Skye E.

Lazaro (#14071)
J. Ramzi Hamady (#16467)
Aaron C. Hinton (#16840)
Austin C. Nate (#17789)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO SET CONDITIONS FOR

RELEASE
Plaintiff,
v.
Cause No. 231500139

KOURI DARDEN RICHINS,

Defendant. Judge: Richard Mrazik

KOURI DARDEN RICHINS (“Kouri”), by and through Skye Lazaro of Ray Quinney &

Nebeker, P.C. and counsel of record, moves the Court, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the

Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205 and her previously filed Motion to Consider

Defendant’s Constitutional Right To Bail1 to set conditions for her release, including the setting

of monetary bail if the court deems appropriate.

1
Docket no. 17, filed May 15, 2023.
 In light of the facts, circumstances, and law unique to this case, Kouri requests that the

Court consider her pretrial release and set conditions for her release. In doing so, this Court can

order such conditions as electronic monitoring or other supervision that will satisfy any concerns

the Court or the State may have. In support of this motion, Kouri states as follows:

BACKGROUND

1. Kouri has lived in the State of Utah for more than twenty (20) years.

2. Kouri met Eric Richins (“Eric”) in March 2009.

3. Kouri and Eric quickly developed a relationship and began living together in June

2009.

4. In January 2012, Kouri and Eric became engaged to be married, and their first child

was born in July 2012.

5. In November 2012, they purchased the home located at 282 Willow Court in

Summit County (the “Family Home”). While legal title was put only in Eric’s name, Kouri also

contributed her separate funds to the down payment. See Objections and Responses to Defendant

Katie Richins-Benson’s First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff Kouri Richins, Answer to

Interrog. No. 2 and corresponding America First Credit Union Bank Statements, collectively

attached as Exhibit 1. Under Utah law, legal title is not dispositive of ownership. See, e.g.,

Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 26, 993 P.2d 887 (explaining that trial courts have

“broad equitable power to distribute marital property, regardless of who holds title”).

6. Kouri and Eric were then married on June 15, 2013.

2
 7. On the date of their wedding, they executed a premarital agreement (the “Prenup”).

A copy of the Prenup is attached as Exhibit 2. The first time that Kouri learned of or saw the

Prenup was when Eric’s mother presented it to her moments before she walked down the aisle.

8. Exhibit A to the Prenup is titled “Summary of Significant Separate Property of

Husband” and was meant to provide a “summary of [Eric’s] assets and debts.” Exhibit A further

provided that it was intended to “give a fair, reasonable, and adequate disclosure of the assets of

[Eric] by category.” Under his assets, Eric listed his interest in C&E Stone Masonry, LLC

(“C&E”), a forklift, skid steer, scaffolding and saws, two trucks, and a dump trailer. Eric listed no

other assets. In particular, Eric did not identify the Family Home as separate, premarital property.

9. While the Prenup also states that Kouri and Eric “do not now have, possess, or

claim any right or interest in the present or future income, property, or assets of the other,” it is

well-established under Utah law that separate property can become marital property when it has

been commingled; when the other spouse has augmented, maintained, or protected the separate

property; and when it is fair, just, and equitable. See Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 22, 235

P.3d 782. From at least September 2013 to March 2022, the mortgage on the Family Home and

virtually all upkeep, maintenance, and improvements were paid using Kouri and Eric’s joint funds

from joint financial accounts.

10. Kouri and Eric had three children during their marriage.

FINANCIAL ALLEGATIONS

11. On September 5, 2013, Eric designated Kouri as a joint owner of an America First

Credit Union (“AFCU”) account ending in 2204 (the “2204 Account”). See Membership Joint

Owner Designation, attached as Exhibit 3. The 2204 Account was the main financial account that

3
Kouri and Eric used throughout their marriage. However, they also had several other joint accounts

at AFCU. In addition, they used several credit cards during their marriage from at least the

following financial institutions: Bank of America; American Express; and Capital One (Cabela’s

credit card). These credit cards were joint credit cards and/or connected to the 2204 Account.

12. Pursuant to AFCU’s Membership & Account Agreement, “[a]ny joint account

owner is authorized and deemed to act for the other owner(s). . . . Any account owner, including

any joint owner, may withdraw all funds and/or close the account, stop payment on items drawn

on the account, withdraw, or pledge all or any part of funds in the account, without the consent of

the other account owner(s). . . .” See America First Credit Union Membership & Account

Agreement § I(4)(c), attached as Exhibit 4.

13. Similarly, under Utah law, financial accounts acquired during a marriage and/or

containing commingled funds constitute marital property to be equally distributed between

spouses. See Sandusky v. Sandusky, 2018 UT App 34, ¶¶ 15-19, 417 P.3d 634; Duffin v. Duffin,

2022 UT App 60, ¶ 23, 511 P.3d 1240 (“Marital property is ordinarily all property acquired during

marriage and it encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever

obtained and from whatever source derived.”).

14. The Amended Information alleges that Kouri withdrew $100,000 from Eric’s bank

accounts and spent in excess of $30,000 on Eric’s credit cards. While the specific accounts and

credit cards remain unclear, to the extent any such money was withdrawn from the 2204 Account

or any other account held jointly by Kouri and Eric, and to the extent any credit card charges were

on joint credit cards or credit cards linked to a joint account, all such funds were equally owned

by Kouri and Eric. In other words, they were not just Eric’s accounts.

