticism of, 46, 47-reject­ 255, 257-258-(Motilal) Nehru's
ion of, in the Montagu-Chelms­ suggestions on Constitution, 54,
ford Report, 50-separate electo­ 55, 56-points of agreement be­
rate in, 46, 5 5 . tween Le:igue and Congress on,
Congress Nationalist Party, 1 69. (Cabinet Mission Plan), 252-254-
Constantinople, 38, 39, 1 1 8. Round Table Conference on, 60-
Constituent Assembly, 1 78, 1 80, 1 82, Simon Report on, 58, 59-Statu­
183, 1 93, 253, 254, 255, 256, 260, tory Commission on, 54.
INDEX 365

Constitutional reforms, 32, 44, 45, 48- policy towards Muslims, 282.
August Offer, ( 1940), 1 58-1 63- Crerar, Sir James, on Congress rule
C.R. Formula, 207-212-Cabinet in the provinces, 1 08 .
M ission Plan, 258-262-Congress­ Crewe, Marquess of, 3 6 , 6 1 .
League Scheme, 46-47-Desai­ Cripps, Sir Stafford, 1 52, 1 76, 1 78,
Liaquat Pact, 227-230-Draft De­ 1 88, 1 89, 1 90, 191, 1 92, 208, 248,
claration, 1 77- 1 80-during 1 858- 274, 275, 281, 288, 292-Congress
1 892, 22-24-June 3 plan, 294- reaction to, Mission, 1 81 - 1 82, 1 84-
300-The Lahore Resolution, 1 26- correspondencc of, with Congress,
1 34-Liberal Party Proposals of 1 81 -Coupland's interpretation o f
( 1941), 1 68-1 72-Montagu-Chelms­ non-accession clause in, Draft De­
ford Reforms, 50-53-post-war claration, 1 87-:lefence of non­
reforms (World War I), 45-Round accession clause, 1 79-discussions
Table Conference and the emer­ of, with Indian leaders, 1 80, 1 8 1 ,
gence of reforms, 59-66-Sapru 1 84, 1 85-Draft Declaration, 1 77-
Proposals, 222-227-Simon Report, 1 80, 20i , 227-explanation of,
57-59-Wavell Plan (1 945), 230- for failure of his Mission,
240. 1 85-1 86, 1 88-190-Indian reaction
Conversion to Hinduism, 53. to the Mission of, 1 80-1 84-meet­
Conversion to Islam, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8. ing with Azad, 251-Mission of,
Conversion to Shi'ism, 9. 1 76-198-Muslim League reaction
Converts, (to Islam) 3-and Hindu to, Mission, 1 79, 1 82, 1 84, 1 85-
and Muslim cultures, 8-lack of on constitution-making body, 1 79
distinction between, and Arabs, 6- --on impossibility of accepting
lack of distinction between, and Congress plan, 1 93-on merits of,
Turks, 7-named as Turks, 8. Draft Declaration, 1 79-180-on
Coorg, 1 24. Muslim League's non-participation
Coronation Durbar. See Delhi Durbar. in Constituent Assembly, 289-
Council of Greater India, 58, 59. on Nehru's remarks on grouping
Council of State, 5 1 , 52, 5 7, 58. of provinces, 273-proposals, of
Council of the Governor-General. See (March 30, 1 942), 201 , 202, 2 1 2,
Governor-General's Council. 227, 3 1 1 , 333-334 (Appendix E).
Coupland, Sir Reginald, 33, 50-on [See also below. ]
Azad's terms to League for coali­ Cripps M ission, 1 76-1 98.
tion government, 93-on interpre­ Cripps Offer. See Cripps Proposals.
tation of Draft Declaration regard­ Cripps Proposals (March 30, 1 942),
ing non-accession clause, 1 87- 201 , 202, 2 1 2, 227, 3 1 1-and Pak­
on Princes commitment to enter istan Plan, 1 86-1 88-attitude of
into Indian Federation, 67. Congress towards, 1 84 - 1 86-text,
Court of Arbitration, 1 25. 333-334 (Appendix E}.
Court of Directors, 22. Cross, Lord, 23.
Cranborne, Lord, criticism of British Culture, Cultural, 8, 9, 10, 1 1, 122, 1 23 .
366 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

Curzon, Lord, 27, 28, 40, 49. Dera Ismail Khan, 1 1 8.

Customs, differences of, between Desai, Bhulabhai, 1 28, 1 29, 234 f.n.
Hindus and Muslims, 1 1 . [ See also below] .
Desai-Liaquat Pact, 227-230.
Devanaagri script, 1 26.
Dacca, 27, 28-Nawab of, 3 1 . Devonshire, Duke of, 1 86.
Das, Biswanath, 86. Dhu'l-Qarnain of Badaun, 1 1 8 .
Daily Express, 1 1 8. Dindigal Anjuman, 26.
Daily Herald, on Congress plan for Direct action, 1 06-Muslim League
non-violent non-cooperation (May resolution on, for achieving Pak­
2, 1 942), 1 92. istan, 275.
Daily Telegraph, on Attlee's statement Divide and rule policy, of British
about recall of Wavell, 292-on government, 148-of Congress, 102
Cabinet Mission Plan, 263-264- -of Curzon, 28.
on failure of Simla Conference, Divine Faith, 326 (Appendix B).
237-on Quit India Movement, Dominions, 47, 1 2 1 , 1 78, 1 83, 300,
196. 301 , 302-constitution for India,
Dardanelles, 4 1 . 1 78, 179, 1 80, 1 82-183, 1 85-con­
Darjeeling, 27, 125. troversy on common Governor­
Davidson, J.C.C., 63. Generalship for, of India and
Day of Deliverance, (Dec. 22, 1 939), Pakistan, 300-304-of Pakistan,
1 1 3, 1 50, 1 5 1 . 300, 301 , 302, 306.
Deccan, rulers of-conversion to Dominion status to India, 60, 82, 1 25,
Shi'ism, 9. 295 , 298-to Pakistan, 295, 298.
Deccan Plateau, 1 39. Dow, Sir Hugh, 205.
Deccan States, 1 24. Draft Declaration ( 1 942), (See also
Deities, 1 2. Cripps M ission) 1 76-1 80, 1 83, 1 85,
Declaration of Rights, 54. 1 88, 190, 1 96-and partition of
Defence, 6, 7, 60, 1 79, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 85, India, 1 86, 187-Congress rraction
193, 2 1 8, 250, 252, 253, 256, 259, to, 1 81-Hindu reaction to, 1 80-
260, 284. Indian reaction to, 1 80-1 84-
Defence Council, 82, 1 72-1 75, Muslim League reaction to, 1 80,
Delhi, 2, 8, 55, 1 1 0, 1 20, 1 22, 125, 1 66, 1 8 1-rejection of, by Congress, 1 8 1 ,
200, 230, 232, 246, 264, 279, 296- 1 82, 1 96-rejection of, b y Muslim
Capital transferred to, 35, 36- League, 1 82-terms of, 1 79-1 80.
New Delhi, 1 6 1 , 223, 225. Dravidians, 1 3 6.
Delhi Durbar, 34-37-announcement Dualism, 60.
about annulment of Bengal parti­ Dufferin, Lord, 23-and Congress, 24.
tion at, 36. Dufferin and Ava, Marquess of. See
Delhi Pact. See Gandhi-Irwin Pact. Dufferin, Lord.
Depressed classes. See Scheduled Durbars, 33.
Castes; Untouchables. Dyarchy, 50, 58, 65.
 I N D EX 367

East (Eastern) Bengal. See Bengal, 2-conquest of Muslim lands, 37-

East, Eastern. education, 22-traders, 2-party
East India Company, 19-transfers position of, in the Central Assembly
power to the Crown, 22. ( 1934, 1 945), 72, 242-party posi­
East Pakistan, 1 1 8. tion of, in the Provincial Assemblies
East Panjab. See Panjab, East. (Bengal, Assam), 8 1 , 84-seats for,
(The) Economist, on British policy of in the Provincial Assemblies, 75.
Congress appeasement, 269-on Executive Councils, 45, 253, 260-
installation of one-party govern­ Central, 1 86, 249, 255, 267, 286-­
ment in India, 282-on Quit India membcrs of the, announced by the
campaign, 192, 196-on the signi­ Viceroy in his proposal of June
ficance of Congress demand for a 1 6, ( 1 946), 267 f.n.-members of
Constituent Assembly, 1 52. the new, announced on Aug. 24,
Education, 73 . (1946), 279 f.n.-members of the
Egypt, 1 89. reconstituted, (Oct. 25, 1946), 283-
E l Hamza, on Congress ideology of Provincial, 5 1 .
hatred and passive insult, 1 38. Excommunication (Hinduism), 4.
Elections, 23, 29, 32, 33, 47, 50, 60, External Affairs. See Foreign Affairs.
84, 257, 280-By-election, 83-
general elections under Cabinet
Mission Plan, 262-manifestos of, Far East, 1 38, 1 76.
Fazl-i-Husain, Sir, 76.
73-75 - of constitution-making
Fazlul Haq, 83, 1 3 1 , 1 74-expelled
body, 1 83, 285, 298-of Federal
from Muslim League, 175-forms
Assembly, 58-of 1 920, 52-of
ministry, 8 1 , 205-forms Progres­
1 934, 72-76-of 1 937, 48, 77, 88,
sive Coalition Party, 82-joins
89, 178, 1 83-of 1 945, 28, 240-243 Defence Council, 82-Muslim
248-party position in, 72, 89- Sufferings Under Congress Rule,
separate electorate, 1 6, 30, 3 1 , 34, 1 00, 102-103-resigns from Muslim
46, 50, 53, 54, 55, 64, 73, 74, 1 83 . League, 82, 205.
Election manifestos, 73-75-points o f Federal Assembly, 58.
difference between Congress and Federal Court, 257.
League manifestos, 74. Federal Government, 218.
Federal List, 65, 252, 254, 256, 257,
Engineer, Sir N.P., 267 f.n.
260-Congress scheme on, to Cabi­
England. (See also Britain), 3, 24, 33,
net Mission, 250-tripartite talks
41, 1 43, 299.
at Simla on, 252.
English, 1 9, 20.
Federation, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 65,
English law, 1 9 . 67-72, 1 17, 124, 1 94, 2 1 8, 250, 252,
Europe, Europeans, 3, 1 4 , 1 5, 1 6, 2 1 , 254, 256, 257, 260-All India Mus­
3 9 , 46, 98, 1 89, 1 96, 204, 232, 234 lim Conference demand for, 55,
f.n., 243, 250, 298, 3 1 0-colonists, 56-Congress responsibility for the
368 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A KI S T A N

postponement of, in India, 7 1 , 99- as body o f converts, 7-causes for

Princes' support for, 59, 60---Round failure of Gandhi-Jinnah talks, 2 1 9-
Table Conference on, 59, 60, 62- 221-Civi ! Disobedience M ovement
Simon Report on, 58. ( 1930), 59, 63-Congress, domina­
Festivals, 1 1 . tion of, 98,99-corresponde.nce of,
Finance, 1 24, 2 1 8, 284-allotment of with Attlee on removal of Wavell,
portfolio of, to Muslim League, 280, 293-correspondence of, with
285. Cabinet Mission, 251 -correspon­
Foreig:n Affairs, 47, 2 1 8, 250. 252, 254, dence of. with Jinnah, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 ,
256, 260, 284. 2 1 1 , 2 1 4, 2 1 5 , 2 1 6, 2 1 7-correspon·
Fourteen Points, 57-Nehru's rejection dence of, with Wavell , 207, 208-
of, 1 1 1 -·text, 321 -324 (Appendix criticism of, by British press, 142-
A). demand for British withdrawal, 2 1 8
Fox, Richard Lane. See Lane-Fox, -denial o f separate nationality o f
Richard. Muslims, 3 , 7 , 1 0, 2 1 5-fasts, 64,
France, French, 1 43, 1 89. 209-general attitude towards Mus­
Fraser, Lovat. 1 1 8, 1 1 9. ims, 1 3 8-interview of, with Cabi­
Frontier Inquiry Committee, 1 1 8. net !v1ission, 250-meeting of, with
Fundamental rights, 252, 255, 256, Mountbatten, 299-on Attlee's de­
258. claration about Cabinet Mission,
249-on Cabinet Mission Plan, 262
-on Cripps proposals, 1 88-1 89,
Gama, Vasco da, 2. 1 90--o n grouping clause of Cabinet
Gandhi, Indira, Campbell - Johnson's Mission Plan, 262-on Hindu-Mus­
influence on, 294, 3 1 3-influence on lim problems, 1 7 1 , 1 72-on Japan­
Nehru, 294. ese attack, 1 89-1 90-on Lahore
Gandhi, M .K., 6 1 , 1 08, 1 1 8, 1 28, 1 29, Resolution, 2 1 4, 2 1 5 , 2 1 7, 220-
1 38, 1 47, 1 77, 1 85, 1 90, 1 9 1 , 1 92. o n League's entry into govern­
193, 1 94, 1 96, 1 97, 226, 276, 277, ment, 284-on principle of Pak­
279, 280, 305, 3 1 4-and agitation in istan, 2 1 2, 2 1 4, 2 1 8, 2 1 9, 220-on
the states, 70-and Congress, 1 1 1- Satyagarah, 1 64, 1 65, 1 66, 1 67-on
and C.R. Formula, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2, separate electorates, 227-on two­
2 1 5, 2 1 9, 220-and Desai - Liaquat nation theory, 2 1 5 , 2 1 6, 2 1 7-on
Pact, 228, 230.-and Khil<ifat moYe­ undoing of partition, 330-on War,
ment, 44-and Round Table Con­ 1 90-opposition of, to partition,
ference, 62, 63-and \Vardha Sc­ 299--pact with Irwin, 60-62-re­
heme, 1 04-appeal to Britain, 1 90-­ action of, to Wavell Plan, 232, 233
arrest of. 59. 63-as Chri>t-likc -support of, to Sapru Proposals,
man, 307-as dictator by proxy, 224-support of, to GhaffarKhan's
97, 98--as embodiment of Hindu demand for vote on Pakhtunistan,
metaphysician concept of Deity, 305-talks with Irwin, 6 1 , 62-
1 3 2-brands Muslim cornmunity talks with Jinnah, 1 99-207, 211 ,
IN DEX 369

2 1 4, 2 1 5, 2 1 6, 2 1 7, 220, 222, 223- ment o f Instructions, 77, 78, 79-

talks with Linlithgow, 1 46, 1 63- postponement of federal part of,
totalitarian attitude of, 1 5 3 - 1 58- 7 1 -violation of, by Congress,
worship of, (portrait), 1 08. 96, 98, 99, 105.

Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 60-62. Governor-General, 23, 24, 47, 52, 66,

Gandhi-Jinnah talks, 1 99 - 221 . 69, 1 80, 1 84, 205, 297-blessings of,

Gangetic Basin, Upper, 1 39. to Congress, 24, 25-Executive

Council of, 22, 52, 1 62-Jinnah as,
Gangetic Delta, 1 39.
of Pakistan, 302-joint G overnor­
Gawaliar, 1 24.
Generalship of the Dominions o f
George, Lloyd, 41, 48-anti-Turkish
India a n d Pakistan, 300, 30 1 , 302,
policy of, 39-condemnation of, bv
-
303, 304-Lcgislative Council of,
Indian Muslims, 40.
20, 22, 23, 33-reaction on Jinnah's
George V, King of England, 35, 36.
refusal to the appointment of
George VI, King of England, 293.
Mountbatten as, of Pakistan, 303-
Germany, Germans, 38, 4 1 , 1 07, 1 29,
statement on special powers to
1 4 1 , 1 64, 1 89, 2 1 2-revolutionary
Governors, 80- 8 1 -super Gover­
societies formed in India under
nor-General, 300-vcto by, 23, 47.
instigation of, 45.
G overnors, 23, 27, 40, 5 I , 5 8, 66, 86-
G haffar Khan. See Khan, Abdu l
condemnation of, by Muslim Lea­
G h atfar.
gue, 1 05 , 1 06-Coun cil of, 47-
Ghaznavi, A . H . , 6 5 .
rule in Assam, 85-Instrument o f
Glasgow Herald, o n Congress resolu­
Instruction s, 7 7 , 78-specia l powers
tion on Quit India 1 92.
to, 77-80, 1 05 .
G overnment of india [See also Central
G overnors' Conference, 295.
Government], 23, 24, 25, 26, 28,
Great Britain. See Britain.
32, 33, 34, 3 5, 40, 45, 47, 49, 1 77,
Greco-Turkish relations, 39.
1 79, 1 85, 1 86, 1 94, 200, 203-all
Greeks, 5, 4 1 .
parties support of, during World
Gregory, W.H., o n loyalty o f Muslim
War I, 43-non-cooperation of, by
India, 1 9 .
Muslims, 3 9-non-cooperation of,
Gurdaspur, 3 1 4.
by Congress, 1 89 .
G overnment o f India Act, ( 1 858), 22.
G overnment of India Act, ( 1 9 1 9), 54-
appointment of Statutory Com­ Hailey, Lord, on non-accession clause.
mission under, 54-criticism of, 1 86- 1 87.
by Congress, 52-elections under Haq, Fazlul . See Fazlul Haq.
the provisions of, 72-reaction of Haq, Sir Azizul. See Azizul Haq, Sir.
Muslims to, 53-working of, (1 920- Hardinge, Lord , 35.
1 927), 52- 5 3 . Hari;a11, 1 54, 1 67 .
G overnment of India Act, ( 1 935), 34, Haroon, Sir Abdullah, on division o f
35-66, 70, 1 24, 205, 293, 305-criti­ India, 1 2 3 .
cism of, by Princes, 68, 69-Instru- Hartshorn, Vernon, 5 7 .
370 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

Hayat, H . M . , 4 1 f.n. 7 5 , 2 1 5-and t h e Constitution of

Hayat, Sikandar. See Khan, Sir 1 9 19, 52, 53-Congress explanation
Sikandar Hayat. for failure of Congress-League talks
Hidayatullah, Sir Ghulam Husain, 85, on, 1 09-Congress-League joint
86, 205, 234 f.n., 243. Session at Lucknow, 46--Congress­
Hind : as Muslim name for India, 2- League Scheme, 46-48-Congress­
as phonetic variation of Sind, 1 . League talks on, (1 935), 1 09- 1 1 5-
Hindi: <iS lingua frmzca of India, 1 26-­ Desai-Lizlquat Pact, 227-230-
as national language for India, 74--­ Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence on,
comparison of, with Urdu, 1 2, 1 3- ( 1 9 3 7-1 9 3 8), 1 10- 1 1 1-Gadhi­
Muslim League on Hindi-Urdu Jinnah t<.:lks on, 1 99-221-Jinnah­
controversy, 106. Bose correspondence on, 1 1 2-
(The) Hindu, 1 65 , 1 70. Jinnah-Nehru correspondence on,
Hindu Code, 4-compmison of, with 1 1 1 - 1 1 2, 1 1 3 , 1 14-Jinnah on fail­
Islamic lilw, 5. ure of Congress-League talks on,
Hindu League, 1 69 . 1 09. 1 1 0-Jinnah on Hindu-Muslim
Hindu Mahasabha, 5 9 , 72, 82, 92. J 10, p act, 1 06-joint communique on
1 1 8, 1 69, 1 87, 1 88, 1 92, 1 94, 223, Congress-Leagt:e talks, 1 09-Mus­
226-domination of, in non-party lim League manifesto on, 75-
Conference, 1 68, 1 70-on Quit Rajendra Prasad on failure of
India campaign, 201-on un-doing Congress-Levguc talks on, 1 10.
of partition, 299. Hindu raj, 96, 1 27, 1 29, 1 39, 1 9 1 , 1 95,
Hindu-Muslim conflicts, 26, 29, 30, 44, 212.
50, 53, 7 1 , 9 1 , 92, 100, 107, 1 2 1 , Hindu society, 1 0, 1 1-ccncessicns to,
1 32, 1 5 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 9 1 , 282, 284-as a by Muslims, 6-integraticn of im­
result of 1 9 1 9 Constitution, 52- migrating tribes into, 4.
constitutional safeguards for, 30- Hinduism, 1 0, 1 32, 1 33-as a social
in the States, 7 1-in U .P., 1 06, 1 0 7 system, 3, 4--caste system in, 4--­
-Moplah rebellion against Hindu comparison of, with Islam, 3-6-­
landlords, 52. Sangathan and Shuddhi movement
Hindu-Muslim Pact, 1 06. 42, 5 3 .
Hindu-Muslim relations, 248-during Hindus, 1 2 , 55, 57, 7 1 , 88, 9 1 , 1 1 8 1 19,
Congress rule, 88-1 1 5 . 1 22, 123, 1 24, 1 25, 1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 36,
1 40, 1 43, 1 46, 1 47, 1 48, 1 49, 1 50,
Hindu-Muslim riots, 29, 30, 53, 92,
1 52, 1 5 3 , 1 54, 1 56, 1 57, 1 67, 1 68,
1 00-103, 1 06, 1 5 1 -Fazlul Haq's
1 69, 1 72, 1 86, 1 87, 1 88, 1 89, 192,
statement on, 102-103-in Bengal,
1 94, 1 97, 225, 226, 227, 232, 239,
29-in Bihar, 1 00. 1 02, 1 03, 1 06-- i n 243, 246, 252, 253, 254, 255, 259,
Bombay, 106--in Calcutta, 279, 26� 275, 28 1 , 307, 308, 309, 3 10,
293-in the States, 7 1-Muslim 3 1 1 , 3 1 2, 3 1 3, 3 14, 3 1 8-agitation
League on, 1 06. by, against partition of Bengal
Hindu-Muslim unity, 44, 46, 50, 52, (first partition), 27, 28, 29, 35-and
INDEX 37 1
Muslims, 5, 1 5-anti-Muslim acti· 68, 142, 143, 1 45, 1 79, 1 82, 1 84,
vities of, 1 4, 1 00-103-appeasement 1 85, 207, 208, 248, 273, 277, 287,
of, by British, 36-Arab name for, 288, 29 1 , 295, 297, 298-chimgc in
9 f.n.-architecture, 1 1-attitude anti-Turkish attitude of, 4 1 .
of, towards foreigners, 5--attitude Hitler, Adolf, 1 77, 1 90, 1 92.
of, towards Muslims and Muslim Hoare, Sir Samuel, 65 f.n., 281 .
League, 3 1 , 32, 1 32-Code, 4, 5- Holy Places, 39.
communal award, 63, 64-::om­ Home Affairs, 284.
parison of, with Muslims, 1 0 , 1 1 House of Commons, 25, 49, 79, 1 77,
1 5, 2 1-Congress as Hindu organi­ 1 78, 1 85, 1 88. 248, 249, 273, 289,
zation, 1 0 1 , 1 02-converts, 8-­ 292, 305.
customs, 1 1-imperialism, 3 1 7- House of Lords, 54, 79, 1 86, 248. 291 .
lack of distinction by, between Howrah, 1 25 .
Turks and Muslims, 7-marriagcs Hume, A .W., calls Indian Muslims as
of, with Arabs, 6-Muslim entry "fossils'', 25-displeasure of, with
into Congress resented by, 42-on Sir Syed, 25-equates Congress
reunion of Pakisrnn with India, with British rule, 25-lays founda­
300, 3 1 5-opposition of separate tion of the Congress, 24, 25.
electorate by , 34-patronage of, by Hunud, 9 f.n.
British, 1 9 , 24, 25-philosophy, 4 Hcmudas, 9 f.n.
-press, 52, 1 33, 265-propaganda, Husain, Sir Faz!-i-. See Fazl-i-Hu�ain,
3-provinces, 1 26, 1 35 , 1 37-R aj, Sir.
96, 1 27, 1 29, 1 39, 1 9 1 , 195, 2 1 2-­ Husain, Zakir. See Zakir Husain.
reaction of, to Draft Declaration, Husain Imam, 234 f.n.
1 80-1 8 1 - rerels, 1 4 -r e v i v i a l i s t Hydari, Sir Akbar, 1 72.
movement, 1 3, Sangathan and Hyderabad, 70, 7 1 , 1 24, 1 74-as a

Shuddhi movements, 53-seats for, sovereign state, 125-draft of agree­

in Interim Government, 266-seats ment with, 304-Nizam of, 7, 122,
won by, in the provinces, 76, 8 1 , 82, 301-Usmanistan, 122.
83, 84, 85, 86-social system, 6-
society, 4, 6, 1 0, 1 1-Swadeshi Ibrahim, Carimbhoy, 1 38 .
movement, 29-thought, 4. Imam, 1 2.
Imam, Ali. See Ali Imam.
Hindustan (See also India), 76, 92,
Imam, Husain. See Husain Imam.
2 1 0, 249, 259-as a separate in­
Imperial Legislative Council. See Legis-
dependent state in the Zafar-ul­
lative Council.
Hasan and Qadri scheme, 1 25 . I ndependents, 243-Muslim seats of,
Hindustan Times, 300. in U.P., 89--party position of, in
Hindustani, 1 2 . 1943 elections, 72-party position
Hindustani Musa/man, I O f.n. of, in provincial assemblies, 8 1 ,
His Majesty's Government (See also 83, 84, 85-party position of, in
British Government), 3 3 , 4 1 , 49, Central Assembly, 242.
372 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R PA K I S T A N

India, Indians, 1 -3, 9, 10, 1 8, 19, 22, 23, Government in, 2 7 1 -289, 3 05
24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 3 7, 40, 44, 46, -Khilafat M ovement in, 3 7-
47, 59, 6 1 , 63, 68, 76, 80, 92, 94, 95, 42-Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms
98, 99, 1 07, 1 10, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 19, for, 50-52-Morley-Minto Re­
1 20, 1 22, 1 28, 1 37, 1 4 1 , 1 42, 143, forms for, 32-34-Muslim colo­
1 44, 145, 1 46, 1 47, 1 48, 1 49, 1 50, nies in, 7-0ffer of August 1 940 to,
1 5 1 , 1 52, 1 54, 1 56, 1 5 7, 1 58, 1 59, 1 58-1 63-origin of name for, l .
1 65, 1 66, 1 67, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 74, 1 76, 2-provincial governments in,
1 78, 1 79, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 85, 1 86, 1 88, ( 1 934- 1 943), 8 1 -87-reaction of, to
1 89, 1 9 1 , 1 92, 1 93 , 1 94, 1 95, 1 96, Draft Declaration, 1 80-1 84-Sapru
197, '.!00, 201 , 202, 209, 210, 2 1 2, proposals for the settlement of
2 1 3, 2 1 5 , 2 1 6, 222, 223 , 224, 225, Hindu-Muslim problems in, 222-
229, 2 3 1 , 232, 237, 241 , 242, 247, 227-Sapru scheme for national
257, 258, 263, 264, 265, 267, 269, government in, 1 77-Sayyid Abdul
273, 279, 280, 282, 284, 292, 2·)5. La tif's scheme for cultural zones
296, 297, 3 1 1 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 4-after within, 1 22- 1 23-Simon Report for,
August 1 5 . ( 1 947), 3 1 5, 3 1 6, 3 19- 57-59-status of self-government
agitation in India, against first for, 45-transfer of power to,
partition of Bengal, 27--<:nti-British 290-306-undcr Muslim rulers, 2,
revolt in, 45, 193-1 98-Arab con­ 1 8 , 22-Wavell plan for, 230-243.
q uest of, I, 2-as source of British India, Central, States, 124.
wealth and power, 3-C.R. Formula India, Government of. See Govern-
for, 207-221-Cabinet M ission in, ment of India.
248-258-Cabinet Mission Plan India, North, 6, 3 1 0.
for, 258-270-confederacy of, 1 2 1 , India, Western , States, 1 24 .
1 24-Congress rule i n , (1937-1 939), India-Burma Committee, 297.
88-1 1 5-constirntional changes in, India Office, 39, 40, 4 1 , 48, 66, 303.
( 1 858-1 892), 22-24- Cripps Offer Indian army, 46-nationa!ization of,
for, 1 77- 193-division of, 1 1 7- 73-Muslims in, 30.
1 40, 1 87. 1 98. 20 1 , 2 1 7, Indian Christian Association, 238.
220, 22 1 , 249. 250, 271-Dominion Indian Christians, 57, 1 07 , 1 69, 238-
status for, 60, 1 68, 1 69, 1 78, 1 79, attitude of, to the failure of Gandhi­
1 80-elections in, ( 1 934), 72-77- Jinnah talks, 221-joint statement
estab!ishment of British rule in, of, at the Round Table Conference,
3-federal status for, 53, 55, 56, 63 -participation of, in the Deli­
58, 59. 60. 62, 65, 67-72, 99, 1 1 7, verance Day, 1 5 1-party position
1 24, 1 94, 2 1 8, 250, 252, 254, 256, of, in Assam, 84-party position of,
257, 260-Government of, Act of in the Legislative Assembly, 8 1 -
1 935, 65-66-Hind and Sind as seats for, i n t h e Interim Govern­
synonyms for, 2-impact of World ment, 266, 267-seats for, in the
War I on, 43-45-impact of World Provincial Assemblies, 75.
War II on, 1 4 1 - 1 75-Interim Indian Civil Service, 24.
I N DE X 373
Indian Councils Act,-of (1 861), 22, 2.1 Hinduism, 4--as a nation, 3 , 1 0- 1 5 ,
-of ( 1 892), 23, 29-of ( 1 909), 3 3 . 1 6 , 1 7 , 22 , 1 1 8, 1 3 1 , 1 56, 1 60, 206,
Indian culture, 9 . 2 1 6, 238, 24 1 , 250-as a religious
Indian Federation, 6 7 , 72, 99-and the minority, 1 0- 1 6-attitude of, to­
Princes, 67-69-Congress responsi­ wards British, 1 8, 19, 36, 42, 44-
bility for the postponement of, 7 1 , attitude of, towards integration,
99. 5, 6-attitude of, towards repre­
Indian freedom movement, 32. sentative government, 2 1 -attitude
Indian Independence Bill, 305-pro­ of, towards War, 1 76, 1 7 7-atti­
vision for common Governor­ tude of, towards Western educa­
General in the Draft Bill, 300. tion, 20-attitudc of, towards
Indian Khilafat Deputation, 4 1 . Western Powers, 38-black-f!ag
Indian Legislative Assembly, 5 1 , 68, demonstration of. against instal­
72, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257, 260- lation of one-party government,
boycott of the Statutory Commis­ 281-blamed for t he Mutiny, 1 8 , 1 9 ,
sion by, 5 7 . 20-boycott of Yictory celebrations
Indian Muslims (See also Muslims), by, 39-C.R. Formula and,
52, 9 1 , 1 1 8, 1 1 9 , 1 22, 1 24, 1 25, 207-2 1 2-clashes of, with Hindus,
1 26, 127, 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 3, 1 35 , 1 3 6, 29-comparison of, with Hindus,
1 38 , 1 39, 1 40, 1 4 3 , 1 46, 148, 1 52, 1 0, I I-Communal Award and,
1 54, 1 55 , 1 57, 1 59, 1 65, 1 66, 1 67, 63, 64-Congress Civil Disobed­
1 69, 1 70, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 7 3 , 1 74, 1 82, ience M ovement and, 1 63 - 1 67-
1 83 , 1 84, 1 85, 1 86, 1 88, 1 90, 1 9 1 , Congress campaign for mass-con­
1 94, 1 97, 20 1 , 202, 204, 207, 2 1 1 , tact with , 93 -96-conf!icts of, with
2 1 2, 2 1 7, 220, 234, 236, 237, 238, Hindus, 26, 50, 52, i 32-contrc­
239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, versy about representat ion of, in
247, 249, 252, 253, 254, 255, 260, the Interim G overnment , 266-270-
262, 274, 276, 285, 293, 294, 303, culture, 8-customs, I I -defence of,
306, 307- All India Muslim Con­ by Sir Syed, 20-demand for Pak­
ference and demands of, 55-56- istan, 1, 1 7, 3 1 , 53, 1 1 7- 1 40, 206,
and August Offer of (1 940), 1 62- 1 63 2 1 6, 2 1 9 , 259, 284-demand for
-and Cabinet Mission Plan, 259, separate electorate, 30, 3 1 , 34, 55-
263, 264, 265-and Congress, 16, demand for separate existence, 3-6,
24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 96, 98, 1 03 , 1 04- 10, 1 1 7- 1 25, 206-demands of,
1 0 5 , 106, 1 07 , 1 53 , 1 66, 1 93 . 200-­ 55-57, 130, 1 34, 1 37, 147- 1 48-
and Indian states, 7 1 -and Khilafat denounce Gandhi's campaign for
Movement , 37-42, 44-and Muslim Civil Disobedience, 59-Fazlul
League, 3 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3 , 1 99-207, 282, Haq's statemen t on atrocities of
284-and politics, 2 1 , 3 1 , 1 1 7, 1 25 , Hindus against, 1 00, 1 02, 103-­
-and Sangathan and Shuddhi fear of, for Hindu domination, 5 3 ,
movements, 4 1 -and Turkey, 40- 57-Gandhi-Jinnah t a l k s o n com­
42-apprehensions of, regarding munal problems, 2 1 2-221-ill treat-
374 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

ment of, by British, 1 8, 1 9, 308- Nehru's statement, 272-reaction

3 1 8-ill treatment of, during Con­ of, to non-accession clause, 1 87-
gress rule, 88-1 08, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2-impact reaction of, to Quit India move­
of Sir Syed on, 1 9-22-in the army, ment, 1 95-reaction of, to resig­
30-in provincial ministries, 8 1 , nation of Congress ministries, 1 49-
82, 84, 8 5 , 86, 87-infiuence of 1 5 1-reaction of, to Simon Report,
M uslim immigrants on, 8-joint 59-rcaction of, to the Statutory
statement by, at the Round Table Commission, 5 7-relations of, with
Conference, 63-Muslim League­ Hindus, 42, 44-48, 52-representa­
Congrcss negotiation on communal tion of, in the Executive Council,
problems, 1 09- 1 1 5-Muslim Lea­ 23 1 , 233-safeguards for, I O, 3 1 ,
gue Manifesto and, 73-74-name 60, 77-81-Sapru Proposals and,
for, 1 , 6, 7, 9 , 1 0, 1 6, 25-National­ 222-227-seats for, in the Con­
ist group of, 26-Nehru on neglect stituent Assembly under Cabinet
of, by Congress, 94-Nehru Re­ M ission Plan, 261-seats for, in
port and, 54, 55-oa Mughul rule the Comtituent Assembly under
in India, I S-organizations of, 26- June 3 Pim, 298-seats for, in
party position of, in Assam, 84- Provincial Assemblies, 75-seats
party position of, in Bengal, 8 1 - for, in U.P., 89-Shareef Report
p.irty position of, i n the elections on atrocities of Hindus against,
of ( 1 934), 76-party position of, in J OO, 102-Simla Deputation and,
Panjab, 83-party position of, in 29- 3 1-support for Jinnah, 203-
Sind, 85-Pirpur Report on atro­ tabligh and tan:im movements of,
cities of H indus against, 100-1 02- 53.
reaction of, to the abolition of Indian nation, 1 6, 30. 99.
Khilafat, 42-reaction of, to the Indian National Congress, 48, 54, 55.
annulment of Bengal partition, 36-­ 80, 89, 90, 96, 99, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3,
reaction of, to Congress refusal for 1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 29. 1 30, 1 32, 1 36, 1 37 ,
co-operation with League, 92, 93- 140. 1 57, 1 58, 1 59, 1 68, 1 69, 1 70,
ri;:action of, to Draft Declaration, 1 7 1 . 1 72, 1 76, 1 84. 1 85, 1 86, 1 88.
J 80, 1 8 1 --reaction of, to the failure 1 89. 1 90, 1 92, 193, 1 94, 1 96, 1 9 7,
of Gandhi-Jinnah talks, 2 1 8-re­ 198, 1 99, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207,
actio11 of, to Gandhi-Irv. in Pact, 208, 209, 2 10, 2 1 3 , 214, 2 1 6, 222.
6 1 , 62---reaction of, to the first 223, 227, 232, 234, 237, 238, 239,
partition of Bengal, 27, 28, 29- 241 , 25 1 , 252, 265, 266, 268, 269,
react i on of, lo Jinnah's acceptance 270, 271 , 272, 273, 274, 275, 276,
of Cabinet l\1ission Plan, 266- 277, 278, 279, 280, 281 , 282, 283,
reaction of, to Lucknow Pact, 46, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 29 1 , 294,
47, 48-react ion of, to l\Iontagu­ 296, 307, 308, 309, 3 1 0, 3 1 1 , 3 12 ,
Chelmsford Report, 53-reaction 3 1 5, 3 1 8-acceptance of invitation
of, to Muslim mass-contact cam­ for formation of Interim Govern­
paign, 94-96-reaction of, to ment by, 277-281 , 294-accep-
I N D EX 375
tance of separate electorate tion of one-party government of,
by, 46, 55-against separate 28 l-Civil Disobedience Move­
electorate, 34--agitation for repeal ment of, 59, 6 1 , 63, 1 63-1 67, 1 94,
of the first partition of Bengal, 1 96, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2-Congress-British
35-alliance of, with Muslim Lea­ government controversy on safe­
gue, 37, 44, 45-48, 75-and Bande guards, 77, 78, 79, 80-Congress­
Marram, 105-and Gandhi-Irwin League scheme, 46-48, 55-Con­
Pact, 60-62-and Indian Muslims, gress-States controversy, 69-71 -
16, 2 1 , 24-27, 29, 3 1 , 105, 106, 107, control of legislatures by, 96-98-
1 08, 109, 200-202-and Indian decision of, to join Constituent
states, 69-70, 7 1 -and Khilafat Assembly, 267, 277-dem::md of,
Movement, 37-42, 44--a nd Lord for a Constituent Assembly, 1 45,
Mountbatten, 304--a nd Quit 146-demand of, for declaration
India movement, 43, 1 9 1 - 1 97, 201 , of war aims, 1 1 3, 1 14, 1 4 1 - 1 44-­
203, 205-and Round Table Con­ demand of, for dismissal of Muslim
ference, 62, 63-and Simla Con­ League ministry in Bengal, 293-
ference, 234-235, 240-and Wardha demand of, for dismissal of the
Scheme, 104, !OS-appeasement of, Muslim League from Interim Go­
by British, 269, 270-arrest of, vernment, 286, 291 , 293-dcmands
leaders, 1 94, 1 95-attempts for set­ assurance of non-interference from
tlement between Congress and governors, 78,79-dictatorship of
League, 88, 93, 228-230, 25 1 , 279, the, 96-99-disturbances due t o
285-:ittitude of, towards Cripps Quit India campaign of, 1 94,
Mission, 1 8 1 - 1 82, 1 84, 1 8 5 , 1 86, 1 95-divide and rule policy of, 1 26
1 88, 1 89--:ittitude of, towards -domin:ition of Gandhi over, 98
Cripps Offer, 1 84-1 86, 201 , 202- -election manifesto of, 73,74-75-
attitudc of, towards Draft Declara­ fascist nature of, 98, 1 07, 126-­
tion, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 84- 1 86, 1 89- fiag of, 1 1 1-.formation of minis­
attitude of, towards Gandhi-Jinnah tries by, in the provinces, 78-87,
talks, 2 19-221-attitude of, towards 243, 244-246-founclation of, under
Montagu-Chelmsford Report and British inspiration, 1 4 , 24, 25-
Act of ( 1 9 1 9) , 53-attitude of, to­ Governor - General's blessings
wards national �overnment, 1 82, to, 24, 25-Hume's identification
1 84, 1 86, 1 88, 1 90, 191, 1 93-atti­ of, with British rule, 25--indiffer­
tude of, to\vards ncn-accessicn ern;e of, to communal riots, 280-