4
 ERIC’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CODY WRIGHT

15. On October 1, 2010, Eric and Cody Wright (“Cody”) formed C&E.

16. Eric and Cody each held a 50% interest in C&E.

17. In addition to being business partners, Eric and Cody were friends outside of work.

18. In September 2016, Eric invited Cody to go hunting with him on a property that

Eric owned in northern Utah.

19. On September 10, 2016, Eric shot a bull elk despite the fact that he had already

filled his 2016 elk permit. As a result, Eric requested that Cody tag the elk with his unfilled 2016

elk permit, and Cody complied.

20. Cody subsequently reported the occurrence to law enforcement, which resulted in

Eric being charged with Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, a Class A Misdemeanor. After

reporting the unlawful tag, Cody was interrogated by law enforcement. During the interrogation,

he made multiple statements criticizing or otherwise calling into question Eric’s character. An

investigation conducted by the Division of Wildlife Resources included a witness interview that

provided evidence Eric had been unlawfully obtaining tags in Linda Richins’ name, having them

mailed to his residence and filling them without her knowledge between 2003-2007 and again

between 2009-2012.2

21. In addition to Eric being charged with a Class A Misdemeanor, the Division of

Wildlife Resources revoked Eric’s big game hunting privileges for a period of eight years, effective

June 3, 2019, to June 3, 2027. Eric appealed the decision to the Utah Wildlife Board and

2
Department of Nat. Res. Case No. 2017-001986, Incident Report pg(s) 5, 10. These allegations were not
prosecuted likely due to being time barred by the Statute of Limitations.

5
subsequently entered into a stipulation and order, which suspended Eric’s hunting privileges for a

period of four years and eight months, running from June 3, 2019, to March 1, 2024. As an avid

hunter, this was devastating to Eric.3

22. As a result of Cody reporting Eric to law enforcement and calling into question

Eric’s character, their relationship was never the same. While they remained business partners,

Eric’s trust in Cody deteriorated significantly, and he did not believe that Cody had his best interest

at heart.

23. On or about August 23, 2023 C & E Stone Masonry, LLC was ordered to pay

$602,745 after an investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor found the company violated

overtime rules by paying workers straight time for all hours worked. The company was

additionally cited for failing to maintain records of hours worked each day and week, as required

by the Fair Labor Standards Act.4

ERIC’S DRUG AND ALCOHOL USE

24. Numerous witness accounts from mutual friends of Eric and Kouri state that Eric

was a partier and loved a good time. He would consume alcohol and THC in any form.

25. Witnesses would go on to recount stories about trips and drinking and drugs in

Hawaii, Africa, New Orleans, Las Vegas, and Mexico. Witnesses have further recounted that some

gummies he bought on the Las Vegas strip in mid-February 2022 had, “Fucked him up bad.”

26. These same witnesses state that Eric largely refrained from drinking around his

family, except on the occasion that his sisters, Katie and Amy, would be present during a party.

3
Stipulation and Order dated April 27, 2021. In the Matter of the Privileges of Eric E. Richins to Hunt in the State of
Utah, Case No. 2017-001986.
4
Dept of Labor Press Release

6
 THE GREECE VACATION

27. In 2019, Eric, Kouri, and six of their friends traveled to Greece to celebrate a mutual

friend’s birthday and enjoy a vacation.

28. At that time, Eric was taking a prescription for Lyme disease that he had recently

contracted from tick bites he suffered on a recent hunting trip in Texas. Eric was advised not to

consume alcohol while on the prescription as combining the two would result in flu-like symptoms,

among other things.

29. One day on the vacation, Eric, Kouri, and their six friends went to eat and ordered

drinks. As a result of his prescription, Eric ordered a non-alcoholic drink. When the waitress served

the drinks, Eric and Kouri questioned the waitress several times to ensure that Eric’s drink

contained no alcohol. The waitress assured them that it contained no alcohol. However, once Eric

took a drink, he quickly became ill. Kouri and one of the friends immediately took a sip of the

drink and believed that it contained alcohol.

30. All six friends that were with Eric and Kouri witnessed that Kouri never handled

Eric’s drink. Instead, the waitress delivered the drink directly to Eric. According to the accounts

of the mutual friends, Kouri immediately took Eric back to the room, called his doctor and found

a pharmacy to purchase the medications and attended to Eric until he felt better. Several hours later

Eric and Kouri rejoined their friends.

31. The State and the State’s witness, Katie Richins-Benson, have advanced the

narrative that Kouri attempted to poison Eric. To the contrary there has not been a single text

message or other document turned over in discovery to support the allegation that Eric ever

7
believed Kouri attempted to poison him or told Katie that he believed she did. Such statements are

specifically contradicted by every witness that was actually present at the time Eric fell ill.

VALENTINES DAY 2022

32. Several years after the Greece vacation, on February 14, 2022, Kouri purchased

lunch for her and Eric from a local diner to celebrate Valentine’s Day. Eric was not feeling well

after lunch and decided to take a nap in the office above the detached garage.

33. At approximately 3:48 p.m., Kouri and Eric corresponded over text. Kouri, who

was designated as “My Princess” in Eric’s phone, asked Eric how he was feeling. Eric responded:

“Okay wish you were here.” See February 14, 2022, Text Messages, attached as Exhibit 5.

34. After Eric was done napping in the office, he entered the home and the room where

the nanny was taking care of his and Kouri’ children. Eric and the nanny spoke, and Eric explained

that he had fallen asleep.