clause, 1 82, 189-attitude of, to­ Jinnah's terms of agreement with,

wards War and defence of India, during the war, 1 28-joint session
1 76, 1 77, 1 8 1 , 1 82, 1 93-boycott of of Congress with Muslim League,
1 920 elections by, 52-Cabinet 46, 53-Muslim mass-contact cam­
Mission's suggested points of agree­ paign of, 93-96-Muslim sufferings ·

ment between Le a gue an:'. , 252-254 in, rule, 99-i09, 1 1 1 , 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 26-
-Churchill's reaction to installa- Nationalist group of, 72, 94-95-
376 T H E S T R U G G L E FOR P A K I S T A N

negotiations with Muslim League, of, t o Statutory Commission, 57,

1 09- 1 1 5-Nehru explains reasons 59-reaction of, to the Viceroy's
for Muslim mass-contact campaign Declaration of War, 1 4 1-reaction
of, 94-non-cooperation of, with of, to Wavell's draft formula on
the Government, 1 89, 1 90, 1 9 7- grouping clause, 279, 280-reaction
non-cooperation of, with M uslim of, to Wavell Plan, 233-reaction
League, 89, 92, 99, 1 12, 1 1 5-objec­ of other parties to Con gress revolt
itves of, 24-on allocation of port­ of ( 1942), 1 94- 1 96-reaction of
folios to Muslim League in the other parties to Congress rule in
Interim government, 284--o n provinces, 99-1 00, 106, 1 07 , 1 1 3 ,
collapse of Pakistan, 300-on 1 50, 1 5 1-re.iection o f Communal
Hindu-Muslim rift, 1 1 4, 1 9 1-· Award by, 64-relations of, with
opposition of, by Muslim press, Wavell, 293-representation of, in
26-opposition of, by Sir Syed the Interim G overnment, 266, 267
Ahmed Khan, 25-opposition of, -resignation of, ministries, 1 09,
to partition and Pakistan, 2 1 7, 1 1 3, 148, 1 49-1 53, 1 89, 1 99, 204,
250--Parliamenwry parties of, 78- 206-rule of, in the provinces, 70,
Parliamentary Sub-Committee of, 80, 8 1 - 1 1 5, 243 , 244-246-terms of,
96-97-party position of, in the to Muslim League for coalition
Central Assembly, 242-party posi­ government, 89, 90, 93-terms of
tion of, in 1 934 elections, 72- offer, to Cabinet Mission, 255-257,
party position of, in 1 9 3 7 elections, 258-totalitarian attitude of, 1 1 3,
7 7-party position of, in 1946 1 1 4, 1 1 5 , 153, 1 56, 258-tripartite
elections, 235-party position of, talks at Simla, 252-underrates
in the Provincial Assemblies, 76, the strength of Muslim nationalism,
8 1 , 83, 84, 85-Pro-Japanese atti­ 9 1 , 1 1 4, 1 1 5-Viceroy on demand
tude of, 1 76, 1 89-1 90, 1 97, 203- of, for a Constituent Assembly,
reaction of, to the appointment of 1 45, 146-willingness of, for nego­
Mountbatten as Governor-General , tiations on the principles of Pak­
294-reaction of, t o August Offer istan, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2-Working Com­
of ( 1 940). 16 0, 1 6 1 - 1 62-reaction mittee of, declared unlawful, 59,
of, to Cabinet Mission, 249-re­ 1 94.
Indian nationalism,_ 9 1 , 1 08, 1 33-
action of, to Cabinet Mission Plan,
Congress claim of monopoly of,
263, 264, 266, 273-reaction of, to
75, 94, 99-Congress concept of,
to the formation of lnterim Govern­
101 .
ment, 267, 268, 270-reaction of, Indian Nationalist League, 1 94.
to grouping clause, 262, 2 64, 27 1 - Indian Parliament, 51, 54.
272, 277, 279, 280, 285, 288-reac­ Indian Patriotic Association, 26.
tion of, to Lahore Resolution, 1 33 Indian Planters. 84.
-reaction of, to League's entry in Indian Princes. See Indian States.
the government, 283, 284-reaction Indian States, 58, 60, 64, 65, 67-72,
 I NDEX 3 77
1 1 8, 122, 1 4 1 , 144, 1 78, 1 8 1 , 1 8 3 , 249, 2 8 1-285-reaction to one-party
250, 253, 256, 259, 260-accession Interim government, 281-
of, to Indian Union, 178-agitation reaction to League's entry into,
against, 70, 7 1 -and Act of (1935) , 283, 284 , 286-non-recognition of
69, 7 1 -and Congress, 69-71 , 1 8 1-­ Nehru as head of the, by League
and constitution, 1 78-and Indian Councillors, 286.
Federation, 67-72-and Muslim Ionia , 5 .
League, 1 81 -communalism in, 7 1 Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, demand for a
-representation of, i n the Consti­ North-West Indian Muslim State,
tution-making body, 1 81 , 261- 1 20- 1 2 1 , 328 (Appendix B)-initia·
revision of treaty arrangement with, tcs the idea of separation, 1 1 9- 1 2 1 ,
1 78. 1 30-Presidential Address of, a t
Indian States Committee, 68. t h e Allahabad Session of Muslim
Indian Statutory Commission. See League, (29 Dec. 1 930), 1 20- 1 2 1 ,
Statutory Commission. 325-328 (Appendix B).
Indian Union, 178, 1 82, 1 83, 1 86, 1 87,
Iran, Iranians, 8, 9, 1 0, 1 1 , 1 2, 37-
1 88, 201 , 3 1 1 .
culture of, 9--influcnce of Iran on
lndianism, 1 0, 1 22.
Indian M uslim literature, 9, 1 2-
Indies, 2.
migration of Iranians to India, 9 .
Indo-British, 1 59.
Irish, 149.
Indo-Muslim culture, 1 0-Central
Irwin, Lord-Gandhi-Irwin Pact, 60-
Asian influence on, 8, 9-Indian
63.
influence on, 9-Iranian influence
on, 9-comparison of, with Hindu Islam, 3 , 5, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 3 7 , 3 8 , 5 3 , 1 2 1 ,
culture, 1 1 . 1 37, 1 38, 2 1 5, 309-affinity of, with
Indonesia, 2 . Christianity, 2 1-comparison of,
Indus Basin, (See also Sind), 1 , 1 24, with Hindu ism, 3-6-Iqbal on re­
1 38-1 39-Civilization, 1 38. lationship of, with social order,
Instrument of Accession, 68, 69, 72, 325 (Appendix B)-Sir Syed Ahmed
304. Khan's rational approach to, 20,
Instrument of Instructions, 77, 8 1 , 2 1-system of law in, 5 .
1 44, 294, 295. Islam, Conversion t o . See Conversion
Interim Government, 2 1 5, 2 1 8, 262, to Islam.
265, 271-289, 290-Congress entry I slamic culture , 8, 9 .
into, 277-28 1 , 282, 293-controversy Islamic law, 5 .
about Muslim League represent:l­ Islamic learning, 20.
tives in, 266 ,267, 268, 277, 278- Islamic society, 5 .
demand for removal of League me­ Ismay, Lord, 295, 3 0 1 , 302, opposes
mbers from, 291 -distribution of appointment of Mountbatten as
portfolios to League members of G overnor-General of India, 294-
the, 284, 285-June 16 Proposals opposes V.P. Menon's alternative
on, 267-League entry into, 267, plan, 296.
 378 THE S T R U G G L E f O R P A K I ST AN

Jagjivan Ram, 267 f.n., 283. Nehru, 1 l l- 1 12, 1 1 3 - 1 1 4-corres­

Jaisalmer, 1 24. pondence of, with Wavell, 266, 267
Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, 73, 241 -en­ -criticism of, for the acceptance
dorsement of Fourteen Points by , of Cabinet Mission Plan, 266-
57. criticism of, in the British Press,
Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad. See Ahmad 1 33, 237-discussions with Cripps,
Jamil-ud-Din 1 84-Fourteen Points of, 57, 321-
Jammu and Kashmir, 3 14. 324 (Appendix A)-Gandhi­
Japan, Japanese, 1 76, 1 77, 1 90, 1 9 1 , Jinnah talks, 2 12, 221-explanation
1 92, 1 96, 1 97, 3 l l-Congress sym­ of the Pakistan plan by, 1 36-1 38-
pathies with, 1 76, 1 89-1 90, 197, 203 . Indian Muslims, support of, 1 29,
Jaykar, M.R., 54 f.n., 1 94, 224. 1 56, 203-negotiations with Ra­
Jenkins, Sir Evan, 228. jendra Prasad, 109- 1 10, 1 1 2-offer
Jenkins, Sir John, 3 5 . of, for cooperation with other
Jesudasan, Robert Albert, 238. parties, 88-on arrest of Congress
Jews, 1 5 . Leaders, 1 95-on Attlee's statement
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 1 6 , 53, 5 6 , 57, on transfer of power, 292-on
60, 88, 92, 93, 1 1 6, ! 26, 146, 147, 148 August Offer of (1 940), 1 60-1 61 -
1 54, 1 55, 1 56, 1 58, 1 72, 1 75, 1 76, !87, on Cabinet M ission Plan, 263, 264
1 88, 1 92, 199, 202, 208, 209, 2 !0, -on Civil Disobedience Movement
2 1 1 , 220, 22 1 , 222, 225, 227, 228, of Congress ( l 940), 1 66-on Con­
229, 232, 235, 236, 241 , 25 1 , 252, ciliation Committee, 225, 226-
263, 265, 267, 268, 275, 284, 285, on Congress policy towards Mus­
287, 305, 3 1 6-:md appointment of lims, 1 06, 107-on Congress refusal
common Governor-General for to cooperate with League, 92, 93-
India and Pakistan, 3 0 1 -304-and on Constituent Assembly, 285, 286
the Cabinet Mission, 249, 25 1 , 274 -on Cripps proposals, 1 84, 1 88-
-and the Interim Government, on Cripps recognition of principle
278, 282, 283, 286, 287, 294, 297, of partition, 1 87-on Desai­
298, 299-and the Round Table Liaquat Pact, 229, 230-on Hindu­
Conference, 60-and the Simla Muslim pact, 106-on inclusion of
Conference, 238-240-appeal for Muslim members in Defence Coun­
obsern.nce of Day of Deliverance cil without consulting the League,
by, 1 50- 1 5 1 -as Governor-General 1 73 , -on installation of one­
of Pakistan, 302, 306-as President party government, 281 -on joining
of Constituent Assembly, 306- the Indian government committed
Attlee's aversion to, 3 1 3 -consoli­ to a united India, 1 54-on migra­
dation of Muslim League by. 1 99- tion of Muslim minorities to Pak­
207-correspondence of, with Bose, istan, 1 3 5 - 1 36-on Muslim mass­
( 1 938), 1 1 2 - 1 1 3 -correspondence contact campaign, 95-on national
of, with Gandhi, ( 1 937-1 938), 1 1 0 government, 1 84-on the need for
-I ! I -correspondence of, with separate homeland (Pakistan) for
 INDEX 379

Indian Muslims, 1 30- 1 3 1 , 1 35-­ under the, 297, 298, 299.

on Quit India movement, 1 9 1 , 195
-on Sapru Proposals ( 1 941), 1 70- Kabir Das, teachings of, 326 (Appen­
1 71-on two-nation theory, 1 30- dix B).
Kalal, 3 1 5 .
1 3 1 , 135, 1 3 7-on Wavell Plan
Kamal Yar Jang Bahadur, Nawab,
( 1 945), 233, 234-Presidential
1 03-Report of the Kamal Yar
Address of, at Lahore session
Jang Education Committee, 1 04-105.
( 1940), 1 30-1 3 1 -proposal of, for
Karachi, 1 25, 1 64, 306.
a super Governor-General, 300- Kartar Singh, Giani, 246.
sides with Congress on Statu­ Kashmir, 70, 7 1 , 1 24, 1 36, 25 1 , 304,
tory Commission, 57-speech 3 14-Maharajah of, 304.
supporting Pakistan Resolution, Kazi Saeed-ud-Din Ahmad. See
(extracts), 3 3 1 -332 (Appendix D) Ahmad, Kazi Saeed-ud-Din.
-statement by, against the Con­ Kemal, Mustafa. See Mustafa Kemal.
gress regime, 1 50-1 5 1 -terms of, for Khairpur, 1 22.
co-operationwith government, (June Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhri, 9 1 -Azad's
1 940), 1 56-1 57-terms of, for agree­ terms to, for coalition govern­
ment with Congress, during War, 1 28. ment, 89-90.
Johnson, A. Campbell-. See Cam- Khalsa Nationalist Sikhs, 83.
pbell Johnson, A. Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, 252-and re-
Joint Defence Council, 303 . ferendum in NWFP, 305.
Joint electorate, 30, 76. Khan, Abdul Hamid, 1 35.
Joint Select Committee (of the British Khan, Bande Ali, 86.
Parliament), 64, 65, 72. Khan, Ghazanfar Ali, 283.
Joshi, M.N., 54 f.n. Khan, Liaquat Ali, 1 38, 234 f.n., 252,
J11m11a, 138. 267 f.n., 283, 287, 301-Desai­
June 3 Plan, 297-300-acceptance of Liaquat Pact, 227-230-on Nehru's
the, by Congress, 299-acceptance allegations against Muslim League,
of the, by Muslim League, 299-­ 298.
controversy on Governor-Gen­ Khan, r-.taulvi Abdul Hakim, 94.
eralship, 300-304-appointment of Khan, Muhammad Ismail, 226, 252,
Boundary Commission under, 297, 267 f.n.
298-establishment of two separate Khan, Nawab Shah Nawaz, of Mam­
governments under, 305, 306- dot, 137.
cvolution of, 294-297--implementa­ Khan Sahib, 87, 1 65, 206, 234 f.n., 243.
tion of the, 304-306-Indian reac­ Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb. See Aurang­
tion to the, 299-300-partition of zeb Khan, Sardar.
Bengal and Panjab under the, 297, Khan, Sardar Muhammad Gui, on
298, 304, 305-referendum under division of India, 1 1 8 .
the, 298, 305-text of the, 340-346 Khan, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla. See
(Appendix G)-transfer of power Zafrulla Khan, Sir Muhammad.
 '

380 THE S T R U G G L E FO R P A K I S T A N

Khan, Sir Shafaat Ahmad, 65, 279f.n . Lane-Fox, Richard, 57.

Language, 9, 1 2, 56.
Khan, S i r Sikandar Hayat, 8 3 , 84, 1 1 5,
1 54, 1 74, 206-0ur/ine of a Scheme Latif, Sayyid Abdul. See Abdul Latif,
of Indian Fedcrarion, 1 24-1 25- Sayyid.
pact with Jinnah, 206. Law (Portfolio), 5 1 , 52, 56, 284.
Khare, 87-opposition of Wardha Law and order, 58.
Scheme by, 1 04. Lawrence, Lord Pethick-. See Pethi­
Kheiri, Abdul Jabbar, plan of, for the ck-Lawrence, Lord.
partition of India, 1 1 8. Legislative Assembly. See Indian Legis­
Kheiri, Abdus Sattar , plan of, for the lative Assembly.
partition of lndia, 1 1 8. Legislative Councils, Central, 20, 43,
Kheiri Brothers. See Kheiri, Abdul 45, 47, 5 1-Congress-League
Jabbar; Kheiri, Abdus Sattar. scheme for, 48-expansion of,
Kher, B . G . , 87, 234 f.n. under Indian Councils Act (of
Khilafat Conference, 39-and the 1 892), 23 -provincial, 43, 45, 46,
abolition of Khilafat in Turkey, 42. 47, 5 1 .
(Also see below). Liaquat Ali Khan. See Khan, Liaquat
Kni!afat Movement, 37-42, 43 -44, 52, Ali.
3 1 0-and abolition of Khilafat in Liberal Party , proposals ( 1 941), 1 68-
Turkey, 42-and Lord Reading, 39, 1 72.
41-attitude of British Govern­ Liberals, 1 94.
Lilly, William S., 26.
ment towards, 39-41-Gandhi and
Linlithgow, Lord, 65, 80, 1 63 , 204 f.n.
the, 44-interest of Indian Mus­
Literature, difference between Hindu
lims in, 37, 3 8-Muslims asked to
and Musli m literature, 1 2-inft­
abstain from victory celebrations , ence of Iran on, 9-Muslim rulers'
39--Shi'ah cooperation with, 38. contribution to, 1 4 .
King Emperor, 69. Lloyd barrage, 86.
Kripalani, Acharya, 298. London, 27, 35, 59, 1 64, 185, 1 9 1 , 200,
Krishak Proja Party, 8 1 , 82, 84, 205. 230, 23 1 , 240, 295, 296.
Lord Privy Seal. See Cripps, Sir Staf-
Labour (Portfolio), 75, 84, 85. ford.
Labour Party (of England), 60, 64, Lothian, Lord, 63, 9 1 .
1 80, 307, 3 1 1 . Lovett, Sir Verney, 1 08.
Lacey, Patrick, 1 3 3 . Lucknow, 59, 92, 95, 1 12, 1 22-Con­
Lahore, 1 30, 1 34, 1 39, 1 6 3 , 1 83 , 2 1 1 , gress and League joint session at,
3 15. 46.
Lahore Resolution, 1 1 7, 1 26-1 34, 1 5 6, Lucknow Pact ( 1 9 1 6 ), 34, 45-48, 50,
1 60, 200, 220, 2 5 1-Gandhi-Jinnah 64, 75, 1 12.
correspondence on, 2 14-21 5, 217. Lumby, E.W.R., 272, 288-289, 292,
Lajpatrai, Lala : suggests partition of 302.
India, 1 1 8. Lumely, Sir Roger, 1 72.
 I N DEX 381
Macdonald, Ramsay, 60, 63. ,\,/ii/at, :22.
Madras, 26, 46, 78, 1 24, 1 67 , 203, 234 Ministers, 40, 5 1 , 52, 53, 58, 66, 77,
f.n.-communal representation 80, 250-controversy about Gover­
from, (in the Constituent Assembly nor's relationship with, 77-80-
under Cabinet Mission Plan), 261- executive powers of, 53-responsi­
Congress ministry in, 87, 243- bility of, to Congress Parliamen­
Congress position in, in elections tary Sub-Committee, 96-99. (See
of ( 1 9 3 7), 7 7--seats in Upper also below).
House, 7 5 . Ministries 48, 5 8, 79, 94, 1 84, 1 86, 287
Maharaj Singh, Sir, 224. --and Congress Parliamentary Sub­
Mahmud, Sayyid. See Sayyid Mahmud committee, 96-99-anti-Muslim
Mahtab, H.K., 267 f.n. conduct of, (Congress), 1 1 1- 1 1 2-
Majlis-i-Ahrar, on civil disobedience Congress Ministries in the pro­
movement, 1 95 . vinces, 70, 80, 8 1- 1 1 5-controversy
Malabar, 5 2 , 1 25 . about governor's relationship with,
Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan, 95, 77-80-formation of, under Act of
1 10-dcclines to sign agreement ( 1935), 77-80-in the provinces, 8 1 -
on Hindu-Muslim unity, 1 10 . 87, 243-246, 293-Nehru's defence
Maida, 27. of Congress ministries, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2-
Afanchester Guardian, 1 27, 1 33, 142. resignation of Congress ministries.
Manda!, J.N., 283. 87, 1 49-1 53, 1 89.
Mangal Singh, 54 f.n. Minorities, 3, 16, 44, 60, 62, 63,
Martial law, 52. 1 22, 1 77, 1 78, 1 84, 1 85, 1 86, 195,
Matthai, John, 267 f.n., 279 f.n., 283. 250, 272-and August Offer of
Mehdi, Syed Muhammad, (Raja of ( 1940), 1 58-163-and Cabinet Mis­
Pirpur), 1 00-Pirpur Report, 1 00- sion Plan, 259-262-and Cripps
1 02. Proposals, 1 86-1 88-and J u ne 3
Mehran (See also Indus and Sind), 1 . Plan, 297-300-and Nehru Report,
Mehta, Sir Pheroz Shah, 3 1 . 54-57-and Round Table Confer­
."1.Jelechchhas, 5 . ence, 60, 62, 63-Attlec's declara­
Menon, Krishna, 295, 297. tion on, 249-Congress-Lcague
Menon, V.P., 204 f.n . , 220, 226, 230, Scheme for, 46-48-European, 1 6-
262, 295 , 300, 302, 303, 3 1 2-alter­ Fazlul Haq's statement on, (Mus­
na tive p Ian of, for transfer of power, lim), J OO, 1 02-1 03-Muslim, 6, 1 5 ,
294-297-influence of, on Mount­ 1 6 , 48, 6 3 , 250-and the Congress
batten, 294. rule in the Muslim, provinces, 99-
Mesopotamian issue, 48. 1 09, 1 05, 1 06-Pirpur Report on,
Middle East, 1 3 8. ( Muslim), 100-102-protection of,
Midnapore, 1 25 . 58-religious, 1 0, 1 5, 1 6-represen­
Migration, 7, 8, 9 . tation of, in the Interim government,
Mieville, S ir Eric, 295, 296, 301 . 267, 277, 283-safeguards for, 53,
Military affairs, 47. 77-80, 98, 1 06 ; in Pakistan Resolu-
382 T H E STR U G G L E FOR P A K I STAN

tion, 329-330 (Appendix ( ) under 29 1 , 294, 296, 297, 301 , 306, 3 1 2,

Act of (l 935), 77-79-sepa, .e elec­ 3 1 5-:md June 3 Plan, 294-300-
torate for, 34, 50, 55-Shareef anti-Pakistan attitude of, 303-304-
Report on, (Muslim), 1 00, 1 02. appointment of, as Viceroy, 291 ,
Minto, Lord, 30, 32, 33, 35-Morley- 294-controversy about the ap­
Minto Reforms, 32-34. pointment of, as common Gover­
Misra, Godavari, 87. nor-General, 300-304-Lord ls­
Mody, Sir Homi, 1 72, 224. m<•y's wc;rning about the appoint­
Moen-jo-Daro, 1 38. ment of, 294-reaction of Congress
Mohamed Ali, Maulana, 4 1 f.n., cri­ to the appointment of, 294-reac­
ticism of, by Hindus, 1 1 9-on Civil tion of, to Jinnah's refusal for
D isobedience Movement of Con­ common Governor-Generalship,
gress, 59-on Muslirm as minority, 303, 304-V.P. Menon's influence
1 6. on, 294, 296.
Momins, 24 1 . Mountbatten, Lady, influence on
Monckton, S ir Walter, 301 . Nehru, 294, 3 1 3 .
Mongol inroads, 8, 1 4. Mudie, Sir Francis, 280.
Moon, Penderel, 272-273. Mughul Emperor, 9, 1 8.
Moonje, 1 68 . Mughul Empire, 1 4 , 1 8, 3 8 .
M ontagu, Edwin, 39, 40, 4 1 , 45, 48-
Mughul India, 1 8.
and Khilafat Movement, 39-40-
Mughul rule, 2.
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms,
Mughuls, 9, 1 1 , 1 09 .
50-52-Montagu Declaration, 48-
49. (See also below) . M uhammad. See Prophet.
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 50-52. Muhammad Ali, Maulana. See Mo-
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 50, 5 1 - hamed Ali, Maulana.
Congress criticism o f the, 5 2 - Muhammad Ashraf, Shaikh-Pakistan
reaction o f Muslims t o the, 5 3 . Literature Series, 1 39 .
Montagu Declaration, 48-49. Muhammad Saadullah, Sir, 84, 85,
Mookerjee, S .P., 82, 1 68. 1 74, 204, 205, 234 f.n.
Moplahs (of Malabar), revolt of, Muhammad Shafi, Sir, 57, 59.
against Government, 52-military Muhammad Usman, Sir, 1 73 .
action against, 52. Muhammad Yunus, 224.
Morley, 32, 3 3 -on separate electorate, Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College,
34. 20.
Morley-Minto Reforms, 32-34-on Muhammadan Central Association of
separate electorate, 34. the Panjab, 26.
Mosley, Leonard, on Nehru's state­ Muhammadan Defence Association of
ments, 273. Upper India, 26.
M otilal, G.S., 234 f.n. Muhammadan Educational Confer­
Mountbatten, A dmiral the Viscount, ence, 26.
INDEX 383
Muhammadan L iterary Society of 263, 264, 268, 269, 272, 274, 276,
Bengal, 26. 277, 278, 281 , 282, 284, 286, 287,
J.1uhammadan Observer, 26. 290, 292, 293, 3 0 1 , 3 15-accepts
Mujtahids, 73. Cabinet Mission Plan, 265, 273-
Municipalities, 23. aims of, 3 1 , 32, 37, 1 01-and Con­
Munshi, K.M., 226. gress, 37, 44, 45, 48, 53, 55, 75, 1 12,
Musalmanan-i-Hil7d, 10 f.n. 1 1 3, 309-and C.R. Formula, 209-
Muslim administration, 1 4 . 2 1 0-and Day of Deliverance, 1 50-
Muslim colonies (in India), 7. 1 5 1-and demand for Pakistan,
Muslim community, 6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 26, 1 1 6- 1 39, 2 1 1 , 2 1 2, 2 1 3 , 2 1 4-2 1 5 ,
52-and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, 234, 240, 275-and Desai-Liaquat
22-Central Asian influence on, Pact, 227-229-and 'Direct Action',
9-Indian influence on, 9-pro­ 1 06, 275-and Gandhi-Jinnah talks,
tection of, by Hindu rulers, 6- 2 1 1-219-:md Interim Government,
mob violence on, 6-Western in­ 277, 278, 279, 283-285, 286-and
fluence on, 1 1 . 1 1 8, 1 19. June 3 Plan, 297-300-and Nehru
•;Muslim corridor" 1 1 8,1 1 9 Report, 55-57-and the results of
Muslim culture, 8, 9, 1 3 , 1 05-influ­ the ekctions of ( 1 945), 242, 243 ;
ences on, 9 . of 1934, 240--and Round Table
Muslim education, 1 9, 5 6 , 103, 1 04, Conference, 60-64-and Simla Con­
1 05-and All India Muslim Edu­ ference, 234-240-and Cabinet Mis­
cational Conference, 1 03-and sion, 250-258-and provincial mini­
Wardha Scheme, 104, 105-Kamal stry making, 8 1 -86, 1 08, 204-207,
Yar Jang Education Committee 243-246-anti-Muslim League po­
Report on, 1 04-- M uhammadan licy of Congress, 93-96-atti­
Anglo-Oriental College, 20-Sir tude of, towards Cripps Mission,
Syed Ahmed Khan on, 20. 1 82-1 83-attitude of, towards Sta­
Muslim Empire, 7, 1 8 . tutory Commission, 57-attitude
(The) Muslim Herald, 26. of, towards War, 1 65-1 66-Azad's
M uslim India, 1 8, 1 9 , 26, 30, 34, 9 1 , terms to, for coalition govern­
9 3 , 1 20, 1 27, 1 28 , 1 3 1 , 1 36, 1 37, 1 39, ment, 89, 90, 9 1 , 93-Blitz praise
1 82, 1 87, 1 9 1 , 263, 264, 281 , 282. for, leadership, 275-Cabinet Mis­
Muslim law, 1 9 . sion on demand for Pakistan, 259-
Muslim League, 24, 25, 3 1 -32, 44, 46, 260-Congress and League point
48, 50, 5 3, 54, 57, 60, 73, 83, 88. 89, of view, 1 48--Congress-League
90, 92, 95, 96, 1 1 3, 1 14, 1 1 5, 1 1 6, Pact ( 1 9 1 6), 45-48, 309-Congrcss
1 1 7, 1 19, 1 22, 1 2 3 , 1 26, 1 27, 1 28, non-cooperation with, 89, 92, 99-
1 29 , 1 3 1 , 1 32, 1 35, 1 36, 1 37, 1 40, consolidation of the, 1 99-207-con­
1 42, 1 43, 1 45 , 1 53, 1 54, 1 58, 1 63, troversy on formation of Interim
1 68, 1 69, 1 7 1 , 1 72, 1 73, 1 76, 1 80, G overnment, 268-269-controversy
1 83, 1 84, 1 85, 1 87, 1 89, 1 9 5 , 202, on grouping clause, 279, 280, 285-
209, 222, 223, 226, 227, 230, 252, 289-controversy on parity of seats
384 THE S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S TAN