35. When speaking with Eric, the nanny witnessed that Eric had no hives and was not

acting ill. The nanny also did not witness Eric using an epi-pen—something she would have

witnessed given the location where the epi-pens were stored in the house. Eric made no mention

of taking Benadryl nor did the nanny witness him taking any Benadryl.

36. After Eric explained that he had fallen asleep, he collected the children and took

them to soccer practice because he was their soccer coach. In doing so, the nanny witnessed that

he appeared to act completely normal.

37. Eric initiated a group iMessage text two days after Valentine’s dinner that included

mutual couple friends and Kouri to set up details to get together for dinner, ultimately deciding on

Purgatory in Salt Lake on Saturday, February 19th.

8
 38. At that dinner, the two couples discussed allergic reactions to allergy shots, a topic

sparked by one of the guests having to go to urgent care right before dinner to make sure it was ok

to consume alcoholic drinks following the shot. Eric seemed confident to those present when he

relayed he believed this is what happened to him. The couples joked about how weird it is to be

allergic to allergy medicine.

39. On February 20, 2022, Eric and Kouri met different friends at a bar for drinks.

Witness accounts state they had never seen Eric and Kouri happier and that Eric made jokes about

being allergic to allergy medication.

40. The State and the State’s witness Katie Richins-Benson have advanced the narrative

that Kouri attempted to poison Eric on this occasion as well. To the contrary, there has not been a

single text message or other document turned over in discovery to support the allegation that Eric

ever believed Kouri attempted to poison him or told Katie Richins-Benson that he believed she

did. These statements are specifically contradicted by several witnesses.

ERIC’S ESTATE PLANNING

41. On November 3, 2020, Eric created the Eric Richins Living Trust (the “Trust”).

Section 1.03 of the Trust sets forth a “Statement of Intent” which provides, in relevant part: “I wish

to provide for both my wife and our children during any time that I am incapacitated or after my

death.” Eric’s estate planning attorney explained that she did not often include statements of intent

in trust documents. A copy of the Trust is attached as Exhibit 6.

42. Section 8.03 of the Trust further provides that although Eric desired to preserve his

trust assets as much as possible for future trust beneficiaries, it was “[his] desire to provide for

Kouri Darden Richins’s legitimate financial needs using the assets of [the] trust.”

9
 43. Kouri was unaware that Eric created the Trust.

44. In addition to creating the Trust, on February 16, 2021, Eric revoked a durable

power of attorney that he had previously executed, wherein he designated “Kouri Darden Richins”

as his attorney in fact. A copy of the Durable Power of Attorney is attached as Exhibit 7. In the

revocation document (the “Revocation”), Eric specifically stated that he “executed a durable power

of attorney appointing Kouri Darden Richins to serve as [his] attorney-in-fact,” a copy of which

was then attached thereto. In the Revocation, Eric stated that he executed the durable power of

attorney on May 8, 2013, even though he had it notarized before a notary public on May 8, 2018.

The notary public specifically remembered Eric appearing before her on May 8, 2018. In other

words, that Eric dated the durable power of attorney as 2013 instead of 2018 was likely a

typographical error. This is particularly true given that Kouri and Eric were not married as of May

8, 2013, such that her last name had not yet been changed to “Richins”, as stated in the power of

attorney. A copy of the Revocation is attached as Exhibit 8.

45. The Revocation also states: “I have advised Kouri Darden Richins that I have

revoked her authority to act as my attorney-in-fact under my May 8, 2013 durable power of

attorney.” However, Eric never told Kouri that he revoked the power of attorney, and Kouri learned

of the Revocation only after Eric’s death.

THE HELOC

46. On March 19, 2019, Kouri took out a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) on the

Family Home. Kouri signed the Revolving Credit Deed of Trust (the “DOT”) using the authority

granted to her by the power of attorney mentioned above. Kouri signed the DOT using the power

10
of attorney because Eric was out of town on a previously planned hunting trip. Eric was aware of

the HELOC prior to Kouri signing the DOT.

47. The DOT was recorded against the Family Home on April 5, 2019.

48. From August 2019-January 2020, HELOC funds were used, in part, to perform

work on a home in Heber City, Utah (the “Heber Home”). Eric knew that HELOC funds were used

on the Heber Home, and Eric, himself, performed work at the Heber Home.

49. The Amended Information states that Eric learned of the HELOC in September

2020. This statement is undermined by the above facts.

KRR PURCHASES THE HOME NEAR MIDWAY

50. Kouri is the owner of K Richins Realty, LLC (“KRR”), a Utah real estate company..

Eric was only a member of KRR for a handful of days in April 2019, at which point he was

removed as a member. Otherwise, Eric has never had any ownership or membership in KRR. See

KRR Organizational Documents, collectively attached as Exhibit 9.

51. In or around February 2022, KRR entered into an agreement to purchase a home

located at 106 North Legacy Way near Midway, Utah (the “Midway Home”). The agreement was

between KRR and the seller, and the Midway Home was conveyed solely to KRR. See Warranty

Deed, attached as Exhibit 10. Kouri did not execute the agreement in her personal capacity, nor

did Eric execute the agreement in any capacity as he was not a member of KRR. In other words,

not only did Eric not need to sign any documents, but he played no role in executing the transaction.

THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES

52. On November 10, 2014, Eric Richins applied for a life insurance policy through

Securian Life Insurance Company. The State alleges that Eric was “unaware” of this policy and

11
Kouri had obtained it out Eric’s knowledge. On November 24, 2014, a medical examination of

Eric was conducted prior to the issuance of the policy. The medical exam is signed by both Eric

and the person administering the exam. Thus, the State’s allegation fails.5

53. On June 13, 2017, a life insurance policy was obtained through CMFG Life

Insurance Company in the amount of $250,000 with an additional accidental death rider. The State

alleges that Eric was “unaware” of this policy and Kouri had taken it out without Eric’s knowledge.

The premium was paid from the joint checking account ending 2204. Thus, the State’s allegation

fails.6

54. On September 28, 2017, Eric Richins applied for a life insurance policy in the

amount of $1,000,000 through Auto-Owners Life Insurance Company. The State alleges that Eric

was “unaware” of this policy and Kouri had taken it out without Eric’s knowledge. On October

20, 2017, a medical examination of Eric was conducted prior to the issuance of the policy. The

medical exam is signed by both Eric and the person administering the exam. Thus, the State’s

allegation fails.7

55. On February 4, 2022, an additional $100,000 policy was offered and accepted in

conjunction with the CMFG Life Insurance Policy obtained in 2017.

56. On January 1, 2022, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy intended to fund

C&E’s buy-sell agreement was changed at approximately 7:21 p.m. Within a matter of minutes,

at approximately 7:27 p.m., the beneficiary was changed back to Eric. See Correspondence with

5
This is the same policy as provided in State’s Binder exhibit 14
6
This is the same policy as provided in State’s Binder exhibit 15
7
This is the same policy as provided in State’s Binder exhibit 12

12
New York Life Insurance Company, attached as Exhibit 11. There is no evidence identifying the

computer from which the login was initiated.

March 3-4, 2022

57. On March 3, 2022, Kouri made Eric a drink, and he consumed around two sips of

the drink at approximately 9:15 p.m. Kouri subsequently laid down in the bed with Eric for around

five minutes. She then went to sleep in one of her children’s rooms—a common occurrence in

their home— because the child was having a nightmare.

58. Eric actively used his cell phone over the course of the next approximately two and

a half hours. Eric was frustrated because he was trying to obtain the horns from an animal that he

had recently shot on a hunting trip in Mexico. A trip, according to witness accounts, that the

outfitter had not been paid for.

59. From approximately 9:13 p.m. through 10:58 p.m., Eric was actively discussing the

situation involving the horns with a friend. At 10:50 p.m., Eric had a phone call with the friend

that lasted approximately eight minutes and thirty seconds. See Eric’s Phone Data, attached as

Exhibit 12.

60. From approximately 11:45 p.m. to 11:56 p.m., Eric was actively using his phone.

He scrolled through Instagram and even searched “how far os [sic] it from scottsdale to nogales,”

presumably based on his conversation with the friend regarding retrieving the animal horns from

Mexico. See Eric’s Phone Data, attached as Exhibit 13.

61. Kouri woke up in her child’s room around 3:00 a.m. When she returned to her and

Eric’s room, she discovered that Eric was cold and not breathing, and she called 911. The

13
dispatcher directed Kouri to perform CPR. Kouri had never performed CPR, nor had she ever had

any CPR training.

62. Based on the dispatcher’s request, Kouri pulled Eric off the bed. Kouri then began

performing CPR on Eric based on the instructions given to her by the dispatcher. This was the first

time Kouri had ever performed CPR. Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter.

EVENTS FOLLOWING ERIC’S DEATH

63. On March 4, 2022, when Eric’s sister, Katie Richins-Benson arrived at the family

home, she immediately told investigators that she was Eric’s power of attorney. Within a matter

of hours after Eric passed away, Katie also contacted Eric’s estate planning attorney regarding

taking over and addressing Eric’s finances. The estate planning attorney explained that it was very

early for Katie to be addressing Eric’s finances.

64. On March 5, 2022, Kouri was contacted by a long-time friend of Eric’s who asked

if he could come by the Family Home, not the Midway house, to offer his condolences. Several

close friends and family members were also at the house or stopped by at various points during

the evening. The gathering was not previously planned but resulted from individuals stopping by

to offer condolences. Much of the gathering was spent playing games with Kouri and Eric’s

children to take their mind off the events of the previous day. The State and the State’s witnesses,

specifically Amy Richins and Katie Richins-Benson, have advanced the narrative that Kouri was

celebrating the day following Eric’s death. Such statements are contradicted by the account of

others who were present.

65. Instead, witnesses recall overhearing Amy discussing “wanting Dad’s truck” with

Eric and Kouri’s children. Amy stayed the night at the Richins Family Home.

14
 66. On March 6, 2022, Kouri attempted to access a safe that she and Eric had previously

purchased using their joint Cabela’s credit card, which was connected to the 2204 Account. The

safe contained Kouri’ personal information and documentation, including her social security card,

birth certificate, and passport, among other things. It also contained documentation for Eric that

she believed would be necessary to review and have accessible.

67. Upon using the original safe code, she realized the code had been changed.

Recognizing that she would need the information contained therein, she contacted a local

locksmith to open the safe. The locksmith arrived and began to work on the safe, but ultimately

did not open it. Amy was still present and became enraged ordering the locksmith out of the garage.

Amy immediately called Katie, then told Kouri, she “could not do anything with the property in

her house or anything with her house because it was no longer Kouri’s house,” claiming that the

house belonged to Katie and the Trust. The police were called. Witness accounts indicate that Amy

escalated the situation and was never hit by Kouri. However, Kouri did push Amy and ultimately

took responsibility for that conduct.

68. Although the locksmith ultimately left without opening the safe, Kouri was able to

locate the new code and open it accordingly. The safe contained approximately $10,000 in cash.

As of the date of Kouri’s incarceration, the $10,000 in cash remained in the safe.

69. Approximately one week later, Cody sent a C&E employee to seize all of Eric’s

work electronics. Around that same time, Cody sent another C&E employee to take and remove

Eric’s work truck. As a result of Cody directing C&E employees to take Eric’s work electronics

and truck, the electronics were not identified or located by law enforcement for months after Eric’s

15
death. It is also unclear whether law enforcement ever searched Eric’s work truck. Eric’s

electronics were not turned over to law enforcement for some time.

THE SEARCH WARRANTS

70. Law enforcement executed search warrants on the Family Home and Kouri’s

personal electronics on April 13, 2022, and May 8, 2023.

71. Law enforcement located no fentanyl in the Family Home.

INCONSISTENCIES IN THE INFORMATION(S)

72. The State filed the original Information on May 8, 2023. That Information contains

the following allegations:

a. Kouri contacted via text message C.L. between December 2021 and February 2022

to obtain prescription pills for an investor. Within a few days, C.L. procured

hydrocodone pills from a dealer and was directed to leave the pills at house in

Midway, Utah that Kouri owned and was flipping.

b. Approximately two weeks later, Kouri contacted C.L. stating that the investor

wanted something stronger, specifically “some of the Michael Jackson stuff.” C.L.

procured fentanyl pills, and Kouri collected the pills from C.L.’s home thereafter.

Kouri paid C.L. $900 for the pills.

c. Around two weeks after February 14, 2022, Kouri contacted C.L. again for another

$900’s worth of fentanyl pills. C.L. obtained the pills, and Kouri directed C.L. to

leave the pills at the outdoor fire pit of the Midway house where cash was waiting

for her. Approximately one week later, Eric died from a fentanyl overdose.

16
 73. The State filed the First Amended Information on May 18, 2023. The First

Amended Information is rife with inconsistencies as compared to the original Information, as set

forth below:

a. C.L. now believes that Kouri contacted her in early 2022 (not late 2021).

b. Despite originally stating that Kouri contacted C.L. via text message, C.L. now

states that she cannot remember whether the contact was a phone call or text

message.

c. While C.L. originally stated that Kouri contacted her for prescription pills, she now

states that Kouri contacted her specifically for fentanyl.

d. While C.L. originally stated that, in the first alleged transaction, Kouri asked C.L.

to deliver the pills to a house Kouri was flipping, C.L. now claims Kouri obtained

the pills in a hand-to-hand transaction at C.L.’s home.

e. C.L. now states that Kouri did not just request stronger pills, but specifically,

stronger fentanyl pills.

f. While C.L. originally stated that there were three alleged pill transactions with

Kouri that all took place prior to Eric’s death, now C.L. states that there were only

two transactions with one taking place after Eric’s death.

i. The First Amended Information is confusing, and the controlled substances

charges appear conflicting. Charge 2 alleges that Kouri knowingly and

intentionally possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute in or

about January 2022. Charge 3 alleges that Kouri knowingly and

intentionally possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute on

17
 February 11, 2022. However, the core of the Amended Information never

alleges that Kouri received any illicit substance in January 2022. Instead, it

alleges that she acquired fentanyl for the first time on February 11 or

February 12, 2022. Thus, for purposes of this Motion, the State has provided

zero evidence supporting Charge 2.

g. While C.L. originally stated that she received $900 for the fentanyl pills, C.L. now

states that she received $1,300 for the fentanyl pills.

h. While C.L. originally stated that cash was left for her at the Midway house fire pit,

C.L. now states that she was given a $1,300 check.

i. While C.L. originally stated that she left fentanyl pills at the Midway house fire pit

a week prior to Eric’s death, she now states that she left the pills there three weeks

later, on either March 9, 2022, or March 10, 2022, and that the house was vacant

and in the process of being sold by Kouri. However, Wasatch County records

demonstrate that Kouri, through her business, sold the Midway house

approximately one and a half months earlier, on January 26, 2022.

74. Such inconsistencies cast serious doubt on the credibility and reliability of the

testimony provided by C.L.

75. In addition, the First Amended Information states that Eric’s safe—the safe that

was purchased on a joint credit card using funds from a joint checking account—contained

between $125,000 and $165,000 in cash. However, in Richins v. Richins-Benson, Case No.

220500076, Katie submitted two separate declarations—both under penalty of perjury—that Eric

18
told her that the safe contained approximately $200,000 in cash. Case No. 220500076, Dkt Nos.

288 (at ¶ 11) and 355 (at ¶ 13).

LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENTS TO C.L.

76. C.L. was interrogated and questioned by law enforcement on several occasions. It

appears that the first time C.L. was questioned, the interrogation was not recorded by law

enforcement. If such interrogation was recorded, counsel for Kouri has not been provided with that

recording.

77. In the first recorded interrogation with C.L., law enforcement explained to C.L. that

absent her cooperation in their investigation, she would be facing very serious criminal charges

resulting in significant jail time.