in the Interim Government, 266- government, 281 -reaction of, to Quit

267-controversy with Fazlul Haq, India movement, 1 95-reaction of,
82-Cripps proposals and Pakistan to the Satyagraha movement of
Plan, 1 86-1 88-criticism of, by Congress, 1 66-1 67-reaction of, to
Congress Press, 247-demand for Wavell Plan, 232, 233-234--seats
removal o f League members from won by, in the Provincial Assem­
Interim Government, 286, 291- blies, 76, 89-terms of offer to
demands dissolution o f tbe Con­ Cabinet Mission, 254-255, 257-258
stituent Assembly, 288, 290-de­ -vilification of, by Congress, 1 0 1 -
mands resignation of Muslim withdraws acceptance of Cabinet
members from Defence Council, Mission Plan, 247, 271-277.
82, 1 74-1 75-entry of, in the In­ l\1uslim Mass-contact campaign, 93-
terim Government. 2 8 1 -285-elcc­ 96, 1 0 1 - 102, 1 1 5-Jinnah on, 95-
tion manifesto of, 73-74, 75- reaction of Muslims to, 94-96.
Fourteen Points (text), 321 -324 Muslim n'.ltionalism, 9 1 , 1 1 5, 1 30,
(Appendix A)-founding of the, 201 .
3 1 -32-Jqbal's Presidential address Muslim rule in India, 2, 6, 7, 8, 1 8-­
( 1930), 325-328 (Appendix B)­ distortion o f the h istory of, 1 4-­
Muslim League Legislators Con­ encouragement of immigration to
vention, 246-247-negotiations with India during, 7.
Congress, 1 09-1 1 5-Nehru on, 1 1 1 Muslim society, 6, 8, 10, 1 1 .
-on anti-Muslim policies of Con­ Muslim University, Aligarh, 89, 1 25,
gress, 105-106-on anti-partition 1 39 .
(Bengal) agitation, 28-on com­ Muslims (See also Indian Muslims),
munal riots, 1 06-on Urdu-Hindi 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1 1 , 12, 1 3 , 14,
controversy, 1 06-on Wardha Sc­ 15, 1 6 , 1 8, 1 9-as Indians, 3 , 1 5
heme, 1 06-Pakistan Resolution, -comparison of, with Hindus, 1 0,
1 1 7, 1 26- 1 33, 1 83 : text, 329-330 1 1 , 1 5-culture, 8-1 3-immigration
(Appendix C)--party position of, of, to India, 7, 8-social system, 6.
in Bengal, 8 1 -rejec t ion of Cripps
Mussolini, 190.
Offer by, 1 82-1 84, 1 87-resolution
Mustafa Kemal, 4 1 .
of, on anti-Muslim activities o f Mutiny. See Struggle for Freedom,
Congress rule, 99- 1 00-resolution 1 857.
of, on Swaraj (1924), 53, 55-reac­ Mysore, 70, 1 24.
tion of Congress and their leaders
to the entry of, in the Interim Go-
vernment, 283, 284-reaction of, Nabobs, 3 .
t o August Offer o f ( 1 940), 1 60- 1 6 1 Naidu, M . Damodaran, 238.
-reaction of, t o the Cabinet Mis- Naidu, P.V., 1 92.
sion Plan, 264, 265-266-reaction Names of lndian Muslims, 8, 9, 1 0- 1 6 .
of, t o t h e installation of one-party Nation, 3, 1 0, 22, 264-Muslims as a
INDEX 385

n a t ion, 1 0 - 14, 22, 3 3 1 -332, (Ap­ 3 1 3-on Cabinet M ission and its

pendix D). Plan, 25 ! , 262, 273, 287-288-on

N ationa l Agricul tural Party, 89. Congress Legislator's responsibility

National A n them, 1 0 5 . to the Congress, 97-on Day of

Nationa l Defence Council, 1 72 - 1 75 . Deliverance, 1 1 3-on grouping

National Herald, 262. clause, 27'2, 273, 276, 287-288-on

National Liberal Federatioi1 , 57-pro­ Hindu - M uslim question. 9 1 , 1 1 2-

posals of, ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 1 68-1 72. (See also on joini n g of the Constituent As­

below). sembly by the Congress, 2 7 1 -272-

National liberals, 52---Federation of, on League's entry into Interi m

57, 1 68-1 72. Government, 284, 286-on Muslim

National Reriew, 282. mass-contact campaign, 94-on

Nationalism, 45, 50, 1 33 . (See also neglect of Muslims by Congre ss ,

below). 94--on protedioa of rights of the

Nationalist Muslims, 26. 56, 76, 89. peoples in fhc States, 70-on sove­

1 07, 242. 243, 284. reignty of Constituent Assembly,

Nationalist Party, 86, 94, 232, 234 f. n . , 272, 276--on Swadeshi movement,

242. '.:: 9--reaction of, to Wavell's re­

Nature, 1 3 3 . call, 293--refusal by, of Viceroy's

Nazis, 1 0 7--Congress dictatorsh i p terms for Interim Government,

compared Vvith, 98. 278-relations of, with Campbcll­

Naz1 muddin. Khwaja , 82, 83, 205, J::il1mon, 294----rcquests rnmoYal of

234 f. n . 267 f.n. l\fos l i m Le:1 gue m�mbers from the

N C\V D:.:lhi, 253� 3 1 5. lr;Jcrim Government, 2 9 1 requests
Nch n 1 , f a\\ :1hc:rl <> l . 9 3 . 9 5 . 97, 1 1 5. I 52, removal of \Vtlvc! ! 1 280, 293----status
1 89, 1 93 , 1 9 7, 1 99 , 2 5 2 , 263, 2 6 6 , of, in the Imcr in1 Go\·crnment,
267 f.n . , 276 278, 279 f. n . , 280,
28 l . 28.\ 2�;'1, 2)4 , 298, 300, 30 1 , l''\,_;hrn , Mo:il:d, S·i. (Sci' aisu Nehru
305, 307, 3 12-;.md V.P. Mrnon's Report ) .

altcrn:1ti1 c Plan, :0lJ 5 , 297, 298, ��1.:hru Con1n1:11cc� 54-55----n1cn1bc,rs of,

300-arrcst of. 59--attiludc of, 54 f.n .
to1\ ctnis C . R . Foin1 U la. 2:!0--com­ Nehru Rcpo1 t, 54-57, 5 '), 63- ;\ ll I n d i a
nicnt by, on Crirp ..;, J 93--corrcs­ i\l u"l i L1 Confcrl:ncc a n d t h e , 55-56
pondcn;,:c of, with Jinnah. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2, �- �J innah-Shcrw'lni recommcn-

J 1 3 - 1 1 4--criticism of, s t a tements cbtions for the, 56-5 7--:!pposilion

on Cab\ner M i ssion Pbn, 272-273- of, b:; M uslims, 5 5 .
defrncc of Cong,·css rule in the /\'ew Statesman and NMiull, 192.
provinces by, 1 1 1 -1 1 2-forms In­ l'·lev.1 York TinKs, 1 96 .

terim G overnmen t , 277-28 1 -In­ News Chronicle, 237.

dra's i nfiurncc on, 294-Lady N ishtar, Abdur R ab, 252, 267 f.n.,
M o u n t batten's influence on, 294, 283, 298.
 386 fHE S T RC G G L E T O R P A K I S T A N

Non-ac:(;s>i J n cbmc, (Draft Ded a ra­ Pakhtunistan, 305.

tion), ! 78, 1 79, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 82 , 1 8 3 , Pakistan, 1, 1 0 , ! 6, 3 1 , 42, 5 3 , 1 00, 1 2 1 ,
1 85 , 1 86, 1 88, 1 89- -aml Pakisun 1 5 3 , 1 66 , 1 77, 1 80, 1 82. 1 8 3 . 1 8 5,
Plan, 1 36 - 1 8 8--Cripps ucY..::n cc of, I SG, 1 87, 1 88, 1 9 1 , 1 94, 195, 1 98,

1 79-Co upland on, 1 87-· .foJian 206, 227, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240,

reaction to, J 80-184. 255, 258, 266, 276, 284, 290, 292,
Non-party Conforence, 1 7 7. 300, 303-Aligarh Professor•;' sc­

Noon, Sir Feroz Khan, 1 72. heme for, 1 25-and C.ibiact rvi i>­

North Afrka. See A fri c a , Nor i h . sion and ils Pbn, 249, 25 1 , 258,

North India. See In.dia, North. 259, 263, 264, 265, 266-and Cripps

Nor th-\Vcst Frontier Province, 53. 58, p r op osal s, 1 8 6 - 1 88- a:·guments

60, 65, 76. 87, 96, 1 00, 1 1 9, 1 24, a g a inst British support for, 308-

1 38, 1 65, 206, 234 f.n . , 243, 2 5 7 , 315 C.R. Formula and de m an d

258, 3 1 5 -Congress success in Mus­ for, 207-21 2--Chaudhary Rahmat

lim constituencies of, 76-Fourtr::cn Ali's scheme for, 1 2 1 - 1 22-Con­

gress o ppos i tion of, 250, 282, 288-
Po ints a n d , 322, 323, 324 (Appen­
dix A) -grouping of, with Muslim compared with the Union govern­
ment of the Cab i ne t Plan, 3 1 8-3 1 9
provinces, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 25, 246, 254-
-cstab!isbment of, 304-306-
LcgisL:!tivc Council for. 5 8 -prc­
GanJhi-Jinnah tal k s and the qu::s­
vinci1! st:ltu-:; for. 5'1. 65.
tion of, 2 1 3-221 Gandhi C'n. 250�
North-We'>t In�L:m :\1uslim St:ttc, 1 2 1 ,
Governor-Gener<il for, 300-30�­
1 22, 3 2 8 L\pper:dix B).
Iq '.: al �nd, 1 1 9- 1 2 l , 328 (Appendix
D)-JiDnJh's role, 306� Jjnn�lh's