78. C.L. is currently on probation pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement in two-

separate cases wherein she plead to four (4) first-degree felony charges, one third-degree felony

and several misdemeanor charges. A search warrant executed at the time of her arrest revealed that

C.L. had a firearm in her bedroom.

79. Specifically, law enforcement demanded that C.L. give good enough details “that

will ensure that [Kouri] gets convicted of murder.” Further, law enforcement explained to C.L.

that her life was “screwed at this point for a minute or for a few years if there’s not cooperation.”

Law enforcement told C.L. that if she gave them what they wanted, it would constitute her “get

out of jail free card.” In addition, after interrogating C.L. for more than hour, law enforcement told

her that they “need[ed] a stronger witness” because the purported details that she had given them

so far were not good enough to be “present[ed] to a court.”

19
 80. After such statements—and other similar statements—C.L.’s testimony evolved to

conform with law enforcement’s theory of this case.

81. C.L. was released from jail thereafter.

82. C.L. had, from time to time over the years, provided housekeeping services for

Kouri and was paid by check for doing so.

ARGUMENT

I. Kouri is Eligible for Bail Because There is No Substantial Evidence to Support the
Charges.

Utah Code Section 77-20-2018 (the “Bail Statute”) states in relevant part that:

An individual charged with, or arrested for, a criminal offense shall be admitted to

bail as a matter of right, except if the individual is charged with:

(a) a capital felony when there is substantial evidence to support the

charge;

[...]

(c) a felony when there is substantial evidence to support the charge and
the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

(i) the individual would constitute a substantial danger to any

other individual or to the community after considering
available conditions of release that the court may impose if
the individual is released on bail; or

(ii) the individual is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if

the individual is released on bail . . . .

The Bail Statute further provides that “any arrest or charge for . . . aggravated murder, is a capital

felony unless: (a) the prosecuting attorney files a notice of intent to not seek the death penalty; or

8
The Utah Constitution mirrors this language. See Utah Const. art. I, § 8.

20
(b) the time for filing a notice to seek the death penalty has expired and the prosecuting attorney

has not filed a notice to seek the death penalty.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-201(3).

The Utah Supreme Court has articulated that “substantial evidence exists when the

evidence presented provides a reasonable basis for a guilty jury verdict.” Randolph v. State, 2022

UT 34, ¶ 73, 515 P.3d 444. “The substantial evidence standard is met when the prosecution

presents evidence capable of supporting a jury finding that the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. In addition, given that “the purpose of the probable cause standard is to

ferret out groundless and improvident prosecutions, the purpose of the substantial evidence

standard is to ensure that the quantum of evidence presented by the State sufficiently justifies the

denial of the defendant’s right to freedom from pretrial incarceration.” Id. at ¶ 74 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). In analyzing whether the State has met the substantial evidence

standard

a district court may make a series of credibility assessments. It may observe and
assess witness demeanor and appearance. And unlike a magistrate making a
bindover determination, a district court making a bail determination does not view
the evidence in a light most favorable to any party—instead, it may evaluate the
strength of the evidence presented by both sides in an effort to determine if the
State's evidence, “notwithstanding contradiction . . . by defense proof, . . .
furnish[es] a reasonable basis for a [conviction].” In other words, when evaluating
whether bail should be denied, the district court may weigh conflicting pieces of
evidence and ultimately decide that, in light of the conflict, there is not a basis on
which a reasonable jury could reach a guilty verdict.

Id. at ¶ 74 (citation omitted).

A. The State Lacks Substantial Evidence to Support the Charges.

Here, the State has filed no notice of intent to not seek the death penalty, nor has the time

for filing a notice to seek the death penalty expired. Thus, the first charge against Kouri constitutes

a capital felony, and the State must demonstrate substantial evidence to support the charge. The

21
State has failed to do so. Law enforcement never identified or seized any fentanyl or other illicit

drugs from the Family Home. Rather, the State relies heavily on the testimony of C.L.—a known

criminal with a long list of drug-related charges who, absent providing convenient testimony to

law enforcement, would be facing a multi-year prison sentence. Not only does the ever-changing

nature of C.L.’s story undermine her credibility, but she also had every incentive to provide law

enforcement with a narrative necessary to satisfy their requests and earn her “get out of jail free

card.” Moreover, C.L. does not testify that Kouri allegedly procured fentanyl with the intent to

give it to Eric. Indeed, the State lacks any credible and admissible evidence on this critical issue.

The State has provided no evidence that there was fentanyl found in the home. Nor have

they provided any evidence that Kouri gave Eric the fentanyl at issue. The State has alluded to a

cocktail that was prepared by Kouri in an attempt to insinuate this is the only way he could have

consumed the lethal dose. However, no glass was ever tested even though law enforcement and

EMS were told upon arrival that she had mixed him a drink. The State and law enforcement never

investigated an alternative theory that perhaps Eric’s alcohol and drug use had escalated. Instead,

the Eric’s family has pushed the narrative from the day following Eric’s death that the only

plausible explanation was that Kouri had “poisoned” him. Law enforcement simply accepted that

narrative and worked backward in an effort to support it, spending approximately 14 months

investigating, finding no evidence, according to what has been provided to the defense, to support

their theory until C.L.

In addition, the financial allegations in the First Amended Information are speculative at

best. The State has no evidence to establish that Kouri allegedly killed Eric for pecuniary gain.

Specifically, contrary to the State’s allegations, Kouri owed Eric no money; it is unclear how the

22
State calculated Kouri’ alleged outstanding state and federal tax liability (it is inaccurate); and

while Kouri owed money to a hard money lender, she was current on those obligations and not in

default.9 Thus, the financial allegations do not establish substantial evidence to support the

aggravated murder charge. Furthermore, each of the facts set forth in the Factual Background

section above undermine the State’s claim of substantial evidence supporting the aggravated

murder charge.

The same is true for the drug-related charges. As for Charge 2, the First Amended

Information is devoid of any allegations or purported supporting facts that, in January 2022, Kouri

obtained an illicit substance with the intent to distribute the same. And with respect to Charges 3

and 4, the State lacks substantial evidence to support these charges for the reasons identified above.

Namely, law enforcement has never located fentanyl or any other illicit substance at the Family

Home, on Kouri’ person, or otherwise. Instead, the State relies almost exclusively on the testimony

of C.L.—a witness lacking all reliability or credibility and with every incentive to fabricate

testimony to ensure her own freedom. For these reasons, and the reasons identified in the Factual

Background section above, the State has failed to demonstrate substantial evidence to support the

charges in the First Amended Information.

B. The State Cannot Demonstrate that Kouri is a Substantial Danger to the

Community or a Flight Risk by Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Whether there is clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is a substantial danger or

likely to flee if released on bail is a mixed question of law and fact. Randolph 2022 UT 34 ¶ 45.

9
Simply stating the amount owed under a loan does not demonstrate financial strain. Otherwise, the State could
simply highlight the fact that an individual has a mortgage—even if the individual is current on the mortgage—to try
and show financial distress.

23
The clear and convincing standard “implies something more than the . . . preponderance, or greater

weight, of the evidence; and something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Essential

Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, 2011 UT 71, ¶ 24, 270 P.3d 430 (citation omitted). It “demands the

introduction of evidence that makes ‘the existence of the disputed facts . . . very highly probable.’”

State ex rel. K.T., 2017 UT 44, ¶ 9 n.3, 424 P.3d 91 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Even if the State could prove that there is substantial evidence to support the pending

charges (it cannot), with respect to Charges 2-4, it cannot demonstrate that Kouri is a substantial

danger to any other individual or that she is likely to flee the jurisdiction.10

First, the facts and circumstances in this case, up to this point, overwhelmingly demonstrate

that Kouri is not a substantial danger. Kouri has been actively engaged with the community well

before and after Eric’s passing. She has participated in a local church group, assisted as a boy

scout’s leader in a local scout troop, participated in events are her children’s school, and attended

myriad local sporting events. In other words, at all relevant times, Kouri has actively contributed

to society, and she is not a substantial danger to any other individual. Most importantly, this case

was investigated for over 18 months. Kouri knew there was an investigation on-going, she retained

counsel, counsel attempted with no-avail, due to the actions of the State, to cooperate in the

investigation, she raised her kids, maintained her business and mourned the loss of her husband.

This mere fact alone, undermines any claim the State can make with regard to either being a danger

to society or being a flight risk.

10
As noted above, the Bail Statute draws a distinction between capital felonies and other felonies. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-20-201(1)(a), (c). Thus, while relevant, the clear and convincing evidence inquiry is dispositive of
Charges 2-4, but not Charge 1.

24
 Second, Kouri is not a flight risk. As stated above, she has resided in the State of Utah for

more than twenty years, her children live in Utah, much of her family lives in Utah, her business

is located in Utah, and most of her closest friends reside in Utah. Moreover, law enforcement

executed its first search warrant in this case more than a year prior to Kouri’ incarceration. Despite

this clear indication that law enforcement was investigating Kouri, she continued to reside in Utah.

Simply put, Kouri is not a flight risk.

Accordingly, the State cannot show substantial evidence supporting the charges of the First

Amended Information, nor can it demonstrate that Kouri is a substantial danger or a flight risk.

Consequently, the Court should permit Kouri to post bail, and she should be released with pretrial

conditions set by the Court.

II. The Court Should Release Kouri and Designate a Set of Conditions to Be Imposed
Upon Her Release While She Awaits Trial or Other Resolution of The Pending
Charges.

Utah Code Section 77-20-205 allows the Court to release a defendant on her “own

recognizance during the time the individual awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges.” It

further permits the Court to designate “a condition or combination of conditions, to be imposed

upon the individual’s release during the time the individual awaits trial or other resolution of the

criminal charges.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205(2)(a)(i)-(ii). In making a determination under

Subsection (2)(a), the magistrate or judge may not give any deference to a magistrate’s decision

in a temporary pretrial status order.

Moreover, in making a determination regarding a defendant’s pretrial release, the Court

must only impose conditions that are “reasonably available and necessary to reasonably ensure:”

(a) the individual’s appearance in court when required;

25
 (b) the safety of any witnesses or victims of the offense allegedly committed by
the individual;
(c) the safety and welfare of the public; and
(d) that the individual will not obstruct, or attempt to obstruct, the criminal
justice process.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205(3)(a)-(d). In light of the fact that Kouri has been living in the

community without issue since before and after Eric’s passing, the absence of other criminal

allegations or record11, and Kouri’ clear compliance and cooperation throughout the pre-file

investigation, the Court should order Kouri’ pretrial release with conditions such that the Court

could ensure that Kouri would still appear in Court, would not pose a danger to any other

individual, and would not take any action to obstruct the criminal justice process.