Observer, � -+2, 1 96, 237, 263. speech supporting P� kistun

Re;olution, 33 l -3 J 2 (Appen-
Oris:>a, 3 5 , 78, 96, 1 24, 234 f. n .-- ccm­
dix D)-Mountba!lcn·,, arc t i- Pak­
rr1:.in :-J rcprcs::: n tz�t!on fron1, in the
istan poiicy, 305, 30.S- -n1ovcnH;nt
Con>lituent A;scm'aly, 26 ! - -Licl!­
tc'.l:mt-G :wernonhip in, 3 5 --m;i1is­
for, 1 1 6- 1 40 - '\ lu:d i m League

try in, 1'6-87, 243-st'lt<es, 7�\ 1 24. L e g ! s l :t t o r s ' c:c th for, 2 4 6-

Osmar..i " C n i versi!y, 106. 247-\fuslim Lc�1gue':.; reso!uticn

Ottom�:n Empire, 3 3 , 3 1 0 . on DLrc..:t ?A ction fer achieving,

Ottom an Thrctcc, t�O. 275-popularization of, 1 34- 1 40,

Oxford. 93. 202-�JfL'P2.ganda again�t, 308�

reaction to Lahore Resolution,
1 3 3 - 1 3 4-re'.lsons for, 1 34-- 1 40-
Pacific Co u nc i l , 1 77. res ol u t i o n o n , (March 24, 1 940),
Pacts : De>'.li-Lbquat Pc1ct, 227-2.'.'.}-� 1 1 7, 1 26- 1 33 , 1 83 , 329, 330 (Ap­
Gandhi-Irwin P.1 ct, 60-6:�... -Luck­ pc:ndix C)-rise of sep ara t ism , 1 1 7-
uow PJct, 45-48. 1 �6--S:,pru Pr o p o s 'l ! > :md dcnund
 IND EX 387
for, 1 70- 1 7 1 , 226-struggle for, 1 7, Parsees, 1 5 1 , 1 69-seats for, in the
275, 282-Western interest in, 3 1 5- Interim Government, 267-support
3 1 8. of, to the Statutory Commission, 57.
Pakistan Resolution . See Lahore Re­ Partition, 2 1 1 , 304, 3 1 5 , 3 1 9-Abdullah
solution. Haroon on, 123-1 24-Aligarh Pro­
Panjab, 26, 46, 48, 53, 56, 63, 64, 82, fessors' Scheme for, 125-and
124, 1 36, 1 38, 1 64, 1 73, 1 74, 1 75, Cabinet Mission Plan, 259-Azad
206, 234 f.n., 236, 300, 309-com­ on, of India, 299-Bilgrami's letter
munal award and Muslim majority to Gandhi on, of India, 1 1 8. Chau­
in, 63-communal representation dhary Rahmat Ali's Scheme for,
of, in the Constituent Assembly, 1 2 1 - 122-Congress opposition to,
261 -Congress position in Muslim of India, 2 1 7, 299-Gandhi's oppo­
constituencies of, 76-grouping of sition to, of India, 299-Iqbal's
with Muslim provinces, 122, 1 25, proposal for, of India, 1 19- 1 2 1 -
254-Iqbal on amalgamation of, Kheiri Brothers' Scheme for, 1 1 8-
with North-West Indian Muslim Lala Lajpatrai suggests, of India,
State, 1 2 1 , 328, (Appendix B)­ 1 1 8-non-accession clause of the
ministry in, 48, 83-84, 244-246, Draft Declaration and, 1 86, 1 87-
-Muslim majority districts of, Lahore Resolution on, 1 26-140-
according to 1 94 1 Census, 316 Nehru's opposition to, of India,
(Appendix G: Annexure A ) parti­ 299-of Bengal (first), 27-29, 3 1 ,
tion of, 259, 297, 298, 304, 3 1 4 32, 35, 36, 44, 61-Sikandar Hayat's
-Shahidganj agitation in, 1 08- Scheme for, 1 24- 1 25-undoing of,
States, 1 24. (See also below). 299, 300.
Panjab, East, 298, 305. Partition Committee, 304.
Panjab, West, 298, 304, 305. Patel, Vallabbhai, 86, 96, 252, 267 f.n.,
Panjab Unionist Party, 76, 83. 279 f.n., 283, 29 1 , 294, 298, 3 0 1 ,
Pannikar, K.M., 3 1 3. 304.
Pant, G.B., 87, 234 f.n., 235. Pathans, 45.
Paramount power, 68, 70, 7 1 . Patiala, 1 36.
Paramountcy, 68, 69. Patna, 95, 1 16, 1 50.
Parity, 255, 257-Azad-Wavell corres­ Peace Conference, 39.
pondence on, 267. Pearl Harbour, 1 89.
Parlakiwedi, Maharajah of, 87, 234 f.n. Peel, Lord, 4 1 .
Parliamentary government, 49, 53, 80, Percy, Lord Eustace, 63.
96-non-existence of, during Con­ Persian, 1 2, 19.
gress rule, 96-Jinnah on impossi­ Peshawar, 1 19.
bility of parliamentary government, Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 248, 274,
107. 275-statement of, on Nehru's
Parliamentary system, 33, 49-Con­ remarks, 273.
gress-League scheme for, 48. Pirpur, Raja of. See Mehdi, Syed
Parmanand, Bhai, 194. Muhammad, (Raja of Pirpur).
388 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A KI S T A N

Pirpur Report, 1 00- 1 02, i03. Provincial Legislative Councils, 23,

Plebiscite, 213, 2 1 4, 2 1 5, 2 1 8. 3 3 , 45, 47, 50, 5 1 .
Poetry, 9--comparison of Urdu and Provincial List, 65, 252, 256, 257, 260,
Hindi poetry, 1 2, 1 3- i nfluence of 261 .
Provisional Government. See Interim
Iran on, 9.
Government.
Poland, 143.
Provinces, 47, 48, 55, 58, 60, 65, 70,
Poona, 1 69, 1 70.
7 5 , 8� 1 08, 25 1 , 253, 25� 258, 259,
Population, transfer of, 123, 1 24.
260, 261 , 262, 264-autonomy of,
Post-war reforms, 45.
47, 67-87, 264-Azad's terms to
Pradhan, G .R. 54 f.n .
League for Coalition Government
Prakrit, 1 2. in U.P. 89, 90-communal repre­
Prime Minister, 58, 248, 295-Nehru sentation from the, in the Consti­
as, 287.
tuent Assembly, 261-Congress rule
Princes (See also Indian States), 59 ,
in the, 80, 8 1 - 1 1 5 , 243, 244-246-
67-72, 99, 1 8 1 -and ( l 935) Act, 68- constitution for the, 60, 253, 254,
and paramount power, 68-Con­ 255, 256-dcmission of authority
gress o n concessions to the, 70- to the, under Mountbatten outline
League's sympathies with, 1 8 1 - of the plan, 295-grouping of the,
support A l l I ndia Federation, 59, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258,
60. 260, 262, 264, 265, 272, 273, 276,
Privy Council, 1 78 . 277, 279, 280, 287, 288-grouping
Progressive Coalition Party, 82. of the Muslim provinces, 1 1 7, ·1 1 8,
Prophet, 5 . 120- 1 40, 254-ministries in the, 8 1-
Protestants, i 5. 87, 243-246, 293-Montagu­
Provincial autonomy, 46, 47, 5 1 , 5 3 , Chelmsford Reforms and the, 50-
67-87, 9 9 , 250, 264-Congress­ non-accession clause of the Draft
League Scheme for, 46, 47. Declaration for the, 1 78 , 1 8 1 , 1 82,
Provincial governments, 23, 5 8, 60, 1 83, 1 86-option to the, under
252--Congress dictatorship in the, June 3 Plan, 297, 298-partition of
96-99-Round Table Conference the, under June 3 Plan, 297-trans­
and, 60. ferred subjects to the, 50.
ProvinciJI Legislative Assemblies, 58, Punjab. See Panjab.
64, 73, 84, 90, 91, 98, 253, 255, 256, Punjab Moderate Muslim Association,
262, 297, 298, 304, 305-contro­ 94.
versy on safeguards for minorities Purnea, 1 2 5 .
under Act of ( 1 9 35), 77- 8 1 -elec­
tions to the, ( 1 937), 73-76-powers
of, to secede from the Union under Qadis 1 9 .
Cabinet Mission Plan, 255, 257, Quet t CJ , 305 .
258 -seats won by Muslims in the, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
( lJ.P.), 89. See Jinnah, Muhammad Ali.. ..
 I N D EX 389
'Quit Tndia' Movement, 1 9 1 , 1 9 3 - 1 98, Religious denominations, 1 5 .
202, 2 1 2, 3 1 1 -Congrcss resolution Religious minority, J O, 1 6-in the
on, 1 9 3 - 1 97--Muslim League on, 195 West, 1 5-Muslims as, 1 5 .
-n:Jn-cooperation of other parties Renan, 325, 3 2 6 (Appendix B) .
with the cimp:tign for, 201 -re­ Report of the Indian States' Committee,
action to, 1 9 1 - 1 92. 68.
Q ureshi, Shoaib, 54 f.n.-disagreemcnt Reserved subjects, 5 1 .
of, with Nehru report, 5 5 . Residuary pcwers, 1 20.
Responsible government, 21, 32, 33-
and Draft Declaration, 1 80, 1 8 1 -
Race, 6- 1 0 . and the Round Table Conference,
Radhakrishnan, S . , 224. 60-Congress-League Scheme for,
Rafiq -i-Hind, 26. 48-Congrcss rule devoid of, 98-
Rahim, Abdur. See Abdur Rahim. during 1 91 4- 1 935, 43-66-in the
Rahmat Ali, Chaudhary, 1 6-dcmand provinces, 58-Montagu Declara­
for m:iking North-India a Muslim tion on, 49 .
State, 1 1 7-demand for Pakistan, Richardson, Henry, 234 f.n.
1 2 1 - 1 22-Now or Never, 1 2 1 . Rommel, 1 89.
Rajagopalacharia, C., 87, 1 64, 220, 234 Round Tah/e, 1 5 1 , 268.
f.n., 67 f.n., 279 f.n., 283-and Round Table Conference, 1 6, 59-64,
dennnd for Pakistan, 214, 2 1 5,
67, 1 2 l-Cor.gress non-participa­
2 1 7, 220-C.R. Formula, 207-2 12.
tion in, 59, 60, 62, 64--Gandhi­
Rajaji. See Rajagopalacharia, C.
Irwin Pact, CO, 6 1 -White Paper on,
Rajasthan, 124.
Rajcndra Prasad, 96, 1 10, 1 46, 267 64-65.
f.n. 279 f.n . , 283--talks with-Jinnah, Russia, 37, 45.
1 09- 1 10, 1 12-version of, on fail­
ure of talks with Jinnah, 1 1 0.
Rajputana, 1 24. Saadullah, Sir Muhammad. See Mu­
Rajshahi, 27. hammad Saadullah, Sir.
Rangoon, 177. Saced-ud-Din Ahmad, Kazi. See
Rao, R . , 1 72. Ahmad, Kazi Saeed-ud-Din.
Reading, Lord, 39, 40, 4 1 , 68. Safeguards for minorities, 96, 1 0 1 , 255,
Red Shirts, 305. 258, 329-330 (Appendix C)-and
Reed, Sir Stanley, 149. Cabinet Mission Plan, 259-and
Referendum, 218- Red Shirts abs­ Draft Declaration, 1 78-Congress
tain from, 305. and, 1 05, 1 06-controversy on, bet­
Religion, 3 , 6, 8, 1 5 , 20, 2 1 , 5 6 -as a ween British Government and Con­
basis for a se:nratc nation, 3 - gress, 77-8 1 .
teaching of, i n Wardha Scheme, Saharan pur, 1 1 8.
104. Salisbury, Marquess o f, 1 49.
390 THE STRUGGLE FOR PAKISTAN