The Court has several combinations of conditions that it can impose to ensure these

objectives. Namely, it could impose conditions requiring Kouri to:

(a) not commit a federal, state, or local offense during the period of pretrial
release;
(b) avoid contact with a victim of the alleged offense;
(c) avoid contact with a witness who:
(i) may testify concerning the alleged offense; and
(ii) is named in the pretrial status order;
(d) not consume alcohol or any narcotic drug or other controlled substance
unless prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner;
(e) submit to drug or alcohol testing;
(f) complete a substance abuse evaluation and comply with any recommended
treatment or release program;
(g) submit to electronic monitoring or location device tracking;
(h) participate in inpatient or outpatient medical, behavioral, psychological, or
psychiatric treatment;
(i) maintain employment or actively seek employment if unemployed;
(j) maintain or commence an education program;
(k) comply with limitations on where the individual is allowed to be located or
the times that the individual shall be, or may not be, at a specified location;

11
As noted in the First Amended Information, Kouri was charged as a result of an altercation with Amy days after
Eric’s passing. Specifically, that altercation resulted from Amy refusing to leave the Family Home and threatening
to kick Kouri out of the Family Home a mere two-three days after Eric died.

26
 (l) comply with specified restrictions on personal associations, place of
residence, or travel;
(m) report to a law enforcement agency, pretrial services program, or other
designated agency at a specified frequency or on specified dates;
(n) comply with a specified curfew;
(o) forfeit or refrain from possession of a firearm or other dangerous weapon;
(p) if the individual is charged with an offense against a child, limit or prohibit
access to any location or occupation where children are located, including
any residence where children are on the premises, activities where children
are involved, locations where children congregate, or where a reasonable
person would know that children congregate;
(q) comply with requirements for house arrest;
(r) return to custody for a specified period of time following release for
employment, schooling, or other limited purposes;
(s) remain in custody of one or more designated individuals who agree to:
(i) supervise and report on the behavior and activities of the individual; and
(ii) encourage compliance with all court orders and attendance at all required
court proceedings;
(t) comply with a financial condition; or
(u) comply with any other condition that is reasonably available and necessary
to ensure compliance with Subsection (3).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205(5)(a)-(u). In other words, in light of the circumstances, the Court has

the capability of imposing multiple pretrial conditions that would ensure that Kouri continues to

comply. The Court can fashion a set of pretrial conditions including any of the foregoing

enumerated factor to impose upon Kouri, and Kouri would unwaveringly comply. At the heart of

the above conditions is the goal to maintain the safety of the community and the integrity of the

judicial process. Kouri has demonstrated that neither of these objectives will be threatened.

Furthermore, in making a decision regarding pretrial release, the Court may consider

several items, including:

(i) the indictment or information;

(ii) any sworn or probable cause statement or other information provided by
law enforcement;
(iii) a pretrial risk assessment;
(iv) an affidavit of indigency described in Section 78B-22-201.5;
(v) witness statements or testimony; or

27
 (vi) any other reliable record or source, including proffered evidence;

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-205(7). The Court has wide discretion to consider several factors in

assessing pretrial release. The Court should consider Kouri’ pretrial release and impose conditions

for such release in light of the issues raised above and in the Factual Background section. On these

grounds alone, the Court should set conditions on Kouri for her release. The Court may also

consider the following:

(i) the nature and circumstances of the offense, or offenses, that the individual
was arrested for, or charged with, including:
(A) whether the offense is a violent offense; and
(B) the vulnerability of a witness or alleged victim;
(ii) the nature and circumstances of the individual, including the individual's:
(A) character;
(B) physical and mental health;
(C) family and community ties;
(D) employment status or history;
(E) financial resources;
(F) past criminal conduct;
(G) history of drug or alcohol abuse; and
(H) history of timely appearances at required court proceedings;
(iii) the potential danger to another individual, or individuals, posed by the
release of the individual;
(iv) whether the individual was on probation, parole, or release pending an
upcoming court proceeding at the time the individual allegedly committed
the offense or offenses;
(v) the availability of:
(A) other individuals who agree to assist the individual in
attending court when required; or
(B) supervision of the individual in the individual’s
community;
(vi) the eligibility and willingness of the individual to participate in various
treatment programs, including drug treatment; or
(vii) other evidence relevant to the individual's likelihood of fleeing or violating
the law if released.

See id. Consideration of the foregoing factors demonstrates that Kouri will easily be manageable

and support granting her pretrial release.

28
 Finally, Kouri is not a potential danger to any individuals or to the community, she was not

on probation or parole during the time of the alleged conduct, and there is no indication that she

would flee the jurisdiction. The overwhelming weight of the evidence currently before the Court

suggests that Kouri would comply fully with any and all conditions set for her release.

Accordingly, the Court should release Kouri and designate a set of conditions to be imposed while

she awaits trial or further resolution of the charges.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Kouri respectfully requests that her motion be granted.

DATED this 9th day of June, 2023.

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

/s/ Skye E. Lazaro

Skye E. Lazaro
Attorney for Defendant

29
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 9th day of June, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing

MOTION TO SET CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE with the Clerk of the Court using the Utah

ECF system, which sent notice of electronic filing to the District Attorney’s Office via the court’s

electronic filing system.

/s/ Lisa Bonnell

1638118

30
EXHIBITS FILED
UNDERSEAL