Samuel, Lord, 149. 5 5-Congress-League Scheme for,

Sant Singh, 224. 46-Congress opposition to, 34,
Sangathan, 42, 53. 74-reasons for, 73 .
Sanskrit, 1 2. Separate representation, 30, 32, 34,
Sapru, Sir Tej Bahadur, 54 f.n., 1 77, 46, 50, 5 1 , 55, 56-and Congress,
1 86, 1 92, 1 94-on Quit India 46, 74-and Montagu-Chelmsford
movement, 1 92, 1 94-role of, at the Report, 50-and Nehru Report,
Round Table Conference, 60- 54, 55.
Liberal party proposals (of 1 94 1 ), Separatism, 50, 1 1 7- 1 40, 1 83, 1 88.
1 68- 1 72 . Serajganj, 1 6 1 .
Sapru Proposals (of 1 944), 222-227. Setalvad, Sir Chimanlal H . , 168.
Sarkar, N.R. 82, 224. Sethi, Dev Raj, 1 64.
Sastri, Sir Srinavasa, 1 68. Shah Nawaz, Begum, 1 74.
Satyagrah. See Civil D isobedience Shahi jirga, 305.
Movement. Shahid, Saiyid Ahmad, 309-Wahabi
Savarkar, V.D. 1 1 8, 1 68, 1 94. movement of, 309-3 1 0.
Sayyid Abdul Latif. See Abdul Latif, Shahidganj agitation, 1 08-Nehru's
Sayyid. unwillingness to support, 1 1 1 .
Sayyid, G . M ., 1 38, 243. Shafi, Sir Muhammad. See Muham-
Sayyid Mahmud, 41 f.n. mad Shafi, Sir.
Scarborough, Lord, 2 8 1 , 282. Shakespeare, William, 1 0.
Scheduled Castes (See also Untouch- Shareef Report, 1 00, 1 02, 1 0 3 .
ables), 8 1 , 84, 1 3 3, 228, 232, 234 Shaukat Ali, Maulana, 9 5 .
f.n.-and the grouping clause, 288- Shaukatulla h Ansari. See Ansari,
attitude of, to Civil Dis o bed ience Shaukatullah.
Movement, 1 94-Fedcration of the, Sherwani, Tasadduq Ahmad Khan, 56.
57-representation of, in the In­ Shi'ahs, 38.
terim Government, 266, 283, 284. Shiah Conference, 241 .
Scheduled Caste Federation, 5 7. Shi'ism, 9-conversion to. See Con-
Scientific and Translation Societies, 20. version to Shi'ism.
Scots111a11, 192. Shiva Raj, N., 232, 234 f.n.
Secretary of State for India, 22, 27, Shoaib Qureshi. See Qureshi, Shoaib.
28, 36, 39 , 40, 46, 47, 51, 52, 54, Slwddhi, 42, 5 3 .
6 1 , 66, 68, 69, 72, 79, 1 84, 205, Shukla, R . S . , 8 7 , 2 3 4 f.n.
248, 2 5 1 , 252, 273, 278, 285, 29 1 . Sikandar Hayat Khan, see Khan, Sir
Self-government, 3 7 , 48, 49, 7 3 , 9 8 . Sikandar Hayat.
Semitic traditions, 1 5. Sikhs, 45, 60, 63, 1 10, 1 69, 232, 233,
Separate clectora te, 1 6, 30, 3 1 , 34, 46, 234, 260, 276, 286-alliance of,
50, 53, 55, 56-Ambedkar and, 64 with Congress in the Panjab, 244-
-and Montagu-Chelmsford Re­ 245-and agitation against Muslim
port, 50-and Morley-Minto Re­ League Government i n Panjab, 1 08
forms, 34-and Nehru Report, 54, -and Communal Award, 63, 64-
I N D EX 39 1

and principle of parity, 226-and Sinha, Srikrishna, 87, 234 f.n.

Shahidganj agitation, 108-and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. See Ahmed
Wahabi movement, 309-310- Khan, Sir Syed.
Desai-Liaquat Pact and, 228- Sircar, Sir Nripendra, 1 68.
Jinnah on position of, in Pakistan, Sirkar, N.N., 226.
1 36-on Gandhi-Jinnah talks, 221 Sitaramayya, Pattabhi, 281 .
-on grouping clause, 288-party Smyrna, 40.
position of, in the Panjab, 83- South Indian Liberal Federation, 238.
representation of, in the Consti­ Speaker, 257.
tuent Assembly, 261, 298-repre­ Socialist International, 1 1 8.
sentation of, in the Interim Govern­ Spectator, 142, 1 86, 1 96, 292.
ment, 266, 267-seats for, in pro­ Statutory Commission, 54-Congress
vincial assemblies, 75. reaction to, 54-Indian reaction to
Sikkim, 124. the Report of, 57-members of the,
Simla, 222, 230, 234, 238, 295. 57-Report of the, 57-59.
Simla Conference, 2 1 2, 222-240, 244, Statesman, 1 5 1 , 269.
248.
Stephens, Ian, 302.
Simla Deputation, 29-3 1 , 34-tripartite
Stockholm Conference (of the Socialist
talks at, 262-268.
International), 1 1 8.
Simon, Sir John, 57.
Strachey, Sir John, 1 9 .
Simon Commission. See Statutory
Commission. Strathcona a n d Mount Royal, Lord,
Simon Report, 57-59-unitary system 57.
rejected by, 58. Struggle for Freedom (1 857), 18-19,
Sind, 54, 60, 96, 108, 1 23, 1 73, 234 f.n. 20, 22, 281-impact of, on Mughul
-amalgamation of, with North­ Empire and Indian Muslims, 1 8-19.
west Indian Muslim State, 1 2 1 , Suez Canal, 1 89.
328 (Appendix B)-Congress posi­ Suhrawardy, H.S., 82, 244, 246.
tion in Muslim constituencies of,
Sulaiman Nadvi, 4 1 , f.n.
76-derivation of the name for,
Suleri, Z.A., 1 38.
1 , 2,-grouping of, with Muslim
Sultan Ahmad, Sir, 1 74.
provinces, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 24, 125, 246,
Sultan of Turkey, 38, 39.
254-ministry in, 85-86, 205, 206,
243-representation from, in the Super Governor-General, 300.
Constituent Assembly, 21 6-sepa­ Surma valley Muslims, 84.
ration of, from Bombay 54, 58, 65. Svaichchhra, 1 32.
Sind Azad Party, 85. Swadeshi Movement, 29.
Sind Hindu Sabha, 85. Swaraj, 53, 98.
Sind Muslim Party, 85 . Swarajists, 52.
Sind United Party (Muslim), 85. Syed Ahmed Khan. See Ahmed Khan,
Singapur, 1 76, 1 89, 203. Sir Syed.
 392 T H E S T R U G G L E F O R P A K I S T AN

Syed, G . M . See Sayyid, G . M . Turks, 7, 8, 1 0, 4 1 .

Syed Mahmud. See Sayyid Mahmud. Two-nation theory, 3 1 , 1 30- 1 3 I , 1 35,
Sylhet, 1 25-amalgamation of, with 1 3 7, 299.
East Bengal, 304,305-referendum
in, 298, 305-seats foi, in the Con­ Union government, 252, 254, 255, 256,
stituent Assembly, 298. 258, 262, 266, 272-Cabinet M is­
sion Plan for, 260.
Unionist Party, 83, 241 , 244. (See also
Tabligh and Tanzim movements, 5 3 . below).
Tahdhib-ul-Akhlaq, 2 1 . Unionists, 83, 206, 244, 245, 246.
Tara Singh, Master, 232, 234 f.n. Unitary government, 55, 58, 272-
Temple, Sir Richard, 1 9 . Nehru report and, 55-Simon re­
Templewood, Lord, 281 . port and, 5 8 .
Thrace, 40-Eastern, 38, 4 1 . United Kingdom, 1 5 , 1 44, 1 78, 307,
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 3 1 . 308.
Time and Tide, 1 27. United Nations, 1 9 3 .
( The) Times, 1 42, 1 52, 1 96, 237, 292.
United Peoples Party, 84, 8 5 .
Times of India, 1 1 8 .
United Provinces, 46, 7 5 , 7 7 , 8 9 , 96,
Tiwana, S i r Khizar Hayat Khan, 83,
1 06, 1 24, 1 50, 234 f.n., 245-Azad's
206, 234 f.n., 246.
Tory party, 1 80. terms to League for coalition go­
Transfer of power, 259, 282, 290- vernment in, 89,90-communal re­
203-Attlee's statement on, 290- presentation from, in the Consti­
294-June 3 Plan for, 297-300 tuent Assembly, 261-communal
-outline of Mountbatten plan for, riots and disorders in, !OJ-Con­
295-reaction on Attlee's st1tement gress ministry in 78, 87, 90-91 , 243
on, 292. -Muslim League on communal
Transferred subjects, 50, 5 1 . riots in, 1 06-Muslim seats in the
Travancore, 70, 1 24. Legislature of the, 89-result of by­
Treaty of Lausanne, 4 1 . election in, 9 5 .
Treaty of Sevres, ( 1 920), 39, 40, 41 . United States of America, 1 92, 307,
Tufail Ahmad M:tnglori, S 1yyid, 26, 308, 3 1 3 .
27. Universities, 23, 75, 76, 1 0 3 .
Turkey, Turkish, 9, 1 2, 37, 38, 39, Untouchables (See also Scheduled
1 97-abolition of Khilafat in, 42- Castes), 57, 63, 64, 1 40 -rnd Con­
and Muslim India, 37, 40, 4 1 , 45- gress :.bnifesto, 74-Se:Hrate eb::­
Balkan wars, 38-British p.:ilicy to­ tora te for, 64.
wards, 39, 4 1 , 44 -aeutrality of, Urdu, 1 2. I O l , 1 03 , 1 1 1 -: J:n-nri­
41-relations of, with Greece, 39. son of, with Hindi, 1 2, l 3 -\1 aslim
Turkey, Sultc:n of, 38, 39. League \fanifesto and, 74-Muslim
INDEX 393

League o n Hindi-Urdu contro­ Wahabi movement, 309-3 1 0.

versy, 1 06, 1 26. Wahabis, 3 10.
Usman, Sir Muhammad. See Muham­ Wardha, 98, 1 9 1 , 1 96.
Wardha Scheme, 1 39-criticism of,
mad Usman, Sir.
1 04, 1 05-Muslim League on, 106.
Usmanistan, 1 22.
Walsh, Stephen, 57.
Uttar Pradesh. (See also United Pro­
War Advisory Council, 1 58, 1 6 1 , 1 62.
vinces), 1 1 8.
War Cabinet, 48, 1 78, 1 79, 1 80, 1 87 ,
1 88--Indian representation in the,
1 i7.
Vasco da Gama . See Gama, Vasco da.
Ward, W.C.E ., 26.
Vaqarul Mulk, Nawab, 3 1 . Washington, 149.
Veto, 23, 47, 237 . Watson, Sir Alfred, 1 5 1 .
Viceroy (See also u nder specific names Wave!!, Lord, 207, 237, 266, 268, 283,
of the Viceroys), 25, 30, 32, 35, 36, 293--correspondence of, with Azad
39, 4 1 , 45, 46, 48, 50, 6 1 , 7 1 , 72, 267-correspondence of, with
80, 1 28, 1 84, 1 90, 202, 203, 204, Jinnah, 268-Nehru's criticism of,
280-negotiations of, with Jinnah
207, 208, 2 1 1 , 236, 248, 264, 265,
on League's entry in the Govern­
266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 274, 278,
279, 280, 28 1 , 282, 284, 285, 286, ment, 283-postponement of the
formation of Interim Government
29 1 , 293, 294, 2'95, 296, 297, 298,
300, 301,302-attempts at Congress­ by, 268, 269-removal of, 280,
League agreement, 279-280-criti­ 285, 291 , 292, 293, 294, 3 1 2-rela­
cism of, on installation of one-party tions of, with Congress, 293-
Interim Government, 281-corres­ scheme of, for phased withdrawal,
pondence of, with Indian leaders, 293 .
1 90, 266, 267, 268, 280, 284, 29 1 - Wavell Plan, ( 1 945), 230-234, 239, 240,
draft formula of, o n grouping 244.
clause, 279-280--position of, in the
West Pakistan, 1 , 1 1 8.
Interim Government, 286-287-pro­
West Panjab. See Panjab, West.
posal of, for formation of Interim
Westcott, Bishop Foss, 224.
Government, 277, 278, 279-refusal
of, for dismissal of League ministry Western India. See India, Western .
in Bengal, 293-refusal of, for vote Whitehall, 295, 300.
on Pakhtunistan, 305-relation of, World War I, 1 1 8-India and the,
with Congress, 293 . 37-42, 43-45-post-war reforms in
Viceroy's Executive Council, 34, 35-36, India, 45-52.
1 57, 1 58, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 62, 1 72, 1 74, World War II, 43, 65, 72, 82, 1 09,
1 79, 1 8 1 , 1 86, 23 1 , 283 . 1 76, 1 77, 1 79, 1 86, 1 89, 1 90, 2 1 0-
Victoria Paper, 26. impact of, on Indian politics, 1 4 1 -
Vidya Mandir, 1 04 , 1 26. 1 7 7-attitude of Congress, to the,
394 THE S TR U GG L E F O R P A K I S T A N

1 76, 1 89- 1 90, 1 97, 203-attitude of Women, 75, 76, 84.

Muslim League, to the, 1 76-Con­ Yavanas, 5 .
gress demand for declaration of the Yunus, Muhammad. See Muhammad
aims of the, 1 1 3, 1 14, 1 4 1 - 1 44- Yu nus .
Declaration of, 1 4 1 - 1 49-resigna­ ZafrullaKhan, Sir Muhammad , 65, 1 74.
tion of Congress ministries at the Zaheer, Ali. See Ali Zaheer.
out break of, 87, 97, 1 49- 1 53 . Zakir Husain, 1 04, 105.